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
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THE COLOUR PROBLEM

ANTHONY H. RICHMOND



The Colour Problem

A STUDY OF RACIAL RELATIONS

BY

ANTHONY H. RICHMOND

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TO

MY PARENTS

All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood

United Nations Universal
Declaration of Human Rights

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A. H. R.

Edinburgh, November 1954

Introduction

THE so-called 'colour problem' in the world to-day resolves itself into one fundamental question: *How will the economically and politically dominant 700 million people who call themselves 'white' respond to the pressing demands for advance from the 1700 millions who are called 'coloured'?* The answer to this question may be as important for the future peace of the world as the ultimate consequences of the conflict between Communism and Anti-Communism. In fact the two problems cannot be so easily distinguished. Already Anti-Communists suspect that the seeds of Communism have been sown among the socially and economically backward peoples over which they rule, and are ready to stamp upon any signs of germination. They do so with greater vigour because they have an uneasy feeling that, by their own neglect, they may have created the very soil on which the seeds of Communism may flourish.

In the last resort the promotion of harmonious racial relations depends upon the application of the principles of social justice laid down in the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, article two of which reads, 'Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other status'. Like most conflicts in human relations the 'colour problem' is ultimately a moral problem. But the moral problems that arise in a changing and complex society often appear difficult, if not insoluble, not because there is disagreement concerning the underlying principles that should apply, but because the facts of the situation are complex and not fully understood. It is often difficult to see how any practical policy can succeed in achieving justice for all concerned. Even when divergent moral principles are involved, as Professor Morris Ginsberg has pointed out, 'the rational solution of a social conflict requires, in addition to moral insight and the will to act on it, an exact knowledge of the objective

conditions of adjustment, and thus a combination of ethics with physical and social science.'[1] It is as a step towards such a clarification of the issues involved that this brief factual survey of racial relations in Britain, Africa, and the West Indies has been written.

The subject-matter of an inquiry of this kind is necessarily vast. I have not attempted to add anything new to existing knowledge, but rather to draw together the numerous threads and observe the over-all pattern. My own interest in racial relations grew out of research which I undertook into the assimilation and adjustment, in Britain, of Negro immigrants from the colonies.[2] It soon became apparent that it was impossible to understand this problem without an examination of political, economic, and social conditions existing in the countries from which the immigrants came. As a result the present book is devoted to a study of racial relations in Commonwealth territories in Africa and the West Indies and concludes with an examination of the position of the Negro population in Britain. It deals, therefore, only with certain limited aspects of the 'colour problem'. No attempt has been made to discuss the position of Asians in their relations with Europeans, except in so far as Asian minorities in Britain, Africa, and the West Indies affect the position of Negroes. Nor does the book deal with the tremendous problem of racial relations throughout the American continent, although there is much in common between the situation in the U.S.A. and the territories discussed here.

These limitations are not meant to imply that there is no 'colour problem' outside of Britain, Africa, and the West Indies. On the contrary the problem is an almost universal one. Throughout the world members of different racial and cultural groups are being brought into ever closer contact and communication with one another. As a consequence they are being forced to make radical adjustments in their way of life. It is this process of adjustment between peoples with a different cultural background which gives rise to the 'colour problem', even though the need for adjustment may

persist long after the initial cultural differences have disappeared altogether. There is a very real sense in which the question of racial differences is incidental to the much larger problem of cultural conflict and social change. Many of the problems of human relations in Africa and the West Indies to-day are the consequence of rapid urbanization and industrialization, which are familiar aspects of the economic and social history of Britain and elsewhere. However, as these human problems are undoubtedly aggravated by questions of race and colour it is essential that there should be no misunderstanding concerning the true meaning and significance of racial differences, as distinct from purely cultural ones.

MEANING OF RACE

In everyday language the term 'race' has a number of different meanings. It is applied to groups of people, animals, plants, and things where the members of the group have some characteristics in common. To the scientist the term race has a more precise meaning; it is essentially a biological concept and implies that the physical characteristics which the members of the group have in common are genetically determined. It completely excludes from consideration any characteristics which are entirely the result of external environmental influences and not the consequence of heredity. As used by biologists and anthropologists the term race also excludes mental traits, such as intelligence and temperament. It has not been finally established whether any connexion exists between physical and mental characteristics from the racial point of view. All the latest and most reliable evidence suggests that there is none; but, whatever may be the outcome of investigations into mental differences between races, the race concept itself is confined to such physical characteristics as stature, colour of skin, hair and eyes, shape of head, nose and lips, cross section of hair, and blood grouping.[3]

It is a common fallacy to assume that the peoples of the world can be divided into two or three clearly defined racial

groups on the basis of skin colour alone. The simple dichotomy of 'white' and 'coloured', and the threefold classification into black or negroid, white or caucasoid, and yellow or mongoloid, have assumed a certain social significance, but they do not correspond with geneticists' understanding of racial differences. In the first instance it has been shown that there are not two or three but many different shades of skin colour. The pathological albino who lacks any pigmentation in the skin may be white, but the large majority of people of European descent range from a pale pink through various shades of colour to the swarthy appearance of Mediterranean peoples. Similarly, the inhabitants of Africa and Asia range from a pale yellow to a very dark brown. Secondly, it has been shown that two apparently identical shades of skin colour may be the product of quite different genetic constitutions. For this reason it is necessary to distinguish between the fundamental genetic constitution of the individual, known as the *genotype*, and the observable characteristics or *phenotype*. The latter is always the resultant of a dynamic inter-action between a certain genotype and a certain environment. Skin colour, in particular, is susceptible to modification by ultra-violet radiation, as anyone knows who has sun-bathed.

Until recently, racial classifications have been based upon biometric studies of phenotypes because not enough was known about human genetics. In fact there has been no systematic examination of the genetic basis of the majority of racial characteristics. The composition of the blood, which has important implications in the field of medicine, is the only characteristic about which enough is known, from a genetic point of view, to enable it to be used by itself as the basis of a genetic classification of human races. A study of the distribution of blood groups confirms one fact, which has long been suspected by anthropologists using the biometric techniques: *there are no clear-cut boundaries between different races.* No matter where the scientist tries to draw a line between one race and another there is a great deal of overlapping. In fact, the only way in which a racial classification is possible

at all is in terms of gene frequencies, or the proportionate distribution of genes in any given population. For example, the blood group O, to which nearly half the population of England belongs, has the highest frequency (between 90 and 100 per cent) among American Indians. At the other extreme, blood group AB, which has not been found at all among Australian aborigines or American Indians, and is rare in Britain, is found among as many as 10 per cent of African pygmies and about the same proportion of Japanese. There is evidence to suggest that the proportion of blood group B increases as one moves eastwards across Europe.[4] It is a fact that a European may safely be given the blood of a Negro of the same blood group but would probably die if given the blood of another European of a different and incompatible blood grouping.

The most useful racial classification so far devised on the basis of blood groups is that put forward by Professor W. C. Boyd. His six races are: (1) Early European (hypothetical), (2) European, (3) African, (4) Asiatic, (5) American Indian, and (6) Australoid.[5] This classification, although arbitrary in its determination of boundaries between gene frequencies, has the advantage of corresponding with common-sense geographical boundaries and of approximating to earlier racial classifications based upon biometric studies of factors such as skin colour, hair form, and shape of head. It must be emphasized, however, that within each of these groups there is a wide range of variation both in blood groups and in other racial characteristics. The concept of race applies to populations and not to individuals. Thus, the genes of one individual may have been drawn from the gene-pool of race X, but it may be quite impossible to tell, from the characteristics of the individual, that they have not been drawn from the gene-pool of race Y. Full details about the blood-grouping of a particular man would not make it possible to assign him to any particular race. It is only the frequencies of the different genes that differ in the gene-pools of the different races, not the genes themselves. If it were possible to specify the frequencies of all the other relevant genes as accurately

as those for blood groups, it might be rare to find a genotype drawn from pool X which could equally well have been drawn from pool Y, but the possibility would still exist.[6]

Before concluding this discussion of the biological meaning of race it is necessary to refer briefly to the question of miscegenation or racial mixture. The fact that the genes for the principal blood groups are so widely spread throughout the world, suggests that miscegenation has probably taken place from the earliest times. Racial crossing has occurred in all parts of the world, wherever migration has brought peoples of different origin into contact with one another. The present populations of Europe, America, Africa, and Asia are hybrid in the extreme. It is only in recent years that strong objections to racial mixture have been put forward, notably in South Africa, but these appear to have no biological foundation. If there were an innate aversion to sexual relations with a person of markedly different physical appearance, as has sometimes been argued, there would be little need for legislation to make sexual relation between different races a criminal offence, as it is in South Africa to-day. The existence of the large Cape Coloured population of mixed Negro and European descent is evidence that no such innate aversion exists. Nor is there any reliable evidence to show that racial mixture leads to any degeneration of the species from the physical or mental point of view. Biologically speaking, miscegenation is neither good nor bad and its effects depend entirely upon the health and well-being of the individuals between whom the cross breeding takes place. *If the descendants of parents of different racial origin appear to show evidence of inferiority, either physical or mental, it is more likely to be due to the unfavourable social climate, the prejudice and discrimination to which they may be exposed, than to any racial factor.*[7]

Race and Culture

Racial classifications take no account of cultural differences between groups of people. There is no necessary connexion between race and, for example, language, nation-

ality, or religion. These are cultural traits which are the consequence of environmental influences. So also are most expressions of temperament and personality. Intelligence, which most psychologists believe to be determined more by heredity than by environment, appears to show a normal curve of distribution in all races. Where the average performance of Europeans appears to have been superior to the average performance of non-Europeans this is almost certainly due to the difficulty of creating satisfactory tests of intelligence which are independent of culture. In any case, almost all such investigations show that some non-Europeans far exceed some Europeans in intelligence and vice versa. If this is the case it may be asked why it is that the various races of mankind do not appear to have shown equal progress in the arts of civilization. Why, for instance, if the African is as intelligent as the European, has the former remained, until very recently, at an elementary level of material culture? Is this not evidence of innate inferiority?

The social scientist answers no, and there are a number of reasons for this. In the first instance, there is evidence that, in different parts of Africa, notably in Nigeria and other parts of West Africa, there were, at one time, flourishing civilizations with highly developed art, sculpture, and metal work, as well as considerable commercial enterprise.[8] Secondly, it is important to see the achievements of the industrial revolution in Europe in true time-perspective. It has been estimated that the whole of the scientific and industrial revolution of the West would fall within a period equivalent to approximately one-half of one-thousandth of the life span of humanity to date.[9] Thirdly, it is wrong to assume that many of the attributes we associate with European civilization had their origins there. Such things as steel, gunpowder, printing, mathematics, and the like were imported.[10] Fourthly, one of the most important factors promoting social changes and advances in material arts is contact between different cultures and civilizations. Despite some evidence of migration, the African peoples were relatively isolated from other societies over a long period and lacked the valuable stimulus

of culture contact. Since contact with European civilization has been established the African peoples have shown a remarkable capacity for imitating the European, which has produced a revolution in their way of life considerably more rapid than was achieved by the European peasant in the eighteenth century.

Although so-called backward countries are making rapid advances there are still big differences in technology, economic development, and material welfare between people in different parts of the world, just as there are differences in religion, and political and social organization. These cultural differences have no connexion with race, as understood by the biologist, but the fact remains that they are confused with racial differences in people's minds. Although the scientist dismisses as unfounded the idea that some races are superior to others, people persist in believing that these differences exist. As a consequence there has grown up a totally irrational 'race consciousness'. *Although having no scientific foundation, belief in racial superiority and inferiority has become a powerful social force.* Its effects are to be observed wherever Europeans and non-Europeans have been brought into contact with one another. In some places, such as in Brazil or Hawaii, where considerable racial mixture has taken place, so that the boundaries between the races are less clearly defined, this race consciousness is not so marked. Elsewhere the European has endeavoured to assert his own superiority over the non-European and to reinforce his position by establishing social and psychological barriers between the races, to which the term 'colour-bar' is usually given. Since the problem of the colour-bar is fundamental to any study of racial relations, it must be examined in more detail.

WHAT IS THE COLOUR-BAR?

The term colour-bar is used to cover several different social and psychological processes which must be distinguished from one another if confusion is to be avoided. Almost all

instances of colour-bar contain three elements: colour prejudice, racial discrimination, and social separation.

Colour Prejudice

Prejudice against a person because of the pigmentation of his skin, or because of some other racial characteristic, is merely one aspect of a general tendency to exaggerate the differences between members of different cultural or ethnic groups. Most people tend to consider the alleged characteristics of their own group superior to the alleged characteristics of another group. Social psychologists call this phenomenon *ethnocentrism.* It has been shown that from the psychological point of view there is a very close connexion between colour prejudice, anti-semitism, fascism, xenophobia, jingoism, and similar states of mind.[11] In each case the individual expresses strong antipathy towards the members of other ethnic groups and is unwilling to admit any serious faults among the members of his own group. Sometimes this intolerance is directed against one group, such as Negroes or Jews, but often these antipathetic attitudes go together.

Whether or not prejudicial attitudes are outwardly expressed will depend a lot on circumstances. Colour prejudice may remain latent so long as the individual does not come into contact with other races. Attitude tests administered by psychologists may, however, reveal these latent prejudices. Furthermore, if the prejudiced individual mixes among people who are relatively tolerant, the ethnocentric tendencies in the individual may not be outwardly expressed. In other circumstances, where prejudice is widespread, it may be freely expressed and elicit the entire approval of the large majority of the individual's friends and acquaintances. In this way derogatory opinions and false notions concerning other groups of people may be reinforced and perpetuated. Isolated individuals prejudiced against Negroes would not present a serious social problem, any more than isolated individuals prejudiced against red-heads. The problem arises when individual prejudices become widespread and the

people holding them support one another in their attitude. Within a particular group there will be some extremely tolerant individuals and some extremely intolerant, while the large majority will fall between the two. The average amount of intolerance expressed towards a particular ethnic group may be greater in some groups than others.

Ethnocentrism, of which colour prejudice is a particular instance, is essentially a psychological phenomenon and has its roots in the individual personality. *Prejudicial attitudes are a means of resolving inner conflicts and of handling anxieties, the origins of which are largely unconscious.* Ethnocentrism, therefore, is closely related to neurotic or psychotic breakdown, on the one hand, and social deviation such as crime or moral delinquency on the other. In a society, such as ours, which is undergoing rapid social changes there is a great deal of personality disintegration and maladjustment. When conflicts cannot be dealt with externally they must be resolved within the personality itself. Successful personality integration and adjustment depend upon many things, among which the most important are satisfactory parent-child relationships in infancy and a sense of security with regard to social status in adult life. It is highly significant that investigations of the psychological origins of prejudice have shown that the people most inclined to be intolerant are those who feel insecure and are afraid of losing their present social status. Insecurity often leads to aggressiveness and this may be directed towards some socially acceptable target, such as is provided in a heterogeneous society by the existence of other cultural or racial groups.[12] Once created, unfavourable attitudes towards other ethnic groups tend to be rationalized and justified. The coercion of subordinates by discrimination and other means provides, in many societies, a socially accepted outlet for aggressive impulses.

Racial Discrimination

It is important to distinguish between racial discrimination and colour prejudice. The latter is a subjective state of

mind, while the former consists of positive acts of deprivation directed towards the members of another ethnic group, individually or collectively. While the function of prejudice is primarily psychological, that of discrimination is essentially sociological. *Discrimination is concerned with maintaining and enforcing status relationships between individuals and groups.* It is a form of non-violent coercion and is the means whereby the members of a society possessing superior social, economic, or political status assert their influence and power over those whom they consider to be inferior, in order to perpetuate the status differences. Racial discrimination is only one aspect of a tendency to be observed wherever there are differences in status between groups within a society. The status of women in Britain, for example, has been progressively improved in recent years, although discrimination still exists as far as remuneration for certain types of work is concerned.

In considering the relationships between two or more ethnic groups in a community two factors are of outstanding importance: the ratio of their numbers and the ratio of their power. It sometimes happens that the ethnic groups in question are roughly equal in numbers. More often than not, however, one group is significantly larger than the others and can reasonably be described as the majority. If the society is a democratic one, in which all groups participate in its government and wealth is fairly evenly distributed, then the numerical relationship may correspond to the distribution of power. In many societies, however, there is an unequal distribution of political and economic power, in which case the majority group may actually assume an inferior position. It can be seen, therefore, that there are three possibilities concerning the status of the majority group in relation to the minorities. The majority may be in a position of superordination, co-ordination (equality), or subordination.

In the latter case the situation may be fundamentally unstable in so far as the superior status of a minority group may require severer discriminatory measures for its perpetuation than is the case where the majority is in a superior position. The members of a dominant minority will be constantly

aware of the insecurity of their position and the possibility of the situation being reversed. This is likely to lead to more repressive measures in order to enhance further the power and status of the minority, but this in its turn will create greater frustration among the members of the majority group who may retaliate with actions of violent coercion, such as rebellion, or non-violent coercion, such as passive resistance. The vicious circle thus created will almost certainly lead to an intensification of conflict and may lead to the ultimate disintegration of a society held together by such a precarious balance of power.

The application of this analysis to the relationships between Europeans and non-Europeans in certain parts of Africa to-day is obvious. In the last resort almost all the social conflicts in Africa to-day resolve themselves into the fundamental one of the relative status that is to be accorded to the several ethnic groups who seek to live together on that continent. Europeans are aware of the fact that they are heavily outnumbered by non-Europeans and are clinging to their superior power. There are forces at work improving the social, economic, and political status of non-Europeans, but there is also strong resistance to this movement. Many Europeans in Africa are afraid that what they call 'white civilization' will disappear under the impact of the overwhelming majority of non-Europeans. This is the essence of the racial conflict now raging. Whether or not a new and integrated multi-racial society is to emerge, in which all the members lead a full and satisfying life according to their capacities and desires, will depend upon the means that are adopted for the resolution of this conflict.

Social Separation

It is said that there is an old Hausa proverb to the effect that the medicine for quarrelling is separation.[13] It is certainly true to say that there can be no conflict between individuals or groups who have no occasion for contact. Similarly a conflict can be ended by the withdrawal of one party.

The aim of social separation is to maintain social and cultural autonomy and to minimize conflict between members of different ethnic groups. This is the third element to be observed in examining the concept of colour-bar. In this context separation means any tendency for social relationships to be confined within certain cultural boundaries. Social separation is the process whereby free contact and communication between members of different cultural groups is restricted by various institutional practices. Separation may be partial or complete. If separation is complete the respective ethnic groups will be fully self-sufficient and isolated from each other. Partial separation in respect of housing and location of residence will create segregated communities, the members of which meet for certain limited purposes, often utilitarian in character. Segregation may also apply to the use of certain amenities. Applied to economic relationships, separation will imply that particular types of work, trades, or professions are reserved for the members of certain ethnic groups. Applied to political relationships it will mean separate representation and special departments of government to deal with the affairs of each group.

Separation, as such, does not necessarily imply discrimination, although it may be, and often is, accompanied by it. Often a measure of separation is adopted voluntarily by the several ethnic groups of a society, in order to preserve intact their respective languages, religions, and other cultural traits. In such a situation any attempt to break down cultural barriers and promote social intercourse may be resisted by all concerned. Limitations upon freedom of social intercourse may apply equally to, and be actively supported by, all the ethnic groups in question. *But when separation is forced by one ethnic group on another the process constitutes a discriminatory practice.* The concept 'separate but equal facilities' when used as a political slogan nearly always means, in fact, separate but unequal. Theory and practice in this respect, as will be seen later, do not coincide. (This was recognized by the United States Supreme Court when, in May 1954, it rejected segregation in American educational establishments.)

But this does not detract from the sociological validity of the distinction between discrimination and separation.

In contrast with the process of separation, as a means of maintaining cultural autonomy, is the process of dispersion which leads to social, although not necessarily biological, assimilation and to cultural synthesis. When members of two different cultures come into contact with one another both processes can be seen at work. There is always a tendency for those who share a common cultural heritage as expressed in language, religion, and common social, economic, and political institutions, to congregate together and to form more or less closed communities with a characteristic way of life. Those who participate in this way of life also share certain beliefs and values which bind them together and create a high degree of social solidarity. Social intercourse of any kind tends to take place between people who have interests in common. Where different ethnic groups live side by side in the same society contact and communication tend to be utilitarian and functional in character. There is a formal fulfilment of certain obligations arising out of specific roles, such as that of employer and employee, professional man and client, shopkeeper and customer, and so on. The more intimate and friendly relationships, corresponding largely with the individual's leisure-time activities, are normally entered into with others of like background. Similarities of language, education, religion, occupation, and hobbies are the kinds of things which draw people together in social participation on the basis of equality. Nevertheless, once some measure of contact, however formal, has been established between the members of different cultural groups, it is likely to set in motion social changes which will lead, eventually, to some modifications in the way of life of one or both groups. Nothing is so conducive to social change as the contact between different cultures. New languages will be learned, new ways of performing everyday tasks adopted, new religions will take root, new philosophies will be discussed, and new technologies and economic systems will come into being which will bring about profound modifications in the former way of life.

As Professor Arnold Toynbee showed very clearly in his Reith Lectures in 1952, the effect of adopting any one aspect of an alien culture is to set in motion a chain reaction in which existing institutions will undergo significant changes.[14] Experience has shown that the technological elements in a particular culture are more quickly adopted and less likely to be resisted than others. But the adoption of a new technology can never take place without, at the same time, setting in motion numerous other changes in the way of life of the peoples involved. This has become very apparent in the so-called under-developed countries where rapid urbanization and industrialization have had serious consequences in terms of community relationships and social control. The old tribal communities were characterized by a strong sense of social solidarity and exercised a rigid control over the individual's behaviour in the light of clearly defined religious and moral beliefs. These frequently differed from the religious and moral ideas of Europeans, but they were, nevertheless, real and valid for the societies concerned. The influence of European economic systems, technology, education, religion, and politics has been to introduce a disintegrating influence into tribal life. Disruption has taken place in traditional codes of law and morals, resulting in a disturbing increase in the signs and symptoms of an unstable society. These include high rates of delinquency and crime, disharmony and breakdown of family relationships, alcoholism, mental ill-health, as well as aggressive and violent behaviour of which *Mau Mau* is probably the most terrible example.

Many Europeans in Africa, horrified by the consequences of their own actions, are trying to set the clock back. Afraid of the consequences of a too rapid absorption of Western culture by the African, they are seeking to resolve the dilemma by bringing about a degree of social separation by which they hope to minimize the possibility of further conflict. They have convinced themselves that if only the African could be persuaded to live his own life apart from the European then all would be well. *The fallacy behind this argument resides in the fact that the effects of culture contact have already gone*

too far to be arrested. On the one hand, the whole European social and economic system in Africa has become dependent upon the active co-operation of Africans, if only to provide the necessary labour. On the other hand, Africans have already absorbed too much of European technology, as well as Western religion, and the philosophy of 'progress', to prevent a complete revolution in the African way of life. It only remains to be seen whether this social revolution is to be a peaceful or a violent one.

SOCIAL REVOLUTION

Any study of human relationships, in a society undergoing rapid social change, must consider the inter-action of two factors to which reference has already been made. The first is the status relationship between the groups concerned and the second is the extent to which dispersion or separation takes place. Where two groups of roughly equal status come into contact with each other and the principle of dispersion operates, then the consequence is likely to be a fusion or synthesis of cultures and the complete assimilation of the members of both groups into a common way of life. Where the opposite processes of separation and cultural autonomy apply to groups of equal status, the eventual result is likely to be the creation of two distinct communities. If large enough, they may form independent nation-states, as in the case of India and Pakistan. In contrast, where there is marked inequality of status, maintained by discriminatory practices, dispersion is likely to bring about a typical class system of social stratification, which in an extreme form may be akin to slavery, with the lowest class having no social or political status at all. Inequality of status combined with social separation will create a society of which the Hindu caste system is typical, where there is not only a clearly defined hierarchy of social status but also marked isolation and segregation. A number of writers have remarked upon the similarity between the caste system in India and racial relationships as

they now exist in the southern states of America and in South Africa.[15] The following diagram illustrates the resulting four conceptual types of relationship:

	STATUS	
	EQUALITY	INEQUALITY
DISPERSION	Assimilation	Class
SEPARATION	Self-Determination	Caste

It is notable that in South Africa many people, who would sincerely like to see Africans accorded equal status with Europeans, argue in favour of the creation of a separate 'Bantustan'. This is strongly opposed by the present South African government, which has introduced various measures which are making the relationships between Europeans and non-Europeans more and more caste-like in their rigidity.

The social status mobility that has occurred in modern Western countries since the industrial revolution is one of the principal reasons why Marxian predictions concerning the inevitability of class war have not been fulfilled. Instead of the increasing 'misery' of the so-called 'working classes' there has been a progressive improvement in the standard of living at all except the very top levels. Progressive redistribution of incomes, by taxation, has made the relative gain of the lower income groups the greater. In addition it has been possible for individuals to make considerable advances in social status, on their own account. This social mobility has been likened to an escalator where all are moving up but some, by their own efforts, faster than others. The consequence has been that instead of the increasing solidarity of the 'proletariat' in the face of the capitalist and property-owning classes, there has been a scramble for improved social status that may be described as 'competitive class feeling' rather than 'corporate class consciousness'.[16]

No status differentials can be created or sustained unless it is possible to 'know one's place' and to allocate others to their appropriate status. Discriminatory practices can only operate if the 'sheep' can be distinguished from the 'goats'

In modern Western societies the display of wealth, of education, of rank or title, of occupation by dress or uniform, and the performance of ritual patterns of behaviour, constitute the outward and visible signs of a person's social status. The important point about all of these distinctions is that they are relatively easily acquired, if not in one generation at any rate in two. The sons and daughters of a 'self-made man' may be sent to expensive schools to acquire the polish which their parents lacked, and which ensures their acceptance in upper-class circles. *Social mobility is much more difficult when the outward and visible sign of social status is a more or less permanent racial characteristic such as skin colour.* Miscegenation may partly obscure racial origin and permit some people to 'pass' into the superior status group. But the large majority cannot escape from the evidence of their appearance.

When skin colour comes to be associated with differences in social status, social mobility is limited by the permanence of this outward and visible sign. When the proletariat consists almost entirely of the members of one racial group and the owners and managers of the means of production are another, the possibility of conflict between the two becomes much greater. While some measure of competitive class feeling may grow up within the two groups, the efforts of the superior status group to preserve its own privileges, influence, and power, will increase corporate class consciousness among both groups. The severity of the ensuing conflict will depend upon the extent to which the superior status group clings to its power and exploits or represses the subordinate group, by discriminatory practices and other coercive measures. If the super-ordinate group permits a narrowing of the status differences between the two groups, with the ultimate establishment of complete equality, then severe conflict may be avoided. But, if the superior status group fears its own ultimate subordination and clings to its power, the consequence may well be that which Marx predicted: class war, which would be all the more terrible because it would also be race war.

CHAPTER ONE

Political Background

THE first Elizabethan Age is noted for the adventurous activities of Hawkins, Drake, Frobisher, and Raleigh, whose exploits laid the foundation of what was to become the British Commonwealth of Nations, now known more simply as the Commonwealth. The second Elizabethan Age will undoubtedly be known as the period when the last vestiges of what was once called the 'Dependent Empire' disappeared, to be replaced by a loosely linked association of independent self-governing peoples of every conceivable race and culture. Fifteenth- and sixteenth-century Europeans had to adjust themselves to the discovery that the Mediterranean was not the centre of the world and that other lands and civilizations existed elsewhere. In the twentieth century Europeans are learning that they are not the only peoples capable of governing themselves and others in accordance with the necessities and complexities of this modern world; hitherto 'backward' peoples are rapidly reaching the stage when they can resume, once again, responsibility for their own political organization.

This is not the place to enter into a detailed account of the historical developments which have led up to the present complicated relationship between the Crown and the numerous territories associated together in the Commonwealth. Yet it would be impossible to understand racial relations in Africa and the West Indies to-day, without seeing the human problem in its political context. For the sake of uniformity a brief account is given in this chapter of the constitutional position in each of the territories concerned; but there are a number of problems, to which reference will be made, where the close connexion between racial relations and politics is especially marked. They are: (1) The controversy in the Union of South Africa over the Separate Representation of Voters Bill which aims at removing the Cape Coloured

population from the common electoral roll. (2) The objections of the Herero to the incorporation of the mandated territory of South-West Africa into the Union of South Africa. (3) The banishment of Seretse Khama and his removal from the chieftainship of the Ngwato in Bechuanaland, following his marriage to an Englishwoman. (4) The objections of Africans, particularly in Nyasaland, to Central African Federation. (5) Controversy over the representation of Africans in the Executive Council of Kenya. (6) The suspension of the Kabaka of Buganda. (7) To a lesser extent the advancement towards self-government in West Africa, particularly in view of the concern at this trend in South Africa. (8) In the West Indies, the suspension of the constitution of British Guiana.

None of these examples is merely a question of racial relations. In each case the situation is complicated by other social, economic, and political factors, but questions of race still play a predominant part in creating and sustaining the conflict. The creation of harmonious racial relations is not just a question of extending the franchise to coloured people, or enabling them to achieve self-government. Problems of prejudice, discrimination, and separation still arise in the everyday social and economic relationships of the several races. But the struggle for political equality and independence has become an important channel of expression for the frustrated ambitions of non-Europeans everywhere. This process can only be understood in the light of certain historical facts.

ORIGINS OF THE COMMONWEALTH

British connexions with West Africa are of much longer standing than those with East and Central Africa, or for that matter with South Africa, which was first colonized by the Dutch. Britain's interest in West Africa began with the slave trade and in this way there is an inexorable link between the histories of the British West African territories and those of the West Indies. This is especially marked in the case of

Sierra Leone which, in its present form, owes its foundation to philanthropists who sought to alleviate the lot of those who had been victims of the slave trade. In 1786 a settlement was founded on the peninsula for Negroes freed in America and the West Indies and for those, known as the Poor Blacks, in London. The latter were slaves who had obtained freedom in England as a result of Lord Mansfield's judgement of 1772. Several hundred Negroes went from London and settled in what was to become Freetown. They were followed by others from the West Indies and elsewhere. With the end of the slave trade there began a long period of trade along the west coast of Africa, but extension of sovereignty over the hinterland, beyond the coastal possessions, was at first hesitant and reluctant. Reluctance was overcome when France and Germany began to compete for territory in Africa.

The acquisition of territories in East and Central Africa was undertaken under somewhat different circumstances. Central Africa was opened up by the commercial and imperialistic enterprises of Cecil Rhodes and, on the termination of the Charter of the British South Africa Company in 1923, the Crown took over what now constitutes Northern and Southern Rhodesia. The Protectorate of Nyasaland was declared partly in order to prevent the Arab slave trade and partly to forestall the acquisition of the territory by other powers. Similar considerations applied in the case of East Africa, although, in the case of Uganda, the building of a railway and the desire to put a stop to internal conflicts in the kingdom of Buganda, which were indirectly threatening the work of missionary societies, were also significant factors. Later Kenya became of importance as an area for European settlement, especially by British ex-servicemen after the first world war.

From a constitutional point of view the Commonwealth consists of independent self-governing members, or dominions, some of which have acquired republican status, while others have maintained a nominal association with the Crown; together with condominiums where the Crown's authority is shared with a foreign power; colonies in various

stages along the constitutional path to sovereignty; colonial protectorates and protected states, and, finally, territories held under trust from the United Nations Trusteeship Council.

The essence of dominion status is the complete independence of legislature, executive, and judiciary from the government of the United Kingdom in Westminster. Each of the dominions is completely free, independent, and of equal status within the Commonwealth, and may secede from it at any time. The Statute of Westminster, 1931, is usually regarded as codifying the relationships between the dominions and the United Kingdom; their relation to the Crown was further clarified at the time of the Coronation of Queen Elizabeth II in 1953, when each country adopted its own form of words to define its slender and symbolic relationship with the Crown. The remaining territories of the Commonwealth constitute what are now usually described as the 'dependent territories', which a leading constitutional authority has defined as composing 'those territories possessing either legislatures subordinate to the Crown (but not always to the Crown exclusively), or rulers in treaty relations with the Crown, and in some cases both'.[1]

According to the manner in which a colony was acquired, its mode of government was determined. All colonies are dependencies which at some time or other have been annexed by the Crown, some as a result of settlement by British subjects overseas and some by the ceding of territories conquered by Britain. Settlers from Britain took with them their rights as British subjects and soon established a measure of representative government. The inhabitants of ceded colonies, in contrast, had only such rights as the Crown chose to allow them, although in course of time the distinction between the two types of colony became less important, as Crown colonies too acquired representative government. The essence of colonial government is that the legislature is subordinate to the executive and the colonial government is subordinate to the imperial government. The nearer the colony approaches to independence the less these two criteria apply.

Legally, a protectorate is a dependency which has not

been annexed. Whatever additional powers the Crown may have acquired, control of foreign relations and defence is the essence of protectorate status. A distinction may be made between protected states – mainly those with a fairly advanced system of internal government found around the fringes of the Indian Ocean – and colonial protectorates, all except one in Africa, which had only elementary systems of government of their own. In most cases they are now administered as one with a neighbouring Crown colony.

There are, finally, the mandated and Trust territories which may be distinguished from protectorates in so far as their administration is subject to a degree of international supervision, originally by the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations, now by the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations. All the Trust territories are Turkish or German overseas dependencies which were taken away at the end of the first world war and governed under mandate, together with territories taken from Axis powers as a result of the second world war.

The constantly changing nature of the political and constitutional status of the countries of the Commonwealth must be emphasized. Martin Wight has drawn attention to the trend when he says that the dependent territories, like the self-governing part of the Commonwealth, are 'in process of development and change; but while the self-governing part of the Commonwealth has steadily evolved in juridical variety and elasticity, there appears to be in the Dependent Empire a converse tendency towards uniformity and the assimilation of different kinds of constituent unit'.[2]

Questions of citizenship are of some importance in considering racial relationships within the Commonwealth. Non-Europeans born in the Union of South Africa are citizens of that country in a legal sense, but are deprived of most of the rights normally associated with citizenship. Furthermore, Europeans who are British subjects and who migrate to the Union may acquire South African citizenship, and with it the right to vote, only after five years' residence. A non-British subject has to wait only one more year.

What is more, the grant of citizenship is wholly at the discretion of the Minister and may be withheld. This contrasts with the situation in, say, Australia where a British subject who is not an Australian citizen may, nevertheless, vote in an Australian election after six months' residence in the country. South African citizenship legislation illustrates the much looser ties with the Commonwealth.

Citizenship in the United Kingdom and Colonies is now governed by the British Nationality Act, 1948, which embodies a whole new law of citizenship of the United Kingdom and Colonies. Before 1st January 1949 people in dependent territories were either British subjects, British protected persons, or possibly both. British protected persons were not British subjects and were, therefore, treated as aliens for many purposes including the Aliens Restriction Acts of 1914 and 1919, the Aliens Order of 1920 and the Special Restrictions (Coloured Alien Seamen) Order of 1925, all of which aimed at restricting the immigration of aliens to Britain and of controlling their activities while in the United Kingdom. One of the effects of the Act was to deprive women, born in Britain and having the status of British subjects, of the right to vote if they married anyone from one of the protectorates who was domiciled in Britain, because technically the wife, too, became an alien. This was remedied by the Act of 1948 when British citizenship was restored to wives who had lost it through marriage to aliens. But the Act of 1948 did little to improve the status of British protected persons although it did remove them from the provisions of the Aliens Restriction Acts. The protected person still remains, technically, an alien for all other purposes and, as in the case of the Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesian protectorates now incorporated into the Central African Federation, cannot qualify to vote in an election, either in Britain or in the protectorate, unless specially authorized to do so.[3]

The remainder of this chapter will be devoted to a brief account of recent constitutional developments in the British Commonwealth territories of Africa and the West Indies with which we are concerned in this book. Under the head-

ing of South Africa we shall consider the Union of South Africa, which is a self-governing member of the Commonwealth; together with the one-time mandated territory of South-West Africa; also the High Commission territories: Basutoland, a colony, and Bechuanaland and Swaziland which are protectorates. Central Africa will include those territories now incorporated into the Central African Federation, the self-governing colony of Southern Rhodesia, with Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, which are protectorates. East Africa will include Kenya Colony and Protectorate, Uganda, Zanzibar and Pemba, and Somaliland which are all protectorates, and the Trust territory of Tanganyika. In West Africa are included the Colony and Protectorate of the Gold Coast together with the Trust territory of Togoland, the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria with the Trust territory of the Cameroons, the Colony and Protectorate of the Gambia and the Colony and Protectorate of Sierra Leone. Finally, leaving Africa altogether, we shall consider the West Indies, including the proposed British Caribbean Federation, British Honduras, and British Guiana, together with the Bahamas and Bermuda.

SOUTH AFRICA

The vast territories south and west of the river Limpopo to which the term South Africa is normally applied are by no means homogeneous, either geographically, socially, or politically. They comprise: (1) the Union of South Africa which, as its name implies, consists of a union of several hitherto separate provinces; (2) the mandated territory of South-West Africa, originally a German colony governed, after the first world war, by the Union of South Africa under the terms of a mandate of the League of Nations, and recently incorporated into the Union as an integral part of it; and (3) the so-called High Commission territories, still governed indirectly from Britain, through the Commonwealth Relations Office. Basutoland and Swaziland are relatively small and

cut off from the third, Bechuanaland, because they are actually surrounded by the Union of South Africa. The United Kingdom High Commissioner in the Union is in fact also responsible for the High Commission territories, which he governs from the Union. It would not be surprising, in the circumstances, if the policies pursued by the British government in Bechuanaland, for example, were influenced by a consideration of the views of the government of the Union, which has always coveted the High Commission territories.

Union of South Africa

The Union came into being in 1910 when Cape Colony, Natal, the Orange Free State, and the Transvaal became one self-governing unit, although at first the provisions of the Colonial Laws Validity Act still applied to its legislation. The independent dominion status of the Union was confirmed when, in 1931, the Statute of Westminster was passed in Britain, followed by the Status Act in the Union Parliament which made it the sovereign legislative authority in and over the Union. The only remaining qualification to the unfettered freedom of the Union Parliament rested in the 'entrenched clauses' of the South Africa Act of 1909, which could not be altered except by a two-thirds majority of both Houses of the South African Parliament sitting together. The first entrenched clause concerned the recognition of both Dutch (subsequently Afrikaans) and English as official languages. The second was intended to preserve the voting rights on the common roll of Africans and Cape Coloured in the Cape Province, rights they had acquired before the Act of Union. In fact African voters in the Cape Province were removed from the common roll and given separate representation in 1936, when the correct constitutional procedure was adopted and a two-thirds majority of both Houses of Parliament passed the Bill. When an attempt was made in 1951 similarly to remove Cape Coloured voters, the Nationalist government adopted ordinary bicameral procedures. This was challenged by the Opposition, but the Speaker declared that

the entrenched clauses ceased to be valid after the Statute of Westminster. The ruling raised serious constitutional issues. Four Coloured voters applied to have the Act declared invalid, and although their claim was dismissed by the Supreme Court it was upheld on appeal.[4] The government responded to this decision by introducing a High Court of Parliament Bill, intended to enable Parliament itself to overrule the decision of the Appeal Court. This Act, too, was declared invalid and a deadlock ensued. At the subsequent General Election in April 1953 the Cape Coloured men who qualified were able to vote as usual, although the Appeal Court's decision was a major election issue.[5] Dr Malan's party was returned and subsequently sought, on more than one occasion, to obtain support from Opposition members in order to obtain a two-thirds majority of both Houses sitting together, to pass the Separate Representation of Voters Bill. This it failed to do. At the same time, further legislation was introduced to divide the South African Appeal Court and thereby limit its effectiveness as an instrument for examining legislation from the constitutional point of view.[6]

Although many South Africans of English descent would probably support the removal of Coloured voters from the common roll, they opposed the unconstitutional action of Dr Malan because it implied a threat also to the status of their own language. If unconstitutional means could be adopted to remove Coloured voters, the same means might be adopted to make Afrikaans the only official language at some future date. The issue is closely bound up with the question of whether the Union of South Africa will retain its present relationship with the Crown, or whether it will eventually declare itself a Republic, or even leave the Commonwealth altogether, as many Afrikaans members of the Nationalist party would like. In October 1953 Dr Malan stated that he saw no immediate advantage to be gained either from a republican constitution or from withdrawal from the Commonwealth, although the Union was free to adopt either procedure if necessary.

The entrenched clauses in the Union of South Africa Act

reflect the highly complex situation which existed at the time that the Act was passed. European settlement at the Cape of Good Hope goes back to the revictualling station set up by a Dutchman, Jan Van Riebeeck, in 1652, to replenish the ships of the Dutch East India Company on their way to the Far East. Although the settlement grew fairly rapidly, the Dutch continued to regard the Cape as little more than a necessary adjunct to the sailing of ships to their possessions in the east. It was not until deputations of colonists went to Holland in 1779 and 1784 that they were given some opportunity to participate in their own government. When the French revolutionary armies invaded Holland in 1795, Britain occupied the Cape and in 1802 restored it to the Dutch Republic, and not to the Company, which was by then bankrupt. The Cape was once again occupied by Britain in 1806 during the Napoleonic wars, and the annexation was made permanent by the Congress of Vienna in 1815. From then until full responsible government in 1872, Cape Colony was nominally governed from Britain but, in practice, the Governor had a great deal of initiative. In 1825 an Advisory Council consisting of a number of officials was set up and this was replaced in 1834 by a Legislative council. In 1850 the colonists secured the right to designate their own representatives by ballot and four years later the colony was granted representative government – representative, that is, of the European settlers, who by now had been swelled by numbers of immigrants from Britain as well as the original Dutch settlers and their descendants.

Soon after the commencement of British rule at the Cape, the English language was declared to be the only official language, and although this policy was later reversed, it created bad feeling among the Dutch settlers. Furthermore an Ordinance was passed in 1828 which established the principle of equality before the law for all 'free persons of colour'. This was a shock to the prevailing beliefs and practices of the Boers, as they had come to be called, who mostly regarded the African as an inferior being, fit only for the role of a servant. The clash between Boer and Briton resulted in the

migration of large numbers of Boers from the Cape and to the establishment of two independent republics. The independence of the South African Republic or the Transvaal was recognized in 1852, and that of the Orange Free State in 1854. About a quarter of the Dutch-speaking people withdrew from Cape Colony and their Great Trek northwards brought millions of Africans under the political domination of Europeans, depriving them of their lands and subjugating them to a regime in which they were expected always to have an inferior status.

The abortive attempts of Cecil Rhodes, then Prime Minister in Cape Colony, to annex Transvaal in 1895 (the notorious 'Jameson Raid'), only served to aggravate the bad relationship between Cape Colony and the Boer Republics which precipitated the Anglo-Boer war of 1899–1902. Meanwhile Rhodes had already been responsible for bringing under British influence the territories of Bechuanaland and those now forming the Central African Federation.

Although the peace treaty which followed the Anglo-Boer war was a generous one in which many of the claims of the Boers were met, the war has left bitter feelings which still have their repercussion in South African politics to-day. Particularly resented is the fact that the British adopted a policy during the war which involved the burning of farms and the congregating of large numbers of women and children into what were called concentration camps, although they were not instruments of political persecution. Nevertheless, 26,000 women and children died of fever. To this day the term 'concentration camp' in South Africa brings to mind the Anglo-Boer war rather than the second world war. Afrikaans-English antagonism continued to play an overwhelming part in South African political life even after the Union came into being. Africans, who constitute two-thirds or more of the population, are practically without direct political power, but in their relations with the non-Europeans there still tends to be a marked difference between the views and policies of the majority of Afrikaans-speaking South Africans and those whose mother tongue is English.[7]

South-West Africa

This one-time German colony is now administered as part of the Union of South Africa. The South-West Africa Affairs Amendment Act, 1949, provides for the representation in the Union Parliament of the European inhabitants of the area who elect six members to the House of Assembly. There are four Senators, two of whom are appointed by the Union government and two are elected. This representation is heavily weighted in favour of the territory, which only has a small European population, relative to the other provinces of the Union. At the first election in 1950 all six seats were won by Dr Malan's Nationalist Party and again in 1953, giving the party much needed support against the opposition of the Unionists. The status of South-West Africa is a matter of dispute in the United Nations, which claims that the Union of South Africa should continue to submit reports upon its administration to the Trusteeship Council, instead of the League of Nations. This Dr Malan refuses to do. In a public statement made in April 1953 he declared that he would be prepared to enter into a treaty with Britain, France, and the United Nations, which recognized the present status of South-West Africa and 'embodied the spirit of the mandate', but he was not prepared to recognize the authority of the Trusteeship Council by submitting any report to that body.

It is to the untiring efforts of the Rev. Michael Scott that the world owes its knowledge of the serious position of the Herero peoples of South-West Africa. It is fitting, therefore, that their story should be told in his own words.

The tribes of S. W. Africa number 330,000 African people living in a land about seven times the size of New York State. The Herero, Nama, Berg, Damara and Bushmen who once inhabited the southern part of this territory are to-day living in separate reservations or are segregated in locations in the urban areas. The menfolk are working on the white man's farms and in his mines. ... The question of the status of the mandated territory of S. W. Africa and its various peoples, in relation to the Government of South Africa and to the United Nations, cannot be considered without

reference to its past and especially to the impact of Western civilization on the African people there. ... Before the Europeans came to these lands, these tribes comprised a fairly prosperous people, despite occasional conflicts and territorial disputes which had taken place among them. Their wealth was in cattle; and the herds roamed over lands that were held in common. ... The tribal organization of these cattle people was such that a proportion of the cattle was held in trust by the Chief or head of the clan; and this rendered it impossible for even the poorest Herero to be without substance. ... When the territory was annexed by Germany in 1890, 'the Herero people must have possessed well over 150,000 head of cattle' ... such was the ruthlessness and efficiency of German colonial policy that within twelve years (after the Berlin conference of all Colonial Powers, 1885) 'the surviving Hereros did not possess an ox, a heifer, or a calf between them'. ... They fought back futilely, in what came to be called the Hereros War in the early years of this century. ... From the close of the Hereros War in 1906 to the beginning of World War I, the tribes of S. W. Africa lived under German rule. In 1914 forces from South Africa, including Hereros, invaded S. W. Africa; and the territory was administered during the next six years under a form of martial law.

In 1920, after the formation of the League of Nations, a Mandate over S. W. Africa was given to South Africa, to 'administer on behalf of His Britannic Majesty ... in the spirit of the Covenant of the League of Nations'. ... The beginning of South Africa's trusteeship was not auspicious. ... Three hundred Boer families from Angola were then brought in and settled on their land with about 32 square miles for each family. The tribes were confined to reservations. ... It would be surprising if some resistance to this dispossession were not recorded; and in this connexion the Bondelswarts 'uprising' in 1922 will be remembered. ... To put down this 'uprising' bombs were dropped on the defenceless Hottentots.[8]

Scott goes on to quote from a Report of the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations (second and third sessions 1947–8), concerning South-West Africa:

1. The Council, being convinced of the desirability of increased participation by indigenous populations in the direction of their affairs, notes that the indigenous inhabitants of the Territory have no franchise, no eligibility to office, and no representation in the governing bodies or in the administration of the Territory.

2. (*b*) The Council observes that there is an expenditure of little

more than 10 per cent of the budget on the indigenous inhabitants, who comprise 90 per cent of the entire population.

3. (*d*) The Council considers that the large numbers of criminal convictions reveals an abnormal situation; and that contractual relations between employer and labourer should not be subject to criminal penalties.

4. (*a*) The Council is of the opinion that the provision of urgently needed educational facilities for the indigenous population is vital to their political, economic, and social development; and notes the statement of the Union Government that facilities for indigenous secondary and technical and higher education have not yet been provided in the Territory, for the reason that sufficient students are not believed to be available.

2. (*c*) I. The Council observes that the indigenous inhabitants, who comprise approximately nine-tenths of the population, occupy 42 per cent of the land. The Council further observes that the interests of the indigenous population are involved in the question of the distribution of land; and points out that it lacks information as to whether the land left to the indigenous inhabitants is adequate in quality and productivity.

2. (*c*) IV. The Council notes that various parts of the Herero Tribe, which was broken up by the Germans, are accommodated in eight different reserves; and that one of the reasons why it has been impossible to reunite the tribe in a single area, according to the replies given by the Union Government, is the fact that 'no area large enough to accommodate a whole tribe in the Police Zone could be made available unless private rights of occupation were violated, which was out of the question'.

The Council considers that the degree to which land has been alienated is a factor in keeping the Herero Tribe physically divided; and that the interests of the tribe constitute an additional reason why the whole question of land distribution should be re-examined by the Union Government.

3. (*a*) The Council is of the opinion that division of the indigenous inhabitants, and their allocation to fixed areas, is not conducive to their general advancement; and that the system of confining them to 'native reserves' is to be deplored in principle.

When in 1946 the Union of South Africa first endeavoured to incorporate the mandated territory into the Union itself, a referendum was conducted which purported to express the will of the African people in favour of the transfer. In actual fact many Chiefs and Headmen opposed incorporation into

the Union and refused to sign the documents given to them. Instead they appealed to the Union government to be allowed to go at their own expense to Lake Success in order to present their case to the United Nations. Their request was summarily rejected by the Union government on the grounds that they had no right to go to the United Nations because they had no government of their own. It was as a result of this that the Herero asked the Rev. Michael Scott to plead their case for them at the United Nations in 1947, 1949, and again in 1951. This he did, despite every obstacle put in his way by the Union government, culminating in his exile from the country. After hearing Scott the General Assembly of the United Nations decided to ask the International Court at The Hague for legal advice on the international status of South-West Africa.

The General Assembly of the United Nations addressed four questions to the International Court of Justice:

What is the international status of the territory of S. W. Africa, and what are the international obligations of the Union of South Africa arising therefrom, in particular:

(*a*) Does the Union of South Africa continue to have international obligations under the mandate for S.W. Africa and, if so, what are these obligations?

(*b*) Are the provisions of Chapter XII of the Charter applicable, and if so in what manner, to the territory of South-West Africa?

(*c*) Has the Union of South Africa the competence to modify the international status of the territory of S.W. Africa or, in the event of a negative reply, where does the competence rest to determine and modify the international status of the territory?

The Court was of the opinion that:

On the general question: unanimously, that South-West Africa is a territory under the international mandate assumed by the Union of South Africa.

On question (*a*), by twelve votes to two, that the Union of South Africa continues to have the international obligations stated in Article XXII in the Covenant of the League of Nations in the mandate for South-West Africa, as well as the obligation to transmit petitions from the inhabitants of that territory, the supervisory functions to be exercised by the United Nations to which the annual reports and petitions are to be submitted, and the reference to the

Permanent Court of International Justice to be replaced by a reference to the International Court of Justice in accordance with Article 7 of the Mandate and Article 37 of the Statute of the Court.

On question (*b*), unanimously, that the provisions of Chapter XII of the Charter are applicable to the territory of South-West Africa in the sense that they provide a means by which the territory may be brought under the Trusteeship System; and by eight votes to six, that the provisions of Chapter XII of the Charter do not impose on the Union of South Africa a legal obligation to place the territory under the Trusteeship System.

On question (*c*), unanimously, that the Union of South Africa, acting alone, has not the competence to modify the international status of the territory of South-West Africa; and that the competence to determine and modify the international status of the territory rests with the Union of South Africa acting with the consent of the United Nations.

M. Basdevant, summing up the Court's judgement on South-West Africa, said: 'It cannot be admitted that the obligation to submit to supervision has disappeared merely because the supervisory organ has ceased to exist when the United Nations has another international organ performing similar though not identical supervisory functions.'[9]

There are two significant points to be noted about this decision. Firstly, that while there was a clear moral obligation there was no legal obligation on the part of the Union to place the territory under the Trusteeship system. Secondly, that whatever the opinion expressed by the International Court there is no sanction behind it to ensure enforcement. The Court was acting in an advisory capacity only. The Union of South Africa has refused to recognize this authority of the Court and has therefore presented the world with a *fait accompli*; South-West Africa has been annexed and, short of a declaration of war, there appears to be little that the United Nations can do about it.

A final stage in the process of incorporation took place in April 1954 with the publication of the South-West Africa Native Affairs Administration Bill which provides for the transfer of the administration of Native Affairs in the mandated territory to the Union Department of Native Affairs

and the transfer of Native land to the South African Native Trust. Actions so far taken by the Union government in connexion with South-West Africa do not augur well for the future, if the case of Berthold Himumuine is any guide. Himumuine, a Herero living at Windhoek, is one of the few Africans who has passed his matriculation in South-West Africa, which he did by taking a correspondence course, afterwards taking a teaching course in the Union. Subsequently he became principal of St Barnabos government school in Windhoek Location and studied for a degree in his spare time. He was offered a place and a scholarship to study in the Department of Education at Oxford University in 1953. But his application for a passport was refused by the Union government and no reason was given. Meanwhile he remains at Windhoek.

The High Commission Territories

Successive governments of the Union of South Africa have indicated that they would like to see Basutoland, Swaziland, and Bechuanaland incorporated into the Union. It is argued that geographically and economically the three territories are already closely integrated with the Union and that it is only right that they should be administered as an integral part of it. In fact when in 1909 the constitution of the Union of South Africa was being drawn up, the African inhabitants of all three territories asked that they should not be included in the proposed Union. Assurances were given that no immediate change in their administration was contemplated, but provision for the possible eventual transfer of the administration of the territories to the Union was made in the South Africa Act, 1909.[10] The position is complicated by the fact that the Southern Rhodesian government, now incorporated into the Central African Federation, has also approached the United Kingdom government on several occasions about its claim to at least the northern part of the Bechuanaland protectorate. The British government repeatedly asserted that no alteration of the status of the three

territories would be made until the inhabitants, African as well as European, had been consulted and the United Kingdom Parliament given an opportunity to express its views on the matter. All the available evidence goes to show that the African inhabitants are as opposed as ever to incorporation into the Union of South Africa.

Basutoland was the first of the three territories to become a British dependency. Owing to clashes between the Basuto and the Boers of the Orange Free State, the Paramount Chief of the Basuto, Moshesh, appealed to Britain for protection, which was granted in 1868. The people of Basutoland were declared British subjects and the land became a part of Cape Colony in 1872. When the Union of South Africa was formed Basutoland became a Crown colony, governed through the High Commissioner in South Africa, who is now responsible to the Commonwealth Relations Office.

Swaziland is the smallest of the three territories and was the subject of much dispute between Britain and the Transvaal Republic. The independence of Swaziland was recognized in 1884, but owing to the actions of the Chief (who is said to have given concessions on more land than he possessed) the Transvaal became responsible for the administration. After the Anglo-Boer war the territory came under the British government with the status of a protectorate. Unlike Basutoland, where apart from the areas set aside as government reserve all the land belongs to the Basuto, Swaziland was entirely given out to Europeans as land concessions. As a result of an Order-in-Council of 1907 one-third of this was expropriated and set aside for the exclusive use of the Swazi people and further land has since been purchased, so that now it is more or less equally divided between African and European. Only part of the European land has been settled.

The Bechuanaland protectorate recently leapt into prominence as a result of the dispute between Seretse Khama, Tshekedi Khama, and the British government over the chieftainship of the Ngwato tribe, after Seretse's marriage to an English girl in 1948. Bechuanaland came under British

protection in 1896, after friction between the tribes and the Transvaal. It was strategically important to Cecil Rhodes in his plans for expanding British influence to the north and was the starting point for the ill-fated Jameson Raid on the Transvaal to which reference has been made. Originally incorporated into Cape Colony, it was put under the control of the High Commissioner on the formation of the Union of South Africa. The territory has an area of approximately 275,000 square miles and a population of roughly 300,000. About 90 per cent of the Africans live in reserves. The remaining land is allocated to Europeans or regarded as Crown land, much of which is arid. The Ngwato Reserve, on the eastern side of the protectorate, has an area of 40,000 square miles and a population of a little over 100,000. The Ngwato themselves number some 20,000; the remaining 80,000 of the population in the reserve consist of Africans who originally belonged to various tribes, but who have adhered to the Ngwato and owe allegiance to the same chief. The history of the Bechuanaland protectorate has been marked by a series of tribal disputes about the succession to the chieftainship, which in one case led eventually to the formation of four separate tribes whose ruling families derive from a common ancestor. In 1923 the death occurred of Khama III, the grandfather of Seretse. He had ruled over the Ngwato for some fifty years and is recognized as one of the great African rulers. He was succeeded by his son Sekgoma II, who died two years later, leaving as his heir his only surviving son Seretse, who was born on 21 July 1921. A Council of Regency was first formed, but in 1926 it was found more suitable to install as Regent Tshekedi, son of Khama III and half brother of Sekgoma II. A Government White Paper continues the story:

> Seretse was educated in South Africa and obtained his Bachelor of Arts degree at Fort Hare. He expressed a desire to continue his education at Oxford, where he went to Balliol College in 1945. Subsequently he left Oxford to pursue his legal studies in London, where he completed the first part of the Bar examination.
>
> In September, 1948, Seretse, in notifying Tshekedi that he pro-

posed to marry Miss Ruth Williams, an Englishwoman, on October 2, stated that he feared that his uncle and the tribe would not approve of his proposed action. They did not; and appeals were made to Seretse by the Native Authority of the Bamangwato Reserve and by others to postpone the marriage. Seretse's only response was to advance his wedding day, so that, in face of this opposition, he was married on September 29 to Miss Ruth Williams.

Seretse was summoned to Serowe by the tribal leaders to explain his action. A series of tribal meetings (*kgotlas*) followed, in which the marriage was discussed.

It is important when considering the opinions expressed at these various meetings to have in mind the position of the Regent Tshekedi. He had ruled the Bamangwato for a period of 23 years. His rule had been firm and enlightened, but more recently it had become increasingly unpopular. At the first tribal meeting in November, 1948, when it was still thought that Seretse might give up his European wife, there was an almost unanimous condemnation of the marriage. The tribe, with very few exceptions, resolved that all steps should be taken to prevent Seretse's wife from entering the Bamangwato Reserve. The subsequent meetings showed the increasing anxiety felt by the tribe that, if Seretse were not allowed to return, Tshekedi would become their permanent chief, an event which they were determined to avoid at all costs. Consequently at the second meeting in December, 1948, there was stronger support for Seretse, though it was not decisively in his favour. At that time he agreed to return to England to pursue his legal studies. In June, 1949, he returned to the reserve, and at a third meeting of the tribe in that month there was a decisive majority in favour of Seretse as chief with his European wife.

The immediate sequel to the June meeting was an announcement by Tshekedi of his intention to leave the reserve, which he proceeded to do, accompanied by a number of his supporters including five out of eight of the 'Chief's Representatives', i.e., leading members of the tribe appointed to preside over the administrative districts of the reserve. He has taken up residence in the Bakwena Reserve. He issued a declaration asserting that the recognized law and customs of the tribe had been violated, and he challenged the validity of the *kgotla*'s decision.

He asked that a judicial inquiry should be held to advise on whether Seretse should be recognized and if so what would be the position of his wife and children. It should be noted that Tshekedi and his supporters have never called in question Seretse's claims to the succession as the heir of Sekgoma; what they have objected to

is Seretse's marriage to a white woman and his suitability while so married to hold the chieftainship. ...

The judicial inquiry unanimously advised against the recognition of Seretse. It expressed its belief that in these circumstances Seretse's absence from the Bechuanaland Protectorate was essential to the peace and good order of the Bamangwato Reserve, and that a period of direct rule would be in the best interests of the Bamangwato. It further advised that Tshekedi should not be permitted to return to the reserve.

It was in this state of affairs that H.M. Government decided to invite Seretse to London so that he might be able to express his views to them directly before any final decision was arrived at. They wished also, before considering other action, to ascertain whether he would be prepared to renounce his claim voluntarily.

At no time was any assurance given to Seretse or to his representatives that if he came to London he would be permitted to resume residence in the protectorate. Statements which have been made to the contrary are wholly incorrect. In view of her obvious concern in the matter an invitation to come to London was also extended to Mrs Seretse Khama, but it was not accepted.

In a series of meetings with Seretse in London it was explained to him, as Parliament was informed on March 8, that H.M. Government viewed with grave concern the danger which recognition would in present circumstances cause to the unity and well-being of the tribe and the administration of the protectorate; that in this matter they had to take into account their primary responsibility for good government in the protectorate, in the light of all the circumstances known to them; and that the best solution would be for him voluntarily to relinquish his claim to the succession.

Seretse was unable to accept this view, and H.M. Government had therefore to make their own decision which was announced in Parliament on March 8. It was to the effect that the High Commissioner had been instructed to withhold his recognition of Seretse as chief for a period of years, sufficiently long for the disappearance of the present tendencies to disruption which threaten the unity and well-being of the tribe. The period required would certainly not be less than five years, and at the end of that time the situation would be reviewed.

During this time Seretse would not be allowed to be within the protectorate unless special permission had been granted. An allowance from United Kingdom funds has been offered to Seretse to enable him to provide for himself and his wife, on the conditions that he does not revisit the protectorate except by permission and

that he does not, either of himself or through any other person or agency, say or do anything calculated to interfere with the good government of the protectorate.

While the chieftainship is in suspense Tshekedi, who will no longer be regent, will be required to reside outside the Bamangwato Reserve and will not be allowed to enter the reserve except by special permission.[11]

The question which many people asked when considering the government's action is why it was not possible to abide by the decision of the third tribal assembly which favoured the return of Seretse with his English wife. While the government denied any direct representation either from the Union or from Southern Rhodesia it was admitted that there was a strong body of European opinion in South Africa as a whole which was shocked by what was described as a 'flagrant example of miscegenation', and which it was feared would 'set a precedent'. Questions were asked in the Southern Rhodesia House of Assembly and the Prime Minister, Sir Godfrey Huggins, was reported to have said that, in his opinion, the decision of the Ngwato tribe to accept Seretse was 'a disastrous one' because it showed 'lack of racial pride in Bechuanaland' and because of the effect it would have on neighbouring territories. He admitted having communicated his views to the High Commissioner in South Africa.[12]

The banishment of both Seretse and Tshekedi was followed by a period of some two years during which the powers of the Native Authority were vested in the District Commissioner. Further tribal assemblies were held in an attempt to obtain fresh nominations and agreement regarding the Chieftainship, with little or no success. One name was prominent in these discussions, although he never obtained the required majority support, that of Raseobolai Kgamane, a senior member of the tribe. Eventually, in May 1953 he was appointed by the government to the office of Native Authority, in the place of the District Commissioner, without assuming the hereditary role of Chief. This enabled Raseobolai to revive customary tribal meetings and courts and would enable development schemes to be pressed forward with greater

ease. The actual Chieftainship remains vacant.[13]

A good deal of space has been devoted to a discussion of the Seretse Khama affair because many people have seen in this an example of political action motivated by colour prejudice and especially prejudice against mixed marriages. In fact, the problem also involved issues which went much deeper and concerned questions of internal as well as external relations. The Ngwato peoples themselves are only one-fifth of the population of Bechuanaland and the fact that their dynastic disputes have received such publicity should not prevent the case being seen in true perspective.

Lord Hailey in his examination of the administration of the High Commission territories raises the question of what steps must be taken towards an increasing measure of autonomy within the territories in accordance with the general policy of the United Kingdom government of eventual self-government for colonies and protectorates. He urges that traditional political organization must give way to constitutional advance and the setting up of a legislature.[14] Meanwhile, in the South African Parliament Dr Malan has repeatedly asserted that the High Commission territories should be incorporated into the Union within the next five years and has said that the Union of South Africa 'would not tolerate the creation of free and independent African states on her borders'. It is notable that in April 1954 Sir Winston Churchill, answering questions in the House of Commons, said that there could be no question of the British government agreeing at present to the transfer of the territories. He expressed the hope that Dr Malan would not 'needlessly press an issue on which we could not fall in with their view without failing in our trust'.

CENTRAL AFRICA

The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland came into existence by Order-in-Council on 3 September 1953. The three territories associated together in this Federation are the

Colony of Southern Rhodesia and the Protectorates of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. The preamble to the constitution makes it clear that Southern Rhodesia continues to enjoy virtual independence and the near-dominion status that it had previously attained, but that the other two territories continue as protectorates with separate governments 'for so long as their respective peoples so desire', although looking forward 'with confidence towards the attainment of full membership of the Commonwealth.' The Federation scheme provided for the setting up of a Federal legislature, in addition to the existing legislature of the three constituent territories. Certain powers are retained exclusively in the hands of the Federal legislature, others are shared with the Territorial legislatures. The exclusive list includes such items as external affairs including defence and immigration policies, questions of citizenship, control of imports and exports including customs and excise, taxation, post-office matters, major irrigation works, atomic energy, all education for Europeans, higher education for Africans, and a number of other items. The concurrent list includes such questions as migration between territories, and control of movement of goods, development of industries and agriculture, roads, electricity, prisons, health, town planning, etc.

The Federal Assembly consists of a Speaker and thirty-five members, twenty-six of whom are Elected Members, six Specially Elected African Members, and three European Members charged with special responsibilities for African interests, one of whom is specially elected in Southern Rhodesia and two appointed by the governors of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland respectively. Of the twenty-six Elected Members fourteen are from Southern Rhodesia, eight from Northern Rhodesia, and four from Nyasaland. Two of the six Specially Elected African Members come from each of the territories. There is a standing committee of the Federal Assembly known as the African Affairs Board which consists of the two Specially Appointed European Members and the Specially Elected European Member charged with responsibility for African affairs, together with

one of the Specially Elected Members from each of the territories. The function of this board is entirely advisory, except in so far as it has the power to request the Governor-General to refer to the Secretary of State for Colonial Affairs in the United Kingdom any legislation which, in the opinion of the Board, discriminates against Africans.[15]

The first elections to the Federal Assembly took place on 15 December 1953, and resulted in an overwhelming victory for the Federal Party led by Sir Godfrey Huggins, which obtained twenty-four out of the twenty-six seats for Elected Members. The electoral laws which governed the election in Northern and Southern Rhodesia were those which operated in those territories before Federation, but as elections had never previously been held in Nyasaland special regulations had to be made. Southern Rhodesia possesses a common voters' roll irrespective of race or colour, but with property and educational qualifications which in practice effectively excludes the large proportion of Africans from voting. Although more probably qualify in theory there are only about 500 Africans on the roll out of an African population of over one-and-a-half million. Financial qualifications were recently raised from an income of £100 to £240 per annum and the alternative property qualification from £150 to £500. The majority of Africans in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland being 'protected persons' and not 'citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies' were excluded from the franchise. In Nyasaland special regulations were made which added property and income qualifications and required the voter to register through a 'constituent association' of which he must be a member. The total number of people thus qualified to vote for the Federal elections in Nyasaland was 1058, mainly Europeans and Asians, out of a total population of 2500 Europeans, 3500 Coloured and Asiatic and two-and-a-quarter million Africans.

A great deal of controversy preceded the creation of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. The question of the possible amalgamation of the three territories had been examined as long ago as 1927 when the Hilton Young

Commission was appointed to inquire into the closer association of the dependencies of Eastern and Central Africa. The chairman of the commission in a minority report favoured the closer association of certain of these territories, but the majority report rejected any such proposal. Special attention was paid to the possibility of federation, amalgamation, or some looser form of union between the Rhodesias and Nyasaland. This too was rejected on the grounds that it would be difficult to devise any stable form of federation between two protectorates and a colony possessing responsible government. The report points out that a self-governing colony would naturally aspire to be the predominant partner and the arrangement would be likely to produce such friction between the colony and the Colonial Office that the only escape would be either the disruption of the federation or complete amalgamation. Amalgamation itself was also rejected mainly because of the concern for the African population. In rejecting amalgamation the commission drew attention to the small white population of Southern Rhodesia and the large African population and showed that the ratio of one European to nineteen Africans would become 1 : 65 if amalgamation took place and pointed out that the control of a large black population by a small white community was still in an experimental stage and it would be unwise to add additional burdens.

