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# PERSONALITY AND RELIGION

*By the same Author*

THE ESSENTIALS OF MENTAL MEASUREMENT.

(Jointly with Professor GODFREY H. THOMSON.)  
4th Edn. Cambridge University Press, 1940.

PSYCHOLOGY AND PSYCHOTHERAPY.

Edward Arnold & Co., 5th Edn., 1944.

PSYCHOLOGY AND THE SCIENCES.

(Editor and Contributor.) A. & C. Black, 1924.

SCIENCE AND PERSONALITY. (Terry Lectures,  
Yale University.) Oxford University Press, 1929.

MIND, MEDICINE AND METAPHYSICS.

Oxford University Press, 2nd Impression, 1938.

PSYCHOLOGICAL METHODS OF HEALING.

University of London Press, Ltd., 1938.

WAR AND THE PSYCHOLOGICAL CON-  
DITIONS OF PEACE.

A. & C. Black, Ltd., 2nd Edn., 1942.

PERSONALITY  
AND  
RELIGION

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## PREFACE

IN the following pages an attempt has been made to consider the general problem of religion in the light of modern psychology. For this purpose, certain chapters from my *Mind and Personality* (University of London Press, Ltd., 1926) and *Science and Personality* (Oxford University Press, 1929), both of which books have been out of print for some years, have been thoroughly revised and incorporated in the text. Indeed, the book may be regarded as a revised and abbreviated edition of *Mind and Personality*, supported by twenty years' further experience on my part in deep mental analysis of psycho-neurotic patients as well as of more normal personalities, and given a more appropriate title, since it is concentrated throughout on the problem of religion.

It was a fundamental interest in religion which led me to the study of philosophy at Oxford, in the college of John Locke, when I was a medical student there at the beginning of the century, and made me feel impelled to take the honour school of Literæ Humaniores in addition to that of Natural Science. I have never regretted this strenuous interlude—which incidentally took me to Germany, to the city where G. W. Leibniz worked and died, and aroused in me a lasting interest in German philosophy, especially in that of Immanuel Kant. For the nationalistic and militaristic aberrations of later German thinkers these two, at least, should be accounted guiltless.

My own subsequent life's work, as a philosopher and psychologist at Oxford while simultaneously practising as a medical psychologist in London, has kept the philosophical problem of religious belief constantly before my eyes, and has demanded serious consideration of its theoretical validity and its practical efficacy. The following pages contain my reasoned confession of faith on this matter.

W. B.

LONDON, W. I.

October 29, 1945.

To  
MY WIFE

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I held it truth, with him who sings  
    To one clear harp in divers tones,  
    That men may rise on stepping-stones  
Of their dead selves to higher things.

TENNYSON.

## CHAPTER I

# INTRODUCTION

### I. PERSONALITY

ONE might be expected to commence any discussion of Personality with a definition. That would be really impossible:<sup>1</sup> different schools of thought hold decidedly different views as to the nature of what the educated public call personality. Only after considering these various views and relating them to one another could we even attempt such a definition. But it is only fair at the commencement to consider at any rate the derivation of the term, and to remind ourselves that *persona* in Latin is supposed to mean a mask; so that, according to this derivation, personality is the part we play in this drama of life, and the use of the word personality emphasizes the fact that we all of us play many parts; as we say in different terms, we are each of us many selves. We come into contact with the world at many angles and see it from many points of view, and we are different in accordance with the differing environments in which we find ourselves.

And yet, although the word itself, *persona*, suggests drama, even melodrama, pretence, hypocrisy, and the like, nevertheless when we come to consider the ordinary use of language we find that people who are regarded as having personality are just the opposite of this. They are not people who play a part. They are people who are genuine, who really believe in what they work and live for. They are people who have taken a definite line of their own. They work out and achieve a certain degree of originality; they do not wear a mask, they are themselves. But once they have created their personality, if that personality is sufficiently strong and striking to impress others, there will be a large number of people ready to model themselves on that personality, to wear that mask; so that in this sense one might say that personality is something that in itself is worked out by the individual, but that it can be copied

<sup>1</sup> A general guiding thread in the discussion is given by the concept of *mental unity and continuity, both theoretical and practical.*

with a greater or less degree of faithfulness; others can take it as a model. This dramatic sense of personality is, of course, the popular sense and is generally left aside by strict science. If one opens any textbook on psychology and expects to receive enlightenment on the subject, one is doomed to severe disappointment. Drama and the science of psychology seem to fall apart from one another. In the past they have kept rigidly clear of one another,<sup>1</sup> but I think we can truthfully say that in recent years a *rapprochement* has occurred, and that on the one hand professional psychologists are more ready to learn from dramatists and novelists, and on the other the dramatist and the novelist are more ready to turn to psychology for information and general points of view.

We are led to ask what has been the cause of this change of attitude, because it is a distinct change of attitude characterizing the present generation, within the last 30 to 40 years. I think we can reply with perfect confidence that it is the advance made in so-called "depth psychology," *Tiefenpsychologie*, and that this advance is definitely linked up with the name of one man, viz. Sigmund Freud. However extensively we may disagree with him in the details of his theory, we must all agree that in his original method—which he has gradually modified and improved—we have a means of getting at the soul of man, the essential individuality and personality of man, more powerful than any previously devised. His method of psycho-analysis is, as is well known, a method of persistently following up what the individual is ready to say about himself. It is not unlike confession; such written confessions as those of St. Augustine or Rousseau remind one to some extent of self-analysis, but they do not go far enough to be justifiably called psycho-analysis. In ordinary confession one simply describes what thoughts are at the moment in one's mind, and goes over one's past life in that way, just stating what one remembers. That by itself is not psycho-analysis. It is the beginning of psycho-analysis, but for adequate analysis, which is to carry us

<sup>1</sup> As a striking exception to this generalization I would refer my readers to the late William Archer's study of the psychology of acting, *Masks or Faces?* London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1888.

any further than this, we have to follow up these memories, and encourage the individual, when being analysed, to say just what comes into his mind, *à propos* his various memories of the past, his various attitudes towards the present, all the various problems in his life, in which he had had to adapt himself to his environment. Instead of the psycho-analyst explaining and solving his problems for him, the psycho-analyst should endeavour to encourage and make him solve them for himself, in this faith, that the solution will be reached by a still more thorough-going self-scrutiny. In the end the aim is for the patient to acquire self-knowledge, but that self-knowledge is a matter of considerable mental labour and effort, a matter of overcoming "resistances," and the effort must be on the part of the person analysed and not merely on the part of the analyst.<sup>1</sup>

This form of analysis, on which we shall have more to say in later chapters, brings us nearer to human nature than we have ever got before—brings us especially near to the more dramatic aspects and elements of human nature. We find in the course of analysis that things that are important, the experiences that have had special bearing on the development of the patient's life, are conative and emotional in their nature. They are related to the most fundamental instincts and impulses of the human race. In a way they represent a sort of interaction between the primitive instinctive tendencies and the actual past experience of the individual. The individual's mind may have become tangled up to a greater or less extent through the persistence of these instinctive tendencies in relation to special experiences of the past, which are preserved in memory. These memory-traces are themselves in some way or other connected with primitive instinctive tendencies, such as those of self-preservation, self-assertion, and sex; and through their interaction with these instincts they themselves remain active, although they are no longer within the circle of the patient's conscious life. His memories are not like pictures that have

<sup>1</sup> There is also, of course, the important factor of the "transference" (*Übertragung*), which the analyst has to deal with and eventually "resolve." S. Freud, *Collected Papers*, vol. ii, ch. xxviii, "The Dynamics of the Transference," Hogarth Press, 1924.

been stored away or hung on the walls of some museum, but are actual forces, still making themselves felt in the background of the mind, still influencing the conscious mind, although themselves remaining unconscious, or outside the field of awareness.

This, then, is one way of approaching the mind; the analytic way, which is dramatic, which does justice to the conative and emotional nature of man, to the mental conflicts that inevitably accompany him on his path through life, and so in its description is more convincing than earlier description. With what may we contrast this modern outlook? We may contrast it, first with the outlook of the introspective psychology of earlier times and, secondly, with the outlook of physiology. The first was introduced into modern thought by, and it had its beginning in, John Locke. It was a method of just looking into one's mind and seeing what was to be observed there.<sup>1</sup> The task was undertaken mainly for the purpose of obtaining fresh insight into the nature of *knowledge*, and all the earlier work of modern psychology was concerned primarily with this question of knowledge—especially as to how the individual could get to know the external world. Locke introduced this "new way of ideas"; Berkeley found the method so convincing that he denied the existence of anything beyond mind. Hume with his sceptical temperament found that he could go even further than Berkeley and abolish even the individual self, and reduce experience to a sequence of sensations, or impressions, and ideas linked together by laws of custom or habit. All three were primarily concerned with the problem of the intellectual side of human nature, the problem of knowledge.

The physiologists, on the other hand, being impressed by the fact that all mind is embodied in a brain, and is in relation to physical change somewhere or other in the organism, worked along entirely different lines. They sought to correlate mental processes of one kind or another with physiological processes and so eventually reached the theory of cerebral

<sup>1</sup> "Reflection" (introspection), according to John Locke, "is the notice which the mind takes of its own operations." *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (1690), Book II, ch. i, § 4.

localization, according to which there was held to be a correspondence between mental processes and physical changes in special parts of the nervous system. For Locke, Berkeley and Hume the unity of the mind, the personality, was mainly of an intellectual nature, and whereas Locke assumed a subject of experience, regarding his "ideas" as the object of that experience,<sup>1</sup> of that understanding, Hume explained away the subject of experience itself, and so seemed to destroy any essential unity of the mind. Physiology put in the place of psychological unity a physiological unity, and taught that the unity of the mind was merely the correlate of the unity of the body and especially of the nervous system, which co-ordinates the working of the different parts of the body.

But a consideration of the more general biological aspects of physiology has led psychology back to something between the extreme intellectualism of the earlier philosophers and the materialism of the earlier physiologists. It has made us see that the mind, like the physical organism, has had a history, and has an environment with which it interacts, so that we look upon psychological accounts of mental reactions to the environment as the completion—as it were, the fulfilment—of more strictly physical and physiological modes of reacting to the environment. And for a time, just as it was held in physiology that the physiological reflex action would serve as the starting point for a systematic explanation of the way in which the brain and mind works, so in biology it has been hoped that the study of the various instinctive tendencies will suffice to give us a systematic explanation of mind in its conative and emotional aspects as well as in its intellectual aspect.

We shall see later that, although all these are good beginnings and true as far as they go, they do not suffice. They do not carry us far enough, although they are very useful in enabling us to write the earlier chapters of psychological textbooks. Thus we can write about the awareness of an external world, the problem of perception, the nature of attention, etc., along the lines of Locke, Berkeley, Hume and their more

<sup>1</sup> For John Locke, an idea is "whatsoever is the object of the understanding when a man thinks." *Essay*, Book I, ch. i, § 8.

modern representatives. We can also write descriptions of the central nervous system, and its connections with the sense-organs on the one side and with the muscular system on the other. We can thus go a certain way towards explaining the issues of life. Further, we can enumerate the various primitive or fundamental tendencies, show their relations to the various fundamental emotions and their inter-relations, and thus obtain the beginnings of a systematic explanation of the conative life or the life of active striving. But along each of these paths we soon find apparently insurmountable difficulties, and are thus led to recognize that they do not carry us far enough. And when we come to consider the more explicitly active side of the mind—deliberation, choice, volition—and the higher forms of æsthetic and religious experience, we can obtain no help from them at all.

I believe that the latest method of analysis, that of “deep mental analysis,” will carry us farther. I prefer to use the phrase “deep mental analysis” for the simple reason that the word psycho-analysis has now become a technical word, belonging to a particular school of thought. Just as Freud was the first scientist to use the word, so now the strict followers of Freud claim that word as their own. Their method is psycho-analysis, and the method used by any who refuse to accept Freud’s theories in detail should perhaps not be called psycho-analysis, so that we need a more general term. The followers of C. G. Jung have suggested the term “analytic psychology”; but the objection to that is that it has already been used in the history of the subject with a very different connotation. It is the title of one of G. F. Stout’s books on General Psychology, and is not sufficiently distinctive. It does not indicate the special kind of analysis that is meant. Another term sometimes suggested is mental analysis or psychological analysis, but perhaps the more expressive term, which Freud himself has on occasion used, is analysis of the depths, or deep analysis. This analysis really is deep in the sense of (metaphorically) going below the surface of the mind, going behind what is immediately apparent, in the faith that in psychology things are not always what they seem. To dig down deep—this is a metaphorical phrase; the mind is

not something solid into which one can dig, but it has layers or strata as it were, layers of mental activities into which one can penetrate from more superficial layers.

This method of deep analysis is more likely to help us because it does not need invariably to simplify its data, as other methods in psychology have had to do. Psychological textbooks generally quote as a merit of scientific method that it works from the simple to the complex and makes sure of its ground in that way. But actual experience in the use of these various methods makes one inclined to doubt the universal truth of this. It is extremely probable that psychology has oversimplified itself in the past, and has allowed itself to be held up too much in the matter of words, in defining terms and getting certain fundamental problems solved, when it had not yet adequate material to solve them. The mind seems different from other realities of the world in this respect, that the more complex, the later developed forms of mental activity, though super-imposed upon earlier forms of mental activity, explain the latter quite as much as being explained by them. If one starts with the opposite assumption and tries to explain the later in terms of the earlier, one is adopting a method of very doubtful validity. It is no doubt valid in the case of the physical world; there it is shown to be true by the way in which it works. It is quite true that our engineers would never have reached the point of inventing aeroplanes unless they had previously established their knowledge and power over nature in more simple forms of mechanism. But this is not necessarily the case with regard to the mind. In the more complex forms of mental activity one has an explication of phases implicit in earlier forms.

One may illustrate this by taking the most extreme instance, namely, religious experience. Attempts have frequently been made to explain civilized religious experience in terms of more primitive religious experience; and, as a matter of fact, we have offered to us a whole sequence of developments from, perhaps, the use of magic spells, through primitive forms of petitionary prayer, thence through idolatry of different kinds, to the purified religions of the highest form, such as the

Christian religion. But it has become very apparent that no real explanation has been achieved in this way, and that the simpler forms of religious experience are much more adequately understood through our knowledge of later forms. This is the question that I shall be dealing with fully in a subsequent chapter, but, incidentally, I may refer to an important book on the subject which has recently been translated into English, *Das Heilige, The Idea of the Holy*, by Rudolf Otto. This book contains an effective criticism of the ordinary historical method, and of the conclusions often drawn from the historical treatment of the subject. So it is equally with questions of volition. If one starts off with merely impulsive and conative tendencies and tries to work up to volition from them, one will never reach volition. One has to start with volition and work downwards, or rather start at both ends or anywhere one likes and keep moving back and forth until one gets a more and more adequate appreciation of mind in its length as well as in its cross-section. In analysis that is what one is doing the whole time. I doubt whether anyone can realize what a powerful instrument deep analysis is until he has used it himself. To those of us who are engaged in this work it is simply astounding to find certain psychologists and other scientists taking the trouble to write critical books about it, and rejecting it for the reasons which they see fit to bring forward. It cannot be criticized or adequately dealt with apart from itself. Many years ago C. G. Jung compared the method with the telescope of Galileo; and just as Galileo refuted his critics best by claiming that they had not used his telescope, so modern analysts can quite well give an adequate reply to their unqualified critics by pointing out that these critics have not used their methods.<sup>1</sup>

The method deals with personality as such the whole time, and although Freud's own theory is the most thorough-going theory based upon deep analysis, the writings of another analyst, Alfred Adler, who has broken away from the Freudian school, shows how important this line of approach is to the inmost essential problem of individuality and personality. In

<sup>1</sup> As regards the *inferences* drawn by psycho-analysts in the course of their use of the analytic method, there is room for very serious and far-reaching criticism.

his books, *The Neurotic Constitution* and *Individual Psychology*, he introduces a new point of view in psychology, setting himself the task of working out what he calls the "lifeline" of the individual. He takes the individual, the person in his present state of physical and mental evolution, and analyses him back, showing how certain forms of behaviour and trends of mental activity reveal themselves again and again, year after year, in his life. He traces the individual's more detailed likes and dislikes, hopes, fears and aspirations, back to more fundamental likes, dislikes and aspirations, not necessarily explaining the later and more complicated in terms of the earlier, but gaining thus a clearer and more detailed view of the articulation, as it were, of the personality—the way in which various parts of the personality work together in producing the final psychophysical reaction. Even the most pathological individual does face the world as a unity. He reacts in definite ways to his physical and social environment. But there is one fundamental trend or tendency which is most prominent in him, and other tendencies less prominent which are subordinated to this one. The kind of description and appreciation of personality for which we can look to psychology in the future is of that nature. It will aim at telling us something of the individual's personality in terms of a main tendency, a main life-line, showing itself, not only at the present time, but throughout the past years, with subordinate tendencies, some of them conflicting with the main tendency, others co-operating with it and supplementing it. William McDougall's doctrine of the "master-sentiment" is also in place here.

If we then turn back to general psychological problems from such a systematic description of the individual mind as this, we shall perceive much more reality in such problems as those, for instance, of evolution, and freedom, and faith. We shall be able then to realize more adequately the creative aspect of consciousness; for, as Henri Bergson has said, consciousness is creative from moment to moment. So far as the mind is a conscious mind it is always producing something new. Nevertheless, we cannot from this general vague freedom of Bergson get to a definite view of volitional freedom, unless we take into

account the structure of the mind of the individual. What psychology does, then, is to explain the mind as a structure, a system of tendencies—but a system superimposed upon a still more primitive system. The individual, so far as he is a man, comes into the world provided with a certain system of mental tendencies, but superimposed upon that system there are further differentiations of tendency, distinguishing one man from another. From this point of view the significance of the term personality is again that implied in the word whence it is derived, viz. *persona* or mask. Personality is the final differentiation which the individual has made, as it were, and produced in himself and superimposed upon all that he has inherited from past generations and lower forms of mental evolution. The term has been used by Jung to illustrate the contrast of what he calls the “personal unconscious” and the “collective unconscious.” Speaking metaphorically one may compare the mind to a pyramid or mountain ascending to an apex. Corresponding to the apex there is the conscious personality, which has below itself the personal unconscious; and still below that, stretching out indefinitely, there is the collective or racial unconscious, merging in the general unconscious of the entire physical universe. Thus far psychology. But when we pass to a philosophical consideration of the problem we shall find that personality has a *universal* element that contrasts it with the individual and the singular, and that in this respect it is an ideal never completely achieved by finite minds.

## II. RELIGION

“Religion . . . shall mean for us the feelings, acts, and experiences of individual men in their solitude, so far as they apprehend themselves to stand in relation to whatever they may consider the divine. Since the relation may be either moral, physical, or ritual, it is evident that out of religion in the sense in which we take it, theologies, philosophies, and ecclesiastical organizations may secondarily grow.”—WILLIAM JAMES, *The Varieties of Religious Experience*.

In this introduction one may be expected to give a first general impression of what one means by religion, before considering it in detail and in its relation to personality. Many definitions of religion have been formulated. The

religious feeling has been defined by Schleiermacher as a feeling of "complete dependence." One finds Professor A. N. Whitehead<sup>1</sup> saying that it is "what we do with our solitariness." Professor J. Bissett Pratt<sup>2</sup> defines religion as "the attitude which the individual takes up towards the determiner of his destiny." Religious feelings are feelings aroused in the individual so far as he considers, subconsciously or consciously, his relation to God—the Determiner of his destiny. I myself suggest that among the most general mental attitudes towards existence the religious attitude should be considered as distinct from (1) the logical attitude, the attitude of thinking things out, (2) the æsthetic attitude of appreciating beauty and ugliness, and (3) the ethical attitude of recognizing moral obligation and different degrees of good. Religion and religious experience are based on a fourth general mental attitude—a very concrete attitude, the attitude of the individual towards the universe so far as he envisages it as something upon which he completely depends and to which he attaches ultimate value. One may think of the individual facing the world with the question, "What is all this?" The answer is given him in the various sciences, in which there is being gradually worked out a systematic knowledge of the external world and also of the "world within." That is knowledge. Or again, he considers the distinctions of the beautiful, the less beautiful, and the ugly, and finds in himself the power of appreciating these distinctions, which power can be developed more and more adequately in the course of his life through self-discipline. Thirdly, he observes that there are different types of actions, some better than others in the given circumstances, and some characters better than others, so that he learns to discriminate between the good and the less good, between good and evil, both of character and of conduct, and he recognizes duty when he sees it. There again he attains discipline of character which gives him ever-deepening insight into the moral aspect of the world.

Now so far as we consider these three separate aspects they

<sup>1</sup> *Religion in the Making*, Cambridge University Press, 1927.

<sup>2</sup> *The Religious Consciousness*, New York, The Macmillan Company, 1921.

seem to represent three distinct and equally fundamental ways of responding to the universe. It may seem that this is all one can do with the universe, viz. appreciate it logically, æsthetically, and ethically. But these three are abstract points of view, from which distinct and mutually exclusive aspects of existence are dealt with. Logically, there must be a further attitude, the attitude of the entire man to his entire environment, and this attitude may be named the religious attitude—the attitude which he takes up to the totality of reality—the whole universe—and according to which he may more or less explicitly order his life. But this position needs a certain qualification. If we consider ordinary usages of speech, and note the way in which the word “religious” is used by different people at different stages of history, we find that it involves something more definite than this. There is the distinction of “religious” and “irreligious,” of “sacred” and “profane.” A person whom men call irreligious may yet have an attitude towards the totality of existence. He may take up the attitude of an extreme scepticism or agnosticism—although we must admit that a sceptic may be religious, and the agnostic certainly is as a rule not without religion. The irreligious person is one who sees no particular value in existence as such, in the universe as such. It does not appeal to him. He is in it and he has to exist and adapt himself—which he does—with a view to the various purposes of achieving happiness for himself and for others, and yet with no particular interest, no particular emotional feeling towards the universe. He may feel that the universe has no claim on him. He may endeavour to get out of it all that is valuable to him, but he does not trust the universe. Distrusting it, he may feel from day to day that chance and circumstance may land him in serious difficulties, that the universe does not care for him and why therefore should he care for the universe? That would be a definitely irreligious attitude. It would indeed be an attitude taken up towards the entire universe, but one could not call it religious. Or again, there is the pessimist who feels that the universe is a huge mistake, or is a process which is attempting unsuccessfully to retrieve its earlier mistakes. Such an attitude as that may sometimes be irreligious. But it

is an attitude which does not essentially exclude religion. Indeed, there is a well-known historical religion which is of this nature—which looks upon the desirable purpose of life to be an escape from the wheel of continual rebirth, and a negation of the will to live—not by killing the body, because that is not sufficient, but by killing the desire for life and all that life means, at its source. That is a form of religion and the attitude is a religious attitude, and yet it is a pessimistic attitude. So that we need a qualification. What sort of a qualification may be given? It seems to me that the qualification is suggested by the word “value.” We set a certain value upon the universe. We look upon it as a system of values. So far as we value it, and, secondly, worship it or hold it worthy, so far we are adopting a religious attitude. By adding this qualification we find ourselves in a position which allows a place for the subsidiary uses of the word “religion”—as when one speaks of a man making money his religion, or his love for another person his religion. It means that he adopts an attitude of worship, of holding it worthy and valuable in a pre-eminent degree—in an absolute degree, looking upon it as a value absolute in nature, not relative.

We are thus brought to the general question of value. Psychologically the only ultimate value is satisfaction of desire. But the desires of the individual tend to fall into systems, because there are certain things he desires for the sake of other things, and his whole life is a system of desires linked up one with another. Ultimately there must be some final end to which all other ends are subordinated. This final end is absolute value and all the others are relative.

So far as the individual is interested in religion or takes a religious attitude he is considering a value that is ultimate and not merely relative. But even that is not all; we must distinguish still further, because such an ultimate end may be happiness, or it may be mere summation of pleasure.

In the hedonistic view, the final aim which controls all other activities is considered to be the desire for the maximum of pleasure. Obviously that cannot be called a religious attitude. Pleasure is a value, but why is it a value? It is a value for the

sake of the individual. Thorough-going hedonism is the worship of oneself. If it is to be called a religion it is simply the religion of extreme narcissism or self-love, making oneself one's god, and since that is to reduce it to an absurdity, we need to go further for our definition of religion.

We may get some help by considering the matter historically. We see that in earlier times religion tended to be a social matter. If we go back to very early times we find that there were two parallel paths of development, one of religion proper, the other of magic. In magic the suppliant attempted to get an answer to his prayer and to satisfy his gods by special forms and ceremonies in which some compelling power was supposed to reside. In religion similar forms and ceremonies were used with the purpose of influencing some deity, some all-powerful or more powerful person, some god in the polytheistic sense. In following up the historical development of these two mental tendencies we should be probably correct in holding that the final outcome of the process of magic is modern science. We manipulate nature, modify nature by all sorts of means to-day to get results which are helpful to some impersonal and final development; whereas the final outcome of religious development is seen in the various higher religions of the present day. According to Sir James Frazer magic is more primitive than religion. Religion superseded magic when magic proved itself finally unsatisfactory. What could not be gained by the imperious methods of incantation was attempted by the humbler and more cautious methods of prayer.

A general characteristic of these earlier forms of religion was that they manifested themselves as group activities. The forms and ceremonies were such as to be carried out by the group and were regarded as of importance to the welfare of the group. The welfare of the individual was subordinated to the welfare of the group. Where there was antagonism between one group and another there was antagonism between one religion and another. The god of one tribe was regarded as distinct from the god of another tribe. So that whereas at the beginning, in earliest times, we may assume that the individual was regarded as part of the group with no independent exist-

ence apart from the group—his values were relative to the values of the group and he had not succeeded in generalizing these distinct values as extending over the entire universe—the progress in religious outlook must have been in the direction of individualization and character-development, but on a universalistic basis. True religion must be true for all. This insight was not gained until within fairly recent times in the world's history. It is religion independent of any particular individual or group, and it is in this sense that Professor Whitehead says that religion is "what we do with our solitariness"—when we consider the value we give to existence independently of the social values involved in social life. Yet if we consider that more closely we find a difficulty, because obviously it cannot mean *eliminating* social values. Subsidiary values are values with reference to special experiences. If we generalize too ruthlessly we may find that what we get is a form of religion without any content. We have emptied it of content. We must get these individual values, these values within the group, etc., and organize them.

To some of my readers it may seem strange that I have taken all this trouble to elaborate the obvious. Those who take religion seriously, as the most important thing in life, no doubt feel that it is clear already—why worry about it therefore—why discuss it further? It is given us in the Christian religion, which we accept. But the problem of this book is not to duplicate any work of the theologian or ecclesiastic, it is to consider religion in its most general aspect, so far as it has a meaning for the individual, whatever special doctrine he may hold, or whether he has any real religious beliefs or not. One could dogmatically give one's own view. That could be quite easily given in a few words, but I am trying to lead up to it by a consideration of more general possibilities. I am endeavouring to show that some of these definitions which I have quoted are not adequate. We need something more precise and definite, and we find it in the conception of *value* (in the domains of thought, art and morals), and of *worship*. The man who pursues truth for its own sake and studies science in an impersonal way, with rigorous self-discipline, is really showing

his belief in a religion and is taking up a religious attitude. He has come to terms with it and considered its relationship to all that can be found out about, or experienced in, the universe. So that when we contrast religion with science and philosophy the difference is a difference of point of view. Science may be made a religion, and in so far as it is made a religion it is made more than mere science. Philosophy may be made a religion, and in so far as it is made a religion it is more than mere philosophy. Science and philosophy are both merely abstract. Religion is essentially concrete.

The problem of the relation of science to religion has been an acute question for many years, and in course of time has undergone repeated restatement. During the last few years further attempts have been found to be necessary, because of the revolutionary changes both in the general religious outlook and in scientific and philosophic conceptions.

Quite generally, as regards physics of a century ago, the difficulty was that physical laws were held to be blind, and assumed to be exact and impersonal, and to represent matter as something which was distinct from mind, distinct from soul and spirit, and yet potentially capable of accounting for life and mind; and it was because of the backwardness of the mental sciences, especially of psychology, that the general effect of advances in physical science during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was to weaken religious feeling and to discourage any kind of religion. This earlier scientific method, this method of measuring rather than classifying, which was at first found so helpful in physical science, was also used in the biological sciences, including physiology and psychology, and produced there the same impression of blind chance, of blind necessity. The still earlier way of looking upon matter as "never mind" and mind as "no matter"—mind one thing and matter another, completely distinct one from another, which was emphatically set out by Descartes, if not originated by him—*that* has been found to be less and less satisfactory. In its place we have the doctrine of "emergent mind" as something which is an emergence from physical activity when that reaches a certain degree of complexity. The word "emergence" is used

to avoid the fallacy that matter produces mind. It is meant to be an historical statement of fact that as biological processes, which are at bottom physical processes, become more and more complex and occur in more and more complicated parts of the nervous system, they carry with them forms of reality which are mental in nature. These mental processes are assumed to follow the same *kind* of rule or law of manifestation as their biological antecedents and concomitants. The general impression produced is one of determinism—of lack of freedom. The individual is brought more and more within the grip of necessity—of complete determinism. But that is the result not so much of scientific discovery as of scientific method. One could have predicted years ago that as science progressed, such would be more and more the impression produced, on the purely scientific plane. According to this method, one looks for causes and conditions, and if one cannot directly observe them one postulates them, one assumes them; one is not dealing with freedom, because one cannot on these lines deal with freedom. Even if there were freedom one would not be able to deal with it. That which is spontaneous escapes; yet at the other end of the scale we have volition, deliberate choice, which cannot be linked up with earlier stages of mental development without admitting such spontaneity. It is like trying to fit a coat which is too small for one. If one buttons it over one's chest it gapes over one's abdomen, and if one buttons it over one's abdomen it gapes over one's chest. One cannot bring the two together in the same system. So from the philosophical point of view we have to consider whether reinterpretation may not be necessary.

In psychology, although we take account of values, we take account of them merely as being interrelated with one another in a temporal way. We consider the mind as a sequence of mental processes. But besides that the mind has its own system of values which to a certain extent transcends time, although it may take time up into itself, and religion is the ultimate reaction of mind to value. Looking at it from that standpoint we see that just as philosophy is more than the sum-total of the various fields of science, being rather the criticism and adjust-

ment of scientific concepts, so religion is more than science and philosophy. It takes both up into itself in the complete concreteness of experience. Instead, therefore, of regarding scientific advance as freeing us from the "superstition" of religion, we may find that in the advance of science religion is needed more and more to restore the balance, and to keep us from reaching views which are a mere caricature of existence, and which are utterly out of harmony with our deepest aspirations and feelings.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> An excellent summary of the Christian position, set out with philosophic accuracy and brevity, is given in *Basic Christianity*, by H. D. A. Major, D.D.; Basil Blackwell, Oxford; 1944.

On the other hand, a revealing summary of the modern attitude of the U.S.S.R. to philosophy, with its whole-hearted adherence to the dialectical materialism of Karl Marx, is given in a paper by Acad. M. Mitin on "Twenty-five Years of Philosophy in the U.S.S.R.," read at the Jubilee Session of the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R., of which long excerpts were published in *Philosophy*, Vol. XIX, No. 72, pp. 76-84, April, 1944, Macmillan & Co., London. Karl Marx himself wrote as follows on the dialectical method: "My own dialectical method is not only fundamentally different from the Hegelian dialectical method, but is its direct opposite. For Hegel, the thought process (which he gradually transforms into an independent subject, giving to it the name of "idea") is the creator of the real; and for him the real is only the outward manifestation of the idea. In my view, on the other hand, the ideal is nothing other than the material when it has been transposed and translated inside the human head. . . . In Hegel's writings, dialectic stands on its head. You must turn it right way up again if you want to discover the rational kernel that is hidden away within the wrappings of mystification" (*Das Kapital*, Preface to Second German Edition, Eng. translation by Eden and Cedar Paul, p. 873, Allen & Unwin, Ltd.).

## CHAPTER II

# PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY

### I. GENERAL DEFINITIONS

ONE of the greatest problems, both in science and in philosophy, at the present day is the nature of mind and the extent to which the individual mind can be influenced and controlled by social organization, and develop contact with an all-inclusive spiritual system in its search for self-realization and happiness.

This brings us to the question of a natural science of the mind. Actually many sciences deal with the mind—the so-called mental sciences (*Geisteswissenschaften*) as the Germans call them. These are (1) the science of *ethics*, which deals with moral obligation and the criteria of right and wrong, (2) the science of *æsthetics*, which deals with the criteria of beauty, and the theory of beauty and ugliness, (3) the science of *logic*, which deals with the nature of thought and the conditions of the validity of thought and of knowledge, and, further, (4) that greatest science of all, *Scientia scientiarum*, viz. *metaphysics*, which deals, or attempts to deal, with the ultimate nature of reality. Metaphysics is the consideration of “the real as such.” It attempts to answer the questions: What is the real? What is the ultimate nature of mind? What is the ultimate nature of matter? What are space, time and causality? What is knowledge? What does it all amount to? To what extent can we reduce everything to some fundamental source? It may be alternatively defined as “the criticism of concepts,” or as a statement of “the absolute presuppositions and first principles” of the other sciences<sup>1</sup>—aims which are more modest and more capable of achievement.

Besides the above-mentioned subjects of study, which are really all parts of what is generally known as philosophy, there is (5) the science of *psychology*, a new science that is making

<sup>1</sup> See R. G. Collingwood, *Metaphysics*, p. 40, Oxford, at the Clarendon Press, 1940.

rapid strides at the present day. How are we to distinguish psychology, which is also a science of the mind, from these other sciences? I have to be dogmatic here; in my opinion, an effective way of distinguishing psychology from these other sciences is to say that psychology is the science of the mind so far as it is *a sequence of mental processes in the individual*. The sciences of ethics, æsthetics and logic are sciences of the mind which deal with mental things from the point of view of *value*, or of a *standard* or *norm*, and are therefore called *normative* or *criteriological sciences*. Psychology is a positive or natural science. In psychology we are dealing with cause and effect, as we are in all the other natural sciences; we are considering the mind as an historical thing, something going on from moment to moment, one moment of mental experience, or mental event, bringing about a subsequent mental event, with the co-operation or correlative action of the brain, the nervous system and the rest of the body. That is psychology. Psychology is a natural science, whereas all these other mental sciences about which I have spoken are philosophical sciences. It will conduce to clear thought if one makes that distinction straight away; otherwise, there is some danger that, with psychology being so prominent at the present time, people may take the pronouncements of psychology as all that is known and can be said about the mind, and they may try to put psychology in the place of the other mental sciences. I should have mentioned among these other mental sciences as, to my mind, a part of metaphysics the science of religion, of our religious experiences or at least of the *validity* of our religious experiences—the extent to which we may rightly believe that we have objective awareness of spiritual existence, an awareness of some supreme and ultimate spiritual value which is objective<sup>1</sup> and relatively independent of the individual mind. That is not psychology. Psychology is now an independent science, but it is also the indispensable background of the philosophical sciences. It has sometimes been looked upon as a competitor

<sup>1</sup> A good definition of *the objective*, in a philosophical sense, is: "What we are constrained to think in order to make our thought consistent with itself" (B. Bosanquet, *Essentials of Logic*, p. 13).

of them, by philosophers equally with psychologists. That need not be so and should not be so. If we avoid such misunderstanding, we can derive much benefit from an alliance between philosophy and psychology. It must now be obvious to all that psychology has its own contribution to make to the general problem of valuation and validity, without any infringement of the rights of philosophy in the matter.

## II. THE STRUCTURE OF THE INDIVIDUAL MIND

Having cleared my philosophical conscience in this way, I will now deal more fully with the general nature of psychology, which is the science of the mind as something that is essentially individual and that goes on in time, as a sequence of mental events, and may be studied in terms of historical causation, as well as in other more general ways. We find in modern psychology (following a lead first given by Leibniz) that, although we are aware of the mind only through our consciousness, and it is consciousness that gives us *awareness* of mental activity, we are forced to believe that a great deal of mental activity occurs, not indeed in complete independence of consciousness, but below the level of clear consciousness, or beyond its field of awareness. So we talk of the sub-conscious mind, beyond marginal consciousness, which is itself the verge beyond focal or clear consciousness. We have the focal or central part of consciousness, clear awareness, and around this the marginal part, which is vague awareness, which in its turn shades off into the part that is outside the field of consciousness altogether, *the subconscious*. This again, we find, if we employ special methods of investigation—especially those of medical psychology—shades into *the unconscious mind*. The unconscious mind is of the utmost importance if we are fully to understand the working of the human personality. The unconscious mind is partly in a state of repression (*Verdrängung*) and partly not. So far as it is in a state of repression or held back from consciousness by some special censoring force it is called the unconscious proper (*das Unbewusste*) or the "Id" (*das Es*). So far as it is not held back from consciousness by any censoring force, so that it can pass

into consciousness at any moment under appropriate conditions of attention, it is called the pre-conscious (*das Vorbewusste*). Thus one has the pre-conscious, which one can identify with the sub-conscious; one has the unconscious proper, or Id, which is in a state of repression, and includes the repressed tendencies, the primitive tendencies of very early years—tendencies and memories, phantasies and ideas associated with them, which are held away from clear consciousness and kept out of consciousness altogether by a repressing force—and finally this repressing force itself, which Freud formerly called the “censorship” (*die Zensur*), and now partly identifies with the super-ego (*das Über-Ich*), which is also unconscious. So that the mind, as we see it now, consists of (1) the super-ego or repressing tendency, (2) the repressed tendencies themselves and their repressed memories, (3) the pre-conscious or sub-conscious—memories and tendencies which are on the verge between consciousness and the repressed unconscious, which can come into consciousness at any moment (just as the name “Homer” might come into your mind at this moment if I called out, “The author of the *Odyssey*”), and which is part of the sub-conscious or pre-conscious—and, finally, (4) consciousness itself and the organized *ego* supporting it. Although the unconscious mind is of the utmost importance—it contains an enormous amount of energy, it is the power of the mental engine—the directing power comes almost entirely from the conscious mind, or rather the organized ego. There is no consistent individual direction of the unconscious as a whole. The unconscious has its own direction, but it is not directed individually; and so the word “Id” (*das Es*) has been used to express it, something neutral and impersonal. In Freud’s important essay *The Ego and the Id*, the “Id” means the unconscious, mainly, if not exclusively, impersonal sexual energy (*libido*). The ego is partly conscious and is individual or personal, with an organization and integration of its own, and in direct touch with outside reality. The “Id” is impersonal, below the level of personality; it comprises erotic or libidinal urges that are common to the race; it is the unconscious instinct and feeling that is common to all of us, although in different degrees in different

people. Its activity is a blind urge or craving for direct satisfaction, and is out of time and dominated by the pleasure principle. In my opinion, consciousness too is common to all of us. That applies not only to human beings, but also to animals. We see the same sort of consciousness wherever we look. We see it, e.g., in a dog. As we get to understand a dog we realize that its consciousness is the same in kind as our own consciousness and responds readily to love and affection. There is probably one great consciousness running through all of us. That has this very important inference—namely, that if we are, deep down, all one, we should have deep sympathy with one another. So, if I may be allowed to spring from the unconscious to the higher consciousness, what our ego or conscious mind should aim at is to be fully aware of that identity of all of us with one another and with the spirit of the universe. Schopenhauer, for whom the “will to live” (*Wille zum Leben*) constituted the fundamental nature of all reality, said that the essence of morality is sympathy or compassion (*Mitleid*). That is quite true. Genuine morality involves being able to sympathise with others and see things from other people’s points of view, and in that frame of mind to fulfil Kant’s maxim: “Act so that the maxim of thy will can always at the same time hold good as a principle of universal legislation.”<sup>1</sup> That is the way in which to overcome irrational strife and to rise above social conflict to a higher synthesis of co-operation instead of mere competition. What holds us back, apart from self-will and moral weakness, is our unconscious mind. It has its values and virtues; it is full of energy; it provides all the fundamental energies, like the spirited horse which carries the rider along, but the rider must direct the horse and know how to manage it. If there is a baulking or distorting of this unconscious activity, if, in early years of childhood, education is carried out wrongly, and unnecessary stresses are allowed, there are added to those unconscious, unavoidably repressed tendencies (not to mention the hereditary tendencies), unnecessary additional tendencies and strains.

<sup>1</sup> “Handle so dass die Maxime deines Willens jederzeit zugleich als Prinzip einer allgemeinen Gesetzgebung gelten könne” (*Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft*, § 7).

## III. EARLY EDUCATION AND THE SUPER-EGO

The development of the super-ego begins in the first few months of childhood through the psychological processes of introjection and projection, and continues during the first few years in relation to the parents (Œdipus complex), and nurses and teachers.<sup>1</sup>

Hence intelligent education of the very young child is of the utmost importance in order to give it a healthy unconscious, for what was conscious then forms a part of the unconscious of later years, both *id* and *super-ego*, as the child passes from the first months and years on into boyhood or girlhood, and on again through adolescence. At adolescence there arise special stresses and strains, and tendencies to react spasmodically and even violently to past repressions and more recent restraints. The utmost care should be taken in education in piloting the young child through those critical years. Instead of eternally telling the child, "You ought to do this," and "You ought not to do that," and emphasizing the duty of obedience as if it were the chief duty of childhood, we should all the time be trying to understand the child, to see the world through the child's eyes and to help the child in that way, by understanding him. Full understanding involves love, of course, and it is through love and understanding that all education should be carried out, not through punishment. Punishment should be avoided as much as possible. I know there are theories on chastening according to which it is supposed to be good. Discipline is necessary, but we get quite enough punishment in life for our needs, if we face life in the right way. I do not mean intentional punishment, but the changes and chances of this mortal life, as well as the ineluctible effects of wrong-doing. We should avoid punishment as far as possible. Even self-punishment is a luxury. Instead of self-punishment, let us have self-training, self-discipline, striving always forwards. Instead of looking back on our sins and groaning and moaning about them and clinging to the thought of them in a sentimental way, let us thrust them away after true repentance (μετάνοια)

<sup>1</sup> See S. Freud, *The Ego and the Id*, p. 44, Hogarth Press, 1927.

and pass on to something higher, determined to advance to the greater things which are possible. What holds us back is a maladjusted unconscious mind, and a maldeveloped super-ego, and so when we have to deal with maladjusted people, people suffering from neurosis, from mental illnesses of one kind or another, we have to penetrate into their unconscious mind by using the method of deep mental analysis.

#### IV. REPRESSION AND SUBLIMATION

We find that these repressed tendencies, when released, are capable of sublimation. Those are two important words, "repression" and "sublimation." Anything in the mind that is repressed cannot be fully sublimated, and so long as it remains in a state of repression it will disturb the working of the mind, it will show unconsciously in all sorts of distorted ways, in ways which the person himself cannot understand, in anxieties, compulsions or phobias, in moods, temperamental changes, explosive mental reactions, or more serious mental derangement. It is those repressed tendencies which are showing themselves and, as it were, knocking at the door, and that "knocking at the door of consciousness," metaphorically expressed, is what are called "neurotic symptoms." Symptoms, like dreams, are disguised fulfilments of repressed wishes. The best way of dealing with such repressions is to release them and face them. One should, as it were, open the door and face them, parley with them, understand them and resolve the mental conflict. Then that energy, which is always of a primitive, instinctive kind—self-preservation, self-assertion and sexual energy, of one kind or another—can be sublimated, that is, directed to higher social and cultural ends. Repressed tendencies, which are very strong in all of us—more so in some individuals than in others—can give a lot of trouble if they continue in a repressed state. They can even produce suicide. In melancholia, suicide is due to the excessive harshness of the super-ego in ruling and condemning the ego. But some suicides are due to repressed self-assertion. The individual is very self-assertive and yet cannot assert himself. He has so much bottled up or thwarted aggressiveness that he would like to kill the whole

world, but this is impossible, and so he kills himself, destroying the mind which mirrors that world. Repressed self-assertion is bad. Undo the repression; recognize the self-assertion, but sublimate it, that is, direct it towards ends that are social and not essentially competitive. There are plenty of such ends. Civilization is only just beginning. In this twentieth century we are only just beginning to be really civilized. All of us are uncivilized in all sorts of directions. Civilization up to now psychologically has been a compromise, a rough and tumble, a hand-to-mouth affair. Just as, under the régime of *laissez-faire*, struggling cities have produced slums and every kind of disfigurement with the advance of the industrial age, so the individual mind has developed irregularly and untidily, with compromises and unresolved conflicts instead of clear-cut solutions. We have to overhaul our civilization, look at the roots of it; all of us have to do that. It is our duty and our right—our birthright—to face things radically and plan intelligently for a more scientific and just social order. We had a chance of reconstructing the world, a chance that came immediately after the last war and was thrown aside. The chance has come again and we must all contribute in that reconstruction. Psychology is going to be of great importance in enabling us to play our part. The physical sciences have long made their contribution and are doing so now at an ever accelerating rate. The engineers are pouring out inventions and practical devices with the utmost prodigality, making our lives more and more comfortable, more and more easy in every direction. What are we doing on the mental side? We are doing very little. Apart from the more mechanical methods of mental and vocational testing (which have made great progress recently), we are re-stating and re-emphasizing old dogmas and affirmations of a pre-psychological age and belonging to an outworn philosophy.

