

UNIVERSAL
LIBRARY

OU_154175

UNIVERSAL
LIBRARY

OSMANIA UNIVERSITY LIBRARY

Call No. 106 A-M Accession No. 17249

Author Aristotelian Society

Title Modern Tendencies in Philosophy

This book should be returned on or before the date last marked below. 1934

ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY

Supplementary Volume XIII.

MODERN TENDENCIES IN PHILOSOPHY

THE SYMPOSIA READ AT THE JOINT SESSION OF
THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY AND THE MIND
ASSOCIATION AT UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, CARDIFF,
JULY 6TH—8TH, 1934.

HARRISON AND SONS, LTD.,
45, ST. MARTIN'S LANE, LONDON, W.C.2.

1934.

At 5 p.m. Annual General Meeting of the Mind Association.

At 8 p.m. Chairman : Professor L. S. Stebbing.

Address by Professor J. W. Scott.

"Humanity and History."

SATURDAY, JULY 7th.

At 10 a.m. Chairman : Professor J. W. Scott.

"The Element of Immediacy in Knowledge."

Professor R. I. Aaron, Professor G. Dawes, Hic

Professor C. M. Campbell.

At 2 p.m. Chairman : Professor T. E. Jessop.

"Artistic Form and the Unconscious."

J. M. Thorburn, A. H. Hannay, P. Leona

At 8 p.m. Chairman : Mr. R. B. Braithwaite.

"Communication and Verification."

Professor L. S. Stebbing, Professor L. J. Russe

Professor A. E. Heath.

SUNDAY, JULY 8th.

At 10 a.m. Chairman : Mr. H. W. B. Joseph.

"Is analysis a useful method in Philosophy ?"

M. Black, J. Wisdom, M. Cornforth.

At 8 p.m. Chairman : Professor W. G. de Burgh.

"Liberty and Discipline in the modern State."

C. E. M. Joad, John Strachey, Professor G. C. Field.

CONTENTS.

PAGE

THE INAUGURAL ADDRESS — HUMANITY AND HISTORY. By J. W. SCOTT	1
--	---

SYMPOSIUM : LIBERTY AND THE MODERN STATE.

I. By C. E. M. JOAD	16
II. By JOHN STRACHEY	31
III. By G. C. FIELD	42

SYMPOSIUM : IS ANALYSIS A USEFUL METHOD IN PHILOSOPHY ?

I. By MAX BLACK	53
I. By JOHN TERENCE WISDOM	65
III. By MAURICE CORNFORTH	90

SYMPOSIUM : ARTISTIC FORM AND THE UNCONSCIOUS.

I. By J. M. THORBURN	119
II. By A. H. HANNAY	138
III. By P. LEON	145

SYMPOSIUM : COMMUNICATION AND VERIFICATION.

I. By L. S. STEBBING	159
II. By L. J. RUSSELL	174
III. By A. E. HEATH	194

SYMPOSIUM : IS THERE AN ELEMENT OF IMMEDIACY IN KNOWLEDGE ?

I. By R. I. AARON	203
II. By C. A. CAMPBELL	218

The Aristotelian Society Publications.

PROCEEDINGS: Annual Bound Volumes. New Series begun in 1900. Prices 10s. 6d. to 25s. (Volumes I to VII and IX are out of print.)

A few parts of the Old Series are obtainable. Price 2s. each.

SUPPLEMENTARY VOLUMES.

- I.—LIFE AND FINITE INDIVIDUALITY. 1918, pp. 194. Price 6s. net.
- II.—PROBLEMS OF SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY. 1919, pp. 220. Price 12s. 6d. net.
- III.—RELATIVITY, LOGIC AND MYSTICISM. 1923, pp. 184. Price 15s. net.
- IV.—CONCEPTS OF CONTINUITY. 1924, pp. 240. Price 15s. net.
- V.—PHILOSOPHY AND METAPHYSICS. 1925, pp. 212. Price 15s. net.
- VI.—METHODS OF ANALYSIS. 1926, pp. 205. Price 15s. net.
- VII.—MIND, OBJECTIVITY AND FACT. 1927, pp. 249. Price 15s. net.
- VIII.—MIND, MATTER AND PURPOSE. 1928, pp. 221. Price 15s. net.
- IX.—KNOWLEDGE, EXPERIENCE AND REALISM. 1929, pp. 225. Price 15s. net.
- X.—INDETERMINISM, FORMALISM, AND VALUE. 1931, pp. 200. Price 15s. net.
- XI.—PHENOMENOLOGY, GOODNESS AND BEAUTY. 1932, pp. 219. Price 15s. net.
- XII.—CREATIVITY, POLITICS AND THE *A PRIORI*. 1933, pp. 223. Price 15s. net.
- XIII.—MODERN TENDENCIES IN PHILOSOPHY. 1934, pp. 240. Price 15s. net.

PUBLISHED BY

HARRISON AND SONS, LTD.,
45, ST. MARTIN'S LANE, LONDON, W.C.2.

THE INAUGURAL ADDRESS.

HUMANITY AND HISTORY.

By J. W. SCOTT.

In casting about for a theme around which to weave a few words which shall be as little as possible unbefitting the present occasion, it has occurred to me to think that a lifetime largely passed during a period when idealism has been on the defensive might be allowed to provide me with a starting point. I have no reminiscences to relate, even if it were permissible to indulge in them. The first impact of Bradley's *Appearance and Reality* was still reverberating when I entered academic life ; I remember the incident of Professor A. E. Taylor's *Problem of Conduct*, and I imagine I heard some of the first audible rumours among idealists of the threatened defection of Alexander. But I only notice these matters now for orientation's sake. In what I have to say, I propose to aim a shaft at what I think has become something of a question with us, judging by the pages of *Mind*, by the appearance of certain recent able books, and by many other symptoms ; namely, What was idealism ? What did it—what does it—try to say or do ? I am in hope that this objective, kept well in view, may also have the effect of bringing my scattered remarks into some relation with the title advertised above my name in the programme of these meetings. If not, I must trust to your indulgence, and perhaps comfort myself with the thought that even the most erratic shooting in these matters may hit something, and even occasionally something more important than the bull's eye.

Of what "Humanity," then, is human history the history ? Of what humanity has idealism taught us to think it the history ?

And do we find that it is so? Or is the 'man' whom we see masquerading down the ages quite another creature, with quite a different real story? Is he best regarded as a shorn and defeated animal? Or shall we, say, with Friedrich von Schlegel, for example, that he is the marred image of God, and his history the slow recovery of the likeness? Such a question, I need hardly say, cannot be answered here. But it may be possible to elucidate some presuppositions which are implied in any such point of view as the latter of the two indicated.

I hazard the suggestion that for idealism, characteristically, there are large regions of reality such that, in knowing them, we must consent to be participators in them if we are to know them rightly; and further, that there are no regions of reality which we shall understand if we entirely abstain from mixing our ideal being with them. Now history is a region of the real. It is one arena in which the nature of things breaks through into the experience of man. Our question about idealism with reference to it therefore is, *What* ideal being of ours are we asked to mix with it, if we would properly understand it? For, according to the position we are considering (as I have stated that position) our report of history, as of other regions of experience, must be that of some sort of an ideal participator in it, if we are to report it as it is.

I cannot wonder - if I may pause upon a preliminary point - that the term participation has had its large rôle to play in the history of idealistic thought. I take it as admitted that idealism as a philosophy is characterised by a certain inability to leave the element of human appreciation and interest out of its picture of reality. This picture has a natural reverse. Thinkers have often glimpsed the universe from such an angle of vision that a material mechanism has seemed to be all that it is. The view survives substantially unchanged from a very remote past. To

refine upon the position of the ancient atomism, as we at present do, by substituting energies for material substances, does not alter its perspective. And the impulse to the idealistic philosophy—as distinct from the argument for it—is quite accurately and simply put by Münsterberg when he exclaims about such a version of the universe, “What can be good or bad in a turmoil of atoms?” The focus of interest is the good or bad. Idealism arises when the mind, confronted with this representation of reality, protests that value too is real. The universe which environs us, it is felt, has value in it; and the conviction washes over into the other main contexts of our experience and colours them. It is thus that the history of men, for example, comes to be regarded, not as a drift of vortices of atoms through the void, but an intelligible tale of man’s recovery from a fall.

Whence, then, comes the reflective corroboration which has built this bare protest into a philosophy? It came by different routes in different ages; in the ancient world apparently largely *viâ* Socrates and his discovery of the soul, or whatever Milesian or Pythagorean guess developed into that. Here the microcosm begins to be taken as witnessing to the constitution of the macrocosm. Plato is led to explain the universe by the highest soul, the self-moved mover, God. And Aristotle, critical as he may be of his master, must needs keep as centre to his picture of things too, the great mover, whose way of working the world is to move it “as a thing beloved.” With moderns like Berkeley and Kant, the idea of a God loving the world would seem to have retired into the invisible religious background of their thought, and left their chief conscious interest the epistemological one, of exposing the subjective factor in the object of human knowledge. But in Hegel the wheel comes full circle again; substance, the objective reality before us, not merely involves but has become “subject.” What eternally sustains all things is spirit in

which man in all his knowing participates; his cognition of objects being but an engagement in its processes. Can we distance this transaction—this discovering a soul of the world, this seeing reality as “subject”—sufficiently to find the nerve of it?

It is something identifiable, I believe, in all the great historical writers. It is the same in Plato and in Bosanquet, in Green and Fichte, in Aristotle and Kant. It consists in a logic which is identically a metaphysic. Aristotle's metaphysic, it is surely becoming more and more clear to us, is just Plato's; and in Plato what is that soul *of* the world but a logic *in* it; a logic identical in spirit, as Professor Burnet tells us, with a specific and cardinal chapter of Bosanquet's *Logic*? That, at any rate, is what the Socratic vision of the forms quietens down into; a system of categories, both of reality and of value.

But I do not find it easy to believe that we get no more light from Kant and the moderns than from Socrates, Plato and Aristotle on the essential idealistic hypothesis. It is only in Kant, I think, that we come to close enough quarters with it to see what precisely it essays; and on the other hand, how mystical is the construction which it bids us put upon the world.

The new method in philosophy sponsored by Kant has for one of its characteristics the ambition not to be found operating with “dead” concepts. Such an assessment of Kant has about it a certain flavour of the meritricious, slightly alienating. But it has to be recorded. For we shall not know what to make of idealism till we know what Kant did. We shall not know that, until we see what he thought he did. And I take it that the centre of his conscious endeavour is to hit off the logic of the mind *qua* active. The logic of activity is transcendental logic.

Kant is an apostate rationalist who finds it impossible to go with Hume and so remains a disturber in his own camp. Rationalism, he seems to feel, must come alive. If one says that the secret of things is somehow with the mind and is not to be found in mere experience, one must be able to meet the insistent question concerning the impedimenta which the mind brings with it when it addresses the facts of the world in an effort to know them—its heritage of prejudice and unexamined assumption. How much of it all remains valid after examination? From the moment when mind and its categories is seriously entertained as an approach to metaphysic, people will be found wondering whether we have any knowledge at all which is not originated in experience. Locke takes the so-called innate principles of the mind in flank, and defeats them in detail. And this labour of Hercules—expulsion of the “rubbish”—begun by Locke, proceeds apace till Kant comes on the scene and is suddenly appalled by how very much of it there is to do. Some of the rubbish is in the foundations of the stable, and you cannot feasibly clear it all out! Hume's mere common-sense would have shown him the impossible task he was upon had he taken a slightly wider survey. All knowledge involves some of this mind's-work. And some of it must be knowledge. We cannot deny that there is such a thing as knowledge. After all, do we not ask questions? Something of what we know must be in the world. And we are compelled to inquire how any knowledge is possible.

The initial challenge comes from the accomplished fact of knowledge. It is met by reflection upon the activity involved. The Kantian answer consists in turning from the possessions of the mind to its life. The mind in contemplating objects is constructing. The latter is a necessary process and, as remarked above, there is a logic of it—transcendental logic. It is all in the familiar letter to Marcus Herz, written just after the Dissertation

of 1771, when Kant had had occasion to summon the whole problem of philosophy before him in a concentrated way, and when apparently he thought he saw the knot that was strangling him and how he could undo it. The presupposition is that some of what we call knowledge really is knowledge. But, Kant asks, "on what rests the reference to the object, of that which we call ideas in us?" "... if the ideas of understanding arise from an inner activity, whence comes the agreement which they must have with objects, which, nevertheless, they do not produce?" He finds why the process is intelligible in the case of mathematics. "In mathematics this is possible; for objects are and can be represented as quantities, only because we are able to produce ideas of them by taking a unit several times over." Kant sees no difficulty in the mind's knowing that which it does. And he replaces the dead furniture of the Aristotelian categories by notions of the understanding which are something that the mind necessarily enacts. What the mind enacts, that it can know. "The notions of quantity are generated actively, and their principles can therefore be developed a priori." By following this clue he finds his way to a proof of the objective validity of those principles which, according to Hume, we only read-into what is given to us. It is a universe of experience which we have; and mind must write out its nature upon all the experience which can come to it.

I think we can only see the nerve of the idealistic procedure when we thus identify the means by which Kant seems to himself to make escape from the impossibilities of Hume. The moment of deliverance was when he saw that to know a line one must "draw it in thought." One's own-produced world is something one may really know. Yet the line (or the triangle, or the mathematical system) is not to be for him the dead product of thought. What is it, then? Clearly it must be the act of producing; or rather, something into which the act of producing

is somehow mixed. I am forced into using such a form of words as this in describing what Kant thought he had arrived at. And I doubt if it will hold a meaning until activity is seen to consist of objects, which perhaps is a less intelligible form of words still !

In any case this construction of the object we know is what has to be interpreted ; and I suggest that it reduces to a process of letting ourselves down into that which we report ; in the case of history, letting our report of it be an incipient participation in it.

Idealism, from this point of view, is the practice of letting what you are get into what you know ; a habit which Professor Alexander, for example, appears to think natural and universal within certain fields of our experience : as in our apprehension of illusions and errors, of values, of the categories and of ourselves. Alexander seems to me to make an impressive attempt to keep out of the vortex (expressed in the above dubious form of words) over which Kantianism dangles us. According to him we not only know space-time. We are a piece ourselves, and enjoy being it. That which we are and enjoy being, is the source from which all things come. If only the source also enjoyed itself and my own enjoyment were a participation in its, we should have idealism. But what enjoys itself really is only the piece of space-time which has become shaped-up into a living human body. And when it is stimulated into its characteristic activity by other pieces of space-time those others stand partially revealed, and that is knowledge. This is all that can be said. For if the activity did anything, in or about the object—if it got mixed into the object—how could knowledge come to pass ? How can there be any revealing of those other pieces of space-time, if they are changed by the act of being revealed ? The activity they stir in us—there seems no escape from this—must do nothing. The line is not “ produced in

thought." Rather there is an activity and there is a revealed line. The activity only sometimes interferes. We find it imputing features to the object on those occasions, for example, when what appears is something illusory or something beautiful. I take it that the idealistic interpretation of these cases is that instead of "imputing" and then contemplating what is imputed, the mind simply enjoys the object. And here the vortex yawns again. On such footing how can it be the object?

It may only be putting two unintelligibilities together, but I do not see that enjoyment of the object can be quite meaningless if gradations of more and less in enjoyment itself are intelligible.

Begin from the position "we do not know ourselves; we know objects and enjoy ourselves," and a more articulate self-enjoyment will immediately appear as all the knowledge of ourselves we ever really have. We shall have to be warned, as Professor Alexander warns us, against looking in that more advanced self-enjoyment for something we can contemplate. What can I do then with such account of the self as I find in Professor Alexander's pages, but sink myself into it and re-live it? And then I am living myself into something I contemplate. Idealism is not far off. Idealism is but a kind of inability to see anything in Heaven or earth but I must do something of this kind with it. It seems to me that if a more and a less articulate and full enjoyment is not unintelligible, it cannot be unintelligible to enjoy the contemplated; for it is the same thing. Of mind pre-eminently is it true, that I must participate in it, enjoy it, if I am to report it as it is; but only pre-eminently. Anything into which mind enters is of the same nature. And idealism is the doctrine that it enters everywhere.

But is this requirement, that I should lay myself into what I know if I am to know it, really unintelligible?

It is perhaps putting the question in a tendentious manner but it is a way of putting it if I ask what sheer mass of experience it is, that registers itself in the unmistakeable reluctance of the world in general—and not merely of Professor Alexander—to concede the behaviourist position. Suppose we accept as the best rendering of the cognitive relation we can find, that it consists in the compresence of a conscious activity in this piece of space-time here (which I call my body) *and* the emergence into view of that piece there. Why not say that it is merely the emergence out of the darkness of that piece, without any conscious activity on the other side at all—the supposed activity of knowing becoming refined away under scrutiny into nothing but the familiar empirical concomitants of “trying to think,” the pin-points of pain which accompany it, puckered-skin-sensations in my brow, tightening of the teeth and the like; which are all merely so many data the more, embroidering the object in the objective field? Whence the obstinacy of our resistance to this very persuasive and masterful psychological reading?

It is primarily, I think, that the world seems so full of situations such that one can only report them by engaging in them—incipiently being them. There are so many great passages in history of which, as historian, I cannot think without being there. I *am*, for the nonce, Hampden or Cromwell, or Hannibal or Cæsar. I take myself with me when I read their story, or else I am not really seeing what they do. And in all my experience of value, the object is a life that I am living through. Only the utmost mathematical fringes of experience seem to present a world with no life like mine with which I must coincide if I am to be intelligent about it. The contemplated is very often before us in such a way that we are obviously not merely enjoying ourselves and contemplating it, but literally enjoying it.

Pressed by these considerations I am driven on the further fact that enjoyment can be interrupted; it can become

relatively harder; and then we seem to be contemplating. It seems possible thus to interpret contemplation as hardened or stiffened or interrupted enjoyment, see it as a kind of knot in the wood, a rock in the stream; an activity still, but one which is inexplicably alienated and "given." It is something artificially detached which could still be appropriated, entered into, enjoyed.

And I seem to approximate an idea of what such appropriation is when I reflect that there is nothing which we cannot alienate from us and see as if it were strange; from the husband in Shaw's play, whose wife wakes up after thirty years of wedded life to find that it is a strange man she has been living with all that time, to the simple experiment of looking at one's own hand or foot in an odd position, and becoming puzzled to know whose it is. It is possible to gaze at the data of the inner sense too until they seem to "have nothing whatever to do with us." But the reason we resist this view of them it seems to me, is just that they are not really experienced like that. They are experienced as connected-up and enjoyed. And I do not believe it matters whether you say "connected-up," or whether you say "enjoyed." Connexion is what enjoyment means. Activity is something in the objects.

I cannot get away from the view that there may be a difference of objects which literally turns what was experience of object into an experience of activity. There can at least be a passage from an object to another one with the same components, which yet is totally different. The Gestalt school have done something for us here. If two pictures are passed before me in more and more rapid succession, one of a vertical line and the other of the same line sloping, there comes a point when the impression I receive, the object before me, still having the same two components, is no longer two lines at all, but something quite different, namely, one line falling. At the point where

the two elements are connected-up something quite different appears. Yet all that has happened is that the one picture is no longer apprehended without the other; or more literally, that each comes to be apprehended in and with the other. The passage from contemplation to activity seems to me to be a transition of this kind. It is a change in the objects. The good woman in the play is suffering from arrested activity. The reason of it—the reason she cannot appropriate her husband, but must contemplate him as something foreign—lies in the context in which she finds him. The impasse consists in the fact that the other contexts in which he figured won't run into this one. That interrupted running (of the object) is her interrupted activity. It merely means that a certain organic unity between the objects has failed. Organic unity and activity seem to be the same thing. The strange set of fingers (my own) which I see protruding from beneath the cushion or from behind the curtain, are strange to me, only until I am able to glimpse a whole, of any tolerable kind, in the fragment. Then I am active.

The question whether I am ever an object to myself is not an easy one. But it seems to me there is a way of letting myself down into the object as I contemplate it, and finding myself there. In any case, the world is full of situations in which I must let myself be a participator as I contemplate them or I shall not get them. And when the idealist begins to seek out where that type of situation ends he finds that it does not end. In all intelligent dealing with the world, whether practical or theoretical, whether in making it valuable or merely in knowing it, the self is engaged in a career of articulating its own self-being by participating in other-being in which mind resides. Mind is that which, if I do nothing in observing it, I do not observe it doing anything. At any rate, I do not observe it doing what it does.

I must be active then if I would know, for what I would know is a living reality ; one whose vitality is manifest in the very circumstance that unless I am active it escapes me.

But what must I do ? For the mere negative virtue of not doing nothing is hardly enough. The suggestion hazarded above is that I must lay myself into the object ; but *what* self, into *what* object ? What, in especial, if the object be history ? Maeterlinck writes the history of the bee, for example ; and in a very obvious sense he lays himself into his subject-matter. I do not cite him for the sake of asking whether his method yields him the truth about the bee ; but merely to sharpen our own question : what minima of subjectivity or self-hood must we lay into human history in this same way, in order to get at the truth of it ?

We must lay enough of ourselves into it to read it as the history of men. Let us remember that it is as moral selves, with free wills, with duties and failings, with resolutions and repentances, that we participate in history and make it. If you speak of the rise and fall of states in your capacity as participator in them, your natural language will be that of purpose and will, of duty done and duty failed in ; it will be of debates and treaties, of the sense of honour or the absence of it, of varying national ideals guiding varying national policies. Your attention will be claimed by the moral and mental universe-of-discourse which prevails among a people when you are trying to understand its historical vicissitudes ; and not by mere *vires a tergo*, those economic forces, biological forces and so forth, which, from another point of view, seem to be alone efficient ; driving on, beneath all the manifest culture and carrying it—being no more determined by it than the foam on the river's surface determines the direction of the stream.

If this be the self which we must lay into history,—the sort of being of our own which must be let live through

the battle again as it tells the tale,—how is the tale going to be affected ?

Obviously, however little akin to either, it will come out as a history more like the Hegelian account of the dialectical progress of ideas than the Marxian account of a progress through the clash of economic forces. We shall find ourselves saying that the real in history is, if not “ the rational,” at least the ethical. We shall be ready enough to sympathize with the suggestion that philosophy is history ; for though we have no great interest in defining *philosophy*, we shall be clear that *history* rightly told (history as really enacted) is philosophy ; or at least is morals. But has the view the least chance to stand the test of fact and observation ?

We seem to be brought sharply up against a purely empirical question. Who or what makes a nation’s history ? Is it the wills and purposes of the agents. Or is it the steady pressure of unseen, unconscious influences—race, soil, climate, topography, economic technique ?

When it first dawns on us to take account of these impersonal factors, their role in the making of mankind seems to be invasive and to crowd out every other. The whole conscious culture of a people seems effect and not cause, their self-determination an illusion, their policies mere rationalization of their necessities.

The view that ideas are the determining factors has, however, one great feature of strength. Its main argument is about how the question should be put. It lifts the issue out of the purely empirical domain. However difficult may be the Hegelian view of history, however impossible the child’s dream of a Friedrich von Schegel, it is extremely difficult to upset the presupposition underlying all such views ; namely, that we go to history with an ideal interest.

In the last resort what we want to know is never the actual procession of events and nothing more. We do not ask just what

has taken place, is taking place, and will take place in the world. Our question appears indeed to be one of fact. We seek to master a field, to achieve unity of view in it as far as may be; and it is done in various ways. Marx would find the common root of all historical phenomena—of the form of government of a period, of its art, religion, philosophy, law—in the people's economic technique, and the test is one of fact. Hegel would find the determining factor in the spirit of the time; Spengler, perhaps, in the dominant symbol; and in these cases too the test is fact. Each asks the same question, "what is the real cue to a civilization?" and wins his factual answer. But always it is the cue to what is interesting in a civilization that he wants. Our concern, then, as philosophical historians, is to know, not what has always and everywhere determined the state; but what has determined every state that has ever come to any good. Even Machiavelli is asking that. The very demand of the healthy historian for sheer bare facts, unselected and unadorned, is at bottom a demand for a basis on which to build something of this kind. We only demand facts because of their value in enabling us to say, not what determines a civilization, but what determines it to any purpose. And our version of the operative factor or factors may be true, although it states no fact. The determinant force or principle we pitch upon may be exactly the right one, although it has never determined any state in the world, and is never going to do so. All that is required of us, is that we be able to say that it has often almost done so; or perhaps, that it has always almost done so—that it has never been far away. History is exclusively interested in that which might have been *and nearly was*. Plato's defence of idealism in political history stands—that an ideal is none the worse for never having been realized, so long as you can prescribe a small change which would realize it.

I have been chiefly occupied here in trying to state what in general the presupposition of idealism is. I make it out to be a

policy rather than a presupposition ; a policy, as I have put it, of letting what we are get into what we know ; a process of enjoying the object, which I believe to be psychologically intelligible, and which, in the case of history, consists in participating in it as we report it ; allowing ourselves to speak and think as moral agents, in the report we make. On the success of the policy, I have not sought to come to any final finding. It is an empirical question. But the empirical question does not arise so soon as we are apt to think. I have tried to indicate one of the conditions, in the absence of which the policy of letting history as enacted get into history as reported, will probably not succeed. It is that we realize that man is always asking for value in history, and is not finally content with fact. If the latter is all we want then the humanity whose history we trace is not to us a moral phenomenon, and we are free to seek its explanation in non-moral forces. If, however, we realize that history is for us, throughout, the history of the desirable, then, although it is still not certain that the determining factors which make for the desirable are moral, I believe that a very different prospect opens up for the hypothesis that they are.

LIBERTY AND THE MODERN STATE.

By C. E. M. JOAD, JOHN STRACHEY, and PROF. G. C. FIELD.

I.—By C. E. M. JOAD.

I.

“THE struggle of man against authority has ended in what appears now to be a decisive and permanent victory for liberty. In the most civilized and progressive countries freedom of discussion is recognized as a fundamental principle.” The quotation is from Professor Bury’s *History of the Freedom of Thought*, published in 1913. In this book he tells us how freedom of thought was established once and for all in the nineteenth century and expresses the view that the struggle for liberty may now be regarded as closed. “Well, that is very nice, very nice indeed—if it is true,” comments Lytton Strachey in his review of Bury’s book. “But after all can we be quite so sure that it is true. Is it really credible that the human race should have got along so far as that?” Since these words were written twenty years have elapsed. They have endorsed Strachey’s doubts and answered his question, conclusively and in the negative; so conclusively, indeed, that it is inconceivable that anybody writing a history of the freedom of thought to-day could have reached Bury’s conclusion.

The facts are obvious and admitted. Over large areas of the world to-day the mind of man has been put into prison and the key has been turned upon it. Human beings may only read what it seems good to other human beings that they should read. Government is omnipotent and strictly irresponsible; the Press is its mouthpiece; education its propaganda; history its apologist; the arts its echo. As for democracy, the only form of government that has been able to tolerate liberty

in the past, having fought and won a war for its ideals in 1914, it is to-day fighting for its existence. With the causes of this condition of affairs this paper is not concerned; they are the concern of the historian, the economist, possibly of the biologist. I wish, however, very briefly to indicate the philosophical principle which appears to me to underlie and to justify this assault upon liberty, to criticize this principle and to state the assumptions upon which, as it seems to me, the philosophical foundation of the case for liberty rests.

II.

Liberty can be considered from two points of view; the point of view of the organizations that curtail it and the point of view of the individuals who wish to enjoy it. I will consider these in turn.

The liberty of the individual to speak what he pleases, write what he pleases, read what he pleases, go where he pleases, has historically been curtailed by two sorts of associations—associations of human beings imbued with certain beliefs as to the origin, nature and purpose of the universe and formed to promote them, and associations of human beings imbued with certain beliefs as to the nature and purpose of political communities and formed to promote them. Liberty has historically been curtailed, that is to say, mainly by Churches and by States. The curtailment of liberty by Churches is not, in the contemporary world, important, and I shall not consider it here. The curtailment of liberty by States is, however, great and growing. This curtailment seems to me to be justified in terms of a certain philosophical theory, the theory commonly known as the Absolutist or Idealist Theory of the State; this theory has, indeed, on occasion been specifically invoked in contemporary

Fascist countries.* I will take three quotations from different exponents of the theory which are relevant to my present purpose. (a) "The State of war shows the omnipotence of the State in its individuality; country and fatherland are then the power which convicts of nullity the independence of individuals." (Hegel.) (b) "The State has no determinate function in a larger community but is itself the supreme community; the guardian of a whole world, but not a factor within an organized moral world." (Bosanquet.)† (c) "It is hard to see how the State can commit theft or murder in the sense in which these are moral offences." (Bosanquet.)‡ The first of these quotations asserts the implicit omnipotence of the State and indicates the condition in which that omnipotence becomes explicit; the second defines by implication the relation to the State to other States; the third, its relation to its own citizens. It is with this last that we are here primarily concerned. Briefly this relation is conceived not as that of an instrument to those who use it to serve their wills and express their purposes, but as that of a substantive individual to its component members upon whom it may impose its will on the pretext that it is expressing theirs.

The general line of thought is sufficiently familiar, and space must be my excuse for not outlining it here. I wish, however, to draw attention to the special significance of the expression *the State*, which implies (1) that the State is a peculiar organiza-

* *E.g.* "Facism conceives of the State as an absolute . . . the Facist State is itself conscious, and has itself a will and a personality—thus it may be called the 'ethic' state . . . The State, as conceived of by Fascism, is a spiritual and moral fact in itself . . . Such an organization must be in its origins and development a manifestation of the Spirit." Quoted from *The Political and Social Doctrine of Fascism*, by Benito Mussolini, translated by Jane Soames, pp. 21, 22.

† and ‡ *Philosophical Theory of the State*, pp. 325 and 324.

tion with rights and powers over its members of a quite special kind ; (2) that the State is a final form of human organization ; (3) that its nature can be considered in isolation without taking into account its relation to other States. (Each of these conclusions is in fact held either explicitly or implicitly as an integral part of the theory in question.)

Against this view of the State, I should urge that the State is simply one particular form of human organization which has been historically evolved, which is provisional and which in all probability will be superseded. The course of evolution, as Dr. Langdon Brown has recently pointed out, consists in increasing not the size of the cell or of the individual, but of the unit of organization. Evolution in fact is a process by which ever more numerous and diverse units are integrated into ever richer and more comprehensive wholes. The earliest forms of life are unicellular. An advance takes place when numbers of unicellular units come together to form an individual who is a colony of cells. At a very early stage in the evolution of vertebrate mammals individual joins with individual to constitute the family. At an early stage in the evolution of human beings family integrates with family to form a larger whole, the tribe ; later, tribe joins with tribe to constitute a whole yet larger, the Nation-State.

Desire for security appears to have been the form in which the drive of life has chiefly expressed itself to effect these later integrations. Security was the motive which led to the alliance of king and people against the feudal nobility, as a result of which the Nation-State was established in Europe at the end of the Middle Ages. It is something of a historical accident that the tendency to larger integration inspired by this motive has not already proceeded to its logical conclusion in the construction of a world State. Rome nearly succeeded in paving the way for this further integration and the beginnings of

other attempts have subsequently been made. But always hitherto the factors which make for conservation at its existing level of the unit of integration actually reached have proved too strong for the drive of evolution in the direction of this further integration. For, whatever the unit which at any particular level of the evolutionary process happens to have been attained, whether family, tribe or Nation-State, it becomes the focus of a number of influential human sentiments. Patriotism and enthusiasm are evoked on its behalf, self-sacrifice in its service, pugnacity in its defence, jealousy for its honour. These sentiments combine to resist its absorption into a larger unit, and such absorption has only been achieved in the past at an appalling price in terms of human suffering. Nevertheless it cannot, I think, be reasonably doubted that a further stage of integration lies before mankind and that State must eventually combine with State to constitute the final unit of integration which is world-State. This step will have to be taken sooner or later by our civilization, if it is to survive, and it involves the surrender of the claim to sovereignty and absoluteness by the Nation-State.

But if I am right in supposing that the State is in no sense either a unique or a final form of human association, there would seem to be no adequate basis for the view of it expressed in the quotations cited above. Thus, the assertion that the State has no determinate function in a large community is not true in fact. Not only is there common action by many States for the control of disease, of prostitution and of conditions of labour, and for the establishment of postal, telegraphic, railway and air communications, but the concept of the League of Nations entails the recognition of the principle that the State is an element in a political complex which is or may become world-wide, and that it stands in moral relations to other members of the complex. The fact that this principle is

frequently flouted in practice by constituent members of the League no more disproves its validity than the fact that men frequently act immorally in practice disproves the validity of the categorical imperative.

The quotation "it is hard to see how the State can commit theft or murder in the sense in which these are moral offences" also presupposes the assumed uniqueness and absoluteness of the State. But, if the State is merely one association among many, a transitory stage in an evolutionary process which will ultimately transcend it, there is no more reason for supposing that it cannot behave morally towards its members than there is for conceding similar theoretical release from moral obligations to a Church, a Trade Union, a trading combination or a club. The contrary view is based in part upon a false analogy between the body politic and the human body, which is also sponsored by the concept of *the* State. The human body not only represents but transcends each one of its members in such a way that it cannot as a whole be conceived of as doing violence to its parts. The body cannot, for example, suppress the rights of its heart or its lungs. It is, indeed, doubtful whether they have rights apart from the body to which they belong. The doctrine of the General Will reinforcing the conception of the unique, isolated, absolute State, has been interpreted to imply that there is a similar relation between the State and its members. It is on the basis of this assumed relation that freedom is represented as something which man obtains only in and through the State. This freedom, we are told, is alone real and concrete and is opposed to the abstract and unreal freedom which is enjoyed by the isolated individual.* An assumed identification

* *e.g.*, Hegel's statement that "Nothing short of the State is the actualisation of freedom," his description of the State as "a self-conscious, ethical, substance and a self-knowing and self-actualising individual," and his assurance that "it carries back the individual, whose tendency it is to become a centre of his own, into the life of the universal substance."

between liberty and law, such that real liberty is only attained in and through obedience to the law, is also a consequence of this line of thought.

But (1) the analogy does not hold. An individual is an end in himself independently of the State to which he belongs. There is, indeed, good ground for supposing that he is *the* end for the State, and that the State is properly to be regarded as merely a contrivance for making the good life possible for all citizens.* If the individual is an end in himself, he has a right to pursue ends which he sets before himself irrespective of the ends of the State. Now there is no sense in saying that the heart or the lungs are ends in themselves, can pursue ends which are independent of the body, or possess rights which are independent of the body. (2) "Only the wearer knows where the shoe pinches." The shoe of bad and oppressive laws may pinch individuals. Yet under a tyrannical government they have no means of making their discomfiture felt. But it is impossible for a part of the body to be ill-treated by the whole without incommoding the whole. Briefly, in the human body it is not possible that there should be no representation of the parts; in the body politic there may be. (3) Once grant that the State is not a unique or final form of human association, and, if the analogy is to be insisted upon, there seems to be no reason why its application should be confined to the State. If the State expresses and transcends my real will and, by virtue of so expressing and transcending it, derives rights over my individual, apparent and rebellious will, so does my Trade Union, my Church, or the international organization to which I may belong. Hence there may arise a conflict of loyalties in which there is no reason in principle why my allegiance must of necessity go to the State.

.

* See pp. 28, 29 below for an elaboration of this.

The great growth of voluntary associations formed for specific purposes during the last hundred and fifty years is, indeed, specially prejudicial to the claims made by the Absolutist Theory of the State. These associations fall mainly into two classes. There are associations of human beings for economic purposes and associations of human beings for ethical purposes. Between them these two classes of associations cater for the demands of men's pockets and the needs of their souls, thus monopolizing the major human interests, other than political interests, which are apt to find collective expression. To these associations a man for the most part voluntarily opts to belong, whereas the State is the only association of which he is a member involuntarily through the territorial accident of birth. Moreover, they cut right across the bounds of the Nation-State and frequently comprise citizens of many different States. No satisfactory principle has ever been suggested which would justify the State in arrogating to itself the right of interfering with an individual's free choice in the matter of the voluntary associations to which he elects to belong, or in presuming to override the obligations which he may have contracted towards them.

The first part of my thesis is, then, that the pretensions which are increasingly put forward by the modern State to interfere with the free comings and goings, thinkings, writings and speakings of its citizens, presuppose a false theory of the nature of the State. This theory derives support from the philosophers' traditional habit of speaking of *the* State, as if *the* State were a self-sufficient entity existing in isolation, thereby enabling themselves to neglect both the relations which the State may have to other States and the obligations which its citizens may have to voluntary associations formed for special purposes. The theory further involves a false analogy between the State and the human body and it assumes, contrary to the obvious indications afforded by the evolutionary process, that

the State is 'an ultimate and final form 'of human association. It also implies (1) that the State is morally good, and (2) that the State ought to be supported by its citizens whether it is good or not. Yet it is difficult to see what abstract reason can be adduced for serving one State rather than another. I now turn to the point of view of the individual.

III.

The philosophical case for individual liberty is embarrassingly rich in arguments. From the wealth of considerations at the disposal of liberty's apologists I select three as specially pertinent at the present time.

(1) It is, I think, an established fact that the advance of the mind of the race is primarily due to the insight of individuals. Original creation in art, original thinking in morals or politics, original research in science, are the products not of masses of men organized in communities, but of the minds of single individuals. Now the very circumstance that the thought of the pioneering few is new and original is bound to make it appear shocking and subversive to the conventional many. Inevitably, it challenges vested interests in the thought of the present, unsettling men's minds, alarming their morals, and undermining the security of the powerful and the established. Hence, the original genius is only too often abused as an outrageous and often as a blasphemous impostor. Heterodoxy in art is at worst rated as eccentricity or folly, but heterodoxy in morals is denounced as propagandist wickedness which, if tolerantly received, will undermine the very foundations of society, while the advance on current morality, in which the heterodoxy normally consists, is only achieved in the teeth of vested interests in the thought and morals it seeks to displace. Thus, while the genius in the sphere of art is usually permitted to starve in a garret, the genius in the sphere of conduct is

usually persecuted and killed with the sanction of the law. An examination of the great legal trials of history from this point of view would make interesting reading. Socrates, Giordano Bruno, and Servetus were all tried and condemned for holding opinions distasteful to their contemporaries, but for which the world now honours them. The genius may be relevantly defined as one who, in Shelley's words, "beholds the future in the present, and his thoughts are the germ of the flower and fruit of latest time."* To put the point biologically, he is an evolutionary "sport" on the spiritual plane designed to give conscious expression to life's instinctive purpose. He represents, therefore, a new thrust forward on the part of life and destroys the prevailing level of thought and morals only to prepare the way for a new one. Thus the thought and moral of the community as a whole presently move up to the level from which the genius first proclaimed his so shockingly original message, and we have the familiar historical spectacle of the heterodoxies of one age becoming the platitudes of the next. Inevitably, we hear only of the geniuses who "break through" and stamp their thought upon the minds of men. But for every one who, in spite of opposition, succeeds in bringing his original inspiration home to the mind of the race, there may have been, probably have been, a dozen whom opposition succeeded in stifling. The case, then, for according liberty to the individual to speak his mind, whatever it may be, is simply the case for not blocking the channels along which alone those intimations can reach the mind of man whose embodiment in concrete form, whether in paint or sound, in moral codes or political institutions, constitutes in the only real sense of the word, his progress.†

* *Defence of Poetry*, p. 5.

† This I take to be the real significance of Mills' celebrated dictum, "If all mankind minus one were of one opinion and only one person were of the contrary opinion, mankind would be no more justified in silencing that one person than he, if he had the power, would be justified in silencing mankind." *Essay On Liberty*, p. 71 (Everyman edition).

This conclusion is not invalidated by the circumstances (a) that in the interests of brevity I have taken the extreme case of the original genius whose thought changes men's outlook and enriches their consciousness. The argument applies, though with weakened force, to the case of every thinker or teacher whose opinions are in advance of those of the majority of his contemporaries. (b) That what may appear to be "in advance of" often turns out to be merely "at variance with," and that it is frequently impossible at the time to distinguish the expression of original inspiration from the outpourings of irresponsible abnormality. We have to reckon with the facts not only that the line between genius and madness is difficult to draw, but also that most geniuses have been at least in part mad. But original truth is at once so rare and so difficult to come by that it is essential to give doubtful cases the benefit of the doubt. "They who tamper with veracity from whatever motive are tampering with the vital force of human progress," wrote Viscount Morley. But it is not necessary that a doctrine's "veracity" should be established at the time of its promulgation. It is sufficient that it should have a chance of being true to render its author's freedom of utterance inviolable. (c) That the original thinker often directly challenges the very government whose forbearance is the condition of his utterance. The State tends to embody the wisdom of average men; its institutions to be clogged with the superstitions of the past. Inevitably those in whom new wisdom is germinating cannot but find themselves in greater or less degree at variance with the established authority. Hence it is the duty of those who, though not themselves the channels of original thought, are alert for its recognition and alive to its value, to ensure that the force of authority is not used to suppress the goad that discomforts it.

(2) The case for liberty has in the past usually been based upon utilitarian considerations, from Socrates, who took the

line that freedom is valuable to society, to John Stuart Mill, who bases his case on "utility in the largest sense, grounded on the permanent interests of man as a progressive being."^{*} John Stuart Mill maintained that society is always the loser, never the gainer, by suppressing the utterances of its members. His argument is briefly that novel opinions will be either true, or false, or partly true and partly false. Society, by suppressing them, not only rules out of court the only process, namely, that of public canvass and discussion, by means of which their truth can be established or their falsity detected, but deliberately forgoes the advantage of adding to truth, if they are true, and of confirming the truth of the received opinions which they call in question, if they are false. If they are partly true and partly false, it is advantageous to society to supplement the one-sidedness of the popularly received truth which the novel opinions challenge by the partial truth which they embody and the popular view omits to consider.

The argument, it is obvious, presupposes that the discovery of truth is valuable and ought to be promoted. I should, then, for my part prefer to state it as follows: Truth is an absolute and ultimate value. By this I mean that its value is intuitively perceived by the human mind. That it is so perceived, the pursuit of useless knowledge, existence of disinterested enquiry in science and philosophy seem to testify. If truth is, in fact, a value, the quest for it needs neither apology nor justification. Now truth cannot be discerned, unless men have the liberty to look for it. This liberty entails freedom of speech, of reading and of writing. It also entails the freedom to make mistakes and to publish unpopular views.

I suspect that liberty might further be defended on the ground that it is itself an ultimate good, whose value, like that of Truth and Beauty, is intuitively perceived. It is, however, a

* *Essay On Liberty*, p. 74 (Everyman edition).

good which is negative rather than positive in the sense that in practice the perception of its value only occurs in its absence. In this sense it is like air. We do not normally value air as a good ; yet the fact that it is indispensable to our bodies is immediately recognized when we are deprived of it. Liberty is the equally indispensable air of the spirit.