The whole question was taken up again in 1938 when the Bledisloe Commission was appointed which reached conclusions essentially similar to those of the majority report of the Hilton Young Commission. A closer association between the two protectorates was recommended although neither was considered capable at that stage of self-government. The inclusion of Southern Rhodesia in a federation was rejected because of the wide disparity between the social and political development of Southern Rhodesia and the other territories and also because of doubts about the native policy of Southern Rhodesia. Concern was expressed at the discrimination and segregation which were already apparent and it was remarked that since there were only 39 Africans on the

common voters' roll in 1938 a common roll 'does not itself provide for the effective representation of Native interests'. It was also noted that there was considerable opposition among Africans, in the protectorates, to any amalgamation or federation for fear of similar policies being pursued in their own countries.[16]

In 1949 a conference was held at Victoria Falls where European representatives from all three territories participated in an unofficial meeting and agreed to press for a closer association of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland. The fact that no African representatives were present caused a great deal of adverse comment subsequently and did little to inspire the confidence of Africans in the movement for a Central African Federation. This conference was followed by an approach to the Colonial Office and the Commonwealth Relations Office. Officials set to work to prepare a report on the historical, geographical, and economic background together with a comparative survey of Native policy in the three territories, and a conference was held in London in March 1951.[17] A year later another conference drew up a draft scheme for federation. The Colonial Secretary had invited African representatives from the protectorates to London for informal discussions with him and to take part in the conference. The representatives duly came to London but, such was the atmosphere of suspicion that had by then been engendered, that they declined to participate in the conference itself. Two African representatives from Southern Rhodesia did take part in the proceedings.[18]

By January 1953 the final scheme of federation was drawn up and there followed numerous debates in Parliament and outside which culminated in the approval of the Rhodesia and Nyasaland Federation Bill and the Order-in-Council creating the Federation which followed.[19] Meanwhile the opposition of Africans in the protectorates to the scheme was made apparent both in Britain and in Africa where there were demonstrations. The main grounds for their opposition to federation were set out by chiefs and citizens of Nyasaland in a petition they intended, but were

not able, to present to the Queen. They summarized their views in the following terms:

(i) Opposition to any political Association with Southern Rhodesia because its Native policy differs too strongly from the Native policy in operation in territories under the control of the Colonial Office, and in the belief that it would result in our losing our land.

(ii) The proposed federal constitution is designed to entrench European political dominance in the countries concerned for ever and it gives to the European minority and to it alone power to amend the constitution.

(iii) We are not willing to purchase economic advancement by the sacrifice of political rights and civil liberties which we believe would result from surrendering us into the power of the European settlers among us.

(iv) Britain acquired control of Nyasaland not by conquest but by agreement between Her Majesty Queen Victoria and the Chiefs of Nyasaland. That agreement did not envisage a change in the constitutional status of Nyasaland without the consent of the people. Moreover, it did not envisage the transfer of Nyasaland from the protection and administration of Britain to a new Dominion, and that step should not be taken without the consent of the people concerned.

(v) Instead of Central African Federation we ask for constitutional reform in Nyasaland which would give Africans adequate and effective representation in the political institutions of the country.[20]

In the debates in the House of Commons and elsewhere, great importance was attached to the consequences of bringing about federation when it was so clearly against the wishes of the large majority of educated and politically conscious Africans. It was hardly a sufficient answer to assert that the large majority of Africans were ignorant and apathetic about the whole question, since this only emphasized the need for continued close protection of African interests by the Colonial Office until such time as Africans in the three territories could be safely left to govern themselves. As it is the Federal constitution provides for a very limited representation of Africans in the Assembly and none at all in the Cabinet. Furthermore, no change can be made in this constitution

which has not been approved by a two-thirds majority of the whole Assembly, which means in practice without the active consent of the white settler community. Subsequent events have done little to remove the impression that Europeans in Central Africa will not lightly give up the politically dominant position they now hold.

Before leaving this brief examination of the constitution of the Federation, there remains the question of government in the constituent territories. Southern Rhodesia has had responsible government since 1923. It is a self-governing colony having full control over its own affairs, with the exception that legislation affecting the African population must have the approval of the Secretary of State. There is an Executive Council consisting of the Cabinet, which has seven members, one of whom is the Prime Minister. There is a single Chamber of thirty members representing single member constituencies. Despite the common electoral roll there are no Africans in the Chamber.

In contrast Northern Rhodesia is administered by the Governor, with the aid of an Executive Council and a Legislative Council which does contain African representation. The Executive Council consists of the Governor as president, six *ex-officio* members, one nominated official, and four unofficial members. The Legislative Council consists of the Speaker, who is an unofficial representative, eight official members, two nominated unofficial members (who may be Africans and in any case represent African interests), twelve elected members for the European community, and four African members selected by the African Representative Council for appointment by the Governor. There was a good deal of opposition among European members at the constitutional changes which were introduced in September 1953, which substantially increased the proportion of African members by giving two more seats to Africans and Europeans alike and reducing by one the number of official members, making the present total of twenty-six instead of twenty-three members. Sir Roy Welensky, leader of the European representatives, resigned in protest at the changes,

but without effect. The Secretary of State for Colonial Affairs subsequently made it clear that he did not intend that there should be any further constitutional changes for at least five years, that is during the lifetime of the new legislature, unless all parties were agreed upon them. He is reported as saying that at this stage of constitutional development one could not envisage a situation where Europeans were swamped by the numerical superiority of Africans, but that if the situation remained as it was there would be a danger of losing the co-operation of Africans whose labour is necessary for the development of the country. The Secretary of State added that the 'swamping' of Europeans politically would have an adverse effect on overseas investment and mean 'at least the complete arrest of the progress that Northern Rhodesia had been making and at the worst a reversal of the whole of that tendency.'[21]

In Nyasaland the Governor administers the territory with the aid of an Executive Council and a Legislative Council. The Executive Council consists of the Governor as president, three *ex-officio* members, one nominated official member, two nominated unofficial members (both European members of the Legislative Council). The Legislative Council consists of the Governor as president, three *ex-officio* members, seven nominated official members, nine nominated unofficial members, including three Africans, one Indian, and a leading European member of one of the missionary societies. In May 1954 the Colonial Secretary announced that he was in favour of further increasing African representation.

It is too early to judge whether the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland will succeed in the formidable social, economic, and political tasks that are facing it. It is a pity that the good-will of so many leading Africans should have been lost in the process of setting up the federation, but it is to be hoped that the policies pursued both by the Federal and the Territorial governments will be such as will inspire greater confidence among the African population in the future.

EAST AFRICA

Although much of East Africa straddles the Equator there is a considerable body of European settlers in the higher altitudes where the climate is favourable. The settlers are of recent origin, the large majority having arrived during the last fifty years, and are smaller in numbers than in Central or South Africa. These are factors of great importance in making any comparison between the political development of, say, Kenya with Southern Rhodesia or the Gold Coast. The permanent European population of West Africa is of negligible proportions. Largely for climatic reasons, Europeans in West Africa have tended to serve a number of years and then to return to Britain on retirement. This is not the case in East or Central Africa, where an increasing number of Europeans, born and bred in the territories, regard Africa as their homeland. Despite the Colonial Office's one-time insistence upon the 'paramountcy of native interests' European settlers in East Africa, especially in Kenya, undoubtedly wield a great deal of power, although hardly so much as Europeans farther south.

There is no Federation of East Africa. A mere passing suggestion by the Colonial Secretary in an address to the East Africa Club dinner held in London in July 1953 that federation might eventually come about, was sufficient to cause a constitutional crisis in Uganda.[22] In fact there is a loose association between the governments of Kenya, Tanganyika, and Uganda. Until 1948 a number of common services had been administered in an informal way by the East African Governors' Conference – a body with no constitutional background and with no provision for the public discussion of its affairs. In January 1948 an East Africa High Commission was set up which consisted of the governors of the three territories and which has control of railways, harbours, customs, posts and telegraphs, defence and research. At the same time an East African Central Legislative Assembly was created, having a majority of 'unofficial' members. The

High Commission legislates for the central services with the advice and consent of the Assembly. The existence of these central organs does not diminish the responsibilities of the individual governments for the basic services of each territory, such as administration, police, health, education, agriculture, animal health, forestry, labour, housing, and public works. Nevertheless the existence of the High Commission and the Central Assembly could be regarded as the first step towards a possible federation.[23]

Kenya

Kenya is a combined colony and protectorate under the same legislature. As Martin Wight points out, Kenya Colony and Protectorate are historically bound up with Zanzibar. 'Kenya colony is a settled colony; Kenya Protectorate comprises the mainland dominions of the Sultan of Zanzibar; Zanzibar itself is a protected state. But to-day there is no constitutional relationship between Zanzibar and the mainland.'[24] The latter is nominally governed by the Sultan with the aid of the British Resident appointed by the Colonial Office and Executive and Legislative Councils. Zanzibar is small, having a total population of less than 300,000.

The first Legislative Council of Kenya was formed in 1907, but it was not until 1948 that elected representatives ceased to be in a minority. For a considerable period African interests were represented in the Legislative Council by two nominated Europeans, but in 1938 Africans were substituted. Further constitutional changes in 1952 resulted in a Legislative Council with eight *ex officio* members, eighteen nominated members, twenty-one elected members (fourteen Europeans, six Asians, and one Arab), together with six nominated African members and one nominated Arab.

Africans had no representation in the Executive Council until the constitutional changes announced in March 1954 as part of the reorganization of government to combat the problem of *Mau Mau*. They were then offered one place in the new Council of Ministers and two additional places on

the old Executive Council, which was retained with greatly curtailed powers. Under the new arrangement there is a War Council of four, concerned with the Emergency, and a Council of Ministers which is the principal instrument of government. The latter consists of the Governor and Deputy Governor, six official members, six unofficial members, and two nominated members. Of the six unofficial members three are Europeans, two Asians, and one African, who is Minister for Community Development.[25]

A proposal for increased African representation in the Council of Ministers was turned down. It seems a pity that, at this crucial period, the opportunity for African participation in the government should be so limited, as this will only serve to aggravate the fact, noted by Lord Hailey, that African political interest tends to be centred less on the proceedings of the Legislative and Executive Councils than on various African political associations within the colony, among which is the proscribed Kenya African Union.[26]

Uganda

Uganda is unique among the East African territories in so far as its protectorate status is combined with a continuation of the traditional system of government which existed when, largely for strategic reasons, Europeans first took an interest in the country. The British government found that the Kabaka and major chiefs of the Kingdom of Buganda had established an efficient system of government which was able to continue administering local affairs under the guidance of the protectorate government. In fact, as Lord Hailey has observed, the existence of the indigenous governments appeared to militate against the development of the political institutions of the protectorate as a whole, because the Kabaka and his Ministers were, as recently as 1940, opposed to the direct representation of Buganda on the Legislative Council, and preferred to negotiate with, rather than participate in, the government.[27] At a later date the Kabaka nominated one of his three Ministers to take his place as one of

the nominated unofficial members of the Council, alongside other African members from other provinces of Uganda. Furthermore in 1953 the Kabaka agreed to a number of alterations in the system of government in Buganda. These involved the transfer to the protectorate government responsibility for the operation of certain departmental services with resulting financial adjustments, together with certain changes in the number of the Kabaka's Ministers and the size of his 'Grand Lukiko' or Council.

A crisis occurred in Buganda towards the end of 1953. The changes already mentioned had aroused a certain amount of suspicion among the Baganda who felt that their traditional rights of self-government might be encroached upon. The possibility of an East African Federation was regarded as disastrous. Despite the fact that the Secretary of State disclaimed any intention of bringing about an East African Federation in the immediate future, the Kabaka's Council was very uneasy. They were not made happier by the knowledge that Central African Federation had come about despite the active opposition of the African population. There followed prolonged discussions between the Governor and the young, English-educated Kabaka. The latter expressed his fear that the status of Buganda as an African society free of white domination was threatened, and demanded the withdrawal of control by the protectorate and the Colonial Office. The Governor, for his part, pointed out that Buganda could not hope to make social or economic progress unless it was an integral part of the protectorate as a whole. A deadlock ensued which was resolved by the action of the Colonial Secretary and the Governor in deporting the Kabaka and banishing him from the throne. The expulsion order was based upon the Emergency Powers (Order-in-Council) Act of 1939 and, although at that time there were no disturbances in Buganda, a state of emergency was declared. A delegation visited London for consultations with the Colonial Secretary. The delegation called for an impartial inquiry and declared that in their view the government's action had been 'void of all natural justice'. Meanwhile the Colonial Secretary declared

that his decision to depose the Kabaka was irrevocable.[28]

In February 1954 a newly constituted Legislative Council of Uganda met for the first time. The Council had previously consisted of the Governor as president with six *ex-officio* members, ten nominated official members, and sixteen unofficial members, including eight Africans. In the new Council the number of members was increased to fifty-six and the number of Africans to twenty, including five representatives from Buganda.

Meanwhile, Professor Sir Keith Hancock was invited to go to Uganda as special Commissioner on constitutional problems, and the Lukiko of Buganda nominated various people to take part in discussions with him. Among the nominees were Dr Ralph Bunche of the United Nations secretariat and Dr D. E. Kalibala, a Maganda who was on the U.N. staff. These two names were vetoed by the Governor, who subsequently withdrew his objections to Dr Kalibala. It was unlikely, in any case, that Dr Bunche could have served and, when certain misunderstandings concerning the terms of reference of Sir Keith Hancock's mission were disposed of, the way was left clear for his investigations, the results of which are awaited with interest. (See Postscript.)

Tanganyika

Tanganyika, formerly known as German East Africa, became a British mandated territory in 1922 and was brought under the International Trusteeship system of the United Nations in 1946. As Lord Hailey has pointed out, the fact that the territory was administered under League of Nations mandate did not make any substantial difference to its administration. The doctrine embodied in Article 22 of the Covenant of the League, that the 'well-being and development of the native peoples form a sacred trust of civilization', was accepted by the British government, in theory at any rate, in other colonial territories as well. Similarly, the emphasis in the Trusteeship Agreement upon the development of free political institutions, suited to the territory and involving

the increasing participation of the inhabitants, is an accepted principle of British Colonial policy.

However, the Legislative Council of Tanganyika still has a majority of official members although it was announced in June 1952 that the government had accepted the two main recommendations of the Constitutional Development Committee which provided for more democratic representation. Hitherto, the Legislative Council had consisted of eight *ex-officio* members, seven nominated official members, fourteen nominated unofficial members, including four Africans, three Indians, and one European representing African interests, who also sat on the Executive Council. The latter had no African members. Under the new constitution recommended by the committee there would be twenty-one representative members, seven from each of the main ethnic groups – European, Indian, and African.

Following the report of the Constitutional Development Committee Professor W. J. M. Mackenzie was appointed as a Special Commissioner to make further investigations regarding the development of local government and the introduction of the election of the unofficial members of the Legislative Council. His recommendations are interesting, especially when compared with the electoral provisions in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Professor Mackenzie begins by pointing out that a citizenship qualification would not be appropriate in Tanganyika because of the variety of nationalities found there. In addition to citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies and British protected persons, there are citizens of other countries and stateless persons who have made their homes in the territory. He therefore recommends that the franchise should be based upon birth, or residence in the territory during three out of the four years preceding the election. Professor Mackenzie recommends that there should be no discrimination on grounds of sex or race and that the franchise should be extended to all persons over the age of twenty-one years who have paid their taxes. He rejects any income, property, or educational test, on the grounds that the franchise should

have the widest possible basis. Although a common roll is not yet practicable he considers that this should be the ultimate objective. In the meantime it might be possible to experiment with a common roll in certain constituencies, but elsewhere Europeans and Asians could vote directly, and Africans indirectly through electoral colleges. To impose property or educational qualifications would inevitably exclude a large proportion of the African population from any participation in the government for many years.[29] Professor Mackenzie's recommendations are being considered by the Tanganyika Government and meanwhile it is hoped that a reconstituted Legislative Council will be established within the next five years.

British Somaliland

British Somaliland is not normally included under the heading of East Africa, but it cannot be conveniently included elsewhere. The territory is a small one having a relatively homogeneous population of Somalis. It has the status of a protectorate and is administered by the Governor who makes ordinances subject to the instruction of the Secretary of State for Colonial Affairs. There is no Executive or Legislative Council, but there is an Advisory Council consisting of forty-eight members whose duty it is to bring Somali views to the attention of the governor. It is hoped that the Advisory Council will provide a training ground for a Legislative Council in the future.[30] Problems of racial relations are of little or no significance in the territory itself, but it merits inclusion here because a considerable number of Somali seamen have settled in Britain.

WEST AFRICA

The West African territories, Gold Coast and Nigeria in particular, are making remarkably rapid strides towards self-government and independence. This is a source of some

jealousy in other colonial territories and of serious concern in the Union of South Africa, where Dr Malan has frequently expressed his strong disapproval of promoting self-government in the Gold Coast and in other territories with a high proportion of illiteracy. Each of the four territories in West Africa looks forward to the day when it will achieve dominion status. Although there is little prospect of a Federation of the West African territories, at any rate in the immediate future, this does not prevent active co-operation between them. Since 1952 there has been a West African Inter-Territorial Conference with a secretariat. The Conference is presided over by the Governor of Nigeria and is attended by two African Ministers from Nigeria and the Gold Coast and two African members of the Executive Councils of Sierra Leone and Gambia. The Conference and the secretariat endeavour to promote inter-territorial and international co-operation in West Africa, and have paid special consideration to medical and agricultural research.[31]

One of the difficulties underlying the government of almost all the West African territories is the fact that political boundaries in and between the various countries are completely artificial and have no relation to natural or ethnic divisions. In fact the peoples of the coastal regions, who have most in common with each other, find themselves separated and under the jurisdiction of different European powers, while they are politically united with other peoples in the interior with whom they bear little similarity, whether from the point of view of race, religion, language, or culture. All the British West African possessions are multiple dependencies in the sense that they combine a colony with a protectorate and, in the case of Nigeria and the Gold Coast, a Trust territory as well.

Gold Coast

Gold Coast is the most complex of the multiple dependencies and consists of the Gold Coast itself, which is a settled colony; Ashanti, which is a conquered colony; Gold Coast Northern Territories, a protectorate; together with Togo-

land which is a Trust territory under British administration.

Certain difficulties arise with regard to the eventual establishment of an integrated and independent dominion of the Gold Coast because of the position of the Ewe people in Togoland. It is a reflection of the complex ethnic composition of the peoples of West Africa and the completely arbitrary nature of the political boundaries, that the Ewe peoples, who number about a million in all, have been split into three groups. The large majority inhabit the eastern section of Togoland which is administered as a Trust territory by the French. Others live in what is now the British Trust territory of Togoland, and the third group in the east parts of the Gold Coast Colony itself. In 1947 the Ewe petitioned the United Nations Trusteeship Council requesting that they should be united, preferably under a separate government of 'Eweland' or in a united Togoland. The matter has been before the Trusteeship Council ever since 1950.[32] On the last occasion a motion was passed which asserted that the integration of British Togoland or any part of it with the Gold Coast before both territories obtained self-government would be contrary to the international trusteeship agreement, and urged the United Kingdom and France to reconstitute the Joint Council for Togoland Affairs. It appears that the present Trusteeship Agreement may have to be amended or replaced, although the British government has expressed the view that, if British Togoland is incorporated into an independent self-governing Gold Coast, then the aims of the Trust would be achieved. However, the incorporation of the Ewe peoples of British Togoland into the Gold Coast without their consent could hardly be justified.

Since the end of the second world war Gold Coast has made rapid strides until now it is on the brink of self-government. The significant features of the constitution of 1946 were the unification of the Gold Coast Colony and Ashanti by the creation of a single Legislative Council and the establishment of an African unofficial majority, some of whom were elected and some nominated. Politicians in the Gold Coast have been criticized for not giving the constitution of

1946 a fair trial, since it was replaced in 1950. The explanation has been given by the authors of the Coussey Report on Constitutional Reform on which the 1950 constitution was largely based.[33] It is pointed out that although the previous constitution did not take effect until 1946, it had been conceived in war-time – 1943 to be precise. The return to the Gold Coast of many ex-service men and others whose outlook had greatly matured and who were able and willing to assume a much greater measure of responsibility made further changes imperative.

The all-African Coussey committee had been set up as a consequence of the recommendations made by the Watson Commission of Inquiry into Disturbances which had occurred in 1948.[34] The latter report was very critical of the role of the chiefs in the administration of the country, but the Coussey committee considered that there was still a place for the chiefs, although it was recognized that certain aspects of chieftaincy would require considerable adaptation to modern conditions. The Coussey Report also recommended the setting up of a second chamber, but this proposal was not accepted by the Secretary of State, who considered that if a bicameral system were adopted at that point it would detract from the efficiency of local and central government bodies by isolating in a chamber with limited functions a number of the more able men whose services were needed in the Legislative Assembly.

As laid down in the Gold Coast (Constitution) Order-in-Council of 1950 the Legislative Assembly consisted of a Speaker elected by the assembly, three *ex-officio* members, six special members on the basis of corporate representation, and seventy-five elected members. The Executive Council, renamed the Cabinet, had three European *ex-officio* members, now replaced by Africans, and not less than eight representative members appointed by the Governor with the approval of the assembly and revocable by the two-thirds vote of the Assembly. The leader of the majority party has the responsibilities and title of Prime Minister. The Governor holds certain reserve powers including that of veto and is

also responsible for the appointment of 'expatriate' permanent civil servants in the upper ranks of the Colonial Service (i.e. men from the United Kingdom). Dr Nkrumah is reported to have said in the Assembly that he was 'proud to report that never has there been any suggestion of the use of the reserved powers or even of the veto.'[35]

Further discussions took place during 1953, with a view to establishing complete self-government at the earliest practicable opportunity. This followed upon a White Paper introduced into the Gold Coast Legislative Assembly in July 1953 and a motion put by the Prime Minister, Dr Kwame Nkrumah, and passed by an overwhelming majority. The motion was in two parts. It called on the United Kingdom government to introduce an Act of Independence 'when the time comes' and asked the British Government to amend as a matter of urgency the Gold Coast (Constitution) Order-in-Council 1950, so that the Cabinet (previously the Executive Council) should be composed exclusively of members of the Assembly, which would be elected on a basis of universal suffrage. This would mean the replacement of the three *ex-officio* Ministers by Africans. It was also suggested that Gold Coast affairs should be dealt with by the Commonwealth Relations Office. The United Kingdom government accepted all the proposals with the exception of the last. After his return to office for the second time, following elections in June 1954, Dr Nkrumah indicated that he would press for self-government as soon as possible.

Dr Nkrumah himself experienced a remarkable rise to power when his party, the Convention People's Party (C.P.P.), were swept into power with an overwhelming majority at the first elections in February 1951. Dr Nkrumah was actually serving a term of imprisonment for participation in seditious activities in 1950. At this time the future Prime Minister was widely described as 'communist', a 'black dictator' and other uncomplimentary terms. Dr Nkrumah describes himself as a 'Marxian socialist' but denies any association with Communism with a capital 'C'. In fact he has taken steps to remove active communists from

positions of influence. It was an act of statesmanship which led to the release of Dr Nkrumah immediately the election results were known, and his installation as Prime Minister. A great deal depends upon the success with which the government of the Gold Coast deal with the numerous problems that face the rapid maturation of a hitherto backward and dependent people. One of the most serious responsibilities facing the government is that of removing any hint of corruption among politicians and civil servants alike. With this in mind Dr Nkrumah himself warned his followers that 'bribery and corruption, both moral and factual, have eaten into the whole fabric of our society and these must be stamped out if we are to achieve any progress'. The C.P.P. did in fact organize a nation-wide anti-bribery and anti-corruption campaign. There was some concern when, in November 1953, the Minister of Communications and Works resigned from the government in view of alleged corruption. A Commission of Inquiry, under Judge Aka Korsah, was set up to inquire into the circumstances of the resignation. A number of allegations were made regarding considerations that had been paid for government contracts. These allegations were not substantiated. The Commission confirmed certain instances of bribery in the case of two Ministerial Secretaries and remarked that 'persons holding public office should consider with all seriousness their personal and official relationship with those who seek or are in a position to seek any business transactions, and in particular contracts, with the Government'.

In May 1953 an official opposition party was set up in the Gold Coast, which combined the United Gold Coast Convention and the National Democratic Party together with a number of independents. The new party was called the Ghana Congress Party and Dr K. A. Busia was appointed chairman.

Nigeria

Nigeria has followed hard in the footsteps of the Gold Coast on the path to freedom and independence. Like the

Gold Coast it is a multiple dependency with complex ethnic divisions which are even more difficult to reconcile because of the size of its population – roughly thirty million, or nearly seven times larger than that of the Gold Coast. An interesting point of contrast is that while the Gold Coast has universal suffrage, Nigeria has only adult *male* suffrage.

Nigeria consists of a colony, a protectorate, and the Trust territory of the Cameroons. This description does less than justice to the complexity of the situation because the territory is further divided into three main regions – north, east, and west – each of which has a considerable measure of autonomy. The constitution enacted in 1951 proved to be unworkable, and further changes were proposed in 1953 which gave to the three regional legislatures greater independence of the central or Federal legislature than they possessed under previous constitutions.[36]

Under the constitution of 1946 Nigeria obtained semi-representative government and in 1951 acquired semi-responsible government. Under this constitution regional legislation had to be submitted to the Central Executive, and this caused friction, in view of the fact that in the Central House of Representatives the northern region commanded half the seats and could therefore exercise considerable pressure if it chose. The constitutional crisis of 1953 eventually resolved itself into a clash between those in the south who wished to press a motion for 'self-government in 1956' and those in the north who supported the more cautious formula, 'self-government as soon as practicable'. The crisis came to a head when the northern House of Assembly passed a resolution which virtually demanded secession from the rest of the country, and western Ministers withdrew from the Central Executive Council. The Secretary of State for the Colonies announced that 'events have shown that it is not possible for the three regions of Nigeria to work together effectively in a federation so closely knit as that provided by the present Constitution'.[37] He said that he intended to call a conference as soon as possible to draw up a revised plan. Some delay occurred owing to the difficulty of getting

representatives from all parties to attend. When, eventually, the meeting was held in London in August 1953, the Action Group, a dominant party in the west, withdrew from the conference because a demand that four western Ministers who had resigned at the end of March should be reinstated was not immediately conceded.

The constitutional proposals of 1953 suggest a Federal legislature consisting of 184 elected members, the northern agreeing to accept only 92 members, the balance being distributed among the eastern and western regions with 42 each, Lagos with 2, and the Southern Cameroons 6. The central Council of Ministers is to consist of 6 *ex-officio* members together with 3 Ministers from each region. In the eastern region a single House of Assembly is to be set up with a regional Executive Council; in the north the bi-cameral system with a House of Chiefs and a House of Assembly is to be retained, as in the western region. In all three areas regional Executive Councils will be responsible for the formulation and execution of policy in all matters not reserved for the Federal government. The powers of the regional governments will be considerably increased.

On the question of self-government by 1956 the conference accepted a compromise proposed by the Secretary of State, who said that he was not prepared to fix a definite date for self-government for Nigeria as a whole, but that in 1956 Her Majesty's government would grant to those regions which desired it full self-government in respect of all matters within the competence of the regional governments. It was agreed that a further conference should be held in Nigeria not later than three years from 31 August 1953 for the purpose of reviewing the Constitution and examining the question of self-government.[38]

The London conference adjourned until January to give time for a Fiscal Commissioner to study the financial arrangements (particularly as regards the allocation of revenue between the centre and the regions), which would have to be made to accompany the changes proposed. The conference also agreed to take up again in January certain other matters

left over by the London conference, including the administration of justice and the future position of the Cameroons under United Kingdom Trusteeship.

The resumed conference endorsed proposals on the future of the Cameroons put forward by the Secretary of State after discussion and in agreement with the Cameroons representatives. The Northern Cameroons would continue to be administered as part of the northern region. The Southern Cameroons would cease to be part of the eastern region, but would remain part of the new Federation of Nigeria and be quasi-federal territory. It would have its own legislature, with powers to legislate on matters within the competence of a region and to raise revenue from those sources open to a regional legislature. It would have an Executive Council consisting of the Commissioner of the Cameroons, three *ex-officio* members, and four members selected from among the twenty-one unofficial members of the legislature after consultation with the leader of the majority party. The Southern Cameroons would be represented by six members in the Federal legislature and would have one Minister in the Council of Ministers.[39]

Sierra Leone

Sierra Leone, which consists of a colony and a protectorate, is also making steady, if less spectacular, progress towards self-government. In 1951 the territory obtained a Legislative Council consisting of the Governor as president, an elected vice-president, seven *ex-officio* members, two nominated unofficial, and twenty-one elected members. The Executive Council consisted of the Governor, four *ex-officio* members, and six appointed members, selective from the elected members of the Legislative Council. In April 1952 five of the six appointed members accepted the Governor's invitation to associate themselves with and take a special interest in groups of government departments. The experiment was successful and in December 1952 a motion was introduced by the leader of the Sierra Leone People's Party, that the

time had come for the allocation of portfolios to members of the Executive Council. The motion was adopted by an overwhelming majority and steps were taken to implement the decision.[40] As a consequence in April 1953 Africans became Ministers in six government departments in Sierra Leone. They are responsible for initiating policy and submitting questions relating to their Ministries to the Governor in Council. They will convey decisions to the heads of departments, who will continue to sit in the Executive Council.

The Gambia

The Gambia is the smallest of the British West African territories and consists of a colony and a protectorate. It is the oldest existing example of constitutional association between a colony and its hinterland.

The constitution was amended following the recommendations of a Consultative Committee in 1953. There is now an Executive Council of five official and six unofficial members, not more than three of whom will be styled Ministers. The Legislative Council has five official and sixteen unofficial members, presided over by a Speaker. Four members will be directly elected from the colony, seven members indirectly elected from the protectorate and the selection of three by the eleven already elected: the remaining two unofficial members are nominated by the Governor.[41]

THE WEST INDIES

It has already been shown that there is an essential interdependence between the history of the British territories in West Africa and those of the West Indies. Nevertheless, apart from sharing certain racial characteristics with Africans from the west coast, and for that matter with Europeans and Asians as well, West Indians to-day have little if anything in common with West Africans, except their British citizenship.

Certain difficulties arise when an attempt is made to define the territories included under the heading of the British West Indies, particularly since British Guiana and British Honduras, previously included in this category, have chosen to remain outside the proposed British Caribbean Federation. The Bahamas and Bermuda also fall outside what is usually termed the West Indies, since they are farther to the north and fall in the orbit of North rather than Central America. However, for convenience, reference will be made to them in this section.

British Caribbean Federation: Proposed Scheme

The idea of a West Indian federation was discussed for a number of years, but it was not until April 1953 that plans were laid to bring such a scheme about. The colonies which eventually agreed to join the federation, subject to the ratification of the scheme by their respective legislatures, were Barbados, Jamaica, the Leeward Islands, Trinidad and Tobago, the Windward Islands, and the other dependencies attached to these territories. The constitution of the proposed British Caribbean Federation provides for a bicameral Federal legislature consisting of a Senate and a House of Representatives. The Senate will consist of nineteen Senators, one from Montserrat and two from each of the other units comprising the federation. Senators are to be appointed by the Governor-General for a term of five years, and the Senate is to have the same powers as the House of Lords in Britain. The House of Representatives is to consist of forty-five elected members. Barbados will have five representatives, Jamaica seventeen, Trinidad and Tobago ten, Montserrat one, and the remaining units two each. The Federal executive will consist of the Governor-General, advised by a Council of State consisting of fourteen members appointed by the Governor-General, who is normally expected to act in accordance with the advice of the Council.[42]

The Federal government will have exclusive responsibility for a number of items of legislation and will share others

listed on the 'concurrent Legislative list' with the legislatures of the constituent colonies. Of these Jamaica is the largest, with a population of more than a million and a quarter. Associated with it are the small islands of Cayman, the Turks, and the Caicos. Jamaica has a bicameral legislature consisting of an elected House of Representatives and a nominated Legislative Council as a second chamber. There is an Executive Council which has the duties of a Cabinet. In April 1953 an advance towards fully responsible government was achieved when eight instead of five members of the House of Representatives in the executive became Ministers. Of these the chief is appointed by the Governor with the approval of the House. The other seven are appointed by the Governor on the recommendation of the Chief Minister.[43]

Trinidad and Tobago, the next largest colony in the Federation, advanced from semi-representative to semi-responsible government in 1950. The Legislative Council consists of a Speaker appointed by the Governor, three *ex officio*, five nominated unofficial, and twenty-one elected members. The Executive Council is composed of the Governor, three *ex-officio* members, one nominated, and five members elected by a two-thirds vote of the Council. Constitutional advances were also made in 1950 by the Leeward Islands and the Windward Islands providing fully representative government.

Barbados is one of the older British colonies which achieved representative government with a bicameral legislature early in its history. In 1946 it obtained a measure of responsible government. This was achieved by a change of constitutional practice rather than an amendment of the constitution itself. Following the election in 1946 when on an extended franchise the Labour Party obtained a large majority, the Governor invited the leader of the Assembly to submit names for the Executive Committee. Hitherto the committee which served as a link between the executive and the legislature had been entirely nominated by the governor. After 1946 it became a potential Cabinet with collective

responsibility for policy, with representatives from the legislature in charge of departments.[44] In 1954 a Prime Minister and a Leader of the Opposition, together with four Ministers, were appointed.

British Honduras and British Guiana

These two mainland territories have chosen to remain outside the British Caribbean Federation. Both have advanced far along the path to independence, although British Guiana received a set-back when its constitution was suspended in October 1953, after operating only six months. Changes were introduced into the constitution of British Honduras early in 1954 and an election held with universal adult suffrage. The election resulted in a victory for the radical People's United Party. The new Legislative Council has a majority of elected members and a Speaker appointed by the Governor from outside the legislature. The Executive Council is the chief instrument of policy, two-thirds of its members being elected by the Legislative Council from among its members.[45]

The constitution introduced into British Guiana in April 1953 conferred universal adult suffrage and provided a bicameral legislature.[46] There was a House of Assembly with twenty-seven members, of whom twenty-four were elected, and a second chamber, a State Council, consisting of nine members appointed by the Governor, two of them on the recommendation of the Ministers of the House of Assembly. There were six of these with departmental responsibility out of the ten places on the Executive Council altogether, giving a majority of two to the elected members. The Governor had certain reserve powers, which included that of referring any legislation that might involve racial discrimination to the Secretary of State. But the reserve powers were not adequate to deal with the crisis which occurred at the end of September 1953.

In the election of April 1953 in British Guiana the People's Progressive Party (P.P.P.) obtained 51 per cent of

the votes and eighteen out of twenty-four seats in the House of Assembly, which secured for members of this party the six Ministerial posts. There is little doubt that the leaders of the P.P.P. had close connexions with international Communism over a period of years. Furthermore, while some of their actions taken when in office would, in isolation, hardly have justified the alarm which was experienced by the Secretary of State and the United Kingdom government, regarded from the point of view of their cumulative effect, they were certainly not conducive to the general welfare of the colony. Among the misdemeanours of the P.P.P. were said to be the following: (i) fomenting strikes for political ends; (ii) attempting to oust established trade unions by legislative action; (iii) removal of ban on the entry of West Indian communists; (iv) introduction of a bill to repeal the Undesirable Publications Order and the flooding of the territory with Communist literature; (v) misuse of the rights of appointment to Boards and Committees; (vi) spreading racial hatred; (vi) plan to secularize Church schools and rewrite text-books to give them a political bias; (viii) neglect of administrative duties; (ix) undermining the loyalty of the police; (x) attempts to gain control of the Public Service; and (xi) threats of violence.[47]

While the evidence on some of these counts was a little thin, probably the fact which influenced the British Government more than anything else was that the new regime was completely undermining the confidence of the business community and causing some concern in the United States and elsewhere. The government could hardly have been insensitive to the accusation of harbouring a Communist state within the Commonwealth. In the White Paper published by the government to justify its drastic action in suspending the constitution, evidence is brought forward to show that turnover in retail and wholesale trades had fallen by 10 per cent compared with the previous year and that a number of companies which had planned large-scale investments in the colony had abandoned their schemes. Unemployment had increased considerably.[48] While it would be unjust to

attribute all these events to the influence of the new party in power in British Guiana, it can hardly be disputed that the political atmosphere created was hardly one of confidence in the stability and advance of the colony. The Secretary of State's action appears to have been precipitated by the fear of violence breaking out at the instigation of the P.P.P. and for this reason troops were dispatched to the area. In fact no violence occurred, and whether this can be attributed to the prompt action of the Governor or whether the actual danger of the P.P.P.'s resorting to force had been exaggerated, it is difficult to say.

It remains to be seen whether British Guiana can recover quickly from this unfortunate interruption of its progress towards self-government, or whether it will have delayed further advance for some time. A solution might be found, after all, in some association between British Guiana and the Caribbean Federation. The radical wing in the colony had in fact been more in favour of incorporation into the Federation than had the more conservative elements, but only if the Federation were to obtain independence immediately. The main objection to incorporation in a West Indian federation in the past has been that British Guiana, which is relatively sparsely populated, might be suddenly flooded with immigrants from the heavily over-populated areas of Jamaica and Barbados. While a sudden influx might be disastrous, it would seem that on the whole the West Indies as a whole would benefit from a controlled migration and resettlement scheme, if this were to coincide with a considerable investment plan and the development of new industries. In the meantime British Guiana has an interim constitution and a Constitutional Commission has been set up to consider further developments. (See Postscript.)

The Bahamas and Bermuda

As has been pointed out, the Bahamas and Bermuda normally prefer to be considered outside of the West Indies proper, and in view of the large geographical distances

between them, this is not surprising. Both have bicameral legislatures and, like Barbados, have a representative system that goes back to the early history of the colonies. They are gradually advancing towards responsible government.

CHAPTER TWO

Apartheid and White Supremacy in South Africa

THE crisis in racial relations to-day manifests itself, in one way or another, in almost every country associated with the British Commonwealth, not least in Britain itself. It is, however, in South Africa that the crisis is seen in its acutest form.[1] It is true that, relatively speaking, some social and educational services provided for Africans in the Union surpass those at present found in East and Central Africa. Furthermore, the naked struggle for power between different racial and cultural groups has, in Kenya, assumed the proportions of a civil war, while in South Africa it has been confined to minor disturbances and a somewhat ineffective passive resistance campaign. Nevertheless, the dominant European minorities in East and Central Africa appear to be willing to give Africans some opportunity, in the future, of improving their own status relative to that of Europeans. In South Africa a large majority of the European population appears to be determined to hold on to, if not extend, its own privileged position and to exclude non-Europeans from a full share in the government of the country, now or in the future. For this reason racial relationships in South Africa are bound to deteriorate until the pressure on non-Europeans becomes so great that a major upheaval ensues. The only alternative would appear to be a widespread change of attitude on the part of Europeans, when and if the grim consequence of present policies is fully appreciated.

ETHNIC GROUPS AND POPULATION PROBLEMS

The ethnic composition of the population of South Africa is extremely complex, as the following table suggests.

POPULATION OF SOUTH AFRICA[2]

TERRITORY	AFRICAN	EUROPEAN	COLOURED	ASIAN	TOTAL
Union	8,840,000	2,750,000	1,170,000	388,000	13,148,000
South-West Africa	380,686	49,641	...	27	430,354
Total	9,220,686	2,799,641	1,170,000	388,027	13,578,354
Basutoland	561,289	1,689	602	274	563,854
Bechuana-land	292,755	2,379	1,082	94	296,310
Swaziland	181,269	3,201	745		185,215
Total	1,035,313	7,269	2,797		1,045,379
GRAND TOTAL					14,623,733

Each of the four major racial groups can be further subdivided on the basis of language, religion, economic status, and urban or rural residence. The Africans, to whom in South Africa the term Native is usually applied, belong to the Bantu-speaking tribes, which can be divided into five major groups. The different dialects are not mutually intelligible. Europeans and Coloured are divided between those whose mother-tongue is English, Afrikaans (a corruption of Dutch), or one of several European languages. Among Asians, languages include Tamil, Hindu, Urdu, and Chinese. As far as religion is concerned there are a number of pagan African religions among which forms of ancestor worship are common, but a large proportion of Africans have been converted to Christianity and may belong to any one of a bewildering variety of denominations, including separatist movements of their own.[1] Among Europeans the main religions are the Christian and the Jewish, but the Christians are divided between the Dutch Reformed Church, the Roman Catholics, and a number of Protestant denominations. Among Asians the main religions are Hindu, Mohammedan, and Buddhist.

The range of economic status is tremendous; the difference in standard of living between the richest and the poorest is far greater than in Britain. At the upper levels there are the wealthy European manufacturers and industrialists and at the bottom are the half-starving African peasants and urban unemployed. Between these two extremes there are some members of every ethnic group whose standard of living is comparable with a working-man's in Britain. But, when a comparison is made with other industrially developed countries, the total national income of the Union of South Africa (approximately £1000 million) and the income per head, are extremely low. Furthermore, the national income is very unequally divided between the different racial groups. This is partly a reflection of the differing productive capacity of the various groups at present levels of economic organization and education, but it is also a result of the deliberate restriction of non-European incomes by discriminatory practices in industry. The net result is that Europeans, who constitute 20 per cent of the population, receive 75 per cent of the national income. Non-Europeans, who constitute 80 per cent of the population, receive 25 per cent of the national income.[4]

South Africa during the last fifty years has experienced the large-scale movement of population from rural to urban areas that is commonly associated with industrialization. At the turn of the century the European population was more or less equally divided between town and country, while only 15 per cent of non-Europeans were urban dwellers. By 1951 75 per cent of the European, 75 per cent of the Asian, 61 per cent of the Coloured and 24 per cent of the African populations in the Union were classified as urban.[5] Furthermore, the rapid urbanization of African and Coloured is likely to lead to a more rapid rate of natural increase, while European birth rates are tending to fall.[6]

These facts give an air of reality to a morbid fear which persists among Europeans in South Africa. It is widely feared that if the African is allowed to emerge from his subordinate role and associate on a basis of equality with

Europeans, then so-called 'white civilization' is doomed to disappear. The argument has been expressed forcibly by L. E. Neame, a South African, who writes: 'The Whites say that they cannot give the non-Whites political equality in the White areas because it would mean the ultimate submergence of White civilization and supremacy; and to that they will never agree.'[7] Part of this assertion is undoubtedly true. Equality for the non-European would mean the end of 'White supremacy', and it is this loss of power which Europeans fear most. It is quite wrong, however, to equate white skins with the cultural achievements associated with western Europe and which are rapidly becoming universal. The answer to this radical misconception has been provided by another South African, Dr E. E. Harris, who points out that the phrase 'white civilization' 'is inadmissible if it implies that the character and value of the civilization depend upon the racial stock of its bearers. If we assert, as we do, that "white civilization" must be preserved, we can sensibly and consistently mean only that a certain type of moral and political tradition must be preserved, and to that the preservation of the race would be irrelevant.'[8]

Many sincere people in South Africa recoil in horror from this point of view because it appears to imply the probability of miscegenation and the ultimate creation of a hybrid race in South Africa. The idea of sexual intimacy between persons of different racial origin appears, at the present day, to stir the deepest emotions and evoke the maximum hostility, not merely in South Africa, but in other parts of the world as well. This does not mean that it never occurs. On the contrary there are people who are unaffected by this aversion and who even feel a positive attraction between opposites. The fact that in Brazil, and even in the West Indies, miscegenation has been widespread and, at least in the former case, appears to have created a new and stable ethnic group well adapted to its environment, suggests that there is no inherent biological basis for the aversion. On the contrary, all the available evidence appears to show that, as with other aspects of racial prejudice, it is a culturally acquired

characteristic. Certainly the early settlers in South Africa felt no such aversion, or there would have been no Cape Coloured population to-day. Nevertheless, the South African Parliament has seen fit to pass two measures, the Immorality Amendment Act and the Mixed Marriages Act,[9] which impose heavy penalties on anyone having sexual relations with a member of another race. In actual fact, throughout the Union in the years 1940–5 the number of mixed marriages averaged less than one hundred per year, although the extent of extra-marital sexual relations between races was probably somewhat greater.[10]

If, as is often asserted, both Africans and Europeans wish to preserve their separate racial identity, there is no necessary reason why the progressive assimilation of Africans, from the cultural point of view, should result in the disappearance of European physical features from South Africa. When barriers of social status are broken down there may be more mixed marriages on the margin, but there will remain other factors, religious, aesthetic, and ideological, which, particularly in South Africa, will make wholesale racial mixture highly unlikely. Nevertheless, the fact remains that the fear of this very thing is so great in South Africa to-day that it breeds severe prejudice in other walks of life and what Professor Hoernlé has called the technique of 'sexual domination'.[11] This manifests itself in social ostracism by Europeans of anyone suspected of being 'tainted' with non-European ancestry, the allocation to an inferior social status of all non-Europeans, and the setting up of barriers to any kind of social relationship other than that of master and servant or similar formal roles. Both the techniques of domination and segregation are employed in an attempt to resolve this conflict. It generates a pathological hatred of the non-European by the European which is all too often reciprocated, if not in reality at any rate by projection. As Professor MacCrone has put it: 'The white man who projects his own hostility on to the black man comes to fear that hostility as a threat directed against himself'.[12]

Africans

It is difficult to obtain accurate and reliable information of a demographical character regarding the indigenous population of South Africa because of the absence, until recently, of any means of recording births, marriages, and deaths and the inadequacy of the periodic census as far as information concerning non-Europeans is concerned.[13] A similar consideration applies to statistics of migration, where accurate figures are only available for Europeans. It is known, however, that the present African peoples in South Africa are not strictly indigenous, in so far as their migration southwards from east and central Africa coincided with the early European settlements at the Cape. The early inhabitants of South Africa were the Bushmen and Hottentots, whose numbers rapidly diminished in contact with Europeans. Racially speaking, therefore, the African population to-day is of Negroid and Hamitic origin with admixtures of Bushman and Hottentot. The Bantu languages which are spoken had originally no written alphabet, but scholars have now provided these and there is a growing literature.[14] At school African children learn in their mother-tongue at first, but later almost all instruction takes place in English, or occasionally Afrikaans.

About three million Africans in the Union live in tribal reserves. These are areas allocated for the sole occupation of Africans. The rest of the African population is to be found in the towns and on the European-owned farms outside the reserves, where they are employed. The increasing urbanization of the Africans is of distinct importance in considering the vexed question of population in relation to land occupation. As a result of the segregationalist policies pursued over a period of many years Africans are not permitted to own land outside of the reserves. In towns they have to live in special 'locations'; elsewhere they are merely illegal 'squatters'.

Lord Hailey, in his *African Survey*, estimated that, although Africans constituted at that time 68·8 per cent of the total

population, they could only occupy 13 per cent of the land.[15] Even this calculation assumed that the whole of the additional land allocated for Native Reserves under the Native Trust and Land Act had been acquired. In actual fact, owing to the difficulty of persuading Europeans to give up land they already occupy, even when an adequate purchase price is paid, only 60 per cent of the additional land proposed has been added to existing Reserves. The proportion of land available for Africans at present should be calculated, therefore, at approximately 10 per cent only of the whole area of the Union. Against this argument official sources in South Africa point out that a considerable part of Union territory is unfit for agriculture or stock breeding, and that only the productive area should enter into the calculation. It is also pointed out that less than a third of the African population lives on the Reserves, which it is asserted are 'almost entirely productive'. In the light of this it is claimed that 30 per cent of the productive part of the Union is set aside for the African population.[16] There are several fallacies in this argument. In the first instance, if a fair comparison is to be made between the land available to Africans for agriculture or stock breeding, and that available to Europeans, then only the rural dwelling members of both ethnic groups should be considered. There are approximately 6½ million rural Africans, but only 670,000 rural Europeans. Furthermore, expert opinion does not agree that the Reserves are all on productive soil. The Report of the Native Economic Commission of 1932 draws attention to the fact that the Ciskei Reserves were never very fertile and are now suffering severely from soil erosion, although some attempts have been made to prevent this in recent years. Erosion is also a problem in the Transkei. In Zululand there are areas of good soil interspersed with bad. Land in the Transvaal, although suitable for citrus growing if capital could be found, is not very good agricultural land, and erosion is taking place in the Orange Free State.[17]

Leaving aside the question of soil fertility, and accepting for the time being the view that the Reserves, if properly

cultivated, could be productive, the ratio of Africans and Europeans to the sixty million morgen of land, said to be fertile, is still fantastically disproportionate.[18] Over three million Africans in the Reserves occupy seventeen and a half million morgen, or roughly six morgen per head. In the European areas 670,000 Europeans occupy forty-two and a half million morgen or roughly sixty morgen per head. This takes no account of the three and a half million rural Africans working on European farms with no opportunity of ever owning their own land, individually or corporately. The position is not substantially different in Swaziland or Bechuanaland, where lack of water is the main problem. There are no European holdings in Basutoland.

In the Reserves the African continues to live according to traditional ways of life in which the family and the tribe play an important part as the basis of social, economic, and political life. Agriculture is primitive and everywhere large numbers of cattle are kept, more for their value as currency than as sources of milk, meat, or hides. The backwardness of the Reserves is aggravated by the fact that large numbers of able-bodied males migrate to the towns or are employed in European areas for at least part of the year, to the neglect of their own agricultural holdings. Africans have always been encouraged to leave the Reserves to work for the Europeans. Taxation has been one of the main means of inducing Africans to accept paid employment – the only means available to them of obtaining the necessary cash.[19] At the same time the fantastically low wages in the towns are frequently justified on the ground that the African really has an alternative means of subsistence available to him and that he only works to obtain some small additional emolument, while his family tends his herds and looks after the land. The lack of an adequate scheme of social security for Africans to cover such contingencies as sickness, unemployment, or old age is excused on similar grounds.[20]

An investigation in Springs Municipality has shown that, as a consequence of low wages and the absence of any measures for social insurance, only 40 per cent of African families

could afford to pay an economic rent for a house, 13 per cent needed some assistance or subsidy, and 47 per cent could not afford to pay any rent at all if they were to cover other essential expenses. While migratory labourers are still employed in towns and on European farms, a large proportion of such workers has become permanently alienated from the Reserves. In any case there is hardly room for them in the already overcrowded agricultural areas.

Over two million Africans, men and women, are employed on European farms where they outnumber the Europeans by five to one. Under supervision the African does all the labour, skilled and unskilled. Contracts of employment vary a great deal, but almost always a large part of the wage is in kind, either in the form of food or the right to graze animals on the land. It has been calculated that total wages earned by a family of five, of whom four are working, including cash and kind, average less than £50 per annum, plus free living space, or about £10 per head.[21] Diet is poor and housing primitive and unhygienic. Yet the lot of the African on a European farm probably compares favourably with that in urban areas. At least sun and fresh air prevent there being as much disease as might otherwise be expected. Leo Marquard has given a vivid description of life for the African in the towns. 'About half the African population lives in controlled locations; some of the other half find accommodation with their domestic employers, or in mining and industrial compounds. The remainder squat, illegally, on or near municipal land in shanty towns, where they erect "pondokkies" of packing cases, sheets of galvanized iron, petrol tins, sacking, and any other material they can find. In the smaller towns the locations are "good" or "bad" according to the degree of interest shown by the local authority. Very few of the locations have any of the amenities of civilized living, such as water-borne sewage, electric light, or running water laid on to the houses. With few exceptions, the houses themselves are poorly constructed, lack proper ventilation or heating, and are overcrowded. A normal density would be three or four persons per 100 square feet; but in many areas it is higher than that.'[22]

Europeans

The European population of South Africa is not a homogeneous one. Apart from differences between urban and rural dwellers the main differences arise from language, which in its turn is a reflection of ethnic origin. In addition to the original Dutch immigrants and the English who followed them there were also a considerable number of French Huguenot refugees and Jewish settlers who have largely been assimilated. The differences between English- and Afrikaans-speaking South Africans remain and find vehement expression in politics. Some of the historical reasons for this have already been discussed. To-day approximately 57 per cent of South Africans have Afrikaans as their mother-tongue and 39 per cent English, while some 70 per cent are probably bilingual. Both languages are used in all official documents.

Europeans as a whole enjoy a standard of living far above that of the non-European population, as is witnessed by the fact that tuberculosis rates for Europeans are the lowest in the world, while those for Africans are the highest.[23] In rural areas the Europeans are farmers on a large scale and in urban localities they own businesses and pursue professional or skilled occupations. There is, however, a proportion of the European population which does not succeed in maintaining this high standard of living and who are described as 'poor whites'. Since the existence of a poor white community is itself a threat to the higher social status and deference in which Europeans are held by non-Europeans, the problem of 'poor whites' has been a source of concern in South Africa. A report into the whole question in 1932 estimated their number at something under 300,000.[24] It was felt necessary to protect them from the increasing competition provided by the acquisition of skill and education by the non-European. Many of the restrictive practices of European trade unions are a product of this fear of losing status. The position of the 'poor whites' in rural areas has been described by Dr Hilda Kuper. What she has to say about Swaziland may be regarded as typical of other parts of South Africa. 'The

poorest Europeans have the lowest social status in their own colour group, but they retain certain status privileges of the dominant colour group even when they are depressed below the cultural and economic level of the Natives. There are many Poor Whites in the country, especially in the south. They are sometimes *bywoners*, others own small farms. They include men abject in their poverty, lacking in initiative, and dependent for occasional assistance on the Natives among whom they live. Most of them have been in Swaziland many years, forgotten, uneducated, backward, slothful. An agricultural officer told me that it was more difficult to develop them than the Natives.'[25]

Poor whites represent only a very small proportion of the population. Of the European population engaged in agriculture 78 per cent are classed as farmers, of whom only 3 per cent have holdings of less than five morgen and 44 per cent had holdings of over 500 morgen.[26] In the towns Europeans are employed in a large number of occupations carrying high status from professional and administrative work to the various skilled trades that have been reserved for Europeans either by legislation or by trade-union practice. In mining, for example, the average wage for a European was in the region of £400 per annum in 1944, compared with £40 per annum for the African.[27] Discrepancies of this kind cannot merely be explained in terms of the higher qualifications of the Europeans, because although some Africans are employed on work requiring considerable skill and knowledge, they still cannot be recognized as skilled workers, or receive a commensurate rate of pay, as a result of the 'colour-bar' legislation of 1926, backed up by unofficial agreements between employers and European trade unions.[28] The question of discrimination in industry will be discussed again later.

Cape Coloured Peoples

There are approximately one million people in South Africa who belong to what is called the 'Coloured' group, whose racial ancestry is mixed. While the African is trying

to make an all too rapid transition from his own tribal culture to an industrialized society in which he is regarded as an alien, the Cape Coloured are culturally European. The problem facing the Coloured man or woman is that of achieving status recognition within the only culture he knows. Until recent years, although economically depressed, the Cape Coloured peoples have had status and privileges denied to the African. So long as they possessed the vote they exercised a certain amount of power and were wooed by European politicians, who wanted to see them lined up with the European against the African. In more recent years this policy has been reversed and the Cape Coloured are being relegated to a position of inferiority and attempts are being made to segregate Coloured from European and African.

There is a wide range of physical features among the Coloured population, and some are light enough to 'pass' as white. It is against this small minority that the recent legislation preventing mixed marriages and requiring non-Europeans to carry identity cards is largely directed.[29] Reference has been made already to the efforts made by Dr Malan to have Coloured voters removed from the common roll. It is clear that their power to influence events in the Union, small as it is, would be considerably reduced if their own representation was on a separate register, where they could only vote for special representatives of their own.

While many spheres of employment are closed to the Coloured man or woman they have opportunities not available to the African. They are employed in the building and printing industries as skilled and semi-skilled workers and are widely employed in factory work, especially in Cape Province where they also provide the bulk of the farm labourers. By tradition they are employed as postmen and many occupy posts in domestic service. There are Coloured doctors treating their own and African people but not Europeans; there are also Coloured teachers. Although the Cape Coloured are generally better off than the majority of Africans, there is a great deal of poverty among them. As Màrquard has put it: 'Inadequate housing, poor clothing and

malnutrition result in a high death rate. The expectation of life of a Coloured male is forty years, as against fifty-nine for a European male. [Now sixty-four.] Tuberculosis is rife. The widespread drunkenness among Coloured people is both a cause and a result of poverty. There exists in the Cape Province a system known as the "tot system", by which Coloured agricultural labourers are given a number of tots of wine during the working day as part of their wages. It has the weaknesses of the truck system of wages, and moreover, it engenders and encourages the taste for strong drink.'[30]

The Cape Coloured people are divided in their loyalties between the African and the European population. In the past they have tended to look down on the African in view of their own privileged status. This identification with the European was natural in view of their cultural background. But recent attempts to deprive the Coloured people of their acquired status is increasing the solidarity of the non-European community as a whole. Although there are some Coloured people of education who are prepared to assent to the creation of a separate voters' roll, the majority appear to be opposed to the transfer. This is not surprising since the provisions of the Act peg the number of representatives for the coloured population (one million) at four compared with 150 representing two and a half million Europeans. There is no provision for any future representation of the Coloured people in the three northern provinces in either national or provincial legislatures. The relative importance of the Coloured vote has already been decreased because, although European women were enfranchised in 1930, Coloured women are still without the vote.[31]

Asian Population

The majority of the Asians now resident in South Africa are the descendants of Indian indentured labourers brought to Natal in the 1860s to provide workers for the sugar industry. There are also a few Asians of Chinese descent and a number of Indians who came later as traders. The total

number of Asians is in the region of 366,000; the majority live in Natal and of these a high proportion (seven out of ten) live in the towns, principally Durban. When the original labourers came they were given the option of settling permanently after ten years. Many more than was expected took advantage of this opportunity, and ever since the Natal Government has been trying to rid itself of an embarrassing complication to its already complex racial problem. Many attempts have been made to persuade them to return, including the offer of free passages, but without success. In the meantime a few of the Indians had become relatively prosperous, exercising a talent for commerce. In 1893 a law was passed refusing the vote to subsequent settlers who came from countries where they would not have possessed the franchise, and in 1896 a tax was imposed on the 'free' Indians who chose to remain in Natal. Indians who had earlier acquired the vote were later deprived of parliamentary franchise and in 1924 of municipal franchise as well. The recruitment of Indian labour ceased in 1911 following agitation for political rights.[32]

Although the majority of Indians have retained religious and linguistic connexions with their forefathers – 81 per cent are Hindu and 14 per cent Mohammedan – they know no other homeland than South Africa. The Indian government has expressed concern for their welfare and has raised the question in the United Nations, but is in no position to take any active steps. Certainly the return of the Indians, even if it were practicable, would only aggravate India's own population problem. At the present day approximately 23 per cent of the Indian population of Natal is employed in agriculture, 15 per cent in commerce, and 9 per cent in domestic service. The largest proportion, 30 per cent, is employed in industry. There is no doubt that they achieve a standard of living far higher than they would have in India itself where they would have the additional burden of a rigid caste system. Most of the original migrants were 'untouchables'. Yet it is not surprising that the Indian himself compares his lot with that of the Europeans among whom he lives rather than

with that of the Indians in India that he has never known. By European standards a large proportion of the Indian community is still below the poverty line. One survey of Indian economic circumstances states 'that half the population has a very low level of subsistence and one-third is merely existing'.[33]

ROOTS OF RACIAL CONFLICT

Three main factors interacting together provide the foundation of racial conflict in South Africa. They are the complex ethnic composition of the population, the wide differences in cultural background between the various groups, and the fact that Europeans are so heavily outnumbered by non-Europeans. The result of cultural contact between the diverse elements making up the population has been to set in motion a chain of events, culminating in the rapid industrialization and urbanization of the African population. These rapid changes have, in their turn, caused further conflicts and created a great deal of maladjustment, which is not limited to the African population or even to non-Europeans. The attitudes and behaviour of the large majority of Europeans exhibit their singular failure to adjust to the reality of the situation in which they find themselves. They are, in fact, trying to escape from a conflict situation by a number of repressive measures and by segregating the ethnic groups, in an abortive attempt to retard the processes of change that have already been set in motion.

A remarkable example of this unrealistic approach to problems of racial conflict in the Union of South Africa is provided by the *Report of the Eiselen Commission on Native Education* published in 1951, upon which the Bantu Education Act introduced in 1953 was based.[34] The report and the Act contain the same fundamental misrepresentation of the nature of education which was frequently expressed in Britain in the nineteenth century. At that time it was widely held that any extension of educational services for the benefit of the 'lower classes' should be such as would fit them for

their 'place' in society, a 'place' naturally determined for them by their 'betters'. This point of view was expressed in typical fashion in an article contained in the newspaper *White Africa*, 28 April 1954, which states: 'Now we come to the class of education which the native requires to make the best of him. He needs vocational guidance. His destiny, if so called repressionists have our (*sic*) way, is to become a miner, an agriculturalist, a builder of roads, an industrialist perhaps, in his own reserves. He must learn more about building and blacksmith's work than Aristotle. A limited application of the three R's – Reading, Writing and Arithmetic – will do him more good than a ton of culture. ... Even knowledge of writing may turn out to be a curse, as it is often used to write out forged passes, which are very difficult to detect.'

The terms of reference provided for the South African Commission on Native Education required 'the formulation of the principles and aims of education for Natives as an independent race, in which their past and present, their inherent racial qualities, their distinctive characteristics and aptitude, and their needs under the ever changing social conditions are taken into consideration'. Such an approach ignores the funamental unity of education as such, and assumes that the cultural differences between African and Europeans which undoubtedly exist will be perpetuated indefinitely. This view has been challenged by sociologists and social anthropologists who have examined the question on behalf of the South African Institute of Race Relations. They state:

> The Commission on Native Education states that there are two schools of thought in South Africa: those who believe that Bantu culture is inferior and must gradually disappear, and those who believe that 'while the old traditional Bantu cultures cannot cope with modern conditions, nevertheless they contain within themselves the seeds from which can develop a modern Bantu culture.

The writers consider that from the point of view of material welfare there can be no question as to which culture is superior, but that in any case this is not the real question at issue.

The question we must ask is, 'What aspects of this culture are viable under present conditions?' For it is fruitless to hark back to one or two hundred years ago and try to assess what might have been, had history taken a different turn. The conditions under which Bantu culture has to prove its ability to survive (or 'develop the seeds in it') are the conditions of South Africa today: a population of twelve million people, a certain defined land space, natural resources of a given order, an existing division of land and natural resources between the different racial groups which, even if it can be modified, cannot be ignored. A further condition which Bantu, or any other, culture should meet is to ensure for its people the optimum conditions of material existence commensurate with the optimum development of its natural resources on the basis of present techniques and knowledge. It is clear from the reports of every Commission that has studied any aspect of Bantu economic organization that, if the national output is to be increased, the old traditional forms will have to be replaced in their entirety. The Reserves 'are undeveloped agriculturally and economically', says the Education Commission. The Reserves are 'over-populated and overstocked ... they do not produce sufficient for the population to live on ... their productive capacity is decreasing', says the Witwatersrand Mine Native Wages Commission. ... In fact, the Reserves at the present moment only accommodate 40 per cent of the South African Bantu population, and that 40 per cent shows a marked sex and age maldistribution.

The writers go on to examine the rapid changes that are taking place in the tribal way of life under the impact of urbanization and industrialization and point out that many of the traditional social institutions related to place of the family, forms of agriculture, and cattle rearing, and the role of the Chief are rapidly disappearing or have become anachronistic.

The Church, the school and the hospital have already been introduced and are to-day established factors in African life. What remains of Bantu culture? The languages remain. But apart from language, we find ourselves unable to find those institutions in traditional Bantu culture which contain in them the seeds from which 'a progressive, modern and self-respecting Bantu order of life' will develop. We do not know what this 'Bantu' order of life, as distinct from a modern order of life, means. ... The evidence from the urban areas and from observation of the trends of behaviour

of those Africans who have made the most significant progress, economically, educationally and spiritually, is that the Bantu are rapidly adopting Western cultural institutions. The Commission itself does not indicate how this evolution of Bantu institutions is to take place. Its evidence demonstrates the inappropriateness of traditional Bantu institutions, and the extent of present day disruption of these institutions. But although the Commission is insistent that Bantu culture must be preserved, and implies that education must make special provision for a Bantu child 'imbued with values, interests and behaviour patterns learned at the knee of a Bantu mother', it fails to state what these particular Bantu values and traditions are, that are attuned to the demands of modern life.[35]

These conclusions are further reinforced by an examination of the extent to which the African has been integrated into the industrial and commercial economy of the Union of South Africa. In 1946 Africans constituted 29 per cent of those employed in commerce and finance, 33 per cent of those in transport and communications, 47 per cent of those employed in manufacturing industries, and 89 per cent of those in mining and quarrying.[36] It is this one fact which makes a policy of separation, whether in education, housing, employment, or politics, completely impracticable, whatever arguments may be put forward for *apartheid* in theory. Before examining more closely the arguments for and against the policies at present being carried out in South Africa and the practical implications of them, it is necessary to consider one of the manifestations of this social conflict, namely colour prejudice.

Racial Attitudes

As has been observed, the function performed by prejudicial attitudes regarding the members of other ethnic groups is essentially a psychological one. Prejudice is a defence mechanism enabling the individual to handle inner conflicts engendered by a failure to make a completely successful adjustment to society. In a society where social conflict is less severe, and where there are no major cleavages of an ethnic

character, prejudice will not be as deeply felt, or as widespread, as in a society where social conflict is as great as it is n South Africa. It is not for the inhabitants of Britain or any other country to point accusing fingers at the European population of South Africa because of their traditional attitude towards non-Europeans. As will be shown later in this book, people in Britain are not entirely free from prejudice, and in certain circumstances it may increase. Nevertheless, it is important that a dispassionate analysis be made of racial attitudes existing in South Africa to-day, recognizing that they are a product of the radical conflict permeating that society. This in no way limits the moral responsibility of the inhabitants of South Africa, regardless of race, to modify their attitudes in so far as these are not rational responses and only serve to aggravate the situation.

Professor I. D. MacCrone has been responsible for the most thorough investigations of attitudes between the members of all races in the Union of South Africa over a period of years. He has used a variety of means of testing and measuring attitudes and has succeeded in showing how they are related, both to the historical background and to the present social and economic situation.[37] He is very much aware of the tremendous importance of racial attitudes and the right ordering of racial relations for the future of South Africa. 'Some forms of culture-lag', he says, 'may be as harmless as they are ineffective; but history records far too many instances of groups who, by their failure to make the necessary mental adaptation in time to new and changing circumstances, have only brought about their own ruin.'[38] Professor MacCrone began his investigations with an inquiry in 1934 into the attitudes expressed towards the African by young South African students of European origin, but distinguished as Afrikaans-speaking, English-speaking, or Jewish. The experimental study was repeated at two-yearly intervals and the results are available until 1944. The results show that there is a statistically significant difference in attitude between the three groups which has persisted throughout this period. The most favourable attitudes, when scores

are averaged, is expressed by the Jewish students, followed by the English-speaking, and finally the most unfavourable by the Afrikaaners. While there has been a definite trend in the direction of more favourable attitudes on the part of Jews and some slight sign of such a trend more recently on the part of English-speaking South Africans, there has been no change whatsoever on the part of Afrikaans-speaking students.

Further investigations reveal other significant aspects of the relationships of the various ethnic groups and the 'social distance' between them. 'What may be described as the individual's tolerance-intolerance threshold for a group may vary from one extreme of a complete absence of discrimination as illustrated by his readiness to admit any members of the group to close kinship by marriage, through various intermediate gradations of tolerance-intolerance or social distance (such as "willingness to admit to my home as personal friends") to the other extreme of maximum discrimination, which finds its expression in an unwillingness on the part of the individual to admit any members of the group in question "to live and work in my country".' Professor MacCrone presents a detailed statistical analysis of the results of these inquiries over a period of ten years and shows 'the high tolerance-intolerance threshold which each of the three "white" groups maintains between itself and each of the three "colour" groups. It is also interesting to note that in all cases the threshold for the two minority groups of Cape Coloured and Indians is higher than for the majority group of Natives – a fact which is, no doubt among other reasons, bound up with the realization on the part of members of the European groups that the social system in South Africa simply cannot function without the economic base provided by the labour of the Native.' Once again the greatest antipathy towards non-Europeans is shown by Afrikaans-speaking South Africans, followed by English-speaking and then Jews. Professor MacCrone also draws attention to the relations between the Europeans and the signs of increasing anti-semitism that are appearing.

