UNIVERSAL
LIBRARY
OU_150484
UNIVERSAL
LIBRARY



This book is presented

by

The Government of the United States

as an expression of

Friendship and Goodwill

of the

People of the United States

towards

The People of India

STRUCTURE AND GROWTH OF PHILOSOPHIC SYSTEMS
FROM PLATO TO SPINOZA

II

PHILO

VOLUME I

LONDON : GEOFFREY CUMBERLEGE
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

PHILO


FOUNDATIONS OF RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY IN JUDAISM, CHRISTIANITY, AND ISLAM

BY

HARRY AUSTRYN WOLFSON

NATHAN LITTAUER PROFESSOR OF HEBREW LITERATURE AND PHILOSOPHY IN HARVARD UNIVERSITY

VOLUME I



SECOND PRINTING
REVISED

CAMBRIDGE · MASSACHUSETTS
HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS
1948

COPYRIGHT, 1947

BY THE PRESIDENT AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE

PRINTED AT THE HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRINTING OFFICE

CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS, U.S.A.

PREFACE

RELIGIOUS philosophies without a preamble of faith, such as those with which we are nowadays acquainted, were unknown throughout the Middle Ages. To mediaeval philosophers of the various creeds, religion was not an outworn survival of primitive times, which, with the magic wand of philosophy, they tried to transform into something serviceable. Nor was it to them a peculiar kind of human experience, which, by philosophic probing into the mysterious workings of the subnormal or supernormal human mind, they hoped to track down to its hidden sources. Nor, again, was religion to them a floating wreckage of an ancient term, gutted out of its original contents, which, in accordance with the salvage-laws of language, they appropriated and used as a designation for their own particular brands of philosophy. It was to them a certain set of inflexible principles, of a divinely revealed origin, by which philosophy, the product of erring human reason, had to be tested and purged and purified. What these principles were, how in the light of them philosophy for the first time was rewritten, and how also for the first time the principles themselves were recast in a philosophic mould — this is the burden of the present study.

In a previous study, we tried to show how the entire seventeen-century-old philosophic structure raised upon the principles of a common preamble of faith was overthrown by Spinoza. When that study, *The Philosophy of Spinoza*, was published in 1934, we conceived the idea of working out more fully the background of some of the problems dealt with in Spinoza's philosophy. Starting with one problem and working backwards and sideways, we gradually managed to draw into our purview all of its major problems, treating of them in their historical development, through mediaeval Latin and Hebrew philosophy, from the

thirteenth to the seventeenth century; back of that, through Arabic Moslem and Jewish philosophy, from the eighth to the thirteenth century; and back of that, through the Church Fathers, through Philo, and through classical Greek philosophy. The outcome of this effort will be published in a series of books under the general title *Structure and Growth of Philosophic Systems from Plato to Spinoza.* The present two-volume study constitutes the second book of the series. Other studies on philosophers following Philo, as well as a general introductory study on Greek philosophy, to the latter of which occasional references are made in the footnotes of this book, will appear at reasonably short intervals. A revised and expanded edition of the two volumes on Spinoza will complete the series.

Primarily this is a study of Philo, and as such it is an attempt to build up, out of innuendoes, a systematic structure of his thought and also to piece together, out of allusions and implications, the story of its growth. But the work is also designed to serve as a general prolegomenon to the major problems of religious philosophy for the seventeen centuries following Philo. The structure of the problems as herein presented will provide a general framework for the same problems as they appear in the works of later philosophers. The texts from various sources brought together in the story of their growth will furnish the most fundamental texts which will come into play in the subsequent history of these problems. The section in each chapter of this book under the heading "Conclusion, Influence, Anticipation" furnishes a brief forecast of the general lines of development of the essential points of the Philonic philosophy in later philosophies down to Spinoza. In the volumes to follow, the story of this development will receive a fuller and more formal treatment.

The preamble of faith with which the philosophy of Philo begins, though no longer universally accepted unchallenged,

has not completely disappeared. It is still the preamble of the living philosophy of the greater part of mankind. At the present time, under the name of one of the most distinguished of mediaeval Christian exponents of Philonic philosophy, a modernized version of that philosophy, in its metaphysical as well as in its ethical and social teachings, based upon the same principles of the same old preamble of faith, is ably defended by an organized school of thought. While it is to be admitted that for one who believes, or is willing to believe, in the principles of the old preamble of faith, it is no more difficult to build up and defend a Philonic type of philosophy at the present time than it was for many a century in the past, we have not attempted here to modernize Philonic philosophy nor have we dealt with the attempts of others at its modernization. The purpose of this book has been to delineate and depict the philosophy of Philo as it shaped itself in his own mind and in its own setting and to indicate briefly how in its main features it was the most dominant force in the history of philosophy down to the seventeenth century. We have not touched upon its fortunes after that century nor upon the story of its resurgence in recent times.

The peculiar literary form in which the works of Philo are written has made him the subject of a variety of interpretations. In the presentation of our own understanding of him, with the exception of a few instances when we have openly taken issue with certain views, either generally accepted or individually espoused, and with the further exception of general references to the literature on Philo whenever they were necessary either as an acknowledgment of indebtedness or for the bibliographical guidance of the reader or to indicate the termini at which Philonic studies halted and from which our own investigation proceeded, we have refrained from entering upon an examination or comparison or criticism of the various current interpretations of Philo — a subject which, if dealt with at all, is to be dealt

with elaborately and with all the fullness it deserves. We have attempted here a fresh examination of Philo both in his relation to his predecessors and with a view to those who came after him — and this on the basis of texts which are fully deployed and studied.

For their generous help and advice I am grateful to Professor Arthur Darby Nock, of Harvard; Professor Francis Howard Fobes, of Amherst; Professor Milton Vasil Anastos, of Dumbarton Oaks, Harvard; and Professors Richard Peter McKeon and Ralph Marcus, both of the University of Chicago. The publication of this work was made possible by the Lucius N. Littauer Foundation.

H. A. W.

CONTENTS

VOLUME I

CHAPTER I

HELLENISTIC JUDAISM AND PHILO 3

I. Hellenistic Jewish Attitude toward Greek Religion and Philosophy 3

The philosophy of the Hellenized peoples, Alexandrian Jewish philosophy, and Egyptian philosophy, 3. — Scriptural attitude toward heathen gods and worship and its manifestation in Alexandrian Jewish literature, 8. — The wisdom of philosophy and the wisdom of Scripture, and the superiority of the latter, 17.

II. Philo on Polytheism, Mythology, and Mysteries . . . 27

Philo's arraignment of the Greek and Egyptian popular religions, 27. — His arraignment of mythology, 34. — His arraignment of the mysteries, 36. — What use he makes of the terminology of popular religion, mythology, and the mysteries, 38. — Discussion of certain views alleging the existence of mysteries among Alexandrian Jews or the influence of the mysteries upon the philosophy of Philo, 44.

III. Discordance, Conformity, Apostasy 55

The three tendencies among the Alexandrian Jews with regard to the interpretation of Scripture: (a) Philosophical allegorism, 55. — (b) Liberal traditionalism, 57. — (c) Extreme allegorism, 66. — The common underlying unity of these three tendencies, 71. — Three types of apostates in Alexandrian Judaism: (a) The weak of flesh, 73. — (b) The socially ambitious, 77. — (c) The intellectually uprooted, 78. — General characterization of Alexandrian Judaism, 85.

CHAPTER II

HANDMAID OF SCRIPTURE 87

I. Behind the Allegorical Method 87

Classification of Philo's writings, 87. — His Jewish sources:

Scripture and the question of Philo's knowledge of Hebrew, 88. — His relation to the unwritten Palestinian traditions, 90. — His Greek sources, 93. — The literary form of his writings, 94. — Generally accepted opinion as to the nature of Philo's philosophy, 97. — Criticism of this opinion, 100. — The application of the hypothetico-deductive method of text study to the writings of Philo, 103. — Philo as a critic of Greek philosophy and the founder of a new philosophy which was to dominate European thought for well-nigh seventeen centuries, 107.

II. The Allegorical Method 115

The literal and the allegorical interpretation of Scripture, 115. — Extent to which these two methods of interpretation were followed by Philo, 116. — Allegory and literalism in Philo's treatment of the story of the six days of creation, 120. — Allegory and literalism in his treatment of the historical narratives after the story of creation, 123. — Allegory and literalism in his treatment of the legislative parts of the Pentateuch, 127. — Allegory in Greek philosophy, in Philo, and among the rabbis, 131.

III. Origin of Scripture and Origin of Philosophy 138

Difference between Philo and Greek Philosophers in their belief as to the origin of their respective texts to which they applied the allegorical method of interpretation, 138. — Philo's three suggestions as to the origin of Greek philosophy, 140.

IV. Faith and Reason 143

Why no subordination of philosophy to popular religion among Greek philosophers and why its subordination to Scripture among Alexandrian Jewish philosophers, 143. — Origin of the phrase describing philosophy as the handmaid of theology, 145. — The subordination of philosophy to Scripture as the subordination of reason to faith, 151. — The limitation of human knowledge; faith or revelation as a source of knowledge, 152.

V. Conclusion, Influence, Anticipation 155

The conception of philosophy as ancillary to Scripture in post-Philonic philosophy, 155. — The post-Philonic use of the allegorical interpretation of Scripture, 158. — Philo's three suggestions as to the origin of Greek philosophy in post-Philonic philosophy, 160. — Spinoza, 163.

CHAPTER III

SCRIPTURAL PRESUPPOSITIONS 164

Philo's preamble of faith, consisting of eight principles, which he considered as essential to every true philosophy, 164. — (1) Existence of God: identification of those whom Philo describes as atheists and of his references to "champions of the mind" and "champions of the senses," 165. — (2) Unity of God: its fourfold meaning, 171. — Why Philo allowed himself to apply the term "god" to objects worshiped by pagans as deities, 173. — Philo's attitude toward the theism of the various Greek philosophers, 175. — (3) Divine providence, 180. — (4) Creation of the world, 180. — (5) Unity of the world, 181. — (6) Existence of ideas: native Jewish origin of this belief, 181. — (7) Revelation of the Law, 187. — (8) Eternity of the Law, 187. — The meaning of Philo's references to Unwritten Law, 188. — The persistence of five of these eight principles as a preamble of faith in post-Philonic philosophy, 194. — Spinoza, 198.

CHAPTER IV

GOD, THE WORLD OF IDEAS, AND THE LOGOS 200

I. God and the Ideas 200

God above the ideas, 200. — God not the Platonic idea of the good, 201. — Explanation of passages in which the term idea would seem to be applied to God, 202.

II. Ideas 204

The ideas, in the sense of patterns of things in our created world, first conceived as thoughts in the mind of God and then created as incorporeal real beings, 204. — Names of God distinguishing Him as the sole creator, 210. — List of ideas mentioned by Philo, 211. — Two new ideas introduced by Philo, namely, the idea of mind and the idea of soul, 213. — Meaning of the priority of the ideas to the world, 214.

III. Powers 217

Ideas as patterns and as causes or powers, 217. — Identification of the ideas with the term "powers" in Scripture, 218. — The powers (1) in the sense of eternal and infinite properties of God

identical with His essence and (2) in the sense of created incorporeal beings distinct from His essence, 221. — Classification of the powers under the two headings of "goodness" and "authority," 224.

IV. The Intelligible World and the Logos 226

The ideas in the sense of both patterns and powers treated as a totality, 226. — The totality of ideas, in the sense of patterns, described as constituting an intelligible world, which, like its constituent ideas, was, prior to the creation of the visible world, first conceived as a thought in the mind of God and then created as a real incorporeal being, 227. — The Logos (1) in the sense of the mind of God identical with His essence in which the intelligible world was conceived as a thought and (2) in the sense of a created incorporeal being in which the created intelligible world is contained as an object of thought in a thinking mind, 229. — The Logos conceived as a power and as such also as the totality of ideas in the sense of powers, 233. — The Logos, as the totality of powers, allusively described as combining within itself the two contrasting groups of powers, "goodness" and "authority," 236. — How Philo differs from Plato in the use of the term "image," 238. — Three stages in the existence of the Logos and powers, 239.

V. Relations between God, the Logos, and the Ideas . . 240

Meaning of Philo's statement that the intelligible world of ideas does not exist in some place, 240. — Interpretation of Philo's parable of a city built by a king, 242. — Meaning of his statement that the Logos is the place of the intelligible world, 245. — Meaning of his statement that God is prior to place and the Logos, 247. — Meaning of his application of the term place to God, 247. — God as "most generic"; the Logos as "the most generic of created things"; the ideas as "generic," 252.

VI. Logos and Wisdom 253

Wisdom as the equivalent of Logos, 253. — Various uses of the terms Wisdom and Logos in Philo, 258. — Explanation of passages in which Philo does not seem to treat of Wisdom and Logos as equivalent terms, 258.

VII. The Instrumentality of the Logos, Powers, and Wisdom 261

Origin and meaning of the term instrument in its application to the Logos, 261. — Origin and meaning of the terms describing

the instrumentality of Wisdom, 266. — Instrument not used by Philo in the sense of intermediary: the world as created by God directly without intermediaries, 269. — Reason for the creation of the ideas, the powers, the intelligible world, the Logos, and Wisdom, 271. — Interpretation of a passage which would seem to imply that the ideas or powers were used as intermediaries in the creation of the world, 274.

VIII. The Fiction of Intermediaries 282

The principle of the equivalence of cause and effect in Plotinus, 282. — How that principle is refuted by mediaeval philosophers, 283. — How that principle has been erroneously applied to Philo, 284. — Wisdom not an intermediary in Jewish tradition, 286. — Analysis of Wisdom in the Wisdom of Solomon: its three stages of existence, 287.

IX. Conclusion, Influence, Anticipation 289

Systematic presentation of Philo's views on ideas, powers, intelligible world, Logos, and Wisdom, 289. — Logos and ideas in post-Philonic philosophy to Spinoza, 293.

CHAPTER V

CREATION AND STRUCTURE OF THE WORLD 295

(*a*) *Criticism of Aristotle and the Stoics* — First argument against Aristotle, 295. — Second argument against Aristotle, 299. — Argument against the Stoics, 299.

(*b*) *Plato's Timaeus and the Book of Genesis* — Vagueness of Philo's statements with regard to the preëxistent matter out of which the world was created and the question whether that preexistent matter was itself eternal or created, 300. — Analysis of the story of creation in the *Timaeus* and the three points in it which are doubtful, 303. — Philo's solutions of these three doubtful points, and the passages in which he indicates that the preexistent matter was created, 305. — Philo's interpretation of the story of the six days of creation in the Book of Genesis, 309. — Philo's conception of the structure of the World, 312. — Creation an act of divine will; God could have created a different kind of world; in what sense the world is said to be indestructible, 315.

(*c*) *Place, Time, Eternity* — The use made by Philo of the various philosophic definitions of place and time, 317. — Eter-

nity as the idea of time, 320. — No eternal generation in Philo, 322.

(*d*) *Conclusion, Influence, Anticipation:* Five points in Philo's theory of creation and their history in post-Philonic philosophy to Spinoza, 322.

CHAPTER VI

THE IMMANENT LOGOS, LAWS OF NATURE, MIRACLES . . 325

I. Immanent Logos 325

Philo's immanent Logos not the same as the universal soul of Plato and of the Stoics, 325. — Discussion of Philo's statements on the immanent Logos as the cause of the laws of nature; his use of the term "fate"; the world as an "imitation" of the pre-existent Logos and as a "raiment" of the immanent Logos, 328.

II. Laws of Nature 332

The three laws of nature discernible in Philo: (1) The law of opposites: the immanent Logos as Cutter or Divider, 332. — (2) The law of the harmony of the opposites, 337. — (3) The law of the perpetuity of the species, 342. — Immanent powers as the equivalent of the immanent Logos, 343. — Meaning of Philo's use of the phrase "the mind of the world" or "the soul of the world" as a description of God, 345.

III. Miracles 347

The free miracle-working God of Scripture and the law-bound God of Plato, 347. — Natural and allegorical explanations of the miracles recorded in Scripture not a denial of their historicity, 350.

IV. Conclusion, Influence, Anticipation 356

Summary of Philo, 356. — Laws of nature and miracles in post-Philonic philosophy to Spinoza, 357.

CHAPTER VII

SOULS, ANGELS, IMMORTALITY 360

I. Living Beings 360

Why the immanent Logos is not called by Philo the mind or soul of the world, 360. — Boundary line between besouled and soul-

less beings, 361. — Whether the stars have souls, 363. — Three classes of living beings, 366.

II. Unbodied Souls or Angels 366
Why some souls do not descend into bodies, 366. — Unbodied souls identified with philosophic demons and scriptural angels, 367. — The abode of angels and their constituent substance, 369. — Function of angels, 370. — Angels as a special kind of immanent powers and called powers, 372. — Why angels are necessary, 375. — Application of the term Logos to angels, 376. — Allegorical interpretation of angels in Scripture not a denial of their reality, 379. — Beneficial, punitive, and evil angels, 381. — Evil angels as the fallen angels, 384.

III. Animals and the Irrational Soul of Man 385
Lower animals and their soul: irrational souls as images of the idea of soul, 385. — Creation of the irrational soul of man, 386. — Constituent substance of the irrational soul and its faculties, 387.

IV. The Rational Soul of Man 389
The rational soul as the image of the idea of mind, 389. — Incorporeality of the rational soul, its indivisibility, and its faculties, 392. — Reciprocal relation between the rational and the irrational soul, 392. — Application of the term Logos to the rational soul, 393. — Other terms by which the rational soul is described, 393.

V. Immortality of the Soul 395
Use of Platonic terms in Philo's discussion of immortality, 395. — The search for scriptural proof-texts as sources for the belief in immortality and the text adduced by Philo, 396. — Question as to the place to which the immortal souls return: the three views reported by Philo, 398. — Philo's own view, 401. — Traditional terms of resurrection interpreted as meaning immortality; and hence immortality spoken of as a palingenesis or new birth, 404. — Immortality as a divine grace and hence individual and not universal, 406. — Philo's reference to a spurious kind of immortality, which is universal, by the side of genuine immortality, which is individual, 410.

VI. Conclusion, Influence, Anticipation 413
Summary of Philo's views on the topics of this chapter, 413. —

Chief characteristics of the discussion of these topics by post-Philonic philosophers, 416 — and Spinoza, 419.

CHAPTER VIII

FREE WILL 424

I. Miracles and Freedom 424

The immanent Logos in the world and the rational soul in man, 424. — Struggle between the rational and the irrational soul in man, 426. — Analogy between Plato and Philo on the dominance of law in the world and on the struggle of the two souls in man, 427. — Difference between Plato and Philo on the power of God over the laws of nature in the world: Miracles, 428. — Difference between Plato and Philo on the power of the rational soul over the irrational soul in man: Free will, 430.

II. The Choice of Good and Evil 432

Responsibility and punishment in Plato: his use of the term voluntary, 432. — Responsibility and punishment in Philo: the term voluntary as used by him, 435. — Explanation of involuntary sin by Philo, 438. — Philo's conception of divine grace as an auxiliary cause in man's free choice of the good, 441. — Divine grace in Hellenistic and Palestinian Judaism, 449. — Two types of divine grace, 450. — Man's free will and God's foreknowledge, 455.

III. Conclusion, Influence, Anticipation 456

Summary of Philo's views on the topic of this chapter, 456. — Recurrence of these views in post-Philonic philosophy, 458. — Spinoza, 461.

PHILO

FOUNDATIONS OF RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY IN JUDAISM, CHRISTIANITY, AND ISLAM

VOLUME I

CHAPTER I

HELLENISTIC JUDAISM AND PHILO

I. Hellenistic Jewish Attitude toward Greek Religion and Philosophy

With a single exception, none of the peoples who after the conquests of Alexander began to participate in Greek philosophy contributed anything radically new to it. All they did was to master its teachings and furnish teachers. The Phoenician population of Citium in Cyprus furnished Zeno, the founder of Stoicism; Sidon furnished another Zeno, who became the head of the Epicureans; Carthage furnished Hasdrubal, who under the name of Clitomachus became the head of the New Academy; the Hellenistic population of Ascalon in Palestine furnished another head of the New Academy by the name of Antiochus; Tyre furnished Diodorus, who became the head of the Peripatetic school; and Apamea in Syria furnished Posidonius, who established a Stoic school in Rhodes, the only Greek philosophic school which flourished at that time outside of Athens. But all of these, though coming from the new centers of Greek culture, and perhaps also of non-Greek origin, were thoroughly Hellenized, not only in language but also in religion, and they appear on the scene of history as Greeks, carrying on the traditions of Greek philosophers. The schools which they came to preside over, and, in the case of Zeno, the new school which he founded, were Greek schools, flourishing in the ancient seat of Greek civilization. The gods, the myths, and the religious and political institutions which as philosophers they had occasion to take as the subject of their speculations were all the same as those of their predecessors from Thales

to Aristotle. If certain vestiges of foreign beliefs and certain undertones of foreign thought are sometimes said to be discerned in their teaching, they themselves had no consciousness of them; and in fact it takes all the skill and imagination and insight of searching scholarship to get even a scent of their presence. The single exception was the Jewish population in Alexandria. This Alexandrian Jewish population produced out of its midst a school of philosophers who consciously and deliberately and systematically set about remaking Greek philosophy according to the pattern of a belief and tradition of an entirely different origin.

The rise of that school and the continuity of its existence for about three centuries, from the translation of the Pentateuch into Greek (*c.* 260 B.C.) to the end of the activity of Philo (*c.* 40 A.D.),[1] was made possible by the nature of the dominant element, if not the basic stock, of the Jewish population in Alexandria and by the nature of the social economy of the Alexandrian Jewish community. That dominant element came from Palestine at a time when Judaism in its native home had already been molded by the teaching and preaching and disciplinary training of the Scribes into that particular form which ultimately gave rise to Pharisaism. From its native home this dominant element of the Jewish population in Alexandria had brought with it not only a Scripture and a tradition, but also a knowledge of that Scripture and tradition, an ordered mode of life and thought based upon them, and a firm resolve to preserve that mode of life and thought under whatever conditions it might find itself. Conditions in Alexandria were such as to favor the maintenance and preservation of this mode of life and thought. Politically the Jews of Alexandria had the right to organize a community of their own within which they were

[1] Cf. below, p. 94.

free to live according to their own religion. Socially they lived in compact masses within certain areas of the city, which provided them with the necessary facilities for the practice of their religion. Economically, though the community as a whole depended upon the outside non-Jewish environment for the main source of its wealth, the majority of Jews within the community gained their living there, without being forced to seek occupation among non-Jews outside. Culturally, though one generation after their settlement in Alexandria the Jews had adopted Greek speech, they remained a separate group, with a system of education and intellectual life entirely their own.[2] Constant communication with the home country in Palestine had kept Alexandrian Judaism, despite the inevitable rise of certain local changes, from becoming completely separated from its original source.

Now the political and social conditions which enabled the Jews to preserve themselves as a special religious entity in Alexandria were enjoyed also by all the other groups which made up the Alexandrian population, and at least one group, the native Egyptians, with a religious mode of life firmly established and with a highly organized class of learned priests, attempted also to develop a religious philosophy of its own, though whatever is known of it comes to us only indirectly. Externally the Egyptian and the Jewish religious philosophies would seem to be alike, both of them, seemingly in imitation of the Stoics, attempting to apply philosophy to their respective religions and justifying these attempts of theirs by claiming, each of these two groups for itself, to have been the originators of that philosophy.[3] But the conceptions which the Egyptians and Jews had of their own religions were so fundamentally different that the philosophies developed by them from the application of Greek

[2] Cf. below, pp. 78 ff.

[3] Cf. below, p. 141.

philosophy to their respective religions also proved to be different, the one being simply an adoption of Greek philosophy; the other being a transformation of it into something new.

Egyptians, like all the heathen nations of antiquity, started with the belief that their own gods were different only in name from the gods of other peoples with whom they came in contact and that the worship of their own gods was different only in form from the worship of other gods by other peoples. From the writings of Herodotus we learn that even before the time of Alexander Egyptian priests claimed that certain Greek gods were borrowed from the Egyptians,[4] and these priests probably also shared in the belief, expressed by Herodotus himself, that certain forms of religious worship, including the mysteries, were similarly borrowed by the Greeks from the Egyptians.[5] When, therefore, later, with the establishment of Alexandria as a center of Hellenistic civilization, Egyptian priests attempted, in imitation of the Stoics, to apply Greek philosophy to their own religion, this attempt was accompanied by a similar attempt to syncretize their own religion with the religion of the Greeks. The religious philosophy resulting therefrom was therefore bound to display no essential difference from the religious philosophy of the Stoics of that time. This conclusion with regard to the nature of Egyptian philosophy, which must inevitably follow from a consideration of these known facts in the case, lends credence to the account given of it later by Plutarch. From that account we gather that the starting point of the philosophy of the Egyptians was the syncretization of their own religion with that of the Greeks. Their own gods were identified with Greek gods;[6] their own stories about their

[4] Herodotus, II, 4, 42, 50. [5] *Idem*, II, 51; II, 171.

[6] Plutarch, *De Iside et Osiride*, chs. 9, 354 C–D; 13, 356 B; 34, 364 D; 61, 375 F–376 A.

gods were identified with Greek mythology; [7] and their own worship of the gods in the form of mysteries was identified with the Greek mysteries.[8] Having thus syncretized their own religion with that of the Greeks, and having also laid claim to the origin of Greek philosophy, they next tried, in conscious imitation of the Stoics, systematically to give a philosophic meaning to their own religion. The chief Egyptian god Ammon becomes to them, of course, nothing but the Greek Zeus, and consequently, like Zeus among the Stoics, he is nothing but the universe.[9] The Egyptian goddess Isis is nothing but the Greek word for "knowledge," and her temple, which is called Iseion, is nothing but a combination of two Greek words meaning the knowledge of true being.[10] The priests of Isis are not mere supervisors of religious worship; they are philosophers, for "the true priest of Isis is he who, when he has legitimately received what is set forth in the ceremonies connected with these gods, uses reason in investigating and in studying the truth contained therein." [11] The laws relating to priests, such as the shaving of their heads, their wearing of linen garments, their restrictions in matters of diet, their abstention from wine, and all the sacred and religious rites which are prescribed for them, have in them "nothing that is irrational or fabulous or prompted by superstition, as some believe," but they contain either some "moral and practical values" or some "refinement of history or natural science." [12] The stories about the gods, such as their wanderings, dismemberments, and many experiences of that sort, are not to be taken literally; [13] they are like similar Greek stories about the gods,[14] and they are to be given explanations "not far unlike the explanations which

[7] *Ibid.*, chs. 25, 360 E–40, 367 E.
[8] *Ibid.*, chs. 27, 361 D f.; 68, 378 B f.
[9] *Ibid.*, ch. 9, 354 C–D. Cf. below, p. 176.
[10] *Ibid.*, ch. 2, 351 F–352 A.
[11] *Ibid.*, ch. 3, 352 C.
[12] *Ibid.*, ch. 8, 353 E.
[13] *Ibid.*, ch. 11, 355 B ff.
[14] *Ibid.*, chs. 25–40.

the Stoics used to give of the gods." [15] To take these stories literally and refuse to explain them philosophically is to think impiously about matters religious.[16] Such philosophic explanations are to be applied to every belief and practice, including the worship of animals. The Egyptian animal worship, properly understood, is no more mere folly than the Greek idol worship. The latter, in its true meaning, does not imply that "the bronze, the painted, and the stone effigies" are gods themselves; it takes them only as "statues of the gods and dedications in their honor." [17] So also Egyptian animal worship does not imply that the animals themselves are gods; they are to be taken only to represent various powers of God.[18]

The conception of their own religion on the part of the Alexandrian Jews, trained as they were in Scripture as interpreted by tradition, was fundamentally different. The term monotheism by which Judaism is generally described

[15] *Ibid.*, ch. 40, 367 C.
[16] *Ibid.*, ch. 68, 378 B.
[17] *Ibid.*, ch. 70, 379 C–D.
[18] *Ibid.*, ch. 74, 380 F ff.

On Egyptian philosophy, see also Diogenes, I, 10–12, drawing upon Manetho and Hecataeus. Not much is known directly about the attempts on the part of the Egyptians to give a Greek philosophic interpretation to their religion, and from the little that is known it may be inferred that it was not widespread. But undoubtedly such a philosophic interpretation was attempted by a few Egyptians, and it may be assumed that on the whole the attempt followed along the lines indicated by Plutarch. With regard to Plutarch, it must be added that his account of the Stoic interpretation of the Egyptian religion is generally taken to be an invention of his own, just as is the later Neoplatonic interpretation of it by Iamblichus. This analogy between the two, however, does not seem to us to be correct. In the case of Plutarch, there is reason to believe that he was actually reporting the teachings of certain philosophic priests in Egypt. The works of writers on Egypt, such as Apion and Hecataeus, are generally considered as sources used by Plutarch. Moreover, an Egyptian priest of the first century A.D., Chaeremon, is said to have recognized the Stoic philosophical teachings in the priestly traditions of the Egyptian religion. Cf. W. Otto, *Priester und Tempel im hellenistischen Ägypten*, 1908, II, pp. 215–224; F. Cumont, *Les religions orientales dans le paganisme romain* [4], 1929, p. 212, n. 24; p. 82; p. 238, nn. 48, 49; A. H. Gardiner, "Philosophy (Egyptian)," *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, IX, p. 859.

may perhaps, in its positive sense, as expressing a belief in the unity of God, lead to endless discussions as to whether that belief was really peculiar to the Jews or as to whether the Jews were really the originators of that belief. But the term in its negative sense, as expressing a unity of attitude — a special kind of attitude — toward other gods, is admittedly to be assumed as something peculiar to Judaism and as something by which it was distinguished from all other religions in antiquity.

This special attitude of the Jews toward other gods has a twofold aspect. On the one hand, the Scripture-trained Jew unconsciously approached other gods with the attitude of a student of comparative religion. Scripture had indeed instilled into him the belief in one God, but he knew that other peoples also believed in the existence of gods, and the same general Hebrew term Elohim is used in Scripture to designate both the Jewish God and the gods of the other nations. The Jewish God is worshiped in a special place, called "house" [19] or "sanctuary," [20] but so also are the gods of other nations worshiped by their adherents in a place described as "house" [21] or "sanctuary." [22] The Jewish God is worshiped by means of various kinds of sacrifices offered on altars by men called priests, and by means also of libation or incense, but so also are worshiped the gods of other nations, and the same Hebrew terms for sacrifice and altar and priest and libation and incense are used to describe these various forms of worship whether they are offered to the Jewish God or to the gods of other nations.[23] The Jews pray to their God and bow down to Him, but so do also other people pray and bow down to their gods.[24] On the other hand, however, the Jew was also trained by Scripture to approach other gods with the

[19] I Kings 5: 19.
[20] Exod. 25: 8.
[21] I Sam. 5: 2.
[22] Isa. 16: 12.
[23] II Kings 10: 19; Jer. 44: 19.
[24] Isa. 16: 12; II Kings 19: 37.

attitude of a dogmatic theologian who is sure he knows what is true and what is false in religion. Indeed, he knew that other people too have gods and their gods are known by the same name as the Jewish God, but he was enjoined not to have any of those other gods before his God [25] and he was also told that all these other gods are "no-gods," [26] they are "lying vanities," [27] they are things of "nought," [28] they are "falsehood," [29] they are "lies," [30] they are "dead," [31] they are carcasses,[32] they are "worthless," [33] they are "dumb idols." [34] Indeed he knew that other gods are also worshiped, and in a manner not unlike that in which his own God is worshiped, but he was enjoined not to bow himself down to them nor to serve them,[35] he was ordered to break down their altars, and dash in pieces their pillars, and burn their graven images with fire,[36] and he was told that sacrificing and offering incense to them was wrong [37] and that praying to them brings no help or salvation.[38]

This twofold view marked the attitude of the Scripture-trained Jews toward all the religions with which they came in contact in the ancient world. With the example of Scripture before them they were not afraid to make use in the description of their own religion of terms used in the description of other religions, but whatever common terms they used, the difference was never blurred for them between truth and falsehood in religious belief and right and wrong in religious worship. For the understanding of the nature of Judaism throughout its history, and especially during the Hellenistic period, this twofold aspect of its attitude toward

[25] Exod. 20: 3.
[26] Isa. 37: 19.
[27] Ps. 31: 7.
[28] Jer. 2: 5.
[29] Jer. 10: 14.
[30] Amos 2: 4.
[31] Ps. 106: 28.
[32] Lev. 26: 30.
[33] Jer. 2: 11; 16: 19.
[34] Hab. 2: 18.
[35] Exod. 20: 4.
[36] Deut. 7: 5.
[37] Lev. 17: 7; Jer. 44: 3.
[38] Isa. 45: 21.

other religions is of the utmost importance. Those who seem to see evidence of religious syncretization in every use of a pagan term by a Hellenistic Jew simply overlook this one important aspect in the attitude of Judaism toward other religions.

The gods with which the God in Scripture was contrasted were the gods of those neighboring peoples with whom the ancient Jews came in contact. Many of these gods are only named, without any further identification, and it is left to scholarship to trace them to the various neighboring countries mentioned in Scripture. Some of them are specifically identified. There is Baal Zebub of Acron,[39] Dagon of the Philistines,[40] Chemosh of the Moabites,[41] Ashtoreth of the Zidonians,[42] Milcom of the Ammonites,[43] and Rimmon of Aram.[44] There are also vague references to "the abomination of the Egyptians," [45] "the idols of Egypt," [46] "the pillars of Beth-shemesh, that is in the land of Egypt," [47] "the houses of the gods of Egypt," [48] "other gods in the land of Egypt," [49] "Egypt with her gods," [50] and "the devices of Egypt," [51] and allusions to the proper name of one Egyptian deity are to be found in the expressions "Amon mi-No" [52] and "No Amon." [53] No reference, however, is to be found in Scripture to Greek gods. But with the establishment of the Jewish community in Alexandria, living there side by side with Greeks and Egyptians, the Jews became acquainted with the names of altogether new "other gods" who are not mentioned at all in Scripture and with the proper names of

[39] II Kings 1:2.
[40] I Sam. 5:7.
[41] II Kings 23:13.
[42] *Ibid.*
[43] *Ibid.*
[44] II Kings 5:18.
[45] Exod. 8:22.
[46] Isa. 19:1.
[47] Jer. 43:13.
[48] Jer. 43:13.
[49] Jer. 44:8.
[50] Jer. 46:25.
[51] Ezek. 20:7 (LXX).
[52] Jer. 46:25.
[53] Nahum 3:8.

the "other gods" of Egypt which Scripture only vaguely refers to. The Scripture-inspired attitude toward other gods, in its twofold aspect, was now extended to the new form of heathenism with which the Alexandrian Jews became acquainted. On the one hand, they did not hesitate to borrow Greek terms from popular Greek religion and apply them to their own religion, but, on the other hand, the application of these Greek religious terms to their own religion did not altogether obliterate for them the difference between these two religions. In the Greek translation of the Bible, when the translators came to translate the various Hebrew terms for God, they did not attempt to coin new Greek terms; they borrowed terms already used in Greek religion. Elohim becomes θεός, even though the Greek term had already various connotations in Greek religion. Adonai and Jehovah, the latter of which was pronounced by Jews Adonai, are translated κύριος, Lord, even though in Greek literature that term is used as an epithet of various gods.[54] *Shaddai* becomes παντοκράτωρ, almighty, even though, again, in Greek literature that term is used of Hermes.[55] The expression *ha-El ha-Gadol*,[56] the great God, is translated by ὁ θεὸς ὁ μέγας, even though in Greek the epithet "great" is applied to various gods.[57] The expression *El Elyon*,[58] the most high God, is translated by ὁ θεὸς ὁ ὕψιστος, even though in Greek that expression is used of Zeus.[59] Similarly in the translation of

[54] Cf. *Corpus Inscriptionum Graecarum* (A. Boeckh), Index III, under κύριος; G. Kittel, *Theologisches Worterbuch zum Neuen Testament*, s.v., III, 1045–1047.

[55] *Anthologia Palatina*, append. 282, cited in Liddell and Scott.

[56] Deut. 10:17.

[57] Cf. *Corpus Inscriptionum Graecarum*, Index III, under μέγας.

[58] Gen. 14:20; Ps. 78:35.

[59] Cf. *Corpus Inscriptionum Graecarum*, Index III, under ὕψιστος; E. Schürer, "Die Juden in bosporanischen Reiche, etc.," *Sitzungsberichte der Berliner Akademie*, 1897, p. 209, discusses the application of this expression to Apollo, Attis, and Mandulis.

Hebrew terms connected with divine worship, such as sanctuary, altar, sacrifice, incense, libation, sprinkling, laver, votive offering, the firstlings or the first-fruits for offering, the Jews did not hesitate to borrow terms from the Greek religious practices. All of these of course meant some sort of Hellenization, but a Hellenization in language only; not in religious belief or cult. This Hellenization in language quite certainly gave to the Jews a wider knowledge of other religions, but it did not cause them to change their conception of their own religion. It indeed made them acquainted with the fact that the Greeks too describe some of their gods as lord, almighty, great, and most high, but that did not shake their belief that their God alone is the Lord, the Almighty, the Great, and the Most High in the true sense of the terms. While with all other peoples in the Hellenistic world the adoption of the name of a Greek deity for one of their own gods meant a religious syncretism, in the case of the Jews it meant only a recourse to the convenience of language. In the case of all those other peoples, no sooner had they learned Greek than they tried to identify their native gods with the Greek gods; in the case of the Jews, no sooner had they acquired a knowledge of Greek than they began to denounce Greek gods and Greek religious worship with the same zeal with which the prophets had denounced the gods and the religious worship of their own Semitic contemporaries and neighbors.

All the Hellenistic Jewish writers before Philo, or those who are reputed to have lived before him, denounce the heathenism of their new environment, its polytheism, its mythology, and its mysteries.

Making use of scriptural terminology, these Hellenistic Jewish writers denounce polytheism. They are conscious of the fact that they are the only people who do not worship many gods. "All mankind except ourselves believe in the

existence of many gods." [60] These many gods whom other people worship are no longer those who are mentioned in Scripture. They are the new gods worshiped by their new neighbors, upon whom they shower the ancient invectives. Evidently acquainted with Plato's view that "the earliest men in Greece believed only in those gods in whom many foreigners believe today — sun, moon, stars and sky," [61] in condemning the "other gods" of their new environment they mention especially those who "deemed either fire or wind or swift air or circling stars or raging water or luminaries of heaven to be the gods which govern the world." [62] They characterize as "false" the god "Phoebus" [63] and they denounce as "utterly foolish" the Greek deification of heroes [64] and the Egyptian deification of the dead [65] and of kings. [66] The stories about those heroes who falsely became gods are to them inventions of men, who are referred to by the Platonic derogatory term mythmakers (*μυθοποιήσαντες*).[67] The mythical deities are thus to them only deified human beings, or more particularly deified dead rulers, and their story is therefore recast by them to fit the scriptural story of the distribution of mankind and the formation of nations and states after the confusion of tongues.[68] Reëchoing the scriptural prophecy that "the Lord rideth upon a swift cloud, and cometh unto Egypt, and the idols of Egypt shall be moved at

[60] Aristeas, 134.

[61] *Cratylus* 397 C–D.

[62] Wisdom of Solomon 13: 2.

[63] Sibylline Oracles IV, 4; cf. V, 324, 326.

[64] Aristeas, 135–137.

[65] Wisdom of Solomon 14: 14–16. Cf. A. Erman, *Handbook of Egyptian Religion*, p. 90, and below, p. 31. S. Holmes in his note *ad loc.*, in Charles's *Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha of the Old Testament*, takes it as a modification of the theory of Euhemerus that idolatry arose from the worship of deceased heroes. Cf. also P. Heinisch, *Das Buch der Weisheit, ad loc.*

[66] Wisdom of Solomon 14: 17–21. Cf. Erman, *op. cit.*, pp. 36–37.

[67] Aristeas, 137; cf. *μυθοποιός* in *Republic* II, 377 B.

[68] Sibylline Oracles III, 105 ff.; cf. *Conf.* 38, 190.

His presence," [69] they prophesy that the Egyptian goddess Isis and the Graeco-Egyptian god Serapis shall pass away at the presence of the immortal God.[70] While, with the example of Scripture before them, they have no objection to describing God by general Greek terms for the gods, they never apply to God the proper name of any of the Greek deities. If Aristeas in his letter is made to say that the God worshiped by the Jews is the same as that which the Greeks call Zeus it is only because Aristeas is presented as a non-Jew and a Stoic philosopher to whom Zeus meant the same as the God worshiped by the Jews, "He through whom all things are endowed with life and come into being." [71]

Then also, using terms borrowed from the Greek translation of Scripture, they describe the various forms of idolatry practiced among the Greeks and Egyptians in Alexandria as "idols" (*εἴδωλα*),[72] "dumb (*κωφὰ*) idols,"[73] "vain things" (*μάταια*),[74] "dead things" (*νεκροί*),[75] hand-made things (*χειροποίητα*).[76] Having been brought in closer contact with Egyp-

[69] Isa. 19: 1.

[70] Sibylline Oracles V, 484–490.

[71] Aristeas, 15–16. Or, perhaps, in Hellenistic times the term Zeus ceased to be the proper name of a god and came to mean "chief god," on which see Roberts-Skeat-Nock, "The Gild of Zeus Hypsistos," *Harvard Theological Review*, 29 (1936), p. 59. The same authors also raise the question whether a Jew or Judaizer could use the name Zeus as a god, and their answer is: "Possibly; we simply do not know the limits of Jewish divagation" (*ibid.*, p. 65, n. 69). Ralph Marcus, in his "Divine Names and Attributes in Hellenistic Jewish Literature," *Proceedings of the American Academy for Jewish Research*, 3 (1931–32), pp. 43–120, has shown that out of 470 terms selected from the entire literature, with the exception of Philo, only 130 do not occur in the Greek bible, and of these many are merely formal variants of expressions which occur in it (*ibid.*, pp. 47–48). No proper name of any deity is found among them.

[72] Wisdom of Solomon 14: 12.

[73] III Macc. 4: 16; cf. *εἰδώλοις ἀλάλοισι* in Sibylline Oracles IV, 7; III, 30; cf. Habakkuk 2: 18.

[74] Sibylline Oracles V, 31; cf. Aristeas, 134.

[75] Wisdom of Solomon 13: 10; cf. Ps. 106: 28.

[76] Wisdom of Solomon 14: 8; 13: 10; cf. Septuagint Isa. 21: 9.

tian religion, they are especially emphatic in their denunciation of the Egyptian worship of "beasts and most kinds of creeping things and animals," [77] "irrational creeping things and wretched animals," [78] "animals which even their enemies held in dishonor," [79] "serpents," and "cats." [80] All these seem to be used by them only as an expansion of what Scripture refers to vaguely as "the abomination of the Egyptians."

With their condemnation of polytheism and idolatry they also condemn all the evil practices which they believe to emanate from them. According to Jewish tradition, the basis of all moral evil is idolatry,[81] and two of the greatest moral evils which are closely connected with idolatry are adultery and murder.[82] Reflecting this tradition, the author of the Wisdom of Solomon says that "the worship of those unnamable idols is the beginning and cause and end of every evil" [83] and that those who worship idols "no longer guard either life or purity of marriage, but one slays another treacherously, or grieves him by adultery." [84] As an example of murder connected with idolatry, he speaks of "slaughtering children in solemn rites," an allusion not only to the Moloch worship condemned in Scripture but also to one which was common in early times among the Greeks and which at the time of this author still survived in some modified form.[85] As an example

[77] Aristeas, 138.

[78] Wisdom of Solomon 11:15.

[79] Wisdom of Solomon 12:24.

[80] Sibylline Oracles III, 30. A similar repulsion at the Egyptian animal worship was also felt by Graeco-Latin writers. Cf. F. Cumont, *op. cit.*, pp. 73–74.

[81] *Sifre Num.*, § 111, F, pp. 31b–32a; H, p. 116.

[82] *Sifra, Aḥare, Perek* 4, p. 81c; *Jer. Pe'ah*, I, 1, 15d.

[83] Wisdom of Solomon 14:24. [84] *Ibid.* 14:23.

[85] In this verse, unlike in 12:5, the reference is not exclusively to Moloch. Cf. W. J. Deane's note in his edition of *The Book of Wisdom, ad loc.*; P. Heinisch, *Das Buch der Weisheit, ad. loc.* cf. also Clement of Alexandria, *Cohortatio ad Gentes*, c. III, PG, 8, 124 c ff.

of adultery connected with idolatry the same writer mentions "celebrating secret mysteries (κρύφια μυστήρια), or holding frantic revels of strange ordinances" [86] — an allusion to the Dionysiac orgies connected with the mysteries of Eleusis.[87] In the Third Book of Maccabees, initiation into mysteries is spoken of as being synonymous with the abandonment of Judaism.[88]

But in the course of time, among the Scripture-trained Jews in Alexandria there appeared those who besides an acquaintance with the heathenish worship and practices of their neighbors learned also to read Greek, and among the books they read were not only Homer and Hesiod but also the works of the philosophers. And of these philosophers — even of the earliest among them, to say nothing of the Stoics — they could not help getting the impression that they had risen above the idol-worshiping and abomination-loving heathen. Not idols did these philosophers worship, but one God, invisible, immaterial, good, and just. Xenophanes exclaims: "One god, the greatest among gods and men," [89] and Aristotle endeavors to prove by arguments that there cannot be more than one god.[90] In those works of the philosophers the Hellenistic Jewish writers also found expressions of opinion against anthropomorphisms. Xenophanes again exclaims that his one god is "neither in form like unto mortals nor in thought," [91] and Aristotle tries to prove that God is not corporeal.[92] In Heraclitus, furthermore, they found an attack upon the veneration paid to images, for, he says, "they

[86] Wisdom of Solomon 14: 23.

[87] Cf. W. J. Deane's note in his edition of *The Book of Wisdom, ad loc.*

[88] III Macc. 2: 30.

[89] H. Diels, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*[3], I, p. 62, Fr. 23; J. Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy*[3], p. 119, Fr. 23.

[90] *Phys.* VIII, 6, 259a, 8 ff.

[91] *Loc. cit.*, above, n. 89.

[92] *Phys.* VIII, 10, 266a, 10 ff.

pray to these images, as if one were to talk with a man's house, knowing not what gods or heroes are." [93] In Xenophanes they also found a denunciation of Homer and Hesiod, who "have ascribed to the gods all things that are a shame and a disgrace among mortals, stealings and adulteries and deceivings of one another." [94] Moreover, among the philosophers they also found denunciations of certain religious practices like those denounced by the prophets. Heraclitus thus denounces the mysteries and the Dionysiac orgies: "The mysteries practiced among men are unholy mysteries," [95] and "if it were not to Dionysus that they made a procession and sang the shameful phallic hymn, they would be acting most shamelessly." [96] As in the prophets, they found in Plato a denunciation of those who believe that the gods "are easy to win over when bribed by offerings and prayers" [97] or that they would betray justice "for the sake of gifts offered by unjust men." [98] More especially did they find in the works of the philosophers a preoccupation with the question with which they were already acquainted from the prophet Micah's question: "Must thou, O man, be told what is good?" [99] And the answer they found in the works of the philosophers was almost like those they found in the answer given by the prophet: "What doth the Lord require from thee, but to do justice and to love mercy, and to be prepared to walk with the Lord thy God?" [100] Justice and mercy are what philosophers would include in their various lists of what they call virtues, and the practice of virtue is what to the

[93] Diels, *op. cit.*, I, p. 78, ll. 10–12, Fr. 5; Burnet, *op. cit.*, p. 141, Fr. 126. Cf. below, II, 116.

[94] Diels, *op. cit.*, I, p. 59, Fr. 11; Burnet, *op. cit.*, p. 119, Fr. 11.

[95] Diels, *op. cit.*, I, p. 81, ll. 4–5, Fr. 14; Burnet, *op. cit.*, p. 141, Fr. 125.

[96] Diels, *loc. cit.*, ll. 6–8, Fr. 15; Burnet, *loc. cit.*, Fr. 127.

[97] *Laws* X, 885 B; *Republic* II, 364 B.

[98] *Laws* X, 907 A. Cf. below, II, 242–246.

[99] Micah 6:8 (LXX). [100] *Ibid.*

philosophers is the good. Exactly like the prophet's advice "to be prepared to walk with the Lord thy God" were the statements they found among the philosophers that "every man ought so to devise as to be of the number of those who follow in the steps of the God" [101] and "to become like God, so far as this is possible; and to become like God is to become righteous and holy and wise." [102] Moreover, all the philosophers, dissatisfied with existing laws, planned to establish laws for the guidance of individuals and states which, like the laws of Moses, were aimed to establish justice and righteousness so as to assimilate the conduct of men to that of God.

And so in presenting the beliefs and laws and practices of Judaism to a hostile world — beliefs which were characterized as atheism, laws which were described as inhospitable, and practices which were condemned as superstitious — they tried to show that their God, though not one of the gods of popular religion, is the God of philosophers, that their laws, though not the same as the laws of the city religions, were like the ethics and politics recommended by philosophers, and that their practices, though outlandish, could be explained as being based upon reason, hoping perhaps that those for whom their writings were intended might recall that some of the Greek philosophers also were accused of atheism and impiety. Thus God who in Scripture describes himself as "I am He who is" (ὁ ὤν)[103] begins to be referred to as ὁ ὤν,[104] with the philosophical connotation of real being, reflecting Plato's use of the term ὄντως ὄν in its application to the ideas.[105] The creation of the world is expressed in philosophic terms as a creation "out of formless matter" (ἐξ ἀμόρφου ὕλης).[106] The

[101] Plato, *Laws* IV, 716 B.
[102] *Idem.*, *Theaetetus* 176 B.
[103] Exod. 3: 14.
[104] Wisdom of Solomon 13: 1.
[105] *Phaedrus* 247 E.
[106] Wisdom of Solomon 11: 17.

Law is described in terms of philosophy as having been drawn up "with a view to truth and the indication of right reason (ὀρθοῦ λόγου)," [107] and its commandments are identified with what philosophers call virtues (ἀρεταί).[108] And the description of the world and man and society in Scripture is reproduced with an admixture of philosophic terminology. The Hellenistic Jewish writers, who condemned Greek popular religion and mythology and mysteries, saw in the Greek philosophers the spiritual kindred of the Jews, just as Aristotle, according to a story told by a Greek writer, on his first meeting with a Jew, saw in him the representative of a race of philosophers.[109]

Still, to these Alexandrian Jewish writers, while philosophy in its teachings about God and about the duties of men was reminiscent of the teachings of Scripture, it never really reached the full truth of Scripture. It only groped after it, and occasionally approached it in a vague way. The full truth in all its splendor is to be found only in Scripture, which was revealed to men directly by God; philosophy is only the product of the human mind, and hence subject to error.

The conception of the divine origin of the Law as it formulated itself in the minds of these Hellenistic Jewish writers reflects what by that time was already an established Jewish belief. Its origin, of course, is the testimony of Scripture itself that Moses spoke the word of God. But the formulation of that belief must have arisen out of the many passages in Scripture about wisdom and the Law and their relation to each other. There was, to begin with, wisdom, which says of itself, "The Lord created me in the beginning of His way,

[107] Aristeas, 161.

[108] Aristeas, 144; Aristobulus in Eusebius, *Praeparatio Evangelica* XIII 12; IV Macc. 5: 23; Wisdom of Solomon 8: 7.

[109] Cf. Josephus, *Apion.* I, 22, 177–181.

before His works of old." [110] Then there was the identification of that wisdom, which was created before the creation of the world, with the Law which long after the creation of the world was revealed by God through Moses. Just as of that wisdom it is said that in the finding of it man is to be happy [111] and that it is to keep him from the strange woman,[112] so also of the Law it is said that man is not to forget it [113] and that it is to keep him from the evil woman,[114] and it is the Law which is "your wisdom and your understanding in the sight of the nations." [115] Out of this there grew up the view that the revelation of the Law was the revelation of that wisdom which had been created by God and existed with Him prior to the creation of the world. As expressed by later rabbis, "The Law is a species of wisdom come down from wisdom on high." [116] But this Law, which is preëxistent wisdom revealed, was revealed only to Israel, for it is the peculiar "inheritance of the congregation of Jacob." [117] To other peoples God has given another kind of wisdom, wisdom acquired by them through their own effort, though with the help of God, and this human wisdom is shared by "the children of the east" and "Egypt" [118] and "Teman" [119] and Tyre [120] and Babylon [121] and Gebal.[122]

In Palestinian Judaism this conception of the divine origin of the Law is given expression by Ben-Sira. To begin with, prior to the creation of the heavens and the earth there had already existed wisdom, for "before them all was wisdom created." [123] Then this antemundane wisdom was revealed in the Law of Moses, for "if thou desire wisdom, keep the

[110] Prov. 8: 22.
[111] Prov. 3: 13.
[112] Prov. 7: 4–5.
[113] Prov. 3: 1.
[114] Prov. 6: 23–24.
[115] Deut. 4: 6.
[116] *Genesis Rabbah* 17, 5.
[117] Deut. 33: 4.
[118] I Kings 5: 10.
[119] Jer. 49: 7.
[120] Ezek. 28: 5.
[121] Jer. 50: 35.
[122] Ezek. 27: 9.
[123] Sirach 1: 4.

commandments, and the Lord will give her freely unto thee . . .[124] and he that taketh hold of the Law findeth her [125] . . . and all wisdom is the fulfilling of the Law." [126] But it is only the wisdom of Israel which is the Law that was divinely revealed, for God who created wisdom and revealed her to men said unto her: "Let thy dwelling-place be in Jacob, and in Israel take up thy inheritance . . . and I took root among the honoured people." [127]

This conception of the divine origin of the Law can also be pieced together from the various philosophic writings of Hellenistic Judaism prior to Philo. In the Letter of Aristeas the books of the Law are described as oracles (λόγια) of God,[128] and the Law is said to be "sacred and of divine origin." [129] No mention is made in this letter of the identification of the Law with wisdom nor of the antemundane existence of wisdom. But the Fourth Book of Maccabees, after reproducing the Stoic definition of wisdom,[130] explicitly identifies wisdom with the Law, in its statement: "This I take to be the culture acquired under the Law." [131] No mention, however, is made of the antemundane existence of that wisdom which is acquired under the Law. But in Aristobulus there is a direct reference to "one of our forefathers, Solomon" as saying that wisdom "has existed before heaven and earth." [132] A direct statement as to the antemundane existence of wisdom, reflecting the Book of Proverbs, is found in the Wisdom of Solomon, in the verse saying that "with Thee was wisdom, which knoweth thy works, and was present when Thou wast making the world"; [133] and the identification of wisdom with

[124] Sirach 1:26.
[125] Sirach 15:1.
[126] Sirach 19:20; cf. 21:11; 24:23; 34:8.
[127] Sirach 24:8, 12.
[128] Aristeas, 177.
[129] Aristeas, 313; cf. 31.
[130] IV Macc. 1:16.
[131] *Ibid.* 1:17.
[132] Eusebius, *Praeparatio Evangelica* XIII, 12, 376b; cf. VIII, 14, 324b.
[133] Wisdom of Solomon 9:9; cf. below, p. 183.

the Law is implied in the same book, in the verse saying that "love [of wisdom] is observance of her laws." [134]

Now Hellenistic Jewish writers must undoubtedly have been acquainted with the claim of popular Greek religion that certain laws were revealed by the gods.[135] But no mention of this claim is made by them. To them, since the Greek gods are false gods, the claims that they had revealed laws are false claims. Undoubtedly, too, these writers must also have known about the various philosophic speculations on wisdom as belonging to God,[136] but when they happened to come upon any such speculation they must undoubtedly have tried to evaluate it in the light of their own native Jewish tradition about wisdom as coming from God. When, for instance, Pythagoras, Socrates, and Plato maintain that God alone is wise (*σοφός*) but man can only be a lover of wisdom (*φιλόσοφος*),[137] the Jewish writers must have seen in such statements, in so far as they attribute wisdom to God, an approach to the truth of Scripture; but in so far as they deny wisdom to man, a confession of the impossibility of man's attaining true wisdom without revelation. When, on the other hand, Aristotle and the Stoics maintain that man can have wisdom but that wisdom (*σοφία*) is to be defined, in the words of Aristotle, as "any science that deals with divine objects" (*θεῖα*)[138] and, in the words of the Stoics, as "the science of things divine and human," [139] the Hellenistic Jewish writers must have seen in these statements a use of the term wisdom in the sense of wisdom attained by man through his own powers as contrasted with revealed wisdom.

[134] Wisdom of Solomon 6:18.

[135] Cf. below, II, 191.

[136] Cf. H. Leisegang, "Sophia," in Pauly-Wissowa. 2. Reihe, 5, cols. 1019–1039.

[137] *Phaedrus* 278 D; *Symposium* 203 E; cf. Diogenes, I, 12. On the earlier use of *σοφός* in the general sense of philosopher, see E. Frank, *Plato und die sogenannten Pythagoreer*, 1923, p. 298, n. 1.

[138] *Metaph.* I, 2, 983a, 6–7.

[139] Sextus, *Adversus Physicos* I, 13.

This, then, is how the Law and philosophy must have contrasted themselves in the minds of the Hellenistic Jewish writers. The former was wisdom revealed by God; the latter was wisdom attained by man's own powers. A direct reference to this contrast between revelation and philosophy is to be found in the Wisdom of Solomon, in its author's declaration that he will declare what wisdom is and how she came, and will not hide "mysteries" (μυστήρια).[140] Now the term mysteries in its ordinary sense refers to certain hidden and sacred rites practiced throughout the heathen world, the nature of which their participants were not allowed to divulge, and the obvious meaning of this verse, therefore, would seem to be that, while wisdom is of the nature of a mystery, unlike the heathen mysteries it is to be divulged.[141] But it happens that the term mysteries by that time had acquired in Greek philosophy an additional meaning. It referred to that kind of wisdom which some philosophers believed, as we have seen, to belong only to the gods and which had to be imparted in secret only to a chosen few. Of Protagoras, whom he describes as a very wise man (πάσσοφος), Plato suggests that he must have told "the truth to his pupils in secret" (ἐν ἀπορρήτῳ),[142] and this truth is described by him as mysteries (μυστήρια).[143] Aristotle, who uses the term wisdom to mean the science of things divine and maintains that man can have wisdom, divided his philosophy into "exoteric" and "esoteric" or "acroastic"; and to the latter, because it dealt with "a more profound and recondite philosophy," it is said he "did not ordinarily admit any pupil

[140] Wisdom of Solomon 6: 22 (23); cf. below, pp. 43 ff.

[141] Cf. S. Holmes's note *ad loc.* in Charles's *Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha of the Old Testament.* Cf. also notes in the commentaries of L. W. Grimm, W. J. Deane, and P. Heinisch, *ad loc.*

[142] *Theaetetus* 152 C.

[143] *Ibid.* 156 A.

until he tested his ability, his elementary knowledge, and his zeal and devotion to study." [144] These esoteric doctrines of Aristotle are in a later time described by Themistius (4th century A.D.) as being of the nature of mysteries (*μυστικοί*) and sacred initiations (*τέλη*).[145] The Stoics, who describe wisdom as the knowledge of things divine and human and consider it accessible to men, still consider discourses about the gods as mysteries (*τελεταί*),[146] evidently to be kept secret from the common people. In general, it may be said that the practice of keeping certain doctrines secret was common among all the schools of Greek philosophy.[147] We therefore take it that it is in contrast to this wisdom or philosophy of the Greeks that the author of the Book of the Wisdom of Solomon says of the wisdom which was revealed in the Law, that "what wisdom is, and how she came up, I will declare, and I will not hide mysteries (*μυστήρια*) from you; but I will seek her out from the beginning of her birth and bring the knowledge of her into clear light, and will not pass by the truth." [148] By all this he means to say that he is going to tell the story of wisdom or the Law "from the beginning of her birth," that is, from the time it was created by God before the creation of the world; "how she came up," that is, how she was revealed by God through Moses; and finally "what wisdom is." Evidently having in mind the statement that "the divine cannot be envious (*φθονερὸν*)," [149] which is used by Aristotle as a refutation of Simonides' statement that

[144] Gellius, *Noctes Atticae* XX, 5.

[145] Themistius, *Orationes* XXVI, 319 D, ed. Dindorf, p. 385, ll. 32–33. Cf. Zeller II, 2[4], pp. 155, n. 7; 116, n. 4 (*Aristotle*, I, pp. 112, n. 1; 113, n. 1).

[146] Arnim, II, 42 and 1008.

[147] Clement of Alexandria, *Stromata* V, 9, PG, 9, 90 A f.

[148] Wisdom of Solomon 6: 22 (23).

[149] *Metaph.* I, 2, 983a, 2–3. I take the reference in the Wisdom of Solomon to be to the statement in Aristotle, unlike the reference later in Philo (cf. below, p. 37), which is to a similar statement in Plato.

"God alone can have this privilege [i.e., wisdom]," [150] he says: "Neither indeed will I take pining envy (*φθόνῳ*) for my companion, because envy shall have no fellowship with wisdom," [151] and also "As I learned without guile, I impart without envy (*ἀφθόνως*); I do not hide her riches." [152]

This wisdom which is the Law, having a divine origin, is also superior to the wisdom which the philosophers have attained to. The latter only remotely approaches certain truths of divine wisdom. In their extant writings, pre-Philonic Alexandrian Jewish philosophers do not criticize Greek philosophy; that was not their purpose. Their main purpose was, as we have said, to show that, while the Jews rejected the heathen deities, they were not atheists; that while their laws were peculiar, they were not inhospitable; and that while their practices were outlandish, they were not superstitious. But still, with all their desire to present Judaism as a philosophy like that of the Greek philosophers, they constantly stress certain fundamental differences. The Jewish God indeed is incorporeal and free of emotions as is the God of the philosophers, but still He is not without personal relation to man. He can be prayed to.[153] God has established a fixed order of nature, but still He can miraculously change that order.[154] God is providence, as philosophers say, but His providence is individual: He rewards and punishes.[155] Man is a part of nature, and his actions follow the laws of cause and effect, but God by His grace has given him freedom.[156] The soul is immortal, as philosophers say, but it is also destructible as a punishment.[157] The laws of Moses aim

[150] *Ibid.*, 982b, 30–31.
[151] Wisdom of Solomon 6: 23 (24).
[152] *Ibid.* 7: 13.
[153] Aristeas, 192.
[154] Wisdom of Solomon 11: 17–20; 19: 6–12, 18–22; cf. 12: 18.
[155] Wisdom of Solomon 14: 3–4; 19: 13.
[156] Aristeas, 231, 236, 237; Wisdom of Solomon 1: 12.
[157] Wisdom of Solomon 3: 11; 4: 19; cf. below, p. 409.

to implant virtue as do the laws recommended by philosophers, still these laws are not merely a means which can be replaced by other means; they are the best means, the means revealed by God, and they are to be obeyed for their own sake as divine ordinances.[158] The superiority of Scripture to philosophy is brought out dramatically by the author of the Letter of Aristeas in his account of the table-talk between the Jewish sages and King Ptolemy Philadelphus. The king asks these Jewish sages all kinds of questions. They answer each question. But the common recurrent refrain in all their answers, expressing the same sentiment in different words, is that God is the source of everything we know and everything we do. Thereupon, says the author, "with loud voice the king greeted them all and spoke kindly to them, and all those who were present expressed their approval, especially the philosophers, for they were far superior to the philosophers both in conduct and in argument, since they always made God the starting-point." [159]

II. Philo on Polytheism, Mythology, and Mysteries

The same attitude toward these various phases of Greek religion — its polytheism, its mythology, and its mysteries — is reflected also in the writings of Philo.

First, whenever he happens to comment upon a scriptural condemnation of the worship of "other gods," those "other gods" become with him the gods of the Greeks and Egyptians. Like the Wisdom of Solomon,[1] evidently again following Plato's view that "the earliest men in Greece believed only in those gods in whom many foreigners believe today — sun, moon, earth, stars and sky," [2] he mentions as an example of the most characteristic form of polytheism the deification

[158] Aristeas, 127; 313; Wisdom of Solomon 6: 18.
[159] Aristeas, 235.
[1] Cf. above, p. 14.
[2] *Cratylus* 397 C–D.

of earth, water, air, fire, sun, moon, planets, and fixed stars.[3] But he then adds the Greek names by which these natural objects came to be popularly known as deities — Kore or Demeter or Pluto for earth, Poseidon for sea, Hera for air, Hephaestus for fire, Apollo for sun, Artemis for moon, Aphrodite for Venus or the morning-star, Hermes for Mercury or the Shiner, Castor and Pollux or the Dioscuri for the two hemispheres — that above the earth and that below the earth; and he alludes to other names of deified natural objects.[4] Those who have invented these names he calls "sophists," [5] evidently using this term here, not in the sense in which he often uses it, as referring to the Sophists of Platonic fame,[6] but in its earlier sense as meaning wise men, not only philosophers but also poets, including Homer and Hesiod.[7] Among the "other gods" which he denounces he includes "opportunity" (*καιρός*), upon whom, he says, "the wickedest of men" look as a god,[8] and he denounces also what he describes as "the impious doctrine of the Epicureans," [9] referring thereby, as we shall see, to the gods of the popular teachings of Epicurus.[10] So does he denounce the deification of heroes, to whom he refers also as "demigods" (*ἡμίθεοι*),[11] describing them as being "both mortal and immortal." [12] Of these demigods he mentions especially Dionysus, Heracles, and the Dioscuri,[13] the last of whom, as we

[3] *Decal.* 12, 53; *Cont.* 1, 3–6.

[4] *Decal.* 12, 54–57; *Cont.* 1, 3.

[5] *Cont.* 1, 4.

[6] Cf., e.g., *Post,* 11, 35: "one of the ancient Sophists named Protagoras."

[7] Cf. Diogenes, I, 12. Cf. Zeller, I, 2[5], p. 1074, n. 2 (*Pre-Socratic Philosophy,* II, p. 430, n. 1). In this sense also does Philo use the term "sophists" as a description of the traditional Jewish scholars in Alexandria (cf. below, p. 59).

[8] *Qu. in Gen.* I, 100; Harris, *Fragments,* p. 19.

[9] *Post.* 1, 2.

[10] Cf. below, pp. 166, 176, 177.

[11] *Cont.* 1, 6; cf. *Congr.* 4, 15; *Probus* 16, 105.

[12] *Cont.* 1, 6; *Probus* 16, 105.

[13] *Legat.* 11, 78.

have seen, he mentions also among the gods [14] without distinguishing them as demigods. Besides heroes, he denounces also the deification of kings, with especial reference to the claim of Caligula, considering such a claim as being only a ridiculous imitation of ancient Greek deification of heroes [15] and suggesting that this deification of kings, with particular reference to the case of Caligula, found no recognition among people, whether Greeks or barbarians, except among the native Egyptians of Alexandria, who were susceptible to it by reason of their belief in animal worship.[16] He evinces no knowledge of the belief among ancient Egyptians, long before his time, in the divine origin and nature of their kings; [17] nor does he seem to know that Ptolemy II was deified during his life.[18] In his condemnation of idolatry, while drawing upon the vocabulary of Scripture, he applies it to the idolatry of his own time. "The world as we know it," he says, "is full of idols of wood and stone, and suchlike images." [19] He refers to them as those who are accounted as gods "in the different cities," [20] and describes them as "being fashioned by the arts of painters and sculptors," [21] out of wood or stone or silver or gold.[22]

[14] Cf. above, p. 28.
[15] *Legat.* 11, 78 ff.
[16] *Ibid.* 25, 162–165.
[17] Cf. above, p. 14.
[18] Cf. W. S. Ferguson, in *Cambridge Ancient History*, VII, p. 17.
[19] *Mos.* II, 38, 205.
[20] *Ibid.*
[21] *Ibid.*; *Decal.* 14, 66; *Spec.* I, 4, 21.
[22] *Decal.* 14, 66; cf. *Mos.* II, 38, 205; *Spec.* I, 4, 21; *Cont.* 1, 7. The expression "fashioned by the skill of painters and sculptors" in *Mos.* II, 38, 205, as well as the expression "fashioned by the craftsmanship of sculpture and painting" in *Decal.* 14, 66, does not mean that Philo believed that the painting of images was prohibited by the Mosaic law. In both these passages, it will be noticed, the images fashioned by painting and sculpture are said to be (1) ξόανα, which definitely means a wooden statue, and (2) ἀγάλματα, which, judging from the expression ἀγάλματα καὶ ξόανα καὶ ζωγραφήματα in *Abr.* 45, 267, means here also a statue made either of stone or of metal. This clearly shows that the condemnation of images in these two passages is not of painted images but rather of statues painted with color. The painting of statues is known to have been customary in Greek sculpture, and Plato speaks of

As a native of Alexandria and one who was acquainted directly with the Egyptians, he devotes special attention to their religion. In one passage, he refers in a general way to "the atheism (ἀθεότητα) of the Egyptians." [23] In another passage, he specifies what that atheism is. "Moses," he says, "has branded the Egyptian character as atheistical, because it values (1) earth above heaven, (2) the things that live on the land (χερσαῖα) above those that dwell on high, and (3) the body above the soul." [24] In this passage, it will be noticed, he denounces three forms of atheism which he ascribes to Egyptians. First, their valuation of earth above heaven, by which he undoubtedly means the various earth deities worshiped by the Egyptians. In his discussion of this form of atheism he mentions especially the Egyptian deification of the Nile, under which he undoubtedly includes the various Nile deities. Similarly, in another passage he describes the Egyptians as being "almost alone among the nations" in their deification of earth, including under this also their deification of the Nile,[25] and characterizes this deification of earth and the Nile as "the atheism of those people." [26] Second, their valuation of things that live in the land above

"painting statues" (*Republic* IV, 420 c). So also in the Wisdom of Solomon 15:4, the condemnation of "the painters' fruitless labor, a form stained with varied colors" does not refer to a painted picture but rather to a painted statue (cf. P. Heinisch, *Das Buch der Weisheit, ad loc.*). According to the Talmudic interpretation of the prohibition against the making of "any likeness" (Exod. 20:4), this prohibition applies only to carved figures but does not apply to images not projecting (*'Abodah Zarah* 43b; Maimonides, *Mishneh Torah*, *'Akum*, III, 10). This interpretation of the law was quite evidently that which was followed both by the author of the Wisdom of Solomon and by Philo, as well as also later by the Jews in Dura-Europos, as may be judged from the paintings in their synagogue (cf. Du Mesnil du Buisson, *Les Peintures de la Synagogue de Doura-Europos, 245–256 après J.-C.*, Roma, 1939). But even in the case of carved figures, the law was not always interpreted with the same rigidity (cf. E. L. Sukenik, *Ancient Synagogues in Palestine and Greece*, London, 1934, pp. 63–65).

[23] *Post.* 1, 2.

[24] *Fug.* 32, 180.

[25] *Mos.* II, 36, 194–195.

[26] *Ibid.*, 193; cf. 37, 196.

those that dwell on high, by which he quite evidently means their deification of animals. Similarly, in another passage he uses the term atheism as a description of Egyptian animal worship.[27] Third, their valuation of the body above the soul, by which, we take it, he means the deification of the dead [28] and the identification of all the dead with the god Osiris.[29] The terms "heaven," "those that dwell on high," and "the soul," which he mentions as being undervalued by the Egyptians, are used by him here as symbolic of the immaterial beings which, in contrast to the atheism of the Egyptians, constitute what he considered as theism — the belief in an incorporeal God and incorporeal ideas above this corporeal world of ours.[30] The terms "heaven" and "those that dwell on high" refer here respectively to God and the ideas, for "heaven" has the meaning of God both in Greek and in rabbinic Hebrew.

Denunciation of animal worship as a practice peculiar to Egyptians occurs also in many other passages in Philo. As in the Wisdom of Solomon, he goes into a detailed enumeration of the animals worshiped by the Egyptians. They worship, he says, "irrational animals," not only domestic animals, such as rams and goats and dogs and cats, and especially bulls, but also wild animals, such as the lion and the wolf among the land animals and the crocodile among the aquatic animals, added to these also the asp among the reptiles, ibises and hawks among the birds, and finally also fishes, either their whole bodies or particular parts.[31] He describes this form of worship as "the folly (ἠλιθιότητα) of Egypt," [32] which probably reflects the scriptural expressions

[27] *Legat.* 25, 163.
[28] A. Erman, *A Handbook of Egyptian Religion*, p. 90.
[29] *Ibid.*, p. 97.
[30] Cf. below, pp. 164, 177 ff.
[31] *Decal.* 16, 76–79; *Post.* 48, 165; *Legat.* 20, 139; *Spec.* I, 15, 79; *Mos.* I, 5, 23.
[32] *Spec.* I, 15, 79.

"the abominations (βδελύγματα) of Egypt" [33] and "the devices (ἐπιτηδεύματα) of Egypt." [34]

His application of the term "atheism" to the particular kind of Egyptian polytheism needs some comment. Atheism to him is not the same as polytheism, and the term is not used by him as a rule as a description of polytheism.[35] When, therefore, he describes Egyptian polytheism as atheism, he is using that term in some special sense. What that special sense is may be gathered from two passages. In one passage, he says that "polytheistic creeds" finally lead to "atheism,"[36] and so we may assume that the polytheism of the Egyptians is called by him atheism because atheism is that which it finally must lead to. In another passage, he seems to indicate that the term atheism as a description of Egyptian animal worship is used by him in the rather loose sense of excessive folly (πολλὴ ἠλιθιότης) or excessive impiety (ἀσέβεια),[37] for, as he says in still another passage, animal worship is the worst of all the forms of polytheism.[38] So also Plutarch, speaking of Egyptian animal worship, says that it plunges the weak and the innocent into "sheer superstition" and the more cynical and bold into "atheistic and brutish reasoning," [39] maintaining, with regard to "superstition," that it is no less an evil than "atheism." [40]

Second, Philo denounces mythology, having in mind usually Greek mythology but occasionally making reference also to Egyptian mythology.[41] Myths to him are man-made.

[33] Exod. 8:22.
[34] Ezek. 20:7, 8.
[35] Cf. below, p. 166.
[36] *Praem.* 28, 162.
[37] *Legat.* 25, 163.
[38] *Decal.* 16, 76, and 80.
[39] Plutarch, *De Iside et Osiride*, ch. 71, 379 E.
[40] *Ibid.*, ch. 11, 355 D; cf. ch. 67, 378 A; *De Superstitione*, ch. 1, 164 E; ch. 2, 165 C. So also Philo says that "superstition" is a brother of "impiety" (*Sacr.* 4, 15). Similar statements with regard to the connection between "superstition" and "impiety" are to be found also in *Deter.* 8, 24; *Immut.* 35, 164; *Spec.* IV, 27, 147; *Praem.* 7, 40.
[41] *Decal.* 16, 76; *Spec.* I, 15, 79; *Migr.* 14, 76.

The expressions "to coin myths" (μυθοπλαστεῖν),[42] "making of myths" (μυθοποιία),[43] and "coiners of myths" (μυθοπλάσται)[44] are used by him in a derogatory sense with reference to mythology and mythologists. Myths are not only man-made, they are also false. They have been handed down "for the deception of mortal kind" and consequently they fill one with "false opinions." [45] Mythology is "sophistry" opposed to "wisdom"; "imposture" opposed to "truth." [46] It invents "mythical devices contrary to the truth," [47] and its gods are "cunningly invented myths." [48] The myth-makers are described by him as those "who have infected our life with falsehoods and chased away truths from its borders." [49] "The hippocentaurs and chimeras and the like" are "forms of life hitherto unknown and with no existence outside mythology," [50] the story of Gorgon is "an invention of a myth," [51] and the "mythical stories" about an original human being who combined the characteristics of both sexes [52] are regarded with supreme contempt by "the disciples of Moses trained from their earliest years to love the truth." [53] The mythologists are "impious," for in their "mythical inventions" they represent God "in word indeed as only endued with human form, but in fact as possessing human passions." [54] Evidently referring to Plato's condemnation of mythology,[55] he says that even philosophers speak of "myth

[42] *Post.* 15, 52; *Gig.* 13, 58; *Conf.* 3, 6.

[43] *Leg. All.* I, 14, 43; *Sacr.* 4, 13; 21, 76; *Immut.* 2, 59; *Fug.* 22, 121; *Spec.* I, 15, 79.

[44] *Conf.* 3, 6; *Aet.* 11, 56; 12, 68.

[45] *Sacr.* 21, 76.

[46] *Praem.* 2, 8.

[47] *Post.* 15, 52.

[48] *Praem.* 28, 162.

[49] *Aet.* 11, 56; cf. 12, 68.

[50] *Spec.* III, 8, 45.

[51] *Legat.* 32, 237.

[52] Cf. Plato, *Symposium* 189 D–190 D.

[53] *Cont.* 7, 63. But the same view is also found in *Genesis Rabbah* 8, 1; *Midrash Tehillim*, on Ps. 139: 5; *Tanḥuma*: *Tazri'a* 1; *Berakot* 61a; *'Erubin* 18a. So also Philo himself in *Opif.* 24, 76. Cf. discussion in Ginzberg, *Legends of the Jews* (Jewish Publication Society, 1909–1938), V, 88, n. 42.

[54] *Immut.* 12, 59.

[55] *Republic* II, 378 D.

and fiction" as "obscuring the truth," [56] and complains of those who "make counterfeit impressions in the yet tender souls of the young, employing their ears as their ministers, and filling them with mythical nonsense." [57] Mythology is not the invention of virtue, but the invention of pleasure.[58] In the second of the ten commandments, therefore, he finds a prohibition not only of the worship of idols but also of the worship of "all those deities which the myth-writers have invented and spread delusion therewith" and for the promotion of which they make use of "melody, metre and rhythm" as well as of the arts of "sculpture and painting." [59] Moreover, not only is it prohibited by this second commandment to worship or to make these mythological deities but it is also prohibited "to believe in (προσίεσθαι) the mythical inventions about the marriage of gods and the birth of gods and the numberless and very grave scandals associated with both of these." [60] Proselytes are described by him as those who "spurn mythical inventions and embrace truth in its purity" [61] or as those who take up their abode "with the truth and with the honor of the one Being who is entitled to honor, abandoning the mythical inventions and multiplicity of sovereigns." [62]

As contrasted with mythology, which is man-made and false, Scripture is the work of God, and "in the work of God you will find no mythical invention, but only inexorable rules of truth firmly established, nor will you find in it metres and rhythms and tuneful verses charming the ear with their music, but nature's own consummate works, which possess a harmony all their own." [63] Moses "refrained from inventing myths himself or acquiescing in those composed by

[56] *Opif.* 61, 170.
[57] *Post.* 48, 165.
[58] *Sacr.* 5, 28.
[59] *Spec.* I, 5, 28–29.
[60] *Decal.* 29, 156.
[61] *Spec.* I, 9, 51.
[62] *Spec.* IV, 34, 178; cf. *Virt.* 20, 102; 33, 178.
[63] *Deter.* 33, 125.

others." [64] Unlike myths which, being man-made, are described by him as belonging to the past and as being old and obsolete and effete, the thoughts contained in Scripture are said by him to be always "new and fresh and in the vigor of youth," for they come from God "who never grows old." [65] Unlike myths, too, which, being man-made, are not only false as literal facts but also contain no underlying meaning, the words of Scripture, being divinely revealed, are true literally when they are meant to be taken as literal truths, but even when they are not meant to be taken as literal truths they still contain an underlying meaning which teaches a true doctrine, to be elicited by the allegorical method. Thus the stories of creation, even though not to be taken as literal facts, "are no mythical fictions, such as poets and sophists delight in, but modes of making ideas visible, bidding us resort to allegorical interpretation guided in our renderings by what lies beneath the surface." [66] Thus also the things told about "the serpent speaking in a human voice" — when taken literally, "these things are like prodigies and marvels" in myths, "but when we interpret words by the meanings that lie beneath the surface, all that is of the nature of a myth is removed out of the way, and the true sense becomes as clear as daylight." [67] Hence the story of the giants is unlike "the myths of the poets about giants," [68] not because it is literally true, but because it contains an underlying meaning.[69] When certain people deride the story of the confusion of tongues,[70] arguing that it is not different from similar Greek myths, his answer is that it differs from Greek myths in that it contains an underlying meaning which can be elicited by the allegorical method. Similarly, in the

[64] *Opif.* 1, 2.
[65] *Sacr.* 21, 76.
[66] *Opif.* 56, 157.
[67] *Agr.* 22, 96-97.
[68] *Gig.* 13, 58.
[69] *Ibid.*, 60.
[70] Gen. 11: 1-9.

tory of Lot's wife, Moses "is not inventing a myth, but indicating precisely a real fact," the real fact being the inner meaning it contains.[71] The point is that when Philo, in various ways, maintains that some scriptural story is not like a myth, he means that it is not like a myth because a scriptural story, whether literally true as a fact or not, always has some underlying meaning, whereas myths neither are literally true nor have an underlying meaning. Even the true historical events of the past recorded by Greek authors, he maintains, are not to be compared to Scripture. "No doubt it is profitable, if not for the acquisition of perfect virtue, at any rate for the life of civic virtue, to feed the mind on ancient and time-honored thoughts, to trace the venerable tradition of noble deeds, which historians and all the family of poets have handed down to the memory of their own and future generations." [72] Moreover, there is a certain intrinsic satisfaction in the knowledge of men and deeds of old, "for truly it is sweet to leave nothing unknown." [73] Still, all this knowledge is only of human origin, whereas all the knowledge that is contained in Scripture is of divine origin, having come to us by way of revelation. Revelation to him is self-taught wisdom, for God has caused it "to spring up within the soul." [74] In the presence of the knowledge which comes from Scripture, the knowledge which comes from Greek sources grows into insignificance and disappears, for "it is impossible that God's scholar or pupil or disciple, or any other name which one may think fit to call him, should tolerate the rules of guidance of mortal men." [75]

Third, he denounces the Greek mysteries. He dwells upon the licentiousness and effeminacy which are associated with the mysteries. Male prostitutes, he says, some of them

[71] *Fug.* 22, 121.
[72] *Sacr.* 22, 78.
[73] *Ibid.* 23, 79; cf. *Metaph.* I, 980a, 21.
[74] *Ibid.* 22, 78; 23, 79.
[75] *Ibid.* 23, 79.

eunuchs, are to be seen "continually strutting about through the thick of the market, heading the procession at the feasts, appointed to serve as unholy ministers of holy things, leading the mysteries and initiations and celebrating the rites of Demeter." [76] In the words "there shall be no τελεσφόρος of the daughters of Israel, neither shall there be a τελισκόμενος of the sons of Israel," which in the Septuagint are added to the verse "there shall be no harlot of the daughters of Israel, neither shall there be a whoremonger of the sons of Israel,"[77] Philo finds a prohibition against receiving or conferring initiation into "occult rites and mysteries" (τελετὰς καὶ μυστήρια). He describes them as "imposture and buffoonery," as "mummeries and mystic fables." He objects to them on the ground that they shut themselves up "in profound darkness and reserve their benefits for three or four alone," arguing that "if these things are good and profitable," they should be produced "in the midst of the market-place," where "you might extend them to every man and thus enable all to share in security a better and happier life." [78] Like the author of the Wisdom of Solomon, who, as we have seen, draws upon Aristotle's saying that "the divine cannot be envious," [79] he paraphrases a similar saying from Plato to the effect that "virtue has no room in her home for envy." [80] The consorting by the children of Israel with the daughters of Moab at Shittim [81] is interpreted by him as "spurning their ancestral customs and seeking initiation (τελουμένους) into the mythical rites of mysteries (μυθικὰς τελετάς)." [82] Using the very language of mysteries, he says of "barbarian and Greek nations" [83] that they are celebrating "mysteries uninitiated" (ἀμυήτους μυήσεις) and "rites unorgiastic" (ἀνοργιάστους τελε-

[76] *Spec.* III, 7, 40–41.
[77] Deut. 23: 18 (17).
[78] *Spec.* I, 59, 319–320.
[79] Cf. above, p. 25.
[80] *Spec.* I, 59, 321; cf. *Phaedrus* 247 A.
[81] Num. 25: 1 ff.
[82] *Spec.* I, 10, 56.
[83] *Cher.* 27, 91.

τὰς),[84] that is to say, their mysteries and rites are a mockery.

Still, despite his condemnation of popular religion, mythology, and mysteries, Philo does not hesitate to make use of the vocabulary of all these in his description of the beliefs and institutions of Judaism.

With regard to popular religion, he does not hesitate to speak of the stars as "the gods which sense descries in heaven" [85] and of the heaven as the "great visible god." [86] Nor does he hesitate to speak of the Furies as "the venerable goddesses" (σεμναὶ θεαί),[87] the name by which they were commonly called in Athens. Nor, again, does he hesitate to speak of God as "the Lord of gods and men" [88] or "the supreme Father of gods and men" [89] or as being "God not only of men but also of gods," [90] though the description "Father of gods and men" is usually applied by Homer to Zeus.[91] In wishing to describe the greatness or powerfulness or goodness of God, or any other of His attributes, he does not hesitate to make use of certain stereotyped epithets which in Greek literature are used with reference to other deities. He thus describes God as "the God of liberty (ἐλευθέριον) and hospitality (ξένιον) and of suppliants (ἱκέσιον) and of guests (ἐφέστιον)," [92] even though all these are titles commonly applied to Zeus.[93] He thus also describes God as "the victory-giver" (νικηφόρος),[94] "the benefactor" (εὐεργέτης), "the saviour" (σωτήρ)[95] and "the overseer" (ἔφορος),[96] even though all these terms are applied to Greek deities.[97] He had no objection to the use of all these terms

[84] *Ibid.* 28, 94.
[85] *Spec.* I, 3, 19; cf. *Opif.* 7, 27.
[86] *Aet.* 3, 10; 5, 20.
[87] *Probus* 20, 140.
[88] *Mos.* II, 38, 206.
[89] *Spec.* II, 29, 165.
[90] *Ibid.* I, 56, 307.
[91] *Iliad* IV, 68, *et passim.*
[92] *Mos.* I, 7, 36.
[93] Cf. L. Preller, *Griechische Mythologie*[4], pp. 958–959.
[94] *Congr.* 17, 93.
[95] *Ibid.*, 30, 171.
[96] *Abr.* 15, 71.
[97] Cf. Preller, *op. cit.*, pp. 942, 950, 958, 959. Cf. Bréhier, pp. 74–75.

because he knew full well that, while in form they were borrowed from Greek popular religion, in substance they expressed certain characteristics of God which are to be found in Scripture. In Scripture, God the Lord is called "God of gods and Lord of lords" [98] and also "Father," [99] and there is no reason therefore why, writing in Greek, he should not describe Him in the Homeric phrase "Father" or "Lord" of "gods and men." In Scripture, too, God is described as one who chooses to let the oppressed go free,[100] who loves the stranger,[101] who brings victory over enemies,[102] who does good,[103] beside whom there is no saviour,[104] and who from the place of His habitation looks upon all the inhabitants of the earth,[105] and there is no reason again why, writing in Greek, he should not condense these scriptural descriptions into commonly used Greek epithets for Greek gods.

Sometimes, however, when he happens to use such common Greek religious terms he tries to show that in their application to God he uses them in a somewhat different sense. Thus Philo felt himself justified in calling God "peace" (εἰρήνη), even though in Greek that is the name of a goddess, inasmuch, evidently, as in Scripture God is described as he who gives or makes peace; [106] still, in order to show that he does not confuse the Jewish God with the Greek goddess Irene, he says, "God alone is the real veritable peace" [107] and, if Melchizedek is called "king of peace," it is God who made him that.[108] In another place, he similarly felt himself justified in saying of God that "He is great (μέγας) and strong

[98] Deut. 10: 17.
[99] Isa. 63: 16.
[100] Isa. 58: 6. The term used in this verse is ἄφεσις, but ἐλευθέριος and ἀφέσιος are both used as epithets of Zeus in the same sense.
[101] Deut. 10: 18.
[102] Ps. 18: 48–49.
[103] Ps. 119: 68.
[104] Isa. 43: 11.
[105] Ps. 32: 13.
[106] Exod. 6: 26; Isa. 26: 12; 45: 7; Job 25: 2.
[107] *Somn.* II, 38, 253.
[108] *Leg. All.* III, 25, 79; cf. Gen. 14: 18.

(ἰσχυρὸς) and mighty (κραταιός)," [109] evidently because Scripture also describes God as "great (μέγας) and strong (ἰσχυρὸς) and awful (φοβερός)" [110] or "mighty" (κραταιός),[111] still, in view of the fact that other gods are similarly described as great gods,[112] he elsewhere describes God as "the all-great (πάντα μέγας) God."[113] In still another place, he happens to quote from the Septuagint the divine appellation "the Most High" (ὁ ὕψιστος),[114] which he undoubtedly knew to be used as a Greek appellation of Zeus,[115] and consequently, in order to show that the application of that term to God does not imply a polytheistic belief, as it does in its application to Zeus, he immediately adds: "not that there is any other not most high . . . but to conceive of God not in low earthbound ways but in lofty terms." [116] Again, Philo could not help noticing that festivals like those prescribed in Scripture are celebrated also by heathen and that in the Septuagint the terms used in translating the various Hebrew terms for festivals are the same as those used as descriptions of heathenish

[109] *Spec.* I, 56, 307; cf. *Cher.* 9, 29.

[110] Deut. 10: 17.

[111] The same Hebrew term נורא which in Deut. 10: 17 is translated by φοβερός is in Deut. 7: 21 translated by κραταιός.

[112] Cf. above, p. 12.

[113] *Somn.* I, 16, 94.

[114] Gen. 14: 18.

[115] Cf. above, p. 12.

[116] *Leg. All.* III, 26, 82. The expression *Theos Hypsistos* was used as an appellation of God by the Jews in Egypt (cf. Roberts-Skeat-Nock, "The Gild of Zeus Hypsistos," *Harvard Theological Review* 29 (1936), p. 69) and in Asia Minor and Delos (cf. W. W. Tarn, *Hellenistic Civilization*[2] (Edward Arnold & Co., 1936), p. 193). U. v. Willamowitz-Moellendorff, in "Alexandrinische Inschriften," *Sitzungsberichte der Berliner Akademie*, 1902, p. 1094, arbitrarily takes the use of this expression by Jews in Athribis, Egypt, to imply their belief in polytheism and hence to indicate their religious Hellenization. An inscription from Egypt, published by O. Rubensohn in *Archiv für Papyrusvorschung*, 5 (1909), p. 163, which shows pagan influence, is taken by A. Tscherikower (*Ha-Yehudim ve-ha-Yevanim ba-Tekufah ha-Hellenistit*, p. 359) to be of Jewish origin on the ground of its use of the expression θεῶι ὑψίστωι. This is inconclusive. This expression had also an independent non-Jewish background (cf. E. Schürer, "Die Juden im bosporanischen Reiche, etc.," *Sitzungsberichte der Berliner Akademie*, 1897, p. 214, n. 1; Roberts-Skeat-Nock, *op. cit.*, p. 64).

festivals. And so Philo tries to show the difference between the two kinds of festivals. "Let us consider," he says, "our famous festal assemblies (πανηγύρεις). Different nations, whether Greek or barbarian, have their own," but these are "the product of myth and fiction, and their only purpose is empty vanity," whereas the festivals prescribed in Scripture, "whether they be weekly Sabbaths or feasts, are His, who is the Cause, and pertain not to any man at all." [117] Writing in Greek, he naturally had occasion to refer to the Olympic games,[118] but still when in the course of a discussion of the verse "Let Dan be a serpent on the road, seated upon the track, biting the heel of the horse; and the horseman shall fall backwards, waiting for the salvation of the Lord," [119] he happens to remark that "the Olympic contest is the only one that can rightly be called sacred," he immediately adds, "not that one which the inhabitants of Elis hold, but the contest for the winning of virtues which are divine and really Olympian." [120]

Nor has he any objection to the use of mythological references. Quite unhesitatingly he refers to "the earliest men" who thought fit to call earth Demeter,[121] to "other philosophers" who liken the number seven to the motherless Nike and Parthenos,[122] to "men of old" who called earth Hestia,[123] and to similar other mythological terms. He does not even hesitate to quote mythology for the purpose of illustrating a certain scriptural verse. The reason why no mention is made of the death of Cain is, according to him, to show "in a figure that, like the Scylla of myth, folly is a deathless evil."[124] In his comment upon the name of Zillah [125] he refers to dis-

[117] *Cher.* 27, 91.
[118] *Immut.* 31, 147; *Cont.* 5, 42.
[119] Gen. 49: 17–18.
[120] *Agr.* 27, 119.
[121] *Opif.* 45, 133.
[122] *Ibid.* 33, 100.
[123] *Cher.* 8, 26.
[124] *Deter.* 48, 178.
[125] Gen. 4: 19.

tinguished men in former times who had gone up to Delphi and dedicated there records of their prosperous lives.[126] Jethro is compared by him to the Egyptian Proteus.[127] The three virtues symbolized by Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, and also the gifts with which Moses was endowed, are likened by him to the Graces.[128] God's blessing is said by him to be "better than the nectar and ambrosia of the myths." [129]

But in the case of mythology, as in the case of polytheism, he occasionally tries to show that the use of such mythological terms should not be taken as an indication of belief in what the terms stand for. The Septuagint usually translates the Hebrew Sheol by the Greek Hades, and so the following verse, wherein the word Sheol occurs, is translated by it: "Let the impious (ἀσεβεῖς) be shamed and driven down to Hades." [130] Evidently with this verse in mind Philo says: "He banishes the unjust and ungodly soul from himself to the furthest bounds and disperses it to the place of pleasures and lusts and injustices; that place is most fitly called the place of the impious" (ἀσεβῶν). However, he immediately adds: "But it is not that mythical place of the impious in Hades, for the true Hades is the life of the bad, a life of damnation and blood-guiltiness, the victim of every curse." [131] Perhaps this true Hades of Philo is not the true Sheol of the Hebrew Scripture either, but at any rate he takes pains to show that the Hades of the Septuagint is not the Hades of mythology. When therefore he says of apostates that "they

[126] *Post.* 33, 113.
[127] *Ebr.* 10, 36.
[128] *Abr.* 11, 54; *Mos.* II, 1, 7.
[129] *Immut.* 33, 155.
[130] Ps. 31:18 (17).
[131] *Congr.* 11, 57; cf. *Heres* 9, 45; *Somn.* I, 23, 151. This non-mythical conception of Hades as referring to punishments for crime as well as to tortures of conscience in this world reflects the view of ancient moral philosophers (cf. Hans Lewy's note to *Congr.* 11, 57, in *Philos Werke*, VI, p. 19, n. 3, referring to Lucretius, III, 978 ff. and Heinze in his commentary *ad loc.*). It must, however, be added that, in addition to a Hades in this life, Philo also believed in the punishment of the wicked after death (cf. below, pp. 409 f.; 412 f.).

will be dragged down and carried into Tartarus itself and profound darkness," [132] he must have mentally added that he does not mean thereby that mythical place of the impious in Tartarus.

No less does he hesitate to use the language of mysteries in his description of the religion of Scripture. The covenant into which the children of Israel and the strangers that were among them as well as their future generations entered with God through the agency of Moses [133] is described by him as an act by which Moses "initiated them into the mysteries" (*μυσταγωγῶν*).[134] Within these mysteries of Moses, as in the Eleusinian mysteries, he distinguishes between the lesser mysteries (*τὰ μικρὰ μυστήρια*; [135] *βραχύτεραι τελεταί*)[136] and the greater mysteries (*τὰ μεγάλα μυστήρια*)[137] or perfect mysteries (*τέλειαι τελεται*).[138] God,[139] Moses,[140] the seventy elders of Moses,[141] the high priest,[142] and Jeremiah[143] are each described by him by the term Hierophant (*ἱεροφάντης*), the technical term which designated the highest officer of the heathen mysteries and the demonstrator of its sacred knowledge. Finally, as in the heathen mysteries, he who has been initiated into the mysteries of Moses is not to divulge them to any of the uninitiated [144] or to any one,[145] but he is to "treasure them up" and, keeping check over his speech, he is to "conceal them in silence." [146]

[132] *Praem.* 26, 152.
[133] Deut. 29: 11–14.
[134] *Virt.* 33, 178.
[135] *Sacr.* 16, 62.
[136] *Abr.* 24, 122.
[137] *Leg. All.* III, 33, 100; *Cher.* 44, 49; *Sacr.* 16, 62.
[138] *Sacr.* 15, 60.
[139] *Somn.* I, 26, 164.
[140] *Spec.* I, 8, 41; II, 32, 201; IV, 34, 176; *Virt.* 11, 75; 32, 174.
[141] *Sobr.* 4, 20.
[142] *Spec.* III, 24, 135.
[143] *Cher.* 14, 49.
[144] *Cher.* 14, 48; cf. also *Fragmenta*, Richter, VI, 206 (M, II, 651); 217 (M, II, 658).
[145] *Sacr.* 15, 60.
[146] *Ibid.*

These statements on mysteries have been taken by certain students of Philo as evidence either for the existence of mysteries among the Alexandrian Jews or for the influence of mysteries upon Philo's philosophy. "From many hints up and down in the works of Philo," says Conybeare, "it is certain that among the Alexandrian Jews there existed a system of mysteries, perhaps in imitation of the Greek mysteries of Demeter which were celebrated year by year on the hill of Eleusis close to Alexandria." [147] Ziegert raises the question "whether Philo, in drawing upon the Greek mysteries, had a certain definite and consciously designed purpose in mind, or whether, following the example of Greek writers, he uses the rich vocabulary in the treasure-house of the mysteries only for the purpose of embellishing his style," [148] and also "whether it would be right to say that on the basis of the mysteries Philo had built up a distinct and comprehensive system of religion or philosophy." [149] His answer to these questions is that "Philo, starting with the view that the mysteries are already contained in the Old Testament," [150] came to conceive the "brilliant idea of transferring the system of ancient mysteries to his own religion, or, rather, to his own Alexandrian religious philosophy, but though he had made an attempt at it, he never brought it to completion, for, as so often elsewhere, so here, too, Philo lacked the power to carry out any planned thought to a consistent and clear conclusion." [151] Goodenough, however, thinks that Philo had not only made a tentative attempt at his plan but had also carried it out successfully, for the entire philosophy of Philo is interpreted by him as a mystery. The Jew in Alexandria,

[147] F. C. Conybeare, *Philo about the Contemplative Life*, 1895, p. 303.

[148] P. Ziegert, "Über die Ansätze zu einer Mysterienlehre aufgebaut auf den antiken Mysterien bei Philo Judäus," *Theologische Studien und Kritiken*, 67 (1894), p. 706.

[149] *Ibid.*, pp. 721–722. [150] *Ibid.*, p. 722. [151] *Ibid.*, p. 724.

he says, "met not Aristotle or Zeno, but the mystic philosophy which was transforming every other oriental mythology into a mystery religion," with the result that "Judaism in the Greek Diaspora did, for at least an important minority, become primarily such a mystery," [152] for "since a Jew could not now simply become an initiate of Isis or Orpheus and remain a Jew as well, the amazingly clever trick was devised, we do not know when or by whom," of identifying, by means of allegory, the religion of Scripture with the religion of the mysteries, and thereby "Judaism was at once transformed into the greatest, the only true, Mystery," within which "God was no longer only the God presented in the Old Testament: He was the Absolute, connected with phenomena by His Light-Stream, the Logos or Sophia." [153] Similarly the Law was no longer merely "a set of commands for physical life" to be obeyed, but rather "the ἱερὸς λόγος of the Mystery," though for those who, like Philo, wished to continue to obey its commands, again by a "clever" device, it was made to mean "the material copy of a Platonic original." [154]

Our own interpretation of Philo as the author of a philosophy like any of the religious philosophies which later appeared in Christianity and Islam and Judaism, and in fact as the mainspring of those philosophies, will be unfolded in the succeeding pages of this study. If our interpretation is right, then the relation of Philo to Greek philosophy is like that of any medieval philosopher, be he Christian or Moslem or Jewish, and the relation of his God to the God of Scripture is like that of the God of any of these medieval philosophers, and the allegorical method used by him is exactly like that used by any one of the medieval philosophers, and his conception of the preëxistence of the Law, which conception he

[152] E. R. Goodenough, *By Light, Light*, 1935, pp. 4–5.
[153] *Ibid.*, p. 7. [154] *Ibid.*, p. 8.

quite naturally identified with the Platonic theory of ideas, is like that of any of the medieval philosophers, and his belief in obedience to the Law and in its eternity is like that of any of the medieval Jewish philosophers. He uses terms borrowed from the mysteries in the same way as he uses terms borrowed from popular religion and from mythology, all of them because they were part of common speech. Moreover, just as Philo himself sometimes explains the special sense in which he uses terms borrowed from polytheism and mythology, so also he explains in what special sense he compares the covenant with God to an initiation into mysteries and in what special sense he enjoins silence with regard to what he calls the mysteries of God.

The explanation of his comparison of the covenant between Israel and God to initiation into mysteries may be pieced together from several passages.

