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Who Wants Disarmament?

Richard J. Barnet

With an introduction by Chester Bowles

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To My Family

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For the accuracy of the facts and the validity of their interpretation, I am, of course, solely responsible.

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Introduction

The world continues to spend over \$100 billion a year on arms. What is more, we do so with frighteningly inconclusive results. The leading strategists of the very nations most involved in the arms race are precisely those who are most preoccupied with spending more.

As the arms race deepens, the intellectual and moral appreciation of the urgency of disarmament deepens, too. But it has an inconclusive air about it, and for practical purposes it is readily displaced by the equally demonstrable necessity to regain a more stable and acceptable defense posture.

For a host of understandable reasons, most men of affairs in Washington and Moscow remain preoccupied with the challenge of armament, not disarmament. On occasion they console themselves and the rest of us with the sophisticated half-truth that more armaments will help promote disarmament because, as Churchill said, "We arm to parley."

But the side effects of the arms race are by no means all so positive. It might seem absurd to keep telling ourselves that the best way to promote peace is to speed up the arms race if the alternative—refusing to maintain effective deterrent strength against growing Soviet military capability—were not even more absurd. Clearly peace is no longer—if it ever was—a simple, one-directional, pastoral proposition. It is an incredible maze of moral, military, economic, and technological problems.

It is not surprising, then, that few public policies have been subjected to more pulling and hauling, more scrutiny and study, more pressures and conflicts of interest, more hard work and dedication in some quarters, or more politics

and propaganda in others, than have the twin issues of arms and arms control in the last few years. The attention given the former has far exceeded that given the latter, but our policies on both have been equally confused.

Moreover, controversies surrounding these issues have refused to fall into any particular pattern. They have sprung up inside the Administration, inside the State Department, inside the Pentagon, and inside the Atomic Energy Commission. We have seen them inside Congress and inside the Republican and Democratic parties. In all likelihood controversies of the same sort have arisen inside the Kremlin too.

Today many of our most intelligent observers—some of them participants in the very policy disputes which I have mentioned—are shrugging their shoulders and concluding that it is impossible to bring any kind of ordered policy out of this chaos. These pessimists may be wrong today. But if the increasing complexity of all these factors continues unabated, they will be right tomorrow.

Year by year the problems of peace become inherently more difficult. This is especially true of the interlocking problems of defense and disarmament. The longer we let the problems grow, the less controllable they become. Indeed the greatest danger of all we face at the moment is that most important issues, by the mere fact of their current importance, tend to become nonnegotiable. The result is that negotiations, which almost everyone accepts as necessary, are more and more conducted for the sake of appearances. International conferences are reduced to methodology and propaganda. Moreover, I am very much afraid that this is the impression which we ourselves, with the assistance of Soviet propaganda, have created about our own attitudes on disarmament.

Over the past few years a tremendous amount of cross-conflict has occurred concerning the major issues in the field

of arms control. The issues under discussion, singly or in combination, have included: the cessation or limitation of nuclear testing; cutoffs in the production of fissionable material; the freezing or reduction of nuclear stockpiles; the transfer of nonnuclear components or of nuclear weapons themselves to nonnuclear powers; protection against surprise attack; the balanced reduction of conventional forces; zones of aerial and ground inspection; the development of reliable international instruments for inspection and enforcement activities; tentative proposals on the use of outer space.

In the last few years the record of our preparations for and participation in negotiations on these subjects has been a confused one. And the confusion is by no means entirely of Soviet making. Indeed on most of these issues we have appeared to be engaged in a game of musical chairs—with ourselves, with our allies, and with the Russians.

I am deeply convinced that we should take a long and steady look at what all this confusion is costing us. It is essential that we assess the reasons for the fundamental inadequacies of our disarmament effort. I have no doubt that what we need most are greater consistency of purpose, preparations in depth, decisiveness in leadership at the highest level, and new funds of knowledge in our citizenry.

It is clear that our defense policy and our disarmament policy are interrelated. To a degree each has an inner logic of its own. And each in its way deserves our undivided attention. At the heart of these policies lie two fundamental truths. The first is the fact that arms races throughout history have usually ended in war. The second is the fact that unpreparedness and unilateral or unsafeguarded disarmament have always ended in national catastrophe.

These two truths are equally basic and must be treated side by side. Some of our major difficulties stem from attempts to separate them in our thinking. Those whose principal emphasis is the perfection of our military defenses are

often deeply suspicious of the advocates of arms controls. Those whose emphasis is the achievement of safeguarded disarmament are equally suspicious of the military men.

What is essential to a fresh approach to our dilemma is the recognition of both basic propositions as parallel routes to disaster. Some who recognize this fact recoil from what they see, and tell us that our only alternative is to leave the outcome to fate. But such defeatism, however understandable, is potentially catastrophic.

Viewed from the defense perspective on survival, our problem is how to keep up with the arms race. Viewed from the human perspective on survival, our problem is how to curtail it. These two perspectives seem destined to live or die together, an inseparable if unstable combination. The central question facing us all at the moment is how to operate from both perspectives at once and pursue simultaneously the policies of rearmament and disarmament, of arms and arms control.

Some critics are certain that the task is impossible. They regard the policies as inherently conflicting—economically at odds, politically unmanageable, and psychologically frustrating. On specific issues these policies would seem to pull naturally in opposite directions. Even the moods of the two policies seem competitive, not complementary. Writing in *Foreign Affairs* for January 1959, Mr. Albert Wohlstetter commented: "Relaxation of tension, which everyone thinks is good, is not easily distinguished from relaxing one's guard, which almost everyone thinks is bad."

Naturally, from the disarmament perspective, there has long been active concern over the spread of nuclear weapons. It has always been highly improbable that the world's other ninety nations would be content to allow the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union to preserve their nuclear monopoly in the absence of international controls.

In its helpful new pamphlet, *The Nth Country Problem*

and Arms Control, the National Planning Association suggests that some eleven more countries have the scientific and industrial capacity to follow France into the nuclear club with actual weapons over the next five years. The countries include Belgium, Canada, West Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Sweden, Switzerland, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Communist China. Just behind them are eight more countries with a similar prospect, if exploited, over a slightly longer period of time. All of this means that the nuclear club is the least exclusive club in the world, and new members can in no sense be vetoed at the whim of the self-conscious elite who now belong.

Recognizing the awesome danger implicit in the “*n*th country problem,” the 1959 General Assembly of the United Nations adopted a resolution proposed by Ireland and directed specifically against the further spread of nuclear weapons. The resolution urged that the ten-power disarmament conference, then about to open at Geneva,

should consider appropriate means whereby this danger may be averted, including the feasibility of an international agreement, subject to inspection and control, whereby the powers producing nuclear weapons would refrain from handing over the control of such weapons to any nation not possessing them, and whereby the powers not possessing such weapons would refrain from manufacturing them.

Now that the French example is before them, the 5th to *n*th powers can confidently be expected to exert increasing pressure on us, the British, and the Russians, to placate in one manner or another their desire for nuclear prestige.

Once more there would seem to be surface evidence that the defense and disarmament perspectives are competitive, not complementary. One view stresses the need for a wider sharing of nuclear weapons, arguing that denying our allies a capacity which our probable enemy already has is suicidal in an era of split-second strategy. The other view stresses the equally realistic danger that a further proliferation

of weapons increases the likelihood that they will never be brought under control, and that the dangers of the accidental or deliberate triggering of a nuclear war will be correspondingly enhanced.

The continuing effectiveness of our deterrent strategy now depends on our ability to muster the skill, nerve, and wherewithal to equip ourselves with multiple strategies for defense. By the same token our chances for a world of greater safety and freedom depend on our ability to develop multiple strategies for peace. Our inadequacy in the field of arms control research is obviously one of the most glaring deficiencies we have.

Why has so little been done to implement the Berkner Report of March 15, 1959? This panel of seismologists outlined a three-year program of research and development which it thought would restore to full efficiency the inspection system for bomb tests agreed upon in 1958 at Geneva. Many distinguished atomic scientists now feel that the addition to the detection network of a series of unmanned seismic stations to pick up small earth shocks might get the negotiations for a test ban over their last hurdles. Why has not the push been made?

Time and again Senator Humphrey, the Chairman of the Senate Disarmament Subcommittee, which has done such outstanding and effective work in this field, has sought an appropriation of \$400,000 which the State Department wants for its own use in procuring special foreign policy studies relating to disarmament, weapons control, and possible technical means for enforcement. Time and again the funds have been refused. Yet the costs and the risks of not moving ahead in these areas are mounting daily; \$500,000 is one thousandth of 1 per cent of our annual defense budget. Where is our awareness of relative risks? And where is our system of values? If one asks his ten-year-old son today whether in his lifetime he thinks it might be possible to take a fishing

trip to the moon, the boy is likely unhesitatingly to answer "Yes." If he is asked whether he thinks it will ever be possible to get missiles under international control, he is likely unhesitatingly to answer "No."

We are, I am afraid, living in a fool's paradise of complacency. What will end it short of catastrophe, I do not pretend to know. But I do know that we have a right to worry, and we have an obligation to propose those things which seem sensible. The incredible fact is that we have delayed so long, and are still delaying, in giving the arms control problem the priority it deserves. It is not that we have never been urged. Rather it is that urgings have fallen on deaf ears.

Thus, it was more than ten years ago, on March 1, 1950, when a distinguished Connecticut Senator, the late Brien McMahon, took the floor of the Senate to call for the kind of action which we have never had. He spoke with urgency then, and his message has great urgency now. Let me remind you of his words—ten years old and still so new:

With each swing of the pendulum the time to save civilization grows shorter. When shall we get about this business? Destiny will not grant us the gift of indifference. If we do not act, the atom will. If we do not act, we may be profaned forever by the inheritors of a ravished planet. We will be reviled, not as fools—even a fool can sense the massive danger. We will be reviled as cowards—and rightly—for only a coward can flee the awesome facts that command us to act with fortitude. This time of supreme crisis is a time of supreme opportunity. The prize of atomic peace lies waiting to be won—and with it a wondrous new world.

It is in this spirit—compounded as it is of hope and fear—that I commend to your thoughtful attention this analysis of the basic issues which we must all face in our attempt to deal with the ultimate problem of existence. Disarmament is not a job which can be "left to the men in Washington," for no policy involving our survival can be left to anyone

else. No issue in our times is more immediate and demanding and few studies I know give in such short compass and with such clarity its essential elements.

Chester Bowles

The Problem in Perspective

Fifteen years of apocalyptic warnings of atomic annihilation have deadened us to the significance of the arms race, for the mind, like the hand, can become calloused. Words like "survival" and "devastation" no longer evoke any response but apathy. Perhaps no aspect of the nuclear age is more terrifying than this: The numbed mind cannot cope with danger. Although the facts about the impact of the blast of the hydrogen bomb, the secondary effects of radiation sickness, and the genetic consequences of fallout have rendered the idea of human extinction intellectually credible to any newspaper reader, the mind rebels at accepting the implications of these facts. Years of accelerating rearmament have conditioned us to regard modern weapons, with whatever perils they may present, as fixtures of our baffling new age. We are so caught up in the psychology of the arms race that it is difficult to imagine a reversal of the process.

These popular attitudes are in large measure shared by the governments who bear the major responsibility for the present arms race, for the problem of controlling the atom in a divided world seems to defy solution. It is ironical that the blast over Hiroshima should have demonstrated the insanity of war at the very moment when the bitterest ideological and political rivalry in modern history was about to begin. The nations have professed greater concern with disarmament in the post-war world than ever before, but the negotiators have carried on their deliberations in the shadow of the greatest arms race in history. The period of our greatest need for disarmament and our greatest dependence on arms have coincided.

We in the United States have witnessed a militarization of our society without parallel in our history. Although we have come to comprehend the peril posed by nuclear weapons, in our quest for security we have turned increasingly to them. This paradoxical situation has confused and frustrated us.

But if dependence on arms has caused us uneasiness, the search for disarmament has led us to despair, since disarmament seems to require too radical a change for the real world. More traditional, and therefore seemingly more realistic a means of preserving peace, is the threat of retaliation. Although this idea has had a notable lack of success throughout history, and arms races have almost inevitably led to war, reliance on military strength seems to offer a pragmatic solution to the problem of survival. The nature of its risks, though minimized, are generally understood. Disarmament, on the other hand, in addition to being an unknown quantity, is an enormously complicated idea and involves a host of technical questions, some of which rest on information difficult to obtain and even more difficult to understand.

It is the relatively concrete though peripheral issues of disarmament—the inspection apparatus, the timetable of disarmament, and the machinery of control—that have received the widest attention and have been the subject of the greatest progress in the negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union. There are issues more basic than these, for the primary question is not how to disarm but whether to disarm. It is this question that the United States has never really faced. Concentration on the technical aspects of disarmament has obscured the fact that the fundamental decisions have yet to be made. Our failure throughout the protracted negotiations to consider adequately the conditions under which we might disarm has revealed our lack of consistency and purpose.

Part I of this book is a consideration of American policy towards disarmament. It traces the development of our thinking on this subject, particularly as respects nuclear weapons,

from the end of World War II to the present. The experience of the early post-war period, in which our leaders first grappled with the problem of the atomic bomb, is particularly important because assumptions and patterns of thought were formed at that time which underlie our attitudes today. This historical sketch has been included only for the purpose of examining the basic objectives of American disarmament policy. What is it that the United States has been trying to achieve? From our point of view, what have been the principal stumbling blocks to agreement? What are the basic assumptions that have guided our policy in the past and what is their relevance to the future?

Part II examines the Soviet attitude towards disarmament. What ideological and historical factors must we understand to evaluate the real, as opposed to the propaganda, attitudes of the Soviet Union? The materials for such an examination are qualitatively different from those pertaining to the formation of American attitudes. The compatibility of disarmament with Communist ideology; the possible effects of disarmament on Soviet strategy; the conditions of Russian life that may prompt the Soviet Union to undertake a commitment to disarmament, and the problems that may stand in the way—these are the topics discussed in Part II.

The disarmament negotiations of the twenties and thirties revealed the difficulties in coming to agreement for arms limitation even in an atmosphere considerably less hostile than that of the post-war period. But our bitter rivalry with Russia has enormously complicated the situation. Concessions which in a calmer period might be cheerfully given are withheld for fear of the stigma of "appeasement." The terrible consequences of the unilateral disarmament of the Hitler period are thrown up as evidence of the dangers of mutual disarmament in our own time. The memory of Pearl Harbor alerts us to the danger of dropping our guard.

In our pessimism at coming to terms with the Soviet

Union on real disarmament, which involves the actual reduction of war-making capacity, we have been concentrating our efforts in recent years on methods of controlling arms rather than banishing them. In Part III we shall examine some of the specific proposals for reducing the risks of the arms race by minimizing some of the most dangerous characteristics of modern weapons: the tremendous advantage an aggressor derives from a surprise attack; the speed of modern delivery systems which precludes deliberation and makes decisions once acted upon almost impossible to reverse; and the increasing risks of accidental war. Part III considers how effective these so-called arms control measures might be in themselves in reducing some of the risks of modern war and how likely they are to lead to more comprehensive disarmament.

This book does not offer a plea for disarmament or an argument against it. It is an attempt to isolate out of the confused mass of material to which we are all exposed the essential facts and issues which must be understood before we reach the question: Who wants disarmament?

Disarmament and American Security

Men have seldom been so ready to recognize the dawn of a new age as on the morning after the attack on Hiroshima. When the atomic cloud lifted and the horrifying results of that single bomb were revealed, it was evident that a political as well as scientific revolution had occurred. Two days after the event it was the sober judgment of the *Manchester Guardian* that no power which lacked the atomic bomb could any longer be considered "secure in its sovereignty or independence."¹ We have lived so long with the threat of atomic annihilation that we forget how acutely the peril was felt in 1945, how commonplace it was to discuss nuclear weapons in apocalyptic terms. Book titles of the era, such as *One World or None*, *The Absolute Weapon*, or *Five Minutes to Midnight*, written not by sensational journalists but by scientists and scholars, reflect the popular attitude of the time. The shudder of anxiety was relieved only by a desperate faith that somehow the stakes of war and peace were now too high to make the wrong decision.

When President Truman announced the scientific triumph that was to bring the war to a dramatic close within a few days, he tempered his exultation with a sober reference to the "tragic significance" of the bomb, a hint of the ambivalent attitude towards atomic weapons that has persisted in our country throughout the post-war period. For all their pride of accomplishment in producing the atomic bomb, many Americans in the post-Hiroshima world could not conceal the guilt they felt that the United States should have used it. In the early days of the atomic era there was considerable debate as to the wisdom and morality of that fateful act. A number of

churchmen and intellectuals denounced the decision to drop the bomb on Japan, and the Secretary of War and later the President himself publicly defended their action. Some of the scientists who had participated in the Manhattan Project gave public expression to their guilt and sorrow and took the lead in urging that the United States subject the weapon to immediate international control. A month before the first test explosion in the New Mexico desert a group of atomic scientists, under the Nobel Prize-winner James Franck, submitted a report to the Secretary of War urging that the bomb, if successfully developed, be exploded over a "desert or barren island" rather than a populated city. "The military advantages and the saving of American lives achieved by the sudden use of atomic bombs against Japan may be outweighed by a wave of horror and repulsion sweeping over the rest of the world."²

The Franck Report perhaps exaggerated the horrified reaction of a world that after six years of war had in fact become almost numb to horror. However, it accurately anticipated that many would be shocked that a peace-loving democracy and not the bestial Germans or Japanese had committed this extraordinary act of annihilation.³ The United States, after all, had always regarded itself as a uniquely peaceable nation. In the earliest days of the Republic, Washington, Jefferson, and Franklin had vigorously opposed the maintenance of large standing armies. For 150 years thereafter it was a source of national pride that our forces were significantly smaller than those of the European powers, that our young men served their country in ways more productive than military service, and that our wealth was devoted to purposes more laudable than war. Though the chief line of defense was our sea power, we took the lead in proposing naval "holidays" and the limitation of naval armaments. Until World War II our national interests, under the protection of two vast oceans, happily coincided with our moral outlook, permitting us the luxury of condemning Europe's arms race. But now the blinding flashes

over Hiroshima and Nagasaki threatened to involve us in the most awesome competition in armaments in history.

The Era of the Baruch Plan

The Administration was well aware of this possibility. The debate on the future of the atomic bomb began in the deepest secrecy in the United States months before the first successful explosion. During the last talk he had with President Roosevelt, Secretary of War Stimson discussed what would happen to the bomb in the post-war world:

I went over with him the two schools of thought that exist in respect to the future control after the war of this project, in case it is successful, one of them being the secret close-in attempted control of the project by those who control it now, and the other being the international control based upon freedom both of science and access. I told him these things must be settled before the first projectile is used.⁴

Stimson originally favored the first school because he thought international control would be a "matter of the greatest difficulty," since it would involve "such thorough-going rights of inspection and international controls as we have never heretofore contemplated."⁵ He wondered whether a police state would ever participate in such a system and briefly considered using the threat of the atomic bomb to compel the Russians to introduce sufficient reforms into their own society to make inspection a practical reality.

Somewhat later he revised his thinking on this matter in favor of a direct proposal to the Russians to stop the manufacture of bombs and to "impound" all existing stocks. His observations on the impact of the atomic control negotiations on Russian-American relations in September 1945 were prophetic.

Those relations may be perhaps irretrievably embittered by the way in which we approach the solution of the bomb with Russia . . .

if we fail to approach them now and merely continue to negotiate with them, having this weapon rather ostentatiously on our hip, their suspicions and their distrust of our purposes and motives will increase.⁶

Recognizing that the Soviet Union had little regard for "small nations who have not demonstrated their potential power or responsibility,"⁷ the Secretary urged that the disarmament issue be taken up directly with the Soviets instead of being subjected to international debate in the United Nations, which he thought the Soviets would not take seriously.

Stimson presented his revised views to a Cabinet meeting on September 21, 1945, that was called to explore possible directions of American policy on the question of atomic control. A number of those present appeared receptive to his ideas. There were, however, two other lines of thought expressed at the meeting. Henry Wallace, then Secretary of Commerce, counseled his colleagues to follow the "line of peace" rather than the "line of bitterness,"⁸ from which remarks Secretary of the Navy Forrestal concluded that Wallace was "completely, everlastingly, and wholeheartedly in favor of giving it to the Russians."⁹ Forrestal himself favored the idea of an American "trusteeship" over the atomic bomb on behalf of the United Nations with an agreement to use it only on United Nations missions. "Until we have a longer record of experience with [the Russians] on the validity of engagements . . . it seems doubtful that we should try to buy their understanding and sympathy. We tried that once with Hitler."¹⁰

A few weeks later the Joint Chiefs of Staff gave their opinion. The United States, they urged, should retain all existing secrets and perpetuate the atomic monopoly for as long as possible. Recognizing, however, that the monopoly could not be permanent, they recommended prompt negotiation of "international control for restricting or outlawing the use of atomic weapons."¹¹

The diversity of views within the government reflected the wider debate that was being carried on across the country.

Opinion polls taken in the late fall of 1945 showed 71 per cent of the people interviewed to be in favor of retaining the "secret" of the bomb.¹² As might be expected, the percentage declined as the realization spread that the secret might be of short duration.

The Administration was also moving steadily closer to the idea of international control. On November 15, 1945, after a series of meetings with Prime Ministers Attlee of Great Britain and Mackenzie King of Canada, President Truman issued an Agreed Declaration on Atomic Energy, which was the first clear indication of U.S. policy on the question of atomic disarmament. The three nations agreed to the "exchange of basic scientific information for peaceful ends" and "control of atomic energy to the extent necessary to insure its use only for peaceful purposes." Most important, the declaration called for "the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons" and "effective safeguards by way of inspection and other means" to guard against violations of a disarmament treaty.¹³ Thus the United States had committed itself to the idea of giving up its atomic monopoly under the appropriate conditions.

This trend towards international control of the atomic bomb worried a number of people in Congress. It seemed too swift for Senator Connally, the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, and Senator Vandenberg, the leading Republican spokesman on foreign affairs. Both Senators were irritated at not having been asked to participate in the drafting of the document and signified their displeasure by conspicuously absenting themselves from the group picture of the conferees which they had been asked to join.¹⁴ Displeasure turned into outrage the next month when Secretary of State Byrnes informed the Senators that he was about to propose an exchange of atomic scientists and scientific information with the Soviet Union. "Sheer appeasement," Vandenberg cried and threatened to resign as U.N. delegate. Only with the greatest

difficulty did Byrnes and Acheson, who was Under-Secretary of State at the time, convince the Senators that no "giveaway" was planned. But when Congress came to pass the Atomic Energy Act, it expressed its misgivings about executive liberality with atomic secrets by including elaborate provisions for restricting atomic information.¹⁵

In late December 1945, Byrnes flew to Moscow to make the first direct approach to the Russians on the matter of atomic energy. Byrnes hoped to be able to persuade Molotov to join with the United States in presenting to the first meeting of the U.N. General Assembly a resolution for setting up an Atomic Energy Commission in the United Nations to study international control of atomic energy. The Secretary had anticipated an extended discussion of atomic disarmament, but Molotov, after insisting that the issue be postponed until the very end of the conference, offered only a few minor amendments. Byrnes later concluded that Molotov's insistence upon relegating the issue to the bottom of the agenda was solely to convey the impression "that the Soviet government did not regard the atomic energy problem as important."¹⁶ Aside from a few of Molotov's heavy-handed jokes concerning the possibility that members of the United States delegation had concealed atomic bombs in their pockets, remarks which Stalin, incidentally, appeared to reprove, nothing more was said about the new weapon.

With apparent Russian agreement secured on the principle of international control, the Administration appointed a group to study the subject further. The committee was headed by Under-Secretary Acheson, but the actual drafting of the report was entrusted to a board of consultants which included, among others, David Lilienthal and Robert Oppenheimer.

The study that emerged from this group, known as the Acheson-Lilienthal Report, became the cornerstone of U.S. disarmament policy for almost eight years. It is interesting,

therefore, to see how the group approached their task. Lilienthal called the report

an opportunity to analyse what is called a political problem in a scientific spirit . . . For we didn't follow the typical political method of starting with the answer all neatly laid out and then look around for facts and arguments to support our pet notion. We didn't start, for example, by asserting that the answer was world government and then pick out facts that would fit that answer. Nor did we say "National sovereignty must in no wise be infringed" and then try to squeeze out a plan that would fit that dogma. No we started somewhat as a chemist might tackling a technical problem: with the facts as he found them.¹⁷

The Acheson-Lilienthal Report, which was released to the public on March 28, 1946, laid the foundation for the most radical disarmament scheme ever proposed by the United States. Its basic recommendations were subsequently to be incorporated into the official proposal of the United States offered in the United Nations the following June by Bernard Baruch and known as the Baruch Plan. The Acheson group started from the premise that a system of disarmament that rested on covenants to "outlaw" atomic weapons without additional machinery to insure compliance would be ineffective in view of the unprecedented temptation a surprise atomic attack would represent to any aggressor. This position represented in itself a substantial break with the tradition of pre-war disarmament negotiations. The Hague Conferences, the Geneva Conventions, the Washington Treaty on Naval Arms Limitation, as well as the numerous abortive disarmament conferences of the League of Nations days, despite occasional talk of inspection, had been mostly concerned with simple promises to disarm. This was to be the Soviet approach to the problem of the bomb. Whatever motives the Soviets may have had in proposing a simple pledge to ban the bomb, it was a more conservative and hence a more natural way of looking at the challenge of atomic weapons than the unconventional American approach. Indeed, Senator McKellar, whom nobody could

have accused of having any disposition to favor the Soviet Union, had offered a suggestion for atomic disarmament in the fall of 1945 that foreshadowed Gromyko's own proposals to the United Nations eight months later—a sharing of atomic secrets once an agreement “outlawing” the bomb had been concluded, with nothing mentioned about inspection or control.¹⁸

The Acheson group took the position that there could be no security until atomic weapons were *entirely eliminated* from national armaments. Therefore, they proposed an International Atomic Development Authority with jurisdiction to conduct all procurement of atomic raw materials anywhere in the world, to carry on atomic research on an exclusive basis, to construct atomic plants, and to license and control atomic research and production for peaceful purposes which, subject to such surveillance, were to remain within the province of national governments. After the International Agency was in full operation, the United States would divest itself of its atomic weapons and cease their manufacture. “In plain words,” explained Secretary Acheson in a radio address,

the Report sets up a plan under which no nation would make atomic bombs or the materials for them. All dangerous activities would be carried on—not merely inspected by—a live functioning International Authority with a real purpose in the world and capable of attracting competent personnel.¹⁹

Neither the Acheson-Lilienthal Report nor the subsequent Baruch Plan put great faith in inspection alone. In view of the emphasis that has been placed on the idea of inspection in subsequent disarmament negotiations it is important to realize why the original United States proposals assigned to it a relatively subordinate role. As Acheson explained it, any nation that was permitted to continue atomic production could ordinarily foil any inspector. The “cops and robbers theory of control,” as he called it, would break down because the “people charged with policing the agreement . . .

couldn't possibly know as much as those they were trying to police.”²⁰ The International Agency, on the other hand, would have both knowledge and prestige, for it would have the only atomic research laboratories in the world capable of working in all phases of atomic explosives and would presumably be able to recruit some of the best scientists from every country.

