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**INTRODUCTION TO
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY**

INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

MIND IN SOCIETY

BY

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PREFACE

In this jointly written study we have endeavored to bring together data and standpoints, both of psychology and sociology, for the purpose of analyzing collective behavior.

The early phase of social psychology represented by sociologists employed largely materials and methods which modern psychology has outgrown. And the social psychology of the present day has not adequately taken into account the recent advances in sociology and cultural anthropology.

The scope of social psychology seems to be in need both of definition and expansion. In our view, its task lies not only in explaining what is generally regarded as a social fact, such as crowd emotion or group solidarity, but also in tracing from its beginnings the influence of the group on the content and pattern of the individual's mind and behavior.

An attempt has been made here to reveal the mechanism through which the group shapes the course of mental life. The psychoses arising in the social environment do not differ in quality from individual psychoses. Both of these, in our opinion, can be represented as correlatives of the stimulus-response scheme. Physical objects and situations demand similar behavior on the part of a number of individuals who have to adjust themselves also to one another's movements. There is, therefore, a dual process of motor adjustment, one to the physical world, and the other to the behavior, actual or potential, of fellow-beings. Group phenomena arise in the course of this latter process of adjustment. Social mentality is the outcome of the translation into psychic states of the stimulus and the responses in this process. It is but lately that the difference between the overt and incipient

modes of behavior has come to be adequately appreciated. We have tried to show the important rôle that incipient responses play in the different orders of group life:

The group, then, is but an episode in the process of adaptation of the individual to the physical world. Activity, rather than reason or sympathy, constitutes the basis of groups. Social life offers man a sure guidance to the fulfillment of the complex needs that he develops, as also to the main purpose of his adaptation to the region which constitutes his immediate environment. When this guidance fails, new groups arise as forms of new adjustment.

The rich texture of social life, therefore, represents a mutual adaptation of the motor dispositions and the forces of the region which has molded a variety of minds into a uniformity, conscious or unconscious. There is a diversity of social schemes and traditions which modify man's innate tendencies and select his mental patterns and modes of behavior, so that he may find his life easier and smoother in his particular region. It is the reciprocal interaction of a people's mental constitution and their social legacy which leads to divergences of cultural types in social development. Myths and legends, faiths and fashions, arise when man's outer surroundings fail to satisfy his inner needs; they release the tension of unfulfilled impulses in the form of ideal objects and situations which fashion a cultural world out of the physical and the biological.

Institutions and traditions remain stable as long as some individuals maintain a harmonious grouping of certain drives and emotions. The rise of a new institution accompanies a new balance of human needs. Conversely, social disruption implies a dissociation of group interests. Groups clash or coalesce when the basic impulses inhibit, or blend with, one another. Both nature and culture help in the weaving of impulses into harmonious designs. But man's emotions and interests constantly seek new combinations and, there-

fore, new objects. Thus his task of group adaptation is ever renewed.

Throughout our analysis, we have persistently endeavored to apply the more generally accepted principles of attention, emotion, and action to the explanation of all complex forms of group behavior. We have not relied upon such traditional concepts as gregariousness or suggestibility. No single psychological category, indeed, has been employed as the master-key to the explanation of the social process: each set of facts is explained in the light of widely accepted psychological principles revealed by analysis. Although we have not followed the premises and conclusions of the Psycho-Analytic School, we have assumed a relation, similar to theirs, between the mental states and behavior. Social and political maladjustments, the phases of conflict in the modern industrial world, the tendencies to the formation of new social groupings, as also the usual materials of social psychology such as traditions and culture, the relations of groups and their values, and the diverse phenomena of crowd life, are some of the subjects which have been treated in the light of the foregoing facts and principles. The subject is new and complex, and its field as yet undetermined. Thus our discussion has touched only the most essential issues. We trust, however, that the methods of our analysis will go some way toward establishing group psychology as a branch of scientific psychology, and as a surer basis of sociological theory.

RADHAKAMAL MUKERJEE
NARENDRA NATH SEN-GUPTA

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INTRODUCTION

Something in our present task reminds us vividly of that too little known but remarkable essay, "The Great Analysis." "What is wrong with the world," writes the anonymous author, "is its vastness. That is what hinders us from reducing the chaos of human affairs to a rational order. In relation to the solar system the earth is small; in relation to the universe, infinitesimal; but in relation to the mind of man, it is bewilderingly huge and complicated. No human intellect has hitherto been able to conceive in any detail a rational world-order, for no human intellect has had the power of grasping a thousandth part of the factors in the problem. There have been Utopias in plenty, both in literature and in political experiment; but a Utopia is precisely a world-order in which the data of the problem are ignored."*

Precisely! The social psychology of our times is a system constructed with inadequate data. It tends rather to be utopian than matter of fact and trustworthy; one may not accept it as adequate scientific basis for human engineering. These generalizations are suggested less by *Mind in Society* than by numerous other contributions which we have read.

Social psychology as an aspect of biology has received surprisingly little attention. In the philosophical systems of the ages there abound speculative and imaginative constructions, together with not a few attempts to gather the facts of human experience into a systematic whole—a description of society, culture, civilization, or of special institutions, types of social group and relationship. In this

*"The Great Analysis," anonymously published by Charles Scribner's Sons, 1912, is out of print; but we are informed that it has been reprinted in *College and the Future*, edited by Richard Rice, Jr.

impressive accumulation of human documents, we discover much evidence of man's ingenuity, curiosity, industry, reflectiveness, and discontent with life as he finds it, but strangely little indication of effort to formulate problems definitely or to devise and develop methods of securing accurate and trustworthy information. The curiosity has expressed itself diffusely, more often in wonderment than in sustained and well-considered observation under definitely controllable and describable conditions. Where well-established and increasingly precise knowledge might be expected, we discover instead inadequately founded generalizations, vague and inexact statements of fact.

Why, then, has social psychology continued to be so largely a matter of talk while certain other and perhaps even less important aspects of vital relations have been rigorously, intensively, and persistently studied with all the methodological resources of modern experimental science? Often the suggestion has been made that it is because the social mind and its expressions are even less readily observed and subjected to precise measurement than are those of the individual. In this we cannot agree. Instead it seems to us clear that group consciousness and behavior are at once as readily and as reliably observable and describable, controllable and experimentally modifiable, as are similar phenomena in the life of the isolated individual. Hence we believe firmly in the possibility of an experimentally developed social psychology and sociology, and we confidently predict their growth during the current century.

Mind in Society interests us as a general and systematic preparation for more intensive observational work. It exhibits most effectively the characteristics of aforesaid as well as of current social psychology, and although problems are not definitely formulated with intent to stimulate the curious to seek their solution, the general effect of the exposition is intensification of one's curiosity.

We do not always agree with the authors' point of view, interpretation, and surmises, but we acknowledge to them a vigorous push forward. Indeed, they have caused us to long for opportunity to analyze the social situation, to measure different forms and aspects of social stimuli, to experimentally manipulate the social environment for specific purposes, and thereupon to attempt to describe peculiarly interesting forms of social experience and expression. All of which eventually should lead to the discovery of principles of laws of biological and psycho-biological aggregation. Therefore, with all our accumulated dissatisfaction in the present status of social psychology, and with our hope that even such an excellent work as our authors have prepared may soon be out of date, we most heartily commend its reading to those who are genuinely interested in the historical background, the status, and the problems and prospects of social psychology.

ROBERT M. YERKES

PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

MIND IN SOCIETY

CHAPTER I

ANTICIPATIONS OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

Development of Human Group Life.—The statement that man is a social being has passed into a truism. It has been accepted as an obvious fact, without any serious effort being made to probe into its real significance and exact limitations. Modern progress in the sciences that concern life, mind, and society, however, makes a direct approach to man's social nature easy and fruitful. The study of the natural history of animals, long before the appearance of evolutionary thought, served to draw attention to the marvels of social organization among many subhuman forms of life. Beehives and ant colonies continue to be cited as examples of solidarity far excelling that of the human community. Naturalists like Reaumur and Fabre, philosophers like Schelling and Von Hartmann, and students of animal psychology like Romanes and Lloyd Morgan, have delineated the processes underlying group life and evolution in the simpler and inchoate phases. Group life now has ceased to be considered as a product of man's rationality, or mutual sympathy. Its roots are sought in the biologic needs of man. Biology has portrayed man as belonging to an order whose development took the direction of increased sociality and mental power. The affinities between man and the social apes have been carefully described, and the factors in man's emergence made vivid by anthropologists. Emphasis has been laid upon man's physical weakness as compared with the wild beasts which surrounded him, his cleverness, his capacity for

collective enterprise, and the effects of the prolonged helplessness of the human infant on the development of his gentleness. All these qualities have made it easy and necessary for man to live in communities. Sociability has been an aid not merely in the struggle for life, but also in the development of freer and fuller life. Moreover, the social life allowed racial gains to be registered outside the organism. Whether acquired bodily modifications can be transmitted or not may remain an open question in the field of biology. But it is agreed on all hands that cultural gains, the cumulative acquisitions of the group, are transmitted with ease, and thus variations are more obvious and cataclysmic in character on the social than on the biologic plane. Cultural works, therefore, become at once the means and measure of man's success in the struggle for existence. And the community from which culture evolves becomes an inevitable fact and a challenging problem for man.

Earlier Sociological Studies.—The science of sociology followed in the wake of the evolutionary movement, and made the study of the human group and its culture its special field. The older ethics of individualism was slowly weakened by the impact of several currents of thought, when the Darwinian idea of evolution came into the field. The social ideals of the nineteenth century stimulated many efforts to understand social life from the standpoints of philosophy, history, economics, and natural science. Of these the economic approach was most productive of social thinking. This was due largely to the insistent economic stress and progressive increase in the complexity of economic organization—the sequel of the Industrial Revolution. The socio-economic institutions underwent rapid transformation on account of the phenomenal progress made in the mechanical sciences and industrial arts. The new industrial system caused a wide disparity of wealth and opportunity among the different social classes, and this facilitated

interest in the study of social groups, chiefly from the economic side. The development of means of communication and expansion of inter-racial intercourse have brought to the notice of mankind the widespread character of mechanical and industrial changes. The birth of new social movements, the change in social alignments, and the shifting of political power in society under economic stress, began to make their influence felt not only in institutional life but also in the inner life of man, in his sympathies and sentiments.

Among the thinkers who early emphasized an inductive study of the social process were the anthropologists who dealt largely with primitive society and the problem of social origins. Forms of marriage, kinship and social organization, property and religion were studied and their beginnings traced by historical inquiries and inductive observations. There was also another group of thinkers who tried to delineate the play of dialectic and causality in the course of history. All these schools brought communities and classes, clans and tribes, into sharp relief. Language, religion, art, domestic and economic organization came to be comprehended within an evolutionary treatment; and from these intensive studies emerged the discovery, not merely of certain stages and phases of development through which man passes, but also of stages and norms of different orders of group life.

Determinants of Group Life.—The growing interest in social anthropology has accompanied a more intelligent understanding of human institutions and experiences and hence bred a more liberal outlook. Every social scheme carries with it a story of evolution and relics of the long past. And, however strange or peculiar its nature may be, every institution is at once the tool and the result of mental and bodily adaptation of the organism to the physical and the human environment. Thus there is a *raison d'être*, that can be understood only through patient study, for each

institution; such determinants of group life can be discovered only through research and careful observation. So working, the anthropologist has found the approach to the basic nature of group life. Meanwhile, biology has come into close contact with psychology and has shown us the fundamental modes of responses, instincts, emotions, and interests with respect to which men resemble one another, thereby setting us on the way to a clearer understanding of the psychological factors that bring men together and form them into large or small associations.

Necessity of Existing Group Life.—An analysis of group life in its various levels would reveal not only the inner mechanisms but also the relations of these to the progress of life and mind. Most living organisms, plants or animals, flourish in a group form of existence. That it is necessary for them to live and grow in association is proved by the facts: (1) that living organisms with vast morphological differences and existing in different geographical surroundings do live in groups; (2) that many of them decay when isolated; (3) further, wherever we find purposive movements, we discover that isolated organisms exert themselves in many cases to form groups; (4) lastly, in man, group life generally exercises a vivifying influence.

Examples of Group Life.—We are familiar with plant colonies. At first these are mere aggregates, but sometimes move as one being. For example, species of social plants which are highly successful in a given environment expand by *ecesis* or migration. There are, again, the societies of ants, bees, and wasps, characterized by division of labor and a harmonious organization. Other forms of group life are seen in the herds and societies of the gregarious animals. We see here the beginnings of leadership and obedience which ultimately expand into the traditions of social control; of the social use of the voice, with or without gesture, which develops into speech; of suggestion, imitation, and tenderness which develop into the social sentiments and

serve as enduring psychic bonds; of collective labor in food-seeking and species knowledge of materials and nesting, etc., which develop into the economic tradition; of the building of dams, roads, stores, etc., which expand into external legacies and traditions. All these foreshadow stability and progress of groups among the human animals.

Group Life Best Studied in Man.—But, though group life is to be found in all orders of living creatures, its nature can be studied best in human groups. For here we meet with a much larger variety of organizations, the comparative study of which more easily brings to our notice the basic factors of group existence. Secondly, the formation of voluntary associations of various types and complexity can be observed fully only in the case of man. By such observation we may discover the inner needs that impel man to seek association with his kind, as well as the influence of those needs upon life in general. Thirdly, we are in a position to study the intensifying and other modifying effects of group life upon diverse mental processes, and thus deduce the biological and psychological significance of the group itself. Such vivifying effects are borne out amply, not only by our daily observations, but also by experiments such as those of Mayer, Schmidt, Triplett, and Allport. When work is conducted socially and not in isolation, there is increased output, diminished time, and improved quality of work. Sen-Gupta and Sinha experimented with a view to ascertaining the increase in output among subjects at a level of practiced efficiency with fluctuations reduced to 2 per cent. When grouped, the same individuals showed an increase in the output of from 14 to 23 per cent.¹

¹Sen-Gupta and Sinha, "Mental Work in Isolation and in Group," *Indian Journal of Psychology*, Vol. 1., No. 2. See also Allport, "Behavior and Experiment in Social Psychology," *Journal of Abnormal Psychology*, 1919, pp. 297-305; and "The Influence of Group upon Association and Thought," *Journal of Experimental Psychology*, 1920, pp. 159-82.

The rôle played by the social environment in molding the dispositions of the young is studied best also from the behavior of the human child. Equally important is the study of psychic disorders arising out of isolation and segregation of individuals from the group, and this can be observed in man only. All these are advantages from the point of view of scientific approach as well as from that of materials and results. Yet the rich variety of human groups cannot properly be appraised except in the context of their simpler antecedents in sub-human life. While in the latter we can discern more clearly the basic factors which lead to aggregation, in human communities we discover the causes which lead to the formation of one group from another; that is, the conditions of variation in group life. And of all the factors promoting the development of collective life, we here find most significant the rôle of the psychic processes.

Formation of the Human Group.—Group life is both an aid and an index to human progress. A group is created in the process of man's continuous adjustment to his physical and social environment. The physical environment leaves its impress on man's occupations and social organization, his religion and his diversions, whether it be to stimulate or to inhibit further integration. But every group is the offspring of a previous one: children are born into the ways of their fathers. Traditions mold man's dealings with regions and with other social groups. Like individuals, groups also meet in friendly or inimical intercourse, and the alliances and conflicts of peoples have played no small part in social formation and development. But, in all this, man is impelled by certain inner drives, the peculiarities of his physical and mental constitution. Representing a common organic equipment, these tend to induce a certain uniformity in the group behavior. It is when all these factors, objective and subjective, function together and respond in common that groups stabilize themselves.

In the following chapters, we shall be concerned principally with the rôle of the mental processes in collective life. As a human phenomenon, group life carries a variety of meanings for man. There are, therefore, many approaches to the analysis of groups. In the next chapter, we shall review these different approaches and examine them from the psychological standpoint.

TOPICS

1. Similarities and differences between insect and human associations.
2. The social life of anthropoids.
3. Mutual aid and competition as factors in man's social adaptation.
4. The psychological assumptions of the older individualistic theories in economics and politics.
5. Laboratory experiments which demonstrate the influence of the group on mental life.

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CHAPTER II

STANDPOINTS IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

Early Views on Group Life.—The scientific study of social phenomena is, as we have seen, of comparatively recent growth. Yet hardly an age has been without thinkers who have attempted to explain the origin and course of social life in accordance with the dominant ideas and theories of their time.

Group life, in its earlier stages, manifests itself principally through rites, ceremonies, and festivities, as well as through specific types of tribal organization. The sanction of all these is looked for mainly in a superior power, be it that of the totemic animal, the guardian-spirit, or the Divine Being. The fourfold division of early Hindu society is explained by Manu and others in terms of their origin from the different parts of Brahma's body. *Mores* and customs that regulate the course of group life are justified similarly as divine commandments. And the normal festivities pertaining to occupations likewise are endowed with a spiritual sanctity. This outlook upon the social phenomena can very well be regarded as essentially theological.

With the refinement of speculation and consequent development of philosophy, there emerges another kind of interest in group life. The attention of the philosopher comes to center in the human soul, its nature and destiny. But, since the soul manifests itself essentially in a social *milieu*, group life comes to be regarded as an external manifestation and as an illustration of the nature of the soul. The ideal society as portrayed by Plato is but an embodiment of the four cardinal virtues: temperance, courage, wisdom, and justice. According to the ancient Indian social

thinkers, the *Gunas* that characterize the human spirit, *Satva*, *Rajas*, and *Tamas*, are found externalized in the castes of the Hindu social system. *Sattwaguna* manifests itself in the Brahman, *Rajas* in the Kshatriya, and *Tamas* in the Sudra. In fact, whenever a philosopher has attempted rationalization of the social process, his effort has taken a like course. Hegel and his followers read in the course of social evolution, and in the expression of social life, the play of the same dialectic that underlies the order of knowledge. The philosopher has thus sought the sanction of social life not in the Divine but in the soul as a metaphysical reality. This outlook may be characterized as metaphysical.

The French Revolution might or might not have been brought about through the imposition of the *gabelle*; it certainly was molded by the contemporary theory of social organization propounded by Rousseau. Indeed, the French Revolution marked a new departure in the attitude toward social life. The prevailing condition of society possessed but little interest for the philosophers of the Revolution. The important problem was the original status and title of the individual in an ideal organization of society. The thinker's task, so conceived, is no more than a speculative delving into social origins—a process that promises to clear up the obscurities of civil and proprietary rights. The same, with equal truth, may be said of the attempts of Hobbes and Locke. They, too, seek to trace back human life to its non-social stage, and the end of their speculative enterprise is to watch the growth of group organization from the very day of its quickening. All these thinkers seek some sanction for political society, sometimes for what actually exists, and sometimes for what is ideally conceived; and that sanction is found in the history of its origin.

The theological speculations on the nature and origin of society do not center around social groups as such. These

are based on the idea of the supremacy of the supermundane reality over human affairs. The principles of social organization enunciated are essentially normative in character. Rights and duties issue from the supernatural power. Contravention of rules of the social organization becomes both a crime and a sin. The metaphysician, likewise, is interested in the inner reality that expresses itself through social phenomena. Group life here is but a temporal manifestation of a cosmic reality. Social laws are not to be sought in the study of society itself but in the pursuit of metaphysical truth.

The reality with which the political philosopher is chiefly concerned is the form of political organization itself. The nature of social life is deduced from certain ideal conceptions of the State or political society. Such conceptions are also based upon a speculative picture of human nature. Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau each differed from the others in his theory of human motives. Their descriptions of a pre-civil or pre-political condition of society which they call the "state of nature" correspondingly differ. The "state of nature" is an unreal state, a figment of the philosopher's brain. As such, it throws no light on the real nature of man's sociality. Among the Social Contract school of writers the idea of a solemn covenant plays an important part. A deliberate and conscious conventional act acquires the status of a highly developed group consciousness, which it is the main business of social psychology to explain. A man is born into a political organization, however crude or primitive it may be. The group, through crude but gradually improved organization, first accustoms the individual to authority and obedience, and then disciplines him into intimate relationship with his fellows. At the same time, the group is remade according to the individual's social needs and ideals as he refashions them from time to time.

On the other hand, some of the early sociologists, dominated by biological conceptions, devoted themselves to an analysis of the points of similarity between society and the organism, and made too much of the dependence of the individual upon the State. In human society there is no intrinsic dependence of the parts on the whole. Again, the organic conception of society is too simple and abstract because it hypostatized an isolated individual and a unified society, and disregarded intermediate associations. The emphasis was either upon the Individual, or upon the State, according to the mode of application of the biological parallelism. Earlier sociology studied society and neglected groups. It studied the general or the social will, neglecting the interests, impulses, and habits of actual groups. For many sociologists even to-day, society is as much an abstraction as the "Economic Man" of the Ricardians or the "Natural Man" of Hobbes and the Social Contract school. They believe in a typical or pattern social mind, exaggerating the unity of the social process. In the field of economics, the doctrines of an Enlightened Self-Interest and a Beneficent Providence have long kept alive the idea of economic harmony. *Laissez faire* or state socialism has been advocated as a corollary, but the economic facts and circumstances could not be fitted into so simple an abstraction. The rise of class consciousness and the conflict of economic interests have now challenged a revision of the older economic psychology. Similarly, in the field of politics, the conception of the Sovereign State embodying a collective will in which the individual and the group wills live and move, which followed the facile doctrine of the Unity of the State, has been abandoned. This revision has also given birth to new schemes of representation of groups and interests which cannot be assimilated into the existing political organization. In different spheres there is a growing recognition of the diversities of group life, and the com-

plexities of relations between individuals and groups, and between the individuals themselves. Within each community, there is an unlimited number of groups and associations which intersect and interweave, coincide and diverge. The individual may, and does, belong to many such groups, and his relations to them are intimate or distant. He is required to evolve his personality out of his social experience and has often to encounter conflict and disharmony in his relations with different groups. Moreover, the groups themselves are in a perpetual state of flux calling for fresh reciprocal adjustment and new orientation of individual emotions or interests.

Juridical Concept of Group.—Allied to this treatment is the approach of a certain class of German and French jurists who also elaborated the conception of rights and duties on the basis of an analysis of man's fundamental impulses, and on the fact of social solidarity which gives a meaning and significance to both law and morality. They treated society, not as a social phenomenon, but as a purely judicial régime, an ensemble of public law, rights, and obligations, founded on a system of pure logic and reason. The concepts of Society and the State, as a result of such analysis, grow more and more definite with respect both to their denotation and connotation, and these are henceforth accepted as objects with well-marked attributes and characteristics. And this is the prerequisite and starting-point of the application of the scientific method.

The juristic conception of the State has, for instance, revealed clearly the nature and limits of State authority. But there are obvious defects in this mode of treatment. The State, as an organism of growth and development, cannot be understood without a consideration of those extra-legal and social forces which lie back of the Constitution and which are responsible for many of its actions and reciprocal reactions. Any view, therefore, which conceives the

State, or any social group, as an institution of public law is as narrow and fruitless as the Hegelian doctrine which goes to the opposite extreme and considers it merely as a moral entity.¹

Limitations of Political Science.—We are concerned in political theory not with all the relations that constitute the group, but only with some of them—with those that maintain the integrity of the group as a functioning unit. Moreover, society, for the political theorist, is essentially human. Its primary concern is the analysis of rights and duties, of privileges and claims, and their distribution in the political order. Therefore, political science cannot take the place of the science of group life; and, in fact, the study of modern politics is to-day an inquiry into the relationship of interacting groups which live and thrive within the political society.

Biological Approach to Sociology.—The life history of animal societies, studied by the biologists, opens up a new approach to the study of human groups, as already noticed. The gathering of organisms into herds, societies, or communities, is viewed as a natural phenomenon forming a phase of the natural life history of living beings. The process is studied in the same spirit as other vital phenomena, and the investigation aims at the discovery of determinate causes and conditions. The ethical and political purposes which loom so large before the political philosopher are explained in terms of the structural and functional peculiarities involved in the process of adaptation. The biological view, thus, is the first step, and an essential step, in the direction of a scientific analysis of the social phenomena.

Function of Psychology.—Group-formation in its ultimate analysis rests upon the biological need of the organism to enter into concourse with other living beings and upon

¹Garner, *Introduction to Political Science*, p. 26.

the psychological factors that necessitate such concurrence. Biology must bring to light the elementary drives that bring organisms together; and psychology must reveal the mental processes that cause all psycho-physical organisms to form into associations, however loose their constitution may be. Each interpretation must supplement the other.

Psycho-biological Group Study.—The close relation of the two sciences mentioned above, biology and psychology, the general agreement in their methods of investigation and in their friendly borrowing of the results from each other's field, and further in the shading off of one into the other through the rise of comparative psychology, have practically welded them into one science with merely a difference of polarity. The study of a group-phenomena at the present time thus tends to be mainly psycho-biological. Anthropology and sociology, as well as political science, are compelled to rest their foundation upon the psycho-biological nature of the human organism. The value of a psycho-biological approach to the problem of social life, therefore, is unquestionable. Such a view would seek the sanction of social phenomena, not in theology or history, but in the psycho-physical constitution of human beings. It would study the basic types of responses of the psycho-physical organism and would trace the phenomena of group life to them. For the organism, from this point of view, is a center, or in other words an organization of responses. And the group is nothing but a correlation of these responses belonging to different centers.

Social Psychology and Human Institutions.—At this stage, however, we do not propose to attempt a logical demarcation of the field of social psychology from the sphere of psycho-biological processes just outlined. We proceed to examine the methods and materials which we owe to different investigators in social psychology. One of the earliest and best known schools of workers approaches social

psychology in the light of anthropological studies principally concerned with the psychical processes underlying the genesis of social customs and institutions. The interest in institutions and institutional changes is limited very often to the earlier stages of cultural evolution, and the classification and ordering of materials are borrowed generally from the field of anthropology.¹

Thus, from the early years of the sciences of philosophy, sociology, and anthropology, interest in language as a product of collective life has stimulated active speculation in many minds; and the study of the problem, from each of these directions, has proceeded upon a more or less articulated assumption of psychological factors. Social psychology but seeks to place these assumptions on a relatively scientific basis of psychological data and to bring the different lines of speculation into a coherent system.

The institution of marriage as a means of social selection equally has engaged the attention of the jurist, the biologist, the anthropologist, and the moral philosopher. And most of the lines of thought proceed upon the assumption of certain psychological motives, be it the perpetuation of the race, the support and protection of wife and children, sexual hedonism, or love in an elevated sense. The social psychologist delves into these motives and seeks to reconstruct their natural history with a view to determining their influence in the evolution of the marital relations.

Religion, in the same manner, has been a matter of scientific speculation in anthropology and sociology. And no account of the phenomenon can claim any degree of completeness without the assumption of psychological motives, processes, and values. The social psychologist, in this instance as elsewhere, endeavors to unravel the intri-

¹ Wundt, *Folk-Psychology*, Chs. I-III. Also Durkheim, *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life*; and Lévy-Bruhl, *Primitive Mentality*.

cacies of religious rites, ceremonies, and myths in the light of the data of psychological observation. Arts and occupations, economic organizations, kinship and tribal forms—all these also have been studied from a variety of standpoints by sociologists and anthropologists. Each line of speculation has had to ground itself on the assumption of certain psychological factors. Special instincts—hunger and love, for instance—æsthetic impulses, and psychic inhibitions in the form of taboos, are some of the factors that have been introduced in the explanation of social origins. It remains for the social psychologist to essay an accurate and systematic enunciation of the psychological principles and factors involved in such phenomena of diverse character.

Psychological Basis of Society.—Another line of thought, developed early in the history of social psychology, is the attempt to explain psychologically the basis of social cohesion, to analyze the social response of the individual mind. Human beings come together into groups, according to this school of thought, through the operation of specific psychic or psycho-physical factors. The responses of human beings which convey a social import, or which are socially directed, also develop through the working of the same factors. Their nature, however, has been differently conceived by different thinkers. Adam Smith identifies it with sympathy which is not merely a subjective sentiment but also involves a motor phase. Ratzenhofer¹ seeks to bring forward a similar factor which he calls interest. Tarde introduces the conception of imitation which, in spite of the repeated attacks leveled against it, especially by Wundt and Durkheim, still seems to flourish in the writings of Ross. McDougall, whose view is widely accepted, has assumed, instead of a single principle, seven primary instincts as the basis of social formation. But we revert to

¹Davis, *Psychological Interpretation of Society*.

monistic principle in the more recent writings of Trotter where the herd instinct figures as the "be all and end all" of the social life. A similar attempt to interpret mental and social evolution in terms of one category is found, in the field of economics, in the works of Veblen with his emphasis on the instinct of construction. This has been followed up by schemes of economic reorganization which promise to give free play to the instinct of construction, now partially inhibited, in the régime of standardized production. Thus, an attempt to remodel the economic group, which exhibits incompatibility and psychic revolt, is made by allowing a freer expression of instincts and emotions. Contrasted with this mode of treatment is the line of approach of those who investigate business or occupational psychology, or study the desires and attitudes of classes, industrial or political. Many economic writers now are turning away from the old psychological hedonism which is the assumption of classical economic theory, to the social postulates of the new psychology; and among them is a group of thinkers who have turned to inductive psychological studies of vocations and industries, and are working out a scientific technique for occupational selection and grading according to intelligence, character, and special capacities. The social mind exhibits itself, according to many of these thinkers, in separate and even antagonistic phases, and there is a partial repression of instincts and desires in every social situation. Social phenomena are interpreted in terms of the repressed complexes; and not only are morbid symptoms of social and political unrest explained in this way, but also the psychology of social reconstruction assumes a new character. Very interesting contributions in this direction in the field of economics are Tead's *Instincts in Industry*, Parker's *The Casual Laborer*, and Thomas's *The Polish Peasant*; and, in the field of politics, Aurel Kolnai's *Psycho-Analysis and Sociology*. The writings of Williams, Lippman,

and others are attempts to explain various social and political attitudes, while an increasing number of writers of the Freudian school are deriving social lessons from the similarity between the individual and the social processes of repression and sublimation.

Nature of the Social Mind.—A third line of work aims at the discovery of the nature of the social mind conceived as a reality. According to this school, the social organization in its very nature generates, through a process of compounding the individual psychic states, a higher form of conscious life, the social mind. This view is represented by sociologists like René Worms and Durkheim. It proceeds from psychological data but tends to lose itself in the mist of metaphysics. Slightly different in complexion is the view advocated by Espinas. The social mind for him is not a resultant but a presupposition of social behavior. Such behavior implies intercommunication of mental states. And this is only possible on the supposition of a psychic medium through which the psychic contact is effected. This view, too, is metaphysical, not only in its general import but also in the method by which it is established.

Social Personality.—A fourth line of study has followed the effort to understand the transformations that the individual mind undergoes in particular types of social *milieu*. The normal individual loses his balance and poise when caught in the whirlwind of mob life. He feels and acts as an altogether new personality in a panic, stampede, or social epidemic. The same thing happens in some of the more noisy and demonstrative types of revivalism. Those that "come to scoff" not only "remain to pray," but very often prostrate themselves on the ground or dance in ecstasy with the congregation. Le Bon's studies in this sphere are probably the best known. The transformation that takes place in the conscious states and behavior of the individual seems to point to the birth of a new personality in the old

body; and this has often been called the social personality. It is the medium through which the individual participates in the life of his fellow beings; and variations in social solidarity and in institutions arise through the refinement, modification, and development of inhibitions in the social personality.

Criticism of Approaches to Social Psychology.—The foregoing survey convinces us that there is no dearth of materials in the study of the psychological problems of society; yet we are far from having a systematic account of social life from the standpoint of psychology. Let us consider how each of the approaches indicated above fails to lead us to the desired end.

Wundt's studies in Folk Psychology, which represent the first line of approach to Social Psychology, are calculated to bring into relief the stages of mental development correlated with the different types of institutions. We are not led from the facts and laws of mental life and evolution to the institutional changes; here we infer the kind of mental states that are likely to arise in a given type of social formation. This brings before us a succession of what might be called mental photographs, of different cultural types. The ultimate psychic factors, which alone can link up and establish continuity between the series of pictures, receive inadequate consideration.

The second method of investigation—that represented by Adam Smith, Ratzenhofer, Tarde, and Trotter—seeks to fill this lacuna. Each appeals to a single psychic factor which may explain the phenomenon of cohesion as well as the rise and the variation of social institutions. The efforts of Adam Smith and Ratzenhofer are distinctly concerned with human associations treated as such. But group life, as we have already noticed, is not limited to the human domain; it has its roots in the biological nature of the organism. Any explanatory principle, therefore, that bears

a specifically human character, as "sympathy" does, would fail to reveal the ultimate nature of group life. Tarde's "imitation" as well as Trotter's "herd-instinct," is hardly of more value. Tarde's sociology is an illustration of his metaphysics, for "imitation" is, in the sphere of mind, what "undulation" is in the physical sphere, and "heredity" in the sphere of life. They can all be subsumed under the general concept of "repetition" which explains the order of the universe. The scheme of society, so viewed, is the scheme of the universe. Imitation, though apparently a psychophysical process, has its roots in the very being of the cosmos. But, apart from its metaphysical coloring, imitation as a psychological conception is little more than formal. Any action may be imitated, and the root of imitation is not to be sought in a specialized instinct for imitation, but in the general conditions that favor the particular type of action. The same criticism applies to Le Bon's concept of suggestion and Trotter's concept of herd instinct. The function of herd instinct thus seems to be nothing more than to permit the other instincts to play their part in the group environment. Its influence is to intensify, or to inhibit, the effect of other instincts. Like imitation, then, it appears to be a formal concept incapable of serving an explanatory purpose. The influence of herd instinct may well be interpreted as that of herd environment. There is, of course, the undoubted fact that organisms, human and other, seek the physical contiguity of similar beings. But it is a biological fact that may or may not have a psychological basis.

The third approach to the study of social psychology is, as we have already pointed out, metaphysical in its character. We set out here from the changes that the individual mind undergoes in a group environment. Man in his group, in a public meeting, or in a mob, displays a characteristic phase of behavior; if introspection were recorded for each

case, it would reveal the inner life in new color in each situation. This undisputed fact of transformation of the personality requires an explanation. There is, again, the fact of communication of feelings, ideas and corresponding responses, from one individual to another. Public opinion, so often relied upon in democracies and exploited by demagogues, appears to be the outcome of this process of communication. Crazes, fashions, and panics that so often alter the values and order of social life, also, are possible through the same process of communication of emotions, ideas, and responses. The easiest explanation of both these sets of phenomena is that there is a social soul, or mind, in which the individual participates when he enters a social group, and which serves as the medium through which the communication of psychic processes from one individual to another is made possible.

The nature of the group mind has been variously conceived.¹ Espinas's "conscience multiple" is virtually a metaphysical conception inasmuch as it rests upon a certain tacit analogy between the physical forces and mental processes which, like the former, are "susceptible of diffusion, division, and transmission, of existing in a state of potentiality at times, and, at others, becoming active through concentration." The social mind is thus an entity whose reality must be assumed to explain the intersubjective phenomena. Another conception of the group mind is found in the system of Durkheim, the inspiration for which probably comes from Fechner. Fechner conceived of a world-soul compounded of individual souls, just as the tones from different keys compound into a harmony—only with this difference, that the world-soul is a new product that exists over and above the individual minds of which it is compounded. Durkheim, though not free from

¹ For Espinas, see Ginsberg, *The Psychology of Society*, Ch. IV., p. 34, l. 3-4.

the metaphysical attitude that colors Fechner's view, is more psychological in his method. He adopts much the same method as Wundt follows in explaining the complex mental states on the basis of the elementary processes. The psychic elements, for Wundt, correspond to the stimulation of certain cerebral areas; the complex mental processes arise through the association of the psychic elements as conditioned by the apperceptive function which, too, corresponds to the functioning of a cerebral area, the frontal lobe.¹ The association of individual mental processes, in the same manner, gives rise to the social mind. While the individual psychoses are connected with the individual brains, the social psychoses need have no such connection. Durkheim, unlike Fechner, does not conceive the social mind as standing over against the individual minds; the latter constitute the former, which is nothing more than its constituents.

The question of the reality of the Social Mind, though a subject for legitimate and interesting speculation, in no wise helps us to predict and control the individual responses, and to do this should be the aim of all scientific investigations in psychology. The acceptance of the solution offered by the foregoing theories affords an easy escape from the diverse problems of the social behavior of organisms. But the assumptions underlying the variety of views on the subject bristle with debatable points, and many of the disputes thus arising seem interminable.

The fourth line of inquiry rests upon the significance of crowd psychosis. The individual character in a crowd seems to be transformed, as has been noted, and there emerges an entirely different personality. The shy and the timid become forward and dynamic persons who command obedience and respect; the "mute, inglorious" individual becomes a Demosthenes when caught in the whirlpool of a

¹Bianchi, *The Mechanism of the Brain*.

social upheaval; and the profane unbeliever is transformed into an ardent fanatic in the excitement of a mass religious movement. These transformations, it is believed, mark the dawn of social life which differentiates, develops, reaches a higher degree of organization, and gives birth to social institutions of various orders. The social and the individual psychoses thus belong to two different types of phenomena. Not only are there two orders of behavior, social and individual; there are also two *egos*, one social and the other individual. These respond to different kinds of stimuli and claim different values for their satisfaction. The nature and evolution of the social *ego*, it is said, form the subject matter for social psychology.

The Individual in the Group.—A closer examination of this view leads us to the last method of treatment of socio-psychic phenomena. At no point in the scale of human behavior do we find a total breach between the social and the individual. The individual being is not called upon to create or organize a social group; he is born into one. Parents, brothers, sisters, and other relatives constitute the social *milieu* in which the child is born. And, throughout the protracted period of nurture, it unconsciously imbibes this influence in diverse ways, as much as that of the physical environment. Every human response, therefore, is a socially-prepared response. There is absolutely no discontinuity between the social and the individual situations of behavior.

Nor is there a single large group, equilibrium with which relieves man from any further task of social adaptation. As he grows in age, he has to participate in several groups at the same time. Just as physical objects serve as termini of action, so do other individuals, social institutions, and the group as a whole. The impulse to social life, then, is not a specific kind of impulse like the herd instinct, imitation, or sympathetic induction; all the normal impulses

that lead men to action in a physical environment lead also to responses to social situations.

As a consequence, mental patterns, consisting of ideas, feelings, etc., develop in the social environment. These patterns differ in different social groups, such as the family, class, club, a holiday excursion, or a funeral procession; and arise in the same manner as different mental patterns develop in different regions; *e.g.*, hills, plains, rivers, seas, forests, etc. There is no specific type of consciousness, *sui generis*, called the group consciousness. Patterns develop without any awareness on the part of the individual, for the individual passes from one group to another in the course of his normal daily routine. The unfolding of the social responses, then, does not necessarily mark a crisis in life. There is a social *milieu* even in very early infancy, and its influence is a continuous determinant of individual behavior. With mental development, there develops a variety of responses to suit different human environments; and this, indeed, constitutes the social training of the child. From early days to maturity, the human organism has to participate at each stage in a variety of groups, large or small, stable or unstable, and its behaviour is perpetually inhibited, favored, and shaped into patterns through the influence of groups. The consciousness of the social environment or of its influence, however, does not always appear on the level of introspection. The processes of adaptation to the social and to the physical environment are in great part unconscious.

Starting-point of Group Study.—Undoubtedly there are mental states and responses in which the group factor looms large. The transformation of the individual character in group life, and the deleterious effect of isolation, are crises that bring out clearly the influence of the group upon behavior. The phenomena of crowd life, for instance, represent such a crisis, but these too may be explained without

assuming any mental processes other than those that appear in our daily intercourse with the world. Similarly, class attitudes, national ideals, social epidemics, and religious movements show how the group transforms the mental states of the individual. But each of these need not and should not be taken *sui generis*. Every one of these has a beginning in the formative stage of life; each has an unobserved origin, develops slowly in the individual consciousness, and often consummates itself in a cataclysm in the individual life. The study of group life, therefore, must begin at these incipient and inchoate stages.

The problem with which we are concerned in the following chapters is twofold. First, we shall attempt to discover the mechanism and the process by which the mental life of man is molded into social patterns by the group environment. Secondly, we shall seek to explain certain special forms of group life in the light of the principles of behavior that our analysis reveals.

TOPICS

1. The psychological theories underlying the Social Contract School.
2. A critical examination of Ratzenhofer's and Small's theory of interests.
3. A critical examination of the following concepts: Imitation, Collective Representation, Herd Instinct, Pluralistic Behavior.
4. Social behavior as a biological phenomenon.

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CHAPTER III

ORIGIN OF GROUP LIFE

Primary Group Phenomena—Stimulus and Response.—Even unicellular organisms manifest phenomena of group life. The study of electro-tropism and chemo-tropism of the protozoa has shown how the unicellular specks of life gather round the positive or the negative pole of an electrode, and how certain chemical solutions favor the gathering of these simple creatures into groups. The same phenomenon is to be noticed in the relatively more complex types of organisms. Swarms of moths revolve around a light. Flies and mosquitoes gather in large numbers in unclean lanes and stagnant pools. We cannot assume a feeling of fraternity or crowd-psychosis on the part of the paramecium or the moth; nor can we postulate an awareness of its fellow-beings' existence; here groups form and dissolve in response to stimuli. This is the initial stage of what Giddings calls "pluralistic behavior."

The socio-genic factor in these cases seems to be the stimulus. If there were no light, there would be no gathering of moths; in the absence of food house-flies would not assemble; if you weaken the CO₂ solution, the paramecia do not cluster together. The stimulus seems to gather *en masse* the organisms, just as a magnet draws the mass of iron filings. We need not attribute any social awareness or any socially-directed impulse to the organisms concerned. All that need be assumed is that each individual organism possesses the capacity of responding to the particular type of stimulus in the same manner as other units of the aggregation. This capacity is usually indicated by the existence of a sense organ capable of giving rise to sensations of a specific intensity and of a motor mechanism set into opera-

tion through sensory stimulation. In the case of the unicellular organism, it would undoubtedly be useless to look for such specialization of sensory and motor functions and mechanism. But we cannot deny that there is reception of stimulation as well as motor-innervation, in whatever manner the functions may be carried out—be it through a specialized nervous system or a homogeneous protoplasmic mass.

Two factors thus seem to be essential to such types of assemblage. There is an external stimulus of a specific character, a chemical compound, an electric current, light, or anything else, with well-defined properties; and there is an organic prepotency to respond or behave in a determinate manner when such a stimulus is presented. The individual organism possesses, in other words, a well-canalized route for the flow of organic energy upon the application of the stimulus. Such a route, moreover, is possessed in common by a whole class of individuals and hence is attributed to phylogenetic factors as its determinants. Accordingly, whenever a stimulus is presented, the response is elicited from a whole host of organisms. And this gives rise to the gathering which, to all intents and purposes, corresponds to the human crowd in a busy street collected round a man in bizarre attire.

Group Stabilization Factors—Organic Memory and Response.—The withdrawal of the stimulus, in the case of the lower organisms, leads to the dissolution of the gathering. The human crowd, however, when the object of interest disappears, takes a little time to review the situation and then slowly breaks up. This is due primarily to two factors, one of which is the capacity of retention of an impression, which the higher organism possesses in a greater degree than the lower. Such capacity is attributed to the characteristic of organic substances described as *plasticity*. The longer the stimulation persists through the plastic

nature of the receptors, the greater would be the chance for the gathering to continue, in spite of the absence of the external stimulus. In other words, what Hering calls "organic memory" seems to be a significant factor of sociogenesis.

The organic memory scintillates into images, and, in more evolved orders of life, into memory ideas. Monkeys and crows mourn for a dead comrade long after its body is removed. The visual sensation, which brings about the gathering, persists as an image and hence serves as the causative factor of the gathering. The physical withdrawal of the stimulus makes no difference. It persists as an image, or an idea, and evokes the proper type of behavior.

The second stabilizing factor consists in the organization of the responses. Sherrington classifies motor-responses into preparatory and consummatory responses. Woodworth, following Sherrington, adopts the same classification.¹ The response attitude evoked by the stimulus, if consummatory, would lead to the cessation of the gathering soon after the cessation of the external stimulus. But if the individual organism possesses the capacity of a variety of responses and of variability of particular responses with changes in the environment, it is more likely that it would evoke a chain of responses. In that case the reaction elicited by the stimulus would function as preparatory to a temporally distant consummatory reaction. The original response would be the beginning of a series of reactions the length of which would determine the duration of the group.

The stability of a chance gathering called forth by a stimulus consequently depends not merely upon the character of the stimulus, but also upon the internal motor equipment of the organism. Specialization and coördination of the nervous system, which mark the course of organic

¹ Woodworth, *Dynamic Psychology*, Chs. III., IV.

evolution and are correlated with the evolution of mind, make it possible for the responses to form into chains, with preparatory phases leading to distant consummatory termini. We accordingly find that social stability is an accompaniment of motor complexity in an ascending order.

The phenomenon of group formation may, thus far, be explained on the basis of stimulus and response. The stimulus impresses itself upon the plastic organism and evokes a response. So long as the stimulus persists, actually in its physical being, or in the form of stimulation of the plastic organic substance, the response also continues. This being so, if the response evoked be positive, all the organisms affected by the stimulus would move towards it; if negative, the movement would be in the reverse direction. The gathering in both these cases would be dynamic in the sense that it continues as long as the movement continues. The continuance of the movement, however, depends upon the physical structure and function of the organism inasmuch as it depends upon the canalization of organic energy as we have seen above. Moreover, the structural or the functional peculiarities must be that of a whole species, since otherwise there would be no group formation. To be sure, group formation ultimately is determined by the character of the stimulus and the response that it sets up. If the response be a single one, the gathering ceases with the response. If each response invariably links itself with others, *i. e.*, stimulates others, the group would continue.

