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COLONIAL ADMINISTRATION

PRINCIPLES AND METHODS OF

COLONIAL ADMINISTRATION

COLSTON PAPERS *based on a Symposium promoted by the* COLSTON RESEARCH SOCIETY *and the* UNIVERSITY OF BRISTOL *in April* 1950

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Preface

THIS VOLUME PRESENTS the contributions to the Symposium on Principles and Methods of Colonial Administration held in April 1950 in the University of Bristol under the auspices of the Colston Research Society.

The Society was founded—as the University College Colston Society—in 1899, and was named after the noted philanthropist and educationalist EDWARD COLSTON, who lived in Bristol from 1636 to 1721. The Society was a body of citizens who wished to assist the University College and to foster the idea of a university in Bristol. Its annual dinners were the occasions for making collections to aid the College and were graced by the presence of such distinguished guests as JAMES BRYCE, MICHAEL FOSTER and LORD HALDANE. At the dinner of 1908 the public announcement was made of the first of the many benefactions by the Wills family, which made possible the foundation of the University and the erection of its main buildings.

The Society continued as a link between city and university and, having assumed its present title, devoted itself to providing funds for carrying on research in the University. It made grants for special expenses and for the purchase of expensive apparatus, and it spread its subventions over the whole range of academic subjects. For a generation its assistance was freely given and accepted with gratitude and was responsible for a constant flow of original work by members of the staff of the University. By 1938 its annual grants had passed the £1,000 level.

In recent years, however, it had become clear that the financing of research work would become more and more a matter for government action and that the role of the Society in this respect would be relatively unimportant. But it was essential that so valuable a link between city and university should persist and continue to exercise its happy influence. The Society must find some function, not otherwise provided for, the utility of which should appeal equally to both groups of its members. The decision was taken to promote a series of annual symposia. The visitors to these would live together in the agreeable surroundings of a University Hall. They would meet the members of the Society at a reception. Together they would be addressed by one of the distinguished guests. Such conferences are common today, but no other body is in a position to assume responsibility for a series, the subjects for which may be chosen from the whole range of philosophy, arts and science, the particular subject for a given year selected as that most ripe for discussion and most likely to be fertile in result.

The Colston Research Society is therefore promoting, in collaboration with the University, a series of such symposia. The contributions are being published in a series of volumes of *Colston Papers* and of these the present volume is the third.

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Introduction

FIFTY years ago the colonial question was a dominant theme in the foreign policies of various European and other powers. The closing decades of the nineteenth century had been marked by a growing recognition of the importance of overseas possessions and thus the British mid-Victorian view that colonies were useless encumbrances, to be got rid of as soon as possible, had been replaced by the belief in the economic as well as the other advantages of "dominion over palm and pine". During the past thirty years France had re-entered the colonial field with an energy that was reminiscent of the seventeenth century, and Germany was clamouring for a place in the sun, proportionate to her power and importance. Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy, therefore, staked out for themselves claims to various parts of the Continent of Africa, and Portugal also joined in the scramble. That country now proclaimed her sovereignty over territories in the interior of the Continent, which she had long regarded as hers, but which hitherto she had tended to ignore.

The conflicting interests of rival colonial powers clashed in South East Asia, the Far East and the South West Pacific as well. While, by 1900, a number of disputes had been settled, many still remained to embitter international relations, and no colonial power was wholly satisfied. Great Britain, France and Germany glared at each other in angry suspicion, while Italy, despite the defeat she had sustained at the hands of the Ethiopians, was still territorially ambitious. In the Far East, Japan looked abroad for new lands to acquire, in which she might settle her surplus population, find markets for her products as well as sources of raw materials for her industries. Even the United States, normally prone to be censorious on such matters, had recently succumbed to the prevailing disease of acquisitiveness.

At that time there were few people in the world who questioned the right of colonial powers to exercise their rule over so-called backward peoples. Science had given a new significance to the products of the tropics, but the people of these undeveloped regions were weak and ignorant. Though by 1900 slave ships had at last been driven from the sea, the slave trade was still rampant in parts of tropical Africa. Even in areas where the slave trader did not appear, the life of the aboriginal was often miserable. Long standing and deadly feuds divided tribe from tribe and people from people, while yellow fever, leprosy, elephantiasis, malaria and a long list of other scourges, with impartial malevolence, struck down the victorious warrior and his victim, slave trader and his slaves. These primitive peoples of the tropics were defective in political organization. They lacked the techniques and the weapons of civilized men and were quite incapable of offering any effective resistance to the forces that now confronted them, even if there had been any wish on their part to do so. With his miraculous powers of healing and his still more miraculous powers of destruction the white man must have appeared

to them half god, half demon, and he still had complete faith in his own capacity and in his right to rule. He was certain that his way of life was in every respect superior to that of the people among whom he came, and indeed, it was part of his mission to show them a better way. All Europeans agreed that this meant changing the Africans' mode of life in many ways but there was a wide divergence of opinion as to what this entailed. Even at that time there was violent opposition to the view held by some people that the native African should be made as much like the European as his dark skin and nature would permit.

Though this arrogance was wrong and stupid, it is nevertheless true that civilized man had many good things to offer the African in return for the products of his land. He had the power to repress slavery, to establish peace and the rule of law, he brought good roads and railways, better agriculture, education, medical science, and many other desirable things. In the present age the Western European appears almost to have lost all faith in himself and there is a danger that he may tend to err in the other direction by under-estimating his capacity for good. From the point of view of aboriginal peoples it may well be that this abject self-depreciation is as harmful as the previous arrogant self-confidence.

It was clear that the native Africans would never develop their country by their own unaided efforts, and yet by 1900 it was also clear that this development was inevitable. Since this was so, it was obviously desirable that it should take place under the direction of civilized states that acknowledged some responsibility for the well-being of aboriginal peoples, over whom they extended their rule. Otherwise, as their continued isolation from the rest of the world was no longer possible, the primitive peoples of the tropics might become the prey of unscrupulous men similar to those who had brought misery to the South Sea islands a generation earlier. Judging from the experience of the South Pacific, such men might be expected to regard the native inhabitants as savages to be plundered or enslaved. Had there been no effective national control exercised on the opening up of Africa, the crimes which were perpetrated there would have exceeded those that stained the history of Oceania a thousandfold. Wrongs were indeed committed in Africa, but the fact that the partition of that continent was carried through by civilized states to some extent lessened the evil.

Fifty years ago, even though the colonial question vexed the chancelleries, public opinion in the various metropolitan states was but slightly concerned with the welfare of the colonial peoples in any positive sense. In a vague way the British knew that for almost a century their country had conducted a costly struggle against slavery. Ever since the days of Wilberforce and Buxton, Exeter Hall had kept a vigilant eye upon British policy towards primitive people and, though its criticisms were not always wise or just, its influence on the whole was beneficent. Religious and philanthropic bodies exercised a similar restraining influence abroad on the policies of their respective governments. In the main, however, colonies were chiefly valued as sources of raw materials, or as markets, and their peoples

were little considered except as consumers and producers, though it is true that missionary bodies regarded the Africans, as well as other aboriginal men and women, as souls to be saved. The plain fact was that Europeans, generally, fifty years ago, were almost entirely ignorant of aboriginal peoples. Indeed, to-day, such knowledge is lamentably limited. Although colonial powers were beginning to compose their differences and although certain conventions had come to be accepted by them in relation to these territories, there was as yet no international acceptance by the civilized world of responsibility for the well-being of backward peoples.

Since 1900, changes have been so rapid and so many that it is difficult to recapture the point of view of fifty years ago. Two wars, conducted on a scale previously unknown to man, have been fought out to their bitter end. In consequence the world is to-day the poorer in material things by the waste of a fabulous quantity of resources of all kinds. The first war destroyed millions of men in the flower of their youth and though the toll of human life in the second was not so great it was still sufficiently grievous. Germany, the dominant power in Europe in 1900, is in 1950 weak and divided. She is still occupied by foreign powers; her Navy has been swept from the sea for the second time; her colonial empire is a matter of history. Italy, also, has lost an empire, though she has been permitted by her late enemies, in view of her wise but somewhat belated conversion to the Allied cause, to administer one of her former colonies for a period of years under international direction. The power of Japan has been temporarily destroyed; her island dependencies have been wrenched from her grasp and the Continent of Asia is locked against her.

The British Empire has altered almost beyond recognition. Ireland has become a foreign republic. The self-governing colonies of 1900 have passed through Dominion status to complete nationhood. The Indian Empire has been split into two separate independent sovereign states, and the days of Curzon now seem almost as remote as the days of Akbar. At one step Ceylon passed from colony to dominion and Burma has quitted the Commonwealth. Meanwhile, similar and equally revolutionary changes have taken place in the empires of France and Holland, while Belgium has become a successful colonial power. Portugal has been putting her overseas house in order and the United States has established the Philippines as an independent nation.

Equally momentous changes have also taken place in the international sphere during this first half of the twentieth century. At the close of the first war the League of Nations came into existence and Article 22 of the League Covenant stated:

> " To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them, and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied

the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilization and that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in this Covenant.

"The best method of giving practical effect to this principle is that the tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted to advanced nations, who by reason of their resources, their experience, or their geographical position, can best undertake this responsibility and who are willing to accept it, and that this tutelage should be exercised by them as Mandatories on behalf of the League.

"The character of the Mandate must differ according to the stage of the development of the people, the geographical situation of the territory, its economic conditions, and other similar circumstances."

Thus the principle of the international responsibility for the well-being of backward peoples was recognized. But the high hopes of the better world which the League was to inaugurate were soon dashed. Although the Mandates Commission did much excellent work its full effectiveness was impaired by the growing infirmity of the League. Before the close of the thirties it was plain to all that this great international experiment, which had held out so much hope for mankind, was a failure. So, within twenty years of the close of the war that had been fought to end war, the world was plunged into a second and even more destructive conflict. At its close the United Nations came into existence. This organization was to be so constituted as to avoid all the defects of the League of Nations and to preserve all its desirable features. But from its inception the new body has been seriously weakened by irreconcilable dissensions; under the leadership of Soviet Russia the Slavonic bloc has continued to be unco-operative and has maintained an attitude of suspicion and hostility to the other members of the organization and in particular towards the so-called "imperialist powers".

The states which had been mandatory powers under the League, with the exception of South Africa, agreed to continue the administration of the territories that had been entrusted to them, as trustees under the new authority. But here, as elsewhere, the work of the organization has suffered from the schism between East and West. Even without the malign influence of the Soviets the task of the trustee states would still have been sufficiently difficult, for some of the smaller nations also are profoundly suspicious of colonial powers in general. If these critics could have their way all non-autonomous peoples would at once become wards of the United Nations irrespective of their own wishes or of the rights of the powers to which they owe allegiance. In some instances the motive of these opponents of colonialism has been the honest wish to serve the interests of backward peoples, but in others it has been of a very different nature. Whatever the motive, this attitude of hostility is to a large extent unreasonable. Some members of the United Nations are no more advanced than some of the peoples over whom they would like to exercise control. Some of them are even more backward.

They have no previous experience of colonial administration and they attach no significance to the experience which metropolitan powers have accumulated in the past centuries. They are almost entirely ignorant of the work that has been done in non-autonomous areas by Western powers, but they persist in thinking of themselves as liberators, who would free oppressed peoples from intolerable suffering. They cannot believe that millions of colonial people take considerable pride in their present citizenship and that they would resent being transferred against their wishes to the care of an organization whose future is by no means secure.

In non-autonomous territories the changes of the past half-century have been no less remarkable. Economic and social advance in some places has been striking, though deplorably slow in others. Colonial peoples are ceasing to be the docile acceptors of external rule that they once were. The white man is rapidly losing his mysterious power and indigenous peoples are coming to regard him as a man very much like themselves, who happens to know a few more tricks. Though they may still be proud of their connections with Great Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Portugal and the United States, they are also becoming more and more conscious of their own identity. The spirit of nationalism grows stronger every day. It has appeared in the West Indies, it is rapidly spreading throughout Africa and it has triumphed in South East Asia. With the examples of India, Burma, Indonesia and Indo-China before them, it is natural that colonial leaders should wish to lead their own peoples along similar paths. This spirit may be vague, indeterminate and of various kinds, but it is powerful. Its appearance, however, should not cause metropolitan powers any undue perturbation. Its growth was inevitable and it does not necessarily imply any repugnance to them. Indeed, if they are wise they will welcome colonial nationalism, and in partnership with colonial peoples they will help to direct it in such a way that it may be made of the greatest good to the peoples themselves and to the world at large. As yet the future of colonial nationalism is far from clear, for at the moment it stands at the parting of the ways and it is by no means certain which way it will go. Non-autonomous peoples may decide to continue along the road which has led them thus far, and if they do this they will maintain their present association with the free nations of the world, and move forward to full nationhood as members of the Western family. They may, however, decide to turn violently Left, take the Communist road and march under the hammer and sickle. It is, therefore, the task of the free nations to show non-autonomous peoples that the way of the West is indeed the better way and this must be done in deed as well as in word. So long as hunger, disease and ignorance prevail in dependent territories, so long may the Communists hope to sweep all these people some day into their net. Moreover, if dependent peoples come to believe that metropolitan powers are unswervingly opposed to their national aspirations they will naturally draw closer to the Communists, who also are opposed by the democracies, and grasp

the hand of "Comrade" Stalin. If this disaster is to be avoided Western civilization must bring to its task courage, wise sympathy and above all imagination.

In consequence of the changes that have taken place in the past half-century, colonial powers, as they were formerly called, are no longer rivals, they are partners, upon whom is poured the unmeasured denunciation of the U.S.S.R. and her satellites. These metropolitan powers are not merely, however, partners in this negative sense, they are partners in a positive sense as well. Thus since the war a considerable interchange of experience has taken place between them. The Caribbean Commission and the South West Pacific Commission have been set up to study problems that are common to these respective areas and to evolve general principles of policy for the good of all. These bodies consist not only of representatives of metropolitan powers but of representatives of the non-autonomous peoples as well. Again, during this same period, a number of conferences of experts of various kinds have been convened; there has been some pooling of knowledge and resources and this co-operation must increase with the years. This partnership must be a true partnership, not a façade behind which old jealousies and rivalries are allowed to continue, the more deadly because concealed.

With the exception of a few scholars, officials and experts in each of the countries concerned, there is little knowledge in any of them about what their partners have been trying to do in their dependencies and what they are doing to-day. Yet, it is quite evident that in the common interest it is desirable that each should have a clear grasp of the others' past policy as well as present intentions and work.

The foregoing were some of the reasons which suggested that a Symposium on the Principles and Methods of Colonial Administration would serve a useful purpose at the present time. The papers contained in this volume consist of two groups. The writers of the first six deal with the historical background and seek to explain the methods and principles which their respective countries have applied. These papers were intended to be mainly descriptive, but some of the writers could not resist the temptation to launch out on the sea of speculation. The second group, that is Paper VII to the end, deals with particular problems and subjects that are common to all non-autonomous territories. Here full rein was given both in the papers and discussions to the expression of individual opinion and some of the contributors have been refreshingly frank in their criticisms. French and English were the official languages of the Symposium, the papers have been written either in one or other of these two as the author wished. In order to aid those who find either French or English difficult to follow short précis of each paper were prepared in the alternative language. The discussions also were conducted in both languages. It was intended that the summaries of discussions should be printed in French and English, but owing to limitation of space this proved to be impossible. The editor was confronted with the choice of excessively short summaries in both languages, which might have turned out to be misleading, or more lengthy summaries in English only. On the whole it

seemed wise to adopt the latter course and I apologize to French and Belgian contributors and to any others who may thereby have been inconvenienced. It is hoped that this volume, despite its defects and its incompleteness, for no references are made in it to the colonial policies of Germany, Russia, Italy or Japan, will nevertheless prove of some interest to those who are in any way concerned with non-autonomous peoples.

I wish to express my thanks to my colleagues, Mr E. W. Evans and Mr P. V. McGrath, for their invaluable assistance, to Mr. F. J. Warne, who acted as translator, and to Professor W. McC. Stewart for his generous collaboration. I am most grateful to all the contributors of papers for their willing co-operation throughout, and lastly I wish to thank my secretary, Miss M. E. Nichols, who contributed so largely to the success of the Symposium.

C. M. MacInnes

Principles and Methods of Administration in the British Colonial Empire

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THE empirical character of the British mind provides a well worn theme. No comparative exposition of national psychology is complete without some contrast between British empiricism and Latin rationalism; between British suspicion of the abstract and the fascination which the abstract exercises on the more logical and the more systematic Latin mind. In the political sphere, the same distinction in mental habit is detected in the contrast between the alleged Latin attachment to centralization and the alleged British attachment to decentralization. Such distinctions are easily over-emphasized. British practice doubtless pivots on precedent rather than on principle. Indeed, the great deference paid to precedents is one of the most striking features of the English common law. But both precedent and principle lead their addicts to much the same destination in the long run; and, as often as not, in the short run. Precedents end in systems. They are only principles in reverse. Successively invoked and applied, they have the same unifying influence. No less than principles, they lead to identity of method and performance. Thus the practice of British rule in Britain's overseas dependencies has come to exhibit much that is common form and seems likely to follow a more or less identical course in the immediate future.

This is all the more remarkable when account is taken of the almost bewildering diversity in all essential features of the component parts of the British Colonial Empire. They are admittedly all alike, or very nearly so, in the paradoxical sense that colonial, as an epithet, is in every instance inapposite, with the possible exception of the small and isolated colony of the Falkland Islands in the far south of the Atlantic Ocean. Relics of an earlier era of colonization also survive in the structure of society in the plantation colonies of the West Indies and of some others. But there is nothing colonial, unless it is Asian colonization or the presence of a small minority of European settlers in the East African highlands, in the tropical and sub-tropical parts of Africa and in Malaya, which together constitute almost the whole of the present-day Colonial Empire in population and territory. Most of the Colonial Empire has some semblance of a common climatic denominator in that most of it lies in tropical or sub-tropical latitudes. But, demographically, it is utterly diverse. And it represents not only an enormous variety of races and cultures, but an equal variety of physical endowment and material equipment. Its component parts vary no less in size. Gibraltar is no bigger than a municipal

borough. Nigeria measures nearly half a million square miles. The circumstances in which different parts of it came under British rule were equally diverse. Besides the remnants left over from the first British Empire disrupted by the American Revolution, there were conquered colonies and ceded colonies detached from some previous allegiance that was European but not British. There were colonies acquired, like some of the Straits Settlements, from Oriental princes by methods resembling those known to commerce as the hire-purchase system. There were gifts reminiscent of the testamentary alienation of their domains to the ancient Roman Republic by some of the kings who ruled on the Eastern Mediterranean seaboard in the last century B.C. In one of the islands of the Pacific, for example, a chieftain showed a quite unsolicited alacrity to surrender himself and his people to the tutelage of the great white Queen. More recently, there were added protectorates and protected states; and, more recently still, mandated territories. The Colonial Empire is a miscellany, without internal affinities or any of the natural ingredients of cohesion, ethnologically, geographically or politically.

In spite of the great diversity of Britain's coloured Empire (as it may properly be called), methods of British rule have followed a remarkably consistent course. Like other colonial powers Britain, during the nineteenth century, enjoyed the advantage of an unchallenged title to rule over dependent peoples; so long, at least, as her title was not challenged by some European rival anxious to forestall or supplant her in the same dominant capacity. Otherwise, her hand was free, and she was unconscious of restraints other than those which were self-imposed. She felt in no way accountable for her behaviour to her subordinates or to any tribunal of world opinion. The era of international organizations competing with national states for the loyalties of dependent peoples lay far ahead. No formidable world power had yet arisen to preach the gospel of anti-imperialism. Within the colonial powers themselves voices were, of course, raised on behalf of oppressed or depressed minorities, or more often majorities, among the dependent peoples. But the removal of abuses was not sought in equality of status or in the political emancipation of the dependencies. On the contrary, reformers advocated the re-direction, or even the intensification, of political control from the metropolitan centre.

Britain thus embarked on her career as an imperial power in the nineteenth century free from the embarrassments and inhibitions which had vexed her as a colonial power and from which she only freed herself through the advent of responsible self-government in the colonies of settlement. Her mood at the outset was authoritarian, and she was free to indulge it. Memories of the French Revolution had left an atmosphere favourable to advocates of authoritarian methods at home and overseas alike. In India, British authority was long majestically employed in applying the Virgilian maxim of *parcere subjectis et debellare superbos*. In the coloured Empire, the British applied a method which they have always found congenial and which has been progressively expanded. The method

is that of administration, or the discharge of the executive and judicial functions of government, through the medium of existing institutions. For convenience, it can be called indirect rule. No dependency which came under British rule was without established public institutions of some kind, except in a few of the remoter recesses of tropical Africa; and it was quickly discovered that such institutions could be turned to use without conflicting with the national aims which the political directors of the Colonial Empire were concerned to pursue. Innovation is a costly and laborious business, even among pliant peoples, if only because those peoples are too ignorant of the processes of innovation to collaborate effectively. The scrapping and replacement of existing institutions needs men and money, if not munitions. Moreover, the respect for established usage is inseparable from the deep-seated British belief in the natural organic growth of human institutions, including the institutions appropriate to government. In politics, as in religion, the British are Protestant. Institutional tolerance is the corollary of a disbelief in universals; and in the coloured Empire institutional tolerance involved no surrender of imperial control, but only some adaptation, generally gradual and not too painful, of existing institutions to the purposes of British rule. As a testimony to British attachment to institutional tolerance, the coloured Empire to-day exhibits survivals of codes of law, both written and unwritten, and systems of judicial administration which are essentially alien. French law, Roman-Dutch law and Islamic law are all in evidence. Asian and African systems of land tenure have had a persistent influence on the administrative structure of government. Princely or chieftainly forms of government are preserved in many dependencies in deference to established usage. Institutional tolerance has its shortcomings and its aberrations. The latter are mostly confined to areas remote from European influence or actively resistant to its impact, where institutional tolerance has passed from conservatism to archaism. Within the official British hierarchy, it has tended to create a caste of " illuminati " claiming special insight into the native mind and deluding themselves and others with myths and shibboleths calculated to perpetuate an isolationism both politically and economically retrograde. More captious critics of British performance are doubtless entitled to detect in institutional conservatism a congenital arrogance which holds the lesser breeds without the law unworthy of the institutions which the authentic sons of Britain cherish as their inalienable birthright. Like Gambetta's anti-clericalism, the British way of life has not been looked on as a suitable article for export.

It is in the economic sphere that Britain has become sensitive to the shortcomings of institutional conservatism. From institutional conservatism, it is only a short step to cultural segregation. And cultural segregation is hardly compatible with the initiation of dependent peoples into the sciences and technical accomplishments, if not the arts, of western Europe which are an indispensable part of their economic education in a world which has become unified in an economic sense. British rule is now moving, reluctantly and resignedly, away from institutional

conservatism in the direction of assimilation. Economically, assimilation is doubtless more progressive. But it can be ruthless; and, in face of active resistance, actively repressive. It tends to give unrestricted rein to commercial and industrial enterprise. It lacks the protective paternalism inherent in the principle of trusteeship, though its impulses find expression in liberal social behaviour alien to British temperament, breaking through colour bars and not even shrinking from racial inter-marriage. But it is becoming clearer that the principle of trusteeship congenial to British temperament and tradition must be interpreted with some flexibility. Official authority during recent decades has not always erred on the side of cordiality towards the exponents of economic enterprise. But the interdependence of welfare and wealth dictates a more cordial attitude. The corporation engaged in trade or plantation development must be accommodated at least as a necessary evil, and the state must find the means of protecting the weak against the asperities of a competitive world. It remains to be seen whether the task of the state will be eased by present projects for development through the agency of public corporations.

In the political field, the gradual retreat of British rule from institutional conservatism on the old lines is apparent. Originally intended as a measure of appeasement, *inter alia*, institutional conservatism is now under fire from snipers in the ranks of colonial nationalism. Too many representatives of the dependent peoples, notably in tropical Africa, have fallen between two stools. They have tasted neither the fruits of institutional conservatism nor those of assimilation. For them traditional institutions have no value and, in a mood of political restlessness exacerbated by the discomfort of an institutional vacuum, they look to European models of government. In the last analysis, assimilation and direct rule, which is its handmaid, may be more realistic and more humane. Time will show whether British rule is successful in its more recent attempts to preserve established institutions while transforming their character; as, for example, the conversion of tribal systems of African government into agencies for the indoctrination of Africans in new political ideas and methods. Root-and-branch methods of destruction do violence to the deep-seated British belief in the organic growth of human institutions, to which reference has already been made. *Les institutions corrompent les hommes* is a sentiment which comes more readily to a Frenchman, though the British might be ready to subscribe to the converse proposition.

Institutional conservatism has hitherto been the mainstay of British rule in the administrative or executive sphere of government. In the support of British rule, institutional conservatism has had a twin prop in representative government. In all forms of government, the crucial power is the power to tax. In it lies the mainspring of political control. Outside a few remnants of an older colonial empire in which legislative authority was partially subjected to popular control, the dependent peoples had been accustomed in the pre-British era to autocratic forms of government in which they were treated as tributaries of the state, sub-

missively rendering to Caesar the things that Caesar might claim, rather than as contributors by consent, let alone as arbiters of their destiny in a changing society. They understood obedience; and they understood revolt. Self-direction and self-help were concepts which lay outside their mental horizons. The moral basis of political obedience was unchallenged, just as the propriety of institutions sanctioned by immutable law and custom, which the British were quick to turn to account, was also unchallenged.

There might be friction between the home government and its official agents in the dependencies. "Prancing proconsuls" might become restive under directives and restraints which they held to be ill-judged. If the pressure from metropolitan directors became light, proconsuls might prance uncurbed. In point of fact pressure was never seriously relaxed. Once the controversies centering round the question of slavery had been settled, whole decades went by during which the affairs of the coloured empire raised no issues capable of inflaming political passions at home or of agitating the domestic politics of Britain. But two perennial preoccupations kept the coloured empire within the purview of the watch-dogs of Whitehall; firstly, the maintenance of conditions of internal security so as to give economic enterprise a permanent right of way and assured elbow-room; and secondly, the avoidance of expenditure which might lead to demands on the British tax-payer. Continuous invigilation rather than continuous interference was the main concern of the home government, while economic development progressed, stagnated or retrogressed in accordance with the prevailing practice of *laissez faire*.

Such conditions, on the face of it, were not propitious to anything but an authoritarian form of government. In the coloured empire representative government of the Crown Colony variety was only authoritarian government in disguise. It involved no surrender of imperial control. It originated early in the nineteenth century in Ceylon in a desire to add dignity to the proceedings of the legislative authority by giving them publicity and by surrounding them with an imposing ritual. Moreover, in several communities contemporary British sentiment was offended by the fact that men of affairs of such unimpeachable standing as leading planters or merchants, particularly when British-born, were excluded from all participation in the business of government. Unadulterated bureaucracy is repugnant to British tradition and temperament; government at the highest level is regarded as the function of the layman rather than of the professional; and the insistence of the imperial authorities on financial self-sufficiency in each individual dependency strengthened the case for some organic relationship between the government and those who by their enterprise were the principal creators of taxable wealth and the principal contributors to the taxes levied on it. At the same time, in the view of the imperial authorities, the assignment of a constitutional status, however subordinate, in the legislative authority to unofficial representatives of local interests provided a useful restraint on proconsular intolerance

or self-importance and gave officialdom access to useful local knowledge. Representative government conferred no responsibilities on the accredited representatives of the dependent peoples. It only conceded a right of suggestion or remonstrance. That its proceedings were invested with the pomp and the ritual of responsible parliamentary government borrowed direct from Westminster is a phenomenon without political significance. It is one of many instances of the deep British attachment to ceremonial. Under the influence of precedent representative government spread widely and rapidly, until it has now become the standard constitutional pattern of government in its legislative functions throughout the coloured Empire. It is capable of much variation in detail, but within very circumscribed limits and always without any vital surrender of imperial control in favour of colonial self-government. Had it been otherwise, it is doubtful, to say the least of it, whether even the powerful force of precedent would have carried representative government with such buoyant ease into vast territories in tropical Africa held together only by the cement of British rule no less than into self-contained and well-established communities like the smaller island dependencies. Representative government in the coloured Empire was never intended to foreshadow any real transfer of power from the home government to some local authority. It was never intended to be the forerunner of responsible government. It was intended to achieve both stability and finality in the constitutional development of the coloured Empire.

It might be claimed that institutional conservatism and representative government provided an impressive example of political common sense and diplomatic adroitness; a judicious blend of caution, economy of effort and benevolence; an object-lesson in the application of the maxim *suaviter in modo, fortiter in re*. Even if the claim were conceded, counter-claims would now be vigorously pressed. Colonial powers now have to reckon with a new phenomenon in the political foreground. This is colonial nationalism which, in its assault on the hitherto accepted basis of the political obedience of the dependent peoples, is now able to appeal to powerful agencies in the world at large for material and moral support. Colonial nationalism appears at first sight as a purely disintegrating agency and as a threat to the national strength of the colonial powers. Britain's reactions suggest a rather different outlook on it and a growing readiness to turn it to good account rather than a disposition towards either frontal resistance or to capitulation in the face of a disruptive, if inevitable, force.

Britain's first official reaction took the form of somewhat non-committal pronouncements. Britain's aim, so it was declared, was to lead the dependent peoples to self-government, or to train them for it. Such professions did not differ greatly from some earlier professions of intentions in relation to India in face of Indian nationalism. To promise self-government on the condition of the political, or more generalized, capacity of the recipient is no very serious commitment; at least not for immediate practical purposes. When the promise is accompanied by

an undertaking to promote material welfare and economic development, as was the case, there is a natural presumption that some standard of material performance is also a preliminary condition of self-government. The argument as to eligibility for self-government can be prolonged indefinitely, because eligibility remains a matter of opinion or argument. But the first official pronouncements were soon qualified by an important rider. The objective was no longer defined as self-government in the sense of complete autonomy or independence, but as self-government within the British Empire or Commonwealth. The official mind was coming to think of the relationship between Britain and each dependency no longer as an isolated bi-lateral relationship, but to think more in terms of the British Commonwealth. A significant straw in the wind was a pronouncement in response to the demands of Cypriot Greeks for Enosis, or union with Greece. The Cypriot Greeks were assured that Cyprus would remain a prosperous and valued member of the British Commonwealth. British colonial statesmanship seems to be feeling its way towards a policy of accommodating the claims of colonial nationalism so long as accommodation can be found within the framework of the Commonwealth.

Self-government within the Commonwealth is a formula that implies little more than the recognition of the physical limitations, notably in man-power and natural resources, of the individual units of the Colonial Empire. It falls short of unqualified self-determination; of the rights of peoples to dispose of their own destinies in conformity with the Wilsonian formula of 1919. But much has happened since 1919 to give an air of unreality to the Wilsonian formula. Without an effective system of collective security, or some international equivalent, self-determination must remain, as it always has been, the luxury of a very small minority of high-powered national states in the front rank as world powers. Lesser states may have enjoyed the same luxury fortuitously or precariously through the hazards of power politics. Legalistic conceptions of sovereignty, in which all sovereign states are equated without regard to variations of national strength, have obscured the hard realities of a world in which the rule of law reinforced by adequate sanctions has never yet governed international behaviour. Many sovereign states have now learnt that their territorial integrity, for example, is not secured in the event of war by any legal fiction of neutral rights in a world in which modern technology has made warfare ubiquitous. New precedents of far-reaching significance have been established. Even a power of the rank of Britain has admitted a *de facto* relaxation of territorial sovereignty by conceding to the United States facilities for operating service bases on British colonial soil in several island or seaboard dependencies in the Caribbean area. Self-evident limitations of sovereignty are becoming familiar; and it is increasingly recognized that without vast resources in man-power and industrial potential the ingredients of independence are lacking.

Not a single unit of the coloured Empire, nor even any regional combination

such as a West Indian federation or a combination of British territories in East or West Africa, is conceivably qualified for self-government, or can become so qualified within measurable distance of time, on any rating of individual economic capacity. The economic qualification must be merged in a wider and more generalized estimate of status, such as participation in the Commonwealth and, therefore, eligibility to draw on the general resources of the Commonwealth. The Constitution of the French Union includes the following provision: "The members of the French Union put into a common pool the totality of their means to guarantee the defence of the whole of the Union. The Government of the Republic assumes the co-ordination of these means and the direction of the policy to prepare and assure this defence." His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom cannot do otherwise for the defence of the lesser units of the British Commonwealth. This commitment of itself limits autonomy in the coloured Empire. The imperial authorities must at least be empowered to secure access to strategic resources, control of strategic facilities and a general direction of external, as distinct from domestic, affairs. It would be idle to disguise the far-reaching character of these limitations to self-government in the coloured Empire but the experience of recent history has limited the pretensions of states to unqualified autonomy, and the principle of co-operation demands, in the nature of things, a degree of subordination which, in the face of so many examples, the most sensitive colonial nationalists might learn to tolerate without any sense of humiliation. Shortly before the secession of the American Colonies from the First British Empire, a British statesman expressed the prevailing contemporary view when he declared: "We owe the colonies protection; they owe us obedience." A partial obedience is inseparable from protection, but it need only be partial. To partial obedience Ceylon, which now enjoys at least formal rank as a Dominion of the Commonwealth, has readily submitted. An important precedent has been established. Or rather a precedent had been followed, for Malta was already in enjoyment of full powers of domestic self-government while subordinate to the imperial government in powers of wider imperial concern. There are evidences that this precedent will be invoked and repeated, *more Britannico*.

A division of powers between a central authority and a number of constituent units is, of course, the essence of the federal systems which have come into being in recent history both inside and outside the British Commonwealth. A corresponding division of powers between two mutually exclusive authorities is technically known as dyarchy. The term came to be applied to constitutional experiments in India shortly after the first world war; but dyarchy was practised to a limited degree, though not under that name, during the first experimental period of responsible government in the major British colonies, as they then were, a century ago. In India, dyarchy failed because it was introduced too late and with a division of powers too heavily weighted on the side of the imperial government. Its future career may be happier in other parts of the Commonwealth. The step

from a division of powers in principle to a transfer of powers in practice may be a short or a long one. It can, of course, only be taken when some body recognized as competent and capable of enforcing its authority is established in a dependency in process of political promotion to take over the powers transferred. It is certainly difficult to foresee the emergence of such a body within measurable distance of time, at least under conditions of political equality, in the larger dependencies of tropical Africa, in some of which there are European minorities who make no secret of their disbelief in political equality for all races. Home rule, as many nationalists have good reason to know, gives a sharp edge to the further question of who is to rule at home. In any event, political development in the coloured Empire is becoming more clearly related to defence and to the wider issues affecting the Commonwealth, with a corresponding release from restraints imposed by individual economic insufficiency. So long as the concept of self-government was associated with that of national self-sufficiency, this association, when applied to the colqured Empire, virtually ruled out political progress, though there might be a vague admission of the possibility of some ultimate arrival at the level of self-government for a lucky few. Membership of the Commonwealth is now coming to be looked on as the cardinal qualifying condition of political progress through a restricted form of self-government, though complete within defined limits and applicable under a very wide variety of conditions. The same qualification is also recognized as entitling a dependency to a share in the financial resources of the imperial exchequer, not only on humanitarian grounds and for the benefit of dependencies as individual units, but for the benefit of the Commonwealth as a whole. Indeed, in most public discussion the emphasis has tended to fall on the latter rather than on the former aspect of the policy embodied in the creation of the Colonial Development and Welfare Fund and of public corporations to undertake development in the coloured Empire. Any success that this policy may achieve cannot fail to augment the collective resources of the Commonwealth. There is, of course, no attempt to define mutual obligations or commitments in any constitutional instrument applicable to the coloured Empire, as there is in the Constitution of the French Union in the article previously quoted, but the British outlook on the coloured Empire is now informed by a federal spirit which opens new horizons to colonial nationalism and may provide a corrective to its more morbid introspections.

Résumé

Principes et méthodes d'administration dans l'Empire Colonial Britannique.

ON contraste souvent l'empirisme britannique et le rationalisme latin, et, en politique, on oppose la décentralisation chère aux Britanniques à la centralisation affectionée par les Latins. Mais en réalité chez les Britanniques, c'est l'influence du précédent qui l'emporte sur les principes pour produire une uniformité de

méthodes dans la diversité des peuples et des territoires coloniaux. Le respect des institutions est à la base de notre méthode qui, par suite des conditions traversées par la Grande Bretagne au XIX^{e} siècle, s'est servi d'une sorte d'administration indirect par l'emploi des institutions déjà existantes chez les peuples de couleur. Ce système s'autorise d'ailleurs de la croyance britannique à la croissance organique naturelle des institutions humaines et de la tolérance également britannique qui accepte la diversité des systèmes déjà établis. Mais le respect des institutions implique souvent une ségrégation peu favorable au développement économique, ce qui a provoqué une réorientation vers l'assimilation.

Le XIX^{e} siècle a donc vu l'établissement d'une forme de gouvernement représentatif qui n'était pour les coloniaux de couleur qu'une forme de gouvernement autoritaire déguisé, peu représentatif, sans pouvoirs ni responsabilité réels, utile seulement pour satisfaire l'amour de la cérémonie et pour masquer une bureaucratie toute puissante.

Devant l'assaut du nationalisme coloniale, la Grande Bretagne a d'abord offert l'éducation vers l'autonomie, l'amélioration des conditions matérielles et le développement économique, mais sans définir ce qu'il fallait entendre par l'autonomie ni établir les conditions d'éligibilité à cette autonomie. Plus tard elle a fait comprendre que elle envisageait une autonomie dans le cadre des Nations britanniques sans droit de sécession. C'était l'attitude dictée par la nécessité d'un système de sécurité collective efficace, les coloniaux de couleur n'ayant ni la force nécessaire pour se défendre ni la capacité économique requise pour l'autonomie absolue. S'autorisant d'un principe qu'exprime si bien la Constitution de l'Union française, la Grande Bretagne s'attribue la co-ordination des moyens de défense de l'Empire et la direction de sa politique pour préparer et assurer cette défense, et cette conception impose aux coloniaux un degré de subordination que les nationalistes de couleur pourront bien tolérer sans se sentir humiliés.

La division des pouvoirs entre une autorité centrale et un nombre d'unités constitutives est l'essence des systèmes fédéraux crées au sein du *Commonwealth* britannique et ailleurs. Le transfert des pouvoirs de l'autorité centrale aux unités peut être rapide ou lent; il faut pour cela que les unités soient capables d'exercer ces pouvoirs; le problème du développement politique des races de couleur de l'Empire est conditionné par des questions de défense et de suffisance économique et le droit de puiser dans les ressources du trésor impérial dépend, non pas de raisons humanitaires ou de bien faits à souhaiter pour les dépendances en tant qu'unités séparées, mais des bien faits qui en resulteront pour le *Commonwealth* tout entier.

Summary of Discussion

PROFESSOR LOGEMANN said that experience in Indonesia had shown that the process of modernizing the native institutions on which indirect rule was based

gave rise to an intractable difficulty in the appearance of an intellectual class separated from the masses and claiming a share in government at the highest level. Professor Logemann added that in the Netherlands Territories overseas representative government had not been regarded as a final stage in constitutional development, but as the forerunner of responsible government. He said that he was still seeking an answer to the question " when are native peoples to be judged eligible for self-government? " The idea of self-government within a Commonwealth provided no clear answer.