The Acheson-Lilienthal Report made a point of emphasizing that the United States would go on manufacturing bombs until it felt safe to discontinue production.

The significant fact is that at all times during the transitional period facilities [i.e., atomic plants] will continue to be located within the United States. Thus, should there be a breakdown in the plan at any time during the transition we shall be in a favorable position with regard to atomic weapons.²¹

Reaction to the Acheson-Lilienthal Report in the United States was generally favorable. Scientists, who had been critical of earlier United States policy statements, endorsed the report. To Edward Teller it was a “ray of hope”²² and Harold Urey called it a “statesmanlike pronouncement.”²³ But there was criticism too. Some of it took the form of cries of panic that a “giant giveaway” was about to take place. Others thought the plan didn't go far enough in the direction of internationalism. Thomas Finletter and Norman Cousins considered the right reserved to the United States to determine unilaterally when it would cease bomb production “an impossible condition” that was “myopic as it is impractical.”²⁴

Perhaps the most striking aspect of the public debate on atomic disarmament stimulated by the publication of the Acheson-Lilienthal Report was that relatively little consideration was given to what the Soviet reaction was likely to be. In retrospect, it seems that Soviet rejection of the essentials of the Acheson Report and Baruch Plan was inevitable. But until the abrupt rejection of the American proposal in the summer of 1946 after only a few weeks of debate there was little public

speculation as to the position Russia would take. Major George Fielding Eliot, military analyst for the *New York Herald Tribune*, for example, briefly raised the question whether the Soviets would ever accept the principles of the report but quickly dismissed these doubts with the conclusion that the Russians could not think an arms race was their "best bet." ²⁵

However, Bernard Baruch, who had been given the task of translating American policy into specific proposals for presentation to the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission in June 1946, had grave doubts that Russia would accept the ideas in the Acheson Report. He and his associates correctly pinpointed the Russian objections.²⁶ The chief objection was that international ownership of all atomic materials and facilities meant in effect capitalist control of the Soviet atomic industry since the international agency would be made up primarily of non-Communist powers with economic and military ties to the United States for as long as even the most optimistic Marxist could see. Baruch understood that the idea of international ownership of what could become a vital segment of the Soviet economy would present the Kremlin with an extraordinarily difficult choice, for centralized planning along so-called Marxist principles was the *raison d'être* of the Soviet state.

While inspection was not as central to the American atomic disarmament program as international ownership, it nevertheless was an indispensable adjunct. Baruch also understood how much of an affront to national sovereignty the very idea of inspection represented. Not only was the Soviet regime likely to fear espionage and commercial piracy, it was also likely to resent any challenge to the monolithic structure of the society it had built, to the purity of its ideology, and to the secrecy that had been an asset of Russian diplomacy since early tsarist days.

Baruch's reaction, however, was not to liberalize the Acheson-Lilienthal proposals but to toughen them. To concede

privately that the Russians might have legitimate objections to the proposals did not mean that he was prepared to meet them, for he was convinced that to do so would jeopardize the security of the United States. Although he changed the concept of international ownership to one of international "managerial control" in the hope that the new formulation might prove less offensive to the Russians, his major contribution to American policy, the provision for sanctions in case of violation of the disarmament agreement which could not be vetoed, proved to be the single aspect of the American plan that most infuriated the Soviets. The Acheson-Lilienthal Report had left the matter of sanctions open. Baruch challenged Acheson on this point, "What are you going to do if they don't behave?"²⁷ Baruch was deeply dissatisfied with Acheson's reply that the matter be "left to juridical interpretation." The more he considered the problem of controlling the atomic bomb the more he felt that what was needed was "international law with teeth."

Thus it was that the idea of "punishment" lay at the heart of the U.S. proposals he finally presented before the first session of the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission in June 1946. The international agency sketched out by the Acheson Report with monopolistic control of atomic weapons and broad powers of surveillance over peaceful atomic research was retained. There were provisions for inspection of "dangerous," i.e., weapons-producing activities, but these were to be limited, since the agency would control these anyway. Inspection of "nondangerous" activities, i.e., peaceful research and development, which would be left in national hands, was to be subject to more sweeping international scrutiny to make sure they remained "nondangerous." But in addition to these now familiar ideas of the earlier report, Baruch included a provision for imposing sanctions. The international agency would have the right to punish any violator of the agreement, and if that power happened to be a great power its veto would have no effect. "There must be no veto," he argued, "to protect those who violate

their solemn agreements not to develop or use atomic energy for destructive purposes.”²⁸ The bomb did not wait upon delay. Therefore in order to deter violations any aggressor would have to know that he faced “swift, sure, and condign punishment” if he committed a serious evasion of the agreement.

In addition to the controversial issues of international management, international inspection, and international punishment Baruch brought up a fourth point which aroused Russian indignation and considerable debate in this country as well. He promised that the United States would stop manufacturing bombs, give the international agency all necessary know-how for the production of atomic energy, and “dispose” of existing bomb stocks in accordance with the treaty; it turned out after the debate in the United Nations had gotten under way that the disposition the United States had in mind was a transfer to the international agency to be used for possible “enforcement” purposes. Pointing to the Acheson Report, which had indicated that the United States would determine unilaterally when these moments had arrived, the Soviets charged that the United States was monopolizing control of the disarmament timetable. Why should the United States have the right to choose whether to give up its bombs, they demanded, when all other participants were obligated from the beginning not to produce them? Henry Wallace, while still Secretary of Commerce, publicly agreed with them. Baruch insisted, however, that the disarmament timetable would either be settled by the treaty itself or by a decision of the United Nations. But, he emphasized, in either event destruction or elimination of atomic stocks would be the final stage in the program. Why, Gromyko retorted in effect, should we trust you to disarm when the proper time comes when your insistence on inspection indicates that you don’t trust us?

The United States proposal was bold and, from America’s own point of view, extraordinarily generous. After all, what nation had ever offered to give up monopolistic control of an

all-powerful weapon, asking only for assurance that it never be used by another? Moreover, the Administration had offered a considerable sacrifice of national sovereignty (which it was likely to have difficulty in persuading Congress to accept) by agreeing to open up our atomic plants to international inspectors.

But despite its boldness and generosity the Baruch Plan was curiously naïve. First, it was designed to be a riskless adventure for the United States. This country, Baruch stated, "must have a guarantee of safety." For this reason we would wait until the last possible moment to divest ourselves of our weapons, and even then atomic bombs were to be turned over to an international agency where the United States, as everyone recognized, had high hopes of having decisive influence for years to come. If all the inspection and control machinery failed, the disarmament treaty was ultimately to be enforced with the very weapons it was designed to eliminate. Thus the United States seemed bent on hedging against possible violations,²⁹ by having atomic bombs remain at least indirectly at its command.

If any truth has emerged out of the fifteen years of disarmament negotiation, it is that a "foolproof" treaty is an impossibility. Risks cannot be eliminated by any system of control or inspection. They can only be balanced against the risks of alternative action. To the United States in 1946 the risks of nuclear disarmament looked worse than they really were because the risks of the obvious alternative, an atomic arms race, were underestimated.

Second, the Baruch Plan had certain features that were calculated to arouse Soviet suspicion and resentment and few features designed to make it attractive. Economic control by a group of capitalist nations, broad provisions for inspection, moralistic talk about "punishment," and what the Russians regarded as the particularly ominous schedule of disarmament convinced them that the Baruch Plan was a shrewd diplomatic

trick to preserve American military superiority. The best evidence that the Russians misjudged U.S. motives in offering the Baruch Plan was the complete absence in the American proposal of any provision for reduction of conventional arms, an area where the Russians had a clear preponderance of power. At the time, the huge Russian army would have been a more important factor in any war of the immediate future than the still small stockpile of American atomic bombs.

Nothing in the Baruch Plan itself or in the general thrust of United States foreign policy gave the Russians any particular incentive to accept the American proposals. Even if they had not been suspicious of them and had not suspected they were merely a propaganda bluff, they would still have preferred in all likelihood to take their chances on an arms race. Probably nothing short of their own proposal—an unenforceable pledge to destroy all atomic stocks—would have struck the Soviets as fair in 1946, since only such a measure would have neutralized the advantage of the American monopoly and at the same time afforded the Soviets freedom to develop their own atomic capacity. But the Baruch Plan was built on the assumption that the Soviet Union had no interests adverse to our own in the matter of atomic energy or else was too weak to promote them. Thus it ignored the disagreeable fact that the Soviet Union in 1946 had more to lose by acceding to the United States proposal than by resisting it.

In the first place, by the time the disarmament negotiations began, the United States had already progressed far towards unilateral disarmament. Even as the war ended the United States, following a familiar pattern, dismantled its forces in disorderly haste. Retention of formidable armies seemed out of keeping with the image of a world restored to sanity that had sustained us in the days of fighting. However, the precipitous demobilization was not the result of a conscious desire for disarmament. Indeed, General George Marshall, in his last report as Chief of Staff of the Army, asserted

in the fall of 1945 that "the only effective defense a nation can now maintain is the power of attack."³⁰ Some six months before the dimensions of the Soviet challenge were beginning to become clear he argued that military preparedness is not a cause of war but a contribution to international stability. To the military, Pearl Harbor had left a searing reminder of the dangers of unpreparedness. A little over a month after the Japanese surrender, the Secretaries of War, Navy and State were in full agreement that the rapid demobilization of America's vast armies was "most inadvisable."³¹

Yet the rate of demobilization continued unabated. The "bring the boys home" campaign, which symbolized the national yearning to return to peacetime living as quickly as possible, created a pressure towards *de facto* disarmament which the government could not resist. True, the United States had the atomic bomb and made it unmistakably clear that it intended to retain the "secret" of its manufacture until effective international control could be established.³² But in 1945 the importance of nuclear weapons was primarily potential. When the two bombs were dropped on Japan in August 1945, no additional bombs were ready for use,³³ and according to a report of the Congressional Joint Committee on Atomic Energy published in 1949, American weakness in atomic armaments as late as 1947 "verged upon the tragic."³⁴

The Soviet Union, on the other hand, not only retained a substantial portion of its mammoth army, but entered on a frantic effort to develop nuclear weapons of its own. In June 1946, at about the time of the opening of the disarmament negotiations in the United Nations, the Canadian government revealed that extensive Soviet espionage activities had uncovered information about the atomic bomb.³⁵ Subsequent disclosures of espionage by Klaus Fuchs and others alerted the United States to the realization that our lead in atomic weapons might not continue for as long as had first been thought. Thus, despite the incomparably greater potential power of the United

States, our rapidly declining military posture probably helped convince the Soviets that agreement on our terms could be avoided.

In the second place, the opportunities for the expansion of Communist power at the end of the war seemed impressive. The possibility of Communist governments in France and Italy was by no means remote. Poverty and dissatisfaction were almost universal and appeared to present unparalleled revolutionary opportunities. In a bitter speech delivered on February 9, 1946, which seemed to Mr. Justice Douglas to be virtually "the declaration of World War III," Stalin strongly hinted that peace was "impossible under the present capitalist development of world economy."³⁶ In the Soviet dictator's view it was a time not for cooperation but for challenge. The partnership envisaged by the American proposals was out of keeping with the basic struggle to which the Soviets had rededicated themselves.

Four days before the atomic disarmament talks were¹ to open in the United Nations in June 1946, the Secretary of the Navy called for a special meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of State to discuss the "disturbing indications" of Russian activities. At the meeting, the threat of a Soviet attack across Europe was discussed as a serious possibility.³⁷ In mid-August the Soviets, seeking to secure control over the Dardanelles, stepped up their pressure on Turkey, a move which Dean Acheson, then Under-Secretary of State, thought might lead to armed conflict.³⁸

American policymakers thus failed to take into account that American military weakness combined with Soviet ambition dictated rejection of the American terms. Indeed, it is unlikely that any great power that was not closely allied with the United States and had the resources to develop atomic weapons of its own would have acceded to the Baruch Plan. Actually, Stalin gambled that he had little to lose by resisting American efforts to reach an agreement, for he correctly pre-

dicted that the alternative would not be ultimatums or a rain of bombs, but unending debate. He had a certain basis for confidence in his analysis. Long before the atomic negotiations had begun, the Administration had stated categorically that it would not use its atomic monopoly to exert pressure on any nation. On November 16, 1945, Secretary Byrnes, stung by repeated accusations in the Soviet press that the United States was engaging in "atomic diplomacy," denied the charge emphatically.³⁹ And President Truman made it clear that "the atomic bomb does not alter the basic foreign policy of the United States."⁴⁰

In the days of its atomic monopoly the United States had three courses open to it to induce the Soviet Union to accept a disarmament agreement: making appropriate concessions, applying diplomatic pressure, or engaging in intensive, conspicuous rearmament. (Some would add a fourth course, preventive war. Whatever its logical merits, however, that has always been a moral and political impossibility.) The Truman Administration embarked on none of these courses. On the one hand the rapid demobilization continued and intensive atomic rearmament was delayed. On the other, it refused to budge from the original Baruch proposals.

The Parallel Monologue

What I have called the Era of the Baruch Plan came to an end almost as soon as Baruch had spoken. The Russian proposals delivered by Gromyko five days later were essentially a demand that the United States scrap its bombs within three months and agree never to use atomic weapons under any circumstances. They provided for no inspection and no sanctions except for what the participating nations should choose to impose under their own laws. In short, they were so fundamentally at odds with the American approach that a reconcili-

ation of the two seemed hopeless. On June 24 *Pravda* bitterly attacked the plan and a month later Gromyko, in his first direct comment on the proposals, delivered an unequivocal rejection. "The United States proposals," he stated, "cannot be accepted in any way by the Soviet Union either as a whole or in separate parts."⁴¹

The "negotiations" on the Baruch Plan and the Soviet counterproposals dragged on for almost eight years. The atmosphere in the United Nations was in striking contrast to the spirited and constructive discussions on the problem of atomic disarmament that had gone on in the United States the year before. The Baruch Plan just missed being a realistic proposal, but at least it was a thoughtful attempt to grapple with an unprecedented problem. Above all, it was the creation of men who understood the urgency of disarmament. And the short period in which it was under active consideration was perhaps the only time in the post-war period when the American government seriously considered giving up its nuclear stockpiles.

After a few weeks of diplomatic maneuver, however, it became clear that the Soviets were not seriously interested in negotiating an agreement for disarmament. They were deliberately unresponsive to questions put to them by other delegates. They took every available opportunity to make speeches denouncing the West which inflamed the atmosphere and made true negotiation impossible. Indeed, it soon became evident that once the Baruch Plan had been presented and rejected the two sides had nothing of importance to say to each other. Thus from late 1946 to the end of 1954 the United Nations was the scene of what one of the delegates called a "parallel monologue." Both sides were intent upon justifying their rigid positions before world opinion and largely ignored each other. The Americans had come to the negotiating table with a proposal which they believed to be fair and from which they would not retreat. Baruch himself strongly felt that the subject was too important for bargaining and rejected the

familiar diplomatic tactic of taking extreme initial positions in the hope of securing agreement by means of subsequent "concessions." For one thing, he was convinced that his basic approach to the problem of atomic control was the only correct one, and, for another, he doubted that Congress would accept any compromise that looked like a retreat.⁴²

The Americans had little incentive to negotiate because the Russians seemed interested only in propaganda. With relentless monotony the Russians stuck to their slogan "ban the bomb," refusing to consider some of the obvious implications of atomic disarmament. Disarmament was not so complicated, Gromyko asserted, "if we really desire to prevent the use of atomic energy as a weapon."⁴³ Despite intensive questioning, Gromyko steadfastly refused to concede the obvious point that fissionable material that could be quickly converted to military use was almost as much of a problem as the bombs themselves. For nine years of negotiation the Soviet government refused to admit that the bombs could be treacherously concealed after an agreement. Soviet obtuseness on this point at first perplexed and then annoyed the Western disarmament negotiators, since this transparent fact was basic to any further discussion of possible solutions. In time, frustration of the Western negotiators gave way to boredom, and the negotiations degenerated into a tedious charade in which the Russians would call the Americans "warmongers" and the Americans would retaliate with only slightly less intemperate language.

The Russians had no incentive to negotiate, because they believed, correctly as it turned out, that time was on their side and that they would soon be able to negotiate from a much stronger position. Since they were probably convinced that they could avoid a "preventive war" despite the appearance of some sentiment for this solution in the American press, the Soviets preferred not to make any agreement until they acquired more strength. In late 1946 a member of the Polish U.N. delegation tried to persuade the Soviet delegates to

accept a compromise solution. He came away from his conversation with the impression that the Soviets would not accept any agreement for international control that involved inspection, since they would then have to reveal the location of their atomic plants, and the corresponding information they would receive from the United States was known to them already.⁴⁴ Meanwhile, they continued their attempts to persuade the United States to undertake unilateral atomic disarmament without safeguards and tried to make as much propaganda capital as possible from the refusal of the United States to do this.

These were the barren years of the negotiations. They were barren not only because they were dominated by propaganda but also because they were lacking in new ideas and new approaches to disarmament. Since neither side felt much incentive to make any progress on substantive questions of disarmament, the negotiators spent much of their time on procedural questions such as what to discuss and when to discuss it. The result was a series of meetings in which the locale and personalities changed but the substance of the talks remained the same. On May 17, 1948, the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, the group to which the Baruch Plan and the Soviet proposals had been presented, announced that it had reached an "impasse" and suspended its work. After nine months it resumed discussions, but on July 29, 1949, over Soviet opposition, it voted to suspend its deliberations indefinitely.

While the negotiations in the Atomic Energy Commission excited the greatest interest because of the particular urgency surrounding nuclear weapons, parallel discussions on conventional arms were also being conducted during this period. It was the Russians who first proposed negotiations for disarmament in conventional weapons. In a flamboyant speech before the General Assembly Molotov called for a treaty for drastic reductions in the one aspect of military

power where Russia had obvious superiority. The *New York Times* ran the headline "MOSCOW ACCEPTS CURB ON ALL ARMS" and Washington began to be worried that the Russians might be able by means of their dramatic proposals to create irresistible pressure for disarmament without adequate controls. "Once discussions in the Security Council appeared to hold out a plan for a disarmed utopia," Forrestal observed at a Cabinet meeting in early 1947, "there would perhaps be irresistible public pressure to adopt such a plan forthwith, regardless of world conditions which for some time will require existence of force to accomplish stability."⁴⁵ It was thus agreed by everyone attending the meeting that "the important thing was to establish methods of inspection and control, and also to establish criteria of world conditions, such as conclusion of peace treaties and establishment of forces under the Security Council as prerequisite to undertaking general disarmament."⁴⁶

The United States, therefore, originally resisted the enlargement of the disarmament talks to embrace conventional weapons. Reluctantly, however, Washington agreed in early 1947 to the establishment of a separate commission to discuss conventional disarmament. The Russians proposed an across-the-board, one-third reduction of forces which would have increased their ratio of superiority over the United States, and they kept repeating this proposal for many years. The West took a far more cautious approach to conventional disarmament than it had with respect to atomic weapons. In 1949 the French proposed a world-wide census of conventional arms, but the Soviets attacked the idea for being an intelligence scheme and vetoed it. In 1951 the United States revived the census idea enlarging it to include atomic weapons, but made it conditional upon Soviet acceptance of the Baruch Plan. In addition, we added a new condition—a general political settlement including a truce in Korea.

The following year the United States introduced a plan

that dealt only with conventional forces. The United States, Russia, and China were each to be limited to between 1 million and 1½ million men and Britain and France to between 700,000 and 800,000. In the same year, the work of the Atomic Energy Commission, which had been in suspension since 1949, was consolidated with that of the Commission for Conventional Armaments into a new Disarmament Commission. For over two years the only purpose served by the new Commission was to provide the Soviets with a new forum for their charges that the Americans were using germ warfare in Korea.

As the negotiations dragged on, they took on an air of disquieting unreality. A plan based largely on the Baruch proposals had been "adopted" by a majority vote of the General Assembly in 1949, but the American victory only served to underscore the futility of the negotiations as they were then being conducted. The Soviets continued to denounce the international agency specified in the Baruch Plan as a supercartel through which the United States was trying to strangle the economies of the rest of the world. To counter the majority vote in favor of the plan, Moscow quickly assembled a "majority" of its own, reportedly 500 million signatures on the Stockholm Peace Petition, a propaganda document incorporating the major Soviet proposals. Nowhere was the propaganda battle fought more bitterly on both sides than in the disarmament negotiations.

Thus, for all practical purposes the Baruch Plan was dead long before it was quietly withdrawn in 1954. The Berlin Blockade, the signing of the North Atlantic Pact of 1949, the Korean War, and the growing solidification of the division of Europe had created an atmosphere in which no one in the United States government was seriously considering complete atomic disarmament. Indeed, the trend was exactly in the opposite direction. In mid-1947 Forrestal stressed the importance of stepping up atomic bomb production, a need which

had been "emphasized by current events."⁴⁷ In 1949 the Soviets exploded an atomic bomb, and the following year President Truman ordered the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission to proceed with work on the hydrogen bomb. By the end of the forties American military thinking had become so dependent on nuclear weapons, which were now hailed as the "shield" of the NATO defense system and the only feasible source of security for the United States, that in all likelihood Congress would not have ratified a treaty incorporating the Baruch Plan had the Russians suddenly agreed to it. Events soon demonstrated how thoroughly sentiment against the idea of complete atomic disarmament had developed. In 1947 Senator Taft charged that Lilienthal's advocacy of international control indicated he was "soft" on Communists,⁴⁸ and by 1953, the year of the hearings on Robert Oppenheimer's security clearance, the physicist's role in drafting the basic ideas of the Baruch Plan was introduced as evidence of his disloyalty to the United States.⁴⁹

Soviet Acquiescence and the Embarrassing Second Look

Perhaps the worst feature of the parallel monologue was the cynical attitude towards disarmament it tended to create. Despite the bitter disagreement between the United States and Russia on almost every practical aspect of disarmament, the two would on occasion subscribe jointly to resolutions of general principles that would conceal in innocuous and appealing language the profound differences that actually divided them. Statements of principles were also issued unilaterally from time to time. Such pronouncements had an almost identical ring whether drafted in Washington or Moscow. Their propaganda flavor was evident, and instead of placating those who yearned for disarmament, these self-serving documents pro-

duced more pessimism and a deeper sense of futility. The Statement of Essential Principles for a Disarmament Program offered by the United States in October 1952 was a typical example. It again called for the complete elimination of atomic weapons for the prevention of war,⁵⁰ but despite its impressive words it merely served to emphasize how remote that goal actually was, for it led to the usual wrangling which further chilled the atmosphere.

In 1953, however, certain changes occurred on both sides of the Iron Curtain that were to alter the rigid patterns that had been formed during the preceding seven years. In January the Eisenhower Administration assumed office, and the new President, recognizing that the atomic arms race was growing more dangerous each year, began to consider a new approach to the disarmament deadlock. Less than two months later Stalin died. On April 16, Eisenhower proposed that each nation agree to limit its production of certain strategic materials for military purposes under a formula to be set by treaty and that the savings achieved by disarmament be devoted to "a fund for world aid and reconstruction."⁵¹

The speech had a powerful effect around the world. State Department cables forwarded reports from Budapest that Hungarian officials had been moved to tears and prayers as they listened to the President's speech over the radio.⁵² Encouraged by the response, the new President began to consider other avenues of approach to the growing threat of nuclear annihilation. Soviet explosion of a hydrogen bomb in August 1953 made the problem even more urgent. In early September Robert Cutler, the President's assistant, sent the following memorandum to Admiral Lewis Strauss, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission:

In a discussion with the President this morning . . . he suggested that you might consider the following proposal which he did not think anyone had yet thought of:

Suppose the United States and the Soviets were each to turn over

to the United Nations for peaceful uses X kilograms of fissionable materials. . . .⁵³

Strauss began an examination of United States disarmament policy to see how such an idea conformed to American security requirements. The United States, he concluded, must be prepared to negotiate with the Soviet Union, but "with present conditions of mutual distrust, no sweeping, complete disarmament plan appears feasible and . . . the best hope lies in a gradual approach in which the goal is neared by stages."⁵⁴ Strauss thought the President's idea of transfers of fissionable material to the United Nations for peaceful purposes a good one because it satisfied what he considered the essential criteria of any practical atomic disarmament plan: (1) It didn't depend upon Russian good faith—that is, a Russian violation would not leave the United States defenseless, since we would retain the bulk of our nuclear stockpiles. (2) It recognized the fact that since the days of the Baruch Plan the atomic arms race had entered a new phase where "absolute accountability for all fissionable material produced, down to the last kilogram, is impossible for either country." Thus the President's "atoms-for-peace" plan was hopeful because it didn't depend on inspection. (3) It avoided "the issue of any sacrifice of sovereignty at this time by any requirement of international ownership, control, or operation of facilities within either country." In other words, the President's plan recognized that the Baruch proposals were now an anachronism.