#### V. ANALYSIS AND SYNTHESIS

The new psychology is going to be constructive as well as destructive. In using analysis we are also essentially bringing about mental synthesis. It is a mere misunderstanding to think

that analysts can analyse but cannot synthesize. All mental analysis means synthesis as well. The mind so far as it is being analysed is being resynthesized at the same time. The mind does not fall asunder in analysis like the parts of a watch. It is an organic living thing, and as repressions are overcome, as selfish tendencies and self-centred tendencies, cowardly tendencies and cowering tendencies or whatever they may be, come up and are adequately faced, judged and corrected, the mind becomes more free. The result of analysis is an increase of freedom, partly, although not wholly, because it involves deepened self-knowledge—*autognosis*, as I have called it—and therefore increased self-control. We cannot be free so long as in the depths of our mind we are tied unconsciously to our early experiences and held in the rut of mere custom. In saying that I am not saying that we should throw aside everything of the past and start afresh from the beginning. That could not be done even if we tried to do it, but, of course, it should not be done. There is a great deal that is struggling and inadequate in the past history of the race and in the development of the individual mind, but there is also a great deal that is just the opposite; nobility of mind, depth of insight, religious aspiration and the striving after the good, the beautiful and the true. Progress would be more rapid if we freed our minds from the incubus and fetters of the erroneous and distorting elements of our own individual pasts. That can be done by analysis. In mental and in psycho-neurotic cases analysis is essential. Their symptoms are the disguised fulfilment of repressed tendencies. Our dreams, too, are the disguised fulfilment of repressed wishes, and to that extent quasi-neurotic symptoms, however normal we may otherwise be.

## VI. ILLUSION AND RELIGION

We all of us have illusions due to strong wishes that we cannot get satisfied in the direct way. Sigmund Freud has said that religion itself is an illusion. In one of the best-known of his books, *The Future of an Illusion*, he endeavours to show that religious belief is an illusion (not a delusion), the disguised fulfilment of a wish for security and mental comfort and rest,

based upon the infantile part of our nature. I would dissociate myself completely from him there. On the basis of one's philosophical training and one's own individual experience of analysing persons and analysing oneself, one can say that this book, though clever, merely sets up a man of straw to knock him down again. If what Freud describes as religion is religion, then indeed it should be destroyed. But Freud seems to regard religion as just a compensation for the changes and chances of this mortal life, a sort of antidote to the terrors of life and the certainty of death that awaits us all, the illusive satisfaction of a craving for safety and security; as if religion were just that, just based upon selfishness and cowardice. True religion is not that. That is superstition. True religion means a rising above anything to do with cowardice or selfishness. It casts aside fear. It is love, and love casts out fear. It is just the opposite of selfishness. It is the decision to love our neighbours as ourselves and rather to let ourselves be killed than to kill another person, rather to suffer injustice ourselves than to be unjust to anybody else. That is religion; it is not a negative thing; it is a positive thing—the most positive and all-inclusive thing there is, and if we look back upon the history of the race we find that all the great religious leaders have been creative personalities. They have entered into the progress of the world, made their contribution of a completely positive kind. The world has been the richer for their presence, and has been lifted forward by them. They have gone steadily in the direction of progress, not of regress. But the Freudian theory of religion is that it is a regress, that it is a stepping back to the attitude of the little child coming up against the great problem of life and death—the problem and grim prospect of individual death. Before the certainty of death we shudder, shrink back and regress to a state of our childhood when we were happy in the bosom of the family, trusting our parents, and feeling supported by them. That is the only general explanation, the only psychological account, that Freud can give of religion, although he also ventures the further suggestion that religion is “the universal obsessional neurosis of humanity. It, like the child's, originated in the Œdipus complex, the relation to the father”

(*The Future of an Illusion*, Hogarth Press, 1928, p. 76). It is true that no mere psychological account can be adequate to religion. To be intellectually adequate in one's analysis of religion one must be a philosopher as well as a psychologist. Moreover, this Freudian picture is a bad psychological account. It is invalidated by a fundamental fallacy, and a fundamental limitation of outlook. The fundamental fallacy is the limitation of the individual's environment, or the "reality" to which he finds himself unequal and from which he retreats into religious illusion or phantasy, to the outside physical and social world. Reality, of course, means much more than that. The spiritual world remains after analysis has done its best, and worst, to purge the mind of all illusion. Everyone can decide for himself how much of his religion is selfishness and cowardice, mere self-seeking and self-protection, and how much of it is something that is, or aims at being, completely fearless and determined to assert the highest, as he sees it, in the face of everything, irrespective of what may happen to himself. The latter is the true religious attitude. What do we mean by religious feeling? Religious feeling is, in my opinion, the feeling of relationship to, and ultimately of union with, the Divine. What do we mean by the Divine? We mean the eternal or spiritual, with all its ultimate *value*, as distinct from the merely temporal.

## VII. TIME AND ETERNITY

That is not merely a word; the eternal is not a *totum simul*, an "all at once." The eternal is the super-temporal, and takes time up into itself. We are all capable of experiencing the eternal or super-temporal. Physical changes, it is true, occur one after another, events follow one another without overlap. But we, as conscious individuals, are aware not only of the immediate present—that is, of a point of time—but also of the immediate past and of the immediate future, in the same moment of experience; we are conscious of what is called the *specious present*, and the specious present, or "the practically cognized present," is, to quote William James, "no knife-edge, but a saddle-back, with a certain breadth of

its own, on which we sit perched and from which we look in two directions into time" (*Principles of Psychology*, vol. i, p. 609). That saddle-back is due to the power of the mind to rise above mere temporal sequence. Our span of attention varies at different times; we live our lives at varying tensions, sometimes at the merely animal level, sometimes at the more strictly intellectual and æsthetic levels; and sometimes, under great stress and strain, when, for example, great bereavement befalls us, when we see deep down into existence, we are on a higher level still, on the truly religious level. That is why there is a certain amount of sadness accompanying most truly religious feeling. The kind of religious feeling that is "slap-you-on-the-back" happy feeling is not adequate to religion. Religion must take account of all the suffering of the world, of the pain and suffering of others as well as our own. We are all of us too ready to be resigned to other people's suffering. We should not be. We should enter into it, appreciate it, and realize it, love them as we love ourselves. It is evidently a part of our training in this life. What happens afterwards we do not know from science. Psychological Research gives no certain answer; I have tried it. That need not disturb us, because we can and should lead the immortal life here and now, as Aristototele said. We should live as far as possible immortally (ἐφ' ὅσον ἐνδέχεται ἀθανατίζειν) now. Instead of having to wait for immortality at the end of this mortal life, we do live it now, so far as we partake of the eternal values of the good, the beautiful and the true, so far as we live our lives courageously, kindly and justly, so far as we take an interest in truth for its own sake, so far as we take an interest in art for its own sake, and pass beyond to the super-temporal, to the eternal. All these activities lead us on to the eternal and enable us to partake of the eternal, and if we can partake of the eternal here and now, why, apart from mourning for those dear ones we have lost, and hoping to be reunited to them hereafter, should we worry about what happens after death? Death is a mere physical event, preceded by a certain amount of pain and suffering, no doubt, but we never really meet it;

we are unconscious when it comes, and as Nettleship, a great don of Balliol, said: "Death does not count." We should face the prospect of it early in our lives and then not give it another thought. Life is what concerns us, not death. Living courageously and unselfishly, with ever-deepening insight into the implications of life and human companionship, we shall learn what the truly spiritual life may be.

### VIII. APPEARANCE AND REALITY

Metaphysically, we can be certain that the real world is beyond this shadow-show of space and time. This physical world is a mere façade, although at times almost trembling with meaning. We feel at times that the veil may be pierced and that we can see what is behind it. Schopenhauer the philosopher said his creed was: "I believe in a metaphysic." My creed is that, too; I believe in something that is beyond the physical, beyond phenomena or appearances. The physical is the manifestation of something other than itself, something that is not merely temporal and spatial. If one keeps to mere science, one will sooner or later run into a dead end; one will not get any further in one's thinking. One becomes an agnostic inevitably if one keeps on the level of space, time and causality, the level of mere phenomena. Anybody who has read Immanuel Kant will appreciate that for knowledge, time, like space, is a form of the mind and we cannot escape it. What Immanuel Kant did not realize was that we do transcend time in our own individual experience; if we bring in psychology we find that in direct experience we transcend time and are doing so always. As a psychologist, I think the probabilities of individual survival are high. That it has been scientifically demonstrated I refuse to admit, but this is not important. What is important to us is to be able to live our lives here and now to the full in a constructive way and in a corporate way, and to partake adequately of the totality of existence which, in theological terms, in religious terms, is "to know God and to enjoy Him for ever," and in philosophical terms, to enjoy the good, the beautiful and the true at their highest and fullest. That is living the eternal life here and now.

### CHAPTER III

## EXPERIENCE AND THE ORGANIZED SELF

PERSONALITY, in its psychological aspect, is grounded in individual mental activity, as manifested by the conscious organism. Mental activity in all its forms shows a number of characteristics which can be regarded as marks of *purposive activity*, or of what W. McDougall has called "behaviour." These characteristics are: (1) spontaneity, as contrasted with mere mechanical reaction to external stimuli; (2) persistence with varied effort, so long as the end which is consciously or subconsciously aimed at is not actually secured; (3) a cessation of the activity as soon as the end is achieved; (4) a tendency to lie in wait for and look out for stimuli which, when they occur, are reacted to in a special way; (5) modification of behaviour or activity in relation to the results of previous activities of a similar nature; and (6) the fact that the organism behaves as a whole, as a unity. From this view of the purposive nature of behaviour, we can pass very simply to definitions of two important general forms of mental process or activity.

One of these is *instinctive activity*, which is purposive activity independent of previous experience; for we know that purposive activity can be carried out independently of the animal's previous experience and practice. The other is what we call *intelligence*, which is the power of modifying instinctive or purposive activity in the light of individual experience. Instinctive or purposive activity, which the animal or human being brings into the world with him independently of his individual experience, may be explained in terms of the experience of his ancestors, although not directly inherited as such. Intelligence, on the other hand, is shown in the modification of this purposive activity in the light of individual experience.

Now we find that psychologically the problem of personality falls under two main heads: There is first the problem of the nature of the *subject* as experienced at any particular moment. In the life of the conscious individual we can discriminate

between the process of experiencing and that which is experienced, between the subject and the object of experience. We find this duality running through all experience; one cannot point to any form of experience or consciousness which does not show implicitly or explicitly this duality of subject and object. Psychologically, therefore, we have a special problem in deciding what is the nature of the subject of this experience. The other general problem, which forms the basis of our discussion of personality, is the problem of the *structure* of the mind and the way in which individual minds are differentiated from one another, and so vary in their individual experiences from moment to moment by virtue of such structure. The mind is not a *tabula rasa*, not something which merely receives external impressions or mirrors them. We know that it reacts to things in the outer world according to its own nature, and that this nature is gradually changing from the cradle to the grave, in virtue of various sensory experiences and also of mental activity going on within, or, as we say, subjective activity. It is in this way that the mind of one person comes to differ from that of another, and the difference is psychological—a difference of mental structure.

We may decide that it is paralleled by a difference of anatomical structure, and a corresponding difference in physiological process and activity. But, even if we can believe in a complete parallelism between one and the other, in accordance with the theory of psycho-physical parallelism, we shall have to wait a very long time yet before physiology gives us much helpful insight into the structure of personality. In psychological observation we have an additional line of approach, and a method of observation which cannot be dispensed with at the present time, nor for many generations to come. Even if, theoretically, we do believe that the body produces everything, yet the way in which individual minds work throws light on this bodily activity of the organism, which can be adequately gained in no other merely physiological way. But such a theory of parallelism is not easy to work out in detail, and in any case it is rather a restatement of the psycho-physical problem than its solution.

There are these two general problems we have now to consider, the problem of the subject of experience and that of the organized self. Let us consider a number of experiences, such as, for instance, the visual experience of seeing a set of electric-lights in front of one. Analysing that experience we find that we are faced with a duality. There is the act of perceiving, the visual perception, and there is also the object which is perceived. The object is what we call the cluster of electric-lights, which may be explained in its context as a part of the physical world around us. We may or may not consider that object as we see it to be mental rather than physical. That is a problem of metaphysics. But, even if we hold, with the realist, that it is physical or non-mental, we have no doubt whatever about the other side of the relation. The visual perception is certainly mental and belongs to the subject. Or, take another experience, that of pain in a diseased tooth. There the subjective side of the experience is the process of being in pain, the object of experience is the pain sensation in a particular part of the body. Here there is also, in addition to the pain sensation, a feeling of discomfort, a tendency to move away from the object.

This feeling or feeling-tone seems to belong to the subject rather than the object side. In seeing the electric light there is a feeling-tone also. One may wish to turn one's eyes away if it is unpleasant, or one may have a pleasant feeling-tone after being too much in an unilluminated room. Here again the pleasure or displeasure falls on the subject, rather than, on the object, side. In another experience one may be working out a mathematical problem, e.g. considering a theorem in geometry. Here again, we distinguish between the subjective side of the experience, the process of thinking, and passing from one stage in the proof to the next, and the parts of the proof that one is thinking about. When the proof is completed there is, on the one side, the process of thinking this geometrical truth, and on the other, the geometrical truth that one has thought. For example, the truth that the square on the hypotenuse of a right-angled triangle is equal to the sum of the squares on the other two sides—this truth itself has no physical reality. Unlike the case of the cluster of electric lights it is difficult to conceive of

it independently of mind; it is something that seems to be essentially related to mind, much more than the electric light cluster, in the way that it is made by the mind. If one thinks it out, one finds that it shows the nature of the mind—the mind works just in that way. To a certain extent that is so with the electric light cluster too; the colour and the shape are mental characteristics. They may be regarded as mental characteristics, but as having an independence of one another and also relations with other objects in space, in a much more pronounced degree than the truths of geometry. We may feel that geometrical truths are not independent of mind, as such, and that physical facts may be independent of mind, as such. The idealist position is that not even physical facts and theories are independent of mind. But if I continued this line of thought, I should be dealing not with psychology but with epistemology, with metaphysics.

To return to the consideration of the subject. Throughout individual consciousness, we find from moment to moment subjective acts of experience succeeding one another in a continuous series. We are active from moment to moment, reacting to objects. In each one of us there is this continuous stream of experience or thought going on. The question arises, "What degree of unity, as well as of continuity, can be attributed to this sequence or stream of individual experience? What is the nature of this unity?" As regards the outside world, there is a tendency to think of different things as having their own substance and essential nature. The facts that we observe about them are called their qualities, primary and secondary, and we have learned from philosophy that the external object is really the law of its states and activities (Lotze). It is useless to ask or to look for some kernel, or central reality, distinct from the various qualities. These qualities as shown by external bodies are parts of it, and so far as we know these qualities we know *it*. We know only a very small portion of these total qualities, which are infinite, because they vary in relation to other things and to the experience of individuals and these relations are theoretically infinite. Anyhow, these qualities vary in relation to one another and obey certain laws, or rules of uniformity.

Here the question naturally arises: Can we argue in the same way about the individual mind in successive moments of its subjective experience? If we think of an internal subject of experience, distinct from every moment of its experience, we hold the theory of a soul, a metaphysical entity distinct from its manifestations. We have a view similar to that which regards the external object as being something distinct from its states or properties. Similar argument may be advanced to show that, as psychologists, we have no right to postulate such a metaphysical entity. William James has endeavoured to get over the difficulty by the statement that the unity of experience is carried by the passing thought or experience. He says somewhere "Thought is born an owner and dies owned." At any given moment the passing thought (using the word thought in the wider sense as corresponding to any mental process with its object or content at the moment) owns what has occurred just before, takes it up into itself, welcomes it, feels its "warmth and intimacy," a relationship of warmth and intimacy that it does not feel towards the experience of other mental entities. All this it gathers up into itself and goes on growing, representing all that has previously occurred. Then each "thought" in its turn dies, or melts into the next moment of consciousness. James has claimed that this is all that we can say of the unity of consciousness, or of the subject of experience, from the psychological point of view. According to this account, then, the subject of experience is a part of a system of consciousness which sums up in itself all precedent experiences in the order of their sequence; it is not a very satisfactory theory if we can only get something more convincing; and we find that James Ward holds an entirely different view.

Ward rejects William James's view with scorn, and considers that unbiased analysis of experience shows that we must distinguish the process of experience from the content of experience. William James has confused the two. When William James talks of the passing thought he means the process-content, and he speaks as if it were just a pulsation of experience, which takes up into itself preceding experience, not distinguishing the subject from the object side. James

Ward contends that any moment of experience shows three aspects, viz. attention, feeling, and what he calls presentation. Presentation is the object of experience at any moment or in any one "concrete state of mind." We can better illustrate this by an example. Take the electric-light cluster again. As we see it, that is the presentation, the momentary modification of our consciousness through which we become aware of the light. That presentation is associated with, and perhaps produces, a feeling of pleasure or displeasure and, so far as the presentation is in existence, it is associated also with the process of attention. We are attending to the electric-light cluster, the presentation is the object to which we attend. The feeling-tone is the result of the attention, or it may perhaps be the cause of the attention—it may be either the one or the other. We may open our eyes and happen to fix them on the electric-light cluster for a moment and notice it, because it is too disturbing, too bright. Otherwise, we take much less notice of it. In this case the feeling-tone determines the attention. Or we may attend to see why one of the bulbs has gone out, and then we find that the feeling-tone may follow the attention process. That attention process, Ward says, is certainly subjective, the feeling is likewise subjective, while the presentation is objective. What is associated or organized in the case of experience is the successive presentations which are related to one another through rules of association and other forms of unity.

Thus for James Ward acts of attention belong to the subject and are manifestations of the subject's existence. He postulates a subject as such, which is to be a subject of experience, but the experience itself is on the object side. So one's criticism of James Ward is that he goes to the extreme opposite of William James's theory, and makes the subject of experience far too abstract, something which is quite otiose except in so far as it serves the purpose of explaining experience. We would urge that what is associated in successive experiences is the various acts of experience rather than the presentations. We find, for example, that in learning-experiments, words become associated together, and can be memorized in accordance with a sequence of acts of attention. It is the movement of attention

from one to the next which links the one to the other, for the reason that one process of attention is linked to the next, and this, of course, gives greater reality to the subject side. This is not what we get in Ward's doctrine. The truth, probably, as usual, lies between the two extremes. Speaking purely psychologically, we regard the conscious mind as a sequence of mental processes in time; which sequence obeys certain laws, or shows certain uniformities, due to the organization of acts of experience with their corresponding contents in systems.

And this brings us to the second of our problems, the problem of the structure of the mind. The mind in its general nature is purposive; and its purposive factors may be classified under the two headings of those inherited and those developed in the individual life. Inherited purposive manifestations are the various instinctive activities,<sup>1</sup> those acquired are modifications through individual experience, through the working of so-called intelligence. Accordingly, we can best begin our consideration of the structure of the mind by considering what are the various instinctive tendencies in the human mind. McDougall has drawn up a list of fourteen such instinctive tendencies,<sup>2</sup> which he considers primary and fundamental. He has given us an important theory as to the relation between instinct and emotion. He considers that these are objective and subjective aspects of the same thing. We speak of instinct when we are thinking biologically, that is in terms of the individual's reaction to his environment. We speak of emotion when we are thinking psychologically, that is, considering the individual's subjective experience. The instinct of escape is an inherited instinct to a set of actions favouring escape. On the subjective side, we may find<sup>3</sup> that, when that instinct is thrown into activity, the emotion of fear is produced. McDougall

<sup>1</sup> McDougall defines instinct as "an inherited or innate psycho-physical disposition which determines its possessor to perceive, and to pay attention to, objects of a certain class, to experience an emotional excitement of a particular quality upon perceiving such an object, and to act in regard to it in a particular manner, or, at least, to experience an impulse to such action" (*Introduction to Social Psychology*).

<sup>2</sup> *An Outline of Psychology*, p. 324, Methuen & Co., 1923.

<sup>3</sup> But see next chapter for a criticism of this.

correlates escape with fear. The instinct of pugnacity shows on the subject side the emotion of anger; the instinct of repulsion has for its subjective emotion disgust, and so on down the whole list of the fourteen instincts.

McDougall writes: "The two lists would run in my opinion as follows, but others might arrange the lists in a slightly different order:

<i>Names of Instincts (Synonyms in Parenthesis)</i>	<i>Names of Emotional Qualities Accompanying the Instinctive Activities</i>
1. Instinct of escape (of self preservation, of avoidance, danger instinct)	Fear (terror, fright, alarm, trepidation).
2. Instinct of combat (aggression, pugnacity)	Anger (rage, fury, annoyance, irritation, displeasure).
3. Repulsion (repugnance)	Disgust (nausea, loathing, repugnance).
4. Parental (protective)	Tender emotion (love, tenderness, tender feeling).
5. Appeal	Distress (feeling of helplessness).
6. Pairing (mating, reproduction, sexual)	Lust (sexual emotion or excitement, sometimes called love—an unfortunate and confusing usage).
7. Curiosity (enquiry, discovery, investigation)	Curiosity (feeling of mystery, of strangeness, of the unknown, wonder).
8. Submission (self-abasement)	Feeling of subjection (of inferiority, of devotion, of humility, of attachment, of submission, negative self-feeling).
9. Assertion (self-display)	Elation (feeling of superiority, of masterfulness, of pride, of domination, positive self-feeling).

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|-------------------------------------|---|
| 10. Social or gregarious instinct   | Feeling of loneliness, of isolation, nostalgia.           |
| 11. Food-seeking (hunting)          | Appetite or craving in narrower sense ( <i>gusto</i> ).   |
| 12. Acquisition (hoarding instinct) | Feeling of ownership, of possession (protective feeling). |
| 13. Construction                    | Feeling of creativeness, of making, of productivity.      |
| 14. Laughter                        | Amusement (jollity, carelessness, relaxation).            |

The minor instincts of scratching, sneezing, coughing, urination, and defecation, are so simple in their bodily expressions that we cannot recognize as specific qualities the excitements which accompany their exercise; though the impulse of each may on occasion be excited in great strength" (*An Outline of Psychology*, pp. 324, 325).

McDougall considers that these various primary instincts and emotions are fundamental inherited ways of reacting to changes of environment. In the course of individual development and experience complex emotions may be aroused through the simultaneous activity of two or more fundamental instincts; so that admiration, for example, in his view, is a complex emotion, a fusion of wonder and negative self-feeling; due to the simultaneous activity of the instincts of curiosity and of self-abasement shown subjectively in the emotion of admiration. However much doubt we may feel about the actual analyses which he gives us of complex emotions, he is undoubtedly on the right track in his general theory as to their nature.

But, besides these straightforward examples of complex emotion, where we have two or more dispositions aroused simultaneously in the mind, there are other, more complicated, emotional states and processes that can only be explained in terms of a higher degree of structure of the mind; that is, if we take the primary instincts as corresponding to the basic emotions of the mind. The simplest form of structure is manifested in the simultaneous activity of two or more independent tendencies, but this occurs very seldom; more

frequently it is activity of the basic tendencies with a background of previous experience of all kinds. Still keeping to this instinctive emotional level, we see that a certain class of complex emotions only occur in specially developed minds in relation to what are called "sentiments." The word "sentiment" is now used in a technical sense in psychology. It was first suggested by A. F. Shand in 1896. Sentiment, according to him, is *an organized system of emotional dispositions, centred about the idea of some object.*<sup>1</sup> It will be clearer if we take an example. Friendship is a sentiment in this sense. Our feelings towards our friends are not crude primary emotions; their formation and occurrence are, at any rate, more complex. Our feeling of friendship is not a summation, a complex of emotions, but it is the law according to which different emotions are aroused in different circumstances. As Shand says: "We feel joy in our friend's presence, sorrow in his absence, anger towards those who do him an injury, gratitude towards those who help him." We feel different emotions in different circumstances. This is because in past experience our emotional dispositions have become organized about the idea of our friend. So it is with hostility and hatred. Hate is a sentiment rather than a simple emotion. We feel sorrow in our enemy's presence, joy in his absence, gratitude towards those who injure him, and anger towards those who help him. Hate and love seem to be systems composed of the same emotional dispositions, but each reacting in opposite circumstances in the two cases; and that may be one reason why Love can easily pass into Hate, and often Hate, in a curious unaccountable way, pass into Love. In both cases there is intense interest in the object. The word "interest" is, perhaps, a better general term than sentiment. We may say that emotional dispositions are organized in different systems, systems of interests. These sentiments of which Shand speaks are interests not only in persons, but in things, and in abstract qualities, causes, ideals. We may have abstract sentiments, or

<sup>1</sup> Ribot, in his *Essai sur les Passions*, uses the term "passion" in a somewhat similar sense. He defines passion as a prolonged and intellectualized emotion dominated by a "fixed idea."

sentiments about abstract objects, as well as concrete sentiments, and in this way one may conceive the structure of the mind as a whole; first the lowest level of the various instinctive dispositions, and then a series of higher levels. From these merely instinctive dispositions—able to function simultaneously in twos, threes, or any number, but having cross-connections between them—one passes to systems of individual emotions and their psycho-physical dispositions corresponding to concrete objects, and later on to systems corresponding to more abstract objects; and at the top of the pyramid one has one overshadowing object, the object of the most lasting and general interest, to which all other interests are subordinate. So one may conceive a mind as a system of interests, with emotional reactions, showing different degrees of unity in the systems of subordinate unities; these systems being incorporated in wider systems, and these wider systems again being incorporated in still wider systems, till at last one has a total system dominated by one all-satisfying interest. In the philosopher one finds the love of Truth as that dominating influence. In the case of such a philosopher as Spinoza, this dominating interest, to which everything was subordinated, was his desire to find something, love for which would fill the mind with complete satisfaction. Spinoza set out with that feeling in his mind, and the result was his system of philosophy—his intellectual love of God was his master-sentiment. His whole life was organized with reference to that.<sup>1</sup> In the case of Napoleon, the love of power was the most central interest, all subsidiary interests, loves, hates, likes and dislikes, showed reference in his life to this dominating interest. The miser has the love of gain, of money as such, as the master-sentiment, which controls all his other interests.

In McDougall's general scheme of mental organization, the master-sentiment, which forms the basis of character, is the self-regarding sentiment—the love of self in the widest sense of

<sup>1</sup> It is interesting to note how certain thinkers, whose master-interest may have been determined by the hazards of their own lives, tend to generalize such master-interests in the race as a whole, e.g. the exclusively economic view of life maintained by Balzac and Marx, perhaps partly in consequence of their individual struggles.

that term. Character is strong or weak, according as this self-regarding sentiment is strong or weak. Even if we take care not to confuse the self-regarding sentiment with crude self-love, we yet feel that this theory of McDougall's is not entirely satisfying. It is too individualistic. We all of us know and have read about characters who show master-sentiments of a much more impersonal nature. We cannot help feeling that love of Truth as such, or of Goodness as such, is higher than mere love of the Self, even in its highest form. McDougall goes so far as to use this self-regarding sentiment as his principal concept in explaining volition. He considers that in cases of hard choice, which are crucial cases, where we seem to act along the line of greatest resistance, cases where we follow an ideal in the face of temptation of a crude physical nature, this result is achieved precisely because the ideal which we follow is linked up with our self-regarding sentiment, that is to say, with the organization of our emotional dispositions about the idea of ourselves. In other words, it corresponds with our ideal of ourselves as we wish to be, which we take as the standard of value for ourselves. McDougall argues that the seemingly more powerful physical temptation is overcome through the use of energy derived from these various emotional dispositions, and that the energy which they supply is more than sufficient to prevent the temptation from being realized. We may find that this general scheme advanced by McDougall of the organization of the mind is in need of supplementation when we extend our view to the consideration of the ethical and metaphysical aspects of personality.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The doctrine of *Gestalt* (shape, configuration), as set out in the writings of Wertheimer, Köhler and Koffka, is of great importance in a consideration of the organization of individual experience, both perceptual and conceptual. The whole is not only greater than the sum of its parts, but also equally primitive and fundamental, where mental activity is concerned. See Kurt Koffka, *Principles of Gestalt Psychology*, Kegan Paul, 1936, especially p. 110, Wertheimer's Law of *Prägnanz*: "Psychological organization will always be as 'good' as the prevailing conditions allow." In this formulation the term "good" connotes such properties as regularity, symmetry, simplicity, etc. A fundamental conception is that of the behavioural environment or "field," which plays a part in psychology analogous to that played by fields of force in physics.

#### CHAPTER IV

### INSTINCT, EMOTION, AND SENTIMENT

W. McDougall's well-known book, *An Outline of Psychology*, to which we have already so frequently referred, may be regarded as the latest and best of a series of expositions of the structure and functioning of the mind, but despite its manifest excellences there can be little doubt that, in the future, systematic psychologists will have to take very much more account of so-called "deep analysis" than they have hitherto been able to do. In his *Outline* we have the most complete analysis of the mind up to date along the lines of ordinary normal psychology, using material and data obtainable by anyone who restricts his attention to the study of his own consciousness and of the behaviour of other normal human beings and animals.<sup>1</sup> Deep mental analysis, however, is not content to observe the surface of the mind, but pushes enquiry further and further back; and, in pushing that enquiry back, obtains by its own methods a greater and greater wealth of material, and draws conclusions from that material according to certain rules, comparing it also with material obtained by close and prolonged studies of pathological cases. Such a method of deep analysis may throw a somewhat different light on the whole matter. It is not that we wish to explain the normal in terms of the abnormal, but these great experiments made by nature upon the human mind do magnify certain lines of functioning, and so make them observable, whereas in the past they have been overlooked.

It will be remembered that McDougall's general conception of the structure of the mind is that it is built upon a foundation of instinctive dispositions. These dispositions are conative in nature, they show characteristics of purpose, and reveal themselves in consciousness as different forms of emotional activity;

<sup>1</sup> McDougall supplemented this somewhat, but not adequately, in his subsequent book, *An Outline of Abnormal Psychology*, Methuen & Co., 1926.

so that we have, corresponding to various fundamental instincts various fundamental forms of emotion. After these fundamental instincts have been discovered and enumerated, McDougall proceeds to describe what he calls secondary emotions, which are due to the simultaneous activity of two or more instinctive dispositions. As an example of such an emotional compound we may take the anger and disgust felt towards anyone who has been guilty of a mean action. That feeling carries with it two corresponding impulses: anger—to destroy or injure the person; and disgust—to keep clear of, and have nothing to do with, him. And then McDougall proceeds in this later book to improve upon the system of emotions he gives in his *Social Psychology* by bringing in “derived emotions”; and this is a very important class, because it shows that he is not unaware of modes of production of emotion which psycho-pathology has forced upon our notice for some years past.

These derived emotions are, for example, such emotions as hope, expectation, anxiety, surprise, despondency, despair. Such emotions do not seem to follow his rule of being the subjective aspect of instinctive activities. If you look closely, you see they are all related to one fundamental form of mental activity—desire. In fact, they have been stated by A. F. Shand<sup>1</sup> in his *Foundations of Character*, under the heading “prospective emotions of desire.” These emotions are aroused in relation to the degree of success or failure of any desire in achieving or attaining its end. If the end seems likely to be attained, hope springs up in the person’s mind; complete attainment brings joy. With the possibility of failure there arises a feeling of anxiety; when the prospects of failure become more pronounced, despondency; when failure seems inevitable, despair. Now, compare these emotions with that of anger, which accompanies the combative instinct. Here in regard to the emotion of anger, McDougall himself admits that it is related to or results from the thwarting of other instinctive activities. If these activities are thwarted or hindered the feeling of anger may be aroused or stimulated. But he will not

<sup>1</sup> A. F. Shand, *The Foundations of Character*, 2nd Edit., London, 1921.

admit that a similar situation is to be found in regard to the emotion of fear. He correlates the emotion of fear with the instinct of escape, and he considers that it is fully explicable in terms of the instinct of escape.

The obvious objection to such a view is that, so far as the instinct of escape is working according to plan, the individual does not experience fear. The man escaping from his pursuers is concentrating his attention on what he is doing, e.g. leaping from crag to crag; he has no time to experience fear. In a way McDougall admits that he may not really feel fear at that time, but insists that the fear is there if he had the opportunity to look more closely into his mind. But it is not a question of not noticing the fear; it is not there at all. When a man is successful in his escape he may not find any trace of fear. Soldiers have often verified this in the course of a war. They have been so busy carrying out their job that they have not had time or occasion to feel fear. But if they are in a tight corner where no means of escape offers itself, they do feel fear. Fear, as such, in the main is similar to members of this class of derived emotions. It arises from the *thwarting* of the instinct of escape. Besides that, I have no doubt that it tends to be aroused when danger threatens, when the instinct of escape is also aroused. A certain amount of fear arises as a danger signal. The mind is thus woken up, but it passes into much more extreme forms of fear and terror when the means of escape are cut off or are problematical.<sup>1</sup>

Further, if we look down McDougall's list of primary emotions, opposite to the gregarious instinct we find that he puts, not the emotion corresponding to the gregarious instinct, whatever that may be, but the various emotions that arise in the mind when the gregarious instinct is thwarted or interfered with. If the gregarious animal is separated from the herd or flock, that animal feels restless, lonely and greatly disturbed; and this emotion seems to be what McDougall has in mind as

<sup>1</sup> We may also note that in the training of character it is desirable, and possible, to diminish or abolish the proneness to anger and fear, while preserving the instinctive activities of combat and of escape and making them more prompt and precise in their response.

the emotion accompanying the functioning of gregariousness. I think it would be rather the pleasant feeling that people seem to experience in going, e.g., to a political meeting or attending a theatre or concert, a feeling of union with their fellows; but the fact that he has to emphasize in his list just the contrary emotions—those that arise when the instinct is not satisfied—gives us a further hint of a kind of classification which is different from his own, and which is more in harmony with the usual view of emotion—the view that it is a kind of friction in the mental machinery. This, no doubt, was at the back of the minds of the philosophers of old who considered the state of being free from emotion (ἀταραξία) as the happiest state; otherwise we have not complete control of our mind; it is a nuisance to feel emotion.

Probably the truth lies between the two extremes. A great deal of emotion is undoubtedly the result of mental conflict, although we must admit that, even where there is no conflict, in certain cases there is emotion. Of course, in psychopathology this factor of mental conflict is all-important. The symptoms of the psycho-neurotic can be expressed in general as a perverted or inadequate means of solving, overcoming, or escaping from the stress of mental conflict—of saving the patient from himself. We shall have to consider that more fully later. Keeping to our task of dealing with McDougall's system, we pass from this important class of derived emotions to the emotions that are aroused within a sentiment. A sentiment is an organized system of emotional dispositions centred about the idea of some object, and certain emotional experiences can only be felt when a sentiment of that kind is present. For example, the emotion of reproach is different from the emotional experience of anger, and yet it is not a blending of anger with any other specific emotion. It is the arousing of the emotion of anger within the sentiment of love. If a stranger does us an injury or displeases us in any way, we simply feel anger towards him; but, if a dearly loved friend does something to hurt our feelings or disappoint us, we feel reproach. There is the feeling of anger, but softened by the sentiment of affection or love, which involves the potentiality of a large

number of different emotions experienced under different circumstances. Only where a sentiment is present would such feelings be experienced.

Our present purpose, however, is not to enumerate the different forms of feelings, but to consider general principles of mental organization. McDougall has applied the doctrine of the sentiments in dealing with the difficult problem of volition, particularly in cases of so-called hard choice, where the individual is moved simultaneously in two directions; in one direction by the very intense native propensity of a fundamental instinct accompanied by a strong feeling-tone, and in an opposite direction by an impulse of a more ideal nature, which seems to carry less energy with it, and yet may win the day. William James, faced with this problem, explained it in terms of a *fiat* of the will. His view was that, if this propensity on the one side was stronger in itself than the motive to act according to an ideal of conduct, the ideal motive being accompanied by a much less vivid feeling would be overwhelmed by this strong native propensity; but that the man of strong will overcomes such native propensity by bringing in also something additional, a *fiat* of the will. McDougall is not satisfied with this solution. He asks whence comes the energy of this effort of the will, and considers that he can find it in the energy represented by a fundamental sentiment which he calls the "self-regarding sentiment." A man has strength of character in so far as he has organized his emotional dispositions about the idea of himself in the form of the self-regarding sentiment; and in a case of hard choice, he brings this self-regarding sentiment into activity. This is the source of the energy which, as an effort of will, reinforces the individual's ideal impulse in its conflict with native propensity.

This is perhaps a more detailed and accurate explanation of volitional activity than has hitherto been given in psychological textbooks. It is certainly superior to that of James, and at any rate it has the courage of entering into detail; but yet it strikes one as being rather too mechanical to be a worthy description of such a complicated organization as that of the human mind. The truth probably is that the will—volition—is the

entire mind in action in its most complete development as a harmoniously working unity, and that within this unity of the mind there are various levels corresponding to different successive stages of development of mental power. The lowest level is the animal level of instinct and appetite. Above that one comes to the level of intellectualism, or generalization of wishes and desires; and, through the interaction, as it were, of knowledge on the one side and the various individual conative systems of the mind on the other, there develops an organization possessing and showing a greater and greater degree of freedom in that it becomes more and more relatively independent of external events as such. That is to say the mind becomes more and more self-determined in the course of its development and thus develops freedom. Freedom is a characteristic that gradually emerges. The mind starts with a minimum of freedom which is present in the simplest form of mental reaction, i.e. in the purposiveness which is to be seen in all behaviour. It develops this in its own way, and, when one has a case of so-called hard choice occurring, one really has one of the lower levels of organization struggling against the higher organization; and, though on the surface, in consciousness, it may make a great deal of fuss, as it were, and may seem to have a great deal of power at its disposal, yet actually it is very much weaker than the rest of the mind. The latter has reserves of power which deal with it; just as after a wound, although the bodily organization shows a rise in temperature and the wound itself looks ugly and attracts attention, nevertheless the rest of the body, the healthy part, is destined to win the battle against it.

We must now turn to another side of the structure of the mind—the cognitive side. Here we have a further very illuminating suggestion from McDougall. He cogently argues that an individual's knowledge accumulates in the form of cognitive dispositions. Just as the active side of his mind arises from the better organization of the conative dispositions of instinct, so on the side of knowledge the individual gradually builds up an organized system of cognitive dispositions. He does this not so much by observing different individual objects in space,

comparing them with one another and so getting more and more general ideas, as we say, of objects—passing, for instance, from different kinds of dogs to a conception of dogs in general, then from dogs, cats, horses, etc., on to the idea of animals in general. Rather, he begins in the other way, with a generalized experience, and learns to differentiate that experience by noting in the course of his life more and more carefully the points of difference between objects. The tendency in the young child is to generalize, but not in the logical sense. It is inclined to overlook differences at first and to classify different things together; then gradually, by noticing differences in relation to its needs (because it only notices owing to its interest in the object), it learns to appreciate variety. But besides this process of differentiation there occur assimilation and apperception, where resemblances are observed between different objects; so that by slow degrees the total system of knowledge of the individual takes a form analogous to that of a tree with its main trunk, branches, twigs and terminal leaves, corresponding to the general conception of objects, and the existence of the different kinds of laws in the different sciences. That is merely to say that this systematic knowledge is a systematic arrangement, as it were, of cognitive dispositions; and the way in which the individual acquires his systematic arrangement of cognitive dispositions is through the processes of differentiation, comparison, abstraction, apperception, and association.

Nevertheless, in addition to this kind of system, one finds also the historical system. The individual lives his life from day to day, various incidents occur, these incidents are in a certain sense retained in memory, and knowledge is laid down, as it were, in that form. This historical kind of experience is not, however, wholly unrelated to the other form, which is not itself historical, but, as it were, *sub specie æternitatis*—the general knowledge of laws and properties, etc., of things and objects, animate and inanimate, and not the actual working of the mind at any point which it has reached. Take an individual at the age of twenty-six or so. He has these various cognitive dispositions laid down in the course of his life, and his reaction to his environment has reference to both these systems. He

reacts according to his own individual experience, and also according to his scientific knowledge, which has been acquired partly by himself, by experiment, etc., and partly from what he has read in books. It is essential to note that both systems of cognitive dispositions have become linked up with conative dispositions. He has acquired likes and dislikes for different branches of knowledge and also in relation to incidents in his own life. And it is when we consider the relation of the cognitive dispositions to conative dispositions that we are facing the real problem of voluntary action.

Individual acts, then, occur with reference to knowledge, on the one side, and wishes, desires, strivings, etc., on the other. These are the sentiments, to which we have already referred, examples of interorganization of cognitive and conative dispositions. But we find that in the individual, besides these healthy sentiments, which are normal features of the mind, there is a tendency for abnormal, unhealthy mental systems to be produced in the mind corresponding to painful experiences of the past. The individual may have had, e.g., a painful experience of a frightening nature. He has been disturbed by a certain event in his life, and later on his whole mind tends to react to analogous situations with reference to the previous fright. Such abnormal systems are called "complexes," and the word complex should, I think, be restricted to abnormal systems. We should not use the term complex if we mean the normal systems, for which the technical term would be sentiment. But where we find pathological disturbance of the individual's judgment, which puts him out of harmony with his environment and prevents him from reacting adequately to a situation, then we would call it a complex. He has had an unfortunate experience and has developed, let us say, a complex against a certain type of individual, so that he does not do himself justice later on when he meets individuals of the same profession or class as the one who has thus disturbed his mind. A complex is essentially of the nature of a fixation, anchoring the mind down and preventing it from moving onward, whereas we can look upon a sentiment as a healthy growth of the mind. Likes and dislikes with reference to adequate

experience, i.e. the various sentiments, grow by including a larger and larger number of objects within themselves, and by being adjusted more and more adequately to these objects. Through them the mind gains greater and greater freedom, a wider scope of activity, and a greater and greater degree of harmonious working. A complex, on the other hand, ties the individual down to the incident or incidents that aroused the complex; it is a kind of precipitation of the mind. The mind is held down and cannot develop further. Other parts of the mind do go on developing, but that particular part is fixed in such a way that when the complex is struck on, as we say, that is, stimulated through association by some chance event, the whole mind reacts just exclusively and explosively to that complex. The individual may, e.g., explode with anger without clearly knowing why he is angry.

We may now ask: why should there be this difference between complexes and sentiments? It is the difference between repression and unrepression—the complex is repressed experience. It is not normal, not healthy, not fully justified; it has not been adequately faced by the individual but has been held in check in a quasi-mechanical way. He has lost the power of normal integration of consciousness in relation to it. A sentiment can, under appropriate conditions, produce the various emotions according to rule; but in the case of a complex what is repressed is, not so much the emotion, but rather the cognitive disposition, i.e. the original experience is withdrawn from attentive control. The mind has lost the faculty of recalling the original experience, although the corresponding emotional reaction can be re-aroused. In certain situations, a person flies into a rage and does not fully realize why. He acts mechanically, like an automaton, instead of like a free human being. One analyses his mind in order to overcome the repression, to bring these forgotten experiences into full consciousness, and in that way the complex is got rid of.

