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RUSSIA AND THE PEACE



RUSSIA AND THE PEACE

By **BERNARD PARES**

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SET UP BY BROWN BROTHERS LINOTYPERS
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To
THE HONORABLE JOSEPH E. DAVIES
Who opened that Door

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TO MY AMERICAN FRIENDS

PLEASE IMAGINE a young Englishman some fifty years ago, who was everywhere told by fellow countrymen that Russia was the natural enemy of his country. This came only from those who had never been there, but they were the vast majority. The very few who had been—mostly solid British traders—sturdily denied this: they said there was no people with whom it was easier for us to get on than the Russians. I decided to go and find out. Perhaps Russia was not our enemy, perhaps she might even be a friend. From the outset, to remain entirely free in my judgment, I determined to be rigorously non-party, and I have never yet even voted in a political election.

With this in mind, I went first to the other great countries of Europe, lived among their peoples, learned their languages, sometimes studied in their universities. My special study of them ran from Voltaire to the present time, a period full of wars and revolutions. With this background I went on to Russia for a year in 1898 and did the same. After pondering for some years over what I had seen and heard, I came again in 1904, but this time with plan and purpose. I traveled in a cart in various provinces; my special interest was the peasants. I was just in time for the Japanese War and the great liberal movement which swept Russia directly after it.

To My American Friends

In 1906 was summoned the first Russian parliament—the Duma, which was practically elected by universal male suffrage. I attended its sittings, and here I went into partnership with a young American, Samuel N. Harper, son of the famous builder of the University of Chicago—a partnership which, though our views were not necessarily identical, was to last for life. We lived, traveled, and studied together in town and country, and from then on always kept in closest touch. Together we went to see those who were playing any important part. With Russians the direct approach is the right one. They are friendly and love to talk, and as their confidences were kept, anyone would tell us what he was out for, what he had done, and why. For a long time we recorded every conversation, for our own use, before we went to bed.

When this direct partnership was no longer possible, I was concerned with work of many kinds for Anglo-Russian friendship and the promotion of study in my own country. The variety of my experiences will come out in this book. I lived through the last war on the Russian front and saw the first years of the Revolution. During the break in Anglo-Russian relations, I was busy organizing Russian studies in the University of London, and I made two extensive visits to the United States to establish close cooperation with colleagues here, speaking at many universities. I have since made four visits to the Soviet Union—the last on the eve of the present war. In 1943 I lectured through Canada and the United States; and I am now, for the second time, teaching in an American university. In writing this book I

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have been greatly indebted to my colleagues here. The little book *Russia*, published a year ago in the American Penguin series, gives the conclusions of my long study of Russia. The present work is a pendant to it, and contains my answers to the questions which have been put to me here on matters that will come up at the peace settlement.

As I am treating separately a number of closely associated subjects, a few repetitions cannot be avoided.

I wish to thank the Editors of the *New York Herald Tribune*, the *New Republic*, and *Foreign Affairs* for their kind permission to reprint material published by them.

RUSSIA AND THE PEACE

I

ON THE FEAR OF RUSSIA

IN A JOURNEY of some months through North America I have met, both in Canada and in the United States, repeated suggestions of a danger of world revolution in case of Russia's victory in the present war.

To start with, when shall we recognize the obvious fact which stares hard into our faces that this suggestion has throughout been the principal weapon of Hitler's propaganda? He began with it in *Mein Kampf* and he has always kept on with it; in fact he was never more vocal on the subject than in his later utterances. He is still "saving the world from Bolshevism," though in Russia itself what we used to describe as Bolshevism is dead as a doornail. Hitler wanted to conquer Russia, and that is why he kept up this smoke screen. Why play his game for him?

"When we are talking of more ground and room in Europe," wrote Hitler in *Mein Kampf*, "we can in the first place only think of Russia and the border states dependent on her. . . . The gigantic empire in the East is ripe for collapse, and the end of the Jewish domination in Russia will also be the end of the Russian State itself."¹ That is what he is still trying to bring about.

¹ *Mein Kampf*, Vol. II, pp. 742-743.

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Next to Bolshevism in Hitler's speeches nearly always follows the word "Jew." In April, 1939, within a month or two of concluding the Russo-German pact, Hitler spoke almost ravingly at Wilhelmshaven of "that Jewish sponge fungus." Not only Russia but Britain and America are charged with being controlled by Jews. Meanwhile, for more than ten years there has been a current joke in Moscow: "What is the difference between Moses and Stalin? Moses led the people out of Egypt, and Stalin led them out of the Central Executive Committee."

The fact is that both in Britain and in America we are pitifully out of date in our understanding of the vast changes which have taken place in Russia in the last twenty-five years, though Russia's fight in the world's battle is enough to make them hit the naked eye. This has its simple explanation. For over twenty years the only Russians with whom we could meet and talk were emigrants who had left Russia as long ago as that and could never go back; so their news was always out of date. One simply did not meet ordinary Soviet citizens outside Russia. Press men found it hard to penetrate there, and then found they could hardly send out anything that was worth printing. These were professional men, so they came out disgruntled and even their books were biased. Ever since the intervention of 1919, the Soviets have been under the constant obsession of an impending attack, now realized. There is nothing that has done more to obstruct good will towards Russia than this official secretiveness, and there can be no real intercourse as between peoples till that heavy curtain is down.

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And then there is also the profound ignorance and superficiality of our own ideas on this subject, for Russia and Russian lay outside all our courses of study.

As the ideas which I meet are consistently twenty years out of date, we must go back and see what has really happened in Russia. The evidence has long been conclusive enough and is now overwhelming. A distraught lady, trying to save a tottering autocracy for her sick boy, sent her weak-willed husband to play at commander-in-chief and, as is proved by her letters to him and by the most complete documentary evidence, entrusted all the major decisions of government to a lewd charlatan whom she regarded as the voice of God because her boy was kept alive by his hypnotism. A brave but illiterate army was sent unarmed to the shambles, and the worn-out monarchy went down in a blood bath of casualties which covered the country. This and in no way Marxism was the real cause of the Russian Revolution. Society was breaking up, and it was essential to put some new authority in the yawning gap thus created.

A month later men with no administrative experience but with a burning purpose, pledged to a new doctrine planned for industrial countries and not for agrarian Russia, returned from abroad to set up a new order for which there had been no lasting historical precedent. They were ruthless in their purpose, world-wide in their challenge and ridiculous in their first experiments. They closed all shops without having prepared any substitute, and the towns starved. They entrusted factories to general assemblies of the workers, and the factories went to ruin; they paid wages irre-

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spective of work, and the workers stopped working; they claimed all profits except bare maintenance from the labor of the peasants, and the peasants stopped producing. They confiscated far and wide, and foreign trade disappeared. They won their civil war against the dispossessed and their foreign helpers, but they had ruined the country. However, they were very willing learners, and these fantastic experiments were thrown aside and never repeated in the same form. Meanwhile, faced by a merciless and victorious enemy, they had had to abandon nearly everything won by Russia in the last two hundred years on her western side, including the lifework of their greatest sovereign, Peter the Great. The world revolution to which they had sacrificed the interests of Russia failed to materialize.

From 1921 Russia was a country ruled by communists who had ceased to practise communism. They had tried to abolish money, but now they had to come back painfully to some kind of currency and had to appeal to the foreign governments which they had challenged, for the means to carry on. They still clung to the hope that the doctrines of Marx might triumph in those industrial countries for which they were intended, but there followed three impressive fiascos—the failure of the communist revolution in Germany in 1923, the failure of the general strike in Britain in 1926, and the defeat of communism in China by Chiang Kai-shek in 1927. It was precisely the completeness of these failures, where no civil war materialized, that was so conclusive—far more so than if there had been campaigns, battles and a victory for their adversaries. They had not won

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a single country to their ideas; the net results of all their efforts to stir up trouble abroad were Fascism and Nazism.

The Communist Party had established itself as the real ruler of Russia, but it was split from end to end by the effect of these failures. And after the bitterest possible quarrel between its leaders, it changed radically both in its objectives and in its composition. It was a sheer fight between two men. On the one side, Trotsky, internationalist by his origin in a race that has no country, brilliant linguist, journalist and orator, artist of conspiracy whose work had lain outside Russia, stirring up revolutions against all governments. On the other side, Stalin, son of a cobbler, not a linguist, who had hardly ever been abroad but had fought the Tsar grimly on his own ground, jailed five times and ultimately a winner, a man in whom the horse sense of the working classes rose to genius, and by all his past and all his environment made for the people to whom he belonged. To Trotsky's iteration of the worn-out plea of "continuous revolution" he opposed his own sensible mottoes which have remained permanent, and no one can be excused for not realizing the contrast. "Socialism [he does not say "communism"] in one country" (his own). "Revolution is not for export; every country must make its own" (and even Lenin said that). "We are quite ready for working relations with any foreign government, even capitalist, which is friendly to the Soviet Union"; this last proved the indispensable basis of the alliance of today. The country, Russia, has come back, and step by step drives the world revolution into a remoter corner. "He [Stalin] said to me

himself," writes Joseph E. Davies, American Ambassador, "that they figured that for him and his associates to achieve that [socialistic-communistic community in Russia that would be a model for the world] was a man-sized job and as much as they could do without trying to run the whole world." Ever since 1922 the Russians have assured us in vain that in Russia we should find "communists but not communism." And today anyone there, official or otherwise, will tell you the same.

The straight fight between Stalin and Trotsky was a very sharp one. By 1929 Stalin had won outright. He evidently had the support of the country and in particular of the young who, by the conditions of the time, had long since been cut off from Europe. He drove his rival from point to point and ultimately back into exile, from which Trotsky practised all his old arts to bring down his hated enemy.

Stalin could now turn to his own program, which was one of construction inside Russia itself. And the "one country" was large enough to go its own way, for it covered nearly a sixth of the land surface of the earth and was endowed with the richest of undeveloped resources. There could have been no appeal, at once more commanding or practical, than for the working up of all these potential riches not for individual owners but for the community as a whole. And this call recaptured the enthusiasm both of the party and of the people. We have ourselves to blame if we cannot see the contrast between this practical and patriotic program and the vain pursuit of world revolution; and the retreat of dictation was itself the surest way to respect, good will or even

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imitation in other countries. Stalin has no record of successes in world revolution. According to Trotsky, it is he who spoiled the favorable chances in 1923, 1926 and 1927; and that is why Trotsky's indictment bears the title "The Revolution Betrayed." Stalin is a home statesman, with a home record of construction, and the new generation which he has created consists not of world conspirators but of technicians, administrators and builders, who base their experience and their enthusiasm on achievements at home.

Two objects face any patriotic statesman: to raise the level of well-being in his own country and to make it defensible against the invader. And both objects had behind them evidence painful enough in the recent past to drive them home on a ruler of Russia. Both alike demanded that Russia should acquire her own heavy plant, which could not be obtained without the good will of other countries. Confiscation had long since been discontinued as senseless, but the smell of it still hung heavy over the rest of the world. Russia could only buy at a hard bargain, and meanwhile belts must be tightened in hopes of the future, for it would be long before the heavy plant could yield its results, and meanwhile the growing recovery of the country must again be delayed. Besides, there were inevitably mistakes to be faced and lessons to be learned. Clearly in this critical period there was a chance of turning the country against Stalin, and it was certainly taken. No one will suggest that there were not numerous innocents who perished in Stalin's ruthless suppression of all opposition, but certainly there

was organized and systematic wrecking. In 1934 came the time when the Plan at last turned the corner and the long awaited "consumers' goods" began to appear. From that moment Stalin had won through, and with him the home program as against world revolution. Stalin was dealing with a kind of "Fifth Column," but we have yet to realize that the principal victims of his purges were precisely the world revolutionists who hoped—for a time, not without reason—that if they could unseat him they might bring Russia back to their own program. No doubt those of them who are outside Russia have just the same wish now.

In his first ruthless push of industrialization Stalin had throughout been working against a time-limit. Evidently he acquainted himself with Hitler's program, as outlined in *Mein Kampf*, much earlier than our statesmen of the West, and this was natural enough in view of the direct threat to Russia which was long ago contained in it. The end of the first Russian Five-Year plan saw Hitler master of Germany, and this was only one of two challenges. Stalin was threatened at his front door by Germany and at his back door by Japan, just the two powers which are making the same fateful challenge to Britain and America.

All the ensuing legislation, which I published at the time without comment in London, showed clearly how his mind was working, for his thoughts passed directly into action. Russia was ruled by 2,000,000 communists—a number far less than the casualties to be expected in another general war, and these were, so to speak, the "first-class citizens" of the country. Stalin in his work of industrialization and col-

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lectivization, which the present war has proved to have been so indispensable, had at one time been almost at war with the main body of his own people—the peasantry. If they were to be expected to defend their country, and—still more doubtful—himself as their ruler, he must give some satisfaction to their elementary instincts, and this he at once resolutely proceeded to do. I could not fail to see from this legislation that the waters were now running in a new direction—back to Russia and patriotism in the sharpest contrast with world revolution.

The first instinct to satisfy was that of property, and this is how the matter stands now. The peasant's home is his property, also his kitchen garden, with a small allotment in personal holding. Within reasonable limitations he has his livestock, and also his share in his collective farm, which, by the most rigorous bookkeeping, depends on the work which he has put into it. He may not acquire anything by the hired labor of others, but what he has himself earned is guaranteed to him by the State as his property and can be invested in the savings bank or bequeathed. Without all this, Stalin could hardly have expected the resolute resistance now being made by the guerrillas; for the guerrilla is in substance the collective farm in arms. Meanwhile, the factory worker was encouraged to do his best by a progressive overpayment, according to the amount by which he exceeded his assignment.

The family was brought back to full honor, discipline fully and sternly reestablished among the young. Divorce was penalized by a progressive tax mounting steeply accord-

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ing to repetition. Abortion, formerly indulged, became a grave criminal offense.

Learning, which had become sheer propaganda, was restored to objectivity. Merit became the only road to the university. In a famous decree, which came directly from himself, Stalin denounced "the overburdening of school children and pioneers with civic and political training" (April 24, 1934). Knowledge was "debunked." The Chairs of History were restored in universities, and the authority of the teachers reasserted. A revised official history of Russia called back to honor all the glories of Russia's national past; religion was declared to have been at first, before the subsequent official degradation, a self-evident step forward in civilization.

We must not fail to recognize that these radical changes, if they were acts of grace, or rather of intelligence, on the part of Stalin, were also triumphs for the main body of the people and were therefore, in their way, moves in the direction of democracy. They were crowned by a constitution of 1936, directly named after Stalin, which at first looked like the frankest recognition of the same principle, only to be curtailed for the time by measures of repression obviously connected with the coming war.

Stalin's foreign policy was even easier to understand, though foreign ignorance and suspicion prevented the understanding. Clearly he had to seek coöperation with those who were threatened by the same enemies, and he did so without delay. Relations with the United States had never been resumed since the Revolution: he restored them as

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soon as possible (November 16, 1933). He made first a pact of non-aggression (November, 1932) and then an alliance (May 2, 1935) with France, another democracy. In September, 1934, he brought Russia into the center of the Anglo-French combination, the League of Nations. And his Foreign Minister Litvinov, who played an outstanding part at Geneva, at each new aggression of the hostile camp called for a common front against it. Stalin's primary interest was world peace, in order that he might continue the task into which he had thrown his heart and his energy, that of home construction, which must inevitably suffer from a new war. This had been clear ever since the Soviets had let the Chinese Eastern Railway go to Japan for an old song. In Ethiopia Russia stood strongly for the Ethiopians. In Spain, after replying first with efficient help to the provocative challenge of Italy and Germany, Stalin chose to stand in with the democracies in the hope that the futile Non-Intervention Committee in London would at last challenge all intervention. In all this policy he has been denounced by Trotsky as a betrayer of world revolution, and in Spain the two were engaged in a sharp subterranean war among the Spanish communists. Russia made a treaty with Czechoslovakia, and both before and *after* Munich offered her support. The long abortive negotiations with Britain and France in 1939 were, on Stalin's part, another attempt to present a common front to Hitler's aggressions. Ignorance, suspicions and misunderstandings on both sides prevented its realization then, but at a heavy price we have it now.

By the Russo-German Pact of August 23, 1939, which

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was never an alliance, whether political, military or economic, and has best been described as "the pact which was also a duel," Russia gained great advantages: a respite of a year and a half, time to study the novelties of German warfare as practised on others, and the chance of snatching back part of the territory lost in the last war. It had been threatened by Hitler in *Mein Kampf*, and formed a kind of *glacis* incapable of self-defense and consisting for the most part of Russian population. On the Baltic, Stalin also tried to recover the lost gates of Leningrad, the special achievement of Peter the Great; this was also threatened by Hitler, who had already begun work on Memel. On the south side of the Gulf of Finland he succeeded. Finland was his most serious miscalculation, and here he had ultimately to content himself with pushing back the frontier a little further from Leningrad, which was only some twenty miles off. Russia has no need to fear Finland, so long as Finland is not, as at present, a springboard for a German attack on Leningrad. At present Hitler holds all this disputed territory and someone has got to drive him out.

It was only a repetition of the fatal logic of Napoleon that Hitler, baffled in the direct invasion of Britain, should turn eastward to bring all Europe under his control which led, by the same fatal logic, to the invasion of Russia. With hardly any resistance, he pushed his way through the frail structure of French policy which by a system of alliances had tried to paste together little states full of mutual jealousies into some kind of eastern barrier. Russia saw well what was coming, and was preparing hëctically to meet

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invasion. After the first pettish irritation at the diplomatic failure of 1939, she was brought back to gravity by the fall of France and the imminent danger to Britain, which left her the next on the list. At once, the Allied war news took first place in the Russian press which, in sharp contrast to Mussolini, assured its public that Britain as yet was by no means beaten. As far as possible, everything was ready for June 22, 1941, when she stood firm against the extravagant demands of Hitler; and the statesmanship of Churchill, that same day, turned the danger of Russia into a logical alliance with Britain.

I will not go into the detail of the magnificent resistance of the Russian people in arms, forecast by Churchill as the foundation of the British alliance; but I must emphasize the decisive influence which it has had on my country. It is true the Russians, as Churchill pictured them at that time, are defending their own homes; but by the valor of that defense they are rendering to us the highest service which one people can render to another, and it is one which we cannot possibly fail to recognize and remember. At countless meetings which I have attended in all parts of Britain, with every party represented on the platform, the non-party chairman will remind the audience that it is the valor of that resistance that has given us more than a year's respite from perhaps the gravest danger that has ever threatened us. This unanimity of deep gratitude, naturally enough, is markedly the strongest in those cities which have suffered most from bombing; for this time we have had the war in our rear and that factor is now the fountain of

our energies. While in this country, I have sometimes heard loose talk of a third war against Russia. Do not expect us to take any part in such criminal foolishness or throw away the friend whom Hitler has so stupidly given us beyond the deserts of our past understanding.

What will Stalin do after victory? We have to wait for the victory, but perhaps this sketch will offer some answer. The normal thing for Stalin to do is to return to that vast program of home construction, so far only initiated, which has been the great task of his life. It is simple fantasy to imagine that the man who drove out Trotsky on the issue of world revolution will now desert to the program of his bitterest enemy. The leadership of Stalin is very much nearer to the ground than that of Hitler, and if he did so, there is enough of the instinct of democracy in the people whom he led throughout the periods of preparation and of battle to call his attention to its own material interests which he has so well understood and directed.

If we have all been twenty years late in our theories and forecasts, this is equally true of the Communist Parties abroad, who have been just as unintelligent and must have been among Stalin's gravest embarrassments. After he defeated Trotsky, he did not let the Comintern meet for six years; and when it was at last restored, it had become an agency not of world revolution but of Soviet, that is to say Russian, policy. To this, too, the objections of other countries were surely reasonable and now he has abolished it altogether. World revolution is an out-of-date catchword in Russia itself. One no longer finds any real interest in it.

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As to future peace, that is what Stalin, thinking only in the interests of his own country, has wanted all along. Britain has already given him a guarantee for twenty years against German aggression, and Russia—witness her present condition—is in as dire need of that guarantee as any country in Europe. Stalin is entrenched in suspicions and prejudices which are not those of a world revolutionary but of the ruler of Russia, but we must recognize that he knows his own interests and that peace on his borders is the first requisite for his continuance of his own task. He will stand for the frontiers which he feels that Russia has the right to claim; in my opinion he will foster friendship with the smaller Slav states to the west of him—an independent Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria—which are the best of buffers against German aggression. But in the main his eye ranges wide over the vast expanse of his own Soviet state and those vast potentialities which it has been his merit almost for the first time to call into life.

But if peace is to be permanent it must before all things be a peace of peoples. Let Stalin, like us, forget the rancors of the past, because it is only by throwing the doors open that intercourse between peoples for mutual benefit of exchange and culture can be made a practical reality.

II

RUSSIA AND COMMUNISM

MARXISM WAS NOT inevitable in Russia. It was in no sense the cause of the Russian Revolution. It is essential in studying Russian Communism to disentangle it from the far more obvious causes which shaped Russian history in that most poignant period.

Of these causes the first was the fantastic incompetence of the Russian government, more especially from the autumn of 1915. Just before that, while in England on leave from the Russian Front, I had said in a memorandum which Sir E. Grey asked me to write for the British War Cabinet, that without a sharp change in Russian management, revolution would become inevitable.

It almost seemed at the time as if that sharp change might come in several stages. There had long since been a liberal movement in Russia bringing her nearer to constitutional rule as practised by the Western democracies; but till that came, decisions were taken not by the national assembly, but by the weak-willed sovereign, and he was swayed by the last person who had talked with him. This was usually his wife, who was obstinately set on preserving the autocracy for her little son. The child was a "bleeder," afflicted with a disease which his mother had herself brought into the Russian reigning family. She had good

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reason to believe that several times, when the best doctors were in despair, he owed his life to the hypnotic intervention of Rasputin. She would hear nothing against this man and regarded him as the Voice of God. Meanwhile everyone else knew that he was a sexual blackguard, constantly disgracing himself at notorious low haunts by scenes of which the police reports were unprintable, and were enough to drag down the prestige of any monarchy. In the summer of 1915 it looked for a moment as if under the influence of national defeat the Tsar was coming into full union with his people; but the Empress challenged and won; and from this time on, as her letters to her husband prove conclusively, nearly all the major decisions of government were dictated to him through her by Rasputin. The best ministers were dismissed and, as no one but scoundrels would choose this road to office, their places were taken by crooks who sought nothing but their own aggrandizement. One of these quarreled with Rasputin and even tried to arrange his murder. Such was the government of Russia in a world war, and that was why reform gave way to revolution.¹

Already in the first few months of the war, the generals were informed by the war minister that munitions were used up and there would be no more for six months. A month later, the cleverest of them, General Brusilov, writes in his memoirs that the regular army had been pounded to pieces and replaced by "a militia of ignoramuses." On May 2, 1915, I saw a division being reduced from a normal fif-

¹ I have published this story with full documentation, in my book, *The Fall of the Russian Monarchy*.

teen thousand to five hundred, and a regiment from four thousand to forty-one. After ten months of war I had to carry back confidentially from the Russian War Office to Lord Kitchener the figure of the Russian losses for the period. It was three million, eight hundred thousand—a figure confirmed in post-war military publications. The Russian army held out for two years after that; but on the eve of the Revolution, in the winter of 1916, I learned that the average number of survivors out of an original company of two hundred and fifty was between four and five, and the figures showed that most units had been replaced practically three times over. What the army lacked in munitions was paid for in human lives. This was the actual cause of the Revolution.

You could not cover even the most passive country with cripples from the Front, some of whom had never even had a rifle in their hands. Clearly, such a government was bound to be swept away. It fell before a quite unorganized street demonstration, asking at first only for bread, on which the idiotic last agents of Tsardom ordered the police to fire with machine guns. Petrograd was crowded with the last “combings out,” predestined for the shambles. These raw troops, at last armed with Allied aid, joined the people, and in a single day the whole thing was over.

But the Revolution, however it came—even if only by default of the government—was far more important to Russia than the war itself. A system originally built up for national defense, and at one time competent, had crumbled; and when it fell, it left behind it a yawning gap. The Tsar

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was gone, and with him all who could claim authority in his name—the police were abolished because they had fired on the people. I lived through that distressful time, and may I never again see the break-up of a whole community—and worse than that, a break-up of character—with adventurers on all sides fishing in the troubled waters. Something else had got to be put in that empty place as soon as possible; and the premium was on whatever was farthest removed from the system which had just fallen.

Stolypin had said before his assassination in 1911 that without a war the revolutionaries could do nothing, and the majority of them were by no means Marxist. The number of active members in the whole Social-Democratic Party, given me by one of them soon after the fall of the last Tsar, was forty thousand, and of these, in all probability, the majority were Mensheviks and not Bolsheviks. Trotsky, himself at that time a Menshevik, never disguised the insignificance of these figures. At the New Year of 1917, just after the death of Rasputin, I remember that I ranged over the field of possibilities. I took account of the Bolsheviks: none of their prominent leaders were in Russia. Lenin later returned to Russia only a month and a day after the Tsar had fallen; Trotsky came later still.

Marxism did not take the center of the stage till some months after the March revolution, and at that time every month almost seemed a century, with all the supports of a human society falling away, hardly noticed, day by day. In an illiterate people, and especially in an illiterate army—for that was what really counted—the insistent urge was to

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peace. This meant that the first issue lay between Russia's allies and her enemies, and in particular between England and Germany. The dice were loaded against England, for Germany offered peace and England asked for more fighting. Speaking in Russian at innumerable meetings, I knew I was speaking simply to war weariness. Later I was very conscious of the moment when Marxism was coming into the middle of the picture.

I have felt throughout the whole story that, in the Marxist system, only that would take root in Russia which was in consonance with the natural instincts of the Russian people. Of course the direct appeal was that only the Bolsheviks—not the Mensheviks or anyone else—preached an immediate peace with Germany. As a matter of fact, the war had still a full year and a half to run, and if Germany won it, goodbye to the Russian Revolution: all the other revolutionary leaders were for fighting on to save the Revolution. In the end, it was we who saved the Bolshevik government by beating Germany in the west and annulling the notorious treaty of Brest-Litovsk. But none of that could be foreseen then.

The other direct appeal of the Bolsheviks—and Lenin's was the master mind of this period—was the summons to the peasants to seize the land of the squires, which now that the police were gone was the easiest of tasks. General Brusilov has best put into words the force of that appeal: "From that moment," he says, "the officer was 'the squire in uniform,' " and in two months from March the deserters from the front numbered two million.

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But nothing in all this will explain why the Bolsheviks, having seized the power in November of the same year, have been able to keep it ever since.

I wish first to distinguish between two different things. One is the horrors of violence and the innumerable personal tragedies of that time. They are specially real to me, for so many of the best of my Russian friends perished in them, sometimes men who would have been invaluable to the free development of a liberal and constitutional Russia. I do not ever forget them, but I very early decided that if I were to keep my balance, I must think of them as of other dear friends who had perished in the war itself, and must understand that, in the terrible conditions which I have related, the explosion which followed was the expression of the wrath of a backward and insurgent people. On the other hand I am sure that the Communists would never have remained in power if they had continued in the practices with which they started; and of that, the most convincing proof is to be found in their own subsequent changes. The word "Bolshevik" has itself radically changed its meaning.

Let us look deeper into the question. The instinctive appeal of Marxism to the Russian consciousness lay in its fundamental idea of collectiveness. I remember a simple village priest, by no means a Bolshevik, saying to me at the time that the situation recalled to him the earliest days of Christianity. It was certainly not the idea of hate, and therefore of slaughter—whether of squires or of anyone else, that ruled the decision: though this was played up to its utmost at the time, and hatred is the inevitable concomi-

tant of a revolution. I believe anyone who knows the real Russia will share this view.

Let us see what roots the collective idea had in the past of Russia. Tsardom itself had grown directly out of the collective idea. It was originally a national dictatorship, then clearly welcomed by the people as a whole, to liberate them from more than two centuries of Tartar domination, and later for the national defense against yearly Tartar attacks. This was understood by every peasant, for the Tartars came yearly with baskets to take away the little children (especially the girls) and with ropes to drag the men into slavery. Russian peasants have never challenged the principle of conscription, so long as the practice was fairly distributed, as it was indeed by the great army reform of Count Dmitry Milyutin in 1874, which allowed no exemption for rank or birth, but only for necessary breadwinners or for education. And to the Russian soldier of today the defense of a country which he can regard as his own is instinctively and immediately accepted. The trouble was that Tsardom had in practice degenerated into nothing better than the idea of a vast estate, the absolute property of its owner, with Ministers who were hardly more than domestic servants; and this was actually the sense in which Russia was governed by the Empress and Rasputin for the year and a half immediately preceding the Revolution. No one can suggest that individual enterprise was in any way encouraged under Tsardom. That was exactly what was lacking.

The collective idea is also the main chord of Russian Orthodox religion. This again is, in the main, a creation of

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national danger. It was the Church that held the nation together when there was a multiplicity of princes, subjects of the Tartar domination. In the last war religion—collective religion—shone on the Russian front, and I was witness of instances which I can never forget. For example, the regimental priest who, on an Easter-week midday of 1916 to the wonder and admiration of all, slowly and reverently, in his full vestments, walked under fire across No Man's Land to the enemy lines with no other possible object than to say the prayers for the dead for those of our men who had fallen there.

Take another feature of the old Russia whose origin is lost in the mists of the past. Throughout Russian history up to 1906 farming had been collective. Again what was lacking was essentially the opportunity for individual enterprise. I saw the Russian peasants when they voted whether to go haymaking, and I saw them as late as 1910 when at last by the established majority of two-thirds, they for the first time decided to divide up the village holding, not as heretofore for temporary occupation according to the number of hands, but for permanent ownership and inheritance. The private farm came as late as that. As I watched them coming home together from a distant part of the holding, with their scythes shouldered like rifles, to their common habitation in the village, or followed their long trains of carts, with their distinctive arched yoke, which somehow conveyed the impression of gun carriages, I saw in embryo what I was later to share—that instinctive fellowship and unity which was the life and spirit of the Russian army.

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And take the army! A British decoration—the Distinguished Service Order—was sent from London to the Grand Duke Nicholas, the Russian commander-in-chief, to assign for a courageous deed. He bestowed it on a particularly gallant regiment, as a whole—that of Smolensk, which had been decimated. The Russian Order of Courage (that of St. George), established, I believe, by Catherine the Great, was not given for some deed of individual heroism, but for doing under dangerous conditions what had anyhow to be done. The Knights of St. George are the pick of the Russian army of all times—the army which will rise in its ranks in the last review. Every man has his number. It will be commanded by Suvorov, for the first class goes only to that Commander-in-Chief who has entered the enemy capital at the head of his troops. The second class can only be won by the conquest of a province. The third and fourth are given to more junior officers for “Courage and Leadership”; the fourth was voted to Nicholas II for bravery under fire: it was the only distinction which he could not award to himself, and at the front or in imprisonment he wore no other. Then came four more classes for the rank and file, and these are, of course, the great majority. The George is now again worn in the Red Army, for it was won by fighting for Russia.

There was one other deep note in the Russian consciousness that gave real response to Lenin’s teaching, the more so that Lenin had devoted his life to the Russian people and suffered in its cause. We must never forget that class war first came from above. The peasants were the great

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majority of the people, and their history was the history of serfdom. The emancipation of 1861 had all the complications of a deferred operation, and it left many unsettled questions behind it. It came from the throne and was in itself a revolution. After it, the government had fallen back into hopeless reaction. The great reform had not obliterated the sense that there were two nations—born of different bones, as the old legend said—rulers and ruled. This sense pervaded all classes. It must have been puzzling to a stranger to Russia to find that “the people” (*narod*) meant the peasants, and later the peasants and workers, and, at the moment of revolution, the peasants, workers, and soldiers. The educated classes were habitually described by another name, “obshchestvo,” which means society. In 1905, I stood on a muddy village street—everyone else there was a peasant—while, by the light of lamps and torches, all present signed their names to a demand for an amnesty “for all who had suffered for the just cause of the people.” The gentry themselves were deeply conscience-stricken by their historical debt and shared the Russian instinct of sympathy for the underdog, sympathy for all who were oppressed and afflicted. This instinct pervaded Russian literature long before the Revolution. The very word “democracy” in Russia meant “the people,” the underdogs. Anyone who had had none of the luck of this world—the maimed, the convict—had his share of this pity. In all Russian field hospitals of the last war it was accorded generously to the wounded war prisoner: he was the stranger who had no friends. That the underdog of yesterday should in turn rise to power was an instinct on which

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could be built a "dictatorship of the proletariat," or if that was impossible, for of course it was, a dictatorship in its name and for its benefit.

And one thing more. There is a great deal of universalism in the Russian character—even in the Russian peasant. It was instinctive with the Russians to regard the world as one great brotherhood. A foreigner was a "far off brother" (I have often benefited by this), with whom it was fascinating to compare notes and find what both of you had in common. Here again Russian literature has truly portrayed the Russian people. Russian writers, with a deep pride in their people, and especially the greatest of them, have always felt sure that Russia had her own great word to say for future civilization as a whole, and that it would be a word of brotherhood; and their nearest brothers would be those who had shared, or whom they believed to have shared, their own lot of the underdog.

Let us return from all this to Lenin in 1917. There were other Marxists in many countries with very different views. Plekhanov, for instance, the founder of Russian Marxism, believed in democracy as we understand it, and trusted to reason and persuasion for his political success. Lenin was different. He had organized, chiefly from abroad, a fighting corps under the strictest discipline, the first totalitarian Party. It had prepared itself to take over the government of the country after a revolution and was trained in strictest obedience and in indifference to all opposition. On the other hand, he was throughout feeling his way to his new task. There was no precedent of communist administration

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except the few bloody weeks of communist power in Paris in 1871, which was likewise the sequel to a national defeat. Nor had the new administrators been able to have any experience of administration.

The Communist Party had two arms: one was the Soviet government, and those of its members who were assigned to it were under the direct orders of the heads of the Party. The other was the Comintern or Third International, whose purpose was world revolution—to spread the movement to other countries and thus paralyze any attacks on Russia. It was believed that, as so many other nations had gone through the same hell, success was possible and was to be grasped at once. Thus, for the time, this arm was by far the more important. The interests of Russia were made completely subordinate to it.

Of course there was resistance. Peace had to be accepted at once on the German terms; and Germany, who thought only in terms of plunder, and especially of grain from Ukraine, showed no mercy. Russia gave up nearly all the territory that she had won since Peter the Great. There was no reason why any educated non-Marxist Russian should accept this humiliation, especially as it meant desertion of the allies to whom Russia was pledged. Such men—in the educated classes, they were the majority—were prepared to go on with us. We on our side showed as little compunction in entering Russia as we are showing in the present war, wherever the Germans are to be countered. Nor was it likely that the novelty of Soviet rule would be accepted offhand by all Russians. Civil war and intervention meant bloodshed all

round, and it was precisely the military compactness of the small Communist Party that carried it through. We were all then thinking in terms of the war; the word Communism came to stink in the nostrils of Russia's former allies whom she had now deserted. In the negotiations at Brest-Litovsk, General Hoffmann, the German commander, cynically told the Soviet representatives that they were at least as absolute as the Tsars before them.

For me the disappointment was twofold. I had watched Russia while she was coming nearer to the liberal principles in which I believed. The first new government, which had tried to go on fighting on our side, had been overthrown, and it was replaced by an ideological dictation which I could never accept. All the same, I have to remember that Britain intervened, not indeed for the Tsar, but for a government which was after her own model, which left her little right to resent the Communists' appeal to her own people over her own head.

There were divergent views inside the party as to the tactics of world revolution. Lenin, keen as he was on its achievement, has left on record the opinion that every country was, for the Bolsheviks, a separate study and must proceed at its own time and in its own way. Trotsky, a wayward spirit who had only joined the Party after the March revolution, was for an immediate, simultaneous, and universal rising; and he utilized the world publicity of Brest-Litovsk to issue a world challenge. This declaration, associated with the first fantastic experiments of the new government with wholesale confiscation, and with the widespread

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horrors of the Civil War, was especially resented outside Russia.

By 1920 the revolution had won in Russia and was in retreat everywhere else. In wartime we all, in a way, become war communists in practice. We are prepared to share food and housing, and our lives are at the disposal of the community to which we belong. This first period of the Russian revolution, a period of war and intervention, is the only one in the record of Soviet rule that is called communistic in Russia, and it is described there as the period of War Communism. A year later Lenin, having won the civil war but at the same time having deepened the ruin of the country, threw away the fantastic first experiments and gave Russia a chance to recover in her own way. The shops were reopened, the trams again ran for money, the peasant recovered his market, and, to my knowledge, numbers of young enthusiasts who had helped to win the civil war committed suicide.

The Soviet government had hoped to replace currency by barter. As the country was in ruins, it had to tread the same painful path back to a stable currency as Germany and France, and it sought the help of those very "capitalist" governments which it had threatened with destruction. Rakovsky, its spokesman at the conference of Geneva in September, 1922, said that a visitor to Russia would now find there "communists but not communism." This was true; and it has remained true ever since. Communism since then has only been spoken of, whether by officials or individuals, as a distant goal.

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Hope dies hard, and the internationalists still believed that Marxism might yet come true for one of those industrial countries which Marx had in mind when he wrote. Instead of that came the three impressive failures, which have been mentioned—first in Germany in 1923, next in England in 1926, and then in China in 1927. The Party was split to its depths, and these three failures led straight to the dog fight between Stalin and Trotsky which has already been described, and Trotsky's "continuous revolution" was replaced by Stalin's "socialism" (not even communism) "in one country," that is, Russia.

Watching the whole story from the outset, almost like the temperature chart of a fevered patient in a hospital, with first a great drive from the rulers above and then a great drift from the people below, I wondered when the rulers would find out the limits of what they could put into practice, and the people would see what they were able to accept. In 1936, I heard a young government spokesman address a meeting of Moscow railway workers on the theme of the transition from socialism to communism. They had an upstanding independence which I should not have seen before the revolution, and they literally pelted the speaker with little pellets containing questions which might just as likely have been asked at a similar gathering in Hull or Newcastle: Would marriage still be approved? Would overpay continue? Was it possible to equalize different people's abilities? The waves were dying down; Russia was returning to the normal. The interest in world revolution had faded away. The Russians were interested in their own

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country, of which they had now reason to be proud. The Five Year Plans had proved a great achievement for the benefit of every member of the community.

The synthesis for which I had been waiting came, in my opinion, in the entirely new trend of Soviet legislation of 1935 and onward: the restoration (within strict limitations) of the profit motive, the triumphant return of the family and of discipline of children, the return of objectiveness in education. Without these, I think the national resistance to the main weight of Hitler's army would have been impossible. These radical alterations came as a great shock to the communists outside Russia. They have missed the significance of these changes; and even the so-called fellow-travelers have had a fuzzy idea that the alliance with Russia which we have today calls for some mild tribute to world revolution.

Stalin was busy with a wholesale transformation of the ruling Communist Party itself. To meet the promised attack of Hitler, he needed deeper roots in the population than his two million first-class citizens of the Party, who would soon be expended in a great national war. That was the reason for his call for "non-Party Bolsheviks" or key men, as we should put it; for "Bolshevik" now means one who puts vigor and ability into the execution of the government's requirements. In fact, the whole aim of the constitution of 1936 was to discover and bring in helpers of ability from all sections of the population. The Communist Party still rules Russia, but only about a third of its members have been in the Party for more than ten years. The excluded

are before all things the former world revolutionists. You will now find them more easily in America than in Russia.

Are we to gather from all this that communism no longer means anything for the Russian? No critical student could suggest that it is so with Stalin. It is his one faith; and though it was long before he met him, his venerated teacher was Lenin himself. But as to its application in practice, there were plenty of differences between the earliest Communist leaders, of whom Stalin was not one. There is evidence that Stalin's rude common sense very early distrusted Trotsky's challenge to the rest of the world. Later, he has said very clearly that if Marxism is a live doctrine, it has to adopt itself to the changing world environment, and more recently even more plainly that Marx could not have foreseen what the world was to be like a hundred years after his time. The faith has been molded by common sense. If we regard his acts rather than his words, and these are much more revealing, he has changed his course steadily and radically and it is precisely the world challenge of Trotsky that he has repudiated.

And what does communism now mean for the ordinary Russian? To start with, it does most definitely mean that the people as a whole are the owners of the means of production, and this is in no way likely to be reversed. You can always tell, in talking to Russians, which of the acts of Soviet policy have real enthusiasm behind them, and this is the first among them. Russians can all explain the reason for it, and its working, and it is something of which they are generally proud. But its meaning is explained to them by what goes

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with it. It means the intimate care of Mother Russia for all her children of whatever race, an entirely free service of public health and education, infinite care for the child, the woman, the cripple, the sick, the old, which is something that cannot be measured in any imaginary equivalent of wages. It means an ideal to be nearer approached, very much as Christianity is to us. Indeed, it is the achieved blend of the old and the new.

And strange as it may seem, what I have found most striking in this new Russia is at last that bracing up of the individual which was so long missing. That is the chief difference which I have noticed since the revolution. I will even venture to guess that this is perhaps a nearer approach to true democracy than the liberal movement before the revolution; for then liberalism was a theory where the sense of its responsibilities was lacking, and now we are beginning to see that material of character and purpose out of which a true democracy can be made.

III

RUSSIA AND RELIGION

THE STORY OF the Communist attack on religion seems to me a very simple one. But to understand any Russian problem one has to know the country—its real values and particularly its hidden values.