On December 8, 1953, the President offered his plan to the United Nations. "The Governments principally involved, to the extent permitted by elementary prudence [should] begin now," he proposed, "and continue to make joint contributions from their stockpiles of normal uranium and fissionable materials to an International Atomic Energy Agency."⁵⁵ The speech produced an enthusiastic reaction; at least it was a new idea. The atoms-for-peace proposal was not a disarma-

ment plan, however. Rather it was the first of the alternatives to disarmament which were to be offered during this period in the hope of reducing international tension.

Even though the atoms-for-peace proposal left untouched the principal source of terror in the world, the bulging nuclear weapons stockpiles in the United States and the Soviet Union, it did show a flexibility in approach that had been absent for some years. Six months later the Administration quietly laid the Baruch Plan to rest. It did so by subscribing to a French-British proposal announced on June 11, 1954, that called for a program of balanced arms reduction leading to complete disarmament. The proponents described their proposal in these words:

First, our concept includes specific provision for the total prohibition of nuclear weapons, and secondly . . . that conventional armaments and nuclear weapons shall be dealt with together. Thirdly, when the . . . treaty comes into effect, those who have ratified it are committed from that moment to a process which ends and is bound to end in comprehensive disarmament. Fourthly, we have made it abundantly clear that disarmament and not just disclosure and verification is our essential objective.⁵⁶

The decision of the United States to support the June 11, 1954, proposals was a turning point in U.S. disarmament policy for several reasons. First, the United States abandoned all idea of international *ownership* of atomic materials, the cornerstone of the Baruch Plan, although it retained and indeed gave increased importance to the idea of international *inspection*. Second, it committed the United States once more to the principle of complete nuclear disarmament. Finally, to the surprise of its proponents the basic ideas of the proposals were accepted by the Soviet Union.

One may ask why did the United States commit itself anew to the idea of complete nuclear disarmament in view of Admiral Strauss's memorandum to the President of the previous year that "no complete disarmament plan appears feasi-

ble"? As we shall see, this commitment turned out to be embarrassing.

There were a number of factors influencing Washington not to renew its commitment to nuclear disarmament. Certainly the idea was becoming increasingly incompatible with the defense policy of the West. During the parallel monologue both sides had feverishly built up their nuclear forces. Moreover, United States foreign policy had become increasingly dependent upon our atomic capabilities. In March 1954 Secretary Dulles enunciated the doctrine of "massive retaliation," intimating that the United States reserved the right to respond to Communist aggression with an atomic attack on the Soviet Union if it so chose. The following December the North Atlantic Council formally approved the use of atomic weapons for NATO forces,⁵⁷ and Admiral Radford, Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, declared that as far as this country was concerned nuclear weapons were now "conventional."⁵⁸

Then, too, by 1954 all illusions as to the realization of a "foolproof" inspection system, an assumption that underlay the Baruch Plan, had vanished. Strauss had made that point very clear in his memorandum to the President. No plan for complete nuclear disarmament could provide complete assurance against concealment of existing stockpiles or even diversion of future atomic production to military purposes.

Changes in the military balance of power also made the new Administration reluctant to undertake substantial nuclear disarmament. The thermonuclear explosions over the United States and Russia produced, paradoxically enough, a growing faith in the stability of peace. Churchill expressed the new sense of security in a statement to the House of Commons in early 1955. While conceding that "the best defense would, of course, be bona fide disarmament all around," he declared that there was a more likely alternative for maintaining peace. "We may now have reached a stage . . ." he said, "where safety will be the sturdy child of terror and survival the twin

brother of annihilation.”⁵⁹ He credited the nuclear stockpiles amassed by East and West with maintaining a “balance of terror” that would prevent the uneasy truce from erupting into total war. Why, from the American viewpoint, the prospects for peace should have appeared to improve as a result of the Russians’ breaking our monopoly of atomic weapons has never seemed clear, yet this optimistic theory has had considerable vitality in this country in the last five years. Perhaps the fact that Soviet leaders for the first time publicly admitted that atomic weapons could destroy world civilization may have contributed to the growing optimism concerning the effectiveness of mutual deterrence. In any event, increasing satisfaction with the present state of affairs, i.e., the arms race, brought with it a growing reluctance to replace the power of retaliation with anything less than a sure thing.

And yet, despite the fact that U.S. policy was strongly rooted in nuclear defense, and complete atomic disarmament seemed hopelessly impractical, the Administration supported precisely such a proposal in the United Nations. There are two possible explanations for this seemingly illogical action. In the first place, the Administration had not yet grasped the implications of Strauss’s report because no comprehensive review of disarmament policy had yet been made. Strauss’s views were not rejected; they were merely not considered by those responsible for formulating and enumerating disarmament policy. One of the major difficulties facing the U.S. government, not only in that earlier period but at the present time as well, has been the lack of coordination in both the formulation and enunciation of disarmament and defense policy. The remarks of Thomas E. Murray, former Atomic Energy Commissioner, provide authoritative and frightening evidence of this:

When we come right down to it, it is not easy to say precisely who makes atomic energy policy in the United States or how it is made. If one were to try to trace the making of a basic nuclear policy

decision, he would have to go through a tortuous maze of governmental agencies that initiate or suggest policies, draft position papers on proposed policies, advise, dilute, compromise, and modify policy proposals. He would probably get lost or give up before he had completed his quest through the State Department, the Department of Defense, the Joint Committee, the National Security Council, the Operations Coordinating Board, the President's special staff assistants on scientific affairs, disarmament, and other matters, and the Atomic Energy Commission itself.⁶⁰

The other explanation for the Administration's willingness to associate itself with the June 1954 plan for comprehensive nuclear disarmament at a time when its most influential policymakers had rejected the idea is to be found in the area of propaganda or, as it was officially designated at the start of the Eisenhower Administration, "psychological warfare." The policy of the United States Government since late 1945 had always been that elimination of atomic bombs from national control was essential to any effective program for reducing the threat of nuclear war. The Russians had continually emphasized the urgency of "banning the bomb," and the sentiment had enormous public support. Therefore, the Administration, one suspects, could not bring itself to withdraw its support for nuclear disarmament, particularly since there seemed no likelihood that the Russians would accept the proposal. This was a serious miscalculation, however, and was the start of a chain of circumstances that were to have far-reaching implications for the future of American disarmament policy and the negotiations themselves.

The immediate Soviet reaction to the June 1954 proposals followed the typical pattern of rejection. But the following September the Russians indicated they were prepared to negotiate "on the basis" of those proposals. On May 10, 1955, in a dramatic change of policy on a number of basic issues, the Soviets presented a proposal of their own that adopted the main features of the Western plan. In the area of conventional arms the Soviets accepted the force levels that

had been proposed by the West: 1 million to 1½ million men each for China, Russia, and the United States, and 650,000 for the United Kingdom and France. One of the most significant aspects of the May 10 proposals, however, was not an offer but an admission. Reversing their long-standing position that nuclear disarmament was an easy matter and that the only obstacle was Western malevolence, the Soviets now declared there were "possibilities beyond the reach of international control for organizing the clandestine manufacture of atomic and hydrogen weapons [for a surprise attack] even if there is a formal agreement on international control." ⁶¹

Equally surprising was the sudden change of the Soviet position on inspection. For the first time the Russians agreed to the establishment of ground control posts at "large ports, railway junctions, main highways, and in airdromes." The inspectors were to have the "right of unlimited access at all times to all objects of control."

A further concession related to the thorny question of the disarmament timetable. Since 1946 the Russians had demanded that the signatories of any disarmament agreement agree immediately never to use atomic weapons under any circumstances and to destroy all atomic stocks. In May 1955 they acceded to the Western proposal of the year before—that atomic disarmament and conventional disarmament proceed simultaneously—with a cutoff of new atomic production to take place after the treaty had been in operation for a year, and destruction of existing stocks to begin only after 75 per cent of the conventional arms reductions had been carried out.

The May 10 proposals included two other points, one of which was substantially modified by the Soviets themselves two years later and the other of which was subsequently accepted by the United States. The first was a renewal of the long-standing Soviet insistence for the immediate "liquidation" of America's foreign bases. (The Russians conceded on this point in the midst of the relatively friendly negotiations that

took place in April 1957 and agreed that the bases could remain until a later stage in the disarmament schedule.)⁶² The second was a demand for a ban on nuclear tests even in the absence of disarmament, a proposal which the United States vigorously opposed until 1958, when it agreed to the Geneva Conference of Experts on detecting nuclear tests and accepted the experts' favorable technical conclusions as a basis for negotiation.

In addition to these two proposals, which in 1955 were still unacceptable to the West, the May 10 proposals left a number of points obscure. For one thing, it was not clear how much inspection the Russians were prepared to accept. The inspectors could examine any "objects of control," but this term was left undefined. Moreover, their right of access was to be restricted "within the bounds of the control functions they exercise." The words seemed to harbor a number of possible disagreements.

Nevertheless, the disarmament program advanced by the Soviets on that occasion represented a striking change of policy that was immediately recognized as such by the Western delegates. The American representative on the Disarmament Commission Subcommittee said he was "gratified,"⁶³ and the British delegate observed that "we have made an advance that I never dreamed possible."⁶⁴ The Russians urged the subcommittee to start work immediately on drafting a treaty. However, eight days after the tabling of the Russian proposal the Western governments insisted on a recess.

The official explanation for the interruption in the disarmament talks was the approaching Summit Conference, which, according to the Americans, necessitated a general review of the whole problem. This was a surprising reaction in view of the fact that the proposals which the Russians went so far towards accepting had been on the table for almost a year and had been endorsed by the United States in a formal subcommittee paper less than three weeks earlier.⁶⁵

As I have suggested above, the Administration seems not to have considered the implications of the proposals to which it had been willing to lend its name. Critical examination of disarmament policy did not seem particularly urgent, since the likelihood of Russian acquiescence appeared remote. Disarmament had therefore been given a low priority in the formulation of foreign policy.

It is true that on March 19, 1955, the President had appointed Harold Stassen as Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament, a post with Cabinet rank. According to the official designation of his duties, he was to have responsibility for "studies, investigations and conclusions which, when concurred in by the National Security Council and approved by the President, will become basic policy towards the question of disarmament." This somewhat vague description gives a hint of some of the troubles he was soon to face inside the Administration itself. From the outset it was not clear whether Mr. Stassen or the various interested departments would have the decisive role in formulating disarmament policy. A Special Committee on Disarmament Problems was organized shortly after Mr. Stassen took office, and on this committee were represented the Departments of Defense, State, and Justice, the Atomic Energy Commission, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the United States Information Agency. Since many of these departments were also represented on the National Security Council, which was to have the final word on disarmament policy, Mr. Stassen found himself more in the position of a coordinator than an authoritative originator of policy. Many of the interested agencies such as the Defense Department or the Atomic Energy Commission had a primary concern with defense rather than disarmament, and their natural leanings were not in the direction of arms reduction.

But at least there was a revival of activity on the disarmament question and a new feeling that progress of some kind was imperative. In preparation for the Summit Conference

of 1955 a panel of government experts on disarmament and outside consultants, under the direction of Nelson Rockefeller, met at the Marine Base at Quantico, Virginia.⁶⁶ Out of these meetings emerged the "open skies" proposal, which President Eisenhower presented to the Geneva Conference. The proposal, which called for an exchange of blueprints of military installations and a comprehensive program of aerial inspection, was designed to permit both sides to retain their nuclear stockpiles but at the same time reduce the likelihood that they would be used.

Since the proposal did not provide for elimination or even reduction of atomic stocks, it marked a significant departure from previous U.S. policy. Indeed, it was not a true disarmament plan at all, for it left untouched the principal danger of the arms race. Nor was it a new proposal. Aerial photography had been proposed to the Russians on a more limited scale in 1946 and again in 1952 and had been promptly rejected on both occasions.⁶⁷ Like the earlier atoms-for-peace plan, it was designed to reduce the tension in which the arms race was being conducted but not to end it.

After the Geneva Conference adjourned, the Disarmament Subcommittee, which still had the unexamined Soviet May 10 proposals before it, resumed its work. As a result of the Soviet concessions it appeared to many observers that for the first time there was a good chance for progress. It was thus all the more surprising that Mr. Stassen, a few days after the new session had begun, should make it clear that the United States had undertaken a retreat. "The United States," he declared, "does now place a reservation upon all its pre-Geneva substantive positions taken in this Subcommittee or in the Disarmament Commission or in the U.N. on those questions in relationship to levels of armament."⁶⁸ The official explanation at first given was that the presentation of the "open skies" idea required a complete re-examination of previous disarmament positions.

As the negotiations proceeded, it began to be clear what had happened in Washington during the months the subcommittee was in recess. The unexpected Soviet acquiescence to nuclear disarmament balanced by corresponding reductions of conventional forces with both subject to inspection—a program which had been repeated so often and with so little hope of acceptance that it had become a platitude—had forced the Administration to re-examine the idea. As late as March 29, two weeks before the Soviet change of position, the United States delegate at the subcommittee, James Wadsworth, had stated unequivocally, “Complete prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction is regarded as absolutely imperative all around this table.”⁶⁹ But now at last the United States was challenged. It could not convincingly blame lack of progress any longer on Soviet intransigence until it took a position itself with respect to the concessions the Soviets had made.

It will be recalled that the Russians finally conceded in their May 10, 1955, proposals that evasions of a disarmament agreement could not be detected with complete accuracy. This was a point the West had been trying to persuade the Russians to accept for many years because it emphasized the need for the international control provisions of the Baruch Plan. The Americans had of course understood it from the start. Yet in 1955 the Soviet admission that nuclear stocks could be concealed in violation of a treaty was used by the United States to justify its abandonment of the idea of complete nuclear disarmament.

It is true that as atomic stocks grew, the opportunities for evasion multiplied. In 1957 Jules Moch, the French representative on the subcommittee and a long-time advocate of substantial disarmament, admitted that the margin of possible diversion of new industrial atomic production to a secret weapons stockpile could be as high as 3 per cent,⁷⁰ even with a comprehensive system of inspection. At that rate, calculates

Philip Noel-Baker, recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize in 1959 for his lifelong devotion to disarmament, a violator could amass enough fissionable material in a year to make ninety-eight Hiroshima-strength bombs (equal to 20,000 tons of TNT) or a number of hydrogen bombs with incomparably greater destructive force. Others have placed the margin of error as high as 10 per cent.⁷¹ The risk is magnified beyond all possibility of calculation if one takes into account the risk that some pre-existing atomic weapons may be consigned to a hidden arsenal in violation of the agreement instead of being destroyed. There was no doubt that inspection could not provide complete security, but this fact had been known since 1946.

As the negotiations continued, the articulation of the new American position on complete nuclear disarmament became clearer. In May 1956 Harold Stassen declared:

It is the United States view that low levels and drastic reductions in armaments—even though carried out under an armaments agreement—would not, if they were not accompanied by progress in the settlement of the major political issues, be in the interest of any country represented at this Subcommittee table. These reductions would increase the danger of the outbreak of war at some point in the world and of such a war in turn spreading to involve all nations, particularly major nations.⁷²

The inescapable meaning of Stassen's remarks, not explicitly stated for propaganda reasons, was that the United States had abandoned efforts to achieve complete nuclear disarmament and was searching for more limited solutions. Stassen's staff had adopted as a "principle guiding United States policy" the conclusion that "in the existing state of scientific knowledge, there could be no safe agreement to eliminate nuclear weapons."⁷³

Since 1956 U.S. disarmament efforts have been concentrated in areas other than complete nuclear disarmament. The search has been for ways to reduce the peculiar danger of

modern weapons rather than the means to eliminate them entirely. Therefore, we have emphasized arms control rather than arms limitation. A number of proposals have been advanced for the purpose of "building mutual confidence" or "reducing tensions." Some of these have been important measures, but none of the proposals for so-called partial disarmament have offered a solution or even pretended to offer a solution to the central problem of the arms race. These developments since 1956 will be considered in Part III.

The Soviets demonstrated their new flexibility by suddenly agreeing with the West in the spring of 1956 that there were aspects of disarmament other than the elimination of nuclear stockpiles where progress was more likely. The West took the occasion to criticize the Soviets for bypassing the crucial question of atomic weapons despite the fact that this was precisely the approach to disarmament that the United States had come to adopt. As a matter of fact, in presenting his proposals for nonnuclear disarmament Gromyko made it clear that he was not retracting any of his previous proposals on atomic disarmament.⁷⁴ This was in contrast to Stassen's withdrawal of stated American positions the year before.

The negotiations continued into 1957. The official U.S. history of the disarmament talks hails the spirit in which these discussions were conducted as the "atmosphere of true negotiation."⁷⁵ Unquestionably the Russians made a series of remarkable concessions. As mentioned above, they agreed to delay the liquidation of U.S. bases until a later stage in the disarmament program, despite the fact that Soviets regard them as a serious threat. Six months before they launched the first sputnik, at a time when their own intelligence probably confirmed the fact that they were far ahead of the United States in the development of ballistic missiles, the Soviet Union urged a ban on all types of these weapons.⁷⁶ The Soviet Union accepted aerial photography as one of the techniques of disarma-

ment inspection in 1956 and the following year enlarged the specified zones that were to be open to aerial inspection. They modified their long-standing position on the timing of inspection, agreeing to the installation of inspection machinery on their own territory before any actual disarmament had begun.⁷⁷ On virtually each of the technical questions that had proved to be sticking points in a decade of negotiation the Soviets indicated a new flexibility. For the first time the Soviet delegates showed a willingness to meet in private, informal talks, abandon their usual vituperative outbursts, and make serious efforts to reach agreement. By the summer of 1957 Russian and American positions had moved closer on most of the major technical issues of disarmament that had been dividing them—the timing and mechanics of a ban on atomic tests, powers of the international inspection agency, and aerial photography.

There was still no agreement, however, on where the elimination of nuclear weapons would fit into the complex disarmament framework now emerging from the negotiations. In line with their stated policy of concentrating on nonnuclear disarmament, the Soviets expressly left open the question of what to do with the nuclear stockpiles. During this period the West was urging that production of nuclear weapons stop when a specified amount of progress on conventional disarmament had been made and an adequate inspection system had been put into operation. Thereafter the atomic powers would transfer agreed amounts of fissionable material from weapons to nonweapons use. The U.S. delegate made it quite clear, however, that the proposal did not contemplate any substantial reduction of existing nuclear stocks.⁷⁸

There was also no meeting of minds on what constituted a proper use of atomic weapons. The Soviets adhered to their familiar demand for an absolute prohibition on the use of atomic weapons, although they were willing to subject the decision to use them to a vote of the Security Council, where

the veto was available. The United States, on the other hand, insisted on complete freedom to resort to atomic weapons for "defensive" purposes.

On August 27 Valerian Zorin, the Soviet delegate, who had been a model of reasonableness and cooperation, suddenly denounced the West in an hour-and-a-half speech. When the West presented its "package" proposal two days later, Zorin refused to consider it, and the negotiations collapsed.

The final "package" proposal of the Western powers presented in the subcommittee on the final day of its existence involved a few concessions to the Russian position, but essentially it was a restatement of earlier proposals for a "first step" towards disarmament. The West now agreed to commit itself to further force reductions below the level of 2½ million proposed in 1956, provided acceptable progress towards political settlements and expansion of the inspection machinery materialized. The proposal previously offered for reduction of existing stockpiles by transferring "on an equitable and agreed basis" stocks of fissionable materials from previous weapons production to an international agency for peaceful use was more clearly defined, although the United States continued to make it clear that we had no intention of reducing our nuclear strength below the level considered necessary for deterrence. We did agree, however, to cease future production of atomic weapons provided the entire "package" was accepted.

In addition the West offered proposals for a ban on atomic tests, inspection safeguards against surprise attack involving extensive ground and aerial inspection, and measures to insure the peaceful use of outer space. The Western proposals stated specifically that each party could consider itself free from all obligations under the treaty in the event of "an important violation by another party."

Considerable speculation developed in the United States over the motives of the Soviet Union in abruptly ending the work of the Disarmament Subcommittee. The day after Zo-

rin's attack President Eisenhower issued a strong denunciation of the Soviet action pointing out that it was "noteworthy" that the Soviet Union had suddenly appeared to lose interest in disarmament at the very moment when it had announced the perfection of the intercontinental missile. Less than five weeks later the first sputnik was suddenly launched. The relaxed atmosphere of the London summer talks gave way to new tension. Sputnik and the resultant panic in the United States over the missile gap, as well as the Turkish-Syrian border crisis of the fall of 1957, dampened the prospects for an early resumption of negotiations. The Soviets refused to continue the negotiations until the Disarmament Commission was expanded to include all eighty-two members of the United Nations, and this was not regarded as a serious proposal in the West.

However, there are a number of other possible explanations for the unexpected Soviet decision to end the negotiations. First, it took the West five months to formulate its "package" proposal. Meetings of the subcommittee in London were often interrupted so that the Western governments could hold consultations in the NATO Council.⁷⁹ On a number of occasions the West appeared to withdraw from positions previously taken. On July 20, 1957, Premier Bulganin wrote the British Prime Minister complaining that the West appeared to retreat whenever the Soviets appeared to advance, and Anthony Nutting, British delegate on the Disarmament Subcommittee, later admitted that "there is perhaps some element of truth in the Soviet contention,"⁸⁰ although he charged the Soviets with doing some retreating of their own. It became clear during the summer of 1957 that Mr. Stassen was prepared to go farther in the direction of meeting certain Russian objections to the U.S. disarmament position than the Secretary of State and that therefore an internal conflict on U.S. disarmament policy was developing. In mid-summer Dulles flew to London and from then on exercised considerably more personal influence on the negotiations. A few months later

Stassen's office was abolished as a separate agency and was brought under the direct control of the State Department.

Another development in U.S. policy which disturbed the Russians and may indeed have strongly influenced them against further negotiation was the program for sharing of nuclear weapons that was then under serious consideration. Premier Bulganin wrote Prime Minister Macmillan a letter in April 1957 denouncing the idea of stationing nuclear weapons in Western Europe and registering particular objection to putting atomic arms in the hands of the West German army.⁸¹ The Russians exploited for propaganda purposes the decision of the United States to share atomic weapons with its allies and the subsequent decision of the NATO Council to receive them, but it seems clear that they regarded these moves as highly provocative and quite inconsistent with the spirit of the Western proposals for restricting the further development and spread of atomic weapons.

As a result of the collapse of the London talks negotiations on actual disarmament ceased altogether for two and one-half years. During the period a number of letters were exchanged between the Russians and the West containing various proposals relating to disarmament, but there were no formal negotiations until a ten-nation Disarmament Conference convened at Geneva in March 1960. In the interim, talks were held on the question of a ban on atomic testing and on methods of preventing surprise attack, but none of these involved any actual reduction of weapons or forces.

When the 1960 Disarmament Conference opened at Geneva, the Russians presented the sweeping plan for accomplishing "general and complete disarmament" in four years that Premier Khrushchev had proposed to the United Nations the previous September. The Russians refused to discuss specific proposals for more modest disarmament until the West said it was "not interested in general and complete disarmament."⁸²

The United States delegate, Frederick M. Eaton, offered a number of unrelated proposals including one calling for a prohibition on launching atomic bombs into outer space. But the Americans were unwilling to give a clear indication of the scope of disarmament they were prepared to accept, because they had not yet decided. The conference had been preceded in the United States by still another full-scale policy review. The findings of a group under the direction of Charles A. Coolidge, a Boston lawyer, were embodied in the so-called Coolidge Report. This document, which has never been made public, is supposed to have dissatisfied our allies because of its extremely cautious approach to disarmament. Whatever the reason, two weeks before the conference was to begin the United States had not yet arrived at a disarmament policy to which both the Pentagon and our allies would subscribe. At the conference itself, both the United States and the Soviet Union demonstrated a rigidity that made true negotiation impossible. Each side seemed to be waiting for events to rescue it from the responsibility of decision making.

The Disarmament Challenge

What conclusions can we draw from the fifteen-year history of American disarmament efforts? Are those who must guide our policy for the future condemned to repeat the past?

The pattern of confusion in United States disarmament policy suggests the urgency of setting our national objectives in this area. We must make up our mind whether disarmament under *any* conceivable circumstances could be a practical or desirable goal for the United States. Do we want disarmament? In an ideal world it is hard to imagine a negative answer. In the real world the question is obviously far too simple for any quick answer. But there is one question that

can, indeed, must be answered before any progress can be made on this issue: Under what conditions *would* we want disarmament?

Curiously enough, when we presented the Baruch proposals in 1946 we gave relatively little thought to the kind of world in which they could represent a practical and acceptable policy. Because they failed to take the real world into account, the proposals were doomed from the start.

In the period of the parallel monologue, intransigence on both sides of the table relieved the American government from the responsibility of formulating a basic disarmament policy. As long as East and West disagreed on such threshold issues as the nature of the inspection machinery and the disarmament timetable, continued deadlock was assured. It was only when increasing Soviet flexibility made possible the achievement of wide areas of agreement on such technical questions that the United States felt challenged to examine the basic premises of its disarmament stand.