(3) The State is not an end in itself ; it exists to promote ends beyond itself, namely, the well-being of its members. The function of the State is, in fact, to establish the conditions which make possible the pursuit of the good life by its members. So much the Greeks asserted and the assertion seems to me never to have been successfully challenged. But, whereas Plato and Aristotle tended to hold that there was one good life for all, or at any rate for the great mass of individuals, which it was the business of the State to promote, we are inclined (and I think rightly) to postulate a number of different kinds of good life appropriate to different kinds of individuals. If modern liberal thought is right in taking this view, it is essential that the individual should be allowed freely to choose for himself the kind of good life in pursuit of which his nature will find its appropriate fulfilment. Such a choice cannot, it is obvious, be made for him. Individual spontaneity in such matters is essential. Liberty, then, is an indispensable pre-requisite not only of the full development of individual personality, but of the discovery by the individual of those ends of value in the pursuit of which alone his personality can reach its full development. It is, in other words, the indispensable condition of his realization of all that he has it in him to be. For the State to cramp this liberty is to inhibit the development of its citizens and to debar them from the pursuit of what appears to them to be good ; in so inhibiting and debarring, it negates the very principle in terms of which alone its existence can be justified.

IV.

Does it, then, follow that there are no bounds which society is justified in imposing upon individual liberty? I think that it does not. On the assumption that the function and *rationale* of the State are to make possible the pursuit of the good life for its members, Mill was surely right in declaring that "the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually and collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their members is self-protection." They are entitled, that is to say, to protect themselves by force, and the use of force by its very nature involves the curtailment of liberty. The question arises whose liberty it is that may be thus justifiably curtailed?

It is, I should say, a fact that every society contains a number of anti-social individuals who do in fact obey its laws unwillingly. Now evil is parasitic upon good, in the sense that it is only worth while for some people to do wrong because most people do right. Thus the burglar is parasitic upon the householder, since, if all were burglars, there would be nothing to burgle. It is the many honest men who make dishonesty profitable, just as it is the many truthful men who make lying fruitful, since, if all men were dishonest, there would be no prizes to be gained by dishonesty, while, if all told lies, nobody would believe anybody else and lying would lose its point. Since it is the existence of law-abiding citizens that calls into being the law-breaking thug, it is clearly the business of the citizen to restrain the thug. The philosopher cannot philosophize while his neighbour is abducting his wife, nor can the artist paint while the burglar is running off with his canvasses. In this sense all civilised activity is dependent upon a minimum background of ordered security, and the maintenance of this background is a condition of its continuance. The presence of force to curtail individual

**Essay On Liberty*, pp. 72, 73 (Everyman edition).

liberty is, in other words, required in society not against the normal, social citizen, but against the anti-social, exceptional citizen whom the activities of the normal citizen call into existence, that he may be restrained from rendering those activities impossible. The function of a State in this connection is, therefore, to maintain that minimum standard of behaviour on the part of all which is the indispensable condition of the pursuit of the good life on the part of any. With this object and with this alone it is entitled, by the instrument of the law, backed by force, to curtail liberty.

II.—By JOHN STRACHEY.

No fruitful discussion of the question of liberty is possible except upon the basis of some theory, whether explicit or implicit, as to the nature of the State. Mr. Joad recognizes this, since at the outset of his paper he states the Absolutist or Idealist theory of the State, citing three typical pronouncements of idealist philosophy, one from Hegel and two from Bosanquet.*

Mr. Joad goes on to reject this theory of the State. Unfortunately, however, he does not offer us any alternative view. (Unless the view that the State is merely an *ad hoc* association of individuals, not differing in kind from a learned society or other voluntary association is held to be implicit in Mr. Joad's paper.)

I now propose to give the view of the State propounded by Marx, Engels and Lenin. It will perhaps be sufficient to state this view very briefly, since it is well known. In order, however, to establish its truth it would be necessary to undertake an extended historical survey, which is impossible within the limits of this paper. Hence, it is proposed to adopt this view of the State as a working hypothesis, and then to see whether its use throws any light on the question of liberty.

Engels first formulated this theory of the State in his "Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State." He summarized his conclusions as follows :—

"The State in no way constitutes a force imposed on Society from outside. Nor is the State 'the reality of the

* Mr. Joad notices that this view of the State is invoked as the obviously appropriate theoretical foundation for fascism. He might have added the dictum of the fascist philosopher, Gentile, who writes : "Both fascism and nationalism regard the State as the foundation of all rights and the source of all values for the individuals composing them. For the one as for the other, the State is not a consequence, it is a principle."

Moral Idea,' 'the image and reality of Reason,' as Hegel asserted. The State is the product of Society at a certain stage of its development. The State is tantamount to an acknowledgement that the given society has become entangled in an insoluble contradiction with itself, that it has broken up into irreconcilable antagonisms, of which it is powerless to rid itself. And in order that these antagonisms, these classes with their opposing economic interests may not devour one another and Society itself in their sterile struggle, some force standing, seemingly, above Society, becomes necessary so as to moderate the force of their collisions and to keep them within the bounds of 'order.' And this force arising from Society, but placing itself above it, which gradually separates itself from it—this force is the State." (Pages 117–118 of 6th German Edition.)

Lenin made this formulation of the theory :—

"According to Marx, the State is the organ of class domination, the organ of oppression of one class by another. Its aim is the creation of order which legalizes and perpetuates this oppression by moderating the collisions between the classes." (State and Revolution, page 115, Vanguard Press Edition.)

It will be seen from these quotations that this theory of the State arises from the Marxian view of the origin and nature of social classes. This view holds that at a certain point in the development of man's powers of production, the splitting up of an originally homogeneous society into social classes becomes alike possible and inevitable. It becomes possible because men's powers of production have developed to a point at which each man can produce a surplus over and above his own necessities. This gives Society the possibility of the division of labour with all its critically important economies. The possibility of

a division of function within Society affords the basis of a governing class, living upon the social surplus. The function of this governing class is, in essence, to develop still further the Society's productive powers. It is only, according to Marx and Engels, when society has reached this point that the necessity of a special organization, which we call the State, arises. This organization consists essentially of an apparatus for the control of the subject class or classes. It consists of a judiciary with its necessary concomitant of prisons and a police force, of the rudiments of a bureaucracy for the purpose of collecting the social surplus by means of taxation, etc., and, above all, of "special bodies of armed men," as Engels calls them, for the enforcement of these arrangements on the rest of society. (Nor can it be denied that these are in fact the features of the State which first developed.)

Lenin makes the point in the following passage :—

"To the question, whence arose the necessity for forming special bodies of armed men (police and standing army) standing above society and becoming divorced from it, the Western European and Russian philistines are inclined to answer with a few phrases, borrowed from Spencer, about the complexity of social life, the differentiation of functions and so forth.

"Such a reference seems 'scientific' and effectively dulls the senses of the average man, obscuring the most important and basic fact, viz., the break up of Society into irreconcilably antagonistic classes. Without such a split the 'self-acting armed organisation of the population' might have differed from the primitive organisation of a herd of monkeys merely grasping sticks, or of primitive man, or races united in a clan form of society, by its complexity, its high technique, and so forth, but would still have been possible. It cannot, however, exist now, because

Society in the period of civilisation, is broken up into antagonistic and, indeed, irreconcilably antagonistic classes, the 'self-acting' arming of which would lead to armed struggles between them. The State is, therefore, formed, a special force is created in the form of special bodies of armed men, and every revolution, in shattering the State machinery, demonstrates to us how the governing class aims at the restoration of the special bodies of armed men at its service, and how the oppressed class tries to create a new organisation of a similar nature, capable of serving not the exploiting, but the exploited class." (*Op. cit.*)

These quotations will perhaps suffice as reminders of the nature of this view of the state. To what conclusions upon the question of liberty will this theory of the state lead ?

Mr. Joad starts his paper by a quotation from Professor Bury's "History of the Freedom of Thought," published in 1913. Professor Bury believed that "the struggle of man against authority has ended in what appears to be a decisive and permanent victory for liberty." Mr. Joad contrasts this statement with what he imagines such an authority would write of the state of the world to-day. He implies, therefore, that in 1913 Professor Bury's view was correct, or at any rate plausible. It may be suggested, however, that Professor Bury's belief in the non-existence of suppression of opinion in 1913 showed his ignorance of the existence of opinions other than those entertained by himself and his circle, rather than the non-existence of suppression. Writing of present-day conditions "over wide areas of the world," Mr. Joad says that "human beings may only read what it seems good to other human beings they should read. The government is omnipotent and strictly irresponsible. The press is its mouthpiece, history its apologist, the arts its echo."

Can we not, with one alteration, apply these remarks with equal accuracy to the conditions of 1913? The one amendment necessary is to substitute the words "governing class" for "government."

This view will, no doubt, seem surprising to those who are accustomed to think in terms of the government, or State, as something fundamentally distinct from the governing class. If, however, the theory of the State submitted above is accepted, it becomes clear that the distinction between the dictatorial, arbitrary, forcible control of opinion by a governing class, acting both through the instrument of the State apparatus and outside it, and the same control of opinion being exercised almost wholly through that State apparatus, is a somewhat formal one.

Let us examine Mr. Joad's propositions. "Human beings," we are told, "may to-day only read what it seems good to other human beings that they should read" . . . "the press is its (the government's) mouthpiece." Was it not equally the case in 1913, however, that the overwhelming and decisive majority of human beings could, and did, only read "what it seemed good to other human beings that they should read"? And were not the "other" and dictatorial human beings the score or so of controlling newspaper and publishing capitalists of that time? The point at issue is this. Is the control of what men may read by the monopolization by a few nominally private individuals of the capital resources necessary for the effective conduct of newspapers a less dictatorial, "unfree," or illiberal proceeding, than a similar monopolization by a government? There is no doubt a distinction. But is it a distinction of any practical or substantial importance?

Again, we are told that education has now become the mere propaganda of the government. Has it not always been with equal rigidity the propaganda of the governing class? Is not

the same proposition true of history? And what can art conceivably be but the echo of the opinions and fantasies of the social group which is able to support the artist?

It is not denied, of course, that there is a distinction between the capitalist democracies typical of, though not universal in, the pre-war epoch, and the capitalist absolutisms typical of, though not universal in, the post-war epoch. But only the most extreme formalist will suppose that this distinction is a distinction between liberty and the forcible suppression of opinion. The distinction is between two different methods by which the same governing class controls public opinion. What has happened is that the ever growing insecurity of the governing class and the consequent increase in the intensity of class conflict has made the old, comparatively subtle and concealed methods of control impossible, and has driven the governing class to a more frank and overt suppression of anti-capitalist opinion.

The above conclusions as to the permanence and inevitability of suppressions of freedom of opinion in the capitalist world follow from the Marxist view of the State. What conclusions, however, follow from this view of the State in regard to the question of freedom of opinion in societies which have overthrown the capitalist system? For although Mr. Joad does not mention the matter, it will, of course, be objected that no communist has the right to question the present extreme suppression of freedom of opinion in the capitalist world, because he supports a like suppression of opinion in that part of the world in which the working class is the ruling power.

It will be observed, however, that the Marxist theory of the State will lead its adherents to expect the suppression of anti-working-class opinion in working-class states as well as the suppression of anti-capitalist opinion in capitalist class states. Indeed, the mere existence of a State pre-supposes the need for a forcible suppression of opinion, since that is precisely

the essential function of states. A difference between the suppression of anti-capitalist opinion in capitalist states, and of anti-communist opinion in working-class states, is that the working class, being informed with Marxist theory, undertakes this suppression unhypocritically and clear-sightedly.

It is able to do this for several important reasons. In the first place, the amount of suppression needed by a ruling working class, even within a few decades of its accession to power, is incomparably smaller than that permanently necessary for a ruling capitalist class. The heavy disproportion between the numbers of the working and capitalist classes respectively makes this inevitable. Again, there can be no end to the regime of force and oppression which must be maintained by a capitalist class. The elimination of the working class, of that class from which surplus wealth is drawn for the maintenance of the capitalist class, is of course impossible. Hence the capitalist class has no prospects of being able to dispense with its apparatus of coercion. On the contrary, it is evident that as the difficulties of capitalism increase, that apparatus must be continually strengthened until (as in fascist states to-day) it becomes so gigantic, both as a bureaucracy and as an armed force, that its subsistence threatens to eat up the entire surplus of the community.

The working class, on the other hand, knows that its forcible suppression of the activities and opinions of the capitalist class, however rigorous such suppression must be on the eve of the revolution, when the capitalist class is still extremely formidable, can be an ever-diminishing factor. The working class is well able to dispense with the capitalist class just so soon as new technicians and administrators have been trained (or old ones wholly absorbed into the working class). The working class becomes co-terminous with society as a whole. It is clear that at this point the need for a state apparatus, the specific function

of which is to hold down subject classes, will have disappeared. One further quotation from Engels is perhaps relevant here :—

“ Thus, the State has not always existed. There were societies which did without it, which had no idea of the State or of State power. At a given stage of economic development which was necessarily bound up with the break up of society into classes, the State became a necessity, as a result of this division. We are now rapidly approaching a stage in the development of production, in which the existence of these classes is not only no longer necessary, but is becoming a direct impediment to production. Classes will vanish as inevitably as they inevitably arose in the past. With the disappearance of classes the State, too, will inevitably disappear. When organizing production anew on the basis of a free and equal association of the producers, Society will banish the whole State machine to a place which will then be the most proper place for it—to the museum of antiquities side by side with the spinning-wheel and the bronze axe.” (*Op. cit.*)

Whatever view may be taken of the validity of the propositions which have been here submitted, they will perhaps make it clear why it is that communists are quite unmoved by complaints that they suppress the opinions of their antagonists, while complaining bitterly of the suppression of their own opinions by the capitalists. In the first place it is not true that communists “complain” of capitalist suppression of opinion. They know perfectly well that such suppression is an inevitable and essential part of capitalist rule. They do, however, point out that just because that rule is becoming ever more precarious, ever more intolerably incompatible with the welfare of the overwhelming majority of the population, this element of suppression is swelling, and must continue to swell, to

monstrous proportions. They predict that so long as capitalism continues, suppression of opinion is bound to increase in something like geometric proportions; that all the attempts to retain some elements of liberty of opinion within capitalist society, even for the comparatively well situated intermediate sub-classes, must become more and more futile as the anxieties of the ruling class increase. They further point out that the suppression of capitalist opinion, which must and will be undertaken by a working-class state, will be incomparably smaller, both in intensity and duration, than the corresponding capitalist suppression. It is an ever-diminishing instead of ever-increasing quantity.

The Communist is, so far as his ultimate aims are concerned, in agreement with the anarchist. He, too, believes that with the final disappearance of classes—with the emergence of the gigantic powers of production which can alone make such a disappearance of classes possible—the need for special organizations for the suppression of opinion ends. "The authority of government over persons will be replaced by the administration of things and the direction of the process of production," as Engels puts it in a well-known passage in the *Anti-Dührings*.

The Communist, therefore, is fully prepared to recognize the truth of the series of arguments which Mr. Joad advances in the body of his paper as to the incalculable damage which the suppression of opinion has done to the human race. He, too, believes that an unknown number of Socrates, Giordino Brunos and Servetus, of men and women whose talents could have been of great service to mankind, have been suppressed before they could make their contribution to human knowledge. But he would say that far more important than the legal persecution of such thinkers, to which Mr. Joad draws attention, is the wholesale physical and mental stunting of the vast majority of the population, which capitalism, and before it, feudalism—

which all class societies in fact—necessitate. For every genius or potential genius who has been persecuted by legal process, 100 have been mentally and physically broken by the unremitting exploitation which has always been the lot of the overwhelming majority of human beings.

The Communist, then, endorses fully the enormous importance of achieving complete liberty of opinion. Marx speaks of the achievement of a classless society as marking the end of pre-history and the beginning of the history proper of the human race. Engels speaks of the leap from the kingdom of necessity into the kingdom of freedom. Thus both indicate that until man has achieved the freedom possible alone in a classless society he is unworthy to be ranked as fully human.

But the Communist points out the conditions indispensable for the realization of human liberty, viz., the abolition of inevitably antagonistic social classes, the discontinuance of the exploitation of the labour of one man by another, and, consequently, the disappearance of the State.

Nor, does the Communist make the vital and, it is submitted, vitiating reservation to his belief in individual liberty, which Mr. Joad states at the conclusion of his paper. Mr. Joad tells us that he believes that there are "bounds which society is justified in imposing upon an individual's liberty."

He then goes on to define the class of persons whose liberty it is permissible to curtail by force. These persons are defined as "law-breaking thugs," and as "burglars," and further as "anti-social, or exceptional citizens." But Mr. Joad gives us not the slightest indication of how the question of which citizens are "exceptional" or "anti-social," and so may be legitimately deprived of their liberty, is to be decided. It is tacitly implied that this will be self-evident. Mr. Joad will no doubt tell us that he would easily have seen that Socrates, Giordino Bruno and Servetus, were not "anti-social or exceptional citizens."

Can we feel the same assurance that if Mr. Joad, or any one of us, living in their epoch, had been one of their judges, we would necessarily have acquitted them ?

Again, we are told that the burglar may legitimately be suppressed. But is not he who holds anti-capitalist opinions in a capitalist society precisely the universal burglar ? For the capitalist, expropriation is theft. Mr. Joad's criterion would certainly allow of the suppression of all anti-capitalist opinion in capitalist societies. Conversely, what is the counter-revolutionary conspirator in a working-class society, in the eyes of the workers, but " a law-breaking thug " ?

Thus we are astonished to discover that at the end of his paper Mr. Joad has felt compelled to open the door to both the past and present forms of the suppression of liberty. Are we not thus driven back to our original proposition that such suppression is an inevitable and integral part of all class societies ?

Finally, doubt may be felt as to whether the Communist's belief that it will be possible to dispense with all suppression of liberty in a classless society is not utopian. There is no space to discuss this doubt here. But it may be briefly suggested that in the end it can only be set at rest by experience.

To the question, will a classless society produce perfect liberty we answer, " let us go and see." It is certain that nothing but the establishment of a classless society will now prevent the growth of an incomparably monstrous suppression of human liberty, of all opinion and action unwelcome to the existing ruling class. The classless society is, at the very least, the only basis upon which any substantial measure of widespread human liberty is conceivable.

III.—*By* G. C. FIELD.

I BELIEVE that the original theory of these symposia was that the third participant should represent the synthesis, which resolves the thesis and antithesis of the first two into a higher unity. It must be confessed that this theory is seldom realized in practice, and I certainly should not venture to attempt such a task on this occasion. I choose, rather, to put forward some small contribution of my own which, from a slightly different point of view, may supplement the other two papers.

First, however, a word to indicate my attitude to my fellow-contributors. With Mr. Joad's own position I am in fairly complete sympathy. I might choose a somewhat different selection from what he rightly describes as the embarrassing wealth of arguments in favour of this position; but there is hardly anything in what he says that I should wish to dissent from. If I had any quarrel with him it would be on comparatively minor points of historical interpretation. I should question, for instance, his association of intolerance of opinion with the Idealist philosophy. It may be true that Hegel and Gentile have appeared as advocates of the authoritarian State. But our leading British Idealists who have been active in public affairs—and no other school of philosophy has in practice inspired so many of its adherents to such activity—have, with hardly an exception, been active on the liberal side. And it seems to me that this is a more logical development of this doctrine than the other. After all, in comparison with the Absolute, the State is only one degree less fragmentary than the individual. At the least Absolute Idealism would seem to provide an excellent philosophical basis for Internationalism. Or again, the doctrine of degrees of truth should tend to produce

better than most other doctrines that combination of respect for the truth and charity towards error which is the essential foundation of tolerance. However, I am more anxious to emphasize my agreements with Mr. Joad than my differences.

With Mr. Strachey I am afraid that I should find it impossible to come to terms at all. I do not doubt that the Marxian theory has made valuable contributions to thought in calling attention to factors which have been too often neglected. But, as a good Marxian, he would certainly not be content with that. He would require us to regard his theory, not as a possible hypothesis to account for some facts of experience, but as a complete and systematic revelation to be accepted as a whole or not at all.

It seems to me, if I may be permitted a brief digression, that Marxianism, in its extreme form, is important rather as a symptom of the working of certain psychological tendencies than as a scientific hypothesis. In this it resembles certain other modern movements of thought, for instance, Freudian Psycho-Analysis and the Diffusionist theory of culture. They begin by calling attention to neglected factors or aspects of the subject under investigation, and that is their real value for thought. But they go on, partly under the influence of the emotions engendered by controversy and partly because the factors they emphasize appeal to other emotional tendencies, to elevate these factors to the position of the sole and sufficient principle of explanation and to deny any significance to any other factor. And they are confirmed in this course by the tendency of the human mind, to which Bacon called attention long ago, to be attracted by a single and simple explanation for its own sake. So the theory itself becomes an object of devotion, and it becomes a presupposition for further argument or investigation that all facts must be explained in the light of it.

I find a symptom of these tendencies in Mr. Strachey's suggestion that it is necessary to have a theory of the State, apparently, before beginning to discuss the nature of liberty. I should maintain, personally, for reasons that will appear directly, that if we had to assign priority to one investigation over the other, we should have to put them in exactly the reverse order and say that it was impossible to arrive at a satisfactory theory of the State until we had a clear idea of the nature of liberty. But the important point here is to insist that we shall almost certainly go wrong if we form a theory on one point and then deduce from it, without modification, a theory on another point which we have not yet examined. A theory of the State which was formed before a careful investigation of the meaning of liberty would almost inevitably have to be modified after we had made such an investigation.

To undertake either of these investigations thoroughly would, of course, be impossible within the limits of a discussion such as this. We shall have to take a great deal for granted and use a good many terms without explaining them as fully as an audience of philosophers might like. Accepting this as inevitable, I will attempt the first step in my task of carrying the discussion beyond the point at which my partners have left it by calling attention to two restrictions which they have both imposed upon themselves. They have both restricted themselves to the relations between State and individual, and they have restricted themselves almost entirely to the special question of liberty of opinion.

I do not know how far the first restriction might be regarded as imposed by the title of the discussion ; but it would certainly give a very one-sided view if we argued as if the State was the only quarter from which limitations on individual liberty might come. Mr. Strachey has glimpses of this ; but he attempts to make the even narrower restriction to the relations between

different economic classes. In reality, of course, any kind of organization involves some individuals having some power over others, and this power may be used to suppress liberty in many different ways, even the liberty of discussion and opinion. One can go further, indeed, and say that wherever one individual has the power of making another's life unpleasant some possibility of this arises. From the point of view of the individual there is little, if any, difference of principle between having to keep silent about your opinions for fear of fine or imprisonment, and having to do it for fear of losing your customers or being bullied by your official superior or sacked by your employer or excommunicated by your priest or boycotted by your associates. This shows, once more, how misleading it is to talk as if our notion of liberty could be deduced from our theory of the State. It would have to rest on a much wider basis than that. For it comes into all relations between human beings.

No doubt the State, or whatever we choose to call the highest authority in a community, is in a particularly favourable position for the suppression of liberty. It is much more difficult to escape from it. Further, other individuals or organisations depend for some of their opportunities of persecution, though not by any means for all, on the position and power given to them by the State or the laws. So the question is undoubtedly of a special degree of interest for those who are in any way responsible for the policy of the State. But the practical problem for them is by no means confined to the choice between the two simple alternatives of imposing restrictions on individuals or leaving them free. Quite as often, if not more often, the question is how far they are to restrict the freedom of some individuals in order to prevent them from restricting the freedom of others. And this, in practice, presents problems of extreme difficulty.

But on one point there should be no difficulty, as far as these considerations are concerned. For the free expression of opinion by one person could never be said, except by a most dishonest use of metaphor, to be a direct infringement of the liberty of other persons. Therefore, if the authorities of the State or any other organisation contemplate the suppression of free discussion on any subject, they can never fairly plead that they are going to do it to secure greater freedom for someone else. They must find other reasons than that.

This suggests that the second limitation which the other two contributors have imposed on themselves has a great deal to be said for it. We cannot regard all possible restrictions on our freedom as equally serious or important. Some of our modern champions of liberty talk at times as if they regarded being burnt at the stake for talking heresy and being prevented from getting a drink at certain hours as on very much the same level of iniquity; but a balanced view has to discriminate between different cases, and the freedom of discussion and expression of opinion is obviously a particularly good test case on which to fight the issue. As indicated just now, suppression of free discussion cannot be defended on the pretence of increasing freedom somewhere else. If defended at all it must be defended on the ground that this kind of freedom is bad. On the other hand, most of those who believe in individual liberty as a good would probably agree that the good it brings was more obviously the result of freedom of opinion than of most other forms of freedom.

But, though that is our main battleground, we cannot ignore the other fronts altogether. We shall find that each raises its special problems, and on some our position may turn out to be so weak that we shall be wise to retire from it altogether. To drop metaphor, even the most ardent believer in liberty must recognize that there are some points on which restriction

is not only necessary but desirable. Mr. Joad indicated briefly, some of these, and he was, of course, met by Mr. Strachey with that modern version of the Fallacy of the Sorites, the where-are-you-going-to-draw-the-line argument. It is noteworthy how constantly this ancient sophistry reappears. And yet its fallaciousness, at any rate in the form in which it is most frequently used, is surely obvious, for it rests on the assumption that if one thing passes into another by imperceptible stages, there is really no difference between them. I suppose an instance in the sphere of visual perception could be imagined if we supposed a man who pondered so profoundly over the precise position of purple that he ended by denying that there was any difference between red and blue ; and this instance would suggest, as a general principle of method, the unwisdom of starting an investigation from border-line cases and trying to work outwards from those. At any rate, in questions of conduct it is far more profitable to start from extreme cases and work inwards till we come to the debatable frontier region ; and if practical necessities force us to draw a line here which appears arbitrary, we shall not let that disturb us overmuch.

And so we return to our extreme case, the liberty of opinion. It would, perhaps, be more strictly correct to speak of the liberty of the expression of opinion. But this distinction is not as important as it might appear at first sight. For in the formation of opinion, if it is to be real opinion and not simply a repetition of phrases, free discussion is an essential element, at any rate in all matters on which difference of opinion is possible at all. The more anxious we are to arrive at the truth the more strongly shall we demand the opportunity of hearing diverse views discussed. The wrong done by the forcible suppression of any view is not merely a wrong to the people who want to express that view. It is an even greater wrong to those who want to hear that view expressed and to consider

it for themselves. But Mr. Joad has said what needs to be said on this point.

I suggest that the choice between liberty and repression in matters of opinion should be guided, before all else, by a consideration of the type of character and the sort of state of mind that they respectively produce and express ; and, in considering that, it is easier and better to begin with the effects of repression. For, as far as practical policy goes, repression is a positive activity while liberty is a refraining from a particular sort of activity. We might expect, therefore, that liberty might be used in many different ways and result in a variety of different kinds of life, while the results of repression would be far more definite and easy to detect. And this is, in fact, what happens. Superior persons have generally found it easy to make fun of those who have used liberty as a political slogan on the grounds that they could not define exactly what they meant by liberty nor what they hoped to attain by it. That, no doubt, has often been true. But they have generally had a pretty shrewd idea of the particular repressions they wanted to get rid of.

Considering, then, liberty of opinion from this point of view, we might usefully follow Mr. Joad in investigating first its effects on the persecuted and then its effects on the persecutor. The effects on those who are or might be persecuted seem fairly obvious. It is hardly open to doubt that the way to live happily under a regime of repression is either to be mentally inert and have no opinions at all or to be highly suggestible and ready to receive any opinions put forward by those in authority or to be completely dishonest and prepared to say whatever will be pleasing to the rulers. Those who are none of these three will necessarily live in a constant state of nervous tension, alternating between fear and bitterness. One might quote the recently published experiences of a shrewd observer who had

just returned home after a tour of observation in Central Europe. "I had occasion in a restaurant, in conversation with a fellow-politician, to say something rude about a Cabinet Minister. I found myself sinking my voice to a ridiculous whisper and looking furtively round to see whether anyone was listening. It was the result of six weeks' sojourn under dictatorships." Those who think that this state of mind is a healthy one will, of course, defend a policy of repression.

The state of mind of the persecutor or advocate of persecution is less often discussed, but perhaps even more important. It seems to me clear beyond dispute that there is a strong impulse in most normal people, arising no doubt from the combination of several natural emotional tendencies, to feel some degree of anger with people who differ from themselves. And anger, if not controlled by any other influences, naturally leads to the use of violence. With the appropriate training and under the appropriate social influences this can, in most people, be reduced to the dimensions of the mild irritations that arise in the debates at a philosophical conference. But the tendency can also be encouraged and glorified and erected into a principle of conduct. There is no evidence, incidentally, that the tendency is any stronger or more easily encouraged in those who hold true opinions than in those who hold false ones. Some observers also have suggested that it is likely to be stronger in those who feel some slight doubt about the truth of their opinions than in those who are absolutely certain of them.

It is extremely probable that in all, or nearly all, cases the adoption of a policy of repression by the State or any other body arises from this tendency. It is certain that it encourages and strengthens this tendency. And the main case of the advocate of liberty must rest on a belief that this tendency is bad, and that, so far as it is allowed to become a motive to action, the action will be wrong. It is bad, they would hold, because it is

incompatible with that fundamental attitude of respect for other individuals, of regarding human beings as ends and not means, which, they would hold, lies at the basis of all morality. We here begin to see indications of the positive moral ideal which lies behind the apparently negative policy of refraining from suppressing free discussion and the expression of opinion. It would be impossible to develop this here. But a realization of the factors involved will make us profoundly sceptical of all specious arguments for repression in particular cases. We shall suspect them of being rationalisations of the primitive impulse against which we have to struggle. Above all, we should be doubly suspicious of them if the opinion that it is proposed to suppress is one which we happen personally to dislike. For we know that this tendency in ourselves will be urging us all the time to accept them.

Having dealt with the extreme case of liberty of opinion, a complete treatment of the subject would demand that we should work down through the other spheres of activity in which liberty was, or might be thought to be, involved. We might, for instance, go on next to the question of the censorship of so-called obscene publications ; but it is obvious that such an examination would be impossible here. There is, however, one sphere in which the principle of liberty has sometimes been invoked about which I should like to say a word by way of a footnote.

Is liberty at stake in the question at issue between a planned and an unplanned economy ? Is State control of industry, in an extreme or a partial degree, an infringement of individual liberty ? It is often supposed to be so, but, as it seems to me, with little or no justification. I may recall the warning, already given, against the fallacy of supposing that restriction of liberty can only come from the State. It is obvious, on any view that liberty of action in the conduct of industry can only be the

privilege of the very few. And even for those few this liberty is, I venture to think, largely illusory. Their actions are dictated to them by economic influences outside their control, just as effectively as if they were under the orders of an employer. The fact is that all co-operative activity in producing anything necessarily involves a large amount of subordinating in practice one's own opinions and one's own wishes to those of other people.

That is not to say that the question of liberty does not arise in such activities. On the contrary, there are many problems in connection with them in which it is a real issue. But they arise equally in State-controlled or private enterprises, and have nothing directly to do with the difference between them. There is the question of the encouragement of individual initiative in subordinates and the delegation of responsibilities to them. There is the question of the encouragement of new ideas and suggestions. There is the question here also of free discussion and criticism of policy. The experience of small democratically-run institutions shows that it is perfectly possible to combine free criticism and expression of differences of opinion with loyal execution of decisions once arrived at, though old-fashioned army officers and ardent Communists find it difficult to realize this. Then there is the very important question how far an organization or a section of an organization or an authority within an organization should attempt to control or influence the conduct of its members in matters that are not directly concerned with their duties in the organization. Should a great public corporation, for instance, insist on marital fidelity as a condition of remaining in its employment? Anyone who has worked in or with an organization knows quite well from experience the difference between an atmosphere of liberty and an atmosphere of repression, even if they cannot always formulate it.

This is merely an illustration of the kind of problems that arise in this connection; but, if my analysis in the test case has been correct of the principle at the back of the demand for liberty, we may at least have found here an indication of the direction from which we shall approach these problems. More than that a discussion of this kind could not expect to do.

IS ANALYSIS A USEFUL METHOD IN PHILOSOPHY?

By MAX BLACK, J. WISDOM and M. CORNFORTH.

I.—By MAX BLACK.

ESTIMATES of the usefulness of any method must involve reference to the ends which that method is intended to serve. The ends of analytic method in Philosophy are not immediately obvious, and difficulties of recognition are increased when those who advocate its use in Philosophy also subject most traditional conceptions of the nature of Philosophy to adverse criticism. Nor is it always clear whether critics propose reform or murder, when they say that philosophical propositions can, in principle, never be uttered,* that traditional Philosophy is a futile attempt to answer meaningless questions, that Philosophy must be replaced by analysis of the findings of science or everyday knowledge,† that such activity is “useless though harmless.”‡ With none of these statements is there occasion to disagree—they are mentioned here only in order to emphasise how difficult must be any attempt to answer the question which is the theme of this discussion prior to agreement on the definition of Philosophy. Of such agreement there is no hope. Is this a confession of the impotence of any discussion on the usefulness of analytic method? Not at all. For disputes concerning the definition of Philosophy, in so far as they are not purely trivial questions concerning the choice of suitably dignified labels for intellectual activities, are based on fundamental and irreducible differences of opinion as to the value of these activities in

* L. Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*.

† R. Carnap, *The Unity of Science*, London, 1934.

‡ J. Wisdom, “Ostentation,” *Psyche*, Vol. XIII, 1933.

themselves. Account can be taken of individual æsthetic preferences in this matter by treating the discussion in the spirit of the tensor calculus, providing each reader with a set of statements to interpret according to his own system of æsthetic coordinates. In short, what a discussion of this kind can hope to produce, is a clear description of the analytic method, its technique and prospects of success, leaving all who please to decide whether the method so defined is useful for the type of philosophic activity which meets with their approval.

By "analysis" is meant, in this paper, primarily the method of "Ostentation" which has recently been explained by Mr. Wisdom.* That method deserves special attention, for it is the most detailed statement available of a conception of analysis which has been practised by Dr. Broad, Prof. Moore, Mr. Bertrand Russell, Prof. Stebbing and many others of the English realists. For though Mr. Wisdom's method is far in advance, in elaboration, sophistication, and ingenuity of definition, of public pronouncements in the nature of analysis by any of the philosophers I have mentioned, there persists in all of them a basic community of outlook. In particular, all probably agree with Mr. Wisdom that the business of analysis is the analysis of facts rather than of the meaning of statements, in a sense of fact in which Mr. Jones sat down, The Mayor sat down, He sat down, This did that, may all express the same fact. That this is, however, a highly condensed, and, therefore, ambiguous, statement, which the rest of

* J. Wisdom: "Logical Constructions," *Mind*, Vol. XL, N.S., pp. 188-216, 460-475; Vol. XLI, N.S., pp. 441-464; Vol. XLII, N.S., pp. 43-66, 186-202; and "Ostentation," *Psyche*, Vol. XIII, pp. 164-177. I have found great difficulty in summarising Mr. Wisdom's views for criticism and what I have to say will refer chiefly to his last paper on "Ostentation" in which he has summarized the conclusions of his previous detailed investigations. I am conscious that my account has done less than justice to some aspects of his position; in particular, I have, deliberately, omitted all reference to his contribution to the theory of generality.

this paper must elaborate, is made clear by the fact that Mr. Wisdom himself has said his method of Ostentation is concerned with the analysis of sentences rather than of facts. But I must be content to say dogmatically, for the moment, that the analytic method under consideration is either concerned with the analysis of facts in the sense of fact in which the same fact corresponds to different sentences ; or, if it is regarded as concerned with analysing the meaning of statements or sentences, analyses those statements into conjunctions of statements entailed by, but not having the same meaning as, the *analysandum*. It is this fact which distinguishes Ostentation or philosophical analysis from logical analysis,* which is concerned with the expansion of statements into statements of identical meaning. The rest of this paper is chiefly concerned with elaborating and making clear the implications of these statements.

In order to do so, I have chosen to interpret Ostentation by constructing a simple universe in which the process of Ostentation would be completely successful. The advantages of this procedure is that it is possible to know the complete analyses of the comparatively few facts available in this universe, and thus to have specific analyses, free from the irrelevances of the examples usually considered. For examination of analyses, of such statements as This is a penny or England invaded France, is complicated by the vagueness and ambiguity of the sentences

* The analysis practised by the English realists can easily be confused with the "logical analysis" of the "Viennese Circle" ; for the latter are said to be concerned with the analysis of the meaning (*Bedeutung*) of statements, and had, until recently, defined identity of meaning, on the basis of the so-called "Thesis of Extensionality," as equivalent to mutual entailment. In this respect, then, "logical analysis," as practised by the Viennese Circle, agreed with the method of Ostentation ; but I understand that the Thesis of Extensionality has now been modified. It is perhaps necessary to add that the theories of the Viennese circle contain marked pragmatic elements which are absent from the theories of the English Philosophers previously mentioned.

expressing the statements, and by ignorance of the proper analyses. The result is to produce doubt as to what is being analysed and confusion as to how the analysis might be performed, if it could be performed. These obstacles, at least, are removed, by examining the specific and non-trivial analyses that can be provided in the constructed universe.

I imagine, then, a universe, (whose non-existence is presumably a contingent fact), consisting of a single subject, S, who, though devoid of all senses except that of sight, and of all consciousness of self, is yet capable of reflective thought. (I am, of course, describing the universe in our own terms—not in those which S himself could use.) The visual field belonging to S is entirely flat, homogeneous and undifferentiated, and always uniformly white or uniformly black when existent. It is assumed, further, that the behaviour of this field is such that each presentation, (whether white or black), persists only sufficiently long to be apprehended as white or black, and is then terminated by a discontinuity (non-existence of the field) only to be immediately succeeded by a fresh presentation of the same or opposite colour, *i.e.*, that experience consists, for S, in a series of successive, homogeneous, discrete, visual presentations of either black or white. It is postulated that S, though without quantitative apprehension of time, is able to apprehend ordinal succession, so that experience not only is, but is actually apprehended by him to be, a linear series of simple elements, qualitatively distinguished only by the possession of one or other of two simple characteristics (black or white). For brevity we will suppose that S refers to the characteristics by the invariable names B and W. (B and W are perhaps logically proper names). The apprehension of the entire series of presentations involves the possession of memory, and it is convenient to compensate S for the monotony of existence by supposing that he has perfect and infallible memory of all

presentations with which he has been acquainted. This, in turn, presupposes that S has names for the individual presentations which are recalled by him; it can be imagined that S names each successive presentation, at the moment of presentation, by an integer, choosing consecutive integers for consecutive presentations. S finds it convenient to have some generic term for referring to the units of experience in his sense-field; he calls them "instants," and the colours B and W "characters." Thus at any instant n , where n is an integer, S can recall some instant m (m less than n) and remember, infallibly, whether m was W or B. Thus, assuming that the series of instants has a first term, the universe consists of a series of instants, or atomic facts, of the form

X1 X2 X3 X4.....

where X1 is the first term, each X is either W or B, and S knows the character of each instant which occurs earlier in the series than the instant at which he has arrived. So far we have been considering S's memory of single instants. We must assume also that S is able, to some extent, to remember a pair of consecutive instants simultaneously (*i.e.*, in the same specious present), and is thus able to perceive that the following four combinations of consecutive presentations, and only these four, can arise :—

WW WB BW BB.

This is, for S, a "necessary" fact.

A pair of successive presentations of this kind is called by S an "event," the following of one instant by another instant of the same colour the "persistence" of that colour, an instant being followed by an instant of another colour the "replacing" of the first colour. Thus, on writing the propositional functions $Per()$ and $()rep()$ for the

relations of "persistence" and "replacement," S will have the following definitions :—

$$\begin{aligned} B_n B_{n+1} &= Per(B) \\ W_n W_{n+1} &= Per(W) \\ W_n B_{n+1} &= (B) rep(W) \\ B_n W_{n+1} &= (W) rep(B). \end{aligned}$$

Moreover, it will be noticed that there are secondary notions of "persistence" and "replacement," definable in terms of *Per* and *rep*, which S uses in thinking of the persistence or replacement of an instant as well as of qualities. Thus, if *n* is any instant, the persistence of that instant means, for S, the persistence of its colour. (Conversely, the persistence of colours could be defined in terms of the persistence of instants, regarded as primary.)

By analogy with the assumption that S had names for instants, it is assumed that he has also names for "events." But in order to be nearer to our own world we must now postulate that S's memory for events is not perfect, that, in fact, he is not always able to remember the character of the relation between the instants which constitute a named or remembered event. The numerical names chosen for instants will supply names for events, if S chooses the index of the first of the two instants constituting the event as a proper name for the event itself. Thus if *E* denote an event, so that $E = X_n X_{n+1}$, we have $E_n = X_n X_{n+1}$. Thus S knows the position of each event in the series of events without knowing the character of each such event. S can now define "characters," of events (in a higher level sense of "characters") in terms of the relations *Per* and *rep* between instants, just as he was able to define the relations themselves in terms of the characters of instants

* Conversely, again, the qualities of instants could be defined, formally, in terms of the higher level qualities between events. It is worth interpolating here, for its technical interest, the interpretation of this result to

Taking stock, then, there are *instants*, *characters of events*, and *relations* between characters (or, alternatively, *relations* between instants) at the first level; *events*, and *characters* (new sense) of events, at the second level.

It is supposed that S proceeds to one and only one further stage of abstraction. Observing that events may be succeeded by events of the same or different character, he extends his terminology in order to speak of the persistence and replacement (new senses) of persistence and replacement (old senses), and, in a derivative sense, of the persistence or replacement of events. Thus he would write

W (n) W (n+1) W (n+2) W (n+3) as Per (En)
and W (n) W (n+1) B (n+2) W (n+3) as (En+1) rep (En).

and he would also refer to the same distributions, less determinately, in terms of the *relations* (new sense) of certain characters by the statements Per(*Per*) and (*rep*)rep(*Per*). Apart from the increasing complexity due, in part, to the deliberate use of words at several levels, the transition from pairs to quadruplets of instants is of exactly the same nature as the transition from instants to pairs of instants or events. Let S refer to sets of four consecutive instants (or two consecutive events) as "histories." I suppose that S, in contrast with his very full knowledge of instants, and extensive but fragmentary knowledge of events, is able to remember two and only two histories, which he knows by the names α and β . Further, that apart from knowing that the eight instants constituting α and β were a

analysis in the actual world. For it would seem that, if mutual entailment between analysandum and analysis, plus increasing multiplicity of the analysis, were to be the only criteria of analysis, it would be possible to analyse facts about sense data into facts about perceptual objects (the direction of scientific analysis. Cf. also the analysis of the Viennese circle) as well as in the opposite direction. The direction chosen by Ostentation is such as to increase immediacy of knowledge of, or acquaintance with, the facts constituting successive stages in the analyses.

group of eight consecutive instants, with characters corresponding to the judgment *Per* (α), S knows neither the position nor the exact constitution of either α or β . Thus the third, and final level of S's universe whose categories are *histories*, characters of histories, and relations between histories, contains only two histories and only one relational fact about histories.