In one place, after dwelling on the virtue of repentance and its importance for all men who by their very nature cannot be altogether free from sin, he says: "And, therefore, when Moses convokes such people and would initiate them into his mysteries, he invites them with conciliatory and amicable offers of instruction, exhorting them to practise sincerity and reject vanity, to embrace truth and simplicity as vital necessaries and the sources of happiness, and to rise in rebellion against the mythical fables impressed on their tender souls from their earliest years." [155]

In another place he describes those who have been "initiated into the true mysteries of the Existent" as "those to whose lot has fallen a generously gifted nature and an education in all respects blameless" and who therefore "do not attribute to God any of the properties of a created being." [156] He contrasts them with those "whose natural wit is more

[155] *Virt.* 33, 178. [156] *Immut.* 13, 61–62.

dense and dull and who have been wrongly educated as children" and, therefore, on account of all this, have a cruder conception of God.[157]

In still another place, after dividing the mysteries of Moses into the lesser and the greater, he places under each of these mysteries two distinct things. The first thing under the lesser mysteries is described by him as the taming of the passions by a method "derived from some divine inspiration," [158] that is, by the laws of Moses, so that initiation into the lesser mysteries makes "the passage from the life of the passions to the practice of virtue." [159] By the practice of virtue, as we shall see later, he means the practice of the laws of Moses.[160] The second thing under the lesser mysteries is the acquisition of a knowledge of God indirectly "through His actions, as either creative or ruling" [161] or "from created things." [162] By this indirect knowledge of God, again as we shall show later, he means a knowledge of God based upon reason and philosophy.[163] Under the greater mysteries he similarly includes two things. The first thing under the greater mysteries is the knowledge that besides the conception of virtue in the mind of man by means of sense-perception, symbolized by the verse "and Adam knew Eve his wife," [164] wherein Eve stands for sense-perception,[165] there is a kind of virtue which comes directly from God, symbolized by the stories of Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, and Moses, who are not represented as knowing their wives.[166] In their case God himself "takes away [from the soul] the degenerate and emasculate passions which unmanned it and plants instead the native growth of unpolluted virtues," [167] for "He is himself Father of the

[157] *Ibid.* 14, 63.
[158] *Sacr.* 16, 62.
[159] *Ibid.* 17, 63.
[160] Cf. below, II, 200 ff.
[161] *Abr.* 24, 122.
[162] *Leg. All.* III, 33, 100.
[163] Cf. below, II, 89.
[164] Gen. 4: 1.
[165] *Cher.* 12, 41.
[166] *Ibid.* 12, 40.
[167] *Ibid.* 14, 50.

perfect nature, sowing and begetting happiness in men's souls." [168] What he means by these statements is the view which, as we shall see, he maintains against philosophy, that besides freedom — which results from the control of the passions by reason — and besides virtuous conduct — which may be attained by the guidance of reason — there is a freedom which comes directly from God as a special grace from Him [169] and a guidance to righteous conduct which comes directly from God as a revelation, again by a special grace from Him, and that revelation is embodied in the Law of Moses.[170] The second thing under the greater mysteries is the knowledge of God as one who is directly "visible apart from His powers," [171] and this direct knowledge of God is described by him as "a clear vision" of God which is perceived directly, and "not from created things." [172] By this, as we shall see, he means a knowledge of the existence of God attained by means of revelation.[173] It will be noticed that the two things under the greater mysteries correspond exactly to the two things under the lesser mysteries. All these four meanings of the Mosaic mysteries are summed up by him in the statement that the mysteries contain "the knowledge of the Cause and of virtue and, third, of the offshoot of them both." [174]

Finally, in one place, he seems to indicate that allegorical method, whereby the true knowledge of God and of virtue is to be extracted from the letter of the Law, was regarded by him as a mystery; for he speaks of those who are not versed in the allegorical method as those "who are not initiated (ἀμύητοι) in allegory," and allegory itself is described by him as "the nature which loves to hide itself." [175]

[168] *Leg. All.* III, 77, 219.
[169] Cf. below, pp. 445–454.
[170] Cf. below, II, 51.
[171] *Sacr.* 15, 60.
[172] *Leg. All.* III, 33, 100.
[173] Cf. below, II, 89.
[174] *Cher.* 14, 48.
[175] *Fug.* 32, 179.

From all this we may gather that by those who have been initiated into mysteries he means men of good native abilities and proper education who have succeeded in mastering their passions and in acquiring a true knowledge of the existence and nature of God. The knowledge of the existence of God, according to him, may come to them either indirectly through God's actions in the world or directly through revelation. The knowledge of the true nature of God means to him the knowledge that God is incorporeal and unlike any of the created beings, and also that by a special grace He has endowed men with a part of His own power of freedom of action and has revealed to them a Law which is to guide them in their free action. These things are called by him mysteries for two reasons. First, they are called mysteries because the true knowledge of them lies hidden in Scripture, and has to be extracted from it by means of the allegorical method, which requires instruction. For this use of the term mysteries Philo had ample justification, since by his time that term had come to be applied to all matters of science which required instruction.[176] Philo himself uses the term mysteries in this sense when he says of Joseph that he "was both the initiated and the initiator in the mysteries of dreams." [177] Second, they are called mysteries as a challenge to the heathen mysteries. Philo seems to say to the votaries of the heathen mysteries: the communion with God and the salvation and the better way of life which you all aspire after are not to be attained by the sacred rites which you practice in secret, by your mummeries and mystic fables, but by obedience to the teachings and practices of the Law of Moses. These are the true mysteries.

This challenge to the heathen mysteries is directly brought

[176] Cf. Liddell and Scott, under *μυστήριον*, and above, pp. 24 f.

[177] *Somn.* II, 12, 78.

out in that passage quoted above in which Philo tries to explain the scriptural teaching of how God by special grace may directly plant in man the growth of virtue. This scriptural teaching, which is described by him as one of the "divine mysteries" (τελεταὶ θεῖαι)[178] or "holy mysteries" (ἱερὰ μυστήρια),[179] is derived by him allegorically from the fact that Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, and Moses, and others of the same kind, are not represented in Scripture as knowing their wives. He then proceeds to say: "Man and woman, male and female of the human race, in the course of nature come together to hold intercourse for the procreation of children. But virtues whose offspring are so many and so perfect may not have to do with mortal man, yet if they receive not seed of generation from another they will never of themselves conceive. Who then is he that sows in them the good seed save the Father of all, that is God unbegotten and begetter of all things?"[180] Then, commenting upon the verse which he quotes as reading "Hast thou not called Me as thy house and thy father and the husband of thy virginity,"[181] he interprets it to mean that God is "the husband of wisdom, dropping the seed of happiness for the race of mortals into good and virgin soil."[182] Now in itself there is nothing strange in the use of this metaphor of sex and marriage in describing God as the source of virtue and happiness in man. Such a metaphor is also used by Plato in describing the ideas as the source of knowledge and truth in man. "It is the nature of the real lover of knowledge," he says, "to strive emulously for true being . . . and the edge of his passion would not be blunted nor would his desire fail till he came in touch (ἅψασθαι) with the nature of each thing in itself . . . and through that approaching (πλησιάσας) it, and consorting

[178] *Cher.* 12, 42.
[179] *Ibid.* 14, 48.
[180] *Ibid.* 13, 43–44.
[181] Jer. 3:4.
[182] *Cher.* 14, 49.

(μιγείς) with reality really, he would beget (γεννήσας) intelligence and truth . . . and so find surcease from the travail (ὠδῖνος) of soul." [183] But it happens that in the mysteries the marriage between some deity and man was not only used as a figure of speech but also was symbolically enacted as a rite. In modern historical reconstructions of the ceremonies performed at the various mysteries we are told that "the culminating rite of Sabazios was a sacred marriage in which the god, represented by the golden adder, was drawn through the bosom of his worshipper; and here the worshipper, whether man or woman, is conceived as female, being none other than the bride of the god." [184] All this had for its purpose the establishment of a symbolic union between the votary and the deity. Philo undoubtedly was acquainted with this kind of rite, and by using in this passage the symbolism of marriage between God and men he meant to challenge all such rites of heathen mysteries. All these mummeries, he seems to say, are unnecessary. There is an unbroken and constant union between God and men, for God is in a sense always in men; He is the source of virtue in them, He has endowed them with a part of His own power to act with unrestrained freedom, and He directly communicates to them His will, whenever they prove themselves worthy of it.

This then is the meaning of Philo's comparison of the covenant between Israel and God to initiation into mysteries.

Let us now see what Philo, on the show of his own explanation, means by his injunction of silence on the part of those who have been initiated into what he calls mysteries.

[183] *Republic* VI, 490 A–B.

[184] Cf. A. B. Cook, *Zeus*, I, p. 396, referring to A. Dieterich, *de hymnis Orphicis*, 1891, pp. 38 f. (= *Kleine Schriften*, 1911, pp. 98 f.); *id.*, *Mutter Erde*, 1905, pp. 110 ff.; *id.*, *Eine Mithrasliturgie*[2], 1910, pp. 123 ff.; cf. also G. W. Butterworth's Appendix to his edition of Clement of Alexandria's *The Exhortation to the Greeks*, in The Loeb Classical Library, p. 388.

To begin with, he means thereby that man is to be modest about the special grace he may receive from God in aiding him to overcome the passions of his body, and he is not to boast about it. Thus, speaking of one of the two of his so-called lesser mysteries, that is, the taming of the passions by the practice of virtue, which he finds symbolized by the baking of the dough into unleavened bread by the children of Israel on their exodus from Egypt,[185] he makes the following statement: "And the method of the softening and improvement of the passions, which was revealed to them by a sort of divine inspiration, they did not utter aloud, but treasured it in silence, not being elated at the knowledge of the mystery (τελετῇ), but yielding and being lowly as to their boasting." [186] Not to blab the mysteries and to conceal them in silence in this case merely means not to boast about them and not to feel proud of oneself for having been favored by God with a special revelation. This is in accord with Jewish teaching that one must not be boastful of the knowledge he has attained through his own efforts or through divine revelation, for "whoever is boastful, if he is wise, his wisdom will desert him and, if he is a prophet, his prophecy will desert him." [187]

Then, he means by his injunction of silence that the allegorical method of the interpretation of Scripture, whereby one is to discover its hidden mysteries, is not to be taught to persons who do not possess the required qualifications for it. To be initiated into these mysteries, as we have seen, means to Philo to be in possession of native ability, a good education, and a moral character.[188] When he says, therefore, that those who have been initiated into the holy mysteries of Moses should not divulge them to any of the "uninitiated,"

[185] Exod. 12:39.
[186] *Sacr.* 16, 62.
[187] *Pesaḥim* 66b.
[188] Cf. above, p. 49.

he means thereby that the mysteries should not be taught to those who do not possess the required threefold qualification. When he says that these perfect mysteries are not to be divulged to "anyone" (μηδενὶ),[189] by "anyone" he means anyone who is not properly qualified. He himself would withhold the allegorical interpretation from the "superstitious" and from those "who are inflicted with the incurable disease of conceit, with petty quibbling about expressions and words, and with juggling tricks of manners." [190] He would impart them only to those who are "worthy" of it, and those only are worthy of it "who, with all modesty, practise true and really unadorned piety." [191]

This need of intellectual and moral qualifications for the study of the inner truths of Scripture is stressed by Philo in many other passages. In one place, commenting upon the verses, "and Moses took the tabernacle, and pitched it outside the camp, afar off from the camp . . .[192] and when Moses entered into the tabernacle, the pillar of cloud descended and stood at the door of the tabernacle and [the Lord] talked with Moses," [193] he interprets them to mean that only those who "have put off all the things of creation and the innermost veil and covering of mere opinion" are allowed to enter into the invisible region and to remain there while learning "the most sacred mysteries." [194] In another passage he says that the souls which "make a quest of God's hidden mysteries" first "build up the actions of virtue," so that only "the virtuous man" receives "wisdom." [195] In still another place he says that God manifests himself and reveals His "secret mysteries" only to a soul that He deems worthy of them, and such a worthy soul is one "that longs for all beauteous

[189] *Sacr.* 15, 60.
[190] *Cher.* 12, 42.
[191] *Ibid.*
[192] Exod. 33:7.
[193] Exod. 33:9.
[194] *Gig.* 12, 53–54.
[195] *Leg. All.* III, 1, 3.

things" and shuns "evil" and destroys "passions." [196] In a fourth place he says that "when the mind soars aloft and is being initiated into the mysteries of the Lord, it judges the body to be wicked and hostile." [197] In the Wisdom of Solomon this view is succinctly expressed in the verse, "For into a malicious soul wisdom shall not enter; nor dwell in the body that is subject unto sin." [198]

For Philo to have made intellectual and moral qualifications a condition for the study of the inner philosophic meaning of Scripture was only to follow a tradition common in Greek philosophy. There was, to begin with, Aristotle's theory as to the subordination of moral to intellectual virtues [199] and as to the need of proper training in order to attain intellectual virtue.[200] Philo has only slightly revised this view by making moral virtue a condition of intellectual virtue, and this under the influence of certain religious preconceptions of Judaism.[201] Then also, as we have already seen, Protagoras, Aristotle, and the Stoics had regarded certain doctrines of their philosophy as mysteries, imparting them to their students in secret, and Aristotle would not impart them to any of his students "until he had tested his ability, his elementary knowledge, and his zeal and devotion to study." [202] The importance of certain preliminary knowledge for the study of the higher branches of learning is emphasized by Philo himself elsewhere, in his statement that one should not enter upon the study of "philosophy" until he had mastered the program of encyclical studies such as grammar and geometry and similar disciplines.[203] By the same token, the highest study of God, which, as we shall see, he calls wisdom and which is considered by him higher than philoso-

[196] *Ibid.* III, 8, 27.
[197] *Ibid.* III, 22, 71.
[198] Wisdom of Solomon 1:4.
[199] *Eth. Nic.* X, 7–8.
[200] *Ibid.* II, 1, 1103a, 15–16.
[201] Cf. below, II, 261 ff.
[202] Cf. above, pp. 24 f.
[203] *Ebr.* 12, 48–50.

phy,[204] should not be undertaken by anybody, nor should it be imparted to anybody, who has not been initiated into the study of philosophy. Not long after the time of Philo, when certain allegorical interpretations of Scripture, of a cosmogonical and theosophical nature, appeared in Palestinian Judaism, the rule was laid down that "one must not discourse on the work of creation before two students, nor on the work of the chariot before one student, unless that student be wise and able to speculate by himself." [205] So also, in a comment upon the verse "Now these are the judgments which thou shalt set before them," [206] playing upon the verb *tasim*, "thou shalt set," and the noun *simah*, "treasure," and therefore taking the verse to mean "thou shalt set before them as a treasure," Rabbi Simeon ben Yohai says: "Just as a treasure is not revealed to every one, so thou art not allowed to discourse on the profundities of the Law except in the presence of worthy persons." [207] The term mystery that Philo applies to the allegorical method and his warning not to blab it out to those who have not been initiated mean nothing more than that rule laid down by philosophers with regard to certain doctrines and by rabbis with regard to discoursing on the work of creation and on the work of the chariot and on the profundities of the Law.

III. Discordance, Conformity, Apostasy

The warning by Philo against divulging the allegorical interpretation of Scripture to those not qualified for it by native

[204] Cf. below, pp. 147 ff.

[205] *M. Ḥagigah* II, 1. The reference is to the story of creation in Gen. 1 and to the vision of the four wheels in Ezek. 1. So also Maimonides, for the same reason, enjoins secrecy in the teaching of metaphysics. Cf. Maimonides, *Moreh Nebukim* I, Introduction, 17, 33, 34, and 71; III, Introduction.

[206] Exod. 21: 1.

[207] *Jer. 'Abodah Zarah* II, 8, 41d; cf. L. Ginzberg, "Der Anteil R. Simons an der ihm zugeschriebenen Mechilta," *Festschrift zu Israel Lewy's siebzigstem Geburtstage*, 1911, pp. 406–408.

abilities, proper training, and moral character was timely and necessary. Like any religious rationalism in history, whether Greek before Philo or Christian, Moslem, and Jewish after Philo, Alexandrian Jewish rationalism was an attempt on the part of a chosen few to reconcile two extremes, a religious tradition which was untouched by philosophy and a philosophy which was unconcerned with that tradition, or even unconscious of its existence. Alexandrian Judaism, like any other religious body either before it or after it, was not a religion of philosophers only. Not all Greek-speaking Jews read Plato: most of them read only the Septuagint, and some of them could not read at all, though by reason of the religious obligation to meditate in the Law day and night the rate of literacy among the Jews in Alexandria must have been higher than among non-Jews.

Alexandrian Judaism at the time of Philo was of the same stock as Pharisaic Judaism, which flourished in Palestine at that time, both of them having sprung from that pre-Maccabean Judaism which had been molded by the activities of the Scribes. Though in the new land to which it had been transported it subsequently developed certain peculiar local characteristics, it did not altogether detach itself from its native source, nor did it remain completely unaffected by the subsequent development of Judaism in Palestine. Judaism in Alexandria started upon its new career with an initial stock of oral traditions and an incipient method of scriptural interpretation, both of which it had brought from Palestine and continued to share in common with those who in Palestine subsequently became the Pharisees. But in their new environment some Alexandrian Jews came into possession of a new body of knowledge derived from Greek philosophy, and out of this new body of knowledge they developed a new method of the interpretation of Scripture, to which the name

allegory was given, meaning thereby philosophic allegory exclusively. This new method of interpretation naturally gave rise to a new problem. On the one hand, those unaffected by philosophy were fully satisfied with the traditional method of interpretation, and proved themselves, therefore, indifferent to the new philosophical method of allegory; on the other hand, some of those who adopted the allegorical method somehow were led to disregard the traditional method. It was Philo's purpose, therefore, to combine the traditional with the allegorical method, preventing the former from becoming hostile toward the latter and guarding the latter against breaking itself loose from the former. As in many instances under similar conditions in the later history of religions, Philo found it necessary to restrict the teaching of the philosophic interpretation of Scripture to properly qualified and properly equipped students.

Specific references to the actual existence of two such extreme tendencies in Alexandrian Judaism, between which Philo was trying to hold the center, are to be found in the works of Philo himself.

The traditionalists are usually described by him as upholders of the literal meaning of texts, both in the legal and in the narrative part of Scripture, as against the allegorical interpretation of them. In one place, trying to justify his allegorical interpretation of a law on the ground of certain difficulties he finds in it if taken literally, he concludes: "Now whether in the plain and literal sense of the ordinance these things are consistent with each other is a matter for those who are in the habit of pursuing such investigations and are fond of them." [1] In another place, again, after enumerating certain difficulties in a certain law if taken literally, he concludes with the following words: "These things, then, and

[1] *Immut.* 28, 133.

other things of the same kind, may be urged in reply to those who are experts (σοφιστάς) in the study of literal interpretation." [2] Similarly, with regard to the narrative part of Scripture, in connection with the story of the confusion of tongues, after quoting in the name of others certain objections to it which he himself answers by giving to them an allegorical explanation, he refers to possible refutations of these objections by "those who can provide for all questions as they arise explanations from the plain letter of the law." [3] Explanations of scriptural narratives from the plain letter of the text, as alternatives to his own allegorical explanations, are quoted by him also in the name of those whom he describes as "some persons" (*nonnulli*)[4] or "certain persons" (*quidam*).[5] From his references to these traditionalists it is quite evident that he calls them literalists not because he thought that they considered themselves bound by the letter of the Law, without allowing themselves any freedom of interpretation whatsoever, nor because he thought that they considered the Law only as a collection of arbitrary commands and senseless stories in which there was no inner significance; he calls them literalists only because they were opposed to the philosophical kind of allegory advocated by him. In their own way they seem to have had their own method of interpretation and their own method of discovering in those commands and stories some inner meaning. The few examples of their interpretation of the letter of scriptural narrative and the numerous examples of his own exposition of what he would describe as the letter of the law bear a

[2] *Somn.* I, 16, 102.

[3] *Conf.* 5, 14.

[4] *Qu. in Gen.* I, 8; I, 10; II, 28; II, 58.

[5] *Ibid.*, II, 64. Cf. M. J. Shroyer, "Alexandrian Jewish Literalists," *Journal of Biblical Literature*, 55 (1936), 261–284. Under the "Literalists" Shroyer also includes (pp. 275–279) those of whom we shall treat later under the third class of apostates (cf. below, pp. 83 f.).

close resemblance to the interpretations of the narrative and legal portions of Scripture by those rabbis who regarded themselves as opponents of the literalism attributed to the Sadducees. The literalists of Philo are presented by him as being conscious of problems and difficulties in the text of Scripture, as pursuing investigations of their own, as being able to match wits with captious critics, and as discovering moral lessons in scriptural stories. The term σοφισταί which he applies to them, we take it, is used by him here not in its derogatory sense of "sophists" but rather in its laudatory sense of "sages" and "experts." Taken in this sense, it may reflect the Hebrew term *ḥakamim*, "sages," which is one of the names by which the Pharisaic interpreters of the law are known. In fact, in Josephus, the Greek term σοφισταί is used as the equivalent of the Hebrew *ḥakamim*, in the sense of men learned in the law.[6]

As a philosopher, Philo was partly critical of them. But when we study carefully the thought behind his uttered words in the passages in which he expresses his criticism of the traditionalists, we shall find that he does not really argue against them but rather with them against themselves. His main criticism of them is that, by their refusing to interpret texts philosophically, they sometimes take Scripture to affirm views, especially about God, which upon a closer examination of their own conscience they would themselves find objectionable. Take, for instance, the verse stating that "God took to heart (ἐνεθυμήθη) that He had made man upon the earth, and He thought upon it (διενοήθη); and God said, I will destroy man whom I have made from off the face of the earth." [7] This verse, he says, if not interpreted philosophically, would imply that "the Creator repented (μετέγνω) the

[6] *Bell. Jud.* I, 33, 2, 648; II, 17, 8, 433; 9, 445.

[7] Gen. 6:6–7 (LXX).

creation of men when He beheld their impiety, on which account He determined to destroy the whole race," [8] but this would imply a change in God, and the implication of any change in God — we may complete his argument for him — would be rejected even by the traditionalists themselves on the simple ground of the explicit statement in Scripture that God "will not change (ἀποστρέψει) nor repent (μετανοήσει), for He is not a man that He should repent." [9] Consequently, he accuses the traditionalists that by their rejection of philosophical interpretation of texts they act like unthinking persons who have not examined themselves (ἀνεξέταστοι)[10] and are therefore full of inconsistencies.[11] Similarly, he argues, the verse in which God says to Moses, "I have shown it to thine eyes, but thou shalt not enter therein," [12] if taken literally as meaning that Moses would not be allowed to enter into the Promised Land, would imply an injustice on the part of God in that He did not allow to Moses, who was one of the "friends of God," that which He had granted to all others, who were only the "slaves" of God, but to assume that would be "folly," for — and here again we may complete his argument for him — Scripture explicitly says with regard to God that "all His ways are acts of judgment; a faithful God, He doth no injustice." [13] Consequently, he again accuses the traditionalists that by their rejection of philosophical interpretation they prove themselves to be inconsiderate and thoughtless persons (ἀπερίσκεπτοι).[14] Furthermore, he seems to argue, the traditionalists, with all the

[8] *Immut.* 5, 21.

[9] I Sam. 15:29 (LXX).

[10] *Immut.* 5, 21.

[11] Cf. *Virt.* 3, 10, where the expression ἀνεξέταστοι ἄνθρωποι is used to describe those who expose the inconsistencies (ἀνωμαλίας) of their soul by random talk.

[12] Deut. 34:4.

[13] Deut. 32:4 (LXX).

[14] *Migr.* 9, 44–45.

minuteness with which they examine, after the manner of the Scribes and Pharisees, the accuracy of every word and letter in Scripture, through their refusal to make use of philosophical allegory sometimes fail to live up to their own standard of accurate and precise study of the choice of words in scriptural texts (*οἱ μὴ λίαν ἠκριβωμένοι*), for only through the allegorical interpretation can one explain, for instance, why in one place Scripture uses the term "husbandman" (*γεωργός*) and in another the term "soil-worker" (*γῆς ἐργάτης*), and why in one place it uses the term "shepherd" (*ποιμήν*) and in another the term "cattle-rearer" (*κτηνοτρόφος*).[15]

Now Philo has no objection to the traditional method of interpreting texts as such; he himself often follows that method of interpretation; but he insists that the philosophical method of interpretation should be added to the traditional. Take, for instance, the scriptural story about the four wells dug by the servants of Isaac.[16] This story, says Philo, may be taken by the traditionalists as a mere story of four wells dug by the servants of Isaac, but philosophers will take it to refer allegorically to the "four parts of the universe, land, water, air, heaven." No objection to the literal interpretation of the story is raised by Philo; still, the traditionalists, because in this particular instance they take the story to refer only to the small world of Isaac, are called by him "citizens of a petty state" (*μικροπολῖται*), whereas the allegorists, because they interpret the verse to refer to the parts of the universe, are described by him as "those on the roll of citizens of a greater country, namely, this whole world" and as men of "more perfect wisdom."[17] There is no implication

[15] *Agr.* 6, 26–29; cf. 5, 20–21; 9, 42–43; 13, 57. The references are to the use of these four terms respectively in (1) Gen. 9: 20; (2) Gen. 4: 2; (3) Gen. 30: 36, and Exod. 3: 1; (4) Gen. 46: 34.

[16] Gen. 26: 19, 21, 22, 32.

[17] *Somn.* I, 7, 39.

in this statement, as we see it, of a general contrast between two conceptions of Judaism — the so-called narrow, nationalistic conception of the traditionalists and the so-called broader, universal conception of the allegorists. Such a contrast between two conceptions of Judaism is never consciously made by Philo. Judaism to him, as to the rabbis of his time, was both national and universal; and the synthesis of the two is fully developed by him, as we shall see, in his political theory, and especially in his view on the Messianic age.[18] Similarly the verse, "a spring went up out of the earth and watered all the face of the earth," [19] may be taken by those "who are not initiated into allegory" to refer to a real spring which watered the land like the Nile, and Philo expresses no objection to such an interpretation; but still, he says, allegorically this spring means the mind.[20] Finally, in connection with the story of the confusion of tongues,[21] of which he himself gives an allegorical interpretation,[22] he says explicitly, with regard to those who follow "the outward and obvious" and take the story literally as an explanation of the origin of the Greek and barbarian languages, that he would "not blame (*αἰτιασάμενος*) such persons, for perhaps the truth is with them also"; he would only exhort them "not to halt there but to proceed onward to figurative interpretations."[23]

There is one passage which contains a derogatory description of people who are evidently not allegorists, but it is not clear whether this passage refers to these traditionalists or not. In this passage Philo says that he would not expound his allegorical interpretations of Scripture, which he calls here

[18] Cf. below, II, 354 ff., 415 ff.
[19] Gen. 2:6 (LXX).
[20] *Fug.* 32, 179 ff.
[21] Gen. 11:1 ff.
[22] *Conf.* 5, 15 ff.
[23] *Ibid.* 38, 190. The term "perhaps" here is an expression of modesty, not of doubt. Cf. below, pp. 66, 125 f.

"the sacred mysteries," to "the superstitious" and to "those who are afflicted with the incurable disease of conceit, with petty quibbling (γλισχρότητι) about expressions and words, and with juggling tricks of manners, and who measure holiness and piety by no other standard." [24] If this passage were meant to be a characterization of the anti-allegoristic traditionalists of Alexandria as a class, then we would have here a condemnation of the Alexandrian counterpart of the Palestinian Pharisees like that which we find among the rabbis of certain types of Pharisees and in the New Testament of all the Pharisees. But it is more likely that the condemnation in this passage refers to certain individuals who were to be found in all the classes of the Jewish population in Alexandria rather than to the traditionalists alone as a whole. It will be noticed that one of the special characteristics ascribed to these people is their "petty quibbling (γλισχρότης) about expressions and words." Elsewhere, quite on the contrary, as we shall see, Philo makes the traditionalists condemn the allegorists for their "petty quibbling" (γλισχρολογία)[25] about words.

What the attitude of those traditionalists toward allegory exactly was may be gathered from two brief descriptions of them found in Philo. In one place he describes them as "drawing up the eyebrows overmuch" (λίαν τὰς ὀφρῦς ἀνεσπακότες),[26] that is to say, putting on a supercilious air and contemptuously dismissing allegorical explanations as something worthless. In another place, where, in anticipation of an allegorical interpretation of the verse "thou shalt stand meeting him on the lip of the river," [27] he raises the question "why Moses speaks of the river of Egypt alone as having 'lips,'" he refers to some people who, "in a spirit of ridicule,

[24] *Cher.* 12, 42.
[25] *Somn.* II, 45, 301; cf. below, p. 64.
[26] *Somn.* I, 17, 102.
[27] Exod. 7: 15.

may say that such points should not be brought into our inquiries, for they savor of petty quibbling rather than of any profitable process." [28]

From these two passages it is quite evident that the opposition to allegory attributed to the traditionalists by Philo is that characteristic of men who, not having been trained in philosophy, have no interest in it and see no use in it and are quite contented to abide by whatever interpretation tradition and the exigencies of life may suggest to them. These traditionalists also seem to have been oblivious of the social significance of the philosophical interpretation of Scripture either as a means of satisfying the inquiring minds among the Jews or as a means of defending Judaism against the attacks of heathen writers. They display a self-confidence and self-contentment which flow from a consciousness of strength and from a faith in the loyalty of their adherents among the great masses of the Alexandrian Jews. Whether among these traditionalists of Alexandria there was also an opposition to philosophy on religious grounds, condemning it as a form of impiety or heresy, cannot be ascertained from the literature of the time. From the analogy of the form which the opposition to philosophy took in the later history of religions, whether Christian or Moslem or Jewish, one is not justified in assuming that such an opposition existed also in Alexandria, for later in the history of religions, again whether Christian or Moslem or Jewish, there were other factors, new and unprecedented, which gave rise to this kind of opposition to philosophy.

These traditionalists are not represented in Hellenistic Jewish literature. All we know about them is derived from Philo's references to them. That they should have left no written records of their interpretations of the Law is un-

[28] *Somn.* II, 45, 301.

doubtedly due to the fact that these interpretations constituted what they, like the Palestinian Pharisees, regarded as oral law, and consequently, again, like the Palestinian Pharisees of that time, they did not allow themselves to commit it to writing.[29] Certain historical works in Hellenistic Jewish literature, such as the Second and Third Books of Maccabees, may perhaps have come from their circle. But such an assumption can be based only upon the slender evidence of silence, that is, the absence in these works of any philosophical discussions. In the case of the Second Book of Maccabees one might perhaps add also the dubious evidence of its assertion of a belief in the resurrection of the body,[30] if one were only certain that the question of resurrection as against immortality was an issue upon which non-allegorists and allegorists were divided.[31] The positive views expressed in these works, such as devotion to the Law, fidelity in its observance, and readiness to die for it, are such as Philo as well as all the other philosophers of his type could wholeheartedly subscribe to. There is no basis for the assumption that these works represent the view of the literalists as against those of Philo and of the other philosophers simply on the ground that they "speak in praise of 'normative' legalism" [32] or on the ground that they ask the Jews "to

[29] According to Stein (*Pilon ha-Alexandroni*, p. 68), the Alexandrian Jews did allow themselves to write down the oral law, and as evidence he points to Demetrius and Aristeas whose works contain some elements of oral law. This is inconclusive. It merely shows that in historical writings the authors allowed themselves to make casual references to oral laws. Similarly in Palestine those who composed historical books allowed themselves to make casual references to oral laws. No general conclusion can therefore be drawn from this circumstance with regard to the legal authorities among the Alexandrian Jews. On the whole, the prohibition against writing down the oral law was subject to certain exceptions (cf. I. H. Weiss, *Dor Dor ve-Dorshav*, I, Wilna, 1904, pp. 87–89).

[30] II Macc. 7:9; 7:23; 14:46.

[31] Cf. below, pp. 396 ff.

[32] Goodenough, *By Light, Light* (Yale University Press, 1935), p. 5.

die bravely for the law of their fathers, and to keep away from the mysteries of the Greeks." [33] To speak in praise of "normative legalism" and to bid the Jews to die for the law of their fathers and keep away from the mysteries of the heathen was something which Philo and all the Hellenistic philosophers have done in their writings.

In contrast to those traditionalists who rejected philosophical interpretation altogether, there were those who in their excessive use of philosophic interpretation rejected the literal meaning of the law altogether. Philo refers to them as "some who, regarding the laws in their literal sense in the light of symbols of matters belonging to the intellect, are overpunctilious about the latter, while with light-heartedness they show but little esteem for the former." [34] Unlike the literalists, concerning whom he says that he would "not blame (*αἰτιασάμενος*) such persons, for perhaps the truth is with them also," [35] with regard to these extreme allegorists he says that "such men for my part I should blame (*μεμψαίμην*) for handling the matter with recklessness; for they ought to have given careful attention to both aims, to an accurate investigation of the invisible and also to an irreproachable observance of the visible." [36] But though he blames them and censures them and finds fault with them, he does not condemn them. He rather pleads with them, pointing out the error of their way and trying to rouse their own disapproval of their own view. His pleas to them are threefold. First, he pleads that by disregarding the literal meaning of the law they place themselves in the position of defying public opinion and of impairing their reputation with their own people, consequences which he assumes they themselves would deplore if they only realized what they were doing.

[33] Shroyer, *op. cit.*, p. 262.
[34] *Migr.* 16, 89.
[35] *Conf.* 38, 190. Cf. above n. 23.
[36] *Migr.* 16, 89.

"As it is," he says of them, "as though they were living alone by themselves in a wilderness, or as though they had become disembodied souls, and knew neither city nor village nor household nor any company of human beings at all, overlooking all that the mass of men regard, they explore reality in its naked absoluteness." [37] But he reminds them that "sacred Scripture teaches these men to take heed of a good reputation," [38] and concludes that, by observing the laws, "one will escape blame and accusation from men in general." [39] Second, he reasons with them that the practical observance of the laws is of great antiquity and recalls to their mind that Scripture teaches "not to do away with any of the established customs which divinely empowered men greater than those of our time have laid down," [40] for these laws, he concludes with an appeal to their loyalty to Judaism, were bequeathed by Abraham as an inheritance to Israel.[41] Third, he tries to show to them the importance of the outward observance of the Law for the understanding and the preservation of its inner meaning, for, he says, the outward observance of the law and its inner meaning are related to each other as body and soul, and just as we must take care of the body because it is the abode of the soul, so also it is only through the outer observance of the law that we can gain a clearer conception of its inner meaning.[42] He finally concludes this argument with a general exhortation to all and sundry that by attaching importance to the inner meaning of the laws about the Sabbath, the festivals, circumcision,

[37] *Ibid.*, 89–90.

[38] *Ibid.*, 90; cf. Prov. 4: 24 (cf. *Ketubot* 22b); 22: 1.

[39] *Ibid.*, 93.

[40] *Ibid.*, 90. The reference is to his own interpretation in *Spec.* IV, 28, 149–150, of the verse "Thou shalt not remove thy neighbor's landmarks which thy forefathers have set" (Deut. 19: 14). Cf. below, p. 192.

[41] *Ibid.*, 94.

[42] *Ibid.*, 93.

and the Temple, we must not on that account "abrogate" (λύωμεν) or "give up" (ἀποταξώμεθα) or "abolish" (ἀνέλωμεν) or "neglect" (ἀμελήσομεν) these laws.[43]

From this analysis of Philo's discussion of the extreme allegorists, we gather the general impression that they were a group of well-meaning though rather misguided people who did not themselves realize the implications of their own view, and Philo felt that all he needed was to point out to them those implications in order to make them turn aside from the error of their way. This impression is still further deepened when we compare Philo's description of this group of allegorists with his description elsewhere of another group of allegorists, the Therapeutae. His description of this group of extreme allegorists as being overpunctilious in regarding the laws as "symbols of matters belonging to the intellect" is reminiscent of his description of the Therapeutae as those who "read the Holy Scriptures and seek wisdom from their ancestral philosophy by taking it as an allegory, since they think that the words of the literal text are symbols of something whose hidden nature is revealed by studying the underlying meaning." [44] But still, in contradistinction to the Therapeutae, who are described by him as being observant of the literalness of the Law,[45] these extreme allegorists are said by him to show little esteem for it. Again, unlike the Therapeutae, who formed an organized community in the neighborhood of Alexandria, these extreme allegorists are

[43] *Ibid.*, 91–92.

[44] *Cont.* 3, 28.

[45] They observe the Sabbath and the other holidays (*Cont.* 3, 30 ff.) and are described as "disciples of Moses" (7, 63; 8, 64). Cf. F. C. Conybeare, *Philo on the Contemplative Life*, pp. 301 and 316. In one thing alone Conybeare finds them in departure from ordinary Judaism, and that is the celibacy of women (*ibid.*, pp 316–317). According to rabbinic law, however, the commandment to perpetuate the human species by marriage (Gen. 1: 28) was not binding upon women (*M. Yebamot* VI, 6).

represented as isolated individuals scattered within the Alexandrian Jewish community.[46] Like the Therapeutae, however, they are possessed of a longing to flee from active life in order to commune with God. This would seem to have been a common tendency among Jews in Alexandria, especially among those trained in philosophy. Philo repeatedly refers to those who, "filled as with pure wine, with the longing for holiness, bade a long farewell to all other affairs and offered up their own lives wholly to the service of God";[47] and he refers to himself as having once been inspired by such a desire.[48] Unlike the Therapeutae, therefore, who sought to gain communion with God through both contemplation and work in a specially organized social setting and by means of a religious discipline based upon traditional Jewish customs, these extreme allegorists remained individual recluses within the madding rush of everyday life in Alexandria, each by himself seeking the way to God through his own individual effort, outside organized religious life, and without the aid of other kindred spirits. As detached individuals, in search of the perfection of their own souls through the life of pure contemplation, they gradually drifted away from the common life of the community into a neglect, and often into an open violation, of the Law — that Law which they themselves admitted to be of divine origin; and they did so without perhaps having ever openly declared that the Law was never meant to be literally observed, and certainly without having ever openly demanded its abrogation. Or, perhaps, they may have developed the view that for the selected few like themselves, devoted as they were to

[46] Gfrörer, I, p. 106, however, takes Philo's characterization of these extreme allegorists in the passage, "as though they were living alone by themselves in a wilderness, etc.," quoted above (n. 37), as being aimed at the Therapeutae.

[47] *Decal.* 22, 108.

[48] *Leg. All.* II, 21, 85.

the study of the Law and to the discovery of its inner meaning, the Law was never meant to be followed literally in all its details: the literal observation of the Law was meant to be binding only upon the common run of men who needed it as a moral discipline and an intellectual symbol. From all that Philo tells us about them, they never consciously separated themselves from the body of Alexandrian Judaism, nor have they militantly tried to propagate their views. Quite on the contrary, from Philo's description of them we gather the impression that, in their absorption in their own individual perfection, they have become oblivious to the social implications of their own personal neglect of the observance of the Law. In his reasoning with them he assumes that they still possessed a sense of regard for the public opinion of the Alexandrian Jewish community and a sense of loyalty to ancient Jewish traditions, that they could still be swayed by the mention of the example of men of past Jewish history, and that they could still be convinced of the disciplinary value of Jewish practices as the only means which could lead to the life of contemplation.

If we are right in our analysis of Philo's description of this group of extreme allegorists, then we may dismiss as historically unfounded the view that they constituted a distinct sect within Hellenistic Judaism and that they were militantly engaged, in anticipation of Paul, in the struggle for the abrogation of the Law, and that as such, therefore, they had placed themselves outside the Jewish community.[49] Still

[49] M. Friedländer, (1) *Das Judenthum in der vorchristlichen griechischen Welt*, 1897, pp. 56–57; (2) *Geschichte der jüdischen Apologetik als Vorgeschichte des Christenthums*, 1903, pp. 438–440; (3) *Die religiösen Bewegungen innerhalb des Judentums im Zeitalter Jesu*, 1905, pp. 282–286. Cf. review of the last of these books by D. Feuchtwang in *Monatsschrift für Geschichte und Wissenschaft des Judentums*, 50 (1906), pp. 497–509; cf. also J. Klausner, *From Jesus to Paul*, Eng. tr. by W. F. Stinespring (The Macmillan Company, 1943), pp. 27–28.

less historically founded is the view that the alleged antinomian teachings of these allegorists are represented in the Fourth Sibylline Oracle.[50] The basis for this latter view is twofold. First, in that Fourth Oracle the Sibyl proclaims to the gentiles that those happy men who "truly love the almighty God" and who, like pious Jews, "bless Him before eating and drinking . . . shall, when they see them, disown all temples and altars, vain erections of senseless stones, befouled with constant blood of living things and sacrifices."[51] Second, the Sibyl sheds no tears when she refers to the destruction of the Temple in Jerusalem in the lines, "To Solyma too the evil blast of war shall come from Italy, and shall lay in ruins God's great temple." [52] Neither of these two passages proves an antinomian tendency. A Jew trained upon the teaching of Scripture and post-scriptural Jewish traditions as to the relative importance of sacrifices and other means of worshiping God [53] — especially a Jew living after the destruction of the Temple, when evidently this Oracle was composed [54] — did not have to be an opponent of the observance of the Law in order to tell the gentiles that the worship of the Jewish God does not depend upon a temple and altars and sacrifices.[55]

These three tendencies in Alexandrian Judaism, the traditional, the allegorical, and the extremely allegorical, thus did not constitute sects. They merely represented a certain conflict of ideas the like of which will be found existing subsequently in both Christianity and Judaism during the periods of their greatest internal unity. They represent that conflict of ideas which is inevitably bound to appear in any

[50] *Idem*, *op. cit.* (1), p. 58.

[51] Sibylline Oracles IV, 24–29.

[52] *Ibid.*, 115–116.

[53] Cf. below, II, 241 ff.

[54] The date generally given is that of about 80 A.D. Cf. Introduction to this book in Charles, *The Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha of the Old Testament*, II, p. 373.

[55] Some take the author to be an Essene or a Christian.

religion based upon a Scripture and a native tradition when on its coming in contact with a philosophy from another source attempts are made on the part of some to reconcile the two. The great mass of believers who will not have felt the impact of the foreign philosophy will see no need of any reconciliation between them. This great mass of believers will either remain indifferent to the innovations of the philosophic reconcilers, or will superciliously look upon them as mere triflers, or, if given provocation, will militantly oppose them as disturbers of the religious peace. Among the reconcilers themselves there are bound to appear all kinds of shades of opinion, differing as to the relative proportion of the traditional ingredients and philosophical ingredients that should be properly entered into the mixture. In such conflicts there are bound to appear extreme views which, if hard pressed, might transform a mere internal conflict of ideas into an open schism. There is no hard and fast rule by which one can determine with accuracy when an internal conflict of ideas ends and a schism begins. But on the whole one may say that a schism in any religion appears when a conflict of ideas leads to the establishment of separate institutions of worship and discipline or to a struggle for the control of institutions already in existence. Such a struggle for control, we know, was going on in Palestine at the time of Philo between the Pharisees and the Sadducees, the stake in the struggle being the control of the Temple and of the Sanhedrin. No such struggle, as far as we know, existed in Alexandria. The synagogues there were the houses of prayer and study for both the literalists and the philosophers. The extreme allegorists, as we have seen from our analysis of the only reference to them in Philo, tried neither to get control of the existent synagogues nor to set up rival synagogues of their own. Even the Therapeutae, in their own community,

with the exception of their ascetic manner of living, did not depart from the established traditions and customs of the people. Nor is there any indication of a partisan conflict in Alexandrian Judaism for the control of such social institutions as the gerusia and the courts of justice.

But besides the traditionalists whom Philo does "not blame" for their disregard for the allegorical interpretation of Scripture, and the extreme allegorists whom he does "blame" for their neglect of the literalness of Scripture, there were those whom he condemns as "apostates (ἀποστάντες) from the holy laws," [56] as outlaws (ἔκνομοι) and lawless (ἄθεσμοι) [57] and as captious critics of the Law,[58] who denounce and decry and deride the law,[59] and whom he places under the anathema of the curses proclaimed by Moses in the name of God against all those who in the future would break their covenant with God.[60]

From the various passages in which he touches upon apostasy it may be gathered that Philo has distinguished three types of apostates.

First, those who forsook Judaism out of the weakness of the flesh. There are "apostates from the holy laws," says Philo, who, being incontinent, "have sold their freedom for luxurious food . . . and beauty of body, thus ministering to the pleasures of the belly and the organs below it." [61] Now the desire for luxurious eating is that which, according to Philo, the dietary laws of the Pentateuch are meant to restrain; [62] and the desire for the beauty of body is that which would usually lead to marriage with heathens, which kind of marriage is prohibited, according to Philo, by the law of the

[56] *Virt.* 34, 182.
[57] *Praem.* 20, 126.
[58] Cf. below, n. 108.
[59] Cf. below, nn. 109–113.
[60] Lev. 26: 15 ff.; Deut. 28: 15 ff. Cf. *Praem.* 20, 126 ff., and cf. 26, 152.
[61] *Virt.* 34, 182. Cf. III Macc. 7: 11: "Those who for their belly's sake had transgressed the divine command."
[62] *Spec.* IV, 17, 100 ff.

Pentateuch.[63] Accordingly, what he means to say here is that among the Jews of his time and place apostasy from the Law started in some cases with those who, out of a lack of self-restraint, broke away from the dietary laws and from the laws prohibiting marriage with the heathen. From a strictly legal point of view, perhaps, the dietary laws and the prohibition of intermarriage are no more weighty than many of the other prohibitive commands in the Pentateuch. But, owing to the fact that the breaking of these laws proved to be, by common observation, the beginning of the breaking away of the social barriers between Jew and non-Jew which ultimately led to a complete abandonment of Judaism, these laws were raised, by the time of Philo, both in Palestine and in the Diaspora, to the status of a fundamental religious principle. Among the rabbis in Palestine, an apostate with reference to the eating of forbidden meat was singled out for special mention,[64] and new dietary laws were added prohibiting the partaking of certain foods or drinks of gentiles.[65] Similarly, intermarriage came to be regarded by the rabbis as a form of apostasy on a par with the worship of Moloch [66] or with heathenism in general,[67] and the prohibition of intermarriage, which in the Pentateuch applies only to the original inhabitants of Canaan,[68] was extended by them to apply

[63] *Ibid.* III, 5, 29.

[64] *'Abodah Zarah* 26b.

[65] See below, n. 70.

[66] *Midrash Tannaim* on Deut. 18: 9, p. 109, and cf. *Sifre Deut.*, § 171, HF, p. 219: " 'Whosoever he be of the children of Israel . . . that giveth of his seed unto Moloch; he shall surely be put to death' (Lev. 20: 2). Rabbi Ishmael says: this refers to one who cohabits with an Aramean woman and begets from her a son who is a hater of God."

[67] *Sanhedrin* 82a: "Said Rabbi Hiyya bar Abuyah: he who cohabits with a Cuthean woman is as if he connects himself with idols, for it is said, 'Judah hath dealt treacherously . . . and hath married the daughter of a strange god' (Mal. 2: 11)."

[68] Exod. 34: 15–16; Deut. 7: 3–4.

to all other heathens.[69] The reasoning underlying these new prohibitions is summed up in the statement that the rabbis prohibited "the bread and oil of the heathen on account of their wine, and their wine on account of their daughters, and their daughters on account of idolatry." [70] Similarly, among the Hellenistic Jews, both Philo [71] and the Fourth Book of Maccabees [72] dwell upon the importance of the dietary laws as a moral discipline, and in the latter work they are treated as a symbol of any law for which a Jew is to give up his life if forced openly to violate it.[73] And so also in the case of intermarriage, Philo's restatement of the scriptural law assumes that the prohibition applies to all heathen,[74] and not only to the original inhabitants of Canaan; and, taking his cue from Scripture, he tries to show how intermarriage must inevitably lead to heathenism. An indirect allusion to apostasy with reference to intermarriage may also be discerned in Philo's description of the apostate as "a man of noble descent who has debased the coinage (*παρακόψας τὸ νόμισμα*) of his noble birth."[75] This metaphor is used by Philo often as a general description of the breaking of any established law, but always with the connotation that the breaking of the law in question involved the adulteration of something which is pure by nature or birth.[76] Consequently, when he speaks here of an apostate as having "debased the coinage of his noble birth," he means not only that he has been disloyal to the laws inherited from his fathers but also that he has been led to this disloyalty by his marriage to a heathen.

[69] On the history of the laws with regard to intermarriage in rabbinic literature, see L. M. Epstein, *Marriage Laws in the Bible and Talmud* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1942), pp. 153–177.

[70] *Shabbat* 17b.

[71] *Spec.* IV, 17, 100 ff.

[72] IV Mac. 5:6 ff.

[73] *Ibid.*, 5:27 ff.; cf. *Sanhedrin* 74a.

[74] *Spec.* III, 5, 29.

[75] *Praem.* 26, 152.

[76] *Sacr.* 40, 137; *Mut.* 31, 171; 37, 208; *Spec.* I, 45, 250; I, 60, 325; III, 7, 38; *Cont.* 5, 41.

From Philo's description of this class of people as having sold their "freedom" (ἐλευθερία),[77] it is quite evident that he does not deal here merely with men who, while remaining within the Jewish community, have out of the weakness of the flesh violated the dietary laws and the laws of intermarriage, but rather with those who, starting with the breaking of these laws, have been led to a complete abandonment of Judaism. "Freedom" here is used by Philo in the sense of that which only the virtuous man possesses,[78] and the virtuous man among Jews is he who obeys the law,[79] for he alone is free who, like Abraham, is a "friend of God" and emancipated from "vain opinion." [80] These apostates, therefore, by forsaking the Law, are described by him as having sold their "freedom." There can be no doubt that in the Alexandrian Jewish community, as in any other Jewish community throughout history, and in Palestine itself at the time of Philo, there were many Jews who out of the weakness of the flesh ate forbidden food and married forbidden women. As a preacher he undoubtedly urged them to mend their ways. But these did not constitute any special problem in Alexandrian Judaism, beyond the general problem of human imperfection and human sinfulness. In one place, speaking of those who have sinned "by necessity, overwhelmed by the force of an inexorable power," [81] by which, as he says later, he means those who have sinned "involuntarily," [82] by their inability to resist temptation, he does not condemn them too harshly. He says of them that they "deserve pity rather than hatred." [83] The pity which they deserve is evidently for the regret and the plague of conscience by which they will be beset. Without a word of condemnation or re-

[77] Cf. above, p. 73.
[78] *Probus* 1, 1.
[79] Cf. below, II. 192 ff.
[80] *Sobr.* 11, 55–57.
[81] *Post* 2, 9.
[82] *Ibid.* 3, 10.
[83] *Ibid.* 2, 9.

proach he describes this common garden variety of sinners among Alexandrian Jews as having a consciousness of sin and as being occasionally moved to repentance, for in a passage in which he speaks of the Day of Atonement as a day "of purification and escape from sin" and as a day of "repentance," [84] he says that that fast day is "carefully observed not only by the zealous for piety and holiness but also by those who never act religiously in the rest of their life." [85] There was evidently no professional class of religious leaders among Alexandrian Jews to acclaim the increasing sins of their patrons as successive stages in the progress of their religion. These casual and regretful transgressors of the law who remained within the Jewish fold are therefore to be distinguished from those described by Philo as apostates who have come to their apostasy through the transgression of the dietary and connubial laws.

Another motive of apostasy discussed by Philo is that which may be described as the vulgar delusion of social ambition. Wealth in the Alexandrian Jewish community was derived from the non-Jewish environment through contacts with heathens. Such contacts with heathens thus became financial assets, and financial assets naturally became marks of a delusive social distinction, and the delusion of social distinction, in turn, led to snobbishness, obsequiousness, self-effacement, aping, simulation, pretense, and ultimately to a begging for permission to join whatever one had to join in order to become a heathen. This, we imagine, was the progressive pilgrimage of certain Alexandrian Jews from a seat in the front row of the synagogue to a place at the tail end of the mystery processions of the heathen. Philo gives us a vivid description of this class of apostates. "Men in

[84] *Spec.* I, 35, 187.
[85] *Ibid.*, 186.

general," he says, "even if the slightest breeze of prosperity does only blow their way for a moment, become puffed up and give themselves great airs, becoming insolent to all those who are in a lower condition than themselves, and calling them dregs of the earth, and annoyances, and sources of trouble, and burdens of the earth, and all sorts of names of that kind . . . look down upon their relations and friends and transgress the laws under which they were born and bred, and subvert the ancestral customs to which no blame can justly attach, by adopting different modes of life, and, in their contentment with the present, lose all memory of the past." [86] To adopt different modes of life and to lose all memory of the past naturally means to become completely severed from the body Israel.

Besides those who sank down into apostasy through a desire for easy living and those who thought they had climbed up into apostasy through a delusion of social distinction, there was in Alexandria a class of apostates who dropped out of Judaism through an unconscious shifting of intellectual interest. They were the intellectually uprooted.

We are apt to think that all Alexandrian Jews, because they spoke Greek, began their education by reciting Homer in Greek schools together with their heathen schoolmates, and, after a lifetime of active participation in the cultural affairs of the city, spent their declining years in some corner of the Alexandrian library discussing with old heathen cronies some passage in Plato or Aristotle or Zeno. But from what we know of political and social conditions in that heterogeneously populated city we have reason to conclude that there was as little intellectual contact of a personal nature between Jew and heathen in Alexandria as there was centuries later, in the Middle Ages, when both Jew and

[86] *Mos.* I, 6, 30–31.

Christian studied Aristotle, and Christians quoted Maimonides from a Latin translation and Jews translated St. Thomas into Hebrew. In Alexandria, the city did not provide a common elementary school system for all the groups of the population.[87] Whatever elementary education existed was furnished privately. In the case of Egyptians and Greeks, elementary education is known to have been of a religious nature,[88] and so also must it have been in the case of the Jews. Gymnasia and ephebea, which served as centers of higher education, were similarly of a religious nature,[89] and were primarily Greek institutions, from which, we know, Egyptians were excluded [90] and so undoubtedly were also Jews.[91] Jewish higher education, whether of a purely religious nature or of a general nature, was provided by the Jews themselves, either in school houses attached to synagogues, as in Palestine, or in the synagogue houses themselves, and this higher education naturally was under the auspices of Jewish teachers. Philo himself refers to the custom of Alexandrian Jews of occupying themselves every Sabbath day with the "philosophy of their fathers" as well as with the "speculation about problems concerning nature," that is, problems of general philosophy, in "places of instruction" (διδασκαλεῖα).[92] Of such "places of instruction" he says in another passage that they are "innumerable in every city" and that people receive there instruction in "philosophy" from teachers whom he describes as being "most experienced" (ἐμπειρότατοι).[93] In this passage, "philosophy" is defined by him as dealing both with "duty to God" and with

[87] Cf. L. Mitteis–U. Wilcken, *Grundzüge und Chrestomathie der Papyruskunde*, I, i, p. 137; cf. W. W. Tarn, *Hellenistic Civilization*[2], p. 174.

[88] Cf. L. Mitteis–U. Wilcken, *op. cit.*, p. 137.

[89] Cf. *ibid.*, p. 140.

[90] Cf. *ibid.*

[91] Cf. below, n. 105.

[92] *Mos.* II, 39, 216.

[93] *Spec.* II, 15, 61–62.

"duty to men," [94] that is, theology and ethics.[95] "Philosophy" as the subject of study on the Sabbath is also mentioned by him in another place, and there it is defined by him as dealing with "the improvement of morals and the examination of conscience." [96] In still another passage he speaks of the interpretation of the Law to the people in the synagogues on the Sabbath day by "some priest who is present or one of the elders." [97] This synagogal school for higher education must have been so well established in the tradition of the Alexandrian Jews that when the Therapeutae organized a community of their own outside of Alexandria they continued that kind of school, calling it "the sanctuary" (*τὸ σεμνεῖον*).[98] These "places of instruction," which, according to Philo, were used on Sabbaths as centers of higher religious as well as of secular education for the great mass of Alexandrian Jews, must have been used during the rest of the week as school houses for higher education for the youth of the community, and perhaps also as centers of all kinds of other activities.

Besides such "places of instruction" for the "philosophy of their fathers" and "speculation about problems concerning nature," Alexandrian Jews at the time of Philo must have had also other kinds of educational and cultural organizations. In an inscription from Asia Minor of a later period there is thus reference to a young men's Jewish sporting organization.[99] Organizations of this kind may have also existed in Alexandria during the time of Philo, and perhaps also

[94] *Ibid.*, 63. [95] Cf. below, p. 147. [96] *Opif.* 43, 128.

[97] *Hypoth.* 7, 13 (Eusebius, *Praeparatio Evangelica* VIII, 7, 359d–360a).

[98] *Cont.* 3, 30–32. Cf. F. C. Conybeare, *Philo about the Contemplative Life*, p. 310, §LI, on the question whether this sanctuary was the synagogue itself or a school attached to the synagogue.

[99] Cf. A. Tscherikower, *Ha-Yehudim ve-ha-Yevanim ba-Tekufah ha-Hellenistit*, p. 358; E. Schürer, *Geschichte des jüdischen Volkes im Zeitalter Jesu Christi* [4], III, p. 15; S. Reinach, "Les Juifs d'Hypaepa," *Revue des Études Juives*, 10 (1885), pp. 74 ff.

young men's Jewish dramatic organizations, where Greek plays, as well as the dramatization of Biblical themes by Hellenistic Jewish writers such as Ezekiel, the tragic poet, were also presented. When Philo, therefore, speaks of his own presence at a contest of Pancratiasts,[100] or at chariot races,[101] or at the performance of a tragedy by Euripides,[102] it may refer to events which took place in such strictly Jewish organizations, or it may perhaps only indicate that he had the curiosity to see these things performed by non-Jews and had the money to pay the admission fee; it does not indicate any participation, even on the part of men of the type of Philo, in the general sporting and intellectual life of the city. Similarly, when he discusses the relative position of the various branches of liberal disciplines and philosophical studies in a school curriculum,[103] his discussion may perhaps reflect conditions in the school in which he himself was educated, but in that case that school was under Jewish auspices and undoubtedly attached to a synagogue. More likely his discussion is not drawn from actual experience; it is merely a restatement of the Stoic theories of the order of studies for the purpose of making use of them in his allegorical interpretation of the scriptural story of Sarah and Hagar.[104]

Among Alexandrian Jews, however, there were no doubt some whose contacts with non-Jews in trade or profession, in military life or in the administration of civil government, led to a closer contact with non-Jews both socially and intellectually. Despite the exclusion of Jews from the gymnasia and ephebea, some Jews must have managed to gain that privilege for their children. Shortly after the time of

[100] *Probus* 5, 25.
[101] *Provid.* 2, 58 (Eusebius, *Praeparatio Evangelica* VIII, 14, 397a); Aucher, II, 103.
[102] *Probus* 20, 141.
[103] *Congr.* 14, 73 ff.
[104] Gen. 16: 1–6.

Philo, Claudius, evidently with reference to those Jews who had managed to intrude themselves where they were not wanted, bids the Jews of Alexandria not "to strive in gymnastic or cosmetic games," [105] that is to say, he bids them not to send their children to gymnasia and ephebea. Perhaps there were also some Jews who had managed to place their children in private heathen Greek schools. There must have thus arisen in Alexandria a class of educated Jews, well versed in the arts and the sciences and philosophy, but devoid of any religious training — not only Jewish but also heathen — having therefore no interest in the application of philosophy to religion, either for the defense of Judaism or for the defense of heathenism. They constituted the free-thinkers of the time, those who were usually referred to as atheists, by which was primarily meant those who denied divine providence — a doctrine which, after a manner, was defended also by heathen philosophers. Philo's own nephew, Tiberius Julius Alexander, with whom Philo debated the problem of divine providence in his treatise "On Providence," seems to have belonged to those uprooted Jewish intellectuals. To such uprooted Jewish intellectuals, all the attempts of the Jewish philosophers within the Jewish community to show that scriptural stories are superior to mythology and that the method of philosophic allegory can be properly applied only to Scripture and never to mythology seemed only evidence of narrow-mindedness. To them Scripture was no better than mythology; and perhaps to some of them it was even worse.

These uprooted Jewish intellectuals, whether they found it advantageous to themselves to join any of the numerous heathen religious *thiasoi* or not, certainly had no reason to

[105] H. J. Bell, *Jews and Christians in Egypt* (Oxford University Press, 1924), p. 25, ll. 92–93, and p. 29.

remain within the religious Jewish community. External political and social and economic conditions of the time did not force de-Judaized Jews to cast in their lot, despite themselves, with the Jewish community. Still less did external conditions force them to assume communal or religious leadership. It was comparatively easy at that time for a Jew to escape Judaism.[106] Those at that time who cut themselves off from the body Jewish cut themselves off completely, leaving no dangling shreds of festering dead tissue. They wrote neither books against Jews nor books about Jews. Nor did any of them try to remake Judaism into a sort of inferior heathenism, with Dionysus or Serapis as central figures — if not as deities, then at least as prophets by the side of Moses. Perhaps some of these apostates, either for devious reasons of some practical advantages or for the simple reason that it was easier for them to lose their relish for the God of their fathers than for the cooking of their mothers, had remained within the Jewish part of the city, though without being part of its religious life; and, with all their indifference toward Judaism, they could not completely refrain from taunting their fellow Jews, especially the philosophers among them, for maintaining that Scripture was of divine origin and that its stories were something superior to the mythological fables of the Greeks. Now, in Palestinian Judaism of about that time, as may be gathered from its literature, such "deniers of the divine revelation of the Law" were regarded not as ordinary sinners but rather as those who have converted themselves completely to heathenism.[107]

It is apostates of this kind that Philo refers to as "malicious critics" (κακοτεχνοῦντες) of the Law, who "are impu-

[106] Tscherikower (*op. cit.*, p. 302), however, thinks that "the Jews enjoyed many special privileges, and it was not therefore always worth while for them to forgo these privileges in order to join the Greek community."

[107] *Tos. Sanhedrin* XIII, 5.

dently bold in inventing objections" (εὐρεσιλογῶν θρασύνηται) against it.[108] It is apostates of this kind, too, that he has in mind when, in his discussion of the story of the confusion of tongues, he says: "Those who are discontented with the constitution of our fathers and always seek for an opportunity to denounce and decry the laws find in these and similar passages openings as it were for their godlessness, for, say these impious persons: 'Can you still speak seriously of the ordinances as containing the canons of absolute truth? For see, your so-called holy books contain also myths, at which you are accustomed to laugh when you hear them related by others.'" [109] It is apostates of this kind among whom he suspects there may be found "some one who may laugh" (*derideat*) at the story of God's making garments of skins for Adam and his wife,[110] or some who, described by him as "being wholly foolish and keeping aloof from the divine company," "mock" at the story of God's changing the name of Abram to Abraham,[111] or some who, again described by him as "unrefined and inept by nature," as "unable to discern any form of virtue," and as "lacking in knowledge and wisdom and prudence," see in the story of the pottage sold by Jacob [112] nothing but an object of "laughter and derision." [113] Undoubtedly among these uprooted Jewish intellectuals there were also materialists and other kinds of atheists, but we do not think that it was Jews of this kind in particular [114] that Philo has in mind when he takes the Ammonites and the Moabites, in the verse excluding them from the congregation of the Lord,[115] as referring to champions of

[108] *Agr.* 36, 157.
[109] *Conf.* 2, 2.
[110] *Qu. in Gen.* I, 53.
[111] *Ibid.* III, 43.
[112] Gen. 25:29.
[113] *Qu. in Gen.* IV, 168.
[114] Which is the view of M. Friedländer, *Geschichte der jüdischen Apologetik, etc.*, pp. 443–446; *Die religiösen Bewegungen, etc.*, pp. 487–488.
[115] Deut. 23:4.

the senses and champions of the mind.[116] As we shall see in a subsequent chapter,[117] this allegorical interpretation of the verse is part of Philo's more comprehensive criticism of various schools of Greek philosophy, in conformity with his view that Scripture not only approves in anticipation whatever is good in philosophy but also rejects in anticipation whatever is false in it.

The picture which we have tried to draw of Alexandrian Judaism is that of a community united in its essential beliefs and practices. By the constant attrition and attraction of the environment, every upgrowth of dissent was worn away and carried off; those who remained within did so by choice and out of a sense of unity and loyalty. Whatever differences of opinion existed among them with regard to the interpretation of the Law — whether it should be traditional or allegorical and, if allegorical, to what extent — they all believed in the divine origin of the Law and in its perfection. This belief was their justification, to the world at large and to their own selves, for their continued existence as a people apart, which they knew was a source of annoyance to others and which, being only human, they must have occasionally felt also as a burden upon themselves. They all also presented a common attitude toward the religion and culture of the outside world, and this they proclaimed courageously and forthrightly — Greek religion was false; Greek philosophy was an inferior form of Judaism. That courage and forthrightness was caught by early Christianity, when it was only a struggling minority in a pagan world, and, with but one slight change in the wording, it repeated the same proclamation — Greek religion was false; Greek philosophy was an inferior form of Christianity. Indeed, Alexandrian Jews craved good-will, but good-will to them meant to bury the

[116] Cf. *Spec.* I, 61, 333 ff.

[117] Cf. below, ch. iii, pp. 167 ff.

hatchet; it did not mean to bury convictions and cover up differences. They never fawned, they never crawled, they never yielded what they considered to be the truth.

With all their endeavor to present Judaism to the world in an understandable and acceptable form, the Alexandrian Jewish writers never compromised with popular Greek religion or mythology or the mysteries. They never tried to present the Jewish God as any of the gods of popular religion, or Jewish tradition as myths, or Jewish religious rites as rites of mysteries. If they ever happen to use certain common Greek divine epithets with reference to God, it is only because the use of such epithets is justified by corresponding descriptions of God in Scripture; and then, too, they use them always with the proviso, often expressed, that only their own God is worthy of such epithets. If they ever happen to use mythological allusions, it is only as literary forms of expression and then, too, always with the proviso, sometimes expressed, that the use of a mythological allusion should not be taken as an expression of belief in the myth alluded to. If they ever happen to use the terminology of the mysteries in their presentation of Jewish rites, it is either for the purpose of emphasizing the contrast between the religion of the Jews and the mysteries of the heathen, or because the terms derived from the mysteries have become part of the common speech and are used in a sense completely divorced from their original meaning. Indeed they did try to present Judaism as a philosophy, but philosophy had to yield to Judaism on every point on which the two met in real conflict. This was the common attitude of all the Hellenistic Jewish philosophers before Philo, and this, we shall now try to show, is what we have found to be the attitude of Philo in all his philosophic writings.

CHAPTER II

HANDMAID OF SCRIPTURE

I. Behind the Allegorical Method

Of all the writings of Philo, which bear thirty-eight titles,[1] four are treatises on certain special problems of philosophy,[2] with only occasional references to Scripture or Jews in two of them.[3] All the others are primarily of Jewish content, and of these, with the exception of three treatises which deal with contemporary Jewish events in Alexandria,[4] all are written in the form either of a running commentary on certain books of the Pentateuch[5] or of discourses on certain topics selected from the Pentateuch. The latter deal with the creation of the world to the expulsion of Adam and Eve from the garden of Eden,[6] Cain and the other generations of Adam,[7] the generation of the deluge,[8] Noah,[9] the tower of Babel,[10] Abraham,[11] the dreams of Jacob and Joseph,[12] Joseph,[13] Moses,[14] the ten commandments,[15] and all the other laws and teachings of the Pentateuch.[16] Within these commentaries upon the Pentateuch, which he calls "Law,"

[1] Exclusive of the *De Mundo*, *De Sampsone*, *De Jona*, *Interpretatio Hebraicorum nominum* and *De Biblicis antiquitatibus*, which are generally acknowledged to be spurious, and exclusive also of the books which are entirely lost. Cf. E. Schürer, *A History of the Jewish People at the Time of Jesus Christ*, II, iii, pp. 321–361; L. Cohn, "Einteilung und Chronologie der Schriften Philos," *Philologus, Supplbd.* VII, iii (1899), pp. 387–435; L. Massebieau, and E. Bréhier, "Essai sur la chronologie de la vie et des oeuvres de Philon," *Revue de l'histoire des religions*, LIII (1906), 25–64, 164–185, 267–289.

[2] *Probus; Aet.; Provid.; Alexander, sive de eo quod rationem habeant bruta animalia.*

[3] Cf. *Probus* 7, 43; 8, 57; 12, 75–87; *Aet.* 5, 19.

[4] *Flac.; Legat.; Cont.*

[5] *Qu. in Gen.* I, II, III, IV; *Qu. in Ex.* I, II.

[6] *Opif.; Leg. All.* I, II, III; *Cher.*

[7] *Sacr.; Deter.; Post.*

[8] *Gig.; Immut.*

[9] *Agr.; Plant.; Ebr.; Sobr.*

[10] *Conf.*

[11] *Migr.; Heres; Congr.; Fug.; Abr.; Mut. De Deo.*

[12] *Somn.* I, II.

[13] *Jos.*

[14] *Mos.* I, II.

[15] *Decal.*

[16] *Spec.* I, II, III, VI; *Virt.; Praem.; Hypoth.; Apologia pro Judaeis.*

Philo includes also passages from some of the other books of the Scripture to which he refers as "Prophets and the Psalms and other Writings," [17] and these passages are dealt with by him in the same way as the passages from the Pentateuch. All together, eighteen of the twenty-four books which constitute the Hebrew Bible are either named or quoted by him.[18] Of those which he does not happen to name or quote, some may have been omitted because he had no occasion to use them. On the whole it may be assumed that his Scripture consisted of all those books which shortly after are referred to by Josephus as the "twenty-two" justly accredited books.[19] He may have also drawn upon some of the books of the Apocrypha, though none of them is mentioned by him.[20]

The text of Scripture used by him is not the original Hebrew but the Greek translation, and sometimes it is the wording of that translation that is made the subject of his interpretation. Still it is not to be inferred from this that Philo had no knowledge of Hebrew. Writing in Greek for Greek readers, he would naturally quote the translation familiar to his readers, even though his knowledge of Hebrew was such that he could himself without too much effort provide his own translation. As for his taking the Greek wording of the text as the subject for his homiletical interpretation, it may be due to the fact that in common with all the Alexandrian as well as Palestinian Jews he shared the belief that the Greek translation of the Law was made with the aid of divine inspiration.[21] That he had a knowledge of Hebrew may be

[17] *Cont.* 3, 25; cf. below, p. 117.

[18] Cf. H. F. Ryle, *Philo and the Holy Scripture*, xix–xxxiii; "Index Locorum Veteris Testamenti" in Leisegang, *Indices*, pp. 29–43.

[19] *Apion.* I, 8, 38. Cf. R. H. Pfeiffer, *Introduction to the Old Testament* (Harper & Brothers, 1941), p. 64.

[20] Cf. Ryle, *op. cit.*, pp. xxxiii–xxxv.

[21] Cf. below, II, 54.

derived from the following facts. First, sometimes his interpretation of a verse turns upon the wording of the original Hebrew which is not represented in the Septuagint.[22] Second, his etymologies of proper Hebrew names, though containing some errors, show that he had a knowledge of Hebrew, for only one who had some knowledge of Hebrew could unconsciously make such errors, and only one who had a thorough knowledge of the language could deliberately allow himself to depart from the true meaning of words.[23] To be sure, neither of these facts is irrefutable as evidence of Philo's knowledge of Hebrew. As for his displaying a knowledge of the Hebrew text in places where the Septuagint text differs from the Hebrew, it may be due to the fact that Philo had before him other Greek translations which kept closer to the Hebrew original.[24] As for his etymologies of proper Hebrew names, they could be explained as having been taken from the works of other Alexandrian Jews. Then there is always the possibility that whatever knowledge of Hebrew he displays in his writings he may have gotten from somebody who knew that language. Still, while there is no positive evidence of his knowledge of Hebrew, the burden of proof is upon those who would deny that he possessed such a knowledge. It is true indeed that the Alexandrian Jews found it difficult to preserve the knowledge of Hebrew as the common possession of all the people, but there can be no doubt that provision for instruction in that language was made by them and that the more learned among them had a knowledge of it. The study of foreign languages in the ancient world was pursued whenever there was need for it. In Alexandria itself, when after the reign of Diocletian a

[22] See some examples below, pp. 190, 211, 256 ff., 267 ff., 336; II, 145.

[23] Such deliberate departures from the true meaning of words are found in the etymologies of the rabbis.

[24] Cf. Ryle, *op. cit.*, p. xxxix.

knowledge of Latin became politically important, the study of that language became a part of the school curriculum.[25] There is no reason, then, why Jews, for religious motives, should not also have studied Hebrew. In some of the etymologies of Philo, such as Aaron meaning "mountainous," Bilhah meaning "swallowing," and Samuel meaning "appointed by God," we may even get some idea as to the manner of their study of Hebrew, for the confusion of certain Hebrew letters displayed in these etymologies can be explained on the assumption that Hebrew was studied in Alexandria from texts in which the Hebrew words were transliterated in Greek characters. With the device of vowel points in Hebrew not as yet invented, such transliterations were a pedagogical necessity. So also the study of Latin in Alexandria, it is known, was from texts in which Latin words were transliterated in Greek characters.[26] The question therefore is really not whether Philo knew Hebrew, but rather to what extent he knew it. On the whole, it may be said that, while he did not know enough of the language to write his intepretations of Scripture in Hebrew, he knew enough of it to read Scripture in the original and to check up on the Greek translation whenever he found it necessary.[27]

Besides the written Scripture, Philo also draws upon certain unwritten traditions. These traditions are referred to by him in various terms.[28] Parallels to many of these un-

[25] Cf. Mitteis–Wilcken, *Grundzüge und Chrestomathie der Papyruskunde*, I, p. 138.

[26] Cf. the same reference. Similarly in Origen's Hexapla by the side of the Hebrew text there was a transliteration of the same text in Greek characters.

[27] On the question of Philo's knowledge of Hebrew, see Siegfried, 1875, pp. 142–145, with references to earlier authors in nn. 1, 2, 3, on p. 142; L. Cohn, *Philos Werke* I, 1909, p. 29, n. 3 on *Abr.* 3, 17; and I. Heinemann's review of it in *Monatsschrift für Geschichte und Wissenschafts des Judentums* 54 (1910), pp. 506–507 and *idem*, *Bildung*, 1932, p. 7, n. 1; E. Stein, *Die allegorische Exegese des Philo aus Alexandria*, 1929, pp. 20–26, and R. Marcus' review of it in *Jewish Studies in Memory of George A. Kohut*, 1935, pp. 469–470; J. Klausner, *Pilosofim we-Hoge De'ot*, I, 1934, pp. 66–68.

[28] Cf. below, pp. 188 ff.

written traditions reflected in the writings of Philo are to be found in the collections of Palestinian traditions known as the Mishnah, the Midrash, and the Talmud.[29] Though these collections were not made and written down until long after the time of Philo, much of the material contained in them, and sometimes even the literary formulation of this material, must already have existed in oral form by the time of Philo. On the whole the relation between the parallel traditions in Philo and the rabbis may be assumed to be of a fourfold nature. First, some of them undoubtedly emanate from a common source, the traditions of early Palestinian Judaism which the Alexandrian Jews had brought with them from their home country. Second, some of them are later innovations independently arrived at by the rabbis and Philo, owing to the common method of interpretation employed by them. Third, some of them may have been borrowed by Alexandrian Jews from their contemporary Palestinian Jews through the various channels of intellectual communication that existed between them. Fourth, some of them were probably borrowed by Palestinian Jews from the works of Philo.[30] Nowhere in the Talmudic literature, however, is there any evidence that the knowledge of Philo reflected in it, and for that matter the knowledge of any other Greek philosopher, is directly derived from literature; more likely they all came by hearsay.[31] In the entire Greek vocabulary that

[29] The search for such rabbinic parallels began with Azariah dei Rossi in his *Me'or 'Enayim: Imre Binah*, ch. 4, 1573–1575.

[30] Cf. J. Freudenthal, *Hellenistische Studien*, Heft 1 und 2, 1875, pp. 67–68; Z. Frankel, *Ueber den Einfluss der palästinensischen Exegese auf die alexandrinische Hermeneutik*, 1851; N. Bentwich, *Philo-Judaeus of Alexandria*, 1910, pp. 208–211.

[31] On rabbinic passages which are supposed to be dependent upon Philo, see Freudenthal, *op. cit.*, pp. 68–77; J. Perles, "Notes et Mélanges," *Revue des Études Juives*, 3 (1881), 114; A. Epstein, "Le Livre des Jubilés," *Philon et le Midrasch Tadsché*, *REJ*, 21 (1890), 80–97 (cf. below, p. 306, n. 60); 22 (1891), 1–25; W. Bacher, *Die Agada der Amoräer*, I, 1892, p. 107, n. 2; N. J. Weinstein, *Zur Genesis der Agada*, II: *Die Alexandrinische Agada*, 1900; cf. Review by W. Bacher in *REJ*, 43 (1901),

is embodied in the Midrash, Mishnah, and Talmud there is not a single technical philosophic term.[32] Moreover, of those Greek terms embodied in them, which in Greek literature have a philosophic meaning in addition to their popular meaning, none is used in its philosophic meaning.[33] Nor are there to be found in them Hebrew or Aramaic terms which may be taken with certainty as direct translations of Greek philosophic terms.[34] All these four possibilities are to be borne in mind whenever one is tempted to decide on the basis of some resemblance any literary dependence between Philo and the rabbis. In our present study, the rab-

139–145; D. Neumark, *Geschichte der jüdischen Philosophie des Mittelalters*, I, 1907, pp. 85, 98 (Hebrew: *Toledot ha-Pilosofiah be-Yisra'el*, I, 1921, pp. 69, 85); L. Treitel, "Agada bei Philo," *Monatsschrift für Geschichte und Wissenschaft des Judentums*, 53 (1909), 28–45, 159–173, 286–291 (reprinted in *Philonische Studien*, 1915, pp. 85–113); A. Marmorstein, "Ra'ayonot ha-Agadah we-Ḳorot ha-Zeman," *Tarbiz*, 5 (1934), 134–147; L. Finkelstein, "Is Philo Mentioned in Rabbinic Literature?" *Journal of Biblical Literature*, 53 (1934), 142–149; M. Stein, "Ha-Midrash ha-Hellenisti," *Sench*, 1 (1929), 141–154; *idem*, *Pilon ha-Alexandroni*, 1937, pp. 299–300; N. Bentwich, *Hellenism* (Jewish Publication Society, 1943), pp. 250–296.

[32] Cf. classification of such terms in S. Krauss, *Griechische und Lateinische Lehnwörter im Talmud, Midrash und Targum*, II, pp. 623–658. Nor does S. Lieberman's *Greek in Jewish Palestine*, 1942, show any influence of Greek philosophic terminology upon the vocabulary of the Midrash, Mishnah, and Talmud.

[33] For instance, the terms *ἀνάγκη* אנגקי, *ἀρχή* ארכי, *δύναμις* דינמיס, *θεωρία* תוריאה, *ἰδιώτης* הדיוט, *παραδείγματα* פרדיגמטא, *σοφιστής* סופיסטס, are none of them used in their philosophic sense. Neumark in his *Toledot ha-Pilosofiah be-Yisra'el*, I, p. 75 seems to take דוגמה, *δεῖγμα*, in the expression דוגמה הוא ברבבה שלו (*Ḥagigah* 16a) in its technical sense of the paradigmatic nature of the ideas. But *δεῖγμα* is never used in Greek in that sense; only *παράδειγμα* has been used in the sense of ideas (cf. below, p. 238). This shows that the term here has its origin not in literature but in speech. The Talmudic expression מסטורין של הקב"ה (*Genesis Rabbah* 50, 9; 68, 12) corresponds exactly to Philo's expression *θεοῦ μυστήρια* (*Leg. All.* III, 1, 3). But mysteries were practiced among the heathen in Palestine and it is therefore from common speech that the expression was picked up by the rabbis. With regard to the term תוריאה, there is no evidence in support of Neumark's contention (*op. cit.*, I, 99) that it is used in a technical philosophic sense; it is rather used in its ordinary Greek sense of *θεωρία*, *a looking at*.

[34] D. Neumark (*op. cit.*, I, p. 64) seems to suggest that the Hebrew צייר in אלהיכם צייר הוא (*Genesis Rabbah* 1, 9) is the Greek *δημιουργός*. But the allusion to the *demiourgos* there is attributed to a non-Jewish philosopher.

binic parallels quoted may indifferently belong to any of these four types of parallels, for they are not essential to our interpretation of Philo as a critic of Greek philosophy;[35] they are used only as corroborative evidence. Our interpretation of Philo is based chiefly upon a study of his own writings in relation to his Greek and scriptural sources.[36]

Interwoven with his treatment of these strictly scriptural topics are discussions of many of the outstanding philosophic problems of the day: the existence of ideas, the origin of the world, its structure and the laws which govern it, the nature of the soul and the realm of living beings, problems of human knowledge, man's knowledge of God's existence and God's nature, and the problem of human conduct both individual and social. The philosophers Philo draws upon, whom he either mentions by name or to whom passages in his works can be traced, come from all the periods of Greek philosophy down to his own time. Of pre-Socratic philosophers, he mentions the Pythagoreans, Parmenides, Zeno, Heraclitus, Empedocles, Democritus, Anaxagoras, Philolaus, the Sophists, and the individual Sophist Protagoras. Then he mentions also Socrates; the Cynic school, naming especially "Aristippus and Diogenes" as following the teachings of that school; Plato; Aristotle. Of post-Aristotelian philosophy he mentions the various schools or their leaders: the Stoics in general and individual Stoics, such as Zeno, Cleanthes, Chrysippus, Diogenes the Babylonian, Boethus the Sidonian, and Panaetius; Epicurus; the Peripatetic philosophy in general and individual Peripatetics, such as Theophrastus and Critolaus; the Sceptics in general; the Academicians in general; and finally the Neopythagorean Ocellus. Without mentioning names, he quotes, or draws upon, Anaximander, Anaximenes, the Pythagorean Epicharmus, the

[35] Cf. below, pp. 103–113.

[36] Cf. below, II, 465–491.

Atomist Anaxarchus, the Sophist Prodicus, the Stoics Aristo of Chios and Posidonius of Apamea, the Peripatetic Aristoxenes, and the Sceptic Aenesidemus.[37] Besides these philosophers, Philo also mentions Homer, Hesiod, Pindar, Solon, Hippocrates, Ion, Euripides, Sophocles, and Aeschylus.[38] Some of these may have been quoted by him from secondary sources, but some of them quite evidently are quoted directly from their own works, and even in the case of authors whose works are no longer extant it is quite possible that he quoted them from their original works which were still extant at his time.

Philo was not the first to interpret Scripture in terms of Greek philosophy. The beginning was made in the Greek translation of the Pentateuch. That translation, to be sure, was meant to be a faithful rendering of the Hebrew text into Greek and not a philosophic interpretation of it. But every translation of a religious or philosophic work from one language into another, no matter how faithfully literal it is meant to be, is unconsciously bound to be also an interpretation of one system of thought into another. Some scholars, moreover, think to have discerned in that Greek translation of the Pentateuch a conscious effort on the part of the translators to identify scriptural teachings with corresponding teachings in Greek philosophy.[39] This conscious effort to interpret scriptural teachings in terms of the teachings of Greek philosophers becomes unmistakably clear in the sub-

[37] Cf. Leisegang, "Index Nominum" in his *Indices*, pp. 1–26, for proper names in the works which are extant in Greek. "Academicians" occur in *Qu. in Gen.* III, 33; "Parmenides" and "Empedocles" in *Provid.* (Aucher) II, 48. For Aenesidemus see Arnim, "Quellenstudien zu Philo," *Philologische Untersuchungen* 11 (1888), 55 ff., and cf. Zeller, III, 2[4], p. 390, n. 4, and p. 9, n. 7. The identification of sources in the case of passages where the name of the author is not mentioned by Philo is, of course, conjectural and incomplete. [38] *Ibid.*; cf. Siegfried, pp. 137–141.

[39] Cf. survey in Freudenthal, "Are There Traces of Greek Philosophy in the Septuagint?" *Jewish Quarterly Review*, 2 (1890), 205–210; Drummond, I, 156–166.

sequent writings of Jewish authors in Greek — such as the letter of Aristeas,[40] which in its external literary form is a historical exposition, and the Wisdom of Solomon,[41] which is written in the form of the scriptural Book of Proverbs. More like the writings of Philo in their external literary form are the works entitled *An Explanation of the Mosaic Law* attributed to Aristobulus [42] and the Fourth Book of Maccabees.[43] The dates of the composition of these books are not certain; every one of them is placed by some scholar after Philo; but we may quite safely consider them all as antedating Philo. Philo himself refers to certain oral philosophical interpretations of Scripture which existed at his time [44] and also to certain written philosophical interpretations of Scripture in the possession of the Therapeutae.[45] It is Philo, however, who brought to full development this peculiar method of interpreting Scripture and also this peculiar form of philosophic literature and it is to him that their vogue in the subsequent history of philosophy is to be traced.

The external form given by Philo to his writings is a purely Jewish form of literary exposition. It had sprung up in Palestine when, together with the establishment of the custom of public reading of portions from the Pentateuch in the synagogue on the Sabbath, there grew up the custom of delivering an oral interpretation of certain selected verses out of the text read. From Palestine the custom of the public

[40] Cf. Schürer, *A History of the Jewish People in the Times of Jesus Christ*, II, iii, pp. 306–312; E. Bickermann, "Zur Datierung des Pseudo-Aristeas," *Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft und die Kunde der ältern Kirche*, 29 (1930), 280–298.

[41] *Ibid.*, II, iii, pp. 230–237.

[42] *Ibid.*, pp. 237–243; Drummond, I, pp. 242–252.

[43] *Ibid.*, pp. 244–248. Cf. also Introductions to these books in R. H. Charles, *The Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha of the Old Testament*, 1913.

[44] *Deter.* 8, 22; *Plant.* 17, 69; *Heres* 57, 281; *Mut.* 25, 141; *Abr.* 20, 99; 38, 217; *Jos.* 26, 151; *Somn.* I, 19, 118; *Spec.* I, 2, 8; *Spec.* III, 32, 178; *Qu. in Gen.* I, 10.

[45] *Cont.* 3, 29. Cf. Siegfried, p. 26.

reading of the Law on the Sabbath together with oral instruction in the form of a sermon or homily was brought over to Alexandria by the early Jewish settlers there. Philo himself has several references to this kind of instruction in the synagogues on the Sabbath.[46] Perhaps Philo himself was one of those who gave such instruction in the synagogues. But, whether the result of such actual instruction or only modeled after the formal manner of such instruction, his writings have the form of sermons or homilies on verses or topics selected from Scripture.[47] Now it happens that only the Pentateuch was read serially in public at the synagogue on the Sabbath and it was usually completed in Palestine, and hence probably also in Alexandria, in cycles of three years. Of the other books of Scripture, only selections from the Prophets were read as an appendage to the reading from the Pentateuch. As a result of this, the formal homilies in the synagogue always turned on a text or a topic taken from the Pentateuch. This is the reason why the homilies of Philo take the form of discussions directly based on the books of the Pentateuch only. For a similar reason, in Palestinian Judaism, too, the early collections of literature, when arranged in the form of homilies in Scripture, were externally based upon the books of the Pentateuch or upon topics derived from the books of the Pentateuch.

This external literary form of his writings determined the order of Philo's treatment of philosophic problems. He was guided by the scriptural verses which he happened to make

[46] *Opif.* 43, 128; *Mos.* II, 39, 216; *Spec.* II, 15, 61–62; *Hypoth.* 7, 13 (Eusebius, *Praeparatio Evangelica* VIII, 7, 359d–360a); cf. L. Cohn, *Philos Werke*, I, 7.

[47] The similarity between the diatribe and the homily (cf. P. Wendland and O. Kern, *Beiträge zur Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie und Religion*, p. 5) and the evidence of the use of topics dealt with in the diatribe form of literature in some of Philo's treatises (cf. the same reference, pp. 8 ff.) does not eliminate the native Jewish Midrashic character of Philo's writings. Cf. M. Stein, *Pilon ha-Alexdroni*, pp. 77–78; Schürer, *op. cit.*, pp. 243, 331; Freudenthal, *op. cit.*, pp. 67–68

the pegs upon which to hang his philosophic speculations. One verse may have suggested to him a topic in the theory of ideas, another a topic in the nature of virtue, a third a topic in the nature of the soul, and so on throughout the manifold items in the various minutiae of problems of philosophy. Philosophical problems are thus invariably presented by him in fragmentary form. Never does a problem appear in its full coherent structure; never is it treated as a whole.

And as the order of his presentation of problems was dictated by the order of scriptural texts, so is also the manner of their presentation. The language of Scripture determines his choice of vocabulary in philosophy. Because Scripture uses the terms heaven and breath by the side of the terms earth and water, he will call the elements fire and air by the terms heaven and breath.[48] Because Scripture says that God breathed into man a breath of life, he will call the human mind breath or spirit.[49] Because Scripture speaks of the word of God and the wisdom of God he will call the divine mind Logos and Sophia.[50] Because Scripture speaks of the Lord of glory and the Lord of the powers he will call ideas glory and powers.[51] Wishing to keep close to the scriptural modes of speech, he will clothe his philosophic thought in scriptural imagery. There is a variety and mixture of vocabulary in the presentation of his philosophy, and there is no attempt to adhere to the technical vocabulary of the schools or to one consistent technical set of terms of one school.

The fact that so many philosophers belonging to opposite schools of thought are drawn upon by him without any evident discrimination, the fact also that philosophic problems are not treated by him systematically but are dragged in, as it were, upon the casual suggestion of scriptural texts, and

[48] Cf. below, pp. 313, 394, n. 45.
[49] Cf. below, p. 394.
[50] Cf. below, pp. 254–255.
[51] Cf. below, pp. 218 ff.

moreover the fact that he never seems to have any difficulty in connecting any philosophic thought with any scriptural verse create the impression that Philo was a preacher with a flair for philosophy rather than primarily a philosopher. That he was a good preacher — in fact, the founder of the art of preaching as we know it — and perhaps the greatest philosophic preacher that has ever lived, can be readily admitted. But was his flair for philosophy of significance enough to entitle him to a place among the founders of new schools in the history of philosophic thought? The general answer to this question is in the negative. An early student of his philosophy expressed the view that Philo "neither founded any sect whatever, nor in my opinion possessed such powers of intellect as to be able to reject the theories of other philosophers, and to strike out a new and hitherto untrodden path for himself," [52] and the same view is expressed by modern scholars in such statements as that "he was not an original philosopher at all, and anything philosophic to be found in his writings can confidently be taken as genuine teaching of his environment," [53] or that "as a philosopher Philo is negligible" and the fact that he "is not an original thinker but a compiler is clear not only from his total lack of original thought but from the slovenliness with which he incorporates his material," [54] or that one of Philo's characteristics is his "normal lack of originality." [55] To one student of his philosophy, Philo seems "a polyhistor of the first rank" but at the same time also a man "who, on account of his enormous knowledge, is incapable of gaining

[52] J. L. Mosheim in his notes to R. Cudworth, *The Intellectual System of the Universe*, Book I, Chapter IV, §XXXVI, ed. 1845, II, 321.

[53] E. Goodenough, *An Introduction to Philo Judaeus* (Yale University Press, 1940), p. 124.

[54] W. L. Knox, *Some Hellenistic Elements in Primitive Christianity* (London: Humphrey Milford, 1944), p. 34.

[55] A. D. Nock, Review of the preceding in the *Guardian*, January 26, 1945, p. 36.

clearness and of building up, either in religion or in philosophy, a scientific system which is consistent and free from contradictions." [56] The characterization most often applied to him by students of his writings, ever since the seventeenth century, is that of eclectic,[57] in the damnatory sense of the term. As to what the dominant element in that eclecticism of Philo is, there exists a difference of opinion. Among the Church Fathers, Clement of Alexandria characterized him as a Pythagorean, Eusebius characterized him as both a Platonist [58] and a Pythagorean,[59] and Jerome characterized him as a Platonist.[60] Besides Platonism and Pythagoreanism, later students began to stress also the influence of Stoicism upon Philo. All this is summed up by Zeller in his statement that the philosophers who had the greatest attraction for Philo are Plato, the neo-Pythagoreans, and the Stoics.[61] A new influence discovered by more recent students of Philo is that of the Greek mysteries.[62] The prevalent view of Philo as a philosopher is well expressed in the following statement: "Philosophers have patronized him as a lowly step in their lofty ladder, and have labelled him according to their fancy or their knowledge of more ancient philosophers." [63] The

[56] P. Ziegert, "Über die Ansätze zu einer Mysterienlehre aufgebaut auf den antiken Mysterien bei Philo Judäus," *Theologische Studien und Kritiken*, 67 (1824), p. 724.

[57] P. Allix, *The Judgment of the Ancient Jewish Church Against the Unitarians*, 1699, p. 357; E. Schürer, *A History of the Jewish People in the Time of Jesus Christ*, II, iii, p. 364; E. Meyer, *Ursprung und Anfänge des Christentums*, 1921, II, p. 366.

[58] *Stromata* I, 15 (*PG*, 8, 781 A); II, 19 (*PG*, 8, 1044 B).

[59] *Historia Ecclesiastica* II, 4, 3.

[60] *De Viris Illustribus*, c. 11. Cf. Dähne, I, p. 31, n. 6; Zeller, III, 2[4], p. 390, nn. 3 and 4; Schürer, *op. cit.*, II, iii, p. 364, n. 110.

[61] Zeller, III, 2[4], p. 390.

[62] The earliest writer to call attention to this influence upon Philo is P. Ziegert, 1894 (cf. above p. 44, n. 148). For later literature, see H. L. Goodhart and E. R. Goodenough, *The Politics of Philo Judaeus with a General Bibliography of Philo* (Yale University Press, 1938), pp. 269–273.

[63] Cf. J. H. A. Hart, "Philo and Catholic Judaism in the First Century," *The Journal of Theological Studies*, 11 (1909), p. 27.

only dissenting voice, as far as I know, is that of Azariah dei Rossi, in the sixteenth century, who describes Philo as follows: "He was a great philosopher — learned in the works of Plato and Aristotle as well as in those of every other wise man — whose renown went forth from before him among the gentiles. He moreover adds new things of his own, so that, while sometimes he appears to be following in their footsteps, sometimes he turns aside from following them, for his way is contrary unto them." [64]

Influence is a vague term, and in the case of Philo the methods by which influence upon him is determined are also vague. Sometimes this influence is determined on the basis of the honorific titles which he happens to apply to certain philosophers. Thus, for instance, Philo happens to describe the society of Pythagorean philosophers as "most sacred" (ἱερώτατον)[65] and Plato either also as "most sacred" (ἱερώτατον) or as "most clear-toned" (λιγυρώτατον)[66] and Parmenides, Empedocles, Zeno and Cleanthes as "divine men" (*divi homines*),[67] and consequently it is inferred that he must have been influenced by them. Now, while from these passages it may be safely inferred that Philo was acquainted with the names of all these philosophers and perhaps also that he had read their works, and furthermore that he was willing to repeat certain conventional, laudatory

[64] *Me'or 'Enayim: Imre Binah*, ch. 4, ed. Wilna, 1866, p. 97.

In the passage quoted in the text, I take the clause "whose renown went forth from before him among the gentiles" to refer to Philo, and not to "any of the other wise men." It thus reflects the description of Philo in Eusebius, *Historia Ecclesiastica* II, 4, 2, which in the Latin translation accessible to dei Rossi reads as follows: "a man held in highest esteem by many not only of our own but also of the gentiles—vir a plurimis non modo nostrorum, verum etiam gentilium maximo in pretio habitus."

[65] *Probus* 1, 2.

[66] *Ibid.* 2, 13, where these two terms are alternative readings.

[67] *Provid.* (Aucher) II, 48.

titles that were attached to their names [68] and perhaps also that he himself went so far as to coin these laudatory titles by which he describes them, it does not necessarily mean that he followed their teachings. In fact it may only show that he was magnanimous enough to speak of them in laudatory terms even though he disagreed with their philosophy; this is true in the case of most of them, as we shall see later. Sometimes the influence upon him is determined on the basis of the literary origin of terms and expressions which he happens to use. Now if Philo does happen to use terms and expressions borrowed, for instance, from some Stoic author or from some Neopythagorean author, or from the vocabulary of the Greek mysteries, it does not necessarily mean that his philosophy was Stoic or Neopythagorean or that it was really not a philosophy at all but only a mystery; the borrowed expressions only throw light upon the kind of books that students of philosophy at the time of Philo in Alexandria used to read, and show that Philo's language represented the literary philosophic language of his time with all its richness and all the variety of elements that entered into its making. Philosophic language by the very history of its formation is bound to be heterogeneous, and it is for this reason that one cannot determine the affiliation of a philosopher by the parentage of the terms he uses. Every word, indeed, has an etymology, and every term has a history. But the use of a term by a philosopher goes beyond its etymology and history, though a knowledge of both of these is essential

[68] The term devine (*divus*, *θεῖος*) which Philo applies to various philosophers is a common Homeric epithet applied to such persons as Ulysses (*Odyssey* IV, 17) and Epeus (*Iliad* XXIII, 689). The expression "divine Plato" occurs in Themistius (*De Anima*, ed. Heinze, p. 4, l. 15) and "divine Aristotle" in Simplicius (*Physica*, ed. Diels, p. 611, l. 8). Plato himself says that it is in imitation of Homer that he applies the epithets "venerable" (*αἰδοῖος*) and "awful" (*δεινός*) to Parmenides (*Theaetetus* 183 E).

for the understanding of its use. By the time of Philo, the vocabulary of men dealing with philosophic or religious topics was a mosaic of terms derived from all kinds of opposite schools of thought, but molded by their users, if they used them understandingly, to a common, consistent meaning. Whatever one thought of "matter," he would not hesitate to describe it by the Platonic "receptacle" (ὑποδοχή), the Aristotelian "hyle" (ὕλη), or the Stoic "substance" (οὐσία), despite differences in the conception of matter implied in these terms. Whatever one thought of "soul," he would not hesitate, whenever the exigencies of style demanded, to call it indiscriminately *psyche* or *nous* or *pneuma*, despite the different meanings these terms have in certain systems of philosophy. Whatever one thought of "God," he would not hesitate to call him indiscriminately Demiurge, Prime Mover, or Soul of the Universe, despite the difference in the conception of God which these terms imply. The style of Philo, like that of any writer, is the product of all that has been written before him. It has absorbed within itself terms and expressions and allusions derived from the philosophers of the various schools, as also from popular Greek religion and mythology and mysteries. But in the case of Philo, as in the case of any other author, while the outer speech of style may be the man, it is the inner speech of thought, and the latent processes of reasoning behind it, that is the philosopher.

The question is thus again before us, Is there a philosopher in Philo behind the preacher? Is there behind all his fragmentary and often inconsistent statements a unifying principle of thought, a coherent system, in the light of which his expressed utterances, drawn from such a variety of contradictory sources, can be completed, unified, and interpreted in their true meaning, as used by him, as understood by him, and as he wanted us to understand them? It is not impossi-

ble, indeed, that they are right who say that Philo did not possess "such powers of intellect as to be able to reject the theories of other philosophers, and to strike out a new and hitherto untrodden path for himself" or that he was not capable "of building up, either in religion or in philosophy, a scientific system which is consistent and free of contradictions," or that he was only an "eclectic"; but at least we must make an effort to find out whether he was really nothing more than all that has been said about him.

To study any philosopher in the midstream of a tradition we must approach him from upstream and we must also follow him downstream. The former approach supplies us with the material with which he has started; the latter may show us the direction in which he has steered the material. As for Philo, he is not only in the midst of a general philosophic tradition, which was started with Plato, but he is also the founder of a new trend within that tradition — a trend which continued without any interruption for about seventeen centuries, terminating ultimately with Spinoza. In the study of the use made by Philo of the material he inherited from Greek philosophy we may therefore learn something of essential importance from the manner in which the same material has been treated subsequently by those who have followed in his footsteps.

Now, for those who have followed in his footsteps — not so much his immediate and direct successors, the Church Fathers, as those who followed him later indirectly, namely, the Moslem and Jewish and Christian mediaeval philosophers — the interpretation of Scripture in terms of philosophy was not simply a matter of mechanically substituting one set of terms for another or of arbitrarily identifying one set of doctrines with another. To all of them it was a complicated study of similarities and differences. They all started with

certain general conceptions as to what constituted true religious doctrines, conceptions which ultimately go back to the Hebrew Scripture and Jewish tradition. Corresponding to these they all had another set of conceptions derived from Greek philosophy. Between these two sets of conceptions they all tried to show there could be no real contradiction. But no sooner had they started to show the absence of any real contradiction between them than they found themselves confronted by all sorts of vexatious problems. No system of philosophy proved itself acceptable to them in its entirety. Every system of philosophy, they discovered, contained views which were true and views which were false; and even the views which were true occasionally were contaminated by elements of falsehood, from which they had to purge them before they could take them into the religious philosophy which they were trying to build up. The effort to reconcile Scripture with philosophy was thus with them not a mere search for the underlying philosophic implications of scriptural texts; it was also, and often primarily, a searching examination into philosophic problems themselves, and it is this latter searching examination into philosophic problems that they most dwell upon in their writings.

It is the same scriptural conceptions as those of later Christian and Moslem and Jewish philosophers that Philo takes to constitute what he considers the inflexible doctrines of true religion, and it is the same literary sources as those used by his followers from which he derives his philosophic conceptions. Like all of his followers, he also started with the belief that there could be no real contradiction between Scripture and philosophy. Like all of them, therefore, he must have been aware — we have reason to assume — of the fact that certain contradictions do seem to exist between Scripture and philosophy, and that these contradictions

would have to be removed. We have also reason to assume that he was not less perceptive than they in seeing that certain philosophic views were absolutely irreconcilable with the teachings of Scripture. Similarly we have reason to assume that he was not less ingenious than they in knowing how some refractory philosophic views, with certain revisions, could be reconciled with scriptural teachings. So also we have reason to assume that he was not less painstaking than they in examining thoroughly every philosophic view before deciding whether to accept it or not. If all this is not apparent in his writings, it is perhaps because he is one of those philosophers who does his thinking in private and presents to the public only the maturity of his thought. If, with the exception of an occasional groan at some pet aversion, he does not dwell much upon the erroneous views of philosophers to which he objected, it is perhaps because his purpose was not to teach true philosophy to students of Scripture but to show the truth of Scripture to students of philosophy. If almost without any exception he adopts philosophic views without telling us that he adopts them only according to a new version of his own, it is perhaps because at his time philosophic views and concepts had not yet become rigidly fixed by the constant hammering of commentators and one could still freely reshape them for some particular use without having to offer an apology or explanation. Perhaps, also, at his time he could envisage a class of readers who were so well acquainted with the original meaning of the views and concepts with which he dealt that he felt no need of constantly reminding them of the revisions he had introduced. Do we not all sometimes quite deliberately pervert a familiar quotation, without stopping to insult the intelligence of the reader by pointing out the liberty we have taken with it?

If this is how we are to approach the study of Philo, then

to get at the true meaning of his philosophy it is not sufficient to collect related passages in his writings, to arrange them under certain headings, and to place in their juxtaposition parallel passages from other philosophers and the Bible. We must try to reconstruct the latent processes of his reasoning, of which his uttered words, we may assume, are only the conclusions. We must do for him what he would have done for himself had he lived at a later time and followed the literary method of that time. We must constantly ask ourselves: What were the scriptural presuppositions with which he started? What were the corresponding philosophic conceptions with which he matched those scriptural presuppositions? Could he have followed those philosophic conceptions? If he could not, but still seems to follow them, how would he have to modify them in order to justify the fact of his following them? And it is in the light of these reconstructed processes of his latent reasoning that we must then study his own uttered words. This method of study we have chosen to call the hypothetico-deductive method of text study.[69] We have already had occasion to describe it elsewhere in its application to a study of two other authors,[70] and we shall describe it in greater detail in our general introduction to the entire series of studies of which this present study of Philo constitutes the second book. Briefly stated, the basis of this method is the assumption that every philosopher in the main course of the history of philosophy either reproduces former philosophers or interprets them or criticizes them. Now if every philosopher in the past did actually tell us the processes of his own reasoning from the very inception of his thought to its complete maturation, then the history of

[69] Cf. *Crescas' Critique of Aristotle* (Harvard University Press, 1929), p. 25.

