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Place of the Indefinite in Logic

BY

KRISHNACHANDRA BHATTACHARYYA, M.A.

Synopsis.

Logic which ordinarily deals with the definite refers to the indefinite (*i*) as only subjective, (*ii*) as an epistemological element of the definite, or (*iii*) as the dialectic function of negation constructive of the definite. Should not logic find place for the absolute indefinite, in view especially of the metaphysic of the irrational ?

Logic as dealing with the form of all thought-content should consider primarily if there is any form which is not matter at all, *i.e.*, which is prior to all determinate doctrine and controversy, scientific and metaphysical. Epistemology, as it is, presupposes determinate principles supposed to be above criticism and hence it lapses into metaphysics. Logic should criticise the basis of this science and start with an absolutely abstract first principle which can be neither a self-evident axiom nor a contingent law, *viz.*, with the bare dualism of the definite and indefinite, to deny which is to admit it. All dualisms except this admit of a third something beyond. If stated as a law at all, the principle would be 'the definite is not and is the

indefinite,' *i.e.*, the line between the definite and indefinite is itself indefinable.

It is different from the dialectic principle of the identity of being and non-being which lays more stress on identity than on difference. Against dialectic, it urges that there is an alternative—unreason—beyond the identity of being and non-being which is reason; against conceptualist logic, that there is the indeterminate beyond determinate affirmation and negation; and against empirical logic, that the positive object of experience is a determination carved out of the indeterminate. It not only thus extends but modifies the logic of the definite: it brings out the indefinite given character of determinate experience, of relation (including contradiction), and of systemic or necessary unity quite as much as it emphasises their character as determinate negations of the indefinite.

Logic starts neither with pure being and non-being nor with determinate being and non-being but with '*this* determinate,' where determinateness or 'thisness' is being or negation or their identity and the 'this' a transcendent indefinite. This indefinite is determined into the relation in a judgment—identity and difference; and so of affirmation and negation, neither is prior to the other. The necessity in reasoning again is in reference to this indefinite, whether taken as a given system of positions as in empirical logic, as a given system of analytic relations as in conceptualist logic, or as a given self-creating system of functions as in dialectic.

Dialectic only shows that a given category *was* necessary: it does not create it and yet *somehow* such prophecy after the event is synthetic knowledge. As however the inferential expectation of material truth is only probable, the ideal form of inference has to be distinguished from the material process. To conceptualist logic, this form of

analytic necessity is *given* and is *somehow* applied to the matter of experience. To empirical logic, the material process—from particulars to particulars—which is really indefinite is *somehow* definite. Kant shows that the forms of conceptualist logic are not merely given but are synthetic necessities, they being necessarily applicable to experience which however in its particularity is unanticipable. So Spencer shows against empirical logic that inference is not only a psychological transition but implies a consciousness of necessity or justification and that the given definite experience is but the Unknowable breaking forth into the relation of difference. Both bring out the transcendent indefinite but both take it uncritically to be *real*. But the indefinite is really a third category, beyond reality and negation, and thus not a transcendental implicate only but a content of positive logic. It may be called unknowable negation or reality and so metaphysically we may deny the knowable world, not only in absolute intuition but in logical thought and we may conceive also determinate noumena or phenomena or both as real specifications of the indefinite. We may make a metaphysical use of the indefinite either way; and in reference to this indefinite, the distinction between necessity and fact, negation and position itself becomes indefinite.

Two applications:—(*i*) *all and some.* In 'all A,' the denotation determined by the definite connotation is definite as denying the indeterminate differences of the particulars which are still implied; and 'some A' means not only this indefinite but also a definite, suggesting that the connotation of A is indefinitely modified by a determinative x. So subalternation may or may not be opposition.

(*ii*) *Negative conditional propositions.* In logic of the definite, conditionals are admitted only as intending a

definite element *explicitly against* a mass of indefinite implication; and negation (*i.e.*, indefinite negation) of this definite element is supposed only to yield abortive propositions. Yet such negation may be practically useful and so the negative hypothetical should be a definite form in logic. The indefinite disjunctive 'A is either B or not-B,' where not-B stands for a definite or an indefinite positive or for nothing at all, is really *negative* in relation to the definite 'A is either B or C' and is in fact the very form of ultimate alternation between knowledge and ignorance, between the definite and the indefinite.

PLACE OF THE INDEFINITE IN LOGIC

1. The purpose of this paper is to examine what modifications of logical doctrine would be necessitated by the admission of the indefinite in logic, side by side with definite position and definite negation. In logic which ordinarily deals with the definite content of thought only, the indefinite is considered in at least three ways. It is sometimes regarded explicitly as extralogical, as only something subjective or psychological which it is the purpose of the science to outgrow or supersede. Sometimes it is treated as provisionally definite; both the uncertain and certain relation of the knowing faculty to the object is taken to yield definite forms of positive logic, the indefinite in fact being admitted as only an epistemological element of the definite content of logic.[1] In dialectic, it is taken as a definite function of truth itself, as the *function* of negation which is neither a mere epistemological element nor a static truth by itself but is still constructive of definite truth only. Our inquiry is whether and how logic should find place for the absolute indefinite as distinct from the indefinite that is only constitutive of the definite and our *primâ facie* justification for the inquiry is that there is such a thing as a metaphysic of absolute doubt—at least a philosophy of the irrational—and that logic as the prolegomena to all science and metaphysics

[1] See ref. to Venn—§ 19.

should not commit itself to the particular metaphysical faith in the finality of a definite system of truth. The indefinite has found in fact a place in metaphysics in many forms. To mention only a few at random, there is the 'negative matter' of Plato, the *maya* of the Vedantists, and the *sunyam* or 'void' of the Buddhists. There is the notion of objective chance in Aristotle and of the inexplicable change of direction of the atoms of Lucretius. There is the conception of the indeterminate will, specially in the extreme form of unmotived or irrational activity, as presented by a Duns Scotus, a Schopenhauer, or a Bergson and there is finally the Unknowable, whether of Kant or of Spencer. These notions are at present homeless in logic; there is no category to express them and disputes arise in connexion with them in metaphysic which properly should have arisen in logic itself.

2. It is necessary to begin by clearly defining the scope of logic as conceived here. Whatever may have been the origin of the science, in its present state it can hardly be treated except mainly as a positive science distinct alike from psychology and the objective sciences and concerned with the most abstract principles, not only of all science, but of all philosophy. It deals with the object or content of all knowledge claimed as such and in this sense is an objective science, though the object here means all thinkables, subjective, objective, and absolute. It considers only the form of the object, not the matter and so its primary problem should be whether there is any form which is not matter at all, which is not determinate, which is undeniably presupposed in all determinate concrete thought, accepted or disputed, which in fact—paradoxical as it may sound—is not affected even by the uncertainty of this problem. It is not the primary purpose of logic to develop this form, if it can be discovered, into the ground-principles or categories of the several concrete

departments of thought. That would be committing oneself to a particular system of metaphysic; and logic, as prior to all metaphysic, can only indicate these by way of bringing out all that it does not deal with. For purposes of logic, in other words, it should be assumed that all intuitions that are claimed as such and all sciences and philosophies *may* be true; it must be universal in the sense not only of presenting the form common to all that is claimed as knowledge but also as presenting the form of all doubt and dispute.

3. This view of logic is forced upon us by the circumstance that it has to take account not only of the positive sciences but also of metaphysics. Metaphysics in reopening the fundamental questions assumed to be settled in the sciences presents many alternative solutions of which it is not for logic to accept or reject any on the ground of commonsense, for the whole purpose of the science is to replace the rough and ready rule of the thumb. Epistemology was conceived by Kant as a prolegomena to all branches of knowledge claimed as such but it differs from logic as we conceive it here in so far as it itself represents a body of knowledge that is determinate or uncriticised, resting as it does either on the authority of introspection or on that of traditional logic for the solution of the critical problem without a prior criticism of these authorities themselves. This prior criticism, if undertaken, would yield us logic proper, with its absolutely abstract or fundamental character. If epistemology has not been able so far to maintain its role of a prolegomena and has come to be a mere chapter in some metaphysical system, dialectical or other, it is because it has not stripped itself, to start with, of all determinate presuppositions, because in fact it has not been fundamental enough. That the transcendental logic of Kant, for example, led to the positive dialectic logic of

Hegel only shows that the antithesis between transcendental and positive is not absolute in the sphere of the determinate. In both, the abstractions with which logic is taken to be conversant are taken to be constructive functions: they are viewed as at once analytic and synthetic. In Kant, the analytic moment indeed remains transcendental in view of a consciousness of a limit to reason, of an indefinite thing-in-itself; but this consciousness of the indefinite is not taken seriously to affect the epistemology itself. The definite unity of the self and its synthetic specification into a definite system of categories are obviously suggested by the presuppositions of a particular system of metaphysic, *viz.*, the developmental, and the indefinite itself is taken to be *real* without criticism. Logic in our present conception however in endeavouring to supply the abstract form of epistemological knowledge itself would stand on a height of abstraction where the distinction of the transcendental and the positive is obliterated. The developmental principle has no necessary place in it any more than the principle of finished existence, for it has no right to build on a determinate metaphysical presupposition: the principle of logic should be absolutely abstract.

4. Can we have such a science at all? If we demand a criticism of epistemology, should we not demand a criticism of the criticism and so on *ad infinitum?* Epistemology starts with a principle that it believes to be self-evident or necessary. If however a real doubt is cast on the principle, if the basis of intuition or axiom in general is challenged as it has been challenged, logic as such has no right to enter into the dispute and to take sides; and so in criticising epistemology, it cannot stand on any so-called necessary or self-evident principle. To start with a determinate contingent principle would be equally absurd and so it can only stand on an

indeterminate principle which can indifferently be called necessary or contingent. This principle can be no other than the bare dualism of the definite and indefinite, in which neither has even the specific implication of reality or unreality. A further criticism of this dualism is unintelligible, for the negation of the principle is nothing other than the principle itself.

5. To explicate this principle. The most abstract and comprehensive dualism that can be conceived is that between the definite and the indefinite. It is possible to show in the case of any other dualism that can be proposed that there is a *third* something beyond it. Even in the case of being and non-being, one can cite an indefinite that is neither, call it the unknowable or freedom or whatever else. It is not necessary to present the dualism of definite and indefinite in the form of a judgment as a law of thought, for the law-form is only a form among forms: the judgment is not the necessary logical unit in such logic as is conceived here. But if a law-form is demanded for this principle—the word principle is sufficiently general in philosophical usage, it may be presented in the paradoxical form—the definite is not and is indefinite at once. It is similar to the dialectical principle of the identity of being and not-being but there is the difference that in the latter, more stress is laid in the last resort on the identity than on the difference between the opposed terms: the synthesis of position and negation is uncritically taken to be only positive, and the final synthesis, *viz.*, the absolute is taken as a positive system of truth. In the principle we have presented, equal stress is laid on the identity and difference of the opposed terms; what it amounts to is that the line between the definite and the indefinite is itself indefinite, that the minimum of difference from the indefinite that constitutes the abstract definite is a vanishing quantity.

6. The difference from the dialectical principle can be stated in another way. The ground principle of logic has been formulated in at least three ways— in the form of system or reason, in the form of relation or judgment, and in the form of an irrelative term, intuition or experience. The identity of being and non-being points to the conception of system as the ruling conception of dialectic. In conceptualist or intuitionist logic, the fundamental principle is best conceived as a relation between positive terms, *i.e.*, as an ordinary judgment like 'this being is not another being.' In empirical logic, an experience is the test of its own truth and so the basal principle may be formulated as 'this determinate being (Mill) or this determinate becoming (Bain) which is not non-being.' In the principle proposed for the logic of the indefinite, no preference is implied for any of these three forms. It is best put as a mere dualism or opposition, definite *and* indefinite, the 'and' expressing apparently the very form of illogicality or the despair of knowledge. It really however expresses the inadequacy of the three forms aforesaid. As against the form of reason, the dialectical principle, it indicates an alternative—unreason—beyond reason : position and negation are not necessarily the moments of the positive absolute. As against the form of judgment, the conceptualist principle as we may call it, it suggests that beyond determinate affirmation and negation, there is the indeterminate (though it may be practically useful) form of doubt or ignorance. As against the form of the irrelative determinate term—we call it the experiential principle provisionally—it points out that the positive object of experience is always a determination carved out of the indeterminate. It suggests in fact that the indefinite has to be recognised as standing outside the term, the judgment, and the inference, that one should go beyond ordinary logic which

simply turns its back on the outlying indefinite and looks to the definite as the sole content of thought.

7. Such recognition of the indefinite implies not only an extension of logical doctrine: it involves also a material modification of the logic of the definite. With regard to the term, for example, the determinate object of experience, our principle shows that the boundaries that demarcate it from the surrounding indefinite are themselves indefinite or indefinable, that the particularity of 'this determinate' is something unique which can neither be taken as a separate definite category nor as a necessary determination of the universal and accordingly the 'this' may be indifferently taken as either being (Mill) or as transition (Bain).[1] With regard to the judgment-form, it is pointed out that definite relation, affirmative and negative, is itself indefinite, that if relation is a given fact, the 'given-ness' is an indeterminate which can be regarded either as an abrupt positive or as a negation of the indefinite and that the negation of the indefinite is indifferently affirmative or negative, *i.e.*, the distinction between affirmative and negative is indefinable or in other words, contradiction is just as conceivable as otherwise.[2] With regard to the form of reasoning, our principle would

[1] Within empiricism in fact is reproduced the opposition between the conceptualistic and dialectic views of the *principium individuationis*. To conceptualist logic, individuality as such is properly a unique category of thought, a simple ultimate thought, and there is sometimes a tendency to abolish it altogether. To dialectic, it is a construction through thought as a function. (*a*) In the empiricism of Mill, corresponding to the simple *thought* of 'this,' appears 'this' individual *experience*, this given simple being. (*a*) In Bain however, experience is taken to be a transition; properly no term is given but only a passage, a differentiation between terms. Individuality is only an arbitrary point in this transitional process: it is a conflux of relations or generalities. Existence is admitted as a separate category, distinct from co-existence, sequence, and resemblance by Mill but not by Bain. These conflicting views only show that the unit-term or the individual is at once definite and indefinite, the latter aspect being systematically ignored in ordinary logic

[2] Here within conceptualism is reproduced the opposition between empirical an dialectical views of *relation*. To empiricism, relation is a given experience; the

indicate that system or necessary relation is as much a given fact as a negation of negation and that this negation of negation may be taken as equivalent to position or negation indifferently.[1]

8. With the Hegelians then, we admit the identity of being and non-being or necessity but hold that this necessity is itself a contingent fact. So the contradiction between being and non-being is to us as much an object of thought as their non-contradiction: a contradictory judgment is neither inadmissible nor is merely a moment in the necessity of dialectical identity. So too the determinate 'this' has not simply being and negation in its constitution but also the indefinite or the Unknowable.

9. The indeterminate being or non-being with which Hegel starts is not the same as our indefinite. In the term, 'this determinate,' 'this' is something unique to

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elementary relations of likeness and difference are taken as ultimate feelings. To dialectic, it is the *function* of negation, the negation of immediacy, the self-distinction of the given. The conceptualist view splits up into at least two types: (*i*) relation is an ultimate given thought and here the ultimate difference between empiricism and intuitionism is a vanishing one. All relation in fact is positive; negation itself is but positive difference (*ii*) Positive relation and negative relation are co-ordinate: absence or void is a category side by side with existence. The given positive stands over against its definite negation. the primary difference is not difference between two positives but between position and negation, this negation being thus a sort of being or position. Thus the distinction between affirmation and negation becomes indefinable. Negation is not being and yet a sort of being.—These conflicting views show again that what is taken to be definite relation in ordinary logic is really indefinite.

[1] The opposition between empiricism and conceptualism has to be traced as affecting the integrity of the dialectic view of *system* or necessary relation. To empiricism, system is no given being: the past does not *exist* in the present and yet the present is what it is *because* of the past. The ground of present knowledge is always non-existent. To conceptualism, the relation of ground and consequent is an eternally existent thought. The dialectic movement presents both these tendencies without reconciling them. As the ground of itself (*natura naturans*), system is a transition, negation of negation, freedom—no existent being. As the consequence of itself (*natura naturata*), it is the *existent* absolute, the *truth* that is thought through and through. This alternation of the dynamic and static aspects in dialectic points to the fact that system or reason is indefinite in its very constitution.

which neither the terms, being nor non-being can be applied, though 'this-ness' or determinat being may be taken as an identity of being and non-being. As constitutive of 'this-ness' then, the indeterminate being or non-being of Hegel is still definite in our sense: 'this' as transcending 'this-ness' is unanalysable, indefinable, or indefinite. 'This determinate' may thus be analysed into the three principles—the indefinite, being, and non-being. In reference to the criticism of the Hegelian position that logic should start with determinate being rather than with pure being, we hold that the indefinite, being, and non-being can all be taken as the starting point indifferently, these being all implied in 'this determinate.'

10. With reference to the judgment, our contention is that it is equally true to say that the terms are or are not constituted by their relation, that in it a given matter of fact, a 'this' which is neither definite being nor definite non-being is determined into a relation of terms, that the relation is at once identity and difference in reference to this indefinite, and that apart from this indefinite, it is just as true to say that there is as that there is not necessary mutual implication between identity and difference, that the affirmative relation is and that it is not prior to the negative.[1] As to reasoning, the necessity implied in

[1] The judgment 'A is B' has been understood in at least three ways: (*i*) A does not exist when A B exists. (*ii*) A exists when A B exists. (*iii*) A exists *because* A B does not exist but is a function—the empirical, conceptualist, and dialectic views respectively in typical form. Taking (*ii*), A is in the limit the unique 'this,' transcending the determination A B. As indeterminate, it is as much definite being as negation and thus (*i*) is justified along with (*ii*). So in (*iii*), A B, the function or negation, *is*, *i.e.*, constitutes A, the existent. Thus A or 'this' is negation, being, and their identity in (*i*), (*ii*), (*iii*), respectively: it is in (*i*) the not-given (not-now-given), in (*ii*) the given and in (*iii*) the existent through not being given. A B then is (*i*) not A, (*ii*) is not A and yet in A, and (*iii*) is A by being not A; in other words, the negative relation is *after* the affirmative, *co-ordinate with* the affirmative and *before* the affirmative in the three views.—All these variations of view-point to the circumstance that relation is at once definite and indefinite: the admission of the indefinite justifies and falsifies all these views.

the 'therefore' is taken by Hegel as the self-creating dialectic of truth itself, as the position created by the negation of negation. In empirical logic, it is taken to be the position contingently reached through other positions, as a particular reached through particulars; and in conceptualist logic, it is the mere explication of a position by negation, as a rendering of a universal premise analytically definite by an individualising minor premise. We however hold that the new something reached in the conclusion is really a definition of the indefinite matter to which reasoning has reference and that the necessity is but a contingent fact in this reference.

11. Hegelian Logic does not admit the indefinite but holds instead that dialectic necessity is creative. Its strength lies however only in *seeing* that a real category of given experience *was* necessary, not really in yielding any new category or creating it. Hence where it has sought to create, critics have only seen a dismal failure or found that it was a sort of prophesying after the event. This inability to create is in fact the implicit admission of the indefinite. What the critics do not bring out however is that this retrospective prophecy, this *seeing* that a stage which has emerged *was* necessary is a *true* seeing: they have yet to explain why the dialectic exposition which is not at least explicitly analytic *fits* the category deduced, how an apparent continuity between an old and new category is at all established by the mere process of negation of negation. It is a form of the old question how what is anticipated by inference comes to be verified by experience and to call it a mere accident or to understand a pre-established harmony is simply to give up the problem of explanation.

12. At the same time it is true that such anticipations of inference are not sometimes verified, that only probable truths are reached actually by inference and

hence the justification for taking the inferential form as only an ideal and for distinguishing it from the material process of inference itself. This amounts on the one hand to the admission of the analytic necessity within this ideal form as itself *given* and as *somehow* applicable to the indefinite matter of experience and on the other to the view that the synthetic material process is a definite necessity inexplicably emerging out of the indefinite. In conceptualist logic, the definite analytic necessity within the syllogism is understood as the given or intuited ideal and error or uncertainty is taken as only the accident of application. In empirical logic where the ideal is nothing and the material process is all, it only amounts to saying that *somehow* as matter of fact we pass from particulars to other particulars which are sometimes verified.

13. As against conceptualist logic, Kant holds that the forms of positive logic are not merely given but are synthetic *a priori* necessities at bottom, that their applicability to experience is not accidental but necessary, that however although matter in general is necessarily demanded by form, *what* specifically the matter will be is unknowable. The Kantian view thus brings out the latent implication of the indefinite in the intuited character and applicability of the forms admitted in conceptualist logic. As against empirical logic, Spencer points out that unless logic is to lapse into psychology, the ideal form has to be taken as necessarily presupposed in the material process, that inference is inference only as implying the consciousness of justification or necessary ground, that this necessary ground or axiom is not only the consolidation of contingent experiences but has the implication of the inconceivability of the opposite and that experience taken as the *given* definite in empirical logic is really the indefinite breaking forth into the relation of difference.

11. Both Kant and Spencer thus bring out the transcendent character of the indefinite but both uncritically take this indefinite to be the unknowable *reality*. Against this however we hold that the indefinite may as well be called the unknowable negation, that in fact it is a third category side by side with position and negation, that it is as much immanent in the definite as transcendent, and that therefore it is not simply the transcendental implicate of definite logic but the content of positive logic itself.

15. Our logic thus finds categories for widely different metaphysical notions of reality, for the notion of the knowable world as unreal in the last resort as well as for the notion of it as a real evolute in all the different senses in which it has been taken. Logic as here conceived renders intelligible the denial of the unique positive reality of the given, not only in the sense in which Hegel understands it who admits the reality and takes it to be constructed by negation, but also in the absolute sense. The assertion of the ultimate falsity of the world—falsity not only to absolute intuition but to logical thought itself—is thus conceivable. In positive logic itself, not only is position to be conceived as negation of negation as it is conceived in dialectic: it is to be admitted also that negation of negation may be indefinite negation. At the same time we recognise that the indefinite may be regarded as real and as embodied in the definite axioms and experiences that we start with as positively *given*. We admit the truth both of conceptualist and empirical logic or—what is the same thing—we can conceive the metaphysical view that determinate noumena or phenomena or both side by side constitute reality. There is nothing finally to prevent us from conceiving that this immanent being is to the transcendent real indefinite a real mode, effect, or objectification, that the definite is a real specification of the indefinite. We thus

frankly make a positive use, logical and metaphysical, of the indefinite, unlike Kant and Spencer who while deprecating such positive use of the indefinite view it implicitly as the *real*. Conflicting epistemological notions are also thus logically conceivable: both necessity and fact can be understood alike as an emanation and evolute of the indefinite, and each may be regarded as the other—*i. e.*, necessity may be taken as an inexplicable fact, as the positive stress of the indefinite real and given fact may be viewed as implying negation of an indefinite negation.

16. The general implications of our principle—the indefinite and definite are and are not one—have been brought out as demarcating the logic of the indefinite from other types of logic. The bearing of it on some details taken at random may be discussed by way of further elucidation.

17. *Conception of all and some.* Logic as dealing with the most abstract content of thought, definite and indefinite, has no direct interest in developing the determinate categories of the several departments of knowledge. If it refers to quantity then, even in the vague form of *all* and *some*, it is only by way of bringing out what it does not deal with. The primary question is whether it starts with the determinate or the indeterminate and our answer is that the starting point is 'this determinate,' where 'this' is the unique indefinite. The difference of the definite and indefinite being itself indefinable, the difference of the determinates from one another is also indeterminate in the last resort. From the side of the definite as fixed by language, we deny this indeterminate difference which we are conscious of, by using the word 'all': the connotation is primarily meant as definite, in view however of the indeterminate differences of the particulars constituting the denotation. The

word 'some' on the contrary primarily means this indeterminate difference in view of the definite connotation. The secondary accompaniment in each case is affected by the primary intention. We have said that the definite and the indefinite are not only different but identical and so the indefinite denotation of 'all A'—indefinite as fixed by connotation and not by enumeration —is itself a definite function or form in logic; and the definite connotation of 'some A'—*viz.*, the connotation of A—is itself rendered indefinite, 'some A' being equivalent to 'all A x' where x is an indefinite determination of A. In so far then as we say that the definite is *not* the indefinite, subalternation may be regarded as an opposition and not so in so far as we admit their identity: the truth of 'all' both denies and admits the truth of 'some.'[1] This only means that quantity-difference which is in the

[1] There are the two ordinary views: (*i*) 'some' means '*not* all,' (*ii*) 'some' does not deny 'all'—*i.e.* (*i*) 'some' is a definite negation of 'all,' (*ii*) 'some' is indefinite. In both views, 'some' is taken as both definite and indefinite in a sense, *e.g.*, in (*i*), though it means 'not all,' it is indefinite which individuals and how many are meant.—Still it is held that this indefiniteness is only subjective: to logic, it means the definite 'not all,' definite because 'not all A' means 'all Ax'—*i. e.*, the connotation of A as qualified by an unknown but real adjective x. In (*ii*), though 'some,' is indefinite as not denying 'all,' it means definitely at least one individual having the connotation of the class: the indefinite is thus provisionally treated as definite in logic. The second view does not assume what the first does that 'some A' is necessarily equivalent to *another* universal, *viz.*, Aα; and the first does not assume what the second does that any individual A is definitely known to have the predicate B in the judgment 'some A is B.' The first would assert 'some A is B' on the two definite grounds (1) that at least one individual A has been found to be *not* B and (2) that the real connection of B is not with A but with Ax. The second would assert it on the ground (1) that at least one A *is* B and (2) that other A's are either B or not-B. The first emphasises the defect of connotation (A should be determined into Aα), *i.e.*, indefiniteness of the connotation which is taken to be definite in 'all A' and the second emphasises the indefiniteness of the denotation in 'some A' which is already indefinite in 'all A,' though the point is provisionally ignored there. 'All A' in fact is both definite and indefinite, definite in connotation and indefinite in denotation. 'Some A,' as indefinite in connotation (A = Ax) is a negation of 'all A'; but 'some A,' as indefinite in denotation is no negation of 'all A,' the indefinite being indefinitely related to the indefinite.—The recognition of the indefinite as a logical, and not merely a subjective,

object or content of thought and not merely psychological is itself indefinite and that these contradictory views about 'all' and 'some' may be both true. Logic should consider this fact of alternation only: it should not be its business to develop the quantitative doctrine itself into some sort of logical algebra or geometry. Nor is it its business to settle the psychological or metaphysical question of the concept, although in thus defining its own business, it would indirectly indicate the germs of the concrete solutions of the questions that have been presented.

18. *Negative conditional propositions.*—Can conditional propositions be negative? (1) There are the opposite views about the hypothetical proposition—(*a*) As distinct from the categorical, its sole function is to express the logical or objective dependence of one relation on another. Non-dependence is no objective relation at all and requires no logical form to express it. The consciousness of it is purely privative: that I cannot connect a consequent with an antecedent is a mere subjective incapacity. There is therefore no negative hypothetical. (*b*) It may be contended however that in any case the negative categorical is allowed in view (we need not discuss the extreme view according to which no negative relation is admitted in logic), *i.e.*, the negative relation is admitted as objective, though it may be with the implied assumption that it is equivalent to a definite affirmative which may not be known yet. As a logical form then, the negative categorical is admissible where

element brings out the truth of both the views of 'some' and 'all.' The logic of the indefinite thus not only makes conflicting logical doctrines intelligible: it points out the essential indeterminateness of the concept, and the really extralogical character of quantity—showing that logic is here uselessly racked with disputes about what as outside its scope must be disputed and indicating that the doctrine of quantity is capable of being developed, not only from the side of the determinate but also from that of the indeterminate.

subjectively there is the ignorance of its affirmative equivalent. Now there should be a difference between the dependence of an affirmative consequent and that of a negative consequent on a given antecedent. The quality of the dependence itself varies with the quality of the consequent and hence a negative hypothetical should be admitted if a negative categorical is admitted. To be negative the hypothetical need not express non-dependence but only dependence of a negation.

19. The dispute here really turns on whether the quality of the dependence is affected by the quality of the consequent. Where we do not know yet what affirmation is equivalent to the negative consequent, should we say that the hypothetical proposition itself is negative? Should we express the state of knowledge there by a hypothetical form at all? We take the example—'if the keys cannot be found in this room after careful search, they are not here.' I do not know *where* the keys are then and still it may be useful to express the circumstance in the negative hypothetical form: I need not waste time searching for them further in this room for the reason stated. But it is urged in the first view that what is expressed in this proposition is only something subjective: there is no objective connexion between the antecedent and the consequent, the absence of the keys here being not conditioned by the fruitless search. But this only means that the keys have not been removed from the room in consequence of the fruitless search. The absence of the keys need not however mean this positive removal and may yet be a useful truth that is inferred from, *i.e.*, is conditioned by the fruitless search as its reason or ground. It is not the content of mere ignorance. Mere ignorance, it may be said, need not be expressed in logic:

The proposition about the keys is useful and yet is not the expression of an objective dependence of a positive fact. Should this intermediate state of consciousness between mere ignorance and positive objective knowledge be expressed in logic? Venn has pointed out the fallacy of over-objectification in logic: to him, logic deals with the *passage* from the subjective to the objective. We hold that logic as dealing with object in the abstract sense of content of thought can never *over*-objectify and that the real truth of Venn's view is that logic deals with the passage from the indefinite to the definite in the object. The useful knowledge about the keys which is not yet positive objective knowledge has a content or object distinct alike from the absolutely indefinite and useless content of ignorance and from the definite object of the positive knowledge of the whereabouts of the keys: it is at once indefinite and definite and as such should have a logical expression. The logic of the indefinite would therefore admit the negative hypothetical and point out that its logical status is indefinite—somewhere intermediate between he forms of positive knowledge and absolute ignorance, and a stage removed in point of definiteness from the negative categorical judgment. The negative categorical is already the explicit objective embodiment of partial ignorance: it assigns a provisional being to negation in relation to a position. In an affirmative hypothetical also, the *contingent* being of the relation in the consequent is such an explicit objective embodiment of partial ignorance: the assertory being of the categorical relation is modified by a negation into a possibility. The negative hypothetical then is an objective embodiment of a double ignorance or negation but is still in view of a position and therefore useful.

20. It may be noted in passing that the issues here are similar to those which arise in the Vedantic discussion

of the illusion of illusion.[1] An illusion being positively *given* has an 'indescribable being' according to Vedanta, even when it is corrected. Has the illusion of illusion such a being also? A compromise between plain yes and no is given by some Vedantists, *viz.*, that the illusion of illusion is *given* in a way different from, *i.e.*, more indefinitely than illusion itself. A similar difficulty may be pressed against Bradley's view of the negative judgment. It presupposes, he says, not a full-formed affirmative judgment but only a question. What is the nature of the question? He himself takes it to be *only psychological*, an ideal suggestion, a floating idea. Bosanquet however would take it as a *logical* content, a rudimentary disjunction. Sigwart would call it a rudimentary positive judgment—*i.e.*, a merely *given* relation. They all admit that a full affirmative judgment need not be presupposed by the negative and yet *what* precisely do they contend about? It is really somewhere intermediate between the *content* of thought and the mere psychological *fact* of thought. This transitional something between the definitely psychological and the definitely logical can only be taken cognisance of in such logic as has been conceived in this paper.

21. (2) As to the disjunctive proposition, the ordinary view is that it cannot be negative in the disjunctive form. The definite element in 'A is either B or C' is that A is in B and C taken together and sometimes the definite side is pushed further to imply the mutual exclusion of B and C. There is indefiniteness then at least as to *which* of the two, B and C, is predicated of A: the disjunctive is so far an explicit embodiment of partial ignorance. It would be held then that 'A is either not

[1] Something is believed to be real, it is next taken to be illusory, and then again on closer observation it may be pronounced *not* illusory. What does 'not illusory' mean?

B or not C' is not the logical denial of 'A is either B or C,' for if the ignorance-element in both is considered, there is no denial, an indefinite being only *indefinitely* related to an indefinite, and if the knowledge-element in both is considered, B plus C is either the same as or a part of not-B plus not-C. In reference to the knowledge-element however, we intend to point out as in the case of sub-alternation that if the connotative side as distinct from the denotative side of B and C is considered, there is an intelligible sense in which B plus C may be taken as the negative of not-B plus not-C.

22. Those who hold that 'A is either B or C' does not deny that A may be both really point to this connotative side: the precise relation between the denotations of B and C may remain indefinite according to them when the disjunctive is asserted. From this standpoint then 'either not B or not C' would be doubly indeterminate. In 'A is either B or C,' it is only affirmed that the connotations of B and C are compatible with that of A. This compatibility is a definite logical content but the mutual relation of B and C is indefinite; the mutual relation of not-B and not-C then would be doubly indefinite. The problem is to find out the value of this double indefiniteness.

23. We may distinguish our position here from at least four positions that may be conceivably advanced. (1) It may be held that the negation of the indefinite 'either B or C' in the form 'either not-B or not-C' has nothing definite in it and is absolutely useless. (2) There is just the opposite view that 'either not-B or not-C' is the *same* as 'either B or C,' B and C being already exclusive. (3) Or it may be held that the mutual exclusion of B and C is indefinite in 'either B or C,' and that 'either not-B or not-C' makes this definite, that it amounts to a more definite affirmation and is therefore no *negation* at

all: it is an *extra* affirmation, an *added* truth *side by side* with the definite truth of 'either B or C.' Or (4) it may be urged that this extra affirmation is a *development* of 'either B or C' rather than an accretion, that it is undoubtedly a negation but amounting to an affirmation. 'Either not B or not C' is taken as (1) no logical form at all or (2) as identical with 'either B or C' or (3) as different from it but not a denial of it or (4) as a denial of it that amounts to a definite affirmation which is at once same and different. Our position however is that 'either not B or not C' is the form of the *indefinite denial* of 'either B or C.' It is denial of the definite element in it–*viz.*, the compatibility of B and of C with A: that the compatibility itself is partial or indefinite, is *not* definite is pointed out by 'A is either not B or not C.' As the denial of what is believed to be a definite element in 'A is either B or C,' it is itself *believed* in and is not dumb ignorance: it has a useful content which yet is not positive, not the same as the given affirmative nor something coordinate with it, nor a negation amounting to a definite positive.

24. That 'A is either not B or not C' is the negation of 'A is either B or C' may be shown in another way. The ordinary form given of its negation is 'A is neither B nor C.' This however states more than the mere negation which should be simply 'A *may be* neither.' If not-B and not-C are understood as the negation of the connotative side of B and C, 'A is either not-B or not-C' is equivalent to 'A is either B or C or neither,' which means precisely that A may be neither.

25. In speaking of a logical form being useful, we have assumed only for the sake of the argument that the merely privative judgment, the expression of mere ignorance is useless. It is necessary now to point out that the word useful is itself a question-begging term; it

dogmatically assumes that the knowing self ought to move towards more and more determinate truth. This assumption itself may be questioned and the logical impulse may be taken to be satisfied in the correction of the given error of determinateness, not in the attainment of new determinations, in getting rid of the limitation of the definite and not in securing increase of definiteness, in the direction of the indefinite and not in that of the definite,—freedom or the absolute state being reached either way. In this 'undefining' process, as we may call it, it is not even necessary that empirical truth should be held fast provisionally. All doubt, including what is taken to be the most irresponsible form of it—*viz.*, absolute scepticism, would be *useful* in this connexion, though there might be grades of usefulness here also. Logic, conceived to deal with the bare dualism of the definite and indefinite can make room for either kind of usefulness or truth.

26. This may be presented in terms of the disjunctive proposition. The proposition 'A is either B or C' or neither may be taken as equivalent to 'A is either B or not-B, the bare form of the Excluded Middle. Now this form may be taken (1) as absolutely useless, a joke, the mere form of ignorance; (2) as the limiting form of disjunction, and therefore a particular case of disjunction, giving us the form of truth, *i.e.*, of the universe as constructed by thought out of the unique given; (3) as the form of the determinate—determinate position and negation as co-ordinate—present in all particular disjunctions; or (4) as the abstract form of truth *developed* in all concrete disjunctions, in all grades of determinate knowledge. Not-B in these views is (1) nothing logical at all, (2) logical only in relation to the unique but definite 'given-ness' of B, (3) a positive logical content side by side with B, and (4) the logical implication of B, as B is of not-B. In conformity to what we have said above, we

hold that not-B is something logical, though not definite: it is the logically useful indefinite. 'A is either B or not-B' is a logical negative of 'A is either B or C,' utterly indeterminate in contrast with it but determinate as expressing the fundamental logical principle of the disjunction of the definite and indefinite, the form of the knowable-unknowable, the form of mystery rather than of absolute truth, the limiting mystery of all philosophy.

Review and Criticism of Dr. James Ward's "Psychology" [1]

BY

P. K. RAY, D. SC. (LOND. & EDIN.)

I. Important Points. II. Does Consciousness imply an Object as well as a Subject, a Not-self as well as a Self, both in a non-phenomenal sense?

I. IMPORTANT POINTS.

§ 1. Standpoint of Psychology: the subject-matter of Psychology. Has Psychology a subject-matter like Botany or Chemistry? What is the relation of Psychology to Physical Science? What is its relation to Philosophy and Metaphysics?

The subject-matter of Psychology is the whole of experience of the individual subject. All the facts of the consciousness of the individual subject—both actual and possible—may be dealt with by the psychologist. Whatever is not part of his actual or possible experience does not come under Psychology. Knowledge is a subject for Psychology so far as it is part of the individual's consciousness. Thus regarded, the knowledge of the individual—as for instance of the external world—has a beginning and a growth and may have an end if the consciousness of the individual comes to an end.

Psychology treats of all objects as related to the individual subject and is not therefore a special science like

[1] Encyclopædia Britannica, 9th Edition, Vol. XX, pp. 37 to 85.

Botany treating of a specified portion of objects apart from their relation to the individual subject. The standpoint of Psychology is thus *individualistic*. It treats of facts as existing in the individual's consciousness—not in the consciousness of this or that individual but of an 'objective' individual as it were. Whatever is or may be part of the experience of the individual belongs to Psychology. Psychology is *objective* in the sense that its facts and principles are true for all individual subjects—and it is *subjective* in the sense that it treats of facts or phenomena as related to the individual subject. It differs from the physical sciences, as the latter treat of phenomena of objects apart from any reference to the individual subject. For these sciences the objects exist by themselves and would exist even if there were no percipient individual subjects in the world. Those sciences are called objective in a double sense—objective in the first place as treating of objects apart from or abstracted from the individual subject and objective in the second place as true for an objective or universalised human consciousness. In the second sense of objective, they agree with Psychology and as they do not treat of the subject they have been specially called non-subjective or objective sciences.

A psychologist is not committed, in virtue of his psychological standpoint of the treatment of experience, to any particular philosophical or metaphysical theory in regard to Self or External World. He may be an idealist like Berkeley or Fichte or a realist like Hamilton or Spencer. His psychology would neither prove nor disprove the reality of the External World or of the Self as transcendental or meta-empirical. Psychology has nothing to say about the "pure Self," "the extra-mental world,"—"the thing-in-itself," "the transcendental object or subject." It treats only of the empirical subject and the empirical object. It traces the origin and growth of

this distinction. It analyses the contents of the subject and object as part of the individual's consciousness. What lies beyond such consciousness is extra-psychological. The pure Self and the transcendental Object or the pure not-self are non-entities for Psychology.

Psychology thus treats of both internal and external experience. It is not correct to say that Psychology treats only of the objects of internal experience. The distinction of internal and external is primarily applicable to phenomena within the body and those outside the body. Its application to what exists in relation to the mind or the individual subject and what does not so exist is inaccurate. The objects of experience are distinguished into internal and external; and the distinction is therefore a psychological one. Psychology has to explain its origin and nature.

The distinction between mental and material phenomena is also not one that can distinguish Psychology from Physical Science. All phenomena as objects of individual experience, come under Psychology Material phenomena are objects of our experience; only they are regarded apart from any individual subject. The same phenomena regarded in relation to the individual subject form the subject-matter of Psychology. Thus there is no sharp line of demarcation between the phenomena of mind and the phenomena of matter. They are all objects of the individual's experience. Light, colour, sound, heat, etc., are objects of our sense-perception and form alike the subject-matter of Psychology and Physical Science—in the former as related to the subject, in the latter as abstracted from it and regarded as existing apart from it.

§ 2. The ultimate constituents of Mind.

According to Dr. Ward the ultimate constituents are attention, feeling (pleasure or pain) and presentations.

These three elements are present in every concrete mental state or psychosis.

Attention is an activity of Self.

Pleasure is a passive state of Self accompanying a sensory presentation and leading to a motor presentation.

Presentations are ideas of sense, passive or active.

A sensation is a complex mental phenomenon consisting of a presentation and feeling (pleasure or pain).

A movement is a complex mental phenomenon consisting of feeling, attention and a motor presentation or idea of movement.

Attention is required both for sensory and motor presentations—both for sensations and movements.

Without attention, no mental state, not even a sensation is possible.

Attention being an immanent activity of Self is never presented. It is not therefore an object that can be perceived or reproduced or thought of. It is known by its effects. It produces sensations and movements and is known through these. It cannot be directly known by itself. Feeling is a purely subjective state of Self. It cannot therefore be an object of consciousness or perception. It cannot be reproduced or thought of. It is known by its effects, namely, movements. It cannot be directly known by itself.

A presentation is any idea, sensory or motor, of which Self is conscious.

No consciousness is possible without a Self and a presentation related to it as an object.

Subject (or Self) and object and the implied relation of presentation between them are the minimum elements of a mental state or psychosis.

Every mental state, however simple, implies a subject and an object presented to the subject.

The relation of presentation means that the subject is *conscious* of the object.

The subject implied by a conscious mental state is not

the empirical subject, for the latter is also an object, that is, a presentation or idea of which the subject is conscious. This subject is called by Dr. Ward the *pure Self*. "By pure Ego or subject," says Dr. Ward, "it is proposed to denote the simple fact that everything mental is referred to a Self" (p. 39, 1st column).

What is this Self? What is its origin and nature? Is it necessary for Psychology to assume it? Is it known? If so, how? It is supposed to be that to which all feelings or mental phenomena are presented. It is therefore itself never presented and known. It is not the same as the empirical ego or subject which is a complex of presentations to the Self or "pure Ego or subject," which is, in fact, an object distinguished from the empirical object but which, like the latter, is presented to the Self.

The question, What is the nature and origin of "the pure Ego or subject," is metaphysical and does not belong to Psychology. The pure Ego is the presupposition of all conscious phenomena or feelings and is not an object of knowledge or experience. *Cf.* Kant, "The synthetical unity of apperception."

The question, Whence is consciousness, does not likewise belong to Psychology.

The distinction of empirical subject and object is a psychological one. It is in fact a distinction between objects that are presented to the Self and implies therefore a pure Ego or subject.

Psychology does not inquire into the origin of consciousness, just as Biology does not inquire into the origin of life, Physics into the origin of matter, and Geology into the origin of the earth.

Psychology starts with mental states or psychical life as given and analyses it into its ultimate elements and can no more account for them than Physics can account for the existence of matter or Biology for the existence of life.

Whether the empirical subject and object presuppose transcendental subjective and objective reality respectively, whether they presuppose only one such reality or more, and if one, whether it is a subjective or an objective reality or whether they presuppose nothing as pan-phenomenalists hold, are questions which Psychology cannot answer. They belong to Metaphysics. From the psychological standpoint of experience, they cannot be answered. Attempts have been made to answer them by a metaphysical treatment of experience. Metaphysics attempts to discover the presuppositions of consciousness and thus to pass beyond its empirical limits. Metaphysics, therefore, by its very nature cannot verify its conclusions by experience. What makes experience itself possible cannot be an object of experience. The self and the not-self of the Dualist or the self-conditioning and self-limiting subject of the Monist are not object of consciousness or experience and they are presupposed or assumed hypothetically to account for the origin and growth of psychical life or consciousness. They can be justified only by the method by which hypotheses are justified in science. Their validity depends on their being able to explain our total experience and on their being shown to be the only tenable hypotheses, all other suppositions being shown to be untenable.

§ 3. Dr. Ward's theory of a pure Ego or subject for Psychology :—

No mental phenomenon is possible unless it is present to a subject.

(1) This subject is not a series of mental phenomena for the series is not possible without such a subject.

(2) This subject is not any member of the series ; for no member of the series, as a single phenomenon, is possible without a subject.

(3) This subject must therefore be a term different and distinct from, though related to, the series.

This subject is the term to which every member of the series must be presented in order to become a mental phenomenon or object of consciousness.

This subject is called by him "pure Ego or subject." It denotes the simple fact that everything mental is referred to a Self. This psychological conception of a Self or subject is not by any means identical with the metaphysical conceptions of a soul or mind-atom, or of mind-stuff not atomic (p. 39, 1st column).

Mind in Psychology means this subject plus the series of feelings or mental phenomena. It does not mean the feelings apart from the subject nor does it mean the subject apart from the feelings.

§ 4. Dr. Ward's theory of object for Psychology:—

Object in Psychology is any idea or presentation of which the subject is conscious.

A presentation is the qualitative aspect of a sensation or the idea of a movement, of which the subject is conscious. The former is called sensory and the latter motor presentation. A sensation has two elements (or aspects or properties) namely, (1) the element of pleasure or pain which is a purely subjective state of the self, not capable of presentation, representation or thinking, and (2) the element of *quality* distinguishing one sensation from another. This element, when discriminated and assimilated, becomes an idea or presentation to the subject. This sensory presentation is a *psychological object* as distinguished from an object that may be supposed to exist independently of mind.

The psychological object is thus an element of a sensation which has become the object of consciousness.

All sensations whatever have this presentative or qualitative element and may, after discrimination and assimilation, yield psychological objects.

Psychologically sensations are thus objective. It is

from sensations that we get our first objects. Sensations are not mere pleasures and pains. They have qualitative elements which distinguish them from one another and which, after due discrimination and assimilation, yield objects.

Consciousness is at first in a confused state, consisting of more or less indistinguishable presentations of the various senses. This confused state becomes gradually differentiated and yield, according to the principle of progressive specification, the different presentations of sounds, colours, smells, etc.

§ 5. Dr. Ward's view of primordial facts of mind :—

A subject
- (1) Non-voluntarily attending to changes in the sensory continuum [cognition;]
- (2) being in consequence either pleased or pained [feeling]; and
- (3) by voluntary attention or "innervation" producing changes in the motor continuum [conation].

The subject is possessed of the one power of attention and of variously distributing this attention which determines partly the intensity of presentation.

The most fundamental distinction for psychology is the distinction between the subject and the object—the subject as acting and feeling and the object as receiving its activity.

§ 6. Dr. Ward's theory of attention :—

Attention is not a presentation. It is an activity of the subject and is known through its effects upon the object.

§ 7. Dr. Ward's theory of pleasure and pain :—

Pleasure and pain are purely subjective states of the subject and cannot be presented. They are known by their effects and not directly by themselves.

§ 8. Dr. Ward's theory of the origin of voluntary or purposive movements :—

These have their origin, according to him, in the movements of emotional expression.

Pain is more connected with movement than pleasure and the movement soon becomes purposive.

According to Ward presentations are either of sensory objects or of motor objects.

§ 9. Dr. Ward's theory of presentation :—

The individual mind grows and its presentations become gradually differentiated and complex.

At the beginning the presentations are indistinguishable and form a confused mass. They are not separated from one another but form a continuous whole. The field of consciousness of a psychological organism is a continuous whole—it is one and continuous.

Psychology cannot discover the genesis of this continuous consciousness. But starting with consciousness as one and continuous, as homogeneous and indistinguishable, it traces its gradual differentiation and the development of the different presentations.

The organic sensations represent the earliest presentations. By their modifications through the special senses, the higher presentations are produced. The sensations differ in intensity, in quality and in massiveness (or extensity). The variations in intensity are continuous. So also are the variations in quality. Sounds, smells, tastes, colours form at first a confused mass. As attention is directed to the confused mass, differentiation is produced in this mass and single sensations are the result. Further attention produces further differentiation and what was simple appears compound and what was confused becomes more clear and distinct. By this process, the various sensations of the different senses become differentiated: sounds are differentiated from colours

as well as from each other, smells from tastes and from one another. The law of mental growth is from the simple to the complex, from the vague and indefinite to the clear and definite. The outline of the field of consciousness is gradually filled up. One presentation is continuous with another presentation; and all sensations with one another. All the presentations are really facts or differentiations of the one continuous and total field of consciousness. This field of consciousness is called by Dr. Ward "objective continuum" (*the totum objectivum*).

If sensations could be magnified, what appears single and simple to ordinary consciousness would appear compound and complex; and what appears detached would appear continuous.

The Law of Progressive Development or Specialisation is as true of mental growth as of plants and animals. A glance at a flower gives at first only a blank presentation. A second glance partly fills it up. A third glance gives further particulars. Thus by repeated glances is obtained a complex presentation of the flower with its various parts and characters.

A presentation is not merely the difference between two states of the mind as held by Bain and his school. It has a unity and individuality of its own. A fixed idea is a presentation which does not change. It may immanate over and influence the whole consciousness.

The Theory that a presentation is a difference or transition between two mental states, entirely overlooks the fact that no difference is possible unless there are two objects and that each of the objects is a presentation. Each object or presentation must first be known and recognised before a difference between the two objects can be possible or known. Knowing means (1) recognising a single object and (2) comparing one object with

another or referring an object to the class to which it belongs. Knowledge of single presentations is necessary before they can be referred to their respective classes. Bain's theory of objects or presentations entirely overlooks the first meaning of knowing.

§ 10. Dr. Ward's Theory of Subconsciousness.

The term "subconscious" is better suited to denote the facts under this head than the term "unconscious." "Subconscious states are presentations lacking the intensity requisite in the given distribution of attention to change that distribution appreciably" (p. 48, 1st column). "Subconscious presentations may tell on conscious life, although lacking either the differences of intensity or the individual distinctness requisite to make them definite features."

The conception of "subconscious states" implies that all mental states are not presented to consciousness within its field of view, that consciousness has, as it were, a threshold and a background or a surface with depths (as in the case of a sea), that conscious presentations occupy the field, the threshold or the surface, and that, as they lack attention, they go beyond the field or into the background or sink into the depths under the surface. It is of course difficult to say when the subconscious states become completely "unconscious."

The existence of mental states as subconscious is inferred from their effects on conscious life.

The attempt to substitute "mental dispositions, capacities or faculties" for "subconscious states" is only another way of admitting that there are states of the mind of which we are not conscious. For a capacity, disposition or faculty is also a state different from a conscious state which it may produce—the difference being in the degree of intensity and other characters.

Wundt regards conscious states and subconscious states

as corresponding to nervous functions; and when the latter stop, the former also disappear. The degree of consciousness corresponds to the intensity of the nervous function.

Mill regards conscious states as corresponding to a certain degree of intensity of the nervous changes below which there are no mental states at all. He thus refers all so-called unconscious mental states to the states of the nerves lacking the degree of intensity required to produce even the minimum degree of consciousness. There is a difference between Mill's theory and Wundt's. According to the latter, psychical and psychological functions correspond to one another, they are as it were, parallel to each other, one ceasing when the other ceases. This also appears to be Herbert Spencer's theory and has been called the Doctrine of Parallelism. Mill's theory does not presuppose any such parallelism or correspondence but regards the mental or conscious states as emerging at a certain point of the intensity of the nervous activity, below which there are no mental states at all.

§ 11. Qualitative Differences of Sensations:—

How to account for these differences? For Spencer's theory of a primordial unit of consciousness corresponding to a single nerve-shock or neural tremor and his attempt to explain qualitative differences by the various grouping of the varying numbers of this unit, see Spencer "Psychology," Vol. I. § 60.

It is no doubt true that some of our supposed single and simple sensations are really compound and complex and that there is a continuity even in the qualitative differences of our sensations as in the differences of their intensity. This is easily proved in the case of the sensations of the same sense, *e.g.*, colours as of the rainbow.

§ 12. Dr. Ward's Theory of Perception.

Along with differentiation, there goes on in the presentation-continuum another process, namely, integration

or synthesis of the proximately elementary presentations into those complex presentations which are called perceptions, intuitions, sensori-motor reactions and the like.

(*i*) Meaning of perception:—It means sometimes

(1) "The recognition of a sensation or movement as distinct from its mere presentation"; and this implies "the more or less definite revival of certain residua or representations of past experience which resembled the present."

(2) Perception is used more frequently to mean the "localisation and projection of sensations."

(3) Perception as used ordinarily means the reference of an impression to an object or thing. We regard the impression, say of sound or light as the quality of a thing or object distinct not only from the subject attending to the impression but from all presentations whatever to which it attends. The making of such an object—"reifaction" as Dr. Ward calls the process—is due to the constant conjunctions and successions of impressions for which Psychology can give no reason, and the constant movements to which they prompt. "Thus we receive together, *e.g.*, those impressions we now recognize as severally the scent, colour, and 'feel' of the rose we pluck and handle. We might call each a 'percept' and the whole a 'complex percept.' But there is more in such a complex than a sum of partial percepts; there is the apprehension or intuition of the rose as a thing having this scent, colour and texture." Page 52, 2nd column.

(*ii*) Perception thus involves:—

(1) The recognition or assimilation of impressions.

(2) The localisation of impressions.

(3) The intuition of things.

(1) Perception as the mere recognition of impressions

The process may be symbolised as follows:—Aa, A standing for an impression or presentation and a its past residuum.

Recognition thus implies retention, *i.e.*, the retention of a presentation as a residuum. It further implies differentiation and assimilation, *i.e.*, of A with a.

(2) Perception as the localisation of impression:

Recognition implies merely assimilation of an impression. Localisation implies assimilation of an impression and reference of it to space.

How is this reference brought about? It involves the idea of space. How does the psychological individual come by the idea of space?

The idea of space is given by active touch, *i.e.*, by movement aided by contact. It is first given to us by our own body. By exploring our own body we probably learn the first lessons in our perception of space.

Localisation means the association of a passive sensation with the idea of space—the association, for instance, of a sensation of colour with the idea of a surface as given by active touch.

Localisation is the formation of a complex presentation out of simpler ones, one essential element being the idea of space. The sensation of sound is not only recognised but associated with the idea of space and referred to some part of it. A touch is not only felt but referred to or associated with the extension of some part of our body. A colour is not only seen but referred to some part of space.

Localisation is either organic or extra-organic. An impression may be referred to some part of our own body or to some part of space outside our body. It means the addition of new elements to the presentation recognised.

(3) Perception as the intuition of a thing or an object.

Ordinarily perception means the intuition of a thing, *e.g.*, a rose.

A thing or object is something different from all the presentations. It is not a presentation or a mere sum of presentations. It is something *having* the presentations. It is the seat and source of the qualities. It has a special position and it fills a particular portion of space. It resists and introduces the various impressions whi h go together or succeed one another in an orderly manner. Psychology cannot account for this orderly succession or co-existence.

All that psychology may be expected to do is to give an account of the following ideas in regard to a thing or an object:—

(*a*) Its reality or actuality.

(*b*) Its solidity or occupation of space.

(*c*) Its unity and complexity.

(*d*) Its permanence or rather its continuity in time.

(*e*) Its substantiality and the conception of its attributes and powers.

(*a*) The actuality or reality of a thing.

The word "Real" is ambiguous and has several meanings which should be distinguished.

(1) "Real" in the sense of "material" is opposed to "mental."

(2) "Real" in the sense of "existent" is opposed to "non-existent."

(3) "Real" in the sense of "actual" is opposed to "possible."

(4) "Real" in the sense of "sense-given" or "presented by sense" is opposed to the "ideal," or "represented"; "real" is the vivid and opposed to the "faint" states of the mind. "Impressions" are "real" and "ideas" are opposed to the "real."

The last, namely, (4) is the meaning of "real" as used in Psychology and is applicable to all the qualities of a thing. Every quality is "real" when it is presented or given by sense.

(*b*) The impenetrability of an object or a thing.

"Impenetrability" means "filled space." An object occupies a certain portion of space and offers resistance to other objects.

At first objects are compared with our own body as the best known object.

When our movements are resisted, we reach the full meaning of an object as a body more or less like our own body and we attribute to it our subjective sense of effort. We personify it and regard it as the counterpart of our own personality. The object is reached as the correlate of the subject. Like the subject the object is regarded as a seat and source of activity, as possessed of force or power of resistance.

No thing or object in without this power of resistance.

(*c*) The unity and complexity of a thing or an object.

Its unity is due to the reference or projection of the various impressions to the same portion of space. The fact that the same impressions go together or succeed one another in a definite order promotes the belief in the unity of a thing. The belief in its complexity arises from the fact of its being the seat and source of various impressions as scent, colour, 'feel,' taste, etc., in an orange.

(*d*) The temporal continuity of a thing or an object further promotes the belief in its unity.

Our own body is a unity of constant and complex impressions and it is from this source that we probably first learn the ideas of unity and identity. These ideas are afterwards transferred to other bodies as they present constant qualities.

(*e*) The substantiality of a thing or an object means its occupation of space. A thing is a tangible plenum, *i.e.*, something occupying space and offering resistance. This tangible plenum is regarded as the seat and source of all the qualities of the thing. The qualities are our impressions projected to the thing or the portion of space occupied by the thing.

Impenetrability or resistance is the most universal of all the constituents of a thing. Whatever has no resistance is nothing. Thus a shadow though it has both shape and colour is the very type of nothingness as it has no resistance.

"That which occupies space is psychologically the substantial, the other real constituents are but its properties or attributes, the marks or manifestations which lead us to expect its presence" (p. 57, 1st column.

II. Does Consciousness imply an Object as well as a Subject, a Not-self as well as a Self, both in a non-phenomenal sense?

Points of Criticism.

§ 1. Is not an object in a non-phenomenal sense as essential and necessary to consciousness as a subject? Dr. Ward examines the attempts to extrude the subject in a non-phenomenal sense, *i.e.*, English Idealism of Bain and Mill. But he does not examine the attempts to extrude the object in a non-phenomenal sense, *i.e.*, German Idealism of Fichte and Hegel. Can a subject produce its own diffused homogeneous or rather confused state which by differentiation produces all the various presentations? For a presentation a non-phenomenal object is as necessary as a non-phenomenal subject.

§ 2. Does not the object influence or partially determine the development of the various presentations? Dr. Ward seems to have entirely overlooked the influence of the object in the determination of the presentations. He denies emphatically that the subject can absolutely produce its own states or presentations and does not at the same time fully recognise the influence of the object.

§ 3. Dr. Ward fails to prove the objective or extra-mental character of the thing. A thing is "a plenum in space." What is space? Only a form of intuition or synthesis of the subject. How to reconcile these two opposite views of space? A plenum in space seems to suggest that space is an extra-mental or objective existence or receptacle as Dr. Martineau holds, while as a form of intuition, it is only a particular kind of activity

of the subject. The "thing" thus oscillates between an objective extra-mental reality and a subjective product of synthesis of the presentations of the Self. How does he justify his Realism? The thing or object according to him seems to be identical with a synthesis of the presentations and these presentations are only differentiated states of the Self. To justify Realism, or the extra-mental and objective existence of the thing, he must postulate a non-phenomenal object as he postulates a non-phenomenal subject, both being essential elements or factors of consciousness.

§ 4. In his theory of the origin of the idea of cause, he follows Dr. Martineau very closely. The idea is revealed to us on the occasion of our own activity—when we ourselves act as cause. This may be in the simplest act of attention or in the most complicated act of voluntary action or movement, as Dr. Martineau explains fully.

§ 5. Dr. Ward's theory of power does not seem to be as explicit and clear as Dr. Martineau's. If power is phenomenal, if nothing non-phenomenal is revealed to us in our voluntary activity or self-consciousness, then all idea of a spiritual self must be given up. With Dr. Ward, the self is an active non-phenomenal reality. But what is its relation to space? Does he hold with Green that space, time, etc., are all relations existing among the presentations or determinations of the Self, that is, that they have their source in the Self? or does he hold with Dr. Martineau that space is an extra-mental existence and is necessary for the objectification of the Self? Without a more definite view of the nature of space and of its relation to Self, Dr. Ward's theory of the thing as well as his theory of the spiritual self are not free from ambiguity. How is one thing distinguished from another? How is one self distinguished from

another? Primarily by their relations to space. In perception the subject is here and the object or thing there. And the same is true of two selves or persons—one here and the other there. Without space things and persons would lose their objectivity and individuality. Dr. Martineau appears to hold the extra-mental reality of space mainly for this purpose—to explain the independent and individual existence of things and of persons.[1]

§ 6. Dr. Ward's psychology, discarding as it does all non-phenomenal objects, is rather the psychology of the school of Absolute Idealism or of Egoistic Idealism than of any other. If the Self alone is postulated for consciousness and if the presentations are mere developments of the confused primitive state of the Self, then we have nothing but the theory of Egoistic Idealism. This theory postulates not only a self but also asserts that the Self spontaneously produces all its various states or determinations and that these determinations are its objects. An object is therefore only a state or activity of the self and is determined by the self itself. The first determination as well as subsequent ones, all are self-determinations—*i.e.*, determinations in the Self by itself, actions of the Self upon itself, states of the Self produced by itself. No not-self, other than a state or an act of the Self, is needed to account for the phenomena of consciousness. All are states or acts of the Self; and all of them, being successive, are in time, while some of them, being reversible and therefore co-existing, are both in time and space. These latter are, therefore,

[1] For Dr. Martineau's doctrines of Cause, Power, Will, etc., see his "Study of Religion," Vol. I, Book II, Chap. I, and his "Essays, Reviews and Addresses," Vol. III. Is there an axiom of causality?

For his doctrine of Immediate Perception see the same chapter, § 1. B.C. 1st edition, pp. 196-200 and 2nd edition, pp. 185-8.

For his doctrine of Space see the same volume, 1st edition, pp. 68, 202-3, 405-7; 2nd edition, pp. 65, 191, 381-3.

extended, lie side by side, and external to one another. These collectively constitute or make up our External World, while those states or acts which are in time only, make up our Internal world ; but both are alike products of the activity or causality of the Self alone. This is the doctrine of Idealism, which seems to underlie Dr. Ward's account of the development of consciousness.

If Dr. Ward does recognise a non-phenomenal object or a real not-self like Dr. Martineau, he seems to have entirely ignored its existence in the development of our presentations and ideas of things. Where does he recognise its efficiency ? Perhaps at the very beginning of consciousness. That is, the confused state of consciousness of the Self at the beginning is due to the action of the object upon the subject. Well, if it acts upon the subject at the outset, why not also afterwards, at the intermediate stages of development ? Why may not the object, a real not-self, determine the state of the subject and its presentations at successive moments as much as the subject itself ? Are not the different phenomena of our mental life products of the interaction of the self and objects which are other than the self ? If the objective element or factor of consciousness is recognised, it would throughout affect the development of our presentations, and the account would, therefore, be quite different from what Dr. Ward has given it. In fact it would be impossible to treat of the states, acts, or phenomena of the mind from an entirely subjective point of view as has been the fashion with the recent psychologists. Every phenomenon of our mental life has a reference not only to a subject but also to an object and it is impossible to treat of it without this double reference. Consciousness itself presupposes both subject and object in the same sense and every state of consciousness is a product of both the factors. In some the reference to one

factor may be more explicit than in others. But in all and every one there is a reference to both, implicit or explicit.

If this be true, then the present method of the treatment of mental phenomena in Psychology is essentially false ; and Psychology must again be united with Metaphysics and both regarded as an inseparable study of consciousness implying both a Subject and an Object, a Self and a Not-self, as its essential elements or factors.

§ 7. In his discussion of the standpoint of Psychology Dr. Ward says :—

" Paradoxical though it may be, we must then conclude that psychology cannot be defined by refereuce to a special subject-matter as such concrete sciences, for example, as mineralogy and botany can; and since it deals in some sort with the whole of experience, it is obviously not an abstract science, in any ordinary sense of the term. To be characterised at all, therefore, apart from metaphysical assumptions, it must be characterised by the standpoint from which this experience is viewed " (1st column, p. 38).

He points out that this experience, *i.e.* " the whole of experience," is viewed in psychology as the experience of some individual.

" The standpoint of Psychology then," he says, " is individualistic ; by whatever methods, from whatever sources its facts are ascertained, they must—to have a psychological import—be regarded as having place in, or as being part of, *some one's consciousness.* In this sense, *i.e.*, as presented to an individual, " the whole choir of heaven and furniture of earth " may belong to psychology, but otherwise they are psychological nonentities " (2nd column, p. 38).

He then proceeds to analyse consciousness and shows that it implies an individual Ego to which its states are presented—to which its feelings, its ideas and activities

belong and that all attempts to extrude the Ego are fruitless. But he entirely overlooks the fact that all attempts to extrude the non-Ego are equally fruitless. Locke assumes an outer world of reality for the explanation of his ideas. Berkeley assumes a world of spirits as causing the phenomena he perceives. Both of them believe that the states of consciousness imply or presuppose both an individual Ego and a world other than the Ego, both determining or jointly producing consciousness and its states. Hume abolishes both the Ego and the non-Ego, leaving only the states of consciousness or impressions and ideas. With him and his followers, the Ego and the non-Ego are mere bundles of impressions and ideas, there is no such subject as is assumed by Dr. Ward nor is there any such object as I am contending for. Mill himself, though a follower of Hume, postulates "a permanent possibility of sensation" as an object and "a permanent possibility of feeling" or "a permanent element of the thread of consciousness," as the subject, these two permanent factors of the states of consciousness corresponding to the non-Ego and the Ego respectively. In his "Psychology" Dr. Ward has nothing corresponding to Locke's outer world, to Berkeley's world of spirits, other than the self, or to Mill's "permanent possibilities of sensation." But in his work on "The Realm of Ends," he postulates other subjects and holds that objects are the products of the interaction of the subjects. These subjects are somewhat like Berkeley's spirits. They are sentient and conative monads with windows for interaction. They are spiritual beings out of time and space but capable of acting and reacting upon one another. Berkeley confined the term spirit to man and God. But Dr. Ward extends its denotation and applies it to whatever is in its essence possessed of the powers of feeling and willing. His monads are spiritual units or atoms and

all phenomena including time and space are the results of their interaction.

§ 8. To me it is evident that the states of consciousness in an individual subject or monad would be determined not only by its capacities of feeling, knowing and willing but also by the powers of the subjects or monads acting upon it, that the experience of an individual subject would not begin until it was acted upon by another subject and that the experience thus started would continue to be influenced and determined as regards its quality and quantity by the subjects acting upon it. In tracing the development of "the whole of experience" of an individual subject, it would be necessary to take into account the activity and interaction of both the individual subject and the other subjects. The other subjects are, in fact, from my point of view, the non-phenomenal objects which I consider to be essential and necessary to the states of consciousness of an individual subject. A non-phenomenal object and a non-phenomenal subject, a not-self and a self are, I hold, given to us on the occasion of immediate perception. Of the non-phenomenal objects thus immediately known by us, some are found by observation to be also subjects. The objects are known intuitively as the correlates of myself; while the knowledge that some of these objects which are other than myself, are also, like myself, possessed of feelings and volitions is inferential. Without a direct and immediate knowledge of objects as non-phenomenal, I should know my own self only as a non-phenomenal reality and I should be landed in solipsism with the belief that all objects and all so-called subjects other than myself are nothing but phenomena or groups of presentations or states of consciousness, somehow, evolved or produced by myself. If my own self is identified with the Absolute, the theory would be that of Absolute Idealism. In

Green's form of it, the human self is a reproduction of the spiritual principle of the universe. With Hegel and his thorough-going followers, there is no non-phenomenal reality and the Absolute is the total whole of phenomena called by them ideas or thoughts, with individual subjects and objects as groups of phenomena. Kant distinguishes a transcendental and an empirical subject and, also, a transcendental and an empirical object. The transcendental subject and the transcendental object are both non-phenomenal while the empirical subject and the empirical object are both phenomenal.[1] He thus uses the words subject and object in two senses; and while Dr. Ward accepts the term subject in its transcendental sense as necessary for Psychology, he rejects the term object in the same sense as unnecessary. But what is an empirical object apart from a transcendental object? An empirical object is a presentation or a group of presentations. Whence is a presentation? Is it not a determination of the transcendental subject by a transcendental object? Would not the determinations be different according to the nature of transcendental objects acting upon the individual transcendental subject? Abolish Kant's transcendental objects and his system is reduced to either Egoistic Idealism, the Ego alone producing and determining all the objects or to some form of Absolute Idealism, with the Absolute Self producing the universe with all its objects or with our own Self as a reproduction of the Absolute producing all its phenomena. Abolish also the transcendental self of Kant and his system is reduced to the pan-phenomenalistic sensationalism of French and English philosophers, *e.g.*, Comte and Bain, on the one hand, and to the pan-phenomenalistic

[1] See my paper on "Kant's Doctrine of the Free Causality of Reason," read before the Society on the 22nd of December, 1913, especially § 3, pp. 26-27 and § 5,

idealism of Hegel, on the other, the former being a mechanical and the latter a teleological system.

§9. Kant distinguishes noumenal causation from phenomenal causation.[1] Dr. Ward recognises this distinction in his "Realm of Ends," pp. 302-4. Had Kant fully recognised the distinction, while writing his "Critique of Pure Reason," and made proper use of it in his "Æsthetic" and "Analytic," he would have regarded the transcendental ego and the transcendental object as joint causes of the empirical object and, also, of the empirical subject, both being products of the differentiation of the presentations produced by the interaction of the two causes. Unfortunately he was prepossessed with the idea of phenomenon as cause and tried to explain it as a category of the understanding. This category is now taken to be either a postulate or a result of observation and induction, while the principle of noumenal causation—that a cause in its true sense is an active non-phenomenal reality—is an intuition. What a cause is, is known directly in our voluntary activity on the occasion of our self acting as cause. In his "Realm of Ends" (Lecture XIII, Freedom), Dr. Ward attributes both efficiency and spontaneity to self as cause. In regard to the 'concept of cause' he says: "Its source and primary meaning we find unquestionably in ourselves as active or efficient" (p. 273). He points out that this concept of cause is not to be identified with Kant's category of cause or "the idea of necessary connection according to law, or the uniformity of nature, as it is otherwise called, for it is this, now-a-days at any rate, that is meant first of all when the term causality is scientifically used" (p. 275). "The scientific principle of causality in short is," he says, "a necessary postulate: scientific knowledge—in other words, knowledge expressed

[1] See the Paper referred to in the foot-note on p. 51.

in general propositions concerning matters of fact—is possible only on the assumption that events actually happen with strict and uniform regularity" (p. 277).

10. In the same work (p. 129), Dr. Ward admits that "experience from the outset involves both subject and object, both self and other, and that the differentiation of both factors proceeds strictly *pari passu*." In this connection, it is worth quoting the whole paragraph containing the argument which leads to this admission.

"There is still a further remark of some importance that may opportunely be made here. It is often said that experience cannot actually 'testify to anything more than the existence of the subject—the existence of a plurality of similar Egos is an inference, a hypothesis to explain the phenomena.' But drawing inferences and framing explanatory hypotheses pre-supposes a self-conscious intelligence already possessed of that objective experience, which by implying its own universality and necessity, implies also a plurality of selves. On this assumption then we come to a deadlock and find ourselves revolving in a hopeless circle. But the escape is simple, once we recognise that experience from the outset involves both subject and object, both self and other, and that the differentiation of both factors proceeds strictly *pari passu*."

The only remark I shall make on this passage is that the object or something other than self involved in experience from the outset is of the same ontological nature as the subject or self and not merely a presentation or a group of presentations. The self and the not-self, the subject and the object are both centres of activity. The not-self is a correlate of the self and both are known directly on the occasion of immediate perception as held by Dr. Martineau and also Hamilton and Reid.

§11. In this connection I must for a moment refer to a remark which Dr. Ward makes on Kant's doctrine of

apperception as giving us a knowledge of objects. He says :—

"We come then to Kant's main position, the objective deduction, *viz.*, that apperception—or that consciousness of objects which goes with self-consciousness—as opposed to perception, is the precondition of all intelligent and scientific experience. What we are here concerned about is not to call the principle in question but simply to indicate and emphasise the one point that Kant completely overlooked. It is a fact, at any rate, that 'the absolutely first foundation of such objective experience' is to be found only in society, in inter-subjective intercourse, and not in 'apperception as a faculty' pertaining to the isolated individual mind" (p. 127).

If there is no consciousness of objects involved in Kant's "apperception" or self-consciousness which corresponds to what Hamilton and Martineau regard as "immediate perception," how is an object or something other than self known? How are other subjects or selves known? What are they? Are they mere groups of presentations, that is, objects in the phenomenal sense only? Or, are they non-phenomenal, active and substantive realities similar or correlate to the one subject directly revealed to us in self-consciousness? In the passage quoted above from his "Realm of Ends," p. 129, Dr. Ward rejects the view that their existence is "an inference, a hypothesis to explain the phenomena" and holds that "experience from the outset involves both subject and object, both self and other, and that the differentiation of both factors proceeds strictly *pari passu.*" If so, the act which reveals a subject reveals also an object. Kant is therefore, right in maintaining that self-consciousness or apperception involves consciousness of objects. But of what kind of objects? Are these objects only the common elements of our subjective experience, *i. e.*, the elements common to

the consciousness of all subjects as distinguished from those which are characteristic of, and present only in, an individual subject? Such objects would be only groups of presentations or "ejects" as they have been called. They would not possess the character of the subject or self. They would not be, as they should be if they have the same character as the subject or self, non-phenomenal and substantive realities. They would not be capable of playing the part of subjects in a society. There would, in fact, be no other subjects or selves and no society whatever. The other subjects are first known as objects possessing the same character as my own self or subject. They are given directly in our immediate perception which reveals at once both a self and a not self, a subject and an object, possessing the same character but opposite in action and position. Both are centres of activity and causality. As acting and reacting upon each other—the subject or self reacting upon the impression made on it by the activity of a not-self or object—they reveal each other's existence in the same act of perception. No perception is possible without the activity of the self; and no sensation is possible without the activity of a not-self. If a sensation is not merely an impression on a self or subject but implies a reaction of the latter upon the impression to make it a conscious state or sensation of the self, then every sensation as the result of the interaction of a self and not-self, is an elementary perception. It implies the reciprocal activity of both and reveals the existence of both. This would justify the Hamiltonian doctrine that every sensation is accompanied by a perception. According to Hamilton, perception is an immediate knowledge of both the subject and the object as substances, while according to Dr. Ward, perception as an act of consciousness implies a subject or self as "a pure ego" or a non-phenomenal reality but not an object of the same or like character.