I have now completed my account of the imagined world. In it we have seen that there are three material categories, instants, events, histories, in addition to a series of relations and properties of different types. Both in these respects and in the increasing indeterminateness of S's knowledge of higher order facts, the imagined universe closely resembles our own: S's universe differs from ours, in fact, in its objective aspect chiefly by its poverty of *data*, and in its epistemological aspect chiefly in the absence of general or existential judgments. And it has been deliberately constructed to have precisely that molecular structure which is postulated by Ostentation and similar methods.

The question I now want to ask is To what extent could S practice Ostentation in his universe and what would be the form of the results of such analysis? Assuming now that S possesses sufficient consciousness of language, he could make the following observations:

(1) That *histories*, *events* and instants are of different logical types.

(2) That the relational words *Per* and *rep* are systematically ambiguous.

(3) That statements at higher levels can be translated in principle, into statements of lower levels, *e.g.*, the replacement of an event means that the relation of the instants constituting the second event is not identical with the relation of the instants constituting the first event.

The process of replating higher level statements (known to be true) by conjunctions of lower order statements, is an essential part of the process of Ostentation. The reason for saying that S can perform such definitions in principle is the fact, previously mentioned, that S's knowledge of higher order facts is progressively more indeterminate. But S's analysis is one of two things: either it is a description of how, if the constitution of the terms composing a statement were known, that statement could be replaced by a conjunction of statements at lower levels; or it is a process of defining, with the help of existential quantifiers* the meaning of higher level terms by means of terms at lower levels.† The second process is logical analysis; and the first is analysis, not of given statements, but of postulated more determinate statements. Reverting to the most interesting fact in S's experience, viz., the persistence of α , S's difficulty is that he does not know the precise constitution of the higher level terms he is using—or as he himself expresses the matter: that α persisted is a fact as certain as any he knows, but when exactly α occurred or what exactly α was like is lost in the mists of antiquity. (I have reverted to the language of our own world, but it would be easy, if it were not so tedious, to translate the metaphors back into the neutral terms of S's system.)

With what results, then, have S's analytic reflections provided him? Awareness of the ambiguities of his language, which is

* The existential quantifier is the symbol *there is a . . . such that* (or $\exists$).

† E.g., the persistence of a named event E means that there are two instants, x , y , comprising E such that either both x and y are B or both x and y are W. Here E is an illustrative variable, x and y are apparent variables, and the analysis is a logical expansion of the term *persistence* (of events) by means of the terms B, W (and logical constants). It may be noticed that the words *event* and *instant* need not occur explicitly in such a definition since any relational term (whose meaning is understood) automatically determines the type of its arguments.

likely to prevent attempts to answer' nonsensical questions (When is an event not a history ?) ; knowledge of the kind of analysis that he could perform if he had further information concerning the *analysandum*. But if S is a philosopher, he is less interested in knowing the specific characters of the ultimate nstants which constitute α (for that is a question for historians, or psychologists, or natural scientists) than in the kind of object that α is, *i.e.*, in the mutual interconnections between terms of different logical types. Hence the most important result of S's investigations is a system of interrelated categories, in so far as he is able to discover such a system. Thus we can distinguish two aspects of S's analysis : (1) A process of replacing statements containing terms of higher levels by statements containing only terms of lower levels ; both statements have exactly the same meaning and the process is one of logical expansion. (2) A process of replacing statements known to be true by descriptions of conjunctions of atomic statements which are entailed by them. In this process some or all of the atomic statements contain variables, *i.e.*, the descriptions in questions are theoretical prescriptions for constructing atomic statements. Thus the *analysandum* and the analysis are not identical in meaning, the latter being indeterminate while the former is determinate. This process is " Ostentation " or philosophical analysis in as far as these are not identical with the logical analysis described under (1) immediately above. I conclude, then, that in so far as Ostentation is of well-defined statements it consists of logical analysis, plus the exhibition of a system of (material) categories.

culties.* For in describing the imagined universe we assumed that S had clear, determinate and certain knowledge of his atomic facts, and clear, indeterminate, and certain knowledge of higher level facts. But a striking feature of most statements which we know to be true in the actual world is the provisional character of what clarity, determinateness and certainty they possess, since all statements (excluding the tautologies of Mathematics or of Logic) may be made less vague,* may then gain or lose in certainty, and must in the process change in degree of determination. Moreover, S was assumed to have a purely reflective nature, *i.e.*, concerned merely in registering knowledge in explicit terms. And the obvious feature of most statements made in the actual world is the fact that, in addition to registering knowledge, they prepare the recipient for action, are prescriptions for the future as well as records of the past. This potential element in meaning is shown in language in the fact that all statements about objects of the level of complexity of perceptual objects (or higher levels) contain implications which cannot be analysed without remainder into a set of categorical statements. That this is so is a consequence of the social aspect of language. For in using a medium of expression common to an entire society, each speaker takes for granted, rather than consciously expresses, an extensive set of implications, the common presuppositions of that society's linguistic forms; and the determining factors of conventions underlying tacitly accepted formulations are, for the most part, systems of beliefs, conventions of action as well as reflection. Thus the analogy of the S universe is misleading, by suggesting an oversimplified structure of language, and by neglecting the fact of the changes in the systems of relationships and categories of terms in the actual world.

* A term, *t*, is vague, means that there are situations in which it is impossible, in principle, to determine whether it is true or false that the object denoted by it is present in that situation.

I have not space to develop this point of view adequately ; I am aware that I am charging the analyst with sins of omission rather than commission, and that he will tend to retort that he has no desire to clarify or increase knowledge or to deal at all with statements that are not clearly, definitely, and unambiguously expressed. But I do not believe that the analyst can detach himself in this way from the process of knowledge. Rather do I value the system of categories he establishes as revealing one only of many possible explicit formulations of the presuppositions involved in a system of society at a given state of development. And it is in the hope of throwing further light on these presuppositions that I will finish this contribution, already too long, by formulating three questions for any of the other contributors to answer.

(1) How is the system of categories used in analysis determined, *e.g.*, are the mutual interconnections between different levels *necessary* connections ?

(2) For any given statement, *s*, is there a unique route for its analysis ?

(3) In what respects, other than the more explicit formulation of a system of categories, is a philosophical analysis of any given statement, *s*, different from a logical expansion of the same statement ?

II.—By JOHN TERENCE WISDOM.

MR. BLACK does not directly concern himself with the question which forms the title of this symposium, but asks instead *What is philosophical analysis?* His example may well be followed, because when it is clear what philosophical analysis is then it will be clear that it is an old and very useful method in a certain kind of philosophy.

In order that people may know what philosophical analysis is before they consider its ultimate nature I shall begin with examples of it. Philosophical analysis is most easily confused with *material* and *formal* analysis.† Hence examples will be chosen and a definition worded so as to bring out the distinction between it and these two.

As to the relations between analysis and what I have ventured to call ostentation. Whenever one analyses the fact that S is P one gives an ostensive translation of the sentence "S is P." Later I shall claim that this is because to do the one is to do the other with a certain intention. It does not follow that to analyse the fact, *The economic man always buys in the best market* is to analyse the sentence, "The economic man always buys in the best market." To suppose that it does follow is to fail to recognize the distinction between saying that analysis *is* translation and saying that it is *a logical construction out of, i.e., may be philosophically analysed into*, translation. It is nonsense to talk of analysing sentences.

¹ *I.e.*, its philosophical analysis.

† I think Mr. Black has both these in mind when he speaks of "logical analysis." Miss Stebbing uses "metaphysical analysis" and "directional analysis" for "philosophical analysis." "The Method of Analysis in Metaphysics," *Proc. Arist. Soc.*, N.S., xxxiii, and *Logical Positivism and Analysis*.

I. IDENTIFYING PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS.,

We want illustrations of the distinction between philosophical analysis on the one hand and material and formal analysis on the other, and of the equivalent distinction between Ostentation* on the one hand and material and formal ostentation on the other.

1. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN MATERIAL ANALYSIS AND PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS. The scientist gives material analyses when he begins by "defining his terms." Thus the economist gives a material analysis of *wealth* if he defines it as *what is useful, transferable, and limited in supply*; and of *interest* when he defines it as *the payment made by a borrower for the use of a loan for, say, a year*.† He would not be giving a material analysis of *wealth* if he defined it as *riches*; nor of *interest* if he defined it as *usury*: these definitions do nothing to render explicit the connotation of the words defined.‡ To give a material analysis is to give an *analytic* definition.

When the psychologist says "*I am in awe of you*" means "*I fear and admire you*" he is giving a material analysis of the fact those sentences express by giving a more *ostensive* but still *same-level* translation of the first sentence. "*The average man is in awe of the medical man*" means "*The average man fears and admires the medical man*" is also a same-level ostentation. On the other hand "*The average man is in awe of the medical man*" means "*Most men (individual) are in awe of any medical man (individual) whom they meet*" is a new-level ostentation. To give a rule for translating sentences about any abstraction in to

* "Ostentation" may be read "capital ostentation" or "new-level ostentation," and "ostentation" may be read "small ostentation" or "same-level ostentation." The *capital* symbolism is not an aimless affectation; it fights a tendency to suppose that Ostentation and ostentation are different species of the same genus.

† Marshall. *Principles of Economics*, p. 73.

‡ See traditional rules for definition. Material analysis must not be confused with physical or chemical analysis of things.

sentences about what it is an abstraction from is to give a new-level ostentation (*i.e.*, an Ostentation) of the sentences and a philosophical analysis of the facts they express.* Thus rules for translating sentences about the biological rabbit, the psychological individual, and the economic man in to sentences about rabbits and men give philosophical analyses.

When Mr. Woodger tries to go a step further† and to treat rabbits like the biological rabbit, by translating sentences about rabbits in to sentences about *rabbitish* sense-patterns, he is giving a philosophical analysis of rabbit-facts and answering the question "What is the ultimate nature of rabbits?" When the psychologist is trying to reduce individuals to their experiences he is doing the same.‡ When the economist translates sentences about the representative firm into sentences about firms and these into sentences about individuals and these into sentences about experiences we have a still longer Ostentation process. We pass down a series of categories from an abstraction of the second order to one of the first order, thence to a thing, and finally to particulars.

A specially illuminating contrast between material ostentation and Ostentation is found in Ethics. The well-known question about the analytic definition of "good" is not a question of philosophical definition but of scientific (*i.e.*, material) definition comparable to the definition of "comic" or of "floating capital." Thus to assert that "good," as applied to states of affairs, means "arouses approval," is to give a material definition of "good." On the other hand to assert that "good," as applied to individuals, means "his states are usually good" in the sense applied to

* This is a very unostensive definition of an important species of philosophical analysis.

† Woodger. *The Quarterly Review of Biology*, 1931.

‡ The reduction of individual things is a step further, one may safely bet, than we shall ever be able to go, however sure we may be that there is such a step.

states, is to give a philosophical definition. Here a predicate suitable in one category (a predicate-phrase intelligible with one kind of subject-phrase), is reduced to (translated into) one suitable to (intelligible with) another.

2. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN FORMAL ANALYSIS AND PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS.—Illustrations of the distinction between formal same-level ostentation and Ostentation are provided by the logician when he says, for example, that "Every dog is dangerous" can be translated into "Something is a dog and dangerous and it is not the case that something is a dog and not dangerous"; and when he adds that all universal affirmative sentences can be translated on these lines he is giving a rule for the ostentation of all sentences of a certain class. The famous translation of "The thing which has S has P" in to "Something has S and P and it is not the case that something else has S" is again a reformulating of a sentence and thus the formal analysing of the fact it expresses.

"*Two horses passed him*" means "*A horse passed him and then another*" might be supposed to be a material analysis of *two*. But it is not; it is a formal analysis. For "two" is not an adjective but functions like "every" and "the"; they enable us to express in one sentence what would otherwise require several.

On the other hand "*Two plus two equals four*" means "*Any conjunctive sentence 'Two S's are P and two other S's are P' can always be written 'Four S's are P'*" is a philosophical analysis in that it provides an Ostentation of "*Two plus two equals four*" (a sentence in which two is no longer used as a *quantifier*).

We may apply all three sorts of analysis to "Two men are good."* (1) "A man is good and another man is good" (formal analysis). (2) A *mannish* pattern of states contains a high proportion of good ones and another *mannish* pattern does so also "

* I am indebted to Mr. George Paul for this example.

(philosophical analysis).^{*} (3) "A *mannish* pattern of states contains a high proportion of states likely to cause approval and another does also" (material analysis).

Lastly I would draw your attention to the idealized example of Ostentation provided by Mr. Black and to the two examples worked out in the rest of this paper, namely (1) the Ostentation of "*S is P* is a general fact" and (2) the Ostentation of "*X* is giving a philosophical analysis of the fact *S is P*."

II.—ANALYSING PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS.

1. PRELIMINARIES. 1.1 *The analysis of analysis.* For our purposes material and formal analysis are best spoken of together as same-level analysis or analysis,[†] and philosophical analysis as new-level analysis or Analysis.[‡]

We have found three kinds of defect in sentences—one for the scientist, one for the logician and one for the philosopher. These defects are partly due to a desire for brevity. Roughly speaking the first consists in giving symbols double work, the second in using special abbreviating devices, and the third in using sentences of small scale. (The analogy has its dangers but—(1) a map may represent a railway and a river which marches with it by a purple line instead of a blue line for one and a red line for the other; (2) instead of separately representing each church in a town it may show the sign for a church with a number against it indicating how many churches; (3) a map may use an adequate multiplicity of symbols for what it does purport to represent and yet be on too small a scale for certain purposes—putting dots for towns instead of for buildings). For the present we may call the first and second defects *material and formal in-explicitness*, and the third a defect of *scale*.

* Good is used differently from goods.

† Read "small analysis."

‡ Read "capital analysis."

To remove either of the first two defects is to give a same-level analysis or analysis; to remove the last defect is to give a new-level analysis or Analysis. More explicitly: (i) *X is giving an analysis of the fact* that S is P* means *X is translating the sentence "S is P" in to a sentence which is more ostensive i.e., more explicitly displays the structure of the fact which "S is P" displays.* (ii) *X is giving an Analysis of the fact that S is P* means *X is translating the sentence "S is P" into a sentence which more explicitly displays the Structure of the Fact which "S is P" Displays*

These statements require explanation in two respects. First, what is meant by "more explicitly displays the structure of the fact which 'S is P' displays," i.e., what is ostentation? Second, what is the significance of the capitals in "more explicitly Displays the Structure of the Fact which 'S is P' Displays," i.e., what is Ostentation?

1.2 *display and Display.*—It will be well to say first what is common to the use of "display" and "Display." Hence the rules which I now give for the use of the word "display" apply also to the use of "Display."

When we utter a sentence we do so because we wish to point out a fact.† In ordinary languages it is understood that certain internal features of the sentence—its form, the words it contains,

* I do not mean by a "fact" a configuration which may or may not occur or exist (cf. Black, *Analysis*, March, 1934, p. 39). This is the old genuine proposition in disguise. Of course it is possible to give a philosophical analysis of a false proposition *S is P*; but this is to say what would be the analysis of the fact which the sentence "S is P" would locate if it did locate a fact. Hence if I wish to make my definitions of analysis cover the analysis of false propositions and at the same time to avoid making them cumbersome, I should just substitute "proposition" for "fact" in the above definitions—without allowing genuine propositions for a moment.

† Sometimes, of course, we are unsuccessful, in which cases we may be said to "state a false proposition."

and the arrangement of these words—intimate the internal features of the fact; in particular, it is understood that the form of the sentence intimates the form of the fact, the elements or words in the sentence the elements in the fact, and the arrangement of the elements in the sentence the arrangement of the elements in the fact.

When a sentence, S, intimates the form of a fact, F, by *identity* of its form with the form of F and by *each* element in F being *named* by a word in S and by the arrangement of the elements in F being *the same as* the arrangement of their names in S then let us say that S (1) completely and (2) perfectly explicitly and (3) directly displays F. Often sentences fall short of this. Some are incomplete, *i.e.*, fail to name all the elements in their facts, *e.g.*, “Arnold is in love . . . (with someone).” These give rise to gossip. Some are imperfectly explicit. They give rise to analysis. And then some which are perfect still suffer from a more subtle defect and are not Perfect. They give rise to Analysis, *i.e.*, philosophy

1.3 *Incompleteness.*—For three reasons it will be well briefly to consider incompleteness. By so doing we shall (1) distinguish displaying a fact from expressing a fact, (2) work out an example of philosophical analysis, (3) distinguish incompleteness from that more subtle defect of being on an inadequate scale which we wish to analyse.

Any sentence made up from proper names (grammar book sense) adjectives verbs and prepositions completely displays a fact. The sentences which incompletely display facts are those in which common nouns and an article are used. Each is derived from a complete sentence by substituting hiatuses, *i.e.*, words like “something,”* for one or more of the proper names in the

* “Something” is called a hiatus because its function in, *e.g.*, “Arnold hit something” could be fulfilled by a well-marked gap in the written sentence or a pause in the spoken sentence.

complete sentence. Thus "Arnold hit Bob" completely displays the fact *Arnold hit Bob*. "Arnold hit . . . (somebody)" incompletely displays *Arnold hit Bob* and *Arnold hit Bill* and etc. —as many facts as there are things which Arnold hit. And "Something is a dog and dangerous and it is not the case that something else is a dog" incompletely displays *This is a dog and dangerous, that is a dog and dangerous*, etc., and also as we shall see certain negative facts. It will be seen that a sentence *incompletely* displays a fact when it does not intimate *all* the elements in that fact. A sentence can completely display only one fact but it can incompletely display any number.

When a sentence completely displays a fact it expresses it. But we must not say of a sentence which incompletely displays a fact that it expresses that fact. We cannot say that "Arnold is in love" expresses the fact that Arnold is in love with Amelia, even if Amelia is in fact the person with whom he is in love. For "Arnold is in love" does not tell us nearly enough to justify our saying that it expresses the fact that Arnold is in love with Amelia. It is customary however to say of an incomplete sentence such as "Arnold is in love" that it expresses a general, *i.e.*, incomplete, fact. This is just a misleading way of saying that it incompletely displays a fact. And if we spoke only in the best style we should never use the expression "incomplete fact." Obviously there is a sense in which "incomplete fact" is a self-contradictory expression; it is self-contradictory if in it "fact" is used in the way it is when we speak of the fact that Arnold is in love with Amelia. There are not two species of fact, one complete, the other incomplete; there are sentences which completely display facts and there are sentences which do so incompletely. Incomplete facts are philosophically analysable into facts (complete), and sentences which contain hiatuses, and the relation *incompletely displays*. "The fact *S is P* is complete" means "The sentence '*S is P*' completely displays a

fact (complete).” (2) “The fact *S is P* is incomplete” means “The sentence ‘*S is P*’ incompletely displays a fact (complete).”

Whatever is said about the incomplete fact *F* could be said by speaking about the sentence “*F*” which incompletely displays a fact (complete). Thus the sense in which incomplete facts have form and elements is definable in terms of the sense in which complete facts have form and elements. We cannot say that *Arnold hits somebody* has three elements *Arnold*, *hit* and *somebody*—there is no such person as *somebody*. On the other hand we cannot say that it has just two elements like *Arnold is happy*. This leads us to say something mysterious like “It contains two elements and a variable element,” or “It has three elements but one is missing.” These mysterious utterances can be translated “The sentence ‘*Arnold hit somebody*’ displays a fact (complete) with three elements but one of these it fails to specify.” Again, to say that *Bill* is an element in the fact *Something hit Bill* is to say “*Bill* is an element in a fact (complete) incompletely displayed by ‘*Something hit Bill*’ and (unlike *Arnold*) is specified by ‘*Something hit Bill*’.”

We so define displays that it is nonsense to talk of a sentence displaying an incomplete fact; for a sentence is said to display a fact only when it intimates form and elements in the sense appropriate to complete facts.

Incompleteness is a defect from the point of view of the gossip, but not from that of the logician or of the philosopher. So let us say when a sentence *S* intimates the form of *F* by identity so that it contains a name or a hiatus for each of the elements in *F* and intimates to a corresponding degree their arrangement that *S perfectly explicitly*, though perhaps incompletely, displays *F*. And let us say that the more explicitly a sentence displays a fact the more ostensive it is. “*Arnold prefers something to something else*” or, better, “*Arnold prefers x to y*” though it

incompletely displays *Arnold prefers Beatrice to Belinda* displays it perfectly. •

Many sentences however fall short of even this ideal. Their shortcomings may be either material or formal. This brings us to :

1.4 *The analysis of ostentation.*—It follows from what has been said that to remove these shortcomings from a sentence is to give an ostentation of it. The shortcoming is material when the several elements in the fact are not severally named or hiated by elements in the sentence, *e.g.*, when “awe” stands for both *fear* and *admiration*.

The shortcoming is formal when though the several elements in the fact are severally named or hiated the fact is nevertheless of more complex form than the sentence. This happens when a quantifier such as “every,” “the,” “one,” “two,” etc., is used. For example, “Two men fell” means “Something human fell and something else human fell.” A quantifier is used in order to express in one sentence what would otherwise require a second containing the same words as the first together with such words as “not,” “other(else),” “same.”* The removal of the formal shortcoming from a sentence “F” is the formal analysis of the fact F. Thus to translate “Every S is P” in to “(a) Something has S and has P and (b) it is not the case that something has S and lacks P” is to give a formal ostentation of “Every S is P” and thus a formal analysis of the fact it expresses. And it is now easy to see why we say that this consists in re-writing “Every S is P” in a form more nearly identical with the form

* “Dogs exist” is non-ostensive in a particularly vicious way because it looks as if it is a universal affirmative “Everything canine exists,” when it really means “Something (is) canine.” This is an example of ostentation without increase in words. It should be noted that it is not an example of Ostentation since dogs are elements of the fact which “Dogs exist” displays and of the fact which “Something is canine” displays. “He is dreaming of dogs” requires special treatment.

of the fact it displays. For the totality of facts which "Everything which has S has P" displays has (i) a positive part, *This has S and P, that has S and P*, and (ii) a negative part, *It is not the case that this has S and lacks P, it is not the case that that has S and lacks P, it is not the case that that has S and lacks P, etc.* Clearly our new positive-negative sentence is much more nearly identical in form with this positive-negative totality than was the old sentence "Everything which has S has P."

To sum up. In section 1.1 we said that to give a same-level analysis of F is to translate "F" into a sentence which more explicitly displays F. We now know what this means.

2. THE ANALYSIS OF OSTENTATION. We come now to that more subtle defect which renders even a perfect sentence not Perfect, the defect which is more and more removed in Ostentation. We may best begin by considering not the meaning of "Ostensive" but the meaning of "S is an Ostentation of S'."

2.1 "*S is an Ostentation of S'*" does not mean "*S is an ostentation of S'.*" A sentence may be quite ostensive without being Ostensive. (A map may use quite an adequate multiplicity of conventions for what it does purport to represent and yet be on too small a scale for certain purposes.)

If we re-write "Every nation invaded France" in the sentence "Some nations invaded France and it is not the case that there was a nation which did not invade France" we obtain, as we have seen, a sentence which perfectly explicitly displays the structure of the totality of facts which "Every nation invaded France" inexplicitly displays. Nevertheless the philosopher who asks "What is a nation?" is expressing dissatisfaction with our analysis because it is still "in terms of nations." It is easy to see the sort of improvement which such a philosopher desires. He would be better pleased if we translated

"Some nations invaded France and 'some did not' into "There were groups* of people each with common ancestors, traditions and governors such that the members of each group selected from among themselves soldiers and these soldiers forcibly entered the land owned by Frenchmen." This, of course, is not quite the correct translation of "Some nations invaded France and none did not," but it is sufficiently nearly correct for us to see that a correct translation in terms of individuals could be given. Let us pretend that "Every group of individuals with common ancestors, traditions and governors forcibly entered land owned by Frenchmen" is the correct translation. What is the improvement in the "individual"-sentence which makes us call it an Ostentation of the "nation"-sentence? Once more—What makes *S* an Ostentation of *S'*? We have seen that it is not that *S* is more ostensive than *S'*, and in seeing this we have seen that *it is not that S contains more words than S'* and thus has a multiplicity more nearly equal to that of the fact it displays.† Usually a more Ostensive sentence does contain more words, but this is not always true and *a fortiori* will not provide us with a definition. "The word 'lions' (is an) incomplete symbol" is an Ostentation of "Lions (are) logical constructions" but it contains no more words. And "'Arnold hit someone' incompletely displays a fact" contains no more words than does "'Arnold hit someone' displays an incomplete fact." Besides mere ostentation usually involves more words.

2.2 "*S is an Ostentation of S'*" does not mean "*S is more complete than S'*." For the Ostensive is a translation of the

* The word "group" could be removed by writing "There were individuals with common ancestors, etc., and there were other individuals with common ancestors, etc."

† Though this answer is most importantly wrong, it is not so utterly wrong as I here pretend.

ostensive and therefore conveys exactly the same amount of information as does the ostensive.*

2.3 "*S is an Ostentation of S'*" does mean "*The elements of the fact which S displays are more ultimate than the elements of the fact which S' displays.*" This is easily seen. England, Germany, France are elements of the fact displayed by "Every nation invaded France"—the elements of the facts displayed by "nation"-sentences are nations. Tom, Fritz, etc. are elements of the fact displayed by "Every group of individuals with common ancestors, traditions, and governors forcibly entered the land owned by Frenchmen"—the elements of the facts displayed by "individual"-sentences are individuals. And individuals are more ultimate than nations. Sense-data and mental states in their turn are more ultimate than individuals. Similarly, judgments (meaning particular events in individual minds) are more ultimate than propositions† and sentences and facts (complete) than incomplete facts, and your credit and my credit than Credit, and Bob's belief that you can fulfil your promises to pay than your credit.

There are other ways of saying that the elements of a fact F are more ultimate than those of a fact F. We may say that the elements of F are *reducible* to those of F, or we may say that they are *logical constructions out of* those of F. A con-

* Contrary to what Mr. Black says, the analysandum and the analysis are identical in meaning, and therefore the latter is not more determinate. What Mr. Black has in mind is this: "England invaded France" completely displays in *its* sense. A sentence which shall equally completely Display what "England invaded France" Displays will be more complete than "England invaded France." But this new sentence is not the Ostentation of "England invaded France," but is *the complete form* of that Ostentation. I believe that Mr. Black's way of putting the point in terms of degrees of determinateness is just the sort of muddled way of speaking that the theory of logical constructions is designed to prevent and the philosopher wishes to eliminate.

† See Broad *Examination of McTaggart's Philosophy*, Vol. I, p. 58.

sideration of examples will show that if x is reducible to y then (i) to say something of x is to say something, though not the *same* thing, of y , (ii) it is not true that to say something of y is always to say something of x , (iii) to say the same thing of y as was said of x is to speak not falsely but nonsensically. *E.g.*, if we reduce a chair to a set of sense-data, then to say that I sat on the chair is to say something about the sense-data but not, thank goodness, that I sat on them.

When S is an Ostentation of S' then not only are the elements of the fact it displays more ultimate than those of the fact S displays; its form also is more ultimate. This may be expressed by saying that the fact a less Ostensive sentence displays is *secondary* to that which a more Ostensive sentence displays. Hence " S is an Ostentation of S' " will mean "The fact which S displays is secondary to the fact which S' displays."

From this it looks as if non-Perfection, unlike incompleteness and non-perfection, is not a defect in the relation between S and the fact it displays but is a defect in that fact itself, namely its secondariness to another fact.

But this account of non-Ostensiveness is merely true. What we want is a thoroughly Ostensive account of non-Ostensiveness. There are signs that we lack this. For the secondary facts are and yet are not identical with the facts to which they are secondary. This paradox indicates that we must push the analysis of Ostentation a stage further. This I propose to do by defining S' displays _{n} a secondary fact _{n} by S' secondarily displays₁ a fact₁, where the suffixes indicate modifications in sense. Let us work this out.

3. FURTHER ANALYSIS OF OSTENTATION. Analysis, up to this point, has helped in the identification of Ostentation but it will do so no further. Fortunately, it may now be assumed that there is no difficulty in recognizing Ostentation. Use is made of this assumption in taking its analysis a stage further

by analysing *more ultimate* and *secondary*. This analysis we have seen must be such as to resolve a certain paradox.

3.1 *The paradox that the facts displayed by a non-Ostensive sentence S' and its Ostentation S, though not two, are not identical.* If S is an Ostentation of S' then it is a translation of S', i.e., expresses the same fact, i.e., displays equally precisely* the same fact or facts. Thus if you say "Every group of individuals with common ancestors, traditions and governors forcibly entered the land owned by Frenchmen" you will merely repeat yourself if you add "Every nation invaded France."

On the other hand, if S is an Ostentation of S', then the fact which S' displays is secondary to that which S displays and therefore they are not identical. Thus the elements of the fact displayed by our "individual"-sentence are Tom, Fritz and Jean, while the fact displayed by "Every nation invaded France" are different, being England, Germany and France. Further, the form of the one fact is not the form of the other and therefore they are not identical.

We must then find some definition of "more ultimate" and "secondary" which removes this paradox by showing how the fact *Every nation invaded France* is not identical with *Every group of individuals with common ancestors, traditions and governors forcibly entered land owned by Frenchmen*, while yet these are not two facts, the nation-fact and then, besides, the individual fact.

3.2 *The solution of the paradox and definition of "secondary" and "more ultimate."* It will be remembered that we have met this sort of paradox before; indeed it is a Reduplication Paradox.† We saw that though the incomplete fact *Something fell* is not identical with the complete fact *This fell* it yet does

* Intimates just as much the form, elements and arrangement of the same fact or facts.

† The kind of paradox in analytic philosophy.

not make a second fact. This paradox we removed by reducing the incomplete fact to (a) the complete fact plus (b) the sentence "Something fell" plus (c) a relation between the sentence and the complete fact, the relation of *incomplete* display. The same methods will serve us here. I therefore now introduce the required relation of *secondary*, i.e., *indirect*, display.

The significant features* of "Every nation invaded France" fix the significant features of "Every group of individuals with common ancestors, traditions and governors forcibly entered the land owned by Frenchmen" and thus it intimates *indirectly* the form, elements and arrangement intimated by the "individual"-sentence. Thus if the "nation"-sentence had been "Every nation invaded Germany" then the "individual"-sentence would have had to intimate different elements and if the "nation"-sentence had been "France invaded every nation" then the "individual"-sentence would have had to intimate a different arrangement. The "nation"-sentence intimates indirectly what the "individual"-sentence intimates directly.

Although the "nation"-sentence does not even try to intimate the form of the individual-fact by having an *identical* form and does not even try to *name or hint* its elements, nevertheless the form and arrangement of the "nation"-sentence play a part in intimating the form and arrangement of the individual-fact and the words the "nation"-sentence contains intimate what are the elements of the individual-fact. Because of this the "nation"-sentence may be said to *indirectly display* what the "individual"-sentence directly displays.

There are two relations with which indirect display might readily be confused. (1) *S indirectly displays F does not mean S inexplicitly displays F.*† Doubtless there is a sense of "tries

* I.e., what words it contains and in what order as opposed to being written large or small, in blue or red ink.

† This is not so wrong as I now make it appear.

for identity of form" in which an imperfect sentence such as "Every dog is dangerous" may be said to intimate form without trying for identity of form. But this is not the sense I have in mind when I say that an indirect sentence does not try for identity of form. I should say that "Every dog is dangerous" though it fails to display form by identical form does try to do so and that consequently although it displays inexplicitly it does not display indirectly. It may be a badly drawn map of the fact of which "Something is a dog and dangerous and it is not the case that something is a dog and not dangerous" is a well drawn map, but it is on the same scale and if the latter is life-size it is so also. On the other hand "Every nation invaded France" is not on the same scale as "Every group of individuals with common ancestors, traditions and governors forcibly entered the land owned by Frenchmen." It is this defect of scale* which makes it correct to say that the "nation"-sentence indirectly displays the individual-fact. This must not be confused with its inexplicit display of the nation-fact. True, when S' indirectly displays F it lacks identity of form with F, but this is not because it tries for identity and fails, but because it does not try.† Thus

* This analogy is more appropriate for some kinds of indirectness than for others. Thus it is hardly appropriate to describe the indirectness of "'Something fell' displays an incomplete fact" as a defect of scale. It is, however, true that any sentence which indirectly displays appears to multiply entities, cf. Mace, *Mind*, January, 1931.

† There is a criterion for deciding whether a sentence is trying for identity of form with a fact. When " F_1 " is trying for identity of form with F, then the elements of the fact F_1 are the elements of F, even though " F_1 " is imperfect and uses disreputable expressions like "two" and "three." When a sentence " F_2 " does not even try for identity of form with F, then the elements of the fact F_2 are less ultimate than those of F. This is not an analytic definition of *not trying for identity of form* and thus of *indirect display*. Such an analysis would be circular, since we shall analyse *more ultimate* in terms of *indirect display*. I shall not analyse indirect display at all; I identify it for you as the relation involved in such and such a way in the analysis of *more ultimate*. As *more ultimate* has already been identified my remark is useful, though not analytic.

do I draw attention to the special sort of lack of identity involved in the special sort of display which I call "indirect display."*

(2) It must not be supposed that *S'* indirectly displays *F* means (a) "*F*" is a translation of *S'* (so that "*F*" displays what *S'* displays) but (b) "*F*" is not identical with *S'* (so that it displays indirectly what "*F*" displays). Thus it would not be correct to say that "Every nation invaded France" indirectly displays what "Toutes les nations envahirent la France" displays. It directly displays what the French sentence directly displays. For the two sentences are on the same scale so that what the French sentence names the "nation"-sentence names and the form which the French sentence shows by identity of form the "nation"-sentence also shows by identity of form. The "nation"-sentence directly displays the nation-fact which the French sentence directly displays and also indirectly displays the individual-fact which the "individual"-sentence directly displays.

It is clear from this last example that when "*F*" displays *F* indirectly then it displays another fact *F'* secondary to *F* and, conversely, when "*F*" displays two facts *F'* and *F* and the former is secondary to the latter, then it indirectly displays *F*. This enables us to define *F'* is secondary to *F* by *The sentence "*F*" displays indirectly what the sentence "*F*" displays directly.*

This definition reduces secondary facts to sentences which indirectly display facts. For to say of a secondary fact that it is secondary is to say of the sentence which expresses it that it indirectly displays a fact; and, in general, when *F'* is secondary to *F* then whatever one says about *F'* just is a statement about the sentence "*F*," the fact *F*, and the relation between them of indirect display. This is the sense in which there are not two facts *F* and *F'*. On the other hand, though to say something about *F'* is to say something about "*F*" and *F* and indirect

* See p. 19.

display,* it is not to say the *same* thing as was said of F' . This is the sense in which F and F' are not identical. These are the senses in which *Every nation invaded France* and *Every group of individuals with common ancestors, tradition and governors forcibly entered the land owned by Frenchmen* are not two facts and yet are not identical. We may now write :—

F is an Analysis of F'

$\doteq$ “ F ” is an Ostentation of “ F' ”

= The elements and form of the fact which “ F' ” displays are less ultimate than those of that which “ F ” displays

= The fact _{n} which “ F' ” displays _{n} is secondary to the fact _{$n-1$} which “ F ” displays _{$n-1$}

= “ F' ” displays _{$n-1$} indirectly the fact _{$n-1$} which “ F ” displays _{$n-1$} directly

It is worth noting that (a) a secondary fact is reducible and its elements are reducible, and (b) a secondary fact is not secondary on account of being reducible to other facts—this is true of incomplete facts. A fact is secondary when it is reducible to another fact or facts in the special way indicated above, i.e., to sentence-facts, and *indirect display*. (c) The use of “element” in which incomplete facts have elements is secondary to (new sense appropriate to phrases and sentences) the use in which complete facts have elements. But the elements of incomplete facts are not reducible to the elements of complete facts.

We have defined less ultimate elements in terms of indirect display. The mistake has often been made of reversing this procedure as follows: *F' is a secondary fact* means “ F' ” *indirectly displays a fact, say F* . “ F' ” *indirectly displays F* means “ F' ” *names a set of elements of F and exhibits their arrangement but these elements are not ultimate, i.e., they are themselves facts having elements and arrangement which “ F ” fails to name and exhibit.**

* See for example, Susan Stebbing “Method of Analysis in Metaphysics,” *Proc. Aris. Soc.*, N.S., xxxiii.

This view is correct in that it reduces secondary facts_n to sentences indirectly displaying_{n-1} fact_{n-1} and thus avoids the belief that secondary facts are a species of fact. And it does not make the crude mistake of *identifying* secondary facts with facts of the second order, i.e., facts about facts. But it does *reduce* secondary facts to facts of the second order. And this is a mistake.* *Every nation invaded France* is not a fact about facts but about nations.

With our definitions not only secondary facts but also secondary elements are persuaded to vanish; not only are apparent species of fact reduced to uses of "fact" but also apparent species of element are reduced to uses of "element." A fact can have many sets of elements; this is true in that there are many degrees of indirectness with which sentences may display it. A fact can have only one set of elements, since it is its elements arranged in a certain order; this is true in the sense that we cannot in the same use of "element" say of a fact that it has this set of elements and this other set of elements.

3.3 *The ultimate definition of "S is an Ostentation of S'."* We have said *S is an Ostentation of S'* means *S' displays_n a fact_n secondary to the fact which S displays_{n-1}*; and that this means *S' indirectly displays_{n-1} the fact_{n-1} which S directly displays_{n-1}* (Difference of suffix indicates difference of sense). This definition is practically† *correct* but it is not quite *ultimate*, i.e., Ostensive. For "displays_{n-1} a fact_{n-1}" may in its turn call for Ostentation. Thus it has been suggested that sentences about individuals

* See John Wisdom, *Mind*, April 1931, p. 212, and *Psyche*, 1933, p. 173, and A. J. Ayer, *Analysis*, November, 1933, p. 2.

But Ayer here makes the very mistake against which the analytic method is directed. For he argues from the mistakenness of the analyses offered by English philosophers of atomic facts to their non-existence or the senselessness of "atomic fact" as used by English philosophers.

† It is made sufficiently general by putting "displays_{n-m}" for "displays_{n-1}."

are in, their turn translatable into sentences about experiences. Then we should have a series of sentences $S_n, S_{n-1}, S_{n-2}, \dots$ displaying more and more directly a fact F . Such a series would have a last term. For any sentence S_r in the series displays_r a fact_r only in the sense that it indirectly displays_{r-1} a fact_{r-1}; and there must come a sense of "displays a fact" which is not defined in terms of another. When "displays a fact" is being used in this ultimate way we will write it "displays₁ a fact₁," i.e., "Displays a Fact," i.e., "Displays the Form, Elements and Arrangement of a Fact," i.e., "Displays the Structure of a Fact." This gives us: *S is an Ostentation of S'* means *S Displays more directly the Fact which S' Displays indirectly*. And now it is clear that indirect Display is a special species of non-Explicitness of Display—not the in-Explicitness of Display caused by the use of "every," "two," &c., but the non-Explicitness of a sentence which does not try to be Explicit.*

To give an ultimate philosophical analysis of the proposition *S is P* is to give a translation of the sentence "*S is P*" which quite directly Displays the Fact which "*S is P*" indirectly Displays. When a sentence tries to Display it is Ostensive and when it is successful it is Perfect.

MR. BLACK'S QUESTIONS.

I now try to outline answers to some of Mr. Black's questions. There are excuses from departing from his order.


A. "*For any given statements, is there a unique or its analysis?*" (i) There are different kinds of Ostentation—that applied to "*Every nation invaded France*" differs from that

* We have seen that indirect Display is not non-explicit display, p. 12. Nevertheless the incompleteness or inexplicitness with which a sentence displays is reflected in the way it Displays. Thus shall we be able to frame definitions of incomplete and inexplicit display.

applied to "*Albert struck something* is an incomplete fact."

(ii) Not only may different facts be displayed with different kinds of indirectness, the same fact may be also. (iii) Nevertheless I fancy that given that S_1 is an Ostentation of S_n then there is only one Ostentation-route between S_1 and S_n ; there may be any number of intermediate stations; but there are no loop ways, one through S_2 and another through ${}_2S$, where S_2 and ${}_2S$ indirectly display in different ways.

The field of ambiguities and some species of *display* may be suggested in the following diagram.*



Smaller letters indicate greater secondariness.

Higher suffixes indicate greater indirectness.

* Suppose a language is such that a certain fact may be displayed more and less completely and more and less indirectly in two ways. Then the sentences displaying that fact may be set out in a 2-dimensional manifold, thus: Degrees of completeness may be indicated by horizontal order; degrees of indirectness by distance from the centre; one way of displaying by the upwards direction and the other way of displaying by the downwards direction. In general, the sentences displaying completely, incompletely, directly, and indirectly and in n ways a fact may be set out in an $\frac{n}{2} + 1$ dimensional manifold.

Different placing of a suffix indicates different species of Display.

The S's are sentences.

F, *f*, *f*. are facts more and more secondary.

D₁, D₂, D₃ (against unbroken lines), are relations of Display more and more indirect.

*d*₁, *d*₂ (against broken lines), are relations of display in a secondary but first grade sense.

d (against dotted line) is a still more secondary relation of display.

The diagram is not completed for ₂S and ₃S.

B. "*In what respects other than the more explicit formulation of a system of categories is a philosophical analysis of any given statements, different from a logical expansion of the same statement*" ? If I understand correctly Mr. Black's use of the phrase "the more explicit formulation of a system of categories," my answer is "In none." I welcome Mr. Black's way of putting the matter. For though it is in a sense very philosophically unilluminating because it is so very far from Ostensive, nevertheless it is philosophically useful, because it puts in *familiar* terminology what I have put in more nearly Ostensive but regrettably unfamiliar terminology.

C. It is in some sense true that "the direction chosen by Ostentation is such as to increase immediacy of knowledge, or acquaintance with, the facts constituting successive stages in the analysis." But we are acquainted with the elements of the lower-level facts in a different *sense* (as opposed to *degree*) of "acquaintance."

D. "*How is the system of categories used in analysis determined, e.g., are the mutual connections necessary connections* ?" (i) I am not very sure what the first part of this question means. In so far as we may speak of *the* system of categories, it is determined by the accidents determining the development of language.

Mr. Black believes that the exhibition of the categories, i.e., the Ostentation of a sentence, reveals presuppositions. This is the old and untrue story that philosophy is a search for ultimate premisses. *What presuppositions are revealed by "Nation"-sentences can be Ostensively translated into "individual"-sentences?*

(ii) As to the second part of Mr. Black's question, namely *Are the mutual connections between the categories necessary?* They are linguistically necessary. *Nations are of a less ultimate category than individuals*, i.e., *Nations are reducible to individuals*, is a linguistically necessary proposition like *Two plus two equals four*.^{*} The explanation of this answer requires an explanation of necessity which I have found myself unable to put shortly enough to include here. I can only say that *Nations are reducible to individuals* is a linguistically necessary proposition because given the usage of "nations" and "individuals" (a contingent fact) then to add that nations are reducible to individuals is to assert a necessary consequence—that is, to repeat oneself.[†] For, as we have seen, *Nations are reducible to individuals* though apparently a fact about nations is really about the relative usage of "nation" and "individual."