[70] Cf. the same reference, pp. 24–29; *The Philosophy of Spinoza* (Harvard University Press, 1934), I, 20–31.

philosophy would be simply a matter of collecting and classifying philosophic data. But no philosopher has ever given expression to the full content of his mind. Some of them tell us only part of it; some of them veil their thought underneath some artificial literary form; some of them philosophize as birds sing, without being aware that they are repeating ancient tunes. Words, in general, by the very limitation of their nature, conceal one's thought as much as they reveal it; and the uttered words of philosophers, at their best and fullest, are nothing but floating buoys which signal the presence of submerged unuttered thoughts. The purpose of historical research in philosophy, therefore, is to uncover these unuttered thoughts, to reconstruct the latent processes of reasoning that always lie behind uttered words, and to try to determine the true meaning of what is said by tracing back the story of how it came to be said, and why it is said in the manner in which it is said.

As a result of such a study, Philo emerges primarily a critic of all schools of Greek philosophy, whether those which by his time had already become obsolete or those which were still flourishing. Believing as he did in the existence of incorporeal beings, he could never be a follower of any of the pre-Platonic schools of philosophy, however much he may praise their founders and however much he may quote with approval some of their sentiments. He may indeed describe the Pythagorean society as "most sacred" [71] and quote with approval their statement that equality is the mother of justice [72] and make use of their theory of numbers in his allegorical interpretation of Scripture,[73] but the metaphysics that is behind the conception of equality and of num-

[71] *Probus* 1, 2; cf. above, p. 100.
[72] *Spec.* IV, 42, 231; cf. below, II, 391.
[73] *Opif.* 30, 89–43, 128; cf. Bréhier, p. 43, n. 1.

bers among the old Pythagoreans and the combination of the theory of numbers with the Platonic theory of ideas among the Neopythagoreans are not followed by Philo. Parmenides may indeed be included by him among the "divine men," [74] but his theory that the world is eternal and that plurality and variability within the world are mere appearances is not followed by Philo. Empedocles also may indeed be included by him among the "divine men," [75] and yet Heraclitus is condemned by him for teaching that the whole world is ruled by the law of opposites without the assumption of a divine agency beyond the world,[76] even though that is also the view of Empedocles. The Sophists are explicitly rejected by him and are represented unfavorably in their traditional character as those "who sell their tenets and arguments like any bit of merchandise in the market, men who for ever pit philosophy against philosophy without a blush," [77] pretending an "ever-curious scepticism" and rejoicing in "disputatious arguments"; [78] and, as we shall see later, he also criticizes the Sophist principle enunciated by Protagoras in his statement that "man is measure of all things," [79] giving to that principle an interpretation of his own.

He similarly dissociates himself from some of the post-Aristotelian schools of philosophy. He openly disagrees with the Epicureans on the most essential points in their doctrine. In physics, he rejects their atomism; in ethics he rejects their hedonism; in theology he denounces the belief in the existence of gods in the form of human beings, as taught by Epicurus in his popular writings,[80] and he denounces also the denial of providence and the doctrine that the world is gov-

[74] Cf. above, p. 100.
[75] *Ibid.*
[76] *Leg. All.* III, 3, 7; *Spec.* I, 38, 208.
[77] *Mos.* II, 39, 212.
[78] *Fug.* 38, 209.
[79] Cf. below, pp. 168 ff.
[80] Cf. below, p. 176.

erned by chance,[81] as taught by Epicurus in his philosophic writings. Similarly the Sceptics are denounced by him in such a statement as that in which he says that they "do not concern themselves with the best things in nature, whether perceived by the senses or the mind, but spend themselves on petty quibbles and trifling disputes." [82] So also the Middle as well as the New Academy is denounced by him in a statement in which he says of the "Academicians and inquirers" that, "preferring neither this one nor that one among the opinions which they investigate, they admit those men to be philosophers who attack the opinions of every sect." [83] Indeed he sometimes repeats the words of the Sceptics about our inability to know certain things, such as the origin and the future of the world, the constitution of the translunar part of the world, and the nature and powers of our own soul.[84] But the repetition of these words is not an endorsement of Scepticism; it is only an expression of his own view against both the Sceptics and the non-Sceptics among the philosophers, trying to show that, while we can have a true knowledge of things, that knowledge can only partly be based upon reason; in part it must be based upon revelation.[85]

His attitude toward Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics is not so clear.

With regard to Aristotle, no philosopher at the time of Philo could be expected to be completely free from his influence. Aristotelian terms, expressions, and formulae occur throughout his writings. Sometimes the Aristotelian influence is apparent even in a context which on the whole is not

[81] *Conf.* 23, 114.

[82] *Congr.* 10, 52.

[83] *Qu. in Gen.* III, 33.

[84] Cf. (1) *Heres* 50, 246; (2) *Somn.* I, 4, 21–24; (3) *Cher.* 20, 65; 32, 113; *Somn.* I, 6, 30–32; *Leg. All.* I, 29, 91; *Mut.* 2, 10.

[85] Cf. below, pp. 152 ff.

Aristotelian, such for instance as his argument for the existence of one world only.[86] Sometimes he aligns himself with Aristotle on questions on which the Stoics differ with him, as, for instance, the denial of a void outside the world,[87] and various problems in connection with virtue.[88] But his use of Aristotelian terms, expressions, and formulae does not indicate a conscious discipleship of Aristotle. Most of these terms and expressions and formulae by that time had already become the common property of philosophy. Sometimes, as for instance in his classification of the four causes [89] and his distinction between active and passive,[90] it is quite evident that he has drawn his Aristotelian material from secondary sources. Nor does his preference for some view of Aristotle to that of his opponents, either in physics [91] or in ethics,[92] indicate a conscious discipleship of Aristotle, for in almost every such instance he considers himself consciously a disciple of Moses rather than of Aristotle. And it is also as consciously a disciple of Moses that he found himself obliged to oppose Aristotle, either indirectly or directly, on doctrines which are characteristically Aristotelian. When he condemns all those who reject the existence of ideas,[93] Aristotle is undoubtedly meant to be included among them. When he condemns "some men" for their belief in the beginninglessness of the world,[94] these "some men" are the followers of Aristotle. Similarly, therefore, when he praises Aristotle by name for his belief in the indestructibility of the world, it is not because the authority of Aristotle carried weight with him but rather because he found it in agreement with what he believed to be the teachings of Moses.[95] It is sig-

[86] Cf. below, p. 312.
[87] Cf. below, p. 312.
[88] Cf. below, II, 268 ff.
[89] Cf. below, p. 265.
[90] Cf. *Opif.* 2, 8.
[91] Cf. below, pp. 312, 314.
[92] Cf. below, II, 272 ff.
[93] Cf. below, p. 164.
[94] Cf. *Opif.* 2, 7, and below, p. 295.
[95] Cf. below, p. 295.

nificant, however, that he never opposes Aristotle by name as he does Heraclitus, Protagoras, and the Sophists and Academicians.

Stoicism is most frequently drawn upon; its terminology and phraseology occur in every topic of philosophy touched upon by Philo. The Stoics were great disseminators of knowledge which they borrowed from others and are too often given credit by historians for views to which their only contribution was a change in the vocabulary or a minute classification or reclassification of parts of a general view held by others. The frequency with which Philo follows the Stoics merely shows that like many others of his time he used the Stoic compilations as a short cut to philosophic knowledge. But despite all this, and despite also his inclusion of Zeno and Cleanthes among the "divine men," when we examine the use made by him of the Stoic material we shall find that he is their critic rather than their follower. He differs from them on the definition of philosophy and wisdom, though ostensibly he quotes their definition of these two terms.[96] He rejects their conception of God,[97] though he makes use of the Stoic expression that God is the soul or mind of the universe.[98] He specifically denounces those who deny the existence of ideas, among whom he undoubtedly included the Stoics.[99] His use of the term Logos may show in some respect the influence of the Stoics, but he uses it in a sense entirely different from that of the Stoics.[100] In his theory of the creation of the world he openly rejects the Stoic view.[101] In his classification of the faculties of the soul, indeed, he more often follows the Stoic scheme than that of Plato or of Aristotle, and in his description of the rational

[96] Cf. below, p. 148.
[97] Cf. below, p. 176.
[98] Cf. below, pp. 345 ff.
[99] Cf. below, pp. 164, 200.
[100] Cf. below, pp. 253, 327.
[101] Cf. below, pp. 295, 299.

soul he uses such Stoic terms as "breath" or "spirit" and "ether" and "a divine fragment," but his conception of the soul is in direct opposition to that of the Stoics and consequently the Stoic terms used by him are not to be taken literally.[102] In his proof of the existence of God he makes use of some proofs derived from the Stoics, but he modifies it so as to use them against the Stoic conception of God and in proof of his own conception of Him.[103] In his discussion of the virtues and emotions one may discern the influence of the Stoics' vocabulary, but here again the influence is only that of vocabulary; in the definition of virtue and its relation to the emotions he is opposed to them. In fact, the entire philosophy of Philo may be reconstructed as a criticism of Stoicism.

Now in all those points in which he is opposed to Aristotle and the Stoics and the Epicureans he is in agreement with Plato. One would therefore be inclined to take him as a follower of Plato. But the Platonic views which are accepted by him are all radically changed. Such radical changes are to be found in his treatment of the theory of ideas,[104] of the creation of the world,[105] of the conception of the laws of nature,[106] of the soul,[107] of the theory of knowledge,[108] of the proofs of the existence of God,[109] of the knowability of God,[110] of the basis of right conduct, and of the ideal state.[111] But whereas his departure from the Stoics was due to a criticism of their views, with regard to his departure from Plato it is partly due to a criticism and partly to an interpretation. The Platonic doctrine was still in a plastic state, and all those who considered themselves its disciples could allow them-

[102] Cf. below, pp. 393–395.
[103] Cf. below, II, 78 ff.
[104] Cf. below, pp. 200 ff.
[105] Cf. below, pp. 300 ff.
[106] Cf. below, pp. 347 ff.
[107] Cf. below, pp. 395 ff.
[108] Cf. below, II, 3 ff.
[109] Cf. below, II, 92.
[110] Cf. below, II, 111 ff.
[111] Cf. below, II, 180 ff., 378 ff.

selves to knead it so as to suit their own particular use. Philo's treatment of Plato may therefore perhaps be considered as a criticism of the common understanding of Plato, or of Plato in its original version, but at the same time also as an adoption of Platonism in its essential principles and a revision thereof and an adaptation thereof to certain essential teachings of Scripture.

Philo is thus a critic of Stoicism and a reviser of Platonism. But we may now ask ourselves whether he himself had a coherent system. How would he have presented that system if he had not scattered his remarks in flashes as homilies on texts? Can we reconstruct that system out of his own writings? He speaks of ideas, powers, Logos, wisdom, and an intelligible world, and what he says of them seems too fragmentary or vague or inconsistent. Can we reconstruct all this into a coherent whole? He speaks of creation, throws out hints of criticism of other theories, and uses enigmatic phrases which mean both that the world was created out of preëxistent matter and that the world was created out of nothing. Can we reconstruct systematically his criticisms of other theories of creation and state once and for all what he really did mean by creation? He speaks of a Logos within the world, expressed in terms borrowed both from Plato and from the Stoics, and he speaks also of laws of nature and of miracles. Can we reduce all this to a system? What did he actually take from others and what were his innovations? What were his laws of nature, and how many of these were there, and how do miracles come in? And can we discover some system and find some characteristic contribution in his scattered sayings about souls and angels and demons and immortality? And what about the freedom of will of which he speaks so often? Is it the same as that freedom of which others before him have spoken? If not, what is the reason

behind his departure from his predecessors? Prophecy is a Greek term. Is there anything new in his treatment of prophecy? And does he treat it in a coherent and systematic manner? People before him had tried to prove the existence of God. Has he anything new to say about the subject? And similarly is his treatment of the unknowability of God something new? If so, what has led him to this view and what consequences followed from it? And when he deals with right conduct, of both the individual and the state, does he only repeat the commonplaces of all good and true men, or does he introduce something new into the philosophic discussion of ethics and politics? This is the task we have set before us.

To all these questions we will try to give an answer in the present study. If the answer given by us is correct, then Philo will emerge from our study as a philosopher in the grand manner, not a mere dabbler in philosophy. He did have the power of intellect to be able to reject the theories of other philosophers and to strike out a new and hitherto unknown path for himself. He is to be given credit for originality in all the problems dealt with by him, for in this particular set of problems he was the originator of every fundamental concept which continued to be discussed thereafter throughout the history of philosophy. Like any great and original philosopher in the history of philosophy, Philo's own philosophy was a reaction against that of his predecessors and contemporaries and, in that sense, like any philosopher in history if not properly studied, he may be called an eclectic. Indeed his learning, like that of many a philosopher in the past, was great and varied, and the artificiality of the literary form of his writings, again like that of many a philosopher in the past, often obscures his thought; but despite all this he built up a system of philosophy which is consistent,

coherent, and free from contradictions, all of it being based upon certain fundamental principles. Finally, while indeed for various historical and perhaps personal reasons he did not found any "sect" in the sense that the Academicians and Peripatetics and Stoics and Epicureans are said to constitute philosophical sects (*αἱρέσεις*),[112] it is most remarkable that without a group of official disciples his teachings became the most dominant influence in European philosophy for well-nigh seventeen centuries.

II. The Allegorical Method

In his attempt to interpret Scripture in terms of philosophy, Philo assumes that scriptural texts have a twofold meaning, a literal (*ῥητή*)[1] or obvious (*φανερά*)[2] meaning and an underlying meaning (*ὑπόνοια*).[3] The underlying meaning he describes by a variety of terms, among them also the term allegory (*ἀλληγορία*),[4] and to interpret a text according to its underlying meaning is therefore described as to allegorize (*ἀλληγορεῖν*).[5] The underlying meaning of a text as well as the allegorical interpretation of it is said by him to be "obscure to the many," [6] to be clear only to "those who can contemplate bodiless and naked facts," [7] to appeal only to "the few who study soul characteristics rather than bodily forms," [8] and to be dear to "men who are capable of seeing." [9] "Allegory" is also described by him as something

[112] Cf. Diogenes, I, 19.

[1] *Cont.* 3, 28; *Abr.* 36, 200.

[2] *Abr.* 36, 200.

[3] *Cont.* 3, 28; cf. Plato, *Republic* II, 378 D.

[4] *Plant.* 9, 36, *et passim.* Cleanthes was the first to use the term *ἀλληγορικῶς*. Cf. H. J. Rose, *A Handbook of Greek Literature* (London: Methuen & Co., 1934), p. 392.

[5] *Migr.* 37, 205.

[6] *Abr.* 36, 200.

[7] *Ibid.* 41, 236.

[8] *Ibid.* 29, 147.

[9] *Plant.* 9, 36.

"which loves to hide itself" and into which one has to be "initiated." [10] All this, as we have seen, means that only those who are qualified both by natural abilities and moral character and by preliminary training are to be instructed in the method of the allegorical interpretation of Scripture.[11]

Of these two methods, the literal and the allegorical, the allegorical is made use of by Philo without any reservation. Everything in Scripture, from names, dates, and numbers to the narration of historical events or the prescription of rules for human conduct, is to him subject to allegorical interpretation. But as for the literal method, it is to be used, according to him, with certain reservations. One general rule laid down by Philo is that no anthropomorphic expression about God is to be taken literally. As proof-text for this general rule he quotes the verse "God is not as man," [12] which is taken by him to contain the general principle that God is not to be likened to anything perceptible by the senses.[13] And so, for instance, he says, the verse "and Cain went out from the face of God" [14] is to be taken "in a figurative sense," since, if taken literally, it is "greatly at variance with truth." [15] If the question is raised why Scripture makes use of such anthropomorphic expressions, the answer given by him is that such expressions "are introduced for the instruction of the many" [16] and out of regard "for the ways of the thinking of the duller folk," [17] so that "it is for training and admonition, not because God's nature is such, that these words are used." [18]

This general rule, however, opens up some new questions. Suppose God is described in an anthropomorphic way as

[10] *Fug.* 32, 179.
[11] Cf. above, p. 49.
[12] Num. 23: 19.
[13] *Immut.* 13, 62; cf. below, II, 97.
[14] Gen. 4: 16.
[15] *Post.* 1, 1.
[16] *Immut.* 11, 54.
[17] *Somn.* I, 40, 237.
[18] *Immut.* 11, 54.

having said something or as having done something. The anthropomorphic manner of expression, to be sure, is not to be taken literally. But what about the thing said by God or done by God? Should that be taken literally as a fact, communicated or performed by God in a manner not anthropomorphic, or should that, too, be rejected in its literal sense? Then, also, how about all the statements in Scripture which do not involve anthropomorphisms? Should they all be taken literally, without any restriction, or is there any restriction to their literal sense?

No general answer is given by Philo to these questions. But indirectly we may gather that different answers would be given by him with regard to different parts of Scripture.

Scripture is divided by Philo into three parts: "[1] Laws and [2] oracles delivered through the mouth of prophets and [3] psalms and other books which foster and perfect knowledge and piety." [19] This corresponds exactly to the traditional Jewish division of Scripture into Law, Prophets, and Hagiographa. The first of these three parts, the Pentateuch, which, in accordance with Jewish tradition, he calls the Law [20] (ὁ *νόμος*, *Torah*), is subdivided by him into two main parts, the historical (*ἱστορικόν*) and the legislative (*νομοθετικόν*); and the historical part is further subdivided into the story of the creation of the world (*κοσμοῦ γένεσις*, *κοσμοποιία*) and all the other stories which in their totality he describes as genealogical (*γενεαλογικόν*).[21] The story of the creation of the world apparently refers to the six days of creation, for he defines it as "beginning with the genesis of heaven and ending with the construction (*κατασκευήν*) of man"; [22] the last part of the definition would thus refer to the creation of man described in the verses "God made (*ἐποίησεν*) man" [23] and

[19] *Cont.* 3, 25.
[20] *Mos.* II, 6, 31. Cf. *Berakot* 5a: "Torah means the Pentateuch."
[21] *Mos.* II, 8, 46–47; *Praem.* 1, 1.
[22] *Praem.* 1, 1.
[23] Gen. 1: 27.

"God formed (ἔπλασεν) man." [24] However, from the contents of his work *De Opificio Mundi* (περὶ τῆς κοσμοποιίας), it may be inferred that he has extended it to the expulsion of Adam and Eve from the garden of Eden.[25] It is not impossible therefore that the expression "ending with the construction of man" refers to the verse "and the Lord God made for Adam and his wife garments of skins and clothed them," [26] which is the last act mentioned before the expulsion. Indeed, in connection with this act of furnishing them with garments one would expect here the Greek παρασκευή rather than κατασκευή, for the former refers to an equipment that is movable and temporary, whereas the latter refers to an equipment that is fixed and lasting. But Philo himself interprets this verse in its allegorical sense as meaning that God "made a body" for Adam and his wife, wherein He clothed "the mind and the senses as in a garment of skin," for "by what power can the construction (*apparatus*) of the human body be put together more excellently, and in a more becoming manner, than by God?" [27] The Latin term *apparatus* in the text quoted undoubtedly stands for the term κατασκευή in the original Greek text.[28] What Philo calls the creation of the world thus includes not only the stories contained in the account of the six days of creation but also the stories of the planting of a garden in Eden,[29] the growing of a tree of life

[24] Gen. 2: 7. H. E. Ryle, in *Philo and Holy Scripture*, p. xxi, takes the expression "the story of the creation of the world" in Philo to refer only to the story of the six days of creation in Gen. 1: 1–2: 4.

[25] Gen. 3: 24. [26] Gen. 3: 21.

[27] *Qu. in Gen.* I, 53. The same allegorical interpretation of the expression "garments of skins," or, rather, as the original Hebrew reads, "garments of skin," is to be found in Abraham Ibn Ezra's Hebrew commentary on Gen. 3: 21. Cf. J. Bernays, *Theophrastos' Schrift über Frommigkeit*, pp. 143–144; D. Rosin, "Die Religionsphilosophie Abraham Ibn Ezra's," *Monatsschrift für Geschichte und Wissenschaft des Judenthums*, 42 (1898), p. 489.

[28] This underlying Greek term, I am informed by Professor Ralph Marcus, is also indicated by the Armenian version. [29] Gen. 2: 8.

in the midst of the garden,[30] the four rivers,[31] the putting of Adam into the garden of Eden,[32] the giving of names to cattle, fowl and beasts,[33] the creation of Eve out of the rib of Adam,[34] the speaking of the serpent,[35] and the making of garments for Adam and Eve.[36] There is a very good justification for Philo's inclusion of all these things in the story of the six days of creation, for all of them, according to Jewish tradition, occurred on the sixth day of creation.[37] Though the opening four verses of the second chapter in Genesis, which immediately follows the account of the six days of creation in the first chapter, is described by Philo as the "epilogue to the narrative of the creation," [38] it is to be assumed that this description is applied by him not only to these four verses but also to the entire two chapters, the second and the third, which intervene between the story of the six days of creation and the birth of Cain. As for the term "genealogical," by which he describes the post-creation historical part of the Pentateuch, it is derived from its use in Greek as a description of that part of history which deals with persons rather than with places, dates, or events.[39] But its application by Philo to the historical narrative of the Pentateuch is due to the fact that that narrative from Adam to Moses and Aaron is presented in the form of a succession of generations, introduced by the words these are "the generations" (γενέσεις) of so and so.[40] Philo himself indicates

[30] Gen. 2: 9.
[31] Gen. 2: 10–14.
[32] Gen. 2: 15.
[33] Gen. 2: 20.
[34] Gen. 2: 21–22.
[35] Gen. 3: 1 ff.
[36] Gen. 3: 21.
[37] *Sanhedrin* 38b; *Tanhuma* ed. Buber, *Bereshit*, §25, p. 9b.
[38] *Post.* 18, 64–65; cf. *Fug.* 32, 178, where Gen. 2: 6 is described as coming "immediately after the narrative of the creation of the world."
[39] Cf. Colson, VI, p. 606, §47; VIII, p. 313, n. *a*.
[40] Gen. 5: 1; 6: 9; 10: 1; 11: 10; 11: 27; 25: 12; 25: 19; 36: 1; 36: 9; 37: 2; Num. 3: 1.

both of these reasons for his use of that term when he describes the historical part of the Pentateuch as being "a record of the good and bad lives and of the rewards and punishments set aside for each of them in each generation" (γενεαῖς).[41]

Let us then see what we may gather about his view with regard to the literal sense of each of these parts of Scripture.

With regard to the story of creation, commenting upon the verse which in the Septuagint reads, "and God finished on the sixth day His works," [42] he says: "It is quite foolish to think that the world was created in six days or in a space of time at all." [43] The term six is taken by him to mean "not a quantity of days, but a perfect number," [44] to indicate that the world was created according to a certain plan and order.[45] Moreover, the story of creation is interpreted by him so as to make the account of the first day of creation [46] and the subsequent repetition of the same account [47] refer to the creation of the intelligible world.[48] But, having laid down these two reservations, he declares "that what has been related about the creation of the world is consistent with strict truth." [49]

As for the other stories in what he calls the story of the creation of the world, he has four sets of statements. First, sometimes he rejects their literal meaning altogether. Thus in connection with God's planting of a garden in Eden, His creation of Eve out of the ribs of Adam, and the speaking of the serpent, he characterizes these stories, when taken lit-

[41] *Praem.* 1, 2.
[42] Gen. 2: 2. Hebrew: "on the seventh day."
[43] *Leg. All.* I, 2, 2; cf. *Opif.* 3, 13; 7, 26; *Qu. in Gen.* I, 1.
[44] *Leg. All.* I, 2, 3.
[45] *Opif.* 3, 13; cf. below, pp. 311 f.
[46] *Ibid.*, 22, 67.
[47] Gen. 1: 1–2; 2: 4–5.
[48] *Opif.* 7, 29–10, 36; 44, 129–130; cf. below, p. 306.
[49] *Qu. in Gen.* I, 1.

erally, as "mythical nonsense" [50] or "incurable folly" [51] or as being "of the nature of a myth." [52] Second, however, in connection with the stories that God put man into the garden of Eden to dress it and to keep it, that Adam gave names to the various animals, and that the serpent spoke, he sometimes accepts them all in their literal sense.[53] Third, he sometimes advances two interpretations, a literal and an allegorical, both of them evidently of equal acceptance to him. He does this in connection with God's planting of a garden in Eden,[54] His creation of Eve,[55] and His making of garments for Adam and Eve.[56] Fourth, sometimes he reproduces a literal interpretation in the name of "some persons," but expresses his own preference for an allegorical interpretation. This occurs in connection with the putting of man into the garden of Eden,[57] the tree of life,[58] and the four rivers.[59] In accepting the literal meaning of these stories, he sometimes tries to show how in telling them Scripture had the purpose of teaching mankind an object lesson. Adam was placed in the garden of Eden to cultivate it, not that the garden needed cultivation, but that "the first man should be as it were a sort of pattern and law to all workmen in future of everything which ought to be done by them." [60] God made garments of skin for Adam and his wife, in order to teach "wisdom" to those who waste their time in the production of useless things and of objects of luxury and to point out to them the virtue of "frugality," by showing that "the gar-

[50] *Leg. All.* I, 14, 43, in connection with the planting of the garden.

[51] *Plant.* 8, 32, again in connection with the planting of the garden.

[52] *Leg. All.* II, 7, 19, in connection with Eve, and *Agr.* 22, 97, in connection with the serpent.

[53] *Qu. in Gen.* I, 14; 20–22; 32.

[54] *Ibid.* I, 6.

[55] *Ibid.* I, 25.

[56] *Ibid.* I, 53.

[57] *Ibid.* I, 8.

[58] *Ibid.* I, 10.

[59] *Ibid.* I, 13.

[60] *Ibid.* I, 14. Cf. the common rabbinic statement "The Torah teaches incidentally proper conduct (*derek ereṣ*) (*Tos. Soṭah* VII, 20).

ment made of skins, if one should come to a correct judgment, deserves to be looked upon as a more noble possession than a purple robe embroidered with various colors." [61]

These last three sets of statements, in which Philo either accepts the literal meaning of these stories or pays some regard to them, all occur in his *Quaestiones et Solutiones in Genesin*, whereas the first set occurs in his other writings. It is quite possible, therefore, that the difference of attitude toward the literal sense between the first set of statements and the other three sets is due to a difference in the type of reader to which these two groups of writings were addressed, and presumably the type of reader to whom the *Quaestiones* were addressed was less philosophical than that to whom his other writings were addressed. But this does not help us to explain Philo's own attitude toward the question under consideration. One thing, however, is quite certain. On purely philosophic grounds Philo had no reason for rejecting any of these stories, for throughout his writings he maintains, as an essential part of his philosophic system, that God can miraculously change the order of nature.[62] Once he declares this possible, he can reject nothing in any of these stories of creation on the ground that it was contrary to the order of nature. In the *Quaestiones*, in his attempt to explain the literalness of the story of the speaking of the serpent with a human voice, one of the explanations he offers is that it was a miracle, for, he says, "when anything very marvellous requires to be done, God changes the subject natures by which he means to operate." [63] Such an explanation could be of-

[61] *Ibid.* I, 53. Cf. below, p. 272, n. 59.

[62] Cf. below, pp. 349 ff.

[63] *Qu. in Gen.* I, 32. Two other explanations are offered by him: "In the first place, it may be the fact that at the beginning of the world even the other animals besides man were not entirely destitute of the power of articulate speech." This undoubtedly reflects the myth, reproduced by Plato, that during the golden age of

fered by him, quite consistently with his philosophy, as an explanation of all the stories of creation. If sometimes he shows a hesitation in resorting to the use of miracles as an explanation,[64] it is only because, like so many philosophers after him, with all his belief in the possibility of miracles, he did not want to overuse the privilege of that kind of explanation.

With regard to the historical events after the creation of the world, the only qualification of their literal truth made by him is that their literalness must be rejected whenever by the acceptance of it "the inspired words of God" would compel one "to admit anything base or unworthy of their dignity," [65] which, of course, leaves a great deal to the reader to decide for himself if a story in its literal sense is base and unworthy of the dignity of the words of God. We may mention, for the purpose of illustration, a few of the stories which he does not consider acceptable in their literal sense. First, there is the story of Cain that "he builded a city." [66] Taken literally, he says, it would mean that he builded a city all by himself, but this, he adds, "runs counter not only to all our ideas but to our reason itself"; [67] and hence he interprets it allegorically. Second, there is the story of Joseph that he was sent by his father to his brethren to see whether it was

---

Cronus beasts were endowed with speech (cf. *Statesman* 272 B–C). Elsewhere, the story "about the days when all animals had a common language" is ascribed by Philo to "devisers of myths," evidently without himself crediting it (*Conf.* 3, 6; cf. E. Stein's note *ad loc.* in *Philos Werke* V, p. 104, n. 1; Ginzberg, *Legends of the Jews*, V, p. 94, n. 58). The other explanation reads as follows: "Thirdly . . . the souls of those who were first created were rendered acute to thoroughly understand every voice of every kind." The superiority in mental powers of the first created man is also dwelt upon by him in *Opif.* 49, 140–141.

[64] Cf. below, p. 353.

[65] *Deter.* 5, 13. In this passage, I take it, the expression "the inspired words of God," which is parallel to the expression "laws of God-beloved men," refers to the historical and other non-legal parts of the Pentateuch. Cf. below, II, 190 f.

[66] Gen. 4: 17. [67] *Post.* 14, 50.

well with them and well with the flocks.[68] In its literal sense, he says, this story cannot be accepted by any sensible person, for "is it likely that Jacob, who had the wealth of a king, was so badly off for household servants or attendants as to send a son out abroad to bring word about his other children, whether they are in good health, and about the cattle to boot?"[69] and hence he interprets it allegorically. Third, there is the statement that "the king of Egypt died and the children of Israel groaned under their labors and raised a loud outcry."[70] Taken literally, the statement would seem to give the impression that there was a causal connection between the death of the king and the groaning and crying of the children of Israel, but this, he says, is "contradictory to reason" and "contrary to expectation, for one would expect, when a tyrant dies, those over whom he has tyrannized to be glad and rejoice";[71] and hence he interprets it allegorically. Fourth, there is the story of the confusion of tongues, concerning which he says that those "who cherish a dislike of the constitution of our fathers" find in it similarities to certain myths among the Greeks and also raise objections to the underlying assumption of the story that a common language is conducive to iniquity.[72] And consequently, while admitting that these insidious criticisms can be answered even by those who are content with a literal interpretation of the story, still he offers an allegorical explanation.[73]

Now there is nothing in any of these statements to show that by his offering an allegorical explanation for the purpose of removing certain difficulties in the external form of the text Philo actually discarded the entire historical set-

[68] Gen. 37: 13–14.
[69] *Deter.* 5, 13.
[70] Exod. 2: 23.
[71] *Deter.* 25, 94–95.
[72] *Conf.* 2, 2–4, 13.
[73] *Ibid.* 5, 14 ff.

ting of the story. All these statements merely show that by the allegorical method Philo found it possible to explain away any narration of incident in Scripture that seemed to him to run counter to reason or expectation or to have some similarity with Greek myths, without necessarily impugning the historicity of the essential basic fact of the story. Indeed Cain did not build a city all by himself as the statement would literally imply, but still there is no doubting of the fact that Cain was a real person and the founder of a city. Indeed Joseph was not literally sent by his father to bring tidings from his brethren, but there is no doubting of the historical fact that Joseph went to see his brethren and was sold by them. Indeed the children of Israel did not lament the death of the king of Egypt, as a careless reader of Scripture might be misled to think, but still there is no doubting of the story that after the death of the king of Egypt the children of Israel did groan under their labors. Indeed there are certain rational objections to the underlying assumption of the story of the confusion of tongues and indeed there is also an external resemblance between this scriptural story and certain Greek myths, but the objections are not unanswerable and there is also a fundamental difference between this story and its parallel myths in that the myths, according to Philo, never have an inner meaning,[74] whereas this story has an inner meaning. There is, however, no doubting on the part of Philo of the authenticity of the main story as a historical fact. He explicitly says that he would not censure those who accept the story of the confusion of tongues literally, "for perhaps the truth is with them also." [75] The qualifying term "perhaps" (ἴσως) is used in this passage after the manner of the Greek usage of this term on certain

[74] Cf. above, p. 35.

[75] *Conf.* 38, 190.

occasions, not as an expression of doubt but rather as an expression of modesty.

To Philo, then, we may assume, no allegorical interpretation of a scriptural story, whether justified by him on the ground of some inherent difficulty of the text or not so justified by him, means the rejection of the story itself as a fact. A clear indication of this attitude is to be found in his prefatory comment to his allegorical interpretation of the name Samuel. "Now Samuel," he says, "was perhaps in reality only a man, but here he is conceived, not as a compound living being, but as a mind which rejoices only in the service and worship of God." [76] Here, too, the qualifying term "perhaps" is used only as an expression of modesty and not of doubt. What he quite evidently means is that his treatment of Samuel as an ideal type does not deny the existence of Samuel as a real person. And so also his allegorical treatment of all other persons or events in Scripture does not mean his denial of their historicity. When, speaking of Enos, Enoch, and Noah, he remarks, "whether we think of them as men or types of soul," [77] he implies that they are both. The Patriarchs, indeed, are symbols of elevated philosophic thoughts,[78] but still they are historic persons and everything that is told of them is a true historic event. The three persons who appeared to Abraham as he sat in the tent door in the heat of the day[79] are indeed profound metaphysical symbols about the nature of God,[80] still they were three real beings, two of them angels, who actually appeared to Abraham.[81] And the same is true about all the stories narrated in the Pentateuch. Not even the miraculous events are de-

[76] *Ebr.* 36, 144.
[77] *Abr.* 9, 47.
[78] *Ibid.* 20, 99 ff.
[79] Gen. 18: 1.
[80] *Abr.* 24, 119 ff.
[81] *Ibid.* 22, 107 ff.; 28, 143 ff.; cf. Gfrörer, I, pp. 290, 291, 293; Drummond, II, p. 243; and below, p. 379.

nied by him as historical facts, though he sometimes tries to explain them either as natural occurrences or as having some allegorical meaning.[82] Statements like "here we may leave the literal exposition and begin the allegorical" [83] occur frequently in his discussion of historical persons and events.

With regard to the legislative part of the Pentateuch, he makes two statements. On the one hand, as in the case of the non-legislative part, he says of it that the "laws of God-beloved men" are not to be taken literally, whenever their literal acceptance would compel one "to admit anything base or unworthy of their dignity." [84] This, again, leaves it to the individual student of Scripture to decide for himself which laws in their literal sense are base and unworthy of their dignity. But, on the other hand, he denounces those of his own time who saw in the law an underlying meaning only and treated its literal meaning with easy-going neglect. The inner meaning and the external performance of the law are to him of equal importance. "We should look on all these outward observances," he says, "as resembling the body, and their inner meanings as resembling the soul." He especially mentions the Sabbath, the festivals in general, circumcision, and the sanctity of the Temple, as examples of laws which have an inner meaning and are also to be externally observed.[85] But what constitutes a law in the Pentateuch? Is every statement in the Pentateuch with regard to doing or not doing something to be taken as a law? This problem is not openly raised by Philo, nor is a direct answer to it given by him, but from various statements he makes about the laws we may gather that he was both coping with that problem and trying to get a solution for it. Technically, the legislative part of the Pentateuch is defined by him as

[82] Cf. below, pp. 350–354.
[83] *Abr.* 24, 119.
[84] *Deter.* 5, 13; cf. above, n. 65.
[85] *Migr.* 16, 89–93.

that which is concerned with "commands" (προστάξεις) and "prohibitions" (ἀπαγορεύσεις),[86] but he finds that besides laws in the strictly technical sense of the term the Pentateuch contains also that which he calls "recommendation" (ἐντολή) or "exhortation" (παραίνεσις) or "teaching" (διδασκαλία).[87] Laws in their strictly technical sense are to him the ten commandments, which he calls, as in the original Hebrew, "Ten Words," and which also, because of their divine origin, he calls by the Greek term "Oracles," [88] and he takes pains to inform his readers that they are not merely prudent words of advice and gnomic sayings but that they are "in reality laws or statutes." [89] Similarly, such laws in their strictly technical sense are all the special laws which he happens to discuss under the headings of these ten commandments.[90] But how many of the laws which he does not happen to discuss among his special laws did he consider as law? Or, were they not considered by him as laws at all? And what was the criterion by which he determined whether a statement in the Pentateuch is to be taken as law or not? In Palestine, some rabbis happened to say that the Pentateuch contained six hundred and thirteen commandments or laws.[91] This necessarily implied certain principles of selection. Centuries later, different lists of the six hundred and thirteen commandments began to be drawn up by various rabbis, and

[86] *Mos.* II, 8, 46; *Immut.* 11, 53; *Praem.* 9, 55; cf. below, II, 200.

[87] *Leg. All.* I, 30, 93–94. A similar classification is to be found in St. Thomas. What Philo calls "commands" and "prohibitions" are included by St. Thomas under the general term *praecepta.* What Philo calls "exhortations" and "recommendations" St. Thomas calls *mandata.* The latter is explained by him as being expressed by way of inducement and persuasion and is illustrated by the law about returning a pledge before sunset (Exod. 22: 25–26), which law, as we shall see later (below nn. 96–99), is not taken by Philo literally. Cf. *Sum. Theol.* I, II, 99, 5 c.

[88] *Praem.* 1, 2.

[89] *Decal.* 9, 32.

[90] *Praem.* 1, 2.

[91] *Mekilta, Baḥodesh,* 5, F, p. 67a; W, p. 74a; L, p. 236 n.; *Makkot* 23b.

Maimonides tried to lay down certain principles of selection.[92] Did Philo have in mind a list of commandments and some principle of selection? In the Talmud, on the basis of the verse "Thy name shall no more be called Abram, but thy name shall be Abraham," [93] one rabbi declares that this verse constitutes a mandatory commandment and another rabbi declares that it constitutes two commandments, a prohibitive and a mandatory,[94] and yet it is counted neither as a prohibitive nor a mandatory commandment in later lists. But, according to Philo, mocking at this verse is wickedness which deserves divine punishment, though he himself interprets it allegorically.[95] Did he take this verse to constitute literally a legal commandment?

Philo's answer to this question may be gathered indirectly from the passages in which he happens to touch upon this problem. In one passage, in connection with the law about returning a pledge before sunset,[96] he first criticizes the literal meaning of the law as too trivial,[97] then he shows from the wording of the law that, by its use of a future indicative instead of an imperative, it could not have meant to be a law in its literal sense,[98] and finally, on the basis of these two considerations, he interprets it allegorically.[99] In another passage, in connection with the law that the unclean does not

[92] *Sefer ha-Miṣwot, Shoresh* 1–14.

[93] Gen. 17: 5.

[94] *Jer. Berakot*, I, 9, 3d.

[95] *Mut.* 8, 60 ff.; cf. Ritter, *Philo und die Halacha*, p. 12, n. 1.

[96] Exod. 22: 25–26.

[97] *Somn.* I, 16, 93–100.

[98] *Ibid.*, 101; cf. Colson, *ad loc.* (V, 599). In the Hebrew, mandatory commandments use either (a) the imperative or (b) the imperfect, which are usually translated in the Septuagint by (a) the imperative and (b) the future. Prohibitive commandments in the Hebrew use the imperfect with either (a) the negative *lo*, usually translated into Greek by the future indicative with οὐ, or with (b) the negative *al*, usually translated into Greek by the imperative or aorist subjunctive with μή. Cf. M. Adler, *Philos Werke*, V, p. 53, n. 1.

[99] *Ibid.*, 17, 102 ff.

become clean until sunset,[100] he similarly infers from the use of the future indicative that the law is to be interpreted allegorically, but still the law in its literal sense is described by him as an "inexorable law." [101] In two other passages, in connection with laws relating to priests and the year of Jubilee,[102] from the use of the future indicative he maintains, with regard to the former law, that Scripture "speaks not so much by way of prohibition (*ἀπαγορεύων*) as by way of stating an opinion (*γνώμην*)," [103] and, with regard to the latter law, that it "does not so much exhort (*προτρέπει*) as state an opinion (*γνώμην*)." [104] Then in several other passages, in connection with the laws of leprosy, kingship, and war, without mentioning that the laws in question [105] are stated in the future indicative, but criticizing their literal meaning as being unreasonable on various grounds, he takes all of them to have some inner meaning.[106] Finally in the case of one law,[107] stated also in the future indicative, in one place he criticizes its literal meaning and interprets it allegorically,[108] but in another place he accepts it as a law in its literal meaning.[109]

From all this it may be inferred that, while believing that

[100] Lev. 22: 6–7.

[101] *Somn.* I, 14, 81.

[102] (1) That the priests should not drink wine when they enter the tabernacle (Lev. 10: 9); (2) "Ye shall not sow, nor shall ye reap its growths that come up of themselves" (Lev. 25: 11).

[103] *Ebr.* 34, 138.

[104] *Fug.* 31, 171.

[105] (1) Leprosy in the skin (Lev. 13: 11–13); (2) the plague of leprosy in a house (Lev. 14: 34–36); (3) that a king "shall not multiply horses to himself" (Deut. 17: 16); (4) the exemption of certain persons from war (Deut. 20: 5–7).

[106] (1) *Immut.* 27, 127–128; (2) *Immut.* 28, 131–133; (3) *Agr.* 18, 84–19, 88; (4) *Agr.* 33, 148–36, 157.

[107] That the unintentional manslayer is to remain in the city of refuge until the death of the high priest (Num. 35: 25).

[108] *Fug.* 20, 106–108; 21, 116–118.

[109] *Spec.* III, 23, 131–133.

all the laws are to be observed literally, he feels that not every statement in Scripture is law in the technical sense of the term, and therefore he is trying to find some criterion by which to determine what statements in the Pentateuch were to be taken as law. He makes a faint suggestion that the wording of the statement, as to whether it is in the future indicative or in the imperative, should decide it, but he does not follow out this distinction consistently. He makes another suggestion that the importance or reasonableness of the statement should decide it, but this at best is only a subjective criterion, and he himself does not consistently follow this criterion either. He attempts to combine these two criteria, but that, too, is not followed by him consistently. All we may gather from his discussion is that while to him all the laws are both to be observed literally and to be interpreted allegorically, as a philosopher he only knew how to interpret the laws allegorically and to give reasons why certain laws should be interpreted allegorically, but, not being a jurist, he was not always certain as to what the literal meaning of the law was. In some places, he expresses his willingness to leave all questions about the literal meaning of the law to those "who are in the habit of pursuing such investigations and are fond of them." [110]

This method of interpreting one system of thought in terms of another was not unknown in Greek literature. For the Greeks, too, had something like a Scripture besides their philosophy, the poems of Homer and Hesiod, which contained the teachings of popular belief. From the earliest times, Greek philosophers appropriated many of the terms of popular religion and endowed them with a philosophic

[110] *Immut.* 28, 133, cf. *Agr.* 36, 157; *Somn.* I, 17, 102. The reference is undoubtedly to the members of the court of Jewish law (*bet din*) which existed in Alexandria (cf. *Tos. Pe'ah* IV, 6; *Ketubot* 25a).

meaning. The first philosopher, Thales, in his reported statement that all things are full of gods,[111] gave to the popular term "gods" a philosophic significance.[112] With the formal introduction of the allegorical interpretation of Homer by Theagenes of Rhegium, this method was followed by such philosophers as Heraclitus, Anaxagoras, Metrodorus of Lampsacus, Diogenes of Apollonia, and Democritus.[113] Plato makes Socrates say that the poets are inspired and that one has to look in their utterances for some hidden inner meaning.[114] Plato himself, despite his expression of disapproval of the allegorical interpretation of the poets,[115] does not hesitate to endow the popular deities with philosophical significance and to give them a place in his philosophy by the side of his philosophic God, the Demiurge, calling them the "visible and created gods" and "descendants of gods"; and while he [116] does not allegorize upon ancient myths and fables, he does not hesitate to make use of them in stating his own philosophic views.[117] Aristotle, also, despite his dismissal of popular beliefs as mere fables,[118] occasionally interrupts himself in the midst of metaphysical discussions to refer, in support of his views, to some tradition handed down from the most remote ages, and he does not hesitate to describe such a tradition as "an inspired utterance" and as "relics of an ancient treasure." [119] Among the Stoics, Zeno, Cleanthes,

[111] Aristotle, *De Anima* I, 5, 411a, 8.

[112] Cf. Zeller, I, 1[6], 264–266 (*Pre-Socratic Philosophy*, I, 221–223); Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy*[3], 49–50).

[113] Cf. J. Geffcken, "Allegory, Allegorical Interpretation," *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*, I, 328; J. Tate, "The Beginnings of Greek Allegory," *Classical Review*, 41 (1927), pp. 214–215.

[114] *Apology* 22 B–C; *Ion* 533 D–534 E; *Protagoras* 342 A–347 A.

[115] *Cratylus* 407 A; *Phaedrus* 229 C; *Republic* II, 378 D. Cf. J. Tate, "Plato and Allegorical Interpretation," *Classical Quarterly*, 23 (1929), pp. 142–154.

[116] *Timaeus* 40 D.

[117] *Timaeus* 40 D; *Statesman* 268 D–274 E.

[118] *Metaph.* III, 4, 1000a, 9–19.

[119] *Ibid.* XII, 8, 1074b, 9, 12–13.

Chrysippus, and Diogenes all applied the allegorical interpretation to the poems of Homer and Hesiod.[120]

Philo, as we have seen,[121] does not admit with the Greek philosophers that man-made Greek mythology contains philosophic truths which are to be discovered by the allegorical method. But what he denies to mythology he claims for the divinely revealed Hebrew Scripture. The readiness with which Philo, and by the same token also his predecessors among Hellenistic Jews, adopted the allegorical interpretation was facilitated by the fact that in Jewish tradition the Jew was not bound to take his Scripture literally. What is known in Judaism as the Oral Law meant freedom of interpretation of the scriptural text, whether dealing with some legal precept or some historical event or some theological doctrine. Every verse in Scripture, whether narrative or law, was subject to such free interpretation. Some of such interpretations may be called allegorical in the strict sense of the term,[122] such, for instance, as when it is said that the word "water" in the verse "they found no water" [123] and the word "tree" in the verse "and the Lord showed him a tree" [124] both refer to the Torah,[125] or that the words "Gilead," "Ephraim," "Judah," "Moab," and "Edom" in a certain verse in the Psalms [126] refer respectively to Ahab, Jeroboam, Ahithophel, Gehazi, and Doeg,[127] and finally that the lover and the beloved in the Song of Songs symbolize

[120] Zeller, III, 1[4], p. 333, n. 1 (*Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics*[2], 356, n. 1).

[121] Cf. above, p. 36.

[122] On allegorical interpretations in Talmudic literature see L. Ginzberg, "Allegorical Interpretation," *Jewish Encyclopedia* I, 403 ff. (1901), with bibliography; I. Heinemann, *Altjüdische Allegoristik*, 1936.

[123] Exod. 15: 22.

[124] Exod. 15: 25.

[125] *Mekilta, Wayassa'*, 1, F, pp. 45a–b; W, pp. 52b–53a; HR, pp. 154–156; L, II, pp. 89, 92.

[126] Psalm 60: 9–10.

[127] *Sanhedrin* 104b–105a.

God and the congregation of Israel.[128] All these are allegorical interpretation in the comprehensive sense of the term allegory. They are as allegorical as the interpretation by Church Fathers of such terms as stone, king, priest, Jacob, and Israel in various parts of Scripture as referring to Christ,[129] and the lover and the beloved in the Song of Songs as referring to Christ and the Church.[130] Now none of these is philosophical allegory of the kind we find in Philo. But that is not of importance. Altogether too much importance is attached by students of allegory to the kinds of things which allegorists read into texts, and too much attention is given to minute classifications of various types of allegory and to distinctions, mainly arbitrary, between what is real allegory and what is not real allegory. The allegorical method essentially means the interpretation of a text in terms of something else, irrespective of what that something else is. That something else may be book learning, it may be practical wisdom, or it may be one's inner consciousness. All these are matters which depend upon external circumstances. The Palestinian rabbis of that time, unlike Philo, happened to have no acquaintance with the literature of Greek philosophy, and consequently they did not interpret Scripture in terms of Greek philosophy; but they interpreted it in terms of something else which they did happen to know, the accumulated wisdom of ages, their own practical experience and speculative meditations, the urging necessities of changed conditions of life, the call of an ever-growing moral conscience, and undoubtedly also repercussions of all kinds of foreign lore. The main thing is that by the time of Philo

[128] Cf. *Canticles Rabbah* to Cant. 1: 2 ff.

[129] Cf. Justin Martyr, *Dialogus cum Tryphone*, 76 and 113; 118; 135.

[130] Cf. Origen, *In Canticum*, Lib. I (PG, 13, col. 83); St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XVII, 20.

the principle was already established in native Judaism that one is not bound to take every scriptural text literally.

Not to be bound by the literal meaning of the text with the rabbis did not mean, of course, that the literal meaning was to be rejected. But even to this there were certain exceptions.

In the first place, anthropomorphic expressions were rejected in their literal sense. Referring to various anthropomorphic expressions in Scripture,[131] the rabbis say "we describe God by terms borrowed from his creations in order to cause them to sink into the ear," [132] that is, in order to assist men in their understanding of what is said. Commenting on the verse, "and upon the likeness of the throne was a likeness as the appearance of a man upon it above," [133] a rabbi exclaims: "Great is the boldness of the prophets who describe God by the likeness of the creature." [134] In the Aramaic version of the Pentateuch intended for popular use, various circumlocutions are employed to avoid a literal translation of the anthropomorphic expressions.[135] A general rule laid down by the rabbis, whenever they find it necessary to reject the literal meaning of a text is "The Torah speaks according to the language of men." [136]

Then, with regard to the historical narratives in Scripture, while all of them were taken literally as facts, there are at least two exceptions. The historical framework of the book

[131] Amos 3: 8; Ezek. 43: 2.

[132] *Mekilta, Baḥodesh*, 4, F, p. 65a; W, p. 73b; HR, p. 215; L, II, 221.

[133] Ezek. 1: 26.

[134] *Genesis Rabbah* 27, 1. Maimonides (*Moreh Nebukim* I, 46) uses this as the principal rabbinic proof-text for the free interpretation of anthropomorphic expressions in Scripture.

[135] Cf. Maimonides, *Moreh Nebukim* I, 27, with reference to Onḳelos.

[136] *Berakot* 31b, and parallels, used by Maimonides, *Moreh Nebukim* I, 46, especially as an explanation of the anthropomorphisms in Scripture.

of Job was declared by one rabbi to be a mere parable,[137] and the story of the resurrection of the dry bones in Ezekiel [138] was declared by another rabbi to be a mere parable.[139]

Finally, with regard to the laws, again, they were all to be observed in their literal meaning and were not to be explained away as allegories. But their supposed literal meaning was not really what the letter of the law meant. It was what custom and tradition and free interpretation made them mean, and often it resulted in what was in reality an abrogation of the law as it is written. The best known example is the law of retaliation, which was interpreted to mean compensation in money.[140] In this case the rabbis may have been less bound by the strictly literal meaning than Philo.[141] But whatever their own interpretation of a particular law happens to be is not so much of importance to us as some of the reasons given by them to explain why certain laws are not to be taken literally. Often they are exactly the same kind of explanations that are given by Philo as to why certain laws should have an allegorical meaning, namely, the unreasonableness and the impossibility of the law in its literal sense as it is written. Two examples of laws which have been referred to above in our discussion of Philo will show how often the very same reasoning that led Philo to conclude that certain laws must have an allegorical meaning, led the rabbis to give a new interpretation of the law or to hint at some unknown hidden meaning which the law may have.

First, the law about a king who "shall not multiply horses

[137] *Baba Batra* 15a. [138] Ezek. 37.

[139] *Sanhedrin* 92b.

[140] *Mekilta, Nezikin*, 8, F, p. 84b; W, p. 91b; HR, p. 277; L, III, p. 65. *Sifra, Emor, Perek* 20, p. 104d; *Baba Kamma* 83b.

[141] On the question whether Philo understood the *lex talionis* literally, see Belkin, *Philo and the Oral Law*, pp. 96–103.

to himself." [142] Philo argues that this must be interpreted allegorically on the ground that its literal meaning is unreasonable, for "the strength in cavalry is a great asset to a king" in time of war.[143] The rabbis, probably for similar reasons, also rejected the literal meaning of the law and interpreted it, on the basis of the use of the singular in the expression "to himself" in its wording, that the law applies only to horses for the king's personal stables, but does not apply to horses to be used in the cavalry of the king's army.[144]

Second, with regard to the law about leprosy.[145] Philo argues that the law must have some inner meaning and is to be interpreted allegorically on the ground that in its literal sense it seems to be quite paradoxical. "One would probably have conjectured the opposite," he argues, "as indeed it would be reasonable to suppose that leprosy, if limited and confined to a small part of the body, is less unclean, but if diffused, so as to embrace all the body, is more unclean." [146] The Palestinian rabbis similarly wonder and wish to know why in the case of leprosy "a bright white spot on the skin of the size of half a bean is unclean, but, if it spread over the entire body, it is clean." [147] And their answer is that it belongs to that class of laws of which God alone knows the reason, and concerning one of this class of laws they say that God revealed the reason thereof to Moses but withheld it from all other people.[148] The only difference between the

[142] Deut. 17: 16.

[143] *Agr.* 18. 85.

[144] *Sifre Deut.* 158 (on 17: 16), F, p. 105b; HF, p. 209; *Sanhedrin* 21b; *M. Sanhedrin* II, 4.

[145] Lev. 13: 11–13.

[146] *Immut.* 27, 127.

[147] *Numbers Rabbah* 19, 1; *Tanḥuma Num. Ḥukkat*, § 3; *Tanḥuma* ed. Buber, *ibid.*, § 4.

[148] *Numbers Rabbah* 19, 6.

rabbis and Philo is that they did not try to guess what the hidden meaning of that law was.

This is the conception of Scripture with which Philo started. The principle that Scripture is not always to be taken literally and that it has to be interpreted allegorically came to him as a heritage of Judaism; his acquaintance with Greek philosophic literature led him to give to the native Jewish allegorical method of interpretation a philosophic turn. The example of the Greek allegorical method, of course, helped and encouraged him and served him as a model. But it is conceivable that his allegorical method could have become philosophical even without such models. When the Palestinian type of Judaism, many centuries later, came in contact with philosophy, the native Jewish conception of the freedom of the interpretation of Scripture led it to develop a philosophical method of allegorical interpretation of Scripture which has many striking resemblances to that of Philo not only in its general character but also in many details. Whatever models of that method they had before them, they were all Christian and Moslem, and we have reason to believe that without the support they found for the allegorical method in native Jewish tradition they would not have been so prone to follow those models.

III. Origin of Scripture and Origin of Philosophy

The theory underlying the allegorical interpretation of texts is that the text to be allegorically interpreted contains implicitly the truth which the allegorical interpretation attempts to elicit. But there is a difference between the attitude of the Greek philosophers toward the texts of Homer and Hesiod which they interpreted and the attitude of Philo toward the Scripture which he was to interpret. Greek

philosophers, even those who did apply the allegorical method of interpretation to the poets, never believed that the works which they undertook to interpret allegorically were divine revelations in the sense in which Scripture was considered by Philo as a divine revelation. From the description of the inspiration of poets and statesmen in Plato we gather that it was regarded by him as being on a level below the inspiration of philosophers, and as being also a type of knowledge opposed to reason.[1] The general attitude of Greek philosophers toward the popular beliefs as embodied in the poets was that they constituted a primitive and rather lower form of knowledge, far inferior to the knowledge attained by philosophers through reason. If popular religion was conceded by them to attain some truth which could be elicited by the method of allegorical interpretation, it was because the human mind, from the very time it began to wonder about the world, saw a glimpse of truth, however imperfectly it may have conceived it. Nor did the Greek philosophers consider the popular form of religious worship as being divinely ordained and of intrinsic merit. Plato indeed recommends the maintenance of the popular forms of religious worship,[2] as does also Aristotle,[3] and, of course, the Stoics [4] and even the Epicureans.[5] But this recommendation was dictated only by practical considerations, such as the preservation of the stability of social institutions. Nor, finally, did the Greek philosophers consider the constitutions and the legal codes of the various states as being of divine origin and hence as perfect.[6]

[1] *Meno* 99 A ff.; *Phaedrus* 249 D f. Cf. below, II, 20.
[2] Cf. Zeller, II, 1^4, p. 932, n. 7 (*Plato*, p. 501, n. 40).
[3] *Ibid.* II, 2^3, p. 796, n. 3 (*Aristotle*, II, p. 334, n. 3).
[4] *Ibid.* III, 1^4, pp. 320–321 (*Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics*^{2}, pp. 343–344).
[5] *Ibid.*, pp. 444–452 (464–471).
[6] See below, II, 168–169.

Quite different was Philo's conception of the Pentateuch and the religious rites and laws contained therein which he was going to interpret. The Pentateuch to him was a divinely revealed document, and the beliefs about God which its narrative parts implied, the manner of divine worship which it directly prescribes, and the constitution of the state and legal codes which it contains are all of divine origin[7] and hence intrinsically true and perfect. And what was true of the Pentateuch was also true of the other parts of Scripture, though, in accordance with native Jewish conceptions, the recommendations in them were not considered by him as Law, and all the utterances in them were considered by him as a type of divine inspiration inferior to those of the Pentateuch.[8] Scripture, the whole of it, was looked upon by him as containing a knowledge and truth revealed by God. It is not a primitive form of knowledge in which the human mind through its native power happened to anticipate in a misty kind of way the clear and certain knowledge discovered much later by philosophers through the working of the human reason. It is a knowledge clearer and more certain than the knowledge attained by philosophers. If it does not appear clear and certain, and if it is couched in language of which the true meaning is concealed by misleading words, it is because God purposely addressed himself in a way understandable to all sorts and conditions of men.

But if the truth revealed by God in Scripture is in agreement with the truth of philosophy, the question may be asked how the philosophers happened to arrive at that truth without the aid of revelation. Philo does not directly raise this question, but he anticipates it by offering three possible explanations of how the philosophers happened to arrive at a truth which is in agreement with that of Scripture.

[7] Cf. below, pp. 184–185. [8] Cf. above, p. 117.

Sometimes his explanation is a sort of primitive attempt in the study of comparative beliefs, customs, and institutions. Similarities mean to him samenesses, and samenesses suggest to him dependence, and so whenever he seems to find similarities between what Greek philosophers attained by reason and what Moses attained by revelation he attributes it to a dependence of Greek philosophers upon Moses. Thus in referring to Heraclitus' theory of the opposites, he describes Heraclitus as "conceiving" [9] these opinions from Moses or as "snatching" them from Moses "like a thief." [10] Similarly, referring to certain Greek laws, he says that the Grecian legislators "copied" from the Laws of Moses.[11] Whether this view of the dependence of Greek philosophers upon Moses was something which suggested itself to the mind of Philo as a plausible explanation of the similarities, or whether he was following a belief already current among Hellenistic Jews, which had by his time already found expression in a work containing interpretations of the Mosaic law attributed to Aristobulus, is a question the solution of which depends upon whether that work, of which only fragments have survived in the form of quotations in the works of later authors, was a genuine work of an author who lived before Philo or a later fabrication.[12] But with whomsoever this view was originated, it has its counterpart in the claim of Egyptian priests of the same period that Greek philosophy was borrowed from the Egyptians.[13]

Philo himself, however, does not always insist upon the

[9] *Qu. in Gen.* III, 5. Translation by Ralph Marcus from the Armenian. Latin: *mutuatus*, having borrowed.

[10] *Ibid.* IV, 152. Translation by the same from the Armenian. Latin: *furtim . . . dempta*, having plagiarized.

[11] *Spec.* IV, 10, 61.

[12] Cf. above, p. 95.

[13] See Diodorus Siculus, *Bibliotheca Historica* I, 96–98; Plutarch, *De Iside et Osiride*, ch. 10. Cf. Zeller, I, 1[6], p. 22, n. 2 (*Pre-Socratic Philosophy*, I, p. 27, n. 1).

dependence of Greek philosophers upon Moses. Sometimes, in dealing with similarities between certain views of Greek philosophers and those of Moses, he merely dwells upon the greater antiquity of the Hebrew writings, without asserting the Greek dependence upon the Hebrew. Thus referring, again, to Heraclitus' theory of the harmony of the opposites, he merely says that he was anticipated in it by Moses.[14] Similarly, referring to a moral maxim of Zeno, he says rather cautiously that "he seems to have drawn his maxim as it were from the fountain of the legislation of the Jews," [15] and again, referring to some moral maxims of the philosophers, he merely points out that Moses had said the same thing before them.[16] Evidently Philo assumes here that philosophers discovered the same truths by their native reason.

Sometimes, however, without directly dealing with the similarities between the Greek philosophers and Moses, he suggests that philosophy itself was a divine gift to the Greeks to enable them to discover by reason with the aid of the senses what to the Jews was made known by revelation. "It is heaven," he says, "which has showered philosophy upon us; it is the human mind which has received it, but it is sight which as guide has brought the two together"; [17] and "Philosophy," he continues to say, "is the fountain of good things, all that are truly good, and he who draws from that spring deserves praise, if he does so for the acquisition and practice of virtue, but blame, if it is for knavish ends and to outwit another with sophistry." [18] The entire passage in which he describes the importance of the faculty of sight as a guide to philosophy is based upon Plato.[19] But the statement that "it is heaven which has showered philosophy upon

[14] *Heres* 43, 214.
[15] *Probus* 8, 57.
[16] *Mut.* 31, 167–168; *Migr.* 23, 128.
[17] *Spec.* III, 34, 185.
[18] *Ibid.*, 186.
[19] *Timaeus* 47 A; cf. Colson on *Spec.* III, 34, 185.

us" is his own addition and, judging by the same expression used by him elsewhere,[20] it means here that philosophy is a special gift of God to those upon whom he has chosen to shower it. Philosophy was thus in a sense revealed to the Greeks as the Law was to the Jews. It is thus contrasted with the laws revealed by God, concerning which he says that "they are signs of the divine virtues, graciousness and beneficence, by which he incites all men to noble conduct, and particularly the nation of His worshippers, for whom He opens up the road which leads to happiness." [21] Philosophy is thus just as much a gift of God to non-Jews as revelation is to the Jews. This is in accordance with his general view, based upon Scripture, that all knowledge comes from God.[22]

IV. Faith and Reason

This difference between the attitude of the Greek philosophers toward their poets and popular Greek religion and laws and the attitude of Philo toward Scripture and Jewish religion and laws gave rise to another difference between them. While Greek philosophers interpreted mythology in terms of philosophy, philosophy never yielded to mythology. Plato's God and the God of Aristotle and the God of the Stoics always continued to be what reason had shown him to be — an impersonal deity, free not only from the anthropomorphisms of the popular deities but also from all the elements of personality that lay behind these anthropomorphisms. Similarly, in all the other questions of philosophy they felt themselves free to accept any view they happened to favor, on purely intellectual grounds, without feeling any compulsion to follow certain preconceptions of

[20] Leisegang, *Indices*, sub ὀμβρεῖν.

[21] *Mos.* II, 35, 189. Cf. below, II, 51 and 190.

[22] Cf. below, p. 202; II, 4 f.; Ps. 94:10; Prov. 2:6; Sirach 1:1.

popular religion — and this despite the fact that Stoic writers speak of God in anthropomorphic terms. If the Greeks had a priesthood, like the original priesthood in Judaism, namely, an organized class of men who acted as custodians and teachers and expounders of the inherited religion, and if such a priesthood had undertaken the work of the interpretation of traditional beliefs in terms of philosophy, then perhaps the result would have been a religious philosophy in which philosophy had yielded also something to religion. But among the Greeks there was no such a priesthood and the task of the harmonization of religion and philosophy was therefore devolved upon the philosophers, who had no interest in the defense of popular religion as such and who had started on their career as opponents of popular religion, and consequently, while as statesmen and citizens they were quite willing to lend the sanction of their authority to the beliefs and practices of the common people, they remained intransigent with regard to their own philosophic convictions. Philo and the other Hellenistic Jewish philosophers, on the other hand, though not priests in the technical sense of the term, still, like their contemporary lay Jewish sages in Palestine, had succeeded to one of the original functions of priesthood in Judaism, that of guarding, teaching, expounding, and handling the Law. To Philo, therefore, as an upholder of the religion of Scripture, while Scripture was to be allegorized in terms of philosophy, the latter had also to meet certain conditions laid down by Scripture. There were certain fundamental beliefs in Scripture which he considered as essential and to which philosophy had to subordinate itself. The subordination of philosophy to Scripture, in matters which were considered by him as constituting the essentials of the religion of Scripture, is a fundamental principle in his conception of the relation between Scripture and

philosophy, with the result, as we shall see, that not only does he interpret Scripture in terms of philosophy but also philosophy in terms of Scripture.

This conception of the subordination of philosophy to Scripture is expressed by Philo in a statement which is commonly known through its later version: philosophy is the handmaid of theology. Let us study the origin and development of this statement.

In Greek philosophy a distinction is made between what was known as encyclical studies (ἐγκύκλια) and philosophic studies.[1] By the time of Philo the term encyclical had come to refer in general to the liberal arts, such as grammar, literature, geometry, music, and rhetoric,[2] as distinguished from philosophy proper. Now among the Stoics there were various opinions as to the value of these encyclical studies. On the one hand, Zeno declared "the encyclical education as useless," [3] whereas Chrysippus, on the other, declared "the encyclical studies as useful." [4] But Aristo of Chios, following Aristippus, describes the encyclical studies as handmaids (θεράπαιναι) and philosophy as the mistress (δέσποινα) or queen (βασίλισσα).[5] This Stoic use of the term "handmaid" as a description of the encyclical studies in their relation to philosophy is reproduced by Philo in his allegorical interpretation of Sarah and Hagar, where he takes Hagar, the handmaid (θεραπαινίς), to symbolize the encyclical

[1] The distinction already occurs in Aristippus (cf. below, n. 5) and Aristotle, *De Caelo* I, 9, 279a, 30, and *Eth. Nic.* I, 5, 1096a, 3–4. The term encyclical is often assumed to mean the same as exoteric studies (Bonitz, *Index*, sub Ἀριστοτέλης, p. 105a, lines 27 ff.; J. A. Stewart in his *Notes*, *Eth. Nic.* I, 3, 1096a, 3). Cf. above, p. 24.

[2] *Cher.* 30, 105; *Congr.* 26, 146–150; Stobaeus, *Eclogae* II, 67, 5 (Arnim, III, 294); cf. below, pp. 150 f.

[3] Diogenes, VII, 32 (Arnim, I, 259).

[4] Diogenes, VII, 129 (Arnim, III, 738).

[5] Diogenes, II, 79–80; Stobaeus, *Florilegium* 4, 109 (Arnim, I, 349–350).

studies and Sarah, the mistress (δέσποινα), to symbolize philosophy.[6]

Then, again, philosophy, as distinguished from the encyclical studies, is divided by the Stoics into logic, physics, and ethics.[7] Of these, logic is generally considered as the lowest. But as for the other two branches of philosophy, various opinions are expressed. Sometimes physics is said to be the highest branch of philosophy, and this is probably due to the fact that, owing to the Stoic conception of God as immanent in nature, theology was included under physics. Sometimes, however, ethics is said to be the highest branch of philosophy, inasmuch as right conduct was considered by the Stoics as the aim of all philosophy.[8]

Philo, on the whole, follows the view accepted by most of the Stoics in including logic, physics, and ethics [9] under philosophy, considering logic as the lowest. But he departs from the Stoics with regard to the place of theology in the classification of the branches of philosophy. With his conception of God as an incorporeal being beyond the physical world, he could not agree with the Stoics in including theology under physics. He could have perhaps followed Aristotle and made of theology a special branch of philosophy. But he does not do that either. He prefers to retain the Stoic threefold division of philosophy, but within that scheme of division of philosophy he shifts theology from physics to ethics. Ethics is accordingly defined by him not only as the science "by which the character is bettered and yearns to acquire and also to make use of virtue" [10] but also as the

[6] *Congr.* 14, 71–80; cf. 4, 13–19; *Post.* 38, 130.

[7] Diogenes, VII, 39.

[8] Zeller, III, 1⁴, pp. 63–65 (*Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics*², pp. 67–69); Drummond, I, 266; Colson, Vol. VI, note on § 99.

[9] *Agr.* 3, 14; cf. Drummond, I, 263.

[10] *Mut.* 10, 75.

science which deals with "the knowledge of the Maker of the world" from which one gains "piety, the most splendid of possessions," [11] and, in contrast with ethics in its new conception, physics is described by him as "the study of the world." [12] As a result of this new conception of ethics he could now with greater reason agree with those of the Stoics who considered ethics, which to him includes theology, as the highest branch of philosophy.

This highest branch of philosophy, which includes both theology and ethics, is to Philo that philosophy which is to be found in the revealed Law of Moses. Taking the terms wisdom (*σοφία*) and prudence (*φρόνησις*) as representing respectively theology and ethics, or, as he says, "the worship of God" and "the regulation of human life," he finds both of them embodied in the laws of Moses.[13] An allusion to these two highest branches of philosophy is found by him in the scriptural verse, "Observe therefore and do them, for this is your wisdom (*σοφία*) and your understanding (*σύνεσις*) in the sight of all peoples, that, when they hear all these statutes, shall say: Behold this great nation is a wise (*σοφὸς*) and understanding (*ἐπιστήμων*) people." [14] His substitution of the term prudence (*φρόνησις*) for the scriptural term understanding (*σύνεσις*) in this verse is undoubtedly due to Aristotle's definition of understanding (*σύνεσις*) as "the judgment concerning those things which come within the province of prudence (*φρόνησις*)." [15] His distinction between "wisdom" and "prudence," again, reflects Aristotle's definition of wisdom as knowledge about things divine (*θεῖα*),[16] or about "cer-

[11] *Ibid.*, 76.
[12] *Ibid.*
[13] *Praem.* 14, 81–84.
[14] Deut. 4: 6, alluded to in *Praem.* 14, 83.
[15] *Eth. Nic.* VI, 10, 1143a, 14–15.
[16] *Metaph.* I, 2, 983a, 6–7.

tain causes (*αἰτίας*) and principles (*ἀρχάς*)," [17] and prudence as dealing with the regulation of the life of the individual as well as that of the affairs of the household and the state.[18] In his statement elsewhere, however, that wisdom is "the way which leads to God," [19] Philo seems to include under wisdom not only the knowledge of God but also the knowledge of that kind of right human conduct which leads to God. This comprehensive use of the term wisdom is also reflected in his statement that "philosophy is the practice (*ἐπιτήδευσις*) of wisdom, and wisdom is the knowledge (*ἐπιστήμη*) of things divine and human and their causes." [20]

Now, verbally, this last statement is a reproduction of a definition reported in the name of the Stoics,[21] with the exception of the final words "and their causes," which are evidently taken from Aristotle [22] and added to the Stoic definition. Still, while verbally this definition of wisdom is taken from the Stoics, and similarly, while the definition previously quoted is based upon Aristotle, the wisdom which Philo, after Aristotle or the Stoics or both, defines as "the worship of God," or as "the way which leads to God," or as "the knowledge of things divine and human and their causes," means to him something different; it means to him a worship or a way or a knowledge which is prescribed in the Law. Similarly, when after the Stoics he contrasts "philosophy" with "wisdom" as a contrast between "practice" and "knowledge," defining the former as the practice of the latter, he uses the term philosophy here in a special sense, as

[17] *Ibid.* I, 1, 982a, 2; cf. *Eth. Nic.* VI, 7, 1141a, 18.

[18] *Eth. Nic.* VI, 5, 1140a, 24–1140b, 30.

[19] *Immut.* 30, 142–143.

[20] *Congr.* 14, 79.

[21] Cf. Sextus, *Adversus Physicos* I, 13, and parallels in notes in ed. Fabricius, II, p. 539, Leipzig, 1841.

[22] Cf. above, n. 17.

referring to that practice of wisdom which is again prescribed in the Law. Wisdom, as we have already seen, is in both Palestinian and Hellenistic Judaism identified with the Law.[23] Philo himself alludes to that identification when he refers to the Jews as "one nation alone among all the select nations of the earth which are desirous of wisdom." [24] Similarly, in his homily on the verse "and Moses took the tabernacle," [25] interpreting the term tabernacle to mean the Law, he says of that tabernacle which is the Law that Moses received it "from God" and that it is "wisdom" and that it is called "the tabernacle of testimony," [26] because it is "wisdom testified to by God." [27] It is because of his identification of the Law with wisdom, — wisdom, which by the Stoic definition is "the knowledge of things divine and human" — that, speaking of the story of creation in the Pentateuch, he says that therein Moses teaches us certain things concerning the existence and nature of God,[28] and, speaking of the ten commandments and of all the special laws, he says that they all train and encourage men to all the virtues,[29] and that they all "inculcate the highest standard of virtue." [30] Again, since philosophy by the Stoic definition is "the practice of wisdom," with his identification of wisdom with the Law he maintains that "what the disciples of the most excellent philosophy gain from its teaching, the Jews gain from their laws and customs." [31] As a result of all this, Philo compares the relation of "philosophy," in the sense of Greek philosophy, to "wisdom," in the sense of the revealed Law, to the relation of the "encyclical studies" to "philosophy," for, he says, "just as the encyclical culture is the bondwoman

[23] Cf. above, pp. 20 ff.
[24] *Qu. in Gen.* II, 58.
[25] Exod. 33: 7.
[26] *Ibid.*
[27] *Leg. All.* III, 15, 46.
[28] *Opif.* 61, 170; cf. below, II, 209.
[29] *Spec.* IV, 25, 134; cf. below, II, 201.
[30] *Ibid.*, 34, 179.
[31] *Virt.* 10, 65.

(δούλη) of philosophy, so also is philosophy the bondwoman of wisdom." [32] Later in the same passage, instead of the term "bondwoman" he uses the term "handmaid" (θεραπαινίς).[33] This subservience of philosophy to wisdom or the Law is explained by him in a passage in which he says that "philosophy teaches the control of the belly and the control of parts below the belly and the control also of the tongue," but while all these qualities are "desirable in themselves," still "they will assume a grander and loftier aspect if practised for the honor and service of God"; [34] for the service and worship of God, as we have seen, constitutes wisdom, and wisdom is the revealed Law embodied in Scripture. When, therefore, Philo speaks of philosophy as being the bondwoman or handmaid of wisdom, he means thereby that it is the bondwoman or handmaid of Scripture.

His conception of what the relations should be between Scripture and philosophy and the other branches of learning is fully stated in his homily on the verse "If a man have a stubborn and rebellious son, that will not hearken unto the voice of his father, or the voice of his mother." [35] Taking the terms father and mother allegorically, he interprets, in one sense, father to refer to God and mother to God's wisdom, and, in another sense, father to refer to philosophy and mother to the encyclical studies as well as to rules of right conduct and just laws enacted by men.[36] Then taking up the terms father and mother in the latter sense, he says of them that they have four kinds of children: first, those who obey both father and mother; second, those who obey neither;

[32] *Congr.* 14, 79. Cf. Seneca, *Naturales Quaestiones*, Prol. § 1, where the Stoics are reported to have said that the difference between that part of philosophy which deals with the gods (i.e., physics) and that part which deals with men (i.e., ethics) is as great as the difference between philosophy and the other arts (*ceterae artes*), i.e., the encyclical studies.

[33] *Congr.* 14, 80.

[34] *Ibid.*

[35] Deut. 21: 18.

[36] *Ebr.* 8, 30–9, 34.

third, those who obey the father only; fourth, those who obey the mother only.[37] Of these four kinds of children, those who obey both father and mother, that is, those who follow philosophy and the encyclical studies and heed also "those principles which are laid down by convention and accepted everywhere," are declared by him the best.[38] But the encyclical studies, as we have seen, are to be subordinate to philosophy, and both encyclical studies and philosophy are to be regarded "as the pupils and disciples" of God and His wisdom, "to whom has been committed the care and guidance of such souls as are not unwilling to learn or incapable of culture," [39] that is to say, philosophy, encyclical studies, and man-made laws have been assigned by God for the guidance of men who have not been favored by God with the special revelation of His Law.[40] Thus, according to Philo, there is to be a harmony between Scripture and all other kinds of useful human knowledge, whatever their source; but the latter are to be the handmaids of Scripture.

The subordination of philosophy to Scripture means to Philo the subordination of reason to faith. This is clearly expressed by him in his comment on the verses "Abraham believed (ἐπίστευσε) God and it was counted to him for justice" [41] and "Not so my servant Moses; he is faithful (πιστός) in all my house." [42] Commenting upon these verses, he says that "it is best to have faith (πεπιστευκέναι) in God and not in our dim reasonings (λογισμοῖς) and insecure conjectures," [43] for "an irrational impulse issues forth and goes its rounds, both from our reasonings and from mind that corrupts the truth." [44] The term faith (πίστις), which is implied in the verb "believed" in the verse "Abraham be-

[37] *Ibid.* 9, 35. Cf. the "four sons" of the Passover Haggadah in *Mekilta, Pisḥa*, 18, F, p. 22b; W, p. 27b; L, I, p. 166.

[38] *Ibid.* 20, 80.

[39] *Ibid.* 9, 33.

[40] Cf. above, pp. 142 f.

[41] Gen. 15: 6.

[42] Num. 12: 7.

[43] *Leg. All.* III, 81, 228.

[44] *Ibid.*, 229.

lieved God," is defined by Philo as meaning that "he had an unswerving and firm assumption (*ἀκλινῆ καὶ βεβαίαν ὑπόληψιν*)." [45] This reflects the definition of faith (*πίστις*) in Aristotle as being a "vehement assumption" (*ὑπόληψις σφοδρά*),[46] and similarly its definition in the Stoics as being a "strong assumption" (*ὑπόληψις ἰσχυρά*).[47] But in Aristotle the term faith is used in the sense of a judgment of the truth of knowledge, whether that knowledge be an immediate kind of knowledge, such as sensation and primary premises, or a derivative kind of knowledge, such as conclusions from premises in syllogistic reasoning.[48] Now Philo adopts here the term faith as a designation of that immediate knowledge of revelation which is contained in Scripture. When he, therefore, says that "it is best to have faith in God and not in our dim reasonings and insecure conjectures," he means that it is best to have faith in the immediate knowledge given by God through revelation rather than in the result of our reason.

The reason why, according to Philo, philosophy must be subordinate to Scripture is that human knowledge is limited, and philosophy, which is based upon human knowledge, is unable to solve many problems. Again and again he tells us how iniquitous it is to rely upon our reasoning, and again and again he reminds us how philosophers among themselves squabble about certain problems which they are unable to solve. Following Scripture's own explanation of the name Cain as meaning "possession," [49] he takes the scriptural per-

[45] *Virt.* 39, 216. Cf. below, II, 215 f.

[46] *Topica* IV, 5, 126b, 18.

[47] Stobaeus, *Eclogae* II, p. 112, l. 12.

[48] An analysis of the term "faith" in Greek philosophy and examples of its treatment in the religious philosophy of Christianity, Islam, and Judaism is given by the present writer in "The Double Faith Theory in Clement, Saadia, Averroes and St. Thomas, and Its Origin in Aristotle and the Stoics," *Jewish Quarterly Review*, N.S., 33 (1942), 213–264.

[49] Gen. 4: 1.

son Cain to symbolize the view that all things are the possession of man,[50] in the sense of the Protagorean doctrine that man is the measure of all things.[51] The mind that conceived that doctrine is characterized by him as being "full of folly or rather of all impiety, for instead of thinking that all things are God's possession, it fancied that they were its own."[52] In his refutation of this doctrine he tries to show how limited and unreliable our mind and senses are. Mind, he says, must rely for its knowledge upon the senses, but the senses, even if they are endowed with perfect organs, are liable to error, "for to free ourselves altogether from natural sources of decay and involuntary delusions is hard or rather impossible, so innumerable in ourselves and around us and outside us throughout the whole race of mortals are the causes which produce false opinion."[53] As evidence for the limitation and fallibility of human knowledge, he points to our ignorance about our own soul and mind, and to the contradictory views maintained by philosophers with regard to them. Is the soul made out of one of the corporeal elements or is it incorporeal? How is the soul to be defined: as limit or as form or as entelechy or as harmony? Is it at birth infused within us from without, or is it something within us which becomes a soul by the influence of the air? Is it immortal or mortal? Where is it located: in the head or in the heart?[54] As further evidence of the limitation of our knowledge, he points also to many other contradictory views held by philosophers with regard to matters which cannot be perceived by the senses.

[50] *Cher.* 20, 65.

[51] Cf. *Post.* 11, 35, where Protagoras' doctrine is described as an offspring of Cain's madness.

[52] *Cher.* 20, 65.

[53] *Ibid.*, 66; cf. 33, 116.

[54] *Ibid.* 20, 65; 32, 113; *Somn.* I, 6, 30–32; *Leg. All.* I, 29, 91; *Mut.* 2, 10. As for the exponents of these various theories of the mind, see Colson on *Somn.* I, 6, 30–32.

Is the world created or uncreated? Will it be destroyed or not? Is everything in a process of becoming or in a state of being? Is man the measure of all things, or is his judgment not to be trusted at all? Is everything beyond our comprehension, or are there many things which are within our comprehension? [55] Again, philosophers hold contradictory views with regard to the translunar part of the universe. Are the heavens made of solid ice or of fire or of a fifth substance? Has the outermost sphere any depth or not? Are the stars lumps of earth full of fire, or are they masses of ether? Are they living and rational beings or not? Are they moved by choice or by necessity? And is the light of the moon its own or borrowed or both? [56] None of these questions concerning the heavens and the stars and the moon, he says, will ever be answered with certainty by human reason; and similarly, he seems to say by implication, none of the other questions can be answered with certainty by human reason. It is for man therefore to know that all things are God's possession,[57] that though "I seem to have mind, reason, sense, yet I find that none of them is really mine," [58] and that our mind is only "the parent of false conjectures, the purveyor of delusion." [59] God, however, whose possession all things are, has in His Law revealed to us the truth with regard to some of these controversial problems, namely, that the world is created,[60] that by the will of God it will not be destroyed,[61] that some things can be known and some things cannot be known,[62] and that one part of the soul is both incorporeal [63] and immortal.[64]

[55] *Heres* 50, 246. As for the exponents of these various opinions, see Colson *ad loc.*

[56] *Somn.* I, 4, 21–24. As for the exponents of these various opinions, see Colson and *Philos Werke, ad loc.*

[57] *Cher.* 20, 65.

[58] *Ibid.* 32, 113.

[59] *Ibid.* 33, 116.

[60] Cf. below, p. 164.

[61] Cf. below, p. 348.

[62] Cf. below, II, 118 ff., 139 ff.

[63] Cf. below, p. 391.

[64] Cf. below, p. 393.

V. Conclusion, Influence, Anticipation

The belief that certain texts have a twofold meaning, an external and an internal, has grown up independently among the rabbis with reference to Scripture and among the Greek philosophers with reference to mythology, but for different reasons. To Greek philosophers myths are primitive wisdom, which contain in an inchoate form certain truths of philosophy; to the rabbis Scripture is divine wisdom, which contains in consummate form all that is true in the achievements of the human mind. Starting with this inherited Jewish belief about Scripture and following the traditional Jewish method of interpreting it with unrestrained freedom, Philo adopts the method of the philosophers in their treatment of myths — the application of which method he denies to man-made myths—and tries to find in the inner meaning of scripture the truths of philosophy. Scripture thus to him contains revealed truths which philosophers had to search for and discover by reason; and these revealed truths of Scripture are either parallel to the rational truths of philosophers, or anticipations of them, or even the sources from which the latter have been borrowed. Because divine revelation must of necessity be conceived as absolutely infallible, whereas human reason by its very nature is subject to error, whenever philosophy is found to be at variance with what is conceived by him to be the uninterpretable position of Scripture, the former must be set aright in the light of the latter. This conception as to the relation of philosophy to Scripture is expressed by Philo in his statement that "philosophy" is the "bondwoman" or "handmaid" of "wisdom."

The ancillary conception of philosophy in its relation to Scripture, which was introduced by Philo, continued to prevail for many centuries in European philosophy, whether

Christian or Moslem or Jewish. Three different views appeared in each of these three religious philosophies with regard to the relation between philosophy and Scripture — views which expressed themselves in the form of three distinct definitions of faith. There was a double-faith theory, according to which true faith is either assent to Scripture without the aid of philosophy or assent to Scripture with the aid of philosophy. There was a single-faith theory of the rationalist type, according to which true faith is the assent to Scripture with the aid of philosophy. There was also a single-faith theory of the authoritarian type, according to which true faith is assent to Scripture without the aid of philosophy.[1] According to all these conceptions of faith, even the double-faith theory and the single-faith theory of the rationalist type, Scripture is still the mistress and philosophy the handmaid. There will always remain certain elements in religion which will have to be assented to without the aid of philosophy.

The history of the ancillary conception of philosophy may be traced through the history of the designation of philosophy as handmaid or bondwoman.

Directly from Philo this designation passed on to the Church Fathers. The statements which we have quoted from Philo with regard to the relation of the encyclical studies to philosophy and of philosophy to wisdom or theology are paraphrased by Clement of Alexandria as follows: "But as the encyclical branches of study contribute to philosophy, which is their mistress (*δέσποινα*); so also philosophy itself co-operates for the acquisition of wisdom. For philosophy is the pursuit of wisdom, and wisdom is the knowledge of

[1] Cf. reference above p. 152, n. 48. In Philo, these fine shades of the problem are not discussed. But his treatment of traditionalists and allegorists (above, pp. 57–70) would indicate a double-faith theory.

things divine and human and their causes. Wisdom is therefore the mistress (*κυρία*) of philosophy, as philosophy is of preparatory culture." [2] Later on he quotes the verse in which Abraham says to Sarah: "Behold, thy maid is in thy hand; deal with her as it pleases thee," [3] and interprets it: "I embrace secular culture (*τὴν κοσμικὴν παιδείαν*) as youthful, and a handmaid (*συνθεραπαινίδα*), but thy knowledge I honor and reverence as a true wife." [4] From the Church Fathers the conception passed on to medieval Latin scholastic philosophy. The expression is used for the first time among Latin writers, perhaps with a different emphasis but essentially in the same sense, by Peter Damian (1007–1072), who, in his assault upon the excessive use of dialectics in the discussion of theological problems, argued that philosophy in its relation to theology must "like a handmaid (*ancilla*) serve its mistress with a certain obsequiousness of servitude." [5]

In Arabic Moslem philosophy the same idea is expressed by Averroes in his statement that "philosophy is the companion or wife (*ṣāḥibah*) of the Koran and its foster-sister." [6] In Arabic Jewish philosophy, Maimonides expresses the same idea in his statement that the various branches of philosophy are to him only "strange women" [7] as compared with the Torah which is, he says, "my loving hind [8] and the wife of my youth" [9] and that those "strange women" are taken by him only to be unto the Law as "confectionaries and cooks and bakers." [10]

[2] *Stromata* I, 5 (PG, 8, 721 A–724 A).

[3] Gen. 16: 6.

[4] *Stromata* I, 5 (PG, 8, 725 B); cf. Philo, *Congr.* 27, 153–154; *Cher.* 1, 3.

[5] *De Divina Omnipotentia*, Ch. 5 (PL, 145, 603 C).

[6] *Kitab Faṣl al-Maqāl wa-Ṭaqrīr*, in Müller, *Philosophie und Theologie von Averroes*, Arabic text, p. 26, ll. 3–4.

[7] Prov. 2: 16.

[8] Prov. 5: 19.

[9] Mal. 2: 14; Isa. 54: 6.

[10] I Sam. 8: 13. *Ḳobeṣ*, I, 49, p. 12 va.

Underlying this ancillary conception of philosophy in its relation to Scripture is the belief that Scripture is not a book like all other books: it contains direct revelations from God. This belief which Philo asserted about the Hebrew Scripture was extended in Christianity to the Greek Scripture and in Islam to the Arabic Scripture. But both to Christianity and, with certain qualifications, to Islam, the Old Testament still continued to be the word of God. When in the early history of Christianity the Gnostics tried to deny the divine origin of the teachings of the Old Testament, a spokesman of their opponents among the Church Fathers declared that "both Testaments are the revelation of one and the same Householder, the Word of God, our Lord Jesus Christ," [11] and that "there is but one and the same God, who ordered them both for the good of those men in whose time the Testaments were given." [12] Similarly in Islam, at least all those parts of the Old and the New Testament which are reported in the Koran or which are ascribed by tradition to Mohammed, are recognized as divine revelations.[13]

Each of these three religious philosophies in their subsequent history continued to see in their respective Scriptures two meanings, a literal and an underlying one; and the underlying meaning was philosophy. The philosophy supposed to be hidden in Scripture changed from time to time, but whatever it happened to be, it was always sought out by the allegorical method of interpretation. This method of interpretation was learned by the Church Fathers directly from

[11] Irenaeus, *Adversus Haereses* IV, 9, 1.

[12] *Ibid.* IV, 32, 2; cf. IV, 35, 2.

[13] Cf. D. S. Margoliouth, "Old and New Testament in Muhammadanism," *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics* IX, 481; I. Goldziher, "Ueber muhammedanische Polemik gegen Ahl al-kitâb," *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft*, 32 (1878), 341–387; D. B. Macdonald, *Aspects of Islam*, 1911, pp. 210–249.

Philo;[14] from them passed on to Islam, and then also to a Judaism which had no direct contact with Philo, but in the latter it was recognized as an old native Jewish method.[15] The questions touched upon by Philo as to the extent to which literal meanings of the text are to be accepted were discussed by various philosophers in all the three religions. On the whole, they followed out certain suggestions made by Philo himself. In Christianity, Origen lays down the rule that the literal sense of Scripture is to be rejected only when it is irrational and impossible, and according to this rule he rejected certain historical narratives as well as laws in both the Old and the New Testaments as not to be taken literally; among these he mentions in particular, as in Philo, the story of the creation of the world in six days, the story of the planting of a garden in Eden, and the story of the creation of Eve.[16] St. Augustine, similarly, asserts that the literal sense should be rejected when it is opposed to true faith or moral propriety.[17] In Islam, Averroes tells us that "all Moslems are in agreement that it is not necessary to take all the expressions of the Koran in their external sense nor is it necessary to divest them all of their external sense by means of interpretation, though they differ as to which needs interpretation and which is in no need of interpretation."[18] In medieval Jewish philosophy, Saadia lays down the rule that only those texts should not be taken literally which in their literal meaning are obviously contrary to fact

[14] On the question whether the Church Fathers received their allegorical method from Philo, see S. Davidson, *Sacred Hermeneutics*, 1843, p. 68; C. Siegfried, *Philo von Alexandria*, 1875, pp. 344–346; 351–358; A. D. Nock, "The Loeb Philo," *The Classical Review* 75 (1943), p. 78, n. 2.

[15] Cf. above, p. 138.

[16] *De Principiis* IV, 1, 16; *Contra Celsum* IV, 38.

[17] *De Doctrina Christiana* III, 10, 14.

[18] *Kitab Faṣl al-Maqāl wa-Ṭaqrīr*, in Müller, *Philosophie und Theologie von Averroes*, Arabic text, p. 8, ll. 7–9.

or imply anthropomorphisms or are self-contradictory or, in the case of law, have been already interpreted in a non-literal sense by the rabbis of the Talmud.[19] Maimonides particularly emphasizes that the "account given in the Pentateuch of creation is not, as generally believed by the common people, to be taken in its literal sense in all its parts." [20]

With the general adoption in Christian, Moslem, and Jewish philosophy of the Philonic view that Scripture has an inner meaning and that that inner meaning is Greek philosophy, the question was raised, in all these three philosophies, as to where the Greeks got their philosophy. The three explanations offered by Philo reappeared in all these three philosophies.

In Christian philosophy, Justin Martyr, like Philo, sometimes speaks of Plato as having borrowed from the Prophets [21] or from Moses,[22] and sometimes he says that those truths which the prophets saw and heard "when filled with the Holy Spirit" [23] and uttered without "demonstration," [24] such philosophers as Socrates became acquainted with only "by means of the investigation of reason," and this because the reason which they employed is a reflection of the Reason or the Word which is Christ, "who is in every man." [25] Reflecting even Philo's statement that "philosophy was showered down by heaven," he says that "the many have not divined what philosophy is and for what end it is sent down to men."[26] Similarly, Clement of Alexandria sometimes speaks of "the plagiarism of the Greek from the Barbarian [i.e. Hebrew] philosophy," [27] but sometimes he quotes Philo almost ver-

[19] *Emunot we-De'ot* VII, 2.
[20] *Moreh Nebukim* II, 29.
[21] *Apologia* I, 59.
[22] *Ibid.*, 60.
[23] *Dialogus cum Tryphone*, 7.
[24] *Ibid.*
[25] *Apologia* II, 10.
[26] *Dialogus cum Tryphone*, 2.
[27] *Stromata* V, 14.

batim by saying that Greek preparatory culture and Greek philosophy "have come down from God to men . . . in the way in which showers fall down." [28] Philosophy, according to him, was revealed to the Greeks as the Law was revealed to the Hebrews, and both were revealed by God for the purpose of preparing the minds of those to whom they were revealed for the advent of Christ; [29] and just as the old and the new revelations are called the covenants of God with the people so also philosophy is said by him to have been given by God to the Greeks "as a covenant peculiar to them." [30] To these two explanations Eusebius adds Philo's third explanation, namely, that philosophers discovered the same truth by their native reason. Trying to show by parallel passages from Scripture and Plato that "Plato followed the all-wise Moses and the Hebrew prophets in regard also to the teaching and speculation about things incorporeal and seen only by the mind," he says "[1] whether it were that he learned from hearsay which had reached him . . . or [2] whether of himself he hit upon the true nature of things, or, [3] in whatever way, was deemed worthy of this knowledge of God." [31] In another place Eusebius only gives the first two explanations, saying that either [1] the Greeks have procured their knowledge from the Hebrews or [2] "they were moved to the same conclusions by innate conceptions." [32] The theory of Plato's dependence upon Moses was first accepted and then rejected by St. Augustine; he himself, like Philo, advances the shower from heaven theory.[33]

Repercussions of these views, probably from Christian sources, are also to be found in Arabic literature. According to the Encyclopedia of the Ikhwan al-Ṣafa, in the second

[28] *Ibid.* I, 7.
[29] *Ibid.* I, 5; VI, 6, 13, 17; VII, 2.
[30] *Ibid.* VI, 8 (PG, 9, 288 c).
[31] *Praeparatio Evangelica* XI, 8.
[32] *Ibid.* X, 1.
[33] *De Civitate Dei* VIII, 11–12.

half of the tenth century, the sciences (*al-'ulūm*) and philosophies (*al-ḥikam*) on which the Greeks pride themselves were borrowed partly from "the learned men of the children of Israel in the days of Ptolemy" and partly from "the sages of the Egyptians in the days of Themistius," while the children of Israel themselves had partly "inherited them from the books of their prophets," who had come by them by means of revelation, and partly — especially such arts as mechanics (*ḥiyal*), magic (*siḥr*), conjurations (*'azā'im*), the setting up of talismans, and the enticements of the powers — borrowed them from other nations at the time of King Solomon.[34] According to Shahrastani, in the first half of the twelfth century, Thales borrowed his view that water was the prime element from the Hebrew Scripture,[35] and Empedocles, according to him, "lived at the time of David to whom he betook himself and under whom he studied." [36] Averroes, however, in the latter part of the twelfth century, only says that "nobody doubts that among the children of Israel there were many philosophers (*ḥukamā'*), as is evident from the books which are found among the children of Israel and which are attributed to Solomon. Philosophy has always existed among those who were divinely inspired, namely, the prophets." [37]

Among the Jews of the Arabic period, two views are expressed with regard to the relation of philosophy to Scripture. On the one hand, Judah Ha-Levi asserts that "the roots and principles of all sciences were handed down from us [the Jews] first to the Chaldaeans, then to the Persians and

[34] Cf. Fr. Dieterici, *Thier und Mensch vor dem König der Genien*, Arabic text, Leipzig, 1879, p. 66, ll. 4–11.

[35] *Kitab al-Milal wal-Niḥal*, ed. Cureton, p. 256, ll. 5–9.

[36] *Ibid.*, p. 260, l. 7.

[37] *Tahāfut al-Tahāfut* IV (XX), ed. M. Bouyges, § 6, p. 583, ll. 10–13; cf. Munk, *Guide des Égarés*, I, p. 332, n. 3.

Medians, then to Greece, and finally to the Romans"; [38] but, on the other hand, Maimonides merely asserts that Jews had once cultivated the science of physics and metaphysics which they later neglected by reason of persecution.[39] In Hebrew literature of a later period, legends appeared that Aristotle became converted to Judaism or even that he was of Jewish descent.[40]

This is how philosophy was made the handmaid of Scripture by Philo, and this is also how throughout the centuries of Christian, Moslem, and Jewish thought philosophy continued to be a handmaid. From this position, Spinoza sought to emancipate it in his *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, a philosophic work which, like the philosophic works of Philo, is written in the form of discussions of scriptural topics and verses. In his effort to emancipate philosophy from its ancillary position, he goes to the very root of the problem — the belief in revelation. By denying revelation, he reduces Scripture to the status of the works of the Greek poets, and as a result of this he revives the classical conception of Greek philosophers as to the relation between popular beliefs and philosophic thought.

[38] *Cuzari* II, 66.
[39] *Moreh Nebukim* I, 71.
[40] Cf. D. Cassel, *Das Buch Kuzari*, p. 47, n. 1.

CHAPTER III

SCRIPTURAL PRESUPPOSITIONS

THE CONCEPTION of Scripture as mistress of which philosophy is to be the handmaid means in Philo that Scripture contains certain unshakable beliefs, constituting a preamble of faith, to which philosophy must accommodate itself. What these unshakable beliefs are is made clear by Philo himself in three places in his works. In one place, he enumerates five lessons which, he says, Moses meant to teach us by his account of the creation of the world. They are: (1) the existence of God; (2) the unity of God; (3) the creation of the world; (4) the unity of the world; (5) divine providence.[1] In another place, he enumerates five classes of people who, according to him, are condemned in Scripture as "impious (*ἀσεβεῖς*) and unholy (*ἀνόσιοι*)," that is to say, as men without religion. They are: (1) those who deny the existence of incorporeal ideas; (2) those who deny the existence of God; (3) those who believe in the existence of many gods; and (4) those who assume the existence of no god beyond the human mind or (5) the senses.[2] In other places he speaks (1) of the belief (*πίστις*) that "the laws [of Moses] were not inventions of a man but quite clearly the oracles of God"[3] and (2) of the hope (*ἐλπίς*) that "they will remain for all future ages as though immortal, so long as the sun and moon and the whole heaven and universe exist."[4] Combining these passages, we find that they lay down eight principles as constituting the essential principles of the religion of Scrip-

[1] *Opif.* 61, 170–172.
[2] *Spec.* I, 60, 327–63, 344.
[3] *Decal.* 4, 15; cf. *Mos.* II, 3, 12; *Probus* 12, 80.
[4] *Mos.* II, 3, 14.

ture, namely: (1) the existence of God, (2) the unity of God, (3) divine providence, (4) the creation of the world,[5] (5) the unity of the world, (6) the existence of incorporeal ideas, (7) the revelation of the Law, and (8) the eternity of the Law.[6]

Now the first six of these eight principles which he describes as being scriptural doctrines are also principles taught in Greek philosophy. It is therefore necessary for us to determine, again from Philo's own words, whether in those principles, which are stated by him in a general way as being taught in Scripture, there are certain characteristic features which distinguished them from the same principles as taught in philosophy.

The principle of the existence of God is described by Philo with sufficient detail to make it clear that he advanced it in opposition to two schools of Greek philosophy: (1) those who "have hesitated and have been of two minds about His existence," and (2) those who "have carried their audacity to the point of declaring that He does not exist at all"; and both these schools of philosophy are described by him as atheists.[7] The first of these schools quite obviously refers to the Sceptics, though in Sextus Empiricus they are not included among the atheists but are treated as opponents of both the theists and atheists.[8] As for the second school, it is not clear to whom it refers, and it may be asked whether

[5] In *Probus* 12, 80, he says of the Essenes that they retain of philosophy only that part which treats philosophically of the existence of God and the creation of the universe. The denial of the existence and providence of God and of the creation of the world are condemned in *Somn.* II, 43, 283.

[6] Neumark mentions only the five principles enumerated in *De Opificio Mundi* as constituting the principles of Judaism according to Philo (*Geschichte der jüdischen Philosophie des Mittelalters*, I, 41; *Toledot ha-Pilosofiah be-Yisra'el*, I, 40; *Toledot ha-'Ikkarim be-Yisra'el*, II, 93–94); cf. also Stein, *Pilon ha-Alexanderoni*, p. 113, n. 1; Goodenough, *By Light, Light*, p. 122.

[7] *Opif.* 61, 170.

[8] Sextus, *Adversus Physicos* I, 191.

among those whom he describes as denying the existence of God altogether he meant to include Epicurus. Elsewhere, in his allusions to the Epicureans, Philo criticizes them only for their hedonism and for their atomism;[9] never for the denial of the existence of God. The attitude of Epicurus towards the existence of God, as reported by Sextus Empiricus, is as follows: "According to some, Epicurus in his popular exposition allows the existence of God, but in expounding the real nature of things he does not allow it."[10] Whether Epicurus was sincere in his declaration of the existence of gods in his popular exposition had been a subject of discussion even before the time of Philo.[11] Philo himself, as we shall see later, attacks Epicurus' popular conception of the gods on the ground of its implication of corporeality, and he undoubtedly could have also attacked it on the ground of its polytheism.[12] Moreover, there is a passage in which Philo definitely indicates that Epicurus is not to be included among the atheists. In that passage he contrasts with the view of those who say that "the Deity does not exist" the views of those who say that "it exists but does not exert providence" and also that the world, though created, "is borne on by unsteady courses, just as chance may direct."[13] These latter views are quite evidently those of Epicurus, and still Philo describes them as views assuming the belief in the existence of God. The question may, therefore, be legitimately raised whether he meant to include here Epicurus among those who denied the existence of God. An answer to this question may perhaps be found in his description of this sec-

[9] Cf. *Fug.* 26, 148. See Leisegang, *Indices*, under "Epikouros."

[10] Sextus, *Adversus Physicos* I, 58.