The object is, according to him, only a presentation or a group of presentations existing in the mind. According to Dr. Martineau, immediate perception reveals a not-self and a self as correlates, acting and reacting upon each other as causes occupying different points of space. They are both centres of power. Both are alternately active and passive. They are not mere phenomena but the ground of all phenomena. No phenomenon is possible without a substance as a source of power. Every true cause is a source of power which is liberated on the occasion of its stimulation by a phenomenon. The self is a source of power which is exerted on the occasion of its activities. Its activity in the form of attention is necessary for all states of consciousness. Its power is directly known by us on the occasion of every effort made by us to do something, to overcome some difficulty or to remove some obstacle. The not-self as a correlate of the self is also a centre or source of power. The term not-self is very comprehensive as it includes every substance and source of power other than the one self which is the subject in relation to all other selves and substances as objects. It comprises all other persons, all other living things and all other bodies as sources of power. They can all act and react upon one another. In the case of other persons we believe that their selves and conscious states are like our own. In the case of lower animals this holds good to a certain extent according to their resemblance to us. In the case of plants their irritability, as proved by the experiments of Professor Sir J. C. Bose, indicates some resemblance to animals. In the case of inorganic objects, powers or forces only are attributed to them. They act and react upon one another as in chemical processes showing that they have special affinity for each other. They resist movements indicating that they are sources or seats of power or force. Light, heat, electricity as causing

mechanical and chemical actions and stimulating vital processes are sources of power. In the case of these objects, we have no evidence of their inner states or changes being conscious. In the case of plants, there may or may not be vague conscious states. Their vitality or life-force lies intermediate between the forces of the mineral world and the mentality or mind of animals. In man the power is not only sentient and intellectual but also moral and spiritual. He is not only conscious of himself and of the various objects around him but also of the infinite and eternal Power which is the source of his own power and of all the powers and forces acting in this wonderful universe.

§12. According to Dr. Ward the subject-matter of Psychology is the whole of experience in a concrete form as belonging to an individual subject. In this sense, "the whole choir of heaven and furniture of earth" may belong to Psychology. Whatever is or may be present in one's consciousness, comes under Psychology. In the case of an individual, the experience or consciousness has a beginning and an end. Psychology may trace the genesis of the experience of an individual subject and mark the different stages of its growth and development. Such a study of the mental life of the individual would correspond to what is called embryology in biology. Psychology may also study the different aspects of the mental life of an individual in its most mature form. Such a study may be helped by the former but it is a distinct and different study just as the anatomy and physiology of man are different from the anatomy and physiology of the embryos. The former confine themselves to the structure and functions of the organs of the adult and fully developed man, while the latter study the structure and functions of the organs of the embryos in different stages of development. Psychology has been treated very much

as the embryology of the human mind. It has studied the mind of the child and the animal and traced its growth and development, without specially attending to and marking the various aspects of the mental life as they are found in the most developed and mature form. Experience grows and develops. So does mental life. So does consciousness. But it is important to know what consciousness is in its fully developed and mature state,—what its various aspects are in this state. Then only the problem may arise, how those different aspects have been generated and how their growth and development may be traced from their genesis. In a second paper I propose to treat of the different aspects of our fully developed consciousness or mental life.

Dr. James Ward's "Psychology"

BY

P. K. RAY, D.Sc. (LOND. & EDIN.)

II

PART I.—*Subject of 1st paper continued.*[1]

§ 1. In my first paper on Dr. Ward's Psychology I tried to show that experience involves two non-phenomenal factors, namely, the subject and the object, and that the quality and the quantity of the contents of experience are determined by the nature of both. On the basis of these two propositions I held that if Psychology treats of the whole of experience of an individual subject as defined by Dr. Ward, it must again be united with Metaphysics and both regarded as an inseparable study of consciousness implying a non-phenomenal subject and a non-phenomenal object as its essential factors.

The main position of the First paper.[1]

§ 2. It is satisfactory to find that Dr. Ward in his revised and enlarged work on Psychology called "Psychological Principles" published in 1918 by the Cambridge University Press, recognises the truth of my fundamental contention, namely, that experience, even the minimum of it, implies two non-phenomenal factors. "So we come," he says, "to describe experience as reciprocal interaction or *mutuum commercium*. This implies two agents and not merely two kinds of

Its truth recognised by Dr. Ward in his recent work on Psychology.

[1] The first paper (A Review and Criticism of Dr. James Ward's "Psychology" published in Encyclopædia Britannica, 9th Edition, Vol. XX, 1886) was read before the Society on the 26th of March, 1917. It is published by S. K. Lahiri & Co.

phenomena—one external, the other internal—whatever that may mean. Of what nature the agency is to which we owe our sense-data is a problem but to suppose that we ourselves are only phenomenal and resolvable into sense-data is after all impossible; for how then do we come to talk of the phenomenal as distinct from the real? But when we know both it is possible perhaps to talk of 'degrees of reality' not however, if we deny our own reality altogether."—[P. 382, "Psychological Principles."]

What interaction of two non-phenomenal agents implies.

§ 3. Experience is interaction between two non-phenomenal agents. Interaction of two agents implies that each is alternately active and passive. When the agent A acts, say, upon the agent B, A is active and B passive or receptive. When the agent B acts upon the agent A, B is active and A passive. Reciprocal interaction or *mutuum commercium* implies that each of the two agents is both receptive and active. As active, each is possessed of power or some faculty of affecting the other. As receptive or passive, each is possessed of some capacity of being affected by the other. Experience is the result of the interaction of the two agents. There is no experience before such interaction. The experience of a subject as a non-phenomenal agent begins when it is acted upon by another agent and when it reacts upon the latter. The subject is conscious of the result of this interaction. The subject experiences the result which is a phenomenon. The psychical life of the subject begins as the effect of its interaction with another agent. The life thus started continues to develop by further interaction with other agents and with the same agent. The effects or phenomena thus experienced by the subject through the continuous interaction of non-phenomenal agents constitute the psychical life or experience of the

subject. The non-phenomenal agents acting upon the subject are the real objects which I regard as essential to the life and experience of the subject as the subject itself. The quality and quantity of the experience of the subject are determined by the interaction of the subject with the different non-phenomenal agents or real objects which act and react upon it. The experience thus produced is permeated by the subject and also by the real objects. The elements of both the subject and the objects enter into it. If the subject is immanent in its experience, as held by Dr. Ward, so is the real or non-phenomenal object, by interaction with which it has been produced. If the subject is not fully exhausted or manifested in its experience but transcends it, as held by Dr. Ward, so is the object. The subject and the object as two non-phenomenal agents are the two poles or two centres of activity of all experience. In the experience of an individual subject is present not only the subject itself, which Dr. Ward recognises and to which Dr. Ward attributes the sole activity of attention but also the plurality of real non-phenomenal objects or agents by interaction with which the whole of the experience of the individual subject has been produced. In the experience which Dr. Ward regards as "minimal," p. 378, there is present a non-phenomenal object which he does not recognise, as well as a non-phenomenal subject which he does recognise. His representation of it as S *p* O, where O is a mere presentation, overlooks the non-phenomenal object without which there is no experience and consequently no presentation at all. In my view O is the non-phenomenal object, S the non-phenomenal subject, and *p* the experience of S in relation to O. S and O are the two non-phenomenal agents which by their interaction have produced

In S *p* O both S and O are non-phenomenal agents and *p* the experience of S, produced by the interaction of S and O; *p* varies with the nature of O.

the minimal experience *p* and which are immanent in it. As *p* grows and develops, certain elements are referred to S and certain other elements are referred to O. But in our minimal experience, both S and O as non-phenomenal agents are present. While S is constant in an individual experience, O varies, but remains always a non-phenomenal agent throughout experience. The richness and variety of the experience of an individual subject is due to the different powers or so-called qualities of the different individual non-phenomenal agents or objects in the world. A thing as an individual object is really an agent acting and reacting upon a subject and producing various sensations constituting the sensuous life or experience of the individual subject. A beautiful object similarly acting and reacting upon the individual subject produces its æsthetic experience. A good and virtuous man as a non-phenomenal agent acts and reacts upon the individual subject and produces its feelings of respect and regard towards him. In this way, the individual subject in its development by interaction with various agents in Nature and in Society passes through many stages, noted by Dr. Ward as follows :—(1) The sensitive and appetitive, (2) the imagining and desiring, (3) thinking and willing, (4) the pure ego or self. These stages of the individual subject or self are not, it should be observed, like the stages of (1) childhood, (2) adolescence, (3) maturity and (4) old age of a man: they all co-exist in a more developed form in the ripe experience of the self. "But this concept," says Dr. Ward, "of the pure ego, of the real self, is *in order of time* rather where the series ends than where it begins; for as experience advances the zonal series extends both outwards and inwards, so to say," p. 362. That is, the sensitive and appetitive self, the imagining and desiring self, the thinking and willing self and the pure ego, though developing

successively one after another, all co-exist and attain fuller and fuller development in the ripe experience of the individual subject. The concept of self underlies all experience and passes through the stages noted above. It is difficult to analyse it and ascertain the conditions of its development. All presentations whatever, that of self no less than the rest, are mine; they are my objects, and I am the subject attending to them. "The presentation of self, then," says Dr. Ward, "is one presentation among others, the result, like them, of the differentiation of the original continuum." The original continuum is, according to Dr. Ward, the confused indistinguishable mass from which all presentations arise by differentiation. It is the starting point of the experience of an individual subject. We have noticed above that in his recent work on "Psychological Principles" he recognises the fact that even minimal experience is the effect or result of the interaction of two non-phenomenal agents one of which is the individual subject and the other must be regarded as a non-phenomenal object. The differentiation of this primal experience gives rise to presentations, some being referred to the individual subject as an agent and some to the object as another agent. As differentiation proceeds, the presentation of self as empirical goes along with the presentation of a not-self as also empirical; but the empirical self and the empirical not-self are, in my view, partial manifestations of the non-phenomenal subject and the non-phenomenal object respectively. I hold that both the individual subject (or self) and an object as non-phenomenal agents underlie the primal experience, the one continuous indistinguishable mass (if there be any); and that all the empirical selves which arise by differentiation of our varied experience are but partial manifestations of the non-phenomenal self as an agent and that all the empirical objects

which arise along with the same differentiation are partial manifestations of the non-phenomenal objects or agents which, by their interaction with the individual subject, produce its growing and advancing experience. The sensitive and appetitive self, the imagining and desiring self, the thinking and willing self, are all manifestations of the one non-phenomenal individual subject. They are all empirical. They may all be called presentations in the language of Dr. Ward. As presentations referred to the non-phenomenal Self, they imply presentations referred to the non-phenomenal Not-Self or objects as agents. Both the sets of presentations, those referred to the Self and those referred to the Not-Self, arise by differentiation of the experience of the individual subject; and if a presentation is called an object, *i.e.*, an empirical object, then the former set, that is, those referred to the subject may be called subject-objects and the latter set, that is, those referred to the non-phenomenal Not-Self, object-objects.

Dr. Ward's theory of the development of experience overlooks the action of the non-phenomenal agents of the World on the Self.

§ 4. Dr. Ward's theory of the development of presentations by differentiation from the original continuum requires only the agency of the Self as attending, but entirely overlooks the agency of a Not-Self as affecting and developing the original continuum. The recognition of the fact of interaction between two agents as a condition of experience implies that the Not-Self as an agent is a determining factor of experience, that the contents of the experience of an individual subject are affected by every agent that acts and reacts upon it. If Psychology treats, as Dr. Ward holds, of the whole of the experience of an individual subject, it must recognise not only the existence of the non-phenomenal agents acting upon the subject, but take into consideration the effects produced upon its

experience by their varying agencies. The sensations of the subject vary in quality according to the nature of the different non-phenomenal agents acting upon it. The sensation of fragrance implies a fragrant agent. The sensation of taste implies a gustatory agent. The sensation of colour or light implies light as an agent. The sensation of sound implies an agent that can produce this sensation. The sensations of extension and resistance imply corresponding agents. These sensations are qualitatively different from one another and the attempt to deduce them all from the original continuum by differentiation through the attention of the subject without the action of the corresponding agents upon it, is, in my opinion, entirely futile and contradicts the view that our experience implies interaction of two non-phenomenal agents. Our primal experience or the original continuum may be a confused and indistinguishable mass produced by the simultaneous action of a number of agents, say, those of fragrance, sound and light, and the subject by its attention to this mass may differentiate the presentation of a fragrance from that of a sound or the latter from that of a colour; but this does not mean that there are not different agents corresponding to them or that they have been produced by the subject without any agent whatever. Pan-phenomenalistic Psychologists may hold that the primal experience of the original confused mass is the only *given* (datum) for Psychology and that out of it, by discrimination, assimilation and retention, arise both the subject and the object and that there is neither a non-phenomenal subject nor a non-phenomenal object underlying or producing it. Bain has attempted to explain the genesis and development of the subject and the object by this method. With Bain both are phenomenal and there is neither a non-phenomenal subject nor a non-phenomenal object. Dr. Ward, however,

postulates a non-phenomenal subject as underlying all experience and holds further that our experience is due to the interaction of two non-phenomenal agents. As a Psychologist he thinks that the recognition of the subject is indispensable, for experience implies an experient and has no meaning without it. But has experience any meaning without the object? Is it possible without a second agent acting upon the subject as an agent? If there is a second agent necessary for the genesis of experience, are not both implicit in it—the object as much as the subject? If we know the subject, we know also the object. Both are known, as I have shown in my first paper, in the same indivisible act of Immediate Perception. Both are alternately active and passive; both are centres of activity and receptivity; both are alternately causes; both are non-phenomenal agents; both are known together as correlates. Dr. Ward is, in my opinion, fundamentally mistaken in regarding the object as a mere presentation. It is a non-phenomenal agent to which a presentation is referred just as the subject is a non-phenomenal agent to which also a presentation is referred. The latter one I have called subject-object as distinguished from the former which I have called object-object. Both the presentations are differentiations from our experience produced by the interaction of the non-phenomenal subject and the non-phenomenal object. As I have stated above, both these agents are immanent in our experience and our experience is bi-polar—due to the interaction of two centres of activity and not of one only. The figure representing our experience is not a circle within a circle, the inner circle standing for the Self and its experience, and the outer circle for the external world, as Professor Fraser represented it with reference to Locke's theory of knowledge, but a circle or an ellipse with two centres of activity, both within the figure.

Berkeley abolished Locke's external world and Fraser represented his theory by the inner circle only, overlooking the activity of the infinite Spirit. Dr. Ward refers to Fraser's representation of Berkeley's theory with evident approval, overlooking the fact admitted by himself that experience is the result of the interaction of a non-phenomenal self and a non-phenomenal not-self. The figure representing our experience must therefore have two foci or centres of activity and not one.

The Self is a non-phenomenal agent.

§ 5. The best example of a non-phenomenal agent is our own self. In the structure of the ripest experience of a fully developed man, the self is (1) creative, (2) thinking and willing, (3) imagining and desiring, (4) sensitive and appetitive as shown by Dr. Ward. All these functions or activities which are only incipient in the child are fully developed in our ripe experience. The Self develops all these activities in its intercourse with Nature and Society. It is dormant in the new-born babe, until it is roused by the activities of the agents which surround it. It passes through many stages developing its activities more and more as it comes into contact with different agents and passes through different levels of experience until it is free and creative and has those manifold functions which are attributed to an individual human spirit. The self throughout its development is alternately active and passive and retains its identity. It is not merely active as held by some and not merely passive as held by others. It is receptive as in the case of sensations, or presentations, and affections of pleasure and pain, of feelings and emotions; and active as in attending, discriminating, thinking, willing, deciding, resolving, creating. In perceiving and knowing it is partly receptive and partly active. Even in a sensation it is partly active as well as receptive. There are no doubt many

sensations which are involuntarily forced upon the Self but there are also many which require its voluntary attention. Without some reaction from the Self, voluntary or involuntary, there would be no sensation. The not-self as correlate and opposed to self is, as I have shown in my first paper, a very comprehensive term including in its denotation all other persons, all animals, all plants and all inorganic objects as agents. To begin with the last, the chemical elements such as oxygen, carbon, phosphorus, etc., as seats or sources of activities must be regarded as agents. Electricity, light, heat, sound, etc., are recognised as energies, and must be regarded as agents. They are also not merely phenomenal but active realities. They act upon the self and produce various sensations. An individual object such as a candle is also both passive and active. It is a unity of activities and passivities inasmuch as by its interaction with certain other agents, it can produce certain phenomena which we call a flame. A rose is also a unity of certain activities and passivities. It is a unity of the agents of fragrance, of light or colour, of resistance and extension. Each sensation as an item of our experience implies the self and a not-self as a distinct agent. The rose as a not-self producing the sensations of fragrance, colour, extension and resistance, is a unity of the corresponding distinct agents interacting with the self. The instinctive tendency is to attribute each sensation to an agent and to regard a thing producing several distinct sensations as a unity of several distinct agents. Each agent is an activity other than that of the self. Whether the different activities or agencies constituting a thing such as a candle or a rose can be reduced in number and derived from a few or one is a question for science to settle.

The Not-Self is also a non-phenomenal agent and comprises agents of different kinds—*viz.*, (1) other persons, (2) animals, (3) plants, (4) inorganic objects.

Plants and animals are also seats of many activities and must be regarded as agents. By interaction and intercourse with them we have many phenomena which constitute an important part of our experience. The most important other agents which interact with one's self are his fellow-beings in the family and society. The higher the family into which a child is born, the greater is its early development. The better the society in which a man lives, the loftier is his own self. All this is due to the fact of interaction of one's self with the selves of other persons. The highest creative self is developed only in society. The highest sentiments of love and reverence are developed only as one comes in contact with persons of the highest character. What is called Ethical Psychology comes into existence only in a society. What is called Religious Psychology is possible only in a self that recognises God as a Supreme Agent—the source of all agents in the Universe. We thus see that the development of the self is entirely dependent on its interaction with the different agents of the world—physical, chemical, biological, mental and moral and also with the Supreme Agent of the Universe. All these agents are not mere phenomena but Realities with partial phenomenal manifestations in their activities. There is no phenomenon which is not the manifestation of the activity of a Reality but the latter is not exhausted in its manifestation. As a cause the Reality is active and a source of power but its power is manifested gradually in its activities at the different stages of development. The self as a Reality is active and manifests its power in the sensitive and appetitive stage as well as in the thinking and willing stage. The phenomena of experience produced by these activities of the self with the agents of the world may be regarded as effects but these effects do not exhaust or do not fully

Our experience is determined by the action of these agents.

represent either the self or the agents that interact with it. The effects as phenomena are pervaded jointly both by the self and the agents. The self is more than its phenomena. The agents are more than the phenomena which they produce by their interaction. The self is immanent in the phenomena and also transcends them. It is a Reality which is present in all its manifestations in the different stages of its development. It is not purely phenomenal and resolvable into sense-data. What is it? And how do we know it?

What is self as a non-phenomenal agent?

§ 6. After Kant, Dr. Ward seems to hold that it is an Idea of Reason—that it is the last term of the subjective series of phenomena. But Kant regarded the self also as a true cause of our voluntary actions. The self as Reason is a free cause—a cause not existing in time and therefore without an antecedent but determining a voluntary action, —freely introducing new elements into the circumstances which determine such an action. He called it noumenal as distinguished from phenomenal, pure as distinguished from empirical. But this does not imply that there are two selves or egoes, pure and empirical, entirely distinct or separated from each other, that there is an impassable gulf between the two as has been imagined by some followers of Kant but that they are inseparably connected, the empirical or phenomenal being a determination or manifestation of the pure or noumenal self through the agency of a not-self. The noumenal self is the non-phenomenal agent which as the real subject, develops successively in time (1) as the sensitive and appetitive, (2) as the imagining and desiring, (3) as the thinking and willing, (4) as the creative and free spirit. It is the noumenal or non-phenomenal self which is present in our primal and in our subsequent growing and advancing experience. It is this self which is receptive and active

and which by interactions with the agents of the world produces the experience of which it is conscious. It is the noumenal self which is present in our sensuous experience, in our æsthetic experience, in our moral experience, in our religious experience. It is the noumenal self which attends and discriminates, which distinguishes presentations into me and not-me, which reasons, judges and deliberates, resolves, strives and attempts to realise the ideals of life. This noumenal self is the real self. Whatever name we may apply to it, the real self has both activity and receptivity. It is that which experiences our experience. But our experience implies also a Not-Self which is also non-phenomenal or noumenal, both active and receptive. The Not-Self is also a reality or a series of reality of different degrees, which is not purely phenomenal and which cannot be resolved into mere changes but which implies something permanent and present in all its changes and which is more than the sum of the changes. It is what Kant calls the thing-in-itself as distinguished from the empirical or phenomenal things. Kant regards it as an Idea of Reason—as the last term of the world-series of phenomena. It is, according to him, real but transcendental. It lies beyond all experience. He regards it as the transcendental ground of our experience. With Kant the Self and the Not-Self are thus both ideas of Reason and both transcendental. To the Self he attributes free causality. In consistency he ought to ascribe to the Not-Self also free causality and regard it as a reality, not existing in time and causing our sensations by interaction with the Self. The two realities, Self and Not-Self, are both noumenal and non-phenomenal, not existing in time but producing phenomena by their interaction. The Not-Self, like the Self, is also a true cause—a cause which is not merely phenomenal. It includes

What is Not-Self as an agent.

(1) other persons or selves which are causes like the Self, (2) all lower animals which are possessed of activities and are not therefore merely phenomenal, (3) all plants which are seats of the activities of growth and development and (4) inorganic objects which are seats of power and force as manifested in their actions upon each other. All these non-phenomenal agents are causes of the experience of the Self. They correspond to Kant's things-in-themselves. Kant was too much prepossessed by Hume's conception of cause as a mere phenomenon to think of the causality of his things-in-themselves and he had treated, in his "Analytic," of the category of cause just to meet Hume's objection to the relation of necessity between cause and effect. He had regarded both as phenomena but the relation between them as necessary because they are inseparably connected as antecedent and consequent in time. He had entirely overlooked the causality which he afterwards ascribed to Self as a noumenal Reality or Reason. Had he not done so, or had he had time to revise and re-write his three Critiques in the light of this fundamental truth of the causality of noumena as realities, he would have regarded things-in-themselves as causes. These things-in-themselves of Kant correspond to the non-phenomenal agents of the world of Dr. Ward. Kant had great difficulty in proving their existence. As, according to him, a cause was merely a phenomenon, they could not consistently be regarded as causes of our sensations. They were therefore abolished by those of his followers such as Fichte who deduced both the Ego and the Non-Ego from the Absolute Ego postulated by him. Hegel was not satisfied with Kant's distinction of noumena and phenomena as two separate worlds. He identified the noumena with his categories and replaced Fichte's Absolute Ego by his Absolute Idea. Kant's things-in-themselves were retained by those of his

followers, who regarded them as the ground of the sensations produced in the Self. Among these followers there are two classes, namely, (1) those who regard the belief in the existence of things-in-themselves as realities, as an inference by the application of the principle of noumenal causation, and (2) those who regard the belief as an intuition, the Self and the not-self being given or revealed at the same time as correlates in the same act of immediate perception.

Is the belief in a Not-Self intuitive or inferential with Dr. Ward ?

I am not sure to which of these two classes Dr. Ward belongs. It is certain that he believes in non-phenomenal agents as realities other than the Self. He calls them ejects and refers to Clifford's theory of Ejection for explanation. Well, Clifford was a pure phenomenalist and his ejects could be only groups of phenomena like the phenomenal subject. Dr. Ward's eject is a real Not-self like the real Self—the Self thrown out as an eject or a reality like the Self but other than the Self. The tendency to do so is described as instinctive and the belief in an eject like that in the Self as naturally produced. But how to justify this belief? If it is not an intuition, it can be justified only by the principle of noumenal causation. The eject is a non-phenomenal cause like the Self. The Self as a non-phenomenal cause is immediately known, while the Not-self as a non-phenomenal cause is known by reasoning—by analogical inference. But in a famous passage quoted by me in my first paper, page 25, Dr. Ward admits that "experience from the outset involves both subject and object, both Self and other, and that the differentiation of both factors proceeds strictly *pari passu*." If an object or something other than Self, that is, a Not-self, is involved with a Self in our experience from the outset, then both are given at the same time without any inference, that is, intuitively, and the belief

in an object, that is, in a real Not-self as a non-phenomenal agent, is intuitive and not the result of reasoning or inference. It is not quite clear which view he really holds —whether he regards the belief in a Not-self as intuitive or as inferential. Dr. Ward believes in a plurality of monads and holds that the experience of the human monad as an individual subject is produced by its interaction with other monads. He can justify his belief in the existence of the other monads only if he knows his own monad and knows it as a non-phenomenal cause. This knowledge may not be given in what he calls the primal experience but may be produced in the course of the intercourse of the individual monad with other monads. The knowledge of the Self as a cause and also of the Not-Self as a cause may be given at the same time or the latter may follow the former; but the principle of the Self and the Not-Self as causes, must be regarded as a fundamental principle. This principle of noumenal or real causation is the foundation-stone of the systems which attempt to escape from the fallacies of Solipsism on the one hand and those of Pan-phenomenalism on the other.

Both Self and Not-self are real or noumenal causes.

Solipsism overlooks the causality of Not-self.

§ 7. Every phenomenon has a cause which is not a phenomenon but a non-phenomenal active reality. This is the fundamental principle of causation which underlies Dr. Ward's system. It is this principle which leads him to regard experience as the result of the interaction of two non-phenomenal agents, for, as it is, according to him, not due to the activity of the Self alone as held by Solipsism, there must be another agent. This principle also saves him from Pan-phenomenalism, for phenomena by themselves are not true causes but are the results of the interaction of non-phenomenal agents. Every

phenomenon arises out of something which is not a phenomenon. It is the result of the interaction of two non-phenomenal agents or causes. We are directly conscious of such agents or causes in our own voluntary activity. The earliest manifestation of such activity is in immediate perception which gives at once both a Self and a Not-self or something other than Self as causes. Pan-phenomenalism regards phenomena as causes of phenomena and ignores the realities underlying them. Mill regards the invariable antecedent phenomena as the cause of the consequent phenomenon. Among the antecedent phenomena, he includes objects which are not mere phenomena but depositories of force or power. Every phenomenon is the manifestation of some power in an object; and when two phenomena in the external world are observed to produce a third phenomenon, the latter is really the result of the interaction of the two objects as agents, as depositories of power. When hydrogen and oxygen unite under certain conditions to produce water, it is not their appearances or phenomena that unite and produce the result but it is hydrogen and oxygen as agents, as possessed of powers or energies which by their interaction produce a new object or agent called water with a deposit of new energies, powers, or qualities producing new phenomena in us. Pan-phenomenalism cannot consistently justify its belief even in the existence of objects which it assumes for explaining the succession and co-existence of phenomena. An object is something more than a mere aggregate of phenomena. It is something which by interaction with something else is capable of producing certain phenomena; and it is something even more than this; for it is not fully exhausted in the

Pan-phenomenalism ignores the principle of real or noumenal causation and substitutes for it the law of phenomenal causation. It does not inquire into the origin of phenomena.

What is an object? It is more than a mere aggregate of phenomena. It is an embodiment or a depository of powers or energies.

phenomena which it can produce by interaction with a second object. It may unite with a third object and produce other phenomena, unite with a fourth object and produce still other phenomena, and so on. It has powers, forces, or energies and these are partly actual or expressed in phenomena and partly potential. It is these powers, forces, or energies that constitute the reality of an object. The doctrine of the conservation of energies in the physical world has made this certain so far as the phenomena of Physics and Chemistry are concerned. Underlying all changes of phenomena there are interactions of energies and the transformation of one form into another and the transition of the same form from actual into potential and from potential into actual. The world as it appears to us is the result of the interaction of its non-phenomenal agents among themselves and with the individual subject of each of us. The phenomena that I see, hear, or perceive by any sense, are the results of the interaction of my Self with the corresponding agents of the world.

Part II. Dr. James Ward's "Psychological Principles"

§ 1. All students of Psychology and Philosophy will be grateful to Dr. Ward for his recent work on "Psychological Principles." It is a revised and enlarged edition of his Encyclopædia articles. It is an exposition of Psychology as a whole and does not treat of those matters of detail which are not necessary for the explanation of the principles. It aims to be explanatory and therefore differs from a work concerned chiefly in being 'descriptive.'

Dr. Ward's new work on "Psychological Principles."

§ 2. According to the author, the standpoint of Psychology is individualistic and its subject-matter the whole of experience as belonging to an individual subject. Psychology treats not only of mental processes but of the whole choir of heaven and furniture of earth, as presented to an individual. Science also treats of experience but it treats of it, apart from any reference to an individual subject. Experience, for science, is regarded as existing by itself apart from the subject of it. No experience is possible without an experient. Science has no interest in this experient but treats of the matter of experience apart from any and all subjects.

The standpoint and scope of Psychology.

Dr. Ward's view is that Psychology treats of experience as belonging to an individual subject.

§ 3. The view of the author may perhaps be best indicated by inquiring into experience as to (1) what

it is and (2) what it implies. Experience is the result of the interaction of the subject as an agent and the World as another agent or rather as an aggregate of agents—"Wherever experience is inferred," says Dr. Ward, "Common sense, then, is right in positing a real agent answering to what we know as Self and interacting with another reality answering to what each of us knows as the World (p. 30)." The World may be regarded as the collective agent which produces by interaction the whole of the experience of an individual Self. Psychology treats of this experience as related to the individual Self, while science, such as Physics, Chemistry or Botany, treats of the same experience with reference to the Agents other than the Self, concerned in producing it. In other words, Psychology treats of the total experience with reference to the subject agent without considering the object agents, while the other sciences treat of the same experience with reference to the object agents, without considering the subject agent. Thus Psychology is the science of the subject agent while Botany, Chemistry, Physics, etc., are sciences of the object agents. What we know of the agents,—the subject agent or Self and the other agents, namely, of the World,—is through our experience which is the result of their interaction. Experience is the only source of our knowledge of both the single subject agent or Self and the other agents and is the common subject matter of Psychology as a science and of Botany,

Dr. Ward's view fully stated: His theory of experience.

Experience implies a Self and the World as two real agents. It is the result of their interaction.

Distinction between Psychology as a science and Botany, Physics, Chemistry as sciences.

Psychology treats of the whole of experience from the point of view of the individual subject experiencing it.

Physics, Chemistry, Botany, etc., treat of certain portions of it with reference to the agents producing it by interaction with the individual subject or Self.

Chemistry, Physics, etc., as sciences. In the former experience is studied with the object of knowing the nature of the Self, or subject agent while in the latter experience is studied with the object of knowing the nature of the agents of the World. Physics studies that portion of our experience, which is produced by what are called physical forces, Chemistry that portion which is produced by what is called chemical affinity, Botany that portion which is produced by life or vitality as manifested in plants and so forth. From this point of view Psychology may be called a subjective science and Physics, Chemistry, Botany, objective sciences—the former treating of the Self as an agent of our experience and the latter of the agents, forces, affinity, life, or vitality, etc., as interacting with the Self in order to produce its experience. The individualistic standpoint on which Dr. Ward lays so much emphasis is, therefore, not the standpoint of any particular individual. Psychology is not the science of a certain definite individual subject but of all subjects or selves so far as they are like (1) in being experients and (2) in the forms and contents of their experience. One and the same Self may be a subject in relation to one agent and an object in relation to another agent as a Self, as in society or in what Dr. Ward calls 'inter-subjective intercourse.' In the former aspect it comes under Psychology, while in the latter aspect it belongs to Sociology which is an objective science. Psychology is a science of selves as subject agents and not as object agents. It does not therefore require to be characterised as individualistic. It does

In Psychology there is reference of the experience to the Self but not to the agents, of the World. In Botany, etc., there is no reference to the Self but to these agents.

Psychology is not, however, the science of any particular individual subject but of all subjects or selves as experiencing.

The same Self may be a subject and an object agent.

Psychology treats of the Self as a subject agent and may, therefore, be defined as a subjective science.

not treat of one Self but of all selves in their capacity as subjects. It is therefore sufficient to define it as a subjective science—as a science treating of the subject agents in all their experience, Physics, Chemistry, Botany, etc., being defined as objective sciences—as sciences treating of the object agents which by their interaction with the subjects or selves produce all their experience. Psychology is the science of the Self, while the others are sciences of the World as consisting of object agents. The Self and the World are correlatives implying each other and both are necessary for our experience.

Physics, Botany, etc., as objective sciences.

§ 4. Some Psychologists divide the sphere of experience into inner and outer, internal and external, and assign the former to psychology and the latter to objective sciences. Dr. Ward objects to this on the ground that the so-called external experience is also experience and quotes Bain in support of the view that all experience is, in a sense, 'mental.' The external experience therefore is also, according to him, a part of mental science or Psychology. "The whole choir of heaven and furniture of earth" as presented to an individual subject, belongs to Psychology. But it should be remembered that, according to him, mind, is not the only agent that produces its experience, that all experience, both internal and external, is the result of the interaction of the Self as an agent, and of other agents than the Self, which are usually considered to be the agents of the World. The problem therefore is:—Can the sphere of experience be distinguished into parts or elements which may be respectively referred to the Self on the one

Can experience be divided into inner and outer, internal and external.

The problem of the analysis of experience in order to distinguish the elements belonging to the Self from those belonging to the agents of the World.

hand and to the World agents on the other? This has been attempted by many philosophers. For instance, Kant refers all that is universal and necessary in our experience to the Self or subject as the constant factor and all that is variable, *i.e.*, the matter or materials of experience to the objective factor,—the agent or agents of the World, the thing-in-itself or things-in-themselves.

Kant's attempt to solve the problem.

Locke regards all ideas and knowledge as derived from Sensation or Reflection. He attributes sensations to the activities of the external objects and reflection to the activities of the Self upon the materials of sensations or ideas. Experience is the result of the interaction of the two agents, the Self and the World. He refers certain ideas as those of solidity, extension, figure, etc., to external objects because, according to him, they agree with the qualities in the objects, which produce them, while he refers the ideas of colours, sounds, tastes, like pleasures and pains, to the Self, though he recognises corresponding to them certain powers which produce them. Power is a simple idea which is received, according to him, from both sensation and reflection, and is therefore attributed by him to both external objects and the Self. Existence and unity are two ideas suggested by every object without and every idea within. He thus distinguishes the elements of experience which belong to the Self and those which belong to the objects or the World. He treats of ideas, of knowledge and of real existence in his "Essay on the Human Understanding." Knowledge is not merely concerned with ideas and their relations among themselves but also with their relations to things. The Self is known by intuition, external things by sensation and God by reason. His Psychology is not therefore a science of

Locke's attempt to solve the problem.

mere ideas as later English Psychologists have made it, but a science treating of ideas, knowledge and real objects. His objects are substances consisting of primary qualities which agree with the ideas produced by them and of secondary qualities which are powers by which the objects produce certain affections (or ideas) in us, and also of certain other powers by which they act upon one another and produce changes among themselves. Locke recognises objects as solid and extended things with powers and regards them as causes of our sensations. He recognises also Self as a thinking thing and God as the Supreme Being and treats of knowledge and things as well as of ideas in his "Essay."

Later attempts.

Later Psychologists have generally treated of the development of experience and of the parts or elements contributed to it by the mind and the external world respectively. The fight between Intuitionists and Empiricists as regards the question of the origin of knowledge was at first on the field of Metaphysics but it was transferred to that of Psychology by empirical philosophers who claimed to derive all knowledge and all ideas from the experience of external objects. The mind was regarded as entirely passive and therefore simply receptive of what was supplied by the external world. The world itself as a Reality disappeared with Berkeley and his followers and the mind as a Reality also disappeared with Hume and his followers; and English Philosophers started with sensations as *somehow given* and attempted to trace their development into perceptions, conceptions, desires, emotions, volitions, etc., constituting the experience of an adult. Bain follows this method to its perfection, deriving both mind and matter, subject and object, the Self and the World and all our experience from the sensations, feelings and instincts of the child by the

Bain.

Laws of Association. Against Bain's pure pan-phenomenalism in Psychology and the resulting pan-phenomenalistic Philosophy, Spencer raised his voice and made himself heard by the publication of the second volume of the second edition of his "Principles of Psychology" in 1872. In this work he regards experience as determined by the Non-Ego and expounds, at great length, a doctrine of the Non-Ego as an external and independent Reality. He is emphatic in holding that the sensations or "the vivid states of consciousness" have causes and that these causes are forms of the energy which constitutes the external Reality or the Non-Ego. According to him, the Ego is also an energy which holds together and moulds and modifies the ideas or "the faint states of consciousness" into a whole.

Spencer.

§ 5. In the line of English Psychologists Dr. Ward comes next to Bain and Spencer. He was trained, as he says, in the schools of Kant and Herbart and was a pupil of Lotze. Traces of indebtedness to these philosophers are visible in his treatment of Psychology. To a French philosopher, Maine de Biran, to whom he referred in his Encyclopædia article of 1886, he appears to have been also indebted.

Dr. Ward.

Bain and Spencer were the leaders of English Psychology in the seventies and eighties of the last century. Dr. Ward in his Encyclopædia article in 1886 introduced into English Psychology the conception of a "pure ego" as an essential element of all states of consciousness, of all forms of experience. No consciousness, no experience is possible without a subject which is conscious or which experiences. The object of consciousness is at first a confused and indistinguishable mass. The organic and other

Dr. Ward's theory of the pure Ego.

sensations are not distinguished but exist in a state of fusion, as it were, in the primal experience of the pure Ego or subject. Dr. Ward's theory of the development of experience seems to be an application to Psychology of the biological theory of the development of an organism. In his view the subject corresponds to the organism and the object, *i.e.*, the indistinguishable and confused mass of which the subject is conscious—the *totum objectivum*—corresponds to the environment. The pure Ego or subject develops its experience by selective attention to and differentiation of the confused and indistinguishable mass into different objects (which are called by him presentations) as the organism develops its various organs by selecting and assimilating its food from the environment. All the distinctions among sensations as organic, and extra-organic, as those of taste, of smell, touch, sound and colour, arise by the process of progressive differentiation or specialisation. The distinctions of internal and external, of mental and material, of me and not-me, of my body and other bodies, and of bodies among themselves, all these distinctions are also the results of progressive differentiation of the one field of consciousness, of the one continuous object—the *totum objectivum*. This theory of the development of experience from a *totum objectivum* by the activity of a pure subject was also new to the English Psychology of Bain and Spencer. Dr. Ward assures his readers that in assuming a 'pure ego' he is not surreptitiously introducing a metaphysical Ego into his Psychology. "By pure ego or subject, it is proposed to denote the simple fact that everything mental is referred to a Self," p. 39, 1st column of the Encyclopædia Article, Vol. XX. This statement made in good faith by Dr. Ward was accepted in the same spirit by some of the

His theory of the "totum objectivum."

younger English Psychologists; and old text books were revised and new ones written in the light of his two new theories.

Dr. Ward's theory of the Self is certainly an improvement on the theories of Bain and Spencer and a contribution to English Psychology. It is really an adaptation of Kant's theory of the transcendental Self to Psychology. It does justice to the part taken by the Self in the development of experience. But what is "*the totum objectivum*" of Dr. Ward? Is it (1) a mere confused appearance of the real world to the real self or (2) a differentiation and product of the latter? To this question Dr. Ward holds that Psychology can give no answer. It is a Metaphysical or Epistemological question. Is not the question of a pure ego which turns out to be an active Self as an organiser of all experience also an Epistemological or Metaphysical question? If experience implies an active Self, does it not imply also an active Not-Self? If a subject is present, is not an object also present in all experience? Is not experience the result of the interaction of two non-phenomenal agents—the subject being one and the object the other? Is not Dr. Ward's *totum objectivum* the result of the interaction of the Self and the World as two agents? Is it not the confused and indistinguishable appearance to the Self, of all the agents which constitute the world? In the subject-object experience, the object as well as the subject is implicit and the object as well as the subject is real. The *totum objectivum*, the so-called environment of the pure non-phenomenal subject, is the result of the interaction of the two agents, Self and the World, necessary for the genesis of any experience If there is a pure Ego, there is also a pure Non-Ego present in all experience. Experience is not the product of either of these

What does Dr. Ward mean by "the totum objectivum".

two without the other. The world as an agent is a factor of experience. The *totum objectivum* has the subject or the Self on one side as a factor or focus and the object or the World as a non-phenomenal agent or reality on the opposite side as the other factor or focus. Experience is bi-polar and has the Self for one pole and the World as a Reality for the other. Dr. Ward in excluding the recognition and consideration of this reality from Psychology on the ground that its treatment belongs to Metaphysics and Epistemology has deprived Psychology of all interest connected with the questions about the objective factors of our experience. In excluding them from Psychology he has followed the lead of Bain. Bain did not believe in any reality beyond phenomena, and was, therefore, justified in excluding the objective as well as the subjective factors or agents of our experience. Dr. Ward includes the subjective factor but excludes the objective factor though in his recent work on "Psychological Principles" he recognises the agency of the latter as a condition of our experience. In insisting on the recognition and treatment of objective factors of our experience in Psychology, I have the high authority of Spencer and also of Locke, the founder of English Psychology, as well as, I may add of Aristotle, the founder of the science of Psychology, and of Hamilton, Reid and Descartes. Spencer follows the English School in explaining the development of our experience by the principle of Similarity, resolving Bain's laws of association into this single principle; but he recognises an external reality as cause and correlative to sensations or "vivid states of consciousness" and treats of it in his Psychology as I have stated above. He regards the Non-Ego as independent of the Ego. Both are real and forms of energy. Both are unknown as, according to his theory of knowledge, only phenomena or states of consciousness

can be known and the two realities are, according to him, beyond the sphere of conscious states. The internal energy "wells up from the depths of our consciousness" and the external energy is the cause of our sensations. The word cause as used here by Spencer is only another name of agent with power. And what "wells up from the depths our consciousness" is a flow from "a fountain of power," the source also of our own power of which we are immediately conscious in our voluntary activity. The power or energy is, therefore, not unknown to us. I have shown in my first paper that the self and the not-self are both centres of power and both joint causes of our sensations. In his recent work Dr. Ward admits this and should therefore regard both as belonging to Psychology. Dr. Ward's theory of the development of experience from a *totum objectivum* shows a very poor recognition of the objective factors in the determination of our experience.

§ 6. The Non-phenomenal Self by successive acts of attention to the mass of the *totum objectivum* evolves, out of it as material, the different kinds of sensations, feelings and emotions, ideas and conceptions, desires and volitions. The only activity essential for this evolution is the activity of the Self in the form of attention; the rest comes by discrimination, assimilation and association of the varying products from the mass itself. The *totum objectivum* is also called the objective continuum or "the original continuity" as distinguished from the active non-phenomenal Self which is conscious. The object of consciousness or experience as distinguished from the Self is the continuous indistinguishable mass in which is

The function of the Self in the evolution of experience according to Dr. Ward.

Dr. Ward's theory of a "totum objectivum" as a mass from which all presentations or objects arise by the selective attention of the Self.

embodied, as it were, the whole world with all its objects. The objects gradually arise by the selective attention, discrimination and assimilation of the Self. This theory of the development of experience entirely overlooks the activity of the non-phenomenal agents of the world—the part they take by their interaction with the Self in determining the contents of experience. The Self is no doubt active in attending and discriminating but the materials are supplied not by the Self alone but by its interaction with the agents of the world. What the material will be at a particular moment depends on the agent that is acting upon the Self. The transition may be gradual if the agent varies gradually for instance the same colour agent in its shades or the same light agent in degree of intensity; but it will be abrupt if the action of a light agent is followed by the action of a sounding agent and if the latter is again followed by the action of a resisting agent. In the case of every sense-perception, the sensation is caused by an agent other than the Self and the perception is due to the activity of the Self. The agents in different kinds of sense-perception are different. Their nature must be a matter for scientific investigation. Whether all the agents which produce different kinds of sensation are ultimately the same or reducible in number to a few must be left to science to find out. But that they determine the contents of our experience and that these contents vary in quality and quantity according to their nature, must be recognised as a fact in Psychology. In æsthetic experience the existence of beautiful objects as agents and their action upon the Self is necessary. For moral experience, it is necessary

Dr. Ward overlooks the action of the agents of the world in the development of experience.

The material of the Self's experience depends on their action.

Sensations as determined by the action of the agents.

for the Self to live in a society of selves. The feelings of regard and respect for persons of higher character imply the presence and activity of these persons and their interaction with the Self. The feelings of compassion and pity imply interaction of persons in distress with the Self. The emotions of wonder, admiration and reverence as well as of devotion and love felt for God, imply that the Self is influenced by an Agent whether it be real or ideal or a Being in whom the ideal is eternally realised. The experience of the Self is therefore determined both by itself and the agents which act upon it. It is as Dr. Ward admits, the result of the interaction of the Self and the World. Using the term, experience, in its widest sense, as including all experience as determined by the different kinds of agents acting upon the Self, we may distinguish—

The quality and quantity of the contents of experience vary with the nature of the agents.

Different aspects of our experience as determined by different agents.

(1) Sensuous experience as determined by external objects through the organs of sense;

(2) Æsthetic experience as determined by beautiful objects not necessarily acting through the sense organs;

(3) Moral experience as determined by the moral nature of the Self by interaction with other selves in society;

(4) Religious experience as determined by the contemplation of God and of other beings or persons higher than man;

(5) Spiritual experience as determined by the contemplation of the Ideals of Truth, Justice, Liberty, Beauty, Love and Goodness.

These Ideals are objective and produce by their interaction with the Self certain sentiments in it.

Psychology as the science of the experience of the individual subject would have to treat of the emotional, volitional, and cognitive elements of the experience of the Self in all the aspects noted above. But it could not treat of them without taking into consideration the nature of the agents and without borrowing from the science, whether it be Metaphysics, Ontology or Epistemology, which treats of the non-phenomenal Agents of the World.

Different Branches of the Science of Psychology.

§ 7. The experience of an individual subject in all the aspects noted above may be treated, (1) as it is found in the ripest experience of a harmoniously developed man, (2) as it gradually develops in the mind of (*i*) a child, (*ii*) an adolescent, (*iii*) a man, *i.e.*, a cultured person with the mind fully developed in all its aspects. The treatment may be merely descriptive or both descriptive and explanatory. The development of the psychical life and experience of the human subject may be compared with the same of the animal subject. The mental characteristics of the different races of mankind may be compared both in their development and in their matured state. The same may be done with the different races of animals.

Dr. Ward's treatment of the development of a psychological individual.

In his Psychology Dr. Ward assumes a psychological individual whose development he traces from the dawn of its consciousness or experience to the human stage. He descends to the lowest of the animal race and shows the continuity of its psychical development with that of the human subject. Psychical life is all one continuous development from the lowest to the highest

species of sentient beings. Dr. Ward in his Psychology is mainly occupied in tracing this development and he follows the steps and adopts the method of treatment of the biological development of the organism. The problem is a stupendous one and it is no wonder that he has not treated of the ripe human experience in all its aspects. In my first paper I pointed out that no Psychology can be regarded as complete, which does not recognise the different aspects of our experience and does not first describe them as they are found in the most mature state. This would no doubt be only a Descriptive Psychology but such a psychology is the pre-supposition of an Explanatory Psychology. The latter has to describe and explain not only the development of our ordinary experience as most Psychologists have attempted but also to describe and explain our experience as it is found in all its aspects in the ripest experience of a fully developed person. What I feel and think is that Psychologists have most sadly neglected the study of our ripe experience in all its aspects and have almost exclusively devoted their attention to the explanation of our experience at its lower levels. Dr. Ward has risen in this respect to a much higher level than most psychologists and deserves, therefore, the gratitude of all students of Psychology. It is to be hoped that the work that remains to be done, would be undertaken by Indian Psychologists and the comprehensive science of Psychology completed by the study of the whole of our experience in the light of both its subjective and objective factors, as it is found in a harmoniously developed person in all its aspects and as it gradually develops in the experience of a child, an adult and a man.

Wanted a complete Psychology, descriptive and explanatory, of all the aspects of our ripest experience.

§ 8. If Psychology ignores the objective factors of our experience, it may treat of the forms of experience

as determined by its subjective factor but not of the contents. It may treat of the mental processes as determined by the receptivity and the activity of the subject but not of the products as determined by the objective factors of our experience. It may treat, for instance, of the general processes of sensation, feeling, desiring, willing, thinking, deciding, resolving and also of attending, discriminating, assimilating, associating as receptivities and activities of the subjective factor but not of the concrete sensations, feelings, desires, volitions, thoughts, decisions, resolutions, attentions, discriminations, assimilations, and associations as determined both qualitatively and quantitatively by the varying agencies of the objective factors of our experience. It cannot adequately treat of perceiving and knowing nor of perception and knowledge, as these terms imply objective realities. Their treatment as at present in Psychology is one-sided and prejudicial to the science of Metaphysics. Psychology in treating of these topics entirely overlooks or ignores objective realities and leaves in the mind of its student the impression that there are no such realities and that the treatment of the subjects as given in books on Psychology is complete. Psychology has thus become injurious to the study of Metaphysics. Psychology has been, is and should be helpful to the study of Philosophy. Psychology, treating of the whole of our experience in all its aspects, must either borrow its data from Metaphysics or be itself metaphysical to such an extent as to be able to recognise and treat of both the subjective and the objective factors of our experience. Perception in all its aspects as sensuous, as æsthetic, as moral, as religious and as spiritual, gives us or implies objective realities. Intuition as

What Psychology would be if it treated only of the subjective factor of our experience.

Psychology as treated at present is prejudicial to Metaphysics—to both Epistemology and Ontology—and consequently also to Philosophy.

used by Intuitionists also reveals objective realities. Voluntary activity reveals the causality and the reality of both the Self and the Not-Self. Psychology, by excluding all questions about reality and knowledge, has become incompetent to treat adequately of these mental acts. A new science called Epistemology has been created to treat of those acts of the mind, which imply or reveal objective realities. Epistemology is regarded as a branch of Metaphysics, whose chief business is to determine the nature and distinguish the different forms of knowledge, while Ontology, the other branch, treats of the nature and the different forms of reality revealed or implied by the different forms of knowledge. Knowledge cannot be treated apart from knowing nor can knowing as a concrete act of the mind be treated apart from knowledge. Reality cannot be treated apart from knowledge nor can knowledge be treated apart from reality. Knowing, knowledge and reality are so interconnected that the treatment of one of them apart from the others must be partial, one-sided and unsatisfactory, and lead to an erroneous view of Philosophy. Psychology, by treating of knowing including perceiving as the earliest form of it, apart from reality, has been a fruitful source of such erroneous views of Philosophy.

Psychology is the best introduction to the study of Philosophy.

It is necessary to restore Psychology to its proper position and make it helpful to the study of Philosophy. Philosophy treats of the Self, the World and God, or, more accurately of man, the Universe and God, or, more simply, of the Universe including Man and God and attempts to determine their relations. Metaphysics treats of the realities of the Universe and tries to determine their relation to the ultimate Reality whether it be called the Absolute in the language of Philosophy or God in the language of Theology. Philosophy is the

doctrine of the whole of the Self, the World and God. Psychology, treating as it does of the whole of our experience as produced by the interaction of the Self with the World and God, is the only science which can introduce a student to the study of such a comprehensive subject as Philosophy.

ON VEDANTA

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I

Change : Is it Real or Unreal ?

In his commentary on *Vedanta Sutras*, II. i. 14, Sankara says :—

"The world of effects not being denied, the process of real change is affirmed" ; at the same time, "Vedantists hold that in the absolute state (stage of absolute cognition), there is a complete lapse of all empirical reality."

Both the views—that change is real (*parinama vada*) and that it is unreal (*vivarta-vada*)—are traceable in Vedanta. The sense-given world before us, of pleasures and pains all compact, is fixed firm in the relations of space, time, and causality. Each individual thing here, as defined by infinite differences, is in a ceaseless process of change. The practical life of every creature is bound up with this empirical world. Sankara has nowhere denied the reality of this world, for who but a mad man

would deny it? He is quite explicit on this point in *Vedanta Sutras*, Commentary, III. ii. 21 :—

"If it be said that this world—composed of 'subjective' existences like the sentient body, etc., and 'objective' existences like the earth, etc.—should be denied, (we reply that) no man can possibly deny it."

In reference to *jivanmukta* souls, souls emancipated while in life, he affirms that this world would only present a *different* appearance to them : it would not be abolished.

He allows to sensible things a relative reality. "Water, etc., are real relatively to the unreal mirage, etc."

In his commentary on *Mandukya Upanishad*, he points out that when a rope is taken for a snake and then again taken for what it is, both the cognitions may be taken as *true* but *different* views, there being no contradiction between them.

And the same view appears in his commentary on *Brihadaranyaka*, in reference to the relative values of the disciplines of *karma* (practice) and *jnana* (knowledge) :—

"*Karma* is first enjoined on those who are steeped in natural ignorance; and then for those who have seen through the unreality of (the dualism of) action and agent, etc., is prescribed—'know Brahman and the identity of your self with it.' There is not a trace of conflict here."

Each discipline, he holds, has absolute value, being accommodated to the stage of the learner or disciple on whom it is enjoined; and he concludes :—

"To the vision of absolute truth, no other objects, no name and form, exist in reality *separate* from Brahma; the one principle without a second is its object. When however (the vision is affected) by natural ignorance,

all these objects are presented as practically real as separate and independent things.....Hence there is no apprehension of a contradiction."

Monistic knowledge and dualistic knowledge do not exclude one another. Sankara insists on the point that this multiform world is not abolished from being on the emergence of monistic knowledge and thus he can admit the unreality of change (*vivarta-vada*) without denying its reality (*parinama-vada*). He holds in fact that behind this world of change, standing outside the causal chain, there is a changeless being which is presented to absolute vision.

That Sankara teaches both the reality and unreality of change is apparent in still another connexion. In his commentary on *Chhandogya*, in discussing the mode of manifestation of the one changeless being into this multiform changing world, he presents two significant analogies, the one illustrative of *parinama-vada* and the other of *vivarta-vada*. That he presents these together shows his real intention with absolute clearness. Here is the passage :—

(In the term 'this world'), "the one changeless being is the significate of the word 'this' and the object of the thought of 'this.' The world is only a systematic form of this being. It is of this being and of no other that our intellect conceives the members or parts. The modes of change are of these conceived or thought-constructed parts. To absolute vision however, what is really apprehended even in the knowledge of this world is the one undual principle. *Even as our intellect apprehends the clay as pot or pitcher, or the rope as snake, it apprehends the one real being as the many modes.*"

Here the example of the clay and pot is presented from the side of *parinama-vada* and that of the rope

and snake from the side of *vivarta-vada*. Sankara continues :—

"That worldly people take this one being as many is due to the character of the intellect. Through the character of the intellect, the clay appears and is spoken of now as a lump, now as a pot; and again through a fault of the intellect, the rope appears and is spoken of as a snake. To the knower of truth however (*viz.*, of the pot as nothing but clay), neither the thought nor the name 'pot' need exist; and through the knowledge of the truth about the rope, the notion of snake too would lapse. Even so, to the knower of absolute truth, the notion—thought and name—of all modes would cease to be presented."

The two analogies presented indicate that Sankara admits the relative validity of both the views of change; and a further important point emerges—*viz.*, that the manifoldness of the modes is only relative to our intellect and names. Consciousness is one and eternal; it transcends space, time, and causality. It appears as many only through the deceptive medium of our senses and intellect. The one changeless conscious principle is presented illusorily to our intellect as the sensibles—sound, colour, etc., as this changing world, as composed of parts. The presentations, sound, colour, etc., perpetually rise and perish before this intellect which forgets that they are essentially one, being the one eternal changeless consciousness. Still what the intellect really apprehends even here is this one principle though it *confuses it* with its own modes.

"Consciousness is the essence of the self, from which it never deviates: it is accordingly eternal. Yet the presentations of the intellect, the medium which is modified by the senses into objects, appear as though they were objects of self-consciousness, generated and pervaded by

self-consciousness or *atma-vijnana*; and hence the modes are regarded as and designated *vijnanas* or 'consciousnesses' by the non-discerning." [Commentary—*Taittiriya Upan.*]

The one undivided principle thus appears as this world of many beings, set in the relations of time, space, and causality—relations through which the intellect must apprehend. In dreamless sleep, this intellect lapses along with its particularised presentations: the world lapses in the undifferenced knowledge of the one conscious principle.

To *vivarta-vada*, the one undivided being alone is eternally real. To *parinama-vada*, the particular objects known by the intellect are empirically real. There is no incompatibility between the two views: if *vivarta-vada* is presented as the final truth, it is with *parinama-vada* as its inseparable background.

The same intellect that knows the conscious principle as many in its direction outwards, *i.e.*, positively, knows it as one and undivided in its direction inwards, *i.e.*, transcendentally. "All that is knowable is presented as seated on *buddhi* (intellect), in the lap of the modes of *buddhi*. The knower of it all, the 'witness'—is the self." "The self does not change, as unlike *buddhi*, it has no parts." Yet the essential nature of the self, *viz.*, eternal consciousness is revealed only in this *buddhi*, only as the presupposition of the conscious modes of *buddhi*. "Brahman, as consciousness itself, is eternally manifest in his home—the mind, in all revelations or cognition of *buddhi*." (*Mundaka Upan.*)

The vibrations or activities of the mind are presented as this empirical manifold. "The visible things that appear to the waking consciousness are not independent of the mind." "All that knows and is known is but the dual vibration of the mind. The mind in essence is the

self itself without an object (different from it.)" [Commentary, *Mandukya Upan.*]

The same truth is presented in another way. Names and forms, says Sankara, could not be manifest till the empirical subject endowed with the vital airs, senses, and the intellect emerged into being. ".....The great Lord entered in the form of *jivatman* (individual self) to manifest names and forms" [Commentary, *Chhandogya Upan.*]. And he adds elsewhere that with the inwardising of the senses and intellect, the conscious principle at the root of conscious states is intuited by seers.

The conscious principle is primarily known as the knower or 'witness.' It is also indirectly known, Sankara tells us, as the first cause of the empirical series of causes and effects that constitutes the empirical world. The primary mode of self-knowledge is alone considered in the present paper.

The self that underlies the empirical world is free, as not bound in space, time and causality, "Through the mere will of this free being is the empirical mind set stirring" [Commentary, *Kena Upan.*]. ".....The desires, etc., move others by enslaving them but do not move Brahman.....They themselves are set stirring by Brahman." [Commentary, *Taittiriya Upan.*]

It may be repeated that between the cognition of the manifold changing world through the forms of the intellect and the cognition of the one changeless self, between these two antithetic testimonies of *buddhi*, there is no real conflict or antagonism. But are these testimonies true in the same sense?

Sankara points out that the changing world of forms, which is referred to in the Vedantic account of creation and the reality of which cannot be denied, has no independent end of its own. The whole purpose of this account

of creation is to explicate the truth about the one self that underlies the world and to which the world is moving.

"Brahman is said to change into the form of the world. This (account) is only presented as a means to the realisation of Brahman" [Commentary, *Brihad-aranyaka Upan.*]. "The effects—from ether to the gross body—are referred to for the sake of the knowledge of Brahman." [Commentary, *Taittiriya Upan.*]

Hence although this empirical world is real for practical purposes, its reality is only relative to the mind enveloped in nescience. When however the world will have accomplished its end by bringing about the cognition of the unity underlying it, the knowledge of the manifold will appear false and illusory. The many and the one cannot therefore be true in the same sense. The whole truth of the many lies in the *end that it accomplishes—viz.*, of leading us to the realisation of the one. The many is false as devoid of independent significance, like the meaningless lines making up a written word. (*Brihad. Upan.*)

That the one self is not realised is due to what is called 'the tangle of the heart' (*hridaya-granthi*), the skein of nescience, desire, and activity. Nescience makes us see *the one as many*, desire means the love of egoistic sense-satisfaction, and activity is what leads us outward, involving us inextricably in worldliness. Through this tangle, the vision of the self is obscured and occupation with the not-self becomes our second-nature.

It has been pointed out that the same *buddhi* which sees the many reveals also the one. *Buddhi* in the former reference is the 'tangle of the heart' (*hridaya-granthi*) and in the latter it is the 'cave of the heart' (*hridaya-guha*), the abode of Brahman (*Brahma-pura*), where alone

the eternal witness of all the particular cognitions is apprehended as the undifferenced unity distinguished from many. "The undifferenced substrate of all differences is to be found here in this cave. Brahman is not apprehended elsewhere" [Commentary, *Taittiriya Upan.*].

Buddhi by itself is an insentient principle: consciousness is the self. The self is the seer of all the modes or presentations of *buddhi*, the joy (*rasa*) at the root of all its feelings, and the eternal free cause that sets up all its activities. The worldli-minded apprehend the empirical world by the 'heart-tangle' and seers have a vision of the self in the 'cave of the heart.'

II

Ethics of Vedanta

Action is natural to all sentient creatures, being determined by the nature with which they are born. [*Gītā*, III. 15, XVIII. 54-9.] The one self or life-principle is manifested in the series of forms, non-moving and moving, including man. The circulation of the life-sap in plants shows the operation of a mind in them. Animals are a fuller manifestation of the life-principle in so far as there is not only vital circulation in them but also sentiency. This manifestation as the individual self of plants and animals is for the differentiation of life and matter.[1]

The life-principle in man has its seat in the heart and is five-fold. The vital 'airs'—*prāna*, *apāna*, *samāna*, *udāna* and *vyāna* are the different functions of this principle operating in different parts of the body. Life appears in man along with the senses, *manas* (the organ of simple apprehension), and *buddhi*. These knowing faculties are inherent in and sustained by life as their matrix. The activities of the senses and the vibrations of *buddhi* are really the activities of life.[2] In the state of deep sleep, *buddhi* with all its presentations passes into a latent condition—*i.e.*, gets retracted into this life; and from life again does it emerge into actuality in the waking state.

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[1] "Wherever there is living sap, mind (*chitta*) is to be inferred. There is no doubt that the self informs the non-moving (plants), for they have an inward consciousness. (The presence of) mind in animals, in addition to the living sap, shows that they are a fuller manifestation."——"The creator, having started into manifestation the as yet unmanifested names and forms, having created the primal matters and the moving and non-moving material bodies, manifested himself by entering them for the differentiation of matter and sentiency (literally food and eater of food)" [Commentary—*Aitareya Upan.*]

[2] "The faculties of sight, hearing, apprehension, and speech—the sources of all knowledge—are fixed in *prana* and *apana* in which life consists. They disappear

Within this gross body or envelope, the *annamaya*, are situated the *prānamaya*, the envelope of the vital airs, and the *vijnānamaya*, the envelope of the intellectual principle. This complex envelope of body, life, and intellect constitutes the *nature* of the self and determines all its actions.

The senses are directed towards objects by the principles of love and hate. "This vision outwards of the not-self is natural" to the sensuous self. *Buddhi* brings in the conceit of the ego, consciousness in the forms, '*I* feel pleasure and pain, this is *my* body,' etc. This egoistic conceit is at the root of all action : it is what Sankara variously calls *adhyāsa* (illusory identification) or *chitta-granthi* the mental tangle).

The actions of the *jīva* or individual self in this empirical world are determined by his nature. The feeling of want rouses the thought of the attainment of the object, that rouses desire, from desire springs will, and from will the action. The *jīva* is helplessly dragged onward by this empirical chain : he has no freedom of choice here.

"This egoistic nature is beginningless. The *jīva* apprehends this empirical world, acts according to his persisting *vāsanās* (traces of past experiences), and enjoys or suffers according to the resulting merit or demerit." (*Sarva-vedānta-siddhānta*). And again, "in ignorance, the self takes the body, the not-self, as the ego and then the great power of *rajas* (principle of activity) binds it in the chain of desire, anger, etc." [*Viveka-chudamani.*]

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when life goes : they then merge (back) into life. The functions of the mind being determined by life are taken to be grounded in life." [Commentary—*Aitareya Upan.*]

"Life is in the five faculties or organs. Life as endowed with *manas* and *buddhi* is the *prajnatman*, the self as cognitive and active. [Commentary—*Chhandogya Upan.*].

"The organ of knowledge is *prajna* that life of which *prajna* is the nature is the *prajatman*.—This is the vital fluid (*rasa*), for when this goes, the body is dried up." [Commentary—*Aitareya Upan.*]

First in order then comes this mistaken identification of the self with the body, thence arises all thought of object, object-thought leads to desire, desire to will, and will to action. So it is the *buddhi* as occupied with the objects that stirs up the vital envelope, the *prānamaya*. *Buddhi*, which is really the principle of *sattva*, of light or tranquil manifestation, is obscured in us by the principles of *rajas* (activity) and *tamas* (passivity). This obscured or impure *buddhi* is called *āsuri-pravritti* in *Gītā* and is characterised there as a nature that is sensual, proud and self-assertive at the expense of others—recognising in fact no self except one's own self.

Is there any place then in Vedanta for the freedom of the self? In his commentary on *Aitareya Upan.*, in explaining why the self has entered this body which is moved by the sense, intellect, and desire, Sankara points out that the self as distinct from these is the ultimate cause of all action, for it stirs these into activity for the realisation of its own end. "Having said, 'I shall enter (the body) for performing the functions of speech, etc.' (it added) 'I shall enter also in order to reveal my true nature.'" "The self is that which has ends, to accomplish which it stirs up the organs of speech, etc. In the absence of this cause, there will be no action like speech, etc., for all activity is motived by ends."

The existence of the free self is in fact inferred from the activity of the complex of senses and intellect. "This complex of effected existences, with speech, etc., as their functions, is in the service of what is other than itself. This.....would not be possible without a being which has ends and which receives this service." This being is immanent in the complex but the "immanence is as of a seer and not of an active agent." The casuality of the self is not an activity in time and precisely in this sense is it free.

This freedom inheres even in the blind activity of the senses and intellect, though it is not here self-consciously realised. Yet the self as cause like the self as seer is realised nowhere but in the 'cave' or the inner depth of *buddhi*. It is this *buddhi* in fact that reveals to us the possibility of perfecting our empirical nature, of progressing towards salvation. It tells us that this nature is under a dual government—that of the desires on the one hand and of the free self on the other.

The self then is the immanent cause of the activity of the senses and intellect, these acting together to realise the ends of the self. Sankara asks—"Is (this body), this complex of effects and instruments, moved by desire, speech, and bodily activity only or is it moved by something different from it, a free being that stirs it up by pure will?" His answer is that the very fact that the complex or aggregate acts points to the existence of a free unity with ends of its own that are accomplished by this action. There is that passage in *Gītā* no doubt which speaks of the senses, etc., acting for their own ends but Sankara in his commentary on *Gītā* (XVIII. 50) argues:—"Supposing the self is not established, the direction of the activities to their own ends would be unintelligible." "That the unconscious body should have ends is inconceivable. Nor can pleasure be for pleasure (as end), and pain for pain. All empirical cognitions have their end in self-knowledge." And again in *Sarva-vedānta-siddhānta*, "self-assertion, self-denial, all actions in fact—are for the self and for nothing else: nothing is dearer than the self."

This self is said to be the 'internal regulator' (*antaryāmin*), the determining cause (*niyāmaka*) which is not determined (*niyamya*). The internal or transcendental causality of the self is in fact illusorily identified, by what is called *āropa* in Vedanta, with the outward or

empirical causality of the organs. The wise who have faith in the free causality of the self seek to get rid of this illusion. They feel the necessity of a discipline for the control of the organs and for the chastening of the empirical mind. They employ the body and the mind for the realisation of the ends of the self.

Here comes in Sankara's psychology of the moral consciousness. "The good (*sreyah*) and the pleasurable (*preyah*)—either as discipline or as the fruit of it—are confusedly presented to the unintelligent. The wise however.....on mature reflection discern their relative value, their difference.....Having thus reflected, they embrace the good, as worthier than the pleasurable." [Commentary, *Katha Upan.* 1, ii, 2.]

This discernment of right from wrong is called *samkalpa.* "*Samkalpa* is a function of the mind. It is the ascertainment of a difference between the right and wrong in objects. After the reflection comes the desire to act in respect of the object thus distinguished." [Commentary, *Chhandogya Upan.*, VII, 4.]

So three stages come out—(*i*) the good and the pleasurable are weighed in the mind; (*ii*) next the right course is ascertained; and then (*iii*) there arises the desire to act accordingly. The next stage is *dhyāna*, the contemplation of the future consequences of the action anticipated on the ground of past experiences.

"*Chitta* is further the faculty of ascertaining the end by (a comparison of) the past and future objects. This is more than the *samkalpa*.....When about the object in question, there arises the consciousness 'this *was* experienced, there comes the will to attain or avoid it."

And then comes the stage of the adoption of the means to the attainment or avoidance. "Having thus formed the desire to act, and the desire to attain..., one attains by adopting the means to attainment."

Not only is *buddhi* or reason necessary to the ascertainment of duty, the attainment of joy is also necessary.—"When joy is attained, where there arises the thought 'I shall attain infinite satisfaction,' this will to act becomes complete. The will has joy as its visible fruition, and there is no will in joylessness" *Chandogya Upan.*, VII, 22, i]. "When it is said—'having attained the future joy'—it is meant only that action is directed to this end."

The discerning soul acts for the infinite bliss of the self, not for worldly enjoyment. Brahman is called *sukrita* or merit in *Taittiriya Upanishad.* The mind has to be disciplined in order to attain this *sukrita.* The more chastened the soul, the higher is the ideal of knowledge, bliss, or power that is manifested. "The varying measures of power, knowledge, or bliss depend on the degrees of purity of the *upādhi* (vehicle, envelope, or body of the self). According to these measures, the one self is manifested in the gradation of embodiments—from man to *Hiranya-garbha* (the Lord as the germ of the universe)." "From the state of man onwards, there is a hundredfold increase of bliss at each later stage." [Commentary, *Taittirya Upan.*]

Our *chitta* (mind), fouled as it is by *rajas* and *tamas* (restless activity and dull passivity), has low desires or ideals. But through chastening discipline, it gradually gets actualised into a transparent medium of *sattva* or pure manifestation, when its desires are no longer directed to false sensuous objects. The desires of the Lord (*Hiranya-garbha*) are characterised as *satyāh kāmāh* [*Chhandogya Upan.*—VII] or 'true desires.' The *satyāh kāmāh* may be called Ideas of Reason after Kant and the things of the world may be regarded as their imperfect manifestations through the obscuring medium of *rajas* and *tamas.* If sense-consciousness is occupied with the present, and our ordinary *buddhi* with the past, present,

and future, this *buddhi* as pure actuality transcends all limitations of space and time [*Chhandogya Upan.*, VIII. 12. v].

The *samkalpa* or creative will from which this creation is said to proceed [Commentary, *Taittiriya Upan*] implies that Brahman is, as creator, endowed with a mind, a manifesting medium of *sattva*, a form of *māyā* which has been called in *Gīta niratisaya sattva* or infinite actuality. Yet He is not dominated by the 'true desires' of this stage: He directs them freely. "Is He, as desirer, to be taken like ourselves as not having yet attained to fruition? No, for He is free. The desires do not move Him, as they.....move others by enslaving them. Why so? They are characterised by true knowledge: being of the self itself, they are pure. Brahman is not moved by them. He is their mover. They are not other than His self. In 'He desired,' *He* is the self."

The ideal for us is to attain the god-like transparency of *sattva*. The causal Brahman, as absolute merit, has been called *sukrita*. *Sukrita* may be rendered 'the absolute good.' How to attain this absolute good?—What is the ethical discipline that will scour our foul *sattva* into absolute purity, that will divert it from its objective direction and inwardise it?

The true 'desires' referred to above are manifested as the 'names and forms' of this world. Through the perverting medium of *rajas* and *tamas*, these pure universals take false individualised forms. "These desires of the self are true but resting on (identified with) the false. These as residing in the self (appear as) the passions for outer objects, for sex, food, dress, etc. Self-willed conduct, as determined by these is said to be false." [Commentary, *Chhandogya Upan.*, VIII.] The pure actualised *buddhi* has far other tendencies. These called *daivi-sampad* in the *Gītā* include the virtues of veracity,

sincerity, compassion, avoidance of injury to others, suppression of anger and pride, etc. The regulation of our foul nature by these virtues will bring about its purity.

There need be no apprehension of a conflict between the prescription 'know Brahman' and this discipline of virtuous action. "The (performance of) unconditional duties (*nitya karma*), by removing obstacles (impurities of the soul), lead to knowledge. Hence the scriptural texts enjoining (virtuous) pratice (*karma*) do not conflict (with those which enjoin *jnāna* or knowledge). Not the ceremonial works like *agnihotra*, etc., but practices such as veracity, self-discipine, avoidance of injury to others, etc., are the surest means to the manifestations of *jnāna*. Other practices like meditation, etc., will also be referred to." [Commentary, *Taittiriya Upan.*]—"Here in the pure *sattva*-nature of the self, in the 'cave of *buddhi*,' in this unmanifest ether.....the knowledge of the absolute self is adequately manifested." [*Viveka-chudāmani.*]

That 'tangle of the heart' (*hridaya-granthi*) will disappear with the attainment of this *sattva*—transparency. The unity of the self in all creatures thus realised, there can arise no inclination to injure others: compassion for all will follow as a necessity: [*Gītā*, XIII, 29]. These virtues of universal compassion, etc., which are natural to the emancipated soul constitute the discipline for the soul seeking emancipation.

That *sarva-karma-sannyasa* of *Gītā*, the renunciation of all duty, is enjoined only on the soul which has been completely chastened by this discipline. Such a soul in fact is in the final stage, devoid of all conceit of individuality, being *jivan-mukta* or emancipated in life. For all else, *karma* or action is the main discipline prescribed in *Gītā*:—

"These actions, Oh *Pārtha*, should be performed

without inclination for the purification of the end. This is a true and excellent view."

"To the sage desiring to rise (to the emancipated stage), *yoga* (action without inclination) is said to be the means (discipline)."

Moral endeavour implies action without a thought of sensuous pleasure, action directed to the end of purification of soul, in the consciousness of duty, the fruits of the action being committed to the Lord.

There is no prescription in *Gītā* to renounce the particular duties of the institution one belongs to. But the end is attained, not by the mere performance of these outward actions, but by a distinctive spiritual attitude. "Does the attainment of the end follow from the performance of one's duties? No. How then?... The attainment to be spoken of follows from the operation of a new cause" [Commentary, *Gītā*, XVIII, 45]. "The will and the bodily activity of creatures flow from the Lord as the regulative principle within them.....The end is attained *by this Lord being worshipped by the performance of one's specific duties.*" Performance in this attitude of worship alone is the free action of the self.

Even the emancipated in life, on whom the renunciation of works is enjoined, are in *Gītā* said to act, not indeed for any end of their own, but for the good of the world. "Though engaged in action, he does nothing (for himself)."

All this will go to correct the false impression about Sankara that his monistic view of Brahman has no place in it for worship and moral activity. In his commentary on *Māndukya Kārikā* he explicitly points out that "there is no incompatibility between monistic vision and the prescriptions of worship." Worship and moral practice are indispensable for one who seeks to purify the soul. The vision of the One is possible only to the soul which

is completely purified. The prescription of moral and religious discipline is meant for those who have a 'middling vision,' the emancipated souls being those who have 'excellent vision.'

"That the self is one and undual is stated for those who have an unerring excellent vision. The beneficent Vedas have prescribed this worship and (ethical) action in the compassionate reflection—'how will those who have bad and middling vision attain this excellent monistic vision?'" [Commentary, *Mandukya Upan.*, iii, 16.]