Here, to start with, is one fact which perhaps explains more than anything else in this story. M. Paléologue, witty and courtly ambassador of the French Republic to the last Tsar, states in his diary: "This people is more religious than its Church." This is true, but not because Russians are ignorant or superstitious; it applies not only to the masses but also to the best Russian minds. Hardly any really intelligent person can fail to recognize this even as he enters the country. All native Russian philosophy has always been idealistic. Of itself, without any special pleading, it arrived at the recognition of the unseen world, of the guiding Deity. When I was translating an article on Lopatin, one of the best Russian philosophers, I remember how a great and loved teacher of mine stood by and listened. As Lopatin's argument reached that inevitable conclusion, my friend commented: "A spirit such as that could dwell in no meaner shrine." It was within the people of all classes,

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not within the formal Church, that the spirit of religion had its real home.

In no country did the great German philosophers from Kant to Hegel leave a greater impression than on the educated élite in Russia; but no sooner did a German idea, perhaps quite secular in its origin, take root in Russia than it at once took on a religious character. Naturally, it was so with the native Slavophiles, men of enlightened, conservative and patriotic thought. The leader of the school, Kireyevsky, was at one time a pupil of Hegel, but made his own very different adaptations of Hegel's teaching. But even the westernizers like Belinsky could only preach atheism in the language of religion—"the cowl has been placed on our heads." The same thing happened with Marxism. And the giants of Russian literature, Turgenev, Tolstoy and Dostoyevsky (especially the last two, who were the most characteristically Russian), were all permeated with religion and had their chosen spiritual advisers in one or other of the great monasteries. Dostoyevsky, in particular, who is far the best interpreter of the mysteries of Russian thought, speaks of his beloved Russia as the Christopher or Christ-bearer, who always carries Christ with him. He is speaking of the Russian peasant and it would be crass ignorance to count this all off as superstition, as has been done by so many foreign visitors and as indeed was fashionable even before the Revolution among some Russian intellectuals, who regarded religion as something entirely out-of-date.

But in the upper levels of the church hierarchy religion had come near to exchanging the substance for a distorted

formalism. In the earlier great period of unrest in Russia, the "Time of Troubles" at the turn of the sixteenth century, there was for a while no Tsar. But there was still an independent head of the Church, the Patriarch, and it was the Church, more than any other leadership, that brought the country back to health and order. The fourth Tsar of the new dynasty of the Romanovs, Peter the Great, resented any rival authority and let the Patriarchate lapse. He put the Church under a civil official whom he significantly described as "the Tsar's eye." From that time the independence of the Church was gone. By the time of the Revolution, the official church had become something very like an extra police ministry. Priests were expected to report the words of their parishioners to the police, some had to send in their sermons for censorship, and two of my own friends among them were actually unfrocked—one for mildly liberal opinions, and the other for speaking against capital punishment which, it must be remembered, was only retained for military offenses or for those who challenged the authority of the government.¹

It is this debasement of the official church which alone can explain the medieval caricature of the last two years of the monarchy. Then, as is shown by the most clearly documented evidence, principal appointments in the Church were dictated by the lewd Rasputin, whom the distraught Empress regarded as the savior of the life of her sick child and as therefore infallible. It is an established fact that

¹ Ordinary murderers were not executed from the reign of Elisabeth (1742-1762).

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Rasputin, who was meanwhile making a public scandal of himself, was able to appoint a political adventurer, Pitirim, to the most important post in the Russian Church. We have the amazing record of the offer of a very large sum of money to him by the Prime Minister, A. F. Trepov, on condition that he should cease to interfere in political affairs but might do what he liked with the Church. Rasputin refused the offer, and it was not he but Trepov who was dismissed. Then, and not now, was the time when religion was in real danger in Russia.

The real Church—that is, the community of Orthodox believers—hated all this far more than the outside public. In 1905, simultaneously with the great liberal movement which took shape in the creation of the Duma, the Church, through its clergy and laity, demanded the calling of a church council to give it a new congregational basis and the restoration of the Patriarchate as the symbol of its freedom. The Tsar nearly gave way. Rasputin advised against any change. Directly after the fall of the Monarchy, this great movement went through of itself. The Church Council was called, and the Patriarchate was restored. The head of the government, who was present to give the sanction of the State, was the Labor leader, Alexander Kerensky.

I possess the legislation which, after the fall of the Tsar, the government of Kerensky prepared to propose to the impending Constituent Assembly. It included toleration and even support of all religious bodies, with the recognition that Russian Orthodoxy was the Mother Church of Russia.

The general chaos which followed the fall of Tsardom

was only ended by the seizure of power by the Communists in November, 1917. They were mostly emigrants returned from Europe. One of their mottoes was the superficial statement of Marx: "Religion is dope for the masses." Yes, it had been used in that very way; but anyone who thought that this phrase exhausted the subject could only be without any understanding of religion, and above all of what religion meant to the Russian. I have often asked Soviet friends: "Is it not quite clear that Jesus Christ was what you call a proletarian?" and they find it impossible to deny it. They then insist that religion had become perverted, and above all misused, and I agree with them. But why challenge the reality as if it were the perversion? In Russia, the attempt to stamp out the religious feeling was from the first doomed to failure.

The new dictators nationalized all church buildings, funds and property, but they did the same all round. The church buildings could be leased back to parish communities for worship, but they could be alienated again by a majority of the inhabitants of a community on a show of hands. (The ballot had now been abolished.) There were about a thousand priests and as many as forty bishops who perished by violence in the Civil War; but after the initial hysteria official interference with the performance of worship was not attempted. The constitution declared freedom of conscience and of religious and anti-religious propaganda. The vital threat was a law forbidding religious instruction to persons under eighteen in groups of more than four. The intention was to cut off religion at the source, allowing it to

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die out with the old believers. The direct attack was on ministers of all religions, who were thereby called upon to betray their ordination vows and to abstain from instructing the young; it is surprising that clerical sympathizers abroad have never understood this.

This direct threat was manfully resisted, and in the spring of 1923 two trials were prepared. That year the Western Easter preceded the Eastern by one week, and this was utilized to test public response to persecution of the clergy. In the Western Easter week, with deliberate imitations of the Passion, foreign priests—Polish Catholics—were put on trial. A précis of the trial, which was often verbatim, was taken by my friend, Captain Francis McCullagh, an Irish Catholic, and one of the most famous of pre-war correspondents in Russia. At one point, the public prosecutor actually set the code of Soviet laws against the Bible and quoted: "We have a law and by that law you have to die." The refusal of the Catholic priests was magnificent and unanimous: they would continue teaching the young as before. The Catholic Archbishop Cieplak was condemned to death. When he heard the sentence, he stood forward and gave the blessing: many of those in court fell on their knees, and McCullagh succeeded in sketching the scene. The Archbishop's principal lieutenant, Monsignor Budkiewicz, was actually martyred—I believe on Good Friday. McCullagh got the whole of his account out of Russia, and there was such a storm of indignation all over Europe and America that the Russian Patriarch, Tikhon, who was to have come before the court in the succeeding Orthodox

Easter Week, was set free without trial. The Soviet Government feared for its recently concluded trade agreements. This was the end of the frontal attack, which has never been repeated in the same form. The Patriarch was everywhere welcomed by crowds of devoted believers, but he was a broken man, and died in 1925. The government did not allow him to be replaced till 1943.

Up to 1928-1929, the atheist attack was waged by arguments which could carry little conviction: for instance, the holy communion spread infection, the holy communion encouraged drunkenness, there was nothing left in the world to explain, the machine had superseded God. The silliest was the evidence of two airmen, published later, who said they had gone up to heaven and could not find God. There was much indirect harassing of believers and especially of priests. In 1928, the Minister of Education, Lunacharsky, who led this attack, made the fatal admission: "Religion is like a nail; the harder you hit it, the deeper it goes into the wood." Any thinking peasant could have told him this in advance.

More desperate measures, though not in the domain of force, were now attempted. The words "Religious and" were now deleted from the provision in the constitution to which I have referred, thus leaving only freedom of anti-religious propaganda (April 14, 1929). School-teaching, instead of being non-religious, was made anti-religious. This was a fatal mistake. You cannot teach a negation. The attempt to do so in Russia stimulated the very force which it sought to explain away. I have heard it tried, and seen it

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obviously fail to satisfy even the teacher himself. There were anti-religious museums to which school children were taken to implant a contempt for religion. In the end this phase passed from anti-religious propaganda to the safer ground of emphasis on scandalous pages in the history of all the churches.

Meanwhile, by a complicated omnibus law, built up on various local ordinances, the Church—which had energetically set itself to carry out some of the excellent social legislation of the government—was debarred from all activities except the performance of worship. Priests were forbidden to live in the towns and had to come in for their work. Many were arrested on the charge of hoarding, because they were inevitably found in charge of the offertories, by which alone the church buildings could be leased. Other expedients were adopted to cut off the priest from his parish, and many priests became travelling missionaries, carrying on their work in the same conditions and with the same support as the first ministers of Christianity. There was plenty of courage. Where the attack came home with most effect was in the matter of training, which had become almost impossible. And another heavy blow was given to church organization by the removal of bishops, or by obstacles put in the way of any regular visits to their dioceses.

I am quite convinced that the attack on the Church has driven religion back to the individual conscience. In the Orthodox communities, with the closing of the church, the icons or religious pictures turn every cottage into a chapel, and it is seldom that one does not find them there. The

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trend of religion in Russia is toward simple Bible Christianity. At the outset of the Soviet period, the non-conformists, themselves persecuted by the Orthodox Church under the Tsars, were left unmolested. They suffered in turn. And were likewise strengthened. The Baptists, in particular, now harassed like the rest, have made numbers of conversions which have attracted the alarm of the official press. One read also in their own literature the achievements of various missionaries who could never give their real names or indicate the scene of their labors. In a recent census which, among other statistics, took those of religious belief, so many confessed boldly to it that the figures were never published. I have been told that there were many others who evaded the question but held as firmly as before to their religion.

More successful were indirect measures, such as the establishment in the towns of a six-day week, which practically eliminated Sunday, and the conversion of village churches, by open vote, to other purposes. As the labor laws threatened everyone with the loss of food and lodging for a day's non-attendance at work, the six-day week was a serious blow, for only once in six weeks did the official rest day correspond with Sunday.

Since 1929, the government has relied on a semi-official body called the "Union of the Godless." Its President, E. Yaroslavsky, a highly intelligent man, has been described as a religious atheist who still hopes to carry his cause by conviction. I possess his instructions of 1937 to his followers and they prove his complete failure. He tells them that his

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organizations "have fallen to pieces," that there is only the most languid interest in the attack, that the churches are more active than ever, that there is an organized nucleus of something approaching a million Christians in the country, that religion has as much influence among the young as among the old (and this is best shown by the congregations on the great feast days), and that, in spite of everything, one-third of the town population and two-thirds of the country population (which is, of course, much more numerous) are still believers. This implies that something like half of the Red Army falls into this category.

There is one interesting development which Yaroslavsky, honest as he is, does not mention. Under the common pressure, the bitterness between rival forms of belief disappeared altogether. Orthodox and Jews supported each other in the difficult task of keeping open their places of worship. Baptists contributed to the upkeep of Orthodox parishes. As in the old days with liberal and revolutionary thought, the prison became a common meeting house of fellowship and sympathy for the religious-minded, and on their release the ministers of one religion would be visited and congratulated by those of another. It was inevitable too—in such a country as Russia, where sympathy with the suffering and oppressed has always been a primary instinct—that the hardships suffered by the priests should have banished the last traces of any class barriers that separated them from the laity. In country parishes they found a solid support in the peasantry, which served to carry them through the worst of their troubles. The humorlessness of the government propa-

gandists was a repetition of an error which, in the old days, was often made by the educated—whether governors, generals, or revolutionary propagandists—who all alike would spoon-feed the peasants as if they had no minds of their own, and often came in for rude surprises.

On the other side, Marxism itself, though acknowledging no foundation but sheer materialism, in Russia inevitably, like any other form of belief, became an idealism. After all, as has been recognized by the acutest of all its critics (Professor Sergius Bulgakov, once a Communist leader and now a Professor of Dogmatic Theology), the Marxist objective was the happiness of all—the poor, the maimed, the oppressed, the weak, the very old, the very young, the weaker sex—in other words, what we should describe as the Kingdom of God on earth; and the really great things that have been achieved in these directions are the finest part of the Soviet record. Does not God see all this, the critic asks, and will He hold to shame this will to a better world? Young communists themselves felt the void in which their materialist creed had left them. They have set themselves the sternest standards in ethics, but this could not fill the gap. In the end it becomes like a contest between two creeds which cannot see how alike they are: "Saul, Saul, why persecutest thou me?" The view of communism now accepted everywhere in Russia is that it is an ideal not yet attained and far-off; and that is how we all regard Christianity. Communism no longer means to Russians the horrors of the first blood-stained years of the Revolution for the ordinary man; it is the ideal, to be realized fully in the future, of

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complete and absolute devotion to the community. One of the most sympathetic accounts of the courage and devotion of the traveling church missionaries of today comes from the pen of Yaroslavsky himself. And from a sturdy priest comes the most understanding appreciation of the moral value of the communist training in a boy of 10 or 12, ending with the words: "Lord, what a good child of our Mother the Church might be made of him!"

Can I describe the conquering appeal of the great church festivals? The deep church bells, with their moving tone, the reminder that one was among the great family of Mother Russia, are now no longer there. But the roads are thronged with a mass of silent, reverent worshipers, whole families going to the great act of loyalty under fire. All have that set face which one recognizes everywhere as the hallmark of the new breed in Russia. There is only room for half of them indoors, and the rest will wait a full two hours in the wintry weather till the priests are ready for the second service. Even so, the big church is so crowded—all standing—that it is only with great difficulty that one can make one's way through to find a place. The deacons can only just get through to collect the generous alms for the poor; by our standards all there are poor. High up in the middle sit the twenty "church-wardens," a target for all eyes and for every threat, the stalwart leaders who keep the church still open. The heartsearching Russian church music is wonderfully full and beautiful, for the choir has been reinforced from churches which have been closed. Candles are reverently lit to be passed from hand to hand till they are placed before a

favorite icon or religious painting. Constantly the close throng has to part to let through individuals or even whole families who, while the Church is under challenge, will not leave the building till they have given their pledge of loyalty by kissing the cross. At the end, we make our way out to the street where the next congregation is patiently waiting.

No sooner had Stalin defeated Trotsky and expelled him finally from the country than he switched all the main forces of the new Russia from the wild-goose-chase after world revolution to the practical task of raising the level of well-being in his own country. As soon as the author of *Mein Kampf*, with its plain-spoken challenge of invasion of Russia, became the absolute ruler of Germany, Stalin set about rallying his forces of defense. He entirely restored the family to its old place of honor. Divorce, which had earlier been allowed almost without formality, now became subject to a progressive tax! Abortion, apart from exceptional cases, was now heavily punished and bonuses were given for large families. No wonder that in his bitterness of exile Trotsky, who is still the high priest of many of the communists outside Russia—whether or not they consciously admit it—wrote in *The Revolution Betrayed* (meaning betrayed by Stalin): “The Fifth Commandment has returned in Russia, and also the Seventh, though so far without any actual reference to God.”

He was right. I have never expected the flag of atheism to be pulled down. But I have always felt sure that religion, as I understand it, was winning through. One could also be sure that any improvement in Russia's relations with Britain

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and America would bring easier times for the Christians in Russia. The persecutions were a quite unnecessary sideline of the Marxian dogma. Yaroslavsky had himself exposed their failure. Stalin, it should be remembered, had been trained for the priesthood and was confined in a punishment cell for reading the works of Victor Hugo, which led to his vigorous exit from the Seminary; but, though Yaroslavsky was a friend of his youth, he had too much sense to follow his friend's fanaticism, and since 1936 significant changes have taken place. Even before then priests regained the vote, and Yaroslavsky himself wrote approval of this. Christian belief no longer debars from posts in Church and State. Icons can be manufactured and sold, and plenty of cottages seem to want one. The famous Iberian chapel over which was once placed the Marxian motto "Religion is dope for the masses," has been reopened. Blasphemous plays and films are no longer allowed. The President of the Soviet Union, Kalinin, has since asked soldiers of the Red Army to respect the wearing of a body cross by their Christian comrades at the front. In the country districts, the labor laws have been relaxed to allow of attendance at the chief religious festivals. Teachers from religious seminaries in Western Ukraine, which was temporarily annexed in 1939, have been appointed to professorships in Soviet universities. Polish priests, and apparently even Russian priests, can hold their services in the front line; some are serving in the Russian guerrillas. *The Godless* had to publish an article by one of Stalin's publicists, stating that Sunday must be restored because that is the wish of the majority of the peo-

ple. And *The Godless* has since been discontinued "in view of shortage of paper."¹

The war, as might have been counted on, has greatly quickened this process. From the first, the Church called for all sacrifices in the defense of the country, and this call found its echo in emigrant communities abroad, where prayers were offered up for the triumph of the Red Army. Hitler's collusion with the exiled reactionary branch of the Russian Church in Serbia had no success either there or in his invasion of Ukraine. The Moscow prelates replied with a vigorous denunciation which was printed in book form by the Soviet State Press and has been circulated in America. When Archbishop Temple became Primate of England, it was the Russian government that served as intermediary for his exchange of greetings with the Metropolitan Sergius in Moscow. This has been followed up by a wartime visit of his colleague, the Archbishop of York, to Moscow. And, of all things, the Patriarchate, allowed to lapse by Peter the Great and only temporarily restored in 1917, has now been reestablished with the approval of Stalin (September 12, 1943). We understand that the regular training of priests in public institutions has also been restored.

In my view, we have no need to be anxious for the future of religion in Russia and certainly not for the effects of our present close partnership with her on the lot of Russian Christians. There are, of course, many changes in the practice of religion in Russia and there will be more.

¹ See the article by Canon P. E. T. Widdrington on "The Religious Situation in Russia" in *Christendom* (Oxford), March, 1942.

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The years of trial have put far more responsibility on the individual conscience, as we have noted. With the out-of-date trappings of the old régime has disappeared that reign of sheer compulsion by which the many and diverse live currents of Russian religious thought were suppressed under a kind of tombstone of official uniformity. These varieties will come out into the open air, which is just what ought to happen. But Russia, in my opinion, has remained the most religious country in Europe. "Sometimes," said the acute critic to whom I have referred earlier, "it falls to one or other branches of the Church of Christ to stand in the front line; that honor has fallen to the Church of Russia, and in our harassed churches you will find a fervor of devotion which I should be happy to see in the churches of Western Europe."

The attack on religion was, from the first, the weakest link in the general communist offensive. Though we cannot forecast the future, we have every reason to say that the attempt to extirpate faith from the Russian spirit has failed, and that this failure has been recognized in Russia.

IV

SETTLEMENT OF THE MULTINATIONAL QUESTION

RUSSIA, LIKE THE United States, includes a mixed population of many national groups. There are about 180—75 large ones, and some quite tiny. It is difficult to count them: it depends on how closely one distinguishes. But there is one staple element, the Great-Russian, the largest homogeneous stock in Europe, which is half the whole population, and if you add its close racial kinsfolk, the Ukrainians and White Russians, nearly two-thirds. There is little difference between these branches. The great family is increasing faster than almost any other in Europe. Its birth rate is half as much again as its death rate. Compare these figures, given by Dr. Ales Hrdlička of the Smithsonian Institution: Russian Slavs, 1.5; Soviet Union, 1.4; U.S.A. (white), 0.8; England and Wales, 0.25; Germany, 0.8; Italy, 0.9.¹ The ideal is, evidently, a united state with a contented population; and Russia's two chief allies, the United States and the British Commonwealth, have both grappled seriously with just the same problem.

In her march eastward, which had so much in common with America's advance to the Pacific, Russia was able to master her difficulties. The advance through Siberia was

¹ *The Peoples of the Soviet Union* (War Background Studies).

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the progress of a colonizer through a comparative no man's land in which only feeble units of backward peoples were encountered. It was in the main the work of the Russian peasant, and he is conspicuously a good mixer. That is why we have heard so little of that advance.

When Russia goes westward, it is a much more prickly process. Here she is meeting states of an earlier organization and more developed culture. Further, this advance has always been the work not of the people but of the Russian government, and has almost always involved fighting. But it could use on some sides a national watchword, for it was a question of recovering from foreign squires a Russian population, lost to Russia during the Tartar domination. Even in the Baltics, where the peasants were not Russian, the squires were German.

In Central Asia, to the southeastward, it was again different. There was no superior civilization to be met. This, as in Siberia, was an advance of Europe into Asia, which was a natural sequel to Asia's invasion of Europe in overwhelming numbers. But here the counterstroke was long delayed. This was not a no man's land; the resistance was fierce, and was only overcome by modern military organization in the latter half of the nineteenth century.

Russia contains a very large part of the Jewish population of the world—at one time nearly half, and now one-third. These Jews are mostly in the western and southwestern provinces, and passed to Russia along with a Russian peasant population in the partition of Poland at the end of the eighteenth century. In Poland they had filled the role

of a commercial middle class, the intermediary between the Polish squire and his White-Russian or Ukrainian serfs. The Jews were extremely useful to Poland and were well treated there. Their lot in Russia was to be very different. For all that, they have regarded themselves as almost native to this region, for there are Jewish monuments along the Dnieper dating back even before the Vikings created the first Russian State along that river in the ninth and tenth centuries. They can, therefore, almost claim to have been as early inhabitants as the Russians. There is another section of agricultural Jews on the Black Sea coast, which has at least as early an origin and has had a distinctive story of its own.

These are very ancient settlements. The important German elements passed into Russia in comparatively modern times. The German knights and merchants who settled along the southern coast of the Baltic made themselves masters of the native Lettish and Estonian population and blocked off Russia from the Baltic. When the Order of knights broke up, they passed under Swedish rule, and it took Peter the Great the best part of his life to win them from Sweden and make his way to the sea. These Germans proved loyal subjects to the Tsars, and took a quite disproportionate part in the administration of the empire. In Russia, therefore, the Germans remained a master class; it was very different with their former subjects, the Letts and Estonians. During the reign of Anne (1730-1740) Russia was almost ruled by Germans, and right down to the last world war Germans were to be found in positions of authority—great or small, from the Governor or General to the

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steward or minor official—over all Russia. Apart from these Germans or “Balts,” as they were called, there was almost up to now a remarkable and compact little German colony on the lower Volga. These were settlers who fled from religious persecution in Germany and were admitted by Catherine the Great (1762–1796). They are simple farmers, with character and enterprise, and their presence and their example have been of high value to the neighboring Russian peasants. Rasputin knew these peasants, and that was why he was pro-German; he advised Nicholas II to marry them to Russians, by which he would get a sturdy stock of peasantry. As Hitler’s armies approached the Volga, they were transplanted to parts of Siberia and Central Asia.

Catherine the Great, anxious to collect information on all the peoples of the country, in 1766 called a Great Commission which, on her insistence, was elected by the whole population, except the squires’ serfs. The crown peasants were well represented, and even the nomad peoples. The German barons and gentry of the Baltics took the lead in a general demand for local self-government, and indeed the Baltic Germans did have their own local courts, universities, and schools. But it all ended, like other dabblings by Catherine in reform, only in an extension of centralization. In particular, the Ukrainians or Borderlanders of the south were now brought within the ring of serfdom.

Catherine, with Frederick the Great, was the author of the Partitions of Poland, a story sinister in its details, which ultimately removed Poland from the map of Europe for a hundred years; but she could say almost with truth

that she had taken for herself only Russian peasant population. It was very different with her grandson Alexander I who, as a result of the defeat of Napoleon, became master of three-fifths of Poland, including its capital, Warsaw. This story, which I will give in its place, was the preface to the very worst period in the history of Russia's administration of her minor nationalities.

To the Germans, the Poles, and the Jews, who were brought in large numbers into Russia by the Polish Partitions, we must also add the Finns, conquered a little earlier in the reign of Alexander I. The Finns till 1809 were under Swedish rule, but they had substantial rights of self-government, including a Parliament and a Cabinet. When Alexander conquered them from Sweden the Finns took a vigorous part in their own fate; and Alexander, who flattered himself on his leanings to liberalism, left them in possession of these rights. The Finns, under Russian rule, behaved with perfect correctness; the question was whether a Russian sovereign, with an unlimited autocracy in big Russia, could be capable of constitutional rule in smaller Finland. Alexander I (1801-1825) and Nicholas I (1825-1855) in their very different ways quite failed to achieve this task; nor did Alexander II (1855-1881), the emancipator of the serfs in Russia, do any better with it. On his assassination in 1881, his son Alexander III instituted a regime of complete reaction and repression, in which the minor nationalities fared worse than anyone else in the empire.

Throughout his reign (1881-1894), Alexander III took

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as his chief advisor Constantine Pobedonostsev, who had been his tutor and performed the same duty for his son Nicholas II (1894–1917). For the period of his power (1881–1905), Pobedonostsev served as Procurator of the Holy Synod, an office which its founder Peter the Great had described as “the Tsar’s eye.” As only one confession, the Orthodox, counted in Russia, Pobedonostsev was in practice Minister of Religion, with the tightest hold not only over his own Church but over every other form of religion in Russia. But in many cases a different form of religion coincided with a different nationality, and here too prevailed the same policy: one Tsar, one Church, one people. The Russian Church, as has already been described, suffered grievously from the tyranny of Pobedonostsev, and if so, what of the rest? For the gallant Poles, Catholicism was now the one form in which their fervent nationality could express itself. It is related that when the tyrant sent down an order interfering with church services, the Catholic Bishop concerned burned this at a candle on the high altar before his congregation. The Orthodox Russians in the old Poland had been offered exemption from Catholic persecution if they would acknowledge the Pope as head of the Church. Those who accepted—and many did not—were called Uniats, and their form of worship, really Orthodox, was described by Catholics as “the eastern rite.” Substantially they made no change, and among them peasants had been known to explain the bargain as a proof that the Pope had become Orthodox! Now it was the Russian Church that persecuted, and the persecution was

successful in driving many into the Catholic Church. By a monstrous law, to leave the Orthodox Church was a state crime. Missionaries were sent to the Lutherans of the Baltic provinces, to herd people into the Orthodox Church, and some were even rewarded for their successes with state decorations. When the Lutheran pastors tried to recover these deserters, sixty of them were removed. The church property of the Armenian Christians was confiscated by the government. The twenty million Mussulmans in the Russian Empire did not escape the same pressure, nor were the heathens of Russian Asia left unmolested.

Let us turn from creeds to nationalities. The subject peoples were classed under the offensive title of *Inorodtsy*, which may be translated as "home aliens."

The Poles suffered terribly in this period. Nothing could drive their national consciousness out of them, but it was attacked in every way. The Russian language was introduced even into all local government offices and into the primary schools. The censor Apukhtin had looked forward to the time when a Polish mother would lull her child to sleep with a Russian song! In the university of their old capital, Warsaw, Poles were taught their own literature in the Russian language. The Polish railway servants were scattered over the rest of the Empire. Polish estates near the German frontier could not be sold to Poles; it was the same with land in the disputed provinces of Lithuania and Volhynia. Similar attempts were made with much more thoroughness and efficiency across the border in Prussian Poland. But the fiber of Polish loyalty to language and land

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triumphantly withstood them. The Prussian government spent large sums on the expropriation of Polish land holders; but when the results were summed up, it was found that the Poles possessed more land than before, for the large sums expended by the Prussian government had been utilized by the seller to buy more land elsewhere. The virile peasants of Russian Poland sought better conditions by crossing the Russian frontier into Germany, and large numbers, both from Russia and from Germany, immigrated as far as the United States, from which they sent money to their impoverished kinsfolk at home. The reign of Nicholas II brought a milder atmosphere for the Russian Poles, but in all its essentials the evil régime remained the same.

The German Empire had been founded in 1871, and irresponsible publicists wrote of the recovery from Russia of "lost provinces" along the Baltic coasts, that is, the old property of the German knights—Latvia and Estonia. Here the Baltic barons conquered by Peter the Great were the landowners, and the common folk were either of Letto-Lithuanian stock or, in the case of Estonia, close cousins of the Finns on the opposite side of the Gulf. Alexander III was strongly anti-German, and his wife detested the Germans as despoilers of her Danish fatherland by Bismarck's war of 1864. The Russian policy here was at first to stir up the subject peoples against their German masters: manor houses were attacked with apparent impunity, and even the language aspirations of the subject peoples received some disingenuous encouragement. But very soon the Russian language was introduced as official everywhere

—in the government offices and law courts, in the German university of Dorpat (now Tartu), and even in the primary schools. Mayors were nominated by the Russian Governor-General, and the Russian censor was put in control of the local German press. Here, too, the reign of Nicholas brought some alleviation, but this only affected the German upper classes and was associated with the return of their influence at court—the lot of the common folk remained unchanged. In the troubled times that followed (1905–1907), there were furious risings of the underdog peoples against their German masters, which were repressed with equal ruthlessness.

On the north side of the Gulf, the Finns also suffered in this period, but their time did not come under Alexander III. This narrow-minded man was at least honest and consistent. They had always behaved well, and on his accession he, on his side, confirmed their constitutional rights, though they could not fail to be a challenge to the same sovereign's autocracy in his native Russia. He asked for identity of currency, customs, and postal service, which was not surprising as the Finnish frontier was only some twenty miles from his capital; and when the Finnish Diet (or parliament) dissented, he did not press his request. But the Finns were exempt from military service in Russia; and Kuropatkin, War Minister of Nicholas II, wanted to force them into the task of imperial defense, and to distribute their recruits through the Russian Army. This demand began the time of trial for Finland. In 1899 a decree of the Tsar put all laws of common interest in the Empire

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under the supervision of the Russian Government. The Finnish authorities refused to publish it, and the Finns would not take the new military oath which was now prescribed. This policy of unification was continued, and in 1904 the Russian Governor-General, Bobrikov, was assassinated. Finland took her part in the general movement of liberation in 1905-1906, and in this period of concessions the Finnish constitution was restored in full; but in the reaction that followed, when the franchise of the new Duma was arbitrarily and severely restricted in Russia, a law odious to most of the Russians themselves was forced through the Duma, bringing Finland completely under Russian control; and the independence of the Finnish Diet was replaced by the introduction of eight members into the Russian Duma, who of course could be out-voted on all questions affecting Finland.

In this period there was the same interference with local rights in the Caucasus, which supplied some of the best regiments of the Russian Army, and it was only with the change of Governor-General that the unrest was calmed down. The first electoral law of the Duma enfranchised the whole Russian Empire; but in 1907 the second law, imposed on the Duma without its consent, by all sorts of complicated restrictions set a premium on the decaying class of the Russian gentry and, generally, on the Great Russian population.

In Siberia, which contained the most sturdy and enterprising Russian population in the Empire, the "pilgrim fathers" who had made their way thither to escape the oppression at the center, questions of politics, as in the

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American middle west, were generally questions of business; but they were cut off from European Russia by an iniquitous internal tariff introduced solely in the interest of the Moscow market.

The chief sufferers of this period were the Jews, and the change of sovereigns brought no relief. At its very beginning there was a violent pogrom, or sacking of Jewish houses, in Balta. From 1881, the Jews were confined to the area which they had occupied in the old Polish State. In 1886 they were excluded from judicial and administrative positions and from most of the professions. Their number in universities and schools, even of their own area, was limited to 10 per cent. They might not employ Christians without special leave. Children were forcibly baptized. Jews, on becoming Orthodox, might claim a divorce. They might not own land. As an eminent Jewish lawyer, Sliozberg, has put it, the question was not what rights the Jews lacked, but whether they had any rights at all. The result was the complete demoralization of the local police, who were very ready to be bribed. There was a whole series of pogroms, directly instigated by them in the first years of the new century.

Nothing was more harmful to friendly Russian relations with the United States than this treatment of the Jews. Indeed, the whole of this policy towards the minor nationalities tended to cut off Russia from Europe, and the traditional Russian championship of the smaller Slav peoples in the Balkans became absurd while Slavs within the Russian frontier lay under such grievous oppression.

In the universal unrest of 1905 there were numberless

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murders of policemen, and the government authority broke down in all the non-Russian parts of the Empire. The Liberals, who led the movement for reform, took as their motto, "The United States of Russia," and indeed the federative principle was always the only real solution of Russia's internal or border problems. The break-up of the monarchy in 1917 was the signal for separatist movements of all kinds. Poland had been conquered by the Germans in the Great War, and the collapse of Germany and Austria made it possible for her to return to the map as an independent State. With Russia in revolution, the Finns found it easy to break away. Even the small Baltic peoples, which had never so far enjoyed national independence, remained outside the new Russia when the Allied victory compelled the retreat of the German troops. Ukraine was traversed by all sorts of competing forces: Germans, Ukrainians, Russian Whites and Reds.

The attitude of Lenin and the Bolsheviks on the question of nationalities was diametrically opposed to that of the Tsars. Nothing was more offensive to their whole political consciousness than the idea of racial discrimination. Here they were in line with the generally accepted principles of Russian liberalism. The election to the Constituent Assembly conducted under the Provisional Government had given the franchise at the age of eighteen over the whole State. Lenin overthrew the Provisional Government and dissolved the Constituent Assembly by force; but in this matter he was prepared to go further, and with much greater determination and energy. In his picture of

the World Union of Soviet Republics, oppressed nationalities were his natural allies, and the idea of oppressed nationalities merged with that of oppressed classes.

But there was another qualification. These were times of revolution, and Lenin was still very far from that problematic "withering away of the State" which he predicted, and which the years that followed have shown to be a complete unreality. It was a dictatorship—a "dictatorship of the proletariat," even if it was really only a dictatorship exercised in the name of the proletariat by the all-powerful Communist Party; and later, even after Lenin's retreat from the impracticable in 1921, there were still dominating heights—the monopoly of political power, of the press, and of foreign trade. All these were read into the new policy on nationalities. They represented the central power of the executive of the State; in a way, with obvious differences, they fulfilled that function which makes possible a centralized direction in a federal state. And here the dictatorship of the center was evidently of the most exacting kind. Communism was the goal, both in Russia and outside her. This was a common direction, alike for all the nationalities of Russia. The economic resources of the whole were at the disposal of the center. I do not see that we can quarrel with this; it is one of the problems of any Federative State, though not for the independent Dominions of the British Commonwealth. Without this any common economic policy would be impossible, and the enormous benefits which the common plan has conferred, for instance, on the backward populations of Russian Central Asia, are a more than

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sufficient vindication. Indeed the common economic plan is ironing out local differences of population and creating a common country. It is a very different matter that the direction of all minds and thoughts, including, for instance, the unhappy hostility to all religion, remained with the center. From this flaw in the system relief could come—and it was likely to be only gradual—not by the “withering of the State,” but by the “withering” of the Communist dictation itself at the center; in other words, by a return to a much more genuine democracy. As a fact, in the matter of religion, relief has actually come by the “withering away” of the policy of persecution at the center. This kind of trouble has come to the surface several times. National strivings in Ukraine have more than once been roughly repressed. The drastic purges of the opposition and of the officialdom of the country eliminated large numbers of those in office in the non-Russian autonomous republics.

On the other hand, at the outset of Soviet rule the championship of the minor nationalities had been entrusted to Stalin who, as a Georgian himself a member of a smaller nationality, was by his origin and instincts from the first devoted to the principle of absolute racial equality; and his opportunities were infinitely extended when in 1922 he became General Secretary of the ruling Communist Party. In 1923 the State was renamed “The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,” with which other nationalities outside could associate themselves. There was also a “right of secession”—a question which had led to civil war in the United States—but it has not been real, as was proved very early in the

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case of Georgia, where the educated class were mostly Mensheviks.

Stalin was the principal drafter of the new political geography of Russia, and it was based not on administrative convenience, but exclusively on nationality; additions or amendments have been governed by the same principle. By far the largest republic is the Russian, including Siberia, with a population now reckoned at 110 millions, or more than half of the whole; but this republic carries the special title "federated," because it includes a number of small national units, sometimes very small indeed, to which a considerable measure of self-government has been accorded. The next most populous is Ukraine, now more than 30 millions. White Russia, with Minsk as capital, is now reckoned at 5½ millions. In the Caucasus there is Armenia with 1¼ millions; in the east on the Caspian, Azerbaijan, mostly Tartar, has 3¼, and south of the mountains, Georgia has 3½. The greatest novelty in the scheme is the national distribution of territory in Russian Central Asia: the enormous Kazakh steppe republic (6⅞ millions), and the four frontier republics running eastward from the Caspian Sea—Turkmen (1¼), Uzbek (6¼), Tadjik (1½), and Kirghiz (1¼). The Jews at Biro-Bidjan in the Far East and, till their transplantation, the Germans of the Volga had areas with rights of their own inside larger units; and it is the same with every distinctive national group.

Blood-union, according to Dr. Hrdlička, is growing fast in the Soviet Union, especially in Russian Asia. The Great Russian element is now the largest in all Asiatic Russia. The

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surprising development of great industrial towns and particularly the transfer of large industrial populations during the present war seemed likely, in his opinion, eventually almost to eliminate racial distinctions.

There is a Communist Party in every larger unit; these were first built up by Russians, but every effort is employed to make them national and the result has been, on the whole, successful. The further one goes eastward, the more does their work take a cultural character. Every unit in the Soviet Union uses its own language in its schools and law courts, with Russian the second and also compulsory language. Of the 180-odd national units, several had no written language of their own till the Soviet orientalists created them. Central Asia has served as a great school for young Russian administrators. Even here, literacy, starting practically from scratch with the revolution, has been brought up to 70.6 per cent. What a lesson for our British administrators in India!

If we except the bias against all religions, everything is done to develop national traditions of art and culture. Certainly Moscow sends out its plans and finally determines them. But all these peoples are brought into active discussion of detail. In this vast country one no longer sees discriminations, whether in educational institutions or in the streets. It is a great school of brotherhood and comradeship.

In December, 1936, a closer definition was given to these rights and duties in the Constitution of which Stalin was especially the designer. It had been published and widely

discussed that year in the Soviet Press. In the imposing structure it set up, an important feature is the Supreme Soviet, or parliament—yet to assume the form of a deliberative national assembly—consisting of two Chambers in every way equal in rights, one of them based entirely on the representation, by election, of all nationalities of the Union, however unequal in population: 25 from each major or “Union” Republic; 11 from each of the smaller “Autonomous Republics”; 5 from each “Autonomous Region”; and one from each smaller national area. Subject to the general State Plan, a Union Republic has the direction of its own food industry, textiles, timber, agriculture, finance, trade, justice, public health, education, art and social maintenance—which, with some differences, may bear comparison with states’ rights in the American Union. National cultural distinctiveness, however, may claim to be much further developed in Soviet Russia.

The Constitution also plainly reasserted among its “Fundamental Rights and Duties of Citizens” (Article 123) its condemnation of racial discrimination, as follows:

“Equality of rights of citizens of the U.S.S.R., irrespective of their nationality or race, in all spheres of economic, state, cultural, social and political life, is an indefeasible law.

“Any direct or indirect restriction of the rights of, or, conversely, any establishment of direct or indirect privileges for, citizens on account of their race or nationality, as well as any advocacy of racial or national exclusiveness or hatred and contempt, is punishable by law.”

Settlement of the Multinational Question

One thing is clear. As compared with the last war, every citizen of the Soviet Union, whatever his origin, has equal reason to defend his country against invaders, and this must be one of the most convincing explanations of the splendid resistance by the whole community.

This régime, with its merits and limitations, may reasonably be borne in mind when we come to the determination of territories after the present war. The contrast with that of the Tsars is overwhelming. That there is room for improvement in the direction of political democracy is obvious. It is, however, a good omen that the three major Allies in the present struggle all pay tribute in their titles to the federative principle—the United States of America, the British Commonwealth of Nations, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

This is the background on which we must interpret the decision of February 1, 1944, by the Supreme Soviet, in which the Council of Nationalities is an equal partner, conferring on the sixteen autonomous republics the right to national armies and a national diplomacy. This is a consequent development of all that had gone before, though we have yet to see how it is translated into fact. On the other hand, it is, for instance, a definite assertion of the unity of Ukraine or of White Russia.

V

THE RESURGENCE OF RUSSIAN PATRIOTISM

I RECALL AN INTERJECTION from a patriotic priest in one of the Dumas. Here, I suppose, he would have been called a 100 per cent American. A member was proposing a project of an international kind. The priest added ironically, "And that the name of Russia should disappear." He was sternly called to order by the Speaker. After the revolution, it almost looked for a time as if it had really disappeared. It passed out of use for the State, which was renamed, for short, the U.S.S.R. "That disgusting word Fatherland," wrote one of the favored writers of the new Soviet Union. I have even seen an official reprimand administered to a minor Soviet official abroad because he used the word "Russia."

I have often had occasion to ask myself which would last longer, Communist rule, or Russia, and I have never had any doubt as to the answer.

The innate loyalty to one's own homeland is closer than any devotion to an international ideal. To be a socialist is by no means necessarily a negation of patriotism. All Poles are patriotic; the terribly cruel history of their country has made them so, and the P.P.S., or the Polish Socialist Party, is as much so as the rest of the nation. In the last

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World War, what was the proportion of Socialists in any country who would not come out in its defense? In Britain, before the adoption of conscription, more than two million volunteers joined the army, principally, of course, from the masses of British labor.

In the Old Russia, patriotism suffered from very grievous limitations, though it was never killed. The more it tends to become the monopoly of a limited class or group, the narrower is its base, yet the instinctive spirit still remained, ready to flame out whenever the country, as a whole, was in danger. In Russia, with the gradual crystallization and final stabilization of serfdom, which took place as late as 1649, the great mass of the people went underground. They were not supposed to share in the common heritage, but they did; and this showed over and over again in the only form in which it could show—in the splendid spirit of unconquerable resistance made by the national army. One general after another gave his testimony to the courage of the common Russian infantry soldier. "Our men showed unspeakable keenness for battle," wrote Münnich. "My unconquerable army," wrote Rummyantsev. It was the soldiers of Russia, certainly not the generals, who defeated Frederick the Great at the battle of Kunersdorf; when he thrust a great wedge into them, they simply would not break, but absorbed it. It was the soldiers and people of Russia, certainly not the Tsar and generals, who really beat Napoleon in 1812.