Consideration has also been given to the question of how the African himself reacts to the pattern of European domination to which he is forced to respond. Professor MacCrone has investigated the attitudes of educated Bantu and found that they expressed a large amount of hostility towards Europeans and in particular against the Afrikaans-speaking group. So marked is this aggressive attitude as to warrant its description as a 'Boer-phobia'. Furthermore this attitude becomes so deeply ingrained in the personality that, like the prejudice of the European towards the non-European, it assumes an independent psychological function in the process by which the individual adjusts to his society. It enables the individual's own failings to be written off and blamed upon external circumstances. The mechanisms of projection, rationalization, etc., which characterize the mentality of those who are prejudiced against coloured people, are equally found among those who are prejudiced against 'whites'.[39]

It is not merely the attitudes of educated Africans that show antipathy towards Europeans. It is not surprising to find that social conflict in rural areas gives rise to similar reciprocal prejudice. Dr Hilda Kuper draws attention to the existence in Swaziland of the 'black man's myth of the white man' as well as the 'white man's myth of the black'.[40] Europeans generally think of the African as a child who cannot be expected to show much intelligence or ability, who is fundamentally happy because he cares for nothing other than food, drink, and sex, but who is liable to sudden outbreaks of brutality. Always there is emphasis upon the inferior character of the African and the constant need for supervision and direction by Europeans. Africans who do not conform to this stereotype are considered to be exceptions to this general rule, and if this nonconformity takes the form of any unwillingness to submit to the domination of the European, it is regarded as insubordination and usually punished. The African's myth concerning the European, on the other hand, also shows an inability to distinguish good from bad. All Europeans are thought to be clever but to be lacking in human kindness. The white man is the children's

'bogy-man'. A similar situation has been revealed in an inquiry conducted by the National Council for Social Research in the Keiskammahoek district of Eastern Cape Province. The authors state that although some Africans do recognize individual Europeans who are both kind and wise in their dealings with Africans, the people have evolved and tend to respond to, a stereotype of the European. 'The European is a bogy-man with whom parents threaten their recalcitrant children. Individual tales of ill-treatment and victimization of Africans by Europeans, usually brought back from the towns, are quite common; even though they are sometimes fanciful, they help to spread the distrust in which all Europeans are regarded.' It is pointed out that although there are many types of social conflict arising within the African group itself, the African people of the district form a homogeneous group when it comes to inter-racial tensions. 'The greatest conflict arises from the cleavage between Black and White, the existence of the colour-bar in employment and in other spheres in South Africa, and the authority which the European Administration exercises over the Africans.' The lack of courtesy in the everyday dealings of Europeans and Africans is keenly felt and although there is a feeling of unity in opposition to white domination, there are few who dare to resist openly. Such resistance as there is is of a passive character and largely takes the form of non-co-operation, which only aggravates the strained relationships.[41]

SEPARATION AND SEGREGATION: *APARTHEID* IN THEORY

The term 'colour-bar' is frequently used in discussing the relationships between Europeans and non-Europeans in South Africa and elsewhere. The concept is one to be avoided because it does not take into account the distinctions made earlier between prejudice, discrimination, and separation, each of which performs a different sociological function. A similar confusion surrounds the use of the word *apartheid.*

When used in theoretical discussions of racial problems the concept of *apartheid* places emphasis upon separation as a means of attaining social autonomy and minimizing social conflict. Yet the practical measures adopted to implement this policy have nearly all been discriminatory in character. It would however prevent any fair discussion of the implications of the policy unless *apartheid* is considered first of all in its idealized form.

Although the word *apartheid* gained currency only after the Nationalist government came to power in 1948 it would be wrong to imagine that the policy that it represents was any great departure from tradition in South Africa. On the contrary some measure of separation between the races has existed for a long time. As long ago as 1917 Field-Marshal (then General) Smuts said in London: 'Instead of mixing Black and White in the old haphazard style ... we are trying to lay down a policy of keeping them apart as much as possible in our institutions. In land ownership, settlement, and forms of government we are trying to keep them apart, and in that way laying down in outline a general policy which it may take a hundred years to work out, but which in the end may be the solution of the Native problem.'[42] The policy of social separation in South Africa, therefore, is not new. Its primary motivation is the preservation of the racial and cultural identity of the European peoples in South Africa. Its aim is the continuation as a separate ethnic group of the present European population. The point has been made forcibly by the High Commissioner in London for the Union of South Africa, H.E. Dr A. L. Geyer. Arguing against the case for partnership which he believed must lead eventually to 'black domination' he has said: 'Partnership could, in South Africa, only mean the eventual disappearance in South Africa of the white South African nation. And will you be greatly surprised if I tell you that the white nation is not prepared to commit national suicide, not even by slow poisoning?'[43]

The theoretical objective of *apartheid* was clearly laid down by Dr Malan during the debate on the Group Areas Bill. He

pointed out, firstly that the various racial groups within the Union always have been and still are in such widely differing and sometimes conflicting stages of cultural and political development that it is impossible to treat them all alike. Secondly, that it is in the interests of both Europeans and non-Europeans that Western civilization should be maintained in South Africa, and thirdly, that experience has taught that racial conflict and tensions are brought about when members of different races live in juxtaposition and that it is in the interests of racial peace that focal points of contact should be eliminated as far as possible.[44]

Even in its idealized form of total separation with a view to the eventual self-determination of the African peoples, *apartheid* is admittedly a policy dictated by the self-interests of the Europeans and motivated by the will to self-preservation. This is not the place to consider the ethical implications of such a policy. One defender of present South African practices has admitted that 'Separation may be a confession of failure to solve the problem of Colour by the application of the highest ethical principles. It may seem to be the evasion of a great moral issue. But some form of separation is the only pattern of life that will be accepted by the majority of the Whites in South Africa.'[45] Eventually, Europeans in South Africa will have to face the moral issues involved, which cannot be evaded for ever. In the meantime the present sociological analysis is concerned with an objective appraisal of the situation as it is, rather than as it ought to be.

The policy of separation as pursued in the Union of South Africa can be considered under six main headings: biological, territorial, social, educational, economic, and political. Apart from early miscegenation biological separation has been the principle and the practice, with very few exceptions, for some two hundred years. Nevertheless, the small number of sexual liaisons and marriages which took place across racial boundaries, together with the tendency for lighter-skinned Cape Coloured men and women to 'pass' as white, led to the legal prohibition of miscegenation, to reinforce the customary practices of avoidance. On the whole it is the

Cape Coloured population which is most affected by the provisions of these Acts. A number of abuses have arisen in the administration of the Immorality Amendment Act in particular. A number of aged couples who had lived together as man and wife for many years were sentenced and ordered to separate, and there is often great difficulty in determining ethnic affiliation.[46] This problem arises in connexion with the administration of any *apartheid* legislation, and an attempt has been made to deal with it in the Population Registration Act, 1950. A register is to be compiled, which will include Europeans and most non-Europeans, and when it is complete identity cards will be issued giving vital statistics, ethnic group, and electoral qualifications.[47]

Reference has already been made to the early attempts at territorial segregation by the creation of Reserves in the rural areas and locations in urban districts. The constant flow of Africans and others to the towns has made these provisions totally inadequate if a policy of separation is to be pursued. For this reason the Group Areas Act, 1950, was passed. This is a complicated piece of legislation which aims at the eventual creation of completely separate residential areas for all ethnic groups in the community. Three main groups are distinguished, White, Native, and Coloured, the latter group having been subdivided further by proclamation in 1951 into Indian, Chinese, and Malay, as well as the Cape Coloured. There has been some suggestion that Natives may also be sub-divided according to tribal affiliation. The Act is primarily concerned with the acquisition, the holding, and the occupation of immovable property (land and buildings). In a full 'group area' all three will be confined exclusively to the members of a specific ethnic group. Certain authorized persons, such as public and domestic servants, priests, and the like will be permitted to occupy premises only with special permission. Pending the creation of full group areas, which must necessarily take some time, temporary controls may be exercised over ownership and occupation in certain districts. These controls may be exerted for a period up to fifteen years and will aim at the progressive modification

of existing patterns of occupation and ownership according to which ethnic group the area has been restricted. By way of example we may consider the case of an African of moderate means who has bought a house in an area which becomes an Indian group area for ownership and occupation. Unless he can secure a special permit he would have to vacate the house within a given period (always less than a year). He could then sell to Indians, or rent the house to an Indian and continue to own until his death, when a transfer would have to take place. Anyone obliged to leave his home because he happens to be in the wrong area would have to do his best to find accommodation in his own group area. No one is obliged under the Act to find accommodation for him, nor is any compensation payable.[48]

The policy of segregation has long been practised in various aspects of social life in South Africa, largely by common custom but sometimes reinforced by the law. Perhaps one of the best descriptions of everyday life in South Africa has been given by Mr Alan Paton, well known as the author of *Cry, The Beloved Country*. He writes:

Let us suppose that you are a white visitor and that you have just landed from London at the airport (now Jan Smuts), outside Johannesburg. You will note at the airport that all officials are white men, but you will see black men acting as porters and labourers. You will see at the airport building, notices which indicate that certain rooms (for example, the main lounge) are for 'Europeans only'. There are other rooms for non-Europeans. ... After leaving the airport you will pass many modern houses, all of which are occupied by white people, but you will see off the road other houses, of a poorly built kind, which are occupied by black people. ... In the streets are many people, both white and black people, and you will note that many of the black people are dressed as domestic servants. ... There is hardly a white house in Johannesburg (or in South Africa) that does not have its servants' quarters, ranging from well-built cottages to mere sheds. ... The bus-stops in the streets, the buses themselves, the seats for the bus passengers, are some for Europeans and some for non-Europeans. If you go to the cinema you will find only white people. If you visit a school you will find only white children, unless you visit a school for native children in one of the 'locations', or a school for Indian children in

one of the mixed areas of Johannesburg or a school for 'coloured' children. You will find, even at the white school, that this school may be either for English-speaking children or for Afrikaans-speaking children of Dutch descent. ... You will find also that education is compulsory for white children but not for non-whites. ... If you visit a hospital you will find in the ward (or perhaps even in the entire hospital) only European or only non-European patients. If you have cause to visit a doctor you will visit a white one, and you will find only white people in the waiting-room. Occasionally you will see a black person (who may be ill) waiting outside in the corridor. You will no doubt find this painful, but you must know that white doctors who have mixed practices usually make *separate* provision for waiting patients, but that other white doctors either confine themselves to a black practice, or attend to their black patients in a separate part of the town or in one of the 'locations'. You will by now realize that there are very few black doctors, and you must know that a black doctor would never attend to a white patient, except under the most urgent circumstances, or secretly. ... If you attend a church in this suburb where you are staying you will find only white people present, though some churches arrange services at separate times for domestic servants. If you attend a synod of some English-speaking churches you will find black and white ministers and laymen together. ... At a synod of an Afrikaans-speaking church you will find only white people, but at a missionary synod you would find all races attending, with probably separate seating and separate facilities for refreshments.[49]

This is a vivid description of daily life in South Africa and draws attention to the way in which, largely by convention, the practice of social separation applies to the relationships between the different ethnic groups. Separate facilities for non-Europeans are provided on all forms of public transport, including the railways, at work and in public offices and post-offices, in hotels and restaurants, shops and theatres, at football matches and other sports (needless to say there are no mixed teams), in churches, hospitals, gaols, and in many other walks of life.[50]

The policy of separation also applies throughout the economic system. Traditionally certain occupations, nearly always the lowest paid ones, are reserved for non-Europeans either by law or by convention. Until recently no African could

become a skilled building-trades worker, but by the Native Building Workers Act, 1951, Africans may be trained for building-work within their own areas, but may not be employed in European urban areas. This Act followed a great deal of agitation because houses for non-Europeans were not being built sufficiently quickly or cheaply, so long as they could only be built by European tradesmen.[51] Where non-Europeans are employed in factories it is nearly always in separate premises, and when non-Europeans were admitted to trade unions they usually formed separate branches. The mining unions are confined entirely to Europeans and most of those in manufacturing industries run 'parallel organizations' for non-Europeans.[52] The possibility of setting aside certain types of work for certain races in industry so as to protect European workers from infiltration was foreshadowed by the South African Minister of Labour, speaking in the House of Assembly in September 1953.[53]

Reference has already been made to the attempts to apply the policy of *apartheid* to the education system as far as Africans are concerned. All schools are in any case segregated, but the problem of the Universities is a more difficult one. The University of Natal has recently established the Durban Medical School which trains African doctors. Although the school is separate from the medical school for European students the standards demanded are precisely the same. The principle of separate but equal provision for non-European students is applied in other faculties at the University of Natal as well. Separate classes are provided in the component college in Durban but not at Pietermaritzburg. At Durban most of the lectures are given to non-European students who sit, separately, for the same examinations and are eligible for the same degrees. At Rhodes University, Fort Hare College for non-Europeans, eighty miles away, has recently been incorporated as a component part of the University. It has its own staff but takes the same examinations as the European college. The Afrikaans-speaking Universities of Stellenbosch and Pretoria have no non-European students.[54]

The two Universities where rigid separation does not apply are Cape Town and Witwatersrand, although even here it still applies to athletics and sport as well as to social occasions. But students attend the same classes as Europeans, take examinations together, and are members of the Students Representative Council. At Cape Town non-European students are not accepted for the course in Engineering because practical work in an industrial establishment is an integral part of the course and the trade union will not permit it. Non-Europeans are also precluded from taking Art because this involves life classes with a nude European model. With these exceptions there is complete equality; the only disadvantages suffered by the non-Europeans follow from their small numbers, which makes it difficult for them to have much voice in student affairs. They also suffer as a result of the private prejudices and snobbishness of European students towards them and there appears to be a tendency for each ethnic group to keep very much to itself.[55]

In 1953 the Minister of Education in South Africa stated that the Cabinet proposed to review the position of non-Europeans at the universities, implying that the continued attendance of non-Europeans alongside Europeans at Cape Town and Witwatersrand did not meet with approval. While both student bodies and the University authorities are anxious to preserve the present equality, the fact that the Universities are dependent for their finance upon the government puts them in a very difficult position. Any attempt to provide separate but equal facilities for the 5 per cent non-European students would be very costly.

The policy of separation as applied to government and administration has involved, in addition to the removal of Coloured voters from the common roll, the setting up of special government departments to deal with Native Affairs and the bringing of many aspects of central and local government, including education, under its jurisdiction. In the debate on the Bantu Education Act in 1953 the Minister of Native Affairs defended the removal of responsibility for African education from the hands of the Union Department

of Education on the grounds that it was important that the 'different state services to aid the Native should be co-ordinated'.[56] Mission schools will be taken over or forced to accept reduced subsidies from the State. (See Postcript.)

In its idealized form of total separation, as advocated by the Dutch Reformed Church for example, the policy of *apartheid* looks forward to the time when completely self-sufficient and independent African communities will be established which will be self-governing.[57] The idea of a sovereign Bantustan has even been suggested by some people as the ultimate objective, although this is not regarded by the majority as practicable. Nevertheless the advocates of *apartheid* as an ideal towards which to work believe that each ethnic group should be given the opportunity of progressively assuming responsibility for local government and administration within the group areas.

DISCRIMINATION AND OPPRESSION: *APARTHEID* IN PRACTICE

Racial attitudes in South Africa display a marked degree of reciprocated prejudice; the policy of separation is widely, almost universally, believed to be the best means of maintaining harmony between ethnic groups. It remains to observe the extent to which the dominant European community maintains its position by discriminating against the subordinate non-Europeans. There is no doubt that the measures now being enforced in South Africa differ very much in their intention and effect from what the exponents of an idealized, theoretical *apartheid* proclaim. In particular the idea of total separation leading to the eventual creation of a Bantustan has no support among practical politicians. Dr Malan himself has rejected the notion outright. In view of the extent of industrial integration to which reference has already been made, and the increasing urbanization of the African population, even a modified form of *apartheid* carried out slowly would cause extraordinary dislocation of the Euro-

pean economy and way of life. No one really believes that it would be possible for African labour to be replaced by European at all levels in all industries. The majority of Europeans would simply not be prepared to do the more menial tasks that are now universally carried out by non-Europeans. Yet that is precisely what total separation, if carried to its logical extreme, would imply.[58]

An objective examination of the policies of separation and segregation as they have been applied in practice can only conclude that *apartheid* is not merely an instrument for the separation of the various ethnic groups, but for the continued domination of the African, Coloured, and Asian communities by the European. The question of land distribution has already been discussed. The inequalities in the distribution of land in rural areas are enormous by any standard. These injustices are perpetuated in the towns and will be aggravated further by the enforcement of the Group Areas Act. The case of Durban may be taken as an example. Under the municipal plan for implementing the provisions of the Act, one-fortieth of the total European population of the city, but one-half of each of the other groups, will be displaced. Property to the value of £9 million will be taken away from Indians and made available to Europeans, while only £900,000 worth of property will change hands in the opposite direction. The changes will involve little or no new accommodation for displaced Europeans, but housing for some 152,000 displaced non-Europeans would be needed, yet no alternative accommodation is offered. This is to happen in a city which already has one of the most serious housing problems imaginable without this added complication.[59]

A good deal of publicity has been given to the Western Areas removal scheme in Johannesburg and the Native Resettlement Act which implements it. The scheme involves the compulsory removal of nearly 60,000 Africans from their present homes to restricted *apartheid* zones in another part of the city. The ostensible reason for the removal is that the present areas are slums badly in need of clearance. It is true

that much of the property is in poor condition, but some of it is not. One of the main reasons for bringing about the removal would appear to be the fact that some Africans at present have freehold rights in the property in this area and Europeans object to this. The African property owners will be deprived of their freehold rights and in the new areas will be allowed a maximum of thirty years' leasehold. This is to be a general practice in implementing the Group Areas Act in urban areas. The Government justifies this on the grounds that African and other owners of property in the western areas of Johannesburg exploited the slum conditions for their own ends and that, in any case, only 2 per cent of the African families living there owned their own homes.[60]

As far as the provision of other amenities and facilities are concerned the courts in South Africa have from time to time adopted the view that if separate provision is to be made for non-Europeans then it must be equal in quality to that provided for Europeans. This principle has never been seriously regarded, and everywhere the provisions for Africans, Coloured, and Asians are inferior. The most outstanding example of discrimination of this kind is to be observed on the railways, where facilities for non-Europeans are notoriously poor in quality. Early in 1953 the South African Appeal Court ruled that when separate amenities were provided by railways or other State departments, they had to be substantially the same as those provided for Europeans. The case arose because it was alleged that an African had committed an offence because he used a waiting-room reserved for 'Europeans only'. The decision created an intolerable position from the point of view of the South African Government because it cut completely across established custom and would have involved enormous expenditure to improve facilities provided for Africans. Instead the Reservation of Separate Amenities Bill, 1953, was introduced which laid down that any person in charge of public premises or vehicles may reserve them or any part of them for the exclusive use of any particular class or race. Anyone found not complying with their regulations will be liable to a fine of £50 or three

months' imprisonment or both. The Bill goes on to say that it lies with the offender to prove that he has a right to the use of the amenity in question (if there is any doubt about his ethnic affiliation). Furthermore, it will be no defence to show that inferior provision or no provision at all is made for the needs of the racial group to which the alleged offender belongs. The Minister of Justice, Mr C. R. Swart, in introducing the Bill, was reported to have said that 'it was inconceivable that the legal position created by the judgement should be allowed to continue. Unless the law was changed the government would be powerless.'[61]

South Africans often defend the customary relationships between Europeans and non-Europeans on the grounds that class factors also enter in. There is no doubt some truth in this, but the deference which the black man is expected to show towards the white would appear to be rather more than is normally associated with class differences. The non-European is expected to approach a European's house from the back door, is not expected to dress 'above his or her station', will never be expected to shake hands with a white person, and frequently has to wait until there is no white person in a shop before being served. In a variety of ways his inferior position is impressed upon him.

Economic and Legal Factors

These class distinctions are aggravated by the restrictions that are placed upon the employment of non-Europeans in the better-paid types of work. In many industries this is a customary practice, but in mining it is enforced by law. The Mines and Works Amendment Act of 1926 prohibits Africans from obtaining certificates of proficiency to do skilled jobs as blasting and engine-driving. African workers are quite competent to do such work, but there is strong resistance to their employment at anything but labourer's work and labourer's rates of pay. Some employers would like to employ Africans at such work, but at less than they pay Europeans, but this is precisely what European workers are

afraid of.[62] An example occurred, during 1953 in Durban, when it was suggested that non-European drivers and conductors should be employed on non-European buses, previously manned by Europeans, but at lower rates of pay than at present paid to Europeans. The proposals were opposed by the Municipal Transport Workers' Union and the Minister of Labour replied that, in his view, the solution rested in the employment of only non-Europeans on non-European buses and vice versa.

Any opportunity of improving conditions of work and wage-rates for Africans through normal trade-union methods has been effectively denied by the Native Labour (Settlement of Disputes) Act, 1953. The Act provides that the term 'employee' in the Industrial Conciliation Act will be re-defined to exclude Africans, for whom separate machinery for industrial conciliation and arbitration is provided. Strikes by African employees are prohibited and, while trade unions for Africans are not prohibited, they are denied any official recognition. The Minister of Labour is reported as saying that if the new machinery was effective, 'Natives would have no interest in trade unions, and trade unions will probably die a natural death'. One of the consequences of the new act is that registered trade unions will be prevented from having African members, and direct collective bargaining between African employees and European employers will be prevented.

It is difficult to prove that discrimination occurs on the level of wage- and salary-rates unless a fair comparison can be made between Europeans and non-Europeans with similar training and responsibilities. One of the few spheres in which such a comparison can be made is that of teaching. In 1947 salaries of European male teachers ranged from a minimum of £275 per annum to a maximum of £620 according to qualifications and years of service. African teachers' salaries ranged from £120 to a maximum of £390 per annum, for those with qualifications comparable with those held by Europeans.[63] Similar discrepancies occur in the remuneration of local and central government employees,

ministers of the church, and others. The idea that it costs more to feed a European than a Coloured or Asiatic and less still to feed an African permeates throughout the social services in South Africa. Dr Sheila Patterson has commented that:

> assistance is apparently based on unskilled wage levels, which are artificially propped in the case of Europeans, and on a somewhat arbitrary assessment of the relative standards of the four ethnic groups. This assessment seems to be based less on actual living standards – for a poor white lives no better than a poor Coloured – than on an estimation of what they should be if white superiority is to be maintained. In this way, social security, as administered by the State, becomes yet another instrument for perpetuating and reinforcing the existing colour-hierarchy.

She goes on to describe other social welfare services administered by the State, local authorities, or voluntary organizations and concludes, 'In all these services ethnic differentiation is maintained.'[64]

Unskilled wages (that is those largely paid to non-Europeans) are approximately 16·7 per cent of the skilled wage. In Britain unskilled wages are approximately 66 per cent o skilled. The difference between the two figures gives a rough estimate of the degree and extent of discrimination against Africans, Coloureds, and Asians. Restrictions upon opportunities for education and training clearly perpetuate this situation, which is further aggravated by the system of taxation. An African, who earns a sufficiently large income, is liable for income-tax in the same way as a European, but very few earn enough to come into this class. There are however a number of direct taxes which fall on Africans who do not earn enough to pay income-tax and which are not payable by 'poor whites'. Direct taxes paid by Africans alone include a general or poll tax, a local or hut tax, quitrents, a provincial hospital tax, and pass fee. The latter nominally falls on the employer but in practice the burden falls between the two. Total receipts from these taxes are in the region of two and a half million pounds. Excluding expenditure on education, which until recently came under a different department, the amount spent by the Department of Native

Affairs was a little over two million. There are in addition the unequal burdens imposed by indirect taxation which seriously affect the non-European. Blankets, clothes, sugar, and tea are all taxed fairly heavily, and impose an onerous burden on the poor. It is clear that the tax system in the Union of South Africa is both regressive and discriminatory. The Social and Economic Planning Council's Report of 1945 concludes: 'The present system of Native taxation leads to grave inequalities as between the Native and other sections of the population. ... Members of the other racial groups who earned an income equal to the average Native income would be exempt altogether from direct taxation.'[65]

The situation, as far as African education is concerned, has been well described by Mr Leo Marquard:

> There was a time when educating Natives was strongly disapproved of – it gave the Africans 'ideas beyond their station' and unfitted them to do manual labour. Money derived from European taxation should certainly not be spent on such an object; if the African wanted education he should pay for it himself. Very gradually, however, public opinion changed. In the beginning small annual grants were made to mission societies for schools. As the demand grew, the grants expanded; but the principle that Africans should pay for their own educational facilities was adhered to, and the Native poll tax was used to finance African education. Then, as late as 1945, the principle that African education should depend upon what the African could pay was abandoned and the State accepted financial responsibility for aiding African education. What remains is for the State to accept full financial responsibility as it does for European education, but public opinion is not yet ripe for such a step.[66]

The political correspondent of the *Rand Daily Mail* (March 1954) reported that a new law is expected for carrying out the Minister of Finance's Budget threat to 'peg the cost of Native education unless the Natives pay more in poll tax. The law would arrange for four-fifths of the Native poll tax, plus £6,500,000 from general revenue, to go into a special fund.' This would mean that as soon as the estimated expenditure on Native education exceeded the limit, the new Bill would enable the Native Affairs Department to recom-

mend that a bigger poll tax be imposed on Natives. As the expenditure on Native education is due to increase by nearly half a million pounds over last year, the poll tax will have to be doubled within five years if the rate of increase continues.

In 1951–2 £44 per pupil was spent on the education of European children, £19 per pupil on Coloured children, and £7 10*s*. per pupil on African children. Free school meals for all children were introduced in 1946, but the amount spent per head exhibits considerable discrimination between different ethnic groups. European children, who were probably least in need of this supplement to their normal diet, benefited most. In the budget for 1953–4, £30,000 less than in the previous year was allocated to African school feeding and no new schools are to be admitted to the scheme.[67]

Some aspects of *apartheid* as applied to the fields of law and politics were discussed in the previous chapter in connexion with the constitutional dispute over the removal of Coloured voters from the common roll. The House of Assembly consists of 150 members, who must all be Europeans. All European South African citizens, male and female, over the age of twenty-one years may vote; Africans have the vote nowhere but in Cape Province, where there is a high literacy and property or income qualification, and a separate voters' roll. Coloured voters qualify for the Common Roll in the Cape, but as we have seen this right is now disputed. No non-European woman may vote at all. The Senate consists of forty-eight members who must be European property owners. Of these, four are elected by Africans of the Union, by a system of indirect election through Chiefs and Native Councils. The Separate Representation of Voters Act, 1951, provides for the appointment of one Senator additional to the forty-eight to represent all Coloured voters.

Discrimination in the form and administration of the law is one of the characteristic ways in which a super-ordinate group maintains its power and influence over the sub-ordinate group, and South Africa is no exception. A high rate of crime and delinquency is to be expected in a situation where there is rapid social change and maladjustment. In

the urban areas of South Africa, this tendency is aggravated by the oppressive character of the laws designed to meet it. Among the most notorious of the discriminatory laws are the Pass Laws which govern the employment, residence, and movement of Africans in urban areas, by night and day. The system has become so complicated and unwieldy that, in 1953, it was modified so that all the necessary documents could be incorporated into one reference book. The fact remains that the urban African still has to carry documents to entitle him to residence in a given location, a lodger's permit, a night pass after 11 P.M., a permit to seek work or to be in a particular area for that purpose, a service contract, a receipt for a casual labour licence, or similar registration certificate according to occupation, temporary visitor's permit, a registered voter's certificate if he is one, a permit to attend school. Alternatively certain Africans may be issued with a pass to exempt them from holding passes!

A very large number of the offences for which Africans are fined or serve terms of imprisonment concern some technical breach of the pass laws – a simple source of error, especially for the illiterate. Failure to pay taxes is also a frequent offence. Another cause of abnormally high 'crime' rates is the fact that for an African to break a contract of employment is a criminal offence. As far as can be ascertained from the criminal statistics 70 per cent of all offences by non-Europeans are 'statutory' in character. The statutes include sanitation, health, and traffic regulations, control of pests and animal diseases, etc., health and safety in industrial plants, the revenue acts, and finally, the largest class, the discriminatory laws which prohibit Africans from drinking intoxicating liquor, compel them to carry passes, to live in certain areas, and which enforce labour contracts by criminal penalties.[68] Furthermore, when Europeans are found guilty of a minor offence they are nearly always in a position to pay the fine involved.

In proportion to the number of convictions nine or ten African and Coloured offenders undergo imprisonment for every European imprisoned. Not only can a far larger proportion of Europeans afford

to pay a fine, but the courts are more reluctant to order imprisonment for Europeans. For serious crimes ... relatively more than twice as many non-Europeans as Europeans are sentenced to imprisonment without the option of a fine and non-punitive treatment is applied more than three times as frequently to Europeans as non-Europeans. Judged by present-day canons of penal reform, which emphasize the desirability of making imprisonment the last resort, the South African penal system is still at a primitive stage of development. Its shortcomings are demonstrated in particular by the large number of young delinquents and short sentence offenders who are sent to prison.[69]

Forced Labour

Another aspect of the penal system in the Union of South Africa which has caused considerable comment in other parts of the world is the employment of non-European prisoners as farm labourers and the building of rural gaols for this purpose. They are also hired out to the Railways and Harbours Administration, to local and provincial authorities for road making, and for surface work in the gold mines. European convicts may not be thus engaged. The system has wrongly been described as one of 'private gaols' and this has been strenuously denied by the government. Nevertheless, the Leslie Farmers' Association Labour Supply Company built a gaol which was opened by the Minister of Justice in 1949. It was the fifth of its kind in the district and the Minister announced his intention of continuing his policy of providing convict labour for farmers. The company had fifty shareholders who had bought their shares at £40 each. Farmers paid 6*d.* (now 9*d.*) per day to the Prisons Department and provided food. In 1953 there were fourteen prison out-stations on farms.

The whole question of forced labour in the Union of South Africa and in South-West Africa was examined by a joint committee of the United Nations and the International Labour Office in 1953.[70] Allegations regarding the existence of forced labour in the Union were made during debates on forced labour in the Economic and Social Council. These

allegations as enumerated in the committee's report refer in substance to the following points:

(*a*) the political rights of non-whites;
(*b*) the question of pass laws;
(*c*) the residential segregation of the Indian population;
(*d*) the compulsory nature of labour contracts for non-whites;
(*e*) prohibitive taxation as a means of securing a contract labour force;
(*f*) the use of penal laws to obtain a supply of Africans for work in industry and agriculture;
(*g*) the recruitment of labour in the Territory of Bechuanaland for the mines in the Union of South Africa;
(*h*) the recruitment of labour in the Territory of Mozambique for the mines in the Union of South Africa.

The committee came to the conclusion that certain of the allegations were outside of its terms of reference, viz. those concerning the political rights of non-whites, and the residential segregation of Indians; while those concerning taxation, and labour recruitment in Bechuanaland and Mozambique, were not sufficiently well substantiated to warrant investigation. The remaining allegations were considered in detail.

The Committee on Forced Labour concluded that the operation of the pass system in the Union and in South-West Africa constituted 'a serious handicap to the freedom of movement of the Native population', that 'such control may serve the purpose of directing a supply of ample and consequently cheap labour towards regions where it is required for economic reasons', and that the State, through the operation of this legislation, 'is in a position to exert pressure upon the Native population which might create conditions of indirect compulsion similar in its effects to a system of forced labour for economic purposes'. With regard to the Native Labour Regulation Act of 1911, by which a breach of a labour contract, or refusal to obey a lawful order, is a criminal offence, the committee considered that this, too,

was conducive to a system of forced labour. 'The fact that it is impossible for the worker to terminate his contract unilaterally before the expiration of its term, without running the risk of heavy penalties, constitutes a serious restriction of personal liberty.' The committee point out that the total number of Africans working under such contracts of labour is very large and that the Union of South Africa has not ratified the International Labour Convention No. 65 concerning penal sanctions for breaches of contracts of employment. The committee also found that the practice of hiring convict labour to private companies and individuals was on a scale sufficient to be regarded as a system of forced labour.

The Committee on Forced Labour summed up its conclusions regarding South Africa and South-West Africa by saying that the committee was convinced of the existence

> of a legislative system applied only to the indigenous population and designed to maintain an insuperable barrier between these people and the inhabitants of European origin. The indirect effect of this legislation is to channel the bulk of the indigenous population into agricultural and manual work and thus to create a permanent, abundant and cheap labour force. Industry and agriculture in the Union depend to a large extent on the existence of this indigenous labour force whose members are obliged to live under the strict supervision and control of the State authorities. The ultimate consequence of the system is to compel the Native population to contribute, by their labour, to the implementation of the economic policies of the country, but the compulsory and involuntary nature of this contribution results from the particular status and situation created by special legislation applicable to the indigenous inhabitants alone, rather than from direct coercive measures designed to compel them to work, although such measures, which are the inevitable consequences of this status, were also found to exist.[71]

There is indisputable evidence that racial discrimination occurs in the administration of justice in connexion with serious offences such as assault, rape, manslaughter, murder, and the like. There appear to be persistent and considerable differences between the treatment of Europeans and non-Europeans for similar offences. Crimes of violence by Euro-

peans against non-Europeans appear to receive the mildest penalties and vice versa. 'It would not be wide of the mark to assert that the treatment of the European offender is mainly reformative, while in punishing the non-European, the emphasis is placed upon the deterrent and retributive aspects of the penal system.'[72] It is only fair to add that the record of the Supreme Court and of the Court of Appeal has exhibited a marked degree of impartiality. This is exhibited by the consistent rejection of unconstitutional legislation and the strict interpretation of the letter of the Suppression of Communism Act, thereby freeing many 'named communists' from the restrictions placed on them.[73]

RESISTANCE AND COUNTER-RESISTANCE

The severe conflicts raging in South Africa to-day are deeply embedded in the personalities of South Africans, black and white. The conflict is equally apparent in the structure of South African society, whose social institutions are not well adapted to the changing situation, and in the prevailing ideologies that are neither compatible with one another nor with the changing situation. The policy of *apartheid*, as has been shown, is not consistent as between theory and practice. Total separation is in any case a completely impracticable policy in so far as industrial integration and urbanization have already gone too far. Partial separation combined with discrimination will never achieve its alleged object, which is the maintenance of racial harmony and cultural autonomy, because the subordinate ethnic groups will not tolerate their inferior role indefinitely. These radical conflicts are signs of the disintegration characteristic of a society undergoing rapid social change as a result of cultural contact. They are as apparent within the social system of the European community as they are in that of the non-European. The widespread anxiety and insecurity experienced by all ethnic groups in South Africa, as well as the frustration imposed by the dominant group on the subordinate, must

inevitably create a great deal of hostility and aggression. The Europeans have a direct and socially approved target for their aggression. They can express verbal hostility towards the non-European, and even translate these verbal expressions into positive actions of deprivation, discrimination, and domination, with the full approval of the majority of other Europeans and with the tacit connivance of custom and often of law. In contrast any direct expression of hostility and aggression towards the European by the non-European is likely to be met with real and immediate punishment. Provocation must therefore be considerable before the non-European will risk direct expression of his resentment of European domination. Although direct opposition and aggression of this kind does occur, hostility is far more frequently expressed indirectly. It is displaced on to a 'scapegoat', or even turned inwards against the individual non-European himself. The African, Coloured, or Asiatic person who accepts the European estimate of himself and his own ethnic group, obtains a certain perverted satisfaction from self-abasement and a willing compliance with the demands of the dominant status group. Similarly much of the traditional hostility of the African for the Asian, and of the Coloured person for the African, is a consequence of aggression displaced from the European on to a less dangerous target.

The Durban riots of 1949 are an example of this process.

> Starting from a trivial incident, in which a young African was knocked over by an Indian trader, a race riot developed in a matter of hours, and Africans killed as many Asians as they could find and pillaged and plundered the Indian quarter. All the evidence is to the effect that the riot was totally unpremeditated. There is, at the same time, considerable and reliable evidence suggesting that Zulus in Natal had long resented the Asians for various reasons: Asian shops exploited the Africans; Asians could get licences to own and drive buses conveying Africans, while Africans themselves could not do so; Asian men were accused of 'interfering' with African women. There is also evidence that the Zulus sensed the attitude of their European masters towards the Asians and thought

that, if they attacked them, the Europeans would not really mind. Finally it has been suggested that the riot was one of general discontent and that, in this case, the Asians stood between the Europeans and the Africans.[74]

Indirect expressions of hostility towards Europeans by non-Europeans are frequent and not always disguised. The alleged laziness of non-European, particularly African, workers is often a consequence of a conscious or unconscious resentment of the European employer. It may find expression in even more obvious forms such as stealing from the employer, damage to machinery and materials, and so on. In the same way the habit of leaving work at short notice, of failing to arrive on time, and a variety of ways of cheating the European, all represent indirect forms of aggression. From time to time, particularly under the influence of alcohol or drugs, the aggression may be expressed directly against individual Europeans who may be assaulted or robbed. There is no doubt that many non-Europeans carry weapons, often intended for self defence in the lawless slums and locations, but which from time to time may be used against Europeans, who in their turn fear assault upon themselves or their women-folk and often carry a gun, which they will use in an emergency. There are times when tension is very high and the slightest incident can set off a chain of reprisals and counter-reprisals.

The riots that took place in South Africa during 1952–3 were typical. They were touched off by comparatively minor incidents but grew to serious proportions. Disturbances occurred in Port Elizabeth, Johannesburg, Kimberley, East London, and Cape Town, in which mobs stoned Europeans, killing some, and set fire to buildings. Police had to open fire to gain control and killed a number of Africans. There is evidence that the large majority of Africans deprecated the senseless destruction and one analysis of ninety-one persons charged before the courts in East London showed that more than 50 per cent of those involved were juveniles, more than two-thirds of them from broken homes where there was no father. In a report on his visits to the riot areas the Director

of the Institute of Race Relations in South Africa commented that the relationship between Europeans was characterized by attitudes of mutual, watchful, worrying apprehension which contributed to a general state of tension of which small lawless elements took advantage.[75]

Non-European Politics

In most countries the hostility of subordinate groups to the *status quo* eventually finds its expression in more or less socially approved channels through organized political activity. This legitimate outlet is denied to the majority of non-Europeans who have little or no place in the political system. There is always a danger, in these circumstances, that political organizations will be treated as subversive and suppressed by the representatives of the State. This has happened in South Africa, but there still remain some channels of organized resistance open to the non-European. The need for organization is obvious. The subordinate role of the non-Europeans will never be altered so long as their protests are like the random fluttering of a trapped bird against the window pane. The situation has been ably expressed in an editorial published in *Torch*, an organ of the Cape Coloured Press, in February 1950:

> The time has come for all to see that no non-European in this country has a dog's chance against the guns of the military and the police. The senseless and useless tactics of flinging oneself against a curtain of bullets and swords which the ruling class can put up cannot but lead to defeat, to greater frustration and needless loss of life, and victory for the oppressors. ... In our struggle for freedom we will time and time again be confronted with the problem of avoiding certain types of conflict which the very society we oppose tries to force on us, so that we may destroy our own forces in useless and directionless struggle. ... The fact that the widespread, deep and unfailing hatred for the oppression forced upon him has to issue in a blind, absolutely directionless and unplanned, wasteful and desperate upsurge of burning, looting, killing, anti-White action, is due to the gross failure of African politicians to provide correct political leadership. ... The hatred of oppression ... will

have to be canalized into political channels by honest political leadership.[76]

Non-Europeans, and especially Africans, are increasingly recognizing the need for direct political action to achieve their aim, the improvement in their status relative to that of the Europeans. But in spite of the realization that political unity is essential, non-Europeans as a whole have not succeeded in creating a single organization to act on their behalf. One of the earliest attempts at a unified organization was made in 1927 but it fell through. After the outbreak of the second world war the Non-European Unity Movement was formed, with predominantly Coloured support and leadership, and has had some influence. Other attempts have been made at unity, but with little success. African, Coloured, and Asiatic political organizations have tended to go their own way. In 1946 the Passive Resistance Council, which organized Indian resistance to the Act of that year which prevented Indians from occupying certain areas, was formed. The Council also made a donation of £100 to the African mine-workers who struck for higher wages in that year, but attempts to win African support for the Indian passive resistance movement were not very successful.[77]

The passive resistance movement in South Africa has an interesting history, going back to the activities of Gandhi in 1906. It contrasts with the activities of the more active and belligerent resistance in Kenya, which has assumed the proportions of civil war. The recent revival of passive resistance has been described by the Rev. Michael Scott:

> In 1946 at the conclusion of the war, the Asiatic Land Tenure and Indian Representation Bill was passed through the South African Parliament, in breach of long standing promises to the Indians in the Cape Town Agreement. The Indian community in South Africa decided that the time had come to protest against a measure which they regarded as economically crippling to them as well as socially degrading to their status. They embarked upon a passive resistance movement against the passage of this law, and this and the other disabilities have been the subject of many debates in the United Nations. The form that their protest took was that of a direct breach of the law by standing on ground prohibited for Indian occupation.

There they would put up a tent, and a number of them would sleep. It was not long before bands of white hooligans sought to break this movement by violence.[78]

Scott goes on to describe how he went to Durban and together with Indians stood to attention and was struck down and kicked by young white men in football boots singing English patriotic songs. Scott and the Indian resisters received three months' imprisonment for their action.

A further step in the growth of the Non-European resistance movement occurred when Dr James Moroka, a graduate of the University of Edinburgh, was elected president of the African National Congress in December 1949. A man of moderation, he disapproved of violence and revolution. He had the active co-operation of leaders of the Indian community in South Africa in instituting a campaign of passive resistance against 'unjust laws', among which the pass laws and laws enforcing *apartheid* were the most important. The following year Mr Albert Luthili took over the presidentship of the African National Congress. He was subsequently deposed as a Natal Chief for his part in the passive resistance movement.[79] Towards the end of 1951 the campaign reached its climax when a letter was sent to Dr Malan requesting the direct representation of Africans in councils of state and the repeal of unjust and racially discriminatory laws. The letter emphasized that 'the struggle which our people are about to begin is not directed against any race or national group, but against unjust laws.' Dr Malan replied to the effect that he had no intention of repealing existing laws nor could he grant political equality to the Bantu. Mass meetings were held in April 1952 to call for volunteers, and between then and the end of the year a systematic defiance of certain laws was carried out in an orderly fashion. Contraventions of pass laws, of segregation in post offices, railways, and similar places, curfew regulations and the like took place on a large scale. By the end of 1952, arrests totalled some 8000 distributed through a number of different towns in the Union. Sentences were at first fairly light, but the resisters refused to pay fines and went to prison instead. Some cases were acquitted on

the grounds that facilities were not equal for Europeans and non-Europeans and that an offence had not therefore been committed.[80]

While the majority of non-Europeans were undoubtedly sympathetic to the passive resistance movement, whether or not they actually took part in it, there were some who took the government's side. In particular the Bantu National Congress, an organization founded by African herbalists who do not wish to see their trade disappear with the increasing use of Western medical aid, actively supports the policy of *apartheid* and strongly opposes the resistance movement.[81] The passive resistance movement is also opposed, for completely different reasons, by the Non-European Unity Movement, which considers that only a complete revolution will ever achieve any improvement of the status of non-Europeans and that the gains, if any, of the resistance movement are trivial.

European Politics

It has been said that all politics in the Union of South Africa are Native Affairs. It is certainly true that almost all political questions in the Union come down in the last resort to racial relations, or at any rate relations between the various ethnic groups.[82] The South African, like most governments, has always had reserve powers to handle emergency situations and any threat to the internal security of the state. But the non-European resistance movement which has begun to make itself felt more strongly since Dr Malan and the Nationalist Party came into power has caused a great deal of uneasiness on the part of the government, and stern measures have been taken to deal with those who are thought to be disturbing existing racial relations. A number of measures have been passed in the South African Parliament which give very wide powers to the Minister of Justice, which would give some substance to the charge of totalitarianism if fully applied. The Suppression of Communism Act of 1950, as amended in 1951, gave a 'statutory' definition of

'Communism' which is wide enough to include any person who expresses opinions which in Britain would be regarded as 'liberal'. Among those 'named' were Dr James Moroka, a well-known opponent of the Communist Party; Mr E. S. (Solly) Sachs, who has on several occasions prior to the Act obtained substantial damages in the South African courts for libel when he has been described as a communist; Mr S. Kahn and Mr F. Carneson, who were Europeans representing Natives in the House of Assembly and the Cape Provincial Council respectively; a number of leaders of the passive resistance movement were also named as 'communists'. In all these cases the Minister ordered that they must resign any public office that they held, including trade union posts, and they must not address public meetings. In some cases limitations were placed on their movement within the Union. However, by a decision of the Appeal Court in November 1953 the restrictions were lifted.

Other repressive actions taken by the government have included the banning of certain publications and the refusal of passports to various 'suspected' persons. The 1951 Amendment to the Suppression of Communism Act makes its measures retrospective, so that actions which at the time were lawful can subsequently be made the grounds for a criminal charge. In November 1952 special regulations were issued to control public meetings and prohibit 'the incitement of Natives'. The regulations were issued pending the introduction of an Act to widen the powers of the government to regulate disturbances. It lays down penalties of up to three years' imprisonment and £300 fine. The provisions were confirmed by the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1953, and the Public Safety Act, 1953. The penalties were increased to five years' imprisonment, fines up to £500, and fifteen strokes of the whip, for any offence committed as a protest against any law, or its administration. This legislation was aimed directly at the passive resistance campaign, hoping by its savage penalties to deter any further action.[83]

Although the opposition, the United Party of South Africa, expressed concern at some of the more reactionary

of the Nationalist government's enactments, it was not until early in 1954 that any large divergence of opinion between the two major parties on questions of racial relations emerged. Until recently the United Party appeared to be wedded to the idea of separation between the races, at any rate for many years to come. Regarding the racial policy of the United Party, Mr Leo Marquard wrote in 1952:

> The United Party has consistently opposed that part of *apartheid* that applies chiefly to the Coloured population. ... On the major issue of African-European relations there would probably be a considerable area of agreement between the Nationalists and the United Party. They would agree, for example, to social *apartheid* in urban areas; on the need to maintain and improve Reserves; and to the general separation of European and non-European in schools, in churches, and in other forms of social organization. Probably the large majority of the United Party would agree to the maintenance of industrial colour bars, though a minority foresee the time when these colour bars will have been modified, if not finally extinguished.[84]

The fact that the United Party did not represent any radical departure from the traditional policies pursued in South Africa probably accounts for the fact that in May 1953 two new political parties came into being. The Federal Party favours the decentralization of power to the several provinces, so that in social affairs each might follow its own tradition, and expresses the view that non-Europeans should have 'the right of expression in the organs of government commensurate with the degree of civilization.' The Federals emerged out of the 'Torch Commando' organization which has not itself supported candidates for the House of Assembly. Led by Group Captain Malan, a Battle of Britain pilot, it has attempted to bring together South African ex-servicemen in opposition to the activities of the Malan government, which it regards as Fascist in character. It has not brought non-Europeans into membership on the grounds that in so far as they do not yet possess the vote they cannot have any influence upon the government. The attitude of Coloured and African who fought in the second world war has been one of disappointment at this restriction.[85]

The newly formed Liberal Party can be regarded as the only really radical party in South Africa, particularly as the term 'liberal' is used in South Africa as a term of contempt. The Liberal Party desires that 'no person be debarred from participating in government or other democratic processes in the country by reason only of race, colour, or creed: and that the political rights based on the common franchise be extended to all suitably qualified persons.' Some of the office-bearers in the party include Mrs V. M. M. Ballinger, M.P., Mr Leo Marquard, Mr Alan Paton, and other well-known people who are among the few who have taken a firm stand on racial questions, rejecting all forms of discrimination and *apartheid*. It is doubtful whether this courageous group will succeed in raising much support in an election, at any rate in the near future.

The creation of two new parties in opposition to the Nationalist government caused some dissension within the United Party, which was in danger of being split by the controversy between the hitherto dominant conservative wing which supported separation and a liberal wing which supported a policy of integrating Africans into the political and economic life of the country. The whole issue came to a head early in 1954 when a speech by Dr I. S. Fourie, which pointed out the economic impracticability of *apartheid*, was challenged by a government speaker who demanded to know whether the United Party was prepared to face the political implications of a policy of economic integration. The reply stated that the implications were understood. Furthermore, the leader of the opposition, Mr Strauss, supported Dr Fourie and went on to say that the United Party stood for integration and that a number of committees were being set up to define the policy more clearly.

It remains to be seen whether the United Party will carry with it any measure of support from the rank and file of voters, especially in the rural areas. There can be little doubt that the support for such a policy comes from the big industrial interests associated with the party, who realize in what jeopardy they would be placed if *apartheid* were to be applied

in its extreme form. Meanwhile this new turn in the politics of South Africa may well be of historic significance and of supreme importance for the future of that country.

Churches and other Bodies

The position of the Churches in South Africa is a difficult one. The Afrikaans Church, the Dutch Reformed, is quite unambiguous in its support of a theoretical *apartheid* and total separation, which its leaders sincerely believe is for the best in the long run. The only exceptions are the courageous criticisms of *apartheid* put forward by Dr Ben Maris in his book, *Colour: the Unsolved Problem of the West*, and public statements made by Professor Keet of Stellenbosch. But they are exceptions to the rule. The Congregational Union of South Africa, in contrast, declared at its General Assembly that it was their 'considered opinion that the African people must be regarded as an integral part of our social structure. ... Any modification of the present educational system should prepare them for closer integration in the social system rather than separate development.'[86] Yet it is the usual practice in almost all Churches of all denominations in South Africa for Europeans and non-Europeans to worship separately.

Other Churches have from time to time come forward with statements condemning the more blatant injustices of the present regime, but few have condemned it outright. Even the Society of Friends in South Africa has not been very vocal in its opposition, although individuals have been associated with the valuable work done by the South African Institute of Race Relations. Individuals in the Anglican community in South Africa have also been vocal, notably Dr Ambrose Reeves, Bishop of Johannesburg, and the Rev. Trevor Huddleston, C.R., of the Community of the Resurrection in Johannesburg. Mr Patrick Duncan, Registrar of the Anglican Diocese of Basutoland, son of the first South African Governor-General of South Africa, has actively associated himself with the passive resistance campaign and has served two weeks in prison as a protest against recent legislation.[87]

Democratic Values

To allow democratic values to govern the relationships of Europeans and non-Europeans would, in the view of many South Africans, spell the ultimate disappearance of white people and white civilizations in South Africa. We have already pointed out the fallacies in this argument, but it is none the less held by the large majority of South Africans. The Nationalists' point of view has been clearly stated by the Director of State Information when he said:

> We Nationalists believe that we must maintain White supremacy for all time. A policy of partnership must lead to Black domination. ... We want the Bantu people back in the reserves where they come into their own and where they will be given self government – under White trusteeship. We cannot have independent Bantu States to threaten White South Africa. We must keep some Natives in the White Areas for a very long time to do the work.[88]

White South Africans are under considerable social pressure to abandon democracy and democratic values because they do not appear to be compatible, if universally applied, with the maintenance of white supremacy. In the situation as it is to-day white supremacy ranks highest on the European South African's scale of values. To liberate the non-Europeans from white domination would be to undermine the whole of the existing social structure and would require many sacrifices on the part of Europeans which they are not prepared to make. *Apartheid* attempts to resolve the dilemma, in theory, by offering the African a measure of freedom and opportunities for self-expression so long as he stays in certain localities. The idea of *trusteeship*, which is sometimes put forward as an alternative to *apartheid*, attempts to resolve the dilemma by thinking of the non-Europeans as children needing the guidance and care of an adult whose wishes must, in the meantime, be complied with. There is always, however, the possibility in the future of the child growing to maturity and demanding his independence. Between *apartheid* and *trusteeship* as a means of resolving the dilemma is the further concept of *partnership*, which, as we shall see later, is increas-

ingly popular in East and Central Africa as a solution to the problem of racial relationships. This combines the idea of separation between the races with a restricted franchise and limited concessions to the non-European group, once again with the promise held out of an eventual increase in the share of the 'junior partner'.

None of these attempts can ever hope to succeed in resolving this dilemma, which is in fact insoluble so long as present attitudes and values are maintained. No satisfactory solution of the problems of racial relations in South Africa will ever occur until and unless the European community is prepared to make sacrifices, social, economic, and political. So long as they insist on retaining their dominant power and control over the non-European, will the present crisis continue until it reaches an explosive state. It is a sad reflection that while respect for the law and for the constitution has resulted in judgements being given in the Union of South Africa courts which are favourable to the position of non-Europeans, nevertheless white domination is itself imposed with all the force of the law. In this way the law becomes an instrument of injustice instead of justice and is brought into contempt in the eyes of non-Europeans, as are most other democratic concepts which they associate with the oppressive regime imposed by the Europeans.

There is always a tendency for a ruling class to cling to its position for as long as possible, but it is to be hoped that Europeans in South Africa will rescind some of their power before the accumulated frustration and hatred for the white man, that is growing rapidly in South Africa, creates a terrible and violent revolution. If industrial and commercial interests in South Africa awaken to the practical implications of *apartheid*, if carried to extremes, they may also recognize that European prosperity is dependent upon the labour of the African. This may lead to the realization that promoting the material and social welfare of Africans is as much in the interests of Europeans as of Africans themselves. Further extreme measures designed to extend the application of *apartheid* in residential areas and in industry, introduced by Dr

Malan early in 1954, are of such a repressive character that the opposition parties may be stirred to action, if they are not too divided among themselves. In particular, there is strong opposition among trade unionists to the Industrial Conciliation Bill, which is intended to establish the principle of *apartheid* in industry, encourages splinter unions, prevents unions from affiliating to political parties, and restricts the right to strike.

HIGH COMMISSION TERRITORIES

Legislation in the Union of South Africa does not directly affect the African population of the High Commission territories, which are the responsibility of the United Kingdom government. Africans from these territories are affected indirectly, however, in view of the large numbers who migrate to the Union for employment. This is not a new phenomenon, although the scale of such migration appears to be increasing. The Union Department of Native Affairs gives the number of Africans from Basutoland employed as approximately 70,000; from Bechuanaland 20,000; and from Swaziland 11,000. The majority of these migrants are men, although recent statistics suggest that an increasing number of women also migrate to the Union. The drain on manpower resources in the protectorates themselves is considerable. It has been estimated that more than 50 per cent of the able-bodied men in Basutoland may be away at any one time, and almost the same proportion from the eastern areas of Bechuanaland. The period away from the territory may vary from a few months to twenty years or more. About 5 per cent probably go away for good.

The immediate reason for this migration is the need for cash and the restricted opportunities for employment offered within the High Commission territories. Although wages in the Union are low, they are higher than those available in the territories. The need for money is itself a consequence of the necessity of paying taxes and the growing desire to

purchase goods and pay for education of children. It has been suggested that there are other social and psychological incentives to migration, one of which is the higher status accorded to any man or woman who has migrated for a period. Among the Basuto, for example, it has been suggested that a spell of work at the mines is often regarded as an essential part of education and a sign of manhood. It is also a reflection of the desire among many of the younger generation to be free of tribal discipline. In general this large-scale migration is an indication of the difficulty of making a satisfactory living within the territories. The value of the money and goods which flow back from the Union to the territories as a result of migrant labour is considerable, particularly where the system of deferred pay operates as a means of saving.[89]

It has been suggested that if Dr Malan does not get his way with regard to the transfer of the territories he may apply economic sanctions by preventing Africans from outside the Union from working in the mines and elsewhere. This would certainly be a serious blow to the economy of the High Commission territories. But it would also be a blow to employers in the Union who want the workers as much as the migrants want work. Already the migrant workers are under certain disadvantages, as they rank as aliens in the Union. It has even been suggested that their children should not be eligible for education in Union schools. Opportunities for education in the High Commission territories are still limited, although a recent report of the United Nations suggests that primary school enrolment in Basutoland was as high as 154 per thousand inhabitants. This is a higher proportion than that claimed for any other indigenous community in Africa, of comparable size. The figures for Bechuanaland and Swaziland are not so favourable.

The only solution to this problem, in the long run, is the development of the economic resources of the three territories. Although a sum of approximately £3 million has been allocated for the development of the High Commission territories under the Colonial Development and Welfare Acts for

disbursement between 1946 and 1956, not all of this sum has been spent. The money is being spent on public works, including communications, water and electrical installations, health, education, and social services, together with schemes for soil conservation, cattle rearing, and control of pests and diseases. The scale of these grants is still very small in relation to the tremendous need; but carefully planned schemes of community development designed to assist Africans in the High Commission territories to achieve a higher material standard of life, without the social disintegration that this normally implies, could provide an antidote to the increase of anti-European feeling which would result from a spread of influence from the Union of South Africa.

CHAPTER THREE

Crisis in British Colonial Africa

OUTSIDE of the Union of South Africa the nationalistic aspirations of European settlers have yet to be achieved. So have those of the indigenous African populations of the British colonial territories. In West Africa where there are no European settlers the problem is, comparatively speaking, a simple one. The British government has indicated its intention of handing over complete responsibility for self-government as soon as it is convinced that there are enough Africans who are capable and experienced enough to take office. In the case of Nigeria and the Gold Coast it is clear that the time when these countries will be able to assume their place as full and independent members of the Commonwealth is not far away. Many African politicians consider that the time is overdue. In East and Central Africa the issues are infinitely more complicated. Here it is not a representative African élite to whom political power is being increasingly given, but a small minority of Europeans who have made their homes in Africa. The whole future of racial relations in these territories depends upon the answer to the question: *What use will be made of the political and economic power now possessed by the dominant European minorities?* Will this power be exercised in such a way that the prosperity of all races in East and Central Africa will be ensured or will it be used to exploit the sectional interest of Europeans? Will the status of non-Europeans be raised, so that all will share responsibility for government as well as the material wealth of the country, or are non-Europeans to remain permanently subordinate? If their status is improved, will non-Europeans take their full share of responsibility for creating an economically sound and politically harmonious multi-racial society?

In East and Central Africa the complex ethnic composition of the population is overshadowed by the all-pervading

distinction between Europeans and non-Europeans; whereas, in West Africa, it is possible to observe the influence upon the political scene of important cultural differences among Africans themselves. Here the fundamental question for the future is whether or not it will be possible for a sense of unity to emerge, which will be sufficiently powerful to bind together as a single nation people whose historical, linguistic, and religious affiliations are with others beyond the frontier. We have already noted the problem of the Ewe peoples in Togoland. It would be tragic indeed if the establishment of an independent Gold Coast were to lead to a series of wars for the unification of Eweland, or if a dominion of Nigeria were to succumb to internal strife between the north and the south. The existence of these divisions is sometimes used as an argument in favour of the continued retention of at least a measure of control by the Colonial Office in London. While it is true that so long as British rule is retained, Africans will have one subject at least on which they can be more or less unanimous – the desirability of Britain withdrawing – it hardly seems likely that an over-protective attitude will encourage the growth of a sense of responsibility. On the contrary, the longer educated and politically conscious Africans feel that they are being deprived of the opportunity for self-government, the greater will be the accumulated frustration which may express itself in internal factions. Nevertheless, the British government can hardly hand over power quite regardless of the consequences.

Racial relations in West Africa are synonymous with political relations. With the exception of a few isolated incidents, inter-personal relations between Africans and Europeans in West Africa are now governed by much the same criteria as those between members of the same race. Differences of nationality, language, education, occupation, and social class have the same significance for human relationships as they do in Britain or elsewhere. Questions of race and colour, while until recently of some importance in West Africa as in the rest of the continent, are now receding into the background. This is far from the case in East and Central Africa.

In the last resort the subordinate status of Africans in these territories will only be changed when political rights are achieved on a basis of equality with Europeans. In the meantime, problems of racial relations find their expression in a variety of ways, affecting everyday life at home, in the street, and at work. Everywhere Africans, even the educated ones, find that they are treated as 'different' and frequently as 'inferior', by the Europeans with whom they come into contact. In East and Central Africa, therefore, it is not sufficient to study the political status of the African, but also his role in the economic system and in social relationships generally. Before doing this it is necessary to make a closer examination of the racial and cultural groups making up the populations of British colonial territories in Africa.

ETHNIC GROUPS AND POPULATION PROBLEMS

As in South Africa, the four major ethnic groups are the African, the European, the Asian, and the Coloured people of mixed descent. Of the latter there are very few, except in Southern Rhodesia and in Sierra Leone, where there is a substantial 'Creole' population, largely descended from the liberated slaves. The table opposite sets out the numerical composition of the populations of each of the territories concerned.

Africans

There is not as yet sufficient information regarding the distribution of blood groups among the African peoples to distinguish the various races from each other on this basis; nor for that matter are there many biometric surveys which would enable different tribes to be classified accurately. It is usual to distinguish three main racial groups from which it is believed the majority of African peoples have sprung. The three basic types are the Bushman, Negro, and Hamite.[1] The majority of Africans are the product of racial mixture

POPULATIONS OF BRITISH COLONIAL TERRITORIES IN AFRICA[2]

	African	*European*	*Coloured*	*Asian*	*Other*	*Total*
Southern Rhodesia	1,800,000	114,000	4,900	3,400	...	1,922,300
Northern Rhodesia	1,650,000	28,000	789	1,119	...	1,679,908
Nyasaland	2,350,000	2,500	...	3,500	...	2,356,000
CENTRAL AFRICA	5,800,000	144,500	5,689	8,019	...	5,958,208
Zanzibar & Pemba	199,975	296	...	15,892	47,999	264,162
Kenya	5,251,120	29,660	964	97,687	26,535	5,405,966
Uganda	4,917,555	3,448	643	35,215	1,659	4,958,520
Tanganyika	7,407,517	17,885	1,547	69,739	13,677	7,510,365
British Somaliland	637,317	...	...	...	2,683	640,000
EAST AFRICA	18,413,484	51,289	3,154	218,533	92,553	18,779,013
Nigeria	25,000,000	9,000	...	1,900	...	25,010,900
Gold Coast	4,111,680	4,211	...	...	2,559	4,118,450
Sierra Leone	1,766,613	598	...	1,216	...	1,768,427
The Gambia	279,000	...	...	...	...	279,000
WEST AFRICA	31,157,293	13,809	...	3,116	2,559	31,176,777
TOTAL	55,370,777	209,598	8,843	229,668	95,112	55,913,998

between these three types and, as a consequence, exhibit a wide variety of physical characteristics. In addition there are the pygmies, who, apart from their stature, are distinguished by an almost equal distribution of blood groups O, A, and B, with almost the highest known proportion of group AB. The Bushmen, although not as small as pygmies, are also short and have a yellow-brown skin. They are characterized by a high incidence of the O blood group. The typical Negro has a dark brown skin, usually described as black, with woolly hair, flat broad nose, thick lips, and is usually tall. The Negro population has a high proportion of blood group A.

The Hamitic type is also tall, with a skin colour of various shades of brown, and with a straight nose which is in distinct contrast with that of the Negro. It is generally agreed that there is a strong 'Caucasian' influence.

In view of the inadequacy of any purely racial classification, ethnic groups in Africa are distinguished by cultural traits, particularly similarities of language. We have already observed that the Bantu-speaking peoples migrated southwards towards the Union of South Africa, and it is not surprising, therefore, to find them inhabiting much of East and Central Africa. In addition to similarities of language the Bantu people tend to possess an attitude that cattle are sacred, said to have originated among the Hamitic peoples, sacred fire cults, puberty ceremonies, and a knowledge of iron work.[3] They are generally an agricultural and cattle-keeping people with social and political systems similar to, although less advanced than, those found among West African tribes. The latter, to whom the term Negro in its narrower and stricter sense may be applied, are roughly equal in numbers to the Bantu, although they occupy a smaller area. Density of population is much greater than in the east and south, and in Southern Nigeria there are a number of towns with populations of over 50,000. There appears to be a more advanced economic system with considerable specialization of crafts, and elaborate trade relations in which women have traditionally taken an active part.[4] The influence of peoples of Hamitic origin is most clearly seen in East Africa where

most of the inhabitants are also cattle-owning and nomadic. One of the significant characteristics of tribes in this region is the division into age-grades with political authority vested in the elders.[5] While there are many primitive religious cults, the Moslem religion has long been established, particularly among the Hausa of northern Nigeria, and, as everywhere in Africa, Christianity has made many converts.

The extreme diversity of African social institutions, economic and political organization, material culture, and religious beliefs makes it impossible to generalize, or to enter here upon detailed descriptions of the way of life of particular tribes.[6] Lord Hailey suggests, however, that there are certain ways in which African institutions and values tend to differ markedly from European. These include 'the predominance of a subsistence economy without great differences in individual wealth; the recognition of close bonds of kinship uniting in obligations of mutual aid a group larger than the individual family; the existence of close bonds between such groups and the land which they have acquired from their ancestors or by conquest.'[7] Even this generalization requires qualification, especially as far as West Africa is concerned, where powerful and rich rulers, as well as a commercial 'middle class', exist and have done so for many centuries. The infrequency of written records makes it difficult to reconstruct the history of African peoples. In this sense it is sometimes suggested that Africa is a continent without a history; but this is a reflection of the ignorance of the European and of the African, which is gradually being remedied. Anthropologists, archaeologists, and historians are slowly piecing together a fascinating story and revealing the existence in Africa of previously unknown civilizations of an advanced order. This is especially true in West Africa where Arabic influence was strong. Educated West Africans, before the advent of the European, frequently spoke and wrote Arabic. Some of their writings have come down to us. There is also evidence that the Vai peoples of Liberia had evolved their own alphabet which was taught in their schools. In 1849 three manuscripts were sent to England and printed.[8]

The impact of alien European culture has everywhere set in motion radical changes in the traditional way of life of the peoples of British Colonial Africa. Many of these have undoubtedly contributed to the material welfare of the African, especially as far as the elimination of endemic diseases is concerned. Others, such as the alienation of land for European occupation, have merely made it more difficult for the African to pursue his traditional shifting agriculture and herding of cattle, without providing a satisfactory alternative. The increasing disruption of traditional, social, and economic organization is reflected in the proportion of Africans who are alienated from their tribal background. More and more Africans are finding their way into employment, either in urban areas or in European agricultural enterprises. For example, 110 out of every 1000 Africans in Southern Rhodesia were wage-earners in the European economy either within or outside Southern Rhodesia in 1946, compared with 122 out of 1000 in Northern Rhodesia and 95 in Nyasaland.[9] By 1951 the total of Africans employed in industry in Southern Rhodesia was over 530,000, including 42,000 women. This was a 34 per cent increase over 1946 and is typical of the trend elsewhere as well.[10] In East Africa as a whole nearly a million adult male Africans are in employment, roughly a half in Kenya. Of these a substantial proportion are employed in agriculture and forestry, but an increasing number are working in mines and factories as well as in government services.[11] In West Africa there is a similar trend. Mining gold, manganese, and diamonds is important in the Gold Coast and is second only in importance to the production of cocoa. In Nigeria coal-mining is of some importance.

'Sir Philip Mitchell has drawn attention to the fact that in East Africa, as in other parts, the increasing number of Africans in paid employment also means the growth of large towns, or concentrations of population where conditions of urban life prevail, such as in the vicinity of mining enterprises or on plantations. He points out that 'increasing numbers of Africans are living under totally different conditions

from those which persist in the tribal lands from which most of them only recently came. More and more Africans are becoming more or less permanent urban residents and although, like peasants the world over, they are generally determined if possible to retain at least some foothold on the land from which they came, it seems likely that from the agrarian angle they ought not to do so and that only the favoured few will be able to retain land sufficient for their support in old age. The outcome will largely depend on the conditions of life and work which Africans find in towns.'[12] What is true of East Africa is of even greater significance in Central Africa. In Southern Rhodesia more than 200,000 Africans work and live in and around urban areas, and this figure is about twice the corresponding figure a few years ago.[13] In Northern Rhodesia the influence of economic developments on Africans is seen in the formation of large aggregations of Africans of mixed tribal origin in the Copperbelt and along the railway line. It has been estimated that the five Copperbelt towns and Broken Hill have a total population of between 140,000 and 160,000. Throughout West Africa there are many towns of 50,000 inhabitants and more, although, particularly in Nigeria, many of these towns have grown up independently of recent industrial influences. In this respect they resemble the semi-agricultural towns of medieval Britain. Lord Hailey has pointed out that 'the extent of population living in urban or semi-urban conditions is ... a feature of growing importance in the social and political life of the Gold Coast.'[14] The same might be said of other parts of West Africa.

Detribalization has numerous consequences, among which the deterioration of family life is one of the most significant and leads in its turn to a number of symptoms typical of an unstable and maladjusted society. Dr K. A. Busia has drawn attention to the incidence of crime and juvenile delinquency, marriage breakdown and sexual immorality, bribery and corruption, quarrelling and fighting as well as unemployment and destitution in his survey of Sekondi-Takoradi in the Gold Coast.[15] The pattern is repeated in many parts of

Africa to-day, as it was in Britain during the industrial revolution and in America when large numbers of immigrants had to adjust themselves to a completely new way of life. Dr G. H. Wilson has examined some of the social and economic consequences of detribalization in Northern Rhodesia at Broken Hill. He calculated that by 1950, 10 per cent of the population would be town-bred. At the time when the investigation was made (1940) there were about 15,000 Africans living in Broken Hill, most of whom still kept in touch with their families in the rural areas, but the interval between visits was shortening, especially among the younger generation and those who had their wives with them. Nevertheless, the sense of duty and obligation towards the family was still strong and this, oddly enough, sometimes led to a prolonged absence from home. The reason for this lay in the fact that men would not wish to return home unless they could take gifts with them and often they could not afford to do this. In any case, the journey home cost the equivalent of two months' wages or took two months to walk. Nevertheless, Dr Wilson found that roughly 10 per cent of the total cash wages earned by Africans was spent on gifts to relatives.[16]

The implications of this trend for racial relationships is clear. Everywhere the African is being drawn into the orbit of the European social and political economy and is fulfilling new roles which bring him into contact and communication with members of other races and cultures. In urban areas the conflicting habits and customs of other Africans from different tribes can be as much a source of social change and require as much adjustment on the part of the individual as contact with Europeans or with other non-European immigrant communities such as Indians or Arabs.