The Conception of Freedom

In Hegel, Bergson and Indian Philosophy

BY

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The problem of Freedom is ultimately at the root of all philosophy. It is of a permanent interest to every student of philosophy. Meinong hardly does justice to the whole question when he says: "……in my opinion, at any rate, this is a matter that was concluded long ago, for those who believe in the law of causality cannot logically be indeterminists."[1] It is not so simple as it appears to be. I propose to discuss the subject with special reference to Hegel, Bergson and higher Indian thought. So far as Hegel is concerned, I shall only refer to his "Rechtsphilosophie," as he seems to me to be at his best there; so that I shall not limit myself to "*Willens-freiheit*" but shall also attempt to bring out Hegel's conception of 'true freedom'—"*Sittlichkeit.*" Hegel's "Rechtsphilosophie" is not a treatise on the mere controversy of free-will but embodies his attempt to comprehend and to exhibit the State as an existence essentially rational, as the realisation of true freedom. The territory of "*Recht*" is 'the spiritual,' and its more definite place and origin is the *Will*, which is free by its very nature. Freedom constitutes the substance and essential character of the *Will*, and the system of *right* is the kingdom of actualised freedom.

[1] Meinong, "Psychologisch-ethische Untersuchungen zur Werttheori," p. 209.

Hegel opens the subject with a polemic against Kant's conception of Freedom. (1) He attempts to show that Kant is blind to half the truth, in as much as he is not aware of the dependence of the subject on the object when he attempts to reduce all objects to mental phenomena. (2) Kant says that in *willing* we actualise the *ought*, what we think *ought to be*. Reason, with perfect spontaneity, creates an order into which it fits the empirical world. Hegel answers that there is no *ought* in Nature, that it can appear only as it actually *is*. It is one thing to purify the will from alien elements and it is another thing to find principles of action within it. Kant failed to do the latter. To him the Will is pure self-consciousness. It must act purely out of reverence for the moral law. The desires are taken as if they were impulses of animals. But such an abstract will, says Hegel, can never be actual, and such desires as Kant desires remain mere impulses. Hegel destroys this dualism by rejecting both the abstract will and the lower appetites. Man's actual will, at any stage, is not simply *related to* (as in T. H. Green), but is *one with* his totality of inclinations, impulses, desires, etc. In its elementary stage, the Will is not only one with but sunk in, these desires and impulses. The will is these and these are the will. The appetites and inclinations are the very life of the will, the ways in which it shows its existence. It is a false philosophic analysis which has separated these two in man's life. It converts distinctions (in thought) into separations (in fact). These desires then are identical with the will. They have their legitimate place within the ego, and are not to be regarded as foreign elements fit to be crushed. (3) Again we are not merely cognitive beings, as Kant implies. If we were, we would cease to be persons or individuals, since in that case there would be only universality but no

individuality. It is in the *will* that specification or individuation takes place. (4) Then again, Kant opposes happiness and duty; his rigid ethics of "duty for duty's sake" leaves no room for the development of feelings. Moral act is to proceed mainly from reverence to the Categorical Imperative, and happiness is not to be set up as an end. But, says Hegel, it is a wrong to duty to make it a horror to the natural man. A will which resolves nothing is not an actual will. That which is devoid of definite character never reaches a volition. Kant's pure will is in the words of Jacobi, "a will that wills nothing." (5) Next, Hegel inveighs against the conception of a "capricious will." The usual idea of freedom, says he, is that of *caprice*. Such an idea, however, must be taken to imply an utter lack of developed thought, containing as yet not even a suspicion of what is meant by the absolutely free will, right, ethical system, etc. "Caprice instead of being will in its truth, is rather will in its contradiction." Some old theologians may come forward to defend the idea of freedom as caprice, but such a conception is self-destructive. Lawlessness cannot give us freedom. We should cease to be 'persons' if our conduct were not regulated by some sort of law or order. When I will what is rational, says Hegel, I do not will what is peculiar. Indeed, as Edward Caird says, "a self that is not determined by any motive has no will." Our will is rational: it is thought translating itself into reality; and as rational it acts according to law. When I act morally, continues Hegel, I act for realising the end, the *object*, but not to assert *myself*. "*Nur das Gesetz kann uns die Freiheit geben.*" Only law can give us freedom. T. H. Green and Caird too have emphasised this point. Caird regards both these ideas of freedom, *viz.*, (1) as obedience to abstract law, and (2) as caprice, as anticipations of a truth which

is adequately expressed in neither. For, in both these forms, freedom is claimed for the self in virtue of an abstraction from the particular content of consciousness; and the particular content must therefore be regarded as absolutely annulled; for, if not, we should be obliged to treat it as externally limiting and determining the self. They may be regarded only as "stages in the development of a higher idea," a form in which "the incontradiction disappears."

Here one might retort that it is *law* to which the existence of *sin* may be traced back. If there were no law, there would be no occasion to violate it, hence there would then be no sin. But Hegel would at once reply that it must not at the same time be forgotten that where there is no *law* there is not even *righteousness*, and we are of course, not prepared to risk this positive gain in favour of a sort of negative consolation that we are free from sin.

Hegel's use of the word "*Moralität*" is by no means synonymous with that of the English "*morality*." He recognises three stages in the development of 'objective morality'—his notion *of* 'true freedom.' In the first stage we have only *Recht*: the law is laid down for us externally, and it is for us to obey and not to question 'why.' At this stage our motives do not enter into the question, and our approval or disapproval falls totally out of the sphere. As mere persons—personality being an essential characteristic of self-consciousness and an essential condition of freedom—we are living in the world of mere legality or *Recht*. But in fact there is no rational or spiritual being, however high or low in the scale of human existence, who is much more than a person. The second stage is reached in *Moralität*, where the 'mere person' of the legal sphere turns into a 'subject,' the law is not merely obeyed but recognised and

approved. At the legal sphere the mere command was enough, but it does not act here as a motive at all unless it gets our internal acquiescence. Morality thus implies the right of self-determination, which further implies—

(1) That all our grounds of action are within ourselves.

(2) An endless right of resistance to every authority that is external. To command the individual tyrannically is to insult his personality, and to impose beliefs authoritatively is to insult his individuality.

(3) The right to enforce our subjective convictions upon the outer world. Not only that the world will invade us, but that *we* will invade it.

(4) That as they stand, *i.e.*, in their separation, neither the will nor the world is as they should be. Both are radically bad. The will is not as it ought to be until it is realised.

(5) Morality is the sphere of the "ought" and therefore of endless striving. It is the sphere of infinite restlessness.

The last point is the most important for Hegel. It means that the moral life is never a finished act. It is always a seeking for the good, which is never completely realised. We are always trying to convert the *ought* into the *is*. Suppose we have succeeded in doing so, then the opposition is destroyed and there is left nothing more for the good man to do. Hence, as Dr. F. H. Bradley says, morality extinguishes itself, *i.e.*, brings its own suicide. But for Hegel *Moralität* is not the highest, nor also the last. There is something better than the striving or the opposition of the subjective and the objective. This opposition, instead of destroying either, brings about a new product by synthesis in the third stage, called *Sittlichkeit*, which is incorporated in the minds of the citizens and implies an

implicit and free obedience to the moral law. "*Die Sittlichkeit ist die Vollendung des objectiven Geistes, die Wahrheit des subjectiven and objectiven Geistes selbst.*" *Sittlichkeit* is objectified in the state, which in itself is essentially rational. Unlike Plato's *ideal* state, Hegel's is an *actual* one. To him the ideal is *here*. But one may naturally inquire if Hegel means to imply that whatever *is* is *right*. This assumption will ring the death-knell of all morality leaving no room for free action and will prove itself inconsistent with facts as we find them. We cannot ignore sin, evil, suffering, bad institutions, etc. Surely we cannot call them right or rational. But Hegel is clever enough to avoid these conclusions only by quibbling. "Sin issues in death; bad institutions must catch fire, because the nature of things is moral. The good alone is real." To be sure this is far from being an *explanation* of the existence of sin and evil, and it betrays itself as one of the weakest points in Hegel's argument.

That morality is exhibited in self-denial is a belief held by many eminent thinkers. Kantian ethics has room for such a tendency. Schopenhauer emphasised the point, and the same is the general trend of Indian Idealistic Philosophy. Buddha too preached the same stoicism. But Hegel repudiates this notion. To him a moral action does not imply the annihilation of the self, because in that case it will cease to be *moral*. There is always a reference to the spirit, says Hegel, in all the acts of spirit. Knowledge must be focussed in some personality and every realisation of impersonal good must be *some*-one's action. Every action is personal. Our self-satisfaction is called *happiness*, which is not the same as *pleasure*. In Kant's system happiness has no part to play. It rather interferes with the moral life in his ascetic and rigorous scheme. But, according to

Hegel, we have a right to be happy, for our natural side is in accord with reason.

This criticism would appear to dispose of once for all the doctrine of Asceticism or *Yoga*, no less than Kantian thesis. There is, however, still a general tendency in Europe to criticise and run down such-like Eastern notions as 'self-mortification,' 'asceticism,' 'self-denial,' 'killing of desires,' and so on. It is not my object to defend a particular doctrine simply because it happens to be an integral part of Indian Philosophy. There is a good deal there that I do not accept as satisfactory, but there is more that appeals to me. Here at least I must say that Hegel's criticism—which is typical of any modern criticism—seems to me to fall beside the mark. Hegel criticises Kant in his own way and ridicules the doctrine without going deeper into it. We perfectly agree that it is *happiness* that should be our *summum bonum*, but *what* constitutes happiness is always an open question. The Eastern conception of happiness is different from the Western. The Eastern mind goes deeper into the analysis of happiness, and finds by reason as well as 'spiritual intuition' (*anubhaba*) that *happiness here* is not after all the highest ideal, temporary, fleeting and limited as it is—that *true* happiness is *happiness hereafter*, the most perfect form of which is self-realisation. Buddhism and Brahmanism are at one in proclaiming that it is *desire* which is the enemy of our perfect happiness. It is *desire* that causes us, otherwise free in our spontaneity, to be in bondage. Hence the way to our redemption—in other words, to our attaining perfect bliss—lies in gradually subduing our desires in order to be able to *kill* them ultimately. But here you will ask me: can desires be at all killed? Is it not a psychological impossibility? Yes, it *is* a *psychological* impossibility, but most of the assumptions of psychology are by no means to be regarded

as ultimately true. Its general description of the processes of thinking, of the laws of mental activity, etc., may be true, while at the same time most of its 'distinctions,' 'divisions' and 'assumptions' may be nothing more than working hypotheses. The very existence of Metaphysics shows that psychological standpoint has no final validity. Psychology, *e.g.*, assumes a dualism of the Mind and the World, each real in itself ; and the present-day empirical tendency is to do away with the existence of any 'self' apart from the 'process of thought.' Each of these postulates is rejected in Metaphysics. Again though it is extremely difficult to annihilate desires, yet it is not impossible to do so. In other words, there *is* such a state as *nishkáma* (desirelessness) or *áptakáma* (complete fulfilment of desire), enjoyed by a true *Yogi* whose mind may be compared to a calm and tranquil ocean. As such a state is obtained only by a very small number, the general belief prevails that the state of "desirelessness" is impossible to attain. From the Indian point of view, our activity has reference not only to 'egoistic' (*svártha*), and 'altruistic' (*parártha*) motives, but may also be perfectly 'disinterested' (*nishkáma*). Such disinterestedness does not come from any inability to fulfil one's desires but from a sense of complete realisation of those desires that are worthy of being realised. Hence an *áptakáma* is strictly speaking *akáma*.

Here I may make a general observation of the Indian standpoint. The desire for annihilating desires will hardly appeal as genuine to any one who fails to realise the force of the Indian's *summum bonum* as "freedom from the bondage of this world ; freedom from its triple pain." Such "freedom from pain" is liable to be misunderstood, and it has actually been so. However, it does *not* advocate the flying away from the world's battlefield, it does not induce to keep away from household life (*grihastha*)

fearing it to be an impediment to one's freedom or self-realisation, it does not insist upon the renunciation of all actions, and it does not imply any marching in the forest as a *sine quá non* of true freedom or *mukti*, and so on. *Mukti* cannot be secured by such-like procedures, since it is no more than an *internal* change and must come from *within*: *mere* change of environment cannot bring about this internal transformation, which can be effected at home as well as in the forest, if proper training is not wanting. Now, the state "desirelessness" spoken of above is only the *last* stage in the evolution of mind—though most minds never attain to that stage, even anywhere near it—and the popular fallacy lies in taking the *last stage* as the *only* stage. Such a position will naturally lead to a number of ludicrous actions and inconsistent ideas. Idealistic pessimism need not darken our life. For instance, while conscious of the fact that the objective world is not ultimately real we still grant it an *empirical* reality and treat it as real for all practical purposes; in such cases, as Berkeley has pointed out, we have to think with the learned and speak with the vulgar. The false interpretation that in order to achieve redemption we must cease all activity is emphatically denounced and deprecated in such-like passages:

"*Na karmanám anárambhán*
Naishkarmyam purushoshnute
Nahi sanyasanád eva
Siddhim samadhigachchhati."

(B. Gita: 3. 4.)

We can only check the strong tendency of false idealism by emphasising, with Hegel and others, the empirical character of desires. So far as the *moral* life goes, we must agree most willingly that our desires cannot be and must not be annihilated, since it is their *harmony* or

organisation that constitutes our moral life. We should transform *bad* desires into *good* ones. But why must we stop there? Why must the process of thought be arrested at that point? Let it rise higher till thought itself breaks down and intuition comes to tell us that strictly speaking, the moral life need not be taken to be ultimate. No doubt this life is a knot of the phenomenal and the noumenal, of necessity and freedom, yet it is possible to feel the existence of a still higher stage, which is neither inferior to the moral life nor in contradiction to it, but is above it and beyond it—which, in the words of Dr. Bradley, is *non-moral* (by no means *immoral*). It is there that one attains what Hindu Philosophy calls *Jívanmukti* (redemption in this very life); it is there that desires are annihilated; it is there that the sense of identity of the individual with the Absolute, or of the individual will with the Will-in-Nature becomes an accomplished fact, not a mere matter of words. It is, as Schleiermacher tells us, this merging of the individual self in the world which is the characteristic mark of an ideal stage of experience (in man), where religion blossoms forth into *something above religion.* Schleiermacher used the term 'religion' in a rather confused manner, but it is just the idea of the "*something above re igion,*" of religion as the comprehension of the oneness of self and the world that I am referring to.

Thus the Hindu notion of 'true freedom' is the freedom of a *Yogi*—who, in himself, appears to have conquered the limitations of space and time, to whom nothing is near or far, to whom time (*trikála*: past, present and future) is an eternal 'Now,' to whom the universe *is* rather than *becomes.* It is in such freedom that the happiness of a *Yogi* consists. Hence, the very content of the notion of happiness being different from Hindu standpoint Hegel's criticism does not touch it.

I may now revert to Hegel and briefly sum up his position: the universal best in its practical form is the well-being of the state. The good which is the substantial motive of the will is to be particularised. Therefore Hegel objects to the Good as an end, since it is too general. The good is the truth of the particular will, and the will is only what it *does*. Evil springs from the fact that we are made to *grow*. Perhaps it is the highest form of perfection, and the being who *can* grow is better than he who *cannot*. Man is essentially a being who moves from 'determination-from-without' to 'self-determination.' The natural will is a self-contradiction. In his natural state man is not good, since he is not free. He falls beneath morality then. He ought to be free, for that is his *real* nature. In short, the state is the representative of objective righteousness, of our true freedom, of "*Sittlichkeit*." We are free individuals only so far as we enact the will of the state and accord with it. Everything is in movement, and even freedom is in movement; *i.e.*, it is not attained all of a sudden but we have to develop it out through *Recht* and *Moralität*. In the first we are in the sphere of obedience to external law; in the second exists the opposition of the subjective and the objective, while in the last stage, *viz.*, *Sittlichkeit*, a perfect harmony is restored; though we obey a law, we no longer obey it like slaves but like free beings, the law is in no way dictated to us but is our own construction.

Let us now consider for a moment the strictly moral problem of freedom. As viewed in the light of Indian Philosophy, it seems at first to be far from clear. I may be excused if I do not offer now anything more than a few scrappy observations on the subject. Sanskrit texts on the point form a very extensive literature, and the various views set forth there are *primâ facie* so clashing, that one is tempted at first to give up the inquiry in hopelessness.

Nevertheless, I believe it is possible to arrive at certain definite conclusions from a patient and close investigation.

First, let us turn to the well-known doctrine of *Karma*, which is generally misunderstood. A correct knowledge of this doctrine promises to help us out of many of the difficulties involved in the problem of Freedom. The doctrine of *karma* seeks to account for man's station in life, his character and his destiny. It points out an inner relation between all the acts which make up his life and to the position which is determined for him in this world. It looks upon our present life not as an isolated phenomenon but as intimately linked with the past and the future. That our *present* life is a stream of activity, and that we do perform 'deeds' *here* is a fact that one can accept without hesitation. The question remains with regard to our *past* and *future* lives. Here comes in the theory of *Karma* to declare that our present life is the outcome of our *karma* (*dharma and adharma*) performed in a previous life, and that the *karma* of *this* life is to determine our future also. That is to say, our station in the present life is determined by the past *karma*, but possibilities are open to us to mould our destiny by means of our acts, good or bad. There are however, three kinds of *karma*: *sanchita*, *prárabdha* and *kriyamána* (or *ágámi*). The first kind includes those acts which we have stored for us during many previous lives, a kind of reserve-fund to our credit.[1] The second includes those causes which operate *before* and immediately determine the existence as well as the happiness and misery of a particular being.[2] The last includes the circumstances which the being under the control of *prárabdha* produces and which are as it were added to the primary

[1] अनन्तकोटिजन्मनां बीजभूतं सदात्कर्मजातं पूर्वोपार्जितं तिष्ठति तच्छञ्चितं ज्ञेयम् ।

[2] इदं शरीरमुत्पादेच्च लोक एव सुखदुःखादिपदं यत्कर्मतत्प्रारब्धम् ।

sanchita to develop some day into *prárabdha*.[1] In other words, the infinite potential, *sanchita*, of an individual, in its kinetic form is *prárabdha*, and the working out of these capabilities under proper circumstances by adaptation is *kriyamána*, that which is being done by the individual for its own progress. *Prárabdha* and *kriyamána* are in fact the two forces whose resultant is the position of the individual at any given moment. So far as our being is determined by *karma* there is 'necessity.' But, as an Indian writer observes, this necessity carries with it no idea of pre-arranged sequence. It endows the organism with certain capabilities which must needs develop in a particular line, but it holds them capable of being modified in the struggle for life, by the laws of natural selection and adaptation. The individual inherits certain tendencies, but the adaptation is partly at least its own business. The being adapted to certain circumstances, which also may have their own inheritance, may be argued to be a result of the original inherited necessity, leaving no room for individual action.

This chain of reasoning is bound to lodge us in an *argumentum ad infinitum*, leading ultimately to the theory of Fatalism or "Election." It is here, therefore, that the splitting up of *karma* into three kinds helps us out of the difficulty. If there were no *kriyamána* we should simply be like machines and our life should then be completely determined from without. But in fact we possess the power of adaptation and modification, consequently even by means of *karma* it is *we* who determine ourselves—in part at least. Complete self-determination may imply that in point of time we did exist in conjunction with our body before any *sanchita-karma* came into being. But this assumption would be fallacious, simply because, *ex*

[1] ज्ञानोत्पत्त्यनन्तरं ज्ञानिदेहकृतं पञ्चपापरूपं कर्म यदस्ति तदागामि ।

hypothesi our body being in itself the embodiment (or result) of our *karma*, cannot be conceived to exist prior to *karma*. This however is the *crux* of the whole problem: our *karma* presupposes the existence of a body (*sharíra*), which in its turn, is held to be the outcome of *karma*. In other words, nobody can enter into existence without *karma*, merit and demerit; and without a body *karma* cannot be performed—a logical see-saw!

How is this difficulty to be solved? The doctrine under discussion gives a simple answer by saying that *karma* is beginningless, as is the world itself. There are and will be endless cycles of creation and destruction. This assumption seems to be a necessity of thought. The seed is the cause of the sprout and the sprout is the cause of the seed. If the assumption of the *anáditva* of the world does not appeal to us, still on the other hand bringing in of the notion of time is no less arbitrary. Well, then, we may not hold that there was any first creation. It may be argued then that if there were a first beginning of the world the Creator must be reproached with inequality of dispensation and cruelty, since we find some people very happy, others very miserable, in others again an intermediate position and so on. The existence of suffering and moral evil must be reconciled with the nature of the Absolute. If there was no rational principle of differentiation guiding the Creator while first creating the world then such a Creator would be like one acting in a state of frenzy or madness. This consequence will hardly appeal to anybody. Hence we must suppose that the world is without a beginning, and whenever a new cycle of creation takes place the Creator is guided by *karma* (merit and demerit). He has been so guided from eternity. Hence, as Shankara says (*cf.* Vedánta-Darshana, II. 1. 34), the fact that the creation is 'unequal' does not imply any fault for which the Lord is to blame. The Lord's position is analogous to that of a

cloud,[1] which gives rain. For, as the cloud is the common cause of the production of rice, barley and other plants, while the difference between the various species is due to the various potentialities lying hidden in the respective seeds, so the Creator is the common cause of the creation of gods, men, etc., while the differences between these classes of beings are due to the different merit belonging to the individual souls. Hence the Creator cannot be reproached with inequality of dispensation and cruelty.

This argument of Shankara appeals to me as very cogent. We are driven by a necessity of thought to assume that the world is without a beginning. Whatever theory is substituted for that of *karma*, some such difficulty is sure to arise.

I need not enter into the consequences of the doctrine of *karma*. One thing is evident: it teaches us to be perfectly happy with our lot, since it is a kind of self-imposition, and creates in our mind a sense of satisfaction, contentment and resignation. To be sure, we are not mere tools in the hands of Destiny, but to a great extent we are creators of our own destiny. We are *free*, but our freedom does not imply 'lawlessness' or 'caprice': it only means our power of choice and adaptation within certain limits. The doctrine of *karma* is a cardinal element, not only of Brâhmanism but of Buddhism as well. Buddha refers to *karma* as the cause of inequality in the world, giving many happy illustrations, one of the typical ones being the inequality of trees due to a difference in the *seed*, which is compared to *karma*. Buddha has said:—"All beings, O youth, have *karma* as their portion, they are heirs of their *karma*, they are sprung from *karma*; their *karma* is their kinsman; their *karma* is their refuge; *karma* allots beings to meanness or greatness."

[1] ईश्वरस्तु पर्जन्यवदद्रष्टव्यः।

It may still be objected that the doctrine seems to leave no room for "freedom." I believe, however, that there has been a good deal of war on mere words: Freedom, Necessity, Liberty, Determinism, etc. A little careful thought will at once convince us of the futility of such war. *Freedom* does not mean absolute indeterminism, but only a particular kind of *determinism*, *viz.*, self-determination 'I am free' means that I am determined from *within* by my own spontaneous will. It must not, however, be supposed that in an act of choice I am exercising my 'liberty of indifference.' Mr. Bertrand Russell rightly says[1]:— When several alternative actions present themselves it is certain that we can both do which we choose and choose which we will. In this sense all the alternatives are possible. What determinism maintains is, that our will to choose this or that alternative is the effect of antecedents, but this does not prevent our will from itself being a cause of other effects. And the sense in which different decisions are possible seems sufficient to distinguish some actions as right and some as wrong, some as moral and some as immoral. Thus also the sense of responsibility is not destroyed by such determinism. We are not exactly in the position of the mad man, who escapes blame for doing a crime, partly because he could not judge rightly as to consequences but partly also because we feel he could not have done otherwise. The question of choice really decides as to praise and blame. The *madman* did not choose between different courses, but was impelled by a blind impulse. We attribute responsibility then, where a man, having to exercise choice has chosen wrongly; and this sense of praise or blame is not destroyed by determinism.

It is interesting to note how far Mr. Russell's views fit in with the theory of *karma*. The *inner* necessity which

[1] "Philosophical Essays," pp. 37-38.

is common to both must always be distinguished from the two kinds of necessity external to *man, viz.*, Fatalism of Islam, and Predestination or Election-Theory of Christianity as commonly understood, both of which being theories of *final* causes are untenable. The doctrine of *karma* is a theory of *efficient* causes.

Turning to the Advaita-Vedánta, we find that its attitude towards the problem of freedom is similar to that of Kant, whose frigidly rationalistic speculation seems to fall in with the 'temper' of the Vedántists. An important distinction is drawn before any explanation of the problem is attempted, and the distinction itself serves a clue to the explanation. This distinction is between two aspects of reality, namely, *páramárthika* and *vyavahárika*. These are exactly identical with Kant's *transcendental* and *empirical*. I take it that both Shankara and Kant have attempted to solve the problem of freedom pragmatically—I mean their *method* is pragmatic. There is no absolute, rigid and stereotyped answer to the question "Am I free?" The answer depends upon the meaning of "I." The self has two principal aspects, the *nöumenal* and the *phenomenal*. The answer to the question at issue will vary according as we mean by the "I" the nöumenal or the phenomenal self. In its noumenal aspect the self is free and its freedom is transcendental, but its active manifestations being phenomenal are necessarily determined. Man is free as '*causa nöumenon*.' The two aspects spoken of above are no more than *aspects*, consequently the self remains one undivided whole.[1] Look at the self in its true aspect (*nirguna-avastha*) the self free from any *upádhis*, it is free in its spontaneity; look at the self as phenomenal, the self with *upádhis*, it is 'not free.' That *karma* is performed

[1] *Cf.* कूटस्थब्रह्मणोर्भेदो नामसात्रादृते न हि।
घटाकाशमहाकाशौ विद्युज्येते न हि क्वचित्॥

by the phenomenal self is self-evident, as without a body (*sharira*) no *karma* can be performed, and body is itself an *upádhi*, a limitation. We sum up, after Deussen, the position of Kant-Schopenhauer Idealism, which is identical so far with the standpoint of Shankara :

1. All that belongs to the phenomenal world lies in the bonds of space (*desha*), time (*kála*) and causality (*káranatá*); '*das Ding-an-sich*' as Will is, on the other hand, free from these intellectual forms in which the world is built up.

2. If I look *outwards*, I see everything through the medium of space, time and causality. If I look *within*, I perceive, under certain restrictions, that which exists independently of these forms—the Will as 'Being-in-itself,' beyond which there is no being.

3. If I look *outwards* at my deeds, I see that they all, being necessitated by motives, must without exception be as they are and not otherwise. If I look *inwards* I find myself free and equally capable of willing an action or its opposite. In this consciousness of freedom is rooted the sense of responsibility for what I do or leave undone. This is particularly important when we discuss the problem in the domain of ethics, on general grounds only. And I believe that pragmatically too this *consciousness of freedom* has a peculiar value. I cannot get over this fact. To me such consciousness is ultimate. The test of 'workability' can also be advantageously applied, as such consciousness works out for my good, making me morally responsible for what I do.

अधिष्ठानांशसयुक्तं भमांशमवलम्बते ।
यदा तदाहं संसारीत्येवं जीवोऽभिमन्यते ॥
भमांशस्य तिरस्कारादधिष्ठानप्रधानता ।
यदा तदा चिदात्माहंमसंगोऽस्मीति बुध्यते ॥
कृतं देहेन कर्मेदं न मया शुद्धरूपिणा ।
इति चिन्तानुरोधी यः कुर्वन्नपि करोति न ॥

Ashtávakra-Gita,

The identity of the self, though easy to speak of, is most difficult to be *realised*. The greatest delusion rests in the idea that the individual self, the *Jiva*, is different in its very nature from the universal self, *Brahman*. True freedom, as Indian thought declares, cannot be attained without *realising* the essential unity of one's "self" with the spiritual principle in Nature. The state in which such realisation has taken effect is called *Jivanmukti*. In other words true freedom is self-realisation. Even on attaining such freedom, *prārabdha-karma* will continue running its course,[1] without its consequences affecting the individual, and no *new* and *fresh* 'Karma' will be created in these circumstances, as that performed in such state of pure passionlessness will be barren and will not bear its fruit, just as a baked seed sowed in the ground never sprouts. In that state the individual may be said to have transcended the territory of 'morality' and become *non-moral* or *supra-moral* (not *immoral*). This point has already been referred to.

Looking at the problem of freedom on general grounds we must always distinguish the two questions: (*i*) Am I free to *do* what I *will*? and (*ii*) Am I free to *will* what I *do*? This distinction was brought out by Voltaire and Robinet also. It is, however, the latter form of the question that we have to discuss; Can I will otherwise than I do? This sums up all forms of 'formal' freedom. Is my volition predetermined? Having done a certain thing I can always form a *detached* picture of myself as having done something else. In this sense we can always do otherwise than what we actually do. But it does not follow that this detached image could ever have been realised in the system of things. However intelligent the detached picture be in itself yet it is not possible as a fact

[1] प्रारब्धकर्मणां भोगादेव क्षयः।

unless it is a factor in the complete picture of the whole universe. My ability to form such a detached picture does not prove anything, because even then it would still be open to a more enlightened consciousness to prove that I was mistaken. The question is not "What am I conscious of ? but "What have I a right to be conscious of ?" The argument from direct consciousness often confuses the issue *a parte ante* with the issue *a parte post*. It makes certain statements about both situations which are true of only one of them. But, as already pointed out, this argument from direct consciousness possesses a very high value pragmatically, and it is chiefly on this ground that our moral obligations can be explained.

The concluding remarks of Dr. Ward in his admirable chapter on "Freedom and Foreknowledge"[1] are relevant to our discussion. He thus speaks of the Pluralist's *via-media*:

"*All* is not decreed: the world is not created like a symphony. Again, all possibilities are not left open: the many have not severally unlimited freedom, that 'freedom of indifference' which is indistinguishable from chance. God's creatures are *creators*, the pluralist maintains: their nature is partly *his* doing, partly their own: he assigns the talents, they use or misuse them. Not everything that is possible is possible to any, yet some initiative is open to every one: none are left with no talent at all. The *total* possibilities then, however far back we go, are fixed; but within these, contingencies, however far forward we go, are open."

Before I refer in particular to Bergson's views on the problem of freedom I might make a general observation. The central conception of Monsieur Bergson's philosophy is *l'idée de changement*, and that was the title of the lectures he delivered at Oxford in 1911. He overturns

the conception of teleological evolution held by Idealists of the 19th century. He fights most vigorously against the conception of life as a sort of *mechanical* organisation. Organisation is to him a *living* organisation, and instead of the pattern determining the process it is the process that determines the patern. The self never stops "rolling" or "growing," and it is only by an imaginary arrest of the process that we can even say "it *is*" at any given moment. Life is ceaseless creation. He says a good deal afresh, yet we look in vain for a complete coherent *system* of his philosophy, which seems to be still in the making. He may perhaps develop the ethical and religious side of his philosophy in the course of lectures he is now delivering in America.

Bergson's system—so far as it is a *system* at all—may be called on the whole 'a revival of Hegelianism.' In his conception of *change*—keeping apart differences in details—he is repeating Hegel without Hegel's obscurities of dialectic and language. In Hegel too thought finds its solution in *evolution*. By means of a circular process it is in ceaseless change—in eternal flux. We cannot arrest it at any point. The moment we attempt to do so, we land ourselves in contradictions. Thought and being are identical. It is not correct to say that being is *in* evolution, because that would create a dualism. Being *is* evolution itself—that is the fundamental idea of Hegel's absolutism. Reality is kinetic, not static. Its mode of being is not immobility but movement, change, evolution. On some details, however, Hegel and Bergson stand at opposite poles of thought. In Hegel, the function of thought is to comprehend the real since thought and being are identical: not only the real is the rational but the rational alone is the real. In Bergson we have just the opposite conception: thought can by no means comprehend reality: thought only *distorts* reality and gives

us a *false picture* of reality. It subjects us to countless illusions; represents one flowing continuous reality as a heap of chopped up moulds or bits, as composed of a number of isolated events; turns *time* into *space*, and leads us astray in many other ways. It is only by *Intuition* that we know what reality is. And in order to reach the court of Intuition we must necessarily transcend the court of concepts. This is however one of the most fundamental thoughts of Bergson, and it is this mysticism of his philosophy that has so much in common with what the Vedanta has to say on the relation of Thought and Reality. It is there that his philosophy will particularly appeal to the Indian mind.

Let us now revert to our problem. How does Bergson answer the question: "Are we free"? Before proceeding to answer this question, he inveighs against the manner in which the problem of freedom is stated in its current form. The very problem in that form is said to be inadmissible. This is discussed by him while formulating his conception of 'liberty' towards the end of the chapter, '*De l'organisation des états de conscience: la liberté*" of his well-known book, originally called the "*Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience.*" I may here quote only the last paragraph:—

"*En résumé, toute demande d'eclaircissement, en ce qui concerne la liberté, revient sans qu'on s'en doute à la question suivante: "le temps peut-il se représenter adéquatement par de l'espace?"—A quoi nous répondons: oui, s'il s'agit du temps écoulé; non, si vous parlez du temps qui s'écoule. Or l'acte libre se produit dans le temps qui s'ecoule, et non pas dans le temps écoulé. La liberté est donc un fait, et, parmi les faits que l'on constate il n'en est pas de plus clair. Toutes les difficultés du problème, et le problème lui-même, naissent de ce*

qu'on veut trouver à la durée les mêmes attributs qu'á l'etendue, interpréter une succession par une simultanéité, et rendre l'idee de liberté dans une langue où elle est évidemment intraduisible."

Bergson thus contends that the problem is, in its current form, inadmissible, since it is due to an illusion under which we turn *time* into *space*, *i.e.*, represent time symbolically. Real time is '*durée*' and is not mere succession but an eternal *now* in which all reality is moving and changing. Existence in time is life. Life, like consciousness, is a *quality* (not a *quantity*), and cannot be measured, consequently the traditional problem of determinism disappears, and free will is seen to be the creative-power of the individual.

Bergson's answer to the question : " Are we free ?" is— " We are free in so far as we really *create.*" Dr. H. Wildon Carr thus sums up this answer in his most admirable monogram on " *Bergson : The Philosophy of Change.*" " Free-will is the power of free creative action, not the liberty of choice. It is the very nature of our lives as individual wholes, the expression of the individuality of Life. On the intellectual view we are all determined and there is no place for freedom in the world as physical science presents it, but that view is false, according to Bergson. Life itself we know only in *intuition*, it is a becoming in which there is no repetition, in which therefore prediction is impossible, for it is continual new creation. Each action looked at individually is predetermined, since it must be explained by its conditions. Hence from this standpoint there is no escape from the determinist's positions. But what is true of the parts viewed as parts is not necessarily true of the whole. " And so it may be that when we regard our action as a chain of complementary parts linked together, each action so viewed is rigidly conditioned, yet when we regard

our whole life as one and indivisible, it may be free. We are free when our acts spring from our whole personality, when they express that personality. These acts are not unconditioned, but the conditions are not external, but in our character, which is ourselves."

I am afraid I have already gone beyond the limits of this paper. I shall therefore, only state a few bare points, without amplifying them, in criticism of Bergson's doctrine of freedom.

1. In the first place, there is nothing new in his definition of free-will as the power of free creative action distinguished from the liberty of choice. In fact we know that "will" is the mark of our individuality and personality, and Idealists generally agree that "will" and "freedom" are synonymous terms.

2. "We are free in so far as we *create*." There is no difficulty in accepting this proposition. We have, in fact, deduced the same position while discussing the doctrine of *karma*. Under that discussion it was easy to see the meaning of "*in so far as*," since we are not *wholly* free but *in part*. But one might ask, when Bergson conceives life as creative evolution he implies that we *always* create, hence there is hardly any particular significance in expressions like: "*in so far as* we create."

3. There is no *repetition* in our life, hence *prediction* is impossible. I ask: "Is that a fact?" Is not prediction possible to some extent? Does not the possibility of predicting phenomena like the eclipse of the Sun and the Moon imply the existence of some sort of *eternal laws*? And may it not be that given all the conditions in which I find myself now, my future could be predicted with some exactness? If however, no prediction is possible, then are the laws governing the physical universe to be also regarded as *changing* every moment? And if there is

really nothing but *change*, what will be our philosophy of Religion: how shall we conceive God, etc? Surely the assumption of *élan vitale*, a *vital impulse* or push driving forward the development of life is no more than a mere postulate.

4. We are free when our acts spring from the *whole* of our personality. But, I may ask, is it not a psychological certainty that each of our acts is the expression of the *whole* of our personality? This is the basal principle of the modern movement of Pragmatism, and it seems to be correct. Well, then, we might ask the Philosopher: are there any acts in the normal state of our mental life in which our *whole* personality does not shoot forth?

5. Life may certainly be conceived as "ceaseless flow" and "eternal creation" but when we take *direct intuition* as our unerring guide, we expect to be informed as to where all this flow is leading. Bergson would not grant any eternal or immutable goal towards which the tremendous activity of the *élan vitale* is merging. Is this activity then to be regarded as aimless? The postulate of a *blind impetus* does hardly throw any light on the question of the *origin* of life or the origin of the world, and now we see that we are told nothing definite as to the *end* of the whole creation! A creation with no definite origin and with no nameable goal or ideal! What is *mere* creation? What does Bergson exactly mean by *creative* evolution? I might observe that Bergson's *evolution* is neither evolution, since it does not evolve any ideal, nor *creative*, since creation is always of something determined: mere blind impulsive creation is more or less a contradiction!

Bergson's solution of the problem of freedom has hardly anything new in it, and that which is new, though put in a most fascinating and charming style, fails to

appeal as sound to many students of philosophy. It is difficult to believe that the problem of freedom will ever cease to be a *problem*. No last word has yet been spoken on it, and the only satisfactory solution lies in taking up the pragmatic attitude, as has already been hinted above.

The Moral Standards in Hindu Ethics.

BY

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I propose to consider in this paper the Moral Standards of the Hindus in the light of comparative ethics and comparative philosophy. My treatment will be philosophical rather than historical and I shall deal merely with the ethical aspect of the question leaving aside for the present the psychological and epistemological issues involved which I reserve for a separate treatment. I may mention here however that these two aspects of the question were clearly distinguished by the Hindus as is shown by the way in which they distinguished the question of the Svarupa or nature of right and wrong from that of its Pramána or means of knowing it. Thus Párthasárathimishra in the "Nyáyaratnákara" in discussing the question of dharmádharma or right and wrong, observes: with reference to dharmádharma, right and wrong, there are two kinds of doubt (viprapatti) which arise in the mind of the inquirer, *viz.*, (1) as to what constitutes the Pramána, the proper means of knowing right and wrong, and (2) as to what constitutes the Svarupa, the nature, standard or criterion of right and wrong. (Kim pramánako Dharmah, kim svarupah iti.)

As I have already stated I shall not deal with the first question in this paper which I reserve for a separate

treatment. As regards the standards themselves I propose to consider them in the following order :—

I. The Standard as Custom and Tradition.
II. The Standard as a Social Category.
III. The Standard as an End.
IV. The Standard as Law.

I shall endeavour to give a correct rendering of authentic texts in the first instance, but it will not always be possible to abide by the strict limits of a mere translation of passages which I consider to be of little use for my purpose. I shall therefore reserve to myself the freedom and latitude which an interpretation of the *spirit* as distinguished from the mere letter necessarily implies though I shall avoid making any extravagant and unfounded claims on such grounds.

I. The Standard as Tradition (Loka-Upadesha) and as Consensus (Lokaprasiddhi).

In the "Nyáyamanjari" in discussing the moral standards Jayanta Bhatta refers to Loka-Upadesha, Tradition and Lokaprasiddhi, consensus as the criteria of right and wrong. Loka-Upadesha, Tradition, is the standard according to those who hold that morality consists in the long-standing customs and usages that obtain amongst peoples. It thus differs from Loka-prasiddhi, consensus which is the standard according to those who insist on universal agreement of belief in the ascertainment of right and wrong. A distinction is thus made between tradition and consensus, the assumption being that as there are conflicting traditions obtaining amongst different peoples there cannot be anything certain or fixed in them to ensure their universal validity as the standard of right and wrong. Hence it is not enduring or long-standing customs that constitute the criteria of morality, but

customs that are universally accepted as authoritative, *i.e.*, in respect of which there is consensus or universal agreement of belief.

In respect of consensus however there has been considerable divergence of views as to its *ultimate* character as a moral standard. Thus some have held consensus *in itself* to be the test of right and wrong, while others have tried to *resolve it into something more* ultimate such as well-being and ill-being. Thus

(*a*) Some hold that consensus as a standard is only secondary and derivative. The real standard is well-being (upakara) and ill-being (apakara), and consensus or universal acceptance is the standard only as being conducive to this well-being and ill-being.

(*b*) Some again think that the ultimate standard into which consensus is to be resolved is not mere happiness or unhappiness in the *psychological* sense but includes also the *biological* criteria of anugraha, organic well-being or increase of life and pirhá, organic ill-being or decrease of life.

(*c*) Others think that there is a specific revelation behind consensus, the revelation of the Moral Law as produced by Shastra or Scripture. Consensus is based on this revelation and derives its authority from the latter.

(*d*) Others again think that consensus is not secondary or derivative as the standard of morality but is authoritative in itself and independently of any extraneous support.

II. The Standard as a Social Category.

The Standard as Social Good including Lôkasthiti or maintenance of the Social Equilibrium and Loka-siddhi or Realisation of the Social End.

In the preceding section we considered the moral standard regarded as Tradition and Custom. It was assumed that established usage of long standing has an

authority in itself which validates its acceptance as the standard of right and wrong in the moral life. There is however no appeal to social good as the ultimate criterion of the validity of custom though such reference may be indirectly implied. There are others however who insist on this test of social utility as the essential factor in the determination of right and wrong so that custom, tradition, etc., are authoritative only in a secondary sense as being resolvable into this ultimate test of social good. Thus the "Nyáyamanjari" notices also the following conceptions of the moral standard, *viz.*—(1) the standard as *Loka-sthiti* or maintenance of the social equilibrium, and (2) the standard as *Loka-siddhi* or realisation of the social good.

It is to be seen that the conception of Loka-sthiti or social stability is more compatible with moral order than moral progress while that of Loka-siddhi, *i.e.*, realisation of the social end or purpose provides both for order and progress. It is also to be noted that the standard of Lokasthiti or social stability implies a relativism in the moral life which impairs its authority by depriving it of its absoluteness and necessity.

This relativism in the conception of Lokasthiti is very clearly brought out by A'ryadeva in the Chatuhsatiká. It is pointed out that there being nothing durable or immutable in popular morality, it hardly inspires confidence in men's minds. (Anavasthitatvát laukikasya dharmasya, tatrástha na jyáyasi). Why? Because as righteousness (Dharma) is nothing but what maintains social stability, the social life is evidently superior to morality and determines the nature of the latter. Thus whatever is laid down by society for the regulation of family ties and relationships and of citizenship within specific territorial zones, *e.g.*, what is laid down in regard to marriage and the like, is regarded as constituting morality. Morality

and immorality are thus social conventions varying from zone to zone and age to age. There is therefore nothing constant or eternal in righteousness, nothing that is fixed immutably by Nature, morality being merely a means of social conservation, the content of which must vary according to the changing circumstances, conditions and organisation of the society which is to be conserved.

> Yá yá lokasthiti-stám-stám dharmah samanuvartate Dharmádapi tato loko valavániva drishyate.
> Loko hi yám yám sthitim vyavasthápayati desha-kulagotrácháravyavasthayá kanyádánodváhanádikam tám tám dharmah samanuvartate. Tasyáh tasyáh sthitéh dharmah iti prasiddhigamanát. Na cha eshah svabhávah vyavasthitasya nyáyo yujyaté, yat deshakálabhedayoh anyathátvát anyathá syat.

On account of this relativism in the conception of Lokasthiti, the Mahánirvántantra recommends Loka-Shreya, the social good as the moral standard as distinguished from Loka-Sthiti or social stability. An attempt is thus made not only to get beyond the limitations of communal and regional morality but also to provide for moral progress besides moral order.

N.B.—It is to be noted that the conception of Loka-Sthiti appears also in the Mahábhárat but there it is interpreted as Lokapálana, preservation of living beings and not as mere social stability, *i.e.*, Sthiti, stability in the Mahábhárat is interpreted to mean pálana or rakshana, preservation.

III. Standard as an End.

The Standard as Sukha or Pleasure.

The hedonistic standard of pleasure also occupies an important place in the ethics of the Hindus. It is the Chárvákas that are credited with this sensualistic standard of pleasure as the guiding principle in morality. The Chárvaka motto of life is: live for pleasure as you can,

and even if life is a blend of pleasure and pain the wise man should so regulate his life as to enjoy the maximum of pleasure with the minimum of unavoidable pain. It is sheer folly to forego pleasure because it is mixed up with pain just as it is folly to give up eating fish to escape the trouble of removing the scales and fish-bones, or to give up cooking the meal to escape the annoyance of beggars infesting and disturbing us. On the contrary we should be reconciled to life as it is and should endeavour to curtail our suffering as much as possible. This is true morality which consists in so regulating life as to make it yield the maximum of pleasure. Similarly immorality consists in unnecessarily increasing the amount of avoidable suffering or pain. Hence rightness and wrongness are to be determined by reference to upakára, well-being and apakára, ill-being, *i.e.*, by egoistic pleasure or happiness and egoistic pain or suffering, and as the body as consisting of the elementary particles of matter is all that we mean by the self, soul or spirit, it is the bodily or sensual pleasures that count, and it is only the fools that sacrifice physical pleasures in anticipation of supersensuous pleasures to come in a future life. In fact there is no future life, the soul perishing with the disintegration of the body so that the wisely-regulated life is that which has made the most of this life so as to make it yield the maximum of pleasure. It is necessary therefore to live prudentially so as to increase our happiness and reduce our suffering in this life, and it is even proper to purchase the pleasures of life by incurring debts, and other similar means. (Ṛnam kritvá ghṛtam pivét.)

It is to be seen that the Chárváka hedonism is gross and sensualistic as well as egoistic. It is the happiness of the self that counts in the last resort and a prudential and tactful regard for others with a view to self-gratification is the only form of altruism that is recommended as

rational and proper. Similarly any discrimination between sensual and refined pleasures in view of qualitative superiority is condemned as foolish.

N.B.—It is doubtful however whether the Chárvákas really preached this gross hedonism which has been ascribed to them. The slokas ascribed to Vrihaspati or some other Chárváka teacher may be nothing but a caricature of their doctrine by their opponents, or else they may be only exaggerated tirades of some Chárváka controversialist against the conventional teaching then current. As a matter of fact we hear of different classes of Chárvákas such as the Sushikshita or refined Chárvákas and the Dhurta or the clever Chárvákas besides the usual run of the Lokáyatikas. They must have represented different grades of refinement in hedonism in their ethical teaching just as they are actually reported to have taught materialism, naturalism and scepticism in their metaphysical and psychological doctrines.

Some criticism of the Chárváka Hedonism.

The Chárváka sensualism has been criticised by all the orthodox schools of Hindu philosophy. The Nyaya, the Sankhya, the Purva Mimámsá and the Vedanta systems are all at great pains to refute the dangerous creed of these free-thinkers. Thus Kumárila in the Sloka-Vártika criticising the pleasure-theory, observes :—

If rightness of conduct follows from well-being and wrongness from the opposite, how can contemplation be an act of merit or drinking be an act of demerit? (Anugrahát cha dharmatvam pirhátashchapyadharmatá, vadato japa-siddhádipánádau nobhayam bhavét—Sloka-Vártika, second Adhyáya). Or take the case of the dissolute rake. His sensualism may cause some little pain in the nature of compunction of conscience, but this is more than compensated by the intensity of the sensual pleasures he enjoys. Hence with the pleasure-theory as the standard of rectitude, the sensualist must be considered to be acquiring considerable merit by indulging

in his sensualism (Kroshato hridayenápi gurudárabhigáminám, bhuyándharmah prasajyeta bhuyasi hiipakáritá).

The above is a refutation of the pleasure theory on the ground of the comparative feebleness of the pleasure in virtuous or meritorious actions and its superior intensity and strength in wicked and immoral actions. Others again refute the Chárvákas by dilating on the transitoriness of pleasures and their impurity on account of their being mixed up with pain.

Thus Vijnánabhikshu in his commentary on the Sánkhyasutras condemns indiscriminate seeking of empirical pleasure as incapable of bringing lasting satisfaction to the individual. There is no lasting relief from the possession of wealth and other worldly advantages, for these are liable to perish or to exhaust themselves in the course of time and with the loss of these there is a recurrence of the pain. (Laukikát upáyát dhanádeh atyantadukkha-nivritti-siddhirnásti. Kutah? Dhanádiná duhkhé nivritté pashchát dhanádikshayé punarapi duhkhánuvrittidarshanát—Vijnánabhikshu.)

It cannot be denied that these material advantages bring some kind of relief, but it is neither absolute nor lasting relief, the pain recurring after an interval like hunger which recurs sometime after appeasement. Moreover the relief which is thus earned by empirical means is like that of the elephant wallowing in the mud: just as the latter obtains relief against its bruised skin by soiling itself so does the person seeking relief from suffering through worldly gain and material advantages. (Drishtasádhanajanyáyám dukha-nivrittávatyantapurushárthatvaméva násti, yathákathanchit purushárthatvam tvastyéva. Kutah? Prátyahikasya kshuddukhasya nirákaranavadéva tena dhanádiná duhkha-nirakaranasya chestanát. Atah dhanádyarjané pravrittirupapadyate iti bhávah.

Kunjarashauchádi-kamapyápata-duhkha-nivartakatayá mandapurushártho bhavatyéva iti.)

Moreover this kind of relief earned by empirical means does not essentially differ from suffering. Why? Because there is no cessation of *all* kinds of suffering thereby. Again, even where these worldly means are effectual in giving satisfaction they implicate their possessor in sin because of the deprivation of others' claims. Lastly there is also pain in the effort which it is necessary to put forth for the acquisition of these advantages. (Sarvaduhkheshu drishtasádhanaih pratikárásambhavát. Yatrápi sambhavástatrápi prati-grahapápádyuttha-duhkhávashyakatvamáha. Sambhavéapi drishtopáyanántariyakádiduhkha-samparkávashyambhavát—Vijnánabhikshu).

It is to be seen that this is also the refrain of the Shankarites in their criticism of the Chárváka Hedonism. In the Gita it is also pointed out that desire is insatiable because it grows by indulgence and hence there is no end to desiring and the consequent strife, pain and disappointment in the pursuit of pleasure (Schopenhauer).

The question why pleasure is to be shunned like pain is also elaborately discussed by the Naiyáyikas.

Thus Udyotkara in the Nyāya-Vártika in defining the highest ideal of life as duhkhena átyantika viyogah, *i.e.*, complete and absolute freedom from suffering, points out that there are altogether three views as to the relation between pleasure or happiness and pain or suffering :—

(1) It might be supposed that whatever is, is of the nature of pain : pleasure or happiness as a positive experience does not exist. (Sarvam svarupatah duhkham : sukham svarupatah násti). This is the Buddhist view—a form of *ontological* pessimism which follows as a corollary from their doctrine of Universal Impermanence.

Udyotkara rejects this view because experience contradicts it (pratyakshavirodhát).

(2) It might be supposed that our so-called pleasures are only subtle forms of pain (Duhkhavikalpa), that happiness as an original positive experience, does not exist (svarupatah sukham násti). Udyotkara rejects this view (1) on the *psychological* ground that it is incompatible with the two-fold reaction of the will (pravritti) *viz.*, as pursuit of the good and as avoidance of the evil, which supposes the existence of both pleasure and pain as original and positive experiences: and (2) on the moral ground that the purpose of righteousness (dharma) will be frustrated if pleasure or happiness did not exist as a positive experience (happiness being the moral fruition or reward of righteousness).

(3) It might be supposed that pleasure exists as an original positive experience (svarupatah sukham asti) just as pain, for it is so experienced by every individual (pratitéh), but there is *no pure pleasure* or happiness, *i.e.*, pleasure unmixed with pain. Udyotkara accepts this view. According to him pleasure exists just as pain, but they are samánopalabhya, mixed up or involved in one and the same experience. Hence there is abinábháva, inseparableness of pleasure and pain, and this relativity of pleasure-pain consists in their—

(*a*) Samána-nimittata, being produced by the same cause so that the causes that produce pleasure also produce pain (yánieva sukhasádhanáni tánieva duhkhasádhanáni).

(*b*) Samáno-ádhárata, having the same ádhára, substrate or locus so that the consciousness regarded as the locus or áshraya of pleasure is also the locus, ádhára or áshraya of pain (yatra sukham tatra duhkham).

(*c*) Samánopalabhyatá, being experienced by one and the same experiencer so that the experiencer (here the manas, mind specifically) of pleasure must also be an

experiencer of pain (yena sukham upalabhyaté tena duhkhamapi).

Hence Udyotkara concludes, vivekahána or judicious selection of pleasure (as the Chárváka recommends) by sifting it from pain with which it is mixed up, is impossible. Therefore if pain is to be shunned, the wise man must be prepared to give up happiness along with it. Not that there is no happiness as a psychological reality, only it does not exist unmixed with pain and should be treated as pain for purposes of ethical discipline. This is ethical pessimism as distinguished from the ontological pessimism of the Buddhists. Pain and evil are not constitutive principles of experience as the Buddhists think: on the contrary the psychological reality of pleasure is a matter of immediate experience, only it should be treated as pain by the wise man because of its inseparableness from the latter.

The Standard as Atma-Santosh, Self-Satisfaction and Atma-Labha, Self-Attainment or Self-Realisation.

In this section we shall consider Transcendental Satisfaction as the moral standard as distinguished from empirical pleasure which is the Chárváka view, *i.e.*, we shall consider the standard regarded as the Shreyah or Good as distinguished from the Preyah, the merely attractive, tempting or pleasant. It is to be seen that this conception of Transcendental Bliss is a necessary supplement to the negative criticism of the Chárváka Hedonism without which the latter would continue to hold its sway over the mind in spite of the pain and evil which it may bring with it.

This conception of Transcendental Bliss occurs not only in the Upanishads, but it is also to be found in Manu and Shankara. Thus in the Upanishads a distinction

is made between shreyah or what is intrinsically excellent and good for the individual, and preyah or what is merely pleasant. Shreya, the Good consists in Atma-Santosh, self-contentment and satisfaction, while Preya, the pleasant is connected with vishaya-sukha or empirical pleasure. Every other pleasure is a reflection of Atma-priti or Bliss that characterises the self, and hence Atma-priti is the highest good and the standard of all good and evil. In fact whatever is done is done with a view to Atma-priti or self satisfaction, and it is this Atma-kama or love of the self, says the Vrihadáranyaka Upanishad, that reflects itself into all other forms of Kámaná, attraction or desire. Thus the husband is dear to the wife not because of the wife's love for the husband but for the love with which the wife loves her own true self. Similarly riches are desired not because riches are themselves objects of love but because of the love with which the individual loves his own self.

Na vá aré patyuh kámáya patih priyo bhavati atmanastu Kámáya patih priyo bhavati. Na vá aré vittasya kámáya vittam priyam bhavati atmanastu kámáya vittam priyam bhavati.

Every particular desire is thus a reflection or mode of the desire for the realisation of one's true self which is the highest good and this good, the Shreyah is to be distinguished from empirical pleasure, the Preyah which arises from external objects. Thus in the Kathopanishad we have:

The good, Shreyah is one thing, and the pleasant, Preyah is another. They attract the purusha or individual in different ways by drawing them to different objects or ends. He who chooses shreyah attains his highest good, and he who chooses preyah is deprived thereby of his ultimate good or end.

Anyat shreyah anyat uta eva preyah, ubhé nánárthé purusham ninitah ; Tayo shreyah ádadánasya sádhú bhávati, hiyate arthát ya u preyo vrinité.

Shankara commenting on the above points out :—

Good, Shreyah means summum bonum, Nishreyasam, highest good and is to be distinguished from the merely pleasant. These two, *viz.*, the good and the pleasant, being directed to different ends or objects, binds individuals in different ways with reference to their station in life. Of these, the good is constituted by truth, Vidyá or knowledge of reality while the pleasant is a mode of illusion, error or Avidyá. Every individual is actuated to perform his duties under the influence of either of the two forces of Vidyá or Knowledge and Avidyá or Illusion. The individual that desires immortality is actuated by the idea of the good to eschew the path of pleasures, because without eschewing the pleasant there is no attaining the good. By seeking the good the individual realises the perfection and nobility of his soul. But the short-sighted fool that chooses the path of pleasures is deprived thereby of his ultimate good.

Prithak eva shreyah nishreyasm, tathá anyat eva preyah priyataram api. Té preya-shreyasi ubhé nánárthé bhinna-prayojané sati purusham adhikritam varnáshramádivishishtam ninitah vadhnitah. Tábhyám vidyávidyábhyám átmakartavyatayá prayojyaté sarvapurushah. Shreyah preyaso hi abhyudayámritatvárthi purushah pravarté. Anyataráparityágena ekena purushena Sahánusthátum asakyatvát. Shreyah kurvatah sadhu shobhanam shivam bhavati. Yastu aduradarshi vimúrah hiyaté viyujyaté arthát purushárthát páramárthikát sah preyah verinité upádatté.

It is to be seen that the original passage speaks merely of a moral struggle as arising from two different possible ends which man may propose to himself—

shreyah, the good, and preyah, empirical pleasure. Shankara however reduces this struggle to the metaphysical conflict between the Principle of Knowledge (Vidyá) and the Principle of Illusion (Avidyá). The choice of right as against pleasure brings in good while the opposite makes man lose his real good.

In sloka 2, the psychological process underlying the choice of the good or the pleasurable is described. It is pointed out that the good and the pleasurable come to man in mixed forms, but the clear-sighted individual separates the good from the pleasurable, and then chooses the good in preference to the pleasurable. But the dull in intelligence chooses the pleasurable for the sake of material gain such as the attainment of the unattained (yoga) and the preservation of the attained (kshema). Shreyashcha preyashcha manushyam etah tau samparitya vivinokti dhīrah. Shreyohi dhīroabhipreyaso vrinīté; Preyo mando yogakshemát vrinīté. Shreya, the good is therefore mixed up in experience with preyah, the pleasant; in other words, in the same situation there are possibilities of shreya as well as preya. The wise man therefore considers both sides carefully, weighs or estimates the relative worth of the virtuous and the pleasurable course, and thus separates the one from the other. When the two different courses draw him different ways, the wise man chooses the virtuous course in preference to the pleasurable one. The foolish choose, on the contrary, the latter for prudential reasons.

Commenting on the above Shankara points out:—

Though shreya as well as preya are under the control of the moral individual, yet owing to cloudiness of the intelligence they come to us mixed up. But the wise man knows how to separate the one from the other even as the swan knows how to drink away the milk by separating it from the water. In short the wise man

discriminates the good from the pleasant and after comparing their relative worth chooses the former. But the dull in intelligence being incapable of discrimination, is led away by prudential considerations and chooses the pleasurable course as consisting of physical comfort and material prosperity such as the possession of cattle, the joy of family life, etc.

Yadi ubhé api kartuh sváyatté purushena, kimartham preyah eva ádatté váhulyena loké. Sattvam sváyatté, tathápi sádhanatah phalatashcha mandabuddhinám durvivekarupé sati vyámishrībhuté iva manushyam etah prápnutah shreyashcha preyashcha. Ato hamsa iva ambhasah payah tau shreyapreyapadárthau samparitya samyak parigamyah samyak manaso avalochya gurulághavam vivinokti prithak karoti dhīrah dhīmán. Vivichya shreyo hi shreyo eva abhivrinīté shreyasah abhyarhitatvát. Yastu mandah alpavuddhih sah vivekásamarthát yogakshemanimittam sharirádyupachayalakshananimittam etat preyah pashuputrádilakshanam vrinīté (Shankara-bháshya on sloka 2).

In another of his bháshyas Shankara gives the details of the above process of choice in which the following stages are distinguished.

(1) Representation of pleasure or other consequences.

(2) Sankalpa—vikalpa of Manas, *i.e.*, mental weighing of the relative worth of the alternatives.

(3) Vuddhyadhyavasáya, *i.e.*, the ascertainment of the understanding or coming to a definite conclusion including discrimination (viveka) between the two.

(4) Prayatna or kriti, volition, *i.e.*, in this case actual choice.

It is to be observed that between the stages of deliberation and choice an intermediate stage of intellectual ascertainment (vuddhyadhyavasáya) is here recognised

which may be regarded as the cognitive aspect of the conative process of volition or choice.

This choice brings, in the case of the shreyah, self-satisfaction, self-content or Atma-santosh, and in the case of the preyah, empirical pleasure, vishayasukha or contingent pleasure.

Hence there are two kinds of satisfaction :—(1) The Transcendental Satisfaction arising from Atma-labha or self-attainment which is Atma-santosh or self-contentment, and (2) Empirical pleasure arising from the possession of external objects.

In the Sarva-vedánta-siddhánta-samgraha the relation between empirical pleasure and one's true self whose essence is self-contentment, is explained in detail. It is pointed out that empirical pleasure is desired only as it is believed to be a means to the realisation of one's true self. In fact, it is the self which is the dearest of all objects to sentient beings. The self is one's own (paramántarah) as distinguished from other objects which are external; its essence is Ananda, Transcendental Bliss, and it is the most beloved of all objects of love.

Atmátah paramapremáspadah sarvasharīriṇám
Yasya sheshatayá sarvamupádeyatvamṛchchati.
(Sloka 627 "Sarvavedáhtasiddhánta-sangraha").

Anyasmát api sarvasmádátmáyam paramántarah.
(Sloka 628).

Tasmádátmá kevalánandarupo
Yah sarvasamád vastunah preshtha uktah.
(Sloka 632).

In the "Upadeshasahasrī" (ascribed to Shankara) it is similarly pointed out that the self is the end of all our activities, that there is no higher or better attainment than self-attainment or self-realisation, that all scriptural prescriptions and duties have this self in view as the ultimate end.

Atmalábhat paronányo lábhah kashchana vidyaté.
Yadarthá vedavádáshcha smártáshchápi tu yáh kriyáh.
("Upadeshasahasri").

But this is true not merely of scriptural actions and duties, it also holds good in the case of empirical actions from material motives. Even these latter have self-attainment (Atmalábha) as their ultimate end. But such actions whether due to motives of empirical pleasure or to the sense of duty or dharma, do not lead to unqualified happiness—the resulting happiness is impure or mixed with its opposite, *viz.*, unhappiness (viparyayah); also such happiness is anitya, non-eternal, perishable. But the satisfaction arising from self-attainment (Atmalábha) is eternal. Again the satisfaction of self-attainment is autonomous, svayamlabdha, while all other satisfactions are anyápekshah, dependent, adventitious, heteronomous.

Atmárthoapi hi yo lábhah sukháyeshta viparyayah
Atmalábhah parah prokto nityatvát brahmavedibhih.
("Upadeshasahasri").

Svayamlabdhasvabhávatvát lábhastasya na chányatah
Anyàpekshastu yo lábhah so anyadrishtihsamudbhavah.
("Upadeshasahasri").

Hence the satisfaction in self-relation is (1) pure, (2) eternal and (3) svayam-labdha, *i.e.*, autonomous, self-evidencing and self-dependent; while other satisfactions whether of pleasure-seeking or of performances for the sake of merit, are (1) impure, (2) transitory and (3) anyápeksha, dependent and adventitious and also (4) result from anyadrishti, attention to things that are non-spiritual.

This, it will be seen, is a new type of Eudæmonism, a kind of Transcendental Eudæmonism which radically differs from the Aristotelian Eudæmonism of the co-ordination of empirical pleasures. Similarly the conception of self-attainment or Atma-lábha is an original and unique form

of the conception of self-realisation which is to be distinguished alike from the Hegelian and Kantian conceptions of it in European Ethics.

Thus Atma-santosh, Transcendental Satisfaction is neither empirical pleasure, nor the organisation of pleasures but represents the essential content and bliss that accompanies the eternally accomplished reality of the self. Similarly Atma-lábha is neither the positing of the self as empty law of Reason (without presentation in experience), nor the realisation of it by the co-ordination of conflicting impulses, but the rediscovery of an eternally fulfilled self which was missed only under the influence of an Original Illusion.

There is thus an essential difference between Shankara's Transcendentalism and Kant's. Kant conceives the noumenal self as realising its rational freedom in Moral Consciousness as the Categorical Imperative of the Moral Law. Because the self cannot realise itself in the blind matter of sense which will never express its unity completely and fully, it presents itself as self-determining reason in the Categorical Imperative of Moral Consciousness, independently of and despite the opposition of our sensuous nature. Hence the autonomous self realises itself as a supersensuous reality as the Moral *Law* or *Ought* of Moral Consciousness and not as a fact sensuously presented in experience. At the same time this Law or Imperative is not an arbitrary fiat or command but is the Law of Reason and thus implies rational necessity and not the freedom of indetermination. If now we compare Shankara's Transcendentalism with Kant's we find that in Shankara the negative attitude to empirical life is scarcely as pronounced as in Kant. In fact we shall see that some of the commentators have even tried to relieve the antagonism between the transcendental and the empirical by the conception of pratibimba, reflection

or copy, as we have in Plato. We thus see, that in Shankara the transcendental is not merely the negation of the empirical but also in a sense its consummation and completion so that empirical values are the reflections, the imperfect and iimited expressions of the fulness of the transcendental self. Hence the transcendental self is an accomplished reality from eternity and does not require to realise itself as Law in a specific act of the Self-legislating Reason. It is also autonomous in being essentially and independently real, *i.e.*, in being non-dependent on anything other than itself. It follows from this that it is of the nature of an eternally fulfilled experience whose essence is this consciousness of complete realisation or fulfilment as expressed in the feeling of contentment or self-satisfaction, and which is therefore to be distinguished from the self-realising *ought* or law of moral consciousness which is the reality of the Rational Self according to Kant. And just because it is this eternally fulfilled absolute experience embodying the quintessence of all reality it is the ultimate ground of all empirical reality, the source or fountain from which all other objects derive their reality.

This positive relation of the transcendental self to empirical life is brought out, as we have already stated, in the doctrine of pratibimba, reflection or copy y Shankara's commentators. Thus in the "Vedántaparibháshá" we have a very interesting exposition of the doctrine arising from the question of the nature of Sukha or happiness Sukha, happiness, says the Vedantaparibhasha, is of two kinds: (1) Sátishayasukha, relative or limited sukha, *i.e.*, sukha or happiness which is capable of being excelled or exceeded, and (2) Niratishayasukha, Unexcelled Bliss or unlimited happiness. The latter is the essence of Brahma or the Absolute. The former, *i.e.*, empirical pleasure is a limited or partial manifestation of the latter,

i.e., a limitation of Transcendental Bliss or Happiness. This limitation is due to the defects and dissimilarities of the psychic modes through which the latter has to reveal itself in empirical life—defects and differences which are themselves determined by the dissimilarities in the objects with which the antahkarana or mind is connected on different occasions. (Sukham cha dvividham, sátishayam niratishayam cha. Tatra sátishayam sukham vishayánushangajanita-antahkaranavrittitáratamyakritán-andleshávirbhávavisheshah. Niratishayam sukham cha Brahma eva.)

The "Sikhámani" commenting on the above observes:—

Just as a particular psychosis owing to the predominance of the essence of Sattva or the medium of illumination in it, partially reflects the intelligence which constitutes chaitanya and thereby itself appears as a form of knowing, so also such a psychosis by appropriating or reflecting in its essence of sattva a ray of the transcendental Bliss that constitutes Brahma, itself appears as a partial or limited manifestation of happiness. It may be proved by agreement and difference that these psychic modes characterised by happiness are connected with specific objects of enjoyment (Yathá kváchit antahkaranavrittih Sattvagunajanyatayá chaitanyagatajnánámshapratibimba-grahityena jnánam, tatha tádrishi vritteh tadgata-ánandaleshapratibimba-gráhakatvat sukham iti vyapadishyaté. Tashyám sukhalakshanáyám vrittau anvayavyatirekábhyám srakchandana-banitádi-vishayasambandho hetuh. Ataeva tattáratamyát sukhatáratamyam). Hence differences either in the degree or in the nature of all empirical happiness must be ascribed to differences in their objective causes or conditions.

An objection however may be raised. If empirical pleasure were thus the psychosis that reflects into itself

the transcendental Bliss that constitutes Brahma, why should it not reflect the fulness of the Bliss that stands near it? But this does not happen as a matter of fact, for all pleasures would then be identical in nature and degree. The "Sikhámani" disposes of this objection by pointing out that though this undivided Bliss always stands near the mind or antahkarana, yet it cannot be reflected by the latter in its fulness and purity on account of the influence of Mulá-Avidyá, an original Principle of Illusion (Nanu yadi Anandapratibimbagrahatvát antahkaranavrittireva sukham, tadá sannihita-paripurnánandasya api grahanasambhavena sarvamapi sukham ekarupam (ekarasam nyunádhikyarahitam iti yávat—"Maniphrabhá") syat, iti chet na. Paripurnajnánavat akhandánandasya mulá-avidyá-àvrittatvena idánim tadbhána-ayogát).

As we have already pointed out this affords an interesting parallel to the transcendentalism of the Platonic metaphysics. Plato also recognised an essential conflict between the pleasurable and the good, but instead of sharpening this conflict into positive opposition he also sought to overcome the dualism by his theory of copies and his distinction of a sensuous and a supersensuous world. Thus the sensuous world is an imperfect copy of an ideal supersensuous world, and the transitory pleasures of this life are the reflection in matter of the Ideal and Perfect Satisfaction that constitutes the good which is the governing principle of the supersensuous world. It is on account of union with matter that there arise the conflict and incompatibility of pleasures and the consequent strife and wickedness of this world. But in the Ideal world there is perfect harmony, every Idea in the Ideal world being completely in agreement with the Idea of the Good and all pleasures being thus moments in the absolute satisfaction that constitutes the Good.

Hence with Plato as with Shankara empirical pleasure is a partial and imperfect manifestation of transcendental satisfaction, but while with Plato there is a harmonious co-ordination of specific pleasures in the supersensuous *summum bonum* or the Good which is thus a satisfaction constituted by a synthesis of individual pleasures, a synthesis which is lacking in the sensuous world of experience, with Shankara the transcendental happiness is not a republic of pleasures characterised by the absence of conflict and discord, but is the infinite essence of the self representing its unqualified and undivided reality in its completeness and perfection. Hence the Infinite satisfaction of transcendental Bliss is a homogeneous undifferentiated infinite essence and not an organisation of partial pleasures—an infinite essence which is itself only imperfectly and partially manifested in empirical pleasures through the veil of Avidya or Nescience. It is to be observed that Shankara ascribes the limitation of this transcendental happiness to Mula-Avidya, *i.e.*, an original Principle of Illusion, a Power of Irrationality which limits the true essence of the self and thereby causes the appearance of the empirical world of evil and imperfection, while Plato ascribes all limitation to *hyle* or matter which is an *inert* and *inactive* principle of division in which the Ideas reflect themselves.

The Theory of Measure as the Moral Standard.

In the preceding section we have considered the standard as Atma-lábha or Self-Realisation and as Atma-santosh or Self-satisfaction and we have also considered the refutation of the Chárváka Hedonism from the standpoint of these theories. We have seen that transcendental satisfaction as being pure and autonomous is conceived as incapable of being attained by empirical

pleasures, and hence the wise man's life is one of rigid self-restraint and freedom from desires. The defect of this view consists in its failure to appreciate the element of truth contained in the hedonistic standpoint. Because undue self-indulgence will entail suffering and misery, therefore all empirical pleasure-seeking is to be condemned. The objection to this ascetic morality is sought to be removed indeed by the offer of a purer non-empirical satisfaction in return, but the fact remains that in this view even innocent pleasures can have no place in the moral life, not to speak of the happiness arising from the higher sentiments and emotions such as patriotism, benevolence, humanism, etc. In the "Atmánushásana" by Gunabhadra, an attempt is made to remove this defect in the ascetic view without however encouraging indiscriminate pleasure-seeking as the hedonists do. Thus it is argued that sin (papa) does not result from the experience of pleasure itself, but from that particular kind of pleasure which destroys the righteousness of the individual (dharmaghátaka). This righteousness is the moral cause or condition of happiness. Hence pleasures that destroy dharma which dharma is the cause of pure sukha or happiness, are to be condemned as evil; and such pleasures always go beyond measure (mátrádi-atikrama).

Na sukhanubhavát pápam, pápam tadhetughátaká-rambhát.

Na ajirnam mishtánnát nanutatmátrádi-atikramát.

("Atmánushásana")

Thus indigestion is not caused by the mere eating of sweetmeats, but by their being taken in excessive quantity. Similarly pleasures as such are not evil, but pleasures indulged without moderation such as will upset the equilibrium of the moral life and destroy its true happiness. Hence immoderate pleasures are evil because (1)

they destroy the soul's righteousness and (2) by destroying righteousness destroy the soul's true happiness. Hence all pleasures that are inconsistent with the soul's moral equanimity and true happiness are evil, and such pleasures always go beyond measure *cf.*) Aristotle). It follows therefore that neither the natural appetites nor the higher impulses and emotions are to be suppressed, but that they are all to be co-ordinated, systematised and regulated in the perfect moral life.

The Standard as Purity of the Motive (Vishuddhyanga-Abhishandhi) as distinguished from the worth or excellence of the consequence.

This is the theory of morality as enunciated by Samantabhadra in the Jaina-Kárikás and elaborated by Vidyánanda in his commentary thereon, *viz.*, the "Ashtasahasri." It is pointed out that righteousness cannot consist in the happiness of others and unhappiness of the self just as unrighteousness cannot consist in the unhappiness of others and happiness of the self.

Thus if righteousness were equivalent to happiness of others and unrighteousness to their unhappiness, then should we suppose that achetana, the non-sentient object, and akasháya, the taintless saint, are also in bondage, *i.e.*, have moral bonds or obligations as arising from their righteousness and unrighteousness, because in them there is also the nimitta, cause or ground of happiness and unhappiness to others.

Again if righteousness consisted in self-mortification, and unrighteousness in self-indulgence, then the dispassionate saint (vitarága) as practising self-restraint will have the bond of righteousness (punyabandha) and the seer or sage (vidván) as enjoying self-contentment (átmasantosh) will have the bond of unrighteousness (pápabandha).

Hence happiness and unhappiness whether of self or of others, cannot of themselves constitute righteousness and unrighteousness. It is only when such happiness or unhappiness arise from the purity and impurity of the motive prompting the action which cause them, that there is righteousness or unrighteousness. Otherwise the Arhat or Sage himself would be frustrated of his purpose, *i.e.*, would not be free (mukta) as he would then be involved in the moral order by coming under the law of righteousness and unrighteousness.

The " Ashtasahasri " commenting on the above points out :—

At two ends of the scale of being, there are no merit and demerit, even though there may be benefit or injury to others, Thus some are below merit and demerit, *e.g.*, non-sentient objects (achetanah), and some are above merit and demerit, *viz.*, the dispassionate saints (vitarága). Only sentient beings that are not free from desires are subject, through their activities, to merit and demerit.

It is therefore not the mere fact of causing happiness and unhappiness that constitutes merit and demerit. They must also be intentional in order that there may be merit or demerit. In the case of the dispassionate saint though there may be causes of happiness or unhappiness, yet the intention to cause them being absent on account of tattva-jnána or knowledge of reality, there are no merit or demerit.

Abhisandhi, intention is thus a necessary condition of righteousness and unrighteousness, and not merely the consequences of happiness and unhappiness.

What, then, is the nature of this abhisandhi, *i.e.*, this intention or subjective attitude as distinguished from the objective consequences of happiness and unhappiness ? It is pure (vishuddhyanga) in the case of punya, merit

or righteousness and impure (samkleshánga) in the case of pápa, demerit or unrighteousness.