Dynamic Basis of the Group. — Not only subhuman but also human groups, to a large extent, are amenable to this simple explanation. That it applies to the street crowd is obvious. There is a visual stimulus, a setting up of positive motor responses in a number of similarly constituted beings, and we have the crowd. The stimulus directly gives rise to the response, as in the case of tropism, and hence the hurrying feet carrying the self-forgetful persons to the scene

of sensation. A more stable association is but the outcome of response to a stimulus that has ceased to exist physically, and has been translated into an idea. The response set up by the stimulus has evoked here a whole host of preparatory responses leading to a more or less distant consummatory one. The basic nature of the group, thus, is everywhere dynamic. It is either a single response, or a chain of responses spread over space and time, on the part of many individual organisms. These responses are evoked either by a physical stimulus already existing, or by one that has translated itself into an image, idea, or concept. Here, again, there is room for elaboration. Just as the motor-responses form into chains, so the images and ideas associate into psychic wholes. Hence, the original stimulus may be transformed into a common set of ideas just as the simple response may lengthen into a series or chain.

Reciprocal Influence of Members of the Group.—The foregoing account of group formation has to be amplified. Another important factor complicates the process as we advance in the scale of complexity of bodily organization. We refer to the influence that the members of a group exert upon one another.

The moth attracted by the light has to adjust its movements not only to the primary stimulus, the light, but also with reference to other moths flying in the same direction. For close physical contiguity and sameness of objective of the movement would necessitate a process of reciprocal adjustment within the limits of available space. Moreover, since each organism is a dynamic unit, there cannot be any final adjustment at any stage. The moth in question has to move toward the light and at the same time to keep out of the way of other moths that also continuously swarm around it. Human beings, too, in a street crowd, have to be careful that they do not obstruct one another in running toward the scene of excitement. The perpetual adjustment

necessitated by spatial and other factors is a constant drain upon the available stock of organic energy. Gradually, the movement canalizes, in a manner not yet adequately explained, into definite channels of response for approaching, avoiding, or otherwise manipulating moving bodies. Such direction of responses to moving fellow-beings gradually translates itself into the process of attention to fellow-beings on the conscious plane of life. Thus, whenever a stimulus calls into being a crowd of individuals, there ensue two types of response. One is directed to the stimulus positively or negatively; the other is directed to the fellow-beings stimulated by the same external situation. The dual process of reactive adaptation, to fellow-beings and to the stimulus, presupposes the existence of a motor mechanism capable of a plurality of functions at the same time. Even in the protozoa such a possibility exists. And in most of the orders of metazoa the plural functioning actually takes place. The extent to which the response to the bodily movements of fellow-beings influences the response to the primary stimulus—that which is the primary cause of movement of the cluster of organisms—measures the importance of the group for the individual.

The response to the primary stimulus simultaneously with that to the moving beings around, each modifying the other—this, then, is the normal character of the group in all relatively complex orders of life. Birds seeking insects in a field may not be under any great necessity of taking account of one another's movements. Hounds following the same scent rush to the objective without much regard to their fellows. Even human beings at a theatrical performance may watch the acting with rapt attention oblivious of other members of the audience. In these instances, the response to the primary stimulus predominates, interrupted here and there by the response to fellow-beings. The direct influence of the group upon the individual in

such cases is but small. On the other hand, vultures sitting on a carcass have to take note of one another's movements. Each of a pack of street dogs running after a female has at every moment to adjust its responses with reference to the others. The competitors in a hundred yards' dash have throughout to keep the other runners as well as the goal in full view. Thus the relative persistence of each class of responses is the measure of the influence of the group upon the individual.

Internal Stimuli Leading to Group Relations.—Up to this point, we have represented the external stimulus as a necessary condition of group formation. There is no doubt that this is so in a very large number of cases. But it need not always be external to the body. The direct stimulus may be a chemical or a physical change within the tissues. Such, for instance, are hunger, thirst, and sex-craving. It is true that these may be due to changes in the external environment. Thirst may be due to the increase in external temperature and consequent changes in the body; sex-craving may set in through seasonal changes. The sexual season largely depends on the kind of food on which the species lives, together with anatomical and physiological peculiarities. Considering these, and further the close biological resemblance between man and the man-like apes, Westermarck infers that primitive man had a pairing season. The civilized man may make love at all seasons, but in spring, especially, his fancy "lightly turns to thoughts of love." Such influences are indirect; the direct stimulus is intra-corporeal.

The existence and operation of such stimuli are difficult to observe. Hence there is an impression that responses are often spontaneous and independent of the stimulus. And the responses that lead to group formation in the relatively complex orders of life are mainly of this character. But a review of the experiments and explanatory hypotheses

in field studies in animal behavior would show that there is always an effort to discern the stimulus that sets up a specific type of response. The seasonal migration of birds, the wandering of animals and of peoples are always attributed to physical conditions. The complexity of the situation may render a particular hypothesis unreliable or untenable; but the general trend of scientific thought is to consider behavior of all orders in the stimulus-response relation.

The reactions to fellow-beings may not always be definite enough for observation. In the case of human beings, as we shall see in another chapter, they are mostly incipient. This probably holds good for sub-human organisms also. The incipient responses are, nevertheless, real and they exert an effective modifying influence upon the course of behavior evoked by the primary stimulus. Likewise, may the responses to the primary stimulus object be incipient. Therefore, the actual deflection of the responses from their normal course is not the only criterion of group-influence. Trainers of animals, as well as investigators of animal behavior, know well how responses inhibit one another, and how the consummatory response, *e. g.*, the swallowing of food, runs its natural course, though there may be a profound modification in the series of preparatory responses. Hence, the visible change is not always the true measure of the influence exerted by the social environment.

Psychic Factor in Group Formation. — The foregoing paragraphs indicate some of the reservations under which the stimulus-response explanation of group-formation holds true. There is another factor, which we have reserved till the last, that effects a profound change in the character of the group. This is the psychic factor. The stimulation effected by the external factors may translate itself into perception, image, or idea of the stimulus. And each of these may elaborate itself through association with other

mental processes. If, for illustration, we assume a stage of life where there is no vestige of consciousness, the stimulus would give rise to a physiological stimulation which would operate as a drive to the motor-responses. With the beginning of conscious life, the stimulation would translate itself into some form of sensory-affective process and this, to the organism, would become a fact of such significance that the stimulation upon which it arises would be completely obscured. With the development of conscious life the elementary stimulus-consciousness would be transformed into a percept, image, idea, or thought. This, again, would tend, at each stage, to elaborate itself into a complex system of determinate patterns. But the fixity of such systems and patterns is only relative; there is a consistent process of shifting of emphasis, of alternation of contents between the focus and the margin. This important series of psychic realities is superadded to the relatively simple fact of organic stimulation which it may completely conceal. And henceforth, in the conscious planes of movement, the casual factor referred to always becomes a perception, idea, or thought. It is true, nevertheless, that the beginning of conscious life does not destroy the stimulus-response scheme, but merely hides it.

Complexity of Human Group Response.—The same principle holds true with reference to the factor of response. The simple response which restores the organic equilibrium lengthens out into a chain by linking itself with other responses. Thus, the simple stimulus-response scheme is obscured by the fact that the final step in the series of responses may seem to bear no relation to the original stimulus. Let us take an illustration from human life. An altercation occurs between a shopkeeper and his customers, and the former assumes a threatening attitude. The latter respond by assaulting the shopkeeper mercilessly. Not content with this, the customers loot the shop, damage the

window in their frenzy, and run away to safety. The linked responses that follow the first one are not directly caused by the primary stimulus; each arises as a consummation of its antecedents.

This scheme, too, is translated into something new through the arousal of conscious factors. The responses, in the first place, come to be represented in consciousness by kinæsthetic sensations and images, which, with the growing psychic complexity, transform themselves into ideas and thoughts. In the second place, each muscular response evokes certain internal changes such as those in circulation, respiration, and in the general vaso-motor system. In the case of human beings, these are correlated with the emotions. Hence arise far-reaching emotive changes along with the kinæsthetic impressions and ideas. In this manner, the responses to the primary stimulus and those to the movements of the surrounding fellow-beings aroused to action by the same stimulus bring with them, on the conscious plane of life, two sets of emotions, ideas, and impressions. These blend and associate themselves, form into patterns, and represent the motor effects of the stimulus.

Thus with the rise of consciousness the reflex gathering of a group of individuals in response to a common stimulus comes to be represented in the minds of individuals as a host of impressions, ideas, and emotions blending with or displacing one another—in brief, forming into determinate patterns of ideational and emotive contents. The influence of the group upon the individual is measured by the relative predominance of the ideas and feelings representing the response to the fellow-beings around: while some ideas are in the focus of attention, others recede into the margin. On the other hand, the primary stimulus idea, and the ideas of reacting to it, are vividly before the mind as contrasted with the other set of reactions to fellow-beings.

This is what we know from the general facts of attention.

But we also know that attention is connected with motor preparation. That which is attended to is the object to which an organism is prepared to react. If the attitude of response disappears, attention shifts its objective. Hence it follows that the relative vividness or predominance of ideas as discussed above ultimately depends upon which set of responses hold the ground—to what extent the response to the fellow-beings around is capable of deflecting from its normal course the normal response to the stimulus.

Analysis of Group Life.—To sum up: The foundation or basis of the group is a series of responses evoked from a number of individuals by a stimulus, and modified by another set of responses mutually evoked by the individuals in action. This analysis holds good throughout the scale of group life, from the simplest to the most complex. At a certain level of organic life, which we have no way of determining, there arise conscious processes: impression, ideation, emotion, and conative attitudes. These are superadded to the unconscious responses. A series of psychic factors, therefore, is superadded to the primary fact of stimulus-response. The psychic factors are: (1) representations of the stimulus; (2) representations of the responses to the stimulus; (3) the affective processes connected with these; (4) representations of the moving fellow-beings; (5) representations of the responses to the moving fellow-beings; (6) the emotive processes connected with these. Usually all of these are not experienced. Some stimuli and responses may remain mere physical facts. For example, a person may be aware of the stimulus but totally unconscious of his responses; he may be vividly conscious of his fellow-beings and may react emotionally to their presence, but the primary stimulus may recede from the field of attention. If the first three preponderate in consciousness, the stimulus becomes the primary fact in the mind of the individual; if the latter three claim exclusive attention, the awareness of

the group displaces that of the physical environment. Both these mental conditions arise in course of the same process of adjustment of a number of individual beings to the environment.

One important corollary follows from the foregoing discussion. Group formation is but an episode in the adaptation of the individual to the environmental stimulus. The group is called into being because individuals are so constituted that they respond to the same stimulus in a specific manner. The influence of the group upon the individual arises through the exigencies of the sameness of the stimulus and the similarity of responses. If the individual were perfectly adapted to the environment, or if there were no call upon the individual to respond, obviously there would be no group life. In the state of lunacy, similarity with fellow-beings with respect to responses is, to a large extent, absent. This leads to the withdrawal of the individual from the group; thus there is little group life in a lunatic asylum. Likewise in the final stage of dementia precox, there is a disinclination to all forms of action, save probably to a few mechanical and repetitive ones. Here also, the individual cannot participate in group life, but fights shy of company. Group life, then, is an adjunct to the normal give and take between the organism and the environment. There is no group life *per se*, apart from the main function of adaptation to the environment. Consequently, a group mind or a group soul, transcending the normal course of the mind of an individual and influencing the latter *ab extra*, does not exist.

TOPICS

1. Difficulties in the explanation of social behavior in terms of stimulus and response.
2. The modification of the stimulus-response scheme through conscious representation.

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CHAPTER IV

SOCIAL CHARACTER OF BEHAVIOR

Contents of the Mental Stream.—The mind of the individual has been compared to a stream. It is an incessant flow of sensations, perceptions, thoughts, and impulses, each of which melts into others and thus maintains continuity. Any portion of this psychic continuum will be found upon examination to consist of a variety of states—of memory, of emotion, of thought. These states arrange themselves into a variety of patterns. Sometimes emotions suffuse the psychic field, perceptions and ideas lurk behind them and stimulate them into greater intensity. Sometimes the bare sensation opens the gate of long-lost memories that bring in their wake echoes of faded love or forgotten joy. In each case the pattern or arrangement has its own special character. The focal state of one moment recedes into the background in the next; that state which demands exclusive attention now, unobtrusively blends with others after a few brief moments. A passion that, like a hurricane, sweeps away before its fury every shred of thought and reason, is found, as the mind courses on, to quicken into life the most ingenious combinations of ideas. These and other ways in which the mental states appear as interrelated may be called the pattern of the states; while the states themselves may be called the “mental contents.” Any moment or cross-section of the mental flow, thus cut out from the rest, is a system of contents arranged in a particular pattern. And the stream of consciousness is a continuous succession of such patterns.

But each mental state, such as memory or perception, can be resolved into still simpler contents, sensations, images, and feelings, which have been called “psychic elements.” A

state, accordingly, is but a form, or mold, or *Gestalt*, into which a series of psychic elements have been welded together. From this point of view, the stream of consciousness is a stream of the ultimate psychic elements formed into ever-changing patterns.

Mental Contents Determined by Environment.—The patterns and the contents of the individual mind are determined by the physical as well as the social environment. The psychic elements probably are influenced but little by these factors. For, provided that the sense organs and the centers are in their normal working order, the psychic elements would arise naturally through the process of give and take of the intra-organic and the extra-organic factors. And, once these contents arise, the mental states, such as perceptions, thoughts, etc., are also bound to appear through the natural interpenetration of the psychic elements. But the relative frequency of occurrence of the different states may vary in individuals. One may have very few passional obsessions, but may be given to imagination; while another may be disposed to sentiment, and be little inclined toward perception and reaction to external objects. The normal person, however, usually develops all the mental states, just as he comes to possess the different bodily organs. But the peculiarities of individuals present themselves much more in the way the various mental states combine than in the pattern of bodily features, gait, and other movements.

The physical environment calls upon the individual to hold his own in the world of nature and to avoid dangers that beset him. Thus every inclement environment favors a characteristic adaptive and defence psychosis in the individual. The occupation of hunting that supplies the hunter with his daily meal demands quickness and accuracy in perception, the emotion of courage, and the capacity of inhibiting the tendency to lassitude that naturally arises from hard physical labor. The fisherman, the farmer, and the herds-

man each in the same manner develops a peculiar set of mental states characteristic of his respective occupation. And these states arise from the adjustment of habits and interests to the needs of daily life. In one case, it is the capacity of observation and quickness of reaction; in another case, foresight and patience; and in the third, the capacity of self-adaptation to seasonal needs and variations, and the habit of rule and obedience.

Individuality of the Unconstrained Mind.—When the day's work is done and each person turns from work to rest, the "control" exercised by the environment over the mental stream relaxes and the pattern and the contents of mind undergo rapid transformations. For instance, the professional hours find all physicians similarly occupied. Their hours of leisure find them as unlike one another as they possibly can be. Each takes to his "hobby," or his own pursuit of pleasure, and, consequently, the contents of mind are different in different persons. But so also are the patterns. One given to music has its consciousness colored by emotions evoked by tonal rhythm; another, given to gardening, has developed a psychic texture woven by muscular effort, anticipatory images of order and symmetry, and specific pleasures elicited by the fragrance of flowers.

In this manner, each distinct situation in our daily life that marks a break from others brings in its special set of psychic contents arranged in particular patterns of continuous sensory attention, of reflection, of perception, of imaginative enjoyment, etc. The psychic history of a day, accordingly, is not merely a continuous procession of changes but is marked also by shifting of scene and color. One set of patterns gives place to another, and a new set of mental contents appears on the field. And this typical alteration is due to a change in the situation that the psycho-physical organism has to face.

The Social Factor.—But the situation is not merely

physical. It is also social. Our mood or temperament, the patterns into which perceptions, thoughts, and feelings arrange themselves, undergo sudden transformation, not only through a change of the "physical" scene, but also on account of the presence of other fellow-beings. A lover, for instance, when alone, has his mind suffused with tender emotions. The ideas of office-work or of the landlord's and tailor's dues sink into the background. A knock at the door shatters "love's young dream," and thoughts of bread and butter, and of money, occupy the focus of attention. The tyrant at home is but a slave at the office. The professor, the lawyer, and the doctor hardly ever carry their professional mood to their hearth; everywhere there is a healthy objection to "talking shop." The ideas, feelings, and behavior of individuals lose their tinge of personal peculiarity and assume a similarity of direction and pattern in a group-environment.

Mental Reactions to Environment.—The ways in which these two factors, physical and social, operate upon the individual mind are somewhat different. (1) A new physical environment brings about a new psychic pattern through the sense data it presents. The physical environment is an object of perception. Its features and phases impress themselves upon the sense organs and develop into ideas and concepts. These evoke appropriate associations which in their turn call up the usual motor responses. Evidently, therefore, the contents and patterns are determined through the influence that the environment brings to bear upon the sensory system. (2) In the case of the human environment, the primary mental change is brought about through the influence that it exerts upon the character of the motor responses. The signs of recognition and the modes of sharing courtesy are the socially accepted forms of such responses. To "cut" a person effectively requires nothing more than a total inhibition of these reactions. That being stared at is resented

in polite society, is probably due to the fact that the person stared at feels himself or herself likened to a physical object that stimulates curiosity. Every one dislikes being examined and observed. Human beings do not expect to be measured; they expect to be responded to. The human body is an object that primarily tends to evoke a change in behavior rather than perceptual attention. The motor responses first aroused, however, call up appropriate sensory contents, ideas, and feelings, as also the patterns into which these contents arrange themselves.

Appeal of Human Environment.—The reason why a human being should primarily appeal to the motor-side of our nature is not easy to ascertain. Probably it is determined by a large number of factors, not all of which are recognizable. In the first place, our behavior changes not only in the presence of human beings but also in that of all living beings. To the young child domestic animals and human beings elicit approximately the same type of reactions. For, to the child, as well as to the adult, the living being is primarily a moving being. It is clear that man's behavior, when he is surrounded by moving objects, is quite different from what it is when he faces a static environment. The dynamic reality in primitive thought is almost invariably invested with a soul. We may no longer be animists in our philosophy; but we are tacitly so in our psycho-physical nature. Even to the modern mind, moving matter carries the meaning of living matter.

In the second place, it is a well-known fact that the moving object carries a greater potential attention-value. Other things being equal, a moving body, rather than a static object, compels notice, because it introduces change into the field of observation and so arouses or influences attention. Thus, it is only natural that the living being should carry a greater attention-value as an object of observation.

In the third place, attention in a certain sense is but a

preparatory stage to action. That which draws our attention possesses the potentiality of calling forth one or other type of reaction. Thus all living and moving objects are calculated to set the motor mechanism of the human body on the very edge of action. The reason is that the living organism is principally an adaptive system. A relatively static environment evokes responses by way of the sensory mechanism. The direct stimulation of the sensory system gives rise to sensory contents as arranged into patterns and each content of the pattern has a greater or less determining influence upon the course of reactions that follow. But when the environment is mobile, the reactions are reflexly aroused; for the need of adaptation is immediate and urgent. The psychic contents arise by the process of back-stroke. Sensations from the reacting organs gather in consciousness, form into ideas, blend together, and arouse their associations, and in this manner produce a pattern of experience. Therefore, the appeal of the moving reality is to the motor nature of man.

In the fourth place, every individual feels himself capable of a large variety of responses. The organisms which are structurally similar thus appear to one another as possessing a large potentiality of reactions. Each person represents to another a moving environment and calls forth a rapid adjustment in terms of actual or incipient movements. And these through back-stroke call up different orders of psychic patterns.

Lastly, a rapid motor adjustment, as we have already seen, always involves compensatory internal changes, of respiration, of circulation, and of glandular secretions. These, however, are correlates of emotion, be they causes or effects. Therefore, a human environment would always give rise to particular emotional qualities.

The human group, as an environment, thus acts upon the individual organism in a definite way, primarily by influenc-

ing the motor-mechanism, voluntary and involuntary. It also develops the mental pattern of a special kind; for the mental contents begin from the nucleus of kinæsthetic impressions, and the associated ideas called up are determined by the character of the nucleus. We know also that special types of emotion arise in the course of the motor response and these must inevitably blend with the impressions and ideas. A psychic pattern, accordingly, is formed with emotions, kinæsthetic impressions, and ideas, and with a determinate motor attitude. This, in its ultimate analysis, represents the primary type of behavior of man in society.

We have but described generally the essentials of psychosocial behavior. Its exact nature has not yet been defined. The account given above enumerates variables of which this behavior is a function. Given a particular kind of reaction, the general pattern and contents would assume a special character; for the emotion and the cognitive contents all depend upon the character of the primary responses evoked. And what the responses would be depends upon a large number of factors which are more or less difficult to calculate. For instance, there is the personal history of individuals concerned. There are also the factors of the physical environment acting upon individual minds.

Individual Habit and Social Behavior.—The motor responses, like the psychic contents, have their own patterns. Such patterns, when they are common to all the members of a species, and determined by hereditary factors, are called *instincts*. But the peculiar environment in which each individual is placed elicits from him certain typical courses of action to meet the adaptive needs of daily life. These, like instincts, are invariable within limits; but, unlike the former, are peculiar to the individual. These are what we call *habits*. Besides these habits, there are certain social behavior patterns. Such, for instance, are the modes of showing courtesy, the types of behavior demanded at parties and

ceremonials, obedience to customs, modes of worship, food-getting, marriage, etc. These show a large amount of variability, though they are common to a large number of people—people belonging to the same group or class or region. They supervene upon habits and serve to modify them. Lastly, there are modes of behavior following upon and determined by the psychic patterns. These are the voluntary or purposive actions.

These types of action, reflex, instinctive, habitual, customary, and voluntary are not mutually exclusive. The classification is not horizontal but vertical. Each is modified by the next in the hierarchical order, and each is more variable than the preceding one. Moreover, in every concrete instance of human behavior, there is a coalescence of all the orders of action. In a panic, the instinctive dominates over the voluntary, habitual, and customary modes of action, though the traces of all may be seen. The action patterns blend just as do the psychic patterns.

And, like the psychic patterns, the action patterns are determined socially. This determination is principally of a negative character. It is through the inhibition of particular modes of responses that the surviving type of action is selected. From the primitive taboo to the present day penal law, all inhibitions serve the same purpose, that of limiting the range of conduct.

Unconscious Submission to Environment.—The determining influence that the physical and the social environment exercises is mostly unconscious. We are hardly ever aware that our body is drawing its sustenance from the world outside. It is only on rare occasions that we ascribe a personal sensation to the environment—as, for instance, when gout is referred to the inclemencies of weather, or a state of physical well-being to the pleasant sunshine and the bracing wind. But most of the time our relation to the physical world is below the threshold of consciousness.

The influence of the social environment works still less perceptibly. Hardly ever are we aware that the way we dress is merely an unconscious and perhaps unsuccessful effort to imitate someone else; that the ideas we believe to be our own have been derived from others; that our feelings and emotions—the most intimate possessions of mind—have been induced by the general social current of emotions. The process of education makes us aware that the ideas and wills of others are working in us, sometimes in harmony with our own attitude and sometimes in opposition to it.

This foreign reference of ideas and wills, however, does not essentially belong to the mental states as such. A new idea that a friend suggests may not itself be foreign to me. A new turn that my action takes might as well have originated from my own nature. The feeling of externality arises through the association of ideas and wills with a personality other than mine. When this feeling of an alien personality does not arise, the mental states in question are readily assimilated as native to the mind. This is the reason why leaders hardly ever feel that they owe their ideas and policies to those who follow; for the feeling of an external personality is absent. In the mind of the chief, the subordinate does not possess an independent personality of his own.

Consciousness of Social Influence.—The consciousness of the influence of the social environment arises from the perception or realization of personalities other than one's own. This perception, however, is determined by certain motor-patterns mentioned above. Every object that figures in our mental life does so by virtue of the fact that it elicits one or other motor responses. The responses, when complex, give rise, through "back-stroke," to an emotive pattern. For the more complex the responses, the greater would be the need of internal compensatory changes and the greater the

means of organic sensations, and hence the greater the intensity and complexity of emotions. Viewed from this standpoint, a personality is an object that calls forth in this manner a complex motor pattern and with it an emotion or emotive pattern. The persons we look upon with awe or reverence are those whose moods and course of action force us to prepare for a variety of responses not anticipated before, or which demand a change in our customary behavior. If the response ceases to be complex and the emotion disappears we look upon human beings on a par with physical objects. Conversely, when an inanimate object calls forth a complex set of responses and an emotive pattern, it is invested with a personality akin to human. The mechanic swears, for instance, at the engine that baffles his skill, and the bad workman is proverbially known to quarrel with his tools.

In fact, there exist instincts, or motor patterns determined by heredity, that have for their object a human personality. Sex responses, parental responses, aggressive actions, etc., are of this type. It may well be, as Freud and his followers urge, that all reactions of this type are derivatives of the sexual. It would then follow that all emotions that are correlated with these modes of action arise from love. But we are not called upon to decide the question here.

This consciousness of social influence appears also in the condition of mental derangement. In certain forms of paranoia the patient is perpetually haunted by the notion that others are exerting their power upon his mind. In other cases, the patient simply feels strongly that someone loves him, or neglects him, or hates him. His responses are adapted to these imaginary conditions, and hence the trouble. Freud, in a recent paper, shows that these paranoid states, especially of jealousy, are due to the operation of sex instinct. Hence our conclusion that the motor responses

lie at the basis of our consciousness of other personalities is generally borne out.

Usually, however, the individual is unconscious of the reality of this influence. Few would acknowledge that his ideas, feelings, modes of thought and behavior are throughout determined entirely by his fellow-beings. Nevertheless, the process of perpetual filtration of ideas from man to man goes on silently and incessantly. And the mechanism laid bare in the preceding pages shows how the group incipiently works upon the mind of the individual.

Social Consciousness.—A person in the company of his friends has a psycho-motor pattern altogether different from what he has in the privacy of his own household. But these changes of content and pattern are normal and usual; they happen so often in the daily course of our routinized life that they pass unnoticed. There are, however, certain other types of changes in the individual mind that attract attention on account of their cataclysmic nature. For example, we have the sudden alteration in the personality of a quiet man suddenly overtaken by the whirlwind of mob life; we know how the supercilious and the profane are caught in the eddy of revivalism; and we witnessed, not many years back, how timid stay-at-home persons assumed a new rôle in the excitement of war. Changes of this nature are so obvious that they have claimed investigation from all quarters; and, for the same reason, they have been attributed to the operation of what has been regarded as "social consciousness," a term which should carry a much wider denotation.

It has been claimed by many writers that this kind of consciousness is different in quality from the consciousness of our everyday life, and that it marks the beginning of a new order of mental life that elaborates and differentiates itself into various types of social psychoses. Such, for instance, are national consciousness, class consciousness, and

internationalism. The function of social psychology, from this point of view, would be (1) to explain the origin, nature, and conditions of the primary social consciousness or crowd consciousness; (2) to explain the rise of other forms of consciousness out of the crowd consciousness. The incipient working of the social influence which we have already noticed is thus excluded from the purview of social psychology.

Natural Preparation for Group Life.—But the account that has been given above rests upon the indisputable fact that there is nowhere a break in the working of the human environment upon the individual. The mob-psychosis differs from other social psychoses only in degree and not in quality. The silent operation of the social environment, all unknown to the individual affected, prepares for him different types of psychic and motor patterns. Nature has canalized for us the responses for the main purposes of life. The child sucks, untutored; the youth courts and procreates without any special training; and every species has its characteristic set of bodily changes for meeting sudden dangers. The bodily mechanism of the individual, through the ceaseless and silent operation of nature for ages, has developed within itself the physiological changes that would enable the organism to face every crisis that the world has in store. Group life, too, has its strains and crises; its ever-changing situations call for sudden and rapid adjustments. And the human group, like Mother Nature, develops in the individual, all unknown to him, patterns of thoughts, feelings, and actions, which forewarn and prepare him with precision and regularity for each new social situation. In both cases, the failure of the mechanism, so developed, means death or injury. The group, like nature, is a pitiless tyrant. If you fail to play the rôle that has been assigned to you, you are laid aside as a social misfit, if you escape being banished from the *milieu*.

Man's Two Masters.—Man has two masters to serve. Physical nature holds him fast; her commands must be obeyed. The human group in which the individual lives is equally insistent in its demands. The individual normally strikes a middle course, placating both nature and society. All individuals in the group have to accept the terms offered by the physical world; hence, in ordinary cases, there is hardly any conflict between the two courses of action. A group of agricultural laborers has its pastimes and recreations, its jokes and arguments consonant with the hard physical exertion that nature calls for in exchange for the wherewithal to live. The individuals agree remarkably in their psycho-physical make-up, inasmuch as the amount of physical labor, fatigue, and vicissitudes of work leave little opportunity for the mind to develop divergent varieties. Accordingly, likes and dislikes, ideas and impulses of different individuals have the same pattern. The responses to nature and to the group converge and blend.

Occasions, however, arise when there is conflict between the demands of nature, or between the habits formed in the daily occupation of life and the responses to the group. Nature and habit alike demand that in rain and hailstorm the individual seek a covered shelter. Yet the festive merry-making of the group drags the individual from his shelter and gives predominance to the psycho-physical pattern prepared by the group. Between the complete union and the complete divergence, there are shades and gradations that elude notice.

But group behavior rarely bars the way of man's adaptation to the physical environment. It is true that holiday rejoicing goes on in the open air regardless of the inclemencies of the weather. Loyalty to the trade union demands starvation of the family. Patriotism calls for the supreme sacrifice. Yet the biting cold breaks up the holiday gathering. The agony of hungry children produces the blackleg.

The love of life and fear of death snap the bonds of loyalty. In the normal routine of life, the group patterns offer easy guidance to man's adaptation to the physical environment. For, biologically speaking, this adaptation is primary, and social adjustment is only an aid to it.

TOPICS

1. The significance of the pattern arrangement in mental life.
2. Difference of mental patterns according to occupations.
3. The significance of motor responses in group.
4. Difference between inanimate objects, animals and human beings as stimuli.
5. The consciousness of kind as a premise and as a fact to be explained.
6. Consciousness of other selves, normal and abnormal.

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CHAPTER V

MECHANISMS OF SOCIAL BEHAVIOR

Social Environment Defined.—The term “social environment” used in the preceding chapters need not necessarily mean an established social order with its traditions and institutions, although it does not exclude this. It signifies rather, the association of human beings similar in appearance and psycho-physical constitution, with modes of behavior some of which show uniformity, and others variability, as between individuals. Furthermore, in a human environment some, at least, of the motor responses of the individual would be directed to the group to which he belongs. The number of individuals necessary to constitute an environment may be small or indefinitely large. The distribution of individuals in space may vary between close physical contiguity and separation by great distances. The duration of association of human beings, too, may range between wide limits—from a few minutes to long centuries. Accordingly, a group may consist of a company in an omnibus, or of a race whose traditions extend over a number of generations. For the purpose of this study, therefore, “social environment” may be defined as a group of human beings with similar psycho-physical constitution and with behavior patterns directed to one another.

The number, time, and space factors undoubtedly determine the varieties of the social environment. It is number, for example, that changes the gathering of a few friends into a party; it is number, again, that changes a small group of spectators of a street accident into a crowd. Similarly, it is the space factor that changes an irritated public into an angry mob, as when the individuals come together on the public road to express their indignation, instead of in the

domestic circle or through the daily press. The influence of the duration factor is well illustrated by differences in the attitude of a mixed company of people on a short steamer trip or on a long ocean voyage. Each of the factors of number, space, and duration, then, is a determinant of the quality of the social environment.

Response or Reaction.—The term “response,” “reaction,” or “behavior” that we have employed requires definition. It covers all movements, those of the voluntary as well as of the involuntary muscles: movements both overt and incipient. It includes also the internal compensatory changes that are perceptible to the senses without any instrumental aid. A response or reaction pattern, accordingly, has for its constituents a series of muscular changes of voluntary or involuntary muscles, and a series of internal changes, visceral and vascular as well as glandular.

The latter class of changes have been called “compensatory.” So undoubtedly they were at one stage or other, in the course of organic evolution. The amount of muscular change in a previous stage of evolution required a much larger amount of internal change for maintaining the integrity of the organic system. But such compensation, in the present condition of the organism, is probably unnecessary or incommensurate with muscular activity. When a business man turns pale in the face of a crisis or feels exhilarated at a piece of good luck, the changes in the vascular or respiratory systems are not in keeping with the amount of effort needed for the exigency, probably no more than a few scratches with the pen. Yet the changes have survived as relics and serve to impart the peculiar coloring that distinguishes the emotive instinctive response pattern from others.

Social Response Patterns.—The development of society has endowed man with habitual and voluntary patterns which are superimposed upon the primitive motor patterns

The former are progressively more variable as between individuals and in different situations. The latter possess a greater degree of stability, uniformity, and invariability. Man's normal behavior is determined by a combination of three factors: his hereditary disposition brought forward from an age-long past, the character of the physical environment, and the character of the group in which he lives. It is almost impossible to estimate the influence of either of these separately. Still, it is possible to indicate the general manner of the working of the social environment.

The social environment, as we have already noticed, exercises only an inhibitory influence upon the behavior patterns. The different modes of habitual action are partly determined by the inhibitory action, of the various social environments in which they arise, upon the emotive-instinctive types of behavior. Habits of eating, dressing, worship, etc., are determined largely by the smaller environment of the family directly, and by the larger group of individuals indirectly. The social etiquette, political filiation, class attitude, religious belief, etc., are determined directly by the larger human environment and, indirectly, by the family.

Voluntary action has been defined as an action the course of which is represented by an idea or group of ideas antecedent to the initiation of movements. The ideas, thus, exercise an inhibitory control over the primary emotive instinctive modes of behavior, as well as over the habitual. These ideas, as well as all other psychic patterns, are determined by the social environment, and in the following paragraphs we shall endeavor to indicate how this is brought about. In general, we may state that the social environment merely serves to fix the limits within which the emotive-instinctive behavior has its full play. The range between the limits as well as the stability of the limiting factors vary widely according to a large number

of conditions, such as the character of the instinct, age, sex, racial habit, and history.

Problems of Social Modification.—It has been observed in the previous chapter that a social environment appeals primarily to the motor-phases of life. Thus, the limits that are set are those that primarily operate on movements or responses. The immediate problem that needs solution is how a social environment sets up inhibitions to actions so that the behavior is unconsciously modified; and the next question is how the contents and patterns of our mind are unconsciously modified by the social environment.

Hedonistic Regulation of Behavior.—We may approach the first problem with recognition of the fact that human beings of all grades and societies are subject to the hedonistic motive. The type of action that yields pleasure is continued; that which leads to pain is given up. The long period of nurture in the case of the human child makes pleasure and pain essentially dependent upon the human environment. The acts of the child are directed to the human beings around him who supply his wants and who thereby limit the range of his satisfaction. The child wants to play with his mother, but the mother cannot remain with him throughout his waking hours. The boy wants his mates to follow his whims, but they tease him. A fight ensues and the boy withdraws. The young man falls in love, but the maiden responds with friendship only. The natural wants receive but partial fulfillment due to the unresponsiveness of the human environment, which, in this way, habitually limits the time, place, or nature of the instinctive act that the individual can pursue. An overstepping of the limits imposed by the environment leads to pain. But, within the limits, the continuance of the act carries satisfaction. The hedonistic principle thus has its own automatic check. So far as the human environment through its responses determines the hedonistic principle, it

sets definite limits to the action of the individual. If the mother can fondle the infant whenever he cries, his impulse for the mother's company is satisfied within very wide limits; the shorter the duration, the narrower the limits. The game that the boy wishes to play must be shorn of pugnacious tendencies, and herein lie the limits. The disappointed lover must either seek a more responsive maiden, or remain satisfied with sisterly friendship. In every case, the range of satisfaction is narrowed. The individuals concerned, however, have no clear notion of the process of limitation. In fact, they are entirely unaware of it. The social modification of behavior is slow and unconscious.

Behavior Changes with the Environment.—There is another factor that modifies responses with equal efficacy. The behavior of the individual undergoes a rapid change as soon as the familiar environment of daily life is replaced by another. This holds true of the physical as well as the social environment. The change in the physical world must be quite appreciable in order that it may elicit a modified response. But a very slight change in the constitution of the human world would exercise a remarkable modifying influence upon the behavior of the individual. That is to say, man is more sensitive to the changes in the circle of his fellow-beings than to those in his physical surroundings; the differential threshold of change is very low. This is illustrated by many commonplace occurrences. The intrusion of a stranger may reduce a group of merry-making friends to silence. The sullen face of a single individual may damp the rejoicing of a score. The sudden loss of temper of an individual may upset the harmony of a social gathering for a whole evening. These and many other examples show how highly strung a human group may be, how slight a maladjustment may alter the character, not only in degree but also in quality, of a human group.

The instincts of the individual prepare, as it were, chan-

nels for their working in the known environment. Everyone, to a certain extent, may indulge in boasting in the family circle without making a nuisance of himself; or, within certain limits, show affection to those loved, in the habitual environment. There are special forms and conventions through which the emotive-instinctive modes of behavior reveal themselves in the human group in which one lives. In some cases, the character of the instincts at work is quite obvious; in other cases, disguises make them unrecognizable. These disguises, however, subtract from the satisfaction that the instincts seek. Courting in the presence of strangers must necessarily be limited by conventions, hence the mutual gratification is qualified. Men who would like to fight tooth and nail obtain but little satisfaction from a polite debate in the committee room. "Smutty" stories that habitually pass around the drinking-table must be garbed in conventional images to be tolerated in a mixed gathering. The disguising cloaks can be laid aside only when the environment changes from the unfamiliar to the familiar.

It is probably true that such wrappings are hardly ever removed completely. Familiar and unfamiliar social environments alike place certain limits to the operation of the instincts. In passing from the familiar to the unfamiliar social group, however, the individual passes from a state of greater to one of less satisfaction with reference to specific modes of instinctive responses. In other words, the facility of the working of instincts is limited by the new factors that alter the familiar into the unfamiliar. Every new factor of the human environment serves to modify the normal response of the individual.

The ever-changing character of the human environment, therefore, perpetually operates upon the response patterns of the individual. A man entering a new social set, a lawyer entering his profession, a young scholar taking up teaching

duties, each of these is embarrassed on entering a new environment; but, in a few years, nervousness is shaken off and behavior is adapted unconsciously to each change in the situation. It is a case of gradual habituation and of the consequent lapse of the conscious purpose.

A child grows to manhood in his family circle with few sharp breaks in the character of the environment. If such breaks do come, he adapts his behavior unconsciously to the successive changes. The arrival and departure of strangers, the variations in mood and behavior of the members of the family, the conduct of the servants—all these operate upon the motor system and discipline it in accepting gradually the entire series of taboos or inhibitions in their various forms and guises. Whenever there is a marked change in the human surroundings, we are especially aware of the way in which our behavior changes; when the change is gradual, we are unconscious of the modification of our responses. In fact, social education consists mainly in the process of this unconscious adaptation.

Clashing and its Modification or Avoidance.—The third factor that serves to modify behavior may be called “co-terminousness of actions.” Two men may be in love with the same maiden. The behavior of one ultimately is modified by the successful wooing of the other. Two persons may be hunting the same game. The successful claimant forces the other to abandon the prize. This principle, combined with the fact of unequal distribution of talents and opportunities in society, explains the sharply contrasted modes and attitudes of groups that we find, for instance, in the economic or the political domain. For the strong and the weak, through mutual adaptation to the situation, can develop special types of behavior to suit different occasions. The weak need not in every case come into conflict with and be subdued by the strong; they can desist from courses of action that lead them into conflict with others. A set of

unconscious inhibitions serves to limit and thus modify the behavior of the weak. At the same time, the strong and the deserving may assume a directive and aggressive attitude that offers a larger scope for their satisfactions and evolves a different set of taboo practices which in developed societies usurp the laudatory names of prestige, honor, etc. This unconscious timidity and attitude of self-assertion are to be found also in the case of different orders of gregarious animals, such as elephants, wolves, dogs, bisons, horses, etc.

The above mentioned phenomena of "coterminousness" of action and of disparity between normal responses and those in the unfamiliar environment, may be regarded as special instances of the operation of the hedonistic principle. For, in both these cases, the modification of behavior is ultimately brought about through the possibility of greater enjoyment of pleasure or avoidance of pain. But there is another process relatively independent of the hedonistic motive, which exercises a far-reaching influence upon the behavior of the individual. We may call it the principle of imitation and reciprocal response.

Imitative Response.—That the individual tends to repeat the responses of those around him, has long been recognized. It is also known that this process is unconscious. Tarde, in fact, sought to explain the influence of the social environment exclusively in terms of imitation. Later writers have shown that imitation, by itself, is not sufficient for the purpose. Besides, the concept of imitation as a special instinct has been overthrown by the destructive criticisms of Durkheim and Wundt. In fact there is no special instinct of imitation. We all know that the individual in a group unconsciously repeats some of the movements of other members of the same group. The action is mainly physical, it may not carry any special emotive coloring which is characteristic of an instinct. Common observation substantiates the statement that man tends to assume a bodily

posture similar to the geometrical configuration of the object perceived, and this need not have any emotional accompaniment. Lipps calls it "empathy" and explains, on this basis, a large number of illusions. Imitation, after all, may be nothing but a form of empathy under special conditions. Psycho-analysis has revealed a process of identification of one person with another. The usual identification is that of the masochist with a woman and of the sadist with a man. The same process of identification may be observed in the case of children; as when a child assumes the rôle now of one, and then of another, member of the family: and herein lies also the germ of our appreciation of the drama. Anthropologists similarly contend that dancing and singing, or even the discovery of tools and weapons by the primitive man, are often the outcome of imitation of familiar objects of the surrounding animate and inanimate nature. The process of identification is more noticeable when the object is a human being and so is more clearly revealed in a correspondence of movements. In the process of repetition, the individual is initiated into a new series of responses to which, for the time being, he is not accustomed.

These responses supervene upon the "native" instinctive movements of the individual, and either replace them or partially limit their scope. For each movement simply by virtue of its temporal course must necessarily displace others. Since the individual always figures as a member of one or another social group, actual or potential, the acquired responses become a permanent feature of the motor constitution of the organism.

Reciprocal Response.—But repetition is only one of the ways in which the modifying influence of the human group is exercised. There is another factor to which we shall give the name of "reciprocal response." A particular response is reciprocal to another when it is related to it in the same

way as an answer is related to the question. It is one of the stages of what Giddings calls "Pluralistic Behavior."¹ The fondling response of the mother when the offspring approach her is common to both men and animals. The cow licks the body of the calf, the cat sniffs at her kitten. The human mother hugs and kisses the crying baby. Similar phenomena are observable in the case of sexual responses. Again, the cawing of the black crow summons a whole flock; the bleating of the sheep has a similar effect. The response in the case of human beings may be articulate or incipient. A movement on the part of one person may evoke a well-marked reciprocal movement on the part of another. The parents and the children may each execute a complex series of movements. Lovers may keenly observe, follow, and embrace one another; or the courtship may be incipient, confined to mutual glances and movements of facial muscles, with a slight blush as the only response to a bold advance.

The reciprocal responses may have a positive or negative significance. The romping calf turns away from the stranger cow that does not respond. The human child runs to the mother, but pales and looks confused when he finds a stranger in his mother's chair. Or, again, his own mother's frown may check his advance. Similarly, the lover recoils when the maiden avoids his glance or exhibits contracted eyebrows. His conduct differs as he meets a glowing or a frigid countenance. No words need be spoken, simple signs or movements serve to check the course and alter the nature of reactions. The reciprocal responses, in such situations, are tacit signs for the continuance or discontinuance of the act.

Eye, Chief Vehicle of Human Response.—Among reciprocal responses, the most direct and important are mutual glances. A direct mutual glance represents the highest reciprocity in the entire field of human relationships. Both the positive movement of advance and the negative move-

¹ Giddings, *Studies in the Theory of Human Society*, Ch. XV.

ment of withdrawal can be expressed directly by the interaction of eye and eye. Thus, love and hate, aggression and self-sacrifice are all expressed by glances. It is for this reason that many primitive people believe that the eye is the seat of the soul, while idolators believe that the image of the god becomes endowed with life as the eyes begin to function. Simmel emphasizes the sociological significance of the eye, and shows that it has special reference to the expression of the face as the first object of vision between man and man. He observes: "The face as a medium of expression is entirely a theoretical organ; it does not act, as the hand, the foot, the whole body; it transacts none of the internal and practical relations of the man, it only tells about him. The peculiar and important sociological art of 'knowing' transmitted by the eye is determined by the fact that the countenance is the essential object of the inter-individual sight."¹

Evolution of Reciprocal Response.—The origin of the reciprocal responses is to be sought, therefore, in primitive reactions, positive and negative. A movement on the part of an individual is followed by a positive movement which gradually evolves into affirmative significance. The negative movement develops in the same manner. The positive movement of advance is complicated by that type of reaction which is likely to further the end in which the original movement seeks satisfaction. The negative movement of withdrawal, too, is complicated by another movement that may replace the end by a different one. The principle may be illustrated by sexual responses. The instinctive behavior of the male may elicit a positive movement on the part of the female. She may on her part respond sexually and show affirmative gestures. Thus, the physical forward movement would aid sexual responses. On the other hand, the female

¹Park and Burgess, pp. 356-61; see also Spykman, *The Social Theory of Georg Simmel*.

may withdraw and the process may be complicated by movements characteristic of fear and flight. Darwin points out that even insects express anger, terror, jealousy, and love by their stridulation. He shows that the chief expressive responses are innate or inherited. They are the last remnants or rudiments of strongly marked and intelligible movements; slight movements such as the erection of the hair, the exudation of perspiration, the state of the capillary circulation or breathing, represent the organic adjustments to particular situations which have survival value. It is well known that many of the inherited movements of sex expression such as those of respiration, peripheral vascular system and of the voluntary and involuntary muscles are connected with the gratification of sex, while the vocal organs were first developed for sexual purposes, that one sex might call or charm the other. The use of language has increased the power of reciprocal response, but the expressive movements of face and body still aid the force of language.