And then the interesting question arises about the relationship of complexes to sentiments as regards analysis. Complexes can be dealt with by analysis; one can resolve a complex. Can

the same thing be done with our sentiments?<sup>1</sup> Theoretically it might be possible. We might look upon a sentiment as a much more fundamental, thoroughgoing, deeply founded system of interests, a strong organization which needs very deep and prolonged analysis for disintegration. Friendships for different people, and interests which we have formed in different kinds of subjects or causes or ideals, ethical, æsthetical, etc.—all these are of the nature of sentiments. In a long analysis they might possibly be interfered with. I think we must leave it as a possibility which will be decided empirically in the course of further experience of long analyses. We know that a number of people have been analysed for a very long time, and some are still being analysed; and it is quite probable that, in their enthusiasm for psycho-analysis, some psycho-analysts will persevere with analysis of their clients—subjects who are not necessarily patients—for longer and longer periods of time. Short analyses may extend over six months or more, deeper analyses may go on for two or three years or even longer, and it would be interesting to see what the effects of such analyses upon sentiments are. One meets with special cases from time to time where the analysis has proved to be extremely disturbing, where the individual has needed further help to restore the balance of his mind. We know also and are prepared for, the possibility that, where patients are on the verge of severe mental breakdown, an analysis might suffice to push them over the border. It is an obvious danger that every psycho-analyst would admit. It is possible that there are limits to analysis, though on the face of it this seems fairly improbable. A person analysed may have derived a certain amount of benefit, not only as regards the symptoms which he may have shown, but also in getting a deeper insight into his mind, and learning to use it more and more adequately by getting rid of the effects of chance incidents of the past, i.e. his various complexes; and then, with a continuation of the analysis there might be a danger of interfering with his healthy sentiments. My own experience in analysing patients, including a number of

<sup>1</sup> See T. H. Pear, "Complex and Sentiment," *Brit. Journ. of Psychology*, vol. xiii, 1922.

really lengthy analyses in recent years, encourages me to take an optimistic view on this question. I have found no evidence of disintegration of healthy sentiments.

As regards terms, therefore, we can look upon complexes as pathological formations analogous in structure to sentiments of the normal mind. In both cases there is a union or systematization of cognitive and conative dispositions, and they both point forward to the general problem of freedom or self-determination of the mind, and the general problem of volition. McDougall's theory of volition in terms of the self-regarding sentiment is clearly a very important generalization which, to a certain extent, does fit in with what can be said about disturbance of volition in pathological cases through the existence of complexes; but when we come to deal with the mind from the point of view of ethics and metaphysics, as distinct from the merely psychological point of view, we may feel more firm in our suspicion that the explanation is somewhat too mechanical.

NOTE. Sentiments may be regarded as the normal psychological organizations of the mind through which the world of values becomes revealed to the individual. In this they are analogous to the sense organs. Just as, in seeing and hearing, the eye and the ear do not *produce* the visual and auditory sensations but only *reveal* visual and auditory objects, so the various instinctive dispositions with which we are born and which later become organized in systems or sentiments are the means whereby we have revealed to us the beauty and goodness of the world around us—the good and bad qualities of the people around us. The values of truth, goodness and beauty are not fully explicable in terms of chance reactions to the environment. They are eternal or beyond time, although revealed in time. Mental illness involves a falling away from the fullness of this revelation, and complexes are always a hindrance to true insight.

## CHAPTER V

### VOLITION

It will be convenient at first to recapitulate and restate some of the observations and arguments of the preceding chapter. We have seen that psychologically the mind can be regarded as a system of subsidiary systems of conative and emotional dispositions, organized in relation to a hierarchy of cognitive dispositions. In general terms the mind has achieved the power of knowing or getting into intellectual touch with facts concrete and abstract, and of feeling emotions of different kinds, and instinctive tendencies towards action in relation to such facts. Starting with primitive instinctive-emotional dispositions, such as the instinctive emotions of fear, anger, etc., these become organized round various objects in which the mind "takes interest," and each of these organizations of emotional dispositions about objects is called a sentiment. So the mind first acquires a series of concrete sentiments, and these concrete sentiments can in their turn give rise to sentiments of a more abstract nature. By different acts of justice we acquire not only the virtue of justice but the sentiment of justice as such; learning to be loyal to individual people and groups of people, we eventually gain the general abstract sentiment of loyalty. In this way various interests become organized in systems which thus control the conduct of the individual. The individual becomes more and more capable of regular consistent conduct—conduct according to rules that can be predicted with more or less accuracy. And this tendency towards the production of wider and more general systems strives towards an ideal aim of one all-inclusive system or sentiment, to which all others are subordinated.

The unitary activity of the mind and its freedom are dependent upon the extent to which an all-inclusive system of this sort is achieved. It is a commonplace to say that we are each of us many selves, different in different circumstances. We seem sometimes to be actuated on different occasions by wholly different motives. However true that may be, there is

the more fundamental truth that we are more or less at one with ourselves in all these subsidiary selves. They are not unrelated to one another except in disease. So far as the mind is healthy the subsidiary selves are organized in one all-inclusive self. And it is to the organization of this all-inclusive self that we must look for a solution of the problem of volition or will.

Will is not a form of mental activity that arises suddenly full-blown at a particular point in the development of the individual mind. It has a developmental history of its own, and rudiments of it are to be found in the earliest beginnings of consciousness. So far as there is system at all and subordination of particular to more general tendencies, so far one has the beginnings of will. One has the raw material of will in what is known as conation, the active aspect of consciousness, the striving towards an end (implicit or explicit) that is to be realized at every moment of conscious life. Conation as such is the lower limit. It becomes more clearly defined and organized as intellectual development proceeds. It progresses in relation to the development of knowledge, and is thus made more and more precise. On the perceptual level there is direct instinctive perception of objects. Instinctive reactions to objects also occur at the higher level where memory and ideation become possible. There are conations directed towards ends not themselves yet actualized, ends that can be imagined but are not at the moment actual. These ends are, first, individual events in the outer world and individual actions. At a later stage of mental development ends of a more abstract nature can be pursued, purposes of a general nature such as to help others, to be true in word and deed, to seek always the highest good. The mind can set these abstract ends before it.

The question is, whence comes the energy that sustains the pursuit of these ends? The ends themselves can be discovered by observation, and by reasoning on the basis of observation. It is in the conative part of the mind that we must look for the energy, the driving force which carries us on to achieve these ends. The various instincts themselves have their own driving force, and among these instinctive tendencies one would include the tendency to observe, question, classify, to acquire

fuller and fuller knowledge of the world around us. One cannot entirely agree with McDougall when he says that the intellect as such merely fixes the end to be aimed at, without itself supplying any energy for achieving that end. Intellect does furnish a certain amount of energy, and the self-denying way in which scientists will put everything second to the pursuit of truth in their particular domain is to my mind an illustration of the inborn tendency to develop energy along these particular lines, which other people do not possess to the same degree. While recognizing that fact, however, we must proceed to admit with McDougall that the energy of volitional activity comes for the most part from another source. If we compare people with one another as regards will-power, we see that to a great extent it is a question of degree of development of the self-assertive instinct. If the self-assertive instinct is strong, there is a possibility of great strength of will eventually arising. If the self-assertive instinct is weak, one is more likely to find vacillation and lack of tenacity. If, in the place of a strongly developed self-assertive instinct, there is a pronounced development of the instinct of self-abasement, there is still greater probability that the powers of volition will not be high. Volition is not self-assertion, it is something much more than that, in that it is the work of the mind at its highest level, and since the highest level cannot work by itself, but draws other levels into itself, volition is the entire mind and the entire character in action. What makes that character one is partly, at any rate, the presence of the self-assertive instinct, whether from the active point of view, or from the point of view of contemplation and of æsthetic appreciation. Emotional dispositions, various tendencies towards taking interest in various ways, are organized about the idea of the self to produce the self-regarding sentiment. This self-regarding sentiment subordinates to itself the other sentiments, concrete and abstract, that have been gradually developing *pari passu* with it, and so introduces discipline and a hierarchy of government which is most effective in bringing about harmonious activity, producing an individual adequately adapted to his environment.

We can test this theory that volition is the whole character in action with the sentiment of self-respect in command, within which the self-assertive instinct bulks large, by considering special cases of volition. Although volition occurs wherever the mind acts as a whole, acting on the highest level even when the individual is not aware of any conflict or stress, yet it becomes more pronounced in cases of mental conflict where the individual seems to act in the line of greatest resistance. There are two general levels of mental conflict, the analytic and the synthetic. In the first, there are alternative solicitations of sense on the same level of mental development. A person feels tempted to do one thing, feels an impulse to carry out one line of action, to follow up one desire, and simultaneously to follow another desire, and there arises a conflict of the two on the same level. This is called analytic choice. But in so-called synthetic choice the two sides that conflict are at different levels of mental development. On the one side there may be a so-called native propensity, and set against it there may be some ideal aim or purpose. In such a case as that the nature of volition comes out most strongly. As William James said, when a patient under the surgeon's knife checks the cry of pain, or when a man in the face of temptation, as, e.g., the reformed drunkard tempted with the desire for drink, crushes those feelings and turns away, these people seem to act in the line of greatest resistance. James's solution might be put in the form of two equations:—

$$\begin{aligned} I \text{ (ideal impulse)} &< P \text{ (native propensity)}. \\ I + E \text{ (effort of will)} &> P. \end{aligned}$$

What is needed in psychology, however, is to get a more complete analysis of the nature of this effort of will. McDougall has faced this problem, and in his theory has argued that the effort of will represents a store of energy furnished by the self-regarding sentiment—that the individual who is passing through these temptations and putting up an adequate resistance is able to do so because he is not merely in a momentary state of consciousness, but in his past life has organized his conative and emotional dispositions in a particular way around

the idea of self. He has developed a strong feeling of self-respect. This feeling of self-respect, which has at its command the energy of the whole system of those emotional dispositions, can furnish energy sufficient to turn the scale in favour of the ideal impulse. The efficiency of volition, according to this description, turns partly upon the degree of harmonious development of the self and partly upon the strength of the self-assertive instinct. After the personality has passed through a course of smooth development from the lower to the higher form in adequate adaptation to its environment, one would expect to find a person of strong volition, with strong powers of will. But actually, of course, each individual has his own special difficulties to surmount, and although struggling with difficulties often increases strength and tenacity of will-power, the result may be less fortunate where the struggle is unsuccessful, especially if initial difficulties occur in early years when the character is least developed. If the formation of these great fundamental sentiments—these more primitive systems of emotional dispositions—is interfered with, one would expect to find later on a defect in the power of volition. And so we come to the problem of the pathology of the will.

There is one other aspect of volition, represented by the contrasted theories of free-will and determinism. We can at once dismiss any doctrine of free-will of indifference (libertarianism). If we are to be psychologists, to believe in the possibility of giving a scientific account of the mind and its development, we must believe in the general principle of *relevance*. Whatever occurs in the mind is relevant to what has occurred before and what is occurring simultaneously. As the mind, if not in itself always rational, looked at from the outside is a rational organism in which the different elements are related to one another in ways that can be understood by reason, so it obeys the principle of sufficient reason (Leibniz). When anything occurs in it there is a sufficient reason why it should occur rather than not occur. That is not the same thing as saying that every moment of consciousness is mechanically determined by preceding events in consciousness. We have to take account of the nature of

consciousness itself. We find that it is never passive; even in its simplest form it is active, and has its own peculiar nature, and because of its own peculiar nature it is removed from the realm of explanation that would apply to material phenomena observed from the outside. It has a degree of spontaneity which is, perhaps, more pronounced at its lowest levels. In the child at play the spontaneity seems most obvious, because relevancy is least apparent. A child's life is spontaneous in that it is *irrelevant*; different moments of consciousness are not closely linked with one another in accordance with a general plan. As the mind progresses, and development proceeds, the plan becomes more pronounced, and the mind becomes more and more determined by its own inner nature; and if we follow up that development from the beginning to the end we see what after all is meant by the freedom of the will. As soon as the will itself has conquered, then comes its action in accordance with character. A man acts freely so far as he is true to himself and so far as he is acting in accordance with the principles developed in his individual life and according to his own personality. So that in the theoretically normal person responsibility is a self-evident fact. A person is responsible to himself, therefore he is responsible to others. But in most people's lives instances occur where one cannot impose full responsibility upon them. In such cases one feels that there has been a disturbance of the unity of the mind, and certain tendencies have been called out so strongly that the rest of the mind has not been able to control them adequately.

Experiences during the first few years of childhood may have a profound influence upon the development of the will. The young child living in a normal household, with normal loving parents, and in congenial surroundings, tends to develop normally, happily, and harmoniously, because the various persons and things present before it, which it can admire and imitate, are in harmony with one another. If the parents feel affection for one another and live in harmony, and the brothers and sisters live in harmony, the little child observes all this and becomes more harmonious in itself, because it has a strong tendency to identify itself with those around it. On the other

hand, if the parents are at enmity with one another, however hard they may try to conceal it, the fact becomes apparent and exerts its baneful influence upon the child. The child sympathizes with both parents, and so internalizes in itself the outward conflict. The child really is each of the parents to some extent, and is torn different ways whenever there is outward conflict. The conflict becomes implanted in the child's mind, and is a source of serious weakness later on. It has often been observed that children of parents who do not get on well together are unhappy and frequently neurotic, and the explanation sometimes given is that the absence of love in the parents really affects the young child before it is born. That may or may not be so, but quite apart from this the observed conflict is sufficient to explain the bad effect on its character.

If certain instinctive tendencies in a child are called out too strongly as compared with other instinctive tendencies, and are developed prematurely, if a child at an immature age is subjected to experiences that hurry up the development of instinct—I am thinking especially of the sex instinct—there arises another very serious source of disturbance. Recently a patient (a girl of 18) came to me complaining that she was obsessed by certain sexual thoughts and was incessantly tempted to use certain words. Investigation of her case revealed that her father was alcoholic, and that when she was as young as seven or eight he would use in her presence all sorts of objectionable language, which she half understood and which evidently stirred up sexual feelings prematurely, with the result that there was an impulse to use these words and to think along these lines; and in spite of her best endeavours she was unable to control it adequately. In a case like this one cannot consider the patient as fully responsible as another person who had had a normal childhood and normal protection from adults around him.

The instincts of self-assertion, self-abasement, and self-preservation (fear) may be unduly stimulated in early years, and in each of these cases there may arise a certain type of character which is defective in a definite direction, and defective volition occurs. If a person is frequently frightened in

childhood, and his fears are played upon—such cases are constantly occurring—later on he may find it very difficult indeed to stand firm in the face of fear-inspiring incidents. In particular, if a young child is frightened with water, if the nurse is careless in dashing water over the child, and it gets frightened, although perhaps quite a courageous child in other respects, it may find great difficulty in learning to swim and dive. Children are sometimes injured through carelessness in putting on and taking off clothes. One child had a horror of suffocation, traced back to the age of four or five, when he used to wear a tight jersey, and the jersey was pulled over his head by his nurse slowly, just for the fun of teasing him and hearing him cry out.

As regards the self-assertive instinct parents can do their children a disservice by being too ambitious for them. By encouraging the spirit of rivalry too strongly in early years they may disturb the balance and harmony of the developing character. A child may be led, as the result of over-stimulation of the self-assertive instinct, to take on more than he can adequately achieve. Failure brings feelings of self-dissatisfaction and self-depreciation, and in that way he may become the victim of what is called an "inferiority complex."<sup>1</sup> This has two aspects, and may in some cases be quite as accurately called a superiority complex. Often if such people do not go on being ambitious they feel that they are untrue to themselves. On analysis, one finds that what they are untrue to is the ideal which their own mother or father has put before them, and with which they have identified themselves. In analysis they can get free from that, and they are only too glad to do so.

To my mind the most pronounced result of analysis, carried out carefully and without undue interference on the part of the analyst, is *liberation from false personality*. The impression one gets as one analyses is that the patient has had imposed

<sup>1</sup> The more usual cause of an inferiority complex is a direct overstimulation of the instinct of self-abasement or self-depreciation, with its accompanying *Minderwertigkeitsgefühl*, or feeling of inferiority, to which the personality then reacts in various compensatory ways. See my recent paper, "The Inferiority Complex and the Paranoid Tendency," *Nature*, vol. 156, p. 259, September 1, 1945.

upon him a personality different from his own; he has had to wear strange clothes, as it were, that did not entirely fit him. Analysis strips them off and the true character emerges. The patient learns to understand himself, but he can only understand himself adequately if he considers in the analysis not only the facts of the situation through which he passed in early years, but also his various instinctive reactions to them. One may find that he has been unduly strained in certain ways, certain instincts have been stimulated too intensely, as in the examples just quoted. Instincts can in this way give rise to very clear-cut symptoms, e.g. the instinct of disgust. A young child comes into the world almost free from this instinct, which first shows itself between the first and the second year. If a child is well brought up, this instinct has no opportunity in early life of coming out in an intense form, but through carelessness occasions may occur which arouse it intensely just at the time when it is beginning to make itself felt, and it becomes "sensitized," as it were, and may give the child a great deal of trouble later on. The obsessional fear of dirt and infection can be traced back to faulty development with regard to this instinct, to a revulsion of feeling in connection with it, and also to the suppression of other primitive tendencies in early life.

NOTE. It will be seen that my general position in Psychology, especially in its relation to Philosophy, is rather similar to that of Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911), with further developments inspired by Freud, McDougall, Jung and Adler in the sphere of deep mental analysis, and with a recognition of the important role of mathematical methods (correlation, etc.) in the domain of mental tests and measurement of physiological processes accompanying mental activity. Indeed, my earliest researches in Psychology were concerned with the application of the mathematical theory of statistics, especially the theory of correlation, to mental tests and to the problem of the interrelations of the various distinguishable mental abilities within the individual mind. See my *Essentials of Mental Measurement*, first published in 1911, later editions in collaboration with Professor Godfrey Thomson, Cambridge University Press, 4th Edn., 1940.

My psychotherapeutic work has impressed upon me the importance of "historical causation" in any truly explanatory psychology, and, like Dilthey, I feel the need of a "Critique of the Historical Reason" to supplement the Critiques of Kant. See *Recent Philosophy*, by John Laird, Thornton Butterworth, Ltd., London, 1936; and *Wilhelm Dilthey*, by H. A. Hodges, Kegan Paul, London, 1944. My own psychological position has been reached, however, in complete independence of Dilthey's work and doctrine.

## CHAPTER VI

### RELIGION AND HEALTH

THE relation of religion and health is a problem which interests everybody; it is very prominent at present, and has been so from the earliest times. It is important not to look upon this as a distinctively modern problem, or of recent interest in theoretical and applied psychology. It has always been with us; in fact, the whole question of health and disease was first faced from the religious point of view. We find in the earliest times attempts at cure which were of a religious nature. Long before our era we find accounts, for example, of the Asclepieion, or temple of Æsculapius at Epidaurus, to which patients made pilgrimages from distant parts. This temple had an inner shrine, a statue of the god, and rooms in which the pilgrims rested after their journey, and prepared themselves for their initiation. They listened to addresses from attendant priests and others, had their minds prepared, and were eventually admitted into the inner shrine, where they often spent the night on couches specially prepared for them, and much of the treatment was supposed to come to them in their sleep. They went to sleep with minds prepared, and the god visited them in their sleep and healed them. Before they went away they would acknowledge their cure, and make presentations of votive offerings to the god. These votive offerings, in the temple I am describing, often took the form of models in more or less precious metal or stone of the parts of the body which were supposed to have been healed. What is of special interest for us is that one of these models is in the form of a foot in a state of hysterical contracture. The foot is drawn up and all the muscles contracted in a certain way—a typical attitude which we find in hysterical contracture, where there is no definite physiological or structural change in the nervous system or muscles to cause it, but through the state of mind of the patient the foot has got into a position where it cannot be used. One of the patients, then, had suffered from hysterical contracture and had been cured by sleeping in the temple and had

given thanks accordingly. Among the cases of cure described we find that of one Valerius Aper, a Roman soldier, who suffered from blindness. He was told by the oracle to mix the blood of a white cock with honey and rub this ointment on his eyes for three days and he would then receive his sight; he did so and recovered his sight and gave thanks. Again, from our modern knowledge of medicine, we can be quite sure that the blindness was hysterical blindness. In those early days, then, long before the Christian era, and before there was any question of Christian healing, the methods of "miraculous" healing were in use.

Passing over the early Christian period to medieval times, we find that it was the custom for patients to visit various shrines and receive benefit for different kinds of illness, some shrines gaining a reputation for special effectiveness in certain forms of illness. But the most famous shrine of all, that of Lourdes, is of much more recent date. Here, in 1858, a peasant girl, Bernadette Soubirous, had a vision of the Virgin Mary, after which the place acquired a great reputation for healing, and has continued up to the present day to produce impressive results.

In all these cases we have pronounced evidence of the influence of the mind upon the body, whether the mind be that of the individual himself or the mind of some external spirit, god, or saint. Here we have mental healing in its most general form.

The important movement of Christian Science in America had its immediate forerunner in the therapeutic activities of a watchmaker named P. P. Quimby some eighty or ninety years ago. Quimby had studied the methods of the French magnetizers, and at first made use of a hypnotized subject for diagnosis and treatment. He discovered a youth of seventeen who was mediumistic or "lucid," and was allegedly able to diagnose patients and prescribe remedies while in the somnambulistic state. On one occasion, however, he noted that the remedy prescribed was a rather expensive one and that the medium, on having this pointed out to him, at once substituted a cheaper remedy. Quimby realized that the

second remedy would have just the opposite physiological effect from the first, but as the patient got well, he concluded that the cure was a matter, not of the drug prescribed, but of the patient's state of mind. If the patient believed the drug would cure him, the drug did cure him. The real cause of his recovery was his state of mind, viz. faith in the efficacy of the remedy. Quimby gave up clairvoyance, therefore, and proceeded to develop his own system of "mind cure," of which the object was to inculcate in the patient's mind habits of right thinking about health and disease.

In 1862 there came to Quimby a poor lady, forty years of age, suffering from paraplegia, and other nervous troubles, and he cured her. Her name was Mrs. Glover, subsequently better known as Mrs. Eddy. She was a woman of remarkable personality and strength of will, although the accounts of her illness lead us to the conclusion that she was probably hysterical. In her early days she seems to have had hysterical attacks, and she herself is said to have discovered that life was bearable at that time only if she could be rocked in a cradle. This is interesting to psycho-pathologists, because this lying in a cradle takes the individual back to early years, and the fact that it benefited a hysterical patient is confirmatory of the regressive nature of hysterical illness. It is a tendency to retreat from reality, and to step back into more infantile conditions. Although Quimby was able to cure Mrs. Eddy, which was a tremendous feat, for her hysteria, if it was hysteria, was of a serious nature—and all doctors know that while light cases of hysteria are easy, severe cases are difficult to cure—he was not able to cure himself of an abdominal complaint from which he died in 1866. After his death Mrs. Eddy proceeded to develop her own theory and practice of Christian Science. In 1875 the first edition of *Science and Health* was published. Mrs. Eddy's philosophy, if it can be called one, is summed up in a number of statements: "God is all in all; God is good, Good is mind; God, Spirit, being all, nothing is matter; Life, God, omnipotent goodness, deny death, evil, sin, and disease." Sickness and symptoms are unreal because matter itself is unreal. If matter

is unreal, why do we get the appearance of matter? It is an illusion of "mortal mind."

Mrs. Eddy was not a philosopher, neither was Quimby. They were therapists or healers, first and last, and developed their vague philosophy to bolster up their method of treatment. It is a philosophy that cannot be thought out in detail, although it contains an important element of truth, as is shown by its practical results. The results of Christian Science are partly bad—that side has been sufficiently and rightly emphasized—but they are also in many cases emphatically good. There is no question that Christian Science has cured large numbers of people, and that it has thriven and spread so widely because of its pronounced success. The reason of this is undoubtedly that it emphasizes certain special factors in all healthy life—the factors of courage, confidence, optimism, a readiness to deny evil, to turn away from it, to refuse to be concerned with it at all, to refuse to do it the honour of even thinking about it. Such an attitude of mind has its dangers. If a man is too optimistic, he may overlook danger signals. One may run past the red light, and great harm may be done. It is not necessary to quote illustrations—they will occur to any one. In spite of that, Mrs. Eddy's system is important because she and those who follow her are trying to produce a *philosophy* of disease. They look upon the distinction of health and disease as a meta-physical distinction, whereas in orthodox medicine one finds that disease and health are considered to be much on a level, health being regarded as the fortunate harmony of working of different parts of the body, and disease being explained in terms of disturbance of that harmony through the action of bacteria or mechanical or chemical injury. We do need a philosophy of health and disease as well as a science of health and disease. Such a philosophy may be more akin to the views of Christian Science than to those of orthodox medicine, since orthodox medicine is definitely materialistic in nature. Although individual medical men may be idealists by personal conviction, orthodox medicine is a materialistic system, and employs materialistic methods. The positive side of Christian Science is good and entirely true. It is borne out by the

experience that the more a patient can conquer fear and refuse to think of disease and illness, the more he can trust in God, in the beneficent purpose running through all creation, and in the superiority of the mind over mere matter, the healthier he will be, the less likely to be ill, and, when he falls ill, the greater will be his chance of recovery. It is on the negative side that the danger lies. If you proceed to forbid any surgical or medical treatment, you are running great risks, you may be sure the results will sometimes be unsatisfactory. Christian Science is a method of treatment which is specially beneficial to the mental side of illness and in cases of so-called functional nervous disorder. Modern medicine has its own place, reality, and value which Christian Science denies, and its dictates should be observed so far as required by the symptoms. All that can be done on the physical side ought to be done, but there is nothing to prevent everything possible being done on the mental side also. That is where so many fall short. Even at the present day there is no danger that the general public will put an undue emphasis on the psychological side of illness. They are still, in the main, too ready to depreciate the value of the psychological factor. As long as the medical and physical considerations are allowed full scope, the importance of the psychological factors cannot be over-emphasized.

These psychological factors are the subject-matter of the modern science and art of psychotherapy, which is thus in the direct line of descent from the early miraculous religious healing, through the work of the mesmerists and hypnotists, down to the more modern methods of Christian Science, faith-healing and suggestion treatment. Psychotherapy teaches that different methods may be needed with different cases and that discrimination is necessary. The psychotherapist should *diagnose* the conditions on the medical side, determine what are the mental factors at work, counteract these factors, and use the modern methods of analysis and suggestion in order to arouse an enthusiastic expectation of cure. It is not easy to affirm health in a general way if the details have not been dealt with. A person with toothache may affirm health till he is blue in the face, but the tooth will go on aching, and the tooth should

come out. In cases of obsession or impulsion it is something to help the patient to form more normal habits of thought and action, to distract his mind from illness by pointing out the better way, an enthusiastic belief in health and in God's goodness, but it is also desirable to find out why he became ill. The important factors of suggestion and faith must thus be supplemented by more or less thorough mental analysis and self-knowledge (autognosis).

### SPIRITUAL HEALING

We now come to the modern problem of so-called spiritual healing. Much of the difficulty in this vexed question is due to lack of psychology both on the medical and the theological side. The psychological line of investigation is the middle line which will be not a compromise but an actual solution. The solution must come, at least in great part, on the psychological plane. There is very great danger, in a subject like this, on the one hand of compromising religion, and on the other of stultifying medical science. We find a large proportion of the medical profession refusing to have anything to do with it, and in the other camp a large proportion of theologians and clergy adopting the same position. Both classes have a good deal of reason on their side, but their spokesmen are none too good at presenting their reasons. Similarly, the enthusiasts for spiritual healing have some right on their side, but they also do not present the situation in a sufficiently convincing way.

As a counterblast to Christian Science and the New Thought Movement, there arose in America the Emmanuel Movement, a sort of alliance between the medical and clerical elements, rather surprising in itself to some people, who unkindly explained it as a defensive alliance against the common foe. It was a movement for getting doctors and clergymen to collaborate in the healing of the sick. The idea was that medical men should diagnose the cases and prescribe on the physical side, and then hand the case over to the clergymen to be dealt with on the ethical and religious sides. This seems a simple way out, but the difficulty is that life is not exactly made that way. The distinctions between the physical, mental, and spiritual are

distinctions for thought rather than for actual practice. In the region of these various diseases, both physical and mental factors have been at work, and if we believe in the spiritual as relatively distinct from the mental, we may say that spiritual factors also have been at work.

The whole point of spiritual healing, the central tenet of the spiritual healer, is that the spiritual factor, as the most important, ought to be the most efficient in dealing with a case. It must, of course, be remembered that in various forms of disease the spiritual factor enters in different degrees. Some diseases present a more pronounced disturbance of a spiritual nature than others. Whole classes of disease seem to have nothing to do with the spiritual side at all. Most of the physical and many of the mental diseases have an hereditary factor which the individual himself cannot help, and added to that hereditary factor are factors of experience which find him unprepared. They are so intensive in their action, so disturbing, that he is absolutely unable to adapt himself adequately to them. The most glaring cases resulted during the last two wars; exposure to prolonged shell-fire resulted in diseases predominantly if not entirely mental and nervous in nature, explained partly by bad heredity and partly by the severity of the mental shock produced. In such instances, the responsibility of the patient for the illness might be quite small. Responsibility in physical illness is often apparently nil, the moral factor as regards causation is almost completely absent. We can never say that it is completely absent, because there is the question, which we have already discussed, of the way in which the patient faces his incipient illness. When he realizes that he is ill, he may react mentally in different ways. He may realize it in a very disturbed way, and show real lack of faith, become a pessimist at once, expecting the worst because of his pessimistic outlook on life in general, and his depreciatory idea of God, and he may rush down the slope still more rapidly than otherwise. His faith may falter, and the faltering of his faith, which is a spiritual thing, has to do with his system of values and his general religious outlook. Treachery to his scale of values and his general religious outlook may contribute, not to the

onset of the disease, but to its increasing intensity, and make it worse and more prolonged than it otherwise would be. Conversely, a frame of mind of modified optimism that takes full account of all the chances as they come, and faces them without fear and with a determination to use every possible means to get back to health without panic, without neglecting any duties to others, is an attitude favourable towards cure, whatever the illness may be.

Are we to hand all this over to the clergyman, and to say that as doctors we have nothing to do with it—that we are concerned merely with the disease? The reason why it is difficult to reply to this question in the affirmative is that the relationship, the connection of this frame of mind with the disease, may be much closer as well as somewhat mysterious. We do not even yet know with sufficient adequacy how these two points of view meet and are related to one another. This is due to the inadequacy of psychological science. But since the rise of the Emmanuel Movement a further step forward has been made in the application of the method of psycho-analysis, or “deep” analysis. In this method the individual’s past is explored as fully as possible from every point of view, primarily from the psychological point of view, but also from that of all the other mental sciences and from the point of view of his duty towards himself and others. A psycho-analyst, if he is to deal with the mind of man thoroughly, must be more than a psychologist; he must be a philosopher acquainted with the general history and problems of philosophy as they present themselves to the individual mind. He must be able through his general training to see the world as through the patient’s eyes, and, in analysing the patient, go back deeper and deeper into his mind to the beginning of the attitude towards disease long before disease troubled him, the attitude of his parents and others round him towards disease, and the reaction of those attitudes upon the patient himself. All this is germane to the problem of the origin of illness, and of the feeling of illness that may arise from an infection or some other disease process. It is in a general way a psychological thing, and as psychological it certainly falls under the heading of medicine in the

widest sense, although in the process ethical and other considerations have to be taken into account. In the process of analysis one realizes more definitely how great is the power of the mind over the body. In the earlier work of the hypnotists, the prominence this had attained, illustrated in the production of blisters and other physical disturbances through strong suggestion under deep hypnosis, showed how the idea of a physical and mental state could pass over into actuality. What we find in psycho-analysis is this—that when the patient has talked for a number of hours, as soon as he lies on the couch he passes into a dream-like state similar to, if not identical with, that of hypnosis. In that state, his powers of remembering the past and of reproducing past events, and describing them with great minuteness, are increased, till eventually he is reproducing previous experiences almost as if he were living through them again. One patient told me that he felt as though he were a little baby in the cradle again, and people were leaning over him. We find the re-living of these early experiences has a very pronounced effect not only on the patient's mental outlook but also on his general physical health. In so thorough an investigation as this, the practitioner sweeps up all sorts of influences; he is out for everything he can find of any sort, especially any kind of difficulty the patient has experienced, bad influences or good influences in his past; he is discovering his early infantile religious outlook, his ideas of duty, his feelings towards parents, his tendency to identify himself with them, and to obey them, and the influences on him of these people's ideas of health and disease. All these things come up in analysis.

We can now reopen the question of spiritual healing on the lines of positive science. Those of us who are doctors, while sympathizing with the spiritual point of view, feel that so much of this is a matter of analysis, of a strictly scientific outlook on the situation, and of endeavouring to get the facts more and more into adequate focus, and in their right proportions. On the psychological side, we are attempting what is attempted on the physical side when one makes a careful bacteriological examination of the various excretions

and secretions of the body, or of the composition of the blood, and the exact history and nature of the disease. Corresponding to all such facts which are so important on the physical side, we are getting together a set of facts regarding our patients on the mental side. And we do find in the course of this analysis that the patient's health as a rule tends to improve. If the analysis is pushed through, the final outcome is a tendency towards improvement in general health and increase in the general mental and physical powers. The mind is strengthened by this process. Has that anything to do with religion and the spiritual side? As a scientific method it has not. So far as you are encouraging the patient to work out his past, letting him convict himself out of his own mouth, you are merely doing things with scientific method. Of course, you can also indicate from time to time your own point of view, although you do this at your peril. You may intervene to help him to see why certain decisions of his past life were wrongly taken, why his outlook was inadequate and led to an unsatisfactory result. So far as you are doing that, you are applying your psychology, giving help on the psychological side. But you are also giving help on the ethical and religious side so far as you are encouraging him on the basis of investigation of his past life to be more honest with himself, to scrap ideas that are proved to be unjustified and false, and indicating to him a possible ethical standpoint, and various alternative possibilities for his choice and decision. To that extent you are doing more than one does in ordinary medicine. Certainly you cannot say, "I am going to do the analysis and then hand the patient over to someone else for all the rest." That someone else would need to know the whole situation, and would need to have done the analysis himself if he is to be adequate in his advice, encouragement, and direction at the end. The general tendency of those who work at the subject with regard to the psycho-neuroses or functional nervous diseases is to deprecate the intrusion of the religious factor in the course of treatment. They would say that the problem of the patient's religion should be settled at the end of the treatment. The dealing with all the discoveries made in the course of treatment is in every case a problem for

the physician, the psychotherapist, rather than for the clergyman.

Let us now look at it from the point of view of the clergyman who is interested in psychological problems, but who is not a doctor, and whose aim it is to give the patient adequate help on the religious side. The patient is ill, and his illness is due in a certain degree to ethical and religious factors. What would the clergyman need to do? If he were psychologically trained, he would need to do what a psychological doctor does—investigate the patient by deep analysis. That would be a very big business, and it would also mean readiness to be on the alert for complications of one sort or another. When a person is ill in one clearly defined direction, you cannot be sure that there is not illness in other directions as well, and you should always be on the look-out for possibilities. In cases of pronounced mental disturbance there is always the possibility of severe mental outbreak, suicidal depression, homicidal mania, or various delusions. The clergyman *qua* clergyman is not adequately trained to deal with such situations. On the other hand, his training specially enables him to give advice with authority on certain matters of conscience, provided that those matters are clearly before him. If he does not understand the general mental make-up of the patient, and the extent to which special incidents in his past have gone to produce his later mental difficulties and so-called temptations, the clergyman may be giving inadequate advice. A doctor does not give advice at all; he helps the patient to form his own opinion. A clergyman may tend to advise and direct, but he needs to know the situation pretty thoroughly in order to do that. This situation may seem to bring us to the Emmanuel Movement again on a higher level. Again the desideratum seems to be an alliance between doctors and clergymen. The doctor carries out the analysis, and gives the clergyman information about the analysis. But in the course of an analysis there springs up a strong feeling of *rappori* with the analyst (“transference”) which is an important factor in the cure, but which is strictly individual. This factor of the influence of the doctor is one which cannot be handed on to someone else. Nor can you

hand on the patient himself to someone else. Since the physician has had the advantage of this *rapport*, he should use it as far as he can. He must use it with extreme tact, in the Socratic manner. If he is dogmatic, the whole process of analysis is disturbed. An analyst who tends to lay down the law is not a good analyst. If he is apt to express strong views while the patient is humbly displaying his past life, he often simply succeeds in shutting up the patient entirely. In order to understand the real conditions of the subject, the physician must be self-effacing. Any advice must be given by implication, and the patient must feel that he has made the decision himself. This is one of the things psycho-analysis must achieve, to help the patient to face the responsibility himself. If the analyst gives definitely formal advice, the patient is tempted to take it and to put the responsibility on his adviser's shoulders. To that extent he has lost personality and has fallen in the scale of spiritual values.

What then remains for the clergyman to do? If the clergyman feels a special call to deal with psycho-neurotic cases, he should certainly get analysed himself and learn all he can about analysis, and although he may not have the opportunity of applying it, he should bear the facts in mind and apply them, and, when he deals with patients, take care not to be dogmatic. Many clergymen have realized this and have made a thorough study of analysis.

It might be objected that the above-mentioned method is appropriate only for a special group of illnesses, the so-called psycho-neuroses. But it is just these illnesses which have given the most considerable results in various forms of miraculous healing, Christian Science, and spiritual healing. This does not mean that such cases are always easy to cure, and if any method does produce a cure (not merely temporary relief) it is worthy of respect and consideration.

By implication I have suggested that psycho-therapeutic methods on the plane of positive science, viz. hypnotism, suggestion, and analysis, might have their beneficial influence upon more definitely physical illness. We cannot draw a hard-and-fast line between the functional and the organic. Although

there is a practical gap between so-called functional cases and the others, we cannot be sure that a more energetic attack on the mental side might not be more beneficial with the latter. Even in diseases where it is a matter of infection, it is a question not only of the virulence of the infection but also of the powers of resistance possessed by the patient. These powers have to do with his general vitality, and much to do with the state of his nervous system. They are closely related to his state of mind, outlook on life, and general mental make-up. By cultivation of the mind he may increase the powers of resistance to physical illness, and even where the illness has no ethical significance the recovery may be facilitated by development of greater force of character.

One modern school of spiritual healing is that represented by the Guild of Health. Its late chairman, the Rev. Harold Anson, has written a most important work on the subject.<sup>1</sup> His view of spiritual healing is that it is a healing of the entire man, and that one cannot otherwise distinguish the mental from the spiritual. If you are considering the whole personality you are dealing with the spiritual form of healing. You may heal any particular part of the personality, remove a patient's paralysis, or diminish his fear of some particular disease, and so help him in that way, and this may be called mental healing, but if you are considering his general outlook on life, that is spiritual. To this extent you may say that every form of healing from this point of view is spiritual healing, even the giving of a pill if it is given with the intention of helping the patient to adjust himself more satisfactorily to the demands of life and to realize his potentialities more adequately. Illuminating as this view is, it is doubtful whether it adequately distinguishes spiritual healing from mental healing. As psychologists, we always deal with the entire personality; even when we meet with apparent dissociation of one part of the mind from the rest, we are aiming at harmony and endeavouring to strengthen the mind, and to help the more

<sup>1</sup> Harold Anson, *Spiritual Healing*, University of London Press, Ltd., 1923. Apart from this general question of definition, the book is full of valuable suggestions on the subject.

healthy part of the mind to deal adequately with the unhealthy part. The patient is maladapted, and we endeavour to help him to attain more satisfactory adaptation. It is very difficult to define the conception of the spiritual.

There is another possibility which seems cruder, yet may be truer, viz. that the spiritual is something which can come to the person from beyond himself, if he prays for it in the right spirit, and makes adequate contact with this wider sphere of reality. There is a real spiritual world with which we are in contact to different extents at different times. We may under certain conditions increase our sense of the spiritual and our expectation of help. The spiritual in that sense would be distinct from the natural, and there would be a very pronounced dividing line between anything natural that has to do with the use of ordinary laws, mental and physical, and this appeal for spiritual aid.

This brings us at once to the vexed question of miracles. Do miracles happen? Is there ever an interference with the natural order of events? Within that natural order must be included the mental as well as the physical. Many people, including some theologians, say that miracles do not happen, because it would be derogatory to God to assume that He made the world so imperfect that He needed to interfere with it on special occasions. But this argument is of doubtful force. We come to the explanation of the purpose of individual existence, and one theory is that men have been created as separate individuals and given the power to achieve greater freedom in order that they may create or develop their own souls. There may well be an arrangement whereby these souls can be helped from beyond themselves if they ask for it, just as in this life there is adjustment even in the more naturalistic order for a person to get what he asks for. If one person is content with existence at a low level, he can become adapted to that level, and live a fairly happy life. Another person has divine discontent, feels he wants something higher, and by striving achieves it. Even in healing, the patient gets from the doctor what he deserves. Some patients get much more help from the doctor than others, because of their mental attitude. In the same way

we as individuals can get varying degrees of help from God in accordance with our mental attitude. An occurrence that may seem a miracle from the outside may not be a miracle in the sense of any breach of continuity; there is no overthrow of any of the laws of nature, but there is that *addition* which is possible, though we are not anxious to admit it too readily here. But we admit it in other walks of life. In the realm of art surely the person who is most whole-heartedly devoted to his art and awaits an inspiration, is the one most likely to get it. Inspiration comes to the great artist. Can we not think of spiritual help coming in the same way to him who really, whole-heartedly desires it, in the right way, not on an ego-centric basis, not for individual advancement and help, but for the sake of goodness as such, for the sake of a higher level of development in every direction? The final test is the pragmatic one. Spiritual healing should be tested by its permanent results. Such testing is a very difficult problem; it is difficult to test these cases of spiritual healing. You need to know the diagnosis, whether it is reasonably accurate and made with adequate skill, the state of the patient's mind, the possible hysterical, or other psychoneurotic addition to the illness, and how far the result is permanent. It is very difficult to get this evidence.

NOTE. A fuller account of Mrs. Eddy's life and teaching, from the point of view of psychotherapy, is to be found in Professor Pierre Janet's *Psychological Healing*, vol. i, Allen and Unwin, 1925. The "official" life is, I understand, by Sibyl Wilbur, *The Life of Mary Baker Eddy*, Harrap, London, 1908. There is also a life by Georgine Milmine, *The Life of Mary Baker P. Eddy and the History of Christian Science*, reprinted with additions from *McClure's Magazine*, Doubleday, New York, 1909.

## CHAPTER VII

### PLATO AND ARISTOTLE

THE history of men's views on the nature of the emotions or passions is part of the history of ethical speculation in general, and as it is only within the last few decades (with several prominent exceptions) that the psychological problem has been attacked for its own sake and with a minimum of reference to its ethical aspect, so it is only in the most recent years that moralists are finding it necessary to set themselves once more the question, What is the significance and importance of the emotions in the formulation of the moral ideal?

Practical needs must have instituted, and language fixed, many distinctions in the conception of the life of feeling in quite primitive times; but if one turns to the earliest known forms of philosophical speculation, the ancient philosophies of India, one finds the emotions and morality there related to one another in a merely negative way. Individual life, the life of the emotions and desires, is considered to be full of pain and misery, of vice and worthlessness. The only right rule of conduct is that which attempts the suppression of all desires, and chiefly of the desire for life itself, from which all miseries flow, so that the individual "Atman" may at length escape the wheel of continual re-births and lose himself in the universal passionless existence of Brahma, the substance of the cosmos. In pre-Buddhistic times the way of salvation advocated was asceticism or self-martyrdom of the most rigorous kind, an asceticism directed not only against the body but also, and much more especially, against the soul, in order to eradicate every desire or tendency to desire and so eventually to bring about its complete annihilation as an individual existence.

Gautama, the founder of Buddhism, changed, not the end of action; but the means to that end. Recognizing the futility of mere bodily asceticism and its impracticability as a universal course of conduct, he advocated greater attention to the suppression of desires at their source, within the mind itself, and preached the doctrine of humility and universal benevolence.

In such wise, by more and more complete renunciation of the will to live, the soul at length entered Nirvana, a state marking the end of all its wearisome transmigrations.

In Greece, the earliest attempt to give a rational account of ethical laws and ethical practice is connected with the name of Socrates. Nevertheless, apart from the remarkable moral example set by his manner of life and death, the method of inductive enquiry which he inaugurated, and the profound impression made by both upon the mind of his brilliant pupil Plato, his positive doctrine that virtue is knowledge and that the good is the useful would set him but a little way ahead of the sophists of his time, among whom he was not altogether unjustly classed. Since complete knowledge carries with it *eo ipso* correct action, any scientific description and classification of the primitive impulses and passions are superfluous for his system. Ethically considered, they all fall into the same class as being naturally submissive to right reason.