Samklesha, impurity (of the mind) again is either

(1) A'rtta, *i.e.*, of an afflicting, distressing character, or

(2) Raudra, aggressive, violent.

(1) As ártta, samklesha or subjective impurity manifests itself in

(*a*) the effort to escape from contact with the unpleasant;

(*b*) The effort to attain the pleasant (manojna) when separated from it;

(*c*) Absorption in the experience of pain and suffering (vedanáh);

(*d*) Nidánam, the desire for the acquisition of power which is not yet acquired (aprápta-aishvaryya-práptisamkalpa);

(2) As Raudra or aggressive, samklesha takes the forms of

(*a*) Himsá, cruelty.

(*b*) Anrita, mendacity.

(*c*) Steya, unlawful appropriation.

(*d*) Vishayasamrakshana, aggressiveness in the maintenance of one's property.

Vishuddhi, purity (of the mind) is also twofold being either of the nature of

(1) Contemplation based on the consciousness of duty (dharmadhyánasvabhávah), or of the nature of

(2) Contemplation of the ideal of purity or perfection (shukladhyánasvabhávah).

Hence right and wrong are to be determined not by the objective consequences but by the nature of the subjective intention of the agent. This therefore is an attempt to go beyond merely consequential morality to the

intuitional principles of right and wrong with a view not merely to their enumeration but also their classification, and the basis of the two-fold classification is not any thing external but is a state of internal determination of the self or Atman or that which the Atman becomes. The ultimate goal however is the realisation of the true nature of the self (átmani svarupéavasthánam), a consummation which is to be attained by purification through the successive phases of the contemplation of duty and perfection. Hence this is to be distinguished from the European goal of life which is one of ceaseless movement or progress as distinguished from the rest in the self which is the essence of svarupávasthiti.

IV. The Standard as Moral Law (Vidhi, Imperative or Command).

The moral Standard is also conceived as a law or command by the Hindus, which again is regarded either as a personal prescription of a superior to an inferior being (Paurusheya) or again as Impersonal Law (Apaurusheya) without a law-giver.

A. The Standard as Personal Moral Law,

i.e., as the prescription of a superior to an inferior spirit. This is how the Standard is conceived by the Chárvákas, the Jainas, the Bauddhas, the Ramanujists and the Naiyayikas. Thus—

(*a*) According to the Chárvákas, the standard is the law imposed by the king, who is the highest earthly authority. The king's injunctions constitute the duties just as the king's prohibitions constitute the opposite.

Thus according to the Chárvákas the will of the Sovereign determines right and wrong, but this is analysed further into the pleasures and pains of the individual. As

pleasure is the only real good and pain is the only real evil, the will of the sovereign is the Moral Law, for it is the sovereign that is the highest earthly authority and the dispenser of all happiness and suffering. (Sukhameva purushartha, duhkhameva narakam. Lokasiddha raja parameshvarah).

(*b*) According to the Jainas and Bauddhas however, it is not the prescriptions of the king, but the injunctions and prohibitions of Arhatas and Buddhas that constitute right and wrong. The earthly sovereign is an imperfect being like ourselves and his authority is based on brute force. Obedience to such authority is prudential and not moral, being based on the hope of reward and fear of punishment. But the authority of the Moral Law is spiritual and not physical, and can be vested only in the seer, the spiritual expert that has attained perfection by self-culture. The earthly king is as much subject to the prescriptions of these moral experts, Arhatas or Buddhas as other imperfect beings.

It is to be seen that the appeal here is to the verdict of spiritual experts and not merely to sheer authority. It is thus to be distinguished from the prudential morality of the Chárvákas which is based on the hope of reward and fear of punishment. At the same time no eternally perfect being is recognised as in theism. The authority of the Moral Law arises indeed from the spiritual perfection of the Arhatas and Buddhas who possess the proper insight into things and thus are able to prescribe the right modes of conduct, but this spiritual perfection is itself an acquisition in time and not an eternally accomplished fact as theists assume. The objection that on this assumption the Arhatas would be themselves without spiritual preceptors to guide them is met by the conception of a chain of Arhatas and Buddhas which is without beginning in time—a chain in which

the preceding Arhatas act as preceptors to their successors.

(*c*) The Nyaya-Vaisheshikas, the Ramanujists and other theists however contend that the Moral Standard is the law of righteousness as prescribed by God, the Creator and Moral Governor of the world, and not merely the declarations of spiritual experts or Arhatas. Thus in the "Nyayaparishuddhi" of Venkatesh we have:—

Right and wrong are determined by the injunctions and prohibitions of scripture, and like the commands of the earthly king, these scriptural injunctions and prohibitions are prescribed by God with a view to the governance of sentient beings and represent his beneficent purpose. Hence right and wrong embody the conscious purpose and intelligence of God, *i.e.*, they are not arbitrary prescriptions of the Divine Will but represent God's rational purpose and end in this world. Right is that which the Divine Intelligence recognises as good or beneficent and wrong is that which it considers pernicious and evil. (Dharmádharmáuvihitanishiddhya-kriya-sádhyatayá abhimatau ájnávato rájna iva sarva prashasituh ishvarasya anugrahanigrahakhyavuddhivishesharupau.)

Right and wrong are thus vuddhivisheshas, *i.e.*, forms of the divine purpose and not objective categories. Further the divine purpose is not an arbitrary fiat of the divine will, but the revelation of the divine intelligence. Hence Vidhi as the command of God does not constitute the Moral law but merely reveals it—it is not law-making, but law-declaring.

According to the Nyaya-Vaisheshikas however the Divine command as embodied in scriptural prescriptions is not merely declaratory (jnápaka) of the moral code but also constitutes it (káraka). The analogy is drawn from

positive law which depends on the will of the sovereign. Moral causation is thus conceived after physical causation and the authority of duty is regarded as being of the nature of physical impulsion or force.

Thus far we have considered the following theories of the Moral Standard regarded as personal Moral Law, *viz.*,

(*a*) Vidhi as the command of the king.

(*b*) Vidhi as anushásana, *i.e.*, as declaratory of the seer's experiences in the paramárthic plane.

(*c*) Vidhi as the command of God conceived, after positive law, as constituting and not merely declaring what is right and what is wrong.

(*d*) Vidhi as God's command regarded as revealing and not constituting the Moral Law.

(*e*) There is yet another conception of Vidhi as the Moral Standard, the view which finds favour with a certain class of Vedantists. According to these Vidhi is Brahma or the Absolute itself and not the mere prescription of a superior or a perfect person. For the essence of the Vidhi lies in its obligatoriness as Moral Law which means that Vidhi has prámánya, validity or self-evidencing authority as Law which makes it binding on the individual moral agent. But Vidhi could not validate itself without being itself a self-validating experience for the validity of the valid is only this that it posits itself in consciousness. Vidhi as pramána is thus chidátmaka, *i.e.*, a self-establishing experience whose authority on the moral agent is nothing but this self-accomplished experience reflecting itself into the consciousness of the individual as something to be accomplished. Hence Vidhi is Brahma itself which is accomplished (Siddha) from eternity. In the consciousness of the individual it appears indeed as sádhya, as a thing to be accomplished, but in so far as it validates itself it is essentially pratibháshamátra,

mere position in consciousness. As a matter of fact the essence of prámánya, validation is nothing but this position in consciousness and Param Brahma, the self-positing Absolute Consciousness is thus the only pramána, the various cognitive processes being regarded as pramána only by courtesy, their validity being ultimately, nothing but the self-evidencing consciousness of the Absolute in the light of which they appear. In so far therefore as Vidhi has prámánya, validity or authority it is nothing but the self-accomplishing Absolute Experience which presents itself as something to be accomplished.

This is a new form of the conception of Vidhi as the Moral Standard which is to be distinguished alike from the conception of it as the prescription of a personal being like God and from that of an impersonal law without a lawgiver. It identifies Vidhi with the Absolute which is not a personal being but the self-establishing suprapersonal consciousness that lights up all experience. The authority of the Vidhi is nothing but the self-fulfilled reality of the Absolute presenting itself in empirical consciousness as a thing to be realised in time. The close analogy of this view with Shankara's Transcendentalism is obvious enough. But while Shankara conceives the Transcendental Life as the negation of the empirical, the latter being annulled altogether in the consciousness of Brahma, it is urged here that the validity which attaches to Vidhi in empirical consciousness is nothing but the self-affirmation of the Absolute which presents itself as Law to the individual moral agent. Hence according to this view the empirical moral life reflects the nature of the Absolute in a way though it does not manifest it in its completeness and purity, while according to Shankara the empirical life is the negation of the Transcendental life in Brahma which is to be reached only by total cancellation of the moral life in the state of karma-sanyasa or

freedom from the bond of duty. It is remarkable however that inspite of this underestimation of the empirical life, the Shankarites not only recognise the value of morality in empirical life but also offer the original and novel conception of a gradation of moral standards and moral codes in accordance with the ascending stages of the spiritual discipline of the individual.

(*f*) Thus according to Shankara the moral code as constituted by the Vedic prescriptions, is impersonal in the sense that the Communicator (Vaktá) of the Vedas only declares the Law and does not create it by his fiat. This communicator is Isvara, Brahmá or the Lord and is thus to be distinguished from the spiritual expert or Aptapurusha of Jainism and Buddhism. In fact, it is eternally omniscient (nitya-sarvajna) and is also srishti-sthiti-laya-kartá, the creator, maintainer, and destroyer of the world, which theistic characters are lacking in the Aptas and Arhats of Buddhism and Jainism. But the Vaktá, the Communicator of the Vedas does not create but merely promulgates the Vedas as they existed in a previous cycle. Some of the Shankarites admit that some of the scriptures have a personal source such as Manu, Mahábhárat, etc., but they are all traced back ultimately to the impersonal (apaurusheya) Vedas. But even the Vedás themselves are empirical, *i.e.*, true in a vyavahárika or relative sense and untrue in a páramárthika or transcendental sense. They are thus all mithyá, untrue and are to be cancelled, but the Vedic untruth or mithyá is to be used in overcoming the grosser or lower untruths, and the Vedas themselves are to be transcended by Brahmatmáekatva-vijnána or the realisation of the identity of the self and Brahma. Now in the course of this process of sádhaná, spiritual discipline for liberation, the ethical standard may assume a different character according to the particular stage of the sádhaná or training of

the individual. In the stage of the worship of saguna-Brahma or qualified Absolute the standard is Isvarájná or command of the Lord. In the more advanced stages of Sádhaná-chatushtaya when external codes and external authority give way to internal sanctions, Atmasantosh and Atmalábha may take the place of Isvarájná.

Thus according to Shankara even though ethical codes and disciplines are relative and empirical, there is an order obtaining in this sphere of illusion which must be observed through a gradation of the moral standards according to the different stages. The ultimate goal indeed is the transcendence of the empirical moral life in the life of the Absolute, but this is to be realised by cancellation of the illusion of the phenomenal life in successive stages in which the lower illusion is to be annulled by the higher and subtler ones and the highest to be cancelled at last by the intuition of the absolute. This it will be seen implies at once the transcendental unreality of the ethical codes as well as their metaphysical and moral necessity within the sphere of illusion. It further implies a gradation in the sphere of the illusory empirical life in which specific codes with their specific moral standards have validity according to their proper sphere. It thus differs from the Hegelian conception of a progressive unfolding of the spiritual life in which the higher stage does not simply annul the lower ones but reaffirms the latter in a new light by absorbing the element of truth contained in them. It further differs from the Hegelian view in that while recognising a certain order in the empirical life which must be conformed to in subduing it, it makes it the absolute negation of the transcendental which is therefore to be reached not by its transfiguration but by its total cancellation in the intuition of Brahman.

B. The Standard as Impersonal Moral Law.

The moral standard is also conceived as Impersonal Moral Law by the Hindus, and not merely as a personal prescription. Thus the Mimámsakas interpret Vidhi as Impersonal Law, which does not derive its authority or force from the will of a Personal Being, but is authoritative in and by itself independently of any personal origin. In fact according to the Mimámsakas the reference to a Personal source is absolutely unnecessary : Vidhi need not be presented as the command of God in order to be authoritative and may simply be a verity of the supersensuous order, a law without a law-giver.

The Claim of the Individual to be Real[1]

BY

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By an individual we mean a finite self of which a continuous series of conditions of consciousness is the expression. The individual possesses two apparently opposed features. On the one hand it is characterised by diversity and change, every condition of consciousness in which its nature is revealed being distinct in quality from all the other conditions, and each condition entering upon existence and ceasing to be in time; and yet on the other hand through the fleeting members of the time series, each of which seems to lack stability and to be so different from the rest, a real unity is expressed. Further each of these features is necessary and despite this apparent opposition they are inter-dependent. It may seem that nothing is more opposed to unity than diversity and change, and that it is impossible for what is so evanescent—constantly coming into being and passing away to possess real unity; and yet the unity of the self would never be known, nor would it exist apart from its changing conditions of consciousness. The self is not a substance which lies beneath

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its varied experiences as a support, nor is it a simple spiritual being which in its eternally changeless existence transcends them; but is a unity which comprehends all its experiences, and lives in and through them. This is no denial of its real transcendence. No single experience, or condition of consciousness, and no group of experiences, can adequately reveal its nature; nor is the unity exhausted in the entire expression that we know or can know; in this the self is certainly transcendent but in no other way. It has no being apart from the experiences in time, and the character of these cannot be altered unless the nature of the unity which they express is changed.

These characteristics will be the more evident if the true nature of a universal is grasped, only a false and imperfect comprehension of universal and systematic unity regards it as exclusive of diversity and change. A tree or a human body is a unity, because it consists of members which are distinct and yet are connected into a whole The head is not the arm neither is it the hand, but each member expresses in its own way the universal nature of the body. The latter is a unity because the spirit of the whole is revealed in a diversity of parts, each of which has its unique characteristics, and yet possesses these characteristics because of the function which it performs in the whole unity. Destroy this diversity of parts, and at the same time the unity is destroyed; a body cannot be constituted of a number of hands each similar to the other, nor does a number of rupees form a unity. Further, change is not more hostile to unity than diversity. The unity of the human body, or of a musical composition when performed, is as real as the unity of a picture or a statue, if not more real; so that the fact that the former unfolds itself in a series which changes in time, whereas the latter has a

definite nature and fixed expression; rather increases than diminishes the perfection of the unity.

Actual experience of the self bears striking evidence to this two-fold character. After a long absence we meet a friend and he greets us with a hand-shake. The greeting is an act of our friend's conscious life. In itself it is most insignificant, existing only for a few moments and then ceasing to be for ever. But why does this momentary experience mean so much? Is it not that we feel the personality of our friend expressed therein? We would not know his personality were it not for this and such like experiences, and yet he is a unity that transcends them all.

This interdependence is seen also in the growth of the individual. The same individual finds expression in the experiences of the boy and of the man; but the universal unity itself has developed, and growth has taken place by means of the conditions of consciousness in and through which it has found expression. The exhilaration of the boy as he watches his playmates climb a difficult tree has a significance beyond the mere joy of the moment for it reveals the boy's nature; the man's approval of an act of moral and spiritual courage, say of a woman who gives her life to the needy and helpless, is a manifestation of the same universal, the life of the man being a continuation of that of the boy; the same universal, yet not the same for the unity has grown unfolding more of its true nature, and this growth has taken place because of all the conditions of consciousness in which it has been constantly realising its being. The man's approval is significant of a richer unity than the boy's glee, for all the experiences from boyhood to manhood have helped to create the systematic unity of the man's character. This expression of a unity through

the present act of consciousness, and the growth of the unity itself connects with the psychological theory of sub-consciousness; which makes clear to us that the condition of mental life of which we are aware is interpenetrated by the whole of our past mental history, which persists below the level of normal consciousness, and effectively determines the present conditions.

The nature of our problem is now apparent. It is to discuss the claim of the finite individual, a more or less perfect unity, which unfolds its life in a temporal series of varied conditions of consciousness, and which undergoes development to a place in ultimate Reality. Is it or is it not a necessary member of the perfect Being, which can never perish? And what grounds are there, if any, for considering its existence alike imperishable? Let us grasp at the outset that the problem is not raised in reference to a simple soul substance which is somehow connected with our present life, but which is in reality already perfect; nor concerning a soul the true life of which is to be one with the Infinite, in the sense of being finally indistinguishable therefrom; but in reference to this actual self, of whose imperfections we are so painfully aware, and yet which we know to be a member of our real world.

So far the individual has been considered as a unity which expresses itself in a diversity of conditions and as possessing characters of its own which are unique. This unique individual however, is by no means independent. Just as the simple experience receives its significance through its unity with the self, so the self acquires its unique characteristics through its unity with the whole Reality. Being a member of an infinite spiritual whole, it realises its

true nature in so far as through it the whole finds expression. To use what must necessarily be a most imperfect analogy, the individual may be likened to a character in a drama ; he has characteristics of his own which distinguish him from the other characters of the play, but his function is to represent the unity of the whole. This is a unity which creates its various members by living in them. The origin and development of the individual forcibly illustrate this dependence upon the wider unity. From the beginning the body develops by means of alliance with its material environment, and in like manner the soul grows by assimilating the spiritual forces that are about it. The father and mother impart to their child life of the mind. Dependence is perhaps the most real fact of man's existence. The material comforts which we now enjoy would be impossible apart from the most complicated division of labour, by which man works not directly for himself but for the community, and in return receives benefits from the labour of others. Departure from this would necessitate a return to the most simple type of life, and even here a certain degree of dependence would be unavoidable. Turning to man's mental and spiritual development, dependence is still more marked. What spiritual growth would be possible apart from communion with our fellow men, and with the beauty and truth of the universe ? To isolate the soul's life is to kill it. Reference has been made to the growth of the self by means of its experiences, but what are these experiences but modes of its relation to that which is beyond ? In different conditions of consciousness a soul experiences love, compassion, delight in the beautiful, admiration for courage and so on ; but the love, compassion and admiration spring from the soul's sympathy with other persons, and delight in the beautiful connects it with nature. So the

experiences in which the soul grows are merely effects of its unity with the wider Reality ; and as the soul itself is not an abstract being, but an existing unity of conscious life ; so its union in the perfect Being is not an abstract union, but a living sympathy with and dependence upon other human souls, and upon the universe by which it is enclosed.

Further it is necessary to note that such union of the individual with the infinite Reality is the union of a self-conscious being and not merely of an unconscious member with its whole. Undoubtedly the basis of the unity is found in the necessary dependence of the body upon its physical, and of the mind upon its spiritual environment, such unity being found by the self in its origin, and not made. But since the individual is self-conscious, the perfection of this union depends upon its own spontaneous activity, by which activity also it may possibly be marred. God's plan, says Robert Browning :—

> " Was to create man and then leave him
> Able his own word saith, to grieve him,
> But able to glorify him too,
> As a mere machine could never do,
> That prayed and praised, all unaware
> Of its fitness for aught but praise and prayer,
> Made perfect as a thing of course."

Had the path to unity been otherwise than by the free surrender of the self to the welfare of the whole, there would certainly have been a loss of perfection.

This being the case the individual may seek the full realisation of its own nature in two ways. On the one hand, finding itself with characteristics of its own which distinguish it from the rest of the real world, it may consider

that its own advantage is antagonistic to the purpose which is being expressed in the rest of the universe. Life may thus assume the form of a fight for its own rights and interests. The legal conceptions of right and of personal property are suggestive of this attitude. They spring from the belief that because certain things belong to the individual, for this reason they can be possessed by no one else, and that no other person therefore is justified in making any claim upon them. The conception tends towards the isolation of the individual so that its existence becomes a continual warfare with the whole. Now the chances of the preservation and development of the self in this way are not very encouraging, for it has set itself against an infinitely superior force, the whole universe being on the other side. Rarely, if ever, perhaps does the individual seek whole-heartedly this mode of self-realisation, but in so far as the attempt is made, nought but failure can ensue for the greater force of Reality which is against it must frustrate every possibility of its development. But an alternative remains. The individual may seek its realisation by the identification of its will and interests with the life of the whole; or, to express this idea more truly, he may surrender every effort after self-realisation, and seek merely harmony with the spirit of the whole. In attaining such harmony the individual becomes a necessary expression of the life of the Absolute, and thus finds himself at home in the universe. So the infinite Reality becomes a friendly power which encourages his self-maintenance.

Let us now translate this abstract theory into terms of actual experience. What does the identification of the will of the individual with the spirit of the whole mean? In order to understand this it is necessary first to form some comprehension of the character of the whole.

The essential nature of the Absolute is that it should express itself in finite centres of consciousness. Just as beauty and goodness do not exist in themselves, apart from the particular beautiful and good things in which they are expressed, so the Absolute has no abstract and separate existence; it may transcend all its expressions in finite individuals, nevertheless such expressions are essential to its nature. Thus the unification of the will of the individual, with the spirit of the whole means the identification of his will with the deepest needs of the individual with whom he is associated in life, and with the spirit of nature which environs him. Harmony of this kind is found for instance, in the life of William Wordsworth, where the mind of the Poet finds itself in such intimate communion with the spirit of Nature, and in such real sympathy with the simple affections and deep feelings of the peasant folk. At this point, however, a difficulty arises. How can this be so when many of those, whose wills have been in the closest harmony with the will of God, have at the same time found themselves in the most bitter opposition to the wills of the people amongst whom they lived? Many of them have been persecuted and even killed for the determination with which they have carried out the will of God. Instances of this type of person enter the mind so readily that it is not necessary here to refer to any, but we will try to point out the reason of this hostility. It lies in the fact that the superficial will of men does not always express the deepest needs of their natures; such a will, we have seen, may be a bad will and directly opposed to the spirit of the whole. If this will is persisted in, the individual will tend to become crushed out, and ultimate satisfaction will be impossible. This kind of will then is only the will of the individual because of misapprehension and ignorance; culpable misapprehension it is true, since the individual is

self-conscious, but none the less misapprehension. The deep need of the individual is for satisfaction, and perfect development apart from which satisfaction is impossible. Now in opposing the superficial will of men the great mind of all ages has allied itself with their deepest needs, and it is this kind of sympathetic kinship alone which is unity with the spirit of the whole. After death the great man is often better understood, and he that has persecuted recognises that his opposition has been to a righteous man; that in fact, his only chance of true satisfaction lay in making the man his friend. He feels that the type of life which the rejected one came to offer him was really the kind of life he himself had been seeking. To sum up then, the secret of unity with the Absolute is love, and the sacrifice which love involves.

The main issue of this argument is now reached. In allying the individual will with the spirit of the infinite Reality by love and sacrifice, does the finite individual lose his distinctive personality? Is the ultimate goal to be reached a condition of complete absorption in which the individual becomes so fully one with the Absolute that he ceases to be a unique individual centre of consciousness, distinct from all other individuals and from God, and is become God himself? Must perfect union mean loss of uniqueness? According to the principles here laid down the answer to these questions must be a decided negative. Not only does identity with God not imply the loss of individuality, but it is the only means by which individuality can be conserved and developed. We have already noticed man's dependence for the sustenance of the powers both of his body and of his mind, upon co-operation with his fellows and with natural forces. Dependence is the law of his being and his meanest wants cannot be supplied save by entering into some sort of relation with his surroundings. Further, to trace his

progress to a fuller life is to trace the growth of his intimacy with the world. Since then individuality is built up by means of unity, why should perfect unity be completely destructive of individuality? This erroneous view of the complete immersion of the finite being in the Infinite will be avoided when the human significance of oneness with God is adequately grasped. Once realise how union with God means deep sympathetic human relationships and we cannot fail to understand how it must develop the unique character of the individual. This may be the reason why we so often find that the view of abstract identity with the Infinite as the goal of existence, is accompanied by the notion that asceticism is the most valuable of religious experiences Now the oneness with God which the ascetic seeks does not appear to us to be true identity with the spirit of the whole; for the Absolute is such that it finds its necessary expression through finite centres of consciousness. How then can true unity with it be gained by isolation from that in which it lives, and moves and has its being? True identity is gained by love and sacrifice for human beings, and not by separation from them. Let us now investigate more closely whether the attaining of such identity means loss of personality. We may illustrate the enquiry by the consideration of one of the most striking personalities that we know, *viz.*, the greatest of dramatists, Shakespeare. The mind of Shakespeare is certainly an instance of a mind that towers above other minds like a peak of a grand mountain range, unique in its individual splendour. A comparison with other great minds such as those of Milton, Dante, or Plato, only serves to emphasize the characteristics which render it distinct. And yet what is the secret of this most marked individuality? Is it isolation from the rest of mankind? Certainly not! The

in sympathy with every phase of human life. With men and women, towards whom we would merely have had a feeling of indifference, he found spiritual kinship. It is clear then that what makes Shakespeare so distinct from his fellow men, and in fact from all human beings, is that intellectual sympathy which gives him a more complete understanding of men. Annul this unity with mankind, and we have annulled his uniqueness also. And this truth is not only supported by the great world geniuses ; we are continually reminded of it by the lives of our personal friends. Who are the men and women whose personalities are most markedly developed ? Are they not those who have learned to live most for others ? The idea inevitably brings into my mind a young man of brilliant intellect, and thorough training, who, if he had remained in his own country, would certainly have made his mark in the world ; but who gave up the chances of such success in order to work amongst an obscure people on the western coast of Africa, far from the companionship of any on the same plane of intellectual development. Here is an instance of one who has ceased altogether to regard the world from the personal point of view, and to claim the peculiar rights of the self as against the rights of others ; and is convinced that the true use of powers is to devote them to the service of others. And this entire surrender of the self in the identification of the will with the deep and unexpressed needs of a less fortunate people, has not resulted in the loss of individuality but in the deepening of spiritual personality. If from among all the people whom I know it was necessary to select the one whose individuality is most marked I should choose this man. So we find that the process by which the individual will is identified with the spirit that is in and through the whole, is the process by which strong and distinctive spiritual

personalities are developed, and that this is as true of the men and women of our experience as of Wordsworth and Shakespeare. To put this in another way the principle of individuality does not depend upon defect but upon inherent perfection. It is sometimes supposed that a man's individuality depends upon his idiosyncrasies, that is, upon those features and interests which, being peculiar to himself, isolate him from all others; in which case, if the ideal of life is perfect union with the Absolute and this is the ideal for all men, it must follow that the peculiarities which isolate men are annulled in the process of unification. If this were so, men in becoming one with God, would lose their differences and at the same time become indistinguishable from each other and from Him. Should individuality however be born of union, the reverse must be the case.

Passing to the significance of this truth for our conception of the Absolute, we find that it alone can give to the latter fullness of content. From a consideration of the nature of the universal it was seen that the unity of the whole could only be sustained by means of the uniqueness of its members. The body is not a unity apart from arms and legs; a nation apart from its people and the events of its history. If then the union of the soul with the infinite Reality is a real union, as the union of the arm with the body is real, its uniqueness is necessary to the being of the Absolute, just as the uniqueness of the arm is necessary to the body. The arm cannot attain perfection of itself as a separate entity, but becomes perfect when its form and function are in complete harmony with the whole body. In attaining unity with the body, however, it becomes, not the whole body, but a perfect arm; and if it could become the entire body, the body, as a body, would be destroyed thereby. So with the union of the finite soul with the Infinite. If

the Infinite is to possess a full and complete life then the finite soul in attaining perfect harmony therewith must retain its own characteristic life ; otherwise the content of the infinite Being is destroyed and there is a loss of perfection in the whole. It may be argued that such loss will not take place since the values which individuals have acquired are handed down in the influence which they exert over other individuals, but the difficulty is not overcome so easily. First there seems to be a contradiction in the assumption that up to a certain stage unity develops individuality, but that with the final perfection of unity it is destroyed ; and secondly, the one personality whose value, which follows from its union, all must recognise, is lost whatever its influence may be.

The process of the acquirement of knowledge is a phase of the identification of the finite mind with the Infinite. In gaining true knowledge the self is becoming one with the universal and eternal, while at the same time developing its own individuality. The knowledge of the beautiful may be considered as a typical instance. Beauty is a universal, that is, it is a unity which synthesizes many particulars. Further, it is timeless ; particular beautiful things are in time but beauty itself is a timeless reality which has its being in and through all beautiful things. Now when the mind comprehends the beautiful, it allies itself with this eternal universal. True comprehension does not consist in merely seeing beautiful objects, nor in forming intellectual concepts of them ; the eye may see many a beautiful sunset, or statue, or even beautiful human lives, and yet the mind's knowledge of beauty may not be increased. But when sympathy with the beautiful object is felt then the comprehension of the universal beauty becomes more adequate, and the finite mind

expands thereby developing its unique characteristics. The mind of any great artist like Turner is a striking instance of this. So in the gaining of all true knowledge, we shall find that the unity of the mind with the timeless universal, enhances the uniqueness of the self which is expressed in time.

Reflection upon the practical side of man's nature points to the same conclusion. I quote from an article on the Problem of Evil appearing in the Hibbert Journal for July of last year, by Rabindranath Tagore. "Our moral faculty," he says, "is the faculty by which we know that life is not made up of fragments purposeless and discontinuous. The moral sense of a man not only gives him the power to see that his self has a continuity in time, but it also enables him to see that he is not true when he is only restricted to his own self. He is more in truth than he is in fact. He truly belongs to individuals who are not included in his own individuality and whom he is never likely to know. He has a feeling for his future self which is outside him, so he has a feeling for his greater self which is outside the limits of his personality. There is no man who has it not to some extent, who never sacrificed his selfish desire for the sake of some other person, who never felt a pleasure in undergoing some loss or trouble because it pleased somebody else. It is a truth that man is not a detached being ; he has a universal aspect, and when he recognises it, he becomes great."

All the contentions of this paper are admitted in this passage. The self which is referred to is the actual self which has a continuity in time. This self possesses unity, since "it is not made up of fragments purposeless and discontinuous." Further it is recognised that the unity of the self is a member of a wider unity ; and

that the development of man's personality depends upon the conscious recognition of his relation to the whole. "He is not true when he is only restricted to his own self"; and note especially "He has a universal aspect, and when he recognises it, he becomes great."

We cannot conclude without mentioning a very obvious difficulty which attaches to the claim for the individual of a permanent place in reality. It will be argued that the self as it exists at present is beset with suffering and evil, and is constantly dissatisfied; the desire for immortality then cannot be a desire for a continuance of the present condition of the self, nor can immortality of this kind be possible, for that which is imperfect cannot continue for ever. The desire must be for a radically transformed self, and in this also consists its only chance for survival. Now what will be the nature and degree of such transformation? Will it be so fundamental that the transformed self cannot be regarded as identical with the finite individual? Will the peculiarities of its finitude which distinguish it from other selves cease to exist? Since the process of transformation in each finite self is a process of becoming one with the Infinite, will they not necessarily at the same time become one with each other? Now if what we maintain is true, a transformation of the self as we know it is necessary, and such transformation must take place through a greater union with Reality; but we have pointed out our reasons for believing that this will result in a deepening of personality. Further, although the hope of all must lie in a closer union with what is Real, all are making the approach by different paths, and the experiences of the way will persist when the goal is reached; for no end can be severed from the means by which it is attained. There must

therefore be identity between every condition of the self; and the transformed self, while embodying the greatest possible harmony will likewise have perfected its individuality.

Plato and the Sophists

BY

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There are, I believe, not a few in this country whose lamps may, like Milton's,

> "at midnight hour,
> Be seen in some high lonely tower,"

within whose solitude they "unsphere the spirit of Plato." Of all the questions raised by that task there are few more interesting or more instructive than that of the great philosopher's relation to the Sophists. The Sophists themselves are not particularly interesting people, but to understand the thought of Plato it is necessary to know what part they played in leading up to it.

The *locus classicus* of the subject is the argument with Thrasymachus in the first book of the *Republic*. It is useful to select a particular passage in order to define the issues: this passage at once suggests itself as one in which Plato is stating his own views with unusual directness. In the first place, the passage is one of the bitterest and one of the most personal in the whole of Plato; his language and his whole manner here are such as to

convince the reader that he is discussing a subject on which he feels very strongly. In the second place, the passage has an important position in Plato's greatest book; it introduces the real discussion and states the problem of the whole treatise.

What then are the changes contained or implied in his passage? The first is that the Sophists are very fond of making long speeches and very averse to the Socratic method of question and answer. Thrasymachus is represented as very anxious to interrupt the discussion 'because he thought himself in possession of a very fine answer.' He does in fact make one long speech. After 'deluging the ears of his hearers with his copious flood of words' he wishes to retire immediately, leaving his remarks to explain themselves. The implication is that the Sophists care only for mastery over their opponents, not for mastery of the truth, that their aim is not knowledge but a reputation for knowledge.

The second charge is that the Sophists demanded payment for their teaching—a charge which in the passage selected is put in the most ridiculous light possible. Thrasymachus has shown a keen anxiety to take part in the discussion but when he is actually invited to do so he stipulates that he must be given a fee in return for his contribution. Indeed he does not proceed until a promise of payment is actually made. Plato's view is quite clear: for him it is as outrageous and ridiculous for a professor of philosophy to accept fees from his pupils as for a man to demand payment for his share in a private conversation.

The third charge is that of teaching immoral doctrines. Thrasymachus is made the exponent of the view that justice is mere good nature while injustice is good policy. Might is right. Injustice practised on an extensive scale

is by far the best and most profitable course that a man can adopt. He states the view so cleverly and convincingly that even after Socrates has given a complete formal refutation of it, his two young friends Glaucon and Adeimantus tell him that Thrasymachus' argument is not yet disposed of. This is perhaps the most serious charge of all, that of devising clever arguments to persuade young men to give up allegiance to the laws of the State.

The fourth charge is that of rudeness and vulgarity. There is such a uniform Athenian polish covering all the differences of opinion in the Platonic dialogues that this charge when it does come is all the more noticeable and significant. Thrasymachus, we are told, 'sprang upon them as if he would tear them in pieces.' He accuses them of 'playing the fool together' and 'talking nonsense' and wishes to know 'why Socrates' nurse leaves him to drivel and omits to wipe his nose when he requires it.'

Are these four charges justifiable? With regard to the first, we know that the Sophists held disputations, that they taught the art of controversy and rhetoric, and that they emphasised style in speech. It is easy to believe that some of them may have exaggerated this emphasis: that is a phenomenon which tends to occur in every nation during the age when it first realises the potentialities of its language. The Euphuism of the Elizabethans is an example of the same tendency. In the development of the individual the same thing happens: there is very often a stage in boyhood or early youth when the mind is distracted from more serious studies by the exacting art of punning. We might say then that this is a natural stage of transition and therefore a good rather than a bad sign. We must also remember that the Sophists were not

a school but a profession. We ought not therefore to attribute the same faults to all; still less ought we to attribute the faults of the worst to all. In modern life the class which most nearly corresponds to the position of the Sophists in Greece is probably that of journalists. In their work as in that of the Sophists there is a strong temptation to exaggeration and to a one-sided statement of a case. But it would be a slanderous accusation to say that their chief aim is concerned with appearance, not reality. Again, it must be remembered that the distinction between appearance and reality is not so easy a distinction as Plato imagined.

The whole of Plato's attitude is based on his theory of Ideas and that theory has not proved so convincing to others as it was to him.

The second charge is one which when stated fairly makes little appeal to the modern reader. There is no doubt something admirable in the Academic view of philosophy and in the pictures which history gives us of Socrates—and, later, Plato—discoursing to a group of young men to whom the teacher is bound by no relation save those of friendship and common aim. But it must be remembered that Socrates was eccentric and Plato well off—an unusual thing for a philosopher. And the Sophist's relation to his pupil was quite different from Plato's. The Sophists professed to teach--and their popularity proves that they did teach—the art of practical success. They gave material advantages and received material advantages in return. Plato on the other hand did not profess to give any such advantage.

The charge only becomes intelligible when we take into account Plato's views on property. In his ideal state everything is held in common. One of the first articles in his programme of social reform is the abolition

of property. The modern reader although he appreciates the end which Plato has in view finds such a proposition absolutely impossible. Even the New Testament, with its unsurpassed idealism, tells us that 'the labourer is worthy of his hire.' Indeed that text, even though it may be modified considerably by the reflection that 'we are all unprofitable servants,' probably indicates fairly accurately the attitude of the modern mind to this question. We do not charge our professors and our clergymen with unspirituality because they accept salaries and stipends.

It should be noted that the charge is unfairly put. We know that Protagoras let his *hearers* settle the amount to be paid. And there is no record of exorbitant fees having been charged by the Sophists or of payment being demanded in so objectionable a way as Plato suggests. How unjust his charge is may be seen from the fact that it led to Aristotle's definition of a sophist as 'one who reasons falsely for the sake of gain.'

If there is any truth in the third charge, it is that the Sophists brought ethical questions into the field of discussion. They destroyed authority in morality. They exploded the notion that we ought to do this or that because somebody or some book once said that we ought to do just these things. To the older folks destroying authority means destroying morality. The real truth is the reverse. Before one can have real morality—or at least reliable morality—one must examine the basis of the structure. If there is any reason in morality at all, then a man's morality must be the better for his having examined it. If there is none, why be moral? And of course we must not forget that the charge is equally applicable to Socrates; indeed,

Socrates was put to death for 'corrupting the young men of Athens.'

As a matter of fact, there is little doubt that the morality of the Sophists was higher, not lower, than that of their age. And of course there must have been very great differences within the class,—differences at least as great as within any of the modern professions. The fault of the Sophists, if there was one fault common to all or almost all the members of the class—was probably intellectual mediocrity rather than immorality.

The fourth charge is perhaps the most difficult of all to understand. It is impossible to believe that Plato could have gone so far out of his usual course as to make such a charge as this, had there not been a substantial basis for it in fact. On the other hand it is probable that Plato and his fellow citizens, proud of their Attic speech and Athenian manners, and endowed with a keen sense of humour, looked down on these foreigners with their provincial accent and mannerisms. We know that the Athenians regarded the Spartans as boors and we also know that one reason for the suspicion with which the Sophists were regarded was the fact that they were foreigners. It seems therefore not impossible that Athenian snobbery may have had something to do with the charge of rudeness which Plato brings against the Sophists. Plato, belonging to the aristocracy of an aristocratic state, is certainly not free from snobbery as his judgments on democracy show.

But Plato's real reasons for attacking the Sophists lay much deeper. One might enumerate three outstanding grievances. One is that the Sophists, while teaching all the subordinate sciences, omitted 'Dialectic.' To

Plato that is synonymous with giving instruction about appearances and omitting all instruction about reality. philosophy is for Plato that which gives meaning to all other studies. Some of the Sophists indeed not only did not teach philosophy but taught that Philosophy was impossible. Nothing, they said, exists. If anything did exist, it could not be known: and if it could be known, it could not be communicated. It is not difficult to see why Plato, whose religion is philosophy, should attack men who taught such doctrines, which must have seemed to him impious as well as foolish.

The second reason is that the Sophists' teaching was, in Plato's opinion, calculated to produce a dangerous type of citizen. They believed that 'one man in his time plays many parts' and they trained him for them. Now there is nothing that Plato dreaded more than versatility, which to him meant lack of steadiness, lawlessness, disorder, loss of principle. 'One man, one trade' is the fundamental law of the *Republic* and it is a law that is applied rigidly throughout. In literature, in education, in politics, in private life, Plato demands a severe simplicity.

The third reason is that the Sophists emphasised the *form* of speech. They taught literary style, rhetoric, the art of arranging one's material in such a way that it would please the ear of the hearer and thus command his attention and his conviction. Now Plato believed that the one thing necessary in presenting a case is to be thoroughly convinced oneself of the truth of one's contention. Veracity and straightforwardness are the best ornaments of speech.

Is there anything that can be said on these three points in defence of the Sophists? With regard to the

first, whatever opinion one may have about the doctrines taught by the Sophists, one ought at least to give them credit for two noteworthy achievements. One is that they made the first real statement of ethical questions. It was not Socrates but the Sophists who 'brought philosophy down from heaven to earth.' The other is that they made a real and (as their popularity shows) to some extent successful attempt to meet the new demand for higher education. We must also face the question whether Plato deals fairly with the non-philosophical sciences when he speaks of them as concerned with appearance not reality. Nowadays we prefer to speak of different sciences as dealing with different aspects of reality. Again, is Plato's course of Metaphysics and Mathematics the best preparation for practical life? History has its Haldanes and its Balfours but they are the exceptions, not the rule.

With regard to the second point, one need only read the famous funeral oration of Pericles to realise that in the matter of versatility 'the real Sophist is the people.' The Athenians admired versatility in their leaders and demanded it from their educationalists: the Sophists being practical men set themselves to supply the demand. And there is no doubt that there is nothing that has led Plato to so many untenable views as his incessant striving after simplicity. It leads him to an unnatural austerity in art, and to cruelty in his treatment of the physical side of life. In the ideal city all art is subordinated to strictly moral ends, all styles containing the slightest suggestion of richness, voluptuousness, or wealth of detail being banished. And any one whose physical constitution is such that he 'cannot live in his regular round of duites' is to be allowed to perish.

With regard to the third point, one cannot listen very seriously to Plato's attack on the literary teaching of the Sophists for it is almost universally admitted that Plato's literary criticism is the least valuable part of the philosophy of the *Republic*. Had civilisation followed Plato's ideal, we should be without Shakespeare, without the theatre, without music—with the exception of a few military marches and simple ballad tunes—without half of the things which make up the life of the educated man. We must also remember that the magnificent prose literature of Greece dates from the age when the Sophists taught their pupils the meaning and value of literary style.

It is difficult to reach anything like certainty with regard to the questions which have been propounded, but it is surely possible without being dogmatic to say that the correspondences pointed out cannot all be mere coincidences. Plato charges the Sophists with accepting fees; he himself teaches a doctrine of money which is quite untenable. He charges the Sophists with rudeness: he lays himself open in his remarks on democracy to the charge of snobbery. He charges the Sophists with giving the non-philosophical sciences too prominent a place in their curriculum: he himself gives the philosophical sciences too prominent a place. He charges the Sophists with setting up versatility as an ideal: he himself pursues the opposite ideal of simplicity to extremes that sometimes amuse and sometimes shock the modern reader. He charges the Sophists with over-emphasising literary form: he makes proposals which would in practice mean the prohibition of almost all literature. It seems fairly clear that his attack on the Sophists has been based on those very parts of his teaching which history has condemned. The Sophists made a real contribution to philosophy

which Plato does not recognise; they represent the common-sense view on several matters with regard to which too much theorising has led Plato away from common sense.

Some Aspects of Negation

BY

KRISHNA CHANDRA BHATTACHARYYA, M.A.

Analysis

The problem is to formulate the logic of the view that truth is manifold. There are many radically different types of logic based on incommensurable views of negation.

What *is not, viz.*, the illusion, may be regarded (1) as having some kind of abstract being or (2) as contradiction itself. Illusion may be (*i*) a being only to be denied, (*ii*) a being as positive as fact but different from it and positively related to it, (*iii*) identical with fact, relation being but identity, or (*iv*) no being at all but negation transcending all being.

These four views indicate four distinct attitudes towards truth, four stages of attention. The positive direction of attention is alone emphasised in the first three views. Pragmatism which recognises the fourth view in one form does not yet suggest a definite discipline of attention in the negative direction. This negative attention is very like introspection, being the consciousness of the absence of object and as such implying cognition of the object as well. The faculty is explicitly recognised in the fourth view of negation which accordingly brings out the need of an intensive discipline of it.

The analysis of the meaning of '*not* illusory' of negation of negation shows the concrete shapes which the above four views assume. In (*i*), 'not illusory' means 'not *merely subjective*,' and all relation being illusory or merely

subjective, there arises the notion of the self-identical reals. Self-identity or self-conservation as a function, and what is opposed to it, *viz.*, the thinking function of the subjective ideas are only grades of illusion, each of which is indifferently one or manifold. In (*ii*), 'not illusory' is what is different from the positively subjective and co-ordinate with it, *viz.*, the objective. Each side of the difference is a relation of terms, subjective relation is distinct from objective relation, and while there is one object-system, there are many idea-systems connected with many substrata. In (*iii*), the truth that is 'not illusory' is the necessary identity of the subjective and objective, of the known and the unknown. In (*iv*), this necessary identity is not positive at all. To say that the limiting unknown is *necessary* is not to know the unknown. Nor will it do to make any positive use of it as a transcendent negation, to take it *e.g.*, either as positively conditioning the known or as negative matter in relation to (Platonic) Ideas. 'Not illusory' in this view can only mean the unknown of which we are aware through the absence of positive knowledge. The principle is uncertainty itself, the uncertain alternation between the unknown and this awareness of the unknown.

The feeling of this alternation is a religion in three forms:—(*i*) an absolute dissatisfaction with the definite dualism of truth and untruth, (*ii*) an absolute condemnation of the attitude in which any religion is taken to be false, and (*iii*) a faith that all religions are not only true but identical. These are bound up with the views (*i*) that the negation of negation is negation, (*ii*) that the negation of absolute negation is the absolute truth of all affirmations and (*iii*) that absolute negation and absolute affirmation are mutual negations in identity.

Such is the absolute, as distinct from the subjectivistic, interpretation of the view that truth is manifold.

1. The aim of this paper is to bring out the fact that there are certain ultimate modes of logical thought embodying types of negation which are really incommensurable and that all philosophical dispute resolves itself in the final analysis into a conflict between such types. Every system of philosophical thought or religion has its own logic and is bound up with one or other of the fundamental views of negation. Each furnishes its distinctive criticism and orientation of the others: it is impossible to refer them all to a single court of trial and probably the only demand should be that a philosophy or religion and its distinctive logic justify each other. Not that however subjectivism or scepticism is the necessary consequence: all the types may be true and truth itself may be manifold. It is necessary to formulate, if possible, the logic of this view of the manifoldness of truth.

Truth is manifold, bound up with incommensurable types of negation: logic of such a view.

2. Negation is intelligible as illusion. When an object is known to be illusory, what kind of being or non-being do we attribute to it? We answer the question too easily when we say that it has a subjective being but no objective being. The antithesis between subjective and objective has only been reached very gradually in the history of thought and there is every reason to regard it as contingent. There is a too facile falling back upon psychology as a secure anchorage, although it should be an open question whether psychical fact is fact at all.

That illusion has subjective being is too easily asserted.

3. To say 'this object is not existent' is to imply either that *this* is no object but something else is, or that this object is no object. In the former case, 'this' is something which can be spoken of without being object, it has a being which is not objective

Two views: (1) illusion has abstract, not concrete being; (2)—is no being at all, but contradiction itself.

being, and so negation means only a *difference* between this peculiar being and objective being. This peculiar being need not at once be spoken of as subjective being: that would be to identify without sufficient proof yet a mental state with the content of it, *i.e.*, with what it refers to. Such an abstract being would be the starting point of a view which interprets negation as mere difference: concrete being would be only a determination of it—determination in a sense which will appear presently. In the latter case where the illusory object is regarded as an object which is no object, negation does not mean mere difference: contradiction itself which is no abstract being is the starting point. We begin then by distinguishing these two starting points—abstract being and contradiction and these we expect to indicate a deep line of cleavage throughout philosophy.

1. The different shades of views in the first type of thought require to be developed in order to be brought into definite relation to the second type.

(*i*) Negation emerges only when an illusion has been corrected, when for example we say, A is real, *not* X. Has X here anything to do to determine or define A? It may be held that A is here by its own right and that it owes nothing to X which is simply to be rejected or outgrown. A which is wholly given is not X: it gains or loses nothing by rejecting X. There is no *relation* between A and X to define A: truth is never determined by relation, truth *is not* relation, *i.e.*, all relation is illusory. Negation is always difference in this type of thought, all relation implies difference, and the primal relation is the difference between fact and illusion. Hence the relation between two facts A and B is itself no fact: each of them is a fact by its own right and each rejects the other as illusion.

Under (1), three views: (*i*) illusion has a being only to be denied: the denial does not determine the fact posited, and so all relation is illusory.

Positive relation between A and B is only this mutual rejection *by* two given beings: what *are* only rejected are not related at all, are neither identical nor different, and so the region of negation is the region of the indefinite.

(*ii*) If however A and B are negations of each other and yet facts, it may be said that an illusion X, by the correction of which A is posited, is only the name of *another fact*; only, *this* is not X, this is A. Something else is X, X is not nothing, and the illusion is only in the inherence of X in *this*. The illusion is not in the 'that' or in the 'what' of the given content but in their particular relation: a judgment alone can be false, not any term of the judgment, nor the bare relation apart from the terms. The false judgment however has a definite form, as definite as the corresponding true judgment; and the relation between these judgments is expressed in the definite negative judgment. 'This is X' is the false judgment corresponding to 'this is A,' the true judgment; and their relation is 'this is not X.' In fact the primal judgment is simply the opposition between two terms like 'this A' and 'this X,' expressed as 'this A is not this X,' through which there emerge the affirmative judgments 'this is A' and 'this is X' and the concepts of truth and falsity as applied to them. The simple negation appears as a difference between two terms but is really an opposition between two judgments and in fact the judgments are judgments because of this simple negation. All relation is at bottom this simple negation or difference, the opposition of truth and falsity is the opposition of a true and false relation, and so relation is not necessarily an illusion as in the previous view. Truth however in this view is the *relation* of two beings as set against some other relation; not the abstract beings but

(*ii*) Illusion and fact alike positive. Negation is only then difference and each of them is a *relation* of inherence or judgment. Relation is fact, different yet inseparable from, though not constitutive of the terms.

these as related constitute the true starting point. This relation is never without the terms, nor the terms without the relation; and yet neither side is *constituted* by the other. This relation which keeps up the difference of the terms and is itself different from them is *inherence*. So we have as facts not only particular given beings but also particular relations of these beings, illusions being included in such particular relations. In this view then, illusions are particular and definite relations: the relations of terms, which are facts are not constituted by these illusions and so terms too are not constituted by their relation.

(*iii*) It may be asked however, if terms and their relations are inseparable, if in the primal negative judgment, 'this A is not this X,' the illusion is inseparable from the fact, and if both the illusion and the fact are particular and definite, by what criterion are illusion and fact distinguished at all? In the view just considered, each negation is at once the distinction; but then as there is no *universal* negation, so there can be no universal fact-character also. This means that fact and illusion are not distinguishable by any general character at all. A particular fact is *not* the corresponding illusion and it is *not* also another fact: there is nothing to distinguish these two negations. So the conclusion should be that a particular fact and the corresponding illusion are *identical* and that the positive relation of inherence therefore is reducible to this identity of position and negation.

(*iii*) Illusion and fact identical, for no general character to distinguish them: all relation is this identity. Particular being is constituted by infinite negation, particular negation by infinite position and all particularity is thus negation.

Particularity in the first two views as above considered is ultimately *given*. In the present view however, the particularity of a position is constituted by that of its negation and *vice versa*. Each position is different from an infinity of other positions and is thus constituted by an

infinity of differences, by infinite negation. Each negation too would thus be the negation of infinite position, *i.e.*, a negation identical with infinite position. There would thus emerge the conception of the identity-in-difference of the finite and the infinite, and of infinite negation and infinite position. Every term however is not only constituted by its negation of other terms but it is also, as explained in the previous view, through such negation turned into a judgment, relation, or negation opposed to, *i.e.*, negating other judgments, relations or negations. A whirl of negation then alone remains but it is still regarded as the positive.

(*iv*) There is nothing however to distinguish such a positive from negation. Here then we definitely leave behind abstract being which was our first starting point and start with contradiction itself or transcendent negation as our first principle. We may next take being as only *posited* by this negation. The uniqueness of particularity is then not removed and need not also be removed. It is not taken indeed as ultimately *given*: it is held as *free* determination by this negation but yet as inexplicable or unpredictible. From the vortex of negation *any* particular may spring and so particulars have only to be accepted as they come and related into a world, positive for all particular purposes but with an absolute inexplicability as the ground of it all. We have accordingly equal right to take particular being as *superseded* by this inexplicability or retracted into this whirl of negation.

(*iv*) So all being is posited or superseded by transcendent negation. [This is the same as (2).]

5. Being then is progressively reduced to negation in these four views. In view (*i*), the particular simple beings are ultimately given and are not in any way determined by negation or the indefinite. In view (*ii*), both the beings and their negations are given as particular and

Gradual resolution of being into negation in these four views,

so all relations are also given as facts. In view (*iii*), particularity is not given but posited or constituted by definite absolute negation. This however does not abolish their dualism: their identity and their difference remain as inexplicabilities, though not as given beings. In view (*iv*) finally, being is abolished and absolute negation alone remains, not only as inexplicably definite but also as inexplicably self-related or self-negating, *i.e.*, as a free function or activity.

6. The true value of these views of negation appears in the concrete types of philosophy and religion in which they take shape. They indicate certain distinctive temperaments or attitudes towards truth, certain familiar modes of handling a given content. One's first impulse is to attend to what is confusedly given, to break up its continuity, to single out its elements, to analyse. It is the attitude of positive attention to the elements and, although it means the withdrawal of the mind from the given confused content, this negative direction of attention is not itself attended to. The given confused aspect also is not attended to, it is simply forgotten or left behind. The next stage is that in which the given aspect is remembered along with the elements analysed out, is distinguished from them and is recognised to contain them. The elements are separated and also related. The given complex and the relation of the elements alternate in the mind, though the alternation itself is not attended to. In the next stage again, the given complex is taken as identical with the related elements and so the elements themselves are felt to be identical. When thus however alternation is stopped and difference superseded by positive attention to this identity, the identity has lost the placid being of the given: it is felt to be an inexplicability, a dream, a being that is negation through and

which indicate four attitudes towards truth.

through—a perfect revel of negation. Positive attention denies itself utterly and the denial itself is known, not by positive attention to it but by attention directed to the positive object alone. Positive attention is recognised as a withdrawal from its own withdrawing activity; in other words, negative attention is known by negative attention to it.

7. In all accounts of attention, the positive direction is alone emphasised: it alone is taken to be under control and capable of being cultured. To try to know or to do something is to positively attend: and even to try to forget it or avoid it is to attend to something else. And yet in all knowing and in all doing, one has a consciousness of the problem before the effort to solve it, a very peculiar kind of consciousness rousing and regulating the effort, containing in fact both the solution and the effort already within it. It is the 'aching void' of James, of which all determinate knowledge and action are the materialisation. This materialisation is ordinarily left to chance and it is never suggested that negative attention which is the very heart of all mental process can be controlled or cultured by any intensive discipline.

Attention which is controlled in the positive direction should be controlled also in the negative direction.

8. The modern pragmatist resolution of truth into will means a recognition in one form of this fourth type of negation. The will that constructs all truth and therefore denies the right of all absolute truth is nothing but this creative negation. Not that pragmatism has suggested any system of discipline for this truth-constructing will: it has not yet told us *how* to construct any particular truth. In this respect it is on a par with absolutism which pronounces reason to be creative of truth but cannot present any method of obtaining a particular truth other than the method of

Pragmatism recognises truth-constructing negation as *will* but like Absolutism suggests no *method* of construction which is but the discipline of negative attention.

experience. So too the neo-Hegelian formula of self-realisation furnishes no ethical discipline other than that presented by positive morality. When Hegel and others sought to *deduce* physics or history, they recognised the legitimacy of this demand for a method other than experience for obtaining particular truths, though they did not satisfy the demand. This method cannot be other than a discipline of negative attention, the process of accentuating the 'aching void,' the deliberate endeavour to see what we *want* to see, *i.e.*, to know the want itself or the particular ignorance.

9. We know the absence of an object, say of a book on the table by a faculty which is neither perception nor inference. It is not perception, for the absence gives no sensation; and it cannot be inference, for inference must be based on perception. The faculty however being there, it may be helped out by perception or inference. It is nearest to psychological introspection, though it knows objective non-existence and not subjective existence merely. The non-existence of a book on the table is an objective fact known by negative attention, defined by relation to the facts obtained by positive attention. Through this negative attention then, we also know a particular negation or absence of knowledge, know the want of a solution and therefore the solution itself. Negative introspective attention accordingly is the faculty that requires to be controlled.

Through negative attention, we know absence of object and therefore the object.

10. The first type of negation which we have considered implies no recognition of the necessity for this control. It leaves the discovery of truth entirely to chance. It suggests nothing but the anxiety to escape the given. It is a mode of self-will in the intellectual region: let only attention assert itself and

Degrees of recognition of negative attention in the four views of negation.

some truth will come. Still the escape here is nothing but negative attention which however does not know itself. The will is unregenerate here, uncontrolled, capricious: it wants to possess or to rest in the positive, wants anyhow to discharge itself only. In the second type, there is already some sort of recognition of negative attention. There is the positive eagerness still to catch the truth but there is no satisfaction or rest in what is caught and hence there is the positive anxiety to return to the given. The consciousness of the possession of a truth is accompanied by a haunting sense of the truth left behind and so each truth is alternately possessed and left behind. Nothing is rejected, everything is only distinguished, and all judgments are taken to be true but different. This haunting sense of the truth left behind, this positive attention to difference is negative attention itself turned inside out. The unregenerate assertive tendency is still regnant but it is the *negation* that is asserted as a positive difference. The difference is however not taken as constitutive of the position, as it is taken in the third view. This would be the next stage then where positive attention and negative attention are employed as one process, where what is known and what is unknown are viewed as in one necessary system of truth which however is still only positive. This truth in which the will finds rest—for it is still anxious for rest—is not dull being but a free play, a moving identity. So the dream of the construction of truth arises here: truth appears at least as a play of reason, as a music which the mind follows and feels it can reproduce but cannot reproduce. The will cannot construct a particular truth, for it has not faith enough in its omnipotence, though there is an irresistible feeling of omniscience, *i.e.*, of truth being absolutely transparent. Hence arise on the one hand the absurdities of *Natur-philosophie* and the indolent acquiescence on the

other in all given reality as rational. The newness or uniqueness of intuition remains over after all dialectic which proves at best that intuition must be unique. The experience of quality is still utterly unpredictible and religion mocks all attempts to trace its evolution. Faith lours ahead as a dark cloud that refuses to be transparent to reason. The free and undoubting play of reason, the facile dream of the transparency of truth gives place to the absolute abruptness of quality and the deathlike seriousness of faith. Negative attention refuses to be positive: it denies its assertive tendency utterly. All truth is retracted into this self-denying negative attention and what remains over is but the demand for its intensive discipline.

11. We began with a discussion of illusion as a clue to the ascertainment of the several types of negation. To bring out their nature in more concrete terms, it is necessary to consider the illusion of an illusion. It involves a double correction or negation. Something is believed to be real, it is next taken to be illusory, and then again on closer observation it may be pronounced to be *not* illusory. The question is what 'not illusory' means. In the first view, illusion which is the name of the utterly indefinite gets some kind of definition in this connexion. Negation being negated becomes definite though not positive, being set against a positive. This definite negation or 'definite indefinite' is the subjective, the *merely* subjective, which the corresponding positive is *not*. The subjective not only does not constitute the positive, it does not determine it in any way. It means a double triumph for the positive alone: it is not merely by its own right, it asserts this right explicitly. So to say 'this object is not illusory' is to say that this object is not *merely* subjective but is self-identical. There emerges then against the notion of

Illusion of illusion leads in view (*i*) to the notions of the merely subjective, of real atomism and psychical atomism, and of illusory continua of energies and thoughts;

the subjective the notion of the self-existent simple which explicitly rejects all relation and all complexity and is the self-conserving real or monad. So then a double series comes out, the series of the reals as rejecting the subjective series, real atomism *versus* psychical atomism. The self-conserving function of the real is only the function of rejection, for which the real is neither the better nor the worse and so it is nothing real by itself. Yet here it gets a pseudo-objective character: it is the activity or energy of the real. On the other side the subjective idea is rejected, *i.e.*, the definiteness of the idea is proved to be nothing and this predicament of being rejected, like the function of rejecting, gets a pseudo-definiteness as the conscious activity of the idea. This conscious activity of the idea would be called 'thought,' being more unreal than the idea and yet on that very account nearer the positive as the cognition of truth. In this negative or illusory region lies the concept of identity-in-difference. The reals are distinct as rejecting all relation and each idea is distinct as being rejected by a distinct real. But the energies of the reals, which are essentially illusory, have not the distinctness of the reals and hence would arise the notion of one energy or self-activity turning up many different energies. This objective self-activity again would be taken as negating a corresponding subjective self-activity, *viz.*, a self-conscious self determining all cognitions of truth. Such then would be the illusory emanations of negation, the implications of the illusion of illusion in the first view.

12. In the second view, negation being negated becomes not only definite but also positive. Only, this positive would be of a different order from the positive of which it is the negation. This positive being of illusion is our ordinary subjective idea which is not to be disparaged as the merely subjective, *i.e.*,

in (*ii*), to the notions of the subjective and objective as co-ordinate, of a single object-system and many minds,

as nothing at all. Here too this idea does not constitute the object: each of them is self-identical by being distinguished from the other. We have nothing but particular negations in this view and the relations among these negations are of a different order from the relations among the positions. Not-A and not-B are like A and B distinct but not-A rejects A in a way different from that in which A rejects not-A. The idea is conscious of not being object but the object distinguishes itself from the idea by not being conscious. Hence arises the circumstance that an object is definitely related to other *objects* only. In the subjective region, two ideas are not the same though they know, *i.e.*, consciously distinguish themselves from, the same object and so the definite objective relations need not be reflected in correspondingly definite relations of ideas. The ideas may have orders of their own which do not reflect the objective order at all: hence the distinction between true and false cognition. False cognitions would be relations of ideas without the definiteness of the relations of things. Hence while we have the notion of a single system of objects, we cannot speak of the system of ideas as single, which as distinct from the single object-system must be regarded as *many* systems, many minds, each definitely related to other minds but indefinitely within itself and to the object-system. Yet the indefinite as such has no place in this view: definite cognitions and indefinite cognitions are alike definite as ideas, definitely connected with the selfs as unconscious substrata.

13. In the third view, the illusion of an illusion is not only definite and positive subjective being but as the original illusion which was pronounced subjective is turned objective, the given is taken to be the identity of the subjective and objective. The distinctness of a particular given position and the

in (*iii*), to the notion of the identity of subjective and objective, of the known and the unknown.

corresponding negation vanishes altogether: what is now taken as objective may appear to be subjective and this subjective again may turn out to be objective and so on indefinitely. It may be said that the objective at which we stop at any stage is only *possibly* subjective and has not yet been actually corrected. But every stage is believed to be contingent because there is no ground to believe that it is final. One may be uncertain whether it will turn out to be illusory but uncertainty or indefiniteness has no place either in this view or in the previous view. The uncertainty itself is here a definite negation of knowledge: the stopping at any object is a definite illusion or definite subjective being which is identical with the corresponding reality of absolute knowledge. Limit itself is posited by reason. All truth is hypothesis and all hypothesis is true: the particular truth which is not yet turned into hypothesis is only a hypothesis in relation to the absolute truth. Thus there emerges the identity-in-difference of the given truth and its explanation. The given by itself is abstract thing-in-itself and the explanation by itself is abstract reason. Each is the negation of the other and their synthesis is the concrete positive, the absolute Idea.

14. In the fourth view, this synthesis of mutual negations is not positive at all. The manner in which the present actual stage of knowledge is resolved into a contingency in the previous view may not be accepted as satisfactory. The difference between the problematic and the assertory statements—that the present object *may* be illusory and that it *is* illusory—may be felt to be an absolute difference; and to cover the defect by saying that all particularity *must be* resolvable into universality

View of the identity of the known and unknown criticised.

may sound very much like a bravado. That uncertainty whether or not what is now believed to be real will turn out to be illusory either appears not to affect the belief at all or if it does, it points to a feeling of certitude about the unknowable which is stronger than all knowledge. To say that the feeling is itself the highest knowledge, that this uncertainty is what is *reasonably* to be expected will not remove the uncertainty itself. The uncertainty in fact deepens: it is uncertain whether we should begin philosophy with the *assurance* that uncertainty is necessary or with the *uncertainty* itself.

15. This deeper uncertainty about the starting point of philosophy should, for all we know, be itself the starting point; but meanwhile there may be attempts at compromise. The assurance of reason may be accepted along with the inexpressible negation of it. The positive may be taken along with the negative but as transcending it. On the one hand, Ideas of Platonic type may be believed to transcend a negative matter and yet to work with it, or on the other the unknowable or unknowables may be regarded as transcending all knowables and yet as positively conditioning them. In either case a positive use is made of negation: it is either the matter that is formed or the real cause, never the bare nothing. There are those who object to all such positive use of negation, although they do not bring out the real implication of their objection, *viz.*, that a negative use is to be made of negation. In the fourth view of negation then, what is 'not illusory' is the unknown of which we are aware by the absence of positive knowledge. Here the principle is uncertainty itself, the uncertain alternation between the unknown and this awareness of the unknown.

Two compromises between views (*iii*) and (*iv*).

16. It is this alternation which takes the form of the uncertainty whether philosophy is to start with the faith that all our finality or positiveness, all unique quality, all our present truth in fact is explicable or necessarily to be expected in respect of us as merely finite beings—with this very halting and withal very assured form of omniscience, or with these inexplicabilities themselves. Neither the given nor the explanation, no positive in fact is the beginning or the process or the goal of philosophy. The identity of the given and the explanation, or of the objective and subjective is the last thinkable positive which alternates with negation. This identity (or reason) is a process and as such is itself a negation opposed to a transcendent negation. This latter negation may be indifferently called subjective will (or interest) constructing all truth, or vital impulse moulding a matter known only as its negation, or absolute will determining at once reason and Ideas. It is not the merely subjective of view (*i*), nor the subjective co-ordinate with the objective of view (*ii*), nor the absolute reason of view (*iii*). The negative use of this transcendent negation is religion which is the negation of philosophy and therefore also the true philosophy.

In view (*iv*), the first principle is the uncertainty whether philosophy is to start with the faith that all unknown is knowable or with the given unknowable.

17. Here also in the final stage, the first three views of negation may alternate. The first type would be the religion of *nirvana*, consisting in an absolute dissatisfaction with the definite dualism of truth and untruth. The negation of negation is itself negation, the dualism of true and false is itself false. The second type would be the religion of absolute toleration, which is a dissatisfaction with all negation, an absolute condemnation of the attitude in which any religion is declared to be false. The

The first three views reappear here. Negation of negation is (*i*) negation, (*ii*) truth of all positions, (*iii*) identity and mutual negation of all positions.

negation of any religion is absolute negation and the negation of this absolute negation gives the absolute truth of all particular affirmations, all particular religions. The third type would present the faith in all religions being not only true but identical. The absolute negation and the particular absolute affirmations are mutual negations in identity. This identity and these mutual negations are then the terminal points of all philosophy. Either side is beyond the dualism of definite truth and untruth.

18. Such is the logic of the manifoldness of truth. The pragmatist interpretation of this manifoldness makes philosophy subjectivistic and logic temperamental. We have endeavoured here to give an absolute, instead of a subjectivistic, interpretation.

Absolute instead of subjectivistic interpretation of the manifoldness of truth.

An Examination of the Ultimate Postulates of Morality

BY

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Philosophers have not used the term "postulate" in connection with morality exactly in the same sense, though there is an underlying unity among the various acceptations of the term. It may be useful to bring together at the outset the several passages from Kant on the one hand and from various English thinkers on the other, which explicitly state the nature and number of the ultimate postulates of morality. We shall then be in a position to restrict our enquiry to a determinate sphere.

(1) Kant, in the "Critique of Practical Reason,"[1] speaks of Immortality, Freedom and the Existence of God, as being the postulates of pure practical reason, *i.e.*, they are suppositions practically necessary or the requisite conditions for the obedience of pure will to the moral law.

(2) Sidgwick[2] appeals to the postulates of God and future life as the only means of connecting virtue and self-interest. Our practical reason, he says, feels a vital need of proving or *postulating* this connection, if it is to be made consistent with itself. Its negation forces us to admit an ultimate and fundamental contradiction in our apparent intuition of what is reasonable. In want of such

[1] Abbott (4th Edition, 1889), p. 229.

[2] Methods of Ethics (6th Edition), pp. 504-505.

a postulate of moral order, we need not give up morality altogether, but we must give up the idea of rationalising it completely. Nay, he goes so far as to regard this reconciliation of duty and self-interest as a *hypothesis logically necessary*.

(3) Dr. Ward[1] finding himself confronted by the dilemma "either the world is not rational or man does not stand alone and this life is not all," decides in favour of the postulates of God and future life, which alone, in his opinion, can save the rationality of the world, provide an adequate sanction for the suppression of egoism and guarantee the ultimate realisation of the moral ideal.

(4) Professor Taylor, in his "Elements of Metaphysics,"[2] sets forth two "ethical postulates," without which morality cannot maintain itself, and, without which moral life would become irrational, *viz.*, (*i*) that the moral life is on the whole the happy life; (*ii*) that there is such a thing as social progress. He thinks, moreover, that both these conditions are shown by the actual experience of mankind to be fulfilled by the constitution of the real world.

(5) According to Prof. Hobhouse,[3] the requirements that the moral order is a rational order, and that a coherent body of ethical thought, whose internal cohesion is itself the ground and meaning of its validity, can be found, constitute a *postulate of Rational Ethics*. He finds in the idea that every individual is a member of a spiritual whole with a common life and general interest, an axiom which gives coherence to sympathies and susceptibilities that guide the moral life of the unreflective man.[4]

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[1] Realm of Ends, p. 421.

[2] P. 386.

[3] "Morals in Evolution," Vol. II, pp. 219, 223.

[4] I may notice in passing that Mr. F. W. Bussell in a paper on "Future of Ethics" (*vide* "Personal Idealism") lays down seven propositions as forming the weight of hypothesis which the ethical agent has to carry in the simplest moral act.

All these postulates are supposed to be "unproved but indispensable assumptions" which being granted, our moral life seems to rest on a rational basis and without which the whole edifice of moral philosophy seems to be insecure, and the practical life of man reduced to a mere patchwork of hazards and compromises. Further, the postulates of Sidgwick, Ward and Taylor fairly well correspond to or are reducible to the Kantian postulates of God and Immortality. Prof. Hobhouse carries us a step further and states the conditions which ethics like any other science must observe and make its starting point. Kant, on the other hand, employs the term "postulates" in a significance different from that of the other thinkers referred to, and advances in support of his postulates, arguments which are not, I think, as convincing as some offered by the English thinkers. I propose therefore to confine myself in the main to the postulates of practical reason as treated in Kantian Ethics and to notice incidentally the contribution made by such English thinkers as Sidgwick, Green, Caird, Martineau and Ward towards the defence or the refutation of the grounds of those postulates.

Before entering into a detailed discussion of the main subject, a few preliminary observations on the nature of Kantian postulation seem to be necessary. It was the general result of Kant's metaphysical investigation that necessitated the peculiar setting of the "Critique of Practical Reason." In the "Critique of Pure Reason," Kant maintained that we cannot theoretically demonstrate the actual existence of objects corresponding to the three Ideas of Reason, *viz.*, soul, world in its entirety and God: that they are regulative, not constitutive principles, which, though always furnishing an impulse to knowledge and holding out ideals or ends towards which that knowledge may aim, yet remain for ever problems to us, for we have no sensuous material adequate to them. Now Kant

claims to have given objective reality to the ideas of speculative reason in the "Critique of Practical Reason." While theoretical reason in its attempt to demonstrate the objective validity of these ideas involves itself in paralogisms, antinomies and transcendental ideal, practical reason, in Kant's view, with its unconditional moral law demanding necessary existence of the highest good possible in the world, postulates the possibility and even the objective reality of the three theoretical conceptions, though only from a practical point of view. It is to be noted that no knowledge of the nature of the world, soul or God is secured thereby but only the assurance of their existence,[1] so that what was formerly a problematic conception is now assertory, what was *thought* is now definitely *known*.[2] In other words we know *that* the soul, an intelligible world and God *are* but not *what* they are.

Now the Kantian proof of the reality of the Ideas may be stated thus :—It is a command of the moral law to promote the *summum bonum*, which therefore must be supposed to be possible and consequently also the conditions necessary thereto, *viz.*, God, freedom, immortality. As the speculative reason can neither prove nor refute them, and as moreover the admission of their possibility is necessary in the interest of practical reason, the righteous man may say, "I *will* that there be a God, that my existence in this world be also an existence outside the chain of physical causes and in a pure world of understanding, and lastly that my duration may be endless."[3] The argument, however, is not based on inclination nor on a mere "will to believe" and we are not justified in assuming on account of what we wish on

[1] Critique of Practical Reason, pp. 232-3 (Abbott).
[2] *Ibid*, pp. 199-200.
[3] *Ibid*, pp. 240-1.

merely *subjective* grounds that the means thereto are possible or that its object is real, in which case every mad man's fancy would have a corresponding reality. It is rather based on the *primacy* of practical reason, on the practical need of assuming the existence of that which is the means of promoting what is objectively necessary and the principle that determines our judgment in this case is the foundation of a maxim of belief in a moral point of view, *i.e.*, *a faith of pure practical reason.*[1]

Now, on this distinction between theoretical and practical reason and the primacy of the latter, I submit the following considerations: (*a*) Kant seems to underrate the function of reason in its theoretical use, in holding that it must wait upon the materials of sense for the objective validity of its Ideas. Even commonsense of mankind credits reason with a capacity of knowing supersensible realities. The same reason which "comprehends the incomprehensibility" of certain truths, also furnishes us with "the eye of the soul" which sees spiritual objects. Being the faculty of the infinite, the unconditioned and the absolute, it must necessarily transcend the sphere of our sense-experience, but though it is unable to represent to us the *mode* of existence of the noumenal realities, it gives us unmistakable assurance of their *existence* by the very nature of its activity, *viz.*, that of transcending the limits of our sensuous experience. And this is all that Kant accomplished by means of practical reason.

(*b*) The conception of phenomena and noumena being correlative we can no more know the one apart from the other than know the subject without the object, or the right without the left. The very use of the term 'appearance' implies the existence of something *real*,

[1] *Ibid*, p. 244.

of which there can be an appearance at all. Nay, one might go a step further and say that the reality of the thing-in-itself, of the noumena is the ultimate presupposition of all knowledge and is the one, positive demand of our reason, while the notion of phenomena or appearance is only negative and derivative, pointing to the imperfect and inadequate apprehension of that reality on the part of the finite conscious subject.

(*c*) It is difficult to conceive that we should have a faculty which gives rise to Ideas that are no more than empty notions and which makes us subject to "necessary and constitutional illusions." [1]

(*d*) The capacity or incapacity of theoretical reason to deal with any object or class of objects must itself be judged by reason, and a reason that aims to discover only what *seems*, not what *is* and why it is, would be a poor thing for us men to be proud of.[2]

(*e*) As Hegel sarcastically puts it, "Kant's position amounts to asserting that a man cannot *know himself* because he cannot take his self, or ego in his hands and see it and smell it." [3]

(*f*) Even the objective reality ascribed to the Ideas by means of practical reason is only a postulation or a positing which theoretical reason is as much justified in making, because it is one of its functions to see to the interests of morality and religion as well as of logic and metaphysics. The so-called moral proofs are no less *theoretical* than the teleological.

(*g*) The ethical postulates create an untenable distinction between knowledge and belief. A belief as Dr. F. C. S. Schiller[4] says, which is foredoomed to

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[1] Flint's Agnosticism, p. 164.

[2] J. Caird's Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion (1880), p. 4.

[3] Quoted in Flint's Agnosticism, p. 170.