SUMMARY.

1. A sentence may incompletely display facts. With this defect the gossip is concerned. It can be removed only by more knowledge.

* To assert that every nation invaded France and then to add that every group of individuals with common ancestors, traditions and governors invaded the land owned by Frenchmen is to make a proposition which is necessary in the sense in which *Two men fell and two more fell and four men fell* is.

† I am here indebted to Dr. Paul Weiss, "Entailment and the Future of Logic," *Proc. 7th Internat. Cong. Phil.*, p. 143, and to Dr. Wittgenstein though I make neither responsible for anything suggested here.

2. A sentence may be inexplicit (a) as to the elements (b) as to the form of a fact. These defects are removed (a) in the scientist's definition of terms and (b) in the logician's reformulation of sentences. Such ostentation causes and is caused by greater explicitness in apprehending the structure of a fact.

3. A sentence may completely and/or perfectly explicitly display a fact and yet be unsatisfactory because that fact is secondary.

A sentence which displays a secondary fact always also indirectly displays in a more ultimate sense a less secondary fact and ultimately but still more indirectly a primary fact, i.e., a Fact. The fact_n which a sentence displays_n is not identical with the fact it Displays and yet we cannot say that there is the Fact and in addition the fact_n. This difficulty is removed when we see that " ' S is P ' displays_n a fact_n " just means " *S is P* " *Displays indirectly at n removes a Fact.*

To translate S_n which indirectly Displays a Fact into S which less indirectly Displays that Fact is to give an Ostentation of S. The labour of Ostentation is usually undertaken with the intention of gaining a more explicit apprehension of the Structure of a Fact. Ostentation carried out with this intention is philosophical analysis.*

* " Analysis " may be used for " Ostentation with whatever intention " and " philosophy " for " insight into Structure however obtained." It is in this sense that analysis is the, or only a, means to philosophy (analytic) and not identical with it.

III.—*By* MAURICE CORNFORTH.

NEITHER of the first two contributors to this Symposium has answered the question before us—namely : Is Analysis a useful method in philosophy ? They have concerned themselves rather with the question : What is philosophical analysis ? According to Wisdom : “ When it is clear what philosophical analysis is, then it will be clear that it is an old and very useful method in a certain kind of philosophy.”

I do not question that philosophical analysis is an “ old ” method, and that “ in a certain kind of philosophy ” it has been “ useful.” I do question, however, whether this method, and that kind of philosophy, is a means of advancing our knowledge. And I take it that, if philosophic analysis, as conceived by analytic philosophy, and as expounded by Black and Wisdom, is not a means of advancing our knowledge, then, in the sense intended in the question which is the subject of this discussion, it is not a useful method in philosophy.

In my contribution, therefore, I shall undertake a critique of the analytic method of philosophy. And in this critique I shall assume what is, I think, the truth, that Black and Wisdom have given a fair account of the analytic method, as conceived of by the school of analytic philosophers.

A critique of the analytic method, or of any other philosophic conception, cannot be “ impartial ” ; it must be undertaken from some point of view, with some principles and presuppositions to back it up. My point of view is the point of view of Marxism, of Dialectical Materialism.

In what follows, therefore, I have attempted to give the Marxist criticism of analytic philosophy.* There are two guiding

* As the methods and principles of Marxism are probably unfamiliar to those present, and very likely abhorrent to them as well, much of what

features of this criticism. In the first place, the attempt to sum up the historical significance of analytic philosophy in the light of the materialist conception of history, and to find the roots of the theoretical weakness of the analytic method in the historical rôle which it plays in the world. In the second place, the insistence that the criticism of analytic philosophy is first and foremost a criticism of the theory of knowledge.

The orthodox exponents of analytic philosophy are not interested in examining the historical significance of their theories ; nor do they greatly concern themselves with the theory of knowledge. My view is, on the contrary, that analytic philosophy cannot be adequately understood or criticized, without understanding its historical significance, and without examining its theory of knowledge.

1. The "logico-analytic method" has played its part in the world as one phase of the history of philosophy. And the history of philosophy is just one part of the history of human society. It has organic connections with the whole of history, and therefore cannot be comprehended as an independent historical complex, but only as a part of all human history.

"The history of all human society, past and present, has been the history of class struggles."* The history of philosophy, as a part of the history of human society, therefore reflects the class struggle.

2. From the beginning of philosophy, there has been a cleavage of two diametrically opposed philosophical tendencies, which we may call materialism and idealism. I refer to that philosophy as *idealism* which lends support, in some form or another, to the

I say will appear dogmatic or obscure. I could not have corrected this without writing a book. What I have written can therefore only be regarded as an outline.

* Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, Ch. I.

essentially religious ideas of the human soul, of a supernatural spiritual world, and of the creation and government of the world of nature by forces which are really spiritual. And I call that philosophy *materialism* which teaches, on the other hand, that the material world is primary and uncreated, existing and changing according to its own laws, and that man's spiritual activities are merely an aspect of his being dependent throughout on the natural material aspects.*

3. The religious and semi-religious notions of idealism have always been useful, since history began, to extenuate or justify class oppression, and to provide various forms of consolation for the sufferings it entails or of "harmless" protest against such suffering. Deceit, tyranny, greed, oppression and exploitation of every description have constantly masked themselves behind high sounding idealistic phrases, and have justified themselves by arguments inspired by idealism.† Idealist philosophy, therefore, plays its part in the world as a useful instrument of the ruling class in class-society.‡

* See Frederick Engels, *Feuerbach, the Roots of the Socialist Philosophy*, Ch. II. If an exact definition of "material" and "spiritual" is sought then it must be based on the distinction of spiritual activity and its material conditions and objects, which is familiar to everyone in his normal life.

† For the most up-to-date example, see the Constitution of the new Clerical-Fascist State of Austria.

‡ The usefulness of idealism to dominant exploiting classes depends fundamentally on the usefulness of Religion. For an explanation of "Religion is the Opium of the people," and all that it entails, see Karl Marx, *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right*. (But don't think you understand what this well-known statement means before you have at least read that essay of Marx; hardly anyone has read it, yet they glibly criticize Marx without taking the trouble to find out what he meant.) Idealism is either of a definitely religious character, or, where it is not, it is still twisted to provide arguments for religion, and, more important, serves religious interests by providing "refutations" of materialism.

Materialism is, in the first place, the negation of all those religious and idealist illusions, which are used to support existing institutions. And in the second place, it proceeds to the criticism of those institutions themselves, through the examination of the actual material foundations of human life, and to the elaboration of which is actually required for a higher order of society. Materialism, therefore, comes to play its part in the world as a revolutionary instrument for the overthrow of the ruling class in class-society.*

4. With the early beginnings of capitalism, came a great growth of natural science, which inevitably represented a materialist negation of existing religious and idealist conceptions. The ruling class, the bourgeoisie, found itself in an increasingly contradictory position, so far as philosophy was concerned. For on the one hand, as a dominant class, it clung to religious and idealistic theories. And on the other hand, the advance of science, which was absolutely necessary as one side of the improvement of the technique of production, contradicted those very theories which were an aid to the bourgeoisie in keeping its control over production.

5. During the last two hundred years many philosophic solutions of this contradiction have been attempted.† And that experience has shown that the most satisfactory bourgeois philosophy is to be worked out along the lines first suggested by Berkeley.

* "Comes to play its part," because in its beginnings materialism was not revolutionary. It was always potentially revolutionary, as the negation of religion and idealism. It became revolutionary only when it turned its attention to the materialist criticism of society. *Cp.* the development of modern materialism through Descartes, Hobbes and Locke, to the French Materialists, and to Dialectical Materialism. See Engels *Socialism, Utopian and Scientific*, and *Feuerbach*; and Marx, *The French Materialists*, and *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right*.

† This contradiction, and the attempt to solve it, will in fact be found to influence all modern bourgeois philosophy, from Descartes.

This means that you accept science, you welcome scientific discoveries, you take up a "scientific attitude." But you say that science is not about what it seems to be about. Science seems to be about the external material world, its constitution and laws, which are absolutely independent of human thought, will or sensation. When so interpreted, science is materialistic, and completely irreconcilable with any religious or idealistic conceptions. But if you say, with Berkeley, that science is actually concerned with predicting the order of human sensations, and with nothing else—then the position is reversed. In that case, nothing that science can prove can possibly contradict the main tenets of religion and idealism. It has therefore been along these lines that the bourgeoisie has found philosophic speculation most congenial.*

Further, this line of speculation produces exactly the sort of mystical questions in which idealism most delights. For instance—Whence comes our experience? What is its significance? As experience is now made into a philosophic Absolute, such questions demand an extra-scientific answer. And so we find Berkeley quite consistently saying that the explanation is that God speaks to us in a divine language. And two hundred years later we find Wittgenstein ending up in what is in essentials exactly the same fashion, in the mystical conclusion of the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*.

The advantage of this line of speculation will now be fairly obvious. On the one hand it allows you to be scientific and materialistic. But since you say that your scientific and materialistic conclusions refer only to the order of your own experience, you can consistently be at the same time mystical and idealistic.

* There is a long list of philosophers who have thought along these lines—J. S. Mill, Mach, Avenarius, Vaihinger, Husserl, Russell, Poincaré, Wittgenstein, Carnap, etc., etc. See V. I. Lenin, *Materialism and Empirio Criticism*.

Hence this line of speculation provides a way in which the bourgeoisie can assimilate the materialist doctrines of science, without forfeiting their religious and idealistic theories.*

6. The logico-analytic method is the most highly developed form of this philosophical speculation of the bourgeoisie. It represents the highest and most systematic refinement of this line of speculation. It represents the most complete elaboration of the various categories which must be used in order to carry on this speculation in the most "scientific" and "methodical" way.†

7. The truth of this historical generalisation about the analytic method can be illustrated from Wisdom's contribution to this symposium.

Wisdom says, first of all, that a philosophic analysis is a "new level" analysis. And then he goes on to explain that the "elements" of facts displayed in a new level analysis are "more ultimate" than those which were displayed before the analysis took place. He also puts this in another way. Before analysis takes place, what is displayed is a secondary fact which "indirectly displays . . . a less secondary fact, and more

* This is, however, only partly true. They cannot ever assimilate a scientific study of psychology, history, economics or sociology.

† These statements do *not* mean that analytic philosophers have *deliberately* set out to rehabilitate religion and reconcile it with science. They mean that the analytic method comes as the culmination of a philosophic development whose *objective historical rôle* has been the attempt to interpret science in such a way that it *will not clash* with religion. The philosophers themselves may not be, and the best usually are not, aware of this. Nor does it imply that analytic philosophers *themselves* draw religious conclusions, or wish to draw such conclusions. Most of them have, we know, the very opposite intention. The objective historical rôle of analytic philosophy, altogether independent of the personal intentions of the philosophers, is so to interpret science as to leave a loop-hole for religion; and in particular, so to interpret science as to offset the danger of its encouraging revolutionary materialism and atheism.

ultimately, but still more indirectly, a primary fact." The process of philosophic analysis then makes clear what are the "less secondary" facts which are thus "indirectly" displayed; and the final end of philosophic analysis will be to make clear what are the "ultimate" or "primary" facts.

This is to say, that the ordinary products of our common-sense and scientific knowledge are not clear as to the ultimate character of the facts to which they refer; and that therefore, given, and accepting, the results of science, etc., it is necessary to undertake a fresh process of investigation—a process of the philosophic analysis of those results—in order to find out what it is to which they ultimately refer.

Therefore, after the acquisition of common-sense knowledge, after scientific investigation, comes the *philosophic* question of what are the ultimate facts referred to.

Here we find that the analytic method is giving expression to exactly the same principle which has for many years proved useful to the bourgeoisie in dealing with scientific knowledge. This is the principle that the knowledge furnished by science (and by common sense) does not make clear what it is really about, and that therefore it is necessary to give it a philosophic interpretation, in order to make clear what it is to which it ultimately refers.

This interpretation then seeks to show that the ultimate elements to which our scientific and common-sense knowledge refers are sensations or sense-data; it seeks to show that such knowledge is really and ultimately concerned with the order of occurrences in human experience; in order that in this way the materialist content of science can be reconciled with mysticism and idealism.

In the statement of the analytic method, there is no suggestion that the analysis should be along these lines. In fact, the statement of the method leaves it absolutely open as to what

kind of objects the ultimate elements revealed in the final analysis will turn out to be. Nevertheless, the whole *tendency* of philosophic analysis is in the direction of phenomenalism ; and this tendency has been enormously accelerated by the work of Wittgenstein.*

This tendency, which seems accidental in relation to the analytic method considered as such, is by no means accidental when the analytic method is seen in its historical role, in philosophy, and in human society generally.

8. The clue to the weakness of the analytic method is to be found in the historical role which it plays as a philosophy of the bourgeoisie. The weakness of the analytic method follows from its very usefulness "in a certain kind of philosophy," i.e., as a philosophy of the bourgeoisie.

9. Dr. Broad made a well-known distinction between analytic and speculative philosophy—the latter being concerned with deducing the ultimate nature of things, and the reasons for everything which exists ; while analytic philosophy is concerned, as its name suggests, with analysis.†

This distinction, while it expresses a real distinction in method which exists, e.g., between the philosophic activities of Spinoza and G. E. Moore, is, nevertheless, a misleading distinction. For analytic philosophy is just as speculative as speculative philosophy. As is shown by Wisdom's contribution to this discussion, it also is concerned with the "ultimate" nature of things.

The bourgeoisie, by its development of natural science and scientific technique, has banished speculation from large fields

* See also a very significant remark of Wisdom's. "Individuals are more ultimate than nations. Sense-data and mental states are in their turn more ultimate than individuals."

† C. D. Broad, *Scientific Thought*. Cp. L. S. Stebbing, *Method of Analysis in Metaphysics* (Proceedings of Aristotelian Soc., 1932).

of inquiry, and has replaced it by scientific methods of inquiry and verification. Nevertheless the need for speculation is still felt by the bourgeoisie. The very success of its scientific discoveries drives this class to make those discoveries themselves an object of speculation, in order to find what it is to which they ultimately relate. This speculation takes the form of philosophic analysis.

But just as the old speculative philosophy was aimed at giving some justification to idealist, mystical and religious conclusions by *deductive* methods, so this new speculation is aimed at providing a like result by *analytic* methods.

10. The principle, so necessary to this latest form of bourgeois philosophy, that science establishes various truths, but not the ultimate nature of those truths, leads to a rigid distinction between two processes of knowing—*Discovery* and *Analysis*.

To this distinction corresponds the distinction between *Science* and *Philosophy*. And to this distinction corresponds also the distinction between different *levels* of the product of knowing, namely, the unanalysed proposition, the product of science or common sense, at the first level; and its analysis, the product of philosophy, at the second level.

Thus, it must be supposed that first of all we *discover* such truths as that bodies attract one another with a force proportional to the inverse square of their distance, or that I am now seeing a table; and that after that discovery, then *analysis* is necessary in order to show what are the ultimate objects to which the discoveries relate, and what is the ultimate structure of the facts which have been discovered.

The discovery is the work of science or common sense; the analysis of what is discovered is the work of philosophy. Philo-

* Under "discovery" are roughly included scientific and common-sense methods of coming to know. Of course, it is impossible to draw a rigid distinction between science and common sense.

sophy does not reveal to us any new truths, in the way in which science does ; it reveals to us the same truths, on another level.

11. It is evident that the validity of the method of analysis will depend on the validity of the above distinctions. In particular, it will depend on the validity of the *epistemological* distinction between the two distinct processes of knowing, discovery and analysis.

This epistemological principle is most vital for the method of analysis. By the use of this principle the bourgeoisie has been able to rescue philosophy from the materialist menace of natural science, and has been able to rehabilitate metaphysical speculation in the face of the blows dealt it by scientific method. For it has been able to say that science certainly discovers truths ; but it is up to philosophy to show to what those truths ultimately refer.

12. In accordance with the historic rôle of the method of analysis, the general tendency of analysis is to make out that all discovery ultimately relates to our own experience : to be more accurate, that the discoveries of *each person* ultimately relate to *his own* experience.

This view stands in sharp contradiction to the materialist view, that such discoveries, though made on the basis of people's experience, do not relate simply to experience, but to events of the external material world.

From the standpoint of the method of analysis, these appear to be two rival modes of analysis of the propositions to be analysed. Those who accept the phenomenological view would say that the materialists have given an analysis, but a wrong analysis. Similarly, it would seem, from the point of view of the analytic method, that the materialists ought to say that they have given a right analysis, and the others have given a wrong one.

Nevertheless, the materialists—or, at all events, the Marxist materialists—would completely deny that what they have done is to give a philosophic analysis, which may be right or wrong. We would say that this whole conception of the distinction of discovery and analysis is epistemologically incorrect.*

13. It is, in the first place, necessary to get over certain confusions which are introduced in the usual manner of presenting the method of analysis.

Analysis is usually presented, as it has been to-day by Wisdom for example, in a purely *logical* light. That is to say, what is stressed is the logical distinction between propositions at different levels—the proposition to be analysed and its analysis. What is not stressed is the epistemological distinction between discovery and analysis.

Hence the part played by the theory of knowledge in analytic philosophy gets forgotten. It is made to appear as if the process of analysis were some *logical* process, whereby from an unanalysed proposition a new-level proposition is arrived at. What the rules of this process are supposed to be is never made clear.†

But in fact, the kind of analysis which is arrived at is, in its later and philosophically more significant stages at least, determined by the views of the analytic philosopher upon the *epistemological* problem of the nature of the first process of discovery. That is, his views about the ultimate nature of

* Herein lies the chief reason why Moore was never a materialist, though many people would think he was. He used to give what seemed to be a "materialist analysis." But epistemologically he was not a materialist, but aligned with those who were opposing materialism.

† The logical distinction of analysandum and analysis is made clear, but not the exact means whereby you get from one to the other in a concrete example. Hence the diversity of opinion as to what is the right analysis of any given proposition, and the number of "possible views" as distinguished from definite statements. *Cp.* Moore, *A Defense of Common Sense*, Section IV, where he gives three "possible analyses," and cannot choose between them.

what is discovered are coloured by his views about the nature of the process of discovery.*

But just as the epistemological theory about this process of discovery plays an important part in determining what sort of analysis will be given, so also the validity of the whole method of analysis depends upon the nature of the process of discovery.

14. Let us investigate the position of those analytic philosophers who give a phenomenological interpretation of the discoveries of science and common sense.

They claim to have analysed propositions of science and common sense, and to have shown that what these propositions are ultimately about is the order of events in experience.

This is not merely a matter of establishing propositions on a new level. If they think that such an interpretation of discoveries is right, then that opinion is based on views about the mode in which discoveries are established.

Roughly,† they think: (1) that the process of discovery must be treated separately for each individual mind, and that each individual can base his discoveries solely on what he observes as a part of his own experience; and they think (2) that, in consequence, we cannot establish knowledge of anything outside the bounds of our own experience, and they think also that we cannot even give meaning to propositions referring to anything outside the bounds of our own experience. From such a theory of knowledge it, of course, results that a phenomenological interpretation must be given to all discoveries.

15. From a materialist point of view, we would entirely disagree that a phenomenological interpretation of discoveries in any way represents a true picture of what we discover. It

* This is very obvious in the case of Wittgenstein and other solipsists. Cp. also the influence of the epistemological distinction of "knowledge by acquaintance" and "knowledge by description."

† *Very* roughly.

represents, in fact, a misrepresentation" of the character of our knowledge. •

But if we wish to go to the root of our difference with the analytic philosophers who are responsible for this misrepresentation, we will not argue with them on the basis of taking on the one hand the propositions they claim to have analysed, and on the other hand their phenomenological analysis, and trying to show that the second is not a proper analysis of the first. We will argue with them on the basis of attacking the *theory of knowledge* which lies at the root of their misrepresentations.

In other words, the argument is transformed from an argument about what is and what is not the right way of analysing given propositions into an argument about the theory of knowledge.

And from the point of view of the theory of knowledge which we would oppose to the theory of the analytic philosophers, the distinction of discovery and analysis, and with it the whole process of philosophic analysis, is shown to be invalid.

16. The theory of knowledge of analytic philosophy (and for that matter most theory of knowledge) considers the process of knowing, *i.e.*, of establishing knowledge, in the first place as a process which can be treated of independently for the case of each single knowing subject, and in the second place as a purely theoretical activity.

That is to say, it is thought that the question "How is human knowledge established?" can be regarded as the question "How does each individual establish his knowledge?" And that in answering the question "How does each individual establish his knowledge?" the individual can be regarded purely as a knowing subject, with the two faculties of sensation and thought; only his cognitive activities are relevant for the question "How is his knowledge established?"

When knowledge is treated in this light, it becomes impossible to show how anyone can have knowledge of the events of the

external material world; such an external world appears as a realm of "things-in-themselves," and man's knowledge seems to be encompassed within the bounds of his experience. No wonder, therefore, that discoveries are interpreted in a phenomenological manner.

17. But let us for a moment cease to regard the theory of knowledge as an object for pure philosophy, and take into account the fact that knowing is merely one of the normal functions of human life, and that knowing exists only as an integral part of human activity as a whole.

Man is in no case a purely theoretical being. In no case does he merely observe, think and reason; he also acts. The social division of labour brings it about that theoretical inquiries are left largely to one section of men, while the others carry out most of the practical tasks of human life. But nevertheless, the theoretical problems have their roots in practical problems, and in their turn assist in the solution of practical problems.* Human knowledge is in no sense an entirely distinct department of human life.

But at the same time, in the theory of knowledge, it is treated just as if it were such a distinct department. This treatment of knowledge, as an entirely distinct department of *philosophic* enquiry, distinct from the study of human society and human life in general, is bound to mean that the character and foundations of knowledge will not receive adequate treatment.

* These "practical problems" are not so much problems facing the individual, as problems facing many individuals organized in society. *Cp.* the way in which the development of modern science has been determined by problems of technique—in navigation, mining, gunnery, the steam engine, etc., etc. This does not mean, of course, that *every* discovery satisfies some direct practical need. Practical requirements determine the general direction of science; but once this general direction is determined, then science assumes a certain momentum of its own. For a full discussion, see *Science at the Cross Roads*, by the Soviet Delegation to the International Congress on the History of Science and Technology, Cambridge, 1931.

As it actually exists in the world, as distinct from the manner of its existence in the idealising imagination of philosophers, knowing is not a process whereby, simply from observation and experience, each individual mind is able to systematise what it discovers in a propositional form. It is a practical activity, and only exists in its connection with human practice. It is not a process whereby the mind merely discovers and verifies interesting truths ; it is not a merely mental process. It is inseparable from action and practice. We discover the properties of objects in order to use those objects for our own practical purposes.

Hence knowledge is correctly regarded, not from the point of view of what each individual can discover as a result of purely theoretical cogitations about what he finds in his own experience, but from the point of view of what *men*, associated in society, can learn as a result of their practical interaction with the objects which surround them, and can then utilize in order to forward their own well-being, and to perfect their practical control over natural phenomena.

Similarly, the verification of the correctness of our beliefs must consist, not purely for each person in what he finds in his own experience, but in the experiences of many people, in actually acting on those beliefs.

The basis of our knowledge consists in the fact that this knowledge is the product of the efforts of many generations of men to interpret the world about them, in such a way that they will be better able to react to the events of the world, and to control natural forces and natural processes.

18. The above considerations point the way to the reply to those who maintain that discovery is closed within the bounds of experience, and who give a phenomenological interpretation of discovery.

For they base this opinion on an inadequate treatment of the character of human knowledge. They have failed to treat

of human knowledge as it really exists, in its connections with human practice, as the cognitive side of human practice, and instead have preferred a purely abstract treatment of knowledge.

In practice men enter into relations with the external material world, even if in pure theory they are unable to establish such relations. The problems of practice, arising from men's interactions with external nature, set the problems of knowledge, and the solution of these problems is tested in practice. Man's knowledge, therefore, as an aspect of his practical activity, overleaps the boundary of experience and external reality. This boundary only appears as an absolute insurmountable boundary from the point of view of pure theory: human practice abolishes this boundary every day.

In practice we are in contact with external objects, and enter into the flux of material processes. This sets theoretical problems to be solved. As the problem is, so is the answer. If the problem relates to the properties of external objects, so must the answer relate to the properties of external objects. The validity of the scientific methods we have evolved for the solution of such problems is vouched for by the success with which they enable us to tackle those problems, *i.e.*, not merely to get an answer theoretically satisfactory, but an answer which will enable us to cope successfully with the practical tasks which set the problems. In this way our knowledge relates to the external world, and we can test its correspondence with the external world.

This relation is based on the practical origin and practical outcome of our scientific knowledge. Hence if scientific knowledge is looked on as a matter of pure theory, abstractly, without reference to its practical origin and outcome, then its reference to external reality eludes us.

Regarding themselves as pure theoreticians, therefore, men erect boundaries between themselves and external nature.

These boundaries are cast down when men take account of their own practical existence. Hence the error of those who give a phenomenological interpretation of discoveries lies in their abstract treatment of knowledge.*

19. Our knowledge, then, relates to the external material world of natural objects and processes.

The propositions in which we express our knowledge are expressive of facts about material objects and material processes.

The apparent gulf between human experience and the material world is bridged by the practical activities of men, so that as practical agents we do find ourselves in possession of verified knowledge about external events and external objects.

We reach such knowledge only by being acted upon by external objects and by acting on them. By scientific methods of observation and experiment, by the framing of hypotheses and putting them to the test of experience, we are able to systematize our knowledge of external nature, and widen and deepen it.

20. The question is now raised by the philosopher—What is the “ultimate” structure of the object of our knowledge? What are the primary facts to which our knowledge relates?

In raising this question, they suppose that superimposed on the scientific methods of discovery, there must be another philosophic activity of finding out to what discovery ultimately relates, what is the “ultimate” structure of what is discovered.

21. We only enter into relation with the external material world in so far as we ourselves are beings living in that world, *i.e.*, in practice. Hence it is through our practical interaction with nature that we are able to discover the secrets of nature, and to arrive at knowledge of the properties of natural objects

* See Engel's *Feuerbach*, Ch. II; *Socialism, Utopian and Scientific*, Introduction.

and the laws of natural processes. In pure theory, divorced from human practice, it has been demonstrated time and time again that none of this can be discovered.

It is not to be expected, therefore, that a pure philosophy, added to science, will succeed in revealing anything about the objects of discovery. We have only one means of finding out anything about these objects, and that is the way which is already being successfully adopted by science. By metaphysical speculation, whether deductive or analytic, we have no method of coming to know anything about external reality. The only means of knowledge is by the hard road of science. By this means we can penetrate ever deeper into the secrets of nature—though not of course to the extent of finding out the “ultimate” truth.

On the other hand, analytic philosophy means departure from the methods whereby we obtain verified knowledge of realities. It means the introduction of vague concepts into the statement of truths, such as “an object,” “a relation,” “sense-data,” etc., in place of the concepts of science which we (or at least the scientist or technician) know how to use. It ultimately means the attempted phenomenological interpretation of discoveries.

The distinction of discovery and analysis, as two modes of knowledge, does not exist. Analysis is either futile and meaningless metaphysical speculation, or else it is simply discovery penetrating deeper into the essence of the phenomena under consideration.

22. To put this in another way. When the connection of discovery and practice is not grasped, and it is not grasped how discovery relates to the external material world, then it seems that philosophy is required to step in, and explain to what discovery does ultimately relate. Then in consequence scientific discovery becomes the object of metaphysical speculation, and this speculation plays the part of neutralising, from the point of view of

the bourgeoisie, what would otherwise be the dangerously materialist character of science. The theoreticians of the bourgeoisie necessarily cannot grasp the real nature of discovery, as a process of the discovery of the properties of external material objects, and of the laws of material processes, simply because it is necessary for the bourgeoisie to cloak the materialist content of their science with a cloak of idealist metaphysics.

When, however, the theoreticians of another class grasp the way in which discovery penetrates into the external material world, then it becomes evident that we can only increase our knowledge of the objects of discovery by continuing exactly the same process of discovery, which alone establishes a knowing connection between us and the external world.

To proceed to philosophical analysis is only to depart from the way of knowledge altogether, and to lapse into speculations, which are useless from the point of view of increasing our knowledge of realities, however useful they may be from other points of view.

23. Nevertheless, it will be said that there are questions which arise, out of the process of discovery, which are philosophic questions, which cannot be answered by a mere continuation of the process of discovery, and which demand philosophic analysis for their solution.

Let us for a moment consider the kind of questions which are supposed, by analytic philosophers, to stimulate the philosopher to analysis.

These are all questions about the "nature" of things. An example taken by Wisdom in his contribution is a very useful one. He says: "The philosopher who asks 'What is a

* Cp. J. Wisdom, *Ostentation (Psyche)*, Vol. xiii). "The philosopher asks, What is the Self? What is the State? What is Time? . . . The philosopher is asking for a certain kind of definition of the Self, of the State" (pp. 174, 175).

Nation ? ' is expressing dissatisfaction with our analysis because it is still ' in terms of nations. ' " Thus the philosopher is supposed to desire to analyse propositions containing the word " nation " because he is puzzled about " what is a nation, " and therefore wishes to find the ultimate structure of facts " about nations. "

He thinks his desire to analyse is the product of a purely philosophic impulse.* In fact the need to find out what is a nation is an urgent problem of the science of history, and is also a very practical problem.

History, for example, has to deal with the causes and effects of such happenings as " One nation invaded another, " " England sent a stiff note to America, " etc. It cannot possibly do this with any success, unless the historians know what sort of events are actually happening when one nation invades another, or when diplomatic notes are sent from one nation to another. Thus in order to carry on their science, historians will have to make clear to themselves what they mean when they talk about nations—or rather, not what they mean, for they might mean anything, but what are the actual facts referred to when they are dealing with the behaviour of nations.

And further, this question of what is a nation is not a merely academic question, as it might seem at first sight to be, when we say that it is a question of history. It is of considerable practical importance for statesmanship to know what a nation is. Thus one of the best statements which exist on the question of what is a nation was written by Stalin† ; and he undertook that analysis, not because he was puzzled as a philosopher, but because he had to deal with the question of the self-determination of nations within the U.S.S.R.

* Wisdom does in fact speak of the " philosophic impulse " and the " philosophic response. " See *Psyche*, vol. xiii.

† J. Stalin, *Marxism and the National Problem* (*Labour Monthly*, vol. xiii).

We find, therefore, in this example that the desire for analysis is not a matter of a pure philosophic impulse. It is the product of very definite requirements of science and practice. Hence also, the way to the satisfaction of this desire will not lie through some philosophic activity, superadded to scientific research. It must lie through a continuation of scientific discovery, utilising still the methods of scientific discovery. Hence what is required to find out what is a nation, is not for the philosopher to take various statements "about nations" and to speculate on their meaning. It is scientifically to analyse what is revealed to us in the actual facts respecting the organization of nations, and their national policies. In that way alone can we find out what we are referring to when we speak "in terms of nations." But in no sense can this be called a special philosophic activity, superadded to science. It is simply a continuation of the scientific study of history.

One or two other examples will bring out the same point. Consider electrons, for instance, and our desire to know more exactly "What is an electron?" The way to find out more exactly what is happening when electrons shoot from place to place, or go round the nucleus inside the atom, cannot be to speculate philosophically upon this question. Mere thought cannot bring us nearer to the electron. What is necessary is to continue sub-atomic scientific investigation; only thus can we find out more precisely what is happening.

Or again, take the case of the nature of perception. Philosophers ask for the analysis of such a proposition as: "I am now seeing a table." A single word, like "seeing," hides a great complexity in the fact which "I am now seeing a table" expresses. Therefore we want to know more precisely what is happening when anyone is seeing a table, or any other physical object. How can this be found out? Once again, not by philosophic investigation, but by scientific investigation (physio-

logical, physical and psychological) into the events which take place when perception occurs. If such an investigation is carried out, then at the end of it we do know more exactly than we did before what is the nature of perception, what exactly happens when a case of perception occurs. On the other hand, mere philosophical speculation on this question cannot possibly bring us any nearer to knowledge of what happens. For what happens must be an object of empirical investigation, not of metaphysics. On the contrary, such speculation is leading us away from knowledge of realities ; for apart from what happens, there is nothing.

24. From these examples, and from the previous discussion, various conclusions emerge.

(1) Empirical scientific investigation (discovery) can and does answer questions respecting the nature of things—the sort of questions which were supposed to stimulate philosophic analysis. When we want to know about the “ nature ” of A, we want to know what exactly is happening when some “ fact about ” A is the case. This can be answered by investigation into what is happening in such circumstances. It cannot be answered by armchair speculation. Similarly, the question itself is the outcome of scientific and practical needs, not of any pure philosophic impulse.

(2) When we make a deeper investigation into the nature of A, then at the conclusion of this investigation propositions “ about A ” can undergo a change of “ level ” or “ scale.” That is to say, the logical process referred to by Wisdom and others as change of “ scale ” is not a process which occurs as a result of philosophy, as distinct from science ; science itself constantly brings about a change of scale of propositions. Such a change of scale must occur when there is insufficient clarity about what is happening when facts about A are the case ; a further investigation is made, and as a result of this investi-

gation it is possible to express facts about A more precisely as facts about B, C and D—this providing a more minute insight into what is happening, into the causes and effects of these events, and their connections generally with other events.*

(3) However, in this process the terms B, C, D, . . . which are capable of replacing A, are what we may refer to roughly as “scientific” terms, *i.e.*, they are defined as a result of scientific researches, not as terms of pure philosophy or logic. For instance, “electron,” “person,” “wave-length,” rather than “object,” “relation,” “sense-datum.”

(4) Finally, every such “scientific” term needs fresh elucidation. The use of such a term raises fresh problems as to the “nature” of the term in question, which again demands further investigation into “what is happening.” Hence nowhere do we reach a final end-scale or level, nowhere do we reach the “ultimate” terms of all investigation.

* While a “deeper investigation” enables us to express propositions of the form F (A) in the expanded form F (B, C, D, . . .), the investigation *itself* does *not* take the form, as analytic philosophers believe, of the expansion of F (A). It takes the form of the closer investigation of what is happening when facts of the form F (A) are the case; which is quite different. *As a result*, propositions F (A) can be expanded, if we like, into propositions F (B, C, D, . . .). A good example is the Marxist Theory of the State. In the light of that theory, I can, if I like, express propositions about the State in an expanded form; and this enables me to understand far better what is happening when facts about the State are the case. *E.g.*, “The British State is being transformed from a Bourgeois-Democratic State into a Fascist State.” I can explain more clearly what this means, without using the “puzzling” words “State,” “Bourgeois-Democratic” or “Fascist.” But this expansion is rendered possible by a scientific investigation into all that is involved in the State machinery and in State action. This involves the enumeration of the factors involved, and of the principal relations between them and other factors, and also the study of the evolution of different State-forms. In the light of this, I can expand propositions of the form F (the State). *Cp.* V. I. Lenin, *The State and Revolution*; F. Engels, *The Origin of the State, the Family and Private Property*.

25. On the other hand, analytic philosophy makes a sharp distinction between discovery and analysis. It cannot grasp the way in which discovery relates to the external material world, and fails to perceive that discovery is also analysis. It endeavours to submit the results of discovery to a process of analysis conceived of as an activity of pure philosophy. This can only mean that metaphysical speculation takes the place of scientific investigation into the nature of the terms in question. It means leaving the path of knowledge for the path of speculation. This speculation implies the search for metaphysical 'ultimate' terms, instead of terms whose existence is empirically established. The tendency of this speculation is to pervert the character of our knowledge, not merely by a vain search for metaphysical ultimates, but by introducing a misleading phenomenological interpretation of all our knowledge.

26. It is necessary to enter in rather greater detail into the speculative, as distinct from the scientific, character of philosophic analysis.

The process of philosophic analysis is supposed to give propositions logically distinct from those revealed by discovery. When a proposition is submitted to analysis, it is supposed to undergo a change of scale. We have just seen that discovery can and does bring about something which can also be called a change of scale of propositions. It is necessary, however, to see how this change of scale is defined by analytic philosophers.

Change of scale is defined by them in terms of "Elements" and the "arrangement" of elements in facts (structure). Thus in Wisdom's contribution to-day, and also in his paper on *Ostentation*, and in other works both by him and by other people, it is made quite plain that the concept of difference of level, as used in defining philosophic analysis, depends on the idea that : "Certain internal features of the sentence—its form, the words

it contains, and the arrangement of the words, intimate the internal features of the fact ; in particular, . . . the form of the sentence intimates the form of the fact, the elements or words in the sentence the elements of the fact, and the arrangement of the elements in the sentence the arrangement of the elements in the fact."

This obviously involves the conception expressed by Wittgenstein in the words : " The world divides into facts. An atomic fact is a combination of elements."

It is then thought that there must be " ultimate," " basic " or " primary " facts, which are combinations of the ultimate elements of the world. And therefore every proposition must express such primary facts—for its truth or falsity must ultimately depend on such facts. Nevertheless, every proposition does not, through its elements and the arrangement of its elements, give a perfect picture of the primary facts which it expresses. And therefore comes the demand for philosophic analysis. As Wisdom says elsewhere : " We must put the philosophic stimulus in the form, not of a question, but of a prayer—Please give me clearer apprehension of the Arrangement of the Elements of the Fact finally located by the sentence " aRb."*

27. When we speak of ultimate elements and primary facts, or, as Wisdom does in the paper on *Ostentation*, of Elements and Facts, it is necessary to have some idea of what these ultimates are, and how we are to find them. Otherwise Logic is reduced to a game of world-building, which cannot claim to have any bearing on the scientific study of the real world. While everyone knows well enough what he means when he talks of facts, and what sort of things would be referred to as the elements of facts, he does not know what Facts are, or what their Elements

* J. Wisdom, *Ostentation*, p. 177.

are.* Nor is there so much as suggested any precise method whereby it is possible to find out what are the Elements of Facts. Nor has anyone ever been able to point unambiguously to a Fact and demonstrate what are its Elements.†

28. Further, the mode of connection of the Elements in the Fact calls for comment.

A Fact is supposed to be a combination of Elements. Thus if A and B are such Elements, then they may be combined in a Fact (A, B). It is here evidently supposed that the propositions stating such Facts obey the laws of formal logic, *i.e.*, the laws of contradiction and excluded middle ; so that we have :

* The capital letters are, indeed, a sign of mystery ; apparently representing great scientific precision, they, in fact, denote the transference into the mystical. They are a sign that the writer has embarked upon the endless philosophic search for the unknown Absolute, for the ultimate nature of things. Characteristically, Wisdom seeks for "apprehension" of the Arrangement of the Elements of Facts, not through methodical investigation, but through "prayer."

† In *Ostentation*, Wisdom says : "The case of 'England invaded France,' which we have considered does not prove that ostentation is humanly possible ; for the translation was not in that case carried out correctly and in detail. It was, however, carried out roughly and in outline" (p. 174). This is just the trouble. You can, of course, carry out analyses "roughly and in outline." When that is done, it will always be found that if the analysis is in any way justifiable, it is in the way already indicated, by discovery. But no one can make an Analysis, with a capital A, revealing the Elements and their Arrangement. Further, it will be said that we can point to successful philosophic analysis in such examples as the Theory of Descriptions, or Wisdom's treatment of general or incomplete facts. Here again, however, what is provided is hardly an Analysis. And while it is naturally true that there is much that is valuable in these theories (as a guide to the valid expansion of propositions, and also as a refutation of former very misleading theories) they do not give any clearer apprehension of the Arrangement of Elements of Facts. Indeed, in so far as these theories are based on the supposition that there are such Facts, they are baseless, and cannot claim to show anything about the Arrangement of their Elements. For no one has demonstrated that there are such Facts.

either $F(A, B)$ or $\text{not-}F(A, B)$, and not both $F(A, B)$ and $\text{not-}F(A, B)$. Hence also it is supposed that if A and B are combined in a Fact (A, B) , then that combination is (A, B) , and not $(A, \text{not-}B)$ or $(\text{not-}A, B)$.

Hence it appears that the whole world must divide into a kind of mosaic of atomic Facts, of the form $(A, B, \dots)$, each of which is a combination of just such and such definite Elements, and not others.*

In this logical scheme of the world, all transition, and passing from one state into another, is denied. The transformations characteristic of natural processes, the changes and movements, are reduced to the form of a series of discrete atomic Facts.

But where there is transition and change, there is in reality no atomicity of discrete Facts, no combinations of such and such definite Elements. Where change is taking place, the combination of A and B is just as much a combination of A and $\text{not-}B$.† For example, if the colour of an object is changing, then at any moment we may mention it is neither this particular shade of colour, nor that particular shade, or alternatively, it is just as much that shade as this shade; the truth is, that the conception of a combination of Elements (object and particular shade of colour) does not fit the process of colour change.

So in general, the conception of the division of the world into Facts which are Arrangements of Elements, is a static conception, which is at variance with the character of the world as we know it, as containing manifold processes of transition, change and movement.‡

* Cp. L. S. Stebbing, *Method of Analysis in Metaphysics*. "A basic fact is an absolutely specific fact. . . . To say that a fact is absolutely specific is to say that its elements are determinate" (p. 85). Cp. also W. E. Johnson, *Logic*, Vol. i, ch. xiv.

† See G. Plekhanov, *Fundamental Principles of Marxism*, Ch. III. *

‡ In Max Black's contribution to this Symposium, he shows his awareness that there is a gap between the ideal logical scheme of the

29. Hence while on the one hand there is no clear method laid down for ever attaining that "clearer apprehension of the Arrangement of the Elements of the Fact" which those who practise the analytic method seek for in prayer, and no one can unambiguously point to a Fact, or demonstrate the Arrangement of its Elements; on the other hand, the ideal scheme of Facts which are Arrangements of Elements, on which the current definitions of analysis base themselves, is conceived of after a false formal logic, suitable perhaps for a static world, but not for a world of continual becoming.

Hence it is that the search for a philosophic analysis, which will reveal the Arrangement of the ultimate Elements of the primary Facts to which discovery relates, is a purely speculative metaphysical enterprise, which cannot lead to true and clear knowledge of realities.

30. What is necessary is not to gain a "clearer apprehension of the Arrangement of Elements," but to gain a more detailed knowledge of what is taking place in the course of material processes, of the factors which influence the development of those processes, and of the laws and properties of the real objects which surround us, as well as of the conditions of our own life as men, and as active units of society.

The first aim (that of philosophic analysis) can lead only to barren speculation at the best; at the worst it means a perversion of the real import of our discoveries. The second aim

world assumed in analytic philosophy, and the real world. He shows this first in constructing a "model" to illustrate the logical postulates of analysis—a "model" which is obviously, in its structure, very unlike the real world we live in. And later he expresses doubts as to the possibility of ever clearly apprehending the Structure of Facts, owing to the indeterminateness of our knowledge. The point is, however, that this difficulty of apprehension is not due to a failure of our own subjective power of attention and discrimination; it is due to the objective incompatibility of a world of continuous process, change and movement, and a static logical scheme of Elements and Arrangements of Elements.

leads to ever-growing knowledge of the real world, and with that a practical ability to solve the problems of life in that world.