Plato follows his master closely in the formal side of this ethical theory, and provides a metaphysical support for the identity of virtue and knowledge in his doctrine of ideas, in which the "idea of the good" is given the place of honour as the *fons et origo* of all the rest. On the material side, he has recourse to psychological analysis, and divides the human soul into three parts or faculties, viz. (1) τὸ λογιστικόν, the rational part, (2) τὸ θυμοειδές, the spirited part, (3) τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν, the appetitive part. He arrives at this classification on the principle that wherever there is *conflict* in the soul, the two elements at conflict are really distinct psychological elements. Thus, when the appetite of thirst is checked, that which checks it, e.g. reason, is a different element from that which thirsts. Despite a superficial resemblance, there is really little analogy between this classification and the modern tripartite division of consciousness into cognition, conation, and feeling. The spirited principle and the appetitive principle each involve both conation and feeling, nor can they exist without cognition. Even to say that conation and feeling are respectively predominant in the mental processes corresponding to these two parts would not be entirely true.

Each of these parts of the soul has its own particular excellence or virtue; that of the rational part is wisdom, φρόνησις or σοφία, that of the spirited part valour, ἀνδρεία, and that of the appetitive part temperance or moderation, σωφροσύνη. In the conflicts of the soul the spirited part, which is the basis of such affections as anger, sense of honour, etc., usually sides with reason against appetite, and indeed should be expected to do so. Its virtue, therefore, is higher than that of appetite, the latter consisting solely of submission to reason. Spirit (θυμός) is both subject and ally of reason; appetite is subject only.

The union of these three virtues in correct proportions constitutes a fourth virtue of the soul, viz. justice, δικαιοσύνη. Since, however, man's chief good can only be attained within a State, Plato describes an ideal community where the three psychological elements of the individual man are represented, "on a larger scale," by three classes of citizens, the rulers and educators, the warriors, and the craftsmen and agriculturists. Each class is to possess its own particular virtue—wisdom, courage, or temperance, as the case may be—and justice within the community implies each citizen and each class of citizens doing its own work and not meddling in that of others. It is to be noted that members of the third class, the craftsmen and agriculturists, are denied the virtues of wisdom and valour, and are supposed capable of temperance only. This pronounced subordination of the individual moral end to the more universal end of the State, which is worked out in such detail in the *Republic*, is to a great extent abandoned in the *Laws*, where class distinctions are less emphasized and wisdom recedes somewhat in favour of moderation or temperance as the essence of moral activity.

The need and importance of the process of *habituation* in producing established virtue, although generally regarded as one of the advances made by Aristotle upon earlier views of morality, was thoroughly appreciated by Plato. Among several passages in which this view is explicitly stated, the following sentence from the *Republic* (444 c.) possesses a special interest as being expressed in almost the same words as those used by Aristotle, *Nicom. Eth.*, Bk. II. It runs: Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ μὲν δίκαια

πράττειν δικαιοσύνην ἔμποιεῖ, τὸ δ' ἄδικα ἀδικίαν; Ἀνάγκη. ["In the same way, does not the performance of just acts beget the virtue of justice, and the performance of unjust acts the vice of injustice? Inevitably."] The distinction between "civic" and "philosophic" virtue also turns upon the fact that habituation is of itself sufficient to produce the former.

In the philosophy of Aristotle ethics is, to a very great extent, if not entirely, separated from metaphysics and based almost exclusively upon psychological data. The new concept of *will* is introduced and the importance of habituation or practice is emphasized. Adopting the Platonic distinction of the rational and irrational parts of the soul, Aristotle proceeds to give a greatly improved analysis of each of these elements. He calls them that which possesses reason (λόγον ἔχον) and that which partakes of reason (λόγου μετέχον), respectively. In the case of the latter he over-rides the distinction of θυμός and ἐπιθυμία and replaces it by a remarkably detailed and accurate analysis of the passions. This, the first scientific account of the passions to be found in literature, is given in the *Rhetoric*, Book II.<sup>1</sup> Passion is here defined as follows: "Passions are all emotions whatsoever on which pain and pleasure are consequent, by whose operation, undergoing a change, men differ in respect to their decisions: for instance, anger, pity, fear, and whatsoever other emotions are of such a nature, and those opposed to them." The complete list is: Anger, Placability; Love and Friendliness, Enmity and Hatred; Fear, Confidence (or Assurance); Shame, Impudence; Benevolence (χάρις); Pity, Indignation; Envy, Emulation. With the exception of χάρις, these passions exist in pairs of opposites.

Of each of them three things may be considered: (1) *How* men are affected, (2) *towards whom*, (3) *for what*.

*Anger* is a painful desire for revenge, arising from injury to oneself or one's friends. It is not entirely painful, however, since "there is a sort of pleasure consequent on all anger, arising out of the hope of avenging oneself." It is felt against individuals, not against the species.

<sup>1</sup> The quotations that follow are taken from Buckley's translation (Bohn's Series).

*Placability*: "A subsiding and appeasement of anger," felt towards the repentant, the humble, the angry, those who are attentive to us, and those whom we fear. The last of these is emphasized by the statement that "it is impossible to feel anger and fear at the same time"—a view which is surely only correct, if at all, in cases of intense excitement of these passions.

*Love or Friendliness* is "the wishing a person what we think good, for his sake and not for our own, and, as far as is in our power, the exerting ourselves to procure it."

*Hatred* is the opposite of love, and is caused by anger, annoyance or vexatiousness, and calumny. It differs from anger in six respects: (1) anger is limited to injuries affecting oneself, directly or indirectly, hatred is not; (2) anger is felt towards individuals only, hatred may be felt towards whole classes; (3) time allays anger, but not hatred; (4) anger merely desires to inflict pain, hatred to do deadly injury; (5) anger is accompanied by pain, hatred is not; (6) anger may eventually be followed by pity for the misfortunes of its object, hatred never. Hatred "desires the extinction of the object of hate."

*Fear* is "a sort of pain or agitation, arising out of an idea that an evil, capable either of destroying or giving pain, is impending on us." The objects which occasion it are danger, injustice, insulted virtue invested with power, *the fear of our enemies*, accomplices, the wronged, rivals, the mild and dissembling (which are more to be feared than the hasty).

*Confidence or Assurance* is the opposite of fear, and inspired by the opposite of what occasions fear.

*Shame* is "a kind of pain and agitation about evils present, past, or to come, which appear to tend to loss of reputation." The objects which occasion it are cowardice, intemperance, meanness, adulation, vanity.

*Impudence* is "a sort of callousness" about these things.

*Benevolence* (χάρις) is "that conformably to which he who has the power is said to confer a benefit on one who needs it, not in return for anything, nor in order that anything may accrue to him who so confers it, but that some benefit may arise to the object." This definition should be compared with that of love.

*Pity* is "a sort of pain occasioned by an evil capable of hurting or destroying, appearing to befall one who does not deserve it, which one may himself expect to endure, or that someone connected with him will; and this when it appears near." It must be distinguished from *horror*, which has a tendency to expel pity and produce a contrary effect.

This definition of pity is followed closely by Hobbes in the *Leviathan*, where he says: "Grief for the calamity of another is *pity*, and ariseth from the imagination that the like calamity may befall himself." Pity and fear are in fact excited by the same objects in relation to another and oneself respectively.

*Indignation* is opposed to pity. Whereas pity is felt towards the undeservedly unfortunate, indignation is aroused by undeserved good fortune.

*Envy*, which is also opposed to pity, differs from indignation in being aroused by the good fortune of the deserving. Persons likely to be envied are: equals, rivals, the successful, and those whose success is a tacit reproach to ourselves.

*Emulation* is "a sort of pain at the apparent presence of goods which are held in honour, and which admit of one's gaining them himself, in the case of those naturally our equals; felt, not because they are present to *another*, but because they are *not likewise* present to oneself." Hence emulation is naturally or essentially a virtuous passion, whereas envy is essentially vicious.

(a) The persons likely to feel emulation are: the young and high-spirited, those enjoying the esteem of their fellows, those with worthy relatives or ancestors.

(b) The persons likely to be objects of emulation are: those whom one admires or desires to resemble.

(c) The things likely to be objects of emulation are: virtues, goods, wealth, etc.

*Contempt* is the opposite of emulation.

It may be observed that the detailed descriptions of the passions which he gives are all in terms of pain and pleasure,<sup>1</sup> supplemented by statements of occasions and causes which are not always strictly psychological in nature.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Nicom. Eth.*, Bk. II, ch. v, 2. λέγω δὲ πᾶσιν . . . ὅλως οἷς ἐπιταί ἡδονὴ ἢ λύπη.

This view of the emotions, viz. that psychologically considered they consist merely of pleasures and pains, has persisted almost down to our own times.

Again, Aristotle nowhere says whether these passions are to be regarded as equally primitive and simple or subordinated one to another in complexity. On his theory of their psychological nature the question could not arise.

A slightly different list of the emotions or passions occurs in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Bk. II., ch. v, ¶ 2, where he says:<sup>1</sup> "I mean by passions, desire, anger, fear, boldness, envy, joy, friendliness, hatred, longing, emulation, pity; in short, everything that is accompanied by pleasure or pain." This is a loose enumeration given merely as an illustration of the meaning of πάθος. Desire and longing are obviously not co-ordinate with the others as states of consciousness.

In this same passage the important distinction is drawn between πάθος and δύναμις, a distinction which is almost identical with the modern one between "emotion" and "emotional disposition." Thus Aristotle writes: "I call those *faculties* (or dispositions, δυνάμεις) by reason of which we are said to be capable of feeling emotions, as, for instance, capable of being angry, of suffering pain, of feeling pity," and he proceeds to describe a third element or category of the mind, ἕξεις (states or habits), "according to which we stand in a certain relation, good or bad, to the emotions; as, for instance, with regard to anger, we are in a bad condition if our anger is too violent, or too slack, in a good one if we hit the happy mean." Perhaps the difference between this and the preceding element might be stated in modern terminology as an antithesis between "acquired" and "innate" dispositions.<sup>2</sup> The parallels, however, in this and in the previous case are of doubtful applicability, since modern psychology has drawn its distinctions along slightly different lines.

With ἕξεις we have reached the proper subject of moral judgments. Ἀρετή, virtue or excellence, is a ἕξις, a state or

<sup>1</sup> The following quotations are taken from the translations in the notes of Sir Alexander Grant's edition of the *Nicomachean Ethics*.

<sup>2</sup> *Nicom. Eth.*, II, 5. δυνατοὶ μὲν ἔσμεν φύσει.

disposition of the mind, produced by habituation through the activity of the will or deliberative choice (προαίρεσις),<sup>1</sup> in accordance with reason. The *material* of moral activity, then, is the whole gamut of the emotions or the emotional dispositions, and the moral activity or virtue is separate and distinct in each separate case—although Aristotle's superficial identification of emotions with pleasures and pains supplies him with a common denominator, as it were, in terms of which he might have built up a hedonistic system<sup>2</sup> which would have slurred over these distinctions, an error from which he is saved by a moral insight rising superior to his psychological theory.

The *formal* characteristic which makes them all identical as virtue is given in his doctrine of the mean (μεσότης). The virtue corresponding to any particular emotion or emotional disposition is a mean state which avoids both excess and deficiency, both the too much and the too little; not a mere objective quantitative mean, the arithmetic mean of two fixed upper and lower limits of intensity of the emotion, but a subjective qualitative mean relative to the character and circumstances of the agent. Thus the emotions of fear and daring, when occurring in excess, exhibit the vices of cowardice and rashness respectively, when in defect vices, anonymous in the first case and cowardice in the second, but when occurring with a medium intensity which avoids both of these extremes and is correctly adjusted to all the circumstances of the case, exhibit the virtue of courage. ὁ μὲν οὖν ἀ δεῖ καὶ οὐ ἔνεκα ὑπομένων καὶ φοβούμενος, καὶ ὡς δεῖ καὶ ὅτε, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ θαρρῶν, ἀνδρείος κατ' ἀξίαν γάρ καὶ ὡς ἂν ὁ λόγος, πάσχει καὶ πράττει ὁ ἀνδρείος (*N.E.*, III. vii, 5).

Virtue is summarily defined in *N.E.*, II, vi, 15, as "that quality of the will which preserves the mean suitably to our nature, conformably to a reasonable definition, such as the man of insight would give."<sup>3</sup> It is reason, then, which fixes the mean, but this reason is practical, not theoretical; it involves

<sup>1</sup> προαίρεσις = βουλευτική ὄρεξις τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν: deliberative appetite of things in our power.

<sup>2</sup> *Nicom. Eth.*, II, iii, 1. περὶ ἡδονῶν γὰρ καὶ λύπης ἐστὶν ἡ ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ.

<sup>3</sup> Zeller's translation of the following passage: ἐστὶν ἄρα ἡ ἀρετὴ ἕξις προαιρετική, ἐν μεσότητι οὕσα τῇ πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ὠρισμένη λόγῳ καὶ ᾧ ἂν ὁ φρόνιμος ὀρίσειεν.

insight and judgment in the realm of particular facts, knowledge of the end to be aimed at in particular cases and also in conduct in general; knowledge, too, of the means necessary to realize that end. Its excellence or virtue is φρόνησις, prudence or insight, an *intellectual* virtue, as contrasted with the *moral* virtues hitherto considered, embodied in the φρόνιμος or man of insight. The φρόνιμος is the man who has acquired through moral experience a kind of moral "taste" (analogous to æsthetic taste), a sense of the moral fitness or unfitness of forms of conduct; who is, as it were, the living criterion of moral activity. Although tradition, education, and training help to account for this virtue, they do not entirely explain it, and Aristotle has not quite escaped the charge of circular reasoning often levelled at him in regard to this view of φρόνησις and the φρόνιμος. Indeed, he may be not unjustly claimed as a supporter of *intuitionism*, since his description corresponds better to the purification, by experience, of a moral insight which had always been present as an essential potentiality of the human soul, than to a production of it from experiences and activities which do not themselves presuppose it.

Of the list of individual virtues which Aristotle draws up, the two at the head, courage and temperance, are based upon the animal nature of man as opposed to his social nature, δοκοῦσι γὰρ τῶν ἀλόγων μερῶν αὗται εἶναι αἱ ἀρεταί (III, x, 1). Courage is a μεσότης περὶ φόβους καὶ θάρρη, and is peculiarly related to the perils of war. It must include nobleness of purpose; "to the brave man courage is something morally beautiful. Of this nature, then, must be the end of courage, for it is the end of a thing which in each case determines its character. Therefore the beautiful is the end for the sake of which the brave man endures and does whatever is brave."<sup>1</sup> In the course of the discussion on this virtue occurs the important passage, οὐ δὴ ἐν ἀπάσαις ταῖς ἀρεταῖς τὸ ἡδέως ἐνεργεῖν ὑπάρχει, πλὴν ἐφ' ὅσον τοῦ τέλους ἐφάπτεται (III, ix, 5): "it is not the case that in all the virtues virtuous action is accompanied by pleasure, save in so far as he attains the end." Aristotle in this case seems definitely to place the idea of τοῦ

<sup>1</sup> *Nicom. Eth.*, III, vii, 6, Sir A. Grant's translation.

καλοῦ ἕνεκα higher than the mere material success, discounted by physical pain, etc., in his conception of the ἡδὺ constituting the end of virtue.

In Bk. III, ch. viii, occurs an enumeration and description of five spurious forms of courage (ἕτεροι κατὰ πέντε τρόπους), produced by (1) regard for reputation among one's fellows, (2) knowledge and previous experience of the particular danger, (3) anger, (4) light-hearted confidence, (5) ignorance of the danger.<sup>1</sup> Anger (θυμός) is singled out as being most closely related to genuine courage: φυσικωτάτη δ' ἔοικεν ἢ διὰ τὸν θυμὸν εἶναι, καὶ προσλαβοῦσα προαίρεσιν καὶ τὸ οὐ ἕνεκα ἀνδρεία εἶναι. Sir A. Grant comments on this whole passage as follows: "It is remarkable on what a high level Aristotle places courage. It must be entirely, he says, prompted by a desire for what is morally beautiful (οἱ μὲν οὖν ἀνδρεῖοι διὰ τὸ καλὸν πράττουσιν); mere physical courage is only an assistance in realizing this (ὁ δὲ θυμὸς συνεργεῖ αὐτοῖς), and the prompting of anger, etc., will make men pugnacious, but not brave. . . . Perhaps Aristotle makes almost too great a separation between true courage and this 'spirited element,' which must be its physical basis. This is to be attributed (1) to his high moral tone, (2) to his analytical mode of treatment." This contrast between the lofty moral end of courage and the narrow restriction of its sphere of application among the psychological "springs of action" is very striking, and would be rather surprising did we not bear in mind Aristotle's ground principle of connecting particular virtues with particular and mutually exclusive tendencies of the soul, and the limitations imposed upon him by language and the public opinion of his time and country. Here, as in so many other cases, his desire to improve on Plato has led him to prefer definiteness and precision of system to the attempt to do justice to a (then) so vague "promise and potency" of human nature which in later times developed into what is generally known as "moral" courage.

Temperance is the virtue which preserves the mean with

<sup>1</sup> For a brilliant modern study of courage, see *The Anatomy of Courage*, by Lord Moran, M.D., 3rd Edition, 1945, Constable.

regard to bodily as distinguished from mental pleasures, being restricted to the sphere of eating, drinking and sex. Although this conception of its nature and scope, which Aristotle sanctions in agreement with the spirit of his time, is based primarily upon the prudential considerations of health and self-control, Aristotle's account shows a clear recognition of the importance of subordinating lower to higher ends whenever conflict occurs. Its ultimate motive, as that in the case of all the other virtues, is the realization of human nature, and in this sense, as T. H. Green has shown, it is formally unimpeachable and points to as high an ideal as the moral sense and moral experience of the time admitted of being conceived.

The remaining virtues have more strict reference to the social environment of the individual. Briefly enumerated they are: liberality,<sup>1</sup> munificence,<sup>2</sup> high mindedness,<sup>3</sup> an unnamed virtue which is the mean state between ambition and lack of ambition, mildness,<sup>4</sup> truthfulness,<sup>5</sup> versatility,<sup>6</sup> friendliness,<sup>7</sup> modesty,<sup>8</sup> indignation,<sup>9</sup> and justice.<sup>10</sup> Of these, modesty and indignation (a mean between envy and malice) are not, strictly speaking, virtues at all. They are mean states of the passions—*ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὰ πάθη μεσότητες*<sup>11</sup>—not of developed attitudes of mind or *ἕξεις*. The others, taken in order, are mean states in respect of spending or giving money, on a small and large scale respectively (1 and 2), self-respect, love of honour, temper (*ὄργη*), social deportment (5, 6, and 7). Finally, justice occupies a place by itself. Two forms of it are recognized, viz. "distributive" justice and "corrective" (or adjustive) justice, and the proportionate distribution of goods and penalties is forced rather violently into the general scheme of the mean.<sup>12</sup>

It was mentioned above (p. 95) that *φρόνησις*, one of the so-called intellectual virtues, fixes the mean in each case, and

<sup>1</sup> ἐλευθεριότης.

<sup>2</sup> μεγαλοπρέπεια.

<sup>3</sup> μεγαλοψυχία.

<sup>4</sup> πραότης.

<sup>5</sup> ἀλήθεια.

<sup>6</sup> εὐτραπέλια.

<sup>7</sup> φιλία.

<sup>8</sup> αἰδώς.

<sup>9</sup> νέμεσις.

<sup>10</sup> δικαιοσύνη.

<sup>11</sup> *Nicom. Eth.*, II, vii, 14.

<sup>12</sup> It is interesting to contrast the Greek conception of justice, which has been summed up in the phrase "equals to the equal" (*ἴσα τοῖς ἴσοις*), with that of a modern reformer: "To everyone according to his need, from everyone according to his power" (Engels).

determines the steps to be taken in order to attain it. This virtue gives unity to the plurality of the individual moral virtues and guarantees the coherence of the moral system. Aristotle will not, however, accept without qualification the Socratic view that virtue is knowledge. Knowledge is indispensable to complete moral virtue, but virtue is dependent on more than knowledge in the ordinary acceptation of the word. This is shown by the phenomenon of ἀκρασία or incontinence, where the agent knows the right and approves of it as right, but does the wrong. "Video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor." Aristotle's solution of this problem, which is generally known as the *moral paradox*, is based upon an appeal to the distinction between actualized and latent knowledge. "The knowledge at such moments is not really actualized in the mind; it is reduced by appetite or passion to a condition of latency."<sup>1</sup>

Aristotle draws a clear distinction between the practical and the theoretical life, between action and contemplation (θεωρία), as represented in the lives of the statesman and the philosopher. He decides unhesitatingly in favour of the latter, as the highest life that man can lead, and nearest to Godliness. Οὐ χρὴ δὲ κατὰ τοὺς παραινούντας ἀνθρώπινα φρονεῖν ἄνθρωπον ὄντα οὐδὲ θνητὰ τὸν θνητόν, ἀλλ' ἐφ' ὅσον ἐνδέχεται ἀθανατίζειν (*N.E.*, X, vii, 8). We cannot entirely escape the "practical" life, but we should so organize it that we may achieve the fullest possible measure of "contemplation"—that we may "as far as possible live immortally." Immortality is not something to be awaited at the end of life, but can be achieved *now*, so far as we live the life of θεωρία.

<sup>1</sup> Henry Sidgwick, *History of Ethics*, 5th Edition, 1902, Macmillan & Co., p. 70.

## CHAPTER VIII

### MORAL VALUES

It might perhaps be expected that in passing from the psychological to the more strictly ethical aspects of personality we should devote special attention to a consideration of the origins of the so-called moral emotions. By these are generally meant the altruistic emotions, of which the typical instance is Benevolence. Some scientists even go so far as to state categorically that "Moral conduct is social conduct." This is a mere blunder. Morality is concerned with all forms of conduct and all forms of individual experience. The origin of some of these forms may be more apparent than that of others; although natural selection would seem capable of explaining altruistic tendencies, or tendencies subservient to the welfare of the tribe, clan, or species, quite as readily as those subserving the welfare of the individual. Our central problem, however, is to investigate the *value* of present-day human consciousness, and for this purpose the general theory of the sentiments together with an insight into the way in which these sentiments arise and form a complex conative and emotional system or developed character, are of more help than a knowledge of the origin of altruistic emotions, whether they have their source in the parental instinct or in the gregarious instinct or in some other primitive tendency. E. Westermarck, in his monumental work on *The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas*, devotes many pages to a discussion of what he terms the "moral emotions." These emotions are, according to him, the emotions of moral approval and disapproval, which are respectively related to Anger and Revenge on the one side, and Gratitude and other forms of Kindly Emotion on the other; and all of these states fall under the general heading, Retributive Emotions. According to Westermarck, all moral concepts and moral judgments are based upon these emotions. It is not my intention to discuss this theory. Whether correct or not, it envisages the problem of Emotions and Morals in a totally

different form from that which I have set before me for consideration, and I explicitly mention it in order to avoid misunderstanding. Moral consciousness is co-terminous with emotional and volitional consciousness. Praise and blame are but incidents in the story.

The great objection to the "Moral Sense" school has always been that it seems to make "moral approval" simply an emotion among other competing emotions, and so to undermine the validity and authority of its judgments. Yet the alternative, and generally preferred, course of classifying all judgments of value under the heading "Reason" is a questionable one. Although we may agree with Henry Sidgwick, for instance, in holding that the principles of Prudence, Rational Benevolence and Equity are axiomatic for all Moral Philosophy, nevertheless we find that, when we endeavour to bring them into relation with actual life and put them into practice, they involve us in interminable casuistry, and, when re-examined in the light of such detailed experience, appear reduced to mere tautology. The values are not here but in the concrete emotional life. Intellect is no doubt of great importance in the moral life, since by it alone can we trace the effects of conduct upon ourselves and upon the world at large, or—which comes to the same thing—obtain a full knowledge of what that conduct really is. This knowledge forms an integral part of the conduct as object for valuation. Valuation by whom or by what? Not by some special faculty of the mind, whether reason, or moral sense, or conscience, but by the entire personality, in so far as it is developed and systematized.

The notion of value is of economic origin, and first occurs in explicit form in Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations*, where it is identified with the satisfaction of man's needs and desires; but only recently has it been made the subject of specialized study. The chief names deserving of mention in this regard, after Nietzsche, are those of Ehrenfels, Kreibig, Meinong, Eisler, Cohn and Witasek in Germany, Tarde and Ribot in France, and Münsterberg and Urban in America. Kreibig defines value as follows: "By value in general, I mean the

importance that the content of a sensation or of a thought has for the subject, thanks to an actual feeling or to the state of tendency which is combined with this content either immediately or by association."

Witasek writes: "Value is always in intimate relation to desire," and again, "In morals, the essential is the value; there, all value is feeling and inversely all feeling is value."

In the judgment of value it is probable that the feeling determines the judgment. Nevertheless, some psychologists and philosophers hold the contrary view. Meinong, for example, contends that the pleasure which constitutes a value, being only recognized as such by a judgment, is secondary to that judgment, which is the necessary condition of its existence. The inevitable biological view is represented by Eisler, who writes: "The true explanation is that which traces back the values to the generic functions of the vital activity, that is, to the constant mode of reaction of the ultimate elements, to the elementary processes; which deduces them ultimately from the principle of organic conservation, understood not in the metaphysical sense, but in the empirical sense of oscillation about a perfect state of equilibrium." Ribot's contribution to the subject is an important book on *The Logic of the Feelings*,<sup>1</sup> in which he describes forms of "affective reasoning" consisting of a concatenation of judgments of value all of which are directed towards, and derive their value from, some particular end. A good example is that of an individual inspired by some all-absorbing passion.

This subject is intensely interesting and most important, but I cannot linger over it. It is sufficient to have emphasized the distinction between existential judgments (ordinary judgments of objective fact) on the one hand, and judgments of value on the other. These latter judgments are an integral part of the subject-matter of psychology. For an imaginary external observer, states of consciousness are matter for existential judgments. For the subject himself they are also matter for judgments of value. This it is which makes psychology so

<sup>1</sup> *La Logique des Sentiments*. I have discussed the subject in an article on "The Logic of the Emotions," in *The Quest*, vol. iii, July, 1912.

peculiar a science and so important as an introduction to ethics and religious philosophy.

Since man is in course of development here below, both individually and generically, his Chief Good or End is but partly apparent. Hegel's doctrine of Personality or Self-realization—"Be a person, and treat others as persons"—would seem to be most in harmony with psychological data, if we interpret personality in the light of the partial results hitherto achieved. No system of ethics can be entirely free from intuitionism, but an economy in the number of intuitions appealed to might be effected by summing up the principles of duty in the words: "Seek always the Highest Good." Experience teaches us that the richer and better organized is our character the greater is our good, and that the helping of others to greater possibilities of personality still further enriches our own. Discipline, intellectual enlightenment, much renunciation and an ever-present readiness for it, are, of course, necessary for the individual and are proved to be so by the value-experiences of the race. Moreover, the maxim leads us to anything but a comfortable egoistic doctrine of self-culture. The potentialities of the soul cannot be discovered except through experience, but we learn from experience that consciousness of a higher value results from self-denial and strenuous battle and even physical pain, in certain cases and in the long run, than from slothful passivity, timorous inaction, or careless enjoyment.

". . . To be weak is miserable,  
Doing or suffering."

Such estimates are no doubt subjective, as all strictly psychological facts must be. But are they *therefore* to be dismissed forthwith as arbitrary? Reason, it is generally admitted, is the evidence both of itself and of the truth of its object, and needs no external criterion. May it not be so with the universe of values? Moral insight does not, indeed, arise full-blown in the individual consciousness. As Hastings Rashdall has said: "Self-evident truths are not truths which are evident to everybody. There are degrees of moral illumination just as there are

degrees of musical sensibility or of mathematical acuteness." There must, too, be fluctuation of preferences from individual to individual, corresponding to their varying powers of experiencing vivid emotion. But despite these differences, and the variations of character which arise out of them, there seems to exist a pronounced tendency towards fundamental agreement. Lord Balfour remarked upon the curious combination of great divergence in the ways of thinking upon ethical problems with equally great agreement as regards the conclusions arrived at, which is shown in the writings of moralists. This fact seems to indicate that such theories should be classed as examples of the "logic of the feelings," whose nature has been described for us by Ribot.

Little has been said here about the intellectual side of ethics. It should, however, be distinctly understood that reason enters into our scheme of values. As is well known, Henry Sidgwick detected a fundamental tendency in the more developed forms of consciousness which he called "the desire to do what is right and reasonable as such." The satisfaction of this desire is a value, and it is one of the essential values of the higher life. Aristotle, after describing an ethical system for Greek gentlemen, in which the central idea was the moderating of the emotions, proceeded to sketch out a life of *θεωρία* or philosophic contemplation, which was alone worthy of the philosopher and his God. This tendency to give excessive value to intellectual activity has remained with us ever since. Nevertheless, while denying it a paramount importance, we can say that it is a *sine qua non* for morals. Virtue is at least knowledge. As Goethe said: "There is no more appalling sight than ignorance in action."<sup>1</sup>

The universe of values is not lawless or anarchic. It contains the evidence of its degrees of precedence in itself. The relative values of goods are intuitively discerned by the intellectually and morally trained individual. The only alternative is scepticism of the direst kind, emotional and intellectual alike—a tumultuous Nietzschean view which would indeed make of life

<sup>1</sup> "Es ist nichts schrecklicher als eine tätige Unwissenheit" (*Über Kunst und Altertum*, Bd. V, 1826).

“a tale  
Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury,  
Signifying nothing.”

### MUSIC AND MORALS

It may be in place here to devote some remarks, however brief and inadequate, to the question of the psychology of Music. The close relation between music and morals has been the subject of remark from very early times. Plato desired to banish certain modes or scales of music from his ideal State, viz. the Ionian and Lydian, because they were too effeminate and “lax.” On the other hand, he attached high moral value to the Dorian and Phrygian modes, since the one represented suitably “the tones and accents of a brave man engaged in a feat of arms, or in any violent operation, who, if he fails of success, or encounters wounds and death, or falls into any other calamity, in all such contingencies with unflinching endurance parries the blows of fortune”; the other, again, expressed “the feelings of one who is engaged in an occupation not violent, but peaceful and unconstrained; it may be, using persuasion and entreaty, addressing either a prayer to a god, or instruction and advice to a man; or, on the other hand, lending himself to the prayers or advice or persuasion of another, and after this succeeding to his wish; and not behaving arrogantly, but acting in all these circumstances with soberness and moderation, and in the same spirit acquiescing in every result.”<sup>1</sup> That music, again, is *the art of expressing emotions by means of sounds* has been the unshaken belief of the majority of great musicians, and also of many philosophers, among whom Schopenhauer is the most prominent example. Music, like poetry, seems to have had its origin in dancing (especially the pantomime dance), which is probably the earliest of the arts and is to be regarded as a specialized form of that expenditure of superfluous energy known as Play. In its earliest forms it was a social activity, predominantly characterized by accuracy of rhythm, the social utility of which in

<sup>1</sup> *Republic*, Book III, 399 b, c.

pursuits involving concerted action is obvious. Indeed, among certain of the Kaffir tribes even of the present day a mistake in rhythm in their concerted songs and dances is said to be punishable with death (Wallaschek, *Primitive Music*). The social characteristic is also apparent not only in the use of incantations in primitive magic, and in the fact that upon the ancient monuments, musicians are never represented singly but always in a group assisting at some ceremony; it is even prominent as late as the eighteenth century in the compositions of musicians like Bach and Handel, whose cantatas and oratorios were written for the use of the community, not for the satisfaction of art-critics.

The emotional theory of music is not without its rival, in the shape of a more "intellectualistic" view, supported by Kant, Herbart, Lotze, and even Rousseau, and expressed in its most concise and classical form by the Viennese critic, Hanslick, whose book, *Vom musikalisch-Schönen*, first appeared in 1854. According to Hanslick, music is concerned only with sounds, not with any subject, emotional or otherwise. In its essence, it consists of sound-forms in incessant movement, the auditory equivalent of *arabesques* in continuous kaleidoscopic change.

Hanslick does, indeed, admit that music may express the dynamic aspect of emotions, but not their contents. The theory is not unfitted to describe the achievements of mere technique and virtuosity, but as a general description of the art, the evidence against it is overwhelming. It is well known that Gluck, when composing the movement in *Iphigenia in Aulide* expressing the anger of Achilles, behaved so strangely in the street that he barely escaped arrest. Gounod openly declared an implacable hatred of mere formalism, and regarded emotion as the essence and meaning of music. Wagner writes of the domain of sounds—which he compares to an unbounded ocean, with the science of harmony as its regulative law—"It is the material of which the innumerable nuances in pitch, timbre or intensity are the adequate and natural expression of the innumerable nuances which can be displayed by pure emotion, *emotion in itself*, independently of all the causes which explain

it, of all the particular circumstances which characterize it."

Particular emotions cannot be adequately expressed by sounds, since they involve the idea of a particular object. Only generalized emotion can be so expressed, if indeed it is justifiable to use the distinction of particular and general in this sense at all. In opera the music is much more general than the words, and we are told that Wagner in some scenes of his operas composed the melody before the words. A certain amount of individuality is contributed by the different emotional characteristics of the different instruments of the orchestra, whereby the effect may be produced of emotional conflict between distinct individuals. The *Leitmotiv* is a device which, though partly conventional, completely fulfils its purpose of singling out a particular individual or a particular emotion. Those who go so far, however, as to assign to each key and scale its appropriate emotion, do so at their peril. Thus the key of E $\flat$  minor, which for Schubert was the expression of the Trinity, in the view of Gretry indicated "an immanent catastrophe"!

Music has developed *pari passu* with verbal language, and it is not, strictly speaking, translatable in terms of the latter. It may, in literal truth, be named *the language of the soul*, in that it expresses directly, and not through the intermediation of abstract concepts or plastic images, the fundamental spiritual forces at work in Man and in Nature. In the combined action of rhythm and harmony within the melody we have a direct expression of the alternations of desire and fulfilment, estrangement and reconciliation,<sup>1</sup> pervading all Life.

<sup>1</sup> "Entzweiung und Versöhnung," Schopenhauer, *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*, Drittes Buch, Kap. 39. "Why rushed the discords in but that harmony should be prized?" (Robert Browning.)

## CHAPTER IX

# PERSONALITY AND EVOLUTION

THE most throughgoing attempt, in modern times, to produce a metaphysics of evolution is that of Henri Bergson; and as his approach to the problem is psychological, we may obtain some light on the relation of evolution to personality from a detailed study of his philosophical system.

Like most philosophers, Bergson starts out from the individual consciousness. Here he finds that the most characteristic quality is change, continuous and progressive. No two moments of consciousness are ever exactly alike. So-called "states" of consciousness are hypostatized abstractions, resulting from the use of language to describe the workings of the mind. Consciousness is a stream, of which the successive pulses interpenetrate one another to a greater or less degree. We become aware of this interpenetration or continuity by an act of intuition in which the mind turns back upon itself, "does violence to itself," and in a fleeting moment transcends the subject-object distinction by being one with itself.

### INTUITION AND INTELLECT

Within the individual mind itself there is, according to Bergson, a twofold tendency: one towards spirituality, in which the mutual interpenetration of mental processes would be complete; the other towards materiality and spatiality, where the interpenetration is at a minimum and the states are really states external, or almost external, to one another. Mind is predominantly spiritual in an act of volition. It is itself moving towards spatiality and materiality in moments of passive reverie. In the former case, the mind gathers itself together in its entirety and propels itself forward into the future in a free creative act. In the latter, it becomes materialized in the form of extended externally-related images. The antithesis is one between intensity or tension on the one hand, and extensity on the other. Spirit is known by intuition, matter is

known by intellect. In most cases both intuition and intellect are needed, since the objects known are generally partly spiritual, partly material. In fact, complete materiality or spatiality, in which there would be mere quality-less points completely external to one another, absolutely indifferent to one another, is a limiting case never reached by actual matter. The function of intellect is to know matter; it has developed *pari passu* with the movement towards materiality in order to know this movement, but for unexplained reasons it has shot beyond its goal and passed to the limiting stage of empty space. Geometry expresses the properties of empty space, and intellect is "ballasted with geometry." The method of the intellect is essentially geometrical and mathematical. Its attempted reduction of all quality to quantity, in the natural sciences, is the logical outcome of its nature and functions.

#### TIME AND FREE WILL

The psychical "states," classified and described by the empirical psychologist, are abstractions, moments of the flux of consciousness torn from their context, instantaneous snapshots of the ever-changing mental life. These states are then employed to reconstruct consciousness by being placed end-to-end, one after another, in a homogeneous time which flows at a perfectly uniform rate and exerts no sort of influence whatever upon them. Such a picture may represent tolerably well for our practical needs time that has elapsed. It is entirely false as a representation of time and consciousness in the process of elapsing. The psychological present is not a mathematical point, but has a certain breadth in which the immediate past, the immediate future, and the experienced transition from one to the other, are present together. This "specious present" gives us real duration or real time. It is a continuous process, apprehended as continuous by intuition. It is to be carefully distinguished from the "elapsed" time just described. Elapsed time is a hybrid concept formed by the union of the concept of succession taken from the actual experience of duration and the concept of distinctness, given by experience of space. It is, in fact, "spatialized time."

The problem of the freedom of the will has been made insoluble by a confusion of these two kinds of time. Determinists and libertarians alike replace duration or real time by spatialized time. Both loosen the solidarity of the past with the present; both over-emphasize the distinction of the motive and the man himself, the will and the deed. Conduct, so far as spiritual, cannot be predicted, because it involves from moment to moment real creation. The knowledge of conditions necessary for any such prediction would have to be an inside knowledge, an actual living of a man's life, and this living would have to extend to the moment of consciousness of the act which was to have been predicted. Freedom of the will is a reality, since spirit is a reality. Indeed, freedom is spirit and spirit is freedom. Freedom is possible through memory, and we shall see presently that Bergson identifies memory with spirit.

### *ÉLAN VITAL*

Turning from the individual consciousness to cosmic process in general, we find the evolutionary progress of the world most explicable in terms of an original *élan vital* or vital impulse, a creative principle which has deposited matter in the course of its progress and is now engaged in making this matter an instrument of freedom by organizing it. An unexplained interruption or inversion of the vital impulse at an unspecified moment of its history<sup>1</sup> originated a downward movement towards materiality and necessity, so that now the whole universe, like the individual mind, is a struggle between an upward expansive movement towards spirituality and freedom, and a downward movement towards materiality and a uniform diffusion which is space.

"Let us imagine a vessel full of steam at a high pressure, and here and there in its sides a crack through which the steam is escaping in a jet. The steam thrown into the air is nearly all condensed into little drops which fall back, and this condensation and this fall represent simply the loss of something, an interruption, a deficit. But a small part of the jet of steam

<sup>1</sup> This introduces a very serious difficulty into Bergson's system—a difficulty which faces all those philosophers who believe in the ultimate reality of time.

persists, uncondensed, for some seconds; it is making an effort to raise the drops which are falling; it succeeds at most in retarding their fall. So, from an immense reservoir of life, jets must be gushing out unceasingly, of which each, falling back, is a world. The evolution of living species within this world represents what persists of the primitive direction of the original jet, and of an impulsion which continues itself in a direction the inverse of materiality. But let us not carry too far this comparison. It gives us but a feeble and even deceptive image of reality, for the crack, the jet of steam, the forming of the drops, are determined necessarily, whereas the creation of a world is a free act, and the life within the material world participates in this liberty. Let us think rather of an action like that of raising the arm; then let us suppose that the arm, left to itself, falls back, and yet that there persists in it, striving to raise it up again, something of the will that animates it. In this image of a *creative action which unmakes itself*, we have already a more exact representation of matter. In vital activity we see, then, that which persists of the direct movement in the inverted movement, *a reality which is making itself in a reality which is unmaking itself.*<sup>1</sup>

Variation, struggle for existence, and survival of the fittest all find an explanation in terms of this meta-physical hypothesis. The different species and genera and orders are the outcome of the struggle of the vital impulse to overcome matter and convert necessity into freedom. Progress along certain lines of evolution has been more successful than along others. The greatest advance has been made in the cases of the Insects, headed by the Hymenoptera, and the Vertebrates, whose highest stage is Man. These two great divisions of the animal kingdom are diverging and complementary lines of evolution. In the one, instinct has developed at the expense of intelligence; in the other, intelligence has developed at the expense of instinct. Instinct is to be regarded as a form of knowledge, and is identical with intuition. It may be unconscious knowledge, and is indeed a knowledge acted rather than felt. Intelligence, on the other hand, is a knowledge of relations. It is

<sup>1</sup> *Creative Evolution*, pp. 260, 261, Eng. tr.

cinematographical in nature, that is, it breaks up the stream of Becoming into a series of instantaneous views, which it then puts in the place of reality and tries to explain in terms of their relations to one another. This form of apprehension has been developed for the purpose of knowing matter, mainly, if not entirely, with a view to acting upon matter. Its "instantaneous views" are things, states, and concepts, and its characteristic mode of procedure is to join like to like, because it is only through resemblances that the mind can predict material changes and practically interfere in their production. But, really, "there are no things, there are only actions." The intellect falsifies its data in order to get a practical knowledge of them, and needs to be supplemented by intuition. Now intuition, which is instinct, is not entirely absent in man. The compact and luminous nucleus of intellect is surrounded by a vague fringe of intuition, and philosophic as distinct from scientific thought consists in the use of this intuition to revivify knowledge and to put meaning into the laws and other products of intellectual activity. The value of the great philosophies of the past resides in their intuition. The play of dialectic, though useful and even necessary to test this intuition, is of subordinate value and importance. The one and only "method" of philosophy is the method of intuition. The philosopher is he who starts life with a special endowment of this faculty of insight and develops it still further by practice and attention to the facts of inner and outer experience. Intuition comes to one but seldom, and then only in brief flashes. The "practical" man ignores it even when it does come, and can find no use for it in his intellectual constructions and beliefs.

### CREATIVE EVOLUTION

Mechanism and teleology are alike incapable of explaining the world-process. Both, alike, ignore the fact of continuous creation, and assume that "all is given." This is obvious in the case of mechanism, and a moment's thought will show that teleology is open to the same objection. According to teleology, the universe or the individual, or both, are in process of fulfilling a plan; but, although the fulfilment is projected into the

future it exists, as a plan, *now*. The truth is that this distinction of form and matter is merely a distinction relative to our needs, a distinction made for this reason by our intellect. But knowledge is wider than intellect, just as reality is wider than matter. From the point of view of knowledge, there is an impassable gulf fixed between organized and unorganized matter. Intellect is capable of knowing the latter, being indeed in a sense identical with it and having a parallel evolutionary history. Not so, however, in the case of the former. The biological and psychological sciences make use of intellectual concepts, it is true, but they need the addition of intuition to grapple with the characteristics of reality which form the essence of their subject-matter.

The legitimacy of assuming a general vital impulse in the explanation of organic evolution is vindicated by its success. Random variations, be they continuous or discrete, finite or infinitesimal, will never explain how a complicated organ, such as the vertebrate eye, has become evolved. The eye is of such a delicate construction that variations of different kinds in different parts of it must be most accurately adjusted one to another, if they are not to interfere with the function of vision. The odds against this correlation happening by chance are too enormous to contemplate. Nor can individual variations be imagined as waiting for their complementary variations and being preserved in the meantime, since this is contrary to the Darwinian principle that useless variations are not preserved. The Lamarckian view of the inheritability of acquired characters does not help us here, apart from the great difficulty which biologists find in accepting it at all. But the complete inadequacy of the ordinary concepts of biological science becomes apparent when we find, as we do, similar structures appearing on divergent lines of evolution. The eye of a certain mollusc, the Pecten,<sup>1</sup> exhibits remarkably close analogies with the vertebrate eye. Yet by far the greater part of its evolution must have occurred after the divergence of the mollusc and vertebrate lines took place. The only mechanical explanation

<sup>1</sup> Bergson's use of this illustration has been criticized by biologists, on the point of fact. But the criticism, although justified, does not destroy the main argument.

which can be suggested is that of Eimer, which would account for the similarity of structure by the identity of an external influence—in this case, light—to which the organs have been exposed. The two organs have been evolved in adaptation to a common influence. But adaptation may be either passive or active. It is passive adaptation alone which would be able to explain such a similarity of evolution as we have before us. Now, as a matter of fact, the adaptation of the eye to light does indeed start by being passive—the light causes the original pigment spot—but this form of adaptation quickly gives place to an active adaptation in which the organ and the organism make use of light for their own ends, and active adaptation no longer fits in with Eimer's theory. Consequently, we are driven back to the view of an original impulse pushing forward in different directions. The similarity of the eyes of the mollusc and the vertebrate is a consequence of the identity of impulse underlying their evolution. The materiality of an organ or organism "does not represent a sum of means employed [as in the case of an artificially constructed machine], but a sum of obstacles avoided; it is a negative rather than a positive reality. . . . The vision of a living being is an *effective* vision, limited to objects on which the being can act; it is a vision that is *canalized*, and the visual apparatus simply symbolizes the work of canalizing. Therefore the creation of the visual apparatus is no more explained by the assembling of its anatomic elements than the digging of a canal could be explained by the heaping-up of the earth which might have formed its banks. A mechanistic theory would maintain that the earth had been brought cart-load by cart-load; finalism would add that it had not been dumped down at random, that the carters had followed a plan. But both theories would be mistaken, for the canal has been made in another way."<sup>1</sup>

The unity of the function is the essential, the complexity of the structure is the relative view taken of it by the intellect; although the mutual adjustment of parts is here again the expression of the singleness of function, and the necessary outcome of it.