Professor MARZORATI referred to the criterion applied by the Mandates Commission in determining the eligibility of Iraq for responsible government. The formula then agreed was that Iraq should be capable of maintaining efficient administration, self-defence and internal security, besides having attained an adequate degree of financial stability and economic development. Guarantees for the protection of minorities had also been demanded. While only a minority might be capable of participating in the administration the majority might be capable of controlling the performance of that minority.

Mr CHADWICK said that the supervision of native administration by political officers had been compared to a scaffolding to be pulled down when the building was completed. He maintained that the political officer contributed something to the permanent structure in the form of a moral code without which government would collapse, just as it was upheld in this country not by any particular structure of government but by the moral impulses which informed governments.

Dr MAIR while admitting the importance of the moral factor, pointed out that self-government was not incompatible with indifferent political morality.

Mr FLEMING asked whether trade unions were a factor in political development in British tropical Africa.

Mr EVANS said that the formula mentioned by Professor Marzorati was inapplicable in a world in which hardly any ostensibly sovereign state was capable of self-defence or provided with the industrial potential required for that purpose. Hence his contention that dependent peoples must seek self-government short of unqualified independence and within some larger group organized either nationally or internationally. Mr Evans believed that in British Africa the comparative success of indirect rule was due to the determination, at least in recent years, of the generality of Africans, and not only a small *intelligentsia*, to acquire modern techniques. He doubted whether trade unions were a powerful factor in political development because trade unionists were very few in what was not in the main a wage-earning economy. He admitted that representative government was now regarded as the forerunner to responsible government, but maintained that this was a recent innovation in official thinking.

La Politique Coloniale de la France
Etude Retrospective

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L'IDÉE de colonisation a subi de nombreuses transformations au cours des siècles. Sa légitimité cependant n'avait jamais été contestée jusqu'à l'époque actuelle et l'expansion outre mer était regardée comme de droit absolu pour un état de quelque puissance. Il n'en est plus tout à fait ainsi de nos jours où le principe même de l'action colonisatrice se trouve contesté. L'Union Française se réclame désormais d'autres fins, encore qu'elle ne renie pas un passé qui fut souvent glorieux. Le présent exposé a pour but de montrer ce que fut la politique de notre pays dans ce domaine avant d'indiquer de manière très sommaire, puisqu'un autre travail doit être présenté au Symposion, quelles sont les tendances actuelles.

Quatre périodes en fait méritent d'être distinguées: A l'origine il s'agit de voyages de découverte, peursuivis sans aucun plan d'ensemble. Puis de Richelieu à Colbert et à Dupleix s'édifia un premier empire, dont la dislocation de produisit de la guerre de Sept ans au Congrès de Vienne. Louis XVIII ne recueillit alors qu'un mince héritage, mais de 1830 à l'époque contemporaine se poursuivit la reconstitution d'un domaine qui, par son étendue, est le deuxième du monde après le Commonwealth britannique.

Il ne peut être entré ici dans le détail de cette longue et glorieuse histoire et seuls quelques faits essentiels de l'époque antérieure au XIX^{ème} siècle peuvent être rappelés: sur le plan politique le but avoué était de fonder des provinces d'outre mer. Ce n'est pas par hasard que le Canada s'appelait la Nouvelle France, qu'on désignait les Antilles et la Guyane sous le nom de France équinoxiale, tandis que la Louisiane devenait la France Méridionale. On cherchait aussi à expédier le maximum de colons, l'idéal de Colbert comme de Richelieu ayant été de créer une classe nombreuse de petits et moyens propriétaires, capables de défendre le sol qu'ils auraient défriché. En même temps se poursuivait une politique systématique d'assimilation, tout indigène qui se convertissait au catholicisme étant regardé de droit comme " regnicole ". L'esclavage fut presque un accident que Louis XIII et Richelieu n'autorisèrent qu'avec beaucoup de répugnance et pour les seuls pays tropicaux.

Il fallait d'autre part que les colonies rapportent. Elles " n'ont dû être instituées, est il écrit dans un rapport fameux, que pour opérer la consommation et le débouché des produits de la Métropole. Elles ne sont absolument que des

établissements de commerce".* D'où le régime dit de l'exclusif ou du Pacte Colonial et qui peut se résumer ainsi: les colonies ne devaient acheter que des produits fabriqués dans la Métropole en échange de quoi celle-ci leur achetait à son tour ce qu'elles avaient à exporter comme matières premières. Par contre toute industrie de transformation était prohibée outre mer. Les transports dans l'un et l'autre sens devaient se faire uniquement sous pavillon Français. Tout trafic avec l'étranger était interdit et les vaisseaux anglais ou espagnols ne pouvaient faire relâche dans un port des colonies Françaises qu'en cas de nécessité absolue. Les autres puissances au demeurant agissaient de même.

La Révolution se montra résolument assimilatrice. Comment aurait il pu en être autrement dans le pays qui venait de proclamer les Droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen, de portée universelle dans le temps comme dans l'espace avec comme postulat l'unité foncière de l'espèce? La loi devait donc s'appliquer sans distinction aux Français des colonies comme à ceux de la Métropole et la Convention fut logique avec elle même lorsqu'à l'appel du célèbre abbé Grégoire elle décréta le XVI Pluviôse an II l'abolition de l'esclavage. Déjà, au point de vue administratif, les colonies avaient été assimilées à des départements et en conséquence tous les droits de douane supprimés le 11 Septembre 1793. Les incidences de telles dispositions eussent sans doute été énormes si elles avaient été appliquées à de vastes territoires, mais par suite de la guerre elles demeurèrent pratiquement lettre morte sauf à Saint Domingue et à la Guadeloupe, reconquise par Victor Hugues.

Bonaparte fut obligé de céder la Louisiane aux Américains. L'expédition Leclerc échoua à Saint Domingue, qui devint république indépendante. Les Isles de l'Atlantique et de l'Océan Indien, récupérées à la paix d'Amiens, furent de nouveau occupées par les Anglais. Le traité de Vienne ne laissa à la France que des bribes de son ancien empire: les cinq comptoirs de l'Inde, la Réunion, le Sénégal, la Martinique, la Guadeloupe et la Guyane: le baron Portal s'attacha à la mise en valeur rationnelle de ces territoires.

Le règne de Charles X amorça la conquête de l'Algérie qui fut achevée sous la monarchie de Juillet. On doit également à celle-ci la fondation des établissements Français d'Océanie.

La seconde République n'eut qu'une existence éphémère, mais elle a profondément influé sur l'avenir colonial du pays avec la libération des esclaves, due à l'initiative de Schoelcher.

Ce furent par contre " les officiers de marine, poussés par les missionnaires, qui provoquèrent les interventions de Napoléon III en Cochinchine et en Nouvelle Calédonie ".†

Le protectorat sur le Cambodge s'établissait à la même époque tandis que Faidherbe s'attaquait à la pacification du Sénégal intérieur.

* Instructions au Comte d'Ennery et au Sieur de Peinier, respectivement lieutenant général et intendant des Isles, rédigées au nom de Choisuel par Dubuc, premier commis de la Marine (1763).

† Ch. A. Julien, *Les techniciens de la colonisation*. P.U.F., p. 2.

Mais c'est à la Troisième République que la France est surtout redevable de son domaine actuel. On a souvent signalé, et avec raison, que l'oeuvre colonisatrice a d'abord été mal vue par l'opinion. Clemenceau n'avait pas assez de sarcasmes pour le " Tonkinois " J. Ferry, dont l'affaire de Langson devait entraîner le chute immédiate. Seule, rappelle Girault, une petite élite résistait autour de la Société de Géographie de Paris, de la Société de Géographie Commerciale, de l'Alliance Française. Il faut ajouter l'influence de quelques grandes entreprises capitalistes. " Il serait difficile, écrit encore Ch. A. Julien, de nier la part du Crédit Foncier, des Compagnies de chemins de fer et des boursiers dans l'affaire tunisienne (1881), des sociétés minières dans celle du Tonkin."*

Peu à peu cependant l'opinion devint moins hostile aux entreprises d'Outre mer. Les grands postes de direction commençaient a être recherchés par des hommes politiques qui ne passaient pas pour réactionnaires. En Afrique Noire nous occupions l'A.O.F. Le Sahara lui même était pacifié au début du XX^{ème} siècle. L'expédition Marchand qui conduisit une poignée d'officiers et de soldats Français jusque sur le Nil eut du moins pour résultat de faire délimiter de manière précise les zones d'influence Française et Anglaise à l'est du Tchad. L'empire sanglant de Béhanzin avait été détruit dès 1894. Celui de Samory tomba en 1896. Les trois missions Foureau—Lamy, Gentil et Voulet—Chanoine assuraient peu après la défaite et la mort de Rabah, le dernier des grands marchands d'esclaves. Le début du XX^{ème} siècle a vu notre installation au Maroc, à la suite d'accords internationaux. A l'autre extrémité de l'Afrique, le territoire d'Obock était occupé en 1894. Le 30 september 1895 les troupes du général Duchesne entraient à Tananarive et dès l'année suivante Galliéni, nommé résident, déposait et expédiait en exil la reine Ranavalo. Cependant l'Indochine s'organisait avec le Cambodge, la Cochinchine, l'Annam et le Laos; des accords successifs délimitaient sa frontière avec le Siam.

On peut rappeler pour mémoire que le 6 novembre 1887 avait été établi le condominium franco britannique sur les Nouvelles Hébrides, et qu'en 1877 la Suède avait consenti à nous rétrocéder la petite île de Saint Barthélémy au prix de 400.000 francs. Au lendemain de la guerre de 1914–1918, la France a reçu mandat de la S.D.N. sur les Etats du Levant, une partie du Cameroun et du Togo. Syrie et Liban sont aujourd'hui des états indépendants qui font partie de l'O.N.U. C'est également sous le contrôle de cette organisation que la France continue à exercer ses autres mandats. Au total l'Union Française ne compte pas loin de 12,000,000 de km. 2 avec 110 millions d'habitants dont 42 pour la France métropolitaine.

Ce rapide historique suffit à démontrer au demeurant que l'actuelle Union Française n'a pas été la résultante d'une politique systématique d'expansion. Il n'y a jamais eu, depuis un siècle passé, la remarquable continuité de vues qu'on peut suivre au contraire de Richelieu à Colbert et au milieu du XVIII^{ème} siècle.

* Ch. A. Julien, *Les techniciens de la colonisation*, p. 3.

La monarchie de Juillet commença par être singulièrement embarrassée du cadeau qu'avec Alger lui léguait la Restauration. Il fut question, à plus d'une reprise, d'abandonner la conquête et Bugeaud prôna d'abord l'entente avec Abd-el-Kader, avant d'être celui qui devait assurer sa défaite. Napoléon III a pratiqué successivement une politique d'assimilation, puis de protectorat. Les mêmes hésitations, les mêmes incertitudes se marquent sous la Troisième République dont la politique, au début, apparaît souvent généreuse, mais quelque peu utopique parce que procédant de " conceptions a priori qui se heurtent à chaque instant aux réalités ".

" Notre législation semble alors l'oeuvre d'ignorants bien intentionnés. Les colonies sont dotées d'institutions vraiment libérales, mais la politique d'assimilation pratiquée sans discernement aboutit à des conséquences ridicules ou lamentables. L'éducation de la Métropole était encore à faire."*

Il n'y eut jamais de parti colonial, au sens strict du met. Cependant une fraction toujours plus importante de l'opinion s'intéressa à nos possessions d'outre mer et à leur mise en valeur. La chance de la France fut de trouver des créateurs d'empire, des Faidherbe, des Galliéni, des Lyautey qui, devant la demi carence du pouvoir central, agirent quelque peu à leur guise. Il en reste encore des traces aujourd'hui où, malgré les réformes accomplies, les gouverneurs ont encore de très vastes pouvoirs. Galliéni n'hésitait pas à conseiller à ses subordonnés de procéder tranquillement aux réformes locales qu'ils jugeaient nécessaires, voire aux opérations militaires, quitte à n'en rendre compte aux bureaux que par petits paquets pour ne pas les effaroucher. Par la diversité des tempéraments s'explique en partie la diversité de l'oeuvre accomplie.

Oeuvre qui repose cependant sur un certain nombre de postulats communs dont le premier fut pendant longtemps une certaine croyance à la supériorité du colon sur l'indigène, tout au moins avant qu'il n'ait évolué. De là, dans cette société fermée, un certain préjugé ethnique. " Pierre Mille, bon connaisseur des coloniaux, attribuait leur solidarité au fait qu'ils se considéraient tous comme égaux et tous aristocrates, la couleur de leur peau étant ici le plus sûr, le moins contestable des titres de noblesse, la vraie noblesse, celle qui donne droit à des privilèges."† A cela correspond l'habitude, qui dura trop longtemps, de traiter les indigènes en inférieurs. Cela est évidemment contraire à la Déclaration des Droits de l'Homme, comme le appelle Ch. A. Julien, mais beaucoup pensaient naguère encore qu'il n'y a pas de colonie possible en dehors d'une telle attitude. Il ne s'agit là d'ailleurs que d'une donnée très générale, car l'analyse permet de distinguer plusiers formes de colonisation ou d'administration coloniale qui ont été successivement et parfois même simultanément appliquées par la France.

Il faut d'abord mettre à part le groupe dit longtemps des " vieilles colonies ": Martinique, Guadeloupe, Réunion et Guyane. Elles ont toujours compté une population blanche relativement importante. D'autre part la Révolution de

* A. Girault, *Principes de colonisation et de législation coloniale*, Edition Besson, p. 133.

† *Le Temps*, 19 août 1909, cité par Ch. A. Julien, *Les techniciens de la colonisation*, p. 7.

1848, en libérant les esclaves, leur donna un patronyme et les droits complets du citoyen. Le suffrage universel, encore que parfois quelque peu dirigé, n'a cessé depuis lors d'y être appliqué. L'Ordonnance de 1827, le Sénatus consulte de 1854 et diverses lois du début de la 3ème République y ont institué un régime curieux qui n'était ni colonial, ni métropolitain et comportait dans certains domaines une assez large autonomie. Le pouvoir central était représenté par un gouverneur dépendant de Ministère de la France d'Outre mer. C'était souvent, avec son chef de cabinet, le seul fonctionnaire civil ayant fait toute sa carrière aux colonies. Les autres chefs de service se recrutaient parmi des fonctionnaires métropolitains, détachés de leur ministère d'origine, ou appartenaient aux cadres locaux. L'enseignement secondaire, et quelques autres services comprenaient une assez forte proportion de " détachés ". Tous les gendarmes venaient de France. L'armée était représentée par des détachements de troupes coloniales dont les soldats étaient recrutés sur place, la conscription n'ayant d'ailleurs été appliquée qu'à une époque relativement récente. Civils et militaires touchaient un supplément colonial de traitement qui, avant guerre, s'élevait à 65 pour cent de la solde métropolitaine. La représentation parlementaire était celle d'un département. Les élections se pratiquaient et se pratiquent toujours comme dans la Métropole au suffrage universel. L'inexpérience relative des populations, le goût passionné de la politique ont entraîné souvent des incidents pittoresques sans grand dommage la plupart du temps. Mais le trait essentiel de ce régime résidait indiscutablement dans les pouvoirs très étendus qui étaient dévolus au Conseil Général. Celui ci avait la prérogative de voter en particulier un budget où entraient, à de rares exceptions près, toutes les recettes et toutes les dépenses faites dans la colonie. Il en résultait comme corollaire le droit d'établir les impôts sous le double contrôle du ministère et du Conseil d'Etat, juge en dernier ressort de la légalité des mesures votées. Le Conseil Général avait également la faculté de solliciter des dérogations au tarif douanier métropolitain et de lui superposer un " octroi de mer " dont le produit était réparti entre les diverses communes au prorata de leur population théorique. La " première Assemblée locale ", suivant la terminologie universellement acceptée, avait ainsi les pouvoirs d'un petit parlement.

Tel est le régime qui a été pratiquement appliqué jusqu'au Ier janvier 1948, date à laquelle est entrée en vigueur la loi d'assimilation du 19 mars 1946, le terme d'intégration étant au fond plus exact. Martinique, Guadeloupe, Réunion et Guyane forment désormais des départements de plein exercice avec chacun leur préfet et des services directement rattachés aux ministères correspondants. Seules subsistent quelques amodiations destinées en principe à faciliter la transition, dans le domaine fiscal surtout. On a ainsi maintenu l'octroi de mer et une règlementation spéciale pour l'alcool. Il est exact, pour l'instant, que le nouveau régime se heurte à des difficultés d'application que ses promoteurs n'avaient pas su prévoir. Il n'en constitue pas moins l'aboutissement d'une politique d'assimilation intelligemment conduite et qui a porté sur des gens de toutes races et de toutes nationalités,

Hindous et Asiatiques compris. " Nous sommes Français, vous êtes Européens", se plaisent à dire les Martiniquais aux nouveaux arrivants, marquant ainsi cet attachement passionné à la Mère Patrie, dont ils ont donné tant de preuves au cours des siècles écoulés.

Ce sont d'autres conceptions qui, ailleurs, ont prévalu et devaient fatalement prévaloir lorsqu'on se trouvait en face de nationalités déjà évoluées. A l'opposé de la politique d'assimilation se trouve celle de contrôle et d'association dont le plus bel exemple est l'oeuvre de Lyautey au Maroc, que ses successeurs ont jusqu'à maintenant respectée.

On a fait d'ailleurs remarquer assez justement que le dernier de nos grands fondateurs d'empires a été servi " par une chance rare ", car il a pu " ne tenir aucun compte de nos traditions coloniales, de nos tendances à l'assimilation ou tout au moins à l'administration directe, parce que l'acte d'Algésiras et le traité de protectorat en rendaient impossible l'application ".*

Le régime du protectorat est en effet régi par le traité en neuf articles signé à Fez le 30 mars 1912 par le ministre Regnault au nom du gouvernement de la Troisième République et le sultan Moulay Hafid. Ce traité laisse intacte en principe l'autorité du Sultan et il est bien certain aussi qu'en supprimant le " bled es siba ", le pays de la dissidence, Lyautey et ses successeurs l'ont étendue à des régions qui ne l'avaient jamais reconnue. Tout récemment encore, le général Juin proclamait qu'il n'y a qu'un seul souverain au Maroc, le Sultan, que le traité de 1912 unit à la France.

Mais en vertu même du traité, celle ci exerce un droit de contrôle sur l'administration, au sens le plus large du terme. Il s'agissait au fond de créer et de réformer et à cet égard les pouvoirs les plus étendus ont été accordés au Résident Général représentant du Gouvernement Français. Ce Résident est assisté d'un ministre plénipotentiaire qui le remplace en cas d'absence. La liaison avec l'administration chérifienne, le Makhzen, est assurée par une direction spéciale, à pouvoir de contrôle et qui est aussi chargée de soumettre à " S.M. le Sultan et à Son Excellence le Grand Vizir les textes législatifs, arrêtés viziriels ou dahirs proposés par la Résidence. Par l'intermédiaire de la Direction des Affaires chérifiennes est aussi acheminée la correspondance des caïds et pachas avec le Makhzen ".†

Caïds et pachas, qui administrent les tribus et les villes, ne sont d'ailleurs pas des fonctionnaires rétribués, mais souvent de hauts personnages, tel le célèbre El Hadj Thami el Glaoui, pacha de Marrakech, dont le loyalisme vis à vis de la France a toujours été absolu. La surveillance de cette administration locale est effectuée par les contrôleurs civils et seulement dans les régions les moins sûres et les plus éloignées par des officiers des Affaires Indigènes.

Il a été créé en 1919 un Conseil de gouvernement dont les deux sections, l'une Française et l'autre marocaine, se réunissent successivement. C'est une occasion,

* Dresch, article Lyautey, *In techniciens de la colonisation*, p. 151.

† R. Coindreau et Ch. Penz, *Le Maroc*, p. 67.

pour le résident général, " d'exposer le budget du Protectorat et de tâter utilement le pouls de l'opinion publique ".* Et MM. Coindreau et Penz de conclure qu'il s'agit là d'une " technocratie efficace " à laquelle ils souhaiteraient seulement de garder un contact plus intime avec les réalités humaines.

Ce n'est pas que les difficultés aient manqué. La révolte du Rif, en 1921, menaça un instant notre protectorat. Depuis la Victoire de la France des impatients ont réclamé " le Maroc aux Marocains " et voulu limiter " le rôle du pays protecteur à celui de conseiller technique ".† Il en résulta un certain nombre d'incidents dont les plus violents furent ceux de Meknès en août 1937, qui firent une dizaine de morts. La dernière guerre et ses péripéties ont de même fait renaître chez certains des espoirs démesurés. Depuis deux ans, depuis l'arrivée du général Juin à la Résidence, tout semble peu à peu rentrer dans l'ordre.

D'autant que la principe de la porte ouverte, que les traités internationaux obligent la France à respecter, a valu au Maroc un essor remarquable et qui continue. Ce n'est un secret pour personne que des capitaux considérables y sont en cours d'investissement. L'agriculture a été rénovée, les richesses minérales exploitées. On en arrive maintenant à l'âge industriel, qui entraîne une énorme concentration urbaine. Du temps de Lyautey les villes européennes ont toutes été créées en dehors et à coté des cités indigènes et l'on s'est contenté dans ces dernières de quelques travaux d'urbanisme pour ne pas en détruire le cachet. Peu à peu, cependant, l'afflux a été tel que les vieilles médinas ont éclaté et que partout se sont créés de nouveaux faubourgs indigènes où l'on essaie de faire pénétrer un peu d'air et de lumière. Casablanca, qui n'était qu'une misérable bourgade en 1908, apparaît maintenant comme une cité populeuse de 650,000 âmes en voie d'extension continue. Rabat est la capitale impériale. Fez, Marrakech jouissent également d'une prospérité jusqu'alors inconnue.

Le régime Tunisien n'est pas exactement le même, parce que plus ancien et parce qu'aussi nous n'étions liés par aucune obligation d'ordre international. Nous avons d'ailleurs trouvé une telle situation que nous avons été conduits, dans bien des cas, à dépasser les limites d'un simple protectorat. Le Bey, en effet, apparaissait en 1881 comme un souverain théoriquement absolu mais sans puissance effective et dont l'administration n'existait qu'à l'état embryonnaire. Il fallut donc " organiser de toutes pièces une structure cohérente sans rejeter d'emblée les éléments épars d'un système féodal et confessionnel lacunaire ".‡ Il en est résulté une bureaucratie complexe qui a consolidé et souvent établi l'absolutisme beylical " en lui retirant ce caractère nonchalant et spasmodique qui est la marque des régimes orientaux pour lui conférer une riguer et une méthode occidentales ".§ D'où la conclusion que, " par la force des choses, la République Française a introduit en Tunisie une sorte de paternalisme despotique " qui se trouve " tantôt enclin à des détentes, tantôt contraint à des rigueurs, balançant entre l'état de siège

* R. Coindreau et Ch. Penz, *ibid*, p. 69.

† Baumont, *La faillite de la paix*, p. 192.

‡ Hubac, *La Tunisie*, p. 97.

§ Hubac, *ibid.*, p. 99.

et les amnisties générales, selon l'inspiration du moment.".* Il est juste d'ajouter que la situation est particulièrement délicate en Tunisie du fait qu'elle se trouve à un carrefour d'influences. L'opposition a été représentée par le mouvement du Destour bientôt scindé en Néo et Vieux Destour. Les incidents de 1938 firent à Tunis même 22 morts et près de 200 blessés. L'affaire n'eut pas les suites graves qu'on pouvait redouter parce qu'à l'automne, les menaces italiennes provoquèrent une profonde réaction indigène qui amena sur le plan intérieur une réelle détente ".†

Entre le système du protectorat et l'assimilation pure et simple il y a eu place pour des politiques variables suivant le temps et les circonstances, suivant aussi le degré d'évolution des populations coloniales. Il est bien certain d'abord que, jusqu'à une époque toute récente, le principe même de la colonisation n'a jamais été sérieusement discuté. M. P. Gourou souligne fortement et à juste titre, à propos de Galliéni, que celui-ci ne s'est jamais demandé " si l'oeuvre coloniale était légitime, si le plus civilisé avait le droit de s'imposer par la force au moins civilisé. Pas de doute à ce sujet. Il était certain que les colonies feraient la puissance et la prospérité de la France. Il considérait aussi comme admis que la domination française assurerait le bonheur des populations coloniales ".‡

Une telle conception était universellement partagée il y a un demi siècle. La colonies étaient regardées en premier lieu comme des réserves de matières premières pour la consommation ou l'industrie de la Métropole. Puis l'on s'avisa que leurs populations pourraient avoir besoin à leur tour de produits fabriqués en Europe ou en Amérique. Ainsi, comme le souligne R. Maunier, les colonies nous fournissent " tous ces objets de luxe qui sont devenus une nécessité, entrés qu'ils sont dans nos besoins et dans nos moeurs, mais nous tenons également à vendre à ces pays lointains beaucoup de nos produits. Ils sont nos marchés, ils sont nos clients, s'ils gagnent sur nous, nous gagnons sur eux ".‖

Dans ces conditions, le régime le meilleur était celui qui permettait de part et d'autre les plus gros bénéfices. En fait l'indépendance relative laissée aux gouverneurs généraux et le degré d'évolution différent des populations coloniales aboutirent à des régimes assez variables dans le temps et dans l'espace. Il n'était pas possible de traiter de la même manière l'Annamite ou le noir de la forêt équatoriale, le Hova des hauts plateaux, le Sérère ou le Mandingue.

L'une des constructions les plus originales qui en est résultée est incontestablement l'Afrique Occidentale Française, érigée en gouvernement général par décret du 16 juin 1895. Jusqu'alors il y avait eu un certain nombre de colonies indépendantes les unes des autres et à hinterland encore incertain. Or la conquête " n'était pas terminée, et l'expérience avait montré qu'il était malaisé de

* Hubac, *La Tunisie*, p. 99.

† Baumont, *La faillite de la paix*, p. 693.

‡ P. Gourou, article Galliéni *In techniciens de la colonisation*, p. 110.

‖ R. Maunier, préface de la réédition de Girault: *Principes de colonisation*, p. 9.

coordonner l'action de deux ou plusieurs colonies voisines pour une entreprise commune ".*

En fait cependant la charte administrative de la fédération ne fut définitivement établie que par les décrets du Ier octobre 1902 et du 18 octobre 1904 dont les dispositions essentielles sont toujours en vigeur. L'unité de l'Afrique Occidentale se marque d'abord par les pouvoirs donnés au gouverneur général, mandataire et représentant de la République Française dans toute l'étendue du territoire. Il porte maintenant le titre de Haut Commissaire et est assisté d'un conseil de gouvernement où depuis 1920 une place grandissante a été faite à l'élément indigène. Les lois votées depuis 1945 ont créé dans chaque territoire des Conseils Généraux auxquels a été superposé le Grand Conseil de l'Afrique Occidentale Française, émanation des Conseils Généraux et qui est désormais chargé de gérer les intérêts communs aux territoires de la Fédération.

Celle ci est composée de huit territoires qui ont chacun à leur tête un gouverneur des colonies sous l'autorité du Haut Commissaire de la République. On distingue ainsi le Sénégal, chef lieu Saint Louis, où habite également le gouverneur de la Mauritanie. Le Soudan a pour chef lieu Bamako, la Haute Volta Ouagadougou, le Niger Niamey, la Guinée Conakry, la côte d'Ivoire Abidjan, le Dahomey Porto-Novo. A signaler au passage qu'il existe toujours à Ouagadougou une administration indigène spéciale sous la haute direction du Moro Naba, descendant des anciens empereurs Mossi et qui continue à régner sur une population de deux millions d'habitants environ.

Il est incontestable qu'un très gros effort a été poursuivi pour la mise en valeur du pays et le développement de la population, grâce à l'appui conjugué des différents services et en particulier ceux de la santé et de l'Enseignement. On s'est efforcé en premier lieu d'améliorer les conditions de vie de la masse et de juguler les grandes endémies tropicales. Le manque généralisé de soins entraînait et entraîne encore trop souvent une mortinatalité et une mortalité infantile fort élevées. Il y a trop d'accouchements avant terme dont la cause est à chercher dans les durs travaux auxquels les femmes sont astreintes. Peu à peu cependant la protection sanitaire s'étend aux villages de la brousse et la lutte a été engagée contre la syphilis, le pian, la lèpre qu'on peut maintenant empêcher d'évoluer rapidement et même améliorer dans certains cas. La maladie du sommeil est en net recul, la fièvre jaune apparaît définitivement enrayée depuis la découverte du vaccin antiamaryl, la dernière grande épidémie ayant été celle de 1927.

Un non moins remarquable travail a été accompli dans le domaine de l'enseignement surtout depuis 1930 où, sous l'impulsion de M. Charton, ont été créées les premières écoles primaires rurales, dont le nombre devait être multiplié autant que le permettait le recrutement de maîtres suffisamment expérimentés. Il s'agit maintenant d'étendre à tous les jeunes Africains un systême qui ne s'applique encore qu'à moins du cinquième de la population d'âge scolaire. L'enseignement,

* G. Spitz, *L'Ouest Africain Français*, p. 79.

qui dure six ans, est uniquement donné en Français, avec une large part du temps consacrée aux activités manuelles.

L'accession se fait par concours aux établissements du second degré qui comprennent des Lycées, des collèges modernes, des établissements d'enseignement technique et, pour former les maîtres, des écoles normales dont la plus célèbre est celle de Sébikotane.

Ainsi se dégage peu à peu une élite indigène qui, en attendant la création d'une université à Dakar, vient, après le Baccalauréat, et parfois même avant, poursuivre ses études dans la France métropolitaine. Elle évolue très rapidement, ce qui pose le problême et de son emploi et de la place qu'on est décidé à lui accorder dans son pays d'origine. Il est trop évident que de jeunes hommes habitués dans la Métropole à être traités sur un pied de parfaite égalité ne sauraient plus admettre, une fois rentrés chez eux, les discriminations que font encore trop de fonctionnaire subalternes à l'ancienne mode. " Moins le blanc est intelligent, a écrit André Gide, plus le noir lui paraît bête ". Et bien des manifestations apparentes d'un orgueil délirant se rapportent bien plutôt à ce qu'on pourrait appeler un complexe d'infériorité renversé.

Il faut admettre aussi que les Africains se rendent un compte exact du rôle joué dans la colonisation par de grandes entreprises financières dont le désintéressement n'a guère été la qualité dominante. A cause même des excès commis on a dû supprimer le travail obligatoire. Il faut reconnaître pourtant qu'il avait seul permis à l'époque la construction de routes et de chemins de fer indispensables à la mise en valeur de vastes régions. Le danger au total n'est pas très grand, car malgré les efforts de certains milieux intellectuels pour éveiller un patriotisme pan africain, il est certain que " la poussière des races et des tribus, la passivité du paysan noir " favorisent le maintien de l'autorité européenne ".*

Il en est de même à plus forte raison en Afrique Equatoriale dont l'organisation est assez proche de celle qu'on rencontre en A.O.F. Le gouvernement général s'étend sur les quatre territoires du Gabon, du Moyen Congo, de l'Oubangui Chari et du Tchad. Chacun a son conseil représentatif comprenant deux sections délibérant en commun. Les membres de la première sont élus par les citoyens de statut Français des deux sexes, ceux de la seconde par les citoyens ayant conservé leur statut personnel et les administrés Français. Les évènements qui se sont déroulés depuis 1939 ont amené le gouvernement de la République à reviser notre politique coloniale dans le sens réclamé par le gouverneur Eboué afin que la société locale fût établie sur des bases telles " que l'Afrique Equatoriale Française entre enfin dans la voie de la prospérité ". Et la conférence de Brazzaville en janvier 1944 recommandait l'accession aussi rapide que possible des populations à la responsabilité politique.

Le problême se présente évidemment de manière très différente lorsqu'on a affaire à des nationalités préexistantes et fortement organisées comme c'est le cas

* Baumont, *La faillite de la paix*, p. 250.

dans tout l'Extrême Orient. Nous avons certes apporté à l'Indochine les bienfaits de notre civilisation matérielle. Nous y avons été des constructeurs de routes, de ports et de digues. Nous l'avons dotée de grands établissements scientifiques. Nous avons créé l'Union Indochinoise avec cinq territoires: une colonie proprement dite, la Cochinchine, deux pays de protectorat dont l'un le Tonkin est une ancienne province de l'Annam tandis que le Laos était partagé en une série de petits royaumes dont celui de Luang Prabang a seul conservé son souverain et enfin deux états protégés, l'empire d'Annam et le royaume du Cambodge. A la tête du tout se trouvait un gouverneur général aux pouvoirs fort étendus. Le poste fut occupé à l'occasion par quelques uns des hommes politiques le plus connus de la France républicaine, Paul Doumer, Alexandre Varenne, Albert Sarraut dont aucun ne pouvait passer pour réactionnaire. Cependant, malgré les bienfaits matériels de l'occupation française, malgré le libéralisme des chefs de la Fédération, l'opposition ne désarma jamais complètement. En février 1930 se produisit le massacre d'une petite garnison isolée à Yen Bay. Au même moment se produisaient dans les grands centres des manifestations massives, d'inspiration communiste, dont le but était de réclamer des allègements fiscaux. On estimait néanmoins, avant guerre, que la situation était loin d'être aussi grave qu'il semblait au premier abord car " la péninsule, placée en face des réalités, préfère la protection de la France libérale à celle du Japon, plus voisin ".* Peut être y avait il là quelque illusion. La guerre de 1939–1945, l'occupation japonaise et les évènements qui ont suivi ont entraîné un réveil brutal du nationalisme et une transformation complète de la Fédération Indochinoise, dans le sens de l'indépendance au sein de l'Union Française: un avenir proche dira ce qu'il en pourra sortir.

Le cas le plus typique est peut être celui de Madagascar. Lors de la conquête, les Hoves n'exerçaient leur souveraineté que sur une partie seulement de la Grande Ile et nombreux étaient les peuples qui avaient sauvegardé leur indépendance. " La survivance des royautés locales, même subordonnées, et l'absence de communications laissait subsister l'isolement géographique et historique des diverses régions ".†

Il vaudrait la peine d'étudier en détail l'oeuvre de Gallièni, arrivé à Tananarive le 16 septembre 1896 et qui pour réduire la révolte alors grondante dans l'île entière, applique la fameuse méthode de la tache d'huile qui lui avait si bien réussi au Tonkin. En même temps chez les peuples autres que les Merina il inaugurait la " politique des races " en donnant le pouvoir aux chefs héréditaires du pays qu'il faisait simplement surveiller par des administrateurs Français ou des officiers. Il voulait " consolider notre influence par la sympathie et l'intérêt ". M. Deschamps rappelle avec raison que Gallièni insistait tout particulièrement sur la nécessité de relations cordiales et d'une compréhension réciproque entre Européens et Malgaches. Il se préoccupait aussi de l'évolution des esprits qui ne manquerait pas de se produire au contact de notre enseignement.

* Baumont, *La faillite de la paix*, p. 447.

† Deschamps, *Madagascar*, p. 82.

En fait Galliéni avait à la fois préparé les voies à une politique d'assimilation amorcée " par la loi d'annexion, par la suppression de la monarchie, par la substitution de fonctionnaires aux chefs féodaux, par l'instauration du Français comme langue d'enseignement " et à l'établissement d'un simple protectorat en laissant " subsister les chefs locaux en dehors de l'Imerina, en créant des écoles normales régionales, qui n'arrachaient pas la future élite indigène à ses racines territoriales ".*

Mais ce grand proconsul eut pour successeurs des " fonctionnaires actifs et consciencieux ", seulement dépourvus " d'esprit politique à grande portée ". Plus soucieux de réalisations économiques que de transformation des esprits, " ils ne mesurèrent pas la puissance de l'attachement aux traditions sous le voile d'une adaptation souvent superficielle " . . . " ils n'aperçurent pas les sentiments des évolués ou s'en irritèrent ". Ainsi, sous notre égide et sans que nous l'ayons toujours compris, " l'unité malgache se formait peu à peu " et† nous avons fini par nous heurter à un nationalisme que nous avions nous mêmes forgés et dont les évènements de 1947 ont révélé la puissance.

Il est bien évident que la dernière guerre n'a fait que rendre d'une urgence plus immédiate les solutions à chercher aux grands problèmes d'Outre Mer. Un grand vent d'émancipation a soufflé sur les populations d'Afrique et d'Asie. Le travail obligatoire a été supprimé, le terme même de colon soigneusement banni. On n'a voulu voir que l'Union Française où des peuples associés doivent jouir de droits équivalents.

Peut être, dans certains cas, est on allé un peu vite en besogne. On a jeté à tort, dans quelques milieux, la suspicion sur le cadre des administrateurs coloniaux, alors que ceux ci, recrutés après une discrimination particulièrement sévère, se sont presque toujours montrés, au cours des trente dernières années, les défenseurs naturels des populations qu'ils avaient sous leurs ordres. Et dans l'ardeur révolutionnaire du moment, l'on a trop souvent oublié que le nombre des solutions applicables, en pays de civilisation attardée, est forcément restreint. On peut certes abandonner totalement les populations à elles mêmes. Presque toujours les progrès matériels et sanitaires accomplis au cours des dernières décades seraient immédiatement remis en question. En outre, à la condition encore qu'aucun troisième larron n'ait l'idée d'intervenir, on en reviendrait très vite à une sorte de féodalité primitive où la masse serait plus durement asservie et exploitée que jamais. Ce système peut se combiner, au demeurant, par le moyen des concessions, avec les intérêts les plus terre à terre du capitalisme dont les grandes sociétés forment alors, dans les pays où elles se sont implantées, comme autant de forteresses inexpugnables au dessus d'une décomposition de type anarchique et total. La colonisation véritable s'adresse à la masse, dont elle veut à la fois élever le niveau de vie matériel et les connaissances. Il est indiscutable qu'elle suppose la conscience d'une certaine supériorité, d'un apport civilisateur et c'est cet apport même qui justifie, au début tout au moins, des méthodes qui s'apparentent

* † Deschamps, *Madagascar*, pp. 90 et 91–92.

obligatoirement au despotisme éclairé. Plus tard, mais plus tard seulement, elles doivent faire place à une association librement consentie et de caractère démocratique. " Le problème de l'Union Française, écrit M. Robequain, c'est l'aménagement de rapports harmonieux entre une minorité de blancs compétents dévoués et actifs et une masse d'autochtones." Le même auteur ajoute qu'à ne considérer que la diversité des pays et des peuples qui composent cette union, il est facile de comprendre qu'elle ne s'organise pas " sans heurts et sans tâtonnements." On peut déplorer le retard qui en résulte, souligner le désaccord entre la fermeté du texte officiel et l'inconsistance de la chose. Le problème est de savoir si ce groupement qui n'est pas sans fissure arrivera à tenir et à se " créer peu à peu les organes nécessaires à sa rénovation et à sa durée ".*

Il semble pourtant qu'en fin de compte on puisse se montrer assez optimiste. La France a derrière elle un long passé colonial, remarquable sous l'Ancien Régime par la fermeté et la continuité des vues. L'immense domaine ainsi constitué a été disloqué par les guerres de la Révolution et de l'Empire. En moins d'un siècle un autre a été recréé d'une importance presque égale. Il se fond aujourd'hui dans l'Union Française.

C'est de notre énergie, de notre vigilance, de notre aptitude à résoudre les problèmes économiques et sociaux qui se posent Outre Mer, de notre souci de respecter les traditions et la fierté naturelle des populations que dépend le maintien et la pérennité de cette Union. La France d'aujourd'hui, libérale et émancipatrice, peut envisager l'avenir avec confiance.