Under Nicholas I, the sergeant-major of European reaction, the ring of authority had been so narrowed down that

patriotism almost ceased to be a possession even of the professional or middle class. No one was to express any idea, even if it agreed with the ruler. Even the Slavophiles, who represented the instinctive pride of Russians in the historical and religious traditions of their own country and their aversion to the wholesale invasion of ideas from the West, were put under open police supervision. The motto of this reign was a negation of all thought: "Submit and obey." In such an atmosphere both patriotism and religion became caricatures of everything that they were meant to represent. Religion became hypocrisy; patriotism became servility—nothing but an echo of the passing wishes of the government. Anyone who thought independently was bound to be alienated from both. It was very long before this deep taint disappeared. Certainly it was strong in the air when I first entered Russia in 1898.

In the Crimean War of 1854, which was a muddle of dynastic policy, military inefficiency, and administrative corruption, patriotism shone out almost exclusively in the heroism of the Russian soldier; Leo Tolstoy, who took part in this campaign, has given a glowing picture of it in his *Tales of Sevastopol*. The sequel to this war was the long-delayed and incomplete emancipation of the peasants. Russia's championship of the Slavs of the Balkans in 1876–1877 was definitely the result of a national and religious crusade which dragged the unwilling Alexander II into war with Turkey. Plucky little Serbia, only just liberated, had challenged the Turk on behalf of her oppressed kinsmen over the border, and in the stream of Russian volunteers

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who came to her aid were such different men as Cherniayev, the empire-building conqueror of Tashkent, and Fedor Rodichev, one of the finest flowers of Russian liberalism, who over and over again in his gallant career stood up with a free word to the Tsar himself. Dostoyevsky, who goes deeper into the Russian consciousness than any other writer, was another champion of this crusade.

But in the gloomy period of reaction that followed, I found in the educated thought of the country a strange rift between home and foreign affairs. It seemed like two totally different stories, though history has shown that they were always intimately connected. The same people were not interested in both, and the second seemed to be almost like a monopoly of the official world. The greatest Russian historian of this period, my teacher Klyuchevsky, in his incomparable story of the Russian people, cares little for Russia's foreign relations and even practically omits the Tartar domination of two hundred and forty years. With the lesser men it was far worse. It was a sort of cynical indifference, which to an Englishman almost struck a chill. In 1912, for my *Russian Review*, I was unable to get from my friends among Russian scholars anything better than an indifferent picture of the magnificent national resistance to Napoleon. It seemed to me in that period that, in spite of the ardent labors of the revolutionaries among the peasants, the educated class as a whole was almost entirely cut off from the people. It was like another nation, or rather like a cosmopolitan inset in Russian life.

The whole period which led up to the Japanese war was

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unnational or even antinational, and the humiliations of this war were the natural outcome. This was a war of the Government without the people, and the Japanese won because there the people were with the government. I saw a part of the country mobilization, and the Russian soldiers might have been going off to prison. But there was one striking contradiction. I attended a meeting—only of peasants—during the last stages of that war, where propagandists from the towns proposed a demand that it should be immediately brought to an end. The peasants would not have it—least of all at a time when Russia was being beaten—and their angry protest ended only when one of them mounted the table and proposed an excellent “amendment”: that the Tsar should call at once the national assembly he had already promised. “And if it says the war is to go on, we shall win.” “That’s right, that’s right,” they all cried in unison.

In the First Duma (1906), dominated by the Cadets, or liberals, the atmosphere was largely cosmopolitan. The Cadets never seized the obvious chance of exposing the mismanagement and corruption of this war. That chance was taken only in the Third Duma (1907–1912), elected on a far narrower franchise, but, in this respect, I think, more representative of the country. The exposures were made in a telling way; indeed, this Duma, which was obviously more patriotic than the government, did carry through several important reforms in the army and navy. In the various crises which led up to the World War, the Duma did succeed in making itself the spokesman of the nation.

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The World War, at its start, offered the Tsar the best chance that he ever had of union with the people, and he was deeply impressed to find himself at one with them. As he repeated, from the balcony of the Winter Palace, the oath of Alexander I, "to make no peace while a foreign soldier remained on Russian soil," the vast crowd, made up of all elements of the population, students, soldiers, and people, fell on their knees and sang the national anthem as it had perhaps never been sung before. The great wave of patriotism carried everyone with it. No foreigner who was present will forget those days. Parties ceased to count. The intelligentsia threw itself wholesale into devoted work for the national army, and the Civil Red Cross in a month or two found provision for two million wounded. There is an excellent picture of that time of enthusiasm in Hugh Walpole's *Dark Forest*.

For the first year of the war, when I was living in the front line, this spirit of devotion to Russia was splendidly maintained. The ordinary Russian soldier never boasted—that he regarded as almost a sin—but there was something very impressive in the way that he spoke of Russia; he spoke with that same reticence and deep feeling with which he would speak of his mother—as of something that lay deep in his heart and thoughts. He might be ignorant, but he was not slow of understanding. The cause of the war—the independence of the smaller Slav peoples (the "younger brothers" as they are called)—did appeal to him. He appreciated that his allies were the free peoples of the West and, above all, that his enemy was the German, whom he had so

often met in his own country, always as the jack-in-office of a delegated authority.

This fine spirit survived the tremendous casualties and privations of the first epic period of operations, when the ambulance provisions of the government were beneath criticism. It survived the crash of the Russian front in May, 1915, and the glorious retreat, contested mile by mile without shell and sometimes even without cartridges. The spirit of sacrifice bore with it a great devotion to one's fellow man. What carried the Russian privates into action—they advanced crawling, four to five yards apart—was the feeling that a comrade must not be left in the lurch. Many young men in the Red Cross whom I knew were obsessed with the idea that they must be where others were under fire. And after the great retreat the whole country was full of this instinct: it swept not only the intelligentsia, not only the Duma leaders, who were nearly all at the front doing Red Cross work, but the Ministers and the Tsar himself. In June, 1915, Russia seemed about to settle not only her external but her internal questions by bringing the Tsar into a lasting union with the people. It was a tragedy that this hope proved to be so short-lived.

Russia—not only the army, but the country—was full of patriotism up to the moment when the obsessed empress took her weak husband in hand, made him flout his Ministers, the Duma, and the nation, and filling his place in the rear, confided the direction of the country to the miserable Rasputin. It was unbelievable—it was a return to the Middle Ages—and it came as a violent shock to the

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whole country. From that time revolution was inevitable, and the war itself became unnational.

I can date this moment, from which stemmed all that followed. In the late summer of 1915, I spent a night among private soldiers alone, with no officer, in a small inadequate redoubt in front of the line, some eighty yards from the enemy and outflanked on all sides. These men were glorious. They were capping each other with hearty accounts of fine achievements of the different units in which they had served. I came back to hear from the general that a messenger whom he had sent to the capital to find out why all supplies were delayed had returned to tell us that these matters were now really controlled by Rasputin. What were we fighting for? The hope of better things was gone. The actual front line remained clean longer than any other place, but the corruption from the rear crept up closer and closer. The best of the regulars had been wiped out twice over; the drafts that came up were more and more like militia. In the rear the privations were becoming unbearable. The state was dissolving of itself. And then from the rear—and practically in a day—came the break, without any organization, but simply as a result of the complete bankruptcy of the whole régime.

There were high lights in the period of social disruption which followed. While millions deserted, thousands enlisted—most of them socialists, some of them quite old, who now came in with ardor to fight at once both for Russia and for the revolution; even the deserters would not leave the front line while they were actually in charge of it;

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but in this tired and broken army it was easy to see how Lenin's well chosen slogans of peace and bread must win the day. And with these went fraternization on the front, and a great wave of international brotherhood with that same underdog working class, which in all countries carried the main burden of the war.

In the period which followed, Russia went out of the picture. "Russia is gone, is gone," said an old peasant, caught in the clash between Red and White armies in the civil war. "And what a great power she was!" The Whites, who on all other points were negative and had not an idea of what they would do if they won, were of course fighting in the name of Russia, but all the initiative was with the master-mind on the other side. Lenin himself has paid his tribute to Russian patriotism: "We love our language and our motherland. We are filled with national pride because of the knowledge that the Great-Russian nation too has proved capable of giving humanity great examples of struggles for freedom, for socialism." But he insisted on the division of every nation into two militant camps; and his Russia was apparently to be merged in a World Union of Soviet Republics, a title soon taken by the Russian State. The experience of the working classes in the war had been of a kind common to all nations, and the cry of this time was that of the internationalist Trotsky from the tribune of Brest-Litovsk: "Proletarians of all the world, unite!" What Russia, as Russia, lost by her absence at this time of decision could only be realized when the urge of the international wave had begun to pass. She had left the ranks of the ulti-

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mate winners of the World War, and it was they who cancelled her surrender; but in territory she lost nearly everything that she had won in the last two centuries. The Versailles settlement was emphatically a Slavic one. Poland returned to the map, so did Czechoslovakia. Yugoslavia was doubled in size. Germany, for the time being, was reduced from granite to sand. But she was the only possible friend left to Russia, and she had shown what was her kind of friendship by her peacemaking at Brest-Litovsk, which she had used to detach Ukraine from Russia and to make of Russia something like a German colony. It might be a Slavic settlement that followed in Europe; but Russia—as Russia—was not there.

It was certainly the Civil War, the Intervention, and the subsequent European boycott that gave the starting point for a new Russian patriotism, on a more intelligent and a much broader basis. Klyuchevsky has written that it is only by going through some great common ordeal that a people becomes a nation. The Red Army soldier was fighting for both his class and his country. It was these same factors, and especially the memory of the Intervention and the constant fear of another common attack, that from the start concentrated the attention of the Soviet government on the organization of military studies. But this was not limited to the work of the Staff College. No part of its program was more complete or more efficient than the building up of Red Army education. In the last war, when three-quarters of the population could not read or write, constant difficulties stood in the way of promotion from the ranks, to fill the enormous

gaps which enemy gunfire had torn in the cadres of officers. The extraordinary success of the Soviet program of literacy, which reversed the previous percentage of literates in the country (from 25 per cent to 75 per cent), was only a beginning, and probably no army in Europe was equipped with a more thorough-going system of all-round education. The Red Army was, however, the spearhead of an international challenge. Its military oath "pledged all deeds and thoughts to the great aim of emancipating all workers" and "to fight for the Soviet Union, for Socialism, and the brotherhood of peoples."

The failure of the wave of international revolution has been described elsewhere. It left Russia with a new and far more concrete danger. In the wake of Italian Fascism came Hitler and Nazism; and behind all his denunciation of communism lay the old program of German penetration and domination of Russia which was bound to call forth a resurgence of Russian patriotism. This time there was a very real threat of actual invasion. No less than the threat of European environment to the France of the Great Revolution—the issue which every revolution fears—it called for a national leader, a Bonaparte if you will, who would crystalize the lessons learned so far into hard common sense and organize the defense. This was the task undertaken by Stalin—to construct and to defend.

There is no more interesting subject of contemporary study than the course pursued by Stalin when he came into real power. He has consummate organizing ability and this, I suppose, is what put him in control of the ruling Com-

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munist Party. I dare say some of his colleagues regarded him as no more than Lenin's secretary, the faithful employee who was to see that all the decisions of the executive of the party were carried out. But the opportunities are great when the chairman dies and the secretary is left in charge; and it must have been soon after Lenin's death in 1924 that Stalin saw what use he meant to make of them. The organ of government, as we know, was the Communist Party itself, and it was all-powerful. Stalin was not a member of the Soviet government, but he could pull all its strings and, if he could carry others with him, make all its appointments. His difficulty was that he was always under a cross fire, from the outside world that mistrusted him as a Communist, and from those of his colleagues who mistrusted him as a traitor to Communism. In the circumstances, it was much less important to note what he said than to see what he did. He has certainly carried through a complete transformation of the Communist Party itself.

How did the Bolsheviks come into power? It was the result of a world war which destroyed all the resources of Tsardom and wiped out its regular army three times over. How long would a new war take to wipe out the personnel of the first class citizens of the new State, the Communist Party? Obviously the pale must be opened to the rest of the nation. The world revolution had not materialized; that fact had to be faced. It had, however, triumphed in Russia, even if it had to abandon all its first and more fanciful experiments there. The defense of Russia, therefore, rested on a Soviet patriotism. The old international formula of the

oath of the Red Army was dropped. Its soldiers now pledged themselves to "the defense of the Soviet Fatherland, and obedience to their military chiefs." The writer who had spoken otherwise of the word Fatherland, was now in disgrace. But not only was it so with the Army, which in a great war must necessarily be the military expression of the whole nation. It would be accurate enough, in a general sense, to say that Stalin had been changing the Party into the nation, and the nation into the Party. That was the point of his demand for "Non-Party Bolsheviks" to help replace the "Old Guard" of internationalism, new men who would stir up activity in every department of the national life. The slogan on the banners displayed everywhere, under the new constitution at the election in 1936, was "The Union of Party and Non-Party." Which meant the union of the Party and the nation.

This is the meaning of the restoration of the family to full honor. The restricted but considerable encouragement of the profit motive gives the Army and people something to fight for, while retaining the old corporate spirit of effort for the common good. The extension of a wider initiative to the local Soviet farms was exactly the step needed to qualify them for their present task, for the new collective farms are the guerrillas of today. The old village communities, before them, were like wasps that harassed all the way the advance and retreat of Napoleon. The present-day collective farms, far better organized under their elected brigade-leaders, lying along the line of the German advance, with access by paths to front and rear through forest

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and marsh impassable to others, are playing a vital part in the main object of Russian strategy—the continuous attrition of the German man-power.

Patriotism is also the meaning of Stalin's restoration to honor of Russia's past. The Soviets were now not afraid to recognize its existence. Professor M. Pokrovsky, friend of Lenin, and the one outstanding Communist historian of the earlier period, in his blinkered determination to admit no deciding factors except economic determinism, tried in his History to eliminate even the influence of the will and character of Peter the Great! Pokrovsky is now universally disavowed, and Peter has come into his full fame. It is celebrated in several outstanding films, which are, throughout, true in detail to the original facts. No wonder; for Peter, the revolutionary on the throne, is the genuine prototype of Stalin himself. In 1936 I saw three other Tsars presented on the stage, never without some sympathy. I know of no finer historical film than that which presents in faithful detail the greatest of all Russian generals, Alexander Suvórov. He is there in the flesh, as his varied life has shown him to us. St. Alexander Nevsky, too, who beat the old German Knights of the Sword on frozen Lake Peipus, is the subject of a great film; and another, about Prince Dmitry of the Don, the first Russian prince to defeat the Tartars, gives a sympathetic historical picture of St. Sergius, the founder of the most famous of Moscow monasteries, who spurred Dmitry on to his national task. This list might be extended indefinitely, and of course it includes figures and scenes of Red Army heroism out of the Civil War of

1918-1920. Even the *Internationale*, the very flag of the Revolution, has been replaced by an anthem written in the sense of the new multinational patriotism of the Soviet motherland.

The Russian patriotism of today is not a matter of Tsars and generals, and it rests on a far broader base, whether of class or nationalities. This war is the corporate resistance of all the 180-odd nationalities of the State, every one of which has the same lively interest in defense of the same common heritage. This was never so before, and is one of the two chief reasons why this resistance is perhaps the greatest of all the triumphs of Russian history. The other reason is the return of Russia herself, no longer as the sole figure in the picture, but as the proud mother of a great family.

This new patriotism shines out in the vision of the latest Russian soldier-poets, Alexis Surkov and Constantine Simonov. One of Surkov's poems contains a revealing phrase, "conquering death by death"—words taken from the Easter psalms of the Russian Orthodox Church; and I cannot forget the soldiers of the Smolensk Regiment singing them at the front at Easter, 1916, just after something like two-thirds of them had been destroyed. They had no shell and hardly any ammunition, but they had not fallen back more than a mile and a half; and there they lay camping in a marsh, as near as possible to the enemy, and still their singing was deep and virile. "Conquering death by death!" I wondered then what other weapon they had to fight with.

Simonov addresses to his friend Surkov the verses which

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follow. They give a picture of the Russian retreat of 1941. Borísov is the place where Napoleon lost so much of the last remnants of his army, crossing the peat-bog river, Berezhina, on his disastrous way out of Russia. In July, 1941, the Russians for days held off the German weight of metal before they were forced to retreat. At the close of 1943 they were close to Borísov on their way back, and that is the meaning of the words, "We'll be waiting for you."

TO A. SURKOV

You remember, Alyosha, those pitiless rains
On the roads to Smolensk without respite or rest,
And the jugs which those overtired women brought out to us
Pressed, like a child from the rain, to their breast.

How they wiped away tears when they thought we'd not seen
them,
And whispered, "God save you!" when saying goodbye,
And once again called themselves soldiers of Russia,
As they used to of old in the ages gone by.

And there, measured rather by tears than by distances,
Ran the broad causeway till hid by some rise,
And hamlets and hamlets and hamlets and parishes,
As if all of Russia were under our eyes,

As if at the bounds of each village of Russia,
Crossing hands over breast to preserve us from death,
Our ancestors out of the past had all gathered
To pray for their grandsons untrue to the faith.

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You know, I am sure, that this, this is our country,
Not the townhouse where days went so easily by,
But these hamlets so plain which our grandfathers traversed,
With plain Russian crosses to mark where they lie.

I can't say for you, but this burden of travel
From hamlet to hamlet I knew not before,
And the tear of the widow, the chant of the woman
I first learnt to know on these crossroads at war.

You remember, Alyosha, that hut at Borísov,
The dead body there and the girl's piercing cry,
And the white-haired old mother in long pleated garment,
The old man in white, as if waiting to die.

Well! What could we say to them? How could we comfort
them?

But she with her keen woman's instinct so true—
Remember, the old lady said to us: "Kinsmen,
Wherever you go, we'll be waiting for you!"

"We'll be waiting for you," said the pastures all round us,
"We'll be waiting for you," said the forest, so near.
Alyosha, you know in the nights I keep thinking
Those voices behind us still follow us here.

On our dear Russian soil we have left the invaders
Nothing better than fire as in ages gone by;
In the old Russian way we have seen stricken comrades
Tear open their shirt, as preparing to die.

You and I, friend,—at present the bullets have spared us;
But though firmly convinced life is all on this earth,
I am all the same proud of this dearest of countries,
This dear, dear sad country that gave me my birth.

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I am proud that in Russia my life is to finish,
That the mother that bore me was Russian of race,
That when seeing me off, in the old Russian manner
She locked me three times in her loving embrace.

Kandalaksha, November, 1941.

VI

THE RUSSO-POLISH DUEL

IT IS A NATURAL HABIT to think that a story begins at the point where we ourselves first became acquainted with it. Age-long problems are not to be understood that way. We cannot know what is in a book by beginning at the last chapter.

The duel between Russia and Poland, grievous for both and tragic for Poland, is a matter of nearly ten centuries, and its original factors are alive and active today.

Poland has never had any natural frontiers; hence the ease of the German conquest in 1939. "Poland" means the plain country, and the plain continues into Russia. Between the Poles and the Great-Russians, who form about half of the population of the vast Soviet Union, lie other peoples of Slavic stock, the White-Russians and the Ukrainians or Borderlanders, at one time called the Little Russians. These, like the Great-Russians, are East Slavs—not West Slavs, like the Poles. Their degree of distinctiveness from the Great-Russian stock has always been violently debated; but there is no question that they are far closer akin to the Great-Russians than to the Poles. These peoples have been from time immemorial the source of constant wars between Russia and Poland.

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The national quarrel has been infinitely sharpened by the religious difference. In the tenth century both peoples were converted to Christianity, Poland in 966 and Russia in 989; but Poland took her Christianity from Rome, and Russia from Constantinople. This difference between Catholic and Orthodox is still acutely alive today. Peasants in the debatable borderland even till lately sometimes described themselves as Catholics or Orthodox rather than as Poles or Russians. The fight between Catholicism and Orthodoxy is a substantial part of the fight between Poland and Russia. With the choice of religion went all sorts of other links and traditions; from their point of view, the Poles regard themselves as the eastern bulwark of Western civilization, and hardly consider Russia as European.

Russia, lying to the east of Poland, was directly exposed to the ceaseless attacks of the nomad peoples who for centuries streamed in upon Europe from the great storehouse of population in Asia. Some of these, such as the Huns and the Tartars, passed over both countries; but in the main Russia was the real rampart of Europe, and when the odds proved too heavy for her, she fell under Tartar domination. For two hundred and forty years (1240-1480) she was almost completely cut off from Europe. This made her incapable of defending the original home of the first Russian State, with its capital at Kiev; and the heart of this first Russia passed under foreign rule.

This introduces another name which will come up at the peacemaking—Lithuania. The Lithuanians were farthest inland of a group of small peoples that lay along the south

coast of the Baltic. Their kinsfolk were the Letts or Latvians to the east around present-day Riga, and the Prussians to the west around present-day Königsberg. The whole of this small group were closer akin to the Slavs than to any other branch of the European family.

This was the last part of Europe to remain heathen. After the crusades a Teutonic Order consisting of swashbuckling knights, chiefly from western Germany, "Christianized" the heathen Prussians with fire and sword and took from them not only their country but their name. A German author, Schleicher, writes of this conquest: "The history of their death struggle against the Teutonic Order must be mentioned as one of the most sinister episodes of mankind." There are still some remnants of them in East Prussia. This was the origin of modern Prussia; and in this conquest, which left a dominant class of one race and a subject class of another, we can trace the beginnings of Prussian militarism. This was also a tragedy for Slavic Poland, for the weak Polish rulers allowed these Teutonic Knights to establish themselves at the mouth of the Vistula, which is the main artery of Poland, and cut her off from the sea. Here we see the origin of the modern question of the Polish corridor at Danzig. As a matter of fact, it was not only a Polish corridor but also a German corridor, for the Polish Kashubs, who lie on the coast, separate the rest of Germany from German East Prussia. Another order of German knights, called the Knights of the Sword, established itself further along the coast to the eastward among the Letts and Estonians, who became their bondsmen.

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The Lithuanians, however, who were still heathen, fought back vigorously; and these wars formed them into a militant people, headed by a remarkable succession of empire builders, that is, conquerors of non-Lithuanian territories. They could not drive the Germans from the coast, but, taking a line of least resistance, they conquered southwards at the expense of the Russians who lived along the Dnieper, even annexing Kiev. They were less numerous than their Russian subjects and, being of inferior culture, did not attempt to denationalize them. On the contrary, White Russian became their official language, and the greatest of their sovereigns, Olgerd, appears to have died a Russian monk.

At this point, Poland comes into the story. Her most outstanding king, Kazimir the Great, after completing a great task of administration and culture, died childless in 1370. In those days peoples were regarded as the property of their princes, and he left Poland to a neighboring sovereign, King Louis the Great of Hungary. The succession was secured only to the sons of Louis, but he left only two daughters (1382). One of these became queen of Hungary; the other, Jadwyga or Hedwig, was recognized as heiress of Poland. It appears that she had been married secretly to an Austrian prince, but this marriage was disregarded, and her hand, together with the throne of Poland, was offered to Olgerd's son Jagellon, now Grand Prince of Lithuania, on condition that he would become a Catholic and convert his subjects (most of whom were Russian and Orthodox) to the same faith. Poland and Lithuania were united, at first

only irregularly and in the persons of their sovereigns, but later, in 1569, by the Union of Lublin under one king, to be in every case elected by a joint meeting of the Sejms or Diets of both countries. The Poles, by right of their superior culture, came to predominate in the administration of Lithuania; and Vilna, the capital, became practically a Polish oasis among Lithuanian population. Many of the great figures in later Polish history and letters came from Lithuania.

Strange as was this chain of events, its positive result was simple, namely, that a large Russian and Orthodox population found itself under the Polish crown. In those days, we must remember, practically no account was taken of the working classes; whether in feudal Poland or in autocratic Russia; they were by now alike—sunk deep in serfdom. Religion counted for more than race, and both countries in all sincerity were deeply pervaded by it. This last factor was a constant embarrassment to Poland. With the Russian peasants and with most of their local princes, the Orthodox confession retained its hold. It was this that in 1596 led up to the Church Unia and the Uniats, who have already been mentioned earlier. Acknowledge the Pope as head of the Russian Church, and you may then go on worshiping in the Orthodox way: and it was only a section of the Russian population that accepted this compromise.

Moscow had by now grown up into great strength. The Tartar yoke had been thrown off, and Russia was herself advancing eastward. Nationality and religion combined to set

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her the task of recovering the Russian subjects of Poland. The words in which her rulers defended this claim sound strongly like the language of modern "self-determination." The Polish King, with the support of the Pope, complains that John the Great of Russia (1462-1505) is seizing his "patrimony," for many Russian princes in Lithuania are transferring their allegiance to Moscow. John replies: "And do not I regret my patrimony, the Russian land which is in the hands of Lithuania—Kiev, Smolensk, and the other towns? . . . Why, not only is our patrimony the towns and districts which we now have, but all Russian land of old, from our forefathers, too." The same sovereign says that there can be no permanent peace with Poland till all is restored: "only truces to draw breath." And every now and then an attempt at what was hopefully called "a lasting peace," sometimes with foreign mediators; one of these, Handeliuss (in 1615), declared that it was "like trying to reconcile fire and water."

To the original vital occasions of quarrel was added another. Poland was far more advanced in culture and had contact with Western Europe. The Poles felt that they would have little chance against their overwhelmingly bigger neighbor, if Russia got in touch with Europe and became more civilized. But this was what Russia eagerly sought, in order to restore the link that had been smashed by the long years under the Tartar yoke. This was why John the Terrible sought the friendship of the England of Elizabeth; and Sigismund Augustus, King of Poland, wrote to Elizabeth bidding her withhold the supply of teachers of

culture from Russia. "Up to now," he said, "we could conquer him only because he was a stranger to education and did not know the arts." Even then the Poles stood for the principle of a *cordon sanitaire* against Russia.

Each side made full use of the other's embarrassments and difficulties. On the extinction of the dynasty of Rurik in Russia, Poland got her chance. There followed years of anarchy in Russia (1605-1613), so closely alike to that of the Russian Revolution in 1917 that every kind of analogy has been traced by those who witnessed that later chaos. Society seemed to be breaking up all round; class rose against class, pretenders to authority challenged each other on all sides. This "time of troubles" for Russia has been called the "golden time" in Poland. Claimants to the Russian throne were launched from Poland; the Polish crown prince was accepted as a candidate in Moscow if he would adopt Orthodoxy; but the King of Poland, who was a fervent Catholic, spoiled Poland's chances; he wanted the crown for himself and besieged and ultimately took one of the most deeply patriotic of Russian towns—Smolensk. Meanwhile the famous feudal cavalry of Poland ravaged and pillaged far and wide, entirely uncontrolled by their sovereign. The Poles actually held the Kremlin for two years (from September 20, 1610 to November 27, 1612). This roused the stay-at-home peasants of the Russian provinces, and a great and growing national host marched to Moscow, drove out the Poles, and cleared the way for the first of the new dynasty of Romanovs, who was elected by a representative national assembly. The Polish statesman

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Leo Sapieha, chancellor of Lithuania, just before this election, tells the Poles: "And now we must expect and fear that, choosing for themselves some potentate as ruler, they will seek full vengeance for the sufferings we have inflicted on them, will demand and try to recover their property, will exact compensation for the destruction we have caused, or even pay us back all that our people have done to them."

From this time onward (1613), the tide turned, at first slowly and then decisively, in favor of Russia. The idea of a common sovereign for the two Slav countries was later entertained more than once, and at last almost realized—but now it was always a Russian sovereign. Moscow was all the while growing stronger, and Poland weaker.

Apart from the obvious disparity of forces, the causes of the turning tide lay deep in the difference between the two régimes. Russia was an autocracy which grew up out of interminable wars of defense, chiefly against the Tartars. Poland was a feudal aristocracy, where the central power progressively disappeared. The Polish crown was now elective: in fact, there was an official interregnum between every two reigns, and there was even an office of "inter-rex," held by the primate of Poland, the Archbishop of Gniezno. The claims of the candidates were examined, and, in particular, what concessions each was prepared to make from such royal powers as still remained; this was an obvious opportunity to corrupt the electors, the members of the assembly. All this had set in long before the Russian "Time of Troubles," and was largely the cause of Poland's failure to

use her opportunities at that time. Foreign candidates were admissible and even had the best chance, for they had more to offer.

This process, which proved to be progressive national ruin, had begun immediately after the reign of Kazimir the Great in 1370. The famous Jadwyga was the daughter of a King of Hungary. Henri of Valois, elected in 1573, had to promise to regain all lost territory, to secure auxiliary French forces for Poland's wars, to build a fleet at his own cost, and pay the debts of his predecessor. Within a year he escaped to France, where he became king, as Henri III. Rarely was a Pole elected, and a foreign candidate who sought the throne naturally hoped that he might carve out of Poland some permanent acquisition for his son, to add to the hereditary domains which he himself already possessed outside Poland. Meanwhile, there the sovereign became little more than a higher magistrate, bound hand and foot by restrictions of the Sejm, which exclusively represented the nobility and gentry.

The Sejm, or national assembly, was therefore itself the supreme authority, but its own constitution prevented it from functioning as such. Every noble or squire was sovereign within his own estate. In the preliminary elections to the Sejm the closest restrictions were placed on the chosen "envoy." In the Assembly itself every member possessed the right of a free veto, that is, of contracting himself and those whom he represented out of obedience to any law with which he disagreed. On the other hand, the parties at issue on any question had the right of confedera-

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tion, that is, of fighting others to make their view prevail. In practice, it was organized civil war.

Russian sovereigns made unscrupulous use of these conditions. In any war, the death of the Polish sovereign and a disputed election were enough to paralyze all Polish effort. In these elections Russia had the same chance to intervene as any prince from France, Hungary, Sweden, or Saxony. Candidates could come with their escorts. Even when disinterested in a given election, Russia had plenty of opportunity to send troops into Poland and keep them there. Peter the Great and Charles XII of Sweden, in their almost lifelong struggle, had each his candidate for the throne of Poland, and it was Peter's who won. Partition of Poland seemed so inevitable that it was planned by all sorts of combinations at different times, and was foreseen and expected even by a Polish king.

Frederick the Great of Prussia, having successfully fought off a combined attempt of France, Austria, and Russia to partition his own country, and fearing Russian expansion towards Constantinople, proposed to Catherine the Great that she should indemnify herself for her victories over the Turks at the expense, not of Turkey, but of Poland. This meant that Prussia, and ultimately also Austria, would share in the spoils. The steps by which this was carried through were a sequence of terrorism, deceit, and corruption, the work of Catherine. It was she who bullied or bribed the Sejm into submission.

The Poles saw, too late, the results of centuries of organized political inefficiency, which had sacrificed everything

to the sole interests of the nobility and gentry. Poland never deserved better to live than between the first and second partitions. A great moral revival spread through the country which resulted on May 3, 1791, in the adoption of an admirable modern constitution. It removed all the old evils, such as the free veto on laws; it reinforced the royal authority, which was to become hereditary, and introduced a modern system of responsible government. Few western historians know that Poland, in this period of her crisis, put into practice a complete system of national education which was a model for the rest of Europe. But this national revival the three surrounding sovereigns would not tolerate. Catherine forced through a second partition in which the Sejm, surrounded by Russian troops, was informed that its enforced silence meant consent. Polish patriotism, which is perhaps the most fervent in Europe, flamed up after this second partition, under the glorious leadership of Thaddeus Kosciuszko of the lesser gentry, who had already played a gallant part beside Washington in the American Revolution. But the forces were altogether too unequal, and Poland was entirely eliminated from the map of Europe in a third partition. Warsaw fell to Prussia, and Cracow ultimately to Austria. Catherine could maintain, not without foundation, that her part of the spoils consisted of Russian or Lithuanian population; but, in any case, Poland proper was sold by Russia to Austria and Germany (1795).

From this time on, European sympathies could only be with Poland. Gallant Polish emigrant units played a distinguished part in the Napoleonic Wars. After his triumph

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over Prussia in 1806–1807, Napoleon for a time liberated the Prussian section of Poland under the name of the Grand-Duchy of Warsaw, where he introduced his greatest achievement, the Code Napoléon. But as all this was part of a deal with Alexander I of Russia, he did not dare to touch the Russian portion, and even increased it later. The Poles had the satisfaction of marching to Moscow in the Grand Army of 1812—they were given some of the hardest jobs, and did more than their share of the work.

After Napoleon's defeat, his conqueror Alexander, who was in close touch with Polish patriots, revived the idea of a joint sovereignty over both Russia and Poland—autocratic in Russia and constitutional in Poland. Russia, at the Congress of Vienna in 1815, obtained about three-fifths of the old Polish State, including Warsaw; Prussia retained Posen and Danzig; and Austria kept Galicia. Alexander gave Poland a very liberal constitution to which, as sovereign, he took the oath. There was a Sejm or Diet on a reasonable franchise, and freedom of press and person; Polish officials were to be placed in all positions, and there was a Polish Army of forty thousand. But it was quite impossible for all this to work. Alexander was instinctively autocratic, and none of these promises were regularly observed. With his successor, Nicholas I (1825)—the most autocratic of Russian sovereigns, though more correct than Alexander—the whole settlement broke down.

In 1830 the Poles rose, and not only drove the Russian garrison from Warsaw, but claimed the so-called "lost provinces" in the east, where the population was in the

main Russian and took no part in the struggle. In spite of gallant fighting they were overwhelmed by superior numbers. They lost their constitution and their army, and passed directly and completely under Russian rule. Their universities and schools were Russianized, study abroad was forbidden, and their best writers could not publish their works. In 1863, there was another rising, romantic but hopeless; it never went much beyond guerrilla warfare; but again there was an attempt to spread the revolt to those eastern "lost provinces" in which the Poles were sometimes an almost negligible minority, consisting of gentry.

As described in an earlier chapter, Poland groaned under intolerable oppression up to the World War of 1914. The Poles had no chance. The partnership of the three great powers which formed a common interest in the spoils, was too much for them. The national instinct of patriotism went right through all classes of the Polish population and became almost a fanaticism. There were shades of difference between the three despoilers which the struggling national consciousness of Poland was quick to use, shifting from one point to another according to changes of political temperature in each partitionment. Austrian rule was the easiest because, as Austria was not built on a national basis, everyone, so to speak, was equally a foreigner. Thus conditions were far better in Cracow than in Warsaw; and in Eastern Galicia, which has an Ukrainian population with Polish towns, the Poles were, in a sense, masters. In Posen, under Prussia, things were hardest of all, because the Prussian oppression of land and language was much more efficient

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than the Russian. "Aren't there fifty thousand Poles here?" asked the great Russian scholar, Harold Williams, as his train passed through Posen. "There are no Poles," answered the German seated opposite him, "there are only Prussians who speak Polish." Dmowski, the talented leader of the Russian Poles, told me he was never afraid of the Russians; the Poles could hold their own by their superior culture. "I feel certain," he said, "that I shall die a German subject." He only just escaped it.

After the romantic failure of 1863, there was a strong movement for realism in Poland, associated with the teachings of a notable writer, Swietochowski. The Poles could still broaden the bases of their own community. The growth of large industry tended to supply the principal lack of old Poland—a Polish middle class. Other spade work of a more political kind was undertaken by Dmowski and his National Democrats, the strongest party in Russian Poland. Their motto read: "Poland is partitioned, but the Polish people is indivisible." After Russia obtained a national assembly, the Duma of 1906, Dmowski worked for the representation of Polish needs in the three parliaments of the partitioning empires—Russia, Prussia, and Austria—each of which contained Polish members. The Poles could only hope for liberation through a war in which all these empires would be engaged; they therefore saw it coming sooner than others. They conferred among themselves as to the common interest of Poland, and the Russian Poles declared emphatically for Russia, simply because on that side there were also France and England; and the best that Poland

can ever hope for must indeed come from such an alliance. During the German occupation of Warsaw (to 1918), the Poles, as Ludendorff himself tells us, maintained complete aloofness.

No one could have foreseen the simultaneous collapse of all three eastern empires, but nothing less could have brought back Poland in her entirety to the map of Europe. For Russia, now at her weakest, torn by revolution and civil war, it was a return of that earlier "Time of Troubles" which had given Poland her best chance. If the Poles had grasped at the "lost provinces" in each of their risings, however hopeless, it was to be expected that they would do so now; and both their principal leaders, Pilsudski from Austrian Poland and Dmowski from Russian, seized this opportunity.

Almost the first action of the liberal Russian Provisional Government, immediately after the fall of Tsardom in 1917, had been to agree to the complete independence of the Poles. In the year and a half up to the end of the World War, and in the succeeding period, there were in Russia, and especially in south Russia, all sorts of warring forces. Far the most important at first were the Germans, who in March, 1918, imposed separate peace treaties on Russia and Ukraine, thus establishing the separation of the two. In the north they had taken Riga. Later, breaking their armistice with the Soviet government, they streamed into the Baltic provinces in the north and into Ukraine in the south. Kiev, the mother city of earliest Russia, in this period changed hands time after time. Now it would be

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held by an Ukrainian government under German control; next by a German puppet, the Hetman Skoropadsky, and later, after the departure of the Germans, by Russian Reds, Russian Whites, or Ukrainians. The army of the Tsar had, as we know, been smashed to pieces; the Red Army was in its infancy. While the Reds were still completing their victory over the Whites, the Poles marched to Kiev. As soon as they were free to retaliate, the Reds marched on Warsaw. They reached the gates of the city, and there Pilsudski, by a well coordinated operation, saved Poland and drove the Reds back in rout into Russia. Lenin felt compelled, as when treating with the Germans at Brest-Litovsk, to cut his losses; within restricted frontiers he had at least won his civil war. At the treaty of Riga, signed on March 18, 1921, he accepted a frontier which gave up practically all that the Germans had conquered up to the March revolution. It was, in the main, the line where the German advance of 1915 had been finally checked by the Russians. The Poles had not observed the decision of Versailles, according Vilna to Lithuania; and an arbitrary stretch of territory, a kind of corridor, was now interposed between Lithuania and Russia.

This treaty of Riga, concluded under conditions which have here been described, is the one which the Poles have always since referred to as the final settlement of the Russo-Polish duel. That will be the subject of a later study. Meanwhile, it is essential that future negotiations should recognize that the duel includes the antecedents related in this chapter, in addition to those which were yet to follow.

VII

UKRAINE

WHOEVER SITS DOWN as a responsible member of a peace conference is going to be beset by insistent claims which, for the most part, mean nothing definite to him. "Are you making a world peace?" "Aren't you going to do justice to *us*?" "Who are you?" "We are the Ukrainians." "Who are the Ukrainians?"

I know no subject which is more difficult to explain than Ukraine. I don't say "the Ukraine," because there is no word for "the" in Ukrainian: it seems to have come from French books on the subject. "La France," certainly, but not "the America" or "the Ukraine."

Ukraine means borderland. Borderland of what? That is the question. Yet the Ukrainians are something very substantial and definite. There are more than thirty millions of them in Ukraine itself, apart from large numbers in the United States and Canada, who are very sure to make their voices heard. Thirty millions is much more than enough to qualify a nation for independence. What are the circumstances which have prevented them from achieving it?

I do not at all think that a separate language is an indispensable qualification for political independence. America and Britain speak the same language; so do Germany and

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Austria. But Ukrainians put the greatest emphasis on the distinctiveness of their language, and as the subject is not to be evaded, it remains for me to give my own conclusions, supported by the verdict of the greatest Slavic philologist of his time. The language of the Ukrainians unquestionably belongs to the Slavic branch, and to the eastern section of that branch. It is definitely much closer to Russian than to Polish.

Now about its history. That is peculiarly complex. There are Polish, Russian, and Ukrainian histories of Ukraine, which sometimes appear to be dealing with quite different and unrelated subjects. Yet there are essential facts which can be accepted, and one can at least sum up the results of one's own study.

It is beyond question that the Varangers or Vikings, who founded the first Russian State in Kiev, called themselves Rus' or Russians, and blended with the eastern Slavs who took the same name. The word Ukraine, if used at all, then meant the borderland of Russia. The reigning house of Rurik covered all present-day western Russia, and had river outposts to the east on the Volga. Kiev, as we know, was constantly attacked by successive waves of nomad tribes from Asia, and, cultivation in that area becoming impossible, the population dispersed in various directions—westward, northward, and particularly into the forests north-eastward—still under princes of the same family. In 1240 the Tartars completed the ruin of Kiev, and very few houses were left standing.

Those who migrated north-eastward blended with the

native Finnish population which they found in the forest area, and eventually formed the Great-Russian family, which now numbers over 100 millions, and built up a new center around Moscow under the same princely family. Those who escaped this mixture are the Ukrainians. They differ considerably in features—lacking the high cheekbones and the broad nose of the Great-Russians—and also in speech, especially the vowel system. Some no doubt never left the black soil around Kiev. Others returned to it when the steppe was again free of Tartar control.

This rich steppe country stretches in a broad belt of black soil eastward into Asia. The greater part was always in the area of Russian colonization. The western part fell to Poland, and Ukraine always has been and is now a battleground between the Poles and Russians. The cause of Ukrainian independence runs directly counter to Polish territorial claims. The Ukrainians are not Poles, nor have the Poles ever regarded or treated them as such. But in Western Ukraine (the Kiev area) the Ukrainian settlers were followed by Polish gentry who acquired vast estates in this empty and fertile region.