[11] Cicero, *De Natura Deorum* I, 30, 85; 44, 123; III, 1, 3; *De Divinatione* II, 17, 40; cf. Zeller, III, 1[4], p. 445, n. 2 (*Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics*[2], p. 465, n. 2); C. Bailey, *The Greek Atomists and Epicurus*, p. 438.

[12] Cf. below, p. 176.

[13] *Conf.* 23, 114.

ond school as declaring that the existence of God "is a mere assertion of men obscuring the truth with myth and fiction."[14] This would seem to indicate that by his second school he does not refer to the followers of Epicurus but to the followers of some other atheist. For this description is given in fuller form in another passage, where he describes those who deny the existence of God and profess atheism as maintaining that God "is alleged to exist only for the benefit of men who, it was supposed, would abstain from wrongdoing in their fear of Him whom they believed to be present everywhere and to survey all things with ever-watchful eyes."[15] Now this view, that religion was invented as a restraint upon wrongdoing, is not Epicurean, but it is the view of Critias, who is described as belonging to "the company of the atheists."[16] It is expressed by him in the following lines: "Some shrewd man, a man in counsel wise, first discovered unto men the fear of Gods, thereby to frighten sinners should they sin even secretly in deed, or word, or thought. Hence was it that he brought in Deity, telling how God . . . hears with His mind and sees, and taketh thought and heeds things."[17] Critias the Athenian, it may be remarked again, is mentioned together with Diogenes of Melos and Theodorus as one of the chief exponents of atheism.[18]

Besides these two schools of philosophers whom he describes as atheists, Philo also opposes his conception of the existence of God to the conception of those whom he describes as the "champions of mind" (*νοῦ προστάται*)[19] and "champions of the senses" (*αἰσθήσεων προστάται*),[20] that is, those who ascribe to their own mind and their own senses powers which really belong to God. As to whom especially

[14] *Opif.* 61, 170.
[15] *Spec.* I, 60, 330.
[16] Sextus, *Adversus Physicos* I, 54.
[17] *Ibid.*; cf. Plato, *Laws* X, 889 E.
[18] Sextus, *Pyrrhoniae Institutiones* III, 218.
[19] *Spec.* I, 61, 334.
[20] *Ibid.*, 62, 337.

he means by these two classes of champions, it is a question which students of Philo have found difficult to answer.[21] But we shall try to show that these classes of champions refer to followers of two interpretations of the Protagorean doctrine which has been transmitted to us in the form "man is the measure of all things." [22]

That by "champions of mind" Philo refers to the Protagorean doctrine can be shown by the fact that elsewhere this Protagorean doctrine, correctly ascribed by him to "one of the ancient sophists named Protagoras," is reproduced by him not in the form in which it has generally been transmitted but rather in the form that "the human mind (*νοῦς*) is the measure of all things." [23] When, therefore, Philo speaks of "champions of mind," this expression could well refer to the Protagorean doctrine as reproduced by himself. Moreover, his description of the "champions of mind," as well as of the "champions of the senses," as those who "make gods" of the object which they champion and as "forgetting in their self-exaltation the God who truly exists," [24] and also his statement, evidently referring to the same doctrine, that

[21] Heinemann (*Philos Werke* II, p. 103, n. 2; *Bildung*, p. 176, n. 2) identifies "champions of mind" with Stoics and "champions of the senses" with Epicureans or with philosophically untrained persons in general or with the Cynic Diogenes. Goodenough (*By Light, Light*, pp. 124–125) similarly identifies them with Stoics and Epicureans respectively. Colson (VII, p. 622) thinks that they do not refer to any particular schools of philosophy, but to ways of thinking in general. An obvious objection to the identification of the "champions of mind" with the Stoics is that the mind spoken of here by Philo is the human mind, whereas the mind identified with God by the Stoics is the mind of the universe.

[22] *Cratylus* 385 E; *Theaetetus* 152 A; *Metaph.* X, 1, 1053a, 36; see also Diels, *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, under Protagoras, Fr. 1.

[23] *Post.* 11, 35. The term "human mind" occurs also in his allusion to the Protagorean maxim in *Somn.* II, 29, 193. In *Post.* 11, 36, he quotes Protagoras literally as "man is the measure of all things," but explains it to mean that "all things are a present and gift of the mind." Cf. also *Heres* 50, 246 and comment below at n. 35.

[24] *Spec.* I, 63, 344.

"the mind shows itself to be without God and full of self-exaltation, when it deems itself as on a par with God," [25] tally with the description he himself gives of those who follow the Protagorean doctrine in a passage wherein he challenges them: "Why, pray, are you any longer ready to deliver grave and solemn discourses about holiness and honoring God, and to listen to such discourses from others, seeing that you have with you the mind that takes the place of God?" [26] This passage, as may be seen, reflects both in language and in sentiment the statement in Plato that Protagoras, as a consequence of his doctrine of measure, addressed his followers thus: "Excellent boys and old men, there you sit together declaiming to the people, and you bring in the gods, the question of whose existence or non-existence I exclude from oral and written discourses." [27]

The "champions of mind" are thus the followers of Protagoras, whose doctrine, reproduced by Philo as "the human mind is the measure of all things," implies, if not an outright denial of the existence of God, at least a suspension of judgment with regard to His existence and also a transference to mind of powers which really belong to God.

As for the "champions of the senses," we shall try to show that it refers to the same doctrine of Protagoras, except that for the term "mind" in Philo's own restatement of Protagoras' formula is substituted the term "senses." That these two classes of champions, despite their being described by Philo as "a fourth and a fifth class," [28] are really subdivisions of one group of followers of the same doctrine is quite evident from his statements that both of them "seek the same goal," that both of them are "votaries of the pestilence of

[25] *Leg. All.* I, 15, 49.
[26] *Post.* 11, 37.
[27] *Theaetetus* 162 D; cf. Diogenes, IX, 51.
[28] *Spec.* I, 61, 333.

self-exaltation," [29] and that both of them are symbolically referred to in the verse "an Ammonite or a Moabite shall not enter into the assembly of the Lord." [30] But why he should subdivide the followers of Protagoras into "champions of mind" and "champions of the senses" may be explained on the ground of certain additional information we may gather about the Protagorean doctrine. According to Plato, Protagoras' doctrine that "man is the measure of all things" implies that "perception by the senses" (*αἴσθησις*) is "knowledge" (*ἐπιστήμη*),[31] or, as it is restated by Diogenes Laertius, "soul is nothing apart from the senses." [32] According to Aristotle, however, the "man" who in the Protagorean doctrine is the measure of all things refers either to the man who possesses "knowledge" (*ἐπιστήμη*), that is, mind, or to the man who possesses "perception by the senses" (*αἴσθησις*).[33] We may reasonably assume that Philo had knowledge of Aristotle's explanation of the Protagorean doctrine as meaning by "man" either "knowledge," that is, "mind," or "perception by the senses." In one place, therefore, reproducing this doctrine in the name of Protagoras, he allowed himself to substitute the term "human mind" for the term "man"; in other places, making use of this doctrine as an explanation of the verse about the non-admissibility of both a Moabite and an Ammonite into the assembly of the Lord, he presents it according to both its Aristotelian interpretations, one in terms of mind, symbolized by the Moabite, and one in terms of the senses, symbolized by the Ammonite.[34] That by the championship of mind and the senses he means

[29] *Ibid.*; cf. 63, 344.
[30] Deut. 23: 4; *Spec.* I, 61, 333; *Leg. All.* III, 25, 81; *Post.* 52, 177.
[31] *Theaetetus* 151 E–152 A.
[32] Diogenes, IX, 51.
[33] *Metaph.* X, 1, 1053a, 35–1053b, 2.
[34] I.e. (a) *Post* 11, 35, and (b) *Spec.* I, 61, 333; *Leg. All.* III, 25, 81.

the Protagorean doctrine is evident from a passage in which he contrasts "those who argue at length that man is the measure of all things with those who make havoc of the judgment-faculty of both sense and mind." [35] From this contrast it is quite evident that by the Protagorean principle that man is the measure of all things he understood man's reliance upon the sole judgment of mind and the senses.

The principle of the unity of God means to Philo four things. First, it means to him a denial of popular polytheism and idolatry, of which he gives a variety of examples.[36] Taken in this sense, it is derived by him from the first two of the ten commandments [37] and also from the verse: "The Lord thy God is alone God, in heaven above and on earth beneath, and there is none beside Him," [38] though he finds support for it also in Aristotle's quotation of the Homeric saying: "The government of the many is not good; let there be one governor, one king." [39] Second, it means to him the uniqueness of God, denying that there is anything like unto Him. He derives it from the verse "It is not good that man should be alone," [40] which he finds to imply the opposite, that "it is good that the Alone should be alone," for "God, being one, is alone and unique, and like God there is nothing."[41] By this uniqueness of God he means especially that God alone is an uncreated creator. Thus, speaking of Moses' opposition to polytheism and idolatry, he says: "This lesson he continually repeats, sometimes saying that God is one and the Father and Maker of all things, sometimes that He

[35] *Heres* 50, 246.

[36] *Decal.* 12, 52–16, 81; *Spec.* I, 3, 13–5, 31; 60, 331–332; *Conf.* 28, 144; *Migr.* 12, 69; cf. above, p. 000.

[37] *Decal.* 12, 52–16, 81; *Spec.* I, 3, 13–5, 31.

[38] Deut. 4: 39; cf. *Leg. All.* III, 26, 82.

[39] *Conf.* 33, 170; cf. *Metaph.* XII, 10, 1076a, 4; *Iliad* II, 204–205.

[40] Gen. 2: 18.

[41] *Leg. All.* II, 1, 1.

is the Lord of created beings, because stability and fixity and lordship are by nature invested in Him alone." [42] "Stability" (τὸ βέβαιον) and "fixity" (τὸ πάγιον) are only other words for "eternity" (τὸ ἀΐδιον), in the comprehensive sense of being both uncreated and indestructible. Thus he also says that God is to be considered as "the one, who alone is eternal and the Father of all things intelligible and sensible." [43] God's unity in the sense of uniqueness thus makes it impossible for anything else to be regarded as uncreated and as creative. On the basis of this conception of the unity of God it would be therefore impossible for Philo to accept Plato's ideas as being uncreated and as also being creative by their own power.[44] Third, the principle of the unity of God also means to Philo the self-sufficiency of God. He derives this from the same verse, which he now interprets to mean that "neither before creation was there anything with God, nor, when the world had come into being, does anything take place with Him, for there is absolutely nothing which He needs." [45] Fourth, the principle of the unity of God furthermore means to him the simplicity of God, which, as we shall see, is understood by him to imply not only the incorporeality of God but also His unknowability and indescribability. This, again, he derives from the same verse, to which he now

[42] *Spec.* I, 5, 30.

[43] *Virt.* 39, 214.

[44] Cf. below, pp. 201, 221.

[45] *Leg. All.* II, 1, 2; *Opif.* 6. 23: "God, with no counsellor to help Him (for who was there beside Him?) by His own sole will determined"; cf. *Pirke de-Rabbi Eliezer*, ch. 3: "Before the world was created, God, in His great name, was alone," and David Luria's *Be'ur*, *ad loc.*

The conception of God as self-sufficient is found in Euripides, *Heracles* 1345; Xenophon, *Memorabilia* I, 6, 10; Menedemus in Diogenes, VI, 105; cf. J. Geffcken, *Zwei griechische Apologeten*, p. 38. Self-sufficiency is also regarded as an attribute of the good by Plato (*Philebus* 60 c; 67 A) and as an attribute of God by Aristotle (*Eth. Eud.* VII, 12, 1244b, 5–10); cf. A. O. Lovejoy, *The Great Chain of Being* (Harvard University Press, 1936), pp. 42–43.

gives a third interpretation. "God is alone and one alone; not composite; a simple nature; whereas each one of us and of all other created beings is made up of many things." [46]

Still, this rigid conception of the unity of God did not lead him to such a puritanism of language as to cause him to refrain from applying the term god to beings who in the common language of non-Jews were called gods. As Scripture, which, despite its declaration that all other gods besides the God of Israel are "no gods" [47] or "nothings," [48] has no objection to applying to them the term "gods" [49] or "god," [50] and to calling God "God of gods and Lord of lords," [51] so also Philo, though he declares the God of Scripture to be the only god, still has no objection to the usage of the Greek language, common also among the Greek philosophers, of referring to the stars as visible gods [52] and to the heaven as the great visible god,[53] and to saying of God that "He is God not only of men but also of gods." [54] This does not mean an attitude of "not denying the existence of lesser gods, but denying that they should be worshipped"; [55] it only means that Philo did not deny the existence of the stars and the heavens and the world, and had no objection to referring to them by their popular names as gods, any more than we today have any objection to calling the days of the week by names describing them as days dedicated to ancient pagan deities.

[46] *Leg. All.* II, 1, 2. See fuller discussion of this subject below, II, 100 ff.

[47] Isa. 37: 19.

[48] Ps. 96: 5; I Chron. 16: 26.

[49] Exod. 12: 12, *et passim.*

[50] I Kings 11: 33.

[51] Deut. 10: 17. Cf. above, p. 39.

[52] *Opif.* 7. 27; *Spec.* I, 3, 19.

[53] *Aet.* 3, 10; 5, 20; cf. Colson's discussion in Vol. IX, pp. 172–173.

[54] *Spec.* I, 56, 307; cf. II, 29, 165: "the supreme Father of gods and men"; *Mos.* II, 38, 206: "the Lord of gods and men"; cf. above, p. 38.

[55] Goodenough, *An Introduction to Philo Judaeus*, p. 108.

This latitude in the application of the term god to objects worshiped by pagans as deities, which would include also the mentioning of the names of foreign deities, would seem at first sight to be contradictory to the scriptural verse "Make no mention of the name of other gods, neither let it be heard out of thy mouth." [56] But this prohibition, according to Jewish traditional interpretation, does not mean that the names of such gods cannot be mentioned or that the term god cannot be applied to them. It prohibits, according to this traditional interpretation, only the following three things: first, using the name of other gods as a designation of an appointed meeting-place; second, praising other gods; third, swearing by the name of other gods.[57] Now it can be shown that Philo was acquainted with these traditional interpretations of the law prohibiting mention of the name of other gods. In his discussion of the verse about swearing by the name of God falsely,[58] he says, "if he who swears a wrongful oath [by the name of God] is guilty, how great a punishment does he deserve who denies the truly existing God and honors created beings before their maker, and thinks fit to revere, not only earth or water or air or fire, the elements of the universe, or again the sun and moon and planets and fixed stars, or the whole heaven and universe, but also the works of mortal craftsmen, stocks and stones, which they have fashioned into human shape?" [59] In support of this he quotes [60] the verse: "Make no mention of the name of other gods, neither let it be heard out of thy mouth," [61] which he reproduces from the Septuagint with a few slight verbal variations. From his quotation of this verse it is quite clear that his indictment of

[56] Exod. 23: 13.

[57] *Mekilta, Kaspa* 20 [4] (F, p. 101a; W, pp. 106b–107a; H, p. 332; L, III, p. 180); *Sanhedrin* 63b; *Tos. 'Abodah Zarah* VI (VII), 11.

[58] *Spec.* II, 46, 252.

[59] *Ibid.*, 255.

[60] *Ibid.*, 256.

[61] Exod. 23: 13.

him who "honors" and "thinks fit to revere" other deities constitutes Philo's own explanation of the meaning of the law about not making any mention of the name of other gods. Philo's understanding of this law, therefore, is that it prohibits not mentioning the name of other gods but only honoring and revering them, thus corresponding to the first two traditional interpretations quoted above, namely, that the law prohibits honoring other gods either by using their name as a designation of an appointed meeting-place or by praising them. Furthermore, the fact that Philo links this verse with the verse about swearing by the name of God indicates that this verse about not mentioning the name of other gods is taken by him, as it is in the third traditional interpretation, to be a prohibition of swearing by the name of other gods. But Philo not only has no objection to the mentioning of the name of other gods, but he also finds in Scripture a law against cursing and reviling the gods of other nations. Commenting upon the verses, "Whosoever curses a god shall be guilty of sin," [62] and "Thou shalt not revile the gods," [63] he says that they refer to "the gods of the different cities who are falsely so called" [64] or to "the gods whom others acknowledge." [65]

With this conception of the existence and unity and incorporeality of God, Philo specifically rejects certain forms of theism identified with certain names in Greek philosophy, namely, the theism of Aristotle, in which God is conceived as an incorporeal form which from eternity existed together with the world as the cause of its motion; [66] the theism of the Stoics, in which God was conceived as an eternal primary

[62] Lev. 24: 15 (LXX).
[63] Exod. 22: 27.
[64] *Mos.* II, 38, 205.
[65] *Spec.* I, 9, 53. So also Josephus, *Apion.* II, 33, 237; *Antt.* IV, 8, 10, 207.
[66] *Metaph.* XII, 7 ff.

fire which remained within the world even after its creation;[67] and the popular theism of Epicurus, in which the gods were conceived as eternal and happy human beings of an ethereal substance inhabiting the space between the worlds.[68] With regard to Aristotle, his view is rejected by Philo, as we shall see, in a passage in which he rejects the view of those who assume the eternity of the world on the ground that they postulate in God "a vast inactivity."[69] With regard to the Stoics and the Epicureans, there is a passage in which he rejects the view of those who assign to God a space "whether inside the world or outside it in the interval between worlds," [70] that is to say, whether the Stoic God who is the primary fire within the world or the Epicurean gods who are ethereal beings between the worlds. In this passage both the Stoic God and the Epicurean gods are rejected on the common ground of their being in place, that is, of their being part of the world and hence not incorporeal in the true sense of the term; [71] but the Epicurean gods would also be rejected by him on account of their plurality. A rejection of the Stoic conception of God occurs also in many other passages. In one place, speaking of the Chaldeans, he rejects their belief that "the visible world was the only thing in existence, either being itself God or containing God in itself as the soul of the whole." [72] This quite evidently represents the view of the Stoics, whose God, that is, the primary fire within the world, is variously described by them either as "the whole world with all its parts," [73] or "the whole world and the heaven," [74] or "the

[67] Cf. Arnim, II, 1027.
[68] Cf. Usener, *Epicurea*, 359, p. 240, ll. 33 ff.
[69] *Opif.* 2, 7–11; cf. below, p. 296.
[70] *Somn.* I, 32, 184; cf. Colson and *Philos Werke, ad loc.*
[71] Cf. below, II, 96 ff.
[72] *Migr.* 32, 179.
[73] Arnim, II, 258, p. 169, l. 14.
[74] Diogenes, VII, 148.

mind of the world," [75] or "the soul of the world." [76] In other places he speaks disapprovingly of the Chaldeans, again meaning the Stoics, who "taught the creed that the world was not God's work, but was itself God," [77] or who considered "the world itself as absolute in its power and not as the work of a God absolute in His power," [78] or whose mind "ascribed to the world powers of action which it regarded as causes." [79] The scriptural text quoted by him in rejection of the Stoic view that God is "as the heaven or the world" is the verse "God is not as man," [80] for that verse is taken by him to contain the general principle of the unlikeness of God to anything perceptible by the senses,[81] which to Philo, as we shall see, means the principle of the incorporeality of God and, in a larger sense, the unity of God.[82] This argument from the imperceptibility and hence also incorporeality of God is also raised by him against the gods of the Epicureans, when, in his allegorical interpretation of the scriptural expression "the face of God," [83] he says: "If the Existent Being has a face . . . what ground have we for rejecting the impious doctrine of Epicurus?" [84]

The existence of God as conceived by Philo on the basis of Scripture is thus of a God who is one and the creator of the world and unlike anything within the world. While he does not consider the Aristotelian and the Stoic conceptions of God as being fully compatible with that of Scripture, he condemns neither of them, either as atheistic or as constituting what Scripture terms the worship of other gods. Aristotle is described by him as having shown "a pious and holy

[75] Arnim, I, 157.
[76] Arnim, I, 532.
[77] *Heres* 20, 97.
[78] *Congr.* 9, 49.
[79] *Mut.* 3. 16.
[80] Num. 23: 19.
[81] *Immut.* 13, 62.
[82] Cf. below, II, 97.
[83] Gen. 4: 16.
[84] *Post.* 1, 2.

spirit." [85] Of the Stoics he speaks as admitting that "God" is the "cause" of the creation of the world.[86] Still less would he object to the God of Plato, who, in his *Timaeus*, as paraphrased by Philo, speaks of God "as the Father and Maker and Artificer, and of this world as His work and offspring." [87] Only the Epicurean conception of the gods is condemned by him as "impious," and is placed by him on a par with the animal worship of the Egyptians and the anthropomorphic representation of the gods in Greek mythology,[88] and this quite obviously is because the Epicurean gods were conceived as having the form of human beings. Of the three conceptions of God which he does not denounce as impious, that of Plato would, according to him, most closely approach the scriptural conception, for the Platonic God is one and the creator of the world and unlike anything within the world. But even the other two conceptions would be looked upon by him as approximating the scriptural conception to a large extent. The God of Aristotle is one and unlike anything within the world, and, while not enough of a creator to satisfy the scriptural requirement for God, He is the cause of that motion by which the world as a whole continues to be what it is and by which also all the things within the world come into being. The God of the Stoics is both one and a creator, and, while not enough unlike things within the world to satisfy the scriptural requirement for God, still He is unlike all other beings in that He is not visible to the eye.

To Philo, then, on the basis of his conception of God, the God of these philosophers is not to be included among the gods which Scripture condemns as false. The philoso-

[85] *Aet.* 3, 10.

[86] *Ibid.*, 8. This statement is not irreconcilable with the statements quoted above at nn. 77, 78, and 79. To Philo the Stoic God is not a creator in the true sense of the term.

[87] *Ibid.* 4, 15; cf. *Timaeus* 37 c. [88] *Post.* 1, 2.

phers' God is only an imperfect conception of God, which philosophers, in the absence of divine revelation, have attained to by reason. In other passages, speaking of non-Jews who have given up polytheism and idolatry, to whom we shall refer as "spiritual proselytes," [89] he describes them as those who "practise wisdom, either in Grecian or in barbarian lands," [90] or as those who are "wise and just and virtuous," of whose existence "both Greece and the barbarian world are witness." [91] Philo's "spiritual proselytes" are not only those who have acknowledged the Jewish God but also those who by their own reason have arrived at a philosophic conception of one God. It is with reference to philosophers like Plato and Aristotle and the Stoics, and with reference also to "spiritual proselytes" in general, that Philo declares: "All Greeks and barbarians unanimously acknowledge" the existence of a God like that in Scripture, a God who is "the supreme Father of gods and men and the Artificer (*δημιουργός*) of the whole world, whose nature, though not only invisible by the eye but also hard to guess by the mind, is yet a matter into which every student of astronomical science and other philosophy desires to make research and leaves nothing untried which would help him to discern it and do it service." [92] Though the expression "Father of gods and men" in this passage is reminiscent of the epithet invariably applied by Homer to Zeus,[93] Philo uses it here, as he does in other places,[94] with reference to the God of Scripture. It does not refer to Zeus of Homer. Whatever

[89] Cf. below, II, 369 ff.

[90] *Spec.* II, 12, 44.

[91] *Probus* 11, 72–74. Among them he mentions the Seven Wise Men of Greece, the Magi among the Persians, and the Gymnosophists in India.

[92] *Spec.* II, 29, 165. Colson (*ad loc.*) and Goodenough (*Introduction to Philo Judaeus*, p. 105) take this statement to refer to all pagans in general.

[93] Cf. above, p. 38.

[94] *Ibid.*

allusion to any Greek deity there is in this expression is to Plato's Demiurge, who addresses the created gods, including Zeus, as follows: "Gods of gods, whose artificer (δημιουργὸς) I am and father of works." [95] These words of Plato, which are quoted by Philo elsewhere,[96] are interpreted by him as meaning that Plato "speaks of the moulder of deities (θεοπλάστην) as father and maker (ποιητὴν) and artificer (δημιουργὸν), and of this world as his work and offspring." [97]

The principle of divine providence is quite obviously directed against the Epicureans who explicitly deny providence.[98] But in the course of our discussion we shall show that Philo's conception of the scriptural doctrine of providence means something different from the providence which Plato and the Stoics attribute to God.[99] To him it means individual providence, the power of God to change the order of nature for the benefit of certain of His favored individuals.

The principle of the creation of the world, which he insists upon, means to him that our present world came into being after it had not been, or, as he himself expresses it, "There was a time when it was not." [100] Like Plato, however, he takes this world of ours to have been created out of something preëxistent.[101] But that something preëxistent, as we shall show later, was conceived by him as having been itself created by God.[102]

These four principles, the existence of God, the unity of God, divine providence, and the creation of the world, are such as could be derived by Philo from Scripture even if he

[95] *Timaeus* 41 A.
[96] *Aet.* 4, 13.
[97] *Ibid.*, 15.
[98] Cf. Zeller, III, 1[4], p. 442, n. 4 (*Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics*[2], p. 463, n. 2).
[99] Cf. below, II, 292–294.
[100] *Decal.* 12, 58.
[101] Cf. below, p. 300.
[102] Cf. below, pp. 303 ff.

had no knowledge of philosophy. Native Jewish tradition had similarly formulated them as principles of religious beliefs.[103] Not so, however, is the case of the principles of the unity of the world and the existence of ideas, which Philo similarly names as scriptural doctrines.

His insistence upon the unity of the world reflects his adherence to Plato [104] and Aristotle [105] and the Stoics [106] and his opposition to many of the pre-Socratic philosophers [107] and the Epicureans.[108] Though he states that this doctrine was taught by Moses in his account of the creation of the world, he quotes no scriptural verse in support of this view. In native Jewish tradition, on the contrary, the view is expressed that simultaneously with the creation of our present heavens and our present earth God created one hundred and ninety-six thousand other worlds [109] or that Eden, which is beyond Paradise, contains three hundred and ten worlds.[110]

Similarly his insistence upon the existence of ideas reflects his adherence to Plato and his opposition to Aristotle, the Stoics, and the Epicureans. While there is no definite statement in Scripture as to the existence of ideas, Philo quotes three verses in which he finds references to this theory: (1) the verse stating that man was made "after the image of God," [111] in which he takes the term "image of God" to refer to the idea of man; [112] (2) the verse which in

[103] Cf. Neumark, *Toledot ha-'Iḳḳarim be-Yisra'el*, II, pp. 31–39; G. F. Moore, *Judaism*, Index, under "God," "Monotheism," "Providence," "Creation."

[104] Cf. *Timaeus* 32 C–33 A; cf. 31 A–B.

[105] Cf. *De Caelo* I, 8.

[106] Cf. Arnim, II, 530–533.

[107] Cf. Diels, *Die Fragmente der Vorsocratiker*, Index, under κόσμος Prädikate.

[108] Cf. Usener, *Epicurea*, 45, p. 9, l. 4.

[109] *Seder Rabbah di-Bereshit*, 4–5, and *Midrash Alphabetot*, 89. See Ginzberg, *The Legends of the Jews*, I, 11; V, 12, n. 30.

[110] *Seder Gan 'Eden*, in Jellinek, *Bet ha-Midrash* II, 53; cf. Ginzberg, *op. cit.*, V, 31, n. 90, and below, pp. 196 f.

[111] Gen. 1:27. [112] *Opif.* 6, 25.

the Septuagint reads: "And thou shalt make everything for me according to what I show thee on this mount, according to the pattern (παράδειγμα) of the tabernacle and the pattern of all the vessels thereof, even so shalt thou make it," [113] in which he takes "patterns" to refer to the ideas of the tabernacle and its vessels; [114] (3) the verse "Show me, I pray Thee, Thy glory," [115] in which the term "glory" is taken by him to refer to the ideas.[116] Of these three scriptural proof-texts for the existence of ideas, the first and third may be dismissed as attempts on his part to import into scriptural texts the external theory of ideas, as he does indeed interpret many other verses in terms of ideas. Not so, however, is the second proof-text, that of the preëxistent idea of the tabernacle and its vessels. Here Philo did not import into the scriptural verse something altogether new; he only combined an old Jewish tradition with the Platonic theory of ideas.

According to this Jewish tradition there had been in existence an ideal tabernacle, or, as it is usually called, sanctuary, prior to the building of the visible tabernacle in the wilderness; and it was that ideal tabernacle which God showed to Moses as a pattern for the visible tabernacle. This tradition is expressed in two ways. Sometimes it is said that the ideal sanctuary was created by God prior to the creation of the world.[117] But sometimes it is said that its creation was only planned by God, or, more literally, came into the thought of God, before the creation of the world.[118] These two versions both imply that there existed an idea of the tabernacle before the latter came into actual existence, with

[113] Exod. 25: 9 (8); cf. Num. 8: 4.

[114] *Qu. in Ex.* II, 52; cf. *Mos.* II, 15, 74; *Congr.* 2, 8: the archetypal pattern of the candlestick.

[115] Exod. 33: 18.

[116] *Spec.* I, 8, 45–48.

[117] *Pesaḥim* 54a; *Nedarim* 39b; *Tanḥuma* ed. Buber, Num. Naso, § 19.

[118] *Genesis Rabbah* 1, 4: *ʿalu be-maḥashabah*; cf. *Midrash Tehillim*, on Ps. 93: 2, § 3, p. 207b.

the only difference that according to the first version this idea as a real incorporeal being was created by God prior to the creation of the world, whereas according to the second version this idea, before the creation of the world, was only a thought of God and did not come into actual existence until the creation of the world. This ideal sanctuary is referred to as the "celestial sanctuary." [119] Besides the sanctuary, there were also ideal models of all its vessels, and these, too, were shown to Moses when he was in heaven.[120] This belief in the preëxistence of the tabernacle and its vessels is part of a more general belief in the preëxistence of certain objects or persons or actions which were subsequently to play a part in scriptural history. In Talmudic literature they are usually said to be either six or seven in number, but, when all the preëxistent things mentioned in the various lists are added up, they actually amount to the following ten: the Law, the throne of glory, the tabernacle, the Patriarchs, Israel, the name of the Messiah, repentance, paradise, hell, the Holy Land. The preëxistence of some of these occurs also in the apocalyptic literature.[121] Two of these preëxistent ten are also mentioned by Hellenistic Jewish writers. First, the preëxistence of the Law is affirmed by them in their identification of it with that wisdom which in Scripture is said to have existed prior to the creation of the world.[122] Second, the preëxistence of the tabernacle is stated in the following verse: "Thou gavest command to build a sanctuary in the holy mountain, and an altar in the city of Thy habitation, a copy of the holy tabernacle which Thou preparedst

[119] *Genesis Rabbah* 55, 7: *bet ha-miḳdash le-ma'alah; Jer. Berakot* IV, 5, 8c: *bet ḳodesh ha-ḳodashim she-le-ma'alah.* Cf. *Tos. Yom ha-Kippurim* III (II), 4: *ḳodesh 'elyon.*

[120] *Exodus Rabbah* 40, 2. Cf. Ginzberg, *The Legends of the Jews*, VI, p. 63, n. 324.

[121] Cf. M. Friedmann in his edition of *Seder Eliyahu Rabbah*, ch. 31, p. 160, n. 33; L. Blau, "Preexistence," *Jewish Encyclopedia*, X, 183.

[122] Cf. above, p. 22.

beforehand from the beginning." [123] It is now generally recognized that this belief in the preëxistence of the tabernacle was not introduced into Hellenistic Judaism under the influence of Plato's theory of ideas; it was rather an old Semitic belief,[124] vaguely intimated in Scripture [125] but probably preserved in a more vivid form in tradition. For the Hellenistic Jews it was quite natural to blend such beliefs in the preexistence of things with the Platonic theory of ideas.

In Philo, besides the traditional belief in the preëxistence of the tabernacle with its vessels, there is reference also to the traditional belief in the preëxistence of wisdom, whence also of the Law, which with him, as we shall see, becomes blended with his own particular version of the Platonic theory of ideas. Wisdom is to him what he usually calls the Logos. It means both the totality of ideas which was created before the creation of the world and the Law which was revealed to Moses; and the revealed Law which is to govern the conduct of man is nothing but the Logos or wisdom which is both the pattern after which the world was created and the law by which the world is governed, for the revealed Law is in conformity with the law of the universe.[126] There is no ground for the view that Philo did not believe in the revelation of the Law as a historical event and that to him

[123] Wisdom of Solomon 9: 8.

[124] Cf. note on Wisdom of Solomon 9: 8 in Charles's *Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha of the Old Testament*, I, p. 549. Cf. also A. Harnack, *History of Dogma*, I, pp. 318–333; D. Neumark, "Ha-Pilosofiah ha-Hadashah," *Ha-Shiloah*, 13 (1904), 553–556; *Geschichte der judischen Philosophie des Mittelalters*, I, p. 22, n. 1; *Toledot ha-Pilosofiah be-Yisra'el*, I, p. 21, n.; and more especially in his *Toledot ha-'Ikkarim be-Yisra'el*, II, 1919, pp. 47–56. On the belief in the preëxistence of certain celestial patterns for things on earth, such as a celestial city and a celestial temple, among the Babylonians, see G. Maspero, *The Dawn of Civilization*, 1894, p. 610; A. Jeremias, *Das Alte Testament im Lichte des alten Orients*, 4th ed., 1930, pp. 425 ff.; *Handbuch der altorientalischen Geisteskultur*, 2nd ed., 1929, pp. 108–116.

[125] Exod. 25: 9, 40; 26: 30; 29: 8; Num. 8: 4; cf. I Chron. 28: 12, 19.

[126] Cf. below, II, 189 ff.

the Mosaic Law was divine only in the sense that it was in conformity with the divine order of the universe.[127]

But in Philo we may perhaps also discern the suggestion of another one of the ten traditional preëxistent things, and that is repentance. With regard to repentance, as with regard to the tabernacle, there are in Jewish tradition two versions. According to one version, repentance was created before the creation of the world;[128] according to another version, repentance came into the thought of God before the creation of the world,[129] that is, the existence of repentance was only decreed by God before the creation of the world. Here, too, according to both versions there had existed an idea of repentance before it came into actual existence; but according to the first version it was created as a real idea before the creation of the world, whereas according to the second version it was not created as a real idea until the creation of the world. As a particular thing and the image of that idea, repentance, according to the rabbis, came into existence with the repentance of Adam.[130] So also Philo, taking repentance to have come into existence, as a particular thing, with Enoch, says in his comment upon the verse "Enoch

[127] Cf. W. Bousset, *Die Religion des Judentums im neutestamentlichen Zeitalter*[2], p. 509: "Jeder eigentliche Gedanke an eine Offenbarung Gottes in der Geschichte tritt hier zuruck. . . . Das mosaische Gesetz ist nur ein Spiegelbild der ewigen vernunftgemässen Schöpfungsordnung Gottes." As against this, see Julius Guttmann, *Die Philosophie des Judentums*, p. 38: "Der historische Offenbarungsbegriff des Judentums, der in der Tora die höchste und endgültige Verkündung der religiösen Wahrheit erblickt, wird von Philon so gut anerkannt wie von irgendeinem Talmudlehrer"; E. Schürer, *A History of the Jewish People in the Time of Jesus Christ*, II, iii, p. 366: "The Thorah of Moses is to him, as to every Jew, the supreme, nay the sole and absolutely decisive authority: a perfect revelation of Divine wisdom. Every word written in Holy Scripture by Moses is a divine declaration." Cf. above, pp. 20 ff., and below, II, 189–190, 199–200.

[128] *Tanḥuma*, Num. Naso, 11; *Pesaḥim* 54a; *Nedarim* 39b.

[129] *Midrash Tehillim*, on Ps. 93:2, § 3, p. 207b.

[130] *Pirke de-Rabbi Eliezer*, ch. 20; cf. Ginzberg, *Legends of the Jews*, V, p. 114, n. 106.

pleased God," [131] that "a little while before God appointed mercy and pardon to exist, now again He decrees that repentance shall exist." [132] Now throughout the story of creation, according to Philo, everything decreed by God to be created had been preceded by an idea of it.[133] Consequently it must be assumed that there had been an idea of repentance prior to its coming into existence as a particular thing at the time of Enoch.

With regard to the revelation of the Law, it was Philo's belief that whatever is contained in the Pentateuch was written by Moses himself by divine inspiration, even the account of his own death at the end of Deuteronomy.[134] "I am not unaware," he says, "that all things written in the sacred books are oracles delivered through Moses," [135] on which account they are assumed by him to contain "no superfluous word." [136] This agrees with the Tannaitic teaching that the belief in the revelation of the Law means that every verse, nay even every letter in it, was written by Moses himself by divine inspiration,[137] though there is a question as to the account of his death whether it was written by Moses himself or by Joshua.[138] But as to the manner of the process of revelation, Philo describes how, in the case of the ten commandments, in some miraculous way every word uttered by God reached the ear of the people.[139] It may be said that he felt the same with regard to all the laws that were revealed by God through Moses, though the process, according to

[131] Gen. 5: 22.

[132] *Qu. in Gen.* I, 82.

[133] Cf. below, pp. 204, 209.

[134] *Mos.* II, 51, 291.

[135] *Ibid.* II, 35, 188.

[136] *Fug.* 10, 54; cf. E. Schürer, *A History of the Jewish People in the Times of Jesus Christ*, II, iii, p. 366, nn. 118 and 119.

[137] *Sanhedrin* 99a; *Sifre Deut.*, § 357, F, p. 149b; HF, p. 427.

[138] *Sifre Deut.*, § 357, F, p. 149b; HF, p. 427; *Baba Batra* 15a; cf. D. Neumark, *Toledot ha-'Iḳḳarim be-Yisra'el*, II, pp. 44–46.

[139] Cf. below, II, 38 ff.

him, differed somewhat with different laws.[140] More than that Philo does not say. If he were challenged to give further information, he would undoubtedly say as did Maimonides many centuries later: "We believe that the whole Law that we now possess was given through Moses and that it is in its entirety from the mouth of God, that is to say, it has reached Moses in its entirety from God in a manner which is described in Scripture figuratively by the term 'word,' and that nobody has ever known how that took place except Moses himself to whom that word reached." [141]

With regard to his "hope" of the eternity of the law, the use of the term "hope" does not mean that it was for Philo merely the expression of a wish; it was for him a belief and a certainty, as may be gathered from his statement that ultimately in the Messianic age every nation will "turn to honoring our laws alone." [142] The term hope is used here by Philo in the sense of firm faith in the fulfillment of a promise that something will happen in the future, for his belief in the eternity of the Law, as may be judged from the wording of his statement,[143] is based upon God's promise in the verses "Thus saith the Lord, who giveth the sun for a light by day and the ordinances of the moon and of the stars for a light by night . . . if these ordinances depart from before Me, saith the Lord, then the seed of Israel also shall cease from being a nation before Me for ever," in which he evidently identifies the Law with Israel.[144] For this use of the term hope in the

[140] Cf. below, II, 39 ff.

[141] Introduction to Commentary on *M. Sanhedrin* X, Principle 8.

[142] *Mos.* II, 7, 44; cf. below, II, 415. [143] *Mos.* II, 3, 14.

[144] Saadia also uses these verses (Jer. 31:34–35) as proof for the eternity of the Law, similarly identifying the Law with Israel (*Emunot we-De'ot* III, 7, Arabic, p. 128, ll. 9–15). These verses are also implied in the statement about the eternity of the Law in Matt. 5: 18, and Luke 16: 17. The belief in the eternity of the Law is expressed also in the following works: The Book of Jubilees 33: 16; The Psalms of Solomon 10: 5; Josephus, *Apion.* II, 38, 277.

sense of faith, Philo had before him the sanction of Scripture. In Scripture the designation of God by the expression "the hope of Israel" [145] and the many verses urging man to place his hope in God [146] have made hope in God synonymous with firm faith in the fulfillment of His promise, for, as he says of God, "He will utter nothing at all which shall not certainly be performed, for His word is His deed." [147] In Greek philosophy the term hope had no such connotation. In Plato, when Socrates is made to say, with regard to a certain phase of his belief in immortality, "I hope (ἐλπίζω) to go to good men," he immediately adds, "though I should not care to assert this positively." [148] The belief in the eternity of the Law was already an established principle in Judaism before Philo, and it is explicitly stated in Sirach.[149]

Again, like the Palestinian Jews, more particularly the Pharisees, Philo recognized the existence by the side of the laws of Moses of a body of traditions which was equally binding in authority. Now on this point there is a difference of opinion among scholars. Some scholars take the term unwritten law (ἄγραφος νόμος) used by Philo always to refer to what is called in Judaism the oral law.[150] Other scholars, however, have tried to show that Philo's unwritten law is always used in the Greek sense of the term and never refers to the Jewish oral law.[151] Still others, while admitting

[145] Jer. 14: 8; 17: 13. In LXX in both these places the term for hope (מקוה) is ὑπομονή.

[146] E.g. Jer. 17: 7. Here for hope (מבטח) the term used in LXX is ἐλπίς.

[147] *Mos.* I, 51, 283.

[148] *Phaedo* 63 c.

[149] Sirach 24: 9; 1: 1; cf. Psalms of Solomon 10: 5. On the belief in the eternity of the Law in Judaism, see Strack-Billerbeck on Matt. 5: 18 (I, 245–247); G. F. Moore, *Judaism* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1927–1944), I, 269–270.

[150] Ritter, *Philo und die Halacha*, p. 14; H. L. Strack, *Einleitung in Talmud und Midraš*, p. 9.

[151] R. Hirzel, "Ἄγραφος νόμος," *Abhandlungen der philologisch-historischen Classe*

that Philo's unwritten law is most often used in the Greek sense of the term, are of the opinion that in some instances it has reference to the Jewish oral law.[152] A careful examination of the problem has led us to support the last view. We shall try to present the case as it appears to our mind, advancing arguments, some of them already known but most of them new, to show that in some passages the term unwritten law unmistakably refers to the Jewish oral law.

In Judaism, the exponents of the oral law are known by many names, among them the name of elders (*zeḳenim*).[153] The contents of the oral law is sometimes described by the general term custom (*halakah*), and this is subdivided into various types, among them the following two: (1) enactments (*taḳḳanot*) and decrees (*gezerot*) introduced by various individual scholars or groups of scholars, which have no basis in the Written Law; (2) interpretations of the Written Law by the method known as *midrash*, that is, investigation into the Written Law.[154] We shall now try to show that in his description of what he calls unwritten law Philo uses terms which are unmistakably the same as the terms used in the description of the Jewish oral law.

First, there is a reference in Philo to "elders" as exponents of oral Jewish traditions. In his preface to his life of Moses, he says that in retelling the life and teachings of Moses he will retell them as he has learned them "both from the sacred books . . . and from some of the elders of the na-

---

der Königlich Sachsischen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften, XX, i (1900), pp. 16–18, 27; I. Heinemann, *Philos Werke*, II, p. 289, n. 1; "Die Lehre vom ungeschriebenen Gesetz im jüdischen Schrifttum," *Hebrew Union College Annual*, IV (1927), 152–159; Goodenough, *By Light, Light*, p. 78.

[152] Stein, *Pilon ha-Alexandroni*, p. 66, n. 1; Klausner, *Pilosofim we-Hoge De'ot*, p. 74; Ch. Tchernowitz, *Toledot ha-Halakah*, I, i, p. 68.

[153] I. H. Weiss, *Dor Dor ve-Dorshav*, I[4], p. 159.

[154] *Ibid.*, p. 67.

tion," [155] for, he adds, "I always interwove what I was told with what I read." [156] "Elders," as we have seen, is used as a technical term designating the exponents of the oral law in Palestine. Moreover, in the Mishnah there is a reference to "elders" who had enacted a certain law with regard to the Sabbatical year which was in vogue among the Jews in Egypt.[157] It is not impossible that by the "elders" in that Mishnah is meant not only the Palestinian "elders" but also the Egyptian "elders" of whom Philo speaks.[158]

Second, there is also in Philo a reference to customs (*halakot*) which have their origin in enactments (*takḳanot*) and decrees (*gezerot*). Commenting upon the verse "Thou shalt not remove thy neighbor's landmarks which thy forerunners have set," [159] he says that this injunction applies also to "the safeguarding of ancient customs (ἐθῶν), for customs (ἔθη) are unwritten laws, the decrees (δόγματα) of men of old," and "children ought to inherit from their parents, besides their property, ancestral customs which they were reared in and have lived with even from the cradle, and not despise them because they have been handed down without written record"; he concludes with the statement that he who obeys the unwritten laws is "worthy of praise" more than he who obeys the written laws.[160] Now, in this passage, we shall try to show from internal evidence, the term "unwritten laws" refers to the Jewish oral law.

[155] *Mos.* I, 1, 4; cf. Ritter, *op. cit.*, p. 14, n. 2; cf. Schürer, *op. cit.*, II, iii, p. 365, n. 117.

[156] The term τὰ λεγόμενα may reflect the Hebrew term *Haggadot*. Gfrörer (I, p. 50) suggests that it may refer to traditions noted down on the margins of the scriptural text.

[157] *M. Yadayim* IV, 3.

[158] Cf. Z. Yawitz, *Toledot Yisra'el*, IV, p. 145.

[159] Deut. 19: 14. Philo, in his quotation of this verse, has πρότεροι, which is a more literal translation of the Hebrew *rishonim* than the Septuagint πατέρες. Cf. below, p. 192.

[160] *Spec.* IV, 28, 149–150.

(a) As a rule, when the term "unwritten law" is used by Philo in its original Greek sense, it means laws which existed before the written laws of Moses were revealed, which laws, as he says, the "first generations" followed with perfect ease,[161] as a "self-taught" law laid down by nature,[162] and of which, he also says, the Patriarchs and others like them were living symbols.[163] In this passage, however, it is quite evident that he does not use the term in the sense of a law which existed prior to the law of Moses; he uses it rather in the sense of laws which are still in existence by the side of the laws of Moses. This corresponds exactly to the Jewish oral law.

(b) Of these "unwritten laws" he also says that they are "customs" in the sense of the "decrees of men of old." This quite evidently refers to that part of the oral law which consists of customs (*halakot*) established by the decrees of various ancient authorities, known as *takḳanot* and *gezerot*, and attributed traditionally to many Biblical personages as well as to personages of the post-Biblical period prior to the time of Philo.[164]

(c) He also says of these "unwritten laws" that they are "ancestral customs" which children ought not to "despise." This undoubtedly reflects the verse "Hear, my son, the instruction of thy father and reject not the laws of thy mother," [165] the substitution of the term "not to despise" (μὴ καταφρονεῖν) for the term "reject not" (μὴ ἀπώσῃ), being due to the influence of the verse "Hearken, my son, to

[161] *Abr.* 1, 5.

[162] *Ibid.* 3, 16.

[163] *Decal.* 1, 1; cf. *Abr.* 46, 276; *Mos.* I, 28, 162; *Virt.* 36, 194.

[164] Such *Takḳanot*, according to Jewish tradition, were enacted by Moses, Joshua, Boaz, David, Solomon, the Prophets, Ezra, the Men of the Great Synagogue, John Hyrcanus, the court of the Hasmoneans, the court of the priests, and Simeon ben Shetaḥ, who was a contemporary of Alexander Jannaeus.

[165] Prov. 1: 8.

the father who begot thee, and despise not (μὴ καταφρόνει) thy mother because she is old." [166] So also the rabbis find in this verse an exhortation for the observance of ancestral customs which are part of the oral law.[167]

(d) He furthermore says that the obedience of these "unwritten laws" deserves greater commendation than the obedience of the written laws. So also the rabbis say concerning the oral law that "The words of the Scribes are to be appreciated more than the words of the written law." [168]

(e) His interpretation of the verse "Thou shalt not remove thy neighbor's landmarks which thy forerunners have set" [169] as referring to the preservation of ancestral customs was undoubtedly made under the influence of the verse "remove not ancient landmarks which thy fathers have set." [170] Similarly these two verses are taken by the rabbis to refer to the observation of ancient customs.[171]

(f) In another place, evidently having in mind again the verse "Thou shalt not remove thy neighbor's landmarks which thy forerunners have set," he says that Sacred Scripture teaches us "not to do away with any of the established customs which divinely empowered men greater than those of our time have laid down." [172] Note the words "greater than those of our time." Similarly the rabbis speaking of decrees and enactments of scholars of old say that "no assembly of scholars can repeal the words of another assembly of scholars unless it is greater in learning and numbers." [173]

[166] Prov. 23: 22 (LXX); cf. Prov. 30: 17.

[167] *Pesaḥim* 50b; cf. Ritter, *op. cit.*, p. 15, n. 2. Cf. also *Shabbat* 23a, on Deut. 32: 7.

[168] *Jer. Sanhedrin* XI, 6, 30a; cf. Ritter, *loc. cit.*

[169] Deut. 19: 14.

[170] Prov. 22: 28 (27).

[171] In connection with Deut. 19: 14, see responsum of Sherira Gaon in *Ṭur Ḥoshen Mishpat*, § 368, which probably reflects an earlier source (cf. B. Epstein, *Ṭorah Ṭemimah, ad loc.*). In connection with Prov. 22: 28, see *Midrash Mishle, ad loc.*; *Yalḳut Shim'oni* II, § 960.

[172] *Migr.* 16, 89, and 90.

[173] *M. Eduyot* I, 5.

Third, besides unwritten laws in the sense of "customs" based upon "decrees," Philo speaks also of unwritten laws based upon the interpretation of the written laws. Speaking of the various explanations of the law of circumcision, he says: "These are the explanations which have come to our ears from the discussions of antiquities (ἀρχαιολογούμενα) of divinely gifted men who have investigated (διηρεύνησαν) the writings of Moses in no cursory manner."[174] Here the expression "who have investigated the writings of Moses" makes it quite clear that Philo does not refer in this passage to "customs" based upon "the decrees of men of old" but rather to those interpretations of the texts by the method which in Hebrew is called *midrash*, that is, investigation into Scripture. An indirect allusion to the term *midrash* and the *midrashic* method of searching into Scripture may perhaps be discerned in his discussion of the question why Moses speaks only of the "lips" of the river of Egypt[175] and not of the "lips" of the Euphrates or other holy rivers.[176] He describes questions of this kind as "investigations" (ζητήσεις) to which, he says, some may object as "savoring of petty trifling" but which he himself defends on the ground that they are "like condiments set as seasoning to the Holy Scripture, for the edification of its readers."[177] The Greek ζήτησις is a literal translation of the Hebrew *midrash*, and the objection raised against this sort of investigation as well as the defense made on its behalf is exactly what may be said against and for the *midrashic* method.

[174] *Spec.* I, 2, 8.

[175] Exod. 7: 15. "Lip" is the literal meaning of both the Hebrew and the Greek term translated in this verse by "brink."

[176] Philo's observation evidently refers only to the Pentateuch. In other parts of Scripture the expression "lip of the river" in Ezek. 47: 6 and Dan. 12: 5 undoubtedly refers to the Euphrates, and "the lip of the Jordan" is explicitly mentioned in II Kings 2: 13.

[177] *Somn.* II, 45, 300–301.

Fourth, these two elements of Palestinian oral law, decisions and interpretations, are clearly indicated by Philo in a passage in which, after describing the written laws, he says that "there are countless other rules besides these, all that either rest upon (a) unwritten customs (*ἐθῶν*) and usages (*νομίμων*), or (b) are [contained] in the laws (*νόμοις*) themselves." [178] In this passage, the expression "unwritten customs and usages," which, in contrast to those contained in the laws themselves, are *not* contained in the laws, quite evidently refers, as in the other passages, to customs based upon decisions, that is, *takkanot* and *gezerot*; for, according to theory, such customs and usages are not derived from the written laws but are new laws introduced "for the sake of the social order," that is, to facilitate men's keeping the Law, or to serve as a "fence around the Law," that is, to guard the Law and protect it. The expression "or are [contained] in the laws themselves," from the very context, cannot refer to other written laws contained in the Pentateuch. It refers to the countless new laws that have already been derived, and that may still be derived, from the written laws by the *midrashic* method, which new laws, according to theory, are implicitly contained in the written laws themselves.

These, then, are the eight principles which, according to Philo, constitute the religion of Scripture, to which every philosophy must accommodate itself. Of these eight principles, five — namely, existence, unity, providence, creation, and revelation — have been generally accepted, though with some changes, by all religious philosophies throughout the ages, whether Jewish or Christian or Moslem. Other principles of belief, not mentioned by Philo, have been added in the course of history, such, for instance, as the belief in

[178] *Hypothetica* 7, 6; cf. Eusebius, *Praeparatio Evangelica* VIII, 7; cf. Schürer, *op. cit.*, p. 365, n. 114.

the resurrection of the body in all the three religions and the doctrine of the Trinity in Christianity. But these five principles are considered as fundamental by all of them.

With regard to the existence of God, scepticism, atheism, Stoicism, and Epicureanism are generally rejected by all the three religions. But with regard to the Aristotelian conception of God, new interpretations of this view, as we shall see, made it possible for some religious philosophers to harmonize its Prime Mover with the scriptural conception of a Creator. Similarly Philo's conception of the unity of God, in all its four senses enumerated above — namely, the rejection of polytheism, the uniqueness of God as the sole uncreated Creator, His self-sufficiency, and His simplicity — were generally accepted. But with regard to the simplicity of God there was some discussion as to its implications. In Christianity, with the rise of the belief in the Trinity, and in Islam, with the rise of the belief in attributes, attempts were made to interpret the simplicity of God so as to reconcile it with the belief in the Trinity or attributes. Discussions, too, appeared in all three religious philosophies as to how far the unknowability of God is to be excluded by His simplicity and also as to how the predicates by which God is described are to be interpreted. With regard to the belief in divine providence, it was generally accepted in its Philonic sense, though it was subjected to a variety of interpretations. But whatever interpretation came to be advanced, it was presented as one which would safeguard the individual character of divine providence. Creation, too, was accepted, though many philosophers, in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, did not follow Philo in his particular conception of creation. But whatever view about the origin of the world was advanced, it was always explained as representing a belief in the creation of the world in conformity with the teaching of the Book

of Genesis. Finally, the inspired origin of the Hebrew Scripture came to be accepted as a common principle of Jewish, Christian, and Moslem philosophy, though in Islam this belief is somewhat modified.[179]

As for the three other principles which Philo presents as foundations of scriptural religion, namely, the eternity of the Law of Moses, the unity of the world, and the existence of ideas, they were not universally accepted by all three religions in their philosophies.

With regard to the eternity of the Law of Moses, both Christianity and Islam rejected it; they believed in the abrogation of that Law.

With regard to the unity of the world, in Christianity, Origen raised the question of the existence of many worlds. Evidently mindful of Sirach's warning "Seek not what is too wonderful for thee, and search not out that which is hid from thee," [180] he declares the entire speculation on this question as an "unsuitable subject for human thought"; nevertheless, he still tries to derive an affirmative answer to it from the New Testament verse "They are not of this world, even as I am not of this world," [181] without quoting any Old Testament verse in opposition to it. Similarly, in medieval Jewish philosophy, Saadia opposes the theory of the plurality of worlds as it appears in Greek philosophy only on the ground that these worlds were not conceived as having been created from nothing, and he differentiates this Greek philosophical view from the view expressed in the Talmudic statement that "God rides on His swift cherub and roams over eighteen thousand worlds" [182] by maintaining that in the Talmudic statement the assumption is that the many

[179] Cf. above, p. 158.

[180] Sirach 3: 21.

[181] John 17: 16. Cf. Origen, *De Principiis* II, 3, 6.

[182] *'Abodah Zarah* 3b.

worlds were created from nothing.[183] Crescas, in his criticism of Aristotle, raises the same question of the existence of many worlds, and, though he quotes in discouragement of this kind of speculation Sirach's warning as it is reëchoed in the Tannaitic statement against inquiring into "what is above and what is below, what is before and what is behind," [184] he also quotes in support of the plurality of worlds the same Talmudic statement with regard to God's riding on His swift cherub and roaming over eighteen thousand worlds.[185]

With regard to the existence of ideas, Philo's view that the belief in them constitutes one of the scriptural fundamentals of religion continued indirectly in Christianity in the doctrine of the Trinity, and in Islam—with the rise, early in its history, of theological speculations known as Kalam—in the doctrine of attributes among those who maintained the existence of real attributes. But while the Christian doctrine of the Trinity is a direct development, as we shall show, of the theory of ideas as revised by Philo, and while also the belief in attributes in Islam is a direct development of the doctrine of the Trinity in Christianity and hence an indirect development of Philo's theory of ideas, these problems acquired an independent status of their own, entirely distinct from the theory of ideas. The theory of ideas in its Platonic sense, ideas in the sense of patterns of things, which to Philo

[183] *Commentaire sur le Séfer Yesira* (ed. M. Lambert), Arabic, p. 5, ll. 8 ff.; French, p. 19. Saadia gives also another explanation of this Talmudic statement, namely, it refers to eighteen thousand successive worlds. On the Jewish attitude toward the belief in successive worlds, see Judah ha-Levi, *Cuzari* I, 67, and Maimonides, *Moreh Nebukim* II, 30, and cf. the present writer's discussion of the subject in "The Platonic, Aristotelian and Stoic Theories of Creation in Hallevi and Maimonides," *Essays in honour of the Very Rev. Dr. J. H. Hertz* [1942], pp. 427–442.

[184] *M. Ḥagigah* II, 1, and *Ḥagigah* 13a, where Sirach 3: 21–22 is quoted. Cf. *Or Adonai* I, ii, 1, and my *Crescas' Critique of Aristotle*, p. 217.

[185] Cf. *Or Adonai* IV, 2.

is an essential creed in scriptural religion, was not accepted as an essential creed of religion either in Christianity or in Islam or in Judaism. In all of them it was discussed as a pure problem of philosophy on which religion had no definite position.[186]

In his assault upon traditional philosophy, Spinoza discusses these five out of the eight Philonic principles which have been acknowledged by the philosophies of the three religions. As for the existence of God, he indeed maintains that God exists and even tries to prove His existence, but his belief in the existence of God only means a belief in the principle of causality as against the Epicurean denial of it and his attempt to prove the existence of God is only an attempt to prove that the wholeness of the world, which is the source of its causality, transcends the mere aggregate of its parts. As for the unity of God, he is willing to repeat all the traditional statements to the effect that God is one and that by His unity is to be understood not only that God is one numerically but also that He is one in the sense of His being self-sufficient and simple. But he does not admit that the simplicity of God means also a denial of His knowability, in the true sense of the term knowability as he understands it, nor does he admit that it means also a denial of His materiality, again in the true sense of the term materiality as he understands it. In his refusal to deny the materiality of God, he departs not only from the medieval philosophers, but also from all the Greek philosophers, rejecting at once both the Platonic and Aristotelian conception of an immaterial God and the Stoic conception of a material God who is immanent in the world. His own conception of God, as to both His nature and His relation to the world, is like that of the Neoplatonized Aristotelian God, except that He

[186] Cf. below, p. 294.

has, in the terminology of Spinoza, both the attribute of thought and the attribute of extension. As for divine providence, he does speak of it indeed, but his conception of providence is radically unlike that of Philo and all the religious philosophers who followed him; it is a revival of the conception of providence as held by Greek philosophers. As for creation, he argues against the various theories of creation as conceived by medieval philosophers. In this, however, neither what he says against the views of others nor what he presents as his own view contains anything new. It is a modified form of the medieval Neoplatonized Aristotelian conception of the origin of the world. The only novelty in it is that he presents it, unlike any of the medieval philosophers, without any attempt to reconcile it with the scriptural account of creation. Finally, as for revelation, he denies it outright, and it is this initial denial of revelation that has led him to the overthrow of all those principles which as formulated by Philo became the common preamble of faith in all the religious philosophies in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam.

CHAPTER IV

GOD, THE WORLD OF IDEAS, AND THE LOGOS

I. God and the Ideas

The starting point of Philo's philosophy is the theory of ideas. This theory was with him a philosophic heritage from Plato and, according to his own belief, as we have seen, also from Judaism.[1] But by his time the theory of ideas had grown into a problem. Some, outspoken opponents of Plato — like Aristotle, the Stoics, and the Epicureans — openly denied altogether the existence of ideas as real incorporeal beings. Others, followers of Plato, while openly affirming the existence of ideas, interpreted them as thoughts of God, thereby practically denying their existence as real incorporeal beings.[2] Then, in the writings of Plato himself there were many vaguenesses and many inconsistencies with regard to the ideas, and these needed clearing up. Finally, many of Plato's statements about the ideas seemed to be contradictory to what Philo considered as essential principles of scriptural religion, and these, he felt, would have to be rejected or else harmonized with Scripture.

Philo will thus start his philosophy with a revision of Plato's theory of ideas. He will be at a loss to know, as will have many a student of Plato after him, whether the God of Plato was outside the ideas or whether He was one of them, and, if the former, whether He and the ideas were co-eternal or whether He was the creator of the ideas. Plato's own state-

[1] Cf. above, pp. 181 ff.

[2] Zeller, III, 2[4], p. 136, attributes this view to the Neopythagoreans. A. Schmekel, *Die mittlere Stoa*, pp. 430–432, attributes it to Posidonius. Cf. M. Jones, "The Ideas as Thoughts of God," *Classical Philology*, 21 (1926), pp. 317–326. All of them take Philo as being of the same view. Cf. below, p. 209.

ments on these points are either vague or inconsistent. Sometimes he speaks of one of the ideas, the idea of the good, as if it were God,[3] sometimes he speaks of God as the one who "produces" [4] or who "made" [5] the idea of bed, and sometimes he speaks of the ideas in general as "ungenerated and indestructible" [6] or as "admitting neither generation nor destruction." [7] With his belief inherited from Scripture that from eternity God was alone [8] and hence that God alone is uncreated,[9] Philo was unable to accept a view which would imply that by the side of God from eternity there were other uncreated beings. God from eternity was alone and anything else besides Him must have been brought into being by God, through an act of creation. In accordance with this fundamental belief, he sets out to give his own version of the philosophy of Plato, and he does so partly as an interpretation of Plato and partly as a departure from him.

Evidently having in mind the passages in Plato where the idea of the good might be taken as identical with God,[10] he says that God is "superior to virtue, superior to knowledge, superior to the good itself and the beautiful itself." [11] Evidently, again, having in mind Plato's analogy of the good to the sun, he substitutes God for good. In Plato the analogy reads that "the good, in the intelligible region, in its relation to mind and the objects of mind" is like "the sun, in the visible region, in its relation to vision and the objects of vision" [12] and that the good is "the cause of knowledge, and of truth in so far as known." [13] The same analogy in Philo reads: "God is the archetypal model of laws: He is the sun

[3] *Republic* II, 379 B–C.
[4] *Ibid.*, X, 597 B.
[5] *Ibid.*, 597 C.
[6] *Timaeus* 52 A; cf. 28 A, 29 A.
[7] *Philebus* 15 B.
[8] *Leg. All.* II, 1, 1–3; *Opif.* 6, 23; cf. above, p. 171.
[9] *Virt.* 10, 65.
[10] *Republic* II, 379 B–C.
[11] *Opif.* 2, 8.
[12] *Republic* VI, 508 C.
[13] *Ibid.*, 508 D.

of sun, the intelligible sun of the sensible sun, and from invisible fountains He supplies visible beams to that which is beheld." [14] To Philo then it is not the good which is likened to the sun, but God; and it is not the good which is the cause of knowledge and of truth, but God. Indeed Philo sometimes calls God "the Good" [15] or "the true Good," [16] but this is not in the sense that God is the idea of good; it is only in the sense of a property of God, which, like all the other properties of God, is considered by Philo as designating the power or action of God.[17]

There are only two passages in which Philo would seem to use the term idea in connection with God. Let us examine these passages.

In one of these passages, taking as his text the verses that God "appeared" unto Abraham and that Abraham "looked, and lo, three men stood over against him," [18] he says that God "presents to the mind which has vision the appearance sometimes of one, sometimes of three: of one, when the mind is highly purified and, passing beyond not merely the multiplicity of other numbers, but even the dyad which is next to the unit, presses on to that idea (ἰδέαν) which is unmixed and uncompounded, and by itself in need of nothing else whatever." [19] Here it would at first sight seem that God is called an idea. But upon a closer examination of the passage it will be found that the term idea is not used here in the sense of a Platonic idea, which, according to Philo, as we

[14] *Spec.* I, 51, 279. Cf. also *Virt.* 30, 164.

[15] *Leg. All.* I, 14, 47.

[16] *Gig.* 11, 45.

[17] Cf. below, II, 126 ff. Ritter (*The History of Ancient Philosophy*, IV, p. 430) sees here an inconsistency in Philo. Cf. on this apparent inconsistency also in Bréhier, pp. 70 and 154. According to Bréhier's interpretation, Philo considers God as "the idea of the good" but at the same time also as "beyond the ideas."

[18] Gen. 18: 1–2.

[19] *Abr.* 24, 122.

have seen, God is not. From the very use of the terms "appeared" and he "looked, and lo" in the scriptural proof text, and from Philo's restatement of these terms by the terms "presents to the mind . . . the appearance" it is quite evident that the term "idea" in this passage is used by Philo in the sense of a conception of the mind. Philo, we know, often uses the term idea in this sense.[20] Accordingly, what Philo says in this passage is that the highly purified mind has an idea of God, that is, a conception of Him, as a being who is "unmixed, uncompounded, and by itself in need of nothing else whatever." This is in accordance with Philo's view expressed by him elsewhere that God is absolutely simple and unmixed [21] and that "He has no wants, He needs nothing, being in himself all-sufficient to himself." [22] The ideas, according to him, are not self-sufficient, for they are dependent upon God for their existence, nor are they, as we shall see, of the same degree of simplicity [23] and unmixedness [24] as God.

In the second passage, he says that "man, the best of living creatures, through that higher part of his being, namely, the soul, is most nearly akin to heaven, the purest thing in all that exists, and, as most admit, also to the Father of the world, possessing in his mind a closer image and copy than anything else on earth of the everlasting and blessed idea." [25] In this passage, the expression "everlasting and blessed idea" would again at first sight seem to refer to the "Father of the world," that is, God, mentioned previously. But, in

[20] Cf. Leisegang, *Indices*, sub *ἰδέα* 4.

[21] *Immut.* 11, 53–55; cf. below, II, 98.

[22] *Virt.* 3, 9.

[23] Cf. below (II, 139 ff.) discussion about the knowability of the powers or the ideas, from which it may be inferred that they are less simple than God.

[24] Cf. below, p. 279. The fact that God does not enter matter whereas the powers or ideas do enter it shows that they are of a lesser degree of unmixedness than God.

[25] *Decal.* 25, 134.

our opinion, it refers to the Logos, and the meaning of the passage is as follows. Man through the irrational part of his "soul" is most nearly akin to "heaven," because they are both made of the purest element, namely, fire,[26] and through his "mind" he is most nearly akin to the "Father of the world," because his mind is a closer image and copy than anything else on earth of the Logos, which Logos is the totality of ideas, including the idea of mind,[27] and is itself called "the idea of ideas." [28]

II. Ideas

The superiority of God to the ideas consists, according to Philo, in the fact that He is their creator. Either as a deliberate departure from Plato's account in the *Timaeus* or as an interpretation of it, Philo restates Plato's account with a highly significant change. In the *Timaeus* the ideas are described as eternal [1] and ungenerated [2] and as not admitting of generation,[3] so that when he comes to describe how God created the visible world as a copy of an ideal pattern, called by him "the intelligible animal," [4] he definitely says that the ideal pattern could not have been something created, that it had to be something eternal and that all that God had to do was to look at that ideal pattern and create a world in its likeness.[5] Philo, however, says that when God willed to create the visible world, and to create it after a pattern, He had previously molded (*προεξετύπου*) its ideal pattern, called by him the intelligible world. Now the term "to mold previously" (*προεκτυποῦν*) used by Philo here in connection with the intelligible world, is in itself sufficient evidence that the

[26] Cf. below, pp. 313, 389, n. 32. [27] Cf. below, p. 213. [28] Cf. below, p. 233.

[1] *Timaeus* 29 A.
[2] *Ibid.* 55 A; cf. 28 A; 29 A.
[3] *Ibid.* 52 A.
[4] *Ibid.* 39 E.
[5] *Ibid.* 28 A–29 D.

intelligible world of ideas was created by God as something real outside His mind. But there is corroborative evidence. The intelligible world is described by Philo as older (*πρεσβύτερος*) in comparison with the visible world, which he describes as younger (*νεώτερον*).[6] This description quite obviously reflects Plato's description of the universal soul as not being younger (*νεωτέραν*) than the world but rather older (*πρεσβυτέραν*).[7] Now in Plato the description of the soul and the world respectively as older and younger means a comparison between two things both of which were created, for the soul, according to Plato, was created.[8] Consequently, we have reason to believe that Philo's description of the intelligible world and the visible world respectively as older and younger also means a comparison between two things each of which was created. The intelligible world, therefore, which according to Philo contains as many "intelligible objects," that is, ideas, as there are "objects of sense" contained in the visible world,[9] was not merely formed in God's thought but was created by God and was given an existence of its own outside of God's thought. So also in his homily on the scriptural account of the first day of creation, which he takes to refer to the creation of the intelligible world as a pattern for the corporeal world, he says that on that day God made (*ἐποίησεν*) seven ideal patterns of various parts of the corporeal world that was to be created.[10] Here the use of the term "made" definitely indicates that the ideas which make up the intelligible world, and hence the intelligible world itself, were created by God and given an existence outside His thoughts. In another place he says that God is "the Father of all things intelligible and sensible."[11] Here,

[6] *Opif.* 4, 16.
[7] *Timaeus* 34 C.
[8] *Ibid.* 34 B ff.
[9] *Opif.* 4, 16.
[10] *Ibid.* 7, 29.
[11] *Virt.* 39, 214.

again, not only the sensible world of things but also the intelligible world of ideas is said to have God as its Father, that is to say, its Maker and Creator. In still another place, in answer to the question "why the creation of animals and flying creatures is mentioned a second time, when the account of their creation had already been given in the history of the six days," [12] he says: "Perhaps these things which were created in the six days were incorporeal beings, indicated under these symbolical expressions, being the forms (*species*) of animals and flying creatures, but now they were produced in reality, the images of the former, sensible copies of those invisible models." [13] The implication is that the ideas were created.

[12] Gen. 2: 19 and 1: 20, 24.

[13] *Qu. in Gen.* I, 19. This passage is a comment on the second account of the creation of fowl and animals in Gen. 2: 19. As we have seen above (p. 119), Philo, following a Jewish tradition, takes all the events contained in Gen. 2–3, which come after the account of the six days of creation in Gen. 1, to have taken place on the sixth day. Referring, therefore, now to the first account of the creation of fowl on the fifth day and of the creation of animals earlier on the sixth day, he says that those which were created earlier "in the six days were incorporeal beings," that is, ideas. I take the parenthetical term *angeli* in Aucher's Latin translation to be a misunderstanding of the text. In a passage parallel to this in *Leg. All.* II, 4, 11–13, Philo says explicitly that the first account of the creation of animals refers to the creation of genera (γένη) and ideas (ἰδέαι). Angels, as we shall see (cf. below, pp. 372 ff.) belong to a class of powers to be called immanent and not to the class of powers which are identified by Philo with ideas. The parenthetical term *creata*, again in the Latin translation, is, however, what is to be expected here, for, inasmuch as the parallel statement in *Leg. All.* II, 4, 13, reads τὰ πάλαι κατασκευασθέντα, we have reason to assume that the Greek original here contained, or implied, a similar term meaning "created." On the basis of the same passage in *Leg. All.*, the Greek term underlying the Latin term *species* here should be not εἴδη but ἰδέαι and, if the term here be εἴδη, then it should be taken in the Platonic sense as the equivalent of ἰδέαι. In the parallel passage in *Leg. All.*, on the other hand, it is quite evident from the context that the term εἴδη is used in the sense of physical forms which are images of genera or ideas. The use of εἶδος in this sense is common in Philo (see Leisegang, *Indices*, under εἶδος 1). I do not think that the term γένος and εἶδος in that passage can be taken in the Aristotelian logical sense of genus and species, as it is evidently done by Leisegang who puts them in his *Indices*, under εἶδος 2. The Armenian term underlying the Latin *species* in the passage in

Scattered references to the creation of the ideas are to be found also in such passages, for instance, as those in which he says that "before the particular intelligible concept [of the human mind] came into being, the Creator produces (ἀποτελεῖ) the intelligible concept itself as a generic existence," [14] and that "before the particular objects of sense sprang up, the object of sense existed (ἦν) by the Maker's forethought as something generic." [15] The term ἀποτελεῖ, "produces," used here by Philo in the first quotation, in connection with the idea of the human mind, is exactly the same term used by him in describing the creation of the visible world,[16] and consequently it is to be inferred that, according to him, ideas were created in the same way as sensible objects; and consequently also the term ἦν, "existed," used by him in the second quotation, in connection with the generic idea, refers to an existence outside the mind of God. The same view is also implied in his description of the ideas as "myriads of rays" which God as the "archetypal light" pours forth (ἐκβάλλει),[17] or in his description of "what we justly call idea" as a certain splendor which God caused to shine forth from himself.[18] In one place, after describing "generic virtue," that is, the idea of virtue, as that which "issues forth (ἐκπορεύεται) out of Eden, the wisdom of God, and this is the Logos of God," he explains the term "issues forth" by the statement that 'in accordance with that [Logos or wisdom] has generic virtue been made (πεποίηται)." [19] The term "issues forth" thus means "has been made." All this is positive evidence that the ideas in Philo were real objects created by God. Similarly when these

Qu. in Gen., I am informed by Professor Ralph Marcus, may stand either for the Greek ἰδέαι or for the Greek εἴδη. Evidently Aucher took it in the wrong sense.

[14] *Leg. All.* I, 9, 23.
[15] *Ibid.*, 10, 24.
[16] *Opif.* 4, 19.
[17] *Cher.* 28, 97.
[18] *Qu. in Gen.* IV, 1.
[19] *Leg. All.* I, 19, 65.

terms, in the subsequent history of philosophy, are used as a description of the process of emanation, that which is emanated from God is also conceived as something which exists outside of God, having been caused by God to emanate from himself. But there is also corroborative evidence of a negative kind. Never does Philo describe the ideas as ungenerated. Indeed in two passages he does use the term eternal (ἀΐδιος) in connection with the term idea,[20] but the term "eternal," as we shall show later, does not necessarily mean "ungenerated"; nor can it have here the meaning of "eternal generation"; it may only mean "everlasting," that is, indestructible; or else, in the passages in question, it may refer to the eternity of the ideas in the mind of God before they were created.[21] When we consider the fact that in Plato the ideas are described as "ungenerated" [22] and as not admitting of "generation," [23] the absence of any of such description of the ideas in Philo is to be considered as a deliberate omission, and this on account of his view that the ideas as real beings are not eternal and are not ungenerated, but are creations of God. This conception of the ideas as created may be considered, however, not as a departure from Plato but rather as an interpretation of him, for in Plato, too, as we have seen, in opposition to his own statements that the ideas are eternal and ungenerated, there is a statement that God produces (ἐργάσασθαι)[24] the idea of a bed, or that He has made (ἐποίησε)[25] that idea of the bed. In the mind of Philo, the conflicting statements of Plato must have formed themselves into a composite view, namely, that the ideas, prior to the creation of the world, had two stages of existence: first, as

[20] *Decal.* 25, 134 (cf. above, p. 203, n. 25) and *Mut.* 21, 122–123 (cf. below, p. 212, n. 55).

[21] Cf. below, p. 222.

[22] *Timaeus* 52 A; cf. 28 A; 29 A.

[23] *Philebus* 15 B.

[24] *Republic* X, 597 B.

[25] *Ibid.*, 597 C.

thoughts in the mind of God, they existed from eternity; then, as real beings outside the mind of God, they were created by God; and it is in the sense of real beings, and hence created beings, exclusively, that he chose to use the term ideas in his writings, probably to counteract the common tendency of the philosophy of his time to regard the Platonic ideas as mere thoughts of God.[26] But even after their creation, according to Philo, the ideas do not cease to exist in the thought of God, inasmuch as God cannot be ignorant of their existence. Accordingly, to him, in the ideas there are not only two successive stages of existence but also two simultaneous phases of existence, one in thought of God and the other outside the thought of God. As a designation of the ideas in their pre-created stage, when they were only thoughts of God, Philo, as we shall see, uses another term.[27]

Thus the ideas, in the sense of patterns of the things which exist in this world of ours, have not existed from eternity as real beings. Moreover, even as mere thoughts of God, the ideas were not always patterns of the things which exist in our world; they were conceived as such by God only when He decided to create the world. "We must suppose," says Philo, "that, when He intended to found one great city, He conceived beforehand the models of its parts (*τοὺς τύπους αὐτῆς*),[28] and that out of these He constituted an intelligible world."[29] The meaning of this passage is quite clear: the ideas which are the patterns of the thing within our world, and similarly also the intelligible world as a whole which

[26] Zeller interprets Philo as believing that the ideas are only thoughts of God (III, 2[4], p. 411). Cf. above, n. 2.

[27] Cf. below, p. 223.

[28] Literally: "the models thereof." But Colson rightly translates "the models of the parts," which is justified by the context.

[29] *Opif.* 4, 19.

consists of the ideas and is the pattern of our world as a whole, were conceived in the mind of God when He determined to create this world of ours; they did not exist in the mind of God before He decided to create the world. Still, inasmuch as the mind of God is always active, always thinking, and never devoid of objects of thought, it is to be assumed that in the mind of God from eternity there had existed an infinite variety of ideas, not patterns of things of our world, but rather patterns of things of an infinite variety of possible worlds, from among which God conceived the particular patterns of things which in His wisdom were the most suitable for this world of ours which He decided to create. That such an infinite number of ideas had existed in the mind of God from eternity, before He decided which of the ideas were to serve as the patterns of the things of this world of ours to be created, we shall see in the sequel.[30]

With his conception of the ideas as created by God, and hence as dependent upon God for their existence, Philo departs from Plato with regard to the application of the term "that which really is" (*ὄντως ὄν*)[31] to the ideas. That term is reserved by him for God alone. In this he derives support from the scriptural name of God, "I am," [32] which in the Septuagint is translated by "He that is" (*ὁ ὤν*), and is explained by Philo himself to mean that "God alone has veritable being." [33] Accordingly, God is invariably described by him as He that really is (*ὁ ὄντως ὤν*; *τὸ ὄντως ὄν*)[34] or He that truly is (*πρὸς ἀλήθειαν ὤν*).[35] Similarly the term *ousia* (*οὐσία*), which, with or without such adjectives as "indivisible," "eternal," "true," and "real," is used by Plato as a designation of the ideas,[36] loses with Philo that

[30] Cf. below, pp. 223, 315–316.
[31] *Phaedrus* 247 E.
[32] Exod. 3: 14.
[33] *Deter.* 44, 160.
[34] Cf. Leisegang, *Indices*, sub *εἶναι*.
[35] *Abr.* 28, 143.
[36] *Timaeus* 35 A; 37 E; *Sophist* 246 B; 248 B; *Phaedo* 78 D.

restricted meaning, and is used by him in the Aristotelian meaning of essence and substance as well as in the Stoic meaning of matter.[37] Since God alone is a creator, he applies to Him exclusively the Platonic terms Demiurge,[38] that is, Craftsman, Maker (*ποιητής*),[39] Planter (*φυτουργός*),[40] Parent (*γεννητής*),[41] Father (*πατήρ*),[42] and Cause (*αἴτιος*).[43] Some of these terms, such as Father, Maker, Parent, Planter, are also to be found in Scripture.[44] The concept of God as creator of everything is also expressed in his application to God of the terms spring (*πηγή*)[45] and light (*φῶς*).[46] The use of these two terms as a description of God, according to Philo's own statements, is based upon the scriptural verses: "Me they forsook, a spring of life" [47] and "The Lord is my light and my saviour," [48] though the analogy of light, or rather the sun, is also used by Plato as a description of the ideas.[49] Sometimes, instead of calling God light, Philo describes Him as lightgiving (*φωσφόρος*)[50] or the "intelligible sun," [51] the latter term evidently based upon a combination of Plato [52] and of the scriptural verse, which in the masoretic Hebrew text reads "For the Lord is a sun and a shield." [53]

Whether Philo has put any limit upon the kinds of things within the visible world for which there are to be corresponding ideas, or whether for every kind of thing within the visible world there is to be a corresponding idea, cannot be

[37] Cf. Leisegang, *Indices*, sub *οὐσία*.
[38] *Leg. All.* II, 1, 3, *et alia*.
[39] *Spec.* I, 5, 30.
[40] *Conf.* 38, 196.
[41] *Spec.* II, 32, 198.
[42] *Opif.* 24, 74.
[43] *Somn.* I, 11, 67.
[44] Deut. 32: 6 (*πατὴρ, ἐποίησέ σε*), 18 (*τὸν γεννήσαντά σε*); Gen. 2: 8 (*ἐφύτευσεν ὁ θεὸς*).
[45] *Fug.* 36, 198.
[46] *Somn.* I, 13, 75.
[47] Jer. 2: 13; cf. *Fug.* 36, 197.
[48] Ps. 27: 1; cf. *Somn.* I, 13, 75.
[49] *Republic* VI, 508 B–C; 509 B.
[50] *Ebr.* 11, 44.
[51] *Virt.* 30, 164; *Spec.* I, 51, 279.
[52] Cf. above, p. 201.
[53] Ps. 84: 12; In the Septuagint, the reading is: "Because the Lord loveth mercy and truth."

known, as he makes no statement in which anything is explicitly excluded from having a preëxistent idea corresponding to it. All his statements bearing on this subject are couched in positive language. From the passages quoted above [54] it is evident that there are as many "intelligible objects," that is, ideas, in the ideal world as there are "sensible objects" in the corporeal world, and that these ideas are the genera of the particular objects, whether particular objects of thought or particular objects of sense. In one place, he speaks of music in contrast to the musician, and of medicine in contrast to the physician, and of art in general in contrast to the artist, as "habits" (ἕξεις) in contrast to the individual persons in whom they exist, and each of these habits is described by him as "everlasting, active, perfect," and as an "idea." [55] Now, the term "habit" in this passage is used by Philo, evidently after Aristotle, in the sense of quality (ποιόν),[56] that is, one of the categories of accident. From this it may be inferred that according to him there is an idea for every accident. In other places, he speaks of the idea of heaven, earth, air, void, water, breath, light,[57] man,[58] first numbers,[59] equality,[60] and virginity,[61] and indirectly he also refers to the idea of virtue [62] and the idea of repentance.[63] All these are universals and correspond to particulars which are objects of nature. But he mentions also the idea of an object which is artificial, namely, the idea of the tabernacle, which, together with its vessels, was shown to Moses before

[54] *Opif.* 4, 16; *Leg. All.* I, 9, 23; 10, 24.
[55] *Mut.* 21, 122–123.
[56] *Ibid.*, 121, and cf. *Categ.*, 8, 8b, 25–35.
[57] *Opif.* 7, 29; cf. *Mos.* I, 22, 126 (light).
[58] *Opif.* 46, 134.
[59] *Ibid.* 34, 102.
[60] *Heres* 29, 146.
[61] *Cher.* 15, 51.
[62] *Leg. All.* I, 14, 45: implied in the expression "heavenly virtue" as contrasted with "earthly virtue"; cf. below, II, 202.
[63] *Qu. in Gen.* I, 82: implied in his statement that "a little while before He appointed mercy and pardon to exist, now again He decrees that penitence shall exist." Cf. above, pp. 185 f., and below, p. 257.

it was made by Bezaleel.[64] But this would seem to have been considered by him an exceptional case, and no inference can be drawn from it as to a general belief on his part in the existence of ideas of artificial things. Finally, from the fact that he denies that God is the cause of evil,[65] it would seem that he did not believe that there were any ideas of evil and imperfection.

This conception of the kind of ideas that exist as patterns of things is based upon Plato, for in Plato's writings are to be found statements to the effect that there are ideas corresponding to every number of individuals which have "a common name," [66] to the four elements,[67] to qualities,[68] to artificial objects,[69] to numbers,[70] to activities,[71] to relations such as equality,[72] and also that there are no ideas corresponding to vile and worthless things.[73] But, departing from Plato's various lists of ideas, Philo introduces two new ideas, namely, the idea of mind and the idea of soul. In Plato there is neither an idea of mind nor an idea of soul.[74] Instead, according to him, prior to the creation of the world there was a universal mind and a universal soul, and these upon the creation of the world were united to form a rational soul, which rational soul was put into the world.[75] Philo, in departure from Plato, as we shall see,[76] does not believe that there is in the world a mind or a soul or the combination of the two. Nor does he believe that prior to the creation of the world there was a universal mind and a universal soul. To him

[64] *Mos.* II, 15, 74; cf. above, p. 182.

[65] *Provid.* (Aucher) II, 82, and cf. below, p. 273.

[66] *Republic* X, 596 A.

[67] *Timaeus* 51 B.

[68] *Phaedo* 65 D.

[69] *Republic* X, 597 C.

[70] *Ibid.* V, 479 B; *Phaedo* 101 C.

[71] *Cratylus* 386 D–E.

[72] *Republic* V, 479 B.

[73] *Parmenides* 130 C. Cf. Zeller, II, 1[4], p. 701, n. 1 (*Plato*, p. 273, n. 126).

[74] This point is discussed fully in our introductory volume on Greek philosophy.

[75] *Timaeus* 30 B; 34 C ff.

[76] Cf. below, pp. 326, 363 ff.

the minds and souls in the world are all individual minds and souls, and they were all created with the creation of the various living beings. But still, all created beings in the visible world, according to him, were preceded by the creation of ideas corresponding to them. Consequently, the created individual minds and souls in the world must have been preceded by the creation of the idea of mind and the idea of soul. We thus find that Philo speaks of the idea of mind (*ἰδέα τοῦ νοῦ*) and the idea of sensation (*ἰδέα τῆς αἰσθήσεως*),[77] the term sensation being used by him here as synonymous with soul, for, as he says, "by the senses (*αἰσθήσεων*) the Creator endowed the body with a soul." [78] These "ideas" of "mind" and "sensation" he also describes as having been completed, that is, created, prior to the "individual mind" (*νοῦς ἄτομος*) and "particular sensation" (*αἴσθησις ἐν μέρει*).[79]

In his description of the creation of the ideas, as we have seen, Philo uses the same term that is used by Plato in his description of the creation of the universal soul, namely, that it is older than the world. Now when Plato says that soul is older than body and prior (*πρεσβυτέραν*) to it, he is careful to qualify these terms by adding the phrase "in birth (*γενέσει*) and excellence (*ἀρετῇ*)." [80] By this he evidently means to emphasize the fact that the seniority and priority of soul is not in point of time, inasmuch as time according to Plato did not exist before the creation of heaven,[81] and without time, as says Aristotle, there cannot be any "prior";[82] the soul is prior and older than the body only in point of what Aristotle would call "priority in nature," in that it is "better and more honorable" [83] than body and is in some way the "cause" [84] of body. Philo similarly tries to explain

[77] *Leg. All.* I, 9, 21–22.
[78] *Opif.* 48, 139.
[79] *Leg. All.* I, 1, 1.
[80] *Timaeus* 34 C.
[81] *Ibid.* 37 D.
[82] *Phys.* VIII, 1, 251b, 10–12.
[83] *Categ.*, 12, 14b, 4–5.
[84] *Ibid.*, 12–13.

that the priority of the creation of the ideas to the creation of the world is not a temporal priority, for, following the generally accepted view that time is connected with motion,[85] and believing as he did that the world and hence also motion were created, before the creation of the world there was no time and hence no temporal priority.[86] Commenting therefore on the verse "In the beginning God made the heaven and the earth," [87] which according to his interpretation of the first day of creation refers to the ideas of heaven and earth,[88] he says that this is not to be taken as a beginning "according to time" but rather as a beginning "according to number," so that the expression "in the beginning God made the heaven" is equivalent to "He made the heaven first." [89] By a beginning according to number and in the sense of first he further explains that he means first in order (*τάξις*),[90] for "order," he says, "involves number." [91] "Order," he still further explains, "is the sequence (*ἀκολουθία*) and connection (*εἰρμός*) of things going on before and following after," [92] for in the creation of the world, he says in effect, there had to be such an order, inasmuch as some things are better than others, and it was reasonable that the heaven should come into existence first, inasmuch as it is "the best of created things." [93] Now all this is only a circuitous way of restating the distinction made by Aristotle between "prior" (*πρότερον*) in the sense of priority "according to time" [94] and other senses of the same term, of which he mentions the following four: (1) "One thing is said to be prior to another when the sequence (*ἀκολούθησιν*) of their being cannot be reversed,"

[85] *Opif.* 7, 26; cf. below, p. 319.
[86] *Opif.* 7, 26.
[87] Gen. 1: 1.
[88] Cf. below, pp. 306-307.
[89] *Opif.* 7, 27.
[90] *Ibid.* 7, 28.
[91] *Ibid.* 3, 13.
[92] *Ibid.* 7, 28.
[93] *Ibid.* 7, 27.
[94] *Categ.*, 12, 14a, 27.

as, for example, " 'one' is prior to 'two'." [95] (2) "The term prior is used with reference to any order (*τάξιν*)," as, for example, "in geometry, the elements are prior to propositions." [96] (3) "That which is better and more honorable is said to be prior by nature" and also (4) "that which is in any way the cause of an effect." [97] Philo's explanation of the phrase "in the beginning" as meaning "beginning according to number" and in the sense of "first" seems to include all these four senses of "prior" which Aristotle distinguishes from "prior according to time." What he means to say is that the world was created according to a certain order of sequence and causality which was to remain permanently as its established law.[98]

Having explained that the phrase "in the beginning" does not imply a temporal priority but rather a priority in "sequence," in "order," and in being "better," he says that this kind of beginning is applicable to the creation of the heaven "even if the Maker made all things simultaneously" (eee).[99] Now the term "simultaneous," too, is said by Aristotle to be "primarily and most appropriately" applied to things which exist according to time,[100] and one would therefore like to ask how, if Philo denied that the ideas were temporally prior to the world, he could say that they were simultaneous with the world. Probably he would answer that he had used the term "simultaneous" in the sense in which, according to Aristotle, species within the same genus are said to be "simultaneous in nature," [101] for all created things, whether incorporeal or corporeal, can be considered as various species under the common genus of created things. It will be noticed that in Aristotle's allusion to Plato's account of the creation of soul, the original expression "God made soul in

[95] *Ibid.*, 30–31.
[96] *Ibid.*, 36, 39.
[97] *Ibid.*, 14b, 4–5 and 12–13.
[98] Cf. below, p. 328.
[99] *Opif.* 7, 28.
[100] *Categ.*, c. 13, 14b, 24–27.
[101] *Ibid.*, 33–34.

birth and excellence prior to body, and elder" [102] is changed by him to read: "The soul is simultaneous with the heaven," [103] the term "simultaneous" being evidently used here by Aristotle only in the sense of a negation of priority in time.

As we go on in our studies, we shall see how even before the creation of the world and of time a kind of timeless priority was conceived by some philosophers to be possible by the introduction, before the creation of time, of the conception of "duration" or a "supposition of time." [104]

III. Powers

Primarily the ideas are used by Philo, as they are by Plato, in the sense of patterns. The scriptural verse which he quotes as proof text for the antiquity of the theory of ideas, namely, the ideas of the tabernacle and its vessels, proves only the existence of ideas in the sense of patterns. But in Plato the ideas are conceived not only as patterns but also as causes (*αἰτίαι*),[1] in which sense he describes them as possessing power (*δύναμις*).[2] Philo similarly describes the ideas, in that passage in which he calls them "habits," [3] as having power (*δύναμις*) and as being active (*ἐνεργοῦν*).[4] With this additional characteristic of the Platonic ideas in his mind, Philo tries to show that the conception of ideas as causes has

[102] *Timaeus* 34 C.

[103] *Metaph.* XII, 6, 1072a. 2.

[104] The origin of the conception of "duration" and the "supposition of time" is traced by the present writer in the chapter "Duration, Time, and Eternity" in *The Philosophy of Spinoza* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1934), and in *Crescas' Critique of Aristotle* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1929), pp. 93–98; 651–658.

[1] *Phaedo* 95 E ff. Cf. Zeller, II, 1⁴, p. 687, n. 1 (*Plato*, p. 263, n. 110).

[2] *Sophist* 247 D–E. Cf. Zeller, II, 1⁴, p. 689, n. 3 (*Plato*, p. 262, n. 109).

[3] Cf. above, p. 212.

[4] *Mut.* 21, 122.

also been anticipated in Scripture. He does this by identifying the Platonic ideas, in so far as they are causes and have power, with what, according to him, Scripture calls the powers of God.

The passage in which Philo identifies the Platonic ideas with the scriptural powers of God is a homily on the verse in which Moses prays: "Show me, I pray Thee, Thy glory." [5] In Philo's paraphrase, Moses' prayer assumes the following form. "I bow before Thy admonitions, that I never could have received the vision of the clearly manifested, but I beseech Thee that I may at least see the glory that surrounds Thee, and by Thy glory I understand the powers that keep guard around Thee. . . . To this He (God) answers: The powers which thou seekest to know are discerned not by sight but by mind even as I, whose they are, am discerned by mind and not by sight. . . . You men have for your use seals which when brought into contact with wax or similar material stamp on them any number of impressions which they themselves are not docked in any part thereby but remain as they were. Such you must conceive my powers to be, supplying qualities to things which have no qualities and shapes to things which have no shapes and yet changing or lessening nothing of their eternal nature. Some among you call them not inaptly ideas (ἰδέας), since they bring form into everything that is." [6]

In this passage, it will be noticed, three terms are equated, glory, powers, and ideas, and of these three terms the first two are said to be scriptural and only the third one is said to be Platonic, for it is Plato and his followers to whom Philo refers in his statement that "some among you call them not inaptly ideas." No reference is made to the fact that in

[5] Exod. 33: 18.

[6] *Spec.* I, 8, 45–48; cf. 60, 329.

Plato, too, the ideas are called powers. But that Philo was aware of Plato's description of the ideas as having power is evident from the fact that he puts in the mouth of God a description of His powers in terms of Platonic ideas as something already known to the readers. It will also be noticed that the identification of glory with powers is introduced by Philo through his spokesman Moses as something which "I understand." No explanation is given by Philo of why Moses understood by "glory" the "powers" that stand around God. The fact that Philo saw no need of explaining why Moses understood that "glory" means the "powers" shows that in his mind the identification of these two terms needed no explanation; that it was something concerning which he had reason to believe that it was known to his readers. The reason why he believed that this identification was already known to his readers is the fact that "glory" and "powers" are explicitly identified in scriptural verses which already at that time, in the synagogues of Alexandria, must have formed part of the liturgy. In these verses, the Psalmist exclaims: "Open wide your gates, ye chiefs . . . that the King of glory may come in. Who is the King of glory? The Lord of the Powers. He is the King of glory." [7] The "Lord of Powers" here is that frequently occurring scriptural expression Lord of Sabaoth, which is usually translated into English by Lord of Hosts, but which in the Septuagint, in this particular verse as well as in many other verses, is translated by a term which literally means "the Lord of the powers" (*κύριος τῶν δυνάμεων*).[8]

As to who those hosts or powers are, of whom God is spoken of as the Lord, it is a matter of speculation among

[7] Ps. 24: 9–10 (LXX).

[8] Other translations in the Septuagint of the same Hebrew expression are: *κύριος σαβαώθ, κύριος παντοκράτωρ.*

scholars. It may sometimes mean the Lord of the hosts of Israel, for Scripture speaks of "The Lord of hosts mustereth the host of battle." [9] It may perhaps also mean the stars, for the celestial bodies are called in Scripture "the host of heaven." [10] Furthermore, it may perhaps also mean the angels, for angels are definitely called the hosts or powers of God in such verses as: "Bless the Lord, all ye his angels . . . Bless the Lord, all ye his hosts" (*δυνάμεις*).[11] "Praise him, all ye his angels: praise him, all ye his hosts" (*δυνάμεις*).[12] Philo, however, like any exegetist of Scripture, has assumed the right to interpret the term "powers," at least when it is identified with "glory," as meaning the ideas.[13]

The powers which are thus identified with the ideas are like the ideas spoken of by Philo as having been created by God. God is said to be the Father of the powers.[14] As created by God, they are also spoken of by him as being external to God and "attending" Him as "bodyguards," [15] as coming after God,[16] as being the glory which is "around" God,[17] and as being "on either side of Him." [18] All this reflects such scriptural statements as "I saw the God of Israel seated on his throne and all the host (*στρατιὰ*) of heaven stood around him, some on the right and some on the left," [19] and "I saw the Lord seated on a high and lofty throne, and the house was filled with His glory; and Seraphim stood around Him." [20] According to Philo's interpretation, we shall see, the term Seraphim has two meanings, one of them

[9] Isa. 13: 4.
[10] Deut. 4: 19, *et passim*.
[11] Ps. 103: 20–21.
[12] Ps. 148: 2.
[13] For his interpretation of the "Lord of the powers" in the sense of the Lord of the angels, see below, p. 373.
[14] *Cher.* 31, 106.
[15] *Spec.* I, 8, 45; cf. *Sacr.* 15, 59; *Immut.* 24, 109; *Abr.* 24, 122.
[16] *Post.* 48, 169.
[17] *Spec.* I, 8, 45.
[18] *Abr.* 24, 121.
[19] I Kings 22: 19.
[20] Isa. 6: 1–2 (LXX).

that of "pattern" (*typus* = τύπος), that is, idea.[21] And so, since Scripture says that "The host of heaven stood around Him, some on the right and some on the left," and that also "Seraphim stood around Him," Philo was quite justified in describing the ideas or powers as "attending" God as "body-guards," as being "around" Him, and as being "on either side of Him." [22]

But this power of acting as causes which the ideas possess does not, according to Philo, belong to them by their own nature. They derive it from God. "To act," he says, "is the property of God, and this we may not ascribe to any created being; the property of the created is to suffer." [23] Since the power to act was bestowed upon the ideas by God, we must necessarily assume that before His bestowal upon them of that power at the time of their creation God had possessed it himself as a property of His own nature, and as a property of God it could not but have existed in Him from eternity. As a property of God, again, it could not be something distinct from the essence of God: it must be identical with His essence.[24] The powers in the sense of a property of God, unlike the powers in the sense of a property of the ideas or the ideas themselves, are thus to be spoken of as eternal. But even the powers as a property of the ideas, since they have been bestowed upon the ideas by God, may be considered as only an extension of the powers as a property of God and may therefore be treated as a part of the eternal powers of God. Philo, therefore, sometimes uses the term

[21] *De Deo*, 6; cf. below, p. 340.

[22] Goodenough (*By Light, Light*, pp. 42–43) has found the term δορυφόροι used in a Hermetic text (as a description of two guards one of which is the keeper and the other the guide of souls) and also in two magical papyri. But in Philo the term *doruphoros* in the general sense of a *body-guard* or an *escort* or a mere *satellite* is used in connection with all sorts of things (see Leisegang, *Indices*, *s. v.*).

[23] *Cher.* 24, 77.

[24] Cf. below, II, 33.

powers in a general sense and speaks of them as being of an "eternal nature," [25] as being "eternal" in contrast to that which is "created," [26] as being infinite as God himself,[27] or as being uncircumscribed as God himself.[28] All such expressions refer to the powers either in the exclusive sense of a property of God or both in the sense of a property of God and in the sense of the property of ideas, considering the latter as only an extension of the powers which are a property of God. Moreover, since the powers possessed by the ideas are derived from God, in whom they are eternal, Philo sometimes refers even to the created powers, which stand around Him, as uncreated. He thus says: "And can you think it possible that your understanding should be able to grasp in their unmixed purity those uncreated powers, which stand around Him and flash forth light of surpassing splendor?" [29] In this passage there is a particular reason for calling the powers uncreated: it is to emphasize that they are not created in the same sense as corporeal things are created; the former are created out of matter, the latter are created like the emanation of a ray of light from the lightgiving God.[30] The term "uncreated" applied to the created powers in this passage may therefore merely mean that they are not created like man; in this sense it is analogous to his statement about the Logos, that it is neither uncreated like God nor created like man.[31]

On the whole, we may therefore say that the ideas in Philo are real beings created by God. But as created beings they may be regarded as patterns, in which sense they are called ideas, or they may be regarded as causes, in which sense they are called powers. Now it happens that when Philo treats

[25] *Spec.* I, 8, 47.
[26] *Mos.* II, 12, 65.
[27] *Opif.* 6, 23.
[28] *Sacr.* 15, 59.
[29] *Immut.* 17, 78.
[30] *Ibid.*
[31] *Heres* 42, 206; cf. below, p. 234.

of them as mere patterns, he calls them ideas, never applies to them the term uncreated, and describes them as having been conceived in the mind of God and also as having been created outside His mind.[32] When, however, he treats of them as causes, he calls them powers, applies to them the term uncreated, and describes them as having, prior to their creation, existed in the mind of God from eternity. Furthermore, during their eternal existence in the mind of God they were as "infinite" and as "uncircumscribed" as God himself.[33] By this latter statement he means that the powers or ideas, before their creation as real beings, to serve as a finite and circumscribed number of patterns of the finite and circumscribed number of things in our finite and circumscribed world, existed in the mind of God as an infinite and uncircumscribed number of patterns of an infinite variety of possible things in an infinite number of possible worlds which God, if He only willed, could create.[34]

The difference between powers as a property of God and powers as created beings corresponds to the difference between the two ways in which God acts upon the world, the direct and the indirect.[35] The term powers in the sense of a property of God merely means the power of God to do things directly in His own person; the term powers in the sense of created beings means the power of God to do things indirectly through intermediaries. According to Philo, as we shall see, primary goods come directly from God, whereas secondary goods, as well as punishments, come from God through the intermediacy of the powers,[36] but in certain circumstances even punishments come directly from God.[37] Now, in native Jewish tradition, God is said to deal with the world in two

[32] Cf. above, p. 208.
[33] *Opif.* 6, 23; *Sacr.* 15, 59.
[34] Cf. above, p. 210.
[35] Cf. below, p. 269.
[36] Cf. below, p. 382.
[37] *Ibid.*

ways, according to the quality of mercy or goodness and according to the quality of law or punishment.[38] These two ways of God's dealing with the world are said to be represented in Scripture by two names of God. According to an earlier Palestinian tradition, goodness is identified with the name Elohim and the punishment with the name Jehovah. According to a later Palestinian tradition, it is the reverse: Jehovah is identified with mercy and Elohim with law.[39]

Reflecting this native Jewish tradition, Philo similarly divides the powers, both in the sense of a property of God and in the sense of created beings, into two classes. One of them is described by the term goodness (*ἀγαθότης*) or propitious (*ἵλεως*) or beneficent (*εὐεργέτις*) or gracious (*χαριστική*) or creative (*ποιητική*); the other is described by the term authority (*ἐξουσία*) or sovereignty (*ἀρχή*) or governing (*ἀρχική*) or legislative (*νομοθετική*) or regal (*βασιλική*) or punitive (*κολαστήριος, κολαστική*).[40] Like the native Jewish tradition, he finds this twofold classification of the divine powers represented in Scripture by the two names for God, Lord (*κύριος*) and God (*θεός*), which in the Septuagint translate respectively the Hebrew Jehovah and Elohim; and, like the older version of the Palestinian tradition, he identifies the

[38] *Jer. Ta'anit* II, 1, 65b; *Genesis Rabbah* 12, 15; *Mekilta, Pisḥa*, 16, F., p. 19b; W., p. 24a; L., I, p. 137; *Berakot* 48b.