Summary

The Colonial Policy of France from the outset to the Present Day

FOUR main periods may be distinguished in France's colonial history. The first was characterized by great voyages of discovery. Then, from Richelieu to Colbert and to Dupleix, came the building-up of the first overseas empire. The Treaty of Paris of 1763 began its dismemberment and that of 1815 was to complete it. But from the July Monarchy (1830 to the present day) another empire was again to be built up, henceforth to be a part of the French Union.

In the seventeenth century and even as late as the eighteenth century, apart from conversion of the heathen, the objective pursued was the foundation beyond the oceans of provinces resembling those of the Mother Country and peopled by a large and well-to-do class of landowners, the introduction of slavery having been accepted only for tropical lands and with great reluctance. But it was also desired to reap material benefits from these distant possessions; hence the drawing-up of the set of rules known as the " Colonial Pact ", the most important of which

* Robequain, *Les richesses de la France d'Outre Mer*, p. 42.

were destined to survive until the nineteenth century. The July Monarchy saw the conquest of Algeria; the 1848 Revolution emancipated the slaves; Napoleon III intervened in Cochin-China and New Caledonia. Yet it was above all under the Third Republic that the territories of the now-existing Union were occupied.

Various kinds of administration have been applied to them: the " old colonies " (Martinique, Guadeloupe, Réunion and Guiana) had a system which all but placed them on an equal footing with the Mother Country. On the other hand, in Morocco, Lyautey was to put into force a policy of supervision and partnership, the success of which was undeniable. Between these two extremes there was, moreover, ample room for policies variable in time and space according to the degree of evolution of the populations placed under a colonial regime. In the main, the results of these policies have been satisfying. The rapid emancipation of the natives has led to the post-war situation and the setting-up of the French Union; its future may be envisaged with some measure of confidence.

Summary of Discussion

PROFESSOR MALENGREAU said the different forms of administration to be found in non-autonomous territories had been determined by historical considerations. He asked: (1) Did Professor REVERT consider these to be provisional forms subject to review? (2) What did Professor Revert mean by " human unity "? (3) Would it be desirable to face the question from the point of view of the plurality of races? (4) Having contrasted the refusal of British nations to accept an Imperial Parliament with the French conception of the French Union he asked if there was not possibly a danger here.

Miss GOVEIA asked for a definition of civilization. If civilization depended upon technical development and if civilization was to be made the condition for colonial self-government then the colonies should be industrialized if and where possible.

Mr BIRCH believed this definition of civilization to be far too narrow. There had been peoples in the past who were unquestionably civilized but who were not markedly industrialized.

Professor MACINNES, Mr EVANS asked what was meant by the French conception of an *élite*. How did France determine that a man was or was not a member of that group? According to Professor Caetano there was a distinction in Portuguese territories between those who are and those who are not Portuguese in culture, but the criteria on which the distinction was drawn were not clear.

Mr EVANS asked: (1) If there was in the French Union a central parliamentary body in which responsibility resided. If so, to what extent were the powers of that body limited by the rights of local councils. (2) If there was a division of responsibility as in dyarchy.

Professor MARZORATI said they were not concerned with the general definition of civilization. In many ways colonial peoples were sometimes superior to the colonizers but the question was to express civilization in terms of technical competence and general capacity for self-rule.

Dr MAIR pointed out that there was formerly a distinction between *citoyens* and *élite*. What was the distinction to-day between *citoyens* and *administrés*?

Professor REVERT said that civilization was a term much favoured by anthropologists but he used it in a more general sense. He was thinking of the moral and religious aspects of civilization.

In the eighteenth century the French had worked for uniformity but that policy had long since been dropped. To-day, while France was anxious for a general overall integration, she was also careful to study the customs and ways of indigenous people in order to adapt the methods of administration to the particular need. Thus a diversity of solutions may result from the application of the same general principle. While France does not work for uniformity she does desire unity.

The problem of the *élite*, he held, was a false one. There were always people who believed themselves superior and there were always some who were. In his opinion education should be thrown open to all and in time an *élite* would naturally evolve. He believed that by experience we should discover when an *élite* was capable of governing.

Some industrialization and development had already been carried out by France in Morocco and Senegal. To-day an *administré* and a *citoyen* meant the same thing.

La Politique Coloniale de la Belgique

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DÉFINIR une politique n'est pas nécessairement la défendre, et, pour venir la présenter devant un auditoire comme le vôtre, il eût été puéril de ma part de troquer à la frontière mon esprit critique contre la robe du panégyriste. La politique coloniale de la Belgique, dont je voudrais donner ici un aperçu très général, a ses mérites et ses grandeurs, comme aussi ses faiblesses et ses limites. Je n'entends taire ni les unes ni les autres. Entre les nations comme entre les individus, la vérité a ses droits, et peut-être les relations entre les peuples seraient-elles aujourd'hui plus cordiales et les puissances colonisatrices moins violemment dénigrées si nous l'avions compris davantage dans le passé. Une véritable collaboration internationale en matière coloniale, comme celle que préconisent les organisateurs de ce congrès, n'est possible que dans la clarté.

Le comportement d'un peuple comme celui d'un individu s'inspire d'une sagesse patiemment conçue et librement acceptée, mais est aussi tributaire dans une large mesure de l'action déterminante de facteurs psychologiques héréditaires qui se sont formés lentement au cours de son histoire.

Pour comprendre la politique coloniale de l'Angleterre, l'extraordinaire souplesse et l'empirisme utilitariste qui la caractérisent, l'indifférence de ses dirigeants pour l'impérialisme politique comme tel, leur préférence marquée pour les formules décentralisatrices et leur répugnance pour tout prosélytisme, il faut se rappeler que cette politique est celle d'un peuple insulaire, convaincu de sa supériorité, nourri de protestantisme et farouchement épris de liberté. Il faut se rappeler aussi que la colonisation britannique, du règne des Tudor jusqu'au XIX^{e} siècle, a été presque exclusivement une colonisation de peuplement. L'Angleterre n'a imposé sa domination politique à des peuples arriérés ou incapables de sauvegarder leur indépendance, que contrainte et forcée, pour éviter—aux Indes comme plus tard en Afrique—de voir l'impérialisme colonial des puissances protectionnistes lui fermer d'importants débouchés commerciaux et financiers. Enfin, ni l'amère leçon de 1774 ni la fidélité maintes fois manifestée depuis des membres du Commonwealth ne sont étrangères à l'attitude actuelle de l'Angleterre envers ses colonies.

Au contraire, pour comprendre la politique coloniale de la France, son impérialisme politique et culturel à peine corrigé dans la constitution de 1946, il faut oublier l'ancien régime et l'humiliant traité de Paris de 1763 pour retenir que la véritable expansion coloniale française est celle d'une nation particulièrement intelligente, fille aînée de l'Eglise, toujours rajeunie par ses révolutions, férue

d'idéologies et animée d'un ardent prosélytisme. Il faut se rappeler aussi que la colonisation française contemporaine fut l'oeuvre de militaires soucieux principalement de relever aux yeux de leurs compatriotes comme de l'étranger le prestige de leur patrie profondément humiliée par sa défaite de 1870. Et si la politique coloniale française n'a pas réalisé fidèlement le rêve d'un Lyautey ou d'un Galliéni, c'est parce que la formation de l'empire français a coïncidé historiquement avec une phase de grande expansion capitaliste.

Nous pourrions multiplier ces considérations en évoquant d'autres puissances coloniales comme les Pays-Bas ou le Portugal, l'Espagne ou l'Italie, mais ces deux exemples suffisent à nous introduire dans le cas très particulier de la Belgique.

A mon avis, trois facteurs principaux commandent la politique coloniale de la Belgique: une absence de traditions coloniales, le sens des affaires en même temps que la vitalité religieuse du peuple belge, et, enfin, la conférence de Berlin de 1885.

Sauf en ces dernières années, rares sont les Belges qui se soient intéressés aux entreprises de colonisation. Comment s'en étonner quand on songe que, pendant des siècles, les habitants des Pays-Bas méridionaux, à l'instar de certains peuples colonisés, ont dû résister à la domination de souverains étrangers et se battre pour obtenir puis pour sauvegarder une indépendance continuellement menacée. Cette alternance de subordination et d'insécurité entraînait avec elle trop de préoccupations immédiates pour permettre une politique d'expansion maritime et coloniale.

Sans doute, après 1830, la Belgique a-t-elle connu pendant près d'un siècle une période de paix relative et de réelle prospérité qui eût été propice à des activités coloniales, si notre tempérament national s'y était prêté. Mais tel n'était pas le cas. Dans leurs paisibles provinces, au carrefour de l'Europe, les Belges coulaient des jours relativement heureux; un travail consciencieux leur assurait une vie confortable et leurs capitaux accumulés trouvaient à l'étranger de faciles débouchés. Des siècles d'occupation leur avaient appris à se méfier des aventures, à ne compter que sur eux-mêmes et sur leur labeur quotidien et à vivre au jour le jour en contact permanent avec le réel. Aussi les quelques tentatives de colonisation amorcées sous le règne de Léopold Ier n'éveillèrent-elles pratiquement aucun écho dans l'âme de mes compatriotes.

Si la Belgique est aujourd'hui une puissance coloniale, ce n'est pas pour l'avoir voulu. Elle le doit avant tout à Léopold II, à ce " géant dans un entresol " comme le qualifiait naguère un publiciste allemand, à ce vieillard extraordinaire dont l'envergure cadrait assez mal avec la bonhomie dénuée d'ambitions de ses quelques millions de sujets. C'était l'époque où la campagne vigoureuse menée par le Cardinal Lavigerie contre la traite des Noirs battait son plein. A l'amour de son pays qu'il voulait grand, et à son esprit d'entreprise s'ajoutait chez le Roi un sens élevé de ses devoirs. Entraîné par l'éloquence du grand Cardinal, il s'enthousiasma pour cette campagne antiesclavagiste dans les territoires qu'il rêvait de mettre en valeur. Il eut l'heureuse fortune de rencontrer chez ses sujets une poignée

d'hommes, la plupart officiers de son armée, au coeur haut placé à qui il sut communiquer son idéal et son esprit aventureux. Beaucoup se sont conduits héroïquement et reposent aujourd'hui en cette terre africaine qu'ils ont généreusement arrosée de leur sang.

Lorsque, en 1908, pour sauver l'honneur du pays et le prestige du souverain, le Parlement vota l'annexion du Congo par 83 voix contre 54 et 9 abstentions, il le fit avec un sens du devoir auquel il convient de rendre hommage. Les peuples comme les individus ont chacun leur mission. Mûe par le sentiment plus peut être que par la raison, la Belgique considéra que la sienne était de continuer l'oeuvre ébauchée par son Roi et de porter la civilisation au centre de ce continent africain que l'héroïsme de ses enfants avait libéré d'un régime inhumain. Elle s'effraya peut-être devant l'étendue de ses responsabilités et des sacrifices que ce devoir allait lui imposer, mais en fait elle n'hésita pas, pas plus qu'elle n'hésitera en 1914 et en 1940 à résister à l'envahisseur germanique.

Ainsi, il y a quarante ans, les Belges ont commencé sans aucune expérience leur oeuvre coloniale, et l'administration de l'Etat indépendant du Congo, vieille de quinze ans seulement, eût été bien incapable de les guider.

Pour tout observateur impartial un second fait commande notre politique coloniale, c'est l'action prédominante exercée au Congo par deux catégories très différentes de citoyens belges: les dirigeants des grosses entreprises capitalistes d'une part et les missionnaires catholiques de l'autre. Les uns et les autres ont eu ainsi une influence marquée sur l'attitude des autorités gouvernementales vis-à-vis des grands problèmes coloniaux.

Le rôle des premiers n'a rien de surprenant étant donné l'intense activité commerciale et industrielle de la Belgique, pépinière d'hommes d'affaires entreprenants et d'ingénieurs de talent. Ceux-ci ont été les premiers universitaires à s'intéresser au Congo; après eux nos meilleurs capitaines d'entreprises, informés des richesses du sous-sol, se sont empressés de les mettre en valeur avec l'aide des groupements financiers les plus puissants de la Métropole.

Il y a une cinquantaine d'années, il n'était guère question de régies ou de nationalisations; pour couvrir ses dépenses, l'Etat dut se contenter d'impositions diverses et de sa participation rendue obligatoire dans les bénéfices des sociétés coloniales. Aujourd'hui encore le prélèvement du Trésor sur ces bénéfices est considérable et représente une fraction importante du budget des voies et moyens. Dois-je rappeler que l'Union Minière du Haut-Katanga, à elle seule, a rapporté l'an passé au Trésor colonial plus d'un milliard de francs congolais, soit près du quart du budget total de la Colonie? Aussi bien le sort de l'Etat est-il lié en quelque manière à celui des groupes financiers intéressés aux entreprises coloniales et dès lors, ces groupes ne sont pas sans exercer une grosse influence sur la politique du Gouvernement. Cette influence n'est pas sans danger pour l'intérêt général et tend fatalement à la prolétarisation des travailleurs. Heureusement, la plupart de nos hommes d'affaires doivent à leur atavisme chrétien un sens de l'humain dont

la main d'oeuvre indigène est la première à bénéficier, mais avec en revanche tous les inconvénients d'un paternalisme à outrance.

Si notre Gouvernement colonial ne peut se soustraire à l'emprise des groupements financiers, il ne peut davantage éviter la pression exercée dans un autre sens par une catégorie de colons non moins influents: les missionnaires, et plus spécialement les missionnaires catholiques. Ceci n'a rien d'étonnant quand on connaît la vitalité religieuse de la Belgique, une des premières nations catholiques du monde. Il y avait en 1948 au Congo et au Ruanda-Urundi environ 4.000 missionnaires catholiques et 1.000 missionnaires protestants, formant environ 15 pour cent de l'ensemble de la population européenne adulte de la Colonie et plus de 20 pour cent de la population active.

L'Etat n'a jamais eu qu'à se féliciter de cet apport massif de missionnaires. Dans cette immense colonie grande comme quatre-vingts fois la Métropole, dans ce Congo d'il y a cinquante ans, avec ses populations primitives aux moeurs barbares, rongées par la misère, décimées par la traite et par les maladies, dispersées à raison de 4 habitants par klm.2, dans ce pays où les difficultés semblaient s'accumuler à plaisir, le Gouvernement avait à fournir un effort gigantesque. Aussi fut-il particulièrement heureux de pouvoir confier aux missionnaires une part importante de ses tâches supplétives, notamment en matière d'enseignement et de soins médicaux; il fut même amené à leur abandonner parfois certaines fonctions administratives, que nos missionnaires assumèrent d'autant plus volontiers qu'en Belgique le catholicisme a toujours été teinté d'un certain cléricalisme. Dès lors, ces missionnaires ne pouvaient plus se désintéresser de la politique du Gouvernement et, parfaits connaisseurs des indigènes en même temps que leurs défenseurs attitrés, il leur arrive fréquemment, aujourd'hui encore, d'intervenir, quand le besoin s'en fait sentir, de tout le poids de leur autorité.

Enfin, un troisième fait domine notre politique coloniale: le régime de tutelle sous lequel le Congo fut placé dès ses origines.

Le statut du Bassin conventionnel du Congo imposé par l'Acte de Berlin de 1885 à l'Etat indépendant et repris dans ses grandes lignes pour le Congo belge par la Convention de St. Germain-en-Laye, est, à peu de choses près, le régime du *trusteeship* organisé par la Charte des Nations Unies. Elaboré à San Francisco en 1945, ce régime vise principalement à assurer dans les territoires sous tutelle le maintien de la paix internationale, le progrès des populations indigènes, le respect des droits de l'homme et des libertés fondamentales, et, enfin, l'égalité de traitement dans le domaine social, économique, commercial et judiciaire pour tous les membres de l'Organisation des Nations Unies et leurs ressortissants.

Le premier point, le maintien de la paix internationale, se retrouve aux articles 10, 11 et 12 de l'Acte de Berlin qui assure la neutralité du Bassin conventionnel et prévoit, en cas de dissentiment sérieux au sujet de ces territoires, le recours à la médiation avant tout appel aux armes. Le second, le progrès des populations indigènes, forme l'objet de l'article 6 qui oblige, notamment, toutes les puissances

exerçant un droit de souveraineté ou une influence dans les territoires du Bassin conventionnel à veiller à la conservation des populations indigènes, à l'amélioration de leurs conditions morales et matérielles d'existence, comme aussi à protéger et à favoriser toutes les institutions et entreprises tendant à instruire les indigènes. Enfin, les autres stipulations du régime de tutelle relatives à l'égalité pour tous sont contenues tout d'abord dans les articles 5 et 6 de l'Acte de Berlin qui accordent à tous les étrangers indistinctement le même traitement et les mêmes droits qu'aux nationaux pour la protection de leurs personnes et de leurs biens, l'acquisition et la transmission de leurs propriétés mobilières et immobilières et l'exercice de leur profession, et qui garantissent spécialement à tous les habitants de ces territoires la liberté de conscience et de culte. Mais on retrouve ces mêmes préoccupations dans les articles 1 à 5 qui contiennent des dispositions autrement sévères; ils assurent en effet dans le Bassin conventionnel la complète liberté commerciale pour toutes les nations, le libre accès au littoral, aux eaux intérieures et aux ports pour tous pavillons sans distinction de nationalité, prévoient en outre l'obligation d'autoriser le transport de toutes les marchandises dans des conditions égales pour tous, nationaux ou étrangers, à un taux ne dépassant pas les services rendus, l'interdiction des droits de transit et même des droits d'entrée—interdiction qui fut légèrement corrigée en 1890 en ce qui concerne les droits d'entrée, tout traitement différentiel restant exclu—et enfin prohibent les monopoles et privilèges en matière commerciale. Dans ces conditions faut-il s'étonner si des juristes de l'époque ont parlé du Congo comme d'une colonie internationale?

Tels sont, à mon avis, les trois faits principaux qui commandent la politique coloniale belge. Efforçons-nous à présent, à la lumière de ces faits, de définir cette politique et d'en dessiner les caractéristiques essentielles. Après quoi nous en verrons quelques applications.

Je voudrais souligner tout d'abord, sans y mettre aucune fierté nationale, l'attitude désintéressée de la Métropole vis-à-vis de ses territoires d'outre-mer.

De la part de la Belgique qui n'a jamais ambitionné aucune colonie et qui est restée totalement étrangère à la constitution de l'Etat indépendant du Congo, pareille attitude apparaît comme naturelle. L'idée du " pacte colonial " n'éveille chez elle aucun écho et, eût-elle voulu en faire l'application, que l'Acte de Berlin ou la Convention de St. Germain-en-Laye l'en eût empêchée. Il serait foncièrement faux de prétendre que la Belgique n'a retiré aucun profit de sa colonie, mais ces profits lui ont été acquis indirectement, par le truchement des sociétés coloniales qui les ont importés, et l'opinion publique, dans sa grande majorité, les ignore au point qu'elle s'imagine, aujourd'hui encore, que le Congo constitue pour la Métropole une charge financière. Aussi, quels que soient les dividendes distribués aux actionnaires des sociétés coloniales, jamais la Belgique dans son ensemble, par l'intermédiaire de ses organes publics, n'a cherché délibérément son profit au Congo. Lors de la reprise en 1908, le Parlement a même exigé la suppression du

domaine de la Couronne dont les revenus avaient permis à Léopold II de doter Bruxelles et ses environs d'embellissements fastueux. Aujourd'hui encore, l'opinion coloniale se montre extrêmement chatouilleuse quand elle craint que la politique économique du Gouvernement n'avantage la Mère-Patrie aux dépens de la Colonie.

Sans intérêt économique direct et n'ayant jamais pratiqué au Congo une politique de peuplement, la Belgique a été conduite tout naturellement à donner une certaine priorité aux intérêts des populations indigènes et à éviter tout *colour bar* dans le sens politique et juridique du terme.

Une autre caractéristique de notre politique coloniale, c'est son empirisme.

Les Belges n'ont pas l'habitude de s'embarrasser de préjugés ou d'idées préconçues. Privée de traditions coloniales et, de ce fait, privée de toute expérience en ce domaine, la Belgique ne connaît aucune raison sentimentale, historique ou politique de se prononcer pour un système de colonisation plutôt que pour un autre. Domination ou peuplement, assimilation ou protectorat, administration directe ou indirecte, sont considérés chez elle comme des vues de l'esprit, objet de vaines discussions académiques. S'il nous arrive de faire la théorie de nos actes, jamais nous ne tâcherons de faire entrer les faits dans le cadre d'un système préconçu. Un de nos ministres a fait sourire un jour les membres du Parlement en prononçant une phrase qui traduit cependant une attitude typiquement belge: " J'agis, puis je réfléchis ". Attitude de l'esprit qui n'est pas sans inconvénients; si elle ne nous empêche pas d'être d'excellents administrateurs, elle nous fait oublier que gouverner c'est prévoir.

Car les Belges, comme l'écrivait un de mes collègues de l'Université, sont " un peuple sans imagination, un peuple qui ne rêve pas, un peuple dont la pensée fixée sur le réel s'arrête au réel et lui fait rendre des fruits utiles. Un peuple qui ne crée pas, mais qui utilise, qui invente peu, mais qui se sert des inventions des autres, mieux que les inventeurs même ".

De là cette autre caractéristique de notre politique coloniale: son peu d'originalité.

L'organisation politique et administrative de la Colonie n'a pas été arrêtée en 1908 sans une étude approfondie des relations existant à l'étranger entre les métropoles et les colonies. Aujourd'hui encore, la plupart de nos décrets s'inspirent dans une large mesure de dispositions législatives prises pour d'autres territoires coloniaux. Mais, si nous ne sommes pas inventifs, nous savons par contre appliquer les solutions empruntées à autrui avec notre esprit méthodique et notre sérieux habituel et les réadapter à la mesure des réalités congolaises.

Enfin, une dernière caractéristique de notre politique coloniale est la réserve, toute paternelle d'ailleurs, de notre attitude vis-à-vis des indigènes et le soin avec lequel le Gouvernement colonial belge évite à leur égard ces générosités inconsidérées dont les Noirs seraient les premiers à pâtir plus tard. Dans l'octroi des libertés politiques ou syndicales, les Belges ne font preuve d'aucune précipitation.

Cette précipitation, avouons-le, est souvent provoquée par le complexe d'une mauvaise conscience auquel, à tort ou à raison, certaines puissances coloniales sacrifient souvent.

Les Belges ne sont pas affligés de ce complexe. Et pourquoi le seraient-ils? Je peux le dire: contrairement à ce qui s'est généralement passé ailleurs, notre histoire coloniale n'est entâchée d'aucune injustice grave, d'aucun attentat collectif plus ou moins camouflé. Nous ne sommes pas venus au Congo les armes à la main, et l'installation de notre administration, au début tout au moins, n'a enlevé la joie à aucun village congolais, bien au contraire. La seule campagne militaire à l'origine de l'Etat indépendant du Congo a été cette croisade antiesclavagiste menée contre les trafiquants arabes dont le commerce odieux soulevait l'indignation du monde civilisé.

Sans doute, en est-il peut-être parmi vous qui ont gardé le souvenir de la violente campagne menée naguère contre l'administration de l'Etat indépendant du Congo. Les réactions de quelques journalistes américains venus récemment visiter notre colonie prouvent qu'une légende tenace s'est greffée sur les prétendues atrocités des fonctionnaires de Léopold II. Je ne dirai pas que l'Etat indépendant du Congo n'était pas la Belgique; je ne prétendrai pas davantage que la récolte du caoutchouc ne fut pas l'occasion à cette époque d'abus éminemment regrettables et même de crimes trop réels de la part de certains agents de sociétés ou de leur personnel subalterne indigène, mais il serait injuste et ridicule de les monter en épingle. Je puis d'ailleurs assurer qu'il n'est aucun Belge, fût-il le plus fervent chrétien ou le socialiste le plus généreux, à y voir pour son pays matière à mauvaise conscience.

C'est pourquoi, jamais jusqu'à présent le mot " colonie " n'a pris en Belgique un sens péjoratif, et nous serons probablement les derniers à le remplacer dans notre terminologie officielle.

Tels sont en résumé les traits essentiels de la politique coloniale belge. Il nous reste à en examiner quelques applications en jetant un regard très rapide et fragmentaire sur la façon dont la Belgique exerce sur ses territoires africains la triple tutelle politique, économique et culturelle.

Le Congo n'étant pas soumis aux dispositions de la Constitution belge, a reçu son organisation politique et administrative d'une loi du 18 octobre 1908 connue généralement sous le nom de Charte coloniale. Celle-ci, à l'instar de ce qui se fait ailleurs, a prévu pour la Colonie une législation spéciale qui trouve sa pleine justification dans une diversité foncière entre les populations du Congo et celles de la Métropole. A cette législation propre à la Colonie s'ajoute une autonomie financière absolue. Il ne pouvait plus être question en 1908 de " pacte colonial " et la Belgique estimait, non sans raison, n'avoir aucun intérêt à la fusion des deux patrimoines.

Ainsi, une personnalité juridique distincte, une législation spéciale, une

organisation politique propre et la séparation des patrimoines soulignent l'autonomie tout au moins relative de la Colonie par rapport à la Métropole.

Le Parlement de 1908 savait aussi qu'en matière coloniale le législateur doit pouvoir intervenir rapidement tant pour innover que pour modifier, et que l'évolution rapide des pays neufs pose des exigences législatives inconciliables avec les lenteurs de la procédure parlementaire. Aussi, a-t-il attribué au Roi, chef de l'exécutif, un pouvoir législatif très étendu, tout en maintenant au législateur métropolitain sa suprématie sur tous les organes investis d'une part quelconque de la puissance publique coloniale. Ainsi, la loi intervient souverainement en toutes matières et les décrets, c'est-à-dire les actes du Roi agissant comme législateur ordinaire de la Colonie, n'ont de valeur que pour autant qu'ils ne sont pas contraires aux lois; le législateur métropolitain s'est en outre réservé exclusivement certaines matières, surtout d'ordre financier, comme le vote du budget, et il a multiplié les précautions pour assurer le contrôle du Parlement sur les autorités coloniales; je cite, outre le vote du budget, le contreseing ministériel sans lequel aucun acte du Roi n'est valable, le rapport annuel aux Chambres sur l'administration du Congo, la publicité exigée pour tous les actes du pouvoir colonial. De plus, le Roi ne peut prendre un décret qu'après consultation d'un Conseil colonial composé de 14 personnes, dont 8 sont nommées par lui et 6 par les Chambres.

Dans le cadre de ces dispositions en quelque sorte constitutionnelles, le Gouvernement du Congo, à l'inverse de la politique coloniale traditionnelle des Néerlandais et des Britanniques, pratique une politique extrêmement centralisatrice. C'est à Bruxelles que s'élabore notre politique coloniale et c'est de Bruxelles que partent tous les décrets. Le Gouverneur général a des pouvoirs très limités et n'agit en réalité qu'au nom du Gouvernement métropolitain. C'est la Métropole qui exerce en propre tous les attributs de la puissance publique.

Historiquement, cette centralisation est une survivance du régime en vigueur sous l'Etat indépendant du Congo; l'inexpérience des autorités locales obligeait l'entourage du Roi-Souverain à assumer pratiquement toutes les responsabilités. Mais elle trouve aussi sa raison d'être dans le souci très réel de l'autorité métropolitaine de sauvegarder au maximum l'intérêt général et spécialement l'intérêt des populations indigènes. Dans tout gouvernement colonial des tendances divergentes se font jour entre les autorités de la métropole et celles de la colonie, les premières s'inspirant davantage de principes théoriques parfois au mépris des possibilités locales, les secondes pratiquant une politique plus empirique, plus souple, mais aussi parfois plus oublieuse des nécessités du lendemain et des principes supérieurs engagés.

La Belgique a toujours réagi vigoureusement contre un élargissement des pouvoirs de l'autorité locale, et ceci quelle que soit la personnalité des gouverneurs et des fonctionnaires qui les assistent. Elle est convaincue que les autorités métropolitaines sont mieux placées pour veiller à l'intérêt général que les autorités locales continuellement en butte aux instances pressantes des colons.

C'est ce même souci de sauvegarder les droits des indigènes qui prive, jusqu'à présent, le Conseil de gouvernement siégeant à Léopoldville, de toute action réelle. La Belgique semble décidée à ne pas accorder de véritables pouvoirs aux assemblées locales aussi longtemps que les indigènes ne seront pas capables d'y avoir une représentation à même d'empêcher qu'ils ne soient sacrifiés au bénéfice d'une minorité européenne dont les intérêts sont fréquemment en conflit avec les leurs.

Dans un pays comprenant 11 millions d'autochtones pour 50,000 européens, la politique indigène [*native administration*] est une des tâches les plus importantes relevant de la tutelle politique. En ce domaine encore la politique coloniale belge témoigne d'un empirisme caractéristique qui la tient à l'écart de la distinction classique entre administration directe et administration indirecte.

Sans doute, les Belges, s'inspirant ici davantage de la politique britannique, ont-ils montré dès le début une préférence marquée pour les méthodes d'administration indirecte, et les déclarations du ministre Franck en 1921 sont formelles à cet égard. Cependant, le décret du 5 décembre 1933 réglant l'administration des circonscriptions indigènes de l'intérieur—les centres extra-coutumiers faisant l'objet de dispositions spéciales—comme celui du 15 avril 1926 réorganisant les juridictions indigènes, sont un dosage assez habile d'administration directe et d'administration indirecte. Ils s'efforcent l'un et l'autre de respecter l'organisation administrative et judiciaire traditionnelles sans craindre cependant d'y apporter de profondes modifications en vue de la faire évoluer favorablement.

Ainsi, le décret de 1933 confie en principe l'administration des intérêts indigènes aux autorités coutumières, mais prévoit la possibilité de les démettre pour indignité ou incapacité; il respecte les groupements traditionnels, mais il autorise l'Administration à réunir certains d'entre eux en des sortes de fédérations appelées secteurs et placées sous l'autorité d'un indigène choisi par elle. L'Administration ne se fait d'ailleurs pas faute d'user de ce procédé: en 1948 il y avait 552 chefferies traditionnelles et 506 secteurs contre 1.212 chefferies et 340 secteurs en 1938. Le décret prévoit également que les chefs de ces diverses circonscriptions exerceront leur autorité conformément à la coutume, mais il leur attribue en même temps de nombreuses fonctions qui les transforment de plus en plus en agents de l'administration européenne.

Dans un pays comme le nôtre, fermé aux idéologies extrémistes et aux théories aprioristes mais ouvert à un certain idéalisme confiant en la perfectibilité des hommes et des institutions, il ne pouvait en être autrement.

De plus, si le législateur se fait scrupule de porter atteinte à l'organisation coutumière, l'autorité locale, au contraire, ne manque pas souvent l'occasion de faire de l'administration directe chaque fois que l'ambiguité du texte législatif le permet. De là une certaine incohérence apparente de notre politique indigène, conséquence en réalité de la querelle vieille comme le monde où s'opposent théoriciens et praticiens et dont l'histoire n'a cessé de prouver la fécondité.

Notre politique indigène subit parfois les effets de notre manque d'imagination. Nos fonctionnaires coloniaux, soucieux de bonne administration, ont fréquemment recours à un paternalisme administratif dont les résultats immédiats sont plus apparents; peut-être ne font-ils pas toujours l'effort suffisant pour amener les autorités indigènes à assumer par elles-mêmes des responsabilités de plus en plus larges, comme le conseillerait une politique à longue échéance.

Quoi qu'il en soit, d'ici quelques années, grâce à la multiplication des secteurs et aux progrès de l'enseignement, des Noirs évolués auront remplacé à la tête de la plupart des groupements indigènes les chefs coutumiers dont l'autorité et le prestige ont été profondément atteints par notre occupation; il semble qu'aux yeux de notre administration ce soit là une condition sine qua non pour l'octroi aux autorités locales de pouvoirs plus étendus.

Si le Gouvernement colonial belge n'a fait entrer jusqu'à présent que peu d'indigènes évolués dans les rouages supérieurs de son administration ou dans ses conseils de gouvernement, c'est parce qu'il se rend parfaitement compte, non par des raisonnements théoriques mais au contact de la réalité, qu'une démocratie politique se construit par le bas, et qu'avant d'instituer au Congo une sorte de parlement aristocratique, il convient de développer les organes locaux de gouvernement et d'administration, et de leur confier tout d'abord les intérêts du village, de la chefferie ou du centre extra-coutumier.

Si nous pouvons parler d'une tutelle vigilante en matière politique, il n'en a pas été de même en matière économique, et cela pendant longtemps. Pour comprendre la politique économique de notre gouvernement colonial, il faut la replacer dans son cadre historique.

Lorsque les Belges ont annexé le Congo en 1908, ils l'ont fait avec un préjugé très défavorable sur sa valeur économique. Chacun savait que le roi Léopold II y avait englouti sa fortune personnelle, et les sommes qu'il dût emprunter à la Belgique pour payer les fonctionnaires de l'Etat indépendant et financer la campagne antiesclavagiste, ne furent jamais remboursées. Situé sur l'équateur, au cœur d'un vaste continent, n'ayant d'autre accès à l'océan qu'un fleuve tumultueux rendu infranchissable par ses rapides, couvert de forêts impénétrables, de savanes calcinées, de marais pestilentiels, où végétait dans un climat meurtrier une population clairsemée, farouche et misérable, ainsi se présentait le Congo dont aucune autre Puissance n'avait voulu.

Pour sa mise en valeur qui s'avérait lente et difficile, le Congo ne pouvait compter sur une intervention directe de l'Etat belge. Jamais le Parlement n'eût accepté de prélever sur le budget métropolitain des sommes importantes ou de risquer son crédit dans une émission d'emprunts pour une entreprise qui lui paraissait extrêmement aléatoire. Le budget colonial de son côté eût été incapable de faire face à des dépenses d'investissement, si minimes soient-elles. On ne pouvait compter que sur les capitaux privés.

Mais les Belges, répétons-le, n'avaient aucune confiance dans les affaires coloniales, et les déboires de leur souverain n'étaient pas faits pour la leur donner. Pour les décider à courir le risque d'y investir leurs capitaux, le Gouvernement devait donc de l'une ou l'autre façon assurer aux futures entreprises coloniales de réels avantages et leur donner des garanties suffisantes de rentabilité. Or, l'Etat indépendant comme plus tard la Colonie n'avait à offrir que les terres dites vacantes devenues sa propriété par un décret de 1885. Ce fut l'origine de cette politique de larges concessions, pratiquée tant dans le domaine agricole que minier, et qui durera aussi longtemps que les bénéfices des entreprises coloniales resteront aléatoires.

Avec les entreprises de transport, l'Etat fut obligé d'aller plus loin. Pour amener les capitaux à s'intéresser à la construction des chemins de fer congolais, et notamment à ce chemin de fer des Cataractes sans lequel, disait Stanley, le Congo ne valait pas un penny, l'Etat dut prendre l'engagement, au cas où ces entreprises ne seraient pas bénéficiaires, de garantir lui-même aux actionnaires un intérêt de 4 pour cent.

Aujourd'hui l'Etat commence à regretter ses générosités. Il voit les avantages qu'il eût pu retirer en exploitant lui-même une partie tout au moins des richesses domaniales. Mais il est trop tard pour faire machine arrière. Ainsi s'explique par les difficultés du début et la méfiance de mes compatriotes la place prépondérante des capitaux privés dans la mise en valeur de la Colonie.

Cette prépondérance n'est pas sans présenter certains avantages, mais comporte également des inconvénients: pour exploiter les richesses naturelles, les particuliers s'y entendent généralement mieux que l'Etat; il n'est pas contestable que l'efflorescence des sociétés privées a été le point de départ de l'essor économique du Congo. Mais, quelle que soit la générosité dont fassent preuve la plupart des grosses entreprises vis-à-vis de leurs travailleurs indigènes—et à cet égard elles ont à leur actif des réalisations, au Katanga notamment, qui forcent l'admiration de nos voisins—il n'en est pas moins vrai qu'une société privée, créée pour servir des intérêts particuliers, ne met pas toujours l'intérêt général en tête de ses préoccupations. L'exploitation du cuivre, de l'étain, de l'uranium, des diamants, de l'huile de palme et du coton a procuré aux sociétés coloniales des bénéfices substantiels au cours des 50 années qui viennent de s'écouler sans que le sort matériel des indigènes se soit fort amélioré. L'Etat a dû intervenir plus d'une fois, notamment en matière de recrutement de la main d'oeuvre, pour éviter que les intérêts des communautés indigènes ne soient sacrifiés à ceux des entreprises européennes.

Mais l'Etat ne peut se contenter d'empêcher les abus, il doit se préoccuper de relever le standing économique des masses indigènes. Pour y parvenir, il fallait un renversement de notre politique économique. Ce fut un des mérites de notre Roi Léopold III, alors Prince héritier, de l'avoir préconisée, il y a plus de quinze ans déjà, notamment en matière agricole. "Le succès des entreprises européennes, disait-il, ne doit pas être considéré comme le but final de nos activités" et

"l'indigène ne peut être considéré comme un simple outil de production". "Le Gouvernement ne devrait plus accorder aucune nouvelle concession dans les régions susceptibles de développement agricole. Telle est ma conviction personnelle mûrement réfléchie." Le Prince préconisait l'exploitation directe par l'indigène, c'est-à-dire "l'établissement du paysannat sous sa forme la plus intégrale, permettant à l'indigène d'accéder à la propriété et de jouir de la liberté économique qui lui est garantie par notre Charte coloniale".

Ce discours a orienté la politique agricole du Gouvernement colonial dans une voie nouvelle; elle trouve son expression notamment dans l'opposition répétée du Conseil colonial à l'octroi de toute nouvelle concession agricole importante, dans l'impulsion donnée aux cultures indigènes grâce au système des cultures obligatoires, dans l'extension des lotissements agricoles en vue de la création d'une vraie classe paysanne, dans le nouveau décret cotonnier qui laisse le producteur indigène propriétaire de sa récolte jusqu'à sa réalisation complète sur le marché, enfin, dans la récente promulgation du décret sur les coopératives.

On pouvait aussi reprocher aux entreprises capitalistes, principalement aux entreprises minières, d'exporter les richesses de la Colonie sans profit suffisant pour celle-ci. Dans un régime où le capital est d'origine étrangère et recueille à lui seul tous les profits de l'entreprise à l'exclusion du travail, l'hémorragie économique est fatale.

Il est bien vrai que l'Etat retient une part importante des bénéfices, mais le Gouverneur général Ryckmans fut le premier à souligner la faiblesse fondamentale d'une économie trop unilatéralement centrée sur l'exportation et de ce fait d'une sensibilité excessive aux fluctuations de la conjoncture. Pour corriger le mal, il fallait pousser l'industrialisation du pays en freinant l'exode des profits réalisés; de là, notamment, la décision prise pendant la guerre par le Gouvernement d'exonérer de taxation les bénéfices réinvestis.

Aujourd'hui, la Colonie est entrée dans une phase d'industrialisation d'ailleurs favorisée par la guerre. Mais dans un régime à grande concentration capitaliste, seules de fortes organisations syndicales peuvent affranchir les travailleurs de la toute puissance des forces conjuguées du capital et de l'entreprise. En autorisant la création de syndicats pour les salariés indigènes comme pour les salariés européens, le Gouvernement, tout en prenant les précautions nécessaires en vue d'éviter une action précipitée, a prouvé son souci légitime de favoriser tout ce qui pouvait tendre à équilibrer dans l'avenir les forces en présence. Aujourd'hui les salaires ne cessent de se relever et la masse commence à entrer à son tour dans le circuit économique.