Into this complex question intrudes another element. Apart from peaceable settlers, there was also a constant flow of daring fugitives. Serfdom was highly developed both in Poland and in Russia; and those who escaped it, wherever they came from, organized themselves in this borderland into warlike communities too strong to be brought back by force. This was the origin of the Cossacks. They came to be accepted as a kind of frontier people, living un-

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der military conditions, with a very democratic self-government in time of peace and stern discipline in time of war. The Cossacks were enthusiastically Orthodox, and those of the Dnieper area served as a kind of spearhead of the remaining Ukrainian population against the Polish masters. The Russian Cossacks, mostly centered around the Don, rendered great services to Russia not only on the Turkish frontier but in the colonising advance into Asia and Siberia. There is a likeness between their role and that of the frontiersmen who advanced through Indian opposition to the Pacific Coast of America.

The Russian Cossacks gave a great deal of trouble in times of unrest, and the Cossacks of the Dnieper, entrenched in an island in the rapids, were a permanent problem to the Polish State. Warsaw tried to limit them to a given registered number, but the very essence of Cossack loyalty and, in fact, of their comparative independence made it impossible for them to accept the exclusion of their comrades. This, in 1647, led to open war between the Cossacks and the Poles. The daring hetman, Bogdan Hmelnit-sky, whose equestrian statue, full of movement, now stands outside the Cathedral of St. Sophia in Kiev, replied to the Polish ultimatum: "The time has gone by for that! I will rescue the whole *Russian* people from Polish slavery for the Orthodox faith. All the common folk will help me as far as Lublin or Cracow, and I will not abandon them." He had several great successes, but the superior Polish discipline and organization proved too much for him.

The Poles had themselves given the example of taking a

sovereign from anywhere. Hmelnitsky after conferring with Moscow assembled his Rada, or general assembly of Cossacks, and in plain words which indicated his own preference asked it to choose a sovereign from Poland, Turkey, Crimea (where there was a semi-independent Tartar Khan), or Russia. The choice was unanimously for Russia (January 8, 1654). As this would obviously mean war with Poland, Tsar Alexis, the father of Peter the Great, had called a national assembly which approved his acceptance of the allegiance of Ukraine.

The war which followed was full of changes and chances, and attracted much attention even in Western Europe. Each side in turn had its successes. At one time Poland was almost completely overrun, in the west by the Swedes and in the east by the Russians. The Cossacks themselves proved very unreliable. They had good reason to complain of the Russian encroachments on their local self-government. What they would have appreciated most of all was the rule of a sovereign as distant as possible, who would fight for them against others but interfere with them as little as might be. They alternated between Russia and Poland, but at times they looked towards Sweden, or even offered their allegiance to Turkey. In 1667, one of the very ablest of Russian statesmen, Alexis' foreign minister Nashchókin, brought the Polish war to an end with the treaty of Andrusovo, which left the lower Dnieper as the boundary between the two States. Kiev, on the western bank, was to remain Russian for two years; a later treaty of 1683 restored it permanently to Russia. Poland was already on the

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road towards the tragedy of the Partition, in which Western Ukraine also, with the exception of Eastern Galicia which fell to Austria, passed under Russian rule until the Russian Revolution of 1917.

Ukraine had no reason to be well-satisfied with the rule of the Tsars. Although there were distinguished Ukrainians in the Russian government, she was regarded only from the angle of government interests. Ukraine had never adopted in full the communal farming system of the Great-Russian peasants, and had always allowed more latitude to personal initiative. The church Unia, which has been described earlier, had many adherents in Ukraine, and these were persecuted by the Russian Church. We remember that Catherine, the author of the Partitions, extended serfdom to Ukraine; she broke up the island fortress of the Cossacks in the rapids of the Dnieper (where the Soviets have since created the great dam), putting the Cossacks on a much more disciplined basis of military service to the government, which they have ever since loyally performed.

In the course of the nineteenth century, the French Revolution of 1789 and the Napoleonic Wars that carried its ideas far and wide brought the instinct of nationality into the farthest corners of Europe. With these ideas Nicholas I of Russia (1825–1855) was at war throughout his reign. Nicholas Gogol, one of the greatest Russian writers of that reign, though a Ukrainian, wrote in Russian; but under Alexander II (1855–1881) the poet Shevchenko, who wrote in his native Ukrainian, was persecuted; the printing of Ukrainian was prohibited, and even a branch of the Russian

Academy of Sciences, which was especially interested in this language, was closed. Ukrainian political groups played a part in the underground work which brought that reign to its tragic close. The Ukrainians had nothing to hope from the black reaction of Pobedonostsev, with its motto, "One Tsar, one Church, one people," which lasted to 1905.

This idiotic policy was a precious gift to Austrian and German propaganda. Bismarck, after soundly beating Austria in the war of 1866, took her under the protection of Prussia and, trusting that simple folk would still regard them as entirely separate states, was diligently engaged in scooping as many Slavs as possible into the Austrian basket; this was the point of his surprise award at Berlin in 1878, which put Serbian Bosnia under Austrian military occupation. One little corner of Ukraine, Eastern Galicia, had been tossed by Catherine to Austria in the Polish Partitions. Thence was set going a movement for the liberation of Ukraine. In this policy there was no care for the Ukrainians. They were, as at the present moment, to be brought under German control. Germany was always very dependent on Russia for her supply of rye. Think how pleasant it would be—this is almost the wording of a later speech of Hitler—if to this Eastern Galicia could be added the great wheat fields of Ukraine, the nearest extensive granary. It was also clear that to take Ukraine from Russia was a most effective way of breaking her economically. So the full weight of both Austrian and German propaganda was thrown into fomenting the legitimate grievances of Ukraine. In this connection, it must be remembered that

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the majority of Ukrainian emigrants to Canada and the United States came from Eastern Galicia, the little tip of Ukraine that lay within the frontiers of Austria. As to the rest of Ukraine which was in Russia, it was kept as silent as possible under the heartbreaking regime of Pobedonostsev.

Economic developments of the greatest importance for Ukraine accompanied the emancipation of the serfs in Russia and Russia's consequent entry into modern capitalism. Great fields of coal and iron, in close proximity, were discovered in Ukraine. Labor, now free to move, migrated in such strength thither as to shift the center of gravity of Russian population southward, and, incidentally, by the influx of Great-Russians, to alter the racial distribution in Ukraine and bind it close to the north. On the other hand, in the changing conditions of land settlement, the Ukrainians, with their much greater initiative, were quicker to take new chances than the Great-Russians who, till 1906, were still bound tight by the cramping authority of the village commune. Ukrainians took up newly available land far afield in Great-Russia or even in Siberia, and the Russian Empire contained many scattered islands of Ukrainian population. Apart from these binding influences, there were no geographical features to mark a boundary between Russia and Ukraine. Two of the most important rivers of Russia, Dnieper and Don, passed through Ukraine. The frontier of a separate Ukraine, if left to Ukrainian forces, would be one of the most difficult in Europe for a General Staff to defend.

In the liberal period of the Duma, Ukrainians, on an

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equal footing with Russians, took an active part in the general movement for reform. The Cadet (Constitutional Democratic) Party of Milyukov, which at this time was much the most important in Russia, with its motto, "The United States of Russia," had many members in Ukraine, and was out to satisfy Ukrainian claims. The military staff of the Kiev district had attracted the most liberal and also the most able elements in the army commands: Alexeyev, Ruzsky, Brusilov, and Dukhonin, all won their spurs in this region. When the Russian turn for invasion came, the authorities had the wisdom to send Russian Ukrainian troops into Austrian Ukraine, and these troops, with whom I lived for nearly a year, definitely carried with them a spirit of liberation.

On the fall of the Tsar, as a direct consequence of the policy of Pobedonostsev, separatist movements broke out all over the Empire, which the weak Provisional Government was quite unable to suppress, and inevitably, the Ukrainians followed the general trend. The question was not wisely handled; an Ukrainian Rada, or national assembly, under influences coming from Eastern Galicia, was called, and it declared Ukraine independent. The Central Powers, Germany and Austria, of course favored this movement, and in the peacemaking at Brest-Litovsk they actually, for the moment, realized their plan of breaking up Russia, by insisting on two separate treaties, one with Russia and one with Ukraine. The period which followed, as described elsewhere, was for Ukraine one of complete confusion. Up to the armistice of November 11, 1918, the Germans were in

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possession, but their extravagant extortions encountered the most vigorous resistance. Afterwards, Kiev was contested by Reds, Whites, and Ukrainians, and ultimately fell to the Reds.

Communist dictatorship was in many ways very unpalatable to Ukraine. Firstly, it was again the dominance of Moscow; and individualism had always been stronger among the Ukrainians than among the Great-Russians. But for that, as some leading Ukrainians said, they would certainly have held on to Russia. It has really been a question of the strength of the Moscow dictatorship in practice, and the use to which it has been put. For instance, peculiarly grievous to Ukraine were the famine years around 1931 when Ukrainians had even to go to Moscow to pick up the crumbs of grain grown in their own country, and there have also been times when the spirit of local independence has strongly penetrated the Communist Party of Ukraine. What was required for peaceful relations was, before all things, the withering away of the strictly Communist pressure from Moscow—a field in which, as we have seen, there have been substantial changes. The more the new Russia has become national, the easier has it been for Ukraine to go the same way. In this sense, the settlement of the multinational question, especially the work of Stalin, has been of the highest value to both peoples. And when I visited Kiev in 1935, its superiority to the Tsarist régime was emphasized to me by Ukrainian scholars in the strongest terms. Ukraine is the second largest Republic of the Union. It has its national boundaries, its own local self-government, the use

of its own language in schools and universities, and not only freedom but encouragement to develop all its old traditions.

This alone explains the Ukrainian resistance to the German invasion. Hitler, like his predecessors, set up his little propaganda-window in the western tip of Ukraine; he closed it down during the Russo-German Pact of 1939-1941; but when he invaded, he counted heavily on Ukrainian discontent. In the initial operations the southernmost advance of the German army was contested longer than any other. Ukrainian guerrillas, though without the northern cover of forests, have proved as vigorous as the others. It can be left to German arrogance alone to raise the necessary resistance to German pretensions.

With the complete reversal of Russian policy on the question of nationalities, the settlement of Russian and Ukrainian relations must be left to the parties concerned. Interference from outside is as little in place as in the American Civil War. The war itself has forged a new unity. It is certain that everywhere in the Soviet Union the people will count for more than before. Economic interdependence more than ever brings all the parts nearer to the whole and, in the policy of internal transformation and construction in the common interests of all, Ukraine has a share which has certainly made her forget the restrictions and humiliations of the Tsarist regime. Any Englishman, with the examples of Canada and Australia, can only wish to see the fullest development of the national genius of Ukraine. The United Nations have far less means than the Germans of imposing

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any settlement from outside. It is in every way reasonable and desirable that Ukrainian populations outside Ukraine, while acclimatizing themselves more and more rapidly to their new environment, should take the keenest interest in the country of their origin, and at the present time they can well be proud of the sufferings and heroism of their homefolk in a cause which is common to all of us. Russia and Ukraine are indispensable to each other, and, in any case, they will find their own way.

VIII

THE POLISH QUESTION TODAY

I HAVE GIVEN the story of Ukraine because that is the territory principally concerned in the Russo-Polish duel. The story of Ukraine has, so to speak, been packed by history into the story of that duel. As far as Poland is concerned, the question is one of imperial claims which it would be impossible for her to realize alone. Nor could Poland ever have hoped to occupy all Ukraine, as most of it has long belonged to Russia. It can only be a question of how much of Ukraine Poland should have.

The Poles are a proud and gallant people; their position between two overwhelmingly greater nations is one of the tragedies of geography. Their treatment under the Tsars was as brutal as it was stupid. Not only the Russians, but the Germans also tried to rob the Poles both of land and of language, and before the last war Poland was an open sore, teeming with bitterness; but that only sharpened the Polish sense of nationality, which became almost an obsession. Their outstanding poet, Mickiewicz, wrote of his country: "How much thou should'st be prized, only he can tell who has lost thee." Divorced from the map, and therefore in a sense detached from realities, the national instinct went back to the moments of greatest glory. In each of the two

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great risings during the period of partitionment, in 1830 and 1863, the fight for liberation was spoiled by unrealizable claims for the recovery of non-Polish provinces, once held by Poland, and they found practically no support among the common folk there.

No student of Russia can disregard the Polish question. We have seen that the history of the two countries has been inextricably interlocked, and when I wrote my own *History of Russia*, I had to devote more than a page of index to Poland. In the time of the Russian oppression of Poland, a citizen of a free country like my own instinctively sympathized with the Poles; and, as I think will be realized from the following details, I can claim to write as a friend of both peoples.

In 1907, I met in the Russian Duma the recognized leader of the Russian Poles, Roman Dmowski. As I watched him steering his difficult course in that foreign assembly, he seemed to me much the ablest man there; he reminded me of the Irish leader, Charles Parnell, and in some ways, even of Cavour. He wished to enlist my help for his country. In our very first conversation I put it to him that England could never keep an army in Poland to defend her against both Russia and Germany. If so, we could only help Poland through friendship with either the one or the other. He accepted this at once, and there followed ten years of the closest cooperation between us. There were many things which we did together. My American partner, Samuel Harper, and I kept him in touch with the press correspondents of both our countries. He asked me for a young scholar to train up

in Polish history in Warsaw, whom I later established in the first British university post in Polish studies at Liverpool. In 1909, I managed to obtain a strong representation of the Poles when arranging a visit of the leaders of the Duma to Britain where they were entertained by our King, Parliament, and many other institutions. No diplomat in any of the three partitioning empires could then have touched the Polish question without a demand for his immediate recall; but as an independent student I was able to keep Sir Edward Grey and the Foreign Office fully informed, and left no doubt with my many friends in Russian political parties about our interest and opinions on the Polish question. In 1913, having good reason to foresee the approach of a German attack on Russia, I raised the Polish question in my *Russian Review*, which had many influential subscribers in Russia; and Dmowski persuaded many leading Poles to present the Polish case in it—he himself contributing four articles. In the summer of 1915 I hurried from the Russian Front to warn him of the impending fall of Warsaw. He brought in his colleagues and discussed the attitude to be adopted by them during the German occupation—which was one of complete aloofness. Dmowski had shown me a map by Spett of Leipzig which, he said, though German, gave a fair view of the boundaries of Polish population. In 1916, I advised him to take it with him to England. In that year the British Ambassador, Sir George Buchanan, was freely consulted by the Russian Foreign Minister, Sazonov, who was then drafting a proposal to the Tsar for full autonomy of Poland. At the insistence of the Empress Alexandra,

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Sazonov was dismissed on this score. On the fall of Tsardom, almost the first act of the liberal Provisional Government, in which I had several close friends, was to accord full independence to Poland without reservation. I only parted company with Dmowski when I found that he was trying to get what he could for Poland out of the ruins of Russia.

In the time of confusion which followed, Pilsudski, like his predecessors, stretched out his hand for the so-called "lost provinces," and the Poles marched into Kiev. The Red Army, still in its infancy, replied by marching on Warsaw. The British government proposed to both belligerents, as a basis of armistice, the so-called Curzon line, which was very nearly the Russian frontier attained later in September, 1939. Both sides refused; the Red Army was driven back in rout; Lenin, who had now won his Civil War, was in urgent need of peace, and on March 18, 1921, by the Treaty of Riga—which the Poles now claim as a permanent settlement—some ten million Russians passed under Polish rule. Of these, the White-Russians, to satisfy foreign opinion by giving them another name, are sometimes described as White Ruthenians; and the Ukrainians as Ruthenians. Ruthenian, after all, is only a German adaptation of the word "Rusin," which means "a man of Russia." "Rusin" was what an East Galician would call himself to me, when I was living in his country in 1914-1915.

There is a sharp difference between the record of Poland in these areas, where her rule is for the most part feudal, and the remarkable work carried out by the Polish government

in Poland proper on her return to the map of Europe. The crime of the Partitions, which ultimately drew the frontier line across her very hearthstone, had divided Poland proper into three sections, each of which, like a sundered limb, had to live a separate life under a different conqueror. Now, habits, institutions, everything had to be once more amalgamated, and Poland deserves great credit for the way in which she tackled this painful and complex task. On the other hand, in the disputed provinces, Poland remained imperial. There was nothing in geography to suggest this frontier line—its sole significance had nothing to do with Poland: it was approximately the line where the Russians had held the Germans at bay from the autumn of 1915 to the Revolution. The population was just the same on both sides. The line cut White-Russia almost exactly in half; if either side had half of it, why not all? On the Russian side lay the White-Russian Republic centered at Minsk, with full language rights and no discrimination of race. What a challenge to face! On the Polish side, there were vast estates of Polish nobles and squires which had survived the earlier period of Russian rule, imbedded in an impoverished Russian population. I lived in these parts with the Russian army in the last war. The general's headquarters would be in large manor houses with electric light, and upholstered with a western comfort and luxury which one would not be likely to find in corresponding manors of Russia. One always felt a strange isolation from the immediate surroundings. This was one of those unhappy parts of the world where class corresponded with race, where the rich spoke one language and

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the poor another. Attempts were made to settle Polish peasants here as a national fringe on an otherwise indefensible frontier, but these efforts did not have time to take much effect. In the one long talk which I had with Marshal Pilsudski in 1922, he told me he had just come back from a part of the State where the population was 80 per cent Orthodox, which of course meant Russian, and he illustrated by a picturesque anecdote the moral frontier which separated the Polish troops quartered there from the surrounding population. I had asked him what I regarded as the vital question: How could Poland face her evident danger without making friends with one of her two irreconcilable neighbors? He did not suggest any solution, and his answer was to be found only in his statesmanship. He made a pact of ten years with each of them—two more “truces to draw breath.”

In 1939, Hitler on his march to world conquest scraped an entirely baseless quarrel with Poland. Britain gave a pledge to Poland (at first unilateral) without any study of how she could, if necessary, bring effective help. France was allied with both Poland and Russia, but had never held any consultations with Russia as to common action. Both Britain and France now turned for help to Russia, who for years past had been vainly offering them her cooperation. For the failure of the long drawn-out negotiations that followed, each party must take its share of responsibility; Britain and France, who had failed to realize the profound changes that had taken place in Russia; Russia, because she suspected that the other countries wanted to direct Hitler's

attack onto her; Poland and the Baltic States, because they refused to utilize the only form of guarantee which could ever have served them, and which was actually offered by Russia—namely, a joint engagement of protection signed by Russia, France, England, and Poland. No meeting of all the parties concerned was ever held; the British carried messages from the Poles or the Baltics to the Russians. The Poles wished strictly to limit any assistance that was to be given to them; and, above all, no Russian troops were to enter Polish territory. After four months of futile talk the Russians broke off the negotiations and made their own arrangement with Ribbentrop, to stand aside from any coming hostilities.

Poland was crushed in something like a fortnight, without having received any active help from her allies. The Polish army was driven back into the area of Russian population, and the government was already in flight from Warsaw. The question that remained was the fate of the Russian population in Poland. It was obvious that Hitler must have them if Russia did not intervene. This was why the Russians marched in, putting the greatest strain on their recently concluded neutrality with Germany. As soon as they marched in, the scanty Polish population (largely gentry and their retainers) having fled, the big estates were divided up among the peasants, preference being given to the poorest; and the institutions of the Soviet Union—above all, the highly developed public services—were introduced. To re-establish feudal eastern Poland, that land would have to be taken back and those big estates restored in the Polish half of White-Russia—a settlement which could only be main-

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tained by a foreign standing army, with no military base behind it.

The settlement of Riga has already been twice reversed, and it will have to be reversed again; for the territory concerned is now in the possession of Hitler. Obviously the Poles are in no position to reconquer it; and no one else can do it but the Russians. For the matter of that, if anyone is also to reconquer Poland proper from Hitler, it is the Russians who will have to do that too. In the long history of the Russo-Polish duel, the Treaty of Riga retreats to an incident in the story: already two chapters back.

At no time more than the present have the Poles had a stronger appeal to our sympathies. The hell through which they are now passing under the German heel is the fiercest and bitterest in all their history. Cool reason does not go with such sufferings. The Poles, not unnaturally, have put more hope in international law than any other people—from the Congress of Vienna in 1914 to the Atlantic Charter in 1941. But even here they have not been consistent. When the verdict of Versailles went against them they marched into Vilna, which had been allotted to the Lithuanians. When Hitler was breaking Czechoslovakia to pieces the government of Colonel Beck seized a small part of the spoils at Teschen. They still seek a peace settlement which will give them all that they claim. For a refugee government in London, the obvious task was to win the utmost support of England; and it is the same with the four or five million-odd Poles in the United States, especially during the preliminaries to a presidential election.

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After the last war Poland relied on France to set up a *cordon sanitaire* against Russia, consisting of weaker elements banded together; but at the crisis France failed Poland as England did, and France, for the present at least, is out of the picture. And who would be Poland's partners in such a combination? Not the Czechs, who firmly hold to the opposite policy of friendship with Russia. Poland and Czechoslovakia have committed themselves to a partnership in a common foreign policy, and here is a sharp divergence on the most important issue of all. Poland's natural partners in a *cordon sanitaire* would be Finland, Hungary, and Rumania, all of whom are, at the time of writing, still fighting in the ranks of the Axis powers.

I repeat my unaltered conviction that England will not fight both Germany and Russia in the cause of Polish claims. If she did, she could not possibly win where the issue would have to be decided, for in time of war she could not send thither either a battleship or an army corps. And any attempt of hers to force this issue could only serve to draw Russia and Germany together again. Each time that that has happened, Poland has been eliminated from the map of Europe. She has already twice disappeared from it, and is off it again now. It is because I earnestly hope that may never happen again after this war, that I write so plainly.

As to America, I can imagine no prospect better suited to drive public opinion back into isolation. Cannot the Poles see that the present grouping of the great powers is the most favorable to Poland that can be, and that everything possible should be done to prevent its disruption?

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I believe we can do a good deal for Poland. My country is pledged not to make peace without the restoration of an independent Poland, and Stalin has more than once repeated his acceptance of this principle. He would be parting company with his own common sense if he tried to restore what was always a sore in Russia by including the Polish nation within his frontiers. He would be inviting Germany to new aggression. And it is precisely as barriers against German aggression that a free Poland and a free Czechoslovakia can best serve the interests of Russia.

Britain is not pledged to a restoration of Russian population to Poland, nor can we achieve it. But I believe we can do for her what will prove of much more permanent value. Britain has given to Russia a guarantee against future German aggression; and even a glance at the gigantic struggle in the east of Europe will show how much that means to Russia. It is the firmest guarantee that the future peace settlement is to be a joint one; and in free countries, such as this and my own, public opinion will judge how this pledge is honored. In 1939 some three or four million Poles fell into the Soviet Union. A "strong and independent Poland" implies their restitution. Neither Poland nor Russia would be strengthened by the acquisition of portions of each other's population. Stalin has already shown that he will not prove unreasonable. For myself, I feel sure he is thinking much less of ten miles of Polish frontier than of a thousand miles of Siberia and the native riches hidden there, which can be brought to life for the benefit of the Russian people.

IX

THE GATES OF LENINGRAD

FEW QUESTIONS could be more full of complications than that with which we are now to deal. Yet it is one on which the public is much exercised, and every one of these complications has got to be faced squarely if it is proposed to put demands to Russia. Here it is more than ever necessary that our knowledge of the details should go back much further than that imaginary beginning of all things, the European settlement of the last war, now overthrown in all its main essentials and, by its bankruptcy, the principal cause of the present struggle. My analysis of the antecedents is not offered as a justification of Russian policy and action, but as the necessary basis to an understanding of what we should be asking of Russia whenever we discuss this question with her.

The old waterway which was the arterial road of the first Russian State of the tenth century passed from the Gulf of Finland by way of the Neva, the Volkhov and Lake Ilmen, to a portage which afforded connection with the Dnieper at Smolensk, and thence to Kiev and the Black Sea. This was the nerve of that first Russian State, and all the three successive capitals of Russia have had easy and direct access to Europe only by this waterway.

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For a long time the Neva outlet of Russia was blocked by smaller peoples. On the north side were the Finns, who were not strong enough to achieve total independence, but were strong enough—whether under Sweden or Russia—to safeguard their own native institutions, which included a parliament and a cabinet. Southward across the Gulf of Finland there were much smaller units, racial groups as they would certainly have been described in America, which never became independent till Russia's temporary collapse in 1917.

Besides being small, these lesser units are all different and have never shown any capacity for amalgamation. The Estonians, at the gates of Peter's capital, are close kinsmen of the Finns. The Letts around Riga are of a totally different ethnic origin, with a quite different, and by no means kindred, psychology. The Lithuanians, further west, are close kinsfolk of the Letts, but even on the collapse of Russia did not unite with them. None of these units on the south Baltic coast were capable of defending their independence, and all were a target for both German and Russian ambition. Hitler, in *Mein Kampf*, includes them all with Russia in his general threat to convert them into a "living room" for Germany—"Russia and the border States formerly dependent on her."

Estonia and Latvia, which had never been independent, were conquered from Sweden by Peter the Great, who spent more than twenty years on thus winning a direct outlet to Europe. His new capital, St. Petersburg, was actually planted on Estonian soil. And in both little countries the

local aristocracy was not native but German, descended from the old German Knights of the Sword.

The founding of St. Petersburg by Peter the Great in 1703 set the seal on a forcible, if superficial, modernization of the Russian State. Peter called it his "window on Europe": it was his direct road to western civilization. The collapse of Russia in 1917 cut her off from this road. While she was distracted by revolution and civil war, it was easy for even the smallest units to break away from her, especially on the side of Germany. The Germans, who with their Baltic nobles had always regarded this area as the best of their roads into Russia, had in the early months of 1918 even conquered these provinces in this time of Russia's confusion and were preparing permanent rulers for them when by our armistice of November 11 of that year they were compelled to withdraw, and these little racial groups remained high and dry under the shadowy protection of the distant victors of Versailles, France and England. For the first time, the million and a half Estonians and the two and a half million Letts were able to set up national states. Having no traditions or personnel of government, they fell, in the main, under the rule of petty dictators. They were closed in by tariffs, and severed from all their former economic connections. For instance, Krenholm, once the largest cotton mill in Russia, with a market to the Pacific, was now closed in by an eastern frontier not a mile away. Russia again became a hinterland cut off from the seas.

On two non-stop journeys by sea from London Bridge to Leningrad between the two wars, I did not encounter the

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Russian frontier till a full day and a half by steam later than I should have done before 1914. When one came to it, one was already some two-thirds of the way up the Gulf of Finland and almost at the gates of Leningrad which was therefore left without protection. The Baltic was filled with the mercantile flags of new small states. But on this side Russia had practically ceased to be a naval power.

This situation was due to the almost simultaneous collapse both of Russia and of Germany. On their revival the little states were sure to be again disputed between them. For the time being they enjoyed a precarious independence under the wing of the victors of Versailles, and more particularly of England, who in time of war could hardly even send a ship into the Baltic to help them. For the French, their independence was a part of that system of the "cordon sanitaire" which aimed at isolating Russia and, above all, separating her from Germany. The subsequent collapse of France has meant the collapse of this system.

The new frontier was almost at the environs of Leningrad. In 1919, when the "White" Russian general, Yudenich, launched an attack from the frontier, he was almost at once in the city, and marks of his assault are still to be seen in the Tsar's little palace at Tsarskoe Selo.

Finland also secured full independence for the first time, but in 1918, she, too, was torn by a civil war between "Reds," friendly to Russia, and "Whites," relying on Germany. The Russians, with their own civil war on their hands, could give no help to the Finnish "Reds." Germany sent munitions and troops to help the Finnish "Whites."

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The "Whites" won, and the new independent Finland was pro-German; Ludendorff had a prince ready for them before the German collapse. Up to the last war, the Russian frontier on this side was the western shore of Finland. Now it was brought back eastward to some twenty miles from Leningrad.

I never saw any assurance of permanence in this novel situation. Russia was bound to recover, and when she realised what had happened to her and again became a great nation she would be sure to feel her terribly cramped position and feel her loss of all that her greatest sovereign had done for her. The old rivalry of Germany and Russia was certain to reappear, and these small pieces of indefensible territory would become once more a battleground between the two. The Finns, too, evidently felt their insecurity, and were particularly careful never to emphasize their close kinship with the Estonians on the opposite side of the gulf. To block Russia's way out altogether and permanently, would be too sharp a challenge.

It must be understood that Russia, who had lost far more territory than Germany in the last war, for a long time remained passive, and more than once formally ratified the new position. Personally, I believe that in the abortive negotiations of 1939 she was prepared to leave the question undisturbed provided she could secure the alliance of the democracies against the invasion promised by Hitler. The publication of the details of those negotiations has been postponed; but I have been informed on the highest Russian authority that Russia proposed to the little Baltic States

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a joint occupation and guarantee by Britain, France, and Russia. It is only too easy to understand why these small states were insistent on staying as they were; but the storm of war was already on its way: Hitler was already taking Memel from Lithuania; these small units with their little bosses were peculiarly susceptible to his favourite method of penetration or "indirect aggression." In my view, they had no security at all against inevitable attack, other than in the guarantee proposed to them. Anyhow, they refused it; the Russians were informed, and made their own arrangements; and the storm broke. Since then the little states have only been a *glacis* or no man's land between two great armies. After all, Russia had more reason to fear a German attack through the Baltic States than Britain had to fear one directed through Belgium, for that way there was a continuous land frontier; and probably it was this, added to all the other suspicions and misunderstandings of the time, that suggested to the Russians that Britain was leaving open a passage for a German attack on Leningrad; and that is what came to pass.

Russia, as I had been warned after Munich, proceeded to "lock her own doors and see to her own defense." And at no point did this definition apply more exactly than in the case of the small Baltic States. During the period of the dubious pact of non-aggression with Germany, Hitler's threat of invasion was never forgotten, and Stalin, as a typical national leader, set himself to deal with it. His first object was to restore his naval defenses on the Baltic to what they were in 1914—namely, as far west as Libau. The little states, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, had no more power to resist Russia

than Germany, and yielded these bases. Russia gave a most emphatic and explicit pledge that there should be no interference in internal affairs, but this promise was quickly and cynically violated. Many Letts had cast in their lot with the Russian Revolution and taken a most active part in it. Many others, as expert farmers, had utilized the great dimensions of the old Empire to play a leading part in the development of Russian agriculture in its various provinces.

This cleared the left side of Russia's road out, and restored the frontier of 1914 on that side. But Finland, on the right side of the road, was a much more solid proposition, and here Stalin made his worst miscalculation. He tried to treat Finland as he had treated the little states. He did not necessarily aim at first at the conquest of all Finland—he even proposed a considerable extension of its frontiers in Karelia, where the population is Finnish—but when his demand for Russia's old naval bases met with a sturdy refusal, he marched in (November 30, 1939). In the first Finnish place which he occupied, Terioki, he set up a rival Red Finn government under an emigrant, Otto Kuusinen, who had accompanied the Russian troops. Stalin even made a treaty with Kuusinen, widely advertised by the Soviet press, by which, for the naval bases in question, he conceded the territory on another side which he had already offered to the legal Finnish government. This treaty must have been meant as a bid to Finland to accept Kuusinen. And it is reasonable to think that Stalin hoped his invasion might prove a military parade which would bring the Finnish "Reds" into power. The Finns met him with a splendidly united national resistance.

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Stalin had proved entirely wrong. Recognizing his mistake, he put the military operations into new hands with new instructions. The Finns were attacked continuously by overwhelming masses of Russians, but held out till their last reserves were exhausted and those in the trenches were brought to the limit of physical endurance. Again, as so often in the past, they had checked the calculations of the aggressor. Stalin cut his losses, dropped Kuusinen, and, treating with the legal Finnish government, insisted only on driving the Finnish frontier somewhat further back, especially on the side of Leningrad, which had been almost within the range of modern gunnery (March 12, 1940).

Stalin was certainly thinking in terms of the coming German invasion of Russia. His Finnish campaign had almost brought him to war with Britain, who had hurriedly prepared a small relief force for the Finnish front. I am convinced by a review of all his actions, that Stalin had no intention of becoming a partner in Germany's war against the western democracies. The Russians had captured the one ice-free port that Finland possessed in the Arctic: Petsamo, tucked in between the closely adjoining frontiers of Russia and Norway. Another open port in these waters would have been of substantial value to the Russians, but they returned it demonstratively to Finland. This was not long before the time when the British were dealing with the close-by Norwegian port of Narvik.

It seems self-evident that if all this disputed territory is to be reconquered from Hitler, it is only Russia that can conquer it. If she is to come out of this war as one of its prin-

cial winners, she is hardly likely to regard the moment of her greatest weakness as fixing the measure of her rights, or be prepared to give up her conquests for some new general formula of world peace. She will naturally ask a number of awkward questions: for instance, if Britain asked her to restore an independent Estonia, she might reply by asking us whether the British have yet gone out of India, which is a very different proposition from little Estonia, and certainly does not lie at the gates of London. She would be sure to see in the demand a revival of the old *cordon sanitaire* to isolate her from Europe, and if she adheres to this position it would presumably take a new war to dislodge her from it.

That the Finns should have joined in the invasion of Russia in 1941 was natural enough, and under German pressure it became inevitable. I cannot see that we should bear them ill will for it. The United States have remained in diplomatic relations with Finland even while she was taking an active part in the siege of Leningrad—a circumstance which Americans should bear in mind when they are inclined to scold Russia for not granting bases for the bombing of Tokyo. But in no case can we now regard Finland as an independent power; she is a weapon in the hands of Germany. As long as Finland is a spearhead for an attack on Leningrad, as she still is at the time of writing, we cannot expect Russia to be indifferent to the question of Finnish independence; for at present, it cannot be called independence—it is really dependence on Germany. If the peace settlement is such as to make it possible for Russia to forget this danger, then I do not think that she has any ground to

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be apprehensive of Finland—as only Finland. The two countries are not economically interdependent. Finland, alone, does not cut off Russia from the sea, or close her window on Europe. In this, again, I attach importance to the twenty years' guarantee against German aggression which my own country has given to Russia. Finland has shown that in peacetime she can be self-supporting. She has the respect and friendship of the Anglo-Saxon democracies, and to these outside supports she can add a strength of her own, which, with the wisdom she has generally shown, will in normal times enable her to go her own way; and her way will certainly be the way of peace.

The question is different on the south side of the Gulf. These little units were never viable, and, furthermore, independence is a questionable gift if they are left in the position of a kind of no man's land between two big nations, and so placed that no distant friends and sympathizers can bring them any effective help. They are of themselves quite inoffensive, but they are inevitably a bone of contention. Russia must wonder why, among her 180-odd nationalities whose aspirations she has been so successful in satisfying, the question of independence should be pressed only for those which lie along the road of the German challenge. In the matter of defense, Estonia is to Leningrad what Long Island would be to New York—if Long Island were also accessible by land to the Germans. The magnificent and successful year-long defense of Leningrad is an epic of patience and courage far longer than even that of Stalingrad. Americans should imagine isolationist Chicago, shelled for

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a year from the neighborhood of Evanston, nearly encircled but still pressing on the hectic work of munitions. It is not likely that the Russians will forget all this, and we can hardly be surprised if they remain indifferent to our demands on this subject. In any case, the complexities of this study are evidence enough of the thought and knowledge that are required before such demands are pressed.

X

RUSSIA, CZECHS AND BALKANS

ORDINARILY, Russia has had a choice of two foreign policies. One is a policy of Asiatic expansion or construction; the other seeks a share in the common life of Europe, and centers itself more particularly in the defense of the Slavs of the Balkans against Turkish or German dominance and aggression.

Russia's relations with her "younger brothers," the Slavs of the Balkans, have been various. Let us take the little Balkan countries in turn.

Her most direct connection was with the Bulgars, who were definitely liberated from Turkish domination by Russian arms in 1877-1878. To Russians of the educated classes it seemed tragic that Bulgaria in the First World War should have drifted into the camp of the Central Powers and fought against her liberators; but nothing else was to be expected after Alexander III, stung by Russia's defeat at the treaty-making in Berlin, could think of nothing better than to play the big bully to Bulgaria, which culminated in the amazing kidnapping of her new Prince in his palace at Sofia. Under *force majeure*, Bulgaria's rulers have made the same choice this time. But for all that, the Bulgarian people are 100 per cent pro-Russian.

The Serbs owed the beginnings of their emancipation to Russia in an earlier war (1812). They were much further off from Russia and much closer to Austria; so in their pursuit of national independence they could feel much more confident in relying on Russia's support, as Russia could not well be dangerous to them. Probably their relations with the big brother have been the simplest and most consistent among all the lesser Slavs. This people of fighters, for whom war is the common affair of men, women, and children, has often challenged all odds and faced all disasters in the Slavic cause. On the other hand, their closest kinsfolk, the Croats, who are Catholics, became acclimatized in the old Austro-Hungarian dual monarchy, and followed a different pattern. Their fight was against Hungarian domination within the monarchy, and they naturally set a value on Austrian support.

The case of the Czechs is quite different. Indeed, they had long since played their own very distinctive part in the story of western civilization. With their great teacher and martyr, John Huss, they were the forerunners of the Protestant Reformation. In their wars of religion, their one-eyed general Zizka (Zhizhka) may be said to have been the initiator of the methods of modern infantry warfare. In the centuries of political subjection to the Habsburgs, their philosopher Comenius revived the principles of education set forth in the *Republic* of Plato, by which a people in subjection can yet remain a nation and, when the time comes, again become a State.

They had, therefore, their own culture; and in their under-

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ground fight for its preservation, they had had to face and conquer infinitely more complex problems than those of political or military domination. Their whole struggle for existence, essentially democratic, encouraged no sympathy for the Russian autocracy. In all their dealings with Russia, they stood on a level with her, with no such appeal for patronage as was made by the others. Their first relations were all cultural; and in the suffocating times of Russian reaction, they gave the Russians much more than they gained from them, and that was a breath of the rising tide of national consciousness, self-developing and self-educating, which even among the smallest peoples was spreading eastward over Europe, as one of the foremost lessons of the great French Revolution. Czechs were brought to Russia as educators; and the intelligent Czech studied the kind of help his country could hope and expect from Russia. It was not for nothing that the philosopher-teacher, Thomas Masaryk, who ultimately became the head of the re-born state, was one of the most acute and discriminating students of the strength and weakness of his contemporary Russia.

In spite of the intensely factious character of their politics, the Slavs have a strong and instinctive solidarity which has survived immemorial political separation. There is no common history of Slavdom. The only link between the peoples—a most fundamental one, it is true—is prehistoric: the peculiar family likeness of their speech. This has still kept them a community, but without any experience of a common life. It is this that has enabled them to fight with such success their long battle of the underdog against

Turkish, or even German, domination. There is far more differentiation in little England, and consequently, until recently, far more dialect. The Slavs have ways of thinking which are almost unintelligible to those who have not lived among them: their link with Russia is that they feel at home there.

Let us pass on from the Slavs of the Balkans to Greece. There is in Russia an instinctive looking back to the ancient past of Greece, for Greece was the mother of Russian civilization—and the acceptance of Greek Orthodoxy is now again recognized even in Soviet official history as a definite advance in Russian culture. But the difference between Rome and Constantinople is more than a simple matter of creed: with it goes a distinctive cultural history of ideals, of habits of thought. The one distinctively Russian philosophy, the Slavophil—which is of course idealist—goes back for its models to the old Greek Ascetics. Traces of their spirit have never vanished in Russia, and they are recognizable in the universal devotion to the community which is playing so large a part in the Russian army of today. That was the very essence of the aloofness, the distinctiveness, of the old Holy Russia. Strange new forms of this spirit meet us today: we read even in the Soviet press about “the consecrated Soviet motherland.”

Both in Greece and in Rumania there are extensive elements of Slav population, which in Rumania have left their traces on the language. Rumania is also officially Orthodox; but her history is much more complicated, a mixture of East and West.

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The one national antagonist of Russia in this area is Hungary. The Hungarians are still the descendants of the warrior race who came from Asia and established themselves between the surrounding mountains in those plains where the Slavs might have found a meeting place and a foothold for a great Slavic empire. The security of the mountain frontiers, which was taken from them after the last war, was based on the Hungarian domination over a Slav people, the Slovaks, who still live among those mountains and are first cousins of the Czechs. The Hungarians regard the Czechs as equally their mortal enemies with the Russians. As a Slav politician of the last century truly told them, "You Magyars are drowned in an ocean of Slavs." So far back as this do national enmities go. Who will hope to extinguish them by some simple and general formula of universal peace?

The Crimean War of 1854-1856 was prompted by Russian imperial policy, but what it claimed was a Russian protectorate of the Orthodox Christians of Turkey, whether Greeks or Slavs. The Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878 was a genuine Russian crusade for the liberation of the grossly misgoverned Slavs of Turkey. Alexander II was drawn into it quite against his will by the imperative insistence of his people. In the Bosnian crisis of 1908-1909, it was only the extreme reluctance of Nicholas II that prevented Russia from challenging the final transfer of the Bosnian Serbs to Austrian rule. At that time a large section of articulate Russian opinion was clamoring for war. The institution of a national assembly in Russia had led to a joint movement of Slavs in those countries where they could make themselves

heard in the national parliaments, and there was an exchange of parliamentary visits between Prague, St. Petersburg, Sofia, and Belgrade. The transfer of Bosnia was the Austrian answer. In 1912 the victory of the united Balkan States over Turkey was followed with the keenest enthusiasm in Russia; and when Austria intervened to challenge the terms of the peace settlement, it was only the unwillingness of the Tsar and his government that kept Russia from joining the victorious Slavs. The war of 1914 which followed the Austrian ultimatum and invasion of Serbia was undertaken by Russia directly in the cause of the Slavs.