Non-European Immigrants

Historically speaking, the Arab immigrants have had a considerable influence in East Africa, especially when the Sultan of Zanzibar extended his influence over much of the interior of what is now Kenya. However, in recent years

there has been a tendency for the Arab community to associate itself more closely with the African. Nevertheless, they are separately represented in the legislature and have their own schools.[17]

The influence of the Indian community has grown as rapidly as that of the Arabs has diminished. There are three times as many Indians as Europeans in Kenya, five times as many in Tanganyika, and ten times as many in Uganda. In Central Africa there is a substantial Asiatic population, mainly consisting of Indians, totalling about 10,000 in all. As in South Africa, where the position of the Indian population has already been discussed, Indians predominate in commerce, and in Tanganyika and Uganda it has been estimated that 90 per cent or more of the trade is in the hands of the Indian community.[18] Many are also employed on railways and in industrial undertakings. In East Africa the Indian community is separately represented in the legislatures and has developed its own educational system with government assistance.

Coloured People

The position of the Coloured population of British colonial territories in Africa is unlike that in South Africa if only for the smallness of the numbers involved. There are less than 10,000 in the whole of East and Central Africa, and although their marginal position between the European and African communities is a source of difficulty, they tend to be associated, at any rate in the minds of European administrators, with Asians rather than with Africans or Europeans. The position of the 'Creole' population of Sierra Leone, however, is in a way unique. Their essentially European background and culture, as well as, in many cases, their European ancestry, are derived from the days of the slave trade and not from more recent contacts. There is, as a result, a tendency for them to remain somewhat aloof from the African population and to emulate Europeans as far as possible.[19]

Europeans

Mr G. W. Broomfield has drawn attention to the fact that Europeans in Africa expect, and the large majority in fact obtain, a standard of living which is higher than is necessary for the maintenance of the essentials of European civilization, higher than that usually achieved by pioneer colonists in other continents, higher than Africa at present levels of economic development can really afford, and a good deal higher than the European immigrants were accustomed to in Europe or would be able to maintain if they were to return there.[20] It goes without saying that this standard of living is immeasurably higher than that of the non-European communities. There have, of course, been failures and bankruptcies, but there is not yet as serious a 'poor white' problem in British colonial territories, as is found in the Union of South Africa.

There is evidence, however, of a growing number of Europeans in East Africa whose economic status is that of the skilled worker and supervisor rather than that of a propertied farmer, manager, or government official. An interesting study has been made by Dr and Mrs Cyril Sofer which suggests that this group has its own peculiar problems of adjustment in the face of the traditional snobbishness of the settlers of longer standing. In this particular case a large-scale constructional project called for a number of skilled workers. At the time of the inquiry (1950) 50 per cent of the inhabitants of the town had been there under six months and the majority of these appeared to be earning £500 per annum, or less. A long-standing distinction between those in government employ and 'commercials' was further aggravated by a new distinction between those who were 'clubbable' and those who were not. In practice this meant having the right type of occupation, an income sufficient to keep up an appropriate 'style of life', and speaking with an educated accent. Many of the newcomers failed to qualify on this basis. It is clear that, so long as economic prosperity enables the newcomers to maintain a standard of life higher than that which they

would otherwise have obtained at home, there is unlikely to be much difficulty. But, if there were a falling off in demand for the services of the European artisan, there might very well be a repetition of the poor white problem experienced in South Africa, with a consequent deterioration of racial relations.[21]

An analysis of occupations pursued by Europeans in Central Africa shows that roughly 15 per cent in Southern Rhodesia, 7 per cent in Northern Rhodesia, and 22 per cent in Nyasaland were engaged in agriculture, forestry, and fisheries. Mining and quarrying absorbed 8 per cent of Europeans in Southern Rhodesia, 38 per cent in Northern Rhodesia, and only 0.2 per cent in Nyasaland. In Southern Rhodesia 17 per cent were engaged in manufacturing, but only 4 per cent in Northern Rhodesia and 1 per cent in Nyasaland. The remainder were engaged in urban occupations of a public service or administrative nature.[22] In terms of urban and rural residence approximately 70 per cent of Europeans in Southern Rhodesia were classified as urban in 1946, 75 per cent in Northern Rhodesia, and 50 per cent in Nyasaland.[23]

The European population in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland has increased rapidly in recent years, mainly as a result of immigration from Britain and the Union of South Africa, particularly the latter. The European population more than doubled itself in the ten years from 1938 to 1948.[24] There has been a similar rapid increase in the European population of East Africa, especially Kenya, where it was estimated that the European population had increased by nearly 12,000 between 1948 and 1953, mainly by immigration.[25] Farming is still the main occupation of most Europeans although mining and manufacturing are of increasing importance and roughly half the European population of Kenya live in areas classified as urban.[26]

In West Africa the role of the European is somewhat different in view of the fact that he is rarely a permanent resident. Europeans are engaged in government service, medical missionary and teaching services, as well as commerce. The large majority live in towns.

RACIAL RELATIONS

There has been no systematic study of racial attitudes in British colonial territories in Africa comparable with the investigations made by Professor I. D. MacCrone in the Union, to which reference has already been made. Consequently, there is a danger of making sweeping generalizations which are not substantiated by the facts. As always, there are Europeans in British Colonial Africa who are quite free from prejudice against Africans and many, particularly teachers and doctors, whose lives are devoted to the improvement of their material welfare and social status. At the opposite end of the scale are Europeans who hold Africans in the utmost contempt and rarely miss an opportunity of expressing hostility towards them. Between these two extremes fall the large majority of Europeans who tend to share a stereotyped view of the African, which suggests that there is some inherent difference between the races. It is often sincerely believed that, while the Africans may eventually achieve a higher standard of living and acquire, at any rate, the outward signs and symbols of Western civilization, they will never really rise to the same cultural level as Europeans. Although, as we have seen, science disputes that view, it is still widely held.

Throughout East and Central Africa, and to some extent also in the West, Europeans expect to receive certain outward marks of respect and deference from Africans which are in excess of those which they would normally receive from Europeans in similar situations. If this deference is not forthcoming the European is liable to interpret the actions of the African as insolence, and to punish him accordingly. Many Europeans show marked discourtesy to Africans and demand an excessively servile demeanour from them. The European tends to use forms of address, such as 'boy', 'nigger', 'wog', and 'kaffir', when addressing or talking about Africans, who very much resent these expressions and the tone of voice that goes with them.[27] The following quotation

from a letter recently published in a Central African newspaper draws attention to the typical European attitude, which can be paralleled in many other parts of the continent.

On coming to this country I was told that to gain their respect and get satisfactory work done, one must treat them very distantly, never relax and be constantly 'chasing them up'. As I did not find this necessary out East, I doubted the truth of this advice and decided to treat them as I did my Indian servants.

The Africans proved much slower in every way, as I had expected, but I found that, as with children, a little praise in the right place went a long way and that kindness and even a joke now and then lost me no respect.

We say, quite rightly, that the African is primitive and slow of brain and in the next breath blame him for not knowing everything about running a European house. Is this reasonable or even rational? Again we say that he is crude and ill-mannered, but how many of us show courtesy to him when we meet him about our daily life?

I have been almost ashamed of my colour when in shops on the Copperbelt at the appalling rudeness of assistants to Africans waiting for attention. Their requests are frequently ignored and they are rudely shouted at when they are waiting quite patiently at one of those tiny little windows.

The assistants keep one voice for European customers and another for Africans, and they seem to imagine that the more they treat the African as something quite beneath them, the higher they rise in the estimation of others. In point of fact they only show that they are suffering from a sense of inferiority, causing them to try to inflate their own ego.

The African learns most easily through copying. Is he going to learn good manners and respect for others through this kind of contact with Europeans? Are we not partly to blame for failing to set him a good example?

As a teacher of young children I am often shocked by the attitude of my pupils towards Africans and their own servants in particular. During the course of a class conversation lately a small boy of five told the class that his Mother had hit a 'Kaffir' when driving the car, and from his expression he thought it quite a joke. One boy even wanted a car so that he could go about knocking down Africans. I have also heard children in Rest House speaking in a very rude way to the servants and their parents taking no notice whatsoever.

The European has done much to better the material lot of the African since his coming, but I feel most strongly that it is attitude of mind that matters. However many hospitals we build; however many clinics we open; however much we improve their living conditions, we shall fail to build a happy future for Northern Rhodesia if we do not strive earnestly to feel a right spirit towards African people.

These examples may appear trifling and harmless but they are indicative of something very wrong indeed in the nature of many White people. We may think that Africans are insensitive to such treatment as they do not demur, but as it is proved they respond to kindness it is not illogical to suppose that they are affected by inconsideration and rudeness.[28]

Throughout Africa the European has become accustomed to an exaggerated deference from non-Europeans, which is very flattering to the ego and undoubtedly bolsters up the individual European's sense of security. A threat to the traditional pattern of relationships between the races is met with strong opposition. Anyone breaking the customary conventions and 'fraternizing' with Africans meets with the same kind of disapproval that friendship between British and German people at the end of the war evoked. A European who shakes hands with an African is likely to be ostracized and one who actually goes and lives in an African village is likely to provoke the maximum hostility, as the following outburst against the activities of sociologists published as a 'leader' in another Central African newspaper demonstrates.

In the name of science certain Englishmen enter this country to make exhaustive studies of the customs and habits of African tribes and in the process they conduct themselves in such a way that they lose the deference traditionally accorded to White men by Africans. At one time, Africans treated all Europeans with a certain deference; later they contrived to distinguish between those Europeans who were worthy of their deference by reason of their intelligence and character and those who were not.

Nowadays, those Europeans whose attitude to Africans has not only been correct, but benevolent, are losing this deference, and this is partly due to the antics of the so-called scientists.

These latter, who, from the very nature of their studies are usually advanced politicians, like to live as closely to the African way of life as they can. They imagine that by living very much as

the African lives, in his village, they will gain the African's confidence and discover the secrets of his personality.

Frankly we think that much of this anthropological or sociological study is 'hooey'. It is interesting and possibly useful to investigate a tribal structure and ascertain in what respects one tribe differs from another. It may be useful too to probe the etymology of an African language, but there are many minutiae of conduct and language which are not worth the time spent on them. The proper study of mankind may be man, but there is no need to labour this study unnecessarily, and it is not necessary to drop to the African level of village life in order to get Africans to talk and unburden themselves. Moreover, anthropologists are apt to project themselves into the life they are examining. They think what they want to think. In the process of the investigation they show the Africans what they want to find and the Africans naturally provide this. ...

European familiarity with Africans breeds contempt by Africans. European men have lived with African women without losing much deference from Africans, but there are Europeans who do not live with African women, but who live according to African standards, who do lose that deference. When Africans see European scientific men, who are considered by them to be a better type of European, behaving as if they were Africans, then they lose their deference and respect for all Europeans. This is not fair to the decent, kindly settlers of Northern Rhodesia who have won the deference by their careful mode of life.

Moreover, such sociologists can disturb the political atmosphere of the country. They can give Africans 'wrong ideas'. They treat them as if they were a grown-up responsible community when they are not, and they teach them to hate and resent the Europeans in the country whom they represent as exploiters. They may not be complete Communists, but they are uncommonly near being so.

This is not good enough. Why should the Europeans of this country tolerate these so-called sociologists who in the name of scientific research are injecting poison into our Race Relations? We settlers do not keep our wits about us half enough. We never seem to know what is going on at the other end of the country.

We do not ask sociologists to be Tories. They can be Communists if they like, but they should behave like responsible Europeans during their investigations and they should not sow the seed of social and political discord.

If they attempt to do this they should be thrown out on their ear without any ceremony. We cannot afford to have such people in the country at the present time.[29]

Despite the frequency of formal contacts, usually in the role of master and servant or employer and employee, Europeans frequently exhibit very little understanding of Africans as persons. Inaccurate and derogatory stereotypes of Africans as lazy, dirty, lying, thieving, sexually promiscuous, brutal, of low intelligence, and generally undesirable in every way, exist widely.

An interesting example was quoted by Mr Fenner Brockway in the House of Commons during a debate on the abolition of the colour-bar:

> On one occasion we met an influential group of white settlers. The most terrifying thing I heard during the whole time I was in Kenya was said by the chairman of those white settlers, a Mrs Bernard, who is a very distinguished farmer.
>
> Without any passion, quite coolly and with deep conviction, she said, 'Mr Hale and Mr Brockway, how can you really ask us to regard the African peoples as our equals? No African is honest, every African is a liar, every African is lazy. They have not a word in their vocabulary for love, loyalty, or gratitude.' Immediately we left that interview, I asked the first Kikuyu I met to write down the words for love, gratitude, and loyalty in his language. In a flash he wrote down 'Wendo' for love, 'Ngatha' for gratitude, and 'Wathikeri' for loyalty. With such a mental attitude on the part of Europeans, can we really anticipate that the Africans of Kenya are likely to be unaffected by the superiority so blatantly expressed by, I hope, the minority of the white settlers' population?
>
> What disturbed me perhaps still more was when I returned to this country and read a book by Bishop Walter Carey, and found him saying exactly the same things that were said by Mrs Bernard in Nairobi. I am glad that the Executive of the Church Missionary Society have officially repudiated any association with the views of Bishop Carey.[30]

These opinions result in unduly suspicious attitudes on the part of Europeans, who expect the worst of the African. It is hardly surprising that such attitudes do not evoke the best response from the African himself, and through the mechanism of the 'self-fulfilling prophecy' the Europeans' worst fears are often confirmed. Africans in their turn develop a hostile attitude towards Europeans. They grow to expect blame, whether deservedly or not, and often assume an atti-

tude of defensive aggressiveness towards the European, lying and cheating being their only weapons against the superior authority and power of the European.

Discrimination and Separation

The reciprocal attitudes of coloured and white in British colonial territories in Africa are translated into a rigid separation as far as social relationships are concerned. This is most marked in East and Central Africa, although until recent years it has also been common in West Africa. However, there are now a few hotels and clubs which Europeans and Africans can visit together. This would have been unthinkable a few years ago. Nevertheless, a social colour-bar still exists almost everywhere in East and Central Africa. An official report dealing with Native policies in what is now the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland has described the situation as follows:

> A social colour bar, for which, of course, there is no statutory authority anywhere, exists in all three territories. In Northern Rhodesia Africans generally find their social position amongst their own community, though individuals have their friends also in European circles. Restrictions are imposed on Africans regarding the possession of liquor, and discriminatory practices include the habit of certain shops serving African customers through hatches, the barring of Africans from European cinemas, hotels, and restaurants, and the provision of separate accommodation for Africans on the railways and in buses. Some post offices also have separate entrances for Africans, though new ones are being built with common entrances.
>
> In Nyasaland the European and African communities, owing to the large cultural and economic gaps between them, do not mingle freely in society. The economic gap is slowly closing; already there are a few Africans whose salaries are almost on a European scale and whose standard of living is comparable to that of some Europeans. The cultural gap may not close, for it is still uncertain how far African culture will develop along European lines. Africans are not admitted to European clubs or hotels and certain restrictions regarding liquor are imposed on them. In European stores only Africans of better standing and appearance are served in the same

sections as Europeans. In cinemas only a limited number of the cheaper seats are available for Africans and their entry is restricted. There are African locations in Blantyre and Limbe, but Africans are not debarred by legislation from residing elsewhere in these townships if they can meet the requirements of the Township Building Rules.

The Southern Rhodesia Government's policy of geographical separation implies that there should not be a mixed society, nor in the Government's view is this desired either by Africans or by Europeans. So long as this policy lasts there can be no question of social assimilation, which might be a step towards racial assimilation. A social colour bar is therefore likely to be maintained at the wish of both races, with equal cultural levels and common interests as the foundation for mutual contact – rather than mixed social intercourse for its own sake.

Restrictions are imposed on Africans in Southern Rhodesia regarding the possession of liquor, and they are not admitted to European hotels save by special arrangement. Separate accommodation in trains, buses, and taxicabs is provided for them. They mix freely with Europeans in shops, but are not admitted to European cinemas. In the larger centres there are separate entrances and counters for Africans in post offices and banks. Africans are debarred from participating in State lotteries and from betting.

Similar social practices are adopted as between the races, based on their different cultural levels, in all three territories, and we can find little or no difference in this respect between them.[31]

A situation similar to that existing in Central Africa is found in most parts of East Africa, especially in Kenya. Zanzibar appears to be a notable exception.[32] Mr Fenner Brockway described his own and other experiences during the debate on the colour-bar in the House of Commons, to which reference has been made, when he said:

I have described before in this House how in Nairobi I was with the African representative of the United Nations and the First Secretary from the Indian High Commissioner's Office, one a doctor of philosophy of Columbia University, New York, and the other a Balliol degree man of Oxford, both much more cultured than I – because I never had the opportunity to go to a university – and how we searched Nairobi for an hour in an endeavour to find a restaurant or an hotel where we could sit down to a meal together. Everywhere the order was 'Europeans only'.

I have a much more recent example of this. When my very great friend, in whom I always have confidence, ex-Chief Koinange, was charged with murder, it was arranged that Mr Dingle Foot should go to Nairobi to defend him. He was met at the airport by an English solicitor and by Mr Awori, an African Member of the Legislative Council. A room had been booked for Mr Foot at a leading hotel in Nairobi. When Mr Awori carried Mr Foot's bag into the lobby of that hotel, he was immediately thrust out of the building, and Mr Foot's reservation in that hotel was cancelled.[33]

Dr L. S. B. Leakey has confirmed the fact that it is virtually impossible to-day for an African in Kenya, even if he is a graduate of an English University, to have a meal in a public hotel or restaurant.[34]

The policy of separation as applied to the relationships of Europeans and Africans in East and Central Africa does not end at a purely social colour-bar. Its most serious consequences are the economic ones arising in the first instance from the land policies pursued in these territories. In Southern Rhodesia the idea, similar to that held in the Union, that territorial separation was necessary if Africans and Europeans were to be permitted to develop to the limit of their capacity, is embodied in the Land Apportionment Act of 1930 (re-enacted in 1941) and in subsequent amending Acts. Under the provisions of this Act land in Southern Rhodesia is divided into Native Areas, European Areas, and Unassigned, Undetermined and Forest Areas. The *Comparative Survey of Native Policy, 1951* examines this Act and compares it with the situation in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland.

The position revealed in this report with regard to the distribution of land in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland may be summed up in this way: In Southern Rhodesia, out of a total of approximately 150,000 square miles, 50,000 have been set aside mainly or exclusively for the use of Africans, while 75,000 are mainly or exclusively for European ownership and occupation. The balance will eventually be divided between the two, with the exception of the forest area which is not for occupation. Given the size of the African

and European rural populations this provides an average density of roughly one person for every two square miles in the European areas compared with fifty for every two square miles in the African areas. In Northern Rhodesia the position is better. Out of a total of approximately 287,000 square miles, 270,000 is mainly or exclusively for Africans, while only 17,000 is exclusively for Europeans. In Nyasaland, with a total of 36,000 square miles, 32,000 is mainly or exclusively for the use of Africans, while 2000 are held on freehold title almost exclusively by Europeans. The balance is Public land. *It will be seen that Southern Rhodesia has set aside 33 per cent of the available land in the colony for exclusive use of the African peoples, Nyasaland 87 per cent, and Northern Rhodesia 94 per cent.*[35] The effects of this in terms of pressure of population on resources has been described as follows:

In both Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland there is a considerable pressure of population in certain of the land set aside for African use. Indeed in certain Reserves in Southern Rhodesia and in the densely populated area of the Shire Highlands in Nyasaland (population density 156 to the square mile) the position has been reached at which it will no longer be possible for every African family to cultivate land, and, as has happened in other countries, a part of the community will be compelled to make its living in other than peasant agriculture. In both countries the position is being relieved as much as possible by increasing by purchase and development the land available for African use, and where possible by resettlement and redistribution of the population. Of more importance are the steps being taken to ensure that the wasteful methods of traditional cultivation are replaced by improved agricultural techniques. In Southern Rhodesia in pursuit of this aim 36 per cent of all cultivated land in the Reserves has been protected from erosion, 40 per cent of African farmers have been influenced to adopt improved methods of cultivation, and 50 per cent of the land in the Reserves has been surveyed and demarcated into arable and grazing areas. In Nyasaland cultivation along the contour is now almost universal. Much more remains to be done in both territories.

The problem of land pressure is not serious in the African Areas of Northern Rhodesia in spite of the large proportion of the Native Trust Land area which is in the tsetse-fly belt. There is, however, a

degree of over-population in the Native Areas close to the line of rail and in parts of the Eastern Province which is being dealt with by the introduction and extension of improved farming methods, including the wide adoption of the practice of contour cultivation.

The differences between the three territories in their land policies will now be apparent. In Southern Rhodesia the Land Apportionment Act has brought about a clear-cut division of land between the two races, and each has security of tenure in its own area. In Nyasaland there is no such division and Europeans and Africans may acquire land on the same terms in the same areas, though the Order-in-Council envisages that African interests shall be paramount in African Trust Land. In Northern Rhodesia Crown Land is primarily set aside for non-native settlement; and the reserves are, save in special circumstances, set aside for the exclusive use of Africans. The remaining 60 per cent of the whole land area is Native Trust Land, where permits of occupancy may be granted to non-natives, providing this is in the interests of the community as a whole, on conditions identical with those applying to Africans, should Africans desire a form of tenure other than traditional.

The greater proportion of land reserved for European occupation in Southern Rhodesia compared to the other two territories should be considered in the light of the declared aim of the Colony to develop European settlement in the years to come to an extent far beyond the present. The rapid expansion of the African population (estimated at 400,000 in 1895 compared with to-day's total of 1¾ millions) has necessitated the application of measures to secure intensive land usage in the African Areas; but if the Colony is to carry within the present century, as has been forecast, a population of from ½ to 1 million Europeans, it is clear that, with over 70 per cent of the land in the European area already alienated, it will be necessary for similar measures to be taken for intensive farming of European-owned land and a considerable degree of sub-division of existing farms in the European Area. Over the same period the greatly increased pressure of the African population (estimated to double every 25 years) will require that large numbers must take up a permanently urbanised existence.[36]

It is clear that the policy of creating reserves especially for Africans defeats its own purpose in Central as in South Africa.

A further important point regarding the policy of separation as applied to Africans in Southern Rhodesia is that all

towns are classified as 'European areas'. Africans, therefore, from the legal point of view, have no right in the towns. They are there only as employees of Europeans and European-owned concerns. They are housed by their employers, on their own land if domestic servants, or in special 'Native townships' and village settlements. In Northern Rhodesia the law is different but the practice is in almost all respects the same. Towns are divided into European and African areas and employees are housed in a town location or on his employer's premises. A similar situation exists in Nyasaland where towns are divided into European, Asian, and African residential areas.[37]

The policy of separation has been applied to the ownership of land in Kenya. The alienation of land for European occupation has been a source of discontent for many years and is one of the main causes of the present disturbances among the Kikuyu.[38] Of the 225,000 square miles of Kenya about 40,000 are almost uninhabitable desert, another 110,000, or thereabouts, are at present either not used at all by man or only very thinly populated, mostly by nomads; 2000 is the coastal belt which presents problems of its own but is not directly concerned with present-day agrarian problems. This accounts for two-thirds of the total area of Kenya. The remaining third constitutes the agriculturally productive part of the colony, containing the main towns together with 90 per cent of the population of the territory.[39] In accordance with a White Paper of 1923 a large area, usually described as the 'White Highlands', has been allocated for exclusive ownership by Europeans who have a privileged position there. The exact boundaries of the area reserved for Europeans have been subject to much dispute, but it has been established by Order-in-Council at 16,700 miles, according to the recommendations of the Carter Commission of 1934.[40] The areas reserved for African ownership total 43,000 square miles. When it is remembered that Africans outnumber Europeans by 150 to 1 the disproportion of the allocation becomes obvious. This does not take into account the question of relative soil fertility. It has been variously estimated that

the White Highlands contain between a quarter and a half of the best land.[41] One of the most aggravating factors about land problems in Kenya has been the vacillating policy of the British government, which has resulted in large numbers of Africans living in a state of constant insecurity with regard to their occupation of land, to say nothing of the dislocation following from the dispossession of Africans. When gold was discovered on the Kavirondo African reserve in 1930 the area was immediately excluded from the reserve and no compensation paid to the inhabitants or equivalent land provided. Subsequent legislation enables some compensation to be paid, but for the far-reaching consequences of dislocation no remedy is available.[42]

In support of the procedure for securing the Highlands for European occupation is further legislation against the 'squatter' on European farm lands. Lord Hailey suggests that planters usually favour the continuance of the system which provides a supply of cheap labour, but that stock-owners are opposed to it as they fear the growth in numbers and the illicit movement of the squatters' cattle. By an Ordinance of 1912 district officials have the right to move back to the African reserves all those occupying unalienated Crown lands outside them, and there are severe penalties for vagrancy applicable to Africans who have left the reserves and who are not in employment.[43]

Although some land has been alienated to European occupation and ownership in Uganda and Tanganyika this is on a much smaller scale than in Kenya and does not present such serious difficulties. In West Africa it is recognized that all lands are the property of Africans themselves and that the State has no special rights. The land problem is confined therefore, as far as British colonial territories in Africa are concerned, to Kenya and Central Africa. It is not surprising, as Sir Philip Mitchell has pointed out, that

> Africans in congested districts should look with covetous eyes upon neighbouring land owned by European farmers, and should regard such land, plainly not suffering from congestion, as the solution to their problem, if only it could be made available for their occupa-

tion. It is equally to be expected that claims should be made to contiguous land as 'our land', firstly because of the age-old habit ... of meeting land congestion or exhaustion by moving on to the next piece of land not actually in cultivation (unless prevented by force by a tribe with rival claims); and second, in the case of the Kikuyu and in one or two other instances, because some of the land was in fact granted to early settlers to which there later proved to be some claim, valid or not, by neighbouring individuals or clans.[44]

Sir Philip goes on to criticize the view that 'Africa belongs to the Africans' and suggests that to provide a piece of land for every African would be no solution to the pressing problems of overcrowding, soil erosion, and low agricultural productivity that now exist throughout East Africa and Kenya in particular. He suggests that surplus population must be absorbed into paid employment either in agriculture or industry. If this is to be the policy in the future a great deal will depend upon the conditions of labour and remuneration that are to prevail and whether existing differentials between African and European employees are to be retained.

There is no doubt that in the course of the last fifty years the economy of Kenya, as of most of the British colonial territories in Africa, has been oriented towards the promotion of European prosperity, with little or no regard to the welfare of Africans. Despite the declaration in 1923 that African interests were to be regarded as paramount, land policies and labour legislation, while ostensibly aimed at promoting general economic prosperity, have done little to alleviate the continued poverty of Africans.[45] European agricultural enterprise has been assisted in many ways, while, until recently, that of Africans has been discouraged; a variety of means have been adopted to induce the African to seek employment in the European economy; and wages have been below subsistence level with wide differentials between Africans, Asians, and Europeans.

European economic enterprise in Kenya has benefited from the building of railways and roads to serve the White Highlands together with indirect subsidies in the form of reductions in railway freight rates for the export market as

well as direct subsidies and loans on a large scale. Discrimination against Africans was carried further when, at one period, the administration assisted the European coffee industry by placing obstacles in the way of the production of coffee by Africans, who were discouraged by local officers from planting coffee and sometimes persuaded to uproot bushes that had been planted.[46] This is no longer true to-day and African production of coffee and other crops for export is increasing, albeit slowly.[47]

The alienation of land in Kenya for the exclusive ownership and occupation of Europeans provided an initial source of labour from among the numbers of displaced persons thus created. As elsewhere in Africa, taxation provided a further means of encouraging Africans to seek employment. The 1907 Labour Rules laid down that administrative officers should do their best to 'encourage' Africans to seek employment, and this led to a good deal of abuse which was the subject of investigation by a commission in 1912. From time to time regulations were issued which permitted 'every possible lawful influence' and 'humane and properly regulated pressure' to be employed to make Africans go out and work for Europeans. As a result there grew up throughout urban districts of East and Central Africa a system of 'pass laws' similar in their operation to those already described in South Africa.

With regard to pass laws, in Central Africa it has been stated officially that 'as between Northern and Southern Rhodesia there is no practical difference in these requirements for the indigenous African. The Africans of both Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, however, complain bitterly of the pass laws of Southern Rhodesia.' The statement goes on in an attempt to justify the situation, saying, 'It is apparent that a territory like Southern Rhodesia with a number of large towns and industrial areas, and which therefore attracts large numbers of African visitors from other territories, must apply any pass laws it may have more intensively than must territories like Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland where non-indigenous African visitors are comparatively few.'[48] In Kenya, the system requiring Africans to

carry a *Kipande* or pass has been recently abolished and instead all races in Kenya carry a Registration Card, similar to the Identity Card issued in Britain during the war, but also bearing finger-prints. The introduction of the system was strongly opposed by some European settlers who considered it humiliating that they, too, should be required to have their finger-prints taken.

The use of pass laws is closely linked with the question of control and supply of labour. From the point of view of European settlers the relative shortage of labour has continued to be a problem to the present day and was particularly acute during and after the second world war when special regulations were issued. These have been examined by the International Labour Office and by a joint committee of the I.L.O. and the United Nations on forced labour.

Forced Labour and Conditions of Employment

A number of allegations regarding the existence of forced labour in territories administered by the United Kingdom were submitted to the committee when it made its investigations in 1953. These referred to the mass recruitment of Africans in Bechuanaland for work in mines; work on the groundnut scheme in Tanganyika; forced labour for failure to pay taxes in the Cameroons, Tanganyika, and Uganda; compulsory porterage in the Cameroons and Nigeria; compulsory labour in Kenya in war-time; conscription of labour in peace-time for industries in Kenya; compulsory labour for public works and services in Tanganyika; requisitioning of labour by indigenous authorities for communal works in Nigeria; compulsory employment in local land conservation work in Southern Rhodesia; forced convict labour in Nigeria; conscription of voluntarily unemployed persons in Kenya; together with a number of general allegations regarding forced labour in the Gambia, Gold Coast, Nigeria, Northern Rhodesia, and Sierra Leone.[49]

The majority of these allegations in the view of the committee were not substantiated, either because there was no

evidence of compulsion or because the number of people involved was so small as not to constitute a system of forced labour within the meaning of the committee's terms of reference. These suggested that such labour must play a significant part in the economy of the country concerned. The question of forced labour in Kenya and Tanganyika, however, was regarded with some concern by the committee. A previous I.L.O. report had drawn attention to the fact that by virtue of emergency regulations there were during the war some 18,000 forced labourers in Kenya and 39,000 in Tanganyika, together with others in Northern Rhodesia and Nigeria, and that these were employed by private employers in industry or agriculture.[50] The fact that the system was brought to an end in 1946 meant that it was outside the terms of reference of the committee sitting in 1953. Subsequent post-war legislation in Kenya which permitted the conscription of so-called 'voluntarily unemployed persons' was examined by the committee which concluded that, although the regulations appeared not to have been widely applied, they were capable of being applied in such a way as to result in a system of forced labour of some importance to the economy of Kenya.[51]

Throughout British colonial territories in Africa the non-European is employed at wages very much lower than those commanded by Europeans either at home or in the colonies. Economists, to say nothing of many enlightened employers, are now agreed on the real inefficiency of a low wage economy, particularly where earnings are not even sufficient to maintain health. Sir Philip Mitchell in the dispatch already mentioned draws attention to this problem as it affects the future economic development of East Africa.

> The East African Territories began their development as economically productive countries at a time when it was generally believed that cheapness of production must be the overriding consideration in the case of tropical raw materials and that it could only be achieved by low wages. The result has been a low wage economy and the consequent wasteful use of unskilled, often undernourished and general unhealthy labourers, of whom the majority

were temporary migrants from some distant tribal area, and from whom nothing but an excessively low standard of industry was expected. Although rates of wages together with other conditions of work have been improving steadily in the past few years, it is probably true to say that they are still to-day, in a strict sense, uneconomic, at any rate for the unskilled and semi-skilled labourer. By this I mean that the wages paid in cash, kind, or housing would, on a strict examination, be found to be less than what is necessary to maintain the worker as well as his dependants on a reasonable standard of living, and would be found also to contain an element of subsidy, more or less hidden, either from the general taxpayer or from ratepayers in towns, or from some other source. For example, the subsidy often comes from a holding of land in the worker's tribal area, where his wife and children subsist by depleting the value of the soil; or it may come by way of the subeconomic housing and services provided in many towns; or by the benevolence of persons outside East Africa, such as overseas Missions, or taxpayers in Britain who contribute through the Colonial Development and Welfare Act; or the hidden element may even be the gradual deterioration of the health of the worker and his family through malnutrition and bad living conditions. The output of work by the labourer may, of course, be worth no more than the uneconomic wage, but that is a different aspect of the problem.

Very closely tied up with the question of the wage level is the question of the efficiency or inefficiency of African workers. Generally speaking, labour in East Africa can at present be credited only with a low standard of output and skill, although there are notable exceptions: for instance, the output on a man/day basis in the Mombasa docks is about double that in Great Britain, and the Railway Workshops in Nairobi would probably compare favourably in this respect with shops in more advanced countries. Inefficiency where it exists may be partly due to ill health or malnutrition, to habits of management deriving from the years of abundant 'cheap' labour and other contributory causes, and to the high value which Africans attach to leisure; but it is certainly also due to inexperience of urban conditions and industrial employment, and perhaps also, in some measure at any rate, to the general low wage economy.[52]

An official inquiry into wages in Kenya published in February 1954 maintained that Africans in urban areas were not paid enough to provide basic needs of health,

decency, and working efficiency. The report recommended an immediate wage increase of ten shillings a month and the introduction of new housing allowances. It was urged that in January 1955 a new urban wage formula should be introduced raising minimum wages and housing allowances from 59*s.* 50 cents to 81*s.* per month. (Interim increases in minimum wages and allowances were in fact introduced soon after the publication of the report.) The investigating committee considered that the basic wages should be calculated to take into account the needs of a family man and not a bachelor. It considered that if an efficient African labour force in urban areas were to be created it must cease to maintain ties with the reserves and become a stable urban population.[53]

The problem of African labour efficiency was examined by Dr C. H. Northcott in an investigation carried out among 6000 employees of the Kenya and Uganda railway in 1949.[54] The report draws attention to the fact that while African wages have risen they have not kept pace with the rising cost of living. It is pointed out that the African salary scales were then assessed on the basis of 50 per cent of the salary scales for corresponding Asian posts and that the ratio between Asian and European is as 55 : 100 under the same conditions. In fact African wage-rates, which are frequently paid partly in kind, are insufficient to maintain the employee in good health, and completely inadequate to keep his family as well. The report draws attention to the meagre provision of schools for African children, both in rural and urban areas, which reduces the opportunity for acquiring skill and advancement in a trade. Not only is there serious malnutrition but the medical report draws attention to the hours of work and the distance from home which prevents many Africans from obtaining meals at the proper times. European ignorance of African attitudes and feelings is commented upon, as well as the deteriorating relationships between Europeans and Africans. One of the most significant comments came from the physician in the team, Dr H. C. Trowell, who referred to the psychological strains as well as the purely

physical ones which inhibit efficiency. 'Sitting and listening to the workers' conversation led one to feel the need for expert and prolonged investigation. How far is this unnatural sexual life a strain? Is there much debt? How many relatives do these African workers support? What tensions lie below the surface? In this connexion it does not appear to me that a doctor can make many accurate observations, but he can assert that the cause of poor work-output is more mental than physical. Malnutrition and disease play their part, but, sitting and talking with the workers in their homes, one became aware of a very grave discontent which, unless constructively guided and relieved, may well threaten the civil peace. The mood is one of resentment and disappointment, and has the appearance of being ominous. When asked to state their grievances they return with monotonous regularity to the questions of wages and poverty.'[55] Read in the light of subsequent events in Kenya this passage is prophetic.

A similar situation to that described by Dr Northcott and his colleagues exists in Central Africa where the position of the African in industry is further aggravated by the attitude of Europeans in Northern and Southern Rhodesia towards the employment of Africans as skilled workers. Africans in Southern Rhodesia are debarred by the practical working of the Industrial Conciliation Act, 1945, from employment under certain 'employers in the industry', in Southern Rhodesian municipal areas. These restrictions are not the direct result of legislation but of the operations of the European employees in their trade union bargaining with employers. A similar situation exists over the Rhodesian railway system in Northern Rhodesia and throughout the copper mines. There, by agreement between the European employees in their trade unions and the employers, Africans are debarred from all but a scheduled list of skilled and semi-skilled jobs. Outside these industries Africans throughout the Federation are employed at any rates which the employer cares to give them, but these are always substantially below equivalent rates for Europeans or Asians, although in Nyasaland

there is not as yet any rigid 'colour-bar' as in the Rhodesias.[56]

Further consequences of the Industrial Conciliation Act in Southern Rhodesia follow from the fact that the term 'employee' as used in the act specifically excludes 'Natives'. As a result it is not possible to register an African trade union under the Act and a special Native Labour Boards Act deals with African workers. Until recently the question of Africans joining a registered trade union had not arisen, since the unions confined their membership to those who had served an apprenticeship period in a particular trade and it would be almost impossible for an African to find a European willing to apprentice him. In fact, early in 1954 the Southern Rhodesian government held that the Rhodesian Guild of Journalists could not remain as a registered trade union because it had one African member and ordered it to amend its constitution so as to forbid membership to non-Europeans. The one African member of the Guild was Mr M. M. Hove, a member of the Federal Parliament. However, after representations had been made from various quarters the government eventually withdrew its objection. In other professions and industries objections to the employment of Africans are so strong that it will be many years before the precedent thus established has any wider influence. (See Postscript.)

There have been some indications recently that European trade unions in the copper belt may be prepared to relax their restrictions upon the entry of Africans into skilled employment so long as satisfactory guarantees can be provided that Africans so employed will not undercut Europeans and lower standards of living. However, it is difficult to see, at the present time, how Africans can compete on equal terms with Europeans unless extensive facilities are made available for general education to a higher standard and for vocational training. Throughout East and Central Africa the amount spent per head on the education of African children is only a fraction of that spent on the education of Europeans.[57] So long as the productivity and earning power of Africans is so low they cannot contribute a proportionate amount per head

in taxation, and Europeans have yet to reconcile themselves to any considerable redistribution of incomes between Europeans and Africans by means of taxation. As it is, Africans already contribute more than their share in this way. Throughout East and Central Africa income tax is at a much lower level than is now the case in Britain. As in the Union of South Africa, the indigenous population pay a poll tax rather than a tax upon income, and only in Northern Rhodesia is this on a graduated basis. In addition, indirect taxation must also be taken into account which, by its very nature, causes the greatest hardship to the poorer sections of the community.[58]

In West Africa there have been no permanent Europeans to compete with the African, either as employees or producers, and in the Gold Coast, for example, Africans have benefited considerably from the boom in cocoa prices in recent years. Nevertheless, Africans still receive very low wages whether in European or African employment. The real problem in West Africa is how to ensure that profits are reinvested in the countries concerned for the benefit of the African population.[59] High prices, low wages, and unemployment have combined with nationalist aspirations to precipitate serious strikes and disturbances in both the Gold Coast and Nigeria since the end of the second world war. While economic factors have also played an important part in creating recent disturbance in other territories, it is interesting to compare the underlying causes of unrest in the West African territories with those applicable in East and Central Africa.

STRIKES DISTURBANCES AND TERRORISM

Enough has been said regarding the origins of social conflict in culture contacts and social change. It remains to examine some of the immediately precipitating causes of conflicts that have actually resulted, not merely in the use of coercion by one side or the other, but often in the perpetration of violence. Disturbances and rebellions on a varying scale have

been a familiar part of British colonial history during the last hundred and fifty years. It is only in more recent years that these disturbances have reflected the complex social, economic, and political changes that are taking place in the daily lives of Africans themselves. In this sense recent expressions of unrest and discontent in British colonial territories in Africa are often, although not always, comparable with the activities of the British working-class movement in the early part of the nineteenth century. It is the struggle for improved standards of living and political representation in which questions of racial differences are merely incidental, although aggravating, factors. This is very clearly illustrated in the case of the disturbances in the Gold Coast in 1948 and in Nigeria in 1949 and 1953.

Disorders in West Africa

Disturbances occurred in various parts of the Gold Coast, but particularly in Accra, in February and March of 1948, in the course of which 29 people were killed and 237 injured. A Commission of Inquiry was sent out to discover the underlying causes of the disturbances and to make recommendations.[60] The report remarked at the outset upon the suspicion which surrounded government activity of any sort and suggested that this could not be attributed to any one particular grievance. The causes were complex and inter-related but may be divided into three broad categories, political, economic, and social. 'The remedy', says the report, 'for the distrust and suspicion with which the African views the European and which is to-day poisoning life in the Gold Coast demands an attack on all three causes. None of them can be said to take precedence.' There follows a list of some sixteen items which the Commissioner considered needed examination. Among the main ones were the dissatisfaction of returning ex-service men with rates of disability pension, levels of wages, opportunities for employment, general social conditions, and poor housing. There was also a shortage of consumer goods and indignation at the high price of imported

goods, against which an active boycott was waged. There was also discontent at alleged discrimination against small producers of timber, seeking rail and other transport, which put them at a considerable disadvantage in relation to the larger (European owned) combines. There was discontent because the 'Africanization' of government services was not proceeding as rapidly as was hoped and because the expatriation allowances paid to European government and other employees were pensionable emoluments. This really meant that there was a disguised form of discrimination in the rates of pay for higher ranking officials, since Africans did not qualify for the additional allowances. Finally, there was some concern at the increasing number of Levantine and Asian immigrants whose 'apparent rise from poverty to wealth in a comparatively short period of time had caused much heartburning.' Underlying all these complaints was the feeling that Africans should be given a greater measure of responsibility as far as the government of the country was concerned.

All things put together, the time was obviously ripe for an explosive outburst of some kind, and in the opinion of the Commission political agitators were not slow to take advantage of the situation. When the Commission began its investigations they found two matters exercising the public mind to a disturbing degree:

'(i) it was asserted, and we have no doubt profoundly believed by a large number of citizens who were not necessarily disaffected, that the rioting and looting which began in Accra on 28th February, 1948, was the spontaneous eruption of a population frenzied by the shooting of innocent ex-servicemen;

(ii) the continued detention of six leaders of the United Gold Coast Convention without a trial on any specific criminal charge was a source of disquiet even among sections of the community unfamilar with the meaning of the "liberty of the subject".'

The Commission examined these two questions in considerable detail. In their view the shooting was necessary to

prevent a lawless mob from storming the Governor's residence. The subsequent disorders, while they may have been aggravated by this incident, were more directly related to the disappointment of the people at finding, after the lifting of the boycott, that prices of goods in the shops had not been reduced, at any rate as much as they had been given to understand they would be. On this point the Commission was very critical of the government.

We are unable to absolve the Government of the Gold Coast at this period from the strongest criticism for its inaction. The reason may not be far to seek. Among the foreign trading community in the Colony, there has long existed a conviction that the indigenous people, by reason of tribalization and mutual distrust, are unable successfully to combine effectively for any single purpose. We should have thought that the successful boycott and 'hold up' of cocoa carried out in 1937, which resulted in the Nowell Commission, would have cured everyone of this fallacy. Unfortunately it still appeared to dominate trading circles and we think it had permeated the Administration. We say this because the first reaction of the Government to the boycott was to declare in effect that it was a purely trading dispute in which the Government, as such, must remain neutral. We cannot emphasize too strongly our view that every economic aspect of life in a colony, affecting the welfare of the indigenous population, is a concern of the highest priority to the tutelary Government of that colony. The people did not believe that the Government was not involved in this dispute. It has become known that, in place of more vigorous methods of price control for textiles, the Government had come to an agreement in 1945 with the importing firms on the retail margins which were to be charged on textiles. This was agreed at 75 per cent gross overall margin above the landed cost. Although this appears to be a high margin it will be appreciated that it was agreed on the understanding that profits on textiles were to be used to compensate for dealings in the less profitable but more essential goods.

There had been ample warning of impending trouble. In December, 1946, the Joint Provincial Council of Chiefs had met the Chamber of Commerce in presence of the Acting Colonial Secretary to complain about the high prices of imported goods and to ask for a fairer system of distribution. Later in the same month the Council was assured that a tentative scheme of price control had been worked out. The importing firms stated that they were

placing larger quantities of goods for direct sale in the stores instead of indirectly through other distributors. No further action was taken until a year later.

In our view the question raised by the boycott was one calling for immediate Government investigation, if need be, by public enquiry. The charge was clear: it was being alleged that importers and particularly those associated with the hated organization which flourished under the name of the Association of West African Merchants (A.W.A.M.) were deliberately keeping up prices of essential commodities to an outrageous extent. If that were true the Government had the power to requisition them, and it had a duty so to act. But the Government took no action and the suspicion not unnaturally grew up that, at all material times, there was some private arrangement between the powerful importers (principally those represented by A.W.A.M.) and the Government whereby they were permitted to do as they pleased. We need hardly say that we are satisfied no such fantastic state of affairs ever existed, but we feel that the Government itself must be accounted responsible for the growth of this suspicion by reason of its failure to take positive steps either to clear the importers of this charge by impartial enquiry or by taking some robust positive action to prevent its continuance if true.

The Government indeed took no positive steps to deal with the boycott until 11th February, 1948, when a series of meetings between the Chambers of Commerce, the Nii Bonne Committee and the Chiefs, under the chairmanship of the Colonial Secretary, was arranged. As a result an agreement was reached whereby the gross overall profit margin to be charged by importers for cotton piece goods other than those for which maximum prices were established, was to be reduced from 75 per cent to 50 per cent for a trial period of three months. Upon this undertaking the boycott was called off.

We cannot help feeling that the announcement of this agreement was so framed as to lead to the greatest public disappointment. As we point out in our observations on Public Relations, we are dealing here with a country largely illiterate and with no objective press. We have not the slightest doubt that the way in which the agreement in question reached masses of the public was in a form calculated to suggest that the price of all the commodities affected was being reduced almost by half. The disillusionment which followed the discovery that prices were only marginally affected must have been intense. We have little doubt that it helped considerably to prepare the ground for the resentment which mani-

fested itself in the looting and useless destruction which later took place in Accra and elsewhere.[61]

The Commission concluded its report with a number of recommendations for political and constitutional reform which led to the setting up of the Coussey committee and the subsequent changes in the constitution to which reference has been made in a preceding chapter.[62]

It is interesting to compare the disturbances in the Gold Coast in 1948 with those which occurred after a shooting incident at Enugu colliery in Nigeria in November 1949, which were also investigated by a special Commission of Inquiry.[63] In this case the Commission were of the view that 'the Chief Commissioner, and the Committee of Officers, who advised him, erred in diagnosing and treating the miners' dispute as a political agitation rather than – what in our opinion it was – an industrial dispute.' This confusion of economic with political objectives frequently occurs in colonial situations but it is not confined to them. Similar incidents were characteristic of the economic history of Britain, America, and elsewhere, and are typical of that stage in industrial development when trade unions are still barely recognized. There is a tendency in such circumstances for the political authority to associate itself with the interests of employers rather than employees, in a misplaced attempt to maintain 'law and order'. This is clearly illustrated by the events in Nigeria. As the Commission pointed out, trade unionism in Nigeria is not of native growth but was planted on the people by the British administration as part of the industrial system. There was, therefore, a special obligation on the government to build it up on proper lines.

> The problem should have been approached with the same enthusiasm, idealism, and faith which built up the Native Administration. We fear that not all the technical departments were imbued with that faith and idealism. There is undoubtedly some substance in the charge of the witness Adio-Moses, who struck us as one of the few responsible types of Trade Union leaders, that although the necessary laws were placed on the statute book there was no spirit behind them. The fine administrative service of Nigeria was

trained in a different school and brought up in a different tradition. Few effective steps were taken to attune to the new trends which called for a very different approach.[64]

The actual events, which set off a chain of disturbances in other parts of the colony, occurred in the Iva valley when the police endeavoured to protect the removal of a quantity of explosives which they were afraid might get into the hands of agitators. The Commission concluded that there was no evidence that the striking miners were in league with the agitators. The reason why the miners objected to the removal of the explosives was that there would then have been nothing in the way of the management closing the mine and effecting a 'lock-out'. The report criticizes the inadequate arrangements that were made for the removal of the explosives, which meant that the police were kept hanging about for hours while tempers were frayed and tension was rising. The attitude of the crowd became more and more hostile and menacing and appeared as if it might get out of control. Eventually the police officer in charge felt compelled to give the order to fire at the crowd. The report continues:

We cannot refrain from the comment that Mr P... did not appear to have complete control over his men. The evidence is that the fire power that he intended to exert over the miners was that of three men. This would have been in accordance with usual police procedure; however, not only did the three men execute the order but firing also took place from ranks all along the line and on the hill as well, and when the cease fire was given it was only the prompt action, which we commend, of Mr B... (another officer) in going along the ranks and knocking up the rifles of the individual policemen that caused them to cease fire and thus prevented what might have been an even more lamentable loss of life.

The report was very doubtful whether the order to fire should have been given in the first place. The Commission concluded that Mr P... had made an error of judgement and that he should have waited at least until a definite physical act of obstruction to the police had been made.

Some evidence was given that the mob was armed. Again analysing this evidence, we are forced to the conclusion that the

only weapons possessed by the miners were sticks which they always carry for walking on that sloping ground, and the implements of mining, such as pick-handles and picks. Some may also have carried matchets, but this would have no particular significance, because it is usual for many Africans in that part of the country to carry matchets. What is significant is this, that that crowd was assembled there for some hours and yet there appears to have been no attempt whatever to use any force against the Police. Not one policeman was injured, not one missile was thrown at them. At the lower ground level near the magazine door there were three policemen completely cut off; there were others on top of the magazine who were also at the mercy of overwhelmingly superior numbers. It is true that there is some evidence that they were struggling, but if the crowd were bent on using force against the Police, nothing could have saved those policemen from grave injury, whereas in fact they were not injured at all. Yet this was one of the main contributory factors which decided Mr P... to open fire. We feel bound to state that the report made by the Police to the Chief Commissioner and later published, that the Police were attacked by a lot of armed miners, was not substantiated by the evidence.[65]

Further disturbances involving violence and looting subsequently broke out at Aba, Port Harcourt, and Onitsha, ostensibly in protest against the treatment of the miners, but the Commission concluded that there had undoubtedly been political agitation behind them.

The Commission examined the long history of industrial disputes which had characterized the Enugu colliery, which is government owned and managed, since the end of the war. In addition to criticizing the administration for an unsympathetic handling of industrial relations it criticized the poor quality of trade union leadership. The principal recommendations concerned the need for a system of conciliation independent of the government; for more responsible trade union leadership; for better safety and health precautions and improvement of wages in the industry; for a better system of public relations and a greater sense of responsibility on the part of the press.

Further disturbances broke out in Nigeria in 1953 and 1954. The most serious were those in 1953 at Kano in the

Northern Provinces which appear to have been a direct outcome of the political crisis at that time. This concerned the 'Action Group's' motion for self-government in 1956, which was strongly opposed by the Moslem community in the north who were afraid that they would be brought under the rule of Christians and pagans in the south. In reply to a question the Secretary of State for Colonial Affairs made the following statement regarding the riots:

I wish first to deny statements that special leave was granted to native administration staff on the day of the riots and that fighting was welcomed, and, indeed, instigated by British officials in collaboration with certain Northern Nigerians. These allegations are wholly untrue. I want also to make it plain that there were no attacks on Action Group leaders and that no evidence has been forthcoming from any source that any such organized attacks were planned. The Lieutenant-Governor was aware of the tension caused by the visit of the Action Group leaders and on Friday, May 15th, all police in Kano were put on the alert. Further special precautions, involving the posting of an additional 260 men in seven riot-units, were taken on May 16th when the Native Authority withdrew all permits issued for political meetings.

As the first acts of hooliganism took place over a wide area the existing police strength was insufficient to restore order, and further substantial reinforcements were brought into Kano throughout the following day. All the major rioting took place after the police had been greatly strengthened. Had these reinforcements not been available damage and casualties would no doubt have been much greater. According to the latest reports, casualties total 46 killed and 205 treated or admitted to hospital: damage to property was small.

A rigorous administrative inquiry into the disturbance is already in progress, and in the light of its outcome the Nigerian Government will consider whether a formal inquiry should be instituted. Meanwhile every opportunity has been and is being taken to impress the need for tolerance and calmness on all sections of the population.[66]

The Colonial Secretary subsequently reported that 100 arrests were made and 52 persons were sentenced to imprisonment on conviction.

Central Africa

There was considerable unrest in Central Africa during 1953, which took a number of forms. There were industrial disputes in the copper belt of Northern Rhodesia, together with a passive resistance movement in protest against the 'colour-bar' in hotels, post-offices, and elsewhere and against Central African Federation. In Nyasaland, hitherto noted for relatively harmonious racial relations, there were passive resistance movements in protest against federation, and against increased rents among tenants in the Cholo district and elsewhere in the Shire Highlands. In several cases the passive resistance campaigns degenerated into violence and rioting. Southern Rhodesia appears to have been remarkably free from actual disturbances although there was a certain amount of unrest. Federation was not such a serious issue among Africans in Southern Rhodesia, who had less to lose than those in the other two territories. Nevertheless in a report tabled in September 1953 the Chief Native Commissioner in Southern Rhodesia stated, 'The public, both European and African, do not realize how much their peace of mind depends upon the tactful handling of the complex problems that daily face the administrative officers. ... Labouring under great difficulties caused by lack of personnel, and hampered by insufficient funds voted to the division for the adequate carrying out of its important duties, the entire staff have earned the thanks of the Colony for the fact that there had been no incident.' The report went on to say that there had been some deterioration in the urban areas in the attitude of certain Africans to Europeans.[67] Early in 1954 a serious industrial dispute involving 9000 workers broke out in the Wankie coalfields, Southern Rhodesia.

Industrial disputes in the copper belt of Northern Rhodesia also occurred. These are not new phenomena. Serious disturbances occurred as long ago as 1935 and again in 1940. Both incidents were the subject of an intensive investigation.[68] It was recognized then that, in addition to low wages, one of the main grievances was the attitude of the European trade-

union which would not allow Africans to be employed in skilled work. The question has been examined on several occasions since, notably by the Dalgleish Commission of 1948 which strongly recommended that Africans should be up-graded, where they were clearly capable of doing the more skilled work.[69] The report has never been implemented and is still resisted by the European mineworkers, despite the apparent willingness of some to try the experiment. Two further matters caused disputes between the African mine-workers and the employers during 1953. The first concerned a demand for an increase of 2*s.* 6*d.* per shift, which was met with an offer in the region of 4*d.* per shift from the employers. The matter eventually went to arbitration and the African workers were awarded an additional 1*s.* 6*d.* per shift – an increase of nearly 50 per cent on previous earnings. The second dispute concerned the unwillingness of employers to deduct from wages the increased union subscription of 2*s.* 6*d.* per month. Previous subscriptions which had been automatically deducted by the employers had been only 6*d.* per month. The increased levy would have given the African mine-workers' union a monthly income of £3000, which is roughly equal to that of the much smaller European union, with a monthly subscription of 10*s.*

In June 1953, a systematic campaign of protest against discrimination and separation in various public places in the copper belt of Northern Rhodesia was conducted. Shops which serve Africans through a window, banks and post-offices with separate entrances, hotels and restaurants which normally refuse service to Africans, and similar places were entered by groups of Africans, in an orderly manner. When service was refused they left after making their protest. Although crowds gathered to watch the demonstrations and extra police were on duty, no disorderly incidents of any kind were reported. In some post-offices, at least, it was reported that the barrier between the counters was subsequently removed.[70] The campaign was concentrated on Lusaka and Kitewe. Protests against federation in Northern Rhodesia took the form of a strike and a 'day of prayer' by

government and other employees. There were also reports of unrest in the rural areas of the Gwembe valley where near famine conditions were said to exist, but where the Africans were resisting the introduction of more efficient farming methods and not co-operating with government officials. Elsewhere there were reports of non-co-operation in the enforcement of fishing regulations. This was attributed, rightly or wrongly, to political agitators opposed to federation.

By far the most serious disturbances occurred in Nyasaland. Eighty-two African chiefs associated themselves with the Nyasaland African Congress in organizing a campaign of non-co-operation with the government in protest against the proposed inclusion of the territory in a Central African Federation. The measures included a withdrawal of representatives from District, Provincial, and Legislative Councils together with various advisory committees; withdrawal of workers in government service, as well as from private employment in agriculture and industry; the non-payment of taxes, and the boycott of European markets and stores. The chiefs felt that they could not go on performing the duties of Native Authority and acting as agents of a government they had come to mistrust. Many resigned and others were suspended by the government. The chiefs went out of their way to repudiate violence, although they were unable to prevent some disturbances breaking out.[71] Perhaps the most unfortunate events were those arising out of the arrest of Chief Gomani. The Rev. Michael Scott who was in Nyasaland and with the chief at the time has written an account of the events which presents a vivid picture of what can only be described as a tragic situation.[72] As Scott points out, the story of Philip Gomani is one which may bring home to others the conflict that is going on in the minds of many Africans, confronted with the choice between violent and non-violent ways of expressing their grievances. It is important that not all forms of African opposition are classified as 'violence and disorder'. Chief Gomani served loyally under British administration as Paramount Chief of the Angoni for thirty-two years. In the minds of many he is

guilty of dangerous sedition. 'In the minds of others he is a gallant old man trying by the only means left to him to interpret what he had learned of Christianity from Britain, into a form of action which would not destroy so many of the values which he had seen created by Britain, and himself helped to create in his own land. In this we see the first attempt by an African tribe, descendants of the Zulus, a warrior people by tradition, to resist without violence.'[73]

When it was officially announced that federation had been 'decided upon' (although in fact the Enabling Bill had not yet been passed by Parliament) Chief Gomani instructed his people to oppose the imposition of federation by various measures of non-co-operation. Officials tried to persuade the chief to cancel his advice but he refused, and eventually he was suspended as Native Authority and ordered to leave his district in twenty-four hours. Instead Chief Gomani remained with his family and many of his people until police came to take him away. The chief wanted to speak to his people before he went but he was not allowed to. Many people gathered round the house and surrounded the police-car while the chief, who could not walk without support because he suffered from Huntington's chorea, moved towards it. 'When the Chief had been brought to within a few feet of the car, the Police Commissioner, apparently thinking that it would be impossible to get him into the car, blew his whistle and the police began to launch a tear-gas attack. (It afterwards transpired that the African Askaris had refused to make a baton charge.) The tear gas was thrown amongst the crowd, who did not know what it was, and believed it to be poisonous. They scuttled and the chief was hustled into the car and driven away.' Later he was rescued by some of his tribesmen and eventually made his way into Portuguese territory where many of the chief's tribe reside. Subsequently, the chief returned to British territory, where he was taken to hospital to await trial. Some time later a *nolle prosequi* was entered in his case, but the Rev. Michael Scott was declared a prohibited immigrant, and deported to England.[74] Chief Gomani died in exile a year later.

The events described above occurred in the middle of May 1953. During the weeks that followed, many prominent chiefs resigned from the office of Native Authority in protest against the arrest of Chief Gomani, including Chief Mwase, chairman of the Supreme Council of Chiefs and Congress and one of the most influential chiefs in Nyasaland. Protest meetings were held in many parts and tear-gas bombs and batons were used by the police to disperse them. Chief Mwase was quoted as saying: 'The government is now creating everlasting hatred between black and white – a thing which was beyond our knowledge and feeling that it could happen in this country'.

Further disorder broke out in Nyasaland during August and September 1953, this time in connexion with the African tenancy system in operation in the Shire Highlands, particularly in the Cholo district, where there are a number of large European-owned plantations. There are less than 500 Europeans resident there, but some 500,000 Africans. The density of population is greater than anywhere else in the protectorate. There are a small group of local inhabitants who were there when the Europeans first arrived at the end of the nineteenth century, but the majority are immigrants who have been encouraged to come and work on the European plantations. Africans who are not employed on the plantations are required to pay rent for their land. The amount of the rent is fixed by legislation in proportion to the level of wages earned in the area. Towards the end of 1952 the amount was increased from £1 per year per adult to £2 12*s*. 6*d*. to conform with higher wages. According to an official statement issued in September 1953 there is congestion and consequent land hunger in certain areas which has been the cause from time to time of minor demonstrations on the part of Africans concerned. This, it was claimed, had led to a deterioration of the 'former happy relations between landlord and tenant' but the main blame for the disturbances was placed upon 'political agitators'. In actual fact the problem of land ownership has been a source of discontent in the Shire Highlands for many years. As in Kenya

there has been controversy over the validity of European claims to the land which Africans claim was merely offered to Europeans for occupation and not ownership. They ask the Europeans to produce their receipts from the chiefs, if, as is claimed, the land was purchased. This has not been done, and in fact the Europeans can only offer Certificates of Claim issued by the first Consul-General, which take the place of title-deeds.[75]

The unsatisfactory nature of the whole situation and the danger of agitations and disturbances was remarked upon by several independent observers and investigators including the East Africa Commission of 1924, by other inquiries in 1943, and after disturbances in 1945, following evictions for non-payment of rent. The whole question of land in Nyasaland was investigated by Sir Sidney Abrahams in 1946, when he recognized the need to 'satisfy the sense of grievance' which existed, particularly in view of the fact that not all the land alienated to Europeans is in actual cultivation. The disturbances in 1953 began in Cholo and spread to other areas. The government used police and troops with armoured cars, guns, batons, and tear gas to suppress the disorders which occurred. Africans, for their part, were responsible for building road-blocks, destroying bridges, and stoning the police and troops.

A Commission of Inquiry was set up to investigate the disturbances in the Southern Province of Nyasaland, but it dealt only with two incidents at Luchenza and Cholo and not with subsequent disturbances which resulted in eleven Africans being killed and many injured and arrested. The report refers in passing to the underlying discontent regarding rents and land problems, but considers the precipitating cause of the disturbances was the rumour, which it claims was unfounded, that a European farmer had murdered two Africans. The Commission considered that shooting at Luchenza was due to two African policemen both accidently firing shots because of their inexperience in handling firearms.[76]

The disturbances which occurred during 1953 in Central

Africa may appear to have been on a relatively small scale, but their significance should not be under-estimated. Unless legitimate grievances are attended to promptly the consequences may be as serious as they have proved to be in East Africa.

East Africa

There was a certain amount of unrest in Uganda in 1949 and again after the suspension from office of the Kabaka of Buganda, but it did not assume serious proportions until later. The original state of emergency was concluded at the end of March 1954, but a second was proclaimed at the beginning of June, when three vernacular newspapers were suspended. In announcing the governor's action the Colonial Secretary stated:

> Towards the end of April the Uganda National Congress called for a three months' buying boycott of everything but bare necessities. The boycott started fairly peaceably, but during the last week members of the public have been forcibly prevented from selling and buying goods, cases have been reported of people being compelled to return goods which they have bought, and coffee trees belonging to people who have ignored the boycott have been cut down. Intimidation has greatly increased and criminal elements have been taking advantage of the situation.

There can be little doubt that the banishment of the Kabaka had serious social and psychological effects on the Baganda, for whom the Kabaka had profound symbolic significance. He was not only a political and spiritual head of his people but a father figure whose psychological influence was important. It is hardly surprising in the circumstances that the Baganda were reluctant to join in the celebrations of the Queen's visit to Uganda. Mr E. M. K. Mulira, a Baganda who came to London to advise the Kabaka, was reported as saying: 'The happy racial relationships which have for many years been the pride of Uganda have been ruined. Today Africans will not mix with Europeans.' This view was confirmed by the Church Missionary

Society which is active in the colony. A bulletin issued by the Society at the end of May 1954 stated: 'A direct result of the unhappy state of affairs obtaining in Buganda today is that not only have congregations in many churches shrunk almost to vanishing point, but social relations between Black and White in the church have been in many cases seriously affected'. It is notable that despite all this unrest there was singularly little violence and, up to the end of June 1954, there were no disturbances. Nevertheless, the Special Constabulary and troops were in readiness. (See Postscript.)

In Tanganyika, a serious grievance concerning some 3000 members of the Wameru tribe was brought to the attention of the Trusteeship Council and considered in July 1952. The following account of the complaint was subsequently published by the United Nations:

Taking up the Wameru petition on June 30, the Council heard an oral presentation of the case by Earle E. Seaton, who appeared as legal representative of the Wameru. Since time immemorial the Wameru had lived on the pleasant and healthy slopes of Meru Mountain. Land on the lower slopes was less fertile and in part infested by the tsetse fly. Between 1899 and 1914 much of the Wameru land had been alienated by the German colonizers. When, after the First World War, Tanganyika was entrusted to the United Kingdom under the Mandates System, it was realized that the alienation of Wameru lands by the Germans had been carried out without sufficient regard for the rights or needs of the tribespeople. Accordingly, the Wameru were allowed to purchase, at a total cost of £5,453, two farms in the Engare Nanyuku and Arusha districts. The tribe also paid a land tax to the Administering Authority and were assured that these lands would forever belong to the tribe.

Recounting the steps leading up to the Tanganyika Government's land resettlement plan, Mr Seaton recalled that in 1946 a Commission was set up by Judge Mark Wilson to study the distribution of alienated and tribal lands in the Arusha area and to make recommendations for the redistribution of such lands to improve the homogeneity of tribal lands and to afford relief from congestion in the area. As a result of the Commission's report in 1947, the Administering Authority decided to remove the Wameru from certain areas, including the two farms they had purchased

twelve years earlier. The Government's decision was first announced to the tribe at a baraza on June 7th, 1949. The tribespeople at once protested and said they could not agree. In August, 1951, they petitioned the United Nations to request the Administering Authority not to carry out its land scheme and subsequently appealed to the British Colonial Secretary and to the Visiting Mission to the territory.

Despite the tribe's petition and various appeals, Mr Seaton said that in November 1951 the Administering Authority sent seven European officers, 66 armed African police, and about one hundred Kenya labourers to remove the people from their lands by force. Cows, sheep, and goats were driven away; household goods and moveable property removed or burnt; all houses, cattle pens, and storage sheds were razed to the ground. The Wameru did not try to resist but sat a little distance away as 'passive spectators'. In the shock and confusion one old man died, several pregnant women suffered miscarriages and large numbers of cattle and livestock were lost.

In March 1951, Mr Seaton continued, the Tanganyika Official Gazette announced a scheme for the re-alienation of the lands from which the Wameru had been evicted. According to this, the Government proposed to divide the 78,000 acres of the two farms involved into 13 units of varying size, each to be given to a European settler and to be held on 99 year leaseholds.[77]

The United Kingdom representative in defending the action of the Administering Authority emphasized that the proposed transfer was in the interests of the Wameru tribe in the long run since it was designed to improve the quality of stock-raising in the territory. The Trusteeship Council passed a comprehensive resolution on the subject which, among other things, expressed regret at the forcible evictions, asked the Administering Authority to relieve the hardships suffered by the tribe during their removal, and to compensate them generously for the losses they had sustained. The Council considered that in future schemes the Administering Authority should be guided by the principle that African communities settled on the land should not be moved to other areas unless a clear expression of their collective consent had been obtained. The Council also recommended the intensification of an educational campaign to convince the tribes-

people of the desirability of reducing congestion in the tribal area by movement to the new expansion regions.[78]

Tanganyika was also affected by the civil war among the Kikuyu which originated in Kenya. Some of the tribes on the border between the two territories are closely related to the Kikuyu of Kenya. Members of the Kikuyu tribe sometimes fled across the border in attempting to escape from government forces. The main disturbances, however, were concentrated among Kikuyu in Kenya and efforts were made to prevent the spread of disaffection among other tribes.

Civil War in Kenya

The recent disturbances in Kenya have been attributed to a secret society to which the name *Mau Mau* has been applied. The term has been so widely used and accepted that it is difficult to realize that its origin and meaning have never been clearly explained. Various theories have been put forward, but none has succeeded in tracing the term to its source. Whether or not an organization actually called *Mau Mau* really existed, the fact remains that a well-organized terrorist body is at work among the Kikuyu, which is aiming at the overthrow of European domination and has been responsible for the death of many 'loyal' Kikuyu in the process. The existence of secret-oath-taking groups who were strongly anti-European and anti-Christian was known as far back as 1949 and they probably existed much earlier. It was not until 1952 that these groups began to use violence in the pursuit of their ends to any considerable extent. But by October 1952 their activities had reached a scale which necessitated the declaration of a state of emergency and the commencement of an anti-*Mau Mau* campaign, which assumed the proportions of a major military operation.[79]

Enough has been said already regarding the disruptive effects of the rapid social changes set in motion by contacts between African and European cultures. It remains to ask why this campaign of violence should have broken out among the Kikuyu and not among other tribes and peoples.