The reciprocal response emanates not only from the individual, male or female, but also from the group. The responses of the group, if they do not operate affirmatively, that is, if they do not point to the end sought by the instinctive movement of the individual, serve to inhibit or modify the original response. The romping of the child, if it does not elicit a smile or some other sign of approval, ceases or becomes less boisterous. The same holds true of the adult individual. The signs of social approval which are the more stable and developed forms of reciprocal response set the limits within which the instinctive-emotive motor pattern runs its course. Their effectiveness needs no proof.

Signs of Response.—Approval, coöperation, encouragement, are different modes of reciprocal response. Every group possesses its characteristic movements for these. Nodding and shaking the head, hand-clapping and patting on the back, shouting, jumping, placing oneself on the side

of the individual concerned, shaking the finger or hand from side to side, raising the eyebrows, etc., are some of the reciprocal movements in social intercourse. Most of them, as emotive expressions, possess an evolutionary history, as the studies of Darwin and others have shown. Considered in this light, they ultimately may be shown to be based upon the movement of advance when positive, and that of withdrawal when negative. For example, hand-clapping has been said to be the relic of the activity of hugging. This is characteristically an advance movement. Patting probably was employed by the primitive warrior to help the processes of respiration and circulation of his weary companion. This again involves advance. The difficulty in interpreting such movements lies in the fact that they are fragments or remnants of complete and complex action patterns.

Evolution of Speech.—The reciprocal responses lie at the basis of communication. For communication is principally the verbal articulation of the reciprocal responses. It operates in the same manner as these responses and serves to modify the instinctive movements. We have already referred to sounds made by animals and birds which afford an index of particular responses and emotional states and evoke correlative responses in other animals or birds. With the development of intelligence, such sounds gradually enter into the conscious situation and form, by a process of association, the links with the complete development of behavior. Romanes, Lloyd Morgan, and others have traced the origin and development of speech. Beginning with a sex call, the voice gradually becomes dissociated from sex in mammals and becomes a more social instrument; notes of anger and joy, fear and distress, alarm and warning come to be differentiated and serve as aids to social integration and control which man has not yet outgrown. The savage has his yells when he fights and his moans when he is helpless and seeks assistance. Anthropologists suggest that the

stimulation of emotions in tribal dance and music, in strenuous or coöperative labor, contributed to develop tone and gesture into the rudiments of human speech.

Laughter.—An unconscious mode of the social control in man is laughter, one of whose functions is to correct anti-social conduct, or bodily, mental, or moral infirmity which is not species-maintaining. Where sympathy and imagination have not developed, as among the primitive peoples, laughter, though brutal and heartless, has served to express strong approval or disapproval and has been of great survival-value.

Prohibition or Taboo.—The primary mode of control of instincts through verbal communication is *taboo*. When handed down as a tradition, it often loses its explicit character of verbal articulation and lapses into signs of approval and disapproval. Another way of control is in the form of demonstrative communication. A course of action is prohibited and an alternative is pointed out. "Don't do this!" is but an attenuated form of the primitive taboo, or of an established code of morals.

Even the articulated prohibition may operate unconsciously. There is no perpetual process of broadcasting of prohibitions. Therefore, social groups must rely on the individual's retentive capacity and ability to learn by experience. These, however, do not always function on the level of consciousness. On the contrary, these bring about the desired end more often through unconscious habits. The prohibitions, in other words, operate as dispositions or "cortical" sets.

The Hedonistic Principle in its different applications, and Imitation and Reciprocal Response, are, accordingly, the factors that work unconscious modifications in the behavior of the individual. They set limits within which the instinctive emotive action pattern seeks its end. The individual is born into a group and these factors are brought into

operation by the different groups of which the individual happens to be a member. The action pattern of the individual, in its habitual form, is but the resultant of the interaction between these factors and the primitive emotive-instinctive endowments. Thus the everyday behavior of the individual, almost to its minutest detail, is determined by the social environment.

TOPICS

1. Application of Darwin's theory of expression of the emotions to the explanation of social responses.
2. The social significance of facial expression and suggestion.
3. The social basis of speech.
4. Modes of the social control of individual behavior.
5. Laughter and gesture as social censors.
6. Taboos and prohibitions in civilized society.

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CHAPTER VI

SOCIAL ADAPTATION OF IDEAS AND FEELINGS

The modification of instinctive responses discussed in the last chapter has an important bearing upon their organization or pattern formation. We shall preface our study with a general consideration of instincts and instinct patterns.

Instincts and their Combination.—In the first place, whatever the ultimate and irreducible number of instincts may be, empirically we find a plurality of modes of behavior of the emotive-instinctive type; as, for example, the instincts of aggression, flight and submission, sex, parental behavior, food-seeking, etc. In the ultimate analysis, they may or may not be reduced to a smaller number. Instinctive behavior may be defined, in the present context, as an hereditarily transmitted and definitely systematized series of muscular activities correlated with characteristic emotions and associated with a group of objects that lead to the cessation of those activities.

In the second place, human beings rarely manifest the symptoms of a single instinct. More than one operate on most occasions, and in such situations they combine or alternate. The process and conditions of their combination have been fully considered by Professor McDougall and need not be recapitulated. What we wish to point out is that in every such combination, the constituent responses are related as “focal” and “marginal.” Such a relation means nothing more than the fact that symptoms of one are more observable than those of others. In the courting of the male, for instance, the manifest amorous behavior conceals the responses connected with aggression. In sadistic love “the affectionate strivings know no other goal than to cause their object pain and agony, varying all the way

from humiliating suggestions to the harshest physical ill-treatment."¹ When the sexual impulse has reached a certain degree of satiety, the aggressive behavior comes to the forefront and may result in marital trouble. This relation holds good, also, with respect to the emotive adjunct of physical responses in these cases. Of the emotions that combine, one may have a greater diffusive effect than others; and hence, the latter often lie unobserved.

Instinctive Ideas and Idea-patterns.—Thirdly, each instinct, besides the emotive color, carries a headlight of ideas. The ideas of a person who is in love and of another who struggles for his daily bread, are very different in kind and arrange themselves in quite different patterns. Instincts, however, have a tendency to blend with one another. The act of flight usually conceals a tendency and a preparation to fight. This is true as much of military tactics as of individual behavior. Over-submissiveness, likewise, raises suspicions of a contrary motive hidden behind the manifest behavior. When such blending takes place, the connected ideas, too, combine into new patterns. Those related to the "focal" or preponderating response occupy the focus of attention while others recede into the margin and contribute to the context and meaning of the former. A change in the relative preponderance of instinctive responses leads to a change in the pattern of ideas.

Instinct-modifying Factors.—Lastly, in the preceding chapter we have shown how the human environment modifies the instinctive patterns of reaction. There are, however, other modifying factors which operate upon man with at least equal force. It would be simplifying matters unwarrantably to lose sight of these. Three such factors must be considered. There is, in the first place, the physical environment to which reference was made in the first chapter. Objects of the physical world to a certain extent elicit,

¹Freud, *General Introduction to Psycho-Analysis*, p. 264.

and also inhibit, instinctive behavior. The relation between seasonal changes and the phenomenon of migration of birds is familiar to ornithologists. Sex instinct, too, has its season of excitement. Again, the environment that encourages hunting, fighting, or deeds of daring, necessarily inhibits the instinct of flight; and the situation that calls forth the whole energy to the solution of the food problem necessarily checks all other instincts, or, at best, arranges them in conformity with the dominant mode of behavior. Professor McDougall, in his explanation of the manner in which instincts are modified, speaks of their organization round certain objects. When these are of the physical environment, the particular organization of instincts, or rather their pattern formation, is clearly determined by that environment.

In the second place, the physiological condition is of supreme importance. The condition of the body at any moment is the resultant of the interaction between the physical environment and the hereditary factors. But we are justified in speaking of it as a condition apart from the physical, inasmuch as it operates as a limit. Health and disease obviously facilitate and inhibit various instincts. So, also, do the normal conditions of fatigue, of sleep, of hunger and thirst. In fact, the increase of activity of the visceral and the vascular systems gives rise to organic sensations which have a determining influence upon the course of emotions. And emotions, as Professor McDougall says, are inseparable adjuncts of instincts. Furthermore, recent studies in the function of the endocrine organs amply show their influence on the psychical constitution and processes. The working of the sexual glands, of thyroid and parathyroids, as well as of the pituitary gland, leaves its impress upon the normal instinctive operations in manifold ways. The influence of the bodily mechanism, as a whole, upon instinctive responses is beyond doubt.

In the third place, recent studies in abnormal psychology have brought home to us the influence of unconscious complexes. Freud and his followers have shown decisively how the behavior patterns organize and disorganize themselves through the mechanism of the unconscious. Instances of sexual anæsthesia show how the sexual act may altogether cease and those of sublimation, also, prove the distribution of the various instincts, as focal, marginal, and unconscious. As has been indicated, we mean by instincts, in such cases, the empirically distinguishable units of behavior pattern.

Behavior of Complex Origin.—These factors, along with the social environment, determine the behavior pattern. They are not mutually independent, but each modifies the effect of others; they are all present and active at the same time. This implies that man's behavior is actually determined not by any one factor but by a complex interlacing of all the factors. We have emphasized, and shall continue to insist upon the importance of the social factor in our analysis of behavior. We do not wish to suggest, however, that it is always clearly recognizable in its manner of working.

Focal and Marginal Relations.—The accommodation of our eyes to an object yields a vivid impression of that object, while the surrounding objects that stimulate the peripheral retina yield less vivid impressions. Impressions can thus be classified as *focal* and *marginal*. We find a similar relation between ideas. A group of connected ideas appears at one moment as holding the focus of attention, and the very next moment yields place to another group which hitherto had been lying relatively obscure in the margin. This alternation of place between the focal and the marginal systems is connected with facilitation and inhibition of instinctive responses. In the case of the visual phenomena mentioned above, the change is connected with changes in the motor adjustment of the eye. The explana-

tion of this is readily supplied by the action theory of Münsterberg.

In its general form this theory runs thus: Every sensation and with it every content of consciousness is determined by two sets of factors: peripheral stimulation and motor discharge. The quality of sensation depends upon the place of stimulation; its intensity, upon the strength of the stimulus; the pleasure-pain value, upon the central source of motor discharge; and its vividness upon the openness and closedness of the channels of discharge. The implication of the theory is that "the preparedness and unpreparedness for action in the motor centers become the regulating conditions for the reënforcement and suppression in the whole world of sensation and ideas."¹ Thus, complete or partial inhibition of instincts leads them to retire from the field with their appanage of ideas. The retirement may be complete or partial; if it is partial, the instinct and its associated ideas lurk in the background and are discernible.

The arrangement of ideas and emotions into the "focal-marginal" pattern, therefore, is clearly an outcome of the analogous arrangement of instincts. And the latter is brought about through the modifying operation of the social environment. The prolonged infancy of the child makes the hedonic factors dependent, as has been noted in the previous chapter, upon the human beings around him. The modification of responses through pleasure and pain is a result, accordingly, of the social environment. So also, more obviously, are the changes wrought by the factor of Reciprocal Response. As soon as a response pattern is inhibited, it recedes into the background. But the human organism is essentially dynamic. The system of instincts is always in an unstable condition: as soon as one recedes, others take its place. And hence it is that we perceive a

¹ Münsterberg, *Psychology, General and Applied*, p. 140.

perpetual succession of psychic and motor patterns in their various arrangements.

Unconscious Mental Changes.—These changes in the mutual relation of ideas and in their pattern formation are effected unconsciously. In the first place, even when we are aware of the determining factors of the environment—when we note, for instance, signs of approval and encouragement—we are but dimly aware, if at all, of the scene-shifting that goes on in the sphere of perceptions, ideas, or feelings. For in our normal life we are not given to constant introspection; we are concerned with the ends to be achieved rather than with the internal processes. Secondly, the social environment in which we are placed in our daily life changes very little in its character from day to day or hour to hour. Hence the influences that it exerts become stereotyped through repetition. The various mental scenes, too, unobtrusively succeed one another without inviting introspective attention. In the third place, the instincts that our normal social and physical environment calls forth, become stereotyped in their pattern formations, and it is seldom that any unusual combination of responses occurs. Thus, the ideas correlated with these fail to incite our mind to introspective endeavors. It is for these reasons that psycho-physical changes produced by the ordinary *milieu* of our lives pass unnoticed. In other words, the social *milieu* silently works changes in our natures. It arranges our thoughts, ideas, and feelings into patterns; it organizes our responses in peculiar formations. But all these lie beyond our ken. It is only when the habitual is disturbed by the unusual, when the humdrum tenor of mind is interrupted by novel feelings and thoughts, that we wake up to an awareness of change.

So far we have spoken of the arrangement of ideas as if it were merely a case of juxtaposition. From the account given it probably has appeared that the focal and the mar-

ginal stand together, one in the light, and the other in the shadow. We must now amplify the account.

Submerged Instincts and their Fragmentary Expression.—Some of the instincts are inhibited to a degree beyond the pale of recognition. So also are the ideas and emotions correlated with them. But their influence is not, therefore, lost. The unconscious psycho-physical systems interpolate with the conscious, including the focal and the marginal. Though the whole inhibited system would be at work, it will most probably be represented by a fragment of the whole system of ideas and of the total response pattern. Intonation and gesture often invest the spoken word with a new meaning; for they reveal factors of previous experience that sometimes elude the introspection even of the agent concerned. The literature of psycho-analysis bears ample testimony to this. The casual slip of tongue, the apparently inconsequential witticism, may express deep-seated sympathies and antipathies long-forgotten. Similarly, a slight movement of the eye, a negligible contortion of a set of facial muscles, may express anxiety, adoration, or grief; the elaborate movements of expression have disappeared, leaving only a few fragmentary signs. It is difficult to reconstruct the complete pattern of ideas and of actions from the fragments, and hence it is that they usually pass unnoticed. But sometimes they reveal their true character by obtruding on the field of consciousness in a more aggressive manner; and they may in most cases be traced through analysis.

This is a rather rough summary of the processes brought to light by the psycho-analytic movement. It indicates clearly how the inhibitory action of the social environment leads to the formation of patterns, psychic and motor, without involving any awareness on the part of the individual. One is entertaining a friend. If the more vivid ideas are isolated, they would indicate, say, a context of business,

and the responses would carry the same meaning. If the marginal processes were brought to light they would show personal liking or fascination, and the responses would indicate a motive of seeking physical contiguity. But the fragments of the unconscious revealed in the focal and the marginal, when traced to their context, might indicate homo-sexuality in thought and action. The patterns belonging to these planes of the psycho-physical life interpolate without any knowledge or effort on the part of the individual. And the formation of the planes, as well as their mental influence, is determined by particular social situations.

Mental Contents Determined by Social Environment.—

The formation of patterns, however, is only one of the results of social influence. The contents which arrange themselves into these patterns are no less determined by the human environment. We shall try to indicate the manner in which this is brought about.

(1) It is undoubtedly a moot question whether attention follows the lead of sensation or the reverse. It is something like the problem of the hen and the egg. But we need not discuss here a theoretical issue. We merely draw attention to the fact that the direction of attention is a determinant of the character of sensation. Sensations are elicited by objects we attend to. And objects are attended to because they are connected in one way or another with the instincts. The facilitation of instinct by the social environment implies that a particular set of objects is attended to, and a particular set of sensations elicited. And all other psychical processes follow the lead of sensations. Thus, a particular set of mental contents is the outcome of the influence of social environment upon the motor nature of man.

(2) The principle of "back-stroke" has been explained in a previous chapter.¹ Each step in the course of the

¹Ch. IV. Cf. Lloyd Morgan, *Instinct and Experience*, Chs. I., II.

motor-phenomenon sends a back-current of sensations, mostly kinæsthetic. With these may be associated organic sensations of the internal organs. These, in their turn, call up associated images and ideas, the effects of past experience. Hence, the facilitation or inhibition of a particular set of motor phenomena gives rise to a particular set of mental contents. And the factors that determine the motor-responses are also responsible for the mental contents.

(3) The relation between the mental contents so far has been represented as that between the focal and the marginal. But that is only a superficial and insufficient account of the phenomenon. Images and ideas not only lie outside one another but also blend and inter-penetrate. Of the many contributions of Professor Freud, not the least is the discovery of the modes in which mental contents combine. In fact, it is regrettable that this aspect of Freud's analysis, which is of great importance for general psychology, has not stimulated the interest and consideration that it deserves.

How Ideas Combine—Condensation Illustrated.—Condensation, transference, symbolization, secondary elaboration, projection, and dramatization are some of the modes in which ideas combine. It is not our purpose to enter into an exposition of the psycho-analytic doctrine; we merely indicate the way in which mental contents are transformed in their mutual relation. For an example, let us take condensation. A is in love with B but marries C. He consequently has to inhibit the sex-instinct with reference to B. But the inhibited instinct and ideas blend with those that are operative. Consequently, the image of C is blended often with that of B; and there is frequent risk of mistake even in such details as the utterance of pet names which even the most scrupulous care on A's part does not always enable him to avoid. This blending of the two images is an instance of condensation. It is obvious that the inhibited ideas and images do not necessarily drop out

of consciousness; nor do they merely stand apart from the more vivid experiences. They blend and constitute a total content of which they are part and parcel. The ideas, through blending, thus constitute a new mental content.

Since no environment, social or physical, can ever satisfy the insistent clamor of various emotive instinctive demands, some of them inevitably must be repressed, and, in consequence, a new mental content arises in the way indicated. Further, our normal awareness does not reveal to us the fact that there has been such blending of ideas and images. It is the total formation, the blended resultant, that operates as a whole upon the psycho-physical system. It is only a careful, deliberate analysis or a marked change in the habitual processes that can bring this matter to light.

Mental Life Shaped by Social Environment.—We have indicated in a previous chapter¹ that probably the psychic elements are not markedly influenced in their origin by the social environment. These depend upon the normal operation of the sense organs and of the rest of the nervous system, central and peripheral. But the elements rarely find their way in an unmixed state to the field of attention. We always find them in adult life in a state of combination. Consequently, it is the combined states, the empirical contents and patterns, that constitute mental life for all practical purposes. And the processes of combination that give rise to empirical contents and patterns, as has been shown, are determined largely by the social environment. It has also been shown that the environment operates silently, and the individual is not aware of it. Thus the mind of the individual becomes socially fashioned day by day.

What is the outcome of this process of socialization, the persistent influence of the human environment?

Mobility of Social Environment and Response.—As regards motor responses there develops in the individual the

¹ Ch. IV.

capacity to accustom himself to the various orders of the human *milieu* in which he may find himself. A suppleness of the physical organization to imitate, and to respond reciprocally to the actual and incipient movements of other human beings, is the most obvious result. The body is released from the bonds of stereotyped responses demanded by a static physical environment; it develops plasticity and mobility through the necessity of adjusting itself to the ever-changing human surrounding. For, as has been shown in the first chapter, the human environment is essentially mobile. It would cease to be human and living should it remain stable and stereotyped. Indeed, if differentiation of reactions and increase in the variability of responses are the lines that the evolution of motor functions has followed, as it seems to have followed, this can be explained only as the result of the adaptation of the organic functions to a social environment essentially mobile and changing.

There has been similar evolution of the psychic contents and patterns. The course of development that mind seems to have followed is in the direction of a larger variability of pattern formation. Not only is there a larger variety of contents and patterns in minds that we call higher, but there is also a capacity to shift the mental scenes quickly, to change one pattern for another and to respond to slight changes in the environment with correspondingly slight modifications of psychic patterns and contents. Such a consummation can arise only as the result of adaptation to an environment which is essentially mobile and dynamic. The apparently static world of space and matter cannot sufficiently account for the richness, suppleness, and imperceptible graduation of psychic life. We must seek an explanation in the ever-changing set of responses that make up the social environment of man.

Social Environment a Necessary Assumption.—A question naturally arises at this point: since the social environ-

ment is a set of mutually modifying responses, how can such an environment arise at all? How can one individual acquire the capacity to share in a social environment if we do not assume the same capacity in other individuals? For it is through the mutual adjustment of responses that this capacity arises in each.

To such a question a satisfactory explanation can only be metaphysical. We can no more explain the ultimate origin of society than we can that of life and mind. We must make an initial assumption of their existence to enable us to proceed with an investigation of their nature. As a matter of fact, we find man, or any organism, to be a member of a social *milieu* from the beginning. Thus, the assumption of the social environment has its justification.

TOPICS

1. The application of Münsterberg's Action Theory to the explanation of social behavior.
2. Social behavior, manifest and incipient.
3. The psycho-physical effects of a simple and stereotyped and a complex and changing social *milieu*.

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CHAPTER VII

RÔLE OF MIND IN GROUP FORMATION

Human Adaptation to Physical and Social Environment.

—The physical world presents to man a situation to which he must adapt himself that he may live. From the botanical and zoölogical resources of his environment, man must obtain his food and materials for his arts of production; it is tropical heat or polar snow that stimulates him to obtain shelter or clothing; it is a world of wild beasts also that compels him to strive for supremacy. All these develop the senses, conceptual processes, and emotions, as well as modes of action, in a particular pattern and shape them into particular functional systems, so that the individual may cope successfully with the forces operating upon him. When his psycho-physical system is not plastic enough for this process of molding, man fails in adaptation. The mental capacities are of the same biologic value as the protective coloring of animals and the physical equipment for sexual selection. Their variations are caused in the same way as the adaptive structural and functional variations of bodily organs.

The psycho-physical patterns of individuals are determined, also, as we have seen in earlier chapters, by the social *milieu* in which the individual lives. In the case of the physical situation, the process of adaptation consists in shaping the static world into termini of human endeavors, into objects that lead to a temporary cessation of efforts and thus to organic equilibrium and well-being. Where external objects defeat man's efforts at molding them to his needs, it is his ideas, feelings, and behavior that must change.

In the case of the human *milieu*, the process of adaptation assumes a different character. A human being appeals to another as a system of responses, as a center which radiates activities. Adaptation of one person to others, then, consists primarily in making the responses coterminal in their pursuit of the same object. In primitive orders of life and in simpler modes of behavior this implies the repetition of the same movements by different individuals. This is the basis of imitation. The object is the same for all; the final or consummatory response—*i.e.*, the manner of dealing with the object that restores, for the time being, the organic equilibrium—is similar; and the preparatory responses that lead to the final stage possess also a great deal of resemblance in their execution, spatial features, and duration. Such, for instance, are the different types of tropisms and compound reflexes. The movements of each individual, called forth by the common stimulus, are reënforced by similar movements of others. The simultaneous noise of birds and animals is a familiar instance. The external object and the first set of responses executed by an individual act as joint stimuli eliciting movements of others.

Variety of Response or Behavior.—The increase of the structural complexity of the organism brings with it a complexity and variability of responses. Thus, the stimulus-object may be common to all individuals; and the consummatory response also may be similar; but the preparatory responses would vary in different individuals because of differences in their bodily conditions, their relative position in space, and the character of other objects which may operate also as stimuli. The group in the complex orders of life, accordingly, would manifest a great deal of variability in regard to the behavior of individuals.

To casual observers, such individual differences as in behavior would appear chaotic. A spectator who sees a

complex game for the first time similarly finds no clue to the reciprocal behavior of the players. Yet the normal variations of responses as between different individuals are nicely harmonized. The orientation of different individuals in space—when a pack of dogs, for instance, runs after a hare—involves the fact that the movement of each would be influenced by that of others. The temporal order in which the stimulus-object is to be approached also determines the reciprocal influence of the behavior of the different units. A street dog that has picked up a piece of bone makes its companions growl. This leads to the affective influence of one organism upon others—a factor which probably is the most important determinant of mutual modification of responses. The presence of one individual usually stimulates a more or less intensive feeling, or its physiological equivalent, in others. If the effect be of a positive or agreeable character, there would be responses of approach; if the effect be of a negative or disagreeable nature, the responses would be those of withdrawal. Lastly, each individual organism is stimulated at the same time by several objects. Though one of these may be especially selected for a complete series of responses, the other channels of behavior are not entirely inhibited. These interpolate in the course of the dominant mode of behavior. Again, each individual has to adapt himself to the movements of others. The movement toward the stimulus-object thus becomes complicated by these tendencies.

Chains of Reciprocal Response.—Such variations in response organize themselves in the form of what we have called, in a previous chapter, Reciprocal Response. The reciprocal responses, in the course of biological evolution, have organized into chains of movements each link of which directly evokes the next. These are the familiar social instincts of sex, self-assertion, submission, etc. The activities of one individual reciprocally evoke instinctive move-

ments in other individuals and in this way markedly modify the process of adaptive response of each individual to the physical object. The behavior of organic beings has a primary direction towards the physical world; but this direction is deflected by the reciprocal responses. The psychology of the individual seeks to study the responses of the individual elicited by the external world in abstraction from the deflection of behavior caused by the social environment. In studying the group, on the other hand, our attention must be directed to the amount and nature of the deflection brought about through the activities of other fellow-beings. But the concrete behavior is a resultant of both these factors.

Interference in Response.—The same object may stimulate a number of individuals to activity leading to a consummatory response. But the reciprocal movements may be such that they interfere with the preparatory responses so that the consummatory stage may not be reached at all, at least by some of the group. In such a case, the group breaks up. When the reciprocal movements are such that they do not deflect the preparatory movements from the consummatory act, the group endures. And the most stable group is that in which each individual's preparatory responses reënforces those of others. Thus, in the case of simple organisms, where an external object evokes a relatively uniform type of behavior that does not manifest marked differences in phase, as between preparatory and consummatory, the group can be explained adequately in terms of the stimulus and the response. But, when the external stimulus evokes a complex series of preparatory responses influencing one another, the nature of the group can only be understood if expressed in terms of the total set of movements which arises.

Group Response Not Simultaneous: Emergence of Leadership.—Normally, the processes of adaptation to a situa

tion do not begin simultaneously in all the individuals concerned. An individual, or a set of individuals, first responds to the stimulus situation and the others follow suit. This is as true of man as it is of most of the sub-human organisms living a group life. Throw a stone at a flock of birds, and some will fly at once but the others take more time. A flock of sheep sights a dog at a distance; when one or two from the middle begin to run, the movement spreads. The same is true of a human crowd.

The group, judging from these facts, is not brought into being all at once, nor do the members influence one another in an infinite series of permutations and combinations. The center from which the movement first sets in not only directs individuals to act with reference to the stimulus object, but also stimulates reciprocal responses. In other words, it is the leader, human or sub-human, that guides activities with relation to the external object. Again, the world of objects appeals to several channels of action at the same time and the individual has to pursue one particular line to the exclusion of others. The leader's action singles out the course of behavior for the followers. The leader, whether regarded as an individual or as a small group, is an essential factor in group life.

Group Life Summarized.—The most obvious form of group life is the collocation of individuals in a limited space and at a given time. It may be a human group or it may be an association of sub-human organisms. It possesses, in any case, the characteristics that we have discussed above. In the first place, every group is called into being by an external object or situation; or by an organic condition such as sex-craving or hunger, which impels the individuals to act as if they were stimulated by a common external object. This is the *sine qua non* of all organic movement. Secondly, the movement starts from a particular individual or group of individuals and is taken up by others. This is

the factor we have termed the center or "leader" of the movement. Thirdly, the individuals in action function as stimuli to one another and evoke reciprocal responses. The leader mediates between the individuals and the external stimulus. The totality of these responses constitutes the group-process.

Similarity of Group Members.—But by far the most important condition of group formation lies in the psycho-physical similarity of the constituent members. The individuals would not act alike unless they resembled one another.

The points of similarity may vary. It may be merely physical similarity; it may be resemblance in behavior, *e.g.*, similarity of dress, deportment, or language. Or the resemblance may be in ideas and ideals.

Stimuli Translated into Emotions.—All these factors are translated into mental terms on the psychic planes of life. The most frequent translation is that of the stimulus. The primary mode of translation is into feelings and emotions. When a situation, internal or external, occurs, the organism *feels* the situation as it proceeds to act. It is probably this fact which caused James to observe that instinct is the mode of acting upon a situation as emotion is of feeling it. The psycho-physical mechanism by which such emotions arise has already been considered. It must be pointed out here that emotions are capable of acting as indicators of stimuli: they serve in some way as substitutes for the situation in which they arise. The negative reactions in lower organisms are mediated more by feelings than by percepts of the stimuli. The blind fury of animals which fall into traps laid by their enemies, from whom they seek to fly, and the blind fear that leads men into the zone of danger which they want to avoid, instance this emotional translation. Emotions, however, from their very nature are pecu-

liar to individuals. Hence, the stimulus will elicit different emotions in different individuals.

Individual Perception.—The perceptual interpretation of objects comprises the sense-impressions, ideas, and images into which impressions are assimilated and the kinæsthetic sensations arising from incipient movements that impart meaning to the perceptual whole. Perception usually comes simultaneously with feelings but is sometimes superseded by them. The stimulus situation in the psychic plane is almost always a perceived situation. But much of the perception is specific to the individual; images and ideas are woven into the individual's life-history. Hence, the stimulus as perceived differs in different persons. And the same is true of images representative of the stimulus and of ideas and concepts that serve so frequently as substitutes for the stimulus in complex forms of mental life.

Leader, How Perceived.—Leadership is likewise translated into psychosis. The leader may be a perceived individual represented not only by sensations but also by images, ideas, and their accompanying emotions. Moreover, the personality of the leader has a meaning for his followers. And the meaning is essentially the kinæsthetic impressions, images, and emotions evoked in the minds of followers and projected to the person of the leader. The meaning element is the most important of all psychic representations. It indicates the nature of responses, direct and reciprocal, that the leader is capable of eliciting. The leader, as perceived in the complex orders of mental life, is often superseded by a system of ideas and thoughts in such manner that his physical being recedes into the background. This happens in all organized groups and institutions. As in the case of the stimulus, the psychic representation of the leader is specific for each individual.

Incipiency of Movement.—Movements, objectward or

reciprocally directed, are complex because they involve a series of muscular and other changes. Thus dogs growl, rush at their opponents, and then fight. A covetous look, a stealthy approach, and a bite,—these are the steps that mark the usual food-seeking activity. But nature in the course of evolution develops short cuts: some of the steps may be omitted and remain incipient. Inciency in most cases means that the movement in question is mainly intra-organic and not amenable to perception. It may, however, manifest itself on critical occasions. Thus, clapping, which is supposed to be an attenuated form of embracing, yields place to the latter in intense emotional situations. The sidelong glance of coquetry may develop into full-fledged sexual pursuit when social inhibitions are absent. Inciency thus does not mean total suppression; it signifies merely a change from the manifest to the latent.

Inciency of movement leads to *economy of effort*, for a few links of a chain of movement may indicate the possible course of a complicated act. It becomes, therefore, unnecessary for the individual to pursue an act to its consummation. A mere frown is sufficient to indicate disapproval, without going as far as to clench the fist or fight. Inciency also opens up the possibility of a *variety of responses* in the social *milieu*. Every man has to respond in different ways when he is in company. To one person he is all smiles, to another he merely nods, from the third he turns away; while he follows the fourth with rapt attention. If the tendencies revealed in each of these fragmentary forms of behavior were carried to completeness, social intercourse would come to an end. The act of avoiding a person would either put the individual to flight or lead to a fight to the finish. In either case, there would be no time to take notice of other persons. Similarly, in polite society, a man may indulge in flirtation within certain limits, the

overstepping of which would cause him to be excluded from that society. It is because of this incipency of a large part of our complex series of instinctive responses that social behavior is possible. For social behavior implies that the individual should be capable of responding in a variety of ways to various persons within a very short period of time. On the other hand, it is the social *milieu* that suppresses phases of a chain of behavior into incipency and allows some of the links to represent the whole, so that a group may run through a whole gamut of instincts in the brief moments of its existence.

Lastly, incipency of movement makes integration of behavior possible. Thus the isolated fragments of different instinctive activities may chain out into a complete movement representing the integration of the primary instincts. When a street ruffian forces his attentions upon a girl, his actions show the blending of the instincts of aggression as well as of sex. If each kind of response appeared in full, there would be no possibility of blending; each would follow out its own distinctive course. Group life, in so far as it encourages suppression and consequent incipency, favors the integration of the normal drives into complex formations.

Social Inhibition and Individual Differentiation.—The process of repression is determined partly by the forces that operate upon the individual and partly by the latter's native endowment—the degree of insistence of his primary drives. We are familiar with the unmannerly person and the bounder in social circles; we also know the raw recruit on the parade-ground. They have not learned to inhibit phases of their psycho-motor equipment that their fellow beings dislike to see exhibited. The native tendency has not yet completely yielded to the social standards. Herein lies the irreducible individual difference or idiosyncrasy.

While an instinct in its full operation exhibits all individuals on the same level, the factor of social inhibition introduces personal peculiarities in the responses.

The introduction of the psychic process operates in the same manner. The suppressed links of the movement do not disappear altogether from the sphere of action. They appear in the psychic field as feelings and as images. The signs of anger may be few and unnoticed; but emotions and correlated ideas fill the gap; and these, linked with the bodily changes, would represent the act of aggression quite as much as the primitive method of assault and battery. In other words, ideas, images, and feelings serve to represent the links of the chain that are lost to view. But, since these are bound up with the special psycho-physical constitution and personal history of the individual, these manifest individual differences. The psychic representations of responses, as emotions, kinæsthetic images, and ideas, all tend to differentiate individuals, while the direct call of the physical environment makes them resemble one another.

Psychic Life, the Source of Individual Differences.—

The foregoing survey shows that the psychic factors, when these supervene upon the organic functions and responses, serve to introduce differences as between individual and individual. The stimulus, and the leader at the lower planes of psychic life, possess approximately the same value for all individuals, as indicated by the uniformity of their responses. But, when these are translated into psychic states, there arise differences in the type of images, in the character of ideas, and the qualities of emotions in different minds. For one person the stimulus may be a perceived physical object, and for another it may be a mere memory-image or an imagined reality, and for a third it may be a mere concept. The manner of psychic translation in these cases makes a vast difference in the effect

principle holds in regard to the psychic translation of the fact of leadership. Responses evoked by the perception of the leader vary greatly from those evoked by his memory or by ideas connected with him. And the leader perceived as a mere man commands less respect and devotion than when he is viewed in the light of ideals and principles. Hence, different individuals would be affected differently by the physical and the human environment. And the responses to the two types of environment also manifest individual differences, as has been shown, through their translation into psychic factors.

It is for this reason that human group life is characterized by a high degree of variation. The group life, we must insist, is essentially motor in its nature. And all the constituent factors of the motor situation, the physical and the social stimuli, as well as the conditions of response, are determined by factors that are peculiar to the individual. The complex psychic life that man possesses accounts for this emphasis of the particularistic tendency; for the psychic life seems to have been shaped by nature to bring out what is specific to the individual constitution.

Individual Variation the Cause of Group Variation.—

It is for this reason that human institutions are so rich in their variety and so variable in their nature. They arise through particular correlations of specific mental characteristics of individuals which are never constant. And as soon as the degree of correlation diminishes, the group decays. The variety of psychic processes, the rapid shifting of scenes and colors, affords ample material for the growth of new institutions. It is this variety of mental patterns which accounts for the striking diversity of groups and cultural institutions in the history of civilization.

Solidarity of the Group.—In spite of this apparent want of uniformity, human groups show a degree of permanence and solidarity against the inroads of natural and other fac-

tors that make for decay and degeneration. The solidarity of subhuman groups depends essentially on two factors: the constant value of the physical stimuli and the fixity in the channels of response. The physical object appeals with equal force to a number of individuals which respond in the same manner. And in this way group life is brought about. The group life of man, too, is certainly conditioned in the same way. For man, like many animals, is a social being, and his native impulses, equally with theirs, are influenced by the physical world. But the human group has a different origin. "Man adjusts himself to his environment, not only through the unconscious urges of his nature, but also when these fail or come into conflict, in terms of purposive ideas. In fact, most of the normal human associations, like clubs, firms, business organizations, etc., are modes of adjustments of the individual brought about through ideas."

Dual Basis of Human Grouping.—Human institutions, then, are based upon a double set of correlations. In the first place, there is a correlation between the native instincts and impulses. When these are stimulated by the same object and in the same manner, a group or an institution results. Secondly, there is a correlation between ideas and other mental processes. When individuals possess the same psychoses, they come together. The normal human institution is a blending of both of these factors.

Summary: How Individual Agreement Arises.—The question arises how individuals come to agree with one another. How is it that similar instinctive responses are evoked in different organisms? How is it that individuals exhibit the same mental pattern? We have already attempted to answer these questions in our preceding chapters and we shall but reiterate: (1) Individuals manifest the same instinctive responses because instincts are similar in different individuals of the same species. The spatial

orientation of individuals makes them susceptible to the same physical stimulation and thus they follow similar channels of behavior. (2) Individuals are trained to agree and to resemble one another in their mental attitudes and modes of behavior. The individual mind has been shaped from the very early days of life through traditions and institutions. This process of modification is unconscious and even the most uncommon traits and original ideas are found repeated among members of the same social order.

TOPICS

1. Psycho-physical resemblance as a condition of group life.
2. Incipient responses, their origin and rôle in society.


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CHAPTER VIII

THE GROUP AS A VALUE

Value-Situations.—Whatever anyone strives for, consciously or unconsciously, possesses value. A value-situation consists of two primary constituents: the effort and the object that, for the time being, leads to its cessation. The effort, however, is conditioned by a feeling element. One may seek to remove an unpleasant feeling, or he may be moved by an anticipation of pleasant feeling. Thus, the feeling may be both negative and positive. The attainment of the object is attended, in the former case, by a primary feeling of relief and at times by a feeling of pleasure. In the latter case, the primary feeling is of pleasure. We may represent the situation in the following manner:



It is evident that the situation represented in (1) presupposes little by way of psychological equipment; whereas that schematized under (2) implies a complex development of the knowing function, *viz.*, anticipation. The latter involves also an adjustment of action to idea, presupposing a coördination of purpose, means, and object. We may, accordingly, expect that a value-situation of the first kind would be more frequent than one of the second kind. The effort or act, in the first instance, is instinctive in char-

acter; in the second, the instinctive response is modified by experiential factors. This, again, implies the greater frequency of the first kind of situation.

Projection of Subjective Sensation to the Object.—It is a familiar psychological fact that feelings which arise on the attainment of an object are ascribed to it. When we taste a few grains of sugar, the sweetness that we experience is certainly a psycho-physical state. Yet in our daily life, we project the feeling to sugar and say that "sugar is sweet," not "we feel sweetness in tasting sugar." The word "sweet" has come to denote no longer a subjective feeling but an objective attribute. Thus, there is always a process of projection of the subjective feeling to the object.

The projection is an outcome of a fixed association of feelings with the object of endeavor. The consequence of projection is that the object always calls forth a specific kind of reaction. For instance, the projection of sweetness to sugar always evokes a positive response and similarly the feeling of bitterness ascribed to quinine tends to produce a negative reflex behavior. The condition in which feelings are not projected to the environment but are ascribed to the ego is called in psycho-analytic terminology, Narcissism. Here the interest in the self preponderates over the interest in the objective environment. All value is ascribed to the self rather than to the animate and inanimate objects of the environment. Consequently, all acts are prompted by and directed to the self. The environment is merely ancillary.

Creation of Group Value.—The foregoing analysis will help us to understand the process of valuation in its social aspects. A social situation arises when, through a common feeling of want, a number of individuals happen to strive for the same kind of object. The mere sameness of feeling, effort, and object, of course, does not create a group. In the course of the effort, the feeling of relief and of pleasure which would primarily be projected to the object would

also be projected to the fellow-beings engaged in the same pursuit. Hence, not only the object but also the group would acquire a value and henceforth evoke a specified kind of behavior. This is the situation in simple types of group life, as for instance in a hunting community. The primary urge to action is hunting; the fellow-hunters are valued mainly as associates in the occupation of life. The military and medicinal societies in Northern Melanesia, in West Africa, and among the Indians of Brazil are functional groups of this character. The same situation occurs also in occupations and professions, as evidenced by the guild, the merchants' association, the trade union, etc. The human group in such instances possesses only instrumental value. Occupation or function is here the chief basis of group formation. If the function be modified, or if it disappears, new formations arise and old groups cease to exist.

The human child has to depend directly upon its parents for every need. The object can be obtained only through the mediation of parents. In this way feelings are projected directly to parents and indirectly to the object. The long period of nurture inculcates on man the attitude of dependence upon parents. Thus value is necessarily ascribed to the parents and others who constitute the immediate family environment. Since the same individuals supply almost all the needs of the growing child, they become the repository of all values. The attitude persists, though in a modified form, when the child grows up into a man or a woman, and maintains the family as a stable institution having an intrinsic value.

Importance of Group Value in Human Evolution.—Value thus is an attribute of that which satisfies. When satisfaction pertains only to a group of urges and not to any single one of them, the value is said to be inchoate. Furthermore, the blending of the urges is determined very largely by the group environment in which the individual

lives. Thus, value for the primitive man is essentially a social product. It is probably for this reason that the savage is most afraid of excommunication, for that shears life of all values. As a consequence of this, the group itself acquires a value, for it is the agency for the appropriation of other values. The larger the number of fulfilled urges, the greater the solidarity of the group. Thus the association which arises in the common pursuit of food interests is a powerful integrating influence. Sex also is a social factor of great significance. Similarly, the elaborate technique, which man evolves by a process of selection and survival, for the conquest of woman, and the corresponding coyness and coquetry of woman which make that conquest difficult, as well as the reciprocal nervous reactions of a violent character, are important factors in the formation of the mind and of group feeling which is genetically referable to sexual life.¹ Later, the love of offspring becomes the basis of group morality and sympathy. The primitive man is one with the group, his mind and feeling are the same as the group's; a vague sense of value is attached to the group. In group feeling, thinking, and acting the first great steps in the early evolution of man were taken; indeed, some believe that when the fervor of group feeling and acting reached its highest pitch in primitive natures under the influence of such crude excitants as drink and sexual stimulation, higher super-individual racial energies were released, contributing to the development of language and religion, music, and the fine arts.

Preconditioning Group Value.—Besides these two kinds of values, the group is also the precondition of the pursuit of any values whatsoever. The disruption of a modern state, for instance, disturbs not only the economic life but also the

¹This is further borne out by the researches of psycho-analysts who trace essentially social activities, such as religious excitement or artistic creation, to the sex *libido*.

whole fabric of social and cultural life. Thus, the state may be said to have a sort of preconditioning value. It constitutes the background on which groups having intrinsic and instrumental values may arise. Any danger to the stability of such a group at once invests it with the highest intrinsic value so that all other groups may be sacrificed in its interest.

Variability of Group Values.—Groups thus may have an intrinsic value, an instrumental value, or a preconditioning value. Groups have acquired different values in different epochs of history. Moreover, what appears in one place as an ancillary group, is invested in another social order with intrinsic value or with preconditioning value. Thus the church organizations of the present day, in many cases, are theocracies of the past; the character of value attached to the group has changed in the course of time. Similarly, the purely occupational group, *e.g.*, the labor organization, tends to claim intrinsic value in the regime of industrial conflict. Values attached to different orders of the group thus change their character under different conditions. Values attaching to groups and subgroups cannot be regarded in any sense as absolutely primary or secondary, original or adventitious. The satisfaction that a group yields depends not upon its size but upon the number of urges that it fulfills and upon the extent to which these are fulfilled. Even a small group like the family may serve as the channel and object of the principal urges of human nature. The criminal seeks the expression of his interests neither through his family nor through his larger social circle, but in the company of his own set, for which he is ready to steal, kill, and die. These instances show how the ground of value may shift from one group to another, in accordance with the degree of concentration of interests that a group demands and stands for. It is not necessary that the whole gamut of human instincts be satisfied by any

one institution, for so comprehensive a satisfaction is not possible. What usually happens is that a group or institution that satisfies an insistent demand draws to itself the less intensive urges, just as a clamorous orator draws a crowd to himself. Through this process of change in the objective of our primal instinctive drives, and through the relative intensification and segregation of one or more of these, new groups arise which carry new standards and values.

Small Groups and Intrinsic Value.—One interesting fact, however, is readily observed. The groups that possess intrinsic value are usually small groups like the family. Large groups, such as the state, race, or nation, possess preconditioning value as defined above. And all occupational groups usually have instrumental value. Philosophers and social reformers have often urged man to change the order of valuation. But human nature seems to have followed its own urges, unmindful of their dictates.