Jevoudrais terminer par un mot sur la politique culturelle de la Belgique dans ses territoires africains.

L'enseignement au Congo est avant tout l'oeuvre des missions. Alors que les écoles officielles accusaient 4.132 élèves en 1948, celles des missions catholiques en

avaient 630.025 et celles des missions protestantes 336.880. Sans doute, ces réalisations, dans leur ensemble, n'eussent pas été possibles sans une collaboration sincère du Gouvernement se traduisant principalement par l'octroi de subsides.

Etant donné l'action traditionnelle de l'Eglise catholique en matière d'enseignement, l'influence civilisatrice des missionnaires au Congo et l'appui qu'ils rencontrent en Belgique, étant donné, d'autre part, les faibles ressources dont dispose le Gouvernement de la Colonie, il n'est pas étonnant que cette collaboration se soit imposée dès le début. Une convention de 1906 entre l'Etat indépendant du Congo et le Saint-Siège en a jeté les bases et jamais, depuis lors, le Gouvernement n'a cessé d'appuyer l'enseignement libre. Sa décision récente de mettre désormais sur le même pied en matière de subsides les écoles des missions nationales, presque toutes catholiques, et les écoles des missions étrangères, pour la plupart protestantes, prouve qu'il est bien décidé à rester fidèle à cette politique.

Celle-ci a permis une extension massive de l'enseignement primaire. En 1948, près d'un million d'élèves étaient inscrits dans les écoles, soit environ 40 pour cent des enfants en âge scolaire, et un pourcentage notablement plus élevé pour les garçons. Sans doute, dans bien des écoles rurales l'enseignement est encore très rudimentaire, mais la présence d'un moniteur ou d'un catéchiste jusque dans les moindres villages est un facteur d'une importance considérable pour ouvrir la voie à la masse toute entière vers une forme supérieure de civilisation.

Cette collaboration a surtout évité à l'enseignement certains écueils qui le guettaient tout spécialement. Le positivisme matérialiste de notre tempérament national eût vraisemblablement menacé l'école officielle d'un excès d'utilitarisme et peut-être frustré en même temps les indigènes d'une véritable formation culturelle, humaniste. D'autre part, laissé à lui-même, l'enseignement libre confessionnel serait devenu trop livresque. La collaboration du Gouvernement et des Missions dans l'élaboration des programmes et des méthodes a permis d'éviter ces deux excès contraires.

Dans une étude publiée en Amérique en 1942 par le Phelps Stokes Fund sur la Charte de l'Atlantique et l'Afrique, il est reproché à la Belgique la pauvreté de ses prestations en matière scolaire au Congo pour tout ce qui dépasse le degré primaire ou le degré moyen inférieur. Ce reproche est injuste et méconnaît les conditions spéciales de départ, les milieux sociaux différents et les méthodes particulières employées. Entre un enseignement utilitaire destiné à faire des Noirs de meilleurs auxiliaires des entreprises économiques du colonisateur et un enseignement classique, généralisé, destiné à humaniser la masse des Noirs et à élever lentement et progressivement son niveau de civilisation, la Belgique, influencée par les missionnaires, s'est tournée davantage vers le second. Il est logique, dès lors, qu'elle ait commencé à viser presque exclusivement le degré primaire et certaines formes du degré moyen inférieur, telles que les écoles professionnelles, normales, etc.

Tout le monde a compris que ce n'était pas là l'édifice scolaire complet pour Noirs. Ce n'en était que le soubassement. Il fallait d'abord jeter sur tout le

territoire de la Colonie un réseau assez serré d'écoles primaires et dans certains centres prévoir les possibilités de formation postprimaire. Grâce à ces méthodes, le fossé qui fatalement, chez nous comme ailleurs, séparera l'élite de la masse, ne sera pas aussi profond que dans d'autres colonies voisines et peut-être arriverons-nous à éviter la naissance d'une caste privilégiée plus désireuse de dominer que de servir.

Avant de franchir une nouvelle étape, il fallait s'assurer que tous les Noirs étaient capables de s'assimiler les matières de l'enseignement primaire, que la plupart d'entre eux l'étaient d'accéder à un enseignement moyen du degré inférieur et un certain nombre d'aborder avec fruit les études moyennes du degré supérieur et même les études supérieures proprement dites. La construction de l'édifice scolaire complet du Congo suppose une certaine élimination, une sélection soignée des élèves aux différents degrés de l'enseignement pour éviter la création d'une classe de dévoyés et de mécontents.

A l'encontre de cette politique prudente à l'extrême, on pourrait invoquer l'exemple des missions catholiques qui ont eu la hardiesse d'inculquer un programme complet d'études philosophiques et théologiques aux quelque 250 prêtres indigènes sortis de leurs grands séminaires et qui constituent, pour qui les ont approchés de près, une des réussites les plus extraordinaires parmi nos réalisations africaines. Mais, ne l'oublions pas, ces résultats sont le fruit d'une sélection particulièrement sévère accompagnée d'une discipline religieuse et morale rigoureuse et suivie, qu'il eût été impossible, dans les conditions actuelles, d'imposer à une élite intellectuelle laïque.

Néanmoins, par la création récente de plusieurs institutions d'enseignement secondaire du degré supérieur, on pouvait franchir une étape nouvelle. Aussi, l'Université de Louvain a-t-elle pris l'initiative de créer dans le Bas-Congo une institution d'enseignement supérieur à caractère universitaire dénommée: Centre Universitaire Congolais Lovanium. Cette institution est appelée à former des médecins, des agronomes, des administrateurs, des professeurs, des vétérinaires. D'accord avec le Gouvernement, nous avons estimé qu'il serait peu indiqué, sauf cas exceptionnels, d'envoyer les Noirs dans nos Universités. La différence de culture entre le peuple belge et le peuple congolais en est la raison principale. Notre enseignement universitaire n'est pas adapté à la mentalité des Congolais et fait appel à un ensemble de connaissances acquises dans le milieu familial ou social, dont le Noir est fatalement privé. L'indigène venu faire ses études en Europe risquerait, d'autre part, de perdre entièrement contact avec le peuple dont il doit être demain le guide et le conseiller. Autant que possible, c'est dans leur milieu naturel et avec lui qu'il faut élever les Noirs à un degré supérieur de civilisation.

Nous parlons de culture. A mon avis, le grief principal à opposer à l'enseignement donné aux Noirs du Congo belge, c'est son caractère assimilationniste; cet enseignement a visé davantage à européaniser les indigènes qu'à les doter d'une culture propre qui soit en quelque sorte la synthèse entre le complexe cultural bantou et la civilisation européenne. Reconnaissons d'ailleurs que jusqu'à

présent nulle part en Afrique nous n'avons rencontré une pareille synthèse, et peut-être n'est-ce pas aux Belges, étant donné la tournure habituelle de leur esprit, à faire en ce domaine oeuvre de pionniers.

Puisqu'une politique se définit généralement par ses buts, on pourrait se demander quel est en définitive celui que poursuivent les Belges au Congo. Veulent-ils faire du Congo une colonie dite d'exploitation ou une colonie dite de peuplement? Désirent-ils l'émancipation politique complète des Congolais ou la création d'une Belgique d'outre-mer? Ce sont là des questions qu'en dehors de leurs obligations internationales ils ne se sont jamais posées et qu'ils ne se poseront vraisemblablement jamais.

En effet, ne l'oublions pas, si les Belges sont devenus colonisateurs, c'est à leur corps défendant. Pour eux, la colonisation est une institution dans laquelle ils ont été impliqués par un dessein providentiel dont ils ne cherchent pas à connaître le pourquoi. Il leur suffit de savoir que cette tâche leur est confiée pour qu'ils s'y donnent sérieusement et sans discussion préalable.

Dès lors, il serait plus vrai de dire que la Belgique n'a pas de politique coloniale arrêtée; elle ne connaît que la fidélité aux exigences du moment présent. Elle fait en Afrique ce qu'elle estime être son devoir, sans chercher à le justifier ni davantage à le mesurer.

Mais si la Belgique colonisatrice n'a pas arrêté sa ligne de conduite de façon définitive, elle sait dans quel sens l'orienter. En quittant la Colonie pour représenter la Belgique au Conseil de tutelle de l'Organisation des Nations Unies, le Gouverneur général Ryckmans disait à ses collaborateurs: " S'il m'eût fallu laisser un dernier message, je vous dirais que la fonction de l'Etat est de faire et de garantir le bonheur des hommes et que la prospérité d'un pays est la prospérité de la masse de ses habitants, et que la Belgique aura réussi son oeuvre coloniale quand, à l'ombre de notre drapeau, nos indigènes vivront heureux."

Cependant, si mon pays entend poursuivre au Congo une politique à même d'assurer le bonheur des autochtones, comme tend a le prouver la constitution récente par le Gouvernement belge d'un Fonds de plus de deux milliards destiné exclusivement au bien-être des populations indigènes, il ne lui viendra jamais à l'idée de définir à l'avance les conditions concrètes de ce bonheur. Pour les Belges, la politique est un art, et ils l'exercent avec l'esprit réaliste et méthodique d'un peuple pour qui " la réalité n'est pas le tremplin du rêve, mais point d'arrêt et instrument d'action ", un art qu'ils pratiquent au jour le jour, avec une extrême prudence, que d'aucuns appelleront timidité, avec cette prudence dont pourtant A. Sarraut disait autrefois qu'elle est le maître-mot de l'oeuvre colonisatrice. Avec eux, il ne faut pas craindre d'action précipitée ni d'initiatives inconsidérées. Par contre ils auront à se défendre continuellement d'une tentation de facilité, car les problèmes coloniaux sont terriblement complexes et notre intelligence légèrement paresseuse.

C'est pourquoi une collaboration internationale, comme celle qui se dessine dans ce congrès, nous est indispensable. Nous avons besoin de l'aiguillon des idées d'autrui pour nous aider à résoudre ces problèmes. Mais, par ailleurs, ces idées peuvent être certaines de trouver au Congo belge un laboratoire admirablement conditionné et des techniciens éprouvés pour les adapter au réel et leur donner leur pleine efficacité.

Car—et vous me permettrez de terminer par une note élogieuse pour mes compatriotes—le miracle du Congo n'eût pas été possible sans la ténacité laborieuse des Belges et l'équilibre de leur esprit. Léopold II qui s'y connaissait en hommes, disait en 1905 au Président du Sénat en parlant des futures activités coloniales de la Belgique: "Les peuples oublieront un jour que cette nation fut petite". Puisse le Congo lui donner raison!

Summary

Belgian Colonial Policy

THREE main factors dominate the colonial policy of Belgium: a complete absence of colonial traditions, the pressure exerted upon the colonial Government by the directors of big capitalist undertakings and by the Catholic missionaries and, lastly, the Conference of Berlin, in 1885, which placed the Congo under protective rule from the outset.

The characteristics of Belgian colonial policy are the disinterested attitude of the Mother Country towards the overseas territories, a pragmatism which stands aloof from theoretical discussions, a certain lack of originality and, finally, an extreme cautiousness with regard to the emancipation of the natives.

Thus, in politics, it is to the point to stress the reluctance shown by the Mother Country to extend the powers of local authority for fear of endangering the interests of the autochthonous peoples. The native policy as such is a skilful blend of direct and indirect rule and, if the authorities in the territories do not always try hard enough to get the natives to take over more and greater responsibilities, they are careful, by building up a democratic system of government from below, to avoid the formation of a privileged caste.

In the economic field, the distrust and scepticism shown by Belgians about the wealth of the Congo, above all when colonization first began, forced the colonial Government, in order to encourage investments, to adopt a liberal policy with regard to capitalist undertakings which showed itself in particular in the granting of big concessions. But this policy did not sufficiently contribute to the improvement of the natives' lot, and the Government has since reversed its policy, particularly in rural areas, by seeking to build up an economically free peasant class. On the other hand, it is trying to speed up industrialization in the country to prevent the Congo economy, too one-sidedly adjusted towards export, from being

unduly susceptible to fluctuations of circumstance. At the same time, it is trying to right the balance between capital and labour.

In the cultural sphere, thanks to close co-operation between the Government and the Missions, Belgium has made a great effort to develop primary education to the full, hoping in this way to avoid creating a gulf between the uneducated mass of the population and an *élite* which might too rapidly attain university standing. This cautious, but continuous, stage-by-stage advance has brought her to the point of setting out fearlessly on the road to higher native education, but she is convinced that it is in their own environment, and not in Europe, that this type of education must be set up and that the native *élite* must rise by its own efforts to a higher level of civilization. In this way, she may, perhaps, hope to avoid to some extent the danger common to most colonial territories of an excessively assimilationistic education.

To sum up, Belgium is following out, by empirical methods, a realistic policy in the Congo for the success of which international collaboration will be extremely valuable.

Summary of Discussion

MONSIEUR ALDUY said there was a good deal of misconception in France, Belgium and Great Britain as to their respective points of view and thus mutual exposition would serve a useful purpose. In preparing indigenous peoples for self-government he believed that a beginning should be made from below by the grant of local responsibility before national autonomy was conceded. Despite the wide extension of primary education there was inevitably a delay of some years before the transfer of power could take place but, he asked, (1) Why delay the grant of some responsibility forthwith? (2) Does restraint in the spread of education imply delay in granting political rights?

Professor REVERT asked: (1) If you went in for the political education of the masses was there not a drop in the level of education of individuals? (2) What was the rôle of the missionaries in education in the Belgian Congo and what was the number of converts? — Was it easier to convert a Moslem or a pagan to Christianity? (3) What was meant by compulsory crops? (4) What was the value of European education and do not the educated Africans relapse into their own traditional ways and beliefs when they return home? (5) Was the object of colonization the promotion of the happiness of colonial peoples? (6) Had we the right to revolutionize national life?

Professor MARZORATI agreed with Professor MALENGREAU that the Belgians had shown a lack of imagination in their colonial policy. Nevertheless, Belgium adhered to the San Francisco Charter though she did exercise strong and direct control from the mother country. There was much hostility to the colour bar in the Belgian Congo. There was also some divergence of opinion between

Belgians at home and in the Congo as to colonial policy. In fact there had been a struggle between the San Francisco conception and that of giving the dominant rôle in the development of the Congo to a small group of colonists. He believed the former view would prevail. Since the Congo possessed such vast resources of natural power, Europeans there must in time give up agriculture to the Africans and devote themselves to the development of industries. As the export trade and secondary industries grew political evolution would be hastened.

Mr JONES doubted the capacity of the metropolitan power to legislate minutely for a distant colony. He asked: (1) If the Belgian government was better informed on these matters than that of Great Britain which he thought was ill-instructed. (2) If the missionaries and administrators would show more capacity if they had more power. (3) Did not control from a distance tend to destroy initiative and to develop a sense of frustration?

Mr HUTTON said that happiness cannot be conferred on colonial peoples (as colonial policy had aimed at doing), but must be achieved by overcoming difficulties, and that this fact properly appreciated could give a new angle to colonial policy: the full development of the individual.

Dr MAIR said we must not judge happiness from the European's point of view. These countries had their own particular difficulties such as parasitic diseases and so on.

Mr PERHAM asked why we should assume that European colonists were necessarily bad. He believed that native peoples were lucky in having them.

Professor MALENGREAU contended that the production of scholars had no necessary bearing on the production of administrators. Already there was some higher education in the Congo, for example, training in medicine, training in agriculture, training of priests.

The Belgian government had tried to avoid the proletarization of the people by the development of native agriculture and industries which would enable them to retain their economic liberty.

There were about two-and-a-half million Catholics and half a million Protestants out of a total population of eleven million in the Congo. Islamic influence was only beginning to manifest itself in the Eastern Congo. Moslems were very much harder to convert than pagans.

The compulsory crops system he had referred to in his paper had an educative aim and was a temporary measure only.

The influence of European education within the Congo had on the whole been good and its effects were not lost when the student returned home. The Governor-General was always consulted about any proposed decree.

Introduction to the paper on Indonesia by D. H. Meijer

J. H. A. LOGEMANN

In expounding Dutch colonial policy Mr Meijer clearly has taken his stand in political ethics. In his own words: his short survey aims at making clear that humanitarian and progressive ideals as regards "colonial" policy already were born amongst former generations. He selected three topics for demonstrating the ethical qualities of Dutch rule over Indonesia, i.e. the principle of indirect rule, the protection of the people against suppression and the protection of Indonesian landed property.

Of course, he could have chosen many equally important items for his demonstration, but these three might suffice to strengthen his general thesis that exploitation colonies in contradistinction to settlers' colonies can show a rather favourable record regarding the protection and emancipation of native populations.

One can easily feel that there is hiding some defensive aggression in this argument which scarcely comes within the scope of this symposium. It obviously aims in the direction of certain inconsiderate criticisms which Dutch colonial policy has met with in the stringent conditions of its last dramatic phase. I feel indeed that a few critical remarks about the performances of the present Indonesian government equally pass beyond the limits of our present discussion. I think these utterances can be fully understood in a member of the civil service whose device has always been the defence of the interests of the voiceless multitude. But nevertheless, I think we might leave them aside and concentrate our attention on the general problems under consideration.

Mr Meijer has given us a bird's-eye view on the subsequent phases of Dutch colonial rule in Indonesia. I avail myself of the opportunity given me to characterize them from a slightly different standpoint. I direct your attention especially to Java; Dutch colonial policy has always been focussed on this main island and it is difficult to fit the other islands into the picture, whereas the general trend remains the same.

I pass with a few words over the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the period of the chartered company. It never renounced its commercial nature. Monopoly was its aim and for that reason it strove for *dominium maris*, secured by a network of factory-fortresses. Territorial dominion resulted gradually and rather unintentionally from conflicts with native rulers, but even then government was largely left in the hands of a feudal aristocracy. Indirect rule was not founded on expectations of a gradual evolution of native conceptions of government into modern administration. It was the fruit of a policy of non-intervention.

Moreover, although the exactions of the Company might bear heavily on the population, they did not shake the foundations of native economy.

Economic liberalism was introduced in the Raffles period (the period of British occupation, 1811–1816, during the Napoleonic wars) and supported by the subsequent Dutch administration. An attempt was made to base government finances on money taxes and private enterprise was promoted in the field of agriculture. At the same time a flourishing plantation industry in the native states of Java, based on feudal servitude, was abruptly broken down in the name of liberalism. The system, however, was wrecked before 1830. The reasons were manifold, but it is, I think, beyond doubt that native society and its self-supporting village economy, notwithstanding their obligation to yield money taxes, could, in the main, do without the wages offered by the plantations.

This breakdown of 1825–1830 seriously retarded the development of Dutch colonial policy according to nineteenth-century standards. Government fell back on a system of compulsory disposal of land and labour for the production of crops for the world market. Feudalism, restrained in the liberal period, flourished again. Nevertheless, money taxes were maintained and wages were paid, so money economy was gradually spreading. Otherwise, nothing was done to emancipate native society. Government policy was purely fiscal. At last it met with increasing opposition in Holland, prompted both by ethical and liberal motives. About 1860 it was on its retreat and since 1870 a new liberal era started.

In the period from 1870 onwards to 1910 the introduction of capitalist enterprise in Java proved a success. Money economy penetrated into the villages. Supply of labour to plantations and industry was abundant. Java was rapidly developing into a dualistic society. Government, by now drawing its income predominantly from money taxes, saw an important task in protecting native society against damaging influences of Western activities.

A distinctly critical point in historical development lies about 1910 and curiously coincides with the beginning of an upward trend in business. The Dutch call it the ethical period of colonial policy. In place of the negative principle, that Western activities should not be allowed to damage native society, comes the positive one that the evolution of native society should be promoted in order to prepare the country for self-government. Annual budgets were growing at a quick pace; in less than two decades a school system was built from the village school upward to the university; municipal and district self-government was introduced and representative government started in the People's Council as a central legislative body.

Ethical policy looked for a gradual development of Indonesian people and Indonesian institutions towards modern social conceptions and modern social tasks. The short period of 1910 till 1940 was long enough to show its inadequacy. Sure there hides some truth in the formula, found by an eminent but rather conservative politician, that by this time everybody had grown ethical, that is

everybody accepted the necessity of a deliberate welfare policy aiming at ultimate self-government for the Indonesian people. Opinions, however, did not and do not agree on the causes which appeared to impede that gradual modernization coming about within the established political order.

On the one hand the modernization of Indonesian political institutions—villages and princedoms—with a few exceptions to be made for those principalities which had generated a feudal administrative apparatus of their own, proved a failure. Modern agricultural co-operation and credit systems scored but a very meagre success. It shone out clearly that there was no short-cut from collectivist pre-capitalism to individualist capitalism. On the other hand, we state several new phenomena, all demonstrating themselves about 1905–1910. There is the rather sudden change in the general attitude towards the school, widespread indifference giving way to fervent desire for Western education. Secondly, there is the rapid growth of urban centres and an urban proletariat. Thirdly, we state the birth of Indonesian political movements, soon displaying a nationalistic character, and decidedly not generated, as Mr Meijer has it, by the award of municipal franchise.

Indeed the slow and secular process of Western economic, social and political activities influencing oriental society, at last had resulted in seriously uprooting it and in generating new social classes. These classes by their own disposition and situation took a radically different stand towards colonial dualism and dominion. These intellectuals and these urban masses had to find their way outside the traditional cadres of ancient Indonesian life. Their minds were opened by compulsion to sentiments and to social and political views which never before had succeeded in striking their roots in the villages or in the feudal courts. They had to fight their way in the Western sphere of dualistic society. Their outlook widened. In the schools and in their jobs, Javanese, Sumatrans and other peoples met, who had been strangers to each other before. They now found themselves in the same situation as against European domination and its implications. In their minds nationalism was born and soon expanded unto the limits of their common political fate into an Indonesian nationalism. It wanted to command power in the agencies where its destinies were decided upon.

Conditions grew seriously worse when the boom of the twenties was followed by the deep and prolonged slump of the thirties and just before the outbreak of the war political evolution reached a deadlock. Sure, in economic affairs the colonial government did not hesitate to develop an Indonesian national policy, although doubtlessly hampered by the ties which bound it up with metropolitan interests. But political emancipation, ardently longed for by the intellectual class came to a standstill. Neither was the government willing to raise the number of Indonesian seats in the People's Council above the 50 per cent. which they already occupied, nor to attribute larger powers to that body. The fact is that, as the Dutch minister of the colonies expressed it in the House of Representatives, any further

step would have meant more than the access to political influence, it would have meant the transfer of power.

Then the war came, the Dutch were ousted and history placed political independence at the feet of the national leaders. They saw no reasons in pre-war developments not to take it up. Historical incident solved a problem which apparently had become an insoluble riddle for colonialism.

Of course, it lies outside the scope of this symposium to pass judgment on the political wisdom of the Dutch Government. But I submit that from the point of view of the historian and of the anthropologist it seems plausible to state that here a policy of indirect rule and gradual emancipation has been surprised by the structural social changes caused by this very process and precisely forbidding the graduality which until recently seemed inherent in every colonial power, except that of the United States.

Perhaps here is a beacon in the sea—as runs the Dutch saying—for present-day colonial powers.

Introduction par le Dr Logemann à la communication de M. Meijer

LA thèse de M. Meijer sur les origines dans le passé des idées humanitaires et progressives en matière de politique coloniale repose sur trois données: le principe de l'administration indirecte, la protection de l'indigène et celle de la propriété foncière. Cette thèse constitue une sorte de défense contre des critiques inconsidérées. Mais on peut d'un autre point de vue, relever les phases notés par M. Meijer dans le développement du régime indonésien, en s'attachant surtout aux faits qui concernent Java:

1. Les XVII^{ème} et XVIII^{ème} siècles: époque de la compagnie, commerciale, monopolisatrice, visant à la domination des mers par des factoreries-forteresses et aboutissant à la domination indirecte (involontaire) des territories, n'ayant aucun but d'évolution graduelle vers l'administration moderne, mais étant le fruit surtout d'une politique de non-intervention, sans atteinte à l'économie indigène.

2. Le libéralisme économique importé sous les Britanniques (1811–16): alimentation des finances gouvernementales par les impôts, encouragement de l'entreprise privée dans l'agriculture; l'indigène pouvant se soustraire, malgré les impôts, au travail salarié des plantations, le système périclita avant 1830.

3. L'alimentation du marché mondial par le dirigisme en matière de cultures et de main d'œuvre, qui entraîna, en même temps qu'une reprise de féodalité, une extension de l'économie monétaire; une opposition croissante à cette politique dans la métropole y mit fin vers 1870.

4. L'introduction, entre 1870 et 1910, de l'enterprise capitaliste qui obligea

les villages d'entrer dans l'économie monétaire, un budget à base d'impôts en espèces; de là la naissance d'une société dualiste et la compréhension de la nécessité pour le gouvernement de protéger l'indigène contre les influences néfastes des activités européennes.

5. Après 1910: période d'expansion dans les affaires, phase morale de la politique coloniale: évolution de la société indigène vers le gouvernement responsable, création d'un système d'éducation compréhensif, accession de l'indigène au gouvernement municipal et régional et, par le Conseil du Peuple, au pouvoir législatif. Mais le gradualisme et la modernisation des institutions politiques indonésiennes se montrèrent inefficaces, le système des coopératives et des crédits agricoles également. Par contre, un grand désir d'éducation succéda à l'indifférence, des centres et un prolétariat urbains se formèrent et prirent une grande extension, les mouvements politiques se montrèrent bientôt nationalistes: les activités occidentales avaient enfin désintégré la société indigène et avaient créé de nouvelles classes sociales opposées au dualisme et à la domination; par l'école et le travail, les divers peuples indonésiens ayant été mis en contact et se trouvant tous campés devant ce dualisme et cette domination européenne, le nationalisme indonésien parut. La forte et longue dépression économique qui commença vers 1930 aggrava la situation politique déjà à un impasse: le gouvernement avait beau développer une politique économique indonésienne sans admettre des progrès vers l'émancipation politique voulu par les élites (le ministre des colonies ayant declaré qu'on ne pouvait ni dépasser le 50 pour cent de représentation indigène au Conseil du Peuple, ni étendre les pouvoirs de ce Conseil sans arriver au transfert des pouvoirs). Survint la guerre et l'occasion d'accéder à l'autonomie politique s'offrit aux dirigeants nationalistes.

L'administration indirect et l'émancipation graduelle ont été prises au dépourvu devant des changements dans la structure sociale, qui n'admettaient plus de gradualité.

Dutch Colonial Policy in Indonesia with some indication of its aims

D. H. MEIJER

A Dutch civil servant in Indonesia until the war

By building further on the paper of A. M. Joekes: *Developments in the administration of Indonesia* delivered to the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1947,* which gave an objective survey of the historical development of the Netherlands

* Published in *Colonial Administration by European Powers*, p. 20–39.

East Indies, I shall try to stress some of the most important principles and methods of "colonial" administration. As a starting point, the following definition of "rule" may be chosen: the advancement of the material and spiritual interests of the population.

It is based upon the practical wisdom of Jeremy Bentham who wrote: "The way to be comfortable is to make others comfortable." It follows that "rule" in this sense may not be used in the exclusive favour of one class or group of the population. Between the clash of interests, a compromise has to be found which might serve both parties. Profit-hunting for one's own class or people at the cost of other people, without furthering the interests of the weaker party, could not give a sound solution to the problem put before the statesmen and economists in local, national and international spheres. Accumulation of riches certainly has resulted in rises in the curve of the growing process of civilization, but with historical regularity these rises were followed by falls, accompanied mostly by severe disturbance of regional or international peace and order. We are witnesses to such a period to-day. Civilizations have disappeared because no way could be found to satisfy the interests of all parties concerned. The unbridled instinct of gaining power by accumulating possessions has nearly always resulted in the creation of the "dog and underdog" position and the law of "the survival of the fittest". Rule in the spirit of Bentham and Van Vollenhoven will be "unselfish"; it will try to concentrate the power of brain and heart on the possibilities of a healthy growth of all the classes and groups of the population and to prevent the community from deteriorating into a material and psychological wilderness, with huge forest-trees and in the shadow a vegetation which hardly can attain growth by lack of sunlight and room.

A description of the conception of "colony" is given by Colenbrander, who differentiates between: (*a*) the settlers' colony, and (*b*) the exploitation colony.

The settlers' colonies, as South Africa, Australia, U.S.A. and Canada, offered the colonists such favourable climatological conditions that a permanent settlement was possible and so new "nations" could develop. Although consisting of immigrants from different peoples, new strong national communities were formed.

The exploitation colonies, as India, Burma, Indo-China, Malacca and Indonesia, did not offer these favourable conditions, so that the Europeans worked there only temporarily and then went back to their home countries. A minority of so-called Eurasians, however, remained in the tropics. At present, the relations of the advanced towards the backward peoples are often discussed and apparently while "exploitation-colonies" are sharply condemned, the "settlers' colonies" hardly share in the general criticism. However, in nearly all the exploitation colonies, the native population grew, both in number and in political status, in such a way that in the majority of these areas, independence movements have sprung up as a fruit of western administration and the effect of two world wars.

In the settlers' colonies, the native population was gradually driven back, deprived of its hunting fields and was ordered to live in closed territories. The Maoris of New Zealand are an exception. Compared with the Indians of North America and the Bushmen of Australia, they were given a fair chance to transform their existence into a modern community. By comparing both expressions: settlers' and exploitation colony, one instinctively throws a stone at the second one. However, the element of colonial " egoism " is active in both cases. In the first one, inevitably the native people are pushed back and a new western community on foreign and conquered territory is created. In the second case, the " exploiter " wanted commodities, which could be sold in other parts of the world and thus, for example, in Indonesia, a western enterprise eventually opened up possibilities which had not existed before: rubber and cinchona seeds were brought from South America and tried with success on Java and Sumatra. By using experimental stations, the sugar-cane industry was developed very efficiently. To guarantee success, the original population had to live in security and to multiply to be able to work in a community which had started to deliver necessary products to world trade. Thus the " colonial administration " had to protect the rights of the native population on the land and the using of irrigation water for the rice fields. As western enterprises also needed land and water for their development, a barrier of law had to be constructed to protect the weak against the strong; to maintain old native rights without making modernization impossible. By associating and combining old sound native unwritten law (customary law) with modern western principles, the Administration tried to further the interest of both parties. By developing the colonial territory in this way, rice production and cattle breeding increased, whereas western trade and industry got a chance to sell products to the rapidly augmenting population.

In the settlers' colonies, an independence movement amongst the aborigines had become an impossibility, because after the settlers disrupted the ties with the " mother country ", the original inhabitants formed a powerless minority in a " sovereign state " of western manufacture. No exploitation colony can escape the final stage of economic and political development: the birth of a free and independent nation.

The Indian Trading Companies of the Dutch cities during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries aimed at getting the most favourable conditions for their trade on the islands of the Indonesian archipelago and were amalgamated in a monopolistic organization, the United East India Company (V.O.C.). The V.O.C. carried the burden of governing the people only where it was necessary. Their own settlements were ruled according to Dutch laws, making an attempt at transplanting the familiar Dutch city community on foreign soil. Indonesians and Chinese, attracted by the possibilities of local trade, industry and labour, were allowed to dwell together in suburbs surrounding the Dutch settlements and were ruled by their own chiefs according to their own customary law. At the end of

the eighteenth century, the V.O.C. crumbled and the Batavian Republic took over the insolvent estate.

During the period 1600–1800, methods and principles of Dutch colonial administration were very simple. The V.O.C. contracted with Indonesian chieftains for colonial products and hardly bothered about the interests of the people. Modern ideas were born during the French Revolution carried by the slogan: "liberty, equality and fraternity". Van Hogendorp advocated the introduction of a humanitarian system by using direct western rule over the Indonesian people in accordance with the new European ideals. But the time was not ripe. The actual position was that the Indonesian rajah or chieftain swayed a very large and undefined power over his subjects. The distance between modern European ideals and Indonesian conceptions of rule could only very gradually be shortened. After the famous occupation period of Raffles, the Dutch were restored in 1816 and a beginning was made at governing the people. The European civil servant obtained the task to further the welfare "of his family as a true father". In 1854, peoples' rights were acknowledged by the law. The beginning of the twentieth century witnessed the birth of political parties and trade unions. In 1906, the first municipal councils started work; residency councils followed. The People's Council for the whole territory of N.E.I. was installed in 1918, and about 1925 followed a series of Regency, Provincial and other regional councils. The members were partly elected and a smaller number nominated. The practice of the People's Council was that the Governor-General nominated members of the opposition, because they had no chance to be elected against the candidates of the feudal and Mohammedan parties. The overthrow of the power of the feudalists, prepared by Japanese propaganda, was effected during the Indonesian revolution (August, 1945). The Indonesian Republican government is now tackling the problem of restoring normal conditions after years of revolution and strife. It is, for the time being, difficult to predict whether it will succeed.

During the second half of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century, the Dutch tried to transplant western humanitarian ideas amongst the Indonesian peoples. A thorough knowledge of the languages, folklore and customary law was necessary to obtain practical results. Never could the Dutch have followed the policy of Mustafa Kemal Pasha in Turkey who could dictatorially sweep away old law and custom and order everyone to learn to write the Latin alphabet and wear European clothes. Scores of scientists and scholars directed their attention on Indonesia and not only for profit in material sense. Using the knowledge they had acquired and directed by a speech delivered by H.M. Queen Wilhelmina to the House of Representatives in 1901, Dutch rule aimed at levelling up the Indonesians. The so-called "ethical policy" had started. Education, medical services, irrigation works, agricultural extension courses were extended to further the interests of the people. The civil service and the police organization

were modernized to be able to meet the requirements of the "ethical policy". The results of the scientific work done at the university of Leiden, the Agricultural High School at Wageningen and the Technical High School of Delft made the advancement of economic conditions possible in Indonesia on such a scale that a university was opened at Batavia and a Technical High School at Bandung.

The results of this "ethical policy" stimulated serious over-population in Java and an impetuous movement to obtain independent political status amongst the Indonesian intelligentsia. Thus, in the former exploitation-colony, the process was in direct contrast with that of the settlers' colonies. Here, the natives hardly played a political role because they had become a minority between the increasing number of foreign colonists. They had played no decisive role in disrupting or loosening the ties with the colonizing country. This struggle for freedom was started by the European settlers and resulted in independence or dominion status for the new state. The general opinion was, that "colonial status" was abolished once and for all. But the problem of the minorities of the original peoples remained unsolved. Colonial status had disappeared between white and white, between Great Britain and the U.S.A. for instance, not between the white majority and the coloured minority.

The great contribution to Dutch colonial policy by Sir Stamford Raffles—who was Lieutenant-Governor from 1811-1816—was the strengthening of the Javanese village system. For the feudal and V.O.C. compulsory contributions and services (mainly labour) he substituted land revenue collected in money through the village headman. The regents were replaced by European magistrates and judges, because as a humanitarian, Raffles aimed at liberating the people from the oppression of their native rulers. After the restoration of Dutch rule in 1816, the village system and the land revenue of Raffles were retained, but the Javanese chieftains were put in authority again. It was necessary to restore the authority of the regents because Chinese and Arab moneylenders and middle-men had replaced the hereditary leaders and so disorganized the native community. The following quotation from a report, written by Governor-General Van den Bosch, is of more than historical interest: "The collapse of authority and social order and growing impoverishment have brought into existence a numerous class of proletarians who go about and steal." Furnivall (*Colonial Policy and Practice*, p. 221) concludes: "His description of Java in 1830 reads in fact very like an account of modern Burma".

The same might be written of modern Java. The people were impoverished by Japanese and guerrilla compulsory contributions. The authority of the "feudal chieftains" has been replaced by the actual power of military and gang leaders who let their units and bands live "on the products of the country", with the result that banditry, a centuries' old social phenomenon, revived all over Java.

As the solution for the difficulties of 1830, Van den Bosch proposed the "Culture System". Instead of paying land rent in cash, the Javanese were required to

furnish an equivalent amount of export crops, coffee for instance, and they were encouraged to sell to the Government additional produce at a low rate. To obtain results, the influence of the Javanese chieftains had to be used from the village headman up to the regents. All the officials, both European and Javanese, were financially interested in this " big state enterprise ", because they drew a commission on produce. During the Culture System, Dutch administration abstained as far as possible from interfering in native affairs. Attention was concentrated on export crops and a succession of famines strengthened the criticisms against the Van den Bosch system. In 1870, Holland decided, under the influence of Thorbecke and Van de Putte and their Liberal Party to replace the Culture System by one of private enterprise and free labour. Douwes Dekker (Multatuli), who had sharply criticized Dutch rule in a famous novel, *Max Havelaar*, publicized his doubts regarding the Liberal system in a work entitled *Free Labour*. His conclusion was that private enterprise certainly would find a way to more or less compulsory labour, by bribing people with influence. The Van den Bosch system was not fundamentally wrong and the Javanese would work voluntarily if humanly treated, wrote Multatuli.

Plantations formerly managed by Government were taken over by private companies or divided amongst the people. Numerous concessions were given out for rubber, tea, cinchona, sisal, tobacco, oil-palm, etc. On Java, the planters used the influence of village headmen and other persons with prestige to secure labour and security and paid for the service given. To protect the Indonesian cultivator from oppression by western enterprise, a real Dutch civil service was created, which no longer acted as " mercantile agents " for a state enterprise, but worked as social welfare officers in the interest of both the population and agricultural and industrial development. Complaints of the population were openly discussed in village gatherings and conferences with the Indonesian civil servants.

The liberal system could not totally fulfil its early humanitarian promises. A large reservoir of labour at low wages was in the interest of the planters, whereas a low standard of living for the millions of the population was bad for the interest of importers. The improvement of general conditions such as security and hygiene was automatically followed by a rapidly increasing number of the population, so that the balance of individual welfare hardly changed.

In 1902, Queen Wilhelmina promised an inquiry into " the diminishing welfare of the people of Java ", which resulted in the so-called ethical policy. The new policy aimed at providing funds for enhancement of welfare by promoting western enterprise and the promotion of welfare for the Indonesians by using the village organization. The Village Act of 1906 was intended to convert the village into a community on western lines, with its own properties, land, markets, schools and petty banks in the interest of the people and under the control of the adult villagers. The idea was to give the people a training school for practical democracy, but in practice the civil service both European and Javanese used the

" autonomous village " as an apparatus to promote those measures which they thought good for the people. The villagers, not understanding the meaning of those measures and not feeling the responsibility for the village funds, mostly agreed with the suggestions and proposals of the civil service officers. In most cases, they trusted these officers as their " fathers " and went on looking after their own affairs, their family, their house and garden, their crop and cattle. Political education is a long-term problem.

As far as western organizations transplanted to the Javanese rural communities are concerned, it is difficult to escape the depressing conclusion that " deplorably little village autonomy remains " (*Adam*, cited by Furnivall, l.c., p. 229). But next to these transplanted western welfare organizations remained the centuries-old Indonesian village way of life, to be comfortable by making others feel comfortable.

The duties of good neighbourship, mutual assistance by building and repairing houses, by watching over the security of the villagers during the night, repairing the small irrigation canals running through the wet rice fields and mutual assistance also during harvest time and village festivities, this real village life was very much alive before the invasion of the Japanese in 1942. Village harmony and solidarity remained intact except in those areas where banditry had taken root, where the " authority " of gang leaders had replaced the influence of the village headman. In such areas, as for instance Bantam (West Java), people trekked away, choosing the line of less danger, not being able to pluck up the courage to complain, afraid of the long knife of the gangster. In those areas, hamlets were deserted and the rice fields accumulated in the hands of a few moneylenders. In such conditions, happy village life was impossible.