<sup>1</sup> *Creative Evolution*, p. 99.

## MIND AND BODY

The general statement of Bergson's metaphysical position in the preceding paragraphs indicates his view as to the relation of spirit to matter, but a more detailed account is needed of the relation of the individual mind to the body with which it is found associated, on the one hand, and to the objects of its external environment which it knows and acts upon, on the other. This is given in *Matter and Memory*, the most psychological of Bergson's works. Indeed, it may almost be looked upon as a textbook of General Psychology, written from an original standpoint, and showing due regard to the intimate relation which exists between psychological analysis and explanation and philosophical first principles, and there is little doubt that it will exercise a considerable influence upon the nature of future textbooks on the subject. Bergson admits that he is a dualist, but claims that his view is neither realistic nor idealistic.

"Matter, in our view, is an aggregate of 'images.' And by 'image' we mean a certain existence which is more than that which the idealist calls a *representation*, but less than that which the realist calls a *thing*—an existence placed half-way between the 'thing' and the 'representation.' This conception of matter is simply that of common sense. . . . For common sense the object exists in itself, and, on the other hand, the object is, in itself, pictorial, as we perceive it: image it is, but a self-existing image."<sup>1</sup>

The individual body, its brain, and even its cerebral cortex, are images among, or by the side of, the other images which go to make up the universe. Realism and idealism stand alike condemned because they alike regard the individual brain, or a special portion of it, as the source, in one way or another, of our representation of the entire universe. They make the psycho-physical problem absolutely insoluble. Most psychologists are now willing to admit that this is the case with the realistic theory known as epiphenomenalism; but the more popular theory of parallelism involves difficulties of the same

<sup>1</sup> *Matter and Memory*, Introduction, pp. 7, 8, Eng. tr.

philosophical order. That material changes in particular parts of the individual cerebral cortex, themselves parts of the whole material universe, should run parallel with, or be "the other side" of, consciousness of the entire universe, is an inconceivability if anything is inconceivable. The view is a philosophic generalization based on an incorrect interpretation of the facts of cerebral localization, which is in its turn determined by an incorrect estimate of the meaning and function of *perception*.

### PERCEPTION

Perception is a form of *action* rather than a form of cognition. Its importance is *practical* rather than speculative. Its distinction from memory is therefore a distinction of kind and not merely one of degree. Whereas memory has to do with the past, the interest in which is speculative only, perception involves an actual presence of external objects to the sense-organs, and is, in fact, the reflexion of the body's virtual or possible action upon these objects, or of the objects' possible action upon the body. An unbiased consideration of the structure and mode of working of the entire nervous system reveals this, although the truth is obscured for the psychologist by the admixture of affection and memory as factors in actual developed perception. The nervous system consists exclusively of nerve-fibres, each supplied with a nerve-cell, which run from the periphery (afferent) to the periphery (efferent) through more central junctions. These central junctions are in every case points of reflexion and redistribution of the nervous impulses. All agree that this is the case with the spinal and other subcortical centres of the nervous system. Anatomical evidence supports a similar view with regard to the functioning of the cortical centres. Here the incoming impulses find a large number of *alternative* paths open to them. The brain is so constructed that a number of incoming impulses can converge to bring about a single unit reaction, or, again, so that a single incoming impulse can dissipate itself along a multitude of efferent paths and so become sublimated<sup>1</sup> without producing

<sup>1</sup> This use of the word "sublimation" is different from that found in the writings of Freud.

any overt reaction. The brain, or rather the cerebral cortex, is thus a sort of telephone exchange and represents a certain amount of *indetermination* in the reactions. It is this indetermination which is the source of conscious perception. Mechanical reflex action is *necessarily determined* action and is therefore unconscious. Perception is likewise action, a reaction to a present stimulus, but it is not necessarily determined; its consciousness is a measure of its indetermination.

In the above account we have described perception in its essence, as it is in theory rather than in fact. Bergson calls this "pure" perception. Ordinary perception as it actually occurs differs from this in containing affection or "sensation," and the contributions of memory. The body, besides being exposed to a virtual action of external objects, is subject to a *real* action. It is this real action which constitutes affection. Affection is an (ineffectual) motor tendency in a sensory nerve. It forms one of the subjective elements in perception. The object of perception is perceived where it is, viz. outside the body; the affection is likewise experienced where *it* is, inside the body. Again, perception is, in fact, not absolutely instantaneous. It occupies a certain breadth of duration. The successive moments of this duration are strung together and condensed by memory, and the *qualities* of sensation are due to such condensations. We shall return to this point later. Finally, memories from the past mingle with perception of the present and may even take its place.

"For if they have survived it, it is with a view to utility; at every moment they complete our present experience, enriching it with experience already acquired; and, as the latter is ever increasing, it must end by covering up and submerging the former."<sup>1</sup>

#### PURE MEMORY AND ROTE MEMORY

"Pure" memory has no physiological correlate. There are no "centres" for memory. The brain is merely a motor organ. Its structure is completely explicable in terms of useful reactions to environmental changes. It conditions present per-

<sup>1</sup> *Matter and Memory*, p. 70.

ception directly, as we have seen, but is related to memory only indirectly, viz. through the motor reaction in perception. Successive perceptions as they occur give rise to memories which are permanently retained in all their particularity, but in an unconscious form. These memories really make up what is known as mind or spirit. In their pure unconscious form they are unextended and in a state of complete interpenetration. On the occasion of a later perception certain of them may find the motor reaction or motor tendency congruent with themselves and are then enabled to slip into the perceptual process and identify themselves with its motor prolongation. In this way they rise again in consciousness as mental images. They thus become partly materialized, as it were, and for the time being are no longer pure memories.

One of Bergson's most valuable contributions to scientific psychology is his distinction of pure memory from rote memory, which he identifies with habit. In learning a lesson by heart, we build up a motor mechanism having all the marks of a habit.

"Like a habit, it is acquired by the repetition of the same effort. Like a habit, it demands first a decomposition and then a recomposition of the whole action. Lastly, like every habitual bodily exercise, it is stored up in a mechanism which is set in motion as a whole by an initial impulse, in a closed system of automatic movements which succeed each other in the same order and, together, take the same length of time. The memory of each several reading, on the contrary, the second or the third, for instance, has *none* of the marks of a habit. Its image was necessarily imprinted at once on the memory, since the other readings form, by their very definition, other recollections. It is like an event in my life; its essence is to bear a date, and consequently to be unable to occur again."<sup>1</sup>

This distinction is similar to that drawn by some psychologists between "personal" and "impersonal" memories. It is absolutely essential for Bergson's theory of memory. Corresponding to it he finds two distinct kinds of recognition, one entirely mechanical based on the working of pre-formed motor

<sup>1</sup> *Matter and Memory*, pp. 89, 90.

mechanisms, the other starting from memories, among which the mind places itself by an act *sui generis*, at a bound, and working back to the perceptual and motor plane of the present. Cases of "mental blindness," or loss of the power of recognition whether visual or auditory, are not due to a real loss of corresponding memories, but to injury or obstruction of the motor mechanisms which give these memories the opportunity of becoming realized as supplementary parts of an actual perception. The facts of psycho-pathology, especially those of *aphasia* in all its forms, decidedly support this view. No memories are ever really lost. We carry our entire past along with us,<sup>1</sup> but disturbance of particular motor mechanisms in the brain may make the recall of some portion of this past either temporarily or permanently impossible. It is our entire past that acts at every moment of conscious experience, but this past is present at different degrees of *tension*, as it were, on different occasions. Bergson represents it by a cone standing upon its apex on a plane. The plane represents the actual material world, which exists in a continuous present, the apex of the cone corresponds to present perception, the base to the manifold of our memories, each with a date of its own and distinct from every other. The memories are all represented in different horizontal sections of the cone, but with a distinctness and at a tension varying with the area of the section. The nearer to the apex the section is taken, the greater the degree of coalescence and tension of the memories, the more impersonal and the more subordinated to action they are. The infinite number of sections which may be imagined correspond to an infinity of different planes of memory from which the past may be brought to bear upon the present. Mental activity is represented in the figure by movements up and down between the apex and the base. It corresponds to expansions and contractions of memory, having as object the discovery of just those memories which may best fit into the motor diagram of present perception. In this way the motor diagram itself may undergo extension, with the result that yet other memories

<sup>1</sup> See my *Psychology and Psychotherapy*, 5th Edition, 1944, especially chap. vi, for evidence from hypnotic experiments in support of this view.

may succeed in inserting themselves and thus come to overlay the percept. The power of the mind to produce contractions and expansions of itself in reference to present experience is, it seems, according to Bergson, a power *sui generis* and ultimate; yet he nowhere clearly distinguishes it from the sum of memories themselves. Before bringing this very obvious criticism against him, however, we must remember that in *Matter and Memory* he definitely limits his consideration of memory and the nature of the mind to those aspects which are essential to his main problem—the relation of mind to matter. After saying that “with memory we are in very truth in the domain of spirit,” he goes on to state that “it was not our task to explore this domain. Placed at the confluence of mind and matter, desirous chiefly of seeing the one flow into the other, we had only to retain, of the spontaneity of intellect, its place of conjunction with bodily mechanism.”<sup>1</sup>

Similarly in his *Time and Free Will* Bergson does not undertake to give us a psychological theory of free will. He contents himself with merely showing that determinism and libertarianism are both impossible views, and that freedom is a psychological fact.

#### MATTER AND MIND

The ordinary views on the relation of mind to matter make the problem an insoluble one in three distinct particulars. They make the difference of matter and mind a contrast of (1) extension and intensity, (2) quantity and quality, (3) necessity and freedom. Taking these distinctions in a literal and extreme sense, they find the gulf in each case an impassable one. But the truth is that extensity is a characteristic of many, if not all, of the sensory contents of consciousness; while, on the other side, matter is not completely extended. Space does not exist as something absolute in which material bodies are located.

“That which is given, that which is real, is something intermediate between divided extension and pure inextension. It is what we have termed the *extensive*. Extensity is the most salient quality of perception. It is in consolidating and in

<sup>1</sup> *Matter and Memory*, pp. 320, 321.

subdividing it by means of an abstract space, stretched by us beneath it for the needs of action, that we constitute the composite and infinitely divisible extension. It is, on the other hand, in subtilizing it, in making it, in turn, dissolve into affective sensation and evaporate into a counterfeit of pure ideas, that we obtain those inextensive sensations with which we afterwards vainly endeavour to reconstitute images."<sup>1</sup>

This approximation of the two terms in the characteristic of extensity helps us to overcome the opposition between quality and quantity, between consciousness and movement. Although corpuscles (atoms, electrons) are at least as much figments of our imagination as the discontinuous and distinct external objects which our perception carves out in the continuous physical universe around us, yet the movements which these corpuscles are supposed to possess as attributes are themselves real. They show differences of rhythm or of vibration-frequency. The vibrations, by exhibiting a certain, though minimal, degree of interpenetration, constitute a real concrete duration. The sensations corresponding to them are in a sense identical with them, only in a condensed condition—an enormous number of them being summed up by the span of memory in one moment. "Between sensible qualities, as regarded in our representation of them, and these same qualities treated as calculable changes, there is therefore only a difference in rhythm of duration, a difference of internal tension."<sup>2</sup>

Finally, mind is essentially free since it has its roots in perception which, we have seen, is a measure of the indetermination of response to stimulation. As memory, it is free in a yet more concrete sense, bringing the past to bear upon the present decision, and also by virtue of its internal tension contracting an indefinite number of external moments in the duration of the present. Matter, on the other hand, is not entirely bound in the chains of necessity. "Absolute necessity would be represented by a perfect equivalence of the successive moments of duration, each to each."<sup>3</sup> Still, the contingency of

<sup>1</sup> *Matter and Memory*, pp. 326, 327.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 330.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 330.

nature must be extremely slight, and in Bergson's view even complete necessity in matter would be no bar to the interaction of mind with it. Matter is annulled, neutralized, or latent consciousness, and conscious perception is only related to it as the part to the whole. So freedom needs a basis of necessity and can only develop in close connection with necessity. The structure of the individual brain with its innumerable alternative pathways for the transference and discharge of nervous energy, making it a veritable "reservoir of indetermination," is something more than a mere symbol of this relation. It represents the intimate organization of freedom with necessity which is the essential characteristic of life and consciousness.

### CRITICISM

Bergson's system of psychology stands or falls with his theory of "pure perception." It therefore behoves us to consider this theory still more closely, and to see what criticisms may be brought against it.

Perception, in Bergson's view, is essentially "discernment." The whole universe consists of images, of which our body is one, acting and reacting upon one another according to the laws of physical science. By virtue of the indetermination implied in the structure of the nervous system, the body isolates from among all the innumerable external influences streaming through it just those to which it can react with a greater or less freedom of choice. These isolated influences "become 'perception' by their very isolation." The relation between perception and external reality is thus simply that of part to whole; "there is in matter something more than, but not something different from, that which is actually given."<sup>1</sup> Bergson denies that the nervous system or any part of it can add anything, in the way of new properties, to matter. "The nervous system, a material mass presenting certain qualities of colour, resistance, cohesion, etc., may well possess unperceived physical properties, but physical properties only. And hence it can have no other office than to receive, inhibit, or transmit movement."<sup>2</sup> Consciousness is not *produced* by interaction

<sup>1</sup> *Matter and Memory*, p. 78.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 79.

between the external environment and the individual brain. It already exists throughout the universe, though in an annulled or latent form. Each point potentially perceives every other point in the universe, since influences reach it from all these other points.

### PERCEPTION AND THOUGHT

As regards the space problem in perception, Bergson is in complete harmony with the views of modern psychology in attributing extensity to sensations and in distinguishing perceptual from conceptual space. Sensations have not to be projected outwards in order to give the perception of an image or object in external space, for how should we know where to project them to? Nevertheless, an immediate perception of the externality and extent of an image and an immediate perception of its exact position and size are two very different things. It is only with the former that we start; the latter is in part a product of mental activity, and, as such, liable to error. We see a star above the horizon when it is really below the horizon. The refraction of the light rays, itself unperceived, has made us see the star in the wrong direction. Perception alone is incapable of correcting this error. Thought is needed, for it is through thought or intellect that *relations* are conceived. It is questionable whether we can ever with legitimacy speak of *perceiving* relations, on the Bergsonian view of perception which makes it identical with "discernment." Bergson himself regards the function of intelligence to be the knowledge of relations. It seems to me that such knowledge cannot be lightly brushed aside by saying that its *raison d'être* is simply utility. It is genuine knowledge, of speculative as distinct from or in addition to utilitarian value, and a kind of knowledge that cannot, on any hypothesis, be given by perception. Intellect certainly enables us to fill in, hypothetically, gaps in our perceptions, but it does much more than this. It gives us a deeper insight into the meaning of perceptions, and furnishes us with the real freedom of deliberation and choice, not that aimless freedom of spontaneous activity and pure duration which is all that Bergson can offer us.

The time and space relations of perception which interest Bergson himself are, as might be expected, those which concern reaction to stimulation, or utility, rather than those bound up with the difficulties of speculation. He writes of an animal at the perceptive stage of consciousness: "By sight, by hearing, it enters into relation with an ever greater number of things, and is subject to more and more distant influences; and, whether these objects promise an advantage or threaten a danger, both promises and threats defer the date of their fulfilment. The degree of independence of which a living being is master, or, as we shall say, the zone of indetermination which surrounds its activity, allows, then, of an a priori estimate of the number and the distance of the things with which it is in relation. Whatever this relation may be, whatever be the inner nature of perception, we can affirm that its amplitude gives the exact measure of the indetermination of the act which is to follow. So that we can formulate this law: *Perception is master of space in the exact measure in which action is master of time.*"<sup>1</sup>

### THE MEANING OF "IMAGE"

Bergson's theory of pure perception only escapes the accusation of being mechanical, even mechanistic, by the element of consciousness which is smuggled in by way of the blessed word, "image." If the Bergsonian reminds us that the emergence of explicit consciousness is explained by the "zones of indetermination" which individuals possessed of a set of cortical centres enjoy, we may reply that this conception of indetermination is either altogether vague or else refers to a form of mechanism which might work just as satisfactorily without explicit consciousness. When memory is introduced the matter assumes, it is true, a different aspect, but even here intellectual activity to the extent of, at least, comparison and abstraction, seems also to require to be assumed in order to make the indetermination a genuinely psychical one.

There is again the secondary question as to whether external "images" are to be regarded as *possessing* consciousness or as

<sup>1</sup> *Matter and Memory*, p. 23.

being conscious (potentially). Bergson writes: "That every reality has a kinship, an analogy, in short a relation with consciousness—this is what we concede to idealism by the very fact that we term things 'images.' No philosophical doctrine, moreover, provided that it is consistent with itself, can escape from this conclusion. But if we could assemble all the states of consciousness, past, present, and possible, of all conscious beings, we should still have only gathered a very small part of material reality, because images outrun perception on every side."<sup>1</sup> We may, therefore, assume that Bergson considers that images *are* consciousness (annulled or latent). But to this it may be objected that these images, when they are brought into explicit consciousness through the process of perception, fall on the *object* side of the subject-object relation. On the subjective side we have the *élan vital* itself, in an individualized form constituting the personality.

<sup>1</sup> *Matter and Memory*, p. 305.

NOTE. The above summary of Bergson's system of philosophy is descriptive rather than critical, and is given as an example of fairly recent philosophical speculation by an acute and powerful mind trained in both science and philosophy. There is much in it to which I cannot subscribe, although it illustrates, like the critical philosophy of Kant, the inadequacy of the merely scientific approach in grappling with ultimate problems.

For my own views on the philosophical significance of the theory of relativity (Einstein) and the quantum theory in modern physics, see chapter ii of my *Science and Personality*, Oxford, 1929. There is nothing in Einstein's theory to encourage doubt of strict objective physical determinism, although, as Bertrand Russell says, "a piece of matter has become, not a persistent thing with varying states, but a system of interrelated events." Now that the nucleus of the atom has been split, with results unfortunate for the Japanese, and the identity of matter and energy has been experimentally demonstrated on a large scale, more sympathy may be felt by the general public for Bergson's attempt to solve the problem of the mind-body relationship than has hitherto been the case. But his theory will need modification in the light of more recent discoveries in physiology and neurology. Physically, the brain exists in the four-dimensional world of space-time, and the correlation of psychological time with the time dimension of brain-physiology is a special problem of its own.

## CHAPTER X

# PSYCHOLOGICAL METHODS IN THE STUDY OF RELIGION

IN considering how far psychology can throw light upon religion, it is necessary to set out from some general conception of what Religion is. Religion itself is a state of mind, a mental attitude towards the universe; it is an attitude which we take up towards the totality of existence. Now there are many different attitudes with which we may face existence. We may meet it with a question, as we do in asking what it is, what is the universe, and what are we as parts of the universe. We may endeavour to get to know the universe, and in some mysterious way we do succeed to some extent in understanding it, as a general system of physical and mental forces. Or again, we may enjoy the universe as a work of art or a collection of works of art. We may appreciate the beauty of the scenery and other things about us. We may deplore ugliness which we find intermingled with that beauty. Thirdly, we may face existence from the point of view of duty, of what should be done, or more adequately, in the light of the idea of the Good. There are, then, these three general all-inclusive attitudes towards the universe: (1) A cognitive attitude, based upon the desire to know; (2) an æsthetic attitude, based upon the desire to appreciate, to do full justice to the beauty of existence, and perhaps to play some little part in adding to that beauty, if the individual is an artist; (3) an ethical attitude, based upon the desire to achieve the highest good possible in individual conduct.

Is there a further general attitude remaining over after these three attitudes have, I won't say received adequate satisfaction, but at any rate have discovered their appropriate fields of activity? There seems to be such a field in the experience of personal relationship towards the universe as that upon which we completely depend. That is, there is an attitude of complete dependence upon the universe which is distinct from the cognitive, æsthetical, and ethical attitudes. This attitude was first singled out by Schleiermacher as the essential element in

the religious consciousness. But if we analyse the situation psychologically, we find that there are other forms of experience in this attitude besides the experience of complete dependence, and these additional forms of experience have been well analysed and described by Rudolf Otto in his book, *The Idea of the Holy (Das Heilige)*. He shows very clearly that the feeling of dependence which is characteristic of the religious attitude is not one of merely causal dependence, not the experience of being a link in a series of causal processes, just a link in the chain of causation, but something still more thoroughgoing, the experience of what he calls creature-hood, that "It is God that hath made us and not we ourselves." We have been made by Him and so we are completely dependent upon Him in that sense, made by Him and therefore entirely in His power. And then there are the further feelings called out in our mind by that idea, the feeling of His infinite power, the feeling of the tremendous, of complete otherness, something entirely different from ourselves, the feeling of mysteriousness, of majesty, and of fascination in which fear and attraction are blended.

I am taking this particular line of approach to the problem, because it seems to me that in this way one can avoid so much of the arguing in a circle that is to be found in the exclusively historical approach, which is the usual so-called scientific approach to the question of the religious sentiment. Usually, we find introductory chapters on lower forms of religious observance, and we have explained to us how, in the course of evolution, there must have been a pre-religious state in which magic figured largely. In magic the individual attempted to get his own way with the powers around him by spells and incantations, and then later, as the result of failure, relative or absolute, of these spells, the individual turned from the attitude of magic to the attitude of prayer or supplication, and at the same time passed from polytheism to a form of monotheism. Along this line of thought, according to this natural history of religion, one is given the impression that the higher forms of religious feeling and religious insight are simply products of lower forms of mental activity; religion has grown out of forms of

consciousness that could not themselves be called religious. In a similar way, attempts have been made to explain knowledge as a development out of mental processes that are not themselves knowledge, the sense of duty as a development out of simpler mental processes not themselves involving the feeling of obligation, the appreciation of beauty as a development out of forms of mental experience not themselves involving beauty, but merely sensations of pleasure and displeasure. Such an approach to the problem of religion is inadequate, if not positively misleading. In considering the subject, we need to take a broader view. At the commencement, at any rate, we must start from a philosophical outlook rather than a merely psychological one. What is first in philosophy is last in science.

For the merely psychologically minded, progress in the science of knowledge, and in the other mental sciences too, might be presumed to mean a greater and greater restriction of the field of religion, and to some minds, at any rate, an ultimate explaining away of religious experience. It was fear that in the beginning of things created the gods, and through knowledge the scope of that fear has been ever more and more reduced. But what has really happened is rather this. Starting with a general attitude towards life, in which these various values of experience were not distinct from one another, where science and religion, ethics and æsthetics, were all mingled together, the development of knowledge and civilization has brought about a gradual separating out of these attitudes—each attitude, as I said at the beginning, has achieved its own general sphere of reference and of fact—and yet we find, after the claims of what may be called the profane sciences have been met, that there is something left over—namely, the distinctively religious experience itself.

It is true that this religious experience has been specially closely associated with ethical experience in the course of mental development, in the individual as well as in the race; forms of worship and religious appreciation have been linked up more and more closely with moral valuations, so that in the higher religions it is impossible to think away moral predicates from the conception of the Divine. Yet there remain non-

rational in addition to these rational moral predicates, characteristics of the Divine which we can merely indicate in words—non-rational types of feeling, such as the feeling of dependence, of otherness, of the mysterious, the tremendous, etc., already referred to. These have their lower as well as their higher forms. In lower forms they appear in various species of superstition, fear of ghosts, the feeling of uncanniness, the daimonic, the otherness of the miraculous or the supernatural. These feelings gradually alter under the influence of increased knowledge, but do not disappear entirely. They are purified and pass from a lower to a higher form, and so in spite of all the progress of scientific thought there remains this particular mental attitude which has been called by Rudolf Otto the “numinous” (from the Latin word *numen*, divinity), and he claims, and I think rightly, that in this attitude we have a definite form of experience, a definite way of experiencing reality; not just a feeling that may vary from one person to another, that may come and go and perhaps disappear entirely with further mental development, but a way of experiencing reality on the same level with the cognitive attitude—the attitude of knowing reality—and the other attitudes which I have enumerated. The task of Psychology is partly to do full justice to this mental attitude by analysing it in as detailed a way as possible, partly to link it up with other forms of experience not generally recognized as religious.

A great deal of work has been done by the method of the questionnaire, in which the investigator sends out a series of questions about their religious feelings to a large number of people. One of the first to adopt this course was Starbuck in America, and in the first great book on the psychology of religion, by William James, Starbuck’s results were largely used. James here marshals the evidence, and sums up the characteristics of the religious life (independently of the discrepancies of creed) as including the following beliefs: “(1) That the visible world is part of a more spiritual universe from which it draws its chief significance; (2) That unison or harmonious relation with that higher universe is our true end; (3)

That prayer or inner communion with the spirit thereof—be that spirit 'God' or 'law'—is a process wherein work is really done, and spiritual energy flows in and produces effects, psychological or material, within the phenomenal world" (*Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 485).

It also becomes clear from the evidence that the phenomenon of *conversion* is a fundamental process in the religious life. Conversion may be defined as a change of general mental attitude from the merely naturalistic attitude towards life to a definitely spiritual attitude. The individual finds the world so full of strange and wonderful things that his mind is at first mainly occupied with getting to understand and appreciate it in a profane way, but he discovers that this is not sufficient to give him true happiness. In spite of his most earnest endeavours to adjust himself to his physical and social environment and to be true to an ethical ideal, a feeling of insufficiency weighs upon his mind, and produces depression from which he struggles to free himself. Peace may come in one way or another, and the process of passing from such a state of conflict and strain to a state of harmony and peace is the process of conversion. Among certain religious sects conversion is striven after along definite lines. The sense of insufficiency and sin is emphasized in the prospective convert. He is encouraged to struggle hard against his difficulties, to face them, and to realize them as fully as possible. He passes through a state of intense mental anguish, and then suddenly reaches a state of calm and peace. But in another class of individuals who take religious life just as seriously, such sudden conversion may not occur. Yet I do not think that we can say that conversion as such is absent, and I am inclined to believe that conversion in its general sense of turning from the merely naturalistic attitude towards life to a more spiritual attitude occurs in every case, but in many cases it may occur slowly and gradually, as a process of healthy growth. Cases of sudden conversion are often to some extent pathological. I do not mean that the conversion itself is pathological, but that the conditions and consequences may be in part pathological. The strain and stress of mental conflict may produce temporary disturbance of functioning of the

nervous system, and in that way give rise to experiences that are not in every respect normal religious experiences; depression, hallucinations, and even temporary delusions that show very close resemblance to the depression, hallucinations, and delusions met with in mental patients quite independently of their religious life.

The feeling of peace and relief may be partly explained on the psychological side as a transition from a state of division of the self, where one part of the self is fighting against another, to a state of unification and harmony. In this transition from division to unification a certain amount of energy is liberated which as a surplus allows all mental processes to occur more readily and freely, producing a feeling of happiness. This is an extremely crude theory, in terms of physiology and psychology, and certainly cannot be accepted as a fully adequate account of the process. The truth is that, so long as we speak merely as psychologists, we are tending to leave out the truly religious attitude altogether. Again, I can only illustrate by the analogy of knowledge. So far as we treat knowledge psychologically, we describe what goes on in the individual mind as a sequence of individual processes which, if taken by itself, would actually explain away knowledge. It would leave us without that conviction of the *validity* of our knowledge which is such an essential part of it. And so it is with religious experience. Psychologically, in the very effort that we make to describe religious experience as a sequence of mental processes in the individual's mind, we are invalidating that experience. We might, indeed, say that we are making an experiment, that we are seeing how far we *can* explain the religious experience of the individual in terms of that individual's own antecedent experience without reference to anything beyond, that we are for the time being putting aside transcendence, because directly we assume that the individual is in touch with an existence outside him, we are passing beyond psychology. All that psychology does is to describe as accurately and fully as possible what goes on in his mind.

Moreover, psychology, like other sciences, is committed to the principle of parsimony, the principle of "Occam's razor,"

to use as few hypotheses as possible and to explain experience as fully as possible in terms of the most general hypotheses; and this brings me to the use made of the doctrine of the subconscious or subliminal self, and in more recent years to the doctrine of the unconscious, to explain or explain away religious experience. Following up the hints of resemblance of certain startling religious experiences to certain pathological experiences, the attempt was made by James to fill up the gap, or to soften down the suddenness of the transition in the individual mind from the state of depression and sinfulness to a state of redemption, by an appeal to processes assumed to go on below the threshold of consciousness, in the subliminal. In the case of sudden conversion, for example, the theory was that the individual's consciousness seemed to remain on a merely naturalistic plane of existence, with a naturalistic outlook on life; in the depths of his mind, however, a change was going on, other considerations were being weighed, other motives were getting their way, a subsidiary self was being developed, a set of mental tendencies which gained in strength and at last broke through into consciousness, and just before breaking through produced a feeling of intense strain and depression. When, however, it had broken through, it was able to combine with what it found there, modifying it, transforming it entirely so that the individual felt a new man, as if he were born again. James himself goes further, and suggests that it may well be that the individual conscious mind comes into relation with the Deity through the intermediation of the subconscious mind. The changes in the conscious mind, in the direction of a more satisfactory religious attitude, may be produced through the intermediation of the subconscious, and in this way prayer may receive its answer. Influences may reach us through the dreamy subliminal which in the hubbub of waking life might pass us by.

From the scientific point of view, one would criticize such a theory as this because it is not thoroughgoing enough. If you bring in the conception of the subliminal and use it as an hypothesis, it is your duty as a scientist to press that hypothesis to the utmost. Although James did not do this, it has been

done by later writers, and in modern times we find a number of enthusiastic psychologists who look to the unconscious for an explanation of all these phenomena, but who, one cannot help feeling, have at the back of their minds the idea that they can only truly rely upon religious experience if it proves recalcitrant to this method. On the one hand, they will reject the supernatural, in the sense of the belief in a spiritual universe as relatively distinct from the ordinary universe in space and time, because all the possibilities of explanation in terms of what goes on in the individual mind have not been exhausted, and yet, on the other hand, they are quite certain that these possibilities of explanation will never be exhausted. To all intents and purposes they are sceptics with regard to the validity of religious experience. The present situation of the psychology of religion is very similar to the situation as regards knowledge at the time when Locke, Berkeley, and Hume were writing. They were endeavouring to get to know what knowledge meant, their aim was to understand knowledge, to know about human understanding, but they used a predominantly psychological method, and although that psychological method increased their knowledge of psychology, it only made the central problem of knowledge more apparent, and it remained for Kant to show how completely they had failed to do justice to the science of knowledge. In the same way, at the present day and during the last forty years psychologists have approached the question of the validity of religious experience along psychological lines, not always realizing that, by the very method they have adopted, they are challenging or denying that validity. In other words, just as psychology as such cannot do justice to the validity of knowledge, psychology cannot do justice to the validity of religion. Of course, it is open to every one to pass beyond the psychological to the philosophical line of explanation, and it is just as essential to do that in the problem of religion as it is in the problems of ethics, æsthetics, and epistemology.

Having emphasized this side of the question, we can with a clearer conscience proceed to apply psychological methods and observations to religious experience, although at every step

in our argument we shall find it necessary to supplement psychology with philosophy. I am thinking at the moment of the attempts made by certain members of the psycho-analytic school to explain away the main facts of the Christian religion in terms of concepts borrowed from pathological psychology. One continental writer, who does not himself belong to the Christian faith, explains the central or main tenets of the Christian doctrine in terms of "projection" and "regression." He contends that the Christian attitude towards life is an infantile attitude that arises as a result of the individual's complete failure to grapple with the mystery of existence. The individual tries to face the facts of reality, fails, and regresses towards more infantile modes of adaptation. Not being able to see adequate security among the forces of nature around him, he steps back to the mental attitude he had when a young child, of implicit faith in the power and goodness of his parents, in the modified form of a belief in a beneficent Deity. His belief in the Divine is simply this infantile feeling, which may surge up even in spite of himself. Again, his intense desire to conserve or preserve his values, logical, ethical, and æsthetic—all those things that make life for him worth living—may be so strong that it produces a sort of hallucinatory fulfilment. It produces a feeling in him that it is fulfilled, that everything is all right, that we are safe in God's hands. Just to illustrate the kind of explanation proffered nowadays, we may mention that another psycho-analyst undertakes to explain the feeling of original sin in terms of the Œdipus complex. The individual has a bad conscience because in his childhood he felt a strong affection for one of his parents, and hatred and jealousy towards the other, which he repressed, and, as a result of repression, there arose feelings of sympathy and bad conscience. These were projected outwards and formed the basis of the systematic doctrines of the Fatherhood of God, the Atonement, etc.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Although psychological factors of this kind, among others, may contribute their share to crude religious emotions, to use them to explain away the essential characteristics of religious experience would be to "pour away the baby with the bath-water."

We can meet these arguments in two ways: one theoretical and the other practical. Theoretically, we can say that they are guilty of what Aristotle called a *μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος*—the fallacy of explaining the facts of one science in terms of the concepts of another—of explaining the normal mind in terms of the abnormal, without first giving an adequate theory of the distinction between normal and abnormal. An analogous situation exists in the neighbouring science of physiology. No one would explain physiological change in terms of pathology. Physiology benefits by knowledge gained from pathology. Pathology also clearly gains enormously from the knowledge of physiology. But the two sciences are quite distinct. Clearly pathology is in the main subsidiary to physiology. The second line of attack is the more satisfactory one of actual experience. According to one's experiences of the pathological processes of projection and regression and the influence of the Œdipus complex in a patient, these are usually diminished or eliminated by a course of psycho-analysis. If, therefore, the typical religious attitude towards life is explicable in these terms, the religious consciousness would be altered by analysis in the direction of elimination. One would expect, according to this theory, that deep analysis would leave the patient less religious than he was before. My own experience has been the exact opposite of this. After an analysis (for scientific purposes) by a leading psycho-analyst extending over ninety-two hours, supplemented by many hours of self-analysis later on, my religious convictions were stronger than before, not weaker. The analysis had indeed a purifying effect upon my religious feelings, freeing them from much that was merely infantile and supported by sentimental associations or historical accidents. But the ultimate result has been that I have become more convinced than ever that religion is the most important thing in life and that it is essential to mental health. The need of forms and ceremonies is another matter, far less fundamental. In many patients whom I have myself analysed I have found a similar result. Although mere emotionalism and religiosity is diminished, the essentially religious outlook on life remains unimpaired.

## CHAPTER XI

### SUGGESTION AND FAITH

WE may now consider in more detail the psychological factors at work in bringing us into relationship with the Divine, and there occurs at once to the therapeutic mind the problem of the general nature of faith, and its relation to suggestion. The modern psychotherapeutic doctrine of suggestion was a direct development from the rather extreme views of Christian Scientists of seventy years ago. So-called faith cures were produced by Mrs. Eddy and her followers, supported by the enthusiasm they had for this line of thought, and many medical and other psychologists who investigated the matter came to the conclusion that, for the most part, the cures could be explained in terms of suggestion. It therefore behoves us to understand as clearly as possible what is meant by suggestion and the theory and practice of suggestion-treatment, and the bearing it has upon faith and other forms of religious experience. Suggestion may be defined as *the acceptance of an idea by the mind, especially by the so-called subconscious mind, independently of adequate logical grounds for such acceptance.* It is an instance of ideo-motor action. The idea is placed before the mind, or rather, aroused vividly in the mind, when the mind is in a state where opposing and conflicting ideas have no chance of making themselves felt; whereupon this implanted or elicited idea tends to realize itself. It takes a certain time in doing so, known as the "latent period." In a simple case of suggestion, then, the mind of the individual is in a passive state, free from contradictory or conflicting ideas, receptive, ready to allow the suggested idea or ideas to be aroused in full force. The idea has a tendency to pass over into action, to bring about its own realization, in so far as it is not interfered with by conflicting ideas. Favouring factors in suggestion are a state of general passivity, muscular as well as sensory, combined with concentration upon some neutral idea. We find in

psychotherapeutic practice, when we wish to produce benefit by suggestion, that our best results are obtained if we get the patient into a passive state, when the muscles are relaxed, a state not so much of attention as what is called by Baudouin *contention*—a state of concentration without effort. We eliminate effort by requesting the patient to relax his muscles, and we encourage concentration by giving him something to concentrate upon. The mind, although passive, is not in a state of distraction. It is narrowed down upon some very general idea, preferably upon the idea of sleep, and if in that state an idea is aroused in the mind, an idea of some change in the patient's bodily and mental condition, that idea tends to realize itself to its utmost possible extent. A convenient time for giving suggestion is before rest at night. At that time the patient has relinquished all his interests in matters of the day, he is more able to get really peaceful and relaxed, and the background of his mind, the so-called subconscious mind, is more accessible to outside influences. In referring to the subconscious in this way, one seems to be speaking rather metaphorically, as if the subconscious were a sort of occult force. It is not exactly that, but rather a class concept, including mental tendencies which are not clearly present in consciousness. Indeed, it is those tendencies not clearly present in consciousness which are most important in suggestion treatment, because those which are clearly conscious have appropriate ideas linking them up with other conscious tendencies. The mind, so far as it is conscious, is alert and acts therefore according to more or less rational motives. Suggestion to the conscious mind has usually little effect—it is transitory if it takes effect at all. Persuasion, which uses rational arguments, is the more appropriate and effective influence in this sphere. Suggestion is a kind of affirmation, it is rightly addressed to the subconscious, to the fundamental tendencies of the mind that are not directly represented in consciousness.

The question then arises—What is the relation between suggestion, as we have thus explained it, and faith? The following example may throw some preliminary light upon this problem. A few years ago I was treating a boy of thirteen for

some disturbing nervous symptoms which interfered with his life at school, and which he was most anxious to get rid of, by means of suggestion (after a preliminary analysis of the conditions in which the illness began). The first two or three hours of suggestion treatment, during each of which he lay passive on a couch, receiving suggestions from me every five minutes or so, seemed to produce very little, if any, effect, till about the fourth treatment, when he suddenly burst into tears, and said in a voice charged with emotion, "Now I really do believe that it is going to be all right; I feel absolutely certain about it." From that moment his symptom (enuresis) disappeared, and he became permanently well. In this case we have an interesting illustration of a transition from suggestion to a state of faith. In suggestion the mind is stimulated to produce an idea, and then this idea in its turn realizes itself, because it has no competitors, it works automatically, by its own momentum as it were. In faith, on the other hand, one finds a state of mind which is essentially active; as William James said, there is a will to believe, it is a definite assertion or affirmation of an active mind. The whole mind is active and the experience is accompanied by an emotion which is something of the nature of volition, a determination to give oneself up completely to the idea for some reason or other. It may be just in order to get rid of a symptom, or for the sake of higher development of the mind—with belief in the possibility of such higher development.

Intermediate between suggestion and faith is auto-suggestion, where the individual gives suggestions to himself. In auto-suggestion he is passive, he thinks of sleep, he gets for a moment or two into a comatose state, almost free from all activity and yet in a state of concentration, and then, in some wonderful way, he is able to present to himself the idea, or bring up before himself the idea, of what he wants, the change he wishes to bring about in his mind or body. He, as we say, affirms this idea to himself, that, e.g., at night he will sleep well, and wake up feeling much better and free from the stammer, or nervousness, or difficulty of concentration, or whatever it may be—that he will be able to concentrate well,

to remember well, to feel cheerful and happy; and experience shows us that beneficial results definitely follow. By perseverance in the use of this method the patient can often transform his whole outlook upon life. I look upon auto-suggestion as a bad term. It is really something more akin to faith than to suggestion. It is the cultivation of a special active attitude of mind, an assertion of health and of faith in its possibility—a particular kind of healthy-mindedness. If you treat yourself by auto-suggestion, you get benefit so far as you can make it depend upon the extent to which you can really believe and affirm to yourself the gospel of health, that health is more real than disease; that so far as the will of God goes, He wills health rather than disease. With such a crude belief results actually do follow.

In dealing with these problems, which are, of course, really extremely difficult, it is necessary to take facts first and look for theories afterwards. We can say as a fact that suggestion produces results, that auto-suggestion produces still more permanent results, and that, if genuine faith is aroused, the most astounding results of a permanent nature may be produced. In this sequence, looked at psychologically, we see that the transition is from passivity to activity, that faith as such is a form of volition, and that auto-suggestion as such is not in conflict with volition, as M. Coué and his followers have wrongly contended; it is simply a completion of volition. The so-called law of reversed effort, which Coué and his followers have made famous, may be expressed in this form: "When the will and the imagination are in conflict, the imagination always wins." The conclusion would seem to be that imagination is stronger than will; but in the French the word *vouloir*, though sometimes meaning will, often means wish, and, so far as one can make out in Coué's own brief writings, he is thinking really of effortful wish rather than of will. If there is a wish on the one hand and imagination on the other, the imagination-result is more likely to occur than the wish-result; indeed, the situation is one of frustrated will. The process of wishing is on the road towards volition or will, but it has not yet reached the final stage of volition. In that transition from wishing to willing

or volition, the imagination, lighted up and intensified by fear or some other disturbing emotion, slips in, as it were, gets the lead, and prevents the wish becoming the will. Imagination then wins because the will has not been completed. On the other hand, that which has been called auto-suggestion, and which I think is a definite attitude of mind akin to faith, is a process of complete volition, turning mere wish into will by adequate control of the imagination.

This will become clear if we take an example. A patient suffering from a fear of open spaces, called technically agoraphobia, may be unable to walk a hundred yards down a wide street by himself or to cross it. As soon as he attempts to start on his journey his heart palpitates, he becomes breathless, tends to hug the wall, becomes less and less able to move, is glued to the spot, and has to give up and return home. Such a patient may be encouraged by his relatives and friends to pull himself together and to make a real effort, and may be told that if he makes an adequate effort he will succeed in getting over this difficulty. But he finds, on the contrary, that the greater the effort the worse the situation becomes, the harder he tries the less he succeeds. This seems to be a situation akin to that summed up in Coué's law of reversed effort: on the one side, the will to walk alone; on the other side, the imagination, the fear, that he will not succeed; and in this conflict imagination wins. But, on looking more closely into the situation, one realizes that there is no complete volition here. The patient is ill, his mental processes do not enable him to will completely in this particular situation. Why, is a matter to be discovered in other ways, through deep analysis—deep analysis will show why he is unable to will to cross the street. In his attempt to will to walk alone or to cross the street, the feeling of effort becomes more vivid and more intense, but it remains a mere wish or suggestion. Opposed to this effortful wish to cross the street, one finds the idea or suggestion of failure accompanied by the fear of failure. In this conflict the suggestion of failure accompanied by the emotion of fear obviously will win, as against the suggestion, unaccompanied by any strong emotion, that he will cross the street. This so-called law of reversed effort

is thus merely a simple illustration of conflict between one suggestion and another, or between one "imagination" and another. If this is so, what do we mean by will? We mean a wish or desire, accompanied by the judgment, affirmation, or belief that we shall fulfil the desire from our own resources, so far as in us lies—that we shall realize the desire because we desire it. In cases like that of agoraphobia<sup>1</sup> the object of the psychotherapist is to train the patient's will, so that one disagrees with Coué, and, instead of saying that a re-education of the will is useless, one rather points out that the patient has not achieved complete volition in this situation, and that he has to learn to will, after first discovering the cause of his incomplete volition by self-analysis or (much more effectively) by deep analysis carried out by the physician. In these cases mere suggestion as an automatic thing is rather ineffective. One may produce temporary alleviation by calming the patient's mind, and discouraging spasmodic effort and diminishing the tendency to intensify the symptoms by effort; but the patient quickly falls back to the original state, because the cause is still there. The truth is, he has no faith in that particular treatment, nor in his power to cross the street, and there is reason for this lack of faith. In some cases one finds deep down in the mind a fear of fainting; he has fainted, or nearly fainted, on some previous occasion, and so he has lost confidence in himself; he feels he will be right away from all aid, so the mere sight of an open space arouses this subconscious idea, his heart beats rapidly, and the initial stages of a fainting attack set in with this feeling of anxiety, a feeling that he is "glued to the spot." Analytical treatment is needed, to uncover the more deep-seated mental factors in his illness and so produce permanent recovery.