It must be appreciated, after all, that the Kikuyu are a tribe of approximately a million people out of the five million Africans in Kenya. Half the Kikuyu have left the Reserve and gone to work in the White Highlands or in the towns. The problem of land and population has been especially acute among the Kikuyu and has been aggravated by a sense of grievance, because it is claimed that much of the land now incorporated into the White Highlands had previously belonged to the Kikuyu, although, at the time that Europeans occupied it, the land was temporarily out of use owing to a serious plague which had affected men and beasts alike.[80] The impact of European culture on the traditional Kikuyu way of life has undermined customary sanctions in family and community, and while there have been widespread conversions to Christianity the latter has not always succeeded in making a very deep impression. The imposition of a system of Chiefs and Headmen on a society which had hitherto depended upon the authority of 'elders' has not been entirely successful. The status of the chief is ambiguous and does not carry with it the authority that traditional chiefdoms in other parts of Africa have done. Altogether an accumulation of frustrating experiences led to the emergence of a marked sense of Kikuyu nationalism and tribal patriotism, as a reaction against European influence. The growing sense of hostility was expressed in terms such as 'the white robbers of our land', the 'Christian influence has destroyed our traditions' together with a glorification of the Kikuyu in the past.[81]

One of the organizations which sought to channel Kikuyu patriotic sentiments was the Kikuyu Central Association or K.C.A. which was formed in 1922. It claimed as one of its objectives the recovery of lands annexed by Europeans, and the organization drew much support from 'squatters' who led a somewhat precarious existence on land now owned by Europeans, but which had often previously belonged to the Kikuyu. The organization also associated itself with protests against the attitude of missionaries towards traditional initiation ceremonies, especially clitoridectomy or female cir-

cumcision, which many Europeans wished to see suppressed. Associated at a later date with the activities of the K.C.A. were the emergence of separatist church movements and the setting up of the Kikuyu Independent Schools Association. These schools, although undoubtedly doing excellent work in increasing literacy, are believed to have been vehicles for the spread of anti-European sentiments and were banned by the government soon after the state of emergency was declared. The K.C.A. was banned during the second world war for alleged subversive activities and its leaders were detained. Later, the Kenya African Union was formed and Jomo Kenyatta, who had been General Secretary of the K.C.A., became its President. As is well known Kenyatta, a man of education versed in the history and sociology of his own people,[82] was subsequently charged and found guilty of being concerned in the organization of *Mau Mau*. He and five other men were sentenced to seven years' hard labour. The decision of the Magistrate's Court was quashed by the Kenya Supreme Court but reinstated by the East Africa Court of Appeal and leave to appeal to the Privy Council was refused.[83]

The numerous acts of murder, violence, and torture perpetrated by the so-called *Mau Mau* gangs hardly need recapitulation here. While frequently directed against Europeans, many innocent 'loyal' Kikuyu also suffered. Chief Waruhiu, who was noted for his loyalty to the British, was one of the first among the outstanding African victims. By the end of April 1953 *Mau Mau* had killed 270 people, of whom 255 were Africans. A year later the number of Africans killed by *Mau Mau* was over 1000. One of the worst massacres was that at Lari, in March 1953, when some 120 men, women, and children of a loyal Kikuyu settlement were murdered. In connexion with the trials that followed, Lord Stansgate asked in the House of Lords under what powers mass trials had been held and how many death sentences had been passed at such trials. In reply Lord Munster, Under-Secretary of State for Colonial Affairs, said that no special powers were required to try simultaneously a number

of people charged with the same offence. Up to date seventeen trials, covering 225 accused, had been completed. One trial involving 67 persons was still being heard. Of the 225 tried, 107 were sentenced to death, and one ordered to be detained during the governor's pleasure. These 108 all appealed to the East African Court of Appeal and 58 appeals were allowed and 50 dismissed. Of the 50 dismissed, 12 had lodged petitions for leave to appeal to the Privy Council and all were refused. Four further petitions were being prepared. Of the 50 whose appeals were dismissed 45 had been executed.[84] Among those sentenced to death were 44 Kikuyu tribesmen accused of murdering a baby during the massacre.

The one factor responsible for undermining the morale of the Kikuyu people more than anything else, and giving the *Mau Mau* organization its peculiar strength, were the oaths which many Kikuyu were coerced into taking. The strength of the *Mau Mau* oath appears to have been derived from two sources. On the one hand, the fear of the terrorists themselves and the punitive action that they might take against those who refused to take the oath or who broke their pledge was undoubtedly a strong sanction. On the other hand, there were deeper influences bound up with primitive magical beliefs which made the fear of punitive action by the gods as real as fear of punitive action by *Mau Mau*. The ceremonies accompanying the oath-taking were gruesome enough to the European mind, involving the drinking of blood and the eating of raw meat among other unpleasant things. The oaths bound the individual to secrecy, implicit obedience to the dictates of the *Mau Mau* leaders and to every kind of anti-European and anti-Christian activity conceivable, including stealing and murder. According to Dr L. S. B. Leakey and other experts on Kikuyu customs, many circumstances surrounding the taking of the *Mau Mau* oath were contrary to Kikuyu law and custom, making the oaths invalid. Nevertheless, they had obtained a sufficient hold on such a high proportion of the Kikuyu tribe that the government resorted to officially sponsored 'cleansing ceremonies'. However, while the *Mau Mau* oath continued to be taken, often forced

on unwilling participants under penalties of death or mutilation, the cleansing oath does not appear to have been very effective.[85]

There has been a good deal of controversy regarding the exact nature and origins of the bestial activities associated with *Mau Mau*. Many Europeans in Kenya simply regarded them as typical pagan rites indigenous to Africa to which the Kikuyu had reverted despite the civilizing influences of missionaries and others in recent years. Anthropologists, among them Professor Max Gluckman, challenged this view and insisted that horrible oaths, sacrifices, and sexual obscenities were a perversion of anything that was characteristic of African tribal life in normal times. The anthropological point of view emphasizes the impact of colonization on a primitive society with consequent loosening of traditional controls without providing adequate substitutes. Added to this are the effects of poverty and subordination in a somewhat authoritarian regime characterized by colour-bar. There is a certain analogy to be seen here between the black magic, witchcraft, and secret rituals associated with *Mau Mau* in Kenya to-day, and similar practices which were not uncommon in Britain as recently as the eighteenth century. Secret societies employing oaths and often involving sexual licence and violence are characteristic of societies in a state of disintegration or held in a state of precarious integration by repressive authority – wherever, in fact, there is widespread fear and discontent. Sir Philip Mitchell himself, who has been the most outspoken critic of the anthropological and psychological interpretation of *Mau Mau*, has admitted a close analogy between the movement and the abominable persecutions and barbarities of the Nazis, as in Belsen. There can be little doubt that *Mau Mau* is the symptom of a sick society and a terrible warning to the world of what could happen elsewhere in Africa if human relationships are allowed to deteriorate further.[86]

In addition to the 'cleansing oaths' the steps taken by the government to deal with the emergency included: (1) Extensive police activity. (2) Setting up special Home Guard

detachments. (3) The introduction of troops, including the King's African Rifles, the Lancashire Fusiliers, and others. (4) The bombing of *Mau Mau* hide-outs in the Aberdare Mountains and other 'prohibited areas'. (5) The impounding of cattle belonging to tribes that refused to give information about *Mau Mau*, and other forms of collective punishment. (6) Wholesale removal of Kikuyu, especially 'squatters' and their families, from European farms in the White Highlands, their detention in transit camps and eventual removal to the Reserves. (7) The Kikuyu Registration Ordinance requiring every adult male Kikuyu employed outside the Reserves to carry an identity card with his photograph (and not merely his thumb print as hitherto). (8) Screening, detention, trial, and imprisonment of large numbers of Kikuyu suspected of being associated with *Mau Mau*. (9) Attempts to starve out *Mau Mau* gangs by creating a 'barren earth barrier' between the Kikuyu reserves and the Aberdare forest. (10) Other measures designed to tighten up security including the closing of schools considered to be spreading subversive ideas, improved intelligence services, 'psychological warfare', and re-education, and increased penalties for certain offences – such as the death penalty for illegal possession of arms.[87] (11) Individual and mass surrender terms were offered to members of *Mau Mau*. In particular negotiations were entered into with a number of the terrorists' leaders to bring the *Mau Mau* campaign to an end. 'General China', a captured *Mau Mau* leader who had been condemned to death for his part in the rebellion, acted as intermediary and towards the end of March there appeared to be some prospect of a successful conclusion of negotiations. Many of the European settlers were opposed to this compromise with the terrorists and considered that the military campaign should be fought to a bitter end. However, the negotiations fell through owing to an unfortunate incident on 7 April which led the terrorists to believe that the surrender offer was not in fact being made in good faith. The exact circumstances in which the surrender plan failed are somewhat obscure, but the following official account was issued by the government:

On March 30th a meeting was held in Nyeri with terrorists' representatives so that they could be informed of Government's surrender terms. At the end of this meeting the six *Mau Mau* representatives appeared to have accepted the terms and left Nyeri the same day to contact their gangs to attempt to convince them that they should surrender.

To enable terrorists to meet and discuss the situation, an undertaking was given that there would be no land or air operations in the forests of Mount Kenya and the Northern Aberdares between March 30th and April 10th. It was made clear to the terrorist leaders that this undertaking did not apply to the mile strip or the Reserves where normal operations would continue. The terrorists' leaders undertook to meet Government representatives again on April 10th to report whether or not the gangs had agreed to surrender.

No representatives have turned up for the meeting arranged. As a result the plan to obtain mass surrenders is now ended and the alternative plan of using the information now in our possession to develop operations has commenced.

It is not clear why the *Mau Mau* representatives have failed in their attempts to arrange surrender. The information available is conflicting; one story is that on the return to their gangs they were at once arrested. Some of them subsequently were released on pressure from passive wing leaders in the Reserves and from those other leaders who were anxious to stop the fighting. Other sources do not confirm this story.

Whatever may have happened at the outset it seems clear that large numbers of terrorists did in fact collect near the forest edge near the Konyu Location with the object of considering surrender. One estimate puts the numbers at about 1000. Further large gangs were reported on the move from the direction of Embu and Nanyuki. This was the situation on the evening of April 6th, though it was not known to Government authorities.

Meanwhile there had been a number of incidents in the Reserves resulting in the death of loyalists and the destruction of schools and bridges. A large gang was located near Gathuini in the Konyu area and on April 7th this gang opened fire on security forces which were deploying for a sweep in the neighbourhood. As a result of the battle which ensued 25 terrorists were killed, including, it is thought, two men who had attended the original meeting on March 30th, although this has not been confirmed. 'General' Gatumuki was also captured. It was Gatumuki who was reported as being primarily responsible for the arrest of the leaders when they returned from the March 30th meeting.

The fact that two of these leaders were in his gang on April 7th and were reported by Gatumuki as being killed in the battle lends credibility to this story. In point of fact neither of these men's bodies have been found, though their personal weapons have been recovered.

Gatumuki states that his gang was part of the big gathering which had assembled in the forest nearby to discuss surrender. This is probably true.

The result of the Gathuini battle was that the gathering in the forest dispersed and there is little doubt that the majority of the terrorists are now convinced that the whole surrender project was a Government trap, designed to bring them together so that they could be slaughtered.

A letter has been received from Karugo, a prominent gang leader, to the effect that all the *Mau Mau* delegates who attended the meeting on March 30th had been arrested by their own people on the suspicion that they had led them into a trap.

Attempts will be made to convince the terrorists that this was not the case and that the battle took place because Gatumuki's gang came out into the Reserve, but this will be a long process and no large-scale organized surrenders can be expected in the near future. It is possible, however, that a number of individuals will surrender and arrangements have been made to enable them to do so if they wish.

An operation which had been prepared to meet the contingency of a failure in the surrender plan started early to-day (April 11th). This operation will make full use of the information obtained during the past few months.[88]

Police activity, at the commencement of the campaign, was handicapped by the lack of trained men, both African and European. There was one African policeman to every 5000 people in the Reserve and one European policeman to every 125,000, and although reinforcements from other areas were called in these were still inadequate. As a result large numbers of untrained Europeans and Africans were enrolled in the Special Police force. As far as the military operations were concerned, in the period 1 January to 28 November 1953, 2822 Africans were killed, 980 were captured, and 263 were wounded. In addition 507 were presumed wounded but escaped. When these figures were announced in the House of Commons there was considerable comment upon

the fact that the proportion of killed to captured and wounded was exceedingly high, and doubts were expressed about the 'shoot to kill' policy which had been adopted.[89] There was also doubt about the military effectiveness, in the circumstances, of bombing *Mau Mau* hide-aways. There was also some public indignation at the use of bombs, regarded as a morally reprehensible procedure. The use of three-inch mortars and other weapons did not appear to call forth the same comment. There was, for example, a letter in the *Manchester Guardian*, 1 December 1953, comparing the bombing of Kikuyu with the use of bombs by Mussolini in Abyssinia. The following report in the *Manchester Guardian*, 14 August 1953, did not appear to stimulate the same public interest (my italics).

> Three-inch mortars have inflicted heavy casualties on a *Mau Mau* terror gang which has been hunted for the past week in the Aberdare Forest. Army headquarters, announcing this, say that the mortars were brought into action by the 4th Battalion of the King's African Rifles.
>
> The gang, *which was originally thought to be a thousand strong, is now believed to number about three hundred, including women food carriers and some children.* During the week-long running jungle battle between African troops and the terrorists, more than fifty of the gang are thought to have been killed and many more wounded.

Some concern was expressed at the institution of collective punishment against suspected Kikuyu in the course of which some innocent people were bound to suffer. In November 1952, in the Kenya Legislative Council, Mr John Whyatt, member for Law and Order, announced that:

> as a result of a judicial inquiry carried out in Nyeri by a native court officer into the recent seizure of nearly four thousand head of cattle and more than five thousand sheep and goats from three Kikuyu sub-locations the Government was confiscating half the stock and would sell it. The proceeds would be devoted to the 'general revenue'.
>
> The other half of the stock would be returned to the tribesmen. The leader of the African Unofficial Members objected to this solution of impounding cattle and asked where in the Government were the friends of 'decent loyal Kikuyu'? The Chief Native Com-

missioner told the council that those tribesmen in three sub-locations who had suffered as a result of terrorism and who were loyal would have their stock returned. Those who were proved to have actively supported the Government would not suffer, but he was afraid 'one or two innocent people' would suffer.

The 'screening' of Kikuyu, and their classification as 'black', 'grey', or 'white' according to the degree of their complicity with *Mau Mau*, proved to be an enormous undertaking. It was announced by the Colonial Secretary that on 5 June 1954 there were 6741 persons detained on detention orders and 6937 in works camps on restrictive movement orders. In addition 22,553 persons were being held for 'screening' and classification on short-term detention orders as a result of 'Operation Anvil' in Nairobi.[90] The total number 'screened' in this way is probably between 50,000 and 75,000. The real problem is what to do with those classified as 'grey' and 'black' respectively. The former are mainly employed on public works and the latter mainly in prison. Their rehabilitation constitutes a major social and psychological operation and meanwhile some public disapproval has been expressed at the creation of near concentration camps to deal with the problem. While the object of rehabilitation is a right and proper one, the detention of large numbers of people under such conditions lends itself to serious abuse, especially when those detained are members of one race, and those detaining another.

Probably the greatest amount of public disapproval was directed against those Europeans, and Africans under their command, who were found responsible for maltreating *Mau Mau* suspects. In November 1953, an Englishman, aged nineteen years, was found guilty of ill-treating Kikuyu tribesmen during 'screening' processes in order to obtain information from them. He was found guilty on twenty charges o assault and sentenced to three months' imprisonment and a £100 fine. The ten Africans with him who were acting under his orders were sentenced to one day's imprisonment and fined £5. The European in question was subsequently reinstated as a temporary district officer.[91] A short time later a

Danish-born Kenya Police Reserve Officer was fined a total of £50 for whipping, or causing to be whipped, five Africans with a rhinoceros-hide whip in order to obtain confessions from them that they had taken the *Mau Mau* oath.[92]

Considerable publicity was given to the case of a British Army captain who was acquitted by a general court-martial of murdering an African by shooting. It was alleged that he had fired a Bren gun into the backs of two Africans who had been detained, and subsequently shot one with a pistol to 'finish him off'. The issue of murder was obscured at the time by a confusion as to whether the right victim had been named in the indictment, but this officer was subsequently found guilty on other charges of cruelty and sentenced to five years' imprisonment. Allegations were made during the hearings concerning monetary rewards offered for every African suspected of being involved in *Mau Mau* who was shot, and of 'Company Scoreboards' being kept. These allegations, and others of a similar nature, were investigated by a military court of inquiry. The latter confined its main investigations to the period after 1 June 1953. Since General Erskine took over command of the operations in Kenya in that month, and expressly declared his intention of stamping out any examples of indiscipline among his troops, the report does not deal with the situation before his arrival. Although the court of inquiry vindicated the conduct of the large majority of British troops in Kenya and found many of the allegations exaggerated, three instances were found of monetary rewards being offered. Attention was also drawn to the practice of certain battalions of cutting off hands from the bodies of Africans killed, for identification purposes. In addition, allegations against two battalions of the King's African Rifles concerning brutality were separately investigated and the Secretary for War assured the House of Commons that appropriate disciplinary action would be taken.[93] Brutalities committed by the police were outside the terms of reference of these inquiries. A number of instances were reported, and in at least one case an African died after receiving multiple injuries inflicted by a beating carried out under orders, with

a view to obtaining information as to the whereabouts of hidden firearms used by a *Mau Mau* gang. In reply to a question the Secretary of State for Colonial Affairs said that the Attorney-General was considering legal action against those responsible.

As for other measures such as collective punishment, the Kikuyu Registration Ordinance, and the wholesale removal of Kikuyu from the White Highlands, none of these measures appears to have achieved the desired result. In fact, it was soon appreciated that conditions in the transit camps, to say nothing of those in the already overcrowded Reserves, were such that the situation was being aggravated rather than relieved by these measures.[94] Similar difficulties arose in connexion with Kenya's growing prison population. In January 1954, in addition to 12,745 *Mau Mau* convicted prisoners, there were 10,932 ordinary convicts, 1598 persons detained under Emergency Regulations, 1845 remand prisoners, and 3864 detainees under the Detention Camps Ordinance. This made a total prison population of 30,984 compared with an average of 9949 in 1952.[95] The consequent strain on prison accommodation and staffs and consequent deterioration in conditions is obvious.

In October 1953 General Erskine expressed the opinion that although the terrorist situation 'looked much better' there was no military answer to Kenya's troubles. In a statement made on the first anniversary of the *Mau Mau* emergency he was reported as saying that the problem was 'purely political'. He considered that if the people of Kenya could address themselves to the problem of how Europeans, Africans, and Asians could live in harmony on a long-term basis they would have achieved far more than he could do with security forces.[96] It is all the more unfortunate that, as a consequence of the crisis in Kenya, relations between the several races appeared to have deteriorated further. Mr Michael Blundell said in the Legislative Council in August 1953 that the European, African, and Asian members of the Legislative Council had drifted apart and that there was now a gulf between the three racial groups on the unofficial

side of the House. Other observers reported that the gulf was not confined to politicians and that suspicion was widespread in farms, households, businesses, commercial and industrial enterprises, and was not confined to the relations between Kikuyu and Europeans.

These conclusions were confirmed by the report of the Parliamentary delegation to Kenya in January 1954.[97] The delegation remarked that:

> it is our view based on all the evidence available to us, both from official and responsible unofficial sources, that the influence of *Mau Mau* in the Kikuyu area, except in certain localities, has not declined, it has, on the contrary, increased; in this respect the situation has deteriorated and the danger of infection outside the Kikuyu area is now greater, not less, than at the beginning of the State of Emergency.

Nevertheless, subsequent reports that a number of *Mau Mau* leaders had surrendered, following negotiations through the captured 'General China', suggested that the overwhelming military strength of the government had brought about at any rate a temporary desire for a cessation of hostilities on the part of some of the rebellious Kikuyu.

The Parliamentary Delegation's report expressed serious concern at the large number of cases of brutality among the police and noted that 'it is useless to expect the general public to respect, and collaborate with the Police, if the Police Force is gravely implicated in brutality and corruption'. The delegation rejected the demands made by some settlers for 'summary justice' in dealing with suspected *Mau Mau* adherents. 'Increased political pressure has been brought to bear on the Government with a view to securing the abandonment of, at least, some of the principles upon which British justice is founded.' The delegation declared itself firmly opposed to any demand for martial law or for 'summary justice' in dealing with the Kenya emergency.

The report also emphasized the importance of breaking down the colour-bar in Kenya if harmonious racial relations are to be created. 'Abolition of the colour bar is not just a matter for legislation, though it is true that an immediate

step forward could be taken by removing discriminatory legislation and providing sanctions against some of the public aspects of the colour bar.' The report emphasized the need for constitutional reform in Kenya to enable all races to participate more fully in the government of the country and to reorganize and co-ordinate the machinery for dealing with the emergency.

> We believe that it is necessary to provide an outlet for African political thought. Discussions should be undertaken without delay with representative Africans, with a view to arriving at an acceptable basis for the election of African members of Legislative Council at the coming general election of 1956. At the same time Africans should be encouraged to develop their own political organizations, thus filling the vacuum created by the banning of the Kenya African Union for complicity in *Mau Mau*.

In fact, discussions between the Secretary of State for the Colonies and representatives of the several racial groups in Kenya took place and changes in the Legislative and Executive Councils were announced in March 1954, details of which have been outlined in a previous chapter. The original proposals were accepted by the European representatives but rejected by Africans who considered that they had been given insufficient representation. Asian members also expressed disappointment that they and African members had not been given more responsibility.

The Parliamentary Delegation to Kenya urged that a thorough investigation of the social and psychological origins and implications of *Mau Mau* should be undertaken by a suitably qualified person. Dr J. C. Carothers was appointed to make such an investigation. He is a psychiatrist who, for twelve years, was in charge of a mental hospital in Kenya and is the author of a book published by the U.N. World Health Organization called *The African Mind in Health and Disease*. In his report on *Mau Mau* Dr Carothers draws attention to the fact that the Kikuyu have had a longer and closer contact with alien cultures than other tribes in Kenya and describes the social disorganization which is characteristic of Kikuyu society in its present transitional stage. He discusses

the parallel between the *Mau Mau* oaths and rituals and those that were associated with witchcraft in Europe three hundred years ago. He suggests that Kikuyu personality to-day is characterized by strong feelings of individualism but marked insecurity and concludes that the Kikuyu need firm and clear direction. With regard to the influence of Europeans Dr Carothers points out that it is often 'Christian' Africans who hate white people most, largely because they see through European hypocrisy. He points out that Europeans often do not practise the principles of Christianity in their dealings either with Africans or other Europeans, and concludes by urging that potential immigrants should be 'screened' to ensure their 'suitability' in terms of readiness to set a good example.[98]

All observers of the Kenya situation are agreed upon one thing. The Kikuyu crisis must not be allowed to destroy the real social and economic advances that have been made, nor must further development be retarded. The Parliamentary Delegation remarked upon the fact that '*Mau Mau* grew and erupted, as it were, at a time of prosperity in Kenya when increasing revenues and good economic prospects had enabled the government to embark on development plans, largely in the African areas, in marked contrast to the depressed and difficult years which preceded the second world war. These better prospects were based upon solid achievement and enterprise in Kenya, throughout what may be described as the pioneering stage of Kenya history.' We may conclude this consideration of racial relations and related problems in British Colonial Africa by examining some of the recent developments in Kenya and in other areas and considering future prospects.

FUTURE PROSPECTS

In December 1953 the Secretary of State for Colonial Affairs made a statement with regard to financial aid to Kenya. In addition to assistance to meet the cost of the military cam-

paign, a grant of £5 million, mostly from Colonial Development and Welfare Funds, will be made, which is to be used for African agricultural development and rehabilitation. A five-year plan is to be prepared by the Kenya Government. Already, since 1946, steps have been taken to improve agriculture and livestock.[99] Development of the resources of land, livestock, and water was assisted by grants totalling £11 million to be spread over the ten-year period 1946–55. It has been estimated that at least a half of this sum directly benefited Africans. In particular, efforts have been made to improve soil-conservation methods and deal with the problem of erosion, to advance research and agricultural education, to assist progressive African farmers to produce cash crops, to improve livestock by good breeding and the eradication of disease. Special efforts have been made to recondition African areas and African settlement, especially by the improvement of water supplies.

The Kenya Government requested a loan to meet certain charges on African education. The Secretary of State said that a decision on this would be postponed until the needs of all the colonial territories were known in the light of information concerning their estimated needs for the next five years. These will undoubtedly be influenced by the proposals put forward in the study of educational policy and practice in British tropical Africa, published in 1953, to which reference will be made later.[100] In the meantime in Kenya, former Kikuyu Independent Schools, closed at the commencement of the emergency, are being opened again under new management, through government and missionary enterprise. Since 1946 considerable strides have been made in the expansion of educational services for Africans in Kenya, although there is a very long way to go yet. Illiteracy, as everywhere in colonial Africa, is high, being more than 70 per cent. However, the number of schools is increasing as fast as the number of trained teachers will permit. Adult education work in village community centres is also progressing. An interesting experiment is Jeanes school, which from 1946 to 1949 was concerned with training ex-servicemen for

civilian life. Since then it has become an adult training centre for community development, in which Africans have taken courses in history, geography, economics, civics, and similar subjects. African housing, health, and hospital services have also been expanded in recent years.[101]

From the point of view of future political developments the present crisis in Kikuyuland casts something of a shadow. It is, however, a hopeful sign that the leader of the European members in the Legislative Council, Mr Blundell, has expressed himself forcibly in favour of a liberal policy, as far as racial relations are concerned. He has urged the need for racial co-operation and recognized that the integration of Africans into the social, economic, and political fabric of the society is essential for the welfare of all in Kenya. He is no supporter of *apartheid.* Whether or not he carries with him the bulk of the settlers in his point of view, and can translate his liberal policies into practice, remains to be seen. At least, when the menace of *Mau Mau* has finally disappeared, the future of racial relations in Kenya, as in the whole of East Africa, promises well so long as the good will of all parties can be obtained. In Tanganyika the participation of all three races in equal numbers in the Legislative Council is an experiment which will be watched with interest, as it may be the solution to an otherwise thorny problem. Equally hopeful are the recent pronouncements of the Governor of Uganda at the first meeting of the newly constituted Legislative Council. The position of the deposed Kabaka rather marred an otherwise important occasion, but the Governor's repudiation of any form of colour-bar in industry was reassuring.[102]

The future of West Africa is, or will be shortly, in the hands of Africans themselves. The constitutional machinery of self-government is being worked out for Nigeria and the Gold Coast, and when Sierra Leone and the Gambia reach the stage when greater independence is possible, they will undoubtedly be able to learn from the experiences of the two larger and more advanced territories. While problems of racial relations will recede into the background as British

political influence is diminished, tremendous social and economic problems will remain to be solved. The economy of the Gold Coast is at present flourishing,[103] owing to the boom in cocoa in recent years, but there is danger in this over-dependence upon one main crop. Professor Arthur Lewis prepared a report for the Gold Coast Government which was published in March 1954. His final conclusion was that the Gold Coast 'is not yet ripe for a big programme of industrialization – there is lack of capital and labour, and the home market is too small. The surest way of preparing the ground is ... the development of agriculture, with priority given to increasing food production and raising productivity.'[104] He points out that investment from abroad will be essential to any industrial development in the future and African business-men will have to be trained. It is quite clear that when the nationalistic ambitions of West Africans are finally achieved there will be many opportunities for Africans to co-operate with Europeans as equal partners in the Commonwealth.

In the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, while steps are undoubtedly being taken to improve the welfare of the African population, the pronouncements of leading politicians are not by any means reassuring. While the policies of the majority party, the Federals, in the newly constituted Federal Assembly, are less reactionary than those of the defeated Confederates, they still support segregation as practised in Southern Rhodesia. While lip service is paid to 'partnership' it is suggested that the role of the African is expected to be that of a 'junior partner', for a long time to come. The following are the clauses in the Federal Party statement of policy, which refer to 'Native Affairs':

> To interpret (without prejudice to the fact that Native Affairs are primarily a territorial responsibility) the reference to partnership and co-operation in the preamble to the Federal Scheme as including:
>
> (1) the desirability of conforming to a system that will enable European and African to live in harmony;
>
> (2) the realization that the European and the African have distinctive and complementary parts to play in the Federation, and

that each should be rewarded according to his contribution to the partnership;

(3) the recognition of the natural desire on the part of each race to develop on traditional lines, and the need for bearing this in mind in the provision of facilities and amenities while the present wide differences exist in the cultural levels of the mass of the people;

(4) the gradual extension of political rights and privileges to those who conform to civilized standards of behaviour and culture, with corresponding diminution in special political representation;

(5) the acceptance of the principle that persons acquiring political rights can no longer enjoy special privileges.

At the Federal Party Congress in August 1953, Mr G. Van Eeden, European leader in Northern Rhodesia, produced a five-point plan interpreting the word 'partnership' in the Federal Constitution. The interpretation named the European as the senior partner and the African as the junior, and said that each should be awarded proportionately to his contribution to the welfare of the community. It claimed recognition of the 'natural traditional desire' of both races to remain socially separate, entailing the provision of separate facilities and amenities.[105]

The Confederate Party makes its position even clearer by stating that:

> the Party recognizes the permanent existence of separate population groups and considers that the way to racial harmony lies in giving each group the opportunity of developing its capacities in its own area in the service of its own people. ... The Party accepts the necessity for European political control and leadership for the foreseeable future, but recognizes the importance of providing training and adequate scope for advancement by the Natives in this sphere in their own areas.[106]

One test of the real intentions of either party may be seen in the attitude towards the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedom, drawn up by the Council of Europe, and endorsed by the United Kingdom Government on behalf of Britain and the Colonies. Some concern was felt in Central Africa because it was believed that the Convention laid down the necessity for universal adult suff-

rage and that, consequently, this would apply to the newly formed Federation. The Federal Prime Minister, Sir Godfrey Huggins, was compelled to make a statement denying that the Convention implied anything of the sort and assuring members that it would not make any difference to the present franchise in Northern Rhodesia or in Nyasaland.[107] Similar concern was expressed in certain quarters at what were described as 'untimely' statements regarding the advancement of Africans in industry. The Chairman of two of the largest copper mines had put forward a scheme which he considered would 'do justice to the legitimate aspirations of one section of their employees while at the same time safeguarding the continued industrial and social security of the other sections'. The Executive Council of the Northern Rhodesia Mine Officials and Salaried Staffs Association regretted the issue of the statement and suggested that a board of inquiry should be set up composed entirely of people drawn from within the boundaries of the federation. This reflects the dissatisfaction felt by Europeans at the proposals of the Dalgleish Report on the advancement of Africans, which Sir Roy Welensky, leader of the Europeans in Northern Rhodesia, has described as 'dead'.[108]

During the campaign in favour of Central African federation a great deal of emphasis was placed upon the idea of a University which was to be open to all races, but this appears to have aroused some doubts now that federation is an accomplished fact. It appears that a multi-racial University in Central Africa has not the unanimous support that was originally proclaimed.[109] However, an announcement that the standard of entrance will be that of a Higher School Certificate suggests that very few Africans will, in fact, qualify for some time to come. In Southern Rhodesia, which is educationally the most advanced, there are at present only twelve schools providing secondary education for Africans, with an enrolment of 1078 pupils. Of these schools, three offer courses leading up to matriculation, one for the Cambridge Certificate, and the remainder at present up to University Junior Certificate only.[110] While primary school

education in all three territories is making advances a great deal of ground has yet to be made up before Africans can begin to play their full part in higher education. In Nyasaland, for example, illiteracy is as high as 90 per cent of the population.

Throughout the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland steps are being taken to improve African agriculture and improve health and other services for Africans, but progress is bound to be slow when total government expenditure on African education, health, and agriculture is so low. In Northern Rhodesia it amounted, in 1950, to 18*s.* 11*d.* per head of the African population; in Nyasaland, 6*s.* 0*d.*; and in Southern Rhodesia 27*s.* 3*d.*[111] The emphasis throughout the Federation is upon 'equal rights for all civilized men' – a phrase coined by Cecil Rhodes himself. Yet Europeans seem to be singularly reluctant to take the steps necessary to raise the African to this level of material civilization, for fear of the political consequences.

It is a remarkable fact that opposition to Central African federation in Britain, and among Africans themselves, came from those who considered that insufficient guarantees were offered for African advancement. Yet opposition to federation in the territories themselves came from those who were afraid that it would mean too much power would be given to Africans. The situation is admirably illustrated in the following quotation from a Northern Rhodesian newspaper written by a correspondent in Southern Rhodesia just before the referendum on federation took place:

> In a shop window looking into what, if it had an Eros, would be Salisbury's Piccadilly Circus, there is a cardboard display neatly executed by a commercial artist. It shows passers-by in simple graph-like terms how the price of whisky, gin, beer, cigarettes, and income tax in Southern Rhodesia will drop if Federation comes about. At the other end of the same street, the same commercial artist has erected another cardboard model, equally appealing. This time it is to prove that – (*a*) unless there is Federation communism will become rife amongst Africans; and (*b*) that the White artisan need not fear competition from the Black worker.
>
> In these two cardboard cut-outs you have the reasons why, in a

week from to-day, Southern Rhodesians will vote convincingly, if not overwhelmingly, for Federation of the Central African territories. ... What I found in Southern Rhodesia was singular and simple. It was FEAR. And, like most other fears, a fear bred of ignorance. They fear the south and White Nationalistic politics; they fear the North and Black Nationalistic politics.

The writer went on to say that he found that the only thing he had to put across in order to sell federation was that Northern Rhodesia was not a Black State. His most convincing argument was 'the stale news, which thousands of them had never realized, that while we (Northern Rhodesians) have two Africans on the voters' roll, they have 429, and anything up to another thousand qualified for it'.[112]

Even in Central Africa there are small efforts being made to work out the real meaning of racial co-operation and African advancement. One merits special mention. It is the experiment in African and European co-operation at St Faith's Mission at Lesapi, Southern Rhodesia. The purposes of the experiment are:

1. To develop African village agriculture on a small-holding basis in full co-operation with Europeans. Its founders believe that a healthy nation can only be built on a foundation of healthy peasant agriculture. In an agricultural country like Rhodesia this is essential.

2. To support the work of the Mission and the Central Primary School. In addition to academic education (for which there is an almost unlimited demand and which is also required by law), to teach respect for such basic things as the soil and hard work. The education provided is therefore based on agricultural techniques suited to Africa and on local industry. In a part of the world where young men who have had any taste of education have an automatic ambition for a white collar or supervisory job, this is one of the hardest of the tasks the school has set itself. The school and the farm have to sell agriculture in competition with academic education and a clean shirt job.

3. To develop a 'common farm' to be run increasingly on a co-operative basis. The principle of organized co-operation is not strange to a member of a tribal society. The farm should serve as an experimental as well as a productive unit to serve and support the agriculture of the whole country.[113]

Describing the work of St Faith's, Mr Patrick O'Donovan has said:

> There is already one young English farmer at St Faith's. He came quite humbly and with no illusions. He wanted to live and work in partnership with the African farm workers. For him, this means real farm labouring alongside Africans. It means accepting the same wages and much the same conditions of life. A young quantity surveyor and a farm secretary and accountant have also gone out to St Faith's from Britain, paying their own fares, and eager to help in the work there. As a result of their work, the gulf that exists all over Central Africa between white and black is not so wide or so deep at St Faith's. The Africans have seen that Europeans can and do work with their hands, shift muck, and sweat like other men, and that not all seek wealth and the commanding position. These young people are perhaps doing more to bridge this gulf than can any pamphlets, speeches, or entrenched clauses in constitutions. It is this sort of approach to race problems that is possible at St Faith's.[114]

It remains to be seen whether it is also possible elsewhere in British Colonial Africa. One important fact must not be overlooked. Harmonious racial relations can only come about with the active co-operation of both Africans and Europeans. If European misdemeanours have been emphasized it is because, until they are remedied, Africans have little chance of proving their merit. This they have yet to do.

The question of African responsibility was emphasized by the new Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia, Mr Garfield Todd, in a speech in February 1954. He said: 'We look forward to the time when all people in Southern Rhodesia, black and white, will receive wages that will establish a civilized standard of living for the whole community, but that day will only come when the African can give a satisfactory return in labour for the wages he desires.' He said that it was in the best interests of the country that there should be the greatest number of well-paid posts, but these things all depended upon sound economics – upon the production of sufficient wealth *per capita* in an industry to make possible the payment of good wages. 'It is not fundamentally a ques-

tion of colour, but of skill and readiness to work – and to work hard.'

For their part, African members of the new Federal legislature emphasized the need for a fair share of government expenditure to be spent on development for the benefit of Africans, for freedom of movement within the three territories, and for posts to be available to Africans in the Federal Civil Service. Mr W. N. Chirwa (Nyasaland African member) expressed concern at the possibility of Africans being relegated to the position of 'junior partners', a position, he said, 'which I must reject on behalf of my people'.

It is notable that the Colonial Secretary, speaking at an Empire Day meeting of the Publicity Club in London, in 1954, was reported as saying that in colonial territories with multi-racial populations the transition from present systems of representation to a common roll could not be undertaken in one leap or in a short time. 'It is going to take very much longer than even the most patient now imagine.' He pointed out that in many territories the Europeans were necessary if the colonies were to develop, but Europeans were a small fraction of the population, and with a modern franchise this leaven would be swamped by the votes of the indigenous population. Nevertheless, Europeans could not remain indefinitely with a substantial majority in voting power.[115]

It remains to be seen whether the nationalistic aspirations of Europeans and non-Europeans in British colonial territories in Africa can be achieved on a basis of equal partnership and co-operation, or whether the roots of conflict are too deep. If coercion rather than persuasion is used in the resolution of these conflicts the consequences for the world may be catastrophic.

CHAPTER FOUR

Aftermath of Slavery in the West Indies

THREE main factors which are contributing to racial conflict in Africa to-day were also responsible, in a marked degree, for bringing about the 'colour problem' in the British West Indies, where it has assumed a somewhat different form. Problems of racial relations in Africa at the present time are a consequence of social disintegration resulting from culture contact, rapid social change, and the subordination of the several ethnic groups to the dominant European minority. The African slave trade represented the deliberate disintegration of an established social order by an exploiting and dominating class of slave traders and owners in the pursuit of an immediate material objective. 'Slavery', as Professor Frankel puts it, 'not only detaches men and women from an established pattern of social relationships, but by using them as chattels for the ends of others, denies them both the opportunity to reconstruct a new society for themselves, and the right to become an integrated and meaningful part of the society of their masters.'[1]

The immediate impact of the demand for Negro slaves in the New World was felt among the West African peoples themselves. Previously orderly and politically fairly advanced communities were reduced to a condition of internal strife as more and more African chiefs and others succumbed to the temptation to get rich quick by deporting their subjects, in return for European merchandise. Thousands were uprooted and forcibly sold to the European traders who left misery and devastation behind them, as well as creating misery for those who became slaves – assuming they survived the terrible conditions of the journey. Once they were set to work on the plantations of the New World the Negro slaves had to make a rapid adjustment to a completely differ-

ent way of life from the one to which they were accustomed. A process of acculturation that would normally take several generations had to be achieved in a very much shorter period. It is not surprising that the scars of this tremendous operation are still to be seen on the face of West Indian society.

The first and most obvious consequence of West Indian slavery, and the immigration of indentured labourers that followed it, was the creation of a population containing a large number of different ethnic groups. Many of the early planters were British, but others were French, Spanish, and Portuguese in origin. Other European immigrants included transporter servants, convicts, and the victims of kidnapping.[2] The African slaves were from many different tribes whose customs and languages varied a great deal. The original Caribbean Indians almost disappeared under the impact of European colonization, but the cultural melting pot was spiced with the East Indian immigrants and a few Chinese. The present population of the West Indies consists of the descendants of all these groups. Some retain in a pure form the racial characteristics of their ancestors, but many are of mixed descent.

At the time of the abolition the number of slaves in the British West Indies was in the region of 700,000 and this represented approximately nine-tenths of the total population. Since that date the population has increased rapidly and is now three millions. The highest densities are found in Bermuda and Barbados with 685 and 481 inhabitants per square kilometre respectively. The rate of increase continues to be high and represents serious pressure upon limited resources. Despite the fact that death rates are relatively high, averaging 13 per thousand, they are combined with high birth rates, 36 per thousand, to create a high rate of natural increase. The region as a whole shows an annual rate of increase of 2·3 per cent and the continuation of this rate, in the absence of emigration outlets, will result in a doubling of the population within thirty years.[3] The situation is aggravated by the drift to the towns, where overcrowding and poverty are rife.

The table opposite sets out the numerical composition of the population in the various territories in the British West Indies, together with the Bahamas and Bermuda. It will be seen that Jamaica has the largest population, roughly a million and a quarter, followed by Trinidad and Tobago, with half a million, and British Guiana with rather less than half a million.

SLAVERY AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

Negro slavery did not come about as a result of racial prejudice. On the contrary, slavery itself was one of the principal historical factors creating and perpetuating the myth that coloured peoples are inferior. Beliefs concerning the inherent defects of the Negro were rationalizations created to justify and excuse an otherwise embarrassing fact. Biologists and theologians lent the weight of their authority in support of the institution of Negro slavery. The very fact that they did so suggests that they felt its obvious inhumanity required justification. Learned treatises were written to prove that the slave trade was carried on according to humane principles and that if it was not it hardly mattered, since the Negro was not really a human being at all.[5] But these fantastic theories had little relation to the real foundation of Negro slavery, which rested upon economic factors.

The purchase of slaves on the west coast of Africa and their transportation to the New World was an attempt to deal with an acute labour shortage created by the cultivation, in plantations, of cotton, tobacco, and sugar. Slavery was resorted to, not by choice, but as a consequence of economic pressure. This in no way disposes of the ethical issues at stake, but the fact remains that if it had not been for slavery in the West Indies, the Caribbean sugar industry would never have arisen when it did. As a contemporary writer put it: 'The reasons for slavery are not moral, but economic circumstances, they relate not to vice and virtue, but to production.'[6] There were not enough free labourers to cultivate

POPULATION OF THE BRITISH WEST INDIES WITH THE BAHAMAS AND BERMUDA[4]

TERRITORY	NATIONAL OR RACIAL ORIGIN						TOTAL
	African	*European*	*Amer-Indian and Caribbean*	*Asian*	*Mixed*	*Not Specified*	
Barbados	148,923	9,839	...	136	33,828	74	192,800
British Guiana	143,385	11,023	16,322	167,237	37,685	49	375,701
British Honduras	22,693	2,329	14,142	1,544	18,360	152	59,220
Jamaica	965,960	13,809	...	29,106	227,148	1,040	1,237,063
Cayman Islands	1,051	2,074	...	...	3,518	27	6,670
Turks and Caicos Islands	4,432	105	...	...	1,584	17	6,138
Leeward Islands							
Antigua	35,437	695	...	80	5,349	196	41,757
Montserrat	13,319	71	...	17	917	9	14,333
St Christopher-Nevis	59,962	925	...	165	5,091	100	46,243
Virgin Island	5,670	35	...	...	799	1	6,505
Trinidad and Tobago	261,485	15,283	26	202,277	78,775	124	557,970
Windward Islands							
Dominica	11,862	142	40	39	35,524	17	47,624
Grenada	53,265	635	113	3,528	14,769	77	72,387
St Lucia	40,616	343	13	2,651	26,326	164	70,113
St Vincent	45,042	1,906	242	1,824	12,631	2	61,647
Bahamas	57,346	7,923	...	178	3,214	185	68,846
Bermuda	...	14,724	...	...	22,638	41	37,403
TOTAL							2,902,420

the sugar; those who went out to the West Indies as indentured servants from Britain were sadly exploited and took the first opportunity of setting up as independent small holders on their own account. Plantation cultivation required a large supply of docile and cheap labour. The aboriginal inhabitants of the West Indian islands proved unsuitable and rapidly dwindled. European planters then turned to Africa. They created the demand which enterprising merchants met by the 'triangular trade' between Europe, and in particular Britain, the coast of West Africa, and the New World, including North and South America and the West Indies. The triangle was completed with a return trip to the point of departure, with the sugar, molasses, rum, tobacco, or cotton, obtained in exchange for the slaves.

The first slave ship to sail from Britain was that of Sir John Hawkins in 1562, who sold the slaves to Spaniards in the West Indies. It was not until the middle of the seventeenth century that the trade became one of the most important branches of overseas commerce on which the prosperity of Liverpool was founded; Bristol and London also had a considerable share of the trade. Between 1680 and the abolition of the trade in 1807, somewhere between two and three million slaves were imported into all the British colonies in America and the West Indies.[7] For over a century more than 20,000 slaves a year were carried in British ships and many more by others, and few voices were raised in protest. When in June 1783 some members of the Society of Friends expressed disapproval, the Prime Minister, Lord North, 'complimented the Quaker opponents of the slave trade on their humanity, but regretted that its abolition was an impossibility, as the trade had become necessary to almost every nation in Europe.'[8]

There has been a great deal of controversy concerning the part played by humanitarian considerations in achieving the abolition of the British slave trade. One writer has put forward cogent arguments in support of the view that the attack on the slave trade was part of the campaign of capital-

ist manufacturers in Britain against the West Indian trade monopoly. 'The reason for the attack was not only that the West Indian economic system was vicious, but that it was also unprofitable. ... The attack falls into three phases: the attack on the slave trade, the attack on slavery, and the attack on preferential sugar duties. The slave trade was abolished in 1807, slavery in 1833, and the sugar preferences in 1846. The three events are inseparable. The very vested interests that had been built up by the slave system now turned and destroyed the system. The humanitarians ... could never have succeeded in a hundred years when every important capitalist interest was on the side of the colonial system.'[9] Against this view it has been asserted that 'abolition was achieved by the application of the principles of justice and humanity', and that economic factors were secondary.[10] The truth probably lies between these two extremes. If it had not been for the activities of the humanitarians, slavery might well have continued for many years longer, although their efforts were undoubtedly assisted by economic and political changes taking place at the time. The agitation for the Reform Bill in the industrial centres was closely linked with the campaign against slavery. One slave owner, Lord Wynford, wrote: 'God forbid that there should be anything like forcing a master to abandon his property in the slave. Once adopt that principle and there is an end to all property.' Disenfranchized industrialists took a different view.

The abolition of slavery, however, did not mean the end of the sugar plantation in the West Indies, although the planters were back where they had been in the seventeenth century. They still needed labour. Attempts were made to encourage immigration from Britain with little success. Indentured labourers from India came for a while until this was stopped because the trade was abused. A few liberated slaves who had settled in Sierra Leone were brought over. But the main supply of fresh labourers came from the East Indies and settled in Jamaica, Trinidad, and British Guiana. Over twenty thousand East Indian immigrants were

introduced into the West Indies from the abolition of slavery until the end of 1850.[11]

It is generally agreed that 'the bulk of the population of the West Indies have lost their original cultures and constructive efforts to provide a satisfactory alternative are long overdue'.[12] Transportation from Africa and the East Indies undoubtedly had a shattering effect, which was not lessened by the deliberate attempts of the planters to stamp out the relics of African and other cultures. In Trinidad, for example, certain proposals put forward for dealing with pauperism among ex-slaves were objected to on the grounds that 'by keeping the Africans together instead of scattering them, their use of their own barbarous dialects, customs and superstitions would be kept up'.[13] There is still a great deal of controversy regarding the significance of many cultural traits found in the West Indies which appear at first sight to be closely connected with their African counterparts. One school of thought points to the evidence of African dialects, folk-lore song and dances, of religious practices and superstitious beliefs, and emphasizes the continuity between African and West Indian culture.[14] Protagonists of the opposite view point out that the slaves were drawn from many different tribes and that no single African tribal culture could be transplanted as a whole. It is argued that whatever similarities and analogies with African social institutions there may be, surviving practices can only be properly understood in terms of the social and psychological functions that they perform to-day and which may have nothing to do with their origin.[15]

There can be no doubt that slavery and its aftermath have created a fundamental disequilibrium in the culture of the West Indies and the consequent social conflict finds many expressions. The situation was seen with unusual clarity by one colonial official in 1849 when he wrote: 'As the question at present stands, a race has been freed, but a society has not been formed'.[16] In the West Indies to-day we see this new society still struggling to its feet. That the process has taken so long is a reflection of the social disorganization that pre-

vailed during and after the slave regime. Some insight into the nature of the system is provided by an examination of certain reforms proposed by the British Government in 1832, before emancipation, which were vehemently rejected by the planters. The proposed reforms included among other things the abolition of the use of the whip, of the Negro Sunday market, and prohibition of the flogging of female slaves.[17] The reason for the planters' attitude is not difficult to see. As the Governor of Barbados put it in 1833: 'The *love of power* of these planters over the poor Negroes, each in his little sugar dominion, has found as great an obstacle to freedom as the *love of their labour*'.[18] To coercion and punishment the slaves responded with idleness, indolence, sabotage, and revolt. The successful slave revolt in San Domingo and the setting up of the independent Republic of Haiti in 1804 was the signal for a series of disturbances throughout the West Indies. British Guiana, Barbados, Jamaica, all had their insurrections, which were put down at considerable cost.

The adjustments that had to be made, both by masters and slaves, after emancipation were of a radical kind, and neither side was very successful. There can be no doubt that from the psychological point of view the change-over from owners and involuntary slaves to masters and voluntary servants was an extremely difficult one to make. The members of the dominant group had to unlearn their disparaging views of their inferiors, and not only adopt a new course of action, but acquire a new habit and frame of mind.[19] On the side of the Negroes no less a change was necessary. The first thought of the Negro after emancipation was to desert the plantation, and set up for himself where land was available.[20] Before the introduction of East Indian labourers the Negroes could command the market because there was a great deficiency of hands. They worked irregularly and refused work they did not like. Slavery had created the pernicious tradition that manual labour was degrading and to be avoided if possible. The attitude still survives among the lower middle classes in the West Indians who at great expense will employ

a servant to perform tasks they could very well do for themselves, because to do so would lower their status in the eyes of others.[21]

Another survival from slavery and the immediate post-slavery period is the widespread practice of *praedial larceny* (stealing crops), and other indirect ways of cheating employers. The worker justifies his behaviour on the grounds that the wage paid for the work is not enough to live on, while the employer says that the labourer is not worth more in terms of the amount of work he does.[22] The problem goes right back to the period following emancipation when the coercive measures used by the slave owners to make the Negroes work were no longer applicable. An experiment was made by instituting a transitional period of apprenticeship and partial freedom, which was not a success and broke down after a few years. The problem of pauperism then became serious. The competitive effect of the East Indian workers forced the Negroes to work harder, but some further incentive was thought to be required, both for the ex-slaves and the more recent immigrants brought to the West Indies at public expense. One suggestion, which involved a form of compulsory labour, was objected to because it was thought to be nothing more nor less than 'slavery in a mitigated form'.[23] The problem was much the same as that which existed under the English Poor Law before 1834. How could one promote the industry of the indolent poor, without interfering with the fundamental liberties of the subject? Lord Grey proposed a solution which has frequently been employed in similar situations: a tax should be imposed which could only be discharged by the earnings of labour. The proposal aroused the wrath of the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society. It was pointed out that to coerce labour by the whip may appear more revolting than to extort it by tax, but practically it meant the same thing, because, in the last resort, failure to pay the tax meant prison or the treadmill.[24]

Another of the outstanding consequences of slavery was the virtual collapse of the social institution of marriage as

understood either in Africa or in Europe. 'Slavery left its mark deeply imprinted on the family, and it is thus in the strengths and weaknesses of family life that the characteristic features of West Indian social organization are most clearly displayed.' This is the considered opinion of Professor T. S. Simey, who continues: 'More or less promiscuous sex relations are regarded in the West Indies as normal behaviour, and the procreation of children as following the laws of God and "nature"'.[25] Marriage in church or by any other legally recognized procedure is the exception rather than the rule, and is the mark of 'middle and upper class' status. Strictly speaking, around 70 per cent of births in the West Indies are illegitimate, if this term can be said to have any meaning in such a situation. The instability is not quite as marked as it may seem at first sight, because many women practise a 'faithful concubinage' with one man over a period of years, and the couple are at least as faithful to one another as many British and Americans in the present day. The West Indian family tends to be 'maternal' without being 'matriarchal', because although the status of women is low, they tend to take the leading role in the family owing to the frequent absence and occasional change of husband.[26] It is common also for several generations to live together under one roof.

The way in which this state of affairs came about is not difficult to see. The slave owners did not encourage the formation of stable marriage relationships between their slaves, as this restricted their mobility and exchange value and undermined the authority of the owner. In any case many owners established temporary or even permanent liaisons with coloured women on the plantation, but would not countenance the idea of a legal marriage. The extent to which such liaisons took place is evidenced to-day in the widespread traits of European racial origin, which can be seen among the coloured population. This brings us to one of the most significant questions, from the point of view of this study of racial relations, the connexion between colour and class in the British West Indies.

COLOUR CLASS AND CONFLICT

A great deal has been written about the social structure of the West Indies, and of Jamaica in particular, by anthropologists, sociologists, and psychologists. All are agreed that in the West Indies 'class and colour interweave to such an extent that a problem which has its origin in class structure may appear to be a conflict over colour'.[27] But the colour conflict in the West Indies is unlike that prevailing in any other part of the Commonwealth. In fact, with the possible exception of Brazil, it is unlike that prevailing in any other part of the world. While the colour conflict elsewhere takes the form of a struggle for power between the white man and the black, the conflict in the West Indies is the struggle going on within the personality of the Negro himself. Here, more than anywhere, the legacy of slavery is to be observed. We have seen that legal emancipation was not social or economic emancipation; still less was it psychological emancipation. In fact, the social and psychological adjustment of the Negro to his environment was more difficult after he gained his freedom than before.

It has already been observed that, under slavery, work was something to be avoided as far as possible and that this attitude is still frequently found among some West Indians. The middle classes still regard manual labour as degrading and the working classes are often accused of laziness, stupidity, and worthlessness. That this is not true is witnessed by the capacity for hard work exhibited by West Indians who migrate to America or Britain,[28] and by West Indians at home when adequate incentives are provided. But the fact remains that West Indian social and economic organization since slavery has often failed to provide such incentives. The transition from slavery to a competitive capitalist society would have been difficult enough in any case. It was made even more difficult, if not well nigh impossible, by reason of the widespread social and economic insecurity that prevailed.[29] The reaction of the working-class West Indian was

often to repudiate the values associated with modern competitive societies, and to seek certain compensatory outlets. The resulting personality pattern commonly found among rural working-class Negroes in the West Indies is that of an accommodating, deferential, dependent individual, happy, irresponsible, apathetic, and child-like.[30] In this way the individual resolves the conflict between what is expected of him and what he is able to achieve in modern society by a complete withdrawal from the competitive culture, and a repudiation of what have been described as 'middle class values'. Unfortunately, as Professor Simey has pointed out, 'the compelling social tendencies of the present age give as the dominant aim of modern (Western) society the acceptance of middle-class patterns of conduct by the whole population, and this is as true in the West Indies as anywhere else'.[31] From this point of view, therefore, many working-class West Indians must be regarded as having failed to make an adequate adjustment to their social environment.

A factor which gives the West Indian class structure its unique character is the association between these 'middle-class values' and the high prestige of anything associated with 'white' society. This is clearly a relic of the high status of white men and women in a society based upon Negro slavery. While there is no absolute colour-bar in the West Indies to-day, there is mild prejudice against the very dark person and occasional discrimination in hotels, clubs, and similar places. Nevertheless, the coloured man can, in theory, go anywhere. He can do so in practice as well so long as he is obviously wealthy. The fact remains that the lighter a West Indian's complexion, the more acceptable he is in middle- and upper-class society. Colour values in this sense are extremely complex and the assessment of an individual's social status depends upon these, as well as upon the socio-economic factors usually associated with class differences. The concept of 'colour' in this context is judged by actual skin colour and texture, hair formation, and facial bone structure. The nearer the features are to the European rather than the African, the more they are approved. For this

reason there is considerable demand, especially among women, for the artificial straightening of hair and bleaching of the skin, to produce a 'better' effect. There is a general tendency for those whose appearance is predominantly African to be described as 'Black' and to be associated with the lower classes. At the other end of the scale are the Europeans and the 'Fair Coloured', who have the highest status. Between the two are the 'middle classes' with a wide range of colour from dark to light. The fact that the terms used to denote colour are also social status symbols is illustrated by the fact that an obviously dark, but wealthy, person tends to describe lighter but poorer individuals as 'Blacks'.[32]

Light-skinned individuals in the West Indies are not only socially more acceptable, but find it easier to obtain employment, especially in shops, as secretaries, or in any capacity where they will come into contact with the general public. If, as often happens, the children of a family are not all of the same colour, the lighter ones are likely to be spoiled at the expense of the others, who will be jealous of this favouritism. White or light-skinned men and women are favoured as marriage partners as this is likely to 'raise the colour' of the family. Dr Henriques has drawn attention to some of the social consequences which follow from this preference:

> The fact that successful Black men seek out and marry women of a 'higher' colour in order to improve their social status, has led to the creation of a class of well-educated, often monied, Black spinsters. These women are unable to get married to the type of man they would like to, as such an individual would wish to marry only a woman lighter than himself. The only men available as mates are those belonging to a socially inferior group with whom they will have nothing to do. ... A Fair man who marries a Dark or Black woman commits social suicide. A Black man, wishing to be socially successful, who does the same throws away the only opportunity he will have of 'raising his colour'.[33]

It is not difficult to see that in such a situation, a coloured man or woman, especially one who happens to be of dark complexion, will be faced with many frustrating experiences, from infancy onwards. He may experience rejection by his

parents, especially his mother, and he will feel constantly thwarted by virtue of his colour. The working-class man, as we have seen, resolves this inner conflict by withdrawal. But this solution is not possible for the man or woman whose foot is already set on the path towards middle-class status. The frustrations he experiences will generate aggression, which will not be repressed, but will find overt expression. He will not solve the conflict in his personality by regression to a state of emotional childishness, but will channel his aggression into a striving for personal success, with little regard for other people. Professor T. S. Simey was the first to draw attention to the aggressive traits in the West Indian character, following a similar analysis of the racial situation in the southern states of the U.S.A.[34] The interpretation has since been developed by other writers and is supported by a good deal of empirical evidence of sociological and psychological significance.

In his discussion of the subject C. V. D. Hadley has pointed out that:

> the emerging middle class individual, by reason of his new set of goal responses, is inevitably brought into situations with many more possibilities of frustration than the proletarian who has not made this readjustment. ... He is liable to feel threatened or frustrated by claims made on him by the group from which he is emerging, claims which remind him of a previous identification with the group, e.g., illegitimate children; he is also liable to be frustrated by individuals in the group above – the upper middle class group, who may refuse to accord him the recognition of a social status which he desires. To an even greater extent he is also frustrated by the feelings of insufficiency and inadequacy, related to the colour situation, which he would have been a fortunate and exceptional West Indian to have escaped. He is, therefore, very liable to be an exceedingly aggressive person.[35]

Sometimes this aggressiveness may be replaced by a withdrawn aloofness similar to the apathy of the proletarian, but more often it will be expressed openly. A self-assertive manner, flamboyant dress, and other forms of 'conspicuous consumption' characteristic of those whose social status is insecure, use of flowery language and long words, and a

tendency to carry a chip on the shoulder, are all the marks of this type of person.

It has been suggested that there is gradually emerging in the West Indies a third social class with its own personality type and altogether better adjusted. This is the upper middle-class person who is secure in his status by virtue of wealth, education, and profession, which his family may have achieved in previous generations and which therefore he has not had to fight to gain for himself. Such a person is often capable of a more balanced outlook and objective assessment of the problems facing the West Indies to-day.

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS

There is in the West Indies a vicious circle between unemployment, poverty, ignorance, indolence, high labour costs, low productivity, and back to unemployment and poverty. As in all the under-developed countries there is a fundamental dilemma to which no adequate solution has yet been found, despite the good work done by colonial development and welfare schemes. Is it possible to extend social services and education, without first developing the economic resources necessary to pay for these services? If so, how successful can plans for economic development be in the face of ignorance, malnutrition, and disease? The inter-dependence between schemes of social welfare or education and schemes for economic development is clearly recognized, but a fundamental social conflict arises as soon as attempts are made to implement either one or the other. Plans for economic development fail for want of a properly trained and reliable labour force, while schemes for social welfare and education fail because the resources to pay for them cannot be raised.

That this is a very real dilemma facing the British West Indies to-day is witnessed in the Report of the Comptroller for Development and Welfare, 1952. It is pointed out that given the rapid rate of increase of the population govern-

ment tax revenues will have to rise steeply during the next ten years if present education services are to be maintained, let alone improved.

Another consideration to be borne in mind is that the increase in tax revenues which took place from 1941 to 1951 owed little to expanded production, and almost everything to the increased prices received for primary products. This is both a stimulus and a warning: a stimulus to governments to concentrate their energies and efforts on achieving a substantial increase in production and productivity in all branches of the territories' life, in order to ensure the essential expansion of tax revenues, and thus of the amounts available for education; and a warning that, unless such an increase takes place (and to some extent even if it does), the future maintenance of educational services will be more or less dependent on the vagaries of world prices and the purchasing power of money. Failing either a continued rise in the value of primary products (of which there is no evidence at present), or a substantial increase in production, it would not seem possible to continue current education policies or to avoid retrenchment in at least some aspects of education.[36]

Attempts are being made throughout the West Indies to develop secondary industries as an alternative means of providing employment and mobilizing the resources of the area. A cement industry has been started in Jamaica and an Industrial Development Corporation has been set up. Teams of experts from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development visited Jamaica and British Guiana.[37] Following the constitutional crisis in British Guiana it was announced that a loan of £9 million was to be made to enable some of the recommendations of the International Bank to be implemented. There is no doubt that soundly based industrial activity must be encouraged in order to diversify an economy which is too dependent upon a few crops such as sugar and bananas, and also to alleviate the unemployment among the fast growing population. Difficulties are bound to arise owing to the lack of raw materials, and the fact that successful industrialization 'calls for a high standard of general education and new services of vocational training and guidance to promote technical skills, thus

adding to the already formidable problems of educational policy.'[38]

In the meantime unemployment is still a serious problem, as indeed it has been since the abolition of slavery. The situation became so acute during the 1930s that a series of disturbances broke out throughout the British West Indian colonies. A Royal Commission was appointed in 1938 to investigate and its report revealed such a serious situation that publication of the report was actually delayed until 1945. Action was taken to remedy the situation at once. In 1940 a Comptroller for Development and Welfare was appointed and active steps taken to deal with the problems of poverty, disease, ignorance, and apathy which existed. A great deal of progress has been made in the intervening years, but unemployment remains a serious question. It is particularly acute among unskilled workers and young people in towns. The Report of the Comptroller of Development and Welfare for 1952, to which reference has been made, states:

> The most serious problem in the labour field is still lack of employment and extensive under-employment; and the situation is aggravated by the steady increase in population. It is estimated that in Jamaica over 20,000 persons are added to the working population each year; in Barbados the annual increase is said to be over 3500; in St Vincent with a total population of 70,000 it is about 1000. ... Only in British Honduras, where employment is available for practically the whole labour force, and possibly in British Guiana, has the demand for labour kept pace with the annual increase in the number of workers available.[39]

In any discussion of unemployment, the question of migration of labour naturally arises. A scheme has been drawn up by which a small number of workers from other colonies might be recruited for agricultural labour in British Honduras. While the other colonies often look to British Guiana as an outlet, the growth of that colony's own population diminishes the prospect of any large intake in the near future. Traditionally, West Indian workers have always found employment by migration to Panama and to the

United States. The entrance of West Indians to the United States is now controlled by the McCarran Act which enforces a strict quota. It is hoped that recruitment for agricultural work will continue but, as workers under this scheme are under contract to work for a specified period, it offers no permanent solution of the population problem. It is little wonder in the circumstances that ever-increasing numbers of West Indians are migrating to Britain in search of employment and the prospects of a higher standard of living than they can hope to achieve at home. To this question we shall turn in the next chapter.

Colour Bar in the Bahamas and Bermuda

These two territories are not normally regarded as part of the West Indies, since they come within the orbit of the North American continent rather than of Central or South America. As a consequence the economic problems of these territories are not as serious as in the West Indies proper, owing to a flourishing tourist trade. It is, however, unfortunate that this source of economic prosperity should be the cause of discriminatory practices against Negroes and coloured peoples generally, when these have almost disappeared in most parts of the West Indies. When the Secretary of State for Colonial Affairs was asked if his attention had been called to the insult offered to Sir Frank McDavid, a distinguished citizen of British Guiana, when he sought hotel accommodation in Bermuda and was refused it on racial grounds, it was stated in a written reply that:

> Her Majesty's Government have always been strongly opposed to the colour bar, but I am advised that its maintenance in certain hotels is essential to the tourist trade on which the people of the Colony as a whole depend for their livelihood. I have informed the Governor of my views and of my hope that everything possible will be done to reduce and finally to eliminate this practice of colour discrimination in Bermuda.[40]

The plea of economic necessity is strangely reminiscent of that once offered in defence of slavery.

CHAPTER FIVE

Racial Relations in Britain

OF the various ethnic minorities of non-European origin whose temporary or permanent homes are in Britain, the Negro group is the largest. The term Negro is used here in its widest sense to mean any person who is of ultimately African descent. It includes not only West Africans, but Africans from other parts of the continent including the Hamitic Somalis, together with West Indians of wholly or partly African descent, and coloured people born in Britain of an African or West Indian parent. The term 'coloured' is used in Britain in a somewhat wider sense than, for example, in South Africa. It includes not only people of mixed racial parentage but also any person of non-European origin, including Indians, Pakistanis, Malayans, Chinese, and Negroes. This inadequate differentiation of the non-European population is merely a consequence of the relatively small number of people who have any knowledge of or acquaintance with non-Europeans in Britain. This, in its turn, is largely because the coloured population is, comparatively speaking, very small and, until recently, has been confined to somewhat isolated communities in one or two seaboard towns.

As in preceding chapters, we shall be concerned mainly with the Negro population and shall only refer in passing to the Asiatic groups. In certain instances, where the Moslem religion acts as a socially integrating force, Africans and Asians come into close relationships with one another. Otherwise there is not a great deal of contact or communication between the two. Cultural and linguistic differences tend to keep the African and Asian population apart. It is difficult to obtain any reliable estimate of the non-European population domiciled in Britain in view of the fact that census and other returns make no distinction on grounds of race or colour. It is possible to distinguish aliens according to coun-

try of origin, but since the large majority of non-Europeans in Britain are citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies, or are British Protected Persons, this is of little help in calculating the size of the coloured population as a whole. Census returns by country of origin are equally misleading because they include, as far as the colonies are concerned, people born in the colonies whether of European or non-European origin.[1] The following figures, therefore, must be regarded as very rough estimates only.

ESTIMATED SIZE OF THE COLOURED POPULATION IN BRITAIN[2]

(Approximate figures 1954)

COUNTRY	NEGROES BORN IN			OTHER COLOURED	TOTAL
	AFRICA	WEST INDIES	U.K.		
England	25,500	18,500	7,250	35,000	86,250
Scotland	1,500	500	250	3,000	5,250
Wales	3,000	1,000	2,500	2,000	8,500
TOTAL	30,000	20,000	10,000	40,000	100,000

The figures for Negroes born in the United Kingdom include adults (over 21 years), juveniles (15–21), and children under fifteen years of age. The figures are roughly equal for both sexes. The remaining figures refer to immigrants, with the exception of a small number of coloured people born in Britain of Asian descent. The immigrants are predominantly male, although since the second world war an increasing number of women have migrated from the West Indies. The immigrants can be divided between those who had established domicile in Britain before 1939 and those who have migrated and settled in Britain during and since the second world war. There were more Africans than West Indians among the pre-war migrants, but in the post-war period the tendency appears to have been reversed. By 1954 the number of colonial immigrants, the majority Jamaicans, had

reached a figure of 10,000 per annum, but against this must be set the number returning to their colony of origin.[3]

The large majority of colonial immigrants make their way to Britain by legitimate means, paying their own passage by sea or air, or 'working their passage'. This procedure means signing on as a seaman at a colonial port and arranging for discharge, or deserting, on arrival in Britain. There were, however, sufficient stowaways in the post-war period to be of some concern to the authorities. Since 1949 steps have been taken to prevent stowing away, with only a limited degree of success. Aliens are refused leave to land, as are others who cannot show documentary proof of their British nationality. A birth certificate alone is insufficient for this purpose, and persons applying for passports in West African and West Indian colonies have been required to show that they are *bona fide* travellers. Between 1946 and 1951 1322 West African and 629 West Indian stowaways were landed.[4]

HISTORY OF THE NEGRO IN BRITAIN

The history of Negroes in Britain falls broadly into five main periods commencing with the era of slavery in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The first period extended until emancipation in the middle of the eighteenth century; in the second period, from the middle of the eighteenth century until the end of the nineteenth, Negroes were at first a fairly common sight, especially in London, but gradually declined in numbers and visibility as they were absorbed into the rest of the population or migrated to Sierra Leone or the West Indies. The third period commenced with the first world war, which was followed by a considerable influx of ex-servicemen and seamen from the colonies, and continued until the outbreak of the second world war. This period was characterized by the establishment of small settlements in Cardiff, Liverpool, and elsewhere. The second world war must be regarded as a distinct period in itself, marking as it did the first spell of relative prosperity after the unemploy-

ment and distress of the preceding decades. Finally, there is the period since 1945 which has been characterized by a flow of immigrants from West Africa and the West Indies and the rapid growth of Britain's coloured population.[5]

The number of Negro slaves in Britain was never at any time very large, since they were not employed in large numbers on plantations as in the West Indies. Those who were brought to Britain came mainly in the capacity of personal servants. At one time it was fashionable to have Negroes as coachmen, footmen, or pages. Nevertheless, eighteenth-century newspapers not infrequently contained advertisements for the sale of slaves or for the recovery of slaves who had deserted their masters. Various estimates have put the slave population in England between 14,000 and 20,000. The legal status of Negroes in Britain was always open to question and several conflicting opinions were recorded in the courts before the famous Mansfield judgement of 1771, which formally declared that the state of slavery was untenable by law in Britain, thereby emancipating those slaves already in Britain and any who could make their way there. However, this legal decision made little difference to the social status of Negroes, the majority of whom continued as servants, seamen, labourers, or beggars.[6]

The end of the war with the American colonies saw a considerable increase in the numbers of Negro beggars and others who found themselves destitute in London. The St Giles' 'Blackbirds' became famous, or infamous as the case may be, and it was their plight which led to the creation of a committee for the relief of Black Poor and the scheme for settling ex-slaves in Sierra Leone, to which reference has already been made. Nevertheless, many Negroes remained in London and were to be found in a variety of employments principally of a menial nature. There were Negro street sweepers, ballad singers, domestic servants, as well as seamen.