Real active Dutch administration began on Java during the nineteenth century and on large parts of the outer Isles in the twentieth century. During this period, the fundamental principles of administration consisted of the following three points: (*a*) indirect rule over Indonesians; (*b*) the protection of the people against oppression and (*c*) the retention of native land in native hands.

According to the Arab principle " like over like is mercy ", the Indonesian rajahs and regents ruled over their people; Chinese and Indian captains looked after the affairs of respectively Chinese and Indians and similarly European officials for European affairs. This policy could be carried out by maintaining the original Indonesian organizations as the village system at the base and the kingdoms or the regencies at the top.

The village stands for the principle " like over like " claiming an Indonesian community ruled by Indonesians. The regent embodied the tradition of ruling the people through their own leaders. His position was very strong. By the strength of law, the regent was nearly as invulnerable as the governor-general. He could not be prosecuted in civil or criminal affairs without consent of the governor-general and he could not be called out as a witness before the court

without that permission. His position was permanent as a rule and mostly hereditary. A strong and honest regent was a link between eastern harmony and western ideas of commerce as an agency for promoting general welfare. This position was modernized and consolidated in 1924 when the regent was appointed *ex officio* as President of the Regency Council and the Board of Commissioners. Numerous regents were members of the Provincial Councils and of the People's Council as well. They were, in fact, personal links between the old village community, their own regency and the modern representative institutions.

From the moment the Dutch introduced municipality councils (1906), the forming of political parties became necessary and the leaders of those parties claimed to be the spokesmen of large parts of the population. They criticized sharply in daily papers and gatherings what Government had done or omitted. The political leader became a rival of the " feudal chieftain " and during the Japanese occupation, the Military Command succeeded in building new rural organizations, so-called " security committees " to give the political leaders a grip over the millions. After the capitulation of Japan, many feudal chieftains were driven out. Indonesian jurists, physicians, technicians and economists are playing nowadays the first violin in the talks on the future of Indonesia and its population and have taken the place of the nobility. The political intelligentsia is a new factor in carrying out the principle " like over like " and although our vision of the future is obscured by a veil of chaos, one might express the hope that they will find a way to regain comfort for all parties concerned.

One of the best traditions of Dutch administration was that Government should protect the weak against the strong. So during the time of the Culture system and the Liberal period, the policy of the government was to protect the people against abuse of power by the chieftains and afterwards against the European, Chinese and Arab financial classes. The liberal Constitution for the Netherlands East Indies in 1854 acknowledged some fundamental rights of the people and made colonial government responsible to the Dutch Parliament. This law scheduled the abolition of slavery on January 1st, 1860, which was practically impossible because the Dutch only gained general control over the Indies as late as the first decade of the twentieth century. So an official statement given in 1922 declared that slavery had disappeared. The importation of slaves was forbidden in 1818 and public slave trade in 1854. When the Dutch Government signed the " Slavery Treaty " of Geneva on September 25th, 1926, she accepted a duty which had already been recognized since 1854.

The same law gave the people the right to make verbal or written complaints and ordered the Governor-General to protect the people against abuse of power. This social evil is as old as mankind and the Javanese have a word for the conception: *sawenang-wenang*. The western democracies fought against the evil with parliamentary institutions, freedom of the press, the right to hold meetings and the creation of political parties and trade unions. Yet this social evil is very persis-

tent because its roots are in the greed of men and their lust for power and it tends to develop where easy profit can be gained. Corruption is a common phenomenon in Indonesia, which is rooted in the old social relations between the higher and lower classes. It is important how a government and its servants try to combat the results of human egoism, and how she tries to determine the " abuse of power " and at any rate to keep such abuse within reasonable limits.

The majority of Indonesian and European servants were keen on investigating complaints of the people and the Government showed repeatedly social courage, for instance, in officially stating that slavery conditions still existed in the Chinese lumber exploitations in Riouw archipelago (1924) and in the Chinese cigarette factories in Tuban (East Java, 1930). Where lack of " official courage " led to the concealment of certain dangerous abuses, extremist elements got a chance to make revolution, as happened 1926–1927 on the west coast of Sumatra and in Bantam (West Java). Sometimes it was very difficult to get at the truth, as was the case with the " blackmail money " (*wang ngaraksa*) alleged to be levied by the gang leaders on Indonesian and Chinese traders, farmers and shopkeepers in Bantam.

Difficult to detect also was the system used by numerous village bank committees to receive money under the names of the members of the bank. The system was so widely spread that it got a name: *nèmpèlan*, which means pasted or glued on. What happened was this. A member of the bank needed f.5.0., but according to the membership book he had the right to contract a maximum loan of f.25.0. The committee refused the loan of f.5.0 but urged the member to put his (her) right thumb-mark under a receipt for f.25.0. The committee would be responsible for returning f.20.0 plus interest, the member for f.5.0. Nobody refused such a proposition. Closing old holes by digging new ones, the village bank committees were able to use public money for some years. The general slump of 1930 made the cardhouse crash and numerous banks had to be closed and slowly reorganized.

The chances of " abuse of power " will remain very great amongst the people of Indonesia, because they readily bend to power and the majority are not interested in public affairs other than village interests within their view. A new independent Government of the United States of Indonesia should act very wisely by upholding the tradition of protecting the weak against the strong.

Another sound principle of Dutch rule was introduced by the Agrarian Law of 1875 which forbids the alienation of native land to Europeans, Chinese and other foreigners. Private enterprise could obtain waste land unsuitable for making wet rice fields, on long lease from the Government (tea, rubber, cinchona, etc.), or could rent land on annual lease from the villagers (sugar cane) against officially calculated minimum prices. During the first decade of the nineteenth century, financial stringency had been relieved by the sale of large areas in West Java. A century later, large parts of these estates were bought back by Government and

divided without cost amongst the villagers. The law of 1875 protected people against official financial need, but also against their own readiness to burden land with debt to foreign moneylenders. The eventuality which happened in the Irrawaddy delta (Burma), where the rice fields gradually came into the hands of Indian moneylenders, leaving the Burmese a poor class of farmhands, was thus made impossible. After this law came into effect, the application of western ideas of property to native land was restricted to small lots necessary for building houses.

This short survey aimed at making clear that humanitarian and progressive ideals as regards " colonial " policy were born amongst former generations and that the difficult problems the statesmen tried to solve repeatedly arise again, as for instance, poverty, disease, hunger, over-population, banditry and the political education of the people. Well-meant principles and methods may have failed or partly been successful, but one fact is clear as daylight: the Indonesian peoples gave birth to a class of intellectuals who want to be comfortable by taking their national affairs in their own hands. To fulfil a promise made by Queen Wilhelmina in December, 1942, a Round Table Conference was recently opened in the Hague to discuss how Dutch responsibility will be handed over to a sovereign Government of the United States of Indonesia. Two distinct groups of leaders play a role: those who want to disrupt every tie with the Dutch are mainly to be found in the Republic Jogjakarta and those who want to co-operate with the Dutch in a union with the kingdom of the Netherlands are predominantly represented by the Federalist movement.

Extremist and moderate views on Indonesian-Dutch relationship are both the fruits of western political ideas. Amidst the turmoil of feeling, it seems there is hardly room for Furnivall's conclusion: " Dutch rule has, in great measure, been successful in softening the impact of the modern west on native social life " (l.c. p. 263).

The " white man's burden " will have to be carried in future on Indonesian backs and an almost superhuman task will have to be taken over by the Indonesian leaders in repairing the material and moral damage done during the Japanese occupation and the Indonesian revolution.

The network of welfare services and the security organizations has got to be rebuilt to combat tropical diseases and to restore peace and order. The reign of terrorism has got to be stopped in the interest of all parties concerned. The youth has to grow accustomed to regular work. The second danger that threatens the realization of the independent United States of Indonesia is that the old system of monopolistic companies might get a chance again. The agreement between the Republic Jogja and the Matthew Fox Company as sole import/export agency for fifteen years at a commission of 5 per cent.; 51 per cent. of the shares in American and 49 per cent. in Indonesian hands, may be an earnest warning against this activity of " free enterprise ".

The third and most threatening danger is that the Cominform, by penetration and infiltration, tries to stir up unrest and chaos to prepare South East Asia for coming events. President Truman's promise as made in the fourth point of his inaugural address, January, 1949, to give relief to "undeveloped areas" by "financial and technical aid", might open a solution if properly and humanely executed.

In the light of the circumstances of to-day, it seems rather futile that intelligent parties stubbornly quibble over constitutional technicalities regarding the building of "Free Indonesia". Regression into the old mistakes and failures has to be prevented and successful principles and methods ought to be carried further.

1. It is important for South East Asia, for the countries maintaining close relations with it and for the world as a whole to pursue a vigorous policy of prosperity and thus to throw up a barricade against Communism, as poverty in that part of the world presents a fertile soil in which destructive political theories can take root.

2. A prosperity programme directed towards raising the standard of living in Indonesia to the Western level can only take effect if the urge to co-operate is stimulated among all those concerned.

3. In so far as production is concerned, a nation's faculty to develop wealth entailing future prosperity for all is more significant than the actual material now being produced.

4. A just distribution is founded upon the moral idea of the organic unity of mankind.

5. For the execution of the programme, guarantee must be given for the security of life and property.

6. In Indonesia, about 80 per cent. of the population depend on agriculture for a livelihood, so a programme of prosperity must, in the first place, be of an agrarian character. Consolidating a sound peasant class is of the utmost importance, because that class is a source of vigour and national virtues and it presents a bulwark against revolutionary tendencies.

7. In connexion with the expanding population and the necessity to increase the productive power of the population, it is necessary to improve the people's food supply, quantitatively as well as qualitatively (calories, proteins, vitamins).

8. For the maintenance and increase of the vigour of the population chronic diseases must be combated and above all prevented.

9. The intensification of education and means of communication by enhancing the individual consciousness and critical susceptibility to fresh impulses, and also by further specialization, will increase the productive capacity of the peoples of Indonesia.

With these nine points taken from an unpublished welfare programme written by a Dutch economist, I may end this short survey.

Amsterdam, July/August, 1949

Résumé

La Politique Hollandaise en Indonésie avec quelques indications sur ses buts

APRÈS la capitulation des Japonais en août 1945, la politique coloniale hollandaise fut vivement critiquée partout dans le monde, cette tendance ayant été stimulée par les activités des chefs républicains d'Indonésie. L'auteur de cette communication essaie de montrer que cette indignation n'est aucunement justifiée.

La politique suivie depuis 1850 a eu pour récompense une augmentation étonnante de la population indigène: A Java le chiffre de la population est passé de 4,500,000 en 1815 à 41,000,000 en 1930. Ce même phénomène s'observe dans d'autres colonies d'exploitation, tandis que le contraire s'est produit dans les colonies de peuplement, où la population autochtone ayant perdu ses terrains de chasse, source de sa nourriture, a décru à tel point qu'elle est devenue une minorité à peine capable de jouer un rôle dans le développement de son pays.

Le mouvement vers l'indépendance en Indonésie est le fruit d'idées de gouvernement d'origine occidentale transplantées dans le pays et surimposées à la conception indonésienne de l'autorité.

A une longue période de mercantilisme et de laisser-faire succéda au XIX^{e} siècle une ère où fut soulignée—par suite de la Révolution française et du mouvement libéral de 1848—l'idée des droits fondamentaux du peuple. Les principes essentiels de l'administration coloniale hollandaise de cette nouvelle époque ont été: (*a*) L'administration indirecte exercée sur les Indonésiens, " le gouvernement par ses pareils est un souverain bienfait [*like over like is mercy*] "; (*b*) la protection de la population contre l'oppression; et (*c*) le maintien des droits de propriété indigènes. Le premier de ces principes visait à éduquer l'Indonésien à utiliser ses propres institutions, par exemple, l'unité du village, pour se gouverner; le second principe avait pour but de mettre fin aux abus de droits féodaux; et le troisième devait protéger le cultivateur indigène contre l'aliénation de ses rizières.

A partir de 1906 une série de conseils représentatifs occidentaux a commencé à étudier les régions où la population était assez avancée pour participer graduellement en plus grande mesure à son propre gouvernement au niveau le plus élevé et, pendant l'automne de 1949, une conférence pour échange de vues sur un pied d'entière égalité a eu lieu à la Haye pour arriver à une solution qui permettra d'établir des Etats Unis d'Indonésie souverains et indépendants. Le problème à résoudre est de déterminer jusqu'à quel point l'expérience et les capitaux hollandais participeront à l'avenir au développement de l'Indonésie.

Comme les répercussions de la deuxieme guerre mondiale menacent presque toutes les phases de l'existence sociale, économique et politique des peuples de l'Asie du Sud-Est, y compris ceux de l'Indonésie, il semble de toute urgence, pour ces peuples autant que pour les parties du monde qui vivent des produits de cette région du Pacifique, de trouver et de mettre à l'exécution un plan qui donnera une solution saine des difficultés qui s'y rencontrent.

L'auteur est d'opinion que plusieurs éléments du programme d'assistance sociale tracé pour les Indonésiens par la politique hollandaise d'avant-guerre pourraient servir de pièces de base à l'avenir à un nouveau gouvernement des Etats-Unis d'Indonésie.

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PART II

Principles of Administration in the Netherlands West Indies

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THE Netherlands West Indies consist of two governorships: Surinam (or Dutch Guiana) and the Netherlands Antilles.

Surinam, situated between French and British Guiana on the north-eastern coast of South America, has a territory of approximately 140,000 square kilometres (57,000 square miles). On both sides, towards the Brazilian border, the boundaries have not been definitely fixed.

Surinam has about 200,000 inhabitants, consisting of Amerindians (3,000), Bush-negroes (20,000), Chinese (2,500), Creoles* (79,000), Europeans (1,600), Indians (from India, 58,000), Indonesians (34,500) and some 2,600 others (1946 figures).

Of these there are 1,650 Confucians, 34,000 Hindus, 1,000 Israelites, 55,500 Moslems, 49,000 Protestants, 34,500 Roman Catholics.

The main products of Surinam are bauxite, timber, and in agriculture: rice, citrus, coconut products, sugar, coffee.

Government expenditure averages around twenty million Surinam guilders a year.

The Netherlands Antilles consist of two groups of three islands: the Leewards: Aruba, Curaçao, Bonaire situated off the coast of Venezuela, near lake Maracaibo; and the Dutch Windwards (in the British Leeward group): St. Martin (half of which is French), St. Eustatius (Statia) and Saba.

Curaçao has an area of about 425 square kilometres; Aruba, 175 square kilometres; Bonaire, 265 square kilometres; Netherlands St. Martin, 40 square kilometres; St. Eustatius, 21 square kilometres, and Saba, 13 square kilometres.

This Government has some 155,000 inhabitants: 95,000 on Curaçao, 51,000 on Aruba, 4,700 on Bonaire, 1,560 on St. Martin, 920 on St. Eustatius, 1,135 on Saba (1948 figures). Of this total, approximately 84 per cent. are Roman Catholics.

The only natural asset of these islands (apart from good natural harbours in the Leewards) is a phosphate mine on Curaçao; as far as agriculture goes, aloes are the only export product; the economy of the territory is wholly based on the oil

* The term Creoles in this paper, as used in Surinam, means locally born people not belonging to any of the other groups mentioned.

refineries (crude oil imported from Venezuela); Government expenditure is around fifty million Curaçao guilders a year.

In considering the *present* principles of "colonial" administration in the Netherlands West Indies, the period of 1942 to date has been chosen, because the modifications were started by the now famous speech of Her Majesty Queen Wilhelmina of December 6th, 1942. (See text in *The Netherlands Commonwealth and the Future*, published by Netherlands Information Bureau, New York, 1945, p. 20.)

The Netherlands West Indies (Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles) have been administered under two very similar Organic Acts, which, in turn, depended on the Netherlands Constitution. The Constitution allowed the handling of internal affairs by the overseas territorial governments, but the Netherlands Government and Parliament kept a large measure of control by retaining the right of approval over the budget in case the territorial government could not pay its way, and by appointing and instructing the governors. The Queen announced in her speech a Round Table Conference for the whole realm (Netherlands, Indonesia and West Indies), to be held after the war in order to give the overseas peoples more real autonomy. After 1945, the Conference could not be convened owing to the situation in Indonesia, but in 1946, delegations from the West Indies came to the Hague to present petitions to the Queen concerning their wishes for a better system of local government.

These wishes had also been studied by a special commission, set up by each one of the Governments in 1943 after the Queen's speech. Their reports were available to a Round Table Conference for the West Indies which was held at the Hague early in 1948 and resulted in several resolutions and drafts. Meanwhile, on the basis of the said petitions and further talks at government level, new Organic Acts were passed by the Netherlands Parliament and promulgated in May 1948.

These provided for a *general* vote (male and female) to elect the local legislative council (*Staten*), a restriction of powers in the hands of the Governor, a new council of (proto-) ministers (leaving the technical heads of departments as mere officials), a budget to be fixed by local ordinance, and a West Indies representative at the Hague for each of the governments.

On the basis of these Acts, the Staten in session made an ordinance concerning the elections and had these held by the middle of March 1949 in the Netherlands Antilles and by the end of May 1949 in Surinam. The party system had developed in the years after the war and the local struggle for votes was especially fierce in the Netherlands Antilles, where in each island, two or three or even four parties contended for the twenty-one seats, without, however, having much fundamental difference in their programmes. In Surinam, the Creoles party won by a large majority, with the Indians as a good second (thirteen and six seats).

In Surinam, the system of the elections is slightly different since groups of the population (such as the Amerindians and Bush-negroes) *may* be allowed a system

of indirect voting in conformity with their specific level of social development. This possibility, however, has not been made use of.

The talks about modifications meanwhile went on at the Round Table Conference which was not formally adjourned and in the Netherlands Parliament. The constitution which had to be adapted to the situation as it had developed in Indonesia was officially modified in September 1948, thus giving further scope for amplification of the local autonomy.

An interim regulation on this basis is now (August 1949) before Parliament.* It enumerates specifically the few subjects which are not considered as being local (*e.g.* defence, international relations, weights and measures, etc.), and thus remain in the hands of the new kingdom (which will consist of the Netherlands, Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles as partners; the definite constitution has not yet been decided upon).

The new regulations imply for the Netherlands Antilles the possibility of decentralizing the government. The two more important islands, Aruba and Curaçao, that have gained wealth and welfare by the oil refineries established there in 1924 and 1917 respectively, want to be more independent, not only from the mother country but also from each other and from their territorial central government.

Here is an example of the general tendency towards nationalistic development, while on the other hand federation and regional co-operation over and above national boundaries prevails in the world.

Regional co-operation had already been established in the Caribbean Commission, to which the Netherlands (and France) adhered in 1945. This Commission thus covers all those territories in Central America that do not belong—not being sovereign states—to the Organization of American States (Pan-American Union). Although it is an advisory body it can be useful as a clearing house for data concerning the Commission territories which have their local representatives on the Commission and in its auxiliary bodies, the Caribbean Research Council and, more important politically, the biennial West Indian Conference.

Apart from this co-operative welfare work, the Netherlands West Indies have also their own welfare plans and funds to which the Netherlands contribute either in cash (Surinam) or in research (the Antilles). These funds are concerned mainly with economic and social projects; the cultural co-operation between the four parts of the (old) Netherlands Kingdom (Netherlands, Indonesia, Surinam and Netherlands Antilles), is being fostered by a newly-established foundation which undertakes sociological research, subsidizes the exchange of cultural matters (music, theatre, exhibitions, lectures, libraries, etc.) and stresses local initiatives; Curaçao has its own museum and both territories have some active societies for promoting arts and lately also sciences.

Dutch influence has been and still is evident in education and missionary work.

* This act giving responsible government to Surinam came into force in January 1950.

Surinam has become a Dutch-speaking country as far as the greater part of the population is concerned (the Creoles and the upper class of the Indians and Indonesians).

Of the locally-trained teachers and doctors, many have been attracted to the Antilles by the better standard of living.*

There has been a general movement of people towards Curaçao and Aruba not only from Surinam, but also from the other Netherlands Antilles which have hardly any resources of their own. Thus Curaçao and Aruba (95,000 and 51,000 population respectively) have gathered some forty different nationalities on their small territories.

The inhabitants of the Netherlands West Indies, except for foreign residents, are either (locally born) Netherlands subjects or Netherlanders. The rather confused question of Dutch nationality and citizenship is being studied by a special commission (Professor Kollewijn, chairman) which will draft a wholly new law on the subject.

The level of (secondary) education in Curaçao is being adapted to that of the Netherlands, the other islands provide primary schools and a few higher classes. Special training (teachers, vocational) can lead to local examinations which are recognized in Holland. The language spoken on the A.B.C. islands (Aruba, Bonaire, Curaçao) is Papiamento (a mixture of Spanish, Dutch, English and vestiges of African languages).† In the schools, Dutch is used as a medium. On the Lesser Antilles, the language is English, Dutch being taught as a discipline.

Social security measures are being enacted, especially in the Antilles which can afford the necessary expenditure. Labour unions do exist, but they are not very active as yet (even less in Surinam than on Curaçao and Aruba).

The Common Law is mostly a locally adapted form of the Netherlands codes. The judicial system of the territories consists of local courts from which an appeal lies to the High Court of the Netherlands.

Turning back to the pre-war period in order to look into the *past* principles of colonial administration, we can discern in Surinam three phases of development (based on Dr. R. van Lier). First, the period of colonization proper (*colonie de peuplement*), an establishment of white settlers who produced—with imported slaves—tropical products for the home markets. The settlers brought their own administration (partially adapted law from the mother country); the West India Company appointed the Governors but the settlers elected candidates for the Council who were eventually chosen by the Governor. The Governor and Council had legislative, executive and judicial powers, although later separate councils for civil juridical affairs were set up.

This system remained in force till the end of the eighteenth century and even during the periods of British occupation (1799–1802, 1804–1816).

* Before the war many went also to Indonesia and Holland.

† On Papiamento see Albert Balink, *My Paradise is Hell*, New York, 1948, chapter 29.

Meanwhile, a second phase in Surinam was developing, since a great part of the original settlers had left the colony, thus giving it the character of *colonie d'exploitation* (absentee owners, local administrators) with a middle class between masters and slaves consisting of their combined offspring.

Thirdly, when, in 1863, slavery was abolished, a pluriform society came into existence (Netherlands officials, middle class of Jewish settlers and Creoles, and black labour, later reinforced by immigrants from China, India and Java).

In the Antilles, a similar system of administration was prevalent during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The grouping into governorships has changed frequently, at one time Surinam and the six islands forming one governorship under a Governor-General (1828–1845). Since, in 1848, the Netherlands Constitution transferred part of the King's powers in colonial matters to Parliament, new Organic Acts for Surinam and the territory of Curaçao were enacted (1865). These established legislative councils of, partly elected, partly nominated, members. The Governor's powers, however, remained very extensive (including those of overruling the council) and only a small number of people were enfranchised. The budget was ultimately fixed by act of the Dutch Parliament. The Netherlands Constitution of 1922 provided for more autonomy in the overseas territories and this was incorporated into the new Organic Acts for Surinam and Curaçao in 1936. Especially more local autonomy was given by decentralizing the administration (village councils and local administration of " polders " in Surinam).

Land tenure was better regulated than in the first period after the abolition of slavery. Rights on Crown lands within the villages were vested in the community, the council being responsible for the gathering of landrent, while on the other hand, having the right to distribute the land among the villagers.

In Curaçao, a land registration (*kadaster*) defines more clearly the individual titles.

As a conclusion, we may state that the Netherlands West Indies on the one hand are becoming more Caribbean minded and are economically more closely linked up with the Americas and even with the U.K. than before, but on the other hand they remain personally and culturally related to the Netherlands.

They have their delegates in the Caribbean Commission and are taking part in the West Indian Conference. The Governors of the three Guianas meet for consultations on common problems, and there is more direct contact between Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles. As to economics, the link between Curaçao/Aruba and Venezuela (oil) is self-explanatory, that with the U.S. involves Surinam bauxite, Aruba oil (Standard), Curaçao oil and (tourist) trade and that with the British Empire is largely trade with Canada and the U.K.

The personal and cultural relations between Holland and the Netherlands West Indies are kept active by Dutch officials, teachers and missionaries working in the West Indies, and by West Indian students and scholars in Holland.

Notwithstanding the growing autonomy and self-reliance and some anti-Dutch feeling, there is no serious tendency to sever the bonds with Holland and the House of Orange. But in the new Kingdom of the Netherlands (Holland, Surinam, Netherlands Antilles), Holland will have to take into account the inherent poverty of the West Indies and all its connotations, including the obligations of the better equipped part of this new federation towards the less developed areas.

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Résumé

Principes d'administration dans les Indes Occidentales Néerlandaises

APRÈS une courte description géographique de ces territoires, avec des indications sur la distribution et la diversité de la population et des religions, sur les ressources et les frais d'administration, l'auteur étudie les principes d'administration de l'époque actuelle, souligne les réformes (extension du suffrage, restriction des pouvoirs des gouverneurs, etc.) qu'on introduit depuis 1942, et indique les tendances vers l'autonomie locale et la décentralisation. Ces territoires développent en même temps des projets économiques, sociaux et culturels et on examine des problèmes de nationalité, de mouvements de population et d'enseignement, ainsi que des projets de loi portant sur la sécurité sociale.

Historiquement, ces territoires ont traversé trois phases dans leur développement: d'abord colonies de peuplement exploitées, à l'aide d'esclaves importés, pour fournir des produits à la métropole, et administrées par les colons sous la Compagnie des Indes Occidentales; ensuite, avec le départ de beaucoup de colons blancs, colonies d'exploitation gérées par des intendants; enfin avec l'abolition de l'esclavage en 1863 et l'importation (en Guyane) de travailleurs venant de la Chine, de l'Inde et de l'Indonésie et, plus tard (aux Antilles), de travailleurs étrangers de nationalités diverses, colonies à société mixte.

Les Indes Occidentales ont leur part dans la Commission des Caraïbes; leurs rapports économiques et commerciaux avec le Vénézuéla, les Etats Unis, le Canada et l'Empire britannique sont de première importance, mais les relations culturelles et personnelles avec la Hollande se maintiennent par les fonctionnaires, professeurs et missionnaires qui travaillent là-bas et par les étudiants et savants des Indes Occidentales qui se rendent en Hollande. Dans la nouvelle confédération qu'on envisage, la Hollande—dorénavant partie du Royaume au même titre que les ci-devant colonies—gardera l'obligation morale de venir en aide à ces régions moins développées.

Summary of Discussion

MR MEIER asked (1) What attention the Dutch had paid to the problem of regulating the growth of population? (2) If the success of the migration from Barbados to Surinam was measured in terms of the migrants or of its effect on Barbados.

Monsieur LANDRY wondered what the status of New Guinea was and what possibility of development there was in that region?

Professor REVERT asked for a definition of a Creole. He said that while there was some similarity between the French West Indies and the Dutch West Indies

and Surinam there were striking differences. The French tended to work in the direction of assimilation and integration within the French Union while the Dutch appeared to work in the opposite way. He wanted to know if teachers were recruited in Surinam and added that French teachers were recruited and trained on the spot and the population was completely French in its outlook. He would like to hear more of the emigration to Guiana.

Professor SIMEY pointed out certain similarities of experience between the Dutch and the British, as for example the difficulty of initiating local self-government. Once people had got a taste for self-government it was natural that they should demand a full grant at once. There might have been some advantage, however, in developing by way of some such system as dyarchy. He asked (1) What Miss Kraal meant by "sitting back and waiting patiently"? (2) Was it possible that the Dutch in the West Indies would profit from their experience in Java?

The force of colonial nationalism in its assault upon colonial powers was a formidable one. In his experience colonial politicians did not want us there. They mistrusted our motives and in their opinion the sooner we cleared out the better. He understood that there had been some jubilation in Georgetown when Singapore fell.

Mr BAYLEY declared that no such jubilation had occurred. Though he was not a typical colonial himself, since he belonged by descent to the European settler group, he believed that he was justified in saying that the great body of intelligent opinion in the British West Indies favoured remaining within the Commonwealth, but he stressed the need for an understanding policy in the advance towards such political development.

Miss KRAAL said the migration from Barbados had been a failure and this was largely due to the fact that the migrants were to work on plantations and not as smallholders. Most of them returned home within a few months.

A Creole was a person born in the colony irrespective of colour or racial origin, with the exception of Javanese and Indians. She noted that Guiana was much more Dutch than the Dutch Windward Islands where a mixed culture already existed. Teachers were recruited and trained in Surinam, but they were attracted by the higher salaries and better conditions of the Netherlands Antilles. Some teachers also went out from Holland. The emigration to Guiana had to be carefully watched lest the delicate equilibrium of the population should be upset.

Miss Kraal defended the idea that Holland should sit back and wait in order that, as in Surinam, people should have time to develop in their own way as in fact they were now doing.

Just as it was not in the interests of the British West Indian colonies to leave the Commonwealth so it was not in the interests of the Dutch West Indies that they should quit the Netherlands Kingdom.

Professor LOGEMANN said the Dutch had done nothing to control the growth of

population. Indeed on the contrary by fighting disease and improving living conditions it had been facilitated.

Though Indonesians claimed New Guinea, that country was in an anthropological sense no part of Indonesia. It was inhabited by an entirely different race. The Dutch believed that the Indonesians lacked the means to develop this backward territory but the matter was still under discussion. If it was to be developed a vast amount of capital would be required most of which he believed would be lost.

Existing social divisions constituted a serious obstacle to national solidarity and advance. Though new classes were arising and though legal setbacks had been removed social drawbacks still existed in Indonesia. Unhappily the people did not trust Dutch aims and even at the time of the conference they could not believe that complete sovereignty would be given to them. This misunderstanding, arising from the conflict between government aims and the actions of their agents overseas, explained a great deal in the hostility of colonial nationalism toward metropolitan powers.

Principles and Methods of Portuguese Colonial Administration

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PORTUGAL embodies the Metropolis (Continental territory and the Azores and Madeira Archipelagoes) and eight colonies scattered throughout Africa, Asia and Oceania.

The African colonies comprise the Archipelago of Cape Verde, Portuguese Guinea, the isles of S. Tomé and Principe, Angola and Mozambique.

Goa, Damão and Diu, on the Malabar coast of the Hindustan, make up Portuguese India; Macau is in the south of China, and in Oceania, half the island of Timor is a Portuguese colony.

In this way, Portuguese colonial policies must take into account territories lying far from one another, quite different in nature and with people on diverse scales of evolution.

The ten islands of the Cape Verde Archipelago take up a small area of 4,033 square kilometres which a most irregular rainfall makes little productive. Prolonged droughts cause great difficulties in feeding the population. The chief value of the Archipelago lies in its being a centre of communication on the Atlantic, with its magnificent sea port of Saint Vincent and the aero-port on the island of Sal.

This Archipelago was discovered by the Portuguese in the fifteenth century. It was barren and was later populated with families brought over from the kingdom and which, in order to exploit the land, brought slaves from the neighbouring coast of Guinea. Hence comes the present population of 180,000 inhabitants, divided into three groups: 5,600 whites, 117,000 mixed and 57,400 blacks. The whole population is civilized and the legal statute for *aborigines* (natives leading a tribal life; in Portuguese, *indígenas*) is not applied to the black people. Portuguese is spoken, although in many places a dialect known as "crioulo", a blend of Portuguese and the native tongue of Guinea, is used.

Guinea is situated on the west coast of Africa, between the parallels 12° 40′ and 10° 57′ N. Guinea is a fertile territory having 36,000 square kilometres and inhabited by 347,500 negroes, 2,200 mixed and 1,500 whites. The negroes are to be found in the legal condition of aborigines and are, generally, farmers tilling the ground almost always on a private property regime. They constitute fourteen tribes with differentiated ethnical characteristics and, although many of them talk Portuguese, yet they use chiefly their own languages and dialects. A great

part of the natives are Mussulmans, it being noted that Islam continues to progress among fetishists more than Catholicism. The tribal organization is respected.

The two islands of S. Tomé e Principe are situated on the Equator off the African coast. They are divided into "roças" (rural estates where only rich tropical produce is cultivated), belonging to European capitalists and producing coffee, cocoa, and oil-bearing seeds. The white population is only made up of officials, some merchants and agricultural overseers and does not exceed a thousand souls. All the land work is done by negroes. The natives of these islands, descending from ancient slaves (the islands were desert when the Portuguese discovered them), number some thirty thousand people, already civilized and are unwilling to be salaried as they prefer farming on their own account, fishing and trading. Thus it becomes necessary to recruit agricultural man-power from among the aborigines of Angola and Mozambique. (This immigration is regulated by law and watched by special magistrates under contracts for limited periods of time.)

So these islands form a typical plantation colony.

Angola is the largest Portuguese colony, comprising 1,246,700 square kilometres and 100,000 civilized people and 3,800,000 natives.

Of the civilized population, 50,000 are whites, 25,000 mixed and 25,000 blacks. The natives live in tribes.

Angola owns excellent ports, the most important ones being those of Luanda and Lobito. This territory is climatically diverse. Northwardly, the region of Congo is an equatorial zone. In the centre, the three table-lands of Malange, Benguela and Huila, crossed by railway lines, are particularly fit for European colonization. These European people are to be found scattered over numerous little villages, Luanda, Malange, Lobito, Benguela, Nova Lisboa, Silva Porto, Sa da Bandeira and Mossamedes being the chief towns. To the south of this latter town lies the long desert of Kalahari.

This colony displays intense agricultural, commercial and industrial activity, an important part of the production being absorbed by the internal market.

Mozambique is the second largest Portuguese possession—771,125 square kilometres, having a population of 60,000 civilized people and 5,000,000 natives.

Among the civilized people there are 31,000 whites, 10,000 Indians, 1,500 of the yellow race, 15,500 mixed and 2,000 blacks.

Mozambique possesses the two most important ports on the east coast of Africa, namely Lourenço Marques (serving Transvaal) and Beira (serving Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland). So international communications play a capital role in the economic life of this colony. Another factor is intimately connected with the economy of the surrounding countries—emigration, either spontaneous or recruited, of natives to the mines of South Africa and Rhodesia.

Whereas in Angola civilized people occupy themselves in small enterprises,

in Mozambique big enterprises predominate, run by the State or by capitalists, and business with natives is carried on chiefly by Indians.

The southern native population is either fetishist or Christian and a sharp rise in their cultural and economic levels is noticeable. There is a large percentage of Mussulmans in the north.

India comprises the three small territories of Goa, Damão and Diu, whose areas total only 3,983 square kilometres, with 625,000 inhabitants made up only of civilized people, of whom 310,000 are Catholics, 300,000 Hindus, 12,000 Mohammedans and 3,000 belong to other religions, principally that of Zoroaster. The economy of these territories is prevailingly agricultural, but the country is poor, and the population being dense (157 per square kilometre) they migrate much. The people in Goa are clever and educated, taking advantage of the numerous schools existing in the country where there is even a Medical School. Their cultural level facilitates access to several careers and professions either in other Portuguese territories or in Hindustan.

Macau is a city built in the south of China, and its size, together with those of the two small adjacent isles, is not more than 16 square kilometres. The Portuguese first settled there in the sixteenth century through an agreement made with the mandarins of Canton, and they have ever since been on good terms with the Chinese. This is a good commercial port, quite lively and much frequented. The population of Macau is Chinese (the Europeans are not more than 3,000) and their number varies a good deal. The fixed population may be estimated at 400,000 inhabitants, but owing to constant wars in China, Macau which is a neutral territory is much sought after by the crowds of refugees, and at certain periods 600,000 to 800,000 or more inhabitants have found support there.

The Portuguese portion of Timor measures about 19,000 square kilometres and it has 460,000 Malays. Europeans are 500 in number, and there are also 700 " mixed " there. From Macau many Chinese go out to carry on business at Timor, where some 2,500 of them have settled down.

This colony is agricultural and during the second world war it was occupied against the will and the protest of the Portuguese Government, first by Australian troops and then by the Japanese who, during three years (1942–45), laid waste the territory by destroying human lives, dwellings, plantations and cattle.

When it was again occupied by the Portuguese an active work of reconstruction was undertaken which is still progressing, the aim being chiefly to restore the population, plant trees again and have new herds.

The Portuguese claim one of the oldest colonial experiences in the modern world. Their navigators from the fifteenth century launched themselves on exploring the Atlantic Ocean, discovered the west coast of Africa, doubled the Cape of Good Hope, sailed across the Indian Ocean and thus revealed the

sea-route to India. Then, proceeding on their Atlantic navigation, they discovered South America and there are strong signs of their having likewise touched at the northern part of America. So, in the seventeenth century, Portugal owned the widest colonial empire in modern times, claiming rights over the whole of the African coast, over numerous islands in the Atlantic Ocean as well as over Brazil and the East as far as China and Indonesia.)

Four battle fleets ensured her rule over the seas and hence came her exclusive right to navigation and commerce, the security of the coastal establishments and the loyalty of the submitted peoples and allies.

When, in 1580, the Crown of Portugal was linked to that of Spain owing to Filipe II having succeeded to the last Portuguese King of the dynasty of "Aviz", the Castilian monarch, blinded by megalomania, began the ruin of the great Lusitan Empire.

With the Invincible Armada many of the most powerful Portuguese ships were destroyed. The war which Spain sustained against the Netherlands permitted the latter to be hostile to the Portuguese dominions which had, till then, been on friendly terms with them, snatching away the Cape, the Java and Summatra Islands and other territories. The religious reform also led to the dissolution of the empire since the countries which got out of the Roman communion failed to respect the Pontifical Bulls which, in exchange for missionary work committed to Portugal in the discovered lands, gave her an exclusive domain. In an internationally organized society which had the Pope as its head and legislator, those Bulls had an enormous legal and even religious importance.

What were the methods made use of by the Portuguese in colonizing in those times?

As the Portuguese went on discovering the coast of the African Continent starting from Morocco (whose chief fortifications they conquered from the Moors), they established fortified bases, preferably on bays. In those castles there was maintained a military garrison accompanying an administrator called "Feitor" whose duty it was to establish business relations with the natives by promoting an exchange of European goods for African riches. Thus sprang the Factories (Feitorias) through which slave traffic was also carried on. From the prevailing trades came some geographic designations still in use on the West Coast, such as Slaves' Coast (Costa dos Escravos), Ivory Coast (Costa do Marfim), Gold Coast (Costa do Ouro) and so on.

Establishments of this kind which struck root along the African coast were numerous. What is to-day known as "Portuguese Guinea" is the rest of the territory occupied by that method; and in Dahomey there still exists under Portuguese sovereignty the old fortress of Saint John the Baptist of Ajuda, near Cotonou.

There was once a time when the Fortress of Saint George "da Mina", which frowned over the Gold Coast, was famous.

On the east coast of Africa, the chief fortresses were those of Sofala, on the island of Mozambique and at Mombasa, although other fortresses such as that of "Baia dos Lagos" (Delagoa Bay)—Lourenço Marques—played an appreciable role.

The factory-fortresses were also the headquarters of a religious Mission which had its church. Thence started a commercial, missionary and political spread into the interior. This coastal occupation was the only one that lack of communications rendered possible; but, according to the ideas of those days, once a coast was taken hold of, the domain of the relative " hinterland " became assured.