[4] Personal Idealism—Axioms as Postulates.

remain a mere belief soon ceases to be acted upon ; either the progress of knowledge will render the practical belief impossible or will prove its truth. We *cannot act as if* the existence of God, freedom and immortality were real, if at the same time we *know* that it is hopelessly inaccessible and indemonstrable.

The real implication of the Kantian doctrine of the primacy of practical reason seems to me to lie in the fact that conation is the source of faith and cause of knowledge. As Ward [1] says, " experience is the process of becoming expert by experiment ; what we learn takes at first the form not of theoretical propositions, but of practical maxims which are thought of not as true, but as useful. Our life is primarily active and hence it is that in striving for what is good, we learn what is true." It is therefore natural that the Pragmatists should make capital out of Kant's theoretical agnosticism and practical faith. Schiller [2] for instance accuses Kant of " boldly encroaching and trespassing on the forbidden domain of the unknowable and returning thence laden with rich spoil" of God, immortality and freedom, and holds that we must choose between theoretical and practical reason, for either the subjects of ethical postulates are not valid at all or they are the foundation of the whole theoretical structure. " To be consistent, Kant should have said that it is our practical activity that gives the real clue to the nature of things, while the world as it appears to theoretical reason is secondary, in which case, the whole of the Critique of Pure Reason should have been rewritten." It was, however, far from Kant's philosophical position to lend support to the pragmatic conception of truth and I think he himself moved in the right direction when he suggested that it is one and the same reason that operates in the theoretical and practical sphere.

[1] Realm of Ends, pp. 413-4.

[2] Personal Idealism.

Before leaving this section, a few words on the relative importance given by Kant to the position of the three postulates may not be out of place. There are some passages where all the three postulates seem to centre round the conception of the *summum bonum; e.g.*, "This (*i.e.*, the *summum bonum*) is not possible without presupposing three theoretical conceptions, *viz.*, freedom, immortality and God. Thus by the practical law which commands the existence of the highest good possible in the world, the possibility of those objects of pure speculative reason is postulated and the objective reality."[1] Again, "I must suppose its possibility (*i.e.*, that of the highest good) and consequently also the conditions necessary thereto, *viz.*, God, freedom and immortality."[2] But in other places, Kant expressly gives primacy to the idea of freedom and regards it alone as the condition of the moral law, the ideas of God and Immortality being "not conditions of the moral law, but only conditions of the necessary object of a will determined by this law." Thus in the preface to the "Critique of Practical Reason," we are told that "inasmuch as the reality of the concept of freedom is proved by the apodictic law of practical reason, it is the *keystone* of the whole system of pure reason, even the speculative, and the *possibility* of other concepts (as those of God and immortality) is *proved* by the fact that freedom actually exists, for this idea is revealed by the moral law. Freedom, however, is the only one of all ideas of speculative reason of which we know the possibility *a priori*, because it is the condition of the moral law which we know."[3] What is more, we find in the "Critique of Judgment," that he includes the Idea of Freedom among the *things*

[1] Abbott's Trans., p. 231.
[2] P. 240.
[3] *Ibid*, p. 88.

of fact, i.e., objects for concepts whose objective reality can be proved. "There is one rational idea which also comes under 'things of fact'; this is the idea of freedom whose reality regarded as that of a particular kind of causality may be exhibited by means of practical laws of Pure Reason and conformably to this in actual action and consequently in experience."[1] Again, "freedom is the only concept of the super-sensible which *proves* its objective reality in nature by means of the effects it can produce there."[2]

It will be therefore more in consonance with the trend of the Kantian Ethics to take up the discussion of the postulate of freedom first and then to pass on to the postulates of immortality and God, which the two elements in the conception of the *summum bonum* require as their necessary conditions.

As to the nature of the criticism I wish to direct upon the postulates, it is sufficient to indicate that I shall not consider their physical, physiological or theological aspects except as they bear upon morality, but shall mainly discuss the inner consistency of the Kantian presentation of the problems and try to find out how far they are morally necessary, and what implications of permanent value they may be said to possess.

The Postulate of Freedom.

Kant's conception of freedom is beset with insuperable difficulties, not only because of the ambiguity attaching to the term, but also as regards its relation to the empirical

[1] Bernard's Trans., pp. 405-6.

[2] *Ibid*, p. 413. We are bound to ask why the same mode of proving the reality of an object through the effects produced by it in experience should not be extended in other cases, *e.g.*, the demonstration of the survival of human soul through experiments by the Psychical Research Society or of the existence of God on the strength of mystic experiences and conversions of born and confirmed villains as recorded in the history of religions.

notion of nature-necessity and to the postulate of God. Sidgwick[1] had long ago drawn attention to the fact that Kant confounded two different meanings of the same word in connection with morality. When we speak of a man being free, we may mean either of two things: *viz.*, (1) that he acts in accordance with reason and is not a 'slave of passion' or (2) that he is free to choose between good and evil. Now Kant uses the word in the 'rational' or 'good' sense in cases of proving the possibility of disinterested obedience to the moral law as such, independent of sensual impulses, while in cases of attaching moral responsibility or moral imputation to human actions, he employs the term in the second or 'neutral' sense. That the two meanings are equally important is undeniably shown by the fact that while Kant explicitly desires us to interpret the postulate of freedom in the former sense, Martineau,[2] on the other hand, contends that only the second meaning can make it a necessary condition of morality. Let us consider the validity of each position.

"Will," says Kant,[3] "is a kind of causality belonging to all human beings in so far as they are rational, and freedom is the property of such causality so that it can be efficient independently of foreign causes determining it."

Now (1) causality as we know it in the empirical world involves a relation of two phenomena, cause and effect, and that which is a cause in relation to one event is an effect in relation to another event, so that each is determined by the other. But here we are to conceive a cause that is not at the same time an effect, *i.e.*, a free cause, which yet determines effects in the phenomenal world. Kant was compelled perhaps by the limitation of language to use the same term to denote

[1] Methods of Ethics, Appendix.

[2] Study of Religion, Vol. II, Bk. III, Ch. 2, § 1.

[3] Abbott's Trans., p. 65.

the relation between a phenomenon and a phenomenon and that between a phenomenon and a noumenon.

(2) By *foreign causes* Kant means not only external objects of sense, but also desires and inclinations that arise, as it were, within the life of the self-conscious subject. Here Kant was labouring under the notion that all desires aim at pleasures, and that because they affect the agent in so far as he is a member of the sensible world, they cannot give maxims fit to be universal laws for all rational beings. No doubt as a refutation of the hedonistic position, Kant's insistence on the non-sensuous determination of the will of a rational being was perfectly justified, but modern Idealism has abundantly made it clear that even in desiring an end, the self-conscious subject is not making himself a slave to a foreign cause, but is determining himself, however imperfectly, according to the law of his own being, in so far as he seeks satisfaction of his self in that end. Indeed Kant himself makes an advance in this direction in passing from the first abstract and formal mode of the formulation of the moral law to the more concrete form of the third formula. What is more, we find him stating almost in the words of Plato that "every rational being desires only the good or at least desires everything *sub ratio boni*, *i.e.*, desires something because he represents it to himself as good"[1] and not *vice versa*. But his formalism was too strong and he returns to it saying that though the object of every volition is a good, the motive or the ground of its determination must be free from all material principles. (3) Again, this transcendental freedom is not to be explained by the study of the nature of the soul or of the motives of the will like any psychological property.[2] Kant makes a complaint against

[1] Abbott's Trans., p. 150, note.

[2] *Ibid*, p. 187.

empirical philosophers who in trying to find the determining physical cause of an action within the subject himself (*e.g.*, *in an idea*) "deprive us of the grand revelation which we obtain through practical reason by means of the moral law, *viz.*, that of a super-sensible world."[1] The so-called "psychological freedom," Kant urged, involves physical necessity. So do the mechanical causality of a clock or a projectile as well as the spontaneity of animal plays, flowing of the stream, and blowing of the wind, to each of which Schopenhaur later on ascribed will. Kant's conception of freedom therefore means independence of everything empirical and of nature generally, whether it be an object of internal sense considered in time only or of external sense in time and space and is to be equally distinguished from the action of *automaton materiale* and *automaton spirituale*.[2]

We shall see presently how far this transcendental or absolute freedom, as opposed to "psychological and comparative" freedom, can render the moral law and moral imputation possible at all and how far it can be reconciled with the mechanism of nature.

(4) The predicate "independent of foreign causes" is however only a negative characteristic of freedom, and if left to itself would lead to indeterminism or motiveless choice. It was far from Kant's position to assert that the free will is lawless. On the contrary, he defines it as a causality acting according to immutable laws.[3] In its positive aspect, therefore a free will is *autonomous*, being in every action a law unto itself and acting on no other maxim than that which can also have as an object itself as a universal law. Free will and will subject to moral laws are one and the same thing. Let us pause to consider the implications of this positive determination. (*a*) It is obvious

[1] P. 187. [2] P. 189. [3] Pp. 65-6.

that Kant is here giving expression to a vital demand of our moral consciousness that the moral law should not be an external authority, exercising constraint from outside but rather be a law of our own giving so that in obeying it, we are conforming to our own self. On the other hand, this law must not be based on our personal idiosyncrasies or private ends, but on our rational nature, which is universal, and objective, and which therefore we share with all rational beings. This seems to me the elements of truth in Kant's conception of rational free will.

(*b*) When however we enquire whether all actions of rational beings are free, or if not, how it comes about that a free agent makes himself a slave to his natural impulses, we are confronted with difficulties and inconsistencies that cannot be surmounted. "Every rational being," says Kant, "has the idea of freedom and acts entirely under that idea." [1] This seems to imply that the agent is acting freely even when yielding to natural passions and evil desires, in which case freedom of will must be interpreted to mean a capacity to choose between alternative courses of action, and Kant's conception of it as will conforming to the law of reason must be abandoned. To save himself from this difficulty, Kant could have recourse to either of two alternatives: (1) that the act done from the motive of passion or from heteronomy of will is done only mechanically or physically so that the agent is not conscious of himself as doing the act; or (2) that the consciousness of freedom exercised in sensuously determined actions is not a positive faculty, but a privation or defect. Kant seems at times to adopt now one of these alternatives and now the other, though he is more explicit in regard to the latter. The distinction between the noumenal or intelligible self and the phenomenal or sensible self, may be construed to mean that in morally good actions the subject

[1] P. 67.

is conscious of his true selfhood, while in wrong-doing or evil choice, he is determined by natural occurrences, like any other animal or thing in the phenomenal world, and therefore cannot be said to possess a self at all. But this alternative is somewhat obscured, as we shall see, by Kant's application of the noumenal and phenomenal categories to one and the same action and to one and the same subject. As regards the other alternative, there is a passage in his Principles of Jurisprudence (I quote from Caird) which runs thus:—"The freedom of the will cannot be defined as the capacity of choosing to act for or against the law, though in will as the empirical phenomenon of freedom we find plenty of examples of this, for freedom (as known through the moral law) has only a negative characteristic, *viz.*, that we are not *forced* to action by sensuous motives. We cannot theoretically exhibit this characteristic in positive aspect as the faculty of man as intelligence *to lay compulsion* on his sensuously determined will. Freedom in reference to inner legislation of reason alone is a faculty or power; the possibility of diverging from this law is a defect or want of faculty." But this is, as Caird[1] says, only an evasion, rather than an explanation of the problem, for how can a defect of freedom be produced in the subject whose essential nature is freedom except by the exercise of that freedom?

The difficulty is enhanced by the fact that Kant admits elsewhere that natural inpulses can belong to our nature as rational beings and determine our will only *in so far as we take them up into our maxims of conduct.*[2] In other words, a rational being can be determined by sensuous impulses only if he has himself through his own action determined himself thereby. Again in

[1] Critical Philosophy of Kant, Vol. II, pp. 255-6.

[2] Abbott, pp. 327-8.

his "Religion within the bounds of Mere Reason," Kant[1] says, "the source of the bad cannot lie in any object that determines the will through inclination or in any natural impulses, but only in a rule that the will makes for itself for the use of its freedom, *i.e.*, in a maxim. If this ground were not a maxim ultimately but a mere natural impulse, the use of freedom would be reduced to determination by natural causes, which is contradictory." For this reason Kant regards the disposition for good and bad to be *innate* in the species and yet ascribes the *authorship* of good and bad actions to the individual. But how a free will can be affected by natural laws and how it can take up sensuous impulses into its motive and make itself thereby unfree is a problem which remains for Kant an inexplicable mystery, and he can only refer us to the fact that every rational being is a member at once of two worlds—the noumenal and the phenomenal,—to which we now turn.

(5) Man, says Kant, stands on the confines of two worlds. He is at once a member of a super-sensible order and of a sensible system of nature. As a "*homo-noumenon*" he is essentially free, completely self-determined, and yet as a "*homo phenomenon*" his actions are subject to physical necessity.

From the latter point of view, we might with an adequate knowledge of his motives and circumstances predict his future conduct in all possible cases with as much precision as in case of a solar or lunar eclipse,[2] and yet from the former point of view, even a thief may say that he *might have* left his immoral action (theft) undone. This consciousness of what 'might have been' or 'ought to have been' done, as opposed to what has been done, is according to Kant both a proof and a result of moral

[1] Abbott, pp. 327-8.

freedom. "I ought, therefore I can" is a formula expressing the same truth.

Now let us examine the validity of the Kantian conception of the two-fold nature of man and the antithesis between the two worlds and see how far his meaning of freedom is compatible with them.

(*i*) A free cause whose efficiency does not interfere with the mechanism of nature is merely super-imposed *ab extra* or in an arbitrary manner. As Martineau says, such a freedom might be a mere subjective form of our faculty of will, so that its objective reality is mere appearance or illusion, just as space though a subjective form of our sensibility, *appears* to be outside us. In that case freedom is empty and un-meaning in isolation from material contents; but whereas in perception both form and matter are within the sphere of sense, here we have the form in the noumenal world and the matter in the phenomenal world, and no manner of schematism can bridge the chasm between the two. As we have already said, Kant is vainly trying to express the inexpressible in applying the function of causality to a noumenal agent.

(*ii*) It is impossible to save moral responsibility and moral imputation on this view. (*a*) After making all possible concession to the Naturalist, Kant turns to 'something more' which remains over after the necessary causation has done its utmost in explaining the moral phenomena. Guilt and remorse, for example, inseparable from a wrong action, can be accounted for as *other than* the necessary causality of the sensible world. But once admit that a man is in any sense a member of the phenomenal world and the whole sphere of morality comes under the sway of Determinism: and guilt, remorse and obligation will receive an explanation on the naturalistic and evolutionary basis as any other

psychological property, without any necessity for a super-sensible region of the 'free causality' in the will.

(*b*) A rational being, we are told, can justly say of every unlawful action that he might have left it undone, although as appearance it is sufficiently determined in the past and is therefore absolutely necessary. Juridical sentences of conscience also do not take into consideration the lapse of time because, "in reference to the super-sensible consciousness of its existence (freedom) the life of sense is but a single phenomenon, which must be judged not according to physical necessity but according to absolute spontaneity of freedom." [1]

If, however, the absolute spontaneity in question does not, like that of plants and animals, admit of deviation from a determinate course, *i.e.*, is only one-sided, we can no more praise a saint or blame a sinner, than we can extol the meekness of a lamb or reproach the ferocity of a tiger. If, on the other hand, freedom is equally exerted in a moral or immoral action then also the praise or blame attached to it loses its value in each case, for the action only takes place in time or in the phenomenal world, while the real noumenal agent of both the moral and the immoral actions is above time. Moreover, it is impossible to reconcile this timeless life of the moral agent with the conception of moral *progress* which must be a process in time, as we shall see in connection with the postulate of immortality. Another difficulty raised by Kant himself will be discussed later on in reference to the postulate of God, *viz.*, how God being the Creator of man can escape the responsibility for the sins of his creatures.

(*c*) Again, a born villain, Kant holds, is justly reproached as guilty "because whatever springs from a man's *choice* (as every action intentionally performed

[1] Pp. 192-3.

dŏes) has as its foundation a free causality which from its early youth expresses its character in its manifestation."[1] But if freedom of wrong choice is "a defect or want of faculty"[2] how can we morally blame a wrongdoer any more than a blind man ?

(*iii*) The formula "I ought, therefore I can" is rather ambiguous. Kant traces the genesis of the consciousness of "ought" or obligation to the partnership of two spheres in the same consciousness. Were I entirely a member of the world of intelligence all my actions *would* conform to the moral law. Were I on the other hand a member of the sensible world alone my actions would be entirely determined according to the natural laws of phenomena. It follows, therefore, that "I will" of the noumenal ego, combined with "I cannot" of the sensible ego gives rise to the "I ought" of the moral agent. Now it is clear that the agent that declares "I can because I ought" has already identified himself with the noumenal world, while a moral subject who is yet under the bondage of sense would say "I cannot though I ought."

At this point we may reconcile the two meanings of freedom insisted upon by Kant and Martineau respectively. The "self" that imposes the law is indeed free in the Kantian sense, but the "self" that obeys is "free" in the sense that it has a power to conform or not to the moral law. In other words, it is in virtue of the *capacity* to choose between good and evil which I possess, that I can recognise the *ought* at all and it is in the virtue of my consciousness of *ought* as self-imposed that I discover my freedom of legislation in a Kingdom of ends to which every rational being belongs as both the subject and the sovereign.

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[1] P. 194.

[2] *Supra*, p. 18.

Thus with the acceptance of Martineau's meaning of freedom we reject Kant's empirical determinism in human conduct and with the retention of Kant's view of freedom as self-legislation in a possible Kingdom of ends, we shut the door against Indeterminism. This leads us to a consideration of the traditional controversy between Freewill and Determinism, which occupies so large a space in English Ethics. (1) The Doctrine of Necessity, to which Kant fell a victim in his treatment of the phenomenal ego, fails to recognise that it is in ourselves as active or efficient that the source and primary meaning of "cause" is to be found. To quote Ward[1] "It was not till deeds were done that men talked of fate, and then falsely projecting the fixity of the past into the future and reflecting it back again, they denied the very source of the idea of fate itself by denying real freedom or personal initiation altogether." Nay, we may go further and say that freedom is a fact of experience not only in human conduct but in the entire world of organised beings. "Life is the death of all natural philosophy" (Ward's[2] quotation from Kant) for life is the capacity to act or change according to an internal principle. As Bergson[3] says, the entrance of life in the world is equivalent to the introduction into it of something that encroaches upon inert matter, an element of indeterminism or unforeseen-ability. Ward even claims to extend the sphere of freedom to what we call inorganic nature and resolves the latter into a plurality of conative individuals aiming at self-conservation and self-betterment. The "Universal law of causation" becomes then only a methodological assumption justified by its practical usefulness, and cannot usurp the place of freedom which is a fact.

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[1] Realm of Ends, p. 271.

[2] *Ibid*, p. 75.

[3] Hibbert Journal, Oct. 1911, Life and Consciousness, p. 34.

(2) The relation of cause and effect holds good only among objects of our experience and it is an error to apply it to the relation between the subject of all experience and his modes of activity, for the agent in determining himself by a motive or the idea of a personal good is not submitting to something foreign or external to himself.

(3) Freewill has been wrongly confused with Indeterminism or motiveless choice. Because a man is free, it does not at all follow that his future conduct must be wholly incalculable. On the contrary, a motiveless will, as Caird shows, is another name for the will that is a *slave* to caprice. We may say with Martineau[1] that "all necessity is uniformity, but all uniformity need not be necessity" for the uniformity of conduct may be due to the self-determination of a conscious subject. Or as Green puts it, actions may be necessary without the agent being a necessary agent.[2]

(4) No doubt, this freedom of self-determination is equally exercised in good and evil deeds, but without such a capacity there would be no meaning in ascribing merit or blame, the sense of guilt or remorse to the moral agent, and responsibility would reduce itself to mere punishability. In fact, Determinism takes away the zest from man's moral endeavours and has a demoralising effect on the agent, as is confessed in so many words by Mill and Sidgwick. Again, if man is but a part or product of nature, as the Evolutionists would have us believe, the precept "Live according to Nature" is either un-meaning or superfluous as Mill and Huxley admit.

On these grounds we cannot agree with Sidgwick, Leslie Stephen, Taylor and Russell who hold that the metaphysical validity of freedom of will is not important for Ethics.

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[1] Study of Religion, Vol. II, p. 203.

[2] Prolegomena to Ethics, § 109.

We may state the ethical implication of the postulate of freedom in the following words:—Freedom in Martineau's sense is the *basis* and freedom in the Kantian meaning is the *standard* of morality. We have freedom of self-determination in order that we may realise the freedom of reason. It is because man is not part of nature but has a spiritual principle within him that he can distinguish between the "desired" and the "desirable," "is" and "ought," and it is because of the consciousness of this distinction that he is realising his freedom from the natural impulses and passions within him, from the control of natural forces without him and giving objectivity to a Kingdom of ends where the will of all rational beings may be regarded as legislative.

Immortality of the Soul.

The next two postulates of morality follow according to Kant from the two-fold conception of the *Summum Bonum*. Immortality results from the practically necessary condition of the duration adequate to the complete fulfilment of the moral law or virtue, which is the *supreme good*, while the existence of God is the necessary condition of happiness exactly proportionate to morality, *i.e.*, of the *perfect good*. These two postulates are so intimately related to each other that it will not be possible to observe a strict line of separation between their treatments.

The Kantian argument for immortality runs thus:—Perfect accordance of the mind with the moral law or holiness is not possible for a rational being in the sensible world at any moment of his existence. It can be found only in a *progressus ad infinitum* towards that goal and this endless progress is possible only on the supposition of an endless duration of the existence and personality of the same rational being.[1]

[1] Abbott, p. 218.

Now (1) what is it that led Kant to deny the possibility of attaining perfection of holiness on the part of man? It was his sharp antithesis between desire and duty, between the particular matter of an action and the universal form of the moral law under which it has to be subsumed, or rather between the sensible ego and the intelligible ego. He finds not a single example of disposition to act from pure duty in the whole human history, because behind all dutiful actions of good men there always lurk some motives of inclination or desire, some end or object in view. The moral law demands on Kant's view that an action should be done not only in accordance with, but for the sake of, duty. In other words, the universal form of legislation should itself be the determining principle of the will. But as we have seen, desiring an end is in no way inconsistent with the morality of an action if the end is a form of self-realisation. As every action is particular, a will that is simply universal and desires no particular end cannot step into the practical sphere at all. It was the abstract way in which Kant conceived passion and reason that accounts for his regarding them as being always in an asymptotic relation.

(2) Granting, however, there is an inherent discrepancy between our sensible and rational natures, we cannot ever begin the task of realising the moral ideal, far less bridge the gulf by an endless progress. Even an infinite time, as Caird says, is not enough for realising an impossible task. No rational being will choose for himself a vain pursuit after an unattainable end. On the other hand, if there is no intrinsic opposition in human nature to render perfection impossible, then it must be capable of attainment even in this life, at least for exceptionally good men, and there is no *raison d'être* of immortality.

(3) Immortality is inconceivable for the noumenal ego which is not in time. Are we to understand that just as the phenomenal ego is necessarily determined while the noumenal ego is free, so also the endless progress only applies to the former, while the latter is eternally perfect? Again if the phenomenal ego is to remain for ever subject to limitations of sense and time, are we not for ever debarred from any knowledge of supersensible or noumenal Ideas of Reason? The union in the same consciousness of the double nature of being in time and not in time, being imperfect and yet perfect, is un-meaning.

(4) There is no guarantee that man, who is depraved by nature, will have an unbroken continuance of the progress which he has made from the worse to the morally better, as far as we can judge from earthly experience which tells us of the falls and transgressions of virtuous individuals as well as of the decline and degeneration of prosperous nations.

(5) "The Infinite Being," says Kant,[1] "to whom the condition of time is nothing, sees in this to us endless succession a whole of accordance with the law, and the holiness which His command requires is to be found in a single intellectual intuition of the whole of the existence of all rational beings." But this is, as Caird says, at once to assert and deny the condition of time, *i.e.*, to say that what for God is eternity is for us endless time, and that in actual experience, we have to traverse that time in order to realise that moral law in ourselves. Immortality then reduces itself to a phenomenal appearance, a way in which we are obliged to represent that which we cannot possibly think, *viz.*, the eternal realisation of goodness in every act of will of the rational being.

[1] Abbott, p. 219.

Equally faulty is the argument for immortality as presented by Green, who says, "a capacity in a self-conscious personality cannot pass away, for it is not a series in time and the fulfilment of its capacity in an end cannot involve extinction because the conviction of an end is founded on the idea of absolute value in a spirit which we ourselves are."[1] But if that which is not a series in time cannot be extinguished, how can it be abiding or progressive? If we are "reproductions of an eternal consciousness" we must be eternal, it may be said. But the self-conscious individual does not partake of the nature of the eternal *qua* individual. Again, as Sidgwick points out, two meanings of "eternal" must not be confused. If we are "eternal" in the sense of being "out of the time series" could we be also eternal in the sense of "perduring through all time?"[2]

Ward following Höffding regards eternity "not as a prolongation of time, but as an expression of the permanence of nature during the alteration of time." "We live in eternity," says he, "in the midst of time."[3] But the same might be said about all plants and animals, and that does not help us about immortality. Moreover, if God and man are co-eternal, as he thinks, both being functionally related to and manifesting their nature in the natural and temporal process of the world, how could we attribute endless progress to the latter, and infinite perfection to the former? To be consistent, Ward has to admit that man too has a perfection of his own here and now, and that even God's perfection is not statical, but active. But this is an untenable position. If man is in a way perfect at every stage of his development (as a plant or a flower is) what on earth does he require an

[1] Prolegomena to Ethics, § 189.

[2] Ethics of Green, Martineau and Spencer, p. 51.

[3] Realm of Ends, Appendix IV, p. 475.

immortal life for? If it be said that he needs *progress* from human perfection to Divine perfection, we reply that it is impossible for man to be "perfect" in a sense in which God is perfect without ceasing to be finite and human. Again, if there is a progress *in* perfection, as distinct from progress *towards* perfection and if God as well as his morally good creatures have to attain the former, we do not know where the journey is to end and where the *abiding rest* is to be found.

There is yet another set of reasoning by which the English thinkers in particular try to uphold the postulate of Immortality. They are under no delusion about the eternal conflict between flesh and spirit, between desire and reason, which, according to Kant, prevents us from attaining holiness on this earth. They have, on the contrary, convincingly demonstrated that the universal rational nature of man can only be realised in and through particular desires and actions and that even the animal appetites are or may be made organic to the spiritual principle in us. But what they cannot explain on the basis of mundane experience is the wide discrepancy between the infinite capabilities of the human spirit and the short tenure of earthly existence allowed for their realisation. Green, Martineau, Caird and Ward appeal to the same form of argument in different words. Thus Martineau speaks of "the Vaticinations of our intellect,"[1] and Caird, of an "inexhaustible spring of life contained in the principle of morality which is universal"[2] as pointing to immortal existence. Ward says, "man's capacities are not worked out here; hence death in not an end"[3] and he thinks that apart from a future life the moral ideal which places the highest good

[1] Study of Religion, Vol. II, Bk. IV, Ch. III.

[2] Critical Philosophy of Kant, Vol. II, p. 308.

[3] Realm of Ends, p. 409.

of each in the highest good of all and with which the best of men identify themselves would be irrational.

Now (1) there is a common error into which all these thinkers seem to have fallen. An ideal as such is always an ideal, which may subsist in a world of universals, but can never exist in time, without ceasing to be an ideal. To say that human beings have *ideals* which are being elsewhere realised is just to commit the fallacy of hypostatising abstractions. (2) We have only to specify the form in which such an ideal is to be realised, to see the shallowness of this expectation. The moral ideal that we pursue is essentially human and has reference to the needs of human society and its realisation means the realisation of a kingdom of *Heaven on earth* where the good of each will be the good of all and perfect harmony will prevail between man and nature and between the varied interests of man. The infinite knowledge and love and good will that we aspire after, can only be conceived of in respect of individuals existing in such a society. Carry this moral ideal to a transcendental sphere and it becomes emptied of all meanings and contents, just as an individual who is cut off from all relation to any society becomes an abstraction. Nothing but egoism or an inverse form of Hedonism can lead us to believe that while death and disease, sin and error and a hundred other physical and moral evils prevail on earth we shall start after death a new life which will bring us nearer to perfection and by a shorter cut. To take a concrete example: if a Shakespeare or a Kant left his work undone in this life, are we to conceive them as writing dramas or critical philosophies now for the denizens of Heaven? (3) The ideal itself is progressive and that which is ideal in one age or society is a realised law or custom or institution in another age or society. No doubt a final end or the highest good casts back at every

stage of development its revealing light and is the informing spirit of all progress, but that end is in the process of realisation on earth. The history of mankind is but the history of the increasing realisation of the purpose that runs through the universe. Nothing is gained by imagining that the spirits of the primitive men who died thousands of years ago or of the American savage tribes who are dying to-day have attained or will attain in the other world the degree of culture and moral goodness which a modern civilised adult possesses. (4) It is impossible for God to give full scope for the realisation of all the aims and aspirations of man without abdicating His throne and sceptre, for even Carlyle's "shoeblack" would demand to be the unrivalled Monarch of God's infinite universe. In other words, the infinite perfection which immortality is to secure us cannot be attained by man without ceasing to be a finite individual and this is impossible, for there cannot be two infinite beings or Gods. (5) As a matter of fact, the moral demand for immortality is the result of a crude view of human nature and destiny, which obtained some plausibility before the theory of evolution was formulated. When man was supposed to be inherently depraved and when the evils and imperfections of existence were regarded as necessary and irremediable means of disciplining the children of God to prepare them for a higher world beyond the grave, the need of a future life was potent. But with the progress of science and civilisation we are already in sight of a state of things on earth where man will become the master of the conditions of his own life, and of the growth of his mind, and will even wrest from nature the secret of life and death, when a better social organisation will allow each individual the opportunity of realising the highest and the best in him and everything will work for harmony. We now see that none of the

evils that make human life miserable are inherent in the nature of man or of his environment, but that moral and intellectual progress can prevent and cure them (including even death). In short, evolution teaches us how man coming from animal ancestry is marching towards a divine destiny and how earth is slowly but surely being transformed into heaven. We cannot picture this final stage, nor can we *personally* share in its glory, but the very idea of its possibility and the consciousness that we are working for such an end can fill us with joy and drive away the craze for a disembodied life. (6) The objection is often urged that this conception of immortality and perfectibility of the human race forgets the claims of personality on which morality is based and that every self-conscious individual is an end-in-himself and can never be used as a means. Far be it from me to deny that *within certain limits* we are ends-in-ourselves. Even plants and animals have certain amounts of self-sufficiency. But it is no more legitimate for a man to regard himself as the absolute end of the universe than for a child to grumble that he has not the perfection of an adult. Individuals in each generation receive their due share of recognition in this life and no more. The sweeper in the street is no less an end-in-himself than the Prime Minister of England, and yet one is relatively more a means than the other. Again civilised men have a greater mastery over natural forces than the savage races, who are rather playthings in the hands of climatic and geographical conditions. The conception of end-in-himself is therefore only an ideal conception to which we approximate according to our moral and intellectual power. The Englishman of the 40th century will be an end-in-himself in a higher sense than the Englishman of the 20th century. (7) The whole argument we are criticising rests on a false conception of self-hood. It is our over-much concentration on the

finite self as attached to a physical organism that leads us to ignore that the universal and infinite self which we want to realise through endless progress is not an individual possession of our own, nor of any of us, but a life which comprehends us all and which abides for ever, while the finite individuals come and go. We forget that moral progress is nothing but a greater and greater identification of our narrow, personal selves with the larger and higher purposes of the whole, with the over-individual ends and values as embodied in the family, the society, the state, the Church, and so on. It is when we realise our unity and identity with this Infinite and Universal self that we find the stability and security of an immortal life here and now, in which, as John Caird [1] says, "our aspirations are changed into fruitions, anticipations into realisations." When we thus partake of the Divine life by surrendering our soul to God, "the infinite ceases to be far off vision of spiritual attainment and becomes a reality." This is in accord with the experience of the religious people, whose one prayer is "Thy will be done, Thy Kingdom come," and not "Grant us an Immortal life."

We have still to notice a third type of the moral argument for immortality, *viz.*, the juridical or retributive argument. Martineau devotes a whole chapter entitled "Vaticinations of Conscience"[2] to the support of this reasoning. Sidgwick also finds it impossible to reconcile duty and happiness and to provide an adequate sanction for morality without a belief in the moral government of the universe, which involves according to his view the belief in the future life. Moreover, popular morality is largely influenced by this religious sanction. Now the

[1] Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion, p. 293.

[2] Study of Religion, Vol. II, Bk. IV, Ch. III.

inconsistency and inadequacy of this view will be apparent from the following considerations:—

(1) If every act of self-sacrifice secures a reward for the agent elsewhere, then it is falsely called self-sacrifice, and no credit can be attached to such an action. Morality then reduces itself to prudence. This conception of rewards and punishments moves in a Hedonistic plane and cuts both ways, for if the martyr renounces happiness on earth for enjoyment in Heaven, the sensualist may deny comfort in the other world for the sake of more certain and immediate pleasures of this life. If it be held that the rewards and punishments in a future life are *eternal* while the pleasures and pains of this life are temporal, I do not see how a *moral and just* government can allow such discrepancy between cause and effect and meet acts of self-indulgence and self-denial during finite time with tortures or pleasures that last for an infinite time.

(2) If conscious performances or shirkings of duties meet their compensations in a future life, it is reasonable to hold also that enjoyments and sorrows that befall our earthly lot with no fault of ours find their explanations in a previous birth and so on. The doctrine of transmigration has as much plausibility as the belief in eternal heaven and hell, in spite of heredity and evolution. If one objects to the former on the ground that as we have no memory of the acts of omission and commission in our previous life, we cannot rectify ourselves in the light of punishments now inflicted, I may reply that the objection applies inversely to the latter, for in the absence of an authoritative proclamation or publication of the divine code of law that prevails in the other world, how are we to anticipate and forecast the rewards and punishments that await us there, and how are we to modify our present conduct accordingly? Does not our

sense of justice demand that instead of a summary trial and conviction of the offenders behind the scene, an opportunity should be given to the injured party on earth to see how far the punishment is commensurate with the offence committed, and whether it has a moral or reformative effect on the wrong-doer ? In any case, whether we are reaping the fruits of what we have sowed in a past life or whether we are sowing the seed of what we shall reap in a future life, the dubious character of the court of justice beyond the arena of our present consciousness cannot have deterrent effects on the minds of enlightened people.

(3) If there is a higher court of law where all earthly wrongs are being redressed what is the need of all the administrative and judicial machinery in modern states ? Are we to conceive that with the establishment of order and peace, of justice and good government, in human society, the heavenly courts are finding less work to do and are confining themselves to cases of appeal or correction of earthly tribunals ? Surely the legal punishments, social blames and internal pangs of remorse meted out to a wrong-doer here on earth are themselves parts of the moral government of God, and there would be an over lapping of temporal and religious sanctions unless the extra mundane verdict is supposed to be modified according to the moral progress of the human race.

(4) It is difficult to imagine how a common system of penal laws can be applied to the departed spirits of various ages or various races, as no two ages or peoples have the same standard of moral judgment and the same notion of justice. What is crime in a civilised society is a custom with the force of law in primitive races, and judged by the absolute ideal of justice and goodness, all the nations of earth may be equally condemned. Even

the life of a single individual may be a complex mixture of various good and evil thoughts and actions. Instead of one heaven and one hell, then, we require an infinite variety of intermediate stations to accommodate the various grades of conduct in various ages and races, which involves either an eternal cycle of existence for every soul or a duplicate of our earth with the condition of every individual inverted. With such a prospect before us, we may as well choose to eat, drink and be merry during the three-score years and ten granted to our mortal frame and reserve all the penances and virtuous practices for another world.

(5) The root-error of a demand for future life lies in (*i*) taking a false standard of value for measuring the rewards of duty and punishments of wrong-doing and in (*ii*) identifying the true self of man with his individual personality.

(*i*) It is forgotten that "blessedness is not the reward of virtue but virtue itself"; that heaven and hell are not outside us but within our heart; that what we gain by duty is the pure joy of service to the common good combined with an increased capacity for self-manifestation; that what we lose by self-indulgence is just the higher and nobler pleasures of a rational life; and that the wrong-doer who escapes legal and social punishments and is also at ease with his conscience is nearer the level of animal life, and the fact that he is not conscious of his degradation is itself a sufficient punishment. (*ii*) It is forgotten that the self which is sacrificed in duty is just the lower and the sensual self, attached to the material framework we call 'body,' and that the expectation of a life beyond to enjoy the reward of virtuous self-denial is itself a craving of the bodily self and should be sacrificed on the altar of the moral ideal. The "spirit which we ourselves 'are" and not

our spirit, has an immortal life and is enriched by our self-sacrifice. "The personal self-conscious being which comes from God" is indeed "for ever contained in God," but not *qua* personal. I am immortal because the good with which I identify myself, the over-individual ends and values, in which my rational and universal self finds its embodiment, are immortal. In a word, it is God living in man that is immortal and not the human personality conceived abstractly as having a separate existence after death, which is an illusion.

The only significance I can attach to the conception of immortality is by viewing it after the fashion of the indestructibility of matter and conservation of energy in the physical world. We find an infinite capacity for good and evil in each of us, and all our thoughts and actions lead to an interminable series of consequences affecting our own lives as well as the life of humanity as a whole, just as the fate of a grain of sand on the sea-beach, to quote Fichte's example, is linked with the life and death of innumerable individuals of succeeding generations. This law of Karma, giving an eternal significance to every word and deed and thought of ours, fills us with awe and arouses our sense of responsibility. Morality postulates that the noble aims and aspirations however secretly cherished in our heart, and however unrealised in our present life, will yet live after us and increase the sum-total of spiritual energy in the universe, while our evil thoughts and desires will either destroy one another in the long run or be transformed into means for the good and lose their vicious influence. This is a faith which is guaranteed by the postulate of God.

The Existence of God.

With regard to the Kantian postulate of God, and the mode of its formulation I would raise the following difficulties.

(1) Admitting that morality is worthiness to be happy and admitting also that Kant was not inconsistent in eschewing all material principles of the determination of will from the moral law, and yet making happiness an element in the *summum bonum* or perfect good in a possible world, I cannot agree with Kant that the happiness which a moral agent deserves need be one of sensuous feeling and not the *intellectual contentment* with one's own person, which results from the consciousness of following the moral law independently of inclination, *i.e.*, from the exercise of freedom which Kant himself admitted to be analogous to the *bliss* or self-sufficiency of the Supreme Being.[1] Kant refuses to call it happiness on the plea that it does not depend on the positive concurrence of a feeling, so that he might invoke a *Deus ex Machina* to reconcile the super-sensible law of morality with the sensible feeling of happiness.

(2) Can we not regard the constant cheerfulness of mind resulting from the most disinterested practice of good as itself a proof of the connection between morality and happiness, just as we infer the reality of freedom from the effect it produces in the sensible world?

(3) If the happiness required by the *summum bonum* is to follow upon the inner determination of the will of a rational being by the moral law, irrespective of its realisation in a sensible world, it stands on the same footing with freedom and no more requires the postulate of God than does the latter; if on the other hand, it is

[1] Abbott, p. 215.

the realisation of the moral law or the execution of the good-will that deserves happiness, then since both the action and the resulting happiness take place *in time* and are events in the phenomenal world, their connection as cause and effect does not require for its explanation an external agency but only the general laws of nature.

(4) As Caird says, if the realisation of the good involves the production of an outward order of things in which happiness goes with goodness then the principle that obligation implies possibility or that "I can because I ought" seems to involve that the individual by his will can produce such an order and not merely that he has right to postulate God as a power that produces it.

(5) If there is an impassable gulf between the Kingdom of nature and the Kingdom of ends, how are we to conceive God as mediating between the two? If it is through mechanical laws, so that in virtue of the original motion imparted by Him, each act of duty is finding its corresponding happiness in exact proportion, then we have no more right to conclude from such a connection to an Intelligent Author, than from the law of Causation in nature. If, however, the connection is made through divine intervention at each particular instance, we are led to all the difficulties to which the Cartesian Doctrine of Occasionalism gave rise.

(6) If God is the sole dispenser of happiness in exact proportion to morality, how would Kant explain the seeming moral anomalies of injustice triumphant, innocence convicted, selfishness prosperous, and righteousness persecuted? How would he meet the difficulties of Mill and Leslie Stephen that God would not allow moral evils in the world, if He were both omnipotent and all good?

(7) If *existence* cannot be logically *inferred* by theoretical reason, neither can it be *given* by practical reason.

in realising moral ideals, we no doubt give objectivity to an idea, but God's existence is not of *our making* in that sense. Yet Kant seems to hold such a view, when he says reason can attain knowledge of the existence of God by "starting from the supreme principle of its pure practical use (which in every case is directed simply to the *existence* of something as a consequence of reason) and thus determining its object."[1]

(8) If we cannot infer an all-wise, all-good, all-powerful Author from the order and design of the small part of the world we know, is not the assumption of all possible perfection on the part of God, because "he must know my conduct up to the inmost root of my mental states in all possible cases and into all future times and because he can allot to it its fitting consequences," an equally illogical inference? For, how are we to ascribe to the God of morality the authorship of beauty and wisdom and order manifested in the inorganic and organic realms of nature?

Moreover, Kant was mistaken in thinking that the teleological argument need point to more than a wise, good and powerful Author as the cause of order and design in nature and in ignoring that whether such an Author also possesses wisdom, goodness and power in their infinity may be left to the ontological argument or to the cumulative weight of all the theological arguments. Kant himself seems to favour the main principle underlying the "argument from design" when he speaks of the feelings of admiration and gratitude evoked by the contemplation of beauty, of obligation attached to dictates of conscience, of respect and humiliation in the presence of the moral law, as pointing unmistakably to a being to whom the said gratitude, obligation and respect are due.[2]

[1] Abbott, p. 237.

[2] Critique of Judgment, p. 375.

Again, if the impossibility of conceiving the exact correspondence between morality and happiness in the way of a mere course of nature is not intrinsic and objective, but merely subjective, *i.e.*, impossible for *our reason* to conceive, and yet if our reason chooses[1] to assume a wise Author of the world as the ground of this connection, may we not extend the same right to our reason in respect of the order and beauty in nature? There, too, we cannot conceive how mere mechanical laws of nature could produce such sublime and beautiful forms. On these grounds, we are bound to reject Kant's claim that the notion of God belongs exclusively to *Morals*.[2]

(9) In connection with the freedom of will, Kant himself raises the difficulty of reconciling it with God's creation. Since God as Universal First Cause is also the cause of the existence of substance, it seems that a man's actions have their determining principle in something which is wholly out of his power, *viz.*, in the Causality of the Supreme Being.[3] Kant solves the difficulty by means of his distinction between the thing-in-itself and phenomenon. Since the existence *in time* is a mere sensible mode of representation belonging to thinking beings in the world and consequently does not apply to them as things-in-themselves, and since the notion of creation can only have reference to what is noumenal and not to empirical causality, we cannot say that God as Creator is the cause of actions in the world of sense, which are appearances, although He is the cause of the existence of acting beings. Now if freedom is a kind of causality which we possess as things-in-ourselves, and if it is exercised equally in our moral and immoral actions, I do not see how God's responsibility for our evil actions can be avoided. If, on the other hand, freedom is

[1] Abbott, pp. 343-4. [2] Abbott, p. 236. [3] Abbott, pp. 194.

only exercised when we act in conformity to the law of reason, then since God is the cause of our existence as things-in-ourselves, and since we as the noumena are the authors of our moral actions, God is the ultimate cause of all good deeds and forfeits all our merits, while we are responsible for our immoral acts. Kant then takes away all merit and praise from human actions and leaves only stings of conscience and punishments for our trespasses.

(10) Kant offers us another form of the moral proof of God from the nature of conscience, which he defines as the consciousness of an internal *tribunal* in man (before which "his thoughts accuse or excuse one another"). Since in all duties the conscience of the man must regard *another* than himself as the judge of his actions, if it is to avoid self-contradiction and since this other must be one who knows the heart and in respect of whom all duties are to be regarded as commands, and since he must possess all power to give effect to his commands, this moral being is God and conscience must be conceived as the subjective principle of a responsibility for one's deeds before God.[1]

But how are we to reconcile this view with the autonomy of will which according to Kant is "the sole principle of all moral laws and of all duties which conform to them?"

If the will of every rational being is a universally legislative will, if it is subject to the law only as itself giving the law, how are we to regard duties as commands of a Supreme Being who is *primâ facie* external to and different from us? After enunciating the freedom and autonomy of will as the condition of morality, it is impossible for Kant to escape the necessary corollary

[1] Abbott, pp. 321-22.

that the noumenal self which is the bearer of the moral law is one and the same for all rational beings, and that it is only in so far as we are *subjects* of the moral law, living in the empirical world with our personal idiosyncrasies and our private ends, that we have a separate, finite and mortal existence. From this point of view I may regard the command revealed through conscience as the dictate of my higher and truer self, *i.e.*, of my universal self as it is in reason, which is all that we really mean by God. The moral ideal would then be a revelation of one infinite and eternal spirit as the source of all goodness, and our sense of imperfection but a shadow cast on our finite consciousness by the light of Holiness within each of us. Such a conception of God would be more in agreement with the moral consciousness of mankind. But Kant's Christian conscience and craving for personal immortality perhaps prevented him from following this line of thought.

(11) In the concluding chapter of the Dialectic of Practical Reason Kant says that "if we could prove God and eternity to be perfectly certain they would stand unceasingly before our eyes with their awful majesty," acts would be done out of fear and not from respect for the law, our conduct would be changed into mere mechanism as in a puppet show where everything would gesticulate, but there would be no life, and he thanks the "unsearchable wisdom by which we exist" for what it has denied no less than for what it has granted.[1] This is not only a libel upon the religious consciousness of man, which gives us inward assurance of the reality of God, but it is contrary to the facts of history. The greatest moral reformers have also been the staunchest believers in God, and

[1] Abbott, pp. 245-6.

the highest spiritual geniuses of the world have never suffered in their moral life because of their feeling the presence of God in their hearts. It is only the pure in heart that *see* God, and it is only the seers of God that can say "I and my Father are one." If scepticism is one secure basis for moral perfection Kant ought to have stopped his philosophising with the Critique of Pure Reason and need not have taken the trouble of supplying us with definite knowledge of God, immortality and freedom as postulates of Practical Reason. The truth is that we can no more derive our knowledge of the *existence* of God from Ethics, than we can derive the distinction between right and wrong from Æsthetics. The consciousness of an infinite and eternal spirit in which we live, move and have our being is as much a fundamental and ultimate fact of human nature as the moral or æsthetic consciousness. We cannot convince one who is naturally defective in sensibility to spiritual realities, of the existence of God, without the aid of special training, just as we cannot prove the beauty of sun-set to one who is devoid of æsthetic apprehension. It is because we bear the stamp of our origin in our spiritual nature that we have a longing for God and know Him to be the author of nature and the embodiment of moral perfection, and not because our conception of the *summum bonum* requires us to postulate God as the mediating link between morality and proportionate happiness.

To sum up, the postulate of God, as presented by Kant, seems to me at once unnecessary and inadequate; (*i*) It is unnecessary because (*a*) the relation between virtue and happiness as a fact is as much amenable to empirical verification and explicable by natural laws as is the relation between mind and body; (*b*) their exact correspondence in a possible world is only an ideal to be

aimed at and to be realised by our own moral endeavours; (*c*) the ancient thinkers showed by an analysis of the actual conditions of society and the nature of morality that the good man is also on the whole the happy man.

(*ii*) It is inadequate because (*a*) a God whose main function is to distribute happiness in proportion to morality cannot fulfil the demands of the religious consciousness and cannot therefore be an object of adoration; (*b*) the autonomous character of the moral law cannot be reconciled with the conception of duties as divine commands, and (*c*) to derive the reality of God from our moral consciousness is to deny the ultimate and independent validity of the religious life and experience.

I conclude by indicating the conception of the moral order and of the nature of God, which, as it seems to me, can serve as the indispensable minimum of accord between morality and religion.

Just as all our scientific and intellectual activities rest upon the belief that the universe is intelligible or is rationally constituted, so our moral life is ultimately based on the faith in the moral constitution of the world, and the science of ethics is impossible without the presupposition that this moral order is also a rational order. This faith is rational in as much as our daily experience and reflective judgment confirm rather than contradict it.

Just as we are bound to recognise the immutable and inviolable character of the laws of nature, even though we may not look behind these laws for an Author of nature, so we are bound to admit that we cannot violate the moral law and disregard the moral ideal with impunity, though we may not readily admit that there is a moral Governor and Just Being at the centre of the Universe. What prevents us from recognising the similarity between natural and moral laws as

regards the consequences that follow upon breaches of them is the fact that in the one case the result is palpable, being physical and mental, and in the other it is moral and spiritual. From this point of view we may formulate the categorical Imperative of Morality in a hypothetical form and say "Thou must act thus if thou art to escape moral and spiritual loss or if thou art to gain the vision of a higher self and a higher world." This loss or gain is not confined to the life of the individual moral agent, but affects the life of his immediate friends, relations and descendants as well as the society to which he belongs. Nay, the loss suffered by a violation of the moral law on the part of a single individual is shared by the whole of humanity; and similarly my self-devotion to an ideal enriches the spiritual world as a whole. There is one standard by which we can measure such losses and gains in the moral order and that is the freedom of the spirit from the bondage of matter, the freedom of insight into the super-sensible sphere of ideal truth and beauty and goodness, freedom of artistic creation, of scientific invention and discovery, of initiating and executing social reforms and moral progress, of subjugating the forces of nature within and without—in short, the freedom of intellectual intuition and pure spiritual activity. I think the study of history and anthropology as well as the living experience of all moral beings will bear out this contention and enable us some day to construct an exact moral calculus showing the amount and the kind of freedom that we lose or gain by each moral or immoral action. The rational sanction for morality is thus secured.

Again, the moral order is not a statical, but a dynamical order, a living, growing spiritual organism to which all men belong as members participating in its life and growth. The moral organism is moving towards an end,

which may be meanwhile described as *perfection* including comprehensiveness of range and the internal coherence of all experiences. Only those members or types which contribute towards that end can thrive or prosper morally and spiritually, while those who hamper its progress must be put aside or become extinct.

Now the conception we have just indicated points to the reality of a spiritual order and to the principle that "morality is in the hearts of things," but it also accords with the demands of religion and with the conception of God as the ultimate reality. For (1) the moral law implies a source that must be perfect and holy and yet not a foreign or external authority, but the immanent self or transcendent continuation of our own spiritual consciousness. In other words, the moral law is of our own giving only because we are from God, in God and through God. (2) The moral ideal, if it is not a mere abstraction derived from generalising our desirable ends, is itself the revelation of a higher spirit which is immanent in ourselves. In other words, we have an inner conviction that the *Ideal* is also the Real and that it is because there *is* an embodiment of the moral ideal, which religion calls God that we have a guarantee for its realisation on earth. (3) Though God is infinite, eternal and perfect, and though we partake in the divine attributes in so far as we identify ourselves with His life, yet the conception of the moral order as a process towards the Kingdom of God saves us from quietism and favours a mode of spiritual activism, for we have to realise the supersensible beauty and goodness of God in the sensible world of space and time, or rather God is to manifest himself in the life of finite individuals, or in the Kingdom of Heaven, and that through our moral endeavours. We may thus say with Hegel that "God is the eternal reality of which the world is a temporal expression," and

yet maintain without contradiction that "God never is but is yet to be." This conception also enables me to identify the "Absolute" of metaphysics with the "God" of religion.[1]

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[1] This paper was accepted as a Thesis for the M.A. Degree by the University of London.

Teachings of Upanisads

BY

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I. Mándukya.

The seer of the Mandukya has his inner consciousness withdrawn from the partial vision of his sense-casing which distorts the oneness of existence and holds up a scene of division with its duality of subjective and objective orders, with its conflict of opposing forces—Man and Nature, with its eternal flux of existences, creating discord and breaking up the harmony of the life universal. The saintly spirit has at once transcended the world of actualities, the order of relative values arranged in a graduated hierarchy with the promise and potentialities of bliss—gross and fine, sensuous and mental in its constituent progressive stages. The inner vision here is deep enough to penetrate through the coverings of the physical, vital and mental sheaths of the individual ego and to take its start at once from a level whence Existence is felt and grasped as an all-pervasive Oneness. The synthetic response of devotional life, the analytic penetration of *yogic* mentality are both discarded; life is seen immediately in its impersonal immanence and transcendence. The heart of the saint has drunk deep in the depth of Existence spreading all round, his vision has attained a wide extension; he feels the One Life, the One Joy in its impartial universality and widest commonalty.

From this height of consciousness, in the light of intellectual Intuition the commonly accepted division of the co-existent personalities of the Cosmic and individual beings is vanquished; the angle of vision, the perspective of life is changed from the multiple existence and fixed in the Oneness of Being. This is the secret of the grandeur and sublimity of the Mandukya; it strikes the deepest chord in human nature and sets it in vibration widening up the intellectual vision with the promise of life eternal. The glory of the conception lies in seeing through the manifold differences and discovering the life supporting them in Existence. In the light of the ever-permanent impersonal background, the modes of finite and limited existence are lost sight of; the widest expansion of our spiritual being dawns upon the vision. The subconscient experience of an automatic display of uncontrolled forces, the synthetic unity of self-conscious life with its ideational promptings are withdrawn from the scene of the superconscient existence whence the illusoriness of the empirical manifold is made clearly manifest. The identity of apperception, the pivot of the Upanishadic culture, runs through every passage and the Identity has been sought to be established in all grades of conscious life. The Mandukya sounds an extremely rationalistic note in accepting existence to be chiefly consciousness. The highest concept of Being is the concept of a static consciousness; the concept of bliss is not here fully developed, although it is implicitly implied in the notion of consciousness and perfection of existence, for Bliss is the Soul of perfection. The express identification of Existence with Bliss of the Taittiriya Upanishat is evidently not present here, though the Absolute Life has been shown to be permeating through all grades of experiences in unchangeable and unchanged existence. The Identity of Consciousness is immanent in all stages of life; it is the cosmic waking consciousness, the

cosmic dream consciousness, the cosmic sleep consciousness. The transcendent Oneness of Being, in itself an impersonal Identity, acquires a personal character in relation to *Avidya* as the all-comprehensive totality of Being conscious of the cosmic Existence in its gross, fine and causal aspects. The budding sense of a Cosmic I on the background of an unruffled homogeneity of consciousness is the natural consequence of the association of an innate ignorance with the Ether of consciousness.

This personal consciousness acquires a different nomenclature in as much as it is aware of the outer or objective world in waking consciousness, the inner or the subjective world in dream consciousness or transcends them both in the silence of deep sleep. When it is conscious of the sense-conditioned Existence, it is called *Bahiprajna;* the awareness of the objective universe. Its range of Being is diffusive over all things and spreads in all directions of the Cosmos in its gross aspect. It is an expansive consciousness including within its range and apparently identified with, the physical and mental existences; the world of thought concrete and universal; the universe of Karma in its causal and effectual aspects. It is the Cosmic Life holding up before us in its purely objective character inclusive of the outer world of Nature—animate and inanimate,—the inner world of mind in its self-conscious thinking and willing. The vision of conscious life is still widened when it is felt to be immanent in the purely subjective experiences of dream consciousness and the spontaneous groupings in subjective consciousness. It has in this association the name of the innerscient—*antahprajna.* Its range of existence is also vast, for the subjective order is full of potential promptings, implicit feelings, undeveloped cognitions, vast possibilities of the finer existence. The mental life is here detached from the sense and free from the limitation of objective consciousness. The rigid

determination of the sense life disappears in the creative spontaneity of the subjective mental life where an ease of unrestrained movement and an expansion of finer self are felt and experienced. Still in this height of existence, life is full of richness in variety of scenes, and like waking-consciousness, it is not isolated from the moments that go to fill up the thread of conscious life. The dynamic conception of life with its ceaseless becoming is brought home to us in, and is native with, the waking and the dream consciousness. But the seer has his penetrative vision extended to the very inmost core and deepest base of conscious life in waking and in dream and has the unfailing cognisance of the unchanging consciousness immanent in the apparently changing conscious life. But as soon as the conscious life passes into the oblivion of deep slumber a change is at once felt ; a temporary quiescence, an occasional restfulness, with a positive feeling of a blank negation of the bits or the moments of consciousness which make up the history and constitute the life of subjective and objective experiences, is within the range of direct apprehension and immediate knowledge. A unique experience of calmness and tranquil joy due to an expansive vision of conscious bliss, only made possible by the temporary cessation of the stirrings, either spontaneous or volitional, of the practical reason to assert the personal existence, to realise its claim, to develop its destiny through a ceaseless conflict with other forces playing around, is within the native claims of every individual; an experience brought home to us automatically, offering to every one of us an occasion to understand the basic principle of consciousness on which the films of experience make their successive appearance and disappearance. But human ignorance is still active and even in this stage the transcendent oneness of conscious existence is not in the field of direct vision. Attention is

diffusive in deep sleep, our mental being with its duality of subjective and objective orders falls unconscious; nothing remains but the primal ignorance with the eternal light of consciousness in the background to express its existence. The conception of static being is in sight, though to feel the consciousness and blissfulness of such existence, the necessity of finally dispensing with the thin layer of primal ignorance is necessary. The stirring of a divided life has no doubt been hushed up in the silence of deep sleep; still we require to feel this silence to be not only a temporary and partial calm enshrouded in the coverings of ignorance but to be the silence of transcendent consciousness with an all-expansive blissfulness of existence, where the scene of empiric life with all its details completely vanishes before the light of supreme consciousness of purity, integrity and identity of Being.

A systematic philosophy based upon cogent logic cannot be expected here. In days of yore, the truth of Being was not sought to be perceived by philosophical speculation, void of practical discipline. It was naturally sought in mystic sublimation, in the heights of intuitive consciousness which can hardly be ignored in our task of directly entering into the Realm of Silence and Eternal Calm. Consequently the Mandukya strikes us as containing the simple philosophic truth of Identity with the methodical statement of gradual stages of actualisation in the opening up of the transcendent vision.

The preliminary discipline of moral and intellectual culture is necessarily presupposed in the life aspiring after spiritual unfoldment. The lower nature of animal or organic being must give way to higher moral culture preparing one for cultivating and developing the life of the spirit within. But the moral life, the forerunner of spiritual consciousness, paves the foundation of a harmony between nature and man and gradually apportions to man

the power to control the dominant influence of nature upon him. It helps him to establish a mastery over natural cravings in the beginning by a hard struggling opposition, but in the long run by striking the deeper chord of inner sympathy, love and chastity—love that unifies, chastity that edifies,—the chord that binds man and nature in unison making the way for harmony in place of apparent discord.

With this adaptation of our moral being, with this deep-wrought harmony between the impulsive and the thoughtful nature, with a full surrender of will to the dictates of reason, the individual entity acquires a fitness and a qualification to strike the innermost chord of its being, which can reveal to him the supreme truth and bring to him the meaning and significance of the consciousness of Identity. To this end the seer has inculcated the importance and usefulness of meditating upon the mystic symbol *Om*. To the seers of the Upanishads this symbol was the key to the hidden innermost secrets of life and knowledge, to the breaking of bonds put on by an innate ignorance—the chord of *jivatwa*, the triple chains of creation, preservation and destruction, fastening us to the cosmic wheel, making us a prey to the vagaries of nature. The direct method of shaking off the gilded fetters of the consciousness of individuality is chiefly analytical penetration into the essence of our being, based upon the process of critical reflection and discriminative consciousness, from *vicara* to *viveka*. This method is more philosophic in nature based as it is upon critical discourse and sustained reflection. Many Upanishads have fully developed the process to a clear method. But the Mandukya has not made a special reference to this customary philosophic course of culture but has adopted in its place a mystical one to fathom the fathomless, to immerge in the boundless Existence. The method here

is to set up a harmony in place of mental distraction caused by the obstructive and restless surrounding, to strike the innermost chords of our mental being, widening up the range of inner vision, paving the way for the realisation of a greater and fuller life. A deep-wrought harmony, aptly called the music of life, at once puts its hand upon the secret key to the gate of the kingdom of light, manifesting before view the sublimity of every step in the way of approximating the Eternal Truth. The means of setting up such a harmony and of bringing the entire being of ours in tune with the Infinite life is the symbol *OM*. It is full of magnificent possibilities as an instrument to stimulate the drooping spirituality. The mighty potentialities of life are brought out in fullness, to pass through all the phases of conscious existence. The panorama of life with its scenic beauties and its sublime depths hidden from our view in the sense-level of existence is laid open to us and we pass through all the aspects of conscious life in Immanence to the silence of Transcendence at last.

The Sruti assures us that the first syllable brings to our inner vision the immanence of consciousness in waking, the witness of every phenomenal grouping. The veil of ignorance holding up the I as an energising principle reaping the fruits of its own deeds is thrown off; the I appears in mystic vision, thus reared up, as the witness of all events and doings in its majestic isolation.

But the spiritual consciousness thus developed is not the *asmita* of the Sankhya philosophy, the basic principle of the egoistic consciousness, energising the creature's working in conscious and vital planes. It is not the logical ego of Kant, the integrating principle for which any objective existence cannot be vouchsafed. It is the transcendent Existence expressing the endless groupings of phenomenal being, not yet felt in transcendent isolation

for the vibrative force set up by the syllable has not attained the sufficient intensity to put off the sense of limitation by the withdrawal of the veil of ignorance. Still it lands us in a shore where we have a clear cognition of the oneness of Being immanent in waking experience. The vibrative force chastens the mental consciousness, draws it out from the lower order to higher order of nature's operation in us to enable us to reach a climax in intellectual vision and to feel the truth of Identity-consciousness in waking experience. With the intensity of vibrative force still increased, the vision is enlarged, and extended to dream consciousness, to the working of mental life in its subjective aspect freed from the limitation of sense operation letting open to us a wider vision of archetypal existence; but still the vision here is not confined to the rhythm and beauty of the inner world of mind, but at once is directed to the self-same isolated consciousness. With the vibrative force still more intensified the inner harmony is so deeply established as to be able to transcend the phenomenal continuum, at first in an experience like sleep consciousness, wherein consciousness is felt freed from association of empiric life, though in a nebulous atmosphere of a blank and unspecialised negation and later on in the depth of *Turiya*, where the intellectual penetration is deep enough to transcend the bound and the operation of native ignorance. The vibrative force which was so long active, gradually dies away, after enlarging the scope of mystic vision, successfully removing the limitation of individualised existence. The process of realisation here is exclusively psychological, consisting as it is, in unfolding the mysteries of wider conscious life encompassing the pragmatic I and in establishing the sense of a cosmic I embracing the totality of existence in its subjective and objective aspects. But the acme or the culmination in the

process is not reached unless the sense of an I retaining a personality in association with native ignorance is set aside in the last stage of supreme fulfilment wherein the sense of an all-embracing existence vanishes in the silence of static consciousness. In the triple states of existence—waking, dream-sleep, deep-sleep—the static consciousness was in clear sight as the witnessing intelligence, although not so clearly felt in dissociation from conscious experiences. The sense of an I in its intellectual isolation and purity was still there, but in the height of Turiya, it is felt in clear transcendence as the one undivided static consciousness of existence.

II. Isa.

The seer of the Isa has the veil of ignorance, primary and secondary, withdrawn from his view which can now command a vision immediately expressive of the truth of Existence in its transcendent and immanent being helping the regulation of life's adaptation in the light of the mystic sublimation thus attained. The vision is exhaustively penetrating into the mysteries of life in its operation on a natural and a super-natural plane and the injunction comes forth with the sublime simplicity of a truth-seer to regulate life in a way which can help it to transcend nature's working and finally to feel the pulse of immortal bliss. The seer at once infuses in us the spirit of apprehending and grasping existence as enveloped in the all-pervading spiritual consciousness, thus transforming our mental vision from its accustomed trait of reading facts in their isolation and in their bare nakedness into its deeper nature of synthetic vision and sympathetic understanding. The intellectual sympathy with the deep mysteries of existence is sought to be established in the seeker's consciousness, not in a hot haste which a psychological revelation, by nature, denies, but by gradually opening up the esoteric vision through all phases of life in its mundane and super-mundane aspects. The seeker has been with his imperfect and undeveloped spirituality first introduced into the world of Karma with its promise of continuity in organic being; but the attraction of the seeker for this sphere of life is soon disturbed by showing the enshrouded darkness of ignorance obtaining therein. But the seer is careful enough to present before the seeker the truth and the hold of Karma in the continuity of our physical existence as the foundation of a higher structure in wisdom and inspiration—a Karma which does not express itself in the multiplication of desires naturally involving us in the

world of complex relation, the order of pragmatic values which is to be scrupulously shunned in order to acquire a fitness, and an adaptability for developing the capacity of inner mystic vision, but is one that has a graceful touch in surrendering its purposeful initiation and in satisfying itself with what is ordained for it in the course of a struggling existence and in accepting it with the spirit of humility and thankfulness consistent with the ungrudging life of the seeker after truth. The unceasing conflict between man and society and man and nature frequently felt in keeping up an existence in the light of the above vision resolves itself into the activity of love and grace establishing a harmony between man and nature which paves the way for opening up the hidden secret of a deeper consciousness. The apparently dominant influence of nature upon man, the majestic sublimity which nature presents before him, fails not to awaken in him the reflex tendency of accepting nature as the idol of worship which is falsely supposed to be potentially competent to fulfil the demands of human existence and eventually to give it last ing satisfaction and highest consummation. The veil of limitation which confines the psychic vision to the bounds of objective consciousness is sought to be lifted up at first in setting up a more extensive vision by withdrawing the mental consciousness from its habitual accommodation and establishing a higher vibrating modification in it in the course of performance of sacrifices, apparently having no significance, but on a deeper insight, manifesting clearly a finer transformation of mental being expressing the truth and the reality of an order of existence otherwise inaccessible to the plain and common understanding. The seeker soon discovers this plane to be full of ignorance, impotent to give enduring satisfaction; the sense of limitation still persisting in consciousness soon breaks the spell of attraction and retards the vision of the seeker who now attempts

to have a penetration into the still deeper planes of existence. With his inner powers more developed and acutely searching, with psychic vision still enlarged and wider in its capacity, the seeker has the world of Devas open unto him with its wondrous and joyous splendours, but this also fails in no time for the bliss it affords and the vision it commands are not deep nor extensive enough to keep long engaged the enraptured consciousness, which still keenly feels the sense of a divided and limited being and the deep yearning and active instinct for an undivided existence soon break the spell and the attraction of the deific consciousness. Unsatisfied with this opening and revelation, the seeker pursues the search in a still deeper level of existence bringing into the range of direct vision the one life pervading the world of effectual realization —the life that sustains the collective effects, generally designated, the world of phenomenal being in its manifested aspect. The adept has now a vision pervasive of the phenomenal order enabling him to penetrate into ectypes of existences in the manifested logos and to feel the uncommon beauty prevailing in this plane of existence. The seer promises the growth and development of wonderful powers of mental being which now has the fineness to grasp the extensiveness of this manifested totality. The psychic vision thus developed can now go deeper still by crossing this plane of existence into the mysteries of causal archtypes, the realm of *Prakriti*, with a peculiar sweetness and satisfaction strong enough to attract the struggling soul which for the moment may mistake the sudden and unexpected calmness it feels, to be the transcendent quiescence. The music and harmony of so deep an existence carry the possibility of alluring the seeker and of lulling him as it were into a *Yogic* sleep—*Prakritilaya*,–rare in its extraordinary tranquillity and soothing restfulness. The seeker has his being so much fine and psychically

developed that the ordinary limitation of a personal existence no longer distorts his vision; his inner consciousness has now the capacity of seeing the causal links which chain up the phenomenal order in their true significance and proper value, so that the attraction which binds the seeker to the lower plane of effectual existence in thought, love and action soon vanishes and the seeker becomes absorbed in the depth and sublimity of the life's source whence currents of sweetness and delight flow, flushes of intelligence and wisdom shoot forth, keeping the lower plane of existence ever fresh in life, ever attractive in beauty, ever mysterious and wonderful to intellectual understanding.

If this allurement can be got over, by rigorous self-control backed by a dis-illusionising vision laying bare its true nature and proper value, the seeker feels no difficulty in crossing the bounds of *Prakriti* with the never-failing cognisance of himself, as no longer a person but as one that is identical with the spiritual consciousness enlightening the whole existence. And in this height of Existence, the dividing line between man and nature fades away, the whole truth of the Identity of consciousness becomes revealed, the seeker attains the vision of a seer which is fixed in the centre of cosmic being, where the vastness of existence, with its internal depths and external varieties gradually vanishes. With the intensity of reflective meditation, the Truth of Existence which for a moment before, in obscure vision, appeared as moving and distant, is perceived to be constant and unchanging. The habitual construction of an universe of space and time no longer holds its own with the intuitive realisation of the transcendent Existence, which has the direct effect of sweeping away the pleasures and pains of a limited being and transforming our moral consciousness from an egoistic outlook to an altruistic embrace. This altruistic expansion

may constrain us to action in the lower plane of existence; in the higher it remains content with a mood of universal love in so far as the sympathetic chord is modified by the touch of wisdom; to be finally passed over into a state where all pulsation of life due to attachment with its consequent anxieties is stopped in the stillness of a transcendent calm.

Two Ancient Schools of the Vedanta

BY

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The Sūtras of Bādarāyana contain the quintessence of the Vedanta Philosophy. Different *Āchāryas* have interpreted these Sūtras in different ways and thus different schools have arisen out of these Sūtras. There is evidence to show that two of these schools at least have come to exist from ancient days. It is my object to place before the readers the evidence that we have on this point.

Among the existing commentaries on the Sūtras, Saṅkara's commentary is probably the oldest. Acharya Saṅkara has on several occasions referred to 'another' commentator and has at times quoted him. We learn from the *Tīkas* of Ānanda Giri and Govindānanda that this 'another' is none else than the *Vrittikāra*. It is clear from the writers of the Visishtādvaita school noted below that this *Vrittikāra* is Bodhāyana. Saṅkara in his commentary to Sūtra I. 3. 19, alludes to 'other theorisers again, among them some of ours,' and in his commentary to Sūtra I. 1. 4, I. 2. 23, I. 4. 12, and IV. 3. 14, alludes to some commentators. Thus it is reasonable to hold that there were several commentators to the Brahma-sutras, one of whom was the *Vrittikāra*. Gauḍapāda who has been called an *Ācharya* having full knowledge of the tenets of the *sampradāya* has been mentioned twice in Saṅkara's

bhāshya. It is known from reliable sources that Gauḍapāda was the *paramaguru* of Saṅkara. The name of *Upavarsha* also occurs twice in the *bhāshya* and the epithet *Bhagavan* has invariably been conferred on him. Saṅkara has indeed referred to the ancient grammarian Pāniṇi in his *bhāshya* but he has nowhere distinguished him by any such qualifying word. In one place (commentary to Sūtra I. 3. 28) he quotes *Upavarsha*. In another place (commentary to Sūtra I. 3. 28) where Upavarsha has been cited he says in effect as there is no *Sūtra* on the first Pāda of the Purva-Mīmāṇsā as to the question of the soul as distinct from the body, Ācharya Sabara Svāmin's remarks on the same must be taken as connected with this Sūtra (Sūtra III. 3. 53), which has been framed by Bādarāyana to remove this blameable want, and for the very reason too *Bhagavān Upavarsha* in his commentary to the *First Tantra* (Purva Mīmāṇsā) states that he will treat of the soul in his commentary to the *Sārīraka* (Brahma-sūtras). It is clear from the words of Saṅkara as has rightly been pointed out by Professor Jacobi that prior to him the two *Mīmāṇsās* formed but parts of the same treatise *Mīmāṇsā* and that *Upavarsha* wrote commentaries on both the *Mīmāṇsās*, *pūrva* and *uttara*.[1] A passage cited by Rāmānuja in his commentary to Sūtra I. 1. 1 from the *Vritti* of Bodhāyana also supports the view that in ancient days both the *Mīmāṇsās* formed parts of the same work. On going through the commentary of Āchārya Sabara Svāmīn on the *Mīmāṇsā Darsana* referred to by Saṅkara we come across a long passage cited by the Āchārya from the *Vrittikāra* which begins, according to the Bibliotheca Indica edition of the *Mīmāṇsā* Darsana, after the words '**वृत्तिकारस्तु अन्यथेमं ग्रन्थं वर्णयांचकार,**' and ends

[1] *Vide* J.A.O.S., December, 1910.

on p. 18 with the line 6 from the top. But according to *Kumarila Bhatta* the quotation from the *Vrittikāra* ends on p. 8 of the same edition with the words '**एवा-समीचीनः प्रत्ययो नान्य इति ।**' Where the quotation ends does not concern us here, though we are more inclined to accept the view of Kumarila in preference to the editor of the Bibliotheca Indica edition which has been accepted by Professor Jacobi. It is evident from the words of Sabara Svāmin that the *Vrittikāra* had also a *Vritti* on the *Pūrva Mīmāṇsā*. Saṅkara in his commentary thus refers to one *Vrittikāra*. One *Vrittikāra* has also been identified by the teachers of the *Visishtādvaita* school with *Bhagavān Bodhāyana*—the founder of their school. It is very probable that the two *Vrittikāras* are the same person. To our mind Professor Jacobi has done a distinct service by pointing out for the first time that the *Vrittikāra* alluded to by *Sabara Svāmin* is the same as Bodhāyana and that Bodhāyana wrote *Vrittis* on both the *Mīmāṇsās* which were regarded as the same treatise in his time. It is further noticeable that *Sabara Svāmin* in his commentary calls *Upavarsha Bhagavān*, but no such qualifying word has been conferred on Pāṇini and Piṇgala, though they have also been cited by him.

Saṅkara in his introduction to his commentary of the Brihadāranyaka Upanishad (Kanva recension) calls his *bhāshya* thereto a "small treatise." Ānanda Giri in his *Tīkā* to the same adds by way of explanation that he calls his *bhāshya* a "small treatise" as compared with that of *Bhartriprapancha* who wrote an extensive *bhāshya* on the Mādhyandina recension of the same Upanishad which begins with the word '**इषा**,' whereas the Kāṇva recension upon which Saṅkara commented, begins with the words '**उषा वा अश्वस्य.**' Hence Saṅkara's commentary covers a field untrodden by that of Bhartriprapancha The Ācharya in his commentary to Brihadāranyaka V. i.

characterises Bhartriprapancha's theory as '*advaita-dvaita*'—at once one and dual and subjects it to criticism. Ācharya Saṅkara in his introductory notes to his *bhāshya* to the Chāndogya Upanishad calls his *bhāshya* a 'small treatise' as well. Āndanda Giri clears up the allusion by adding that he calls his own a 'small treatise' as compared with that of 'Draviḍācharya' who composed a voluminous commentary on the same. We learn from the teachers of the *Visishtādvaita* school that both Bhartriprapancha and Dramiḍācharya had commentaries on the Brahma-sūtras. Yāmunācharya—the *guru* of Rāmānujācharya in his well-known work 'Siddhi Traya' refers to a series of teachers who preceded him and composed commentaries on the *Brahma-sūtras*, They are the *Bhāshyakrit* (probably Dramiḍācharya), *Tanka*, *Bhartriprapancha*, *Bhartrimitra*, *Bhartrihari*, *Brahma-datta*, *Saṅkara*, *Srivatsānka-misra* and *Bhāskara*. Ācharya Rāmānuja in his well-known work '*Vedārtha-saṇgraha*' mentions the names of six ancient teachers, *viz.*—*Bhodhāyana*, *Tanka*, *Dramiḍa*, *Guhadeva*, *Kapardi*, and *Bhāruchi* who preceded him and claims them all as belonging to his own school. In the same work he cites the views of *Saṅkara*, *Bhāskara*, *and Yādavaprakāsa*, and controverts them. In the opening lines of his *Srībhāshya* to the *Brahma-sūtras*, Rāmānuja further notes that the ancient teachers such as Dramiḍāchārya and others abridged the extensive Vritti on the Brahma-sūtras composed by Bhagavān Bodhāyana, and that he himself explains the syntactical meanings of the *Sūtras* in accordance with their views.