Self-examination led to dilemma: there were two stubborn facts of the nuclear age which could not be reconciled and which seemed to preclude effective disarmament. First, the principal stimulus to the arms race and the chief source of concern around the world were the nuclear stockpiles. Compared to these, even massive armies seemed of secondary importance. Atomic weapons struck terror in the hearts of all who dared to think about them not only because their destructive potential was incomparably greater than any weapon of the past, such that they posed a real threat of human extinction, but also because their overwhelming effectiveness in a surprise attack seemed to offer an aggressor an irresistible temptation.

The second stubborn fact was in a sense the antithesis of the first. Besides holding out the greatest threat of war, the bombs represented the best hope of maintaining peace. The world into which the atomic bomb was born could not, it was

felt, be held together by any force more rational than fear of mutual destruction. Deterrence through threat of nuclear retaliation was recognized and is still recognized as a fixture of American policy. The combination of the first fact—that nuclear bombs are the weapons principally responsible for the danger of the arms race—and the second fact—that abandonment of nuclear deterrence is an unreasonable risk for the United States—leads to the conclusion that atomic disarmament is suicidal and nonatomic disarmament relatively insignificant. Once the decision is made to retain a substantial number of nuclear bombs, the tensions generated by armaments are not likely to subside significantly. To the extent that weapons are kept in sufficient quantities to mount an attack as insurance against violations, the disarmament agreement is unlikely to accomplish its mission. A nation that holds in reserve the capacity to retaliate also retains the capacity to attack. To a potential victim a power armed for defense and a power armed for attack appear identical. The difference between the two is purely a matter of national intention. The formulation of intention, especially in a totalitarian state, is a highly secret process. Perhaps both sides may have only defensive motives for retaining a nuclear capacity. Nevertheless, where rival states hedge against each other's perfidy by retaining retaliatory weapons, it is plain that the arms race will go on. Aware that its rival possesses weapons which could be used either for defense or for a devastating attack, neither state will feel safe until it is convinced that its margin of superiority is sufficient to discourage an attack.

Disarmament and deterrence are particularly difficult to reconcile in dealing with atomic weapons. In a period when weapons development is reasonably static, it may be possible for rival powers to achieve a degree of parity and at that point call a halt to the race. The limited agreements on agreed ratios of naval strength adopted at the 1922 Washington Conference on Naval Arms Limitation were possible only because

the signatory nations believed they could accurately assess the relative power of the weapons at their command. Most nuclear weapons, and particularly the delivery systems needed for their use, however, have yet to be tested under actual battle conditions. It is impossible to know how many bombers an ICBM is worth or to gauge the relative impact of a submarine-based missile. When a high-altitude United States U-2 reconnaissance plane successfully penetrated over a thousand miles of heavily defended Soviet territory before being shot down, previous estimates on the effectiveness of manned aircraft in evading anti-aircraft defense were probably revised in many capitals, including Moscow. The instability of the armaments competition not only makes a policy of deterrence more hazardous, but it reduces the incentive to disarm in the very areas where arms reduction might reduce tension. In an atmosphere of uncertainty the tendency will be to disarm only in the areas of superfluous or inefficient weapons, as both the United States and Russia have done unilaterally, and to maintain as large a lead as possible in the armaments that count.

Faced with the paradox that atomic weapons were both the chief stimulus of war and the chief deterrent to war, American policymakers turned to the idea sometimes known as "arms control." Many different measures with different purposes were described by this term, but they all had one thing in common: the nuclear stockpiles were to be left substantially intact. It was often claimed that these measures would "build confidence" that would lead eventually to nuclear disarmament, but it was never explained exactly how this development would come about. Measures of partial disarmament as ends in themselves (as opposed to separate stages of an integrated program leading to complete nuclear disarmament) avoid the dilemma of the two stubborn facts of the atomic age, but they do not help solve it.

Thus the only approach which is likely to reduce materially the fear of war is one that involves the substantial elimina-

tion of nuclear weapons from national arsenals. But today the elimination of our nuclear strength appears almost unthinkable in view of the high state of tension in the world which we believe is caused primarily by the Soviet challenge. For propaganda reasons of our own we are unwilling to state, despite Russian urging, that the United States is "not interested" in complete nuclear disarmament. On occasions we still declare it to be a goal of American policy. And yet, at the conference table we have stated frankly that nuclear disarmament in the present world is out of the question. Conflicting statements of high officials have added to the confusion. In May 1957 Admiral Radford, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, expressed the opinion that "we cannot trust the Russians on this [disarmament] or anything . . ." ⁸³ President Eisenhower promptly disassociated himself from this view, remarking "there has got to be progress in some kind of disarmament." ⁸⁴

Today, however, there is little enthusiasm for the idea of disarmament in Washington. The Pentagon and the Atomic Energy Commission, whose responsibility is defense through military might, wield a decisive influence on our disarmament policy. Reliance on military strength has become a habit, a military-dominated economy part of our way of life. In 1956 15 per cent of the U.S. labor force was estimated to be at work on military orders. As much as 50 per cent of our scientific and engineering research is reportedly related, directly or indirectly, to the arms race. ⁸⁵

If there is no way we can avoid all this in the world as it is, what changes would we require before we could substitute a policy of disarmament for our policy of deterrence? In the short-lived era of the Baruch Plan we indicated that the only prerequisite to disarmament was the establishment of policing machinery that would meet our specifications. In 1955 and 1956, however, after substantial agreement on disarmament machinery had been achieved, the United States came to the conclusion that no system of inspection or control, no matter

how perfect, could in itself deter a treacherous attack with atomic weapons. As the arms race has continued, the opportunities for diverting hidden atomic stocks, building secret processing plants, or making other preparations for a future violation of a disarmament agreement have multiplied many times. The improvement in detection equipment has not kept pace with the increased possibilities of deception. Thus while a comprehensive system of inspection can reduce the risk of evasion, it cannot by itself eliminate it. Since this is true, even complete agreement from the Soviets on every aspect of inspection would not warrant the abandonment by the United States of its nuclear deterrent if we reasonably believe the Russians would violate a disarmament agreement whenever they could do so with impunity.

If improvement in inspection machinery would not in itself justify nuclear disarmament, what about changes in Soviet policy? Certainly Soviet policy has been responsible for our major rearmament effort. Is it possible that Soviet policy might change ultimately, so as to permit substantial disarmament?

Despite occasional theoretical talk of the need for armaments in order to maintain stability, even in a world free of immediate crisis, American reluctance to disarm has not been primarily due to any abstract faith in military power, for our traditions run in another direction. Rather our dependence on arms can be traced directly to a concrete fear of Soviet intentions. From about 1948 on, it has been the basic thinking of the Pentagon and State Department that the Soviet Union would attack the United States if it ever became profitable to do so. High-ranking military leaders and authorities on Soviet policy have continually presented this pessimistic view to Congress. No less an authority than Winston Churchill has credited the American atomic bomb with the salvation of Europe from the Russian hordes. We have viewed every increase in Soviet power as a military challenge and have assumed for almost

fifteen years that it is only our massive retaliatory power that deters the Russians from a deadly attack.

It is true that since the development of the hydrogen bomb on both sides and the shift in Soviet diplomacy to increased flexibility and subtlety, the conviction has grown that the struggle between the United States and Russia will be fought by means other than total atomic war. Despite the recognition American planning has given to certain changes in military technology and Soviet tactics, the assumption that the Soviets under the right conditions would not hesitate to use force against us has never been revised. Presumably the "right" conditions would be that the Soviet Union would be relatively safe from a crushing retaliatory blow and that no less risky means of accomplishing its political objectives were available. Thus we spend each year over half our budget on defense because we believe the Soviets have never given up their intention to bury us. If one could sum up the current view, it is that they wish us a natural death if possible, but are quite willing to help if necessary.

This assumption about Soviet policy precludes any agreement for disarmament that would involve a significant reduction of deterrent power. It is one thing to accept a system of inspection and control known to be inadequate where the attitude of the potential violators (and every nation of course qualifies as that) is at worst ambiguous. It is quite another when you are convinced that one of the signatories of the disarmament treaty has a fixed intention to destroy you whenever he gets the chance, for an imperfect treaty faithfully observed on one side and deliberately evaded on the other offers precisely such an opportunity. To enter into a disarmament agreement dependent to any degree on "good faith" with a nation of messianic ideas, implacable hostilities, and a deeply rooted belief that its ultimate survival depends upon the destruction of all its rivals is more than a reasonable risk. It is an invitation to disaster.

If the above description accurately fits the present-day Soviet Union, it would be clearly dangerous to conclude any disarmament agreement with the Soviets that would involve a substantial reduction of our military power. Where would such a decision leave us?

The obvious result of such a decision would be a continuation and an inevitable acceleration of the arms race. With this development would come a high risk of catastrophe, for intensive rivalries in arms have usually led to disaster. The likelihood of an intensification of the arms race is great because the forces of inertia would impel us in that direction. After fifteen years of cold war, a "redoubled defense effort" is the typical response to political crises. While this course may actually be the most dangerous one of all, to those who have the responsibility of decision it may look considerably safer than disarmament in a hostile world.

It has been pointed out, however, that the balance of terror may be less stable than we had thought.⁸⁶ As the burden of the arms race grows, the desire to end it by striking a preventive blow may increase. A sudden and overwhelming technical breakthrough might give the Russians the confidence to make the attempt. The theoretical justification for such a move has already been developed. A Soviet Marshal, writing in an official military journal, has declared that under certain circumstances a "pre-emptive attack" against an enemy who is preparing to launch a surprise attack is justified.⁸⁷

An alternative approach would be to concentrate on the factors in the world that make us reluctant to disarm and consider under what conditions those factors might change. In other words, if it is a fear of Soviet intentions that is the real source of our objection to disarmament, should we not consider what changes in Soviet goals and Soviet techniques are necessary before disarmament could become a rational step for us to undertake—and what changes are possible? What changes in political behavior would we insist upon? In short,

what would the Soviet Union have to become before we would accept their word on a disarmament agreement? Once we have decided upon the minimum conditions of security that would justify the leap in the dark that disarmament inevitably represents, we should re-examine Soviet goals to see whether these conditions are possible. And since the Chinese Communists are also likely to develop atomic weapons before long, it will be necessary to consider under what circumstances it would be reasonably safe to rely on their good faith as well. And then the most difficult question of all: What changes in our own policy would we or could we make to induce hopeful changes on the Communist side?

Merely to pose the questions suggests the extraordinary difficulty in arriving at answers. Yet the questions cannot be avoided without capitulating altogether to the arms race. Nor are these questions likely to be any more soluble in the future. At the conference table the United States has frequently advanced the argument that progress on disarmament should wait upon the solution of existing political disputes, that efforts should be concentrated first on settling the specific controversies dividing the atomic powers and only thereafter on disarmament. It is often said that the arms race is but a symptom of national rivalries, and that if the rivalries are called off, dependence on arms will automatically decline. Others have replied that in an atmosphere poisoned by the deadly competition in armaments the solution of political difference is impossible, for each side feels too insecure to make the minimum concessions necessary for successful negotiation.

The solve-the-political-problems-first approach has been used to justify a cautious policy towards disarmament. The advocates of this approach do not say that disarmament is impossible, but only that it is impossible now. Is there any basis for confidence that the prospects for disarmament will improve with the resolution of specific controversies? Are the specific points of conflict around the globe where American

and Soviet power contend the real source of the tension that has led to the arms race? Or put differently, if all the particular political crises of major importance were resolved, would the Soviet-American rivalry end?

If Russia were a typical imperialist power, one might confidently give an affirmative answer. For example, the disputes of the colonial powers before World War I involved limited objectives, and national survival was seldom at stake. But the situation is quite different today. The differences between Russia and the United States are not causes but manifestations of a deeper rivalry. Neither side needs nor wants for its own use any real estate now in issue. Neither side is primarily interested in securing economic advantages outside its borders at the expense of the other. Commercial rivalry is not a major source of contention. What divides the two super-powers is the very question of coexistence: Can a dynamic state with a revolutionary ideology and apparently unlimited ambition live side by side with an equally powerful state that resists its encroachments? The specific issues dividing the Communist and non-Communist world in 1960 are not the same as in 1946. Iran, Greece, Korea, and Indochina are quiescent. Berlin and Formosa have taken their place. As Mao Tse-tung describes it, Communist strategy is one of "protracted war." The pressure points change, but the conflict continues. If the Chinese leader has accurately described the character of the struggle between the two worlds, then it is clear that the liquidation of particular controversies is not an occasion for disarming.

A review of a few events of the post-war period tends to confirm this thesis. The signing of the Austrian State Treaty in 1955 was a "liquidation," as the Russians call it, of one of the political controversies arising out of World War II, but it did not significantly reduce tensions or increase the willingness of the United States to disarm. Nor have Soviet unilateral moves such as the reduction of its forces, the banning of tests, or the

relinquishment of the Finnish naval base at Porkkala inspired any appreciable confidence in the West. We have considered them merely tactical shifts portending no change in fundamental policy. John Foster Dulles used to ask the Soviets for "deeds, not words," and recently Khrushchev has flung the same challenge at us. But it is quite clear that neither side will be impressed with any deeds short of major concessions, and these neither the Soviets nor ourselves are likely to give merely as good-will gestures. Thus it does not seem promising to postpone active efforts for disarmament until the "negotiating atmosphere" improves, for such a course is likely to involve a longer wait than the world can afford.

Moreover, it is entirely possible that the disarmament issue is actually more soluble than the political issues themselves. It is more difficult to imagine reconciling United States and Soviet interests on the status of Berlin, for example, than on those aspects of disarmament where the interests of the two powers may coincide. Avoidance of nuclear devastation is probably the strongest common purpose uniting the Communist and non-Communist world. The possibility that the Kremlin might decide to risk the adventure of atomic war cannot be discounted, but from the Soviet point of view a nuclear contest seems an irrational means of expanding its power in view of the available alternatives.

Progress on disarmament would appear to require, therefore, a careful look at Soviet intentions and to depend on an accurate estimate of the Soviets' own attitude towards arms control. An overly optimistic estimate leading to an agreement which would not provide adequate security for the United States could obviously be a fatal mistake. But an overly pessimistic estimate which resulted in a missed opportunity would be equally tragic.

Disarmament and Soviet Goals

No nation in history has professed its devotion to the cause of disarmament with greater fervor than the Soviet Union. Since its first diplomatic rapprochement with the outside world, the demand for radical solutions to the arms race has been a consistent theme of Soviet diplomacy. Russia has raised the cry for disarmament at every available opportunity and has broadcast it daily over the global propaganda circuits at its command.

The response in the West has been deeply skeptical. Most Soviet proposals have sounded like pure propaganda. Many, but by no means all, have turned out on examination to be as cynical as they have sounded. The Soviets themselves have publicly acknowledged the benefits to be derived from disarmament propaganda. Writing in the official Soviet *Istoriya Diplomatii* (*History of Diplomacy*) in 1945 (about "bourgeois" disarmament diplomacy), Eugene Tarle, a leading Soviet historian, observed:

From time immemorial the idea of disarmament has been one of the most popular means of dissimulating the true motives and plans of governments. The explanation of this is very clear. . . . Every proposal for the limitation of armaments can always count on wide popularity and support from world opinion.¹

Thus the Soviets have long recognized that disarmament in international politics, like slum clearance in city politics, is an indispensable plank of a popular political platform. By adopting, and often monopolizing, the role of the champion of disarmament the Soviet Union has achieved a number of political successes. It has convinced many people throughout the world

of its peaceful intentions, diverted attention from issues such as the suppression of the Hungarian revolt where its position has been considerably less popular, and in a number of instances has divided and confused its adversaries. Moreover, the disarmament issue has helped Soviet leadership win popular support at home as well. Soviet citizens are reassured that the Soviet Union continues to "struggle" for disarmament. World tension and even adverse working conditions inside Russia are blamed on the refusal of the West to accept the Soviet proposals for arms reduction.²

The Impact of Tradition and Ideology

The Soviet Union inherited from the tsars the dual tradition of maintaining large standing armies on the one hand, and promoting disarmament on the other. Imperial Russia supported the largest army in Europe and its military forces played a continuously important role in support of its diplomacy. At the same time Russian tsars had on several occasions taken the lead in urging the nations of the world to disarm. Alexander I wrote Castlereagh in 1816 proposing a general reduction of forces.³ In 1898 Nicholas II invited the great powers to the First Hague Conference to discuss "the most effective means of assuring to all peoples the blessings of real and lasting peace, and above all of limiting the progressive development of existing armaments."⁴

The proposal of the Russian autocrat for a conference on the problem of arms was unprecedented and evoked general skepticism. The suspicious reaction of the *Philadelphia Record* of September 8, 1898, has a familiar ring:

If Russia could induce the European governments to reduce their military establishments, thus making it possible to correspondingly decrease her enormous standing army, Russia could devote her energies exclusively to the conquest of China, Tartary, Persia, and Turkey by

the slow process of absorption: and the savings from her military budget swell the corruption fund needed for the purchase of sultans, khans, and mandarins.⁵

In 1907 Tsar Nicholas called the Second Hague Conference, although by this time Russia had suffered a crushing defeat at the hands of Japan and was less interested in arms reduction than in regulating the laws of war. Neither of the Hague Conferences accomplished anything in the way of disarmament, although they did lay down prohibitions on the use of certain weapons, including poison gas.

Periodic appeals for disarmament were thus part of the Russian tradition and for many years were part of Marxist tradition as well. The international Marxist movement went on record on several occasions as favoring disarmament. Marx himself had little to say about it, Engels somewhat more. However, Lenin at one point in his career devoted considerable attention to the question whether disarmament was compatible with Marxist theory.

Marxist analyses of the relationship between Marxism and disarmament are of more than historical interest in any consideration of the Soviet attitude on arms control. First, Marx, Engels, and Lenin remain the principal prophets of Communism to be scrupulously followed when convenient, ruthlessly suppressed when necessary, but never officially ignored. The Kremlin will forget about the leading Marxist theorists, Khrushchev assures us, "when shrimps learn to whistle."

Second, more up-to-date ideological analyses of the disarmament problem are unavailable. In view of the predilection of Soviet leadership for explaining or defending current policy, be it in literature or agriculture, in ideological terms, the absence of such discussion on disarmament is striking. Despite the millions of words devoted each year to the subject in the Communist press, official propaganda is silent on the relationship between Marxist ideology and disarmament pol-

icy. So too is official scholarship. In *SSSR i Problema Razoruzhenija* (*The USSR and the Disarmament Problem*), a comprehensive, scholarly work published in 1959 in the Soviet Union,⁶ the author V. M. Chaitsman does not suggest in any of the 450 pages that disarmament may involve ideological problems for a Communist even though his bibliography includes some of Lenin's bitterest attacks on the idea.

Most contemporary Soviet statements on disarmament, whether sincerely meant or not, have the shallow ring of slogans. Whatever other function they may serve, they are meant as missiles in a propaganda war. The penetration of fundamental thinking on disarmament in Washington is a prodigious task because of internal conflict within the Administration, but the analysis of Soviet intentions on disarmament is even more difficult because of the strict centralized control of its propaganda and the secrecy of its decision-making process. For this reason it is tempting to look outside current official apologia for insights into Soviet attitudes on disarmament. It seems reasonable to begin such an examination with Communist analyses of the problem from a freer and franker time.

Marx himself expressed reservations about disarmament,⁷ primarily because he was suspicious of its chief proponent, the tsar. Friedrich Engels, however, became an enthusiastic supporter. In a series of articles written in 1893 entitled "Can Europe Disarm?" he called upon the nations to reduce the term of military service through international agreement, to replace standing armies with local militia equipped only for "defensive" action, and to summon an international conference for the renunciation of war. These changes, Engels insisted, "can be made by the existing governments and in the existing political situation."⁸ Although thirty years earlier Engels had dismissed disarmament as a utopian notion, he came to support it out of a growing fear that the arms race would bring either economic ruin or a catastrophic war. Along with most of the other Marxists of the day, he advocated disarmament as

part of the political program of the Second International, the organization of socialist parties, without worrying whether such proposals were compatible with Marxist doctrine.

Lenin also was among the supporters of the resolutions of the International calling for general disarmament, but this fact is not particularly significant. In the decade before the outbreak of World War I, the relevance of the disarmament issue to a revolutionary program was not apparent, and hence arms limitation was not a matter of great concern to the single-minded Bolshevik leader. When the war broke out, however, the character of the disarmament question was dramatically transformed. From a platitude to which all Marxists could comfortably give assent, disarmament became a deeply controversial matter. From a passive supporter, Lenin became a bitter antagonist.

During the early war years, when most Marxists were calling for an end to the war and a treaty for the immediate scrapping of weapons, Lenin was heaping on disarmament some of the more contemptuous epithets of his bristling vocabulary. "Fantastic schemes," "stupid propaganda," "vulgar bourgeois reformism"—these were a few of his chosen characterizations. One could not support disarmament and be a Bolshevik!

In Lenin's eyes the world of capitalism is doomed to constant strife. War is the inevitable result of economic rivalries, for sooner or later capitalist competition erupts into military conflict. "The war is not an accident, not a 'sin,'" Lenin argued in 1914, "it is a form of capitalist life as natural as peace."⁹ The question of peace or war in Lenin's view is purely a matter of economic determinism. It has little to do with the presence or absence of good will of statesmen; whether individuals are reasonable or belligerent can exert little influence on the ultimate course of events. Lenin ridiculed the proponents of disarmament for their assumption that the course of a nation's foreign policy can be tempered by the

application of human reason or the power of persuasion. He heaped scorn on Karl Kautsky, a leading advocate of disarmament among the socialists of the day, for trying to "*persuade* the capitalists and the petty bourgeoisie that war is a terrible thing while disarmament is a good thing." ¹⁰

In an article devoted to disarmament written in 1916 Lenin acknowledged that arms limitation was a social ideal, but an ideal achievable only in a classless society. "Only after the proletariat has disarmed the bourgeoisie can it . . . scrap arms of all kinds. The proletariat will doubtless do this, but only after disarming the bourgeoisie and no earlier." ¹¹ Thus, disarmament would come about not by negotiation but by the victory of the Communist revolution. Once the world revolution were achieved, the need for armaments would disappear. In a world of capitalist powers negotiated disarmament was impossible. In a world of Communist powers negotiated disarmament was unnecessary.

It was, moreover, self-defeating for a good Marxist, Lenin argued, to demand disarmament in order to prevent wars among capitalist states, for behind the demand lay a false premise: that all wars are necessarily deplorable. In his view war was not inevitably evil, for under the right circumstances it would advance the cause of Communism. Lenin rebuked those in the socialist movement who joined bourgeois liberals in urging disarmament because of an emotional distaste for war. "If the present war provokes only horror and fright on the part of reactionary Christian socialists and tearful petty bourgeois, only aversion towards any use of arms, toward blood, death, etc., then we must say capitalist society has always been and is an *endless horror*." ¹² Violence, he pointed out, has always been a prime mechanism of human change. It is the direction of that change, not the degree of violence accompanying it, that determines whether a war is "just" or "unjust."

In Lenin's view the justification of any war should be

tested not by the standard of conventional morality but by the standard of the Marxist dialectic. If a war advances the cause of world revolution (or whatever more parochial objective the Communist analyst might substitute) it is a "just" war. If it retards historical progress, it is an "unjust" war. Whether the conflict is "aggressive" or "defensive" as these terms are commonly understood is irrelevant, for he considered the circumstances of its outbreak mere historical accidents. A Communist

must analyze and evaluate the importance of war from the point of view of the interest of his class—the proletariat. . . . He must evaluate war not by the number of its casualties but by its political consequences. If that war serves the interests of the proletariat as a class . . . such [a] war is progressive irrespective of the victims and the suffering it entails.¹³

Lenin attacked disarmament enthusiasts for their naïve hope that violence can be eliminated from human affairs or that governments could cease to rely on force—at least before the realization of world Communism. Violence was essential not only for the overthrow of the bourgeoisie but for the maintenance of the Communist regime that would follow.

He is not a socialist who waits for the realization of socialism without a social revolution and a dictatorship of the proletariat. Dictatorship is a government power which leans directly on *violence*. In the epoch of the twentieth century as in any epoch of civilization generally, violence is not a fist and a club, but an *army*.¹⁴

It is only within the last few years that the peculiar role of violence in Lenin's theory has received much general attention in the United States. The writings of Mao Tse-tung on this subject have helped bring these ideas into focus.¹⁵ The idea of a world in which there is no peace but only a continuous struggle involving an infinite variety of shades of violence is foreign to American thinking. But this is a basic idea in Leninist strategy. Force is a permanent and essential factor

in international relations, and will not disappear until a Communist world is achieved.

In estimating how much weight should be given Lenin's pre-revolutionary statements on disarmament for purposes of evaluating present-day Soviet attitudes on the subject, it is important of course to remember the historical context in which they were uttered. Having come quite late to the Marxist "classics" for insights into Soviet strategy, American commentators have occasionally tended to give what seems to be undue importance to isolated quotations. It is true, as Henry Kissinger has pointed out,¹⁶ that comfortable and optimistic peoples have frequently disappeared from history at the hands of revolutionary powers because they refused to take statements of revolutionary aims at face value. Nonetheless, bravado, exaggeration, and just plain ignorance have found their way into Marxist writings, and where they are discernible, they obviously should not be given excessive weight. For example, Stalin's statement that "a sincere diplomat is no more possible than iron wood"¹⁷ is often quoted as "proof" of the Soviet dictator's cynical attitude towards international relations.¹⁸ This remark, a typical revolutionary cliché of the period, uttered long before Stalin met his first diplomat, in itself gives little indication of the mature thinking of the future dictator, although, as it turned out, he probably would have subscribed to the sentiment in his later days.