If, then, suggestion and faith are distinct, in what way can we indicate their relationship more clearly than we have already done? From the theoretical point of view, I think we can say that suggestion is ultimately always dependent upon

<sup>1</sup> The deeper cause of agoraphobia is some early sexual difficulty, according to Freud. See his *Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety*, Hogarth Press, 1936, pp. 88, 89. In my experience, the explanation given above is more generally applicable.

some form or other of faith, and not conversely. The patient may not be conscious of faith, he may respond to suggestion and suggestion may be given in a mechanical repetitive way. He may have no conscious faith in the method, but he finds that the method benefits him. If one analyses him, however, one discovers that in his subconscious mind there is faith. The relationship between suggestion and such a general (often subconscious) background of faith is similar to that between the empirical investigation of nature by scientists, and the general metaphysical principle of *the uniformity of nature*, within the domain of knowledge. A scientist would not be able to make a single step forward in his investigations or theories about the universe unless he had that belief in the uniformity of nature—that A remains A unless and until it is altered by some other factor, that if A becomes B there is some reason for it in the intrusion of further factors. Unless he holds this metaphysical belief in the uniformity of nature, he is unable to form hypotheses, and by their means advance in scientific knowledge. His individual generalizations from facts of experience are based upon this belief. Similarly an individual benefits by suggestion treatment along special lines because of his more general belief or faith in the universe. The individual may not consciously hold such a faith, but somewhere in his mind there is that faith, the belief in a friendliness somewhere, and if he were completely lacking in it, then he would be completely inaccessible to therapeutic suggestion. Actually, in the case of everyone, there is the tendency, the readiness to believe in friendliness outside—based upon early childhood experiences and inherited tendencies. This again brings us back from the point of view of suggestion and faith to the more fundamental problem of “deep” analysis.

Some psycho-analysts consider that the facts of suggestion, of faith-healing, etc., are explicable in terms of early experiences within the bosom of the family, in terms of the Œdipus complex and psychological reactions thereto. The theory is a very complicated one and cannot be dealt with in detail here.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See especially S. Freud, *Totem and Tabu, Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, and *The Ego and the Id*, Hogarth Press.

One may, however, consider it in its most formal aspect, and point out that the whole question of faith in terms of infantile experience is based upon an original postulate. It is not necessarily based upon facts at all; facts may later on be discovered to support the special details of the theory, but the general theory has its real basis elsewhere, in the *postulate* that whatever is in the mind can be explained in terms of previous experience. It is the postulate of determinism. Some psychologists may think that determinism is on the road to being proved through the further development of psychology. That, of course, is reasoning in a circle, because what we do in psychology is to look for causes of the various effects that we see, on the basis of the postulate of determinism. In philosophy there is the fundamental *principle of sufficient reason* (Leibniz), the principle that there is always a sufficient reason why anything should happen rather than not happen. Determinism looks for the sufficient reason in any particular case always in what has already occurred. We therefore know beforehand, however rapidly deep analysis may develop—and it is developing rapidly every year now—we know beforehand that it will seem to restrict ever more and more the doctrine of the freedom of the will. The further psychology advances, the less will the idea of freedom, or of spontaneity of the mind, be apparent. But the very fact that we can predict this shows that it is not the result of psychological advance. Psychology cannot either prove or disprove determinism.

More cautious psychologists adopt the doctrine of “self-determinism”. They must adopt some form of determinism if they are to be psychologists at all, in order to link up and co-ordinate mental events within a wider system. But they take as their system not the antecedent processes of the mind only, but the entire mind right up to the present moment. The test of a determinist doctrine is the power of prediction, and, in the case of mental process, prediction is impossible unless we know every moment of the person’s life right up to the moment when the action which we are supposed to be predicting occurs. The act is then completely determined because it is determined by his entire self. This is a doctrine of self-

determinism, rather than determinism, because it is determinism within a self which is growing and which acts as a whole. What we mean by freedom is the power of the mind of the individual acting as a whole. A person is free and is acting freely when he is most himself in carrying out an action. The kind of action that to us seems impulsive action, where we feel out of ourselves, out of our mind, and we wonder later on however we could have done such a thing, such action is not free. So far as conduct is the outcome of the whole mind working in its unity, so far it is self-determined, and free in the only sense in which we can understand freedom.

Although one may seem to have deviated along another line of thought, and to have left the question of faith, it is of significance for the problem of faith, because faith is such an affirmation of the entire mind. Dr. W. R. Inge has defined faith as *a readiness to trust and to follow the noblest hypothesis*; it is an act of self-assertion, one decides to be on the side of the angels, takes one's side in the battle of existence, for battle it is. Ideally at least it should represent an attitude of the entire mind, but it may often be not so complete. It may often be rather a momentary mood, and so far as it is that, it may be followed by a relapse. Here the vexed question of spiritual healing arises. The process of spiritual healing is a process of arousing faith, the faith state, and that faith state may have different degrees of rationality, which is the same thing as saying that it may extend over a smaller or larger area of the self, and if it is limited to a small part of the self, it may mislead the individual instead of helping him. One reason why some of us are very doubtful of the wisdom of spiritual-healing services is that, for many who attend such services, it is an appeal to superficial emotion and to primitive credulity. There is the tendency to intensify that hysterical condition of mind from which many of the patients are already suffering. In some cases there may be a disappearance of hysterical symptoms and apparent cure, but only at the expense of replacement by another symptom—namely, reliance upon a quasi-miraculous possibility, the expectation of getting something for nothing, as it were, of getting direct gifts without

full appreciation of corresponding demands upon personality. Mass-suggestion may produce startling results of a temporary and superficial kind, but individual treatment is more likely to produce deep and lasting benefit.

The whole question of spiritual healing is one of extreme difficulty, and awaits further medical and psychological investigation. But among its more obvious dangers we cannot overlook the danger of intensifying the hysterical or the infantile attitude towards life that many neurotic patients have, and the danger of disappointment and of a set-back to their faith in the case of those who receive no lasting benefit.

NOTE. The truly spiritual problem in psychotherapy is that of *sublimation*, in which instinctive energy, after being liberated from morbid repression by deep analysis of the mind, is directed towards higher social and cultural ends, within a general system of religious belief. See my *Psychology and Psychotherapy*, chapter xiii (Sublimation and Spirituality), Edward Arnold & Co., 5th Edn., 1944. After analysis, help may be given to the patient by means of intensive suggestion treatment and progressive relaxation. As I have written elsewhere: "The patient lies on a couch and is asked to close his eyes, to give himself up to sleep, to let all his muscles go limp. He is told to breathe slowly and rhythmically, and in doing so his muscles progressively relax. Relaxation should begin with the small muscles of the hands and feet, and will then spread up the arms and legs, over the body, and on to the muscles of the head, neck and face. . . . The concentration on the idea of sleep, the deep breathing, and the muscular relaxation must all be carried out without effort. *Concentration without effort* sums up the mental attitude of the patient. The suggestions subsequently given should always be of a *positive* nature. They should never imply inability or lack of power, but always be in the direction of increased power, increased vitality, and enhancement of the normal in other respects" (*Psychological Methods of Healing*, pp. 114, 115; University of London Press, Ltd., 1938). The Hindu practice of Yoga, a method of self-discipline comprising controlled breathing, systematic use of postures, and controlled meditation, presents some parallels to my method. Yogic breathing, or *pranayama*, involves a holding of the breath between inspiration and expiration, but I have not found this more helpful than ordinary deep breathing in the production of progressive relaxation.

## CHAPTER XII

### MYSTICISM

WE now come to a consideration of what is probably the most important form of religious experience—namely, mystical experience—to which all other religious feelings seem to lead up. The mystical experience is an experience of apparently direct union with the Divine. It is a form of meditation which leads the soul up to divinity. In this mental state the person may lose the feeling of individuality, and may seem to pass beyond the limitations of space and time. When he endeavours to describe his experience he can only express it in negatives. He can say what the experience is not, but he is quite unable to say what it is. One of the greatest authorities on mysticism is Saint Teresa, and her own experience and general theory are summed up in that important book, *The Interior Castle*,<sup>1</sup> in which she describes various stages of union with the Divine. In almost every form of religion in the world we find similar experiences described, although there are individual differences. Leaving aside these differences, we find quite enough identity to convince us that, just as religious feeling itself is a special mental attitude towards life and a sort of knowledge of reality, so here in mysticism we have its central core, the most characteristic way in which our religious knowledge comes to us. If only it were universal, there would be no further trouble about the matter. Unfortunately, so many people protest that they are unable to verify the occurrence of mystical experience in themselves; this is a serious difficulty in the way of its significance or validity, though not destroying its interest for psychology.

Before considering this matter further, it would be well to mention certain types of experience that are analogous to the mystical experience, but that otherwise are not regarded as of special religious value or importance. In the first place, there is the peculiar feeling of joy, exultation, or rapture that may accompany certain sensory experiences. Certain bars of music and phrases of poetry seem to have a quite irrational appeal that cannot be explained in terms of the actual associations

<sup>1</sup> *The Interior Castle, or The Mansions*, by Saint Teresa of Jesus (w<sup>r</sup> 1577). Translated by the Benedictines of Stanbrook; revised with Intro<sup>d</sup> and Additional Notes by the Very Reverend Benedict Zimmerman. Second Edition, Thomas Baker, London, 1912.

the sounds or meaning of the words, but apparently touch some hidden chord in the mind, and thereby stir the soul deeply. Muscular and kinæsthetic sensations sometimes arouse a similar feeling. Well-ordered muscular activity may often induce a feeling of unity with nature. On a beautiful spring morning, when away from one's fellow men in the fields, one may be suddenly overtaken with a feeling of the direct continuity of one's own life with the life of nature. One looks with different eyes upon the scenery and welcomes it as a part of one's self, or rather, as something infinitely greater than one's self in which one is merged. This feeling may be intensified in special circumstances, as, e.g., when riding, in which no doubt sympathy with one's horse as well as the muscular exercise play their part. We might perhaps explain these, often extremely pleasant, experiences as a sort of reversion to an earlier and more primitive form of consciousness, when we were less aware of our own individuality and its problems: when we were more in touch with the animals and plants around us, and felt our kinship with them more vividly. Since it is not an experience constantly present, when it does come it comes with a special vividness, as intensified pleasure, which is not surprising; it is normal and healthy, not pathological. Communion is in general a healthy form of experience. It is the feeling of isolation from nature, animate and inanimate, which is the terrible thing, and which we find in such pronounced form among some of our mentally deranged patients.

Secondly, there are the mental states sometimes produced by anæsthetics—the so-called "anæsthetic revelation." Under the influence of alcohol, ether, chloroform, and especially of nitrous oxide gas, many people get extraordinary feelings of deepened insight into the meaning of things. They may come out of the anæsthetic with the conviction that they have solved the riddle of the universe, and suffer great disappointment because all they can find in their minds at the moment of awakening are some doggerel rhymes that have no significance whatever. Then again, a similar mystical experience can come over one in conditions of self-hypnosis. If one lies passive on a couch with the eyes closed and all voluntary muscles relaxed, and

breathes slowly and deeply in order to increase that relaxation, one may feel oneself slipping away from the world of clear consciousness, losing the feeling of orientation and of sensitivity in the limbs. The body seems to be floating in the air, and later on one may feel that one does not possess a body at all. In this state, one seems to become de-personalized, as it were, absorbed in the "all," into the soul of the universe. One attains to what has been called cosmic consciousness.

Now can we find any identical factor in these various experiences? In all except those accompanying muscular exercise, in the anæsthetic revelation, auto- and hetero-hypnosis, etc., one characteristic seems to be the abolition of the motor tendency. In a normal man who goes about his affairs with eyes wide open and mind alert, there is a definite adjustment of muscular activity to the needs of the situation. His muscles possess tone and are ready to come into action, and his experience is essentially sensori-motor. It is probably this motor aspect of experience which intensifies the feeling of personality, and if it is brought into abeyance with anæsthetics or special artificial modes of relaxation, the sense of personality disappears with it. The individual is less conscious of the dividing lines between himself and the rest of the universe.

It is clear that, in mystical experiences proper, we ought to allow for the possible admixture of such experiences as these and discount them; although it is more than doubtful whether we can say that all religious mystic experience should be explained in terms of such cruder experiences. Some scientists tend to criticize all these experiences as abnormal, because they involve a disturbance of the sensori-motor attitude towards life. But this would be to make a very great assumption, an assumption analogous to the one we have already discussed in connection with determinism. Such scientists map out a general system of explanation, and everything they find in that system they call scientific. Everything not explained in terms of that system they attempt to explain as pathological, and in calling it pathological they deny the validity or importance of it.

An alternative explanation would be the following: It is obvious that experience, as we know it, occurs and ce

us under the forms of space and time, because we are embodied minds, because we are limited, finite parts of the universe, and yet we have in us powers that can in some way lift us beyond these limits. It seems quite clear that one such power is that of thought; another is the direct insight of æsthetic appreciation; and religious experience in its mystical form may prove the greatest power of all in this direction. When, in the mystical experience, we have the feeling of timelessness, it is quite conceivable that we *are* passing beyond the limits of time, and proving, to ourselves at any rate, that time is appearance and not full reality, and that immortality is not something we have to wait for at the end of this life, but something we can and do achieve in varying degrees while still living this life. That has been the view of leading philosophers throughout the ages. We find Aristotle urging his readers, ἐφ' ὅσον ἐνδέχεται ἀθανατίζειν, "to be immortal as far as possible," even in this life.

Thus we come to the tremendous metaphysical problem of the reality of time, which is, perhaps, the greatest metaphysical problem of the present day, and especially important to our point of view of personality. So long as we consider time as one of the ultimate conditions of individual experience, we are tied down to a certain theory of personality, which may easily be the wrong one. All psychological theories of personality, of course, are of this nature, and, to a great extent, they are for that reason rather depressing, because they emphasize the limits of which we are all aware. But in emphasizing these limits they tend to make them much more complete and ultimate than they really are for us. Again, if we use physiological modes of thought in considering psychological problems, we are impressed by rates or rhythms of physiological processes. As physiological psychologists we may be impressed by experiments which show that estimation of time is most accurate with a certain interval and less accurate with shorter or longer intervals, or again, that experience of succession has a lower limit of sensitivity. In the background there may be the unspoken but fallacious assumption that the experience of succession is the same as, or at least runs parallel with, a succession of experiences; and again the further assumption

that a succession of experiences runs parallel with a succession of physiological changes somewhere or other in the organism. It is easy to show by metaphysical argument (cf. Kant) that the conception of time as something ultimately real leads us to definite antinomies or contradictions, from which we cannot escape unless we agree to regard time as appearance and not reality. But we still find it extremely difficult to understand most aspects of experience, unless we do regard time as real. If we consider experience in detail, we see how much time contributes to the quality of that experience. So impressed was Bergson by this fact that he has taken time as the very stuff of which reality is made. He speaks of *durée réelle* as something which is ultimate, although he regards the time of mathematical physics and the other physical sciences as spatialized time. Of course, many of the goods and pleasures of life seem to be bound up with the time function. Time is essential even to such a good as the ethical good, the good will. A good action is one which is definitely and deliberately intended and carried out, and can only be carried out in the course of time. If one imagines time transcended, it is difficult to imagine any strictly moral action, or indeed any action at all. It is difficult to attribute the characteristics of morality, which is one of our three general values, to a timeless experience. In transcending time, one seems to transcend morality as such. In æsthetic experience timelessness seems to be more possible. When we enjoy a picture, for the time being we feel ourselves out of time; its artistic meaning is timeless. But then when we turn to music, another form of art, time appears to be of its essence, though even here we should not be too certain of this. We know there is an anecdote about Mozart, who, in speaking of one of his compositions, explains how he first had it in his head before he wrote it down. He heard all the notes together—*zusammen*. That was a wonderful experience, he said, the like of which he seldom felt again. In music there is a degree of transcendence of time; chords occur one after another, yet they have to combine in some way to give a feeling of harmony and melody, and one is conscious of what has gone before and what is about to come. One sees more meaning in the produc-

tion the second time than the first, because one then knows what is coming. So that one might say, with regard to music, that although the possibility of musical experience, and of the training of the ear, is bound up with the conditions of temporal sequence, yet the ultimate outcome when the trained ear appreciates the true inward meaning of music is something that is already on the way towards transcendence of time. As regards truth, it is quite clear that time is transcended—once true, always true. Although the proving to a class of schoolboys that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles takes time, and individual boys take varying lengths of time in gaining an adequate insight into that geometrical truth, once they have acquired that truth the insight is beyond time. Moreover, it was true before they began to consider it, and it will remain true after they have ceased to think of it. Truth, as truth, is certainly beyond time.

Finally, as regards religious experience, one feels that it is essential to this experience, if to any, that it should be beyond time. Although it may be conditioned by time, in that one gains an ever deepening insight into its truths through an experience that comes to one in the course of days, yet the experience itself takes us out of time and enables us to attain to a mystic attitude towards the universe, beyond any opportunism that acceptance of the reality of time can give. If we assume that time is completely real for us, that we are bound down in a time process, and that we do not transcend it at all, then our ultimate outlook upon reality is very depressing and unmeaning. Despite temporary improvements in the conditions of human life and the advance of physical science, this earth will eventually become uninhabitable, degeneration will come sooner or later to the race, to the physical side of things, so that in terms of matter and material change and temporal process there seems little room for ultimate hope.<sup>1</sup> The life of the human race would really be "a tale told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, signifying nothing." But all the meaning we find in life is on the way towards a transcending of time. When

<sup>1</sup> The further advance of science and of its power over nature may, of course, falsify this prophecy. The potentialities of intra-atomic energy are in place here.

we look towards a future life, we look not so much towards a life at some future time that some enthusiasts would like to prove and even describe for us, but to a life eternal, in which we pass beyond the conditions of the merely material, which, of course, is the temporal and spatial. We mean by matter something such that two portions of it cannot be in the same place at the same time—that is probably still the best definition of matter which we can give. We can only think of matter in terms of space and time, although we now know that matter and energy are one, in so far as atomic disintegration produces enormous amounts of physical energy, as the atoms themselves vanish and become transformed into radiant energy.

It is very significant that these various experiences that appear to transcend time, and also perhaps space, accompanied by disorientation in space and time, bring with them a diminution of feeling of individuality, so that in the end it looks as if we shall have to dismiss individuality with other aspects of existence as appearance and not complete reality. It is very doubtful whether we shall be able to preserve individuality as an ultimate value in the scheme of things; it is a stepping-stone, no doubt, and, as far as we can see of existence in this life, there is a parallel process of individuation and social integration going on, so that really great individuals, great personalities, are those who have individualized their lives so that they are in closer communion with their fellows, rather than in isolation from them. In a way this is an absorption. The great statesman, the great man of action, the great scientist, is the person who is able to suppress his mere individuality in order that he may gain a wider personality of the group or nation to which he belongs. The great statesman speaks for an entire nation because he is able to understand the various needs of the individuals in it. He does not lose his personality thereby, he does not efface it, he makes it all the more real. On the other hand, the self-centred paranoiac who has to be shut up in an asylum is convinced of his own greatness, believes himself to be a reincarnation of Napoleon or of the Messiah, or even God Himself, and, corresponding to his intense feeling of individuality and difference from others, we find a depressing bank-

ruptcy in his mental make-up. No really great man is ever a megalomaniac. The great scientist is he who keeps clear of fanaticism and crankiness by continuous moral effort, by effacing his own peculiarities, wishes, desires, and interests in the matter, in order to get as unbiased a view as possible of the facts. He has the greater task of effacing, not only the individuality of nationality, but of humanity itself, and yet in that process we cannot say that he is losing personality in the true sense of the word. Personality, then, ought to be distinguished from individuality. Individuality is a mere difference from others. Personality is a process of development, in which we have parallel processes of individuation and assimilation. The man of personality gives out to the world around him and also absorbs it in himself, identifying himself as far as possible with others and sympathizing with their aims. Yet, however far developed, finite personality must be appearance and not complete reality, because in the universe there is no room for merely separate persons. Ultimately there can only be one complete person, he who is completely self-sufficing, and he can only be completely self-sufficing if he has complete knowledge and power over his environment, and therefore he must extend throughout that environment, and must be the totality of Reality itself. The only complete person is the Absolute or God, and progress toward personality in individuals seems to be partly intellectual, along the path of reason, and partly intuitional. One can see it as a union, ever closer and deeper, with the spirit of the universe, as an identification to a greater and greater extent with all that is highest in the universe, and that is the intellectual and intuitional counterpart of what we mean by the mystical experience.

One might perhaps do more justice to this problem of the mystical by admitting that there is a lower and a higher form of mysticism. The lower form is on the plane of immediate feeling, unmediated by thought. Such is the experience of the athlete, the drug-addict, the devotee of self-hypnosis, the primitive artist in man. Here is an experience of direct union on a lower plane of feeling. Then thought discriminates, distinguishes subject from object, objects from one another, holds

the mind apart from its object, and yet, in that process, links it up more and more closely with its object until, when its work is done as far as it can be done, again there arises a communion, a feeling that the subject-object relationship is being transcended, and this is the true, the higher mystical experience. It will include various types of experience. We will not identify it with religious mystical experience because we have already marked and separated that off from our other general attitudes towards the totality of things—the intellectual, the æsthetic, and the moral attitudes, and in each of these attitudes we find the higher form of mysticism. There remains the mysticism which may truly be called religious. But even that does not completely satisfy us, since we are left with four distinct things which we feel must in some way be unified. Actually, of course, they are unified in an all-inclusive experience, which is the real higher mystical experience, the mediation by thought of all the other attitudes, including the religious, so that just as the race began life in a primitive religious way, likewise at the end, after science and philosophy have done all that they can, the fundamental attitude is once more a religious attitude. An individual who is unable to get that attitude at all is to that extent incomplete. We sometimes find that such an individual is mentally sick, suffering from repressions which cut him off from it. With the removal of these repressions by analysis the experience may become once more possible to him.

It is only fair to mention here that one school of thought explains all these mystical experiences in terms of what is called Narcissism. In such experience there is a turning inwards of the mind upon itself, a drawing in of libido, a concentration of libido upon the self. An increase of Narcissism under certain conditions may bring with it a feeling of intense pleasure and of liberation, transcending time and space, although it is really a set-back, a regression, to an infantility of an extreme type. The actual evidence in support of so extreme a theory is quite inadequate, and against it may be set the general arguments of pp. 36, 134, above. But we should not overlook the rôle played by Narcissism in some forms of religious experience.

## CHAPTER XIII

### PERSONALITY AND VALUE

ANY theory of personality is faced with a special problem in determining the position of values—goodness, truth, beauty—and of religion within the circle of individual experience. We can only deal with it in its most general aspect here.

There is nothing very much to be said from a formal point of view with regard to ethics. On this side the real problem is that of obligation, and however much we may accumulate empirical knowledge on the subject of human conduct we do not thereby get any deeper insight into the nature of obligation than we should by considering ordinary cases of everyday life. Empirical considerations—considerations of the experience of different races at different periods of history—show that duties change and vary with circumstances. What is the right thing to do at one period of time, within one circle of culture, and at one epoch of history, may be different from what should be done at some other period of time. But in both cases there is a feeling of obligation involved, and something which is more than a mere psychological feeling, something which seems to go deeper than a mere human feeling, something which seems absolute—namely, obligation. “I have to do this; this is my duty.” And if you ask why, all you can say is, “Because it is my duty.” You cannot give a reason for it. In the end you give an approximate reason for doing some particular thing, and having given that reason you ask why you should act with reference to that reason, and the only reply is: Because I am bound to act so, it is obligatory on me to act as I do, e.g. to treat everybody as an end and not merely as a means, to avoid giving objectless pain to others, to promote the happiness of the world in general. If you ask the reason why you should do it, you find none apart from this, which is more than a mere momentary feeling, which is a conviction. Thus duties change, but duty remains the same. Obligations change and vary with circumstances, but obligation as such is there, and cannot be evaded. We can ignore it, but we suffer by ignoring it and

find ourselves falling to a lower level of spiritual development.

The situation is similar to that with regard to knowledge itself. You cannot explain knowledge as such. Truth itself cannot be explained. You can indicate the way in which truth arises—the way in which an individual may approximate more and more to truth through observation, and through the adequate and harmonious working of association. You can understand how error arises through false associations and how delusions may arise, but truth itself cannot be explained. It is an ideal which we feel is a reality, but a reality which is never completely reached by us. It is there. So far as we trouble to think at all, it is implied. So with the appreciation of beauty, or æsthetic experience, we can describe the conditions under which the individual becomes more and more expert in the appreciation of beauty of different kinds like music and the plastic arts, but in itself we cannot understand it. We can describe the concomitants specially involved in the contemplation of different works of art, the pleasure of a peculiar nature which we say is æsthetic, but that is not the æsthetic experience itself. In a similar way with morality, we can indicate how an individual becomes more and more moral by learning to be more and more disinterested in his outlook on life, but why he should be disinterested we cannot say. That is simply borne in upon us. We do judge others in that way at any rate. We put other people in the rank of moral excellence to the extent to which they fight for the good of the community and the whole of existence rather than for themselves alone.

How it is possible to pursue the ethical ideal is again really a mystery. We feel that genuine freedom is involved in this. It is true that the great ethical writer, Henry Sidgwick, used to protest that the general problem of freedom was of little importance to ethical theory, but the tacit assumption of self-determination was at the back of all his reasoning. The truly ethical outlook on life is bound up with belief in self-determination, in the power of the mind to act from itself, from within itself. It must be active rather than merely passive. Instead of being merely moved from outside by various physically external or psychologically external motives, it must be able to

take a definite stand, it must be able to identify itself with the moral law. That seems to me to mean freedom. In conventional morality you identify yourself with a code of conduct because you wish to do as others do, but such conduct is only by accident moral, if moral at all. In truly moral action you realize its rationality, but more than that and beyond that you realize its value, and you have in you some direct power of realizing its value. This is called conscience. Unfortunately the word conscience is rather spoiled for our purpose, because it is so often identified with accidental feelings that vary from time to time, and with individual experience that can be disturbed in disease.<sup>1</sup> A person can be over-conscientious, and it is interesting to notice in these disease cases that over-conscientiousness goes with a deficiency and not with an excess of morality. Patients suffering from over-conscientiousness are over-conscientious about less important things and not over the really fundamental things. One's attention is drawn from time to time to an announcement in the newspaper that someone has made an anonymous payment to the Chancellor of the Exchequer for income tax, and it is called conscience money. That conscience money is generally a very small amount. The last amount I saw was £1 5s. You may be sure that if that person had been really guilty of defrauding the income tax collectors, and had taken the trouble afterwards to make restitution, the amount would be much greater than £1 5s. I look on cases like that as pathological disturbances of conscience, but conscience in a psychological sense and not in a truly ethical sense. One feels one needs another word. It is a direct feeling of obligation, just as much a rational thing as an emotional thing. The most moral people are not the most emotional people about conduct. So in matters of the intellect; a person who is sound in his work as a scientist or a philosopher is generally not so emotional as one less sound. The same rule applies to æsthetic appreciation, e.g. in appreciation of music,

<sup>1</sup> It is here that Freud's doctrine of the "ego-ideal" or "super-ego" as set out, e.g., in his essay, *Das Ich und das Es*, is in place. But such a theory is quite inadequate to explain conscience and obligation as such. No merely psychological explanation could suffice.

in the course of the necessary training of the musical sense, one must learn to get away from crude emotion. That crude emotion is a temporary thing, showing that the mind is caught up and stimulated and is reacting, but the emotion is too individual, and one has to appreciate the general, the universal, in all these things. In the plastic arts, one has to appreciate, as Plato and Schopenhauer said, the *idea*. One has a direct vision of the idea, or of the relationship between ideas. And emotions stand in one's way. It is true that there is a peculiar feeling in æsthetic and intellectual and moral appreciation, e.g. in appreciation of duty done for its own sake, quite apart from, and in addition to, circumstances being considered, and the consequences. I am inclined to think that here one has the soul, the ego, reacting in its essence.

The self, the mind that psychology deals with, is not the same as the soul. Psychology is not the science of the soul; psychology is the science of the mind, of mental process in time, but corresponding with that mental process in time, and as a complement of it, you have the experiencing ego, and that ego has its own reality and its own unity. This is the idea of the pure or transcendental ego, as distinct from the empirical ego. Psychology deals with the empirical ego, shows how it develops in course of time, how the young child starts life with the empirical ego partially organized, to a certain extent inherited. The child inherits aptitudes and interests from ancestors, just as it inherits the organization of its physical body. Talent is inherited, but genius is not inherited. Talent is characteristic of the empirical ego, the inter-relation of the pure ego with the material environment. Genius is characteristic of the pure ego, which is out of time, although it reveals itself in time. The explanation of genius does not seem to come from heredity. If you consider Beethoven, you do not find any evidence—and if you are going to be scientific, you must judge by evidence—of that transcendent power of giving meaning to musical sounds and creating artistic form, in his ancestors or in the history of the race. Genius can show itself not only in art, but also in philosophy and morals. Socrates and Jesus were moral geniuses. You are dealing all the time with a different level of reality.

A dualism like this is not, in the end, intellectually satisfying, for the reason that the intellect is a unifying thing, that what we mean by thinking is unifying, systematizing, fitting things within a system. When we form a hypothesis, what we do is to observe a number of facts, and see their implications and inter-relationships with one another, and so far as we find they form a unity, we consider that we are getting better insight. This unifying principle is an urge that forces us along. No dualism can be ultimately satisfactory. In our philosophy we must try to synthesize knowledge of the empirical ego and knowledge of the pure ego. That cannot yet be done. We do not know enough about it. It is better, however, to draw distinctions, so long as they are really the right distinctions, than to synthesize too hurriedly and mix things up. It is most important to distinguish this value-experience from the empirical experience. The distinction which emphasizes the essential importance of value over against chance experiences that occur to us from moment to moment and from day to day, is extremely important for our theory of personality, because it puts the centre of gravity of the personality in the right place.

The value-experiences of the good, the beautiful and the true, are not identical with religious experience, although they are related to it. Religious experience is not exactly on all fours with them; it is not on the same level but is on a higher level still. Religious experience arises so far as the individual is facing the totality of existence. The feeling thus aroused, so far as the personality takes up a mental attitude towards the whole universe, is religious experience. Within it the value-attitudes are of the utmost importance, and we tend nowadays to emphasize the ethical attitude, the appreciation of goodness, duty, obligation, in relation to religion. But if we study it psychologically, we see that there is not always a point to point correspondence between genuine feelings of religion and genuine feelings of morality. A person may have strong religious feelings, which are not merely emotion but a genuine awareness of mystery, of the totality of things—of a great mystery with its own peculiar feeling of communion and satisfaction in communion—in relative independence of the extent

to which he fulfils the moral law, or the extent to which his conscience is sensitive, or the extent to which he is aware of his duty—what he should do and his obligation to do it. And conversely we may find another person who reaches a very high degree of ethical excellence, who is very strict in doing his duty in life for its own sake, in the right way, not in any morbid way, and yet with no very intense feeling or conviction as regards his attitude towards the totality of things. We must separate the two. I do not mean that either of them can be completely absent. It would be going too far to say that anyone exists who is entirely deficient in the ethical or religious attitude, but because they do not tend to run parallel they must be distinguished on the psychological level. But the level to which they really belong is not the psychological level. It is a higher level and the level of religion is higher even than that of value. There is the level of value, but the level of religion is higher than the level of value in the sense that it is more all-inclusive and more face to face with totality and the innermost mystery of existence. Thus there are aspects, ethical, æsthetic and logical, which are all aspects of reality, but religion itself is an attitude to reality in its concreteness. The values are important, and it is difficult to conceive religion apart from them. We should probably be right in saying that normal human nature has a religious sense, not in the out-of-date sense of faculty psychology but in the form of a primitive tendency towards the religious attitude—to feel the mystery, the beneficence, and perhaps too the sternness of the spirit of the universe. This is gradually revised in the course of the individual's life, it is freed more and more from irrelevant experiences, just as the appreciation of music or other forms of art is gradually freed from irrelevant experiences.

With regard to this religious attitude, we must recognize how it varies in emphasis from person to person, and we must be ready to attach importance to what we find in the experience of those who are most taken up with it. The saints and the martyrs, by living the religious life, have shown the earnestness and the reality of it. There is always the question of pathological emphasis that runs through all this subject. As we see

in the case of conscience, a direct feeling may be emphasized pathologically, and our criterion there would no doubt be the criterion of balance. We find that where the conscience is pathologically over-emphasized it is out of proportion. In a similar way some people are over-religious in a pathological sense, they are unbalanced and their religion carries with it a lot of crude emotion that does not belong to religion at all. It is sometimes called hysteria, or by some other name derived from psychopathology. Even in the lives of great saints and martyrs one finds distinguishing aspects and characteristics that are pathological, especially in the conversion experience which some of them have passed through. Yet by taking them not individually but in relation one to another, and comparing their inner experience with their outward conduct, one gains a fairly satisfactory impression of what in them was true religion and what was spurious emotion due to a slight over-balancing of the mind when face to face with this stupendous mystery. Just as they themselves in examining their own lives gradually learn and advance in religious insight—learn to throw aside certain experiences or turn aside from them—so the observer, the psychologist or the philosopher, or the student of the philosophy of religion, comparing these individual experiences, can in that way learn what religion means in the lives of others. That is the empirical side. You cannot say *a priori* what religion should be, just as you cannot say *a priori* what beauty or morality or truth will be. That form of the *a priori* has been abandoned by everyone. When we say that these values are beyond the merely empirical, we do not mean to say that they are *a priori*. We learn them through experience, but in the course of experience we separate them out, we train ourselves by self-discipline, and by observing others disciplining themselves we see how they get more and more direct insight into reality.

Let me try to make this argument more concrete in regard to æsthetic experience. Suppose we take architecture. A Greek column is æsthetically pleasing. Consider by the side of that Greek column the picture of Atlas holding up the world. You contemplate that and feel uncomfortable, you feel that it is

something incongruous, not æsthetically pleasing. On the other hand, contemplate the structure of an ordinary wall. That is not in itself æsthetically pleasing—the Greek column is. What is the difference? Schopenhauer's theory is that, in each of these instances, there is a representation of two ideas in relation to one another—the idea of weight and the idea of support. In the case of the wall the support is too great for the weight, and the two "ideas," support and weight, are not clearly distinguished. In the case of Atlas the weight is too great for the support. In the case of the Greek column weight and support, entablature and shaft, are adequately adjusted to each other. It gives a feeling and an awareness of harmonious relationship. And the æsthetic reality with which one is in contact when appreciating the Greek column is not essentially one of pleasure in harmony, but a direct sensuous awareness of harmony in those two ideas—the aspects of weight and support. Two people may be able to appreciate the Greek column as a work of art to the same extent, but the one person may feel strong emotion about it and the other may not. One person may feel great pleasure, and the other not so pronounced physical pleasure. The æsthetic experience is not the same thing as physical pleasure. It is an experience of harmony. In the personality that experience comes from the soul itself, it is one of its inmost characteristics.

If a person asks himself what he really is, he finds himself faced with the need of analysis. A good way to carry it out is to get analysed over a long period, in which one works over all one's past, and in that way discards a lot of accidental accretions and hysterical and sentimental associations, looking upon the process as a sort of long death-bed repentance or *μετάνοια* (change of mind), facing one's past as something not entirely past and done with, asking oneself what it all amounts to, what one expected and expects of the world, what one really values in life and in others. One finds that it is not accidental or mere physical pleasure or any immediate and momentary sequence of experience. The temporal aspect as such falls away. One finds oneself seeing life more from the point of view of the eternal. Even temporal experience itself can be eternal. There

are two general forms of temporal experience. There is the mere sequence of one's life from moment to moment—it is that form of the temporal that is appearance and not reality. That in itself is of little value. But we succeed more or less in transcending it the whole time, at one time more than at another. In one sense the temporal is a mere nothing. In another sense it is important, because it is woven into our experience, inasmuch as it is a condition of our appreciating, especially, e.g., the sequence of notes in music. And yet in that sequence of notes one realizes that true musical appreciation has already transcended the sequence. One would be merely at the animal level if it were not so. The work of art so far as it is a work of art is beyond the temporal.

In ethics, an analogous relationship holds good. Moral conduct is a sequence of cause and effect. In the circumstances that make the hero ready to risk his life for others, there is a temporal sequence, but of course the heroism is out of time. The general act of heroism is above mere time, though it has to occur in time. Each one of us needs to think all this out for himself, he cannot learn it from books. He must discipline himself and purify his powers of appreciation. That is what I mean when I say that we should examine ourselves as fully as we can if we are to get an adequate view of what is meant by personality.

My readers may object that I have never told them what personality is, and have made my discussion very uninteresting by leaving out just the sort of thing that the world calls personality, viz. the individualism of people who get their photographs in the paper and in other like ways make themselves prominent. To my mind that is not personality at all—that is a movement in the opposite direction. Personality is within these values which we have been describing, and passes through them to enrich the higher or the more profound religious attitude. It takes one beyond time and beyond the limits of the individual, and that is what is meant in saying that personality is in the end transcended in the Absolute or God, and that there is only one complete personality, or, rather, super-personality. We partake of these values; they

are revealed to us gradually. We learn to get into relationship with them. We find that the more sincere we are the more able we are to get into relationship with them. We find that what is meant by faith is conviction of our personal participation in these values, and what prevents us from having faith is generally ourselves. A person has no faith in himself when he knows that he is not sincere. To the extent to which we are not sincere we lack faith, and our sight is blinded, and we move away from the vision of true reality. So far as we are vouchsafed that vision of ultimate reality, we can only get it as parts of one another and of the totality of things. In the end it is the totality of things that is fully real, and not ourselves. We have reality only so far as we are parts of the totality.

This is all so very obvious that it is difficult to understand why anyone should object to this theory of the Absolute, of God the be-all and the in-all. We are members of one family, families are parts of one another, we are all brothers and sisters, we feel certain that unity of action for the sake of the totality of humanity must be the right action, not merely in the ethical sense, but in the true metaphysical sense, bringing us nearer to the ultimate meaning of things. Looked at from that point of view, pathology takes a wider scope. We are all of us pathological, not only in the sense of showing tendencies to psycho-neurosis or psychosis but in the more general sense of being blinded in our insight, being cut off, being obsessed by our individuality, not going out sufficiently smoothly into touch with the totality of existence round us. That going out is not a vague mystic thing, but something definite. We have relationships to those nearest to us; our family is relatively more important to us because we know more of it, and our knowledge helps us to act more effectively and truthfully, and our action must shade off as it covers a larger and larger radius, but we cannot put the circumference anywhere. We must take as our ideal, and stretch out our lives to include, the totality of existence. This does not mean absorbing totality into ourselves, but getting absorbed into it—not a form of disintegration, a sinking into the Nirvana of nothingness, but

living the life of the universe so far as we can throughout our lives. From that point of view, as Nettleship said, "death does not count." It is a physical experience, generally involving a certain amount of pain and anguish, but as a reality we can pass beyond it; before we face it we can see it as something that is just incidental, and when it does come it only affects the lowest level of our nature. We are people living on a different plane altogether from the plane of mere physical life and death. And so far as we get that totality, and sustain it for any length of time, we feel the question of individual survival after death is wrongly stated. We are already, in this life, in relation to eternal existence. We can partake of that eternal existence. We may and probably all do, think that immortality or continued existence of some sort is probable, but whatever reasons we have for thinking that are derived from the eternal characteristics of experience, not from the temporal characteristics of experience. So long as we think of existence temporally in terms of sensation and association, we are bounded by mortality. When we die our sense organs and our brains disintegrate. It is not that kind of existence which is immortal. Memory may be a different matter. This is a difficult problem—the question of how far memories are associated with and dependent on our brains and disappear when our brains disappear. It may be that brain activity is responsible for the recall of memories, but not for their retention, and that so-called loss of memory is only a failure in the power of recall.

The poets are nearer the truth than any prose writer, and when Browning says, "The soul, doubtless, is immortal—where a soul can be discern'd," he really gives us the truth. We shall survive so far as we deserve to survive, to the extent to which we are capable of transcending the conditions of merely temporal physical existence. Although much of the work of the Psychical Research Society, the Spiritualists, etc., is important in the effort to obtain empirical evidence of survival, one cannot say that the results hitherto reached are particularly impressive or cheering, because in their triviality they seem to tie one down too much to a merely temporal sequence. The evidence such as it is may be valid, but it is not inspiring.

The loss of loved ones and the longing for reunion with them is a legitimate and powerful motive for our quest. Many have taken "the road to Endor" only to return disillusioned and disappointed. But apart from this, why think too much about another life? We have our reality here. Let us realize the scale of values, seek always the highest good, strive for that, and the rest is in the hands of the Absolute. It seems to me that this is the best temper of mind in which to lead one's life. Live immortally as far as possible now, as Aristotle said so long ago—live the immortal life at every moment. See things from that angle, and live one's life from that angle. It is to the extent to which we do that that we are persons.

Yet personality itself is appearance rather than complete reality. In this view I am following F. H. Bradley. However much he has been criticized, that central position of his seems to me to be ultimately sound. Intellectually we are forced to think in terms of one—intellect means that; and spiritually we are forced to think in terms of one—spirit means that. Spirit means unity with something that is all-inclusive and is perfect, so far as we can appreciate perfection at all. Our imperfections of all kinds come, in some degree, from being separated off from one another. We have to be separated from one another, because each has to do his own work, and no two persons have the same work to do, but this separation should be according to an all-inclusive law, joining persons up, so that the separation is only justified so far as it is an aspect of union. And that brings one to a form of mysticism; but it is not the mysticism of the spiritual sybarite who seeks pleasant feelings as such, but the satisfaction of the most central and also most all-inclusive characteristics of one's mind. And that is what the higher mysticism is. In the higher mysticism, which may be more pronounced in some conditions of mind than in others, the experience itself is other than mere emotion. It is a feeling of peace, of complete safety and satisfaction—a conviction that perfection, i.e. God, exists, and that we may in however humble a way participate in that perfection and thus, and only thus, achieve realization of our inmost personality.

#### CHAPTER XIV

### PERSONALITY AND SURVIVAL OF BODILY DEATH

As regards the possibility of personal survival of bodily death, the evidence of *Psychical Research* is clearly of scientific importance. All relevant facts should be considered and investigated with scientific precision. Any scientific statements should be based upon knowledge and not upon ignorance. Nevertheless, our belief in survival is but little influenced by the findings of *Psychical Research*. Evidence from that source falls far short of convincing proof. Alternative hypotheses are possible, and in the end the conclusion must remain within the realm of hypothesis, whereas the arguments in favour of survival which are really impressive are on a different footing, and have to do with a different level of our mind—the level that comprises the general scheme of values. We have already seen on more occasions than one that value-experiences are only indirectly the subject-matter of psychology, and yet are the most important parts of our mental life. Hence a theory of values is needed, which is to be not a merely psychological theory. Considerations of a psychological nature are relevant, but do not constitute the foundations of such a theory. The theory of values belongs primarily to metaphysics, not to psychology.

This question of survival is intimately bound up with the theory of values. Is the life we live on this earth worth while? If we believe that it is, what are our reasons for such belief? We may find that the answer to this gives an answer to the further question: Are we likely to survive? We are likely to survive so far as we can continue and complete the realization of values which we are in process of realizing here. This is probably the most decisive criterion. We cannot get certainty. Scientifically we do not get certainty. It has often been remarked that in *psychical research* we have at times seemed to be on the verge of obtaining some conclusive evidence to settle the question in a positive way, and through carelessness in the reports of observers or

through peculiar circumstances apparently accidental, this evidence has broken down, producing the impression that we are possibly not meant to know. Possibly it is good for us not to be scientifically certain about a future life, for reasons that will at once suggest themselves. One such reason is that if the future life is happier than this life there would be a greater temptation to leave this life when faced with specially difficult circumstances, and so to lose the discipline which this life has for character, and to miss some of the factors of character-training. If, as Keats said long ago, this world is "the vale of soul making," it is fairly clear that many of the difficulties which we would otherwise wish to avoid, and do attempt to avoid, are of real benefit to us.