In the East, the Portuguese sought above all to take possession of trade since their arrival there in the fifteenth century, by taking it over from the Turks. To that end they established strategic bases on the Indian Ocean covering the entries into the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf, where their fleets might find support and thus conquering the necessary ports, setting up factory-fortresses and entering into vassalage by and alliance with local princes.

Thus was born the first European Empire in India. It embodied conquered territories entirely belonging to the Portuguese, like Goa, Diu and Malacca; native kingdoms either protected or allied, where the Portuguese kept commercial agents only, sometimes in factories; and finally, concessions obtained for the construction of factory-fortresses in territories utterly out of Portuguese control, like Colombo, in the island of Ceylon.

This Empire constituted the *Indian State* governed at Goa by a representative, in person, of the King of Portugal, with the title of Vice-Roy.

Business relations were at once accompanied by an intense missionary expansion, the greatest hero of which is Saint Francis Xavier. The Indians who became converted to Christianity were regarded as equals to the Portuguese from the kingdom, racial crossings being also encouraged.

From India, scientific and missionary expeditions went forth throughout the whole of Asia and thus led the Portuguese to be the first Europeans to set foot in China and Japan.

The desert islands of the Azores, Madeira, Cape Verde, S. Tomé, Principe, Fernando Po, Ano Bom and so on were, after being discovered, given over by the Crown to Portuguese noblemen who were entrusted with exploiting and providing for them, and having a right of appropriating to themselves all the income yielded. The " Donátarios " or Captain Donees exercised all authority—civil, judicial and military—on the islands, but they could not forbid one's having recourse to the Crown or withhold Royal inspection.

The islands were peopled with families brought over from Portugal, but in the tropical zone it was found impossible to adapt Europeans to agricultural work. So, while the Azores and Madeira were colonized exclusively with people of the white race, in Cape Verde and the other islands more to the south there was no help, after several trials, but to resort to the black race and bring over slaves from the African Continent.

The " Donatários " (those in charge) carried on colonization at their own expense. Later, as the islands became populated and the function of the Donee family gradually lost importance the Crown called back the authority given over and replaced the officials representing the owner-in-charge by royal magistrates.

Brazil was discovered in 1500, and the Portuguese confined themselves first to commercial exploitation similar to that in Africa, by establishing factory-fortresses on the coast, through which was imported chiefly a kind of red wood which looked like live coal (in Portuguese—*braza*) and hence the name of " pau brazil " given to that wood; and just as in Africa, the trade of the different factories began giving names to the various zones of the west coast, so, too, in South America, the first trade caused the replacement of the name which had been given to the country through the piety of the discoverers—Terra de Santa Cruz (Land of the Holy Cross), with that of the precious wood—Brazil.

It was soon found that the coastal occupation alone was not quite enough to hold Portuguese sovereignty fast over this vast territory. And so, in 1534, the king decided to experiment with the method that had been made use of in peopling the desert islands and made a donation of twelve large provinces to private individuals who might colonize and exploit them at their own expense, having full authority over them.

The method proved inefficient, but it was a grand-scale trial which fixed thousands of Portuguese people to the American soil and brought about important capital investments. Then the King took upon himself the governor generalship of Brazil which a progressive agricultural exploitation made more attractive. In the meanwhile, the missionaries had found in the aborigines a docile, intelligent and sensitive race, quite different from that in Africa, and which was easily convertible. While the European farmers sought man-labour, the Jesuit missionaries defended the liberty of the "Tupis" in their villages and thus a strife crept in which lasted for centuries and brought serious difficulties to the Government.

The way to reconcile the economic needs with the requirements of religion was the importation of negro slaves from Africa who were bought from their chiefs—(" Regulos "). In fact, the native chiefs always had a great number of slaves whom they exchanged for European articles. As these negroes were very difficult to convert, especially while they remained rooted in their tribal life, the missionaries did not object to their passing from Africa on to Brazil where they could be more easily catechized. Thus was operated the great human drain from Angola, Congo and Guinea to the benefit of Brazil.

The basic agricultural item was sugar followed by tobacco, cassava, rice and finally cotton. At the same time, the settlers carried on large-scale cattle breeding and dealt in hides. But at the beginning of the eighteenth century, the first gold mines were discovered and later those of diamonds. The appearance of these riches brought about a rush: not only the settlers but also new people from Europe sought to make a fortune.

When the mine-seeking fever cooled down, there remained from it a deeper penetration into the Brazilian wilds, the foundation of new towns, the tilling of new grounds, a more intense circulation of benefits. The expulsion of the Jesuit Fathers, which, due mainly to the influence of colonial farmers, was ordered by Pombal in 1759, caused disorder among the natives and removed the great obstacle which had prevented them from working on the farms of the settlers. When in the early part of the nineteenth century, owing to Continental blockade and the invasion of Portugal by the troops of Napoleon, the Court of Lisbon was made to transfer itself to Rio de Janeiro, Brazil received a new incentive to her progress with the presence of the King and the social values which accompanied him. In 1808 her ports were opened for trading with the whole world. The King of Portugal stayed in Rio for twelve years, and in 1815 he decreed that Portugal and Brazil should be regarded as two sovereign states forming one united kingdom.

On returning to Lisbon, the King left his elder son in Rio as a Regent; but the latter proclaimed his independence in 1822 and set up the Empire of Brazil.

With a scanty population, Portugal had managed, between the fifteenth and nineteenth centuries, to garrison the African coast from Tangier to Melinde, people the desert islands of the Atlantic, colonize the vast territory of Brazil, including Uruguay, settle firmly in India, maintain the establishment of Macau and yet keep up missionary, scientific and business relations with many other countries in Africa (as Abyssinia), Asia and Oceania.

While one saw Brazil becoming independent, the difficulties arising from the three French invasions suffered by the Metropolis followed by a long period of civil commotions caused Portugal in the first half of the nineteenth century a slowing down in her colonial work.

The doctrine that only an effective occupation of the interior of Africa could confer rights of sovereignty began to be asserted in international quarters.

With regard to the coast, it had already been just that doctrine that had given Portugal a victory at the arbitrations in connection with the possession of the island of Bolama (President Grant being the arbitrator), Lagoa Bay or Lourenço Marques (Marshall MacMahon arbitrating); but it was impossible for Portugal to prove her rights to other African territories which, in the partition of the Continent, came to be taken over by other Powers.

There followed a period of occupation of the interior by the submission of rebel chiefs (campaigns of Mozambique, 1895–1899; south of Angola, 1907–1914; Guinea, 1916), the opening up of a wide net of communications by road and railway, and the setting up of an efficient civil administration, while a strict delimitation of boundaries was going on and geographical and hydrographical charts were being got up.

Thus Portuguese colonial experience started from as far back as the fifteenth century and embodies most various forms: it has come in all parts of the world, in contact with most varied races, has had its imperialistic and military days, was

sometimes founded on trade, at other times it aimed at a settlement with farming and mining, and can show in its assets a great modern nation—Brazil.

The principles and methods of Portuguese contemporary colonial procedure are the fruit of this experience profoundly lived by the people and which the latter practise by intuition.

The modern colonial administration by the Portuguese is based on four fundamental principles:

(*a*) Political unity;
(*b*) Spiritual assimilation;
(*c*) Administrative differentiation;
(*d*) Economic solidarity.

Let us see the meaning of each one of them:

(*a*) Portugal is a unitary state wi h only one territory, only one population and only one Government. Angola and Goa are integrated in the national territory just as are the metropolitan province of Algarve or the adjacent islands of the Azores. Hence comes the doctrine, repeatedly emphasized, of the inalienability of any parcel of the territory.

The population is made up of two juridical classes: citizens and aborigines. The law regards as aborigines the members of the black race or those descending from it who continue to live in their traditional way and do not by education acquire the outlook and manner of life of civilized men. Legally, there are aborigines in Guinea, S. Tomé and Principe, Angola, Mozambique, and Timor. At Cape Verde, in India, and at Macau there are only citizens as in the Metropolis.

The statute for the aborigines protects the natives who are still attached to their traditional concepts against the drawbacks of the application of a right of the European type which they could not understand and would do violence to their habits. As soon as a native acquires European mentality and habits he becomes a citizen and participates in the civic life of the Portuguese nation.

Unity of territory and population implies unity of Government. The colonies are represented at the National Assembly in spite of their locally representative organs and despite there being in Lisbon Councils specializing in colonial administration. It is the Government that moulds the higher legislation and administration of the colonies ensuring part collaboration tending towards the interests of the whole. Both the Metropolis and the colonies reciprocally help and assist and defend each other as constituents of the same unit.

This feeling of political unity is one of the characteristic traces of Portuguese colonization and to such an extent that it has imparted itself to former colonies as has happened in Brazil. It is known that in South America there existed two great

colonial domains: the Spanish and the Portuguese ones. The Spanish dominion broke up into numerous Hispano-American republics. The Portuguese domain, whose territorial extent exceeds that of the present territory of the United States of North America, is still co-terminous with Brazil and not even the federalist experiment of 1891 can alter this fundamental unity.

(*b*) The Portuguese colonial administration has for its object a spiritual assimilation by its native populations.

Although respecting the *modus vivendi* of the natives the Portuguese have always endeavoured to impart their faith, their culture and their civilization to them, thus calling them into the Lusitan Community.

This preoccupation results from the religious nature of the Portuguese expansion. In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the Portuguese believed that they had a mandate to carry the Christian Gospel to the people living in the darkness of paganism. The Pope confirmed this mission by a Bull which conferred on the king of Portugal the duty of expanding the Faith and gave him to that effect the exclusive right to occupy certain zones. That was the reason that led Pope Alexander VI to divide the world yet to be discovered into two spheres of influence, one for the Portuguese and the other for the Spaniards (*Inter Caetera*, 1493 Bull), the delimitation of which came to be made by the Tordesilhas Treaty (1494) between the two Kings of the Iberian peninsula.

Thus on arrival in a new country with a heathen population, the Portuguese were concerned with converting the natives to Catholicism; this missionary fervour has passed, but in Portuguese colonial methods there has always remained an interest in souls, a desire to win them over, an anxiety to assimilate the colonized to the colonizers.

The assimilative spirit of the Portuguese does not impinge on laws and institutions. We understand that overseas territories call for governing and administrative processes different from those adopted in the Metropolis. We do not try to impose European laws on a native mentality. But by living together and by educating we have been transmitting our mentality, our faith, our culture, our customs in such a way that those who assimilate are later naturally fitted into Portuguese legislation and institutions through their own requirements, not by imposition.

The outcome of such an orientation is borne out particularly in Brazil and India. The Brazilian people who have not yet been touched by cosmopolitan influences do still keep Lusitanian habits and culture. These people are composed of descendants of ancient settlers and Portuguese immigrants; but besides this class there are other people who have been strongly assimilated, viz. the descendants of negro slaves and the descendants of natives, the latter already being much "crossed" with whites. So then has all this population become homogeneous and in this unavoidable interpenetration of cultures Portuguese culture has always predominated.

It is likewise in Portuguese India; beside the descendants of Portuguese families who settled in Goa, there is an important portion of Indian people who are Christians and who have entirely assimilated western culture. Curiously enough some of the most eminent names in Portuguese medicine and in the magistracy of the past half-century are those of Indians, true *Portuguese of India* who, in the Metropolis, find themselves as much at ease as in their own land.

(*c*) The peculiar circumstances of territory, of society and of economics in the colonies call for adequate administrative regimes, and therefore different from the system of administration ruling in the Metropolis.

Until the nineteenth century, Portuguese dominions owned different institutions according to the characteristics of each one of them. After the liberal revolution (1832), a community of rights and institutions was tried by making extensive to " overseas provinces " (as the colonies were then called), the same laws as were in force in the Metropolis and by abolishing the Colonial Office. But this system could not hold long and, although the spirit that had animated it prevailed throughout the nineteenth century, it was inevitably attenuated by the facts of the time, and many special devices were introduced in the government and administration of the colonies.

Early in the twentieth century, following an effective occupation, there developed a tendency to adopt an opposite orientation of granting to each colony an ample autonomy to organize and administer itself. But this failed to yield happy results and the present-day formula was consequently agreed upon, more in keeping with the Portuguese traditions. European and overseas Portugal became one political unity, administratively differentiated as to its diverse parts, since each one must have an organization and laws more suitable to its position, economics, population and social development.

To a spirit of nationality in common, to a political and spiritual community translated into certain legal uniform rules, corresponds a particularism of laws for, and administration of, each territory, regarded as a moral person with financial autonomy.

(*d*) A consequence of political unity is economic solidarity. Instead of the broken-down " colonial pact " which made the Metropolis the exclusive beneficiary of colonial utilities, we have been practising a policy of inter-territorial co-ordination with division of labour and internal protectionism. The Metropolis pays for sugar or sisal coming from the colonies a higher price than if they had been bought from abroad, only to encourage those plantations. The strong protection given to cotton permitted an extraordinary increment in plantations in Angola and Mozambique. Inversely, when a product is sold to a foreigner with a broad margin of profit, it may happen that on the home market prices thought adequate are maintained but which are lower than world quotations.

An industrialization of the colonies is in progress, but within a joint scheme with the Metropolis. When, some years ago, cotton spinning and weaving plants

were installed in Angola and Mozambique, preference was given, in getting up the capital, to industrialists in the same lines in the Metropolis, and the necessary European workmen belonged to Portuguese works. Similar facts occur with other industries, like that of cement. But with regard to plants that are established in the Metropolis, it becomes necessary to use colonial raw materials whenever possible.

This intimate solidarity, also reflected in preferential tariffs, is not, however, an impediment to an affluence of foreign capital or to its fixing. Portugal welcomes, without hostility, any foreign initiatives which may not mean a threat to her sovereignty and whose purpose will be to collaborate in the development of her territories.

The Portuguese have always regarded colonization as an act to dignify native populations. In no territory discovered and colonized by them has extermination of natives ever taken place. Everywhere they have entered into quick contact with the natives for business and cultural relations.

In earlier centuries, the form which, on the part of the Portuguese, their interest in the native assumed was the concern of carrying down to him the message of the Gospel so as to bear him out of the darkness of paganism and save his soul.

Simultaneously, the Portuguese saw the necessity of taking advantage of wasted riches of the new worlds, to render the land more valuable, and make Europe share in the unheard-of possibilities of tropical regions. In the heroic age of discoveries and colonization Portugal counted around one million inhabitants and it was with that thin population that she went across the whole globe occupying and conquering a large part of it! No wonder then that those men of whom a superhuman effort was demanded, who underwent enormous difficulties and perils and perished in all latitudes, should think inadmissible the apparent "farniente" of the African and American peoples. For that reason, as otherwise happened also to other colonizers, they made them work with themselves. But in this forced collaboration there was no hatred, the dealings of the Portuguese with the natives having rather always been characterized by lively cordiality.

The turning of lands to good account and evangelization of the people took on a like importance in the traditional policy. Nowadays, too, Portuguese orientation places on parallel lines the interests of Europeans as leaders in the transformation of backward regions and the interests of natives as a mass to be prepared to become part of a future civilized people. Thus Portugal cannot accept in absolute terms the principle: "paramountcy of native interests"; rather on the contrary her traditional methods come closer to what Lugard called *dual mandate*.

Hence arises the fact, which has impressed every observer on his way through

the Portuguese colonies, of a peaceful and respectful inter-living between colonizers and natives. The truth is that there is no *colour bar* in our colonies. Only in the colony of Mozambique, at one or other point, through the influence of the Union of South Africa and Rhodesia, will one notice some trace of racial separation. There is no doubt that in villages there are native quarters where necessarily the way of living is different for civilized and uncivilized people. But once a coloured man has acquired European habits and culture he comes to live among Europeans without any difference at all.

In his dealings with an aboriginal himself, a Portuguese will treat him in a friendly way and this is by no means a hindrance to necessary authority: even if the natives are at the most backward stages of civilization, they are thought of as men. And to this kind of treatment they can hardly fail to be sensitive.

It is not out of place here to speak about a delicate problem regarding which the Portuguese have often been criticized—racial interbreeding.

The Portuguese have been charged with practising and favouring miscegenation, thus endangering the purity of race and even the dignity of a European in Africa.

Well, this accusation is wrong. One must not forget that the Portuguese have been in Africa ever since the fifteenth century. Up to the twentieth century, conditions of living did not favour a settling down of European families in tropical territories. So the Portuguese population was made up of a large majority of white men and very few white women. The men were always eager to come back to Europe. In these circumstances racial-crossing was not a policy but a necessity.

Portuguese rulers always showed great reluctance as to blood-mingling with the black race. As a matter of fact, they did promote legitimate alliances between whites and Indians in the East, between whites and Tupi women in Brazil; not so in Africa; here, generally speaking, inter-breeding arose from illegal unions, and hence the only one colony wherein sprang a "mixed" population with fixed characters was that of Cape Verde. In the other colonies, the "mixed" people constituted a not predominant part of the local population, just as in the province of the Cape and other African regions not belonging to the Portuguese.

Portuguese tradition has it that civilized parents must care for and educate their "mixed" offspring. In the past thirty years, a multiplication of white families in Portuguese colonies has given the European woman a natural preponderance in a civilized centre and thence the energetic defence, set up by herself, of family integrity and the rights of legitimate children with a certain hostility against "mixed" children. It is quite believable that within the next ten or twenty years inter-breeding in Africa will be exceptional.

On the principle that political unity is founded on a moral unity (unity of beliefs, language and feelings) Portuguese colonization has attached great importance to the religious factor in civilizing natives.

Although broadly welcoming missions of all Christian confessions, it is understandable that Portuguese law should protect Catholic missions especially, as a large majority of the people are Roman Catholic. The diffusion of Catholicism among Africans, therefore, corresponds to a spiritual link of the utmost importance between them and the Metropolis. Legal protection is extended to all Catholic missions, no matter what their nationality is.

It is to Catholic missions that the law entrusts the official duty of giving an elementary tuition to natives. This teaching is an education of a mass in extension and comprises only the Portuguese language, reading, writing, arithmetic and Christian morals. It is meant as a preliminary penetration of Portuguese culture, not to divert the natives from their tribal life or from their traditional economics. On this basis, later, the education of the " élites " is built up with the teaching of new techniques and access to higher knowledge.

The rudimentary teaching is carried on by native teachers under the guidance of missionaries. At each native village there is at least one of these tutors; on fixed days, the native teachers meet at the Mission House and at any moment they are liable to be called upon by a missionary who comes over in order to examine their task and complete it.

Everywhere the Portuguese have left behind them as a mark of their passage the language they speak. So, in that very vast Brazil where the natives used to talk several different dialects, the Portuguese language has struck root and to-day everyone speaks it there. In Portuguese India the language of the Metropolis is cultivated with the same care as it is in Portugal.

Portuguese is spoken in all the colonies and one of the great concerns in colonial policy is to generalize the use of the language among the natives.

The Portuguese have been some of the greatest learners of native languages since the fourteenth century, and in their literature are to be found hundreds of grammars, guides, text books and studies of exotic tongues. Even to-day, missionaries practise native dialects for the preaching of the Gospel. But the principle of spiritual assimilation demands that there should be an easy communication among all the members of the Portuguese community. Even within each colony, when it is a question of vast territory with a variety of races and dialects, progressive civilization requires that all the inhabitants may be able to communicate among themselves, and in preference to creating and imposing one native vehicular language the Portuguese language is made general.

Of course, the Portuguese language thus spoken in so many different territories and by so many varied peoples is bound to become richer and acquire several tonalities. The Portuguese language as spoken in Brazil (not literary Portuguese which is the same) has terms and expressions and phonetics and constructions different from those heard in Portugal. The same happens to the language of the Hindu-Portuguese in Goa, or the Sino-Portuguese in Macau or of the Afro-Portuguese at Cape Verde, in Guinea or Angola. But, rather curiously, the

phonetic differences one notices in Macau are very similar to those noted in Brazil, in relation to Portugal.

Besides, Brazil was a " melting pot " of Portuguese, Tupis, and Negroes from the west coast of Africa, with an unavoidable inter-mingling of cultures and contributions from the lexicon. Therefore the Portuguese spoken by the natives of Brazil and those of Angola is in many points analogous.

The intimate inter-living of races, the educational preoccupation with spiritual assimilation and the general use of the Portuguese language make it necessary for the method of indirect administration only to be slightly practised.

In law, chiefs appointed in accordance with old tribal customs and brought under single control by European administrators are regarded as authorities fitted into the Portuguese hierarchy. Such chiefs collaborate with the administration and receive orders and instructions from the latter, which they see that their subjects carry out. But, in fact, Portuguese authorities supervise native communities closely and intervene directly in their affairs, thus avoiding despotism by chiefs and combating all backward practices.

In each " Circumscription " (area) the administrator centres in himself wide powers in every line of European administration and supervises native policy. He himself presides over the natives' own law courts made up of chiefs and elderly men of the tribe concerned. A " Circumscription " holds several " posts " where a subordinate official fulfils his duties to decentralize the business of the administrator.

Every effort is directed towards " civilizing and causing assimilation without de-tribalization ". Unfortunately, circumstances are working together powerfully with a disintegrating effect on former tribal units and it is almost inevitable that the tribes will get disrupted within a few years. The authority of the administrator and of the missionary will then prevail over the inefficient power of the traditional chief.

The principles and methods of Portuguese colonial administration have been summarily set out. We have been careful to avoid overcharging this " setting out " with details and making a descriptive study of the present-day administration which legislative reforms may turn into an " old one " in a short time. So, we have brought out preferably the fundamental guiding lines which everything else obeys.

In these principles there is much experience accumulated and some idealism too. Things do not always come to pass in practice just as they are dreamt of by the creators of systems, but what matters is to know whether through the painful process of life the effort of men of good will is or is not being followed up by lasting triumphs.

The Portuguese came across miserable peoples in Africa, who were being

oppressed by despotic chiefs, besides being undermined by horrible illnesses, underfed, and depressed by a hostile nature.

Contrary to what some adversaries of colonization to-day want to make people believe, European action in Africa has been in many respects a liberating one, putting an end to the despotism of native rulers (*Regulos*), doing away with slavery, stopping human sacrifices and bringing to an end the sombre domination of sorcerers. The complex subject of African disease has been studied and there has been developing a wide and increasing drive against the sufferings of negroes under any form. To make black women dignified beings has been an aim, motherhood has been given protection, childhood has been defended and excessive mortality thwarted. Since the sixteenth century, the Portuguese have introduced food-plants till then unknown in Africa, especially those brought over from Brazil like maize, cassava, sweet potatoes, groundnuts. People who coarsely fed on roots, wild fruits, grasshoppers and rats began having a more substantial and more and more balanced diet.

The frequent wars among tribes, their rivalries, mass-murdering, and plundering, were put a stop to and man was no longer *homini lupus*. Roads were opened up, means of communication lay bare unexplored forests, wild beasts withdrew into the jungle and life has been rendered more pleasant and safer. Small villages received sanitary care, the mosquito and tsetse were fought against. Natural wealth could then be exploited; and, at the cost of immense capital for ever buried in African soil and of many lives lost, the standard of living of all the inhabitants of the black continent is being improved.

In the meantime, the education of Africans has also been in progress. On the one hand, their being in touch with Europeans enables them to be trained in several techniques and reveals to them new habits and concepts of life. And at the Mission Houses and Schools the youth are living in conditions which enable them more easily to take in the teachings of civilization.

Taking into account the great variety and magnitude of the difficulties with which Europeans have had to wrestle the results achieved in the past fifty years in tropical Africa are enormous. Let it be borne in mind that, as has so often been stated, black Africa is a zone of the globe which has always proved to be hostile to man and particularly so to a European. Conquering and subduing it is no fruit of theories conceived in the seclusion of study and laboratory or of any doctrine preached by ideologists—it is the outcome of endeavour, abnegation and sacrifice on the part of the colonizing country.

Résumé

Principes et méthodes de l'Administration Coloniale Portugaise

L'AUTEUR indique d'abord la distribution et l'étendue de l'empire colonial portugais, ses caractéristiques géographiques et démographiques, ses ressources et son activité économique. Il trace ensuite l'histoire de l'expansion coloniale à partir de XV^e siècle à travers une diversité de races et de territoires pour arriver, après la perte du Brésil, à la période moderne.

Les quatre principes fondamentaux qui forment la base de l'administration portugaise moderne sont l'unité politique, l'assimilation spirituelle, la différenciation administrative et la solidarité economique.

Le territoire portugais est inaliénable. Dans ce territoire la population se divise juridiquement entre citoyens et aborigènes, ces derniers, protégés dans leur vie traditionnelle, ayant la facilité d'accéder aux droits de citoyen par l'assimilation de la mentalité européenne; le gouvernement de l'empire est unifié, il existe des conseils spécialisés pour l'administration coloniale; les colonies envoient des députés à l'Assemblée Nationale, mais ont en même temps leurs organes représentatifs à elles.

L'assimilation spirituelle des populations indigènes par l'inculcation de la foi, de la culture et de la civilisation portugaises a ses origines dans le caractère religieux de l'expansion coloniale; dans leurs méthodes coloniales les Portugais gardent toujours cet intérêt spirituel: on n'impose pas des lois européennes à une mentalité indigène; c'est par l'assimilation que l'indigène arrive à en avoir besoin.

Après l'échec de la politique d'uniformisation des droits et institutions au XIX^e siècle et de celle de l'autonomie coloniale dans les premières années du XX^e siècle, on en est venu à la formule actuelle, plus traditionnellement portugaise, de l'unité politique du Portugal européen et d'outre-mer et de la différenciation de l'administration dans ses diverses parties suivant les besoins.

La solidarité économique decoule de l'unité politique et implique des prix et des tarifs de préférence, et la protection douanière accordée aux denrées coloniales, la corrélation de l'industrie coloniale naissante avec celle de la métropole.

Les Portugais ont dès l'origine obligé les indigènes a coopérer au développement de leurs pays, mais sans les tyranniser ni les exterminer. La distinction qui s'observe sous un régime de libéralisme racial, est une distinction de culture et non pas de couleur: l'indigène, une fois civilisé, vit comme un Européen parmi les Européens; ce qui ne veut pas dire que la politique portugaise favorise ou encourage le métissage, mais elle a d'heureux résultats dans les relations paisibles qui existent entre colonisateurs et indigènes.

Les Portugais attachent une grande importance, dans le domaine de l'éducation, à l'oeuvre civilisatrice des missionnaires catholiques: ce sont eux qui dirigent

l'enseignement primaire aux colonies, enseignement qui comprend le portugais, la lecture, l'écriture, l'arithmétique et la morale chrétienne; l'enseignement des élites, partant de ces bases, vise à l'inculcation de nouvelles techniques et de connaissances plus étendues. Par l'emploi du portugais comme langue commune des territoires, on espère faciliter l'assimilation spirituelle.

L'administration coloniale portugaise est par principe directe: tandis que les chefs indigènes sont des intermédiaires entre les autorités et les tribus, ces autorités interviennent dans les affaires indigènes pour empêcher le despotisme et les pratiques arriérées. Le but de la politique coloniale, " civilisation et assimilation sans désintégration du système tribal ", est sérieusement compromis par les forces destructrices du monde moderne.

La colonisation portugaise a conféré aux indigènes d'immenses bienfaits: abolition de l'esclavage et des sacrifices humains; relèvement du statut des femmes et des enfants; développement de services médicaux; extension des ressources alimentaires; développement des moyens de communication et diffusion de la civilisation; enfin et surtout la conquête de l'Afrique tropicale.

Summary of Discussion

MR MEIER wanted to know what the reaction of Portugal to the American Point Four programme was.

Monsieur LANDRY was interested to observe the stress placed upon human relationships in Portuguese territories. It was wrong to speak of those countries as undeveloped since in fact their ports and urban areas were highly developed. He asked: (1) If there was a tendency to promote economic solidarity between Portugal and her colonies? (2) Did this policy profit the home country most? (3) What was meant by the two-price system? (4) How did Portugal try to solve the problem of the poor whites?

Professor READ asked: (1) What was the effect on Portuguese African colonies of the migration of so many men to the Rand and had it altered the attitude of Africans to government? (2) Had it had any effect upon the development of the capacities of the migrants? (3) Had it disrupted or altered village life?

Monsieur ALDUY complained of a lack of literature on the subject of Portuguese colonization. While there was no evidence of a nationalist movement among the people he wondered (1) If there was any movement towards emancipation or at least towards equality with the Portuguese. (2) What the legal conditions of admission to Portuguese citizenship were? (3) How those citizens obtained admission to the national assembly and what the extent or limit of the right to vote was? Were there one or two electoral colleges and what was the position of the electorate? (4) What was the extent of local participation in local government? Could an African who had become a Portuguese citizen enter the

administration? Had Africans without citizen status the right to enter the administration?

Mr HOWARD asked: (1) Had the Portuguese colonies been a burden on the mother country? (2) What had been their effect upon its economy?

Professor MALENGREAU asked how colonial experts were trained. He believed that paternalism was a bad system since it deadened initiative and all liberty was lost. In support of this he gave an example from Belgian experience.

Miss GOVEIA was surprised that the Portuguese who had encountered such great difficulties in converting negroes to Catholicism were now so successful in their policy of assimilation. She believed that the reason why negroes were preferred to the aborigines in Brazil was that the latter died out under plantation discipline whereas the negroes stood up to it. The preference for them was simply because they made better slaves and had nothing to do with the difficulties of conversion.

Professor CAETANO in reply said Portugal was ready to accept foreign collaboration and the Portuguese had no reason to distrust the Americans.

The two-price system was a wartime device by which prices were fixed for certain commodities in order to enable the Portuguese to buy at lower rates than the world level. In this way it was intended to prevent Portuguese consumers from being deprived of these commodities altogether by the working of world competition. The system was now abolished.

White immigrants were a serious problem in South Angola where, as in the Union of South Africa, a class of poor whites had been created.

The immigration to the Rand was governed by an agreement between Portugal and South Africa and the great problem was to restrain it. The mines attracted active men because of the glamour of city life, high wages and so on. Moreover the young women declined to marry young men who did not go. Though labour engagements were voluntary they were regulated by the governmental agreements referred to. So secret engagements, which were frequently far from satisfactory, were made. According to the agreement such labour contracts had a definite time limit. In various ways this system had been bad for native life. It had led to the break-up of families, to a moral decline and to repugnance on the part of the men for traditional farm work.

There were many books dealing with colonial questions in Portuguese but they had not been translated.

The Portuguese were seeking to establish equality between the colonials and themselves but this goal had not yet been reached.

There was no revolutionary nationalist movement but Africans demanded particular advances from time to time.

If the African or other colonial could read and write, if he relinquished primitive habits and lived as a civilized man, he could receive full political rights. There are not two electoral colleges, but a colonial citizen votes like any other.

They conduct municipal government through tribal organizations. There were many African and other colonial Portuguese citizens in the administration and now they could be officers in the Portuguese army.

Though the fortunes of colonies had varied, historically and cumulatively the mother country had profited a very great deal from her connection with them but, of course, they had benefited as well.

There was a colonial school for training administrators.

The negroes were not always recalcitrant but it was found that they were held by their primitive paganism in their native habitat. While the negro became a Catholic when transported to Brazil his religion was often contaminated by traditional folk beliefs and practices.

In general it may be said that where Islam spreads Christianity has no success in evangelization.

American Government of Overseas Dependencies

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As a matter of principle, the American public is highly sympathetic to the demands for self-government expressed by the world's colonial populations. The early history of the United States as an ex-colony, its peculiar democratic ideology, and its humanitarian tradition have combined to make this sympathy extremely responsive, assertive and at times irresponsible, especially when the colonies of other powers are involved. This predisposition is supported by strange attitudes toward American colonies. Ignorance and indifference predominate, along with an amazing incapacity to face the fact that the United States is itself an imperial power.

Most of the American colonial empire was acquired in 1898 and 1899, during a brief period when the nation felt the fleeting impulse of demonstrating to itself its new capacity as a Great Power by joining the general scramble for colonies. The wayward impulse has been forgotten and the full knowledge of its consequences repressed. Throughout the last fifty years, Americans have carefully avoided, officially and unofficially, calling their " territories " colonies. There is neither a Colonial Office nor a Colonial Civil Service. Indeed, most Americans would register surprise and disbelief were they told that their country possesses " colonies ". Most of them realize that there are " territories ", but they know little or nothing of the problems of these territories or of what their government has done there. In part, this indifference can be explained by self-centred isolationist leanings and by the small size of the empire. Indifference, moreover, is happily protected against the self-reproach of irresponsibility by the general assumption that American administration of the territories has been and is immaculate and nonpareil.

In somewhat less crude form, these ambiguous attitudes can be discovered in the actions and declarations of Congressmen. Here, the result is an absence of any clear-cut American policy towards its overseas dependencies. Though distinguished by sudden spurts of major policy formulation, policy has been haphazard and vague, and some observers indeed maintain that the United States lacks a recognizable colonial policy. Indifference to and suppression of the subject are also reflected in the sparseness of publication. While the literature on the individual islands is large and official reports and Congressional hearings numerous, there are hardly more than a half-dozen worth-while books and articles on American colonial administration in general.

When the United States acquired an empire fifty years ago, the nation was intellectually unprepared to lay down a suitable programme for subject populations. Except for the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, no guidance was to be found in its traditions. This Ordinance prescribed an admirable programme for the quick political assimilation and self-government of newly-settled areas in the continental West. It did not fit the vastly different conditions and destinies of the Philippines or Puerto Rico. Nevertheless, the basic elements of the Ordinance no doubt helped to shape policy during the first two decades after 1898. The initial policy was one of assimilation and the expectation of gradual progress toward self-rule. But the records of the time suggest clearly that the aim of assimilation was rooted also in the conviction—naïve and yet somehow magnificent—that to become Americanized is an unquestionable blessing for any people. The attempt was made to create in the islands a structure and philosophy of government and politics patterned upon the American model. In education, the emphasis was on the inculcation of American political and cultural values and on making English the language of the land. In the economic sphere, public action was confined to programmes of public health and transport; a policy of tariff assimilation was established; otherwise *laissez faire* was the prescription in the colonies as well as at home. This firm determination to alter existing institutions in order to make them conform to American patterns was the central objective of American policy.

In discussing the government of American dependencies, a sharp distinction must be made between the islands administered by the U.S. Navy (Guam, American Samoa, the ex-Japanese Trust Territory and—until 1931—the Virgin Islands), on the one hand, and Puerto Rico, the Philippines, the Virgin Islands since 1931, Hawaii, and Alaska, on the other. Naval administration, at no time affecting more than 90,000 natives, owes its continued existence to Congressional postponement in dealing with the political problem posed by the acquisition of these territories.

Congress has virtually unlimited authority to determine how dependencies are to be governed and, unless it delegated the law-making function provisionally to the President, it has from time to time passed Organic Acts for this purpose. Organic Acts are not constitutions in the legal sense, for they remain subject to Congressional revision without the consent of the colonial population—a power, however, that has hardly ever been exercised.

While the Filipino revolt against American occupation was still under way, President McKinley dispatched two commissions to the islands. The first reported on conditions in the islands and advised against immediately granting independence to the Filipinos. The second was requested to set up and head a civil government in the new dependency. According to the instructions, it was the policy of the United States to frame a scheme of government with the welfare of the islands solely in mind, with the largest possible measure of Filipino

participation in their own government—the extent to depend on the political " fitness " of the population. Eventual independence was promised. In 1901, Mr. Taft was appointed the first civil governor of the Philippines, three appointed Filipinos were added to the five American members of the Commission, and the Commission began to act as cabinet and legislature for the islands.

In 1902, Congress passed an Organic Act providing for a governor-general, vice-governor and other cabinet members to be appointed by the U.S. President with the advice and consent of the U.S. Senate. These appointees were also to function as the upper house of the island legislature. Pending restoration of peace and a population census, an election was to be held for choosing delegates to the Philippine Assembly, the lower house of legislature. All legislation, including approval of the budget, was vested in the two bodies which were also to appoint two Filipino commissioners to represent the territory in the U.S. Congress. Other provisions of the Act conferred upon the Filipinos most of the constitutional rights and privileges enjoyed by Americans in the United States, including freedom of speech, assembly and religion. By the Provincial and Municipal Acts of 1901, passed by the Commission, a system of local self-government was outlined, with the chief officials to be elected by popular vote. Since the franchise required either previous office, property qualifications, or literacy in English or Spanish, the electorate was very small.

The second Philippine Commission had been instructed that " the main body of laws which regulate the rights and obligations of the people should be maintained with as little interference as possible. Changes should be made mainly in procedure, and in the criminal laws to secure speedy and impartial trials, and at the same time effective administration and respect for individual rights ". Accordingly, a legal system developed which was a mixture of Roman law and English common law. The Organic Act of 1902 provided that the Justices of the Supreme Court were to be appointed by the President and the judges of the first instance by the governor with the consent of the upper branch of the legislature. From the beginning, nearly all justices of the peace were Filipinos. The majority of the intermediate judges were at first Americans who were, however, gradually replaced by Filipinos. Until the granting of independence, the majority of the Supreme Court remained American, though the Chief Justice had always been a Filipino.

The civil service was organized on the basis of two principles. First, honest and efficient administration was to be guaranteed by the " merit " and " examination " system. Secondly, natives were to be employed " to the fullest extent practicable ". On the whole, both principles were observed faithfully in practice although, during the initial period, the large majority of officials in the higher and intermediate echelons were Americans.

Developments in Puerto Rico took a similar course. The Foraker Act of 1900 provided for an American civil governor and an executive council of six Americans

and five Puerto Ricans, all to be appointed by the President. The council acted as cabinet and as upper house of the legislature. The lower house was elected by popular vote as was the Puerto Rican commissioner who represented the island in the United States Congress. The Organic Act determined that the Puerto Rican Assembly was to fix the conditions of the electoral franchise. By 1906, all Puerto Rican males, twenty-five years of age or older and able to read and write in Spanish or English, were entitled to vote. The Municipal Act of 1902 provided for a sharp division of power between the elected executive and the legislature, with control by the central government confined to matters of special taxation and public borrowing. The judicial system was completely changed. New civil and criminal codes based on English common law were promulgated and the entire court system adapted to the American model.

By these Organic Acts, the United States clearly retained full power over the affairs of the new territories. However, the acts also extended to the islanders far more participation in the government than they had possessed under Spanish rule. With the practice of partial self-government (especially in the municipalities), the recruitment of natives for the civil service, and the gradual effects of extended education, Congress expected from the beginning to increase gradually the degree of self-rule in the new possessions.

The next step in this direction was taken during the first world war under the administration of President Wilson. In 1916, Congress passed the Jones Act for the Philippines. A Filipino Senate and the Assembly, both elected by popular vote, were given all legislative power. The legislative was thus definitely separated from the executive. The United States President retained the power of appointing the governor-general, the vice-governor, the auditor and deputy auditor, and the justices of the Supreme Court; all other appointments were to be made by the governor-general with the consent of the Filipino Senate. Laws on a few specific subjects (tariffs, currency, and immigration) required approval by the United States President. Other legislation required the signature of the governor-general. If he vetoed a law and it was passed over his veto by a two-thirds majority, the final decision rested with the United States President.

The Jones Act of 1917 established virtually the same form of government for Puerto Rico. In addition, the Puerto Ricans, who had received no official promise of eventual independence, were given United States citizenship which conferred upon them all the rights that any American enjoyed except, of course, the right to vote for the President and the Governor.