When the character of this knowledge is grasped, the proposal that it should be submitted to philosophic analysis, of the sort outlined by the analytic philosophers, is seen to be useless, harmful and impossible. So far as philosophy is concerned, its task cannot therefore be to submit discoveries to analysis; this is not, and cannot be, a useful method in philosophy.

The philosophy which "interprets" the results of science, the philosophy which endeavours to elucidate the nature of reality by extra-scientific methods, whether by analysis or by deduction, cannot elucidate anything, cannot provide any useful contribution to human well-being. To it is reserved the function of cloaking the real character of our knowledge, and obscuring the import of discovery, in the interests of the bourgeoisie, and of international reaction in its struggle against revolutionary materialism.

The vital philosophy of the future cannot attempt any such "interpretation." It has the task of breaking through the web of mystical speculation which obscures men's understanding of themselves and the world about them. Its task is to unravel the general laws of motion of all real processes, to elucidate the general principles of all real change and development, and to explain by what means men are able to gain accurate knowledge of the world in which they live.

The advance of philosophy is thus a part of the advance of scientific knowledge. The advance of philosophy thus clarifies men's minds as to themselves, the world, and their means of knowledge. And in so doing, it is a part also of the advance of mankind in practical control over the forces of nature, and in the struggle for the emancipation of the human race.

ARTISTIC FORM AND THE UNCONSCIOUS.

By J. M. THORBURN, A. H. HANNAY, P. LEON.

I.—*By* J. M. THORBURN.

“LES Allemands . . . ne savent pas dessiner. C’est là que fait faillite leur culture. Le grand instrument de la culture c’est le dessin, non la musique. Celle-ci déséprend chacun de soi-même ; elle l’épanouit vaguement. Le dessin, au contraire, exalte le particulier ; il précise ; par lui triomphe la critique. La critique est à la base de tout art.” I cannot remember ever having read anything with feelings so mingled of delight and unqualified protest as the above remark of Gide’s in *La Nouvelle Revue Française*, which by the merest apparent chance a friend brought to my notice one summer day around the close of the war. Why in all the world, I thought, should this so obviously discerning mind repeat once more that old infernal parrot-cry about the Germans’ lack of Form ? My mind protested, but my soul was intrigued. Ever since, the words have kept ringing there like a kind of faery bell. Even now it will not quite be stilled.

For one finds evidence, deep in the heart of Germany itself, of a reflection that, at the least, does not altogether run athwart the Frenchman’s view. If one allows oneself to saunter, quietly, impartially, back through the gateway of Spengler to his masters,* to Nietzsche first, who called himself an Ear-man as distinct from an Eye-man,† but finally to Goethe, one finds there a source of ideas, I do not say, necessarily, more complete

* “Goethe gave me method, Nietzsche the questioning faculty.”—*Decline of the West*.

† Contrast Wyndham Lewis, *Time and Western Man*, p. 8. “In my case it is the eye. It is in the service of the things of vision that my ideas are mobilized.” But if the whole body were an eye, where were the hearing ?

or comprehensive, but more authentic' because closer to the artist's own experience—more authentic, too, because I doubt whether the history of art affords the instance of an artist of the first order who had so trained himself to dispassionate reflection about his art as Goethe.

Goethe has given utterance, at all events, to the idea that the ordinary way of seeing nature was not the artistic one. Men and women, naturally passionate, naturally view each other as passionate beings, but without singing their passion. Yet it is just through song* that in opera the artist expresses himself; and this expression has a certain quality—a quality akin to truth, call it the *Kunstwahre* as distinct from the mere *Naturwahre* of non-artistic human passion. "The *Kunstwahre* and the *Naturwahre* are entirely different."†

There is another antithesis, however, which is much more pervasive of Goethe's mind—which keeps haunting it and which finds expression from time to time both in prose and verse. It is the antithesis between a Nature that stands in some kind of organic relation to the artist's mind and for which the artist has some kind of feeling—it might be beautiful, yet not entirely beautiful as the highest kind of art is beautiful—and a complete or satisfying experience of beauty, which nevertheless *is also an experience of Nature*, and which is essentially characterised as Form, artistic Form. No doubt we have to admit an ordinary, human and non-artistic view, Everyman's view (*sieht jedermann*); but the important contrast is between the man who is interested, intimately interested (*der etwas zu thun hat*), and the man who secures the high achievement of Form—"Form, a secret for nearly everybody."‡ This, of course, is not merely a contrast between two kinds of men, but a contrast between two phases

* Weimar Ausgabe, Abt. I, Band 47, pp. 261 ff.

† W.A. I, 47, p. 262.

‡ W.A. I, 47, p. 265.

or moments of Goethe's own experience; and further, it is a contrast between two different kinds of art—a less perfect kind which no doubt shows an intimate view of nature and a beautiful sensible expression, but which lacks something; and the perfect kind of art, if ever it is to be found, which while having the beautiful sensible expression has something more besides, something that can only be called Form—Form, which is, indeed, in more ways than one, a secret.

If ever this highest type of art can come about, we shall be obliged to take leave of the ordinary idea of nature as external *merely*. For, “a completed work of art is a work of the human spirit, and in this sense also a work of nature.”* The human spirit, then, which is in some way distinguishable from external nature, is yet nature at least in so far as it works through art. Initially, at all events, Goethe's position would be something like this: there is an external nature—apparently external,† anyhow—which commands our feeling, our awe or our love; but there is also an inner nature which, no less, must command our feeling. My phantasy, my illusion is as much worthy of respect as anything outside. It is just as much nature. In the above passage, this inner nature seems to be identified with spirit; but this is not to rule out the possibility, as we shall see, that the *schöne Sache*, the poet's consciousness, may not in some sense be distinct from both the inner and the outer nature.

At all events, there can be no doubt what Goethe regarded as at once the really difficult, and the finally essential, part of the artist's task. It was to make the work of art veritably also a work of the human spirit in the sense thus indicated. And—what is even more interesting—all the indications go to show that this difficulty had to do with the “secret” of Form. There was so much art that had indeed the indispensable quality of the

* W.A. I, 47, p. 265.

† “Without, as ye are fain to call it.” W.A. I, 48, p. 204.

Kunstwahre (Greece could show that), yet had not the quality of the inwardness "of the human spirit," which Goethe felt as an artist he possessed and with which he must find the way to endow the work of art. (The task of the modern world.) I should not like to undertake dogmatic statement, but I think the main direction of Goethe's reflection is this: that however splendid or however pure, artistically, the sensible clarity of art may be, the "secret" of Form cannot be fully manifest unless there is also, in its entirety, the presence of this quality of inwardness.

Suppose that nature, external nature, at least partially transformed or in process of transformation as the *Kunstwahre* could be sought through long and systematic ardour; suppose also there could be a kind of devotion to nature on the part of the artist, a willingness to forgo his own inner life, then the artist would "find himself" in nature to this extent: that there would appear an art—an art in sensible form—which, while it *was* sensible would also be an expression, to some minor degree, of himself and of that inner life which he had so far forth sacrificed. This might be true, in a way, of all art, but it is much more obvious, it is much easier to think, in reference to painting. To raise the question of music at this point brings out a sharp contrast. "The musician must turn in upon himself and develop his most inward side so that he may bring it to outwardness. It is not his business to court the sensibility (Sinne) of the eye. All too easily the eye over-reaches and defrauds the ear. Inversely, the formative artist must live in the outer world and, correspondingly unconscious of his own inner being, be outwardly manifest."*

Evidently the type of formative art which most courts the sensibility of the eye will be taken as the plastic art of Greece; but one must remember, in this context, how persistently

* W. A. I., 25, p. 11

Goethe strove to express himself through painting and how much it cost to reach admission of failure.

After all, the important thing for Goethe was poetry; and through the appeal to his experience as poet he would discover, if anywhere, the essentials of his relation to nature. Outer nature even though transformed as *Kunstwahres* was not, as a rule—not prevailing—Goethe's starting point. True, he might often, or generally, seek nature as the place of inspiration. But actually, the inspiration began from within. Typically, of course, not, possibly, in every case, but typically. "It has sometimes happened to me that [outward] nature seemed to promise me a felicitous voice, when inwardly a secret genius appears to forestall her by whispering something rhythmical; so I let myself sway with the tempo of it and begin to think that I can catch the sound of very gentle tones—tones that may accompany *any* kind of song (Lied). Realisation comes to me in one way or another at pleasure."*

Yet just as the realised work of formative art—the art that seemed so wonderfully to court the sensibility of the eye—was often insufficient because of its lack of depth, so now on the other side, the rhythmical and the musical appear as insufficient from lack of sensible clarity. There would indeed be a whole range of poetry which, because of the preponderance of these elements, threatened to become mere illusion (Wahn).

The idea of illusion, therefore, becomes important. Goethe seemed sometimes to speak of a world of illusion, partly in reproach, but partly also in a kind of awe—the world of illusion was so much mightier than the real world.† And then, too, he speaks of it with longing—

“Fühl' ich mein Herz noch jenem Wahn geneigt.”

* W.A. I, 25, pp. 65-66.

† *Sprüche in Prosa*. Hempel, Berlin, 1870. No. 252.

From the Dedication to Faust I, right on to the very last mystical chorus that brings Faust II to a close, this longing for a *Welt des Wahns* amounts almost to the primary *motif* of the whole poem.

No doubt, we are here dealing with its expression in poetry. But then for Goethe it had also to become a matter of conscious and deliberate reflection.

The world of illusion has a very natural expression in poetry, or rather, Goethe would warn us, in what presents itself as poetry. As the opposite of formative art (which courts the sensibility of the eye), rhythmical language (with its diminution of intellectual meaning) seems to have a potency to charm the soul into the world of illusion. It is a kind of music. Sometimes, even, its accents divest themselves of *all* intelligible meaning, and then it becomes so closely akin—if you like, perilously akin—to music.* Hence Goethe tends at times to view the entire art of literature as something opposed with extraordinary vigour to all the formative arts. Writing of Winckelmann and his problem, he says: “From anything literary, indeed from the highest type of work whose concern is with word and speech, from poetry and rhetoric, it is difficult if not almost impossible to pass over to the formative arts; for there lies an abysmal cleavage between them to transcend which there would be required a natural endowment of unique kind.”† No doubt this utterance has a double edge. It might mean, on the one hand, that poetry and rhetoric are *musical* in character and without the quasi-objective articulation of visible formative art; but it might also mean, on the other, that poetry and rhetoric have an apparent *conceptual* import which is opposed

* Cf. the passage in Stevenson's *Weir of Hermiston* where young Hermiston, trying to write poetry, can hear only the rhythm of the universe—let alone the whole of French symbolism.

† W.A. I, 46, p. 34.

to the non-conceptual character of formative art. Both meanings are relevant to our discussion; but it is with the first that we are presently concerned.

To sum up the present stage of the argument: There is an art which, prevailing, "courts the sensibility of the eye"; and it stands in sharp opposition to one which inclines the heart "towards that illusion,"*—to an art which, because of its temporal rhythm, stands close to music as tone. And the appeal of this musical art is, prevailing, for the ear.

Prevailing, of course, not absolutely. Music as played articulately by instruments does court the sensibility, though of the ear. It is sensible, and cannot be altogether illusion. A picture, though it court the sensibility of the eye, and typically does so, has also and essentially the qualities of rhythmical and musical illusion.

It is almost as if there were in Goethe's mind, a kind of never-ceasing effort towards a relative evaluation. Which of the two things is he to regard as the more fundamental in the experience of the artist? Here is a passage in which he seems desirous of holding the balance—in vain. "Were not speech indisputably the highest thing we have, I should place music still higher than speech, indeed, as the very highest thing."† This introduces us to the opposition, within the single domain of the rhythmical, as between poetry with its quasi-conceptual character and its apparent *Wirklichkeit* and music as tonal with

* The illusion, namely,

"Was ich besitze, seh ich wie im weiten

Und was verschwand, wird mir zu Wirklichkeiten,"—

and

"Alles Vergängliche

Ist nur ein Gleichnis;

Das Unzulängliche,

Hier wirds Ereignis,"—

the beginning and the end of Faust.

† W.A. II, 11, p. 173.

its oblivion of the real world and its leaning towards *Wahn*—the second possible meaning of the passage about Winckelmann. There are traces of an inclination to equate the element of *Wahn* (with its accent upon the rhythmical) with the “unconsciousness” of the artist, or at least with his freedom from consciousness; and to regard that moment of unconsciousness as—in some sense—the highest value. He seems to be warning a young poet against a too-ready acceptance of contemporary mode and current tendency in literature. “See that you manage to regard yourself historically and to convince yourself how easily a man may fail to gauge the development of the times closest to himself. The consciousness of the poet is a fine thing, but the true power of production always lies, in the last resort, in the unconscious (*Bewusstlosen*)—and so much the better, too, the more highly cultural the talent is . . . Yet little can be said on this matter, and this must stand but as an indication.”*

This is a late utterance, 1832, the last year of Goethe's life. At the close of 1831 he had written perhaps the most remarkable passage of all “on this matter.” He has so disciplined himself, he says, as to be able to effect the deepest contact—or as deep a contact as he can require—with the unconscious, while yet not losing his conscious vision. It is apropos of Faust, “By a secret psychological adjustment (worthy perhaps of closer study), I believe myself to have attained to a mode of production which, in full consciousness, has brought to birth work that I can entirely approve—though perhaps I shall never be able to swim in the flood-tide of it again—work that Aristotle and other prose-men would have ascribed to a kind of *Wahnsinn*.”† Whether or not this long, disciplined effort of Goethe's to bring together the moment of sensibility with the moment of illusion was successful in the high sense as regards the work towards which it was most earnestly directed, the closing passages of *Faust II*,

* W.A. IV, 49, p. 418.

† W.A. IV, 49, p. 166.

I could scarcely undertake to guess. At all events, it was deliberately proposed as a legitimate artistic intention, and approved as a fruitful one.

The following generalisation will take us a little way from Goethe's actual record of his reflection on art, but so far as I can see, it is necessarily implied in these and other recorded utterances :—

The visual and the musical appear as two variable or shifting foci which it is the unceasing effort of the artist to bring together, but which within any given experience it rarely or never seems possible entirely to unite. And these two variable or shifting foci will surround themselves with minor variable foci ; or rather, minor foci will appear in relation to each of the major foci. There will, in poetry, be the word (as understood) tending towards the visual and away from the other focus. (The tension thus appears within the single experience of poetry.) There will be poetry as spoken word, accentuating the visual tendency and there will be music as tone in the strict sense. (The tension thus appears in virtue of two different types of art. Yet these two different types may converge as song or choral music.) There will be an art of a high degree of sensible clarity whose actual medium is nevertheless instrumental tone, and there will be an art of deeply illusory quality whose actual expression is yet a visible plastic one. (The tension in this case appears between two different types of art, each of which has too much sacrificed its characteristic power in order to appropriate the alien quality of the other. Michelangelo gives us an art where *Wahn* has too much sway, though he is a painter or sculptor. Gluck gives us an art where too much is sacrificed to *Sinne* as pleasant clarity, though he is a musician.)

Houston Chamberlain* attempts a formulation of Goethe's ideas through the antithesis of *Sinnenkunst* to *Wahnkunst*.

* Goethe. München, 1912.

The terminology is not Goethe's, but the exposition seems deeply in harmony with the spirit of Goethe. I shall make use of the antithesis in this form, subject to the reservation that Chamberlain takes little or no account of Goethe's effort to discover the moment of the poet's consciousness—of his effort to see the “conscious” and the “unconscious” as somehow to be held in relation or to be brought together in a single experience; and I disagree entirely with the view that Goethe and Wagner are artists of the same kind. These things, I take it, are not unconnected with racial prejudice. Yet it must be said that in the chapter called “The Poet,” there is a profundity which I do not think is to be found in any other writing on Goethe—not on this particular aspect at least.

Sinnenkunst, then, is that kind of art whose main intention is sensible clarity, and it will be typified through the arts of the visual. *Wahnkunst* is that kind of art whose main intention is towards imagination and emotion. It will be typified, if at all, through music in so far as music is free from the burden of objective reference, or of apparent objective reference. The contrast is, of course, relative; but both *Sinnenkunst* and *Wahnkunst* stand for a relative deficiency in artistic purity or in artistic achievement. Goethe's art is regarded as achievement of the highest excellence because it completely transcends the deficiency that either term represents.

II.

Goethe, at all events, placed a high value upon the moment of the “conscious-free” in the artist's experience. There can be no mistake about this. How, from the angle of approach which our subject demands, are we to see this “conscious-free” at work in Goethe; and how is the manner in which it works in him to be generalised as a mode of all artistic work?

The discovery of his own highest powers came to him through a certain reaction from the genius of Shakespeare. The superiority of Shakespeare lay in his power to let his characters grow as they would, to leave them alone as living persons must be left alone to pursue their own experience and destiny. Shakespeare uniquely among all poets brings to birth characters which are to the minimum degree bearers of anything that the poet *intends* them to bear of himself, from his own sources, of his own ideas, of his own emotions. This has to do with the English genius and with the peculiar modes of English culture. It is the way in which *Sinnenkunst* of a very high order would occur in England—a *Sinnenkunst* whose specific form was that of the drama—a highly visual form of art, and the correlate of a very complete objective organisation of cultural life.

With such powers of character portrayal Goethe easily enough learned he could not vie. He was the more pushed back on to himself, on to his power towards the exploration of the musical. Just as Shakespeare led his art to its brightest focus as *Sinnenkunst*, so Goethe began to find *his* art at *Wahnkunst*. The *Urfaust* and *Faust I* are, I think, *exactly* in point.

First, then, the problem which confronts us is to interpret through Shakespeare, Goethe's assertion that the poet's *Productionskraft* lies in the unconscious or conscious-free. The thing to be held prominently to view is that Shakespeare, of all artists, so far as falls within our scope, had to interpret his experience, artistically, through human personality. How, then, would the "unconscious" of such an artist appear in relation to his *Productionskraft*? It seems to me that an important part of the answer is given in an extraordinarily clear, succinct and yet complete form in Dr. Ernest Jones' *Psychoanalytic Study of Hamlet*. It is not very often that any of the Seven Seals is broken in short compass or in brief span of time. But for once this happened. Men had been searching, perplexed, wondering,

persistent, for three hundred years for some clue to the enigma of Hamlet ; and they had found nothing ; and then the book was opened and the revelation effected quite suddenly, and, in a sense, once for all, in this little pamphlet. A brief statement can do no manner of justice to this exceedingly exact analytical Study of Hamlet, but the outline of its thesis must here be given. Hamlet is bound by a profoundly unconscious and unrecognised tie to his mother, Gertrude. The correlate of this with regard to his father is an equally unrecognized jealousy. Consciously he loves and honours the father ; and so far as the conscious motivation is concerned, there seems no reason why he should not perform the act of a just vengeance. But in deep actuality jealousy of the father leads Hamlet to identify himself with Claudius who murdered his father and possessed himself of Gertrude—the very thing which he, Hamlet, would like to have done. Yet again, he hates Claudius because Claudius still plays the father-role and possesses Gertrude, the very thing he would like to do. If then, Hamlet *condemns* Claudius he condemns that principle within himself which might achieve the elimination of the father and the possession of the mother ; if he refrains from condemning and killing Claudius, he allows the hated father-principle to reign in undisturbed possession of the mother. Hence the suspension of every possibility of action.

The point that I want to bring out is that Shakespeare's *Hamlet* offered an unusually suitable field for the genius of Dr. Jones in view of his peculiar training and tradition. Dr. Jones' task became possible because Shakespeare's medium *was* human personality—human personality in the concrete, in all the realism of the Englishman's vision, in the unfolding of a personal history as it was for the culture of Elizabethan England. Shakespeare's art was just that type of *Sinnenkunst* which lent itself to Dr. Jones' penetration. By broad contrast,

Freud's own effort in the case of Leonardo was at least a relative failure; and this, I think, is due, in part, to the fact that it was just not Leonardo's task to interpret *his* experience through human personality. It was much less in some ways, and much more in others.

Goethe, by contrast with Shakespeare, offers no such analytical field. In all the essential *poetry* of Goethe there is no concrete personality, no concrete dramatic situation, no concrete unfolding of tragic destiny that can for a moment compare with those of Hamlet, or of Shakespeare's plays generally. In Shakespeare, Banquo's *ghost* can return—but not Banquo. For Banquo is the creation of an entirely realistic vision. In Goethe, Faust, Gretchen, Helena, Mephistopheles and the rest can alike fall in the calamity of tragic destiny or vanish in the interlude of comic satire—and reappear; just as they all, like the mystical choruses, may at one moment accuse, and in the next approve, when looking upon the destruction of the beautiful world. Very decidedly, Goethe's poetry is mystical where Shakespeare's is not, in this sense, that the opposites or contradictories appear together, or are asserted in the same relation.* This lends itself to a musical form of art, in which succession can become mergence, and where one thing or person, Proteus-like, changes into another without being required to retain its individuality. It does *not* lend itself to a visual art just because of the dependence of such an art upon the objective, or at least because of its correlation with the objective. The visual lends itself to an art in which the visible form resists the attempt to merge its individuality. It is all relative, of course—relative† through and through.

* The classic instance is perhaps Angelus Silesius :

Ich bin so gross als Gott ;

Er ist als ich so klein.

† The relative character of the difference between Shakespeare and Goethe must be stressed. In so far as Jones scores his signal success

But the accent, visual-objective, falls on Shakespeare, the accent, *musikalischer Wahn*, falls on Goethe.

At first sight, this looks like admitting that the musical is the formless, or in danger of being connected with the formless ; but Goethe's intention, at all events, was towards a very different conclusion. The element of *Wahn*, apparently antagonistic to Form was actually, in his view an essential condition of Form. The problem was to secure the latter not by omission of the former but by the fullest appropriation of it.

Here, then, it seems necessary to find a sufficiently broad and comprehensive view of the two poets and the divergent kinds of art they represent. The extraordinary felicity of Dr. Jones' analysis of the Shakespearean work seems to me an important cue. Take, by way of violent contrast with Shakespeare, the case of a musician, in the stricter sense of that term. Since music does not work primarily through the artistic focussing of human character and human destiny, there would be something much less easy, would there not ?—in attempting the corresponding analysis of, say, Mozart, relying—at least in part—on his music. Of course, the themes which he preferred, *The Marriage of Figaro*, the *Magic Flute*, the *Requiem*, would afford a cue ; but in his case, the non-vocal and non-choral works are just as important—I should say, more important ; and these do not seem readily to lend themselves to an analysis of the type Dr. Jones might give. Not without reason Spengler said that “in chamber-music, Western art as a whole reaches its highest point.”

through the limitation of his analysis to a person, Shakespeare—accomplished undoubtedly by help of Shakespeare's play, *Hamlet*—he is bound to miss those qualities of Shakespeare's art which are, shall we say, extra personal ? For an excellent discussion of this point, see Jung's paper on “Psychology and Literature,” now published in *Modern Man on Search of a Soul* (Kegan Paul).

In general, then, music in the strict sense will either lie beyond the scope of this analysis, or will not be so easy of access as are the arts of the visual. Phantasy, indeed, and all the Kingdom of Illusion seem as if they *could* only be brought within the required scope in so far as they had received some expression or exteriorisation as sensible art of the visual type, poetry here having a possible claim to inclusion within this type. Or to generalize—the more distinct or tangible the sensible expression of *Wahn*, the more it would come under the required scope; the less it had sensible expression, the more remote it would lie from possibility of analysis. It will be observed here, of course, that music (in the strict usage of the word, music) is sensible, but being a radically temporal form of sense lies in remoteness from access to analysis.

The Shakespearean drama is a relatively externalized and visual art. By contrast, the lyric poetry of Goethe is relatively less externalized, and the moment of the visual in it is, in certain essential respects, much less. Still, it is externalized because recorded in writing or print, and it *has* the essentials of the visual-sensible which make it art. But penetrating further—penetrating into the region of Goethe's own mind which he called *Wahn*, we find the accent now altogether thrown over on to the side of flux, floodtide, reverie, rhythmic ebb and flow, *temporal* ebb and flow. And I mean, too, that this characterizes all, reverie, phantasy, *Wahn* and Illusion—not only Goethe's. The more you detach from any form of sensible clarity, the more you become purely temporal and are lost in that "flood-tide."

It would seem, then, as if the only thing to be done were to take the Bergsonian way, and to say that the intellect can never apprehend duration. Without wishing to deny that the creative act of the artist "contains a secret" which will never be made manifest, I do not think it true to say that the intellect has no means of access to our particular difficulty at this point.

Here is what I believe to be an essential cue. I start from the facility and felicity of Dr. Jones' analysis of Hamlet. 'There is an ease about it—the right kind of ease—and a success that must be taken into account. These things arise because the analysis is, and can be, directed towards one single *human* experience. The relation to the mother is the starting point. That can only begin at birth, not earlier than birth.

There is, however, no absolute reason why the mother should be taken as the starting point, or the earliest thing, or the single conditioning thing. While the organism comes into being as organism at birth, the organization of the life-continuum certainly does not begin there. Actually the organic continuity of life is unbroken, and goes back, through the intra-uterine life, to the life of the parents and then further back, indefinitely. What is now in question is the pre-conditioning of the life of the organism. Some things at least in the early life of the organism are more easily related to this pre-conditioning than to the experience of the organism itself within its environment. Perhaps in a very general way the closer you come in the life of the separate organism to the moment of birth, the more you need to go back to such pre-conditioning in order to understand what is happening.

Now the various types of art show a certain difference among themselves with respect to the time when they awaken in the experience of those who are to be the vehicles of a sufficiently representative genius.

Music, in especial, awakens earlier. Not always, perhaps. But typically. It comes under the general principle that, requiring the lowest degree of organization with regard to the spatial and visible world, some of its powers and characteristics are manifest in a striking way when the organism has relatively little organized relation to the spatial-cultured world. My suggestion is therefore that in seeking for the vital organic

relations of music we are thrown back more on the preconditioning of the organism than on the organism's own experience. The arts of the visual, and of poetry, relate themselves a little more easily to the organism itself. It is only a question of degree, of course.

We are accustomed to trace the sources of a developed poetic imagination to the various relations of the life history—that is the *Dichtung und Wahrheit* of Goethe. But the more childish forms of imagination, the *Welt des Wahns* detached from sensible expression and losing itself, characteristically, as temporal ebb and flow—they begin early and they call for relation to the preconditioning of the organism more than to the organism's own history.

To sum up: Experience of the organism relates, with *relative* ease, to the visual and the conceptual-objective—to space; organization of the life-continuum previous to the existence of the organism relates, with *relative* ease, to phantasy, reverie, process, music—to time.

Very well, then, Dr. Jones' analysis enlisted the aid of a person, as focussed through art. The person, as *persona dramatis*, stands within a spatial-cultural world. Drama is action, of course, and is temporal, no doubt; but the accent is here thrown over upon the spatialized personality, and his own life history. What kind of analytic view will there be, or could there be, where the emotional phantasy throws the accent over upon time; and where it would be necessary to seek organic relations which pass back and altogether beyond the life-history of the organism?

It is here that Jung's view of archetype or archetypal phantasy is in court. The essential of this view is: that it is possible to distinguish between the conditioning of phases of experience through factors in the personal history of the individual and the conditioning of phases of experience through factors

that go back before the time of the beginning of the personal history of the individual or the separate life of his organism. In so far as a phase of experience is characterized through the conditioning of elements remote in time from the separate life or the personal experience of the individual, it is called archetypal. It must be remembered, of course, that the preconditioning of the organism, as well as such things as intra-uterine life, and mere biological process, is also *human experience*, and again human experience almost *ad infinitum*. "Great poetry draws its strength from the life of mankind, and we completely miss its meaning if we try to derive it from personal factors."*

Wahn, in the sense in which Goethe used it, may, I should suppose, be any relatively inchoate imaginative or emotional process. That it is strongly tinged with emotion is evident by Goethe's account of his own case. In such a case as Michelangelo, could it, on the whole, be more imaginative than emotional? The contrast between "imaginative" and "emotional" is, again, but a relative one. Still, we might suppose there would be a *Wahn* standing, on the whole, closer to the side of the visual-imaginative and, securing, if at all, its Form in the arts of the visual; and a *Wahn* standing on the whole, closer to the emotional and to *temporal* ebb and flow to rhythm, to beat, and so securing, if at all, its Form as music in the strict sense.

My suggestion, then is: that music with its profound reminiscence of blind, elemental *beat*, would be the most "archetypal" of the arts. That would only mean, after all, that the organized, vital forces behind the artist in his musical creativeness were less dependent on his personal experience, and more dependent on his inherited psychophysical structure. Relatively so, of course—relatively only. All great art is profoundly dependent on inherited psychophysical structure, but the arts of the visual relate a little more—only a little more—to the

* Jung: *Psychology and Literature*.

experiences of the artist's personal life than music ; and a little less—only a little less, to the remote or archetypal. Yet the little increase of the dependence of music on inherited psychophysical structure might mean a great deal. There is no reason to suppose that Gide is right in suggesting that music has necessarily a less perfect form than drawing. But even though music has a perfect form, or perhaps in *virtue* of its own peculiar perfection of form, it might stand in some remoteness from a culture whose characteristic development had been through drawing or which had secured a very complete assimilation of drawing to itself. It is Nietzsche, I think, who speaks of music as an autumnal* art. It comes late, and the later discovery—let us say, creative discovery—of Form as musical may very well stand in a kind of hostility to the earlier discovery, no less creative in its own time, of Form as visual. Is music autumnal, perhaps, because it is the emotional-sensuous concomitant of the destruction of the beautiful world within which alone drawing could feel itself secure ? On the other hand, while I have to confess that I receive a far deeper joy through music than through the arts of the visual, I can be dubious about a proposed culture which should be wholly musical. At all events, there can be no mistaking the tension in men's souls to-day between their love of Form as music and their love of it as visual ; but I see nothing deplorable in this. For whether or not the tension is able to bring about a new and better world, it is the prize condition without which no new or better world could come. When Mr. Wyndham Lewis calls the man who will not declare for unconditioned and exclusive devotion *either* to the ear *or* to the eye a grey blotch, or some such term of abuse, I am obliged to protest that I have both ears and eyes. That is why I cannot take sides and must endure the experience of tension.

* If so, would the autumnal character of music in this regard be the correlate of its early appearance in the life of the musician of genius ? I think so.

II.—By A. H. HANNAY.

I FEEL doubtful whether the quotation from Gide with which Mr. Thorburn opens his paper is really very pertinent to Mr. Thorburn's main theme, because it seems to me that Gide has in mind the somewhat hackneyed antithesis between classical and romantic art, while Mr. Thorburn is dealing with a new and different antithesis. However that may be, Mr. Thorburn himself points out that music is by no means formless and indeed it seems to me that music has more of deliberate form or arrangement in it than any other art. I have read and listened to many disquisitions on the formal arrangement of pictures and have always found them a little obscure and arbitrary, but the formal arrangement of the themes in most music is as unmistakable as that of a Turkish carpet. It all depends, of course, on what is meant by form or design and I suspect that many art critics are very vague as to what they do mean by it.

Mr. Thorburn proceeds with a second antithesis which again seems to me to be different from the main antithesis discussed later on. The antithesis between nature as seen ordinarily and not artistically and nature in the work of art constitutes a very interesting and puzzling problem and I do not think that it can be solved, as it often is, by the statement that the artist gives "form" to nature. Mr. Thorburn has suggested elsewhere that the theory of *Einfühlung* should be combined with the theory of the unconscious and here, of course, we do approach his present problem. This problem, however, deals with the opposition between two kinds of art and not between nature and art. On the one hand Mr. Thorburn finds in visual art an art of sensibility, throughout lucid and objective, and on the other hand in music an art loaded with subjectivity and subconscious factors. Between the two and inclining generally either to

the one side or the other, is literature. As language, which is the vehicle of intellect and reason, literature, according to his view, makes for clearness and objectivity, but in its music it contains always a surd element which belongs to the subconscious, and if not to the primordial inherited and archetypal, then to the personal subconscious. Mr. Thorburn tends to identify visual art with sensibility, lucidity, objectivity, and realism, and musical art with subjectivity, illusion, imagination and subconsciousness.

I should like first to examine the reason why Mr. Thorburn thinks that visual art is par excellence objective art and music par excellence subjective art. Mr. Thorburn refers mainly to representational painting and my remarks will also be concerned principally with this particular kind of visual art.

Now, in this, it is true, some recognizable object is always depicted; objects indoors and out of doors; things and people. And in this respect visual is definitely different from musical art which represents nothing: the latter may sometimes express the emotion of movement or of the sea and so on, but the element of representation (which means reproduction), is negligible. This can be realized clearly in the fact that music about the sea can be appreciated without knowing it is about the sea, while appreciation of a sea painting, in my view, necessitates recognition. If, therefore, objective means this reference to a recognisable object, then I agree that visual art is definitely objective.

But what precisely is involved in this recognition that a sea picture is of the sea? Principally that the two dimensional coloured pattern in fact relates to a three dimensional experience. The recognition is necessary to enable us to get, not knowledge, but sensations of distance, solidity, atmosphere, movement and so on. The important thing is not the recognition, but the sensations resulting from it. And these sensations are just as surd, as inexplicable and ultimate as the sensations

of sound in music. It is, of course, true that the sea means more to us than this complex of visual or semi-visual sensations, it means H_2O and several other chemical ingredients : but sound can also be stated in terms of wave frequencies.

Nor are the musical sensations, *i.e.*, the sensations of sound, any more subjective than those of colour, distance and so on. There is, so far as I can see, no reason for distinguishing between the two in this respect. If the one is objective in the sense of being independent of the observer, so is the other.

There remains, however, the difference that the creative stimulus in the case of music appears to be more personal than in the case of the picture. The artist sees at any rate some of his painting out there in nature, but the musical sonata is an arrangement of sounds effected wholly by the activity of the composer. The decorative pattern on the other hand is nearer to music. The elements of the pattern are given just as are the notes of the scale and sounds of the instrument, but the pattern and the melody are, as is said, imagined by the artist. The picture does deal with sensations which, although they may be subjective, are apparently to a larger extent given than are the sensations of music.

Does it follow from this, as I understand Mr. Thorburn to maintain, that music is more emotional, imaginative and subconscious than representative painting ? I am not clear whether Mr. Thorburn thinks that emotion, imagination and subconscious art are different terms relating to the same activity or whether he merely holds that they are different activities each of which is at its most intense when associated with the other two. On the face of it I do not see why a realistic representational painting should not be just as emotional as an "imaginative" painting or the literature of illusion or music. And I do not mean the fortuitous incursion of personal associations or memories, but intrinsic æsthetic emotion. Take, for instance, Constable's

"Weymouth Bay." The delight in the scudding clouds is as great as any delight in an imagined scene. Further, I should be disposed to contend that this painting, although it may have been done on the spot, was the work of the imagination. The imagination, if different from the visual sensation, must always operate through it, in order to be expressed and realized. Thus it must alter the visual sensation, and that is why a work of art is a modification of ordinary vision and at first appears strange and arbitrary. It is, of course, possible, and I am inclined to think it is the case, that what is called imagination in pictorial art is simply a power of developing further the visual sensation. In any case it seems to me that the so-called realistic representational painting is instinct with (1) emotion and (2) imagination.

If that is the case there is no valid reason, in my opinion, why representational painting should not be the vehicle of and prey to subconscious urges as much as music. The elements of earth, air and water with which landscape art is concerned carry an appeal which goes very far back into human history, and they may well be a source of what Jung describes as archetypal emotions. And I should be by no means surprised to learn that there is a complete psycho-analytical explanation of the modern passion for plastic volume, both in painting and in sculpture.

Exactly how an archetypal emotion is to be recognized is not clear and, of course, if there is no definite means of recognition, the way is open for all kinds of vague and mystifying assertions which lead nowhere. That there are emotions and images which come out of the past is more than probable, but I cannot see that any particular art enjoys a monopoly of them or, indeed, has a greater share of them than any other.

Further, even if this were the case, what of it? There is a real danger of our losing our heads over these antiquities. When

a biological throwback appears in our midst, we are immensely interested scientifically, but we do not set him above other folk. But the primordial in art is definitely given an exalted position, as though primitive man felt more profoundly and imagined more vividly than we do to-day. This is sheer romancing and even if primitive man did feel profoundly, the emotion was appropriate for him, but not for us. We must build our own images and illusions. This does not mean that we should not borrow from whatever part of the past is at any particular moment most suggestive for us, but the completed work, whether pictorial, literary or musical, must have a contemporary outlook. The pure throwback is no good.

Mr. Thorburn speaks of primordial art as one of illusion and thereby he does provide a clue to the art which he regards as primordial, at any rate so far as literature is concerned. A certain confirmation is lent to his suggestion in the popular view that really imaginative art deals with other worldly creations such as faeries, magicians, spooks and spirits. The art of the northern Germanic countries is regarded as more imaginative than that of the south, and that is because Germanic art still retains more of the primitive mentality; it is still Gothic. The accredited beliefs of yesterday become the illusions of to-day. So long as it is genuine and spontaneous and has some relevance for the contemporary world, there can be no objection to this Gothic imagination as such. But immediately it becomes a deliberate harking back or a self-conscious surrender to the automatic writing of the unconscious, then it loses power and deteriorates. German surrealist painting seems to me to belong to this degenerate class of pseudo illusion.

The position in art of the subconscious motif in the Freudian sense is altogether different from that of Jung's archetype. The latter has a certain respectable normality and one can readily accept it as an ingredient in most works of art. But the Freudian

complex is something to be avoided as soon as it is brought to light. The aim of psycho-analysis is to dissolve the complex and if the work of art is the outcome of a complex, will not the analysis bring the work of art itself under suspicion? If it were shown that the modern predilection for inflated volumes had some Freudian basis, the predilection would tend to disappear and the works of art would be not so much explained as explained away.

The psycho-analytic method, in so far as art is concerned, must necessarily be always confined to the critic. If the artist were aware of his own complex it would no longer be one. It is true that modern novelists introduce psycho-analysis into their work, but that is conscious and not itself a subject for analysis. That all works of art are at bottom the product of subconscious complexes I see no reason to believe, and in cases where a complex is subsequently disclosed, it seems to me that the disclosure either condemns the work of art as abnormal or it shows that the complex was merely an occasion of the work, in the same way as a love affair may be the occasion of a fine novel; but it sheds no important light on the work itself.

Mr. Thorburn has cited an actual instance of a Freudian explanation which he thinks has thrown a flood of light on a dramatic masterpiece. I still remain to be convinced that the theory propounded by Ernest Jones is correct, namely, that Shakespeare was working out an Oedipus complex in Hamlet and that Hamlet's indecision was the outcome of the secret sympathy with his father's murderer which was engendered by his incestuous desire for his mother. The only evidence either for or against such a theory is to be found in the play itself, and it is to be noted that Jones talks all through of Hamlet as though he were an historical character and not merely a creation of Shakespeare. The argument, no doubt, is that while Shakespeare himself thought he was developing one kind of dramatic

situation, all the time his "subconscious" was creating its own characters and situations possessing the uncanny independence and objectivity of persons in our dreams. Thus Hamlet acts and speaks precisely as a person haunted by an Oedipus'-complex would do, although Shakespeare did not deliberately intend this. Ernest Jones, however, produces very few quotations in support of this view and for the most part deals with Hamlet as though he were outside the play.

Actually, it seems to me that the play itself, as written by Shakespeare, does not support the Oedipus'-complex theory. Further, had Shakespeare ever intended to write a play on this subject he would have constructed the play differently and brought out clearly the incest motive. Mr. Thorburn will no doubt object that this is irrelevant, because it was never suggested that Shakespeare was aware of his real theme. I maintain, however, that it is relevant from the point of view of the play as a work of art. If the play has, in fact, the theme attributed to it by Ernest Jones, then, as a work of art, it is a failure. That is to say the analysis will have had a dissolvent effect.

III.—By P. LEON.

I.

WITH what Mr. Hannay says I agree. So, I think, does Mr. Thorburn, if not as completely as I, at least more than Mr. Hannay seems to suspect. Lest, however, the sight of such perfect trinitarian unity appal some with the prospect of theological dullness, I forthwith promise that soon there will be a brawl and even a knock-out blow aimed at the present feast's purveyor in chief, who, I hope and pray, will give back as good as he gets.

In the first part of his paper Mr. Thorburn makes a certain antithesis between music and painting (including to a certain extent all visual art), which in the second part he tries to equate (so I think) with the antithesis between the unconscious and conscious. With this equation I will deal separately. Now I propose to begin by telescoping the first part and some of the second part in what I trust is a concise and accurate, if somewhat baroque and mythopœic, presentation of his antithesis.

Through the musical ear we hear, we are at one and we "archetypally" pulse with, the unlocalized pulse of the universe, to which pulse, perhaps as the beat and boom of the deep, we hearkened long, long ago in the characters of our fishy ancestors. (As Mr. Thorburn is likely to think intra-uterine sensibility to music—is it not rather physiological susceptibility to sound?—of some significance to *Æsthetic* I make him here a present of the information given to me by one mother, namely, that during her pregnancy she had to shun music because it made the child dance within her.) With the artistic eye, on the other hand, we contemplate the spatially extended heart, lungs, sinews and skeleton of the universe, which we have come to know more or less piecemeal by our own individual exploration. The whole of Mr. Thorburn's paper I would describe as a ringing

of the changes upon the classic theme of *Æsthetic*, the contrast between the spatial and non-spatial, between the spātial and temporal, between *stasis* and flow. So admirably thoughtful and thorough, lucid and deliberate is his contribution that I think it deserves to become the *locus classicus* for that classic subject. This I say all the more willingly in that I propose to demolish the whole structure. However that may be, it is only as that ringing and those changes that his otherwise peculiar terminology and queer subsidiary antitheses can be understood (by me at least).