Lenin's anti-disarmament statements date from a single period of his career. Most of them were written during World War I as tracts in the battle against the pacifists in the Marxist movement who wanted a quick end to the fighting. Lenin, on the other hand, believing the conflict to be a unique revolutionary opportunity, called upon his followers to turn the "imperialist" war into a "class" war. Disarmament propaganda, he wrote, diverts the workers from the revolutionary struggle.¹⁹

Subsequent history suggests that early Bolshevik opposi-

tion to disarmament may have been more a matter of temporary tactics than deep-seated conviction. After the Bolsheviks had seized power, their position on the arms question changed abruptly. To be sure, as late as 1920 Lenin was still urging the Party to agitate against disarmament.²⁰ But by 1922, the year of the first major diplomatic conference with the outside world, Lenin's government was offering the first of the sweeping proposals for arms reduction which have since become so familiar. No attempt was made to reconcile the proposals with the Soviet leader's previous doctrinal statements. There was no official explanation why disarmament should have suddenly become respectable for Marxists. Only on rare occasions did Maxim Litvinoff at Geneva allude to the Leninist dogma that under capitalism wars are inevitable, and even then he was careful to blunt the impact of the revolutionary message by pointing out that "the danger of war might be considerably diminished or made comparatively remote by some measure of real disarmament."²¹ Any lingering doubts concerning the ability of disarmament to solve the problem of war have long since disappeared from Soviet lips.

What validity do Lenin's ideological objections to disarmament have for his successors today? Are they relevant at all? How vital are traditional Communist convictions on this issue? Is it significant that the dogma has never been officially revised? We cannot close our minds to these questions merely because the answers are in doubt.

For Lenin the basic objection to negotiated arms reduction was its superficiality. The causes of war, he taught, are to be found in the inherent antagonisms of capitalism, and no amount of good will, legal formulas, or complicated inspection machinery can avert the catastrophic course towards which all capitalist powers are propelled. The capitalist economy depends on war production, and the nature of capitalism itself drives nations to war. Thus disarmament without revolution leaves the roots of war untouched.

The idea that capitalism inevitably drives nations to war, however, probably has less of an impact on Soviet thinking than it had in Lenin's day. The Armageddon Lenin envisaged, a bloody scramble of great powers for colonies and markets, has been revised, partly as a result of the capacity for stabilization capitalism has demonstrated and partly because of the unanticipated ascendance of a single capitalist state to a position of dominance over its rivals. Still more important is the change in the nature of war that has come about through the discovery of atomic energy. Even a dedicated Marxist must wonder whether economic competition will drive capitalist nations to wars they know to be suicidal. The theory of the inevitability of imperialist war has an anachronistic ring in the age of the megaton bomb. Khrushchev, in a modification of an old dogma, has proclaimed that war involving capitalist countries is not a "fatalistic inevitability."²² In short, the dramatic changes in world politics since Lenin's day may have convinced Soviet leadership that the decline of capitalism, still a fundamental tenet of the faith, as Khrushchev assures us, may come about through means other than war. If that is really the current assumption, the Soviet ideologist can now admit the effectiveness of disarmament in eliminating war without denying Communist eschatology.

Lenin's second objection to disarmament was more a matter of tactics than dogma. He thought that agitation for arms reduction would hinder the course of world revolution, but this idea has for many years been an anachronism. In his own day Lenin perceived that disarmament slogans could win friends for Communism. Since that time the disarmament theme has advanced the prestige of the Soviet Union around the world more than traditional Marxist agitation ever could. In Stalin's time disarmament propaganda was used both to symbolize Russia's peaceful intentions and to stigmatize the policy of the West. Stalin carried on a frenzied campaign for disarmament at the very moment when his policy was most

hostile. At the height of the cold war, the "ban the bomb" slogan was exploited exclusively as anti-American propaganda.

Lenin had a third objection to disarmament, however, which is far more relevant to today. In all his pre-revolutionary writings, it will be recalled, he stressed the vital role of violence in government. Within nations as between nations, force was the instrument of change. Lenin's theory of the just and unjust war, in which violence has not only a legitimate but a progressive role, has been taken over and given new emphasis by Mao Tse-tung and the present Chinese government.²³ And Soviet leaders have not repudiated it. In the course of a visit to Peiping in September 1959 Khrushchev again endorsed Lenin's theory.²⁴ The logical corollary of a belief that violence is a natural, necessary, and often a positively moral part of life is that disarmament is an absurdity.

Lenin often emphasized the important role of military power in buttressing domestic governments. "The permanent army everywhere and in every country," he once observed, "is used not so much against external enemies as against internal ones."²⁵ The dictatorship he himself created proved the aptness of his observation. Terrorism, based on a monopoly of overwhelming physical force, has been a major instrument of Soviet internal rule. Since the death of Stalin, it is true, the role of violence in the administration of the Soviet Union has been significantly curtailed and many aspects of police state life have been removed. This is a hopeful trend, because a nation that chooses to solve its domestic problems by the application of force is even more likely to approach its international problems with the same solution. Increased liberalization of Soviet society could improve the prospects for disarmament.

But what of Soviet reliance on force in international relations? Since the days of the post-revolutionary civil war, the Kremlin has maintained that only Soviet military strength has kept Russia from being destroyed by the "capitalist encircle-

ment.” The need for defensive forces has always been regarded as axiomatic. But, the Soviet disarmament proponents argue, this need will disappear once the capitalist nations have agreed to dismantle their forces. But is it likely that Soviet leadership really puts its faith in this simple formula? Are they really as willing as they claim to entrust Soviet security to capitalist promises?

How is it possible then that a nation that has consistently set its security requirements as high as has the Soviet Union would be content to disarm on the strength of its enemy's good faith? It would not have been characteristic for Stalin to count on American self-restraint, democratic traditions, or the spirit of fair play as a guarantee of compliance on our side. Nor would he have been willing to disarm on the strength of information obtained by espionage. These considerations suggest that the Soviets either did not seriously mean their early post-war proposals for atomic disarmament without adequate verification or else intended to evade them.

The year 1955, therefore, is a crucial date in the history of the disarmament negotiations, for in that year, as indicated in the preceding section, the Soviet Union for the first time admitted the gravity of the evasion problem and appeared willing to discuss measures of disarmament that might reasonably satisfy its own security requirements. Soviet leaders are still deeply conscious of the comparative ease with which a disarmament agreement can be evaded. “A nuclear bomb you can hide in your aunt's closet,” Khrushchev is reported to have remarked recently to Premier de Gaulle.²⁶ The Russians have expressed willingness to accept a comprehensive system of inspection, including control of delivery systems, in the event of radical atomic disarmament. True, in recent years Khrushchev has argued that the impossibility of obtaining a system of inspection adequate to detect existing nuclear stockpiles makes inspection less important than a “moral commitment” not to evade the treaty. The offers to accept inspection still stand,

however. It is impossible to know how serious the Russians are about their still vague proposals on inspection because the West has been reluctant to negotiate the inspection question in connection with an agreement for substantial, as opposed to partial, disarmament, and the Russians resist comprehensive inspection under any other circumstances. The present Kremlin position may well be, however, that the risk of any unwanted atomic war, whether deliberately initiated by the West or begun by accident is so serious that Soviet security might be enhanced through disarmament. Thus an agreement with the West for arms reduction under an adequate system of inspection might be held to satisfy the defense requirements of the Kremlin.

Unfortunately, however, the role of force in Soviet diplomacy has not been primarily defensive—at least not according to the standards of the non-Soviet world. The use of violence, and more frequently the threat of violence, has formed a consistent pattern in Soviet diplomacy. It would be shortsighted to suggest that the Soviet Union is unique in this regard. But in comparison with the other contemporary major powers it is fair to say that war and rumors of war have a special role in the conduct of Soviet foreign policy.

Even in the period of its relative military weakness before World War II, saber-rattling speeches were commonplace. The expansion of Soviet power across the Baltic states, Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia was accomplished either by the use of military power or the threat of its use. The instigation or at least the encouragement of military action in Korea and Indochina, the suppression of the Hungarian revolt, and the “missile diplomacy” of the Suez crisis are a part of the same disquieting record. The threatened use of force in the Berlin crisis suggests that the trend continues. True to Lenin’s teachings, Soviet diplomats might consider that violence has a normal and continuing role in the conduct of foreign relations.

Coexistence in a Disarmed World

Thus while Lenin's belief in the impossibility of effective disarmament in a capitalist world may have been revised, his idea that force has a legitimate and important role in the attainment of Communist objectives has thus far survived. A treaty with the Soviet Union, therefore, for substantial disarmament would involve fewer risks than those now associated with the arms race only if a fundamental change in the Soviet attitude towards force should occur. The Kremlin would have to abandon force as one of its tactical weapons not only when peaceful coexistence was achieving diplomatic successes but also in periods when only a show of military power could advance its goals. From the standpoint of American security, the test is not whether the Soviets want disarmament but whether they want it enough to adhere to such a policy even if it meant forgoing advantages that could only be won through force.

For the Soviet Union to enter into a disarmament agreement in good faith would seriously circumscribe the tactical flexibility in which it has taken such pride. The familiar tactic of zigzag, the alternation of threats and smiles, of propaganda attacks and cultural exchanges, of guerrilla warfare and foreign aid, has been the subject of much recent analysis. Communist theoreticians have been delighted to outline the technique in print and record its successes.²⁷ All this would largely end. With the dismantling of the Soviet army and the destruction of its nuclear stocks, much of the Kremlin's peace talk would lose its edge. Its voice would still carry enormous weight in the councils of the nations, but the world would tremble a little less when it spoke. If satellite nations rebelled, economic sanctions or ideological appeals, but not Russian tanks, could be used to bring them back into the fold. If an-

other nation dared to oppose its policies, the Soviet Union would have no rockets with which to threaten it.

It would be unwise to assume that the Russians would abandon the struggle to increase their power once a disarmament agreement had been signed. Khrushchev never tires of assuring us that the competition with the United States will not end. Is it clear, however, that a competition need represent a threat? Is it not possible to look forward to a time when the struggle will be fought with less menacing weapons? Again, Khrushchev assures us that is exactly what he means by peaceful competition.

Any agreement in which we could put our trust, however, would have to bring with it a new sense of confidence to replace the old sense of security which we have, rightly or wrongly, derived from weapons. It would be difficult for the United States to feel secure enough to cast its deterrent power aside if the Soviet approach to the outside world remained essentially what it is today.

The diplomacy of the Soviet Union has been characterized by a reluctance to make an irrevocable commitment to any course of action. It has generally tried to hedge against a policy once adopted, in effect to keep a second string to its bow. While Soviet leaders may keep their eyes resolutely fixed on their ultimate ends, the speed and suddenness with which they change their means has often dazzled the West. A similarly tentative attitude towards arms control would make meaningful disarmament impossible. The United States would find it difficult to commit itself to disarmament in a world where the sudden coup, the quick reversal, and the unpredictable response could keep the international diplomatic atmosphere in a constant state of turbulence, or where the continuing Soviet attitude towards disarmament itself was uncertain. A disarmament agreement could become effective only if each side became convinced that the ultimate aims of the other did not pose a mortal threat. Once developed, such mutual confi-

dence could only be maintained if each side exercised caution in promoting its foreign policy.

Is the Soviet Union sufficiently concerned with the perils of the nuclear age to seek a more stable relationship with the West under which neither side would need to rely on armaments? The Soviet Union is now fully cognizant of the catastrophic consequences of a full-scale atomic war. For many years after Hiroshima, perhaps because of wounded pride at not having participated in the discovery, fears it dared not admit to itself, or a desire to avoid panic among its own population, the Soviets emphatically denied that the new weapons technology had brought about any fundamental changes in war or diplomacy. Not until after the death of Stalin did a Soviet leader publicly admit that an atomic war could destroy civilization. While it is true that on subsequent occasions other Soviet leaders have insisted that the Communist nations would emerge from an atomic war victorious and relatively intact, there is a certain amount of bravado in such statements. Recent efforts to prepare the Russian population against atomic attack and the new emphasis on atomic weapons in Soviet military doctrine suggest that the Kremlin now understands the implications of atomic war. It is not necessary to credit the Soviet Union with a single pure motive to conclude that the Kremlin is bent on avoiding the devastation of its own territory. Therefore, the danger of modern war could be reason enough for the Soviet Union sincerely to seek disarmament.

On the other hand, it may be too optimistic to conclude that the Kremlin would necessarily shrink from a nuclear holocaust just because of the obvious horrors involved. Estimates presented to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy indicate that the Soviets would suffer a 3 to 5 per cent population loss as a result of a U.S. retaliatory attack. It has been pointed out that this is approximately the casualty price the Communists paid for collectivization in the 1930s and much less than the toll suffered in World War II.²⁸ Of course the Soviets them-

selves might arrive at a much higher estimate of casualties, as indeed others in this country have done. Moreover, since the losses would occur largely among the urban population, they would have a particularly disruptive effect on Soviet life. In view of the importance of centralized control to the Soviet system, the breakdown of communication after an attack would in itself have a devastating effect on the economy.

Another consideration that might make the Soviets eager to remove force as one of the weapons of the world struggle is its recent experience in using force. Generally speaking, the Soviets have won conspicuous successes since World War II by following an avowedly peaceful line and have hurt their prestige and circumscribed the area of their maneuverability whenever they have resorted to force. The crushing of the Hungarian revolt aroused deep apprehension, even among the neutral Asian nations, and would have cost the Soviet Union considerably more in prestige and influence had the Western powers not resorted to an act of force of their own in Suez at about the same time.

What would be the implications for the United States if we were to accept the Soviet challenge of peaceful coexistence? Would the United States be at a substantial disadvantage if it agreed to a nonmilitary competition?

Before answering these questions it seems proper to consider whether the existence of our large nuclear stocks has any appreciable influence on the ideological, economic, or cultural battles between the Soviet Union and the United States that are being fought today. One has to conclude, I think, that the bombs have been no substantial deterrent to Soviet activity in the Middle East, Southeast Asia, Cuba, or Latin America. Nor are they likely to keep Russian influence out of Africa. Whatever developments in these areas that offer Soviet economic and propaganda campaigns the prospect of success are not likely to be retarded by America's continued possession of atomic bombs.

Of course, we could, conceivably, force a showdown and demand that the Soviets call off their global program or face nuclear retaliation. In such a situation our bombs would have a direct relation to the present program of competitive co-existence. But this suggestion lies in the realm of political fantasy. The Soviets would never be so careless as to present us with an economic or propaganda challenge to which the use or threat of force would seem a rational response. American, and more especially European, opinion has been seriously divided on the question of using force even in the face of such overtly military challenges as Quemoy and Berlin. It is hardly likely that the public on either continent would support a policy of fighting Soviet foreign aid with bombs.

Even more important, assuming support for such a policy could be found, putting it into effect would raise terrifying moral issues for the United States. Is stopping the advance of Communism, when unaccompanied by the use or threat of force, an end for which we are willing to use any means, including global destruction? Is it rational or right to resist by military means inroads on our power that are indirect and are effected by persuasion?

What would be the prospects for the further increase of Soviet power if the Soviet Union ceased to pose a military threat? In the so-called noncommitted countries political and economic penetration would probably be easier for the Kremlin than it is today. Certainly the converse has been true. In the wake of the "missile diplomacy" of the Suez period several neutralist nations stiffened in their attitude towards the Soviet Union. Generally speaking, wherever the Soviet Union has talked softly, its influence has increased. In contiguous countries that are outside its formal orbit, such as Finland, where the basic Soviet technique has been to combine the carrot and the stick, Soviet influence might conceivably decrease if only the carrot were left. In the satellites Soviet power might also decline, for it is questionable how effectively

it could maintain control if it lost the ultimate sanction of military force.

In any event, the United States cannot compete effectively with the Kremlin in saber-rattling. Our attempts at applying military pressure to the Middle East through the Eisenhower Doctrine, for example, have not been a conspicuous success.²⁹ On the ideological, economic, and cultural level, however, the United States ought to be able to match the Soviet Union. Our resources in economic strength and global good will presently surpass those of Russia. With intelligent leadership the United States is more likely to maintain its lead in these areas than it is in the weapons race. Since we have unique advantages for winning friendship and respect in the world if we exploit them effectively, it is hard to see, on balance, why the United States should not welcome a truly peaceful competition.

Abandoning our reliance on force would have its own dangers, however, and these cannot be ignored. The most obvious and serious peril would be a treacherous shift of the competition back to the military plane. The Soviets could do this by hiding weapons in violation of the treaty and threatening the United States at a time when we no longer had any deterrent capability.

There are other risks as well. Disarmament might have an accelerating effect on world revolutionary changes, and such developments might become less subject to our influence and direction than they are today. For example, the United States would lose the capacity to intervene with military or naval forces as in the Lebanese-Iraq crisis of July 1958. On the other hand, the Communist world would incur certain disadvantages by giving up force. For example, the Soviet Union might have to weaken its grip on Eastern Europe once it had dismantled its army. East Asia might look more sympathetically to the United States if China did not represent the threat it does today. In short, it is difficult to predict whether the ultimate course of events in a disarmed world would favor one

side or the other. But there is surely no need to take the Soviet prediction of its own ultimate success at face value.

Whatever its course, such a competition could only be kept from erupting in military violence if each side came to a tacit agreement not to press the other too far. If the two blocs were sincerely committed to the idea of disarmament, each would have an interest in convincing the other of the relative stability of the competition, since the sudden development of a sense of insecurity on one side or the other could lead to a frantic resumption of the arms race or even, in case of extreme panic, a preventive war.

We have been speculating whether the Soviet Union might have an incentive to change its approach to the outside world enough to make substantial disarmament a rational policy for the United States. Needless to say, the changes could not come all at once. Nor would a complete conversion be necessary before a number of steps towards disarmament could begin.

Some would say that we have been asking an illusory question. The Soviet Union cannot change, they would assert—at least not merely as a result of a conscious decision of its leaders. They point out that a revolutionary or messianic force is not really in control of its own destiny. It is driven by inner compulsion until it is stopped by external force. Nor does it suddenly run out of steam. In its process of degeneration it is opposed by a counter force of equal strength, is defeated, and then slowly recedes. Historical examples that have been given include the Moslem defeat at the Battle of Vienna in 1683 and the turning of the Arab tide in France in 732.³⁰ Each of these events was the culmination of decades of counter pressure, they argue, and one cannot expect a swifter process in our own time.

But societies and their motivating dogmas change, and not always as the result of military pressure. As for the Soviet Union, the rate of change has been phenomenal. In forty

years transformations have taken place more radical and more profound than have occurred in many other societies over a period of centuries. It would be shortsighted to assume therefore that changes in the Soviet outlook in our own time are automatically excluded. Objective conditions at home and abroad might influence the Soviet Union to moderate its policy to the point where disarmament could become a reality.

Hopeful Factors

What are the factors capable of influencing Soviet policy away from messianism and violence into a more stable and normal pattern? Before considering them, it seems important to remember that the Soviet view of force is purely pragmatic. We must distinguish the Soviet attitude towards force from the Nazi attitude, for in retrospect it seems that the Hitlerian empire was always destined to live and die by violence. Unlike Nazi doctrine, Communist ideology does not give military power a position of honor in its hierarchy of values. War, which Mao Tse-tung calls "this monster of mutual slaughter among mankind,"³¹ is not glorified for its own sake as it was in Hitler's private nightmare world. Although they do not scruple at its use, Communist leaders normally prefer other means. Since they see no positive virtue in force, they are likely to abandon it whenever it seems irrational or unprofitable. Ideology, therefore, is not the pessimistic factor it was in the Third Reich.

Changing economic requirements represent one force that could impel Soviet policy in a more peaceful direction. It is sometimes suggested that just as economic pressures were at least partially responsible for driving Hitler to war, these same pressures will keep Khrushchev and his successors at peace. For this reason some have taken comfort in Khrushchev's campaign to "overtake and outstrip the United States" in hog pro-

duction. Perhaps Soviet leadership, they say, is eager to disarm because economic pressures make it impossible for it to maintain both a mammoth striking force and a decent standard of living, and political pressures make it impossible for it to choose the former over the latter. In early 1957 Professor Abram Bergson of Harvard University, an authority on the Soviet economy, discussed this point in a statement addressed to the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Disarmament. As an economic matter, he pointed out, the Russians "have something to gain and nothing to lose" ³² from disarmament. Because of the smaller Soviet gross national product, defense spending represents a far greater strain on the Soviet economy than on the American. Moreover, under their controlled economy there would be no danger of unemployment when workers are released from defense industries, since they could be easily absorbed elsewhere. Thus the problem of reconversion of a defense-oriented economy, which would represent a difficult challenge for the United States, is not a major factor in the Soviet Union. In disarmament the Soviets would gain needed capital and manpower to increase their industrial potential and improve their standard of living. Devotion of the savings achieved by disarmament to consumer goods could be taken as encouraging evidence of the peaceful orientation of Soviet leadership, for the way in which a government spends its money, especially in a planned economy, is perhaps the best available index of its intentions.

But the campaign to outstrip the United States is not primarily in the area of hogs and butter, much less automobiles and refrigerators. Despite the enthusiastic comments of Mikoyan and Khrushchev during their visits here concerning American supermarkets, the building of a competitive chain in the Soviet Union does not have a high priority. Soviet leaders have indicated that they would divert most defense funds to heavy industry and catch up with the United States in steel, coal, and other basic industries. "By using the cuts in defense

outlays as a basis to expand capital investments in heavy industry," Professor Bergson warns, "the Russians actually could expand their future defense potential." Their choice, he points out, is not simply between guns and butter, but guns, butter, and machines, and machines can be used at a later date to produce either guns or butter.³³ Thus, he observes, a commitment to heavy industry does not necessarily indicate peaceful intentions.

On the other hand, if the Soviet Union already possesses, as we believe it does, enough military power to destroy the United States several times over, it would be a peculiarly wasteful process to subject the Soviet economy to the strain of a major conversion in order to accomplish a result already within its power. Even if a future surprise attack on a disarmed United States is presently contemplated, this could be accomplished by a secret store of existing bombs and would not require the cumbersome process of wholesale reconversion to military production which might alarm the United States. On balance, therefore, diversion of military expenditure even to heavy industry might well have an encouraging effect on future Soviet relations with the outside world.

Another development that might encourage the Soviets to think more seriously, and perhaps more sincerely than they have up to now, is the spread of atomic weapons to other powers. From the viewpoint of the Soviet Union this is not a favorable development. It makes the international situation more volatile and more difficult to regulate from Moscow. Although it may have the advantage of lessening the degree of dependence of certain European powers on Washington, it also gives them an incentive to defend their own territory they lacked before. The problem, still anachronistically referred to as the "fourth country" question despite the emergence of France as an atomic power, represents a serious threat to Soviet leadership. When relatively small powers, whose role in international relations the Soviet Union has always regarded

as invidious,³⁴ have the capacity to plunge the world into nuclear war, the risks inherent in stirring up discord and dissension or in disseminating incendiary propaganda increase sharply, and accordingly these familiar and often successful techniques become impractical. The National Planning Association estimates that eleven additional countries have the present capacity to produce nuclear weapons within five years, including East Germany and Communist China. Should East Germany actually come into possession of such weapons, the dispatch of tanks to crush a future revolt might not be the easy decision it once was.

Most important, however, is the matter of China. The Communist government in Peiping not only does not share the enthusiasm for disarmament and peaceful change espoused by Khrushchev, it states the fact emphatically. In a series of articles published shortly before the May 1960 Summit Conference Chinese spokesmen criticized any disarmament agreement that would interfere with the use of force for revolutionary purposes and declared that the People's Government stood ready to support and foster armed uprisings in the non-Communist world whenever the opportunity lay open to it.³⁵ Peiping has revived Lenin's ideas about just and unjust wars, the inevitability of war under capitalism, and indeed claims to welcome a nuclear catastrophe. Communists should not fear a nuclear war, the Chinese newspaper argues, "for on the debris of dead imperialism"³⁶ the perfect Communist society can be erected.

We do not know how close Communist China is to developing its own nuclear weapons, but it is probably closer than Moscow would like. In April 1955 Russia promised to establish atomic piles and cyclotrons in China and to train the scientific personnel necessary for their operation. Since that date, however, conflicting reports have reached the outside world concerning the extent to which the Soviet Union is actually assisting the Chinese with their nuclear program.³⁷

If it is true that Moscow has more to gain by converting the struggle to one of peaceful change and Peiping has more to gain (or so it thinks) by preserving militant Communist orthodoxy even in the face of nuclear war, there is a fundamental cleavage in the Communist movement, a potentially serious threat to Russian leadership and, perhaps, an unparalleled opportunity to conclude a disarmament agreement. A brooding, powerful, and hostile China might possibly give the Soviets the incentive to support a general disarmament agreement that appeals to good faith, pious resolutions, and public pressure could never give.

It is conceivable that the interests of the Soviet Union and the interests of the West in keeping China from becoming a nuclear power could coincide. The Soviet Union would secure no apparent advantage in giving up its nuclear monopoly within the Communist bloc. Moreover, China's approach to international relations is considerably more belligerent and less responsible than that of the Soviet Union, and the risks Peiping seems willing to run may well be a matter of concern in Moscow. If there is any validity to the idea of a conflict of interest between the two Communist giants in the matter of atomic weapons, it is obvious that the situation should be exploited quickly. Once China has succeeded in building a nuclear stockpile of its own, the problems of disarmament enforcement would become far more difficult than they are now in view of the vast expanse of Chinese territory. And it is by no means certain that the Chinese would even agree to disarm after they had acquired nuclear weapons.