Under President Wilson, rapid strides were made in replacing American by local officials in the territories. Governor-General Francis B. Harrison pressed this process with utmost determination so that, at the end of his last term, the civil service was largely Philippinized. At a more gradual pace, the same development took place in Puerto Rico. After the Democratic Party was turned out of office in the United States, the Republican administration tried to recapture some of

the powers which the Wilson administration had—in Republican opinion—extended to the dependent population with undue haste. This attempt was abortive. In fact, the governors soon found their actual powers more and more curtailed, as the right to nominate officials passed in effect into the hands of the majority party in the island senates. The veto of the United States President and the power of Congress to annul any territorial legislation no doubt put some restraint on the territorial legislatures. Congress, however, never used its power of annulment and the President exercised his veto very sparingly.

In Puerto Rico, the advance toward autonomy, though in substance slowly increasing during the inter-war period, was not reflected in outward form before the 1940s. In 1946, President Truman appointed the first Puerto Rican—Jesús T. Piñero, the elected resident commissioner in Washington—as governor of the island. The following year the governorship was made elective and, except for the auditor, the popularly elected governor was given the authority to appoint his own cabinet with the consent of the Puerto Rican Senate. Mr. Luis Muñoz Marín, the leader of the *Populares*—overwhelmingly the majority party—became governor. The U.S. President continues to appoint the five justices of the Supreme Court. Acts of the Puerto Rican legislature remain subject to his veto and to review by the U.S. Congress and the Federal Courts. In effect, this change gave the Puerto Ricans nearly full self-government in domestic affairs.

Political and constitutional change was more dramatic in the Philippines. Congress passed the Hawes-Cutting Bill in 1932 calling for a Philippine legislative convention to frame a constitution. If the U.S. President approved it, the Filipinos were to vote for a government and the islands were to attain what has been called "Commonwealth" status, for a period of ten years. During this interval, free trade between the islands and the United States would be gradually removed and, through a High Commissioner, the U.S. President would exercise certain residual but vaguely defined powers in order to protect American interests. The Bill failed to specify that the United States would give up its military and naval bases after the ten-year period. The intention of the Act was that, pending final separation, there should be as little American participation in the Philippine government as possible and hence ample opportunity for the population to prove its capacity for self-government.

President Hoover vetoed the Act on the grounds chiefly that the territory was neither politically nor economically mature for independence. Congress passed the Bill over the Presidential veto only to see the Act rejected by the Philippine legislature "because . . . among other reasons, the provisions of the law affecting trade relations between the United States and the Philippine Islands would seriously imperil the economic, social and political institutions of the country and might defeat its avowed purpose to secure independence to the Philippine Islands at the end of the transition period; . . . because the powers of the High Commissioner are too indefinite, and finally because the military, naval and other reservations

provided for in the said act are inconsistent with true independence, violate national dignity and are subject to misunderstanding ".

In March, 1934, the Congress passed the Tydings-McDuffie or Philippine Independence Act, which differed little from its predecessor. The new Bill did not define more clearly the powers of the High Commissioner. Nor did it alter the timetable for tariff separation. In the field of defence, however, the law provided that—while military and naval reservations were to be maintained during the Commonwealth period—thereafter the military bases were to be surrendered and the fate of the naval reservations decided by negotiations within two years after independence. The Philippine legislature approved the new Act in May, 1934, and a constitutional convention completed the draft of a constitution in February, 1935.

The Convention was not entirely free in designing the Philippine constitution. It had to get the approval of the U.S. President and the Tydings-McDuffie Act prescribed that the constitution was to be republican in form, contain a bill of rights, and especially guarantee religious freedom. In March, 1935, President Roosevelt declared that the Constitution conformed with Tydings-McDuffie Act and two months later it was ratified by a plebiscite in the Philippine Islands. Manuel Quezon was elected President and in November, 1935, the new Commonwealth government was formally inaugurated. In 1946, the Philippine Republic became independent.

The Virgin Islands were administered by the U.S. Navy from 1917 until 1931 when civil government was introduced. Until 1936, however, the island government was based on the old Danish laws which provided for very little native participation in the government and for a highly restrictive franchise. The Organic Act of 1936 entrusted all local government to the governor, appointed by the U.S. President, and to the legislative Assembly which is elected by universal franchise. If a bill is vetoed by the governor and then again passed by a two-thirds majority, it is sent to the President for final action. The Virgin Islanders are American citizens. In 1946, President Truman appointed the first Negro governor, Judge W. H. Hastie of Washington. There is no independence movement in the islands.

Outside the field of government, the United States paid close attention to education. During the decade after 1899, Americans believed it to be their mission to Americanize their new wards. In addition to making English the common language of the territories, the objectives were to abolish illiteracy, to give every child the intellectual means towards becoming a patriotic citizen, to implant American ideals and traditions, and to develop the body of highly-trained natives, indispensable to good government.

On August 23rd, 1901, the U.S. Army Transport *Thomas* docked at Manilla with 600 American school teachers. Soon there were to be over 1,000, not including many American soldiers who participated in the schooling. These young

teachers were energetic, adventurous, and possessed a vigorous faith in the worth of their mission. They scattered through the islands and began to teach. There is something simple-minded but also impressive about this enterprise.

In 1898, only 200,000 children were in school. By 1939, when the Philippine population was approximately sixteen million, six million Filipinos from five to nineteen years of age were attending school. However, the American programme showed inevitable weaknesses. Quality had been sacrificed to quantity. The costs of education were met by insular revenues and, although a very large proportion of the budget was devoted to schooling, the national income was too low to sustain the educational level common in western countries. About half of all school children never went beyond the second primary grade and, owing to the fact that all schooling was given in a foreign tongue, the educational result was meagre by western standards. Although the knowledge of English made fairly rapid progress in the absence of a native common language, it was poor English and with lack of practice it was soon forgotten by most pupils. On the other hand, the number of Filipino youths who passed through high schools and college were too numerous to find suitable employment. The American stress on the non-vocational, strongly supported by the lingering traditions of the Spanish upper class, made these graduates reluctant to seek commercial or industrial employment and loath to do manual labour.

Progress in reducing technical illiteracy was equally rapid in Puerto Rico. When the United States occupied the island, only 25 per cent. of the population had been able to read or write. By 1935, the percentage had mounted to 65, primary and high schools were free for all children and the University of Puerto Rico, numbering about 5,000 students in recent years, charged only low tuition and offered many scholarships. But the quality of instruction was still markedly below continental standards and, especially in the hill country, schools were sparse and overcrowded. The American attempt to make English the common language failed completely. The Puerto Ricans uphold their Spanish tradition and, despite laws to the contrary, Spanish became the basic language of instruction. The educational record is most satisfactory in the Virgin Islands, where English had been the island language under Danish rule, and literacy is high. In 1940, 84 per cent. of the population were literate, virtually all children of school age attended school, and high schools, textbooks and school lunches were free of charge.

Americans are wont to point with pride to their accomplishments in all the territories in the fields of health and sanitation and certain public enterprises, such as roads, ports and waterworks. These achievements are indeed impressive. Both in Puerto Rico and in the Philippines health services were set up during the first stage of occupation. In the Philippine Islands, the death rate was forty-seven per thousand in 1898 and had dropped to eighteen by 1937. In the face of a relatively low standard of living and native fatalism, this is no mean achievement. Progress

was steady though less spectacular in Puerto Rico. There, basic poverty—manifested in a deficient diet and squalid, overcrowded slums—were odds too great to be overcome without huge assistance from the outside.

In the economic sphere, American governments concerned themselves chiefly with the tariff question. The basic policy was one of tariff assimilation, establishing free trade between dependency and metropolis and extending the high protectionist tariff to the territories. As a consequence, the dependent islands specialized in producing goods for which they had a comparative cost advantage not in the world market but in the American market: the Philippines in sugar, copra, and tobacco; and Puerto Rico chiefly in sugar and rum. Both countries sent nearly all their exports to the United States and bought there nearly all their imports. In the shorter run, this policy resulted in considerable prosperity especially since the islands were allowed to keep the customs duties which they collected on their imports from third countries. However, this policy also meant that industrialization in the islands could not be fostered by infant-industry tariffs, that their standard of living became dependent on continued free access to the American market, and that some of their imports could have been purchased more cheaply in the world market.

Both the Philippines and Puerto Rico were and are economically underdeveloped countries. With one of the highest population densities in the world and continued rapid population growth, speedy economic development was particularly urgent in Puerto Rico if consumption levels were to rise from their extremely low depths. Itself firmly attached to the symbols of free enterprise, the United States was in no position to foster economic development by public action. Tariff protection, virtually the only accepted means of stimulating new industries, was denied to the dependencies *vis-à-vis* the metropolis. *Laissez faire* meant reliance on private investment. Yet indigenous as well as American investment capital preferred the export industries and while considerable American funds were invested in Puerto Rico, comparatively little ventured into the Philippines.

These predominant American attitudes on economic policy are, of course, not compatible with the grant of subsidies whenever bad conditions are impressed on the minds of policy-makers. The Philippines received little aid of this kind. They were too far away and living conditions there were far superior to those in Puerto Rico. The latter territory, however, received various grants from Federal agencies, especially after 1933 when the New Deal had become entrenched in Washington. The activities of many agencies—such as the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, the Food Distribution Administration, and the Works Progress Administration—were extended to Puerto Rico but not to the Philippines. It has been calculated that, from 1898 until 1945, Puerto Rico received $580 million in direct financial aid. This assistance has been second only to sugar production as a source of income to the island. In the Virgin Islands, whose economy had

declined hopelessly for many decades, American grants *per capita* have been even larger. Up to 1945, a total of 45 million had been given to these islands, and at least half of the income of all wage earners is now derived from U.S. government expenditures.

During the last fifteen years, moreover, the United States has been far more willing in the dependencies than on the mainland to operate or at least tolerate public development projects of various kinds. A yet earlier venture in this direction was initiated by Governor-General Harrison in the Philippines from 1913 to 1921. Harrison perceived the need for industrial development in the islands and finding private enterprise insufficiently interested, embarked upon a large-scale public programme. Several government financial and development enterprises were founded. When the Republican Party returned to power, the President instructed General Wood, Harrison's successor, to get " the government out of business " in the Philippines. General Wood was partially successful, largely because Harrison's scheme had been too ambitious for the slim managerial resources of the Filipinos. Nevertheless, the idea of public enterprise remained alive in the territory and found strong expression in the Philippine Constitution.

During the late 1930s and the 1940s, the U.S. Congress grudgingly tolerated a development in Puerto Rico which was little short of a revolution of the island's political and economic structure. The old Puerto Rican ruling group was pushed aside, unless it would collaborate in the reforms, and the Popular Party, led by Mr. Luis Muñoz Marín, achieved complete political control. With this development came a proliferation of public agencies and enterprises designed to assist in economic development and to take over operations in the fields of transportation and public utilities.

In the Virgin Islands, public rehabilitation and development projects were started while Mr. Hoover was President. An ambitious homesteading programme was the main feature of the plans. The Virgin Islands Company was set up as a public enterprise to operate sugar mills and distilleries and, recently, Congress authorized another development programme which is to cost $10 million, an amount that equals the assessed valuation of all real estate in the islands.

In the first Organic Acts, Congress also attempted to protect the new dependencies against American monopolist business enterprise. The Foraker Act specifically prohibited the ownership of more than 500 acres of Puerto Rican land by a single corporation. For thirty years, unfortunately, this provision was honoured only in the breach. Under the governorship of Mr. Tugwell, the provision was finally enforced. The larger sugar estates are now gradually being broken up and, in part, nationalized. The Philippine Act of 1902 provided that no single corporation was to acquire more than 2,500 acres of the public domain. This law was enforced because the Filipino leaders, unlike the Puerto Rican ruling groups, supported it fully.

Naval administration in the smaller islands is very different from the kind of

government thus far discussed. Both in Guam and American Samoa, naval authority was established by Presidential Order on a temporary basis to continue only until Congress had enacted " organic legislation ". In both cases (as in the case of the Trust Territory recently taken from Japan), Congress has procrastinated. The governor and his staff are all Navy officers or personnel administering the island on short tours of duty. The Navy has been entirely free in selecting a suitable form of government for the islands. Although this government is divided superficially into the customary three branches, ultimate control is vested in the governor. All important and most inferior positions are held by Navy personnel. The naval governor is the head of the various government departments, boards and commissions. The courts are created by the Naval governor and can be abolished or changed at his discretion by executive order. In these courts, there is no jury and no appeal to the courts in the United States.

On the whole, the Navy has done excellent work in the fields of public health, transportation, and education. But it has only very recently begun to let the natives participate in the administration. Previously, the Navy definitely discouraged or suppressed all native endeavours in this direction. In 1917, a Guam Congress was set up, but it was neither representative nor legislative. A second, and this time representative, Congress—with two houses—was established in 1931. Yet this body, too, performed only advisory functions. Only in 1947 was it given limited legislative authority, with the governor retaining power of veto. If his veto is overruled by a two-thirds majority in the Congress, the legislation goes to the Secretary of the Navy for final disposition. American Samoa, politically less mature than Guam, also had an advisory and non-representative parliament. In February, 1948, the Navy governor proclaimed the establishment of an advisory legislature for Samoa.

For some decades, legislation has been pending with almost every Congress to give Guamanians and Samoans American citizenship, civil government, and a share in their own government. In recent years, the President has repeatedly asked for such legislation. However, Congressional indifference and Navy opposition, open or covert, have thus far prevented such action. Congressional hearings indicate that on the whole Congress actually favours such reform. Since Congress took no action in 1949, President Truman has ordered the Department of the Interior to take over the administration of Guam in 1950.

The machinery available in the United States for ruling the territories is singularly ill-adapted to this purpose. As a result, the decision-making process is complicated, unpredictable, and often bogs down altogether. The organs involved are Congress and its Committees, the President and various government departments and agencies, and—in the colonies themselves—the governor and those members of his cabinet who are appointed by the President.

Congress has ultimate authority to determine the structure and processes of colonial administration. For doing so, this body is severely handicapped by

inadequate knowledge and lack of sustained interest in territorial affairs. There are the two Committees on Territories and Insular Possessions. Membership in these is not a coveted assignment and, in the House at least, has a rather high turnover. Frequently, the activities of these Committees are easy-going and desultory. Lack of intrinsic interest and the likelihood that the re-election chances of members are not at all affected by what is done for the territories account for this apathy. Thus congressmen have little incentive to acquire the foundations of statesmanship in this problem area. Nor is Congressional concern with the territories concentrated in these Committees. The Public Lands Committees, the Naval Affairs Committees, and the committees dealing with foreign affairs, agriculture, appropriations, and so forth, may find themselves peripherally involved in the business of the territorial relationship. Moreover, even if individual committees did display sustained zest in dealing with territorial affairs, they would still face the apathy of Congress as a whole. There have been many individual Congressmen who took the interests of the territories very seriously and, year after year, attempted in vain to obtain Congressional action. Even when they induced one legislative branch to act, the other often failed to take up the matter.

Lack of interest and the pressure of more urgent tasks often limited the initiative that might have been expected from the President of the United States. The initiative displayed by Democratic administrations has traditionally exceeded that of the Republicans. The bulk of the empire was acquired when the Republicans were in power; and, from that time on, the Democratic Party has advocated vigorously either independence, statehood, or greatly increased self-government for the territories. The Republican Party also honoured these objectives as its own but has consistently opposed speedy reform. The great advances in this direction were made under Presidents Wilson and Franklin D. Roosevelt, and President Truman has been following their example. Owing to the American system of government, however, Presidential proposals are often ignored by the Congress, and Congressional apathy toward the dependencies or hostility toward the President has doomed to failure several recommendations of these three Presidents. The inadequate channels through which the problems and demands of subject peoples can reach the President make it uncertain that their troubles will even come to his attention. Unless the President or someone in his immediate entourage has an intrinsic and strong interest in the territories, no initiative can be counted upon. The chief deficiency in this respect is, of course, the absence of a colonial office or department.

At the present time, the Navy Department is the " home office " of the naval governors, while the civil governors report through the Division of Territories and Island Possessions in the Department of the Interior. The War Department was the home office for the Philippines and, until 1934, for Puerto Rico. Several other Departments (Agriculture, Labour, State, etc.) have extended the exercise of some of their functions to the territories, and although an executive order

requires them to report on these activities to the Division of Territories and Island Possessions, they have failed to do so. In fact, the administration of the territories is likely to suffer from the not infrequent feuds between departments, such as the one between the Departments of Agriculture and the Interior in the early 1940s. Short of the White House, there is no central agency with overall authority in the field of colonial administration and no point at which co-ordination can be secured and experience accumulate. Much depends on the interest taken in colonial affairs by the Secretary of the Interior and on his relation with the President. But the chances are slim that the Secretary of the Interior will or can afford to cultivate such an interest, for he heads a large department whose major activities in resource conservation and public works are carried on within the continental limits of the United States.

The Division of Territories and Island Possessions, furthermore, is a distinctly minor section of the Department. It is handicapped by the fact that its powers and duties have never been defined by either statute or executive order. It is understaffed in every way. In 1948, the Division consisted of about twenty employees half of whom constituted the secretarial staff. It has no corps of administrators with special training or competence and it does not maintain trained administrators in the areas which are under its jurisdiction. Because of inevitable frustration and low official status, the Division has rarely been able to attract competent men to serve in it.

Owing to the lack of interest in Washington, governors have sometimes been able to exercise very considerable influence and initiative in the dependencies, provided their policies conformed with majority wishes in the islands. Governors were often handicapped, however, by the departmentalized approach at home. Thus, the various Federal agencies and bureaus that operated in Puerto Rico functioned separately from the governor and were responsible only to a Washington department or its regional office. Conflicts with other territorial cabinet officers separately appointed by the President also caused the governors trouble occasionally.

After the Organic Acts were passed during the Wilson administration, American governors suffered an increasing restriction of their power and influence at the hands of local legislatures which knew how to encroach upon the executive sphere. Except for their veto, the governors of Puerto Rico and the Philippines found their real powers more and more undermined. One reason for this was that the insular legislatures controlled the purse-strings. The salary of the entire executive branch came out of insular funds and had to be appropriated by the legislature. As a result, the size of the governor's staff and the entire administrative apparatus was maintained on an inadequate scale. Through their power of confirmation, the legislature virtually arrogated to itself the nominating function, and native officials exhibited loyalty to native political leaders rather than to the governor. Usually, governors were handicapped further by their unfamiliarity

with the territory and, in Puerto Rico, with the language of the land. Their ignorance was easily exploited by shrewd and experienced politicians in the territorial legislatures. Jealousy and distrust, finally, made the legislatures extremely reluctant to augment the powers of the governor even when, in specific instances, a strong executive was required for new tasks assumed by the government. There was a tendency, therefore, for the veto power to become the governor's principal instrument of government; in such a situation, the alternative to paralysis is that the executive ceases to govern. Governors' vetos were indeed very numerous but few Bills were passed over the governor's veto and sent to the President for final disposition.

It is clear that the American machinery for governing the territories has been seriously deficient. This deficiency is both cause and effect of the apathy toward the dependencies and the absence of a clear-cut policy for them. Still, a vague general policy did exist. Following the initial impulse to " Americanize " the new dependencies, the majority of policy-makers came to feel that in the course of time Hawaii and Alaska would somehow achieve statehood in the Union, the Philippines would get independence, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands would become more self-governing, and the other Pacific islands would receive citizenship, civil government and the beginnings of self-government. When and in what form these developments took place (or were to take place) depended (or depends) upon the President and relatively small groups which take an active interest in the dependencies and temporarily shake Congress out of the inertia which it ordinarily displays toward the territories.

In view of the vagueness of the American objectives and of the general apathy regarding the dependencies, why were these objectives implemented at all? In the first place, they were rooted in the widespread and firm belief that self-government should be enjoyed by any spatially distinct group that wants and is capable of it. Secondly, no important national or group interest, real or imagined, was in conflict with this goal. There were, of course, some groups of investors and traders whose business interests in the colonies might be jeopardized by territorial self-government, independence, or statehood. But these have been insignificant compared to business groups that felt injured or menaced by the influx of goods from the dependencies.

From a national point of view, all the territories, with the exception of Hawaii, have been economic liabilities rather than assets, despite the doubtful benefits from the extension of American tariff and navigation laws to the dependencies. In effect, the United States paid a heavy subsidy to Philippine and Puerto Rican producers. The direct costs of naval administration in the Pacific islands and numerous and large grants to the Virgin Islands made these smaller territories conspicuous financial burdens. Puerto Rico is also on the debit side. The island is permitted to collect and keep the customs duties which in all the States of the Union are turned into the Federal treasury. Although Puerto Ricans are American

citizens and receive many fiscal grants from the Federal Government, they do not pay Federal income taxes. Puerto Rico is also permitted to levy excise taxes on the rum and tobacco it sells in the United States. Finally, Puerto Rico has received numerous direct grants, especially since 1934, for road building, rehabilitation, education and agriculture.

Except for Hawaii and Alaska, the strategic and prestige value of empire seemed doubtful or non-existent to most Americans during the inter-war period when the nation was following its isolationist inclination. In any case, prestige of empire can mean little or nothing to a nation that believes itself to be leading all other nations in almost every respect. Interest in the strategic value of the dependent islands is no doubt greater now than it was before the last war. But this value is felt to reside largely in the assurance that the islands can be prevented from falling into the hands of a hostile power.

The American record in the territories must be appraised in terms of American intentions, however vague, ambiguous and confused; in terms of the governmental machinery and pertinent American dispositions affecting the implementation of these intentions; and in terms of the specific environment, in the territories, within which American policies operated.

As a first step in conducting such an appraisal, it might seem useful to consult the dependent populations. But except for some definite reactions which must have been based on genuine feelings among these populations, this would be an undertaking of great difficulty and doubtful value. Verbal expression of dissatisfaction with imperial policy and practice is in the nature of the colonial relationship (wherever free speech prevails) and is bound to swell in volume as education, income, and self-government advance and public opinion rallies around a popularly elected legislature. The genuine demand for yet more self-government and independence is inevitable unless, perhaps, independence would obviously and seriously harm the dependency in question. Moreover, the refusal by the imperial power of any colonial wishes, however unreasonable, will be imputed to the existence of the colonial relationship and interpreted as gross neglect or wilful exploitation. The basic fact is that self-government by the dependent populations is not and cannot be fully responsible, and the candidate for elective office will find it expedient to express grievances, that, if elected, he will not be called upon to remedy.

As far as it has affected economic welfare, American government of the dependencies has been already discussed. Being addicted to the free-enterprise system and distrustful of economic planning and enterprise by government, the United States was not well equipped ideologically to organize economic progress in the territories. The firm, though declining, reign of the *laisser-faire* principle and the traditional reliance on voluntary individual effort also obstructed adequate provision for social services, much as was done in this field. Given these ideological bearings and the economic and social structure of the mainland, the United

States, furthermore, could not be expected to intervene in the dependencies for purposes of redistributing national income when it was divided in a grossly unequal fashion. Despite these factors and despite phenomenally swift population growth, the real income of the territories expanded greatly under American rule. In the Philippines, the national income is estimated to have increased five-fold from 1898 to 1938. Although the population grew by 2.2 per cent. per annum, *per capita* income was doubled during the period. In excessively populated Puerto Rico, expanding *per capita* income has considerably outstripped population growth during the last twelve years. And the Philippine standard of living was and is above that of any other country in the Middle or Far East. It has also been estimated, that in the middle 1940s, *per capita* income in Puerto Rico was somewhat higher than in Trinidad and Cuba, twice that of Jamaica, and nine times that of Haiti.

The policy of tariff assimilation, which conferred very considerable favours on the dependencies, would have been a good policy had all the territories been on the way to complete political assimilation. It was certainly a good policy for Hawaii and Alaska and, on different grounds, for the Virgin Islands. It was an unfortunate policy, however, for the dependencies that were eventually to attain full independence or autonomy. The economies of the territories adapted themselves to free access to the American market. This made them dependent on an advantage which would certainly be denied once a territory gained full independence. The policy of tariff assimilation was thus incompatible with the policy laid down in 1899 of eventually extending independence to the Philippine Islands. Political independence would be extremely disruptive economically if tariff assimilation were abruptly removed, and would always be somewhat ambiguous as long as tariff preferences were continued and regarded as a burden by the ex-metropolis.

Bold as the American education policy was, it tried to achieve too much with the limited financial and personnel resources available in the territories. English has become the common language in Hawaii, Alaska, and the Virgin Islands; it gained some currency in the Philippines and the smaller Pacific islands; but it remained a foreign language in Puerto Rico. Technical literacy and other formal education apart, the United States has undoubtedly achieved some inculcation of American values whenever they were not in basic conflict with indigenous value patterns. But like other imperial powers, and perhaps a little more so, the United States failed to recognize the true and largely disruptive impact which an imperial country must have on indigenous society, its way of life, and the imponderable ways in which personality is shaped by the social mores. Unlike most other imperial powers, the United States did its best to maximize this impact. Given the degree of ignorance, parochialism and conceit which, until recently at least, characterized the attitudes of imperial powers toward their colonial wards, it is indeed doubtful that a greater awareness of this problem would have brought

intelligent reactions to it. In any event, the resolute manner in which the United States abruptly modified political institutions, economic organizations, judicial systems and education programmes, testifies to lack of fundamental insight into the problem.

The failure to comprehend and take into account foreign culture was a serious liability when it came to altering the political institutions in the dependencies. The emphasis—exceptional among modern imperial powers—was on fostering constitutional self-government of the western type and establishing it within a short period of time. This policy was pursued on the assumption that the "inferior" cultural structure and forces in the territories would adapt themselves automatically and quickly to political change and formal schooling imposed from the outside.

In view of this superficial conception of the problem, it is astonishing that American policy succeeded as well as it did. This success seems explainable only if one grants that despite all its shortcomings, American policy elicited widespread faith, especially in the Philippines, in the sincerity of American intentions. Despite the ill will and resentment generated in colonial leaders by the inferior status implied in the colonial relationship, a considerable portion of the evolving ruling group credited the United States with the intention of seeing free communities arise in its dependencies. And this, no matter how much is done by the imperial power in the economic field and for health and formal education, is the heart of the matter—at least to the politically mature groups in a colony. Their natural desire is to govern.

There can be no question that in all but the small islands administered by the Navy the United States prepared its subject populations for self-government with great effort and speed. There are chiefly three ways by which an imperial power can effectively convey to a subject population experience of the principles and methods of self-government: by increasing the powers of an elected legislature, by extending the franchise, and by including a maximum number of natives in administrative work. In all three respects, progress has been rapid in the Philippines and in Puerto Rico, not to speak of Hawaii and, latterly, Alaska. The first general election in the Philippines in 1907 created the first popularly elected national legislature anywhere in the Far East. Ever since 1899, both Philippine and Puerto Rican history reveal ever-increasing self-government. The degree of self-government achieved by these dependencies as early as the first world war, on both national and local levels, exceeded that of any other colonial dependency. The conditions of the suffrage were left largely to the deliberations of the colonial legislatures. Universal suffrage was eventually established everywhere, though literacy qualifications continued to keep the electorate small in the Philippine Islands. With the exception of the initial period after occupation and with the exception also of a few high positions, staff for the colonial executive branch was recruited not from a metropolitan civil service but from the local population.

These rapid advances in self-government were irregular rather than based on a well-timed, long-range plan. Although there was constant prodding on the part of the native élites, progress was in effect initiated and imposed by the metropolis. In no case have the advances been made in response to rebellious activities or acute pressure by the dependent peoples.

As promised from the beginning, the grant of self-government to the Philippines eventually became a grant of independence. That this promise was kept is usually attributed to the pressure of economic interest-groups intent upon denying Philippine products free entry into the American market. There is a great deal of truth in this view. It is doubtful that without this pressure, Congress would have acted as it did. But if in the absence of this pressure, Congress had not so acted it would have been because of indifference rather than any strong interest in maintaining the colonial status. And if these lobbying activities were a necessary condition for the passage of the Philippine Independence Act, they were probably not a sufficient condition. Indifference toward colonial empire, fear that possession of the Philippines might involve the nation in a Far Eastern war, and a genuine belief in the virtue of the Act, also had their parts in the decision. Several influential Congressmen were firm believers in the principle of self-determination. Ultimately it was American public opinion which sanctioned the movement.

As scheduled, the Philippines received their independence in 1946. However, certain American actions during and after the war have unfortunately incurred severe Filipino criticism. One of these is the alleged policy of General MacArthur and his staff of favouring Filipino politicians like the late Manuel Roxas, who collaborated with Japan during the war, and of helping the Filipino ruling class to assert its power in the face of a strong revolutionary movement in the rural interior of Luzon. Another potent source of ill will lies in the economic conditions attached to the final transfer of sovereignty. During the war, President Roosevelt repeatedly promised that the Philippines would receive American aid for rehabilitating the islands. The Philippine Rehabilitation Act of 1946 provided for the payment of $400 million for war damages to private properties in the Philippines; another $120 million were allocated for repairing and rebuilding public buildings, roads, port and harbour facilities, etc.; and $100 million of American surplus property were to be transferred to the islands. The Filipinos have been dissatisfied with these provisions because appropriations and payments have been unduly delayed and because they estimate their war damage at a much higher figure.

The Filipinos are rightfully indignant over some of the provisions of the Philippine Trade Act (Bell Act) of 1946. The war had made it impossible for the Philippine economy to adjust itself gradually, as provided for in the Tydings-McDuffie Act, to the impending loss of preferential access to the American market. The Bell Act provides that, subject to the established quota limitations, Philippine exports would be admitted free of duty to the American market until 1954.

Between 1954 and 1974, 5 per cent. of the lowest American import duties would be added each year, so that Philippine products would be subject to the full duty by the end of the period. American exports to the islands would be subject to equivalent treatment.

From the American point of view, this was a generous settlement, especially since the provisions of the new act were substantially more liberal than those of the Tydings-McDuffie Act. There were two provisions, however, which it is difficult to defend. First, during the duration of the special trading relationship, the Philippine peso must be pegged to the American dollar at the ratio of 2 : 1, and the convertibility of the peso into the dollar must not be suspended or the transfer of funds from the Philippines to the United States in any way restricted. These provisions could be modified only by agreement with the U.S. President. Secondly, " the disposition, exploitation, development, and utilization of all agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain . . . and other natural resources of the Philippines, and the operation of public utilities shall, if open to any person, be open to citizens of the United States and to all forms of business enterprise owned and controlled, directly and indirectly, by United States citizens ". As long as Philippine exports receive preferential treatment, then, American businessmen will formally enjoy equal rights with Filipino businessmen. This is not a reciprocal provision, for no such rights are accorded to Filipinos in the United States. In order to conform to this provision, which was made a condition of receiving the benefits of the Act, the Philippine Constitution had to be amended. Following a plebiscite, this amendment was made. In passing this law, Congress was clearly ignorant of or indifferent to Filipino sentiment and acted against the express recommendations of the Departments of State and Commerce.

Because of the continued dependence of the Philippine Islands on American tariff preferences and because of the military weakness of the Philippines, it might be readily inferred that this erstwhile American territory is not actually an independent country. This is a complex question which cannot be discussed here in full. It is very well possible that the United States will feel itself moved to give special future aid in order to prop up the Philippine economy and to guarantee the nation against aggression. It is probable that such help will be conditional on certain policies to be pursued by the Philippine government. But will such " dependence " be different for the Philippines than for, say, Italy or Belgium? In other words, will such " dependence " result from a consideration of mutual interests or from the former colonial status of the Philippine Islands?

Of the other dependencies, Hawaii and Alaska are on the way to statehood within the Union, although Congressional indifference may delay the decision for some time. It is very likely that civil government and extended self-government will soon be accorded to all the smaller Pacific islands. They are too small—as are also the Virgin Islands—to aspire to independence. The future status of Puerto

Rico is undecided. It is generally agreed that the island can have independence for the asking. But such a grant would be made conditional upon Puerto Rico's renunciation of all the economic benefits which she now obtains from the United States. This is a sacrifice which the island is in no position to make and, for this reason, even American radicals are opposed to giving the Puerto Ricans independence. There is a small independence movement in the island and—as Sumner Welles once put it—the majority no doubt would be happy to get " divorce with alimony ". But without alimony, the Puerto Ricans do not want divorce. Their leadership is too mature to clamour for independence at any price. As self-government advanced during the last decade, island politics have, in fact, become concerned mainly with economic problems. The present entirely Puerto Rican administration is doing its best by granting tax concessions to attract private American capital, while at the same time expanding government enterprise.

Statehood for Puerto Rico is neither politically feasible nor economically desirable. As a state in the Union, the island would lose some of the substantial subsidies it is now receiving and it would have to contribute to the financial maintenance of the Federal government. It is very improbable that Congress would be willing to make Puerto Rico a state. Since about one-fourth of all Puerto Ricans have negro blood, Congressmen from the southern states would probably oppose such a move. The principal problem, however, lies in the failure of the American attempt to assimilate the Puerto Ricans. Theirs is essentially a Latin and hence alien culture. It is one thing for the United States to assimilate individual immigrants who settle in the United States; it is another to change—with a mere handful of officials—an entire people in their own land. In the foreseeable future, then, the Puerto Ricans will enjoy a great deal of autonomy and eventually perhaps get something like " dominion status ".

It is difficult to judge the extent to which the United States has succeeded in actually rearing its dependencies in the art of democratic self-government as practised in the western nations. Self-government can be easily given. It is a different proposition to " give " democratic self-government which must rest on specific value preferences and the self-control of political maturity rather than on a mere constitutional arrangement, however well designed. The United States clearly made it its business to stimulate and develop democratic self-government in all its territories except Guam and American Samoa. How well it succeeded only history can tell. The blindness of most American policy-makers to the complexity of this self-chosen task—particularly to the requirement of bringing about profound changes in the make-up of the " social personality " of the dependent populations—may be thought to doom the experiment to failure. But it is doubtful that a partial awareness of the problem would have been translated into more effective policy.

A close scrutiny of government and politics in the Philippine Islands after 1936 during the last two decades reveals many cases of administrative inefficiency and

corruption, of oppression and exploitation of the many by the few. If we expect perfection, the experiment must be rated a failure. The record looks far less discouraging if we compare these failings with comparable failings in the United States itself and in most democratic countries. In fact, the record is on the whole impressive if we consider how short a period these societies have had for mastering a political system that was imposed from the outside and is extremely exacting of political maturity.

The chief weaknesses of the political system in the Philippines lie in the unequal distribution of political power. The majority of the population as yet takes little interest in national, as apart from local, politics. Because of the literacy requirement, the electorate is still small. The social and political structure is dominated by a relatively small minority of wealthy and well-educated Filipinos. The middle class, outside officialdom, is small and composed largely of Chinese. As a result, the Filipino farmers and farm workers find it difficult to formulate their grievances and press their demands through democratic and orderly channels. There is no question but that the Philippines are in urgent need of land reform and other basic reforms designed to bring about a less inequitable distribution of wealth, income, and educational and political opportunities. The United States has remained aloof from this problem. As the Puerto Rican example shows, the United States probably would have tolerated radical changes if they had been effected through the established system of government. The United States was not prepared to intervene and impose such change from the outside. Everything considered, this was probably a wise course to follow. In Puerto Rico, the upper class was gradually dispossessed of its former power and the unruffled development of the Puerto Rican " New Deal " was carried through by the majority party in the island.

Another weakness of the evolving democratic system in the Philippines and in Puerto Rico is the overwhelming strength of one political party and the personal feudal structure of party leadership. The lingering Spanish traditions and the inevitable lack of political sophistication among the masses are no doubt chiefly responsible for the importance of personality and personal allegiance in party hierarchy. In the Philippines, the recognized identity of interest among the ruling groups is an element in giving the *Nacionalista* party a virtual monopoly over the political life of the islands. The chief reason, however, for what is *de facto* a one-party system lies in the simple fact that party life evolved in a colonial system. As long as colonial status obtains, indigenous politics are predominated by the demand for increased self-government or full independence. Political parties and legislatures become primarily instruments for attaining these goals rather than for performing the usual tasks of government. Until self-government is secured, all other political issues lack finality. This one-sided orientation of political thinking and action discourages the multiplication of political parties.

These weaknesses in the political life of the possessions may or may not prove

fatal to genuine democratic government in the longer run. They are unlikely to do so in Puerto Rico where the *Populares* Party expresses the desires and will of the large majority of the electorate. It is too hazardous to make any predictions for the Philippines. Until the present, the Philippine performance has been ambiguous. But it does not compare unfavourably with earlier phases in the life of many western democracies or with the political regimes of other Oriental nations.

The American record in its colonial dependencies shows both weak and strong points. Colonial policy is not only determined by official policy but also by the way the imperial power goes about solving its own domestic problems. And these ways present the usual mixture of good and bad almost regardless of what specific criteria are applied; moreover, they do not always fit the conditions of colonial administration. Excepting the long continuation of naval rule in Guam and Samoa, and allowing for the limited awareness with which western imperial nations have approached the colonial problem, the overall colonial policy of the United States is commendable rather than the opposite. It has been especially progressive—unduly and onesidedly progressive, no doubt, in the judgment of other imperial nations—in the constitutional and political field. On the other hand, American policy has been deficient in the formulation and execution of detailed objectives interrelating the various aspects of colonial life. This weakness, as well as occasional instances of injustice, was caused by ignorance, indifference and carelessness rather than by selfish designs. Sins of omission far exceed sins of commission. Even the perpetuation of naval administration in the small Pacific islands resulted from Congressional apathy.

While the record does not entitle Americans to the complacency which they often display, they need not feel ashamed of it either. Indeed, it is difficult to resist the vague feeling that theirs may be on the whole the best performance in a field in which, perhaps, no performance can in principle be good in any absolute sense. It is a feeling that can be supported by citing instances of significant action by the dependent or ex-dependent populations themselves. In 1948, for example, when a conference of thirteen Latin American states on dependent territories discussed Puerto Rico as a colonial problem, the Puerto Rican legislature unanimously passed a resolution. The resolution pointed out that Puerto Rico is functioning under a democratic representative government, enjoying all democratic liberties to the full, is making rapid progress in developing its economy, and can obtain full independence upon its own request. It warned the Latin-American nations to " keep their hands off " Puerto Rican relations with the United States—a request which Puerto Ricans were quick to call the " Muñoz Doctrine ".

It is also a fact, unique in the annals of ex-colonies, that on August 13th, 1938, when the Filipinos had achieved Commonwealth status, they celebrated as a national holiday the fortieth anniversary of the occupation of Manilla by the United States. It is true, finally, that a large part of the Filipino nation put up

widespread and prolonged resistance against the Japanese and that of all the non-independent populations in the Far East, it was the only one to do so.

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Résumé

L'Administration Américaine des Dépendances d'Outre-Mer

AYANT eu leurs origines dans un groupe de colonies qui se sont libérées par leurs propres efforts, les Etats-Unis sont par tradition anti-impérialistes et ce n'est que dans les dernières années du siècle passé qu'ils sont devenus une puissance coloniale. Dès lors, ils ont eu à s'occuper de territoires administrés sous un régime civil, notamment les Philippines et Porto-Rico, et de territoires insulaires administrés bureaucratiquement par la marine. Dans les territoires autrefois administrés (les Philippines) il y a eu un progrès politique continu qui a abouti à la réalisation de l'indépendance. Les restrictions constitutionnelles qui limitent l'autonomie des territoires à l'état intermédiaire sont décrites en détail et la manière dont on les fait peu à peu disparaître est examinée et commentée. Si l'on passe en revue ce que l'Amérique a accompli pendant cette dernière étape, on constate en particulier de

notables progrès dans l'éducation (avec, à Porto-Rico, l'échec complet des tentatives d'imposer l'anglais comme langue commune, tentatives qui avaient leur part dans la politique qui visait sans contredit à américaniser les peuples des territoires), et en même temps des progrès également notables dans les domaines de la santé et des travaux publics.