Thus, the alleged subjectivity or non-objectivity of music can mean only the absence (in musical experience) of spatially extended objects. For in respect of universality, publicity or communicability music is as little subjective and as much objective as painting or, for that matter, as mathematics and logic. Similarly, music is formless only if by form we mean shape and spatial multiplicity in unity. In the sense of pattern, law or order, variety in unity, music has as much form as anything can have. Indeed Mr. Thorburn only plays with the idea of placing it on the side of the relatively formless; ultimately, with Goethe, he seems to decide for musical form as form *par excellence*. He cannot have forgotten the connexion between music and mathematics (including geometry) nor the fact remembered by every schoolboy, that the idea of mathematically formulable laws of nature or natural order originated with Pythagoras' discovery of the numerical ratios determining the concordant intervals of ἀρμονία or the scale, a discovery first cosmically generalised by his followers as the notion of the "harmony of the spheres." Again, when Mr. Thorburn thinks of the senses, or rather the *Sinnen* (for German words are kinder than English to German *Tiefsinn*), he is struck only by the spatiality of the *sensa*, by their externality to ourselves and to each other. Hence, rather arbitrarily, he identifies sensible

clarity with spatial separateness, the sensible with the visible, the visible with the pictorial (and plastic), and the musical with the non-sensible. Apart from this preoccupation with space he will surely agree that music is as clear, as sensuous and as sensible as painting or any other art. Lastly, it is only in the light of this same preoccupation that I can explain to myself his extraordinary attribution to music *par excellence*, and in lesser degrees to other arts also, of illusion or *Wahn* (Mr. Hannay, I venture to think, uses the same language only to humour Mr. Thorburn). Illusion proper—that is, the taking of something for what it is not—never forms part of the artistic experience, for this experience is not judging; when such illusion is present we have reverie, phantasy, compensatory castle-building, imaginary wish-fulfilments, sinful indulgence in folly, but not artistic experience, even though the reverie be performed in relation to, or under the stimulation of, a genuine work of art. By musical or artistic illusion, therefore, I suppose Mr. Thorburn can only mean either, once more, the complete absence of a spatial world, or the replacement of the spatial world of perception by one which is only quasi-spatial, without external parts external to each other and to us, but, instead, with parts mutually interpenetrable or flowing into each other like the “parts” of a feeling or spirit or meaning, with *stasis* become flow, with gross corporeality or solidity etherialized or spiritualized, a world which is like an “insubstantial pageant,” which is “apparell’d in celestial light” or is celestial light—in short, the world which Nature always is when apprehended æsthetically. In any other sense how can music, of all arts, be illusory? Since it is non-representational, what can you take it for except music if you are musical, or excruciating noise if you are not? (Parenthetically I would like to complete my exposition by saying that unless Mr. Thorburn intends a joke it is a pity that, after using “externalizing” intelligibly

and significantly for reference to, or evocation of, a spatial world, he should imply that we have the same kind of externalizing when a lyric is printed on a spatially extended sheet of paper! p. 133.)

I have tried to give a faithful account of Mr. Thorburn's theory, bringing to bear thereto even what I hope has been sympathetic divination. But I trust that my account has already made it clear that the antitheses do not amount to very much. The subsidiary ones I regard as simply terminological variations upon the main antithesis between spatial and non-spatial. Of them, the one in respect of form (with which is identical the one between subjective and objective) collapses at once, for the simple reason that no one means by form simply shape or spatial multiplicity in unity. Even to set up his contrast Mr. Thorburn has had to think of painting as exclusively drawing. But painting is also painting or colour, and its form is partly colour-orchestration, and this, I suppose, he himself would call the musical element in painting, thus abolishing the opposition he has set up. Now watch the basic antithesis itself—between spatial and non-spatial, *stasis* and flow—dissolve into thin mist or into nothing, at least as far as art is concerned. On the one hand, even the mere drawing (artistic) of a tree or wheelbarrow presents us not merely with the spatial configuration, but also with the "feel," or "life," or atmosphere ("spirit" I would prefer to say), of the tree or wheelbarrow. As for painting, Corot's landscapes, Oscar Wilde tells us, are Corot's moods. Moods and the "feel," or "life," or "atmosphere" even of a spatial object, are no more spatial or static than beat, pulse or rhythm. (Incidentally, since painting involves emotion as much as music does, down goes another antithesis set up between them, namely that in respect of emotion). Further, the tree and wheelbarrow themselves and the whole of nature, provided they are viewed æsthetically, are spatial only with that spiritualized,

de-spatialized, kinetic spatiality of which, I suggested, Mr. Thorburn is thinking when he speaks of illusion. They are, in short, musical. Mountains were to Byron not spatial masses but a feeling and a passion, and Wordsworth tells us in many passages how nature was to him transparent and a spirit, heard or seen. On the other hand, music, however divorced it is from spatial objects, does, for some people at least and even without the help of descriptive titles, evoke, if not the spatial images, at least the "feel" and "atmosphere," of the sea, the moon, horses, &c. And this is precisely what painting does. If it be contended that musical evocation is far more vague and variable than graphic or pictorial reference, let it be remembered that an artistically drawn or painted tree or wheelbarrow is far from being a tree or wheelbarrow and nothing more; the something more may be very vast and as vague and variable as anything in music. If Tintoret, as Ruskin tells us, gives "oracular voice" to "a stone, leaf, or shadow," then how much of the oracular may not a whole tree or wheelbarrow hold! Either may be a complete Dodona or Delphi. In the domain of poetry Mr. Thorburn applies this antithesis only with the help of a flagrant mis-statement of the facts. He shows in poetry a tension between the musical and the verbal element by maintaining (p. 127) that the verbal element accentuates the visual (the spatial and static, therefore). But it does not do this except in that limited and dubiously successful poetry which is verbosely pictorial. What is accentuated in good poetry is meaning on the one hand and feeling of every kind on the other. Surely Mr. Thorburn cannot have forgotten his Edmund Burke and his Lessing's *Laocoon* (the classic treatise on the relation between poetry and painting and between the kinetic and the static). Burke penetratingly remarks that "words operate . . . not by presenting any image to the mind, but by having the same effect on being mentioned that their original has when it is

seen.”* He says further: “Indeed, so little does poetry depend for its effect on the power of raising sensible images that I am convinced it would lose a very considerable part of its energy if this were the necessary result of all description.”† He then praises Homer for not trying to make us visualize Helen’s beauty but, instead, letting the old men of Troy express the effect of it upon them. The same praise is also given by Lessing, who contrasts Homer’s method with Constantine Manasses’ foolish attempt at piecemeal visualization of that same beauty.‡ Now, neither meaning nor feeling is visual or spatial any more than music is. The alleged tension, therefore, does not exist, at least not in poetry that is poetry.

With all this, as well as with what Mr. Hannay has said, Mr. Thorburn must agree, in principle if not in detail. For he himself repeatedly insists that his antithesis in all its phases is purely relative, always between the more and the less and even between the only a little more and the only a little less, of the same thing. The truth, however, is that what he has said illuminatingly of music (the art to which he is most sensitive, as one might have gathered even if he had not told us) holds of all art in so far as it is really art, and that his antithesis of more and less is, not between music and painting as he alleges, but between the more and the less artistic or beautiful, and as such could have been applied in the domain of all the professedly musical. While claiming to contrast music with painting, imaginative hearing with imaginative seeing, he has in fact all the time been contrasting music and imaginative hearing with physical percepts and physical seeing (May it be that he is not very sensitive to the visual arts and to poetry?). Between imaginative hearing with its object and imaginative seeing with

* *The Sublime and Beautiful*, v. iv.

† *Ibid.*, v. v, and cf. ii. iv.

‡ *Laocoon*, xx and xxi.

its object there can, indeed, be no antithesis. For imaginative hearing, as I have suggested elsewhere, is also imaginative seeing (as well as every other imaginative sense), and imaginative seeing is also imaginative hearing (as well as every other imaginative sense): the imaginatively heard music we also imaginatively see and even imaginatively taste and smell, and the imaginatively seen picture we also imaginatively hear and even imaginatively taste and smell. (And here collapses the last of Mr. Thorburn's subsidiary antitheses. For painting and music are *equally* the products of the imagination.)

That his antithesis is not really between music and painting Mr. Thorburn seems to agree on p. 127 where his language practically amounts to the admission that there may be some music which is more pictorial than some painting and some painting which is more musical than some music. That it is really between the more and the less artistic or beautiful, and that therefore it does not hold at all within the domain of pure art or beauty he confesses outright in the next paragraph. But because he makes this confession only at the end, instead of at the beginning, of his antithesis, and confines it to part of a sentence instead of making it co-extensive with the whole of his paper he gives me my *casus belli* or *casus rixæ*. He seems to be of those who hold that there are species of beauty or of art *quâ* pure art. But there are no species of beauty, for the simple reason that beauty belongs to the beautiful in virtue of the latter's total individuality or individual totality (it is in fact this individuality), and in respect of their whole individuality individuals cannot be compared or classified. Of a finite number of individual beauties you may give an infinite number of classifications, now setting all music against all painting, now some music along with some painting, poetry and sculpture against other music, painting, poetry and sculpture, and so on; but in no case will the grounds of either the differences or the

similarities be found in beauty or pure art. The exposition of them also will not elucidate beauty or pure art, though it may elucidate something else, something that is different from, or falls short of, beauty or pure art. (Note that Gide is trying to illuminate culture rather than art.)

When I read the many brilliant sayings (such as Gide's) that appear from time to time about alleged types of beauty or art, I am in the habit now of taking them æsthetically only. Of each in turn I exclaim: "How fine!" or "How deep!" or "How mysterious!" They suggest to me a new kind of poetry, which I find partly realized by some contemporary poets, a poetry using largely the mysterious resonances and emotional auras of scientific and philosophic terms, among which words like "unconscious," "sub-conscious," "psycho-analysis," used in an opalescent elusive way, will play the same rôle as "alembic," "alchemy," "grammary." When I have to choose in respect of truth between two such equally fine but mutually contradictory *dicta*, I am forced to decide that neither as a whole is true or false. Each contains some illuminating truth applied in a partisan spirit to some art or beauty and actually applicable to all art or beauty, and each therewith confuses a number of interesting but generally non-æsthetic problems. Gide's problem is that of culture rather than of art. Each is truth vitiated by a pseudo-concept. This term is Croce's, but lest my use of it be my own, I must explain it. A pseudo-concept, then, is an indiscretion in relation to *fundamenta divisionis*. I should be guilty of pseudo-concepts if I set or wrote a treatise on "The contrast between the philosophy found in all books bound in morocco and that contained in all books bound in calf." The German professor is obsessed by pseudo-concepts, who opposes the noble Nordic to the mean Mediterranean psychophysical type and then laments that "unfortunately" one may find a Mediterranean psyche in a Nordic physique and a Nordic psyche in a Mediterranean

physique. It is through pseudo-concepts that we set up an anti-thesis between the pictorial (or visual) and the musical, and Nemesis will later compel us to speak of pictorial music and musical pictures.

In the present instance the illuminating truth (misrepresented however by infelicitous terminology) lies in what is said about music : limited factiously to music, it really applies to all art. It is warped by the pseudo-concept and confused with a non-æsthetic problem, as may be seen from the following. The only thing which differentiates *all* music *in common* from *all* painting *in common* is the fact that the one is heard and the other is seen. But mere seeing or hearing is not æsthetic, and the merely seen or heard is not beautiful. The problem of the difference or separateness between them (between hearing and seeing and between sound and the seen) is extremely puzzling and interesting, and it is that, I venture to suggest, which really agitates Mr. Thorburn (though, perhaps, he does know it) as, indeed, it agitates me. But its discussion can only pseudo-conceptually be attached to Æsthetic (the enquiry into the nature of beauty), to which it is as irrelevant as, to the enquiry about the nature of truth, would be the consideration of the difference between the hearing and the visual reading of a true judgment. What is very relevant to Æsthetic is the consideration, not of the difference or separateness between hearing the audible and seeing the visible, but of the transcendence in art of this difference or at least separateness. This problem, however, Mr. Thorburn, I think, does not touch.

II.

The second part of his paper he begins with some very queer implications. The Germans, notoriously a people of ideas and theories, stupid and dangerous though these generally are, would be called a "conscious" people, in the ordinary jargon of our day.

Goethe also, especially the Goethe of *Faust*, eminently a thinker, would be called a "conscious" poet. On the other hand, the English, devoid of theories and ideas, and impatient of the intellect, are often enough said to be an "unconscious" people; and Shakespeare, the poet with no philosophy, as Shaw complains, is often cited as the poet of the unconscious *par excellence*, Mr. Thorburn, however, *apparently* at least (I do not quite understand him here) reverses all these relations. (Perhaps, irritated with the Germans, like all of us, he wishes to place them nearer the *Ur-slime*.) However that may be, his chief contention seems to be that music and poetry like Goethe's refer to, are dependent upon, conditioned and explicable by, the more unconscious or archetypal or deeper Unconscious (that which consists of the mnemonic accumulations of the race rather than of the individual, may I say?), while painting, the other visual arts, and poetry like Shakespeare's are similarly related to the shallower, personal, more conscious Unconscious (the mnemonic accumulations of the individual?).

There are at least ten senses of the "Unconscious," all of them different and unrelated, all of them confused by psychological and psycho-analytical æstheticians, including, I fear, the Mr. Thorburn of this paper. Seven of these senses I will spare the audience, three I must give.

I am quite sure that, though they should not, many people by the "Unconscious" denote the inventive, originative, creative, organizing spirit itself, that which is something like Aristotle's νοῦς ποιητικὸς or active intellect. We may think of it as "inconscient" (absurdly, it may be) simply because it is that which "*has*" consciousness and which, in itself as distinguished from what it "*has*," must be contentless; we may also think of it as "formless" because it is that which performs all formation, articulation or organization and which, in itself as distinguished from the "forms" it "*has*" or "provides,"

cannot be of any particular form. The chief thing to remember about it here is that it is *a priori* with all its forms, not only with its *a priori* categories of thought and perception but also with its æsthetic forms or individual organizing principles of beauty : all these organize, but do not derive from, "experience." Speaking more mythopœically of it than we have already done, we may say that this "Unconscious" is the womb of the unborn. It is *invention* in general, which in relation to beauty or art is the æsthetic imagination.

By the "Unconscious" is, however, also denoted something quite different : something like Aristotle's *νοῦς παθητικός* or passive intellect, the *memory* or rather the totality of past experiences or of the mnemonic accumulations of the race and the individual. It is formless ; either, like Plato's *δεξιμένη* or void, because it is the receptacle of all formed experiences, or because it is the congeries of these. "Unconsciousness" here denotes the absence of scrutiny or of a central organizing or controlling activity. The fundamental axiom about this Unconscious is that nothing new can come out of it, nothing that was not experienced by the individual or at least by his ancestors. We may call it the tomb of buried memories, including complexes. It is the "Unconscious" of the psychoanalysts.

Now, psychoanalysts, leaving their legitimate medical sphere, are fond of rushing in and identifying the first with the second "Unconscious." They identify, that is, the womb with the tomb, invention with memory (or the *mneme*) the new with the old. They then proceed to apply to intense activity, to the creation of a beautiful poem, true religion or ethic or philosophy, the explanation which holds of passivity, of phantasy, reverie, dreaming or insanity, of the straying, that is, of faded ghosts of experience through a weary, lazy, sleeping, or cracked brain. Goethe, I venture to think, by the "Unconscious" refers (in

the main at least) to the first kind, that is, to the imagination itself. But in respect of the imagination, we have already said, there can be no antithesis—not even of more and less—between music and painting or the visual arts. Mr. Thorburn, I fear, belongs to the psycho-analysts. They and all reference to their “Unconscious” must be ruled out of court by *Æsthetic* for the reason that the new, the organizing spirit or life, in short, the beauty, of a work of art is *a priori* and can never be explained by the old or the past or the experience or memory whether of the individual or of the race. It is true that the work uses or organizes this experience or these mnemonic accumulations (including complexes) and so may be said to spring from them as the flower from the soil or the dung-heap. But even so, the life of the flower is one thing, the dung-heap another.

It may, however, be said that the study of the soil of art has an independent, though non-*æsthetic*, interest, and is helped by Psycho-analysis. But be it noted that when the artist (especially the writer) organizes some mnemonic residuum he and we become clearly conscious of it. Why then do we need Psycho-analysis? It is conceivable that the latter is needful for getting at the psychic contents of inarticulate and unintrospective persons. But the writer's (especially a Shakespeare's) business and aptitude lie precisely in exploring every nook and corner of his psyche and in dragging out of it, for trade purposes, whatever he can. Is not then this fad of applying Psycho-analysis to writers and literature a preposterous carrying of coals to Newcastle? We may be sure on the one hand that if the psycho-analyst were as conscious of the contents of the psyche as Shakespeare he would be writing poems, plays or novels instead of psycho-analysing, and on the other hand that if Shakespeare had had an incest-complex (to attribute it to his Hamlet is to attribute it to him) we should have known of it long ago and should not have had to wait three hundred years

for the inspired psycho-analyst to come along and break one of the Seven Seals.*

This brings us to the third sense of the "Unconscious." What is often called the "Unconscious" exists in the psyche of a few people only or even only in the theory-ridden imagination of the psycho-analyst. The incest-complex is a case in point. A complex, I take it, is formed only when a strong *inclination* for something is violently *repressed* by a social or religious taboo or some other prohibition. Basing myself on Westermarck, I would urge that the taboo against incest is simply a free *expression* of a general and strong natural *disinclination* for incestuous intercourse. Hence there can be no incest-complex except in a few individuals who abnormally have incestuous inclinations. Shakespeare may very well have been one of these rare ones and have concealed the fact from fear of the public. If he was, we can only say "Poor Devil!" For even the free and merrie England of Elizabeth did not quite smile upon incest. The fact or figment is of no interest to Æsthetic.

I am inclined to say that what lies behind Mr. Thorburn's antithesis in respect of the unconscious is simply this. Under Bergsonian influence, perhaps, he is inclined to identify (arbitrarily) consciousness *par excellence* with awareness by means of classificatory concepts, which presents us with reality cut up into quasi-spatially separate compartments; awareness through the visual arts seems to him largely spatial; hence he places it nearer the "conscious" in contrast with musical awareness which is "unconscious" (non-spatial). But I prefer to say that there is more in the antithesis than I understand.

I promised a brawl and I have brawled. But let me have done so like a banqueter, servitor of the Muses and not like a

* It is relevant here to remark that when, as in *Pericles*, Shakespeare does deal with incest he is quite outspoken and does not exercise himself at arranging a treasure-hunt for the psycho-analyst.

churl. I do really appreciate the merits of Mr. Thorburn's paper, though not from my point of view of the function of *Æsthetic*. Against that view I would, however, urge myself that, dreaming of a perfect beauty and perfect art, it tends to make of *Æsthetic* only the science of a never-satisfied norm. Only such an *Æsthetic* perhaps can completely reject all Mr. Thorburn's antitheses. Actual art and beauty are far from perfect. In reflecting upon these we have to consider wherein lies their imperfection and what obstacles have to be overcome on the way to perfection. To such consideration Mr. Thorburn's contribution is of undisputed value. From this point of view my criticism reduces to a suggestion that the value would be enhanced by the addition of another antithesis, namely, that between sound and music, physical and musical hearing, more imperfect and less imperfect music. It would be interesting to see whether this contrast is not exactly the same as those here given between music (perfect) and painting (imperfect), poetry (perfect) and poetry (imperfect).

COMMUNICATION AND VERIFICATION.

By PROF. L. S. STEBBING, PROF. L. J. RUSSELL *and*
PROF. A. E. HEATH.

I.—By L. S. STEBBING.

THE possibility of both commonsense and scientific knowledge presupposes that different people communicate. Communication is never direct; some means of communication is required. Any means of communication may be called a language. "A language" may be defined as "any set of objects arranged in a determinate way, in accordance with a rule, so that the arrangement of a determinate set of objects in a determinate way represents another set of objects arranged in another determinate way." The arrangement in accordance with a rule requires someone who is obeying the rule. In other words, I have just been stating the important platitude that there is no language apart from a *user*. It is not necessary, for the purpose of this paper to distinguish between spoken and written languages. I shall find it convenient to speak of the user of a language as a *speaker*. Let the arrangement of the first set of objects be called "a sentence," and the arrangement of the second set of objects "a fact." Then the speaker using the sentence representing the fact communicates that the fact is. For brevity, I shall refer to the fact, which the speaker's sentence represents, as F_1 . In a secondary sense he may be said to communicate his awareness of F_1 . But it is important to keep clear the distinction between the communication of F_1 —*i.e.*, the communication intended—and the communication of the speaker's awareness of F_1 . I shall, therefore, arbitrarily confine "communication" to the case of F_1 , and shall use "convey" for communication, in a secondary sense, of the speaker's

awareness of F_1 .* The distinction is important because, unless F_1 is a fact about the speaker (*e.g.*, *I am tired*, *I see a ship*), what the speaker primarily communicates is not a fact about himself, although he always conveys a fact about himself; when he primarily communicates a fact about himself he also conveys still another fact about himself. Communication in a secondary sense may be said to take place if the hearer notices both what is communicated and also what is conveyed. Let what is conveyed be referred to as F_2 . Then F_2 does not contain F_1 as a part, but the elements of F_1 are among the elements of F_2 .

To answer the question how communication is possible is to answer the question how sentences can be used by a speaker A, so as to refer a hearer, B, to that which A intended to refer B. Unless there is such common reference communication has failed. When a successful communication is made by A to B, then B understands what A intended him to understand. Understanding is receiving a communication. Communication requires at least (1) a communicator, (2) something communicated, (3) a language, (4) a recipient of the communication. I do not suggest that the communicator and the recipient must be different persons, but if the same person is both he must be playing different roles. Nor do I suggest that the something communicated must be devoid of complexity. On the contrary, I have guarded against that assumption by speaking of what is communicated as a fact.

How is the common reference required for communication possible? I want to consider answers to this question which have been given by philosophers who accept the principle of

* As used here "convey" is not intended to indicate that the fact conveyed is taken note of by the hearer of the sentence representing F_1 . For this reason, "convey" is probably an unsuitable word, but I cannot think of a better.

verifiability. This principle is usually expressed in the form, "the meaning of a proposition is the method of its verification." This statement is not very clear, but I have no space to discuss its interpretation. I shall assume familiarity with the principle.* The philosophers to whom I shall refer are Prof. Carnap, Prof. Schlick, Mr. Ayer and Prof. Lewis.†

It is usually agreed that if verification is carried far enough, that which verifies is directly experienced, *i.e.*, that with which there is acquaintance. "Directly experience" and "be acquainted with" are here used as synonymous expressions. "There is direct experiencing" can be significantly replaced by "I directly experience" only at a certain level, namely, at the level at which language could be used and communication is possible. At this level we may say that that which is directly experienced is *content*. Content is inexpressible; it is incommunicable. The statement "Content is incommunicable" is either meaningless or true. For the sake of brevity, I shall take it to be true, but since the denial of every significant proposition must itself be significant, it may be granted that the statement requires reformulation if it is to be unobjectionable. I think, however, that we come to see that content cannot be communicated only because we are forced to notice what Prof. Lewis calls "psychological differences,"‡ not because we

* I have discussed the principle of verifiability in *Logical Positivism and Analysis*, p. 18 *et seq.*, and have there given references.

† The first three have, no doubt, been influenced by Dr. Wittgenstein. Prof. Lewis seems to me to show traces of having been influenced by C. S. Peirce, who certainly anticipated the principle of verifiability. Thus Peirce says, "The rational meaning of every proposition lies in the future." (*Monist*, 1905, p. 173.)

‡ See *Mind and the World-Order*, p. 72. He says: "For imagery and feeling, and even to some extent for sensation, idiosyncrasy is the rule. Furthermore . . . there can be no final verification of any community in these respects," (p. 73).

first see that it would be nonsense to say that content is communicable. Since we *do* communicate, the question then arises: *What* is communicated? Profs. Schlick and Carnap reply, "Structure." But what is *structure*? Philosophers in perplexity about this question take refuge in the pronouncements of Bertrand Russell. It is sufficient here to recall that Russell says, "relation-number is the very same thing as is obscurely intended by the word "structure."* Prof. Schlick has also laid stress upon number as a means of communication. He has suggested† that I could communicate with a being who had entirely different senses from mine, provided that I could find some stimulus which was in one-one correlation with his impressions. Prof. Lewis also discusses the possibility of communicating with "creatures on Mars of a high order of mentality" who "might be psychologically rather different from ourselves and have senses and experience largely incomparable with our own." He says, "if we could establish some initial common understanding, . . . then in spite of our differences from them, it would be hard to set a limit beyond which it could be said with certainty that our common understanding could not go."‡ He suggests that such initial common understanding could be established by light-flashes to which the Martians should eventually correspond with light-flashes in one-one correspondence with ours. From this statement it seems clear that that concerning which there is "initial common understanding" is simply structure. But Prof. Lewis also insists that "if language really conveys anything, then there must be something which is identical in your mind and in mine when we

* *Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy*, p. 61.

† I am relying on some lectures which Prof. Schlick gave before the University of London, in November, 1932. These lectures have, unfortunately, not been published.

‡ *Op. cit.*, p. 94.

understand each other.” I find it difficult to determine what Prof. Lewis takes to be *identical in your mind and mine*. He holds that there are two factors in common understanding, viz., common, *i.e.*, shared, definitions and identical application of terms to the same objects, *i.e.*, what I should call common reference. These identical elements cannot be sense-contents, for these are inexpressible and unshareable; they must be pure concepts. But by a “pure concept”* Prof. Lewis means an ideal abstraction *defined* as the meaning common to two minds when they understand each other. This, however, does not give the required denotational identity. It appears that “we exhibit” the denotation of our terms by our behaviour. Prof. Lewis says, “identity of meaning consists practically in implicit modes of behaviour”;† and again, “congruity of behaviour is the ultimate practical test of common understanding.”‡ He sums up a long discussion—to which I have not space to do justice—in the statement: “community of meaning is secured if each discover, within his own experience, that complex of content which this common concept will fit. When the behaviour of each, guided by this common concept, is comparable or congruous, we have, so far, a reality in common.”§

The conclusion of all this seems to be that A successfully communicates something to B (*i.e.*, B understands A) when B’s behaviour is congruent with A’s behaviour under similar circumstances. Mr. Ayer has also stressed this point. He says, “I observe that two people—one of whom may be myself—understand one another, understanding being defined in terms

* See *op. cit.*, p. 70 : “we shall define the pure concept as ‘that meaning which must be common to two minds when they understand each other by the use of a substantive or its equivalent’.”

• † *Op. cit.*, p. 84.

‡ *Op. cit.*, p. 90.

§ *Op. cit.*, p. 116.

of behaviour.”* He adds, “I say this would not be possible unless their worlds had a similar structure. But all this is only significant if it is verifiable in my experience.”* I do not know whether Mr. Ayer would deny that structure is communicable. He certainly asserts that the possibility of understanding other people, and thus the possibility of communication, presupposes similar structure. He also denies that there are any expressions common to “my” language and “your” language which communicate structure, so that on this point he is in disagreement with Schlick and Carnap. Indeed, it is nonsense to talk of expressions being common to many “private” languages. Mr. Ayer asserts that “since I hold that every proposition I can understand must be verifiable in principle in my private experience, it follows that all language is in a sense ‘my’ language.” Thus he maintains that all “expressions ultimately refer to (my) experience.”† If, then, we ask how expressions referring to “(my) experience” are to be communicated, Mr. Ayer seems to reply that they are communicated by being transformed into propositions about bodily circumstances. Such a proposition as “Mr. A is now seeing a chair,” or “Mr. A is angry” could, he says, “be ‘publicized’ by being transformed into propositions of the form “A’s body is chair-seeing, A’s body is angry-behaving,” etc., etc. In a system of public propositions there are no lost propositions. We may consider the truth of “A’s body is angry-behaving” to be established by the assertions of a psychologist who is in attendance on A: or may consider the truth of the psychologist’s assertions to be established in part by propositions describing his own physical state—propositions asserting, for example, that he is not under the influence of drink, and so on *ad infinitum*.”‡

* “On Particulars and Universals,” *Proc. Aris. Soc.*, N.S. XXXIII, p. 62.

† *Op. cit.*, p. 61.

‡ *Analysis*, Vol. I, p. 6.

Prof. Carnap adopts a similar view. He seems to maintain that I could verify "Mr. A is now seeing a red circle" by observing "A red sphere is lying before Mr. A," and "Mr. A has an open eye." But I must admit that the proposition, "Mr. A's body is chair-seeing" does not seem to me to elucidate the proposition "Mr. A is seeing a chair." It is not difficult to see, however, why the former must be substituted for the latter once the principle that the meaning of a proposition is the method of its verification has been accepted. In the case of propositions about A's experiences, B has no means of intuitive certification. Moreover, it would be contended, that if, *per impossible*, B could have a direct experience of A's experience, that direct experience would still be an experiencing of what was happening to B's nervous system. The difference between "I am seeing a chair" and "You are seeing a chair" is that the latter can be known only as the result of apprehending a more or less lengthy causal chain.* Prof. Carnap holds that when in ordinary conversation we do understand one another, we do thus apprehend these causal chains. With this, I suppose, Mr. Ayer would agree.

Concerning the means of communication Mr. Ayer is, I think, in disagreement with Prof. Carnap. Mr. Ayer denies that there are many private languages; Prof. Carnap holds that each of us has a private language which he calls a basic protocol ("ursprüngliche Protokoll"). It is difficult to discover what exactly Prof. Carnap means by "Protokollsätze." He says, "Hierunter sind die Sätze verstanden, die das ursprüngliche Protokoll etwa eines Physikers oder Psychologen enthält."†

* *Erkenntnis* 3, p. 227, "Ueber Protokollsätze."

† *Erkenntnis*, 2, p. 437. "Die physikalische Sprache als Universal-sprache der Wissenschaft." An English Translation of this article, by Mr. Max Black, is shortly to be published under the title "The Unity of Science," by Kegan Paul. (*Psyche Miniatures*.)

A protocol proposition seems then to be a proposition stating certain observations of mine. Prof. Carnap supposes that I could "record" these observations, and that this direct record would be expressed in my protocol language which is private to me. But he appears unable to explain what sort of record this would be. He contents himself with saying: "Ein ursprüngliches Protokoll würde vielleicht so lauten: 'Versuchsanordnung: an den und den Stellen sind Körper von der und der Beschaffenheit (z.b. "Kupferdraht"; vielleicht dürfte statt dessen nur gesagt werden: "ein dünner, langer, brauner Körper," während die Bestimmung "Kupfer" durch Verarbeitung früherer Protokolle, in denen derselbe Körper auftritt gewonnen wird): jetzt hier Zeiger auf 5, zugleich dort Funke und Knall, dann Ozongeruch'."* He admits that it is not at present possible to decide very exactly what are the characteristics of the protocol, or direct record, language. He appears to favour such expressions as "Now joy," "Here-now blue"; "There-now red" and so on. But I do not see how the language appropriate to the sending of telegrams should be regarded as specially adapted to express my direct experience.†

Prof. Carnap recognizes that we do communicate, that science is common knowledge (and this involves *Erkenntnis* as contrasted with *Erlebnis*), and that physics, for instance, is an empirical science. To account for these facts he has to show how an "intersubjective" or common language is to be derived from a set of private protocols. He believes this to be accomplished by interpreting protocol propositions as containing *words*, not as describing states of affairs, or content, and as communicating structure. He, in common with Prof. Lewis, insists that communication does not depend upon having

* *Ibid*, p. 437.

† The point is that a protocol proposition is a direct observation-statement, if this expression may be allowed.

similar experiences, but upon being able to refer to that which takes the same place in the speaker's world as in the hearer's world.* Physics, it is contended, is established by observations which are independent of specific sensory experience; it is inter-sensory and thus inter-subjective. Thus we are able to communicate and build up a system of common knowledge in spite of the fact that we are each confined, so far as the direct record of our observations is concerned, to a private, incommunicable language.

I find these conclusions difficult to accept. It seems to me impossible to get a universal, or intersubjective, language out of a set of private languages. Mr. Ayer seems to agree that such a procedure is absurd. But the alternative he adopts is difficult to understand. I do not properly see the significance of Mr. Ayer's statement that all language is "in a sense" my language. Certainly this statement admits of an interpretation which would make it true. Since there is no language apart from a speaker, it follows that wherever there is language someone is speaking, and in speaking he uses what is *his* means of communication. But to draw from this any conclusion concerning either the form of the language or the nature of what is communicated is to fall into the fallacy of the ego-centric predicament. I have elsewhere pointed out that for the Logical Positivists cases where personal pronouns enter are not fundamentally different from cases where (in our ordinary expressions) no personal pronouns occur.† The Logical Positivists seem to be committed to the view that every significant sentence includes a first person singular pronoun.‡ Thus

* Cf. *Mind and the World-Order*, p. 75.

† See *Logical Positivism and Analysis*, p. 19.

‡ From this view it follows that my knowledge of other minds is construction out of elementary experiences, this construction being such that its significance depends entirely upon the possibility of translation into sentences from which the first person singular *cannot* be eliminated.

they take the ego-centric predicament as a fundamental premiss.

I wish to maintain, on the contrary, that there is a fundamental difference between propositions which would ordinarily be said to be propositions about myself, *e.g.*, "I am tired," "I see a chair," and propositions *made by me*, but not about myself, *e.g.*, "That is a chair." In asserting any proposition I am (as I said at the beginning) *conveying* a proposition about myself, but what is primarily communicated need not, *in any sense*, be a proposition about myself. A distinction may be drawn between the pair of propositions "I have a toothache," "You have a toothache" and the pair "I have a pen," "You have a pen," on the ground that in the case of the first pair, *I* and *You*, could not both be arguments for the same propositional function "*x* has a toothache"; whereas, in the case of the second pair, *I* and *You* could both be arguments for "*x* has a pen." The difference is due to the fact that "I have a toothache" *directly* refers to an actually occurring ache, whereas when *I* say "You have a toothache, I do not *directly* refer to an actually occurring ache; I refer *indirectly*. But the statement nevertheless is significant for me because I could directly refer to an actually occurring ache. Indeed, the difference between the two statements is comparable to the difference between "I have a toothache *now*" and "I fear I shall have a toothache *to-morrow*." This latter statement is significant, but it does not directly refer to an *actually occurring ache*; it would be non-significant if I had never had toothache, but its significance does not depend upon its being *verified*, *i.e.*, found true, but only upon its being *verifiable*, *i.e.*, capable of being recognized should it happen to occur. In the same way, it seems to me that I can understand "You have a toothache" because I know how an ache is verifiable, although I cannot, in the case of your toothache, directly verify by reference to what is actually

occurring. It follows that I cannot *know* that you have toothache, *but* it is equally the case that I cannot *know* that I shall have toothache to-morrow. But in both cases alike I can *understand*, and could communicate, what I cannot know. To deny that I can understand "I fear I shall have toothache to-morrow" is to limit what can be understood to what is actually occurring now.

It seems to me that if what I have just been contending be admitted, then we can see that it is possible to have a common language, *i.e.*, a language capable of being used by me and by you with *the same reference*. I admit that I have difficulty in saying what exactly is meant by "the same reference." But I hope I may be able to indicate what I mean by using the example I have given. In saying "*I have toothache now*" and "*I fear I may have toothache to-morrow*," the italicized words have the same reference in the sense that their significance depends upon my ability to recognize an actually occurring ache *when it occurs*, not upon their directly referring to an actually occurring ache. In the same way *I understand* "You have toothache," and my ability to understand this sentence does not in the least depend upon my ever having the experience of that actually occurring ache which would be the experience verifying that you have toothache. *This* experience you alone can have ; hence, you alone can verify the statement. But I can understand it as referring to an experience *which I do not have*.

The truth in the principle of verifiability (which principle lies at the basis of the views I have been discussing) seems to me to have been pointed out by Prof. Moore some years ago. He suggested that empiricism might be taken to be defined by the statement : "That we can know nothing but what could be experienced, *i.e.*, what is the same kind as what we experience."* It is consistent with this view, as Prof. Moore pointed

* *Proc. Arist. Soc.*, N.S. III, 1903, p. 93.

out, to admit that "we do know more than we actually experience" for "what is of the same kind as an object of experience is just what *can* (in one sense) be experienced, although, as a matter of fact, it never can (in another sense) be experienced." In like manner, I think, communication is possible because I *can* refer to what is not actually being experienced by me, but which is of the *same sort* as what is actually being experienced by me. Thus I see no good reason for saying that all language is *my* language, except in the sense that whenever language is being used *someone*, *i.e.*, an I, is using it.

It may be true, as Bertrand Russell has maintained, that "empirical *knowledge* is confined to what we actually observe,"* although I do not think so. But it is not true that a proposition is *meaningless* unless it directly refers to what we are actually observing.† Indeed, some of the consequences drawn from the principle of verifiability seem to me (as I have pointed out elsewhere),‡ to result from a confusion between (1) establishing a certain proposition as true, (2) understanding what difference its truth or falsity would make, (3) knowing the evidence upon which my belief in its truth or falsity is based. But (1) and (3) seem to me to have nothing to do with the possibility of communication, and thus of understanding. The question how communication is possible involves the two problems: (i) How can we understand propositions about other minds? (ii) How can we understand propositions about the past? These problems are frequently confused with the problem how we can have *knowledge* of other minds and of the past. In my opinion they

* *Our Knowledge of the External World*, p. 112. Italics mine.

† I do not say that Russell would disagree with this statement, but, I think that the origin of the principle of verifiability may be traced to a mistaken interpretation of the earlier work of Russell, Moore, and Whitehead.

‡ *Analysis*, No. 2, p. 27.

must be sharply distinguished. We certainly cannot have knowledge of that which we do not understand; but we can understand that which we neither know nor believe.

I am not, then, concerned here to inquire how we can have *knowledge* of the past, *i.e.*, how we can establish that in judging about the past we sometimes judge truly. I do not even suppose that this could be established with certainty. My point—to repeat—is that we can *understand* a judgment about the past. I believe I can understand such a judgment because the judgment is about the *sort* of thing which I *could* experience now, although, as a matter of fact, I am *not* experiencing it now. In the same way, I think that I can understand a judgment which is not about my experience because, and only so far as, it is a judgment about the *sort* of thing I *could* experience, even though it should be the case that I never *can* actually be having the experience itself. It is in this sense only, I think, that all expressions which I can understand must “ultimately refer to my experience.”

Prof. Lewis—whose differences from the Logical Positivists are quite fundamental—attempts to secure what I have called “the same reference” by means of shared definitions, on the one hand, and, on the other, by the exhibition of denotation by behaviour.* He admits that “the exhibition of meaning” by behaviour “depends for its success upon the ability of the person . . . to make the analysis which will isolate correctly just that totality of properties which is common to the things isolated.” Thus he assumes the possibility of isolating properties common to the things indicated. If this is possible, I do not see why the properties thus isolated should not yield *the same reference* of which we are in search. I hope that possibly Prof. Lewis would agree with me here. I think his main difference from the Logical Positivists lies in his insistence that we do

* *Mind and the World-Order*, p. 78.

“transcend” the given. But in his treatment of knowledge of the past he seems to me to take a view which contradicts this position, and which is manifestly untenable. He attempts to account for such knowledge by saying that “the event is spread throughout all after time, much as modern physics may say that the field of an electronic charge is spread through all space and that this field *is* the electron.”* I believe that this account of our knowledge of the past must lead to the acceptance of a view very like Whitehead’s untenable doctrine of prehension. But the criticism I want to urge now is that this view of our knowledge of the past resolves it into knowledge of the present. I believe that this consequence would be unacceptable to Prof. Lewis; it would, further, involve the denial of any possibility of my referring to what is happening to you. Yet I think that Prof. Lewis would be strongly opposed to the main tenet of Logical Positivism, namely, that every sentence I can understand must be translatable into a sentence containing a first person singular pronoun.

To sum up the main points put forward for discussion in this symposium. (1) I maintain that we must start from the fact that we do communicate, and then see what follows from this fact. We must not start from the standpoint of private languages. (2) Although it is nonsense to say that my direct experiencing is identical with your direct experiencing, there must be elements directly experienced by me which are the same as some elements directly experienced by you. (3) This, *sameness* is secured when what I directly experience is *of the same sort* as what you directly experience. (4) There are words which are used by you and by me in the same sense; moreover,

* *Op. cit.*, p. 151. I have no space to deal properly with Prof. Lewis’s treatment of this problem. Fortunately, since the above was written, the problem has been admirably discussed by Miss MacDonald in a paper on “Verification and Understanding.” (See *Proc. Arist. Soc.*, 1934.)

in principle, every word could be so used. (5) The ultimate verification of every proposition must be such that it *could* be expressed in a proposition about my experience. But it does not follow from this that every proposition is in fact about my experience. (6) Thus the ultimate reference to my experience does not entail either that each of us has a private language, or that all language is my language in any important sense. (7) To accept the first of these alternatives leads to the unsatisfactory attempt, made by Prof. Carnap, to get a public language out of a set of non-overlapping private languages. To accept the second alternative is to leave completely mysterious in *what* sense all language is also public. (8) I thus reject Mr. Ayer's view that a universal is a class of sense-contents (Erlebnisinhalten).

The outcome of this paper is mainly negative. Its main purpose is to point out that acceptance of the principle of verifiability renders impossible any satisfactory account of communication and of our understanding a judgment about the past.

II.—By L. J. RUSSELL.

1. I SHALL deal with part of Miss Stebbing's negative conclusion, viz., that the principle of verifiability makes it impossible to give a satisfactory account of communication.

Miss Stebbing has reached this conclusion by a discussion of a particular form of physicalist doctrine. I shall argue that the particular form of physicalism she attacks is only a half-way house to a more logically consistent form, which is not open to her attacks, though it does seem to me to be open to difficulties of a different sort. And as Carnap seems to me to have moved towards the logically consistent form under the impulses given by Neurath,* and as the half-way form of physicalism seems to me to be untenable, it seems worth while to try to state physicalism in its consistent form, and to see what happens to Miss Stebbing's problem when this is done.

2. Certain principles appear to have been instrumental in leading to the intermediate form of physicalism dealt with by Miss Stebbing. The starting point was in positivism, with its anti-metaphysical tendency. The principles guiding the development of physicalism appear to have been :—

- (i) The distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description, and the assertion that the former is basic and the latter derived.
- (ii) The assertion that my knowledge by acquaintance is my direct experience, and that my direct experience is mine and is incommunicable to anyone else.

* See Carnap, *Erkenntnis*, Vol. II, p. 452, n. 1, and Neurath's articles, "Soziologie im Physikalismus" in *Erkenntnis*, Vol. II, p. 393 ff., and "Protokollsätze," *Erkenntnis*, Vol. III, p. 204 ff. All later references are to Vols. II and III of *Erkenntnis*.

- (iii) The principle is that wherever possible, inferred entities are to be replaced by logical constructions ; which itself is less rigid than
- (iv) The principle of verifiability, to the effect that no proposition has meaning which cannot be translated (by means of tautologies) into a set of propositions asserting that so and so under such and such conditions will experience such and such.

These principles are capable of being interpreted in such a way as to lead to a complete solipsism ; for if (ii) is taken as the fundamental principle, and if the qualification "wherever possible" in (iii) is rejected as not conforming to the strict requirements of (iv), and if (iv) is interpreted as conditioned by (ii), then the conclusion follows that the facts verifying a proposition p for S_1 cannot be communicated to S_2 ; *i.e.*, that nothing communicated can be communicated as verifiable. It is no use to try to get out of this by talking about "structure."

This result is due to stress on "direct experience" as something private and incommunicable, and to the interpretation of the principle of verifiability in terms of direct experience.

The possibility of avoiding solipsism turns on giving a different interpretation to the principle of verifiability, and on leaving the meaning of (i) (ii) and (iii) to be determined in the light of the principle of verifiability. It involves a development which throws less and less stress on "direct experience," and which ends in rejecting direct experience altogether. In what follows, §§ 3-6 deal with the first stages of this development, §§ 7-10 with its final stages. The remaining sections are critical.