Not all Negroes in Britain during the latter part of the eighteenth century and the early part of the nineteenth were of low social status. Occasionally sons of chiefs and notables in West Africa were sent to England for purposes of education,

sometimes at the expense of their families and sometimes of missionary societies or trading companies. Dr K. L. Little mentions the names of Negroes who had prominent places in the Courts of George I and of George IV.[7] In fact the general attitude towards Negroes appears to have been one of tolerance combined with curiosity. The eighteenth century was the era of the 'noble savage' and it was not until later in the nineteenth century that attitudes towards coloured people in general appear to have shown signs of deterioration. The change in attitude appears to have coincided with a decrease in the frequency of contacts with Negroes in Britain, but an increase in contacts with coloured people in the colonies as a consequence of imperialistic expansion. The African and West Indian colonies, together with the Indian Empire, became of increasing economic and political importance to Britain. There grew up a large colonial government service, the members of which exerted considerable power and influence over their coloured subordinates in the colonies and acquired considerable social status at home. These officials tended to emphasize the wide cultural differences between themselves and the indigenous inhabitants of the colonies by maintaining a rigid social separation between European rulers and non-European ruled.[8] This served to aggravate existing barriers to communication and provided fertile ground for misapprehensions regarding the actual and potential capacities of coloured peoples. In the circumstances it is not surprising that writers such as Gobineau and Chamberlain, who supported the myth of 'Nordic superiority', had a large following.

In the Twentieth Century

Colour prejudice at this rather sophisticated level was not of very great significance to Negroes who found their way to Britain at the beginning of this century. Most of them were seamen, or had been at some time in their careers. So long as work was available, as in war-time, Negro seamen were welcome enough aboard British ships, although their chances

of promotion above the ranks of boiler-man, donkey-man, or A.B. were poor. When work was scarce white seamen were apt to express hostility towards coloured seamen, and the disturbances which broke out in Cardiff and Liverpool and on a smaller scale in east London, Tyneside, and Glasgow, after the first world war, were a reflection of the growing sense of insecurity which was felt by white seamen, who resented the competition of coloured colonials. That the competition was real and not imaginary is evidenced by the fact that so long as a coloured man was signed on at a colonial port, such as Freetown, he could be paid at much lower rates than those which applied to any man, white or coloured, who was signed on at a port in Britain. This had a dual effect. It increased the European seamen's resentment of the non-Europeans, while it encouraged the latter to settle in Britain in the hopes of obtaining the better pay and conditions that applied. In actual fact the unemployment which characterized the period between the two world wars meant that the coloured seamen obtained the worst of both worlds. If they were signed on from a colonial port they obtained inferior pay; if they came to Britain they frequently had difficulty in obtaining work at all, and were faced with the open hostility of many white seamen.

The disturbances of 1919 followed a similar pattern wherever they occurred. A relatively minor incident between one or two men, probably under the influence of drink, provided the spark that set off the inflammatory situation. In Liverpool the coincidence of a sudden increase in the number of Negro immigrants after the first world war, and the first signs of the post-war depression in the shipping industry, led, in May and June of 1919, to serious disturbances. The climax was reached when a Negro was drowned in a scrimmage on the docks and the police had to make several baton charges on the crowd. In Cardiff rioters attacked shops and houses where there were Negroes, a number of people were injured by guns or razors, and one person died. Soldiers were called in to assist the police. A similar incident occurred in Canning Town where the resentment against Negroes as

competitors for work was clearly manifest. The upshot of these disturbances was a campaign for the repatriation of coloured colonials in Britain and a number, in fact, took advantage of schemes to pay their passage to their home town. Others remained in Britain in hopes that the prospects of work would improve, but on the whole they were disappointed. The hardships of unemployment and poverty which affected most industries for varying periods between the two world wars were especially acute in the shipping industry, and coloured seamen became resigned to the idea that they would be the 'last to be hired and the first to be fired'. Many abandoned the sea and sought employment ashore, but the majority had little skill that would qualify them for more than labouring jobs. The large majority experienced long spells of unemployment between short periods of work, with all the demoralizing effects that are commonly associated with prolonged idleness.

Reference has already been made to the effects of the Special Restrictions (Coloured Alien Seamen) Order, 1925, which forced many Negroes who were British protected persons, and even some who were in fact British colonial subjects, to register as aliens. This reflected a general opposition to coloured colonials in Britain, which was also seen in the abortive proposals for replacing coloured firemen by white on all British ships and for the transportation of both adult and juvenile coloured people from Britain to West Africa. These suggestions were put forward in the early 1930s by the Association for the Welfare of Half-Caste Children in Liverpool. (The Association was subsequently renamed the Association for the Welfare of Coloured People.) It was the concern for the welfare of children of mixed racial descent which led in 1929 to the first investigation into the social and economic status of coloured people in the city of Liverpool.[9] It is unfortunate that the report of this investigation, while drawing attention to the depressed social and economic conditions of coloured families and the poor prospects for coloured children, did more harm than good to the state of relationships between coloured and white people in the city. The

methods used in the inquiry would not stand up to the test of scientific objectivity which any similar investigation would be expected to pass to-day. A sample of families was studied, which, far from being selected on a random basis, was derived from the names on the records of social welfare agencies, thereby introducing an uncontrollable bias. Furthermore, the absence of a control group of white families meant that many factors were attributed to coloured families which in fact were typical of many families in the neighbourhood during the depression, and were socio-economic in origin rather than due to any racial influence. The report of the inquiry received considerable publicity and did much to spread a misleading impression of the coloured population, through the derogatory remarks that it contained and the 'moral indignation' which was apparent throughout the report at the association of coloured men with white women. Other studies were made in Cardiff and elsewhere which, through the emphasis placed upon crime, prostitution, and disease, rather than upon the environmental influences which created these problems, had a similar adverse effect on public opinion.[10] One study which presented a more balanced and realistic picture based upon more reliable information did not receive the publicity it deserved.[11]

In 1938 a second investigation in Liverpool was conducted, this time under the direction of the head of the social statistics division of the University, who was also author of the three-volume *Social Survey of Merseyside*, published in 1934. It is possible to place a good deal more faith in the results of this investigation, particularly in view of the fact that it was possible to compare the results with a control group of white families.[12] The most important findings of the report were: (1) that 75 per cent of the males in coloured families were unemployed, a percentage very much higher than among white males in similar occupations. (2) Coloured families tended to fall below the 'poverty line' as defined in the social survey of Merseyside, in greater proportion than white families. (3) Coloured families tended to pay higher


rents for similar accommodation compared with white families. These conclusions appear to have been borne out by other inquiries elsewhere. Dr K. L. Little in his study of Cardiff suggests that 'so far as rentals are concerned, it is possible that the position of coloured families in Cardiff is even more extreme than that discovered in a recent survey in Liverpool'.[13]

The situation changed rapidly after the outbreak of the second world war. The enormous demands made upon British ships in convoy duties during the war created a state of full employment which brought about a considerable decrease in discrimination against coloured seamen. Although the higher ranks of the Merchant Service were not open to Negroes, the latter could work alongside their white comrades for the same pay and status. For the time being economic competition was replaced by a sense of common purpose in the face of shared dangers. A similar situation existed among the coloured men who joined the armed forces and fought side by side with white soldiers, sailors, and airmen. There was, for example, a large contingent from the West Indies in the R.A.F. In the early part of the war there was not the same demand for men from overseas in the services, but there was a considerable need for skilled and semi-skilled workers in the factories. It was to meet this need that a group of 345 West Indians was brought over to England between 1941 and 1943. These men worked in war factories in the north of England and many stayed in Britain after the war. The full story of this group of men, and the problems of assimilation and adjustment which they experienced, has been told elsewhere.[14] They found much prejudice against them in various circumstances, but, as far as employment is concerned, the situation was satisfactory so long as the war lasted and there was a big demand for skilled and semi-skilled factory workers. Since the war, while the situation has not become anything like as serious as in the 1930s, unemployment has once again become rather a problem as far as coloured colonials in Britain are concerned. Seamen have been most seriously affected, followed by labourers and other

unskilled workers. This is particularly true of Liverpool, which is a Development Area and has had, since the war, a rather higher rate of unemployment than elsewhere in the country.[15]

The following diagram illustrates the trends in unemployment in Liverpool between 1930 and 1950. The figures for unemployment amongst Negroes are estimates only because, although the number of unemployed is known accurately as far as colonials are concerned, figures for English-born coloured men and women are not available. In any case the total coloured population of Liverpool is itself a matter of estimation rather than accurate statistical calculation. Nevertheless, the picture presented may be regarded as a fairly reliable one as far as Liverpool is concerned. The pre-war experience of Cardiff was similar, but unemployment has not been quite so serious in other parts of the country since the war in view of the fact that, outside the Development Areas, more or less full employment obtained until recently. Since 1950 the position in Liverpool has remained much the same with unemployment among coloured colonial workers fluctuating between 15 per cent and 20 per cent.[16] In east London the rate of unemployment in 1951 was approximately 15 per cent.[17]

UNEMPLOYMENT ON MERSEYSIDE, 1930–50



PREJUDICE, DISCRIMINATION, AND SEPARATION

A number of studies have been made in Britain of various aspects of prejudice. It has already been observed that colour prejudice is closely related to other forms of ethnocentrism such as antisemitism, which is of similar social and psychological origin. Dr J. H. Robb's study of anti-semitism in a working-class area of London throws a good deal of light upon the complex factors which lead some people to express strong antipathetic attitudes towards out-groups such as Jews or Negroes.[18] What ethnic minority is actually selected as the target for severe prejudice will depend a great deal on time and place. In addition to Jews and coloured people, other groups such as Catholics, Irish, Poles, and Italians have become objects of hostility in certain communities, from time to time. The common denominator in all these cases appears to be the fact that the prejudiced person sees the out-group as in some way or other constituting a threat to his own personal security and status. Severe prejudice is a response to inner feelings of anxiety and insecurity which have their origins deep in the unconscious mind, and are often derived from early childhood experiences of deprivation or frustration. As far as attitudes towards coloured people in Britain are concerned, there is now conclusive evidence to suggest that the population can be considered to fall into three broad groups of roughly equal size. One-third is tolerant of coloured people, one-third is mildly prejudiced, and one-third is extremely prejudiced.

Extremely prejudiced people in Britain strongly resist the idea of having any degree of contact or communication with coloured people. They object vehemently to mixed marriages, but are almost as strongly opposed to having coloured people in their homes, or to working with them in a factory or office. In fact they are generally of the opinion that coloured people should not be allowed in Britain at all. At the opposite end of the scale are those who, while often not altogether approving of mixed marriages, consider that it is

a question for the individual concerned to decide for him or herself. Otherwise they would be prepared to entertain coloured people at home and would have no objection to working with them. In fact they approve of the idea of coloured people coming to Britain, for work or for training and education, and have no objection to their remaining permanently if they wish. Between these two extremes there is a wide range of opinions regarding coloured people which, chameleon-like, tend to reflect the commonly held stereotypes of their neighbours and friends. These mildly prejudiced people have rarely given very much thought to the matter and cannot be said to be emotionally involved, in the sense of having any very strong feelings on the question themselves. One remarkable fact which emerges from almost all studies of prejudice in Britain is that most people think others more prejudiced than themselves.[19] In so far as their behaviour is largely determined by what they believe to be the expectations of others, discriminatory practices consequent upon prejudices are nearly always attributed to a need for deference to the views of others. Clearly, this is often a mere rationalization of the individual's own prejudice, but it can also be more than this. It is not difficult to see that in a situation where everyone believes everyone else to be prejudiced, prejudice itself must thrive until its own sandy foundations are undermined. A judicious educational campaign will have little influence on the minority who are severely prejudiced, but could make considerable headway with others. At the present time landladies refuse accommodation because of what their husbands or the neighbours might think; employers refuse accommodation to coloured workers because of what their white employees might say and do; hotel and restaurant managers worry what their clients will think if they admit Negroes; and people make derogatory remarks about coloured people because it seems the 'thing to do'.

That there is room for a great deal of educational work regarding coloured colonial peoples is shown by the inquiry conducted by the Social Survey on behalf of the Colonial

Office in 1948.[20] This was intended to discover the extent of public knowledge of, and interest in, the colonies. An appalling degree of ignorance was revealed. Three-quarters of the people interviewed could not distinguish between a dominion and a colony and, when the difference was explained, only half could actually name correctly a single colony. Hardly any (4 per cent) were able to suggest the name of a colony which had recently made advances towards self-government. Only about a third could name any food or raw material and the colony from which it came. A quarter of the informants thought that the colonies were mostly inhabited by white people and only 16 per cent knew that the site of the then much publicized ground-nut scheme was East Africa. Ignorance was slightly greater among older people and in the lower income groups, but the differences were not sufficient to modify a picture of widespread ignorance and confusion. An encouraging sign, however, was that two-thirds of those interviewed approved of money being spent on colonial development.[21]

It is not a lack of correct information about the colonies and their inhabitants which serves to aggravate racial relations in Britain, so much as the completely wrong ideas that are widely held. These are matched on the other side by the misapprehensions shared by many coloured colonials about life in Britain, until they actually come to experience conditions for themselves. It is not surprising that when reciprocal levels of expectation are so vastly different on both sides, misunderstanding and consequent prejudices are rife. The table opposite indicates the marked contrast between the principal stereotypes held, on the one hand, by people in Britain about the colonies and, on the other, by coloured colonials about Britain. It is not difficult to see that both sets of beliefs are equally far removed from reality.

FALSE STEREOTYPES

MANY PEOPLE IN BRITAIN BELIEVE:

1. *Coloured colonials are pagan:* We have to send missionaries to the colonies to convert heathen coloured people who practise head-hunting, cannibalism, infanticide, polygamy, and black magic.

2. *Coloured colonials are uncivilized:* Coloured people are poor and backward; they live in primitive mud huts 'in the bush', wear few clothes, eat strange foods, and suffer from unpleasant diseases. This is because they are inherently inferior to Europeans.

3. *Coloured colonials have strong sexual urges:* Coloured men are less sexually inhibited and capable of giving greater sexual satisfaction than white men. Once having had relations with a coloured man a white woman will not be interested in white men.

4. *Coloured colonials are ignorant:* They are illiterate, speak strange languages, and have no proper education.

5. *The colonies are economically weak and dependent:* Britain is spending a lot of money in trying to give aid to the 'under-developed' countries.

6. *The colonies are full of wild animals.*

MANY COLOURED COLONIALS BELIEVE:

1. *Britain is a Christian country:* Everyone in Britain will express the Christian virtues of love and tolerance, attend church regularly, and welcome the stranger in their midst. There is no colour prejudice in Britain.

2. *Britain is a prosperous country:* Most people in Britain live like Europeans do in the colonies; they have big houses and keep servants to do all the manual work; there is full employment and as Britain needs workers it is easy to get a job at good pay; Britain is a 'welfare state' and will not let anyone be destitute; if they are ill there is a free health service.

3. *White women are strongly attracted by coloured men:* Women who express the strongest opposition to others who 'go out' with coloured men, are the ones who most desire their attentions.

4. *Britain has a free education system:* Anyone can go to school or college free of charge and become a professional or skilled worker if he wants to.

5. *Britain is a powerful nation:* Much of her power is a result of having exploited the colonies for her own benefit.

6. *Britain is an El Dorado.*

Where do the fantastic notions, of which the above are merely a few of those most frequently heard, come from in the first place? It is obvious that each of them has a small kernel of truth, but this has been exaggerated and distorted until it bears no resemblance to the facts at all. Consider first of all the false stereotypes which many people in Britain believe about coloured Colonials. It is true that a high proportion of Africans are not Christians, although most West Indians nominally are. Nevertheless, the efforts of missionaries during the last two hundred years have not been without effect and the percentage of those who are at least nominally Christian is very high in some parts. This is especially true of those Africans who make their way to Britain. The majority of these have had at least the rudiments of Christianity drilled into them at missionary and even government schools. Very few African tribes still practise cannibalism or any of the other unpleasant rites frequently attributed to them, still less those who come to Britain, who have usually been 'detribalized' in every sense of the word. Yet these notions persist in the minds of people in Britain. Since the proportion of people who attend churches in Britain to-day is very small, the churches themselves can hardly be blamed for perpetuating misapprehensions on this score. It seems more likely that the present generation harbours barely conscious memories of things they were told in day school or Sunday school, many years ago.

Much the same applies to the idea that Negroes and others are not used to 'civilized' ways. Again, a large proportion of the African population, and even some of the West Indian, live under material conditions of life that can only be described as primitive. But enough has been said in this book already to show that an ever-increasing proportion of the coloured population of the African and West Indian colonies is growing up under essentially urban conditions of life, overcrowded and poverty-stricken though they may be. Overcrowding and poverty are not unknown in Britain. As for clothing, food, and disease, in all these respects the African is rapidly becoming Europeanized. Unfortunately, when it

comes to teaching colonial history or human geography in schools, if the subjects are taught at all they tend to emphasize the contrasting elements in the situation which permit more 'vivid' presentation, rather than the similarities. It is true that in recent years some attempts have been made to remedy the situation and the use of dramatic material through radio and films has been useful in this respect. Probably the most serious offenders, as far as conveying 'false stereotypes' is concerned, are out-of-date text-books. This question is of importance in the field of international relations as well as racial relations, and has recently been the subject of intensive investigation by UNESCO.[22]

Stereotypes about Negro sexuality come into a different category altogether. They are not the product of a faulty educational system so much as an expression of deep-seated emotional conflicts concerning sexual matters. There is a good deal of evidence to show that in modern Western civilization erotic or sexual impulses are subject to a great deal of repression and renunciation. In so far as the Negro is popularly identified with the 'savage' and thought to live a life which is relatively free from the conventions and restrictions associated with 'civilization', he is often believed to be free from sexual restraints. As a result it is suggested that the Negro comes to represent in the mind of the white man or woman that aspect of his own unconscious with which he is in a state of conflict. Hostility which the individual directs towards the part of himself that wants to break away from the sexual restraints is projected onto the Negro, who is accused of doing all the things that the white person himself would like to do, but dare not.[23] In fact, the Negro is also subject to similar restraints, even in primitive societies, and may also experience conflicts with regard to sexual expression. This is especially true if he lives in an urbanized area where there are fewer women in proportion to men and the opportunities for legitimate sexual expression without public disapproval are limited. The situation is aggravated further when the only women are European and the public disapproval of illicit sexual relations is reinforced by their disapproval of miscegenation.[24]

It is not difficult to see how the coloured person's stereotypes about life in Britain have come about. Until recently the education of Africans and West Indians on the Western pattern has been largely in the hands of missionaries. Consciously or unconsciously they have painted a picture of Britain as a Christian country and *ipso facto* one in which the inhabitants expressed all the Christian ethical virtues that the missionaries so painstakingly instilled into their converts. As for Britain's economic position, full employment, and the welfare state, all these things have been a part of the propaganda put out by radio and newspaper, at least since 1939.[25] Britain's need for workers has been emphasized and has encouraged many colonials to make their way to Britain in the belief that there would be work for them. This was hardly surprising when displaced persons and European volunteer workers were being recruited. Colonials who 'make good' in Britain often return home with exaggerated stories of life in Britain, while those who fail to make a successful adjustment often feel too ashamed to return to their home town or village for fear of ridicule, so strong is the belief that Britain is an *El Dorado*. So the vicious circle is perpetuated.

Despite the fact that half the people in Britain have never met a coloured man or woman and, of those who have, in most cases the acquaintance has been only casual, prejudice against coloured people is widespread. More than two-thirds of the European inhabitants of Britain are liable to express some derogatory opinion or disapproval of coloured people, in certain circumstances. But the question remains, is this prejudice translated into positive acts of deprivation directed against coloured people as individuals or groups? To what extent is there discrimination against Negroes in Britain?

Discrimination

The most striking thing about both prejudice and discrimination, from the point of view of the Negro in Britain, is that he never knows when or where to expect it. He may go for long periods, or if he mixes in certain limited circles,

even for a life-time, and never meet it. There are Negroes in Britain who can quite genuinely say that they have never been turned away from a hotel, restaurant, or dance hall because of their colour; never been refused accommodation or the lease of a flat; never been turned down for a job; never been told they can be served in the public bar but not the saloon; and never been called 'a bloody nigger' by a passing stranger. But such fortunate people are few and far between. The large majority of Negroes in Britain can provide instances of disciminatory behaviour by people in Britain which they themselves have experienced, and many more which have befallen their friends. Many of these incidents are small and of little significance, but the cumulative effect can have a seriously demoralizing influence on a coloured man already finding it difficult enough to make a successful adjustment.

The first experience of discrimination which a coloured colonial immigrant in Britain has to face is almost invariably in his search for somewhere to live. Whether he wishes to rent furnished rooms, with or without board, to take an unfurnished flat, to buy or lease a house or flat, or obtain temporary accommodation in an hotel, he is liable to find his colour a handicap to him. This is true irrespective of his social status. He may be a stowaway recently arrived from the colonies, a skilled worker or professional man, a student politician, or member of the African nobility; it will make no difference. If he has friends they may give him the benefit of their experience and advise him not to try this or that address, because there is a 'colour bar'. Instead, he may be told where he can find the accommodation he requires without embarrassment, although sometimes he may have to pay a little more for it. If he has not the benefit of others' experience to guide him he is bound sooner or later to find the door closed to him. Sometimes this is done without ceremony and to the accompaniment of abuse, but more often it will be done apologetically. 'The room was let this morning'; 'I would not mind myself but what would the neighbours say'; 'I have my other guests to consider'; 'You see we have a lot

of Americans who stay here'; 'I would have no objection but we are bound by the terms of the lease'; 'If we admit Negroes then the value of the property will fall at once'; 'Of course we have nothing against you personally, but ...' These are typical of the excuses offered.[26]

The immigrant colonial worker may obtain some advice in his search for accommodation from the Colonial Office welfare department, but on the whole he is left to handle this problem on his own. The student is in a slightly more favourable position in so far as the facilities of University lodgings bureaux are at his disposal. Landladies who wish to take students register with the bureau, and if the accommodation is 'approved' students are sent with a recommendation until all the vacancies at that address have been filled. Long experience has shown the officials of these bureaux that many landladies will not take coloured students and, in London at least, they are requested, on registration, to indicate their preferences as between male and female students and with regard to race and nationality. The records of this bureau have twice been analysed, once in 1938–9 and again in 1952–3, and the results appear to be fairly consistent.[27] Approximately 70 per cent of these landladies were unwilling to accept coloured students, and as far as very dark Africans or West Indians were concerned the figure was nearer 85 per cent. It is clear that these figures substantiate the stories told by colonial students of their long and weary search for accommodation, which is so often their first impression of life in Britain. It is true that there are hostels for colonial students, but these can only take a small proportion of the total number of colonial students and are not necessarily the most satisfactory solution to the problem.

The experience of colonial students in London is repeated by other students in varying degrees in other parts of the country and by working men from the colonies everywhere. It has already been noted that in Liverpool. before the second world war, coloured families were paying higher rents for their houses than white families in similar accommodation, and this is almost certainly as true to-day, not only in Liver-

pool. The problem is equally serious as far as the coloured professional man is concerned, especially if he wishes to lease a flat in a fairly 'respectable' area. The inclusion of restrictive clauses in leases is of dubious validity, but the practice is undoubtedly widespread, although exactly how widely it is almost impossible to discover. The general impression appears to be that clauses forbidding letting or sub-letting to 'persons of colour' are automatically written into the leases of property owned by several large companies. Until such clauses are challenged in the High Courts it is not known whether they are really legal and effective. So far there has been no test case, and in the meantime this form of racial discrimination continues unchecked.[28]

There has been a test case regarding accommodation in hotels, although the circumstances surrounding the decision in favour of the coloured man were such that it cannot be regarded as having set a precedent.[29] Certainly it has not succeeded in putting a stop to racial discrimination in hotels, which, although by no means universal or even frequent, happens sufficiently often to be a cause of concern. One fashionable hotel in London has been especially criticized on this score in the House of Commons. Punitive measures such as the withholding of licences by the Ministry of Food or the refusal to send official visitors to the hotel have been proposed, and rejected by the government, as a means of combating this discrimination.[30]

Discrimination against coloured men and women in Britain in their search for employment is as unpredictable as in the attempt to obtain accommodation. Many employers pursue a liberal policy and so long as the coloured man in question has the requisite qualifications, including membership of the appropriate trade union, will employ him without question. Others refuse absolutely to take coloured workers in any circumstances. On the whole it would be fair to say that the majority of employers will take coloured men or women with the right qualifications, so long as the need for workers is sufficiently great, as during the war when labour was scarce. At other times there is some hesitation. If work is at

all scarce many employers prefer to give the first opportunity to people born in Britain, especially locally, rather than to immigrants whether from other parts of the country or from overseas. (It is often forgotten that many coloured people have themselves been born and bred in Britain.) The policy is partly a matter of private inclinations on the part of the employer and partly a question of labour relations in the factory. Although the trade-union movement as such has no 'colour bar', individual members are often prejudiced and may cause 'trouble' if coloured workers are taken on, while white workers may still be without work. In circumstances such as these many employers prefer to 'play safe'.[31]

Statistics of unemployment among coloured workers cannot, by themselves, be taken as an indication that discrimination is taking place on a large scale. While it is true, as we have seen, that rates of unemployment among Negroes in Britain are several times higher than among the white population generally, it would be necessary to take a matched sample of coloured and white workers of similar ages, occupations, and skill before any reliable estimate of the degree of discrimination could be made. One of the difficulties about employing coloured colonial workers in Britain is that their training and experience in Africa or the West Indies has been different in character from what is usually required in Britain. In the West Indies, for example, a man tends to be a 'jack of all trades'. If he has done an apprenticeship in the engineering industry he has probably had limited experience of all the principal trades, but has not specialized in any one of them to the extent that would be expected in Britain. The result is that his skill at any particular trade is often only sufficient to warrant his employment at semi-skilled rates, rather than as a skilled workman which, by West Indian standards, he is. Misunderstandings on this score are a source of considerable concern on the part of employers and coloured employees alike. Nevertheless, as war-time experience showed, given experience of specialization the West Indian or other coloured artisan is as competent as any other.

It is among seamen that the greatest difficulty with regard to employment arises. Apart from war-time there have always been more men wanting to go to sea than there have been jobs, and in the resulting competition for employment the coloured man is always at a disadvantage. The seamen's union has been constantly on its guard against unfair competition and has sought to protect the interests of the regular seaman. After the second world war a system of 'establishment' was instituted whereby a seaman with a long service record would be given priority for employment over the more recent recruits to the industry. Now some West African and West Indian seamen, by virtue of their war and pre-war service, qualified for establishment but many of the more recent immigrants did not. For this reason many coloured men found it difficult to obtain employment at sea from 1945 onwards. The highest rates of unemployment recorded were among coloured firemen and stokers in Liverpool, and many of these unestablished men were unemployed for long periods.

Attention was drawn to the problem when, in 1950, Mrs E. Braddock raised the question in the House of Commons. She asked the Minister of Transport:

> How many colonials in Liverpool are registered as seamen unestablished and established respectively; to what extent arrangements have been made with the Shipping Federation that a rota of employment is worked; if the Minister is aware that some colonials with good discharges have not had a trip for up to fifteen months, and that the method of selection is having a disturbing effect on the colonial seamen; and if he would investigate the matter?

Mr Alfred Barnes wrote in reply:

> The Shipping Federation inform me that last week eighty established and 381 unestablished coloured seamen regarded as suitable for employment were registered at their Liverpool office. The selection of crew is a matter for the industry, but I understand that preference is always given to the established seamen when vacancies occur. It is true that there are some unestablished seamen who have not been employed for fifteen months, but owing to the general situation in the Liverpool area, the Ministry of Labour have the utmost difficulty in placing these men in alternative employment.[32]

It should be noted that Mrs Braddock's question specifically

said 'colonial' seamen, but the reply given is in terms of 'coloured' seamen – which will include English-born coloured men, East Indians, etc.

The situation, not always fully understood by the coloured men themselves, led to many accusations that discrimination against coloured men was taking place in the shipping industry. The employers, for their part, were able to point to the coloured seamen who were in employment, and dismissed the charge as absurd. The whole problem was aggravated by constant references to bribes that were alleged to pass between the men who did obtain employment and the officials responsible. There has rarely been sufficient evidence to substantiate charges of this kind. Nevertheless, a certain amount of 'palm greasing' undoubtedly goes on. If favouritism is exercised in the choice of particular individuals or groups of coloured men, it is usually defended on the grounds that they have a reputation for being hard workers and less 'troublesome' as employees. To this, the men who fail to obtain employment retort that by less 'troublesome' the employers merely mean that the employees they favoured were willing to put up with bad conditions at sea without protest, and enable employers to keep ships at sea that no white man would consider working on. Obviously there is a lot to be said on both sides of the argument. In any case the practice of manning a whole ship, apart from officers and higher ranks, with members of the same nationality, while having much to commend it from the point of view of convenience, does lend itself to abuse.

The position with regard to discrimination in other public places such as dance halls, restaurants, and public houses varies a great deal. It is in these situations, as in certain hotels, that the influence of prejudiced Americans in Britain sometimes makes itself felt. It would be absurd to blame all such instances of discrimination on the presence of Americans or to suggest that all Americans are necessarily prejudiced. Nevertheless, in localities where there are a number of American troops, who provide a relatively wealthy clientèle, proprietors are sometimes apt to institute a colour-

bar as a precautionary measure to avoid any possibility of 'trouble'. An interesting example occurred in Manchester in the latter part of 1953 and resulted in applications for renewal of licences by certain public hotel proprietors being challenged at a City Licensing session. It was alleged that an African from the Gold Coast, a graduate of Manchester University, had been refused service at two licensed houses in the city, on the grounds of his colour. The defence alleged that the discrimination was necessary in order to avoid the possibility of clashes between coloured men and Americans who frequented the bar. The justices stated that they strongly deprecated racial discrimination in licensed houses and insisted that a customer, no matter of what nationality, colour, or creed, should be served so long as he conducted himself properly.[33]

Discrimination of this type is really another form of imposed social separation, the main object of which is to prevent conflict. There is in fact no rigid separation or segregation of races in Britain such as is found in South or Central Africa. There is absolutely no separation in public offices, transport, cinemas, or anywhere else in Britain. While coloured men occasionally complain that white people get up and find another seat if they sit down next to them in a bus or similar place, there is in fact no formal segregation. It is sometimes suggested that the existence of 'coloured communities' in certain cities is an indication of some measure of segregation having taken place, and there is a measure of truth in this. But two points of difference must be observed between the situation in Britain and that in South Africa, or in America. In Britain, even in the localities with the densest coloured population, there are still many white families living in the same streets, as neighbours of the coloured families. In so far as partial segregation has taken place it is a result partly of the difficulty experienced by coloured people in finding accommodation in other parts of the city, but also of their own natural inclination to live in proximity to their own friends and acquaintances of the same nationality.

Nevertheless, it is still true to say that this partial segrega-

tion on a residential basis has aggravated existing barriers to communication between coloured and white people in Britain and has enabled the false stereotypes discussed earlier to remain unchallenged. The vast majority of people in Britain know about coloured people only what they read in their newspaper, and this is rarely favourable. The dispersal of coloured people in the various cities in which they have settled would do much to improve racial relations; whereas the relative isolation of an under-privileged minority, while it may minimize the possibility of conflict in the short run on a kind of 'out of sight out of mind' basis, can only aggravate the sense of deprivation experienced by the coloured minority. The deliberate planning of separate 'coloured communities' in British cities is not therefore to be encouraged.[34]

COLOURED COMMUNITIES IN BRITAIN

The principal coloured communities in Britain have grown up spontaneously. They are to be found in Cardiff, Liverpool, Tyneside, Manchester, Birmingham, and London. There are smaller and less well-established groups of coloured people also to be found in other parts of the country as well. While each has its unique features a number of common factors can be observed. All consist of heterogeneous groups of non-Europeans from very varied cultural backgrounds: they are, in other words, cosmopolitan. All are located in the poorer quarters of the town and tend to be at least partially isolated from the rest of the community. With the exception of one or two more recent settlements, the coloured communities are of seafaring origin, although a much wider range of occupations may now be represented. All are regarded by the respective city authorities as a 'problem'.

Cardiff

Cardiff illustrates the relative isolation of the coloured communities in Britain more than any other city. Not only are there the social barriers that have already been discussed,

but there are purely geographical barriers between the coloured quarter and the rest of the city as well. Dr K. L. Little has drawn attention to this factor in his study of the coloured community in Cardiff.[35] He describes the locality in which the large majority of coloured people live and draws attention to the fact that 'this peninsula of human habitation is almost literally shut in and cut off from the rest of the world by a compact barrier of docks, water, rails, fencing, and machinery. There are in fact only three ways of entering the area by land.... The limited access serves not only to indicate the physical isolation of the district, but perhaps psychologically also to give the city folk and the inhabitants of the peninsula alike an enhanced sense of the mutual dis-association.'[36] Dr Little also draws attention to the fact that this tendency towards isolation is not limited to coloured people in our society but is characteristic of the relationships of seafaring people and others generally. Social relationships established by a seaman tend by the nature of his occupation to be more transitory in character than others and as a consequence his role and status among non-seafaring people tends to be somewhat uncertain, and this is aggravated when he is of a different race or nationality. Dr Little also suggests that it is significant that other 'isolated' types such as prostitutes who are also 'out of status' with the rest of the community are also found in this geographically separate locality.[37]

It is unfortunate that a great deal of publicity has been given from time to time to the less reputable activities of Cardiff's 'Tiger Bay'. The existence of brothels and cafés of ill-repute in this locality is notorious and as a consequence the coloured community has tended to get a bad name, because the large majority live in this neighbourhood. It would be absurd to pretend that Negroes or other coloured people are never involved in running brothels, peddling drugs, smuggling, or any of the nefarious activities always associated with a dockland area. But that they are any more responsible for these activities than white men and women is open to dispute. In any case, in so far as coloured people

become involved in illegal or immoral proceedings the part played by prejudice against them, in legitimate fields of activity, must not be overlooked.

The cosmopolitan nature of the coloured communities in Britain has been mentioned, and Cardiff is no exception. In addition to men and women, white and coloured, born in Britain there are West Africans, West Indians, Arabs, Somalis, Maltese, Indians, Pakistanis, Greeks, and others of various origin. In addition there are those who have established no permanent domicile in the city but who spend varying periods, usually in seamen's lodgings and boarding houses, between ships. The total number of coloured men and women in the city is difficult to estimate and appears to vary from time to time. When Dr K. L. Little undertook his inquiry in 1941–2 he considered that the total coloured population was in the region of 6000, taking into account white wives and other dependants as well as transitory inhabitants. Arabs and West Africans formed the majority, with West Indians also claiming a high proportion. Since then the proportion of Cardiff-born people of mixed descent, children and adults, has probably increased, although the popularity of Cardiff among recent immigrants has probably declined relative to other parts of the country. This means that the coloured quarter is becoming a more settled community. There are Cardiff-born coloured people of the second and third generations and regular clubs and community centres attached to the churches catering for the younger generation.

Despite the cultural diversity of its population the coloured community of Cardiff exhibits at times a remarkable degree of cohesion which can be understood properly only as a reaction to the prejudice and discrimination which is directed towards its members by the white population. It is at times of crisis that this solidarity is most clearly manifest. At other times differences of language, religion, nationality, and economic class make the creation of a definite organization for the protection of the interests of coloured people extremely difficult. Small groups in the nature of 'friendly societies' have been formed mainly with the object of in-

suring against unforeseen contingencies such as illness or death. But these societies are small and their finances do not permit more than a limited amount of activity. Referring to one of these organizations catering especially for Africans, Dr Little has said, 'Its leaders are among the most respected members of the community, and it is looked upon as a highly respectable organization by coloured and white alike. Socially, perhaps, its most important function is a status-assuring body. Its approved criteria – sober and informed discussion, a proper funeral, a "moral" code of behaviour – are also goals of the lower middle classes as such.'[38] By the more politically conscious among the coloured population, friendly societies of this kind are regarded as 'unrealistic' in their approach. Yet despite attempts, both in Cardiff and on a national level, to organize a more politically active society for the protection of Negro interests, comparable with the American Association for the Advancement of Coloured Peoples, no such organization has yet emerged as an effective force. This is probably due, on the one hand, to smallness of numbers and, on the other, to the fact that discrimination in Britain, not being sustained by law, is an elusive issue to fight in political terms.

Liverpool

The association of Liverpool with the Negro populations of Africa and the West Indies goes back to the days of the slave trade but, like Cardiff, the present coloured community originated at the beginning of the twentieth century and was increased by a wave of immigrants after each of the two world wars. Unlike Cardiff's, the coloured population of Liverpool is not geographically isolated from the rest of the city, although there tends to be partial social separation. The earliest Negro and Chinese immigrants tended to settle in close proximity to the docks at the south and east end of Liverpool, but as early as 1929 it was noted that a few families had scattered throughout the city and as far as the new housing areas on the outskirts. In the present day there

is a wide dispersion, but a still definite concentration in the postal district of Liverpool 8. Here coloured and white families live next door to each other, and while in a few streets two-thirds or more of the inhabitants are coloured people, there are others where the proportion is reversed.

Up to the time of the second world war the coloured population of Liverpool was not as large as that in Cardiff. An estimate in 1934 suggested that there were not more than 500 adult male Negroes and about the same number of Chinese.[39] Largely owing to restrictions on immigration, the Chinese population does not appear to have increased very much, while the Negro population, as a result of immigration and natural increase, has probably been multiplied tenfold. West Africans are in the majority, with Liverpool-born coloured people and West Indians a close second and third. The exact figures vary from time to time and can only be estimated roughly, as no accurate statistics exist. There are also a few Somalis and Arabs. The Asian population includes Indians, Pakistanis, and Malayans as well as Chinese. A rough estimate would put the total number of adult male Negroes in Liverpool in 1954 at about 4000, to which must be added probably another thousand Liverpool-born coloured women, and a similar number of children and juveniles of both sexes under the age of twenty-one years. The total Chinese population, men, women, and children, is probably under a thousand. The remaining Asians tend to be a transitory population who rarely establish a permanent domicile in Liverpool.

Seafaring is still one of the principal occupations among Liverpool's coloured population, but it has long ceased to be the only one. Many ship's firemen have turned to similar work as boilermen on shore. Many others obtain employment, when they can, as labourers. There are also a number of skilled and semi-skilled tradesmen, mainly West Indians, in engineering and related industries. Liverpool, and the north-west region of the country generally, absorbed a number of West Indian Negro workers in factories during the war. About half this number returned to the West Indies

at the conclusion of hostilities, but many came back once again to Britain when they discovered the poor opportunities for employment at home. Of the large number of West Indians who have migrated to Britain since the second world war, many of them landing at Liverpool, the majority have dispersed to other parts of the country, where employment prospects are better; but a few have remained in Liverpool. On the whole, men with proper trade qualifications and membership of the appropriate trade union can usually find employment in the long run, but the unskilled workers are more difficult to place.

In addition to a community centre for coloured people and their white friends, sponsored by the white community in Liverpool, there are a number of clubs and associations organized by West Africans, West Indians, and English-born coloured people for themselves. Many of these take the form of cafés which act as meeting-places and informal clubs, usually used predominantly, but not exclusively, by the members of a particular nationality. Others are registered as private clubs with a liquor licence; the majority of these are run as legitimate concerns, but one or two have a reputation for being centres for gambling, hashish smoking, and the like, though the extent of this kind of illegal activity is often exaggerated. There are several small organizations in the nature of friendly societies, such as those described in Cardiff, which tend to cater especially for the smaller sub-cultural groups such as Somalis, or tribal groupings among the West Africans whose common tie is mainly that of language. One or two attempts have been made to organize political activity among the coloured population, especially the unemployed seamen, but without a great deal of success. As so frequently happens where there is a grievance to be exploited communistic elements have provided some of the leadership in such movements, but there is little evidence that they have carried the rank and file with them. Disturbances which occurred in Liverpool in 1948 were in no way political in origin.[40]

Liverpool, like Cardiff, has a growing population of

second- and third-generation coloured people who have grown up in the city, among whom is a small minority of seriously maladjusted youths, whose delinquent exploits bring a bad name to the rest of the coloured population. This problem will be discussed further in a later section. It is sufficient to say that although it is frequently asserted that the coloured population is a 'problem' as far as the city is concerned, this is hardly substantiated. Local police are the first to admit that the large majority of the coloured population is thoroughly law-abiding; if there is more poverty and unemployment among Negroes than whites, then this really constitutes a 'white problem' in so far as it is an indication that full employment has not been achieved and discrimination still exists. The proposal recently made that coloured men should be recruited as police constables in the city of Liverpool has a certain merit in it, if the idea is not merely to confine them to duties in the south end of Liverpool, but to enable them to participate in the ordinary routine duties of a constable.[41] It would then have the advantage of familiarizing the white population with the idea that coloured men are on the side of the law, instead of the opposite idea that is all too frequently conveyed in the popular press.

Tyneside

Another coloured community which is mainly seafaring in origin is that on Tyneside. In fact it is really two separate communities each with its own distinctive way of life. On one side of the river is a Moslem community of about 1000 people in all, mainly consisting of Arabs, Somalis, and Pakistanis, together with their wives, who are nearly always English-born, and their children. The core of the settlement is a group of some sixty families occupying semi-detached houses constructed by the local authority and where no white families are found. The rest of the Moslem population live in the old section of the town close to the main settlement, occupying one- or two-roomed flats or living in boarding houses.[42]

The large majority of the men in the Moslem community are seamen and experience the same vicissitudes with regard to employment that seamen, and particularly coloured seamen, face anywhere. There are in addition a few who own cafés, boarding houses, or market stalls. The cafés are the centres of recreation for the men who, when they are not at sea, meet daily for conversation, card games, and to consume non-alcoholic beverages such as tea, coffee, and milk, since Moslems are teetotal. The most active voluntary association is the Moslem League, which fulfils the functions, among other things, of a friendly society for insurance purposes and a body protecting the general interests of its members.

By far the most important factor integrating the heterogeneous collection of nationalities that make up this Moslem community is their common religious persuasion. Two rooms are set aside for the religious observances including the five daily ritual prayers and the seasonal ceremonies. A religious leader who is locally known as a Sheikh superintends these activities. Although women usually occupy a position of low social status, relative to men, in Moslem societies, many of the English wives of the Moslems on Tyneside appear to take an active interest in their husbands' religion; some have become converts and frequently the children are brought up in the Moslem faith. In fact, in contrast with the non-Moslem groups in Britain, the English-born coloured children with Moslem fathers do not appear to identify themselves entirely with the cultural values of the mother, but in many cases grow up to accept Islam and marry within the Moslem community.[43]

The situation among the non-Moslem coloured community on the other side of the Tyne is very different. The Africans and West Indians who make up this group number only in the region of 150 or so altogether, and are scattered among white families in three separate localities. There is, as a consequence, much less social cohesion and there is no religious tie to bind them together. Although the majority are nominally Christian this fact does not act as an integrating force. In fact the main force acting towards the creation of social

solidarity among this Negro community is the prejudice expressed by the white community. The principal social forces appear to be acting in the opposite direction, despite the existence of prejudice. The dispersed nature of the Negro population of Tyneside, as far as work, recreation, and residence are concerned, means that there are more numerous opportunities for contact with white people than among the Moslems. In fact those who have lived in Tyneside for a long period have learned to accommodate themselves to the white people they come into contact with; they know how to avoid occasions for misunderstanding and conflict and do not allow examples of prejudice or discrimination to disturb them unduly. The attitudes and behaviour of these 'Old Timers' as they have been called are in marked contrast with those of the more recent immigrants, who are more apt to react with indignation at the frustrations they experience.[44]

Members of the Negro group on Tyneside tend to adopt shore work more readily than the Moslems, and a number are engaged in labouring or semi-skilled occupations in factories and elsewhere. Similarly, Negroes in the non-Moslem community tend to use recreational facilities such as cafés and dance halls also used by the white population, rather than separate ones. This may occasionally lead to some clash with the white people present, but it is notable that neither in North or South Shields have there ever been disturbances comparable with those which have sometimes taken place in Liverpool and other places.

Manchester

The coloured population of Manchester is of comparatively recent origin. Although there are one or two inhabitants who settled in the city before the first world war and a few who made their way there in the period between the two world wars, the large majority of the Africans and West Indians in Manchester have settled since 1945. There are approximately 2000 Africans, mainly from the Gold Coast

and Nigeria, and some 1000 West Indians, with a few Somalis and others. The focal point is the area known as Moss Side, which is one of the poorer localities of the city. Unemployment is probably less serious than in Liverpool, although it has increased somewhat since 1951. In February 1954 there were 260 unemployed coloured colonials in the city. Occupations ranged from labourers, stokers, and firemen, through the ranks of semi-skilled workers, to Corporation bus conductors and drivers, and from taxi drivers to a number of self-employed small business men. There were also a number of students who, especially in the case of Nigerians, appeared to assume a leadership role within the coloured community to a much greater extent than in Liverpool or elsewhere. Early in 1954, through the combined voluntary efforts of coloured and white workers led by a lay brother of the Order of the Holy Cross, a one-time lodging house was converted into a community centre in Moss Side.

There are in Manchester a number of tribal and other societies providing a measure of social integration among coloured people but, as in other localities, these appear to rise and fall in popularity and effectiveness and rarely succeed in breaking down the barriers of social class and nationality between the different groups. Although there is undoubtedly colour prejudice in Manchester, especially as far as questions of housing and relations with white women are concerned, there appears to be general agreement amongst the coloured population in Manchester that it is a more agreeable city to live in, in this respect, than Liverpool. It is perhaps a consequence of the fact that Manchester did not experience with quite such severity the depression of the 1920s and 1930s, that its inhabitants are prepared to accord to Negroes who have settled in the city a shade more toleration to-day.[45]

East London

The coloured population of Stepney, Canning Town, and other parts of east London is smaller and less well-established

than the communities found in Cardiff, Liverpool, or Tyneside, although like these it is largely maritime in origin. The lack of cohesion in this group is surprising, since coloured people have been a familiar part of the east London scene since the days of slavery, although during the latter part of the nineteenth century their numbers dwindled until they were reinforced by further immigrants after the two world wars. The general impression of the coloured settlements in east London is that they act as a transitionary stage in the immigrants' assimilation and adjustment. The more ambitious and successful tend to move away from the locality when opportunity arises, and occupational and geographical mobility appears to be even higher here than in other coloured communities.[46]

Although there is a considerable number of Asians (including Pakistanis as well as a few Indians and Chinese), the number of African and West Indian Negroes is probably not more than about 500. The majority are of fairly recent origin and are reacting to the inevitable disillusionment that sets in when an immigrant colonial begins looking for somewhere to live and somewhere to work. Only a few have qualifications as tradesmen, the majority being unskilled or at most semi-skilled workers who find work as labourers, porters, and stokers. Some enter the clothing industry, which is one of the most important in the neighbourhood, and sometimes work their way up until they can undertake fairly skilled work. But the majority do not remain long enough to pick up more than the rudiments of the trade and then they leave in search of a better paid job.

The problem of finding accommodation is as serious in east London as it is elsewhere, if not more so. Living conditions tend to be extremely poor and may account very often for the poor workmanship and other characteristics of which employers frequently complain. A man who has not been able to get a proper night's rest, or the kind of food that he finds palatable, and who lives in property long ago declared unfit for human habitation, is bound to deteriorate in health and efficiency. Most of the men in east London, as in other

parts of the country, are living with English women, but the disintegrated and transitory nature of the community means that the relationships tend to be far less stable than in the more settled communities. In fact, an interesting comparison can be made between east London, 1951, and the coloured community in Liverpool in 1931 or thereabouts. The size of the two communities was approximately the same; both lacked any real measure of social integration; in both cases relationships between the coloured men and white women tended to be temporary and unstable compared with the relative stability characteristic of the coloured families in Liverpool to-day; both were in a state of economic depression, although in this respect coloured men in east London are probably better off than their counterparts in Liverpool twenty years ago. Unemployment among coloured colonials in east London in 1951 was approximately 15 per cent, whereas it reached 75 per cent among coloured men in Liverpool in the 1930s. Needless to say both groups experienced very poor living conditions and paid high rents for unsatisfactory houses or lodgings. The members of both groups tended to feel a sense of grievance at the prejudice and discrimination, real and imagined, which they experienced.

Other London Boroughs

No systematic study has been made of coloured people living in other parts of London, although it has been estimated that nearly a quarter of the total coloured population of the United Kingdom lives in the Greater London area. Although these coloured immigrants are scattered throughout the metropolis there are pockets of greater density in the boroughs of Lambeth, Islington, Paddington, and St Pancras. Also Kensington and Hampstead have a considerable number of coloured students. In some cases local authorities have expressed anxiety at growing numbers of coloured people in their locality. Apart from the universal difficulties of finding accommodation and employment there is no evidence that coloured people in London constitute a serious

administrative problem. There is a small minority of irresponsible colonials which is associated with such illegal activities as drug peddling and the organization of prostitution, but there are many more white men who are similarly engaged.

London presents very real attractions to the minds of newly arrived immigrants, a large proportion of whom make directly for it as soon as they reach this country. They believe, not without some justification, that the employment situation is easier there than in other parts of Britain, but they are rarely prepared for the difficulties which occur in reality. It does not take long for them to realize that London streets are not paved with gold.

Birmingham and the Midlands

The coloured population of the midlands is fairly recent in origin. Before the second world war there were a few Indians living in Birmingham, but since the war there has been a rapid expansion. African and West Indian immigrants have made their way to the midlands, and to Birmingham in particular, because they believed that, whatever difficulties they might have finding work in a place like Liverpool, there would be no such problem in Birmingham. For several years after the war many industries in that area were very short of labour and the coloured man was reasonably sure of employment. A change began to take place about 1952–3 when the export drive was beginning to slacken. Unemployment began to appear, especially among labourers and unskilled workers. The situation has since improved and there were only about 200 coloured workers in Birmingham unemployed at the end of 1954. They were mainly Indians and Pakistanis.

Estimates of the total coloured population of Birmingham vary between 2500 and 6000. Probably a figure in the region of four to five thousand would be reasonable, with West Indians in a majority, followed by West Africans, a few Somalis, and others. A notable feature of the situation is the enlightened policy which the authorities have adopted to-

wards the continued growth of the coloured population. As early as 1951 special facilities were provided at one of the evening institutes in the city to provide adult education as well as recreational facilities for the coloured population. An Afro-Caribbean Centre was set up which was very popular. Many coloured men registered as students. Courses in English were popular with Somalis and others, while general educational courses enabled students to bring themselves up to the standards required for preliminary examinations in engineering and similar fields. Having reached the necessary standard the student would then enrol in the usual way for more advanced and technical studies at one of the regular evening institutes in the city. In this way the feeling was avoided that the Afro-Caribbean centre was an attempt to segregate the African or West Indian students from others. On the contrary the object of the centre was to assist the new-comer to make the necessary social and vocational adjustment to his new environment. In this the centre appears to have had a good deal of success.

For several years there has been a special 'Co-ordinating Committee' in Birmingham concerned with the welfare o the coloured population. The committee is presided over by the Archdeacon of Birmingham and has done valuable work. A recent proposal is that there should be a specially appointed welfare officer whose responsibility it will be to provide a kind of information and advice bureau for immigrant colonials. This official will keep in touch with the Ministry of Labour, the Assistance Board, and the housing authorities and attempt to smooth the way of coloured men in difficulties. This task was at one time performed by the Area Officer of the Colonial Office Welfare Department until this work was brought to a close in 1952.

A controversy occurred early in 1954 over the employment of coloured colonials in Birmingham as drivers and conductors on municipal transport. They had previously been employed on maintenance work but not on work that would 'bring them into contact with the public'. The main objections to the employment of coloured colonials appeared

to come from the trade unions, but less on grounds of colour than because, if the number of drivers and conductors was brought up to full establishment by employing colonials, then opportunities for earning considerable sums as overtime would be reduced.[47] However, it was eventually agreed that suitably qualified coloured men should be employed as drivers and conductors and a number are now working.

The problem of housing for coloured colonials is as difficult in Birmingham as it is everywhere. There is a tendency, as in other cities, to congregate in one part of the town where accommodation is both poor and expensive. Probably the most serious aspect of the situation in Birmingham is the persistent myth that work is easily available. Nevertheless, colonials in other parts of the country, and even in the colonies themselves, are still under the impression that in Britain generally, and in the midlands in particular, there is plenty of work to be had. The men come with wild dreams of earning large wages, but their voyages often end in disillusionment. It is little wonder that they attribute their failure to discrimination, when in fact it is merely a reflection, very often, of the general economic situation and their own lack of special skills of the right sort. This does not mean that in Birmingham, as elsewhere, there is not some discrimination, but this is found less frequently than the unemployed coloured man is prepared to believe.

SOCIAL STATUS AND ADJUSTMENT

It would be wrong to create the impression that coloured colonials in Britain constitute a homogeneous group from the point of view of social status. On the contrary, social class differences within coloured communities are as great as those existing in the population generally. At times of crisis, as during the disturbances in Liverpool in 1948, these differences of status may become less significant in the face of open hostility by the white population, but at other times class distinctions play an important part in the life of coloured

colonials. Furthermore, the tendency on the part of white people to rank all coloured people together and think of them as part of the poorer sections of the working class, is very much resented. Broadly speaking, coloured colonials in Britain can be divided into four classes: (i) Seamen, labourers, unskilled and semi-skilled workers. (ii) Skilled tradesmen, clerical workers, sportsmen, and theatrical artists. (iii) Professional men and women including doctors, lawyers, university teachers, higher paid theatrical artists, etc. (iv) Students, whose eventual status will be that of professionals, but who are distinguished from this group in Britain because they have less money to spend and are usually in Britain for not more than five or six years. Students come into a somewhat special category and will be dealt with separately.

Colonial Students in Britain

During 1952–3 there were over 6000 colonial students in Britain, about half of whom were in London. This includes private students as well as the 1500 or so who held scholarships, together with about 500 student nurses from the colonies. Students attended Universities, University colleges, teachers' training colleges, technical colleges, and similar places of higher education such as the Inns of Court. The most popular subjects were law and medicine. Despite the crying need for specialists in agriculture, forestry, and similar subjects in the colonies there is great difficulty in persuading colonial students to take up these careers. It appears that the higher social status accorded to doctors and lawyers and, in the latter case, the avenues which open up towards a political career are considerable attractions.

In addition to the distinction between scholarship holders and 'private' students paying their way (who, contrary to popular opinion, are in the majority) it is necessary to distinguish between sponsored and unsponsored students. The latter are 'free-lance' in the sense that they have come to Britain in search of higher education without first obtaining

the approval of student advisory committees or their governments at home. Among these are some who obtain employment and study at evening institutes or by correspondence courses in their own time. On arrival in Britain the officially sponsored student, whether he is a scholarship holder or not, is usually met at the boat by a representative of the British Council, which is now responsible for the welfare of colonial students in Britain, or by a representative of one of the voluntary societies such as the East and West Friendship Council which co-operates with the British Council in this work. Advice and guidance are given regarding travelling arrangements and accommodation.

Reference has already been made to the difficulties which coloured colonial students have in their search for suitable lodgings, despite the assistance that they obtain in this respect from the various University lodgings bureaux. In the larger University centres special hostels are provided for some colonial students, but in the smaller University colleges it is more usual for special places to be kept for colonial students in hostels used by all students. This would appear to be a more satisfactory arrangement, as separate hostels for colonial students, while administratively convenient, suggest segregation and only serve to aggravate the students' feelings of isolation. If a colonial student has a place in a hostel with non-colonial students he will more quickly adjust himself to his new life and assimilate into the main body of the student community. Only a small proportion of colonial students can be housed in hostels at all, so that like other students a large part of their student career will be spent in lodgings. It is not surprising that many colonial students prefer the sheltered existence of a hostel to the insecurity of lodgings and that considerable unrest has from time to time arisen as a consequence of the closure of certain hostels.

In the Universities themselves there is absolutely no discrimination or separation, although many students complain that they are sometimes 'cold-shouldered' by other students. This appears to be a general reaction to the English person's habitual casualness and occasional snobbery which is rarely a

manifestation of colour prejudice. Nevertheless, women students frequently admit to a certain constraint when it comes to having a coloured student as a partner at a dance or as a 'boy friend' however 'innocent' the relationship. This would appear to be partly a subjective feeling of aversion, the origin of which is similar to the sexual stereotypes concerning coloured men that have already been discussed. It is also, however, a response to public opinion in the sense that a girl may feel that her chances of obtaining a boy friend of her own colour and nationality will be diminished if she is seen often in the company of a coloured student. Apart from this, it would be fair to say that University students are comparatively free from colour prejudice and that any examples that may occur are far more a manifestation of a class snobbery than of prejudice regarding race or nationality. Snobbery of this kind is strong in certain colleges of the older English universities.

Colonial students have their own organizations with the universities, such as the West Indian Students Union, and there are a number of other organizations which interest themselves in the welfare of overseas students generally, in addition to the official activities of the Colonial Office and the British Council. Most universities have an adviser of overseas students who gives such guidance as the student may require in the pursuit of his academic studies. Mention has already been made of the work of the East and West Friendship Council, one of whose activities is the arrangement of occasional hospitality for overseas students. Volunteers are put in touch with students who are invited to a meal or for week-end visits and longer. Not all students are interested in this kind of hospitality, which they sometimes feel has an air of condescension about it. Others are glad of the opportunity of visiting ordinary homes in Britain. Occasionally misunderstandings arise on both sides through ignorance. Often the colonial student of a wealthy family cannot understand the absence of servants in most homes and the dietary peculiarities of guests and of hosts sometimes lead to embarrassment. It was with the object of smoothing the way

for the overseas student, not familiar with everyday life in Britain, that the Liverpool Committee of the East and West Friendship Council published a small booklet called *Your Stay in Britain*, which provides simple advice regarding luggage, food, accommodation, and etiquette in Britain. In many respects the colonial student in Britain is in a favoured position relative to other colonial immigrants, who do not have so much to assist them in the process of adjustment.[48]

Adjustment of Colonial Immigrants

Three factors beyond all others are of vital importance in determining the degree of success that a colonial immigrant has in adjusting to life in Britain. Firstly, the extent to which his pre-emigration experiences have been a help in preparing him for life in a highly urbanized and industrialized country like Britain. Secondly, the initial expectations of the man himself about life in Britain and what he hopes to do there. Thirdly, the extent to which he succeeds in obtaining a reasonable measure of economic, social, and psychological security in his relationships with other people in Britain. We shall consider each of these points in turn.

Among the pre-migration experiences which are of significance in promoting the adjustment of an immigrant colonial the ability to speak fairly good English on arrival is of the utmost importance. In this respect, as in others, West Indians have an initial advantage over Africans in so far as, with few exceptions, English is their native language. Apart from minor differences in accent and the use of certain words the West Indian has no difficulty in making himself understood, or in understanding people in Britain. The large majority of West Africans who come to Britain also speak English with varying degrees of fluency. But for the African English is not his native language and has either been acquired in school or just picked up in the course of his travels. Somalis and East Africans are at an even greater disadvantage because, although they often speak good Arabic and sometimes Swahili in addition to their own dialect, they

rarely have an adequate command of English before coming to Britain. Language difficulties create an immediate barrier between the white and the coloured man and obviously make the acquisition of new skills at work, as well as purely social relationships, very difficult.

After language as a factor in social adjustment comes the general level of intelligence and of education possessed by the immigrant. This is where the differences between the social classes previously referred to become apparent. The professional man with a higher education and qualifications immediately acceptable by English standards has tremendous advantages over other colonials. Skilled tradesmen with good experience and ability also make a better adjustment than the unskilled men, although even the skilled man may find that his experience and qualifications are not always acceptable in England and that he has a lot to learn.

Among other pre-migration experiences which often influence the adjustment of a coloured colonial to life in Britain are the social and economic circumstances immediately preceding his departure from the colony. A man who has experienced a long period of unemployment, or who has failed to adjust himself to urban life at home, is not likely to settle down when he reaches Britain. A man who migrates to escape from some marital entanglement or because he is in trouble with the law does not reach his destination in the best frame of mind to meet the problems and frustrations that are sure to beset him on arrival in Britain. The young delinquents and 'pilot boys' from West Africa who stow away in order to get to Britain, often with quite laudable ambitions to 'make good', do not have the best start if, as is usual, they begin their life in Britain by serving a term of imprisonment for their offence of stowing-away.[49] This frequently proves to be the quickest introduction to undesirable company and sets the immigrant's feet on the wrong path. Many stowaways have actually made a good adjustment, furthered their studies, obtained employment and settled down in Britain, or returned home better equipped for their experiences. But the large majority are less fortunate.

Reference has already been made to the unrealistic expectations of the majority of colonials coming to Britain. The high hopes and ambitions of the immigrant and the idealized impressions that he has of life in Britain make it almost inevitable that he will suffer bitter disappointments within a very short time of arrival: as soon, in fact, as he tries to find somewhere to live or to work. This sudden shattering of all his illusions is bound to create severe anxiety feelings in the individual and seriously to undermine his sense of security. Within a few days of arriving in Britain many colonials long to escape home again. Usually this is impossible, and even if it were possible their own pride would prevent them from returning and confessing failure after so short a time. The migrant's friends and family have often encouraged him to leave home, sharing the belief that if he can only get to England then he will be able to earn good money and send his savings home for the support of his parents or his brothers and sisters. If he does not send money home he will almost certainly write home or send messages by friends evading the truth and saying what a 'wonderful time' he is having. It is this refusal to confess failure to folks at home which probably accounts for the persistence of the myth of Britain as *El Dorado*.

It is important at this stage to distinguish between those immigrants who actively seek to assimilate the cultural norms of the British way of life and to become absorbed into an ordinary working- or middle-class community, and those who wish to retain their own culture as far as possible. The latter group includes, particularly, the members of the Moslem faith, who continue to worship in their own way and to mix almost entirely with others of their religious background. A Moslem will find it necessary to make certain adaptations to his traditional way of life in order to fit into a British city. He will learn a new language, possibly a new trade; he will marry an Englishwoman and permit his wife and children liberties that would not be permitted a Moslem wife at home. But as far as possible these compromises are kept to a minimum. Moslems have no desire to become

English in the sense of achieving complete assimilation. The reverse is true of the West Indians who come to Britain. The large majority of West Indians have already assimilated enough of English culture, through the educational system in the West Indies, to regard themselves as English in everything but name. They come to Britain expecting to be accepted as such and are very much hurt and surprised when they discover that the attitude of most English men and women towards them is unfavourable. West Indians in Britain constantly try to break down the barriers between them and the English people with whom they come into contact. The more they try to penetrate the barriers of prejudice the more frustrated they become. Some make a successful adjustment to this difficult situation. Others react with open hostility and aggression towards the English. They become cynical, see prejudice where it does not exist, adopt a 'chip on the shoulder' attitude, and often degenerate into poor workmen, if not criminals. Others respond by withdrawing into the coloured community, no longer trying to gain acceptance by white people. They suppress their hostility and seek outlets for their social needs among other coloured people. This type of adjustment may even result in a complete repression of hostility towards white people and a denial that prejudice and discrimination exist, because the man no longer experiences it within the narrow compass of his social relationships. This is an ostrich-like solution to the conflict.[50]

The non-Moslem West African frequently falls between these two extremes. The more educated and 'anglicized' he is the more his reaction to life in Britain will be similar to that of the West Indian. The West African who has not achieved a very good command of English may continue to associate with his fellow countrymen and not attempt active assimilation. In these circumstances the various 'tribal' societies that have been formed from time to time in the various coloured communities in Britain have played an important part in the adjustment of the immigrant to his new surroundings. Such societies, like the clubs for English resi-

dents abroad, provide an opportunity for the immigrant to mix with others like himself, with the same background and the same problems. It is not surprising if sometimes these societies become vehicles for the expression of nationalism as well as complaints and grievances about life in Britain; but they are rarely large or influential enough to make any impression on the authorities.[51]

These societies that cater for the needs and interests of particular national, or 'tribal', groups in Britain constitute a means whereby the individual succeeds in obtaining satisfying social relationships with others, thereby maintaining a measure of psychological security. Without such outlets the immigrant is liable to experience undue anxiety through his feeling of isolation from the rest of the community. The adjustment of any individual to the society in which he is living depends upon his fulfilling successfully definite roles, understood and accepted by him and carrying with them a measure of status, thus providing him with a sense of security. Since a large part of a man's life is spent at work this is one of the most important sources of status and security. A man who can obtain and hold a job, which not only provides him with an adequate income but also a satisfying outlet for his talents and a sense of doing something worth while, will be much better equipped to handle the problems and difficulties that he may face in his family life or in the community in which he lives. It is not surprising, therefore, that the morale of unskilled labourers, and others among the coloured population in Britain who have experienced lengthy periods of unemployment, is often very low. Studies of West Indian workers in Liverpool during and since the war have demonstrated clearly the close relation between a man's skill and ability at his work and his general adjustment to life in Britain.[52]

If the above analysis is correct one would expect the best adjustment to be made by the coloured professional men and women who are recognized, both by coloured and white people, to be highly successful in their own particular field, whatever it may be. This group, sometimes described as the

'social *élite*' of the coloured population in Britain, is small in number and widely dispersed both in terms of residence and occupation.[53] A large number live in London but others are scattered throughout the country. Many, although not all, are public figures in the sense that their names are known to everybody. This is especially true of those whose field of achievement is sport, athletics, or entertainment, where they are literally 'in the public eye'. Strictly speaking it is wrong to refer to people in this category as a 'group' since there is little or no sense of belonging to a particular community. Identification tends to be with middle-class white people rather than other coloured people in Britain. In this sense the coloured *élite* does not, with certain exceptions, provide active leaders for the coloured communities in Britain, as is the case in America for example. The late Dr Harold Moody, who founded the League of Coloured Peoples in Britain, must be regarded as an exception to this rule; but it is notable that since his death nobody has really come forward to take his place as the accepted leader and spokesman of the coloured population in Britain.

From the point of view of racial relations in Britain the coloured *élite* performs a valuable function in familiarizing the public with educated and successful coloured men and women, thereby undermining the derogatory stereotypes so widely held. They perform a useful role in allowing their names to be associated with various 'progressive' organizations concerned with questions of racial or international relations. But very few adopt an actively political role in the sense of openly challenging the present social system as it affects coloured people. To do so would antagonize the white public at large, upon whom so many depend for their living. The ostracism and hostility which Paul Robeson has experienced since he allowed himself to become associated with radical movements in the U.S.A. and labelled a 'communist', is an object-lesson to any coloured men or women who wish to maintain popularity: they must steer clear of politics. One consequence of this is that if a coloured man in Britain does climb the ladder of success he will tend to alien-

ate himself from other coloured people. Just as in the trade-union movement a man who reaches high office frequently has to modify the attitudes and behaviour which originally made him popular, thereby laying himself open to the charge of having 'betrayed' his fellow workers, so the members of the coloured *élite* are often accused of becoming 'Uncle Toms'. Any coloured man who gets on well with white people is liable to this accusation which carries with it a good deal of opprobrium.

It is perhaps a consequence of the stereotype of the Negro as good at singing, dancing, or playing the fool that it is a good deal easier for a coloured man to achieve success in the realms of entertainment than in any other profession. If a coloured man or woman has real talent there is little to stop their reaching the top of the tree as an entertainer. The same cannot be said of other professions. A coloured man who tries to achieve success in Britain in an academic capacity or in any of the other professions may find that he has to meet some prejudice on the way, albeit disguised. One interesting qualification of this rather sweeping generalization is that, among certain people, coloured doctors have an almost mystical or magical quality. They are frequently thought to be much better than English doctors with similar qualifications, and coloured doctors in Britain sometimes succeed in building up very successful practices.