The change in the character of values, and the general order of valuation, raise psychological issues of great interest. Why do intrinsic and instrumental values shift? Why do small groups usually possess intrinsic values? Let us approach the latter question first. Human personalities, of all objects, have the surest claim to intrinsic worth. The child, the mother, the wife, the husband, all possess values by virtue of their very existence. It is for this reason that faults and shortcomings are overlooked and forgiven in relatives. The ground of valuation in these cases lies in the fact that each personality fulfills not one kind of instinctive urge but many. Thus, the value that is attached to the individual is not that arising from any one instinct but from a whole group of instincts. The feelings arising from each specific instinctive urge blend together and are projected to the individual. It is because these feelings lose their particularistic tendencies in the blended whole that

they assume an intrinsic character. Further, some of the interests serve as the nuclei round which other interests gather and constitute a complex of urges. The urges of food and sex, for instance, in all ages and countries have served as nuclei which have attracted to them other impulses, such as those of aggression and acquisition. The interest-group seeks its satisfaction as a whole. Thus some of the constituent urges may be directly, other only indirectly, fulfilled. When any object or situation directly fulfills the nuclear interests, it possesses intrinsic value. In this way, the institution of the family comes to possess intrinsic value. On the other hand, a trade union normally fulfills the food urge indirectly by securing for the individual an opportunity to compete for livelihood under advantageous conditions. The character of the nuclear interests is different in different individuals, societies, and epochs of history. In the age of knight-errantry, for instance, the impulse of aggression was often the organizing factor. In the period of a gold rush, or of geographical discovery, other interests were the meeting ground of instinct complexes. There is, accordingly, a change in the order of valuation, the intrinsic value in one situation changes into instrumental value in another.

The group, in order to possess intrinsic worth, thus should fulfill a complex of instincts of each of its constituent members. The value of the group lies in the sum-total of satisfactions that it affords. From the very nature of the case, it follows that such a group cannot be large, for, the more numerous the constituents, the greater the difficulty in the mutual adjustment of instincts and the less the satisfaction. Again, the adjustment of instincts is a gradual process, and it must vary with the physical and mental growth of individuals. A durable group cannot go beyond a certain numerical limit, because of the restive nature of man. Thus it is that only small groups come to possess intrinsic value.

Changes in Group-valuation.—A change in group-valuation accompanies a change in the organization of the instincts that the group fulfills. A bachelor values his club as an organization through which his desires for food, rest, amusement, human companionship, etc., may meet with complete and regular satisfaction. As soon as he marries, however, these desires are blended with the primary sex demand, and render the family hearth a place of greater value than the club. Among some individuals a few years of married life bring about satiety in the sex-desire, and consequently a certain looseness in the organization of instincts, and the value of family life diminishes. The club then acquires a fresh lease of interest.

The relative value of different social institutions for any given period of time can be explained on similar principles. The number of persons who participate in any institution, and the degree of sacrifice those persons may be prepared to make for it, indicate the direction and character of the interest that the institution fulfills. Customs, manners, laws, and social organizations thus may be adjudged with respect to their value. When a decaying institution, *e.g.*, sweated or child labor, is attacked, there are only a few who come forward in its defense, though many through sheer inertia of tradition may perpetuate it. The value of the institution, therefore, cannot be measured by numbers alone. The interests that the institution serves may disintegrate; there may be left merely the external shell of an effete institution. It is only when we are able to estimate the amount of strain and opposition that an institution can withstand that we are in a position to appreciate its value.

Judged by this standard, all human groups possess some kind of value, intrinsic, instrumental, or preconditioning. Even the same group may possess different value to its different constituents. Thus, the church organization may

be of intrinsic value to the priests, and of instrumental value to worldly persons who look upon religion as a means of material well-being. Groups, then, are objects to which individuals direct their activities that they may obtain different kinds of satisfaction.

Individual as Member of Divers Groups.—The individual finds himself in a number of different groups, passing from one to the other. From his family-group he passes to the street where he is a member of a crowd, and thence to the office where he participates in a special type of voluntary organization. He also may be a member of a volunteer force, of a religious order, of a trade union, or of a municipal board. Each of these has for him a specific value.

Social harmony is possible only when these different values blend in the individual mind. We have seen in a previous chapter that in addition to the motor-responses and emotions, the instinct carries a headlight of ideas.¹ Each group-value, similarly, is associated with a system of ideas. When the individual passes from one group to another, the motor responses, emotions, and ideas undergo a certain change in quality and pattern. In a harmonious state of society this transition is smooth and continuous, so that there is no break between one order of group life and another. But in a social order, where conflict prevails, the different groups yield satisfaction-values so diverse in character that the same individual cannot participate in all. When, for instance, a state is made up of people who markedly differ in race, language, or wealth, they live in groups so utterly unlike that there is no possibility of any common membership. This situation readily translates itself into one of conflict and of class-stratification, as we attempt to show elsewhere.² In a harmonious social order, therefore, it should be possible for the individual to enjoy all group-values, to live harmoniously in all group-envir-

¹p. 70. ²pp. 140-145, 185-186.

ments. Probably it is because democracy holds out hope in this regard, that it has come to be the order of the day. And each new variant of democracy, like socialism or communism, bears a more generous promise for the realization of this program. One of the conditions for such a consummation is that the population should be limited in space and number. It may not be possible to go back to the city states of ancient Greece or the village communities of medieval India; there may be modern organizations of a regional character that would open up a variety of group life for their numerically limited constituents. The value of a residential university consists largely in the fact that the number of students and spatial distribution are circumscribed. This makes it possible for all to participate in the different kinds of group life within the university.

Emotional Balance and Group Harmony.—The essential condition of harmony of values of group life lies in a balance of the emotions. Each group evokes a specific emotion more or less analyzable. It is difficult for an individual to pass from one group to another when these emotions are in opposition. When emotions are disguised by the ideational processes, as in the voluntary organizations such as political parties, the conflict still persists. Nor does the process of habituation effectively bring about a conciliation of the emotive attitudes. For emotions are connected with instincts and endure as long as instincts operate. A conflict of values thus represents, in reality, a conflict of the animal urges. An attempt is often made to gloss over the opposition and to explain it as a conflict of ideals. But, in its ultimate analysis, it is essentially a maladjustment of the instinctive drives.

Chaos in Group Valuation.—Again, the modern scheme of life everywhere presents chaos in valuation. There is no well-ordered system of values; the values attached to different groups do not really indicate the trend of life; as

a consequence, there is a frequent change in the system of values, almost cataclysmic in character. Thus, the relative attention given to the cinema and to the fine arts does not really indicate the direction of social interest; nor do the changes in fashions and hobbies; nor, again, do the ever-multiplying international organizations such as leagues, peace associations, etc., really satisfy any stable group of instincts and interests. The unsettled condition of valuation of groups indicates a perpetual change in the combination of the urges. No stable pattern is being formed. Each complex of instincts, interests, and ideas operates for a short while, brings into existence new groups and organizations, and then dissolves and reforms into other patterns. The chaos of values thus indicates a groping of the primal interests for a new adjustment.

Man as Creator and Creation of His Group World.—The world that man lives in is not the mere geographical region. Man modifies the physical environment; he seeks his adaptation to a world that he himself has chiseled and molded. What man does not find in external nature, he creates out of his own thought and imagination. In other words, man's environment is both physical and spiritual. The growth of civilization consists in the increase of the mental creations fashioning matter to human ends. Man's world, consequently, is perpetually changing and he has to adapt himself to every change. If a particular combination of the biologic urges does not bring satisfaction, there is a new organization of interests and a renewal of effort at adaptation. The inevitable trial and error with their consequences necessarily follow, and bring in their wake chaos and trans-valuation. The various feelings, emotional attitudes, and ideas attach themselves to the social situations and are organized round them as mental patterns. A social situation, which gradually becomes the nucleus of a par-

ticular mental pattern, focuses reflection so that its *purpose* comes uppermost. Man realizes its relations with other psycho-social situations and, with the slow growth of imagination and reflective thought, finds a way of formulating and reconciling his varied mental patterns, the relations of groups to him, and himself to them, and of finding in them some trend which he consciously strives after. By this process, he rises to the plane of ideal value, which, however, is blended out of one or more of the primary instincts that now are organized into larger mental systems. With increase of knowledge and experience, ideals widen in range and become varied in contents. They have relation to the complex interplay of many instincts and interests; and, since they are consciously striven after, they further and complete the inherent tendency to organization of impulses, or the different planes of value. We thus reach the final level of integration of the personality, but there is found a continuity of development from the beginning to the end. The complexity of group life proceeds *pari passu* with the organization of a complex variety of impulses, which bears also the impress of intellectual processes, imagination, and thought. While being essentially social products, these latter indirectly promote the solidarity of group life by contributing to the transformation of naïve impulses into stable and rational purposes. It is group life which, acting on countless generations, determines the organization of impulses and hence the components of personality. The group environment determines what impulses compose the foreground, how the mass of impulses and interests is harmonized, and what combinations produce that enduring harmony which we call character. The stability and complex evolution of group life, on the other hand, are possible because of the fusion, harmony, or unity in the world of consciousness.

TOPICS

1. Classification of groups according to the values they represent.
2. Change of values as exemplified in the development of the family or the church.
3. Changes in valuation at social crises.
4. Conditions of the stability of institutions.
5. Value as an index of social adjustment.

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CHAPTER IX

CONTACT OF GROUPS

Man's Varied Needs.—The objects of the physical environment in which man is placed evoke diverse modes of behavior. Some of the objects fulfill his organic needs and are appropriated; others sound a warning and are avoided. The relatively few and simple responses stimulated by the physical environment, with its flora and fauna, are deflected from their course and modified by the activities of fellow-humans. The human individual has to adapt himself to man and to nature at the same time, and each process of adaptation influences the other. Still, the primary adjustment that nature forces upon man is that to the objects of the physical environment. These objects accordingly possess primary values for man.

But forests and rivers, plants and herbs, horses and cattle cannot fulfill all the aspirations of social and spiritual man. Some of his desires are satisfied only by human beings, human groups, and human situations. Mother and father, age-groups, and clan-festivities, games, and sports are all essential to the satisfaction of man's varied mental and bodily needs. Hence, like a physical object, the social situation possesses intrinsic values for man. But even these are too few and simple in nature to fulfill the instincts in their rich variety of combinations. Moreover, man's nature is restive and perpetually changing. The multiform desires in ever-varying patterns need new objects and situations for their fulfillment. Neither physical nature nor the social environment can keep pace with the changing mental patterns. Hence, there arises the necessity of myths and legends, songs and ballads, fables and fictions. Such ideal

objects, like the physical reality and the social situation, possess value for man.

Concretion and Disintegration of Group Values.—No single value plane by itself functions in the normal life. At every point, the physical, the psycho-social, and the ideal values interpenetrate. The more complex the fusion or unity of impulses and interests, the more thorough the system of interrelated groups or the more advanced the evolution of group life. There is thus a concretion of values, an intensification of the satisfaction upon which they rest. As values thus deepen and expand, a larger and larger number of impulses find fulfillment, and group life which serves as the medium for the fusion of these attains greater stability.

There is also a process of disintegration of values, by which we mean the separation of the physical, the social, and the ideal phases from one another. Instances of total dissociation are hard to find. We can find examples only of relative increase and decrease in emphasis. The pursuit of brutal lust uninfluenced by the behavior of fellow-beings; the hunt for food by the famine-stricken, callous to other people's needs—these are instances of efforts at reaching a state of physical satisfaction and equilibrium, a search for bare physical values. They represent a condition where social and ideal values are abnegated altogether. Society at different places and times has established military orders, institutions of slavery and serfdom, eunuchs, and janizaries, where there was no channel for the satisfaction of many of the normal appetites. Contract or indentured labor in mines and plantations subserves an industrial order in which nothing but the barest need of food is met. These are instances of failure in the social situation upon which the individual relies for guidance, as the animal does on his self-regulating organic functions, and to which the individual ascribes the undifferentiated potentiality of be-

neficence. The consequence is that the individual alternates between the sphere of life marked out for him by his social environment, and the life of physical appetites divorced from social conventions and ideals, and manifest in their brutal nakedness. Again, both the physical and social life at different periods and in different countries have lost all value for persons who have sought satisfaction from ideal objects. Such are the great ascetic orders of Buddhism and medieval Christianity. Here satisfaction arises neither from physical nor from social pursuits, but from fixation to an ideal, which serves as the only open channel for the expression of the primal needs, transformed and sublimated.

Conflict of Group Values Followed by Reversion.—In group psychology, any conflict between value planes unaccompanied by any compensation, such as protection from danger or individual comfort derived from unity with the herd, leads to social strain and stress. In modern industrial life, for instance, the conflict between the instincts of self-assertion, construction, etc., and the herd standards superimposed upon the individual worker by routine production; the conflict between the parental and sex-instincts and the herd instinct embodied in the working man's plane of living; between the instincts of acquisition and mastery and the modern demands of communism enforced in the interests of herd solidarity—all these have brought about a serious crisis in the social situation. In individual psychology, such crises are followed by a reversion to the primitive and the primal. The same is the case in group psychology. The present economic unrest, which shows us the conflict and disruption of personal as well as group values, is associated with many an experiment in individual separation or in group organization, which remind us of the return to the primitive social organization of ants, bees, and wasps. The foundation of socialistic brotherhoods, of self-governing communal workshops and communal hold-

ings, illustrates a process of the disruption of the larger group into smaller ones calculated to satisfy in full the normal impulses of man. From the standpoint of value satisfaction, there is a draining of the instincts and impulses to their smaller groups which therefore come to be repositories of interests.

New Values of Group Life.—To show the matter in another light, group activity is nothing but a system of motor responses, some directed toward immediate objects, others rising from and directed from the responses themselves, *i.e.*, socially directed. From their very nature, such dynamic realities are perpetually changing their direction and combination. Value arises through a certain synthesis of these responses when they come together in a specific order. Thus if the responses be a, b, c , their interaction will give rise to the value x . Another synthesis, c, d, a, m, n, p , etc., will give rise to the values y and z . Thus, different combinations of responses represent these different values, x, y , and z . If these response syntheses may exist without interfering with one another, the total system of responses, which is the social situation, will possess the values x, y, z . But, in addition, it will have another value, w , for supplying the values x, y , and z . The group thus possesses an intrinsic value, w , as well as instrumental values, x, y, z , which arise from its normal dynamic existence. The stability of the group depends upon whether a specific value, w , is experienced and ascribed to a group as such by the individuals. For, in unorganized groups, the values x, y , and z , would be ascribed independently to different sets of responses; and the values in such cases would bear no relation to one another. Instead of one group, we should have several relatively independent systems. The synthesis of values thus generates a new value. The same holds true of these smaller groups. Even the values x, y, z , represent the value of a small group, w , and the process of analysis may

be carried beyond a group of individuals to a group of impulses of the individual. Though there is, therefore, no lowest limit of intrinsic values, there is an ever-ascending hierarchy. The process of valuation of the individual is undoubtedly the outcome of a social environment, as economics and ethics tell us. But the solidarity of society depends also upon the value that its constituent members ascribe to it. The ascription, again, is emotional or intellectual, or both. As we rise from smaller to larger groups, the intensity of emotions diminishes; the process of valuation partakes more and more of an intellectual character, and the conviction grows that the group stands for a set of ideas and purposes and is not of the same character as particular objects of the physical environment which feed the impulses of man.

Formation of Group Habits.—Valuation depends mainly on motor processes which readily mechanize themselves into habits. There is, in consequence, a lapse of the positive value experience. But, even in the case of habituation, there is a negative value experience in the sense that though the group does not offer any direct satisfaction, its absence signifies absence of satisfaction and therefore of values. The solidarity of the group is in no small measure dependent upon this preconditioning factor. Indeed, in all forms of group life, from the smallest to the largest, both positive and preconditioning factors contribute to their cohesiveness.

Habit diminishes the conscious attention with which our impulses and interests are organized into mental systems. Thus, the group which stands for the fulfillment of impulses and is hence regarded as an organization of set purposes and ideas, gradually hardens into an institution, and its purposes lose their significance for the individuals. They repeatedly experience sentiments and ideas which become habitual, so that man pursues or rejects a proposed act without mental effort. Groups, when crystallized into

customs, traditions, and institutions, stimulate, not reflective thought, but the contrary. Thus the habits which have been evolved to suit the system of political and industrial groups, functional and regional associations, family or class, have become the norm of the whole body of customs and usages of people, and man is born into them. They mold his sentiments and form standards of value through which he orients himself on all ethical issues.

Conflict Phenomena in Group Life.—It is only when the individual is face to face with a conflict of impulses and interest that the purpose of the group becomes actively dominant for him. Man then makes his choice. If he finds others who experience the same mental conflict, a smaller group within the group, *i.e.*, a faction, is formed. Such a faction organizes more intense feeling and will attitudes around itself, and challenges and diminishes the prestige of the larger group. The conflict of allegiances awakens reflection and the contrast of purposes becomes vivid. Thus the faction is supported by the most plausible arguments and evokes the loyalty of those amongst whom there is a real repression of complexes or grievances. Family sets, political parties, industrial classes, etc., represent a new combination or organization of impulses, ideas, and interests—the psychological basis of the complex differentiation of groups in society. Old groups lose their prestige. Time-honored loyalties are transferred to new objects. Old grievances find their outlets in new channels, sometimes giving a strong feeling-tone to the new group behavior. Above all, the conflict promotes deliberation and judgment so far as the needs of harmony require. Wherever there is such fission, or splitting, there is also witnessed an attempt by the larger groups to amalgamate by subordinating their smaller differences to larger ends, which are more insistent for adjustment or fulfillment. Thus the coalition

of political parties, the adjustment of industrial classes, or the union between the State and the Church, are familiar instances of amalgamation under the stress of war. Family factions similarly disappear in face of litigation, while clan or caste rivalries are hushed in the midst of a catastrophe. This implies that the egotistic interests and ideas of the minority are thwarted for the time being by the policy or the behavior of the group to which it belongs. The recalcitrant minority, with its baffled interests and ideas, shows defensive reactions familiar to the psycho-analyst. When two hostile groups come into conflict, attitudes of superiority or inferiority are woven into their interests and purposes. When they balance each other, compromise, concession, and substitution characterize their policy; then the rank and file cannot reconcile themselves to the group's reasons, bringing about fresh conflict, which tests their loyalties to their particular groups.

Group Conflict Resolved in the Ideal.—Through all this conflict in group life there gradually evolves an increasingly harmonious fusion and economical reconciliation which, indeed, and not mere differentiation and complexity, characterize social development. Ideals arise largely from the fact that different and often rival groups compete for man's allegiance. It is a conscious process by which man responds to the demands of different groups. It is in the ideal that a man finds reconciliation of the diverse interests and impulses envisaged for him by the different groups. It is the ideal which governs the social responses of a man who is a member of different and competing groups. When a man identifies himself in imagination with the ideal and wishes to achieve it in reality, he can easily relinquish his membership in a group whose policy or conduct brought about a mental conflict; he can clearly define the limits within which the policy of the different groups no longer

thwarts one or other of his interests and purposes, and he can also formulate for himself a mode of conduct which reconciles the demands of the different groups.

Man's different loyalties can be interwoven or built together only on the ideal value plane. Thus the conflicting factors which come into play in social relationships are integrated and man's conduct assumes a definite trend and is stamped with individuality. It is in the social life, in the interweaving of group interests and purposes, that we find the conditions which govern the development of personality. The end perceived is now the harmonious development, not of the individual personality as such, but of the totality of group life with which the individual can enter into organic relation.

Group Symbols.—Just as groups with their partial satisfaction-values have their leaders and symbols, the consciousness of the community and of the whole are also sought to be grasped in the form of ideal objects or symbols. Religion and art in this way have sprung up and have evoked affection and reverence. But the symbols of art and religion which claim to express the unity of the whole social community have degenerated often into communal dogmas and cults. Thus these have become possessions of partial groups, priests, artists, a church, an artistic conclave, instead of universal treasures.

Yet, if man has to live the life of the community and the life of the universal, his perception, thought, and sentiment which can lift him above his narrow allegiances and intolerances, can come only from his art and religion. The forms and dogmas of religion everywhere present habitual and ready-made organizations of sentiments, ideas, and purposes which provide the individual with the source of authority and the norm of conduct in political, social, or economic groups, as well as in purely religious groups. But

the prohibitions and taboos that religion inculcates have often served the purposes of class oppression and encouraged stagnation. Interests and standards beyond the existing order have been discouraged. Accordingly established religion has appealed more strongly to vested interests and reactionary tendencies of human nature than to the progressive and idealizing tendencies. For this reason the religious sphere has often been shaken by keen conflicts between the ideal group and the group of tradition and authority.

Birth of New Social Traditions.—Man repeatedly finds reason to complain of the partiality and inflexibility of his groups. The fixed habits of thought and action which the groups lay down for him frequently conflict with his individual feelings and will-attitudes. In such stresses and strains, the individual by his reflective thought pictures the ideal in which the conflict of ideas and sentiments is resolved and a new moral value created which the individual may or may not share with the rest of the community. It is, however, at these points of departure from the conventional sanctions of the groups, that new norms of social behavior are evolved. At first these are unique and bear the stamp of a great originating personality; but later they assert themselves almost automatically, and become regarded as basic in the morality of their age or country. It is thus that social advance has been possible through the continuous interchange between the beaten paths of thinking and acting to which the groups would confine the individual, on the one hand, and his own attitudes and sentiments, on the other. Social morality rests on the foundation of relatively fixed habitudes of the sentiments, but it is continually being enlivened and enriched by new knowledge and experience of individuals. The enlightenment and sensitiveness of these individuals, however, are only possible because the tradition and authority of

groups have made their lives easy and smooth in the lower levels of group relations where moral decisions are automatic, and involve scarcely any mental effort.

TOPICS

1. Instinct, Habit, and Will as sources of valuation.
2. The conflict of values in the modern industrial system.
3. The rôle of ideals in group-conflict.
4. The development of individual morality.

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CHAPTER X

PSYCHOLOGICAL BASIS OF CULTURE

What Culture Comprehends.—Various definitions of culture have been given. Tylor, in an oft-quoted passage, defines culture as “that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society.” Culture thus consists of physical objects, imaginal and conceptual entities, institutions, modes of behavior, and subjective attitudes. All these arrange themselves into particular patterns and build up culture-systems characteristic of epochs, races, and regions. The constituent traits of a culture-pattern are numerous and intimately woven into one another. Any change in culture, therefore, can set in but slowly; the culture-pattern as a whole is an enduring reality, outlasting generations of individuals and extending over broad periods of history.

Cultural Studies.—Culture-systems, for this reason, are regarded as objective facts that are contrasted with the perpetually-changing mental processes and serve to shape and control the latter. Many of the constituents of culture, such as the physical products of culture-life, arts, crafts, and occupations, modes of behavior, laws, and customs, can be studied readily by observation but without much reference to the mental states of the people who participated in them. And even when we are concerned with imaginal and conceptual objects or emotive attitudes, the same objective method of study may be pursued. For these mental states, so far as they possess any cultural import, are shared by a large majority of a group. And inter-subjective possession inevitably leads to inter-subjective communication. Thus,

even the inner psychic processes reveal themselves to observation from without.

As a consequence, culture has come to be regarded as essentially an objective phenomenon that can be studied by the method of observation characteristic of the natural sciences. The causal nexus of the phenomena is to be traced in the series of historical events antedating and coexisting with the culture-pattern to be explained. The basic principle of explanation is the contact of race with race, of one group of people with another. Culture originates from culture, just as life originates from life. As Goldenweiser says: "Cultural changes which are to be interpreted historically are referred to cultural antecedents, not to racial, environmental, or general psychological ones." And Ogburn maintains that "the historical method is particularly fruitful in the study of society, and is also valuable in the analysis of social phenomena when we are trying to ascertain the cultural, psychological, biological, and climatic factors. The historical method is usually not only the best first procedure in such analysis but is a remarkable safeguard against mistakes in diagnosing for the other factors. The historical method in its extreme simplification means getting the cultural facts."¹

From this standpoint, a psychological analysis of cultural phenomena holds out but little promise. Although the culture-life shapes the individual mind and employs it in manifold ways for its own expression, and although cultural influence in its transmission has to pass through the media of minds, the psychological process has no rôle to play in the chain of causation. The psychological factors, according to Rivers, are merely "concomitants of social processes with which it is possible to deal apart from their psychological aspect."² Kroeber's theory of the "super-

¹ *The American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XXIX, pp. 192-93.

² *Kinship and Social Organization*, p. 92.

organic" advances a similar methodology. He would like to explain culture in terms of culture itself and not in terms of individual psychology. Goldenweiser, however, insists on an historical explanation on different grounds. If only we had the knowledge, he says, "We could trace all elements of culture back to such psychological beginnings in the minds of individuals. On the other hand, if what we are interested in are the changes in culture or in individuals at any given time and place, social and cultural factors at once emerge as having causal significance. One cultural factor, while of course working through psychological channels, will causally affect or transform other cultural factors."¹

Place of Psychology in Cultural Studies.—These views look upon psychic processes and cultural phenomena as independent variables, so that they can be dealt with separately. The origination of cultural traits and modification of cultural systems are historic events that have their causes and consequences far beyond the span of individual consciousness. An analysis of mind thus would be of interest to the student of sociology, but of no substantial help. As a medium and a center of initiative, mind may be regarded as a constant and probably unknown factor in the chain of social causation. Nevertheless, it must be admitted that every element of culture has its origin in the individual mind, and can produce a social effect only through the media of minds.

Again, the analysis of mind in relation to cultural facts is not the exclusive interest of the psychologist. Religious institutions, social laws, and customs are, for the persons who participate in them, though not for the anthropologists, modes of behavior controlled by ideas, feelings, and beliefs. We freely admit that the causation of these mental states is a complex affair and not confined to the psychic plane.

¹*The American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XXIX, p. 705.

Yet the behavior would end if the psychic factors disappeared. Magic, for instance, loses its force when faith in its efficacy becomes weak and faltering. Rites and ceremonies decay and disappear when strong beliefs change into æsthetic fancies. The physical appliances of culture, it is true, may be compared and their relations objectively studied. But the cultural modes of behavior, that constitute a very considerable portion of culture schemes, scarcely lend themselves to study apart from the psychic context from which they derive their meaning and motive-force. The psychology of culture, from this point of view, would be the discovery of the mental states that impart significance to manners, customs, and modes of behavior. It is, in other words, an analysis of the motives that maintain institutions. The character of the motives, their ethical, political and biological efficacy, would, then, grade the level of culture.

Again, the transfusion of a culture by traits foreign to it hardly admits of explanation excepting in the context of psychology.

Cultural Problems Requiring Psychological Treatment.

—Professor Ross speaks of the missionary spirit developed by the followers of the Confucian faith in China under the spur of Christian missionary competition. A similar change is said to have taken place among the Buddhists in Ceylon with respect to the conceptions of incarnation and immaculate conception. This phenomena is called by Professor Ross “constrained adaptation.”¹ The essential condition of such adaptation is a mental readiness to accept and incorporate a cultural trait in the already-existing system. Again, Rivers admits that “there is one department of Sociology in which psychological assumptions become indispensable,” *viz.*, when the purpose is “to show how social institutions come into existence as the result of

¹ Ross, *Outlines of Sociology*, p. 166.

blending of peoples." Thus, peoples that come together may meet in a friendly or hostile spirit; and this is essentially determined by psychological factors. "The only way in which the culture of an immigrant people can be carried about the world is in a psychological form, in the form of sentiments, beliefs, and ideas."¹ Dance and drama, for instance, in the indigenous theaters in India, Java, and Cambodia, are very similar in character. The themes represented are also the same, derived from the *Ramayana* and the *Mahabharata*.² There is no doubt that the stories as well as their modes of presentation reached Java and Cambodia from India. We know, further, that the Indian culture was carried to the peoples of Central Asia, the North Western regions beyond India, Afghanistan, Beluchistan, etc., equally as to the Javanese and the Cambodian peoples; yet there is evidence of a greater degree of influence on one side than on the other. This fact signifies a certain psychological condition that favors the assimilation of the themes as well as forms of dramatic art, on the one side, and an indifference to them on the other. We may very well suppose that the peoples of Cambodia and Java shared kindred sentiments, beliefs, and ideas. From this standpoint, the psychology of culture would attempt to disclose the mental mechanism that operates in the diffusion of culture-traits.³ For instance, it would be necessary to investigate whether a particular trait is received primarily as a set of conceptual thoughts or as a complex of visual or verbal images, whether the process of assimilation is mediated mainly by feelings or by modes of action. It would be necessary, also, to inquire how any new cultural phase permeates the social atmosphere before being incorporated

¹ Marett, *Psychology and Folklore*, pp. 95-96.

² Stella-Bloch, "Dancing and the Drama," *East and West Orient*, Vol. I., No. 5.

³ Wissler, *Man and Culture*, pp. 287-288.

into a system. Does it appear as an idea or as a suggestion to action; does it arouse opposition, or does it insinuate itself unobtrusively into the new culture-system? All these would constitute the psychological problems of culture.

Again, the question of the independent origin of culture-traits demands, *par excellence*, psychological treatment. The extensive geographical distribution of totemism, for instance, cannot be accounted for as an historic accident followed by a process of diffusion. The guardian-spirit idea or totemism must have sprung up independently, and those tribes which might have adopted such ideas and institutions exhibit a marked receptivity for these. Goldenweiser observes that "the complex of ideas, attitudes, and practices, which is totemism, is congenial to early mentality and therefore characteristic of it."¹ He thinks that "neither the socio-psychological nature of totemism, nor its geographical distribution, nor its historic rôle can be understood without a proper appraisal of the underlying social skeleton."² But, since totemism is admittedly "congenial to early mentality," it is equally obvious that it cannot be understood excepting in the context of that mentality. Similarly, the complex of ideas and emotions which underlies magical practices and nature-myths, or customs like the *couvade*, is congenial to primitive mentality and therefore characteristic of it.

Early Psychological Culture Studies.—As a matter of fact, much of the work of pioneers in the study of primitive culture has been in the nature of a psychological interpretation of cultural phenomena.³ The studies of Spencer, Frazer, and Wundt show a marked inclination toward an analysis of psychic motives that explain the genesis of diverse orders of customs and institutions. Spencer thus tries to account

¹ Goldenweiser, *Early Civilization*, p. 284.

² *Ibid.*, p. 289.

³ *Ibid.*, Chs. XV., XVI.

for the ideology of family names and of spirits as processes of ratiocination based upon "unconscious hypotheses" regarding the relation and classification of facts. Frazer, in the same way, tries to explain the phenomenon of magic, as resulting from reasoning on the basis of "an implicit faith in the order and uniformity of nature." Intellectualistic theories of this type are inadequate for the explanation of the multiform nature of culture-objects. But, though the solution thus arrived at is incorrect, the problem of correlation between the culture phenomena and the mental processes is genuinely conceived. Wundt, as we have already noticed, does not seek a unitary explanation of the whole of culture-life in terms of one basic mental function. He analyzes the rise of each culture-object, myth and fable, boomerang and bull-roarer, hut and cave; and each of these is explained in terms of certain mental functions. These functions, Wundt emphasizes, can occur, however, only in the group environment. Thus, without constructing a theoretic group mind, Wundt is in a position to attach due importance to the social factor in the genesis of culture. Wundt's effort consummates itself in a series of mental photographs corresponding to the different orders of the cultural situation. No unified system of the psychology of culture is reached in his study. Still the persistent problem, how the diverse psychic factors, singly and collectively, generate culture objects, is brought into bold relief.¹ Durkheim in the same manner emphasizes the essentially psychological origin of culture phenomena. But his studies are grounded on an analysis of the mental states of the group. The group-mind, which for Durkheim has a specific reality over against the individual mind, originates the "collective representations" that lie at the basis of culture

¹ There is a great deal of difference of opinion on this point. See *The American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XXVII., p. 621.

life. Religion and myth that possess a super-individual reference are explained in the same manner.¹ The difficulty with Durkheim's theory of the group-mind has been discussed from many points of view.² The fusion of individual minds into a new psychic reality cannot be regarded as a fact; it is a metaphysical theory. Still, the psychic origin of culture-phenomena is prominent in his method of treatment. Freud, again, has drawn our attention to the psychological processes that underlie the different orders of social life. In his case, it is the unconscious mental mechanism which plays the most significant rôle in the genesis of culture.³ The attitude, ideology, and method for probing into the psychic origins of culture indeed has engaged the attention of a long line of psychologists and sociologists. There is no methodological difficulty in treating a culture-scheme as an objective fact determined by other objective facts. But the series of psychic events, too, should be regarded as determinants. To regard these as mere epiphenomena of the culture-life, as Rivers does, is to deny that men, in the group environment, are motivated by psychic antecedents. Many of the thinkers whom we have mentioned have certainly thrown light on one phase or other of the origin and diffusion of culture. And the validity of the psychological problem of culture is to be measured by the success of their method.

Correlation of Mental and Cultural Life.—Bartlett, in his *Psychology and Primitive Culture*, proposes to set a new issue. "What we chiefly want to understand," he says, "are the interrelations of the responses at a given stage; which are dominant, and why they are dominant; what occurs when they conflict, and what when they unite. We

¹ Durkheim, *Elementary Forms of Religious Life*, p. 225.

² Ginsberg, *Psychology of Society*, 56-60; Goldenweiser, *op. cit.*, Chap. XVI.

³ *Group-psychology and Analysis of the Ego; Totem and Taboo.*

need not, then, speak of primitive imagining, belief, thinking, and so on, as if these, considered as psychological responses, were any different in the primitive as contrasted with the modern mind. But what we must do is to study how imagining, thinking, believing, or other typical responses, may vary in the position of dominance which they occupy at different stages of culture.”¹ The interest for psychology thus lies in discovering the correlation between the dominant factors of mental life and the culture-products.

Problems in the Psychology of Culture.—Psychology can approach the culture-life, therefore, through a number of problems. (1) We may study the concrete beliefs, faiths, and ideas in the context of which the institutions and the physical products of culture can be properly understood. (2) We may study the mental processes that mediate in the reception and assimilation, on the one hand, and rejection on the other, of one culture system by another. Both this and the first line of study would supply valuable materials for the construction of a psychology of race or stage of culture. (3) We may, in the next place, analyze culture-phenomena to discover the proximate mental principle from which they originate. A psychic mechanism, individual or social, conscious or unconscious, becomes necessary as an hypothesis inasmuch as the cultural objects comprise not only products of skill but also ideal constructions. A study of this kind is calculated to elucidate not only the rise of culture but also how mind functions in different physical and social situations. (4) Lastly, we may try to infer, from the nature of the culture-products, the character of the mental operations that predominate in any race, group, or environment. It is a study in the correlation of two series of events, psychic and cultural, which would be of interest both to the psychologist and to the ethnologist.

¹ *Psychology and Primitive Culture*, pp. 22-23.

Each of these lines of study has its place in a comprehensive system of Psychology of Culture.

We may, however, pursue the inquiry in another direction. We may ask: "How does an individual respond to cultural stimuli?" Our problem would lead us to the essential psychic processes that enter in the cultural response and thus enable us to understand the character of the cultural phenomena. Again, a person may be imbued with a greater or less degree of culture, and cultural stimuli, too, may be of varying degrees of complexity. We may ask how persons of higher and lower culture respond to the same situation; we may also inquire how the same person may react in cultural environments of different degrees of complexity.

Degrees of Culture not Degrees of Rationalization.— "If one looks into the career of culture," says Wissler, "it will be apparent that the difference between us and the more primitive groups lies in the degree of rationalization we assume toward the functions of group life."¹ The difference between the cultured and the uncultured person, or between higher and lower culture, thus would lie in the degree of rationalization. A formula of this nature obviously cannot do justice to much of what is regarded as cultural phenomena. Art, undoubtedly, is a very important trait of culture. But is the production or appreciation of objects of art a result of rationalization? Similarly, a large body of manners and customs that govern the relation between man and man, can hardly be regarded as rationally motivated and selected even in the most civilized community. Thirdly, the variety of fashions in dress that appear in endless sequence in civilized groups, can never be regarded as an expression of "rational attitude towards the functions of group-life." And, lastly, personal decorations and ornaments that play so large a rôle in all orders of society

¹ Wissler, *Man and Culture*, p. 326.

cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be looked upon as rational in origin or in their manner of display. An attitude of rationality may be a condition of the individual's preference for culture schemes; it does not account for the culture itself.

Degree of Culture Determined by Associated Experience.—The mental state of a cultured person is a complex pattern that develops through stages and is capable of varying in degree. It is a product of social training, a part of which is purposively imparted and the rest unconsciously assimilated. The child is trained gradually in the ways of the group it belongs to; the outsider is initiated into the manners of a new circle or set. Within the same community, therefore, we find marked differences in culture-level. Thus the flag conveys a far different meaning to a veteran than it does to the raw recruit. To the former, the bare impression of the physical object is supplemented by a rich host of images and ideas of past exploits, and the series of emotions connected with historic victories or defeats. Such memories and traditions adhere only loosely to the perceptual processes of the recruit. The difference between the two lies, then, in the amount of past experience that each can bring to bear on the object of perception. The difference in the degree of culture, therefore, consists in the number of associated ideas in terms of which a new impression can be assimilated. The same difference with regard to the meaning of cultural objects will be noticeable between a grown-up person and a child. It is in this manner that culture functions as an apperceptive mass.

Culture Differences in Behavior.—Culture, again, expresses itself as set forms of behavior. To the cultured, a breach of social etiquette carries with it an unpleasant emotion, which is absent in the case of the *parvenu*. In the case of the former, behavior is determined by the accumulated experience which he obtains from his social

training; while the latter proceeds by the method of trial and error. Ideal objects, such as tribal or national honor, or social conventions, such as those which govern the treatment of aged persons, women and children, are represented in the mind of persons trained in them by a set of ideas, images, and feelings unified into a system of apperception.

The apperception mass is, however, the past experience which is instilled in the minds of the members of a group directly and indirectly. An animal is guided by the present physical stimulus. Through a process of training, imitation, or repetition, objects or situations long past are brought into relation with the organisms and offer easy guidance. In this way animals acquire a system of organized responses controlled by past experiences.

Culture as Organized Experience.—Culture as a mode of perception and appreciation, a form of conduct, and a process of ideal representation, consists essentially in the incorporation of the ideas, images, and feelings of the past into schemes for the guidance of behavior. Culture, then, is only a more complex instance of the process of learning by experience. In the normal process of learning by experience, the effects of the past are ever-changing. Every new adjustment elicits a new set of concepts and images. This means that the individual has to depend on the stimulus and the casual associations that it may at the moment evoke. No unerring direction is given for a course to be followed. The fluid material of past impressions and images is crystallized into durable systems which may warn or guide the individual. Cultural objects, institutions, or traditions, therefore, are organized forms of the useful, cumulative experience of the group which regulates the behavior of the individual.

Culture in Human Evolution.—Nature has endowed all orders of organic life with tropisms and reflexes, instincts and impulses, which ensure for them an easy and effective

adaptation. Groups, likewise, invest the human animal with traditions and institutions, conventions and ideals, which similarly assure a process of progressive adaptation. Again, in the ordinary course of learning by experience, the past that is renewed in the present situation is the limited past of the individual life. Culture, on the other hand, revives the experience of eras and generations of the race: it extends the scope of mind so that the individual may utilize the stored experience of ages to fulfill his purpose in the scheme of life. Further, one phase of organic evolution seems to consist in equipping the individual with a rich and elaborate specialization and coördination of organs and functions for the purpose of adaptation. In another, we see an elaboration of tools, weapons, and engines, which are extra-corporeal, with which man has equipped himself as means to assert his lordship over nature. Lastly, man devises ideal objects and situations with a view not only to perfecting his ascendancy over his physical environment, but also to securing a more generous fulfillment of his desires and interests than is promised by his physical nature.

TOPICS

1. Classification of culture products.
2. Distribution of culture objects.
3. Conflict and assimilation of independent cultural systems.
4. Social inheritance as a factor in survival.

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CHAPTER XI

ECONOMIC ROOTS OF SOCIAL BEHAVIOR AND CULTURE

Economic Pursuits and Group Character:—Hunting Peoples.—We have seen that a group which seeks the same kind of livelihood under the same conditions shows a similarity of character. Anthropologists have given us the classification of the three characteristic phases of culture which follow in order; *viz.*, the hunting, the pastoral, and the agricultural stages. It is realized now that the classification is oversimple and that many tribes are huntsmen, pastoralists, or cultivators indifferently, according to their environmental characteristics. The order of development not only does not represent a chronological sequence but also differs among different peoples. Nevertheless, the hunting or collectional economy belongs without question to one of the earliest modes of living, and has impressed specific characters on individuals and societies. The struggle with forest, water, and animals emphasizes instincts of self-assertion and pugnacity, and represses the milder urges of nature. Thus the latter tend to fulfill themselves in ideal objects, in sentimental songs and ditties, folk tales, and myths.

Totemism of the Hunters.—The exacting pursuit of hunting, which drains organic energy along a single direction, is incompatible with the functioning of the manifold urges of nature. The vivid impressions of the chase by day and by night and the alternation of feasts and fasts color the psycho-motor patterns. The full meal after days of starvation leads to an abnormal nervous exhilaration in which dream and suggestion, sympathetic magic, dance, and music easily flourish. The origins of totemism have been dis-

cussed by many writers, yet the question remains obscure. The majority of American ethnologists, such as Boas, have seen in totemism simply the extension of the conception of the individual animal guardian spirit amongst the hunting peoples. Customs and ceremonies designed to secure the favor of the animal spirits before hunting, or to placate the beasts that have been killed, are widely prevalent among hunting peoples. The origin of animal paintings and sculptures in prehistoric times is also to be attributed to such beliefs and practices regarding animal spirits.¹ Totemism is the general religion amongst the hunters. It is the environment of animals which supplies the hunters with the totemic names and emblems which play an important part in their mental and social evolution. Durkheim observes that plants had only a secondary place as emblems, for they can hold only a secondary place as food so long as they are not cultivated. Moreover, the animal is more closely associated with the life of men than is the plant, if only because of the natural kinship uniting these two to each other. On the other hand, the sun, the moon, and stars are too far away: they give the effect of belonging to another world. The way in which such emblems probably were chosen is described by Strehlow who says that he has noticed that "The totemic centers are generally situated near a mountain, spring, or gorge where the animals serving as totems to the group gather in abundance." He cites a number of examples of this fact, proceeding: "Now these totemic centers are surely the consecrated places where the meetings of the clan are held. So it seems as though each group had taken as its insignia the animal or plant that was the commonest in the vicinity of the place where it had the habit of meeting."² Every species of plant

¹ C. Dawson, "Religion and Primitive Culture," *The Sociological Review*, April, 1925.

² See Durkheim, p. 234.

or animal which is habitually sought thus forms a nucleus round which all the interests, the impulses, the emotions of a tribe tend to crystallize. The primitive man desires to possess the beasts or plants, to control them as dangerous, useful, or edible things. This leads to a belief in special power over the beast or plant, a prohibition to destroy or to eat, and an affinity between man and the forces of the environment upon which he mainly depends. It is in this manner that totemism, comprehending within itself the particular pattern of beliefs and rituals which govern the primitive man's efforts to deal with his vegetable and zoölogical resources, offers, from the survival point of view, effective guidance to the satisfaction of his manifold impulses in his particular environment.

Primitive Religion of Food.—Malinowski points out that food is the main link between man and his surroundings, that by receiving it he feels the forces of destiny and providence, and thus deduces the cultural—nay, biological—importance of primitive religion in the sacralization of food. Hunters or fishers celebrate a good catch or the opening of the season of their pursuit by feasts and ceremonies at which food is ritually handled, the animals propitiated or worshipped.¹ It is also well-known that in primitive exchange the idea of participation in sacrifice played not an insignificant rôle. Behind the economic phenomenon of barter lay the idea of communion in the beneficent abundance which Providence had bestowed. Food being scarce, the bestowal of gifts, which was the inevitable accompaniment of primitive trade, was witnessed at a much later stage. In the early economic stages the characteristic plant or animals of the region to which man feels grateful commands reverence, while others which are dangerous to him engender admiration and fear. Hence arise characteristic

¹ Article on "Magic, Science and Religion" in *Science, Religion and Reality*, edited by Needham.

beliefs, cults, and social arrangements associated with them, while the food-getting activities, such as collecting, hunting, fishing, etc., are endowed with varied and tense emotions.

Wissler goes much further and finds amongst hunters and the more primitive agriculturists a most intimate relation between the range of a culture and its food complex. For example, the Eskimo culture developed around the complexes of winter sealing and summer caribou hunting. Another example is the Indian culture of the western plains in America which developed around the bison and which presents a diffusion area coincident with this fauna. Similarly, the cultures of the North American Indian tribes reveal the general characteristics of what is described as the maize complex. The same varieties of corn, the same methods of planting, fertilizing, and cooking prevailed everywhere in the Mississippi valley and eastward; we also find numerous religious ceremonies and social observances definitely associated with maize.

Social Behavior of Hunting Groups.—Even folklore is shaped and colored by occupational traits. Branford observes: "A verdant paradise stocked with carefully preserved game; frequent and copious meals of richly spiced viands and fermented drinks; trophies to recall memoirs of exploit; things of bright color and shapely form gently to titillate the senses in the intervals of hunting and feasting; the major enhancement of war to fall back upon when hunting flags in its stimulus to sex, to prowess and to prestige; of these elements will be woven the fabric of vision." When they do not dream of the other world they show themselves as rude and uncommunicative, fond of solitude and silence. Thus Dr. Decorse, who describes hunting among the inhabitants of the Sudan, says: "If the hunter is rude and uncommunicative it is no doubt on account of the silence and solitude to which the chase has accustomed him—but it is above all because distrust and fear lurk in the forest and

the thick bush. Life there is one continual tension of the senses; in front of him is always the mysterious and troublesome barrier of the underwood; there is no horizon, nothing but dusk; the sharpest eye is deceived by fancies; man, who is born to use his sight, has only his ears to depend upon; less fortunate than the animals, whose nose replaces the eye, he is aware of his inferiority; he lives on the defensive, with watchful eye and straining ear." At the same time the constant search for, and fight with, the wild game make the huntsmen physically and mentally more alert, while the predatory life imposes a decided check on the development of other-regarding impulses. We need not dwell upon the ferocity of some savages, such as Iroquois or Zulus. Amongst such savage tribes are manifest an utter insensibility to human suffering and to the claims of the weak, an aggressive self-assertion, and an incontinent self-glorification which exhibit themselves in many horrid customs and rituals. There are at the same time the germs of that stern and yet unbending mood which is due to the bracing effects of the struggle for existence, and which is in strange contrast with the mildness of such savages as the Hottentots, the wood Veddas, or the Brazilian forest folk who all live in isolated or unattractive regions where stagnation or positive degeneration overcomes them.