3. If you start, not with a single individual, but with a group of individuals (S_1, S_2, S_3 , &c.) supposed to be co-operating in the assertion of a body of common propositions (science),

and interpret the principle of verifiability as saying that no proposition has meaning *for science* that could not be 'verified *in some way* by *every* member of the group, then certain conclusions follow at once:—

- (a) The proposition " S_1 directly experiences m_1 " is a proposition that could not be verified by S_2, S_3, S_4 , &c. ; it could be verified only by S_1 . It then has no meaning for science.
- (b) The proposition that " S_1 directly experiences that m_2 is intermediate in character c between m_1 and m_3 " is a proposition that could not be verified by S_2 or S_3 or S_4 , &c. ; it is, therefore, meaningless for science. Thus all propositions about the "structure" of direct experience are meaningless for science.
- (c) The proposition "The proposition p is verified by S_1 " must be capable of being verified by S_2, S_3 , &c., if science is to consist of a body of propositions verifiable by every member of the group as verifiable by every member of the group.

(a) (b) and (c) taken together involve that verification (for the purposes of science) cannot be interpreted in terms of direct experience ; verification must itself be a public process.

It is at this point that the thesis of behaviourist psychology becomes of value, that only what can be published can be taken into account of by science.

To illustrate. The oculist testing the eyes of a patient sets the patient at a distance from an illuminated card on which certain letters are printed. He says to the patient not, "Can you see the letters on the bottom line?" but "Read (*i.e.*, say aloud) the letters on the bottom line." For the oculist himself has no means of verifying the patient's answer to the first question. The command to read, results in the oculist being

able to verify the proposition " S_1 has read such and such letters correctly, such and such letters incorrectly," and this is a proposition that S_1 can also verify by walking across the room and reading the letters near at hand.

The oculist has other ways of verifying the proposition that S_1 can read the letters correctly without actually getting the patient to read, *e.g.*, he might light up the letters one by one, and say to the patient, "Press this button when Z appears," and so on.

Verification then must be interpreted as some kind of public performance.

4. Any public performance which serves as a verification, or as part of a verification, can be called a "report." A "report" is relative to a "reporter," which may be a machine, or a plant, or an animal, or a person, &c. An acid turns blue litmus paper red. "Turning red" is the report made by litmus paper in the presence of an acid. A weight of 1 lb. put on the scale of a good balance makes the finger of the balance turn to the mark "1 lb." The taking up of this position by the finger is the "report" of the balance when 1 lb. is on its scale. A person says "red" if he is in certain circumstances in the presence of a patch of colour and stimulated by the words, "say what colour is just now in front of you." The uttered word "red," and various changes in his eyes, nerves and body, form parts of his "report" in these circumstances.

In none of these cases is it necessary to suppose any "direct experience" of any quality. The litmus paper does not "express its direct experience of acidity" by turning blue. The balance does not "express its direct experience of 1 lb." by pointing to 1 lb. There is no need to assume that the person "expresses his direct experience of red" by saying red. All that science needs in any of the cases is the capacity for "reporting."

"Verification" then, for scientific purposes, must be interpreted in terms of such "reports" and not in terms of any "direct experience."

5. Suppose you allow yourself to be partially influenced by the concept of direct experience in the formulation of the concept of "basic reports" (protokollsätze). The concept of direct experience leads to the conclusion that a proposition is unassailable so long as it consists merely of the assertion by a subject S_k "I (S_k) directly experience m_k ." S_k may be mistaken if he says " m_k is occurring there now." Then when you formulate your principle of verifiability in a behaviouristic manner, concentrating on public reports, you may distinguish between basic reports and non-basic reports as follows:—

A report that " m is the case" may be wrong. But " S_1 reports m_1 " cannot be questioned by S_1 (for brevity I omit separate symbolisation of the conditions under which the report is made). And if S_2 reports " S_2 reports that S_1 reports m_1 ", *this* cannot be questioned by S_2^* . Again S_2 may report that S_2 generally reports m_2 on occasions when S_1 reports m_1 , and S_1 may report that S_2 generally reports m_2 when S_1 reports m_1 ; and similar reports may be made by and about S_3 , S_4 , &c. This being so, it follows that while a report, to be unquestionable, must be expressed in the form " S_k reports m_k ", all such reports can, if they satisfy certain conditions, be put side by side into one comprehensive report belonging to the group (which I shall call a group report): "The group reports S_1, m_1 ; S_2, m_2 ; S_3, m_3 ; &c." And it is possible under these conditions to abbreviate the report in the form, "The group reports m ", a dictionary being attached explaining that $m = m_1$ in an S_1 report, $= m_2$ in an S_2 report, $= m_3$ in an S_3 report, and so on. If further, all the reporters can be so adjusted as to report m under these

* Cf. Carnap *Erkenntnis*, Vol. II, p. 461, § 7, second sentence.

conditions (persons being taught the scientific terms, instruments being marked with the suitable terms), then the dictionary can be done away with.*

Then comes the work of elaborating this group report into "science," through the use of hypothesis and formal logic resulting in a set of propositions which state not merely what has actually been reported, but make reference to what would be reported under various circumstances in which no reporter actually reported.

6. A rough account of the kind of conditions reports must satisfy if this is to be possible may help to make the situation clearer. It is not sufficient that S_1 , S_2 , &c., should make corresponding reports in similar circumstances on a number of isolated occasions. Suppose S_1 reports "red there now," on an occasion on which S_2 , S_3 , . . . all make the same report, and reports "green there now" when S_2 , S_3 , . . . make this report. It cannot be taken for granted that whenever S_1 reports red (or green), S_2 , S_3 , &c., would report red (or green), and still less that when S_1 reports blue, the rest would report blue. For experience shows that this is not always the case. But experience shows also that there is a way of testing a reporter from this point of view. If a set of situations is of such a sort that S_1 's reports, taken together, show a certain structure (as a set of weights, about which S_1 reports w_1 heavier than w_2 , heavier than w_3 , &c.), and S_2 's reports (whether couched in the same language or not) show $w_1 R w_2 R w_3$, &c., and so on for S_3 , S_4 , &c., then S_1 , S_2 , &c., can all be taken to be trustworthy reporters in this field and within this range, in the sense that any report made by any member of the group can be translated into the public language and incorporated into the group report, "The group reports m ," even though the other members of the

Cf. Carnap's paper "Über Protokollsätze," *Erkenntnis*, Vol. III, p. 215, ff., for a similar point.

group have not been present. When Rutherford weighs a weight and reports $w_1 = 1$ gm., and Einstein weighs another weight and reports $w_2 = 2$ gm., there is no need to suppose that Rutherford uses similar words to Einstein or has similar direct experience; the reports of both can be expressed in the same symbols, and put together (assuming that each credits the reports of the other) in the group report, "Rutherford and Einstein report that $w_1 = 1$ gm., $w_2 = 2$ gm."

The illustration shows the way in which "structure" enters into the process of "accrediting" a reporter. There is no meaning for science in supposing that though an experience cannot be communicated, yet the "structure" of an experience can. "Structure" is something public that can be reported on, and has nothing whatever to do with experiences. It has to do only with reports.

The reports which are in the first instance elaborated into "science" are accredited reports of accredited reporters; the group report runs: "The group of reporters making up the body of accredited scientists reports m and n and p , &c."

There is thus a difference between an "accredited report" and a "protokollsatz" (a basic report) in the sense of § 5. In the sense there mentioned, a report is unquestionable so long as it is in the form " S_k reports m_k ," and science is ultimately based on reports of this kind. We cannot pass from " S_k reports m_k " to " m_k is the case." But it may be the case that S_2 can note that when S_1 reports m_1 , S_2 reports m_2 , and so on; in such a case we can get a common report expressed in common language to the effect that $S_1, S_2, S_3, \dots$ report m .

7. Miss Stebbing has questioned this whole procedure. So has Neurath.* And as the matter is fundamental I want to criticise it from my own point of view.

* *Erkenntnis*, Vol. III, p. 211, ff. See also Carnap, *Erkenntnis*, Vol. III, p. 227, which seems to me to accept the same point.

On this view you cannot begin with reports of the form "m is the case." The only unquestionable reports are reports like " S_1 reports m_1 ," and the reference to S_1 cannot be dropped. S_2 can report " S_2 reports that S_1 reports m_1 ," but not " S_1 reports m_1 ,"

Now if this is the case we shall under the conditions already mentioned be able to have such reports as:—

(a) S_1 reports that S_1 reports m_1 , that S_2 reports m_2 , that S_3 reports m_3 , &c.

S_2 reports that S_1 reports m_1 , that S_2 reports m_2 , &c.

And so on for S_3 , S_4 , &c.

(b) S_1 reports that S_1 , S_2 , S_3 , &c., report m.

S_2 reports that S_1 , S_2 , S_3 , &c. report m.

And so on for S_3 , S_4 , &c.

(c) S_1 reports that S_1 reports that S_1 , S_2 , S_3 , &c. report m, that S_2 reports that S_1 , S_2 , S_3 , . . . report m, &c.

S_2 reports that S_1 reports that S_1 , S_2 , S_3 , &c., report m, that S_2 reports that S_1 , S_2 , &c., report m.

And so on for S_3 , S_4 , &c.

(d) S_1 reports that S_1 , S_2 , S_3 , . . . report that S_1 , S_2 , S_3 . . . report m.

S_2 reports that S_1 , S_2 , S_3 , . . . report that S_1 , S_2 , S_3 . . . report m.

And so on for S_3 , S_4 , &c.

But we shall never in this way get such a proposition as :

The group consisting of S_1 , S_2 , S_3 , . . . reports m, since this would be a proposition of the form "Such and such is the case," and not a proposition of the form " S_k reports such and such."

In short we cannot derive a group report from private reports.

In fact, the whole notion of a "private report" must be questioned. It is still tarred with the brush of "direct experience." We must ask if a report of the form " S_k reports

' m_k ,' is really a report that expresses anything private to S_k . And we see that it is not. It could be put in the form 'It is the case that S_k reports m_k ,' and reported by anyone without restriction to the particular reporter; if we want to express it as genuinely restricted to S_k , we cannot even do it by saying, " S_k reports that S_k reports m_k ." For that is in the form, "It is the case that S_k reports that S_k reports m_k ." We shall need to say, " S_k reports that S_k reports that S_k reports . . . ad inf. that S_k reports m_k ," which is not a genuine report at all.

In short, there are no private reports. All reports are public. If " S_k reports m_k ," then "It is the case that S_k reports m_k ." It ought to be put, not in the form of something belonging to S_k , but in the form " m_k is reported under certain complex circumstances." If S_1 says "red" in the presence of a particular patch, then the word "red" is no more private to S_1 than to the particular patch. The presence of S_1 is just one of the complex conditions in which red is reported. And the problem of "group reports" is not the problem of getting from private reports to public reports. It is simply the problem of discovering propositions which will render it possible to make statements about what reports will be made under conditions C_k on the basis of reports made under conditions C_1, C_2, C_3 , &c.

From that point of view the problem: If S_1 reports m'_1 when S_2 reports m'_2 , and S_1 reports m'''_1 , when S_2 reports m'''_2 , and so on, what will S_1 report when S_2 reports m''_2 ? is strictly similar to the problem: If balance No. 1 says 1 lb. when balance No. 2 says 5 units, and No. 1 says 3 lbs. when No. 2 says 10 units, what will No. 1 say when No. 2 says 10 units?

In short, we have to get rid of the conception of a report as being S_k 's report in any other than a physical sense; we must think of the presence of S_k as one part of the conditions under which the report is made. If S_1 says "red" in the presence of the patch, the report is just as much the patch's report as

S_1 's, and for scientific purposes could equally well be treated as such.

For to say " S_1 reports m_1 is unquestionable so long as we keep the reference to S_1 ," is to say nothing more than " m_1 is unquestionable so long as we merely mean ' m_1 occurred under conditions not as yet defined.'"

8. Neurath has seen perfectly clearly, and has insisted on it, that no reporter reports in anything but a public manner. We can say that to speak of a report as "so and so's report" is merely a convenient abbreviation. "So and so" is merely a part of the conditions under which the report occurred.

If, *e.g.*, we note that S_1 makes the same report as S_2 under similar conditions, we are noting something exactly analogous to what we note if we note that thermometer No. 1 makes the same report as thermometer No. 2 under similar conditions. Now if we have a group of tested thermometers, any one of which can be substituted for any other without making a difference to any report, then we can use this group to register the variations of thermometer reading over a complex field, by putting No. 1 at s_1 , No. 2 at s_2 , and so on, and having observed "No. 1 reports n_1 at s_1 ," "No. 2 reports n_2 at s_2 ," "No. 3 reports n_3 at s_3 ," &c., we can say, "The group of thermometers reports n_1 at s_1 , n_2 at s_2 , n_3 at s_3 , &c." In a precisely analogous way what is required is that the reports of various personal reporters should be able to be taken as if they were reports that any reporter would make, so that a complex report can be made over a complex situation. And just as we might note that a particular thermometer had become damaged, and that its report was thus conditioned by the damage in a way which prevented it from being linked up without qualification with the reports of other thermometers, so we might note in a parallel way about a personal reporter.

9. Neurath goes a step further than even all this involves. I suggested that physicalism interprets the principle of verifiability in such a way as to assert that no proposition has meaning *for science* that could not be verified in some way by every member of the group. This does not go so far as to say that no proposition has meaning *for any reporter* that could not be verified by every member of the group of reporters. Neurath does say this - justifiably, I think. So that any proposition about "direct experience" is for him meaningless. The whole notion of "something incommunicable" is for him meaningless. When Wittgenstein says that one must remain silent about that of which one cannot speak, Neurath replies, one must certainly remain silent if one cannot speak, but not "about anything." If there is anything to be silent "about", it can be spoken about. And if it can be reported in certain circumstances, then the report can be incorporated into science.*

10. Let us see what follows from what we have arrived at so far:—

(i) Sentences alleged to report "direct experiences" are meaningless.

(ii) "Private reports" are meaningless. Every report is a public report. It is of the general form "m is reported in circumstances c" (c including reference to the physical make-up of a particular reporter and to the conditions in which the report is made). It means nothing to its reporter that it cannot mean to any reporter of the group.

(iii) Science is based on reports, and is relative to a group of reporters, and is the result of an attempt to correlate all the reports of the group in a system of propositions free from contradiction, and having various other characteristics (into which I cannot go here).

* *Erkenntnis*, Vol. II, p. 396. Cf. Carnap, *Erkenntnis*, Vol. III, p. 181.

(iv) If there are two different groups of personal reporters, of such a sort that no report of the one group can be fitted in with the reports of the other group, while all the reports within each group fit in comfortably with each other, then each group will find itself compelled to complete its own science by reports about the individuals of the other group. Each group, in fact, is likely to accuse the members of the other group of making pseudo-reports (pretty much as the various "schools" of philosophy often do nowadays). And if each group manages to carry on its activities in life and to go on consistently making reports which fit in with the reports of its group, but not with those of the other, there will be no way of getting a science which includes the reports of both groups.

(v) There are no such problems as "the problem of knowledge" or "the problem of the nature of existence," or of "the nature of facts," &c. We have simply the fact of reports; science being a complex set of propositions, based on reports, and elaborated into propositions stating what reports would be made in certain circumstances which included the presence of any member of the group. A proposition is a complex stimulus to behaviour. A report made by a person is a complex occurrence which may be, and often is, the utterance of a proposition, though it may be behaviour of some other kind, like pressing a button.

(vi) There is no "problem of communication." To say that S_1 communicates with S_2 when S_2 understands what S_1 intends to refer to, is to use language which has no meaning. What S_1 *intends* to refer to, cannot be reported. The situation ordinarily described as a situation in which S_1 is endeavouring to communicate with S_2 is really a situation in which S_1 is behaving in a way reportable by any S , which includes a report (which may not be overt) made by S_1 to the effect that if S_1 does so and so S_2 will do so and so, and that S_2 's behaviour will include

behaviour of a particular kind relative to S_1 ; *e.g.*, a boy comes up to a man saying, "You are wanted on the 'phone, sir," and the man says "thank you," and goes to the telephone. Here we have a simple case of the only kind of communication that is possible. The boy's "intention" and the man's "understanding what the boy intended," if alleged to mean anything other than physical behaviour, are pseudo-concepts.

(vii) Thus, further, to say that "only structure can be communicated," is to speak without meaning. All we can say is that reports concerning structure are needed in order to distinguish between the characteristics of one reporter and those of other reporters (*i.e.*, are needed for the calibration of a personal reporter, just as they are needed for the calibration of a thermometer, or of a balance. Cf. § 6).

11. So far Neurath. I proceed to development and criticism of this view.

The elaboration of reports into "science" requires generalisation, hypothesis and transformation by means of logical language consisting of rules for translating sentences into other sentences.

For it is the business of science, not merely to accumulate reports, but to state what would be reported under circumstances in which nothing is actually being reported.

The entire reference is in the end to reports. And the old rule that "inferred entities are to be replaced so far as possible by logical constructions," has to be reworded in accordance. For the language of this rule is too close to the old talk about the mind to be safe. We shall have to begin by distinguishing between "basic" reports and reports that are not basic in a more fundamental way than the way already spoken of. A "basic" report will not mean an "unquestionable" report in the sense of one which has to be included in the group report without restriction to the individual reporter. The distinction

will depend on experience. There will be no way of distinguishing between "inferred entities" and "experienced entities," or between "knowledge by description" and "knowledge by acquaintance." All these concepts are (on a strict physicalist view) pseudo-concepts.* We shall have to replace them by something more strictly physical.

Consider, *e.g.*, the distinction between "match box" and "hard, yellow, smooth, oblong, &c." These are all words which occur in actual reports. The only way of distinguishing between a non-basic and a basic word would be somewhat as follows:—

There have been occasions when S_1 reported "match box there," when S_2 —or S_1 under slightly different conditions—reported "yellow oblong but no match box," or something of that kind. As an empirical generalisation from many reports of this kind containing various kinds of word, the statement is made as a "group statement," that reports made by any observer S_k , if restricted to certain kinds of word, are more likely to be confirmed by the rest of the observers in the group than reports which contain other kinds of word. "More likely" only. For it cannot be asserted that all reports made by any observer S_k , if restricted to certain kinds of word, are certain to be confirmed by other observers. S_1 may report "yellow patch there," when S_2 , &c., reported "no yellow patch there." But if it found that words like "match box," "ball," "coat," &c., occur more frequently in unconfirmed reports than words like yellow, hard, oblong, &c., this will justify the distinction between the latter as basic and the former as non-basic, and

* Carnap's view of protokollsätze seems to me to be much more closely connected with the point under discussion here than with the view Miss Stebbing appears to attribute to him about "private languages." See his examples, *Erkenntnis*, Vol. II, p. 437–8. But as I am not quite clear as to how far Carnap has gone in the direction of Neurath I have tried to discuss the position generally without restriction to Carnap.

justify the rule that "wherever possible, in reports, non-basic words are to be replaced by basic," and the instruction that the meaning of any proposition containing a non-basic word is to be derived by translating it into propositions containing only basic words.

The rules for making such translations will be tautologies based on empirical generalisations. And as generalisations are always liable to be overturned by further and more precise reports, such tautologies will always be liable to be rewritten.

Note that the distinction between basic and non-basic words is a distinction relative to the group of accredited reporters. As before, there might be two groups of reporters, whose group reports were mutually unacceptable. In such a case the words basic for one group would not be basic for the other.

12. There is a further point necessary for the formulation of physicalism, which it seems to me lays the whole doctrine open to serious criticism. Science is not a mere body of actual reports. The main propositions of science are not statements like statements to the effect that " S_1 at point s_1 and time t_1 under conditions c_1 reported m_1 ." They are statements (when expressed in verifiable form) to the effect that under conditions c anywhere and at any time any reporter would report m . They are verified on a set of occasions if a set of observers under the prescribed conditions does make the prescribed reports.

Look at this more closely. What is the meaning of hypothetical propositions, *e.g.*, that under certain circumstances a reporter would report m ? Take a simple historical statement such as, *e.g.*, that S_1 is asleep in the next room during the stretch of time t_1 — t_2 , and that no one else is in the room. According to the principle of verifiability this "means" that if a reporter were to behave in certain ways he would report such and such. (The reporter here might be a person, but it might be a camera

or a dictaphone, &c.). But the form "If . . . then" is not itself basic. It needs to be translated. It is really a generalisation to the effect that "It is not the case that any reporter behaves in certain ways during t_1 — t_2 , and does not report such and such."

But suppose no one behaves during this stretch of time in the prescribed manner. Then the generalisation "It is not the case that any reporter behaves in certain ways during t_1 · t_2 " is accredited. But that being so, what *can* be meant by saying that "if any reporter does behave in these ways he will report so and so"? Formally I can only see this: " p_1 is not the case" implies "It is not the case that p_1 and not p_2 ," and this is by definition equivalent to "If p_1 , then p_2 ."

So that given " p_1 is not the case" *any* hypothetical proposition with p_1 as antecedent can be asserted.

But this means that *any* hypothetical proposition can be asserted—i.e., is verified—so long as the instructions contained in its antecedent are not actually carried out.

In other words, *one* mode of verifying a hypothetical proposition is *not* to carry out the instructions contained in its antecedent.

There is nothing new in all this. But what was a mild paradox in purely symbolic logic becomes much more serious when it is found at the heart of all verification.

" S_1 is sleeping next door" *means* on this view "It is not the case that a reporter is in the room and does not (under certain circumstances) report such and such." But suppose no reporter is in the room. Then it *is* verified, on this view, that S_1 is sleeping in the room.

We *need* some meaning for a proposition even when it is *not* verified (cf. Miss Stebbing). And physicalism can it seems to me give *no* meaning to a *hypothetical* proposition *except* in terms of actual occasions of behaviour. For physicalism allows

of no such concepts as insight or consideration of alternatives, &c. ; it restricts itself to reports of reporters under determinate circumstances. If S_1 says "If S_2 does not jump out of the way he will be run over," that report cannot possibly be "verified" in the strict physicalist sense unless S_2 does not jump out of the way.

For the strict physicalist there are no "facts" other than those contained in reports. And if it cannot be reported that " S_2 does not jump out of the way" (because S_2 does jump) then I cannot see any possible verification for "If S_2 does not jump then he will be run over," which would not be a verification for any statement with the same antecedent, whatever you put as consequent (*e.g.*, then he will become a pillar of salt : or, then it will rain).

13. The result of our general discussion can be summed up briefly. Suppose you want to avoid all metaphysics and be strictly scientific by refusing to accept any proposition, or to consider any word which is not capable of being publicly verified, and suppose you insist that nothing can be publicly verified which cannot ultimately be reported by some reporter in conditions in which *any* reporter could either directly or indirectly make the same report, then in strictness I think you have to cut out everything which a strict behaviourism would cut out : all "direct experience," all "private intentions, observings, conjecturings, inferrings," all distinction between "my experience" and "your experience." There remain nothing but reports made by various reporters in various circumstances. These reports are not to be taken as meaning that "observers" "perceive" or "observe" that such and such is the case. They are simply to be taken as "reports," and by the manipulation of words it is possible for a group of reporters to make a complex set of group statements, which serves as a complex stimulus to further action for all the reporters of the

group. "Science" is such a complex set of group statements, being relative to a particular group of members of the zoological species *homo sapiens*; and it is a zoological fact about the group serving the group as an aid for getting out of its mazes.*

But if a second group uses a different set of group statements unverifiable by the members of the first group, which serves it for getting out of *its* mazes, then that, too, is a zoological fact, and there is no occasion for either group to report contemptuously on the members of the other group. At the same time it is likely that each group will be reported by the other group as being "sunk in metaphysics."

I want to stress this point. Suppose one group is purely physicalist, another group theological. The second group will make certain reports containing words like God, grace, sin, salvation, &c., under certain conditions, and will form these reports into a systematic group statement, the first group will report differently under these circumstances. But neither group, on the physicalist principles, would have any justification for claiming superiority over the other group.

Thus the notion of "pseudo-problems" (*schein-fragen*) has no relevance except *within* one of the groups. It has no relevance whatever as used by members of one group to criticise members of another group.

If this is the case of physicalist doctrine proper it is even more clearly the case of those incomplete physicalists who still use the notions of private experience, solipsistic language, direct experience, &c. For they are still (from the point of view of strict physicalism) sunk in the gross superstition of accepting *as their very own*, something which none but themselves could verify, and which they are unable to communicate to anyone else.

* Cf. Carnap, *Erkenntnis*, Vol. III, p. 178-9.

14. I have tried to show that the account¹ of physicalism which Miss Stebbing attacks is only a half-hearted physicalism which is unstable and untenable and that the doctrine itself has to be stated in a much more radical way. For the radical physicalist there is no problem of "communication"; it is a pseudo-problem. Thus the radical physicalist avoids Miss Stebbing's attacks. But in doing so he lands himself in a position in which it is impossible for him to attack Miss Stebbing, *so long as she is unwilling to attach herself to the physicalist group*.*

This, however, is not a method of settling controversies.

I conclude then: (a) That the principle of verifiability as used by the physicalists is incompatible with any kind of concept of "private experience" or of "direct experience," &c.; (b) that a strict physicalism can give no satisfactory account of the hypothetical propositions of science and that consequently the "meaning" of a proposition must be different from that given to it by physicalism; (c) that the promise held out by physicalism of settling controversies and of avoiding pseudo-problems by a new kind of method is not borne out, except for such members of its group as have no controversies with one another.

(a) and (b) are in agreement with Miss Stebbing's contentions. I have left myself no space to discuss her positive views or to give my own; but I should regard my discussion of physicalism as reinforcing her contentions.

While I do not regard physicalism in its logically consistent form as a satisfactory view I think it has very great value for philosophical analysis, especially in its destructive aspect as applied to the principles (i) to (iv) in § 2. My own view of these principles is that they are not simple, and are capable of various

* For this kind of situation see Carnap's reply to Duncker, *Erkenntnis*, Vol. III, p. 186-7.

interpretations. In their most straightforward interpretation they lead directly to an extreme solipsism. If you interpret (iv) the principle of verifiability—in such a way as to make a public language possible while at the same time trying to avoid pseudo-problems (*schein-fragen*), you can only do so consistently by denying (i) and (ii), at least in their straightforward interpretation.

III.—By A. E. HEATH.

1. MY contribution must, I am afraid, be scandalously brief ; but its brevity may be an advantage in following two papers so closely packed with important material. I shall, indeed, confine myself to a few notes on points raised by my predecessors, in the hope that they may form a helpful general opening to our discussion of what they say.

There must be many who, like myself, look with rueful (though often puzzled) admiration at those who are busily engaged in teaching us that much of our philosophising is "nonsense." We had suspected it, of course, as befits all who take their rationality seriously. But the extent of what is affirmed to be nonsensical has grown, of late, to alarming proportions. What attitude do my predecessors take to this? Prof. Stebbing, on the whole, approves of it as a healthy empirical trend ; but (as we all expect of her) she casts a very critical and enquiring eye on the procedure of the logical positivists. Prof. L. J. Russell seems to me to be uneasy, and covers his uneasiness by developing their extreme case to logical absurdity.

As I understand it, Stebbing starts from the position, which she adopts from Moore, that philosophers must begin by accepting as *true* certain commonsense statements which we should all—when we are not supposed to be engaged in philosophy—*unhesitatingly* admit to be true. The business of the philosopher is to *analyse* these true statements. In recent years this stressing of analysis has led to various kinds of logical positivism, most of which show a tendency to end in some form of solipsism. *That is why the problem of Communication becomes of central interest.* Applying Moore's method again to this, Stebbing asserts, as a commonsense truth, that we do in fact communicate ; and she

attempts an analysis of its meaning. Or, rather, she tries to find out what account of the meaning of communication (in Moore's second sense of meaning) is given by those philosophers who accept the Principle of Verifiability.

2. The first question I would like to raise may, in the phraseology of those we are discussing, be a pseudo-problem; but it occurs to me to ask whether it might not be possible for us to find a statement of a commonsense truth, expressed in a sentence we could understand and accept, which would turn out on analysis of its meaning to be nonsense? If we admit the necessity for accepting commonsense truths, and also trust our analysis, there would be conflict. Is there any ground for assuming, out of hand, that this conflict cannot arise?

In this connection I feel sure that we shall soon have to apply our analytical labours to the notion of commonsense itself. For example, the assumption on commonsense grounds that we do in fact communicate, seems to be analogous to Reid's assertion that the fact that we must trust human testimony is one of the First Principles of Contingent Truths. What status do such principles have? Are they categorical, since they are presumed in our commonsense beliefs? And do other kinds of what would ordinarily, at some point in the history of mankind, be called commonsense beliefs, such as "the earth is flat," have a different status?

3. Apart from this general question, a fundamental difficulty at once arises over the principle of verifiability. Expressed in the form, "the meaning of a proposition is the method of its verification," it provokes the obvious question as to whether you *can* verify any proposition which does not already possess a meaning prior to its verification. This difficulty has been put in a different and more precise form by Miss Margaret Macdonald in a recent paper. She points out, it seems to me justly, that "verification" is usually employed, in science and

elsewhere, not to establish the meaning of propositions, but to prove them true. And she shows how confusion between these two quite different uses of the word by positivist philosophers leads to certain paradoxical results concerning our knowledge of the past.*

Let us waive that point, however, and consider the *ground* for the adoption of the principle. This is clearly twofold, as Stebbing showed in an earlier discussion of this principle.† It is in part an assertion of a radical *empiricism*, since a proposition is only understood if it is verifiable, and only verifiable if we know the conditions under which it would be true or false—which means that the criterion of the solubility of a problem is its reducibility to possible experience. And it is in part an assertion of the *individual* character of knowledge, since the meaning of a proposition is just how it would be verified, and that must lie within the verifier's own experience. Each of these assertions raises its own problems.

4. I suspect that it is the empirical side of the work of logical positivists which provides its attractiveness to many of us. It is the culmination of several lines of development in modern thought. To mention only one, it clarifies the relation between philosophical activity and the sciences. Schlick distinguishes two meanings of "science."‡ First it may denote a set or system of true propositions; and secondly, it may signify all the human activities, proceedings and contrivances necessary for the discovery and proof of those propositions. On his view, therefore, philosophy is not a science in the first sense. Yet, since clarifying our thoughts (which to him is the function of philo-

* *Proc. Aristotelian Society*, XXXIV, p. 144, "Verification and Understanding."

† *Logical Positivism and Analysis*, pp. 15, 19.

‡ *Proc. of the Seventh International Congress of Philosophy*, 1931, "The Future of Philosophy," pp. 112-116.

sophy) consists in discovering or defining the real meaning of our propositions, and since the meaning of a proposition has to be known before its truth can be established, therefore philosophy has to do its work before a theory (a science in the first sense of the term) can be built up. That is to say that all "science" (in the second sense of the term) is essentially philosophic. This throws light upon the historical relation between the two.

So long as the fundamental ideas have not become perfectly definite," says Schlick, "the main energy of the scientist must be directed towards the elucidation of their meaning; that is why, up to modern times, the work of science had to be chiefly philosophical in character; and it makes us understand why it became estranged from philosophy as soon as its basic concepts had grown clear enough. So in this respect our view gives a complete account of the historical development. It also accounts for the fact that all great revolutions in science (such as those we are witnessing in contemporary physics, for example) are justly considered to be of a philosophical nature and import, for such revolutions always consist in the discovery of a new meaning of the basic concepts (such as time, space, substance)." It is to be expected also, that these cycles of change will take place in our knowledge of other fields of experience which, for the moment, we describe as philosophical disciplines. It is obviously no accident that the Viennese group created an association called *Verein Ernst Mach* "for propagating and furthering a scientific outlook" and for "creating the intellectual instruments of modern Empiricism."*

Logical empiricism, however, like all empiricisms in the history of thought, has difficulty in doing justice to the universal aspects of our knowledge, and when it is linked to scientific positivism, the difficulty becomes acute. Thus Carnap holds

* The Journal *Erkenntnis* is the organ of this group and of the *Gesellschaft für empirische Philosophie* in Berlin.

that a science like physics is empirical, and yet consists of common knowledge. His problem, then, is to show how an intersubjective or common language can be derived from the individual private language, which we each have, and which he calls a basic protocol. You will see now how wisely Stebbing chose the subject of her discussion. For the central and pressing problem of logical positivists is *to account for this passage from private to public*. Both Stebbing and Russell have shown us how the final crisis arises over efforts to avoid confinement to our own private experience. The tendency to some form of solipsism comes about because (as we have already noted) the principle of verification possesses not only an empirical side, but also one which asserts the individual character of knowledge. To this side we may now turn.

5. The insistence upon the directly experienced character of that which verifies, if verification is carried far enough, is (as one would expect) usually accompanied by the view that what is directly experienced is incommunicable.* Now if we accept the fact that we communicate as a commonsense truth, the question at once arises as to *what* it is which is communicated. Stebbing brings out the difficulties in the view held by such writers as Schlick and Lewis that what is communicated is "structure." To these difficulties I should like to add a further one, arising out of certain of their arguments as quoted by Stebbing. Schlick suggests that I might be able to communicate with a being who had entirely different senses from mine; and Lewis puts forward the notion of similar communication with creatures on Mars of a higher order of mentality. As Stebbing shows, communication in these cases, for both writers, depends

* Nevertheless, I do not understand why Stebbing is so dogmatic in saying that the statement, "Content is incommunicable," is either meaningless or true. Is there not still open the possibility that it might have meaning and be false?

on some form of communication of "structure." Now whether or not, on their view, a plausible theory of the communication of structure is possible, it is not in the least clear to me that they have any right at all to speak of "creatures psychologically different from ourselves." For surely there is no *method of verification* which could give *meaning* to the expression "beings with senses different from ours." In short, so long as they rely upon the principle of verification they have no means of verifying the existence of such beings. And since there *does* seem to me some sense in speaking of creatures psychologically different from ourselves, this is an argument against their position.

6. Why, however, is there this tendency to fall back upon structure as that which is communicated? Because, as Russell points out, if verification is to be of any use for logical positivists it must be a *public* process. And he then, in my opinion, performs a very useful service indeed, in showing that, once recognized, this involves these writers in a development which throws less and less stress on "direct experience," and ends in rejecting it altogether. In short, their need for justifying the public character required from scientific statements finally undermines the radically empirical grounds from which they proudly start. This curious result is more intelligible if we remember that Neurath's Physicalism drifts inevitably into all the old difficulties of a coherence theory of truth: the doctrine, that is, that truth is not merely discovered by means of coherence with other truths, but *consists* in that coherence. The representatives of a scientific *Weltauffassung*, Neurath says, "know only science and the clarification of scientific methods In the formulas of science, with the aid of which human beings succeed in understanding one another, only logical-mathematical signs are utilized. It is senseless to say: 'I see the same red as my friend.' How my friend combines the symbol 'red' with other signs clarifies for me the structure of his system of expression.

More cannot be done by science.”* Concentration upon the principles of symbolism then serves to draw our attention away from anything which the symbols may stand for; and at once the problems of the coherence theory arise.

7. Over emphasis upon symbols has another consequence: it stresses the abstract. Stebbing points out a relation between what Carnap attempts in his logical construction of the world and Eddington's game of world-building; and she suggests that it arises because we are tempted into supposing that a theoretical, abstract system adequate to describe what *I* suppose to be happening to other minds and bodies, is adequate even in the case of my *own* experience.† (This sort of thing has obvious affiliations, as Russell also points out, to Behaviourism.) Stebbing suggests that logical positivists are tempted into positions of this kind because they adopt the point of view of methodological solipsism. The adjective is used to indicate that it is a form of solipsism which need not be in conflict with the commonsense view of the world. Thus Braithwaite, in a discussion with Stebbing, says that “If a solipsism, instead of asserting propositions incompatible with those of the ‘Common Sense view of the world,’ propounds analyses of these propositions, it cannot be rejected as noncommonsensical.”‡ To this Stebbing replies that though logical positivists do not deny that I can truly say that other people exist, they maintain, however, that this and all other expressions ultimately refer to my experiences, and must therefore be completely analysable in terms of my experience. She holds that though it is nonsense to say that my direct experience is *identical* with yours, yet there are some elements directly experienced by me which are the same as some elements directly experienced by you. So though the ultimate

* O. Neurath, *Monist*, XLI, 1931, p. 620.

† *Logical Positivism and Analysis*, p. 26.

‡ *Analysis*, I, 1, 1933, p. 14.

verification of every proposition must be such that it *could* be expressed in a proposition about my experience, yet it does not follow from this that every proposition is in fact about my experience. (Incidentally, if this be true, communication is interpretable.)

8. This way of avoiding the solipsistic consequences of logical empiricism seems to me to be sound ; but one part of the argument, if I understand it rightly, raises another difficulty. This is in connection with her distinction between the intended communication of a fact F_1 , and communication of the speaker's awareness of F_1 . Stebbing uses this to counter the view of the logical positivists that every significant sentence includes a first person singular pronoun ; and she does so by maintaining that there is this fundamental difference between propositions which would ordinarily be said to be propositions about myself, and propositions made by me.

I am not quite sure that Stebbing's account of "communication" and "conveying" is exact enough for her purpose. It is true that a "speaker" (in her sense), in using a sentence, communicates that the fact is. But it does not seem to be true that the speaker in *conveying* F_1 also communicates (in addition to F_1) his awareness of F_1 . He may be aware of quite a different fact, say Z , and be using a sentence which, whilst he thinks it communicates that Z is, in actual fact communicates that F_1 is. In this case what is "conveyed" will not have among its elements the speaker's awareness of F_1 . What this amounts to is that a language is in some way independent of individual users of it, and sometimes communicates something quite different from what the speaker thinks it does, or *intends* that it should. Thus, as Stebbing uses it, the word "conveys" may be ambiguous, and to avoid ambiguity some further distinction is needed which has not yet been provided. This point has some importance because while, as Stebbing says,

there is no language apart from a user, yet a language has a certain degree of independence of individual users of it. How this comes about I do not know ; but it is a fact which any adequate analysis of language must take into account *

* I suppose it is on this fact as basis that some German philosophers have spoken of language as " objective spirit." This line of thought will be unpalatable to logical analysts ; but a way will remain open to it until their analyses include that fact.

IS THERE AN ELEMENT OF IMMEDIACY IN KNOWLEDGE ?

By PROF. R. I. AARON and PROF. C. M. CAMPBELL.

I.—By R. I. AARON.

IN dealing with this question it is more than usually necessary to avoid ambiguity in language and to make our terms clear. The word *knowledge* is used here in a wide and loose sense. It seems to cover all instances of cognition and every type of awareness. It is a generic term for all those experiences that are in any sense cognitive, including not merely knowing with certainty, but also opining, "being under the impression that," sense-perception and so on. It even covers, I suppose, the effort to come to know, or the gathering of evidence and the thinking necessary to enable one to make up one's mind as to what is most likely to be true. At the same time, I assume that the question as a whole directs us primarily rather to the subjective than to the objective side. Without prejudging the issue as to whether we can deal adequately with the subjective without also giving equal consideration to the objective, I assume that we are meant as far as possible to confine our attention to the cognizing rather than to what is cognized. I also assume that we are dealing with the actual attaining of knowledge and not with the mind's stored-up knowledge.

In the second place, the term *element of immediacy* is equally ambiguous. It might be identified on the one hand with the so-called "immediate experience", the experiencing that occurs in sensation and in introspection. In this sense, the immediate is synonymous with the given, and the question would then be : Is there truly a given in our experience ? This question is

no doubt of great importance to solipsists and subjective idealists and to those who tend that way, but to the rest of us the answer is fairly obvious. And I can hardly think that those who framed the question set us were thinking about givenness in framing it, or that they desired to begin still another debate on solipsism. For there is a second sense in which the phrase *element of immediacy* can be used, namely, as meaning a direct knowing, an intuition, and this must have been the meaning which the framers of the question wished to give it. We are being asked, I take it, whether there exists an element of immediacy in the sense of a direct knowing, which is certainly no mere passive reception of the given, but is active apprehension with mind at the height of its cognitive activity. I shall proceed on the understanding that these two senses of *immediacy* are different and that our concern is with the second. Before I finish, however, I hope to return to immediate experience in the first sense, and to seek to compare it with immediacy in the second sense.

Now put in this way there seems to be only one possible answer to the question and that an affirmative one. There is an element of immediacy (in the second sense) in knowledge. The only finally satisfactory argument I know in favour of this view is the empirical one. But it is surely sufficient. One might use a favourite device of Berkeley's and appeal to the reader's own experience. Is he not occasionally aware of knowing directly? Indeed, is not this what everyone means by the term *knowing* when it is used in a precise and strict sense? For instance, I may think that this country has seen the worst of the industrial depression and that it has now turned the corner. But I do not *know* this. On the other hand, I do know that seven and five are twelve, and I do know that I am now having an experience which I describe as seeing a brown patch. The latter are instances of knowing directly.

If such, however, is the true meaning of the phrase *element of immediacy*, and if this is what *knowledge* really means in the precise and strict sense, the question set us begins to look absurd. Dr. Moore has been saying recently that many questions if carefully analysed would be seen to be nonsensical. And it might appear as if we had such a question here. For if my analysis is correct we are really being asked: "Is there an element of knowing in knowledge?" a question which at first sight would seem to be tautologous.

On second thoughts, however, if we recall the wide and loose way in which the term *knowledge* is being used, the question may still have some significance. It is quite sensible to ask whether an element of *direct* knowing is present in all kinds of cognition of whatever sort, and I propose to return to this question later. But we must also consider a view that would assert that there never is direct knowing in our sense in any kind of cognizing. For there are those who seem to deny that knowing is apprehending directly or intuiting, whether at the beginning or in the course or, again, at the end of a cognitive process; and who yet do admit both cognitive processes and, at least, partial knowledge. Some such view has been sketched for us in the clearly written exposition of Idealist logic which recently appeared from the pen of Mr. C. R. Morris. It is there argued that the Coherence theory denies immediacy.* I do not know whether Mr. Morris means that it denies immediacy in both of the above senses, but he certainly wants us to believe that it denies it in the second. Whether this is, or is not, sound interpretation of the Coherence position I need not here discuss. There are certainly passages in Hegel or, again, in Bradley which seem to assert immediacy. And Professor Joachim, if I remember rightly, in his inaugural lecture on this very subject did not deny immediacy in knowledge. But Mr. Morris might

* *Idealist Logic*, cf. pp. 313-4.

reply that the denial is implicit in any Coherence theory of knowledge, and cannot be avoided if the theory is worked out fully. One may, however, safely leave the question as to whether Mr. Morris is a sound exponent of Idealist logic in this matter to the Idealists themselves. His book interests me because it presents a position that contradicts the one which seems to me to be true, though I gather that Mr. Morris himself is not sufficiently convinced by the position he presents to accept it outright himself.