[39] Cf. A. Marmorstein, *The Old Rabbinic Doctrine of God*, 1927, pp. 43 ff.; *idem*, "Philo and the Names of God," *Jewish Quarterly Review*, N.S. 22 (1931–32), 295–306; L. Finkelstein, "Recent Progress in Jewish Theology," *Jewish Quarterly Review*, N.S. 20 (1929–30), 362–363; R. Marcus, "Recent Literature on Philo," *Jewish Studies in Memory of George A. Kohut*, 1935, pp. 477–478; M. Stein, *Pilon ha-Alexandroni*, 1937, p. 58, n. 3.

[40] Cf. *Cher.* 9, 27–28 (1): Goodness, identified with creation, and (2) authority; *Sacr.* 15, 59: (1) sovereignty and (2) goodness; *Heres* 34, 166: (1) gracious and (2) punitive; *Abr.* 25, 124–125: (1) beneficent and (2) governing or regal; *Qu. in Ex.* II, 68, Harris, *Fragments*, p. 67: (1) creative and (2) regal, from which come respectively (1) propitious or beneficent and (2) legislative or punitive; *Fug.* 18, 95: (1) creative, (2) regal, (3) propitious, (4) legislative, subdivided into (a) command and (b) prohibition. Cf. Siegfried, p. 213; Drummond, II, pp. 83–85.

power of goodness with Elohim, or God, and the punitive power with Jehovah, or the Lord.[41] But inasmuch as he uses the term powers both in the sense of ideas and in the sense of a property of God, he expresses himself in his various classifications of these powers in two ways. On the one hand, referring to powers in the sense of ideas, he speaks of these two classes of powers as something distinct from God.[42] But on the other hand, referring to the powers as a property of God, he speaks of God himself as being gracious,[43] or good,[44] or a creator,[45] or a king,[46] or a sovereign,[47] or a lawgiver.[48]

In the native Jewish original of this Philonic classification of the powers, the term "powers" is not used. The term used there instead is one which literally means "measures" and derivatively means also "rules" and "standards."[49] A reflection of this original Palestinian term may be discerned also in Philo. In one passage he gives his twofold classification of the powers in the form of a comment upon the verse "Hasten and knead three measures (*μέτρα*) of fine meal."[50] He then adds the explanation that each of God's powers "measures all things" and that "His goodness is the measure (*μέτρον*) of things good, His authority is the measure of things in subjection, and the Ruler himself is the measure of all things corporeal and incorporeal, on which account the powers assume also the functions of rules (*κανόνων*) and standards (*παραπηγμάτων*) and measure what lies within

[41] *Plant.* 20, 86; *Abr.* 25, 124. The translation of Jehovah by *κύριος* reflects the traditional Jewish substitution of Adonai for Jehovah.

Bréhier (pp. 144–151) tries to find parallels for this distinction in Stoicism. Goodenough (*By Light, Light*, pp. 42 ff.) tries to find its parallels in the Hermetic literature.

[42] *Cher.* 9, 27–28; *Fug.* 18, 94–96.

[43] *ἵλεως. Leg. All.* III, 61, 174.

[44] *ἀγαθός. Ibid.* I, 14, 47.

[45] *ποιητής. Spec.* I, 5, 30.

[46] *βασιλεύς. Cher.* 29, 99.

[47] *ἄρχων. Ibid.* 24, 83.

[48] *νομοθέτης. Fug.* 13, 66.

[49] *Middot.*

[50] Gen. 18:6.

their province." [51] One can readily admit that there is an allusion in this passage to Plato's statement that "in our eyes God will be the measure of all things," [52] in opposition to Protagoras' view that man is the measure of all things.[53] But still — in view of the fact that what Philo calls here "powers" and describes as "rules" and "standards" and as "measuring" is called in native Jewish tradition by a term which means "measures," "rules," and "standards" — it is not unreasonable to assume that the two classes of "powers" in Philo and the two classes of "measures" in native Jewish tradition are somehow connected and, if neither of them is dependent upon the other, they may reflect a common tradition.[54]

IV. The Intelligible World and the Logos

We thus have in Philo two terms, ideas and powers, expressing two aspects of the Platonic ideas — one their aspect as mere patterns of things and the other their aspect as causes of things. With regard to the term ideas, Philo uses it exclusively as a description of the patterns created by God when He decided to create our world; and hence he never applies to ideas the term uncreated. With regard to the term powers, however, Philo uses it both as a description of the eternal powers which are a property of God and as a description of the powers which were created by God when He decided to create our world; and hence he speaks of powers also as uncreated. But sometimes Philo treats of the ideas, and also of the powers, as a totality, no longer as the patterns or causes of individual things in our world but as the pattern

[51] *Sacr.* 15, 59.

[52] *Laws* IV, 716 c.

[53] *Post.* 11, 35; *Somn.* II, 29, 193. Cf. Leisegang's note in *Philos Werke* on *Post.* 11, 35, and Colson's note on *Post.* 11, 36, and on *Somn.* II, 29, 193.

[54] Cf. above, p. 91.

or the cause of the world as a whole. When treated as such, they are given by Philo two new names, intelligible world and Logos. Let us, then, study these two new names.

The treatment of the ideas as a totality under one name is already found in Plato, in passages wherein he refers to the ideal pattern of the world as a whole as the intelligible animal (*νοητὸν ζῷον*)[1] or the animal that truly is (*τὸ ὃ ἔστι ζῷον*),[2] in contrast to the physical world which he describes as a "visible animal" (*ζῷον ὁρατόν*);[3] and under this intelligible animal he includes four ideas of the four types of living beings in the world, to which he refers as the intelligible animals (*νοητὰ ζῷα*).[4] But the expression intelligible world (*κόσμος νοητός*) which Philo gives to the totality of ideas is not known to have been used before him.[5] Plato, indeed, uses the expressions "intelligible place" (*νοητὸς τόπος*)[6] and "supercelestial place" (*ὑπερουράνιος τόπος*)[7] as a description of the place of the ideas, but these two expressions do not exactly mean the same as Philo's "intelligible world," for by the former Plato means the astronomical heaven[8] and by the latter he means, according to our interpretation, an infinite void outside the world.[9] Philo's "intelligible world" is

[1] *Timaeus* 39 E. Cf. J. Horovitz, *Untersuchungen über Philons und Platons Lehre von der Weltschöpfung*, 1900, pp. 1–103.

[2] *Ibid.* [3] *Ibid.* 30 D.

[4] *Ibid.* 30 C; cf. below, p. 307.

[5] Philo is taken to be the first to have used the term intelligible world. Cf. Bréhier, *Plotin: Ennéades* II (1924), p. 58, n. 1; P. Shorey, *Plato: The Republic* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, the Loeb Classical Library, 1930–1935), VII, 517 C, Vol. II (1935), p. 130, n. a. The expression *κόσμος ἀσώματος* in *Philebus* 64 B does not mean the "incorporeal world" of the ideas, but rather the "incorporeal order" which exists in living bodies in the physical world, the term *κόσμος* having there the meaning of *λόγος* (cf. R. G. Bury's note in his edition).

[6] *Republic* VI, 509 D; VII, 517 B.

[7] *Phaedrus* 247 C.

[8] Cf. L. Robin, *La Theorie platonicienne de l'amour*, pp. 83–84; R. Arnou, *Le Désir de dieu dans la philosophie de Plotin*, p. 48, n. 1; P. Shorey, *loc. cit.*

[9] Cf. below, p. 241.

neither of these.[10] The term intelligible world was probably coined by Philo himself. This intelligible world is defined by him as a "commonwealth (πολιτεία) of imperishable and incorporeal ideas," [11] or as a world which "consists (συνεστῶτα) of ideas" [12] or "of invisible ideas," [13] or as a world which was framed (ἐπάγη) from "incorporeal and paradigmatic ideas." [14] As the individual ideas are the patterns of the individual things in the world, so the intelligible world is the archetype of this phenomenal world [15] or the pattern of this visible world.[16] Again, as in the case of the ideas of which the intelligible world is constituted so also in the case of the intelligible world, it is always spoken of as something created by God. We have already quoted Philo's use of the expressions "He first fully formed" and "elder" in connection with the intelligible world as a whole.[17] The intelligible world, like the ideas of which it consists, is a pattern of this world which was conceived and created by God when He willed to create this world. It had no existence prior to that. As in the case of ideas, Philo never refers to it as uncreated. Like the ideas, as a pattern of this world of ours, the intelligible world had no eternal existence even in the mind of God; it was conceived by God only when He decided to create the world.

The term "intelligible" in the expression "intelligible world" would seem to have been used by Philo in two senses.

In one sense, it would seem to have been used by him as the equivalent of the terms "incorporeal" and "invisible," which terms are used by him in the expression "incorporeal ideas" or "invisible" ideas. "Intelligible" in this sense is the opposite of "sensible," and accordingly it means something which can be conceived only by the human mind, as

[10] Cf. below, p. 245.
[11] *Gig.* 13, 61.
[12] *Opif.* 4, 17; cf. 5, 20; *Somn.* I, 32, 186.
[13] *Conf.* 34, 172.
[14] *Mos.* II, 25, 127.
[15] *Conf.* 34, 172.
[16] *Opif.* 4, 16.
[17] Cf. above, p. 205.

opposed to that which can also be perceived by the senses. That this is one of the meanings of the term as used by Philo is quite evident from his use of the expression "intelligible world" as the opposite of "visible world" [18] or "sensible world." [19] Taken in this sense only, the "intelligible world" merely means a world which, because of its incorporeality, can be apprehended only by the human mind.

But the term "intelligible world" would seem to have been used by Philo also in another sense. Not only is it something that can be apprehended only by the human mind, but it is something which, irrespective of the possibility of its being apprehended by the human mind, exists as an object of thought of some kind of mind. For the existence of the intelligible world, according to Philo, does not depend upon the fact that it can be thought of by the human mind; to him, it had existence even before the human mind was created. But still, even before the human mind was created, it had existence not only as an incorporeal world but also as an intelligible world, that is, as an object of thought of some mind. What, then, is that mind of which, even before the human mind was created, the intelligible world was an object of thought?

What that mind is and how it is related to the intelligible world may be gathered from Philo's description of the creation of the intelligible world.

When God had decided to create the world, he says, "He thought out (*ἐνενόησε*) beforehand" the ideas, and out of these ideas "He constituted the intelligible world." [20] The intelligible world, like the ideas of which it consists, was thus "thought out" by God, which implies that it was an object of God's thought, His *νοητόν*, and the result of His act of

[18] *Opif.* 4, 16.
[19] *Mos.* II, 25, 127.
[20] *Opif.* 4, 19.

thinking, His *νόησις*. But when there is an "object of thought" and an "act of thinking," we know from Aristotle, there must be also a mind, a *νοῦς*, which does the thinking, though in the case of God, who in this case does the thinking, these three are all identical.[21] The intelligible world, therefore, before its creation, was the object of thought of the act of thinking of God's mind. Now of the three terms which we should expect here — *νοῦς*, *νόησις*, and *νοητόν* — the third is directly mentioned by Philo in the expression *κόσμος νοητός*, the second is implied in the verb *ἐνενόησε*, but as for the first, *νοῦς*, he does not use that term at all, but in its stead uses the term Logos (*λόγος*), which occurs in his statement that "the world consisting of the ideas could have no other place (*τόπον*) than the Logos of God which ordered them." [22] "Logos" in this passage quite clearly stands for "mind." That Philo uses here the term Logos as a substitute for Aristotle's term mind (*νοῦς*) is also evidenced by the fact that his statement here about the Logos, that it is the place of the intelligible world and ideas, is itself based upon a statement by Aristotle that the thinking (*νοητική*) soul, that is, mind, "is a place (*τόπον*) of forms (*εἰδῶν*)." [23]

Logos, then, is Philo's substitute for the term Nous. For this use of the term Logos as a substitute for the term Nous, Philo had ample justification. In Plato it is correlated with the term knowledge (*ἐπιστήμη*) and thought (*διάνοια*), and is ascribed to God as a characterization of the intelligence with which He created the sun, the moon, and the five other planets, and by which the creative processes in nature in animal and plant life and even in the formation of lifeless substances are continued.[24] In Aristotle, it is often used as a designa-

[21] *Metaph.* XII, 7, 1072b, 18–22; 9, 1075a, 3–5.
[22] *Opif.* 5, 20.
[23] *De Anima* III, 4, 429a, 27–28.
[24] *Timaeus* 38 c; *Sophist* 265 c.

tion of the rational faculty and hence as the equivalent of Nous.[25] In the Stoics, too, it is used as a designation of the rational faculty and hence as the equivalent of Nous,[26] and accordingly, just as they speak of God as the Nous of the world or the Psyche of the world, so they also speak of him as the Logos of the world.[27] Philo, therefore, had good justification for the use of the term Logos as the equivalent of the term Nous, though why he should have substituted it for Nous is a question which we shall try to answer later.[28] It is the mind of God, renamed Logos, in which the ideas and the intelligible world consisting of the ideas were conceived and of which they are an object of thought. Inasmuch as God is absolute simplicity, His mind and His thinking and the objects of His thought are all one and indentical with His essence. The Logos, therefore, as the mind of God and as the place of the ideas from eternity, starts on its career as something identical with the essence of God.

The ideas, however, as we have already seen, do not remain in the mind or the Logos of God. By an act of creation they acquire an existence as created beings outside the mind of God. When they are created and sent forth to an existence outside the mind of God, according to Philo, they are not allowed to fly loose in a disorderly fashion. They are compacted into a world, and that world, again, is not allowed to exist as a bare, compacted group of ideas without something to encase it. The world compacted of ideas is an intelligible world, that is, a world which continues to be the object of thought of a mind, but no longer a mind which is in God and identical with His essence, but a mind created by God, especially created by Him to serve as an encasement of the

[25] Cf. Bonitz, *Index Aristotelicus*, sub λόγος III.

[26] See Index to Arnim, sub λόγος (ratio) and νοῦς.

[27] Cf. below, p. 253, n. 2.

[28] Cf. below, p. 253.

intelligible world and the ideas which constitute that intelligible world. Now, since Philo has chosen to call the mind of God in which the ideas and the intelligible world were conceived by the name of Logos, he continues to use that name also for the mind which God has created as the encasement of the created ideas and the created intelligible world. The Logos, therefore, which started its career as the mind of God or as the thinking power of God, and hence as identical with the essence of God, now enters upon a second stage of its existence, as an incorporeal mind created by God, having existence outside of God's essence, and containing within itself the intelligible world and the myriads of ideas of which the latter consists.

The Logos, then, is the mind of which the intelligible world and the ideas which constitute the intelligible world are the objects of thought. But mind and its object of thought are identical not only in the case of God but, to some degree, also whenever the knowledge of the mind is actual; for, as says Aristotle, "actual knowledge is identical with the thing known." [29] Accordingly, mind or the Logos, whose knowledge of the thing known by it is actual, must be identical with the intelligible world or the ideas which constitute the intelligible world, though, of course, not to the same extent to which the mind of God was identical with the ideas ere the latter were created. It is in this sense that Philo says of the Logos that it is "the rich and manifold union of myriad ideas." [30] In one place, he says that God "stamped the entire world with an image and idea (ἰδέᾳ), namely, His own Logos." [31] Here the term idea, with which the term Logos is synonymous, is evidently used collectively in the sense of the totality of ideas. The conception of the

[29] *De Anima* III, 7, 431a, 1–2.
[30] *Sacr.* 25, 83.
[31] *Somn.* II, 6, 45.

Logos as the totality of ideas, and hence its description by the term idea, is also brought out by him in his statement that the idea of man, which was created by God prior to the creation of the perceptible man and of which the latter is an image (*similitudo*), is itself "the form (*forma*) of the principal character," which form he describes as "the Logos of God, the first principle, the archetypal idea, the first measure of the universe." [32] It is evidently in this collective sense of the totality of the ideas that the Logos is also called by him the idea of ideas (ἰδέα ἰδεῶν),[33] an expression based, as we shall show, upon Aristotle's description of mind as the form of forms (εἶδος εἰδῶν).[34] In another place, he says that "the human mind" was shaped "in conformity with the archetypal idea (ἰδέαν), namely, the most sublime Logos." [35] Here Logos is evidently used in the sense of the idea of mind.[36] It is in this sense that he speaks of the Logos in its relation to the individual human mind as the archetype (ἀρχέτυπος) or pattern (παράδειγμα) of the latter, and of the latter as the copy (μίμημα) of the former.[37] Later we shall show that he uses the term Logos also in the sense of the idea of virtue.[38]

The created incorporeal Logos outside of God, which started on its career as an uncreated Logos in God, continues to possess one of the essential characteristics of the source from which it is derived. It is not only a mind capable of thinking; it is also a mind always in the act of thinking. Just as the uncreated Logos in God is a power like all the powers of God, the act of God's thinking, His νόησις no less than His

[32] *Qu. in Gen.* I, 4.
[33] *Migr.* 18, 103; *Opif.* 6, 25; cf. below, p. 247.
[34] *De Anima* III, 8, 432a, 2.
[35] *Spec.* III, 36, 207.
[36] Cf. above, p. 213.
[37] *Heres* 48, 230; 233; cf. *Opif.* 23, 69; *Spec.* III, 36, 207, and below, p. 425.
[38] Cf. *Somn.* II, 36, 242–243, and below, p. 261; II, 202.

νοῦς, so also the created incorporeal Logos is a power, and it encases the ideas not only in the sense of patterns but also in the sense of powers. Accordingly, in his description of the created incorporeal divine Logos, Philo also says that it is that "which God himself completely filled with incorporeal powers." [39]

It is because the Logos is conceived by Philo as both the totality of ideas and the totality of powers that sometimes, as in the case of the ideas, he describes it as created. The Logos is thus spoken of as the eldest and most generic of created things,[40] as "older than all things which were the objects of creation," [41] as not being uncreated as God, though not created as human beings,[42] as being the first-born son of God,[43] the man of God,[44] the image of God,[45] second to God,[46] a second God,[47] and as being called a god by those who have an imperfect knowledge of the real God.[48] An implication that the Logos is created is contained also in a passage where he says that "being the Logos of the Eternal (ἀιδίου) it is of necessity also itself incorruptible (ἄφθαρτος)." [49] Here, we take it, he uses the term "incorruptible" as distinguished from "eternal" deliberately, in order to show that while God is "eternal," in the sense of being both ungenerated and incorruptible, the Logos is only "incorruptible" but not ungenerated. In another place, too, he deliberately describes the Logos, or as he calls it there "the right Logos," merely as "not corruptible" (οὐ φθαρτός), and from this non-corruptibility of the Logos he deduces that a statute which is law is αἰώνιον,[50] a term which should be translated here not by

[39] *Somn.* I, 11, 62.
[40] *Leg. All.* III, 61, 175.
[41] *Migr.* I, 6.
[42] *Heres* 42, 206.
[43] *Agr.* 12, 51, *et alia.*
[44] *Conf.* 11, 41; cf. 14, 62; 28, 146.
[45] *Conf.* 28, 147, *et alia.*
[46] *Leg. All.* II, 21, 86.
[47] *Qu. in Gen.* II, 62: secundus deus.
[48] *Leg. All.* III, 73, 207; cf. *Somn.* I, 39, 229–230; 41, 238–239.
[49] *Conf.* 11, 41.
[50] *Ebr.* 35, 142.

"eternal," as it is usually done,[51] but rather by "everlasting," for previously he has used as an equivalent of it the term "deathless" (*ἀθάνατον*),[52] that is, something which has a beginning but has no end.[53] In all these passages, the Logos is spoken of, directly or indirectly, as being created. In two passages, however, he directly uses the expressions "the eternal Logos" (*ὁ ἀίδιος λόγος*)[54] and "the eternal (*ἀίδιος*) image, the most holy Logos."[55] Eternal as a description of the Logos is also implied in the expression "eternal and blessed idea,"[56] which, as we have suggested, refers to the Logos.[57] In all these passages, in which the Logos is spoken of as eternal, the term eternal is not used in the sense of uncreated. It is used either in the sense of indestructible, or, as we have suggested above in the case of the powers, in the sense of its including the two stages of the existence of the Logos taken together. Whether the term eternal here is used in the sense of "eternal generation" is a question which we shall discuss later.[58] But unlike the term powers, which is sometimes used by Philo exclusively in the sense of a property of God, the term Logos is never used by him exclusively in that sense, except in those statements in which it refers figuratively to God's activity of speaking — as, for instance, the statement that "God then speaks (*λαλεῖ*) in unmixed unities, for His Logos is not a sonant impact of voice upon air, or mixed with anything else at all, but it is

[51] So Latin translation; Drummond, II, 193; Colson; Adler in *Philos Werke*. Yonge correctly: everlasting.

[52] *Ebr.* 35, 141.

[53] One must not, however, assume that Philo uses the terms *ἀίδιος* and *αἰώνιος* rigidly in the sense of eternal and everlasting respectively. In *Plant.* 2, 8, God is described as *αἰώνιος*, whereas the Logos is described as *ἀίδιος*.

[54] *Plant.* 5, 18.

[55] *Conf.* 28, 147. In this passage the reading may be not "eternal" but rather "invisible" (*ἀειδής*). Cf. *Philonis Opera*, ed. Wendland, *ad. loc.*

[56] *Decal.* 25, 134. [57] Cf. above, p. 203. [58] Cf. below, p. 322.

unbodied and unclothed and in no way different from unity," [59] or in the statements that "His Logos is His deed" [60] and "Whatever God says (λέγῃ) is not words (ῥήματα) but deeds." [61] In all these statements, the term Logos, whether expressed or understood, is used as a figurative way of describing the property of God to act.

With his use of the term Logos not only in the sense of the totality of ideas but also in the sense of the totality of powers, we should expect him also to say that the Logos is the totality of those contrasting powers of goodness and authority, or propitiousness and legislativeness, in which all the powers are classified by him. Now Philo does not actually say that, but he expresses himself to the same effect in different words. In his comment on the verse "And He posted the Cherubim and the flaming sword," [62] he explains that the Cherubim and the flaming sword symbolize respectively the powers of goodness and authority, adding that the Logos is in the midst between these two powers, for it had the effect of "reuniting" them, and through it "God is both ruler and good." [63] Similarly, in his comment on the verse "I will speak to thee from above the mercy seat in the midst of the two Cherubim," [64] the two Cherubim are interpreted as symbolizing the creative and the regal powers,[65] and the expressions "from above" and "in the midst" are taken to refer to the Logos, who is described as being "above all these" or "the charioteer of the powers" [66] or "in the mid-

[59] *Immut.* 19, 87. Similar other examples are to be found in the passages in Leisegang, *Indices*, under λόγος III, 1.

[60] *Sacr.* 18, 65; *Mos.* I, 51, 283.

[61] *Decal.* 11, 47.

[62] Gen. 3: 24.

[63] *Cher.* 9, 27–28; cf. *Qu. in Gen.* I, 57, where the flaming sword is taken to symbolize the heaven or the sun; cf. below, pp. 337 ff.

[64] Exod. 25: 22 (21).

[65] *Fug.* 19, 100; *Qu. in Ex.* II, 68; Harris, *Fragments*, p. 66.

[66] *Fug.* 19, 101.

dle" (*μέσος, in medio*)[67] or "the source (*πηγή, fons*) from which the creative and regal powers divide themselves off." [68] All this is merely a figurative way of describing the logical relation of the Logos, as the totality of powers, to the chief two powers which are contained within it. It is only another way of restating the view which he has expressed elsewhere in his statements that the Logos is "the rich and manifold union of myriad ideas," [69] or that it is the "idea of ideas," [70] or that it is that "which God himself has completely filled throughout with incorporeal powers." [71] Neither the statement that the Logos is the "source" of the creative and regal powers nor the statement that "from these two powers others grow out" [72] is to be taken literally as indicating a theory of "descending emanations." [73] The terms "source," "divide themselves off," and "grow out" are only figurative terms expressing the logical relations of whole to part or the prior to the posterior. It is for this reason that in another place all these powers are figuratively described as "colonies" of the "mother-city" which is the Logos, and are arranged among themselves according to the order of logical priority.[74] All these various descriptions of the Logos in its relation to the powers merely mean that, as the totality of the powers, the Logos combines within itself the two opposite groups into which the powers are divided and as such acts as their harmonizer and mediator — a rôle which Philo

[67] *Qu. in Ex.* II, 68; Harris, *Fragments*, p. 66; cf. *De Deo* 5: "Desuper autem dicitur loqui, qui in medio est, quia Ens per verbum omnia exornavit." In *Heres* 34, 166, he who is said to be "standing above and in the midst of them" refers to the Logos; not to "God himself" as translated by Colson.

[68] *Qu. in Ex.* II, 68; Harris, *Fragments*, p. 67.

[69] *Sacr.* 25, 83; cf. above, p. 232.

[70] *Migr.* 18, 103; *Opif.* 6, 25; cf. above, p. 233.

[71] *Somn.* I, 11, 62; cf. above, p. 234.

[72] *Qu. in Ex.* II, 68; Harris, *Fragments*, p. 67.

[73] Cf. Goodenough, *By Light, Light*, p. 27.

[74] *Fug.* 18, 95.

elsewhere explicitly assigns to the Logos and which will be dealt with more fully later in our chapter on the immanent Logos.

His conception of the Logos, and of the ideas which are contained in the Logos, as created by God has led Philo to revise the meaning of the Platonic term image (εἰκών). In Plato the term image is used exclusively with reference to things in the visible world; ideas are not images, they are patterns (παραδείγματα).[75] In Philo, indeed, the term image is still applied to things in the visible world,[76] and ideas as well as the Logos are still described by the term pattern as well as by the term archetype (ἀρχέτυπος),[77] but, unlike Plato, Philo describes the ideas as well as the Logos also by the term image.[78] God alone, according to him, is to be described only by the terms pattern and archetype [79] and never by the term image. The ideas as well as the Logos are indeed patterns or archetypes with reference to things in the visible world which are modeled after them, but they are only images with reference to God who has created them. This double aspect of the ideas and Logos is clearly brought out in his homily on the meaning of the name Bezalel and on the verse about the creation of man after the image of God. The word Bezalel, he says, means "in the shadow of God"; and by "shadow" is meant the Logos which "is the archetype for further creations, for just as God is the pattern of the image, to which the title shadow has just been given, even so the image becomes the pattern of other things, as the prophet made clear at the very outset of the Law-giving by saying, 'And God made man after the image of God,' [80]

[75] Cf. *Timaeus* 28 c–29 c.

[76] *Opif.* 6, 25; *Plant.* 12, 50; *Ebr.* 33, 132–133.

[77] *Ebr.* 33, 133, *et alia.* This term is not used by Plato.

[78] *Leg. All.* I, 13, 33; 13, 42; 16, 53; III, 31, 96; *Somn.* II, 6, 45.

[79] *Deter.* 24, 87; *Spec.* I, 51, 279. See Leisegang, *Indices, s. v.*

[80] Gen. 1: 27.

implying that the image had been made such as representing God, but that the man was made after the image when it had acquired the force of a pattern." [81] But in order to differentiate between the two usages of the term image, he sometimes speaks of image when applied to the ideas as the "incorporeal" image [82] and of image when applied to corporeal objects as "visible" [83] or "sensible" [84] image. This double use of the term image, as we shall see, reappears in the writings of the Church Fathers, as when, for instance, Origen speaks of "certain images (*imagines*) which the Greeks call ideas (*ἰδέας*)." [85] The term "image" is used here by Origen in the sense of "invisible image" (*imago invisibilis*)[86] and in the Philonic sense.

Our interpretation of Philo that his Logos, as well as his powers, has two stages of existence prior to the creation of the sensible world, one from eternity as a property of God and the other as something created by God, differs from the interpretations hitherto advanced of Philo. The common opinion among students of Philo is that the Logos, as well as the powers and the ideas and the intelligible world, prior to the creation of the sensible world existed only in the mind of God.[87] This common interpretation seems to be based upon the assumption that, inasmuch as the prevailing interpretation of Plato at the time of Philo was that the ideas were only thoughts of God, Philo could not have believed otherwise. But it overlooks the fact that the belief in the existence of ideas as real beings does appear later in history,

[81] *Leg. All.* III, 31, 96; *Heres* 48, 230–231; *Opif.* 6, 25.

[82] *Somn.* I, 14, 79.

[83] *Opif.* 51, 146.

[84] *Ebr.* 33, 132; 34, 134.

[85] *De Principiis* II, 3, 6.

[86] *Ibid.* I, 2, 6.

[87] Dähne, I, 208–12; 259; *Gfrörer*, I, 176; 179; *Heinze, Die Lehre von Logos*, 255; Zeller, III 2[4], p. 411; Drummond, II, p. 174; Bréhier, p. 154.

and there is no reason, therefore, to assume that Philo could not have held such a view. That Philo did actually hold such a view has been shown by us on the basis of the texts examined. In anticipation of our discussion in a subsequent chapter, we may also add here that besides the two stages in the existence of the antemundane Logos and powers there is still a third stage, and that is their existence, after the creation of the world, as immanent in the world.

V. Relations between God, the Logos, and the Ideas

In our analysis of Philo we have found that the relation of God to the Logos is that of the Creator to the created, that the relation of the Logos to the intelligible world is that of mind, an actually thinking mind, to its object of thought, and that the relation of the intelligible world to the ideas is that of the whole to the parts of which it consists. We shall now take up a certain number of passages in which Philo discusses these relations of God to the Logos, of the Logos to the intelligible world, and of the intelligible world to the ideas, and shall try to present them in the form of a connected argument.

In such a connected argument the starting point is a passage in which Philo expresses his disapproval of the assumption that the intelligible world exists in place. "To speak of or conceive that world which consists of ideas as being in some place (*τόπῳ τινί*) is illegitimate." [1] On the face of it, this statement would seem to be only a repercussion of Plato's complaint that because of our "dreaming state" we think that "all which exists," including the ideas, "must be in some place (*τινὶ τόπῳ*) and filling some space" [2] and a reaffirmation of Plato's statement with regard to the idea of beauty that it is "never anywhere (*οὐδέ που*) in anything

[1] *Opif.* 4, 17. [2] *Timaeus* 52 B–C.

else," [3] a statement on the basis of which Aristotle generalizes that Plato's ideas are "nowhere" (*μηδέ που*)[4] or that they are "not in place" (*οὐκ ἐν τόπῳ*).[5] However, the emphatic manner of Philo's statement here has in it the decided ring of a challenge rather than the acquiescence of an agreement. Philo seems to challenge here some one who, while believing in the existence of ideas, holds that the ideas exist in some place. Now it happens that Plato himself, with all his explicit denial that the ideas exist in place, speaks of them as existing in a "supercelestial place" (*ὑπερουράνιος τόπος*).[6] What he means by this "supercelestial place" he does not explain. Our own interpretation of it is that he means by it a supercelestial void which, according to him, as also according to some of his predecessors, surrounded the world.[7] If this interpretation of Plato is correct, then Philo's challenge here is aimed at Plato, who believed that there was a void outside the world, which void he calls supercelestial place, and that the ideas existed in that supercelestial place.

No argument is advanced by Philo here against the view that the intelligible world of ideas exists "in some place"; he only presents his own view in opposition to it. But, if we are right in our assumption that the expression "in some place" here refers to a void outside the world, then his argument against it is to be found in his repeated rejection of the existence of such a void [8] and in the arguments he advanced against it.[9] Indeed in none of the four places where he discusses the void outside the world is the belief in its existence

[3] *Symposium* 211 A.

[4] *Phys.* III, 4, 203a, 9.

[5] *Ibid.* IV, 2, 209b, 34.

[6] *Phaedrus* 247 C.

[7] This interpretation is discussed fully in our introductory volume on Greek philosophy.

[8] *Plant.* 2, 7; *Heres* 47, 228; *Aet.* 16, 78; 19, 102.

[9] *Plant.* 2, 7–8. On the source of these arguments see Bréhier, p. 86.

attributed to Plato, and in three of these places it is either directly or indirectly attributed to the Stoics.[10] But the attribution of the belief in a void outside the world to the Stoics, and not to Plato, does not mean that he did not understand Plato to believe in the existence of such a void any more than it does not mean that he did not know that the Pythagoreans and the Atomists also held such a view. It only means that Philo is following his general custom of attributing to the Stoics ancient views which were only revived by them, but which by his time were associated with their name. Certain it is, however, that it is this "supercelestial place" of Plato that Philo had in mind in his reference to the illegitimacy of speaking of the ideas as existing "in some place," and, if he did not believe that Plato's supercelestial place referred to a void, he must have certainly felt that these terms lent themselves to such an interpretation; and perhaps there were some people at his time who did actually interpret them that way. It is such a possible or actual interpretation of Plato's statements that the ideas have their location in the "supercelestial place" that he had in mind when he said that "to speak of or conceive the world which consists of ideas as being in some place is illegitimate."

If the intelligible world of ideas does not exist in a void outside the physical world, where, then, and how does it exist? To answer this question Philo resorts to an analogy, which, in the rather extended form it is presented, sounds like the parables of the rabbis and Jesus. One has only to add at its beginning the words "I shall tell you a parable: what is it like unto? It is like unto a king who was about to found a city," or the words "the creation of the world is like

[10] In *Aet.* 16, 78; 19, 102, it is directly attributed to the Stoics. In *Heres* 47, 228, it is identified with the belief in a general conflagration, which Philo usually treats as a Stoic belief.

unto a king who founded a city," to make it read like a parable in the Midrash or in the New Testament.

If a king founds a city, says Philo, his purpose is, as a rule, to satisfy his soaring ambition and to add fresh luster to his good fortune. Again, a king, as a rule, cannot build a city by himself; he must make use of the services of some skilled architect. The architect, on receiving the commission from the king, sets about first to devise a plan for the city to be founded. He studies the site upon which the city is to be founded and in accordance with the conditions of the climate and the terrain he sketches mentally the various parts of that city. Out of these mental sketches of the various parts of the city he then forms, again mentally, a general image of the city as a whole. This image he carries in his "soul" as the impression of a seal is carried in wax. Philo is careful not to mention that the architect makes a diagram of his plan, for that would destroy the purpose of his parable.[11] The architect carries his plan, Philo repeats twice, in his "soul," that is, in his rational soul or mind. Finally, "by the innate power of memory he recalls the various parts of the city . . . and like a good craftsman he begins to build the city of stones and timber." [12]

Compared with this, the creation of the intelligible as well as of the visible world by God has many similarities, but also many dissimilarities, both of which are brought out by Philo in his account of God's creation of the intelligible as well as of the visible world. Unlike the king in the parable who is

[11] A similar parable in the Midrash reads: "According to the custom of the world, when a mortal king builds a palace he does not build it by his own skill but with the skill of an architect, and that architect does not build it out of his own head, but employs plans and diagrams to know how to arrange the chambers and the wicket doors" (*Genesis Rabbah* I, 1). It is to be noted that in the Midrash the use of "plans and diagrams" by the architect is mentioned.

[12] *Opif.* 4, 17–18; 5, 20.

in need of a skilled architect to plan and build the city for him, God in the creation of the world was "with no counsellor to help Him." [13] Then, again, unlike the king in the parable, God did not create the world in order to satisfy some soaring ambition of His or to add fresh luster to His good fortune. The creation of the world was a mere expression of his goodness, for "God, guided by His own sole will, determined that it was meet to confer rich and unrestricted benefits upon that nature which apart from divine bounty could obtain of itself no good thing." [14] Like the architect in the parable who devises an ideal plan of the city in accordance with the requirements of the condition of the site on which the city is to be built, God plans the world for the benefit of those who are to inhabit it "in proportion to the capacities of the recipients." [15] Again, like the architect in the parable, who sketches first plans of the individual parts of the city and out of these forms a plan of the city as a whole, God, in planning the creation of the world, "conceived beforehand the models of its parts out of which He constituted the intelligible world" as a whole.[16] Then, also, just as the plan of the city devised by the architect in the parable "held no place in the outer world, but had been engraved in the soul of the artificer as by a seal," [17] so also the plan of the world devised by God had no other place than "the divine Logos," [18] a term which, as we have seen, is used by Philo in the sense of rational soul or mind.[19] Finally, like the architect in the parable, God, "using the intelligible world as a pattern, brought to completion the world visible to the senses." [20] There is, however, one fundamental difference between the ideal city in the soul

[13] *Ibid.* 6, 23.
[14] *Ibid.*
[15] *Ibid.*
[16] *Ibid.* 4, 19.
[17] *Ibid.* 4, 18; 5, 20.
[18] *Ibid.* 5, 20.
[19] Cf. above, p. 230.
[20] *Opif.* 4, 19.

of the architect and the intelligible world in the Logos which Philo does not bring out in this analogy but is brought out by him, as we have shown, in many other passages. In the case of the architect, neither his soul nor the ideal city which is in the soul has an existence outside the body of the architect. In the case of God, however, the Logos or the mind of God, after the intelligible world is formed in it, is created by God as a real being outside the essence of God,[21] and as a real being, a Logos or a pure mind, it contains within itself as object of its thought the intelligible world which in its turn consists of the ideas.

The upshot of this analogy is that the intelligible world consisting of ideas does not exist in "place," that is, in a void, for "the world consisting of ideas would have no other place than the divine Logos." [22] In other words, the Logos is the place of the intelligible world as well as of the ideas of which the intelligible world consists. Accordingly, in his comment upon the verses "He came to the place of which God had told him" [23] and "He lighted upon the place," [24] Philo takes the term "place" to refer, by way of allegorizing (ἀλληγορῶν),[25] to the Logos; [26] and the reason why the Logos is called place, he adds, is that the Logos is that "which God himself has completely filled throughout with incorporeal powers." [27]

The exact meaning of the relation of the Logos to the intelligible world or the ideas, by which Philo has justified himself in speaking of the Logos figuratively as place, is to be found in Aristotle, upon whom Philo must have undoubtedly drawn for the use of this expression.[28] Aristotle, refer-

[21] Cf. above, p. 232.
[22] *Opif.* 5, 20.
[23] Gen. 22: 3.
[24] Gen. 28: 11.
[25] *Somn.* I, 11, 67.
[26] *Ibid.* I, 11, 66; 12, 68; 19, 117.
[27] *Ibid.* I, 11, 62.
[28] Cf. above, p. 233.

ring to such a Platonic expression as that the ideas may be only in our souls (ἐν ψυχαῖς),[29] says: "Therefore it has been well said that the soul," that is, the thinking (νοητική) soul or mind, "is a place (τόπον) of forms," [30] which he himself subsequently explains as meaning nothing more than that "the forms are in the soul," [31] or that "the faculties of the soul are identical with the forms," [32] or that the mind (νοῦς) is the "form of forms" (εἶδος εἰδῶν).[33] All these statements with regard to the identity of the mind with the intelligible object are further qualified by the statements that it is only when "the objects are immaterial" that "that which thinks and that which is thought are identical," [34] that it is only "actual knowledge" which "is identical with the thing known," [35] and that it is only when the mind "thinks" that it is "actually" something,[36] that is to say, having actual knowledge and being identical with the thing thought or known.

This is exactly what Philo means by his statement that the Logos is the place of the intelligible world and with it also of the incorporeal ideas of which it is constituted. The intelligible world is the content of the Logos, just as in Aristotle the forms are the content of the mind. And just as in Aristotle the mind, when it is in the actual operation of thought, is identical with the intelligible object, so also in Philo "the intelligible world is nothing else than the Logos of God when already engaged in the act of creation." [37] This is also the meaning of his description of the Logos as "the rich and manifold union of myriad ideas," [38] or that "which God

[29] *Parmenides* 132 B. See Hicks on *De Anima*, 429a, 27, in his edition.
[30] *De An.* III, 4, 429a, 27–28.
[31] *Ibid.* III, 8, 431b, 29–432a, 1; cf. II, 4, 417b, 23–24.
[32] *Ibid.*, 431b, 28.
[33] *Ibid.*, 432a, 2.
[34] *Ibid.* III, 4, 430a, 3–4.
[35] *Ibid.*, 19–20.
[36] *Ibid.*, 429a, 24.
[37] *Opif.* 6, 24.
[38] *Sacr.* 25, 83.

himself has completely filled throughout with incorporeal powers." [39] The Aristotelian background of all this is quite clearly evident, as we have pointed out above, in his description of the Logos as the "idea of ideas" (ἰδέα ἰδεῶν),[40] which corresponds exactly to Aristotle's description of mind as the "form of forms" (εἶδος εἰδῶν).[41]

But the Logos, as we have seen, did not remain within God, but was given by God, through an act of creation, an existence of its own. With that created Logos, God is, therefore, not identical, and cannot be said to be the place of that Logos in the same way as the Logos is said to be the place of the intelligible world. Accordingly, Philo maintains that God is "prior" (πρό) to place and Logos,[42] using the term "prior" (πρό) here, of course, not in the temporal sense but rather in one of the senses which, according to Aristotle, the term prior (πρότερον) has, namely, as a description of the relation of cause to effect.[43]

But by the time of Philo the term "place" as an appellation of God, the origin of which has been variously explained, must have already been in common usage in Palestinian Judaism. As interpreted in later Jewish sources, it meant that "God is the place of the world, but His world is not His place," that is to say, God is everywhere in the corporeal world, thereby exercising His individual providence, but He is no part of the corporeal world and is unlike anything in it. In Greek philosophy, the use of the term "place" as an appellation of God does not occur, but a suggestion for the use of it does occur, and that suggestion may have been made perhaps before the time of Philo. According to Sextus

[39] *Somn.* I, 11, 62.

[40] *Migr.* 18, 103; *Opif.* 6, 25, according to some readings; cf. Cohn et Wendland, *Philonis Alexandrini Opera, ad loc.*

[41] *De Anima* III, 8, 432a, 2.

[42] *Somn.* I, 19, 117; cf. I, 11, 65. [43] *Categ.* 12, 14b, 4 ff.; cf. above, p. 214.

Empiricus, the Sceptics, in their arguments against the Peripatetics, tried to force the latter to admit that God was to be considered by them as the place of the world. The argument is as follows. According to Aristotle, "the heaven" is not in any place, because "no body contains it." Again, according to Aristotle, all men agree in "allotting the highest place to the deity," that highest place being called "ether." From these two statements, the Sceptics argue, it must follow that God is "the limit of the heaven" and "since heaven's limit is the place of all things within heaven, God — according to Aristotle — will be the place of all things"; but this, they conclude, "is itself a thing contrary to sense." [44] In view of all this, Philo could not remain satisfied with the mere statement that God is "prior to place and Logos." He wanted to reaffirm the Jewish application of the term place to God, but, in order to safeguard it against misunderstanding, he wanted also to explain what to his mind was its real meaning.

And so we shall now try to show how Philo continues to argue that, while God cannot be described as the place of the created Logos in the sense of His being identical with it, there are other senses in which God can be described as the place of the created Logos as well as the place of all other created things. "The term place," says Philo, "has a threefold meaning: firstly, that of a space filled by a body; secondly, that of the divine Logos." [45] In neither of these two

[44] Sextus, *Adversus Physicos* II, 31–34, referring to Aristotle, *Phys.* IV, 5, 212b, 8–9; *De Caelo* I, 3, 270b, 6–7 and 22 (cf. J. A. Fabricius, in note to his edition of Sextus Empiricus, II, 1841, pp. 681–682; J. Freudenthal, "Alexander Polyhistor" in his *Hellenistische Studien*, 1–2, 1875, p. 72, referring also to Proclus, *Timaeus* 117 D). For the Palestinian Jewish use of this divine appellation, see *M. Yoma* VIII, 9. For the native Jewish explanation of it, see *Genesis Rabbah* 68, 9. This Palestinian Jewish use of the term has been taken to have either a Philonic or a Persian origin, but it is undoubtedly of native Jewish origin (cf. A. Marmorstein, *The Old Rabbinic Doctrine of God*, I, 1927, pp. 92–93). [45] *Somn.* I, 11, 62.

meanings, of course, can God be called place. "There is, however, a third signification in keeping with which God himself is called a place, by reason (1) of His containing things, and being contained by nothing whatever, and (2) of His being that to which all things flee for refuge, and (3) because He is himself the space of himself, for He is that which He himself has occupied." [46] The first two of these three reasons for calling God place is given by him also in his comment on the verse "I will give thee a place to which he who has slain a man [unintentionally] shall flee." [47] "For here," says Philo, "he uses the word place, not of space entirely filled by a body, but figuratively of God himself, since (1) He contains (περιέχων) and is not contained, and because (2) He is the refuge for the whole universe." [48] The third and first of these three reasons are given by him also in the following passage: "God is His own place, and He himself is full (πλήρης) of himself, and He himself is sufficient for himself, filling and containing all other things in their destitution and barrenness and emptiness, but himself contained by nothing else, seeing that He is himself one and the whole." [49]

Now the three reasons given by Philo in these passages as to why God should figuratively be called place reflect three characteristic descriptions of place found in Greek philosophy. In Aristotle, three of the five essential characteristics which he assumes to belong to place read that "place is what contains (περιέχον) that of which it is the place and is no part of the thing . . . and is separable from it." [50] Again, in Aristotle, the goals toward which things in the world move naturally and in which they rest naturally are called the proper places (τόποι οἰκεῖοι) of those things,[51] which

[46] *Ibid.*, 63.
[47] Exod. 21: 13 (LXX).
[48] *Fug.* 14, 75.
[49] *Leg. All.* I, 14, 44.
[50] *Phys.* IV, 4, 210b, 34–211a, 3.
[51] *De Caelo* I, 8, 276a, 10–12; *Phys.* VIII, 3, 253b, 33–34.

view is expressed by him in the statement that each of the elements "naturally tends to be borne towards its own place (*χώραν*)." [52] Finally, in the Stoics, place is defined as that "which is possessed (*ἐχόμενον*) by a body" [53] or that "which is occupied (*κατεχόμενον*) by an existent thing." [54]

Evidently with these characteristics of place in his mind, Philo tries to show how God can be called place figuratively. For, argues he, if with Aristotle one considers that the essential characteristic of place is that it is "what contains" (*περιέχον*) and is not "what is contained," then God is to be called place figuratively, inasmuch as He contains all things and is contained by nothing whatever. If, again, with Aristotle one says that the proper place of a thing is that toward which it is naturally moved and in which it naturally rests, then God is also to be called place figuratively, inasmuch as He is that to which all things flee for refuge. Finally, if with the Stoics one says that place is a space possessed or occupied by a body, then God is also to be called place figuratively, inasmuch as He himself occupies himself or is full of himself. The main contention of all this is that if God is to be called the place of the world in a figurative sense, it is not in the sense that God is identical with anything in the world or with the world as a whole. God can be called figuratively the place of the world only in the sense that He is that which contains and not that which is contained, that He is different from the world, that He is the cause and creator of the world. And it is in this sense that in his comment on the verse which in the Septuagint reads "Didst thou not call upon me as thy house, thy father, and the husband of thy virginity?" [55] he says: "Thus he implies clearly that God is

[52] *De Gen. et Corr.* II, 8, 335a, 20–21; cf. *Phys.* IV, 5, 212b, 29–30 (*τόπον*).
[53] Aetius, *Placita* I, 20, 1 (Arnim, II, 504).
[54] Sextus, *Adversus Physicos* II, 3 (Arnim, II, 505).
[55] Jer. 3:4.

a house, the incorporeal space (χώρα) of incorporeal ideas, that He is the father of all things, for He begat them, and the husband of wisdom, dropping the seed of happiness for the race of mortals into good and virgin soil." [56] In this passage God is called "the incorporeal space of the incorporeal ideas" not in the same sense in which the Logos is called "the place of the intelligible world," namely, in the sense of His being identical with the ideas, but rather in the sense of His not being part of them and of His being separable from them.

And so the relation of God to the Logos is described by the term "prior," that is to say, a relation of cause to effect; the relation of the Logos to the intelligible world is described by the term "place" in the same sense as soul or mind is said to be the place of forms, that is, in the sense of their being identical, and the relation of the intelligible world to the ideas is described as that of a whole to the parts of which it is composed (συνεστώς).[57]

But in the writings of Philo we may discern another method of describing the relation of God to the Logos and the relation of the Logos to the ideas. In one passage, speaking of God and the Logos, he says that "the most generic (γενικώτατον) is God, and next to Him is the Logos of God, but all other things have an existence only in word, but in deed they are at times equivalent to that which has no existence." [58] In another passage, speaking of the Logos in its relation to all other things, he says that "the Logos of God is above all the world, and is eldest and most generic (γενικώτατος) of created things." [59] In a third passage, speaking of the ideas in their relation to particular things, he says that "before the particular intelligible thing comes into be-

[56] *Cher.* 14, 49.
[57] *Opif.* 4, 17; cf. also 19.
[58] *Leg. All.* II, 21, 86.
[59] *Leg. All.* III, 61, 175; *Deter.* 31, 118.

ing, the creator produces the intelligible thing itself [i.e. the idea] as a generic (γενικόν) being." [60] In these three passages, then, God is the "most generic" absolutely; the Logos is the "most generic of created things"; and the idea is simply "generic." The use of the term genus in various degrees of comparison, we take it, was advisedly chosen by Philo. He wanted to describe the relation of God to the Logos and of the Logos to the ideas as a relation of the more universal to the less universal. Each idea is only "generic"; the Logos which is the totality of ideas is "most generic" of all the ideas which constitute it; and God is "most generic" absolutely; there is nothing more generic than He. In these three passages the term generic is used by him in three distinct, though not unrelated, senses. The ideas are described by him as generic in the sense that a genus is "the comprehension in one of a number of inseparable objects of thought, as, e.g., animal, for this includes particular animals." [61] The Logos is described by him as the most generic of created beings in the sense that it is the most generic of all the generic ideas which are contained in it as parts in a whole, for these generic ideas in their relation to the Logos which contains them is like that of species to a genus, inasmuch as, according to Aristotle, the relation of species to genus is like that of parts to the whole.[62] God is described by him as the absolutely most generic in the sense that He is the uncaused cause of all things, for, being the cause of all things, He is their genus, inasmuch as the universal or genus, according to Aristotle, reveals the cause,[63] and, being himself uncaused, He is the most generic of all things.

[60] *Leg. All.* I, 9, 23.
[61] Diogenes, VII, 60.
[62] *Metaph.* V, 25, 1023b, 24–25.
[63] *Anal. Post.* I, 31, 88a, 5–6; II, 2, 90a, 30.

VI. Logos and Wisdom

We have seen, then, that the term Logos is used by Philo in the sense of Nous,[1] both as the mind of God which is identical with His essence and as a created mind which is distinct from His essence, and that its use in that sense is justifiable by certain precedents. That he should have preferred the term Logos to the term Nous as a description of this incorporeal mind is not due, as it is generally assumed, to the Stoic influence. In the first place, the Stoics never use the term Logos in the sense of an incorporeal being and as the totality of the ideas; they use it only in the sense of immanent principle in the world, like a soul or mind. In the second place, the use of the term Logos by the Stoics has been too much exaggerated; they more often use the expression "soul of the world" or "mind of the world" than the term "Logos."[2] If Philo had a predilection for the Stoics and wanted to follow them, he would have used the term "soul" or "mind" as the equivalent of the term "Logos," and more often than the term Logos. Mere imitation of Stoic vocabulary would thus not explain his substitution of the term Logos for mind in the sense of the divine mind or in the sense of an incorporeal mind created by God. The reason for his preference for that term is, to our view, simple enough and understandable enough. He wanted to have a special term to designate the divine mind, or the incorporeal mind created by God, in order to distinguish it from the human mind, and therefore he selected the term Logos to be used in the sense of the divine mind, leaving the term mind to be used in the sense of the human mind.[3]

[1] Cf. above, p. 230.

[2] Cf. Index to Arnim, under λόγος, νοῦς, ψυχή.

[3] He never uses the term "mind" in the sense of God's mind. As for the designation of God as the mind of the world, see below, pp. 345 ff.

Besides this quite understandable reason, the term Logos, in addition to its meaning of mind and the thinking power of mind, has also in Greek philosophy the meaning of "word," [4] and it is used in the Septuagint [5] as well as the Wisdom of Solomon [6] as a translation of the term "word" in the oft-repeated expression the "word of God." Now the "word of God" in Scripture is used in the various senses in which we shall find the term Logos used by Philo, namely, as a means of the creation of the world, as a means of governing the world, and as a means of prophecy and revelation. In Scripture, it is by the word of God that the heavens were made; [7] it is in fulfillment of the word of God that the forces of nature perform their functions; [8] it is the word of God that is communicated to prophets; [9] and it is the word of God that is revealed in the Law.[10] With all this variety of usages of the term Logos in Scripture, it was quite natural for Philo, whose purpose was not only to interpret Scripture in terms of Greek philosophy but also to interpret philosophy in terms of Scripture, to substitute the term Logos for the term Nous. It is a matter of indifference to us whether in Judaism before the time of Philo the personification of the term Logos meant that the Word of God was already considered as a real being created by God or whether its personification was merely a literary figure of speech.[11] What is important for us is merely the fact that the term Logos in Scripture had such a variety of uses that it helped to recommend itself to Philo as a substitute for the term Nous in the sense of the divine mind.

With his substitution of the scriptural term Logos for the term Nous, it was quite natural for Philo to use also the

[4] Cf. Bonitz, *Index Aristotelicus*, under λόγος I.
[5] Ps. 33 (34): 6; 147: 18; 148: 8.
[6] Wisdom of Solomon 9: 1.
[7] Ps. 33: 6.
[8] Ps. 147: 18; 148: 8.
[9] Isa. 2: 1; Jer. 1: 2; Ezek. 3: 16.
[10] Exod. 34: 27, 28; Deut. 10: 4.
[11] Cf. below, p. 287, n. 24.

term Wisdom as the equivalent of Logos.[12] For this he had the example of Scripture, where the term wisdom is used in almost all the senses that the term Word is used and, like the Word of God, Wisdom is said to be that by which God established the world;[13] it is in Wisdom that all the works of God in the world are performed;[14] it is imparted to men by God;[15] it is personified;[16] and by the time of Philo it is already identified with the revealed Law[17] and with the Word of God.[18] In the Wisdom of Solomon, wisdom is treated exactly as the Logos in Philo.[19] In Greek literature, too, he could find the use of the term Wisdom in the sense of mind in such a statement of Plato as that in which he speaks of wisdom (*σοφία*) and mind (*νοῦς*) as equivalent terms.[20] Furthermore, personification of Wisdom is to be found also in Greek mythology.[21] Using Wisdom, therefore, as the equivalent of Logos, which is the totality of the powers, Philo speaks of it as having, prior to the creation of the world, those two stages of existence which he attributed to the powers as well as to the Logos, namely, as a property of God and as a real being created by God. As a property of God, God's wisdom is described by him as eternal,[22] a certain kind of wisdom is called by him God's own wisdom,[23] and God alone is said by him to be wise,[24] or God is said by him to be the only wise being.[25] As something created by God, wisdom is conceived by him as being intermediate between God's own wisdom and human wisdom and is described as

[12] *Leg. All.* I, 19, 65.
[13] Jer. 10: 12; cf. Prov. 3: 19.
[14] Ps. 104: 24.
[15] Prov. 2: 6.
[16] Prov. 8: 1 ff.
[17] Sirach 24: 23 ff.
[18] Wisdom of Solomon 9: 1–2.
[19] Cf. below, pp. 287 ff.
[20] *Philebus* 30 c; cf. Drummond, I, p. 67.
[21] Leisegang, "Logos" in Pauly-Wissowa, 25, 1070, ll. 7 ff.
[22] *Immut.* 20, 92, if the reading is *ἀιδίου* and not *ἰδίου*.
[23] *Leg. All.* II, 22, 87.
[24] *Migr.* 24, 134; *Congr.* 21, 114.
[25] *Sacr.* 17, 64; *Ebr.* 27, 106; *Fug.* 8, 47.

"the fountain which He drew out of His own Wisdom" [26] or as the "flinty rock . . . which He cut off highest and chiefest from His powers." [27] As in the case of the created Logos, God is called the Father of Wisdom,[28] and, while Wisdom, unlike Logos, is not called the son of God, it is called the daughter of God, because both in Greek and in Hebrew the word for wisdom is of feminine gender.[29]

This conception of Wisdom as having been created by God is directly based upon the scriptural verses in which Wisdom is made to say, according to the Septuagint version, "before the ages He founded (ἐθεμελίωσε) me . . .[30] and before all hills, He begets (γεννᾷ) me." [31] The Greek for "founded" in "He founded me," differs from the Hebrew, which reads "I was set up," but it has the meaning of creation, as may be judged from the verse "By wisdom God founded (ἐθεμελίωσε) the earth." [32] Though in his paraphrase of the first verse of Wisdom's speech Philo departs from the Septuagint's version, "The Lord created (ἔκτισε) me the beginning of His ways for His works," [33] and puts in its mouth the words "God obtained (ἐκτήσατο) me first of all his works," [34] the substitution here of the word "obtained me" for the Septuagint "created me" as a translation of the Hebrew *kanani* does not mean that he believed that Wisdom was not created by God but only obtained by Him after it had existed apart

[26] *Leg. All.* II, 22, 87. In *Sacr.* 17, 64, God himself is said to be "the fountain of wisdom" who "imparts each form of knowledge to the mortal race," but that evidently means that God is the ultimate fountain of knowledge.

[27] *Leg. All.* II, 21, 86.

[28] *Ibid.* I, 19, 64.

[29] *Fug.* 9, 50–52. In § 52, wisdom is said to be called also father because it begets learning in souls.

[30] Prov. 8: 23.

[31] Prov. 8: 25; quoted by Philo in *Ebr.* 8, 31.

[32] Prov. 3: 19.

[33] Prov. 8: 22.

[34] *Ebr.* 8, 31; cf. *Virt.* 10, 62.

from God from eternity;[35] it only means that he imported into the Greek term ἐκτήσατο, which in the sense of "he obtained" is a literal translation of the Hebrew term *ḳanah*, the additional meaning of "he created," which traditionally the Hebrew term was taken here to have. We may gather this from another passage where Philo follows the Septuagint in translating the Hebrew term *ḳanah* by the Greek term meaning "to obtain" or "to get," but in the course of his discussion he explains it to mean "to create." In the passage in question he quotes from Scripture, through the Septuagint version, Eve's, or, according to him, Adam's, statement after the birth of Cain, namely, "I have gotten (ἐκτησάμην) a man through God";[36] and then, in his comment upon the inappropriateness of the use of the expression "through God," which implies that God is only an instrument and not a cause, he says that "that which comes into being (γινόμενον) is brought into being (γίνεται) *through* an instrument, but yet *by* a cause."[37] Here the Septuagint term κτάομαι, to acquire, is taken by him to mean γίγνομαι, to be born or to be created. In still another passage,[38] he quotes from the Septuagint Abraham's speech to Melchizedek, King of Salem: "I will stretch forth my hand to [the Lord], the most high God, who created (ἔκτισε, Hebrew *ḳoneh*) heaven and earth,"[39] but immediately after thus translating the Hebrew *ḳoneh* by the Greek meaning "who created," he refers to God as He "whose κτήματα all things are."[40] The term κτήματα quite evidently is used by him not in the sense of "possessions" but rather in the sense of "creations,"

[35] But see D. B. Macdonald, *The Hebrew Philosophical Genius* (Princeton University Press, 1936), p. 51, who finds in this change of wording an indication of the belief in the eternity of wisdom.

[36] Gen. 4: 1. LXX: διὰ θεοῦ.

[37] *Cher.* 35, 125.

[38] *Ebr.* 27, 105.

[39] Gen. 14: 22.

[40] *Ebr.* 28, 107.

which conclusively shows that with Philo the Greek κτάομαι has acquired through the Hebrew *ḳanah* the meaning "to create" in addition to its original meaning "to obtain."

Wisdom, then, is only another word for Logos, and it is used in all the senses of the term Logos. Both these terms mean, in the first place, a property of God, identical with His essence, and, like His essence, eternal. In the second place, they mean a real, incorporeal being, created by God before the creation of the world. Third, as we shall show, Logos means also a Logos immanent in the world,[41] and so, also wisdom, again as we shall show, is used in that sense.[42] Fourth, both Logos and wisdom are used by him in the sense of the Law of Moses.[43] Finally, Logos is also used by Philo in the sense of one of its constituent ideas, such, for instance, as the idea of mind.[44] In the light of all these various uses of the terms Logos and wisdom, if we do happen to come across certain passages in which he does not seem to be treating these two terms as identical we must not at once accuse him of inconsistency.[45] We must try to find out whether in those passages in which he does not seem to treat them as identical he does not use one of these two terms in one sense and the other in another sense. Let us examine a few such typical instances.

In one place he says that the law of the cities of refuge, allegorically interpreted, means to bid man "to pass forward to the supreme divine Logos, who is the fountain of

[41] Cf. below, pp. 325 ff.

[42] Cf. below, pp. 333–334, which is in opposition to Heinze, *Die Lehre vom Logos in der griechischen Philosophie*, p. 255. In the Wisdom of Solomon, wisdom is similarly used in this sense; see below, p. 288.

[43] Cf. ὁ ἱερὸς λόγος (*Spec.* I, 39, 215, and elsewhere); σοφία (*Leg. All.* III, 15, 46); cf. above, pp. 147, 184; below, II, 189.

[44] Cf. above, p. 233.

[45] Cf. discussion on these inconsistencies in Heinze, *Die Lehre vom Logos*, p. 253; Drummond, II, 207–211; Goodenough, *By Light, Light*, p. 22.

wisdom, in order that he may draw from the stream and, released from death, gain life eternal as his prize." [46] Here, then, Logos is explicitly said to be the fountain of Wisdom and not identical with it. But the inconsistency disappears when in this passage the term Logos is taken to refer to the antemundane Logos and the term wisdom is taken to refer to the wisdom in the sense of the revealed Law of Moses. The passage lends itself to this interpretation. Taken in this sense, the Logos indeed is the fountain of wisdom. In a similar way Philo could have said that the antemundane wisdom is the fountain of the revealed wisdom, for the belief in the preëxistence of the Law means that the revealed Law has its origin in the preëxistent Law.[47]

In another place, taking the high priest to symbolize the Logos and commenting upon the verse that the high priest "shall not defile himself for his father or for his mother." [48] Philo says that this is "because, methinks, he is the child of parents incorruptible and wholly free from stain, his father being God, who is likewise Father of all, and his mother Wisdom, through whom the universe came into existence," [49] Here, again, it would seem that Logos and Wisdom are not identical. But again the solution of the difficulty is to be found in the fact that, in this passage, wisdom, as is quite evident from the context, refers to the antemundane wisdom, whereas the Logos, symbolized here by the high priest, refers to the immanent Logos. For when we closely examine the kind of Logos which, according to Philo, the high priest symbolizes, we shall find that he symbolizes both the incorporeal Logos of the intelligible world and the immanent Logos in the visible world; about the latter we shall speak in a subsequent chapter.[50] This is definitely brought out by

[46] *Fug.* 18, 97.
[47] Cf. above, p. 184.
[48] Lev. 21: 11.
[49] *Fug.* 20, 109.
[50] Cf. below, p. 325.

Philo in his discussion of the symbolism of the high priest's vesture, concerning which he says that you will find "his holy vesture to have a variegated beauty derived from powers belonging some to the realm of pure intellect, some to that of sense-perception." [51] Elsewhere he tells us what powers of the visible world some of the garments symbolize: they are the four elements, the upper and the lower hemispheres, and the signs of the Zodiac.[52] Now in the passage in question Philo especially emphasizes the symbolism of the high priest as the immanent Logos of the visible world. He says: "Now the garments which the supreme Logos of Him that is put on as raiment are the world, for it arrays itself in earth and air and water and fire and all that comes forth from these." [53] Consequently when he says that the Logos symbolized by the high priest has Wisdom as its mother, he means thereby the immanent Logos which, as we shall see, has its source in the intelligible Logos,[54] the latter of which is identical with the Wisdom spoken of in this passage.

In still another place, in his allegorical interpretation of the verse "A river goes out of Eden to water the garden: thence it separates into four heads," [55] he says that Eden means here "the Wisdom of the Existent," and "the divine Logos descends from the fountain of Wisdom like a river to lave and water the heaven-sent celestial shoots and plants of virtue-loving souls which are as a garden; and this holy Logos is 'separated into four heads,' which means that it is split into four virtues." [56] Now, in another place, commenting upon the same verse, he says: "'River' is generic virtue, goodness. This issues forth out of Eden, the wisdom of God, and this is the Logos of God, for in accordance with that has

[51] *Migr.* 18, 102; cf. Wisdom of Solomon 18: 24.
[52] *Mos.* II, 24, 117–126; *Spec.* I, 16, 85–87.
[53] *Fug.* 20, 110.
[54] Cf. below, p. 327.
[55] Gen. 2: 10 (LXX).
[56] *Somn.* II, 36, 242–243.

generic virtue been made. And generic virtue waters the garden, that is, it waters the particular virtues." [57] Here, then, we have an inconsistency. In these two passages the term wisdom is taken in the same sense, undoubtedly in the sense of a property of God, but, with respect to Logos, in the first passage it is said to issue forth out of wisdom, while in the second passage it is said to be identical with wisdom. But the inconsistency disappears if the term Logos in these two passages is taken to be used in two different senses. In the first passage it is used in the sense of the idea of virtue,[58] or, as Philo calls it, generic virtue, and in the second passage it is used in the sense of a property of God.

VII. The Instrumentality of the Logos and Wisdom

The terms which have so far come into play in our discussion of Philo's theory of ideas are five: ideas, powers, intelligible world, Logos, and wisdom. The term ideas is of Platonic origin; the terms powers and Logos are of a mixed Greek and scriptural origin; the term intelligible world is of Philo's own coining, based upon a somewhat similar combination of terms in Plato; the term wisdom is predominantly of scriptural origin. But then we find one more term which Philo uses as a description of the Logos, and, indirectly, of wisdom, and that is the term "instrument" (ὄργανον).[1] Let us study the origin of this term as used by Philo and also the special sense in which he uses it.

The origin of this term, we shall try to show, is Aristotelian. When Aristotle, in opposition to Plato, had brought down the ideas (ἰδέαι) from what Plato called the "super-

[57] *Leg. All.* I, 19, 65.

[58] Cf. above, p. 233.

[1] *Cher.* 35, 125–127.

celestial place" (ὑπερουράνιος τόπος) and the "intelligible place" (νοητὸς τόπος)[2] beyond material things, and attached them to material things as forms (εἴδη) inseparable from them, he still retained for them some of the characteristic terms by which Plato described his ideas. His form, like the Platonic idea, is still called pattern (παράδειγμα) and cause (αἴτιον).[3] But form to him is not the only cause. It is one of the two main causes, the other being matter, and form itself is subdivided into three causes, the efficient, the formal, and the final, thus making all together four causes. In his description of the relation of these four causes to each other, he says that form subsists in the "efficient cause," [4] the efficient cause is the cause of "form" in matter,[5] and through "matter" form is fulfilled as the "end." [6] Thus the four causes, according to Aristotle, make up a series, in which the efficient cause is the beginning, the final cause is the end, and form and matter are intermediaries. The efficient cause works on matter by means of form, and form becomes a final cause by means of matter. Such intermediaries between the efficient cause and the final cause are in accordance with Aristotle's own terminology to be called "instruments" (ὄργανα).[7] We should therefore expect to find that both the material cause and the formal cause are called instruments by Aristotle, inasmuch as both these causes exist as intermediaries between the efficient cause and the final cause. And, in fact, we do find that both these causes are described by him as instruments, the material cause as the instrument of the formal cause and the formal cause as the instrument

[2] *Rep.* VI, 509 D, VII, 517 B; cf. above, p. 227.
[3] *Phys.* II, 3, 194b, 26; *Metaph.* V, 2, 1013a, 27.
[4] *De Gen. Animal* II, 1, 732a, 4–5.
[5] *Metaph.* VII, 8, 1034a, 4–5; XII, 4, 1070b, 30–34.
[6] *Phys.* II, 7, 198a, 25–26, and see Ross's note in his edition.
[7] *Metaph.* V, 2, 1013a, 35–1013b, 3.

of the efficient cause. With regard to the material cause, it is directly described by him as an instrument of the formal cause in a passage in which he says of it that it is "that which serves as an instrument to what is generated," [8] or that it is "that which is used by the end," [9] meaning here by the term "end" the "formal cause" which, in this passage, is identified with the final cause.[10] The description of the formal cause as an instrument is suggested by him in his criticism of the materialists who, owing to their failure to distinguish between the material cause and the other causes, recognize only the material cause. As a result of their recognition of only the material cause, argues Aristotle, their explanation of the process of becoming differs from his. According to their explanation, the process of becoming is to be accounted for only by the action of the elementary qualities hot and cold, which they consider as forces inherent in matter and hence as constituting a material cause. In contradistinction to this, Aristotle's own view is that hot and cold are "form" and "privation," [11] or two "contraries," which exist in matter as their common "substratum"; [12] and the process of becoming, according to him, is to be explained by the action of an efficient cause which employs a formal cause in order to cause matter to attain a final cause. In his criticism of the materialists he argues, first, against their omission of the efficient cause and, second, against their omission of the formal cause. By their omission of the efficient cause, he argues in the first place, they flagrantly disregard facts observed both in art and in nature.[13] By their omission of

[8] *De Gen. Animal* II, 6, 742a, 24.
[9] *Ibid.*, 23 and 32.
[10] *Ibid.* I, 1, 715a, 5–6; cf. Zeller, II, 2³, p. 328, n. 1 (*Aristotle*, II, p. 356, n. 1).
[11] *Metaph.* XII, 4, 1070b, 11–12.
[12] *De Gen. et Corr.* II, 1, 329a, 30–31.
[13] *Ibid.* II, 9, 335b, 29–33.

the formal cause, he argues in the second place, they erroneously treat the elementary qualities hot and cold, which to them are material causes, as "too instrumental" (λίαν ὀργανικάς).[14] From his contention, therefore, that the materialists by their omission of formal causes have erroneously treated material causes as "too instrumental" it may be inferred that this instrumental character which the materialists erroneously attribute to what they consider material causes should be attributed to what Aristotle considers formal causes. From these statements of Aristotle with regard to the use of the term instrument we thus gather that matter may be considered as the instrument of the formal cause and form may be considered as the instrument of the efficient cause.

Now Philo, in his adoption of the Platonic theory of ideas, has taken out the Aristotelian forms from within the world and made a new world out of them, the intelligible world, and this new world he placed in the Logos.[15] As a result of this, the term "instrument," which Aristotle indirectly applies to form, is applied by Philo to the Logos. That it is Aristotle from whom Philo has borrowed the term instrument in its application to the Logos may be gathered from one of the passages in which the Logos is described by him as the instrument (ὄργανον) through which (δι' οὗ) the world was framed (κατεσκευάσθη).[16] Immediately preceding this description of the Logos as an instrument, there is a passage

[14] *Ibid.*, 336a, 1–6. Cf. Joachim's notes in his edition (pp. 249–252). With regard to "hot and cold," he says first of Aristotle that he regarded them as forces "inherent in, and constitutive of, matter" (p. 250, ll. 4–5) and then the same of the materialists that they regarded them as forces "inherent in, and constitutive of, the matter of which bodies consist" (p. 251, ll. 35–36). This is undoubtedly an accidental error. To Aristotle, as we have seen (above n. 11) "hot and cold" are "form and privation." Cf. also Cherniss, *Aristotle's Criticism of Presocratic Philosophy*, p. 228, n. 48.

[15] Cf. above, p. 231.

[16] *Cher.* 35, 127.

in which Philo enumerates the Aristotelian four causes.[17] Three of these causes are quite obviously described by him in terms suggested by the Aristotelian vocabulary. The efficient cause is described by him vaguely by one form of the Greek term for cause (*αἴτιον*) and more specifically by the expression "that by which" (*τὸ ὑφ' οὗ*), which expression is similarly used by Aristotle as a description of the efficient cause.[18] The material cause is described, exactly as in Aristotle, by the term matter (*ὕλη*) and by the expression "that from which" (*τὸ ἐξ οὗ*).[19] The final cause is described again vaguely by another form of the Greek term for cause (*αἰτία*) and more specifically by the expression "that for which" (*τὸ δι' ὅ*) and goodness (*ἀγαθότης*). Similarly in Aristotle, the expression "that for which" (*τὸ διὰ τί*)[20] and the term "the good" (*τἀγαθόν*)[21] are used as descriptions of the final cause. In his description of the formal cause, however, Philo departs from the vocabulary used by Aristotle in those passages in which he formally enumerates the four causes. Instead of the term "form" which is used by Aristotle, he uses the term instrument (*ὄργανον*; *ἐργαλεῖον*), and instead of the expression "that from which," which is used by Aristotle as a description of both the material and the formal cause,[22] he uses the expression "that through which" (*τὸ δι' οὗ*). Now the expression "that through which" is used also by Aristotle in the sense of instrument,[23] and consequently he could have used it also as a description of

[17] *Ibid.*, 125–127.

[18] *Metaph.* I, 4, 985a, 25 and 27; cf. R. Eucken, *Ueber den Sprachgebrauch des Aristoteles*, 1868, p. 73.

[19] Cf. *Phys.* II, 3, 194b, 24; *Metaph.* V, 2, 1013a, 24.

[20] *Anal. Post.* I, 24, 85b, 27–35. This use of the expression is not brought out by Eucken, *op. cit.* pp. 38–39.

[21] *Metaph.* I, 3, 983a, 33.

[22] *Phys.* II, 3, 195a, 19; *Metaph.* V, 2, 1013b, 20–21.

[23] *Phys.* VIII, 5, 256a, 6; cf. Eucken, *op. cit.*, p. 38.

form, for, as we have seen, form is described by him as an instrument. In the light of all this, we may reasonably assume that Philo's description of the Logos as an instrument through which the world was made, resting as it does, according to his own statement, upon what he considered as a generally accepted description of form as an instrument through which something is made, is ultimately of Aristotelian origin, even though there may have been some intermediary source, as yet undiscovered, upon which Philo was directly dependent. As for the term instrument as a description of the Logos, it is used by Philo in two passages, in which passages he says of the Logos that God "used it like an instrument when He was making the world (ἐκοσμοποίει)" [24] or that "when He was fashioning the world (ἐκοσμοπλάστει), He used it as an instrument, so that the arrangement of all the things that He was completing might be faultless." [25] In three passages, however, instead of describing the Logos directly as an instrument, he describes it as such indirectly by speaking of it as that "through which" (δι' οὗ) the world was framed (ἐδημιουργεῖτο)[26] or "by which" (ᾧ) God made (εἰργάζετο) the world.[27]

Just as the Logos is described by Philo as an instrument "through which" or "by which" the world was made, so also is Wisdom described by him as that "through which (δι' ἧς) the world came into existence" [28] or "was brought to completion." [29] This is as should be expected, inasmuch as Wisdom is used by him as the equivalent of the Logos.[30] But instead of applying to Wisdom the term instrument, he applies to it the term mother.[31] In one place he describes Wis-

[24] *Leg. All.* III, 31, 96.
[25] *Migr.* 1, 6.
[26] *Sacr.* 3, 8; *Spec.* I, 16, 81.
[27] *Immut.* 12, 57.
[28] *Fug.* 20, 109.
[29] *Deter.* 16, 54.
[30] Cf. above, p. 255.
[31] *Fug.* 20, 109; *Deter.* 16, 54; *Leg. All.* II, 14, 49. The term "mother" is also implied in the statement that God is "the husband of Wisdom" (*Cher.* 14, 49).

dom as "the mother and nurse (τιθήνη) of the all." [32] Now in Plato the terms mother and nurse are applied to matter,[33] and elsewhere Philo himself makes reference to this use of these two terms by Plato and adopts them as a description of matter.[34] How does it happen, then, that in his theory of ideas, which is based upon Plato, Philo should call Wisdom, which is the totality of ideas, by terms which Plato himself applies to that which is the opposite of the ideas? [35]

A clue to the explanation, however, is furnished by Philo himself in the very passage in which he applies the terms mother and nurse to Wisdom. In that passage, he first quotes from Scripture the verses in which Wisdom says of herself: "God obtained me first of all his works and before the ages He founded me." [36] Then, commenting upon this verse, he says: "True, for it was necessary that all that came to the birth of creation should be younger than the mother and the nurse of the all." [37] Now it happens that a few verses below the verses quoted by Philo, Wisdom says that when God prepared the heaven and made the foundations of the earth strong, "I was with Him" — [38] and here follows a word which in the masoretic Hebrew text reads *amon* (אָמוֹן) and in the English Authorized Version is translated by "as one brought up with him." But in the Septuagint it is translated by "as one working as a joiner" (ἁρμόζουσα), which shows that the underlying Hebrew reading for the Septuagint translation was *aman* (אָמָן), and the same underlying Hebrew reading is implied also in the translation of it "as an artisan"

[32] *Ebr.* 8, 31.

[33] *Timaeus* 50 D; 51 A; 49 A; 52 D. Cf. also Aristotle, *Phys.* I, 9, 192a, 14.

[34] *Ebr.* 14, 61; *Qu. in Gen.* IV, 160; cf. below, pp. 300, 309.

[35] Bréhier (p. 119) explains it on the ground that in Greek mythology and mysteries the terms "wisdom" and "mother" are sometimes used as descriptions of certain deities.

[36] Prov. 8: 22–23.

[37] *Ebr.* 8, 31.

[38] Prov. 8: 30.

(τεχνῖτις) found in the Wisdom of Solomon.[39] But the Hebrew letters *aleph*, *mem*, *nun*, which constitute the word *amon* or *aman*, may also read *omen* (אֹמֵן), which means a *nurse*, and whenever that word *omen* occurs in Scripture it is translated in the Septuagint by τιθηνός.[40] In the Midrash these two readings, *oman* and *omen*, would seem to have been regarded as of equal plausibility, for, in its speculation as to its meaning, it suggests both artisan and nurse, the latter in the sense of pedagogue or leader or trainer of boys.[41] Now the same Hebrew letters, *aleph*, *mem*, *nun*, which may read either *amon*, nursling, or *aman*, artisan, or *omen*, nurse, may also be read *imman* (אִמָּן), meaning "their mother." [42] Assuming, therefore, that Philo, after the manner of the Midrash, was speculating as to possible meanings of the word in question, we can easily see how it may have occurred to him to suggest that it might mean mother and nurse, whence he came to say that Wisdom is "the mother and nurse of the All." [43] The same speculation as to these two possible meanings of the term, namely, mother and nurse, the latter in the sense of leader or trainer, is also reflected in the Wisdom of Solomon. Drawing upon the scriptural verse with regard to Wisdom which says that "length of days is in her right hand; and in her left hand riches and honor," [44] it says that "with her there came to me all good things together,

[39] Wisdom of Solomon 7: 22 (21). It is also possible that the reading אָמוֹן was taken to mean the same as אָמָּן.

[40] Cf. Num. 11: 12; II Sam. 4: 4; Isa. 49: 23; Ruth 4: 16.

[41] *Genesis Rabbah* 1, 1.

[42] From his explanation of the name "Benjamin" as meaning "son of days" (*Mut.* 15, 92; *Somn.* II, 5, 36), whereby Philo shows that he took יָמִין to be the same as יָמִים, it may be inferred that he would also take אִמָּן here to be the same as אִמָּם.

[43] In the Septuagint τιθηνός is used both as masculine and as feminine; cf. Num. 11: 12; II Sam. 4: 4; Isa. 49: 23; Ruth 4: 16.

[44] Prov. 3: 16.

and in her hands innumerable riches: and I rejoiced over them all because Wisdom leads (ἡγεῖται) them; though I knew not that she was the mother (γενέτιν) of them."[45] The term "leads them" and "mother of them" undoubtedly reflects the double meaning of the three Hebrew consonants *aleph*, *mem*, *nun* which in Philo are given the meaning of "nurse" and "mother."

The application of the term instrument to the Logos, and hence also to the ideas or powers abiding in the Logos, does not mean that God has delegated to the Logos the act of the creation of the world, so that He cannot be considered as having created the world directly. That this is not the meaning of Philo's use of the term instrument as a description of the Logos may be gathered from a passage in which he discusses the creation of the different parts of the world. The world, he says, consists of three kinds of beings. First, the "stars," that is, the heavenly bodies in general, and "unbodied souls which range through the air and sky," that is, angels, both of which partake of virtue and are immune from vice.[46] Second, plants and animals, which "partake neither of virtue nor of vice."[47] Third, man who is of "a mixed nature" and is capable of both "virtue and vice."[48] Of these three kinds of beings, the first two are declared by him to have been created by God himself, for, he says, "it was most proper to God, the universal Father, to make those excellent things by himself alone, because of their kinship to Him."[49] With regard to the third kind of being, man, God is said to have employed the "powers" as "co-workers" (συνεργοί) in creating him,[50] and even in the case of man the powers were used as co-workers only in the creation of his

[45] Wisdom of Solomon 7: 11–12.
[46] *Opif.* 24, 73; *Conf.* 35, 176.
[47] *Opif.* 24, 73; *Conf.* 35, 177.
[48] *Opif.* 24, 73; *Conf.* 35, 178.
[49] *Opif.* 24, 74.
[50] *Opif.* 24, 75; *Conf.* 35, 179; *Fug.* 13, 68–70.

body and his irrational soul; his rational soul was created directly by God.[51]

It is evident then that despite his statements that God used the Logos as an instrument through which the world was created, the creation of the world, with the exception of the body and the irrational soul of man, was considered by Philo as a direct act of God. The term instrument applied to the Logos does not therefore mean that the Logos was a "co-worker" of God in the act of the creation of the world in the same way as the powers are called by him "co-workers" of God in the act of the creation of man. The term instrument, therefore, is not used by Philo in the sense that God, who for some reason or other could not create the world by himself directly, delegated His power to the Logos, or to the ideas and powers abiding in the Logos, to act as His substitute or representative or intermediary in the creation of the world. The sense in which Philo uses the term instrument can be gathered from the main passage in which he applies it to the Logos. In that passage, as we have seen, he substitutes it for Aristotle's term form, which he has taken out from the world and restored to the position of a Platonic idea outside the world; and consequently it is in the sense that Aristotle has called his form instrument that Philo is to be expected to call his Logos instrument. Now in Aristotle the form is an instrument only in the sense that it is through the form that subsists in the mind of the artist as a pattern that the clay is molded into a statue. By the same token, the Logos is to be called instrument only in the sense that it is through the intelligible world as a pattern, with which the Logos is identical, that the visible world was created. Instrument, therefore, merely means pattern, for the tools which the architect employs in the building of a city include

[51] Cf. below, p. 289.

not only axes and hammers and saws but also plans which, according to Philo's parable,[52] he carries in his mind. His use of the Logos, and the contents of the Logos, as a pattern does not deprive God of being directly the creator of the world, a creator without any co-worker or intermediary.

But the question may now be raised: What need was there for God, prior to his creation of the world, to create ideas and an intelligible world made out of these ideas and a Logos to hold that intelligible world? Why could not God, to whom "all things are possible," [53] create the world without any pattern? Was not the creation of an intelligible world prior to the creation of the visible world merely a duplication of effort? This, as will be recalled, is one of the objections raised by Aristotle to the Platonic theory of ideas.[54]

Philo does not raise this question directly, but he provides an answer for it in his parable of the king who was about to found a city. "God," he says, "being God, knew beforehand that a beautiful copy would never be produced apart from a beautiful pattern, and that no object of perfection would be faultless which was not made in the likeness of an original discerned only by the mind." [55] The same explanation is also implied in his statement that "when God was fashioning the world, He employed the Logos as His instrument, so that the arrangement of all things that He was completing might be faultless." [56] This explanation quite obviously does not mean that God knew beforehand that He could not build a perfect world without a pattern, for that would be contrary to the omnipotence of God which Philo himself so often asserts. What this explanation really means is that God acted after the analogy of any intelligent human being who does

[52] Cf. above, p. 243.

[53] *Opif.* 14, 46; *Jos.* 40, 244; *Qu. in Gen.* IV, 130.

[54] *Cf. Metaph.* I, 9, 990a, 34–b, 8.

[55] *Opif.* 4, 16.

[56] *Migr.* 1, 6.

not enter upon any great project of building without having planned it out beforehand in his mind. But if one should further ask why God should act like an intelligent human being rather than like an omnipotent God, Philo would answer, as would also the rabbis, that God acts in such a way as to set an example to men. It will be recalled that in his comment upon the verse "And the Lord God made for Adam and for his wife garments of skins, and clothed them," [57] Philo says that this humble work of tailoring was quite suitable for God, inasmuch as it was intended "to teach wisdom" to mankind, showing by the example of God who made these humble but useful garments that useful labor and frugality are more honorable than a wasteful life of luxury.[58] Similarly the rabbis find in this verse an object lesson to men, teaching them to be as charitable as God and provide clothes for the naked.[59]

But this question which he does not raise directly with regard to the Logos is raised by him with regard to the employment of the powers as co-workers of God in the creation of the body and the irrational soul of man. "One may not unfitly raise the question," he says, "what reason there could be for his [i.e. Moses'] ascribing the creation in the case of man only not to one Creator as in the case of the rest but, as the words ['let us make man'] would suggest, to several." [60] In answer to this question Philo offers two explanations.

First, it is "because He deemed it right (δικαιῶν) that by the Sovereign should be wrought the sovereign faculty in the soul, the subject part being wrought of subjects." [61]

Second, since among all created beings man alone is endowed with the freedom to choose evil,[62] "God deemed it

[57] Gen. 3: 21.
[58] *Qu. in Gen.* I, 53; cf. above, p. 121.
[59] *Soṭah* 14a.
[60] *Opif.* 24, 72.
[61] *Fug.* 13, 69.
[62] Cf. below, p. 431.

necessary (ἀναγκαῖον) to assign the creation of evil things to other makers, reserving that of good things to himself alone." [63] In another place, the same answer is phrased as follows: "Very appropriately (προσηκόντως) therefore has God assigned a share in the creation of this being, man, to His lieutenants, saying 'let us make man,' so that man's right actions might be attributable to God, but his sins to others, for it seemed to be unfitting to God, the all-ruler, that the road to wickedness within the reasonable soul should be of His making, and therefore He delegated the forming of this part to those about Him." [64] In still another place, the phrasing of this explanation is as follows: The employment of the powers in the creation of man is to the end that, "when man orders his course aright, when his thoughts and deeds are blameless, God the universal ruler may be owned as their source, while others from the number of His subordinates are held responsible for thoughts and deeds of a contrary sort: for the Father ought (ἔδει) not to be cause of evil to his children, and vice and vicious activities are evil." [65]

Here, again, Philo does not say that God could not create man perfect and sinless, or that He himself could not create directly the imperfection and sinfulness in man, or that it was improper for Him, by reason of His own nature, to create directly the imperfection and sinfulness of man. All he says is that, since man was to have a sovereign faculty and a subject faculty, it seemed "right" to God to assign the creation of the subject faculty to His subordinate powers and also that, since man was to be created imperfect, God deemed it "necessary" or "appropriate" that He himself should not be directly the creator of the imperfect part in man. If, again, the question were asked why God deemed it necessary or appropriate, Philo would undoubtedly answer

[63] *Fug.* 13, 70. [64] *Conf.* 35, 179. [65] *Opif.* 24, 75.

again that it was in order "to teach wisdom" to mankind. That Philo did not mean that it was improper for God, by reason of His own nature, to be directly the cause of evil is evident from the fact that, under certain circumstances, as we shall see, God himself is considered by him as the direct cause of evil.[66]

From all these passages it is quite clear that the Logos is called an instrument through which the world was created only in the sense that in it are contained the ideas which served as patterns for the creation of the world. As instruments in the mere sense of patterns they were used in the creation of the heavens, of all living and non-living beings under the heavens, of the four elements,[67] and, as we shall show, even of matter.[68] But in the case of the creation of the body and the irrational soul of man, the ideas as powers were used as instruments in more than the mere sense of patterns; they were co-workers of God, to whom He delegated the task of their creation, and the reason why God employed the ideas as patterns in the creation of the world and why also He delegated to them, as powers, the act of the creation of the body and the irrational soul in man is that God acted in a manner in which He wanted man to act.

In opposition to this argument, there is a passage in which Philo would seem to say that God delegated to the ideas or powers not only the act of creating man but in general the act of the creation of the whole world. The passage reads as follows: "When out of that [shapeless and qualityless matter] God produced all things, He did so without touching (ἐφαπτόμενος) it himself, since it was not lawful (θέμις) for His nature, happy and blessed as it was, to touch (ψαύειν) indefinite and confused matter, but instead He made full use of the incorporeal powers, well denoted by their name of

[66] Cf. below, p. 382. [67] Cf. above, p. 269. [68] Cf. below, p. 308.

ideas (ἰδέαι), to enable each genus to take its appropriate shape." [69] In this passage, it will be noticed, he speaks of "all things" (πάντ') and of "each genus" (γένος ἕκαστον), and concerning "all things" and "each genus," not only concerning man, he would seem to say that God did not create them directly himself but only through the agency of the powers. This would seem to be contradictory to some of his other statements which we have quoted above; and, unless we assume that Philo did not know his own mind, or that he changed his mind, a way must be found to reconcile this statement with his other statements.

A way of reconciling this apparent contradiction is to be found, we believe, in the distinction drawn by Philo between the powers which existed as patterns prior to the creation of the world and the powers which, upon the creation of the world, entered the created things and have remained immanent in them as the principle of the preservation of the forms of the things in the world and of the world as a whole. We shall deal fully with this stage in the existence of the powers, the third stage of their existence, in a later chapter. These imimanent powers, constituting in their totality an immanent Logos, are treated by Philo, as we shall see, after the manner of the powers and Logos of the Stoics which are always immanent, and are described by him in terms of the Stoic description of their immanent powers and Logos. Now the passage just quoted follows Philo's criticism of the Stoic conception of powers, and the theory of ideas or powers presented therein is offered in opposition to the Stoic conception of powers, and as an improvement thereon. But inasmuch as the Stoic conception of powers criticized by Philo is one of immanent powers, the improved substitute for that conception offered by Philo must necessarily be his own con-

[69] *Spec.* I, 60, 329.

ception of immanent powers. We shall, therefore, try to show that the powers which in the passage quoted are described as intermediaries, and not merely as patterns, refer to the powers immanent in the world and not to the powers which existed prior to the creation of the world.

Let us therefore first analyze Philo's criticism of the Stoic conception of powers, and then, in the light of that criticism, let us interpret his own conception of powers in the passage quoted.

The powers (*δυνάμεις*) of God, according to the Stoics, pervade the world throughout and do not exist as incorporeal beings outside the world, even as God himself, according to the Stoics, is immanent in the world and is not an incorporeal being outside the world.[70] God, who is immanent in the world and whose powers pervade the world throughout, is identified by them with the active (*ποιοῦν*) principle in the primitive fire out of which the world came into being,[71] and that active principle is called by them quality (*ποιότης*).[72] By the same token, we assume, the powers of God may also be called qualities. This active principle or quality is inseparably connected, according to the Stoics, with a passive (*πάσχον*)[73] principle, which they call matter (*ὕλη*)[74] or substance without quality (*ἄποιος οὐσία*).[75] Now the powers or qualities which pervade all things are conceived by the Stoics as being themselves material things, and they are said to reside in material things in the sense of their being intermingled with them.[76] Furthermore, these material powers or qualities intermingled with material things are said by the

[70] Diogenes, VII, 147.
[71] *Ibid.*, VII, 134.
[72] Cf. Zeller, III, 1[4], p. 100, n. 3 (*Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics*[2], p. 105, n. 1).
[73] Diogenes, VII, 134.
[74] *Ibid.* [75] *Ibid.*
[76] Cf. Zeller, III, 1[4], p. 101, n. 1 (*Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics*[2], p. 105, n. 3).

Stoics to be active by their own nature and not by reason of some power above them, for, the Stoics hold, there is no power above the qualities.

This is the Stoic conception of powers which Philo undertakes to criticize. Accurately restating their view, he says of the Stoics, without mentioning their name, that "some aver that the incorporeal ideas are an empty name, having no participation in any real fact" and abolish "the archetypal patterns of all the qualities (*ποιότητες*) of substance (*οὐσίας*), on which the form and dimensions of each separate thing was modelled." [77] His criticism of this view is stated by him tersely. "The creed which abolishes ideas," he argues, "confuses everything and reduces it to that formless and qualityless substance which underlies the elements." [78] What he means to say by this terse criticism is this. With their belief that "quality" is as material as "substance," and with their denial of the existence of incorporeal ideas or powers above the qualities, the Stoics have really no reason for assuming any distinction between quality and substance. The two are alike, and consequently all things are formless and qualityless matter, and there is therefore no adequate explanation of why things in the world differ from one another according to certain definite and permanent forms, such, for instance, as we observe in the elements and in things formed out of the elements. He finds an allegorical allusion to this Stoic view in the scriptural term "crushed," [79] for, he says, "anything crushed has lost its quality and form and, to speak the strict truth, is nothing else than shapeless matter." [80] Briefly restated, his argument is as follows: With their denial of the existence of incorporeal ideas or powers, the Stoics also deny that the powers which are immanent in

[77] *Spec.* I, 60, 327.
[78] *Ibid.*, I, 60, 328.
[79] Deut. 23: 2 (1).
[80] *Spec.* I, 60, 328.

things are not intermingled with the matter of those things. But by denying the latter, they are left with no explanation for the persistence of qualities in things. But since qualities do persist in things and since an explanation for this persistence must be found, the persistent qualities, he wishes us to conclude, are not intermingled with the matter of the things in which they persist. That the argument here is from the persistence of qualities in things for the existence of immanent powers which are not intermingled materially with those things is also evident from his concluding remark, which reads as follows: "That erroneous view introduces great disorder and confusion, for, by abolishing those [powers], by means of which the qualities [exist], it abolishes the qualities also." [81] Note that no verb is given in the phrase "by which the qualities"; the verb is only understood, and naturally the verb understood here is εἰσί (*exist*) rather than ἐγένοντο (*came into existence*). Now the expression "those powers by means of which the qualities exist" inevitably means the immanent powers by means of which the qualities persist in their existence. It does not mean the incorporeal powers or ideas by means of which as patterns or instruments the qualities come into existence.

It is this Stoic view, which, according to Philo, fails to account for the permanency of shapes and qualities in the things of the world, that he tries to replace by his view of the immanent powers. He does not deal here with origin of shapes and qualities in things; he deals only with their per-

[81] *Ibid.*, 329: ἀναιροῦσα γὰρ ταῦτα, δι' ὧν αἱ ποιότητες, συναναιρεῖ ποιότητας, translated in Mangey: "sublatis enim ideis *unde qualitates sunt*, qualitates ipsas tollit pariter"; by Yonge: "For when it takes away the things *by means of which the distinctive qualities exist*, it at the same time takes away the distinctive qualities themselves"; by Heinemann in *Philos Werke*: "indem er nämlich die Wesenheiten leugnet, *durch welche die Eigenschaften entstehen*, hebt er auch die Eigenschaften selbst auf"; by Colson: "For by abolishing the agencies *which created the qualities*, it abolishes the qualities also."

manency in them. He assumes that matter already exists, without telling us here that it was brought into existence by God. This he tells us elsewhere.[82] Indeed he starts the presentation of his own theory of ideas with the words "When out of that shapeless and qualityless matter God produced all things," but it is not his object here to tell how God produced all things out of matter. This he tells us elsewhere, and, according to what he tells us elsewhere, all things, with the exception of the body and the irrational soul of man, were produced directly by God.[83] Here he only tries to tell us how these shapes and qualities were implanted in "all things" and in "each genus" at the time of their creation so that they would be permanent in them. This was not done directly by God, for "it was not lawful" for God to enter the matter out of which all things were created. This was done by the powers, for whom, though they are incorporeal, it was lawful to enter that matter and become immanent in it and thereby act as the principle of the preservation of the shapes and qualities. But though they enter the matter, they still retain their own distinctive character and do not become intermingled with the matter. The full meaning of Philo's statement, then, is as follows: "When out of that [shapeless and qualityless matter] God produced all things [and wished these things to remain permanently possessed of the shapes and qualities with which they were created], He did so without touching it himself [i.e., without himself entering the matter], since it was not lawful for His nature, happy and blessed as it was, to touch indefinite and confused matter, but instead He made full use of the incorporeal powers, well denoted by their name of ideas, to enable each genus to take hold of (λαβεῖν) its appropriate shape [i.e., to take and preserve its appropriate shape]." [84]

[82] Cf. below, p. 308. [83] Cf. above, p. 269. [84] *Spec.* I, 60, 329.

That the reference in these passages is to the immanent powers is evident from the fact that in a parallel passage, after dealing with the powers as incorporeal beings existing apart from the world, Philo makes God address Moses as follows: "But while in their essence they are beyond apprehension, they nevertheless present to your sight a sort of impress of their active working. You men have for your use seals which, when brought into contact with wax or similar material, stamp on them any number of impressions, while they themselves are not docked in any part thereby but remain as they were. Such you must conceive the powers around Me to be, supplying qualities to things devoid of qualities and shapes to things devoid of shapes, and yet changing or lessening nothing of their eternal nature." [85] In this passage, the powers which are compared to seals which come in contact with wax and stamp impressions upon it are quite evidently the powers in the third stage of their existence, after they have already become immanent in the world.

The reason given by Philo in this passage for God's not entering matter is couched in scriptural phraseology. It reflects, in the first place, the many passages in Scripture in which it is commanded that the unclean shall not touch the clean, such, for instance, as "She shall touch no holy thing,"[86] "They shall not touch the holy things," [87] "Whosoever touches the carcass of them shall be unclean," [88] and "Depart ye, depart ye, go ye out from thence, touch no unclean thing; go ye out of the midst of her; be ye clean, ye that bear the vessels of the Lord." [89] It also reflects many passages in Scripture in which God is described as holy, especially the

[85] *Ibid.* I, 8, 47.
[86] Lev. 12: 4.
[87] Num. 4: 15.
[88] Lev. 11: 24.
[89] Isa. 52: 11.

passages in which the people are told that, because God is holy, they should be holy and should therefore refrain from defiling themselves with unclean meat.[90] But behind this scriptural phraseology there is also a metaphysical reason. The holiness of God, which in Scripture implies greatness, majesty, exaltedness and elevation above all things earthly, has acquired with Philo the metaphysical meaning of immateriality. A clear statement of this identification of the conception of holiness with that of immateriality is found in a passage in which Philo says that the wisdom of God is called holy (ἁγία) because it contains "no earthly ingredient." [91] Still more striking is the identification of holiness and immateriality in another passage, in which Philo says: "Separate, therefore, my soul, all that is created, mortal, mutable, profane (βέβηλον) from the conception of God the uncreated, the unchangeable, the immortal, the holy (ἁγίου) and solely blessed." [92] This passage sounds almost like an answer to Ezekiel's complaint about the priests, that "they have not separated between the holy (ἁγίου) and the profane (βεβήλου)." [93] Holiness, therefore, means with Philo immateriality; and the unlawfulness of the holy to touch matter means with him, metaphysically, the impossibility that the absolutely immaterial, such as God is, should enter matter. It is the powers only that can enter matter, for, though they are immaterial, their immateriality is presumably of a lower order than that of God, and they can therefore enter matter, even as the immaterial rational soul can enter a body.

Still while the powers that enter matter are used by God as intermediaries, it does not mean that, according to Philo, God, even though He is pure immateriality, could not, by

[90] Lev. 11:44; 20:25–26.
[91] *Fug.* 35, 196.
[92] *Sacr.* 30, 101.
[93] Ezek. 22:26.

His mere word and command, act upon the material world directly, without having to enter matter himself and without also having to employ intermediaries. In fact, there is evidence in Philo that such direct action of God upon the material world is possible. To begin with, all primary goods in the world come to deserving individuals directly by God.[94] Second, even evil things, such as punishments, which as a rule come indirectly from God through His powers,[95] have sometimes come directly from him. Of such punishments which have come directly from God Philo mentions three of the ten plagues in Egypt, namely, the swarms of flies, the murrain, and the destruction of the first-born.[96] Consequently, his statement that it was "not lawful" for God, because of His holiness, "to touch" that which is profane does not mean that it was impossible for God to do so; it only means that God has thereby intended, as Philo says in the passage quoted above, "to teach wisdom" to men; in this case it is to teach them that it is "not lawful" for them to defile themselves by anything unclean.

VIII. The Fiction of Intermediaries

In the history of philosophy, with the appearance of the theory of emanation in Plotinus, there appears also the view that because God is immaterial and absolutely simple the world could not emanate from Him directly. This view is expressed by Plotinus in the formula put by him in the form of a question: "How from the One, as we conceive it to be, can any multiplicity or duality or number come into existence?" [1] or, "How could all things come from the One which

[94] Cf. below, p. 382.

[95] *Ibid.*

[96] *Mos.* I, 17, 97; 23, 130–24, 139; cf. below, p. 349.

[1] *Enneads* V, 1, 6.

is simple and which shows in its identity no diversity and no duality?" [2] In raising this question Plotinus says that it has already been discussed by ancient philosophers.[3] The reference is undoubtedly to Aristotle's statement that "it is a law of nature that the same cause, provided it remains in the same condition, always produces the same effect" [4] or "that a single motion must be produced by a single cause." [5] But since the world does exist, and, according to Plotinus, its existence is an emanation from God, he concludes that it must have emanated from God not directly but rather indirectly, through some intermediary.[6] As the intermediary through which multiplicity emanated from unity Plotinus takes the ideas of Plato, the totality of which he calls Nous as Philo calls it Logos.