The instability and precariousness of life restricted the hunting group to the small horde. Such small hordes are scattered in the forest as a result of food deficiency, and hence there cannot be much development of social organization. The only division of labor that emerges is that between the sexes, and the only occupation, warfare. Among the Masai and Matabele it is thought that warfare is the only employment which becomes a man. The Chippewas regarded the use of the bow and arrow, the war club, and the spear as man's noblest employments. The Maoris consider it more honorable, as well as more desirable, to acquire

property by war and plunder than by labor. Gradually, the occupations of the armorer and the smith were differentiated and regarded as honorable professions. These arts were early carried to greater perfection than the useful arts. The domestic operations and occupations were left to the women.¹

Group Behavior of Pastoral Peoples.—A different behavior with other traditions emerges in the pastoral stage. There is greater security of food supply. Thus, the human group becomes larger, less mobile, and more settled in its abodes than in the hunting stage. The family group now can have a separate existence and responsibility, for the care of children is shifted from the communal group to the parents. But, since only the male members of the family can look after the cattle and protect them during grazing, the male head of the family comes to be of paramount importance. The animals call for tender care and devotion which react upon the family life. The imperative need of provision for the flock develops foresight. As milk is transformed into cheese, we are storing for future consumption. As the cattle are kept over winter, we are making provision for further production. Property develops in flocks and herds and changes man's nature. The study of pedigree and practice of selection in breeding suggest ideas of leisurely growth and fulfillment. The vigil of flock by day and by night encourages the contemplative life. "Spectacle of sky, movements of heavenly bodies, immensities of space, periodicities of time, passage of seasons, all perform their fullest office of arousal in the shepherd." Youth, full of agility and vigor, does not monopolize respect as in the hunting régime, but the wisdom that belongs to age becomes prized by society. The seasonal movements of the flocks for fresh pasturage keep alive the roaming habit and

¹Howerth, "The Origin and Development of Productive Industry," *American Journal of Sociology*, March, 1924.

develop a more systematic social control than hunting could call for. The nature of the domesticated animals has governed the capacity for movement and social organization of different peoples. Hahn, for instance, has drawn a comparison between the pastoral peoples of Asia and Africa. He contrasts the life of the latter, based essentially on the rearing of cattle, with that of the former, who own those powerful means of transport and locomotion—the ass, the horse, and the camel. The possession of these animals accounts, according to him, for the brilliant historical expansion of the Asiatic shepherds; by the aid of these animals they were able to extend their migration and to develop the warlike qualities which they displayed in their conquests. The African shepherds, on the contrary, being less mobile on account of their lack of transport animals that could be used for great distances, looked on their flocks in a miserly spirit, as treasures to be carefully guarded. They added to their pastoral activities a rudimentary agriculture—though they did not rise to the use of the plough—which rendered their type less pure and distinctive than that of the Asiatic shepherds.

Group Behavior in the Agricultural Stage: Economy of the Peasant.—The agricultural process of integration with its further refinements has followed and supplanted the hunting and pastoral processes. Agriculture stabilizes the population and leads to the development of home and private property, capital and resources. It thus nourishes the parental and gregarious, the constructive and the acquisitive impulses. It establishes a clear division of the sexes, fixing the woman's status in family life and social organization. Among primitive tribes, the work of the gardens, plantations, and fields, nearly everywhere, devolves upon women. Even where the men are not entirely free from field labor they share in it only, as a rule, for certain preliminary or final operations. Lévy-Bruhl traces this to the

primitive belief that in the social group women represent the principle of fertility. "Cultivation, itself accomplished by women, has the sense of participation. We must not say merely that agricultural labor is attended by magical practices; the work itself is a magic operation, since it is women who perform it."¹ Agriculture breeds conservatism, a resignation to an overmastering nature and a belief in an inexorable fate. The influence of the seasons and rainfall, which are cyclical in their recurrence, and which dominate the food quest as well as the periodic anxiety for the harvest, gives rise to taboos and penances, fasts and festivals, returning with the seasons to the peasants' hearths and fields. Many of such feasts and festivals are attended by magical rites, intended to increase productivity, and performed by the women, who observe purificatory ceremonies.

The accumulation of capital and differentiation of opportunities give rise to class distinctions, and we have the emergence of the honorable and the degraded occupations with their reactions on types and character. Captives in war were made into slaves in the previous stages. But in agricultural serfdom, which implies regular and systematic labor, a great step is taken in economic development, and social stratification comes to be based on the agreeableness or disagreeableness of labor. The aggressive impulses and desires for emulation and mastery, which have played so important a part in the hunting economy, now are repressed or become transformed into fights for causes or principles. Similarly, the dominance of the herd or the gregarious instinct, which created in the pastoral economy a rigid authoritative discipline, is gradually relaxed. Wanderlust is superseded by attachment to hearth and soil. Man loses a good deal of his former aggressive character, his sense of communism, his desire for the simple life, and his mystic

¹Cf. Malinowski, *Science, Religion and Reality*, pp. 66-70, 73-78.

vision. But the peasant's scheme of life is enlarged, and his range of desires and visions widened.

As the peasant economy is centered round a fixed settlement, man is humanized and socialized. He stores, he builds, he transmits to posterity the fruits of his generation. His visions extend to the future. He conceives ideals of fulfillment that bind man in his generation. This is attested by his construction of temples, his formulation of codes and law, his observance of rites and ceremonies, which are all alike linked with nature's life process renewed in human life. The peasant cultivates a kinship with nature and with his fellow-beings. He regards himself as a part of the mysterious life of nature, on the one hand, and of the abundant life of humanity on the other. A patience born of the belief in a beneficent Providence, humility, and love in social intercourse, and a singleness of aim and purpose, are the agricultural life-values, which have helped the survival and progress of peasant civilizations.

Industrialism and its Social Reactions.—The industrial system is based on the elaboration of man's labor and tools. While it has partially released man from drudgery and hence contributed to the development and satisfaction of his more complex and artificial wants, it has led to a divorce between work and social status. The industrial system also has involved the dissociation of a large mass of toilers from the ownership of tools and implements. Both constructiveness and acquisitiveness have been inhibited in the case of many wage-earners, who hence regard labor with hatred and capital with envy and distrust. On the other hand, the elaboration of a money economy affords opportunities for an exaggerated play of the acquisitive impulses through the handling of symbols. Power and prestige under the price system of economy go with money. Consequently, the dominant values, which are aids to survival for the few

successful men, are conspicuous waste and "vicarious enjoyment of leisure," as Veblen described them; and these spread to society, engendering in the minds of those who cannot command sufficient number of monetary tokens, a sense of inferiority and worthlessness.

Money Economy and its Social Drawbacks.—The distinction between money and barter economy is of great significance in the history of social and moral development. The concept of money is associated with an elaboration, standardization, and substitution of wants unknown in the previous state. But the system of money economy involves separation between moral values and economic relationships, and hence elaborates a mere pecuniary culture which is compatible neither with an all-round satisfaction of the complex values nor with social efficiency. Among primitive tribes, shells, which are used in barter, can be used only with a very definite specification. Exchanges made are specialized and even regulated. Thus, among the Melanesians "money serves two chief ends: first, it will purchase a wife; secondly, it will obtain allies in warfare, and pay the compensation due to the dead, whether these have been simply murdered or killed in fight. In the system of barter, in particular, certain things can only be exchanged for certain other things, a spear for a bangle, for instance, fruits for tobacco, pigs for knives. They willingly exchange things which can be made use of in the same sort of way; thus coconuts may be bartered for tobacco, or weapons for ornaments (spears for bangles or glass beads, etc.)."¹ In the agricultural countries of the world and in the rural tracts in the industrialized countries, barter is still the rule, importing social relationships into economic transactions, and making economic service a part of social obligation. It is true that the commutation of the obligation to work into a fixed money payment by the feudal villein, or the pay-

¹ R. Thuruwald.

ment of cash wages to the field-laborer, has everywhere led to the emancipation of the worker. At the same time, the cash nexus has meant a loss in intimate personal relationships, characteristic of the group organization of the earlier epoch.

A similar neglect of moral and even physical considerations characterizes the use of money. The elaborate industrial and commercial system, with its complicated, interwoven chain of processes, has kept alive the demand for an increase of production irrespectively of social efficiency. First, there is the fear of unemployment which means starvation for the masses of toilers as well as for the increasing classes of middlemen. Secondly, there is the profit-seeking impulse of the manufacturer and the merchant, who fill the newspapers with advertisements of their goods and speed the rate of public consumption. Thirdly, the masses derive their standards of consumption from the wealthy classes, whose desires are sophisticated and who display their rivalry and aggression by conspicuous waste. Hence, both production and consumption are determined with little reference to the needs of personality. The belief is widespread that money can buy everything. Hence the other belief gradually creeps in that the pleasures and satisfactions that money cannot buy are not worth striving after; and it is the intellectual and moral values that are neglected where the suggestions forthcoming from all quarters, under the competition of industrial and commercial interests, are to get and spend as much money as possible. The vital energies of men are weakened as a result of unwholesome consumption, and this further weakens the desire for self-realization.

Machinery and the Worker.—The system of mechanical production with its long hours, monotony of work and life, and the dreary, squalid conditions which surround the workers, leave unsatisfied some of the elemental instincts.

Man feels that he is part of an alien irresistible system of machinery, with wheels within wheels, which he cannot comprehend. He is forced to do work for which he may not be fitted and the speed of his work is controlled from without. Thus he feels his degradation. "In the textile industry, for example, the rate of production is determined by the speed of machines. It is impossible for the workers tending the separate operations to influence the rate. Human beings are subordinated, not immediately to the will of other men—although, of course, some human will decides the rate at which the engines move—but to the motion of machinery. That this has deleterious effects upon the body as well as upon the spirit of man seems probable from the researches. The rhythm of such machines as lathes in certain operations appears, furthermore, to drive workers onward regardless of the accumulating poisons of fatigue, and regardless even of their ability, in some such cases, to alter the speed of the machine."¹ Parker has enumerated the powerful forces of the working-class environment which thwart or balk instinct-expression. These are suggested in the phrases, "monotonous work," "dirty work," "simplified work," "mechanized work," "the servile place of labor," "insecure tenure of the job," "hire and fire," "winter unemployment," and in the ever-found union of the poor district with the crime district, and the restricted district with prostitution, the open shop, and labor turnover, poverty and the bread-line, the scrap heap, and destitution.² Even the commoner kinds of labor, Bertrand Russell thinks, could be made a source of health and life, and a joy instead of a weariness if, instead of being conducted by ancient traditional methods, without any possibility of intelligent participation by the wage-earner, it were alive with the search for new methods and new inventions, filled with the spirit

¹Chenery, *Industry and Human Welfare*, pp. 152-153.

²Parker, *The Casual Laborer*.

of freedom, inviting the mental as well as the physical coöperation of those who do the work.¹

Management of Industry.—The system of management is molded on a military pattern. The general manager is responsible for the work of the entire organization and delegates authority and responsibility to subordinates, and they to their subordinates. "In such a form of management, criticism from the head goes completely down the line, gathering in vehemence and force as it proceeds, while praise extended from the top usually penetrates only as far as the superintendent's office. Despotism, which manifests itself in harsh criticism or tyrannical treatment of men, is undoubtedly the characteristic of this form of management. Money returns are the only gauge of success, and that foreman is best who can force from his men the greatest amount of work with the least possible compensation."²

Group Reactions against De-humanized Industry.—Thus the constructive instincts and the desires for self-assertion are inhibited and the working-class tends to fulfill these in ideal representation. The mass of workmen, who all resent the domination of foremen and fear the overpowering resources of managers, is brought together by the class. A different behavior, with habits and traditions far different from those seen in the workshop, emerges in the class. The workmen, whose impulses of assertiveness or constructiveness have been denied, participate in the management of the trade union with its diverse fields of activity. The employers also shorten the hours of labor, improve factory sanitation, and invent and improve machinery to take over the harder and more monotonous and disagreeable tasks. Profit-sharing and copartnership in industry similarly turn

¹ Bertrand Russell, *Proposed Roads to Freedom*.

² Dodge, "The Spirit in Which Scientific Management Should Be Approached," in Thompson's *Scientific Management*, p. 287.

to account the instinct to work and lessen the burden of industrial labor. Constructive instincts are recognized and appealed to also in the movements for the revival of arts and handicrafts, coöperative production, and the democratic control of industry, all of which aim at the release of the normal feelings inhibited by modern industry. But more often, standardized mass production makes labor a curse. It engenders the belief that exploitation is honorable. Thus, the directive or leisure class assumes a masterful, domineering attitude. Now and then the attitude of the employing class renews the fighting, bullying impulses of the group which has brought together the individuals who feel their degradation; and labor leaders appear, as the huntsmen of old, stirring the resistance of labor groups, meeting might with might.

The power of organized unionism is increased a hundred-fold through consciousness of concerted action of large masses of people, through crowd behavior, and through the suggestion of radical literature and journalism. The man to whom a status of inferiority has been given finds in the baffling of his social life a rationalized cause of class hatred, while large profits and ostentatious display of wealth and culture provoke the worker's feelings of inferiority and hatred. The inferiority-patterns reflect themselves in the social and philosophical radicalism of the present day. Men condemned to poverty and obscurity seek refuge in a belief in the injustice of the present economic and political régime which denies them their merest human due. On the other hand, the propertied classes develop defence mechanisms. The present order is justified by them against every attack or complaint of the radical. There are some conservatives of the extreme reactionary type who invoke law and public opinion, which they control through the manipulation of the newspaper agency, to attack the radicals on the slightest pretext or provocation. Such use of influence by reac-

tionary capitalistic interests, which are now conspicuous centers of social suggestion, leads to greater resentment and hatred among the working-folk.

Industrial Idealism and Signs of Fulfillment.—Again, along with the widespread feeling of hatred of a system that denies them the elemental needs of human nature, a feeling which is not only against particular employers but also indiscriminately against capitalistic interests, there is an ideal of love and solidarity. The workers picture an ideal state in which the attitude of domination-subservience, characteristic of the present system, no longer prevails. There is a solidarity of the various classes of workers, though, perhaps subconsciously, the only class represented as of great significance is that of the urban proletariat. Resentment is keen among workers because government and law are on the side of the capitalists. Hence, along with the attempt to bring about coöperation in industry and solidarity in the interests concerned in production, there is a serious endeavor to build up a new polity, or at least to picture an ideal state where government is no longer simply a strong arm used by the dominating classes in their own interest. A sense of bafflement diminishes the output of energy, and promotes its canalization along dangerous anti-social channels. The result is social inefficiency. But, in the midst of conflicting currents of motives and dispositions, in those places where production no longer seeks mere profit at the expense of baffling some of the strongest instincts of the great majority of men, and consumption ceases to be impulsive and illegitimate, a saner and a more conscientious view of economic relationship is emerging.

TOPICS

1. Forms of animism among Hunting Peoples.
2. The religion of the Nomads.
3. Agricultural deities and festivals in the Far East.

4. The effect of class conflict on social and political relations.
5. The effect of the profit-seeking impulse on production and consumption.
6. The effect of repression on the workingman's attitude.

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CHAPTER XII

REGIONAL EVOLUTION OF CULTURE

Harmony of the Region.—Every region presents to man a distinct situation which is uniform and constant. The vegetable and animal world, the sources of food, the methods of food-getting, etc., which are somewhat the same in a given region, evoke responses which are similar in all members of society. Thus a similarity of behavior is established in all inhabitants of a given region. Habits, customs, or traditions present those well-canalized channels for the expenditure of organic energy which the experience of past generations has proved to be useful. These, therefore, correspond to heredity in organic evolution and save the individual from the costly process of learning by trial and error. Animals have their stock of traditions. They form the habit of roaming in an advantageous location or spending the night in a certain cave, or acquire skill by practice in the capture of prey. Trails made through a forest by one animal tend to be used by other animals. The flying of wild birds in formation and herd phenomena among the gregarious mammals show accumulation of habits by animals. W. H. Hudson observes that some gregarious animals, particularly birds, live together in the most perfect peace and amity; and here no leader is required because, as a species, in their long association together in flocks they have attained a oneness of mind, so to speak, which causes them to move, rest, and to act at all times harmoniously together as if controlled and guided by an extraneous force.

Traditions, Animal and Human.—Animals acquire new habits by the method of trial and error, also by imitation and tuition; and the process of domestication initiates them into a certain type of human culture. Many instances have

been adduced. The fire-engine horse shows a remarkable adaptation to a human situation. The trained monkey and parrot acquire culture-elements from human beings. Many species of birds are known to educate their young instinctively in flying and other very important matters.¹ Songs invented by certain birds and then acquired by other birds through association are conclusive evidence of the rudiments of culture; if "culture" is used in the strictest sense of the word. Traditions thus play some part in the behavior of all higher mammals. In the case of human beings, however, the individual's own ideas and actions, and his judgments upon social habits, continually infringe upon and modify such customs and traditions. Formerly man's motor reactions, both to the environment and to the group, were direct and well-defined. Any deviation from the familiar and the old was dangerous and consequently was looked upon with misgiving. This explains the reverence for custom, and the dread of novelty, in the primitive mind. Traditions at first gather around the more compelling aspects of life, such as the mode of economic organization and means of livelihood, defence and attack, birth, marriage and death, and the unseen forces of nature. It is obvious that plants, animals, and inanimate objects of the region exercise from the beginnings of culture a sway over man's feelings, ideas, and images, and become interlaced with his modes of behavior. Some of these traditions are crystalized, others unformulated. Nevertheless, these restrict man's interests and habits, and sometimes they continue to restrain behavior even when their necessity has been long outgrown. But the complexity and variety of reactions and the rich heritage of social experience have deprived tradition of much of its old reverence.

Traditions in the Making.—The richness and variety of

¹ See a suggestive article by Hart and Pantzer: "Have Sub-human Animals Culture?"—*The American Journal of Sociology*, May, 1925.

traditions in modern life demand a large amount of variability in behavior. In primitive times, war and the constant need of self-preservation oriented instincts and other motor reactions into a few well-defined outlets. But under more stable conditions of society, the impulses of construction, assertiveness, etc., may not subserve the needs of offence and defence. There is a new fusion of instincts and interests which alters the tone and character of an old tradition. At the same time, new opinions and beliefs arise which give an entirely new direction to instincts. But these, so long as they remain inchoate and ill-formulated, cannot aspire to be traditions. Traditions thus represent a cluster of ideas and emotions in which an individual does not wholly participate, but which command the general acceptance and instinctive satisfaction of the people. So long as traditions remain uncrystallized and floating, they remain opinions and beliefs restricted to individuals. The motor phase of life is ever ready, however, to change its direction and branch off into new channels which the social heritage cannot check or guide. Thus the adventurous spirit seeks to direct instinctive and emotional tendencies in untried, dangerous channels. Likewise, the inhibitions of social tradition wear off and give birth to novel ideas and new schemes of action. Gradually, such new clusters of ideas and emotions, such new modes of action, receive social sanction and are elevated to the category of traditions. When traditions are formulated, it is these which blend with the usual trends of expression that behavior takes. Therefore, the diversity of traditions accounts for the variety in the concrete manifestations of psychic types.

Traditions, the Material of Culture.—The traditions tend to arrange themselves, to cohere, in a definite pattern. This is what we term "culture," comprehending the whole scheme of life. Men are born to it and are as unconscious of imbibing it as they are of respiration. How a particular

tradition comes to predominate over others, thereby giving rise to a more or less coherent culture, has been explained by anthropologists and ethnologists in many ways. Some have attributed it to the unconscious complexes in the racial mind arising from the familiar objects of the geographical environment which become associated with the food quest. Wissler, for example, plots the distribution of cultural traits of the Indians on a map of North and South America. Similarly, the culture-region concept has been found applicable to African data by Herskovits, who has worked out the East African region on the basis of the cattle complex. The contributions of Lowie, Sapir, and Goldenweiser point in the same direction. Thus, the environment has its share in contributing the "brick and mortar" of culture: the materials of technology, the subjects for religion, the characters of myths, as well as certain factors which limit or enhance the growth and spread of social and political systems. Wissler's particular contribution in this field consists in the thought that environment, while powerless to create culture, is capable of holding it to certain forms which develop as one of several possible ways of solving the problem of environmental adjustment. For obvious reasons, material culture is especially prone to being held in check by environment.¹ On the other hand, Herbert Spencer, Tylor, and other anthropologists of his school believed in unilinear development in every culture following upon innate psychological characteristics of the peoples. Inventions, for instance, were regarded as new adjustments arising out of an accidental permutation and combination of old modes of behavior. Others again, like Graebner, Eliot-Smith and his school, emphasize the phenomena of diffusion of traditions that serve as nuclei in culture-formations. This completely upsets the scheme of a parallel development of

¹ Goldenweiser, "Diffusionism and the American School of Historical Ethnology," *The American Journal of Sociology*, July, 1925.

cultures with definite stages or stadia of the older school.

Regionality of Cultures.—The truth seems to be that regional conditions impress upon cultures a distinct stamp or pattern which is transmitted from generation to generation by social selection. The diversity of cultures and their well-determined courses cannot be explained away as fortuitous or as a result of casual diffusion. There is, in every case, the constant factor of the geographical environment which develops traditions not only economic in character but also religious, social, and æsthetic. The constancy of the external factor lends stability to the group of traditions. These operate as the apperception mass, as the selective agency for all other innovations and incoming influences. Thus, a new trait accepted from a foreign group conforms to the general pattern of culture. If it does not so conform, there is conflict, and the trait is finally rejected, or its imposition is forced by conquest. Interesting instances are adduced by the new school of anthropologists. Wissler, examining the spread of the horse in North America, found that it was readily adopted into the hunting patterns of the plains Indians, but was rejected as useless by those whose homes were in the woodlands, and who hence had no use for it. The history of the spread of staple crops, of agricultural processes and implements of industry, or of ceremonial rites and observances, shows that acceptance or rejection was governed by their suitability and adaptation to the general pattern of the culture adopting them. Similarly, the history of conversion is full of instances of the success or failure of a proselytizing religion adapting its beliefs and rites to old dogmas and superstitions.

Institutions, the Practice of Traditions.—There is yet another process of transformation which the social product has to go through as a result of the interaction of minds. This is represented by the growth of institutions. The dif-

ference between traditions and institutions consists in the fact that while the former represent ideas, interests, and emotions, the latter represent these as translated into social action. Institutions are thus definite or sanctioned modes of social behavior. A tradition is hypothetical in character, while an institution is categorical. There exist, in modern societies, traditional institutions which derive their prestige from the past. There are also novel institutions, which are new orientations of social interests and which as yet have not obtained the approval of the whole community. Certain sections of the community still distrust these new institutions, while among other sections they are sanctioned and crystallized modes of behavior.

When institutions are still new and in the process of making, the ideas and emotions that underlie them remain vivid and intense. On the other hand, the ideas and emotions behind time-honored institutions become so stale that they simply become modes of behavior. The lapse of ideas from the field of attentional consciousness, reduces a complicated series of social behavior to the category of instinctive reactions. This process will be made clearer by an illustration. In modern societies, monogamy is a well-established institution. A man enters into the marriage relation and goes through a series of acts without reasoning about them. When he comes across a people practicing polygamy or polyandry, a conflict arises in his ideas. It is this conflict which generates his interest. He is then called upon to exercise his critical faculty. Thus what was distinctive and personal, and hitherto was unevoked, is now called into play. There is a fresh assimilation and interaction of his feeling and judgment with those of his neighbors. Through such comparisons he forms his own opinion. Since this is a matter which concerns a common habit in the community, approval or disapproval in word and action arouses new interests and emotions which clash with, or

reënforce, already-existing ideas and emotions. Out of this intermingling there emerges a more or less stable judgment which we call "public opinion."

Public Opinion and its Social Importance.—Public opinion, crystallized in catch-words and phrases of censure and praise and spread from mouth to mouth, evokes, in individuals, interests and emotions similar to the interests and emotions aroused by fellow-beings. Verbal intercourse, discussion in the press and on the platform, lead to addition and filtration, unanimity or difference; but in every case the opinion crystallized in a maxim or shibboleth arouses feelings and sentiments ranging from the wild outbursts of excited crowds to the sober expressions of critical and dispassionate judgment. Legislation also looks for its support to public opinion. Law which is not supported by the existing public opinion cannot succeed. On the other hand, the evolution of positive law proceeds *pari passu* with the conscious formulation, by the enlightened classes of society, of aims and purposes which then filter down to the masses. In every age, courts of law invariably sought to make their decisions, first, in accordance with custom and precedent, and secondly, in accordance with the force of public opinion. By the side of positive law, accordingly, there is a vast and growing body of unwritten law which plays no small part in governing social attitudes.

Regional Differences Reflected in Social Behavior.—Traditions, institutions, and public opinion are different in different regions and social *milieus*. Climate, food, soil, natural resources, topography, etc., evoke characteristic motor reactions and modes of social behavior. This explains a different social selection as regards food and wages, standards of living, usage, and habits. There may or may not be a similar equipment of instincts and impulses of different peoples, but there is no doubt that the effects of tradition and the institutional environment are a characteristic

expression of instincts, a specific line of transmission and a specific psychical type. Ginsberg observes: "The inherited dispositions are actualized in a form determined by social experience and under the influence of the environment. Institutions and traditions in general mold the behavior of individuals and determine the way in which the inherited dispositions shall be actualized. But, on the other hand, traditions and institutions themselves are in the long run due to innate dispositions stimulated to activity by the conditions of the social and physical environment and are constantly modified by the varying circumstances in which the individuals find themselves."¹ It is the native human nature which supplies the raw material, but traditions and institutions furnish the machinery and the designs, simplifying the world and making the life of man easier and more successful in a particular environment. These therefore come to have a survival value of their own over and above a people's original equipment in instincts and impulses.

Climate as Illustrating Regional Difference and its Influence on Peoples.—On the one hand, the region, by its selective influence, fixes in a stock certain inherent favorable physical and mental qualities. Differences of sense perception, of irritability, and of temperament are being studied in association with differences in the physical traits of different peoples, and the conviction is gaining ground that mental qualities are inherited like physical qualities and character. The influence of climate on sex and on the nervous system generally is now well recognized. A dry atmosphere and possibly a high altitude seem to have a deleterious effect on the nervous system. Dr. Moben maintains that nervous diseases are more common in high altitudes than in low. But Dexter shows that low humidity, especially if accompanied by wind, produces increased nervous tension as shown by mild insomnia or increased irrita-

¹ *The Psychology of Society.*

bility. Nossiloff noted the effect of the polar night on the native population. It caused an apathy of body and mind and a general feeling of drowsiness which was especially manifest in children, who seemed to pine away. A plentiful supply of sunlight produces a buoyant, joyous temperament.¹ McDougall states the effects of these climatic zones as follows: "High temperature combined with moisture certainly tends to depress the vital activity of Europeans and to render them indolent, indisposed to exertion of any kind. On the other hand, high temperature combined with dryness of atmosphere seems to have the effect of rendering man but little disposed to continuous activity, and yet capable of great effort; it tends to produce violent spasmodic activity. A cold climate seems to dispose toward sustained activity and, when combined with much moisture, to a certain slowness." For examples, he mentions Malays, as showing the effect of hot moist climates, Arabs as illustrating the effect of dry heat, and the English and Dutch for the qualities produced by a moist, cool climate. Huntington² has studied climatic influences on the intensity and continuity of labor and on the health and vitality of peoples; and he concludes that the most important, from the point of view of energy, are seasonal variations in temperature from day to day, and humidity. He found that the maximum amount of physical labor was performed at an average temperature of 60 to 65 degrees F., and mental activity was greatest when the outside temperature averaged about 38 degrees. Coöperation between the anthropologist and the psychologist is establishing a *prima facie* case for the distribution of mental characteristics in particular regions.

Study of Cultural Types.—On the other hand, traditions and institutions govern the way in which the physical and

¹ Bushee, *Principles of Sociology*. ² *Climate and Civilization*.

mental characters shall be actualized. Through the mutual correlation and adaptation of a people's mental constitution and the social inheritance of a region, we have distinctive types of culture.

Cultural types are, therefore, formed by the following factors:

(1) The physical factors of geography and physiography.

(2) The psychical factors, such as the hereditary racial dispositions and qualities.

(3) The social factors, such as the characteristic habits, traditions, and institutions of a people.

(4) The historical tradition, which has been built up layer upon layer by the interaction of the physical and the psycho-social factors in the life of a people.

Such types show correlated differences in the following:

(1) *Differences in food, standard of living, and mode of economic organization.*—Man's interests and habits and his social organization are molded, in the early stages, by the botanical and zoölogical resources of a region. The transition from the hunting to the pastoral phase and from the pastoral to agricultural activity exhibits a change in the entire mode of life or culture. Agriculture attaches a people to the region. The region weaves around it a complex web of life in which plants, animals, and human groups are inextricably linked together by chains of action and interaction which man is slow to recognize. But in these chains of circumstance, which reach up and down and around, we have the essential factors which mold his culture. With the development of agriculture, of material arts and of technology, the effects of fixation and isolation on the human group become increasingly manifest. Each stage of economic development nourishes a characteristic political system, a type of domestic organization, and a form of property. The transition from the hunting to the pastoral stage, for instance, has meant as we have already seen, a

more stable food supply and a more distinct notion of territorial ownership and ownership of the means of common defense than obtained among wandering hunters. The advance from the pastoral to the agricultural stage implies also a more settled life, a larger accumulation of capital, and a greater economic differentiation. The form of the family was loose and unstable in the hunting régime, and hence kinship and social organization could not crystallize. In the pastoral stage, the patriarchal family, with its supreme authority of the patriarch, was evolved and the status of woman was degraded. The latter could be recovered in the agricultural stage only, when the work of the women in the fields proved much more important as a source of food supply to the community than the protection of the flocks and herds against wild beasts by the male members of the family.

Similarly, an aggressive character, a well-knit organization, a sense of discipline, and supreme authority of the tribal chief—all these are essential characteristics of the pastoral races, giving them a considerable relative strength and the best possible power of action against the settled peoples of the plains. The latter, however, show a virile and expansive political power, especially in the great plains and the river valleys. It is thus that political institutions and forces are the outcome of economic conditions. According to Oppenheimer, all world history, from primitive times up to our own civilization, presents a single phase, a contest between the economic and the political means; and it can present only this phase until we have achieved free citizenship. The peculiar legal forms and social alignments are governed likewise by economic and political institutions and forces interacting upon one another.

(2) *Differences in impulses both hereditary and acquired, in traditions and in institutions.*—The organization of group life and the forms of relations between individuals

and between groups are governed by social selection and are under the influence of physical factors. There are exhibited fundamental physical and social characteristics peculiar to and widespread in a certain region, establishing a correspondence of the type of social and economic behavior. The correspondence of economic, social, and legal forms manifested with a greater or less continuity in a succession of generations, springs from and reënforces the distinctive cultural characteristics.

Traditions as Variable Components of Culture.—The traditions which constitute a culture refer to particular phases of action. There is, for instance, a tradition as regards the inedibility of different kinds of food: such as taboos of pork and beef among the Muhammadans and Hindus. There also grows a corresponding tradition as regards the domestic value of animals, such as the cow, camel, or reindeer. There are traditions of family forms and relations between the sexes. These amalgamate with other traditions, sometimes religious, sometimes economic, sometimes artistic. The basic feature of such association of traditions lies in the fact that some of them are emphasized more than others and serve to coördinate and give coloring to the whole group of traditions. There is, of course, a shifting of emphasis; that which was in the focus recedes into the margin, and another association takes its place. Though the total stock of traditions, in such cases, remains the same, the culture undergoes a marked transformation. It is with reference to the dominant tradition that a culture receives its characteristic definition. In times of war, the military traditions of every people are marshaled to the forefront, and the peaceful, commercial race begins to think and talk military jargon; as the experiences of the last war amply illustrate.

The dominance of a tradition may be brought about through many factors. The influence of the geographical

environment, contact with new peoples, migration, conquest, discoveries, and inventions—every one of these may lift a tradition from relative obscurity and place it on the apex of the whole system of social traditions.

Whenever there is a rearrangement of the scheme of traditional life, it is inevitable that some of the traditions may not be in keeping with the dominant one, and wholly or partially wear off. Thus, culture changes through a process of constant shifting, and wear and tear, in the stock of racial traditions.

TOPICS

1. Climate as affecting social life.
2. The distribution of mental characteristics in particular regions.
3. The region as mold of traditions.
4. The relation of ecological areas to culture.
5. The culture region and the culture center.

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CHAPTER XIII

LEGACY OF RACE

Race Differentiation in Adaptation to Environment.—Race behavior is something concrete and particular. It is a conjuncture of economic, political, and ethnic factors; and a classification which takes into account only one division of social behavior and misses the correlated variations in the totality of social work and experience is essentially unscientific. Thus, the basis of classification cannot be unitary but must be manifold; nor can there be any single law of three (or more) stages deduced either from the subjective or the objective point of view. There is, as we have seen, a correspondence of the type of social and economic behavior and the correlated adaptive reflex in the relations of family or group organization which lie embedded in a people's social and political history. The reactions in culture, in religion, in art, or in educational activity are no less significant. On the other hand, the dominating types of social and economic behavior mold the type of social and political organizations and leave an impress not merely on intra-group but also on intra-national relations. The influence of capitalistic industrialism, for instance, has resulted in the modern system of international economic rivalries, furthered by small capitalistic groups in rival nations which seek to possess exclusive economic advantages. Thus, rival economic imperialisms are partly the outcome of rivalries of capitalistic and financial juntas of the different nations; and the masses in different countries, as an inevitable result of the social and economic traditions which they themselves shaped through generations, carry a heavy economic burden. The peaceful or aggressive economics or politics of a people in the intra-racial sphere is

a repetition of intra-national relations. It is interesting to trace the successive types of intra-national relations which develop when economic or political conditions in a country so change as to make for the predominance of one instinct, or group of instincts, after another. With the development of successive groups of instincts and values, the economic and political organizations are shaped in accordance with the dispositions which acquire predominance. But the other dispositions also continue active, so that the development of an organization in satisfaction of the predominant dispositions is deflected by opposing tendencies and is consequently irregular.¹ Therefore, the evolution of social values is an exceedingly intricate and complex process, and taxes to the utmost the accuracy of regional inquiry and the clarity of a broad comparative and historical survey. But it is certain—and proofs are accumulating from new researches of anthropology and ethnology—that there is both a physiological and a psychological adaptation of stock to environmental conditions. From the numberless variations in physical and mental traits produced by race segregation and unification, by social activity and material culture with elaboration of useful arts, natural selection picks out certain characteristics that are to become permanent physical and psychical elements in race differentia. The primitive psycho-physical type which, under the operation of biological causes and conditions, has developed in interaction with the twofold environment of nature and society, is the first stadium, furnishing the material that is worked up into the more complex organization of cultural types.

Maintenance of Cultural Race.—If the individual organism is maintained by the balance of hereditary conservation and progressive variation, cultural race is maintained

¹ Williams traces the history of successive attitudes in American life in his *Foundations of Social Science*.

culture, as the matrix of the race. Progress consists in the greater liberation of organic and social energies in the life processes of society by the continual interchange of matter and energy between a population and the region it occupies, and an ever-richer return to the twofold store of nature and society, so that the cycle is reproduced in ever-increasing measure. Since the gifts of stock and region vary, progress is not unilinear. The synthesis of organic and inorganic materials and the forms and activities of culture differ in different zones and lend variety to the interactions of nature and race, yet representing an ever-flowing stream of civilization which is perpetually fed and renewed as it is perpetually evaporated and used up. Such is the comparative view of civilization, with its geographical zones of culture and its primal bio-sociological types of cultural race.

Racial Extension, Conflict, and Unification.—Like all living organisms, a racial or cultural type also seeks to extend its area of distribution by the aid of such means of migration and ecesis (acclimatization) as it possesses. Mason shows that migrations were, and are still, very common among the natural races; leading to a great admixture of races and industrial arts. It appears evident from a study of the migrations which might have led the Mongoloid peoples to America that escape from the regions of an ever-vanishing food supply in the rear and pursuit of an inviting food supply in front played a prominent part. Two hundred years ago and more the upper Pacific, the Behring Sea, and the plains of the great West contained far the largest stores of human subsistence in the world. The fish, the sea-cow, the Arctic mammals, the caribou, the buffalo, in a certain sense, peopled America. In the Indian Ocean and the Pacific, six hundred years ago, the Polynesian race suddenly became the Norsemen of that area. In the same Malayo-Polynesian area, especially in the region extending from Australia to Indo-China, dwell Negroes, Malayas,

Polynesians, and Australians. There is thus a great confusion of industry and race undergoing the process of transformation from segregation to unification. Racial peculiarities thus indeed overlap the natural elements of industry; and the techno-geographer, and the ethno-geographer are merged into the ethno-technologist.¹ This is not past history. Its mneme is still alive to-day in the continuous outward thrust of the frugal laborious Chinese and Japanese upon both sides of the Pacific and the corner of the Indian Ocean, which makes the Yellow Peril a standing menace; or in the invasion of the aggressive Euro-American peoples of the tropical and semi-tropical regions, with its corollary of the conflict between the competitive industrial and agricultural communal standards which has brought about Asian and African unrest. This gives new significance to the spirit of unity underlying a Pan-Asiatic, a Pan-African, a Pan-Islamic, a Pan-Arabic, a Pan-Slavic, or a Pan-Nordic alliance based upon racial characteristics; as, for instance, color, common traditions, economic or political, or cultural or religious interests. This also explains pronounced attitudinizing, such as Easternism and Westernism in a larger sphere, and chauvinism, which claims to solve world problems by the single key furnished by a particular racial stock. These racial or cultural divisions have also called forth universal solvents like the League of Nations, the socialistic ideal of a universal brotherhood and international protection of labor, or the trusteeship of the backward races. From the point of view of the psychology of nationality, such divisions breed unity on national, ethnic, or geographical bases, and evoke the best cultural energies of a stock to realize within itself the ideal of serving humanity and the world by offering its own solution. The natural child of vainglorious nationalism thus becomes the citizen of the world.

¹*American Anthropologist*, VII, 137-58.

On the other hand, such divisions engender elements of conflict and discord that underlie some phases of modern economic imperialism: the exploitation of the backward races and regions, or the policy of open and closed door, segregation and reserve, which are governed by the psychology of the white man's burden and the colored man's docility.

Racial Problems: Migration and Intermixture.—Factors of cultural race also enter into the insistent problems of race colonization and emigration, in which the numerous types of human behavior centering round acquisition or domination, competition or rivalry, coöperation or racial sympathy, determine the social intercourse of the peoples in contact. To these problems of racial behaviorism may be added the subsidiary questions of intermixture and intermarriage, which have begotten new racial types such as the mulattoes in America, the Filipinos, Dutch Indians, and Eur-Asians in Asia, and the half-castes in Australia and New Zealand. Western eugenicists now emphasize the fact that great attention must be paid to immigrations, so that inferior individuals belonging to foreign races no longer may enter a country and settle without question or interference. A mixture between nations who stand high from a race-biological point of view, and others containing lower race elements, such as gipsies, Galicians, certain Russian tribes, etc., must be condemned.

It is a fact that during the last decades the mingling of races has increased to an enormous degree as a result of philanthropic measures and immigration. The migrations of nations in former times, biologically regarded, were harmless in comparison with those of the last eight or ten years. On the German frontier, for instance, there have come in from the East 600,000 persons represented by no means the best racial elements; while the immigration accepted by the United States of America during the same period has been almost three times as large.

Naturalization and Imported Labor Problems.—There also arise questions of naturalization, so important to-day in the new continent; and of the conflict of African, European, and Asian labor in South Africa; or of native and Asiatic labor in the United States of America, Canada, and Australia. These labor problems turn upon the differential capacity and standards of consumption or on differential adaptabilities. Industrial and agricultural occupations demand increased and new energy. Partly for this reason, and partly on account of a low birth-rate among the maturer and better-organized peoples, foreigners are called in. Thus race mixtures result. It is recognized that some crossings are in fact constantly removing undesirable characters, while others are creating new miseries for mankind, *e.g.*, tuberculosis and other diseases, and social evils, such as the increasing criminality from mentally disturbed race elements. Dr. East and Dr. Jones have put the case biologically: "Through the operation of the laws of heredity such unions tend to break apart series of character complexes which through years of selection have proved to be compatible with each other, and with the persistence of the race under the environment to which it has been subjected. Because of the transmission of factors in linked groups, the low probability of obtaining a single recombination equal or superior to the average of the better race does not warrant the production of multitudes of racial mediocrities, which such a mixture entails."¹ Nor must we forget the special psychological problems of social life and government which arise out of a constant stream of immigration. The quality of the immigrant population affects the temper and character of the race. Economic migration for higher wages in a foreign country does not represent the normal ability of the people. More detrimental to standard and values is the influx of slaves and dependents, as in ancient Rome. Again, the pioneer immigrants from con-

¹Quoted by J. J. Thomson in *The Outline of Science*, p. 747.

quered provinces show greater capacity and intelligence than those who follow when the channels of immigration are worn deep, straight, and smooth. The industrial qualities of immigrants introduce the race factor into the economic problem, while the qualities which fit or unfit them for assimilation complicate government, law, and moral standards. The preponderance of Negroes in the southern part of the United States, especially emphasized by modern sanitation and philanthropic effort; the economic competition of the Japanese and Chinese with the American laboring class in the fruit gardens and fields of the western states; the gradual and irresistible pressure of the eastern laborers on the Indian and the *mestizo* population of tropical South America; and the conflict between the Indian, the Chinese, and the native population in Malaysia: all these represent the natural forces which affect the race balance. On the other hand, the legislation against Asiatic immigration in the United States, in the British Colonies, and particularly in Australia, or the use of political power against the Hindus on behalf of the white population in South Africa, and against the Chinese on behalf of the Malays in the Philippine Islands, shows how the public policies of some of the advanced races contribute toward limiting the opportunities to expand of the less advanced peoples.

Racial Differences Exaggerated.—Races have also their natural likes and dislikes. Jealousy, suspicion, and racial hatred poison international relations. Where several races have come to live together, social outbreaks are frequent. The "German menace" is probably a thing of the past; but the "yellow peril" is still a convenient issue for the election platform in the United States, South Africa, and Australia. In South and East Africa, the relation between the whites, the Asiatics, and the native population has yet to be adjusted. These antipathies rest, in some instances

upon a perception of physical differences. The contrast between white, brown, yellow, and black is too impressive not to influence human behavior. Certain experimental studies seem to indicate that mixed and pure races have their specific color-preferences. Garth finds that the æsthetic value of colors is but little influenced by education.¹ Racial antipathy may finally rest upon such ultimate æsthetic attitudes. Again, we know that colors easily acquire associations in the form of ideas and emotions. The association of white with purity, of black with dirt, and of red with passion is very common. It is easy to pass from this fact to sensational fiction and film pictures in which the villain is often a brown Hindu, a yellow Chinaman, or a dark Negro. The color-associations sometimes acquire a racial significance through historical incidents. The feeling against the Negro in the United States probably rests on the fact that the Negro began his American career as a slave. On the other hand, the Red Indian is the historic enemy of the whites on the New Continent and commands the consideration due to an antagonist who was vanquished only after a long struggle. Dress and language, mode of living, and economic pursuit accentuate the basic physical difference. Those who favor the exclusion of the Asiatic races from South Africa, Canada, and Australia often support their case by the argument that the mode of life of the Oriental is far different from that of the European races. It is clear, therefore, that the fact of physical difference between races is accentuated by a number of cultural factors. Hence, racial antipathy, though it rests upon an instinctive basis, can be modified to some extent by humanitarian education and ideals. The sympathies or antipathies

¹Garth, "The Colour-preferences of five hundred and fifty-nine full-blooded Indians," *Journal of Experimental Psychology*, Vol. V., No. 6, 1922, pp. 392-417.

of peoples, no less than their possessive or distributive impulses, have played, and are playing, an important part in domination or assimilation, conquest or absorption.

Scientific Basis of Internationalism.—It is essential to understand the social attitudes and temperaments of different nations in order to find a scientific basis of internationalism. The study of socio-psychological conditions is imperative for a readjustment of the relations between the so-called superior and organized, and the so-called inferior and unorganized races. It is well-known that ignorance and misunderstanding of the character and capacity of the less organized peoples of the world have been fruitful causes of conflict and suffering. A scientific Asianism or a scientific Africanism reiterates the need of a more careful understanding and a wider sympathy which will reënforce the doctrine of the mandate by an ideal of mutually serviceable coöperation between the advanced and backward races as directing the aims of future statesmanship. If international activity be the basis of a world-wide ethical organization, its basis, in turn, must be found in the comparative psychology of peoples.