There are some coloured men in Britain, either members of the middle-class *élite* or of the better educated among the skilled workers, who do adopt leadership roles of a relatively minor kind. That is to say they do not become public figures or leaders of any large movement for the advancement of coloured people, but within the narrow circle of their own national group or local community they become leaders of a sort. Very often the fulfilment of these leadership roles, as presidents or secretaries of local clubs or societies for example, enables them to gain a measure of esteem from other coloured people and sometimes even from whites, and this gives them an added sense of status and security, which assists them in their adjustment. Very often aggressive tend-

encies, which in other circumstances may be directed into anti-social activities, are then channelled into the leadership role, thereby putting them to constructive purposes. Psychologically speaking people of this type very often betray an inclination towards domination and a desire for power which is characteristic of a certain type of leader, and stems, in the last resort, from an underlying sense of inferiority or insecurity. But the outlets provided in this way often enable a much better social adjustment to be achieved than might otherwise be the case.

Any discussion of social adjustment must include a reference to sex and to the family life of coloured colonials in Britain. It has already been observed that there is a considerable disproportion between males and females in the coloured populations of Britain, with a result that if immigrants are to settle down to a normal family life or have any heterosexual relations at all, these must be, almost inevitably, with white women. The whole subject is of such importance to the question of racial relations in Britain as to warrant devoting a whole section to it. As far as social adjustment is concerned there is little doubt that by far the best adjusted in every way, at work and in the community, are those who have established a permanent relationship, whether legal or not, with a woman who is loyal and affectionate. A man with a wife and family to support is a better workman and in every way a more responsible person. The sense of security derived from stable and satisfying marital relationships is of vital importance in promoting adjustment.

MIXED MARRIAGES AND COLOURED PEOPLE BORN IN BRITAIN

The idea of mixed marriages between coloured and white people probably evokes greater antipathy than any other aspect of coloured colonial immigration to Britain. Some of the social and psychological origins of this attitude have already been discussed. The interesting fact about inter-

marriage in Britain, from the sociological point of view, is that it takes place principally between coloured men and white women. This is in contrast with the situation in South Africa, the West Indies, or the U.S.A., where the large majority of coloured people of mixed descent trace their ancestry to the relations between a white man and a coloured woman. For reasons that are not yet fully understood this type of relationship, while usually frowned upon, never evokes the same deeply emotional reaction that the reverse situation does.

One of the first and most important consequences of the prejudice against mixed marriages is that it limits the range of possibilities with regard to the coloured man's choice of a partner. Therefore it reduces, in purely statistical terms, the chances of a 'right' choice being made and a stable relationship being established. So strong is the stigma attached to marrying a coloured man that it is fair to say that mixed marriages usually occur where the girl or woman is in certain respects a deviant from the norms of her own culture. This does not mean that feelings of deep affection cannot develop between a white girl and a coloured man and result in marriage. Indeed, it frequently happens; and even where affection was not a primary factor in establishing the relationship it often grows in course of time. The main point is that a white girl marrying a coloured man often has to make such sacrifices in terms of her relationships with friends and family that only if marriage to a coloured man offers powerful compensation will she be likely to face the social ostracism that will nearly always follow. These compensatory factors may be of several kinds. Improvement of social and economic status is one. If by marrying a coloured man, a woman's material circumstances are likely to be improved, then she may risk the prejudice. In this way one frequently finds a working-class or lower middle-class girl marrying a successful upper middle-class coloured man of professional status. Similarly, a girl from a poorer working-class home may marry a skilled tradesman or lower middle-class clerical worker. More often than not, only girls who are destitute will

marry recently arrived and unemployed colonials, often to save themselves from prostitution.[54]

Other compensatory factors may be at work when a girl marries a coloured man. Sometimes it is an escape from emotional insecurity. A girl has quarrelled with her family and run away from home, or become pregnant by a white man who has deserted her, committed a crime and wishes to escape detection, or lost her parents, has no friends, and cannot find work: these are some of the reasons which account for a girl finding the stigma which our society places on mixed marriages preferable to any other alternative that may be open to her. Often the relationship proves mutually satisfying, since the coloured man and the white woman, each with their own feelings of isolation and insecurity, may be able to give to each other the affection and esteem, the sense of status and security, that the world denies them. Yet a state of emotional insecurity is not the best beginning for the adjustments which must be made by both parties to any marriage. It is not surprising, therefore, that many relationships between coloured men and white women, whether validated by law or not, do not prove lasting. Yet a high proportion do last a lifetime and must be judged at least as happy as the average marriage between two white people.

The woman has a useful part to play in assisting the adjustment of the coloured immigrant in Britain, quite apart from the question of sexual satisfaction and emotional security. Dr S. F. Collins has drawn attention to the intermediary role of the white wife of a coloured man.[55] She acts as a bridge between him and the white society of which he is trying to become a member. She helps him when language difficulties are involved. She may come with him to the employment exchange and she will almost certainly conduct any negotiations in connexion with acquiring a house, since her status as a white woman gives her advantages in this respect over the man. Particularly if her husband is a seaman the wife will have the main responsibility for bringing up the children. Growing up in Britain the children tend in any case to have a stronger emotional attachment to the

mother, especially if the father does not speak good English and if he is away at sea much of the time.

The question of coloured children who are born in Britain is of vital importance. Many people who are in almost all other respects very tolerant of coloured people defend their objection to mixed marriages on the grounds that the children of such marriages are bound to suffer. It will be as well to examine how far this has been true in the past and how far it remains true to-day. There is a tendency to overlook the fact that a large proportion of the coloured population of Britain was born in this country and knows no other cultural background. It is this group to which the term 'half-caste' is often inaccurately applied. The name Anglo-coloured which is also used is not much better, since it cannot be applied strictly to coloured people born in Wales or Scotland. The only satisfactory term appears to be the rather clumsy 'coloured people born in Britain' which will be used here.

Coloured People born in Britain

It has already been suggested that there are about ten thousand coloured people who were born in Britain. Some are now in their late fifties and early sixties, which suggests that there has been a small indigenous coloured population since the turn of the century. The influx of Africans and West Indians during and after the two world wars resulted in some increase in the number of births between 1918 and 1925 and between 1941 and 1951. The numbers born from 1942 to 1946 were increased by the coloured children, legitimate and illegitimate, born of American Negro servicemen. While there are coloured children and adults scattered throughout the country, the main groupings are to be found in the more established coloured communities of Cardiff, Liverpool, and Tyneside.

The social and economic circumstances of coloured children from infancy onwards vary a great deal according to the economic and social status of their parents. The sons and daughters of middle-class and professional coloured men

and women may attend fee-paying schools, proceed to a university, and enter one or other of the professions. But these are the privileged few. The large majority of coloured children are born into families in poor economic circumstances and suffer the deprivations which arise as a consequence of this. This is especially true of those born in the 1920s and brought up in the depression years of the 1930s. Coloured children shared with their white schoolmates the effects of malnutrition, inadequate clothing, and poor housing conditions. As we have seen, coloured families tended to suffer even more than white as a result of unemployment during the depression, and this had its effects on the health and welfare of the children. During and since the second world war the situation has much improved, and coloured children, like white, have benefited from the provisions of the welfare state. Coloured children to-day are better fed and healthier than their predecessors of twenty years ago. In fact, although there is no precise statistical evidence, the general impression is that, from the point of view of material welfare, coloured children are by no means the most seriously deprived in Liverpool's south end, and the same probably applies in other areas.

Material welfare cannot be the only consideration. We know that affectional deprivation and the consequences of emotional insecurity and conflict in the home can have even more serious effects upon the social adjustment of children than the effects of poverty.[56] In this respect coloured children have tended in the past to be, and often still are, exposed to a number of anxiety-creating situations. Some of these are by no means limited to coloured children: they are the common experience of children with an unstable home background. Other sources of anxiety are also widespread but aggravated by the fact that the child is coloured. Sometimes a coloured child suffers emotional conflicts simply because of the attitude towards coloured children and mixed marriages in Britain.

Under the heading of experiences common to coloured and white children are those which arise from the nature of

the father's occupation which, if he is a seaman, often implies long periods of absence from the home or, if a labourer, is likely to mean intermittent spells of unemployment. The social and psychological consequences of paternal deprivation are not as fully understood as the effects of maternal deprivation. But there is some evidence to suggest that paternal deprivation may have serious effects on the development of the child's capacity for self-discipline and his response to authority.[57] Similarly the psychological effects of prolonged unemployment during the depression years have been studied, and there is little doubt that the lowering of morale on the part of the unemployed father can have its effects on the children. An unstable home background with conflict between parents leading eventually to a 'broken home' is known to be a potent cause of delinquency, neuroticism, and backwardness in the children. The fact that many coloured children in Liverpool, Cardiff, and elsewhere grow up in a disturbed family atmosphere is sufficient to account for the symptoms of maladjustment sometimes found among the children, without any reference to questions of colour.

Illegitimacy alone carries with it a serious stigma. When the illegitimate child is also coloured the stigma is even greater, and the feeling of rejection and insecurity experienced by illegitimate coloured children is considerable. Furthermore, the mother of a coloured illegitimate child is less likely to want to keep the child herself, since the prejudice against her will be even greater than it is against any unmarried mother. Because of prejudice it is harder to arrange adoption or fostering for coloured illegitimate children, who will mostly grow up in children's homes of the institutional type, with all that this implies in terms of affectional deprivation. If the people in charge of the home share the widespread colour prejudice, then coloured children under their charge may suffer further discrimination and deprivation. An extreme case is exemplified by one voluntary organization providing children's homes in various parts of the country, which will not admit coloured children in the ordinary course of events, but makes an exception in the case

of a coloured child born to a woman already married to a white man.

The position of coloured children in school is important from the point of view of their social development and subsequent adjustment. If the child has grown up in a district where there are very few, if any, other coloured children a great deal will depend upon the attitude of teachers and o the parents of other children. If the child's parents are both coloured, and especially if they are of middle-class or professional background, then the child may be accepted without any difficulty. But prejudice against mixed marriages is sometimes transferred to the child, and if this is aggravated by class snobbishness there may be a tendency for parents to disapprove of their children playing with the coloured child, who may experience considerable anxiety and rejection as a result. In districts where coloured children are a more familiar sight, and there is less class consciousness, the position of the coloured child may be easier. At any rate, as far as the situation in Liverpool is concerned, there appears to have been a considerable change in the attitude of parents and teachers towards coloured children in the last twenty years. There is evidence that during the 1930s the coloured child was not always well received by teachers and headmasters, who, with notable exceptions, often had a very poor opinion of the coloured children under their care.[58] In more recent years attitudes appear to have improved considerably and every attempt made to integrate the coloured children into the normal school atmosphere, without any prejudice and discrimination. In these more favourable circumstances coloured children have often shown themselves both intelligent and responsible. In one school, in Liverpool's south end, a boy of Negro descent has more than once been appointed 'Head Boy'.

An interesting study has been made of the relationships between coloured and white children in a number of schools in Liverpool's south end.[59] Three local authority schools and three Church of England schools, which between them catered for the large majority of the coloured children in the

city, were studied. The schools were situated in two working class wards in which the socio-economic status of parents ranged from that of unemployed labourers to skilled manual workers, together with a few clerical workers, shopkeepers, and others. The total number of children in the six schools was just over a thousand and the ages ranged from seven to fifteen years. All the schools were co-educational. The coloured children made up about 20 per cent of the total and were classified according to descent as 'Chinese' (5 per cent) and 'Other Coloured' (15 per cent). A rough assessment was also made of the socio-economic status of the child according to a 'clothing standard'. A four-point scale was used which was reduced, for certain purposes, to a twofold classification of 'inferior' or 'superior' clothing. The children were then given certain tests in which they were asked to name their 'best friend' and the person they 'liked least' in the class. A statistical analysis of the result enabled the investigators to assess the extent to which children were chosen or rejected according to race or class differences.

Two conclusions emerged quite clearly from the investigation. Firstly, that the children did discriminate in their choice of friends according to the 'clothing standard'. Children of the superior clothing group discriminated against those of the inferior clothing group in their choice of friends; but the children of the inferior clothing group appeared to choose their friends without regard to this factor, although even the poorly dressed children occasionally rejected others also poorly dressed. The interpretation of the results from the point of view of racial discrimination was complicated by the fact that 'Chinese' children tended on the whole to be better dressed than the average white, while 'Other Coloured' children tended to be in the inferior clothing group. It may very well be that the occasional examples of discrimination against coloured children that were observed were actually the consequence of poorer clothing rather than of race. Nevertheless, the second conclusion is that, taken as a whole, the evidence appears to support the view that white children do not discriminate against coloured

children in their choice of friends; nor do coloured children discriminate against white. The statistical evidence is corroborated by the observations of teachers and others and is in line with the results of research elsewhere. It is, however, sometimes suggested that as a child grows older he or she becomes more colour-conscious and that some prejudice begins to show itself at about school-leaving age. If this is true, it may well be connected with impending difficulties as far as competition for employment and for prospective marriage partners is concerned.

The difficulties which have been experienced, especially between the two world wars, in placing coloured juveniles in employment in Liverpool is probably typical of other coloured communities as well. It was actually concern for the welfare of coloured juveniles which led to the setting up of the Liverpool Association for the Welfare of Half-Caste Children, which sponsored the investigation of 1929–30 to which reference has already been made. In that report emphasis was placed upon the poor employment prospects open to coloured boys and girls when they left school. White children, too, faced similar difficulties during the depression years, but the situation of the coloured child was aggravated by the prejudice which existed. Few firms at that time appeared willing to try the experiment of employing coloured juveniles and few families were prepared to accept a coloured girl in domestic service. The Liverpool Association collaborated with the Juvenile Employment Bureau in the collection of statistics regarding unemployment among coloured boys and girls, and before the war special efforts were made to place them in suitable employment. Experimental training schemes for girls in handicrafts and domestic work were started, and boys were trained in cookery with a view to employment in ships' galleys. Neither scheme appears to have been particularly successful. It was not until the outbreak of war in 1939 that the employment position improved for coloured juveniles in Liverpool.

The position of coloured juveniles in the post-war period has reflected the improved economic circumstances of Liver-

pool as a whole, and unemployment is not nearly as serious a problem as it was in the 1930s. Nevertheless, the Liverpool Youth Employment Bureau notes that although, with few exceptions, firms do not bar coloured children, there is in practice always a preference for the non-coloured boy or girl.[60] Coloured juveniles are mainly employed in unskilled or semi-skilled employment in factories and warehouses or, in the case of boys, at sea. Occasionally an intelligent and ambitious girl may continue her education in night school and obtain clerical employment. One remarkable consequence of the prejudice against coloured people in Britain is that coloured girls are rarely employed (except in the coloured community itself) in shops or cafés where they will 'come into contact with the public'. Yet many coloured girls, both immigrant colonials and those born in Britain, are employed as nurses. It is difficult to imagine why white people should object to being served by a coloured girl with an article or a cup of tea in a shop, while they are apparently content to have a coloured girl administer a bed bath or an enema. Such is the irrational nature of colour prejudice.

There remains the question of the marital prospects for coloured men and women born in Britain. A great deal will depend on the factor of 'visibility'. A light-skinned man or woman whose non-European ancestry is not particularly obvious will probably have little difficulty in finding a wife or husband, as the case may be. They are not likely to marry a white person, although this will probably be their ambition, or that of their parents on their behalf, but they will have little difficulty in finding a suitable partner from among the more eligible coloured immigrants. But in this respect men will be at a disadvantage because of the preponderance of males among the immigrants. Another factor of importance is social status. A man with a good steady job and a reasonable income will have less difficulty than an unskilled worker, liable to long spells of unemployment. Women with a darker complexion will also be at a disadvantage because, among West Indians especially, there is a marked preference for 'marrying light'. Coloured women born in

Britain tend to prefer West Indians or coloured Americans as partners, rather than Africans, whose cultural background is very different from their own. The limitations of choice affecting coloured girls of Moslem families are even greater since they are encouraged to marry another Moslem.[61]

The large majority of coloured people born in Britain are no less law-abiding than most citizens. In view of the evidence accumulated here it is not, however, surprising to find that some coloured men and women find considerable difficulty in making a satisfactory adjustment to society and that a few of the men degenerate into hardened criminals. If an unstable home background is combined with poverty, overcrowding, and other unfavourable environmental factors, the situation is ripe for the emergence of a delinquent youth. Add to this the experience of colour prejudice with its consequent feeling of isolation, leading to bitterness and disillusionment, and it is not surprising that some coloured youths born in Britain react to these frustrations by violence and lawlessness and seek to escape from their inner conflicts through alcohol and drugs. It is significant that several coloured youths born in Liverpool expressed the nature of their problem when asked to complete a form stating their nationality. They all refused to complete the form and when asked for an explanation one of them said, 'My father was African, my mother English, but I am not anything at all'. This sense of 'not belonging' is frequently found among colonial immigrants to Britain, but it is even more serious among coloured people born in this country. They are often taken to be immigrants themselves and when, as frequently happens, someone suggests that they ought to 'go back where they came from', they are naturally indignant. It is little wonder that many coloured men born in Britain tend to be bitter, cynical, and resentful not merely against white people but also against Africans, West Indians, and American Negroes in Britain. The large incomes possessed by American Negro servicemen make them very popular with the coloured girls who often desert their English-born coloured boy friends in favour of the wealthier Americans.

Situations such as this hardly improve international or inter-racial relations and are sometimes the cause of violent incidents in public bars and dance halls. Such incidents bring the whole coloured population a bad name, owing to the publicity that is given to them.

We may sum up this discussion of mixed marriages and the position of coloured people born in Britain by saying that there is no inherent reason why mixed marriages should not be successful or why coloured children should not grow up into healthy well-adjusted citizens. That mixed marriages are less often successful than others, and that the children of such marriages sometimes become severely maladjusted, must be attributed to the widespread existence of colour prejudice and the practice of discrimination. It is to the credit of the large majority of coloured parents in Britain that they have succeeded in maintaining satisfactory marital relations and have brought up their children to take their rightful place as responsible citizens of this country, despite the many hardships and handicaps that they have had to overcome.

CONCLUSION

The coloured population of Britain has become a permanent feature of its social life and is likely to increase rather than decrease in size as a consequence both of natural increase and further immigration. As a British subject the coloured colonial has every right to seek his fortune in Britain just as Europeans have a right to do so in the colonies so long as the rights and obligations of both groups are clearly understood and recognized. To suggest that all coloured people should be sent back to the colonies is as absurd as the suggestion recently put forward, in all seriousness, by one politician in England, that all white settlers in Africa should be repatriated. Nevertheless, during recent years the policy of the Colonial Office has been, quite rightly, to discourage irresponsible migrants who are not likely to make a successful adjustment

to life in Britain. So far these efforts have not counteracted the undoubted attraction that Britain has for many colonials. This is especially true in a colony like Jamaica where unemployment is such a serious problem and social insurance does not exist.

Once the migrant has reached Britain he has at his disposal the same facilities as are available to any other British subject or alien resident in Britain. He can obtain employment, if it is available, through the Ministry of Labour, and financial assistance from the National Assistance Board. Once he has obtained employment he begins to pay his contributions and will eventually become entitled to draw national insurance benefits. If he is sick he can have recourse to the benefits of the Health Service and if he is homeless there are hostels provided by the Salvation Army and similar organizations to which he can go. No special privileges are accorded to him that are not equally accessible to every citizen. Nevertheless, the Colonial Office has formed an Inter-Departmental Committee of officials of various departments to discuss problems affecting the colonial population in Britain. The committee also has informal meetings with unofficial bodies such as the British Council of Churches which is interested in the welfare of coloured colonials and others in Britain. The Jamaican Government has seconded a welfare officer from their Labour Department to the Colonial Office to keep in touch with Jamaican migrants in Britain and to help them with their problems.[62]

The whole question of coloured people in Britain is inextricably linked up with the social and economic problems of the colonies themselves. Until there is full employment in these territories there will continue to be a flow of migrants to Britain in search of better conditions. Until the facilities for higher education in the colonies are extended there will continue to be colonial students who will wish to graduate from a university in Britain. Even supposing that these two conditions were fulfilled it would still be desirable that coloured colonials should come to Britain in order that by contact and communication with people of other cultures

and nationalities greater mutual understanding should be created. This will only come about if there is a guarantee of social and economic security for the population of Britain itself.

Already there is apprehension among some workers. At a meeting of the T.U.C. Regional Advisory Committee in Coventry in November 1954 a motion was introduced which, among other things, proposed that coloured people should not be engaged without discussions between the union and the employer, that coloured people should be barred from supervisory posts, that white workers should have priority when applying for jobs, and that coloured workers should be the first to go if redundancy occurred. It is notable that, after the motion had been proposed, another speaker immediately moved 'next business' which was carried with applause, so that no discussion of the resolution was possible. It is unlikely that any attempt to introduce an official colour-bar in industry would receive the support of the trade union movement as a whole. Nevertheless, individual workers may not be so tolerant and it is clear that an increase in the coloured population, combined with a fear of unemployment by the white population, could only lead to a deterioration of racial relations in Britain.

Conclusion

WHAT conclusions can be drawn from this factual survey of racial relations? What are the prospects for the future? Any conflict in human relationships may be resolved if one party exterminates the other. This has occasionally happened when a primitive race has succumbed to force of arms, dwindled in numbers through lack of resistance to alien diseases, or disappeared through the complete destruction of their culture and with it the will to survive. But such cases are rare. Quite apart from the ethical objections that would be raised against any attempt to exterminate one race by another, numbers alone would make such a policy completely impracticable. Equally impracticable, as we have seen, is any attempt, however well meaning, permanently to separate Europeans and non-Europeans so that each race pursues its own way of life in complete isolation. Economic interdependence, if nothing else, has gone so far that nowhere in the world, least of all in South Africa, could such a policy be carried out. Any attempt to do so will result in the undermining of the European economy and a destruction of the standard of life which Europeans have achieved without in any way benefiting non-Europeans. *So-called 'white civilization' will only be preserved by sharing its fruits with non-Europeans, not by depriving them of its benefits.*

The principal conclusion, therefore, to which this study leads us is that somehow or other the various ethnic groups making up the populations of the territories concerned must find a way of living together. But the question remains whether the relationship between Europeans and non-Europeans is to be characterized by domination and oppression or equality and co-operation. As has been shown, prejudice and discrimination are to be observed in varying degrees in all the countries examined, but it is in South Africa that the racial crisis is to be seen in its most acute form. It is here that irrational race consciousness has become

so virulent that it now governs not only social, economic, and political policies, but all human relationships. Non-Europeans are being subjected to measures designed to preserve the power and status of the European minority, whose lives are dominated by a fear of being overwhelmed. What is not understood is that this xenophobia on the part of Europeans may itself be the very cause of their undoing. While it is true that a certain amount is being done to improve the material welfare of non-Europeans, and the importance o this must not be underestimated, its value is completely negatived by other measures which are coercive and discriminatory.

What will be the consequence if policies in Africa become increasingly oppressive? Recent investigations into the socio-psychological consequences of oppression on personality and behaviour only serve to confirm the lessons of history. *Oppression sows the seeds of revolution.* When a large section of the population is subjected to severe deprivation, insecurity, and suffering as a result of the restrictions imposed by a small governing class, the consequent frustration generates aggressive impulses which must find an outlet. Dr Muzafer Sherif has analysed the social psychology of revolution and his conclusions have an ominous relevance to the present situation. He points out that oppression, tyranny, and threats to the security of life itself, when imposed by a privileged governing class on an expanding, strengthening populace, result in a reaction against prevailing norms and values which frequently leads to mass movements and violence. The change may not be sudden. It comes about as new groups and new leaders are found. As Sherif puts it, 'People sharing the common lot of oppression, exploitation, and deprivation eventually develop an in-group belongingness and loyalty as distinguished especially from the hostile out-group. Appropriate in-group feelings and values arise or become strengthened. In conflicts with the governing group, which naturally closes its ranks against the onslaught of the new movement and resorts to various degrees of coercive action to keep it in place, the in-group solidarity and its appropriate values are

strengthened still further and attitudes of hostility towards adversaries become intensified in the same degree.'[1] In such a critical situation, where tension and conflict are severe, small incidents may evoke disproportionate action on the part of the authorities and precipitate more serious disturbances which may develop into a mass movement. These conclusions are borne out by intensive studies of the effects on personality and behaviour of severe frustration and oppression such as was experienced by displaced persons in Europe during the second world war. The investigations into this problem conducted by Dr Tadeusz Grygier led him to conclude that, under oppression, aggressive action becomes a tool necessary to avoid destruction.

> Oppression is conducive to the formation of the anti-social character structure, which is prone to external conflicts and crime, and characterized by egocentricity and projection and by sharp in-group *v.* out-group distinction with hostility and resentment directed against out-groups; the main feature of this personality structure is the turning of aggression outwards at the level of action and a scheme of apperception regarding the world as hostile and threatening.[2]

The description could very well be applied to the oppressor as well as the oppressed.

The implications are clear. The harder Europeans try to maintain their present privileged position by coercive measures, whether violent or non-violent, the more likely it is that they will precipitate a revolution in which what they choose to call 'white civilization' may be submerged. Coercion provokes coercive retaliation. Already passive resistance movements are protesting against discriminatory measures. If these movements are driven underground by oppressive legislation they may emerge again, with violence rather than non-violence as their means. Violence has already occurred in Kenya and elsewhere, but it is not too late to prevent it spreading. If present policies are reversed and genuine efforts made to raise the status of non-Europeans, to lift the burden of discrimination and to integrate the several ethnic groups into a working partnership, there need be no fear for the

future. Social, economic, and political equality for non-Europeans will not spell the end of 'white civilization'. Equality, co-operation, and toleration will mean not only material prosperity for all, but the preservation of the values of peace, fellowship, and freedom which are the essentials of the Christian-humanist tradition. There is a fund of good-will among Europeans in Africa which, if mobilized, could bring this about. Among those who are genuinely convinced that only through separation can a solution be found for present conflicts, there are many who abhor the consequences of *apartheid* as practised by the Nationalist government in South Africa. If these people of good-will could be convinced of the impossibility, under any circumstances, of complete separation as they understand it, then their support might be won for positive measures for the improvement of the status of non-Europeans.

What has been said applies specially to South Africa but it is equally true of British colonial territories in East and Central Africa where attempts are being made to create multi-racial societies. Nothing will be achieved if non-Europeans are denied the opportunity of developing their potential capacities. Attention must be drawn to the term *potential capacities*. Considerable emphasis is placed, especially in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, upon the several races being rewarded in proportion to their respective contributions to the new society.[3] No attempt should be made to measure the contribution of Non-Europeans unless there is equality of opportunity for education and training up to the maximum of any individual's capacity, irrespective of race. Even then it is doubtful if the contributions of the races should be measured in material terms. The Christian view emphasizes the unique importance of the individual of whatever race and irrespective of his capacities or efficiency, and in all but totalitarian states this is usually held to be a sounder spiritual foundation for the State than the former utilitarian view.

In the West African territories and in the West Indies, the inhabitants are making rapid strides towards self-govern-

ment. A great deal will depend upon the calibre of the leaders who emerge, as they will be responsible for directing the affairs of large and potentially powerful states. Abuse of power is not a monopoly of Europeans and the temptations will be great. It would be a tragedy if, when independence is finally achieved, the shackles of imperialism were to be replaced by the shackles of a totalitarian state, whether fascist or communist in character. If self-government is to benefit colonial territories, the creation of a parliamentary democracy must accompany the building up of an efficient and incorruptible civil service demanding the highest standards of public service. All this will take time, and meanwhile the British Government, through the Colonial Office, has a tremendous task in front of it, preparing the way for complete independence for those territories where the majority of the population desire it. It is not sufficient for the European settlers in East and Central Africa to claim that they are ready for self-government and dominion status, when the African population wishes to retain its closer connexion with Britain. Until Europeans in these territories have won the confidence of the African population the latter will continue to fear that, once free of control from the Colonial Office, Europeans will behave as they have behaved in South Africa. Now is the time for Europeans in East and Central Africa to show that they are willing to share their power and privileges and to admit Africans and Asians into equal working partnership with them.

What can be said of Britain? The constant flow of West Indians and West Africans to Britain in search of work is a reflection of the failure to create full employment and satisfactory living conditions in the colonies. It is not, as many people suppose, the positive attraction of the welfare state which brings so many coloured colonials to Britain, but the complete lack of any social and economic security at home. Schemes for colonial development and welfare have only touched the surface of the problem; the resources of Britain have been mobilized for defence and capital investment in the colonies has taken second place. Part of the solution to the

'colour problem' in Britain lies in the rapid improvement of standards of living and opportunities for remunerative employment in the colonies. Meanwhile, there are other positive steps that can be taken which would contribute towards the abolition of the colour-bar, both in Britain and in the colonies.

ABOLITION OF THE COLOUR-BAR

In a debate in the House of Commons it was urged by the Opposition that Her Majesty's Government should 'take immediate steps to introduce legislation with a view of the progressive elimination of the colour-bar.'[4] An amendment tabled by government supporters and subsequently adopted substituted the phrase 'continue to promote the progressive elimination of the colour-bar', leaving out the reference to legislation. Supporters of the amendment took the view that legislation 'so far from solving the problem ... will merely stoke the fires of racial prejudice and intolerance and increase still further the fears by which race hatred is fed'. Other contributors argue that the colour-bar arose 'from differences in outlook, in psychology, and in habits' and that some measure of separation was necessary and desirable when there were such wide differences in cultural background between the races. These different points of view reflect the inadequacy of the concept of colour-bar for any rational analysis of racial relations. As was pointed out in the introduction, three distinct social phenomena are involved, prejudice, discrimination, and separation. Action which is appropriate with regard to one cannot be applied to the others.

Eliminating Prejudice

It is frequently argued that the elimination of colour prejudice depends upon education. If by education is meant formal instruction of children or adults in order to correct false stereotypes and remove ignorance regarding racial

differences, then experience shows that this can only make a limited contribution to the solution of the problem. Enough has been said to show that education is undoubtedly necessary and that the formal instruction in schools which children at present receive still leaves much to be desired. A more enlightened and up-to-date approach to the teaching of subjects such as human geography would be valuable. But education alone is not enough. Prejudices, as we have seen, arise out of certain fundamental psychological experiences all too common in this rapidly changing world. They are a response to anxiety and insecurity and cannot be remedied by mere instruction.

If we are to get at the roots of prejudicial attitudes we must remove the experiences in the life-history of the individual which give rise to them. In this respect prevention is as important as cure. Attempts to diminish colour prejudice in this generation will be of little avail if the next generation grows up in an environment which fosters the insecurity and expectation of deprivation that creates ethnocentrism, as well as other forms of maladjustment. Dr John Bowlby has drawn attention to the universal human need for that 'complex, rich, and rewarding relationship with the mother in early years, varied in countless ways by relations with the father and with brothers and sisters that ... underlie the development of character and mental health.'[5] The essential function of the family in this respect is to provide an atmosphere of affection and security which enables the individual to reach maturity as a mentally balanced and well adjusted person, able to face up to problems and difficulties and deal with them in a rational manner. It is notable that studies of prejudice and of maladjustment emphasize that the tolerant well-adjusted individual is not one who is altogether without conflicts and anxieties, but one who is able to handle these conflicts without resort to the mechanisms of repression, projection, and the like.

If the foundations of mental health have been laid in childhood, experiences in adult life are less likely to result in ethnocentrism. Nevertheless, it is also important that in

adult life the individual should experience a sense of security derived from satisfying personal relationships with others in which there is mutual respect and esteem. The fear of war, widespread economic insecurity, or any real or apparent threat to the individual's social status may express itself in prejudice against other individuals and groups. For this reason it is absolutely essential that in Africa to-day it should be clearly understood that the several ethnic groups are essential to each other and that only through mutual co-operation can a contented and prosperous community emerge. If one or other ethnic group insists upon regarding the others as a threat to its own status, a vicious circle will be created in which irrational fears may be transformed from fantasies into realities. Already prejudice and discrimination are creating discontent which, if allowed to grow, may generate reciprocal race hatred on such a scale that a clash will be inevitable. It is not too late to prevent this if the right course of action is adopted now.

How can mutual distrust and prejudice be broken down, once it has arisen? This is one of the most difficult problems with which we are faced. Mere exhortation or appeals to the intellect are of little avail, unless they are supported by a change in the individual's emotional involvement. As Dr Kurt Lewin put it, re-education must involve a change of culture in the sense that the individual must receive support from the other members of his group and their whole system of shared values must be changed.[6] This amounts to a complete change in the individual's perception of the outside world. Re-education, in this sense, must come about through the free acceptance by the members of a group of a new set of values, a new ideology, which emerges out of their own experience and is not imposed upon them from outside. A person who is forced to accept a new set of values may have a loyalty to the old and a hostility to the new, which only widens the gap between the values to which lip service is paid and the ones which govern actual behaviour.

How can such a radical adjustment of attitudes and values be achieved when colour prejudice is so widespread and so

deeply ingrained in the personalities of so many people? Experience with small groups has shown that when subjective or institutionalized barriers to communication between the members of different ethnic groups are broken down through participation in some common task, intolerance is reduced. When stereotypes are contradicted by experience a sufficient number of times and when the individual is supported in his change of attitude by other members of his own group, prejudices are modified. But how can these lessons be applied to much larger groups? For guidance on this point we may consider other instances of the growth of toleration. Bigoted attitudes towards the members of other religious denominations have been modified in course of time; the harsh treatment of slaves and criminals was once condoned and justified but no longer commands support; there used to be a great deal of prejudice against women taking any part in public affairs, but this is rapidly disappearing. In many spheres of human relationship intolerance has given way to more favourable attitudes. In each case a certain section of the community has ceased to be regarded with veiled or open hostility and is now regarded as qualifying for the treatment normally accorded to others.

The elimination of colour prejudice, as of other forms of intolerance and injustice, involves the extension of a certain set of values or moral ideas, so that they apply to a wider group of people. It does not mean the creation of new ideals, but the application of old ones to an area of human relationships hitherto not regarded as being covered by these particular concepts. We have seen already that Professor Leo Kuper made this point clearly, with regard to South Africa, when he stated that democratic values 'are deeply rooted in the political thought and practice of white South Africans for the purposes of regulating their own relationships. Yet the realization of these values throughout the society would be subversive to the existing social structure, since the effect would be to liberate the non-whites from domination.'[7]

The growth of toleration is nearly always a slow process. Public opinion rarely changes suddenly even under the

impact of modern methods of propaganda. The fight against intolerance of any kind is never an easy one, and meanwhile members of the under-privileged or persecuted group in question may suffer a great deal. Very often they are in no position to plead their own cause, and amelioration of their position may only come about when disinterested persons can take up their cause. History provides numerous examples of men and women whose moral convictions have led them to believe that the intolerance of their fellows was a cause of serious injustice and have devoted their lives to convincing others of the need for toleration and a humanitarian attitude. In the same way there are Europeans to-day, such as the Rev. Michael Scott, who have identified themselves with the cause of non-European peoples in Africa and by their devoted service have drawn the attention of the world to this pressing problem.

The ultimate establishment of tolerant attitudes towards the members of another social group comes about when it is clearly understood that the group in question is no longer, if indeed it ever was, a threat to those who have been intolerant. When it is understood that the existence of religious minorities is not a threat to the established Church; that slavery is not essential to prosperity; that the proper care and treatment of criminals decreases rather than increases the threat to life and property; and that women have a place in public life which does not threaten the status of men – then prejudice is overcome. So, when Europeans are eventually persuaded that the social, economic, and political advance of non-Europeans is not a threat, but a necessary condition of the prosperity of Europeans and non-Europeans alike, colour prejudice will disappear.

Combating Discrimination

The elimination of prejudice will almost certainly be a long and gradual process. There are more immediate actions that can be taken to remove certain forms of racial discrimination wherever they are found. It is sometimes suggested

by the defenders of the colour-bar that certain forms of racial discrimination are specifically designed to protect the interests of non-Europeans. It is pointed out that, if much of the legislation governing the ownership and occupation of land in British colonial territories in Africa were abolished, white settlers or Asian immigrants would be free to acquire the land to the further detriment of the indigenous population.[8] This specious argument need not detain us long. Discriminatory legislation is not that which distinguishes between one group in the community and another, but which enhances the power and privileges of a superordinate status group at the expense of the subordinate. Legislation which prevents Europeans from acquiring land occupied by the African population is the opposite of discriminatory. It would be as foolish to argue that legislation designed to prevent employers from exploiting women and children in industry was discriminatory.

Discrimination does, however, take a number of different forms, some of which are more amenable to legislative action than others. All forms of discrimination which are actually given the sanction of the law by incorporation in statute, order, bye-law, or similar regulation could be abolished by simple amendment or revocation. This would cover most of the political disabilities affecting non-Europeans and a number of other discriminatory practices as well. But, in a society where there are wide disparities of economic status, the mere abolition of discriminatory legislation is not enough. More positive measures must be taken to ensure that the discrimination does not continue in another form. Schemes of legal aid may be required to assure equality before the law. Financial qualifications and educational tests, as well as racial qualifications, may have to be removed to ensure fair representation for the several ethnic groups in a society. It is not enough, as has been seen in Southern Rhodesia, to institute a common roll if the large majority of Africans are too poor to qualify for the vote.

A memorandum submitted by the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the Commission on Human Rights,

Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, asserts that:

> The enjoyment of human rights without distinction as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth, or other status can be guaranteed to all persons within the jurisdiction of a particular State by the enactment and enforcement of legislation which (*a*) abrogates all laws which permit or entail any discrimination, and (*b*) prohibits and penalizes discrimination by both officials and private persons.[9]

The report gives a list of discriminatory practices which it considers might be used in determining which acts of discrimination should be declared penal offences. Among these are included inequality before the law, in personal security, in freedom of movement or residence, in freedom of thought, conscience, religion, and the expression of opinion; inequality in the right of freedom, of peaceful association, of choice of employment, in opportunities for education and training and inequality in services provided for the members of different social groups. The report also lists forms of discrimination which assume the form of granting privileges or imposing odious duties as well as deprivation of human rights.

Although the memorandum recognizes that it may not be possible to eradicate all forms of discrimination by legal action it considers that many forms of discriminatory conduct could be suppressed or greatly lessened by legal measures. The report lists the following reasons why the law can act as a factor preventing discrimination:

> (*a*) It fosters the conviction that discrimination is wrong by fixing standards which are respected by the great majority of people. (*b*) People who have little respect for the law are nevertheless afraid of the consequences of unlawful conduct: they therefore obey the law to avoid its penalties. (*c*) In both cases, and whatever the motive, the resulting daily behaviour tends to create social customs which are in harmony with the law; these customs constitute a powerful collective force. (*d*) The law can also help to repair the harm produced by unlawful conduct, in so far as it can provide indemnities and reparation for the person wronged.[10]

Many people, while accepting these general arguments, are doubtful if legal action can be effective particularly if,

the climate of public opinion is against it. There are always many ways in which the law can be evaded. It is also argued that legislation may cause resentment which will accentuate prejudice and eventually increase rather than decrease the amount of discrimination. While at first sight these arguments may appear to have some force, experience of anti-discriminatory legislation in the U.S.A. does not support the view that legislation is necessarily ineffective or that it produces effects opposite to those desired.[11] Naturally, there is initial resistance and resentment among those who are no longer able to benefit from the discrimination hitherto practised. But in the long run the threat of prosecution and the unfavourable publicity that would ensue is usually sufficient to ensure conformity.

It is in connexion with acts of discrimination committed by private persons in their everyday social relations with members of other ethnic groups that legislation would probably be least effective. Here the ultimate disappearance of discrimination will probably depend upon the success of educative and other measures designed to eliminate prejudice. In any case, it is important that the elimination of discrimination be not considered purely in terms of legislation and negative penal measures against those who break the law. *There must be positive measures designed to promote the welfare of under-privileged groups and eliminate differences of social, political, and economic status between the members of different races.* Programmes of social and economic development must be instituted which will raise the standards of living of the large majority of the population of under-developed countries. Such schemes will involve the gradual breaking down of barriers of class and culture between races. This immediately raises the problem of social separation, which is a third factor in the question of colour-bar.

Separation and Cultural Autonomy

While the complete separation of the several races in Africa can never be achieved, those who advocate this policy

have grasped one essential truth. *The too sudden impact of European culture and technology upon a relatively primitive people can have disastrous effects upon behavioural adjustment and personality.* The effect of culture contact and rapid social change is to introduce conflicts within the society the resolution of which can never be quite painless. The accumulated experience of the last two hundred years combined with the benefits to be derived from applied sociology may help to mitigate the consequences of these conflicts, but they can never entirely remove them. Nevertheless, a great deal has been learned from the study of industrialization and urbanization, which could be fruitfully applied in the present day to under-developed areas. If careful planning and control are instituted from the start some of the worst consequences of industrialization (rural depopulation, urban overcrowding and slum creation, low wages and poor working conditions, lack of satisfying social relationships at work and in the community, and the disintegration of family life) can be avoided. Otherwise we may expect to find even more poverty and destitution, tuberculosis and venereal disease, crime and delinquency, divorce and separation, mental ill-health and other symptoms of maladjustment, than are already to be observed in the rapidly growing towns and cities of Africa and the West Indies.

If, in the transitional period between a peasant economy and an urbanized industrial one, some degree of cultural autonomy could be preserved by partial separation *without discrimination*, this might be a valuable means of preventing the social disintegration hitherto regarded as an inevitable consequence of economic advance. But it is open to question how far the idea of 'separate but equal' treatment for different ethnic groups can ever be more than the pious expression of good intentions. The temptation to place the emphasis upon *separate* rather than equal has so far prevailed, wherever it has been tried. The fact remains that, if the rapid social and economic changes which have already been set in motion in under-developed countries are not to have disastrous consequences, then some degree of control must be exercised over the processes of change themselves.

The term 'social engineering' is sometimes adopted to denote the planned control of social change. Some objections may be raised to the term in so far as it appears to imply the deliberate manipulation of human beings, albeit for their own good, by some all-wise and all-powerful authority. The idea is repugnant to the notion of the fundamental liberty of the subject. This is not the place to enter into a detailed philosophical discussion of the meaning of freedom and how far it is compatible with planning and control. However, this much is certain. Factory acts, wages councils, compulsory schemes of industrial welfare and joint consultation, economic planning, town planning, minimum housing standards, compulsory education, national insurance, and many other examples of state interference and control are necessary for the welfare of the large majority of the population of a modern society. If this had been understood earlier in the nineteenth century a great deal of suffering and misery might have been avoided. It is not too late to apply these lessons in Africa and the West Indies. The fundamental question for the future is whether the several ethnic groups are to draw apart, emphasizing the cultural differences between them, or whether they will work together to create a socially integrated society. It is possible to plan for either type of society, but the plans will only be successful if they are in harmony with the present trends in social development.

SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

We may consider the question of planned social change under four main headings: economic development and the development of social services, educational development, community development, and the development of political institutions. All are closely related to one another, and if advance in one takes place without advance in all the others, serious conflict and maladjustment will occur. Development on all five fronts must be co-ordinated, which is not an easy task. As Professor T. S. Simey has pointed out, a state of

conflict has already arisen between the political, social, and economic elements in contemporary colonial policy.[12] When considered in isolation their respective aims are often unexceptionable, but it is doubtful if they can be realized simultaneously without creating dislocation. This is especially true in connexion with any attempt to raise standards of living. Under-developed countries find that they cannot maintain elaborate social services without raising levels of economic productivity in order to pay for these services. At the same time improved social welfare leads to a rapidly increasing population and pressure on resources, so that it is difficult to undertake the necessary saving for capital investment. When new methods of agriculture and industrial production are introduced they break up traditional patterns of community life and create problems of personal adjustment and social control. Finally, the improving economic status of the indigenous peoples is often seen as a threat by the hitherto dominant European community.

Economic Development and Social Services

Economic development needs to be considered from three points of view: its aim, its form, and its scale. If the aim of economic development is to bring immediate returns to the investor, whether it be private enterprise, public corporation, state enterprise, or an international investment agency, then it is bound to come into conflict with the ultimate social welfare of the population in general. There is no necessary reason why investment, planned primarily with a view to promoting the welfare of the inhabitants of the under-developed countries, should not also, in the long run, give adequate returns on the capital invested. Here, as within any particular industry, it will be readily understood that concern for the welfare of employees pays its own dividends. Cheap labour is notoriously expensive from the point of view of long-term economic analysis. Similar considerations apply to agriculture where the alternative is between production of specialized crops on a large scale for export and the more

efficient production of crops for local consumption, which will raise standards of living and meet present world shortages of food. It is not suggested that export markets should be ignored altogether, since these must provide necessary means to pay for essential imports. But Professor W. A. Lewis has drawn attention to the fact that the special interest of the United Kingdom in colonial agriculture has tended to be its contribution to the dollar deficit. Nowadays plantation agriculture is no longer practicable because cheap indentured or slave labour is not available. Large-scale capital investment in plantation agriculture is not a satisfactory alternative, as the failure of the ground-nut and similar schemes has shown. Therefore 'if new plantations fade out of the picture, the development of peasant agriculture becomes the principal means of expanding colonial output, and this involves a complete revolution in our approach.'[13]

Consideration of the aims of economic development has led inevitably to the question of its form. The encouragement of peasant agriculture and of rural industries is more likely to contribute to the material and social welfare of the inhabitants of backward countries in the early stages of industrialization than plantation agriculture or the exploitation of mineral wealth. One of the most important steps towards this end must be the provision of rural water supplies and electrical power. In this connexion the brilliantly planned and executed scheme of the Tennessee Valley Authority has provided a model which might well be copied in other places. The proposed schemes for hydro-electricity in the Gold Coast, Uganda, and elsewhere could be the foundation for a rapid improvement in standards of living in those territories. But any such enterprise clearly needs a great deal of capital. In fact emphasis upon peasant agriculture and rural industries will probably require more investment than other plans, rather than less. Professor Lewis writes: 'The idea that British colonial Africa should receive, by gift and loan, private and public, an annual inflow of £100 millions will seem fantastic to most of those who participate in governing Africa. But what else does Britain mean when

she says that her object is to promote rapid development in Africa? For this purpose £100 millions a year (£2 per head) is modest and conservative.'[14]

Clearly the scale of economic development must be greater than has previously been thought possible. In fact if development is conceived on too small a scale it may merely serve to hasten the rate of social disintegration without providing the means of reintegration at a new level. The building of roads and the spread of mass literacy may simply serve to expose hitherto isolated communities to Western culture without providing the opportunities to benefit from it. The consequent frustrations may contribute to widespread discontent, encourage the flow of migrants to the towns, and lay the foundations for a movement such as *Mau Mau*. If economic development involves the break-up of rural communities and rapid urbanization the cost of social services to deal with the problems arising may be beyond the means of the society in question. But if through the encouragement of peasant agriculture and rural industries, traditional communities can be held together, the demands on the social services will be much less. The limited resources available can be directed into the provision of hospitals and schools and will not be required to assist large numbers of unemployed persons in urban areas. Where family ties and obligations of kinship are retained, the care of children, and of the aged, need not become a burden on the public purse. This is not to suggest that a network of social services, such as is now a familiar and accepted part of the 'welfare state' in Britain, should not be the eventual aim in under-developed countries. But until productivity has been greatly increased the burden of such elaborate services is likely to be excessive.

Education

From social services it is not a far cry to the question of education. Whether education is considered in terms of formal teaching in schools, campaigns for 'mass literacy', instruction in health and hygiene, demonstrations of improved

methods of agriculture, or training for employment in industry, education is a fundamental necessity for social development. The question immediately arises, what kind of education is necessary and desirable? Is it enough to provide instruction in reading, writing, and arithmetic; if not, what is needed most? It is interesting in this respect to compare the report of the Eiselen Commission in South Africa, to which reference has already been made, with the report on African education in the British colonies published in 1953. The latter is based upon the work of two study groups, one on West Africa under the chairmanship of Dr G. B. Jeffery and one on East and Central Africa under the chairmanship of Mr A. L. Binns.[15] All three reports agreed in recognizing that African education cannot be a mere replica of that which is taught in European schools. The Binns report states: 'The aim of education must be to prepare Africans to live well in their own country, and the system of education must not be a pale reflection of that given in England, where conditions are altogether different, and where the native culture of the people is altogether different. What we seek in effect is a more liberal education for Africans based on their own African environment and their own way of life.'[16] The Jeffery report puts it this way: '... the things that are of value in the old African way of life must be preserved and the African must be prepared to face moral problems in new and strange forms'.[17] The preservation of much that is valuable in Bantu culture in so far as it is adaptable to modern conditions of life constitutes, as we have seen, a theme running through the whole of the Eiselen Commission's report on South Africa. The main difference between the latter report and the Binns and Jeffery inquiries rests in the perception of the part which Africans are to play in the social and economic life of their respective countries in the future. In South Africa, while it is recognized that changes must take place in the social and economic organization of Bantu society, education appears to be oriented in the direction of maintaining the *status quo* as far as the subordinate role of Africans in relation to Europeans is concerned. This was

emphasized by the Minister of Native Affairs in introducing the Bantu Education Act in September 1953. He is reported as saying that 'education must train and teach people in accordance with their opportunities in life, according to the sphere in which they live' and that education which aroused 'wrong expectations on the part of the Native himself' would only lead to frustration and bad racial relations.

Present South African educational policy is clearly dictated by the ideology of *apartheid* or social separation, whereas the intention behind the plans for educational development outlined in the Binns and Jeffery reports is the integration of the African into the social life of the territory as a whole. The real problem is how to achieve the latter without completely alienating Africans from their own language, art, music, dancing, and traditional crafts, or from the social and moral obligations associated with the kinship system, which can make such a valuable contribution to stability in the new order.

A final point may be made regarding educational policy. The supporters of a policy of separation often argue that it is not merely a question of differences in culture, but of the different levels of social and economic advance which necessitates separation in schools. One writer quotes the results of research carried out in Britain which suggest that 'working-class children, especially those from large families, appear on the whole to fit less easily into the life of a grammar school than boys from middle-class homes and smaller families' and they 'tend to be rated at a lower level by their masters on traits such as personality, industriousness and sense of responsibility'.[18] The writer goes on to argue that if this applies to working-class children in Britain it would apply *a fortiori* to Bantu children in Africa and that therefore separate schools for European and non-European children and different curricula are justified.[19] But this is not a logical conclusion to draw. The disparity of performance of working-class and middle-class children of comparable innate intelligence is evidence of the need to improve the home conditions of working-class children so that they can compete on equal terms with middle-class children. It is not an

argument for separating them, and the same applies to the disparities between European and non-European children. Others defend separation in schools by pointing to the fact that many middle-class parents in Britain prefer to send their children to fee-paying schools rather than let them mix with children of working-class parents. But it need hardly be pointed out that there is a great deal of difference between voluntary separation of children, where parents have a free choice in the matter, and compulsory separation as a result of a segregational policy, enforced by the law.

Community Development

Arguments similar to those used to defend compulsory segregation of European and non-European children in schools are put forward to support residential segregation and the compulsory allocation of the several ethnic groups to their own separate communities. The fact that wide differences in class and culture at present distinguish Europeans and non-Europeans in East, Central, and South Africa is often regarded as sufficient justification for their permanent separation. Once again it is important to distinguish separation that is made compulsory and enforced by law and that which comes about voluntarily as a matter of choice. When a common language, religion, and national origin as well as social status draw people together to form a residential community of their own accord there can be no objection. But when this tendency towards separation and cultural autonomy is artificially fostered by making residential segregation compulsory and permanent, then unjustifiable inroads are being made on human freedom. It is the element of force, the legal coercion implied by the policy of *apartheid*, which makes it so objectionable.

Despite the objections to *apartheid* as a social policy there is a great deal to be said in favour of not breaking up traditional communities if they can be assisted to meet the impact of technological advance and economic development without completely disintegrating. Dr Phillips Ruopp has pointed

out that programmes of economic and technical assistance are programmes for community development and must begin at the level of the village although the village community should not be an exclusive concern. 'It is a question of emphasis and of the most fruitful means for enriching life everywhere and enabling men to fulfil their destiny in a way appropriate to their common humanity. The various levels of development are concomitants: the community of the region and the region of the community.'[20] Experience in urban areas also has shown that there is a tremendous need to create a sense of community to combat the effects of the social disintegration which is often characteristic of urban life. A sense of community is normally equated with social solidarity, but a fundamental dilemma arises when solidarity at the level of the small community must be reconciled with membership of a larger territorial group such as the nation or even the world as a whole. T. R. Batten has pointed out that the stronger the feeling of solidarity between members of a social group and the wider the range of values, attitudes, and interests which they share exclusively, the more likely it is that the group will come into conflict with other groups.[21] If, as the exponents of *apartheid* would have it, community development is to proceed on racial lines, then, as modern trends increase the scope for contact between different local communities, conflict is likely to be intensified. Complete separation may prevent conflict, but partial separation accompanied by a feeling of social solidarity among the members of different ethnic groups may have the opposite effect. Any programme of community development must, therefore, have as one of its principal aims the promotion of a sense of belonging, not merely to a local village, neighbourhood, or racial group, but to a nation and ultimately to a world-wide community of nations.

Political Development

This leads to the question of political development as far as racial relations and the problems of colour-bar are

concerned. The present situation and the impending changes were discussed in Chapter One. With the exception of South Africa, the tendency everywhere is to extend to the non-European peoples of the territories concerned increasing opportunities for participation in government. In some cases separate systems of representation for Europeans and non-Europeans have been instituted, while in others there is no distinction. In East and Central Africa the European minority has a predominating voice in the government of the colonies concerned. As the non-Europeans advance, socially and economically, they will expect to be given greater political representation. It is on this issue that racial relationships may become strained in the future. *Europeans in East, Central, and South Africa may consider themselves to be a benevolent aristocracy; but experience has shown that benevolent aristocracies cannot be relied upon to remain benevolent. They are no substitute for democracy.* Only when the franchise is extended to the large majority of the population can their point of view be adequately represented and can they be sure that proper measures for their welfare will be enacted. The system whereby several million Africans are represented in Parliament by one or two specially selected Europeans must be replaced everywhere by a proper system of elections on the widest possible franchise, without restrictions of race, property, income, or education. There is no foundation for the view that because a man is illiterate he is incapable of voting intelligently. The illiteracy rate in Britain was still very high when the franchise was extended to the working man and there were many people who raised their voices in protest, just as there are objections to giving Africans the vote to-day. In fact the arguments used to-day have a familiar ring. This is how one writer put it in 1878:

When the county franchise was talked of in 1873, there were many who thought the subject ill-timed – that the rural workman was an unfit subject to be invested with political power. The idea in many minds was that those hard-working men in the rural villages of this England of ours had no aspirations or desires above working, eating, drinking, and sleeping – that they were content to let their

more favoured and better educated superiors think for them, make laws for them, administer these laws; and no matter how unjustly those laws, of which he, as a poor man, had no voice in the making, might be administered, he, the working man, was expected to sit quietly down and tamely submit to the decision of his rich superiors ... of course the man who dug and delved from morn till night, who toiled through summer's heat and winter's stormy rage, was looked upon as a political nonentity.[22]

The history of the labour movement in Britain demolished that belief, just as the growth of trade unions and political representation for non-Europeans must eventually disillusion those Europeans in Africa who still believe that Africans and Asians are politically incompetent.

COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS

The development of political institutions in the colonies may easily precipitate a crisis in Commonwealth relations. In fact the future of the Commonwealth is closely bound up with the problem of racial relations. On several occasions Dr Malan has commented unfavourably upon British colonial policies and particularly upon granting at an early stage self-government to the Gold Coast. He has objected to the possibility of a 'Negro West African State' becoming a free and independent member of the Commonwealth. In a statement made on 23 February 1951, he argued that the Commonwealth is a closed group, all free and equal, and that in admitting a new member all existing members should have an equal say. He objected to the fact that Britain had acted on her own in admitting India, Pakistan, and Ceylon to the Commonwealth and apparently intended to do the same with other territories as they achieved self-government. The whole controversy reflects the unsatisfactory nature of the term 'Commonwealth', which is used in different ways. It is sometimes applied only to the independent self-governing dominions, but in its original and official sense 'Commonwealth' covers all territories previously included in the Brit-

ish Empire. India always was and colonial territories now are integral parts of the Commonwealth. Furthermore, India was a full member of the Imperial Conference before gaining independence and Southern Rhodesia has been represented at the Prime Ministers' Conference although not yet possessing full dominion status. It is clear therefore that to grant self-government to the Gold Coast will mean simply that she is no longer a dependent territory within the Commonwealth, but an independent member free to secede from the Commonwealth if she wished.

Dr Malan claims that full membership of the Commonwealth should only be granted to those countries which share 'specific common interest and sufficient homogeneity of culture and political outlook'.[23] It is apparent from the context of his statements that he interprets the qualifications mainly in terms of race and colour. But if colonial territories achieving self-government were to be discriminated against, and not admitted as full and equal members of the Commonwealth, it is more than likely that they would secede altogether rather than accept a humiliating secondary role. What is more, India, Pakistan, and Ceylon might very well follow in protest against this racial discrimination. There is a very real sense, therefore, in which, if Dr Malan persists in his attitude, Britain may have to choose between a uni-racial Commonwealth with South Africa as a member and a multi-racial Commonwealth without her.

Another question affecting the relation between Britain and the Union of South Africa is that of the High Commission territories, to which reference has already been made. Dr Malan appears determined to press for the incorporation of these territories into the Union, despite the desire of the inhabitants to remain subject to Colonial Office control until such time as they can become independent. If a formal approach to the British government is made, it will necessitate a more definite statement of policy on this matter than has so far been made. It should be noted that the government is merely committed to consulting the inhabitants of the territories before transfer, and while the implication is

that transfer would not take place without their consent this is by no means absolutely certain. It is not without significance that Dr Malan himself has drawn attention to the fact that the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was brought about despite the active opposition of the African inhabitants. It is to be hoped that when and if the time comes the British Government will be firm in its refusal to compromise itself by exposing the inhabitants of the High Commission territories to the full blast of the Union's racial policies, even though this may precipitate a serious crisis in the relations between the United Kingdom and the Union of South Africa.

There is a strong movement within the Nationalist Party in the Union which favours the creation of a Republic of South Africa and even the withdrawal of the Union from the Commonwealth. Dr Malan himself has been quick to appreciate that there would be no immediate advantage to be gained from such action, but it remains a possibility for the future. There are strong economic ties with Britain and the Commonwealth and the existence of gold and other important mineral wealth in South Africa makes it very important from the point of view of Britain's economic welfare that these ties should not be severed. Nevertheless, the time may come when economic considerations will have to be overruled in favour of human considerations and social justice. As the Union is a free and independent state there is little that Britain or any other member of the Commonwealth can do to influence South Africa's racial policies. Attempts by India to have questions raised in the United Nations regarding the position of the Indian minority and other races in South Africa have been met with indignant protests at this 'interference with the internal affairs' of another nation. When South Africa's policies have been discussed at the United Nations the United Kingdom delegate has either refrained from voting or voted with South Africa.

Europeans in South Africa are undoubtedly sensitive to criticisms from outside regarding present racial policies, but their reaction is one of obstinate resentment rather than a

willingness to act upon advice. At least as far as this book is concerned, if criticisms have been made against present policies in the Union of South Africa it has also been made quite clear that there is much room for improvement in Britain and in the British colonies. We, in Britain, have no right to condemn what is happening in South Africa in a spirit of self-righteousness; but, by doing everything in our power to improve racial relationships in those areas where we have direct responsibility, we can set an example to South Africa and to the world. We must extend fundamental human rights to all, irrespective of colour, class, or creed, remembering the definition of human rights put forward by Mahatma Gandhi in a letter to the Director-General of UNESCO written 25 May 1947:

> I learnt from my illiterate but wise mother that all rights to be deserved and preserved come from duty well done. Thus the very right to live accrues to us only when we do the duty of citizenship of the world. From this one fundamental statement, perhaps, it is easy enough to define the duties of Man and Woman and correlate every right to some corresponding duty to be first performed. Every other right can be shown to be a usurpation hardly worth fighting for.[24]

Let us hope that the gentle spirit of Gandhi will work in the hearts of men and women, of every race and religion, in the tremendous tasks of conciliation that lie ahead.

Postscript

NOVEMBER 1954

SINCE the last pages were written, nearly six months ago, several significant events have occurred and I am indebted to the publishers for permission to insert this addendum in order to bring the facts up to date.

In the Union of South Africa, Dr Malan, who is over eighty years of age, has resigned and Mr J. G. Strydom is now Prime Minister and Leader of the Nationalist Party. It has become customary to associate the policy of *apartheid* with Dr Malan, but he had a moderating influence on his more extreme colleagues and therefore it is possible that his successor may be even more reactionary. Meanwhile the United Party, under the leadership of Mr Strauss, has attempted to formulate a policy which, while not shocking the susceptibilities of the majority of its supporters who regard segregation as essential, nevertheless represents an alternative programme to that of the Nationalists. The United Party is more realistic in its acceptance of the inevitability of economic integration and the permanence of the African urban population, which the Nationalists prefer to regard as temporary phenomena. Furthermore, the United Party claims that it intends, if it is returned to office, to repeal the Bantu Education Act, which has stirred up a great deal of opposition, especially from the Churches.

Churches have played a big part in pioneering education for Africans, but in future their influence is to be reduced to a minimum. It is alleged that responsibility for African education is to be placed in the hands of the Bantu themselves, under the 'direction' of the Minister for Native Affairs. This centralization of power could be disastrous in so far as it aims to stifle African opposition to *apartheid*. The date set by the Department of Native Affairs for taking over mission schools is 1 April 1955. All mission schools have been told that they

must state by 31 December 1954 whether they wish to relinquish control of their schools and hostels, or whether they wish to retain control as unaided institutions or with reduced subsidies.[1] Very few churches can afford to maintain their schools without substantial subsidies. In any case many churches are not prepared to co-operate in a system of State education, the aims of which they fundamentally oppose. The Anglican Bishop of Johannesburg has already announced that mission schools in his diocese will close down.

Even supposing some mission schools find it possible to continue, they will be subjected to strict supervision by the Minister of Native Affairs. A circular has been issued, drawing attention to an administrative order based upon legislation of 1923 and 1945, which includes the following clauses:

1. Owing to the intervention by representatives of certain Church and other bodies in matters outside the scope of the work they should undertake amongst Natives, it has been decided that provision should be made for the cancellation of leases (for mission and other sites in locations or native villages) if the activities of any such representative outside the normal scope of his work are of a subversive nature or might tend to lead to or encourage deterioration in the relationship between the Natives and governmental persons or bodies if not to out-and-out defiance or breaches of the law. A clause in the model Deed of Lease and Permission to Occupy attached provides for the cancellation, without compensation, of the occupational rights in such cases. (Clause 5 of the Circular.)

2. When in the opinion of the Minister of Native Affairs, the Occupier uses the site or allows or suffers it to be used for purposes other than those for which it was granted, or the activities of the said occupier or any of his representatives whether on the site or elsewhere, are such as to encourage or tend to encourage deterioration in the relationship between Natives and the Government or governmental persons or bodies or the Grantor, or are aimed at defiance or breaches of the law, the Grantor may ... give the occupier three months' notice in writing of the cancellation of this Permission to Occupy and on the expiry of such notice, this Permission to Occupy shall be deemed to be cancelled. (Clause 11 of Model Permission to Occupy.)

3. No non-Native may reside on the site without the approval of the Minister of Native Affairs. (Clauses 8 of the Permission to Occupy and 6 of the Deed of Lease.)

4. All new school sites must be allocated to the Department and not to Church or other bodies. (Clause 9 of the Circular from the Department of Native Affairs.)[2]

There is little doubt that it is the government's intention to eliminate the influence of Churches which have been critical of *apartheid* as a policy, while still leaving room for a limited amount of missionary activity by the Dutch Reformed Church which officially supports the Nationalists' point of view.

Central Africa

While the Northern Rhodesian Legislative Council has approved, with only one dissentient, resolutions outlining a progressive policy with regard to the representation in the Council of the different races, the Federal Assembly has rejected a motion by Mr D. L. Yamba of Northern Rhodesia calling for equal treatment for all races in public places within the Federation. It may be argued that the two questions are unrelated, but this is not so. There is a close connexion between the social and the political aspects of discrimination and the vote in the Federal Assembly reflects the preponderant influence of the traditional policy of Southern Rhodesia.

The resolutions approved by the Northern Rhodesia Legislative Council were introduced by the Member for Native Interests, Mr John Moffat. He argued that the term 'Partnership' had been interpreted in so many ways that a more definite statement of policy was called for. His resolutions were:

1. The objective of policy in Northern Rhodesia must be to remove from each race the fear that the other might dominate for its own racial benefit, and to move forward from the present system of racial representation in the Territorial Legislature towards a franchise with no separate representation for the races.

2. Until that objective can be fully achieved, a period of transition will remain, during which special arrangements in the Legislative and Executive Councils must continue to be made, so as to ensure that no race can use either the preponderance of its numbers or its more advanced stage of development to dominate the other for its own racial benefit.

3. During this period of transition, special legislation must be

enforced to protect, to the extent that may be necessary, the interests of either race. Meanwhile this Council notes and agrees with the statement of the Secretary of State that it is the duty of Her Majesty's Government to ensure that on contentious issues the balance is fairly held.

4. Every lawful inhabitant of Northern Rhodesia has the right to progress according to his character, qualifications, training, ability and industry without distinction of race, colour, or creed.[3]

Mr Yamba's motion in the Federal Assembly read: 'That equal treatment be accorded immediately to all races in all public places within the Federation and that such action be enforced by legislation by the Federal Assembly.' The amendment which was adopted read: 'That within the constitutional responsibilities assigned to the Federal government they will endeavour to provide improved facilities for all races.' The Prime Minister, Sir Godfrey Huggins, in opposing the original motion made one statement which aroused some indignation among African members. Referring to the clause in the Preamble to the Federal Constitution which states that Federation would 'foster partnership and co-operation between their inhabitants', he is reported to have said: 'Let us for the sake of the Federation which was for economic advancement, *not for the preamble which was forced upon us*, have patience. It is the abject poverty of the masses which is the cause of the trouble. We have not the money to educate them and elevate them.'[4] (My italics.)

As far as Southern Rhodesia is concerned it is apparent that the government intends to maintain its traditional policy of segregation. It is true that certain amendments to the Land Apportionment Acts have been introduced. These enable Africans to live in, and to use offices and clubs in, certain European areas (notably on the site of the new University College, which otherwise could not accommodate African students or staff), and to permit multi-racial hotels at airports. These amendments have been opposed by the Confederate Party, which has announced its intention of repealing the amendments if returned to office. However, the Minister of Native Affairs has reaffirmed that the Land Apportionment

Acts are to remain the basis of Native policy, thus committing the country to racial segregation in the foreseeable future. The Minister rejected suggestions that Africans should acquire freehold title in urban areas on the grounds that this would mean the participation of Africans in municipal councils, and this was contrary to the policy of the Southern Rhodesian government.[5]

Certain changes have been announced with regard to the position of African Trade Unions in Southern Rhodesia. A Native Industrial Workers' Unions Bill has been introduced and is to go to a Select Committee for consideration and report. The Prime Minister, Mr Garfield Todd, has stated that the Bill is an interim measure. During this interim period African conditions of service will continue to be regulated through a system of Native Labour Boards. Registered unions might have direct representation on these boards, on which employers would also serve, under an independent chairman. It is not intended to introduce the system of Industrial Councils at this stage, and the Bill does not entitle African unions to make use of the strike weapon. The unions will be industrial unions, and not craft unions. Only one union will be allowed in each industry in each centre, and the Registrar of Native Industrial Unions must be satisfied that the union is representative of workers in that industry. Membership will be open to women, but the new system will not cover agricultural or domestic workers, nor African mineworkers on mines which have less than 300 workers. Mr Todd has explained that the recognition of African unions will be in two stages. First they will be enrolled by the registrar, and all unions, whether enrolled or not, will be subject to the scrutiny of the registrar, and will have to make available to him copies of their minutes and audited accounts. When the registrar is satisfied that the union is functioning properly, and that its members properly understand the duties and responsibilities of trade unionism, he will allow the union to proceed to the second and more responsible stage of full registration.[6]

In Northern Rhodesia a Board of Inquiry into the Advancement of Africans in Industry, under the chairmanship

of Sir John Forster, has made its report. It reached the 'inescapable conclusion' that the establishment of the principle of awarding to any African promoted to skilled work, the European rate of remuneration, would disrupt the African wage structure throughout the Federation and seriously threaten the national economy. The Board found 'a fundamental difference of opinion between the copper-mining companies and the European Unions as to the proper method to be adopted in respect of the advancement of Africans.' The European Mineworkers' Union are clearly afraid that African advancement will mean a lowering of European standards of living and the possibility of unemployment. They consider that if Africans undertake work hitherto done by Europeans they must be paid at the European rate. The Board, however, took the view that this would mean the indefinite postponement of any advance for Africans and that some compromise was necessary. They found it in the idea that skilled jobs should be simplified by 'fragmentation'. Africans would then be employed on these tasks on lower rates of pay than those received by Europeans who normally undertook the whole process.[7]

Unfortunately, the Forster recommendations shirk the basic issue which eventually must be faced. Are Africans to be allowed to receive the same rate of pay as Europeans when they can prove themselves capable of doing the same work equally efficiently? There can be little doubt that some Africans are already capable of skilled work, and if schemes of further education and training are introduced more and more Africans will qualify; but as things are at present they will not receive skilled rates of pay. In the meantime, one o the largest mining combines, the Rhodesian Selection Trust Company, has given notice to the European Mineworkers' Union that it intends to terminate the present agreement in order to negotiate fresh agreements, the terms of which, 'while fully safeguarding the legitimate interests of the members of the union, will permit the satisfaction of the reasonable aspirations of the company's African employees', in accordance with the terms of the Forster report.[8]

East Africa

In Kenya the *Mau Mau* struggle continues. It has been estimated that the number of active *Mau Mau* adherents at large is in the region of 7000, but a steady trickle is surrendering. In the meantime rehabilitation must be undertaken in the detention camps and elsewhere. Lack of personnel is a handicap and the Society of Friends and the Save the Children Fund have sent out relief workers, but their numbers are infinitesimal in relation to the tremendous need.