This Plotinian principle that from one only one can proceed, which we may call the principle of the equivalence of cause and effect, can be shown to be logically based upon another principle, equally insisted upon by Plotinus and equally reflecting, at least in its essential point, the view of Aristotle, namely, that God acts without will and design. The One, according to him, who is "immovable" (*ἀκινήτου ὄντος*) is also "without consent (*οὐ προσνεύσαντος*), without volition (*οὐδὲ βουληθέντος*), and in general without any kind of movement (*οὐδὲ ὅλως κινηθέντος*)." [7] Now medieval philosophers were fully aware of this logical connection between these two principles, and consequently in their criticism of the theory of emanation both Maimonides and St. Thomas argue that if we assume that God acts by will and design there is no need for the assumption of intermediaries, for the principle

[2] *Ibid.* V, 2, 1.
[3] *Ibid.* V, 1, 6.
[4] *De Gen. et Corr.* II, 10, 336a, 27–28.
[5] *Metaph.* XII, 8, 1073a, 28.
[6] *Enneads* V, 4, 1. [7] *Ibid.* V, 1, 6.

that from one only one can proceed is not applicable to an agent who acts by design and will.[8]

Modern historians of philosophy, however, have failed to see the connection between the principle of the equivalence of cause and effect and the principle of the necessary causality of God, and consequently whenever they find the conception of a God who is immaterial and simple they see an impossibility of His acting upon the world directly without intermediaries. This kind of reasoning has been especially applied to Philo, who stresses not only the immateriality of God but also His unknowability. From the very beginning of the critical study of the philosophy of Philo it has been assumed that Philo, because of his conception of the absolute immateriality of God and the unknowability of His essence, was confronted with the problem of how to bring God into relation with the world, both as creator and as governor, and in order to solve that problem he had to resort, as did Plotinus in a later period, to intermediaries. This common assumption of historians as to the starting point of Philo's philosophic investigation has been well stated by Zeller: "The more abruptly the divine essence becomes separated from the world and the more every finite being is at the same time made unconditionally dependent upon divine causality, the more strongly does Philo find himself pressed by the necessity of resorting to intermediaries, whereby the action of an extramundane deity upon the world would become possible."[9] Four kinds of such intermediaries, according to Zeller, were borrowed by Philo from various sources: "From the domain of philosophy, (1) the Platonic theory of ideas and (2) the Stoic theory of efficient causes [i.e., what the Stoics call the

[8] Cf. Maimonides, *Moreh Nebukim* II, 22; St. Thomas, *Contra Gentiles* II, 21–24.

[9] Zeller, III, 2[4], p. 407.

Logos or the mind or soul of the world], with which the Platonic world-soul was easily combined; from the domain of religion, (3) the angels of Jewish-Persian origin and (4) the demons of Greek mythology." [10] In this combination of intermediaries Zeller sees an attempt on the part of Philo to combine two contradictory "assertions," the religious and the philosophical, "without noticing their contradiction" [11] and without attempting to build up a "firm theory" or to reduce the various elements to a "system like that of Plotinus." [12] As a result of this, Zeller concludes, the philosophy of Philo, beginning as it did with two contradictory elements, "could not come to any unity of doctrine free from contradictions." [13] This view with regard to the need of the Logos as an intermediary expresses the common view of historians up to the time of Zeller, and it has not been changed essentially since that time.[14]

In our analysis of Philo's conception of the instrumentality of the Logos and wisdom, we have already shown that Philo was not troubled by the problem of how his immaterial God could create a material world nor did he resort to any intermediaries as a solution for the problem. The Logos and, indirectly, also wisdom are described by him as instruments only in the sense of patterns; [15] the need of patterns is explained by him only on the analogy of intelligent human action; [16] and the world as a whole and all that is therein,

[10] *Ibid.*, pp. 407–408; cf. Gfrörer, I, p. 134; Dähne, I, p. 155; Heinze, *Die Lehre vom Logos*, p. 204; Drummond, II, pp. 63–64.

[11] *Ibid.*, p. 413.

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 418.

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 466.

[14] Cf., e.g., J. Freudenthal, "Alexander Polyhistor," in his *Hellenistische Studien*, 1875, p. 73; P. Heinisch, *Die griechische Philosophie im Buche der Weisheit*, 1908, pp. 122–123; 126; Julius Guttmann, *Die Philosophie des Judentums*, 1933, pp. 34–35; J. Klausner, *From Jesus to Paul*, 1943 (1939), pp. 181–183.

[15] Cf. above, p. 270.

[16] Cf. above, p. 272.

with the exception only of the human body and irrational soul of man, were created by God directly without any intermediaries.[17] The only passage in which Philo would seem to speak of the powers as intermediaries, intervening between the holiness of God and the confusion of matter, refers, as we have shown, to the powers which are immanent in the world and are the principle of its preservation, and not to the powers which existed prior to the world and were the patterns of its creation.[18] Moreover, even these immanent powers are employed by God not by the necessity of His aloofness from the world, but by reason of His choice and will, for, as we have shown, according to Philo himself, sometimes God dispenses with the intermediacy of these immanent powers and acts upon the world directly without any of these intermediaries.[19] This disposes of those intermediaries which Zeller finds Philo to have borrowed from the Platonic theory of ideas and the Stoic theory of efficient causes or the Logos. With what he calls the Jewish-Persian angels and the Greek mythological demons we shall deal in a subsequent chapter.[20]

Nor is there any justification for the assumption that the need of intermediaries in Philo is a Jewish heritage. The three verses which Philo quotes as proof text for the scriptural belief in the existence of ideas [21] conceive of the ideas only as patterns and not as intermediaries to whom God has delegated the power of creation. As for use of Wisdom and the Word of God in Scripture in connection with the creation of the world, it does not by any stretch of the imagination mean that they were intermediaries. In Sirach, Wisdom, which is identified with the Law,[22] is said to have been created before

[17] Cf. above, p. 269.
[18] Cf. above, p. 276.
[19] Cf. above, p. 282.
[20] Cf. below, pp. 375 f.
[21] Cf. above, p. 181.
[22] Sirach 24: 23.

the world,[23] but it is nowhere said to have been used as an intermediary in the creation of the world. As for the *memra* of the Targum, no scholar nowadays will entertain the view that it is either a real being or an intermediary.[24] In the Holy Spirit (*ruaḥ ha-ḳodesh*) and Shekinah of the Talmud there is indeed sometimes the undoubted implication that they are real beings created by God, but their function is confined to the inspiration of prophecy; they are not used as intermediaries in the creation of the world.[25] Even the angels, who as messengers of God are His intermediaries in the world, act as intermediaries not because God's nature would not allow Him to act directly, but because God by His own will decides what actions in the world should be performed by him directly and what actions should be performed by the intermediacy of angels. This is evidenced by the fact that in native Jewish tradition, as in Philo, God occasionally acts directly without the intermediacy of angels.[26]

Wisdom in the Wisdom of Solomon is sometimes assumed to be different from the Logos of Philo [27] but, like the Logos, it has given rise among students to a variety of conflicting interpretations. To our mind, however, Wisdom is dealt with in that book as the Logos, according to our interpretation, is dealt with in Philo. As the Logos in Philo, so Wisdom in the Wisdom of Solomon has three stages of existence: (1) as a property of God, (2) as a real being created by God prior to the creation of the world, and (3) as a being im-

[23] Sirach 1: 4.

[24] Cf. G. F. Moore, *Judaism*, I, p. 417. *Idem*, "Intermediaries in Jewish Theology," *Harvard Theological Review*, 15 (1922), 41–85. Cf. also Strack-Billerbeck, "Exkurs über den Memra Jahves" in their *Kommentar zum Neuen Testament aus Talmud und Midrasch*, II, pp. 302–333; J. Abelson, *The Immanence of God in Rabbinical Literature*, pp. 146–173; K. Kohler, "Memra," *Jew. Enc.*, *s. v.*

[25] Cf. G. F. Moore, *Judaism*, I, p. 437; Abelson, *op. cit.*, pp. 77–145; 174–277.

[26] Cf. above, pp. 269, 282.

[27] Cf. Heinisch, *op. cit.*, pp. 126 ff.

manent in the world. Starting with the last, we find (3) that as an immanent being it is described as that which "pervades and penetrates all things," [28] and as that which "extends mightily from end to end and administers all things well," [29] and as that which "though but one, has power to do all things, and, remaining in herself, renews all things." [30] It is with reference to this immanent Wisdom also that Solomon is made to say, "For she that is the artificer (τεχνῖτις) of all things taught me, even wisdom"; [31] for the immanent Wisdom, in penetrating all things, penetrates also the human soul, being "all-powerful, all-surveying and penetrating through all intelligent, pure, most rare spirits," [32] and thus becoming the source of human knowledge and wisdom. Then, (2) prior to the creation of the world, Wisdom, like Philo's Logos, existed as a real being who was created by God, described as "alone in kind" (μονογενές)[33] and of "noble birth" (εὐγένεια),[34] as "sitting beside" (πάρεδρον) God on the throne,[35] as "initiated into the knowledge of God and a chooser (αἱρέτις) of His works," [36] and as being "with" God (μετὰ σοῦ) and "present" (παροῦσα) when He created the world.[37] But (1) all these powers of Wisdom and Wisdom itself were at first properties of God identical with His essence, possessed by Him even before He created Wisdom and endowed it with these various powers; for, ultimately, it is God who made the world,[38] who is the

[28] Wisdom of Solomon 7: 24.

[29] *Ibid.*, 8: 1.

[30] *Ibid.*, 7: 27. I take this to refer to the immanent wisdom, emphasizing that even in its immanent stage it is not corporeal and intermingled with the corporeal things. Cf. above, p. 279, and below, p. 327.

[31] *Ibid.* 7: 22.

[32] *Ibid.* 7: 23.

[33] *Ibid.* 7: 22.

[34] *Ibid.* 8: 3.

[35] *Ibid.* 9: 4. Cf. above, p. 220.

[36] *Ibid.* 8: 4.

[37] *Ibid.* 9: 9.

[38] *Ibid.* 9: 9; 11: 24.

"artificer" (τεχνίτης)[39] of the world, and who "administers"[40] (διοικῶν) all things. But it will be noticed that, speaking of Wisdom during its second stage of existence, he refers to it only as having been "with" God and as having been "present" when the world was created and as having also been a "chooser" of God's works — that is to say, a sort of consultant, after the analogy of the angels in the Midrash and Talmud with whom God consulted at the creation of man; [41] but it is nowhere described as an intermediary in the act of creation.

The conclusion we are forced to reach is that Philo had neither a logical nor a historical reason to look for intermediaries, and if his Logos and powers and ideas are in some respects employed by God as intermediaries they are selected by Him for that task not because of the need to bridge some imaginary gulf between Him and the world, but rather, as Philo himself suggests, for the purpose of setting various examples of right conduct to men.

IX. Conclusion, Influence, Anticipation

The starting point of Philo's philosophy is Plato's theory of ideas. By his time there were three conceptions of the ideas: first, that they existed as real incorporeal beings from eternity; second, that they have existence only as thoughts of God; third, that they have no existence at all except through their immanence in things. Philo combines these

[39] *Ibid.* 13: 1.

[40] *Ibid.* 15: 1. By this assumption of three stages in the existence of Wisdom, all the apparent contradictions in the Wisdom of Solomon with regard to Wisdom (cf. Heinze, *Die Lehre vom Logos*, pp. 197–201; Drummond, *Philo Judaeus*, I, 219–225; Charles, *The Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha of the Old Testament*, I, 528) are solved.

[41] *Genesis Rabbah* 8, 3–9; *Sanhedrin* 38b.

three conceptions of ideas by endowing them with three stages or three kinds of existence. First, from eternity they had existed as thoughts of God; second, prior to the creation of the world they were created by God as real incorporeal beings; third, with the creation of the world they were implanted by God in the world and thereby became immanent in the world. These three stages of existence are not successive stages; they are three kinds of existence which the ideas have, corresponding to three classes of ideas; so that even after the creation of the world one class of ideas are still thoughts of God, another class of ideas are still real incorporeal beings, and a third class of ideas are immanent in the world. In this chapter we have dealt only with the first two stages of their existence. In a subsequent chapter we shall deal with their third stage of existence.

During their first stage of existence, when they were only thoughts of God, the ideas were patterns not only of things which subsequently came into existence with the creation of our world, but they were patterns also of all kinds of possible things in all kinds of possible worlds which God, had He chosen, could have created. But when God in His wisdom decided to create this our world, He first conceived in His thought and then created as real incorporeal beings those ideas which were to serve Him as patterns of things in our world to be created by Him. Various kinds of ideas are mentioned by Philo, and on the whole they are such as can be found in the various dialogues of Plato. But in departure from Plato he introduces two new ideas, the idea of mind and the idea of soul.

Through a suggestion in Plato that the ideas are not only patterns but also causes endowed with power, Philo identifies the ideas with the term "powers" which is used in Scripture in the expression "the Lord of the powers," or, as the ex-

pression runs in English, "the Lord of hosts." Accordingly, he calls the ideas also by the term powers.

Through another suggestion in Plato that the ideas in their totality constitute what he calls an "intelligible animal," corresponding to our world which he calls a "visible animal," Philo calls the totality of ideas by the name of "intelligible world."

Then also, through the general philosophic view that thoughts must be the object of a thinking mind, Philo considered the ideas, while they were yet thoughts of God, as having been conceived by the mind of God, which mind, of course, was identical with God's essence. This mind of God is called by him, for various reasons, the Logos of God and sometimes also the Wisdom of God. Moreover, when God compacted these ideas and created them as an intelligible world, He also created a mind in which the intelligible world and hence also the ideas were to be contained. This mind, created by God as the container of the intelligible world, is similarly called by him Logos and sometimes also Wisdom. In the Logos and Wisdom, just as in the ideas which are contained in them, there are thus also three stages of existence: first, a Logos or Wisdom which is eternal and is identical with God's essence; second, a Logos or Wisdom which is created as an incorporeal real being and is distinct from God's essence; third, an immanent Logos or Wisdom.

Five terms all together are used by Philo in connection with the ideas, namely, (1) ideas, (2) intelligible world, (3) powers, (4) Logos, (5) Wisdom. These five terms fall into two groups: first, the terms ideas and intelligible world, which are used by him only with reference to the second stage of the existence of ideas; second, the terms powers, Logos, and Wisdom, which are used by him either with reference to the combination of the first and the second stage of existence

or with reference only to the second stage. In the case of powers and Wisdom, they sometimes refer only to the first stage. Logos, Powers, and Wisdom, as we shall see later, are also used with reference to the third stage. Again, the term intelligible world is used by Philo as a description only of the totality of ideas, that is, of ideas in their restricted sense of patterns; the term Logos is used by him as a description of both the totality of ideas and the totality of powers, that is, of ideas in the sense of both patterns and causes. Finally, according to a native Jewish tradition adopted by Philo, the powers of God are divided into two main classes, beneficial and punitive. The Logos, therefore, as the totality of powers as well as of ideas, is represented by him as the totality of both these types of powers which, expressed by him in figurative language, is said to be "in the middle" of the powers or is the "source" of the powers.

The relation of God to the created Logos is conceived by Philo as that of cause to effect; the relation of the Logos to the intelligible world is conceived by him as that of the mind to its object of knowledge; the relation of the intelligible world to the ideas is conceived by him as that of the whole to its constituent parts. The interrelations of these terms are sometimes described by him as interrelations between the more universal and the less universal. God is thus described by him as "the most generic" without any qualification; the Logos is described by him as "the most generic of created things"; the ideas are described by him simply as "generic." Sometimes, drawing upon the Aristotelian terminology, he describes the Logos — in its capacity as the mind of the intelligible world — as the place of the intelligible world, by which he means that the two are identical and are distinguishable only in thought as the mind is distinguishable from its object of knowledge. Similarly God, in His relation to the ideas

in their first stage of existence, when they are only thoughts of God, is described by him as "the incorporeal space of the incorporeal ideas." But in His relation to the ideas as well as to the intelligible world and the Logos in their second stage of existence, when they are already created and real incorporeal beings distinct from God's essence, God, according to Philo, cannot be described as their place; He can only be described as being "prior" to them, prior in the sense of being their cause. In one sense, however, God can be called the "place" of everything, and that is in the Aristotelian sense that "place" is that which contains, without being identical with that which is contained. For since God contains everything and is not identical with anything in the world, He may be called the place of the world as well as of everything within it.

Finally, the Aristotelian forms, which have grown out of the Platonic ideas, are by implication described by Aristotle as "instruments," in which description the term instrument is used in the sense of a form or pattern in the mind of the agent or artist or efficient cause. Similarly Philo, on restoring the forms of Aristotle to the status of the ideas of Plato, still retains for them the title instrument in the sense of pattern. And so the ideas and powers and the Logos and Wisdom are all in various ways called by him instruments. But in the case of all of them, they are called by him instruments only in the sense of patterns; they are not called by him instruments in the sense of intermediaries.

Historically, one of the most important features of Philo's revision of the Platonic theory of ideas is his application of the term Logos to the totality of ideas and his description of it as the place of the intelligible world, which in its turn consists of the ideas.

In the subsequent history of philosophy, the Logos be-

came separated from the intelligible world and the ideas, and came to be treated as something apart from them. As such it entered upon a new career in the history of the Christian doctrine of the trinity. From Christianity it passed on into Islam under the form of its orthodox theory of divine attributes. As integrally implicated in the problem of divine attributes, the Logos thus indirectly continued to exist as a problem also throughout medieval Moslem and Jewish philosophy.

With the separation of the Logos from the ideas and its emergence as a new problem of its own, the theory of ideas, too, emerged as a problem distinct from that of the Logos and came to be treated as such throughout the history of philosophy, though later it became better known as the problem of universals. Throughout the subsequent history of the theory of ideas the influence of Philo has been felt. If their existence is admitted, they have had to depend for their existence upon God. Oftentimes, as in Philo, three stages in their existence are distinguished.

In his grand assault upon philosophy, Spinoza, by doing away with the entire conception of the existence of incorporeal beings, does away also with ideas and an intelligible world and a Logos. Directly, Spinoza does not deal with any of these problems, except in so far as he mentions Plato's theory of ideas,[1] in so far also as he refers to Jesus as the eternal son of God [2] or as "the idea of God," [3] and finally in so far as he uses the same term, eternal son of God, as a designation of each of his two immediate infinite modes.[4] Indirectly, however, all these problems are involved in his discussion of the problems of creation and divine attributes.

[1] *Short Treatise* I, 6, § 7.
[2] *Cogitata Metaphysica* II, 10; *Epistola* 73.
[3] *Ethics* IV, Prop. 68, Schol.
[4] *Short Treatise* I, 9, §§ 2–3.

CHAPTER V

CREATION AND STRUCTURE OF THE WORLD

In his discussion of the problem of the origin of the world Philo enumerates three views which were current in his time: the Aristotelian view that the world is eternal in the sense of its being both uncreated and indestructible,[1] the Stoic view that this world of ours is one in a succession of worlds each of which is both created and destructible,[2] and the Platonic view that the world is created but not destructible.[3] Of these three views, the Aristotelian view is rejected in so far as it affirms the uncreatedness of the world [4] but it is praised for its pious and religious spirit in so far as it affirms its indestructibility; [5] the Stoic view is completely rejected; [6] the Platonic view is declared to have been anticipated by Moses.[7]

(*a*) *Criticism of Aristotle and the Stoics*

The rejection of the Aristotelian view of the uncreatedness of the world is on the ground that it "impiously" postulates in God "a vast inactivity." [8] This Philo declares to be contrary to the Mosaic teaching that "in existing things there must be an active cause and a passive object," the latter of which is "in itself incapable of life and motion, but, when set

[1] *Aet.* 3, 7 and 10–12; *Opif.* 2, 7; *Conf.* 23, 114; *Somn.* II, 43, 283.

[2] *Aet.* 3, 8–9.

[3] *Ibid.* 4, 13–16.

[4] *Opif.* 2, 7–11; cf. *Somn.* II, 43, 283.

[5] *Aet.* 3, 10. In *Opif.* 2, 7, where Aristotle is criticized, his view is described as that which believes that the world is "uncreated and eternal" and similarly in *Aet.* 3, 10, where he is praised, his view is described as that which believes that he world is "uncreated and indestructible." But evidently the criticism in the former place is meant only for the "uncreated" part of his view and the praise in the latter place is meant only for the "indestructible" part of his view.

[6] *Aet.* 5, 20–9, 51. [7] *Ibid.* 5, 19. [8] *Opif.* 2, 7.

in motion and shaped and endowed with life by mind, changes into the most perfect masterpiece, namely, this world." [9] Now, it will have been noticed, the view which Philo ascribes to Moses and on account of which he rejects the Aristotelian theory of the uncreatedness of the world is only a restatement of Aristotle's own view, and is even couched in Aristotle's own terms. The distinction within existing things between active and passive is Aristotelian; [10] the description of the passive as that which in itself is incapable of motion and hence of life is also Aristotelian;[11] and equally Aristotelian is the description of God as the one who sets the world in motion, and who sets it in motion as a mind and is its life.[12] Since Philo, therefore, uses the very words of Aristotle as a refutation of Aristotle's own theory of the uncreatedness of the world, we have reason to believe that the main point of his argument is that Aristotle's theory of the uncreatedness of the world is somehow inconsistent with his own conception of God as a Prime Mover. But inasmuch as Philo only implies that there is such an inconsistency, without telling us what it is, we shall try to work out this implication ourselves.

Philo would seem to be arguing as follows: Aristotle himself, despite his belief in the uncreatedness of the world, is compelled to admit the existence of a God, on the ground of the impossibility of an infinite series of movers and things moved. This God, according to him, is the cause of all the motions in the world. Now, being the cause of all the motions in the world, God must certainly be more active than any of the other motive causes in the world. But among the

[9] *Ibid.* 2, 8–9.

[10] *Phys.* VIII, 4, 255a, 12–15. The terms used, however, are not Aristotelian.

[11] *Phys.* VIII, 4, 254b, 27–33; *De Gen. et Corr.* II, 9, 335b, 29–31.

[12] *Metaph.* XII, 7, 1072a, 25 ff.

motive causes in the world there are those which bring things into existence from non-existence, that is, those which produce motion in the category of substance.[13] When Aristotle maintains, therefore, that the world is eternal and that God did not bring it into existence from non-existence, he makes of his God, whom he calls the Prime Mover, less of a cause than some of the other motive causes in the world, for, in comparison with those motive causes in the world which are capable of bringing things into existence from non-existence, his God is to be characterized by "a vast inactivity." It is by such reasoning that St. Thomas tries to show that Aristotle's immovable mover must be the cause of existence (*causa essendi*) to other things.[14] This argument, while proving creation, would, of course, not prove creation *ex nihilo*, for the motive causes in the world which bring things into existence do not bring them into existence *ex nihilo*, but rather out of something which serves as a sort of matter. But that is all that Philo wishes to prove by this argument, namely, that this world of ours did not exist from eternity.

If our interpretation of this argument is right, then it can be shown that it is modeled after an argument for providence reproduced probably from the Stoics. The argument in question is as follows: "Those who grant that the gods exist must acknowledge that they perform some action (*aliquid agere*), and that action an exalted one. But there is nothing more exalted than the administration of the world. Conse-

[13] *Categ.*, 14, 15a, 13–14.

[14] *Contra Gentiles* II, 6 (2): Item, Ostendum est (l. I, c. 13), per rationem ejusdem, esse aliquod primum movens immobile, quod Deum dicimus. Primum autem movens, in quolibet ordine motuum, est causa omnium motuum qui sunt illius ordinis. Quum igitur multa ex motibus caeli producantur in esse, in quorum ordine Deum esse primum movens ostendum est (ubi sup.), oportet quod Deus sit multis rebus causa essendi. It may be remarked that Aristotle, too, sometimes speaks of God as a "maker" rather than a "mover." Cf., for instance, *De Caelo* I, 4, 271a, 33. This question is discussed in our introductory volume on Greek philosophy.

quently the world is administered by the divine forethought." [15] All that Philo had to do to change this argument for providence into an argument for creation was to start with the same major premise and then change the minor premise and conclusion to read as follows: "But there is nothing more exalted than the creation of the world. Consequently this world was created by God."

That Philo in his preceding argument has transformed an argument for providence into an argument for creation becomes all the more evident when we consider that his next argument for creation in the same passage is based upon providence. "Those who assert that the world is uncreated," he argues, "unconsciously eliminate that which of all incentives to piety is the most beneficial and the most indispensable, namely, providence, for it stands to reason that what has been brought into existence should be cared for by its Father and Maker. . . . But between that which has never been brought into being and one who is not its Maker no such tie is formed." [16] The argument as phrased reads as if the belief in creation were with Philo a religious fiction necessary for the promotion of piety and of the belief in divine providence. But it is more than that. To Philo, the belief in providence ultimately rests upon creation, for the belief in providence is part of the belief in the possibility of miracles, and creation is the greatest miracle recorded in Scripture. Providence to him means individual providence, and individual providence is based upon the belief that God, by His sheer will, can miraculously change the order of nature which He himself has implanted in the world.[17] Now the creation of the world, as we shall see, is considered by

[15] Cicero, *De Natura Deorum* II, 30, 76.
[16] *Opif.* 2, 9–10.
[17] Cf. below, p. 348.

Philo as the strongest proof for the possibility of miracles [18] and hence also for individual providence. In one place he combines those who deny the existence of God, those who deny the creation of the world, and those who deny divine providence into one group, characterizing them all as giving themselves to studies "directed against nature or rather against their own soul" and also as declaring "that nothing exists beyond the world of our sight and senses, that it neither was created nor will perish, but is uncreated, imperishable, without guardian, helmsman or protector." [19] And so Philo, following his own view, transformed a Stoic argument for providence into an argument for creation.

In another passage, evidently also referring to the theory of the uncreatedness of the world, Philo rejects this theory on the ground that it "combines as joint causes God and that which is created, two opposite natures like two different colors, whereas there is really one single cause, and that an efficient one (*δρῶν*)." [20] The point of this argument seems to be that, if we assume that God is only a cause of the motion of the world, then the world is independent of God for its existence and may therefore be considered as a joint cause with God for everything within the world, and God is therefore not to be considered as the only efficient cause.

The Stoic view he rejects by several arguments. One of these arguments, concerning which he says that it is hailed by countless people as "very exact and absolutely irrefutable," [21] reappears subsequently in the history of philosophy. It tries to show that no adequate motive could be found in God for the successive destructions and constructions of worlds. If it were merely out of a desire to destroy worlds, then this is incompatible with the goodness and

[18] *Mos.* I, 38, 212; II, 48, 267; cf. below, p. 354.
[19] *Somn.* II, 43, 283.
[20] *Leg. All.* III, 3, 7.
[21] *Aet.* 8, 39.

immutability of the nature of God. If it were out of a desire to construct another world, then that other world would have to be either worse than the world destroyed, or similar to it, or better than it; but of these three possible assumptions the first is incompatible with the goodness of God's actions, the second with the usefulness of God's actions, and the third with the perfection of God's actions.[22] The argument is somewhat similar to that employed by Plato in showing that God could not change himself on the ground that He would have to change himself either into something better or into something worse, neither of which is conceivable with reference to God.[23]

(*b*) *Plato's Timaeus and the Book of Genesis*

In adopting Plato's view of the creation of the world on account of its agreement with the story of creation in the Book of Genesis, Philo also interprets the scriptural story of creation in Genesis in the light of Plato's story of creation in the *Timaeus*. The creation of the world was out of what he calls by the Aristotelian term matter (ὕλη)[24] or by the Stoic term substance (οὐσία),[25] and describes by the Platonic term mother (μήτηρ) or foster-mother (τροφός) or nurse (τιθήνη).[26] But with regard to that matter, it is not clear whether he considers it as created by God, or whether he considers it as coeternal with God. Interpreters of Philo differ on that point. Those who say that he considered matter as created

[22] *Ibid.*, 39–44; cf. a similar argument in Sallustius, *Concerning the Gods and the Universe*, VII, by A. D. Nock (Cambridge University Press, 1926), pp. 12–15 and lx–lxiii.

[23] *Republic* II, 381 B–C.

[24] *Plant.* 2, 5; *Heres* 32, 160.

[25] *Opif.* 5, 21; *Plant.* 1, 3; *Heres* 27, 134; *Somn.* II, 6, 45. Cf. Leisegang, *Indices*, sub οὐσία, 3.

[26] *Ebr.* 14, 61; *Qu. in Gen.* IV, 160; cf. above, p. 267.

find support for their interpretation in such passages as those in which God is said to have brought into being "things that were non-existent" (*τὰ μὴ ὄντα*)[27] or in which He is said to be "not only a Demiurge, but also a Creator (*κτίστης*)"[28] and in which to create (*creare*) matter is said to be a property of Providence[29] or in which matter is spoken of as having been created (*γέγονε*).[30] Those who say that Philo considered matter as eternal argue that the term "non-existent" is used by Philo in a relative and not an absolute sense; that the statement that God is not only a Demiurge but also a Creator means that God is not only a Demiurge of the perceptible world but also the Creator of the intelligible world; that the passages in which the term creation is used in connection with matter are not statements of Philo's own belief; that the terms which he most often applies to God are Craftsman (*δημιουργός*), World-molder (*κοσμοπλάστης*), and Artificer (*τεχνίτης*), all of which imply the making of the world out of something.[31] On the basis of all these considerations and from "his failure to speak of matter as created,"[32] Drummond concludes his survey of the problem with the following words: "On a survey, then, of the whole evidence, I think we must conclude that Philo believed in the eternity of matter."[33] The same conclusion is also arrived at by Neumark[34] and Bréhier.[35]

[27] *Opif.* 26, 81; *Mut.* 5, 46; *Mos.* II, 20, 100; cf. *Somn.* I, 13, 76.

[28] *Somn.* I, 13, 76; *Spec.* I, 5, 30.

[29] C. G. L. Grossmann, *Quaestiones Philoneae*, Lipsiae, 1829, I, p. 19, n. 70.

[30] Eusebius, *Praeparatio Evangelica* VII, 21, 336b.

[31] Drummond, I, 297–307.

[32] *Idem*, I, 300.

[33] *Idem*, I, 307.

[34] Cf. D. Neumark, *Toledot ha-Pilosofiah be-Yisra'el*, I, 1921, p. 61. In his earlier German work, *Geschichte der jüdischen Philosophie des Mittelalters*, I, 1907, pp. 71–72, he has left the matter in doubt.

[35] Bréhier, pp. 80–82. So also J. Klausner in his *From Jesus to Paul*, p. 188.

From our own survey of the whole evidence, however, we have come to the conclusion that no light can be thrown on Philo's position on this question from his use of such terms as "non-existent" or "creator" or "create" on the one hand, and "craftsman" or "world-molder" or "artificer" on the other. Nor can one determine his position on this question with the help of Scripture or post-scriptural Jewish tradition. With regard to the scriptural story of creation, one need not refer to the findings of modern critical scholarship that the creation story in Genesis reflects a view similar to that of Plato and that there is no suggestion in it of creation out of nothing.[36] One has only to refer to the fact that in medieval Jewish philosophy some philosophers have found the scriptural story of creation quite compatible with the belief in a preëxistent eternal and uncreated matter,[37] and, what is more important, support for such an interpretation was thought to be found in a Midrashic work.[38] Those medieval philosophers evidently felt themselves much freer in their interpretation of the story of Genesis than Philo is assumed by Caird to have felt himself, for he solves the entire problem as to Philo's view on the origin of the preëxistent matter by stating that "in accommodation to Jewish notions, God must be supposed to create matter in which his ideas are realized." [39] Nor, again, can an answer to this question be found in post-scriptural Jewish literature already in existence by the time of Philo. In this literature, two conflicting statements are to be found. In the Wisdom of Solomon, on the

[36] Cf. J. Skinner's *Genesis* in *The International Critical Commentary*, pp. 41–50.

[37] Cf. for instance, Judah ha-Levi, *Cuzari* I, 67; Maimonides, *Moreh Nebukim* II, 25; Gersonides, *Milḥamot Adonai* VI, 2, 1. The treatment of this view in Jewish philosophy has been discussed by the present writer in "The Platonic, Aristotelian and Stoic Theories of Creation in Hallevi and Maimonides," *Essays in Honour of the Very Rev. Dr. J. H. Hertz* [1942], 427–442.

[38] Maimonides, *Moreh Nebukim* II, 26, quoting *Pirke de-Rabbi Eli'ezer*, Ch. 3.

[39] E. Caird, *Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers*, II, 191.

one hand, it is said that God "created the world out of formless matter"; [40] in The Second Book of Maccabees, on the other hand, it is said that God made heaven and earth and all that is therein "out of things non-existent" (ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων).[41] But here, again, the question may be raised whether the "formless matter" was itself created or not, and also whether the "things non-existent" are absolutely or relatively non-existent. Similarly inconclusive is the position of Aristeas on this question. His argument that the deified heroes are not true gods because the useful things which they invented are only combinations of things already created but "they themselves did not make the construction (κατασκευήν) of the things" [42] does not necessarily imply that God's creation of the world was *ex nihilo*;[43] it means no more than what it says, namely, that the heroes merely took things which were already constructed and made new useful combinations of them, whereas the Jewish God, being a true God, made the very construction of the world, but that construction may have been made out of a formless matter and not necessarily *ex nihilo*. If, therefore, an answer is to be found to the question of Philo's position on the subject, it will have to be found in some passage in which he definitely and unmistakably states that the preëxistent matter out of which the world was created was itself created by God.

Such a passage, we believe, is to be found in his revision of the creation story of the *Timaeus*. In that passage, either

[40] Wisdom of Solomon 11: 17.

[41] II Macc. 7: 28.

[42] Aristeas, 136.

[43] D. Neumark, taking the term κατασκευή in the sense of "matter," derives from this passage in Aristeas a belief in creation *ex nihilo* (*Toledot ha-Pilosofiah be-Yisra'el*, I, p. 61). H. Andrews in Charles's *Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha of the Old Testament* translates the term similarly by "substance" and so does also H. St. J. Thackeray in his translation of the Letter of Aristeas in *The Jewish Quarterly Review*, 15 (1903), p. 366.

as an interpretation of Plato or as a departure from him, Philo, we shall try to show, has explicitly stated his view of the creation of matter. If students of Philo have failed to see it, it is because they have failed to see Plato through the eyes of Philo. Let us then start with Plato.

Of Plato's conception of the preëxistent matter, as of everything Plato has said, there are a variety of interpretations. The interpretation which we have arrived at and which we believe was the interpretation given to Plato by Philo may be outlined as follows. First, there is an unlimited void which is the abode of the ideas. We have already referred to this and have shown how Philo criticizes and rejects this view.[44] Second, within that unlimited void, there is a limited void. It is this limited void that Plato calls receptacle (ὑποδοχή) or space (χώρα) and "mother" (μήτηρ)[45] or nurse (τιθήνη)[46] or fosteress (τροφός),[47] and it is that *in which* (ἐν ᾧ)[48] the world is to be created. Third, in that limited void there are copies (μιμήματα)[49] or shapes (μορφαί)[50] or traces (ἴχνη)[51] of the ideal four elements, which copies are "devoid of reason and measure."[52] It is *from these* copies of the ideal four elements (ἐξ αὐτῶν)[53] that, according to Plato, the world was to be created. Fourth, the Demiurge transforms these copies of the ideal four elements into the four elements, and then out of these four elements[54] he creates the world.[55] The principal feature in this interpretation of Plato is that the limited void called "receptacle" or "space"

[44] Cf. above, p. 241.

[45] *Timaeus* 50 D; 51 A; cf. also Aristotle, *Phys.* I, 9, 192a, 14.

[46] *Timaeus* 49 A; 52 D.

[47] *Ibid.* 88 D.

[48] *Ibid.* 49 E; 50 C.

[49] *Ibid.* 50 C.

[50] *Ibid.* 52 D.

[51] *Ibid.* 53 B.

[52] *Ibid.* 53 A.

[53] *Ibid.*

[54] *Ibid.* 53 C–56 C.

[55] *Ibid.* 40 A–40 C. More fully on this interpretation of Plato in our introductory volume on Greek philosophy.

and the copies of the four elements within that limited void called "mother" or "fosteress" or "nurse" have both come to be regarded as preëxistent matter, the one the matter *in which* the world was created and the other the matter *from which* the world was created.

This is the general outline of Plato's preëxistent matter as it must have shaped itself in the mind of Philo. But within the outline of that picture there were three blurred spots. (1) Plato is inconsistent with regard to the origin of the ideas, nor does he make it clear whether the unlimited void where the ideas exist was created or not. (2) Nor, again, does he make it clear whether the limited void, that is, the matter *in which* the world was created, was created by God or existed from eternity. (3) Nor, finally, does he make it clear whether the copies of the four ideal elements within the limited void, that is, the matter *from which* the world was created, was created by God or existed from eternity: all he says about them is that they were stamped from the ideal elements "in a fashion marvellous and hard to describe." [56]

In our presentation of Philo's version of Plato's theory of ideas we have shown how Philo has removed the first ambiguity in Plato by abolishing outright the unlimited void in which the ideas were supposed to exist and also by declaring that the ideas were created by God.[57] Here, in our presentation of Philo's version of Plato's story of creation, we shall try to show how Philo has similarly removed the second and third ambiguities in Plato, by declaring that the matter *in which* the world was created and the matter *from which* the world was created were both themselves created by God.

The passage in which we find Philo's removal of these two

[56] *Ibid.* 50 c.

[57] Cf. above, pp. 241 f. and 204 f.

ambiguities in Plato is his interpretation of the scriptural account of the things created on the first day of creation, which he takes to refer to the creation of the intelligible world or the world of ideas.[58] As text for his interpretation he takes the three verses in the first chapter of Genesis: "In the beginning God made the *heaven* and the *earth.* And the earth was invisible and without form, and *darkness* was above the *abyss*; and the *spirit of God* was borne above the *water.* And God said: 'Let there be *light.*'"[59] The *seven italicized words* are taken by him to refer to seven ideal patterns of things constituting the corporeal world which was to be created in the subsequent five days.[60] "Heaven" is explained by him as "incorporeal heaven," by which he means the idea of fire, for elsewhere we find that in his enumeration of the four elements he uses the term heaven for the term fire.[61]

[58] *Opif.* 7, 29; cf. 44, 129–130. [59] Gen. 1: 1–3.

[60] The seven things which according to Jewish tradition were created prior to the creation of the world (cf. above, p. 183) are not the same as those enumerated here by Philo. The similarity is only in the number seven. Nor is there any evidence that *Midrash Tadshe,* ch. 6, has used Philo's statement here (cf. A. Epstein, "Le Livre des Jubilés, Philon et le Midrasch Tadsché," *Revue des Études Juives,* 21 (1890), p. 83, and L. Cohn, *Philos Werke,* I, 36, n. 3). The main point in Philo's statement here is that the seven terms in question mentioned on the first day of creation stand for the ideas of seven things which were to be created on the subsequent days of creation. *Midrash Tadshe,* on the basis of the scriptural narrative, enumerates twenty-two kinds of things that were created during the seven days of creation and among them, again on the basis of the scriptural narrative, it mentions the seven things that were created on the first day.

A much closer analogy is to be found in the following statement in *Exodus Rabbah* 15, 22: "Three things were created prior to the creation of the world — water, air, and fire. Water conceived and gave birth to darkness; fire conceived and gave birth to light; air conceived and gave birth to wisdom." By taking the first three in this list to refer to ideas and the second three to refer to their corresponding objects, we have here a statement which is analogous to that of Philo in its main contention. Furthermore, by taking in this statement fire to mean heaven, and light to mean luminaries, and by taking also air to mean spirit, and wisdom to mean mind, we have here a still further analogy to two of the ideas and their corresponding objects mentioned by Philo.

[61] *Somn.* I, 3, 16; *Mos.* I, 20, 113; *Spec.* III, 20, 111; *Conf.* 27, 136. But see interpretation of "heaven" and "earth" in *Leg. All.* I, 1, 1; 9, 21.

"Earth" is explained as "invisible earth," that is, the idea of the element earth. "Darkness" is explained as the "idea of air," and "water" is explained as "the incorporeal essence of water," that is, the idea of water. "Spirit of God" is explained as "the incorporeal essence of spirit," by which he means the ideas of mind and soul. "Light" is explained as "the incorporeal essence of light" and as "an incorporeal pattern, discernible only to the mind, of the sun and of all the luminaries which were to come into existence throughout heaven." This corresponds to the idea of the celestial bodies.

Thus six of the seven ideas created by God, according to Philo, on the first day of creation are the ideas of the four elements, the ideas of mind and soul, and the idea of the celestial bodies. This is indeed an interpretation of Genesis in terms of the *Timaeus* — not in terms of the *Timaeus* as it is written, but rather in terms of the *Timaeus* as it was understood by Philo. In the *Timaeus* as it is written there is no mention of an idea of mind and soul: [62] there is reference there only to the ideas of the four elements, of which the idea of fire is mentioned explicitly,[63] and also to the idea of the celestial bodies.[64] Here Philo adds the idea of mind and soul.[65] Again, in the *Timaeus*, the ideas are definitely described as "eternal" [66] and as "uncreated," [67] and, with regard to the copies of the ideal four elements in the limited void, there is no statement whether, like the ideas, they are

[62] Cf. above, p. 213.

[63] *Timaeus* 51 B.

[64] Cf. *ibid.* 30 C and 39 E–40 A. In these passages of the *Timaeus* there is reference not only to the idea of the celestial bodies but also to the ideas of birds, fishes, and land-animals. The idea of man was created according to Philo on the sixth day. Cf. *Opif.* 46, 134; *Leg. All.* I, 12, 31, in connection with Gen. 1: 26.

[65] Cf. above, p. 214.

[66] *Timaeus* 29 A.

[67] *Ibid.* 52 A.

uncreated or, unlike the ideas, they are created. Philo, however, definitely says that the ideas of the four elements are created and consequently the copies of the ideal four elements in the limited void are also created. Thus Philo has cleared up the ambiguity in Plato with regard to the copies of the ideal four forms, concerning which Plato only says that they were stamped "in a fashion marvellous and hard to describe." [68]

But then, we shall now try to show, in his comment on the term "abyss" he clears up the ambiguity in Plato with regard to the origin of the limited void. The term "abyss" is explained by him as the "idea of void," for "void," he says, "is very deep and yawning" (*ἀχανές*).[69] Now this "void," identified as it is with an "abyss" which is "yawning," is reminiscent of Hesiod's "chaos," which literally means "gape," "yawn," [70] and with which Plato's "receptacle" or "space" is undoubtedly connected.[71] Consequently when Philo speaks of the creation of the idea of void, he means that the idea of Plato's "receptacle" or "space" was created and hence Plato's receptacle or space itself was also created.

We thus have in Philo a clear, though indirect, statement that the Platonic "receptacle" or "space," that is, the matter *in which* the world was created, was itself created by God. When that "receptacle" or "space" was created, God also created in it what Plato calls "copies" or "shapes" or "traces" of the ideal four elements, that is, the matter *from which* the elements and hence the world were created. Again, Philo does not mention directly the creation of the matter

[68] *Ibid.* 50 c. [69] *Opif.* 7, 29.

[70] See Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy*[3] (London: A. & C. Black, 1920), p. 7, n. 1.

[71] Cf. Zeller, II, 1[4], pp. 729–30 (*Plato*, p. 303); cf. also *Aet.* 5, 18: "Chaos in Aristotle's opinion is space." For this identification of Hesiod's "chaos" with "space," see *Phys.* IV, 1, 208b, 30–33.

from which the elements were created, but he alludes to it in his statement that God "created space (χώρα) and place (τόπος) simultaneously with bodies (σώματα)."[72] By the term "bodies," we take it, he means here both extended bodies — that is, the elements — and the copies or shapes or traces of the four ideal elements — that is, the matter *from which* the elements were created — for the term "body" has also the meaning of matter in the sense of its not being an idea.[73] It is because of the double meaning of the term "bodies" used by him here that he uses the two terms "space" and "place," meaning thereby that "space" was created simultaneously with the "matter *from which*," whereas "place" was created simultaneously with extended bodies or the elements, for "place," by its Aristotelian definition, implies the existence of extended bodies.[74] It is this "matter *in which*," together with the "matter *from which*" contained therein, that Philo calls by the Aristotelian term matter,[75] by the Stoic term substance,[76] and by the Platonic terms mother, fosteress, and nurse.[77] It is also this twofold matter that he describes as shapeless (ἄμορφος),[78] formless (ἀνείδεος),[79] figureless (ἀσχημάτιστος),[80] indefinite (ἄπειρος),[81] without quality (ἄποιος),[82] and the like — terms which are the same as, or similar to, the terms used by Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics as the description of matter.

Having thus departed from Plato, or given a new interpretation of Plato, by making his receptacle as well as the copies of the ideal four elements contained therein created by God, he follows Plato faithfully in his description of the process of

[72] *Conf.* 27, 136.
[73] Cf. Leisegang, *Indices*, sub σῶμα, 2.
[74] Cf. *Phys.* IV, 4, 212a, 5–6.
[75] Cf. above, p. 300.
[76] Cf. above, p. 300.
[77] Cf. above, p. 300.
[78] *Heres* 27, 140; *Spec.* I, 60, 328.
[79] *Mut.* 23, 135.
[80] *Somn.* II, 6, 45.
[81] *Spec.* I, 60, 329.
[82] *Opif.* 5, 22; *Heres* 27, 140; *Mut.* 23, 135; *Somn.* II, 6, 45; *Spec.* I, 60, 328.

the creation of the world. Out of these copies of the four ideal elements within the receptacle, both of which together he calls "matter" or "the substance of the world," God formed the four elements.[83] These four elements "He laid down as first foundations, to be the sensible elements of the sensible world." [84] As in Plato, the elements are described by him as having certain geometrical figures.[85] From these elements, again as in Plato, God constructed the world.[86]

Philo's interpretation of the story of the six days of creation is thus as follows. On the first day, God created the intelligible world of ideas, of which Scripture mentions specifically seven ideas, namely, the idea of what Plato calls the "receptacle," the ideas of the four elements, the idea of the celestial bodies, and the idea of mind and soul. Then He created a copy of the idea of the "receptacle" and, within it, copies of the ideal four elements, both of which together constituted what is known as formless matter, out of which He created the four elements. Out of the element fire He then created, on the second day, the corporeal heaven; [87] on the third day, land and sea and trees and plants; [88] on the fourth day, the sun and moon and stars; [89] and on the fifth day, aquatic animals and birds of the air.[90] Finally, on the sixth day, He created land animals,[91] the mind of man [92] or the ideal man,[93] which is referred to in the first account of the creation of man,[94] and the corporeal or individual man, which is referred to in the second account of the creation of man.[95] This interpretation in his *De Opificio Mundi* differs only in slight details from that in his other works.

[83] *Heres* 27, 133–135.
[84] *Ibid.* 27, 134.
[85] *Qu. in Gen.* III, 49.
[86] *Cher.* 35, 127.
[87] *Opif.* 10, 36–37.
[88] *Ibid.* 11, 38–13, 44.
[89] *Ibid.* 14, 45–19, 61.
[90] *Ibid.* 20, 62–63. But see above, p. 206, n. 13.
[91] *Ibid.* 21, 64–66. But see above, p. 206, n. 13.
[92] *Ibid.* 23, 69–71.
[93] *Ibid.* 46, 134.
[94] Gen. 1: 27.
[95] Gen. 2: 7; cf. *Opif.* 46, 134 ff.

As in the case of the intelligible world — whose priority to the perceptible world was said by Philo to be not temporal, on the ground that time did not exist before the creation of the world [96] — so also in the creation of the perceptible world he declares that it was not created "in time." [97] Though occasionally Philo loosely uses such expressions as "there was a time when it was not," [98] or "God . . . made things which before (*πρότερον*) were not," [99] all such expressions merely mean to convey the idea that God brought the world "out of non-existence into existence." [100] In subsequent discussions of this problem among medieval philosophers, as we shall see, this difficulty of language was overcome by the introduction of a sort of pseudo-time, independent of motion, before the creation of the world,[101] so that one could be justified in using temporal expressions with reference to the world even before its creation. So also the succession of the six days of creation in Scripture is not to be taken as implying a sequence of time, for "all things took shape simultaneously (*ἅμα*)" or "at once" (*ὁμοῦ*).[102] The term six means "not a quantity of days, but a perfect number,"[103] and that perfect number is used in the sense of

[96] Philo uses the following expressions in connection with time: "Time began either simultaneously with the world or after it" (*Opif.* 7, 26). "Time is more recent than the world" (*Leg. All.* I, 2, 2). "Time itself came into being with the world" (*Sacr.* 18, 68). "God is the maker of time also, for He is the Father of time's father, that is, of the universe, and has caused the movements of the one to be the source of the generation of the other" (*Immut.* 6, 31). The movements of the world, according to Philo, "could not be prior to the objects moving, but must of necessity arise either simultaneously with the world or later than it" (*Opif.* 7, 26).

[97] *Leg. All.* I, 2, 2.

[98] *Decal.* 12, 58.

[99] *Somn.* I, 13, 76.

[100] *Mos.* II, 48, 267.

[101] Cf. above, p. 217.

[102] *Opif.* 22, 67; cf. 3, 13. On the use of the temporal term "simultaneously" here see above, p. 216.

[103] *Leg. All.* I, 2, 3.

"order," to show thereby that the world was created according to a certain perfect order [104] and that it is to follow that order.[105]

His conception of the structure of the world is like that common at his time. With Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics he holds that there was only one world; [106] but in his argument for its oneness he disregards the elaborate arguments of Aristotle and draws upon the simple argument of Plato that there must be only one world because there is only one ideal model of the world,[107] changing only the Platonic argument from one ideal model to an argument from one Demiurge "who made His work like himself in its uniqueness." [108] Perhaps this change is also due to the influence of Aristotle's argument for one heaven on the ground that if there were many heavens the moving principles would be many in number.[109] With Aristotle he holds that outside the finite world there is no void, and he argues directly against the Stoics on this point.[110] Whether he has also understood Plato's "supercelestial place" to refer to a void outside the world is a question which we have raised above.[111] Again with the generally accepted view, he holds that this one world is spherical in shape and hence presumably finite, though he loosely describes the size of the spherical outermost heaven as being "of infinite magnitude" (ἀπειρομεγέθης).[112] At the center of the universe, like all his contemporaries, he places

[104] *Opif.* 3, 13.
[105] *Ibid.* 22, 67.
[106] *Ibid.*, 61, 171; *Migr.* 32, 180.
[107] *Timaeus* 31 A–B; cf. above, p. 181.
[108] *Opif.* 61, 171.
[109] *Metaph.* XII, 8, 1074a, 31–33.
[110] *Heres* 47, 228; *Aet.* 16, 78; 19, 102; *Plant.* 2, 7; cf. above, p. 241.
[111] Cf. above, p. 241.
[112] *Heres* 47, 227–229. That the term ἀπειρομεγέθης is used by Philo in the loose sense of immeasurably great, and not necessarily infinite, is evident from the expression τὰ ἀπειρομεγέθη διαστήματα (*Mut.* 33, 179). "Distances" within the world are even according to *Heres* §§ 227–229 finite in length.

the earth.[113] He does not, however, happen to say anything directly about its shape — it was still a question among the Stoics whether it was conical or spherical [114] — nor does he say anything about the question as to its being at rest or in motion, which was an issue raised by Aristotle against Plato.[115] There is equally no definite statement by him with regard to the question whether the heavens consisted of a fifth element; but from his use of the term heaven instead of fire in his enumeration of the four elements [116] it may be inferred that he followed Plato and the Stoics, as against Aristotle, in making the heaven consist of fire, but, following the Stoics, he occasionally calls that fire ether.[117] He follows the Stoic Diogenes of Babylon in adopting the Chaldean system of the order of the planets rather than that of Philolaus and Plato,[118] thus giving the order of the lower four planets, Sun, Venus, Mercury, [Moon],[119] instead of Venus, Mercury, Sun, Moon. In one passage he gives the order of these lower four planets as Sun, Mercury, Venus, Moon,[120] in which passage the transposition of Mercury and Venus may be taken as purely accidental, for his main purpose in giving the order of the planets in that passage is, as he himself says, to give his approval to the "conjecture" of those "who assign the middle place to the sun and hold that there are three above him and the same number below him." [121] In his description of the motions of the various

[113] *Plant.* 1, 3; *Conf.* 30, 156. [114] Diogenes, VII, 144–145.

[115] Cf. *Timaeus* 40 B; *De Caelo* II, 13, 293b, 30–32. Cf. E. Frank, *Plato und die sogenannten Pythagoreer*, pp. 205 ff.

[116] *Somn.* I, 3, 16; *Mos.* I, 20, 113, and cf. 26, 143; II, 43, 238; *Spec.* III, 20, 111.

[117] *Praem.* 6, 36; *Mos.* II, 50, 285. Cf. Drummond, I, 276, and full discussion of the problem on pp. 273–279.

[118] Cf. T. [L.] Heath, *Aristarchus of Samos*, pp. 106–107.

[119] *Cher.* 7, 22. [120] *Heres* 45, 224.

[121] A similar statement that the sun occupies the middle place is to be found in *Mos.* II, 21, 103.

spheres, which on the whole follows the commonly accepted view, he describes that revolution of the planetary spheres which is from east to west and in which they share in common with the same kind of revolution of the sphere of the fixed stars, as being "under a compelling force" (*βεβιασμένη*) and "involuntary" (*ἀκούσιος*).[122] This evidently refers to the theory of "counteracting" spheres by which Aristotle explains the participation of the internal spheres in the diurnal motion of the outermost sphere.[123]

As for the composition of the world, he denies the atomism of the Epicureans, believing in the infinite divisibility of matter. In one place, in a homily on the verse "He smote the Egyptian and hid him in sand," [124] he takes the Egyptian whom Moses smote to symbolize the two Epicurean doctrines, "the doctrine that pleasure is the prime and greatest good, and the doctrine that atoms are the elementary principles of the universe." [125] In another place, in a homily on the verse "he divided them in the midst," [126] he interprets it to refer to the Logos which in its capacity as Cutter (*τομεύς*) "never ceases to divide, for when it has gone through all sensible objects down to the atoms and what are called indivisibles, it begins from them again to divide those things contemplated by reason into inexpressible and indescribable parts." [127] The meaning of this passage, we take it, is that those so-called atoms and indivisibles of the Epicureans, which according to them are discernible only by the mind, are really not indivisibles, for they can be further and infinitely divided by the mind. In view of this, then, when in still another passage the vagueness of the text makes it doubtful whether Philo means to say that atoms exist or

[122] *Cher.* 7, 22.
[123] *Metaph.* VII, 8, 1074a, 1 ff.
[124] Exod. 2: 12.
[125] *Fug.* 26, 148.
[126] *Gen.* 15: 10.
[127] *Heres* 26, 130–131.

that they do not exist,[128] that passage is to be interpreted so as to mean that atoms do not exist.

Following Scripture and Plato, he conceives the act of creation as an act of will and design. The scriptural method of emphasizing the existence of will and purpose in the act of creation by saying that God created by His word or by His wisdom is followed also by Philo in his use of such expressions as that the universe was made by the word (λόγῳ)[129] or by the wisdom (σοφίᾳ)[130] of God. Sometimes he describes the creation of the world more explicitly as an act which God willed (βουληθείς).[131] He quotes with approval, and also restates in his own words, Plato's statement that the final cause of the creation of the world was God's desire to bestow His goodness upon the world [132] and to make it most perfect.[133] But this perfection of the world, being only an act of God's good will and not a necessary result of the perfection of His nature, is relative only to the beings for whom it was created, but it is not relative to the power of God who created it. If God willed, it was in His power to create a different world and a more perfect world. "Not in proportion to the greatest of His own bounties does He confer benefits — for these are without end or limit — but in proportion to the capacities of the recipients." [134] Our present world is so ordered that various living beings live in the various elements — in the water, in the air, in the earth, and even in fire [135] — and, in the case of the amphibious creature, in more than one element. No living being lives in all the four elements. Still, "if the existent One had willed to employ His skill, by which

[128] *Agr.* 30, 134. See Colson's note *ad loc.* (III, 491–492), where two possible interpretations of this passage are given.

[129] *Sacr.* 3, 8.

[130] *Heres* 41, 199.

[131] *Opif.* 6, 23.

[132] *Opif.* 5, 21; *Cher.* 35, 125–127.

[133] *Deter.* 42, 154; cf. *Timaeus* 29 D–E.

[134] *Opif.* 6, 23.

[135] *Plant.* 3, 12.

He made amphibious creatures," He could have changed the order of nature and created an animal capable of living in all the elements.[136] This is evidently in criticism of the philosophic view that "it is fixed and settled where each thing can grow and have its place," so that "fishes cannot live in the fields." [137] And, just as the world was created by the will of God, so also will it be saved from destruction by the will of God. Evidently reflecting Aristotle's statement that "whatever is generated must be destructible" [138] and Plato's statement that the world, though generated, is indissoluble by the "consent" or "will" of God,[139] he says with regard to the world that "it has been generated, and generation is the beginning of destruction, even though by the providence of the Creator it may be made immortal."[140] Unlike Plato, however, according to whom the "will" and "consent" of God by which the world is to be indestructible can never be changed even by God himself, Philo, as we shall see, assumes, as part of his belief in miracles, that God can always change His will for some good reason. With all his insistence upon the indestructibility of the world, he does not mean that God could not destroy the world if He had the will to destroy it. He only means that we can rely upon God's promise that He would not destroy it. His vehement criticism of the Stoics for their belief in the destructibility of the world is primarily directed at their belief that the destructibility of this world of ours as well as of all the other successive worlds must come about by the necessity of an inexorable fate.

[136] *Deter.* 42, 154.
[137] Lucretius, *De Rerum Natura* III, 784–787; cf. V, 128–131.
[138] *De Caelo* I, 12, 282b, 4.
[139] *Timaeus* 41 A–B.
[140] *Decal.* 12, 58.

(c) *Place, Time, Eternity*

In the course of his discussion of the creation and structure of the universe Philo touches occasionally upon the staple philosophic problems of space (χώρα) and place (τόπος) and time (χρόνος) and eternity (αἰών). Let us see what definite views he had on these topics.

Philo does not deal directly with the problem of place and time, but whenever he happens to touch upon them he operates with material drawn indiscriminately from Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics. Thus in one passage there is a disguised allusion to the use of space in the Platonic sense of the matter *in which* the world was created.[141] Similarly several allusions are to be found in other passages to Aristotle's definition of place as "the boundary of the containing body."[142] So also does he make several allusions to the Stoic definition of place as that which is possessed (ἐχόμενον) or occupied (κατεχόμενον) by a body,[143] which he reproduces as being "a space filled (πεπληρωμένη) by a body."[144] As for the view with which he himself would agree, one thing is quite certain that he could not accept the Stoic definition of place. The Stoic definition implies that there is an infinite void outside the world and that part of that void is completely filled by the world, and it is that part of the completely filled void that is the place of the world, and similarly it is every part of that place of the world that is the place of every part of the world corresponding to it. But Philo does

[141] *Conf.* 27, 136, and cf. our discussion of this passage above, p. 309.

[142] *Phys.* IV, 4, 212a, 5–6; cf. *Somn.* I, 11, 63; *Fug.* 14, 75; *Leg. All.* I, 14, 44, and our discussion of this passage above (p. 349); also *Conf.* 27, 136, and our discussion above on p. 309. Cf. H. Leisegang, *Die Raumlehre im spätern Platonismus*, pp. 44–45.

[143] Arnim, II, 504 and 505.

[144] *Somn.* I, 11, 62; *Fug.* 14, 75 (ἐκπεπληρωμένη); cf. Colson on *Fug.* 14, 75; cf. also above, pp. 245, 248 ff.

not believe in the existence of a void outside the world [145] and consequently he could not accept the Stoic definition of place. In one passage, which seems to express his own approved view on place, Philo says that "place was conceived (*ἐνοήθη*) when bodies were at rest (*ἠρεμούντων*)." [146] Now, at first sight, this statement would seem to be the opposite of the statement made by Aristotle that "the existence of place is held to be obvious from the fact of mutual replacement" [147] and also from "the typical locomotions of the elementary natural bodies" [148] and especially his concluding statement that "place would not have been inquired into, if there had not been a special kind of motion, namely, that with respect to place." [149] But on a closer investigation it will be found that in the evidence for the existence of place from the "typical locomotions of the elementary natural bodies" Aristotle emphasizes not only the fact of their being moved to the appropriate places but also the fact that they are at rest in those places. In one passage, referring to these "typical locomotions of the elementary natural bodies," he says that "each of the bodies is naturally carried to its appropriate place and rests (*μένειν*) there." [150] In another passage he says that "it is reasonable that each kind of body should be carried to its own place" [151] and "should rest (*μένει*) naturally in its proper place." [152] In general, his own explanation of his definition of place as meaning that, "if a body has another body outside it and containing it, it is in place," [153] clearly shows that, while he considered motion as a factor in our becoming aware of the existence of place, it is the mere fact of the enclosure of bodies within

[145] *Plant.* 2, 7; *Heres* 47, 228; *Aet.* 16, 78; 19, 102; cf. above, p. 241.
[146] *Somn.* I, 32, 187.
[147] *Phys.* IV, 1, 208b, 1–2.
[148] *Ibid.*, 8–9.
[149] *Ibid.* IV, 4, 211a, 12–13.
[150] *Ibid.* IV, 4, 211a, 4–5.
[151] *Ibid.* IV, 5, 212b, 29–30.
[152] *Ibid.*, 33.
[153] *Ibid.* IV, 5, 212a, 31–32.

other bodies, without their being necessarily in motion, that enters into the definition of place and into the formation of our conception of what place is. And this is exactly what Philo means by his statement that "place was conceived when bodies were at rest."

In the passage just quoted Philo continues to say that "time was conceived when bodies were in motion." [154] In another passage he similarly says that "the world of our senses, when set in motion, has caused the nature of time to shine forth and to become conspicuous." [155] This reflects the view common to Plato [156] and Aristotle [157] and the Stoics [158] that time is connected with motion. Formally, however, whenever he reproduces a definition of time, it is usually that of the Stoics that he reproduces, namely, "time is the interval (*διάστημα*) of the motion of the world." [159] But this Stoic definition, it would seem, was considered by Philo as being merely a restatement in formal language of the Platonic conception of time. Thus, in one passage, after quoting Plato to the effect that "time is indicated by days and nights and months and successions of years, and none of these can subsist without the movement of the sun and the revolution of the whole heaven," [160] he concludes, by referring to the Stoics, that "thus people who are accustomed to define things have correctly explained time as the interval of the movement of the world." [161] He similarly follows

[154] *Somn.* I, 32, 187.

[155] *Immut.* 6, 32.

[156] *Timaeus* 37 C–39 E.

[157] *Phys.* IV, 11, 219a, 1–220a, 26.

[158] Arnim, II, 509–521.

[159] *Opif.* 7, 26; *Aet.* 2, 4; 10, 52; Arnim, II, 509, p. 164, l. 33; 510, p. 165, l. 1; cf. Colson on *Opif.* 7, 26; H. Leisegang, *Die Begriffe der Zeit und Ewigkeit im späteren Platonismus*, p. 12.

[160] *Aet.* 10, 52; cf. *Timaeus* 37 E.

[161] *Aet.* 10, 52.

Plato when, in his comment on the verse that the lights in the firmament of the heaven were created by God in order that they should be "for days, and years," [162] he says that one of the purposes for which the heavenly bodies were created was to distinguish "days and months and years, which are the measures of time, and which have given rise to the nature of number." [163] The particular passage in Plato reflected in this statement is that in which Plato says that "the sun and the moon and five other stars which have the name of planets have been created for defining and preserving the numbers of time" [164] and that "all living creatures for whom it was meet might possess number." [165] Again like Plato, with whom the linkage of time with motion has led to the conclusion that "days and nights and months and years were not before the heaven was created," [166] Philo also says that "time was not before the world," [167] and if Scripture says "In the beginning God made the heaven and the earth," [168] the expression in the beginning is to be taken not in a chronological sense but rather in the sense of its being first in the order of importance.[169]

Time is thus inseparable from the motion of the world and like the world itself it was created. But to Philo as to Plato everything in the world is a copy of some ideal pattern and, therefore, since time is in the world, it must be a copy of some ideal pattern. What then is the ideal pattern of time to be called? Naturally one would expect it to be called the idea of time. But Plato has already selected the term aeon (*αἰών*), which literally means a space of time or a lifetime or an age, but which is commonly translated by the

[162] Gen. 1:14.
[163] *Opif.* 18, 55; cf. *Leg. All.* III, 8, 25; *Fug.* 10, 57; *Mut.* 47, 267.
[164] *Timaeus* 38 C.
[165] *Ibid.* 39 B.
[166] *Ibid.* 37 D.
[167] *Opif.* 7, 26.
[168] Gen. 1:1.
[169] *Opif.* 7, 26–27; cf. above, p. 215.

term eternity, as a designation for what he should have called the idea of time.[170] Philo has retained that term in the sense of the idea of time, though he still continues to use it quite often in the sense of time or lifetime or age or any space of time.[171] In its specific sense of the idea of time he says of "eternity" that it is "the archetype and paradigm of time" [172] and of "time" that it is "a copy (μίμημα) of eternity," [173] which sayings reflect Plato's statement that "the nature of the ideal was eternal" and that time is "a moving image of eternity." [174] In further explanation of eternity in the sense of the idea of time, Philo says that "the word eternity signifies the life of the intelligible world, as time is the life of the perceptible world," [175] with the understanding, of course, that while the life of the perceptible world is motion, the life of the intelligible world is free of motion. Playing upon the name Father which is applied to God by both Scripture and Plato [176] and conceiving of the intelligible world as the elder son of God and of the perceptible world as the younger son of God, he calls time, which arises only through the life or the motion of the perceptible world, the grandson of God.[177] The term eternal, in its strictly technical sense, can thus apply only to motionless things, namely, God, the Logos, and the powers or ideas

[170] *Timaeus* 37 D ff.

[171] For some examples of Philo's use of the term αἰών, not in the technical sense of "eternity" as opposed to "time" but rather in the common sense of time or some space of time, see *Leg. All.* III, 8, 25; III, 70, 199; *Sacr.* 11, 47; 21, 76; *Plaut.* 27, 116; *Ebr.* 5, 24; 47, 195; *Migr.* 22, 125; *Fug.* 10, 57; *Mut.* 34, 185; *Somn.* II, 5, 36; *Mos.* I, 37, 206.

[172] *Immut.* 6, 32; cf. *Mut.* 47, 267.

[173] *Heres* 34, 165.

[174] *Timaeus* 37 D; cf. J. G. Müller, *Des Juden Philo Buch von der Weltschöpfung*, p. 168.

[175] *Mut.* 47, 267.

[176] Cf. above, p. 211.

[177] *Immut.* 6, 31.

which constitute the Logos. But the term eternal, as we have tried to show above, does not always mean with Philo ungenerated. Even the Logos and its constituent powers or ideas in their second stage of existence, which is a created existence, are sometimes described by him as eternal, which we have explained to be used by him in the limited sense of everlasting.[178] Whether the Logos, and with it also the powers or ideas, all of which are described by Philo both as eternal and as generated, were conceived by him as having been eternally generated is a question which, if raised, could not be answered with certainty. To us, however, it seems that Philo could have no conception of "eternal generation," for such a conception would be contrary to his view of the "aloneness" of God before creation,[179] a view which implies that there was a time — to make use of this term here figuratively — when God was alone and there was with Him, or by the side of Him, or coming into being outside of Him, no Logos or powers or ideas, though all of these were in His mind from eternity. The concept of "eternal generation" appears only later in Plotinus and in Christianity, and its appearance then is due to the fact that both Plotinus and those in Christianity who held this doctrine wanted to indicate thereby that there was no time when God was alone. We shall have occasion to deal with this problem more fully in our other volumes in this series of studies.

(*d*) *Conclusion, Influence, Anticipation*

In his discussion of the theory of creation, as presented in this chapter, Philo has added five new elements to his general statement, quoted in a previous chapter, that the creation of the world is a cardinal principle of scriptural religion: first, his statement that the indestructibility of the world is

[178] Cf. above, p. 235.

[179] Cf. above, p. 172.

an essential creed of scriptural religion; second, his arguments against Aristotle's belief in the uncreatedness of the world; third, his arguments against the Stoic theory of the successive creations and destructions of worlds; fourth, his view that the preëxistent matter out of which the world was created was itself created by God; fifth, his view that if God willed He could have created a world different from ours.

In the subsequent history of philosophy some of these five points were rejected while others were accepted. First, the belief in the indestructibility of the world was not generally considered as an essential element in religion.[1] Second, though in later history the arguments against the uncreatedness of the world became more elaborate, the essential criticisms raised by Philo are discernible as the basis of some of the subsequent more elaborate arguments. Third, the Stoic view of the successive creations and destructions of worlds, which is rejected by Philo, was with certain modifications, either accepted or regarded as compatible with Scripture by some Christian,[2] Moslem,[3] and Jewish [4] philosophers, but some of his arguments against it were repeated by those who, like St. Augustine, rejected it.[5] Fourth, his revision of Plato's view of the preëxistent matter by making it created was followed by many of those in Christianity who, like Tatian,[6] Theophilus,[7] and St. Augustine,[8] adopted the

[1] Cf. Maimonides, *Moreh Nebukim* II, 27.

[2] Origen, *De Principiis* II, 2, 4–5.

[3] Cf. reference to Muhammad al-Baqir and Ibn al-Arabi in Muhammad Ali's *Translation of the Holy Qaran*, Lahore, 1928, p. lxxv.

[4] Judah ha-Levi, *Cuzari* I, 67. The treatment of the theory of the creation of successive worlds in Jewish and Moslem philosophy as well as in Origen and St. Augustine is discussed by the present writer in "The Platonic, Aristotelian and Stoic Theories of Creation in Hallevi and Maimonides," *Essays in Honour of the Very Rev. Dr. J. H. Hertz*, [1942], 427–442.

[5] *De Civitate Dei* XII, 17.

[6] *Oratio adversus Graecos*, ch. 5.

[7] *Ad Autolycum* II, 4.

[8] *Confessiones* XII, 8.

Platonic theory of a formless matter out of which the world was created. However, there were some who found that creation out of an eternal preëxistent matter was compatible with Scripture [9] and many others who insisted upon creation directly *ex nihilo*.[10] Fifth, his view that if God willed he could have created a different world is discussed in the works of many subsequent philosophers, Moslem,[11] Jewish,[12] and Christian.[13]

Spinoza in his assault upon traditional philosophy rejects all theories of creation, including creation out of a preëxistent matter,[14] and returns to the Aristotelian conception of the eternity of the world. He also comes out directly against the view, first expressed by Philo, that the world could have been ordered to be otherwise than it now is.[15]

[9] Cf. above, n. 33.

[10] As, e.g., Maimonides, *Moreh Nebukim* II, 13; St. Thomas, *Summa Theologica* I, 45, 1.

[11] Cf. discussion of the Ash'arite view on this point in Algazali, *Tahāfut al-Falāsifah* I, § 28 (ed. Bouyges); Averroes, *Kitāb Kashf 'an-Manāhij* in Müller's *Philosophie und Theologie von Averroes*, p. 84; Maimonides, *Moreh Nebukim* I, 73 (10), 74 (5); II, 19.

[12] Maimonides, *Moreh Nebukim* II, 19; cf. II, 17.

[13] Abelard, *Theologia Christiana* V (PL, 178, 1321A), St. Thomas, *Summa Theologica* I, 25, 6.

[14] Spinoza's criticism of traditional theories of creation is discussed by the present writer in the chapter on "Unity of Substance" in *The Philosophy of Spinoza*.

[15] *Ethics*, I, Prop. 33; *Short Treatise*, I, 4, § 3 and § 7; cf. *The Philosophy of Spinoza*, *ad loc.*

CHAPTER VI

THE IMMANENT LOGOS, LAWS OF NATURE, MIRACLES

I. Immanent Logos

Following the view generally held by Greek philosophers, with the exception of the Epicureans, Philo maintains that the order of the world is determined by certain immutable laws of causality. Now these laws of causality were generally explained by all those who admitted their existence as being due to what they all called God, but their conception of that God differed on certain essential points. To Plato, God is an immaterial being who, prior to His creation of the world, had existed from eternity without a world and, when He willed to create the world, implanted in it a soul which contained a mind to govern it according to certain immutable laws. It is God, therefore, who has implanted these laws in nature and it is a universal soul which administers these laws.[1] To Aristotle, too, God is immaterial, but He has existed from eternity together with the world, being therefore not the creator of the world but only the cause of its motion; and, as the cause of its motion, He is also the cause of the immutability of these laws of motion which proceed from Him.[2] To the Stoics, in opposition to both of them, God is something material, who from eternity has existed as an active principle in the eternal primary fire, out of which He himself created this world of ours. Within this world even after its creation, according to them, God has remained as an active material principle, whom they describe as the Logos [3] or the

[1] Cf. below, p. 427.

[2] Cf. *Metaph.* XII, cc. 7 and 10.

[3] Diogenes, VII, 134. Cf. also Arnim, Index, under λόγος, p. 70, col. 2.

seminal Logos (λόγος σπερματικός) of the world,[4] or the mind (νοῦς) of the world,[5] or the soul (ψυχή) of the world,[6] and whose extension throughout the various parts of the world they describe again as the Logoi or the seminal Logoi,[7] or as the Powers (δυνάμεις)[8] of God. It is this internal material principle that they regard as the cause of the immutable laws of nature. Philo, as we have seen, rejects the Aristotelian conception of God on the ground of its incompatibility with the scriptural conception of God as a creative, and not merely as a motive, cause of the world.[9] He rejects also the Stoic conception of God on the ground of its incompatibility with the scriptural conception of God as an incorporeal being.[10] His conception of God is like that of Plato, a being who is both incorporeal and creative. But, as we shall see, he does not follow Plato in ascribing a soul to the world as a whole,[11] and consequently he does not use the Platonic vocabulary of ascribing the immutable laws of nature to a world-soul. He does follow, however, Plato's description of the ideas as being not only patterns (παραδείγματα) apart from the world, of which things in the world are only imitations (μιμήσεις),[12] but as being also in the world through their presence (παρουσία) in it, through their communion (κοινωνία) with it, and through the participation (μέθεξις) of things in them.[13] Accordingly, to Philo the ideas or powers or, as he describes them in their totality, the Logos, after

[4] *Idem.*, VII, 136 (Arnim, I, 102).

[5] Aetius, I, 7, 23 (Diels, p. 303, l. 11; Arnim, I, 157).

[6] Aetius, I, 7, 17 (Diels, p. 302b, l. 15; Arnim, I, 532; III, 31).

[7] Arnim, I, 497; II, 1027.

[8] Diogenes, VII, 147.

[9] Cf. above, pp. 295 ff.

[10] Cf. above, p. 176.

[11] Cf. below, pp. 360–361.

[12] So in the *Philebus*, *Parmenides*, *Theatetus*, *Sophist*, *Politicus* and *Timaeus*; cf. J. A. Stewart, *Plato's Doctrine of Ideas*, p. 8, and cf. above, p. 233.

[13] So in the *Phaedrus*, *Phaedo* and *Republic;* cf. Stewart, *loc. cit.*

having served as patterns on which God modeled the world, were introduced by God into the world to act within it as the immutable laws of nature.

Here then we have in Philo a third stage in the existence of the Logos, as well as of the powers, no longer a Logos in the sense of a property of God nor a Logos in the sense of the totality of the created incorporeal powers, but a Logos in the sense of the totality of the powers of God existing within the world itself. This Logos or powers within the world itself, being so much like the Logos or powers of the Stoics which are only within the world, is as a rule described by Philo in terms borrowed from the Stoic vocabulary. Still, it is not the same as the Stoic Logos. The Stoic Logos is something material; its residence in things is conceived as an intermingling with matter; [14] it is identified with what they call God, and beyond it there is nothing superior. The immanent Logos of Philo, however, is conceived as something immaterial, being only an extension of the preëxistent incorporeal Logos; it resides in things after the analogy of the residence of Plato's rational soul in body and somewhat also after the analogy of the residence of Aristotle's form in matter. But beyond it there is God. In order that it may not be confused with the Stoic Logos, which is material and always in the world and is identified with God, Philo takes great pains to emphasize, whenever he happens to speak of this immanent Logos, that it is merely another stage of the existence of the same incorporeal Logos which is apart from the world and that beyond it there is a God who is not immanent in the world. While the residence of the Logos in the corporeal world is conceived by him, as we have said, after the analogy of the residence of Plato's preëxistent mind or soul in the body

[14] Cf. Zeller, III, 1[4], p. 101, n. 1 (*The Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics*[2], p. 105, n. 3).

of the world, still Philo never describes the immanent Logos as the mind or the soul of the world. His immanent Logos, while performing the same functions as Plato's or the Stoics' world-soul, is not a world-soul. The expressions mind of the world and soul of the world, taken from the Stoics, are indeed used by him, but they are used by him not in the Stoic sense as a description of the immanent Logos but rather as a description of God above the Logos, and therefore, as we shall see, they are used by him only as a figure of speech and not in their original Stoic sense.[15]

Let us now examine the texts in Philo upon which the preceding observations are based. We shall try to knit together his scattered statements into a connected story.

To begin with, he says, "the natures of the heavenly bodies and movements of the stars" as well as "the vast number of other operations in nature" to which they extend "are invariably carried out under ordinances and laws laid down in the universe as unalterable."[16] Using the Pythagorean term equality (ἰσότης)[17] as a description of the perfect order (κόσμος) of the universe, corresponding to democracy in states, health in the bodies, and virtuous conduct in souls,[18] he says that "all things in heaven and earth have been ordered aright by equality under immovable laws and ordinances."[19] Again, using the Stoic analogy of the universe to a state, or, as he calls it, "a great city," he says that "it has a single constitution and a single law."[20] But, just as in agreement with the Stoics he emphasizes the existence of immutable laws in the universe, so also in opposition to them he emphasizes his disagreement with their view that these laws are to be attributed to a God who is within the universe

[15] Cf. below, p. 245. [16] *Opif.* 19, 61.
[17] *Spec.* IV, 42, 231. See Colson and Heinemann (*Philos Werke*) *ad loc.*
[18] *Spec.* IV, 42, 237. [19] *Spec.* IV, 42, 232. [20] Jos. 6, 29.

and part of it. He is especially opposed to their description of God as fate (εἱμαρμένη).[21] Criticizing the Stoics, as is his wont, under the guise of Chaldeans, the people among whom Abraham was born and from whose influence he later freed himself, he is opposed to them on the ground that "they made fate and necessity into gods," imagining "that this visible universe was the only thing in existence, either being itself God or containing God in itself as the soul of the whole" and "teaching that apart from the things in the visible world there is no originating cause of anything whatever."[22] He similarly maintains that while Moses was acquainted with the Stoic teaching that "causes have their sequence, connexion and interplay,"[23] he did not represent "fate and necessity as the cause of all events."[24]

Still, following his general method of making use of popular terms and expressions in some changed meaning, he does not hesitate to use the word "fate," in the sense of the unalterable laws of nature, provided it is understood that these laws depend upon God as their ultimate cause. Thus in his homily on the verse "Discern, I pray thee, whose are these, the seal-ring, the cord, and the staff,"[25] he takes the term "cord" to refer to "the world-order, fate, the correspondence and sequence of all things, with their ever-unbroken chain," but makes them all belong to God alone.[26] So also does he not hesitate to speak of a journey "appointed by fate,"[27] or awaiting "the end of one's fate,"[28] or of a man dying as being "carried off by fate."[29] So also does he speak of the length of the life of men as being "according to the fixed rule

[21] Aetius, I, 27, 6 (Diels, p. 322b, ll. 13–14; Arnim, III, 35).
[22] *Migr.* 32, 179.
[23] *Heres* 60, 301.
[24] *Ibid.*, 300.
[25] Gen. 38: 25.
[26] *Mut.* 23, 135.
[27] *Probus* 17, 111
[28] *Flac.* 21, 180.
[29] *Legat.* 4, 25.

of fate," [30] even though according to his own belief it is God who fixes the limit of human life.[31] The "fixed rule of fate" evidently reflects Aristotle's order (τάξις) which determines the length of life of living beings.[32] As with the term fate so also with the term fortune (τύχη), he has no objection to using it, provided one means by it divine providence. Speaking of the rise and fall of nations which, of course, he attributes to a divine law in nature or the immanent Logos, he says "circlewise moves the revolution of the divine Logos which most people call fortune." [33] So also does he say that "opportunity (καιρός) is looked upon by the wickedest of men as a god" or "as the cause of things in the world, but by wise men and virtuous men opportunity is not looked upon in this light, but God only, from whom all opportunities and seasons proceed." [34] In another place he says of "opportunity" that it is "the minister (ὀπαδὸς) of God." [35] It is in this sense that we are to understand any such statement of his as that in which he says that "the man of worth who surveys not only human life but all the phenomena of the world knows how mightily blow the winds of necessity, fortune, opportunity, violence and authority." [36] Plato went only so far as to say that "fortune and opportunity coöperate with God in the government of human affairs." [37]

Then, as the immediate cause of these immutable laws of nature Philo has decided to use the term Logos, probably for the mixed reason that in Scripture the forces of nature are said to operate at the bidding of the word or the Logos of God [38] and also that that is one of the terms used by the Stoics.[39] But inasmuch as he has already used the term

[30] *Qu. in Gen.* I, 100.
[31] *Ibid.* I, 91; cf. *Shabbat* 30a on Ps. 39: 5–6.
[32] *De Gen. et Corr.* II, 10, 336b, 10–13.
[33] *Immut.* 36, 176.
[34] *Qu. in Gen.* I, 100; Harris, *Fragments*, p. 19.
[35] *Migr.* 22, 126.
[36] *Somn.* II, 12, 81.
[37] *Laws* IV, 709 B.
[38] Ps. 147: 18; 148: 8.
[39] Cf. above, p. 231.

Logos as a description of the totality of the ideas or powers, it is necessary for him to point out the difference between the terms Logos used in that sense and the term Logos which he is now to use as a description of the immediate cause of the laws of nature in the created visible world. This distinction is made by him in a passage in which he says that "The Logos is twofold as well in the universe as in human nature; in the universe there is (a) that Logos which deals with the incorporeal and archetypal ideas from which the intelligible world was framed, and also (b) another Logos which deals with the visible objects which are the copies and likenesses of those ideas and out of which this sensible world was produced." [40] The difference between these two types of Logos is then this: Logos in the first sense refers to what, according to our interpretation, is the second stage in the existence of the Logos, that is, the antemundane Logos after it had emerged from God and become, through an act of creation, an incorporeal being with an existence of its own. Logos in the second sense refers to a third stage in the existence of the Logos, when, with the creation of the world, it became incarnate in the body of the world, in the same way as a soul or a mind becomes incarnate in the body of an individual living being.[41] In its second stage, the Logos is the instrument of the creation of the world; [42] in its third stage, it is the instrument of divine providence or of the preservation of the world, for "without toil He made this vast universe long ages ago, and now without toil He holds it in perpetual existence"; [43] and it is through the immanent Logos, which

[40] *Mos.* II, 25, 127.

[41] Cf. above, p. 327. For various other interpretations of this twofold Logos, see Dähne, I, pp. 208–212; Gfrörer, I, pp. 176–179; Heinze, *Die Lehre von Logos*, pp. 231–234; Zeller, III, 2[4], pp. 423–424; Drummond, II, pp. 171–182.

[42] Cf. above, pp. 261 ff.

[43] *Sacr.* 7, 40.

is "the indissoluble bond of the universe," [44] that the world is held in perpetual existence.[45] Then, again, with reference to the Logos in its second stage, the world is said to be an imitation (μίμημα) of it; [46] with reference to its third stage, the world is said to be its raiment (ἐσθής). Thus, in his homily on the verse concerning the high priest, in which it is stated that he is consecrated "to put on the garments," [47] he says that "the garments which the most ancient Logos of the existent puts on as a raiment is the world, for it arrays itself in earth and air and water and fire and all that comes forth from these." [48] He compares the Logos as clothed with the world to soul as clothed with the body and to the intellect of the wise man as clothed with the virtues.[49] Let us keep this phraseology in mind. When we come to our discussion of Christianity, we shall see the significance of this comparison of the world as the clothing of the Logos to the body as the clothing of the soul.

II. Laws of Nature

With his recognition of the existence of laws of nature and his decision to describe the cause of these laws of nature by the term Logos, he undertakes to tell us what these laws of nature are, and in accordance with these laws of nature to classify various types of their cause, the immanent Logos. In various passages he touches upon various laws of nature drawn from various sources in Greek philosophy, but taken together they show that Philo conceived of three definite laws of nature.

The first law of nature is the law of opposites. As described

[44] *Plant.* 2, 9; cf. below, p. 339.
[45] *Ibid.* 2, 10.
[46] *Opif.* 6, 25.
[47] Lev. 21: 10.
[48] *Fug.* 20, 110. That he deals here with the immanent Logos is evident from § 112, where he speaks of the Logos as the bond of existence.
[49] *Ibid.*

by Philo it means that all things in the world are divided into two parts which are equal though opposite.[1] The characteristic expressions used by him are that, in the creation of the world, God divided all things equally "according to all forms of equality," [2] so that "no section is greater or less than another by even an infinitesimal difference, and each can partake of the equality which is absolute and plenary," [3] but these equal parts are opposites, for "everything in the world is by nature opposite to something else." [4] "The subject of division into equal parts and of opposites," he says, "is a wide one"; [5] and he goes into a full description of such divisions, starting with the infinite divisibility of matter and going through all the realms of nature, of man, of mind, and of society.[6] That which causes the division is the immanent Logos, who "never ceases to divide," on which account he calls it "the cutter" (*τομεύς*).[7] Since Philo uses the terms Logos and Wisdom as equivalents,[8] he also distinguishes within Wisdom an incorporeal Wisdom and an immanent Wisdom, and therefore he sometimes attributes the function of dividing things into opposites also to the immanent Wisdom. Thus, in his homily on the verse "And they returned and came to the spring of judgment (*'en-mishpat*, *πηγὴν τῆς κρίσεως*) which is Kadesh," [9] he says: "One might think that it cries aloud that the Wisdom of God is both (1) holy, containing no earthly ingredient, and (2) a sifting of all the universe, whereby all opposites are separated from each other."[10] The implication of this is that Wisdom which, like the Logos,

[1] *Heres* 27, 133–48, 236.
[2] *Ibid.* 29, 146.
[3] *Ibid.* 28, 143.
[4] *Ibid.* 43, 207.
[5] *Ibid.* 27, 133.
[6] A study of the sources of these detailed divisions is to be found in Goodenough, "A Neo-Pythagorean Source in Philo Judaeus," *Yale Classical Review*, 3 (1932), 115–164.
[7] *Heres* 26, 130.
[8] Cf. above, p. 255.
[9] Gen. 14:7.
[10] *Fug.* 35, 196.

is the totality of the ideas in the intelligible world,[11] is, in its sense of "judgment," again like the immanent Logos, also the principle of the division of things in the world into opposites. The significance of his identification of Wisdom in the sense of "judgment" (κρίσις) with the immanent Logos as the principle of division of things into opposite and equals is his statement elsewhere in the name of "the masters of natural philosophy" that "equality is the mother of justice" (δικαιοσύνης),[12] for judgment (κρίσις) and justice (δίκη) are considered by Philo as identical.[13]

This theory of the divisibility of things into opposites is ascribed by Philo to Heraclitus,[14] and he refers to it as Heraclitus' "opinions concerning opposites" (*sententiae de contrariis*).[15] Now in the extant sources in which Heraclitus' theory of the opposites is stated,[16] no mention is made that the division of things into opposites is done by the Logos. In fact, modern scholars have raised the question whether the term Logos which is used by Heraclitus means a universal principle or whether it only means the discourse of Heraclitus himself.[17] Similarly, the Stoics who happen to speak of the division of things in opposites, like those mentioned by Philo,[18] do not definitely say that it is the Logos which does the dividing. As an explanation of the origin of Philo's description of the Logos as the principle of the division of things into opposites, several possibilities suggest themselves. First, it is possible that only the theory of opposites

[11] Cf. above, p. 255.

[12] *Spec.* IV, 42, 231; cf. *Plant.* 28, 122; *Heres* 33, 163, and below, II, 391.

[13] *Mut.* 36, 194.

[14] *Heres* 43, 214; *Qu. in Gen.* III, 5.

[15] *Qu. in Gen.* III, 5.

[16] Cf. Diels, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, "Wortindex," under ἐναντίος, ἐναντιότης.

[17] Cf. J. Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy*[3], p. 133, n. 1.

[18] Cf. examples in Bréhier, p. 87, n. 2.

is attributed by Philo to Heraclitus, whereas the theory that the Logos is that which does the dividing is the application of his own view of the Logos to Heraclitus' theory of the opposites. Second, it is possible that Philo had before him certain writings of Heraclitus, to which he refers as "Books on Nature" (*Libri de Natura*),[19] in which there was a statement to the effect that the Logos was the principle of the division of things into opposites. Third, it is also possible that Philo, like other ancient authors, understood Heraclitus to have used the term Logos in the same sense as it is used by the Stoics, namely, as the active principle within the world, and that then, out of various other statements in both Heraclitus and the Stoics about the division of things into opposites and about the primitive fire, he has drawn his own inference that it must be the Logos which does the division. For, according to both Heraclitus and the Stoics, fire is the primitive matter out of which all things arise.[20] Out of fire, then, all the opposite things in the world arise. Now within fire there are, according to the Stoics, an active and a passive principle, and the active principle, among the other names by which it is called, is also called by the name of Logos.[21] Therefore, Philo must have concluded, the active principle or Logos is that which causes the division of things into opposites.[22]

The term "cutter," however, which he applies to the immanent Logos acting in its capacity of a divider of things into opposites, does not seem to have been derived from Heraclitus or from the Stoics. It would seem to be of scriptural origin,

[19] *Qu. in Gen.* III, 5 end, and cf. *Heres* 27, 133.

[20] Diogenes, IX, 7–9; VII, 142.

[21] *Ibid.*, VII, 134.

[22] With this compare discussions on this subject in Heinze, *Die Lehre vom Logos* (1872), pp. 226–229; Bousset, *Jüdisch-Christlicher Schulbetrieb in Alexandria und Rom* (1915), pp. 23–30; Bréhier, pp. 86–89; Goodenough, "A Neo-Pythagorean Source in Philo Judaeus," *Yale Classical Studies*, 3 (1932), 116–164.

derived from certain verses in Scripture which Philo interpreted as anticipations of Heraclitus' theory of opposites. One of these verses, which in the Septuagint reads: "The plates of gold being cut (ἐτμήθη) into hairs," [23] is quoted by Philo as "the plates of gold he cuts (τέμνει) into hairs," [24] taking the subject "he" to refer to the Logos. Another verse which in the Septuagint reads "he divided (διεῖλεν) them (αὐτὰ) in the middle and placed them (αὐτὰ) facing opposite each other," [25] is paraphrased by Philo, evidently under the influence of the original Hebrew text, by "and the parts cut off (τὰ τμήματα) he placed facing opposite each other." [26]

But as in the case of his use of the term Logos in the sense of an immanent principle in general, so also now, in the case of his use of it in the special Heraclitean sense, he makes it clear that he is conscious of the fact that Heraclitus does not believe in the existence of an immaterial God outside the world and above the Logos, and accordingly he openly repudiates Heraclitus, declaring a "bad man" him "who derives every thing from the world and makes it return to the world, who imagines that nothing has been created by God, who is a follower of the opinion of Heraclitus, advocating such tenets as 'fullness and want,' the 'universe one,' and 'all things interchange.'" [27] While the Logos to Philo may indeed be described as the divider, it is a divider only by virtue of its being used by the unshowable God; [28] in reality it is the Creator who does the dividing, [29] and "God alone is exact in

[23] Exod. 39: 3 (LXX 36:10).

[24] *Heres* 26, 131.

[25] Gen. 15: 10.

[26] See Philo's quotation of the last part of Gen. 15: 10 in *Heres* 43, 207. The substitution of τὰ τμήματα for αὐτὰ would represent the Hebrew איש בתרו. The verse is quoted by him as in the Septuagint in *Qu. in Gen.* III, 5, but, as in *Heres* 43, 207, the second αὐτὰ is omitted.

[27] *Leg. All.* III, 3, 7.

[28] *Heres* 26, 130. [29] *Ibid.*, 27, 133: ὁ τεχνίτης; *Qu. in Gen.* III, 5: *Creator.*

judgment and alone is able to 'divide in the middle' bodies and things," [30] and it is God himself who divides the powers into beneficent and punitive,[31] and it is God himself who, "in His perfect knowledge of their mutual contrariety and natural conflict," divided the light from the darkness.[32]

The second law of nature which Philo attributes to the immanent Logos is the law of the harmony of the opposites. Not only are things divided into opposites, but the opposites are also equal, and, because they are equal, an equilibrium is established between them and they become harmonized. As in the case of the opposites, Philo goes into a minute analysis of the various types of equality and into a detailed description of how these various types of equality exist throughout the universe.[33] The act of harmonizing the opposites is attributed by him also to the immanent Logos. "Good reason, then," he says, "have we to be sure that all the earth shall not be dissolved by all the water which has gathered within its hollows, nor fire be quenched by air, nor, on the other hand, air be ignited by fire, since the divine Logos stations itself between the elements, like a vocal between the voiceless elements of speech, so that the universe may send forth a harmony like that of a masterpiece of literature, for it mediates between the opponents amid their threatenings and reconciles them by winning ways to peace and concord." [34] In Aristobulus this harmonization of the opposites is attributed directly to God. "The constitution of the world," he says, "may well be called for its majesty God's standing (*στάσις*); [35] for God is over all, and all things are

[30] *Ibid.* 28, 143.

[31] *Ibid.* 34, 166.

[32] *Opif.* 9, 33; cf. Gen. 1: 4.

[33] *Heres*, 28, 141–42, 204.

[34] *Plant.* 2, 10.

[35] This probably refers to the expression "the standing (*στάσιν*, Hebrew: *hadom*) for the feet of our Lord" in I Chron. 28: 2; in Isa. 66: 1, the Hebrew *hadom* is translated by *ὑποπόδιον*.

subject unto Him, and have received from Him their station (*στάσιν*), so that men may comprehend that they are immovable. Now my meaning is like this, that heaven has never become earth, nor earth heaven, nor the sun become the shining moon, nor again the moon become the sun, nor rivers seas, nor seas rivers." [36] The law of the harmony of the opposites is also brought out in Philo's statement that the Logos, — that is, the immanent Logos — acts as a "mediator" and as one who "arbitrates between the things which seem in opposition to each other, thus creating love and unanimity, for the Logos is always the cause and creator of fellowship." [37] Again, all things are said by him to be held together "in accordance with the divine Logos which binds them by the most skillful art and by the most perfect harmony." [38]

In his statements of the law of the harmony of the opposites no reference is made by Philo to Heraclitus. Nor is there in Heraclitus any explicit statement that it is the Logos which brings about that harmony. In later restatements of Heraclitus' views, God himself is said to be the opposites of "day, night; winter, summer; war, peace; surfeit, famine," [39] or the opposites themselves are said to be the cause of their own harmony, for "junctions are: wholes and not wholes, that which agrees and that which differs, that which produces harmony and that which produces discord; from all you get one and from one you get all." [40] Among the Stoics, however, the unity of the world and the universal sympathy which pre-

[36] Quoted in Eusebius, *Praeparatio Evangelica* VIII, 11, 377a–b.

[37] *Qu. in Ex.* II, 68, and Harris, *Fragments*, p. 66. Cf. Goodenough, *By Light, Light*, pp. 26–27.

[38] *Qu. in Ex.* II, 90; cf. also II, 118. Cf. Bréhier, p. 88, n. 2.

[39] Hippolytus, *Refutatio Omnium Haeresium* IX, 10 (ed. Duncker et Schneidewin, p. 448, ll. 33–34). Cf. Zeller, I, 2[5], p. 664, n. 1; (*The Pre-Socratic Philosophy*, II, p. 38, n. 1).

[40] *De Mundo*, 5, 396b, 20–22; cf. Bréhier, p. 88, n. 2.

vails among all its parts is said to be due to God,[41] who to them is the active principle within the primary fire called, among other things, also Logos. It is probably the Stoics, with whose view he may have also identified that of Heraclitus, that are the source of Philo's theory that the Logos is the harmonizer of the opposites.[42]

Sometimes Philo describes this principle of the harmony of the opposites in terms used by Plato in connection with his world-soul and by the Stoics in connection with what they call both world-soul and Logos. Plato uses the term bond (*δεσμός*)[43] in connection with his world-soul, and says concerning it that God "caused it to extend throughout the whole" [44] and that its function was "to guide the greatest part of created things to the best end." [45] The Stoics similarly describe their world-soul or Logos as a principle of cohesion (*ἕξις*),[46] which is defined as a bond (*δεσμός*)[47] and is represented as pervading every part of the world [48] and as being the ruling principle (*ἡγεμονικόν*) in it.[49] With all this in the back of his mind, Philo says of the immanent Logos that it is "the bond (*δεσμός*) of all existence, and holds and knits together all the parts"; [50] it is "a glue and bond" by which all things are held tight; [51] it "holds together and administers (*διοικοῦντος*) all things"; [52] it is "the ruler (*δίοπος*) and steersman (*κυβερνήτης*) of all"; [53] it extends throughout nature, "combining and compacting all its parts, for the Father the Begetter made it the indissoluble bond of the universe." [54]

[41] Sextus, *Adversus Physicos* I, 78–85.
[42] Cf. Bréhier, p. 88, n. 2.
[43] *Timaeus* 38 E; 41 B.
[44] *Ibid.* 34 B.
[45] *Ibid.* 48 A.
[46] Diogenes, VII, 139.
[47] *Immut.* 7, 35; Arnim, II, 458.
[48] Diogenes, VII, 138.
[49] *Ibid.*, 139.
[50] *Fug.* 20, 112.
[51] *Heres* 38, 188.
[52] *Mos.* II, 26, 133. So also in Wisdom of Solomon 8: 1; cf. above, p. 288.
[53] *Cher.* 11, 36; *Migr.* 1, 6.
[54] *Plant.* 2, 9.

But here again, in order not to be misunderstood, Philo tries to make it clear, whenever the occasion arises, that his immanent Logos, unlike that of the Stoics, is not itself God, but has a God above it. Indeed the Logos may be called the bond which holds the world together, but in reality it derives that power from God, for ultimately it is God who "without toil made this vast universe long ages ago, and now without toil holds it in perpetual existence." [55] The Logos may, after a fashion, be described as administering all things and as ruler and steersman, but in reality it is God who administers (διοικεῖν) all things [56] and who is the ruler (δίοπος)[57] and the steersman (κυβερνήτης).[58]

The description of the immanent Logos as both divider and combiner, but with a closer resemblance to its original use in Heraclitus and the Stoics, is reflected in Philo's interpretation of the Seraphim in the vision of Isaiah. "I saw the Lord seated on a high and lofty throne and the house was filled with His glory and Seraphim stood around Him, each having six wings, and with two they covered the face, and with two they covered the feet, and two they used in flying."[59] The term Seraphim, he says, may be taken to mean either a pattern (*typus*) or fire (*incendium*).[60] By this he means that the term Seraphim may be taken to refer either to the incorporeal Logos in the intelligible world of ideas, which is a "pattern," or to the immanent Logos in the physical world, which the Stoics call "fire." Taking up the latter meaning of the term, he says that literally the Seraphim — as indicated by the etymology of the Hebrew word, which, as taken

[55] *Sacr.* 7, 40.
[56] *Conf.* 33, 170.
[57] *Spec.* IV, 38, 200.
[58] *Decal.* 12, 53.
[59] Isa. 6: 1–2.
[60] *De Deo* 6. In the Latin text, the reading is Cherubim, which is obviously an error. Cf. M. Adler, "Das philonische Fragment *De Deo*," *Monatsschrift für Geschichte und Wissenschaft des Judentums*, 80 (1936), 167.

by Philo, means "the burning ones" — are made of fire, — not the destructive kind of fire but the kind of fire "by which all things are skillfully made." He then adds: "Wherefore, as it seems to me, some philosophers also declared that a craftsmanlike fire proceeds by a regular road to the production of seeds in generation." [61] This additional statement is almost a literal quotation of Zeno's definition of nature or the Logos as "A craftsmanlike fire proceeding by a regular road to generation." [62] This craftsmanlike fire, he continues, divides matter into the four elements,[63] of which earth and water are symbolized by the two lower wings which cover the feet of the Seraphim and air and fire are symbolized by the two upper wings which cover the face of the Seraphim.[64] But since, according to "certain natural philosophers" (*Physici quidam*), by which he means Heraclitus and Empedocles, "love and opposition" (*dilectio et oppositio*) are also elements, which elements initiate movement in the other four elements,[65] love and opposition are symbolized by the two wings by which the Seraphim fly and raise themselves to the Prime Leader (*dux princeps*) who is the sole harmonizer.[66] Here then God, who is above the Logos, is the true harmonizer, and by the same token also the true divider; and the immanent Logos, represented by the Seraphim, which means fire, is the principle of both opposition — that is, the law of opposites — and love — that is, the law of the harmony of

[61] *De Deo*, 6: "Quare, ut mihi videtur, etiam nonnulli philosophorum, ignem artificialem asseruere in viam cadere ad semina in generationem producenda."

[62] Diogenes, VII, 156; Cicero, *De Natura Deorum* II, 22, 57: "Zeno igitur naturam ita definit, ut eam dicit ignem esse artificiosum ad gignendum progredientem via."

[63] *De Deo*, 8.

[64] *De Deo*, 9.

[65] Cf. Aristotle, *De Gen. et Corr.* I, 1, 314a, 16–17; and 315a, 17.

[66] *De Deo*, 10. With this interpretation, compare the interpretation of this passage in Goodenough, *By Light, Light*, pp. 30–31.

the opposites. The terms love (*dilectio*) and opposition (*oppositio*) used by Philo in this passage reflect the terms love (φιλία) and strife (νεῖκος) used by Empedocles,[67] combined with the term opposites (ἐναντία) used in Heraclitus' theory of the opposites.[68]

A third law of nature which Philo attributes to the immanent Logos is the law of the perpetuity of the species. "God willed," he says, "that nature should run a course that brings it back to its starting point, endowing the species with immortality, and making them sharers of eternal existence," so that the fruit comes out of the plant, the fruit contains a seed, and out of the seed comes a plant again.[69] This reflects Aristotle's generalization that men and animals and plants can be eternal only as species and not as individuals.[70] In describing this principle of the perpetuity of the species, however, Philo does not use the Aristotelian vocabulary. In Aristotle the perpetuity of the species is described as being due directly to the nutritive power (τὸ θρεπτικόν), for "this nutritive power exists in all alike, whether animals or plants, and this is the same as the power that enables an animal or plant to generate another like itself, that being the function of them all if naturally perfect." [71] In Philo the perpetuity of the species is described as being due directly to the presence of "seminal essences" (σπερματικαὶ οὐσίαι) within plants, which endow them with the power of reproducing their species, for "hidden and imperceptible within these seminal substances are the Logoi of all things." [72] Elsewhere the Logos is similarly described by him as the "seminal es-

[67] Cf. Diels, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, "Wortindex" s.v

[68] Cf. above, p. 334.