Comparative Psychology of Race.—The comparative psychology of races has been little studied by the only precise methods, those of experimental psychology. There seem to exist some differences between savage and civilized peoples, especially as regards the sensations of hunger, thirst, sex, and the less definable impressions of health and *malaise*. Certain tests of the acuteness of vision, audition, smell, and taste have been applied by Messrs. McDougall and Myers to the Torres Strait natives. Their general conclusion is that these primitive races possess some slight advantages over the normal European in sensory acuity. Mr. McDougall's observations indicate that the Murray Islanders far excel the European in their power of tactile discrimination; their muscular sensibility also appears to

be more delicate. It is doubtful whether this superiority is the outcome of hereditary endowment or of special knowledge developed through practice in familiar surroundings. The character of the data is such that no certain conclusions can be reached.¹

Some interesting results of a comparison of Oriental and American student intelligence were given by Waugh under the following heads:

	American	Chinese	Indian
1. Concentration of attention.....	75	75	62
2. Speed of learning.....	66	62	45
3. Association time.....	46	38	58
4. Immediate memory.....	58	..	54
5. Deferred memory.....	80	..	88
6. Range of information.....	23	15	24

Some tests for comparison between white and black adults were also applied in the army camps. These showed a distinct massing of Negroes in the lower grades and of whites in the middle grades. As regards Negroes and foreign-born Italians, the small percentage of the latter finally rated in Alpha, and the large percentage rated in Beta implied an inferiority on their part, as compared with the former, given approximately equivalent educational opportunities; but, on the other hand, a distinct inferiority of the black race was indicated by the percentages of Negroes and Italians in the latter grades.² Some experiments conducted at the Calcutta Psychological Laboratory, however, indicate that the norm of central reaction time of a group of Bengali boys is 177 sigmas, a value slightly less than that shown by Europeans.³

It is very difficult to estimate the scientific value of such tests. It is still more hazardous to take them as a basis for

¹ *Reports of the Cambridge Anthropological Expedition to Torres Strait*, Vol. I., parts i. and ii.

² Gault, *Social Psychology*, Ch. V. See also Garth, *Scientific Monthly*, 1926, No. 23.

³ *Indian Journal of Psychology*, Vol. I., No. 3.

racial comparisons.¹ Some observers suggest that the Mediterranean peoples are more responsive than the peoples of the Baltic; that sensuous æstheticism, altruism, sociability, and sensitiveness to public opinion, as well as vengefulness, are more strongly developed in the south than in the north of Europe.

Racial Temperament.—Races show also differences in temperament which appear as differences in the urgency of instincts, and in mental and emotional, or motor tendency. Differences in temperament, fundamentally considered, are mainly differences in metabolism, *i.e.*, in biological chemistry. Differences in metabolism are connected with the processes of bodily waste and recoument, the relation between proteid and starch consumption, the balance of vitamins and natural salts, etc. These latter, as well as the variations in the development of the ductless glands, have all been the adaptive variations of physical race in a given environment. Thus, around the biological traits and metabolic characteristics of race and the activities of the regulating organs have gathered differential psychic traits and neural and muscular functionings, as well as acquired cultural differences, which are transmitted to the succeeding generation of the species as traditions.

Racial Intellect and Character.—Any successful working of the League of Nations connotes, therefore, a careful study of the socio-psychological conditions of the different nations coming under its ægis. Professor Thorndike regrets that so little is known of racial differences in intellect and character, a knowledge of which is so essential to guide the treatment of the lower by the higher races and the treatment of the latter by one another. It is interesting to note that the differences in intellect due to race, though real, are generally small. In the intellectual test applied by

¹ Sen-Gupta: "The Field of Race Psychology," *Indian Journal of Psychology*, Vol. III, No. 2.

Professor Woodworth only small differences were found between the Europeans and Indians, Eskimos, Ainus, Filipinos, and Sinhalese. The difference in the present status of races is due mainly to the great or small size of the racial group, intercourse or seclusion, or to such environmental influences as favorable or unfavorable economic conditions.

Internationalism of the Future.—Along with comparative race biology and psychology, which will study racial variations in original nature, there is accordingly need of investigation into the gradation and evolution of instincts and traditions and systems of life-values of different races. Cultural inheritance itself is plastic and develops in the light of new experiences and values. The relative importance of original racial traits and cultural traditions on the one hand, and the physical, neural, and affective variability on the other, determines the progressive adaptation of the race. Thus, race psychology and cultural anthropology will work hand in hand toward the interpretation of the complex phenomena that result from the interaction of various cultural types exemplifying on one side the laws of hereditary succession, fixation, and conservation, and on the other the laws of progressive selection and variation. The disintegration of racial and cultural values and racial or cultural maladjustment will now have a new meaning for international sociology and ethics. Out of the truths made manifest in the course of these complex inquiries, ultimately will be evolved a scientific humanitarianism based on what may be called the Euthenics of Race and Culture. Such a science will be in harmony with modern knowledge of man, race, and environment, and will seek to apply this knowledge to the evolution and consciously organized selection of races and peoples. Much cruelty, much unrighteousness, much unutterable suffering which hitherto have marked the intercourse between races will no longer be

defended by the careless shibboleth of "race progress," and science will bring forward the compelling idea of the unity of man amid a diversity of cultures, each the natural child and rightful heir of its appointed region of the earth. Thus alone can the relations between the races be established on the bedrock of justice, fair play, and equal opportunity. And so, in the family of races, the strong and the adult members will cherish and protect those as yet immature by means of international legislation and administration which will be regarded as imperative for the progressive evolution of humanity. The races who are the unfortunate victims of an inexorable heredity or of a relentless environment will be treated as *protégés* under the sympathetic and beneficent care of the elders among the nations. Through a saner and a more conscientious internationalism, shall we not ultimately achieve the ideal of the Eudemics of Race—a distant ideal as yet—and may we not claim that a more extended comparative study of race and culture origins will reënforce substantially the idealism and mutual goodwill of nations which are being exhibited so conspicuously in the great experiments in world reconstruction that we are witnessing to-day?

TOPICS

1. The adaptation of race to the region.
2. Racial differences in instincts, intellect, and character, real and fictitious.
3. The psychology of color prejudice.
4. The myth of racial inferiority.

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CHAPTER XIV

SOCIAL CHANGE

Fluidity of the Social Order.—The transition from the old to the new sociological outlook marks a significant revolution. People were wont to regard the social order with the physical environment, as fixed and unalterable. The call was upon human nature to fit itself to its immutable environment, physical and social. But human nature is found to be restive and ever-changing, variable in the direction as well as in the quality of its impulses. Thus the institutional contrivances and ends that fail to fulfill the needs of human nature have to be reshaped and readjusted in the light of a deeper analysis. And, if human interests overflow the limitation of existing institutions, new ones must arise to meet the expansion and put man on the way to organic equilibrium. It is true that religion and ethics, education and eugenics aim at controlling the ever-insistent urges in human behavior; but their efficacy is obviously slow and uncertain. Yet these are not altogether without virtue. Our position, maintained in the earlier chapters, has been that there is a perpetual process of re-shaping and reorganization of human urges through the working of social agencies directly or incipiently. The process is one of selection, inhibition, and blending, or in other words, of pattern-formation of individual motives, conscious and unconscious, in correlation with those of other individuals. This is the process of socialization. But there always would be human urges, and individuals whose whole personality would be dominated by such urges, serving as the centrosomes for the genesis of new orders of groups.

Causes of Social Change.—The causes which bring about

social change are either sudden and cataclysmic or gradual and slow. Familiar instances of the former are sudden disturbances of physical nature affecting the proportions of sexes, such as famine, or abundance of food supply, epidemic disease, flood and fire; or again, cataclysmic changes may be of social origin, a war, a revolution, a migration, a religious movement, or a great invention. Instances of the latter are furnished in all types and stages of society by the gradual and peaceful development of new groups, political, religious, or economic. These latter are of widespread, nay, universal significance, although the importance of the former, too, cannot be ignored.

Working of Social Change.—In social changes of the former type, individuals are subjected usually to a twofold influence. There is, in many cases, an increase of social cohesiveness and hence of the control of the individual by the herd standards; on the other hand, the individuals are thrown back on their own resources for their self-preservation, resulting in a subjective feeling of isolation, fear, and helplessness. Both of them are unconscious and either may dominate. The modification of institutions will depend largely upon the dominance of either of these trends. Again, mental changes induced in this case being forced from without, there is little opportunity for the mutual adjustment and coördination of the various urges and interests. The resulting institutions or usages engendered through this situation are of an unstable character; they vary in different and even opposite directions. This is the reason why cataclysms have sometimes been welcomed as precursors of social progress. The inertia and conservatism of institutions are broken down through the ambivalence of the social and individual interests; and the possibility of many-sided development arises analogous to the vacillation and nervous strain in the case of individuals. Institutions typifying the various trends arise, leading to a state of social

chaos, and those which are best adapted to the new situation ultimately succeed.

The changes of the second type, which are gradual and slow, spread from individuals to the community. It is the larger group rather than the individual which, in this case, has to face the problem of internal adjustment. The changes initiated in individual centers eat into the vitals of institutions, and the group must either accept or discard the issue. In case the question involved is a fundamental one, the group changes its social composition or even is dissolved. In the latter case, we have the origination of new groups, interests and usages, dissociated from the general tenor of social life. In the former case, small adjustments spring up within the groups concerned, assimilating the new factors introduced. There is no violent departure in the form of the institution or from the conscious interest and purpose underlying it. The tendency to variation is limited in direction and the social inertia is hardly disturbed. This is why we so often hear of the contrast between violent revolution and peaceful evolution.

Institutional Change—the Family Group.—The types of variation have been examined. We proceed to an analysis of institutions that undergo frequent and far-reaching mutations.

The uniformity or variability of an institution is measured by the number of forms it exhibits in comparison with other institutions in any given community. The variety of forms indicates the multiform grouping of the psychobiologic factors. Conversely, uniformity is correlated with a fixity in the nature and organization of such factors. The institution of the family manifests a uniformity of character in relation to other institutions in almost all grades of communities, both primitive and civilized. The membership of the family is extended in every community to a well-defined circle of persons. In some cases, the bond of

relationship is traced through the father; in others through the mother; and in some the bond is purely mythical. In every case, the family group is well demarcated, either through the custom of endogamy or through the limitation of kinship by the totem. In most cases, there is a well-defined code of conduct which governs the intercourse between the different members of the group. The integrity of the family group is maintained through an elaborate system of prohibitions which assume various guises, such as the primitive taboo, the ecclesiastical proscription, or the legal disability.

Variations in the form of the family occur in two ways. The membership is kept uniform through the substitution of fictitious for real relationship, as in adoption, or, as in the case of marriage, with a distant cousin where the prescribed bride, a first cousin, is non-existent. Another mode of variation lies in the modification, or violation, of the injunctions themselves. One who can defy authority without fear of penalty or disapprobation of the group lessens the prestige of the standards of social control and encourages others to do the same. In consequence, the prohibited relationship is contracted and the family changes its character and composition. A timid person who oversteps the legitimate course of action, but shrinks from the penalties involved, purifies himself through expiatory ceremonies. In both these cases the complexion of the family changes through the modification of the prohibitions.

There are thus two sets of factors controlling the family formation: a set of positive factors satisfying themselves through legitimate or sanctioned means, and a set of negative factors which limit individual behavior. The negative factors earmark certain relationships as undesirable and proscribed, yet leave a wide field within which choice may be exercised and natural impulses satisfied.

Taboos or Prohibitions.—Such prohibitions are termed

"taboos" in primitive society. Though the taboo-feeling and the taboo penalty in its lighter forms have survived even to the present day, their social rise and the intensity of emotions elicited have suffered. Moreover, the particular prohibitions have developed into conscious general principles and have been incorporated into positive law backed by the consensus of public opinion. The specific restrictions in their process of disintegration lose their denotation and are reduced to a feeling of general aversion limited to certain foci. When a more developed society revises the same prohibitions, it is done in the form of a deliberate legal principle more or less in harmony with the general body of law and usage, which is enforced by the community as a whole and does not work itself out through the innate, injurious, or sacred properties of the prohibited object.

Sublimation of Instinct.—It is the socialized human nature, the human instincts sublimated to group-ends and readily coursing through the legitimate channels of social activity, that serve as the psychological foundation of normal and healthy group life. Even so egocentric an impulse as sex may be controlled, sublimated, or projected into noble and beautiful channels, into creations of art, the master works of man. It may be so transformed that it retains nothing in common with the physical impulse that begins the love-life. In the great religions of the East, sex has been transformed into the symbol of creation and conception of life, of the Primal Mother fertile in complex and interwoven life-values which widen out into diverse socialized impulses and social relations. Thus sex impulse, which normally gives rise to the group through the relation of man and woman and the consequent process of generation, has been diverted from its usual course, and has functioned as a direct socio-genic factor binding together a large number of individuals into a religious order. Through

this change, the old religious orders fell into slow decay and new orders emerged orienting, for instance, the instincts of self-denial, etc., in ascetic brotherhoods. Similar sublimations are probably at the basis of religious orders founded on the conceptions of the fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man. Again, social service and welfare work, teaching, nursing, etc., are sublimations of the maternal instinct. Thus, the power and possibilities of instinct are infinite, and education means nothing more and nothing less than the nurture and utilization of this dynamic force in the building of individual and racial character. A great binding force to-day is the ideal of labor brotherhood, which further illustrates the fundamental principle of sublimation. The primitive tendencies of teasing, bullying, etc., have been, and can be, socialized into the well-known phenomena of strike and sabotage which weld together unorganized laborers into groups or unions. The bond of common opposition to the capitalist and the bourgeois and of common interests of labor in advanced or backward regions is today idealized into the conception of international, socialistic brotherhood. Its importance will be felt more and more in schemes and experiments of world-reconstruction in the future.

Outlets for Human Impulses—a Social Necessity.—All such associations are called into being in response to certain environmental situations that evoke a fairly complex group of normal human impulses. Some of them are more insistent, *e.g.*, the impulse to aggression or self-assertion in a military group. But in the military group there is a tendency for men to become arrogant, hard-hearted, and selfish; and the parental instincts are repressed or sublimated. The impulses of sex in a military group also have to be sublimated and modified in accordance with the normal military routine. Thus we find soldiers fondling their weapons of destruction as sweethearts. The factory

conditions in large-scale standardized production favor repetitive movements without much appeal to impulses and emotions which in normal human psychology operate as drives. These pent-up dynamogenic factors must have their outlets. If the principal business of life does not offer outlets to these factors, they either must organize around certain other objects, which may be in opposition to the daily routine, or else must run in divergent directions, thus disrupting the normal unity of individual and group life.

Abnormal Behavior.—We thus see that the group is subject to disruption due to the emergence of a conflicting impulse or interest. As soon as another impulse or interest, besides that which is the nucleus of group formation, comes into the foreground the singularity of responses is disturbed. It is well-known that, in animal societies, a herd sometimes in a sudden outburst of anger turns upon and destroys another member of the group which has become ill or wounded. Primitive communities similarly exhibit an almost animal-like tendency to adhere to old habits. Any strangeness of behavior is looked upon with suspicion and dread, and primitive society turns upon and kills a stranger or an innovator in the belief that he is a wizard, especially when a famine, defeat, or calamity is threatened.

Formation of New Groups.—As man's mental constitution becomes more and more complex, and interests, feelings, and ideas become differentiated, new groups, as we have seen, arise by differentiation of some larger social grouping. The original drives which produce common reactions, when a number of individuals seek a common external object, serve as the binder, but with these as nuclei there develops an appanage of institutions and customs which are conducive to ease and effectiveness of the reactions. These generally relate to the reciprocal responses of individuals seeking the same object in a common situation.

Social attitudes and regulations which best facilitate the satisfaction of the central interest of the group come into vogue and the behavior of an individual which hinders or threatens the common pursuit is promptly suppressed. Herein lies the genesis of law and punishment.

Social Regulation.—Taboos and totemic regulations secure success in food-getting, and the fear or danger of an exhaustion of food resources, whether of plants or animals, underlies many primitive rituals and ceremonies. Similarly, clans, *phratries*, *gotras*, etc., represent an endeavor to satisfy normal sex life, and they also have their codes and regulations asserting the socialized attitude and penalizing forbidden conduct.

All this implies that large numbers of individuals, *i.e.*, whole groups, have to repress certain tendencies and conform to the traditions and conventions of the larger groups to which they belong. If a single individual disobeys the institution or breaks the convention, he incurs the displeasure of his group; but he can appeal to an authority outside this group, either to a stronger group or to the social community as a whole. Thus, the family group, the clan, the *phratry*, the craft-group, the priest-group, or the warrior-group, each stands for the satisfaction of particular interests, feelings, and ideas; and an individual ostracized by one may appeal to another. In many villages in India, there is a whole hierarchy of groups, each standing for a social development of particular interests. The family, sub-caste, village community, and the social community represent the ascending series. Thus a punishment inflicted by the headman of a special group upon an aggressor may be reversed by the next higher group to which he appeals, and the injured party will abide by its decision.

Social Neuroses.—In many societies, however, the repressed tendencies of a large number of individuals express themselves in neuroses. On the one hand, the pressure of

herd standards upon individuals oversteps the limits to which human nature can safely suppress its elemental tendencies in the interest of group-life. On the other hand, the mechanisms of rationalization, sublimation, etc., prove too weak. Thus the instincts stand out in open rebellion.

Social Accommodations.—Rationalization is effective in mitigating the conflict between old traditions and new drives. Among primitive tribes, taboos are modified to suit new economic conditions, and yet the fact of modification is concealed. The practice of fictitious adoption, which introduces a stranger into the family by a ceremonial or symbolic birth, is well-known in India. Maine has given many such instances of fictions in primitive law. In the village communities, the fiction of a soil-brother is resorted to when strictly blood-relationship alone can secure rights in land. The history of conversions is full of instances of the adoption of special devices to rationalize departures from the past. Myths are often invented to account for changes in social customs and usages. The assimilation of aboriginal tribes and castes into the Hindu social organization, or the differentiation of sub-castes, frequently is accompanied by the invention of fictitious ancestry.

New myths also have sprung up accompanying the change from a totemic to an eponymous group. Social reform has been eased by the introduction of new customs in the guise of old and outworn ones. In an old and conservative country, the opposition between scientific and religious beliefs is mitigated by rationalizing some of the ancient dogmas, and by a psychical segregation which enables hostile elements to exist side by side. It is well-known that when Christianity spread over Europe, the people made saints of their former deities. Analogous phenomena have been observed among Catholicized Indians of the south-west United States and villagers in Malabar and Cochin in India.

Conflict Avoided by Segregation.—Another type of social-psychological conditions of change is met with when two rival races or cultures are face to face and neither can conquer or assimilate the other. Under such conditions, the adjustment is accomplished by establishing social relations on the basis of mutual segregation. In domestic and social life, intimacies are forbidden, while each community enjoys communal autonomy and maintains its own rights in its own sphere. On this basis an effective social adjustment has been brought about between Hindus and Muhammadans in India, and to some extent between whites and Negroes in the southern part of the United States. This kind of adjustment implies the recognition of the superiority of a community's own beliefs and culture in the midst of antagonistic cultural forces, and involves a solution of the conflict through effective dissociation.

Phenomena of Social Repression and Conflict.—We have seen that group life was less complicated and interests and ideas were fewer in earlier times. As new feelings, interests, and ideas which were antagonistic to the central interest of the group arose, there was first an attempt at rationalization and sublimation, which mitigated antagonism and even brought about a compromise. When, on the other hand, the reflexes were repressed, there developed open hostility or rebellion. In the past, the rigidity of religious organizations was due to their smaller equipment of interests and ideas. Attention, therefore, was concentrated on the religious attitude which expressed the whole social attitude. The totemic group would punish with severity the least deviation from the standardized beliefs and patterns of behavior. Similarly, the Catholic church would brook no heresy. This led to violent conflicts over religious doctrines. In modern times, differences in religious beliefs do not arouse much physical violence, because man has now a wider and more complex range of interests, and also because

interest in religion has diminished as a result of the economic pursuit. Thus, differences in economic beliefs have replaced religious differences as incentives to social strife. The increasing struggle between capital and labor has produced characteristic beliefs and attitudes of a superior and inferior class, and these have aroused characteristic group myths and patterns of behavior. Repression of complexes occurs through church discipline, autocracy, caste or class system, or again, through war, disease, and famine; and these lead inevitably to the ascendancy of the balked impulses, not merely in isolated individuals, as in the case of crime; but also in the multitude, as in the case of revolution.

But, so long as a new adjustment through new social relations and a new alignment does not establish itself, the struggle between dominant and less organized groups continues. Sometimes the conflict is covert and sometimes open; thus, when the individuals of one group are held in fear or subservience by another, or by the irresistible authority of the State, fear and inferiority complexes are the invariable result. On the other hand, the dominant groups struggle to hold their own in spite of the logical weaknesses of their pretensions. Characteristic forms of group pathology accordingly develop; such as superiority and inferiority complexes, pathological patriotism, the oppression psychosis, collapse of moral, sudden outburst of violence, etc.¹

Social Pacification.—In such cases social change can be facilitated only by open and free discussion of group relations. This would release much of the psychological tension within the groups and at the same time make evident to the members the illogicality of the group myths. Open hostility between the groups would soften gradually to friendly rivalry, the groups would be socialized, and a rational analysis of conflicting experiences and principles,

¹See Miller, *Races, Nations, and Classes*.

CHAPTER XVI

EMERGENCE OF THE CROWD

Individual Transformation in the Crowd.—The psychology of the crowd may be regarded as the starting-point of social psychology in its modern aspects. The transformation that the individual undergoes in a crowd is so remarkable that a new order of psychosis has been supposed to supervene upon the normal course of mental life. Many of the writers on social psychology regard it as the beginning of social life, the elementary fact upon which the science of social psychology is to ground itself. According to them, the psycho-social factors that reveal themselves in crowd life serve as the foundation of organized groups when they become complex, through mutual interlacing, and attain a certain degree of stability or persistence.

Lines of Crowd Study.—Crowd study has usually been undertaken along three lines. In the first place, the occasions of crowd-formation have been investigated with a fair amount of exactitude and accuracy of detail. We know the rôle of panic and catastrophe, of political and racial sentiment, and of religious emotion in bringing crowds into existence. We also know the agencies through which these psychic and social factors influence the individual. Newspaper articles, public harangues, parliamentary orations, judicial decisions, sermons from the pulpit, and even rumors may draw individuals from their hearths and homes to public parks and streets. History, fiction, and observation combine to assemble a rich variety of materials under this head.

In the second place, the characteristic features of crowd life have been studied more or less elaborately. That the crowd is emotional, suggestible, irresponsible, credulous

changeable in its moods and prone to violence, is common knowledge. We know equally well how the crowd is swayed by its leaders, and how the sane and the sober forget their normal selves in the crowd and give themselves up to impulse and unreason. The psychology of the revival meeting, the market-place, the criminal gang and revolutionary mob, as well as of the political gathering together under the spell of stump oratory, has been more or less elaborately described in the literature of social psychology.

In the third place, the causes producing these characteristic changes when the individual finds himself in the crowd have been subjected to analysis. Many attempts have been made to explain the unity or *rapport* in modes of behavior and ideas of individuals constituting the crowd. Imitation, the group-soul, herd instinct, suggestion, hypnosis, telepathy, and *libido* are some of the hypotheses that have been invoked to account for the alteration in personality that sets in when a person becomes member of a crowd. It is noteworthy that much of the effort in social psychology has been diverted to an examination of the logical coherence and sufficiency of each of these factors on which special stress has been laid by a particular school of writers.

Crowd Defined.—We may begin our study with an attempt at a definition or, at least, a fairly precise understanding of the character of the "crowd." Many such attempts have been made in the past. A crowd, thus, is said to be "a chance collection of individuals" among whom a condition of *rapport* has been established.¹ Sighele looks upon the crowd as an "elementary organism, from which the sect issued, like the chick from the egg, and that all other types of social groups may, in this manner, be deduced from this social protoplasm."² Many sociologists have tried to eluci-

¹ Park and Burgess, p. 893.

² *Ibid.*, p. 872.

date the characteristic features of the crowd by distinguishing it from other types of collective life such as the mob, gang, public, etc.¹ None of these supplies a satisfactory basis of a psychological analysis of crowd life.

The crowd is essentially a collection of human beings in a limited space. Extend the space and the crowd thins out of existence. It is probably for this reason that the police in all countries disperse crowds by separating them into small groups. In other words, crowd life thrives when the individual constituents are in close physical contiguity. Trotter, for instance, explains the phenomena of group-formation of all orders in terms of the herd instinct, the tendency of the organism to seek the physical neighborhood of its fellow-beings. But spatial propinquity is only a condition of crowd life; it does not constitute its whole essence or explain all its activities or outbursts.

Causes of Crowds.—Men gather together not casually or aimlessly but from psycho-physical necessity. It is true that even chance visitors are caught in the eddy of revivalism. It is also true that people walking along the public streets suddenly converge toward a scene of interest and may become part of it, simply because a crowd has gathered. But the whole gathering is not casual. There is a core of the crowd, a ring of individuals who are driven into it out of necessity by the urge of their natures. As a matter of fact, we may speak of two factors that bring men together in space, a factor that drives them and another that pulls them together.

A physical catastrophe, such as an earthquake, a tornado, or an explosion, drives men out of their seclusion to seek one another's company. The same is the effect of a social or political catastrophe like the declaration of war, the fall of government, or the death of a popular hero. In a politically-minded people, an emotional tension caused by a

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 870.

newspaper article or the utterance of a politician, also would favor the formation of crowds. And even a holiday, which is of no catastrophic significance but which upsets the established order of things, could be a predisposing cause. Anything that interrupts the routine of life may drive people to form crowds.

Habits, routinized life, and institutions that hold fast man's attention and endeavors, counteract the tendency to chance gatherings of individuals that may easily develop into crowds. There must be an effective break in the continuance of action and attention along customary lines in order that crowds may form. What psycho-physical condition does such a break or arrest imply? The condition is one of dispersed attention and of directionless motor-tendencies. The organic energy for action, which is a condition of muscular tension, exists. But the outlet has for the moment been closed. The same description applies to attention. The dispersion of attention is not due to fatigue; it arises from the sudden displacement of the object of attention. The condition of inattention and inaction is of short duration; either the old object and the customary channel of action reestablish themselves or new ones take their place.

A physical disaster like a storm or a shock of earthquake leads to the suspension of all routine work. Thereupon, in every mind, arises a feeling of insecurity and fear. The emotive condition stimulates the channels of instinctive activity, such as that of flight. A panic ensues. The instinctive mode of behavior replaces the habitual and customary, and initiates a markedly new course of action. A social catastrophe likewise, such as a bank failure, the death of an honored citizen, or the fall of a government, interrupts the smooth tenor of daily life. The normal socio-psychic adjustment is disturbed for the time being,

just as office routine is upset for a while if the clerks find on arrival that the furniture of the building has been arranged differently.

Resistance to Crowd Psychosis.—In the case of a person with well-regulated habits, when one type of motor-attitude is discontinued another takes its place; the suspension of one train of thought makes room for another. The more numerous the interests in life, the larger the number of probable courses of action. A person with "stakes," therefore, is generally unsuited for membership in a crowd; it does not interest him. Secondly, an individual with well-informed motor-tendencies, such as stable habits, is less susceptible to crowd-psychosis; for it is difficult for any sudden occurrence to suspend his usual activities for any length of time. An individual with a dominant purpose in life, for this reason, does not easily lend himself to the joy and abandon of a holiday, picnic, or fair. The motor-pattern in terms of which he orients himself to his world refuses to be disturbed by casual and sudden promptings. We conclude, therefore, that the essential condition for crowd-formation is the suspension of the customary motor-patterns for a period sufficiently long to permit others to take their place. What these others are will shortly be discussed. The stimulus that brings about such a condition of vacuity is, then, the "driving" factor in crowd-formation.

Predisposition to Crowd Influence.—It is obvious from the foregoing discussion that the condition of "vacuity" may be produced by external factors and also by the psycho-physical state of the individual. The normal course of our motor life may be disturbed by the force of outward circumstances; the suspension also may be the outcome of inner inhibitions. In the case of a person with set purposes and regulated habits only catastrophic physical and social conditions might dam the normal channels of activity. But

in the case of persons with a normal tendency to stray from their work, such as idlers and vagabonds, any excuse would be good enough to relieve them from the boredom of continuous toil. When everyday work is not pleasant to an individual, and when he may break away from it with impunity, almost any external stimulus possessing an appreciable amount of intensity would succeed, at least for the time being, in disturbing the routine of the day.

Vacuity and its Causes.—The internal factor of vacuity, then, predisposes the individual to give himself up to oscillations of attention. This tendency may develop through the operation of diverse factors. In the first place, we know that any physical discomfort tends to check concentration of attention in a specific direction and the pursuit of routine duties. Visual disorders and auditory defects, it is well known, lead to oscillation of attention from object to object, among school children, to so great an extent as to cause serious maladaptation to the school environment, truancy, and other troubles. A feeling of discomfort or of sickness has the same effect upon the adult; they engender a state of mind in which the ordinary routine palls and bores, and only the exciting and the sensational can hold the attention for any length of time. In the same manner, the class of persons who are in a perpetual state of want, *e.g.*, slum-dwellers, develop a condition of unstable attention that only the unusual and the sensational can arrest. It is for this reason probably that the poorer classes of population most frequently supply the human material of crowds.

An idea or a feeling that persists and haunts the mind has likewise a disturbing influence upon attention. When something weighs on our mind we can hardly settle down to our normal occupation and have to seek relief from worry and duty, usually in some novel experience. The conflict between the haunting ideas and the normal psychic and

motor patterns causes a tendency to dispersion of attention which readily seizes upon any new or unusual impression. This effect is accentuated when a large number of persons is similarly affected by an idea. For in such cases the movements of fellow-beings serve both as objects that occupy the attention, and as stimuli that initiate responses alien to the normal motor life. In any case, a persistent idea, unconnected with the daily life, operating upon the individual or upon a group, disturbs the usual tenor of attention and of the motor impulses. Consequently, there is a tendency to suspension, if not an actual suspension, of the attentional adjustment. It is for this reason that a prolonged war, a social catastrophe like instability of government, or the fear of promulgation of an unpopular law, make their stress felt in developing crowds and mobs. In the same way, the aftermath of a physical cataclysm, such as a great earthquake, tornado, or fire, is marked by crowd and mob formations.

In the third place, both of these conditions, the inner uneasiness developed through physical discomfort, and the attentional maladjustment through the persistence of a disturbing idea or feeling, may result, not from any objective cause, but from the neurotic psycho-physical constitution of the individual. There are individuals who are affected by the slightest untoward occurrence: they are incapable of concentrating their attention upon their daily business for any length of time; their minds wander from object to object. As a consequence, such individuals cannot adjust themselves to the environment. They go down in the economic struggle and constitute the lower stratum of the social order. The attention of these persons is dispersed every now and then; and any intensive form of experience has an appeal for them. In some cases the neurotic condition is due to heredity, in others it may be traced to illness, poverty, malnutrition, and other environmental factors.

Such social failures supply good material for crowd formation.

Mental Dissociation.—Taking all these facts into consideration, we are led to the conclusion that the condition of mind that produces a state of vacuity is one of dissociation. In the case of physical ailments, the organic sensations symptomatic of disease are dissociated from the normal stream of consciousness in terms of which we adapt ourselves to the environment of our daily life. The conflict between the two dissociated factors is only resolvable in an unusual experience—an exciting event, for instance. In the same manner, a perpetual physical discomfort, such as that due to hunger and cold, conduces to the splitting up of the contents of mind. There are the conscious factors in terms of which we seek adaptation; and there are those factors that destroy concentration of attention. The laborer tries to attend to his tools, but hunger gnaws at his vitals. Attention oscillates from the one to the other, and any new experience supplies welcome relief. Mob outbursts are frequent in years of unemployment and famine. In most cases, the atrocities perpetrated by mobs do not in any way allay their suffering. The strain of war or other social and physical cataclysms bring about, in the same manner, a state of dissociation. The ideas and feelings connected with unusual happenings do not readily blend with the normal occupations of life. There is, in consequence, a certain lassitude in the daily work, as was noticed frequently during the last war. The escape from the conflicting factors, again, lies in an experience which is out of the ordinary. That largely explains why individuals give themselves up to riotous excesses or to fantastic crazes, when a community passes through storm and stress. One way to combat this dissociational psychosis is to deny the fact of inner conflict. Thus we find during the war an attempt to persuade every one to believe that to carry on the daily

work was helping the nation. But it is hard to evoke much enthusiasm for commonplace truths.

The neurotic psycho-physical disposition, referred to above, is particularly conducive to dissociation: in fact, it would appear that neurosis is essentially a state of dissociation. And the love of the sensational and the morbid, so markedly displayed in neurosis, is essentially an attempt to escape from the dissociational state of mind. One set of impulses crosses another, and the fixation point of attention is lost at frequent intervals. An experience that may supersede the conflicting states, by virtue of its intensity, readily controls the attentional adjustment. More frequently instead of a sudden vacuity there is a perpetual shifting of attention between the two dissociated contents. There follows accordingly a state of mental fatigue which is relieved by the novel experience.

The internal driving factor or precondition of crowd-formation, then, lies in this process of dissociation. It may be a sudden development, as in the case of a social cataclysm; or it may be a state of some duration, as in the cases of economic stress and neurotic condition. A dissociation of this nature keeps the individual in a state of unstable equilibrium, so that almost any chance stimulus attracts the attention and evokes response. When the stimulus makes a common appeal to the attentional and motor phases of a number of individuals we have a crowd.

TOPICS

1. Physical disasters as occasions of crowd formation.
2. Economic factors in crowd formation.
3. Conversion of normal groups into crowds.

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CHAPTER XVII

CLASSIFICATION OF CROWDS

Nature of the Crowd Stimulus.—In the last chapter we indicated the conditions of crowd-formation: first, the psycho-physical disposition and second, the stimulus that evokes a common response from a number of individuals.

The stimulus that "draws" the crowd has no specific qualitative import. It may be said that sight and hearing are the senses generally excited. This, however, does not signify any special peculiarity in these senses. These play a more important rôle simply because men normally adapt themselves to their environment through eyes and ears. It should also be pointed out that in order to lead to crowd-formation, the visual and the auditory impressions must be out of the ordinary. But the phrase "out of the ordinary" is relative. Thus shouting and gesticulation may pass unnoticed in the marts of a great city; in a small town these gather a crowd. A brawl may be a usual feature in one type of café; it may be a scandal in another. In general, an impression to which the individuals in a particular neighborhood or area are accustomed, does not make them flock together.

We have pointed out already that if a man is to be drawn to a crowd his mental stability must disappear, through the novelty, intensity, or some other characteristic of the stimulus. Adaptation means that the response evoked from the organism by the stimulus has been rendered incipient through the repetition or temporal continuity of the stimulus. A change, however, translates the incipient into the overt. When passers-by leave unnoticed an inebriate gentleman on the street, it means that such

an occurrence is usual and does not call for any action or response. Whatever motor tendency naturally arises remains incipient. If, however, the hilarious person be the Prime Minister of England, the call to attention would no longer be incipient; men would gather to stare at him, and in other ways respond to the occasion. The motor-value of the impression would no longer be suppressed by the routined activities. It would express itself through movements that would set aside, for the time being, all other motor tendencies.

Stimulus-situation of Crowd Formation.—We now may characterize the stimulus, or, rather, the stimulus-situation that leads to crowd-formation. Since we have to take into account the internal disposition of the organism upon which the stimulus operates, it is better to consider the stimulus-situation, meaning thereby a specific collocation of intra-organic and extra-organic factors. The crowd-forming stimulus-situation would be one in which the incipient responses to a stimulus become overt, through certain specific properties of the stimulus or through the dormant condition of motor dispositions and incipient motor-responses in a number of individual organisms.

Variety of Crowd Response.—From this characterization we may proceed a step further. The incipient motor-tendencies are not made overt equally in all stimulus-situations. A free fight on the street would impel the passers-by to turn round; a few would watch, and the rest would go their ways. If the fight persisted, a more complex set of responses would be brought into play; some would proceed to assist, others would stand and vociferate; and a few would run for the police. The crowd, in the second instance, would be a much more complex affair than in the first. And this complexity would be due to the fact that the responses evoked by the stimulus remain largely incipient in one case and become overt in the other.

Crowd Types.—Thus, to understand the nature of the stimulus-situation that “draws” crowds, we must try to form a precise idea of the different types of crowd. Attempts have been made to distinguish the “crowd” from the “public,” and from the “mob,” as well as from other forms of group life such as sects.¹ These distinctions are based principally upon extremely generalized types of psychophysical behavior. For instance, we are told that: “In the public, interaction takes the form of discussion,” whereas the crowd “mills”; and when the crowd acts, it becomes a mob.² Such distinctions obviously are not rigid enough to demarcate one kind of group from another. The characteristics of the public, of the crowd, and of the mob interpenetrate. Does not “milling,” for instance, when it becomes vocal, translate itself into “discussion”? Is there, again, a perfectly stationary crowd? Even a street-crowd, watching a new post-box or the wreck of a car, attentively adjusts itself to the object, approaches it, or recedes from it. Hence, all that can be said in favor of these attempts at definition is that they indicate general tendencies.

Meanwhile, it remains true that the crowd, as a collection of human individuals in a limited space, is not a unit with a typical form of behavior. It is capable of a variety of motor-responses. And we can understand the variety of crowd life in terms of these responses. Crowd is thus an abstract name for a number of concrete gatherings, each possessing a characteristic pattern of psychosis and behavior.

Stationary Crowds.—In the first place, there is what we may call the “stationary crowd,” the term “stationary” being used in a relative sense. Men who gather round the stump orator in the park; people who assemble on the street

¹ Park and Burgess, pp. 869, 870-71.

² *Ibid.*, p. 869.

to watch a quaintly-attired hawker, or a signboard advertising a new tooth-paste; passers-by who elbow their way to a scene of accident where a number of persons have already gathered, constitute a crowd of this nature. We may characterize it as the "attentional crowd," for its behavior is mainly attentional. The people adjust themselves to see or listen to the object of attention; they move toward it; they push one another to get near; on the whole they behave like a swarm of moths around a lamp, shifting with every change in its position. The senses are adjusted to the object and the motor-responses are ancillary to the sensory adjustment.

Such a crowd is not altogether stationary; its movements, as stated above, are in keeping with the movement of the object. It is not, again, merely attentional; it is often emotive and discursive. But all these features center around the object to which the members of the crowd adjust themselves for attentional observation. The essential feature, then, of such a crowd is its state of absorption in the object that it watches.

Milling Crowds.—In the second place, we may speak of a "milling" crowd. The state of "milling" has been well observed in the case of animal herds. It is no less observable in the case of a human gathering. A mason working on the seventh floor of a building under construction places himself in a dangerous position; the watching crowd grows tense, so that it is possible to see the clenching of fists and hear the irregular excited breathing. The stump orator excites his audience to a raging passion, and angry murmurs float in the air. This is the state of "milling," a state of tenseness of muscles ready for an overt act; a state in which impulses to action have been freshly awakened to life but are inhibited for the time being; yet the overt expressions are about to throw off restraint.

In the milling crowd, the object of attention for the time being is put out of focus, and an emotional disposition rules. The objective fact recedes and an emotive tension about to engender action sways the organism. It is a state of transition from the objective to the subjective. Yet it is not an emotive crowd, of which we shall speak later. The emotional coloring appears as an adjunct to, and reënförment of, the impulses about to break their bounds. The overt expression, if any, is principally of action and not of emotion. But milling does not lead inevitably to action; the murmur of angry disapprobation is as quick to die out as to arise; and the object soon regains its control over attention.

Moving Crowds.—The state of "milling" may give rise to a definite course of impulsive action, such as aggression or flight. We may call a crowd of this character a "moving crowd." The members of the crowd all follow, as it were by an inner *rappört*, a common course of action. They all run in the same direction jostling one another; they vociferate in the same manner. They all execute similar movements. The same motor-tendencies develop simultaneously in all, and it seems mysterious how this happens.

The behavior of the crowd, under such circumstances, is of an emotive-instinctive pattern. The voluntary and customary modes of behavior suddenly are brushed aside, and the primal instinctive type gains the upper hand. In the field of consciousness, the idea representing the result of deliberation yields its place to impulse. Or, sometimes, the action is of an ideo-motor nature, so that no sooner does an idea of action appear in consciousness than the action is executed. In either case the alternative courses of action are not balanced or even considered. In a deliberative assembly, a number of ideas, each embodying a different plan of action, is suggested. These are weighed; one is

adopted and the rest dismissed, or there is a compromise which suggests the blending of a variety of responses. But, in the moving crowd, the motor-system is so wrought up that almost any plausible idea is transformed at once into an overt act.

The essential feature of the moving crowd, then, is the psycho-physical constitution and history of the persons forming the crowd. The motor-system must be capable of being brought to a condition of tension through the operation of the particular stimulus; the tension, again, must be such that it would overcome all inhibitions and end in a specific type of emotive-instinctive action. The particular quality of this action similarly depends upon the psycho-physical constitution and history of the individuals. The object that holds together the stationary crowd no longer plays the same important rôle. The psychic field presents a dominantly kinæsthetic rather than a perceptual pattern. Consequently, the unity of the crowd consists in a *rapport* of responses rather than an identity of the object of attention.

Crowd Leadership.—Yet, it would be a mistake to suppose that the external object plays no part in determining the behavior of such a crowd. It is the object, conceived as a situation, that releases the tension and sets the responses free. It is an object, again, in the form of the crowd-leader that guides the responses. The fact of leadership is a determining element not in human behavior alone. Its importance in animal herd life has been dwelt upon already: "There is much debate between herders as to the advantage of goats over sheep as leaders. . . . It appears that leaders understand their office, and goats particularly exhibit a jealousy of their rights to be first over the stepping-stones, or to walk the tottering log-bridges at the roaring creeks. By this facile reference of the initiative to the wisest one, the shepherd is served most. The dogs learn

to which of the flock to communicate orders, at which heels a bark or a bite soonest sets the flock in motion.”¹ The same phenomenon has been noted in the case of other animals, such as wolves and deer. Leadership, then, is a widely prevalent phenomenon and has its basis not only in the psycho-physical but also probably in the biological history of the organism. The psychological factor is most likely a super-addition to the basic biological factor; a mere psychological explanation does not go far enough to explain the phenomenon of leadership.

There are, then, three determinants in the formation of a moving crowd. In the first place, there is the object or the stimulus, conceived as a situation that gives rise to a state of tension in the organism which keeps the motor machinery on the edge of action, and a change in the condition of the stimulus-situation releases the tension and precipitates the overt act. In the second place, the psycho-physical constitution of the individual is conducive to the precipitation of action. In the third place, the leader guides the action toward its consummation.

Active Crowds.—Akin to the moving crowd in its motor-tendencies and yet more complex in its structure, is what may be called the “active” crowd. In a riot we find that the crowd yields itself to a variety of impulsive acts. One group, in a state of frenzy and apparently without any ulterior aim, is engaged in smashing shop-windows and in other kinds of destructive acts; a small section at the same time engages in profitable loot; a third group runs amuck, belaboring innocent passers-by; while members of the original crowd stampede. The moving crowd displays a relatively simple type of emotive-instinctive behavior; an active crowd manifests several lines of such activity. The tension releases itself through several channels.

¹ Mary Antin, *The Flock*, pp. 110-29, quoted in Park and Burgess, pp. 88-93.

This heterogeneity of responses brings with it a plurality of leaders. Each group engaged in a particular action has its own leader:—a leader, for instance, in the fight, another in the loot, and a third in the flight. A crowd here seems to break up into several crowds, each with its specific type of behavior. But the plurality may again resolve itself into a unity; the first sign of alarm, or the first call to fight, would transform the active crowd into a moving crowd.

The determinants of this kind of crowd life are the same as those for what we have called the moving crowd; but there is a difference in their relative importance. The external stimulus-situation calls the crowd together, sets its motor machinery on the edge of action, and releases the tension into a particular channel of activity. The action, again, is carried to its consummation under the guidance of the leader—another external object. The operation of the external factor is dependent solely upon the inner condition of the psycho-physical system, as has been noticed above. In the case of the active crowd, these internal factors play a much more important rôle. It is because the behavior of the active crowd is controlled mainly by the inner psychomotor dispositions, rather than by the external circumstances, that we find a plurality in the modes of behavior. For, if individuals, subjected at the same time to similar external influences, exhibit quite divergent kinds of behavior, the cause should be sought in the variety of the psychomotor constitution and in the history of the psycho-physical dispositions of the individual organisms. This idea finds support in the fact that riotous conduct of the crowd is more frequent in cities and industrial centers where there is always a mixed population than in the rural areas where the individuals are largely homogeneous with respect to their psycho-physical constitution. The precondition of the formation of the active crowd, then, is the setting up of a plurality of action impulses.

Emotional Crowds.—The importance of the inner conditions is emphasized further in the case of what we shall call the "emotional crowd." Many writers in social psychology have pointed out that all crowds are emotional, that the most obvious type of response consists in the expressions being usually associated with emotions. No other definite action-attitude is set up; movements and activities characteristic of the moving and the active crowds are in abeyance. The bodily changes in such circumstances are "indefinitely directed," as Külpe says.¹

A crowd of this nature is usually found at revival meetings in all ages and climes. We have descriptions of the "frantic and dishevelled dances of the Bacchantes, following a wine-cart through an ancient Greek village." W. E. B. Du Bois thus describes a revival scene among the Negroes: "An air of intense excitement possessed the mass of black folk. A suppressed terror hung in the air and seemed to seize us— . . . a pythian madness, a demoniac possession, that lent terrible reality to song and word. The massive form of the preacher swayed and quivered as the words crowded to his lips. The people moaned and fluttered, and then a gaunt brown woman suddenly leaped into the air and shrieked like a lost soul, while round about came wail and groan and outcry, a scene of human passion such as I had never even imagined!"² James quotes another instance of this character: "I know not how I got back into the encampment, but found myself staggering up to Rev. ——'s Holiness Tent: and, as it was full of seekers and a terrible noise inside, some groaning, some laughing and some shouting, and by a large oak, ten feet from the tent, I fell on my face by a bench, and tried to pray; and every time I would call God, something like a man's hand would strangle me

¹ Külpe, *Outlines of Psychology*, § 52.