Āchārya Rāmānuja both in his Vedārtha-saṅgraha and Srībhāshya has also quoted passages from the commentaries of Bodhāyana (Vrittikāra), Tanka (*Vākyakāra*) and Dramiḍāchārya (Bhāṣhyakāra). Srīnivāsadāsa in his *Yatīndra-mata-dīpikā* cites the names of the following

ancient Vedanta teachers: *Vyāsa*, *Bodhāyana*, *Guhadeva*, *Bhāruchi*, *Brahmānandī*, *Draviḍāchārya*, *Srī-Parankusanatha*, *Yāmunamuni*, and *Yatīsvara*.

From the above short review, it is clear to us that two principal schools at least arose out of the Brahma-sūtras —one *advaita* headed by *Upavarsha* for whom Saṅkara shows special reverence and invariably calls him *Bhagavān* and another Visishtādvaita school for whom Rāmānuja shows special reference and calls him *Bhagavān* as well. Gauḍapāda belongs to the former school, and *Tanka*, *Dramiḍāchārya*, *Guhadeva*, *Kapardi*, *Bhāruchi* and *Srī Vatsānka-misra* belong to the latter. As Sabara Svāmin also calls *Upavarsha Bhagavān*, he appears to be an ancient and revered teacher. The ancient commentator Sabara Svāmīn whose style closely resembles that of Pātaṇjali's Mahābhāshya, cannot be, according to Bühler's estimate, much later than the beginning of the Christian era. So *Upavarsha* must be far anterior to Sabara Svāmin. It is well known that the *Sphota-vāda* has been promulgated by Pānini, Pataṇjali, and other *Vaiyākaranas*. Saṅkara in his bhāshya to Sūtra I. 3. 28, opposes the same and cites the authority of the venerable *Upavarsha* apparently with the object of opposing the ancient grammarian Pāniṇi whose name stands connected with it. Saṅkara's statement in a way supports the traditional view about *Varsha*, *Upavarsha*, and *Pāniṇi* recorded in the *Kathā-sarit-sāgara*. The *Katha-sarit-sāgara* by Soma-deva a Kashmirian poet who composed his work about 1070 A.D., mentions the names of *Varsha*, *Upavarsha*, *Pāniṇi*, *Pantaṇjali*, and others. According to this work *Varsha* is the *guru* of Pāniṇi and *Upavarsha* is the brother of *Varsha*. Somadeva himself states that his work has been based upon the work—*Brihatkathā* and has in no way deviated from the original (*Brihatkathā*). The original *Brihat-kathā*, in the opinion

of Bühler, must go to the first or second century A.D. Hence it appears to us that the traditional opinion recorded in the *Kathā-sarit-sāgara* to the effect that *Varsha* and *Upavarsha* were the teachers of Pāṇini has come down to us from an ancient time, and when it is viewed in the light of Saṅkara's statement does not seem to be unfounded. For the reasons stated above we are inclined to view *Upavarsha* as a teacher and contemporary of Pāṇini. We are glad to note that Mahāmahopādhyaya Haraprosāda Sastri in his able article on "Two Eternal Cities in the Province of Behar and Orissa," has very recently held that the dates of *Pāṇini*, *Varsha* and *Upavarsha* must be earlier than 300 B.C., and thus his views are fairly in agreement with the conclusion we have come to above.[1]

Now about the date of Bodhāyana. As *Sabara Svāmin* refers in his *bhāshya* to the *Vrittikāra* who is none other than *Bodhāyana*, Bodhāyana must be earlier than Sabara. We have noted above that Rāmānuja calls him *Bhagavān* and places him at the head of the *Visishtādvaita* school. Now who is this *Vrittikāra Bodhāyana*? We know of one *Bodhāyana* also called *Baudhāyana* who is the reputed author of the Srauta-sūtras, Grihya-sūtras, and Dharma-sūtras. Is this Bodhāyana identical with the Vrittikāra Bodhāyana refered to by Rāmānuja? In the Bhāradvāja Grihya-sūtras (iii. 11), is given the following list of teachers to whom reverence is shown: *Vaisampāyana*, *Phalingu*, *Tittiri*, *Ukha*, *Ātreya*, the *Padakāra Kaundiṇya*, the *Vrittikāra Kānva Bodhāyana*, *Bharadvaja*, *the Sūtrakāra Āpastamba*, etc. In the Baudhāyana Grihya-sūtras, we find almost the same names,—*Phalingu*, *Tittiri*, *Ukha*, *Aukhya Ātreya*, *the Padakāra Kaundiṇya*, *the Vrittikāra Kanva Baudhāyana*,

[1] Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society. Vol. VI. Part I.

the Pravachana-kāra Āpastamba, etc. Bühler holds that the word Vrittikāra qualifies Kaundiṇya that is the word which precedes it and not Kānva Bodhāyana which comes after. It appears to us that he will hardly be followed by any one in his rather far-fetched interpretation. The word *Vrittikāra* naturally goes and is evidently an epithet of the name that follows. Moreover, we do not know of any *Vrittikāra* of the name of *Kaundinya* but we know of one *Vrittikāra* named *Bodhāyana*. Hence it is more proper to view the *Vrittikāra* as connected with Kānva Bodhāyana than with *Kaundinya*. Further, from a comparative study of the philosophical views of the Vrittikāra Bodhāyana cited both by Saṅkara and Rāmānuja and of the Sūtrakāra Bodhāyana as contained in his Dharma-sūtras, it seems very probable that these two *Bodhāyanas* are the same person. According to the Vrittikāra Bodhāyana cited by Rāmānuja, *karman* or work is but a stepping-stone to *Brahma-jnāna*. This is exactly the view of Bodhāyana of the Dharma-sūtras. The Vrittikāra cited both by Saṅkara and Rāmānuja is found to hold that *Paramātman* is above *Jivātman* and after the attainment of final release *Jivātman* abides in *Paramātman* as one spirit and passes beyond the fear of mundane existence. The views of Bodhāyana of the Dharma-sūtras appear to be similar. The *Vrittikāra* cited by Rāmānuja holds that the *mukta* attains unity with the Highest in light or Divine nature only, but not in respect of the powers of creation, preservation, and destruction of the universe. Bodhāyana of the Dharma-sūtras advocates similar views. The *Vrittikāra* cited by Saṅkara is found to maintain that *Gāyatrī* is Brahman. Bodhāyana of the Dharma-sūtras holds that *Pranava* is Brahman. The similarity of the views of the two Bodhāyanas cited above, I think, is sufficient to establish their identity. Thus in our opinion the Dharma-sūtrakāra

Bodhāyana is identical with the Vrittikāra Bodhāyana referred to by Rāmānuja, Saṅkara, and Sabara Svāmin. According to Macdonell, Bodhāyana's Dharma-sūtras are older than those of Āpastamba. Professor Bühler places Āpastamba between the 5th and 3rd centuries B.C., and Bodhāyana in the 4th century B.C. But in the list of teachers given both in the Grihya-sūtras of *Bharadvāja* and *Bodhāyana*, as Bharadvāja intervenes between Bodhāyana and Āpastamba, Bodhāyana ought to be placed a little earlier. So we cannot be far wrong if we place Bodhāyana in the 5th century B.C. Hence we conclude that two ancient schools upon the Brahmasūtras one *advaita* founded by *Upavarsha*, and another *Viśishṭādvaita* founded by *Bodhāyana* came into existence in India, a few centuries prior to Christ, and that they were handed on through a succession of teachers and disciples and to a very large measure moulded the philosophical ideas of the Hindus.

The Springs of Action in Hindu Ethics

BY

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Hindu ethics comprises the stages of sociality and psychological ethics as preparatory to the ideal of the spirit which is the philosophy of the Absolute. The subject of the present paper "The Springs of Action in Hindu Ethics" constitutes a part of the psychological ethics of the Hindus and is of immense significance for comparative psychology as well as comparative ethics. The subject is treated in Vaisheshika, Nyáya, Sánkhya, as well as Vedánta systems, and my object in the present paper is to consider all the presentations of the subject together so as to bring to light the standpoint of the Hindus in regard to this particular phase of the ethical problem as well as the specific Hindu contribution to the analysis of the question.

The Vaisheshika treatment of the question is to be found in Prasastapáda's Bháshya on the Vaisheshika sutras which I have supplemented by occasional references to the Nyáyakandalitiká. As regards the Nyáya view however I have considered it necessary not only to refer to Vátsyáyana's presentation of the subject but also the classification in the "Nyáyamanjari" of Jayanta Bhatta which is slightly different and in some respects fuller. My presentation of the Sánkhya treatment is based mainly on the Vyása-Bháshya on the Pátanjala sutras while the Vedánta view I have tried to expound from one of the

later writings which, as we shall see, presents many special points of interest in several ways.

I. The Vaisheshika Classification of the Springs Action.

Prasastapáda considers the subject of the Springs of Action in the Gunagrantha of his bhashya on the Vaisheshika sutras. According to him there are two roots or Springs of the process of willing, namely, Desire (Ichchhá) which is always the desire for pleasure or happiness, (Shukha) and Aversion (Dvesha) which is the aversion towards pain (Dukha).

(*A*) *Analysis of pleasure or Sukha.*

The nature of pleasure is that it is characterised by a peculiar consciousness of gratification, a sense of favourableness or anugraha, and its specific effects are (1) this sense of favourableness, (2) a feeling of attraction towards the pleasurable object (Abhishvanga) and (3) certain bodily expressions such as the brightness of the eyes, the face, etc. (Nayanádi-prasáda, Vaimalya).

It is to be observed that the effect of favourableness gives us the *subjective* side of pleasure while attraction represents its *objective* or conative aspect. Lastly the *physiological* effects, namely, the brightness of the eyes, etc., are also taken into consideration.

In the Nyáyakandalitiká the effect of favourableness is very fully explained. It is pointed out that pleasure being by nature favourable is the experience of the object which reacts favourably on the self producing the consciousness of fruition. This constitutes the subjective appropriation of the pleasure. Pleasure being once produced produces also the consciousness of itself as

favourable to the self and this constitutes the self's approval of the pleasure. Hence according to this interpretations there are no unfelt or unrecognised pleasures, a conclusion against which the Vedantist will cite such familiar states as the unconscious happiness of a dreamless sleep and analogous experiences.

Prasastapáda next enumerates the conditions which induce pleasure, which are :—(1) proximity to the desired object, (2) consciousness of some good to be attained, (3) stimulation of the sensibilities by the object, (4) organic equilibrium (svastata) and (5) merit (dharma).

It is pointed that ishtopalavdhi or prospect of some good to be realised by the object is a necessary condition of pleasure, for the person who is drawn towards some other object feels no pleasure from the experience (Vishayántara-vyáshaktasya sukha-anutpádát). Hence pleasure presupposes not only subjective predisposition for the object but also active interest and attention for the time being, this being the pragmatic aspect of all feeling.

It is also assumed that besides the natural causes, pleasure also supposes certain other conditions of a non-phenomenal character. These are the moral causes or conditions of pleasure such as dharma, merit or righteousness of the subject. The assumption is that the life of a spiritual being cannot be explained merely by natural causes without reference to his freedom or self-determination. It is this fact of freedom that distinguishes the spiritual from the merely natural agent. A spiritual being is the creator of his own values, and his pleasures and pains should be regarded in the last analysis as the fruition of his own self-determined activity, his own karma.

In the Nyáyakandalitiká three other kinds of pleasure are also recognised, *i.e.*, pleasures which are induced by conditions different from those noticed above. Thus we have pleasures of reminiscence (Smritijam) and pleasures

of choice and resolution (Sankalpajam). These are not sensory feelings and do not depend on the condition of the stimulation of the sense organs. Thirdly, there is in the case of those who have attained a true knowledge of the self a kind of satisfaction even when we have neither object (Vishaya), nor desire (Ichchhá), nor reminiscence, nor anticipation—a kind of felicity which results from (1) self-knowledge (átmajnána), (2) self-collectedness (shama), (3) contentment (santosh), (4) the consummation of righteousness (prakrista dharma).

Hence two kinds of pleasure are to be distinguished:

(1) Lively and fleeting pleasures—the pleasures arising from the titillation of the flesh. These include the sense-feelings as well as the pleasures of reminiscence and choice. All these arise from attraction towards the object and consist in a feeling of restlessness.

(2) A quieter and more permanent form of satisfaction—a pleasure in self-centered repose and calm and therefore free from mental unrest.

It is to be seen that the latter is not the same as the refined pleasure of the Epicurean. The Epicurean's refined pleasure presupposes a minimum of objective conditions and is therefore heteronomous. Here however no objective condition is recognised, the pleasure arising wholly from within, being the manifestation of the felicity that belongs by nature to the self.

(*B*) *Analysis of Pain* (*Dukkha*).

Just as pleasure is characterised by the sense of favourableness so pain has the opposite characteristic of unfavourableness (upaghâta). The effects of pain are (1) unfavourableness, (2) aversion towards the object causing pain (dvesha) and (3) paleness (dainya, vichchhávatá). Similarly the conditions which induce pain

are : (1) proximity towards an object of aversion (anavipreta-vishaya-sánnidhya), (2) apprehension of evil (anishtopalavdhi), (3) stimulation of the sense-organs by the object, (4) absence of organic equilibrium and (5) demerit. There are also pains of reminiscence and of anticipation in which there is no sensory stimulation. But there is no transcendental suffering corresponding to the transcendental bliss which belongs by nature to the self.

(C) *Analysis of Desire* (*Ichchhá*).

From the feelings of pleasure and pain arise two kinds of reaction of the will, *viz.*, desire (ichchhá) and aversion (dvesha).

Desire is defined as apráptaprárthaná, the yearning for the unattained. It is either egoistic (Svártha) or altruistic (Parártha). An egoistic desire is the desire to attain something for the self of which it is not yet in possession as when we say 'may this happen to me (apráptasya vastunah svártham pratiyá prárthaná idam mé bhuyát). An altruistic desire is the desire to attain something for another of which the latter is not yet in possession as when we say 'May this happen to him' (Asya idam bhavatu). The Nyáyakandalitiká does not recognise the ego-altruistic form of desire as an independent class.

The conditions of desire are :—(1) connection of soul with the mind (átmamana-samyoga, (2) Experience of pleasure, (3) Recollection of pleasure leading to the expectation of similar pleasure in future.

In the case of the absent object the desire is supposed to arise from the recollection of it as a means to pleasure. In this case the absent pleasure moves the will through the representation of it by the mind. This brings out the pragmative aspect of cognition : "even a representation

is a motive because of the consequence to the subject (Phalasya prayojakatvát.) An idea of the good is therefore not a mere idea, but also an incipient activity to realise the good.

The Nyáyakandalitiká here points out that desire is a stretching forward as well as a stretching backward, a double-faced psychosis which points alike towards the future and the past. Thus we may desire to attain the unattained, to realise the unrealised. This is one form of desire. But there is also another form of it, which is the desire to live over again through the past. Thus the desire for the object of pleasure generates the effort to realise it which has therefore a forward reference. Similarly the desire to recollect the past restores the past in the form of memory. (Upádána-ichchhátahtadanugunah prayatnah bhavati, smarana-ichchhátah smaranam.)

In the Nyáyakandalitiká these two aspects of desire are considered to be independent phenomena. In the Vyása-bháshya on the Pátanjala sutras however they are shown to be closely related and to constitute the two different marks of all transformation (parináma). It is there pointed out that change of form involves the two-fold process of the transformation of the potential into the kinetic and of the kinetic into the sublatent. Hence even the present state (the kinetic, vartamána) contains within itself the marks of the past (the sublatent, atita) and the future (potential, anágata). The present that stretches beyond itself into the future is thus the present which has drawn the past into itself. Desire therefore as a present state of unrest is both a reinstatement of the past and an anticipation of the future.

D. The Springs of Action under Desire.

After analysing desire Prasastapáda next considers the Springs of Action coming under desire. These are :—

(1) Káma. According to Parasastapáda it signifies the sexual craving in ordinary usage, but when particularised may also designate longing for happiness in heaven (svargakámaná), for wealth (artha-kámaná), etc.

(2) Avilásha. Appetite for food and drink (bhojanam tatra ichchhá abhiláshah).

(3) Rága. Passion which is the desire for a recurring enjoyment of objects (punah-punah-vishaya-ranjana-ichchhá).

(4) Sankalpa. Resolve which is the desire to realise what is not yet (anágatasya arthasya karanechchhá).

(5) Kárunya. Compassion which is the desire to remove the sufferings of others without any prompting of self-interest (svárthamanapeksha paraduhkha-prahánechchá).

(6) Vairágya. Dispassion which is the desire to renounce the world from the perception of its faults (dosha-darshanát vishaya-tyágechchhá).

(7) Upadhá. Insincerity which is the inclination to deceive others (parapratáranechchhá).

(8) Bháva, which is a carefully concealed desire—a desire without physical expression but manifested by signs (anatarnigurechchhá lingair-avirbhávitá, yá ichchhá sá bháva).

(9) Chikirshá, Desire for Action, Jihirshá, Desire for appropriation, and the various other forms of desire arising from the differences in their corresponding actions (kriyávedát ichchábhedáh).

It will be seen that Prasastapáda's list notices the individualistic appetites (*e.g.*, the appetite for food and

drink) as well as the cravings of the sex which are non-individualistic and serve the preservation of the race.

Secondly, it also recognises the difference between a desire as such and the more enduring and persistent form of it which we call passion (Rága).

Thirdly, a distinction is made between desires for enjoyment and desires for action. This is the basis of the difference between Passion (Rága) and Resolve (Samkalpa). Passion is a Bhogechchhá, a desire for enjoyment or fruition while Resolve is a Karanechchhá, a desire for action, a desire to realise the unrealised. In passion the subjective aspect of desire is prominent, in Resolve its objective aspect.

Fourthly, Dispassion is regarded as a form of desire and not as a form of aversion. The reason is that aversion or hate in any form is believed to be inconsistent with the mental equanimity and calm of the state of Transcendental Freedom or Moksha to which Dispassion is recognised to be a necessary means.

This is also the underlying purpose in the inclusion of compassion among the forms of desire rather than of aversion. It is to be seen however that while the negative feeling of compassion is recognised by Prasastapáda, the corresponding positive virtue of the Buddhists, *viz.*, rejoicing at the good of creatures, muditá, maitri is not noticed. This omission is significant from the biologist's as well as the sociologist's point of view. For the maintenance of life as well as social stability removal of suffering is perhaps more imperatively necessary than the furtherance of happiness. This is why it is easier for us to sympathise with suffering and misery than rejoice at the good fortune of our fellow-beings. It also explains the elaborate provisions of society for the detection and punishment of crime and its comparative deficiency in regard to positive reward of merit and

service. In fact, it is this consciousness of the interminable suffering of life that accounts for the Hindu preference of Dispassion to Compassion as the means to transcendental satisfaction. Compassion is a virtue of the lower order: it may alleviate suffering to a certain extent but cannot destroy it altogether. It thus gives us a relative best rather than the absolute best, and the uncompromising idealist who seeks an absolutely perfect order should turn away from the world, *i.e.*, should refuse to participate in a life which is a mere compromise. Hence he must cultivate Dispassion which is the desire to renounce all desires and this will lead to his freedom in the end. [It must be noticed here however that the great teachers of Buddhism and Jainism insist on vicarious suffering for others among the perfections, though it does not appertain according to them to the Transcendental State. The Vaishnava scriptures, *e.g.*, the Bhagavat and the Vaishnava teachers, *e.g.*, Rámánuja, go further recognising Compassion for suffering as among the perfections of the Muktas and indeed of Bhagaván himself.]

Analysis of Dvesha, Aversion and the Springs of Action which are forms of Aversion.

Aversion is described by Prasastapáda as being of the nature of a consuming flame that produces a burning sensation, as it were, in the subject (Dveshah prajvalátmakah).

Its conditions are: (1) The contact of the soul with the mind (átma-mana-samyoga), (2) experience of suffering, and (3) recollection of suffering leading to the apprehension of it in future.

The Springs of Action which are compounds of Aversion are:—

(1) Krodha, Anger. It is the form of aversion which exhausts itself after a momentary ebullition and is the

cause of certain physical expressions such as violent tremor and agitation of the body as a whole as also specific changes in the organs of sense and motor activity (sharirendriyádivikárahetu kshanamátrabhávidveshah krodhah).

(2) Droha, Revengefulness. It has no perceptible physical expression (alakshita-vikára), is long meditated (chiránuvaddha), and terminates only with the infliction of some actual injury (apakára-avashána).

(3) Manyu, Concealed Ill-will. It is the aversion which an injured person feels towards his malefactor, but on whom he is conscious of being powerless to retaliate; apakritasya pratyapakárásamarthasya antarnigurhah dveshah. Hence it is a special form of revengefulness—revengefullness conscious of being impotent to retaliate, and it is therefore also without physical expression like revengefulness in general, being seated (antarnigurha) deeply within the inner life of the soul.

(4) Akshamá, Jealousy. It is the aversion which one feels towards the good qualities in another (paraguneshudveshah).

(5) Amarsha, Envy. It is the aversion which arises from the sense of relative inferiority. Svaguna-paribhavasamutthahdveshah. Hence it is Jealousy become self-conscious.

It is to be seen that the forms enumerated under Dvesha are emotions and sentiments rather than active impulses. They however lead to conation and are therefore included among the Springs of Action.

We should note also that Prasastapáda's analysis is on a scientific basis only as regards the two main classes, *viz.*, Desire and Aversion. The rest are mere enumerations based on observation. At the same time Prasastapáda shows an acuteness of psychological analysis which will do credit to any of the modern psychologists.

Thirdly, we should observe that Prasastapáda gives us a mainly psychological classification, but the division of desires into egoistic and altruistic is also on a socio-ethical basis.

Fourthly, we should note that Prasastapáda does not trace all impulses to one root, *viz.*, the desire for the good. This is the view of Socrates who thus resolves evil into something negative, *i.e.*, as the privation of good. This is wrong according to Prasastapáda. Pain could not be the mere privation of pleasure because it is never experienced as such and also because a mere negation can never be an object of willing.

Lastly, it is to be remarked that the connection of the soul with the mind is recognised among the conditions of Desire as well as Aversion. But as in the Transcendental State this connection ceases, Desire as well as Aversion and their special forms must be regarded as appertaining to the empirical life as distinguished from the Transcendental. They are thus pathological. At the same time we have a special form of Desire, *viz.*, Dispassion which is not pathological but pure and which therefore characterises the intermediate stage of the spirit between the purely empirical and phenomenal and the absolutely Transcendental and non-empirical.

II. Nyaya Classification of the Springs of Action.

According to the Vaisheshikas, there are two roots of the will, namely, Desire and Aversion. The Naiyayikas, however, resolve these into something more ultimate, *viz.*, Error, Delusion, Moha. The subject is treated by Vátsyáyana as well as by later writers on Ancient Nyaya, *e.g.*, Jayanta Bhatta. The later presentation, however, is in some respects fuller and more advanced than the earlier.

(*A*) *Vátsyáyana's Classification of the Springs of Action.*

According to Vátsyáyana the passions and emotions are to be traced ultimately to one root, *viz.*, Delusion, Moha. From Delusion arise Attraction towards the favourable object (Anukula-vishayeshu rágah) and Repulsion towards the unfavourable object (Pratikula-vishayeshu dveshah). From attraction and aversion arise the various forms of the passions and emotions such as Mendacity (Asatya), Deceitfulness (Máyá, Kapatatá), Greed (Lobha), etc. These lead to conation (Pravritti) which may be either righteous (Shubhá) or unrighteous (Ashubhá).

Vátsyáyaná's classification thus differs from Prasastapáda's in two respects. In the first place Vátsyáyana traces attraction and aversion to something more ultimate, *viz.*, Error. Secondly, in addition to the purely psychological classification of the springs of action on the basis of the original difference between attraction and aversion, he also suggests an ethical classification on the basis of the rightness and the wrongness of the conduct to which they lead.

It is also to be seen that Vátsyáyana considers the disorder of the reason to be the ultimate source of the passions. This intellectualistic contempt of the passions is also a characteristic of the Stoics. There is, however, one important difference between Vátsyáyana and the Stoics in this respect. For the Stoics the impulses in themselves are not passions—they are transformed into the passions only when under the influence of error they are carried beyond their natural limits. Vátsyáyana, however, makes no distinction between the natural impulses and the passions. According to him all impulses are to be traced to the disordered reason and therefore

are to be regarded as subversive of the tranquillity of the soul. This applies to the righteous as well as the unrighteous impulses which are alike bonds that bind the soul to the life of Samsára. Hence the non-phenomenal, transcendental life is a life of absolute freedom, of freedom not only from the natural bonds but also from the obligations of the moral life. The released individual is one who has refused to participate in the phenomenal life, has annulled his will-to-live (Trishná) by withdrawing his assent to Samsára and all that comes with it.

(*B*) *Jayanta's Classification of the Springs of Action.*

Jayanta's classification in the "Nyáya-Manjari" represents the later treatment of the subject from the standpoint of Ancient Nyáya, and is more profound and complete than the earlier presentation of Vátsyáyana.

According to Jayanta, conation (Pravritti) is to be traced to three roots, *viz.*, Moha (Delusion), Rága (Attraction), Dvesha (Aversion).

Delusion (Moha) is defined as the erroneous judgment implying an assent of the will (Avasáya) which arises from the failure to discriminate the ultimate transcendental nature of things (Vastu-paramártha-aparichchheda-lakshana-mithyá-avasáya).

It is regarded as the crowning folly (Pápatama) because attraction and aversion cannot arise except through Moha, Error or Delusion.

The emotions and springs of action which are compounds of Delusion are the following :—

(1) Mithya-jnána, Erroneous Cognition. It is the erroneous judgment which ascribes to a thing the nature of something else (Atasmin tat iti jnána).

(2) Vichikitsá, Perplexity, Scepticism. It is the judgment or attitude of the will which arises from the absence of certain or definite knowledge (Kimsvit iti vimarsha).

(3) Mána, Vanity. It is the consciousness of a false superiority produced by the ascription to oneself of excellences which one does not possess.

(4) Pramáda, Inadvertence. It is neglect of duty arising from the absence of earnestness.

From Delusion arise the impulses of Attraction and Aversion and the compounds coming under them. Rága, Attraction, is characterised by the object that is regarded as favourable (Anukuleshu artheshu abhilásha-lakshanah rágah).

The compounds coming under Attraction are the various forms of Desire. These are :—

(1) Káma, sexual craving. Prasastapáda extends the meaning also to longing for happiness in heaven, for wealth, etc.

(2) Matsyara. It is defined as the unwillingness to part even with that which is not diminished by sharing with others : Yat anyasmai nivedyamánamapi dhanavat na kshiyate tat aparityagechchhá.

(3) Sprihá, Worldliness. It is the desire for worldly possessions and things that are non-spiritual : anatmiya-vastuáditsá.

(4) Trishná, Will-to-live. It is the desire to live again as produced by the representation of a possible recurrence of this phenomanal life : punarbhava-pratisandhána-hetubhuta-ichchhá.

(5) Lobha, Greed. It is the desire to obtain a forbidden thing : nishiddha-dravya-grahanechchhá.

Next as to Devesha Aversion.

It is the opposite of Aversion and is characterised by repulsion towards the object regarded as unfavourable : pratikuleshu arahalakshanah dveshah.

The compounds under aversion arise from the various forms of repulsion : asahana-bheda-prakára-bhedât.

These are :—

(1) Krodha, Anger. It is an explosive emotion of the painful type, sudden in appearance and painful to the subject like a burning flame (prajvalaamaka). Its physical effects are certain expressions of the eyes, the eye-brows, etc.

(2) Irshyá, Envy. It is the Aversion which arises from the perception of even the most ordinary advantages by others : Sádhárane api vastuni parasya darshanát asahanam.

(3) Asuya, Jealousy. It is the grudging sense of the superior qualities in another : Paraguneshu akshamá.

(4) Droha, Malevolence. It is the disposition to do injury to others.

(5) Amarsha, Malice. It is revengefulness without physical expression, that is, is the long-cherished but carefully concealed desire for revenge in one conscious of being powerless of doing an injury in return : adarshita-mukhadivikárah param prati manyu.

It is to be observed from the above that Jayanta considers the enumerations under Delusion (*e.g.*, erroneous judgment, perplexity, etc.) to be independent motives to will, and he holds that the forms under attraction and aversion act as motives only under the influence of Delusion. Hence according to him, we have two kinds of the springs of action both arising from Moha or the disorder of the reason (1) those that are derived immediately from Moha and as such are motives to the will, (2) those that act through attraction and aversion. The difference between these two classes lies in the fact that the springs of action which arise immediately from Moha are characterised by a minimum of feeling while those that act through attraction and aversion are characterised

by a marked preponderance of feeling. It is also to be noted that by including erroneous judgment, perplexity, etc., under the springs of action Jayanta brings out an important psychological truth, *viz.*, the pragmatic aspect of cognition. It is a mistake in this view to consider cognition apart from conation. An act of knowledge is at the same time a conative attitude implying a reaction of the will and a preparedness to respond in a specific way. This conative aspect of cognition comes out clearly in the last two enumerations under this head, *viz.*, vanity and inadvertence, the first of which consists in the overestimation of the subjective factor in all action and the second in the underestimation of the objective factor. The folly of the vain person is ultimately an illusion in regard to the subjective conditions of action, while that of the careless person is an illusion in regard to the objective conditions.

Secondly we should note that Jayanta's classification is scientific only as regards the three main classes, *viz.*, Attraction, Aversion, and Delusion. The rest are mere enumerations without any scientific basis. At the same time certain forms of passion are noticed that have escaped even so competent an observer as Martineau. For example, while noticing revengefulness in general Martineau has not analysed that particular form of it which is characteristic of the person who is conscious of being too weak to retaliate. This holds good also in respect of Matsyara under Attraction and its corresponding feeling namely, Irshya under Aversion and also of Worldliness Will-to-live and the enumerations under Moha.

Comparing now Jayanta's enumeration with Prasastapá da's we notice that the enumerations under aversion (dve sha) are much the same in both, but the enumerations unde attraction diverge widely in the two lists. For example in Jayanta there is no mention either of Dispassion or o

Compassion. Similarly in Prasastapáda we miss Jayanta's Trishná and Sprihá. Jayanta excludes Dispassion from his list of the passions and emotions possibly because while the passions according to him are the effects of the disordered reason which erroneously conceives as a good what is in reality its opposite, dispassion is the means through which the soul is liberated from the bondage of these passions. But according to Prasastapáda the ultimate roots are the feelings of attraction and aversion and these need not be regarded as co-effects of some cause still more ultimate such as Moha. Hence there is room in Prasastapáda's scheme for the inclusion even of the Transcendental Impulse of Dispassion.

III. Patanjali's Classification of the Springs of Action.

He considers the subject in Sutra 34 of the Sadhanapáda in the Yoga Sutras.

According to him, the passions of cruelty, mendacity, sexual indulgence, etc., are to be traced to three roots :— Greed (Lobha), Anger (Krodha) and Delusion (Moha). For example, cruelty in the form of animal slaughter may originate in greed or the desire for the pleasure of eating. It may also originate in anger produced by any injury received from the animal. Lastly it may arise from the sophisticated idea that animal slaughter in connection with particular religious ceremonies is a source of merit to the agent (Vitarkáh himsádayah lobha-krodha-moha-purvakah—Pátanjala sutras. Lobhena mámsacharmárthena, krodhena apakritamanena, mohena dharmo me bhavishatiti—Vyása-bháshya. Mohena yajnárthahimsayá nirodosho dharmo bhavishyatityevam rupena ityartha —Yoga-vártika).

These passions again may determine the moral agent in various ways. Thus some may indulge their

passions by overt acts, some again may persuade others to acts that will gratify themselves, while some may merely assent to such acts in others. (Vitarkah himsádayah kritakáritánumodita lobhakrodhamohapurvakah). All these again may be of various degrees of intensity. Some may be mild and comparatively harmless, some again of mean (Madhya) intensity and therefore not to be neglected, and some violent (Adhimátra) and urgently requiring control.

Vyasa in his commentary goes a step further in this quantitative division. According to him each of these degrees is capable of a further subdivision on the same quantitative basis. Thus within the class of the feeble impulses we may notice the three grades of the extremely feeble, the moderately feeble and the feeble approaching the mean in intensity.

It is to be noted that Patanjali does not teach the extirpation of the passions as the Stoics do. He only insists on a gradual conquest of such passions as overthrow the balance of the spirit and disturb its peace. In fact he makes a distinction between passions that are to be uprooted altogether and those that may be permitted under certain special conditions. Thus the impulse of cruelty, mendacity, etc., must be put down by all means and in all Bhumis or levels of spiritual life. Thus it will not do to excuse oneself for cruelty because one belongs to a specific class of men, *e.g.*, the class of fishermen, nor because it is perpetrated in a particular place, *e.g.*, in a place of pilgrimage, nor also because there is a special occasion, *e.g.*, an auspicious hour or auspicious day. These passions have no place in the moral life and therefore are to be uprooted altogether.

It is to be seen therefore that according to Patanjali some impulses must be put down altogether and in all conditions but other impulses may be permitted in certain

conditions and within certain limits, and the gradation of the passions in respect of intensity or strength indicates the practical method of restraining the impulse or uprooting them altogether where necessary. In this respect Patanjali's view may be compared with that of Aristotle and his rule of the golden mean. The mean according to Aristotle is not necessarily the quantitative mean; it is the mean of the particular ethical context in every particular case and therefore errs neither by excess nor by deficiency. Aristotle does not show how this mean is to be realised by the individual by a proper ordering of his passions and emotions. What Aristotle does not furnish in his ethical scheme Patanjali gives us in his theory of the quantitative gradation of passions. As the passions cannot be extirpated all at once, the practical moralist should begin with the strongest and the most violent forms of it. After subduing these he should turn next to the weaker and less obvious forms. It will be seen therefore that in a really comprehensive scheme of ethical discipline Patanjali's method will have a place in no wise less prominent than Aristotle's. Aristotle's scheme provides the theoretical rule for deciding as to the necessity of repression. Patanjali's scheme indicates the course of practical training which must be undergone for the actual attainment of self-mastery.

The Vedanta Classification of the Springs of Action.

The subject is very fully treated in the "Jivanmukti-viveka" of Vidyáranya Svámi. In this work the author classifies the springs of action on the basis of certain spontaneous and instinctive tendencies.

The causes of anger and other motives are certain latent and residual tendencies (samskáras) in the mind produced by habitual past indulgence. These tendencies

are the Vásanás, and constitute the sources of the emotions and passions which are unreflective and spontaneous.

These subjective predispositions or Vasanas are either good (shuvá, auspicious) or evil (ashuvá, inauspicious).

The evil tendencies are the cause of birth and participation in Samara. These are :—(*i*) Desire for popularity (Lokavásaná), (*ii*) Desire for learning and reputation for piety (shástra-vásaná), (*iii*) Desire for carnal pleasures (deha-vásaná) to which some add also (*iv*) certain mental traits (mánasa vásaná) such as boastfulness (dambha), pride (darpa), etc.

According to a second interpretation—

Mánasa-Vásaná signifies those unrealised desires which flit over the surface of the mind without being subjectively appropriated, the passing wishes (Kámyamána) that seem to have no effect on personal life, as distinguished from

Vishaya-Vásaná or desires realised and appropriated by the self (bhujyamána).

The purer inclinations (Suddha-Vásaná) are supposed to lead to cessation of life (Janmavináshini). They are distinguished from the baser passions by the fact that they are not unreflective or spontaneous but involve the judgment of the truth. These are :—

Sympathy with the happiness of others (Maitri).

Compassion towards the suffering (Kárunya).

Rejoicing at the good of sentient creatures (Muditá).

Indifference or neutrality towards the unrighteous (Upekshá).

Self-collectedness and tranquillity of the mind (Shama).

Repression of the external senses (Dama).

Endurance of pain (Titikshá).

Renunciation (Sanyása).

It is to be noted that the distinction between unappropriated desires and desires consciously approved and chosen

is of profound significance from the ethical standpoint. Our modern ethical treatises notice only the more obvious and potent forms of passions and impulses, that is, those which either pass into obvert action or are consciously approved by the moral agent. The passing wishes and unappropriated desires are ignored on the assumption that since they have no effect on the personal life they are without ethical significance. Research into the life of the subconscious is however bringing out the significant fact that these fleeting desires are neither arbitrary nor unimportant but are the occasional expressions of an undercurrent of a deeper subliminal personality which may under certain circumstances be strong enough to upset the conscious life of the moral agent.

Secondly, we should note that in addition to the usual Vedanta virtues of equanimity, repression of the senses, etc., this author notices also the altruistic impulses of compassion, sympathy, etc. It may not be hazardous to conclude from this that these are only later additions under Buddhist influence.

We should note also that Maitri corresponds to the Christian virtue of good will and Muditá to that of peace with all sentient creatures. Hence Muditá as the harmony of the individual with the rest of creation represents on the objective side the state which is represented on the subjective side by the virtue of equanimity (Shama). Shama is a state of internal equilibrium and self-harmony while Muditá is harmony with creation in general.

Concluding Remarks.

We have so far considered, in detail, the subject of the Springs of Action as presented in the various systems of Hindu Philosophy. If now we consider all these presentations together, we find that one of the special

characteristics of the various psychological analyses of the passions is the description of their physiological expressions and effects which are always fairly accurate and exact. Another characteristic of the psychological analyses is the idea of psychological composition in the genesis of the complex emotions and passions, the doctrine of the compounding of elementary mental states into complex psychic compounds. A third feature of these analyses is the recognition of the residual, the instinctive, the subliminal even in our ethical life and its psychological basis. Another characteristic of the various Hindu classifications of the Springs is the attempt at a non-empirical explanation of the passions with a criticism of their values based thereon. Thus the passions are judged and appreciated not so much by reference to the standard of the empirical order and its maintenance and progress as by reference to their conduciveness or non-conduciveness to the life transcendental and absolute. It is in fact this transcendental standpoint that underlies the doctrine of Error as the ultimate cause of the passions which bind the individual to the phenomenal life of Samsára. But this transcendentalism and intellectualism, however, is counterbalanced by a corresponding pragmatism in their empirical investigations where cognition is always viewed in its pragmatic aspect as intellection in the service of life and therefore closely connected with the life of will or volition. It is also to be seen that there is an attempt throughout to overcome the dualism of the transcendental and the empirical worlds by the assumption of some kind of transcendental impulse even in the empirical life, a pure aspiration as distinguished from the pathological yearnings of the natural life. This is the significance of the Sáttvik emotions, Shubha-vásanás which have transcendental Sukha or happiness for their object as distinguished from empirical pleasure. These

are the pure impulses which drive out the impure ones and thus bridge the gulf between the transcendental and empirical worlds.

The psychological ethics of the Hindus is therefore not only theoretical but also disciplinary and practical always keeping in view the practical end of leading spirit beyond the empirical life to that which is non-empirical and transcendental. But the transcendental life which it aims at is not a life of co-operation and freedom in co-operation, but one of absolute freedom and perfect autonomy of the self. It is here that it furnishes the strongest contrast to Buddhist, Vaishnavik and Christian ethics all which recognise self-realisation through the life corporate as the highest ideal of the spirit.

চতুর্থ অধ্যায়।

বেদান্তে ধর্ম্ম।

স্বভাবতঃ মানুষ বহির্মুখ, বিষয়-প্রবণ। ইন্দ্রিয়বর্গের সম্মুখে বিষয় উপস্থিত হইলেই, মানুষের চিত্তে বিষয়-কামনা জাগিয়া উঠে, বিষয়-ভোগের ইচ্ছা উদ্রিক্ত হয়। আমাদের ইন্দ্রিয়গুলির প্রকৃতিই এইরূপ। বিষয়-বিশেষের উপরে অনুরাগ এবং বিষয়-বিশেষের উপরে বিদ্বেষ,—আমাদের স্বভাব-সিদ্ধ। বিষয়েন্দ্রিয়-সংযোগে এইরূপে আমাদের চিত্তে, রাগ-দ্বেষ, কাম-ক্রোধ, ও সঙ্গে সঙ্গে সুখও দুঃখের অনুভূতি জাগিয়া উঠে। এবং ইহাদের দ্বারা চালিত হইয়া আমরা কর্ম্মে প্রবৃত্ত হইয়া থাকি। ইহাই আমাদের স্বভাব-সিদ্ধ "প্রকৃতি"।

জন্মাবধি, ইন্দ্রিয়বর্গ বিষয়-তৃষ্ণাবিশিষ্ট হইয়াই জন্মিয়াছে। এই বিষয়-তৃষ্ণাকে,—বিষয়-প্রবণতাকে, শ্রুতিতে "অশনা-পিপাসা" শব্দে * নির্দ্দেশ করা হইয়াছে। মানুষের সর্ব্বপ্রকার ক্রিয়ার মূলে, এই বিষয়-কামনা অবস্থিত। এই কামনা দ্বারা সকল জীব, অবশ-ভাবে চালিত হইয়া, সেই আকাঙ্ক্ষা তৃপ্তির নিমিত্ত কর্ম্মে নিযুক্ত হইয়া পড়ে †। ইহাতে জীবের কোন স্বাধীনতা দৃষ্ট হয় না। বিষয়েন্দ্রিয়যোগে, যে সকল কামনা, যে সকল রাগ-দ্বেষ, যে সকল প্রবৃত্তি (Impulses) জাগিয়া উঠে, উহারাই

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* "অশনা-পিপাসা শব্দেন, ইন্দ্রিয়ানাং স্ববিষয়-গোচরৌ তৃষ্ণা-কামৌ উচ্যেতে"—(সায়নদীপিকা)।

† "কেনায়ংকারিতঃ কর্ম্মবন্ধনাধিকারে অবশ ইব প্রবর্ত্ততে ?···তস্মাদ্ভবিতব্যং তেন, যেন প্রেরিতো-ঽবশএব বহির্মুখো ভবতি স্বস্মাৎ লোকাৎ।···এবং তর্হি উচ্যতাং, কিংতৎ যৎপ্রবৃত্তি-হেতুঃ ? তদিহা ভিধীয়তে—এষণা-কামঃ স, স্বাভাবিক্যাঃ অবিদ্যায়াং বর্ত্তমানাঃ 'পরাচঃ কামানমুযন্তি' ইতি কাঠকশ্রুতৌ"—বৃহ° ভাষ্য, ১।৪।১৭ "বিষয়প্রবৃত্তিনিমিত্তং কামাঃ সর্ব্বং পুরুষং নিয়োজয়ন্তি"—মুণ্ডঃভাষ্য।

আপন পথে জীবকে অবশ-ভাবে চালিত করে এবং উহাদের দ্বারা প্রেরিত হইয়াই জীব কর্ম্মে প্রবৃত্ত হয়। ইহাই সকল জীবের প্রকৃতি, সকল জীবের নৈসর্গিক স্বভাব *। এই সকল রাগ-দ্বেষ, কাম-ক্রোধাদি প্রবৃত্তি ও সুখ দুঃখাদি, পরস্পর কার্য্য-কারণ সূত্রে গ্রথিত হইয়া, ক্রিয়া করিয়া থাকে। সুতরাং, এই সকলের সমষ্টিকে "জৈব প্রকৃতি" বলা যায়। ইহা ছাড়া, জীবের আর কোন স্বতন্ত্র স্বরূপ বা স্বভাব নাই। সাধারণ সংসার-মগ্ন মানুষ এই প্রকারই বোধ করিয়া থাকে †।

এ বিষয়ে মানুষে ও পশুতে বিশেষ কোন পার্থক্য নাই। প্রবৃত্তি-চালিত মানুষের ক্রিয়া এবং প্রবৃত্তি-চালিত পশুর ক্রিয়া,—প্রায় একই প্রকার। ইন্দ্রিয়তৃপ্তির আশায়, ফলাকাঙ্ক্ষা ও সুখাশক্তিবশতঃ, আমরা বিষয়-প্রাপ্তির লোভে ধাবিত হই ও কর্ম্ম করিয়া থাকি। ঐ সকল কর্ম্মের উদ্দেশ্য—সুখ-লাভ। সুখ-লাভই মনুষ্যজীবনের ও চেষ্টার একমাত্র লক্ষ্য হইয়া উঠে। যাহা মনের প্রীতিকর, ইন্দ্রিয়ের অনুকূল, তাহার উপরে মনের তৃষ্ণা জাগিয়া উঠে। বিষয়-গুণাদির চিন্তায় মন ব্যাপৃত হইলে, তৎপ্রাপ্তির সংকল্প উদ্রিক্ত হয়, সংকল্প হইতে কামনার উদয় হয়, এই কামনাই পুরুষকে "অবশ-ভাবে" বিষয়ের দিকে টানিয়া লইয়া যায়। ইহাতে জীবের কোন স্বাধীনতা, স্বতন্ত্রতা দেখা যায় না‡। অন্তঃকরণের বাসনার অন্ত নাই। এই বাসনা, বিষয়াভিলাষই —সংসারের হেতু। বিষয়-সংযোগে কামনা উদ্ভূত হয়। যাদৃশ ফলে আসক্ত-চিত্ত হইয়া কর্ম্ম করা যায়, তাদৃশ ফল পাওয়া যায়। এই প্রকার কর্ম্মে আর 'স্বতন্ত্রতা' কোথায় থাকে ?

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* "যাহি পুরুষস্য 'প্রকৃতিঃ' সা রাগদ্বেষপুরঃসরৈব স্বকার্য্যে পুরুষং প্রবর্ত্তয়তি। ...ইষ্টেরাগঃ, অনিষ্টে দ্বেষঃ ইত্যেবং প্রতীন্দ্রিয়ার্থং রাগদ্বেষৌ অবশ্যম্ভাবিনৌ.....কামোহি উদ্ভূতঃ, রজঃপ্রবর্ত্তয়ন্, পুরুষংপ্রবর্ত্তয়তি 'তৃষ্ণয়া অহংকারিত' ইতি" গীতা" ভাং ৩।৩৪-৩৬।

† "স্বাভাবিকং পরাগেব অনাত্মদর্শনং।.....যা চ পরাক্ষুএব ভোগেষুতৃষ্ণা।.....বহির্গতানেব কাম্যান্ বিষয়ান্ অনুগচ্ছন্তি অল্পপ্রজ্ঞাঃ"—কঠভাষ্য। "জীবো হি নাম.....প্রাণঃ পঞ্চকরণবৃত্তিঃ, মনো-বুদ্ধিযুক্তঃ,.....বিজ্ঞানক্রিয়াশক্তিদ্বয়সংমূর্চ্ছিতাত্মা।.....বুদ্ধ্যাদিসম্বন্ধঃ দেবতাস্বরূপবিবেকাগ্রহণনিমিত্তঃ"—ছাং ভাং।

‡ "ক্রিয়তে হ্যবশঃ কর্ম্ম সর্ব্বঃ প্রকৃতিজৈঃগুণৈঃ"। "স্বভাবজেন কৌন্তেয় ক্রিয়তে হ্যবশোপি সন্" গীতা।

স কামঃ ঈষদভিলাষমাত্রেন অভিব্যক্তঃ যস্মিন্ বিষয়ে ভবতি, স অবিহন্যমানঃ "ক্রতুত্ব' মাপদ্যতে। ক্রতুর্নাম অধ্যবসায়ো নিশ্চয়ো যদন্তরা ক্রিয়া প্রবর্ত্ততে "—বৃহ° ভাষ্য°।

মানুষের এই প্রকার প্রবৃত্তি-পরিচালিত স্বাভাবিক জীবনে এবং পশুর জীবনে কোন পার্থক্য দেখা যায় না *। গীতায় মনুষ্যের এইরূপ স্বভাবসিদ্ধ জীবনকে "আসুরী সম্পদ" বলিয়া বর্ণনা করা হইয়াছে †।

মানুষের স্বাধীনতা ও স্বতন্ত্রতা।

(১) এখানে একটী গুরুতর প্রশ্ন আসিয়া উপস্থিত হইতেছে। সুখ-প্রাপ্তি ও দুঃখ পরিহারের নিমিত্ত, কামক্রোধাদি প্রবৃত্তি দ্বারা পরিচালিত হইয়া, অবশ-ভাবে ক্রিয়া করাই যদি মনুষ্য ও পশুর স্বভাব-সিদ্ধ ধর্ম্ম হয়, তাহা হইলে মনুষ্য ও পশুতে প্রভেদ কি? আমরা মনুষ্যকে তৎ-কৃত গর্হিত কর্ম্মের জন্য দায়ী করিয়া থাকি, শাসনের ব্যবস্থা করিয়া থাকি; কিন্তু পশুকে তৎ-কৃত অন্যায় আচরণের জন্য দায়ী করা হয় না; অপরাধের শাস্তি বিধান করাও হয় না। কেন তবে এই পার্থক্য? মানুষ ত তাহার অতীত কালের কর্ম্মসংস্কার ও প্রাচীন বাসনা প্রভৃতি তাহার যেরূপ প্রকৃতি গঠিত করিয়া তুলিয়াছে, সেই প্রকৃতি দ্বারা অবশ-ভাবে পরিচালিত হইয়াই, এই গর্হিত কর্ম্মের আচরণ করিয়াছে। তজ্জন্য তাহাকে আমরা দায়ী করিব কিরূপে? কিন্তু তথাপি আমরা ত মানুষকে ক্ষমা করি না। কেন এরূপ হয়? এরূপ হয় এই জন্য যে, আমরা সকলেই জানি যে, মানুষ আপন পুরুষকারের বলে, সর্ব্বদাই তাহার প্রকৃতিকে শাসন করিতে সমর্থ ‡। কর্ম্মসংস্কার, বাসনা, রাগ-দ্বেষাদি প্রবৃত্তি—এই সকলের দ্বারা গঠিত প্রকৃতিটাই 'মানুষের যথাসর্ব্বস্ব' নহে। মানুষের যেটী প্রকৃত 'স্বরূপ' বা 'স্বভাব' তাহা, এই অর্জিত প্রকৃতি হইতে স্বতন্ত্র। প্রলোভনের সামগ্রী যত প্রবল হউক্, রাগ-দ্বেষাদির বেগ যত বলশালী হউক্, উহাকে শাসিত করিয়া রাখিতে মানুষ সর্ব্বদাই সমর্থ। আত্মা,—প্রবৃত্তি-সংস্কারাদি হইতে স্বতন্ত্র; সুতরাং আত্মার বলে—পুরুষকারের বলে, ঐ সকল প্রবৃত্তি সংস্কারাদিকে

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* যথা পশ্বাদয়ঃ.....দণ্ডোদ্যতকরং পুরুষমুপলভ্য.....পলায়িতুমারভন্তে, হরিততৃণপূর্ণপাণি মুপলভ্য তং প্রতি অভিমুখী ভবন্তি; এবং পুরুষাঃ অপি ব্যুৎপন্নচিত্তাঃ"—ইত্যাদি (ব্রহ্মসূত্র, ভূমিকা)।

† গীতা, ১৬।৬ ২১ শ্লোকগুলি দ্রষ্টব্য।

‡ ".....প্রতীন্দ্রিয়ার্থংরাগদ্বেষৌ অবশ্যম্ভাবিনৌ। তত্র পুরুষকারস্য শাস্ত্রার্থস্যচ বিষয় উচ্যতে। ...পূর্ব্বমেব রাগদ্বেষয়ো র্বশ্যুনাগচ্ছেৎ "—গী° ভা°, ৩।৩৪।

শাসিত রাখাই মানুষের কর্ত্তব্য। সে, আত্মার এই স্বাতন্ত্র্য ভুলিয়া, প্রবৃত্তি সংস্কারাদিকে প্রবল হইতে দিয়াছে। এই জন্যই আমরা মানুষকে দায়ী করিয়া থাকি। এতদ্ দ্বারা, আত্মার স্বাতন্ত্র্য প্রমাণিত হইতেছে। আত্মার "স্বাধীনতা" পরিস্ফুট হইতেছে।

(i) শঙ্করাচার্য্য আমাদিগকে বলিয়া দিয়াছেন যে, যাহারা অবিদ্যাচ্ছন্ন, মূঢ়, সাধারণ লোক, তাহারাই আত্মার স্বতন্ত্রতা ও স্বাধীনতার (Freedom) কোন খবর রাখে না। ইহারা—প্রাচীন কর্ম্ম-সংস্কার, বাসনা, সুখদুঃখাদি দ্বারা মানুষের যে 'প্রকৃতি' গঠিত হইয়াছে, উহাকেই 'আত্মা' বলিয়া মনে করে। কিন্তু মানুষের এটা একটা বিশেষ অধিকার * যে, মানুষ—ধর্ম্ম ও অধর্ম্ম, পাপ ও পুণ্য, সৎ ও অসৎ,—ইহাদের পার্থক্য নির্দ্ধারণ করিতে পারে। এবং সৎ ও অসৎ প্রবৃত্তির মধ্যে, গুরু-লঘু তুলনা করিয়া, অসৎ প্রবৃত্তি ত্যাগ করিয়া, যেটী সৎ, সেইটী গ্রহণ করিতে পারে †। এইরূপ বিচার করিতে পারে বলিয়াই, আত্মা যে স্বতন্ত্র, স্বাধীন, ইহা নিঃসংশয়িতরূপে প্রমাণিত হয়। শঙ্করাচার্য্য এই কথাটা কেমন সুন্দর করিয়া বলিয়াছেন, পাঠকবর্গকে তাহা দেখাইতে ইচ্ছা করি। তিনি বলিয়াছেন—

'যাহারা প্রবৃত্তির দাস, বিষয় ভোগে নিমগ্ন, তাহাদের জীবনের কোন লক্ষ্য নাই, উদ্দেশ্য নাই। ইহারা আপন জীবনের লক্ষ্য, "পরম-পুরুষার্থ," —বাছিয়া লইতে পারে না ‡। সংসারের যে বিষয়-লোভে ইহারা আসক্ত-চিত্ত, সেই বিষয় বা বস্তুটাকেই ইহারা আপনার "পুরুষার্থ" বলিয়া মনে করে §। কিন্তু যাঁহারা মার্জ্জিতবুদ্ধি, তাঁহারা সংসারের এই চঞ্চল, অসার, অস্থায়ী পদার্থ গুলিতে সন্তোষ লাভ করিতে পারেন না। সংসারাতীত ব্রহ্ম-

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* "মনুষ্য এব হি বিশেষতো অভ্যুদয়-নিঃশ্রেয়সসাধনে অধিকৃতঃ।...ব্রহ্মবিদ্যায়াঃ সর্ব্বাত্মভাবফল-প্রাপ্তিং ধ্রুবামেব মন্যন্তে"—বৃহ°, ১।৪।১০

† কঠ-ভাষ্য, ২।২।২। ছান্দোগ্য-ভাষ্য, ৭।৩- ও ১১-২৩।

‡ "তস্য পুরুষার্থ-সাধন প্রতিপত্তৌ অসামর্থ্যং পরবশীকৃতচিত্তস্য "(বৃহ° ভা° ৪।৩।৩৫ কার্য্যাকার্য্য-বিষয়বিবেকাযোগ্যতা অন্তঃকরণস্য নাশ উচ্যতে—নাশাৎ পুরুষার্থাযোগ্যো ভবতি" (গী° ভা°)।

§ "যো হি বহির্মুখঃ প্রবর্ত্ততে পুরুষঃ 'ইষ্টং মেভূয়াৎ' ইতি—ন স আত্যন্তিকং পুরুষার্থং লভতে। —আত্যন্তিকপুরুষার্থাভিবাঞ্ছিনং স্বাভাবিকাৎ কার্য্যকরণসংঘাত-প্রবৃত্তিগোচরাৎ বিমুখীকৃত্য প্রত্যগাত্ম-স্রোতস্তয়া প্রবর্ত্তয়তি॥ —ব্রহ্মসূত্র। "সর্ব্বোহি উত্তরোত্তরং বুভূষতি—অতো ন পুত্রপশ্বাদিভিঃ প্রলোভ্যোহং। ততোপি অধিকতরং পুরুষার্থং অভিপ্রেপ্সুঃ দুষ্প্রাপ্যমপি—(কঠ, ১।১।১৮

বস্তুকেই তাঁহারা 'পরম পুরুষার্থ' বলিয়া গ্রহণ করেন। এবং সেই লক্ষ্য স্থির রাখিয়া, সেই প্রয়োজন সিদ্ধির অনুকূল সাধন অবলম্বন করেন *। শ্রেয় ও প্রেয়—উভয়ই একসঙ্গে উপস্থিত হয়। মূঢ়েরা ইহাদের গুরু-লাঘব নির্দ্ধারণে অসমর্থ; ইহারা প্রবৃত্তির অধীন হইয়া সুখার্থ ধাবিত হয়। কিন্তু মননশীল লোকেরা উভয়ের গুরু-লাঘব উত্তমরূপে বিচার করেন এবং প্রেয়ত্যাগ করিয়া, যেটী পরম মঙ্গলকর সেই শ্রেয়টী বাছিয়া লন, এবং সেই শ্রেয়লাভই জীবনের একমাত্র লক্ষ্য হইয়া উঠে। এই বিচার দ্বারা,—আত্মা যে স্বাধীন, স্বতন্ত্র এবং প্রকৃতির অধীন নহেন, এই তত্ত্বটী প্রমাণিত হয়†।

এই উপলক্ষ্যে বেদান্তের আর একটী কথা পাঠক লক্ষ্য করিয়া দেখিবেন। সৎ ও অসৎ; পুণ্য ও পাপ;—এই উভয়ের গুরু-লাঘব বিচার করিয়া, একটীকে ত্যাগ এবং অপরটীকে গ্রহণ করিবার স্বাধীনতা যখন মানুষের আছে; তখন জগতে এই যে আমরা পাপের—অধর্ম্মের—বাহুল্য দেখিতে পাই, তাহার জন্য ঈশ্বরকে দায়ী করিতে পারা যায় না। বেদান্তে সে কথাও বলিয়া দেওয়া হইয়াছে। অধর্ম্ম-বাহুল্যের জন্য মানুষই একমাত্র দায়ী। ঈশ্বর, তদনুসারে সুখ-দুঃখাদির ব্যবস্থা করেন মাত্র‡। অবশ্য, মনুষ্যের দেহাভ্যন্তরে পাপ-প্রবৃত্তির বীজ নিহিত আছে সন্দেহ নাই। লোভ, হিংসা, ঈর্ষা প্রভৃতি মন্দ-প্রবৃত্তি, মানুষের চিত্তে, বীজভাবে প্রসুপ্ত রহিয়াছে, সন্দেহ নাই। কিন্তু মনুষ্যের ইচ্ছাশক্তি যখন স্বাধীন, তখন, কেন সে অসৎ প্রবৃত্তির প্রশ্রয় দিয়াছিল? অসৎ প্রবৃত্তির বেগ দমিত করিয়া রাখিতেও সে পারিত।

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* "যাহি পুরুষস্যপ্রকৃতিঃ সা রাগদ্বেষপুরঃসরৈব পুরুষং প্রবর্ত্তয়তি।—যদা পুনঃ রাগদ্বেষৌ তৎপ্রতিপক্ষেণ নিয়ময়তি, তদা শাস্ত্রদৃষ্টিরেব পুরুষো ভবতি, নপ্রকৃতি-বশঃ"।—গীতা, ভাষ্য, ৩।৩৪

"আত্মানাত্মপ্রিয়য়োঃ অন্যতরপ্রহানেন ইতরপ্রিয়োপাদানপ্রাপ্তৌ, আত্মপ্রিয়োপাদানেন ইতরহানং ক্রিয়তে—বৃহ° ভাষ্য, ১।৪।৮

† প্রেয়-শ্রেয়সী—পুরুষং—বধ্নীতঃ। তাভ্যাং—আত্মকর্ত্তব্যতয়া প্রযুজ্যতে সর্ব্বঃপুরুষঃ। যস্তু অদূরদর্শী প্রয়োজনাৎ হীয়তে।—মন্দবুদ্ধীনাং দুর্বিবেকরূপে—প্রেয়শ্চ শ্রেয়শ্চ।—সম্যক্ মনসা আলোচ্য গুরুলাঘবং বিবিনক্তি (Rational reflection and selection of one)।—হংস ইব অম্ভসঃ পয়ঃ মনসা সম্যগালোচ্য বিবিনক্তি—পৃথক্ করোতি ধীরঃ। বিবিচ্যচ শ্রেয় এবাভিবৃনীতে, প্রেয়সোঽভ্যহিতত্বাৎ।

‡ "দেব-মনুষ্যাদি বৈষম্যেতু তত্তজ্জীবগতানি অসাধারণানি কর্ম্মাণি কারণানি ভবন্তি—ঈশ্বরঃ ধর্ম্মাধর্ম্মৌ অপেক্ষতে" (ব্রহ্মসূত্র, ২।১।৩৪)। এবং "অকৃতাভ্যাগম-কৃতনাশ-প্রসঙ্গশ্চ, সুখাদিবৈষম্যস্য নির্নিমিত্তত্বাৎ (ব্রহ্মসূত্র, ২।১।৩৬) প্রভৃতি দ্রষ্টব্য।

তাহার ত সে স্বাধীনতা ছিল। সেই জন্যই জগতে এই অধর্ম্মের, অসৎ-কর্ম্মের, প্রাবল্যের জন্য, বেদান্ত মনুষ্যকেই দায়ী করিয়াছেন।

(ii) ভাষ্যকার বলিয়া দিয়াছেন যে, সারাজীবন মানুষ যদি কেবলমাত্র বিষয়ভোগে ব্যাপৃত থাকে, প্রবৃত্তির সেবা ও ইন্দ্রিয়তৃপ্তিকেই একমাত্র লক্ষ্য করিয়া তুলে এবং তদনুরূপ কর্ম্মে নিমগ্ন থাকে; তাহা হইলে এই সকল লোকের চিত্তে, মৃত্যুকালেও, সেইরূপ সংস্কার অঙ্কিত হইয়া যায়। ঐ সকল সংস্কার প্রবল হইয়া, মৃত্যুর পর, রজ্জুবদ্ধ বলীবর্দ্দের মত, উহারা জীবকে টানিয়া লইয়া যায়। পুনরায়, সেই সংস্কারানুসারে উহাদের দেহেন্দ্রিয় নির্ম্মিত হয়; পুনরায় উহারা বিষয়ভোগে লিপ্ত হইয়া পড়ে *। ভাষ্যকার বলিয়া দিয়াছেন যে, এই মহান অনিষ্ট নিবারণের জন্য,জীবের কর্ত্তব্য যে সে সারা-জীবন, আপন জীবনের লক্ষ্য ও পরমপুরুষার্থ স্থির করিয়া লইয়া, তদনুসারে কর্ম্ম করে। যাহাতে আত্মার স্বাতন্ত্র্য ও স্বাধীনতা নষ্ট না হয়, তাদৃশ অনুষ্ঠান করিতে হইবে। অশুভ কর্ম্মের পরিত্যাগ করিয়া, অপ্রমত্তভাবে পরম যত্নসহকারে, পুণ্যকর্ম্ম সম্পাদন ও ধর্ম্মাচরণ করিতে হইবে। তাহা হইলে আর বিষয়বাসনা, কর্ম্ম-সংস্কার প্রভৃতি, আত্মার "স্বতন্ত্রতাকে" আচ্ছন্ন করিতে পারিবে না। সারা-জীবন আপন লক্ষ্য স্থির রাখিতে পারিলে, জীব আপন ইচ্ছানুরূপ উন্নতলোকে জন্মগ্রহণ করিতে পারিবে। এবং সে এ প্রকার উন্নত দেহেন্দ্রিয়াদি গঠন করিয়া লইতে পারিবে, যদ্দ্বারা উহার উন্নততর প্রজ্ঞা, মেধা, স্মৃতি অভিব্যক্ত হইতে পারিবে †। আত্মার

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* "বিষয় প্রাপ্তিনিমিত্তং কামাঃ কর্ম্মসু পুরুষং নিয়োজয়ন্তি। তত্র তত্র তেষু তেষু বিষয়েষু তৈরেব কামৈঃ বেষ্টিতো জায়তে" (মুণ্ড, ভাষ্য, ৩।২।২)

† "তদা এষ আত্মা বিশেষবিজ্ঞানবান্ ভবতি কর্ম্মবশাৎ, ন স্বতন্ত্রঃ। স্বাতন্ত্র্যেণ হি সবিজ্ঞানত্বে সর্ব্বঃ কৃতকৃত্যঃ স্যাৎ। নৈবতুতৎ লভ্যতে।—তস্মাৎতৎকালে স্বাতন্ত্র্যার্থং যোগধর্ম্মানুদেবনং, পরিসংখ্যানাভ্যাসশ্চ, বিশিষ্টপুণ্যোপচয়শ্চ শ্রদ্দধানৈঃ পরলোকার্থিভিঃ অপ্রমত্তৈঃ কর্ত্তব্য ইতি সর্ব্বশাস্ত্রানাংযত্নতো বিধেয়োঽর্থঃ, দুশ্চরিতাচ্চ উপরমণং।—কর্ম্মণানীয়মানস্য স্বাতন্ত্র্যাভাবাৎ।—এতস্মহি অনর্থস্য উপশম-বিধানায় সর্ব্বশাখোপনিষদঃ প্রবৃত্তাঃ।—তস্মাৎ অত্রৈব উপনিষদ্বিহিতোপায়ে যত্নপরৈর্ভবিতব্যং।"পূর্ব্বানুভব-বাসনাপ্রবৃত্তানাং তু ইন্দ্রিয়ানাং ইহ অভ্যাসমন্তরেণ কৌশলমুপপদ্যতে। দৃশ্যতে চ কেষাং চিৎ কাস্মচিৎ ক্রিয়াসু—বিনৈব অভ্যাসেন জন্মত এব কৌশলং।—তথা বিষয়োপভোগেষু স্বভাবত এব কেষাঞ্চিৎ কৌশলং।—যস্মাৎ বিদ্যাকর্ম্মণী পূর্ব্বপ্রজ্ঞা চ—দেহান্তর প্রতিপত্ত্যুপভোগসাধনং, তস্মাৎ বিদ্যাকর্ম্মাদি শুভ-মেব সমাচরেৎ, যথা ইষ্টদেহসংযোগোপভোগৌ স্যাতাং—ইতি প্রকরণার্থঃ—বৃহৎ, ভাষ্য ৪।৪।৪।২ "কর্ম্মা-

স্বাধীনতা থাকিল বলিয়া, উহার পূর্ব্ব-স্মৃতিরও উচ্ছেদ হইবে না। এই প্রকারে ক্রমে উন্নত হইতে উন্নত-তর লোকে উন্নীত হইতে পারিবে *।

পাঠক এই সকল আলোচনা হইতেই বুঝিতে পারিতেছেন যে, বেদান্তে মানব-আত্মার স্বতন্ত্রতা ও স্বাধীনতা এবং মানবাত্মার অমরত্ব কেমন সুস্পষ্ট প্রতিপাদিত হইয়াছে। এই বিষয়টী পরে আরো পরিস্ফুট হইবে। বেদান্তে মনুষ্যকে, পশুর মত, আপন প্রবৃত্তি ও কর্ম্মের দাস বলা হয় নাই। কর্ম্ম-বন্ধন ও প্রবৃত্তির দাসত্ব হইতে মানবাত্মাকে উন্নীত করিবার কথাই বেদান্তে প্রদর্শিত হইয়াছে। আত্ম-সামর্থ্য দ্বারা, আপন পুরুষকারের বলে, মানবকে —পশুত্ব হইতে দেবত্বে, † সংসার হইতে সংসারাতীত ব্রহ্মে,—লইয়া যাইবার কথাই বেদান্তে সম্যক্ আলোচিত হইয়াছে। কিন্তু তথাপি, প্রিয় পাঠক, পাশ্চাত্য পণ্ডিত বেদান্তের সম্বন্ধে কি বলিতেছেন দেখুনঃ—

"The Indian Theism, because of its bondage to the Karma idea, has been unable to rise to a high conception of the Divine Character. In making motive itself the fetter, instead of evil motive, it turned its back upon the ethical goal and suggested the endeavour to escape from the region of the ethical altogether .....The endeavour to get rid of desire is an endeavour to pass beyond the good and ends in confounding the conscience with covetousness" (Indian Theism).

শঙ্করাচার্য্য সুস্পষ্ট বলিয়া দিলেন যে, মানুষ আত্মার 'স্বাতন্ত্র্য' ও 'স্বাধীনতা' ভুলিয়া, যদি রাগ-দ্বেষাদি প্রবৃত্তির বশীভূত হইয়াই, অশুভবাসনা-পরায়ণ হইয়াই,—কার্য্য করে, সেরূপ কর্ম্ম পশুর মত। কিন্তু যদি মানুষ

ন্যপি হি—তদনুরূপং ভাবনাবিজ্ঞানং প্রায়ণকালে আক্ষিপন্তি—যথাসংকল্পিতং লোকং নয়ন্তি "(ব্রহ্মসূত্র, ৪।১।১২)

* "পুণ্যকর্ম্মোদ্ভবৈঃ বিবিক্তৈঃ কার্য্যকরণৈঃ সংযুক্তে জন্মনি সতি, প্রজ্ঞামেধাস্মৃতি বৈশারদ্যং দৃষ্টং" (বৃহ° ভাষ্য° ১।৪।২)।

"স্বাতন্ত্র্যেনৈব হি গৃহাদিব গৃহান্তরং অন্যমন্যং দেহং সঞ্চরন্ত…অপরিমুষিত-স্মৃতয় এব দেহেন্দ্রিয়, প্রকৃতিবশিত্বাৎ নির্ম্মায় দেহান্ —অধিতিষ্ঠন্তি"।—ব্রহ্মসূত্র, ৩।৩।৩২।

† "স্বভাবসিদ্ধৌ রাগদ্বেষৌ অভিভূয়, যদা শুভবাসনাপ্রাবল্যেন ধর্ম্মপরায়ণো ভবতি তদা স "দেবঃ। "যদা স্বভাবসিদ্ধ রাগদ্বেষপ্রাবল্যেন অধর্ম্মপরায়ণো ভবতি, তদা "অসুরঃ"।

আপন পুরুষকারের বলে, স্বভাব-সিদ্ধ রাগদ্বেষাদিকে বশীভূত করিয়া, পরম-পুরুষার্থ লাভোদ্দেশে, শুভবাসনা ও ধর্ম্মপরায়ণ হয় এবং "অমানিত্ব" প্রভৃতি সাধন অবলম্বন করে, তাহা হইলে সে 'দেবত্বে' উন্নীত হইবে এবং পরিশেষে পরমাত্মার লাভে কৃতার্থ হইতে পারিবে। এরূপ সুস্পষ্ট উক্তি সত্ত্বেও, কি প্রকারে পাশ্চাত্য পণ্ডিতগণ শুভাশুভ সর্ব্বপ্রকার বাসনা ধ্বংশের কথা বুঝিলেন, ইহা বুঝিয়া উঠা কঠিন!

ব্রহ্মপ্রাপ্তির সাধন ও ধর্ম্মসমূহ।

(২) এখন আমরা বেদান্তে, ব্রহ্ম-প্রাপ্তির নিমিত্ত কি প্রকার সাধন অবলম্বনের কথা বলা হইয়াছে, তাহারই আলোচনা করিব।

(i) সর্ব্বপ্রথমেই শঙ্কর বলিয়াছেন যে, যাহার মতি যে প্রকার, যাহার মনের ইচ্ছা যেরূপ, সে ব্যক্তি তদনুরূপ সাধন অবলম্বন করে। যে ব্যক্তির চিত্ত যতটুকু সংস্কৃত, যতটুকু বিশুদ্ধ, সে সেই প্রকার সাধন অবলম্বন করিয়া থাকে। শাস্ত্র কাহাকেও কোন বিষয়ে বলপূর্ব্বক নিযুক্ত করে না, কোন বিষয় হইতে বলপূর্ব্বক প্রতিনিবৃত্তও করে না। যাহারা রাগদ্বেষচালিত, তাহারা স্বর্গাদি সুখের কামনায়, সকাম কর্ম্মকাণ্ডের আচরণ করিয়া থাকে। আর যাহারা বিষয়ে বিরক্ত, যাহারা অপেক্ষাকৃত মার্জ্জিতচিত্ত, তাহারা ব্রহ্ম-বিদ্যারই আশ্রয় গ্রহণ করিয়া থাকে। লোক আপন রুচি অনুসারে জীবনের লক্ষ্য ও উদ্দেশ্য স্থির করিয়া লয় এবং তদনুসারে সাধন গ্রহণ করিয়া থাকে। আপন রুচি অনুসারে লোক আপন পুরুষার্থ অবলম্বন করে*। এই প্রকারে লোকের কামনারও অন্ত নাই; সংসারে কাম্য বিষয়েরও অন্ত নাই †।

যাঁহারা অপেক্ষাকৃত সংস্কৃত-চিত্ত, তাঁহারা সংসারের কোন বস্তুতেই আকৃষ্ট হন না। সংসারের কোন বস্তুতে, কোন সুখে ইহাঁরা তত আদর

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* "অনেকা হি পুরুষাণাং ইচ্ছা। বাহ্যবিষয় রাগাদ্যুপহৃত চেতসো ন শাস্ত্রং নিবর্ত্তয়িতুং শক্যং। নাপি স্বভাবতো বাহ্যবিষয়বিরক্তচেতসো বিষয়েষু প্রবর্ত্তয়িতুং শক্তং।—নতু শাস্ত্রং ভৃত্যানিব বলাৎ নিবর্ত্তয়তি' নিয়োজয়তি বা।—তত্র পুরুষাঃ স্বয়মেব যথারুচি সাধনবিশেষেষু প্রবর্ত্তন্তে···যস্ত যথাবভাসঃ, স তথারূপং পুরুষার্থং পশ্যতি: তদনুরূপানি সাধনানি উপাদিৎসতে "(বৃহ° ভাষ্য, ২।২।২০)। পাঠক, শঙ্কর কি জগতের বস্তুগুলিকে উড়াইয়া দিতেছেন?

† "প্রায়েণ হি পুরুষাঃ কামবহুলাঃ; কামশ্চ অনেকবিষয়ঃ, অনেক কর্ম্মসাধনসাধ্যশ্চ" (বৃহ° ভাষ্য, ৪।৪।১৫)। শঙ্কর কি কর্ম্মকে উড়াইয়া দিতেছেন?