In the political field one significant development has occurred. A new party, under the leadership of Mr Michael Blundell, has been formed to unite all races in support of multiracial government. It is known as the United Country Party and was set up in July 1954. However, it is opposed by the Federal Independence Party which objects to non-Europeans in the government. In October 1954 it was announced that there would be a truce between the two parties in order that Europeans could present a united front until the end of the *Mau Mau* campaign.

Perhaps the most startling of recent developments are those which have taken place in Uganda in connexion with the constitutional crisis and the position of the Kabaka. Although Mr Lyttelton, now Lord Chandos, asserted that his decision to depose the Kabaka was 'irrevocable', his successor found ground for reconsidering this decision. Two new factors have emerged in Uganda. Firstly there is the judgement in the case brought in the Uganda High Court to test the validity of the action of the British government in withdrawing their recognition of the Kabaka Mutesa II. The Chief Justice of the Uganda High Court held that the 1900 Agreement setting up the Protectorate did not give the Kabaka the legal right to recognition enforceable by the Court. In case he was held wrong on appeal he gave as his opinion that the government had been wrong in withdrawing recognition under the terms of Article 6, but that such action could rightly have been taken under Article 20.[9] It is unfortunate that many Baganda misunderstood the judgement and assumed that it meant the

immediate return of the Kabaka.

The second factor is the agreement reached on constitutional matters at the Namirembe conference between the Governor of Uganda and the Buganda Constitutional Committee appointed by the Lukiko and presided over by Sir Keith Hancock. When the Governor tried to deliver his speech announcing the British Government's proposals following the recommendations of this conference, he was shouted down by the crowd assembled outside the hall, and had to abandon his speech. On this occasion the misunderstanding arose because he referred to the possibility that the Lukiko might wish to elect a new Kabaka. This caused considerable indignation.

In fact, the Secretary of State for the Colonies has made it clear that if the Lukiko wish Mutesa II to return he will not be prevented from doing so. But it is stipulated that there should be an interim period of about nine months, until the new constitution is established and working properly, before the Kabaka returns. The White Paper summarizes the new constitutional arrangements as follows:

that the Kingdom of Buganda, under the Kabaka's government, should continue to be an integral part of the Protectorate; that the conduct of public affairs in Buganda should be in the hands of Ministers; and that, while all the traditional dignities of the Kabaka should be fully safeguarded, Kabakas in future should be constitutional rulers bound by a Solemn Engagement to observe the conditions of the Agreements regarding the Constitution and not to prejudice the security and welfare of the Buganda people and the Protectorate.

The Governor has recommended the introduction of a Ministerial system. The Executive Council would consist of 14 members (including the Governor): nine of these would be Officials, six or seven of them with Ministerial status, and there would be five Ministers, of whom three would be Africans, drawn from the public. There would also be two African Parliamentary Under-Secretaries. At the same time the Legislative Council would be slightly enlarged, to permit of increased African representation for Buganda, Bugosa, and one other district, and the proportion of African members would be increased to half the total. African members would sit on both sides of the House and the present balance, which gives the

Government side the majority through the Governor's vote, would be preserved.

In the light of the Governor's recommendations the Buganda Constitutional Committee have agreed to recommend to the Lukiko that Buganda members should be elected to the Protectorate Legislative Council by the Lukiko.[10]

West Indies

The Report of the British Guiana Constitutional Commission, 1954, has been published.[11] It provides a detailed account of the social, economic, and political factors leading up to the suspension of the constitution and the action taken against leaders of the People's Progressive Party. It confirms the existence of the strong Communist element in the party and reaches the reluctant conclusion that there is 'no alternative but to recommend a period of marking time in the advance towards self-government.' This in effect means the indefinite retention of the present arrangement which is virtually personal rule by the Governor, through Ministers appointed at his own discretion.

Few people would pretend that this is a satisfactory state of affairs, but the Commission was convinced that any attempt to reintroduce democratic elections in the near future would simply result in a repetition of the crisis of 1953 and would be detrimental to the social and economic advance of the territory.

United Kingdom

The economic crisis in the West Indies is reflected in the growing numbers of Jamaicans and others who are migrating to Britain. In a debate in the House of Commons the Secretary of State for the Colonies has stated that it is the government's intention to go into the intricate problems which arise, including 'the possibility of legislation, if that is thought necessary, to impose some measure of regulation of control on this flow.'[12] The government is fully aware that legislation would be a serious matter as it would affect the whole ques-

tion of citizenship of the United Kingdom and Colonies and relations with other members of the Commonwealth. It must be remembered that the number of Jamaicans arriving in Britain is only a small proportion of the total number of Commonwealth citizens migrating to this country.[13] Unfortunately, their colour makes them more obvious than others.

The most satisfactory solution, in the long run, would be to step up the rate of industrial development in the West Indies. This should be linked with carefully planned schemes of sponsored immigration for periods of one to five years for training and experience in industry. In this way the shortage of skilled workers, at present a serious obstacle to economic development in the West Indies, could be overcome.

In Britain the problem of housing Jamaican immigrants remains one of the main sources of tension, which will only be resolved as the present housing shortage is reduced on a national scale. Meanwhile, it is evident that 'the colour problem' is not a monopoly of any one country and Britain must also put its house in order.

Notes and References

INTRODUCTION

1. M. Ginsberg, *Moral Progress*, p. 28. (Frazer Lecture at the University of Glasgow, 1944.) Jackson, Glasgow, 1945.
2. A. H. Richmond, *Colour Prejudice in Britain: A Study of West Indian Workers in Liverpool, 1941–1951*. Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1954.
3. Even supposing that further research on the genetic basis of psychological traits reveals *differences* in mentality between racial groups, this will not necessarily imply that one race is any *better* than another. For a full discussion of this and related questions see *The Race Concept: Results of an Enquiry*, pp. 51–8. U.N.E.S.C.O., Paris, 1952.
4. L. C. Dunn, *Race and Biology*, p. 29. U.N.E.S.C.O., Paris, 1951.
5. W. C. Boyd, *Genetics and the Races of Man*, p. 268. Blackwell, Oxford, 1950.
6. I am indebted to Professor C. H. Waddington who, in a private communication, suggested this formulation of the geneticists' understanding of race.
7. For a full discussion of the implications of miscegenation see H. L. Shapiro, *Race Mixture*. U.N.E.S.C.O., Paris, 1953.
8. A. Okafor, 'West African Background: An Outline', in *The New West Africa*. Allen and Unwin, London, 1953.
9. C. Levy-Strauss, *Race and History*, p. 37. U.N.E.S.C.O., Paris, 1952.
10. M. Lewis, *Race and Culture*, p. 29. U.N.E.S.C.O., Paris, 1952.
11. T. W. Adorno, *The Authoritarian Personality*. Harper, New York, 1950. For a summary see H. J. Eysenck, *Uses and Abuses of Psychology*, pp. 261–81. Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1953.
12. Adorno, *op. cit.* p. 384 *et seq.* and Richmond, *op. cit.* p. 7 *et passim.*
13. D. Westermann, *The African Today and Tomorrow*, p. 146. Oxford University Press, 1949. Professor Westermann recognizes that the complete separation of Black and White peoples in Africa is a practical impossibility and therefore urges the races to 'get together and learn to understand each other' (p. 147).
14. A. J. Toynbee, *The World and the West*. Oxford University Press, 1953: especially his chapter on 'The Psychology of Encounters', pp. 68–84.
15. E.g. J. Dollard, *Caste and Class in a Southern Town* (new ed.), Yale, New Haven, 1949, and I. D. MacCrone, *Group Conflicts and Race Prejudice*, South African Institute of Race Relations, 1947. In view of the unique historical and religious factors involved in the Hindu caste system some writers have objected to the extended usage of the

term caste. Cf. O. C. Cox, 'Race and Caste: A Distinction', *American Journal of Sociology*, p. 368, vol. 50, 1945.

16. R. M. MacIver and C. H. Page, *Society*, p. 364 *et seq.* Macmillan, London, 1950.

CHAPTER ONE

1. M. Wight, *British Colonial Constitutions 1947*, p. 2. Clarendon, Oxford, 1952.
2. *Ibid.* p. 13.
3. A British Protected Person can obtain citizenship of the United Kingdom and Colonies by naturalization. This means he must have an adequate knowledge of English, take an oath of allegiance, and pay a sum in the region of £5. He can also qualify after twelve months' residence in the United Kingdom. For a full discussion of the law and its implications, see C. Parry, *British Nationality*, Stevens, London, 1951. In Northern Rhodesia only fourteen Africans have been granted citizenship of the United Kingdom and Colonies since 1948, and of these only four have registered as voters. *Federation Newsletter*, 15 January 1954, p. 3.
4. The Appeal Court held that the Separate Representation of Voters Act was 'invalid, null and void and of no legal force and effect' because it had not been passed by a two-thirds majority of both Houses in joint session, as required by the South Africa Act. For a full account of the judgement see *South African Law Reports*, May 1952.
5. It will be noted that only Coloured *men* could vote. Although European women over the age of 21 years were enfranchized in 1930, Coloured women were not given the vote. (In the South African context the term Coloured distinguishes non-Europeans of mixed descent, and is not used to describe Africans or Asians.)
6. The Bill to divide the South African Court of Appeal was introduced in September 1953. It sought to revoke Section 96 of the South Africa Act in terms of which the Appeal Court is established. In its place it proposed a Court of Civil and Criminal Appeal and a Court of Constitutional Appeal, the latter consisting of five judges chosen by the Governor General. The government did not proceed with the Bill in the 1953 session.
7. For a useful account of the historical background and of the relations between English- and Afrikaans-speaking South Africans, see L. Marquard, *The Peoples and Policies of South Africa*, Cumberlege, Oxford, 1952.
8. M. Scott, *Shadow over Africa*, pp. 7–10. Union of Democratic Control, 1950. The document consists of the statement presented by the Rev. Michael Scott to the Fourth Committee of the United Nations on 26 November 1949. For a full account of the history of the Herero

peoples and of Michael Scott's association with them, see Freda Troup, *In Face of Fear*, Faber, London, 1950.

9. For a useful analysis of the legal issues involved in the case of South-West Africa, see S. A. Yankson, *South-West Africa in the International Scene* (privately printed, Edinburgh, 1953).
10. For a detailed account of the provisions of the South Africa Act in this respect and a history of the discussions between the governments of the United Kingdom and the Union of South Africa, see *Basutoland, the Bechuanaland Protectorate and Swaziland*, Cmd. 8707, H.M.S.O., London, 1952.
11. *Bechuanaland Protectorate: Succession to the Chieftainship of the Bamangwato Tribe*, Cmd. 7913, H.M.S.O., 1950.
12. *The Times*, 9 July 1949.
13. The appointment of Rasebolai as Native Authority was announced by Mr Hopkinson in the House of Commons. See *Parliamentary Debates* (Hansard), 13 May 1953.
14. But Lord Hailey examined the economic inter-dependence of Bechuanaland with the Union of South Africa and concluded, 'one might hesitate to suggest that circumstanced as it is, the Protectorate could hope to aspire to a position of full economic or political independence'. Lord Hailey, *Native Administration in British African Territories*, Pt V, p. 332. H.M.S.O., London, 1953.
15. Full details of the constitution of the Central African Federation are set out in *The Federal Scheme*, Cmd. 8754, H.M.S.O., London, 1953.
16. A useful summary and discussion of the findings of the Hilton Young (Cmd. 3234/1929) and the Bledisloe (Cmd. 5949/1939) Commissions is found in K. Kirkwood, *Federation of Central African Territories*, South African Institute of Race Relations, 1952.
17. Central African Territories: Report of Conference on Closer Association (Cmd. 8233); Geographical Historical and Economic Survey (Cmd. 8234); Comparative Survey of Native Policy (Cmd. 8235), H.M.S.O., London, 1951.
18. *Draft of Federal Scheme*, Cmd. 8573, H.M.S.O., London, 1952.
19. For the debate on the second reading see *Parliamentary Debates* (Hansard), 6 May 1953.
20. The text of the abortive petition was published by the Africa Bureau with an appendix by A. Creech Jones, London, 1953.
21. Speech made by Mr Oliver Lyttelton to a press conference in Lusaka, Northern Rhodesia, and quoted in the *Manchester Guardian*, 14 January 1954.
22. The exact words of the Secretary of State for Colonial Affairs were: 'Nor should we exclude from our minds the evolution, as time goes on, of still larger measures of unification, and possibly still larger measures of federation of the whole East African territories'.
23. Mr Martin Wight has commented: 'It has been emphasized that the establishment of the High Commission does not mean "political fusion or federation". But if federation is a form of government in

which there is a union of several political units under a central government for certain permanent objects, each of the component units retaining the management of its own internal affairs, so that its inhabitants live under two sets of laws, this is exactly what is implied by the East African High Commission and Central Legislative Assembly.' *Op. cit.* pp. 86–7.

24. *Ibid.* p. 81.
25. Constitutional changes announced by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 10 March 1954.
26. Hailey, *op. cit.* Pt I, p. 209.
27. *Ibid.* p. 80.
28. A full account of the discussions between H.H. the Kabaka and H.E. the Governor together with the correspondence between them and the Secretary of State is published in *Uganda Protectorate: Withdrawal of Recognition from Kabaka Mutesa II of Buganda*, Cmd. 9028, H.M.S.O., London, 1953. (See also Postscript.)
29. *Tanganyika Constitutional Development Commission: Report of Special Commissioner*, Government Printer, Dar-es-Salaam, 1953.
30. *The Colonial Territories, 1952–53, op. cit.* pp. 18–19.
31. *Ibid.* p. 15.
32. A summary of the Ewe petition is contained in a memorandum prepared by the United Nations Secretariat, Seventh Session (T./640, 26 May 1950).
33. *Gold Coast: Report to H.E. the Governor by the Committee on Constitutional Reform*, Colonial No. 248, H.M.S.O., London, 1949.
34. *Gold Coast: Commission of Enquiry into Disturbances, 1948*, Colonial No. 231, H.M.S.O., London, 1948.
35. Quoted by G. Padmore, *The Gold Coast Revolution*, pp. 169–70. Dobson, London, 1953. This is a useful, if somewhat partisan, account of recent developments in the Gold Coast.
36. *Report of the Conference on the Nigerian Constitution*, Cmd. 8934, H.M.S.O., London, 1953.
37. *Parliamentary Debates* (Hansard), 21 May 1953.
38. *Report, op. cit.* pp. 4–10.
39. *Ibid.* p. 10. This came into force in October 1954.
40. *The Colonial Territories, 1952–53, op. cit.* p. 14.
41. *The Colonial Territories, 1953–54*, Cmd. 9169, p. 14. H.M.S.O., London, 1954. This came into force in September 1954.
42. *The Plan for a British Caribbean Federation*, Cmd. 8895, H.M.S.O., London, 1953.
43. *The Colonial Territories, 1952–53, op. cit.* p. 28.
44. Wight, *op. cit.* p. 59, and Cmd. 9169, p. 29.
45. *The Colonial Territories, 1952–53, op. cit.* p. 28.
46. *British Guiana: Report of Commission on Constitutional Reform*, Colonial No. 280, H.M.S.O., London, 1952.
47. *British Guiana: Suspension of Constitution*, pp. 3–4. Cmd. 8980, H.M.S.O., London, 1953.
48. *Ibid.* pp. 8–9.

CHAPTER TWO

1. Here, as in Chapter One, the term 'South Africa' is used collectively to apply to the Union of South Africa, South-West Africa, and the three High Commission territories. References to legislation apply only to the Union of South Africa and to South-West Africa.
2. Figures for the Union of South Africa are derived from the Bureau of Census and Statistics, estimates for 1952; those relating to South-West Africa are the provisional figures of the 1951 census. Of the Africans, 156,453 were enumerated and the remainder estimated outside police areas. The figures for the High Commission territories are those of the 1946 census.
3. According to the Sixth Census of the Union in 1936, 50 per cent of Africans were 'heathen', 17 per cent 'Native separatist' and 12 per cent Methodist. The remainder were divided among some ten or more different denominations of Christianity.
4. Cf. 'The National Income and the Non-European', in E. Hellman and L. Abrahams (Eds), *Handbook of Race Relations in South Africa*, pp. 306–47. Cumberlege, Oxford, 1949. It must always be borne in mind that there is a danger in comparing national incomes and their distribution, particularly as different items enter into consumption which do not always appear as transactions for accounting purposes. See 'Concepts of Income and Welfare' in Frankel, *The Economic Impact on Under-Developed Societies*, pp. 29–55. Blackwell, Oxford, 1953.
5. M. Horrell, *A Survey of Race Relations in South Africa 1951–1952*, p. 24. South African Institute of Race Relations, Johannesburg, 1953.
6. The European birth rate declined from 32·2 in 1911 to 25·18 in 1942, while the rate for Africans is probably in the region of 40 per thousand p.a. Cf. L. Kuper, 'Some Demographic Aspects of White Supremacy in South Africa', *British Journal of Sociology*, vol. I, no. 2, 1950.
7. L. E. Neame, *White Man's Africa*, p. 10. Stewart, Cape Town, 1952.
8. E. E. Harris, *White Civilization*, p. 35. South African Institute of Race Relations, Johannesburg, 1953.
9. Act No. 55, 1949, To Prohibit Marriages Between Europeans and Non-Europeans, and Act No. 21, 1950, To Amend the Immorality Act 1927, So as to Prohibit Illicit Carnal Intercourse Between Europeans and Non-Europeans.
10. Hellman, *op. cit.* p. 12.
11. A. Hoernlé, *South African Native Policy and the Liberal Spirit*, p. 26. W.U.P., Johannesburg, 1945.
12. I. D. MacCrone, *Race Attitudes in South Africa*, p. 309. Oxford University Press, 1937.
13. In July 1953 it became compulsory for the first time in the Union for all births and deaths, European and Non-European, to be registered in rural as well as in urban areas.

14. See R. H. W. Shepherd, 'African Literature', in Hellman, *op. cit.* pp. 599–611.
15. Lord Hailey, *African Survey*, p. 723. Oxford University Press, 1938.
16. *South African Survey*, No. 4, p. 9. Issued by the Director of Information, South Africa House, London, 1950.
17. This is not the place to distribute blame for soil erosion. The European in South Africa tends to attribute it entirely to the primitive agricultural techniques of the African. The fact remains that before the coming of the European shifting agriculture actually prevented, rather than caused, erosion. But that was before the pressure of population on the land was as great as to-day. Furthermore, large-scale methods of farming introduced by the European have, in places, also been responsible for soil erosion. For a full discussion see W. M. Macmillan, *Africa Emergent*, pp. 125–9, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1949, and in E. Roux, 'Land and Agriculture in the Native Reserves' in Hellman, *op. cit.* pp. 171–90.
18. A 'morgan' is a South African measure, roughly equal to 2·1 acres.
19. An official report by the Social and Economic Planning Council of the Union states, 'one of the main objectives of Native taxation is, or was, to exert pressure on Natives to seek work in agriculture, mining, or manufactures. In this object it is probably very successful.' *Taxation and Fiscal Policy*, U.G. No. 48, 1945, para. 85. More recently the Union government has denied that this is the present aim of Native taxation and a joint report of the U.N. and the I.L.O. on forced labour concludes, 'although in some cases Natives might have to resort to labour to pay taxes, the allegation ... that they were maintained to secure a contract Labour force was not substantiated'. *Report of the* ad hoc *Committee on Forced Labour*. Studies and Reports (New Series No. 36), I.L.O., Geneva, 1953.
20. A committee was set up by the government of the Union in 1943 to investigate social services and recommend improvements. Commenting on social insurance and social assistance measures the Social Security Committee said: 'There is no sick pay arrangement; no national system of family allowances; no general provision for abnormal costs associated with vital events; no cover against unemployment for the vast majority of employees; no grants to invalids if they are Non-Europeans; and no pensions for old Natives'. U.G. No. 14, 1944, para. 80. Following the report a scheme of old-age pensions for Africans was instituted which provided £12, £9, and £6 per annum for pensioners living in cities, towns, or rural areas respectively. This compares with £60, £54, and £48 per annum for Europeans. A scheme of unemployment benefit was constituted in 1950 *which specifically excludes migratory workers* and any African men earning less than £182 p.a. (i.e. the large majority). Children's Maintenance Allowances and School feeding schemes have also commenced but with differential rates of benefit, cf. Horrell, *op. cit.* pp. 72–3. African children do not receive free milk otherwise provided for pre-school boys and girls.

21. L. Marquard, *Peoples and Policies of South Africa*, p. 54. Cumberlege, Oxford, 1952.
22. *Ibid.* p. 49.
23. Death rates from tuberculosis during 1949, per 100,000 of estimated population, were 25·48 for Europeans, 140·45 for Asiatics, 448·30 for Coloured people, and as high as 600 for Africans in the largest towns. Statistics of morbidity and mortality generally reflect the enormous differences in health and welfare between the different ethnic groups. Crude death rates, for example, in 1951 were Europeans 9·2 per 1000, Asiatics 10·7, Coloured people 20·6. African urban death rates are not generally available but are estimated at three or four times as high as Europeans in the same towns. In Durban e.g. African death rates were 24·4 per 1000. Horrell, *op. cit.* p. 65.
24. *Reports of the Carnegie Commission on Poor Whites*, National Conference on Social Work, South Africa, 1932.
25. H. Kuper, *The Uniform of Colour*, pp. 36–7. W.U.P., Johannesburg, 1947.
26. Hellman, *op. cit.*
27. *Ibid.* p. 128.
28. Competition between 'poor whites' and 'poor blacks' for employment in the 1920s was acute and is remembered with bitterness, as is the unemployment of the period in Britain. That this fear is still widespread is witnessed by the statement made by the organizer of the European South African Mineworkers Union in January 1954. He is reported to have said that if mine owners persevered with their policy of raising the status of the African in the mines, he predicted a worse blood bath than in 1922, when the miners' strike over the employment of Africans developed into armed hostility between the strikers and the government. *Manchester Guardian*, 8 January 1954.
29. Population Registration Act, 1952. For a discussion of its implications see Marquard, *op. cit.* p. 79.
30. Marquard, *op. cit.* p. 81. In 1952 26 per cent of the offences committed by Coloured people were drunkenness, compared with 7·5 per cent European and 3·2 per cent African. Liquor laws restrict the access of Africans to intoxicating drinks.
31. The Women's Enfranchisement Act (No. 18, 1930) gave European women throughout the Union the right to be registered as voters for the House of Assembly and Provincial Councils and to be elected to these bodies. The importance of the Coloured vote was further diminished in 1931 when property qualifications in the Cape were abolished for European males.
32. It is interesting to note that this agitation was led by Gandhi, thus sowing the seeds of 'passive resistance', a method of protest which has been widely adopted by non-Europeans of all races in South Africa.
33. R. Burrows, *Indian Life and Labour in Natal*, p. 32. South African Institute of Race Relations, Johannesburg, 1952.
34. *Report of the Commission on Native Education, 1949–1951*, U.G. No.

53/1951. The Bantu Education Act, 1953, provides for the transfer of responsibility for African education from Provincial control to the Department of Native Affairs. At the second reading of the Bill the Minister said that 'better race relations would exist when Native education was dealt with in the way his department proposed to deal with it in the future. Sound race relations', he said, 'were spoilt when the right kind of education was not given, when it was given under supervision of those who raised false hopes among Natives, or when Native education was not planned along State lines'. *South African Survey*, No. 68, p. 13. South Africa House, 1953.

35. A. W. Hoernlé and G. Hellman, *The Analysis of Social Change and its Bearing on Education*, South African Institute of Race Relations, No. RR.98/52/TB (mimeographed, 1952). (In my view the writers underestimate the contribution to 'stability through change' that may be made if the ties and obligations of the family and the extended kinship system can be retained, at least in part. See Conclusion, pp. 310–12, A. H. R.)
36. Horrell, *op. cit.* p. 57.
37. I. D. MacCrone, *op. cit.* (1937).
38. I. D. MacCrone, 'Race Attitudes: An Interpretation', in Hellman, *op. cit.* pp. 669–705. This is a valuable summary of MacCrone's inquiries up to 1949 and my résumé is based on it.
39. I. D. MacCrone, 'Reaction to Domination in a Colour-Caste Society', *Journal of Social Psychology*, vol. 26, pp. 69–98, 1947.
40. H. Kuper, *op. cit.* p. 30.
41. M. Wilson *et al.*, *Social Structure*, p. 178 *et seq.* (vol. 3 of Keiskammahoek Rural Survey). Shuter and Shooter, Pietermaritzburg, 1952.
42. Quoted by H.E. Dr A. L. Geyer in an address to the London Rotary Club, 1953. (Mimeographed, p. 6.) It should be noted that Smuts modified his view in later years.
43. *Ibid.*
44. Dr Malan, quoted by K. Kirkwood, *The Group Areas Act*, p. 6. South African Institute of Race Relations, 1951. The author quotes a number of earlier Acts dating back to 1913, all of which implemented a policy of residential segregation.
45. Neame, *op. cit.* p. 94.
46. Abuses which have arisen in connexion with the administration of the Immorality Amendment Act are described by Sheila Patterson, *Colour and Culture in South Africa*, pp. 142–3. Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1953.
47. *Ibid.* p. 44. The Act does not apply to South-West Africa and for reasons of economy excludes African women and African males under 18 years. One of its main aims appears to be the prevention of 'passing' by light-skinned Coloured people.
48. Cf. Kirkwood, *op. cit.* p. 36. See also *South African Survey*, No. 5, p. 9 (1951), where it is noted that the vice-chairman of the Land Tenure Board had stated that the 'government expected every municipality to implement the Act and that he could not see that there would be

much additional cost to municipalities. It was not as if the Act would be forced on them and they would be made to find accommodation for displaced people.'

49. A. Paton, *South Africa Today*, pp. 4–6. Lutterworth, London, 1953.
50. Segregation is not limited to 'walks of life' – it also applies to hearses and cemeteries. Patterson, *op. cit.* p. 125.
51. The Native Building Workers Act, 1951, proposes that African building workers should be trained for work in their own areas only at a lower wage than white workers. Cf. Patterson, *op. cit.* p. 260, note 211. The maximum that an African skilled building worker would earn is a little over £20 per month compared with £57 per month for a European artisan.
52. There are three main types of trade union in South Africa. The mining industry unions which have a rigid colour-bar; the secondary industries such as food and textiles which oppose the colour-bar; the large majority fall between the two extremes and, while having no colour-bar in their constitution, run parallel organizations, e.g. A.E.U. Government Workers, etc. Cf. S. Sachs, *The Choice Before South Africa*, p. 191. Turnstile, London, 1952. But note that under new legislation Africans are prevented from becoming members of registered trade unions. See p. 114.
53. *South African Survey*, No. 67, p. 1 (1953).
54. For a discussion of segregation and discrimination in South African universities see *The Times*, 3 November 1953.
55. Patterson, *op. cit.* p. 104.
56. *South African Survey*, No. 68, p. 13 (1953).
57. *Statement on the Native Question*, Church Congress of the Dutch Reformed Federated and Mission Churches, Bloemfontein, 1950.
58. According to a report of the Department of Labour for 1950 Non-Europeans constitute 16·4 per cent of the skilled, 67·1 per cent of the semi-skilled, and 98·5 per cent of the unskilled labour force.
59. Horrell, *op. cit.* pp. 34–5. Similar injustices arise in the case of Johannesburg where 60,000 non-Europeans will be uprooted, losing freehold rights enjoyed for some fifty years together with their churches, schools, and other amenities.
60. See *Information Digest*, No. 10, p. 6. The Africa Bureau, August 1953, and *South African Survey*, No. 76, p. 14, February 1954.
61. *South African Survey*, No. 66, p. 4 (1953). The United Party did not oppose the Reservation of Separate Amenities Bill, which was made retrospective in operation.
62. See also note 28 above.
63. Hellman, *op. cit.* pp. 139–42.
64. Patterson, *op. cit.* p. 117.
65. P. H. Guerault and J. N. Reedman, 'Taxation', in Hellman, *op. cit.* pp. 273–305.
66. Marquard, *op. cit.* p. 187. When the Bantu Education Act takes effect the State will assume financial responsibility, but it will also mean virtually the end of missionary activity in this field.

67. Patterson, *op. cit.* p. 96, and M. Horrell, *Survey of Race Relations in South Africa, 1952–3*, pp. 94–5. South African Institute of Race Relations, Johannesburg, 1954.
68. H. J. Simms, 'The Law and its Administration', in Hellman, *op. cit.* pp. 41–108.
69. *Ibid.* p. 96.
70. United Nations and International Labour Office, *Report of the* ad hoc *Committee on Forced Labour*, Studies and Reports (No. 36 New Series), I.L.O., Geneva, 1953.
71. *Ibid.* pp. 71–82.
72. Hellman, *op. cit.* p. 97. Also Patterson, *op. cit.* Appendix M, p. 368, where a number of sentences for similar offences were compared for different ethnic groups.
73. In November 1953 the South African Court of Appeal held that a person who had been 'named' as a 'communist' in terms of the Act and banned from attending meetings and other activities was not bound by the ban. The court held that the mere fact that a person's name had been found on a list of members of an 'unlawful organization' did not mean that person any longer supported the organization in its aims. *South African Survey*, No. 72, p. 5 (1953).
74. Marquard, *op. cit.* p. 86.
75. M. Horrell, *Survey 1952–3*, *op. cit.* pp. 27–33. For examples of individual aggressive acts against Europeans by Africans and Coloured people see Patterson, *op. cit.* p. 188.
76. *Torch*, editorial, 20 February 1950. Quoted by Patterson, *op. cit.* pp. 336–7, note 145.
77. R. M. de Villiers, 'Politics', in Hellman, *op. cit.* pp. 511–33.
78. M. Scott, *Civilization Indivisible: A Statement for the United Nations Commission on the Racial Situation in the Union of South Africa*, pp. 3–4. The Africa Bureau, London, 1953.
79. *Economist*, 7 March 1953.
80. Horrell, *op. cit.* pp. 11–13.
81. This point is made by Professor Leo Kuper in his article in *British Journal of Sociology*, vol. 4, No. 3, 1953.
82. There may also be some truth in the suggestion that the extreme Republican wing of the Nationalist movement uses *apartheid* as a 'vote catcher' for its own ends.
83. *South African Survey*, No. 54, p. 1. Also Horrell (1952–3), *op. cit.* p. 37.
84. Marquard, *op. cit.* p. 157.
85. *Ibid.* pp. 172–3, and Patterson, *op. cit.* p. 222, note 128.
86. Quoted by Norman Goodall, 'Race and Church in South Africa', the *Listener*, 20 May 1954.
87. Rev. T. Huddleston wrote a letter to the *Observer* (30 August 1953) under the heading 'For God's Sake Wake Up', appealing for support for his campaign for civil rights. The letter led to further correspondence and a reply from Father Huddleston in which he asked: (1) that the Christian conscience all over the world should become vocal; (2) that the British people and government should let their

views on racial discrimination be known to the government of South Africa; (3) that people in Britain should be sure of the facts of the situation; and (4) that discrimination in Britain itself should be eliminated. For a description by Mr Duncan of his experiences, see the *Observer* (27 December 1953).

88. L. Kuper, *op. cit.* (1953), pp. 244–9.
89. I. Schapera, *Migrant Labour and Tribal Life.*

CHAPTER THREE

1. C. G. Seligman, *Races of Africa*, p. 30. Oxford University Press, 1930.
2. All figures must be regarded as approximate. Some are based upon an exact census, but others are estimates. In the case of multiple dependencies the figures include Protectorates and Trust Territories as well as the colony. The principal source for the figures in this statistical table is the *Digest of Colonial Statistics*, No. 10 (Tables B, C, and D). Colonial Office, H.M.S.O., London, September-October 1953. In East Africa 'other' refers mainly to Arabs.
3. Lord Hailey, *An African Survey*, p. 21. Oxford University Press, 1938.
4. *Ibid.* p. 26.
5. *Ibid.* p. 28.
6. For a full description of the way of life of the principal African tribes see a series of monographs under the title *Ethnographic Survey of Africa* (ed. D. Forde). International African Institute, London.
7. Hailey, *op. cit.* p. 29.
8. Amanke Okafir, 'West African Background', in *The New West Africa*, p. 23 (ed. Basil Davidson). George Allen and Unwin, London, 1953.
9. *Central African Territories: Comparative Survey of Native Policy*, p. 16. Cmd. 8235, H.M.S.O., London, 1951.
10. *The African in Southern Rhodesia*, No. 5, p. 2. Office of High Commissioner for Southern Rhodesia, London, 1952.
11. Colonial Office, *Land and Population in East Africa*, p. 13. Colonial No. 290, H.M.S.O., London, 1952. See also *Notes on Commerce and Industry in Kenya*, p. 47. Kenya Government Office, P.O. Box 621, Nairobi, 1953.
12. *Land and Population in East Africa, op. cit.* p. 13.
13. Cmd. 8235, p. 69. See also *The African in Southern Rhodesia*, No. 6, p. 5.
14. Lord Hailey, *Native Administration in British African Territories*, Pt 3, p. 216. H.M.S.O., London, 1951.
15. K. A. Busia, *Social Survey of Sekondi-Tukoradi*, p. 84 *et seq.* Crown Agents for the Colonies, London, 1950.
16. G. H. Wilson, 'The Economics of Detribalization in Northern Rhodesia', *Rhodes-Livingstone Paper*, No. 6, 1941. One official Com-

mission has described conditions in African locations, government and private, as 'presenting a miserable picture'. All fell short of the minimum requirements of decency and hygiene when occupied by married people. *Report of Commission to Enquire into the Administration and Finances of Native Location in Urban Areas*, Lusaka, 1944.

17. Hailey (1938), *op. cit.* p. 317.
18. *Ibid.* pp. 341–2.
19. For a discussion of the social role of the Creole population see K. L. Little, *The Mende of Sierra Leone*, pp. 262–4. Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1952.
20. G. W. Broomfield, *Colour Conflict*, p. 81. Edinburgh House Press, London, 1945.
21. C. Sofer and R. Ross, 'Some Characteristics of an East African European Population', *The British Journal of Sociology*, vol. 2, No. 4, 1951.
22. *Central African Territories: Geographical, Historical and Economic Background*, p. 37. Cmd. 8234, H.M.S.O., London, 1951.
23. Cmd. 8235, *op. cit.* p. 69.
24. Cmd. 8234, *op. cit.* p. 14.
25. *Notes on Commerce and Industry in Kenya*, *op. cit.* p. 30.
26. *Ibid.* p. 30.
27. The Commission of Inquiry into disturbances in the Northern Rhodesian copper belt, 1940, remarks: 'In the course of our inquiry many witnesses, European and African alike, drew our attention to the bitter resentment caused amongst the African workers by the terms of address and sneering attitude which, it was stated, were not infrequently used towards them by the European mine workers'. Quoted by G. W. Broomfield, *op. cit.* p. 130.
28. Letter published in *Northern News*, Lusaka, 10 April 1953. The situation is confirmed by G. and M. Wilson, *Social Change*, p. 15. Cambridge University Press, 1945.
29. Published in *Central African Post*, 10 April 1953.
30. *Parliamentary Debates* (Hansard), 1 May 1953. Similar stereotyped views are expressed by C. T. Stoneham when he writes: 'The African native is by instinct and cultivation a liar. He has no consideration of honour or public spirit to restrain him; among his own kind it is assumed that everyone will lie when it serves his purpose and would be a fool not to.' *Mau Mau*, Museum Press, London, 1953.
31. Cmd. 8235, *op. cit.* p. 21. The situation as far as Southern Rhodesia is concerned is confirmed in another official publication: 'The whole policy of geographical segregation postulates by implication that there should not be a united society in Southern Rhodesia. ... This presupposes the maintenance of the two races and the avoidance of a mixed race. This, in turn, means that there is generally no social intercourse between them. ...' *The African in Southern Rhodesia*, No. 8, p. 13.
32. Broomfield, *op. cit.* p. 135.
33. *Parliamentary Debates* (Hansard), 1 May 1953.

34. L. S. B. Leakey, *Mau Mau and the Kikuyu*, p. 114. Methuen, London, 1952.
35. Cmd. 8235, p. 13 *et seq.* The detailed position is set out in Appendix I of the report.
36. *Ibid.* pp. 15–16.
37. *Ibid.* p. 36.
38. See Leakey, *op. cit.* pp. 1–10 and 57–67.
39. Sir Philip Mitchell, *The Agrarian Problem in Kenya* (1946).
40. Hailey (1938), *op. cit.* pp. 249–50.
41. N. Leys, *Colour Bar in East Africa*, suggests that half the best land is in the European area. Broomfield makes a conservative estimate of a quarter. Broomfield, *op. cit.* p. 20.
42. Hailey (1938), *op. cit.* pp. 751–2.
43. *Ibid.* p. 385.
44. *Land and Population in East Africa*, *op. cit.* p. 6.
45. Lord Hailey writes: 'The Kenya White Paper of 1923, in its declaration of the paramountcy of African interests, was no doubt a genuine attempt to indicate a liberal policy; but the subsequent efforts to elucidate the meaning of this declaration led to a controversy which was as barren of result, and often as bitter in character, as any of the great theological arguments of the past. The real test of British intentions in Kenya lay in the treatment of the land question, or the apportionment of expenditure between objects affecting European and Africans.' Hailey (1938), *op. cit.* p. 142.
46. *Ibid.* p. 386.
47. In 1952 African produce for export mainly consisted of wattlebark extract, cotton lint, and hides and skins, although there were 3000 acres under coffee. *Notes on Commerce and Industry in Kenya*, *op. cit.* p. 40. According to another official publication it is hoped that there will be some 25,000 African growers of coffee with an acreage of about 8600 by 1955. Other African crops will include pyrethrum, tea, tobacco, sisal, and citrus fruits. *African Development in Kenya*, Government Office, Nairobi, 1952.
48. Cmd. 8235, *op. cit.* p. 24.
49. *Report of the* ad hoc *Committee on Forced Labour*, p. 101. U.N. and I.L.O., Geneva, 1953.
50. International Labour Conference, 29th Session, 1946. *Report IV (1) Proposed International Labour Obligations in respect of Non-Self-Governing Territories*, p. 16. I.L.O., Montreal, 1946.
51. *Committee on Forced Labour*, *op. cit.* p. 111.
52. *Land and Population in East Africa*, *op. cit.* pp. 15–16.
53. *Report of the Committee on African Wages*, Government Printer, Nairobi, 1954.
54. Colonial Office, *African Labour Efficiency Survey* (ed. by Dr C. H. Northcott), Colonial Research Publication, No. 3, H.M.S.O., London, 1949.
55. *Ibid.* p. 85.
56. Cf. Cmd. 8235, *op. cit.* pp. 20–1.

57. In the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, the figures are:

	Total		Per Head					
	African	Other	African			Other		
			£	s.	d.	£	s.	d.
Northern Rhodesia	654,104	462,222	0	8	0	12	0	0
Nyasaland	245,000	20,450	0	2	0	2	4	0
Southern Rhodesia	741,296	1,899,371	0	8	7	14	0	0

See Cmd. 8235, *op. cit.* pp. 54 and 70–2. In Kenya £911,834 was spent on African education in 1952, which represents approximately 3*s.* per head of the African population: this is an increase of 68 per cent over 1951. Expenditure on European education during 1952 was £554,168 or £18 per head of the European population. See also expenditure per pupil in Kenya quoted in Hansard, 28 July 1954.

58. 'It has not been found possible to estimate the indirect taxation paid by Africans through Customs in Northern Rhodesia or Nyasaland, but in Southern Rhodesia it is estimated that this does not at present exceed £150,000. Smaller fees are paid by Africans for certain licences in the northern territories, while in Southern Rhodesia Africans generally pay the same fees as Europeans.' Cmd. 8235, *op. cit.* pp. 37–8. The total revenue raised by Native taxes in these territories is £484 million in Southern Rhodesia, £164 million in Northern Rhodesia and £197 million in Nyasaland. Cmd. 8234, *op. cit.* p. 47. In Kenya approximately £1 million was collected in African poll and personal taxes in 1953.

59. For a discussion of this question see Henry Collins, 'Economic Problems of British West Africa', in *The New West Africa, op. cit.* pp. 102–40.

60. Colonial Office, *Report of Commission of Enquiry into Disturbances in the Gold Coast, 1948.* Colonial No. 231, H.M.S.O., London, 1948. See also *Statement by His Majesty's Government on the Report,* Colonial No. 232.

61. Colonial No. 231, *op. cit.* pp. 35–6.

62. See p. 68.

63. Colonial Office, *Report of Commission of Enquiry into the Disorders in the Eastern Provinces of Nigeria, November 1949.* Colonial No. 256, H.M.S.O., London, 1950.

64. *Ibid.* p. 13.

65. *Ibid.* p. 40.

66. *Parliamentary Debates* (Hansard), 10 June 1953.

67. Annual Report 1952 of the Secretary of Native Affairs, Chief Native Commissioner, and Director of Native Development. Quoted in the *Federation Newsletter,* p. 10, 17 October 1953.

68. Reports of Commissions appointed to inquire into disturbances in the copper belt, published in Lusaka in 1935 and 1940 respectively.

69. *Report of Commission on the Advancement of Natives in Industry*, Lusaka, 1948.
70. The Secretary of State for the Colonies stated seven post offices in N. Rhodesia retained separate entrances and that these were due for reconstruction. *Parliamentary Debates* (Hansard), 15 July 1953. Separate entrances remain in S. Rhodesia.
71. For full details of the resolutions passed at the third Nyasaland Chiefs' Union held at Lilongwe in September 1953 together with proposed constitutional reforms submitted to the Governor see *Information Digest*, No. 11, October 1953. The Africa Bureau, London.
72. Michael Scott, 'African Episode', first published in *Nimbus*, vol. 2, No. 2, 1953, reprinted and published by the Africa Bureau, 1953.
73. *Ibid.* p. 5.
74. *Ibid.* p. 6.
75. For a full account of the social, economic, and political factors contributing to the disturbances see Colin Legum, 'Background to the Disturbances in Nyasaland' issued as a Supplement to the *Information Digest*, No. 11, October 1953. The Africa Bureau, London.
76. *Report of the Commission of Enquiry into Disturbances in the Southern Province of Nyasaland, 1953.*
77. *Tanganyika: Its Present and its Future*, p. 23. United Nations at Work, No. 4, U.N. Publication 1952/1/28.
78. *Ibid.* p. 22.
79. In August 1953 General Erskine described the situation in Kenya as a 'civil war raging within the Kikuyu tribe' and outlined his strategic aims. Report in *Manchester Guardian*, 8 August 1953.
80. For a full account see L. S. B. Leakey, *Mau Mau and the Kikuyu*, especially chapters 1 and 7. Methuen, London, 1953.
81. Lord Hailey remarks upon the growth of 'a definite Kikuyu consciousness' in recent years despite the fact that they were not, traditionally, a martial people like the Masai. *Native Administration*, Pt 1, *op. cit.* p. 120.
82. See Jomo Kenyatta, *Facing Mount Kenya*, Secker and Warburg, London, 1953.
83. The original proceedings were quashed on the grounds that the magistrate did not have jurisdiction in the district in which the trial had taken place.
84. *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Lords, vol. 184, 9 December 1953.
85. For a discussion of the nature and effects of *Mau Mau* oaths and of the 'cleansing ceremonies', see articles in the *Manchester Guardian*, 11 November 1952 and 17 February 1953.
86. Professor Gluckman's interpretation of *Mau Mau* is contained in an article in the *Manchester Guardian*, 19 March 1954 and Sir Phillip Mitchell's reply was published on 10 May 1954.
87. Up to June 1954, 179 Africans had been executed for illegally possessing arms. (Report by Colonial Secretary in the House of Commons, 23 June 1954.)
88. Statement issued by Kenya Public Relations Officer, 24 April 1954.

89. *Parliamentary Debates* (Hansard), 9 December 1953. From the beginning of the emergency to the end of March 1954, 4029 terrorists and 1245 members of security forces and civilians were killed.
90. Statement by Colonial Secretary, 23 June 1954.
91. The magistrate said in passing sentence: 'It is easy to work oneself into a state of pious horror over these offences, but they must be considered against their background. The accused has taken the commanding step of accepting full responsibility. He is young and inexperienced, and his first experience of Mau Mau at the Lari massacre could not have left him unaffected. It is regrettable that one so young and inexperienced should have been placed in such a position and in such circumstances.'

    The magistrate ordered the fines to be paid to the assaulted tribesmen as compensation. *Manchester Guardian*, 13 November 1953.

    The Secretary of State for the Colonies said that the accused did not serve his sentence in prison but was employed on outside work under Section 88 of the Tanganyika Prisons Ordinance. The *Kenya Weekly News* reported that he was living in an hotel and employed on a revision of law books at near-by administrative offices. *Manchester Guardian*, 10 December 1953.
92. Report in *Manchester Guardian*, 22 December 1954.
93. *Parliamentary Debates* (Hansard), 26 January 1954.
94. A correspondent in the *Manchester Guardian* reported that despite a swing of opinion towards a more constructive policy, the exodus of Kikuyu from the White Highlands was continuing. 'Various factors contribute to this movement, which is both crowding the hastily built transit camps and gravely exacerbating the state of affairs in Kikuyuland.' *Manchester Guardian*, 18 March 1953.
95. Figures quoted in 'Kenya Calling', *Newsletter*, No. 29, 13 January 1954, Kenya Public Relations Office, London.
96. *Manchester Guardian*, 22 October 1953.
97. *Report by Parliamentary Delegation to Kenya, January, 1954*. Cmd. 9081, H.M.S.O., London, 1954.
98. J. C. Carothers, *The Psychology of Mau Mau*, Government Printer, Nairobi, 1954.
99. For details see Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, *African Development in Kenya, 1946–1955: Land, Livestock and Water*, Kenya Government Office, Nairobi, 1952.
100. *African Education: A study of Educational Policy and Practice in British Tropical Africa*, produced on behalf of the Nuffield Foundation and the Colonial Office, Oxford University Press, 1953. See p. 311.
101. Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, *Some Aspects of the Development of Kenya Government Services for the Benefit of Africans from 1946 Onwards*, Kenya Government Office, Nairobi, 1953.
102. Speech by Sir Andrew Cohen at Kampala, 5 February 1954. Reported in *Manchester Guardian*, 6 February 1954.
103. In February 1954 the Gold Coast Finance Minister presented a budget for £65 million and told the Assembly that the country's

revenue had increased enormously over the last ten years. It had, he said, been used prudently and there was now sufficient money in sinking funds to redeem two oversea loans which fall due for payment in 1959. *Manchester Guardian*, 6 February 1954.

104. W. A. Lewis, *Industrialization in the Gold Coast*, Government Printer, Accra, 1954.
105. Published by the Federal Party, Salisbury, Southern Rhodesia.
106. Details of Confederate Party policies published in *Southern Rhodesia Newsletter*, p. 2, No. 26/53, July 1953.
107. Sir Godfrey Huggins, quoted in *Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland Newsletter*, p. 2, No. 11/53, December 1953.
108. For details of speech by Mr R. L. Prain, Chairman of Roan Antelope and Umfuliva copper mines see *Newsletter*, No. 12/53; for reply by European Mine Officials see *Newsletter*, No. 14/53; for statement of Sir Roy Welensky see *Newsletter*, No. 6–7/53.
109. The statement by the Rhodesia University Board that the university would be multi-racial had created a great deal of interest abroad, said Mr S. R. Denny, Administrative Secretary, in the Northern Rhodesia Legislative Council on 3 December 1953. 'The university', he said, 'is regarded as starting out on a unique experiment. All eyes in the United States and England are focused on Salisbury, which is all very flattering, but embarrassing. The Board regarded it as normal, but now that they are embarking on this experiment they are getting worried as to what the result should be.' *Newsletter*, No. 14/53, p. 6.
110. *Ibid.*
111. Cmd. 8235, *op. cit.* pp. 67–8.
112. Article in *Central African Post*, 2 April 1953.
113. Patrick O'Donovan, *Africa: Which Way Now?* p. 9. The Africa Bureau, London, 1953.
114. *Ibid.* p. 11.
115. Report in *Manchester Guardian*, 25 May 1954.

CHAPTER FOUR

1. S. H. Frankel, *The Economic Impact on Under-Developed Countries*, p. 25. Blackwell, Oxford, 1953.
2. While many of the lower-class Europeans transported to the West Indies subsequently 'made good', others swelled the ranks of the poor whites or 'Red-legs' of Barbados, said to be 'pallid, weak and depraved from in-breeding, strong rum, insufficient food and abstinence from manual labour.' Eric Williams, *Capitalism and Slavery*, p. 25. University of N. Carolina Press, 1944.
3. Colonial Office, *Development and Welfare in the West Indies*, 1952 (Report by Sir George Seel), pp. 85–6. Colonial No. 291, H.M.S.O., London, 1953.

4. With the exception of the Bahamas (1943) and Bermuda (1950) these figures are those of the census of 1946 and are taken from the *Digest of Colonial Statistics*, No. 10, September-October 1953, Tables H, M, and N. Colonial Office, H.M.S.O., London, 1953.
5. In 1772 Rev. Thomas Thompson published a paper entitled *The Trade in Negro Slaves on the African Coast in Accordance with Humane Principles and the Laws of Revealed Religion*; in 1796 a paper read to the Manchester Philosophical Society was entitled *An Account of the Regular Gradations in Man* in which the author argued that the Negro was 'nearer to brute creation than any other human species'. In 1852 *A Bible Defence of Slavery* by Rev. Josiah Preit was published.
6. Gibbon Wakefield quoted by Williams, *op. cit.* p. 34.
7. G. R. Mellor, *British Imperial Trusteeship 1783–1850*, p. 434. Faber, 1951.
8. Williams, *op. cit.* p. 126.
9. *Ibid.* pp. 135–6.
10. Mellor, *op. cit.* p. 118 *et seq.*
11. For detailed statistics see Mellor, pp. 450–1.
12. *Report of the West India Royal Commission*, pp. 357–8. Cmd. 6607, H.M.S.O., London, 1945.
13. Mellor, *op. cit.* p. 215.
14. M. S. Herskovits, *The Myth of the Negro Past*, Harper, New York, 1941.
15. J. G. Leyburn, *The Haitian People*, Yale University Press, 1941. For a discussion of the two points of view see T. S. Simey, *Welfare and Planning in the West Indies*, p. 32 *et seq.* Clarendon, Oxford, 1946.
16. Harris, quoted Mellor, *op. cit.* pp. 167–8.
17. Williams, *op. cit.* p. 197.
18. *Ibid.* p. 201.
19. Mellor, *op. cit.* p. 164.
20. For an interesting study of the immediate aftermath of slavery in America where conditions were similar, see H. H. Donald, *The Negro Freedman*, Schuman, New York, 1952.
21. M. Kerr, *Personality and Conflict in Jamaica*, p. 35. University Press of Liverpool, 1952.
22. *Ibid.* pp. 18 and 108.
23. Mellor, *op. cit.* p. 216.
24. *Ibid.* p. 218. Cf. the situation in Africa to-day: see above, pp. 88 and 163.
25. Simey, *op. cit.* p. 79.
26. *Ibid.* p. 86. For comparison see E. Franklin Frazier, *The Negro Family in the United States*, University Press, Chicago, 1940.
27. Kerr, *op. cit.* p. 93.
28. A. H. Richmond, *Colour Prejudice in Britain: A Study of West Indian Workers in Liverpool, 1941–1951*. Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1954.
29. It is interesting to note that as early as 1865 producers' co-operatives were being set up in Jamaica on the initiative of ex-slaves and appeared to be successful. J. M. Ludlow, 'Cornwall Agricultural and Commercial Association of Jamaica', *Good Words*, pp. 672–80, London, 1866.

30. C. V. D. Hadley, 'Personality Patterns and Aggression in the British West Indies', *Human Relations*, p. 356, vol. 2, No. 4, 1949.
31. Simey, *op. cit.* p. 103.
32. For examples see Kerr, *op. cit.* p. 97.
33. F. M. Henriques, 'Colour Values in Jamaican Society', pp. 116–18. *British Journal of Sociology*, vol. 2, No. 2, 1951. For a fuller discussion see the same author's *Family and Colour in Jamaica*, Eyre and Spottiswoode, London, 1953.
34. Simey, *op. cit.* and J. Dollard, *Caste and Class in a Southern Town* (new edition), Yale, New Haven, 1949. For a discussion of West Indian personality types in Britain see Richmond, *op. cit.* p. 116 *et seq.*
35. Hadley, *op. cit.* p. 358.
36. Colonial No. 291, *op. cit.* pp. 41–2.
37. *The Economic Development of British Guiana*, Report of a Mission organized by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Geoffrey Cumberlege, London, 1954.
38. Colonial No. 291, *op. cit.* p. 8.
39. *Ibid.* p. 67.
40. *Parliamentary Debates* (Hansard), 9 December 1953.

CHAPTER FIVE

1. The one per cent sample tables of the 1951 Census give the following figures regarding the birthplaces of residents in Great Britain: *Commonwealth Territories in Africa* (excluding the Union of South Africa): 16,100; *West Indies:* 15,200. For present purposes these figures are subject to amendment on two scores. In so far as they include Europeans born in these territories they must be reduced, if only coloured colonials are being considered. But against this must be set the fact that the sampling procedure assumes a fairly random distribution of the characteristics in question. In so far as coloured colonials tend to congregate in certain parts of a town, the sample almost certainly underestimates the actual numbers.
2. While all available information, from records of the Colonial Office, Ministry of Labour, and other official sources, has been used in compiling this table, several of the figures cannot be regarded as more than 'intelligent guesses'. The term 'Other Coloured' here includes all Asians, i.e. Indians, Pakistanis, Malays, Chinese, and any person of Asian descent.
3. The Colonial Secretary has stated, 'There is no detailed information about numbers involved up to June 1951. Since then statistics show that in 1952 and 1953 the number of West Indians was roughly equal, at slightly over 3,000. It has now jumped ... to 8,000 in the first nine or ten months of this year.' *Parliamentary Debates* (Hansard), 5 November 1954.

4. See statement of Home Secretary in House of Commons, 27 November 1950, and also an article by M. P. Banton, 'Recent Migration from West Africa and the West Indies to the United Kingdom' in *Population Studies*, vol. 7, No. 1, July 1953.
5. Cf. M. P. Banton, who in 'Changing Position of the Negro in Britain' distinguishes only four distinct periods. *Phylon*, vol. 14, No. 1, 1953.
6. For a full discussion of the Mansfield judgement and its consequences see K. L. Little, *Negroes in Britain*, pp. 176–85. Kegan Paul, London, 1948.
7. *Ibid.* p. 199.
8. Cf. Little, *ibid.* pp. 215–18.
9. M. E. Fletcher, *Report on an Investigation into the Colour Problem in Liverpool and other Ports*, Association for the Welfare of Half-Caste Children, Liverpool, 1930.
10. E.g. a report by Captain G. A. Richardson for the Joint Council of the British Social Hygiene Council and the British Council for the Welfare of the Mercantile Marine, 1935. This report is discussed by M. P. Banton in *Phylon*, *op. cit.* p. 81.
11. N. Hare, 'Prospects for Coloured Children in England', *The Keys* (September 1937), a Journal then published by the League of Coloured Peoples, London.
12. Caradog Jones, *The Economic Status of Coloured Families in the Port of Liverpool*, The University Press of Liverpool, 1940.
13. K. L. Little, *op. cit.* p. 125.
14. A. H. Richmond, *Colour Prejudice in Britain: A Study of West Indian Workers in Liverpool, 1941–1951*. Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1954.
15. A. H. Richmond, 'Economic Insecurity and Stereotypes as Factors in Colour Prejudice', *The Sociological Review*, vol. 42, No. 8, 1950.
16. *Ibid.* p. 18.
17. M. P. Banton, 'Economic and Social Position of Negro Immigrants in Britain', *The Sociological Review*, p. 46, vol. 1, No. 2 (New Series), December 1953.
18. J. H. Robb, *Anti-Semitism in a Working Class Area*, Tavistock Press, London. (Forthcoming publication.)
19. M. P. Banton, for example, remarks: 'A mild disapproval of coloured people is conventional in Great Britain. ... The writer has been struck, how, time after time, persons will open a conversation with disapproving remarks about Negroes and then, without prompting, will shift to more favourable remarks on finding that the other person apparently holds no strong views on the subject.' *Sociological Review*, *op. cit.* p. 57.
20. G. K. Evens, *Public Opinion on Colonial Affairs*, Central Office of Information (New Series 119), London, June 1948.
21. *Ibid.* p. 19.
22. A series of booklets published by U.N.E.S.C.O., e.g. J. A. Lauwery's *History Textbooks and International Understanding*, U.N.E.S.C.O., Paris, 1953.

23. For a full discussion of this question see I. D. MacCrone, *Race Attitudes in South Africa*, pp. 296–309. Oxford University Press, 1937.
24. For a discussion of sexual relations and adjustment in connexion with West Indian workers in Britain see Richmond, *op. cit.* (1954), pp. 69 ff.
25. K. L. Little notes this problem in connexion with young people in Sierra Leone: 'The most common assumptions are that in England, education is available to everyone, almost without exception, to a University level; that the government controls everything: it finds you a good job and helps to maintain you and that nearly everyone in England has a "white collar" job, or has something to do with machines'. *The Mende of Sierra Leone*, p. 261. Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1951.
26. For actual examples see Richmond, *op. cit.* (1954), pp. 71–7.
27. The first study was made by Dr K. L. Little and is contained in an appendix to *Negroes in Britain*, *op. cit.* pp. 271–81. The second investigation was carried out by A. T. Carey and is reported in an article, 'London Landladies and Coloured Students', in *The Fortnightly*, No. 1042 (New Series), October 1953.
28. See for example correspondence on this subject in *Manchester Guardian*, 19 August 1953, and during subsequent weeks. The National Council for Civil Liberties state that: 'Our attention has been drawn to the fact that it is doubtful whether clauses in leases discriminating between different classes of Her Majesty's subjects on grounds of colour are valid. This point was made by Sir Hartley Shawcross when Attorney General in answering a question (Hansard, vol. 470, pp. 2 and 3). ... We have had to point out, however, that to the best of our knowledge no decision has been made on the validity of such clauses, and that anyone challenging them might well find themselves involved in an action.' (Letter in *Manchester Guardian.*)
29. See Constantine *v.* Imperial Hotels Ltd., K.B. Div., 28 June 1944. *Times Law Reports*, 4 August 1944.
30. In the House of Commons on 14 December 1953 and on 23 January 1954.
31. For a discussion of discrimination against West Indian workers in Britain see Richmond, *op. cit.* (1954), pp. 35–52.
32. *Parliamentary Debates* (Hansard), 4 April 1950.
33. Report in *Manchester Guardian*, 5 February 1954.
34. The nearest example of actual segregation is the special council houses provided for some of the Moslem families on Tyneside (see p. 260). It was also suggested, at one time, that special provision should be made for the coloured population of Liverpool, but this has never been the official policy. See *Merseyside of the Future*, p. 20. Merseyside Civic Society, 1944.
35. K. L. Little, *Negroes in Britain*, *op. cit.* Pt 1.
36. *Ibid.* pp. 44–5.
37. *Ibid.* p. 43, footnote.
38. *Ibid.* p. 110.

39. D. Caradog Jones, *Survey of Merseyside*, vol. 1, p. 75. University Press of Liverpool, 1934.
40. For a full account of the 1948 disturbances in Liverpool see Richmond, *op. cit.* (1954) pp. 101–8.
41. Mrs E. M. Braddock, M.P., raised the question of employing coloured colonials as policemen at a meeting of the Liverpool Watch Committee on 19 January 1954, and was assured that if a man had the requisite educational, physical, and other requirements he would be considered. *Manchester Guardian*, 20 January 1954.
42. S. F. Collins, 'Social Processes Integrating Coloured People in Britain', *British Journal of Sociology*, vol. 3, No. 1, March 1952.
43. *Ibid.* p. 25.
44. *Ibid.* p. 26.
45. I am indebted to Dr K. L. Little and to the author, E. B. Ndem, for permission to read an unpublished MS., *Negro Immigrants in Manchester*, on which this brief account is based.
46. For a fuller account of the coloured community in east London see M. P. Banton, 'Negro Workers in Britain', *The Twentieth Century*, vol. 151, No. 899, January 1952. Also the same author's article in *Sociological Review*, *op. cit.* pp. 43–61.
47. This incident received considerable publicity in the press and the fact that the transport employees took a ballot on the employment of coloured workers was adversely commented upon.
48. A detailed study of colonial students in Britain has been prepared by P.E.P. (Political and Economic Planning) and will be published shortly.
49. The term 'pilot boy' is derived from their function of piloting European sailors and soldiers to prostitutes, but their groups also engage in many other delinquent activities. Some of these youths were well educated and are reacting to frustrated ambitions for wealth and prestige, while others come from broken homes or are otherwise lacking parental care. For details see K. A. Busia, *Social Survey of Sekondi-Takoradi*, *op. cit.* pp. 96–100, and reference in Banton, *Population Studies*, *op. cit.* p. 6.
50. For a fuller discussion of the adjustment of West Indian workers in Britain see Richmond, *op. cit.* (1954), pp. 109–31.
51. For a discussion of the significance in Britain of these national and 'tribal' groupings see M. P. Banton, 'The Social Groupings of Some West African Workers in Britain', *Man*, No. 203, 1953.
52. A. H. Richmond, 'Relation Between Skill and Adjustment of a Group of West Indian Workers in Britain', *Occupational Psychology*, vol. 25, No. 3, 1951.
53. I am indebted to Dr K. L. Little for permission to read an unpublished MS. by Miss V. Junod, based on her study of the coloured *élite* in Britain. The opinions expressed here are my own.
54. Some coloured colonial immigrants consort with prostitutes as do white men whose opportunites for normal sexual outlets are restricted. But owing to the prejudices of their clientele 'better-class' prostitutes

normally refuse their services to coloured men, wealthy or otherwise. A few coloured men 'live off immoral earnings', but the extent to which this occurs is sometimes exaggerated.

55. S. F. Collins, 'Social Position of White and "Half Caste" Women in Coloured Groupings in Britain', *American Sociological Review*, vol. 16, No. 6, December 1951.
56. J. Bowlby, *Child Care and the Growth of Love*, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1953.
57. Unpublished Ph.D. thesis by John Nash, Edinburgh, 1953.
58. For evidence see A. H. Richmond, 'Economic Insecurity and Stereotypes as Factors in Colour Prejudice', *The Sociological Review*, p. 9, vol. 42, Section 8, 1950.
59. L. Silberman and B. Spice, *Colour and Class in Six Liverpool Schools*, University Press of Liverpool, 1950.
60. I am indebted to Mr W. Duncan, M.B.E., Superintendent of the Liverpool Youth Employment Bureau, for the information in this paragraph, conveyed to me in a private communication.
61. Cf. Collins, *American Sociological Review*, *op. cit.* p. 799.
62. I am indebted to this official, Mr I. De Souza, for the information contained in this paragraph.

CONCLUSION

1. M. Sherif, *An Outline of Social Psychology*, p. 415. Harper, New York, 1948.
2. T. Grygier, *Oppression: A Study of Social and Criminal Psychology*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1954.
3. See pp. 205–6.
4. *Parliamentary Debates* (Hansard), 1 May 1953.
5. J. Bowlby, *op. cit.* p. 1.
6. K. Lewin, *Resolving Social Conflicts*, Harper, New York, 1948.
7. L. Kuper, *op. cit.* p. 244.
8. E.g. Mr Oliver Lyttelton, Colonial Secretary in the debate referred to above. It should be noted that there is a subtle but important distinction between differentiation or discrimination *between* and discrimination *against*.
9. United Nations, *Main Types and Causes of Discrimination*, p. 45 (E/CN.4/Sub.2/40/Rev.1), 1949.
10. *Ibid.* p. 43.
11. M. Berger, *Race Equality and the Law*, U.N.E.S.C.O., Paris, 1954.
12. T. S. Simey, 'Social Advance in Non-Autonomous Territories', p. 210, in *Colonial Administration: A Symposium promoted by the Colston Research Society and the University of Bristol, April 1950*, Butterworth, London, 1950.
13. W. A. Lewis, 'A Policy for Colonial Agriculture', in *Attitude to Africa*, p. 79. Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1951.

14. *Ibid.* p. 75.
15. *African Education, op. ci .*
16. *Ibid.* p. 67.
17. *Ibid.* p. 56.
18. H. Himmelweit and J. Halsey, 'Selection for Secondary Education and Achievement in Four Grammar Schools', *British Journal of Sociology*, March 1953.
19. J. Gerber, *Educational Opportunities for South African Native Peoples* (Lecture before Royal Empire Society, June 1953). Mimeographed. Published by Director of Information, South Africa House, London, 1953.
20. P. Ruopp, *Approaches to Community Development*, p. 20. W. Van Hoeve, The Hague, 1953.
21. T. R. Batten, 'Social Values and Community Development', in Ruopp, *op. cit.* p. 82.
22. George Potter, 'The Labourers and the Vote', *The Nineteenth Century*, January 1878. Quoted by Michael Goodwin, *Nineteenth Century Opinion*, p. 218. Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1951.
23. A full account of Dr Malan's views on the Commonwealth was contained in *Die Burger*, 24 February 1951, in the form of a question-and-answer interview. The interview was reprinted in *South African Survey*, No. 9, 15 March 1951.
24. U.N.E.S.C.O., *Human Rights*, p. 18. Allan Wingate, London, 1949.

POSTSCRIPT

1. *South African Survey*, No. 89, p. 10. 15 September 1954.
2. Circular from Department of Native Affairs dated 3 September 1954 and reprinted in *Africa Digest*, Vol. 11, No. 5, p. 13.
3. *Ibid.* p. 4.
4. *Ibid.* p. 3.
5. An address by Hon. P. B. Fletcher, Minister of Native Affairs in Southern Rhodesia, to Rhodesian National Affairs Association in Salisbury, 11 June 1954. Published by the Information Office, Rhodesia House, London.
6. Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland *Newsletter*, No. 43, p. 3.
7. *Ibid.* No. 40, p. 7.
8. *Ibid.* No. 44, p. 5.
9. Colonial Office, *Uganda Protectorate: Buganda*, Cmd. 9320. H.M.S.O., London, November 1954.
10. *Ibid.* p. 1.
11. Colonial Office, *Report of the British Guiana Constitutional Commission, 1954*, Cmd. 9274. H.M.S.O., London, 1954.

12. *Parliamentary Debates* (Hansard), House of Commons, Vol. 532, No. 174, Col. 834.
13. Board of Trade figures show that 18,000 immigrants possessing Commonwealth citizenship landed in Britain in the first quarter of 1954 of whom 1700 were from the West Indies. *Manchester Guardian*, 10 July 1954.

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Anthony H. Richmond is Lecturer in Social Theory in the Department of Social Study of the University of Edinburgh. He was formerly a member of the research staff of the Department of Social Science, University of Liverpool. Born in 1925, he was educated at the County High School, Ilford, and won a Leverhulme Scholarship to the London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London). He obtained an honours degree in economics and sociology, and undertook some post-graduate studies in industrial relations before proceeding to the University of Liverpool, where he obtained a higher degree in sociology. It was in Liverpool that he conducted the research for his first book, *Colour Prejudice in Britain* (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1954), which is a study of a group of West Indian Negro workers in Britain. Although his main researches and publications have been in the field of racial relations he is principally interested in applying sociology and social psychology to the study of human relations generally. He has published articles on, among other subjects, industrial relations and international relations. He is a member of the Society of Friends (Quakers) and served during the war in the Friends Ambulance Unit.