According to this position there is no immediacy, in the second sense, in knowledge, for the latter is entirely discursive and never intuitive. The position, we are told, originated with Kant, who came to it as the result of his reflections upon physics and the physicist's method of gaining knowledge. The physicist, it seems, does not begin with so many intuitions of truths relevant to his study, nor does he proceed by means of such intuitions. He begins with a crude theory of the physical world already present in his mind. It is not necessary at present to enquire how it came to be there, though it is obvious that his sense-experiences have had something to do with its coming. His whole aim now is to correct his first crude ideas. His first ideas are likely to be incoherent and vague. He corrects them by building up in thought a more coherent and more explicit system. He brings to light what were at first hidden implications and he lays bare all the laws or connexions which link his system into one. Physics is nowhere apprehension of a physical world independent of the knowing of it; it is the construction in thought of a more and more adequate system, in which construction there is no element of immediate or intuitive knowledge. Each judgment is discursive, grounded on the system as a whole, and, in so far, conditional.

Such is the case with physics. But now, it is asked, is not what is true of physics true of every other realm of knowledge?

Is not knowledge everywhere discursive and nowhere intuitive Mr. Morris himself points out that mathematics presents a special difficulty. In that science it is exceedingly difficult to deny all intuition and direct knowing. Yet in order to ensure a consistent account of knowledge in general we need to include mathematics also. All knowledge of whatever sort is system-constructing and nowhere does it involve an element of immediacy.

Now this kind of view seems to me thoroughly fallacious. I think the fallacy rests upon a confusion between knowing, in the precise sense, and thinking, and I should not be surprised if this confusion were responsible for many of the errors into which we fall. Is it possible to justify the practice of using thinking and knowing as synonymous terms, as if there were no differences whatsoever between them? The question needs to be asked in face of the widespread and unreflecting identification of the two—frequently by philosophers who could not possibly be classed as Idealists. It is almost common to-day to speak as if it did not matter whether we use the word *thinking* or *knowing*, since they both mean the same thing in the end. But do they?

For instance, is not the description given above a description of the *thinking* of the physicist rather than of any knowing? It is perfectly true that the physicist builds in thought alternative systems based on alternative hypotheses. But does he suppose, or can it rightly be supposed by anyone, that this system-building is *in itself* an instance of knowing? The physicist at least seems to be assuming that there exists an independent world of physical things which he is trying to know, and that the system in his thoughts, corresponds or fails to correspond to that world.* And if he is told, as Mr. Morris' Idealist tells

* The word *corresponds* should not deceive us into assuming that the physicist must hold a Correspondence theory of *knowledge*. We are concerned here with a theory of thinking and not of knowing. I should support a Correspondence theory of thinking. But the theory of knowing which seems to me most plausible is quite other, namely, that knowing is direct apprehension.

as, that the only test of the validity of his thinking must lie within that thinking itself, namely, in its coherence, he would think this view foolish. For he knows that there is a test of thinking external to thinking itself, namely, knowing. Of course, he readily admits that we frequently cannot know, and so cannot finally decide between the systems we have built in thought.* But the fact that this is so confirms the view that thinking is not knowing.

I cannot see, therefore, that any appeal to the method of physics justifies the common identification of thinking and knowing, nor does it explain the tendency to identify them. The latter seems to need some other explanation. One may suggest here at least three possible explanations. In the first place, we constantly use the term *knowledge* loosely. As was seen earlier, it may even cover the effort to come to know, and as such it certainly covers scientific thinking. The thinking of the scientist is just such an effort, and consequently is classed as cognitive and knowledge. Actually, however, the thinking is a sign that up to the present the scientist has failed to know directly, and because of this he has to think. In the second place, we tend to identify thinking and knowing because the former, especially if it is scientific thinking, is permeated with knowing. Sound thinking is that in which every piece of relevant knowledge we possess is brought to bear upon our system-building. We shall deal with this matter later, but it is easy to understand how things so intimately related tend to be identified, although the intimate relation does not of itself justify the identification. But, thirdly, there is still a further explanation of the identification, namely, the emergence and widespread acceptance of the view that thought, left to itself, will develop out of itself all

* I propose to return later to the question as to the presence or absence of direct knowing in the natural sciences.

truth. This is a position that we need to consider with some care. . . .

The view finds its most explicit expression in Idealist logic, and there the core of the position is a theory of inference. For knowing is either judging or inferring ; but judgment is found to be implicit inference ; consequently to understand inference is to understand knowing in its most explicit form. First, the mind at the stage of "feeling" or "immediate experience" gains content. There are also *a priori* elements that ought not to be neglected. But, for the rest, knowing is inferring, and inferring of course is thinking. When inferring begins there is already present to mind a content in thought, provided in the first case by "immediate experience." This "ideal content," as Bradley calls it, is the object, and inference can now be defined as the "ideal self-development of an object." Just like any other organism the thought-content, which is itself organic in character, grows and develops, and its growth is inference. Knowing as inference is the self-development of objective content. Thinking is precisely the same thing, so that we are fully justified in identifying the two.

I may be completely failing to understand Bradley and wholly misrepresenting him in this necessarily bald account. But I find it impossible to read his Terminal Essay on inference without feeling it to be a most unfortunate expression of the "evolutionism" which so beset the last generation. For can we really admit for a moment that an ideal content develops itself ? Will the premisses of any inference ever develop into anything of themselves ? The suggestion seems to me absurd. The conception of development, I venture to think, hinders rather than helps here. For, to put the matter simply, what happens surely is that we see (or know) that these premisses imply the conclusion. We discover an implication, an objective fact. I shall return later to consider its character. Mr. Bradley

agrees, I think, that it is an objective fact, but with the aid of the concept of development as applied to thought he tries, as it were, to get *into* the implication itself. It is objective only as thought content, something alive and growing. Implication is growth. Such a theory, however, seems to me to neglect the most essential element present in the inference. It neglects the act of knowing the implication. To talk in terms of development (or even of "passage" which is more common amongst logicians) in dealing with inference is to veil this element from us and to make an adequate account of inference wholly impossible.*

On the other hand, to recognise the intuitive element present here is to realize the truth about inference. It itself is a process in thought, in which we first bring our premisses together and then—the heart of the process, itself an act and not a process—see (or know) what these premisses imply. The seeing may take place immediately the premisses are put together. None the less, putting premisses together is not itself seeing. The latter is something different. It is precisely what we mean in this paper by an element of immediacy in the second sense. The whole process is a thought-process, thinking, but in this particular piece of thinking, namely inference, an element of direct knowing is invariably present.

Knowing in the strict sense, then, is present in the thought process, but is not identical with the whole of it. And with this information in our hands we may return with some confidence to face the criticism that knowledge nowhere involves an element of immediacy. We can now see that the knowledge which is inference involves invariably an element of immediacy. The contrary view would be impossible did it not rest upon an unjustified identification of thinking and knowing. But once

* I am glad to observe that the latest exposition of logic, Mr. Mace's, avoids this error. Compare his definition of inference, *The Principles of Logic*, pp. 27-8.

the essential difference between them is grasped it becomes impossible to assert that knowledge is a mere thinking, wholly lacking in an element of immediacy or direct knowing.

We have now arrived at the following position : Whether or not every cognitive experience has in it an element of immediacy, some such experiences do involve such an element. Consequently, the complete denial of immediacy or direct knowing is impossible, and the view which would have us make this denial cannot stand examination. We do know directly, as when I know that I am now seeing brown. But also, one kind of indirect knowledge, and that the most important, namely inference, is now seen to have at its core an element of direct knowing. Indeed, some have held that inference (meaning particularly deductive inference) is the only kind of indirect knowledge which is ever certain. What more we know with certainty is what we know directly. In that case, if in the question put before us we were merely asked whether there existed an element of immediacy in absolutely certain knowledge, we could answer without hesitation that there must be such an element. I admit, however, that once again the question is beginning to look absurd.

We may now turn to consider probable knowledge. Is there an element of immediacy, in the above sense, in probable knowledge ? Under this head I shall group all that is included under the term *knowledge* which is not absolutely certain knowledge. I do not, of course, propose to examine all the various forms of probable knowledge grouped together in this way. In the few pages left me that would be wholly impossible. I cannot even discuss the presence or absence of an element of immediacy in our knowledge of our own selves (if this is *probable* knowledge) and of others, though I recognise the great importance of these questions. But I propose to confine myself to a consideration of our probable knowledge of the external world. For I find the question we are discussing particularly pertinent there.

Now the first problem that arises if one asks whether there is an element of immediacy in our probable knowledge of the external world is that as to the relation between immediacy in our second sense and immediacy in the first sense, namely, "immediate experience." If we could straightway identify immediacy in the first and second senses we might conclude that in sensation itself we gained direct and certain knowledge of the external world. So far there would be no place for probability, since all would be certainty. We should, of course, still be limited in one sense, for no single individual's experience extends over the whole range of existence. Our knowledge of that which lay beyond immediate experience might still be probable only. Yet our immediate experiencing would be certain knowledge of the external world. But, now, is "immediate experience" in this sense immediate knowledge of the external world?

It may be claimed that it is at least immediate knowledge of something, some bare minimum, the *sensum*. In my present field of vision are patches of colour, of which I am directly aware. They may be subjective, they may not exist as qualities of real physical objects; even so, I am aware of something when I see them. Is such "immediate experience" to be termed knowing? I think it will be easier to answer this question if we bear in mind that the claim made here for sensation might equally well be made for imagination or dreaming, experiences in which I am also aware of patches of colour before me. Would one say that in imagining a blue patch I know? On the whole, I tend to think that it would be better not to use the word *knowing* in this connexion,* and certainly, whilst I

* To avoid misapprehension, I had better emphasize that I am thinking of seeing blue and not of knowing that I see blue. Of course, my knowledge that I now see (or imagine) blue is an instance of direct knowing in the precise sense. But we are considering here my seeing (or imaging) blue. Is this knowledge? I want to answer in the negative.

should admit a likeness in respect to directness, that makes seeing, for instance, a useful metaphor for knowing, I should not identify "immediate experience" in this sense with the direct knowing which I take to be the immediate element in knowledge.

I readily recognize, however, that nothing of supreme importance is at stake here, and pass without further comment to what is much more important. Sense-perception is taken to be knowing not in the very restricted sense (if, indeed, this is knowing at all) of being an awareness of patches of colour, sounds and so on, but in the much more important sense that I know, in sensing, real qualities of physical objects existing in complete independence of me and of my experiences. Now is "immediate experience" knowing in this sense? Personally, I have no doubt whatsoever as to the right answer here. At this time of the day it is unnecessary to repeat the evidence which proves conclusively that the only possible answer is the negative one. We are not in a position to say *with certainty* that *sensa*, of which we are aware in experience, do really pertain as qualities of things to an external and independent world. They may be subjective and private to each individual experiencing. Sense-experience does not provide me with direct knowledge that this table which is before me (I am assuming the realist view for the moment with regard to *its* existence) is brown. (I cannot, of course, say with certainty that it is not brown either—but that is beside the point.) One thing seems quite clear: that we cannot possibly affirm that our "immediate experience" in sensation is, in this sense, direct knowledge of the external world.

Accordingly, we cannot straightway identify immediacy in the first of my two senses with immediacy in the second, and this I think justifies the distinction I made at the outset. It also means that if we are asked whether there is an element of

immediacy in our knowledge of the external world, we cannot say that seeing colours, hearing sounds and so on is an element of immediacy in the second sense. Accordingly the question still remains unanswered. Is there any immediacy, in this second sense, in our probable knowledge of the external world?

I wish to consider here two answers that may be made. In the first place, it may be argued that there is a fundamental difference between seeing a table and imagining one, and that this difference arises from the fact that in sensing we know directly the existence of a physical object independent of us. And we know this even though we are compelled to admit that the table itself may not be brown, in spite of our first confident assumption that it is brown. Now is our probable knowledge of the external world based upon a piece of direct knowledge of this sort? Or are we to say that our knowledge of the external world is entirely inferential? At present I do not know how to reply to this question; there is so much to be said for and against both views. But I will venture to say, what may perhaps be felt by many others besides myself, namely, that all those theories which have up to the present attempted to explain our belief in the existence of an external world wholly in terms of inference from sense-perception seem to leave a residuum never adequately explained. That does not prove that they are on the wrong track; only I do not know of any such theory which is completely satisfactory and adequate in this respect. On the other hand, the most serious difficulty that faces the other view is that we should appear to be asserting that we know an existent, wholly devoid of content, for we cannot say for certain that the *sensa* are applicable to it. We should thus have a mere *that* without a *what*. Is it possible to meet this difficulty? It may be argued that we never find a mere *that* in our experience; from the first we regard the *sensa* as pertaining to the external existence we then know.

Reflection shows that this may be error, that the external existent may not possess the content which we at first attribute to it. We then search for other content. But there is never a period in which we are aware of a mere *that* without content. We are aware of an object, and on reflection find that the externality of much of its content can be doubted, but, according to this view, we do know and cannot doubt that *something* external is there.

However, our present point is that were it once proved that we know the existence of external entities directly in sensation, this would be an important element of immediacy in our knowledge of the physical world. But it would not be the only element. For, secondly, the question as to whether our probable knowledge of the external world has in it an element of immediacy or not may be answered on wholly different lines. For instance, we make extensive use of mathematics in natural science, and surely there is direct knowing whenever we introduce mathematics. The knowing in mathematics is intuitive discovery *and*, so far as I am able to judge, this remains true whether one takes the Logistic, the Formalist or the Intuitionist view as to the nature of mathematics. In this sense, therefore, our probable knowledge of the external world, in so far as it involves mathematics, would have to include within it an element of immediacy. Moreover, as we have seen, *all* inference involves immediate knowing, and this is, of course, as true of inductive as of deductive inference. Perceiving implications is as essential a part of induction as of deduction.

It is, accordingly surely impossible to deny the presence of direct knowledge in our probable knowledge of the external world, for whatever might be said as to our knowing the external directly in sensation, we cannot deny that our knowledge involves intuitions and apprehensions of implications. But here we meet with a difficulty. What kind of object is it that we then intuit

or know directly? What is the real status of mathematical objects and of implications? Is the mathematical object an empirical object? Are there anywhere in nature perfect circles and triangles, and if there are do we deal with *them* in geometry? Again, is a sound implication from false premisses a connection of facts in the external world and so *real* in the sense in which this table is real? If we return negative answers, does this mean that such objects are merely "in thought" and mind-dependent? Are such objects creatures of mind's own making? If they were, of course, the Idealist view of, for instance, inference would be much strengthened. Inference would not be the apprehension of implication but the very creation of it and the bringing of it into being in the self-development of thought. But I cannot see that it is necessary to adopt this position. An alternative view is possible and it seems to me truer. Such objects are "ideal," in Husserl's sense, as being non-empirical; yet they are as independent of the mind knowing them as are tables and chairs. Geometry is apprehension of objective truth, which is in no sense mind's or thought's creation. Likewise, when we apprehend an implication in our thinking about the external world, it also is discovery of objective fact, and we are justified in describing it as an element of immediacy in our second sense.

The problem which then becomes urgent, however, if this second alternative is accepted, is that of the relation of our knowledge of such "ideal" objects to our sense experience, on the one hand, and to our general attempt to know the external world on the other. Implication, we argue, is an ultimate relation that we apprehend. But, now, do we ever apprehend directly implications (or any other relations whatsoever) existing in the external world? Certainly, through vision we gain not mere isolated patches of colours but groups of such colours in a certain order, which frequently recur in the same order. At the present moment I see two patches of colour, brown and

green, and I also see that the green patch is to the right of the brown patch. This is certainly part of the empirically given. But now, if I once admit that I am directly aware in sensation of the existence as independent of me of this table (which I take to be brown) and of this chair (which I take to be green), must I not also say that I know that the chair is to the right of the table? That is to say, have I not here the direct apprehension of a spatial relation between physical objects? And if I am empirically given this spatial relation, what connection (if any) exists between it and the space I consider in geometry? Again, if I know a spatial relation existing between real physical objects what connection is there between such knowledge and my seeing colours? Is there, after all, a justification for the famous distinction between primary and secondary qualities? And if there were, should we not be compelled to say that in one respect at least, namely, with regard to the experiencing of primary qualities, the element of immediacy in the first sense of the term is also an element of immediacy in the second? Lastly, do I ever apprehend directly implications amongst things in the external world? Or are implications only discoverable in the realm of defined terms?

All these problems, I am aware are involved in the position I am putting forward. I cannot discuss them any further, for it is time to draw the one general conclusion which I think I can safely make. There is certainly an element of immediacy in our probable knowledge of the external world. Even if it be denied that we have any direct knowledge of the existence of physical entities independent of the mind, or of relations between such entities, there would still be apprehension or intuition of objects and relations independent of mind, there would still be direct knowledge, and so an element of immediacy

II.—By C. A. CAMPBELL.

PROFESSOR AARON'S successors in this symposium certainly cannot complain of a paucity of material for discussion. If in what follows I omit to deal with a large part of his interesting paper, it is by no means because I regard the problems I neglect as unimportant, nor (to my regret) because I am wholly at one with Prof. Aaron in his treatment of them, but merely because, if I attempt in the space at my disposal to cover the whole range of the topics raised, I am doubtful of being able to say much that is even intelligible about any of them. As I am forced to select, I propose to concentrate upon the earlier half of Prof. Aaron's paper. The positions there put forward are, I think, maintained in a less tentative fashion than the positions in the later pages. Moreover, there is implicit in them something in the nature of a challenge to unregenerate persons like myself who still decline to relegate to the lumber-room the theory of knowledge advocated by Idealism.

It will be convenient to begin by saying something about the meaning which Prof. Aaron attaches to the question set to us, a question undoubtedly susceptible of diverse interpretations. The major difficulty in interpretation centres upon the precise signification to be given to the words "element of immediacy." Prof. Aaron distinguishes two important senses in which these words may be being used, and points out how the meaning of our question varies with the particular sense we adopt.

According to the first sense (which identifies the "element of immediacy" with "immediate experience"), what we are being asked in this symposium is taken by Prof. Aaron to be: Is there truly a given in our experience? This formulation of our question Prof. Aaron rules out as unacceptable, mainly on the ground, I think, that it admits of too obvious an answer.

And I agree that if the question be interpreted in literal fashion, as calling merely for a considered "yes" or "no," there would very likely be little difference of opinion. On the other hand, granted an answer in the affirmative, it would be both interesting and, I think, legitimate to go on to investigate the exact character of this "given" element, and the nature of the function which it fulfils in the inception and development of knowledge. I own to an uneasy feeling that this is in fact the problem that we were meant to discuss. But, as the purpose of a symposium is nullified if the contributors do not keep contact with one another, I shall not raise these questions in the present paper.

pass on, therefore, to Prof. Aaron's second sense of the words "element of immediacy." According to this meaning, what we are being asked is whether there is an element of "intuition" or "direct knowing" in knowledge. It soon turns out, however, that this question is no better suited to discussion than that which we have just dismissed, *unless* we are using the term knowledge in something less than its "precise and strict sense." For what we mean by "knowing," Prof. Aaron holds, is, when we use the term precisely, identical with what we mean by immediate or intuitive knowing. Hence our question is resolved into a tautology: Is there an element of knowing in knowledge?

It is here that my difficulties begin, for I cannot see that the "tautology" is satisfactorily made out. Knowledge in the strict sense, we may agree, must possess the character of "certainty." But why must it also be characterized by "immediacy"? This further character appears to me neither to be implied in the natural meaning of the term "knowledge," nor to be a legitimate deduction from the nature of certainty. Indeed, at first sight Prof. Aaron's doctrine wears a very paradoxical appearance, for it seems to follow from the denial of mediate knowledge that inference is incapable of yielding

knowledge in the strict sense. And yet later Prof. Aaron makes it quite apparent that he does not at all mean to deny the existence of inferential knowledge.

Evidently there is some misunderstanding which we must do our best to clear up. What does Prof. Aaron mean when, in despite of "inference," he tells us that knowledge and immediate knowledge are equivalent terms, and accordingly, by implication, that there is no such thing as mediate knowledge?

I think that the explanation lies in the too exclusive regard paid by Prof. Aaron to a feature of inference which he emphasizes later in his paper. The "knowledge of implications," he urges, is immediate knowledge. Our apprehension that certain premises imply a certain conclusion is always a case of immediate "seeing." And in this he seems to me to be right. We cannot, in inference, apprehend that the conclusion follows from the premises "through" or "on account of" some *further* factor. For if we are using the "further factor" in our inference, it must really belong to our premises. I entirely agree, then, that there is in inference an "immediate" grasp of the connexion between premises and conclusion.

This fact, however, by no means disposes of the possibility of mediate knowledge. I "immediately know" that a certain conclusion follows from certain premises. But is *this* knowing the same thing as *knowing the conclusion*? Not at all. I may quite well know that a certain conclusion follows from certain premises, and yet be so far from "knowing" the proposition expressed in the conclusion that I actually believe it to be a false proposition. I know the conclusion *immediately* only in the sense that I know that it follows from the given premises. I do *not* know the conclusion immediately in the sense of knowing it as a true proposition.

When this distinction is recognized, it seems to me that the possibility of genuinely mediate knowledge becomes apparent.

Suppose that we have premises which we know (in the strict sense). And suppose that we see that these premises imply a certain conclusion. It is possible then for us to say that we know the conclusion," both in the sense that we know that it is implied by the premises, and in the sense that we know it to be a true proposition. And whereas we know the former immediately, the latter we know mediately. We know the conclusion as a true proposition, because we see that it follows from certain other true propositions. If this is not "mediate" knowledge, it is hard to say what "mediate" can mean—or, for that matter, what "immediate" can mean.

I feel a minor difficulty, to which I shall allude briefly, concerning the status as knowledge of the "immediate seeing" in inference. Is it entitled to rank as knowledge proper on the same terms as, for instance, the certain mediate knowledge of a proposition? Knowledge has as its correlate, reality. To be knowledge at all, it must be "of the real." And although I am prepared to agree that "implications" belong to reality in *some* sense, the fact that there is widely admitted difficulty in determining in just *what* sense they belong does seem to me to suggest that we do not, when we "know an implication," know reality in the same unambiguous way as when we know a categorical proposition. I doubt, therefore, whether we ought to speak of the "seeing of implications" as knowledge in its full and proper sense. After all, if any of us were to subject our intellectual content to an examination with a view to discovering how much "genuine knowledge" we possessed, would it seem to us fitting to include in our ultimate catalogue the "knowledge of implications" from premises we believe to be false? Surely not. Yet these pieces of knowledge are entitled to be included if the knowledge of implications is, as such, knowledge in the full sense. I submit that we ought to regard this kind of apprehension, this grasp of the connexion

of premises with conclusion, as an instrument of knowledge, rather than as itself knowledge. It may fairly enough be called the immediate element present in all mediate knowledge.

Prof. Aaron holds, of course, that there are instances of immediate knowledge other than the "knowledge of implications." We must now consider his views on this matter. The method he employs to establish the existence of such knowledge is, by his own avowal, the empirical one, the "appeal to the reader's own experience," to his "occasional awareness of knowing directly." And Prof. Aaron himself supplies a couple of illustrations of the kind of thing he means.

The illustrations are carefully chosen and I shall not, perhaps, in what I wish to say about them, controvert very much that which Prof. Aaron is anxious to hold. On the other hand, Prof. Aaron's use of the "empirical method" does seem to be a profoundly unsatisfactory way of settling the question of the existence of immediate knowledge. It is very evident that the "reader" to whom appeal is made to say whether or not he is ever aware of "knowing directly" is not at all in a fit condition to judge concerning a question of this kind until he has received a great deal of instruction which Prof. Aaron does not supply. To "know directly" is to know both "truly" and "without mediation." But it is a commonplace that even sophisticated persons are frequently certain, or frequently believe themselves to be certain, of that which is not in fact "true"; and that, again, they frequently suppose that there is no mediation where mediation does, in fact, exist. If the reader be not carefully prepared by an exposure of the pitfalls that beset the uninformed and the unwary in this matter, his judgment appears to me to be really worthless.

Nor do I think that Prof. Aaron can better his case by urging that his appeal is not to any and every person, but to the philosophical person who may be presumed to be reading his

paper. For since the question of the existence of immediate knowledge is a recognised philosophical issue--Prof. Aaron himself contends that one important philosophical school denies its existence--no simple appeal to this quarter can carry us any further. No appeal can be expected to have weight, I think, which is not backed by an analysis of crucial instances, directed especially to demonstrating that the reasons which have induced some persons to find in these instances uncertainty or mediation or both together are fallacious reasons.

Are Prof. Aaron's instances in fact valid cases of "immediate knowledge"? To some extent the answer will depend upon the exact sense given to "immediate," for "mediation" may be of more than one kind. In the present connexion, I think it would be natural to take "mediation" in the sense of "inferential mediation." The question would then be whether, in the given instances of knowing, there is any appeal to a "ground" as mediating the union of subject and predicate.

If this be our question, I should be of the same opinion as Prof. Aaron about at least one of his instances:--"I am now having an experience which I describe as seeing a brown patch." So far as concerns the connexion which it is the special point of my judgment to affirm, nothing that can legitimately be called inference appears to be involved. The "having the experience" is not affirmed of my self in virtue of any cognized "ground of connexion." There is no appeal, explicit or implicit, to a "system" of which the terms are members, and the nature of which is such as to determine the connexion I affirm between the terms. I neither have nor require a "ground" for connecting the terms, for I perceive their connexion "directly." It may be that I could, by conducting a psychological investigation, find reasons why I am now having the experience that I know I am having. But I do not need to wait for these reasons, nor can they add anything to the certainty with which I know

that I am having the experience. No doubt there is what may be called a "subjective ground" of my knowledge, viz.; the awareness of experiencing that accompanies all conscious experience. But that is beside the point. It in no sense "mediates" the connection I affirm. Indeed this "subjective ground" turns out, when we reflect upon it, to be just the "knowledge" itself. The awareness of experiencing is the knowing that I am having the experience. To say that I know that I am having the experience because I am aware of having it is just to say that I know because I know.

I am a good deal less certain, however, that Prof. Aaron's other alleged instance of immediate knowledge, that "seven and five are twelve," can fairly be said to be free from any element of inference. How do we know that $7 + 5 = 12$? I move in these spheres with a trepidation only too well justified, but it does seem to me certain that there is a cognized ground which mediates the equation here apprehended. In order to apprehend the equation we must, I think, understand the principle upon which the number-series is constructed. We must understand that the series is generated by the successive repetition of homogeneous units, so that 2 is 1 and 1, 3 is 1 and 1 and 1, and so on, each number being nothing but the aggregate of the units which compose it. Given so much insight into the numerical system, we can readily discern such simple relationships between its members as are expressed by the proposition $7 + 5 = 12$. If we understand the number 12 to be got by taking the unit 12 times, and in the same way understand the numbers 7 and 5 to be got by taking the unit 7 times and 5 times respectively, we can see at a glance that 12 may be constructed by taking 7 and adding to it 5. What is required, be it noted, is more than merely "understanding the meaning of the terms." That, of course, is a precondition of *any* knowing, mediate or immediate. The point is that here the terms have to be understood in their

nature as members of a common system. In this sense, it is insight into the numerical system that makes possible my apprehension of the truth of the equation in question. 7, 5, and 12 are differences within the system which are recognized to be, by the very nature of that system, so inter-related that the summation of the first two numbers gives a total which is equivalent to the third number. This is not, indeed, "explicit inference," but there is mediation through an objective ground, there is a "because"; and this seems to suffice to constitute an "inferential element."

With these too perfunctory comments we must hastily pass on, if we are not to limit our discussion merely to the opening paragraphs of Prof. Aaron's paper. The next topic with which we have to deal is the alleged refusal of Idealism to admit the existence of immediate knowledge, and the reasons which are supposed to account for this refusal. I am not altogether prepared to agree, as will become apparent later, that the Idealist does without qualification deny all immediate knowledge, but it will, I think, be profitable to consider why he is supposed to do so.

The first reason alleged is the connection taken to exist between the Idealist theory of knowledge and the account which the Idealist gives of the nature of knowing in physics. This account (we are told) presents the physicist's knowing as through out discursive or mediate, and the Idealist, generalizing from what he finds true of this important branch of knowledge, takes all knowledge to be discursive. The essence of knowing in physics consists in the manufacture of more and more coherent systems. There are no such things as truths accepted as valid in their own right. Each candidate for truth is accepted only in so far as it is found capable of fitting into the system of physical thought as a whole. "Each judgment is discursive, grounded on the system as a whole, and is, so far, conditional." The

attempt to extend this view to cover mathematical knowing is Prof. Aaron points out, fraught with special embarrassments, but it is undertaken by Idealism in the interests of a "consistent account of knowledge in general."

Now if the criticism which Prof. Aaron proceeds to pass upon this doctrine were only to the effect that the generalization from the nature of knowing in physics (assuming that it takes place) is invalid, I should find little with which to disagree. I should support the view that mathematical knowing, for example, presents peculiar features to which a doctrine of knowledge dominated by the coherence theory of truth is unable to do justice. The Idealist has, I think, taken too light-heartedly the difficulties offered from the side of mathematics to his doctrine that "only the whole truth is wholly true." But Prof. Aaron's criticism goes much deeper than this. As I understand him, he holds that the Idealist's account of the physicist's knowing is vicious even with respect to the physicist. It does not represent the physicist's *knowing* at all, but only the physicist's *thinking*. The truth is (he holds) that it is the *latter only* that is "discursive," and it is because the Idealist has confused the physicist's knowing with his thinking that he has fallen into the error of supposing that the physicist's *knowing* is discursive.

I find this criticism (which I trust I have stated fairly) very difficult to understand, much less to accept. So far as I can see, the Idealist account is just what it purports to be—an account of the physicist's "knowing" in the only sense in which the physicist, as such, does "know." If it is not also an account of "knowing in the precise sense," the fault, I should argue, does not lie with the Idealist, nor with the physicist's efforts after knowledge, but (if anywhere) with the limited nature of the human mind's capacity for physical knowledge. If we like to give the name of mere "thinking" to whatever

falls short of absolute knowledge, then, of course, the Idealist is describing the physicist's thinking. But there will be no confusion in his mind between the physicist's thinking and the physicist's knowing unless the physicist does in fact practise some way of "absolute knowing." What that way is I have not been able to discover from Prof. Aaron's pages.

Prof. Aaron is of the opinion, however, that he has the support of the physicist himself in denying that what we have here is a description of his "knowing." "But does he [the physicist] suppose," asks Prof. Aaron, "or can it rightly be supposed by anyone, that this system-building is *in itself* an instance of knowing"? Unless the phrase "system-building in itself" be interpreted in a narrow, and in this context illegitimate, manner, the correct answer seems to me to be that, just in so far as the physicist believes his systems to be genuinely systematic, he *does* so suppose. The physicist does not imagine himself to be creating his systems *in vacuo*. From the beginning his theories, his hypothetical systems, are built on the basis of experience, and they are developed throughout in explicit or implicit reference to experience. A theory is not a consistent theory if it does not succeed in "saving the appearances." There is surely no question in the physicist's mind of "theories" divorced from "reality." The purpose of the "theory" is to gain an understanding of reality, and "system" is demanded just because the physicist is convinced that physical reality is itself an orderly or systematic structure.

I spoke just now of a "narrow" interpretation of the phrase "system-building in itself," upon which a different answer might be proper. It is no doubt permissible, in the abstract, to use this phrase to stand only for such mental acts of the scientist as belong to the realms of constructive imagination and supposal. When the scientist constructs alternative theories,

and holds in suspense his final decision upon their respective claims to truth until he has completed the work of verification by reference to all the relevant cognitive experiences, I should agree that during these processes he neither is, nor supposes himself to be, "knowing."

But obviously *this* cannot be the "thinking" of the physicist which the Idealist is accused of confusing with knowing. It would be absurd to suggest that the Idealist's account is confined to the description of processes such as these. That account describes to us *judgments*, as well as construction and supposal (as indeed Prof. Aaron's own rendering of it verbally recognizes). We are told, on any such account, how the conjectural system, which is merely "supposed," undergoes rigorous testing before being "pronounced" or "judged" to be true of reality. But it is superfluous to labour the point. The Idealist's account of the physicist's knowing clearly does not and could not omit to recognize either the physicist's judgments concerning systems or his system-informed judgments about particulars. I think that Prof. Aaron must be going the whole way, and saying that the physicist does not suppose even his systematic judgments about reality to be instances of "knowing."

Of course in one sense the Idealist himself would agree that these are not instances of "knowing." For he would say that the judgments of physics never can achieve ideal completeness of system, and that they therefore must remain partially inadequate vehicles of truth. But he would add at once that since you can get nothing *better* than this in the realm of physics, it is idle to speak of it as *merely* the physicist's "thinking" and not his "knowing."

And what of the physicist's own attitude? Does he really believe that his systematic judgments are instances of a mere "thinking" that is distinct from "knowing"? When he has

laboriously worked his way through alternative theories to one which at last appears to him capable of reconciling all the relevant cognitions, does he really suppose that the "coherence" at which he has been aiming, and which he has now (as he thinks) achieved, is a guarantee only of a very pretty *theory*, and not a criterion of the attainment of *knowledge*? To myself, only one answer seems possible. But it is not, I fear, the answer which commends itself to Prof. Aaron. "If he [the physicist] is told," we learn, "as Mr. Morris's Idealist tells him, that the only test of the validity of his thinking must lie within that thinking itself, namely, in its coherence, he would think this view foolish." Why would he think it foolish? 'For he knows that there is a test of thinking external to thinking itself, namely, knowing." (Happy physicist, to "know" without even the travail of philosophical reflexion that the coherence doctrine of the test of truth is wrong!)

It is to be observed that Prof. Aaron does not, on behalf of the physicist, deny the coherence test outright, but rejects only its claim to be the *sole* test of the validity of thinking. My persistent difficulty is that I cannot discover what is the nature of the *other* test which is called "knowing," and which, when it is available, enables us apparently to "decide between the systems we have built in thought." I shall venture to make one or two observations upon Prof. Aaron's general position in the matter, but I do so with some misgiving, for I recognize that, with the best intentions, I may have failed utterly to grasp the drift of his thought.

(1) Prof. Aaron at least seems to connect the physicist's (alleged) refusal to recognize coherence as the only test of the validity of his thinking with the physicist's assumption "that there exists an independent world of physical things which he is trying to know." I cannot for myself see that this assumption has any bearing on the matter. It *has* a bearing upon the question

of the *meaning* of validity—a bearing which is, in my opinion, quite insufficiently realized by those who hold that coherence is the “nature,” as well as the “test” of validity or truth.

I think that the assumption is definitely incompatible with the view that we *mean* by true thinking coherent thinking. But I do not think that it is in any way incompatible with the view that the *test* of true thinking is its coherence. So far as I can see, the assumption in question can be entertained consistently with any view about the test of truth.

(2) The importance which Prof. Aaron apparently attaches in this connection to the physicist's belief in an independent physical world might suggest that the “knowing” which is to be the test of the validity of thinking has something to do with “sense-perception.” Observing his promise in a footnote “to return later to the question as to the presence or absence of direct knowing in the natural sciences”, I, for one, anticipated a treatment along some such lines. Actually, of course, this is not at all what we find. The range claimed with confidence for direct knowing is a modest one, being virtually confined to mathematical knowledge and the knowledge of implications. Neither of these types of knowing seems capable of serving as the knowing of which we are in search, the knowing that furnishes a test of truth in physics supplementary to (and, as I think is meant, superior to) “coherence.”

As a matter of fact, the perceiving of implications in physics is, I should say, itself made possible only by the acceptance of the coherence test. When we see that, given certain propositions about physical phenomena, a new proposition (not analytically contained in the premises) necessarily follows, is not our seeing that this conclusion follows at bottom a seeing that the given set of propositions cannot be thought coherently with one another if the new proposition be not accepted? We “see the implication,” i.e. we see that *if* the given propositions are true,

this further proposition must be true,* only because we take it for granted that true propositions must be coherent with one another, and because we see that the given propositions can be thought coherently with one another only if the new proposition be accepted. We may take the well-worn illustration of the theoretical deduction of the existence of Neptune. The discoverer of Neptune saw it to be a necessary implication of certain accepted physical propositions that there must exist a body with the particular characteristics of this planet. Its existence was "implied," because only on the assumption of its existence could the given propositions be rendered coherent with one another. Banish the reliance upon coherence, and the "seeing of implications" loses its ultimate foundation.

(3) It seems possible that Prof. Aaron's dissatisfaction (as well as his conviction of the physicist's dissatisfaction) with the coherence test is due, at least in part, to a too narrow view of what "coherence" means for its votaries. Bradley never tired of emphasizing that the "coherence" which is the test of truth involves not merely "internal harmony," but also "comprehensiveness." The two characteristics are, he tried to show, complementary aspects of the ideal of "system." If the coherence test is to receive fair treatment, it is highly important to remember the aspect of "comprehensiveness." Yet it is often forgotten. Mr. Morris, for example, in descanting upon the alleged difficulty for the coherence theory of explaining advances in scientific knowledge, says bluntly that "the coherence theory takes no account of the popular distinction between the Newtonian and the Einsteinian view in terms of *comprehensive-*

* Often, of course, the implication seen is the implication of a "probability." But the general principle underlying the discernment of the "probable" implication is the same. The degree of probability, its approach to certainty, is determined by the degree of coherence that is seen to obtain between the propositions in the premises and the proposition in the conclusion.

ness.”* Mr. Morris’s writings are always stimulating, but here the effect on one reader at least is staggering. Among Bradley’s numerous discussions of the criterion of truth it is difficult to find one that does not stress “comprehensiveness.” And if it be argued that Bradley is not *entitled* to include “comprehensiveness” as one aspect of “coherence,” the obvious rejoinder is that at least he is entitled to have his reasons for including it systematically examined.†

To sum up what I have been saying in recent pages: I see no reason to suppose that the Idealist’s account of the physicist’s “knowing” is an account merely of his “thinking”; I believe that it includes features which the physicist himself regards as knowing—e.g. systematic judgments about reality—and I do not think that it excludes any act or process of the physicist which can lay legitimate claim to the title of “knowing” finally, I have been unable to discover to what further test of valid thinking, beyond “coherence,” the physicist is supposed to appeal.

Prof. Aaron is, however, so firmly convinced that the main errors of the Idealist theory of knowledge are due to confusing thinking and knowing that he has pursued the matter further, and endeavoured to trace the “confusion” to its ultimate source. That source he finds in a perverse theory of inference. As I do not believe that the alleged confusion exists, I am naturally not prepared to find that the Idealist theory of inference has any tendency to promote it. My comments must now, I fear, be perilously brief, but my disagreement with Prof. Aaron on this issue is too acute to be denied all expression.

The gist of Prof. Aaron’s argument is, I think, as follows. For Idealism all knowing is at bottom “inference.” To under-

* *Idealist Logic*, p. 184.

† *Appearance and Reality* (2nd Edition), p. 363 *et seq.* is worth consulting in this connection.

stand inference¹ is thus to understand the essence of knowing. Now inference is defined by Bradley and his school as "the real self-development of an object." This "object" is a "thought-content," which is regarded as growing, like any other organism, and "its growth is inference." But this doctrine, Prof. Aaron holds, is false, and the falsity is of a kind which prevents the Idealist from recognizing a "knowing" which is quite distinct from thinking. A thought-content does not "develop itself." Inference cannot be understood in terms of anything that thought-contents do. The true essence of inference lies in *seeing*, or *knowing*, that the premises imply a certain conclusion. The act of "knowing the implication" is the fundamental thing in inference. And to talk of development, or even passage, of thought-content is "to veil this element from us and to make an adequate account of inference wholly impossible."

There are a number of points in Prof. Aaron's interpretation of the Idealist position which are to me unacceptable. His general identification of that position with "the view that thought, left to itself, will develop out of itself all truth" seems to me unjust to a logic which, like Bradley's, disowns the practicability of the "Dialectic Method,"* and explicitly admits the indispensable function of perception in the attainment of truth.† But it will be enough here to deal only with Prof. Aaron's strictures upon the Idealist's application to inference of the conception of development: for I venture to think that it is a misunderstanding on this point that causes him to charge the Idealist with failure to do justice to, or perhaps even to leave room for, the act of "knowing the implication."

* See especially *Appearance and Reality* (2nd Edition), p. 30, and again pp. 568-9.

† There is a sufficiently clear statement in *Essays on Truth and Reality*, p. 203.

It must be borne in mind, in the first place, that in using the metaphor of development the Idealist is using a *metaphor*. He does not intend that all the features characteristic of biological development should be regarded as relevant to the development of the "ideal object" in inference. One very important difference, stressed by Idealist logic, is that the development of the ideal object in inference is *non-temporal*. There is no temporal lapse within inference proper, any more than there is within judgment proper. What, then, is the special point of the introduction of the metaphor of development? I shall explain as briefly as possible what I take it to be.

I suppose that Prof. Aaron, although he denies "development" and dislikes "passage," will agree that the subject in inference undergoes "change" of *some* kind. If it remains simply the same, there is no thinking or knowing of any sort. It will be agreed also that there is one particular type of change, characteristic of living things, to which we give the name "development" to distinguish it from other types of change. When a sapling grows into a tree, we say that the change undergone is a case of "development." If some one should take it into his head to paint the tree red, white, and blue, the tree will again have undergone change, but this change we should not call "development." The difference is that in the case of "development" the change undergone is thought of as somehow *proceeding from the thing's own internal nature*.

It is, as I understand it, this characteristic of the change in the "ideal object" in inference which leads Bradley and others to speak of its "self-development." The new qualification which the ideal object accepts must be apprehended, if we are to have "inference," as something not externally imposed, but as pertaining to it by reason of its own nature. I may think of an isosceles triangle, and go on, on the basis of mere memory, to

think of the angles at its base as equal to one another. Here there is no inference, for the change in the ideal object is not apprehended as proceeding from its own nature. If, on the other hand, my thought of the isosceles triangle as having its basic angles equal arises from my apprehension that the nature of an isosceles triangle is such that this property inherently belongs to it, the "change" is seen to proceed from the ideal object's own nature, and we do say that we have "inferred."

This is, I think, the main reason, and also the sufficient justification, for taking the essence of inference to lie in "the self-development of an ideal object." And when it is thus understood, I cannot see that there is anything in this doctrine incompatible with a due recognition of the act of "knowing the implication." My "knowing the implication" in the above instance is my seeing that an isosceles triangle, considered in its nature as a definitive member of the spatial system, must, in virtue of certain relationships which membership of that system imposes, possess the property of having the angles at its base equal to one another. The doctrine of "the self-development of an ideal object" is just an attempt to bring out what the inner being of an "implication" is, to bring out that there is no inference unless the change in the subject of it, the "ideal object," is recognized as mediated by *its own nature*. I quite agree with Prof. Aaron that by means of the conception of development Bradley tries "to get into the implication itself." Only I should have thought that at least to try to do this was the business of every logician.

My submission is, then, that if the knowing which the Idealist account of inference is supposed to neglect be identified, as it seems here to be identified, with the act of "seeing the implication," there is in fact neither neglect of it nor a tendency to neglect it.

I must in conclusion voice my regret that this paper should have been almost wholly critical. But I have felt that it would be futile to offer a constructive treatment which would inevitably be based upon epistemological presuppositions foreign to the paper upon which it followed.