On the Galician front and in constant visits to the field hospitals, I had the opportunity, through wounded prisoners and other information, of watching the reaction of the various Slav peoples to the Russian invasion of Austria in 1914. The Serbs of those parts that had been annexed by Austria came over to us smiling. I read a report of an Austrian officer that said: "The real war is in Serbia." He described how the whole nation moved as one. "It is a pity," he ended, "that so fine a people has got to be wiped from the face of the earth." The Croats were different; many of them were "good Austrians." Particularly impressive was the attitude of the Poles; even in Austrian Poland they lived in the most harmonious way with the invading Russians: it was a pleasure to see how simply the Russian soldiers got on with the Polish families on whom they were quartered. The Russian Poles, under the leadership of Dmowski, had chosen from the start the side which was allied with the western democracies, and rendered us countless services.

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As for the Ukrainians of Austria, their troops sometimes fired in the air. I remember a wounded prisoner telling me quite simply that the arrival of the Russian troops, which were also largely Ukrainian, had repaid him for his wound. The Uniats claimed to be as Orthodox as the Russians, and the religious differences, in spite of the stupid actions of the Russian church authorities, disappeared of themselves. "Let's all say the Lord's Prayer together, and leave it at that," they said.

Very outstanding was the contribution of the Czechs. Their procedure was more thought-out and systematic. When we got near enough to the Moravian Plain, they began coming over to us in masses: three times a whole regiment, and in one case with the band playing. We were ordered never to ask a Czech, "Where did you surrender?" but, "Where did you come across?" They were unique in at once seeking service on our side, and our Czech legions did the most daring work in bringing over new Czech units to us. After the Revolution, when the Russian Army was breaking up, they took the leading part in Kerensky's ill-judged offensive, and later they were the most stable element in still holding up an eastern front in Siberia. I had frequent contact with them there, and was invited to address their troops. "Do they understand," I asked their Colonel, "that without the recovery of Russia, Czech independence hangs in the air?" He replied, "Every man in the ranks knows that."

Indeed, the absence of Russia from the last peace settlement—whoever is to carry most of the blame—is the chief reason why the settlement did not give us peace. Apart from

Russia, it was a Slav settlement. Poland came back to independence after one hundred and twenty years of bondage, Czechoslovakia after three hundred; the South Slavs—Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes—were united in the new Yugoslavia. Only the Bulgars paid heavily for choosing the German side.

The last distribution of gains was not the ideal way of achieving a lasting settlement. That cannot be done without also taking into account the interests of those who have fought against us. It was this discrimination between winners and losers, and between "haves" and "have-nots," that vitiated the settlement in the Balkan and Danube areas. A really plucky attempt was made to minimize this defect by the new Czechoslovak State under the wise rule of Masaryk. This role was bound to fall to the Czechs, for, though not the most attractive of the peoples in this area, they have unquestionably by far the greatest political intelligence. They did succeed in setting up the truest democracy in surroundings which seemed the most prohibitive—and that halfway on the direct road from Berlin to Vienna. Though they started out of the ruin of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, they did achieve a financial stability and even gave help to the new Austria. The Czechs had had to fight their way out of bondage, and in the long struggle of centuries they had acquired an obstinacy to which no doubt they owed their survival; but their new constitution was a model of wise treatment of national minorities, and it was only the repetitive journalism of Hitler that could make it seem otherwise. They gave more thought and consideration than any of their near neighbors to their new mutual relations with them; and

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the Little Entente, which combined them with the Yugoslavs and Rumanians, was a sincere attempt to win both security and peace. Diminished Hungary, surrounded by Slavs, remained an implacable enemy, absolutely refusing to recognize the new situation as having any sense or permanence.

It was inevitable that the full assault of a revived Germany should fall on Czechoslovakia. There was no logic in the insistence of France, backed by England, that there should be one place where the accepted principle of self-determination should not apply—namely, in the relations of Germany with German Austria; but Hitler's procedure was such as to make it not a union but a conquest; and thereby little Czechoslovakia was almost surrounded and cut off from all her allies. I will not retrace here the miserable story of Munich, which fills most of us with shame. Our one excuse in England was that we were not ready: a good enough one for England, but without satisfaction for those who had been taught to count on our protection. The full extent of our humiliation was seen when it was proved that we were not even able to save Prague for the Czechs. Russia, though by now a member of the League of Nations, was not invited to Munich and thus was excluded from the councils of Europe. After Munich—and I state this on the highest Czech authority—Russia still offered help to the Czechs.

She was to get her revenge when the unnatural partners of Munich came next year to Moscow to solicit her favors one against the other. The Czech Minister continued to be recognized in Moscow long after his country had been re-

moved from the map of Europe—that is, almost throughout the life of the Russo-German pact.

The Czechs still clung pathetically to the idea of Slovak solidarity, but the little Slovaks, who dreamed of absolute independence, simply fell into Hitler's lap. As Czechoslovakia fell apart, Poland stepped in and seized a small part of the spoils at Teschen. These are not pleasant things to record. The German attack on Poland followed almost immediately, and some twelve hundred Czechs managed to escape from their enslaved country to fight for Poland.

The contribution to the war effort of the United Nations made by the occupied Slav countries, though necessarily limited, has, on the military side, been a fine one. Polish air-men have shown the most dauntless courage, and their Czech brothers-in-arms have shown equal determination. The Serbs threw out their ruler, Prince Paul, as soon as he joined Hitler, and, as in the last war, are fighting to a finish in their own country. Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary, with varying degrees of participation, have been swept into the net of our enemies.

In preparation for the peace settlement, two treaties have been concluded in London—one between Greece and Yugoslavia, the other between Poland and Czechoslovakia—each confirming the principle of a common foreign policy and common action. The first plainly relies on Russian friendship, which is now the principle of British policy. Will it be the same with the treaty between the Poles and the Czechs? The Czech attitude we already know. Of the Polish, we have still to be assured. The Poles appear to favor

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a cordon sanitaire against Russia; the Czechs will serve as the most efficient cordon sanitaire against Germany. There is no doubt which of the two we shall prefer. Disagreement on such a fundamental issue would necessarily vitiate this treaty of alliance.

Russia, in the first Soviet years of international challenge and crusade, took no account of nationality, and disowned any special interest in her Slavic kinsfolk, as an obsolete and bourgeois myth. It is interesting to note that not one of these smaller countries succumbed to the internationalist wave of world revolution, which so many people here seem still to fear. Indeed, nationality is the very texture of every one of these small peoples. But despite counter-professions, the Russian interest in the "younger brothers" came back, as it was bound to do. As the Nazi storm gathered against Russia herself, the old instincts revived. The *danse macabre* came nearer and nearer, and at each step Russia put in her word. Of her attitude to the Czechs after Munich I have spoken. In 1939 Russia spent several months trying to build up a defensive alliance with Poland. She offered very belated but wholehearted support to Yugoslavia when the Serbs determined to stand firm. She gave a sharp warning to Hungary and to Bulgaria when they cast in their lot with Hitler; the farce of the Russo-German pact was already becoming obvious. In the *glacis* which Russia seized during this period, defense was obviously the dominating factor, and with the exception of Eastern Galicia and Northern Bukovina, both chiefly Ukrainian, she took back only a part of what she had held in 1914.

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If Stalin had been other than the clear-headed statesman that he is, we might perhaps have expected him to regard the present war as a stepping-stone to future conquest westward. He represents, on the contrary, the old instinct of Russian aloofness, and his interest is centered on the so-far neglected task of internal construction in the vast territory which he already controls. More than that, as himself a member of a minor nationality, the Georgian, he has been the author of the satisfactory settlement of the multi-national question in Russia. To annex Czechoslovakia would be to convert a firm friend into a bitter foe. To bring back Russian rule to Warsaw would be the best way of creating on his very frontier a natural focus for German intrigue. The toughness of Czech character and the fervent national morale of the Poles, shown in the threatening period of world revolution, are a firm defense for each of them against any Russian domination, whether ideological or national.

XI

SMALL POWERS AND GREAT

WE MAY PAUSE here to discuss a question which is of the first interest to all of us. There are many views on this subject, and I can only give mine; but I think it is vital to the peace settlement that we should arrive at a considered opinion.

From what has been written, anyone will be able to see how complex are the problems which have been treated so far, and how impossible it is to make any reasonable settlement of them without far more study than has generally been attempted.

Anyhow, the Versailles peace treaties entirely failed to achieve their object, and began to fall away in ribbons as soon as they were seriously challenged. It is no good to go back and repeat all the old mistakes.

After the Napoleonic Wars, while diplomats struggled for advantages, the whole tired world imperatively demanded peace. In those days, especially on the European continent, decisions rested with the sovereigns. Alexander I of Russia (the "King of Kings," as he was called among the victors), whose mood was becoming more and more mystic, was obsessed with this yearning. He had very recently had a bitter surprise in a treaty negotiated by the brilliant Talleyrand which had aligned with France against him two of his

recent partners in victory—England and Austria. Rising from his bed in the middle of the night, he drafted a plan for a Holy Alliance of sovereigns who would promise never to quarrel among themselves and always to seek the happiness of their peoples. He showed it to friends, he circulated it among his brother sovereigns: some of them smiled, all of them wondered what they could get out of it, and all except the British Prince Regent, who was precluded by the British constitution, put their signatures to it.

With all the differences of time and circumstance this same obsession for peace returned in full force after the last war, only this time it was a matter not of princes, but of peoples and their representatives. The outcome was the League of Nations, whose covenant was attached to the peace treaties.

This settlement was dominated above all by ethnography, or in other words by the principle of self-determination, which really was a product of the French Revolution and had been so shamelessly disregarded in previous settlements, when peoples were simply handed about as property. Hardly any account was taken of economics when marking out the frontiers, and in the end there were a number of tiny units closely ringed around with defensive tariffs. Though it was not fully realised, the whole economic framework of central Europe was broken up.

Self-determination, too, though we cannot see how it could be improved upon as a principle, is not an unfailing guide to tranquillity. This peace, like all others before it, was, in the eyes of those who gained by it, to last forever.

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There is no such thing as a year I in history. Is recognition to be given only to those units which show on the map, at the moment of settlement? Are they to be forever the prescriptive factors? What about the losers in the last war? You can't work out this principle in eastern Europe, where there are all sorts of oases of population and interlacing lines: Bulgarians mixed up with Serbians, Hungarians with Rumanians, Lithuanians with Poles, and, at that time, little islands of Germans even as far as the Volga.

In the conditions of the last settlement a premium was put on division. Every little ethnic group was a candidate for "nationhood," and the smaller it was, the louder was its assertion of its distinctiveness. "Yes, let him come," said our clever King Edward VII when a small Balkan Prince proposed a visit, "but tell him not to bring too many people with him. I've always noticed that the smaller the prince, the longer the suite." What is a "nation"? The Scots are a splendid nation with a great cultural history, but they do not need political independence to assure themselves of the fact. The Canadians are a fine people and they could have independence for the asking, but they see no need to ask for it. Versailles was an overdue reaction against an entire disregard of all racial rights. Never were so many little nations recognized at once—sometimes with quite impossible frontiers, and without an examination of those processes which turn a racial unit into a nation. I am only suggesting that there is something of an apprenticeship in this matter. As none of these little units can defend itself, still less run to the help of a neighbor, one simply prepares the

way for a new Hitler, who recognizes no rights of nations but those of his own, to push them all over once more. In the United States, which is a very school of nationalities, this question is settled quite easily and with remarkable success, but not by way of racial independence.

There followed at once the practical question, how this multicolored structure was to be bolstered—for in that part of the world strength had disappeared. In England, when the troops had gone home, the general instinct of the public was at least not to engage too far in commitments on the continent; but we had to support France, who had one dominating apprehension—the fear for her security. The French plan was to erect what I will unkindly describe as a lath-and-plaster structure of small states, surrounding Germany and cutting off Russia, which were to look to France for protection. The most substantial of these units was Poland which, though off the map for more than a century, more nearly approached the great powers in importance. The larger Poland was, the better the purpose would be served; but there were other units, such as the little Baltic States, left high and dry by the temporary ruin of Russia and the ultimate defeat of Germany. They were like an exposed flat of the sea, and the two tides were bound to return. Hardly any book I know is more impressive than the last one written by Clemenceau—the very man who had kept France up to her best through the war—with the tremendous title *Grandeurs et Misères d'une Victoire*. Here, in sight of the grave, he sees no hope in this settlement. “Le soldat inconnu” has achieved nothing durable: “Le

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soldat inconnu de l'avenir" will be faced with an impossible task.

One has only to look through the history of peacemaking to see that all treaties in succession crumble of themselves in the face of new realities. In this we shall find a clear warning not to rely on any piece of paper that does not have something alive and substantial behind it. We can quite understand why, time after time, a war-worn world goes to sleep in such a hope. But this is no better than lazy thinking—if thinking at all. It is a most deceptive substitute for all the constant care and study which are needed to keep the structure in repair.

Whatever else we may think of Hitler, we have to agree that, starting from nothing at all, he pushed over this whole fragile structure. I think the most interesting and revealing passages in *Mein Kampf* are to be found in the account of his earliest efforts. He is almost alone, but he knows his own mind. At every step, while all in Germany are filled with uncertainty, he marks the point which he wants to reach, and goes straight to it. And in the countries of the conquerors, he meets the same universal uncertainty. They are all waiting to see whether they can agree about anything: the League has no compelling power, and any discordant voice, if it is a loud one, can bring about a deadlock. He is there before they see where he is going. I think the climax came when fifty-two nations at Geneva condemned Mussolini's shameless attack on Ethiopia, and no one did anything about it. That was principally because France, under the leadership of Laval, was unwilling to move. After that, one gave up hope.

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If Mussolini and Italy could go forward undisturbed, what were we to expect from Hitler and Germany? England had shown the same reluctance to move when Hitler marched into the demilitarized Rhineland. When the time came, he simply put his shoulder to one partition after another in the lath-and-plaster structure, and walked through—generally without any effective resistance.

Those of the smaller states that have roots far back in the past—Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Holland, and even Belgium, though of later date—are invaluable elements for so much of international law as is obtainable. By the nature of things, their first interest is world peace. In eastern Europe it is very different. The chief interest of the Hungarians is what they can take from Rumania, and the chief interest of the Rumanians is what they can take from Hungary. When Czechoslovakia fell, Poland came in to seize some of the spoils. It would be useless to expect the Premier of one of these smaller states to give the signal for general resistance when the panzers were at his own frontier—still less, to go gallantly to the defense of a threatened neighbor.

If that is the experience of the recent past, can we scrap all the force that we have built up as soon as we have won, and rely entirely on that least secure of all things, a written world agreement? I am sure Americans will understand that my own country has passed too recently through too grim a danger to be content with such security alone. We really had disarmed more extensively than any continental power, when the blow fell on us in 1940. During that crisis the London *Daily Telegraph* printed almost weekly some

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one or other of Wordsworth's fifty-odd sonnets on liberty. In 1806 when we stood alone against Napoleon, after the fall of Prussia at Jena, he wrote:

Another year, another deadly blow!
Another mighty empire overthrown!
And we are left, or shall be left, alone,
The last that dare to grapple with the foe.
'Tis well—from this day forward we shall know
That in ourselves our safety must be sought,
That by our own right hands it must be wrought,
That we must stand unpropped, or be laid low.
Oh dastard, whom such prospect doth not cheer!

Does not this exactly apply to our situation in 1940, when we had nothing left for defense but the remnants of our former armament? We are told that when Mr. Churchill had to announce to his Cabinet that France was definitely out of the war, he raised his head amid the general depression and said: "You know, in a way, this somehow stimulates me." We had to rely on our own forces, and our boys in the air saved us. I believe practically all of those are gone now.

If we are going to keep any authority after this war, we must be sure to keep our power. If so, it is essential that there should be agreement among those who have won the war and are capable of guaranteeing that the peace will be maintained. This is more important to the smaller states than to anyone else, for they cannot otherwise expect any settlement to be permanent. To leave them out of all these questions would be absurd—worst of all when it comes to those which concern themselves. The Czechs were not

present at Munich, and the disastrous settlement of their fate was made without them. The smaller states must have the means of making their voices heard; but it is no use giving them responsibilities which they could not or would not fulfill.

Again, the greater states, in their dealings with one another, and in the presentation of their wishes or demands, will have to take account of simple geographic facts, and not try to extend their authority to parts where they have no means whatever of enforcing it. In 1830-1831, when the Bourbons were finally expelled from France, there were incipient risings in several parts of Europe. France and England were then able to bring into existence the present Kingdom of the Belgians: but they were not able to do anything more than aggravate the unhappy fate of insurgent Poland. If you are going to fight someone, you must have a clear idea as to where you are going to fight, especially if you wish to be of any use to those whom you seek to protect. After Napoleon, Europe, for some sixty years, fell into two rival camps, headed by England and Russia. If there is to be no repetition of such a discord, it is essential that now, without delay, there should be reached some clear understanding of the kind of settlement which the United Nations are prepared to support in the countries recovered from German occupation. Otherwise we may see civil war in each of them as soon as Hitler is down.

Especially on behalf of the smaller states, I believe Britain did a wise thing in giving Russia her guarantee against German aggression in the future. That gives us the best claim

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for asking that the coming European settlement should not fall into discordant parts, but have the strength of a joint agreement in which all reasonable rights of the smaller nations may be secure.

XII

RUSSIA, TURKEY, PERSIA, INDIA

RUSSIA AND TURKEY were long accepted by Europe as the very type of traditional enemies. For this there were in the past very good reasons.

The Tartars, who were kinsfolk and later co-religionists of the Turks, conquered Russia in 1240, and held the country in bondage and under heavy tribute up to 1480. It was from the Tartars that the divided Russians learned unity, and the Tartars may be regarded as indirectly the creators of the Russian autocracy. Later they themselves split up into various kingdoms, and the Russians were able to attempt a counterstroke which eventually carried them to the Pacific. However, one of the Tartar nests, Crimea, remained unconquered. In 1453, before the Russians had thrown off the Tartar yoke, the Turks, who were likewise warrior invaders from Asia, at last captured Constantinople—from which Russia had taken her form of Christianity—and advanced into the Balkans, subduing the Greeks, Serbs, Bulgars, and Rumanians, and for a long time holding Hungary. Naturally, the Tartar nest in Crimea fell under their protection. So long as this arrangement held, it blocked off Russia from her natural outlet, the Black Sea, and prevented her from utilizing the wonderfully fertile lands of

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Ukraine, which had seen the first beginnings of Russia's own history. Yearly the Tartar raiders used to issue from their nest and drag the Russian peasants away to slavery. Catherine the Great, on the eve of the French Revolution, beat the Turks and isolated Crimea from them, and not long afterwards Crimea, like a ripe plum, fell into her lap. The Turks saw this with consternation: "We have lost our gates," they said; and Catherine, entertaining the Austrian Emperor Joseph in these parts, gleefully explained to him that she was now within quite a short voyage of Constantinople.

The Turkish conquests had brought under the Sultan's rule a great mass of Christian population. Most of these were Slavs, and nearly all of them, like Russia, were of the Orthodox confession. Under Turkish rule, which was unintelligent and very oppressive, these naturally looked to Russia as their champion; and indeed, by a mixture of legend and policy, the Tsars claimed to be the rightful heirs to Constantinople. "Moscow," they said, "is the Third Rome, and there will be no other." Their hereditary dream was to put back the Orthodox cross on the Cathedral of Saint Sophia in Constantinople. Russia had herself conquered from the Tartars large masses of Mahometan population, and while Christians from the Balkans sought the championship of the Tsar, Mahometans from Russia appealed for help to the Sultan.

How many of the great wars of Europe have originated in the Balkans! Anyhow, the last two! As Turkey fell into decline, the Powers of Europe were constantly quarreling over

the "sick man's heritage," and the Sultan did what he could to play them off against each other. France for a long time had a traditional hold over the Sultan. England wanted to make sure that Russia did not get to the Mediterranean. Germany, as soon as she became consolidated into an empire, was the most insistent of all. There was a constant rivalry for concessions, sweetened by offers of patronage. Nicholas I of Russia, by the treaty of Unkiar Skelesi in July 1833, took the sick man under his personal protection—which would probably have been the wisest way of opening his own road through the Bosphorus, if it had not at once aroused the jealousy and opposition of the rest of Europe. England and France fought and defeated Russia in Crimea in 1854–1856, and England was again on the verge of war with Russia in 1878, when the Russian armies stood outside Constantinople and the British fleet was cleared for action on the sea. It was this crisis that ended so unhappily for Russia in the Treaty of Berlin. The time came when the British negotiator of that treaty, Lord Salisbury, declared that we had "put our money on the wrong horse," and it was the Germans who later established their predominance at Constantinople. This was how Turkey came to be on the German side in the last war.

Nicholas II, then allied with us, was always asking for Constantinople. I recall a meeting in Petrograd in 1916, at which prominent public men of all parties discussed this question. Very few took any great interest in it, and the shrewdest of them asked what Russia would do with Constantinople if she ever got it. Her problems of administra-

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tion were already much too much for her; and it was not apparent how this single naval outlet, so easily blocked by submarines, would turn Russia into a Mediterranean power. To be sure of the peaceful passage of her trade would be a substantial benefit, but why go in and occupy? Toward the end of that same year, on the eve of the Revolution, the Russian Premier, Trepov, was able to announce to the Duma that the Allies had agreed to the annexation: the announcement, which was meant to divert opinion from the rotten state of internal affairs in Russia, fell entirely flat.

The results of the last war, and above all the Russian Revolution, brought radical changes in the relations between Russia and Turkey. The Slavs of the Balkans had now all been freed from Turkish rule. With an atheist government in Russia, the dream of replacing the Cross on Saint Sophia, always a medieval survival, passed into ancient history. The great builder of modern Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, was himself not very ceremonious in his treatment of the traditions of the Crescent, and the Caliphate vanished in this period. The positions of Russia and Turkey were not dissimilar. Russia started the war on the side of the eventual winners; but they both came out of it with heavy losses: in fact, both lost much more territory than Germany. It is also worth noticing that neither Russia nor Turkey made any immediate attempt to recover what they had lost, and that both for a time concentrated entirely on internal reconstruction. That is the greatness of Kemal, and he left Turkey much stronger than before.

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But in their relations with the outside world, both the new Russia and the new Turkey were prepared to make themselves independent. It was so even in their relations with each other. When the Soviets set up a foreign trade monopoly, the Turks did the same, and were therefore the one country to meet them on equal terms. The two drew together in a useful and practical friendship. For Russia it may be even better to have a friend, not too strong and therefore desirous of peace, as keeper of the Straits than to hold the Straits herself—the suggestion of which had so often roused the hostility of other European powers.

In the present war Turkey, combining tact with firmness, has done her very best to keep out; but there are two Powers with which she has throughout refused to quarrel—they are England and Russia, and they are now both on the same side. It would not be easy to imagine a cause of contention between the new modernized Turkey and the United States. With England, Turkey has an alliance—which was one of the wisest acts of British statesmanship. And from Russia, just at the most critical time, she had an assurance of good will (March 24, 1941). It might not be too much to hope—especially now that the war seems to be moving towards a decision—that the intervention of Turkey, in alliance both with Russia and with England, may replace that old atmosphere of continuous irritation which has been the cause of so many conflicts between them in the past. Anyhow, it would be a good basis for a peace which could lead to friendly co-operation between all three.

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Persia is, at the present moment, a meeting ground of Russia, England, and America, for cooperation in the vital cause of common defense.

Russia's early relations with Persia had nothing unexpected about them. There were some wars, but ordinarily the two countries carried on side by side. After the emancipation of the peasants in 1861, as Russia began to develop an industry of her own, the one part of the world outside her borders in which her foreign trade was predominant was northern Persia, around the capital Teheran. There the Russians had carefully studied the local needs and tastes.

Persia lay on the road to India, and therefore was a field in which British and Russian mutual suspicions often rose to the surface. That is why Sir Edward Grey, proceeding to liquidate our long period of Russophobia, chose just this contentious field to try out the possibility of a sincere understanding. The choice was sound. There were no diplomatic tricks about Sir Edward Grey. His method was always to go straight to the other party concerned, to put simply and sincerely his own views and his own doubts, and to find out whether by direct exchange a mutual accommodation was possible. He had also the best of intermediaries in Sir Arthur Nicolson, then British Ambassador in Petersburg, of whom he once said that he wished he could have him everywhere. The Anglo-Russian convention of 1907 on Persia was the beginning of our new friendship with Russia. It secured the integrity of Persia, recognized different spheres of interest, and even left one area open in case

Germany, now approaching by the Baghdad Railway, might care to join in the agreement and make it an instrument of international peace.

There were a number of distinguished public men in Russia who wished to build on this agreement some convincing proof of Anglo-Russian friendship. They included, besides one of the most farsighted of Russian engineers, the president and other important members of the Duma, which throughout its existence was strongly pro-British. It was a well thought-out scheme for overland communication by rail between England and India. It could not be taken as having any bellicose intention, for obviously it had to pass over the German rail system. As the Russian railways already reached the Caspian, the new road could be finished much earlier than the German-Baghdad route, which was still plowing its way through Asia Minor. It was only necessary to complete the connection across Persia with the British-Indian system; and the Russians proposed of themselves that the rail gauge in this section be the British. It fell to me to deliver this scheme to Sir Edward Grey. He said at once that he did not preclude the possibility that India would some day be approached by rail, and he left the question open for consideration by the City of London. The project did not advance further, and directly afterwards came the first world war. How useful this railway would have been now in carrying out the joint purposes of Lend-Lease to Russia! But I believe that something of the kind has actually come into being.

When the Soviet government came into power, it re-

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nounced all the old concessions of the Tsars in Persia, retaining only one right which has now proved most valuable—of moving troops through Persian territory; and that right was in a sense a basis for the present munitions supply line to Russia from her two major Allies.

Russia's interest in India is one of long standing. Peter the Great, who scared Western Europe by his sudden apparition there in 1698 and his mysterious interest in ship-building, is credited with having left a political testament (the authenticity of which has been challenged), naming the conquest of India as one of his goals. Napoleon, without having made up his mind, thought of turning eastward from Acre in that direction in 1799, and described the defender of that fortress, Sir Sidney Smith, as the man who made him miss his destiny. Soon after he came into power in France, he planned with Tsar Paul of Russia the conquest of India. On the Russian side, the details are fantastic. The Russians were to march without maps across central Asia (which had not yet been conquered) and find their own way to "the English settlements." Paul was shortly afterwards murdered by his own subjects. His sudden change of sides in foreign policy was one of the reasons.

The thought of a Russian invasion of India worried British opinion, especially the military, from the fall of Napoleon up to our own time. It was always the chief reason given in England for suspicion of Russia, and it was still the principal obstacle to friendship up to 1904.

On the other hand, Krylov, the greatest of Russian

fabulists, who lived in this period, takes it as a typical example of irresponsible chatter on public affairs.

The fate of India, with all its whens and whys
So plainly he describes
But see before his very eyes
His house has nearly finished burning.

My impression gleaned from many conversations with representative Russians has always been that they had resented our constant opposition to their access to the sea; and that, if we felt there was some part of the world where they could hit us back, they were not sorry, but that no practical approach to the question had so far been seriously considered. One, in particular, a business man, explained to me that, assuming they could conquer India, it would be very difficult for them to hold it, for in the absence of a strong fleet the maritime frontier would at once become very vulnerable, and their own financial resources would not be equal to the burden which England, as the occupying power, carried for the needs of India.

Our Crimean War in alliance with France was undertaken to prevent Russia from getting an outlet to our sea road to India at Constantinople. We supported against her the prince priest Shamyl, champion of the independence of the Caucasus. Russia is suspected of having taken a hand in the promotion of the Indian mutiny in 1857. Whenever Russia was rebuffed on the European side, she instinctively took the line of least resistance and advanced eastward. Humiliated in Crimea, she went forward to the conquest of

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central Asia, which she carried out in the next twenty-five years. This in no way resembled the advance of the Russian people through Siberia two hundred years earlier, for here there were fierce native populations and the task could only be tackled by military organization. Both empires were moving towards each other through turbulent tribes which by their restless raids tempted them on to further advance. On each side there were fire-eating generals, sometimes contemptuous of orders from home—like Cherniayev, who did not open the dispatch forbidding the storming of Tashkent until he had stormed it. In the circumstances, the Russian Chancellor Gorchakov was surely not unreasonable in thinking that the race would not stop till the two empires reached a settled frontier, with authorities who could keep order on both sides of it. In 1884, Merv was taken by the Russians; Afghanistan was the scene of intrigue and counter-intrigue and was twice at war with England. There were late echoes of this hostility in 1885 in an encounter at Penjdeh, when even the liberal government of Gladstone asked war credits of Parliament, and again in 1891 on the Pamirs in the Himalaya Mountains. All this mutual hostility and suspicion was put aside with Grey's Anglo-Russian convention of 1907, which led to the Anglo-Russian entente and the alliance in the last war.

During the brief period of the Russian provisional government of 1917, when the Bolsheviks were preparing to seize power, Trotsky, on Sunday after Sunday, denounced England from the balcony of Lenin's headquarters near the British Embassy. He had three themes, which were often

emphasized in the German propaganda of the time: they were Ireland, Egypt, and India. As Germany had conquered a very large part of Russia at that time, and we were straining every nerve to supply the Russians with munitions, it may fairly be assumed that Trotsky was Germany's friend, and not ours. I can remember that Kerensky then asked me earnestly about our attitude on India. Though of course I could not speak for our government, I thought that if there should ever be a united demand from Indian opinion that we should go out, we could do nothing but go.

There can be no doubt whatever that the Soviets have always stood consistently for the independence of India, as also for that of China. They have made this clear on all occasions. I am no authority on India, having never been there. What has been the measure of their propaganda, except for the few incidental details which have reached me, I am unable to say. I do see that in the present Anglo-Indian crisis—perhaps the greatest which British rule in India has had to meet—the Soviets are leaving us to deal with it, refraining from causing us any embarrassment, though it is obviously the best chance that their propaganda has ever had. For that, as an Englishman, I am grateful. The question, as it stands in the present war, clearly involves the defense against the Japanese—not only of India, but of China.

Of course I know that most Americans take the same view of this question as the Russians. I can only ask them to do the same, and wait. It is an obvious anomaly that the affairs of India should be decided by the parliament of a distant island in the North Sea. In a question of such vast-

Russia, Turkey, Persia, India

ness, such long standing, and such manifold complications, we could not reasonably expect any immediate solution from the mission of Sir Stafford Cripps. But a pledge has been given by the British government, not unlike that which I forecast in the conversation with Kerensky which I have mentioned.

As to the Russians, I do not anticipate their entry into India; nor, from what I have heard from Hindus about Indian opinion, do I imagine that they would be any more welcome there than we are. I think that the strong national trend of Stalin's government has made this more unlikely than before, nor do I see any reason for assuming that a Russian occupation would be contemplated.

I can only say one thing, which must at the present moment seem only problematic. It is that any step which leads to the full satisfaction of Indian wishes is likely to improve greatly the relations between Russia and England.

XIII

RUSSIA AND THE FAR EAST

RUSSIA'S EASTERN DOMAINS were won in two different ways—the first was natural, the second was forcible. The natural way came two hundred years before the forcible.

The first way was through Siberia. This, when the Russians first passed through it, was a no man's land, with no population but a few weak, scattered and primitive tribes. The Russian was most at home in dealing with such matters. Remember Bismarck! "Russia should go eastward: there she is a civilizing force."

The Russians who came here were themselves a simple folk. They came here to get away from the government pressure which had created serfdom in Europe, to keep them fixed when they insisted on being fluid; for fluidity is the very essence of Russian history, as it is of American. Their first track through the great empty forests lay northerly, near the Arctic. The story began with John the Terrible's decisive victory over the Tartars at Kazan, in the time of the English Tudors. After that the way lay open, and in the end of that reign a Cossack, Ermak, who was under government ban, conquered a Siberian native chief in a single battle between very small forces, and laid his conquest at the feet of the Tsar. In the troubled times which imme-

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diately followed, labor everywhere in Russia for a time broke loose from its moorings; and though Siberia amounts to something like a third of Asia, the Russian pioneers, pressed through it from end to end, reaching the Pacific near Kamchatka in 1648. Later, in 1732, using the same simple and primitive pressure, with Cossacks and traders in the van, they even passed the Bering Strait into Alaska (it is only some sixty miles across, broken by islands) and descended the American coast as far as California. It was some time before they deepened their acquisitions in Siberia southward, towards the masses of Mongolian and Chinese population. The first treaty between Russia and China, that of Nerchinsk in 1689, actually restored to China unoccupied territory which had been taken up by the Russian advance. The Maritime Province, with its southern end at Vladivostok, was only acquired from China nearly two hundred years later, in 1860.

This last acquisition roughly coincided in time with Russia's forcible conquest of Central Asia, which lay very much nearer her base. This story was told in the last chapter. Meanwhile, more solid things were happening further north in Russia's own natural field of action, Siberia. This vast country, which is endowed with wonderful potentialities, was attracting a steady stream of Russian peasant cultivators. The law forbade them to leave their village communes, but rough and ready scouts made the long journey as best they could, and were followed by numbers of their fellow-villagers. This was all to the good, and the movement gained strength when, under the last two Tsars, Witte,

constructed the Trans-Siberian railway, which brought Petersburg and Moscow into direct communication not only with the Pacific, but also with the great storehouse of world population which lay immediately to the south of Siberia in Far Eastern Asia. It was natural that, having suffered the brunt of the attacks of the nomad invaders on behalf of Europe, Russia should now lead the van of European civilization in Asia.

But it must not be thought that Siberia was full of Russians. It is calculated that in 1851 it had a population of no more than 2,700,000; and the time and conditions for the counter-advance were peculiarly unfavorable. Russia was at that time in an abyss of reaction from Europe and progress, and, as far as the government was concerned, the march eastward was definitely undertaken as an escape from Europe and from the "contagious diseases such as Nihilism" which—according to Bismarck—had followed from any close contact with western civilization. And she was ever drawing closer to Japan, the one Asiatic country which, however empirically and superficially, had set herself to learn everything that Europe could teach her. Japan, long closed to every contact with the outside world, owed her new strength and challenge to a sharp turn which may be dated from 1868, and lasted until 1927. In 1868, the Mikado gave his sacred authority to an oath which marked a new epoch: "That a deliberative assembly shall be summoned and all measures shall be decided by public opinion; that high and low shall be of one mind in the conduct of the administration; that matters shall be so arranged that not only the government officials

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and Samurai [the aristocracy] but also common people may be able to obtain the objects of their desire, and the national mind may be completely satisfied." There is more that is equally explicit; but the point is that this oath was really followed up by a thorough and consequent realization of all these principles. Japan, therefore, adopted the latest principles of European liberalism just at the time when the Russian government was plunging its stupid head into Asia in order to get away from Europe; and in the duel which followed, Japan really represented Europe and Russia represented Asia.

In 1894 a crisis in the affairs of Korea, where Japan was seeking an outlet for her surplus population, led her into war with the suzerain of Korea, China. Japan, precisely owing to the lessons which she had already learned from Europe, above all in military organization, was an easy winner. But joint action of the continental powers of Europe—Russia, Germany, and France—intervened to rob Japan of the major fruits of her victory.

Two alternative policies were suggested to the Tsar. His singularly able finance minister, Witte, offered a policy of peaceful advance. Russia took over the burden of China's heavy war indemnity to Japan. In return, Witte was able to extend the Trans-Siberian railway from west to east through the northern part of Manchuria, thus greatly shortening his road to Vladivostok. The Chinese statesman, Li Hung Chang, who made this deal with him, strongly warned Russia not to press further south of this railway.

But Russia now turned away from the wisdom of Witte

and the warning of Li Hung Chang. Germany was always anxious that Russia should remain an autocracy and, forgetting Europe, commit herself as deeply as possible in Asia. This is the main burden of the copious correspondence of Kaiser Wilhelm II with the weak Tsar Nicholas II. In 1897 two German missionaries were killed in China. On a visit to the Tsar, Wilhelm asked if he had any objection to a German annexation of Kiao-Chow. When Nicholas reported this matter to Witte, he mildly observed that, as Wilhelm was his guest at the time, he could hardly refuse him. Germany now initiated a race for the spoliation of China. Nicholas followed suit with the seizure of Port Arthur, which lay far to the south of the railway; England took Wei-Hai-Wei, and France, Kwang-Chow. This all-round pillage aroused fierce patriotic indignation in China. The European legations in Peking were besieged, and were only relieved by a second European military expedition. China was again made to pay heavily. The cession of Port Arthur to Russia was extended from twenty-five to ninety-nine years, and the fortress, which Japan had in vain captured in her recent war, was united by rail to the Trans-Siberian system.

Russia and Japan were now left face to face. The two main issues between them were Korea, now independent, and southern Manchuria. Russia could have accepted an equality of interest in both, or a division of spheres of influence—Manchuria for the Russians, and Korea for the Japanese. A number of agreements were made, but they were not kept. Witte was now overruled, and the irresponsible

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advisers surrounding the Tsar wanted both Manchuria and Korea for Russia. Japan's overtures, including a visit of her greatest statesman, Ito, to St. Petersburg, were treated with contempt; and on February 8-9, 1904, the Japanese, as they were later to do at Pearl Harbor, started war without declaration by seizing Chemulpho, a northern port in Korea, and by blocking Port Arthur.

This war, on the Russian side, was a complete muddle. On the Japanese side there were plan and purpose, perfect cooperation between the forces, and the whole-hearted support of parliament and people. In Russia the war was intensely unpopular; there was no unity of command, unless we can take as such the wavering decisions of the Tsar far away near St. Petersburg. The main forces of Russia were never engaged: they were kept in Europe to sit on the heads of the Russian people. The Trans-Siberian had not yet been quite completed and had only a single track: it is a wonder the railroad worked as well as it did. The Russians were pushed from point to point—in fact, about as far as the Japanese would care to follow. In the end Witte, who had opposed the war, was sent to Portsmouth, New Hampshire, to make the best job he could of the peacemaking; and indeed, with the help of the mediation of Theodore Roosevelt, he was singularly successful in reducing Russia's humiliation as much as possible.

The ignominious failure of the Russian government in the Far East led directly to the great movement of reform in Russia in 1904-1907. There was a completely new direction of public thought, even in the government itself. I

recall two interviews I had with the chief evangelist of the Far Eastern policy, the personal friend of Nicholas, Prince Ukhtomsky. In 1904 he told me coolly that when Russia had dictated peace in Tokyo she was going to clear up all questions in Asia, including that of India. In 1905, he said to me: "The Far Eastern policy to which I have devoted my life, is dead; the cross is definitely placed over its grave."

England had been the one ally of Japan, but only in a very precise and limited sense: she was pledged to intervene only if another power, presumably Germany, were to come in on the side of Russia. Germany could have done very little to oppose us in the Pacific, and this alliance helped to keep her out of the fight. It was Germany, not England, who was discredited in Russia by the results. She had egged the Russian government on to the adventure and, when it failed, she had closed her doors to Russian loans. The period which immediately followed was one of Anglo-Russian friendship, leading up to the alliance of 1914; and it was not strange that a parliamentary Japan, already allied to England, should have shared in the alliance of the Great War. Russo-Japanese relations, in the period just before it, had been entirely pacific. The Russian public, taking no responsibility for the stupid policy of its government, regarded the earlier war as a salutary lesson. "I don't think the Japanese will get into the Kremlin," I had said at a dinner in Petersburg during the Japanese war. "No," said a Russian, "but the Russians will."

Japan's position during the first World War gave her a unique opportunity. Germany could do nothing in the Far

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East, so Japan had no difficulty in taking Kiao-Chow, and her allies left her practically free in that area. She had a good chance of valuable economic exchange, but she was too narrow in her aims to make anything of it. When Russia broke, she did not seem to know what to make of the new situation. In the Intervention she did not push further than the Maritime Province, and did not make the most of her opportunities even in Manchuria. The ablest man whom I met there in 1919 was General Gondatti, formerly the Tsar's Governor General of the Amur province. He assured me that the Japanese could not live there—only send men in relays to manage their fisheries. "Look for them in Burma," he said—a good enough guess for twenty-odd years ahead. They put forward—but did not press—claims to a kind of protectorate over Manchuria: the American troops, if we rightly understand General Graves, were there to prevent any Japanese annexation. At the Washington Conference in 1921, Russia's rights were reserved for the future; and when the Japanese were called upon to withdraw, they did so like all the rest of us, not even holding on to the coveted Maritime Province where they had been supreme. My impression, when I was there, was that they had been upset by the results of the war, and even felt that the wrong side had won.

Ever since her Revolution in 1911 huge China had been in complete disorder, with war lords and plundering armies whose advances and retreats were once wittily compared to the game, "Here we come gathering nuts in May." Outer Mongolia, in which Russia had long been interested, de-

clared its independence; but in 1915 it again accepted Chinese suzerainty on the condition of autonomy. The wildest of "White" Russian pirate adventurers, Ungern von Sternberg, had his field of action in these parts; and the Soviets, when they intervened, were regarded as restoring order. Their troops remained there until 1925. In 1919-1920 the Soviet government had appealed to China for support against the imperialist powers; and in 1924 they surrendered to the Chinese government in Peking all past concessions to the Tsars, retaining only, for working purposes, their link of the Trans-Siberian through northern Manchuria, the Chinese Eastern railway. Since 1907 three different governments had materialized in different parts of China: one in Peking, one in Manchuria, and one—that of the great Chinese reformer, Sun Yat-sen—in the south, in Canton. To this last the Soviets sent advisers, and the advance of Communist propaganda at one time seemed spectacular. But in 1927 Chiang Kai-shek, a pupil of Sun Yat-sen, broke with the Communists and expelled the Soviet advisers. This was the last important foreign success of this propaganda.