Secondly, if we were scientifically sure of a future existence, we should lose whatever moral advantage attaches to uncertainty. The uncertainty is itself a testing circumstance for character. Different people react to that uncertainty in different ways. Some say: "Let us eat, drink, and be merry, for to-morrow we die." Others say: "We have this life, let us make the best of it and develop its possibilities to the utmost, help one another while we are here, sink our merely individual differences as far as possible, pursue the values we clearly see without enquiring too much about the more ultimate values of existence at present hidden from us." These are the two extremes. On the one hand we may find people giving up the pursuit of ideals, adopting an Epicurean attitude towards life, regarding the senses and direct physical pleasure as the most obvious and the most important things in this life, and living for them. On the other hand, we may find people recognizing the value of evolution, approving of the good, emphasizing it, and fighting for it without thought of anything beyond—following virtue for its own sake without thought of reward. Perseverance in that attitude of mind is itself a training of character, and most likely to develop to the utmost the potentialities of character. A conviction, grounded in scientific knowledge, that there is a future life, would not necessarily interfere with such training; but in the previously mentioned type of person it might encourage a different order of "good-

ness"—it might encourage such persons to look at spiritual things as means to an end instead of as ends in themselves. Probably, if men were certain of another life, the actual differences between individuals would remain much as they are now.

If we believe in super-personal values, which are, as it were, caught up in, or participated in by, the individual personality—if we believe that the individual achieves personality partly through submission, living for values, striving to purify his power of appreciation of those values, and partly through affirmation of them, we pass beyond individuality towards a more general outlook on life, a super-individual outlook, in that way lessening individuality but gaining rather than losing in personality. As the individual disciplines his mind to an appreciation of this hierarchy of values, he gains another attitude which is also a personal attitude, the attitude of religion, in which he faces reality not in its abstract aspects of truth, goodness, and beauty, but in its concrete character as the spirit or soul of the universe, which includes these values in itself, and realizes them in its own life. The individual in losing his individuality, gains it again as part of this all-conclusive spiritual unity. And if we take the individual personality as a very faint reflection of what we may believe the Universal Mind to be, we may feel that its development and realization is cut short in this life. However long we may live, fulfilment is denied us in every case, more in some cases than in others, and the adequate fulfilment from the point of view of the imperfect human mind can only be achieved by continued existence in later lives. This would appear to be a really powerful argument for belief in a future existence.

Another argument for survival is that from the absolute value of love and affection. Many people who would claim to have no particular wish or desire for their own immortality, yet have a feeling that the ending of all friendships in this life would be so pronounced a violation of any principle of conservation of value as to be profoundly irrational. Most men think more of the immortality of those dear to them than of their own immortality. What appears much more of a waste

than that of merely individual excellences and achievements, is that of the bonds of affection that spring up between individuals and raise them to a higher unity. It is, indeed, in such a higher unity in this life between individuals who are unselfishly fond of one another that we may see an analogy of what may be eventually the communion of saints or the system of souls towards which the whole universe may be working. We may regard the whole process of evolution as a process of soul-making. And without love, no soul.<sup>1</sup>

The process of evolution, occurring not only on this planet but throughout the whole of the stellar systems of the universe, may be a process of indefinite multiplication of psychical and spiritual reality, and an indefinite union and systematization of that reality. It may be that the whole process of existence is a process in which God or the Absolute goes out of Himself to produce individual agents, to a certain extent separated from one another, with a very small initial amount of freedom which they can make use of and develop, and so work out their own salvation by gradually adding to that freedom—realizing the conditions under which that freedom is diminished or increased, learning by experience that they cannot be sufficient unto themselves, that they must live as parts of one another, realizing that salvation can only come to all simultaneously, that we shall all be ultimately saved together if we are saved at all. Possibly the conditions of reality itself may be such that only in this way can souls be produced. We may *imagine* conditions in which souls might spring fully developed from the God-head, and yet that may be impossible. It is a question of what we mean by the omnipotence of God. God is omnipotent in that He can do everything in harmony with His own nature. Some things are not in harmony with His nature. It may be that the production of individual souls in initial perfection and completely adapted to one another is not in harmony with His nature.

<sup>1</sup> Those who think that a *disbelief* in immortality is justified by science and philosophy are the dupes of their own cleverness or erudition. The advance of science has freed us from crude superstition and its savage terrors, but leaves us with the larger hope—ἡ ἐλπίς μεγάλη, καλὸς ὁ κίνδυνος, "the spacious hope, glorious is the adventure" (Plato).

Such a view as this seems to be assuming the time process as something real. If we regard time as ultimately real, and God as in time rather than time in God, we come up against all the contradictions or antinomies that Kant has set out so fully, and a general philosophy of existence is impossible to us. So far as we regard time as ultimately real we are certainly limited to a merely scientific knowledge of the world. That is what science is—organized knowledge in terms of space and/or time. But philosophy attempts to pass beyond this position. We may, if we like, protest that it is impossible to pass beyond; that we are in time, and cannot get out of time. I have already tried to explain how according to the doctrine of values we are on occasions lifted more or less out of time even in this temporal life. Nevertheless, the sketch which I have given of the production of souls out of the divine nature or essence, and their gradual return, is in terms of time. That is the way in which it appears to us, the only way in which we can think of it. We find that all our scientific thinking, all our scientific knowledge, while giving us an increasingly clear view of the world around us, ties us down to the self-contradictory framework of space and time. The limitation is especially apparent in the case of time.

Nevertheless, by timelessness one does not mean a *totum simul*, a mere simultaneity. Timelessness, or eternity, is not a negation of time, it is rather a fulfilment of time. Time for us, as we experience it, is more than spatialized time, more than a sequence of one thing after another. Bergson has drawn from this consideration a conclusion precisely the opposite of that which I am drawing. Bergson makes time, *durée réelle*, the very stuff of reality. The time with which we deal in physics and in the other physical sciences is spatialized time. Bergson would consider that reality as such is duration, and so one finds at the centre of his system of philosophy the conception of an *élan vital* pressing forwards towards greater and greater vital complexity. This is the fundamental principle which he uses in explaining evolution, upon which may be grafted the Darwinian theory of struggle for existence and natural selec-

tion and other evolutionary factors of modern biology. The world is in process of creation, and to the question about the beginning of it all, Bergson gives a most unsatisfactory reply. He speaks about an "interruption" occurring at an unspecified date in the past in the forward progress of the spiritual principle—a falling away in the opposite direction, which is matter. In the organic world one finds this vital impulse making use of matter (its own "waste product," as it were). The vital impulse continues to mould it for its own purposes. Bergson's idea of the relation of structure and function is that function produces structure, and not structure function. His view is the opposite of the materialistic theory, according to which one starts with the simplest configuration of atoms that fall into groups or systems, the more stable systems surviving, until systems arise sufficiently complicated and stable to be capable of the function of consciousness. For Bergson the reality is spiritual energy, which asserts itself in spite of a tendency to "fall away." As there is a falling away, in a sort of condensation of the world in matter, the spiritual energy then proceeds to mould that matter and produces the various systems of function and plan, culminating in the intuitive and intellectual life of man. The objection to this theory is that it does not carry us far enough. The assumption which it has to make (viz. that of an "interruption") practically means a retreat from the philosophic problem. To the question "Why did the interruption occur?" there is no answer. On the other hand, if one holds that God exists from eternity to eternity—that the existence of God and Spirit is beyond time, then one may find—or some genius in future ages may be able to find—a place for time within that eternal system, and one may be able to explain how the temporal series has arisen.

The individual mind is an abstraction. Just as, if we look towards the future, we can see the various selves or personalities becoming more and more harmonious with one another and achieving universal values; so, if we think back into our past, and into the past of the whole organic world and of the stellar systems, we again find ourselves arising from unity rather than from diversity. We are parts of one another from

the beginning, just as we become parts of one another in the end. We are parts of one another in the beginning in a different sense, indeed, from that in which we become parts of one another in the end; nevertheless, the beginning and the end, although separated for us by a temporal series, are parts of the same system. If we think at all we have to assume that reality is intelligible, which means that reality is coherent and forms a system in which everything is relevant to everything else—we have to accept the principles of relevance and of sufficient reason.

Our thinking occurs in time, and we set out our scientific knowledge in a temporal sequence. Yet in our thinking we see that truth transcends time. The universe, the totality of things, must be a system, but it must be beyond time, a system that finds a place for time in itself. What is the meaning of time to us individually? It has various meanings. Taken at its highest level time has the meaning of development, of a deeper and deeper penetration into the meaning of things. Time means for us deepened insight into the significance of the universe. Some may hold that "the end is progress." These have the zeal of the reformer, who wishes to leave the world better than he found it. But thought cannot stop there. Indefinite progress is in theory as unthinkable as indefinite regress. There is no meaning in a better unless one can believe in a best. This world is imperfect, and the more we appreciate these imperfections the more we tend to realize the significance of progress, and of a possible perfection. When we hear of a terrible case of cruelty, or of cynical self-seeking, it is then that we become specially conscious of what good means in contrast with evil, just as it is through our own bad actions, through our own mistakes, that we become more aware of what we are falling away *from*, of the possibilities which we are missing in the way of development of character. And all this comes to us in sequence of time. It can only come to us in that form in our individual lives, and the time sequence is an essential condition of this life. Similarly with the appreciation of beauty, we can only wake our souls in process of time; we need time for it. Likewise with truth; we can only fully appreciate truth through

the process of manufacturing it, hammering it out. But some do it much more rapidly and completely than others. A mathematical genius will reach mathematical truth at a much quicker rate than will a mathematician of average ability. Mathematics, indeed, is a good illustration of the significance of temporal experience in revealing what is essentially self-evident and beyond time. The time taken in reaching truth is relative to mathematical "sincerity," to the extent to which the mathematician can free himself from the influence of irrelevant factors. So in morals, we in our finite lives can only achieve the self-evident through painful experience and frequent failure. Sincerity is an indispensable condition. We thus gradually re-make ourselves in the light of the moral ideal, and in so doing gain an ever-increasing insight into the nature and significance of that ideal. Similarly with art—æsthetic appreciation of music, painting, sculpture, etc. So, too, in religion, which is an attempt to find out the purpose of the universe, believing that there is such a purpose, taking it as a hypothesis, and endeavouring to identify oneself as far as possible with that purpose, and to play one's part within it. Here there is the great question of optimism and pessimism. The purpose of the universe may be not beneficent, but indifferent, or again it may be a huge mistake, it may have no meaning at all, and what we think is its meaning may be simply illusion due to our own individual wishes and restricted points of view. The argument against this is a pragmatic one, that the more sincere we are with ourselves in working out and applying the doctrine of values, the more do we realize that there is a force greater than ourselves, not only individually but also collectively, working towards a realization of these values. We advance inevitably from a religion of humanity to a religion of God.

NOTE. I do not underestimate the value and importance of Psychical Research, especially the more recent experimental work on telepathy and precognition. I myself have devoted much time to the investigation of the powers of certain well-known mediums. Although I have found no adequate *scientific proof* of personal survival along these lines, some of my experiences have been very difficult to explain on any alternative hypothesis. See my *Science and Personality* Oxford University Press, 1929, chapters xv, xvi.

## CONCLUSION: FAITH, LOVE AND PERSONALITY

IN this final chapter I wish to touch on a number of topics. Firstly, as regards Faith. I have always emphasized the active nature of the faith state, urging that the faith state is an active frame of mind corresponding to, if not identical with, the "will to believe" of which William James speaks. It is not the same as credulity or "wishful thinking," nor is it the same as belief on the basis of scientific evidence. It is, in its fullest form, a determination to trust in the good and to act upon the noblest hypothesis. It is a belief in value and it is a determination to pursue such value and do one's best to increase it if possible, at any rate not to betray it. As such, as an attitude of mind akin to will or volition, it is the underlying force of all therapeutic suggestion; suggestion is based upon faith. Faith is not to be explained in terms of mere suggestion, mere ideo-motor action. In much suggestion treatment the faith involved is an unconscious faith; it is a faith belonging to the unconscious mind rather than to the conscious part of the mind. An individual who has no conscious belief or expectation of benefiting from treatment may nevertheless benefit from suggestion treatment. Further analysis of such a case shows that in the unconscious there is this active attitude, the attitude of an active will to believe, the active valuation of something as worth while, the expecting a result because it is good. It is a fundamental belief in the goodness which is at the back of things, a belief in the friendliness of the universe, that the universe is not absolutely alien to us, not hostile to us, but friendly.

I have drawn a parallel between that situation in regard to the active side of life and the situation in the realm of the intellect. In science we collect evidence, observe facts and form hypotheses to explain those facts, and proceed further to verify the hypotheses with reference to additional facts. The scientist considers that in doing this he is avoiding metaphysics, avoiding any non-empirical assumptions, and basing his work entirely upon experience. But thinking further we see that

observation of facts and colligation of facts, forming hypotheses and testing hypotheses, would be impossible unless we held the fundamental assumption that nature is uniform, that there is a rationality in things, that *A* remains *A* and does not change into *B* except for some sufficient reason. If *A* becomes *B* there is a sufficient reason for it. Everything in the universe, we believe; is *relevant* to everything else. There is no irrational or purely fortuitous alteration from one state to another without a cause. There is a belief in the uniformity of nature, a belief in the rationality of things, which is a background to the scientist's work, which is the fulcrum by reference to which he can produce theories of the universe. So the analogy is this. As the belief in the uniformity of nature is the background of scientific reasoning and investigation through the method of hypothesis—the formation and testing of hypotheses—so faith in the friendliness of the universe, in the goodness at the heart of things, is the background, the support of the therapeutic method of suggestion treatment. If a patient is completely without this underlying faith, it seems to me that he would fail completely to respond to suggestion treatment. Secondly, as regards Personality, I have repeatedly pointed out that personality is more than individuality. It develops from individuality. In everybody there is a universal element—something that transcends the individual.

These two matters, faith on the one side and the nature of personality on the other, need to be taken together. They are linked up with one another. We bring them together in order to get a more satisfying view of Religion. Religion is my central problem in this chapter. If we ask for the nearest analogy to religious experience (analogy is at the basis of most constructive intellectual and philosophical work) we should say that it is of the nature of love. In the love of one person for another there is a direct relationship—a relationship which cannot be adequately understood from the outside. It may have a biological significance and purpose, but that does not completely sum it up. Over and above that there is a direct intuition, a direct insight, which is ultimate. In a similar way, so far as a person has a religious attitude, it seems to me, it is a

feeling of love—love for the universe, and for other people in the universe; as I have said in earlier chapters, a belief in the worthwhileness of things, a feeling of worship and adoration. The feeling of guilt and desire for security, upon which some Freudians rely in their analysis and explanation of religion, is not so ultimate. A feeling of guilt may arise—bad conscience may arise from a feeling of inadequacy, of falling away from one's ideal, of disloyalty, of being untrue to this experience; but the experience itself is an experience of love, similar in quality to love between one person and another, but higher in the sense that it has a much wider scope. One may love parts of the universe, one may love a science, or an art, any particular art or any particular science, any particular place. One may love individual persons and things. One may love one's country, or one's nation, one may love humanity; and this love is a real thing, and as love it brings with it, carries with it, an expectation of reciprocity. Whatever you love, you feel in a way loves you. It may seem absurd to say that an object, a house or a village or town loves the individual that loves it, but in the most complete forms of love there is reciprocity. We feel that it is at any rate a plausible hypothesis that, widening our scope of love, we eventually reach something similar to that which Spinoza reached at the end of his philosophical pilgrimage. He was driven by a desire, by a craving, a determination to search for something the love for which would completely satisfy the mind. He found that in the love of God or Nature, *Deus sive Natura*—the *amor intellectualis Dei*. He took the path of the intellect, although a great deal of his work was on the emotions. He dealt with the emotions along intellectual lines, after the manner of geometry, so that his is a very special case. But in a more general way we may see that the individual can widen his love to include the totality of the universe and that his feeling for the universe may vary from time to time, from day to day, or from year to year, just as the love of one person for another may vary, and that at certain moments and under special conditions the love may blaze out with great fervour, with complete sincerity, and complete conviction of worth. Those experiences I would call mystical

experiences. What I mean by a mystical experience is a feeling of union with the divine, a feeling of love, a feeling of love which is reciprocated, which may come to a person, not always as the direct result of merit although not independent of merit. Some may strive for it and fail to get it; others may be more fortunate; but when it comes it does come in relation to worth in the individual in the sense of striving, of aiming high, of really endeavouring to find God. It comes from a search for Him, a belief that He is there to be found. "Thou wouldst not have sought Me, hadst thou not already found Me." The person who does not care about such things does not get that experience. The Gallios of life are not the people who would get that experience. On the other hand, many earnest people are too earnest, they strive too hard, they stand in their own light and may through over-anxiety miss their way.

A theory like this cannot be demonstrated. It is suggested by analogies and can be tested by experience. Difficulties will be found at once—the pain and suffering in the world, the cruelty and the apparent prevalence of blind chance. Further insight shows us that much pain is avoidable pain; it is due to error, stupidity, blindness of insight for which a person is not always free from responsibility. The pain itself is a danger signal, and to that extent helpful. And the theory does not seem so far-fetched and indefensible if we remember that in the beginning we do come from the universe. We have developed from mother earth, our ancestors have developed eventually in connection with the burning mass of material torn from the sun by the pull of a passing star, and the sun has been developed out of more profound chemical and physical reactions in the abyss of space. On the principle that the stream cannot rise higher than its source, we believe that the source of all this is something that is at least as intelligent as the highest form of conscious life on this or any other planet.

A more difficult question is as regards the personality of God.<sup>1</sup> The usual view is that God is a Person and that relation-

<sup>1</sup> Miss Hilda D. Oakeley has an interesting discussion of this problem in her book, *A Study in the Philosophy of Personality*, Williams and Norgate, Ltd., 1928. See also Professor C. C. J. Webb, *Divine Personality and Human Life* (Gifford Lectures), Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1920.

ship between the individual and God is a personal relation; but it seems to me that there is a difficulty. It seems obvious that He cannot be a person in the sense in which we are persons, even in the sense in which we are more than individuals, because a person is in relation to an environment, in relation to something outside himself—a spatial and temporal relation on the lowest level, leading up to the highest form of personal relationship. But God has no environment, nothing is outside Him. Moreover He has made us. "It is God that hath made us and not we ourselves." We have come from Him and the relationship must therefore be a one-sided one. It cannot be completely reciprocal. More comes from God than from us in essentials and nature. "We love Him because He first loved us." Love comes from that direction, just as in the case of parent and child. A parent who loves his child calls out love from the child in return. Religious experience, it seems to me, is the consciousness of this love—the awareness of it. That may be masked and neutralized in all sorts of ways. One of the most obvious ways is through self-centredness, self-love; self-love is the enemy of every other kind of love. It is the vampire which seeks to draw everything into itself. It is the thing from which we must obtain deliverance. It is the dragon which must be slain. This it was to which St. Paul might have referred when he spoke those words: "O wretched man that I am! who shall deliver me from the body of this death?"—struggling to get away from himself—to get beyond himself. Other factors may work in the same direction, like disappointed ambition and disillusionment, which are simply a secondary narcissism. A person who becomes disillusioned has set up false ideals which cannot be realized. He is out of touch with reality. Instead of dying to live, killing the love of self in order that the higher self may develop, passing on and on, that is too much for him. Instead of that he creates an imaginary world around him, he sees the world in colours which he himself has projected upon it, and so he makes the world part of himself. He puts himself at the centre, he is ego-centric, and that does not work. He fails, and when he fails his emotional tendencies are turned in on himself. He turns from God to himself. He is like a child

who turns away and says he won't play. The extreme instance of that is the suicide who decides to end it all. The great crime of the suicide (in certain cases) is that he presumes as an individual to pass judgment on the universe. These are negations of religion.

There are degenerate forms or perversions of every kind of feeling, and one may meet with perversions of the religious feeling. One may hear of a person making someone else or something else his god or his religion—making some subject or some pursuit his sole aim in life, feeling towards it something analogous to the feeling of intense devotion or adoration appropriate to religion—a readiness to give himself for the sake of that object. From the purely intellectual point of view, such a position, such a mental attitude, can only be completely satisfied if it does include the entire universe; anything less than the totality of things is not suitable to be taken as God, since it contains an inner contradiction. It is not self-sufficing. For this reason, if for no other, any form of polytheism or pluralism must be wrong. Even if you have only two universes you have the further problem of how they are related to one another, and you are thus forced to look for a wider system which includes the two. Just as with the intellect you must believe that truth is one, so in religion you must believe that God is one.

Of course what I am saying is a repetition in other terms of what you find in any of the great religious literatures, especially in that of the Christian religion. God is love—the essence of it. It is in Him that we live and move and have our being, and He cannot be a person in the sense in which we are persons, because even if we become more than individuals, if we gain personality by acquiring an element of universality, of being a particular universality, God is universality itself. God includes all the various values, the eternal values of the good, the beautiful, the true, in quite a different way from that in which we partake of those values. We can fall away from them. We can be untrue to them. But we do not (except in a qualified sense) ourselves make them. We endeavour to discern them, and by discipline of the soul we get a clearer view of them and

get inspiration from them; but, although we play a part in developing them by the creative power of personality, through the faculty of choice, we do not make them as God makes them. They are a part of God, and I have already suggested in general terms how they are related to Him. They are aspects of His nature. I said just now that God was universal, but He is individual too. He is a concrete universal, the most concrete universal of nature. So that in one sense it might be said that God is the perfect personality and that all other personalities are imperfect—fall short of that personality. But I have always felt sympathy with the view which F. H. Bradley sets out in the last chapter of his *Appearance and Reality*, when he says there is a certain amount of intellectual confusion in those who speak as if the Absolute had personality in the sense that individuals have, in the sense that one can attribute selfhood to the individual. One denies personality to God only because one considers that God is beyond personality, as we know it and understand it. It is no question of adopting any theory of pantheism, any view of drab uniformity and mechanical necessity of the entire universe; but there is no reason whatever to hold such a view. That could only come from adhering too closely to the more elemental and general sciences of physics, chemistry, and biology. I don't think anyone who takes psychology seriously could be a pantheist. We hold that there are gradations, differences of degree in the universe; that just as there are different degrees of truth for individual minds so there are degrees of value, and that God is the system of values in their true order. He represents the hierarchy of values in their completeness, and it is because we see no reason to deny a certain degree of freedom to the individual that we would say, looking at it intellectually, that the Absolute is entirely free. And so conversely we could look on our freedom as something which is derived from the Absolute. The justification for belief in mental contact with the Divine or in a cosmic consciousness is firstly, that we come from the universe, we are parts of it, and therefore we should expect a feeling of community of that sort, and secondly, that this experience of world-love, the religious experience in its highest

form, is normal and not pathological. People who have it are the better for it. They do not become morbid and neurotic through it. There is a form of experience sometimes called mystical which really is morbid, and a good deal of it is narcissistic, is an introversion of love upon the individual himself. The individual has a feeling that he is transcending space and time, because he is returning to an earlier stage of his life now reactivated in his unconscious mind where tendencies are out of time, where they act timelessly.

It is extraordinary what similarity and convergence there is in the views of different people at the present day on the relation of science and religion. I have read a great deal of the literature during the last twenty or thirty years, and that is what strikes me—not that different people have different views, but that they all have much the same views, almost as though they were quoting one another. The differences are less pronounced than the differences between one creed and another. On the psychological side the beginning of this study was made by Professor Starbuck in America, who sent out a questionnaire on the subject of religious experience. William James in his *Varities of Religious Experience* analysed the results thus obtained. The answers boiled down to a few conclusions which I have already quoted (p. 128). Discounting the discrepancies of the creeds, he found some central nucleus of agreement, and it is interesting to note that one element was the reality of prayer. We are parts of the spiritual universe, with which we can come into relation, and in which, as James says, work is done in the sense of actual transfer of energy—energetic effects are produced. Prayer is central to religion. Many are the definitions of prayer. Several come to my mind—"He who rises from his knees a better man, his prayer is answered" (George Meredith, *The Ordeal of Richard Feverel*), James said, "We pray to our ideal self"—in doing so we give a chance for our ideal to lift us up.—"He prayeth best who loveth best," etc. Prayer is in its essence a form of affirmation of faith, an avowal of confidence, trust, worship, adoration, a readiness to accept the will of God. Petitionary prayer is secondary to that. The only

justification we should have for making any petition would be because of that. Any petitionary prayer apart from that is like the prayer put up to an idol, a sort of magic, just a formula for producing effects. It is really an element of practical science rather than an element of religion. Magic launched science. Magic came before science. Spells and incantations failed, so people set to work to learn more about the laws of nature, and commanded nature by obeying her.

Sir James Frazer has his own theory about the relation of prayer and magic. According to his view, this transition occurred when individuals found that magic failed. At first they adopted the imperious method of magic and incantations, they strove to bend the forces of nature, the spirits of the universe, to their will; but, failing, they became more humble and changed to an attitude of entreaty and supplication. But it seems to me that such a theory misses the essential nature of religion. It commits the fallacy of explaining a later development in terms of an earlier. It is not only legitimate and desirable, but also necessary, for science to work out an historical description of the processes of development or evolution, but it is another thing to *explain* the later in terms of the earlier. Theoretically it is obvious that the later would explain the earlier in matters of intellect, and we see that this is so. Likewise in matters of ethics, of æsthetics, and ultimately of religion. In the later stages of development, aspects become explicit that were merely implicit in the earlier, and therefore likely to be overlooked in any description of the earlier. It is all very well for us to dogmatize about the way primitive peoples thought, judging their thoughts from their actions. It is quite possible that certain essential characteristics may thus be overlooked. What is described is the more prominent and noticeable characteristics of their superstitions. But the essential spiritual element of their religion which may be there, may be there from the earliest times but not so pronounced—as it may not be so pronounced in a young child as it is later on in life, in our modern civilization. It may be there. That is the essential thing. The outward forms and ceremonies are relatively unimportant. Savages may consider that sort of thing important, in

the sense of being necessary or indispensable. It need not be held that they attach any more importance than this to it. Then why do they insist that it shall not be omitted? Just *because*, it seems to me, they attach overwhelming importance to the spiritual as such.<sup>1</sup> That is their way of manifesting the spiritual. It is only at a very high level of development that rites and ceremonies can be dispensed with.

One may go farther and say that it is doubtful whether they can ever be entirely dispensed with. Though an individual may, at a certain stage in his or her mental or spiritual development, feel relatively independent of rites and ceremonies, yet with a further development of his life he may feel the need of them again. People I have spoken to on the subject say that without that their spiritual life tends to fade and lose clearness and precision. While recognizing that the spiritual life as such is not the same as the rites and ceremonies, yet they realize that the ceremonies are helpful in keeping it fully alive—just as a person who is interested in a particular subject is helped by reading books written by others on the subject and by going to discussions and lectures. He gets stimulus from outside. It prevents him from falling too much in on himself. That is a real danger. Many who think they can do without forms and ceremonies may tend to scoff at those who need them, thinking that they are in an infantile stage of religious development and are in danger of the other extreme of narcissism. But the same danger threatens the person who does without forms and ceremonies. He may fall back on himself. There is one line of action which will save both alike from narcissism—living for others, living for a wider system, forming part of a group, living for the group, living outside ourselves as much as possible. It looks as though that is essential. What sums up the Christian religion better than any other is the phrase 'Die to live!'<sup>2</sup> a phrase you find in Hegel. Hegel has a number of illuminating phrases somewhere or other in his writings. "Be a whole or join a whole"—if you are not part of a community, living its

<sup>1</sup> Also because fear and ignorance play an important part in their general religious attitude.

<sup>2</sup> "*Stirb und werde!*"

life, you have to be complete in yourself, and you find you can only do that if you are God. So that means we have to live as members of one another. Hegel says elsewhere, "Be a person and treat others as persons"—adopt the personal relationship, the personal attitude which is the universal attitude. The same thing was put forward in the maxims of Kant—"Treat every one as an end and never merely as a means." "Act so that the law of your action can be made a law universal." That of course is practically the same as the golden rule—"Do unto others as you would they should do unto you," "Love your neighbour as yourself."

It is very easy to criticize these statements—to show that in special instances the ideas of morality are self-contradictory, that they are not logic-tight. Yet they are greater than logic; as ideals they are therefore real, and they have a real influence on all who accept them. They do not mislead in practice. There is no danger of those following such rules falling short in their ethical conduct. The difficulty is that the intellectual formulation of ethics is difficult.

It was Lord Balfour who said many years ago, "It is extraordinary, in comparing the great variety of ethical systems, to find so great a unanimity of their conclusions." It means that the heart of man is sounder than his intellect in this matter. One conclusion might be drawn from it—that it is a form of justificatory reasoning (Ribot), a rationalization. You have rules of conduct that you accept intuitively and then you look for reasons for them afterwards. You do not act because of the reasons; you find reasons for your actions. You cannot live by intellect alone. It is an abstraction, or rather a set of abstractions—a "ghostly ballet of bloodless categories," to use F. H. Bradley's phrase. Reality is wider than that, fuller than that.

This brings us to the general theory of values. We have cravings, desires, and wishes, the satisfactions of which are values. As Adam Smith said, "Value is the satisfaction of desire." But these values are not all on the same level; some have more importance than others for the individual and for the race, and the question is whether there are any such

things as ultimate values, or absolute values. Even if we deny this, we may yet find reason to believe that there is an absolute *order* or hierarchy of values. The values are related to one another according to degrees of precedence. The main classes of values are: (1) Æsthetic values or degrees of beauty, (2) Moral values or degrees of the good, and (3) Logical values, or degrees of truth. These values must be objective. They are general or super-individual, and are relatively permanent—if indeed they do not transcend time completely. This is obviously the case with logical values. But it is equally so for the other two general classes of value. Moral action is action that takes the individual out of himself and lifts him above mere individuality. Artistic creation is likewise super-individual. If it were merely an idiosyncrasy of the artist, he would not care to claim for it an art-value; and in calling it an art-value he himself attributes to it a value that other people ought to appreciate. Moreover, one such art-value should be appreciated as higher than another—there is a scale of art values.

#### INDIVIDUALITY AND PERSONALITY

It remains for us to sum up, and put in more precise terms, our doctrine of personality. Personality should be distinguished from individuality. The term individuality, when used in a technical sense, may be regarded as indicating a mere difference from other people, but personality means more than this. Considered from an evolutionary point of view, it may be said that individuality arises out of a certain kind of generality and passes into another kind of generality. Individuals develop out of the general characteristics of the species. The individual man belongs to the genus *Homo sapiens*. He has a distinct character developed in the course of evolution, represented by his various instinctive or primitive tendencies—tendencies to take notice of different incidents, different kinds of objects and facts in the outer world, and to react to them in more or less definite ways. He comes into the world inheriting certain tendencies, both to perceive and to react to his perceptions; he also feels in particular ways about things, and strives in special directions. All this is something general or common to him and to others

of his class. He differs from the horse, the ox, and the dog in the nature of his instinctive tendencies. But besides this general character represented by his various instincts, there is something individual in each man. Various instincts are inherited with different degrees of intensity and differentiation, and the individual also manifests a certain degree of *spontaneity*. Biologically considered, as manifested in other domains of the animal and plant kingdom, it may be called *variability*, or a tendency to spontaneous variation from earlier forms of inherited tendency. And this spontaneity, associated with gradually developing powers of thought, is what contributes freedom to the human race. If an individual had no spontaneity he would not be free; he would be simply like a gramophone record grinding out results that had been produced ages before. Spontaneity is a tendency to vary, though not lawlessly or irrationally—a tendency to try new methods of reaction and test new kinds of experience. Reasoning is something more than this. Reasoning is observing, comparing, abstracting, drawing conclusions from data, and in that way producing something new. So something new is produced, on the one hand, through spontaneity, and on the other through the working of reason.

One may describe in terms of spontaneity the working of the æsthetic powers, the power of appreciating beauty, of discriminating between the beautiful and the ugly or between different degrees of beauty, and the striving to create further beauty.

The fulfilment of moral obligation or the pursuit of the good is also based on spontaneity. So far as it is more than mere convention, more than a mere sheep-like following one of another, doing things because our ancestors did them, or because our neighbours do them—so far as it is a following of the inner light and a striving towards a better, so far it is creative. The three classes of values—the good, the beautiful, and the true—are all of the nature of creations. They are not static, they are dynamic, continually unfolding, continually expanding. These values, as we create them by our persistent and painstaking discrimination, are general values. So that we

pass from the generic of the race through individuality to gain a more general outlook. We start as parts of one another, inheriting similar though not identical powers, and we separate ourselves off from one another. As we reach adolescence we become more acutely aware of our difference from others, and find a tendency in ourselves to assert that difference; but as we develop further, that development carries us towards the pursuit of values classified under these three headings: goodness, beauty, and truth, which values again are general, teaching us that we belong to one another, and are all members of one universe. We find ourselves in the universe. This is what I call personality. We see the paradoxical nature of the term. Personality is general, but it is also creative. The universality of personality is creative because it partakes of the creativeness of the totality of things. Descriptions of the creative process of working given by geniuses in science or art seem to illustrate this. They all speak of something coming to them as if it came from elsewhere, yet they know that it belongs to themselves. In creation there is a point of junction between the Absolute and the Individual—universal elements of their own nature making use of the material provided by their individuality. One may, then, speak of personality as being on the one hand general and universal, and on the other creative. Nietzsche considered that the chief thing a man had to do was to transcend himself—that manhood was something to be overcome. The objection to that, in the form in which Nietzsche sketched it, is that it is too vague, too indefinite, and allows too much reality to the time process. The time process has undoubtedly a degree of reality, but it is something one is overcoming all the time in the course of one's life, so far as one is following the light of value-discrimination. So far as we seek the highest good in its various forms, we are transcending the time process. Our mental states do not simply fall outside one another, they are not joined up end to end like pictures in a cinematograph film, nor do they merely overlap. They raise us to a form of experience that is above the experience of transition, of sequence. Indeed, so far as we begin to get the *experience* of sequence, we are above sequence. The mere fact that we can

discriminate, that we can put *A* before *B*, and know that *C* follows *B*, shows that we are seeing things from the point of view of the Eternal. In human life transcendence shows varying degrees. It is high in the highest products of value experiences. In the appreciation of a symphony, or a picture, or a piece of architecture or sculpture, there is something which is in its essence eternal. It reveals itself in time, every experience lasts during time, but so far as experience is of any value to one it is beyond time. Similarly with truth; in considering any truth about the world, one finds that it is beyond time. It may take time into itself, but it is in essence beyond time. And if one considers a noble action of heroism or self-sacrifice, although it occurs in time one feels that it has its place as something eternal, as something beyond time.

When one asks how these classes of values are related to one another, one finds that they are abstractions or aspects of ultimate reality or the Absolute. One reaches the conception of the Absolute or God as *the concretion or realization of all values, beyond time*; because time must be within God, God cannot be in time. The experience of the Absolute, whatever it is, is something that is eternal. We perhaps get some faint reflection of what that experience may be in our highest moments of appreciation of these different values.<sup>1</sup>

These new values are values for everybody. We have to be intensely democratic and communistic in this matter. We cannot be exclusive. So far as salvation as a religious conception is concerned, it must be for all. God is no respecter of persons, and although people vary in their powers of appreciating values, these powers are not mutually conflicting but represent varying degrees of approach to an identical ideal, which we believe to be real and which is realized in the absolute. It leads to at-oneness, and that is why one is anxious to distinguish personality from individuality. Mere individuality, which is so much a craving to be different from others and

<sup>1</sup> All we have willed or hoped or dreamed of good shall exist;  
Not its semblance, but itself; no beauty, nor good, nor power  
Whose voice has gone forth, but each survives for the melodist  
When eternity affirms the conception of an hour.—ROBERT BROWNING.

to get special advantages not shared with others, is a bad thing, a regression towards a more childish outlook on life, and is not in the line of progress. Nevertheless, courage to take an individual line is an essential element in personality. In popular speech the term personality seems to connote the power of the individual to stimulate and to activate the imagination of others—as with great statesmen and great generals.

We may consider further this question of privilege and distinctiveness. No one wishes to see the world degenerate into a universalism of crude mediocrity. Rivalry has its part to play in calling out the powers of individuals, encouraging them to make the best of themselves, and to get the best out of themselves; but that best when it is observed is something not merely of themselves, it is beyond themselves. *So that we can regard personality as a process but not a product, for it is never completely produced. It is a process that is creative on the one side and intuitional on the other. As personality grows, it produces something new, something that was not there before, and also brings with it increased insight into the nature of things, into the values of the world.* The more we discipline and purify ourselves, the more sincere we are with ourselves, getting away from the merely individual, the deeper will be our insight into life, and the greater our power of appreciating values. But the creative aspect is equally important. Both intuition and creation are involved in the living world of values as we know it, and also in the conception of genuine personality.



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were keenly interested in education. The advocates of a "federal department of education with a secretary in the president's cabinet" hoped that their cause might be realized. This hope was dashed, however, when the secretary of the interior, with the approval of the president, formally repudiated advocacy of such a transformation. In a formal statement read before the annual meeting of the American Council on Education in May, 1929, he declared:

The place of the national government is not that of supplying funds in large amounts for carrying on the administrative functions of education in the communities, but to develop methods, ideals, and procedures, and to present them, to be taken on their merits. The national government, too, can give widespread information on procedures, can report on what is going on in different parts of the country and in the world, and can unify to some extent the objects of those in the field of education in so far as unification is desirable. There is a distinct place for this sort of thing in the administrative side of the national government, but it should not be recognized as an administrative position with large funds at its disposal. *A Department of Education similar to the other departments of the Government is not required.* An adequate position for education within a department, and with sufficient financial support for its research, survey and other work, is all that is needed.

This statement was followed by action that may or may not be of far-reaching significance to American education, but certainly emphasizes the intention to reduce the educational administrative functions of the United States Interior Department to the minimum and to formulate policies for greatly enhanced non-administrative educational work by the federal government that may materially affect the educational activities of other departments.

Of relatively minor practical importance but indicative of the policy expressed by Secretary Wilbur was the change of the name of the United States Bureau of Education to the United States Office of Education.

Of more importance than this change of name is the attempt to formulate more exact definition of the functions of the federal government in education. For this purpose Secretary Wilbur called a conference of leading educators on June 7, 1929. Dr. C. R. Mann, director of the American Council on Education, was designated as chairman, and Mr. J. W. Crabtree of the National Education Association, secretary. Three subcommittees were organized: one

under the chairmanship of Dr. James E. Russell to consider the educational activities of the national government; one headed by President Lotus D. Coffman, of the University of Minnesota, to consider subsidies to the colleges; and the third, to study other subsidies under the direction of Mr. Frank Cody, superintendent of the Detroit schools. This commission later secured \$100,000 from the Rosenwald Fund to finance the study, and Dr. Henry Suzzalo was chosen to direct the work.

It will be noted that the work of the Commission, as indicated by the subcommittees, gives considerable emphasis to matters of subsidy. This fact and the discussions of the Commission have led to concern in certain quarters lest the Commission report a general disapproval of federal aid for education in the states.

At the present time the more important federal aids to state education consist of annual income from land grants made available by the Morrill Act of 1862, the flat appropriations derived from the Morrill Act of 1890, and the Nelson Amendment of 1907. In addition, funds for research, especially for agricultural research, are made available through the Hatch Adams and the Purnell Acts. In none of these cases does the grant of federal money carry an obligation to the state to appropriate further funds. Two of the federal subsidies—the Smith-Lever funds for agricultural extension and the Smith-Hughes funds for vocational education—do require that the state or local community provide an amount of money equal to the federal grant. Since it is the land-grant colleges and vocational education that receive the major portion of federal monies, some concern has been felt by the beneficiaries lest the committee disturb existing arrangements. This fear is probably not justified since both these interests are adequately represented on the Commission, and the character of the other members is such as will effectively prevent distortion of logical conclusions.

In harmony with President Hoover's plan for determining facts and seeking advice from well-informed experts as a basis for formulating policy, several special educational commissions, in addition to that upon the relations of the federal government to education, have been set up. These include a national commission to consider the problems of illiteracy, a commission to consider the educational

uses of the radio, and, indirectly, a commission on the entire problem of social welfare.

The national study of secondary education for which funds had been requested of Congress in 1928 by Dr. J. J. Tigert, then commissioner of education, was inaugurated in July, 1929. Commissioner Cooper retains the general direction of the survey, but has secured Dr. L. V. Koos as associate director in immediate charge of the professional and technical aspects of the study. Mr. Carl A. Jessen, of the staff of the Office of Education, is acting as assistant to the commissioner in charge of the business and mechanics of the survey and of certain elements of the study itself.

As announced, the plans for the survey definitely provide that it shall not be a study of urban secondary education alone. Special attention will be paid to the problems of high-school education in the smaller communities and rural areas. It will include an examination of the growth and present status of secondary education in the United States, the forms of its administration, the types of high-school organization, the articulation of the high school with the levels both below and above the secondary level, and will treat the curriculums in considerable detail. Of special interest is the plan to study the secondary-school population and its related problems. As outlined by the committees serving on the staff of the commission, this phase of the study will investigate the proportions of secondary-school population in and out of school in relation to age, race, sex, intelligence, and social economic status. In this connection, special inquiry will attempt to determine the articulation of the schools with the occupational life of secondary-school graduates.

In harmony with the purposes and methods of national service to the schools of the country through organized service demanded by various groups, a paragraph was introduced into the Interior Department appropriation bill in the fall of 1929 looking to a national study of teacher-training in the United States. Two hundred thousand dollars is asked for this purpose in order to make "a study of the qualifications of teachers in the public schools, the supply of available teachers, the facilities available and needed for teacher training, including courses of study and methods of teaching."

This project, which will probably be made effective by congress-

sional action, is of special importance in view of the development during 1929 of the rather general conviction that there is an oversupply of teachers. Considerable evidence has been assembled to indicate that this is a fact so far as actual numbers are concerned. However, many educators question whether the supply of well-qualified teachers is excessive. Further, it is claimed by no one that the oversupply extends to all phases and subject-matter fields. Educators who are interested in the deficiencies and inequalities of rural education are especially concerned lest measures be taken to reduce the supply without sufficient attention to the need for more and better-trained teachers in rural schools. This group, therefore, regards the proposed teacher training study as of special importance in that it hopes that from such a study plans of procedure and measures of relief may be devised.

Attention was called in this review of education for 1928 to the fact that opportunities available to Negroes for preparation to enter medical schools were very restricted. As was indicated, this was a situation that affected the medical care of a very large proportion of our population. The American Medical Association, upon the basis of a survey of Negro colleges and universities made by the United States Bureau of Education in 1928, prepared and published in 1929 a reclassification of the Negro colleges upon the basis of their ability to do work acceptable for admission to medical schools. Up to the time of the publication of this new classification, the American Medical Association had rated only five Negro colleges in the United States as doing work that would be accepted at par for admission to medical schools. The new classification rates twenty-five Negro colleges as prepared to offer acceptable work for admission to medical schools. Such a tremendous expansion of approved premedical work should greatly facilitate training of Negro physicians.

Of hardly less importance than the expansion of opportunity thus provided is the fact that the American Medical Association issued the new list with the statement that any college which will pay the cost of reinvestigation may be examined annually in order that due recognition can be given for such improvements as have been made. This enlightened policy is in striking contrast to con-

ditions that previously based judgment of the ability of Negro colleges to offer premedical work upon facts that were in some instances ten years old.

It should be noted in this connection that the American Medical Association does not wish to encroach upon the accrediting and classification functions of the regional and national accrediting associations of colleges and secondary schools. The ratings given by the American Medical Association list are not intended to refer to four years of work given by the institutions but represent the ability of Negro colleges to offer two years of acceptable premedical college work. The list is effective only until such time as provision is made for the classification or approval of colleges for Negro students by the established regional accrediting associations.

The only regional association which does not rate Negro colleges within its territory has been that of the Southern Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools. It is of extreme educational importance and of great sociological interest, therefore, that at the meeting of the Association in December, 1929, the Association voted without a dissenting voice to rate both Negro colleges and high schools within its territory. A committee was appointed for this purpose with Mr. H. M. Ivy, superintendent of schools at Meridian, Mississippi, as chairman. There seems to be no reason why this decision of the Southern Association to assume responsibility for passing judgment upon the quality of the work of Negro colleges and high schools should not be carried to completion within the near future, except the necessity of securing approximately \$25,000 for the prosecution of the investigation. In view of the national importance of the action of the Southern Association and the splendid opportunity it gives for the improvement of race relationships, it is difficult to believe that the required funds will not be forthcoming.