To measure the prospects for hopeful change inside the Soviet Union by focusing on the problems Moscow must face and the pressures to which it is subject is admittedly a difficult task, but it is one which governments must customarily undertake in trying to fathom the intentions of their sovereign neighbors. Unfortunately, the task is enormously complicated by the intrusion of ideology into Soviet administration. Republi-

cans and Democrats in Washington can imagine how they would react to specific international problems if they were running the Russian state, but they have greater difficulty imagining how they would behave if they were Communist rulers. There is a tendency on the one hand to overemphasize the ideological factors influencing Soviet decisions and, on the other, to underestimate or ignore them altogether. Nonetheless, projecting the intentions of Soviet leaders on the basis of available information is an exercise which is absolutely essential to the conduct of our foreign policy.

Our estimate of Soviet intentions is, after all, the basis for our huge defense effort. To recognize opportunity may sometimes be more difficult than to recognize danger. It would be ironical, however, if in our concern for security we let slip a real chance for disarmament and missed an opportunity to lighten the burden of the whole world merely because we had read Lenin's teachings on tactics as immutable truth or had refused to acknowledge that changing conditions can influence national aspirations.

Signs of Progress

What indications are we likely to have, however, that those conditions which *might* influence Soviet policy along favorable lines have really had that effect? National policy is such a closely guarded secret in the Soviet Union that we have no reliable way of knowing whether the factors that *ought* to influence Soviet leaders in one direction or another have in fact done so. Where should we look for indications that the fundamental changes in Soviet attitude which are essential to a successful disarmament program have actually occurred?

A significant diminution of the intensity and virulence of Soviet propaganda would be one such sign. The Soviet press continually fills Soviet ears with a false and distorted view of

world affairs. Since the war, and even at times during the war much of this propaganda has concerned the United States. During periods of so-called relaxed tensions the stream of falsehood has been somewhat restrained, but it has always spurted forth again with renewed intensity.

The propaganda campaign against the United States and the non-Soviet world is more than an unpleasant nuisance. It has several alarming aspects. In the first place, propaganda often influences the policy of the propagandist. As George Kennan has shrewdly observed, "habitual carelessness about truth has tended to obliterate the distinction between what they [the leaders of the Kremlin] do believe and what they merely find it convenient to say."³⁸ Richard Nixon, who has no particular predisposition to take the remarks of Soviet leaders at their face value, confirms Kennan's thesis. He came away from his talks with Khrushchev in the summer of 1959 convinced of the sincerity of the Premier's belief that the workers in the United States are ready to revolt.³⁹ It is impossible to go on day after day proclaiming false facts without falling under the sway of the falsehood and accepting distortions as truth. Soviet propaganda suggesting that the West had not disarmed in good faith or was secretly rearming or was preparing some intrigue against the Soviet world would be an alarming development, even if the campaign had a purpose other than to divert attention from actual evasions on the Soviet side. Even the best disarmament system requires from all participants clear thinking and stable emotions, and these are impossible in a deliberately hostile atmosphere. If Khrushchev or his successors were to succumb to the paranoiac suspicion of a Stalin, which the dictator's own propaganda machine probably helped keep at a high pitch, an intolerable strain would be put on the disarmament agreement and its inspection machinery.

Of course, the continuation or, more significantly, the resumption of anti-American propaganda, particularly accusa-

tions that the United States was cheating on the disarmament agreement, would have another and even more threatening significance. It is an age-old technique of the aggressor to fill the air with charges that his victim is about to attack. Soviet doctrine may permit and even encourage the "just war" irrespective of its offensive or defensive character. But to Soviet propaganda every war fought by the Soviet Union is a defensive war—the attacks on Poland and Finland included. Charges that the United States was evading the treaty might well indicate that Russia itself was planning to rearm or otherwise repudiate the treaty or even was preparing to attack. In any event, a sudden burst of propaganda could serve as a warning to the United States which would enable it to take appropriate action.

On the other hand, suspension of Russian propaganda before the effective date of a disarmament treaty would be a significant and promising development. Cessation of attacks on the non-Soviet world would represent a break with a long tradition and would have considerable symbolic meaning for the Soviet people. Nothing would tear down the wall insulating the Soviet Union from the rest of the world faster than for Soviet citizens to stop being told that all the world not subject to Soviet influence is against them. A suspension of hostile Soviet propaganda would improve the atmosphere for diplomatic negotiations on outstanding differences between the Soviet Union and the West. And it would greatly improve the chances for avoiding friction in the day-to-day operations of any system of on-the-spot inspection.

Moreover, the absence of anti-Western propaganda might actually reduce the risk of violations of the disarmament agreement. Preparations for a surprise attack, for example, would depend upon the willingness of a substantial number of persons to evade the treaty. The Kremlin might well be reluctant to embark on a treaty violation to which substantial numbers of its citizens would be privy without employing its tradi-

tional techniques of psychological control. Soviet leadership would hesitate to rely on the blind loyalty of enough persons to carry out extensive treaty evasions and would prefer to justify its treachery through a program of hostile propaganda.

A study of the clandestine rearmament program carried on in the Weimar Republic, which, incidentally, was to a considerable extent made possible by the secret cooperation of the Soviet Union in trading Russian military equipment for German technological assistance, concludes that without the participation of a substantial portion of the population, exposure of disarmament violations is inevitable.⁴⁰ Although, conceivably, relatively fewer persons would need to know about a secret atomic stock than would have to be informed of a secret cache of conventional weapons or a general mobilization, the development and deployment of the means of delivery for massive atomic attack would almost certainly require the complicity of a considerable number of persons. The risk that some of these individuals would reveal the treaty violation to the outside world would be unreasonably great unless the government took steps to create a psychological climate which encouraged evasion. This could only be done effectively through mass propaganda which, of course, could be monitored outside the Soviet Union. Thus suspension of hostile propaganda, whether resumed at a later point or not, would appear to make it more difficult for the Soviet Union to launch a surprise attack, and for this reason alone the end of the hate campaign would be a promising development.

A change in the basic Soviet attitude on inspection would be even more significant. From the time of the first presentation of the Baruch proposals, the question of inspection has dominated the disarmament discussions and has appeared as the principal stumbling block. One could legitimately ask why this has been so. Both the United States and the Soviet Union have changed their minds on this question. Before World War II the attitude of the United States was not entirely clear.

In 1926 Hugh Gibson, the American representative on the Preparatory Commission of the League of Nations Disarmament Conference, declared that "the American delegation has opposed the proposal to establish supervision and control of national armaments by an international agency since it is felt that any limitation agreements must rest primarily on international good faith and respect for treaties."⁴¹ Although seven years later the United States accepted the principle of "effective, automatic, and continuous supervision,"⁴² the inspection idea never received much emphasis in American disarmament thinking in the pre-war period.

Curiously enough, it was the Soviets rather than the West who actually pressed for inspection in the negotiations of the 1920s. The 1927 Soviet proposal called for a permanent international control commission, to be made up, incidentally, of trade union representatives and legislators rather than executive appointees of the respective governments.⁴³ The international agency was to have complete access "to every facility for the full investigation of all activities of the State, of public associations, and of private persons which are connected with the application of disarmament."⁴⁴ At this point it is difficult to say whether the proposals were sincerely meant, although Allen Dulles, who attended many of the conferences of the period, felt that they were.⁴⁵ But in any event, it is odd that an issue on which each side has reversed—one might almost say exchanged—its position should have proved to be the principal source of contention.

Moreover, the United States government, as mentioned in the preceding section, has never had any illusions about the efficacy of inspection. The Acheson-Lilienthal Report and the Baruch Plan were both based on the premise that deterrence of disarmament violations would have to depend primarily on techniques other than inspection. At Senate hearings held in November 1945, when the atomic age was scarcely three months old and Russia was still known as our gallant

ally, General Leslie Groves, wartime chief of the Manhattan Project, told the Senators flatly that inspection wouldn't work. "I wouldn't want any part of it," he said, pointing out that inspectors were sure to put their national loyalty above any obligation they might feel to the international inspectorate.⁴⁶ And Robert Oppenheimer, who was for inspection, spoke of its limitations. When asked by the same group of Senators what instruments were available to detect the presence of atomic bombs which might have been concealed in packing crates and smuggled into the United States, his grim answer was, "a screwdriver."⁴⁷

Why, then, has there been so much emphasis on inspection in the post-war disarmament negotiations? The answer is that inspection has both a practical and symbolic value. While it is true that there are serious obstacles to truly effective inspection, and that perfection, therefore, is out of the question, there is no doubt that a comprehensive system of inspection, especially one that embraced delivery systems, would drastically reduce the risk of evasion. What a comprehensive system of inspection would involve is beyond the scope of this book. In 1958 an excellent study of this question was published by Columbia University⁴⁸ which came to the general conclusion that a multiple system of inspection including such measures as detailed, on-the-spot observation, aerial photography, and budgetary control could provide a "workable system" for insuring compliance.⁴⁹ While it is possible to argue that the more inspection there is, the greater are the opportunities for day-to-day friction, no one denies that as inspection increases the temptation to evasion declines.

But there is another, perhaps even more important function of inspection. A willingness to accept comprehensive inspection is a significant indication of good faith. Charles E. Wilson, while Secretary of Defense, put it this way:

It is like auditing the financial activities of a big corporation. Somebody may do a little local stealing once in a while, but you can tell

whether the thing is right or not. . . . [From] my point of view, this inspection system is simply to assure each party that the attitudes of the other parties continue to be proper.⁵⁰

Comprehensive inspection represents a substantial sacrifice of national sovereignty. There have been a number of individuals and groups in the United States that have been bitterly opposed to permitting foreign inspectors into our atomic plants. It is true that most of this opposition was expressed in the years of our atomic monopoly, but there is still considerable reluctance in this country to grant broad rights of inspection to foreigners. As President Eisenhower posed the question in his press conference of July 6, 1955: "Are we ready to open up every one of our factories, every place where something might be going on that could be inimical to the interests of somebody else?"⁵¹ In a system of complete disarmament the fear of espionage, which has been a real fear in both the United States and Russia, would presumably decline although it would probably not altogether disappear. But even in a demilitarized world the fear of commercial piracy would remain, and conceivably might even increase. No more than British firms or Soviet state-owned factories, would American industry welcome the disarmament inspectors into their laboratories, especially if the intruder happened to be a national of a commercial rival. Writing in the relatively optimistic days of the "spirit of Geneva," Sir John Slessor, Marshal of the Royal Air Force, observed that neither the British nor the Americans nor the Russians would accept within the immediately foreseeable future an inspection system under which the agents of the international control organ would be "free to go literally anywhere they chose."⁵² Effective inspection requires just such freedom. Undoubtedly, a nation must want disarmament intensely before it will submit to such a system.

For the Soviet Union a comprehensive system of inspection poses special problems. "Inspection, like complete free-

dom of cultural exchange, strikes at the very heart of any controlled state.”⁵³ First, surveillance by foreigners challenges the Soviet system of social control, and an effective inspection system would require the presence on Soviet territory of thousands of foreigners. The Russian government has traditionally regarded widespread foreign contacts with its citizens as contaminating. They have some historical support for a view that extensive relationships with foreigners not subject to the control of the state represent a threat to the regime. On each of the two occasions during the last hundred and fifty years when substantial numbers of Russian troops surged into Western Europe or were taken there as prisoners, either wholesale defections or the importation of dangerous ideas have resulted. The preference of large numbers of Soviet citizens to remain in internment camps in Germany rather than return to their homeland indicated a repetition on a grander scale of the disaffection that seized many of Tsar Alexander’s officers upon returning from the Napoleonic Wars, a disaffection that erupted in the Decembrist Revolt of 1825.⁵⁴ A society in which large numbers of foreigners are free to circulate, express their opinion, and give orders cannot long remain monolithic. In order to do their job effectively, the inspectors would have to be men of considerable training and intelligence and possess obvious qualities of leadership. Thus they would be in a position to wield considerable influence. The Soviet government might well feel that since the United States is already open to foreign influence, just on this ground alone inspection would represent too great a concession.

On the other hand, as the confidence of the regime in the loyalty of its citizens increased, the fear of disaffection as a result of foreign contacts would be likely to decline. The growing willingness to permit foreigners inside the Soviet Union and the relaxation of restrictions on their movements are encouraging indications that the Kremlin is less appre-

hensive about the effect of foreign contacts on its citizens than it has been in the past.

The presence on its soil of a small army of scientists responsible only to an international body would threaten the Soviet Union in another respect, however. The recognition of an autonomous agency free from the authority of the Party and the state would make central control more difficult. The inspectors would be in positions of authority over Soviet citizens, and if they were to do their job effectively would have to have the power to subpoena documents and interrogate individuals. The activities of the inspectorate could not be integrated into any future five-year plan. Not only would the existence of this extra-governmental authority on its territory have a disagreeable symbolic significance for Soviet leaders, it would be a practical nuisance as well. How much time should plant managers allot to interrogation by the inspectorate? Will the inspectors approve the particular accounting methods of the factory managers? (To do their job properly they would need to have considerable power to prescribe reporting techniques and similar requirements.) How many disaffected workers or managerial rivals will make false reports to the inspectorate for harassment purposes? (The right of prosecution in such circumstances would have to be extremely limited if voluntary disclosure is to play an effective role in the inspection system.) In short, the impact of the inspectorate on Soviet life would be difficult to predict in advance, and this fact alone would make the institution unattractive to Soviet leadership.

Intensive inspection would also challenge the secrecy of the Soviet state. If there were strikes in Siberia or student riots in Kazan the roaming inspectors would know about it. The whereabouts of Soviet leaders would perhaps be less of the calculated mystery it is today. The inspectors, unlike tourists or even diplomats, would not be subject to Soviet control and,

by hypothesis, would be free to go anywhere they chose. No doubt the Kremlin feels it has less to hide and more that it is eager to show than it had in Stalin's day. The numerous labor camps of the Stalin period, which, reportedly, have been sharply reduced in number under Khrushchev, simply could not have been open to international inspection any more than Hitler would have dared to reveal the extent of his macabre empire of concentration camps. Once the inspectors are admitted, however, the techniques of control open to the regime become circumscribed. A return to slave labor, police terror, or other manifestly revolting aspects of a totalitarian regime would be most difficult.

Except for extremely general statements about the inviolability of national sovereignty, none of the likely Soviet objections to inspection that I have just raised have been acknowledged or even discussed by the Soviets themselves. This fact is certainly understandable. Each of them rests primarily on what the outside world would regard as a defect of the Soviet system. The Russians have voiced one objection to inspection, however, which, although meant as propaganda, does represent a real concern: Inspection offers unparalleled opportunities for espionage. Military secrecy, which all nations endeavor of course to practice, is an absolute passion in the Soviet Union. Military information is a term of enormous breadth. The ubiquitousness of spies is part of traditional Soviet lore. Practically speaking, an inspection system would almost certainly work to the disadvantage of the Soviet Union vis-à-vis the United States. Espionage in American territory, as the array of Soviet spy cases testifies, has been a relatively easy matter. Similar opportunities in the Soviet Union are much more limited. Thus effective inspection would act as an intelligence equalizer (or, in franker Soviet terminology, an espionage equalizer), if the inspection agency were to communicate its findings to national governments.

For this reason the Soviets have been especially worried

about the problem of timing. They periodically charge the West with wanting inspection before disarmament, since the West has usually insisted that the inspection system begin functioning before substantial nuclear disarmament takes place. Why should we let you scour our territory for military secrets, the Russians ask, while you still retain the power to destroy us? How do we know your inspectors aren't engaged in sighting in targets? Let us all disarm first, and then you may look. The American answer is obvious: Then it may be too late!

None the less, there is considerable justification for the Soviet point. Inspection exposes many vulnerabilities in the Soviet system and involves a substantial disadvantage for the Soviet Union if after the exposure it is still subject to atomic attack. For this reason, paradoxically, the solution to the inspection problem seems easier in the context of an agreement for complete or substantial disarmament than in connection with a more modest arms control arrangement. There will always be a problem of timing, however. For example, those military instruments needed for attack that seem easiest to subject to inspection, such as missiles, aircraft, launching sites, and other delivery equipment, may represent the most valuable and closely guarded secrets. Generally speaking, it is the latest fruits of military research that are easiest to control, because their numbers are limited, but these are the very instruments of war nations least like to disclose. Hence, the Soviets are anxious to reveal much of their military information not at the beginning of the disarmament program, as the West would like, but at the end. However, the Russians have indicated, at least in general terms, that they would accept comprehensive inspection as part of a general disarmament plan and would be willing to establish the inspection system before actual arms reductions occurred. The details as to the scope of such inspection have never been worked out. But in fairness to the Russians it must be said that since 1955 we have never been willing to discuss inspection in the context of

any disarmament agreement calling for substantial reduction of nuclear stockpiles. They have made it plain that they will accept much less inspection in connection with partial disarmament than they would in connection with an agreement aimed at the elimination of atomic weapons.

The Russian position on inspection has changed considerably over the years. The initial Soviet plan offered in June 1946 as counterproposal to the Baruch proposals did not even mention inspection, and none was to be mentioned for another eight months. In February 1947, Gromyko agreed to "inspection, supervision, and management" (the word "management" was deleted two weeks later) of all atomic plants.⁵⁵ The following June he agreed to include mining facilities within the inspection system but made it clear that inspection was to be "periodic" rather than "continuous." Special investigations were also to be permitted, but "normally" the inspectors would visit only at such times and places as they were expected.⁵⁶

Originally, the Russians had insisted that the inspectors would have to be nationals of the country to which they were sent, but a year after the Baruch proposals were presented they agreed to inspection personnel "selected on an international basis." They also agreed that the international inspectorate should carry on atomic research, although they rejected Baruch's idea that the international agency monopolize such research.⁵⁷

Another five years were to pass before the Soviets agreed to the principle of continuous inspection, and then with the ambiguous proviso that the inspectors could not interfere "in domestic affairs."⁵⁸ In the May 10, 1955, proposals, the Russians agreed to the establishment of ground control posts at large ports, railway junctions, main highways, and airfields, although the timing of the various inspection rights was not made entirely clear. The following year the inspection proposals were further amplified. Ground controls were to be applied to foreign bases as well as the territories of the signa-

tories. Objects of control would include military units, military stores and ammunition, naval and air bases, and factories manufacturing conventional arms. The detailed description of objects of control did not include atomic facilities, since the 1956 plan, in an effort to meet Western desires at the time, did not relate to nuclear control.⁵⁹ What specific details on inspection for atomic facilities the Russians are prepared to accept in the event of substantial nuclear disarmament have never been revealed, because since 1955 the West has been reluctant to consider disarmament on this scale.

After initially rejecting them, the Russians have also acceded to Western ideas on aerial photography. In 1956 they agreed to aerial inspection of Europe, not including the Soviet Union, as a first stage in a disarmament program. In 1957 they expanded the projected inspection zone and agreed to more ground control posts, although they now refused to have such posts at airfields unless the West agreed to the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons. In 1958 at the Geneva Conference of Experts called to study the technical requirements of a ban on atomic testing, the Soviet representatives agreed to the establishment of 170 control posts around the world, each staffed with thirty persons.⁶⁰ The Soviets have tentatively agreed that twenty-one such posts should be located on Soviet soil.

As hopeful a sign as Soviet acceptance of realistic inspection would be, Soviet cooperation in solving the enforcement problem would be perhaps an even more important indication of its good faith, for an effective enforcement system demands a greater surrender of sovereignty than inspection does. Since the days of the Baruch Plan, however, the Soviets have shown no interest whatever in any system of international sanctions. The Baruch Plan, it will be recalled, had at its core the idea of "punishment" of atomic aggressors. Each signatory was to agree in advance that it would not veto the use of sanctions against itself if a majority of the United Nations voted to im-

pose them. The Russians dismissed this idea as an affront to national sovereignty. Actually, it was an unrealistic proposal, since any provocation by a great power that would merit the use of force as punishment would inevitably result in war, and at that point whatever legal procedures that had been established would break down. The Russians' own proposal that sanctions be established by national legislation was even more unrealistic, for it was unlikely that the Minister of Justice would prosecute the Minister of Defense for concealing atom bombs.

The problem of enforcement remains the central problem of the disarmament riddle. In recent years the United States has insisted on retaining a substantial portion of its nuclear force to insure compliance with a disarmament agreement. This solution to the enforcement problem of course makes substantial nuclear disarmament impossible, and accordingly does little to remove the essential threat of atomic war.

Is there any means of enforcing a disarmament agreement short of war itself? The inspection system itself cannot do it. Fear of detection can act as a restraint in the face of temptation, but once the decision to evade is made, there is little the inspectors can do. True, unintentional violations may arise, and when these are detected the delinquent power will presumably prevent their recurrence. But unintentional evasions are obviously not the major danger. If the Soviets decided to evade the agreement and prepare for an attack, they would, if they followed their present pattern, begin with small and ambiguous violations—minor harassments of the inspectors or concealment of a small quantity of fissionable material. If these violations were detected, the United States would then have to make the same kind of painful decision it must make today: What is an appropriate response to “nibbling” infringements of the international order? The difference would be that, after having disarmed, its range of choice would be more limited. Should it deliver an ultimatum? Rearm in secret?

Attack when ready? In the face of unilateral Soviet rearmament or clandestine stockpiles each of these choices would involve a fearful risk.

A disarmament agreement that depends exclusively on self-policing is inherently less stable than one in which the signatories have agreed in advance on the enforcement machinery each will accept. During the war considerable enthusiasm was expressed for the idea of an international police force. At the Dumbarton Oaks Conference in 1943 the Russians actually proposed an international air force to be made up of volunteers from the member states.⁶¹ It has always been clear, however, that the Soviets never intended to subject themselves to the power of an international army; although they have been quite willing, as the Suez crisis indicates, to join in enforcing international law against others.

Immediately after World War II a number of statesmen, including Anthony Eden, called for a revision of traditional ideas of sovereignty in the light of the unprecedented atomic challenge. In presenting his proposals Baruch made the same argument. The Soviets, however, have resisted the idea of any substantial infringement of national sovereignty, a concept they devoted considerable effort to transforming into a moral virtue. As the Soviet delegate to the U.N. International Law Commission put it, "If Soviet statesmen fought for the principle of sovereignty it was because the principle protected democratic governments and encouraged the battle against world domination by one group."⁶²

The Soviets have thus been unwilling to restrict their sovereignty to the point of accepting the judgment of an international legal authority in any matter touching their national interest. The Soviets share the general reluctance of all sovereign governments to submit to decisions not of their own making, an attitude which has also been extremely strong in the United States, as evidenced by the "Connally Reservation" limiting our acceptance of the jurisdiction of the World Court.

In addition, the Soviets have a special concern that they will not be fairly treated by international tribunals. "Only an angel could be unbiased about the Soviet Union," Litvinoff once remarked.

As the years of their diplomatic isolation fade into the background and their international prestige rises, however, it is possible that the Soviets might reconsider their long-standing aversion to international adjudication of political questions. Certainly an essential precondition to such a development would be a demonstration of enthusiasm for a strong international judiciary from the United States. In 1946 Gromyko appeared skeptical that the U.S. Congress would ever accept the control features of the Baruch Plan, and he may well have been right. The Russian correctly sensed that the United States was not in a position to put much pressure on the Soviet Union to sacrifice part of its own sovereignty, since the ultimate American stand on the same issue was most uncertain. So today the Russians could only be induced to accept some form of international arbitration if there were powerful backing for the idea in the non-Soviet world. The Russians have on occasions shown serious regard for world opinion. The reversal of the Soviet stand on aerial photography was in large measure due to public pressure, for the "open skies" plan appealed to the popular imagination. Soviet willingness to accept the jurisdiction of an international judicial authority, even for a limited range of decisions, would be a hopeful sign that the Soviets were really interested in stabilizing international relations. While it is true that a judicial body without any physical means of enforcing its judgments offers something less than a guarantee of stability, it would provide a more rational technique for solving problems arising under a disarmament agreement than its present alternatives.

Just as no inspection system can prevent a calculated effort at evasion, so no enforcement system can deter a power bent on rearming. But solemn public undertakings of nations

do exercise considerable influence over their foreign policies, and a pattern of acquiescence in the decisions of an international tribunal would in time create a precedent of considerable moral force. Thus disputes arising under the disarmament agreement might be successfully handled in this way. How quickly an unenforceable pledge can establish itself as a precedent and how much influence it can then exert is indicated by the Eisenhower Administration's gratuitous promise to call a moratorium on atomic testing. Although the President has subsequently announced that the United States feels free to resume full-scale weapons testing, the actual decision to do so would be extremely difficult in view of past commitments and public pressure. The Soviet Union is under similar pressure to extend its unilateral pledges not to conduct nuclear bomb tests.

How significant would these changes in the Soviet approach to international relations actually be? How reliable an indication of good faith are they? Individually, perhaps, neither the cessation of propaganda, nor the acceptance of inspection, nor the agreement to be bound by the international tribunal would be a sufficiently reliable sign to justify the plunge into the unknown that substantial disarmament must always be. Taken together, such factors would present an extremely encouraging pattern, and in a world where progress along these lines had taken place complete disarmament would represent less of a risk than a continuation of the arms race.

Are these changes impossible? If they are, substantial disarmament on terms the United States can rationally accept is impossible, and efforts to reach this impossible goal should be abandoned. But to date we have yet to make clear why it is that we recoil at the idea of complete disarmament. We are wrong to assume that the Soviet Union knows the real basis for our objection, for no government has the image of itself that its rivals have. And a government like the Soviet Union, which has its own peculiar moral justification for everything

it does, is even less likely to have an objective view of its own activities. If our present pessimistic assumptions about the Soviet Union are immutable, let us not talk about disarmament. It does not improve international relations or ease tensions to have arms talks that are bound to fail. It does little to build confidence in diplomacy to see the leading statesmen of the world playing a game with an issue that means life or death. We ought then to consider other measures at once less hopeful and less risky, and this I propose to do in the next section on arms control.