[69] *Opif.* 13, 44.

[70] *De Gen. Animal.* II, 1, 731b, 31–732a, 1; *De Anima* II, 4, 415b, 3–7.

[71] *De Gen. Animal* II, 1, 735a, 16–19.

[72] *Opif.* 13, 43.

sence" (σπερματικὴ οὐσία) of things,[73] as the "seminal and craftsmanlike Logos" (σπερματικὸς καὶ τεχνικὸς λόγος)[74] and as the "seminal Logoi" (σπερματικοὶ λόγοι).[75] All these reflect various terms of the Stoics, such as, "craftsmanlike fire,"[76] "seminal Logos"[77] and "seminal Logoi,"[78] which are used by them to describe their God, identified by them with the active principle in the primary fire, as the creative principle in the world, after the analogy of the seed in the generation of animals.[79] But here, too, after having ascribed to his immanent Logos powers like those ascribed to it by the Stoics, Philo tries to make it clear that his immanent Logos, unlike the Stoic Logos, is not the ultimate cause of the generation of plants or animals in the world nor of the creation of the world itself. Above it there is God. "So Moses," he says, "beyond all other, had most accurately learned that God, by setting the seeds (σπέρματα) and roots of all things, is the cause of the greatest of all plants springing up, namely, this universe."[80] In this, at least in so far as the generation of plants and animals is concerned, Philo aligns himself with Aristotle as against the Stoics, for to Aristotle, too, while the "nutritive power" within plants and animals is the immediate cause of the perpetuity of their species, the ultimate cause of that perpetuity is the prime mover or God.[81]

Sometimes, instead of Logos, which is the totality of God's powers, he makes use of the term powers as a description of the immediate cause of the immutable laws of nature. As in the case of the immanent Logos, he describes these immanent powers as "bonds." In his homily on the verse "the Lord

[73] *Qu. in Ex.* II, 68; Harris, *Fragments*, p. 67.
[74] *Heres* 24, 119; cf. *Aet.* 17, 85.
[75] *Legat.* 8, 55.
[76] Cf. above, n 62.
[77] Cf. above, n. 4.
[78] Cf. above, n. 7.
[79] Diogenes, VII, 136.
[80] *Plant.* 12, 48.
[81] *De Gen. et Corr.* II, 10, 336b, 30–337a, 1.

came down to see the city and the tower" [82] and on the scriptural expression "God in heaven above and upon the earth beneath," [83] he says that these should not be taken to refer to God himself but rather to His powers, for "He has made His powers extend through earth and water, air and heaven, and left no part of the universe destitute, and uniting all with all has bound them fast with invisible bonds (δεσμοῖς), that they should never be loosed," [84] for "the powers of the universe are bonds (δεσμοὶ) that cannot be broken." [85] These powers within the universe by which the world is held together are the same as, but have a different kind of existence than, those powers outside the universe which make up the intelligible world and the antemundane Logos and "according to which God established and ordered and arranged the universe." [86] Again, as in the case of the immanent Logos, he describes these immanent powers in terms of Heraclitus' principle of the harmony of the opposites, for "though transcending and being beyond what He has made, none the less has He filled the universe with himself; for He has caused His powers to extend themselves throughout the universe to its utmost bounds and in accordance with the laws of harmony has knit each part of each." [87] The use of the term power in this sense is also found in the Letter of Aristeas, where the high priest is made to say that "there is only one God" and that "His power (δύναμις) is manifested throughout the universe, since every place is filled with His might." [88] It is similarly found in Aristobulus, in his statement that "the power of God is through

[82] Gen. 11: 5; cf. *Conf.* 27, 134.
[83] Deut. 4: 39; cf. *Migr.* 32, 182.
[84] *Conf.* 27, 136.
[85] *Migr.* 32, 181.
[86] *Ibid.*, 182.
[87] *Post.* 5, 14.
[88] Aristeas, 132; cf. discussion on the meaning of this statement in Gfrörer, II, p. 63; Drummond, I, p. 241.

all things." [89] But in opposition to the Stoics, to whom these powers are powers of a God who is the active principle in the primary fire which resides within the universe,[90] Philo emphasizes that these immanent powers are the powers of a God "who contains but is not contained" [91] and who is "neither the universe nor its soul." [92] A complete statement of these immanent powers in their relation to the immanent Logos and to God, who is not immanent in the world, is to be found in a passage where he describes the Logos, that is, the immanent Logos, as "the charioteer of the powers," in relation to which God is described as "He who is seated in the chariot, giving directions to the charioteer for the right wielding of the reins of the universe." [93] On the whole, to Philo's mind, the immanent Logos is the totality of the immanent powers in the visible world, just as the incorporeal Logos is the totality of the incorporeal powers in the intelligible world.[94]

Though in his criticism of the Stoics Philo explicitly rejects their description of God as the soul of the universe, because of the implication in the Stoic use of it that God is a corporeal being and part of the universe,[95] still he does not hesitate to apply to God this expression, or the expression mind of the universe, in the loose sense of ruler of the universe without the implication that He is corporeal and part of the universe. He thus says: "There are two minds, that of the world, which is God, and the individual mind." [96] But in opposition to the Stoics, who maintain that both the soul of the world, which is God, and the soul of man are fire, he argues that God is indeed the soul of the world but we have no

[89] Eusebius, *Praeparatio Evangelica* VIII, 12, 666 d.
[90] Diogenes, VII, 147.
[91] *Conf.* 27, 136; *Migr.* 32, 182.
[92] *Migr.* 32, 181.
[93] *Fug.* 19, 101.
[94] Cf. above, p. 227.
[95] *Migr.* 32, 181.
[96] *Leg. All.* III, 9, 29.

knowledge about the substance of either soul or God, except that it is incorporeal.[97] That God is described by him as mind only in the loose sense of His being the ruler of the world is brought out in a passage in which he argues that "just as sense is the servitor of mind, so all the beings perceived by sense are the ministers of Him who is perceived by the mind," and that, consequently, "if the mind in us, so exceedingly small and invisible, is yet the ruler of the organs of sense," God, whom on the basis of his previous analogy he now describes as "the mind of the universe," and who is "so transcendently great and perfect," must *a fortiori* be "the King of Kings, who are seen by Him though He is not seen by them." [98] In another place, he argues from the existence of a mind (*νοῦς*) in man, which is the ruler of the body, to the existence of a God who is the ruler of the world.[99] In still another place, he explains that "the wise man is the first of the human race, as a pilot in a ship or a ruler in a city or a general in war, or again as a soul in a body and a mind (*νοῦς*) in a soul, or once more heaven in the world or God in heaven." [100] The difference in the relation of God to the universe and that of our mind to the body is directly stated by him in a passage in which he says that, in contradistinction to our mind which dwells in our body and is contained by it, God "dwells outside all material nature and contains everything without being contained by anything." [101] By the same token, just as he speaks of God as being the mind of the universe, he also speaks of the individual human mind as being a sort of god (*τρόπον τινὰ θεός*) of the individual human body, and the reason he gives for his

[97] *Ibid.* I, 29, 91; cf. *Mut.* 2, 10. Our knowledge of the incorporeality of the rational soul, according to Philo, is based upon Scripture (cf. below, p. 394).

[98] *Spec.* I, 3, 17–18.

[99] *Abr.* 16, 74.

[100] *Ibid.* 46, 272.

[101] *Migr.* 35, 192.

application of the term god to the human mind is the comparison of the rulership of God in the universe and the rulership of the individual human mind in man.[102] In a similar sense he speaks also of the mind as being a god to the irrational soul.[103] In all these passages, as will have been noticed, God is said to be the mind or the soul of the universe only in the sense that God is the ruler of the universe, after the analogy of the human mind in its relation to the human body or in its relation to the human soul or in its relation to some parts of the human soul.

III. Miracles

When Philo described the immutable laws of nature as having been implanted in the world by God at the time He created it, he was following not only Plato but also Scripture. Like Plato, Scripture assumes that there are certain immutable laws in nature and that these laws were implanted by God. It is God "who giveth the sun for a light by day, and the ordinances of the moon and of the stars for a light by night," [1] ordinances which will not depart from before Him.[2] Like Plato, too, Scripture conceives the immutability of these laws of nature as being due to an assurance of its permanency given by God, a covenant, as it were, made at the end of the deluge between Him and "every living creature of all flesh," an everlasting covenant, by which God gave assurance that "while the earth remaineth, seed time and harvest, and cold and heat, and summer and winter, and day and night shall not cease and that neither will He again smite any more everything living, as He has done." [3]

[102] *Opif.* 23, 69. [103] *Leg. All.* I, 13, 40.

[1] Jer. 31: 34. [2] Jer. 31: 35.
[3] Gen. 8: 21–22; 9: 16–17; cf. Jer. 33: 20–21.

There is, however, one difference between Plato and Scripture as to these laws which according to both of them God implanted in the world. When the God of Plato assured the celestial bodies and the deities of popular religion that "in my will (*βούλησις*) ye possess a bond greater and more sovereign than the bonds wherewith, at your birth, ye were bound together," [4] that will was never to be changed. Not only will the world not be destroyed, but also the order of its nature will not be changed. Though the God of Plato started as a free agent and created the world by will,[5] by His own voluntary abdication of His own power to change the laws which He himself has implanted in the world, He has deprived himself of freedom and has henceforth acted by the necessity of His own nature no less than the God of Aristotle who never created a world by His own will. In the philosophy of Plato there is no room for miracles. The God of Scripture, however, despite the covenant, has still reserved for himself, mentally, the right to upset the order of nature, at least temporarily, whenever there should be a need for it; and, while it is a matter of doubt whether the God of Scripture ever will bring about the destruction of this world, He did, as a matter of record, perform miracles by temporary changes in the order of nature.

Philo follows Scripture. According to his interpretation of Scripture, the world created by God will never be destroyed. His proof-text is God's promise to Noah, quoted above, which he takes to mean the indestructibility of the world.[6] Referring evidently to Plato, he approves of those "who declare that though by nature destructible the world will never be destroyed, being held together by a bond of superior strength, namely, the will of its Maker," [7] and this

[4] *Timaeus* 41 B.
[5] *Ibid.* 29 D–E; 41 A–B.
[6] *Aet.* 5, 19.
[7] *Heres* 50, 246; cf. 30, 152; cf. *Timaeus* 41 A–B.

view he also attributes to Moses, saying that even though the world, by its having come into existence, must by its own nature be destructible, "by the providence of God it was made immortal." [8] But with Scripture, either in conscious opposition to Plato or as an interpretation of him, he believes in the possibility of God's changing the order of nature. While admitting that earth, rain, air, husbandry, medicine, and marriage in the ordinary course of nature are productive of certain effects, yet he maintains that "all these things, through the power of God, admit of change and transition, so as often to produce effects quite the reverse of the ordinary." [9] He particularly calls upon the miracles recorded in Scripture as evidence of God's power to change the order of nature. In great detail he describes as historical events the miracles wrought by Moses in Egypt before the exodus of the children of Israel and in the wilderness after their exodus.[10] Of these miracles, some were performed through intermediary agents, either by Aaron or by Moses or by both, while others, namely, swarms of flies, murrain, and the destruction of the first-born, were performed, according to him, directly by God himself without any intermediary agency.[11] What miracles are and for what purpose they are wrought may be gathered from the words he puts in the mouth of Moses when addressing the people before their miraculous crossing of the Red Sea: "Do not lose heart. God's way of defence is not as that of men. Why are you quick to trust in the probable and the likely and that only? When God gives help He needs no armament. It is His

[8] *Decal.* 12, 58; cf. above, p. 316.

[9] *Immut.* 19, 87.

[10] *Mos.* I, 12, 65 ff.; *Migr.* 15, 83 ff.

[11] *Mos.* I, 17, 97; 23, 130–24, 139. The same fourfold classification occurs also in *Tanḥuma, Exodus, va-Era*, 14; *Exodus Rabbah* 12, 4, and 15, 27 (cf. Ginzberg, *The Legends of the Jews*, II, p. 341, and V, p. 426, n. 170).

special property to find a way where no way is. What is impossible to all created being is possible to Him only, ready to His hand." [12] Miracles accordingly are something wrought by God, either indirectly or directly, which would not have taken place by the ordinary processes of nature. They are "impossibilities no doubt as judged by what to outward appearance is credible and reasonable but easily accomplished by the dispensations of God's providence." [13] The scope of miracles includes such performances as the transference of the function of one element to another, as, for instance, for air, instead of earth, to bring forth food,[14] or the changing of the property of an element, as, for instance, for fire to move in a direction contrary to its nature,[15] or even the changing of the nature of a composite object, as, for instance, for the serpent to speak with a human voice.[16] The belief that God can upset the laws which He himself has implanted in nature [17] is explained by Aristobulus in his comment on the verse "Mount Sinai was altogether on a smoke, because the Lord descended upon it in fire." [18] The descent here, he says, is not local. It only means that God in a miraculous way imparted to fire the efficacy (*τὸ δυναμικόν*) to blaze without consuming.[19]

Sometimes indeed he attempts to explain some miracle recorded in Scripture by natural causes. Thus the story of how Moses had made sweet the bitter water of Marah by throwing a tree into the spring [20] may, according to Philo, be ex-

[12] *Mos.* I, 31, 174.
[13] *Ibid.* II, 47, 261.
[14] *Ibid.* I, 36, 202; II, 48, 267. Cf. Exod. 16: 4 ff.
[15] *Qu. in Gen.* IV, 51; Harris, *Fragments*, p. 34. Cf. Gen. 19: 24.
[16] *Ibid.* I, 32. Cf. Gen. 3: 2.
[17] Cf. above, p. 347.
[18] Exod. 19: 18.
[19] Quoted in Eusebius, *Praeparatio Evangelica* VIII, 11, 377c–d.
[20] Exod. 15: 22–26.

plained as an outright miracle, in which case the tree "was created on this occasion for the service which it was destined to perform," or it may be explained by natural causes, in which case the tree "was formed by nature to exercise a virtue which had hitherto remained unknown." [21] So also in the story of how Moses brought water out of the rock by smiting it with his staff,[22] it may be explained as an outright miracle, in which case "then for the first time a body of water was collected in it through hidden channels and was forced out by impact," or it may be explained by natural causes, in which case "the rock contained originally a spring and now had its artery clean severed." [23] But such attempts at a natural explanation of miracles are not meant by Philo to be a denial of the miraculous nature of the occurrence. They are meant only to show that God sometimes employs the powers of nature to perform His miracles. The fact that the hidden sweetening virtue of the tree and the hidden spring of the rock were discovered by Moses just at the time when they were needed was due to the miraculous intervention of God.[24] Often, indeed, he tries to give allegorical

[21] *Mos.* I, 33, 185.

[22] Exod. 17: 1–7; Num. 20: 1–13; Deut. 8: 15.

[23] *Mos.* I, 38, 210–211.

[24] An explanation of this miracle of bringing forth water out of the rock analogous to that given thereof by Philo occurs in the Mishnaic statement that "the mouth of the well," i.e., the miracle here under consideration, is one of the ten things which were created at twilight on the sixth day of creation (*M. Abot* V, 6, and see Hebrew commentaries *ad loc.* and Rashi on *Pesaḥim* 54a). According to the Midrash, furthermore, not only this miracle and the other nine miracles which are mentioned in the Mishnah as having been created at twilight on the sixth day, but also all the other miracles recorded in Scripture, were created during the six days of creation by a stipulation which God made with every natural object at the time He brought it into existence (*Genesis Rabbah* 5, 5, and see Maimonides on *M. Abot* V, 6). The motive underlying this rational explanation of miracles in the Midrash was a desire to reconcile the possibility of miracles with God's expressed promise to observe the laws which He has established in the universe (cf. *Exodus Rabbah* 21, 6, and cf. above n. 3). Miracles, according to this Midrashic explanation, are thus not alto-

interpretations to Scriptural miracles. But in such cases, again, the attempt at an allegorical interpretation of miracles should not be taken as a denial of their historicity as actual facts. Thus in the story of how Moses smote the rock and brought forth water, besides explaining it as an outright miracle or as a miracle by natural causes, he also explains it allegorically, taking the "rock" and the "water" as referring to the immutable God from whom showers forth the birth of

---

gether contrary to nature, but still the events in question are not thereby deprived completely of their miraculous character. They are still to be considered as acts due to the direct intervention of God, first by His implanting them in nature as exceptions to their established order and then by His making them occur exactly at the time they were needed and by His announcing their occurrence beforehand.

This Midrashic explanation of miracles by a sort of preëstablished disharmony is analogous to a similar explanation of divination by the Stoics. "They maintain that from the beginning of the world it has been ordained that certain signs must needs precede certain events, some of which are drawn from the entrails of animals, some from the note and flight of birds, some from the sight of lightning, some from prodigies, some from stars, some from visions of dreams, and some from exclamations of men in frenzy: and those who have a clear perception of these things are not often deceived" (Cicero, *De Divinatione* I, 52, 118). But in this Stoic conception of divination there is nothing miraculous. The harmony was established, according to them, by necessity and not by will, and the process of divination is to them, again, a necessary process without any element of divine grace in it (cf. below, II, 47).

In medieval Jewish philosophy, on the basis of this Midrash, Judah ha-Levi offers the following explanation of miracles: "The changes in the ordinary processes of nature were in accordance with nature, for they have been arranged for and determined upon by the eternal will ever since the six days of creation" (*Cuzari* III, 73 end). This, too, was not meant by ha-Levi to be a denial of the miraculous nature of the events that happened. In Maimonides this Midrashic view is restated as follows: "The rabbis consider these miracles as being to some extent also natural, for they say that when God created the universe and endowed it with these natural properties, He made it part of these properties that they should produce certain miracles at certain times. The sign of a prophet consists accordingly in the fact that God made known to him the time he should announce the event that is to take place and informed him that the event would take place in accordance with what has been implanted in nature from the beginning of its creation" (*Moreh Nebukim* II, 29; cf. *Shemoneh Peraḳim*, ch. 8; Commentary on *M. Abot* V, 6). In the light of all this, I do not think that Bréhier (p. 182) is quite right in taking Philo's attempts at a rational explanation of some miracles as an indication of his disbelief in

all that exists.[25] This allegorical interpretation certainly does not mean a denial of the historicity of the event, the veracity of which, as we have seen, is accepted by him elsewhere; it only means that the event, true historically though it is, has also an allegorical meaning and that it points to a moral in addition to its recording a fact. Only in the story of creation, with reference to which his allegorical interpretation may be taken to be a denial of the literalness of the narrative, does he declare such a miracle as the creation of Eve out of one of the ribs of Adam [26] to be of the nature of a myth.[27] The story of creation is treated as in a class by itself throughout the history of the philosophic interpretation of Scripture, and many a theologian, whether Jewish or Christian, about whose belief in the possibility of miracles and in the historicity of the miracles recorded in Scripture there can be no doubt, allowed himself to interpret the story of creation as purely allegorical.[28] But even in connection with the story

---

miracles. Examples of miracles rationally explained by Philo are given also in Goodenough (*By Light, Light*, pp. 187–188), but the author quite properly draws no inference therefrom as to Philo's disbelief in miracles. Siegfried (p. 210) sees in these attempts at a rational explanation of miracles evidence of the existence of some lingering doubt in the mind of Philo as to the logical reconcilability of miracles with his conception of God — which, as we have seen, is exactly the motive underlying the Midrashic attempt at a rational explanation of miracles.

[25] *Somn.* II, 32, 221–222; *Leg. All.* II, 21, 84.

[26] Gen. 2: 21. "Sides" instead of "ribs" in the Septuagint and Philo.

[27] *Leg. All.* II, 7, 19.

[28] As, e.g., Origen, who believed in the historicity of the miraculous events recorded in Scripture (cf. *Contra Celsum* II, 48–53) and yet takes the stories of creation in a purely allegorical sense (*De Principiis* IV, 1, 16), explicitly mentioning the story of the creation of Eve as being a mere allegory (*Contra Celsum* IV, 38). Similarly Maimonides affirms his belief in the historicity of scriptural narratives, including those of the miracles (*Moreh Nebukim* III, 50), and yet he declares that "the account given in the Pentateuch of creation is not, as generally believed by the common people, to be taken in its literal sense in all its parts" (*ibid.*, II, 29). Here again Bréhier (p. 184) takes Philo's statement with regard to the story of the creation of Eve as an indication of his rejection of the historicity of all the miraculous stories recorded in Scripture.

of creation, this particular story of the creation of Eve is elsewhere taken by Philo as a historical event.[29]

The allegorical explanation of miracles by Philo is thus no denial of their historicity as events which actually took place, just as his occasional attempt at a rational explanation of them is no denial of the miraculous nature of those events. It is therefore quite literally and without any equivocation of language that he could proclaim that "if anyone disbelieves these things, he neither knows God nor has ever sought to know Him; for if he did he would at once have perceived — aye, perceived with a firm apprehension — that these extraordinary and seemingly incredible events are but child's-play to God." [30] If one should doubt the power of God to work miracles, he throws out the challenge, let him look at the world which was created and ordered by God. In comparison with the wonders of the universe, all of which are the work of God, all these recorded "extraordinary and seemingly incredible events are but child's-play to God." [31] The act of creation itself is to him one of the greatest of miracles, and, if God could do that, nothing is impossible for Him, for "as God called up His most perfect work, the world, out of not being into being, so He called up plenty in the desert, changing round the elements to meet the pressing need of the occasion." [32] The act of creation as an argument for the possibility of miracles comes up again and again in later religious philosophy.[33]

[29] According to Bréhier (*loc. cit.*), all of Philo's declarations as to his belief in the historicity of the scriptural miracles which are to be found in his *De Vita Mosis* and the *Quaestiones* should be taken allegorically, whereas his allegorical interpretations of scriptural miracles which are to be found in his *Legum Allegoria* should be taken literally.

[30] *Mos.* I, 38, 212.

[31] *Ibid.*

[32] *Ibid.* II, 48, 267.

[33] So Tertullian uses the act of creation as an argument for the possibility of the miracle of resurrection (cf. *De resur. carn.* c. XI). St. Augustine uses it as an argument for resurrection as well as for miracles in general (*De Civitate Dei* XXI, 7).

His conception of miracles as a certain element of freedom reserved by God for himself even after He has implanted the laws of nature in the world is clearly expressed by him in his statement that while God has implanted certain unalterable laws in the universe by bestowing upon it "powers (*δυνάμεις*)," He did not bestow upon it "independent (*αὐτοκρατεῖς*) powers," so that, "like a charioteer grasping the reins or a pilot the tiller, He guides all things in what direction He pleases as law (*νόμον*) and right (*δίκην*) demand, standing in need of no one besides: for all things are possible to God." [34] The "law and right" in this passage refer to God's own law and right and not to the order of nature which He has established; the implication is that God does in the world and with the order which He has established in it whatever to His inscrutable wisdom is just and right in a given particular instance, even when by doing so He has to upset the laws of nature which He has established for the general good of the world as a whole which He has created. A similar type of reasoning appears later in medieval philosophy in connection with the problem of miracles. There arises the question that the assumption that God does occasionally change the order of nature must inevitably mean also the assumption that God acts unjustly, inasmuch as the order of nature is the same as the order of justice. St. Thomas' answer to this is that for God to do something against the order of nature or justice as established by Him in the world does not mean that He does something against the order of His own nature and His own justice.[35] The world is thus conceived by Philo as a world which is run according to a certain preëstablished law

Similarly Maimonides uses creation as an argument for the possibility of miracles in general (*Moreh Nebukim* II, 25) and for the possibility of resurrection in particular (*Ma'amar Teḥiyyat ha-Metim*, c. 42, p. 30, ed. Joshua Finkel; *Ḳobeṣ*, II, p. 10vb).

[34] *Opif.* 14, 46; cf. *Conf.* 34, 175.

[35] *Sum. Theol.* I, 105, 6.

on a scheduled timetable, and man can make his plans in the world with a reasonable expectancy that that which has been is that which shall be and that the order of nature will remain constant. But still he is to know that God can change this order and this schedule without previous notice, though not without some good reason known only to himself.

IV. Conclusion, Influence, Anticipation

Students of Philo generally assume that Philo's Logos has two stages of existence, before the creation of the world as a thought of God and after the creation of the world as immanent in the world. We have shown that before the creation of the world it had already had a second stage of existence as an incorporeal being created by God. The immanent Logos is a third stage of its existence. Unlike the Stoic Logos, which is material and intermingled with matter, the immanent Logos of Philo is conceived by him as something immaterial, an extension of the preëxistent immaterial Logos, and it resides in the world after the analogy of the preëxistent mind or soul which Plato conceives as residing in the world. Still, while it is unlike the Stoic Logos, the immanent Logos is described by Philo in terms of the Stoic Logos, except that he does not call it the mind of the world or the soul of the world. These two expressions are reserved by him for God, who is outside the world and to whom he applies them figuratively, merely as a description of His being the ruler of the world.

In his treatment of the immanent Logos, Philo endeavors to answer two questions.

The first question is whether the world is governed by certain immutable laws of nature. In opposition to the Epicureans and in agreement with Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics, he answers this question in the affirmative. For this

he finds support in Scripture, which, according to him, affirms not only the indestructibility of the world but also the immutability of its natural order. But these laws of nature were implanted in the world by God from above and they are administered by the immanent Logos through the power which it has received from God. His scattered statements on the laws of nature when brought together and analyzed and classified show that in the administration of the world by the immanent Logos Philo has discovered three general laws of nature, namely, the law of the opposites, the law of the harmony of the opposites, and the law of the perpetuity of the species.

The second question raised by Philo is whether these laws of nature, once implanted by God in the world, can be upset by God. In opposition to the generally accepted view in Greek philosophy, even to that of Plato, he answers this question in the affirmative. Evidence for this he finds in the many miracles recorded in Scripture.

In this view of Philo we have an adumbration of the view with regard to the laws of nature which we find subsequently in Christian, Moslem, and Jewish philosophy. The common element in all these three philosophies is that there are laws of nature, that these laws of nature were implanted by God in the world, but that God by a miraculous intervention can upset these laws of nature. We may quote St. Augustine as representing this Philonic view among the Church Fathers. "What is there so arranged by the Author of the nature of heaven and earth as the exactly ordered course of the stars? What is there established by laws so sure and inflexible? And yet, when it pleased Him who with sovereignty and supreme power regulates all He has created, a star conspicuous among the rest by its size and splendor changed its color, size, form, and most wonderful of all the order and law

of its course." [1] The reference here is to an event recorded in Marcus Varro's *De Gente Populi Romani*, and later in the same chapter he refers also to the miracles of the sun's standing still and its moving backward which are recorded in Scripture.[2] The occurrence of events, he says, which some people attribute to what they please to call fate, that is, the inflexible laws of nature, should be really attributed to the will and power of God himself.[3] This view is also represented by St. Thomas in his statements that "God established the order of nature," [4] and that "this order is subject to Him, as proceeding from Him, not by the necessity of His nature, but by the choice of His own will, for He could have created another order of things; wherefore God can do something outside this order created by Him, when He chooses," [5] and that "those things which God does outside those causes which we know are called miracles." [6] The laws of nature are said by him to be due to divine providence (*divina providentia*),[7] which he describes as divine reason (*ratio divina*)[8] or eternal reason (*ratio aeterna*)[9] or divine wisdom (*divina sapientia*),[10] terms which reflect Philo's "divine Logos," "eternal Logos," and "divine Wisdom." [11] Similarly in Arabic philosophy, both Moslem and Jewish, this view is represented by those who argued against the orthodox Kalam's denial of causality and laws of nature as well as against the Aristotelian conception that God acts by the necessity of His nature and without free will. All of these

[1] *De Civitate Dei* XXI, 8.
[2] Josh. 10:13; Isa. 38:8.
[3] *De Civitate Dei* V, 1.
[4] *Sum. Theol.* I, 105, 6, obj. 3: *Ordinem naturae Deus instituit.*
[5] *Ibid.*, c.; cf. *Cont. Gent.* III, 99.
[6] *Sum. Theol.* I, 105, 7, c.; cf. *Cont. Gent.* III, 101.
[7] *Sum. Theol.* I, II, 91, 1, c.
[8] *Ibid.*
[9] *Ibid.*, 2, c.
[10] *Ibid.*, 3, ad 1.
[11] Cf., e.g., *Opif.* 5, 20; *Plant.* 2, 8; *Heres* 25, 126.

acknowledged the historicity of the miraculous events as recorded in Scripture and the Koran. Indeed, not all the miracles recorded in Scripture are of the type that upset the laws of nature, that is, *contra naturam*; some of them are according to nature, though besides nature, that is, *praeter naturam*,[12] and the miraculous element in them consists in the acceleration of the natural process or in its timing. Moreover, some philosophers, especially among the Jews, explained even those miracles which seem to be contrary to nature as events for which God had made provision at the time of the creation of the world and hence as being to some extent part of the order of nature.[13] But however God is conceived by the medieval philosophers in His relation to the physical world, whether as acting contrary to nature, or whether as accelerating or timing the processes of nature, or whether as carrying into effect at an opportune time the exception to the processes of nature which He had made provisions for at the creation of the world, He has retained His character as a free agent and as exercising His freedom of will in His relation to the affairs of mankind.

It is this traditional conception of the possibility of miracles that was made the subject of attack by those who began to assail some of the fundamental conceptions of traditional philosophy which were formulated by Philo. In the case of Spinoza, after his direct attack on the possibility of miracles, he reaffirmed the classical conception of the immutability of the laws of nature, especially as it was conceived by Aristotle.[14]

[12] Cf. Maimonides, *Ma'amar Teḥiyyat ha-Metim* c. 49, p. 34, ed. Joshua Finkel; *Ḳobeṣ* II, 11rb, where miracles are divided into those which are (1) "impossible by nature" and those which are (2) "possible by nature," corresponding to St. Thomas' (1) *contra naturam* and (2) *praeter naturam* (*De Potentia* VI, 2, ad 3; *II Sent.*, XVIII, 1, 3c).

[13] Cf. above, n. 24.

[14] Cf. *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, ch. 6.

CHAPTER VII

SOULS, ANGELS, IMMORTALITY

I. Living Beings

It is significant that the immanent Logos, which pervades the world throughout, is never called by Philo the soul or mind of the world. Whenever he happens to use the expressions soul of the world and mind of the world, he uses them in an analogical sense as a description of God's governance of the world.[1] His avoidance of the use of these expressions in their literal sense and as a description of the immanent Logos was deliberate. He wanted to avoid the inconsistency in the use of these expressions by both Plato and the Stoics in that they first affirm that there is a soul or a mind which extends throughout or permeates the world and then distinguish within the world between animate and inanimate beings.[2] By not applying to the all-pervading immanent Logos the expression soul or mind of the world Philo can with greater verbal consistency affirm that within the world there is a distinction between things that have a soul or mind and things that have no soul or mind.

Soul and mind, like all other things in the world, are to Philo, as they are not to Plato, images of ideas; in this case images of the ideas of soul and mind.[3] The ideas of soul and mind, as will be recalled, were created by God on the day which Scripture calls the first day of creation.[4] After the model of the soul, the powers, at the behest of God, created irrational souls together with bodies,[5] and God himself

[1] Cf. above, p. 346.
[2] Cf. below, p. 361.
[3] Cf. above, p. 214.
[4] Cf. above, p. 307.
[5] *Fug.* 13, 69; cf. *Opif.* 24, 74–75; *Conf.* 35, 179; cf. below, p. 386.

created rational souls without bodies.[6] In this, Philo follows Plato in the *Timaeus*.[7] All these souls are individual souls; besides these individual souls there is not, as assumed in Plato's *Timaeus*,[8] a universal soul. Instead of a universal soul, there is to him an immanent Logos, by which he means the totality of immanent ideas. Again, unlike Plato in the *Timaeus*, who has his unbodied rational souls, immediately after their creation, placed in the stars,[9] Philo has them placed in the air.[10] But, like Plato in the *Phaedrus*,[11] he distinguishes within these unbodied souls between those which are to be embodied and those which are to remain without bodies.[12] As for the cause of this distinction, we shall discuss that later.[13] Unbodied souls as well as bodies with souls are described by Philo as having the nature of living beings (ἡ φύσις τῶν ζῴων) [14] as distinguished from beings which neither are souls nor possess souls.

Things in the world are thus to Philo, as they are to Plato and Aristotle and the Stoics, divided into animate and inanimate. But, like the Stoics [15] and unlike Plato [16] and Aristotle,[17] he does not place plants among the animate beings, even though like all the philosophers he distinguishes them, by virtue of their having growth, from growthless beings. Growthless beings, as in the Stoics, have only a cohesive principle described by the term habit (ἕξις); plants have an inner principle of growth described as nature (φύσις);

[6] *Plant.* 4, 14; *Somn.* I, 22, 137; *Fug.* 13, 69; *Conf.* 35, 179; cf. below, p. 389.

[7] *Timaeus* 69 c; cf. below, pp. 387, 397.

[8] *Ibid.* 41 D.

[9] *Ibid.*

[10] *Somn.* I, 22, 135, and 138.

[11] *Phaedrus* 246 c.

[12] *Gig.* 3, 12; *Plant.* 4, 14; *Somn.* I, 22, 140.

[13] Cf. below, p. 367.

[14] *Conf.* 35, 176.

[15] Sextus, *Adversus Physicos* I, 81; cf. Zeller, III, 1⁴, p. 196, n. 1 (*Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics*², p. 208, n. 3).

[16] *Timaeus* 77 A–B.

[17] *De Anima* I, 5, 410b, 22–23; II, 2, 413b, 7–8.

and animals and men have an inner principle of life called soul (ψυχή).[18] The term "soul," when applied to man, is used either in a general sense so as to include both the irrational and rational souls [19] or in a special sense with reference to the rational soul.[20] For the latter, the more specific term is mind (νοῦς)[21] or common equivalents of the term mind.[22] But the term "mind" is sometimes also used by him loosely in the sense of the irrational soul.[23] In one place he says that "the mind . . . has many powers, namely, the power of habit, the power of nature, the power of soul, the power of thought, and countless other powers." [24] Here the term "mind" would seem to be used not only as including the rational and the irrational soul but also as including "habit" and "nature." However, the term "mind" in this passage is qualified by the statement "when as yet unclothed and unconfined by the body." [25] By this qualifying statement, we take it, he wishes to indicate that by the term "mind" in this passage he means the incorporeal, antemundane Logos, which is elsewhere described by him as "the mind above us," [26] that is, what is described by him here as "the mind when as yet unclothed and unconfined by the body." Now the Logos, as we have seen, is the totality of powers,[27] that is, the totality of all the ideal patterns of all the particular powers in the world, and so Philo is justified in saying that it includes not only the power of "soul" and the power

[18] *Immut.* 7, 35–9, 45.

[19] *Leg. All.* II, 24, 95; *Agr.* 7, 30–31; *Spec.* I, 37, 201.

[20] *Heres* 11, 55.

[21] *Immut.* 10, 45.

[22] Such, e.g., as διάνοια (*Opif.* 46, 135); λόγος (*Deter.* 23, 83); πνεῦμα (*ibid.*); λογικὸν πνεῦμα (*Spec.* I, 35, 171).

[23] *Leg. All.* I, 12, 32. Cf. Drummond, I, pp. 218–223.

[24] *Leg. All.* II, 7, 22.

[25] *Ibid.*

[26] *Heres* 48, 236; cf. 234.

[27] Cf. above, p. 234.

of "mind" but also the power of "habit" and the power of "nature."

While departing from Plato and Aristotle and following the Stoics in his exclusion of plants from among living beings, Philo is in doubt whether he should equally follow the Stoics,[28] and in this case also Plato[29] and certain statements of Aristotle,[30] by including the celestial bodies among living beings. In one place he raises the following questions: "Are the stars living and intelligent, or devoid of mind and soul? Are their motions determined by choice or simply by necessity?" [31] And in answer to these questions he says: "All these and suchlike points pertaining to heaven, that fourth and best cosmic substance, are obscure and beyond our apprehension, based on guess-work and conjecture." [32] Indeed, in several places in his writings he does speak of the stars as having life and intelligence. But, when these passages are closely examined, it will be noticed that in all of them he speaks in the name of somebody else, without committing himself to the view he presents. In one place he says: "Those who have made philosophy their study tell us that the stars too are living creatures and entirely endowed with mind, of which some, the planets, move by a power inherent in themselves." [33] In another passage he says that the stars "are said to be not only living creatures but living creatures endowed with mind, or rather each of them a mind in itself, excellent through and through and unsusceptible of any evil." [34] In still another passage he says that "each of the stars is said to be not a living creature only but mind of

[28] Diogenes, VII, 145; Cicero, *Academica Priora* II, 37, 119.
[29] *Timaeus* 39 E–40 A.
[30] *De Caelo* II, 2, 285a, 29; II, 12, 292a, 11 and 20–21; 292b, 29.
[31] *Somn.* I, 4, 22.
[32] *Ibid.*, 23.
[33] *Plant.* 3, 12.
[34] *Opif.* 24, 73.

the purest kind through and through." [35] In all these passages, it will be noticed, Philo is careful to attribute the statement about the animality and rationality of the stars to somebody else.[36]

In one passage, however, he would seem to speak in his own name. He says: "The stars are souls divine and unmixed through and through . . . for each of them is mind in its purest form." [37] But the statement in this passage, it will be noticed, is an exact parallel of the statement in the last passage quoted above, where it repeats something said by others; and consequently we are justified in assuming that his failure to quote it as the view of somebody else in this passage is only an accidental omission. Moreover, the statement in both these passages that each star is a pure and unmixed mind in itself, that is, a mind existing without a body, cannot be an expression of his own view, for elsewhere, speaking of "rational and divine natures," he divides them into two classes, "some incorporeal and perceptible only by mind, but others not without bodies, such as are the stars," [38] which quite clearly indicates that stars are not, according to his own view, without bodies. That this statement does not express his own view may be still further shown by a study of the meaning and origin of it. The view that stars themselves are minds cannot be traced to any source. But a source for it can be found if we take Philo's statement to mean only that both stars and minds are constituted of the same element, for in that case it reflects the Stoic view that

[35] *Somn.* I, 22, 135.

[36] Drummond (I, 282–283) presents Philo as believing that the celestial bodies are living and rational beings.

[37] *Gig.* 2, 8.

[38] *Opif.* 50, 144. Cohn (*Philos Werke*) makes the statement "such as are the stars" refer to "the incorporeal and perceptible only by mind," which seems to be an attempt to remove the apparent contradiction with the other passages.

both stars and minds are constituted of the element fire, or the purest kind of fire called ether,[39] and also that minds ultimately resolve into ether.[40] Now, we know that Philo is opposed to the view that mind consists of any of the elements.[41] Consequently the statement that each star is a pure and unmixed mind in itself cannot represent his own view. Indeed in that passage in which he expresses his own view that the stars are "not without bodies" he also describes them as "rational (λογικαὶ) and divine (θεῖαι)." But the term "rational" here in its application to the stars does not mean possessing reason any more than the term "divine" means possessing a God or being a God. The term "rational" here as a description of the stars merely means that the stars are moved according to a certain fixed order which can be calculated by reason. Similarly the term "divine" as a description of the stars merely means that they are imperishable, for in that special sense is the term "divine" used by Philo himself elsewhere, as, for example, in the statement that "the soul bears two kinds of offspring, one divine (θεῖον), the other perishable." [42]

That Philo did not consider the stars as living beings may be still further inferred from his formal classification of the various types of living beings in the following passage: "Living nature was primarily divided into two opposite parts, the irrational and the rational, this last again into the mortal and immortal species, the mortal being that of man, the immortal that of incorporeal souls which range through air and heaven." [43] It will be noticed that the stars and the celestial bodies in general are omitted in this enumeration of living

[39] Cf. Zeller, III, 1[4], p. 192, n. 2; p. 198, n. 5 (*Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics*[3], p. 204, n. 3; p. 211, n. 5).

[40] *Heres* 57, 283, and cf. below, p. 400.

[41] Cf. below, p. 391.

[42] *Leg. All.* II, 23, 95.

[43] *Conf.* 35, 176.

beings. This denial of the existence of a soul in the celestial bodies and the hesitancy of definitely saying that such a soul does not exist reflects a similar attitude on the part of Aristotle, who, while he sometimes speaks of the celestial bodies as being moved by a soul,[44] at other times speaks of the heaven as being moved naturally (πέφυκε) and in virtue of its own nature (κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ φύσιν),[45] that is, without a soul. Perhaps also it reflects the influence of the Epicureans, who explicitly deny that "earth and sun and sky, sea, stars and moon" possess vital motion and sense (*vitalis motus sensusque*).[46]

Thus, according to Philo, there are three classes of living beings, namely, animals, men, and incorporeal souls. Let us now see what he says about these three classes of living beings.

II. Unbodied Souls or Angels

Of the rational incorporeal and immortal souls created by God and stored away in the air [1] not all descend into bodies. These incorporeal souls, he says, "are arranged in companies that differ in rank." [2] The difference between these companies of incorporeal souls is that some of them are "endowed with a diviner constitution" [3] or "are of a perfect purity and excellence," [4] and hence "have never deigned to be brought into union with any of the parts of earth," [5] or "have no regard for any earthly quarter," [6] or "have never felt any craving after the things of the earth." [7] This reflects Plato's

[44] Cf. *De Caelo* II, 2, 285a, 29; 12, 292b, 29.

[45] *De Caelo* I, 2, 269a, 5–7. On the development of this view in Aristotle, see Jaeger, *Aristotle*, pp. 153 ff.; 346 ff.

[46] Lucretius, V, 125.

[1] *Somn.* I, 22, 137.

[2] *Plant.* 4, 14.

[3] *Ibid.*

[4] *Somn.* I, 22, 140.

[5] *Gig.* 3, 12.

[6] *Plant.* 4, 14.

[7] *Somn.* I, 22, 140.

statements in the *Phaedrus* with regard to the incorporeal souls, which he compares to pairs of winged horses and charioteers,[8] that when any of them is "perfect and fully winged, it mounts upward," whereas that "which has lost its wings is borne along until it gets hold of something solid, when it settles down, taking upon itself an earthly body." [9] But as to what is the cause of the difference between these two groups of incorporeal souls so as to make one descend into bodies and the other abstain from descending into them there seems to be a difference between Plato and Philo. To Plato, in the *Phaedrus*, where the souls are said to be uncreated,[10] the difference must have existed in them from eternity, and in the *Timaeus*, where the souls are said to be created,[11] their descent into bodies is ascribed to the law of fate.[12] To Philo, however, the souls were created by God and God acts by absolute freedom of the will,[13] bound by no law of fate; [14] consequently we may assume that the differences between these two groups of souls were determined by an act of God's free will. God's free will is Philo's universal explanation — and to him a satisfactory explanation — for anything that cannot be explained by the natural order of causality.[15]

These incorporeal rational and immortal souls which do not descend into bodies, he adds, are what the philosophers call demons but what Scripture is accustomed to call angels.[16] Though in Greek the term *angelos* in the sense of a heavenly messenger is sometimes applied to certain deities, such as Hermes,[17] Iris,[18] and Nemesis,[19] still it is not used as a tech-

[8] *Phaedrus* 246 A. [9] *Ibid.* 246 C. [10] *Ibid.* 246 A. [11] *Timaeus* 41 D.
[12] *Ibid.* 41 E. [13] Cf. below, p. 431. [14] Cf. above, p. 329.
[15] Cf. Drummond, I, 337: "No satisfactory explanation is given of their descent into the body." [16] *Gig.* 2, 6; *Somn.* I, 22, 141; cf. also *Sacr.* 2, 5; *Conf.* 34, 174.
[17] *Odyssey* V, 29; *Cratylus* 407 E. [18] *Iliad* II, 786; III, 121.
[19] *Laws* IV, 717 D. Cf. G. Kittel, *Theologisches Wörterbuch*, s.v., I, 73.

nical term in the sense of special class of beings whose sole function is to act as messengers of God. The identification of demons with souls which are like all other souls but which, because of their greater perfection, do not descend into bodies must have been indirectly inferred by Philo from Plato's *Phaedrus*. In that dialogue, where the incorporeal souls are compared to pairs of winged horses and charioteers [20] which soar upwards toward the outer surface of the heaven from which they behold the ideas which are outside of the heaven,[21] Plato says that "Zeus, driving a winged chariot, goes first" and that "he is followed by an army of gods and demons," [22] and then, after describing the life of the "gods," he says: "such is the life of the gods (θεῶν); but of the other souls (αἱ ἄλλαι ψυχαί), that which best follows after God and is most like him, raises the head of the charioteer up into the outer region." [23] The expression "the other souls" must have been taken by Philo to refer to the "demons" mentioned previously as distinguished from the "gods," and consequently he inferred that the demons are souls.[24] In one place, however, souls which do not descend into bodies are said by him to be called "heroes" by Greek philosophers and "angels" by Moses.[25] The use of the term "hero" here by Philo in the sense of "demon" reflects Plato's *Cratylus* where the two words refer to the same thing,[26] though they are not

[20] *Phaedrus* 246 A.

[21] *Ibid.* 246 D.

[22] *Ibid.* 246 E f.

[23] *Ibid.* 247 E f.

[24] Plotinus (*Enneads* V, 8, 10) seems to take the expression "the other souls" to refer to something distinguished from the "demons"; cf. W. H. Thompson's note in his edition of the *Phaedrus*, p. 47, on 246 E.

There is no other more explicit statement in Plato which could serve as source to Philo's statement that demons are incorporeal souls which do not descend into bodies.

[25] *Plant.* 4, 14.

[26] *Cratylus* 397 E, 389 C–D.

used there to mean souls which do not descend into bodies. Conscious, however, of the view of Aristotle and some Stoics that demons do not exist, Philo warns his readers, with regard to what he says about demons and angels, "and let no one suppose that what is here said is a myth." [27]

As to the permanent abode of these incorporeal souls or demons or angels, Philo has three statements. First, they "hover in the air," [28] they were made "in the air" and "exist on high nigh to the ethereal region itself." [29] Second, they "range through the air and heaven." [30] Third, they are "inhabiters of the divine world," [31] by which he means the heavens, for elsewhere he says that the heaven consists of a "fifth element" which partakes "of a wonderful and divine essence." [32] From all these passages we gather that the angels have their original abode in the air, or rather the upper part of the air near the heaven, but in their ascent upward they traverse the air and reach the heaven, where they establish their permanent abode. Now, that the angels are in the heaven is not only to be derived from many passages in Scripture [33] but also from the *Phaedrus* of Plato, where the demons as well as the gods in their ascent upwards are said ultimately to reach "the outer surface of the heaven." [34] But as for his view that air is the original abode of the angels or the demons, it must be based upon the *Epinomis*. In the *Epinomis*, the demons are said to be made of ether.[35] Now "ether" in the *Epinomis*, while called a fifth element,[36] is placed between air and fire,[37] the latter of which is the element out of which the heavens are made. Accordingly the

[27] *Gig.* 2, 7.
[28] *Ibid.*, 6.
[29] *Plant.* 4, 14; cf. *Conf.* 34, 174.
[30] *Conf.* 35, 176.
[31] *Qu. in Gen.* III, 11.
[32] *Ibid.* IV, 8.
[33] Cf., e.g., Gen. 22: 11.
[34] *Phaedrus* 247 C.
[35] *Epinomis* 984 E.
[36] *Ibid.* 981 C.
[37] *Ibid.* 984 B.

term ether is used in the *Epinomis* not in the Aristotelian sense as something different from any of the four elements,[38] nor in the Stoic sense as a purer kind of fire,[39] but rather in the Platonic sense as the purest of the many kinds of air.[40] The demons, furthermore, though made of ether which is under the heaven, are said in the *Epinomis* to move "to the whole of heaven with a lightly rushing motion." [41] Philo undoubtedly correctly understood the ether of the *Epinomis* to mean the upper and purer part of air, and consequently he says of demons or angels that their abode is the air near the heaven and that they "range through the air and heaven." Moreover, in his description of the angels Philo dwells upon the fact that "they are invisible to us" [42] or that they are "wholly beyond apprehension by sense" [43] or that "they are not apprehended by sense." [44] So also the *Epinomis* says of the demon that "it is not entirely plain to sight: when it is near by, it is not made manifest to us." [45] But though he follows the *Epinomis* in making air the abode of the demons, he does not follow it in making air or rather ether their constituent element. He describes the demons or angels as incorporeal (*ἀσώματοι*),[46] by which he means not only that they are without bodies but also that they do not consist of any of the corporeal elements. They are, according to him, of the same nature as the mind, for, he says, "they must be apprehended by the mind, in order that like may be discerned by like," [47] and of mind Philo explicitly says that it does not consist of any of the elements.[48]

The functions of angels as described in Scripture are found

[38] *De Caelo* I, 3, 270b, 17–25.
[39] Cf. above, p. 313.
[40] *Timaeus* 58 D; *Phaedo* 111 A
[41] *Epinomis* 985 B.
[42] *Gig.* 2, 8.
[43] *Plant.* 4, 14.
[44] *Somn.* I, 22, 135.
[45] *Epinomis* 984 E.
[46] *Plant.* 4, 14; *Conf.* 35, 176.
[47] *Gig.* 2, 9.
[48] Cf. below, p. 391.

by Philo to be the same as the functions of demons as described by Plato. In Plato the functions of demons are described in the statements that they are "interpreting and transporting human things to the gods and divine things to men; entreaties and sacrifices from below, and ordinances and requitals from above," [49] and that also through them "are conveyed all divination . . . and all sooth-sayings," [50] for "the whole of the demoniac is between divine and mortal." [51] So also Philo finds that the functions of angels as described in Scripture are that "they both convey the biddings of the Father to His children and report the children's need to their Father" [52] and that they also are employed by God "as ambassadors to announce the predictions which He wills to make to our race." [53] One function, however, which Plato ascribes to demons is not mentioned by Philo. According to Plato, each man's individual demon guides him after death to the place of judgment and from there to the other world.[54] A similar view occurs also in the Testament of the Twelve Patriarchs, in which the angel of peace is said to meet the departed soul and to lead it into eternal life.[55] Similarly, in the Talmud the ministering angels are said to announce to God the arrival of the righteous man after his departure from the world, and God is said to tell them to go out to meet the newcomer and to let him enter into peace.[56] In Philo, however, there is no specific mention of this as one of the functions of angels. But inasmuch as he speaks, as we shall

[49] *Symposium* 202 E; *Epinomis* 985 B.

[50] *Symposium* 202 E.

[51] *Ibid.*

[52] *Somn.* I, 22, 141; cf. *Gig.* 3, 12; *Plant.* 4, 14.

[53] *Abr.* 23, 115.

[54] *Phaedo* 107 D.

[55] Testament of Asher 6: 6; cf. Testament of Benjamin 6: 1.

[56] *Ketubot* 104a. Cf. A. D. Nock, "Postscript," *Harvard Theological Review* 34 (1941), 101–109, where this belief is fully discussed.

see,[57] of the return of the immortal souls to the divine world to dwell among the angels, it is not impossible that he also believed, though he does not mention it, that the returning souls were escorted or welcomed by angels.

On the whole, Philo considers the angels as merely a special kind of immanent powers in the world. Just as the immanent powers in the world are the instruments of divine providence, so also the angels are instruments of divine providence; but whereas the immanent powers are employed by God in the exercise of His care over the world as a whole, the angels are employed by him in the exercise of His care only over mankind. "They are consecrated and devoted to the service of the Father and Creator whose wont is to employ them as ministers and helpers, to have charge and care of mortal man." [58] Inasmuch as both demons, according to philosophers, and angels, according to Scripture, are only intermediaries between God and men, Philo maintains that the Hebrew term *mal'ak*, angel, which means messenger, is an apter designation for these intermediating incorporeal souls than the Greek term demon,[59] probably having in mind Plato's etymological explanation of "demon" as meaning he who is knowing (δαήμων).[60] Philo finds in Jacob's dream of the ladder, in which Jacob saw that "the angels of God were ascending and descending on it," [61] a proof-text for this function of angels as intermediaries. A striking parallel to this is Plato's statement with regard to demons that "the middle creatures move both to earth and to the whole heaven with a lightly

[57] Cf. below, pp. 401 f.

[58] *Gig.* 3, 12; cf. *Qu. in Exod.* II, 13: "An angel is an intellectual spirit, nay more, an intellect pure and simple, altogether incorporeal, created as a servant of God for a certain purpose and appointed for the performance of services of which our mortal race is in need."

[59] *Somn.* I, 22, 141; *Plant.* 4, 14.

[60] *Cratylus* 398 B.

[61] Gen. 28: 12; cf. *Somn.* I, 22, 133, and 142.

rushing motion." [62] Because of their function as intermediaries, Philo calls them "the lieutenants (ὕπαρχοι) of the Ruler of the universe," [63] or His servants (ὑπηρέται),[64] or, in their totality, "the servant (ὑπηρέτης) and minister (θεραπευτής) of the Ruler who has marshaled them." [65] In their capacity as the lieutenants and ministers of God in the visible world, wherein they are employed by God as the instruments of His providence in connection with the affairs of men, they are thus like the immanent powers, which are employed by God as the instruments of His providence in the physical world at large. The term "powers" is therefore sometimes used by him to include both the immanent powers and the angels, as in his statement that "as pillars support whole houses, so also do the divine powers support (1) the whole world and (2) that most excellent and God-loving race of mankind." [66] Of the two phrases which we have set off by numbers, the first undoubtedly refers to the immanent powers in general and the second to angels in particular. Moreover, sometimes angels themselves are described by Philo as the "powers" [67] of God, reflecting, as in the case of the ideas, the scriptural expression the "Lord of Sabaoth," that is, the "Lord of the powers" (κύριος τῶν δυνάμεων), which sometimes means the Lord of the angels.[68] But inasmuch as the Hebrew "Sabaoth" means also "armies," and in the expression "the host of heaven," which refers to the stars, the Septuagint translates the term "saba" by "army" (στρατιά),[69] Philo calls the angels in their total-

[62] *Epinomis* 985 B.

[63] *Somn.* I, 22, 140. [64] *Ibid.*, 143.

[65] *Conf.* 34, 174.

[66] *Fragmenta*, Richter, VI, 222 (M, II, 662).

[67] See term "angels" in *Abr.* 23, 115, for which term "powers" is used in 28, 143–145.

[68] Cf. above, p. 220; cf. also The Prayer of Manasses 15.

[69] Jer. 8: 2; 19: 13; II Chron. 33: 3, 5.

ity also "army" (στρατός) or "divine army" (θεῖον στράτευμα).[70] For this description of the angels by the term "army" he also had before him Plato's expression "an army (στρατιά) of gods and demons."[71] It is also to Plato's description of this "army of gods and demons" as a "divine company" (θεῖος χορός)[72] that Philo describes the angels also as a "most sacred company" (ἱερώτατος χορός).[73] Sometimes, instead of calling the angels powers, he describes them only as "the subordinate servants (ὑποδιάκονοι) of His powers,"[74] that is, of the powers which are identified with the ideas constituting the intelligible world. The same description occurs also in his statement that the company of angels which exists in the air is "an attendant (ὀπαδός) upon the heavenly [powers]," that is, of the powers through which he has previously said that "the incorporeal and intelligible world was framed."[75] The term "heavenly" is used by him here in the sense of "incorporeal" or "ideal." So also is the expression "heavenly virtue" used by him in the sense of the "idea of virtue."[76]

Philo's treatment of angels, we have thus seen, is as systematically coherent as his treatment of the Logos and powers and ideas. In the case of the latter three, we have distinguished three stages of existence. In the first stage, they are all in God and are all identical with God, the Logos being the mind of God and the powers the content of that mind. The term ideas does not happen to be used by Philo explicitly as a description of the powers in this first stage of their existence. In the second stage, the Logos is a created incorporeal mind and the powers and ideas are the content

[70] *Conf.* 34, 174; cf. *Sacr.* 2, 5.
[71] *Phaedrus* 246 E f.
[72] *Ibid.* 247 A.
[73] *Conf.* 34, 174.
[74] *Spec.* I, 12, 66.
[75] *Conf.* 34, 174 and 172.
[76] *Leg. All.* I, 14, 45; cf. below, II, 202.

of that mind, the former describing that content in its aspect as cause and the latter describing it in its aspect as pattern. During this second stage of their existence, all these three are distinct from God but identical with each other. In the third stage, with the world already created, the Logos is a mind immanent in the world and the powers are its content. The term ideas, again, does not happen to be used by Philo as a description of the powers in this their third stage of existence. By this interpretation of Philo, we have been able to remove all the apparent inconsistencies in his treatment of the Logos and powers and ideas. By the identification now of angels with a special kind of these immanent powers, all the apparent contradictions in his treatment of angels are similarly removed. Angels, according to Philo, are not ideas. Nor are they powers in the sense of ideas. Nor, again, are they called Logoi in the sense in which the Logos is called the totality of ideas. If they are called powers, they are called so only in the sense of the immanent powers. Similarly, if they are called Logoi, they are called so, as we shall presently show, only in the sense of the immanent Logoi.[77]

Both Plato and Philo discuss the question of why such intermediaries are necessary. Plato says: "God with man does not mingle, but the demon is the means of all intercourse and converse of men with gods and of gods with men, whether waking or asleep." [78] Again, the demons as intermediaries between God and men "understand the whole of our

[77] On the alleged inconsistencies in Philo's treatment of angels, see Zeller, III, 2[4], pp. 409–414; 430–431. Drummond (II, pp. 147–148) removes these inconsistencies on the basis of his own interpretation of Philo's powers as having two aspects and by identifying angels with the second aspect. On the identification of angels with ideas, see Ch. Bigg, *The Christian Platonists*, pp. 11–12; H. Leisegang, *Die Raumtheorie im späteren Platonismus*, pp. 38–39; cf. also comment on Aucher's Latin translation of *Qu. in Gen.* I, 19, above, p. 206, n. 13.

[78] *Symposium* 203 A.

thoughts, and show extraordinary kindness to any one of us who is good and true and hate him who is utterly evil, as one who already partakes of suffering, for we know that God, who has the privilege of the divine portion, is remote from these affections of pain and pleasure, but has a share of intelligence and knowledge in every sphere." [79] So also Philo, explaining the role of angels as intermediaries, with evident reference to Plato's statement about demons, says: "not that God, who is already present in all directions, needs informants, but that it was a boon to us to avail ourselves of the services of Logoi, acting on our behalf as mediators, so great is our awe and shuddering dread of the universal Monarch and the exceeding might of His sovereignty." [80] As proof-text for this he quotes the people's plea to Moses at the revelation on Mount Sinai: "Speak thou to us, and let not God speak to us, lest we die," [81] and concludes: "For should He, without employing ministers, hold out to us with His own hand, I do not say chastisement, but even benefits unmixed and exceeding great, we are incapable of receiving them." [82] But, as we have already tried to show, the employment of intermediaries is part of God's plan in governing the world; He did not employ them because it was impossible for Him to act directly.[83] The functions which are performed by the angels are sometimes performed by God himself. This is evident from the fact that even in speaking to the people God does not always employ an angel as an intermediary. At the revelation on Mount Sinai, according to Philo himself, God himself spoke to the entire people directly.[84]

Following his custom of applying the term Logos to mind, whether mind in the sense of the place of the intelligible

[79] *Epinomis* 985 A.
[80] *Somn.* I, 22, 142.
[81] Exod. 20: 19.
[82] *Somn.* I, 22, 123.
[83] Cf. above, pp. 271 ff.
[84] Cf. below, II, 38 f.

world or mind in the sense of the rational soul of man, he also applies that term to those minds or incorporeal souls which constitute the angels. The angels are called by him Logoi,[85] and each angel which appeared to individual persons according to the scriptural narrative is called by him Logos.[86] Now the demons, with whom the angels are identified by Philo, are according to Plato arrayed in twelve companies.[87] Similarly, beginning with the Book of Daniel and continuing throughout post-Biblical Judaism the angels gradually become grouped in certain orders.[88] So also Philo considers the angels as being arrayed in certain companies,[89] each of them having certain special tasks to perform. Among the tasks assigned by Plato to the demons, or perhaps to certain classes of demons, is to act as guardians of cities and districts.[90] So also in Scripture as well as in post-scriptural Judaism angels are considered as guardians of nations.[91] Among these angels who are guardians of nations, the guardian of the Jewish nation is especially mentioned by name. It is Michael.[92] This guardian angel of Israel is called in Scripture "one of the chiefs" (ἀρχόντων)[93] and "the great chief" (ἄρχων),[94] whence we get in post-scriptural Judaism the Greek term archangel,[95] that is to say, chief-angel. Philo similarly speaks of an archangel,[96] whom he describes

[85] *Somn.* I, 22, 142; 23, 147; *Post.* 26, 91; *Leg. All.* III, 62, 177.

[86] See Leisegang, *Indices*, under λόγος, IV.

[87] *Phaedrus* 247 A.

[88] Cf. Dan. 10: 13; Enoch 61: 10–11, 71: 7–13.

[89] *Conf.* 34, 174.

[90] *Laws* IV, 713 C ff.; V, 738 D.

[91] Dan. 10: 13, 20–21; *Canticles Rabbah* to 8:14.

[92] Dan. 10: 21.

[93] Dan. 10: 13.

[94] Dan. 12: 1.

[95] I Thes. 4: 16; Jude 9; cf. Testament of Levi 3: 5; Apocalypse of Moses 3: 2; 22: 1; 38: 1; Secrets of Enoch 20: 1; 21: 3; 22: 11.

[96] *Heres* 42, 205; *Conf.* 28, 146; *Somn.* I, 25, 157.

as "the eldest Logos" [97] or as standing "above Logoi" and "above angels" like "the charioteer of a chariot." [98] Now when we examine the three passages in which the term archangel occurs in Philo we find that it is always used in connection with Israel. In one passage, it is symbolically called Israel; [99] in another, it refers to the angel who was enclosed within the cloud which "came between the camp of the Egyptians and the camp of Israel" [100] for the protection of the latter; in the third, it refers to the angel called the Lord, who appeared to Jacob in his dream and promised him that the land upon which he lay would be given to him and his seed.[101] Philo must have found an additional source for the belief in guardian angels of nations and of a special guardian angel of Israel in the verse which in the Septuagint translation reads: "When the Most High distributed nations, when He dispersed the sons of Adam, He set boundaries of nations according to the number of the angels of God, and Jacob His people became the Lord's portion, Israel became the lot of His inheritance." [102] Though this verse is interpreted by Philo allegorically, wherein the term "nations" is taken by him to refer to the "nations of the soul" and the term "angels" is taken by him to refer to "forms or nations of virtue," [103] still, in this case as in all other cases where he interprets Scripture allegorically, the literal meaning of the text is not discarded by him. Thus while indeed the name of the angel Michael is not mentioned by Philo, it was the

[97] *Heres* 42, 205.

[98] *Somn.* I, 25, 157.

[99] *Conf.* 28, 146.

[100] *Heres* 42, 205; cf. Exod. 24: 19–20; cf. *Mos.* I, 29, 166, and Drummond, II, 267–268.

[101] *Somn.* I, 25, 157; cf. Gen. 28: 13.

[102] Deut. 32: 8–9. Cf. Sirach 17: 17; cf. Drummond, I, 148–149.

[103] *Post.* 26, 91–92.

angel Michael, the guardian angel of Israel, whom he had in mind when he spoke of the archangel.[104]

These angels, who, being incorporeal souls, are invisible,[105] sometimes become visible and appear to men. Philo discusses nine instances in Scripture where angels are said to have made their appearance to persons either in their waking hours or in their sleep, namely, (1) in the case of Hagar,[106] (2) in the case of the three visitors of Abraham,[107] (3) in the case of the attempted sacrifice of Isaac,[108] (4) in the case of Lot,[109] (5) in the case of Jacob in his sleep,[110] (6) in the case of Jacob at the ford of Jabok,[111] (7) in the case of Moses in the burning bush,[112] (8) in the case of the camp of Israel at the Red Sea,[113] and (9) in the case of Balaam.[114] As in the case of many of the persons and the events in Scripture in whose historicity Philo had no doubt, so also in the case of angels in whose existence as real beings he had no doubt, Philo sometimes interprets their appearance to certain persons in an allegorical sense. Thus in the case of the three visitors of Abraham, two of the visitors are interpreted by him in a literal sense as angels,[115] and in an allegorical sense

[104] Goodenough (*By Light, Light*, pp. 79–80) makes the general statement: "He could not possibly have made room for a literal Gabriel or Michael in his thinking."

[105] Cf. above, p. 370.

[106] Gen. 16: 7–12; 21: 17–18; *Qu. in Gen.* III, 27–34.

[107] Gen. 18: 2–16; cf. Gen. 19: 1; *Abr.* 22, 107 ff., especially 22, 113; 23, 115.

[108] Gen. 22: 15–18; *Leg. All.* III, 72, 203; *Abr.* 46, 273.

[109] Gen. 19: 1–22; *Qu. in Gen.* IV, 30.

[110] Gen. 28: 12; *Somn.* I, 22, 123 ff.

[111] Gen. 32: 25–31. *Mut.* 2, 14; 14, 88.

[112] Exod. 3: 2.

[113] Exod. 14: 19. *Heres* 42, 205–206.

[114] Num. 22: 22–35.

[115] *Abr.* 22, 113; 23, 115; and cf. 28, 142–143.

Concerning the third, who was in the middle, Philo explicitly says: "In my opinion that one was the truly Existent, who held it fitting that He should be present" (*ibid.*, 143; cf. also references in next note, where the one in the middle is definitely said to be God). Still it is not impossible that by "The truly Existent

as the powers which constitute the intelligible world.[116] Similarly in his homily on the verse "and he saw the angel of God standing in his way" [117] in the story of Balaam, he says that the "angel of God" allegorically means "conviction (ἔλεγχος), the divine Logos, the angel who guides our feet and removes the obstacles before them, that we may walk without stumbling along the high road." [118] Thus also in his allegorical interpretation of the angel who addressed Hagar as she was seated by a fountain of water in the wilderness,[119] of the two angels who stayed in Lot's house in Sodom,[120] of the angels which Jacob saw in his dream,[121] and of the angels whom he met in Mahanaim [122] prior to his wrestling with a man at the ford of Jabok [123] — in all these instances he takes angel, which term he identifies with Logos, to refer allegorically to conviction, virtue, and the power of human reason. But these allegorical interpretations, as said before, do not exclude the historical veracity of these narratives as recording events when angels who are real beings, called philosophically demons, made their appearance before certain persons.[124] In his interpretation of the three angels who appeared to Abraham as men,[125] he explicitly says

---

here," just as by "Lord" in *Somn.* I, 25, 157, he refers to the Logos or archangel (cf. above, p. 378). Gfrörer (I, 158) argues that the middle figure could not have been God himself and tries to prove it from *Abr.* 23, 116, where Abraham is called a fellow-servant (ὁμόδουλον) of all the three of them.

[116] *Abr.* 24, 119–122. Cf. *Sacr.* 15, 59; *Qu. in Gen.* IV, 2; *De Deo* 2–3, in all of which only the allegorical explanation is given.

[117] Num. 22: 31.

[118] *Immut.* 37, 182.

[119] Gen. 16: 11; cf. *Fug.* 1, 5–6. 1.

[120] Gen. 19: 4; cf. *Conf.* 8, 28.

[121] Gen. 28: 11–12. *Somn.* I, 19, 115–119.

[122] Gen. 32: 2–3.

[123] Gen. 32: 23 ff. *Sobr.* 13, 65.

[124] Cf. discussion in Gfrörer, I, pp. 290, 291, 293; Drummond, II, 243.

[125] Gen. 18: 2.

that the story has both a literal or open meaning and a hidden meaning,[126] and though he adds that the open meaning is "suited for the multitude," whereas the hidden meaning "appeals to the few," [127] he does not mean that the open meaning is not true.

The angels in the visible world, as we have said, are, according to Philo, the instruments by which God exercises His providence over man, just as the powers which constitute the Logos are the instruments by which God created the intelligible world.[128] It is for this reason, as we have seen, that he sometimes calls the angels powers [129] or the servants of the powers.[130] Accordingly, just as the powers are divided into beneficial and punitive,[131] so also the angels are divided by him into beneficial and punitive. Thus two of the three visitors of Abraham, in their literal sense of angels, correspond to the two powers which they allegorically symbolize, one being beneficial and the other punitive.[132] This, on the whole, corresponds to the division of angels into beneficial and destructive which occurs in post-scriptural Jewish literature.[133] The beneficial angels, according to Philo, are employed by God to give to men what he calls "secondary boons"; and "secondary," he explains, "are such as involve riddance from ills." [134] Thus when the angel who has preserved the city of Zoar from destruction [135] is called by Philo beneficial,[136] it is only in the sense that he brought what he calls elsewhere a "secondary boon," that is, the preservation

[126] *Abr.* 24, 119; 29, 147.
[127] *Ibid.* 29, 147.
[128] *Conf.* 34, 171–172 and 174.
[129] Cf. above, p. 373.
[130] Cf. above, p. 374.
[131] Cf. above, p. 224.
[132] *Abr.* 28, 145; cf. 24, 119–121.
[133] Cf. "good angels" (II Macc. 11: 6; 15: 23; Tobit 5: 21); "angels of punishment" (Enoch 53: 3; 56: 1; 62: 11; 63: 1), "angels of destruction" (*Kiddushin* 72a).
[134] *Leg. All.* III, 62, 177.
[135] Gen. 19: 21–22.
[136] *Abr.* 28, 145.

of the city from the evil that might have befallen it. The punitive angels, according to him, are employed by God to inflict punishment upon all those who deserve it,[137] as, for instance, the case of the angels who destroyed Sodom and Gomorrah.[138] God himself, however, according to him, gives what he calls the "principal boons," [139] such, for instance, as "health in the simplest sense, preceded by no illness in our bodies." [140] It is "principal boons" that Philo refers to whenever he says unqualifiedly that "God is the cause of good things" [141] or that "it is fitting that He himself should extend boons and gifts and benefits." [142] "Secondary boons," as we have seen, are given by God through angels. Similarly, when Philo says that punishment is administered by God through angels,[143] he does not mean to exclude "boons" in the sense of "secondary boons" from being also administered by God through angels. Thus also we know that his statement with regard to punishment does not mean that God may never administer punishment himself. Some of the plagues of Egypt, according to Philo, were administered directly by God himself.[144] There are no inconsistencies in Philo on this point; there are only incomplete statements which have to be completed by a comparison with other statements.

Both these kinds of angels, the beneficial and the punitive, are considered by Philo as "having no participation in wickedness," [145] as being "worthy of the name" angel, and as being "sacred and inviolate by reason of that glorious and blameless ministry," [146] for even the punitive angels, in per-

[137] *Conf.* 36, 180; *Fug.* 13, 66.
[138] *Abr.* 28, 145.
[139] *Leg. All.* III, 62, 177.
[140] *Ibid.*, 178.
[141] *Conf.* 36, 180.
[142] *Fug.* 13, 66.
[143] *Conf.* 36, 180; *Fug.* 13, 66.
[144] Cf. above, pp. 282, 349.
[145] *Conf.* 35, 177; cf. *Genesis Rabbah* 48, 11.
[146] *Gig.* 4, 16.

forming their services, carry out the command of God.[147] In fact, "punishment is not a thing of harm or mischief, but a preventive and corrective of sin."[148] It is for this reason that in one place he includes even the punitive angels under the general description of angels as "God's beneficent and merciful and bountiful powers."[149] But Philo speaks also of another class of angels whom he calls "evil angels," first referring to them as if they were real beings and then treating them allegorically,[150] without any formal transition from one of these methods of treatment to the other. But here one is inclined to take his allegorical explanation to mean a denial of their actual existence. As proof-text for this class of angels he quotes the verse: "He sent out upon them the anger of His wrath, wrath and anger and affliction, a mission by evil angels."[151] From the context of Philo's discussion it is evident that by these "evil angels" he does not mean punitive angels or angels who, as messengers of God, inflict evil upon sinners, but rather morally evil angels, who are not messengers of God. He describes them as being "unholy and unworthy of their title," and as "slipping (*ὑποδυόμενοι*) into the name of angel,"[152] referring in the course of his discussion to the fact that "men in general speak of good and evil demons, and in like manner of good and evil souls."[153] The purpose of this reference is evidently to justify the application of the term "angel" to the morally evil beings, and he does this by referring to the analogy of the use of the Greek terms "demon" and "soul." The reference is undoubtedly here to Plato's explanation of the term "demon" as wise and knowing[154] and to his explanation of

[147] *Fug.* 13, 66.
[148] *Conf.* 34, 171.
[149] *Ibid.* 36, 182.
[150] *Gig.* 4, 17–18.
[151] Ps. 78: 49.
[152] *Gig.* 4, 17.
[153] *Ibid.*, 16.
[154] *Cratylus* 398 B.

the term "soul" in Greek as the "power which supports and holds nature," [155] and also to Plato's distinction between a good and a bad soul [156] and to the Stoic distinction between good and bad demons.[157] Now, argues Philo, just as the terms "soul" and "demon" may apply to the bad soul and the bad demon, even though the bad soul does not support and hold nature and the bad demon is not wise and knowing, so also the morally evil angels may be called angels, even if they are not messengers of God.

Who these morally evil angels are he does not say. But one may gather whom he means from his explanation of them allegorically as those who "know not the daughters of right reason, i.e., the sciences and virtue, but count the mortal descendants of mortal men, i.e., pleasures mortal as their parents." [158] From this interpretation it may be inferred that he means by the evil angels those "sons of God" who, according to the story in Scripture, "saw the daughters of men; and they took them wives of all which they chose." [159] By the time of Philo these "sons of God" were taken to refer to a class of fallen angels [160] who had revolted under the leadership of Satan [161] and who were each individually called Satan.[162] Now what Philo wants to say here is that these "sons of God," which is only another term for angels,[163] after their fall have forfeited their right to be called angels: they should be called Satans; and, if they are still called angels, though qualified by the term "evil," in that verse

[155] *Ibid.* 400 B.

[156] Laws X, 896 E ff. Plato does not speak of bad demons.

[157] Plutarch. *Quaestiones Romanae* 51; *De Defectu Oraculorum* 17; cf. Zeller, III, 1[4], p. 329, n.3 (*Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics*[2], p. 353, n. 3).

[158] *Gig.* 4, 17.

[159] Gen. 6: 2.

[160] Cf. Enoch 6–16.

[161] *Ibid.* 54: 6; 69: 5.

[162] *Ibid.* 40: 7.

[163] Philo has here the reading "angels" (*Gig.* 2, 6). So also in Job 1 : 6 and 2 : 1, the "sons of God" of the Hebrew reads in the Septuagint "angels."

which he has quoted as his proof-text, it is only in the same way as the Greeks speak of bad demons and bad souls. The expression "slipping into the name of angel" seems to reflect the scriptural verse "The sons (Septuagint: angels) of God came to present themselves before the Lord, and also Satan came among them." [164] The expression "and also Satan came among them" is evidently behind Philo's expression "slipping into the name of angel." What he means to say is that these "evil ones" who in Scripture are called "evil angels" should properly be called "Satans," but they are "slipping into the name of angel" in the same way as when, in the Book of Job, "the angels of God came to present themselves before the Lord," it is said that "also Satan came among them."

III. Animals and the Irrational Soul of Man

Unlike Plato, to whom the lower animals are degraded types of human beings,[1] Philo, following the scriptural account of creation, considers all the lower animals as having been created.[2] But, like Plato,[3] supported by the story of creation in Scripture,[4] he divides living beings into three classes — fishes, birds, and land-animals [5] — declaring that "of creatures that have a soul (ἐμψύχων), fishes were the first which He created" and then "after the fishes He created the birds and land-animals." [6] In accordance with the scriptural sentence "Let the waters produce reptiles having living souls," [7] we may assume that Philo believes that the souls

[164] Job. 1:6; 2:1.

[1] *Timaeus* 91 D–92 C; 42 C.
[2] *Opif.* 20, 62.
[3] *Timaeus* 39 E; 91 D–92 C.
[4] Gen. 1: 20–25.
[5] *Opif.* 20, 62–21, 64.
[6] *Ibid.* 21, 66.
[7] Gen. 1: 20 (LXX).

of these lower animals were created together with their bodies; and, in accordance with his own general theory of ideas, we may also assume that he believed that just as the bodies of these living beings were created after the pattern of certain ideas of living beings so also were their souls created after the pattern of the idea of their souls.[8] The difference between creatures which have souls and those which have no souls is stated by him in several installments. In one passage he says that the difference between them is that besouled creatures have sensation; [9] in another passage he says that the difference between them is that besouled creatures have imagination (*φαντασία*) and impulse (*ὁρμή*), adding that imagination is dependent upon sensation; [10] and in the third passage he says that the difference between them is that besouled creatures have sensation, imagination, and impulse.[11] All this reflects Aristotle's statements that sensation is that which differentiates animal from plant,[12] that imagination is never found by itself apart from sensation,[13] and that animal cannot be appetitive (*ὀρεκτικόν*), that is, cannot have what Philo calls impulse (*ὁρμή*), without imagination.[14] According to Plato, plants have both sensation and desire (*ἐπιθυμία*).[15]

This kind of soul, called irrational (*ἄλογος*),[16] is possessed also by man. But in connection with man Philo gives us a fuller account of the creation as well as the nature of his irrational soul. This irrational soul of man was created by God when He formed man "out of the matter scattered here and

[8] Cf. above, pp. 213-214.

[9] *Opif.* 20, 62.

[10] *Leg. All.* I, 11, 30.

[11] *Immut.* 9, 41.

[12] *De Anima* II, 2, 413b, 2.

[13] *Ibid.* III, 3, 427b, 15–16.

[14] *Ibid.* III, 10, 433b, 28–29. Philo uses *ὄρεξις* and *ὁρμή* as equivalents; cf. e.g., *Leg. All.* III, 38, 115, and 39, 118.

[15] *Timaeus* 77 B.

[16] See Leisegang, *Indices*, under *τὸ ἄλογον*.

there, which Moses calls clay." [17] The irrational soul together with the body was, however, created not by God himself but rather by His powers, who did it by "imitating" (μιμουμέναις) the skill shown by God in forming the rational soul.[18] In this he follows Plato who likewise says that the irrational soul together with its body was created by the secondary deities by "imitating" (μιμούμενοι) the Demiurge,[19] but he finds a scriptural proof-text for it in the use of the plural in the verse "Let us make man." [20]

Though Philo refers to this irrational soul as earthlike (γεώδης),[21] he does not mean that it is made of the element earth, for we have Aristotle's testimony to the fact that while the elements air, water, and fire were considered by various philosophers as being each a constituent of the soul, none of them considered the soul as being made of earth except those who have described it as being derived from, or as being identical with, all the four elements, which included earth.[22] It is hardly conceivable that Philo should depart on this point from the generally accepted philosophic view. What he means by the term "earthlike" is simply that the soul is corporeal. As to what it was actually made of, Philo seems to be undecided. Sometimes he suggests that the irrational soul is blood, as when he says that "in many passages the Law of Moses pronounces the blood to be the essence of the soul," [23] but this statement is sometimes qualified by him by the statement that "in real truth the breath (πνεῦμα) is the essence of the soul, but it has not any place of itself independently of the blood, but is carried in and

[17] *Leg. All.* I, 12, 31; Gen. 2: 7; for the expression "scattered here and there," see *Tanḥumah, Pekude*, § 3, and Ginzberg, *Legends of the Jews*, I, pp. 54–55; V, pp. 71–72, nn. 14 and 15.

[18] *Fug.* 13, 69; cf. *Opif.* 24, 74–75; *Conf.* 35, 179.

[19] *Timaeus* 69 c.

[20] Gen. 1: 26.

[21] *Leg. All.* I, 12, 32.

[22] *De Anima* I, 2, 405b, 8–10.

[23] *Deter.* 22, 80; *Heres* 11, 55; *Spec.* IV, 23, 123.

mingled with the blood." [24] Sometimes he seems to suggest that the soul is the seed (*σπέρμα*), which he also calls the moist substance (*ὑγρὰ οὐσία*), as when he says that "seed is the principle of the generation of animals," [25] that is to say, it is that with which animal life begins and by which animals are differentiated from plants. But here, too, he qualifies his statement by adding that "nature, like an artificer, or, to speak more correctly, like a consummate art, forms living creatures, by distributing the moist substance to the limbs and different parts of the body, the breathlike (*πνευματική*) substance to the faculties of the soul, namely, the nutritive and the sensitive." [26] Sometimes he suggests that breath, which he calls air (*ἀήρ*), without blood or seed, is the soul, as when he says that "the Artificer made air as habit (*ἕξιν*) in motionless bodies and as nature (*φύσιν*) in bodies which move but without a faculty of imagination, while in bodies that are susceptible of impulse and imagination He made it as soul (*ψυχήν*)." [27]

Though Philo names no authorities for the different views as to the substance of the soul which he happens to mention, except for the scriptural verses in connection with the identification of soul with blood,[28] the three views which he happens to mention can be identified with three views known in Greek philosophy. The view that soul is blood is attributed to Critias; [29] the view that it is the seed or the moist substance is implied in the view attributed to Hippon that the soul is water because "in all animals the seed is moist"; [30] the view that it is air is attributed to Diogenes.[31] Like the

[24] *Fragmenta* on Gen. 9: 4, Richter, VI, p. 230 (M, II, 668); Harris, *Fragments*, p. 26; cf. Drummond, I, pp. 320–321.

[25] *Opif.* 22, 67.

[26] *Ibid.*

[27] *Somn.* I, 22, 136.

[28] Lev. 17: 11. Cf. above, n. 23.

[29] *De Anima* I, 2, 405b, 5–8.

[30] *Ibid.*, 405b, 1–5.

[31] *Ibid.*, 405a, 21–25. For "breath," see Arnim, II, 777 ff.

Stoics, he also speaks of it as fire.[32] Following Plato, he divides this irrational soul into two parts, the irascible (*θυμικόν*) and the concupiscent (*ἐπιθυμητικόν*), locating the former in the chest and the latter in the abdomen.[33] But, drawing also upon other conventional classifications of the faculties of the soul which were common in his time, like Aristotle, he divides this irrational soul into the nutritive (*θρεπτικόν*) or vital (*ζωτικόν*) faculty and the sensitive (*αἰσθητικόν*) faculty,[34] or, like the Stoics, he divides it into seven faculties, namely the five senses, speech, and generation.[35]

IV. The Rational Soul of Man

Animals have only an irrational soul.[1] But man, in addition to his irrational soul, has also a rational soul or mind.[2] "I," says Philo, "am many things, soul and body, and of soul there is a rational part and an irrational part." [3] Unlike Plato in the *Phaedrus* [4] but like Plato in the *Timaeus*, he holds that this rational soul was created, and just as in the *Timaeus* of Plato the rational was created by God himself,[5] so also in Philo that which is rational in us was formed by God himself.[6] But then he departs from Plato. According to Plato, there was no idea of mind nor any idea of soul; but

[32] Cf. *Decal.* 25, 134; above, pp. 203–204; Arnim, II, 773 ff.

[33] *Leg. All.* III, 38, 114; *Spec.* I, 29, 146–148; *Spec.* IV, 15, 93. Cf. *Timaeus* 69 E–70 E.

[34] *Fragmenta*, on Gen. 9: 4, Richter VI, 230 (M, II, 668); Harris, *Fragments*, p. 25; cf. *De Anima* II, 3, 414a, 32–414b, 1; 4, 415a, 23–25, and see also Drummond, I, 319.

[35] *Opif.* 40, 117; *Leg. All.* I, 4, 11; *Deter.* 46, 168; *Agr.* 7, 30; *Heres* 48, 232. In *Abr.* 5, 29, generation is omitted. Cf. Arnim, II, 823–833.

[1] There is a special treatise by Philo on this subject, entitled: *Alexander, sive de eo quod rationem habeant bruta animalia* (Richter, VIII, 101–148).

[2] Cf. above, p. 362.

[3] *Leg. All.* III, 1, 2.

[4] *Phaedrus* 246 A.

[5] *Timaeus* 69 C.

[6] *Conf.* 35, 179; *Fug.* 13, 69.

instead there was a universal mind existing probably from eternity, and a universal soul which was created by God prior to the creation of the world out of three ingredients — the same stuff as the ideas, the stuff of matter, and a mixture of the stuff of ideas and the stuff of matter.[7] According to Philo, there are ideas of mind and soul, both of them created by God when he formed the intelligible world on what the Pentateuch calls the first day of creation.[8] He therefore speaks of the human mind as "the mind created after the image and idea," [9] or as being "a closer likeness and copy than anything else on earth of the eternal and blessed idea," [10] or as a "divine image" and as "being shaped after the archetypal idea, the most sublime Logos." [11] In the same sense, in another passage, after having described the idea of soul as the "image of God" [12] and a "pattern," [13] he speaks of the "human mind" as a "fragment of that divine and blessed soul from which it cannot be separated," [14] that is, an image of the idea of rational soul, which is as immaterial as its pattern.

Following Plato in the *Timaeus*, according to whom, after God compounded the human rational soul, "He divided it into souls equal in number to the stars," [15] Philo says that the rational souls created by God in the image of the idea of mind were "equal in number to the stars." [16] But then he departs again from the *Timaeus*. Whereas according to the *Timaeus* these souls prior to their descent into bodies were placed in the stars,[17] according to Philo, prior to their descent into bodies they had their abode in the air.[18] Then, again, follow-

[7] *Timaeus* 34 B ff.
[8] *Opif.* 7, 29; cf. above, p. 307.
[9] *Leg. All.* I, 13, 42.
[10] *Decal.* 25, 134.
[11] *Spec.* III, 36, 207; *Heres* 48, 230, 234; cf. *Opif.* 23,
[12] *Deter.* 24, 86.
[13] *Ibid.*, 87.
[14] *Ibid.*, 90.
[15] *Timaeus* 41 D.
[16] *Somn.* I, 22, 137.
[17] *Timaeus* 41 D.
[18] *Somn.* I, 22, 135 and 138. But see above, p. 369, about the abode of angels.

ing Plato, he applies what Plato says about his preëxistent universal mind and soul to his individual mind and soul. Just as Plato says of his preëxistent universal mind and soul that the Demiurge "constructed mind within soul and soul within body because without soul mind cannot dwell in anything," [19] so also Philo says of the individual mind and soul that "by the senses the Demiurge endowed the body with a soul" and placed over them mind as a dominant part to be served by them, because "without the perception of the senses, mind by itself alone was unable to apprehend" colors, sounds, flavors, scents, and the like.[20]

Though only images created after the pattern of an idea, these rational souls are not corporeal. Unlike the soul of Plato, they have no admixture of matter: they are made of the same stuff as the ideas after which they are modeled. "This branch of the soul," he says of mind, "was not formed of the same elements out of which the other branches were brought to completion, but it was allotted something better and purer, the substance in fact out of which divine natures were wrought." [21] By the term "divine natures" here he means the incorporeal intelligible beings or ideas.[22] Denying that mind is "breath" or "blood" or "body in general," he declares that it is "no body but incorporeal." [23] In another place he speaks of Abraham as having mounted up into the "incorporeal soul of this body of ours." [24] Consequently, with all his departure from Plato in details, Philo considered himself essentially a follower of Plato and his school, to whom

[19] *Timaeus* 30 B. [20] *Opif.* 48, 139. [21] *Immut.* 10, 46.

[22] Leisegang (*Philos Werke*) and Colson, *ad loc.*, take the "divine natures" here to refer to the stars. But see discussion of this passage in Drummond, I, 332. Cf. also in Drummond, I, 325–335, his discussion of all the passages on the basis of which the conclusion was drawn that Philo was not altogether free from a materialistic conception of the rational soul.

[23] *Somn.* I, 6, 30. [24] *Deter.* 44, 159.

he refers as "those who maintain that the faculty of reasoning comes in from without, being divine and eternal." [25] Also, following Plato, he assigns to the rational soul a location in the body different from the locations he assigned to the irrational parts of the soul,[26] that location being, as in Plato, the head,[27] though it might also be, according to Philo, the heart.[28] The heart is the place where the Stoics [29] locate the entire soul with all its faculties, for to them the rational faculties of the soul do not differ in their origin from the irrational faculties. When Philo, however, assigns the heart as the seat of the rational soul, he still retains the chest and the abdomen as the two seats respectively of the irascible and concupiscent faculties of the irrational soul.[30] Unlike the irrational soul, therefore, of which the faculties are parts located in different parts of the body and operating through various organs of the body, "our mind is indivisible in its nature." [31] Faculties indeed it has, such as intelligence (*σύνεσις*), sagacity (*ἀγχίνοια*), apprehension (*κατάληψις*), prudence (*φρόνησις*), "and other powers." [32] But these faculties are not parts of the rational soul in the sense in which the faculties of the irrational soul are parts; they are rather only functions of the soul which are not located in different parts of the body and do not operate through different organs of the body.

Between the rational and the irrational soul there is, according to Philo, somewhat of a reciprocal relation. On the one hand, as we shall see,[33] the irrational soul is dependent

[25] *Opif.* 22, 67.
[26] Cf. above, p. 389.
[27] *Spec.* IV, 15, 92; cf. *Timaeus* 69 E; 90 A.
[28] *Deter.* 24, 90; *Somn.* I, 6, 32.
[29] Diogenes, VII, 159.
[30] Cf. above, p. 389.
[31] *Heres* 48, 232.
[32] *Congr.* 18, 98. A list of powers of the rational soul mentioned by Philo in various places, without an attempt to classify them, is given in Drummond, I, 343.
[33] Cf. below, II, 4.

for the proper functioning of its faculties upon the rational soul. On the other hand, as we shall also see,[34] the rational soul makes use of the data of sensation furnished by the irrational soul to form rational concepts. Then, also, the rational soul, as again we shall see,[35] is graced by God with the power of free will by which it can control the desires and emotions of the irrational soul.

Just as Philo has used the term Logos as the equivalent of the term mind in the case of the mind which is the place of the intelligible world,[36] so he now also uses the term Logos as the equivalent of the mind which is in man. He thus uses the term Logos as a description of that part of the soul which is the opposite of both the irascible and the concupiscent parts of the soul.[37] In Plato the opposite of these two irrational parts of the soul is similarly described by the term Logos [38] or mind,[39] or by such equivalent terms as "the immortal soul," [40] "the supreme form of soul within us," [41] and the "rational part." [42] But just as the immanent Logos in the world so also this Logos in man has its source in the pre-existent Logos which is the totality of all the ideas constituting the intelligible world. Accordingly, in one passage, after having referred to the preëxistent Logos and the Logos in man as two Logoi, "one the archetypal Logos above us, the other the copy of it which we possess," [43] he refers to them afterwards as "the mind with us and the mind above us." [44]

Another term used by Philo as the equivalent of mind is "breath" or "spirit." Now this term "breath" or "spirit" is applied by the Stoics to the rational and the irrational

[34] Cf. below, II, 3.
[35] Cf. below, p. 431.
[36] Cf. above, p. 230.
[37] *Spec.* IV, 15, 92; *Virt.* 3, 13; cf. *Leg. All.* I, 22, 70 (λογικόν); III, 38, 115 (λογιστικόν).
[38] *Timaeus* 46 D.
[39] *Ibid.*
[40] *Ibid.* 69 D–E.
[41] *Ibid.* 90 A.
[42] *Republic* IV, 439 D (λογιστικόν).
[43] *Heres* 48, 230; cf. also 233.
[44] *Ibid.*, 236.

soul alike; in Philo, however, the term "breath" which he applies to mind differs, both in origin and in meaning, from the term "breath" (πνεῦμα) or "air" (ἀήρ) which, as we have seen, he applies also to the irrational soul.[45] In its application to the irrational soul the term "breath" is of Stoic origin and it means something corporeal; in its application to mind it is of scriptural origin and it means something incorporeal. The scriptural proof-text for the latter use of the term, quoted by Philo, is the verse "and God breathed into his face a breath of life." [46] The difference between these two meanings of the term "breath" is brought out by Philo himself in his explanation that the "breath of life" which God breathed into Adam was "not air in motion, but a certain impression and character of divine power, which divine power Moses calls by an appropriate name image," [47] that is to say, it is an image of the idea of mind which is itself called image.[48]

Still, in his desire to state his philosophic views in terms current among philosophers of his time, even though these terms do not literally express the exact meaning of his views, he does not hesitate to make use of a Stoic statement that "the soul is of ether, a divine fragment." [49] But to show that

[45] Cf. above, p. 388. "Breath" is also used by Philo for the element "air" (*Sacr.* 29, 97).

[46] Gen. 2: 7. The term used in the Septuagint for "breath" here is πνοή. In five places (*Opif.* 46, 134; *Leg. All.* I, 12, 31; *Plant.* 5, 19; *Heres* 11, 56; *Somn.* I, 6, 34), Philo, in quoting this verse, uses the same term. In two places (*Leg. All.* III, 55, 161; *Deter.* 22, 80), he uses the term πνεῦμα. In one place (*Spec.* IV, 24, 123), he uses first the former term and then substitutes for it the latter term. The two terms are thus used by him interchangeably. Still in another place (*Leg. All.* I, 13, 42) he distinguishes between these two terms. The term πνεῦμα, he says, applies to the rational mind when conceived as something created "after the image and idea," i.e., after the idea of mind, without reference to its connection with the irrational soul; the term πνοή, on the other hand, refers to the rational mind when conceived as connected with the irrational soul created of matter.

[47] *Deter.* 23, 83.

[48] Cf. above, p. 238.

[49] *Leg. All.* III, 55, 161; *Somn.* I, 6, 34; cf. Diogenes, VII, 143; cf. 156.

he does not mean this statement to be taken literally, he says that while "others, by asserting that our mind is a portion of the ethereal nature, have claimed for man a kinship with ether," Moses by his statement that God "breathed into his face a breath of life" did not mean to liken "the species of the rational soul to any created thing, but averred it to be a genuine coinage of that divine and invisible breath" [50] which God breathed into Adam. The term "fragment" is also used by him elsewhere figuratively, as when he says that "every man, in respect to his mind (*διάνοια*), is allied to the divine Logos, having come into being as an impression or fragment or ray of that blessed nature," [51] or as when he says that the rational faculty (*λογισμός*) is "a fragment of the universal soul, or as it might be put more reverently, following the philosophy of Moses, a faithful impression of the divine image," [52] that is, an image of the idea of mind which is itself called image.[53] "Impression," "fragment," and "ray" are thus the terms by which he figuratively describes the essence of the mind as an incorporeal image of the idea of mind. It is in this sense that he also explains the "divine spirit" which God breathed into Adam as "an effulgence of the blessed and thrice-blessed nature of God." [54] Here as elsewhere, use is made by Philo of the Stoic vocabulary, but there is a departure from the Stoic doctrine.

V. Immortality of the Soul

Besides irrationality and rationality, corporeality and incorporeality, these two souls in man are also distinguished from one another by mortality and immortality. The irrational soul is corruptible (*φθαρτή*)[1] and mortal (*θνητή*),[2]

[50] *Plant.* 5, 18.
[51] *Opif.* 51, 146.
[52] *Mut.* 39, 223.
[53] Cf. above, p. 238.
[54] *Spec.* IV, 24, 123.

[1] *Leg. All.* I, 12, 32.
[2] *Fug.* 13, 69.

whereas the rational soul or mind is incorruptible (ἄφθαρτος)[3] and immortal (ἀθάνατος).[4] This reflects again the view of Plato, to whom the irrational soul is the corruptible and mortal soul whereas the rational soul is the incorruptible and immortal soul.[5] Following Plato's statement, in his comparison of the soul to "a pair of winged horses and a charioteer,[6] that "the natural function of the wing is to soar upward" [7] and that "each soul returns to the place whence it came," [8] he says that the souls which are immortal "soar back to the place whence they came." [9] But unlike Plato, who, in those passages upon which Philo has drawn in his discussion of immortality, speaks of the soul not only as immortal but also as ungenerated,[10] Philo considers the soul which is immortal as generated.[11] Again, unlike Plato, with regard to whose view on immortality there is doubt as to whether the individual human soul is itself immortal as a distinct entity or is immortal only through the universal soul with which it becomes united,[12] in Philo, because of his denial of a universal soul,[13] immortality means the eternal persistence of the individual soul as a distinct entity.

But by the time of Philo, in Judaism, partly as an internal development and partly through foreign influences, certain definite beliefs about the hereafter of the individual had come to the fore. Resurrection of the body and immortality of the soul are the two forms which that belief took, the former primarily among Palestinian Jews, the latter primarily among Hellenistic Jews. As in the case of all beliefs or customs

[3] *Immut.* 10, 46.
[4] *Probus* 7, 46; *Congr.* 18, 97; *Spec.* I, 16, 81.
[5] *Timaeus* 69 C.
[6] *Phaedrus* 246 A.
[7] *Ibid.* 246 D
[8] *Ibid.* 248 E.
[9] *Gig.* 3, 13.
[10] *Phaedrus* 246 A.
[11] Cf. above, p. 389.
[12] Discussed in our introductory volume on Greek philosophy.
[13] Cf. above, pp. 360, 389–390.

which appeared in Judaism after the Biblical period, attempts were made to find the origin of these beliefs in scriptural texts. The Palestinian rabbis directly raised the question: "Whence is it proven that resurrection is a belief based upon Scripture?" and in answer to this question they quoted all sorts of proof-texts.[14] Jesus, in answer to the Sadducees who denied resurrection, found a scriptural proof-text for that belief in the verse "I am the God of Abraham and the God of Isaac and the God of Jacob," [15] on which he comments that "God is not the God of the dead, but of the living." [16] Hellenistic Jews undoubtedly must have also been engaged in a similar search for proof-texts. A repercussion of such a search is to be noticed in the Wisdom of Solomon where the author says: "Better than this is childlessness with virtue, for in the memory of virtue is immortality." [17] What the author is really trying to do in this verse is to quote as proof-text for the belief in the immortality of the soul a verse from Isaiah with regard to childless persons who keep justice and do righteousness. Concerning such childless persons God says: "I will give them, in my house and within my walls, a memorable place, better than sons and daughters; I will give them an everlasting name which shall not cease." [18] We can almost hear the voice of the author asking himself, after the manner of Palestinian rabbis: "What does the expression 'an everlasting name which shall not cease' mean?" And his answer is, again after the manner of Palestinian rabbis: "You must admit, it cannot mean anything else but immortality." It is not surprising therefore that Philo should also look for a scriptural proof-text in support of the belief in

[14] *Sanhedrin* 91b.
[15] Exod. 3: 6, 16.
[16] Matt. 22: 32; Mark 12: 26–27; Luke 20: 37–38.
[17] Wisdom of Solomon 4: 1.
[18] Isa. 56: 5 (LXX).

the immortality of the soul. The proof-text which he produces is the verse in which God says to Abraham, "But thou shalt go to thy fathers nourished with peace, in a goodly old age."[19] Commenting on this verse, Philo says: "He here clearly indicates the incorruptibility of the soul, when it transfers itself out of the abode of the mortal body and returns as it were to the metropolis of its fatherland, from which it originally migrated into the body," for "what else is this but to propose to him and set before him another life apart from the body?"[20]

But what is that "fatherland" intimated by the term "thy fathers" in Scripture to which the soul returns? Before giving his own view on the subject, Philo discusses three other views, which, from the manner in which they are introduced by him, would seem to have been current among Hellenistic Jews who had adopted them from Greek philosophy.

"Some affirm," he says, that the term "thy fathers" refers to "the sun, moon and other stars."[21] This evidently reflects the view of Chrysippus, according to whom immortality, which to him is confined to the wise, means that the soul, which consists of an element similar to that of the stars, will upon the death of the body mount to heaven and there as-

[19] Gen. 15: 15 (LXX).

[20] *Qu. in Gen.* III, 11. A similar interpretation of Gen. 15: 15 as referring to the doctrine of the immortality of the soul is implied in the following verse in IV Macc. 18: 23: "But the sons of Abraham, with their victorious mother, are gathered together unto the place of their fathers, having received pure and immortal souls from God." The expression "gathered together unto the place of their fathers" is undoubtedly an interpretation of the expression "thou shalt go to thy fathers" in Gen. 15: 15. Furthermore, the interpretation of the scriptural words "thy fathers" as meaning "the place of their fathers (πατέρων χῶρον)" is analogous to Philo's interpretation of the same words as meaning "the metropolis of its fatherland (*metropolin patriae*)." Incidentally, this analogy would seem to indicate the reading χῶρον of Codex Alexandrinus rather than the reading χορὸν of Codex Sinaiticus.

[21] *Heres* 57, 280.

sume the spherical shape of stars,[22] and it will continue to exist in that condition for as long as the world continues to exist, that is, until the general conflagration. For this view of immortality, these anonymous interpreters of the words "thy fathers" must have found support in the scriptural verse, "And they that are wise shall shine as the brightness of the firmament; and they that turn the many to righteousness as the stars for ever and ever." [23] It must have been a combination of these two sources that is also behind such statements about the immortal souls in the Apocalypses as "And they shall be made equal to the stars" [24] or "It is shown unto them how their face is destined to shine as the sun, and how they are destined to be made like the light of the stars" [25] or "Now ye shall shine as the lights of heaven." [26]

"Others think," he continues, that the term "thy fathers" refers to "the ideas in which, as they say, the mind of the sage finds its new home." [27] Now there is nowhere in Greek philosophy a direct statement that the immortal souls after death find their home among the ideas. But the view reported here by Philo is evidently based upon a combination of two statements made by Plato in the *Republic*. In one statement he suggests that the ideas have their abode in the "intelligible place" (*τόπος νοητός*),[28] by which he means the heaven.[29] In another statement he says that those souls which are not relegated to the nether region are sent up to heaven where they are to live for a certain period of time.[30] From the combination of these two statements, those anony-

[22] Zeller, III, 1⁴, p. 205, n. 4 (*Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics*², p. 218, n. 1).

[23] Dan. 12: 3.

[24] II Baruch 51: 10.

[25] IV Ezra 7: 97.

[26] Enoch 104: 2.

[27] *Heres* 57, 280.

[28] *Republic* VI, 509 D–510 B; VII, 517 B–C.

[29] Cf. above, p. 227.

[30] *Republic* X, 614 C ff.; cf. L. Robin, *La Théorie platonicienne de l'amour*, p. 84; E. Bréhier, *La Philosophie de Plotin*, pp. 28–29; P. Shorey's note in his translation of the *Republic*, *ad loc.*

mous "others" must have inferred that the immortal souls are sent up to heaven there to live among the ideas, and hence they interpreted the term "thy fathers" to mean the ideas.