Probably the proposal of the year that is most important from the standpoint of its potential effect upon actual instruction in the schools is that made by Dr. C. H. Judd, of the University of Chicago, before the American Council on Education in May, 1929. Dr. Judd pointed out that the timidity of the colleges in attacking social problems is accentuated in the public schools. "It is striking-

ly true that the rank and file of even the college students of the country are relatively little affected by the social sciences, and that high school and elementary school pupils are hardly reached at all."

Yet society depends upon these schools to prepare the rank and file of its citizens for participation in the community life of the nation in such fashion as will enable them to vote and act intelligently upon economic and social problems of national and state concern. The school authorities, for safety's sake, quite generally hesitate to introduce live social discussion and instruction, or they are unable to do so since such work usually affects the standing or the advantage of one or another social or economic group. Dr. Judd made a plea for the appointment of a commission to carry on a series of experiments under ordinary school conditions for the purpose of securing and sifting a large body of material which might be formulated in such a way that it might be utilized in the schools "with sufficient sanction behind it so that teachers will be free from the inhibitions which now handicap them in devising social instruction." The American Council on Education appointed such a commission under the chairmanship of Dr. Judd, and co-operative arrangements have been made with several school systems whereby the plan may be financed. The significance of this development is apparent from the statement of the principle that will control its activities. "The proposal is not that social studies be added to the present curriculum, but that a comprehensive reconstruction of the curriculum be undertaken with a view to making social studies the core to all that is taught in the schools."

Attempts to secure unity of educational effort and consideration of the problems involved occupied an increasingly important position during 1929. In the field of higher education the most striking movement in this direction was the creation of a single board to control all the public higher educational institutions of Oregon. The five institutions had been under the control of three boards, one each for the university, the agricultural college, and the normal schools. A fourth board, that on higher curriculums, had the function of preventing and abolishing undesirable duplication of work between the institutions. These old boards were eliminated and their powers and duties lodged in a single board of nine members.

Political and local influences are guarded against by making the term of board members nine years, by restricting the governor's power of removal, by making ineligible for membership any resident of a city in which one of the institutions is located, and by permitting upon the board not more than one alumnus each from the university, the agricultural college, and the normal schools. All funds are allotted to the institutions by the board and no representative of an institution may appear before the legislature or any of its committees without the written authority of the board.

The law which established this experiment in co-ordinated control of the state public higher institutions further stipulated that prior to inauguration of the new policy the board should arrange for a survey of higher education in the state by an impartial outside agency. The United States Office of Education has been invited to undertake this survey and will complete the work in 1930. In order to insure that the board has continuous and comparable information concerning the institutions under its control, the law made provision for the employment of an executive secretary "fully qualified by educational training, ability, and experience."

Of somewhat different character and scope, but equally indicative of educational interest in unity of effort on the part of the various agencies and levels of education, was the *Seventh Yearbook* of the Department of Superintendence of the National Education Association, published in 1929. This publication was devoted entirely to the problems of articulation between the different units of the American public-school system—elementary, secondary, collegiate, university, and professional. It is significant also that the commission which prepared this *Yearbook* was continued, with instructions to carry on further investigation of the same subject for report in the *Yearbook* to appear in 1931.

Another publication that disturbed academic calm to a greater extent than any report since that on medical education was the Carnegie report on college athletics which appeared in October, 1929. The importance of this report lies not alone in the facts submitted in regard to the commercialism of college athletics and the exploitation of athletic ability by educational institutions. It is of even

greater value in that it provides disinterested outside leadership in attack upon a situation with which college and university presidents cannot deal effectively at first instance. They are seriously handicapped by the fact that the public is ignorant of the effects of commercialized college athletics upon educational standards, and misinterprets intercollegiate contests as evidence of undergraduate enthusiasm. The report should tend to change the attitude of the public and to make it realize that the forces which largely mold the present form of intercollegiate athletics are those traceable to the financial returns to the institutions and to the newspapers that provide the ballyhoo.

## GOVERNMENT

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### ABSTRACT

Congress has laid the foundations for a great publicly owned water power by authorizing the building of the Boulder Dam, but allows its operation by private companies under lease. Among the states, Utah has launched long-distance planning of public works as a relief for unemployment. The Pennsylvania state government has been reorganized on the basis of the single-headed department with the advisory commission, and even administrative commissions within the departments, still testifying to the fear of a powerful bureaucracy as well as the practical necessity of groups of men for the semi-legislative and semi-judicial work of administration. Unpaid commissions as a means of supervising executive officials and of rule-making testify in other states that a highly centralized government has not yet found favor in this country. The session laws of last year show that the use of professional bodies to control the members of their own professions is an accepted form of administrative organization. Decisions of the Supreme Court have sustained the presidential pocket veto, the power of the secretary of war, under statute, to regulate the flow of water from Lake Michigan, and have regularized the position of an administrative court, the Board of Tax Appeals.

Governmental changes as shown by the legislation of 1929 show development of the same tendencies toward centralized government organized under single-headed departments in the more important industrial states with the persistence elsewhere of the citizens' commission, either unpaid or paid a small *per diem* to carry on both the administrative and the rule-making duties of the government. The most interesting and important of these commissions is that in Utah, which initiates the long-distance planning idea which has been so vigorously urged by official and unofficial spokesmen recently, since unemployment has become a serious problem in this country. The project in its full development calls for planning the construction needs of the state over a long period, and then permitting an administrative body to determine at what time the particular plans should be carried out, in order that the work may be realized when most needed to supply employment. Of course, in some cases projects cannot be delayed, but must be completed as soon as possible in order to meet a need. The task of determining, under local and political pressure, which projects should be at once begun

and which should be delayed is no simple one, nor is it easy to determine when unemployment threatens and the time is ripe for releasing work.

The Utah act is only a beginning, but it is significant for students of government. It is notable that the legislature on the recommendation of the governor has confided the delicate and important task of determining just when the particular work should be done and of controlling its expenditure, not to the state administration, but to a body of unpaid citizens appointed by the governor, themselves selecting their own administrative force. This is the opposite pole to the movement for centralizing power and responsibility in the hands of the governor and the official administration.

Another interesting use of the citizens' commission to effectuate a sort of guild organization of trades and professions is freely illustrated in the last year. Licensing of such persons is the approved method of testing their capacities by examination and disciplining them by withdrawing or suspending licenses. This power of professional life and death, however, is not placed in the hands of the regular officers of the state, but is kept within the group regulated by requiring that members of that group alone shall be appointed to the commission, and not infrequently on the recommendation of their professional association.

#### FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

Outstanding in legislation affecting the federal government is the Boulder Canyon Project Act.<sup>1</sup> The secretary of the interior is authorized to construct and operate the dam at Boulder Canyon and a canal taking the waters of the Colorado River into Imperial Valley in California, and to construct also a hydroelectrical power plant. A fund of \$165,000,000 is set aside for the work, to be advanced as called for by the secretary of the interior. All money received from the operation of the project is to be paid into the fund. Before beginning construction the secretary must assure that it shall be self-supporting by contracting for sale of water or power for a sum sufficient to insure payment of expenses and operation and maintenance, and within fifty years the repayment of the cost

<sup>1</sup> Public 642 45 Stat. at L. 1057.

of the plant plus interest. The dam is to remain government property managed by the secretary of the interior, who may, however, lease units of the plant with the right to generate electrical energy or make a general lease of the use of the waters for power. Under the provisions of the leases the secretary may regulate service by the lessee to the public.

The only other statute of importance in the organization of government is the central purchasing act,<sup>2</sup> the purpose of which is the concentration under one administrative head of the purchase of supplies for the executive branch of the government. The secretary of the treasury is authorized to administer the service through the General Supply Committee, and the finances are taken care of by creating a special fund in the treasury from which payments may be made, to be reimbursed by the departments and establishments for which purchases are made.

#### STATE GOVERNMENT

*Long-range planning.*—The year 1929 witnessed the first fruits of the idea of the long-range planning of public works sponsored by President Hoover as a means of regulating unemployment. It is to the state of Utah that must go the credit of initiating what may be a very deep-seated reform in which is implicit, not alone the immediate purpose of distributing the use of state money so that it will accomplish the social purpose of relieving unemployment, but also the further object of providing a more orderly and intelligent development of building plans of the state through concentrating in the hands of a single state agency, control, not only of the planning of state construction, but also of the duty of determining the order of importance of the projects to be undertaken.

By chapter 101,<sup>3</sup> the Utah legislature created a commission of five citizens to be appointed by the governor with the consent of the Senate, for four-year terms, except that the first appointments were divided, two for two years, the others for four years, so that there would be a degree of overlapping which would assure a certain continuity in the policy of the commission and would make

<sup>2</sup> Public 833 45 Stat. at L. 1341.

<sup>3</sup> Law of 1929, Utah Unless otherwise indicated, chapter and page numbers refer to the session laws of 1929 of the state mentioned.

temporary political exigencies less controlling. To remove the commission farther from partisan political control and make it representative of the best class of citizens, the commission is not paid, which means that the governor is expected to find business men and citizens whose principal occupation is not the state service, to give their time and take responsibility for the very important duties of the commission. The commission is given further independence of the state administration by having power to appoint its own staff, headed by a secretary and a superintendent of construction. The theory of the centralization of executive control in the governor or in any branch of the state administration is completely put to one side, except so far as the auditing department has control over expense to prevent spending money for purposes not authorized by law. These purposes are very wide. The commission is authorized to make plans and contracts for state work, to acquire property and sell parcels not needed for state uses, and to submit to arbitration any controversies arising in the course of its operations. The freedom of the commission to undertake work at such periods as it deems most advantageous for the public is made very evident in the method of financing its operations. A bond issue is authorized, to be sold to the extent and at the time requested by the commission, so that money is not impounded in the treasury from tax revenue nor are bonds sold until the money is actually needed for use, but financing is provided in advance so that the commission is free to undertake its work as it pleases.

The bill originally introduced provided a program for a twenty-year period, specifying a large number of buildings for the university and for state institutions, including a provision for a new state prison. But the legislature was not willing to follow the governor so far, and as it became law the act provides for only a two-year program of building construction, but nevertheless the amount of the bond issue authorized, \$1,150,000, is an earnest expression of the sincerity of the legislature in its experiment. The commission has been set up and is functioning. Its pioneering work will be of importance to the whole country.

*Single-headed departments.*—The reorganization of the Pennsylvania state government, chapter 175, is the outstanding expres-

sion of the trend toward the modernization of American state government during the year 1929. Scattered executive offices, boards, and commissions are assembled into nineteen single-headed departments and three independent commissions. In the case of two of the commissions, the rule-making function is prominent. The other is a semi-judicial organ. There is no reason of principle why the first two, the Board of Game Commissioners and the Board of Fish Commissioners, should not have been consultative commissions in a single-headed executive department of conservation, but the third is the Public Service Commission, whose function is so clearly judicial that it can only be exercised by a board. The governor, with the approval of two-thirds of the Senate, appoints those heads of departments who are not elective officers, and the members of all independent commissions. The terms of appointment are made to correspond with the term of the governor, by making them for four years, beginning with the third Tuesday in January after the election of the governor.

The principle of centralizing control in the head of the department, notable in New York and California, is not followed so completely in Pennsylvania, since the governor appoints the deputies in each department and many advisory boards. Furthermore, the power of the head of the department to reorganize his bureaus is subject to the approval of the Executive Board, the governor's cabinet. He may choose any six department heads who, with himself as chairman, form the Board. Unlike the federal cabinet, the Board has, however, definite powers. In addition to its control over the bureaus in the departments, it is also vested with the duty of fixing a standard compensation for the officials and employees, to which must conform department heads, who appoint their subordinates, except the deputies, and fix their compensation, subject to approval by the governor.

Boards and commissions are grouped under the departments and are not abolished. The idea of a separate local board for each state institution, rather than direct central control, a persisting decentralizing tendency, is preserved, and rule-making boards are continued, notably the Council of Education, the State Welfare Commission, the Advisory Health Board and the Industrial Board in

the Department of Labor, and in the same Board, the Workmen's Compensation Board with its combined rule-making and judicial powers. The act is an administrative code setting forth the duties and powers of the Executive Department in addition to its organization.

California and New York continue their executive reorganization on the principle of the single head in the set-up of the departments dealing with correction, which New York, chapter 243, calls the Department of Correction, and California, chapter 191, the Department of Penology. The governor and Senate in New York appoint the commissioner of correction, who holds, according to the usual New York formula, for the term of the appointing governor. He has the usual broad powers of organization of his Department and the appointment of subordinates, but there must remain in the Department two boards, the Commission of Correction, with the commissioner as chairman and seven members appointed by the governor, who receive \$10 for each day actually spent on service, and the ex officio Board of Parole, consisting of the commissioner, the second assistant commissioner, the head of the Bureau of Parole, and the warden of the prison in which the candidate for parole is confined. The Commission has the usual visitorial and advisory powers with direct access to the governor and the legislature.

The California act has an interesting novelty in the method of appointment of the director. The governor must select him from the chiefs of divisions of the Department. He holds office at the pleasure of the governor and is a member of the governor's council. The Department is divided into five divisions and there must be at least a monthly meeting of the chiefs to consider questions of duplication and to improve the correlation of the service. California provides for study of its treatment of prisoners through the Division of Criminology, whose chief is the chairman of the California Crime Commission.

Washington, chapter 115, shows her approval of the principle of centralizing authority by abolishing her ex officio Highway Commission, vesting its powers and duties in a director of highways, and also consolidating in his department the duties of the state engineer. A check is set up against rash expenditure of money by requiring

the governor and the director jointly to sign all contracts for highway construction. It is very evident that the single-headed department is making progress, but it is also clear that the legislature still considers as important the check of non-salaried lay boards and commissions.

*Boards and commissions.*—The single-headed commissioner appointed by, and directly responsible to, the governor has not yet, however, won the whole-hearted approval of the legislature. In Ohio the system is even held to have failed in the case of control over the wild life of the states, for the legislature (p. 551) took away from the secretary of agriculture this branch of his duty and vested it in a Conservation Council of eight "reputable citizens," who serve for overlapping four-year terms and not more than four of whom may be of the same political party. Their positions are made safe from executive interference by the provision that they may be removed only for cause by the governor, or on recommendation of a majority of the Council itself. A curious split in authority appears in the appointment of the administrative officer of the department, who is appointed by the secretary of agriculture on the recommendation of the Council.

Arizona, chapter 84, is more orderly in its supervisory organ for fish and game, the head of which is an unpaid commission of three, not more than two of the same political party to serve for overlapping terms. It, however, appoints its own game and fish warden who, with the consent of the commission, appoints his deputies, thus centralizing authority and also insulating the administration of the department from executive interference.

The variety of opinion in different states as to the organization of a governmental function comes out clearly in the comparison between the Washington change in the control of its highways from a commission to a single individual as compared with the statute of Oklahoma, chapter 68, which puts the corresponding department under a Highway Commission of three. Oklahoma is perhaps traveling toward single-headed control, for the number of commissioners is reduced from five to three, and they are paid whole-time salaries in place of \$10 for each day spent on duty. Thus the Commission is professionalized on a whole-time basis.

Maine, chapter 361, also will pay a full salary to its State Highway Commission of three, and adds that one of the members must belong to the political party having the second largest vote at the last gubernatorial election.

Kansas, by chapter 258, also adopts many-headed management in its new Bureau of Labor and Industry and furthermore establishes its independence from the governor by making the terms of its three members overlapping, and vesting in it the right to appoint subordinates. Representation of interests in administrative commissions, so common in labor administration, is consecrated by the requirement that one of the commissions must have been for at least five years actively identified with labor. It is not surprising that the same state, by chapter 259, creates a paid Public Service Commission of three, with overlapping terms, to have jurisdiction over public utilities. Kansas by these acts divides functions formerly in one department, but the character of the functions differs so widely that the decision of the Kansas legislature can scarcely be said to be a reversal of the tendency toward centralization.

A rational example of that tendency is Oregon 251, which combines the boards of the University, the Agricultural College, the Normal Schools, and the Board of Higher Curricula, into a Department of Higher Education under a board of nine to serve for nine-year overlapping terms. Members are appointed by the governor with Senate approval. A standing committee of six senators must approve interim appointments. Statutes establishing a tax levy for the institutions are repealed, so they will be dependent on the budget for their income.

*Regulation of professions and trades.*—What might be called a modern guild system under the supervision of the state is developing rapidly among the American commonwealths. The demand for the regulation of various trades and professions has been extending far beyond the learned professions to which it was originally confined. It has been freely extended to trades, and for the year 1929 the barbers seem to be particularly singled out for regulation or modification of existing regulations, but the idea has been applied to what were formerly considered business groups, notably the real estate brokers and salesmen, and title abstracters. From the gov-

ernmental point of view, it is especially interesting that it is a board of persons belonging to the profession or trade to be regulated which examines candidates, makes regulations, and has the power of suspending or revoking licenses, that is, the real power of discipline in the profession or trade. The right of appointment is usually vested in the governor, with the condition that the appointee must be a practitioner of the trade or profession as in Montana, chapter 127, which requires the members of the Board of Barber Examiners to be "practical barbers."

An interesting modification is Nevada, chapter 13, under which the State Barbers' Board must contain one journeyman barber and one employing barber, but is presided over by the secretary of the State Board of Health, thus diminishing the strict guild control, which is further weakened by the provision for county boards, who are named by the State Board of Health, but must be composed of one physician, one employing barber, and one journeyman. The State Board of Health is also given a degree of control over the State Board of Beauty Culturists by Montana, chapter 104. The three members are appointed by the governor from a list of six recommended by the Board of Health, but each member must be a hairdresser or cosmetologist. Administratively the Board of Health is, however, given a wider authority than is usual, through its power to appoint an inspector of beauty parlors to enforce regulations.

A combined board is sometimes created for allied trades as in Arizona, chapter 76, where the Board of Barbers and Cosmeticians consists of one journeyman barber, one employing barber, and two cosmeticians, who must come from different schools. The Board licenses barbers and cosmeticians and makes regulations to assure sanitary conditions in the shops, which must be approved by the Board of Health.

Another variant, the position of a dominant profession, appears in Vermont, chapter 113, where a chiropodist is added to the Board of Medical Examiners, consisting of seven doctors, when they are examining a chiropodist. Chapter 347 of Minnesota is a step away from the strict guild theory and the vesting of control in a dominant profession. It abolishes the Board of Masseurs and vests in the

Board of Medical Examiners the licensing and regulating power over masseurs, but the Board must appoint a masseur as assistant.

By chapter 416, the New York Board of Dental Technicians of three contains one practicing dentist and two technicians. In some cases there is a further recognition of the guild through requiring the appointments to be from persons recommended by the professional association. The solitary Vermont chiropodist, for example, must be named from a list submitted by the Vermont Pedic Association. In South Dakota, chapter 1, the Abstracters' Board of Examination must be recommended by the South Dakota Title Association. The Real Estate Commission of three in Arkansas, chapter 148, must be selected by the governor from a list of twelve recommended by the Arkansas Real Estate Association. A modification of the principle in California, chapter 68, requires that five of the members of the board be appointed from the Northern California Chapter of the American Institute of Architects, while the other five must be from the Southern California Chapter. The whole board makes rules, but the northern and southern boards function separately for other purposes.

In unorganized states each of these boards is answerable only to the governor and the members of its guild, but organized states assemble them under particular departments. In Pennsylvania, for instance, they are all gathered into the Department of Education, as in New York. California has a different plan. Under chapter 290, it establishes a Department of Professional and Vocational Standards, with a director appointed by and holding during the pleasure of the governor. The various professional boards are grouped in two departments, No. 1 containing the Medical and Dental Boards and the Board of Pharmacy; No. 2, the others. This division is important, since the boards in Department No. 1 may hire their own lawyers and investigators and thus control the discipline of their own professions, but as to the boards in Department No. 2, it is the director who hires the lawyers and investigators and prosecutes violations of the law and rules of the board. It is notable that the lawyers, the best organized guild in the state, are not included among the groups subject to the Department of Professional and Vocational Standards.

*Extension of state control.*—In spite of the decentralization evidenced by the home-rule movement, there are some cases in which the state is extending its power over the localities. One of the most important evidences of this tendency occurs in the field of taxation. Arizona, by chapter 46, creates a Board of Tax Survey of three members to assess all property in every county. After the first survey the board continues its work and conducts a new survey during each five-year period. It is to employ a qualified person as an executive and may engage a tax valuation expert to help him. The existing elective tax commission is made the Board of Tax Survey, with small salaries as members of the Board. The system of county assessment will disappear under the pressure of the professional survey. The neighboring state of New Mexico, chapter 84, authorizes the State Tax Commission to appoint one of the members of the County Board of Tax Appraisers, the other two being the county assessor and a member appointed by the county commissioners. Here again the influence of the state toward equal and full assessment is evident.

Following the same line of development, North Dakota, in chapter 259, creates a State Department of Weights and Measures to take over for the state a duty formerly exercised by the sheriffs in each county, the appointment of sealers of weights and measures, thus securing uniformity and centralized control. Another noteworthy instance is the centralization in a state bureau of the means of identification of criminals, to which bureau peace officers are required to send finger-prints and other means of identification. Authorizing acts were passed in North Dakota, chapter 116, and Arizona, chapter 16, during the last year. The chiefs of the bureau are instructed to aid local peace officers, and Arizona expressly directs them to exchange information with other states and with the central bureau at Washington.

The police functions of the state as a unit are also recognized in a new law in Minnesota, chapter 355, which gives the commissioner of highways power to appoint a law enforcement unit to enforce the laws relating to the use and operation of motor vehicles on the highways, except the speed laws. North Carolina, chapter 218, authorizes its Highway Commission to create a state highway patrol, with

apparently no limitations on its functions. In quite another field the movement for state control appears in California, chapter 540, which creates a Division of State Aid in the Department of Welfare, under a chief appointed by the director with the approval of the governor and the Board of Social Welfare. There is a state-appointed board of citizens in each county to co-operate with the county and local authorities and make recommendations. The actual administration of the act, the granting of aid, and investigations are left with the county supervisors, but they are rather pointedly told that they may use the state-appointed board of citizens as a means of investigation.

#### SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

In three cases the Supreme Court passed on interesting questions affecting governmental organization. The pocket veto received the sanction of the Court in *Okanagon Indians v. United States*.<sup>4</sup> The Constitution provides that the President must return a bill with his veto to Congress within ten days unless Congress prevents it by adjournment; otherwise the bill will become a law. For the first time a question came before the Court on a statute which had gone to the President less than ten days before the first session of a Congress adjourned. It was argued that the same Congress would reassemble in December and that the President was not prevented from returning the bill to an officer of the House for resubmission at the opening of the next session in December, so that the result of his not having returned the bill was that it had become law and not that it was vetoed. The Court, however, depending both on the ordinary use of language and on unbroken usage since the Constitution went into effect, sustained the power of the President to veto such bills by non-action. The position of the Board of Tax Appeals was involved in the case of the *Old Colony Trust Company v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue*.<sup>5</sup> The Revenue Act of 1926 authorized a direct appeal on the law from the Board to the Circuit Court. The question arose as to whether the decision of an appeal from an administrative board was a judicial function. The court sustained the statute, saying that a similar situation arose in the

<sup>4</sup> 279 U.S. 655.

<sup>5</sup> 279 U.S. 716.

case of other appeals from administrative tribunals like the Federal Trade Commission. There are adverse parties, the claimant and the United States, a subject matter, the question of what tax shall be paid, and the judgment is a judicial judgment.

In *Wisconsin v. Illinois*,<sup>6</sup> the power of the secretary of war under the authority of Congress to regulate the withdrawal of water from Lake Michigan through the drainage canal was sustained as an executive function, since it involved the determination of the amount of water which could be withdrawn from the lake, an expert question, said the Board, to be decided by engineers. The city of Chicago was ordered to find some other means to dispose of its sewage than the withdrawal of the huge quantity of water from the lake, which was reducing the level of the lower lakes and thus affecting the capacity of shipping in that very highly developed waterway.

In the first two decisions, it was made clear that the court passing on a case is not always deciding simply a litigation between two contending parties, but is exercising an important public function by laying down a rule of general application. In its forum then should appear representatives of the public interest as well as of the parties to the case. Following a custom of which there have been several instances of late, the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives appeared by counsel in the Okanagon Indian case to defend the position of the House, and the Committee on Taxation of the American Bar Association, aided informally by the legislative counsel of the Senate, argued for the legality of the procedure of the Board of Tax Appeals in the Old Colony Trust Company case.

<sup>6</sup> 278 U. S. 367.

## STATUS OF THE CHILD

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### ABSTRACT

The latest available statistics on birth-rate, infant mortality, and size of families are given. Growing recognition of the importance of the early years is indicated by the increasing number of nursery schools and centers for research in the psychology of the preschool child. Contemporaneous trends in the applications of social work to child welfare problems are shown in the rapid development of child guidance clinics. The popularization of child study for parent education is another important social movement. Both welfare work and research are placing more emphasis upon the social relationships of the child.

### BIRTH STATISTICS

The latest United States Census report of births is for 1927. In that year, the birth registration area included all but six states. The number of live births was 2,137,836, which represents a birth-rate of 20.6 per thousand. Of the total number of live births, 1,099,287 were males and 1,038,549 were females, a proportion of 1,058 males to 1,000 females.

From the time when the birth registration area was established in 1915, the annual figures show a slight but consistent tendency toward a decline of the birth-rate. There is a similar tendency to decrease in the death-rate over the same period, with the exception of a marked increase of the death-rate in 1918 over that for the three preceding years.

In 1927, the birth-rate exceeded the death-rate by 81 per cent. A tentative estimate for 1928 gives the birth-rate as 19.7 and the death-rate as 12.0 for that year.

The birth-rate in the United States for 1927 was less than that for certain foreign countries but higher than that for others. For example, that same year Japan had a birth-rate of 33.6, Ceylon one of 39.5, Egypt one of 42.7, and Chile one of 44.8; at the other extreme, the birth-rate for Sweden was 16.1; for England and Wales, 16.6; for Austria, 17.8; and for France, 18.1.

### INFANT MORTALITY

The last accurate report on infant mortality is also for 1927. There were in that year 82,931 stillbirths, the sex ratio being 1,368

males to 1,000 females. The rate was 3.9 stillbirths per hundred live births. The total deaths of infants under one year of age were 138,017, the sex ratio being 1,325 males to 1,000 females. This was an infant mortality rate of 64.6 per thousand live births. The previous record low rate of infant mortality was 70.8 in 1924.

The 1927 infant mortality rate was lower for the urban than the rural area—63.2 for the former and 65.6 for the latter. If the urban and rural infant mortality rates from 1915 to 1927 are studied, it appears that up to and including 1920 the urban was decidedly higher than the rural rate, but that from 1921 to 1927 (inclusive) the urban was slightly lower than the rural rate except in 1922 (when it was considerably higher) and 1924 (when it was only slightly higher). The figures suggest that the care of infants is improving more rapidly in the city than in the country.

#### SIZE OF FAMILIES IN WHICH CHILDREN LIVE

The average number of children ever born to the mothers who reported births in 1927 was 3.2 per mother. The average for foreign-born women was 3.9; for colored women, 3.7; and for native-born white women, 3.0. These averages being for mothers of all ages probably do not represent the size of the completed family. If mothers over thirty-five years of age are considered separately, the data may be more representative of the completed family. The average number of children born to mothers aged from thirty-five to thirty-nine years was 5.8, and the average number living was 5.1, while the average number born of mothers of from forty to forty-four years was 7.5, with 6.5 as the average number living.

In analyzing the size of families in relation to the occupations of the fathers, the largest average number of children was reported by wives of coal-mine operatives. For the age group of thirty-five to thirty-nine, there was an average of 7.5 births, with an average of 6.3 living; for the forty- to forty-four-year group, an average of 9.1 births, with 7.5 living. The lowest average number of children for mothers of from thirty-five to thirty-nine years was for wives of dentists—3.1 born and 2.9 living. The lowest average for the from forty- to forty-four-year-old mothers was 4.4 born and 4.0 living, reported by wives of lawyers, judges, justices, and technical engineers.

## CHILD LABOR LEGISLATION

In 1924, Congress proposed a twentieth amendment to the United States Constitution to provide for the federal regulation of child labor. The Children's Bureau of Washington, D.C., gives an unofficial report of the action on the amendment by the different states at the end of 1929. According to this information, the amendment has been ratified by both houses of the legislatures in only five states. In three states it has been ratified by one house; in twenty-four states it has been rejected by both houses; in eight states rejected by one house; in two states indefinitely postponed by one house, and in six states no definite action has been taken.

The Children's Bureau is now preparing an up-to-date report of the present legislation concerning child labor in the different states.

## NEWER PHASES OF CHILD WELFARE

We have become familiar with the clinical organization in which psychiatry, psychology, and social work are brought together in the interests of a well-rounded diagnostic and treatment technique of maladjusted children. Yet the first clinic employing these co-operative professional services was not established until 1891, and its patients were mostly mentally deficient children whose behavior was of an antisocial type. The first juvenile court clinic with similar personnel was not opened until some years later—in Chicago in 1909. Child guidance clinics, providing for the treatment of less severe personality and behavior problems and educational maladjustments, did not begin to be available until 1922, but the 1928 directory of psychiatric clinics lists 136 which operate under the name of child guidance, some limited to small school systems, others organized on a city-wide or county-wide basis.

The 1925 directory of psychiatric clinics published by the Commonwealth Fund showed that 209 cities in 25 states gave full- or part-time service to different types of problem children; the 1928 directory showed a spread to some 320 communities in 32 states; and a recent survey made by the United States Children's Bureau reports that there are altogether 500 such clinics in this country. Social work is an important phase of the work carried on by all these clinics, despite the classification of "psychiatric."

In spite of the increase of child guidance clinics, in which social

case work is an especially large part of the treatment program, the Commonwealth Fund has recently issued a statement that not more than 20 per cent of the population can now take advantage of these, since most of them are located in cities of more than 150,000. It is proposed to work out some method whereby smaller communities and more rural areas may also be provided with these facilities.

The recent increase in the number of nursery schools is noteworthy in view of the importance placed upon the first years of the child's life as prime factor in the later social adjustment. The United States Bureau of Education issued a list of nursery schools in January, 1930, giving the approximate number for this country as 157, a 34 per cent increase over the number reported for 1928-29.

These sample figures give some suggestion of the rapid development of organizations devoted to the improvement of the child's mental and social adjustment. Within the last five years there has been a marked acceleration of social progress in this field. Conferences of social work also have been devoting more time to discussions of the social problems of childhood. Some five years ago (in 1924) a national Orthopsychiatric Association was formed, with a membership of psychiatrists, psychologists, and social workers actively engaged in work leading to better social adjustments of children, the annual meetings being devoted to reports of research in that field. The White House Conference on Child Health and Protection has recently organized an Advisory Committee on Problems of Mental Health, which are, of course, intimately associated with problems of social adaptation.

#### RESEARCH CENTERS

While the chief aim of clinics and nursery schools is necessarily one of practical service, educational and research activities are also an integral part of the program in many instances. A considerable amount of literature has appeared in the form of books, pamphlets, and articles in journals, which contain data of value to child sociology, both as a pure and as an applied science.

The centers devoted primarily to research are still for the most part to be found associated with the departments of psychology in large universities. The best known are the Yale Psycho-clinic, the University of Iowa Child Welfare Research Station, the University

of Minnesota Institute of Child Welfare, and the University of California Institute of Child Welfare. The Institute at the University of California is the most recently established of these four, but has already issued some interesting contributions to the scientific literature on children and has under way a number of elaborate research projects, many being concerned with the social relationships of the child.

Since its first publications in 1926, the Minnesota Institute has produced seven books and fifty-four articles. At least three of the books and twelve of the articles have a bearing upon sociological subjects.

The studies of genius which are being carried on at Leland Stanford University, and of which the first two volumes have already been completed, are contributing statistical and other material which is of a sociological as well as psychological nature.

#### POPULARIZATION OF CHILD STUDY

Education for parenthood has a prominent place in the adult education movement. Child-study institutes and parent-education conferences are held regularly in several cities and states, and each year sees new areas of population drawn in on these. The parent-teacher associations are turning their meetings into child-study classes and calling upon professional workers for lectures and leadership of group discussions. The subject matter which is utilized for parent education shows a change in harmony with the new trends in child study, with a shift in emphasis from physical care and habit-training to personality and character formation and social adjustment.

The literature on child care and training has grown to a surprising volume within a few years' time. New books have appeared in rapid succession, and several new magazines have been launched. A survey of the recent literature shows that a great amount of space is given to a consideration of social relationships.

The popularization of scientific child study is undoubtedly having its effect upon the social group. It is altering public opinion and forcing a recognition of the fact that proper care of children cannot be assured by the mysterious functioning of a "parental instinct" but is something to be learned. It is intensifying the attitude that

adults who bring children into the world are assuming an enormous burden of responsibility toward those children and toward society.

Theoretically, parent education should illuminate the problems of child-rearing; but, actually, just because the rôle of parenthood is shown to be such a responsible one, there is an equal possibility that it will exaggerate unfortunate situations. For parent education often leads those who come into contact with it to analyze their previous treatment of their children, to become conscious of errors, and to react with feelings of guilt or failure. These reactions interfere with their own mental and social adjustments and create emotional tensions in the family circle which may be detrimental to the parent-child relationships.

Fortunately, the present trend is to introduce education for parenthood before, instead of after, the fact. When it is more generally given at an early age the social results will probably be entirely wholesome. But in its present state there is at least an opportunity to raise some question as to its being without any exception a desirable factor in contemporaneous social life.

#### BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

The University of North Carolina Press has published a selected bibliography of child sociology literature prepared by Professor Ernest R. Groves, under the title of *The Child and the Home*. The books and articles listed really cover a much wider scope of social relationships than is indicated by this title.

There are two books which should be mentioned because to some extent they serve to summarize and crystallize this new branch—child sociology. *The Child in America*, by W. I. Thomas and D. S. Thomas (Knopf, 1928), is a critical survey of behavior problems, and programs which have been undertaken in order to prevent or correct misbehavior and to insure better social adaptation. *The Child and Society*, by Phyllis Blanchard (Longmans, Green, 1928), outlines the effect of the social forces with which the child usually comes into contact, analyzes the socializing process to which the individual is subjected during childhood and adolescence, and describes some of the common ways in which the socializing process may break down to produce personality and behavior maladjustments.

# THE STATUS OF WOMEN

CHASE GOING WOODHOUSE

Institute of Women's Professional Relations

## ABSTRACT

In the educational field there has been an increase in the number of women teachers both in schools and in colleges and universities and they form an increasing proportion of all teachers in both groups. Also experiments in the higher education of women indicate sureness of position and self-confidence on the part of the leaders in this field. In the economic world women are gainfully employed in larger numbers, and a wider choice of occupation is open to them. In the field of politics the numbers holding office and the numbers employed in the better salaried positions are slowly increasing. Legislation in regard to the property rights of married women continues to be more favorable to them.

A century or two from now, when the history of the last seventy-five years is being written, there is no doubt that the change in the status of women not only in the United States but throughout the world will occupy a prominent place in the factors noted as influential in shaping the character of the period. Limiting the discussion to this country alone, the last few years have seen changes in the educational, economic, political, and legal status of women too numerous even to list. Only an illustration or two from each field can be given here.

The United States has gone far in the experiment of educating its women as well as its men. *Bulletin 39 of the United States Bureau of Education* (1927) shows 174,700 more girls than boys in secondary schools. In the universities and colleges in 1926, three women received a first degree to every four men. In graduate schools the enrolment of women and men is as three to five, but two men receive an advanced degree to every one woman. Of course there are still limitations which the women face. The women's colleges suffer under financial handicaps and there are remnants of restrictions on the work of women at the state universities. On the other hand, with the exception of Harvard, all the important law and medical schools are open to them. In a list of fellowships and other aids for advanced and professional work recently compiled by the Institute of Women's Professional Relations, it was a surprise to find how many were open to women even if seldom or never awarded to one.

The outstanding improvements in nursing education indicated by the work of the Committee on the Grading of Schools of Nursing, the establishment of the Yale School of Nursing, the graduate work at Teachers College, and the forward strides taken by the Army School of Nursing are signs of advancement in the profession second only to teaching in the number of women following it.

Two new institutions have been established with the purpose of experimentation in the higher education of women. The recent announcement of the program for Bennington College points to a break with traditional entrance, residence, and graduation requirements. Its purpose is to prepare young women for achievement in some adult activity, and the degree will be given only to an individual who has proved her ability to stand on her own feet and to work with skill and understanding in her chosen field. Whether the details of the Bennington plan are good or bad is not the question. Its importance lies in the fact that such an experiment with its entire cutting away from tradition, from the pattern of education developed at the institutions for men, should be initiated by a college for women. It is the latest step in a chain of developments of which the Institute of Euthenics at Vassar is an outstanding example, which indicates a feeling of sureness and of self-confidence on the part of women in the field of higher education.

The other institution referred to is the Institute of Women's Professional Relations, financed by private individuals, sponsored by the American Association of University Women, and established in January, 1929, with headquarters at the North Carolina College for Women. Briefly stated, the objectives of the Institute are to act as a clearing-house for information on the opportunities and requirements for college women in business and the professions; survey and chart present opportunities for college women; study new opportunities; co-operate with business and professional groups in securing facts on necessary aptitudes and training; co-operate with educational institutions in planning for functional education; study the problems involved in the changing position of women in economic life and in the home.

An invaluable review of the changing status of women in the economic world is found in a recent census monograph, *Women in Gainful Occupations 1870 to 1920: A Study of the Trend of Re-*

*cent Changes in the Numbers, Occupational Distribution and Family Relationship of Women Reported in the Census as Following a Gainful Occupation*, by Joseph A. Hill. As this study points out, the contributions of women to economic production in its commercial aspects are of such substantial proportions that not only is it impossible to ignore them as a factor in industrial progress but they are worthy of serious study as an important element in this progress.

There has been a steady increase in the percentage of women gainfully employed. It was 14.7 per cent in 1870; in 1880, 16.0 per cent; in 1890, 19.0 per cent; in 1900, 20.6 per cent; in 1910, 25.5 per cent. The apparent decrease to 24.0 per cent in 1920 is eliminated when the change in the date of the census and in the instruction to enumerators in regard to listing agricultural laborers is considered. It is interesting to note that if to the 8,202,901 women gainfully employed in 1920 are added the 22,500,000 who it is estimated are actively engaged in the care and management of their homes, we have 30,702,901 women actively employed, or 89.7 per cent of all women sixteen years of age or older. This coincides almost exactly with the 89.9 per cent of the men of the same age who are listed as actively employed.

In five occupations the number of women employed in 1920 showed a decrease. These were servant, dressmaker, or seamstress not in a factory, laundress not in a laundry, milliner and boarding- or lodging-house keeper. Together they showed a decrease from 2,458,737 in 1910 to 1,785,036 in 1920. The tendency for women to enter commercial, clerical, industrial, and professional fields was greater between 1910 and 1920 than in the previous decade. The changes in their occupational distribution are most clearly seen if large classifications are compared. In 1870, of the women in non-agricultural pursuits 60.7 per cent were servants; in 1920, 18.2 per cent. The clerical group, clerks, saleswomen, stenographers, and typists, bookkeepers, accountants, and cashiers were 0.8 per cent in 1870, 25.6 per cent in 1920. The factory group showed a slower increase, from 17.6 per cent to 23.8 per cent, and the principal professional pursuits an increase from 6.4 per cent to 13.3 per cent in the same period.

While much has been made of the fact that of the 572 occupa-

tional classifications used by the census in 1920 there were only 35 in which women were not listed, a careful examination of the figures shows 165 others in which very small numbers of women were found. In general, while there is less concentration in the occupations of women than there was fifty years ago, there is no evidence that women are gaining ground to any marked degree in occupations in which they have been hitherto represented in small numbers, nor are they entering new occupations in large numbers. Perhaps, as this census study suggests (what is happening is that they are replacing men in those occupations for which they prove themselves best fitted and that, while exceptional individuals will always be found in all lines of work, the great mass of women will find their way into certain occupations more or less to the exclusion of men.

From certain points of view women have gained ground in the professions. While about one-fifth of all employed persons are women, they account for nearly one-half of those in the professions. This is very largely due to the increased numbers in teaching. In 1870, 84,047, or 66.3 per cent, of the teachers were women; in 1920, 652,500, or 81.7 per cent. However, the administrative positions are still in the hands of men, the *Educational Directory* for 1928 listing, for example, only 6 women state superintendents of education, 9 deputy or assistant state superintendents, 45 city superintendents as compared with 2,808 men, 900 county superintendents as against 2,703 men.

In college teaching the number of women has increased. In 1910 they composed 18.9 per cent, in 1920, 30.2 per cent of college teachers. In spite of the gain in numbers, recent studies such as Marion O. Hawthorne's "Women as College Teachers" in the *Annals*, May, 1929, and Emilie Hutchinson's *Women and the Ph.D.*, a bulletin of the Institute of Women's Professional Relations, indicate a feeling of despair and resentment concerning their situation in regard to salary and promotion. The same complaints come from women in industry, where the feeling of impermanence has made the work of the labor organizer difficult. The whole question of equal pay for equal work is still far from definition to say little of solution.

That women are bearing part of the economic burden of dependents is attested by the fact that 23.4 per cent of the total number of

gainfully employed women are married. In 1920, 1 married woman out of every 11 was employed and 2 out of every 9 women at work were married. The Women's Bureau has repeatedly shown in its studies that the married woman in industry is there because of economic pressure. A study of 568 professional women by the writer ("Married College Women in Business and the Professions," *Annals*, May, 1929) shows very clearly that they are working largely for the same reason.

An interesting enterprise which should help both these groups is the recently established National Committee on Employer-Employee Relationships in the Home, of which Dr. Amey Watson, of Philadelphia, is director. The Committee proposes a program of research and experimentation to determine satisfactory working conditions in household employment, methods for putting desirable standards into practice, training requisite for household employees, and ways of providing it. The aim is to raise the whole level of household employment. The result should be to attract to this line of work many women well suited to it who are now either unemployed or in some occupation for which they are less adapted and, at the same time, to release others for employment more suited to their aptitudes and training.

In the political field women are just gaining a foothold, but with 8 women in Congress, 7 states with women in the upper chamber, and 23 with women in the lower, with women in every state on state boards of various types, with women state officials, such as equalizer of taxes, chief insurance examiner, assistant attorney, increasing in number, and with a fair sprinkling of judges, progress must be reported.

In the federal government service women have steadily gained recognition in the better-paid positions. The recent appointment of a woman to the Board of Tax Appeals, a position paying \$10,000 a year, gives two women in the service this salary. A collector of internal revenue at Chicago, a collector of customs at Honolulu, a commissioner of immigration at Boston, trade commissioners at Shanghai, Rome, and Oslo are merely illustrative of a list that could be extended over a page but that represents the development of the last few years only.

In the field of private employment changes have come which cannot be reviewed here beyond mention of the increased number of appointments to important positions in the conservative field of banking. In 1929 women were listed in the official banking directory as holding positions in practically every official capacity from chairman of the board to manager of a department. This, again, is a development of the last ten years.

In the legal field much might be reported. For the first time in its meetings of fifty-six years the Institute of International Law was addressed by a woman and passed a resolution in favor of equality in private and public rights without differences based on sex. The new inheritance law of New York State deserves mention. It abolishes dower and courtesy and the distinction between real and personal property. Now the surviving spouse receives outright one-third of the entire estate of the deceased husband or wife where there are children, one-half and certain absolute amounts where there are no children but near relatives, and the entire estate where there are no near relations. Limitations on the right to will property away are strictly limited. While this may not be welcomed by those who believe in great personal freedom of action, from the point of view of the majority of married women it represents a great step forward.

The changing attitude toward the service of women on juries should be noted. In 10 states, 2 with certain qualifications, service is compulsory; in 11 states, Alaska, and the District of Columbia there is a permissive law; in 2 states the situation is uncertain; in 25 states women are ineligible.

Many more illustrations of the changing status of women might be listed, but all point in the same direction, to a growing acceptance on the part of the general public of the idea that women, like men, are individuals, each to be treated as a separate entity and not merely as a member of a class, and each to be given freedom of action and equality of opportunity so that she may find her level in the educational, economic, social, and political world.