It has, however, been very inadequately realized that this last wave, for a time, threatened to be very successful in Japan itself. Many young people were fascinated by the new ideas. The Japanese government reacted in the sharpest way, with numerous arrests and a wholesale suppression not only of Communism, but of any latitude in that direction, including liberal opinions. This was only the Japanese part of that extinction of liberalism in so many countries of

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Europe that followed as a result of the horrors and disillusionments of the World War—but in Japan it took on a peculiarly strong fascist color. It marked the end not only of parliamentary rule, but of the long-time friendship with liberal England, where the period of liberal leadership had also ended.

In 1927 the Japanese Premier, Tanaka, presented to the Mikado a memorandum containing a whole program of aggression which, though formally disavowed, became the textbook of all succeeding Japanese policy. Japan had already won Formosa and Korea. She was now “to cross swords again with Russia in Manchuria,” and then proceed to the conquest of China, which in turn was to lead on to “the southern seas” (of course, including Australia), to Burma and India, and “to Asia Minor and even Europe.” From this time on, parliament went further and further into the shade; and the army and navy, taking the lead, embarked on a policy of unlimited aggression which was meant, in effect, to give Japan the empire of all Asia.

Japan had negotiated with the Soviet government to obtain the remaining half of the island of Sakhalin. She only gained a vaguely worded concession of fishing rights, which caused complications later. The Soviets had so far no important industrial bases in Siberia, and it was only in 1929 that they created a separate Far-Eastern army. In September, 1931, starting with an obviously pre-arranged “incident,” Japan set foot in northern Manchuria and put up a puppet state, “Manchukuo.” This meant the appropriation of the Chinese Eastern railway. It was an essen-

tial link in a world trunk line. Its abandonment for a ridiculous price was one of the first convincing signs that the Soviets were ready to make great sacrifices for peace. The Russians were now driven back northward to the long and circuitous line of the Amur River. This turned the fortress of Vladivostok into an isolated projection of Russian territory—a kind of floating kidney, with the Japanese both in front of it and behind it. Were it now to be used as a base for the bombing of Tokyo, it could easily be cut off from Russia at once. The Japanese went further: they even demanded the demilitarization of the newly withdrawn frontier. In spite of numerous negotiations the frontiers were never defined to the satisfaction of both sides, and were constantly the scene of small conflicts. The League of Nations sent a commission to Manchuria in 1932; its decision was adverse to Japan, but only led to Japan's exit from the League. She also at this time refused all offers of a non-aggression pact with Russia. The second Soviet Five-Year Plan (1932–1936) paid special attention to railway and industrial construction in the Far East.

On November 15, 1936, was concluded an Anti-Comintern Pact between Germany and Japan, which Italy joined a year later. It had no bearing on the suppression of internal communism, because that had already been done successfully enough in all three countries: it was nothing else than an instrument of territorial aggression. About a month later, after the mysterious kidnapping of Chiang Kai-shek, his government and the Chinese communists came to an agreement to stand together against Japan. Further attempts of

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Russia and Japan to agree did not materialize, and the Soviets sent large war supplies to China, using for the purpose an improved road which linked China with Kuznetsk, one of the new great industrial bases in Russian Asia. In 1937 a fresh Japanese "incident" outside Peking started an invasion of the main body of China, which ultimately became linked with the Second World War. Border warfare between Russia and Japan continued; and in 1939, without any declaration of war, it developed into large-scale fighting in the neighborhood of Lake Hasen which lasted some six months. The Russians had evidently greatly strengthened their defenses, and got the best of it, a fact which was fully advertised in the Soviet press.

Up to the Russo-German pact of August 23, 1939, Russian, American and British policies seemed to be following similar lines. After that, Russia did everything she could to prepare for the approaching struggle with Germany; and in April, 1941, she at last—clearly on Japanese initiative—concluded a neutrality pact which, while leaving Japan free to go southward, appeared to guarantee Russia from any further attack by Japan. There was a good deal of confusion in Japanese internal politics, which was closely followed by the Russian press. It looked as if Japan, with divided counsels, found it difficult to make up her mind to make the big challenge. On June 22, 1941, Germany made up hers by invading Russia; and on December 7, Japan, behind a mask of friendly negotiations, attacked the American naval base at Pearl Harbor.

It is upon the major Powers that the issue of the present

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World War depends. Among them Russia has borne so disproportionate a share in the toll of lives and territory that she cannot be expected to challenge Japan with a "second front" of her own in Asia. Yet in nothing has she been more consistent than in her active support of Chinese independence, and probably no other Power has more issues to contest with Japan. In 1912 Kaiser Wilhelm II on a visit to Nicholas II, drawing aside the Russian foreign minister Sazonov, gave him a warning which reveals more foresight than any other of his political utterances. The substance of his warning was this: "You must take and organize China, or else Japan will, and you will be deprived of any outlet to the Pacific." The danger still exists, and it is not likely that the Soviet government has been blind to it.

XIV

ON THE RUSSIAN EMIGRATION

IN THE LIGHT OF EVERYTHING that I have written here, am I unreasonable in hoping for some alleviation from the greatest privation which a Russian can suffer—the loss of his country, for at least some members of the Russian emigration.

After the Communists seized the power in Russia, and dissolved the newly elected Constituent Assembly, in the time of civil war, when they would accept nothing less than complete acceptance of their creed and their dictation, at least a million Russians, and certainly not the least patriotic, scattered over all the countries of the earth, from Europe and America to China. The Soviet Government demanded their return within a short time limit: failing this, they were expelled *in absentia* for ever from their country. What has not changed since then, and most of all, the whole outlook of the Communist Party?

In 1935, having taken full note of these fundamental changes, I was preparing to go back to Russia. I had no intention of doing so at the price of any sacrifice of my own independence or of my numerous friendships among the emigration. At Easter time I visited their chief center, which was at that time in Paris. My old friend Alexander Guchkov, former President of the Duma and War Minister of the Pro-

visional Government of 1917, was one of the very few among these poor divided people who could gather the best representatives of their various views for any common purpose. He invited me to report to them on British opinion about Russia. I said I did not think I would offer a report, but I would like to open a discussion, and in particular to put to them a question. The attendance came up to our hopes, and in my opening remarks I discussed the most important of recent events in Europe, Hitler's advent to power with a program for the conquest of Russia. Then I put my question: "Which do you prefer—that Hitler should conquer Russia or that the Soviet Government should succeed in defending her?" "You have put us a very difficult question," they said. "I know that; but what is your answer?" "It splits us up completely," they said. "Then may I hear the different views?" The keen discussion which followed made it clear that they were radically divided. The military, which means the older officers of the Tsar's army, were predominantly for Hitler. All those whom I credited with any political judgment were on the side of the Soviet Government.

When I got to Moscow in December of that year, I brought up the same subject in another form. Mr. Litvinov who was at that time unwell, at the request of our British Ambassador, very kindly received me without delay. I submitted to him an authorization from our conference of university teachers of Russian in Britain, to conduct in its name negotiations for opening the door to British students for travel and study in Russia. In the very friendly conversation which followed, I expressed the desire of our central

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School of Slavonic Studies in London, of which I was Director, to enroll Soviet scholars in our list of corresponding members. "But you have got the emigrants," said Mr. Litvinov. "Of course, as a British university organization in London, we ask the help of all scholars, and that is why we want contact with yours."

The question thus opened was later discussed with me in a dinner conversation of some three hours in the Moscow Foreign Office. "We gave the emigrants a time limit to come back," said my host of the evening, "and since they did not return, we regard them as our enemies." "Do you know," I asked, "that Alexander Guchkov is now dying of cancer in Paris?" "No," they said, "and Guchkov was someone" (he was, in fact, almost the most formidable of their enemies). "Well," I said, "I suppose you are thinking of Guchkov and others like him. I am thinking of that new generation of Russians that has grown up abroad, nearly all devoted to Russia, and many of them eager to get back to their own country and take part in the great work of construction which is going on here; and, if you will allow me, I must say that from that point of view a time limit is the last thing that would have occurred to me." In reply they told me of a definite case—a rather striking one in view of its antecedents—which was under consideration. I told them of my Easter meeting in Paris. "There is a large loyal part of the emigration whose support you have. It is not my affair; it is yours and theirs; but you have a bridge from you to them, if you wished to use it." On my return, I was thanked by Russian liberals for raising the question.

That was only a beginning. The split deepened further in the next few years—still, of course, with many intermediate points of view. In circumstance and environment the advantage was at first always with our future enemy. So many of the emigrants had seen nothing of Russia since those poignant and terrible early days of the revolution, when they had lost all their property and so many of their nearest kinsfolk; and they were very slow to believe that there had been any material change in Russia. So I found when on my return I gave my first report designedly to some of the oldest, who had suffered most. But even there, and sometimes in the most unexpected quarters, you could see how the yearning for their country, the distant dream that they might even some day be able to return to it, made them wish to believe me straight off. Others wrapped themselves in their old mantle of years of isolation and refused to believe that any change was possible. And all around them, among their English friends, there was the atmosphere which they themselves had done so much to create. On their side, too, and in a much more terrible sense, the wish was the father to the thought: Hitler might overthrow the whole regime and open the door for their own return.

I am sure that many Russian emigrants who took this view surrounded Hitler, too. At one time I wanted to publish some kind of objective estimate of the military value of the Red Army, a subject which everyone was then discussing. This could not be obtained from inside Russia. I turned to the best Russian expert I knew, a brilliant officer accepted by all of us as a first-class military historian. I got a sketch which

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simply set itself to prove that the Red Army was hopelessly inferior to that of the Tsar. I could not print it, because it ignored entirely all those capital factors which every layman knew of—Russia's possession of a new heavy industry, and of her own technicians, and, in place of the old illiterate mass, possibly the most systematically educated army of today. The writer was already well on his way to Hitler—to whom I don't suppose his information has brought much profit.

The emigrant Church, too, was hopelessly split. The refugee Russian Church in Serbia, which at one time had proclaimed a Tsar of its own, seemed to make political propaganda its primary, even its sole, purpose. Its Head wrote and published an open letter to Hitler telling him that he was now their Führer, and (caricaturing a beautiful phrase in the old Russian military litany) that his troops were now "the Christ-loving Army!" Hitler, on his side, gave them a cathedral in Berlin, and gradually brought them under the control of a nominee of his own. On the other hand, the Russian emigrant Church established in Paris had the closest relations with Britain and America, and received from both a steady stream of support—largely through the generosity of Mr. John R. Mott and the American Y.M.C.A., and from all sorts of little rural corners in England. This branch avoided political controversy and devoted itself primarily to training Orthodox priests. It accepted candidates also from the rival jurisdiction, but when I visited its Head in Paris—an old friend of many years—he gently complained, "My Christian brothers are not treating me in a very Christian way." They were threatening to excommunicate him! In

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London, congregations of these two jurisdictions, for whom an Anglican Church building had been provided, did not even worship together, but used it alternately.

On Hitler's invasion of Russia, the political question became an acid test to decide who was for Russia and who was against her. Two of my emigrant friends in London had together been closely associated with the old Imperial Embassy there. Both of them were of the old aristocracy and one, who had been in charge of the Embassy, had had a close family connection with the personal entourage of the Tsar and his consort. After that day of revolution, June 22, 1941, which began with Hitler's invasion of Russia and ended with Churchill's Anglo-Russian alliance, he wrote to the *London Times*, in dignified language that commanded respect, that there in Russia was his country and his own people, whatever the form of government: that here in London was his second home, and he invoked a blessing on the alliance; and for this letter he received the thanks of our Prime Minister. The other, his former colleague, asked him how he could have written that letter: "Don't you see that for Hitler to win is the only way for us to get back to Russia?" This one's daughter was already serving a ten years' sentence in England, as a convicted spy of Hitler.

From that day the choice was clear. In England, at least, there could be very little doubt as to how it was being faced. England, herself at war, and long since well aware that she was immune from the feeble threat of communist revolution, was swept wholesale by the splendor of the Russian national resistance. No detractors could speak openly, and the mass

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of the Russian emigrants were carried away too, with a new pride in their great people. As several of them told me, they felt that among their English friends it was now an honor to be a Russian. They plunged into the work of war like the rest of us, they got wide opportunities, and they could be more useful than most of us in the common cause.

In the United States there could be no such rush of feeling, no such current to carry the emigrants along with it; for this country was not yet in the war, much less had suffered in its own person. Besides, in character the Russian emigration in America was somewhat different. In England, it belonged exclusively to the Russian educated class. Quite as many of these had come to America—and I have always thought they were the most fortunate of their fellows, for this was a new world with all sorts of opportunities for those who were capable of taking them, and they very soon became as American as the rest. But in the seven years preceding the last war, there had also come perhaps as many as 200,000 proletarian workers from White Russia. There were numbers of Ukrainians too, but these came almost exclusively from the small non-Russian part of Ukraine in the old Austria, and their dream was an independent Ukraine, with no Polish, Hungarian, or Ukrainian masters, for which they were pathetically inclined to look to "Uncle Hitler." The Russians were divided among various shades of political thought. There were the old-time reactionaries of the *Rossia*, the Social Democrats of the *Novoe Russkoe Slovo* (conditionally pro-Soviet), and the definite Soviet sympathizers of the *Russky Golos* in New York and the *Novaya Zarya* in San

Francisco. The church situation was also very confused; only a small but perhaps growing section accepted the jurisdiction of the Orthodox Metropolitan Sergius in Moscow (who has now been installed as Patriarch). But as time went on, and America fully entered the war, one could say that among educated Russians—even among those whose past and whose sufferings least disposed them to sympathy with Soviet Russia—there was the same great sway of Russian patriotism which one seldom fails to find in Russians, and perhaps least of all in Russians in exile. And all the time there was coming to meet them the same great surge of patriotism in Russia itself, which has done so much to produce so glorious a resistance. A famous Soviet war worker, sent over to America, was escorted by an emigrant Russian lady. “What is the most striking thing you have seen here?” asked the guide. “You,” said the visitor. “You can’t go back to Russia, yet you are helping me heart and soul.”

I have the hope that, after the war, those among the emigrants who have stood the test so finely will not be allowed by the Soviet Government to run to waste. Some, especially among the younger ones, will still long to go back to Russia. Those who remain can be an invaluable element in Russian relations with America. It has been due to a persistent mistake on the Soviet side that we have not met in our own countries Russians who could speak for theirs. The war has, of itself, brought to Russia a supply that can help to fill that gap.

XV

RUSSIA AND GERMANY

OF COURSE there are many exceptions, but it does seem as if there were some kind of natural discord between the German temperament and the Russian. The Russians have put it into a proverb: "What is medicine to the Russian is death to the German." Somehow Russian and German seem doomed to perpetual misunderstanding: what are merits to the one, are defects to the other. Moderation and accuracy, the typical German virtues, are held up to scorn in the brilliant social comedy of Griboyedov. The delightful skit of Saltykov-Shchedrin, "Boy with Pants and Boy Without" (an imaginary dialogue between a tidy little German boy and an untidy Russian one), with the best will in the world leaves both sides nowhere. In face of the keen Russian sense of humor, the German lack of it is all the more fatal. But perhaps the most essential difference is between prose and poetry, the material and the spiritual.

This comes out all the more because the two peoples are close neighbors; and the Germans have just those things which were most necessary to fully develop the enormous economic possibilities of Russia—the skilled workers and the machinery—and there is no doubt that the industrious and accurate German has rendered great services to Russian cul-

ture and civilization; but it is somehow as if the German got lost in a country that was too big for him: his minute spade work brought him well earned rewards, but every attempt of his to do the really big thing, to get that broad footing in the country which he sought, seemed to go the wrong way. He constantly misjudged the Russian, and had something like an instinctive contempt for him.

The closest of Russia's earliest relations were with that part of the German community which was driving German dominance eastward at the expense of less developed peoples. It was actually on the frontier of Russia that Prussian militarism grew up among the Baltic Orders of Knighthood; and Peter the Great by his conquest absorbed a large part of this element into the Russian Empire. These Germans retained their old character, proud and aloof. Bismarck has described the Germans of the Baltic as the best red-tape officials in the world. Certainly they did more than any others to keep the Russian Government foreign to the Russian people. And the lesser folk of the same stock, applying a German conscience to the sometimes impracticable Russian laws, were everywhere familiar to the Russians as the representatives of some delegated authority—managers, foremen, stewards, teachers, or officials.

While Germany was hopelessly divided, Russia, from the time of Catherine the Great, was well able to play off in her own favor the bitter rivalry of Hohenzollerns and Habsburgs, of Prussia and Austria. This situation lasted through the wars of Napoleon, and only ended with Russia's humiliation in the Crimean War. Soon afterwards, with Bismarck's

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foundation of the German Empire under Prussian leadership in 1871, there followed a complete reversal of the old balance of relations. By his three successful wars of 1864, 1866, and 1870, Bismarck created a Prussian hegemony over Europe. He was keenly aware of the dangers which might threaten his new victorious *status quo* from the west or the east—or, worst of all, from both at once; and he spent infinite care and resource on keeping his chief rivals at arm's length and, as far as possible, in constant mutual misunderstanding and ignorance. It was always a difficult game to play, and it was doubtful how long it could be kept up. But it lasted all Bismarck's time; and if at the Treaty of Berlin he had come out with a flat preference for Austrian claims over Russian, he had still his treaty of re-insurance with Russia which was unwisely discarded after his fall by Wilhelm II.

Meanwhile German industry, always steadily and persistently going forward, had taken full account of the revolutionary changes brought about by the emancipation of the serfs in Russia in 1861. With the liberation of that enormous mass of labor, all the economic values in Russia were in a state of flux, and the country was everywhere seeking new lines of development. The German Imperial Government, undoubtedly the most efficient in Europe, stood solidly behind the advance of German industry and enterprise in Russia; and if there had been no political complications to compromise this advance, the Germans might have found themselves masters of Russia without ever having to fight for it.

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There is a merit which we must concede to Kaiser Wilhelm II: that having the strongest army in Europe, he reigned some twenty troubled years before he actually put it to the test. But his crude and arrogant self-importance was always provoking a feeling in Europe that the respite might be short. His handling of his Russian relations was abysmally bad, and he was always sailing straight for failure. With his own solemn exaggeration of latter-day sovereignty, he naturally concentrated on the personal vanity of the weak Tsar Nicholas II. He restored an old tradition of the two reigning houses, that each sovereign should send the other a personal attaché who would enable them, when desired, to communicate over the heads of the ordinary accredited ambassadors. It was not the first time that a Prussian sovereign had intervened to counsel a Russian Tsar to disregard the claims of reform in Russia: his grandfather had given this advice to Alexander III at the outset of his reign. In the extraordinarily tactless letters of Wilhelm II to Nicholas II, which are a remarkable revelation of vulgarity, there are always two main refrains: Be an Emperor, and Go eastward! Bismarck had known and despised the weakness of Imperial Russia—the giant with the feet of clay—and of course wished it to continue. He too had wanted Russia to embark on imperial adventures eastward, so that he could get the free hand that he wanted for Austro-German advance in the Balkans. But he would never have let his own object be so obvious; and Nicholas, for all his weakness, had a peculiarly delicate instinct which quickly told him when he was being imposed upon. When the Far Eastern enterprise

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broke down, Wilhelm had no comfort for his friend; he advised him to accept defeat, and closed his market to Russian loans. When Nicholas turned to France and England, Wilhelm's impatience made the break final. In the summer of 1905, he lured the unsuspecting Tsar into a secret meeting at sea. He brought with him a high Foreign Office official and a ready-made treaty of offensive and defensive alliance—wholly disregarding Nicholas' commitments to France—and managed to force him into signing it. This little trick was upset by the Russian Minister Witte, and was never forgiven.

In all four crises (mostly in the Balkans) that led up to the last war, it was natural that Wilhelm should try to break up the combination which was forming against him. He achieved the opposite result, because he was so obviously trying each time, at all costs, to make his own will triumph over his neighbors'.

The root of the matter lay in the long-accepted tradition that, if peace were to be maintained in the Balkans, some common term must be found between the conflicting claims of Austria and Russia, the two great powers with large Slav populations. Wilhelm put forward the new theory that Russia had no right to be interested in a quarrel between big Austria and little Serbia. That was something which even a weak Tsar with a mild Foreign Minister could not accept; Wilhelm's miscalculation was in thinking they would. When the Russians refused his ultimatum, the German Ambassador Pourtalès almost collapsed, and had to be helped from the room. The bluff had not come off.

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The mistake was colossal. At one stroke it annulled all the great gains which German economic penetration had deservedly won in Russia. The war was popular even with the ordinary Russian soldier, because so many of them had had to do with the German as a jack-in-office in their own country. When it became a war on two fronts, it was to the Russian side that the Germans repeatedly addressed their suggestions of a separate peace. Their most fatal mistake of all was made after the Revolution, when they sent Lenin and his comrades through in a sealed wagon. "It was with our full consent," said General Hoffmann, the German Eastern Commander, later, "that Lenin—call it a poison gas if you will—broke up the Russian Front." Common sense should have warned against the use of such a double-edged weapon at that stage of the war. The vengeance was the German Revolution.

Under the Weimar Republic it did seem as if Germany could put her relations with Russia on a better footing than bullying or intrigue. Books appeared in Germany which frankly recognized the old mistakes. The opportunity was ideal. On the one hand, both countries, for different reasons, were under a kind of European boycott. It was only sensible that they should draw together, and they did so in the Treaty of Rapallo in 1922. The fact that the writ of Versailles did not apply in Russia was certainly a help to Germany in evading the extreme impositions of her conquerors. Apart from that, Russia now lay in ruins, and German technique and German industry—and above all, German study and knowledge—had a rightful claim in the

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work of reconstruction. It had always been not only reasonable but right for a Russian to ask himself at any given moment where he could find the best partner in constructive work—and at this point all the advantages lay with Germany. But liberalism never took root in Germany, and Hitler's conquest of power brought back the worst features of the old German-Russian relations.

I had been watching every move in the great game for thirty years, sounding out every contact that I had among those who could inform me most closely. I had gone to Russia simply to find out what were our chances of Anglo-Russian friendship. We British made countless mistakes of detail—usually they were petty mistakes—and often things went against us by our omissions, by our defaults. Over and over again, we depended on the mistakes of our opponents. The Germans beat us easily in matters of detail, industry and knowledge; but when they made mistakes, they were capital and decisive. They knew everything, and understood nothing. Kaiser Wilhelm was the most efficient artificer of Anglo-Russian friendship. We missed him terribly, and could hardly have hoped to have ever again such a powerful ally—much less a better one, in Adolf Hitler.

All our British brotherhood in Russia, whatever our line of work, whatever our personal views or preferences, saw a spectre taking shape before us after the last war, an almost inevitable friendship between Russia and Germany for a war of revenge. I recall the warning of Admiral Kolchak when I said good-bye to him in Omsk, in 1919, not long before his death: "I am afraid that Russia may come to find

herself in the same position as Germany—as one of the losers in the war. Then the two are sure to draw closer together. I think that will be a very bad thing for my country, but on the day when it comes about, I shall not be there.”

Even before Hitler, I saw the beginnings of a curious intrigue—something like that which in 1917 had dispatched Lenin and his companions to Russia with the blessing and financial support of the German general staff. This was another curious partnership between Junker and Bolshevik, both sides with tongue in cheek. I asked a prominent German expert on Russia what was now his prescription for relations with her. He replied, “I think, your British capital and our technique.” Did he think that I was quite a fool? I answered that our capital would probably go with our own technique (though I could not feel at all sure that it would). I was not surprised to learn that this expert was closely concerned with the Treaty of Rapallo. His prescription is sure to be brought out again later.

From the moment that he was able to put his ideas into practice, Hitler played our game for us as none of us could have played it. His program was from the outset a combination of old and new. When he came into power, the danger of world revolution was over, defeated three times; and the Russians, so long cut off from the outside world, had lost all real interest in it. Still, as reactionaries in other countries had done, he could take up an old threat and exploit it as a party weapon. With Hitler, the anti-Communist crusade was from the outset a smoke screen for the age-old German “push eastwards,” for the purpose of territorial conquest.

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That is the point of all Hitler's flattery of British conservatives, and his many bids for our cooperation, or at least our neutrality. Perhaps we might not see that once Germany controlled Russia, she would be unconquerable. The essential point was to avoid a repetition of the old mistake—a war on two fronts.

Stalin saw all this, and persistently sought our friendship. The many and crucial mistakes in the long negotiations of 1939 are part of the story of Anglo-Russian relations. The Russo-German pact of August 23 came on us like a cold douche, a most unpleasant surprise; and yet it might have been feared, even expected: and it was a cold douche of realism. I had the best means throughout the period that followed, of testing the reality of this agreement. Duranty has called it "the pact which was also a duel." David Low, as usual, was exactly right from the start. He drew Stalin and Hitler arm in arm, smiling into each other's faces, each with a revolver clutched behind his back. Underneath was the legend: "Someone is taking someone for a walk." There was never any alliance, whether political or military; on the contrary, there was a sharp rivalry, as became clear in the striking events which followed. There was an economic treaty by which neither side profited: neutral Russia's economic support to Germany fell far short of neutral America's support to England; nor could Germany, once at war, carry out her promises of machinery for Russia. In words, Russia—anxious above all things to keep Germany quiet—gave all the satisfaction she could. The Soviet press was instructed to revive every incident of the British intervention of twenty years

before, while not a word was said of Germany's almost simultaneous intervention in the Baltics and Finland. Even then, no mention was ever made of the leader of the British intervention, Mr. Churchill: the Russians knew well the value he now put on Russian friendship, and were saving him for the future. The Russian march into Poland was a race to save the Russian population from Hitler, and reached the boundary which Stalin had set himself. It looked for a moment as if there must be a clash, but Hitler had his hands full with Britain and France, and accepted for the moment something which he could not prevent. It was the Russians themselves who drew back from the first line of demarcation between the two armies—a line which ran through Warsaw itself, and was a direct challenge to Britain's guarantee of an independent Poland. While supporting Hitler in his suggestion of a negotiated peace, Russia did not make herself responsible for his conquests. All this I ascertained at the time, and it has proved correct.

When France fell, and just when Mussolini made his abominably bad guess, Russia took the opposite line. New instructions were immediately followed by the Soviet totalitarian press. No, England was not beaten, and it was very likely that she would not be. (Russia now came next on Hitler's list.) The British war news henceforward came first; there was admiration for the superb feats of the R.A.F. and the glorious resistance of London. England held good; and Hitler, now closely following the example of Napoleon, turned his back on England and gradually came closer to Russia. At each new move, especially through the Slav coun-

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tries (Yugoslavia and Bulgaria), Russia plainly showed her opposition to German access to the Black Sea. The stage was set, if need be, for a Russian alliance with England.

With the same access to direct information—though there were things which I could not know—I followed the last steps of the German advance to the Russian frontier. In November, 1940, when Hitler summoned Molotov to Berlin, I was sure it was to demand Russia's adherence to his "New Order" in Europe; and I was equally sure that Russia could not be treated like Rumania or Bulgaria. When this was made clear to him, Hitler (as I read it then) was extending the claims of his economic agreement; he wanted to enter Russia to manage his own production and transport on the spot. This, it was obvious, would be fatal to the Russian regime itself. There was a time when it looked as if Russia were doing everything possible to stave off a direct challenge, but I felt certain that on this issue she would stand firm. Of this I was able to get direct assurance a day and a half before the German troops passed the Russian frontier.

XVI

GERMAN DESIGNS ON RUSSIA

As soon as this war is won, Stalin must get back to his life-work of building up a new Russia. It may take a whole generation simply to get back to where he was before the war. It is to me inconceivable that this most practical man, without foreign languages or a first-hand knowledge of Europe, should choose that moment to take up the very task which he has opposed and rejected—of world revolution. He has won through with his own people because he has directed them to far more material advantages; and when victorious, they would certainly have something to say if the work to which he had braced them were now for a time to be left in its ruins.

But he will not, of course, stop short at reparation; he will go on into the future, for otherwise nothing which he has so far done can be complete. He has only begun his great task of waking up the hidden resources of Russia for the benefit of all his people, and that will go on long after Stalin.

In this task he has a greater and more immediate need of world peace than any other ruler. He has always seen this; from the time when he let pass the challenge of Japan and, in sharp opposition to Trotsky, set himself to win the co-

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operation of the democracies against a German invasion. But also he cannot carry forward his task of construction without at least some cooperation. It is quite true that, thanks to what he has already done, Russia is in a very different position with regard to help from outside. Certainly she will never again be in that "colonial" dependence from which Lenin always sought to rescue her. She has her own technicians, and they may already, for the first time in her history, be equal to her routine needs; but there will still have to be close contact with the forward march of industrial ingenuity and initiative abroad. If there were no other proof of this, it would be clear enough from her present dependence on what we can do for her in the supply of munitions. It was not for nothing that the model which she set herself was to get equal with America.

Then in this task there is for Russia—as there has always been—a choice of partners in the constructive work of peace; and in this choice there have never been more than two alternatives: on one side Germany, and on the other America and Britain. Germany had all the advantages; she was far closer and she had just what Russia most needed—the knowledge, the machinery and the technicians. Before the last war, by sheer diligence and competence, she was almost driving all her rivals out of the field.

In this there was nothing to surprise us. From the foundation of the German Empire in 1871, a numerous consular staff in Russia backed every German commercial deal and, apart from that, a thoroughly trained staff of special commissioners made themselves intimately acquainted

with the rapidly changing conditions in each district, that marked the industrial revolution set going by the emancipation of labor in 1861. On the other hand, the British Consulate General in Moscow was responsible for an enormous area, including Archangel, which the smallness of its staff prevented it from covering efficiently. When the war came in 1914, it seems that numbers of our Vice Consuls were Germans. British goods were preferred because of their soundness; some British firms such as Mather and Platt, the big machine builders of Manchester, would supply their customers with those spare parts which were so difficult to replace in a country which had hardly an industry of its own. Russian industrialists have themselves recognized that the British trader wisely preferred that the commercial deal should be satisfactory to both parties. But our people were often outwitted by methods which they did not care to use. A German firm, which was short of cutlery for Russia, applied to a British firm and was foolishly allowed to put its own trademark on what it purchased there. It then manufactured a stock of very inferior knives, on which it put the British trademark. It offered both in Russia, each as the opposite of what it really was, and naturally it got the market. A German imitation of the famous Worcestershire sauce was sold under the very distinctive label of that old firm, with the addition in small letters in German at the bottom: "Is no better than Noskau's." In my country travels in the provinces before the Revolution, I met only German advertisements—with almost the single exception of McCormick's harvesters. Our

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people neglected that side of business, and our commercial travellers were far rarer than the German. Some British firms confined themselves to correspondence by mail. I remember a trade circular which ended with the words, "The goods will be delivered at Preston Station, Lancashire."

After the last war, when both she and Russia were the outcasts of Europe, Germany had the same chance again. But each time she spoiled all her own chances by her direct appeal to brute force. And that was because fundamentally, in her attitude to Russia, her goal has always been domination.

Russia has throughout been the coveted *Lebensraum* (or "living-space") of Hitler. But this was only the continuation of a very old story, and whatever sympathy one might have had at first with his vigor in awakening Germany to a new life, one recognized at once in *Mein Kampf* the old, time-worn dream which could lead only to new wars. Germany was always out to conquer the Slavs, and push her own frontiers eastward. Trade had taken fully as much part as policy in this program of domination.

In modern times the most prominent word in this program was Ukraine. I have told that story earlier—the restlessness of the Ukrainians under any outside rule, their ineffective strivings for independence, the fatuous national policies of the Tsars, the Austro-German mask of patronage, the temporary enforcement of Ukrainian independence on Russia through the treaties of Brest-Litovsk. To these we can add the complete selfishness and unintelligence of the German occupation in 1918, which everywhere drove

the population into active resistance; the elimination of Brest-Litovsk by our victory over Germany in the west; the revival of the German program in *Mein Kampf*; the covetous allusions to Ukraine in Hitler's speeches; his show window in its tip in the Carpathians; his invasion, his conquest, and his defeat. The separation of Ukraine from Russia means the economic paralysis of Russia. But after all, Ukraine, already overcrowded, could hardly satisfy the Hitler program of a living-space for German settlement. The great spaces are further east, and Hitler had already been almost as frank in his public references to the Urals and Siberia.

Here again Hitler's idea was not original. In 1917, when the last war was already going wrong for Germany, there was published a German book which not long afterward came to me for review. Its title ran: *The March Eastward: Russian Asia as the Goal of German Military and Economic Policy*, by Werner Daya. Long afterwards, the author wrote me a very wordy letter disavowing the actual form of the title, but that was how it was published; the book had passed through higher hands, even those of the German ambassador to Japan. Though severely cut down, it was an admirable analysis of the economic potentialities of Siberia, which, as it truly said, "would in competent hands be a second North America." Germany, it represented, had made a hopeless mistake in going to war with the western states of Europe: "The Atlantic Ocean got on our minds." The alliance plainly foretold for the future was with Japan; and—though this was not clearly stated—Russia, even if accepted as a junior member of their alli-

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ance, was evidently to be under complete German control. In that case, the writer declared, Germany would in future be entirely immune from a British blockade, and it was clear that what was in view was a war of revenge.

Later, when Hitler had preached his doctrine, he was twitted by the German Social Democrats with having stolen his ideas from Daya, which was all the more mortifying to him because Daya was a Jew. In consequence, Daya had to flee from Germany and later died in England, after writing to me the lengthy letter which I have mentioned; it was sent to me by his wife, though never completed or signed.

In 1919, in the eight months which I spent in Siberia, the one solid economic unit was the Cooperators, who, abstaining from taking any part in the civil war of that time, carried most of the public life of the country, including not only the trade but the primary education, and most of the work of publication. I had frequent meetings with them for detailed discussion, and they told me of three German attempts to acquire a dominant financial interest in their work. The Japanese were there, too, and their object seemed to be, in the main, to discover a supply of metals that would replace their dependence on America.

In Siberia, as it was then, Hitler might have had an easy run through, once he had crossed the Volga. It was on the Volga that he was stopped by the almost legendary defense of the new great city to which Stalin had given his name. May this be the end of the threat of the German mailed fist to Siberia, and may the impending development of its

wealth which is sure to follow remain permanently in Russian hands!

And what will the Germans do when the great dream of conquest has failed? I think the answer is quite simple. They will go back to the old economic spadework which was so promising and for which they are so admirably qualified. Yes, in scholarship and in trade they have generally been the spadeworkers of the world. Of course, the big plan has spoiled the modest one, and the brutalities of the Nazi invasion are not likely to make the Germans welcome guests in Russia—which gives us a far better chance than ever before. But Germans don't always see things like that: they are patient and painstaking.

Twice on her road to economic penetration, Germany has been well on the way to success. She was slowly driving out her trade rivals before 1914. After her defeat, the common European boycott of Russia and Germany unexpectedly gave her back her chance. Then she spoiled it again; but it may be reckoned a certainty that she will try to come back to it. The question is whether we shall spoil our chances, too. Or whether we shall simply go to sleep again. I am afraid it is quite likely; and, if so, we shall only have ourselves to blame.

XVII

RUSSIA AND ENGLAND

IF YOU READ THE RECORDS of those old English traders who rediscovered Russia in the time of the Tudors, you will feel the joyous spirit of adventure with which they traveled "regions yet unknown" in their search for new worlds. They were peculiarly objective: the admirable *Russe Commonwealth* of Giles Fletcher was taken as an authority in Russian schools. They are credited with having had a kindly eye—so judges Inna Lyubimenko, a valuable investigator of foreign records on Russia—and they were most fascinated by what was most unlike themselves. The result was that they created a similar attraction in the Russians who came in contact with them. It was a novel and refreshing partnership—on the one side, the Russian saw a bold spirit of adventure, rejoicing to be outside the bounds of the ordered and limited life which the Englishman left behind him in his own country; on the other, the Englishman saw a great broad world of unlimited possibilities and a free and responsive people, who, as with so many later British travelers, almost thanked you for the interest which had brought you to come and see them. The Russia Company, founded at that time, still exists in London, and its annals record a long history of interchange for the benefit of both sides.

What the Russians wanted of England, then and afterwards, was men who knew how to get things done, who would show instead of order, lead instead of command. The Scots, naturally, played a great part in this partnership, and it has gone on right down to our own times.

The story of government relations began in this commercial intercourse; in fact, the first diplomats were paid by the Russia Company, but it came to be very different. The knowledge of Russia was in England something like a trade secret: both government and public remained in profound ignorance. "Omne ignotum pro magnifico," says Tacitus: everything you don't know about, seems ten times the size.

For England these relations began with a succession of scares. Peter the Great, who came to England to study ship-building in 1698, was a very alarming person, and left his lodgings at Deptford in an astonishing state of disorder. Catherine the Great suddenly sent the Russian fleet—of whose existence we hardly knew—through the Channel and the Strait of Gibraltar into the Mediterranean to destroy the Turkish fleet outside the Dardanelles. Her son Paul joined Napoleon in a mad-cap scheme—laughable on the Russian side if one knew the details—for an overland march, without maps, from the Ural River, for the conquest of India. In the Napoleonic period Russia was sometimes with us, sometimes against us, according to what question was uppermost at the moment: the resistance to a world conqueror from France, or a challenge to our high-handed treatment of neutrals on the seas. We could not always hold our alliances with Russia. We had even then, from the

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Russians, a repetition suggestive of today's complaints on the question of "a second front." There were on our side pettinesses of detail which gave us a name for meanness with the childlike and emotional Russians. We lost our alliance of 1798 with Paul partly because we refused to exchange a French war-prisoner for a Russian, as we did for an Englishman. In our alliance of 1805 with his son Alexander I we were suspected of "not pulling our weight": our promised help for besieged Dantzic arrived too late. Yet looking over the whole of the long record, we find that we have only once fought Russia, and have been five times allied with her against a world aggressor.

The one war—and this is another warning for today—came after the greatest of these aggressors had been brought down by our common effort. The fall of Napoleon and the exhaustion of France left Europe very empty in the middle, with two strong powers, Britain and Russia, facing each other from east and west. We remember this well, and it is the set purpose of our present policy that this should not happen again after the present war.

The profound isolation into which Britain sank back after the gigantic struggle against Napoleon, greatly deepened our ignorance of the outside world; but the Russophobia which ruled our public and our policy during that long period had its explanation. We could see only the Russian Government of Nicholas I, not the Russian people, of which all the thinking elements were struggling for self-expression under a suffocating rule. The policy of the Russian Government had nothing to do with the Russian peo-

ple. Napoleon is reported to have said at St. Helena that Europe would eventually be either Cossack or Republican. The battle of the ideas of the French Revolution was in full swing in Russia itself. Europe was divided by layers rather than by nations; and Palmerston was the champion of movements of liberation in Hungary, Italy, or elsewhere, just as Nicholas was the arch-champion of the *status quo*.

But for Britain there was also another antithesis. Here were two empires in constant mutual suspicion. We had never forgotten the mad scheme of Paul, and we seemed to have developed an extraordinary doctrine that any approach by Russia to an open port on the road from Britain to India was a challenge and an offense to ourselves. It was this conjunction of two totally different causes of hostility that brought British Liberals and Conservatives together when in 1854 we drifted into the Crimean War.

This war may be fairly described as a classic muddle, of which the famous charge of the Light Brigade was only the best example. Nicholas certainly respected us and wanted our friendship more than any other; the estrangement began with our respectable rebuff of a lordly and irregular, but perfectly sincere, offer of an all-round deal with us about Turkey. We took up Turkey because we were afraid of Russia. The original dispute over the Holy Places of Jerusalem was really settled before we went to war; the actual occasion lay in certain vague claims of Russian championship of the Orthodox subjects of the Sultan, which came up during the dispute. The first operations proved a sufficient answer; the Russians were driven

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back from the Danube; the invasion of Crimea was an afterthought, to teach the Tsar a lesson, as the French and we had got our forces mobilized and on the spot.

Apparently we could have walked straight into Sevastopol, but we did not. The generalship on both sides, with the one exception of Todleben's defence of Sevastopol, was less than second-rate; commissariat and ambulance were almost equally inadequate on both sides, and the waste of men was monstrous. It turned out that neither side could hit the other very hard; and the principal feature of the war was the loss to both from the severance of valuable economic relations.

The same question came up again in 1877, but this time without leading to war. This time we were much more to blame; for Alexander II had taken us for the principal model of his great reforms, and he was dragged into war with Turkey by what was really a national crusade of his subjects, with which Gladstone was not out of sympathy. We thought in our ignorance that it was simply a repetition of the dynastic claims of his father. If we saw red, the Russians did not. According to the testimony of our British traders resident in Russia, they were never identified with the policy of their government, and continued their valuable partnership without unpleasantness or interruption. British prisoners of war, such as Major Lake of Kars, gave the same evidence: they got on splendidly with the Russians and, in fact, had the time of their lives. It was this complete discordance between British views of Russia in England and the views of Britishers in Russia that made

me want to find out whether after all, as I was always told in England, Russia was our natural enemy. I soon found out which was right when I got there.