² Quoted in McDougall: *The Group Mind*, p. 27.

by choking.”¹ The revival meetings of the Vaishnava sect, the Sankirtans, partake of the same general character. The writers have had personal experience of such meetings. These usually begin with singing accompanied by beating of brass cymbals and bells. Then the people become excited and jump and dance in mania, some continuing ceaselessly till they drop down in sheer exhaustion. There are at intervals sighing, weeping, and wailing, and throughout there is personal and group concentration of emotion. In all these instances, the principal feature of behavior is emotive and the *rapport* in the emotional tone holds the crowd together. The essential condition for the existence of such a crowd thus is to be found in the inner dispositions that favor the rise of emotions in the appropriate stimulus-situation.

Mutability of the Crowd.—The term “crowd,” as ordinarily employed, is only a generic term, as would be obvious from the foregoing discussion. We have pointed out at least five groups of phenomena to which the name “crowd” could be given. And each of these arises, as we have seen, through a special collocation of the determining factors. To be sure, almost all crowds begin as what we have called “stationary” crowds. From this condition a stationary crowd may dissolve; or it may transform itself through the state of “milling” into a moving crowd, an active crowd, or an emotional crowd. “Milling” as an intermediate state is well portrayed in the description quoted from Du Bois in which he speaks of a “suppressed terror” hanging in the air, of “a pythian madness,” and of “demoniac possession,” as antecedent to the gathering giving itself up to a condition of bewildering emotivity. The same description is generally true of the other forms of crowd life.

Preconditions of Crowd-formation.—Let us now try to grasp the nature of the stimulus-situation, of the “drawing”

¹ James, *Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 250.

factor in the crowd life, which we set out to discuss in this chapter. The classification of crowds that has been set forth above has paved the way for such a consideration. Before we proceed, however, we must remind ourselves of the two preconditions essential to crowd-formation. In the first place, the constituent members of the crowd must be near the place where the crowd is formed. We all know that, if individuals are few and far between, the chances of crowd-formation are correspondingly small. People do not rush from great distances to join crowds. When they do, the gathering assumes a different character. For a crowd is a spontaneous gathering of individuals in a limited space when such a gathering yields itself up to a relatively primitive type of motor-response, such as the instinctive or the emotional type. In the second place, the potential members of the crowd possess a certain degree of similarity in their psycho-physical constitution. People who are dissimilar in any fundamental respect, or who imagine themselves to be dissimilar, do not readily participate in the same crowd. This is easily observed in cases of street crowds in the larger Indian cities. The Europeans in India do not join a crowd unless the situation is very exceptional. Even the Eurasians keep aloof in most cases from the Indian gatherings. This is due to real racial as well as imaginary differences between the Europeans and the Eurasians on the one hand, and the Europeans and the Indians on the other. Within the limits of these conditions, crowds gather when the appropriate stimulus-situation occurs.

Crowd Stimulus and Response.—The rôle of the stimulus differs in different kinds of crowd. In the case of the stationary crowd, the stimulus controls the response in the sense that the removal of the stimulus leads to a rapid dissolution of the crowd. In the case of the other forms of crowd, the stimulus merely sets the inner motor dispositions into operation. The removal of the stimulus would the

necessarily lead to a cessation of crowd behavior; the motor-mechanism, once set in motion, would run its natural course. In the first instance, crowd-behavior is maintained by the stimulus; in the second instance, it is only *set up* by the stimulus.

The formation of a stationary crowd is a matter of everyday occurrence. One has merely to walk a few minutes on the street to see a crowd of this character. In one evening, in the course of a couple of hours' walk, one of the writers counted not less than seventeen such crowds, of varying size, in one of the principal thoroughfares of Calcutta. The first step in the formation of such crowds, as has been pointed out in the previous chapter, consists in a break in the habitual routine. This may be brought about by a sensory stimulus of an unusual nature, *e.g.*, a shout in the public street, a display in a shop window, a play of lights for advertisement, and many others. In such cases, men advance toward a spot from which they may observe the object to advantage. The object thus serves at once as a driving and a drawing factor. It breaks the routine and it pulls the strings of the "puppets of the show." The crowd endures till the perceptual and the associative processes evoked by the stimulus complete themselves. In other words, the members of the crowd disperse only when they understand what it is all about. The steps of the process then are: (1) sensory stimulation; (2) bodily movements necessary for attentional adjustment toward the object; (3) perceptual and associative processes. The chances of crowd-formation depend upon the attention-value that the particular stimulus carries for the class of people concerned. The sensory stimulus in the case of man is, as has been remarked, visual or auditory, or both. In the case of the lower organisms with a stronger susceptibility to other sensory stimuli, as, for instance, olfactory with insects, a whirring would be accounted for as naturally by these.

Only the perceptual and the associative processes would be replaced, in all probability, by the motor processes.

Crowd its Own Stimulus.—More commonly, however, the “driving factor,” that which interrupts the habitual responses, is *the perception of a gathering itself*. We come across a ring of men in a spot and stop to inquire the reason for the gathering. The perception of other men moving in the direction of the crowd acts as the stimulus. We see men moving, and, before we realize it, find ourselves walking in the same direction. It seems to be a case of ideo-motor action, wherein the perception, or the idea of a movement, precipitates the act. The conception of imitation employed for the explanation of such phenomena readily bears reduction to this psychological process.

Tension in the Milling Crowd.—In the case of the “milling” crowd, the psycho-physical system of individuals is in a condition of tension. There is tension in the internal organs, in the visceral, vascular, and digestive systems, as well as in the muscular system. By the term “tension” we should understand not only a state of readiness for a specific kind of activity, but also incipient changes that follow upon such a condition. The sensation of choking, the feeling of palpitation, the feeling of flushing—all these are characteristics of the state of “milling,” and arise from the tension of the internal organs. The tension of the muscular system is easiest to observe. The clenching of fists, hard-set facial expression, rigidity of the whole body—these can be seen at almost any gathering which is worked up to a point of passion. Now, this twofold state of tension releases two separate types of response. If the internal organs have prepotency, and if, consequently, the organic sensations predominate, we have an emotional crowd. If, on the other hand, the muscular system is prepotent, the tension is released in a series of movements, and we have a moving or an active crowd. The reason is not far to seek. The

organic sensations are concerned most intimately with emotions. They either constitute or condition emotions. If these sensations predominate, we thus would have an outburst of emotion. Incipient muscular movements, on the other hand, readily translate themselves into overt acts. The state of "milling," accordingly, marks a point of transition to one of the other types of crowd life—"moving," "active," or "emotional."

The objective stimulus, in this instance, plays but an insignificant rôle. It is the tension of the psycho-physical system that really matters. For it is this tension that determines the character of the subsequent behavior. The function of the stimulus is to release the tension, to set the ball rolling. The "driving" factor in this instance is the *onset* of the tension. The "drawing" factor is the stimulus-situation arising from the relation between the stimulus and the tension of the psycho-physical system.

Objective and Subjective Crowd Conditions.—The same principle holds good with respect to the "moving," "active," and the "emotional" crowds. The driving factor is the onset of the muscular tension and organic tension; the drawing factor is the stimulus as releasing the tension. Here too, the specific character that the crowd behavior would assume depends not essentially on the character of the external stimulus but upon the internal state of the organism. If, however, the external object plays but a minor part, the question arises as to how there comes to be a *rapport* in the psycho-physical condition of a large number of individuals. One phase of this question has been discussed in Chapters VI and VII. We have seen that the responses and the mental constitution of individuals modify each other and thus tend to form a common pattern. Another answer to the question lies in the observation that it is only when the constituent members of a crowd possess a similarity of psycho-physical constitution that it is possible for

them to form a "milling," "moving," "active," or "emotional" crowd. The "stationary" crowd as discussed above, since it is conditioned mainly by attentional responses evoked by external stimuli, may be formed of different kinds of individuals. But these other forms of crowd life presuppose likeness or homogeneity, at least in certain respects. We therefore may speak of the "stationary" crowd as being objectively conditioned and of these other four types as being subjectively conditioned.

Crowd Rapport.—The likeness in question may be entirely arbitrary, due to a common habit or similarity of occupation and general habits; or it may be due to the basic native likeness between man and man. This latter class of similarity is to be found in the emotional and instinctive equipment of human beings. The organic tension that we have spoken of above, is most often a stage preparatory to the instinctive and emotive responses. Thus, the condition of *rapport* between man and man, placed in the same physical environment, subject to the same set of stimuli, and provided with the same native equipment, does not seem to be a mysterious affair. It is but a case of the "same stimulus, same response" principle, which is of wide application. And the same supposition explains the likeness of responses between crowds on different occasions; for it is one or more of the primitive modes of responses that must find expression in such cases.

The suddenness with which crowds are formed, and the insufficiency of the objective stimulus to explain the character of crowd-behavior, may be explained in the same manner. In the case of the "stationary" crowd, it is the operation of the same stimulus that evokes the attentional response. But, in the case of the other types of crowd, the driving factor, as already stated, is the onset of the psychophysical tension. This tension may be initiated long before the formation of the crowd. The diverse factors that

determine this state have been considered in the previous chapter; and their character leads us to believe that their operation may extend over a long stretch of time. Moreover, once the state of tension is produced in a small group, it spreads unconsciously to the individual as shown in Chapters VI and VII. Thus, the stimulus, in these instances, merely serves to release the preëxisting tension in a particular manner.

TOPICS

1. Kinds of crowds at political and religious gatherings.
2. The rôle of the stump orator.
3. The expression of crowd emotions.
4. The behavior of a lynching mob.
5. The behavior of an industrial mob.

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CHAPTER XVIII

ANALYSIS OF CROWD BEHAVIOR

Conventional Response Patterns.—The normal social environment, in which the individual lives and grows, serves to inhibit some responses and facilitate others. A business man, for example, in intercourse with his partners or associates, has to inhibit expressions of personal affection or temper; since freedom to indulge in these causes the business relation to assume a new character. Even then it would remain true that the individual would have to inhibit many forms of normal behavior—those, for instance, that would be evoked in his family circle. Each kind of social environment—and man in his daily normal life lives in several such environments—tends to develop a particular pattern of responses. These are formed through the assimilation of the primitive reflexes and instinctive responses into the molds of the habitual and the customary. Thus the responses of the individual are given a certain *Gestalt-qualitat* and a certain amount of stability.

How Response Patterns Are Formed.—This is achieved, as we have seen in Chapter IX, by rendering incipient some of the phases of a complex series of acts. Supposing *a, b, c, d, e, f* to be the reflexes that constitute a response pattern under the stress of a social situation; the series may be perceived as made up of the elements *a* and *f* only, *b, c, d, e* being inhibited and rendered incipient. The outburst of emotion is inhibited into a flushed countenance, that of eager affection into a mere handshake or smile. This is the outcome of inhibition. The state of incipency has a very significant rôle in the organization of behavior. In the first place, incipency leads to economy of time. If a feeling

of anger is to have full expression in behavior, a certain length of time is required during which other types of behavior have to be given up. If, on the other hand, only a fragment of the total complex of "angry behavior" can represent the whole, the time taken is much shorter. Thus a number of action-tendencies may realize themselves within a brief span of time. A flushed face may go with business talk; but stamping and blustering cannot. All the reactions that a situation evokes are reduced to convenient partial responses, passing in quick succession, through this mechanism of inhibition.

In the second place, a certain balance is struck between the several kinds of behavior through the coalescence of responses so as to give the total behavior pattern a new character. Thus "firmness" of behavior is often the resultant of the positive and the negative tendencies of action that a social situation calls for. In this way, the overt actions of an individual have for their setting a mass of incipient actions. And every social situation develops a specific quality of behavior pattern of this type, some of the responses being implicit and others explicit.

Adaptation to Social Environment.—The organization of responses in this manner is to be acquired. Persons introduced into a new social environment often fail to respond. Most of the channels of action are closed and there is an overwhelming feeling of shyness and hesitancy. The well-known phenomenon of "stage-fright" is an instance in point. The actor knows what is expected of him; but there is no overt action; the behavior remains incipient. In other cases, men behave extravagantly. They talk and laugh and are always on the move. Every stimulation calls forth an overt response. They produce the impression of being "bounders" at parties and social gatherings. Here, there is an absence of inhibition. As time passes, a balance is struck between the two attitudes; some of the responses are made

overt and others inhibited into incipency. The individual is adapted to his environment.

Group Development from the Crowd.—What is true of the individual is true also of a group. Let us consider the passengers on an ocean liner when they come aboard. They crowd near the gangway, on the deck, and round the chief steward and the purser; each place where a crowd may collect has its own group. There is hardly any social relation between one person and another. In a few days, or even hours, there are interchanges of greetings; there is an atmosphere of sociability. The crowds have been molded into a definite social form. But, on nearing port, the organization begins to break up. And, at the hour of landing, the harmonious social group once more has lapsed into a crowd, or a number of crowds, eager to get ashore. We begin with responses coldly incipient or loudly overt; there is gradual organization into a pattern; and then there is dissolution—a lapse into crowd behavior.

Time Element in Group Development.—We thus see that if a group holds together for sufficient time, there is a chance for the individual to develop a complex behavior pattern of the type we have considered above. The shorter the life of the group, the less mutual influence is developed among the constituent members. Hence the responses of each individual are more or less left to run their own course. There is but little in the way of organization of responses into the pattern of the incipient. A certain amount of such organization, of course, is always to be expected. For a crowd is a group, the members of which have been members of previously existing groups. Some aspects of this past group experience are carried by the individual into the new crowd. This is the reason why all crowds do not behave precisely in the same manner. In general, then, we may state as a principle that if a crowd persists in time, has great duration value, it ceases to be a crowd. The mem-

bers of a fortuitous crowd do not exercise an inhibiting influence upon one another. The responses of the individual assume the normal overt form. The complete chain of psychic and bodily events is brought into full play. But, as the crowd life lengthens out in time, the individuals have to adjust their behavior to one another; some of the responses are facilitated and others inhibited.

Group and Crowd Behavior Illustrated.—This process has an important consequence. Let us suppose that as a guest in a drawing-room you observe your host slip on the beautifully polished floor. Your natural feeling probably will be one of amusement, but you will have to check its expression. The unwritten conventions force you to inhibit the overt expression of certain mental states and feelings. On the other hand, imagine a man suddenly falling flat in the public street. In such circumstances, there is no inhibitory convention for most spectators; they may indulge in smiles, laughter, and even jeers. Here we have the overt expression of feelings and persistence of mirth, so that a crowd gathers at the scene. When most if not all of the responses elicited by a situation are overt, the emotions connected with the act have free and full play. Of the complex series of movements which the individual tends to execute, only a few are inhibited and rendered incipient. A comic scene in such a situation evokes loud laughter, and a melancholy one tears and weeping. There is an exaggeration of movement as compared with what we find in the normal social situation. As an accompaniment of this exaggeration, there is a greater intensity of emotion. For the organic concomitants of the motor phenomena, which at least strengthen, if they do not produce emotions, are released from inhibition. Laughter and weeping, expressions of anger and pity, are only too obvious in the individual of the crowd. And hence it comes to be that the crowd is emotional. The emotion is generated through the

response of the individual to the moving body of his fellow-men; and there is also the emotion evoked by the stimulus-situation. Both these sets of responses are allowed to run their full course without restraint. For the crowd as a temporary gathering has no time to develop restraint.

And, just as the emotions and movements run their full course, so do the ideas evoked through association. If an action persists, all the ideas connected with it persist also. Thus, the simple impression evoked by the stimulus is enriched through the play of the numerous associative tendencies. Each phase of the act, playing its full rôle, gives rise to new impressions and ideas. And, as a consequence, the individual appears fully engrossed in the action, in the emotions, and in the associated ideas, all of which run in a definite direction. Hence it happens that the individual in such cases sees but one phase of the fact. In the case of a maniac, or a man in a violent passion, only one aspect of the fact, only one type of emotion, only one channel of action presents itself.

In normal social life, on the contrary, no idea, emotion, or action is allowed to elaborate itself to its fullness. The operation of the stimulus upon the individual is limited by the particular set of inhibitions characteristic of the group to which the individual belongs. A jocose remark made by the teacher in his class does not induce the students to leave their seats and pat him on the back; the same joke, indulged in a company of friends, would probably lead to energetic responses.

Suggestibility in Crowd Life.—In crowd life, the diverse psycho-physical tendencies are not balanced as in normal group life. Janet designates a phenomenon of this character as “suggestibility.” For the ordinary individual, every idea is followed by other ideas, but the “images are dim, the tendencies to action are vague and slight, the idea develops into action only with the coöperation of an addi-

tional volitional element; the personality must back the idea, and the end-reaction is accompanied by conscious effort. In the suggestible person, on the other hand, a clear-cut idea seems to be transformed and to become at once another psychological phenomenon, an act, or a perception. In fact they almost immediately move their limbs in a manner quite visible outwardly. They really get up and dance; they walk, run, jump, struggle, cry. . . . Each idea seems to develop to the maximum, to give all it contains in the way of images, muscular movements, and visceral phenomena. This complete development of all the elements contained in an idea is an essential characteristic of the phenomenon [suggestion]."¹ Suggestibility of this nature has been observed by all competent authorities to be a feature of crowd life. And it arises, as we have tried to show, through the absence of the inhibitory influences usually exercised by the social environment. For a crowd, being a group of short duration, does not develop those inhibitions which arise through mutual adjustment of individuals to one another.

Self-forgetfulness of the Individual in the Crowd.—

Another fact, often noticed, is that the man in the crowd loses his self-consciousness and sense of individual responsibility. The ego-feeling that differentiates one individual from others also invests him with a feeling of responsibility. The latter is but the awareness that the reward or punishment, approbation or condemnation, for a particular act, would be attributed to the ego. It is the ego which will be praised or blamed; and the feelings of pleasure or pain will color the vividly-experienced ego. Thus the sense of responsibility depends upon the distinctness and the vividness of the ego-feeling. And whatever impairs the contrast between a particular ego and other selves incidentally blunts the edge of the ego-feeling that rests solely upon this

¹Janet, *Major Symptoms of Hysteria*, p. 279.

contrast. Consequently, there is a loss also of the sense of responsibility.

These phenomena can be explained partially as a result of intensification of emotion. When a person is dominated by a violent emotion, the ideational processes are inhibited and the responses occur mainly as instincts or compound reflexes. There is, as ordinary observation tells us, a loss of the ego-feeling. It is for this reason that a person's guilt assumes a less grave form in the eyes of law when it is the consequence of violent passion.

But emotion cannot explain all the cases. In what has been called the stationary crowd, there is but little manifestation of emotion. Yet the oblivion of the self is complete even here. Men forget their immediate occupation and watch an accident in the street; and they wake up suddenly, as it were from a reverie, and go about their work. How is this to be explained? In the first place, it seems that all intensive stimuli that evoke perceptual processes lead to a loss of self-consciousness. A flash of lightning or a loud noise has a similar effect, as daily observation testifies. The reason is not far to seek. The sensory constituents of perception, by virtue of their intensity and drive, usurp for the time being the whole field of attention, and all other experiences recede into the margin. The self-feeling accordingly disappears, and the disappearance remains complete so long as the stimulus which represents the driving or drawing factor in crowd-formation increases in intensity.

Moving Stimuli.—Again, a moving stimulus has the same effect upon the mind as an intensive stimulus. Both usurp the whole field of attention for the time being. It is for this reason that the trader frequently employs a moving object for the purpose of advertisement. Children and adults alike watch a moving train, airship, or even a moving ball, in complete absorption. Whatever moves, pro-

duces an impression that for the time being claims the whole field of attention. The reason is obvious. Any object that we perceive calls forth a continuous series of responses for adjustment. Hence the attention would necessarily be object-ward; and all other experiences would be set aside.

We have seen in a previous chapter that one man appeals to another mainly as a *moving* being.¹ And a crowd would have the same effect upon the individual as a mass of *complex moving objects*. Thus it is but natural that the perception of the *crowd* as a *total object* would brush aside the ego-feeling and all other individual experiences. In fact, the man in the crowd is hardly ever aware of the individual as such; he is engrossed in the perception of the crowd as a whole.

Group-Mind Theory Unnecessary.—A new factor is introduced in the cases of what we have called the “moving” crowd and the “active” crowd. Man easily forgets his worries and anxieties in intense muscular work. A protracted and intensive series of kinæsthetic sensations easily banishes the self-feeling and other subjective experiences from the field of consciousness. Our daily activities reveal the fact that the self-feeling is altogether absent when we engage in muscular exertion such as running. Now, exertion of this character is the most important feature of the types of crowd life mentioned above. The loss of the ego-feeling hence is no mystery in these instances, though on this rests the conception of the super-individual group-mind. The individual in the crowd participates in the group-mind, so runs the argument, and hence the loss of ego-consciousness. It is the herd-mind that works through the individual and relieves him of the sense of responsibility. Whether the higher ego should be conceived as the result of telepathic communication, or of fusion of individual experiences, is beside the point; the outcome is the same. As against this

¹ pp. 42-43.

idea, the theory suggested above rests upon the fact that the ego-consciousness is an intermittent experience even in our ordinary life. It is vividly present only in rare moments. The metaphysical reality of the self and its psychological experience are not the same. One of the main conditions of such an experience is the introversion of attention. Thus, when attention is externally directed to an object or act, which by virtue of its intensity claims the whole of our attentional field, the ego-feeling naturally disappears. There is thus no need of introducing the idea of a social mind to explain this phenomenon.

Crowd Leadership—Freud's Hypothesis.—Another striking feature of crowd life is its domination by the leader. In all organized groups, there is unquestionably an emotional tie between the leader and his followers almost akin to that subsisting between father and son or lover and beloved. The devotion of subjects to the king, of the regiment to the officer, or of parishioners to the priest, testifies to the existence of an emotional attitude that persists through the storm and stress of adverse circumstances. The presence of this emotive factor has led Freud to advance the hypothesis that the relation in question is a libidinous one. It is the sex-impulse in its widest, or sublimated sense, that binds the followers to their leader. He further supposes that the psycho-physical processes that constitute the crowd life are called forth by the leader. Hence it follows that it is the leader who calls the crowd into being and holds it together. The unity of crowd life is the outcome of the unity of leadership. And the libidinous impulse is the motive and cause of crowd-formation.

We have no desire to deny that an emotive relation of the type indicated may develop at certain stages and among some of the individuals in the course of group life. But to say that it constitutes the essence of the group-mind is overstating the case. Indeed, some of the facts already

referred to render such a supposition extremely doubtful. In the first place, we all know that in the stationary crowd there is hardly any place for leadership. The individuals adjust their attention to an intensive stimulus; and the process is almost of a reflex order. The movement toward the object of interest is not guided by any particular individual, but through the perception of the stimulus and of the movement of a large number of persons. Obviously, in such instances, crowds form without the guidance of a leader. The relation of the individual is principally to the stimulus and only incidentally to his fellow-beings.

In the second place, the feeling, when it appears, varies in intensity in different members of the group. There are individuals who belong to the inner circle of the leader and exhibit toward him a personal affection. Whilst we move away toward the outskirts of the group, both actually and figuratively, the emotive relation is superseded by a cognitive or motor-relation. We find an attitude of indifferent acceptance. Yet the integrity of the group holds; the man on the fringe adheres to it almost as tenaciously as the man in the inner circle. This is what happens in the "moving" and in the "active" crowd. A group in flight selects a member who happens to be in front, and follows him. What is necessary is that he should be easily recognizable and capable of being followed; he should not be too far in advance of others. In short, the essential requisite of leadership is that the leader should evoke attention easily and his motor responses should not be unlike the actual and the incipient responses of his followers. The emotional relation, when present, is a super-addition.

In the third place, leadership, as already noted, is a biological fact. Even sheep and wolves require a leader for their herd life. The libidinous relation among these creatures is expressed in overt acts, such as sniffing at the object of affection. Such expressions, however, are not

usually manifested toward the leader. To urge that these tendencies are rendered incipient, or are forced into the unconscious, would be to attribute to these organisms a more complex mental machinery than is warranted by the known facts. The hypothesis of libidinous relation, therefore, does not hold good in this context.

The Freudian hypothesis attaches undue importance to the rôle of the leader. The essence of crowd life lies in the behavior of the crowd; the unity of the crowd consists in the congruity of the responses elicited from the different individual centers. But these reactions, as we have seen, are occasioned by external stimuli and by certain inner dispositions favoring the operation of those stimuli. A crowd comes into being only when these responses have set in. The selection of a leader takes place only when the crowd has come into being, and there is a certain amount of unity in the behavior of individuals. Leadership thus is not, temporally, the primary factor in crowd-formation; the stimulus-situation and the inner conditions must be there already. Therefore, we cannot say that the leader calls the crowd into being. We should rather insist that the rôle of the leader is to *guide* the responses, not to *initiate* them. The *libido* factor, accordingly, even if it were present, would not explain the genesis of the crowd.

The growth of affection for the leader is gradual. The mutual adjustment of relations that such affection presupposes implies a prolonged existence of the group. But the crowd, as we have seen, is a phenomenon circumscribed in time. In groups of a more complex order, however, there is certainly a chance for the development of an emotion of libidinous character as, for instance, in the army, or in church organization. As a matter of fact, the instances cited by Freud are of this order. But, in the elementary form of group life, in the crowd, there is but little chance for the development of the libidinous relation.

Nature of Crowd Rapport.—We turn now to the last though not the least important characteristic of crowd life, *viz.*, its unity. Every investigator in crowd phenomena has noticed an inner *rapport* among the individuals who constitute the crowd. What brings about this unity or harmony of responses? We find a variety of hypotheses dealing with this question; but, before we turn to them, let us examine the nature of unity in crowd life. In the first place, similarity and reciprocal adjustment of responses are easily noticeable. Thus the *rapport* is primarily that of the motor-mechanism. Secondly, judging from the modes of expression, there seems also to be a similarity with respect to the emotional contents.

Again, we know that the crowd is liable to hallucinations. The aftermath of the disaster at Halifax was marked by an expectancy of attack by the Germans and a bombardment by the German fleet. The homeless people moving about distinctly saw a face in the cloud.¹ This implies a common content, entirely subjective. Thus, in the third place, there is a similarity in the imaginal contents of consciousness. As a consequence of these similarities, we should expect also a *rapport* in thought, in association, in belief, and in judgment. But how far there is an actual similarity in these respects is a matter for investigation. For the individuals in a crowd may be subjected, indeed, to the same hallucination or illusion; but, whenever they try to compare beliefs or ideas concerning it, there is disagreement. It is related that a mixed gathering of Hindus and Muhammadans at a fair saw a fakir walk across a river. There was no difference of opinion on the point. But, when someone raised the question whether the fakir was an agent of the benevolent or of the evil spirit, a riot broke out between the Hindus and the Muhammadans. The hallucinatory perception may be shared, without any

¹Price, *Catastrophe and Social Change*.

appreciable change in beliefs, ideas, or thought processes. This observation, moreover, is supported by the fact that each hallucinatory experience is differently explained by different individuals. Because the crowd is guided by images, there is an immense influence of formulæ and catch-phrases upon the crowd life; for a formula is nothing but a verbal image. When, however, there is any occasion for the interpretation of the formula, a wide divergence of views manifests itself.

The *rapport* noticed in crowd life obtains mainly in the spheres of action, emotion, and imagination. Individuals may still differ in respect of the other mental processes; but these are, for the time being, held in abeyance. The vividness of the image, the intensity of emotion, and the urgency of action, push them into the background. Diversity, however, manifests itself as soon as the crowd becomes deliberative. Every individual pits his ideas against those of others, with the consequences that a conflict of ideas intervenes between the operation of the stimulus and the overt response. But, with this change, the crowd, too, translates itself into a public.

Crowd Mentality.—The “man in the crowd,” as often has been noticed, cannot do justice to his intelligence and special gifts. His mentality declines to the low average level. This is the result of inhibition of thoughts and ideas, or other intellectual processes. These represent specific acquisitions of the individual, and when these are suspended the individual approximates to the average; the mental contents that are shared by all control the behavior of the crowd.

Primitive Nature of Crowd Unity.—The image, however, is not an essential process in the psychic composition of man in the crowd. The “milling” crowd and the “emotional” crowd have but few images, although they are pre-disposed for the reception of images. The factors that unite

the members of these crowds are the emotive and the motor tendencies. And the channels through which these motor tendencies express themselves and the forms that emotions assume are more or less stereotyped, and may be catalogued by careful observation. Professor McDougall's classification of the principal instincts and primary emotions may be justified on this ground; they indicate the typical modes of behavior and emotive processes that individuals in the group have in common. The inhibition of thoughts and ideas means that the controlling factors which shape the primitive reflexes into the behavior patterns of our normal life are no longer operative. The affective life is reduced to the more primitive emotions, the cognitive to the images, and the life of action to instincts. All that constitutes the more primitive equipment of man's psycho-physical nature obtains the upper hand. Hence, the primordial similarity between man and man. But, when the native equipment differs and there is difference with respect to any of the above-mentioned factors due to heredity, education, or any other general cause, it produces characteristic types of crowd life. A crowd of men and a crowd of women do not behave in the same manner; for the emotive life of the two sexes, in many ways is different. Nor do crowds formed of children, of adults, of laborers, and of college students, act in the same manner. The unity of crowd life, therefore, is based upon the similarity of the primitive emotional-motor equipment. There is no need to assume a spiritual identity of the members.

TOPICS

1. Stabilization of the crowd.
2. Freud's theory of crowd psychosis.
3. Primitive mentality and crowd mentality.
4. Social control of crowds.

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CHAPTER XIX

FUNCTIONAL AND REGIONAL GROUPS

Man's Earthly Ties.—The popular psychology of instincts directs our attention more to the individual and less to his environment and culture. It is these, however, which mold and guide the individual's equipment of instincts, and establish gradation and intricate balance in the system of behavior which underlies the institutions of a people or cultural region, and which furnishes the basis upon which its normal psychical processes take place. Man's instincts, as we have seen, cannot be treated either in the abstract or in isolation. They must be regarded as concrete sets of equipment in particular groups of individuals, interlaced with a scheme of regional and ethnic values and underlying a characteristic type and order of institutions. The demands of the environment never cease. If the needs of nutrition and of dwelling and other secondary wants are satisfied, the ever-expanding range of locomotion calls upon man to enter into fresh relations with the earth—for making roads and providing for other modes of transport. Human impulses multiply—by cell-division, as it were. They seem ever to be on the increase. And every fresh chain of impulses is a new tie to the earth; every new urge impels man's body and mind earthward. The more insistent demands of the body can have their fulfillment through a few simple relations between human beings. But the social drives branch off and subdivide—a karyokinesis of instincts. And every increase in the complexity of instincts means an increase in the complexity of human relations. There is thus a parallel growth in the relation of man to region and of man to man. Man's mind has not enough

freedom to get rid of region and man; human impulses seek satisfaction only in the earth and in fellow-beings.

Human Response to Environment.—The human organism is called upon, as we have seen, to respond in two directions: to the dynamic human beings around him and to the physical world in which he lives. Each set of responses modifies the other through opposition, blending, or otherwise. Viewed from the plane of psychosis, we find impressions, ideas, and feelings corresponding to the stimulus-response situation, interlacing with one another and forming a rich variety of patterns in the individual mind as the active human life courses on.

Ceaseless Adaptation to Regional and Social Change.—The need of adaptation to the physical environment is perpetual, so long as an organism lives. A social or religious revival, a movement of population from village to city, a change in outlook due to contact with a new civilization, a geographical discovery or a political cataclysm, may bring about the domination of a group of instincts over others deranging or rearranging the established scheme of values. But the people have to attune their behavior, in the long run, to the rhythm of the region; and a transformed culture with new values, ideals, and outlooks is born as a consequence. The region ultimately stamps itself on those who live in it. A disintegration of groups and values may likewise result from the introduction of new modes of economic organization; but the economic life must be adapted to the original equipment of instincts favored in a particular region or race. The transition from the animal-rearing stage to militant nomadism, the domestication of animals, the supersession of intermittent hoe-culture by regular agriculture, the discovery of metals, the use of metals for weapons,—in all these cases we are led to realize economic change as a cardinal element in altering the whole culture of a people through the passing into the background

of instincts and traditions which formerly dominated, and the emergence of new instincts. Gradually, a new order of group life establishes itself as a result of a new pattern-formation of institutions and traditions. Thus, institutional change is nothing more or less than the reorientation of the established group-scheme and life-values of the region. Comparative race psychology alone can furnish the key to an understanding of social modifications. A regional and ethnic approach to social psychology, utilizing the data of comparative economics and sociology, alone can unravel the inner principles of social change, based as this always is on the concrete psychical equipment of diverse peoples and regions. Throughout the course of human history, there have been witnessed the processes of the conflict of civilizations and social types when two or more cultures have come in contact in course of their expansion; and the gradation of instincts and social values of one culture have consequently been modified, assimilated, or integrated. But the conditions of disintegration of values, and consequently of group organization, are ever-present as well in the life history of a particular people as in interracial relations; and these have perhaps never been more apparent than in the present age.

From Regional to Cultural Group.—Groups in social life normally represent an adequate or partial fulfillment of certain urges. A complete fulfillment depends not only upon physical but also upon ideal objects or relations. When physical objects placed within a limited spatial area call forth common responses from a number of individuals, and when, in consequence, a common set of ideas and emotions arises, we have a regional group. The regional group arises from an adaptation of individuals to a common set of physical objects. The life-history of the group gathers round these objects. But they are supplemented by ideal or cultural creations. Thus, rivers become sacred to a people;

and mountains command reverence as the abode of their gods. Similarly, the unity of the village community comes to be embodied in the temple, church, or city hall. Furthermore, ideal objects are brought into being and enrich the environment of the people.¹ Such, for instance, are the tutelary or guardian deities of ancient states and kingdoms, and the abstract principles of Liberty and Democracy of modern states. It is easy to realize that behavior toward a mountain or river as physical object would be simpler than that toward these when sanctified by ideal notions. The ideal objects and relations, therefore, evoke a more complex set of responses than do mere physical objects; *i.e.*, a greater satisfaction is yielded when cultural works and experiences enlarge the geographical environment. The regional group thus becomes transformed into the cultural group through the blending of the physical and the ideal.

Dissociation of Ideal from Physical Basis in Modern Industrial Groups.—In a complex cultural group, however, there may be dissociation of the ideal from its concrete physical setting. A union of workers under modern industrial conditions, for instance, is a group concerned in a particular occupation in a specific environment. When this group is more concerned with the ultimate political ideals and aims of union labor and less with more immediate economic or social needs, we have the basis of class formation; for the political ideal is abstracted from the concrete social and economic urges of the workingman's environment. The complex set of instincts fulfilled in the cultural situation is here disintegrated, and only one set of them claims exclusive attention. Usually that set of instincts, which from the very nature of the group can receive but little satisfaction, translates itself into intense, emotional fervor. In the first place, the physical environment has established restrictions upon modern workers as regards the use and

¹ These are called by Durkheim "collective representations."

ownership of land through the property and contract institutions. This leads to a disparity of opportunity and power, and we have capitalist and labor groups created in opposition to each other. Now, the former groups, owning property and the instruments of production, seek to impose upon the rest of the population the contractual and other conditions which perpetuate this disparity, and thus arouse anger and resentment. Again, they are dominated by bare pecuniary motives, and their standards of conspicuous consumption, contrasting so markedly with the standards of the labor groups, engender annoyance and dissatisfaction among the latter. Thus fear, repulsion, and self-assertion all enter as elements into the socio-psychical situation. Inadequacy of income and constant dread of unemployment lead to a severe repression of both sex and parental instincts, especially among the casual laborers. The divorce of ownership from the product, the disparity between the worker's efficiency and his reward, as well as the exigencies of modern standardized production, which admits of no individual adaptation of processes to ends, counteract and repress constructive instincts. The workers in modern industry cannot exercise directive capacity; self-assertion, and powers of control and management are balked; consequently, the importation of notions of socio-political power in industrial management in the class theory of the proletariat exercises fascination. The class, thus, offers ideal fulfillment to one segregated aspect of instinctive life. It exhibits instability and militancy, symptoms of maladjustment to the environment. The background of modern economic groups, accordingly, is a pathological social situation dominated by class-consciousness, which is a social neurosis. Such groups do not provide for an adequate satisfaction of the instincts of creation, construction, self-assertion, and group-solidarity. The whole industrial system thus neglects the elemental urges which underlie personal

worth and achievement and emphasizes ancillary or instrumental values.¹

Defect of Modern Class Movements.—Even in recent collectivistic schemes of reform, the picture of injustice that is drawn is concerned with instrumental values, wealth, prestige, material comforts. Such has been the influence of the mechanical industrial system and the social hypnosis to which it has given rise. A defect of recent class movements, Syndicalism and Communism, has often been that they insist upon the fulfillment of partial interests rather than of the whole human nature. They strive after economic interest abstracted from the complex scheme of values in which it arises, and do not allow legitimate outlets for the remaining unsatisfied complexes. Moreover, the rigid socio-economic organization of the commune may work very well for unprogressive bees and ants, but not for dynamic human nature that is perpetually projecting its tentacles of interest in novel directions.

Group Struggle for Special Interests.—In normal society, there is a perpetual effort at reconciliation of instincts and emotions which give full play to all the individual's tendencies without the exaggeration of one set of tendencies or the repression of others. The seeds of conflict and disintegration are planted, as we have seen, as soon as this effort ceases. Within every group, however few or large the bundle of instincts it integrates, antagonisms inevitably arise. Usually one instinct, stronger than the others, gives color to the group life and activity. This is evident from the fact that the endeavors gather around a set of objects, actual or ideal, which indicate the nature of the dominant instinct. The object calls for the expenditure of different amounts of organic energy in different environments. If the object that satisfies a group of instincts causes a heavy

¹ For an analysis of instinctive factors in class struggle, see Eldridge, *Political Action*, Ch. XXII and Mukerjee, *Borderlands of Economics*, Ch. VIII.

drain of the organic energy, the particular set of instincts concerned dominates all others. The individuals who seek the same object, *e.g.*, livelihood under the same conditions, thus show a similarity of behavior and consequently a similarity in the psycho-motor patterns. This is the basis of an occupation group, which appears in a wide variety and exuberance of forms, where man struggles for the barest needs of life against the forces of nature, as well as against the forces of a relentless industrial order. Where the demands of the physical environment are not inexorable, the strain of organic effort in a single direction is compatible with the functioning of other urges of nature. Thus, an occupation group has in this case an opportunity of expanding into a larger social group which satisfies manifold instincts and impulses. This obviously is the natural course of development in favorable geographical environments.

Origin and Development of Class.—The overemphasis of a particular set of instincts prevents others from reaching their satisfaction in concrete objects of the environment. They tend, therefore, to fulfill themselves in ideal objects, which, under the same conditions, physical and traditional, will be more or less similar for all individuals. Hence arises what we have called a "class," which is oriented principally to psychic representations of what would fulfill the repressed desires. This representation, according to the psycho-analyst, would not be a direct picture of the object desired. Often it would be disguised in various ways. Thus it often may be emotional, a mere hatred of the system that denies a group of individuals the needs of their nature. It may envisage an ideal state where there is full satisfaction. It may assume a motor character directing the energies toward the destruction of the present order. Grounded as it is on repression, a class would develop among its units an exuberance of emotion which naturally

would be projected by them primarily to the social end and object and secondarily to the group. Thus arise class feelings and class *mores* and manners, which, when aggressive, are transformed into class exclusiveness. To be sure, the dominance of the mere food-getting impulse at the expense of the impulses of construction, leadership, etc., is at the root of modern economic unrest. As the group increases in its range and holds together individuals by placing before them a distant fulfillment, *e.g.*, an abstract idea of power, the antagonism within the system becomes pronounced. There emerge abstract ideas and secondary satisfaction values which express themselves in conflicting policies and group ideals.

Idealization of the Region by the Group.—Thus in the normal course of things such groups contain within themselves the seeds of disruption. While the ideal object holds out more or less distant prospect of fulfillment to the primary human needs, the objects of the immediate physical environment, the region, offer direct satisfaction. Hence there is always the temptation to break away from the pursuit of the idea, and a consequent oscillation between loyalty to the functional group and the imperative demands of nature. At the same time the abstract idea carries different meanings and concrete representations within the group itself, thereby accounting for its subgroups and parties. But the zest with which the idea is pursued has an intensive, emotional character. For the pursuit of an idea implies repression of the physical operation of elemental urges, and a consequent deflection of emotions from their normal object. The outcome of this is that repressed emotions blend and are projected to the ideas and principles basic to the formation of the group. A conflict of ideas consequently evokes a conflict of emotions and of primal human instincts. In the case of the regional group, however, the normal stimuli being physical objects, the physical

expression of instincts is not checked. Consequently there is less occasion for a vehement cumulation of emotions. Moreover, the interlacing of stimuli, as for instance, pasture grounds and homesteads, common irrigation channels and temples, stores, and playgrounds, etc., leads to an interlacing of instincts that feed on these as well as of their emotional correlates. Accordingly, there is little opposition between emotional attitudes. The result of this is that the region becomes not only a spatial area but also an idea, concreted by the fact of its reference to external objects, and to this are projected emotions of loyalty, local pride, love of country, etc. The hysteric intensity of emotions in this case is absent inasmuch as these are largely drained through the concrete satisfaction of instincts.

Sub-groups and their Treatment by the Group.—The formation of sub-groups in any larger order of group life is a normal phenomenon. All extensive groups are called into being not by one stimulus only, but by a complex set of stimuli eliciting a multiplicity of responses. And each stimulus is capable, in its own way, of integrating around it a more or less complex system of responses. When the complex normal environment is abstracted into a simple concept that functions as the stimulus to group-behavior, there is only one type of psycho-physical pattern that is possible for group-formation, and deviation from the pattern spells disloyalty to the society in question. Thus smaller groups in such a scheme of group life are suppressed or at least looked upon with disfavor. The variety of sub-groups that normally arises under the regional mode of social organization easily lends itself to a process of interweaving and blending, resulting in an hierarchy in which the smaller units are not lost. A functional group, when it seeks to spread and stabilize itself, has to adopt the regional scheme of organization to make its sub-groups and smaller centers vital and active.

Regional Group as Basis for New Social Order.—To establish a basis for the new order, and to mitigate or prevent the waste and bitterness that mark class struggle to-day, the organization and division of labor should run on somewhat different lines. The social class should represent a complex of common ideas and emotions, a fusion of manifold instincts to ensure as many points of contact with other classes as possible. The hypostasis of a specific set of instincts and tendencies, as embodied in a group, gives rise to group exclusiveness and an inevitable under-valuation of the broader human qualities which do not depend on the special training of the class. A logical definition of ideals and principles of an organization inevitably leads to intolerance, particularly when logic is followed sincerely. The more extensive the range and satisfaction which the group provides, the less narrow are its feelings and ideas. This, as we have seen, is the chief difference between the neighborhood group and the class. The regional group does not base itself merely on economic motives. It represents a division of functions and associations which result from a similarity of modes of living, and it comprehends, therefore, the entire social life of the region. Accordingly, it satisfies the concrete needs of the whole of man's nature in an outpouring of interests in a variety of social efforts and aspirations; not, as does the class, in one line, governed by only one set of tendencies. A trade union has its class dogmas, its benefit funds, and its economic regulations. The regional group, being based on a wider valuation of human instincts, will have, besides these, its festivals and its ceremonies, perhaps its own religion and artistic equipment, so that the whole man, and not a mere fragment of his personality, can find ample opportunity for self-expression. It is true that existing associations of labor and capital are concerned with political, educational, and artistic activities; but these are pursued essentially as means to

the satisfaction of economic ends. The regional group, built up of homes and families, neighborhoods and local associations, rather than the wide-spread association bound together by a single set of instincts, is the appropriate field for the integration of diverse instincts and values. In the intimacies of personal and social relationships, many of the vital instincts and dispositions of man, which are repressed in the larger social order, receive adequate satisfaction. Loyalties, which otherwise become thin and abstract, thrive and are replenished in strength by attachment to the region. Group life which takes the form of regionalism renders easier an integration of ideas, emotions, and modes of behavior, and the pent-up complexes which now surge for expression in open rebellion can be redirected to new fruitful outlets.