"Others again have surmised that by 'fathers' are meant the four first principles and potentialities of which the world is composed, earth, water, air, and fire," [31] and into which all things in the world "are resolved." [32] To this general statement, he adds that, in the final resolution of all things into their elements, the soul will resolve into ether, of which the soul is a fragment and which some ancients considered as a fifth substance.[33] With the exception of the reference to ether as a fifth substance, which is an Aristotelian view,[34] this interpretation of the term "thy fathers" reflects the view of those Stoics who believe that the soul of each individual upon the death of the body is reabsorbed into the universal soul, that is, the primary fire or ether, of which it is only a part.[35]

None of these three views could be acceptable to Philo. He could not accept the view that the souls become stars, for to him the stars are made of the element fire,[36] whereas the immortal souls are immaterial.[37] For the same reason he could not accept the view that the souls are resolved into the primary fire or ether. Nor could he accept the view that the souls go back to heaven to dwell there among the ideas, for to him the ideas are not in heaven, but rather in the intelligible world, which is not the same as heaven.[38] His own view is that the souls, on departing from the bodies, do indeed go back to heaven, but there they rejoin that company

[31] *Heres* 57, 281.
[32] *Qu. in Gen.* III, 11; cf. *Heres* 57, 281.
[33] *Heres* 57, 283.
[34] *De Caelo* I, 3, 270b, 17–25.
[35] Diogenes, VII, 156.
[36] Cf. above, p. 313.
[37] Cf. above, p. 391.
[38] Cf. above, pp. 227 f.

of souls which have never descended into bodies, namely, angels. This view is expressed by him in a variety of ways in several passages.

In one passage, dealing with that verse about Abraham's going to his fathers, he says: "But to me he appears to intend to indicate the incorporeal substances and inhabiters of the divine world, whom in other passages he is accustomed to call angels." [39] Now by the "divine world" he means here the heavens, for in another place he says that the heavens consist of a fifth element which partakes "of a wonderful and divine essence," [40] and by "angels," of course, he means here what he elsewhere identifies with incorporeal souls or demons.[41] Accordingly, the native home of the soul to which it returns after death is the heavens, where it joins the angels or demons, who are pure souls which have never entered into bodies.

This view is expressed more explicitly by him in his comment upon the scriptural euphemism for death, "he was added to his people," used with reference to Abraham.[42] Taking the expression "to his people" to mean "to the people of God," [43] he interprets "the people of God" to refer to angels, and therefrom he concludes that upon his death Abraham became "equal to the angels." [44] It is, therefore, in the sense of angels that he uses the term "the unbodied," when in a description of the immortality of the soul he says that "we who are here joined to the body, creatures of composition

[39] *Qu. in Gen.* III, 11.

[40] *Ibid.* IV, 8.

[41] Cf. above, p. 367.

[42] Gen. 25: 8.

[43] This interpretation of the words "to thy people" is described in *Qu. in Gen.* IV, 153, as being allegorical.

[44] *Sacr.* 2, 5. In IV Macc. 13: 17, the statement that "when we shall have suffered thus, Abraham, Isaac and Jacob will receive us, and the fathers will praise us" would similarly seem to imply that the fathers, including Abraham, who are immortal souls and whose place is evidently the heaven (cf. above, n. 20), have become equal to angels.

and quality, shall be no more, but shall go forward to our rebirth, to be among the unbodied (*μετὰ ἀσωμάτων*) without composition and without quality." [45]

This view, that the immortal souls find their final abode in the heavens by the side of the angels or demons, reflects the view of Plato in the *Phaedrus*. According to Plato in that dialogue, the place to which the soul by its natural function soars is "the place where dwells the race of the gods," [46] and that place is "the outer surface of the heaven," [47] that is, the outer surface of the outermost or eighth sphere, and from that position these immortal souls behold the ideas which reside "outside the heaven" or in the "supercelestial place," [48] which, according to our interpretation, refers to the infinite void which surrounds the world.[49] By the "race of gods" in this passage Plato means demons, whom Philo here calls angels. The same view is expressed also in the Apocalyptic literature in such statements as "They shall be made like unto angels" [50] and "Ye shall become companions of the hosts of heaven." [51] In the Talmud and Midrash, too, the imperishable souls of the righteous are said to be welcomed by angels or to abide in the seventh heaven alongside the various orders of angels or to minister before their Creator like the ministering angels.[52]

The heaven, which is the home of the angels, is thus the place of the immortal souls. But it is by no means the place of all the immortal souls. When Abraham was going back to his "fathers" to be "added to the people of God" he was indeed going back to heaven to be among the angels;[53] not to the intelligible world to be among the ideas. And similarly

[45] *Cher.* 32, 114.
[46] *Phaedrus* 246 D.
[47] *Ibid.* 247 C.
[48] *Ibid.* 247 C.
[49] Cf. above, p. 227.
[50] II Baruch 51: 10.
[51] Enoch 104: 6.
[52] *Ketubot* 104a; *Ḥagigah* 12b; *Midrash ha-Gadol* on Gen. 50: 26.
[53] *Sacr.* 2, 5.

Jacob, when he was "added to the people of God," went back to heaven to be among the angels.[54] So also Elijah, who did not die but was "carried up with a whirlwind as it were into heaven," [55] went up there to be among the angels.[56] And probably so also all the righteous whose souls are immortal find their abode in heaven among the angels. But there are a few exceptions among scriptural personages. When Isaac died, the Septuagint does not translate the Hebrew by "he was added to his people" but rather by "he was added to his race or genus (*γένος*)." [57] Now the term "genus," as we have seen, is used by Philo as a description of the ideas.[58] Hence he infers that Isaac did not go to be among the angels who are in heaven but rather among the ideas which are in the intelligible world, which is not the same as heaven.[59] So also Enoch, of whom Scripture says that, while yet alive, "he was not found, because God translated him," [60] did not go to heaven to be among the angels, "but it is here suggested that he was translated from a sensible and visible place into an incorporeal and intelligible idea," [61] that is, into the intelligible world of ideas, which is not the same as heaven. Following a certain widespread Jewish tradition, Philo includes Moses among those who, like Enoch and Elijah, did not die but were translated to heaven during their lifetime.[62] But "when he had to make his pilgrimage from earth to heaven and leave the mortal life to become immortal," [63] he did not take up his abode, as did Elijah, among the angels in heaven, nor did he take up his abode, as did Enoch, among the ideas

[54] Cf. *Sacr.* 2, 5.
[55] II Kings 2: 11 (LXX).
[56] *Qu. in Gen.* I, 86.
[57] Gen. 35: 29.
[58] Cf. above, p. 252.
[59] *Sacr.* 2, 6.
[60] Gen. 5: 24.
[61] *Qu. in Gen.* I, 86.
[62] *Sifre Deut.*, § 357, on 34:5; *Soṭah* 13b; *Sacr.* 3. 8; cf. Ginzberg, *The Legends of the Jews*, VI, p. 161, n. 951.
[63] *Mos.* II, 51, 288; cf. 291.

in the intelligible world, but he is among those "whom God has advanced even higher, and has enabled them to soar above all species and genera and stationed them beside himself," [64] and in proof of this he quotes the verse, "But as for thee, stand thou here with Me." [65]

Thus, according to Philo, there are three places to which immortal souls may go. First, to heaven to be among the angels, which is the place for all the immortal souls. Second, to the intelligible world to be among the ideas, which is the place to which Isaac and Enoch went. Third, to the presence of God, above the intelligible world, which is the place to which Moses went.

Throughout his writings Philo speaks of the immortality of the soul rather than of the resurrection of the body. No direct or indirect reference to resurrection as distinguished from immortality is ever made by him,[66] though the belief in resurrection was common among the Egyptians of his own native country and though also it is mentioned in the Sibylline Oracles.[67] But it is quite evident that all the references to resurrection found in the traditional literature of his time were understood by him as being only a figurative way of referring to immortality. It is on account of this, we imagine, that he constantly draws upon the traditional vocabulary of resurrection to express his view of immortality. The belief in resurrection is expressed in Scripture in the following verses: "Thy dead shall live, my dead bodies shall arise," [68] or as it is rendered in the Septuagint: "The dead shall be

[64] *Sacr.* 3, 8.

[65] Deut. 5: 28 (31).

[66] The question "Where was my body before birth, and whither will it go when I have departed?" (*Cher.* 32, 114) has no reference to the problem of resurrection. It only expresses a general state of wonderment, just as the subsequent question "Where is the babe that I once was?"

[67] Sibylline Oracles III, 66; IV, 187–191; cf. Josephus, *Bell. Jud.* II, 8, 11, 154.

[68] Isa. 26: 19.

raised up again, even they in the tombs shall be raised up." "And many of them who sleep in mounds of earth shall be raised up, some for everlasting life, and some for disgrace and everlasting shame." [69] In the Second Book of Maccabees it is expressed in the following verses: "The King of the world shall raise us up, who have died for His laws, unto everlasting recovery of life" (*ἀναβίωσις ζωῆς*).[70] "But doubtless the Creator of the world, who formed the generation of man, and found out the beginning of all things, will also of His own mercy give you breath and life again (*πάλιν*)." [71] "So he died, calling on Him who is Lord of life and breath to restore them to him again (*πάλιν*)." [72] The distinctive mark of all these descriptions of resurrection is that it is conceived as a new life. In the Second Book of Maccabees the expressions used are "recovery of life" and to "give breath and life again." Philo applies these expressions to immortality and describes it as a new birth (*παλιγγενεσία*).[73] Elsewhere, in connection with the vocation of Moses,[74] he uses in the same sense the expression "second birth" (*δευτέρα γένεσις*),[75] that is, a new or second birth to a life in which the soul is free from the body. Such a restatement of the immortality of the soul in scriptural terms of the resurrection of the body is common in all the writings which consciously turned corporeal resurrection into something incorporeal. Thus the Ethiopic Enoch expresses itself in the language of bodily resurrection when it says that "the righteous shall arise

[69] Dan. 12: 2 (LXX).

[70] II Macc. 7: 9.

[71] *Ibid.* 7: 23.

[72] *Ibid.* 14: 46.

[73] *Cher.* 32, 114. Cf. the expression "another life (*altera vita*)" in *Qu. in Gen.* III, 11, quoted above, p. 398, n. 20.

[74] Exod. 24: 16.

[75] *Qu. in Exod.* II, 46; Harris, *Fragments*, p. 61. The Latin translation adds after *secunda nativitas*, within parentheses, *sive regeneratio*. On the "second birth" in this passage, see Bréhier, p. 242; Goodenough, *By Light, Light*, pp. 226–227, and A. D. Nock's review, in *Gnomon*, 13 (1937), p. 159.

from their sleep," [76] for what it really means is a new incorporeal life, since it is only "the spirits of you who have died in righteousness" that "shall live and rejoice." [77] The term "palingenesis" is indeed used by the Stoics,[78] and Philo himself uses it in their name in his restatement of their theory of the destruction and renewal of the world.[79] But, as is his custom, in his adoption of this term, he used it as a description of a view which he considered as being of scriptural origin.[80]

In Plato, though all the souls return to the place whence they came, they do not all return there at the same time. The first to reach that place is the soul "which best follows after God and is most like him," [81] that is, "the soul of him who has been a guileless philosopher or a philosophical lover." [82] Among the Stoics, Chrysippus is reported to have said that only the souls of the wise continue to exist until the general conflagration.[83] In Judaism, the two forms of the hereafter of the individual, resurrection and immortality, were considered as rewards for righteous conduct during one's lifetime. "For to know Thee is perfect righteousness; yea, to know Thy dominion is the root of immortality." [84] So also Philo, reëchoing the words of Plato, says that those which "soar upwards back to the place whence they came"

[76] Enoch 91: 10; cf. 92: 3.

[77] *Ibid.* 103: 4. Cf. *Berakot* 17a.

[78] Cf. Arnim, II, 627 and 593.

[79] *Aet.* 17, 85; 18, 93; 19, 99; 19, 103.

[80] L. Cohn (*Philos Werke* on *Cher.* 114) and Goodenough (*By Light, Light*, p. 376) maintain that Philo has borrowed this term from the mysteries. Colson and Whitaker (Appendix to *Cher.* 114) maintain that he has borrowed it from the Stoics. From whomever Philo has directly borrowed this term, he must have come to use it by the process of reasoning we have tried to describe.

[81] *Phaedrus* 248 A.

[82] *Ibid.* 249 A; cf. *Phaedo* 82 B.

[83] Diogenes, VII, 157.

[84] Wisdom of Solomon 15: 3.

are "the souls of those who have given themselves to genuine philosophy" [85] and that "immortal life" awaits "pious men." [86]

But what happens to the unrighteous and the sinners? According to Plato, the soul by its very nature is indestructible and cannot therefore be destroyed by the wickedness of the body.[87] Whether this refers to the individual soul or to the universal soul is a question which is of no concern to us here at present.[88] The main point is that the soul of the wicked, according to him, is indestructible in the same sense as the soul of the righteous. All that the wickedness of the body can do to the soul is to cause it to have to go through certain stages of reincarnation in beasts [89] or a certain period of purification in a purgatory.[90] Whether of the righteous or of the unrighteous, "each soul," he says, "returns to the place whence it came in ten thousand years." [91] Among the Stoics there was a question whether the soul is individually indestructible, at least before this our world is destroyed by the general conflagration, and also whether there is a distinction in this respect between the soul of the righteous and the soul of the wicked. According to some, the individual soul ceases to exist immediately upon the death of the body and is at once absorbed in the universal soul.[92] As against this view, Cleanthes is reported to have said that "all souls continue to exist until the general conflagration." [93] Others, however, are reported to have said that "the souls of the

[85] *Gig.* 3, 13–14.
[86] *Post.* 11, 39.
[87] *Rep.* X, 610 A.
[88] Discussed in our introductory volume on Greek philosophy.
[89] *Timaeus* 42 B ff.; 91 D ff.; *Phaedrus* 249 B.
[90] *Phaedrus* 249 A; *Laws* X, 905 A ff.
[91] *Phaedrus* 248 E.
[92] Diogenes, VII, 156; cf. above, p. 400.
[93] Diogenes, VII, 157.

foolish and of irrational animals perish together with their bodies," [94] and still others are reported to have said that the soul of the foolish does not perish immediately when freed from the body but continues to abide by itself "for certain periods of time." [95] Philo himself refers, in a general way, to these various views of the Stoics in a passage in which he reproduces the following question concerning the soul: "When we die, is it extinguished and destroyed together with our bodies, or does it continue to live a long time?" [96] Neither the Platonic view with regard to the reincarnation of the souls of the wicked nor the Stoic view with regard to either the immediate or the retarded destruction of the souls of the wicked implies a belief in individual providence and individual reward and punishment. According to Plato, reincarnation follows wickedness by the necessity of a predetermined law of fate.[97] As for the Stoics, the immortality of the individual soul of the wise, according to those of them who hold this view, is due only to the fact that the soul, constituted as it is of a different element than the body, is stronger than the body and does therefore survive it; and the destructibility of the soul of the wicked, according to them, is similarly due only to the fact that such a soul has been weakened by the action of the body and has thereby lost its power of survival.[98]

In Judaism, however, with the firmly established belief in individual providence and individual reward and punishment, both resurrection and immortality are considered as acts of individual providence, coming to each individual as a reward or a punishment for his actions. With regard to

[94] Diels, *Doxographi Graeci*[2] p. 471, ll. 23–24, Arnim, II, 809, p. 223, l. 24.

[95] Diels, *op. cit.*, p. 471, ll. 20–21; Arnim, II, 808, p. 223, l. 21.

[96] *Somn.* I, 6, 31.

[97] *Timaeus* 41 E–42 D.

[98] Discussed in our introductory volume on Greek philosophy.

resurrection, it is definitely stated that certain types of wicked persons will not be resurrected.[99] With regard to immortality, those in Judaism who have adopted this belief similarly speak of it as a reward reserved only for the righteous but denied to the wicked. Thus in the Wisdom of Solomon, in contrast to the righteous, of whom the author says that their "hope is full of immortality," [100] he says of the wicked that "void is their hope," [101] and in contrast to virtue the "memory" of which, he says, "is immortality," [102] he says again of the wicked that "their memory shall perish," though he figuratively speaks also of their being "in grief." [103] So also the Palestinian author of the Psalms of Solomon, quite evidently speaking only of immortality, says that "the inheritance of sinners is destruction and darkness," [104] "the sinner shall perish forever," [105] and "when I was far from God, my soul had been wellnigh poured out into death." [106] Similarly Philo says that "awaiting those who live in the way of the impious will be eternal death." [107] All these statements by themselves, it must be admitted, are not conclusive, for the "eternal death" spoken of by Philo may be taken in a figurative sense. It is in such a figurative sense, in fact, that students of Hellenistic Jewish literature usually take all the references to the death or perdition of the soul of the wicked that are to be found both in Philo and in the Wisdom of Solomon,[108] the assumption

[99] *M. Sanhedrin* X, 1–4.

[100] Wisdom of Solomon 3: 4.

[101] *Ibid.* 3: 11.

[102] *Ibid.* 4: 1.

[103] *Ibid.* 4: 19.

[104] Psalms of Solomon 15: 11 (10); cf. 14: 6 (9).

[105] *Ibid.* 15: 15 (13); cf. 15: 13 (12). [106] *Ibid.* 16: 1–2. [107] *Post.* 11, 39.

[108] Cf. Dähne, I, 331, n. 402: "Philo entscheidet sich also für eine *immortalitas animi naturâ* nicht *gratiâ*." Drummond, speaking of the allusions to the hopelessness and perishability of the wicked in the Wisdom of Solomon, says (I, 213): "But

evidently being that, inasmuch as the belief in the immortality of the soul must have come to them from Plato, like Plato, they must also believe in its indestructibility. But in view of Philo's repetition of the Aristotelian principle that nothing created can be immortal, and in view also of his own explanation of the immortality of the created world as being due to the providence of God,[109] it logically follows that the soul, by virtue of its having been created, must by its own nature be mortal, and that, if the soul of the righteous is immortal at all, it is so only by the providence of God as a reward for righteous conduct. Consequently, since it is only by the providence of God that the soul of the righteous ceases to be mortal, it is quite reasonable to assume that the soul of the wicked never ceases to be mortal and never acquires immortality. The mere fact that Philo is in agreement with Plato as to the immortality of the soul does not necessarily mean that he must also be in agreement with him as to its indestructibility. Throughout his philosophy, as we have seen so far and as we shall see again, Philo constantly modifies Plato's philosophy by introducing into it some new element. The new element which he has introduced into the Platonic doctrine of the immortality of the soul is the possibility of its destruction in the case of the wicked, a possibility which logically follows from his belief that its immortality in the case of the righteous is due only to an act of divine providence.

But Philo, as we have seen,[110] departs from Plato in that he believes there is an idea of mind. Accordingly, to him the

---

even if we had not the example of Philo to support us, we might fairly speak of the soul's death when we refer, not to its extinction, but to the forfeiture, through sin, of its highest and truest life." Again, speaking directly of Philo, he says (I, 339): "Accordingly Philo treats it (the soul) as in its very nature immortal."

[109] Cf. above, p. 316.

[110] Cf. above, p. 213.

individual mind in each man is only an image of the idea of mind. The mind, concerning which he says that it may be either immortal or perishable, depending upon the kind of life it has lived during its existence in the body, refers therefore only to the individual mind in man, which is one of the many individual minds created by God as images of the idea of mind. The idea of mind itself, the prototype of all the individual minds, though also created, is like all other ideas imperishable, and with the imperishable idea of mind there is also an imperishable idea of humanity, the idea of an uninterrupted continuity of an animal species which is endowed with a mind. Individual men are indeed all perishable, and individual souls of certain men, the wicked men, are also perishable, but mind-endowed mankind, with all its righteous and wicked men, is imperishable. Accordingly, Philo feels that, despite his denial of the universal immortality of individual souls, he can still speak of some kind of universal immortality — the immortality of the universal idea of mind as well as the immortality of the image of that universal idea in the human species as a whole. For such a kind of universal immortality he had before him the precedent of Aristotle. When Aristotle was forced by his conception of the soul to deny the immortality of the individual human soul, he held out as a consolation the immortality of the human race. "Since, then, individual things are incapable of sharing continuously in the eternal and the divine, because nothing in the world of the perishable can abide numerically one and the same, they partake in the eternal and divine, each in the only way it can, some more, some less; that is to say, each persists, though not in itself, yet in a representative which is specifically, not numerically, one with it." [111] Evidently with this statement

[111] *De Anima* II, 4, 415b, 6–7.

of Aristotle in the back of his mind, Philo argues that nothing in the world is really perishable, inasmuch as the species to which every individual thing belongs is eternal.[112] The individual musician or scholar or the individual prudent and temperate and courageous and just and wise man indeed dies, but music and scholarship and all the various virtues never perish. It must be so, he argues, "unless we are to say that the death of some individual man has wrought destruction on mankind." [113] Knowing, however, that at his own time there were philosophic speculations as to what the concept of "mankind" was, he dismisses such speculations as irrelevant to the problem at hand. "What 'mankind' is, whether a genus (γένος) or an idea (ἰδέα) or a conception of the mind (ἐννόημα), or whatever we may call it, is a matter for the decision of those who make exactness in the use of terms their study." [114] The three terms he uses here as possible descriptions of the universal term "mankind" refer respectively to the views of Aristotle, Plato, and the Stoics with regard to universals. This emphasis upon the immortality of the human race, however, is not used by him, as it is by Aristotle, as a substitute for the immortality of the human soul; it is used by him, as we have been trying to show, as supplementary to it. Similarly, following certain statements of Greek philosophy, he sometimes speaks of "the true Hades," Hades being the Septuagint translation of the Hebrew Sheol, as "the life of the bad, a life of damnation and blood-guiltiness, the victim of every curse," [115] by which he means that the punishment of sin consists in the torture of conscience in this world.[116] But by this, too, he

[112] Cf. above, p. 208.
[113] *Deter.* 21, 75–77; cf. *Agr.* 38, 166–168; *Abr.* 11, 55.
[114] *Deter.* 21, 76.
[115] *Congr.* 11, 57; cf. *Heres* 9, 45; *Somn.* I, 23, 151.
[116] Cf. above, p. 42.

does not mean to deny the punishment of sin after death; it is again used by him only as supplementary to it.

VI. Conclusion, Influence, Anticipation

Incorporeal things, to Philo, are not necessarily generic things, and particular things are not necessarily corporeal things. The paradigmatic ideas are both generic and incorporeal. But the images modeled after the ideas, which are particular things, may be either corporeal or incorporeal. Thus, for instance, according to Philo in departure from Plato, there is an idea of soul and an idea of mind, and yet, as for the particular images of these ideas, there is a difference between them. The particular images of the idea of soul are corporeal; the particular images of the idea of mind are incorporeal. The images of the idea of soul, according to Philo, are particular irrational souls which were created by the powers at the behest of God out of the elements water, air, or fire, and they were created together with the bodies in which they exist and from which they remain inseparable. But as for the images of the idea of mind, they are particular minds or rational souls which were created by God himself as pure incorporeal beings, free of the admixture of any of the elements, and, as pure incorporeal beings, immediately upon their creation, they were stored away by God in the air for future disposition.

Though all these rational souls were created by God as pure incorporeal beings, they were created by Him with certain differences in the purity and excellence of their constitution. These differences, created in them by the inscrutable will of God, account for the main difference in the subsequent history of the two principal classes of them.

One class of these rational souls, those which by the will of God were created of greater purity and excellence of con-

stitution, never descend into bodies. They always remain unbodied souls. From their original abode in the air, where all rational souls have been stored away upon their creation, they move upward to the heavens, where their permanent abode is. Philo calls these unbodied rational souls by the scriptural name "angels" and identifies them with the demons in Plato. The function of the angels, on the whole, is like that of the immanent Logos or powers in the world, which is to act as agencies of divine providence. But, as distinguished from the immanent Logos or powers, angels are the agencies of divine providence only in connection with men. Philo therefore describes them as messengers who "both convey the biddings of the Father to His children and report the children's need to their father." Because they are like the immanent powers or Logos, they are also called powers — that is, immanent powers — or servants of the powers — that is, servants of the incorporeal powers in the intelligible world — or Logoi — that is, immanent Logoi — and each individual angel who appears to man is sometimes similarly called Logos, that is, an immanent Logos. Though invisible, these angels in their appearance to men sometimes assume visible forms. Among the various specific functions of the angels is their function of acting as the guardians of nations, including the Jewish nation. The guardian angel of the Jewish nation is referred to by Philo as the archangel or the eldest Logos, meaning thereby undoubtedly the angel Michael.

Since angels are a special class of immanent powers in the world, like the powers, they are divided into beneficial and punitive. Both these classes of angels act by the command of God as intermediaries between Him and men. But both punitive angels and beneficial angels perform functions which are sometimes performed by God himself. Angels are

used as intermediaries, thus, not because the actions performed by them cannot be performed by God or are not suitable to be performed by God, but only because God in His wisdom decided that it was the best way, in certain instances, to deal with men for their own good. Both beneficial and punitive angels, as messengers of God, are therefore God's sacred and blameless powers in the world. As distinguished from these angels, who are angels in the true sense of the term, Philo finds that Scripture speaks of "evil angels," by which is not meant punitive angels but rather morally evil beings, loosely called angels, who do not act as messengers of God. Though Philo is vague in his description of this class of angels, his reference undoubtedly is to those evil beings which by his time were already known as the fallen angels.

Another class of the rational souls, those which by the will of God were created of inferior purity and excellence of constitution, descend into bodies. There is only one class of bodies into which these rational souls descend, and that is human bodies. They do not descend into the bodies of animals below man nor into the bodies of the celestial spheres or planets or stars, though Philo refers to some philosophers who held that the celestial bodies are living and rational animals. While encased in the human body, the rational soul affects the life of the body and is affected by it. On the one hand, it helps the process of sensation induced into the body by the irrational soul within it, and, on the other hand, it utilizes the data of sensation for the formation of intellectual concepts. More especially does it exercise control over the body by its power of free will, with which it was endowed by God. But still, even while in the body, it never loses its character as a distinct entity, so that when the body with its inseparable irrational soul dies, the rational soul departs and enters upon its bodiless eternal and immortal life. The place

where rational souls abide during their immortal life varies. Some of them go up to heaven, by which is meant the astronomical heaven, to abide among the angels; some of them go up to the intelligible world, to abide among the ideas; some of them go up even higher, to abide in the presence of God. Immortality, however, is not due to rational souls by their own nature; it is a gift from God, and God who created them can also destroy them; consequently only the souls of the righteous who have earned the gift of immortality survive, while those of the wicked may be destroyed.

In the subsequent history of philosophy, whether Christian or Moslem or Jewish, various views appeared, drawn from various Greek philosophers, with regard to the nature of the soul, its definition, and its faculties, but in all of them stress was laid on certain fundamental principles which, as in Philo, were considered as essential to what was considered true religion. As in Philo, the soul was considered as something created, though there were differences of opinion, corresponding to the same differences of opinion with regard to the creation of the world, as to what is meant by the term creation when used with regard to the soul, and there were also differences of opinion as to whether the soul is preëxistent or not. As in Philo, the soul was considered as something separable from the body and as existing as a distinct individual entity within each human body, though there were differences of opinion as to what is meant by the individuality of the soul as a distinct entity. Some thought that each soul enters the human body as a distinct individual entity; others, like Avicenna, and, in a somewhat different sense, Averroes, contended that the soul enters the body not as a distinct individual entity but rather as a part of the Active Intellect, a sort of universal soul, and that only subsequently, through the acquisition of knowledge during its existence in

the body, acquires its distinctness and individuality. As in Philo, immortality was taken to mean the continuance of the existence of the soul as an individual and distinct entity, though the question was discussed whether in its state of immortality it will stand as a distinct individuality quite apart from all other similarly individual souls, or whether, again as contended by Avicenna and, in a different sense, by Averroes and their respective followers, during that state of immortality it will be absorbed in the Active Intellect whence it originally came, but somehow, in some inexplicable manner, will retain its acquired individuality. Finally, as in Philo, immortality was considered not as something due to the soul by its own nature, but rather as a gift from God, which can be taken away, and hence the soul was considered as something destructible, though there were various explanations as to what is meant by the destructibility of the soul.

Philo's refusal to commit himself on the question of whether the celestial bodies have souls and minds and his denial of the possibility of arriving at any positive solution of this question [1] are reflected in subsequent philosophy. Among the Church Fathers, Origen says: "Regarding the sun, moon, and stars, whether they are living beings or without life, there is no distinct deliverance," [2] though he himself believes that they are "living and rational beings." [3] Such also is the belief of Tatian [4] and Jerome.[5] John of Damascus, on the other hand, denies that the heavens or the celestial bodies are living beings.[6] St. Augustine is undecided and leaves the

[1] *Somn.* I, 4, 23; cf. above, p. 363.
[2] *De Principiis* I, Praefatio, 1.
[3] *Ibid.* I, 7, 2–3.
[4] *Oratio ad Graecos*, Cap. 12.
[5] *In Ecclesiasten*, on 1:6 (PL, 23, 1068).
[6] *De Fide Orthodoxa* II, 6 (PG, 94, 885 A–B).

matter in doubt.[7] Later the problem was reopened by St. Thomas.[8] In Arabic Moslem philosophy the view that the celestial bodies are living beings is challenged by Algazali,[9] and in Arabic Jewish, as well as in Hebrew, philosophy the view that the celestial bodies are not living beings is either directly or indirectly expressed by Saadia,[10] Judah ha-Levi,[11] Crescas,[12] and Isaac Arama.[13]

Similarly in the treatment of angels, subsequent philosophies, whether Christian, Moslem, or Jewish, continued to dwell upon certain elements which Philo treated as essential to the scriptural doctrine of angels. As in Philo, angels were considered as real beings, though it was maintained that not every term "angel" in Scripture is to be taken to refer to a real angel,[14] and though also there was a difference of opinion as to whether the term "angel" in Scripture does ever refer to the powers of irrational beings. Maimonides affirmed that it does,[15] whereas St. Thomas objected to Maimonides and maintained that it does not.[16] As in Philo, angels were considered as created beings, though among the Church Fathers the question was raised as to whether they were created before the creation of the world or with its creation. Origen, followed by others, maintained that they were created be-

[7] *De Genesi ad Litteram* II, 18, 38 (PL, 34, 279); *Enchiridion*, Cap. 58 (PL, 40, 260).

[8] *Summ. Theol.* I, 70, 3.

[9] *Tahāfut al-Falāsifah* XIV (ed. M. Bouyges, pp. 239–246).

[10] *Emunot we-De'ot* I, 3 (8); VI, 3.

[11] *Cuzari* IV, 1.

[12] *Or Adonai* I, 1, 6.

[13] *'Aḳedat Yiṣḥaḳ* II, ed. Pressburg, pp. 16a–17b.

The discussion of this question in Algazali and in Jewish authors is dealt with by the present writer in his *Crescas' Critique of Aristotle*, 1929, pp. 535–538.

[14] Thus the term "angel" in Scripture is said sometimes to mean a prophet (cf. Justin Martyr, *Dialogus cum Tryphone*, Cap. 75; Maimonides, *Moreh Nebukim* II, 6) or any godly man (cf. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XV, 23, PL, 41, 408). Cf. below, II, 45.

[15] *Moreh Nebukim* II, 6.

[16] *Sum. Theol.* I, 50, 3 c.

fore the corporeal world,[17] whereas others maintained that they were not created before the world. According to St. Augustine,[18] with whose view St. Thomas agrees,[19] they were created on the first day of creation. In a Midrash, it is definitely denied that the angels were created on the first day of creation, and while according to one rabbi they were created on the second day, according to another they were created on the fifth day.[20] As in Philo, they were considered as incorporeal beings, though there were differences of opinion as to the nature of their incorporeality. Thus, to take but one example, St. Thomas argued against Avicebron, denying the latter's assertion that angels, though incorporeal, are composed of matter and form.[21] As in Philo, attempts were made to identify angels with some incorporeal beings provided by philosophers in their scheme of the universe, though not always, as in Philo, with the demons of Plato. In the Middle Ages they were sometimes identified with the Intelligences of Aristotle.

Spinoza, in his grand assault upon traditional philosophy, by his denial of the existence of incorporeal beings, denies the existence of angels and also the existence of a soul as something separable from body. Among the heresies of which he was accused in his youth are said to have been the denial that God is incorporeal and with it the denial also that angels exist and that the soul is something different from the principle of life.[22] Later in his correspondence he writes to a friend: "I see that you are not so much philosophizing as, if I may say so, theologizing; for you are writing down your thoughts about angels, prophecy and miracles. But perhaps

[17] *De Principiis* III, 5, 3.
[18] *De Civitate Dei* XI, 9.
[19] *Sum. Theol.* I, 61, 3 c.
[20] *Genesis Rabbah* 1, 3.
[21] *Sum. Theol.* I, 50, 2 c.
[22] Lucas, *La Vie de feu Monsieur de Spinoza*, in A. Wolf, *The Oldest Biography of Spinoza* (London: G. Allen & Unwin, Ltd. [1927]), pp. 45–46 and 97–98.

you are doing this in a philosophical manner." [23] Judging by his own philosophizing about prophecy and miracles,[24] we have reason to believe that by philosophizing about angels he means the denial of their existence. His own philosophizing about the soul, however, is not a denial of its existence as something distinct from the body; it is only a denial of its separability from the body. As in most of his criticism of traditional philosophy, he returns to classical Greek philosophy as it had been before it became Hebraized by Philo. In this case, he returns to the philosophy of Aristotle in its Neoplatonized medieval form, restating its views in his own terms and in his own geometrical method.

Now in Aristotle, the view that soul is distinct from body while at the same time it is also inseparable from it is expressed in his conception of the soul as being the form of the body. Being form, it is distinct from body, which is its matter; being the form of the body, it must be inseparable from body, as form must inevitably be inseparable from its matter. But in Spinoza, Aristotle's matter and form become respectively the attributes of extension and thought in God and the immediate infinite modes of these attributes, called respectively "the absolutely infinite intellect" and "motion," [25] and of these two the human body and the human mind are respectively finite modes. He therefore says of the human mind that it is a "part of the infinite intellect of God" [26] or that it is the idea [27] of the human body, that is to say, the form of the human body, and as a result of this conception of the human mind he quite naturally concludes

[23] *Epistola* 29 to Oldenburg; A. Wolf's translation.

[24] Cf. below, II, 68, and above, p. 359.

[25] Cf. chapter on "Extension and Thought" in the present writer's *The Philosophy of Spinoza.*

[26] *Ethics* II, Prop. 11, Corol.

[27] *Ibid.* II, Prop. 11.

that "the human mind is united to the body," [28] that is to say, it is inseparable from it.

With such a definition of mind, it would seem that Spinoza would line himself up with those who believed that celestial bodies, like stars and planets, have also a mind, for all things in the world, according to him, are finite modes of God's attributes of extension and thought, just as, according to Aristotle, all things in the world are composed of matter and form. And in fact Spinoza himself definitely says that "all things are besouled (*omnia . . . animata*), although in different degrees (*diversis gradibus*)." [29] But this, in our opinion, does not mean that he believed that everything in the world, including stars and planets, had a soul like that of man, endowed with consciousness, any more than it means that he believed that a stone had a soul like that of man by which it would be conscious of its falling. The latter is explicitly denied by him.[30] What he means is exactly what St. Thomas says of Aristotle, that while all things have forms (*species* = εἴδη), the different degrees (*diversi gradus*) in the perfection of nature constitute a diversity of species or forms (*specierum*),[31] so that, while the forms of some things are souls, the forms of other things are not souls. Similarly here, Spinoza, using the term "soul" loosely for the finite mode of the attribute of thought in each thing, the equivalent of Aristotle's "form," says that all things are "besouled," but "in different degrees," some of them having souls in the strict sense of the term, being endowed with consciousness, others having no souls in this strict sense of the term.

Since the human mind, according to Spinoza, is inseparable

[28] *Ibid.* II, Prop. 13, Corol.
[29] *Ibid.* II, Prop. 13, Schol. (*Opera*, ed. Gebhardt, II, l. 28).
[30] Epistola 58 (*Opera*, IV, p. 266, ll. 13–15).
[31] *Quaestiones Disputatae: De Anima*, Art. 7, Resp.

from the body, it cannot survive the death of the body as an individual entity. Spinoza could have argued thus against the traditional view of immortality just as he argues against the traditional views on incorporeality, free will, creation, prophecy, and miracles. But the purpose of his philosophy was not only metaphysical but also moral, and the plan of the Ethics was, first, to reject all the main premises of traditional religious philosophy which had been held valid since the time of Philo and, then, to show how his own new philosophy, without a personal Deity and without miracles and revelation and free will, may not only be as good a guide in life as the old philosophy but may also offer as good a consolation for the after-life as the old philosophy. It is for this reason that he presents his views on immortality not in opposition to those who maintain it in its traditional form but rather in opposition to those who in his own time and in his own city denied it altogether. To begin with, on the basis of his own philosophy, he could quite logically maintain that on the death of man neither his body nor his soul is absolutely destroyed, but as finite modes they both become reabsorbed into the infinite modes, namely, "motion" and "the absolutely infinite intellect," of which they are respectively parts. Then, like Avicenna and Averroes and their followers in the past, he tries to show that the human mind, though in its origin it is only a part of the absolutely infinite intellect, becomes individualized during the lifetime of man by its acquisition of knowledge of the type which he describes as the second and third of his three types of knowledge.[32] Then this individualized human mind, on its reunion with the absolutely infinite intellect whence it originally came, somehow, in some inexplicable manner, retains its acquired indi-

[32] *Ethics* V, Prop. 38, Demonst.

viduality. The human soul is thus immortal, or eternal, as he usually calls it, and its immortality is in a certain sense personal and individual.[33]

[33] Spinoza's definition of mind as well as his conception of immortality is discussed by the present writer more fully in the chapters "Body and Mind" and "Love, Immortality, and Blessedness" in *The Philosophy of Spinoza*.

CHAPTER VIII

FREE WILL *

I. Miracles and Freedom

In Philo, as in any other philosopher, the problem of the freedom of the will in man is but a special phase of the more general problems of the existence of immutable laws in nature and the relation of mind to body. Now with regard to laws of nature Philo's view is clear. There are, according to him, certain unalterable laws by which the universe is governed, but these laws were established in the universe by God at the time of its creation. This view is expressed by him in a variety of ways in such statements as that there are "ordinances and laws which God laid down in the universe as unalterable" [1] and that "this world is the Megalopolis and it has a single polity and a single law." [2] These laws of nature are sometimes designated by him in their totality by the general term Logos, by which he means an immanent Logos in the created physical universe, conceiving of it as part of that incorporeal Logos which existed prior to the creation of the universe. It is this immanent Logos which is described by him as "the bond of all existence," which "holds and knits together all the parts," [3] and which also "administers all things." [4]

Equally clear is his view with regard to the relation of mind to body. Man is a miniature world [5] and, like the great

* Reprinted with some revisions from the *Harvard Theological Review*, XXXV (1942), 131–169.

[1] *Opif.* 19, 61.
[2] *Jos.* 6, 29.
[3] *Fug.* 20, 112.
[4] *Heres* 38, 188.
[5] The analogy of man to the world as a microcosm to a macrocosm is attributed by Philo to some anonymous philosophers of whom he says that "they declare that

world which consists of a body and a Logos within it, man consists of body and mind, and this mind within the body is, according to Philo, like the immanent Logos in the world, a part of the incorporeal Logos which existed prior to the creation of the world. Thus in one passage, after having referred to the preëxistent Logos and the Logos in man as two Logoi, "one the archetypal Logos above us, the other the copy of it which we possess," [6] he describes these two Logoi as "the mind within us and the mind above us." [7] Like the immanent Logos in the world, this immanent Logos in man is that which constitutes the principle of order and harmony and purposive rational action in man. In its relation to the powers of the irrational soul the mind is like a king in a state; it governs and unifies all these powers, which form its bodyguard, as it were, and accompany it as an escort.[8]

Throughout the philosophy of Philo, however, there is the implicit assumption of a fundamental difference between the rule of the immanent Logos in the world and its rule in man. In the world there is only a body which the Logos encounters, a body whose basis is a chaotic, discordant, and errant matter, and no sooner is that Logos placed in the world than it subdues that matter, controls its errancy, and establishes its governance of law and reason and orderly processes in the world. In the human body, however, it is not only an errant matter which the Logos encounters but also another soul which was created by God when He formed man "out of the matter scattered here and there, which Moses calls clay" [9]

---

man is a small world and alternatively the world a great man" (*Heres* 31, 155). It is also implied in his reference to the world as the "greatest and most perfect man" (*Migr.* 39, 220) and to man as a "small heaven" (*Opif.* 27, 82). Cf. Drummond, I, 288–289. On this analogy, see Plato, *Timaeus* 30 D; 44 D; Aristotle, *Phys.* VIII, 2, 252b, 26–27.

[6] *Heres* 48, 230 and cf. 233.

[7] *Ibid.*, 236.

[8] *Migr.* 31, 170.

[9] *Leg. All.* I, 12, 31; cf. above, p. 387, n. 17.

and that soul, too, which he calls earthlike (γεώδης),[10] is made of matter. Being made of matter, it is errant, disorderly, and irrational; but more than mere body, it is a force; it is active in its errancy and not merely passive; it is not easily overcome by the immanent reason; it offers resistance to it, with the result that in man throughout his lifetime there is a struggle between the rational and irrational souls.

This struggle of the rational soul with the body under the dominance of the irrational soul is described by Philo with striking clearness in many characteristic passages. "In so far as the soul of the wise man," he says, "descending from the ether above, comes down upon and enters a mortal and is sown in the field of the body, it is truly sojourning in a land which is not its own." [11] The body under the dominance of the irrational soul not only fails to coöperate with the rational soul but is an "actual hindrance" to it [12] and is "a plotter" against it.[13] The passions which arise in the body, though when mastered by reason they may become our helpers, are in reality "our actual foes," [14] so that we are constantly afflicted from within by "pleasures and desires and sorrows and fears." [15] The outcome of that conflict is uncertain. Sometimes it is the victory of reason, in which case the resulting action is described by such terms, borrowed from both philosophy and Scripture, as goodness, virtue, wisdom, and righteousness [16] and the agent is described as good, wise, and righteous.[17] Sometimes, however, the outcome of the conflict is a victory for the passions, in which case the resulting action is described as wickedness or im-

[10] *Ibid.*, 32.
[11] *Qu. in Gen.* III, 10; cf. *Heres* 54, 267.
[12] *Leg. All.* I, 32, 103.
[13] *Ibid.* III, 22, 69.
[14] *Ibid.* II, 4, 10.
[15] *Qu. in Gen.* III, 10.
[16] τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἡ ἀρετή, τὸ σοφόν, σοφία, δικαιοσύνη. See Leisegang, *Indices* s.v.
[17] ἀγαθός, σοφός, δίκαιος. See *ibid.*, s.v.

piety or sin [18] and the agent is described as foolish or wicked or sinful.[19]

So far Philo's position with regard to the action of the immanent Logos in the world and in man is like that of Plato as portrayed in the *Timaeus*. For though Philo's immanent Logos, which God implanted in the world at the time of its creation to serve as its governing law, is not made of the mixed stuff of the Platonic universal soul but it rather shares the pure immateriality of the ideas, still in function the universal soul and the immanent Logos are alike. The universal soul of Plato, exactly like the immanent Logos of Philo, was made by God "earlier and elder than the body." [20] It was set by God "in the midst" of the world and was spread "through all its body." [21] Its purpose was to act as the "mistress and governor" of the world [22] and that purpose was actually attained, for when the world was created out of matter, called also necessity, and within that world the universal soul or mind was placed, "mind overruled necessity" and "this universe was fashioned in the beginning by the victory of reasonable persuasion over necessity" [23] and the soul of the universe, which contained mind and was rational, "began a divine beginning of unceasing and intelligent life lasting throughout all time." [24] Similarly Philo's description of the two souls in man, the rational and the irrational, and the conflict between them, though containing elements from other dialogues of Plato as well as from other non-Platonic sources, is essentially based upon Plato's description in the *Timaeus* of the rational and irrational souls,[25] of the conflict between them [26] and of the possible victory of the rational

[18] τὸ κακόν, ἡ κακία, ἀσέβεια, ἁμάρτημα. See *ibid.*, s.v.
[19] φαῦλος, κακός, ἀσεβής, ὑπαλτιος. See *ibid.*, s.v.
[20] *Timaeus* 34 C.
[21] *Ibid.* 34 B. Cf. above, p. 339.
[22] *Ibid.* 34 C.
[23] *Ibid.* 48 A.
[24] *Ibid.* 36 E.
[25] *Ibid.* 42 E ff.; 69 C.
[26] *Ibid.* 42 E–44 D.

soul over the irrational soul by the strength which it may gain through knowledge acquired by means of training.[27]

But as we go on to scrutinize further their respective statements with regard to the causality of God and His power over the laws which He has implanted in nature, we discover a vast difference between their views, and out of this difference, we shall try to show, there arises also a difference between their views as to the freedom of man. Both of them, as we have seen, believe that there are unalterable laws of nature, and both of them also believe that these laws of nature were implanted by God in the universe as an act of good will. But there is a difference between them as to the power of God over these laws of nature. To Plato, once the laws of nature were implanted by God in the world, by His implanting in it the universal soul, these laws can never be upset. Indeed God, who has created the universe and has implanted the laws of nature within it, should logically be able also to dissolve them; still, to dissolve that which He has perfectly constructed, argues Plato, would indicate "the will of an evil one," and since the Demiurge is not an evil one, he assures the created Gods, i.e., the celestial bodies and the deities of popular religion, that "in my will (*βούλησις*) ye possess a bond greater and more sovereign than the bonds wherewith, at your birth, ye were bound together."[28] What he really means to say is that on the creation of the world and the implantation of the laws of nature within it God abdicated His power to upset these laws and gave His assurance, as it were, that He would let the world run according to its established laws without any interference on His part. It is like the covenant which the God of the Hebrew Bible established between himself and "every living creature of all flesh" that is upon the earth, at the cessation of

[27] *Ibid.* 86 B–87 B. [28] *Ibid.* 41 A–C.

the deluge, an everlasting covenant, by which God gave assurance that "while the earth remaineth, seedtime and harvest, and cold and heat, and summer and winter, and day and night shall not cease and that neither will He again smite any more everything living, as He has done." [29] But while the God of the Hebrew Scripture, despite the covenant, has still reserved for himself, mentally, the right to upset the order of nature temporarily for the sake of performing miracles whenever there should be a need for them, the Demiurge of Plato had made no such mental reservation. There is no room for miracles in the philosophy of Plato. His God, though He has started as a free agent and created the world by will,[30] by His own voluntary abdication of His power to change the laws which He himself has implanted in the world, has deprived himself of freedom and thereafter acted by the necessity of His own nature no less than the God of Aristotle who never created a world by his will.

In the philosophy of Philo, however, there is room for miracles, for while his God is philosophically the Demiurge of Plato, He has still retained the essential characteristics of the miracle-working Jehovah of the Hebrew Scripture. Believing as he did in the historicity of the miracles recorded in Scripture, even though occasionally he tried to read into them some allegorical meaning or to explain them as normal events, he modified, or perhaps he thought that he only interpreted, Plato's conception of the unalterability of the laws of nature in accordance with his belief in the miraculous intervention of God in the established order of the universe. While agreeing with Plato that God has implanted universal laws in nature and that these laws can be relied upon, for all practical purposes, to operate with uniformity and with a

[29] Gen. 8: 21–22; 9: 16–17. Cf. also Jer. 31: 34–35; 33: 20–21.

[30] *Timaeus* 29 D–E; 41 A–B.

certain scheduled regularity, still God can upset these laws of nature, and in fact He did upset them on many occasions in the past as an act of goodness to men in time of their need. God to Philo is thus not altogether indifferent to the vicissitudes of human beings, or at least to those of such human beings as are especially favored by Him, in their unequal struggle against the inexorable forces of nature, and He does on certain occasions interfere on their behalf and help them to come victorious out of that struggle.

Corresponding to this difference between them with respect to God's power over nature there is a difference between them also with respect to the power of the human mind over the body. In Plato, the victory of reason over the passions, or its defeat by them, depends entirely upon the relative strength or weakness of these two contestants. Given a mind which for some reason or other has failed to reëducate itself in the knowledge of true being which it had forgotten on its entrance into the body, and given at the same time a body of which for some reason or other the passions are strong and powerful, the victory of body over mind is definitely assured and nothing in the world could change it, unless it were some external causes which happened to weaken the power of the passions or to strengthen the power of the mind. If, therefore, we had a gauge by which we could measure the relative strength or weakness of mind and body, we could at any given moment predict the outcome of the conflict between them. Hence it is the possession of knowledge or the lack of it that automatically will lead to the victory of the rational or the irrational soul. There is no such third factor as a will, conceived as something autonomous and as something which is free and independent of both the rational and irrational faculties of the soul and which by some arbitrary action tips the scale on the side of the one or the other. Whenever the

rational and irrational souls meet in conflict, the victory of the one or the other will be decided on the basis of their respective strengths and weaknesses. For man there is no choice in the matter.

In Philo, however, the victory of the rational or the irrational soul is not decided mechanically by the strength of one in relation to the strength of the other. There is to him a will in man which by some unaccountable manner may decide in favor of the one or the other, even when by all the laws of causality the outcome should have been otherwise. For just as he considered God as working miracles in nature to help those whom He favored in their struggle against the forces of nature, so did he also consider God as being not altogether indifferent to the struggle in man of mind against the forces of the body. God, according to Philo, would not let man be a passive object in the struggle of mind and body. He would not allow the struggle between mind and body to be determined, like the struggle between two bodies, by the ordinary laws of nature. Mind was therefore endowed by God with part of that power which He himself possesses of upsetting the laws of nature. As a divine grace man was given that freedom of action by which God himself in a miraculous way comes to the help of His chosen ones in their struggle against the odds of nature. The determination of the mind to do or not to do is thus not the result of natural causes which are "of God" or "according to God" and by which the unalterable laws of nature established by God in the world are operated. Such a determination by the mind is a break in the nexus of these natural laws and in the established laws of the universe even as miracles are. This power with which the human mind was endowed to choose or not to choose refers not only to the choice of good, but also to the choice of evil, even though the mind is by its very nature

rational, for, as says Philo, there are in our mind "voluntary inclinations (ἑκουσίους τροπάς) to what is wrong." [31] The essential rationality of the mind does not preclude the possibility of its acting, by the mere power of its free will, against the dictates of reason.

II. The Choice of Good and Evil

The difference between Plato and Philo on the question of human freedom is clearly brought out in their respective treatments of the question of human responsibility for the choice of evil and of the justifiability of punishment meted out to wrongdoers by both God and the state.

Plato does not raise this question directly, but from the answers which he provides against such a question we may judge that he was conscious of it. The question as it must have appeared to him was of a double nature. In the first place, he wanted to justify the punishment which according to his eschatology is meted out to the souls of those who live in unrighteousness by their being reincarnated successively in the bodies of various creatures until they turn from the evil of their ways.[1] In the second place, he wanted to justify the penalty meted out by the state to wrongdoers for various offenses.[2]

In answer to the first question, he simply states that divine justice is vindicated by the fact that at the very beginning, when the individual souls were about to be put for the first time in human bodies, they were all given an equal start and were all equally warned of the consequences of their future behavior, for, as they were distributed among the stars prior

[31] *Deter.* 32, 122.

[1] *Timaeus* 42 B–D.

[2] *Laws* IX, 860 B; cf. IV, 718 B.

to their being put in human bodies, "He shewed to them the nature of the universe and declared unto them the laws of destiny, — namely, how that the first incarnation should be ordained to be the same for all, in order that none might suffer disadvantage at His hands; and how it was needful that they, when sown each into his own proper organ of time (i.e., star), should be born as the most God-fearing of living creatures (i.e., mankind)." [3] This equality of start and this equality of warning, according to Plato, was given by God to men "to the end that He might be blameless of the future wickedness of any one of them." [4] By this Plato exculpates God from any moral responsibility for the evil of human conduct. "The blame is his who chooses: God is blameless." [5] Then, too, God to him is not the cause of evil,[6] nor is the soul as such the cause thereof. Evil arises out of the fact that the soul placed in the body happens to be overridden by the body, when man by his irrational desires allows it to become thus overridden.[7] It is our duty, therefore, says Plato, "to try to escape from earth to the dwelling place of the Gods as quickly as we can; and to escape is to become like God, so far as this is possible; and to become like God is to become righteous and holy and wise." [8] This is as far as Plato goes in exculpating God of the evil man does. But the fundamental question whether man's own irrational desires by which his rational soul is overridden are themselves predetermined by causes outside of man's will, and whether also man by a will absolutely free and undetermined could at any moment arbitrarily change the course of his action — that is not dealt with by Plato. God's responsibility, according to him, ends with the creation of the

[3] *Timaeus* 41 E.
[4] *Ibid.* 42 D.
[5] *Republic* X, 617 E
[6] *Ibid.* II, 379 C.
[7] *Timaeus* 42 E; cf. *Laws* X, 900 E, 904 A.
[8] *Theaetetus* 176 A.

world, which was the best possible world which could be created and within which the souls of all men had an equal start. Once the world was created and the souls for all future men planted in it, God retired, as it were, from the world, letting it run according to the laws which He had established in it. There is no individual providence in the philosophy of Plato.

In answer to the second question, Plato seems to admit that inasmuch as man's actions are to a large extent predetermined and are not entirely his free choice, the only justification for the punishment of criminals by the state is that such punishments are either curative or deterrent, for the wrongdoer is to pay the penalty for his misdeed, says Plato, only "in order that for the future both he himself and those who behold his punishment may either utterly loathe his sin or at least renounce to a great extent such lamentable conduct." [9] Even the punishment of death inflicted upon incurable criminals is justified by him on the ground that "not only is it better for the sinners themselves to live no longer, but also they will prove of a double benefit to others by quitting life — since they will both serve as a warning to the rest not to act unjustly, and also rid the state of wicked men." [10] Indeed Plato speaks of a distinction between voluntary (ἑκούσια) wrongdoings and involuntary (ἀκούσια) wrongdoings [11] as well as of a distinction between a voluntary lie and an involuntary lie.[12] But when we examine the sense in which Plato uses the term "voluntary," we shall find that there is no indication that he meant thereby the existence of a will which is free and independent of reason and concupis-

[9] *Laws* XI, 934 A.

[10] *Ibid.* IX, 862 E; cf. XII, 958 A. Cf. R. D. Archer-Hind, *The Timaeus of Plato*, p. 325, ad 86 E.

[11] *Laws* IX, 861 B.

[12] *Ibid.* V, 730 C; *Republic* VI, 533 E.

cence. The term "voluntary," we shall find, is used by him here in two senses: (1) in the sense of not being compelled by some external agent,[13] and (2) in the sense of knowing what one does, for in the case of a lie he explicitly says that an involuntary lie is one that is told through ignorance (ἀμαθία).[14] Accordingly voluntary lying and voluntary wrongdoing mean only lying and doing wrong without external compulsion and with full knowledge of the act. It is in this sense of "knowingly" that Plato uses the term "voluntarily" in his statement that "no one is voluntarily (ἑκὼν) wicked."[15] By knowledge, according to him, the mind is strengthened in its struggle with the passions of the body and automatically overcomes them.

In Philo this question of human responsibility and of the justification of punishment is touched upon in many places, though it is never treated in a complete and systematic manner. But in all the passages wherein the problem is treated, though at first sight the sentiments expressed in them seem to be so much like those of Plato, we discern certain expressions which, taken in connection with his views we have found elsewhere, seem to emphasize his belief in the absolute freedom of the human mind. Thus in one passage wherein he discusses the superiority of man to brute animals he says that man is "blamed for what he does wrong with intent and praised when he acts rightly of his own will" on account of his possession of "a volitional and self-determining mind, whose activities for the most part rest on

[13] *Statesman* 293 A.

[14] *Republic* VII, 535 E. It is interesting to note that the Hebrew *shegagah*, which, according to rabbinic interpretation, means the commission of a sin through ignorance, is translated in the Septuagint by ἀκούσιον (Lev. 4: 2; Num. 35: 11, *et passim*).

[15] *Timaeus* 86 E. Cf. discussion in commentaries of R. D. Archer-Hind, A. E. Taylor, and F. M. Cornford, *ad loc.*

deliberate choice (προαιρετικαῖς)." [16] This by itself may perhaps not mean more than Aristotle's statement that men are praised or blamed only for voluntary actions [17] and that they are praised or blamed for virtues or vices [18] because virtues and vices are actions which involve deliberate choice (προαιρετική).[19] By itself, then, Philo's statement may perhaps mean only, as does Aristotle's statement, that a voluntary action is an action without external compulsion and without ignorance.[20] But when Philo says that God gave to the human mind a portion "of that free will which is His most peculiar possession and most worthy of His majesty" [21] and that by this gift of free will the human mind "in this respect has been made to resemble Him," [22] it is quite evident that by man's free will Philo means an absolutely undetermined freedom like that enjoyed by God, who by his power to work miracles can upset the laws of nature and the laws of causality which He himself has established. It is because of this undetermined freedom possessed by man that Philo frees God of blame for the sins committed by man and justifies the punishment meted out to man for his sin, for the human soul thus "being liberated, as far as might be, from the hard and ruthless mistress, necessity, may justly be charged with guilt, in that it does not honor its Liberator and therefore it will rightly pay the inexorable penalty which is meted to ungrateful freedmen." [23]

That a voluntary act to Philo does not mean, as it does to Plato and Aristotle, an action done with knowledge is made clear by him in his homily on the scriptural verses: "Behold I have set before thy face life and death, good and evil;

[16] *Immut.* 10, 47.
[17] *Eth. Nic.* III, 1, 1109b, 31.
[18] *Ibid.* II, 5, 1105b, 31–1106a, 2.
[19] *Ibid.* II, 6, 1106b, 36; cf. II, 5, 1106a, 3–4.
[20] *Ibid.* III, 1, 1109b, 35 ff.
[21] *Immut.* 10, 47.
[22] *Ibid.*, 48.
[23] *Ibid.*, 48.

choose life," [24] which verse is drawn upon also subsequently by the Church Fathers for proof of their view as to the freedom of the will.[25] "By this," he says, "He puts before us both doctrines: first, that men have been made with a knowledge of good and of its opposite, evil; second, that it is their duty to choose the better rather than the worse, because they have, as it were, within them an incorruptible judge in the reasoning faculty, which will accept all that right reason suggests and reject the promptings of its opposite." [26] It will be noticed that the knowledge of good and evil does not in itself constitute a voluntary act; knowledge is merely a condition under which one exercises the power of the freedom of choice. "He had made him free and unfettered, to employ his powers of action with voluntary and deliberate choice for this purpose, that, knowing good and ill . . . , he might practice to choose the better and avoid the opposite." [27] In fact, according to Philo, all men have a knowledge of the good, but some, notwithstanding that knowledge, choose by their own free will to follow the base, and it is because they had that knowledge of the good that they are convicted for the choice they have made. "Who indeed is so lacking in reason or soul that he never either with or without his will receives a conception of the best? Nay, even over the reprobate hovers often of a sudden the vision of the excellent, but to grasp it and to keep it among them they are unable. . . . Nay, never would it have come to them save to convict those who choose the base instead of the noble." [28] This statement, too, on the face of it, may be merely a reflection of Plato's view that all men by their very nature have the capacity to

[24] Deut. 30: 15 and 19.
[25] Justin Martyr, *Apologia* I, 44; Origen, *De Principiis* III, 1, § 6.
[26] *Immut.* 10, 50.
[27] *Ibid.*, 49.
[28] *Gig.* 5, 20–21.

regain the vision of the ideas for fleeting moments during their lifetime, though it is only philosophers who by their special training and preparation can be in continuous communication with them.[29] But Philo, as will have been noticed, in restating this view, says that those reprobates, who have a sudden vision of the excellent and get some knowledge of it, out of their own free will choose the base instead of the noble and that it is for this reason that they are held responsible for their deeds and are convicted.

The choice of evil is thus in man's own hand. But what about evil which one commits involuntarily? The answer to this question may be gathered from several passages in Philo's writings.

Sin, says Philo, may be committed either voluntarily (ἑκουσίως) or involuntarily (ἀκουσίῳ).[30] Now with regard to voluntary sin, he explicitly says that the sinner in question cannot say that the sin he has committed was "according to God's will (κατὰ θεόν)." [31] Voluntary sins, according to him, have their sole source in the sinner himself, or, to use his own words, "they are acts of our own will (γνώμης)." [32] With regard to involuntary sin, however, he distinguishes within it two kinds. One kind of involuntary sin, just like voluntary sin in general, cannot be said to have come about by the will of God. It can be explained only as being due to the fact that man is part of nature and subject to the laws by which it is governed. According to these laws of nature, it may sometimes happen that, without any intention on the part of man, ignorance and carelessness and weakness will inevitably result in mishaps as well as in sins. Such involuntary sin can be said to proceed from God only indirectly, that is to say, only in so far as it is God who implanted in the

[29] *Phaedrus* 249 B–D; cf. Grote, *Plato*, II, 219.
[30] *Fug.* 14, 76; *Post.* 3, 10–11; *Agr.* 40, 176.
[31] *Fug.* 14, 76.
[32] *Ibid.* 13, 65.

universe these laws of nature. Another kind of involuntary sin is described by Philo as coming about directly by the will of God, and this for a certain definite purpose, namely, for the purpose of administering justice in the universe. As a typical example of this kind of involuntary sin he takes the case of the unintentional slayer mentioned in Scripture. This particular kind of involuntary sinner, according to his interpretation, is one whose past life is not altogether stainless but who somewhere in his past must have committed certain sins, though sins which are few in number and which can be easily remedied.[33] A man with such a past is chosen by God as an instrument of His judgment in inflicting punishment upon some more grievously guilty person,[34] who somehow has escaped from the justice of men,[35] and whom God, after His manner of not inflicting evil directly, wishes to punish through the instrumentality of some intermediary agent.[36] In being chosen, on his past record, by God as an instrument of carrying out His divine judgment, man thus happens to commit what is known as involuntary sin, for which, incidentally, he receives a light punishment and thus expiates the few and remediable sins of his past.[37] The act

[33] *Spec.* III, 21, 122.

[34] *Ibid.*

[35] *Ibid.*, 121.

[36] *Fug.* 13, 66.

[37] This analysis of Philo's view as to the cause of involuntary sin is based upon passages in *Spec.* III, 21, 120–123, and *Fug.* 13, 65–14, 76. In both these places Philo discusses Exod. 21: 13, which in the Septuagint reads: "If he did not do it voluntarily, but God delivered into his hands, I will appoint thee a place whither he who hath killed shall flee." Evidently following what in his time must have already been a Jewish tradition, which we shall quote at the end of this note, Philo takes this verse to refer to a case where A, who was a guilty person deserving of punishment (*Spec.* III, 21, 120–121), was killed unintentionally by B, who in the past had committed a few remediable sins (*ibid.*, 122). His comment on this verse is as follows: "The writer feels that intentional acts are acts of our own will, and that unintentional acts are acts of God's will (θεοῦ): I mean not sins, but, on the contrary, all acts that are a punishment for sin" (*Fug.* 13, 65). What he means to say is this: Involuntary

committed by the involuntary sinner is therefore an act of God's will, its purpose being to carry out His divine judgment in punishing sinners. The reasoning may perhaps sound somewhat casuistical, but casuistry is bound to ap-

sins which serve no purpose of punishment are not acts of God's will but rather those of natural causes; involuntary sins which serve the purpose of punishment are acts of God's will, because, as he says subsequently, God has chosen B as the minister of His judgment and the instrument of His vengeance upon A, in view of the fact that God does not inflict punishment directly (*Fug.* 13, 66; *Spec.* III, 21, 121–122). When later in *Fug.* 14, 76, Philo says that "it is lawful, therefore, for one who feels that he has been involuntarily changed, to say that this change has come upon him according to God's will (κατὰ θεὸν), a statement which the voluntary sinner may not make," the reference is only to that kind of involuntary sinner whose involuntary sin serves the purpose of punishment. Though this discussion of Philo deals primarily with the particular case of murder, his introductory statement in *Fug.* 13, 65, "The writer feels that intentional acts are acts of our own will, and that unintentional acts are God's acts," as well as his succeeding discussion, quite clearly shows that he tries to draw from it a generalization with regard to all human actions.

The Jewish traditional interpretation of Lev. 21: 13, referred to above (quoted by Ritter, *Philo und die Halacha: Eine vergleichende Studie*, p. 30, n. 3, and referred to by Heinemann, *Bildung*, pp. 400 f.), is reported in the name of Simeon b. Lakish, a Palestinian Amora of the third century. It reads as follows: "What case does the verse deal with? It deals with the case of two persons who killed human beings, one of them unintentionally and the other intentionally, but neither of them committed his act in the presence of witnesses who could come and testify against him. The Holy One, blessed be He, therefore, causes them to meet at the same inn. The one who has killed intentionally seats himself under a ladder and the other who has killed unintentionally begins to climb that ladder and falls down upon the one who sits underneath it and kills him. The result is that he who has killed intentionally suffers punishment by death and he who has killed unintentionally suffers punishment by exile" (*Makkot* 10b).

Though the homily quoted is Amoraic, it is based on an older Tannaitic homily in *Mekilta, Nezikin* 4, Exod. 21: 13, (W, p. 86a; F, p. 80a; HR, p. 262; L, III, 35). The sentiment expressed in it is also found in another Tannaitic homily on Deut. 22: 8: "When thou buildest a new house, then thou shalt make a parapet for thy roof, that thou bring not blood upon thine house, if any man fall from thence." Upon the last statement, which literally reads "if any *one falling* fall from thence," the school of Ishmael comment as follows: "that man was destined to fall since the six days of creation, seeing that he has not yet fallen and yet Scripture describes him as '*falling*'; this in truth is in accordance with the principle that reward is brought about through the agency of a worthy person and punishment is brought about through the agency of a guilty person" (*Sifre* on Deut. 22: 8, § 229, F, p. 116a; HF, p. 262); *Shabbat* 32a). The same interpretation of the verse is also implied in pseudo-Jonathan Targum *ad loc.*

pear in any kind of theodicy no less than in any kind of ethics.

His view on the doing of evil is thus quite clear. He explicitly distinguishes between voluntary and involuntary evil. Voluntary evil is done by man alone; God is neither directly nor indirectly the cause of it. Involuntary evil may be said in certain instances to have been directly caused by God.

Not so clear is his view on the doing of good. He does not speak of an involuntary good deed or virtue or righteousness, and this for the very good reason that, like Aristotle,[38] he defines virtue, or rather righteousness (δικαιοσύνη), as an act performed by voluntary choice (ἑκουσίῳ γνώμῃ),[39] and consequently no virtue can be described as involuntary. By this definition of righteousness he makes it quite evident that the choice of good is a voluntary act. The same view is expressed by him also elsewhere: "And mark, the words in which thy Father urges thee to go put no compulsion (ἀνάγκην οὐδεμίαν) on thee, in order that thou mayest follow the better course at thine own volition (ἐθελουργός) and by thine own self-determination (αὐτοκέλευστος)." [40] Still, these statements are not as explicit as his statements about the choice of evil. He does not state negatively, as he does about both voluntary and involuntary evil, that in the choice of good God is not a cause either directly or indirectly in any sense whatsoever. His only statement about it is that the doing of good is by our "voluntary choice," without "compulsion," and by our own "volition" and "self-determination." The question may therefore be raised whether by this omission of any negative statement Philo meant to indicate

[38] *Eth. Nic.* II, 6, 1106b, 36, where virtue is defined ἕξις προαιρετική, and III, 2, 1111b, 7, where προαίρεσις is said to be ἑκούσιον.

[39] *Somn.* II, 26, 174.

[40] *Deter.* 4, 11.

that in the choice of good, though it is always voluntary, God has a part, and, if so, what that part is.

An answer to this question is to be found in a fragment from the lost fourth book of his Legum Allegoria, which contains another homily on the verses: "Behold I have set before thy face life and death, good and evil; choose life, that thou mayest live." [41] The homily reads as follows:

It is a happy thing for the soul to be able to choose the better of the two choices put forward by the Creator, but it is happier for it not to choose, but for the Creator to bring it over to himself and improve it. For, strictly speaking, the human mind does not choose the good through itself, but in accordance with the thoughtfulness of God, since He bestows the fairest things upon the worthy. For two main principles are with the Lawgiver, namely, that on the one hand God does not govern all things as a man and that on the other hand He trains and educates us as a man.[42] Accordingly, when he affirms the second principle, namely, that God acts as man, he represents our mind as capable of knowing something, and willing, and choosing, and avoiding. But when he affirms the first and better principle, namely, that God acts not as man, he ascribes the powers and causes of all things to God, leaving no work for a created being but declaring it to be inactive and passive. He explains this when he says in other words that "God has known those who are His and those who are (His) holy [and] He has brought [them] near [to himself]." (Num. 16: 5.) But if selections and rejections are in strictness made by the one cause, why do you advise me, legislator, to choose life or death, as though we were autocrats of our choice? But he would answer: Of such things hear thou a rather elementary explanation, namely, such things are said to those who have not yet been initiated in the great mysteries about the sovereignty and authority of the Uncreated and the exceeding nothingness of the created.[43]

The view expressed in this fragment has been characterized by Drummond as one which "in effect reduces the belief

[41] Deut. 30: 15 and 19.

[42] The reference here is to the scriptural statements "God is not as a man" (Num. 23: 19) and "as a man would chasten his son, so the Lord thy God will chasten thee" (Deut. 8: 5) discussed by Philo in *Immut.* 11, 53 ff. and elsewhere.

[43] Harris, *Fragments*, p. 8. Parts of the translation of this fragment are from Drummond's *Philo Judaeus*, I, 347, n. Cf. also Latin version of parts of this passage in Franciscus Turrianus, *Adversus Magdeburgenses Centuriatores pro Canonibus Apostolorum, & Epistolis Decretalibus Pontificum Apostolicorum*, IV, Florence, 1572, p. 361.

in free-will to a useful delusion of the less educated," [44] and it would seem to be contradictory to Philo's statements elsewhere as to the existence of free will in man. We shall attempt, however, to show that this fragment does not teach a denial of free will, but rather that it stresses a certain fundamental detail supplementary to Philo's conception of freedom.

If we examine the fragment carefully we shall note in it two curious facts.

In the first place, the fragment deals only with man's choice of the good but makes no mention at all of man's choice of evil. It only says that "the human mind does not choose the good through itself"; it does not say that it does not choose the evil through itself. Indeed it speaks of the mind as being unable through itself to avoid as well as to choose, to reject as well as to select, but the terms "avoid (*φυγεῖν*)" and "rejections (*ἀπεκλογαί*)," judging from his use elsewhere of the expression "he might practice to choose the better and avoid (*φυγῇ*) the opposite," [45] mean here to avoid and reject evil, which is a form of choosing good. Now this omission of any reference to the cause of the choice of evil cannot be accidental and merely due to the fact that in the verse quoted (Deut. 30: 19) there is only the statement "choose life," for previous to that verse there is also mention of the possibility of the choice of evil and death (Deut. 30: 17–18). The omission of any reference to the choice of evil in this fragment can be accounted for only by the fact that the point which Philo was going to make in this homily was that only the choice of good was caused by God, but not choice of evil. No evil, as he repeats in a variety of ways, can come directly from God, and this includes the evil-doing of man as well as evil done to man.[46]

[44] Drummond, *loc. cit.* [45] *Immut.* 10, 49. [46] Cf. above, n. 37.

In the second place, with regard to the choice of good, we may say at the very outset that such sweeping statements in this passage about the "exceeding nothingness of the created" and the "sovereignty and authority of the uncreated" and about the fact that "the powers and causes of all things are attached to God" and about the unreality of the presentation of the human mind as being "capable of knowing something, and willing, and choosing, and avoiding" do not in themselves indicate that Philo denied of man the freedom to choose good. Even with his belief in absolute human freedom he could make these statements, in view of the fact that that freedom, as he has said in his extant works, is a gift bestowed upon man by God, a portion of his own power of freedom, whereby he is made to resemble God.[47] These general statements by themselves do not therefore conclusively prove anything with regard to the exact belief of Philo as to the question of man's power to choose good. What he exactly meant to say on this question in this fragment of his lost work must be determined by a careful examination of some of the other statements contained in this fragment as well as of some of the implications of what he leaves unsaid in it.

Now it will have been noticed that in contradistinction to his statement in his extant works with regard to the choice of evil, that it is of our own will,[48] he says here about the choice of good that "selections and rejections are in strictness made by the one Cause," that is to say, directly by God. Furthermore, God's direct causation of man's choice of good, it will also be noticed, is described as "the thoughtfulness of God, while He bestows the fairest things upon the worthy." This quite obviously implies that man must first do something to render himself worthy of the bestowal upon

[47] Cf. above, nn. 21, 22. [48] Cf. above, n. 32.

him by God of the power to choose good. Now that doing of something by which man renders himself worthy in the eyes of God to receive the still greater power of choosing good must inevitably refer to some act of free will. This, however, could certainly not refer to some act of free will exercised in the choice of evil, as that would hardly render man worthy of the gracious gift of the choice of good. It must therefore inevitably refer to some act of free will in the avoidance of evil or in the choice of good. Thus this fragment, in trying to attribute man's choice of good to God, assumes that man himself already possesses some part of freedom to make such a choice. Furthermore, in the very opening statement of this fragment Philo says that "it is a happy thing for the soul to be able to choose (ἰσχύειν λαβεῖν), but it is happier for it not to choose (μὴ αὐτὴν ἑλέσθαι), but for the Creator to bring it over to himself and improve it." Note the difference in wording between "to be able to choose" and "not to choose." If the wording of these two statements was chosen with care, and we have no reason to doubt that it was so chosen, then the evident meaning of this statement is not to deny the soul's ability to choose the better but rather to assert that, while the soul is able of itself to choose the better, it actually does not make that choice by itself but God brings it to himself and improves it.

The cumulative impression of all these statements then is that, while a man is able to choose the better, he will not have to rely upon his own power, that is to say, that power of free will with which God has endowed all men, for, if he proves himself worthy, God, through His thoughtfulness, will aid him in making that choice by bringing him to himself. The direct intervention of God in man's choice of good dealt with in this fragment must therefore be assumed to refer only to some help lent by God to man in the choice of good, when

man proves himself worthy of such a help by trying by his own power of free will with which God has endowed all men to avoid evil and to choose good. When therefore in this fragment God is spoken of as the cause of man's choice of the good, this statement is to be understood in two senses: (1) as the ultimate cause of the free will with which all men are endowed and (2) as the auxiliary cause of certain particular acts of the choice of good where man has proved himself worthy by exercising his free will in the avoidance of evil and in the pursuit of good.

This conception of divine aid or grace in the choice of good to those who have already by their general power of free will taken the initial steps towards the attainment of the good is expressed by Philo in several passages in his extant writings. In one of these passages, comparing the righteous mind in the soul of the individual to the righteous man in the race, he declares that, when a man has not completely succumbed to temptation and his rational soul or mind has not been completely effaced by sin and wickedness induced by the passions of his irrational soul, he will be helped by God to save himself by the choice of good. "Let us pray then," he says, "that, like a central pillar in a house, there may constantly remain for the healing of our maladies the righteous mind in the soul and in the human race the righteous man; for while he is sound and well, there is no cause to despair of the prospect of complete salvation, for our Saviour God holds out, we may be sure, the most all-healing remedy, His gracious power, and commits it to His suppliant and worshipper to use for the deliverance of those who are sickly, that He may apply it as an embrocation to those soul-wounds which were left gaping by the sword-edge of follies and injustices and all the rest of the horde of vices." [49] The implication of this

[49] *Migr.* 22, 124.

passage is quite clear: if man by his own free choice has kept himself from being completely sunk in evil and sin, even though he has not been able to resist temptation altogether, God by His power of graciousness will come to his assistance and will help him to choose the way to salvation.

The same view is also implied in another passage.[50] In that passage Philo speaks of the ordinary run of men who are constantly tossed about between reason and passion. He describes them as those who "set out to wage war on the passions on an insignificant, not on a grand, scale, but seek to come to terms and arrange a truce with them, putting forward the word of pacification." [51] Such men, he says, can acquire virtue only by toil (πόνῳ).[52] But, he adds, toil itself cannot achieve virtue without the help of God and consequently "it is necessary that the soul should not ascribe to itself its toil for virtue, but that it should take it away from itself and refer it to God, confessing that not its own strength or power acquired nobility, but He who freely bestowed also the love of it," [53] for, he concludes, "only then does the soul begin to be saved, when the seat of anger has received reason as its charioteer, and toil has come to create in it, not self-satisfaction, but a readiness to yield the honor to God, the Bestower of the boon." [54] From the entire context of the passage it is clear that what Philo means to say is that man by his mind, which is endowed with freedom implanted in it by God, can of himself through toil take the initial steps in the attainment of virtue. He cannot, however, through himself and by his own toil achieve virtue. Mere toil will not lead him to the desired end, if not accompanied by a realization that his ability to take the initial steps in the attain-

[50] *Leg. All.* III, 46, 133–137.
[51] *Ibid.* III, 46, 134.
[52] *Ibid.*, 135.
[53] *Ibid.*, 136.
[54] *Ibid.*, 137.

ment of virtue and to toil for it is in itself a gift of God. Once he realizes that, God will help him to attain virtue.

In still another passage, speaking of the two natures in man, the irrational and the rational, he says, "Let us offer a noble and suitable prayer, which Moses offered before us, that 'God may open to us His own treasury' (Deut. 28: 12) and that sublime reason pregnant with divine illumination to which He has given the title of 'heaven'; and that He may close up the treasuries of evil things," [55] concluding that God indeed "opens the treasury of good things but closes the treasuries of evil things." [56] Here, again, the implication is that sin is closed up by God and man chooses it entirely by his own free will, whereas virtue is left open by God so that if man makes an effort by his own free will to reach it, he can easily find it with the help of God. Prayer for divine help in guarding oneself against the choice of evil is also recommended by Philo in the following passage: "Pray then to God that thou mayest never become a leader in the wine song, never, that is, voluntarily take the first steps on the path which leads to indiscipline and folly." [57]

The concept of grace is explicitly mentioned by him in his etymological explanation of the name Hannah. After explaining that Samuel stands as a symbol for "a mind which rejoices in the service and worship of God," [58] he says: "His mother is Hannah, whose name means 'grace' (χάρις), for without divine grace (θείας χάριτος) it is impossible either to leave the ranks of mortality or to stay forever among the immortal." [59] By the mortal and the immortal here he

[55] *Ibid.* 34, 104.

[56] *Ibid.*, 105. In § 104 Philo uses definitely good in the sense of virtue and evil in the sense of sin, whereas in § 105 good and evil are used by him respectively in the sense of reward and punishment. Here as elsewhere the two meanings of good and evil are used by Philo indiscriminately. Cf. above, n. 37.

[57] *Ebr.* 32, 125. [58] *Ibid.* 36, 144. [59] *Ibid.*, 145.

means those who deserve to be mortal or immortal as a result of their actions, namely, the wicked and the righteous. Elsewhere he explains "grace" here as "the gift of the wisdom of God" [60] or the gift of "an inspired temper possessed by a God-sent frenzy." [61]

What is required of man to be worthy of grace is discussed by him in another passage. Speaking of the mind that has been initiated into "the holy mysteries," that is, the mind that has learned to gain control over the passions and has also acquired a knowledge of God,[62] he says that "it has been honored with the gift of quietude by God, who willed that it should be undistracted, never affected by any of the troublesome passions which necessities of the body engender, laying upon it through greed the domination of such passions." [63]

This conception of a divine grace or help in the attainment of virtue to those who of themselves with the power given to them by God make an effort to attain it was evidently common among the Jews, both Hellenistic and Palestinian, at the time of Philo. In the Wisdom of Solomon man is represented as having the power to love righteousness and the Lord and Wisdom and to be able to seek them [64] and also as being able by his own power to keep the Law which constitutes the love of Wisdom.[65] But still man is said not to be able to obtain Wisdom without the help of God and one of the conditions of obtaining the help of God, it is further said, is to know that Wisdom is a gift of God for which one has to pray [66] and, if one prays for it, it will be given to him.[67] In the Letter of

[60] *Immut.* 2, 5.
[61] *Somn.* I, 43, 254.
[62] Cf. above, p. 49.
[63] *Praem.* 20, 121.
[64] Wisdom of Solomon 1: 1; 6: 12.
[65] *Ibid.* 6: 18.
[66] *Ibid.* 8: 21.
[67] *Ibid.* 7: 7. On the doctrine of grace in Hellenistic Judaism see also A. D. Nock, *St. Paul* (Home University Library, 1938), p. 75.

Aristeas the same view is expressed in the statements that "it is a gift of God to be able to do good actions and not the contrary," [68] that "the soul is so constituted that it is able by the divine power to receive all the good and reject the contrary" [69] and that it is not possible to acquire the virtue of temperance "unless God creates a disposition towards it." [70] A suggestion of this view of divine grace as supplementary to free will may perhaps be also discerned in one of the descriptions of the Pharisaic doctrine given by Josephus.[71] More definitely is this combination of the element of divine grace with absolute free will expressed by the rabbis in many statements, of which the following ones are characteristic. Commenting on the verse, "Surely he scorneth the scorners, but he giveth grace unto the lowly," [72] they say: "To him who desires to contaminate himself doors are open (to go out and act according to his free choice); to one who desires to purify himself assistance will be given (from heaven)," [73] for as they say elsewhere: "The evil impulse of man gains strength against him every day . . . and were it not for the help of the Holy One he could not prevail against it." [74]

While the ordinary run of men, according to Philo, could acquire virtue only by toil with the assistance of divine grace, there were certain persons, he maintains, to whom virtue was natural and they needed not to toil in order to attain it. Of such a nature, according to him, was Moses, "because he, being perfect, has no small or petty aims, nor any desire to moderate his passions, but goes so far as to cut off all passions everywhere," [75] and consequently he "received virtue easily

[68] Aristeas, 231.
[69] *Ibid.*, 236.
[70] *Ibid.*, 237; cf. 238 and 226.
[71] Cf. below, nn. 99 and 100.
[72] Prov. 3: 34.
[73] *Shabbat* 104a and parallels.
[74] *Sukkah* 52b; *Ḳiddushin* 20b.
[75] *Leg. All.* III, 46, 134.

and without toil from the hands of God." [76] Of such a nature was also Noah. "For should anyone ask why the prophet says that Noah found grace in the sight of the Lord God [77] when as yet he had, so far as our knowledge goes, done no fair deed, we shall give a suitable answer to the effect that he is shown to be of an excellent nature from his birth." [78] So also were Melchizedek,[79] Abraham,[80] Isaac,[81] and Jacob.[82] But this perfect nature with which all these perfect persons were endowed from their birth was itself a gift by divine grace, for, as he says in his discussion of Isaac: "Some even before their birth God endows with a goodly form and equipment, and has determined that they shall have a most excellent portion." [83] Whether this view that certain scriptural personages were endowed from birth with a disposition to virtue meant also that the personages so endowed were absolutely sinless during their lifetime is not stated by Philo. All he says about them, as will have been noticed, is that by a certain natural endowment they could receive virtue easily and without toil. Elsewhere he makes the general statement that "sin is congenital to every created being, even the best, just because it is created." [84] Whether this statement includes also those whom he describes as having been favored by God with a most excellent portion is not clear. In rabbinic literature, conflicting opinions are expressed as to the sinlessness of the Patriarchs.[85] Similarly with regard to

[76] *Ibid.*, 135.
[77] Gen. 6: 8.
[78] *Leg. All.* III, 24, 77.
[79] *Ibid.* 25, 79–81.
[80] *Ibid.* 27, 83–84.
[81] *Ibid.* 28, 85–87.
[82] *Ibid.* 29, 88–89.
[83] *Ibid.* 28, 85.
[84] *Mos.* II, 29, 147.
[85] (1) That they did sin: *'Arakin* 17a; *Midrash Tehillim* on Ps. 16: 2; *Ecclesiastes Rabbah* on Eccles. 4: 3; *Nedarim* 32a and parallels. (2) That they did not sin: *Mekilta, Vayassa'*, 3 (W, p. 56b; F, p. 48a; HR, p. 163; ed. L, II, 106). Cf. S. Schechter, *Some Aspects of Rabbinic Theology*, 173; G. F. Moore, *Judaism* I, 468 L. Ginzberg, *The Legends of the Jews*, V, 220, n. 66; 228, n. 110.

Moses, sometimes he is spoken of as having committed certain sins,[86] whereas sometimes he is spoken of as if he were sinless.[87] Noah is represented as having sinned immediately after he had found grace in the sight of the Lord God.[88] Whether those scriptural personages, such as the Patriarchs and Moses, who in rabbinic literature are represented either as being predominantly virtuous or as being absolutely free of sin, were also considered by the rabbis, as they were by Philo, as being endowed by God from birth with an excellent nature which made it easy for them to acquire virtue is not clear. Such a rabbinic statement as that the Patriarchs were three exceptional men "over whom the Evil Impulse had no power" [89] may perhaps mean, as is the opinion of Philo, that they were endowed from birth with a special gift to resist evil; but it may also be only a description of the fact that by their own free will and toil they subdued the Evil Impulse.

It is in the light of this analysis of his conception of free will that a great many of the vague statements in which the homilies of Philo abound are to be understood. As an example I shall take his homily on the verse: "God cast a trance upon Adam and he went to sleep." [90] He takes this verse allegorically as referring to "mind" which "falls into a trance when it ceases to be engaged with objects appropriate to it," and from the words "God cast a trance" he infers that "this change and turning which he undergoes is not by himself but by God who 'casts it on him,' that is, brings and sends it on him." He then tries to prove this empirically. "For if the change were in our hands I should

[86] *Yoma* 86b and parallels. Cf. Ginzberg, *op. cit.*, VI, 109, n. 616; 148, n. 889.

[87] *Shabbat* 55b; *Sifre* on Deut. 32: 50, § 339, F, p. 141a; HF, p. 388.

[88] *Petirat Mosheh* in Jellinek, *Bet ha-Midrash*, I, 118. Cf. Ginzberg, *op. cit.*, III, 427; V, 186, n. 49.

[89] *Baba Batra* 17a. [90] Gen. 2: 21.

have recourse to it, when I wished, and when it was not my deliberate choice I should then continue unturned. But as it is, the change is actually repugnant to me, and many a time when wishing to entertain some fitting thought, I am drenched by a flood of unfitting matters pouring over me; and conversely when on the point of admitting a conception of something vile, I have washed the vile thing away with wholesome thoughts, God having by His grace poured upon my soul a sweet draught in place of the bitter one." [91] At first sight it would seem that contrary to what we have shown from Philo's other statements, that according to him evil is never caused directly by God and that in the choice of good God is only an auxiliary cause, he says here that the choice of evil is not of our own free will but is caused by God and that similarly God forces upon us the good contrary to our free choice. But upon a closer examination of this passage we shall find that it falls in with Philo's views as we have found them elsewhere.

To begin with, the statement here that unfitting matters pour over man even when he wishes to entertain some fitting thought is to be taken to refer to involuntary sins, which, according to Philo, as we have seen,[92] are committed by man as a result of the fact that owing to his past record he has been chosen by God's will as an instrument of His judgment. Accordingly the other statement here that "this change and turning which he undergoes is not by himself but by God" is to be understood as referring not to sins directly caused by God but rather to those brought about incidentally as a result of his having been chosen by God as the instrument of His judgment. Then the statement here about wholesome thoughts with which God in His grace washes away the conception of something vile which man is on the point of ad-

[91] *Leg. All.* II, 9, 31–32. [92] Cf. above, n. 37.

mitting is to be taken to refer to a case where the man in question has merited in the eyes of God that special assistance in the attainment of good which, according to the other passages we have discussed, God extends to those who are worthy of it.

That this is the meaning of the passage is shown in the sequel. "Now every created thing must necessarily undergo change, for this is its property, even as unchangeableness is the property of God. But, while some, after being changed, remain so until they are entirely destroyed, others continue so only so far as to experience that to which all flesh is liable, and these forthwith. This is why Moses says, 'He will not permit the destroyer to come into your houses to smite you' (Exod. 12: 23): for He does indeed permit the destroyer — ('destruction' being the change or turning of the soul) — to enter into the soul, that He may make it evident that what is peculiar to created things is there; but God will not let the offspring of the 'seeing' Israel be in such wise changed as to receive his death-blow by the change, but will force him to rise and emerge as though from deep water and recover." [93] The meaning of this passage is quite clear. That man should change from fitting thoughts to unfitting is necessary by the general scheme of God which made man's soul consist of a rational and an irrational part. That some men should remain in their changed condition and lead a life of wickedness until they are destroyed is also in accordance with the divine scheme which endowed man with freedom of choice. That God should not allow the Israelites to go to utter destruction by their wrongdoing is also in accordance with his view that God extends His grace and help to those who are worthy of salvation and that to Him the Israelites are worthy of such salvation, if not by their merit,

[93] *Leg. All.* II, 9, 33–34.

then by the merit of their ancestors, who were especially elected by God, and whose merit is inherited by their offspring. This last view refers to the principle of the "merit of the Fathers" which is dwelt so much upon in rabbinic theology,[94] and which goes back to the scriptural verse: "Only the Lord had a delight in thy Fathers to love them, and He chose their seed after them." [95]

His view that God has reserved for himself the power to upset the laws of nature by working miracles has provided Philo, as we have seen, with a logical explanation for human freedom. Free will in man is nothing but a part of God's own freedom, with which man is endowed by God. But the question inevitably arises how such freedom can be reconciled with the knowledge which God is said to possess of all things even before they happen. Philo does not raise this question directly, nor does he discuss it, but without much ado he asserts his belief both in the foreknowledge of God and in the free will of man, "for," he says, "God the maker of living beings knoweth well the different pieces of His own handiwork, even before He has thoroughly chiselled and consummated them, and the faculties which they are to display in a later time, in a word their deeds and experiences." [96] Again: "So Moses says that God brought all the animals to Adam, wishing to see what appellations he would assign to them severally. Not that He was in any doubt — for to God nothing is unknown — but because He knew that He had formed in mortal man the natural ability to reason of his own motion, that so He himself might have no share in faulty action." [97] The same combination of divine foreknowledge and human free will is also to be found in one of

[94] Cf. Schecter, *op. cit.*, 170–198; Moore, *op. cit.*, I, 536–545.
[95] Deut. 10: 15; cf. 4: 37; 7: 6–8.
[96] *Leg. All.* III, 29, 88; cf. *Opif.* 52, 149.
[97] *Opif.* 52, 149.

the descriptions of the Pharisaic doctrine given by Josephus, in which he says: "They hold that to act rightly or otherwise rests, indeed, for the most part with man, but that in each action Fate (εἱμαρμένη) assists." [98] The term Fate, it has been shown, is used here by Josephus in the sense of Providence [99] and consequently the statement here means that despite man's free will God has a knowledge as well as a foreknowledge of his actions.[100] The Pharisees, or rather the rabbis, speaking for themselves, say similarly that "everything is in the power of God except the fear of God" [101] and that "everything is foreseen, yet freedom of choice is given."[102]

III. Conclusion, Influence, Anticipation

Let us now summarize the result of our discussion of Philo's theory of free will. Man as a part of nature, a microcosm of the macrocosm, is composed of a rational element which

[98] *Bell. Jud.* II, 8, 14, 163. In *Antt.* XIII, 5, 9, 172, the wording of the statement is different.

[99] Cf. note in Thackeray's translation *ad loc.*, referring to Reinach; G. F. Moore, "Fate and Free Will in Jewish Philosophies according to Josephus," *Harvard Theological Review*, 22 (1929), 379 ff.; I. N. Simḥoni, notes to his Hebrew translation of *Bell. Jud.*, *ad loc.*; J. Klausner, *Historiyyah Yisre'elit*, II, 102.

Goodenough, in his *By Light, Light*, p. 79, takes "Fate" in this passage of Josephus in its literal sense and makes Josephus attribute to the Pharisees the "doctrine of predestination," concluding: "It is . . . in harmony with the Sadducees that Philo consistently, in its Stoic form, repudiates determinism, to make man a free moral agent." This is not a happy presentation of the case. The point at issue between the Pharisees and the Sadducees, even on the basis of the statements by Josephus, was not on the question of free will; the point at issue between them was on the question of divine providence.

[100] It is not impossible that in his use of the term "assists (βοηθεῖν)" there is a suggestion of the doctrine of divine grace as supplementary to free will, which we have discussed above, nn. 68–74. Moore (*op. cit.*, p. 384) hesitatingly suggests a possible origin of this term in the distinction found in Chrysippus between principal and adjuvant causes. The term *gratia adjuvans* occurs later in Christian theology (see Loofs, *Leitfaden zum Studium der Dogmengeschichte*, *Register*, s.v., and cf. below, pp. 459 f., nn. 2–9).

[101] *Berakot* 33b and parallels.

[102] *M. Abot* III, 15.

comes from the intelligible world and of a body which is created of matter. As in the world as a whole, these two elements in man are opposed to each other. But whereas in the world reason did by divine decree at the very beginning of the creation of the world gain dominance over the arrant and discordant matter, in man reason did not gain undisputed dominance, for it is not only body that reason has to contend with in man but also a bodily soul, which was itself created by God and endowed by Him with certain powers which are irrational and opposed to the powers of reason. The conflict between these two sets of powers, the rational and irrational, therefore, continues in man throughout his lifetime. Left to themselves, the outcome of the conflict would depend upon the relative strength which these powers would happen to possess or would have developed in the course of man's life.

But God, who in His own case has reserved for himself the power of freedom to upset the laws of nature which He established in the world at the time of its creation, has endowed man with a similar power of freedom to upset the laws of nature to which he is subject. This is a sort of miracle which man can work in the economy of his own life analogous to the miracles which God can work and does work in the economy of the world as a whole. This miraculous power of free will with which the human mind is endowed extends both to the choice of evil and to the choice of good. But there is the following difference between these two kinds of choices. The choice of evil is left wholly to the power of man. The choice of good, however, is not left wholly to man's power. Once man makes an effort to utilize the power granted to him in overcoming evil and in pursuing good, and once he recognizes that that power of his is a gift from God and that without that gift of God he would be helpless in his effort, and

once he prays for further help from God, God will come to his assistance in his effort to overcome the evil and to attain the good. This is merited grace, which applies to all men. But in the case of some men, God endowed them even before their birth with free grace, and such free grace was even inherited by their descendants. In such cases of inherited free grace, while those who are blessed with it are not wholly immune from sin, they will never be allowed by God to sink completely in sin. This freedom of action which man enjoys as a gift of God does not in any way, according to Philo, contravene the prescience of God. Despite the freedom of man to act as he chooses, God may still be said to have foreknowledge of what man will do.

In Philo's conception of human freedom we have an adumbration of all the elements of the problem as it presented itself to the minds of religious philosophers, whether Christian, Moslem, or Jewish, throughout the ages. Like Philo, they all as a rule start out with the assumption that there are laws of nature but that these laws were established in the world by God and that God has reserved for himself the freedom to upset these laws on certain occasions and for good reasons in the form of miracles. We have already quoted the views of some representative religious philosophers on this point.[1]

It is this freedom of the will of God in His relations to man, which is assumed by all medieval philosophers, that has provided them, as in Philo, with a rationale for their common belief in the free will of man. When God created Adam and implanted in him a mind, He implanted in him therewithal the freedom of choice whereby out of his own free will he disobeyed God and fell. But in Christianity there appeared

[1] Cf. above, pp. 357 ff.

the belief, given expression to by St. Augustine, that with his fall Adam was deprived of that freedom and that this lack of freedom was inherited by his descendants. If man was still spoken of as having free will, that freedom of the will had to come to him as a grace from God. In other words, the divine grace which according to Philo was only auxiliary to the initial freedom which man possessed became in the case of the descendants of Adam the sole basis of their freedom, a sort of freedom which in reality amounted to a theological determinism. Still the Philonic view has found expression in Christianity. St. Augustine himself, earlier in his life, before he adopted the view with which his name is associated, believed that the descendants of Adam have retained to some extent that freedom of choice with which Adam was endowed by God and that, if they make an effort to exercise that freedom in the right direction, God will further their effort by His adjuvant grace (*gratia adjuvans*).[2] "When anyone perceives that by himself he is not strong enough to rise up, let him pray for the help of the Liberator. Grace then will come, and it will forgive past sins, and help him who exerts himself, and bestow the love of justice.[3] . . . Grace indeed brings about that we shall not only *will* to do rightly but also *be able* to do so, not by our own powers, but by the help of the Liberator.[4] . . . For will is not enough, unless God also shows His mercy; but God, who calls to peace, does not show His mercy, unless will has preceded, forasmuch as 'peace on

[2] Cf. F. Loofs, *Leitfaden zum Studium der Dogmengeschichte*, 4th ed., pp. 360–361, 378.

[3] *Expositio quarumdam propositionum ex Epistola ad Romanos*, 13–18 (PL 35, 2065): *cum se quisque cognoverit per seipsum surgere non valere, imploret Liberatoris auxilium. Venit ergo gratia quae donet peccata praeterita, et conantem adjuvet, et tribuat charitatem justitiae.*

[4] *Ibid.* (2066): *Gratia vero efficit ut non tantum velimus recte facere, sed etiam possimus; non viribus nostris, sed Liberatoris auxilio.*

earth *is* to men of good will.'" [5] Thus Jerome, commenting on the verse, "Her sins, which are many, are forgiven, for she loved much," [6] says: "From this we understand that it is not by our own power only that we do what we wish but also by the mercy of God, if only He gives assistance to our will." [7] Similarly Cassianus sums up his discussion of free will in the statements that "there always remains in man free will which may either neglect or love the grace of God" [8] and that "the grace of God coöperates with our will favorably and in all things assists it, protects it and defends it." [9]

In connection with free will and grace there appear in Christianity also the other problems which we have found in Philo and the rabbis. As in Philo and the rabbis, in whom we have found either vague or contradictory statements as to the sinlessness of various scriptural personages, so also in Christianity there appeared the question whether there were men before the appearance of Christ who did not commit sin.[10] Of a similar nature is the problem in Islam as to whether the prophets were sinless.[11] Again as Philo, who held that the special grace of the Patriarchs was inherited by their descendants with the result that Israel would not be allowed by God to go to utter destruction by sin, so also in Chris-

[5] *De diversis Quaestionibus LXXXIII*, 68, 5 (PL 40, 73): *Parum est enim velle, nisi Deus misereatur: sed Deus non miseretur, qui ad pacem vocat, nisi voluntas praecesserit; quia in terra pax hominibus bonae voluntatis.* Cf. Luke 2: 14. [6] Luke 7:47.

[7] *Dialogus adversus Pelagianos* (PL 23, 542 B): *Ex qua intelligimus non nostrae solum esse potestatis facere quod velimus, sed et Dei clementiae, si nostram adjuvet voluntatem.*

[8] Joannis Cassiani Collationes XII (PL 49, 929 A): *Et idcirco manet in homine semper liberum arbitrium, quod gratiam Dei possit vel negligere vel amare.*

[9] *Ibid.*, XIII (932 A): *Et ita semper gratia Dei nostro in bonam partem cooperatur arbitrio, atque in omnibus illud adjuvat, protegit et defendit.* Cf. St. Augustine, *Liber contra collatorem* III, 8 (PL 45, 1805).

[10] Not only Pelagius but also Athanasius took the positive view on this question, Cf. Hagenbach, *History of Doctrines*, §§ 108, n. 3; 110, n. 2.

[11] E. Sell, *The Faith of Islam*, 3d ed., 1907, p. 244; F. A. Klein, *The Religion of Islam*, 1906, p. 73; M. Muḥammad Ali, *The Religion of Islam*, 1936, p. 233.

tianity Paul declares that "all Israel shall be saved" in the end because "as touching the election, they are beloved for the fathers' sake." [12] Then also as in Philo and the rabbis, simultaneously with the free will of man medieval philosophers affirmed the foreknowledge of God. But more than Philo and the rabbis they saw the difficulties involved in the assertion of these two propositions. It is this phase of the problem which led in Islam to the denial of freedom on the part of the orthodox Kalam and in Christianity, and to a lesser degree in Judaism, to a restriction of the meaning of freedom. The common tendency, however, was to maintain the two and to find a way of reconciling them. A formula which appears constantly in philosophy is that God's knowledge is not causative. In Christianity among the Church Fathers this formula, as restated by John of Damascus, reads: "God foreknows all things but does not pre-determine them." [13] In Arabic philosophy, the same formula, as quoted in the name of the Mutazilites, reads: "The knowledge of what is to come into existence is not the cause of its coming into existence, just as the knowledge of that which has come into existence is not the cause of its having come into existence." [14] The explanation offered in medieval philosophy in support of this principle is rather subtle, but it ultimately amounts to nothing more than the simple assertion of Philo and the rabbis that both God has foreknowledge and man is free.

It is this traditional conception of God's, as well as man's, freedom of the will, which originated in the philosophy of Philo and was maintained throughout medieval philosophy, though occasionally somewhat modified, that was made the subject of attack by those who before Spinoza began to nib-

[12] Rom. 11: 26–29.

[13] *De Fide Orthodoxa* II, 30 (PG 94, 969 B f.): *πάντα μὲν προγινώσκει ὁ θεὸς, οὐ πάντα δὲ προορίζει.*

[14] Judah ha-Levi, *Cuzari* V, 20; cf. Saadia, *Emunot we-De'ot* IV, 4.

ble at traditional philosophy, and by Spinoza himself in his grand assault on it. The result, in the case of Spinoza, was a return to the classical conception of the immutability of the laws of nature, especially as it was conceived by Aristotle, ere it was modified by Philo's introduction of the principle of the changeability of these laws through the miraculous intervention of God. The God of Spinoza, like the God of Aristotle, acts by what traditional philosophy would call the necessity of His own nature but which Spinoza himself defines as true freedom. Man also, according to him, has not that power to overcome his passions which traditional philosophy would call the power of one's free will; but still he himself, like Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics, speaks of man's ability to overcome his passions by knowledge and thereby become free. It is not until the entire conception of immutable laws of nature was called into doubt that absolute undetermined freedom of the human will, like that asserted by Philo, makes its reappearance in philosophy. But the ground for the questioning of the immutability of the laws of nature is not the rediscovery of a God who like the God of Philo and his followers is endowed with a miracle-working power. The historical background of this new view is to be found in the ancient Epicurean denial of causality.