These British traders did a very real service to Russia, which has had generous recognition from the best historian of the Russian Factory, the Marxist, Tugan-Baranovsky. If there had been any British academic study of Russia, we should have known by this time that the outstanding fact was the industrial revolution—with far wider potentialities than that of our own new Lancashire in the eighteenth century—produced by the liberation of labor in 1861. This set rolling all sorts of new live forces and transformed the economic map. Russia had only an infant industry and, being predominately agricultural, did not dispose of floating capital. Foreigners entered the field in their different ways. The French, for the most part, made the radical mistake of entrusting their capital to the patriarchal Government—which put them in the dependence of a creditor on a debtor. The Germans, from outside, with the support of the newly established German Empire, studied the field for the advantages which it could give them. The British came into Russia, built their factories there, and shared their profits with Russian labor. Knoop, originally an agent of de Jersey & Co. of Manchester, became the greatest of the cotton kings of Moscow. Sir William Mather of Manchester, the first great employer to set up an eight-hour day in his works in England, was another outstanding developer of the Moscow cotton industry, and always regarded Russia as his second home. Mr. Hughes of Dowlais Top in Wales

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created the new industrial town of Yuzovka (Hughesovka, now Stalino), in the center of the incipient Donets industry. These were teachers, men who cared for their employees, and in 1918 Yuzovka went on working for its employers nearly a year after other factories had ceased. But it was the Germans who appreciated, for their own interest, the full dimensions of the colossal change which had taken place; and with their unremitting study and enterprise, at a time when all economic values were changing, they were gradually making themselves masters of the new strategic points and edging their rivals out. Russia was in this period a very promising investment, and 10 or 15 per cent was only an ordinary profit.

There was another link between England and Russia which was known only to few. It is one of the surprises of history that the Russian and Anglican Churches, which have never had a single page of common history, had independently arrived at a practical identity of teaching, the only difference being the omission of the words "and the Son" in the doctrine of the origin of the Holy Spirit. Identity of belief means identity of thought on the gravest interest in life. It is only thus that we can explain the surprising intimacy of thought between the Anglican High Church and the Russian Slavophiles, who represented the deepest contribution that Russia had made to the philosophical and religious thought of Europe. In no way associated with the out-of-date organization of their Church, they stood for what was most distinctive in Russia, and they had a profound understanding of the very essence of

that deep conservatism which is the common heritage of almost all Englishmen of all classes, for which they found the fitting term, "the eternal conservatism of England"; it has carried us as a nation through one great crisis after another. The Slavophiles were countrified folk, and in their nearness to our thought I find a reason why the Englishman—or, for the matter of that, the American—unlike the Frenchman or German or any other foreigner, is instinctively more at home in rural Russia than in the great towns.

The religious instinct, in the simplest sense of the term, has one peculiar tradition in the history of Russia in the work of the British and Foreign Bible Society, which was admitted to the country by Alexander I after the Napoleonic Wars. It does not preach; it is not denominational; its long Russian connection has taught it wonderful tact, and up to the Revolution its colporteurs for generations circulated the Bible as a gift in any part of the country. A similar service was rendered much later by the American Y.M.C.A.

The man who rediscovered Russia for the general Anglo-Saxon public was Sir Donald Mackenzie Wallace. I knew him in his later days; the generous old fellow put me on my legs with a review of my first book, and told me he was my sleeping partner. He lived for years in Russia before he wrote his great book in the late seventies. It is said that the publisher refused the first draft as too serious, and that Wallace revised it, making the same points with a number of amusing anecdotes. Wallace was the typical pioneer—an all-round explorer with a shrewd and kindly eye, who

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charted the field for others to follow him in a whole number of special studies.

The greatest of these followers was Harold Williams who, like Wallace, ended up as foreign editor of the *London Times*. Williams was essentially a scholar, though at that time no place existed for him in the British educational system; he knew practically every language in the Russian Empire, but he retained a vivid English style of his own. To know such a man was in itself a culture. Russia, once she came into her own, like Italy, instinctively attracted the best of English minds. Maurice Baring, a poet with a second sight, penetrated into the Russian consciousness deeper than any other foreigner, or than most Russians. Russia has possessed a special attraction for the Scot or the Welshman. We comrades were a happy band there, well knowing what a responsibility rested on us, but rejoicing in that unbounded field of thought and imagination. Somehow life seemed richer there. "When you leave Russia," Williams once said, "don't you feel as if something were being taken out of you?"

We were not going to have our own knowledge of Russia until we went there ourselves to get it. Till then, we largely depended on the Russian emigrants in England. I don't care what their politics may be: I never believe in taking our views of a country from those who have fled from it. The earlier emigrants were the very opposite of those who succeeded them after the Revolution. They did do us a service in stirring the torpid waters of English thought, for nothing could have informed us less than the extraordinar-

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ily fatuous views of Russia to be obtained through the official channels of the Russian Government.

When I first came in 1898, I went up country as soon as possible with nothing but Russian books and a Russian dictionary. After four years of preliminary study of the other chief countries of Europe, this was like returning to infancy. I well remember how, passing through a forest glade, I realized that I had the opportunity of Arthur Young, the British farming expert who traveled through France on the eve of the great Revolution and later witnessed its beginnings. This old world was about to disappear and was already in a profound process of transformation; but long after the revolution in minds had taken place, the ancient façade still stood, like a rotten wall that was waiting to be pushed over, and I had not one or two years like Arthur Young but nearly twenty before it actually fell.

The Russia in which I first lived and studied was being slowly and steadily permeated with the spirit of nineteenth century European Liberalism: I was myself absorbed in this movement, and its story includes my own, so I will tell it as I myself saw it. "Freedom" here was a sacred ideal, because it was still fighting for its realization: Russia, as usual, came last in Europe. I was witnessing just such a fight as that which had filled the life of my father, an enthusiastic follower of Gladstone. The instincts, the very words, were the same. There were two main directions, Western, and Slavophil, but both led forward to the same general objectives. The only difference was the question of pace. Perhaps equally

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effective were those of the reformers who did not wish to out-run the old habitual instincts of the Russian consciousness. In intercourse it did not make much difference. Both views alike, the quick and the slow, implied a sincere interest in England and friendship with her. I could take almost as a yardstick, as a final and trustworthy measure, that exactly in the degree to which a given Russian sought a broader and more free and fruitful development for his own country, he was already won for friendship with England.

I trusted to this measure, and it never failed me. In 1904-1905, as the tide was rising, I made country journeys of exploration. I was never so happy as when I could turn my back on Petersburg: it was certainly the peasant who taught me most, even about Russian politics. In 1906, with the institution of the Duma, the Tsar summoned to the capital "the best men invested with the confidence of the population." The peasants took him at his word, and none of the members were more interesting and refreshing than the so-called Non-Party, which included most of the peasant members; they followed eagerly every action of the humdrum professional parties, to see which were likely to do most for the *narod*, or people, the great underdog majority of the population. In 1909 I was able to bring the leaders of the six central groups in the Duma to England on a visit to the Mother of Parliaments. From that time, there were committees in both countries, not so much parliamentary as representative of every main phase of public life, engaged in spade work for a better and closer understanding. In the same period we founded our School of

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Russian Studies in the University of Liverpool, which issued a "Russian Review" with the help of Russian scholars and public men. In 1912 our Russian friends more than repaid our hospitality of 1909. The procedure and precedents of the Duma were mostly copied from English models, and the further development of this friendship figured on a short list, that hung in the cabinet of its President, of subjects which he did not wish to pass out of his hands. I have mentioned these various experiences because they convinced me of something which I think fundamental: if you could only bring Russians and British together, you did not need to do anything else; everything went of itself, with a quick interest and an appreciative response on both sides.

Here I have been writing of the foundations and antecedents of the alliance in the last war; I certainly know of no alliance that was closer or more chivalrous; every time we asked them to do something, they tried to do it, for no better reason than because we asked. Our ambassador, Sir George Buchanan, whom I served throughout, was himself the best representative of British friendship and chivalry. "I wish we did not ask them to do too much," he once said to me. And when the Russian army had been completely broken, he cabled to our Foreign Office asking whether it would not be best, instead of asking for further effort, to give Russia back her pledge to us.

In the summer of 1915 came a crisis in which Russia was on the eve of constitutional rule. For the moment, absorbed in devotion to the national army, Tsar, Ministers, and Duma were all of one mind. It was the direct intervention

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of the Empress that defeated this hope and made revolution inevitable. The Provisional Government of 1917 was staffed with firm friends of England. But Russia is not England. The arrears of the past were too heavy, and the experience of army and people in the war was in itself profoundly revolutionary. We had innumerable friends; the only advantage that Germany had over us was that she offered immediate peace; but that, whatever the conditions, was in itself enough.

What followed has to be read in terms of that time, which were just the same as those of the present war. It was unthinkable that there would ever have been a British intervention in Russia if we had not been at war with Germany, and if so large a section of the Russians had not themselves offered to go on with us. We are doing the same now, we enter without scruple any country where there is German opposition to be met. The transition back to normal ways became most painful when we had beaten the Germans and wondered what we could still do for those whom we had asked to help us. Our people had themselves gone home, and in the end it became clear to all that we could do nothing; but we had lost the friendship of Russia.

XVIII

SOVIET RUSSIA AND ENGLAND

WE WERE COMPLETELY CUT OFF from Russia for some years, though there were still means of gathering what was happening there. This was the time when the Germans had the opportunity of proving the sincerity of their friendship. During the period when the issue between them and us was still in the balance, I had spoken in Russian at many meetings all over the country—not at all as an ally who begged the Russians to go on fighting for our sake, but asking them as a friend of their country whether, in their own interest, they were wise to break with us. For if Germany won the war, it was obvious that the Russian Revolution would be done for. I had always had a friendly reception, but I knew that the case which I put had no hope of success. During the civil war I had spoken in the same sense right through Siberia, so that my return was doubly barred.

Then came the turn for a Soviet intervention in my own country, and I travelled round England, as I would do again in the same circumstances, advising against our imitating the Bolsheviks at home. They had reasonably counted on the fact that so many other peoples had passed through the same hell in the World War, and I was alarmed to find out how far they had got with their propa-

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ganda in Britain. There was certainly a sharp difference of opinion on Russia, which rested on class. The upper class, the drawing rooms, entirely ignorant of the extent of the Russian sacrifices, talked of the separate peace as "the greatest betrayal in history." The workers inclined to think that Russia had now the ideal labor government. But any sort of contact soon brought corrections. Thorne and O'Grady, two Labor M.P.'s who visited Russia between the two revolutions of 1917, saw at once that the new leaders were in no sense of their own class: "Look at their hands!" said one to the other. Lenin, of course, was the highest kind of Russian intellectual. When he told Herbert Smith that we ought to have a heavy civil war, the sturdy Yorkshire miner asked himself what place Lenin had in that matter. I had always felt certain that our surest defense against the Russian hysteria of that time was the excellent good sense of our workers themselves. They had not built up our Trade Unions, our Cooperatives, and our Labor movement in order to be told to line up behind the latest novelty that came from Russia. We could point to positive and far-reaching legislative achievements in the social services, some of which, like old-age pensions, were the work of a Conservative government. As Lenin had realized, British Labor was among the aristocracy of world Labor: one did not see our workers sharing alike with the coolies of India. British Labor, for the most part, limited itself to a call for a strike to "down tools" till an end was put to our intervention in Russia, which after the Armistice of November 11, 1918, gradually died out of itself.

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In my numerous meetings I was often at grips with British Communists. A sort of mobile audience was kept going, certainly by funds from abroad, to rush any ordinary meeting. On the other hand, if one were invited to address any of the many excellent standing organizations of workers for public lectures, an interrupter would even be brought up to apologize. The audience wanted to learn something about the subject, and did not tolerate the substitution of a side-show by someone else than the invited speaker. My most interesting experience was a public debate with my friend William Gallacher, at present the one Communist member of Parliament. I don't think it could have taken the same course in Russia. Gallacher was a fine sportsman. He won the toss, sent me in first, and gave me an extra innings at the end. The interrupters were there, but he silenced them, and afterwards introduced me to his best friend with the words, "He's my friend but he's your side." I couldn't see what there was to be afraid of.

I am quite clear that the Bolshevik attack on England reached its peak in the spring of 1920. Up to then, the ordinary young inquirer would say, "I'm a Bolshevik"; by the autumn, the same young man would say, "I am not a Bolshevik, but are you fair?" The same date has been given me from two very opposite sides—by Jack Murphy, the only Anglo-Saxon that I know who was on the Executive of the Comintern, and by the head of the Criminal Investigation Department of Scotland Yard. Murphy says truly that by that time the revolution had won in Russia and was in retreat outside. I was so convinced of this, that in the

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autumn I went back to my ordinary academic work, to build up a School of Slavonic Studies in London.

The Comintern actively continued its interventions, mainly working through the industrial disturbances which were so common in the postwar world, notably, for instance, in South Wales. Kamenev was in England offering his advice on our so-called "Black Friday." The Communists had two kindred institutions which served them on our side: the Trade Union International (Profintern), and their organization for support to the victims of labor troubles abroad (MOPR). Our first Labor Premier, Ramsay MacDonald, who recognized the Soviet Government in 1924, would have been a Menshevik in Russia, and quite clearly discriminated between revolution and democracy. He was certainly scared by the famous Zinoviev letter of 1924, printed in the *Daily Mail* in time to sway the General Election which drove his government from power. The letter contained strong internal signs of forgery; but after all, Zinoviev, then head of the Comintern, was saying just the same kind of thing at any time. Particularly resented were the approaches to members of our armed forces, though these took only insignificant effect. I have to note that in the period when there was real danger, precious little was done by the powerful British middle class in their own defense. It was only afterwards that many of them welcomed the scare of Bolshevism as a very useful party weapon.

Nothing did more harm to the Bolshevik cause in England than the wholesale attack on religion and the Easter

trials of priests in Moscow in 1923. The outburst of indignation, headed by the Archbishop of Canterbury, was common to all forms of religious belief in the country. It was very long before these trials could be forgotten. Lord Curzon, who was at that time our Foreign Secretary, sent a dispatch that seemed to indicate a breach in our trade relations, which had been renewed in the agreement of March, 1921. At least this direct and frontal attack on religion was never renewed in the same form.

In September, 1925, Tomsky, head of the Russian Trade Unions, was welcomed as a fraternal delegate at the British Trade Union Congress at Scarborough, and the program which the Congress adopted was that which had brought the Bolsheviks into power in Russia. A severe Coal Strike was in progress, and the Trade Union Council, which constituted itself into a kind of GHQ, claimed the allegiance of all manual workers in any course which it might take. On these lines the General Strike which followed in May, 1926, would hang up the whole public service of the country; and this might be expected to lead to a transfer of power to the Trade Union Council: this was the Russian motto of 1917—"All power to the Soviets"—and it meant, of course, the disfranchisement of all but manual workers. Nothing was ever more humorous than the application of this motto in England in 1926. On the first day of the strike, when the streets should have been empty but for the Trade Unionists, London saw an immense one-way throng of the rest of the population all going to work. Most were walking, but any passing car would give a lift if possible.

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The strikers were without delay adequately replaced in all essential services; interruptions were of the feeblest kind, and universal good humor prevailed. The ordinary citizen simply put into practice his ordinary independence. In the deadlock which followed, the labor leaders were obviously more hesitant than anyone else to take the next step to open conflict. Their leaderless followers in several places filled the gap with football matches of the most friendly kind between strikers and police: in Plymouth, the wife of the chief constable kicked off. The government controlled the radio, and it gave the public the actual scene of the surrender of the strike. The Chairman of the Trade Union Council, fully as bourgeois as the Prime Minister, Mr. Baldwin, announces that his Council is thinking of calling off the strike, and Mr. Baldwin expresses his satisfaction. What an anticlimax! That is the end of the "heavy civil war," which is now transferred to Moscow in a bitter conflict between Trotsky and Stalin. The aftermath of the triumphant Home Secretary, Joynson-Hicks, ends in a similar futility. The Russian Trade Delegation (Arcos) is raided for incendiary literature, and the safe, when filed open by the police, reveals the tobacco pouch of the manager.

Another futility has been throughout revealed in Communist candidatures in British elections. Only three candidates in the whole Soviet period have ever made their way through to join the other six-hundred-odd members of the House of Commons. We have an excellent rule which demands that anyone who has a good enough opinion of

himself to stand for election must lodge a modest deposit, which is forfeited if he fails to win a modest minimum of votes. In case after case the Communist candidate forfeits his deposit, showing conclusively that the Communist Party has no serious roots in the country.

From the time of the British recognition of the Soviet Government in February, 1924, relations were constantly disturbed by their use for propaganda purposes in Britain and in India. The protests of the British government were met on the Russian side with the plea that the Soviet Government was not responsible for the acts of the Comintern. As has been pointed out, both Soviet Government and Comintern were instruments of the Communist Party. Both in Ireland and in Wales the propaganda came up against a solid obstacle in the deep religious consciousness of the Catholic Irish and the deeply emotional and evangelical spirit of the Welsh. India was a more promising field, but however profound the gap between the Indian intellectuals and the British middle class, there is little evidence to imply any Indian inclination for Russian Communist rule. British Labor has always shown an instinctive hostility to the Communist procedure of infiltration into its ranks. Communism may appeal to British intellectual Socialists who have attached themselves to the solid phalanx of Trade Unionists, but these last have no idea of having their policies made for them: they resent the suggestion that the tail should wag the dog.

One of the chief evils of all this period was the loss of direct contact with Russia. Internal processes always take

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long to obtain recognition abroad, and Russia was changing faster than any other country. In the new political conditions created by the Revolution, it was almost unthinkable that a Wallace or a Williams should be able to settle down for years of objective study in Russia. Only Soviet officials reached England, and they did not dare to talk there. The field was open to enthusiastic and emotional theorists from our side who packed their views of that new world in with their luggage and brought them back with them hardly changed, for very few of them took the trouble to get any acquaintance with the language of the country. Thus we were left with little more than a choice between two views, almost equally ignorant. Russia was depicted to us either as a heaven or as a hell; both were party views, and between them any discrimination was crowded out. Consequently, Russia became for us simply a plaything of British party politics. The public remained in complete confusion. In news from foreign countries, there is always a natural premium on the sensational, and this, together with the ruthless suppression of all opposition to Stalin's Five Year Plans which I have traced elsewhere, helped to widen the gap between the two opposite views. The uninformed enthusiast was not equipped to give any explanation. We have all the more reason to be grateful to those few young technicians who threw themselves into the great work of construction in Russia. They were a little window through which we could see something of what was actually going on there, and the sensible views which they brought back helped to give us some kind of perspective of the subject.

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For England as for Russia, everything changed with Hitler's advent to power in Germany. By now, the Five Year Plan had established itself, and there was at least some realization of the difference between Trotsky's world program and Stalin's home one. The work of construction had clearly begun to justify itself; inevitably, it called for outside help and for peaceful relations with the outside world. Communism now depended on the argument of example, and if it meant a great national effort to raise the standard of living for the community as a whole, it carried an appeal which was entirely lacking in the barren racial creed of Nazism. If we were now to be left to ourselves, we had no need to choose either the one or the other; but with the majority of our population, who did not have big incomes for which they were still apprehensive, there was soon no doubt which would be viewed with the lesser hostility.

The change which Hitler brought about in British opinion was very sudden and very complete. Soon after the last war our British student body collected several thousand pounds for the starving students of Germany. I was then Senior Treasurer of our National Union of Students. Up to Hitler they were undoubtedly pro-German, and the change came at once. In my view, it was just the same with the man in the street. Long before our government, he had made up his mind that this fellow must be stopped. And we had one statesman who is typically a crystallization of the wisdom of the street; that is Winston Churchill; and through the degradation of appeasement he had his eye on the possibilities of friendship with Russia. For many

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of us the whole point was that, while Communism as a world threat was fading out, Russia and the Russian people were coming back into their own.

The Communist Party in England was negligible, with tiny little would-be Lenins who understood nothing of what had happened in Russia. It was quite out of step. British Labor still resented any organization which, for whatever purposes, took its orders from Moscow; and it was just as suspicious as ever of infiltration. The Comintern, as transformed by Stalin, was now an instrument of Soviet foreign policy, but its former use was not forgotten. Stalin was now seeking for a united front, not of the world's workers for world revolution, but of other nations against Hitler. But the past stood in his way. He would have been wise to have done now what he did later—abolish the Comintern altogether. The British Communists were mystified; so were the so-called “fellow travelers,” bound by their former complacency towards the idea of world revolution. The man who saw clearest was, as often, our outstanding cartoonist, David Low. He showed a little Trotsky grinding a small barrel organ in a deserted London park, with a stupid young policeman saying, “Can’t you see that man is dangerous?”

I realized very early that Hitler had given us back our chance of friendship with Russia. I realized that the new Soviet Ambassador Maisky was a friend of England, sent to us to work not for revolution but for our friendship. On this basis I have myself had his friendship, and never has he given me any forecast which did not prove true. I had

published the new legislation which had marked the great swing of Russia's new policy, both home and foreign, and now that they wanted us, it was not difficult to go there without any sacrifice of one's independence.

At Munich Russia was demonstratively left out of the picture. She had her revenge when both Germany and we sought her friendship in Moscow in 1939. She must have felt as if we were treating her as only secondary to Poland and the little Baltic states. She had to be approached as a great nation, a first class Power threatened by the same danger as ourselves. No wonder that these negotiations failed, and that, as I had been warned after Munich, she locked her own doors and saw to her own defense. How many young lives might have been saved if we had taken then what we have now.

Twice during the Russo-German Pact, we were not so far from war with Russia. First, when Russia marched in to save from Hitler the Russian population in Poland, but we still held to the principle of the Curzon Line and took no action. Second, when we prepared an expedition for the Finnish front in 1941. We were next busy enough with our home defense. We held the enemy at bay, and he turned from us to conquer Europe and Russia. As he marched through one little country after another, he was constantly making it clearer to us that British interests and Russian were the same, and the very day that saw him invade Russia, brought our alliance. The Germans had made the same capital mistake they had made last time.

It would be very difficult for me to do full justice to the

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great wave of enthusiasm which went right through Britain —first, when the Russians met the German challenge, and later as there developed before us the splendid picture of the national Russian resistance. It had nothing whatever to do with party politics; it was before all things human. In kind it recalled the enthusiasm for Garibaldi and all that he stood for in the struggle to unite Italy, but it was wider and deeper, for it so directly concerned all of us. For a year and a half before coming to America, I was invited to travel all over our island and speak on Russia in almost every large center of population, literally from Inverness to Cornwall. The Russian people in arms had suddenly become clearly visible to us, and the picture had an extraordinary attraction. We had all been assured that Hitler would walk through them quite easily. Everyone was asking why we had known and understood so little about them till now. In every town the principal representatives of every party view would be gathered together on the same platform, and would pay their tribute to Russia with a harmony that was better than any unison. Each tribute was sincere, and sometimes the most eloquent came from the conservative. There were shades of difference between various districts which only heightened the general agreement. All Scotland and the North were downright and wholehearted in their admiration. The Welsh, who are a people of poets, threw into their tribute the whole force of their emotion. Especially impressive were those places along our south or east coasts which even during periods of lull were never wholly immune from bombing. Indeed, the damage from bombs was very often the

measure of the enthusiasm for the Russians, for it was they who had taken the main weight off us. In the face of the general enthusiasm, carping was hardly ventured. Taking up one such instance, speaking amidst the ruins of Coventry, the Bishop, one of our wisest and best, hit exactly what everyone was feeling with the words, "That seems to me incredibly mean." We have had the war at home. The rear has known what it is, as well as the front. The majority of our casualties have been in our own country, and we are too near to realities to mince words.

There are other ways in which we are drawing nearer to the Russian people. Indeed, it is as if we were approaching each other from two sides. As they are returning from the international hysteria, so we, in our war life of four years, have often been faced with those social problems with which they have been grappling. In war we all have to live a corporate life and, so far from being ashamed of it, it is just the most patriotic who accept it with the greatest readiness. There is a sense of brotherhood, especially in bombed districts, which makes us feel the wants of others and seek every way in which they can be relieved. Food is common. The sacrifice of life is common. It could not be taken that one man's loss of life or injury is only his own affair.

I feel sure that this is the spirit in which we shall meet with others for the securing of a lasting world peace. In these four years we have suffered very grievously; again our young people have been bereft of many of the best of their future leaders. Realities of this kind make it impossible

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that we should give play to political preferences; least of all could we listen to the suggestion that we should let this war lead on to a quarrel with Russia. We shall stand up to her, and we shall expect her to do the same to us, but we shall seek a solid and workmanlike solution, based on serious and sympathetic study, for every problem that may face us. We shall explore the possibilities of every kind of cooperation profitable to both sides in our postwar relations; and the enormous tasks of reconstruction with which Russia will then be dealing will give us the most practical means of proving to her that her partners in war are also her friends in peace.

XIX

RUSSIA AND AMERICA

AT THE VERY OUTSET of the history of American independence, one of the wisest of all American statesmen put into words his view of the natural relations between his country and Russia. Thomas Jefferson was deeply interested in the Russia of his time: he watched with a keen and discriminating judgment the various changes in her policy, and at each change his sure instinct took him straight to the heart of the matter.

"When it was possible to do so," writes Dr. Mitchell Franklin in *Soviet Russia* for January, 1943, "Jefferson adhered to a conception of Anglo-Russo-American unity for the purpose of overcoming Napoleonic aggression and imperialism. . . . Jefferson's opposition to Napoleon was grounded on the conception that the United States would be destroyed, if Russia or England lost their independence to the French aggressor." "The rights of nations to self-government being my polar star," Jefferson once said, "my partialities are steered by it."

Jefferson had direct contact with Alexander I of Russia and expected great things from the liberal beginnings of his reign. Alexander, as is known, then thought sincerely of giving a constitution to Russia; and Jefferson, on learning

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of his interest in that of the United States, chose for him two textbooks on the subject. To Dashkov in 1809 he wrote, "Both nations being in character and practice essentially pacific, a common interest in the rights of peaceable nations gives us a common cause in their maintenance." In a letter of April 19, 1806, to Alexander, he described him as one "who can extend his eye and his good will to a distant and infant nation, unoffending in its course, unambitious in its views." He had a special admiration for Alexander's policy in education which, however surprising it may seem, was at that time the most liberal in Europe. To his publisher, Duane, he writes, "He is not of the very first order of understanding, but he is of a high one. He has taken a peculiar affection to this country and its government, of which he has given me public as well as personal proofs. Our nation being, like his, habitually neutral, our interests as to neutral rights, and our sentiments agree."

To Thomas Leiper he wrote on January 1, 1814, "Surely none of us wishes to see Bonaparte conquer Russia and lay thus at his feet the whole continent of Europe. England would be but a breakfast." For England he had praise and blame at different times, but not long before his death he wrote that England and the United States "holding completely together, have nothing to fear from the united world. They will be the models for regenerating the conditions of man, the sources from which representative government is to flow over the whole earth."

In a remarkable article in the *Russian Review* for November, 1941, Mr. Roger Dow calls attention to marked

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similarities between Russia and the United States. "Illimitable space has been the birthright of Russians and Americans and has colored their lives and their ways of thinking." Size, space, and colonization, he rightly says, have been the essence of Russian history. In the forward advance of the Russian people the settlers constantly moved on "steadily away from the old metropolitan centers," and sometimes left large gaps behind them. They had their own rough and ready way of organizing some kind of common life. The new community thus created was a "melting pot," and the melting pot worked because the bulk of the immigration represented the dominant ethnic strain of the metropolitan areas—Anglo-Saxon in America and Great-Russian in Siberia. This is very true. The result was a common language; and, for myself, when I had to speak right through Siberia to farmers' audiences, I found my task no more difficult than if I had been in Moscow.

Two countries that have a great deal that is alike—that is because they are two peoples. They have hardly had a common page of history. They have had no wars, and it seems that it would be idiotic if they did. For one thing, where would they fight, and what about? It is difficult to see how either could do the other any very great harm.

They have had very different governments, but that has not succeeded in bringing them into conflict. Russia was first on the scene of these relations, even on American soil. Peter the Great, not long before his death in 1725, commissioned the Danish sea captain, Bering, to find out whether

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Siberia joined on to North America. They nearly do. Bering, sailing from Kamchatka in June, 1730, discovered the strait separating the two, which now bears his name. He was shipwrecked and died; but the strait was later crossed by that stream of Russian traders which had brought the no man's land of Siberia into the Russian Empire, and it passed on down the west American coast through Alaska and even into California, where it got in touch with the Spaniards of San Francisco. This colony of the Russian people was later ceded to the United States in 1867 for \$7,200,000 in gold, and has since infinitely reimbursed the purchasers in gold alone. Alaska had been one of the occasions for the declaration of the Monroe Doctrine, that the United States would challenge any further colonization of the American continent; and this was fully accepted by Russia.

Russia favored and helped the birth of American independence. Her position at that time was that of the greatest neutral power, equally opposed to claims of domination whether on the European continent or on the seas; and during the American Revolution Catherine the Great of Russia joined with Sweden, Denmark, Austria, and Portugal in the so-called Armed Neutrality, which challenged England's arbitrary use of her sea power. This coalition was revived as a League of Neutrality by her son Paul and Napoleon in 1800. During the British-American War of 1812, Russia showed her friendliness by offering her mediation. In the Crimean War America expressed her sympathy with Russia, and during the American Civil War, when

there seemed a danger of foreign recognition of the Confederate Government, the Russian fleet paid visits of friendship to New York and San Francisco.

The first serious cause of friction between Russia and America came after 1881, with the intolerable anti-Jewish legislation in Russia. This was of course the work of the Russian Government, then in full reaction and deeply estranged from the Russian people. American opinion, like that of other countries, was especially outraged by the armed attacks on Jews, undoubtedly organized by the Tsar's police, which took place in several towns near the beginning of the new century. This led to indignant speeches in Congress and even, in January, 1913, to the annulment of the Russo-American commercial treaty of 1832. But nowhere did public indignation rise higher than in Russia itself. Much the most impressive speech to which Sam Harper and I listened in the short-lived first Duma of 1906 was the denunciation of the pogroms by Prince Urúsov, formerly Assistant Minister of the Interior.

It may certainly be said that President Theodore Roosevelt rendered a real service to Russia in offering his good offices for the termination of the Russo-Japanese War, which was ended by the treaty signed at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, on August 29, 1905. At the last moment the fundamental obstacle was removed, when the Japanese negotiator waived the question of an indemnity and thus relieved Russia of a grave humiliation. Witte, the outstanding Russian statesman of the period, who had to argue the Russian case, pays warm tribute in his memoirs not only

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to the United States Government but to the friendliness of American public opinion and press.

The United States entered the first World War when Russia, after heroic efforts, had been almost crushed by overwhelming casualties. On the fall of the Monarchy, it was the first Power to recognize the democratic Russian Provisional Government of March, 1917. A distinguished American Mission was sent to Russia, headed by the elder statesman, Elihu Root, and generous help was poured in for Russian public needs. This was no time—with Russia invaded, the army destroyed, and the whole country in distress—for her first experiment in constitutional government. Nearly everywhere in Europe, parliamentary rule was practically almost suspended: as we were to discover, the war had put an end to the great Liberal period of the nineteenth century. In Russia, the Revolution so long overdue was bound to take violent forms. It is easy enough now to condemn the various policies of foreign governments, allied with Russia and at war with Germany, in that time of confusion; but certainly none of them showed more consideration for the Russian people, or interfered less, than the Americans. The situation was further complicated by the pressing need for a common policy between partners whose attitude to the events in Russia was anything but identical. In Siberia, which was the scene of the American intervention, the interveners took no part in the fighting and their principal service was the administration by an American of the Siberian railway. We now know that its chief object was to prevent Japanese annexation of Russian territory; and that

was the cause which the United States successfully upheld in the final stage of the intervention, the Washington Conference of 1921, when Japan was persuaded to withdraw her troops, and Russia's rights were reserved to her. In the terrible years of famine which followed in Russia, the American contribution of service and relief dwarfed all others, and it would be difficult to estimate how many millions of Russian lives were saved by American charity.

One other great service must be mentioned here. Not merely the ruling class of Russia, which was extremely limited, but the educated classes too were largely scattered all over the face of the globe by the proletarian Revolution of November, 1917—not merely “Whites,” but anyone who was not “Red.” Something like a million Russians left Russia to seek such sympathy and charity as they could find abroad. In the very various destinies which awaited this mass of broken or uprooted humanity, the most distressful was that of those who sought safety in China. Life was very hard in France and Germany. The Czechs and the Yugoslavs made noble efforts to pay their debt to the great wounded Slavic brother, and a good deal was done by England. But those who came to start life again in the New World were certainly the most fortunate, and particularly the young. They did not feel like foreigners in a country largely recruited by immigration, and took their stand by the side of others. An admirable American institution saw to their interrupted education, advancing sums which were regularly repaid when the student had gained a footing in the new country.

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But we come now to the first grave estrangement in this remarkably untroubled history of Russo-American relations, and that just at the time when the disappearance of an absolutist system of government should have opened the door to closer intercourse between the two peoples. The root of the estrangement lay in the setting up of a new absolutist government in Russia. I am writing as an English non-party liberal who deeply values the common ties, and above all common instincts, which connect my own country so closely with America. England, too, had to deal with the same question. I think I must have been more disappointed than you were—much more, because all my particular work had been inspired by the hope of a free Russia, and it had seemed to be coming of itself, or for a moment even to have come. But I did know that in the life of a country the solid thing is a people, and not a single crisis in its history or a phase in its government. Was there not a French Revolution? Could we have expected that so radical a change, far more important to Russia than the war itself or even than her foreign relations, would go through without violence and excess? Should we not, in such a case, watch closely, as at the sick bed of a friend, for the signs of recovery, which with patience we should certainly have seen? Or should we refuse all further thought on the question, and stamp forever the passing phase as eternal?

This last is what has been done. Planes go fast now from one country to another, but knowledge travels much slower. We might still find on the stage of some remote country

the typical "Lord Dundreary" with the weeping whiskers, from the *Punch* of my boyhood, as the characteristic Englishman of today. Russia in the last twenty-five years has changed more rapidly and more radically than any other country in the world. Our stay-at-home took very long to realize that the menace of world revolution was at the time really a menace. In fact, I fancy that, in both of our countries, that was the time when he did nothing about it: certainly it was so in mine. But as it became a memory, it became a party stick with which to belabor one's political opponents, and as such it has served very well. It was not so with those who knew and believed in the Russian people.

Very important in this respect was our almost complete severance from Russia and the consequent deep deterioration in the qualifications of our informants. The Soviets themselves did not welcome visitors who had known Russia earlier and perhaps had ties there. The new carpetbaggers, who, without knowledge of either the language or the country, now made the trip, were a poor substitute for their predecessors. The result, in most cases, was a sickly adulation of everything "communist," and often a complete misinterpretation of what they had seen. But when will it be understood in America that the "intelligentsia"—which often means those who do not wish to understand anything foreign to their own theories—were exactly what was crushed in the period of Soviet rule, and that by now they have been entirely replaced by a new and practical race of builders and constructors?

But as time went on, information on Russia, and particu-

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larly American information, became more enlightening. It might not be scholarly, but more often than before it reflected observation and thought. Curiously enough, the fact that the United States delayed its recognition of the Soviet Government till 1933—that is, much longer than other countries—worked in this direction. England had recognized, and was engaged in constant disputes on propaganda. America had still something to offer, and Americans found a readier welcome. In their case their government was out of the picture, and they were received as individuals who might be useful later. This was the point that was grasped by those fairly numerous young American technicians who gave indispensable help to Russia in the earlier Five Year Plans; and, in other ways than technical, they were just the right people to go there. They were young, they had vision, they found plenty of friends in that young country, and they were able to bring back that kind of knowledge which can only be won by taking a part in the practical life of the country. And it was the same with the foreign Press in Moscow. The hard times when Walter Duranty was almost alone and depended on his ingenuity to get anything out that was worth printing, passed away, and he was joined by a number of able and enterprising colleagues. They were followed, in many cases, by first-class experts in different fields of public life, who could not disregard the many refreshing and novel experiments which the new Russia could show them in their various specialties—science, economics, education, public health, drama, cinema, and many others.

To one such, whose special study was Russia itself, both

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Russia and America owe a particular debt. And England too, for the matter of that; for every acquisition of scholarship in English is equally our gain. President William R. Harper, the great academic statesman who built up the University of Chicago, went to Russia long ago under the wing of Mr. Charles R. Crane, one of the best friends that the Russians have ever had. On his return he said to his young son: "Samuel, I want you to be the best expert in the States on Russia." Samuel and I foregathered in 1906 at the First Duma. We were both there as students, not as journalists, and for both of us the primary interest was the Russian people, especially the peasantry. I suggested that we should live together for a week and see if our work went better jointly. This partnership, in one form or another, direct or indirect, went on to his unexpected death in January, 1943. We traveled together among the peasants, we interviewed public men together, we worked together in Liverpool University. His concise, abbreviated letters always told me far more than they appeared to contain, and just what was most worth knowing. I had two or three after I landed in America in December, 1942. I was on my way to him when one morning he was found dying in bed. He had carried out his father's assignment by public service in every part of his field; and though he could have had no notice that his end was so near, he has left in perfect order his Russian memoirs up to date, with a number of clear and valuable notes on the principal questions to be discussed with Russia at the peace meeting. Harper knew his Russia in and out. He went back as soon as it was possible for any-

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one of his distinction to do so. He has covered the break, and his work on Russia of the Soviets is even better than on Russia before the revolution.

British and Americans, newspaper men and writers, have always forgathered naturally in Russia since the days of the First Duma, when the same hope brought us all out there. David Macgowan in his worn frock coat—Abraham Lincoln, some of us used to call him—was then our beloved leader. How well I remember him, stepping into a group of peasants where a police provocator was trying to get them to commit themselves! This man wore the mask of a foreign correspondent. "Come out of that," said Macgowan, "or I'll take away your ticket." And he could have done it, for, as president of our Foreign Press Association, he had insisted that we should distribute the tickets ourselves. Yes; you can do things in Russia if you have spirit and do them the right way. Under his lead we were a band of brothers, and sometimes in a crisis we would pool our knowledge to see that all our readers got all the facts. I don't know why it is, but Russia, which seems to have so disuniting an influence on people at home, is for us who go there a kind of freemasonry, and that quite independently of the various conclusions which we may form. One can tell at once, even from the turn of a sentence, whether the writer has really been there or not. Since the revolution, perhaps for reasons that I have given, the Americans on the spot are more numerous and more able; but if an old debt is now in a sense reversed, it continues to hold us together. William Henry Chamberlin and Maurice Hindus

stand out as having put us under especial obligations, and Paul B. Anderson, of the American Y.M.C.A., has probed the vital question of the future of religion in Russia perhaps as deeply as any Russian. There have been journalistic tragedies. The man who dared to say what he thought in the most poignant moments of this tremendous period might find himself permanently cut off from his loved object of study, but practically none ever lose their affection for the Russian people.

There is something quite natural in this attraction. Perhaps more so with Americans than with British, for American life is larger and has more scope, and that is what most attracts the visitor to Russia. The English visitor feels the same attraction precisely by contrast with his own tight and crowded country: here there is room and vision. It is quite certain and has often been testified that the Russian feels the corresponding attraction for the Anglo-Saxon. He likes his direct friendly approach, the sense of liberty from association with one who comes from a free country; and with his simple, clever, and childlike questions, he is constantly finding new points of contact. Unless all my understanding of Russia is wrong, his instinctive wish is that his country, to which he is devoted, should be no less free.

There is no doubt that a certain hatred and suspicion of everything Russian has taken deep root among certain groups in America. There is also no doubt that, as in the case of my own earliest experiences, the best antidote for it would be to show those concerned how utterly unlike their imaginary picture is to the real Russia. One source of

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these suspicions which can be identified seems to me to be particularly unconvincing. The followers of Trotsky here are probably stronger than in any other country. In very few cases are they actually Russians. They are furious with Stalin for having abandoned the world revolution: Trotsky himself wrote a whole book on this subject with the title, *The Revolution Betrayed*. They have found it easy to forget all the bloodshed of the first challenging years, and they quite forget that later it was the world revolutionists who were themselves the chief victims of Stalin's rough-handed purges. They attack everything Russian; and the simple stay-at-home, who still identifies Russia with a menace to his own income, often seems ready enough to listen to them. All these misunderstandings are shutting off from us the sight of those vitalizing possibilities which are opened up to us by the prospect of future collaboration in the works of peace—in that great task of reconstruction and construction which will face Russia for the next fifty years.

That, however, in no way reflects the policy of the United States nor of the United Nations. America was only following her highest traditions when she gave generous help to Russia in this war, before she was yet allied to her. That help has since been infinitely increased, and it is in Russian victories over the common foe that it is taking effect. We all now recognize that the world has become a narrow place, that no part of it can be indifferent to what is going on in Russia. Can there be any intelligent view of the future world which leaves out that great country, where so much of history is at this very time in the making?

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It was after long consideration and discussion of all causes of contention that the United States recognized the Soviet Government in 1933. It was fortunate that one of her first ambassadors, Mr. Joseph E. Davies, while holding fast to the traditions of his own country, set himself to find any basis of understanding and good will in the country to which he was accredited. Whether he succeeded can be judged from the tribute paid to him on his departure by the old peasant Kalinin, who is President of the Soviet Republic. He said to Mr. Davies: "All the worst you have had to say, you have said to us, and the best that you have had to say, you have said to our enemies." That, as I see it, is a triumph both of mind and of character; and there is nothing that counts for more than character in the relations between two great countries.

XX

THE RUSSIAN MIDDLE-WEST

I AM CONVINCED that the main objective of Hitler's program of German land-settlement was Siberia. I am also convinced that if he had got Siberia he would have been almost invincible. In Siberia, as compared with Ukraine, he would have found the broad spaces and the goods without the population.

A second North America! Yes! The resources of Siberia, for the most part undeveloped, are unlimited. Thousands and thousands of miles of virgin forest. Metals of all kinds, from platinum and gold to coal and iron. Already the Soviet Union is the second gold-producing country in the world. In my eight months' stay in 1919, amid the confusion of civil war, two big new coal fields were discovered; but that is nothing to what has since been done by Stalin's Russia. East of the Urals lies a vast area of farm products which, even before the last war, cold storage had made accessible to western Europe. Such was the panic of the Moscow producers that they secured a prohibitive internal tariff against Siberian goods coming into competition with them through Chelyabinsk.