However, if we accept the idea that the Soviet Union has not and cannot stand still, we ought to decide if there are any conceivable changes that might take place in our own time—short of the unlikely day Walter Lippmann mentions when all Soviet babies will be born with wings, singing “God Bless America”—which would make us willing to enter into an agreement with them for the substantial elimination of nuclear and conventional weapons. If we are in a position to influence the course of some of those changes, we should make a massive effort to decide how best to do it. Without setting our security requirements higher than necessary or seeking a settlement that would be obviously disadvantageous to the Soviet Union, we should decide what our minimum security needs are and what the Communist movement would have to do and become before we could dare give up our reliance on weapons. Planning of this sort has a fantastic air, it is true, because the situation planned for is unprecedented. Predicting how the Soviet Union or the United States would behave in a disarmed world is an enormously difficult task, but we have scarcely made a start.

Arms Control: Road to Disarmament or Blind Alley?

Despite the agreement on numerous technical issues that has been achieved in the fifteen years of disarmament negotiations, present prospects for substantial disarmament, either in nuclear or conventional weapons, are not bright. If the two basic premises of U.S. policy are correct—first, that the Soviet Union would be very likely to violate a disarmament agreement if it could do so without detection, and second, that there is no machinery available to insure either the detection or the prevention of such a violation—any agreement that would impair the deterrent power of the United States would not be a rational policy. The soundness of the first premise has just been considered in the previous section. As for the second premise, it is reasonably clear that a perfect system of inspection is an impossibility, although an agreement for complete disarmament would become a reasonable risk if the opportunities for undetected violations could be reduced to an acceptable level. There is a question, however, whether the efficiency of inspection techniques can keep pace with the increasing opportunities for evasion offered by mobile weapons.

If disarmament to the point of impairing our power to retaliate is logically unacceptable either on account of the political or technical premises just mentioned, is there an alternative means of curbing the arms race? Is there a middle ground between an unrestrained competition of armaments on the one hand, and complete disarmament on the other? Is it

possible to approach the problem of armament by taking a few modest steps towards disarmament?

In view of the fact that neither side has seemed willing to assume the risks of nuclear disarmament in the present world, the emphasis of the negotiations in recent years has shifted from the ambitious proposals of the early atomic age to a number of more limited solutions to the arms problem. Such solutions are usually termed measures of "partial disarmament," "limited disarmament," or "arms control," and these terms have been the subject of considerable confusion. They have been used to describe measures for limited disarmament of conventional forces, for the gradual reduction of atomic stocks, and for the control of weapons delivery systems. In all of the above situations the use of the term "disarmament" seems accurate; each of them involves a reduction in the capacity to make war. But agreements to ban atomic testing, to limit the savagery of war, to conduct aerial reconnaissance, or to withdraw troops from specified areas have also been described as "partial disarmament," and here the term is somewhat misleading. None of these would affect the war-making capacity of the major nuclear powers. Aerial reconnaissance would not in itself deter a surprise attack, and a test ban would in no way decrease the danger of existing stockpiles, which are sufficient to wipe out all the participants in any future atomic war. Inaccurate nomenclature creates unwarranted confidence that progress towards disarmament has been made and tends to pacify the public pressure for arms reduction, which ultimately may be the most hopeful force now at work in the world.

It is important, therefore, to distinguish measures of "partial" disarmament which are steps on the road to comprehensive disarmament from such partial measures that are ends in themselves. Phasing has been an important and controversial aspect of all disarmament plans of the post-war period, particularly those envisaging a substantially disarmed world

as their final stage. No one has ever thought that the world armaments burden could be exercised with the signing of a disarmament treaty. The Russian proposal to accomplish this result in four years has never been taken seriously by anyone familiar with the problems involved.

Thus every proposal for substantial disarmament necessarily includes measures of partial disarmament as way stations towards the ultimate goal. What distinguishes a substantial disarmament agreement from a partial disarmament agreement is the presence of a commitment by the signatories to proceed from stage to stage according to a pre-determined schedule. The Russians have generally insisted on a built-in timetable of disarmament while the West has generally resisted the idea, preferring to reserve its decision whether to go on from one stage to another until satisfied that the disarmament machinery is working satisfactorily. Indeed, during the negotiations of 1957 the West insisted that the achievement of "progress towards" specified political settlements, such as the reunification of Germany, should be a prerequisite to moving into the second stage of disarmament.¹ A disarmament program in which each participant is free to withdraw at any point, however (even though he may be bound not to restore the military power he has already reduced), is not one which the participants can safely treat as an agreement for complete disarmament.

The purpose of a complete disarmament agreement is so to reduce the war-making capacity of nations, under a system of inspection that will make evasion unlikely, that war will be less probable than under the present arms race. In view of the limitations of inspection, however, it is scarcely possible to make a commitment for complete disarmament at the outset unless the estimate of the intentions of all probable adversaries appears reliable and offers reasonably hopeful prospects. But the United States has pressed its security requirements beyond this point. We have suggested that even if we were satis-

fied that present Communist leaders would not violate a disarmament agreement, we would still hesitate to undertake such a commitment because

in the ten years ahead, and in the decades thereafter, some nation might suddenly have and exercise a tremendous overpowering military force against all other nations solely by reason of having within its hands a clandestinely developed and secretly maintained storehouse of multi-megaton bombs.²

Such an attitude would exclude substantial disarmament for all time. True, the United States could not reasonably commit itself to nuclear disarmament until we had obtained a credible estimate of Communist intentions that would offer us rational hope as to their behavior in a disarmed world. However, to receive present assurance concerning the attitudes of future Soviet governments or the intentions of other nations that may rise to power in the years to come is clearly impossible. If such assurance is essential to our security, then all talk of complete nuclear disarmament is nonsense. In the light of such reasoning the abolition of nuclear stockpiles cannot come either at the beginning or the end of the disarmament schedule because the risk of future violations can never be entirely eliminated.

If the maintenance of a deterrent power is considered a more reliable means of preserving peace with freedom than efforts to eliminate weapons of mass destruction, the question arises: are there lesser measures of disarmament that might reduce the risk of war?

Manpower Reductions and Disengagement

Since 1955, the United States has taken the official position that measures of partial disarmament would "build confidence" and that the growing atmosphere of trust that initial steps towards disarmament would promote would encourage

further mutual concessions. Thus reduction of conventional arms has been treated as one such confidence-inspiring proposal. Yet when the Russians carried out substantial unilateral reductions in 1955 and 1956, the United States contended that the contraction of the Soviet army was not an occasion for rejoicing. The Administration regarded these moves as efforts at modernization which probably increased Soviet military capabilities. At approximately the same time the United States carried out a similar program which undoubtedly inspired no greater confidence in the Kremlin.

It does not seem promising, therefore, that manpower reductions will have much effect on the major source of tensions, for the fears that grip the world are primarily related to nuclear war. Since the extremely high manpower levels of the World War II era are no longer considered necessary in view of the availability of tactical atomic weapons, agreed troop reductions which still leave armies of 1½ million to 2 million men (as the United States has proposed) are not particularly significant. Armies of such strength would still be able to fight limited wars and would probably also be adequate to serve as shock contingents or occupation forces after a massive atomic attack. Only drastic reductions in forces might have an appreciable effect on world tensions.

Although violations of agreements to reduce armies, unlike agreements to destroy nuclear stockpiles, are relatively easy to police, neither the Soviet Union nor the United States has been willing to undertake radical land disarmament except as part of a "package" agreement involving conditions that have always proved unacceptable to the other. Thus Premier Khrushchev's proposal for "general and complete" disarmament called for the reduction of forces down to levels needed for internal security, but it also called for complete prohibition of atomic weapons. In 1947 the Russians insisted in the United Nations Commission for Conventional Armaments that prohibition of atomic weapons should take place prior to reductions

in conventional forces, a proposal that would have put the West in a permanently inferior military position because of the Russian superiority in troops. As mentioned earlier, the Russians for many years also proposed a flat rate one-third reduction of forces for all countries, which would have left them with a greater superiority than ever. In March 1956, the Soviets for the first time proposed a reduction of forces without any conditions relating to atomic weapons. Once again the West hesitated, explaining that the force levels they had proposed in 1954 and 1955 were meant only for a world in which substantial nuclear disarmament had taken place.³

In rejecting the Soviet proposal for conventional disarmament based on the Western powers' own figures, these nations had put themselves in the position of appearing to oppose all progress on disarmament. In effect, what the West was saying was that nuclear disarmament was impossible and since conventional disarmament was impossible without nuclear disarmament, substantial reductions of conventional forces were excluded, too. In addition, the settlement of specific political disputes,⁴ such as the reunification of Germany by free elections, was added as a new condition. In 1956 the United States offered to reduce conventional forces to 2½ million and promised further reductions to the 1½ million level offered the year before when the political settlements had occurred, but we would not give any precise indication of the timetable we had in mind because, in the words of the British delegate at the negotiations, Anthony Nutting, "the Pentagon was still not prepared to commit itself that far ahead."⁵

The changing attitudes of East and West towards conventional disarmament in 1956 provide a nearly perfect illustration of the psychology of the arms race. Before 1956 the United States had an overwhelming superiority in nuclear weapons and Russia a distinct advantage in conventional forces. It was thus natural for each side to seek to discard

weapons in which it was weak and retain those weapons in which it was strong. By 1956 the Soviets had developed a powerful atomic capacity, had probably reduced significantly the United States lead in nuclear weapons, and were willing therefore to abandon previous commitments for "banning the bomb." Confronted with this disquieting development, the West tended to resist any significant degree of disarmament. The episode indicates that while a military build-up may be helpful in keeping the lid on specific political situations such as Berlin or Formosa, confronting an adversary with situations of strength does not make him rush to disarm.

Like force reductions, disengagement is an arms control solution that is intended to reduce tensions without removing the capability of attack. In recent years various proposals have been made, in the West by Anthony Eden and George Kennan, and in the East by the Polish Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki, under which certain specified areas in Europe would be purged of men and weapons. Although the details of the several suggestions vary, they share a common purpose: the creation of a buffer area between East and West. The theory behind these proposals is that if a large array of forces were not confronting each other at close range in the heart of Europe, tensions would subside. The idea of a pull-back has a certain aesthetic appeal. The prospect of armies retiring to their garrisons and evacuating forward positions seems like progress.

Unfortunately, however, the presence of the large armies in Europe is far more a result than a cause of tension. It is true that disengagement would reduce the likelihood of border incidents, and it is also true that demilitarized zones have been at least partially effective in localized conflicts such as the rivalry for the Gaza strip, where, but for physical separation, Egyptian and Israeli armies would constantly clash. But border incidents are not likely to spark off a general war. In the fifteen years of cold war there have been enough plane

shootings and similar incidents to provide provocation for a series of wars. For obvious reasons the tacit convention has developed between the United States and the Soviet Union not to treat such occurrences as a *casus belli*. Even the admittedly deliberate incursion of an American reconnaissance plane did not incite the Soviets to military retaliation beyond shooting down the plane itself.

The large troop concentrations in Europe are not regarded by either side as the primary danger, for the decisive battles of future wars are not likely to be clashes of ground forces. Why then are the troops there? American forces are in Europe to symbolize the immediate involvement of the United States in any attack on the continent. Russian forces are there because the Soviet Union derives political and military advantages from a forward position. Were it to withdraw its troops behind its own borders, they would still be available on short notice for an attack on the continent.

Thus like most partial disarmament schemes that are designed to take effect within the context of a continuing military rivalry, the disengagement idea, depending upon the particular terms adopted, could work to the substantial disadvantage of one side or the other. Paul H. Nitze, formerly Director of the Policy Planning Staff of the State Department under the Truman administration, writes that there were those in the State Department in 1948 who favored the "symmetrical" withdrawal of American troops from Europe in return for a Russian withdrawal behind the Bug River because Soviet influence in Eastern Europe would thereby diminish and Germany would eventually be reunified on terms acceptable to the West. For this reason there seemed no possibility that the Russians would accept the idea, and this conviction was completely confirmed at the 1949 Council of Foreign Ministers at Paris.⁶ Today it is difficult to see how any disengagement could avoid resulting in a military disadvantage to the West, for if ground forces have any deterrent role of their own to

play in the defense of Europe, removal of American forces from the continent would increase the risk of either attack or gradual infiltration.

Another argument against disengagement which is often made is that it causes a political vacuum which results sooner or later in a penetration by the power that is best able to make the attempt. The withdrawal of American troops from South Korea a few months before the June 1950 invasion is an example of this danger.⁷ Disengagement after a period of intensive cold war would introduce a number of new and essentially unpredictable factors into a relatively stable although unsatisfactory situation. Thus growing uncertainty might heighten anxieties rather than build confidence.

The Control of Atomic Tests

Would a moratorium or a ban on the testing of nuclear weapons increase confidence and provide a basis for genuine disarmament? Supporters of this measure have given primary emphasis to the necessity of reducing the world radiation hazard rather than the political implications of stopping the tests. Soviet propaganda has insisted that an immediate end to the tests is essential to remove the immediate threat of radiation-caused sickness and the future threat of harmful genetic changes. Many scientists in the United States agree with this position. Others take a more conservative view.⁸ All are agreed, however, that any substantial increase in the world radiation level is highly undesirable.

The political implications of a test ban are at least as important as the public health aspects, however. The tests are represented by military leaders and scientists as being essential to further weapons research. In our time the nub of the arms race is not competitive accumulation of weapons but competitive research. With stockpiles as high as they are on both

sides, a major breakthrough in the race is likely to come about through development of qualitatively different weapons and, perhaps more important, mechanisms for their delivery. An effective ban on testing would retard military research, though it would not end it altogether. Moreover, a universal ban on testing would materially help prevent nations which have not yet acquired the capacity to develop nuclear weapons from obtaining such a capacity. This consequence of an end to weapons testing would also have an important braking effect on the arms race.

Originally, the United States opposed any ban on testing that was not a part of a general disarmament agreement. Since we were unwilling after 1955 to consider seriously measures for substantial nuclear disarmament, this meant in effect that the test ban issue was nonnegotiable, too. In 1956 the United States offered to limit atomic tests but continued to resist an absolute ban. In 1958, in response to mounting pressure from the Western allies and neutral nations (it was India that first suggested the idea of a ban on tests), we agreed to a conference of experts to discuss the technical feasibility of an enforceable test ban agreement. The decision to hold the meeting of experts was designed to placate public opinion,⁹ but the political implications of the move were not adequately considered.¹⁰

It was predictable that the experts would arrive at favorable findings on the technical issues, for a U.S. scientific team under Dr. James Killian had come to the same general conclusions the previous spring.¹¹ But Washington was not adequately prepared for progress in this area any more than it had been in the matter of nuclear disarmament or conventional disarmament, for it had not yet decided whether a ban even under the best of conditions was desirable. And the decision is yet to be made. The Atomic Energy Commission and the Pentagon have continuously opposed the test ban, because they believe that the United States must stay ahead of the Russians in weapons technology. They have evinced con-

siderable interest in developing smaller nuclear weapons that can be used in limited battlefield situations without inflicting devastation on surrounding civilian populations. Research on the "clean bomb" must be continued, it is argued, not only for humanitarian reasons but to provide our forces with workable weapons that will not have a suicidal effect.

After negotiations of the nuclear testing issue were opened, the United States, following the lead of the Soviet Union, announced a unilateral suspension of further test explosions for a specified period. The period was renewed once, and although the President subsequently announced that the United States would resume atomic explosions for nonweapons purposes, it is unlikely that we could conduct a full-scale program of bomb detonations, in the absence of a marked deterioration in relations with Russia, without incurring massive opposition around the world. While the negotiations for a controlled test ban agreement dragged on for many months, a *de facto* agreement without any controls whatsoever was actually in effect.

The *de facto* agreement not to conduct test explosions undoubtedly improved the atmosphere, but it did relatively little to improve the political atmosphere. The mere suspension of tests did not encourage either side to think that each other's crash research programs, the ultimate threats, were being discontinued. Both Washington and Moscow viewed the unilateral decisions of the other as political gambits—a part of, not a cessation of, the cold war.

Although the mere absence of testing does not contribute significantly to the building of mutual confidence, particularly since both stocks and research levels are already very high on both sides, a controlled agreement providing for a reasonable amount of inspection is another matter. After many months of negotiation the Soviets agreed to permit limited numbers of internationally selected scientific personnel to be stationed in the Soviet Union with seismographic equipment. They

were to have the right to make a limited number (the exact number is still a matter of contention) of on-the-spot checks of Soviet facilities without any Russian interference. Despite original Soviet suggestions to the contrary, the Soviets finally agreed that there would be no veto of day-to-day operations of the inspection personnel.

It should be noted that the Soviets have taken a much more cautious position with regard to inspection for test bans than they have with respect to disarmament. They have never demanded a veto right over day-to-day operations of the inspection authority in any of their disarmament proposals¹² and have offered to give a disarmament inspectorate much freer access inside the Soviet Union than they would be willing to give to test ban monitors. As they themselves have explained it, control without disarmament is unacceptable; the more disarmament, the greater sacrifices for control they are willing to make.

However, even the limited inspection system on which substantial agreement has been achieved would be a significant step towards more comprehensive inspection. For the first time, we would have a practical laboratory to study the operation of an inspection agency and could learn something of the problems such an agency faces. It is true that the strain placed on a test monitoring agency would be considerably less than the burden a disarmament inspection agency would have to bear because continuing the tests is probably not a life-or-death issue to either side. Nonetheless, the administration of a test ban agreement would offer some indication of the good faith of the participants.

Moreover, any penetration of the Soviet Union by an international inspection agency would have a significance transcending that of the testing issue itself. The presence inside the Soviet Union of several hundred inspectors—a figure which the Soviets appear willing to accept—would be an important symbolic break with the past. For the first time,

Soviet citizens would be subject to the authority of international personnel. To be sure, the activity of the inspectors would be limited in scope; the authority to inspect specific events is far different from the roving commission to inquire into all phases of national life that the inspectors under a comprehensive disarmament program would need. Nevertheless, a start would be made in the direction of more general inspection. Having accepted the idea of international surveillance on their own soil, it would be difficult for the Soviets to oppose more comprehensive inspection for disarmament as a matter of principle.

What are the risks? Briefly stated, they are that "small" (Hiroshima-strength or less) underground explosions could escape detection. Although research conducted after the Geneva experts conference indicated that atmospheric explosions would be easier to detect than had previously been thought,¹³ it turned out that underground explosions up to 20 kilotons were more difficult to distinguish from earthquakes than had originally been anticipated.¹⁴

Although the Berkner Panel on Seismic Improvements¹⁵ concluded that the efficiency of the Geneva system would be greatly improved, it must be assumed that under any system of inspection presently foreseeable some risk that some small explosions may go undetected will remain. However, the significant question in considering a test ban is not whether the risk of evasion exists but how important is the risk.

Here we venture into an area shrouded in technical complexity and, to a considerable degree, in military secrecy. If the Russians were to forge ahead in the development of highly accurate delivery systems through which weapons could be trained on our world-wide network of bases, they would have a good chance of achieving the destruction of our retaliatory capacity. Having neutralized our vaunted "strike-back" power, they would have scored a breakthrough in the balance of terror which might mean either our capitulation or destruction.

Whether the opportunity to conduct secret tests of low-yield nuclear bombs would materially aid such research has never been made clear, but former Atomic Energy Chairman Strauss has testified that perfection of delivery systems would continue after tests had stopped.¹⁶

Mere improvement of Russian low-yield weapons would not seem to constitute much of an additional military threat to the United States at this stage of the arms race. The weapons would have to be qualitatively different in some way to become a significant factor in the military balance of power. It is true that the qualitative difference could be of a psychological rather than mechanical nature. Thus a weapon that was peculiarly able to dramatize its destructive force, like the Hiroshima bomb, might terrorize an enemy into surrender even though weapons of equivalent explosive power were already available.

Some advocates of continued atomic testing have expressed the fear, therefore, that the "clean" nuclear explosive might afford a similar psychological advantage to the nation that succeeded in producing it first. As Edward Teller expressed it in testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Disarmament, the danger of an agreement to suspend tests honored by the United States and dishonored by the Soviet Union would be that

some day, five years from now, 10 years from now, the Russians may announce "We have clean explosives with which we can serve the good of mankind." They would thereby achieve a greater victory than sputnik and a successful economic offensive put together.¹⁷

Moreover, Dr. Teller continued, if the Soviets were to use clean bombs in any future war and the West had to resort to dirty bombs, because that was all they had, "we would have no way of replying, and we would stand by completely helpless."¹⁸

One wonders, however, how important a psychological advantage the Soviet Union would really derive in either of the

above eventualities. A sudden announcement that the Russians had developed an explosive for "peaceful purposes" in violation of a solemn pledge not to carry on any explosions at all would hardly be calculated to win esteem for the Soviets. Such a situation would be unlike the development of the sputnik, which was an achievement towards which other nations were openly striving in the name of science. It would hardly have the same appeal as an economic offensive, since underdeveloped nations need food, machinery, and other basic industrial equipment more than they do "peaceful atomic explosions." True, the Soviet Union might offer to assist other countries with essential blasting operations, but in most instances conventional explosives would be adequate for these purposes. Should our attitude towards atomic testing be seriously influenced by the possibility that in a few cases the Soviet Union might make a spectacular atomic demonstration that would immediately brand it as having committed a breach of faith?

The possibility of a sudden use in war of "clean" bombs which had been developed as a result of secret explosions presents a more serious problem. If the Soviet Union should confine its use of nuclear arms to those weapons that cause a minimum of radiation hazard to the civil population, the United States, it is true, would be subject to considerable pressure not to reply with fallout-producing bombs. In limited wars, therefore, the Soviets might derive some advantage in perfecting smaller, fallout-free weapons by virtue of having conducted secret low-yield tests in violation of a suspension agreement. An argument along these lines is significant, however, only on the assumption that *limited* atomic wars are a likely form of conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. As for massive, all-out wars, it would seem that the more convincingly the prospects of destruction of the Soviet homeland can be presented, the more effectively the principle of deterrence will operate upon Soviet leadership.

Thus development of "clean" nuclear weapons is not likely to help stave off a total war.

Moreover, good reasons exist not to want the "clean" bomb at all. In 1957 Jules Moch pointed out in the Disarmament Subcommittee that the production of the so-called improved weapon would seriously complicate the task of eventual nuclear weapons control and inspection. As Philip Noel-Baker explains it:

The making of *fissile* material [used in existing "dirty" bombs] requires extensive plants, which cannot be concealed; the making of *fusionable* lithium deuteride . . . for H-bombs [the basic process is similar to that of the proposed fission-free "clean" bombs] is done by electrolysis, and the necessary installation can be relatively small. The raw materials are so abundant that no control of them would be possible at all. In fact, "clean" bombs are now the next great danger in the arms race, and the strongest of all reasons for stopping tests.¹⁹

The Prevention of Surprise Attack

Measures for the prevention of surprise attack have been widely hailed in the United States as a "first step" towards disarmament. Since the days of President Eisenhower's "open skies" proposal, reconnaissance schemes have been advanced for the purpose of developing, to use the President's words, "mutual confidence." Trust, all agree, is a precondition of substantial disarmament.

In 1956 and 1957 the United States and the Soviet Union brought their respective positions on aerial photography closer together. The United States proposed combining the system of ground control units suggested by the Russians with some measure of air reconnaissance. The Russians agreed in principle, but since each side was bent on inspecting those areas where it believed the other had the greatest concentration of bases, no agreement was reached on the geographical limits of the inspection zone.²⁰

In 1958, at the suggestion of the United States, a conference of experts was called to study the technical aspects of safeguarding against surprise attack. The West submitted detailed inspection programs it considered necessary to control the instruments of surprise attack, such as long-range aircraft, ballistic missiles, and underwater craft. A variety of technical devices including photography, acoustic, magnetic, and pressure techniques, infra-red photography, and many others were suggested. The Soviets rejected the basic idea of comprehensive inspection without any actual reduction of weapons strength, and the conference ended in failure.

Recently the French have renewed the appeal for control of the development, production, and possession of vehicles of delivery for nuclear weapons.²¹ For the short time remaining before missiles in great numbers are fully operational and capable of being easily concealed below ground, the best hope of stopping the arms race lies in controlling the delivery systems. It is too late to locate all the bombs, but it may not be too late to identify and put under international control all but an insignificant number of delivery devices.

A program of "controlling" missiles and other means of delivery, i.e., locating them, counting them, and destroying them or rendering them harmless, and a program of "inspecting" missiles have one thing in common. They are both designed to prevent surprise attacks. But they are fundamentally different in approach. The first is truly a disarmament measure because it reduces the *capacity* for launching a surprise attack. It may still be possible to account for enough of the total world supply of delivery devices to make a surprise massive attack extremely unlikely. While it may be true that bombs can be delivered in suitcases by secret agents,²² the likelihood of a nation risking its destiny on that kind of operation is remote. To be successful, a surprise attack against the United States would have to be launched on a massive scale. For this reason, a system of control that could account for a large proportion

of the world supply of delivery devices would significantly reduce the risk of a deliberately launched war. Although the bombs would remain, their threat would be substantially removed. With their use neutralized, it would be reasonable to hope that actual destruction of the weapons would soon follow. Thus control of delivery systems is a measure of "partial" disarmament that holds high promise of leading to further disarmament.