প্রদর্শন করেন না। ইহাঁরা মুমুক্ষু। লৌকিক যত প্রকার প্রিয় বস্তু আছে, সর্ব্বাপেক্ষা পরমাত্মাই ইহাঁদের নিকটে প্রিয়তম বলিয়া প্রতীয়মান হয়। অন্য বিষয়ের আকাঙ্ক্ষা ত্যাগ করিয়া, ইঁহারা পরমাত্মারই আকাঙ্ক্ষা করিয়া থাকেন। যাহা সর্ব্বাপেক্ষা প্রিয়, তাহার লাভের জন্য, ইহাঁরা সর্ব্বপ্রকার প্রযত্ন ও উদ্যম সহকারে, তাহারই অনুকূল সাধন অবলম্বন করিয়া থাকেন। ইহাঁদের সকল আকাঙ্ক্ষা, সকল উদ্যম, সকল যত্ন, সেই পরমাত্মবস্তুর অনুসন্ধানে কেন্দ্রীভূত হইয়া পড়ে*। ইহাঁরা সংসারের নশ্বর, বিনাশী পদার্থগুলির সঙ্গে, সেই নিত্য, অবিনশ্বর ব্রহ্মবস্তুর তুলনা করিয়া অনিত্যবস্তুর অপূর্ণতা ও অসারতার উপলব্ধি করিয়া, ব্রহ্মবস্তুকেই পরমপুরুষার্থ-সাধক বলিয়া গ্রহণ করেন। এবং এই পরমাত্মাই সর্ব্বপ্রকার ইষ্ট-সাধক বোধে, অপর আর কোন বস্তুরই প্রার্থনা করেন না। †

(ii) আমরা বলিয়া আসিয়াছি, মানুষের চিত্ত স্বভাবতঃ রাগ দ্বেষাদি প্রবৃত্তি দ্বারা অধিকৃত। বেদান্তে এই রাগদ্বেষাদিকেই "চিত্তের মল" বলিয়া কথিত হইয়াছে। চিত্তের মল দূর করিতে না পারিলে, চিত্তে ব্রহ্মজ্ঞানালোক ফুটিয়া উঠিতে পারে না। এই জন্যই ব্রহ্মবিষয়ক উপদেশ একবার শুনিলেই যে চিত্ত ব্রহ্মবিদ্যা দ্বারা অধিকৃত হইবে, এরূপ আশা করা যায় না ‡। শুভকর্ম্ম ও জ্ঞানের অনুশীলন দ্বারা চিত্তশুদ্ধি করিবার কথা বেদান্তে পুনঃ

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* "আত্মনি ক্রিয়াকারকফলাধ্যারোপলক্ষণো হি সংসারঃ...তস্মাৎ বিরক্তস্য তদ্বিপরীতব্রহ্মবিদ্যা-প্রতিপত্ত্যর্থোপনিষদারভ্যতে "(বৃহ° ভাষ্য, ১। উপোদ্ঘাত)। "আত্মতত্ত্ব মেব জ্ঞেয়ং, অনাদৃত্য অন্যৎ—অন্যৎ লৌকিকং প্রিয়মপি অপ্রিয়মেবেতি নিশ্চিত্য, আত্মৈব প্রিয়ো নান্যোস্তীতি প্রতিপদ্যতে।—যোহি লোকে নিরতিশয়প্রিয়ো ভবতি। স সর্ব্বপ্রযত্নেন লব্ধব্যো ভবতি। অয়মাত্মা সর্ব্বলৌকিক প্রিয়েভ্যঃ প্রিয়তমো ভবতি। তস্মাৎতল্লাভে মহান্ যত্নঃ আস্থেয় ইত্যর্থঃ। কর্ত্তব্যতাপ্রাপ্তমপি অন্যপ্রিয়লাভে যত্ন-মুজ্ঝিত্বা"—বৃহ° ভা°, ১।৪।৮ "অন্যস্মাৎ বাহ্যাৎ লোকাৎ, আত্মানং ফলান্তরত্বেন প্রবিভজতি"—বৃহ° ভা°, ৪।৪।২২

† "তৎকারণয়োঃ অবিদ্যা-কাময়োশ্চলত্বাৎ, কৃতক্ষয়ধৌব্যোপপত্তিঃ" (বৃ° ভা°, ১।৪।১৫)। স্বস্মাদেব লোকাৎ সর্ব্বমিষ্টং সম্পদ্যতে—নান্যতঃ প্রার্থনীয়ং আপ্তকামত্বাৎ" (ইহ স্বো লোকঃ=পরমাত্মা")—বৃহ° ভা°, ১।৪।১৫ "নিত্যমেব আত্মানং পশ্যতি, যস্মাচ্চ জিহাসিতব্যমন্যং উপাদেয়ং বা যো ন পশ্যতি "(৪।৪।৬)। সংস্কৃতস্যচ বিশুদ্ধসত্ত্বস্য জ্ঞানোৎপত্তিঃ অপ্রতিবন্ধেন ভবিষ্যতি" (৪।৪।২২)

‡ "যেষাংপুনঃনিপুণ-মতীনাং ন অজ্ঞানবিপর্য্যয়লক্ষণ...প্রতিবন্ধোঽস্তি তে শরীরস্থি সক দুরুক্তমেব ...অনুভবিতুং। তান্প্রতি আবৃত্ত্যানর্থক্যংইষ্টমেব। —যস্তু ন এষ অনুভবঃজ্ঞাগিবজায়তে, তংপ্রতি আবৃত্ত্যভ্যুপগমঃ"—ব্রহ্মসূত্র, ৪।৩।২

পুনঃ উপদিষ্ট হইয়াছে। এই সকল চিত্তের মলকে ব্রহ্মবিদ্যার প্রতিবন্ধক বলিয়া বর্ণিত হইয়াছে *। রাগদ্বেষাদি-প্রেরিত হইয়া লোক, পরানুগ্রহ ও পরপীড়াদির উৎপাদন করিয়া থাকে, এবং কত প্রকার অধর্ম্মের আচরণ করে। পুণ্যকর্ম্মাদির আচরণ দ্বারা, ভগবৎপ্রীতিজনক কর্ম্মানুষ্ঠান দ্বারা, জ্ঞানানুশীলন দ্বারা, এই সকল চিত্তমল বিশুদ্ধ হইতে থাকে। যতদিন না সম্যক্ প্রকারে ব্রহ্মজ্ঞান উৎপন্ন হয়, ততদিন কর্ম্ম ও জ্ঞানের অনুশীলন সমাপ্ত হয় না; মানুষের কর্ত্তব্যেরও পরিসমাপ্তি হয় না, একথা পুনঃপুনঃ বেদান্তে বলা হইয়াছে †।

(iii) বেদান্ত পুনঃ পুনঃ বলিয়া দিয়াছেন যে, ভগবান মানবাত্মার মধ্যে যত প্রকার সাধু প্রবৃত্তি, সদ্‌গুণ, শক্তিসৌন্দর্য্যাদি নিহিত করিয়া দিয়াছেন, সেই সকলের পূর্ণঅভিব্যক্তি ও পুষ্টিসাধন না করিতে পারিলে ব্রহ্মপ্রাপ্তি সম্ভব হইতে পারে না। যত প্রকার শুভ-সম্পদের অধিকারী করিয়া মানুষকে ভগবান্ সংসারে প্রেরণ করিয়াছেন, সেই সকল সম্পদের পুষ্টিও পূর্ণতা বিধান না করিতে পারিলে, মানুষের পরমপুরুষার্থলাভ কদাপি সম্ভব-হইতে পারিবে না।

(a) শ্রীমৎ শঙ্করাচার্য্য তাঁহার গীতা-ভাষ্যে, বলিয়াছেন যে, মানুষের চিত্ত "আসুরী সম্পদ" দ্বারা অধিকৃত রহিয়াছে। এই আসুরী সম্পদ্ দ্বারা আচ্ছন্নচিত্ত লোকেরা অহঙ্কার, দম্ভ, কাম, ক্রোধ দ্বারা অভিভূত হইয়া, সর্ব্বদা বিষয়ভোগের আকাঙ্ক্ষায় ব্যস্ত থাকিয়া, পর-পীড়ায় বড় আনন্দ উপভোগ করিয়া থাকে। 'ইহার ধন কাড়িয়া লইব,' 'উহার সম্পত্তি লুণ্ঠন করিব,' 'দেশে আপনার নাম জাহির করিব,'—ইত্যাদি বিষয়ে অহরহঃ মত্ত হইয়া থাকে। ভাষ্যকার নির্দ্দেশ করিয়াছেন যে, এই

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* "যদা প্রক্রান্তস্য বিদ্যাসাধনস্য কশ্চিৎ প্রতিবন্ধোন ক্রিয়তে···তদাইহৈব বিদ্যা উৎপদ্যতে" (ব্রহ্মসূত্র, ৩।৪।৫১)। "উৎপন্নাবিদ্যা ন কিঞ্চিদপেক্ষতে; উৎপন্নং প্রতি অপেক্ষতে" (৩।৪।২৬)

† "জ্ঞানাধ্যয়ন-ধার্ম্মিকত্বাদিভিঃ আত্মানং অভিখ্যাপয়ন্, দম্ভদর্পাদিরহিতো ভবেৎ, ন পরেষামাত্মান-মাবিস্কর্ত্তুমীহতে যথা বালঃ, তদ্বৎ।" (৩।৪।৪০) "ন চ নিত্যনৈমিত্তিকানুষ্ঠানাৎ প্রত্যবায়ানুৎপত্তিমাত্রং ন পুনঃ ফলান্তরোৎপত্তি রিতি প্রমাণমস্তি।—ন চ অসতি সম্যক্‌দর্শনে, সর্ব্বাত্মনা কাম্য-প্রতিষিদ্ধ-বর্জ্জনং —কেনচিৎ প্রতিজ্ঞাতুং শক্যং" (৪।৩।১৪)। "জন্মান্তরসঞ্চিতাৎ সাধনাৎ জন্মান্তরে বিদ্যোৎপত্তিং দর্শয়তি —(৩।৪।৫১) ("কর্ম্ম জ্ঞানঞ্চ—নিষ্কামস্য মুমুক্ষোঃ সত্ত্বশুদ্ধ্যর্থং ভবতি" (আনন্দগিরি)।

স্বাভাবিক 'আসুরী সম্পদ্' মানুষকে সংসারে বাঁধিয়া রাখে। তাই যত্নপূর্ব্বক এই আসুরী ও রাক্ষসী সম্পদ্ পরিত্যাগ করিতে হইবে। পরিত্যাগের উপায় কি? ভাষ্যকার বলিয়াছেন, "দৈবী সম্পদের" যত্ন-সহকারে অর্জ্জন করিতে থাকিলে, ঐ সকল দম্ভদর্পাদির প্রভাব কমিতে থাকিবে। এই সকল "দৈবী সম্পদ্" অর্জ্জিত ও পুষ্ট করিতে থাকিলে চিত্তের মল দূরীভূত হইতে থাকে এবং চিত্ত বিশুদ্ধ হইয়া উঠে। তাদৃশ চিত্তে দৈবী সম্পদের জ্যোতিঃ স্নিগ্ধ কিরণ বিকীর্ণ করিতে থাকে *। শঙ্কর বলিয়াছেন, দৈবী সম্পদের অর্জ্জন ও পুষ্টি ব্যতীত মোক্ষলাভ সুদূর পরাহত।

"সংসার-মোক্ষায় দৈবী প্রকৃতিঃ।
নিবন্ধায় আসুরী। দৈব্যাঃ—
আদানায়; ইতরয়োঃ—পরিবর্জ্জনায়"।

দৈবী সম্পদের বর্ণনার স্থলে, ভাষ্যকার বলিয়াছেন যে, মন ও বুদ্ধি যে সর্ব্বদা, মানুষের সহিত পরস্পর ব্যবহারের সময়ে, দৈনন্দিন জীবনে, পরবঞ্চনা, কাপট্য, মিথ্যা ও অসরলতা প্রভৃতি দ্বারা আবৃত রহিয়াছে; তৎপরিবর্ত্তে, দৈবী সম্পদের অর্জ্জন দ্বারা সত্য-ব্যবহার, পরের কল্যাণকামনা, ঈর্ষাশূন্যতা, প্রভৃতি আসিয়া চিত্ত অধিকার করিতে থাকিবে। লোভশূন্যতা, ভূতে দয়া, ক্লিষ্ট ব্যক্তির ক্লেশ-নাশের জন্য উদ্যম, চিত্তের নির্ম্মলতা সম্পাদন, দৃঢ়তা, সহিষ্ণুতা, প্রভৃতিকে ভাষ্যকার "দৈবী সম্পদ্" বলিয়া নির্দ্দেশ করিয়াছেন। ভবিষ্যৎ কল্যাণের নিমিত্ত, একাগ্র হইয়া, এই সকল সম্পদের অর্জ্জন করিতে হইবে। এতদ্ব্যতীত, ব্রহ্ম-প্রাপ্তি অসম্ভব †।

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* "ইন্দ্রিয়-বিষয়-সংসর্গজনিত-রাগাদি-মলকালুষ্যাপনয়নাৎ আদর্শ-সলিলাদিবৎ প্রসাদিতং স্বচ্ছং অবতিষ্ঠতে যদা, তদা জ্ঞানস্য-প্রসাদঃ স্যাৎ"—(মুণ্ড ভা, ৩।১।৮

† এই সকল গুণ বা সম্পদ্‌কে "ধর্ম্মপূগ" বলা হইয়াছে। (গীতা ভা, ১২।১২)।

"তত্র সংসারমোক্ষায় দৈবী প্রকৃতিঃ। নিবন্ধায় আসুরী রাক্ষসী চ।—ইতি দৈব্যাঃ আদানায় প্রদর্শনং ক্রিয়তে; ইতরয়োঃ পরিবর্জ্জনায়।" "সংব্যবহারেষু পরবঞ্চনামায়ানৃতাদিবর্জ্জনং শুদ্ধসত্ত্বভাবেন ব্যবহারঃ। "মনোবুদ্ধেঃ নৈর্ম্মল্যং মায়ারাগাদি কালুষ্যাভাবঃ।" "পরজিঘাংসাভাবঃ।" "শঙ্কর ভাষ্য দেখুন। দৃষ্টা হি অমৃদিতকল্মষস্য উক্তেপি ব্রহ্মণি অপ্রতিপত্তিঃ বিপরীত প্রতিপত্তিশ্চ।...এব মাদি অন্তদপি জ্ঞানোৎপত্তেরুপকারকং—"অমানিত্ব মদম্ভিত্ব" মিত্যাদি।...সত্যমিতি অমায়িতা অকৌটিল্যং বাঙ্মনঃ কায়ানাং...ন আসুর প্রকৃতিষু মায়াবিষু"—কেন ভাষ্য, ৪।৮

(b) এই সকল গুণ (Ethical virtues) ব্যতীত, ভাষ্যকার অন্যত্র, আরো কতিপয় গুণের অর্জ্জন ও পরিপুষ্টি-সাধনের জন্য, তাহাদের উল্লেখ ও ব্যাখ্যা করিয়াছেন। ঐ সকল গুণকে বা ধর্ম্মকে, ব্রহ্মপ্রাপ্তির "সাধন" বলিয়া নির্দ্দেশ করিয়াছেন। তিনি বলিয়া দিয়াছেন যে, এই সকল গুণের অর্জ্জন ব্যতীত এবং এই সকল গুণের দ্বারা চিত্ত পরিপুষ্ট না হইলে, কখনই পরমাত্ম-সাক্ষাৎকার লাভ হইবে না। ইহাদের অর্জ্জন দ্বারাও, চিত্তের পূর্ব্বোক্ত মলগুলি দূরীভূত হইয়া যাইবে *। এই সকল গুণকেও তিনি মুক্তির কারণ বলিয়া নির্দ্দেশ করিয়াছেন †। যাঁহারা মুমুক্ষু, যাঁহারা পরম-পুরুষার্থ ("উত্তম ফল") লাভার্থ উদ্যমযুক্ত, তাঁহাদের পক্ষে, এই গুণগুলির অর্জ্জন অবশ্য কর্ত্তব্য, নতুবা ব্রহ্ম-লাভ ঘটিবে না। এস্থলে এই সকল গুণের কতিপয় উল্লিখিত হইতেছে—

আমাদের মন, ইন্দ্রিয় প্রভৃতির স্বাভাবিক গতি বিষয়ের দিকে নিবদ্ধ। বাহ্য বস্তুর সেবা ও আকাঙ্খা হইতে ঘুরাইয়া আনিয়া ইহাদিগকে আত্মাভিমুখী করিতে হইবে ‡। জীবনের যে উদ্দেশ্য স্থির করিয়া লওয়া হইয়াছে, সেই উদ্দেশ্য সিদ্ধির অনুকূল করিয়া ইহাদিগকে চালিত করিতে হইবে। আত্মশ্লাঘা-রাহিত্য; অন্যে অপরাধ করিলেও বিক্ষিপ্তচিত্ত না হইয়া, ক্ষমাশীলতা প্রদর্শন;

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* "অধুনা তু তজ্ "জ্ঞানসাধনগণং"—অমানিত্বাদিলক্ষণং—যস্মিন্ সতি, তজ্ জ্ঞেয়বিজ্ঞানে যোগ্যঃ অধিকৃতঃ ভবতি। যৎ-পরঃ সন্ন্যাসী জ্ঞাননিষ্ঠঃ উচ্যতে।"..."অন্তশ্চ মনসঃ তৎ-প্রতিপক্ষভাবনয়া রাগাদি-মলাপনয়নং—শৌচং।"

† "জ্ঞাননিমিত্তত্বাৎ 'জ্ঞান' মুচ্যতে,...জ্ঞান-সহকারিকারণত্বাচ্চ" অমানিত্বাদীনাং জ্ঞানসাধনানাং ভাবনাপরিপাকনিমিত্তং—তত্ত্বজ্ঞানং তস্য অর্থো মোক্ষঃ—সংসারোপরমঃ।"

"মানিত্বং, দম্ভিত্বং, হিংসা অক্ষান্তিঃ, অনার্জ্জবং ইত্যাদি 'অজ্ঞানং' বিজ্ঞেয়ং পরিহরণায় সংসারপ্রবৃত্তি কারণত্বাৎ" (গী° ভা°, ১৩।১১)।

"সত্যস্য বলবৎ-সাধনত্বং...কুহক-মায়া-শাঠ্যাহঙ্কার-দম্ভানৃতবর্জ্জিতাঃ—" মুণ্ডক ভাষ্য, ৩।১।৬

‡ "কার্য্যকরণ সংঘাতস্য বিনিগ্রহঃ—স্বভাবেন সর্ব্বতঃ প্রবৃত্তস্য সন্মার্গে এব নিরোধঃ।"..."ততঃ প্রত্যগাত্মনি প্রবৃত্তিঃ করণানাং।" "সংস্কারবতাং বিনীতানাং সংসৎ° তস্যাঃ জ্ঞানোপকারকত্বাৎ" (Spiritual consciousness finds expression and wins strength in mutual affections services and duties through its relation to others).

মুমুক্ষু ও সচ্চরিত্র ও সাধুব্যক্তিগণের সহিত সংসর্গ, ঈশ্বর-নিষ্ঠা প্রভৃতি। এই সকল গুণ পরিপক্ক হইলে, সংসার-বন্ধন শিথিল হইয়া যায়।*

(c) গীতাভাষ্যে, অষ্টাদশ অধ্যায়ে, "জ্ঞাননিষ্ঠা" কাহাকে বলে, তাহার ব্যাখ্যা করিতে গিয়া, ভাষ্যকার বলিয়াছেন—এই সকল পূর্ব্বোক্ত "অমানিত্ব" প্রভৃতি সম্পদের অর্জ্জন ও পরিপুষ্টি মুমুক্ষু ব্যক্তির একান্ত কর্ত্তব্য। তদ্ব্যতীত চিত্তশুদ্ধি অসম্ভব এবং তদ্ব্যতীত ব্রহ্মলাভ কদাপি ঘটিবে না। এই জ্ঞাননিষ্ঠাকে "চতুর্থী ভক্তি" শব্দে নির্দ্দেশ করা হইয়াছে। এই সকল গুণ উৎপন্ন হওয়া মাত্রই ত ব্রহ্মজ্ঞ হওয়া যায় না। এগুলির পুনঃ পুনঃ অভ্যাস ও দৃঢ়তা সম্পাদন করিতে হইবে। তাহার ফলে ব্রহ্মজ্ঞান উৎপন্ন হইবে। এই কথা বলিয়া দিয়াছেন †।

(d) শঙ্কর তৈত্তিরীয়ভাষ্যে বলিয়াছেন—যে,—যজ্ঞাদি কর্ম্মের অনুষ্ঠান আর একমাত্র 'কর্ম্ম' নহে যে, উহা করিতেই হইবে। কত প্রকার কর্ম্ম বা সাধন রহিয়াছে, সেই সকল অবলম্বন করিলেই, চিত্ত ব্রহ্মলাভের যোগ্য হইয়া উঠে। ব্রহ্মচর্য্য; ইন্দ্রিয় ও অসৎপ্রবৃত্তির শাসন; হিংসা বর্জ্জন; সত্য-প্রিয়তা; ধ্যান, ধারণা—প্রভৃতি ধর্ম্মাচরণ দ্বারা চিত্ত, ব্রহ্মপ্রাপ্তির যোগ্যতা লাভ করে এবং এই সকল ধর্ম্মই ব্রহ্মপ্রাপ্তির সর্ব্বোৎকৃষ্ট "সাধন।"

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* "জ্ঞানং—সর্ব্বেষাং জ্ঞানানাং উত্তমং, উত্তমফলত্বাৎ। জ্ঞানানামিতি—'অমানিত্বাদীনাং'। ন যজ্ঞাদিজ্ঞেয়বস্তুবিষয়ানাং;—তানি ন মোক্ষায়;—ইদং তু মোক্ষায় ইতি পরোত্তমশব্দাভ্যাং স্তৌতি" (গী° ভা°. ১৪।১)।

এই সকল ধর্ম্ম সম্বন্ধে গীতা, ১৩।৭-১১ শ্লোকগুলির ভাষ্য দেখুন্।

† "নৈষ দোষঃ। জ্ঞানোৎপত্তিহেতুং সহকারিকারণং,—বুদ্ধিবিশুদ্ধত্বাদি, 'অমানিত্বাদি গুণঞ্চ' অপেক্ষ্য জনিতস্য পরমাত্মৈকত্বজ্ঞানস্য···আত্মানুভবনিশ্চয়রূপেণ যৎ অবস্থানং, সা পরা 'জ্ঞাননিষ্ঠা'।···ইয়ং চতুর্থী ভক্তিঃ।···গীতা ভাষ্য, ১৮।৫৫।

শঙ্কর বলিয়া দিয়াছেন যে, অধ্যাত্ম শাস্ত্রে—মুক্ত পুরুষের যে সকল 'লক্ষণ' বর্ণিত হইয়াছে, সেই গুলিকে মুমুক্ষু ব্যক্তি 'সাধন' বলিয়া গ্রহণ করিবেন এবং যত্নপূর্ব্বক ঐ সকল সাধন অর্জ্জন করিবেন। পাঠক এই তত্ত্বটি মনে রাখিবেন।—"সর্ব্বত্রৈব হি অধ্যাত্মশাস্ত্রে, কৃতার্থ লক্ষণানি যানি, তান্যেব 'সাধনানি' উপদিশ্যন্তে যত্নসাধ্যত্বাৎ"—গীতা ভাষ্য, ২।৫৪

এতদ্ব্যতীত, তিনি "ঈশ্বর প্রসাদ"কে (grace),—ব্রহ্মপ্রাপ্তির 'সাধন' বলিয়া নির্দ্দেশ করিয়াছেন *।

(e) ভগবৎ প্রসন্নতা লাভের জন্য, একান্তমনে তাঁহার শরণাপন্ন হওয়াকেও শঙ্কর, ব্রহ্মপ্রাপ্তির মুখ্য সাধন বলিয়া নির্দ্দেশ করিয়াছেন। এই প্রকারে ইহার উল্লেখ আছে—

(i) বেদান্ত দর্শনের ৩।২।২৪ সূত্রের ভাষ্যে, ভক্তি, ধ্যান ও প্রণিধান দ্বারা ভগবচ্চিন্তাব উপদেশ প্রদত্ত হইয়াছে *।

(ii) কঠ-ভাষ্যে, ভগবদনুগ্রহ ব্যতীত পরমাত্ম লাভ সম্ভব নহে,—একথা স্পষ্ট বলা আছে †।

(iii) সর্ব্ব প্রকারে, সর্ব্বভাবে, ভগবানের উপরে সর্ব্বপ্রকার কর্ম্ম সমর্পণ করতঃ, তাঁহারই শরণাপন্ন হইবার উপদেশ আছে ‡।

(iv) এইরূপে একনিষ্ঠ, ভগবচ্ছরণাগত ব্যক্তির চিত্তে, ভগবান স্বয়ং বুদ্ধিবিকাশ ও জ্ঞানের অভিব্যক্তি করিয়া দেন,—ইহাও বলা হইয়াছে ¶।

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* "নহি অগ্নিহোত্রদীন্যেব কর্ম্মাণি। ব্রহ্মচর্য্যং তপঃ, সত্যবদনং, শমো, দমোঽহিংসা—ইত্যেব মাদীন্যপি কর্ম্মাণি বিদ্যোৎপত্তৌ সাধকতমানি বিদ্যন্তে। ধ্যান—ধারণাদিলক্ষণানি চ বক্ষ্যতি।"

"ন প্রতিবন্ধক্ষয়াদেব বিদ্যা উৎপদ্যতে, ন তু ঈশ্বরপ্রসাদতপোধ্যানাদ্যনুষ্ঠানাদিভিরিতি নিয়মোঽস্তি।" ইত্যাদি, তৈ° ভাষ্য, শিক্ষাবল্লী। ১২ অঃ। মুণ্ডক ভাষ্য, ৩।১।৫ দ্রষ্টব্য। কেন ভাষ্য, ৪।৮।

এই স্থলে বৃহ° ভাষ্য, ১।৪।২—শঙ্করের মন্তব্য দেখাও কর্ত্তব্য।

"পুরুষার্থসাধনৈঃ স্তুতত্বাৎ 'ব্রহ্মচর্য্যং' জ্ঞানস্য সহকারি 'সাধনং'।" (ছা° ভা°, ৮।৫।৩)। "আহার-শুদ্ধিঃ—রাগদ্বেষমোহদোষৈরসংস্পৃষ্টং বিষয়বিজ্ঞানং। আহারশুদ্ধৌ সত্যাং অন্তঃকরণস্য নৈর্ম্মল্যং ভবতি; সত্ত্বশুদ্ধৌ···ভূমাত্মনি অবিচ্ছিন্না স্মৃতিঃ···ভবতি" (৭।২৬।২)।

* সংরাধনঞ্চ—ভক্তি-ধ্যান প্রণিধানাদ্যনুষ্ঠানং" ইত্যাদি।

† "যমেবৈষ বৃণুতে তেন লভ্যঃ, তস্যৈব আত্মা বৃণুতে তনুং স্বাং

‡ "তমেব শরণং গচ্ছ সর্ব্বভাবেন ভারত।" "মচ্চিত্তঃ সর্ব্বদুর্গাণি মৎ প্রসাদাৎ তরিষ্যসি"। তদনু-গ্রহহেতুকেনৈব বিজ্ঞানেন মোক্ষসিদ্ধির্ভবিতুমর্হতি" (ব্রহ্মসূত্র, ২।৩।৪১)।

¶ "দদামি বুদ্ধিযোগংতং যেন মামুপযান্তি তে।

"অজ্ঞানজং তমঃ, নাশয়াম্যাত্মভাবস্থোজ্ঞানদীপেন ভাস্বতা"। ইহা দ্বারা বুঝা যায়—ঈশ্বরে ও জীবে গাঢ় সম্বন্ধ (Interaction) আছে; কিন্তু উভয়ে ঠিক এক (Identification) নহে। এইজন্য শঙ্কর বলিয়াছেন—

"ন স এব সাক্ষাৎ, নাপি বস্ত্বন্তরং জীবঃ"—বে° ভাষ্য, ২।৩।৫০

পাঠক দেখিতেছেন, আমরা বেদান্ত কথিত ধর্ম্মগুলির একটু বিস্তৃত আলোচনা করিলাম। ভগবান্ মানবাত্মায় যে সকল সদ্‌গুণ, শক্তি সৌন্দর্য্য,ও সাধুবৃত্তি ও সম্পদ্ নিহিত করিয়াছেন, সেই সকল গুণের পুষ্টি, বিকাশ ও পুর্ণতাপ্রাপ্তি ব্যতীত ব্রহ্মলাভ হইতে পারে না। বেদান্তের ইহাই উপদেশ। কিন্তু অনেকের ধারণা অন্যরূপ। তাঁহারা বলেন—

"The method of attaining to the *Atma*, according to the teaching of the Upanishads, is that of *making the human spirit a desert*.. ...The goal of effort is an absorption in which all difference is lost.....Every movement of the mind and heart must be cast forth and stilled."

আমরা. ধর্ম্মজীবনলাভ সম্বন্ধে, যে সকল উক্তি উদ্ধৃত করিয়া দেখাইলাম, তাহা হইতে পাঠক বুঝিতে পারিবেন যে, এই প্রকার সিদ্ধান্ত কতদূর সত্য এবং ইহা বেদান্তের সম্পূর্ণ বিরোধী সিদ্ধান্ত কিনা।

মানুষের চরিত্র-বিকাশ ও ধর্ম্মোন্নতি

(৩) মানুষের ধর্ম্মজীবন লাভের উপযোগী কি কি গুণ বা ধর্ম্মের বিকাশ ও কর্ষণ আবশ্যক, সেগুলি উল্লিখিত হইল। মানুষ এই সকলধর্ম্মকে কার্য্যতঃ (Practically)নিয়োগ করিয়া, আপন চরিত্রগত করিয়া লইয়া, আত্মোৎকর্ষ সাধন করিবে,—তদ্বিষয়ে বেদান্তে কিরূপ প্রণালী অবলম্বন করিবার উপদেশ প্রদত্ত আছে, আমরা তাহা বলি নাই। এখন, পাঠকবর্গের সুবিধার নিমিত্ত, বিপ্রকীর্ণ ভাষ্য হইতে একত্র সংগ্রহ করিয়া সেই প্রণালীর একটা সংক্ষিপ্ত বিবরণ দিতে ইচ্ছা করি।—

আমাদের "বাসনা" দুই প্রকার। (১) মলিন বাসনা। ইহাই গীতায় "আসুরী সম্পৎ" নাম কথিত হইয়াছ। (২) শুভ বাসনা। ইহা "দৈবী সম্পৎ" নামে কথিত হইয়াছে। স্বভাব-সিদ্ধ রাগ-দ্বেষ, ঈর্ষা-অসূয়া প্রভৃতি দ্বারা আমাদের চিত্ত আচ্ছন্ন রহিয়াছে; তজ্জন্য আমাদের কর্ম্মও এই সকল রাগ-দ্বেষাদি "মলিন বাসনা" দ্বারা চালিত। পুরুষকারের বলে, এই সকল মলিন বাসনা উচ্ছেদ করিতে না পারিলে, আত্মার স্বাধীনতা ও স্বতন্ত্রতা

(Freedom) কখনই পরিস্ফুট হইতে পারিবে না *। কিন্তু কি প্রকারে এই মলিন বাসনার নাশ সম্ভব ?

এই মলিন বাসনা নাশের নিমিত্ত, বেদান্তে দুইটী বিষয়ের উল্লেখ আছে। (১) তত্ত্বজ্ঞানের আলোচনা। (২) শুভ বাসনা বা "দৈবী সম্পদের" অর্জ্জন, কর্ষণ ও পুষ্টি। কি প্রকারে দৈবী সম্পদের কর্ষণ ও পুষ্টি করিতে হইবে, সে কথা পরে দেখাইব। সর্ব্বাগ্রে আমরা এই তত্ত্বজ্ঞানের কথাটাই বলিতে চাই।

১। তত্ত্বজ্ঞান বা বিচার †।

এই তত্ত্বজ্ঞানের পুনঃ পুনঃ আলোচনা করিতে থাকিলে, পুনঃ পুনঃ বেদান্তোক্ত বিচার করিতে থাকিলে,পরমাত্মা যে জগতে অভিব্যক্ত বিকার-গুলির মধ্যে অনুপ্রবিষ্ট আছেন এবং পরমাত্মা যে জড়বর্গ হইতে স্বতন্ত্র—এই বোধ ফুটিয়া উঠে। পরমাত্মা যে সকল বিকারে অনুপ্রবিষ্ট, কোন বিকারই যে তাঁহা হইতে স্বতন্ত্র নহে,—এই বোধও দৃঢ়তা লাভ করে। পরমাত্মা হইতে স্বতন্ত্র ও ভিন্ন করিয়া লইলে, এ জগতের সকল বস্তুই অসত্য, মিথ্যা হইয়া পড়ে। এই প্রকারে সকল বস্তুতে অনুস্যূত, সকল বিকারে অনুপ্রবিষ্ট, পরমাত্মাই সর্ব্বদা চিত্তে ভাসিতে থাকে ‡। তত্ত্বজ্ঞান বা বিচারের ইহাই লক্ষ্য।

বিচারের প্রণালী এইরূপ—

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* সা চ বাসনা দ্বিবিধা—মলিনা, শুদ্ধা চ। মলিনা—আসুরী সম্পৎ। শুদ্ধা—দৈবী সম্পৎ। "পুরুষকারস্য বিষয় উচ্যতে—যাচ পুরুষস্য প্রকৃতিঃ সা রাগদ্বেষপুরঃসরৈব পুরুষং প্রবর্ত্তয়তি…যদা রাগদ্বেষৌ তৎপ্রতিপক্ষেণ নিযময়তি তদা…ন প্রকৃতি-বশঃ"—শঙ্কর ভাষ্য। "পৌরুষেণ প্রযত্নেন শুভেদ্বেবাবতারয়" (বশিষ্ঠ)।

† ইহাকেই গীতায় শঙ্কর 'সাংখ্যজ্ঞান' বলিয়াছেন। "যৎসাংখ্যৈঃ প্রাপ্যতে স্থানং, তদ্ যোগৈরপি গম্যতে" (গীতা) "দ্বৌ ক্রমৌ চিত্তনাশস্য যোগো জ্ঞানঞ্চ রাঘব" (যোগবাশিষ্ঠ)। শঙ্করাচার্য্য যোগের তত আবশ্যকতা বলেন নাই, জ্ঞান বা বিচারেরই প্রাধান্য দিয়াছেন। (এস্থলে—'চিত্তনাশ' অর্থ Development "চিত্তস্যাভ্যুদয়ো নাশো, চিত্তনাশো মহোদয়ঃ")।

‡ জড় বিবেকেন সর্ব্বানুস্যূত চৈতন্যপৃথককরণং। সাক্ষিণি সর্ব্বানুস্যূতে কল্পিতং সাক্ষ্যং (দৃশ্যবর্গঃ), তদ্ভিন্নতয়া মৃষাত্বেন পশ্যতি। অধিষ্ঠানজ্ঞানদাঢ্যে সতি, তদ্ভিন্নতয়া দৃশ্যস্য চ অদর্শনং অনায়াসেনৈব ভবতি" (গীতা, মধুসূদন)। সামান্যস্বরূপ ব্যতিরেকেণ অভাবাৎ বিশেষাণাং" (শঙ্কর)। "সর্ব্বঞ্চ প্রপঞ্চজাতং ময়ি আরোপিতং, মদ্ভিন্নতয়া মৃষাত্বেন পশ্যতি।"

গীতায় ভাষ্যকার পুনঃ পুনঃ "সমদর্শন" প্রতিষ্ঠিত করিবার কথা বলিয়া দিয়াছেন *। এই সমদর্শনই, বৃহদারণ্যকে ও ছান্দোগ্যে "সর্ব্বাত্ম-ভাব" নামে অভিহিত হইয়াছে। আমরা স্বাভাবিক রাগ-দ্বেষাদি চালিত হইয়া, জগতে বস্তুগুলিকে যেমন দেখিতেছি. উহারা স্বরূপতঃ তদ্রূপ, ইহাই মনে করিয়া লই। উহারা স্বভাব-সিদ্ধ সামর্থ্য অনুসারে, পরস্পর ক্রিয়া ও প্রতি-ক্রিয়ার ফলে,—কেহ বা ছোট, কেহ বা বড়; কোনটি বা ক্ষুদ্র, অধম, কোনটী বা উচ্চ, উন্নত;—হইয়া জন্মিয়াছে। ইহাদের মূলে আর কোন 'স্বতন্ত্র' কারণ নাই †। পরস্পর ক্রিয়া ও প্রতিক্রিয়ার অনিবার্য্য ফলে, ঘাত-প্রতিঘাতের স্বাভাবিক বলে,—কার্য্য-কারণ-শৃঙ্খলে বদ্ধ থাকিয়া—বিনা উদ্দেশ্যে, বিনা প্রয়োজনে আপনা আপনি (By chance and accident) কেহ বা ছোট, কেহ বা বড়; কেহ বা দুঃখী, কেহ বা সুখী;—হইয়া ব্যক্ত হইতেছে। স্বভাবতঃ এইরূপেই আমরা জগতের বস্তুগুলিকে ব্যবহার করিয়া থাকি। যে বস্তুর যেরূপ ভেদ ও বৈষম্য রহিয়াছে, তাহার সঙ্গে আমাদের ব্যবহারও তদনুরূপ হইয়া থাকে। কেহ বা শত্রু, কেহ বা মিত্র; কেহ বা ধনী, কেহ বা দরিদ্র; কেহ বা আমাদের অনুগ্রহ ভাজন, কেহ বা পীড়ার পাত্র!

কিন্তু যাঁহারা "সমদর্শী" তাঁহারা এ প্রকারে কোন বস্তুকেই দেখেন না। তাঁহারা জানেন যে—

(ক) সকল বস্তুই ভগবৎশক্তি সম্ভূত।

"মম তেজোঽংশ সম্ভবং"।
"তস্যৈব মহিমা ভুবি দিবে"।—

সকল বস্তুই—তাঁহা হইতে প্রাদুর্ভূত; তাঁহাতেই অবস্থিত; তাঁহারই মহিমাদ্যোতক; এবং তাবৎ বস্তু—তাঁহারই বিভূতি, ঐশ্বর্য্য। ইহারা কেহই স্বাধীনভাবে আপনা আপনি আইসে নাই।

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* আত্মৌপম্যেন সর্ব্বত্র 'সমং' পশ্যতি যোঽর্জ্জুন। সুখং বা যদি বা দুঃখং" (গীতা)।

† অসত্যমপ্রতিষ্ঠং তে জগদাহুরনীশ্বরং। অপরস্পর সম্ভূতং কিমন্যৎ কামহেতুকং।...অসৌ ময়া হতঃ শত্রুঃ হনিষ্যে চাপরানপি। ঈশ্বরোঽহমহং ভোগী সিদ্ধোঽহং বলবান্ সুখী।...মামাত্মপরদেহেষু প্রদ্বিষন্তোঽভ্যসূয়কাঃ" ইত্যাদি; গীতা।

(b) প্রত্যেক পদার্থের একটী একটী স্বভাব আছে। এই স্বভাব ভগবদ্দত্ত। যাহার যে স্বভাব, তিনিই তাহার নির্দ্দেশ করিয়া দিয়াছেন। ইনি সকলেরই নিজ নিজ প্রয়োজন অবগত আছেন এবং সেই উদ্দেশ্যানুরূপ স্বভাব প্রদান করিয়াছেন *।

(c) ইহারা কেহই স্ব স্ব স্বভাবকে, মর্য্যাদাকে, অতিক্রম করিতেছে না। তাঁহা দ্বারা নিয়মিত হইয়া, শাসিত হইয়া, প্রত্যেকে স্ব স্ব স্বভাবানুসারে নিয়মিত ভাবে কার্য্য করিয়া যাইতেছে। ইহারা যে আপনা আপনি, ক্রিয়া ও প্রতিক্রিয়ার ফলে, অনিয়মিতভাবে (Irregularly) ক্রিয়া করিতেছে তাহা নহে। তাঁহারই শাসনে নিয়মিত হইয়া, কেহই আপন আপন মর্য্যাদা লঙ্ঘন করিতে পারিতেছে না, নিয়ম অতিক্রম করিতে সমর্থ হইতেছে না। ইহাদের স্ব স্ব ক্রিয়া—তাঁহা দ্বারাই—শাসিত ও নিয়ন্ত্রিত †।

(d) সকল বস্তুই পরস্পর সম্বন্ধে আসিয়া পরস্পরের উপকার ও পরস্পরের উপরে ক্রিয়া করিতেছে। এতদ্দ্বারাও, ইহারা যে এক মূল কারণ হইতে জন্মিয়াছে, তাহাই পাওয়া যায় ‡। নতুবা উহারা পরস্পর পরস্পরের সঙ্গে সম্পর্কে আসিতে পারিত না। তিনিই মূলে থাকিয়া সকলকে পরস্পর সম্বদ্ধ করিয়া দিয়াছেন, তাই ইহারা আপন আপন স্বভাবানুসারে নিয়মিতরূপে কার্য্য করিয়া যাইতেছে §। কেন তিনি ইহাদিগকে সম্বন্ধে আনিলেন?

(e) ইহাদের দ্বারা তাঁহার একটা মহৎ প্রয়োজন, মহান্ অভিপ্রায়,—সাধিত হইবে বলিয়া সম্বন্ধে আনিয়াছেন। তিনি সকলেরই 'প্রয়োজনবিৎ'।

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* "স দেবাংশ্চ অগ্ন্যাদীন্ লোকিনঃ জানাতি···ভূতানি চ ব্রহ্মাদীনি···সূর্য্যাচন্দ্রমসৌ···তাদর্থ্যেন প্রশাসিত্রা তাভ্যাং নিবর্ত্ত্যমানলোক-প্রয়োজন-বিজ্ঞানবতা নির্ম্মিতৌ" ইত্যাদি (বৃহ° ভাষ্য, ৩।৮।৯)

† অস্মাদেব ব্রহ্মণো বিভ্যৎ নিয়মেন প্রবর্ত্ততে সূর্য্যচন্দ্রাদিকংজগৎ···কর্ত্তৃত্বং তেষাং (আদিত্যাদীনাং) পুরুষাণাং চ ব্রহ্মণোঽন্যস্য ন স্বাতন্ত্র্যেন অবকল্পতে"···।"এতস্য বা অক্ষরস্য প্রশাসনে গার্গি। সূর্য্যাচন্দ্রমসৌ বিধৃতৌ তিষ্ঠতঃ"।

‡ "যচ্চ পরস্পরোপকার্য্যোপকারকং তদেককারণপূর্ব্বকং একসামান্যাত্মকঞ্চদৃষ্টং···পরস্পরোপকার্য্যোপকারকভূতং ইদং জগৎ পৃথিব্যাদি"।

§ "তাশ্চ যথা প্রবর্ত্তিতাঃ এব নিয়তাঃ প্রবর্ত্তন্তে, অন্যথাপি প্রবর্ত্তিতু মুৎসহন্তঃ। তদেতৎ 'লিঙ্গং' (বৃ° ভা°)।"

তিনিই সকলের উদ্দেশ্য ও স্ব স্ব প্রয়োজনের ব্যবস্থা করিয়া দিয়াছেন *। এইজন্যই তাবৎ বিকারকে "পরার্থ" বলা হইয়াছে। ইহাদের কাহারই নিজের কোন স্বতন্ত্র প্রয়োজন নাই। ইহারা আত্মার প্রয়োজন সাধন করিবার জন্যই তাঁহার দ্বারা প্রেরিত ও 'সংহত' হইয়া সেই উদ্দেশ্য সাধন করিয়া যাইতেছে †। কি সে মহান্ অভিপ্রায়, কি সে মহৎ প্রয়োজন,—যাহা এই বিকারগুলি সাধিত করিতেছে ?

(f) এই যে অসংখ্য ব্যক্তি (Individual) দেখিতেছি, ইহারা স্ব স্ব জাতীয় শক্তিকে (সামান্য)--বুকে লইয়া জন্মগ্রহণ করিতেছে ‡। এবং ঐ শক্তিকে আশ্রয় করিয়া তদনুরূপ ক্রিয়া করিতেছে।—

"স্বজাতীয়-কার্য্যোৎপাদনসামর্থ্যং
উত্তরোত্তরসর্ব্বকার্য্যেষু অনুস্যূতং"।

এই ব্যক্তিগুলি, স্ব স্ব জাতীয় শক্তিতে প্রোত হইয়া, প্রোথিত হইয়া রহিয়াছে। কোন ব্যক্তিই উহাদের স্বজাতীয় শক্তিতে অনুগ্রথিত না হইয়া থাকে না §। প্রত্যেক ব্যক্তিতে, উহাদের স্বজাতীয় শক্তি অনুপ্রবিষ্ট হইয়া, অনুগত হইয়া রহিয়াছে। প্রত্যেক ব্যক্তির মধ্যে, উহাদের স্বজাতীয় শক্তির অভিব্যক্তিই--সেই মহান্—অভিপ্রায়, সেই মহৎ প্রয়োজন। এই জন্যই ভগবান প্রত্যেক বস্তু ও জীবকে পরস্পর সম্বন্ধে আনিয়াছেন। তবেই আমরা বুঝিতেছি, প্রত্যেক ব্যক্তিই গোড়া হইতে, ঐ মহৎ প্রয়োজন বুকে লইয়া—স্বজাতীয় শক্তিকে অভিব্যক্ত করিবে বলিয়া উৎপন্ন হইতেছে। সেই

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* যাথাতথ্যতোঽর্থান্ ব্যদধৎ শাশ্বতীভ্যঃ সমাভ্যঃ"—কঠ। "লোকপ্রয়োজন-বিজ্ঞানবতা নির্ম্মিতো' (বৃ° ভা°)।

† "স্বার্থেন অসংহতেন পরেণ কেনচিৎ অপ্রযুক্তং সংহতানাং অবস্থানং ন দৃষ্টং। তথা প্রাণাদীনামপি সংহতত্বাৎ ইতরেনৈব সংহতবিলক্ষণেন তু সর্ব্বে সংহতাঃ সন্তঃ জীবন্তি"।

"তাদর্থ্যেন অনুপরতব্যাপারা ভবন্তি"।

‡ "অনেকে হি বিলক্ষণাঃ চেতনাচেতনরূপাঃ সামান্য-বিশেষাঃ তেষাং পারম্পর্যগত্যা একস্মিন মহাসামান্যে অন্তর্ভাবঃ" (বৃ° ভা°)।

§ "কার্য্যকরণসংঘাত-বিশেষঃ। স যেন জাতিবিশেষেণ সংযুক্তো ভবতি, স জাতিবিশেষো মানুষাদিঃ মনুষ্যাদিজাতিবিশিষ্টাঃ এব সর্ব্বে প্রাণিনিকায়াঃ পরস্পরোপকার্য্যোপকারক-ভাবেন বর্ত্তমানাঃ" (বৃ° ভা°)।

"সর্ব্ববিশেষাঃ সামান্যে প্রোতাঃ...সামান্যানন্বিদ্ধানাং বিশেষাণাং অদর্শনাৎ"।

উদ্দেশ্য বুঁকে লইয়া প্রত্যেক ব্যক্তি, স্বভাবানুসারে নিয়মিতরূপে আপন ক্রিয়া নির্ব্বাহ করিতেছে। ইহারা যে আপনা আপনি, ক্রিয়া ও প্রতিক্রিয়ার ফলে বিনা প্রয়োজনে, উৎপন্ন হইয়াছে, তাহা নহে।

(৫) গীতাকার বলিয়া দিয়াছেন যে, ভগবান স্বয়ং, প্রত্যেক ব্যক্তির মধ্যে অনুপ্রবিষ্ট—অনুস্যূত—সেই সেই জাতীয় শক্তিরূপে অভিব্যক্ত হইতেছেন—

"সামান্যরূপে ময়ি সর্ব্বে বিশেষাঃ
প্রোতাঃ, দুন্দুভ্যাদি দৃষ্টান্তৈঃ"।
"রসাদিরূপেণ মমৈব স্থিতত্বাৎ"।

তিনিই সর্ব্বত্র তত্তজ্জাতীয় শক্তিরূপে অভিব্যক্ত হইতেছেন *। তজ্জাতীয় ব্যক্তিগুলি, স্বজাতীয় শক্তিতে (কারণে) প্রোত রহিয়াছে। ঐ সকল ব্যক্তির মধ্যে, তজ্জাতীয় শক্তি অভিব্যক্ত হইতেছে। যাহার মধ্যে অভিব্যক্তি যত অধিক, সেই ব্যক্তিই তত অধিক ভগবৎ প্রয়োজন সিদ্ধ করিতেছে; সেই ব্যক্তিরই সংসারে তত উপযোগিতা। সেই ব্যক্তিই তত সুন্দর, তত ঐশ্বর্য্য-শালী।† তুমি, আমি, রাম, শ্যাম—প্রত্যেক মানুষটীর ভিতরে, মনুষ্যত্ব অভিব্যক্ত হইতেছে। যাহার মধ্যে মনুষ্যত্বের—মনুষ্যজাতীয় শক্তির বিকাশ যত অধিক, সেই ব্যক্তি ততটা ভগবৎ-প্রয়োজন সিদ্ধ করিতেছে। এইরূপ সর্ব্বত্র।

বেদান্ত-মতে, যেখানে চিত্ত, সেইখানেই ব্যক্তি। বৃক্ষেও ব্যক্তিত্ব আছে। প্রত্যেক বৃক্ষে তজ্জাতীয় 'বৃক্ষত্ব' অভিব্যক্ত হইতেছে‡। যে বৃক্ষবিশেষে

* ময়ি সর্ব্বং ইদং প্রোতং সূত্রে মণি-গণাইব।...রসোহমপ্সু কৌন্তেয়।"—রসতন্মাত্ররূপঃসর্ব্বাসু অপ্সু অনুগতঃ, তদ্রূপে ময়ি সর্ব্বা আপঃ প্রোতাঃ...পৌরুষং পুরুষত্বসামান্যং...নৃষু পুরুষবিশেষেষু যদনুস্যূতং তদহং" (মধুসূদন)।

† এই স্বজাতীয় শক্তি 'আকৃতি' নামে পরিচিত। আকৃতি—নিত্য। "তদাকৃতিরেব ভবতি।...পুরুষাৎ পুরুষো জয়াতে, গোঃ গবাকৃতিরেব ন জাত্যন্তরাকৃতিঃ" (ছাঁ ভাঁ, ৫।১০।৬)

আকৃতি গুলি—ভগবৎ-সংকল্পপ্রসূত; তাঁহারই জ্ঞানে নিত্য বিধৃত। "সত্যাঃ কামাঃ"। কামাঃ ব্রহ্মণোঽনন্তাঃ"

‡ যত্র রসস্তত্র চিত্ত মনুমীয়তে। যত্র চিত্তং তত্র রসসঞ্চালনাদিনা জীবসদ্ভাব অনুমীয়তে" (শঙ্কর)।

তজ্জাতীয় বৃক্ষত্বের অভিব্যক্তি যত অধিক, সে বৃক্ষ ততটা ভগবৎ-প্রয়োজন সিদ্ধ করে; সে বৃক্ষ তত সুন্দর; তত উপযোগী। এইরূপে নিম্ন হইতে উচ্চ জীব পর্য্যন্ত, ক্রমোর্দ্ধভাবে সর্ব্বত্র, প্রত্যেক ব্যক্তির মধ্যে ভগবানের জ্ঞান-শক্তি-ঐশ্বর্য্যের ক্রম-বিকাশ হইতেছে *। ইহাই তাঁহার মহান্ অভিপ্রায়, মহৎ প্রয়োজন। তিনি—

"প্রেয়ো বিত্তাৎ, প্রেয়ঃ পুত্রাৎ,
প্রেয়োঽন্যস্মাৎ সর্ব্বস্মাৎ"।

তিনি—

"সত্যং শিবং সুন্দরং"।—

এই সর্ব্বপ্রিয়, সত্য-সুন্দর ব্রহ্মবস্তু—প্রত্যেক ব্যক্তির মধ্য দিয়া, ক্রমোচ্চ-ভাবে অভিব্যক্ত হইতেছেন। তুমি ছোট বড় বলিবে কাহাকে?

(h) ভাষ্যকার বলিয়াছেন—যে 'কারণ' হইতে যে 'কার্য্য' গুলি উৎপন্ন হয়, উহাদিগকে সেই কারণ হইতে বিভক্ত করিয়া লওয়া যায় না; ভিন্ন করিয়া লওয়া যায় না †। কোন ব্যক্তিকেই, উহার মধ্যে অনুস্যূত স্বজাতীয় শক্তি হইতে—সেই সত্য শিব সুন্দর হইতে—ভিন্ন করিয়া লইতে, স্বতন্ত্র করিয়া লইতে পারা যায় না। সুতরাং তুমি ছোট বলিবে কাহাকে? কাহাকে তুচ্ছ জ্ঞান করিবে? ঘৃণা কাহাকে করিবে? সকলের মধ্যে সেই এক মঙ্গল উদ্দেশ্য, অভিব্যক্ত হইতেছে; কেহই সেই মঙ্গল অভিপ্রায় হইতে পৃথক হইয়া থাকিতে পারে না। সকল ব্যক্তিতেই মঙ্গল অভিপ্রায়, জ্ঞান-শক্তি-সৌন্দর্য্য, ‡ বিকাশিত হইতেছে; সকলেরই প্রয়োজনীয়তা—অভিপ্রায়, রহিয়াছে। তুমি কে, যে—ইহাকে শত্রু বল, ইহাকে পীড়ন কর? উহাকে ভালবাস, আর ইহারে ঘৃণা কর? এই প্রকারে সকলের মধ্য দিয়া এক মঙ্গল অভিপ্রায়

* "একস্যাপি কূটস্থস্য চিত্ত-তারতম্যাৎ, জ্ঞানসুখৈশ্বর্য্যাণাং অভিব্যক্তিঃ পরেণ পরেণ উত্তরোত্তরং ভূয়সী ভবতি"—(বেঁ ভাষ্য)। "উত্তরোত্তরমাবিস্তরত্বমাত্মনঃ"—ইত্যাদি (ঐত ব্রাহ্মণ শঙ্কর ভাষা)।

† "যস্য চ যস্মাদাত্মলাভঃ, স তেন অপ্রবিভক্তো দৃষ্টঃ"……"ন তত এব নির্ভিদ্য গ্রহীতুং শক্যতে"।

‡ "সোপিতু জীবস্য জ্ঞানৈশ্বর্য্যাতিরোভাবঃ…দেহেন্দ্রিয় মনোবুদ্ধিবিষয়বেদনাদি যোগাৎ ভবতি"—বেদাঁ ভাষ্য, ৩।২।৬

"জীবেশ্বরয়োরপি জ্ঞানৈশ্বর্য্য-শক্তী"—৩।২।৫

—সর্ব্বত্র "সমদর্শন"—প্রতিষ্ঠিত হইবে। বেদান্ত-বিচারের হহাহ মহৎ ফল।

ইহার ফলে হইবে এই যে,—একজন লোক প্রতিকুল অবস্থায় পড়িয়া দুঃখদারিদ্র্যের পীড়নে নিপীড়িত হইতেছে; ক্লেশ ও অভাবের নিষ্পেষণে, উহার মধ্যে নিহিত—অনুস্যূত—ভগবদভিপ্রায়—জ্ঞান-শক্তি-ঐশ্বর্য্য—অভিব্যক্ত হইতে পারিতেছে না। তুমি আপন ক্ষুদ্র স্বার্থ ভুলিয়া, উহার ঐ প্রতিকুল অবস্থা দূর করিয়া দিয়া, উহাকে দুঃখদৈন্যদরিদ্রতার কবল হইতে রক্ষার চেষ্টা করিয়া, যাহাতে উহার মধ্যনিহিত 'মনুষ্যত্বের' ভালরূপে অভিব্যক্তি হয়, তজ্জন্য চেষ্টা করিতে পারিবে। ভগবানের মঙ্গল অভিপ্রায় সুসিদ্ধ হইবে।

বেদান্ত-বিচারে এইপ্রকারে "সমদর্শন" উপস্থিত হয়। পরের দুঃখ দূর করিবার প্রবৃত্তি জাগিয়া উঠে। যাহাতে ঐ দুঃখীও জ্ঞানবান্ ও শক্তি-সম্পন্ন হইয়া অপরের উপকারে সমর্থ হয়, তাদৃশ প্রবৃত্তি উৎপন্ন হয়। ইহাই বেদান্ত-কথিত "সমদর্শন"। এই প্রকার বিচারের ফলে রাগদ্বেষের নাশ হয়। ভেদ-বুদ্ধির পরিবর্ত্তে—'সর্ব্বাত্ম—ভাব, উপস্থিত হয়।

মানুষের কথা ত দূরে। একদিন দেবতাদেরও ভেদ-বুদ্ধি উপস্থিত হইয়াছিল। ভগবৎ-শক্তির কথা ভুলিয়া, তাঁহারা নিজেরাই যে অসুর-জয় করিয়াছিলেন, তজ্জন্য গর্ব্ব করিয়া বেড়াইতেছিলেন *। ভগবৎশক্তি হইতে স্বাতন্ত্র্য কাহারই নাই। সর্ব্বত্র ভগবৎ-শক্তি অভিব্যক্ত। জগৎসৃষ্টির অপর কোন উদ্দেশ্য নাই। সর্ব্বত্র ভগবৎ-শক্তির অনুভবই উহার একমাত্র উদ্দেশ্য।

২। 'শুভবাসনার' বা ধর্ম্মের আচরণ।—আমাদের স্বাভাবিক রাগদ্বেষাদি মলিন-বাসনা,—আমাদিগকে অবশ-ভাবে কর্ম্মে প্রবৃত্ত করাইয়া থাকে।† কিন্তু

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* কেনোপনিষদ দ্রষ্টব্য।

† "তাসাং পরিত্যাগোনাম—তদ্বিরুদ্ধ মৈত্রাদি বাসনোৎপাদনং"। শঙ্করও বলিয়াছেন—"রাগদ্বেষৌ তৎ-প্রতিপক্ষেণ নিযময়তি" এবং "অন্তশ্চ শৌচং প্রতিপক্ষভাবনয়া রাগাদিমলাপনয়নং" (গী° ভাষ্য, ৩।৩৪ and ১৩।৭)।

আত্মা সেই রাগ-দ্বেষাদির দাস হইয়া থাকিবে কেন? আত্মা স্বতন্ত্র; আত্মা স্বাধীন। তাই বেদান্তে মলিন-বাসনা পরিত্যাগের ব্যবস্থা আছে। এই সকল মলিনবাসনার বিরোধী 'শুভবাসনার' উৎপাদন দ্বারা উহা বিনষ্ট হইয়া যায়।

মধুসূদন বলিয়া দিয়াছেন যে—"মৈত্রী, করুণা, মুদিতা, উপেক্ষা এবং 'অমানিত্ব প্রভৃতি' এবং 'অভয়-সত্বশুদ্ধি" প্রভৃতি ধর্ম্মের আচরণ দ্বারা মলিন-বাসনা নষ্ট হইয়া, 'সমদর্শন" উপস্থিত হয় এবং চিত্ত সদ্‌গুণে পুর্ণ হইয়া উঠে। *

রাগ-দ্বেষমূলক কর্ম্মে,—অপরের প্রতি অনুগ্রহ বা অপরের দুঃখ ও পীড়া আনয়ন করে। যাহা দুঃখোৎপাদক, তাহার উপরে স্বভাবতই আমাদের ক্রোধ জ্বলিয়া উঠে এবং আমরা তাহার নিগ্রহ ও পীড়া উৎপাদন করিয়া থাকি। ক্রমে আমারদের মিত্র ও শত্রুর সংখ্যা বৃদ্ধি পাইতে থাকে †। শঙ্কর বলিয়াছেন—"রাগ-দ্বেষ, মায়া, বঞ্চনা অনৃত—মূলক ব্যবহারই ত "সংসার"। তৎপরিবর্ত্তে যদি মৈত্রী, করুণা, অমানিত্ব—পুর্ণ ব্যবহার সকলের সঙ্গে করিতে পার, তাহা হইলেই সংসারের উচ্ছেদ হইল" ‡। আমরা

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* পতঞ্জলি বলিয়াছেন—"মৈত্রী করুণা মুদিতোপেক্ষাণাং—সুখদুঃখ পুণ্যাপুণ্য বিষয়াণাং ভাবনাত-শ্চিত্তপ্রসাদনং"। "মৈত্রাদি চতুষ্টয়ঞ্চ উপলক্ষণং—'অভয়ং সত্বসংশুদ্ধি রিত্যাদীনাং, 'অমানিত্বানাঞ্চ' ধর্ম্মাণাং সর্ব্বেষামেতেষাং শুভবাসনারূপত্বেন মলিনবাসনানিবর্ত্তকত্বাৎ',)গীতা ভাষ্যে মধুসূদন)।

['অভয়ং সত্বসংশুদ্ধি ' প্রভৃতি—গীতা, ১৬।১—শ্লোক দ্রষ্টব্য।]

'অমানিত্ব, প্রভৃতি—গীতা, ১৩।৮-১১ শ্লোক দ্রষ্টব্য।

† "শত্রু মিত্র যোগনিমিত্তৌ হি তেষাং রাগদ্বেষৌ"—ছা° ভা° ৫।১০।২

‡ মানিত্বং, দম্ভিত্বং, হিংসা অক্ষান্তিঃ, অনার্জ্জব ইত্যাদি 'অজ্ঞানং বিজ্ঞেয়ং পরিহরণায়;- সংসার-প্রবৃত্তি-কারণত্বাৎ (গীতা° ভাষ্য, ১৪।১১।

"সাহঙ্কারাভিসন্ধীনি-কর্ম্মানি ফলারম্ভকানি, ন ইতরাণি'। (১৩।২৩)। "অবিদ্যা-কামবীজং হি সর্ব্বমেব কর্ম্ম..... অজ্ঞাঃ কর্ম্মিনঃ গতাগতং কামকামাঃ লভন্তে। ভগবৎকর্ম্মকারিণো যে...তে উত্তরোত্তর হীনফলত্যাগাবসান সাধনাঃ—ইত্যাদি গীতাভাষ্য, ১৮।৬৬। এইজন্যই গীতা সিদ্ধান্ত করিয়াছেন যে, কর্ম্মের ফল ও আসক্তি ত্যাগ করিবে, কর্ম্মত্যাগ করিবে না।

শঙ্কর বলিয়াছেন—"বন্ধস্বভাবান্যপি কর্ম্মাণি, সমত্ববুদ্ধ্যা স্বভাবাৎ নিবর্ত্তন্তে (গী° ভা° ২।৫০)। "অবিদ্যা-কাম-ক্লেশবীজনিমিত্তানি হি কর্ম্মাণি জন্মান্তরাঙ্কুরমারভন্তে (১৩।২৩)। অতএব মৈত্রাদিচালিত কর্ম্ম দ্বারা বন্ধন-নাশ হয় ও মুক্তি ঘটে।

তাহা হইলেই দেখিতেছি যে, যেখানেই 'কর্ম্ম-ত্যাগের' কথা আছে, সেইখানেই রাগ-দ্বেষ, দম্ভ-দর্পাদি মূলক 'কর্ম্মের' কথাই বুঝিতে হইবে।

(a) মৈত্রী, করুণা, মুদিতা—মূলক কর্ম্ম দ্বারা 'সমদর্শন' প্রতিষ্ঠিত হয়। সকলের মধ্যেই নারায়ণ অবস্থান করিতেছেন; সর্ব্বত্র ভগবদভিপ্রায় অভিব্যক্ত হইতেছে। সুতরাং অপরের সুখ ও আনন্দ দেখিলে, যেন তুমি নিজেই সেই সুখ ও আনন্দ ভোগ করিতেছ,—ইহাই মনে করিবে; উহাকে ঈর্ষা বা উপেক্ষা প্রদর্শন করিবে না। নিজের মনে করিয়া হর্ষ প্রকাশ করিবে। যেমন আমি,—নিজের যাহাতে ইষ্ট হয় তাহাই সম্পাদন করিয়া থাকি; নিজের অনিষ্ট উৎপাদন করিতে ইচ্ছা করি না; তদ্রূপ, অন্যের ও কদাপি পীড়া বা অনিষ্ট উৎপাদন করিব না; যাহাতে উহার ইষ্ট হয়, তদ্রূপ কর্ম্মই করিব *। পরোপকারার্থ, পরের ইষ্ট করিবার জন্য, অপরের দুঃখ-দৈন্য দূর করিয়া, তন্মধ্যস্থ ভগবদভিপ্রায়ের অভিব্যক্তি হইবার পক্ষে সাহায্য করিব। এই প্রকারে, অপরের দুঃখ দর্শনে, নিজের দুঃখানুভবের মত, করুণায় হৃদয় ভরিয়া উঠিবে; কখনই পরের দুঃখে হর্ষ বা উপেক্ষা উপস্থিত হইবে না। আত্ম-স্বার্থ তুচ্ছ করিয়া, নিজের ন্যায় পরেরও দুঃখদুর্দ্দশা দূর করিবার নিমিত্ত কর্ম্ম করিব। এই প্রকারে কর্ম্ম করিতে অভ্যস্ত হইলে, রাগ-দ্বেষাদি বিনষ্ট হইয়া যাইবে। এই প্রকারে, যাহারা শুভকর্ম্মে নিযুক্ত রহিয়াছে, তাহাদের কর্ম্মে 'মুদিতা'—আনন্দ ও অনুমোদন আনিবে; কখনও তাদৃশ কর্ম্মের প্রতি হিংসা বা ঈর্ষা আনিবে না। অপরের শুভ কর্ম্মের অনুমোদন করিতে থাকিলে, নিজেরও শুভ কর্ম্ম করিবার প্রবৃত্তি জাগিয়া উঠিবে। আবার, যাহারা দুর্ভাগ্যবশতঃ কোন অশুভকার্য্যে লিপ্ত রহিয়াছে, তাহাদিগের কর্ম্মে অনুমোদন বা ঈর্ষা প্রকাশ না করিয়া, বরং উপেক্ষা প্রদর্শন করিবে। এই উপেক্ষার ফলে, নিজেরও আর কোন পাপ-কর্ম্ম করিবার প্রবৃত্তি উৎপন্ন হইবে না; পাপকর্ম্মে ঘৃণা উপস্থিত হইবে। অপরের সুখ-ভোগকে যেমন আপনারই সুখ-ভোগের তুল্য মনে করিয়া

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* মিত্রস্যাহং চক্ষুষা সর্ব্বাণি ভূতানি সমীক্ষ্যে— যজুর্ব্বেদ, অঃ ৩৬।১৮
আত্মৌপম্যেন সর্ব্বত্র সমং পশ্যতি যোঽর্জ্জুন। সুখং বা যদি বা দুঃখং—ইত্যাদি গীতা।

লইয়াছ, তদ্রূপ পর-গুণের প্রতিও একটা আনন্দানুভব উপস্থিত হইবে এবং অপরের সেই গুণ দেখিয়া, নিজেরও তাদৃশ গুণ অর্জ্জন করিবার ইচ্ছা আসিবে এবং তদনুরূপ কর্ম্মে আসক্তি জন্মিবে। এই প্রকারে জগতে মৈত্রী, করুণা প্রভৃতির সিংহাসন প্রতিষ্ঠিত হইবে। সমত্বদৃষ্টি জন্মিবে *।

(b) "অধ্যাত্ম জ্ঞান-নিত্যত্বং"—

তোমার যেটী পরম কল্যাণপ্রদ, তোমার যেটী পরম-পুরুষার্থ,—যাহাকে তুমি জীবনের লক্ষ্য বলিয়া বাছিয়া লইয়াছ ;—সেই লক্ষ্যটী যাহাতে অনবরত তোমার সম্মুখে উপস্থিত থাকে, তুমি লক্ষ্য-ভ্রষ্ট না হও, সেই ভাবে তোমার দেহেন্দ্রিয়াদির বলকে—সেই লক্ষ্য, সেই উদ্দেশ্য সিদ্ধির অনুকূল পথে সর্ব্ব-প্রযত্নে নিযুক্ত করিবে। ভাষ্যকার বলিয়াছেন—ইন্দ্রিয়াদির সমুদয় স্বাভাবিক বেগকে, জীবনের সেই মহালক্ষ্যসিদ্ধির অনুকূলে প্রেরণ করিবে ; তদ্দ্বারা সেই লক্ষ্যের বল সমধিক বৃদ্ধি প্রাপ্ত হইয়া উঠিবে ; স্বাভাবিক প্রবৃত্তি-গুলিও, ভগ্ন-তরীর মত, উচ্ছৃঙ্খল হইতে পারিবে না। সকল প্রবৃত্তি একমুখী হইবে †। পুরুষকার ও জ্বলন্ত উৎসাহের সহিত, সেই লক্ষ্য যাহাতে সম্যক্ সিদ্ধ হয়, তজ্জন্য নিয়ত ব্যাপৃত রহিবে।

(c) এইরূপে স্বাভাবিক রাগ-দ্বেষ, পরবঞ্চনা-মায়া প্রভৃতি নির্ম্মূল হইয়া যায়। এতদিন ইহারাই আত্মার প্রভু, আত্মার চালক ছিল! এখন হইতে, আত্মাই, আপন পুরুষার্থ-সিদ্ধির অনুকূল করিয়া লইয়া, সকল প্রবৃত্তিকে আপনার সেই মহৎ প্রয়োজন সাধনের উপযোগী করিয়া লন। এতদিন এই সকল মলিন-বাসনা আত্মাকে বাঁধিয়া রাখিয়াছিল। এখন আত্মাই উহাদিগকে বাঁধিয়া আপন অনুকূল-পথে উহাদিগকে প্রবর্ত্তিত করিলেন। পরোপকারে ও অহিংসায় জীবন ভরিয়া উঠিল। রাগ-দ্বেষ বিনষ্ট হইল। সর্ব্বত্র "সমদর্শন" প্রবুদ্ধ হইয়া উঠিল। এখন হইতে মৈত্রী, করুণাদি ধর্ম্মগুলি—তোমার হৃদয়কে ও তোমার কর্ম্মকে অধিকার করিল। ন্যায় ও মঙ্গলের

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* শঙ্কর বলিয়াছেন—"বন্ধস্বভাবাস্তপি কর্ম্মাণি সমত্ববন্ধ্যা স্বভাবাৎ নিবর্ত্তন্তে (গীতা ২।৫০)

† "ইন্দ্রিয়াত্ম্যপসংহারেণ, একাগ্রতয়া স্বাত্মসংবেদ্যতাপাদনং যোগঃ, তস্মিন্ ব্যবস্থানং তন্নিষ্ঠতা—এষা প্রধানা 'দৈবী সম্পৎ'। কার্য্যকারণ-সংঘাতস্য স্বভাবেন, সর্ব্বতঃ প্রবৃত্তস্য—সন্মার্গে এব নিরোধঃ কর্ত্তব্যঃ।

প্রতিষ্ঠা হইল। ধর্ম্ম-জীবন গঠিত হইল। আত্ম-সামর্থ্য জয়যুক্ত হইল। আত্মা —সকলের অতীত, স্বতন্ত্র। ব্যোম-বিহারী বিহঙ্গের মত * আত্মা মুক্ত। তুচ্ছ রাগ-দ্বেষ, ক্ষুদ্র ফলাকাঙ্খা—আত্মাকে বাঁধিবে কিরূপে? চঞ্চল সুখ-দুঃখের হিল্লোলে, আত্মাকে কম্পিত করিবে কিরূপে? আত্মার সামর্থ্য—অটল অচল; উহা হিমাচলবৎ অপ্রকম্প্য। "মিথিলায়াং প্রদগ্ধায়াং ন মে দহ্যতি কিঞ্চন" !! "ন মৃত্যু র্ন শঙ্কা ন মে জাতি ভেদঃ" !!

(*d*) পাঠক, এই আলোচনা দ্বারা সুস্পষ্ট দেখিতে পাইতেছেন যে, মানবাত্মায় সদ্‌গুণ, সাধুবৃত্তির সম্যক্ বিকাশ ব্যতীত এবং পরের প্রতি মৈত্রী, করুণা প্রভৃতির কর্ষণ ও পুষ্টি ব্যতীত, কদাপি ব্রহ্মজ্ঞান উৎপন্ন হইতে পারে না বেদান্ত এই মহাশিক্ষা দিয়াছেন। বেদান্তের অপর শিক্ষা এই যে, মানুষ আপন আপন কর্ত্তব্য পালনে বিমুখ হইবে না। যে ব্যক্তি যে কার্য্যে নিযুক্ত রহিয়াছে. আপন কর্ত্তব্য বোধে সেই কার্য্যে সম্যক্ রত থাকিবে এবং ভগবানের হস্তে কর্ত্তব্য সমর্পণ করিয়া, সঙ্গে সঙ্গে সর্ব্বদা ভগবৎ-পরায়ণ হইয়া কর্ত্তব্য পালন করিবে। ভগবৎ-পরায়ণ হইয়া কর্ত্তব্য পালন করিতে থাকিলে, ক্রমে তদ্‌দ্বারা চিত্ত ব্রহ্মপ্রাপ্তির যোগ্য হইয়া উঠে। গীতা বলিয়া দিয়াছেন যে, যে ব্যক্তি ভগবৎ-পরায়ণ না হইয়া, কেবলমাত্র আপন কর্ত্তব্য পালন করিয়া যায়; তাহাদের পক্ষে ব্রহ্ম-লাভ সম্ভব-পর হইতে পারে না। ভগবন্নিষ্ঠা ব্যতীত কর্ত্তব্য-পালন দ্বারা চিত্তে জ্ঞানালোক ফুটিয়া উঠে না। এই জন্য, ভাষ্যকার বলিয়া দিয়াছেন যে, ঈশ্বরে চিত্ত অর্পণ করিয়া, আপন আপন কর্ত্তব্য পালন করিবে। † ইহাও ব্রহ্ম-প্রাপ্তির একটী মূল্যবান 'সাধন'। এ প্রকার সুস্পষ্ট উক্তি সত্ত্বেও, অনেকে সিদ্ধান্ত করিয়াছেন যে, বেদান্ত কর্ত্তব্য কর্ম্ম পরিত্যাগেরই পরামর্শ দিয়াছেন।—

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* ঋগ্বেদে জীবাত্মাকে "সুপর্ণ বলা হইয়াছে।

† "এতেষাং জাতিবিহিতানাং (যুদ্ধ-কৃষিবাণিজ্যাদীনাং) কর্ম্মণাং সম্যগনুষ্ঠিতানাং স্বর্গপ্রাপ্তিঃ ফলং স্বভাবতঃ।.....কারণান্তরাত্ত্ব ইদং বক্ষ্যমানং ফলং।...কিং স্বকর্ম্মানুষ্ঠানতঃ এব সাক্ষাৎ সংসিদ্ধিঃ? ন; কথং তর্হি?...স্বকর্ম্মণা প্রতিবর্ণং ঈশ্বরং অভ্যর্চ্চ্য কেবলং, জ্ঞাননিষ্ঠাযোগ্যতা-লক্ষণাং সিদ্ধিং বিন্দতি মানবঃ" —ইত্যাদি (গী০ ভা০, ১৮।৪৫-৪৬)।

"The tendency is apparent in the Upanishads towards an intelectualism which *forsook* the *performance of practical duties*" (Indian Theism).