Functionalism and Regionalism.—Schemes have been put forward recently in which many of the functions now exercised by the sovereign State will be taken over by local and occupational groups, the rules and customs of such groups superseding to a large extent the sphere of sovereign enactment. This school of thought is known as *functionalism*. The great advantage of functionalism is that the individual knows fully and intimately the interests and issues he is called upon to decide, and these have the power of emotional and instinctive appeal. Functionalism, therefore, promotes an active citizenship and brings upon the current issues an informed and enlightened criticism. The defect of functionalism is that the group still rests on mere economic solidarity. It therefore embodies interests and emotions which are not widely extending, instrumental values; and this is the fruitful source of psychical segregation and conflict both in individual life and in social and political spheres. Group organization in the West takes the form of Syndicalism, Guild Socialism, or Sovietism; in the East it is rather a form of Regionalism, and a class

cleavage which is not in its origin economic. "Groups belonging to the same neighborhood, groups belonging to a particular social stratum, groups united by a community of pursuit or interest, form what is virtually an autonomous unit, subdivided it may be, and even mutually encroaching; while units unite in a loose federalism in which the central authority is a convenience rather than a State."¹ In such a system, capable, as history shows, of infinite modification, men are classified according to essential organic differences, differences of occupation and mode of living. This creates characteristic forms and types of relation between individuals and families, between families and castes, and between castes and village communities. The village community is a compact and consistent neighborhood organization which evokes in its management the public spirit of the citizens, and is conducive to genuine coöperative thinking, because there is an interweaving and a reconciliation of diverse interests and wills of different functional groups. Emotions are aroused in the administration of matters of local interest, while passions are excluded because of the very character of group-formation which does not center round derivative values. On the other hand, the community adjusts itself to find new sublimations of interest and emotions which may comprehend ever-expanding spheres of life.

Humanization of Industrialism through Regionalism.—

A similar line of reform would be applicable in the industrial sphere, where the formation of natural groups and associations would be a corrective of the present social neuroses. There is no doubt that the division between producer and consumer, which industrial history confirms and perpetuates, is responsible for the rise of instrumental values centering around ease and cheapness of production

¹ *Glasgow Herald*, 21 Feb., 1924, reviewing *Democracies of the East*.

at the cost, for instance, of art and workmanship. In the guild communities envisaged by the economic reformers, producer and consumer would be one and the same person considered under two aspects. The control of consumption is also advocated. Modern industrial unrest is favored by the perpetual striving for appropriation of material goods irrespectively of deeper values. This is the result of the present industrial system and standardized production which encourage mere mechanical efficiency. The present distribution of the national income, characterized by a wide disparity in the possession of material goods and opportunities, stimulates the desire of the have-nots. In this sphere, a new alignment of groups and interests, which might be somewhat less efficient than the present system, so far as the ease, speed, and cheapness of the production of goods is concerned, would be more satisfactory in respect to the creation and equitable distribution of the deeper social values. Large-scale capitalistic industry, which in the main has nourished the appropriative and possessive impulses at the expense of the elemental instincts of self-assertion, construction, etc., can be rescued from the pursuit of bare mechanical efficiency only by fostering the spirit of neighborliness and local attachment through such means as self-governed workshops, agricultural and craft guilds, and regional councils. In collective or social ownership and management, in group control of consumption, in closely-welded guilds and coöperatives, regionalism is much better adapted to human needs and human nature than the economic schemes which communism has given us. In the regionally-organized community, rising layer upon layer from the lower functional and local associations, satisfying vital instincts and impulses, there would be a far better adjustment of the social machinery to man's needs and aspirations than under the present organization of society. The community would go back, indeed, to the original folk

mass in its revival of local autonomy and economic management, with the associated local gatherings, festivals, games, arts, and crafts; but the integration would be based on a new and deeper synthesis, with the function of the State and the economic classes vastly clarified. Above all, there would be a developing sense of the community as beyond the State and the present social order, which would bind man together in his generations and different habitats, achieving its expression in art, literature, religion, and humanitarian service. These would satisfy the cravings of the whole concrete personality of man and bind together the race in everlasting bonds.

TOPICS

1. The limitations of class groups.
2. The psychology of regionalism.
3. Principles of industrial grouping.
4. The psychological basis of the unitary and the pluralistic state.
5. Occupational *versus* proportional representation.

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CHAPTER XX

SOCIAL NEUROSES

Repression of Impulses in Group Life.—Every impulse in its ultimate nature is a state of psycho-physical tension which terminates at a definite physical object and in a more or less definite socio-physical situation. Impulses do not motivate man singly, but in groups, and these permutations and combinations, the number of which is indefinite, vary from age to age and in different races and regions. Individuals of a group are motivated by the same combination of urges and therein consists the psycho-social situation. Every individual seeks to satisfy his needs in the company of fellow-beings similarly motivated. There arises, therefore, the need of mutual repression of the physical and elaborate instinctive activities in their overt form, resulting in their partial nonfulfillment. When the urge of the incipient or inhibited instinctive tendencies is imperative in some of the members—for all creatures are not alike in the endowment of instincts—we have the formation of new groups. The diversity of groups represents the different combinations of instincts and impulses demanding concrete satisfaction. And a normal society is one which affords an opportunity for the multiplication of groups and institutions as new needs or combinations of drives arise.

Methods of Repressional Relief.—But the rise of new groups cannot keep pace with the changing patterns of human desires. Hence we find in every normal group life social and cultural contrivances for the satisfaction of instincts which either are not insistent enough for a concrete satisfaction, or cannot be satisfied without disturbing

the dominant purposes of physical and social adjustment. The most common contrivance is their satisfaction through art and literature which, in various forms and compositions, provide outlets for the impulses which are not insistent enough to demand direct fulfillment. Even forms and rituals of religions are devised to give ideal and symbolic satisfaction. Such, for instance, is the introduction of the Mother cult in Tantrik, or the Radha and Gopi cult in Vaishnava tradition, or phallicism in its different forms and guises in various ancient religions. Another familiar contrivance is the expression of a primal impulse under innocent disguises so as to harmonize its satisfaction with the daily routine of life. The social vogue of hunting, fishing, etc., of organized tours, expeditions, and camping, has kept alive the satisfaction of elemental impulses under modern civilized conditions. Indeed, men seek relief from the regular and humdrum occupations in these pastimes, not merely as a matter of change; they bring in satisfactions to the impulses unfulfilled in the normal adaptation to the environment.

Social Relaxations.—Apart from these sports and pastimes, there are festive occasions in every society which more directly remove the normal inhibitions of instinctive activities in greater or less degree, according to the strength of moral traditions. We are familiar with the withdrawal of social conventions at holiday resorts and with the kissing under the mistletoe in Anglo-Saxon countries. Among primitive tribes the same relaxation of moral codes is observable on occasions of communal feasts and dances, and at the periodical tribal gatherings, where all sex taboos are, for the time being, dispensed with. The aboriginal tribes of India who abandon forest life, settle down in villages and gradually accept a stable marital relation, taste the joy of battle in sham fights and give themselves up to sexual promiscuity in annual spring feasts and dances. The

indulgence at the Holi festival in Northern India in coarse jokes and ribald songs, and the general hilarity and abandon, serve as safety-valves for repressed wishes and desires of a people among whom there are institutions that exercise strong inhibitions on sex impulses. Such are some of the social agencies through which a group seeks satisfaction of elemental impulses in the course of the routine life.

Group Behavior in Change and Crisis.—A group life devoid of elasticity does not offer facilities for the growth of new traditions, institutions, and customs, demanded by a new collocation of impulses. Every society has to face changes and crises brought about by a catastrophic physical phenomenon such as an earthquake or a great fire, a flood, famine, or pestilence that compels new modes of behavior involving an unaccustomed combination of native drives. For example, during a protracted famine, the instinct of food-getting dissociates itself from parental and sexual instincts, and parents are known to sell their children or expose them to death, and women to sell their chastity. During an earthquake or a flood, the village bully mellows down into friendship with his neighbors and becomes the accepted village leader. Again, there are social catastrophes such as war or political revolution, a general strike or a crisis in industry and finance. These dissociate and regroup many of the dominant instincts of man into new behavior patterns. War, for instance, combines the latent martial ardor of woman with her parental feelings and the new behavior pattern is objectified in nursing sisterhoods. In the same way chaplains, scientists, engineers, and members of all other professions combine their specific interests with those of aggression and destruction. Such crises indicate the lines of a new orientation of impulses; this happens even in normal society with changes of occupation or residence, rise or fall in the economic scale, changes in the political status, etc. Intercourse with other

peoples and types also stimulates new needs, and calls for new adjustments in the same way.

Social Neurosis and its Symptoms.—When the traditions, institutions, and conventions of social life do not allow free play to the new needs and wants, emotions, and ideals that arise through the new filiation of instincts, a state of neurosis sets in. The earliest symptom of this pathological condition is indicated by the vogue of representations in art and literature which pander to desires unrealizable in normal life. Another symptom which becomes manifest is that of fashions, crazes, and fads which in select circles offer escape from the *ennui* caused by repression of the dominant passions. The perpetual succession of dances, parties, picnics, excursions, and tours provides safe outlets for the primal instincts whose fulfillment in their gross physical form is denied by the exigencies of social life. But these luxuries are not for all. Those whose circumstances do not allow them to make use of such facilities are forced, when the need becomes dominant, to form secret groups, their own Bohemian sets and special clubs. Similar in nature and origin are the anarchists' secret societies, the workingmen's communist clubs, esoteric conclaves of religious fraternities, suicide clubs, etc. These serve to fulfill the desires of the few whose impulses are strong enough to sustain them in unwonted and perilous adventures. When their numbers swell, and their feelings and ideas are spread abroad, the veil of secrecy is discarded, and the secret group appears as the militant group challenging the traditions and beliefs of the larger group. Such has been the history of the rise of the labor organization in every country, and in fact of every great revolt, economic, religious, and social.

Social Symptomology.—Throughout the history of civilization there have been recurrent periods of group disintegration due to the inner instinctive conflicts; and these

have been followed by social disturbances and experiments revealing, through their perplexities, a new adaptation of instincts in individual and social lives to the environmental forces. From times immemorial there have been cases of individual revolt against the herd or group standards of conduct. Out of the ferments have also arisen new groups embodying a deeper and more advanced fusion of the instincts and values which were formerly either repressed or disintegrated. The question for the social pathologist is to discover whether the current institutions and traditions afford suitable opportunities for the fulfillment that the whole gamut of impulses seeks. If the manifold impulses and instincts are frittered away in individual psychopathic reactions or are repressed by social laws and conventions, the social situation becomes pathological. For, biologically speaking, the whole body of the individual and not its particular sense equipment responds to a given stimulus; similarly in the social body, the more intimate the fusion of instincts or the more numerous the channels of approach of different instincts, the nearer perfection it is sociologically.

The exaggerated emphasis of a particular set of instincts has to-day embodied itself in particular institutions; and the intensified group consciousness, characteristic of modern political and economic life, is a symptom of the disintegration of social values. The irrepressible conflicts between labor and capital and between the conservative classes and the proletariat waste the great dynamic force of the race. In politics "the conduct of a state" which is guided by two opposing parties is, indeed, very similar to that of an individual who is the prey of two opposing tendencies of approximately equal strength, and state management on these lines suffers from disadvantages very similar to those which we have studied already in the case of the individual. Similarly, in the case of international politics, the cult of

the narrower forms of patriotism inevitably leads to a distortion of all facts concerned with the relations among nations; and, among the causes of war itself, not the least is to be found in the mental blindness induced by repression acting on whole peoples and races.¹ The compartmental aspect to psychical life is seen in every field; the divorce between art and industry, between private business and social morality, between ethics and politics—all this represents the dissociation of the emotions which are forced back into the unconscious and operate as sources of interminable conflicts. Secret diplomacy to-day has its counterpart in the publication of secrets of personal and domestic life in autobiographies and letters, and the suppression of individual liberty in essentials is accompanied by the abuse of personal license in fashions of art, music, and dress. ✓

Subconscious of the Group.—It is also worth noticing that the age which has witnessed the most elaborate attempts at socialization of the physical sciences is the same that has seen the rise of spiritism, occultism, and other cults which appeal to the unlearned and credulous. In the words of Boris Sidis, personality is repressed by the rigidity of social organization. "Under the enormous weight of socio-static press, under the crushing pressure of economical, political, and religious regulations, there is no possibility for the individual to determine his own relations in life; there is no possibility for him to move, live, and think freely; the personal self sinks, the suggestible, subconscious, social, impersonal self rises to the surface, gets trained and cultivated, and becomes the hysterical actor in all the tragedies of historical life. Society also falls into a hypnoid condition. The social mind gets disaggregated. The gregarious self begins to move within the bosom of the crowd and becomes active, the demon of the demos emerges to the

¹T. C. Flugel, "Freudian Mechanisms as Factors in Moral Development," *The British Journal of Psychology*, June, 1917.

surface of social life and throws the body politic into convulsions of demoniac fury." ¹ This is an extreme picture of the subconscious mob that usually slumbers within the bosom of civilized society.

Social Restlessness.—Characteristic of the present age is its restless, fitful moods. Restlessness of attention is due to failure to understand the real social cravings, the emotions which are dammed up in the unconscious and which cannot be identified. Man, therefore, multiplies indefinitely his artificial wants to obtain the satisfaction which nothing seems able to afford. Indeed, the want-neurosis, as we may term this perpetual hunger for satisfaction, is itself a grave symptom of social pathology. It has arisen in social life in the same manner as the repression of vital instincts and impulses in the individual psyche leads to vague longings and desires, fantasies, and whims of varying degrees of intensity. As, in individual psychology, hypnotism, suggestion, and other mental therapeutic measures change the mental attitude toward symptoms, though they do not effect a cure; similarly, in social psychology, there have arisen certain political and economic fashions with their catch-words, shibboleths, and symbols, which afford an imaginary satisfaction to all sorts of social discontent, and promise easy relief from the tardy and strenuous process of social adjustment. Moreover, each class has its own bent of mind, and hypnotic suggestions given in that direction by such shibboleths and catch-phrases are very effective. Such, for instance, are the economic determinism preached by the Marxian school of socialists, the Syndicalist myth of the revolution, or the Bolshevik doctrine of the dictatorship of the proletariat. All these represent a morbid state in which society regards disease as a morbid gain and prefers to nurse it.

Social Hysteria.—Similarly, the social utopias, delusions,

¹ Sidis, *The Psychology of Suggestion*, Chap. XXVIII.

and imaginations so abundantly developed in these days serve as outlets of repressed desires. They represent the symbolic working-out of desires as in dreams, and are but conscious lies. Such lying, however, is a social satisfaction. The longer one holds to a lie, the more one believes in it, and the more difficult it becomes to explode. Herein lurks great danger when society becomes the victim of a pathological liar. Social paralysis and apathy, which we find ever-recurrent; exaggerated tenderness and sympathy on behalf of the working class, on the one hand, and blind indifference and insensibility to social suffering, on the other (anæsthesia and hyper-æsthesia), represent symptoms of hysteria. Outbursts of grief and social sympathy, tearful appeals of social and economic reformers, craving for social change, are to some extent morbid signs.

Social Doubts and Fears.—Besides hysteria, psychoneuroses comprise compulsive neuroses, obsessions, doubts, and phobias. Is it not true that in social thinking to-day we often find the obsession of a hidden idea, as, for instance, the excessive fear of revolution, or anarchy, or the fear of dictatorship, be it of individual or of class; and is this not the result of dissociation of instincts and impulses? For example, when every class seeks control, in the general social concourse that desire necessarily remains hidden, and yet there develops a general phobia against dictatorship. All democracies, inasmuch as they give opportunities for all, stimulate, in individuals or in groups, a desire for power and mastery. This, however, remains concealed in the consciously-accepted axioms and canons of popular government. Nevertheless, there is ever a suspicion, verging on a phobia, against usurpation of authority by the few. All democracies are nervous in this respect. This nervousness never has been more evident than it is to-day. Possibly the general vogue of coalition-rule in Europe at the present time is traceable to such fear.

Social Melancholia and Dementia.—Many again turn back from the present unrest and conflict and seek refuge in obsessions of degradation and decay of civilization—forms of social melancholia with characteristic psychical segregation and transference of effect. Indifference or opposition to all efforts and ideals of social and economic reform spring also from a kind of social fatalism which has its affective basis in social melancholia. Or, again, we find anarchists with their social gospel of non-resistance and their idea of withdrawal from group life, portending social dementia. Similarly, the idea of an exclusive, nationalistic State which stands outside the pale of personal and international valuation, stands on much the same footing as the individual of anarchism.

Neurotic Literature.—Even in the field of literature, we come across neurotic tendencies widely manifest in various schools of writers. Literary critics have referred to the neuroticism in degenerate productions such as those of Strindberg and his school; the reversion to the life of primal impulses as portrayed by Knut Hamsun; the spells of Ibsenism which have obsessed even the insular literature of England; and, above all, the emphasis on pathological conditions which many of the Russian writers reveal in the unstable lives of their heroes. The wide popularity of such works indicates that they feed certain natural cravings that are denied satisfaction in normal life as well as in literary and artistic channels.

Psychical Inadequacy.—What, then, are the psychological conditions which by preventing normal expression of urges endanger the stability of the normal system? In social psychology, sublimations are weakened when the social energy-supply is low, as in times of industrial breakdown or political disappointment. These bring about a state of social fatigue, ennui, or inertia which is the precipitating situation of social neuroses in which are comprehended many

types of individual neuroses. Indeed, the discovery of psychological inadequacy suddenly made under the stresses of battle and loosely termed "shell shock" was the forerunner of the dawning recognition of the same factors in social life. In modern times, the complex and elaborate specialization of function and association in every field already makes a strong demand on the social energy-supply. It also renders individual and social adaptation very difficult. Industrial conflicts, as well as wars, waste a good deal of the psychic reserve of the people. Periods of unrest and depression also are episodic. These expose to view the veneer which merely covered suppressions that were not properly sublimated or redirected. Psychological inadequacy is manifest in the phobias of diverse objects or diverse situations in different manias and obsessions and stereotyped hysterical symptoms. There is, for instance, a very simple kind of social insanity in which whole groups seem to run away and exclude themselves from the herd standards of conduct. Many a repressed desire is here transformed into a delusion or hallucination of some threat to the individual and group; thus also are produced social fear, anger, elation, and apathy, all of which are presumably direct utilizations of the old group consciousness capacity. Characteristic are the alternation of feelings between the two poles, ecstasy and depression, faith and distrust, cruelty and sympathy, which marks ordinary psychopathic phenomena as well as our present social utopias. These imaginations are all readily translatable into terms of action and hence involve the same degree of divorce from "reality." And it is these which now characterize the dynamic social fears and dreams of the age.

Social Disintegration and Reintegration.—As groups and their values disintegrate, there may be in individual lives a fresh synthesis and coordination of instincts, resulting in a rationalization or a forcing of unconscious tendencies and

desires into forms that are more or less acceptable to the prevalent scheme of values. Associated with this is a symbolic satisfaction for hidden instincts; or, in the absence of any direct or natural outlets for the emotions, there may be a social breakdown (depression and set-back), or a reversion to lowly emotions and primitive ideas (social crime). More generally the energy is transferred to altruistic or supernatural substitutes at the bidding of conscience and convention, a transference significant of times of stress. Or, again, individuals may form themselves into unstable groups in which they think and act mainly by and through their unconscious minds. Their clubs, gatherings, or brotherhoods serve as useful releases for social "complexes" and also for the elaboration of dreams, ideals, and perhaps illusions. The abstract ideas held as beliefs by them form a closed system like the obsession of the paranoiac, and hence tend to make individuals act and think as automata. Thus, some of the modern demagogues and reformers, like ancient medicine-men, have exhibited an incoherent association, the absence of logical assembling of experiences, suggestibility and auto-suggestibility, and even nervous instability and epileptic tendencies. But it is not seldom that progress and invention are due to these individuals and their group who impress their genius on the sluggish imitative mass of inferiors. For this they must satisfy the deepest instincts and emotions of man in new sublimations and synthesis; they must bring about new social groupings in which the unsatisfied society will find various symbolic satisfactions as a compromise. It is thus that social progress ever includes a double movement, first a disintegration of instincts and values, and precipitation of social neuroses, and afterward a construction of new symbols and beliefs and a new orientation and reconciliation of instincts and values both in individual and in group life.

TOPICS

1. Feasts and religious celebrations—their place in primitive and modern society.
2. Art and literature as indications of social neurosis.
3. Some recent “utopias” as expressions of repressed desires.
4. Poverty and disease as factors in social neurosis.
5. Secret societies and their members—a study in mental pathology.

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CHAPTER XXI

BEHAVIOR IN ISOLATION

Isolation of Dementia and Illness.—The phenomenon of isolation represents the disintegration of group life, and as such it enables us to discern the factors underlying the growth of associations. Isolation may vary both in degree and in kind. We are familiar with cases of complete withdrawal from all forms of social intercourse as in the later stages of dementia. The patient leads a negative existence and is capable only of mechanical, repetitive movements. He becomes entirely unaware of, or callous to the human beings around him; he cannot respond reciprocally to their behavior. A similar condition is brought about in cases of serious illness where there is a heavy drain on the organic energy. The patient develops a natural desire to be alone and physicians, too, advise isolation. In fact, he wishes to be relieved of the strain of reciprocal adjustment necessary in the presence of fellow-beings, and the physician's caution is mainly intended to husband this energy for bodily recoupment.

Voluntary Isolation—the Recluse.—There are also instances where an individual voluntarily withdraws himself from society. The hermit and the religious recluse are met with in every Eastern country. In many cases, they live by themselves, often refusing to be seen by their fellow-men and not infrequently maintaining a strict vow of silence for many years. The beginning of such a course of life is induced by an overwhelming feeling of worry or burden involved in social life. Here, also, the desire is to seek relief from the necessity of reciprocal behavior. Usually we find hermits and societies grouped into orders and brotherhoods which insist upon a plain and simple way of

life. Each person is taught to be as self-sufficient as possible. Thus the reciprocal adjustments are rendered few and easy. Even in ordinary life, we find persons retiring for solitary prayer and worship. The desire here is to avoid the interruption of domestic and social intercourse. Poets, musicians, and artists similarly isolate themselves from the daily concourse.

Punitive Isolation.—There are also forms of punitive isolation. The solitary confinement of prisoners is a familiar example. The object of such punishment seems to be to deprive the culprit of any relief he can derive from mutual relations with his fellow-prisoners. Thus, even jailers or warders are often prohibited from holding any social communication with the prisoner. In spite of all precautions, however, prisoners have been known to devise elaborate codes and signals for the purpose of communication. They humanize even weeds and flowers, rats, spiders, and wasps and make them serve as companions for daily communion. A similar mental stress is produced as a result of social boycott or excommunication. It is the supreme need of reciprocal behavior which is inhibited through confinement and ostracism.

Occupational Isolation.—Again, there are certain modes of life in which man has to live in relative isolation from his fellow-beings. There is witnessed in such cases a marked deficiency with respect to social behavior. The rusticity of the farmer or the unsociability of the scholar are familiar examples. The mutual behavior of individuals that leads to the formation of a socialized pattern of mind is undeveloped and inhibited, and hence arises want of urbanity or idiosyncrasy.

"Only" Children.—Similarly the "only" child so thoroughly studied by psychologists shows extreme conceit, jealousy, selfishness, and self-anxiety, which make him unpopular with his mates and force him to further isola-

tion. The failure of reciprocal behavior is here both the cause and effect of isolation.

Nature of Isolation.—Isolation, then, is a widely-manifested phenomenon, differing in degree, types, and motives. The essence of the situation lies in a break or discontinuity of the behavioristic relation between the individual and his group. The individual ceases to be stimulated by the activities of those around him, and is not compelled to influence them by his own behavior. In ordinary life, when a person is absorbed in his own thoughts and feelings, he segregates himself by remaining aloof from all channels of reciprocal behavior. Similarly, when one desires to “cut” or “snub” a person, the most effective way usually is to become irresponsible to his speech and gesture. Estrangement between friends is also marked by a gradual diminution of the warmth and number of reciprocal responses. It is only when the motor-life of the individual is thus circumscribed that he is said to be in isolation.

Physical Causes of Isolation.—Such disturbance or interference with the motor adjustment may arise as a result of various causes. In the case of dementia, for instance, the isolation of the individual is brought about through a derangement of the central nervous system. This, in its turn, fails to sustain the order of succession of the muscular responses, overt and incipient, necessary for the adjustment of the individual to his fellow beings. The complex organization of the responses is disintegrated and resolves into mere repetitive acts which are not sufficient to orient the individual to his ever-changing social situation. Similarly, when a person suffers from a serious malady, the vitality is so much lowered that the intercourse with the human *milieu* cannot be maintained. Hence there arises the need of complete segregation.

Psychological Causes of Isolation.—But reciprocal behavior is not determined merely by the condition of the

central nervous system or general physical vitality. The tone of reciprocal behavior is preserved also by psychological factors. The complex interchange of responses constituting reciprocal behavior often is maintained through the drive of a dominant impulse. The group, as we have seen, arises in the course of effort by the individual to secure from his environment, both physical and social, what satisfies his organic needs. As long as the dominant pursuit persists, the responsive adjustment between individuals continues. In those cases where the whole emotional life of the individual is canalized exclusively in an all-absorbing pursuit, any thwarting or balking of the latter results in the disintegration of reciprocal behavior, and hence of collective life. Many are the instances in which bankruptcy, or other public disgrace, has led men to live the life of a recluse. Disappointment in love has similarly forced men and women to live in social aloofness and obscurity. The main social incentive has disappeared, and along with it the habitudes of reciprocal adjustment.

Again, it often happens that the dominant impulses of sex, of acquisition, of self-assertion, may remain as strong as ever, but their satisfaction may be repressed or balked owing to lack of opportunity. The habitual responses in such cases have to be perpetually inhibited, and the energy required for this is so great that such persons can live a life of mechanical routine and fixed habits only. The inner feeling of dissatisfaction, as a consequence, is projected to the social order as a whole, and this results in cynicism and sourness often marked in old maids and disappointed bachelors. This leads, again, to greater isolation and estrangement from society, and engenders a feeling of subjective isolation. In persons of quite a different nature and temperament, the fulfillment that is denied in the physical and human situation is sought on the plane of ideas and images. The lover creates imaginary situations where

he finds his beloved, and communes with her in songs and dreams.

Idealization in Isolation.—Others similarly live in celestial worlds and hold daily communion with gods and spirits. The images which are the denizens of their heaven are but means for the fulfillment of their balked desires. Many also find in day-dreams and reveries the opportunities for enjoyment they miss in the course of their daily life and withdraw from all social intercourse to give up themselves to such imaginary fulfillments. The overt responses constituting reciprocal behavior are, in such cases, rendered incipient, and such persons seem to observers to be enjoying quiet and rest. Yet it is well known that prolonged indulgence in day-dreaming induces as much fatigue as a busy day's intercourse. The reason is that such persons live in the company of their mental creations, though not in that of their fellow-beings.

So long as the objects of day-dreaming and reverie and the realities of daily life are completely dissociated, the conduct of the person does not seem unusual. But it sometimes happens that the images of reverie interpolate with everyday realities. Gods and angels, departed friends and unknown enemies, periods of life long buried in the past, rehabilitate themselves in the ordinary routine of life. Thus arises a state of delusion and hallucination. It is through this process that those condemned to isolation lose their equipoise of mind. In the same manner, the incipient responses toward ideal objects may become overt, and hence behavior appears to be unbalanced. The individual converses with departed souls, fights with imaginary foes, and makes love to non-existent sweethearts.

Behavior to the Real and to the Ideal Compared.—The difference between behavior toward an ideal object and that toward physical reality is easily noticeable. Yet the inner mechanism which underlies such difference requires analysis.

When a person is physically present before another (called for clearness "the observer"), some of the latter's responses that constitute his behavior must be overt and others incipient. Thus the observer has to adjust his eyes to the real person's face, converse with or move toward him. The number and nature of the incipient responses must necessarily be determined by the character of the overt responses. Facing the person, eye to eye, the observer has to check effectively any feelings of enmity or contempt that may arise; in the presence of a lady in society he has to inhibit any all-too-obvious attitude of admiration. The reciprocal behavior similarly limits the nature and number of the responses. Moreover, the physical presence continuing for some time, imparts a certain stability and organization to the responses which make up behavior.

In the case of an ideal object, however, all the responses are incipient. Hence a larger variety becomes possible. Again, whereas a real person has to be tolerated whether he fulfills the observer's needs or not, an ideal person can change his mood or behavior to suit the impulses and interests that have created him. Thus the attitudes of love and hate, adoration and contempt, may follow in bioscopic succession; and the ideal person, too, undergoes successive transformations. Moreover, the ideal person, unlike his prototype, sets no limits to the number and nature of the responses by necessitating any overt activity, or by any reciprocal behavior. Accordingly, there is no organized or stable system of behavior toward him. It is for these reasons that day-dreams and reveries spin out in an endless series of images, thoughts, and feelings, eliciting behavior without order or system.

Ideal as Substitute for Real.—All these images, ideas, and behavior, however, are but mechanisms for securing satisfactions which normally result from intercourse with fellow-beings. It is the denial of this fulfillment in every-

day life which accounts for such phenomena. A group in which individuals find themselves may demand so novel and varied a succession of responses that the adjustments necessary to give those responses cannot be made. The mutual relations between individuals in a group may be unpleasant or distasteful; the dominant interests that they desire to serve may be denied their satisfaction in the company they keep. The only course left open in all these instances is to withdraw from the group. The same situation arises also in the ideal and imaginary world. The mental objects brought into being may baffle all efforts at adjustment. They may fail to yield the pleasure that the individuals expect from them. They may not truly represent the unfulfilled organic urges. The individuals thus strive to escape from the images which their own nature has brought into existence. But the images are not like real humans whom they can avoid. The ideal images persist in the mental *milieu*, and continue to haunt.

It is in order to fly from these haunting creations of the mental environment that individuals immolate themselves or end their lives in suicide.

Isolation of Grief and its Cure.—The imperative necessity of adaptation to the physical situation serves to keep apart the ideal from the concrete, the imaginary creations from the realities of daily life. The more strenuous the demands of adaptation, the more stringent the psychic segregation. Thus, when an overwhelming grief compels a person to seek refuge in isolation and brood over his or her misfortune, the effective cure consists in a gradual renewal of the daily round of domestic duties and resumption of social intercourse.

Products of Isolation.—When the stress of physical adaptation is less insistent, the dissociation between the mental creations and the daily realities is incomplete and the former has a greater chance of interpolating with the latter.

Thus it is not isolation alone which necessarily would lead to mental instability. Again, the ideal objects that man creates may be fragmentary, or they may coalesce into a complex pattern. A person, for instance, may create a beautiful girl in his imagination and offer his love. As a single piece of imagery such creation is nothing more than a delusion. But when a number of situations and imaginary persons is brought into being and a plot develops, we have a work of art or fiction. This difference in complexity results from the inner equipment of individuals. There are persons who in isolation lose balance and develop insanity. There are others who create poetry, art, and religion. In the case of the former, the responses are directed to a medley of images; in the latter these are organized into attitudes and standpoints. In the case of poets and artists, the motor life which has been inhibited voluntarily or involuntarily finds its fulfillment in ideal objects which are of value not only to the individual but also to society. The diverse effects of isolation on mental life thus rest upon irreducible individual differences.

Value of Occasional Isolation.—"By all means," says George Herbert of Cherbury, "use sometimes to be alone." Man's occasional isolation, like sleep or rest, is a biologic need. It is only when isolation is induced by unusual circumstances or imposed as a punishment that abnormal consequences follow. Man is essentially a motor animal. It is through his activities that he is brought into touch with the animate and inanimate world. The effect of isolation is to dam the channels of motor-response that represent the modes of vital adaptation. It is for this reason that isolation has so far-reaching an effect upon the individual. The physical objects to which man seeks normal adjustment are translated into the ideal and the imaginary. The overt muscular changes, that offer the only means of satisfaction and bring home the joy of expression, are suppressed into

incipiency. Thus, the adaptative effort for which the mechanism of the human body and mind has evolved is baffled. Man's mind tries to compensate for the inhibitions and denials in the human *milieu* by its own creations which are intended to maintain the adaptative behavior in spite of its failure in real life. Man removes himself from his *milieu* and peoples his own world with fancies, myths, and fictions. Day-dreams and reveries are thus biologic defences that man's nature sets up to ward off the effects of social privation. The failure of such defence-formations is seen in lunacy and suicide. Its success is consummated in the creations of art and religion. In sensitive natures, the strain of social intercourse and of social inhibitions is found too burdensome. Isolation is of value to the individual as offering an escape from constant and strenuous adjustment, and such relief has often been the means of acquisition of images and experiences on the ideal plane which have not only been a source of joy for the individual but have also contributed to improved human relations and intercourse by a process of idealization.

TOPICS

1. Social contrivances securing the separation of the individual from the group.
2. The effects of solitary confinement.
3. The isolating effects of religion.
4. The use of day-dreams and reveries.

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CHAPTER XXII

PSYCHOLOGY OF PROGRESS

Man's Progressive Environment and Behavior.—The activities of man, like those of any other organism, are directed primarily to the objects of the physical environment. The imperative demands for food and shelter early develop specific sets of reactions to the inanimate world. The primitive man learns to seek edible herbs and avoid poisonous ones; he finds comfort in a sheltered cave and avoids an exposed cliff. Selected types of behavior evolve with the discrimination of environmental objects. Activities are motivated by physical needs which are satisfied by physical objects.

Let us imagine that man's environment, at this stage, comes to include a stock of animals. New modes of behavior at once arise: many of the animals are killed and used for food; some are tamed for service and companionship; others are destroyed to make the environment safer for humanity. New types of behavior here arise through the addition of new objects in the region.

But man has also his own kith and kin who live and communicate with him. They elicit a rich pattern of responses. A few are held in warm friendship; some are sought as companions in the daily occupation; others are viewed with cold indifference, and still others with suspicion and enmity. A difference in behavior toward man and toward other animate and inanimate objects characterizes even man's early days. For man has the capacity of responding in manifold ways to every mode of behavior he elicits in fellow-man. His conduct, therefore, must forestall all harmful responses. Thus, the apparently friendly greeting with a stranger may be complicated by furtive precautions against a possible

attack. Hand-stroke, or clasping and embrace, are actions that hinder inimical conduct. At the same time, the life of action develops as its appanage a graded series of emotions to suit each specific form of muscular movement. The feeling of surprise at meeting a stranger may develop into one of unfriendliness as the result of a gesture of suspicion, and culminate in bitter hate at the moment of attack.

Development of Culture.—Concurrently with the rise of the diverse action types and emotions directed toward the inanimate and animate objects of the environment as well as towards fellow-men, there develops a complex set of images, percepts, ideas, and thoughts representing the objects and the responses they elicit. They are consolidated into particular patterns of beliefs, cults, and doctrines, which henceforth control and select man's behavior in all its phases. We thus find that culture systems develop around the cultivation of such edible plants of the region as rice and maize, or the domestication of such animals as cattle, horse, or reindeer, or, again, the hunting of seal, caribou, or bison. These supply the materials and *motifs* of totemic beliefs and observances, folk-tales and myths, songs, and ballads.

Man's life in the setting of hills, rivers, and valleys, his manifold relations with plants, animals, and his fellow-beings, interlace his action-attitudes, emotions, and ideas. We find that, in the early days of civilization, where the linkage with inanimate and animate nature is vivid and profound, all the objects that surround man's daily life and toil have their inevitable place in his culture scheme. The everlasting mountain, the ancient tree, Mother Earth who bestows on her children her rich gifts which recur with the seasons, the mother-cow, the numerous totemic plants and animals which serve to protect and to warn—it is thus that natural objects, plants, and animals supply man with names, images, and symbols which play an important part

in his mental and social development. Out of them are fashioned the complex texture of religious ceremonies and social observances, and the rich fabric of art, myth, and dream. Thus there is an interweaving of forests and rivers, plants, and animals into one tissue of culture. There is one pattern of psycho-motor life woven by different strands of impulses, emotions, and ideas and brought into play in every situation. The culture pattern reacts in the same way as the protoplasmic mass of the amoeba drains into its pseudopodia.

Animism and animatism are but products of this order of mental life. The same general attitude manifests itself toward every kind of object. Thus, the totemic belief concerning animals modifies in various ways behavior toward fellow-men as regards marriage, kinship, and social organization. Similarly, membership in a certain clan involves a certain attitude toward plants and animals. The sun and the moon, conceived as ancestors, have also governed human relations; and the attitude of man toward these objects of nature has been one of reverence and worship. Man's behavior toward each order of objects and phenomena thus is modified by that toward other objects and phenomena of his environment. Such modification is but a complex instance of the spatial deflection of the movement of an organism toward its primary objective through similar movements of other organisms.

Such a culture scheme endures so long as it proves good to man in offering a sure guidance to the satisfaction of his manifold impulses in his particular region. The diversity of the phases of culture—hunting, pastoral, agricultural, and manufacturing—arises as forms of new adjustment when such guidance fails. As a consequence, new social types and culture schemes arise bringing in their wake a changed mental pattern. In agriculture, for instance, the cultivation of different staple crops such as rice, wheat, or

Indian corn, and the rearing of different domestic animals, governs the social organization as well as the course of mental life. The forests and wild animals, which constitute a more essential element of the economic environment in an earlier stage, diminish in significance. Earth and crops, rain and seasons, now would weave together all the variegated threads of ideas, emotions, and impulses into one complex web of psychic life.

Culminating Culture of Cities.—Contrasted with these there arises a distinct culture in cities and other centers of large population. Man here deals with secondary and intermediate goods, raw materials derived from an unseen world of plants and animals, and these latter recede into the background. While in the collectional or agricultural phases, man's ideas, interests, and feelings centered around plants, animals, or the earth, in the civilization of the city, his psychical responses gather around men or groups of men. The principal adjustment that man seeks is to Man.¹ Yet, even in our modern cities, man seeks to retreat from the aridity and emptiness of urban life to a suburban home and garden where he may satisfy his nature sensibility, or to the forests where his dogs serve as companions in hunting and shooting. A flower-pot and a poodle are derelict survivals which, similarly to some of the vestigial bones and tissues in his physical frame, bespeak man's original way of life.

Civilization as Specialized Development.—The history of social development thus may be conceived as a process of gradual shifting of interests from a situation comprising objects of the environment as well as human-beings to one containing some only of these factors. The course of civilization may be regarded as a process of gradual specialization in which one or other factor of the environment serves

¹Vide Galpin, *Rural Social Centres in Wisconsin*. Summaries in Park and Burgess, p. 247.

as the nucleus of culture and hence as the focus of thoughts, feelings, and impulses. Groups, and institutions, customs, and traditions gather round and stabilize each of these specialized culture-types. Each culture-type maintains a characteristic economic organization, political system, and form of family and property. Pastoral societies, for instance, are nomad societies because the flocks have to migrate regularly between summer and winter pastures. The seasonal migrations develop a sense of discipline as well as power of organization. Thus, the shepherds early build up a strong government under the authority of the tribal chief. Again, their mobility and habits of warfare discourage accumulation of property, and for this reason we find among pastoral nomads peculiar traits of hospitality and generosity. Further, the woman cannot guard, tame, or breed the flocks, and thus her economic importance among shepherds is diminished as compared with man's. Hence, pastoral tribes usually are organized upon a strict patriarchal basis, the head of the family being the absolute ruler and owner of flocks and other property. It is in this manner that institutions, customs, and traditions modify one another as they serve as tools of adaptation, all contributing, by a process of correlated variation, to fix and maintain the social type suitable for the region. Even so imperative a feeling as sexual jealousy is modified beyond recognition as a result of adaptation to the geographical or institutional environment. In unfavorable regions, families can accumulate only small amounts of property which cannot be advantageously divided, but which at the same time cannot be cared for by one person. Polyandry arises under such conditions, for it assures common participation in property and coöperation in labor.

Intensive Development of Group Life.—Not only institutions, customs, and beliefs but also the entire psychic composition of the individual is shaped into a particular pattern

through his orientation to the region or environment. The solidarity of group life and the inter-group relations arise in such cases because the individuals are oriented to a common physical situation. The relationship between man and man is of secondary significance in comparison to that between man and his environment. But there are situations in which man, to fulfill his needs, has to reach nature through man. The fellow-being in such cases is not a mere companion, but a necessary intermediary in the search for food. The behavior of fellow-beings, their modes and temperaments, has to be watched in the same manner as a peasant watches variations of the weather and changes of the seasons. The emotional relation between labor and employer, producer and consumer, the profound though indirect dependence of the conduct of one industrial group upon that of another, for instance, are to be explained by the fact that each is an indispensable medium for the fulfillment of primary needs and interests. Thus a social order arises in which the adjustment of man to man, and of group to group, becomes more imperative than the adjustment of man to nature.

Groups and Group Values in Evolution.—Within each of these schemes of life, further differentiation arises. Impulses dissociate and segregate; these fixate upon ideal objects, images, and symbols, and give rise to functional groups. Such, for instance, are totemic groups and secret societies, castes and guilds, *phratries* and village communities. Thus groups have waxed stronger or disintegrated, aroused loyalty or opposition, in different epochs of history. Values attached to different groups have similarly shifted and led to social adjustments. New groups have also sprung up, expressing dominant instinctive drives. Man has exhibited perpetual change in the organization of his impulses and interests. Groups, similarly, have formed and dissolved, renewed and reformed according to ever-

changing mental patterns. It is in this way that groups, by satisfying intrinsic values, have functioned in the history of man so as to insure him easy guidance to the purposes of adaptation. Social development also exhibits phases of lapse of intrinsic values and group disruption. We have seen that the class, which is the most important functional group in our industrial civilization, fails because it implies divorce from the basic natural and human environment and the imperative organic needs. The religious ascetic order, likewise, in all ages has degenerated and disintegrated because of its inevitable failure to guide man in the fulfillment of his varied basic cravings.

Similarly, the trade union, in so far as it has not been able to guarantee a family or living wage, or to account for family and other social obligations, fails as an occupational group. In such instances, the human impulses do not find in the group the effective guidance they seek.

Specialization, its Necessity and Drawbacks.—Specialization breeds conflict and hence is a source of social disruption. At the same time, modern social life in its complex phase cannot be carried on without it. Necessarily, then, there must be groups and individuals who have to direct their natural urges into narrow channels, and to ideal objects and values, so that the people as a whole may live. There must be miners in the community who have to live underground away from their family groups and work in the dark for long hours; there must be factory-hands who have to specialize in minute portions of a long, complicated chain of standardized processes which to them is utterly incomprehensible; there must also be soldiers who must live in barracks and regiment themselves to a strenuous and monotonous life for a far-off event. In all these cases, the culture scheme, which is at once the product and tool of adaptation, has failed to assure the individual that har-

mony of interests which an effective adjustment alone can assure.

A similar specialization in the animal world is seen in the process of domestication. With the gain in the output of work that results from domestication there has been a corresponding degeneration of animals under artificial conditions. They become obese, coarse, scraggy, and subject to attack by parasites. Eugenists similarly point to the dangers to the race due to decline of physique, vitality, and birth-rate under modern urban industrial conditions. Not less significant is the poverty of life that results from expression of but few of the impulses with which nature has endowed man.

Menace of Over-specialization.—In spite of the return of efficiency that it brings, specialization in modern life is a source of serious menace to the organic and mental well-being of the individual as well as of the race. The group life which develops as a tool of adaptation, an instrument for meeting the onslaught of nature through collective response, is seriously threatened with disruption. The culture that the group carries forward as an inheritance from ancestral life, and which, like the inner organic drives, marks out stereotyped courses of behavior for man, is devitalized and tends to become biologically ineffective as the result of specialization. Groups and classes that arise through specialization and as the result of orientation to ideal objects tend to conflict with one another.

Problem of the Great Society.—Hence has arisen need of an effective integrating influence that will weld together the divergent trends of social life. Such an influence, in the case of smaller and simpler groups, is found in the organic equipment of living beings, in tropisms, reflexes, instincts, impulses, and emotions. It is the need of satisfying them that drives individuals to form groups and sub-groups.

Their varied fusion and combination, on the one hand, and disintegration on the other, have built up the existing exuberant variety of groups and values in their normal and pathological forms. The question naturally arises whether the same factors would supply, at this social stage, the urge for an effective integration. What instinct or group of instincts can the Great Society—that resulting from the aggregation of small units—fulfill? What additional natural satisfaction does the State or the industrial class offer to the individual? There is, indeed, preconditioning value, that of serving as the *milieu* wherein smaller units may live and thrive; but neither the State nor society at large can raise to the pitch of stimulation the desires that draw men together for concrete satisfactions. Thus, the warmth of personal relationship and neighborliness in vital, regional groups which utilize subtle points of social contact such as special qualities of speech or expression, or particular traditions, customs, and institutions springing from the neighborhood, are absent from the Great Society. The Great Society thus lacks vitality in so far as its aggressive and centralized tendencies tend to repress man's natural groupings and his elemental instincts of mastery and self-assertion.

The Path to Solution.—Yet patriotism and class allegiance, nationalism and imperialism, have claimed the best that individuals and groups can give; a fact to which history bears ample witness. The aggregation of groups as an ideal object has found concrete embodiment in symbols and insignia, in territories, traditions, and laws, and thus has sought to ground itself on the natural impulses and instincts. But an integration of this type, however effective and vital for the time being, carries within it the seeds of disintegration that is the normal fate of all classes and functional groups. It is for this reason that states have sought to invigorate themselves by granting regional auton-

omy and functional government. Or again, it is sought to renew society, in its foundations, by the organization of economic interests as the basis of political representation. Similarly, industrial classes are strengthened by the local ties of the self-governed workshop or the regional association. For the same object, theologians, metaphysicians, and moral philosophers have joined hands to reënforce the instinctive basis through the inculcation of beliefs, judgments, and ethical ideas that will intensify, sustain, and rationalize the basic impulses. The strength of the synthetic group should be looked for not in the cravings of instincts but in those higher mental processes which bring about and maintain a stable combination of impulses. Thus it is through the instrumentality of ideas, beliefs, and faiths alone that we must look for an extension of group life adequate to the needs of the Great Society.

TOPICS

1. The significance of animism for social psychology.
2. Modern pastimes and recreations as survivals of primitive habits.
3. Specialization, its uses and abuses.
4. The integration of groups.

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