Truly a land of milk and honey. When I returned to England in 1919 from the heart of Siberia—having done

the whole journey from Omsk to Newcastle exclusively by water—Mr. Lloyd George congratulated me on my “escape.” “But I didn’t escape at all,” I said, “I came back with a large cargo of butter.” “Butter? Butter?” said Mr. Lloyd George. (In 1919 there was precious little in England.) “Yes, sir, we use it there to grease the wheels of carriages.” And shortly afterward this impressionable man made a speech on “the bursting cornbins of Russia.”

My water road from Siberia had been explored by Nansen before the last war. He found that in seven out of every eight years there is water transport by the Yenisei to Krasnoyarsk; in a small boat you could even go further up into China. But that, of course, is nothing in comparison with the open road that runs across the Pacific.

Siberia, with the old Russian government, was a great secret—the prison house which was also an inexhaustible treasure house. It was a name of fear to those who had never been there: mines worked by convicts; wolves, snows, and innumerable birch trees which the too free-thinking politician was sent to count. When the enterprising Captain Wiggins, the first visitor from Europe, appeared at the mouth of the Yenisei, the local officials had the shock of their lives.

But it was not only the daring politician, but the daring Cossack or peasant pioneer who gravitated to Siberia. Overcrowded villages in European Russia, especially in Ukraine, sent so-called walkers (*hodoki*) who hitch-hiked that long journey, especially after the Trans-Siberian Railway was opened, and like Joshua and Caleb of old marked out pieces

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of good land to which later the whole village would quietly migrate.

This was against the law; and when Nicholas II came to the throne in 1894, his reactionary Home Minister, Goremykin, suggested that these settlers should be brought back. Nicholas had visited Siberia and was chairman of the Trans-Siberian. Very pertinently he asked how many there were of them, and when he learned the numbers, he regarded the movement as elemental, and to be fostered rather than hampered. Unfortunately, government patronage did much to spoil it. The first pioneers, the original pilgrim fathers, were men of the finest stock; they are now the most conservative element in Siberia. Free tickets and government agencies of settlement attracted the loafers, who after the Revolution were the chief element of unrest; when I went through in 1919, the earlier settlers were setting up local militias to guard the security of property.

In Siberia there had been prisoners, but no squires and no serfdom. The climate is peculiarly healthy and bracing, and out of these hardy pioneers it produced a fine type of manhood, which has supplied some of the hardest regiments in the Russian Army. When I was with them in the Carpathians in the mid-winter of 1916, the Japanese officer who shared a room with me cowered with cold, but the Siberians regarded it as a Riviera. There is the same sense of space in these sturdy frontiersmen as in the frontier settlers who broke new trails from the Atlantic to the Pacific. Now that the movement has been freed from the unnatural restrictions of the old regime, I am convinced

that the economic development of Siberia will be a central fact of the twentieth century, as America's very similar march westward was of the nineteenth.

Siberia, like the Middle-West, is before all things practical and taken up with its own interests. The Siberians have been called the Yankees of Russia. With them business replaced politics. They never wavered in their loyalty to their homeland in European Russia. In 1919 I was told that two of the many political groups were separatists. I asked each of their leaders, and their answer was the same: "We should be satisfied," said the Grand Old Man of Siberia, Potanin, "with what you have given to Canada; and we would take less if Moscow did not want to give as much." The Co-operators stood obstinately out of the civil war. They said to me, "We shall do nothing that can cut us off from our brother Co-operators in Soviet Russia," and in this I saw the pledge of the future unity of this vast country. They have got their way: Russia remains one, and the greater latitude of self-government which the collective farms received in 1935 brings them appreciably nearer to the principles to which the Siberian Co-operators have always held. The question which was uppermost in their minds was how to secure direct business communications with the outside world. The countries with which they most wanted closer contact were England and America.

These men were a fine home product, with every instinct of local initiative. "We," they said to me in those early days of Bolshevism, "are a pyramid resting on the village. Bolshevism is a pyramid upside down, trying to stand on its

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ern Lena; the rock salt of Nordvik; great new coal fields: anthracite at Norilsk, bituminous at several places in the northeast—at times actually on the coast, as for instance at the new port of Ugolnaya; fluorspar at Kamderma; tin on the Yana and the Chukhotsk Peninsula; nickel at Norilsk and Chukhotsk; zinc in four different places; graphite near Igarka; copper at Norilsk. Add to this, forests that stretch from the Finnish frontier to the Pacific, described as “probably the only virgin forest areas in the world,” about one-fifth of the world’s supply, some of it so far only surveyed by airplane. Add, too, the abundant wealth in fisheries, especially concentrated around the trawler system at Murmansk. At Omsk on the Irtysh, I sat near the town pier, watching two primitive-looking fishermen with a net, who were simply scooping fish out of the river. And add, also, that the primitive tribes of the north have now been drawn for the first time into the state system of education and civilization. The radio on the Arctic coast is itself the equivalent of a revolution. The great farming area of Western Siberia is extending northward and eastward, and scientific discoveries have made it possible even to grow dwarf apples and pears within the Arctic Circle.

That is only the fringe, taken care of at once that nothing should be wasted. It would be difficult to give any adequate idea of what the Soviets in this short period have done with the main body of Siberia. The Ural industry has been increased four-fold. East of that, in 1914, there was no industry except the Lena gold fields. Now, Omsk, on the Irtysh, has its agricultural plant and motors. Novosi-

but since then the Soviets have themselves attended to all these needs. In Siberia there are now many more people, many more factories, many more arsenals of defense.

Let us see what the Soviets have done in Siberia since they came into power.¹ First, the Arctic water road which I traveled: only a single explorer, Captain Vilkitsky of the Imperial Russian Navy, had sailed clean through it from the Atlantic to the Pacific. I believe it took him two years. It is a distance of three thousand miles. After years of scientific planning, with investigation of all the conditions of wind and ice, the Soviets in 1928 set up a fully equipped organization, the "Main North Sea Road" (*Glavsevmorput*). In ten years it did wonders. It has equipped 56 polar stations, covering the whole route: a report says that 10 more have since been added. The yearly record of ships that have passed through rose from 42 in 1933 to 64 in 1936. Thanks to the yoking of research with aviation and naval construction, the road can be kept open for more than two months. Ports have been established on the magnificent Siberian rivers, nearly all of which come out into the Arctic Ocean, and enormous areas have been opened up by organized river transport. (Obi and Irtysh system, 3286 miles; Yenisei system, 3224; Lena system, 6250.) Windmills are utilized to create electrical power. This work of exploration and organization has made available enormous new resources: of mineral salt, in which the Aral district is peculiarly rich; the new rich gold fields discovered on the north-

¹ For these and following details I am deeply indebted to the publications of the United States Department of Commerce.

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ern Lena; the rock salt of Nordvik; great new coal fields: anthracite at Norilsk, bituminous at several places in the northeast—at times actually on the coast, as for instance at the new port of Ugolnaya; fluorspar at Kamderma; tin on the Yana and the Chukhotsk Peninsula; nickel at Norilsk and Chukhotsk; zinc in four different places; graphite near Igarka; copper at Norilsk. Add to this, forests that stretch from the Finnish frontier to the Pacific, described as “probably the only virgin forest areas in the world,” about one-fifth of the world’s supply, some of it so far only surveyed by airplane. Add, too, the abundant wealth in fisheries, especially concentrated around the trawler system at Murmansk. At Omsk on the Irtysh, I sat near the town pier, watching two primitive-looking fishermen with a net, who were simply scooping fish out of the river. And add, also, that the primitive tribes of the north have now been drawn for the first time into the state system of education and civilization. The radio on the Arctic coast is itself the equivalent of a revolution. The great farming area of Western Siberia is extending northward and eastward, and scientific discoveries have made it possible even to grow dwarf apples and pears within the Arctic Circle.

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birsk (formerly Novo-Nikolayevsk, capital of the old Co-operators on the broad Obi) is now the capital of the region, and between 1926 and 1939 it increased from 120,000 to 406,000; it has metal, textile, and foodstuff plants, and two electrical stations. The brand new enormous Kuznetsk Basin is far bigger than the Donets, with an estimated 450 billions of tons of coal, a yearly production of 16¾ billions, and an abundance of iron ore. It contains Stalinsk, with its blast furnaces; it has risen since 1934 from 4,000 to 170,000. Barnaul, center of the enormous rich Altai field, which has almost every variety of metal, has risen from 79,000 to 148,000; Kemerovo, from 28,000 to 133,000; Prokopyevsk, from 11,000 to 107,000. In the huge republic of Kazakhstan, formerly almost completely neglected, lies the vast coal field of Karaganda. In 1926 Karaganda was a village; in 1939 it numbered 166,500. Alma Ata has risen from 45,000 to 231,000. In 1913, 90,000 tons of coal were mined here; now 5 millions. Balkash has its copper smelter, borax and phosphorites. The pre-revolution cotton belt, with increased irrigation, has been greatly enlarged. Tashkent, now 585,000, has its textile mills; Tadzhikistan, its silk mills. The new Turk-Sib Railroad now links this area with the Siberian.

Constant exploration goes on in Eastern Siberia. The most important discoveries include gold, iron, coal, lead, tin, tungsten, mica, and graphite. Krasnoyarsk, on the huge Yenisei, now risen from 72,000 to 190,000, with a town park which is simply an untouched part of the original virgin forest, is a great center of gold mining. The possibilities of

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the coal field on the Turgus River are immense. Irkutsk, risen from 108,000 to 243,000, is also a center of gold mining machinery, with a neighboring big field of iron ore at Angaro-Ilin. Locomotives and cars are made in the Buryat-Mongolian capital, Ulan-Ude. Chita has gold, tin, and cattle breeding. The vast northeastern Yakutia, equal in size to all European Russia, has been brought into life with the discovery of gold, tin, coal, oil, silver, lead, copper, and zinc. On the Pacific coast lies the fortress of Vladivostok, now doubled in size, and to the north of it the new city of Komsomolsk (71,000), with steel plant and shipyards. The railway system is constantly being extended. Air transport connects this Far East with Moscow in 24 hours. Moscow has its telephone system to the Pacific. It is the Russians, not the Germans, who are turning Siberia into a second North America. And even this is only a beginning.

The more I read of the history of the American march westward, the more I think of the Siberian march eastward, and some day I hope the two will meet for mutual exchange and mutual benefit. Peter the Great's instruction to Bering: "Go and find out if Asia joins on to America," has shown that the two countries are next door to each other.

The global map, which cancels the unreal distances of the absurd parallels of Mercator, first claimed my attention in Russia over thirty years ago. I met it in a book, *For the Knowledge of Russia*, by the great chemist Mendeleyev, who for the first time looked down on Russia not from above the equator but from above the North Pole, and saw the extravagant distances disappear of themselves. Russia,

with Siberia, is seen to be on a sea in close neighborhood to Alaska and Canada. The problems of these countries are the same: that of transport through icebound waters—which the Soviets have now mastered—and that of pushing wheat crops further north, a problem which is of equal interest to Canada. Every improvement discovered in one country can be of equal use to the other. Aviation has abridged all distances. A famous new American road gives direct communication by air with Siberia. America has already fine schools for the study of Siberia at Berkeley, Stanford and Los Angeles.

I believe that there is plenty to be done between the peoples of Russia and America. This has been shown by those able and spirited young Americans, also pioneers, who, as technical experts, gave some of the best of their youth and enthusiasm to the service of the Five Year plans. In difficult times they showed the Russians how easy it was to get on with Americans, and the happy experiences which they brought back with them were the best contribution that has been made to the dispersal of misconceptions and suspicions here.

Will Russia welcome American industrial cooperation for the post-war period? That question has already received the most practical of answers. It is to be found in a leaflet published by the Amtorg Trading Corporation, the representative of Soviet trade in America, to attract advertisements for its new *Catalogue of American Engineering and Industry*. Advertisements are solicited from firms manufacturing a comprehensive list of articles. To quote it will be a

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very convincing, if very prosy answer to this question. It includes: "machine tools and small tools; rail, air and water transport; shipbuilding equipment; oil well and refining equipment; mining, construction and road building equipment; electrical equipment; iron and steel products; alloy steels; factory and plant equipment; chemical plant equipment; textile machinery; food processing and canning equipment; plastics; miscellaneous equipment and services."

XXI

STUDY AND ACCESS

TO PASS FROM controversial subjects—"the malices of the day," as they are called in Russia—to such a simple question as study may seem to some an anti-climax. It is exactly the opposite. If this question had been properly attended to in time, many of the others would no longer be controversial.

Think of the peace problems to which so many British and American writers are prepared to offer confident solutions! Think of the task of administration of reconquered territories which may await us! And then ask if we have any detailed knowledge at all of the questions with which we may have to deal. It is so easy to sit in one's library and draft a plan of world peace, raising by the way all sorts of new contentious questions, and so hard to grapple seriously with those which already face us.

Then think of our home sources of information. They are nearly all foreign, for they come from persons of foreign origin in our midst. And the more vocal of them are with us because they intensely disapprove of what is being done in their own countries. On Russia, for instance, we have had successively two opposite sources of information: emigrants who had fled from the Russia of the Tsars, and emigrants who had fled from the Russia of the Soviets. Both

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had the ear of our own people, and both might quite naturally want us to quarrel with their homeland. And where were our own sources? Almost entirely lacking. We judged Russia almost exclusively by fugitives from Russia.

And then, above all, there is the German. He has a weapon far more formidable than any new military invention. He has the knowledge, because he has taken the trouble to work for it. In all my forty-odd years of Russian study I have had to recognize as a concrete fact that he was out to see that we did not get that knowledge—that we should always see Russia through German eyes.

Without long experience it would be impossible to realize how systematic that purpose has been. Germany had the interior lines, and she used them in every way to hold us apart—to keep Russia unknown and misunderstood by other countries. It was part of the obsession of encirclement.

This was a set purpose with both Bismarck and the Kaiser, but the falsification goes to its extremest lengths with Adolf Hitler. Falsification is a high art, and Hitler has made of it an exact science. The passages which deal with it in *Mein Kampf* are the most masterly of all. He can still play on us as on an instrument. Without knowledge we are an easy prey.

The German purpose has long shown itself in every department of life. In 1914, on the eve of the last war, I had to see nearly every Russian Cabinet Minister on a test issue, and I can sum up the results very simply. Half were for maintaining a free hand in foreign relations: these were all for reform in Russia. Half were completely in the pocket

of Germany, and this half included the War Minister; all these stood for reaction at home. This Cabinet continued unchanged into the war, and that explains why the Russian Army had to fight under such unequal conditions.

It was just the same in trade. Our simplicity has even made the Germans impudent in their confidence. They have frankly told business men here and in Britain that there was only one way to trade profitably with Russia, and that was through German agents. This same purpose ran right through German scholarship, and I often had to encounter it there. In 1912 a visit of representative British to Russia was taken as an offense by the German press. We were not to shake hands with Russia.

How are we to get level with them in this peace-time battle which so often decides the fate of wars, alliances and peace treaties? Governments have a habit of coming to the universities for the finished product of study only at the last moment of emergency, and this is altogether too late. In London University we call it "whistling for a taxi," without that provision of study and careers which will make sure that any taxis are there. If you are to serve your own country in a foreign one, don't delay learning about it till you are buying a ticket to go there. In a long acquaintance with our embassy in Russia, I hardly ever knew a diplomatic attaché who could carry on a simple conversation in Russian. It was not till 1935, under Lord Chilston, that I found them all learning the language of the country. What firm would do business in that way?

The task has had to be tackled by private initiative and

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private munificence, especially that of the great educational foundations. For instance, it was the life work of that great fellow and most lovable of teachers, Archibald Cary Coolidge, who stood halfway between Harvard and diplomacy; and it was largely his personal achievement that the American delegation at Versailles surprised its British colleagues by its efficiency.

Experience has proved that the lines on which Coolidge worked are the right ones. We must get rid of the antiquated idea, still common in some university departments both in England and here, that students of foreign languages are to be regarded only as prospective philologists, and that they are not to be released for any other studies than, say, early English, the *Chanson de Roland* or Church Slavonic. There are two quite different things which require a quite different approach: language as a subject of special study, and language as a means to other studies. In twenty years as the head of the London School of Slavonic Studies, I always found that of twenty beginners only one wanted the language for philology. The others all wanted it as a master key to the study of the country—certainly its literature, but also its history and its economics. That is the equipment which a business firm would want for its agents, or a government for its diplomats or consuls. Coolidge wedded language and history, and such a marriage invariably bears fruit.

The Germans have long since seen all this. The *Auslands-Hochschule* in the Dorotheen Strasse in Berlin provided this training for the study of every country in which Germany

had an interest. That is why the German agents are there ready, when they are wanted.

In England the systematic study of Russia—language and area—was begun in the young University of Liverpool in 1907. In 1918 that gifted Welshman, Mr. Lloyd George, asked himself and others why we were so ignorant of the life of other countries. As Prime Minister, he set up a committee under the chairmanship of the head of our Commission for examinations for the Civil Service. This was the distinguished historian, Sir Stanley Leathes. The original terms of reference spoke only of “modern languages,” but Leathes obtained leave to change it to “modern studies,” thus including history and economics, in which hardly anything at all had yet been done. The committee made the widest possible inquiry, and among its results was the development of a central School of Slavonic and East European Studies already founded in London University under the leadership of Professor Thomas Masaryk, then an exile in England and a member of the university staff. This school is now listed as a “Central Activity” of the University of London, and has its own governing body, including representatives of Departments of the Government, the London County Council, the London Chamber of Commerce, other universities and Slavonic societies. It is housed in the central building of the University, and has as its close neighbors the university library, the sister School of Oriental Studies, and the Institute of Historical Research, with a back door across the street into the British Museum. It numbers a staff varying from twelve to fifteen, and offers Degree and Diploma

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courses not only in the language and literature but in the history and economics of the countries of Eastern Europe. It is the natural resort for post-graduate students from other British universities and sometimes from American. It has managed to institute the teaching of Russian in a number of leading secondary schools, and it holds a yearly conference of teachers of Russian, which has often taken an initiative, whether in academic questions or in approaches to official or public bodies. Since 1922, it has issued thrice a year the *Slavonic and East European Review* (250 pages), with three British and three American contributing editors.

I should mention that since my visit to America in 1924, when I taught at a summer session in Berkeley, we British teachers of these studies have been in close contact with our American colleagues, perhaps more intimate than in any other department of scholarship. I then offered Coolidge house room in our *Slavonic Review*, for which he named the three American contributing editors. Any decision of Coolidge's was at once accepted by his colleagues in America, many of whom had been his own students. Till America possessed her own serious publication in this subject, as is now the case, we served as publishers for both countries. In 1940, when conditions were very hard in England, we handed over this *Review* to a group gathered around Professor Samuel H. Cross of Harvard, to be continued for the time being in America.

A significant advance was made at Cornell University in the summer of 1943 and I was privileged to take an active

part in it. I say "privileged" because, in all my thirty-five years as a Professor of Russian, I have never seen a better piece of all-round organization, nor, for the time limit concerned, anything so successful. The Cornell schedule, which ran from July 5 to October 25, integrated the whole study of contemporary Russian life. The language was studied in an exacting, intensive course. The history was taught from the beginnings of Russia, and a parallel course dealt with Russian government and international relations. Literature, after being carried through the great writers of the nineteenth century, was treated intensively for the Soviet period. Other main courses dealt with Russian economics, and Soviet institutions and public life. Meanwhile, every week we had a visit from a specialist, sometimes the first in the country, in Russian ethnography, industry, military history, law, public health, education, art, and music. I have never seen so complete a scheme. The students, brought in by their keen interest in the subject, included senior men from University or Army and proved to be of a high level. I hope some day to see this venture lead up to organized and regular academic work on the same lines. Its success is a remarkable tribute to the director of the course, Professor Ernest J. Simmons, who, whether as organizer, scholar, or colleague, renews in full the American tradition first established by Archibald Coolidge, and has now carried his work to a further achievement, which would earlier have hardly been possible.

In England regional study, that is, the study of a nation and not only of its language, has been fighting its way ever

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since the first war. In Slavic studies, its victory has been almost complete from the start; but Oxford still denies a degree to the unhappy student of modern Russian economics till it has driven him through a superficial acquaintance with Church Slavonic, a subject which is, of course, entirely useless to him. German studies in England have given considerable recognition to this principle, but not French; no place has yet been found in our curriculum for the special study of French history. In the United States, the authorities of Army and Navy education in the present war at one stride went past us, when they initiated the new curriculum of Language and Area. Very valuable work on these lines had already been done for many years at Georgetown University under the leadership of Professor Edmund Walsh. The new move has stimulated interest all round, more particularly in the American Council of Learned Societies (which ranks with the Academies of other countries) and in the great educational foundations. I am sure that these are the right lines, and that they promise a definite advance in our knowledge of other countries, and I hope to see some day institutes for their special study. Judging by our twenty years of experience in London, this can best be done by a series of self-contained institutions for given Languages and Areas, whether they are to be independent or attached to a given university or universities. Wherever language and history work together, there is success; and wherever they don't, there is failure. This would remove these studies from the ordinary chances of death or retirement of teachers or changes in university policy, which may leave students

stranded and the studies only half begun. It is only those who have had to deal with international relations, who can realize how all-important this question is.

In 1897 I was near the completion of my background study of Europe as a preparation for a life study of Russia. As I sat in a hotel on the Piazza di Spagna in Rome, an English friend asked me where I would be next year. "I hope, in Russia," I said. "Poor thing!" came a voice, apparently English, from a far corner of the room. Rather annoyed, I asked, "Are you interested in Russia?" "I am a Russian," the stranger answered, and then he explained, "You will be faced by a thick curtain, which you will have to push aside; but if you can get past it, you will find a world of wonderful variety and beauty."

If the Russian government has such beauty and variety to show, why do they not let us see it? It is the Russian people that is our natural friend—not any passing Russian government. Yet every obstacle is placed in the way of prolonged residence in that country, and of visits by Russians to us.

Before the Revolution the British Embassy was practically interned. There was light social converse, but our representatives were not expected to inquire into the conditions of the country. The government of the Tsars kept a number of fashionable young attachés who talked perfect English with a public school accent, and gave facile and hopelessly misleading information. These were sent flying by the Revolution; and our own attachés, ignorant of Russian, com-

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plained that the new officials "talked no known language"—only, that is, the language of their own country.

This practical internment became much more competent and severe after the Revolution. When, after the interval of rupture of relations, our embassy returned to Russia, the Soviet Ministers did not visit it, nor was it advisable for any Russian to do so. This was the last place to offer any facilities for a study of Russian or of Russia.

In every way the Soviet government wrapped itself in a heavy shroud of suspicion and secrecy. I am not one of those who pick out for blame its secretiveness in military matters. On the contrary, I think they did very well to guard their military secrets, and I can easily understand why they are so grudging in admitting correspondents to the front. But if we can't get through to the Russian people, we have no chance for that kind of friendship that can serve as a real support of world peace. It is imperative that we should get past this curtain; and it is useless for Soviet officials to complain that Russia is so very ill understood in the world outside if we cannot have the first condition for knowing and understanding her.

In December, 1935, I approached Mr. Litvinov, then Commissary for Foreign Affairs in Moscow, on behalf of my fellow scholars in Slavic Studies, asking for the establishment of a hostel to house British and American students with some Russians, at a cost which a student's pocket could carry, with entry to the colleges which taught their respective subjects, and, if possible, with means of getting into contact with Russian student life. The ordinary ex-

change was prohibitive: a foreign student would at that time pay, say, thirty cents for an equivalent of three. Already the visitor who took part in the few-weeks tours of "Intourist" was a privileged person, traveling much below the ordinary cost. We wanted the Russians, then, to add to "Intourist" an "Instudent"; the students would be much fewer in number and far more useful to Russia, for they could sit down to regular and prolonged study. The idea was favorably received, and was discussed with me in detail by the various authorities concerned. Professor Harper of Chicago supported my plea on his next visit. In 1937 Professors Cross and Simmons were in Russia, and authorized me to speak also in their names. I had had to secure the support of four organizations. VOKS, the Society for Cultural Relations with other countries, was, as always, very helpful. "Intourist" supported the proposal. It received friendly consideration in the Commissariats of Foreign Affairs and of Education. The decision rested with the Committee for Higher Education of the last-named Commissariat. As I was leaving Moscow in September, 1937, its chairman rang me up to say he thought it a very promising idea and I might expect an early answer. A month or so afterwards, I was informed that the question had yet to be finally decided. That is the last that has happened. The door needs another push, which the conditions of alliance ought certainly to make easier. Recent indications have encouraged me to think the Soviet authorities themselves recognize that it should be opened. Till it is, it is useless for them to complain of our ignorance.

XXII

HOW TO MAKE A NEW WAR

I CANNOT myself understand how anyone could want to make a third world war. Twice in my time we have had four years of war in my country, and life and death seem too real for us to wish for anything of the kind. It can only be people who haven't yet had enough of war, and that is probably because they haven't yet had it. Yet it seems that the subject is freely talked about, and a new war is quite easy to make—far easier than a lasting peace. They must forgive us if we definitely prefer the second.

I am sure that the Anglo-Saxon population in both our countries can't want it. Of course everyone will want to go home again. There has never been such a marrying war in both countries. And this time, owing to the necessary length of the preparation, those concerned have not been caught in a sudden emergency, but have settled down to married life as soldiers, and in many cases they seem to have had babies, so that the urge for home is likely to be even stronger than last time. Is it possible that racial groups, already satisfactorily settled in this country, may find it easier to indulge in political solutions for the countries of their origin which might seem only visionary to those who are still there and have to deal with realities as they are?

And how are we to secure a real peace? One thing seems to me certain: that we cannot approach the peace settlement with prescriptions which we have no means of enforcing. In this matter, for every country including my own, the first of all questions is the measure of the participation of America in carrying out the settlement; for we cannot avoid the conclusion that on the measure of her participation will depend the measure of her authority; and this is a question to which we do not yet have the answer. Walter Lippmann lately wrote a fine and courageous article on this subject under the title, "On Deflating Our Pretensions." And the measure of participation must depend on geography; for in any conflict a primary factor will be the part of the map where it will have to be decided.

I agree again with Mr. Lippmann in another of his articles where he emphasizes the unwisdom of overloading ourselves with generalities of our own drafting, when proceeding to discuss such complicated issues as anyhow face us. We cannot say: These are the rules; we have made them. To take one instance: can we insist on the formula that all nations are equal, when it is so obvious that they are not? In the light of the very recent past, that would give us the most uncertain basis for a durable peace. The only logical conclusion of such mathematics is that the citizen of the great state, who will certainly have the main responsibility in the preservation of peace, counts only as a fraction of the citizen of a small one.

And then we shall also have to settle: "What is a nation?" There are artists in the manufacturing of "nations."

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The Hungarians, who came from Asia, to further their domination of a Slav people, the SLOVAKS, have invented a new variety called SLOVIAKS—namely, Slovaks who would prefer to be Hungarians. No one except the Hungarians certifies their existence. A more familiar variety are the “Ruthenians”—a German word obtained from the word Rusin, or “man of Russia,” in order to found a title for bringing Russians (or rather only a part of them) under foreign rule. Would all these ethnic claims apply to the racial groups in America? Or, again, are only those nationalities to be considered which have been constant objects of contention between Russia and Germany, and are incapable of defense against either? Russia, like America, has numbers of racial groups. And must ethnography be the only consideration when we are making the settlement? And is no account to be taken of economics?

Equally inadequate is the determination of frontiers by a given fixed date in the past. Do we go by the first which we ourselves happen to have heard of? And is that the first time that these questions became questions? Our judgment will be very insecure if it does not take account both of past conditions and of present; and of these we shall need to have something like the same knowledge as those with whom we have to argue each case.

Dogma is so easy to make. Statesmen have been taught by experience to be wary of it. It is rather the pastime of the irresponsible theorist who puts in a claim to lead public opinion. Generalities will never serve as an excuse for absence of the knowledge of detail. Yet this is a very

favorite diversion. I have met sociologists who are prepared to lay down the law about any country, with no more equipment than what they claim to be principles of sociology. It is a popular game which, as in the last war, has for many a great attraction. It deals with imaginary values, which one pastes together into various confederations. It demands no detailed knowledge of any of the elements concerned: they are somehow to stand together and have so many votes in a universal parliament. I am reminded of a young German whom I once met—definitely an Intellectual—who used to lay down the law on the pronunciation of English. We put in front of him all the words that we could think of, which contained the letters OUGH. He dealt with them straight off:

COFF, ROFF, THROFF, BOROFF, ENOFF, DROFFT, THOFFT.

You can see it was quite easy, and had practically done itself. So now you could leave it alone and go and settle some new problem. I remember asking an elderly statesman of great experience long ago, how the Balkan states would settle their differences, when, as he said, one man was a Serb and his brother a Bulgar. "Oh, they'll settle it," he said. "How?" "By assassination," he said very quietly. This is certainly cynical, but it is a good deal nearer to reality. What did the Poles do to Czechoslovakia at Teschen when Hitler was tearing it up? And what have the Hungarians and Bulgars done to Yugoslavia under the same protection up to now? A world parliament will have its agenda full of such questions. One of the most important of all questions

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must be the definition of the subjects which will lie in the scope of its discussions.

This last problem, in particular, will have to be approached, not in a wave of emotion, but with a clear head, for it carries in it all the difference between success and failure. I feel sure that none of the three major allies on whom lies the chief responsibility for the maintenance of peace—America, Britain, and Russia—will be prepared even to consider anything like a complete surrender of its sovereignty to the votes of a world assembly, empowered to call on it for any wholesale sacrifice: for instance, of the British Fleet, without which the scattered British Commonwealth of Nations would fall in pieces of itself, and Britain would lie at the mercy of any surprise. Rumania and Bulgaria, for instance, would hardly be appropriate judges of this question. On the other hand no question affecting Rumania or Bulgaria could possibly be settled satisfactorily without their participation; there can be no repetition of what happened at Munich. We learned too much last time of all the possibilities of wangling—for instance, Laval's emasculation of the verdict of the League of Nations on Mussolini's invasion of Ethiopia—to expect anything angelic of a parliament in which every member represents some limited national interest and is probably looking to right and left to see what support he can get for it. And each of them, in his own case, would admit that national self-defense is the most real of all necessities.

As I have mentioned Rumania and Bulgaria, I will pass on to mention the difficulties which will confront any too

easily conceived plans of federation, which is of course desirable where it can really be attained. These little Balkan countries have given very little to European civilization. By their history, they hardly belong to it. They have largely spent their time in fighting each other. There has been a Bulgarian empire in the Balkans, there has been a Serbian one; those of their sovereigns whom they hold in the greatest renown are those who have for the time won most territory from their neighbors. Often the play of greater powers and often the source of European wars, they may be generally reckoned as hostile pairs: Hungary and Rumania may side with the Germans, and Rumania and Serbia may side with us. So, when one side wins, the other side suffers. It is not so simple to bunch them together in a federation. It would be easier, for instance, if their rulers would bury the hatchet, for Serbia and Bulgaria, who are much of the same stock, to join together.

Thus each peace settlement leaves a number of malcontents. The judgment of each war is between winners and losers, even though the losers were acting under compulsion. But the world is not static. Values change—sometimes under our eyes—and treaties crumble of themselves. I would say that the most important clause in any peace treaty which hopes to endure is one that provides the procedure for its own revision. And that makes infinite demands not only for honesty but for constant patience and care; for peace, if it is to last, must be worked for harder than war.

We recognize that world schemes failed last time because there was no strength behind them. As this war will have

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to be won by the stronger side, it will need the stronger side to maintain it. Shall we then begin by hurriedly pulling down all the power that we had to build up, in order to win? Or, again, shall we start in by picking holes in our allies and claiming sacrifices—to which there may be ready answers? These lines lead to war—not to peace. Any amount of material has already been got together for such reciprocal recrimination. I think I foresee a British attitude on this subject. We did take down our protecting wall last time, and its remnants were barely enough to stave off ruin in 1940.

In the case of Russia, there is also the divergence of our ways of life. It is now fifteen years since she took for her motto the building of her own new order in her own way, and this has enabled her to render to the common cause in this war services without which victory would still be invisible. She recognizes, and any of us who have studied her recognize, that if her present regime were transplanted into any other country, it would not be communism, any more than it is now in Russia. The challenge of her earlier years of revolution was to individualism, which is nowhere stronger than in England, and is perfectly capable of defending itself. We British persist in going our own way, and if there is anything in which our courses may be similar, that is our choice and not hers. We shall never get any nearer friendship by trying to make her go our way: the essential point is that we shall go ours. Yet this will not satisfy the detractors of the alliance. Any old question can be fished up, even with secondhand authority and the dates all wrong,

to prove that nothing new has happened in Russia in the last twenty-odd years (as if that were so in our own countries!) and that she must recognize that she is still in disgrace with the rest of the world.

Let us imagine that she has to do business with an irresponsible critic who has somehow made his way to the council table. He confronts her with all the charges which he has oftenest heard made against her.

"You are very wicked," he says. "You are communist—and 'communist' means snake. In fact, communist is my favorite kind of snake, and I won't have you take it away from me. That is settled: and that being so, we are going to put up a sanitary cordon against you, to defend the rest of the world against your infection. Never mind how much you've done in the war, what sacrifices you have accepted, or what you've reconquered for us. For gatekeeper we are going to give you your old friend and neighbor Poland; and as Poland will have to be big and strong, she must have some Russian territory, and lead a new confederation which will permanently undo the work of Peter the Great and cut off Russia from Europe."

That line of approach will be the surest of all roads to a new war; and that is the plan which was tried last time and has failed so conspicuously. (I am, of course, not talking of Polish population, which we British are pledged to restore to the map; and this we cannot accomplish without friendship with Russia.)

I can imagine no better plan for driving America into complete isolation than to face her with some understand-

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ing of the endless complexities of those age-long problems of which she knows so little and cares less, and to demand that she should give to each of them a final solution. Those entrusted with such a task are only too likely to come to the conclusion that their country had better be out of it. To try for all, is to fail of getting anything.

We do not yet know of any common Allied policy on the future treatment of Germany. I think everyone realizes that we must arrive at one as early as possible. So far, we cannot hear much more than the rumblings of national risings in the countries which the Germans still occupy. It is, as yet, impossible to say what directions such risings will take. The one thing certain is that the terrible experiences which they are all still suffering forbid that they shall come out of this war the same as when they first passed into it. Such profound changes can only be visualized later. Their experience has been radically different from that of those who have tried to represent them abroad. If peace is to be assured now, if the fall of Hitler is not to be followed by civil war in every country, with rival support from outside, there must be early agreement as to common sponsorship of the next stage. Common decisions on these problems will anyhow not be easy to attain. They cannot be attained at all without frank and friendly exchange between the Allies and Russia.

XXIII

RUSSIA AND THE PEACE

LET US TURN from all this too often uninformed suspicion to the pursuit of real peace. Last time we sought safety in shutting our eyes to Russia, and left her out because we did not see how to deal with her. There is no security in evasion. Fear never won a war, or a peace either. Russia remains there in the center of the world picture—perhaps the biggest factor of all—and anyhow it is at this time the main test of whether a lasting peace can be won.

The road to peace *can* be simpler, and even perhaps easier, than the road back to war; but it depends on going forward. The first necessary step in dealing with Russians is always to go and talk to them; and we may even be surprised at the ease with which we can understand each other. A famous Russian fable tells of a pretty little box which looked very complicated and difficult to open. Someone who thinks he knows all about such matters twists it and squeezes it in every direction. All he had to do, was to lift the lid. The fable ends: "This was a box that opened of itself."

We are told that at a press conference in Washington, the British Foreign Secretary, Mr. Eden, was asked whether we could trust Russia. He said that when you are dealing

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with someone, you must settle whether you are going to trust him or distrust him; and that he had settled to trust. Anyhow, that is the only way to get any nearer to an understanding.

I think it is this that explains why the results of the Allied Conferences in Moscow (Nov. 1) and in Teheran (Dec. 1) were as promising as they proved: especially those of the first, for it must have been the more formidable. The method in each was direct approach. Each subject which had produced friction was tackled in due order: the "second front," the support of armed risings in occupied countries, and co-operation after the war. These questions could not all be settled straight off, but it was agreed to settle them in common, and the proper organs were set up for the purpose. This, so far as we can see at present, was the right reply to mutual suspicions. The Russians are peculiarly susceptible to the direct approach. They are more childlike than you and we are and more emotional, and peculiarly sensitive to success where they are themselves the hosts. And they are right: for hospitality helps to create the atmosphere of agreement. Take each question as it faces you and grip it! Never flatter! Always stand up to them—that is what they respect. But explain frankly where you disagree and why. With the distance, the ignorance, and the misunderstandings that divide us, there will easily be new occasions for doubt, and each of the major Allies has at different times supplied them. If we are the more grown-up, it is on us that rests the great responsibility for removing the doubt as it faces us. It is worth any effort that is required of us.

Stalin will have to do the same, if he is to get anywhere. He has been feeling his way forward all the time, ever since the death of Lenin in 1924 left him with the unique opportunities of a secretary without a chairman. What an interesting progress it has been! No blind obedience to a written formula. Careful thought and careful spadework, and then, when the time came for decision, resolute action and advance. I am sure that he is feeling his way still, and that his advance depends on ourselves.

All through, it is his deeds that have been much more enlightening than his words. He has already traveled far in very definite directions. To judge by his past, my forecast of his future action would be this: He has shown that his heart is in his own country, that he has set his reputation on a purely practical object of vast scope, its radical transformation for the benefit of all. Then he will need world peace. He has the tough aloofness of a stay-at-home Russian. I think he will be very loth to engage himself in any entangling schemes of world government. Strange as it may seem, he is in this respect less of an internationalist than most of the scheme builders in this country. But he can be credited with the good sense to see that he, too, must play his part in the building of world peace, twice in a generation so rudely disturbed. It would not be sense to bring Poles or Czechs under Russian rule. He will claim the frontiers to which Russia's past and her services in the present war entitle her. Then he can turn homewards, to complete the great task which he has set himself, and which has been put back for years by the ruin of invasion.

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For a practical understanding I believe we have many favoring data. All three major allies, on whom depends the main responsibility of winning the war and maintaining the peace, have certain principles in common. All are, in character, multinational; and Stalin's own settlement of this problem is, in its ethnic justice, the most comprehensive and far-reaching of all. All three—America, Britain, and Russia—have alike had to grapple with the inescapable problem of reconciling a federal system with regional independence. The United States has faced this problem with unremitting care since the first beginnings of her national history. She taught a good lesson to us British. The British Commonwealth of Nations now rests on the Statute of Westminster. Look carefully through Stalin's detailed distinctions between the functions of the federal government and those of the autonomous republics in his constitution of 1936, and you will see his contribution to this problem. All three powers bear the recognition of the federative principle in the titles of their States.

I have written on the radical internal transformation of Russia, of which the outside world seems hardly to know anything; I have written, too, of the radical transformation of England under the influence of war as a homemade reality, of which America knows a great deal, and to which she has given the fullest and most generous tribute. You have no reason to mistrust the strength of British individualism or the natural conservatism of the English people. Nor, believe me, have you any reason whatever to imagine that we should think of balancing our favors between

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America and Russia. Our kinship with America is something too intimate; and it is more deeply instinctive than ever, after what you have done for us when without you we must even have been broken. Perhaps you might read the parable of the Prodigal Son. But, very definitely, the life of common purpose in the war has made us much more intelligent of the spirit of Russia. And I believe the Russian people under the influence of this war is drawing nearer to an understanding of us. I think that after the war the similarities will be greater, and the understanding stronger. Russia must always have her word to say in world affairs—to this even the troubles of the past bear witness—but with the insistence on mutual respect which is native both to Russia and to Britain, I do not think that what she has to say will scare us.

For a real understanding, the essential need of the future is friendship and exchange between peoples. If British and Americans feel at home in Russia, the Russian government must not put obstacles in the way of their going there. If the Russian so easily makes himself at home in America and Britain, he must be free to come to us. The Soviets will be losing all their most solid chances of international friendship if they fail to see this.

The most solid of all exchanges between peoples are those of trade and industry. Between Russia and Britain, this exchange has had a long and happy tradition. It is now especially for America that the road is open, and for a much greater volume of cooperation in the future. In this there will be nothing of the "colonialism" which Lenin feared.

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Stalin has set Russia on her legs, and the exchange and intercourse will be on equal terms. But I cannot see how the new Russia, in her economic and industrial advance, could afford to cut herself off from the new lessons and the new methods which, even more than in the past, will continue to be learned from America. And all the most recent data concerning approaches of the Soviet planners to American industry make it clear that this view is also theirs.

The last word of a book by an Englishman on this subject must be on the imperative demand for peace. I need not remind my American friends how long the ordeal of war has lasted for our young generation twice in the last thirty years. But this has to be my last thought because I live so much among the young. In London University, where my work still lies among them, the future of leadership of our country was devastated in the last war. Those of our young folk who only just got into it, yet belong to my own generation. Those who came next, who had lost so many of their natural leaders, entered life self-centered, disgruntled, and factious. In the twenty years between the two wars, there came a wonderful recovery. Sharing closely in the student life, I saw that the new generation which entered this war was better even than that which entered the last. These young people were broader, fuller, better equipped, more articulate, and more consciously and intelligently devoted to public service. On the edge of ruin in 1940, it was the elders who were responsible for the almost impossible conditions of defense, and it was the young people who saved us by their spirit and courage. I believe

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that nearly all the original composition of the R.A.F. of that time is now gone. Our Navy is traditionally silent, but how many gallant young lives have been swallowed up there! Many a family, like my own, has lost all that it sent to that splendid service. Can't we do better for them this time? There is little hope for our world if the answer is to be: No.

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