A program that provided for inspection rather than elimination of missiles and aircraft would not reduce the capacity for surprise attack. Thus it would not in itself lead to any disarmament. In fact, the basic theory behind such a scheme is actually antithetical to the idea of disarmament. Advocates of weapons reduction contend that the existence of weapons heightens tension and increases the risk of war. They point to instances of history where conspicuous rearmament or a show of strength have brought on war. Advocates of measures to prevent surprise attack through inspection alone make a quite different point. They deny that the mere existence of the weapons is provocative provided they are held in readiness to defend rather than to attack. Proposals for the control or dismantling of missiles are designed to prevent all attacks, whether launched by surprise or not; inspection schemes are calculated merely to reduce the temptation of surprise. By reducing the capacity to attack, an agreement for effective control provides objective verification of the decreasing likelihood of war. In other words, each side receives assurance that the other is *incapable* of launching a massive attack because it lacks the instruments to carry it out. Inspection schemes, however, are based on the premise that without the benefit of surprise an aggressor is *unlikely* to attack. Thus, such proposals focus on the intentions of a potential aggressor rather than his capacity. According to this theory, the final restraint on any aggressor is the knowledge that he will gain no advan-

tage by a surprise blow and that he will face devastating retaliation for any attempt.

Thus inspection schemes do not replace or modify the balance of terror. They are designed to make it more stable and reduce some of its risks. Essentially, there are two kinds of risk in the present balance of terror. First, there always remains the risk that despite the obvious dangers involved in launching a massive atomic attack, an aggressor might decide to do it anyway. What deterrence does an inspection system provide in this situation? This would depend upon the importance of the element of surprise in an aggressor's calculations, because it cannot be emphasized too often that the inspection system is directed only against the element of surprise.

The surprise factor could become important to an aggressor if a sudden blow offered any hope of knocking out his victim's retaliatory force at the same time he carried out his own massive onslaught. If an aggressor is able to foresee such a situation, the balance of terror is broken, for he can count on delivering his blow with relative impunity. At present, a surprise attack is particularly dangerous for the defender because many of his delivery instruments present stationary targets that can be destroyed before they have the chance to carry out their mission. With the warning that an inspection would provide, the potential victim can move his retaliatory weapons out of range or even launch a preventive attack of his own. Thus surprise attack becomes less attractive and the deterrent effect of the mutual terror is strengthened.²³ It may be true that as retaliatory weapons become more mobile, as in the case of atomic submarines, or more easily concealed, as in the case of missiles sheltered under the surface of the earth, a surprise attack will constitute less of a peril for a defender than it does today, and that consequently measures to prevent surprise attack will decline in importance. In any event, it is important to realize that inspection schemes give no greater

protection nor greater assurance than the balance of terror itself. They are not a substitute for the arms race but only a means of making its course more predictable.

Some have suggested that after a system of inspection had been in effect for some time and neither side had made any aggressive moves towards the other, each side would become reassured about the peaceful intentions of the other. But the fact that the enemy has waited a long time to attack does not in itself give real cause for confidence. The United States has made its plans on the assumption that the Russians would attack whenever their leaders believe the risks favor such a move, and not before. The mere absence of an attack for any specified period should not encourage either side to relax if the arms race continues. For this reason, elaborate schemes to prevent surprise attack may actually increase our danger by encouraging false confidence.

The Russians have been antagonistic to any control measures that merely minimize the risk of surprise and leave the capacity to attack. For some time, however, they have realized the importance of the element of surprise. Although in Stalin's day Soviet military doctrine disparaged the role of surprise, and blitzkrieg tactics were denounced as "adventurism," in 1955 a new line of thinking was introduced. "In certain cases," Soviet Marshal Rotmistrov wrote in an official Soviet military journal,

surprise attack with the massive employment of the new weapons can provoke the quick collapse of a state whose capability for resistance is low as a result of basic failures of its social and economic structure, and also of an unfavorable geographical location.²⁴

Since then Soviet military experts writing in official public sources have expressed the opinion from time to time that a major atomic war is likely to start with a surprise attack by the United States.

It is impossible to know whether the Soviets actually fear the possibility of a United States surprise attack, but

it seems reasonable to assume that they do. They are not likely to credit the United States with the altruistic motives with which we credit ourselves. Nor are they likely to ignore or even put in proper perspective various statements that have appeared in the American press relating to preventive war. Any military moves of the United States, even though their intent may be purely defensive, are likely to be exaggerated in the light of Communist ideological preconceptions about the aggressive nature of capitalist society. Thus the Russians may well have an interest in reducing the likelihood of a *deliberate* surprise attack. But so far, at least to the Kremlin, such assurance has not been worth the disadvantages a comprehensive system for preventing surprise attack would entail.

In addition to reducing the risks of deliberate atomic war, schemes for preventing surprise attack are also intended to minimize the danger of the so-called accidental war. The balance of terror can be upset by a deliberate calculation to accept the risks of a holocaust, but it is the prevailing opinion today that it is more likely to be upset by a miscalculation. To keep the balance stable each side must know two things. First, it must know that the other side still retains crushing retaliatory power, and second, that the other is not planning an imminent attack. Even if one side is conscious of the other's power, he may attack anyway if he is convinced that his adversary is about to launch an attack of his own. The inspection system is designed to provide assurance on both scores. It is a continual reminder to the would-be aggressor that his potential victim still retains a powerful retaliatory force. It is also a means of assuring the victim that certain otherwise ambiguous moves of the aggressor, such as missile firings, troop maneuvers, and flights of aircraft do not portend an imminent attack.

One of the sources of instability in the present balance of terror is its dependence upon accurate communication and rational human response. Neither of these is entirely predictable, particularly in times of high stress. As weapons become

more automatic in operation, as the importance of human control over them diminishes, the opportunities for an accidental war through misinterpretation of the intentions of the adversary multiply. The Strategic Air Command has a so-called fail-safe procedure permitting the bombers once they are dispatched to be recalled before reaching their targets. This procedure depends upon verbal or mechanical communication which could fail. But there is not even an imperfect system of recall for a missile once it is dispatched. And, of course, an accidental dispatch of a nuclear missile may well result in a deliberate response in kind.

The Russians have often pointed out that reciprocal misapprehension could cause an accidental war. In April 1958 Gromyko remarked to the press:

After all, meteors and electronic interference are reflected on Soviet radar screens, too. If in such cases Soviet aircraft, loaded with atomic and hydrogen bombs, were to proceed in the direction of the United States and its bases in other states, the air fleets of both sides, having noticed each other somewhere over the Arctic region, under such circumstances would draw the natural conclusion that a real attack by the enemy was taking place, and mankind would find itself involved in the whirlpool of atomic war.²⁵

The Russians have conjured up the image of the appearance of a flock of geese on a radar screen leading within minutes to global disaster. They raise this specter not as an argument for reconnaissance, which they have up to now refused to consider except in conjunction with actual disarmament, but as an argument for the elimination of foreign bases and certain other concrete measures of arms reduction. It is somewhat difficult to visualize exactly how a reconnaissance system would prevent an accidental war. Some suggest that the extra minutes' notice the system would provide could be used to conduct crash negotiations to determine the true intentions of both sides. But the atmosphere of extreme tension in which these desperate talks would be held would not favor a successful outcome. A more important function of the system

would be to provide assurance that particular events inside the Soviet Union and the United States, such as missile firings, did not indicate that hostilities were about to start.

Actually, a war of mistake is less likely to come about by a bizarre mechanical accident than as a result of a political miscalculation. In an atmosphere of threats and hostility, one side is likely to misread the intentions of the other and resort to a war it does not want in order to forestall the attack it believes (perhaps erroneously) the other side is preparing in support of its political objectives. Thus if one side continually pushes its adversary to the brink of war in order to gain some political objective, neither side can ever be sure at what point war might become a deliberate choice. If the United States continues to operate under the premise that the Soviet Union will launch an atomic attack whenever it appears profitable for it to do so, a pattern of extreme provocation by the Soviet Union, even if meant as bluff, could result in sufficient panic in Washington to set off an atomic attack of our own. Similarly, "defensive" action of the United States, such as aerial incursions of the Soviet Union, may be regarded in such a completely different light by the Soviet Union as to convince them that we are determined to reach out for "security" even to the point of denying them their own. And this situation too holds serious danger of war.

Reconnaissance measures to prevent surprise attack, however, could be helpful in limited but important ways. To the extent they improved the stability of the balance of terror, they would reduce the danger of war for as long as the world continues to be "regulated" by this archaic and dangerous device. Confidence resulting from the assurance that surprise attack was less likely would help the international atmosphere. If, as part of the system, the Russians could be persuaded to accept substantial inspection, this would be, as in the test ban situation, a hopeful and significant development that might exceed in importance the reconnaissance scheme itself. But

these measures are not "first steps" to disarmament, for they are designed to make the use of armaments more practical. They do not build the kind of confidence which disarmament requires, for, if anything, they emphasize the importance and necessity of the weapons of deterrence.

Partial Nuclear Disarmament

Some claim that measures of partial disarmament can serve another, more traditional purpose. While taking the position that complete disarmament is highly unlikely and that partial steps do not necessarily lead in that direction, they assert that civilized nations can at least agree on measures to make modern war more rational. Since there is no alternative to force, they ask, cannot the nuclear powers establish a convention for themselves to keep a lid on the violence that they will one day unloose? Is it necessary that war lead to the disintegration of world civilization?

The realization that modern total war is a unique political and ideological phenomenon has only recently struck us. The century of total war, as Raymond Aron calls it, has introduced into the modern world the idea of unconditional surrender. While the technological advances of military science of the last century were designed mainly to make the defeat of an enemy army a more efficient and less costly process, military progress in our own time has been concentrated in weapons of terror designed to bring about the physical and spiritual collapse of an enemy society. Engines of mass destruction create their own psychology. Unlimited violence instills a desire for complete revenge, and the use of a terror weapon summons an even more awful response. War has become so all-consuming that destruction and punishment, rather than the political objectives for which it may have started, are regarded as its primary end.

It has been proposed, therefore, that Russia and the United States agree to retain their nuclear stockpiles but prune them of the weapons that are most likely to result in global ruin. Thomas Murray, who for seven years was an Atomic Energy Commissioner, suggests that an agreement first to stop testing and then ultimately to eliminate H-bombs of the megaton range is both feasible and rational.²⁶ As he puts it himself, what he has in mind is not disarmament but "rational armament." The megaton weapons which we have been stockpiling provide little support for our foreign policy, he argues, for we would only use them to retaliate for a massive Soviet attack. Since the principal military danger lies in the area of limited attacks, he continues, the big weapons are superfluous. Moreover, since the megaton bombs are the principal source of radioactive fallout, all nuclear powers share a common interest in eliminating these irrational weapons from their arsenals.

Humanizing war was the major objective of all early disarmament efforts. The Hague Conferences and the Geneva Convention established detailed rules for conducting hostilities. These measures were not designed to prevent the outbreak of war or "build confidence" but only to keep things from getting out of hand once the war had started. When the Baruch Plan and the Russian counterproposals were under discussion in 1946, disagreement developed among the Soviet and Western delegates as to the success of those earlier efforts in lessening the brutality of war. The Soviets pointed to the fact that poison gas was not employed in World War II and argued that similar moral commitments even without means of enforcement could be successfully applied to nuclear weapons. The other delegations produced a long list of violations of international law which had been committed on all sides during the war, including the bombing of open cities and the massacre of civilians and prisoners of war. Moreover, they argued, poison gas, unlike atomic bombs, makes a relatively ineffec-

tive weapon, and there is little temptation to resort to its use in violation of an agreement.

It is true that the belligerents of a future atomic war would share a common concern to keep the level of destruction down, although an overpopulated, relatively undeveloped, and ruthless state such as China would not share that concern to the same degree as other states with more to lose. Whether the atomic powers would be more likely to exercise self-restraint in conducting a war as a result of having entered into an agreement to do so is dubious. As suggested above, a sense of practicality rather than a feeling of moral commitment persuaded the belligerents of the 1939 war to forgo the use of gas. If it is in the interest of both sides not to use suicidal weapons they will not be used as long as rational decisions are still being made.

Unfortunately, it is precisely in moments of national crisis that the element of rationality is most often lacking. Nations, like men, are highly unpredictable when subjected to stress. Men in society often fail to observe the prevailing legal and moral codes, even when it is manifestly impossible to violate them with impunity. Experience has proved that sovereign powers, being beyond social restraints, are even more likely to ignore moral and legal inhibitions whenever they feel sufficiently threatened.

Whether a mere pledge by the nuclear powers not to use megaton weapons in any future war would actually prevent their use, therefore, seems dubious. There would exist a strong possibility that one side or the other in desperation would resort to its H-bomb stockpile if it were available. An agreement to eliminate weapons of a certain specified strength, i.e., the megaton bombs, would involve the same problems discussed above in connection with substantial disarmament, including the problems of inspection. There would be many additional difficulties as well, for how could the inspectors be kept from acquiring information of intelligence value about the smaller

atomic weapons. In the context of a continuing military rivalry the prospect for controlling one segment of weapons production and leaving all the others uncontrolled does not seem promising, since one side or the other is likely to think the system is working to his disadvantage.

Some have questioned whether the elimination of megaton bombs is even desirable as long as the nuclear arms race continues with respect to lower-range weapons. They point out that the terror bomb has only one function which it can perform effectively: punishment. It cannot be aimed at exclusively military targets. Thus its only purpose is the devastation of cities.

It can be argued, therefore, that the super-hydrogen bomb is primarily a "defensive" weapon, since the nation that relies on it most is the one seeking to deter an attack. One of the disarmament efforts of the inter-war period was an attempt to classify weapons as either "aggressive" or "defensive." Since every nation regards its own forces as defensive, there was no consensus on these terms beyond a general feeling that an "aggressive" weapon was something other nations had in greater supply than you did. As far as their intrinsic functions were concerned, weapons like tanks and planes could be used either for attack or defense. The hydrogen bomb, however, because of its inherent characteristics is of more importance to potential victims than to potential aggressors. According to this theory, an aggressor would be more likely to launch an attack with smaller weapons aimed at the victim's retaliatory forces than with large weapons which would render a considerable portion of his territory unsuitable for occupation or exploitation.

For this reason, some have suggested exactly the reverse of the above proposal. Each side should reduce the stockpile of its small or medium weapons, which are primarily adapted to a surprise attack against the retaliatory forces of the other, and retain the large bombs as instruments of deterrence. This

scheme is as little subject to effective policing through inspection as the other proposal for partial reduction of nuclear stockpiles we have just considered. Moreover, an agreement to retain only the large bombs would have the undesirable effect of insuring that any atomic war would be fought on a massive scale. While this might well be true in any event, it is an inevitable result of concentrating weapons strength in the megaton range. Further, the underlying assumption that an aggressor would never use the terror weapons, but rely exclusively on a nonatomic attack, seems hardly justified.

Conclusion

All plans for partial disarmament share a common assumption and a common problem. The assumption is that the arms race will go on—perhaps at a slower rate or in a different direction—but it will continue. For this reason, to be acceptable to both sides any arrangements for partial disarmament must not disturb in any significant way the prevailing balance of military strength. This is the problem all such plans must face. Most disarmament proposals can fairly be regarded as attempts to disarm the opponent in areas of his greatest proportionate strength, although the Baruch Plan, which would have prematurely ended the American monopoly of the atomic bomb, is an exception.

To reduce the threat of war and at the same time preserve the existing balance may, in the final analysis, be so much of a self-contradictory task that partial disarmament efforts are doomed to failure. Certainly neither side wants to lose its relative military position while tensions are still running high. Since negotiations for disarmament are normally conducted in an atmosphere of international crisis, both sides are suspicious that the proposals of the other will contain traps. And because the weapons which are the major subject of the negotiations

have had almost no actual battlefield experience, it is difficult as a technical matter to decide what a “balanced” reduction of forces would be, even if each side were convinced that the other wanted to come to an objectively fair solution.

It seems plain, therefore, that attempts at disarmament proposals which try to hedge against all conceivable risks will not only fail to build confidence but will actually further inflame the atmosphere. Any agreement for meaningful disarmament requires an awareness of the risks involved, as objective an assessment of those risks as it is given to humans to make, and, ultimately, an act of faith.

Preparations for Progress

Disarmament has seemed so fundamentally at odds with the hard facts of a divided world that it is widely regarded as a utopian solution. The question is, however, whether disarmament is any more utopian a means of preserving peace than the mechanism of deterrence on which we have put such great reliance. The success of each appears to require a basic change in existing patterns of behavior. Peace through disarmament would demand a willingness to look for security through means other than military power; peace through deterrence, a willingness to accept permanently a threatening status quo. Historical support for each alternative is pessimistic, although perhaps less conclusive in regard to disarmament since so little has been tried. Deterrence by threat of violence—our historical legacy—has never prevented war. Unilateral disarmament and the few cautious steps towards mutual disarmament that have been taken have never prevented war either.

To be “for” or “against” disarmament in our world, therefore, seems a singularly unrealistic approach. Neither the military planner who sees no end to the arms spiral nor the pacifist who calls upon the world to make itself over by a sheer act of will offers any practical basis for progress towards peace. To tell the world to go on making and testing nuclear weapons is like telling a drunk to go on drinking. To say “there has *got* to be progress on disarmament” is as fruitful as telling the drunk to pull himself together.

It is difficult to envisage much progress on disarmament until we stop treating it as a theoretical problem and recognize that it is an approach to salvation that is peculiarly appropriate to our own world. This does not mean that disarmament

will necessarily work, but it does mean that it is worth the kind of research we are quite willing to devote to marketing techniques, satellite construction, or refinements of the atomic bomb. Valuable research has already been completed on aspects of inspection, but the mechanics of the disarmament treaty represent only one phase of the problem and by no means the most important or difficult one.

There is, for example, a series of questions waiting to be faced concerning the achievement of security in a disarmed but still divided world. Where can we put our trust in a world where we have abandoned our trust in arms? If an international authority with police power over the major nations is impractical, what alternative stabilizing mechanisms would be available? How much (or, more realistically, how little) would Russia have to change its approach to international relations before the United States should take the risks of substantial disarmament? And what would be the effect of disarmament on our national goals? In a disarmed world would we retain the capacity to guarantee the security of our allies against Communist infiltration? Against spontaneous revolution? Would it be crucial for us to be able to guarantee their security in either such case? Would retention of our system of alliances be desirable? Are we irrevocably committed to the prevention of Communist expansion merely by military means, or must we for our security resist all Communist encroachments by whatever means effected? Would we dare to contend with Russia in a world without arms for the friendship and loyalty of the emerging underdeveloped peoples, or would any competition bound to become so threatening to one side or the other that the use of force would be resumed? In a world disarmed would a revolutionary power be more likely to moderate its ambitions, or would it exploit the physical defenselessness of its neighbors to work their destruction through the treacherous use of force? Would we be willing to see the balance of power shift decisively to the other side as a result

of peaceful competition without lifting a hand in anger to stop this course? Would the Soviet Union? What kind of assurance would we want from Russia that it would not try to destroy us whenever it acquired sufficient relative power to justify the attempt? What kind could it give and what would the assurance be worth? What kind of guarantees could we in turn give the Soviet Union?

Then there are questions concerning the conditions under which disarmament might prove acceptable. It has become quite clear by now that neither the Soviet Union nor the United States is willing to make gratuitous contributions to an "atmosphere of mutual trust." Each concession for the relaxation of tensions, quite properly, has a price tag. Arriving at the right price while the arms race continues is particularly difficult because the subjects of possible concessions are themselves intimately involved in the military competition. For example, the reunification of Germany is as much a military as it is a political problem. In a disarmed but still divided world Germany would continue to be the subject of competition, but its overriding importance would be diminished because it would not represent a military threat to either side. Today, however, any solution of the German problem would vitally affect the military balance of power in Europe. In the context of an arms race each side, therefore, has been reluctant to offer real concessions for fear of appearing weak and encouraging the other to make further demands. Concessions have been in such short supply that prices have remained inflationary.

One of the most difficult problems of a disarmament agreement is caused by the natural desire of the signatories to hedge against disaster in case the system should fail. Keeping bombs in reserve for such an eventuality is unsatisfactory because their very existence poses a threat. Is there any other way of providing each signatory an escape in the event of the treachery of its rival without thereby wrecking the treaty? Is

there a mechanism for restoring the innocent power to a relative position equivalent to, or at least not much worse than, the relative position he was in with respect to his rival before each of them agreed to disarm? Or must we in order to give disarmament any chance of success burn our bridges behind us?

A related problem involves the integration of arms reduction and arms control. The French delegate to the U.N. Disarmament Commission described the goal in this area in these words: "Neither control without disarmament; neither disarmament without control; but progressively all the disarmament that can be controlled."¹ Implementing this program has proved extraordinarily difficult because the equation in any particular situation is uncertain. To put the question from the Russian viewpoint, how much of a weakening of American military power should be required to offset the disadvantage incurred in exposing such Soviet military secrets as the location of missile launching sites? Or, to put the same question from the American point of view, how much of a guarantee of Soviet compliance should we require before we reduce our strength? Technical studies of the mechanics of control indicate that the more comprehensive the system of inspection the greater the guarantee of compliance.² Since comprehensive inspection will only be acceptable in the present world if accompanied by comprehensive disarmament, which involves serious risks in the event of noncompliance, we are in a paradoxical situation in which the disarmament treaty offering the greatest security against evasion also presents the greatest risks if in fact it is evaded. Is there a point at which we would assume those risks short of a millennial change in the Communist world? If so, what is the point and how do we arrive at it?

What about the impact of disarmament on the domestic economy? The Russians are undoubtedly convinced that American business leaders, fulfilling the prophecies of Lenin, are conspiring to keep America armed. Lenin believed that

the "crisis of capitalism" could be postponed only by massive military expenditures. Communist propaganda repeats this theme today. And it is undeniable that military expenditures play an important role in our economy. Each year some \$25 billion is spent for weapons and military facilities.³ Conceivably, there might be more general interest in disarmament if the demands of defense production resulted in a shortage of the consumer luxuries to which we are all accustomed. But, unlike the economy of the Soviet Union, where production of consumer goods has been sacrificed in favor of military requirements, the American civilian economy may have benefited from the stimulus of military expenditure.

We have boldly answered the Communists that the American economy can take substantial disarmament in its stride and still produce prosperity. But we have yet to start the necessary planning to make good on our claim. Whatever the ultimate effect of disarmament on the American economy, such a step will require a number of important decisions which must be made well in advance of actual reconversion. Indeed, they ought to be made before serious negotiation begins. We must face such questions as these: How much of the capital presently devoted to weapons production and research should go to support disarmament machinery? What program should be adopted to soften the effects of the unemployment that will result during the transition of the economy from military to nonmilitary production? How should America spend its surplus when disarmament does begin to release resources for other purposes? What kind of additional foreign aid programs would we feel a need to promote for our security in a disarmed world? What domestic projects would deserve our attention?

Answers to these questions are as vital to an approach to disarmament as they are to life in a disarmed world. Yet we do little to answer them.

The investigations of the Senate Subcommittee on Disarmament reveal that as of September 1957, after eleven years

of disarmament negotiations, "no agency of the executive branch has made efforts to ascertain the economic consequences of a reduction in armaments."⁴ And over a year later, in October 1958, in its Final Report the same Senate subcommittee made this observation:

There are only some 6 or 7 persons who work full time on disarmament in the State Department. The subcommittee is struck by the disparity in the effort the world is putting into thought and action for controlling and reducing armaments and the effort going into the development, fabrication and build up of armaments.⁵

And outside of the State Department in the other executive agencies there is little sustained and intensive attention to disarmament. From time to time, the Administration has called upon distinguished private citizens to review our policy, make recommendations, and even negotiate agreements with the Russians. The contributions of these individuals have been important, but it is unquestionably true that no one can acquire the background essential to deal with these stubborn problems in a few months of service. There is no more reason to put the responsibility for formulating disarmament policy and negotiating disarmament agreements in the hands of conscientious, but inexperienced, amateurs than there is to put the Pentagon under the control of *ad hoc* committees or part-time generals.

Moreover, the only agencies in the government that do have a continuing interest in disarmament are those which have a primary responsibility for and hence a commitment to military defense. Since bureaucracies are notoriously inefficient at seeking their own dissolution, it is too much to ask those to whom our defense effort and atomic energy program are entrusted to prepare for disarmament as well. This fact has been recognized by a number of prominent political figures, including Senator Kennedy, Governor Rockefeller, and former Governor Stevenson. Clearly what is needed is a permanent agency with responsibility for conducting research in disarma-

ment and advising the President in the formulation of disarmament policy.

But this is not enough.

Not only the government but the American public must prepare ourselves if there is to be any hope of achieving the breakthrough to peace we are all seeking. While many aspects of disarmament are highly technical and are perhaps completely comprehensible only to experts, the ultimate decisions, whether to take one kind of risk or another, are appropriate to the democratic decision-making process. Indeed, no statesman—of whatever stature—could make the kind of commitment which disarmament requires unless he had the public with him. In the final analysis, the public must sit as a jury to weigh the opinions and recommendations with which we are confronted, as best we can, and then decide. And the decision cannot be delayed. The longer the arms race continues, the more difficult a solution becomes and the greater the risks of war. It is, therefore, more urgent than ever to face the challenge of disarmament and decide whether we *want* disarmament, for upon our decision may well depend the future of civilization on this planet.

Notes

PART I

1. Editorial, as quoted in *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, vol. I, no. 3, p. 5 (Jan. 10, 1946).
2. As quoted in *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, vol. I, no. 10, p. 3 (May 1, 1946).
3. See Norman Cousins and Thomas K. Finletter, "A Beginning for Sanity," in *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, vol. II, no. 1, p. 11 (July 1, 1946).
4. Henry L. Stimson and Mac-George Bundy, *On Active Service in War and Peace* (New York, 1947), p. 614.
5. *Id.*, p. 636.
6. *Id.*, p. 644.
7. *Id.*, p. 645.
8. Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs* (Garden City, 1955), vol. I, p. 524.
9. *The Forrestal Diaries*, Walter Millis, ed. (New York, 1951), p. 95.
10. *Id.*, p. 96.
11. Truman, *supra*, vol. I, p. 525.
12. *The International Control of Atomic Energy Growth of a Policy* (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946), p. 13.
13. *Id.*, p. 120.
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