(৪) বেদান্তে ধর্ম্মজীবন গঠনের কি প্রকার প্রণালী উল্লিখিত হইয়াছে, তাহা আমরা সংক্ষেপে বলিয়া আসিলাম। এই প্রকার ধর্ম্ম-জীবন অভ্যস্ত ও সুপরিপক্ক হইলে, "পরমার্থ দৃষ্টি" উপস্থিত হয়। এই "পরমার্থ দৃষ্টি" সম্বন্ধেও ভ্রান্ত ধারণা প্রচলিত আছে। তাই আমরা এ বিষয়ে দুই একটী কথা বলিয়া, আমাদের বক্তব্য শেষ করিব।

পরমার্থদৃষ্টি।

১। জগৎ-সম্বন্ধে—

(a) অবিদ্যাচ্ছন্ন জীবের স্বাভাবিক দৃষ্টি, জগতে অভিব্যক্ত নাম-রূপাদিতেই আবদ্ধ হইয়া পড়ে। আমরা জগতে নানাশ্রেণীর বস্তু দেখিতে পাই;—বৃক্ষজাতীয় বস্তু, পশু জাতীয় বস্তু, মনুষ্য জাতীয় বস্তু— কত জাতীয় বস্তু আমরা সর্ব্বদা * প্রত্যক্ষ করিতেছি। প্রত্যেক জাতিতে আবার অসংখ্য নাম-রূপ-ধারী 'ব্যক্তি' (Individuals) দেখিতে পাই। ইহাদের প্রত্যেকটী প্রত্যেকটী হইতে স্বতন্ত্র, ভিন্ন। আবার সকল বস্তুই সর্ব্বদা পরিণত হইতেছে, ইহাও সর্ব্বদা দৃষ্ট হয়। এমন বস্তু কদাপি পাওয়া যাইবে না, যাহা এক অবস্থা হইতে অপর অবস্থা না পাইতেছে। ইহাই বস্তুগুলির প্রকৃতি। দৃষ্টান্তের অভাব নাই। একটা বৃক্ষের কথা ভাবিয়া দেখ। উহার বীজাবস্থা বিনষ্ট হইবার পর, উহা অঙ্কুরাবস্থায় পরিণত হয়। আবার, অঙ্কুরাবস্থার পর, উহা বৃক্ষাবস্থায় পরিণত হয়। আমার প্রতি দৃষ্টিপাত কর। আমার বাল্যাবস্থার পরে যৌবনাবস্থা; যৌবনাবস্থা চলিয়া গিয়া, এখন প্রৌঢ়াবস্থায় উপনীত হইয়াছি। এইরূপ, মৃচ্চূর্ণাবস্থা চলিয়া যাইবার পর, পিণ্ডাবস্থা; পিণ্ডাবস্থার পর, ঘটাবস্থা দৃষ্ট হয়। পূর্ব্বাবস্থাটী, বর্ত্তমানাবস্থার 'কারণ'। এই বর্ত্তমানাবস্থাটী, উহার পূর্ব্বাবস্থার 'কার্য্য'। এই প্রকারে, কার্য্য-কারণ-সূত্রে আবদ্ধ থাকিয়া, প্রত্যেক বস্তু এক অবস্থা নাশের পর,

* ভাষ্যকার বলিতেছেন—"যদা তু স্বাভাবিক্যাঅবিদ্যয়া নামরূপোপাধি-দৃষ্টিরেব ভবতি স্বাভাবিকী, তদা সর্ব্বোঽয়ং বস্তুস্তরব্যবহারোঽস্তি"।

অপর অবস্থায় পরিণত হইতেছে, ইহাও আমরা সর্ব্বত্র সর্ব্বদা প্রত্যক্ষ করিয়া থাকি। বস্তুর এই সকল অবস্থা ছাড়া যে আবার কোন 'স্বতন্ত্র' পরমাত্মা বা অপর কোন বস্তু আছে, তাহা আর আমাদের দৃষ্টিগোচর হয় না। ইহারই নাম 'স্বাভাবিক দৃষ্টি"।

(b) কিন্তু যাঁহারা "পরমার্থ-দৃষ্টি" সম্পন্ন লোক, তাঁহারা বলেন যে—'আচ্ছা তোমার কথা মানিলাম। আমরা নানাশ্রেণীর বস্তু দেখিতেছি; ঐ সকল বস্তু এক অবস্থা হইতে অপর এক ভিন্ন অবস্থায় পরিণত হইতেছে;—এ কথাটাও মানিতেছি। উন্মাদ ভিন্ন এ কথাটা কেহ অস্বীকার করিতে পারিবে না *। প্রত্যক্ষ দেখিতেছি যাহা তাহা অস্বীকার করিলে, আমার ঔদ্ধত্য প্রকাশ পাইতে পারে, গায়ের জোর প্রকাশ পাইতে পারে;—কিন্তু আমার বুদ্ধিবৃত্তির তীক্ষ্ণতা প্রকাশ পাইবে না। ভাষ্যকারও বলিয়াছেন যে, "প্রত্যক্ষ দেখিতেছি এই জগৎ-প্রপঞ্চ 'বিদ্যমান' রহিয়াছে, ইহার অপলাপ করা ত কখনই সম্ভব হইতে পারে না" †। প্রত্যক্ষ দেখিতেছি মৃচ্চূর্ণাবস্থা চলিয়া গিয়া, ঘটাবস্থা উপস্থিত হইয়াছে;—ইহা অস্বীকার করা ত চলে না। মাটির পরিণতি ঘট;—ইহা নদী হইতে জল লইয়া আসিয়া আমার ক্ষুন্নিবৃত্তির সাহায্য করিতেছে; সর্ব্বদা আমার সাংসারিক প্রয়োজন—ব্যবহার—নিষ্পন্ন করিতেছি ‡। সুতরাং বস্তুর অবস্থান্তর-প্রাপ্তিও কখন অস্বীকার করা চলে না।

কিন্তু তুমি যে বলিলে যে, ইহা ছাড়া আর 'স্বতন্ত্র' কোন পরমাত্মা নাই,—এই কথাটা তোমার আমরা মানি না। নাম-রূপাদি সকল অবস্থান্তরের মধ্যে একটা জিনিষ অনুস্যূত হইয়া আসিতেছে। উহা আপন 'স্বাতন্ত্র্য' বজায় রাখিয়াই, অবস্থান্তর গুলির মধ্যে অনুগত হইয়া আসিতেছে। এই অবস্থান্তর-

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* কথাটা এই যে, ব্রহ্ম যখন বিকারগুলি হইতে 'স্বতন্ত্র' তখন বিকারগুলি থাকুক বা অবস্থান্তরিত হউক, তাহাতে সেই 'স্বাতন্ত্র্যের' বা 'একত্বের' ক্ষতিহইবে কিরূপে? "নামরূপোপাধ্যস্তিত্বে, 'একমেবাদ্বিতীয়ং ইতি প্রতয়ো বিরুধ্যেরন্ ইতি চেৎ? ন; মৃদাদিদৃষ্টান্তৈঃ পরিহৃতত্বাৎ" (বৃ০ ভা০, ৩।৫।১)।

† "যদি তাবৎ বিদ্যমানোয়ং বাহ্যঃ পৃথিব্যাদিলক্ষণঃ, আধ্যাত্মিকশ্চ দেহেন্দ্রিয়াদিলক্ষণঃ—প্রপঞ্চঃ প্রবিলাপয়িতুং উচ্যেত···স পুরুষমাত্রেণ অশক্যঃ প্রবিলাপয়িতুং"—ইত্যাদি। ‡ অর্থক্রিয়াকারিত্বরূপং ব্যবহারিকং সত্বং অস্তি"। "ইদানীং প্রত্যক্ষগোচরতয়া, ন মৃষাত্বং বক্তুং যুজ্যতে"। "সত্যত্বং ইন্দ্রিয় বিষয়াদ্যপেক্ষয়া"।

গুলি সেই স্বাতন্ত্র্যের হানি করিতে পারে না। দৃষ্টান্তের অভাব নাই। রজ্জু-সর্প, শুক্তি-রজত, মরু-মরীচিকা প্রভৃতির দৃষ্টান্ত লও। সর্পাবস্থার প্রতীতি হইতেছে; কিন্তু রজ্জু ত প্রকৃতই অবস্থান্তরিত হইয়া পড়ে নাই। উহা স্বতন্ত্র রহিয়াই, সর্পাবস্থা পাইয়াছে; রজ্জুটা প্রকৃতই সর্প হইয়া উঠে নাই। তুমি যে আবার অবস্থান্তর গুলির মধ্যেই কার্য্য-কারণের কল্পনা করিতেছ, সেটাও ঠিক্ কথা নহে। যাহা অনুস্যূত হইয়া আসিতেছে, সেই জিনিষটাই প্রকৃতপক্ষে ঐ সকল অবস্থান্তরের 'কারণ'। উহা হইতে অবস্থান্তর উৎপন্ন হইয়াছিল এবং উহাই সকল অবস্থান্তরের মধ্যে আপন স্বাতন্ত্র্য হারায় নাই *।

পরমার্থ-দৃষ্টি সম্পন্ন লোকেরা এই প্রকার কথা বলেন। তাঁহাদিগকে কিন্তু জিজ্ঞাস্য এই যে, 'মহাশয়! আপনারা ত অবস্থান্তর গুলিকে স্বীকার করিতেছেন। এবং আপনারা ঐ অবস্থান্তর-গুলির মধ্যে অনুগত একটা জিনিষ স্বীকার করিতেছেন এবং উহা স্বতন্ত্র থাকিয়াই প্রত্যেক অবস্থান্তরের মধ্যে অনুগত—ইহাই বলিতেছেন। যদি তাহাই হয়, তবে আমি আপনা-দিগকে জিজ্ঞাসা করিব যে, এই উভয়ের সম্বন্ধ তবে কি প্রকার হইবে? এই অবস্থান্তর-গুলির সঙ্গে, সেই অনুস্যূত জিনিষটার সম্বন্ধ কি প্রকার?

ভাষ্যকার উত্তর দিয়াছেন—

'পরমাত্মাই এই নাম-রূপাদি বিকারগুলির মধ্যে অনুস্যূত রহিয়াছেন। এই বিকার-গুলি, এই অবস্থান্তর-গুলি প্রকৃত পক্ষে তাঁহা হইতে 'স্বতন্ত্র' কোন বস্তু নহে। ইহারা উৎপন্ন হইবার পূর্ব্বে, মধুতে রসের ন্যায়, কাষ্ঠে অগ্নির ন্যায়, ঘৃতে মাধুর্য্যের ন্যায়, তাঁহারই মধ্যে অবিভক্ত-ভাবে ছিল। বর্ত্তমানেও, তাঁহাতেই ঐভাবে রহিয়া,—ইহারা এক অবস্থা হইতে অবস্থান্তর প্রাপ্ত হইতেছে। আবার তাঁহারই মধ্যে পুনরায় ইহারা বিলীন হইয়া যাইবে। সুতরাং ইহাদের স্বতন্ত্রতা কৈ? প্রকৃত কারণের সহিত, উহার কার্য্য বা অবস্থান্তর-গুলির এই প্রকারই সম্বন্ধ †। যাহা হইতে যাহার অভিব্যক্তি

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* "অসতঃ শশবিষাণাদেঃ সমুৎপত্ত্যদর্শনাৎ অস্তি জগতো মূলং"। "তচ্চেৎ অসৎ কার্য্যং, ন তস্য কারণেন সম্বন্ধধী রিতি অসদেব কারণমপি স্যাৎ"।

† "একমেব দ্রব্যং.....সংস্থান ভেদমাপদ্যমানং...কার্য্যাকারেণ পরিণমতে"। "দৃষ্টং হি লোকে জলে বীচি-তরঙ্গ-ফেন-বুদ্বুদাদয়ঃ উত্থিতাঃ, পুনস্তদ্ভাবংগতাঃ বিনষ্টা ইতি"। "সামান্যাৎ হি বিশেষাঃ উৎপদ্যন্তে .....সামান্যে লব্ধসত্তাকানামেব কর্ম্মণা স্পষ্টীকরণং",(ছা° ভাষ্য)।

হয়, তাহাকে ছাড়িয়া সে থাকিতে—পারে না; তাহা হইতে বিভক্ত হইয়া সে থাকিতে পারে না *। মৃত্তিকা হইতে উৎপন্ন ঘটাদি যে কোন অবস্থাই ধারণ করুক না কেন; মৃত্তিকা হইতে বিভক্ত হইয়া, মৃত্তিকার স্বরূপকে ত্যাগ করিয়া, মৃত্তিকার স্বরূপ হইতে অন্য কোন স্বতন্ত্র বা 'ব্যতিরিক্ত' স্বরূপ লইয়া, ঘট কখনই উৎপন্ন হইতে পারিবে না, থাকিতেও পারিবে না †। অতএব, নামরূপাদি বিকারাত্মক জগৎটাও—ব্রহ্মস্বরূপ হইতে কোন স্বতন্ত্র বা ভিন্ন বস্তু হইতে পারে না। অবস্থান্তর-গুলি, সেই অনুসূ্যত কারণ-স্বরূপেরই পরিচায়ক; কোন স্বতন্ত্র বস্তু নহে'।

অতএব আমরা দেখিতেছি যে, অবস্থান্তর-গুলিকে, নাম-রূপাদি বিকার-গুলিকে উড়াইয়া দিবার কোন প্রয়োজন থাকিতেছে না। জগৎকে অস্বীকার বা অপলাপ করিবার, কোনই প্রয়োজন নাই ‡।

২। জীবাত্মা সম্বন্ধেও অবিকল এই তত্ত্বই বুঝিতে হইবে—

(a) আমাদের 'স্বাভাবিক দৃষ্টিতে,' আমরা কাহাকে 'জীব' বলিয়া থাকি? বাহিরের জগৎ, আমাদের ইন্দ্রিয়ের উপরে ক্রিয়া করিতেছে; আমরা জগৎ হইতে নানা প্রকার জ্ঞানাদি অর্জ্জন করিতেছি। আবার, আমরা আমাদের স্বভাব-সিদ্ধ রাগ-দ্বেষাদি চালিত হইয়া নানা প্রকার কর্ম্মে ব্যাপৃত হইয়া রহিয়াছি। যেটী সুখকর, সেই বস্তু বা লোককে প্রিয় মনে করিয়া উহার প্রতি আসক্ত হইতেছি। আবার যেটী দুঃখজনক, উহার উপরে ক্রোধে রক্তচক্ষুঃ হইতেছি, এবং উহাকে শত্রু মনে করিয়া, উহাকে হিংসা ও উহার পীড়া উৎপাদন করিতেছি। ইহাই 'জীব'। ইহা ছাড়া যে আবার 'স্বতন্ত্র' কেহ জীবাত্মা আছে, তাহা নহে। আবার, আমার এক অবস্থা চলিয়া গিয়া,

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* "যস্য চ যস্মাদাত্মলাভো জায়তে, স তেন অপ্রবিভক্তো দৃষ্টঃ, যথা ঘটাদীনাং মৃদা"।

† "কার্য্যংহি কারণস্য অন্তর্বর্ত্তি ভবতি"। "সামান্যাৎহি কারণাৎ আত্মলাভো বিশেষাণাং (কার্য্যাণাং); সামান্যব্যতিরিক্তস্বরূপানুপলব্ধেঃ.....অতঃ স্বরূপ-প্রদানেন বিভর্ত্তি" (বৃ°-আনন্দগিরি) "নন্বু সর্ব্বাত্মত্বে দুঃখসম্বন্ধোপি স্যাদিতি চেৎ? ন; দুঃখস্যাপি আত্মত্বোপ গমাৎ। "ছা° ভা°, ৮।১২।১

‡ "যদাতু পরমার্থ দৃষ্ট্যা অস্যত্বেন নিরূপ্যমাণে নামরূপে.....বস্ত্বন্তরে তত্ত্বতো ন স্তঃ, তদা একমেবাদ্বিতীয়ং পরমার্থদর্শনগোচরতাং প্রতিপদ্যতে"। "ন চ নামরূপব্যবহারকালে তু অবিবেকিনাং ক্রিয়াকারকাদিসংব্যবহারোনাস্তীতি প্রতিষিধ্যতে।.....ন চ পরমার্থাবধারণনিষ্ঠায়াং বস্ত্বন্তরাস্তিত্বং প্রতিপদ্যামহে...তেন ন কশ্চিৎ বিরোধঃ" (বৃ° ভা°, ৩।৫।১)।

অপর এক অবস্থা উৎপন্ন হইতেছে। আমার এইরূপে সর্ব্বদাই অবস্থান্তর ঘটিতেছে। পূর্ব্বাবস্থার সহিত বর্ত্তমানাবস্থাটী কার্য্য-কারণ- সূত্রে আবদ্ধ। আমাদের নিকট ইহাই 'জীব'।

(b) এস্থলেও, পরমার্থ-দৃষ্টি সম্পন্ন লোকেরা বলিবেন যে,—'তুমি সর্ব্বদাই অবস্থান্তরিত হইতেছ। রাগ-দ্বেষ-প্রেরিত হইয়া বিবিধ কর্ম্মে নিযুক্ত রহিয়াছ। এ সকল কথা আমরা অস্বীকার করিতেছি না। কিন্তু তুমি যে বলিলে যে, ইহা ছাড়া আবার 'স্বতন্ত্র' কে আছে যে তাহাকে 'জীব' বলিব? —তোমার এই কথাটা আমরা স্বীকার করিতে পারি না'। পরমার্থ-দৃষ্টি সম্পন্ন লোকেরা এ সম্বন্ধেও, দুই প্রকার কথা বলেন—

(i) প্রথম কথা এই যে,—তুমি এই যে তোমার অবস্থান্তরগুলির কথা বলিলে; তুমি যে বলিলে যে পূর্ব্বাবস্থা চলিয়া গিয়া বর্ত্তমানাবস্থা তোমার উপস্থিত হইয়াছে; এখানে একটী জিজ্ঞাস্য আছে। এই দুইটা অবস্থাই যে তোমার—তুমিই যে পূর্ব্বাবস্থা ত্যাগ করিয়া বর্ত্তমানাবস্থা গ্রহণ করিয়াছ, এ কথা তুমি কি প্রকারে বুঝিতেছ? পূর্ব্বাবস্থাটা ত অতীতাবস্থা; উহা ত চলিয়া গিয়াছে; উহা ত এখন আর নাই। বর্ত্তমানাবস্থাটা ত বর্ত্তমান কালে আবদ্ধ। সুতরাং এই বর্ত্তমানাবস্থাটা যে, অতীতাবস্থারই ফল, তাহা কেমন করিয়া হয়? তুমি বলিবে যে, তুমি নিজে অনুভব করিতেছ (Recognition) যে, এটি পূর্ব্বাবস্থা হইতেই উৎপন্ন। কিন্তু এই যে তুমি নিজে বুঝিতে পারিতেছ যে দুই অবস্থাই তোমার; ইহার প্রকৃত কারণ এই যে,—এই দুই অবস্থা হইতে 'স্বতন্ত্র',— এই দুই অবস্থারই 'অতীত,'—আত্মা আছেন। সেই আত্মাই, ঐ দুই অবস্থাকে বাঁধিয়া রাখিয়াছেন *। পূর্ব্বাবস্থাটাও তোমারি অবস্থা; বর্ত্তমানাবস্থাটাও সেই তোমারি অবস্থা। দুই অবস্থার মধ্যেই এক 'তুমিই' অবিকৃত-ভাবে অনুস্যূত রহিয়াছ। সেই জন্যই বুঝিতে পারিতেছ যে, উভয়টীই তোমারি অবস্থা। অবস্থা দুইটি পরস্পর 'ব্যাবৃত্ত' (Discontinuous) ও 'ব্যভিচারী' (Mutually exclusive)। কিন্তু

* "অন্বয়িদ্রব্যমেব সর্ব্বত্র 'কারণং' ভবতি, ন পিণ্ডাদিবিশেষঃ,—অনন্বয়াৎ, অব্যবস্থানাচ্চ"। "ন হি কারণোপষ্টম্ভমন্তরেণ অবিভ্রংশমানং কার্য্যং স্থাতু মুৎসহতে"। "পূর্ব্বাপরকালয়ো রিতরেতরবিচ্ছেদঃ, অবিশিষ্টস্তু কর্ত্তা" (বৃ° ভা° ১।৪।৭)।

উভয় অবস্থান্তরের মধ্যে তোমার একত্ব অনুগত (continuous identity) রহিয়াছে। সুতরাং ঐ অবস্থান্তর-গুলিই যে 'জীব' তাহা নহে। জীব প্রকৃত সে, যে এই অবস্থান্তর-দ্বয় হইতে স্বতন্ত্র রহিয়াই, অবস্থাদ্বয়কে বাঁধিয়া রাখিয়াছে *। অবস্থান্তর-গুলিই একে অপরের কার্য্য বা কারণ নহে। ঐ আত্মাই প্রকৃত কারণ। পূর্ব্বাবস্থাটাই, পরাবস্থার 'কারণ' নহে। সেই আত্মাই, সকল অবস্থান্তরের 'কারণ' এবং সকল অবস্থান্তরের মধ্যে অনুস্যূত।

(ii) পরমার্থদর্শীগণ আরো একটা কথা বলিয়া থাকেন। এই যে তুমি আপনার সুখ-প্রাপ্তির জন্য লালায়িত; অপরের অনিষ্ট করিয়াও, অনেক সময়ে, কেবল নিজের সুখ উৎপাদনের জন্য ব্যস্ত হইয়া পড়; —ইহার কারণ ত্রই যে, যিনি তোমার মধ্যে রহিয়াছেন, তিনি—

"প্রেয়ঃ পুত্রাৎ, প্রেয়ঃ বিত্তাৎ প্রেয়ো ঽন্যস্মাৎ সর্ব্বস্মাৎ"।

এই নিমিত্তই তুমি সুখ চাহিয়া থাক। প্রকৃত কথা ইহাই। "সুখের জন্যই যে সুখ, বা দুঃখের জন্যই যে দুঃখ তাহা নহে" †। সমস্ত বস্তুই—"তদর্থ"। 'যাঁহার প্রয়োজন-সাধনার্থ এবং যাঁহার দ্বারা প্রেরিত হইয়া, তোমার ইন্দ্রিয়-মন-বুদ্ধি প্রভৃতি সমবেতভাবে ক্রিয়াশীল, তিনি ঐ সকল হইতে ভিন্ন, স্বতন্ত্র" ‡। এমন পরম-প্রিয় আত্মা তোমার মধ্যে অবস্থিত, তাই অন্য বস্তু তোমার প্রিয়। এইরূপ, অন্যের সম্বন্ধেও বুঝিতে হইবে। তুমি যেমন তোমার প্রিয়, তোমার সুখের অন্বেষণ করিয়া থাক;—তদ্রূপ, অপর সকলের মধ্যেও সেই পরম-প্রিয় আত্মবস্তু আছেন এবং তজ্জন্যই সকলেই, তাহাদের যাহা প্রিয়, তাহাদের যাহা সুখকর,—তাই চায়, তারই অনুসন্ধান করে। তবেই, তুমি কাহারই দুঃখ উৎপাদন করিতে পার না; কাহারই দুঃখ উৎপাদন করিতে তোমার অধিকার নাই।

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* "কথং হি অহমদোঽ দ্রাক্ষং, ইদং পশ্যামীতি চ—পূর্ব্বোত্তরদর্শিনি একস্মিন্নসতি প্রত্যভিজ্ঞাপ্রত্যয়ঃ স্যাৎ"। "অন্যথাভবত্যপি জ্ঞেয়ে, জ্ঞাতুর্ন অন্যথা ভাব অস্তি"। "অবস্থাত্রয়সাক্ষী একঃ.....অবস্থাত্রয়েণ ব্যভিচারিণা ন সংস্পৃশ্যতে"। "অনুগতঃ.....ব্যাবৃত্তেভ্যঃ...স্বতন্ত্রঃ—মধুসূদন।

† "স্বার্থাঃ সর্ব্বাঃ প্রবৃত্তয়ঃ ব্যর্থাঃ প্রসজ্যেরন্। ন চ দেহাদ্যচেতনার্থং শক্যং কল্পয়িতুং। নচ সুখার্থং সুখং; নচ দুঃখার্থং দুঃখং"—গীতা০ ভা০ ১৮।৫০

‡ "যদর্থাঃ যৎপ্রযুক্তাশ্চ ঐন্দ্রিয়িকাশ্চেষ্টাঃ স অন্যঃস্মতঃ। "তচ্চ একার্থবর্ত্তিত্বেন সংহননঃ অন্যত্বেন পরমসংহতংন ভবতি"।

তবেই আমরা দেখিতেছি যে, এ স্থলেও, জীবের 'কর্ম্ম' উড়াইয়া দিবার কোন প্রয়োজন নাই *। কর্ম্ম উড়াইয়া দিবার কোন প্রয়োজন উপস্থিত হইতেছে না; কেবলমাত্র কর্ম্মের গতি ফিরাইয়া দিতে হইবে।—

"যোগঃ কর্ম্মসু কৌশলং"।

রাগ-দ্বেষাদি চালিত হইয়া, আত্মার স্বাতন্ত্র্য ভুলিয়া গিয়া,—তুমি ও অনিষ্ট করিয়াও, আত্ম-সুখ-লাভের নিমিত্ত ব্যস্ত হইয়া পড়িয়াছ। এইটা ঘুরাইয়া দিতে হইবে।

পরমাত্মা যেমন আমাতে, তেম্‌নি তোমাতে, তেম্‌নি তিনি সর্ব্বত্র। তিনি যেমন তোমার প্রিয়, তেম্‌নি আমারও প্রিয়; সকলেরই প্রিয়। সুতরাং অপরের মধ্যে অবস্থিত সেই পরমাত্মার প্রিয় সম্পাদন করিতে হইবে; অপরের মধ্যে অবস্থিত পরমাত্মার অনিষ্ট বা পীড়া উৎপাদন করিতে পারিবে না। কেননা, তাহা হইলে, প্রকৃতপক্ষে, তোমার নিজেরই অনিষ্ট উৎপাদন করাই হইবে। বেদান্ত বলিতেছেন,—শুভ বাসনা দ্বারা প্রেরিত হইয়া কর্ম্ম করিলেই,—মৈত্রী, করুণা প্রভৃতি দ্বারা চালিত হইয়া ক্রিয়া করিলেই,—স্বাভাবিক রাগদ্বেষাদি চলিয়া গিয়া, সর্ব্বত্র ব্রহ্ম-দর্শন প্রতিষ্ঠিত হইবে। একথায়, জীবের কর্ম্ম উড়াইয়া দেওয়া হইতেছে না। কেবল, 'স্বার্থপর" কর্ম্মের পরিবর্ত্তে, পর-মঙ্গলার্থ—জগতের কল্যাণার্থ—কর্ম্মানুষ্ঠানই আসিতেছে।

পাঠক দেখিতেছেন, শঙ্কর-মতে, জগতের কোন বিকারকেই যেমন উড়াইবার কোন প্রয়োজন উপস্থিত হয় না; জীবেও তদ্রূপ কর্ম্ম-ত্যাগের কোন প্রয়োজন উপস্থিত হয় না।

হস্তামলকের ভাষ্যে এই জন্যই শ্রীমৎশঙ্করাচার্য্য স্পষ্ট করিয়া বলিয়াছেন

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* "যথাপ্রাপ্তস্যৈব অবিদ্যাপ্রত্যুপস্থাপিতস্য, ক্রিয়াকারকফলস্য আশ্রয়েন……ক্রিয়াকারকফলভেদস্য লোকপ্রসিদ্ধস্য সত্যতাং অসত্যতাং বা ন আচষ্টে, ন চ বারয়তি।……ব্রহ্মৈকত্ববিদ্যায়াং…ব্রহ্মৈকত্বে নির্বিষয়ত্বাৎ তদ্‌গ্রহনফলাভাবদোষপরিহার উক্তো বেদিতব্যঃ, পুরুষেচ্ছা রাগাদি বৈচিত্র্যাচ্চ।…যস্য যথা অবভাসঃ, স তথারূপং পুরুষার্থং পশ্যতি, তদনুরূপানি সাধনানি উপাদিৎসতি।……তস্মাৎ ব্রহ্মৈকত্বে বেদান্তাঃ ন বিধিশাস্ত্রস্য বাধকাঃ"—বৃঁ ভা° ২।১ ২০

যে—জীবন্মুক্ত পুরুষেরও জগতের কল্যাণার্থ কর্ম্মানুষ্ঠান কর্ত্তব্য বলিয়া ঘোষণা করিয়াছেন—

জ্ঞানার্থত্বেন কর্ম্মণা মুপযোগো হস্ত্যেব। জ্ঞানোৎপত্তেস্তু পরং লোক-সংগ্রহার্থং অনুষ্ঠানং কর্ত্তব্য মেবেতি" *।

লোকে এ সকল কথা তলাইয়া দেখে না। মনে করে,—বেদান্তে Practical ধর্ম্মের কোন কথা নাই; সর্ব্বকর্ম্মত্যাগ করিয়া, 'জড়-ভরত' সাজিয়া থাকিবারই পরামর্শ আছে !!!

(iii) পরমার্থ-দর্শীরা আর এক প্রকারে বস্তুর অনুভব করেন, তদ্দ্বারা-ও স্বাভাবিক রাগ-দ্বেষাদি নির্মুল হইয়া যাইতে পারে। আমরা এই গ্রন্থের দ্বিতীয় অধ্যায়ে দেখাইয়াছি যে, সকল বস্তুরই আপন আপন স্বভাব বা স্বরূপ আছে। অন্য বস্তুর সংসর্গে, সেই স্বভাব হইতেই নানা ধর্ম্ম ও ক্রিয়াদির অভিব্যক্তি হয়। এ সকল ধর্ম্ম ও ক্রিয়াদি কোন 'স্বতন্ত্র' বস্তু নহে। ইহারা সেই স্বরূপেরই অভিব্যক্তি, সেই স্বরূপেরই পরিচায়ক। সকল বস্তুই তবে তত্তজ্জাতীয় শক্তির অভিব্যক্তি-ক্ষেত্র। একথাটা ভুলিয়া গিয়া আমরা স্বাভাবিক রাগ-দ্বেষাদি চালিত হইয়া, 'এটা সুখকর', ওটা দুঃখকর,'—এই প্রকারে সকলের সঙ্গে একটা 'স্বার্থের' সম্বন্ধ পাতাইয়া লইয়াছি। যে বস্তুর যেটী প্রকৃত স্বরূপ, সেই ভাবেই সেই বস্তুকে গ্রহণ করা কর্ত্তব্য। ইহা করিলে আর আপন সুখ-ভোগের আকাঙ্খা উদিত হইবে না। 'এটী আত্মার ভোগ্য বস্তু' 'ওটী আমার বিদ্বেষের বস্তু'—এই প্রকার ভাবনা শিথিল হইয়া উঠিবে। অতএব, বস্তুর স্বরূপ-চিন্তাও,—রাগদ্বেষাদির হস্ত হইতে নিষ্কৃতি লাভের একটা মূল্যবান্ 'সাধন'। এই উদ্দেশ্যেই শঙ্করাচার্য্য বলিয়াছিলেন—

"সংকল্পানুদয়ে হেতু র্যথাভূতার্থদর্শনং"।

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* শঙ্করের অনুগত শিষ্য মধুসূদন গীতায় বলিয়াছেন—

"যতাবসিদ্ধৌ রাগ-দ্বেষৌ অভিভূয় যদা শুভবাসনাপ্রাবল্যেন ধর্ম্ম পরায়ণো ভবতি, তদা স 'দেবঃ'। যদাত স্বভাবসিদ্ধরাগদ্বেষাদি প্রাবল্যেন অধর্ম্মপরায়ণোঃ ভবতি. তদা 'অসুরঃ'।

গীতার বিভূতি অধ্যায়ে স্বরূপ চিন্তার উপদেশ আছে *।

ব্রহ্ম-সাক্ষাৎকার।—

(৫) যখন পূর্ব্বোক্ত গুণ বা ধর্ম্মগুলির অনুশীলন দ্বারা চিত্ত পরিপূর্ণ হইয়া উঠিল, যখন আত্মার সকল ধর্ম্মের, সকল গুণের, সম্যক্ বিকাশও অভিব্যক্তি হইতে লাগিল; তখন সংসারাতীত পূর্ণ ব্রহ্ম-সাক্ষাৎকার ঘটে। তখন পরম-পুরুষার্থ লাভ হয়। তখন সকল কামনা, সকল উদ্যম, সকল যত্ন সকল চেষ্টা, সকল কর্ত্তব্য পরিসমাপ্ত হয়। তখন তোমার সকল আকাঙ্খা শেষ হইল। ঐ সংসারাতীত ব্রহ্মবস্তু—এই জগতের পর্য্যবসান-ভূমি।—

"কামস্যাপ্তিং জগতঃ প্রতিষ্ঠাং" +।

তাঁহাতে জীবের সকল কামনার শেষ হয়; এই ব্যক্ত জগৎ তাঁহাতে গিয়া প্রতিষ্ঠা প্রাপ্ত হয়। "সা কাষ্ঠা, সা পরা গতিঃ" ‡। জগতের ও জীবের সেই খানে গিয়া গতি শেষ হয়। তোমার সকল কর্ত্তব্য তাঁহাকে পাইলেই শেষ হইল; আর কোন কর্ত্তব্য অবশিষ্ট রহিল না।—

"ন আত্মানমনুভবতঃ কিঞ্চিদন্যৎ
কৃত্যমবশিষ্যতে" §।

জগতের কোন বস্তুতেই এতদিন—যত উচ্চ ও মহৎ বস্তুই হউক্ না কেন—তুমি পূর্ণ তৃপ্তি পাইতেছিলে না। তাঁহাকে পাইয়া আজ পূর্ণ তৃপ্তি ও তুষ্টি লাভ করিয়া কৃতার্থ হইলে।

"ন হি আত্মনঃ একত্বাত্মবগতৌ সত্যাং ভূয়ঃ কাচিদাকাঙ্খা উপজায়তে, পুরুষার্থ সমাপ্তিবুদ্ধ্যুৎপত্তেঃ'।

"তথৈব চ বিদুষাং তুষ্ট্যনুভবাদিদর্শনাৎ ¶।

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* গীতা, দশম অধ্যায়, ২০—৪২ শ্লোক এবং সপ্তম অধ্যায়, ৭—১২ শ্লোক দ্রষ্টব্য। "সম্যক্জ্ঞানেন যথা ভূতাত্মদর্শনেন ইত্যাদি" (মুণ্ডক ভাষ্য, ৩।১ ৫)।

+ কঠ, ১।২।১১

‡ বেদান্তভাষ্য ৪।১।২

§ "অত্রহি সর্ব্বে কামাঃ পরিসমাপ্তাঃ। জগতঃ সাধ্যাত্মাধিভূতাধিদৈবাদেঃ আশ্রয়ঃ সর্ব্বাত্মকত্বাৎ।

¶ বেদান্তভাষ্য, ৪।৩।১৪

ইঁহাকে পাইলে আর কোন যত্ন, চেষ্টা, উদ্যম করিতে হইবে না। কেন না, ইঁহাকে পাইবার জন্যই ত যত উদ্যম করিতেছিলে।

"নহি সম্যক্ দর্শনে কার্য্যে নিষ্পন্নে যত্নান্তরং কিঞ্চিৎ শাসিতুংশক্যং" *।
"প্রাক্ তদুৎপত্তেঃ তদর্থশ্চ প্রযত্ন উপপদ্যতে এব" *

তোমার সকল অনুষ্ঠান শেষ হইল; আর কোন অনুষ্ঠান করিতে হইবে না।—

"তদ্দর্শনস্য কৃতত্বাৎ নানুষ্ঠানান্তরং কর্ত্তব্যং" †।

তাঁহাকে পাইয়া তোমার অনুষ্ঠিত পুণ্যকর্ম্ম আজ কৃতার্থতা লাভ করিল; কেননা তিনিই "সুকৃত" ‡। সংসারের কোন আনন্দেই পূর্ণ তৃপ্তি পাইতেছিলে না। তাঁহাকে পাইয়া পরমানন্দের অধিকারী হইলে।—

"যত্র গণিতেভেদ-নিবৃত্তিঃ সা আনন্দস্য পরাকাষ্ঠা' §।

ইহা অপেক্ষা, আর কোন আনন্দলাভের জন্য উৎকণ্ঠিত হইতে হইবে না। এখানে পাপ, হিংসা, ঈর্ষা, প্রভৃতি প্রতিকুল শক্তির সহিত সংগ্রাম ও সংঘর্ষ শেষ হইয়া গিয়াছে। এক "সর্ব্বাত্মভাব" আসিয়াছে ¶। এখানে সকল বিরোধ শান্ত—সকলই ব্রহ্মভূত। সকল উচ্ছৃঙ্খল ইন্দ্রিয় ও প্রবৃত্তি সুনিয়ন্ত্রিত হইয়া গিয়াছে। নিরবচ্ছিন্ন ধর্ম্ম-জীবন প্রতিষ্ঠিত হইয়াছে। সব শান্ত, সব পূর্ণ।

জগদতীত ব্রহ্মসাক্ষাৎকার ঘটিলে, সকল কামনা ও সকল কর্ত্তব্য শেষ হইয়া যায়; কেননা এতদিন ইহাঁরই জন্য ত কামনা করা হইতেছিল এবং ইহাঁকে পাইবার আশায় কর্ম্ম করা হইতেছিল। এই উদ্দেশে, বেদান্তে কর্ম্ম

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* বেদান্তভাষ্য, ৪।১।১২ এবং বৃহ° ভাষ্য, ৪।৪।৬

† বৃ° ভাষ্য, ১।৪।৭ বেদান্তদর্শনের চতুঃসূত্রীতে কর্ম্মানুষ্ঠান নিষেধের অর্থ ইহাই।

‡ তৈত্তিরীয়, ২।৭।২

§ বৃ° ভাষা, ৪।৩।৩৩

¶ নহি যস্য আত্মৈব সর্ব্বংভবতি, তস্য অনাত্মা কাময়িতব্যোঽস্তি। সর্ব্বাত্মদর্শিনঃ কাময়িতব্যাভাবাৎ কর্ম্মানুপপত্তিঃ (বৃ° ভা° ৪।৪।৬)।

"সমস্তস্তু সন্ কুতো ভিদ্যতে, যেন বিরুধ্যতে বিরোধাভাবে কেন হন্যতে জীয়তে? বৃ° ৪।৩।২০

ও কামনাকে সর্ব্বাতীত ব্রহ্মের 'সাধন' বলা হয় নাই। মানুষের উত্তরোত্তর সকল উদ্যম, যত্ন, কামনা ও আকাঙ্খার, যেখানে পূর্ণতা প্রাপ্তি হয়, এমন একটা স্থানের কল্পনা করিতেই হইবে *। যে স্থানে আর কোন কর্ম্মও উদ্যম যাইতে পারে না; যেখানে আর কোন আকাঙ্খা উপস্থিত হইতে পারে না; সে স্থানেও যদি অপর কাহারও আকাঙ্খা কর, অপর কাহারও জন্য কর্ম্ম কর্ত্তব্য বলিয়া মনে কর, তাহা হইলে আরো অপর একটা স্থান কল্পনা করিতে হইবে, যে স্থানে সকলের পূর্ণ তৃপ্তি লব্ধ হইতে পারে। এই জন্যই, এই উদ্দেশ্যেই, শঙ্করাচার্য্য, বেদান্তদর্শনের চতুঃ সূত্রীতে, "কর্ম্ম দ্বারা কদাপি সর্ব্বাতীত নির্গুণ ব্রহ্মকে পাওয়া যায় না"—বলিয়া ঘোষণা করিয়াছেন। কেন না, নির্গুণ ব্রহ্ম সকল কর্ত্তব্য কর্ম্মের পর্য্যবসান-ক্ষেত্র; —সকল উদ্যম ও চেষ্টার বিশ্রান্তি-স্থান। সকল উন্নতির, সকল উত্তরোত্তর বৃদ্ধি-প্রাপ্ত গতির —একটা শেষ স্থান স্বীকার করিতে হইবে †। স্বীকার না করিলে, কোন্ বস্তুর সহিত তুলনা করিয়া, তুমি সংসারের ভাল ও মন্দ, ছোট ও বড়, নিম্ন ও উন্নত,—বস্তু গুলির তারতম্য নির্দ্ধারণ করিবে? একটা সর্ব্বাপেক্ষা উচ্চ, সর্ব্বাপেক্ষা সংসারাতীত, শেষ-পরিসমাপ্তির স্থান স্বীকার না করিলে,—সংসারের ছোট বড় বস্তুগুলিকে, পরস্পরের মধ্যে তুলনা দ্বারাই কেবল ছোট-বড় বলিতে হইবে। কিন্তু এ স্থলে, তুমি যেটাকে ছোট বস্তু বলিতেছ, সেটাকেই আমি যদি বড় বলিয়া নির্দ্ধারণ করি, তাহা হইলে কিরূপে—কাহার সহিত তুলনায়—এই বিবাদের নিষ্পত্তি করিবে? এই জন্যই ভাষ্যকার জগদতীত, সংসারাতীত, ব্রহ্মবস্তুকেই সকলের পর্য্যবসান-ভূমি বলিয়া ‡ নির্দ্দেশ করিয়াছেন। এখানে আসিয়া সকল কর্ত্তব্য শেষ হয়; সুতরাং কর্ম্ম আর ইহার 'সাধন' হইতে পারে না। "পূর্ণস্য পূর্ণমাদায় পূর্ণ-মেবাবশিষ্যতে" §।

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* শতগুণোত্তরোত্তরক্রমেণ বর্দ্ধমানঃ যত্র বৃদ্ধি কাষ্ঠামনুভবতি'—বৃ° ভাষ্য, ৪।৩।৩৩, "সতি হি অস্মিন্নবশিষ্যমনেঽর্থে আকাঙ্ক্ষাস্যাৎ (বৃ° ভা° ২।১।১৪

† "এবং, পরব্রহ্মবিদো···ন কথঞ্চন গতিরুপপাদয়িতুং শক্যা "ন হি গতমেব গম্যতে'—বেদান্তভাষ্য, ৪।৩।১৪ "আত্মা বৃদ্ধিবিবর্জ্জিতঃ ১।২।১৮

‡ "সূক্ষ্মত্ব—মহত্ব—প্রতাগাত্মত্বানাং সা কাষ্ঠা—নিষ্ঠা—পর্য্যবসানং' (কঠভা° ১।৩।১১ "সংসার—ব্যবহারো ভূম্নি নাস্তীতি সমুদায়ার্থঃ (ছা° ভা° ৭।২৪।১ § বৃহ° ভাষ্য, ৫।১।১

এই মহাতত্ত্বটী না বুঝিয়া, লোকে বলে,—বুঝি ব্রহ্ম-লাভ করিতে হইলে সকল কামনা, সকল উদ্যম, সকল কর্ম্ম একেবারে মুছিয়া ফেলিবার উপদেশ —বেদান্ত ও ভাষ্যকার উভয়ই দিয়া গিয়াছেন !!

হা ! দুরদৃষ্ট !!!

জীব যতদিন এই সংসারে বদ্ধ রহিয়াছে, ততদিন এ সংসারের কোন বস্তুতেই আকাঙ্খার পূর্ণ তৃপ্তিলাভ করিতে পারে না। কোন উদ্যমই—যত সৎউদ্যমই হউক্—শেষ হইয়া যায় না। এক সৎকার্য্যের অনুষ্ঠান কর, এইখানেই তোমার কর্ত্তব্য পরিসমাপ্ত হইল না। তদপেক্ষা অপর সৎকর্ম্ম করিবার আকাঙ্ক্ষা উপস্থিত হইবে। সংসারস্থ জীবের প্রকৃতিই এইরূপ। এ সংসারে পূর্ণরূপে সাধু হইয়াছ ; আর তোমার পক্ষে তদপেক্ষা উন্নত সাধু হইবার অবশিষ্ট কিছু নাই ;—এরূপ হইতে পারে না। একটী কল্যাণকর কার্য্য করিলে, আর তোমার পক্ষে অপর কল্যাণকর কার্য্য করিবার কিছুই নাই, ইহা সংসারে কদাপি সম্ভব নহে। যতই কল্যাণকারী হও, যতই পুণ্যকৃৎ হও ; তোমাকে এতদপেক্ষা আরো অধিকতর পুণ্যকর্ম্মকারী হইতে হইবে। এই পৃথিবীতে পুণ্যেরও শেষ নাই, কল্যাণেরও শেষ নাই। ভাষ্যকার বলিয়াছেন,—

"উত্তরোত্তর-হীন-ফলত্যাগাবসানসাধনাঃ ভগবৎকর্ম্মকারিণঃ"। "পূর্ব্বপূর্ব্বপ্রবৃত্তিনিরোধেন উত্তরোত্তরাপূর্ব্ব প্রবৃত্তিজননস্য প্রত্যগাত্মাভিমুখ্যেন প্রবৃত্ত্যুৎপাদনত্বাৎ।

পৃথিবীর অবস্থাই এই প্রকার। এখানে কোন বস্তুরই পূর্ণতা নাই ; সবই অপূর্ণ। এখানে আকাঙ্ক্ষারও শেষ নাই *, পরিসমাপ্তি নাই। এই জন্যই, সংসারাতীত ব্রহ্মে সকল আকাঙ্ক্ষার পূর্ণতা প্রাপ্তি ঘটে। তাঁহাতে সকল পুণ্য, সকল কল্যাণের পরাকাষ্ঠা ও সাফল্য সিদ্ধ হয়। তিনি, সেই সংসারাতীত ব্রহ্ম, সকল উন্নতির, সকল বৃদ্ধির চরম-ভূমি ও পরাকাষ্ঠা। এইখানে আসিয়া সকল উদ্যম, সকল কর্ম্ম, সকল চেষ্টার বিরতি হয়। যতদিন এই সংসারাতীত পরমাত্ম-বস্তুকে না পাইতেছ, ততদিন তোমার পুণ্যকর্ম্মের, সাধুকার্য্যের, কল্যাণকর কর্ত্তব্যের

* নৈবং উৎপত্ত্যাদিশ্রুতীনাং নিরাকাঙ্ক্ষার্থপ্রতিপাদনসামর্থ্যমস্তি'—বেদান্তভাষ্য, ৪।৩।১৪।

পরিসমাপ্তি অসম্ভব।* ততদিন তোমার পক্ষে পুরুষার্থ-লাভ শেষ হইবে না।

এই জন্যই বেদান্ত-গ্রন্থে ফলাকাঙ্ক্ষা বর্জ্জিত হইয়া পুণ্যকর্ম্ম আচরণের উপদেশ প্রদত্ত হইয়াছে। কর্ম্মই তোমার লক্ষ্য নহে। ধর্ম্ম-কর্ম্ম দ্বারা চিত্তের মালিন্য দূর করিয়া, পরমাত্ম-প্রাপ্তিই তোমার লক্ষ্য। কর্ম্মফল লাভই যদি উদ্দেশ্য হয়, তাহা হইলে ব্রহ্ম-প্রাপ্তি ত উদ্দেশ্য হইল না। জীবনের দুইটী উদ্দেশ্য হইতে পারে না। এক ব্রহ্ম-প্রাপ্তিই মানবের চরম উদ্দেশ্য। কর্ম্ম যাহাতে সেই চরম-উদ্দেশ্যে লইয়া যায়, তজ্জন্যই ত কর্ম্ম করিবার ব্যবস্থা প্রদত্ত হইয়াছে। সুতরাং কর্ম্ম করাটাই তোমার চরম উদ্দেশ্য হইতে পারে না। পুণ্যকর্ম্ম সেই সংসারাতীত ব্রহ্মে লইয়া যাইবার দ্বার মাত্র।

(৬) পরিশেষে আমরা এই ব্রহ্ম-সাক্ষাৎকার সম্বন্ধে আর একটী কথা বলিয়া পাঠকবর্গের নিকট হইতে বিদায় লইব। সেই কথাটী এই যে, শঙ্কর-মতে, ব্রহ্ম-প্রাপ্তির অবস্থায় জীবের স্বরূপের একান্ত বিনাশ হইবে কি না?† আমরা এই গ্রন্থের দ্বিতীয় অধ্যায়ে বলিয়াছি যে, শঙ্করাচার্য্য,—জীবের যে আপন আপন 'স্বরূপ' আছে, ইহা স্বীকার করিতেন। অন্য বস্তু ও বিষয়ের সম্পর্কে, এই স্বরূপের অভিব্যক্তি জন্মে। আমাদের ইন্দ্রিয়, মন প্রভৃতির যতই সাত্ত্বিক পরিণতি হইতে থাকে, স্বরূপের অভিব্যক্তিও তত উন্নত ও তত পূর্ণ হইতে থাকিবে। ব্রহ্ম-প্রাপ্তির অবস্থায়, জীবের দেহেন্দ্রিয়াদি সত্ত্ব-প্রধান হইয়া উঠে বলিয়া, তদ্‌যোগে স্বরূপেরও ক্রমশঃ পূর্ণাভিব্যক্তি হইতে থাকিবে। আমাদের মনে হয় যে, জীবন্মুক্তাবস্থায় যে জীবের স্বরূপটী একান্ত বিলুপ্ত হইয়া যাইবে.—ইহা শঙ্করাচার্য্যের অভিপ্রায় ছিল না। পূর্ণতা-প্রাপ্তির নাম ত আর বিলোপ হইতে পারে না। বেদান্ত-দর্শনের শেষ ৭ ও ৮ সূত্রে, মুক্তের স্বরূপ এবং ব্রহ্মৈশ্বর্য্য প্রাপ্তির কথা সিদ্ধান্ত করা হইয়াছে। ছান্দোগ্য-ভাষ্যে (৮।১২।৫), মুক্ত-পুরুষের অত্যন্ত বিশুদ্ধ 'মন' থাকিবে—

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* "যৎ কর্ত্তব্যং তৎ সর্ব্বং ভগবত্তত্ত্বে বিদিতে কৃতং ভবেৎ। ন চ অন্যথা কর্ত্তব্যং পরিসমাপ্যতে কস্যচিৎ"—গী° ভা°, ১৫।২০

† পাশ্চাত্য সমালোচকগণ, জীবের একান্ত বিলয়ই বুঝিয়াছেন—The goal of effort is an absorption in which all difference is lost and which aims at the loss of the sense of conscious personality."—ইত্যাদি।

একথাও স্বীকৃত হইয়াছে দেখিতে পাওয়া যায়। সেঅবস্থায় মনের যেরূপ বর্ণনা আছে তাহা এইরূপ—

'জীবন্মুক্তের মন সর্ব্বপ্রকার মালিন্যাদি শূন্য, সত্ত্বপ্রধান, স্বার্থ-বিবর্জ্জিত এবং অতিসূক্ষ্ম বস্তুর ও ভবিষ্যৎ বিষয়ের উপলব্ধি করিতে সমর্থ হইয়া উঠে। এই প্রকার মনের দ্বারা জীবন্মুক্ত পুরুষেরা সর্ব্বত্র ব্রহ্মদর্শন করিতে থাকেন।*

কোন কোন স্থানে, মুক্তাবস্থায় মনো-নাশের কথা আছে বটে, কিন্তু তদ্দ্বারা রাগ-দ্বেষাদি দ্বারা দূষিত, অশুদ্ধ মনকেই লক্ষ্য করা হইয়াছে। এই ছান্দোগ্য-ভাষ্যেই আমরা দেখিতে পাই—"ইন্দ্রিয়-মনো-বিযুক্তঃ" বলার পরই আবার—"মন-উপাধিঃ" বলা হইয়াছে। মন—আত্মার শক্তি-বিকাশের সাধন; উহা ধ্বংস হইবে কিরূপে? উহা ত বিনষ্ট হইয়া যাইতে পারে না।

এস্থলে একটী কথা স্মরণ রাখিতে হইবে। আমরা বলিয়াছি, এই জগৎ হইতে এবং জীব হইতে স্বতন্ত্র একটী স্বরূপ—ব্রহ্মের আছে। ব্রহ্ম—জগৎ হইতেও যেমন স্বতন্ত্র; জীব হইতেও তেমনি স্বতন্ত্র। কিন্তু, জগৎ যেমন ব্রহ্ম হইতে কোন স্বতন্ত্র বস্তু নহে—উহা ব্রহ্মেরই স্বরূপ-বিকাশ মাত্র। তদ্রূপ, কোন জীবেরই ব্রহ্ম হইতে স্বতন্ত্র স্বরূপ নাই। কেননা, ব্রহ্মের বাহিরে ত কোন বস্তু নাই। সুতরাং জীব, তাঁহার স্বরূপ হইতে অতিরিক্ত স্বরূপ পাইবে কোথা হইতে? এই কথাটা বুঝাইবার জন্য জীবকে —'ব্রহ্মাত্মক,' 'ঈশ্বরাত্মক'† বলিয়া নির্দ্দেশ করা হইয়াছে। ব্রহ্ম—জীব হইতে স্বতন্ত্র; কিন্তু কোন জীবই—ব্রহ্ম হইতে স্বতন্ত্র হইতে পারে না। শঙ্কর-ভাষ্যে এই কথাটা নানাভাবে উল্লিখিত হইয়াছে।—

"ন স (পরমেশ্বরঃ) এব সাক্ষাৎ,
নাপি বস্ত্বন্তরং—জীবঃ"।‡

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* "মনস্তু.....মৃদ্বিতকষায়ং সূক্ষ্মব্যবহিতাদি সর্ব্বোপলব্ধিকরণমিতি 'দৈবং চক্ষু'রিতি উচ্যতে সবৈ মুক্তঃ স্বরূপাপন্নঃ.....সর্ব্বাত্মভাবমাপন্নঃ.....মন-উপাধিঃ সন্.....নিত্য-প্রততেন দর্শনেন রমতে"।

† "নহি আত্মনঃ ঈশ্বরেণ একত্বং মুক্ত। অন্যৎ কিঞ্চিৎ চিন্তয়িতব্যং অস্তি" (ব্রহ্মসূত্র, ৩।৩।৩৭)। "সংসারিণঃ সংসারিত্বাপোহেণ ঈশ্বরাত্মত্বং প্রতিপিপাদয়িষিতং" (৪।১।৩)।

‡ অন্য স্থলে আছে—"প্রতিষিধ্যতে এব তু পরমার্থতঃ সর্ব্বজ্ঞাৎ পরমেশ্বরাৎ 'অন্যো' দ্রষ্টা শ্রোতা বা। পরমেশ্বরস্তু.....শারীরাৎ.....'অন্য'"—ব্রহ্মসূত্র, ১।১।১৭

সকল বস্তুর, সকল জীবের মধ্যে অবস্থিত ব্রহ্মবস্তু—এই সকল জীব ও বস্তু হইতে স্বতন্ত্র, ভিন্ন। কিন্তু কোন জীবেরই ব্রহ্মস্বরূপ হইতে 'অতিরিক্ত' বা 'ভিন্ন' কোন স্বরূপ থাকিতে পারে না।* চৈতন্যাংশে, সকল জীবই ব্রহ্মস্বরূপ।†

আমরা পূর্ব্বে দেখিয়াছি, প্রাণই—জীবের চৈতন্য, জ্ঞান, ঐশ্বর্য্যাদি অভিব্যক্তির দ্বার বা ক্ষেত্র।‡ যখন প্রলয়ে, প্রাণ ও জীব, ব্রহ্মের মধ্যে একাকার হইয়া অবস্থান করে, তখন জীবের স্বরূপের অভিব্যক্তি হয় না। তখন জীবের স্বরূপ অপ্রবুদ্ধভাবে, অব্যক্ত-রূপে, সুপ্ত থাকে।§ কিন্তু প্রলয়ের পর, যখন প্রাণ-স্পন্দন জীবের দেহেন্দ্রিয়াদিরূপে পরিণত হইয়া পরস্পরকে সম্বন্ধে লইয়া আইসে, তখন জীবের স্বরূপটী বিস্পষ্ট হইতে থাকে এবং দেহেন্দ্রিয়াদির সংসর্গ-বশতঃ সেই স্বরূপের অভিব্যক্তি হইতে থাকে।¶

শঙ্কর আরো বলিয়াছেন যে—

> 'যেমন তুরী ও বেম প্রভৃতি নিমিত্ত-কারণের
> সংসর্গ বশতঃ, তন্তুর স্বরূপটী বিস্পষ্ট হইয়া
> উঠে, তদ্রূপ দেহেন্দ্রিয়াদির সম্পর্কে জীবের
> স্বরূপটীও ক্রমে বিস্পষ্ট হইতে থাকে'।‖

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* "অস্তি চ আদিত্যাদিশরীরাভিমানিভ্যো জীবেভ্যঃ 'অন্যঃ' ঈশ্বরোঽন্তর্যামী" (ব্রহ্মসূত্র, ১।১।২১)। কিন্তু—"ন হি জীবো নাম অত্যন্তভিন্নো ব্রহ্মণঃ, 'অহং ব্রহ্মাস্মী'ত্যাদি শ্রুতেঃ" (১।১।৩১)। এ সম্বন্ধে১।২।৮। সূত্রের ভাষ্যটী বিশেষভাবে দেখা কর্ত্তব্য।

† উভৌ অপি চেতনৌ সমানস্বভাবৌ" (১।২।১১)। "চৈতন্যঞ্চ অবিশিষ্টং জীবেশ্বরয়োঃ, যথা অগ্নি-বিস্ফুলিঙ্গয়োঃ ঔষ্ণ্যং" (২।৩।৪৩)।

‡ "তত্র চ (প্রাণে) আত্মচৈতন্যজ্যোতিঃ সর্ব্বদা অভিব্যক্ততরং"—বৃ° ভা°, ৪।৪।২

§ মায়াময়ী মহাসুষুপ্তিঃ, যস্যাং স্বরূপপ্রতিবোধরহিতাঃ শেরতে সংসারিণো জীবাঃ" (ব্রহ্মসূত্র, ১।৪।৩)।

¶ "তেজোবন্নভূতমাত্রা সংসর্গেণ লব্ধ বিশেষবিজ্ঞানা সতী·····বিস্পষ্ট মাকরবাণি" (ছা° ভা°, ৬।৩।২)। "প্রাণসম্বন্ধমাত্রমেব হি·····জীবত্বভেদকারণং" (ছা° ভা°, ৫।১০।২)

‖ "এবং তন্ত্বাদিকারণাবস্থং·····অস্পষ্টংসৎ, তুরী-বেম-কুবিন্দাদি কারকব্যাপারাভিব্যক্তং 'স্পষ্টং' গৃহ্যতে" (ব্রহ্মসূত্র, ২।১।১৯)।

সুতরাং, যতদিন প্রাণ-স্পন্দনের সহিত সম্পর্ক না হয়, ততদিন জীবের স্বরূপ বিস্পষ্ট হয় না। সুতরাং প্রলয়ে জীবের স্বরূপ—ব্রহ্মের মধ্যে অবিস্পষ্ট-ভাবে, একাকার হইয়া,—বিলীন থাকে। শঙ্কর বলিয়াছেন—'মধুতে রসের ন্যায়, ঘৃতে মাধুর্য্যের ন্যায়,—উভয়কে তখন আর বিভক্ত করা যায় না। জীব ও প্রাণ—উভয়ই তখন, ব্রহ্মের মধ্যে অবিভক্ত, একাকার, "বিবেকানর্হ" রূপে অবস্থান করে। উভয়ই তখন ব্রহ্ম-স্বরূপকে প্রাপ্ত হয়, 'তাদাত্ম্য-' প্রাপ্তি ঘটে। সুতরাং ব্রহ্মের অদ্বৈতত্বের কোন ক্ষতি হইতে পারিতেছে না। এই প্রকারে শঙ্করাচার্য্য, ব্রহ্মে—জীবের ও প্রাণের অবস্থিতি ও একীভাব বর্ণনা করিয়াছেন। আবার, অভিব্যক্ত হইবার পরও, জীব ও জগৎ—ব্রহ্ম হইতে 'স্বতন্ত্র' হইয়া থাকিতে পারে না। সুতরাং জগতের বিকাশাবস্থাতেও —ব্রহ্মের অদ্বৈততার কোন ক্ষতি হইতে পারিতেছে না।*

ইহাই শঙ্করাচার্য্যের সিদ্ধান্ত। তিনি যাহা লিখিয়া গিয়াছেন, তাহা হইতে আমরা এই সিদ্ধান্তই পাই। মুক্তিতেও জীব, অবিভক্ত-ভাবে ব্রহ্মে অবস্থান করিতে থাকে।† কোন বস্তুকেই তখন আর স্বতন্ত্র বলিয়া, ভিন্ন বলিয়া বোধ থাকে না। এ কথায়, জগতের কোন বস্তুই উড়িয়া যাইতেছে না; বস্তুর স্বাতন্ত্র্য-বোধ থাকিতেছে না, এইমাত্র। বেদান্তকথিত "সর্ব্বাত্মভাব" শব্দেরও ইহাই অর্থ।

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* "অব্যক্তং……জগতো বীজভূতং……পরমাত্মনি ওতপ্রোতভাবেন সমাশ্রিতং বটকণিকায়ামিব বটবীজশক্তিঃ……পুনস্তত এব অভিব্যক্তং" (কঠ° ভা°, ১।৩।১১)।

"যদাস্পদং সর্ব্বং……সদসতোঃ স্থূলসূক্ষ্ময়োঃ তদ্ব্যতিরেকেন অভাবাৎ……'তদাত্মভূতং'—"—প্রশ্ন, ভা° ২।২।১। "একী ভবন্তি অবিশেষতাং গচ্ছন্তি, একত্বমাপদ্যন্তে"। "ভিদ্যেতে নামরূপে গঙ্গাযমুনেত্যাদিলক্ষণে তদভেদে, সমুদ্র ইত্যেবং প্রোচ্যতে……তদ্বৎ পুরুষ 'আত্মভাবা গমনং' যাসাং কলানাং" (প্র° ভা°, ৬।৫)

"মধুনি রসবৎ, সমুদ্রপ্রবিষ্ট-নদ্যাদিবচ্চ 'বিবেকানর্হা'…একীভূতা ভবন্তি—সুষুপ্ত-প্রলয়য়োঃ"—প্র° ভা°, ৪।১।২ "রশ্ময়োঽর্কস্য…তেজোমণ্ডলেইব"।

† মুক্তির বর্ণনাও এইরূপ—

"মোক্ষকালে……যানি চ মুমুক্ষুণা কৃতানি কর্ম্মানি অপ্রবৃত্তফলানি……ত এতে, কর্ম্মাণি, বিজ্ঞানময়শ্চ আত্মা……পরে অব্যয়ে অনন্তে……একীভবন্তি, অবিশেষতাং গচ্ছন্তি, একত্ব মাপদ্যন্তে……ও অবিদ্যাকৃতনামরূপাৎ বিমুক্তঃ……পরং পুরুষং উপৈতি" (মু° ভা°, ৩।২।৭-৮)।

"অবিদ্যা-প্রতিবন্ধমাত্রো হি মোক্ষঃ"।—শঙ্কর-ব্যবহৃত 'অবিদ্যা' শব্দের অর্থটী পাঠক ভুলিবেন না।

বৃহদারণ্যক উপনিষদে, জীবন্মুক্ত পুরুষের অবস্থার একটী অতি সুন্দর বিবরণ লিপিবদ্ধ আছে। আমরা তাহা হইতে বুঝিতে পারি যে, সে অবস্থায় জীবের 'স্বরূপ'-নাশের কোন সম্ভাবনা নাই। আর, সে অবস্থায় জগতের কোন বস্তুরই আর স্বাতন্ত্র্য-বোধের সম্ভাবনাও থাকে না। পতি-পত্নীর দাম্পত্য-মিলনের দৃষ্টান্ত দ্বারা জীবন্মুক্তের অবস্থাটী বিশদ করিয়া দেওয়া হইয়াছে। পতি যখন আপন প্রিয়তমা ভার্য্যা দ্বারা আলিঙ্গিত হইয়া মিলনানন্দের অনুভব করিতে থাকেন; তখন যেমন তাঁহার আর বাহ্য কোন বস্তুর বা বিষয়ের অনুভূতি থাকে না, কেবলমাত্র উভয়ের মিলন-জনিত মহানন্দে তাবৎ অনুভূতি বিলীন হইয়া যায়; ঠিক সেইরূপে, জীবের যখন পূর্ণতা লাভ ঘটে, জীব যখন পূর্ণানন্দস্বরূপ ব্রহ্মের সঙ্গে মিলিত হইয়া যায়, তখন কেবলমাত্র পূর্ণানন্দের অনুভূতি জাগরূক হইয়া উঠে; বাহ্যবিষয়ের কোন প্রকার অনুভূতি আর চিত্তে স্ফুরিত হয় না। জীব সেই মিলনানন্দের মহারসে গাঢ় নিমজ্জিত হইয়া থাকে। বাহ্য বিষয়ের সর্ব্বপ্রকার সুখ-দুঃখাদির অনুভূতি সেই মহানন্দের অন্তর্ভুক্ত হইয়া যায়।* আমরা এই বর্ণনা হইতে, জীবের স্বরূপ-নাশের কথা পাই না। স্বরূপের পূর্ণতা-প্রাপ্তিরই কথা পাই। বাহ্য-বিষয়ের স্বাতন্ত্র্য-বোধ তৎকালে বিলুপ্ত হইয়া যায়; একথাতেও আমরা বাহ্য-বিষয়বর্গের বিনাশের কথাও পাই না।

জগতের অভিব্যক্তির পূর্ব্বে, অভিব্যক্তির পরে, প্রলয়ে এবং জীবন্মুক্তির অবস্থায়—ব্রহ্মের সঙ্গে, জীবের ও জগতের যে 'একতা-প্রাপ্তির' কথা শঙ্করাচার্য্য তাঁহার ভাষ্যের নানাস্থানে বর্ণনা করিয়াছেন, তাহা কি প্রকারে বর্ণিত হইয়াছে, সেই বর্ণনা আমরা পাঠকবর্গকে দেখাইলাম। ব্রহ্মে এবং জীবে এই যে ঐক্য বা অবিভক্ত-ভাব বর্ণিত হইয়াছে,—আমরা এ বর্ণনায়, কোন অবস্থাতেই জীবের 'স্বরূপ'-নাশের কোন কথাত প্রাপ্ত হই না। কোন অবস্থাতেই জীব, ব্রহ্ম হইতে পৃথক হইয়া থাকিতে পারে না। অবিদ্যার প্রভাবেই আমরা, আপন বুদ্ধির দোষে, ব্রহ্ম হইতে আমাদিগকে 'স্বতন্ত্র'

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* "তদ্ যথা লোকে প্রিয়য়া স্ত্রিয়া সম্পরিষক্তঃ……বাহ্যমাত্মনঃ ন কিঞ্চিদপি বেদ মত্তোঽন্যত্তন্ত ইতি নচ আন্তরং অয়মহমস্মি সুখীদুঃখী বেতি। পরিষঙ্গোত্তরকালং একত্বাপত্তে র্ন জানাতি"—ইত্যাদি (বৃ° ভা°, ৪।৩।২১

বলিয়া মনে করিয়া থাকি। এই অবিদ্যা-নাশই জীবন্মুক্তি। ব্রহ্মবস্তু সর্ব্বদাই জীবাত্মায় অবস্থান করিতেছেন। তাঁহা হইতেই জীবে জ্ঞান-শক্তি-সৌন্দর্য্যের বিকাশ হইতেছে। কিন্তু ইহা অসম্পূর্ণ বিকাশ। সাধন-প্রভাবে জীব, আপনার ইন্দ্রিয়, মন, বুদ্ধি প্রভৃতির সামর্থ্য যতই বৃদ্ধি করিতে পারিবে, ততই তদ্‌যোগে আত্মার মধ্যে পরিপূর্ণ ব্রহ্মবস্তুর জ্ঞান-শক্তি-সৌন্দর্য্যের পূর্ণ অভিব্যক্তি হইতে থাকিবে। ততই তাঁহার সঙ্গে জীবের তত ঐক্য সম্পাদিত হইতে থাকিবে। অপূর্ণতা চলিয়া গিয়া ততই জীব পূর্ণতা-লাভে সমর্থ হইবে। ইহাকেই শঙ্কর, ব্রহ্মের সঙ্গে জীবের 'একাত্মভাব' বলিয়া বর্ণনা করিয়াছেন। ইহাতে জীবের স্বরূপেব বিনাশের কথা আমরা পাই না; স্বরূপের ক্রমাভিব্যক্তি বা পূর্ণতার কথাই প্রাপ্ত হই।

সর্ব্বাত্ম-ভাব।—

আমরা পুনঃ পুনঃ বলিয়া আসিয়াছি যে, জগতে যে নাম-রূপাদি বিকার-বর্গের অভিব্যক্তি হইতেছে, ইহারা ব্রহ্মস্বরূপ হইতে 'বিভক্ত' হইয়া, তাঁহাকে ছাড়িয়া, তাঁহা হইতে ভিন্ন হইয়া—থাকিতে পারে না। কেননা, ইহারা তাঁহারই স্বরূপকে বিকাশিত করিতেছে, তাঁহারই স্বরূপ ইহাদিগকে বাঁধিয়া রাখিয়াছে। অতি নিম্ন স্তর হইতে উন্নততম প্রাণী পর্য্যন্ত যত কিছু বস্তু, ইহারা—তাঁহারই স্বরূপকে ক্রমোর্দ্ধভাবে বিকাশিত করিয়া তাঁহারই জ্ঞানৈশ্বর্য্যের পরিচয় দিতেছে। এই মহাতত্ত্ব ভুলিয়া গিয়া, আমরা বুদ্ধির দোষে এই নাম-রূপ গুলিকে তাঁহা হইতে 'বিভক্ত' করিয়া লইয়া, উহাদিগকে স্বাধীন, স্বতন্ত্র, স্বয়ংসিদ্ধ বস্তু বলিয়া বোধ করিয়া থাকি। মনে করি যেন, ব্রহ্ম আপন স্বরূপকে হারাইয়া এই সকল বস্তুরূপেই পরিণত হইয়া পড়িয়াছেন। তিনি যেন 'অন্য একটা' কিছু হইয়া পড়িয়াছেন। এই বোধটাই অবিদ্যার কাণ্ড। এই বোধের পরিবর্ত্তে, সকল বস্তুকে তাঁহারই পরিচায়ক দ্বার বলিয়া বোধ প্রতিষ্ঠিত হইবে। তাহাই মুক্তি। ইহাকে 'সর্ব্বাত্ম-ভাব' শব্দে বেদান্ত নির্দ্দেশ করিয়াছেন। ভেদবুদ্ধির পরিবর্ত্তে, এইরূপ অভেদ-বুদ্ধি উপস্থিত হওয়ার নামই মুক্তি। আমরা বুদ্ধির দোষে তাবৎ বস্তুকে তাঁহা হইতে অন্য বলিয়া ভাবিতেছি। কিন্তু যখন পরমার্থ-দৃষ্টি প্রবুদ্ধ হইবে, তখন কোন বস্তুকেই আর

তাঁহা হইতে 'বিভক্ত' বলিয়া বোধ থাকিবে না। এ জগৎ তখন তাঁহারই অভিব্যক্তি বা স্বরূপ-বোধক বস্তু বলিয়া নিশ্চয়-প্রতীতি উদ্বুদ্ধ হইবে। ইহাই বেদান্তের প্রদর্শিত মুক্তি।*

এ কথায় জগতের কোন বস্তু উড়িয়া যায় না। এ জগৎ, তাঁহাকেই ক্রমোর্দ্ধভাবে বিকাশিত করিয়া চলিয়াছে। এই ভূর্লোক হইতে আরম্ভ করিয়া ব্রহ্ম-লোক পর্য্যন্ত—ক্রমোন্নত-তর কত জগৎ রহিয়াছে। জীবও এই সকল জগতে, তদুপযুক্ত দেহেন্দ্রিয়াদি নির্ম্মাণ করিয়া, তদ্‌যোগে ব্রহ্মেরই জ্ঞানৈশ্বর্য্যের ক্রমোন্নত পরিচয় পাইতে থাকিবে। কিন্তু এই দেশ-কালে বদ্ধ জগতের স্বরূপ এই যে, এখানে পূর্ণতা-প্রাপ্তি অসম্ভব। উন্নত হইতে, আরো উন্নত, তদপেক্ষা আরো উন্নত—এই প্রকার অভিব্যক্তিই—এই দেশ-কালে বদ্ধ জগতের নিয়ম। সুতরাং এই জগতের অতীত হইয়া না যাইতে পারিলে, উন্নতির, উদ্যমের, চেষ্টার—পূর্ণতা-লাভ সম্ভব হইবে না। এইরূপে, বেদান্ত—মানবাত্মাকে জগৎ হইতে জগদতীত ব্রহ্মে যাইয়া পূর্ণতা-লাভের তত্ত্ব নির্দ্দেশ করিয়াছেন। সেই জগদতীত ব্রহ্মে—সকল পুণ্যের, সকল কর্ম্মের, সর্ব্ববিধ উন্নতির, মানবাত্মার সর্ব্বপ্রকার বিকাশের, পূর্ণতা ও পরাকাষ্ঠা প্রাপ্তি হয়। ইহাই বৈদান্তিক মুক্তি।—জগৎ-সৃষ্টির উদ্দেশ্যই—মনুষ্যের পূর্ণতা-বিধান। দেহেন্দ্রিয়-মনবুদ্ধির সাত্ত্বিকতা-প্রাপ্তি হইলে তবে ত তদ্‌যোগে ব্রহ্মের জ্ঞানৈশ্বর্য্যের উপলব্ধি ঘটিবে।† যে মুলকারণ হইতে জগতের অভিব্যক্তি, সেই ব্রহ্ম প্রাপ্তিই জগতের চরম-লক্ষ্য। জগৎ সেই পূর্ণতা লাভের নিমিত্তই নিয়ত ধাবিত হইতেছে। যে লোকেই আত্মার গতি হউক না কেন, সর্ব্বত্র এই প্রকারে ব্রহ্মদর্শন হইবে, স্বাতন্ত্র্যবোধ বিলুপ্ত হইবে।

(ক্রমশঃ)

শ্রীকোকিলেশ্বর শাস্ত্রী,
বিদ্যারত্ন, এম্-এ।

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* "সর্ব্বাত্মভাবঃ স্বাভাবিকঃ। যত্তু সর্ব্বাত্মভাবাৎ……বালাগ্রমপি 'অন্যত্বেন' দৃশ্যতে……তদবস্থা অবিদ্যা……সর্ব্বাত্মভাবো মোক্ষঃ" (বৃ° ভা°, ৪।৩।২০) "কথং সর্ব্বাত্মতোপপত্তিরিত্যাহ—ইমান্ লোকান্ আত্মত্বেন অনুভবন্……ব্রহ্ম সর্ব্বানন্যরূপং গায়ন্" (তৈ° ভা°, ৩।১০।৫)

† দেহেন্দ্রিয়প্রকৃতিবশিত্বাৎ নির্ম্মায় দেহান্ অধিতিষ্ঠতি"—ইত্যাদি। (বে° ভা°, ৩।৩।৩২)

"স বৈ মুক্তঃ সর্ব্বাত্মতামাপন্নঃ সন্……মন-উপাধিঃ সন্, এতেনৈব মনসা কামান্ পশ্যন্ রমতে।" ছা° ভা, ৮।১২।৫)