Du point de vue économique, on examine les effets de l'union douanière entre la métropole et les territoires, l'orientation de l'effort de ces derniers vers les denrées les plus avantageux à produire, les tendances générales qui ont gouverné le placement des capitaux, la mesure dans laquelle les capitaux privés ont été renforcés par des capitaux provenent de sources publiques, la protection des territoires contre les abus de l'entreprise monopolisatrice.

L'administration par la marine, établie d'abord provisoirement à Guam et à Samoa, a pour caractère essentiel la nomination d'officiers à la plupart des postes administratifs, les indigènes n'ayant été admis que très récemment au gouvernement et encore à titre consultatif seulement. Guam passera en 1950 au Ministère de l'Intérieur faute d'action efficace et d'intérêt de la part du Congrès et en l'absence d'un Ministère des Colonies indépendamment constitué.

L'examen des institutions politiques et de la structure administrative des Etats-Unis dans leurs effets sur la politique coloniale impose la conclusion qu'elles sont aptes à mettre obstacle à une politique positive ou vigoureuse. Cette politique coloniale, en tant que consciente et voulue, a pour but le progrès des territoires vers le gouvernement parlementaire autonome, bien que le statut indépendant des Philippines laisse encore des problèmes à resoudre et que des facteurs économiques particuliers à Porto-Rico écartent la possibilité d'y faire accorder un statut pareil.

Le gouvernement américain a accordé dans le passé des subventions importantes et des prix et des tarifs de préférence pour aider le développement des territoires (des Philippines, de Porto-Rico et des îles Vierges notamment) sans exiger de contribution par l'impôt au Trésor fédéral; les concessions douanières constituent d'ailleurs une source d'embarras lorsque l'autonomie politique est en voie de réalisation. Et quant aux autres difficultés que soulève la question de l'autonomie, on constate à Porto-Rico l'insuffisance économique, aux Philippines l'incapacité et la corruption dans l'administration, la distribution inégale des pouvoirs politiques et par conséquent, des lenteurs dans les reformes, du régime foncier en particulier; dans les deux pays on rencontre la domination politique par le parti ou des chefs de parti.

Et cependant, bien que l'on n'ait pas toujours compris les effets du choc des valeurs américaines et indigènes, malgré l'effort d'américaniser des populations de culture espagnole et malgré les abruptes virements de politique coloniale, l'effort américain a, par sa sincérité, réussi au-delà de toute probabilité; et en dépit de tentatives indigènes pour la discréditer par la calomnie ou pour en accélerer le pas par la révolte, la politique américaine a toujours eu comme but principal l'autonomie progressive des territoires; l'analyse des difficultées inhérentes à toute

tentative vers l'autonomie partielle comme étape transitionnelle amène le jugement final que le grand mérite de l'effort américain est dans son attitude progressive du point de vue politique et que son plus grand défaut est de n'avoir point prévu " des objectifs qui relieraient étroitement entre eux les divers aspects de la vie coloniale ".

In Professor KNORR'S unavoidable absence, his paper was introduced by Dr F. C. JONES who traced the development of American policy in the Pacific to the moment of Japan's defeat and noted its strategic implications. He referred to American experience in the preparation of Territories for statehood within the American Union. This technique had been applied in Alaska and Hawaii, but was not suited to the conditions of the ex-Spanish dependencies—Puerto Rico and especially the Philippines. In the latter, economic and social changes had been slow in comparison with the constitutional developments leading to independence.

Summary of Discussion

MR MEIER stated that recently the United States government had become aligned with a socialistic national party in Puerto Rico which represented 70 to 80 per cent. of the population. The plan of this party for the development of the island was similar to plans for depressed areas in Europe. It was most unusual that the United States government should find itself in this position since it generally tried to prevent any kind of planning in colonial areas over which it exercised direction.

Mr CHADWICK asked for more information about planning in the Virgin Islands. It was his experience that you could not develop territories without money but if you injected too much you killed the initiative of the people as was done with the Amerindians who had been given everything they wanted with the result that they became degenerate. He wondered if the same thing was happening in the Virgins.

Professor LOGEMANN asked: (1) Had the United States affected the social structure of the Philippines by its educational system, its legislation and its work among backward tribes? (2) Had the introduction of democratic forms of government shifted political power in the Philippines or merely confirmed the ruling class in its possession of it?

Professor READ spoke of the valuable work being done by various American universities, such as Cornell, and other bodies in studying contrasting types of culture both within its own colonial areas and outside. She asked if it was tacitly accepted by the government of the United States that such independent bodies should proceed with this work, produce information and suggest lines of development which might later be incorporated in official policy.

Mr HOWARD drew attention to point four of President Truman's Four Point programme, relating to the improvement of the conditions in undeveloped areas.

Mr G. I. JONES asked for more information about Liberia.

Monsieur ALDUY questioned the view that there was no American imperialism. The Americans were traditionally hostile to all forms of colonization but there appeared to be some confusion about the meaning of this term. There had been a form of American colonization in a whole series of countries. He instanced a protest made by the American consul at Dakar to the Governor-General against the financial policy of profit margin reduction. All over the French Union requests were now being made by Americans for the concession of exploitation rights. Was not the growth of this policy of economic intervention a new form of colonization?

Dr JONES said that while not an expert on the Virgins, he did not think the development policy there would produce the same results as had been the case formerly among the Amerindians.

In social reform the Americans were cautious. It was their policy to leave the initiative in these matters to the people themselves.

The power of the Filipino ruling class was shaken by the Japanese occupation. Since the war there has been a land reform and rent reduction movement among the peasantry, accompanied by armed revolt. As a result of this an attempt was now being made by the Filipino government to put a plan of reform into effect.

As the slave owners of the South did not wish to have freed negroes in their neighbourhood because of the unrest which they might cause, the idea of Liberia was propounded. An American colonization society came into existence in the early part of the nineteenth century whose object was to repatriate freed negroes to Africa but interest in the scheme soon waned. Though there was a good deal of financial and other American interest in the place, Liberia was not an American colony.

The American government allowed universities and other unofficial bodies a free hand in their investigations and researches but what the effect of such work may be upon official policy was uncertain.

Certainly the Americans had been high-handed in their relations with colonial and other European powers but he did not believe that this implied any intention of establishing a new form of indirect imperialism in those countries as Japan had done in Manchuria. It was merely an indication of the normal American tendency to give good advice to *those backward Europeans* and was partly due to that sense of urgency which Americans had about the problems of Europe.

La Naissance du Nationalisme Outre-Mer

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JUSQU'À la dernière guerre, les diplomates ou les hommes d'Etat qui se penchaient sur l'évolution, au cours du XIXème siècle, des peuples et nations balkaniques, avaient coutume de la considérer comme une sorte de phénomène unique en son genre, étrange par sa complexité et le déroulement de sa trame. La mystérieuse "question d'Orient" était traitée en soi, comme un accident de l'Histoire.

Il devient aujourd'hui évident, surtout aux yeux de ceux qui interrogent l'avenir politique de l'Asie et de l'Afrique, que les évènements des Balkans au siècle dernier n'étaient que le premier épisode d'une phase nouvelle dans l'histoire de la planète: celle de l'éveil et de l'affirmation des nationalités dans le monde entier en attendant, espérons-le, la phase du regroupement des nationalités au sein des grands ensembles.

Les caractéristiques essentielles des mouvements qui agitent, depuis quelques années les populations des pays dépendants se décèlent déjà clairement dans les premiers balbutiements des peuples soumis au joug ottoman. On y observe là comme ici que la conquête et l'occupation ont désagrégé la société ancestrale ou tout au moins en ont miné la structure à ce point qu'on n'y peut guère distinguer qu'une sorte de conscience très vague d'une certaine originalité de civilisation ou de race, ce dernier vocable étant pris dans son sens le plus large. Encore n'y a-t-il là qu'un sentiment trop faible pour pouvoir animer un mouvement de revendication dans des pays où la condition humaine est au plus bas.

Pourtant la colonisation turque ne parvient pas à étouffer l'éclosion, dans ce *no man's land* social et politique, des germes d'un ordre nouveau. Des élites nouvelles apparaissent: émigrés, retour d'Occident; commerçants en liaison avec l'étranger; moines érudits, héritiers du moine Païsii, qui a l'abri des pouvoirs établis, reconstituent avec peut-être plus de romantisme que d'objectivité, un passé qui, quelques décades plus tard servira de référence, aux chefs politiques.

Le climat ainsi créé, il suffira, que la pression des grandes puissances et le jeu d'affinités particulières entre les assujettis et certaines puissances (la Russie en l'occurrence) affaiblissent de l'extérieur l'appareil militaire et bureaucratique de la Sublime Porte, pour que les avant-gardes des peuples domestiqués puissent, avec l'aide étrangère, chasser les anciens maîtres. Au sein des jeunes Etats, principautés ou royaumes, les collectivités accèderont peu à peu à la conscience de nations, dont les frontières ethniques ou culturelles seront loin de coincider toujours avec les frontières politiques.

Tel est, approximativement, le dessin général du mouvement des nationalités dans les Balkans au XIXème siècle, mouvement qui fut décrit avec sympathie par les historiens d'Occident, peut-être parce que, chrétiens, ils assistaient à la défaite des infidèles, ou qu'Européens, ils voyaient sans déplaisir disparaître les derniers vestiges d'une oppression qui avait failli déferler au-delà de Prague et de Vienne.

Peut-être des raisons inverses des précédentes expliquent-elles que le mouvement des nationalités chez les peuples dépendants d'Afrique et d'Asie, soit aujourd'hui observé avec moins de bienveillance, voire d'objectivité. Pourtant les origines n'en sont pas fondamentalement différentes selon la latitude, à cela près que la colonisation européenne en Asie ou en Afrique a probablement bouleversé plus que ne l'a fait la colonisation ottomane, l'équilibre de populations dont le genre de vie était sans aucune mesure avec celui pratiqué dans les métropoles.

Du reste ce rappel historique n'avait qu'un objet: celui de marquer comme point de départ la généralité d'un phénomène dont il sera ainsi plus aisé de suivre les manifestations chez les peuples colonisés.

En termes plus précis, la conquête et l'occupation étrangère, si élevés ou désintéressés qu'en soient les motifs, quels que soient le lieu et l'époque, engendrent inévitablement la désagrégation des structures sociales chez ceux qui en sont les victimes. Mais par une sorte d'évolution inverse, et cette observation est particulièrement valable pour les pays d'outre-mer, de ce déséquilibre surgissent des sociétés nouvelles, dont les composantes peuvent être très différentes des précédentes, et qui ont tendance à s'agréger en groupements nationaux.

L'un et l'autre mouvements peuvent dans la réalité ne pas se distinguer aussi nettement. Ils n'en ont pas moins leur existence propre. Mais l'enchevêtrement des causes de désagrégation et des causes de regroupement aboutit, selon la prédominance des unes ou des autres, à donner au nationalisme colonial des visages très différents.

Comme nous, européens, sommes trop souvent à la fois juges et parties, il nous arrive, pour n'avoir pas suffisamment distingué les facteurs d'origine, d'établir une différenciation qui, à notre avis, serait arbitraire, entre la revendication de l'égalité, celle de l'autonomie, celle de l'indépendance, qui ne sont que les vagues successives d'une même lame de fond.

* * *

I.—La conquête, quelle que soit la mission qu'elle se propose, est génératrice de déséquilibre social. C'est là un lieu commun en matière de conflits dans le monde dit civilisé: c'est une vérité moins universellement admise lorsqu'est envisagée la prise de possession des terres exotiques. On a souvent cité cette phrase ingénue qui montre à quel point les contemporains des conquistadors de la Renaissance pouvaient être indifférents aux souffrances engendrées par la colonisation:

"Les spectateurs pieux, à l'arrivée au Portugal des premiers esclaves africains de Henri le Navigateur, réfléchirent avec grand plaisir au sauvetage de ces âmes, auparavant perdues".

Il ne venait même pas à l'esprit de l'auteur que des faits de ce genre répétés à l'infini aboutissaient à créer d'innombrables déracinés, ferments des insurrections futures.

Certes, les méthodes ont changé. Il n'en demeure pas moins que la colonisation provoque—plus ou moins selon qu'elle est de peuplement ou d'exploitation—la dislocation des hiérarchies et des communautés ancestrales. Observation qui s'impose en Afrique Noire, où les chefs de tribus ou de clans, les classes nobles, les vieillards, les sorciers se voient dépossédés, dans une mesure qui ne cesse de croître, de leur autorité. En conservent-ils une parcelle, c'est au colonisateur qu'ils en doivent le maintien et ils n'ignorent pas que leurs velléités d'indépendance envers l'administration aboutiraient tôt ou tard à des sanctions. Même l'autorité purement morale a tendance a être transférée à d'autres. S'agit-il des chefs religieux, la pénétration du Christianisme ou de l'Islam réduit rapidement leur domaine d'influence. S'agit-il du prestige que confère la sagesse ancestrale, celui du Blanc ou de l'Autochtone formé à l'école d'Occident ne cesse de s'affirmer et finit par prévaloir. Dans certaines régions du Niger ou de la Haute Volta, par exemple, l'autorité des rois locaux, qui ont hérité de sceptres devenus fictifs, ne cesse de décroître au profit de celle de leurs petits fils ou petits cousins, diplômés des écoles ou des facultés métropolitaines et parfois munis d'une auréole parlementaire.

Ces remarques ne s'appliquent pas qu'à l'Afrique Noire où les civilisations s'affirment avec moins de force qu'en Afrique du Nord. Elles sont également valables dans l'ensemble du Mogreb. Le cas de l'Algérie est particulièrement suggestif. La colonisation française y a littéralement pulvérisé les cadres et les institutions locales. Il y existe bien encore certaines familles musulmanes qui jouissent de quelque prestige, mais dans la mesure où une telle comparaison est permise, ce prestige ne tire pas à beaucoup plus de conséquence qu'actuellement celui de la noblesse française. Ces familles, dépossédées de leurs privilèges ancestraux et de la majeure partie de leurs biens, ont tenté de compenser les premiers par les faveurs de l'administration, qui distribue entre autres les fonctions ou les titres de caïds, aghas ou bachaghas, et de pallier à la pénurie des seconds par des pratiques, certes bien antérieures à l'installation des Français, mais qui rendent plus difficilement sensibles aux masses les bienfaits de la colonisation. On ne trouverait pas en Algérie, en nombre suffisant, de fortes personnalités susceptibles de constituer l'armature d'un Etat, comme cela serait possible au contraire au Maroc, grâce à la politique Lyautey.

Entendons-nous bien: il ne s'agit pas ici de porter un jugement de valeur sur la colonisation ou les vertus des régimes dont l'histoire aurait normalement doté les pays d'Outre-Mer s'ils n'avaient été conquis. Il n'est question dans ce propos que de marquer la généralité de ce fait: la société coloniale est toujours désagrégée par la conquête. Mais la désagrégation est plus ou moins complète. Elle l'est au plus haut point dans les colonies de peuplement comme l'Algérie ou dans les colonies d'exploitation lorsqu'il s'agit de pays socialement mal armés comme

l'Afrique tropicale. Elle l'est beaucoup moins dans les colonies d'exploitation où la structure sociale a pu mieux résister, soit que les colonisateurs l'aient tolérée (Maroc), soit qu'ils se soient contentés de ne la point détruire (Cambodge–Annam). En vérité tout a été atteint, non seulement les coutumes de l'Afrique tropicale, mais même celles fondées sur le Coran. En Algérie, les colonisateurs ont été amenés, peu à peu à intervenir dans l'exercice de la justice et pas uniquement de la justice pénale ce qui eut été difficile à éviter, mais même civile par la nomination des cadis (juges), par le renvoi de la procédure d'appel devant les tribunaux de droit français et par une multitude de dispositions qu'il serait fastidieux d'énumérer.

On n'a pas manqué de noter que la colonisation aboutit à spolier de leurs terres les indigènes, que ceux-ci soient possédants selon les thèses coraniques ou usufruitiers d'une propriété comme c'est le cas général en Afrique Noire. On estime en Algérie que 1 million d'Européens sont propriétaires des 2/5 des terres, les 3/5 revenant à 8 millions de musulmans.

On a moins remarqué l'extraordinaire bouleversement des valeurs économiques découlant de la conquête. Le capital d'un autochtone était fonction jadis du nombre de ses esclaves et de certains objets, aujourd'hui totalement dépréciés. Il l'est encore, notamment au Cameroun et au Nigeria, en fonction de celui de ses épouses. Mais dans la mesure où l'on a créé des besoins (vêtements, ustensiles divers) et des moyens nouveaux et rares d'échange (monnaie), l'entretien de ces épouses est devenu plus cher et le capital indigène non entretenu par de nouveaux profits s'est amenuisé. En quelques années les valeurs économiques ancestrales se sont effondrées et ont été remplacées par d'autres qu'il était singulièrement malaisé d'acquérir puisque les colonisateurs s'étaient empressés de s'en assurer le monopole (meilleures terres dans les colonies de peuplement, ressources minières et commerce un peu partout). L'Europe n'a pas connu depuis Jules César des révolutions économiques comparables à celles qu'ont dû subir les élites ancestrales de l'Afrique tropicale et même de certains pays de l'Afrique du Nord.

On est loin des déclarations solennelles du Général de Bourmont le 5 juillet 1830, au lendemain de la prise d'Alger: "La liberté des habitants de toutes les classes, leur religion, leurs propriétés, leur commerce et leur industrie ne recevront aucune atteinte".

Sans doute était-il impossible de tenir de telles promesses et les Anglais eux-mêmes n'y sont point toujours parvenus. Peu importe ici le point de vue du moraliste. Il suffit au sociologue et à l'historien de noter, sans tenir compte des déclarations officielles, combien profond a été le bouleversement causé par la conquête dans les pays d'outre-mer, bouleversement dont les contemporains ne furent nullement conscients.

S'ils l'avaient été, ils se seraient vraisemblablement appliqués à réintroduire les éléments désaxés—chefs coutumiers ou religieux—dans le circuit d'échanges intellectuels, sociaux et économiques que les colons traitants, administrateurs et soldats créaient entre eux.

Il n'en fut rien. Même dans les colonies françaises, où la politique d'assimilation a été loyalement tentée, on a assisté à une ségrégation beaucoup plus spontanée que voulue des populations en présence. Sauf aux Antilles et au Sénégal, où plusieurs siècles de coexistence ont fini par faire tomber presque toutes les barrières, colonisés et colonisateurs voisinent toujours sans presque jamais se rencontrer. Sans doute y a-t-il quelques exemples d'osmose en Afrique Noire ou blanche, mais il y a là surtout une évolution récente dont les causes seront analysées plus loin. A mon avis, le fossé social tend à se creuser plutôt qu'à se combler, car le niveau de vie des indigènes s'élève progressivement par l'accroissement de la production et le développement de la scolarisation au moment précis où le niveau de vie des colonisateurs tend à baisser, du moins en Afrique tropicale, par suite de la venue dans ces derniers pays de blancs refoulés par l'appauvrissement de l'Europe. Le Blanc sent sa supériorité menacée: il se raidit.

Dès lors, on peut ainsi définir les conséquences générales de la conquête: dans les pays d'outre-mer il se crée au début de la colonisation une sorte de *no man's land* social où les individus et les collectivités perdent la conscience, qu'ils ont normalement d'exister, sans pour autant s'agréger à leurs conquérants. Mais, quelque inférieur que soit leur degré de civilisation, il n'en apparaît pas moins très tôt une sorte de sentiment difficile à définir, qui tient à la fois de la résignation et du ressentiment. Les colonisés savent le plus souvent dissimuler ce sentiment, que certains européens ne parviennent jamais à identifier, que d'autres découvrent à une imperceptible intonation de voix.

Il arrive parfois que ce sentiment explose. On dit alors que la fièvre nationaliste s'est abattue sur telle région comme une épidémie de peste. Les médecins savent bien que les épidémies ne se propagent que dans les milieux favorables.

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II.—Dans ce climat particulièrement propice quels sont donc les facteurs immédiats de l'apparition et du progrès du nationalisme?

Il va de soi, que, selon les pays considérés, selon leur évolution et les conditions politiques et économiques dans lesquelles ces pays se trouvent placés, le degré d'efficience de ces facteurs est éminemment variable. Sous cette réserve, c'est précisément en raison de l'extrême variété de présentation des faits essentiels qu'il importe d'établir entre aux les liaisons qui commandent les développements futurs.

Je ferai mienne l'observation de M. Hubert DESCHAMPS, ancien Gouverneur des Colonies:

"On tend à expliquer le nationalisme colonial non pas objectivement, mais d'après les slogans des partis. Pour l'opinion de droite, les nationalismes coloniaux sont le résultat de l'instruction donnée aux indigènes et de la propagande communiste. Pour l'opinion marxiste, les nationalismes coloniaux représentent la lutte du prolétariat de couleur contre l'impérialisme capitaliste".

Ces jugements, parce que simplistes, sont les plus communément admis: ils ignorent délibérément la cause la plus générale: celle qui tient au progrès technique et économique.

Il y a quelques mois on a lancé dans divers milieux l'idée des Etats-Unis d'Afrique. Il est symptomatique qu'une formule de cet ordre—si utopiste qu'elle paraisse—ait pu voir le jour. Qu'en auraient pensé les premiers explorateurs modernes qui n'avaient pas des moyens de pénétration très supérieurs à ceux dont disposaient les contemporains de Ptolémée?

Il y aurait un parallèle intéressant à établir entre les phases d'instauration des moyens de communication de l'homme et de la pensée et les étapes de la prise de conscience des groupements ethniques. En Afrique tropicale et équatoriale l'ère du chemin de fer et de la piste correspond à l'apparition de groupements humains nouveaux à l'intérieur de frontières politiques ou administratives le plus souvent artificielles. C'est le chemin de fer, le long duquel cheminent le télégraphe et le téléphone et auquel les pistes aboutissent, qui a fait naître une certaine homogénéité entre les innombrables tribus de la Côte d'Ivoire ou entre les quatre groupements principaux de la Guinée Française. Le cas de la ligne Abidjan—Bobodioulasso ou de la ligne Konakry—Kankan se retrouve un peu partout. Il est caractéristique d'une époque comprise entre 1880 et 1930 environ. Depuis une vingtaine d'années au plus et surtout depuis la dernière guerre mondiale, l'avion, la T.S.F., le camion automobile, la route goudronnée succédant à la piste, contribuent à établir des liens nouveaux qui dépassent les frontières administratives ou politiques et permettent de découvrir des affinités de race ou de culture le plus souvent insoupçonnées jusque là. Il n'est pas jusqu'au panislamisme qui ne doive à la radiodiffusion—en particulier aux émissions du Caire—et au cinématographe d'expression arabe, un concours des plus efficaces. Depuis peu de temps, l'avion a rapproché singulièrement non seulement Karachi du Caire, mais de Batavia et de Fez et même de Dakar.

Ces considérations peuvent sembler primaires: elles n'en sont pas moins de la plus haute importance car elles montrent que la politique la plus raciste—celle-là même qui tendrait à confiner les indigènes dans l'ignorance et dans la seule pratique des activités et des coutumes ancestrales—serait vouée à la longue à l'échec car il n'appartient pas à un Gouvernement quel qu'il soit d'enrayer le progrès technique.

Celui-ci entraîne d'ailleurs avec plus ou moins de retard le progrès économique. Quelles que soient les précautions du colonisateur, il ne peut dans la mesure où l'économie du pays a besoin ne serait-ce que des bras des indigènes, empêcher qu'une parcelle du revenu créé reste entre les mains de ces derniers.

En fait, en Gold Coast, au Nigéria comme en Afrique Occidentale française ou en Algérie, on assiste à l'apparition de nouvelles couches sociales.

D'une part, le sous-prolétariat local tend à se transformer en prolétariat conscient et organisé: c'est le cas en Tunisie et en Algérie où les syndicats locaux ont eu une quinzaine d'années acquis une force considérable. D'autre part, un moyen

et un haut commerce indigène se forment, à côté de ceux que détiennent les colonisateurs ou les éléments—tels les Grecs, Syriens ou Libanais de la Côte occidentale d'Afrique—qui sont venus à la suite des colonisateurs. D'importants transferts de fortune s'effectuent à l'heure actuelle au Maroc au profit des marocains. Dans toute l'Afrique du Nord sous contrôle français, la puissance du capitalisme tend à passer aux mains des autochtones et cela est vrai également du capitalisme foncier: les Arabes, après avoir fait fortune dans le négoce rachètent peu à peu les terres dont leurs ancêtres ont été dépossédés.

Une élite surgit ainsi dont le colonisateur n'est qu'indirectement responsable, mais une élite qui a au moins autant d'importance pour l'avenir du groupe que celle née des écoles, l'une et l'autre se rejoignant mais ne se confondant pas. Je pense notamment à telle personnalité musulmane dont l'influence est considérable dans les milieux d'affaires algériens sans être négligeable dans les cercles politiques, et qui jamais n'a reçu une instruction quelconque même élémentaire.

Cette observation n'est pas non plus dépourvue d'importance en ce sens qu'elle permet de saisir ce que l'on pourrait appeler la génération spontanée des élites du salariat ou du négoce par l'effet naturel du progrès économique.

Dans le même temps les écoles, même si elles ne sont qu'en petit nombre, parviennent à former en Afrique Noire des instituteurs, des infirmiers, des médecins africains, de petits fonctionnaires; en Afrique Blanche, des instituteurs, des médecins, des pharmaciens, des avocats, des fonctionnaires, parfois quelques professeurs ou ingénieurs. Les uns et les autres représentent les éléments de la société indigène les plus mal accueillis par le colonisateur local. Jules FERRY a noté non sans étonnement il y a 3/4 de siècle:

"Le cri d'indignation universelle qui a accueilli d'un bout à l'autre de l'Algérie les projets d'écoles indigènes que le Parlement français a pris à coeur. . . . Les colons n'ont pas de vues générales sur la conduite à tenir avec les indigènes. Ils ne comprennent guère vis-à-vis de ces trois millions d'hommes d'autre politique que la compression".

En fait, les autorités françaises n'ont pas pratiqué par la suite avec autant de rigueur, que le laisse supposer Jules FERRY, une politique de compression encore qu'à peine 1/10ème des enfants musulmans étaient scolarisés en Afrique en 1946.

Le plus grave c'est qu'au fur et à mesure que ces cadres autochtones apparaissent dans l'administration ou les affaires ils sentent croître chez le colonisateur une sorte de sentiment de crainte justifiant ou ayant l'air de justifier des mesures d'autodéfense, dont il est facile de deviner quels peuvent être les chocs en retour.

C'est à ce stade de l'évolution—celui où la société indigène se trouve être dotée d'une intelligenzia issue des écoles ou du négoce—qu'interviennent, comme un facteur et non des moindres, les conceptions démocratiques en honneur dans les métropoles. Ce stade est déjà atteint en Afrique du Nord vers 1936; il ne l'est qu'une dizaine d'années plus tard dans le majeure partie de l'Afrique tropicale; il ne semble pas encore l'être dans le bassin du Congo.

Les hommes, sous toutes les latitudes, sont accoutumés à ne retenir dans les doctrines qu'ils adoptent que ce qui est susceptible de leur être utile. Dans l'idéal démocratique de la France, les Algériens, qui en 1936 applaudissaient le projet BLUM-VIOLLETTE destiné à leur conférer le statut de citoyen français, voyaient essentiellement le moyen de réaliser l'égalité de droit et par conséquent de traitement avec le colonisateur. L'adoption de ce statut n'impliquait nullement que les relations à l'intérieur de la société musulmane puissent être modifiées conformément aux principes démocratiques.

C'est exclusivement dans ce sens, que la Déclaration des Droits de l'Homme a joué, c'est-à-dire, qu'elle a influé sur les relations entre les métropoles et les pays d'outre-mer, comme au siècle dernier entre la Sublime Porte et les chrétiens des Balkans. L'histoire des cent dernières années nous enseigne que ces derniers ont eu eux-mêmes beaucoup de peine à s'adapter aux conceptions de la démocratie.

Celles-ci apparaissent donc pour les populations d'outre-mer beaucoup plus comme un moyen d'émancipation vis-à-vis du colonisateur que comme des principes à usage interne. En sorte qu'il suffit que ces idées, même réduites à quelques symboles, même dépourvues de moyens d'expression, trouvent des esprits en état de réceptivité pour que s'accroisse aussitôt la force des mouvements nationalistes.

On a beaucoup reproché à la France d'avoir instauré en Afrique Noire des assemblées élues et d'y avoir permis l'élection de parlementaries. Pourtant le nationalisme est beaucoup plus développé en Gold Coast où ces institutions n'existent pas jusqu'ici. C'est dire que les ferments nationalistes n'ont pas besoin pour se développer de l'existence de tout un appareil démocratique: c'est plutôt le contraire, ainsi qu'il apparaitra plus loin.

Qu'il suffise ici de marquer que la revendication de la démocratie réside essentiellement outre-mer dans la recherche de l'égalité soit avec l'homme colonisateur, soit même par rapport à la Métropole tout entière, quand il s'agit de groupements où les élites sont puissantes. Cette considération explique pourquoi les Noirs se révèlent assez perméables à la propagande du communisme stalinien, présenté uniquement comme un moyen d'affranchissement vis-à-vis des métropoles, en dehors de la lutte des classes, ce qui permet par exemple, au parti communiste, de faire fond sur des chefs indigènes, vrais aristocrates qui eussent été les premières victimes d'un marxisme authentique.

En Afrique du Nord, où la maturité politique est plus grande, l'influence du stalinisme est restée faible même chez les esprits ayant échappé à l'Islam. Les dirigeants arabo-berbères, après une période d'hésitation où ils crurent trouver, dans une assimilation totale avec la démocratie française, la solution au problème de l'égalité, sont venus directement au nationalisme. A peine quelques uns d'entre eux en Algérie ont-ils été tentés par le communisme stalinien et à un moment seulement. Les démissions ou épurations, la chute verticale des effectifs constatés au sein du parti communiste algérien sont la preuve du reflux.

Cette conception de la liberté par rapport au colonisateur, conception qui absorbe tout entière l'idéal démocratique chez les colonisés, se trouve encore renforcée de nos jours par la conjoncture internationale.

Une égale impuissance à résoudre le problème de la paix et de la guerre tend à confondre aux yeux de l'opinion publique la S.D.N. et l'O.N.U. Il existe pourtant une différence essentielle entre ces deux organismes en ce qui concerne l'équilibre des nations participantes: c'est la formation au sein de l'O.N.U. d'une sorte de coalition des puissances anti-coloniales, dont l'Inde, la Pakistan et le Mexique ont pris la tête, au moment précis où la suprématie des Etats Unis, sentimentalement anticolonialistes, les dispense de ménager comme avant-guerre la Grande Bretagne ou la France.

Par l'action permanente du Conseil de Tutelle ou par l'effet des décisions prises par l'Assemblée, l'O.N.U. tend, sans peut être s'en douter, à conférer au nationalisme colonial un caractère en quelque sorte international, s'il est permis sans paradoxe d'associer ainsi deux vocables antinomiques.

Pour comprendre ce phénomène singulier, il convient de se remémorer certains évènements qui ont marqué profondément au cours du dernier conflit les zones d'Afrique et d'Asie soumises au contrôle européen. Il a été rappelé plus haut le rôle considérable du progrés technique aboutissant à un véritable brassage des populations, voire à la constitution de groupements humains nouveaux ou au rapprochement des anciens. Que doit-on dire alors de l'influence que l'armée nippone a pu exercer sur les territoires de la Grande Asie, qu'elle a successivement occupés, ou des armées anglaises libérant les Etats du Levant ou Madagascar; ou des troupes américaines débarquant en Afrique du Nord et en Afrique Occidentale? Les Japonais excitaient la haine du Blanc et nous leur devons les conflits sanglants de l'Indochine, de l'Indonésie, de la Malaisie et de la Birmanie; les Britanniques, sans pour autant témoigner d'intentions malveillantes à l'égard de la France, apportaient avec eux des conceptions coloniales très différentes des méthodes françaises de l'assimilation; les Américains, eux, et de très bonne foi, croyaient que l'ére de la colonisation était définitivement close. Les uns et les autres contribuaient à rendre plus difficile la recherche dans les cadres nationaux de solutions aux conflits nés de la conquête et de l'occupation coloniales.

Dès lors à partir de 1943, la propagation des idées démocratiques, l'action des partis socialistes et communistes métropolitains contribuent de moins en moins à la formation des mouvements nationalistes outre-mer tandis que s'accroît l'influence de certains facteurs d'ordre international. Les peuples d'outre-mer parviennent avec plus ou moins de netteté à considérer qu'ils sont solidaires les uns des autres, quelles que soient les frontières qui les séparent. Leur solidarité s'établit en fonction de leurs affinités de race, de religion ou de culture. On se préoccupe beaucoup moins en Algérie du rôle des parlementaires musulmans que des développements de la puissance de la Ligue Arabe et des liens de cette dernière avec l'un des deux Grands ou avec l'O.N.U. La décision de cette dernière en

faveur de l'indépendance du Fezzan a fait naître un espoir immense au coeur des Tunisiens et des Marocains. Depuis deux ans déjà, des contacts sont établis entre nationalistes de l'Afrique Noire française et britannique. Quant aux partis communistes de l'Afrique Noire (Nigeria ou Côte d'Ivoire), ils éprouvent depuis un an déjà le besoin d'afficher leurs liaisons avec la Russie soviétique, considérée beaucoup plus comme un gage de puissance, que comme l'idéal de l'Etat futur.

L'apparition entre peuples et nations colonisés, d'une solidarité—ou son renforcement—étayée par la solidarité au sein de l'O.N.U. entre puissances jadis colonisées, et par l'appui moral des Etats Unis, dont l'expansion économique s'accommode mal en Afrique et en Asie des entraves politiques dues aux métropoles européennes, tend à transposer sur le plan international les mouvements nationalistes outre mer qui jusqu'ici exerçaient leur action à l'intérieur de l'Etat colonisateur. Cette situation n'est pas sans analogie avec celle née dans les Balkans au siècle dernier.

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III.—L'analyse poursuivie jusqu'ici, qui s'est attachée à la définition tant des facteurs de désagrégation des sociétés coloniales que des causes tendant au regroupement des collectivités indigènes pourrait laisser entendre que les manifestations du nationalisme sont partout les mêmes, quelles que soient les circonstances de temps et de lieu. Elles sont au contraire des plus variées allant de la recherche de l'égalité de traitement à la revendication de l'indépendance en passant par celle de l'autonomie, ces trois phases pouvant se succéder en peu de temps, l'une d'entre elles pouvant ne jamais apparaître, ou toutes les trois étant au contraire susceptibles de coexister dans un même pays, chacune correspondant à une fraction de l'opinion publique.

Les quinze dernières années de l'histoire de l'Algérie offrent une vue panoramique de toutes les formes que peut revêtir un nationalisme encore à ses débuts. En 1936 l'immense majorité des élites musulmanes est favorable à une politique d'assimilation intégrale qui aurait fait de tous les Algériens sans distinction ethnique des citoyens français complets comme ceux de n'importe quel département métropolitain. Seule une minorité groupée autour de MESSALI HADJ revendique un statut d'autonomie. On sait qu'il ne fut pas fait droit aux exigences de la majorité et que le projet BLUM-VIOLETTE ne fut pas retenu. Aussi dès 1943, la première étape est-elle franchie: les personnalités musulmanes, dans leur quasi-totalité, y compris l'actuel président de l'Assemblée Algérienne SAYAH Abdelkader, signent le manifeste qui demande la création d'une République algérienne fédérée à la République Française. MESSALI HADJ et le P.P.A. (Parti Populaire Algérien) exigent alors l'indépendance pure et simple. Deux ans plus tard les émeutes de Sétif et de Guelma, suivies de l'inévitable répression policière, dressent l'un contre l'autre les deux groupes de populations et écartent peut être définitivement toute faculté de compromis. A l'heure actuelle, à part quelques éléments ralliés sincèrement ou

en apparence au maintien du statu quo, les élites hésitent entre la formule du fédéralisme et celle de l'indépendance à conquérir si nécessaire par la force.

L'Algérie est sans doute le cas le plus complexe de ceux qu'offre l'Union Française, les facteurs les plus divers y ayant exercé des influences parfois contradictoires. A l'origine la conquête y a été particulièrement brutale et l'occupation plus étendue que partout ailleurs. En 1946, 14,600 européens possédaient 8,500,000 hectares (moyenne de 50 Ha) et 297,400 musulmans 1,435,000 Ha, soit une moyenne d'un peu plus de 4 Ha par propriétaire musulman. Dans cette colonie de peuplement où les meilleures terres ne pouvaient être laissées aux indigènes, qui d'ailleurs ne savaient guère les faire fructifier, il ne pouvait être question non plus de laisser en place les pouvoirs établis (malgré les idées de Napoléon III sur le royaume arabe).

L'administration directe et la dépossession des familles de grande tente ont abouti à une désagrégation presque complète de la société arabo-berbère tandis que se développait une immigration française et espagnole des plus entreprenantes accédant rapidement à une puissance économique et financière considérable. Le déséquilibre entre les deux sociétés juxtaposées, que l'Islam ne tend pas à rapprocher, atteint ainsi un rare degré d'acuité.

Toutefois la colonisation française, si elle n'a guère ménagé les anciens cadres, sauf en les fonctionnarisant, a respecté les fondements de la société islamique qui a pu ainsi survivre, renaître peu à peu de ses cendres et reprendre contact avec la Tunisie et le Maroc. Les nouvelles élites arabo-berbères beaucoup plus dégagées du passé que celles des protectorats voisins ont pris conscience de leur originalité. A l'exception de quelques exaltés, leur nationalisme est plutôt algérien que nord-africain. Ce qui n'implique pas le moins du monde qu'il s'accommode mieux que celui de la Régence de la présence française. Je dirais même au contraire: plus la colonisation a été intense, plus grand est le ressentiment chez l'indigène, plus difficile à combler le fossé entre les deux groupes. C'est là que réside le drame des trois départements français de l'Afrique du Nord, où seuls les colons français jouissent de l'intégralité des droits politiques du citoyen, où ces colons ne permettront jamais que les arabo-berbères accèdent à cette intégralité et où ceux-ci prendront de plus en plus conscience à la fois de leur originalité nationale et de leur solidarité avec les autres peuples dépendants. Si les formules pourtant souples de l'Union Française ne s'avèrent pas efficaces, la solution du conflit latent n'interviendra qu'à l'occasion d'évènements à caractère international.

Les pays de l'Afrique Noire française tropicale et centrale n'offrent pas de situation aussi complexe mais permettent peut-être mieux de saisir le mécanisme de l'éclosion d'un nationalisme qui le plus souvent s'ignore encore.

Dans ces territoires, la colonisation française n'a pas tendu au peuplement mais seulement à l'exploitation et au commerce de certaines ressources agricoles, héritières des épices du temps jadis. Elle n'a donc pas dépossédé, sur une grande échelle, les autochtones d'autant plus que ceux-ci n'avaient généralement pas une

conception très précise du droit de propriété foncière considéré le plus souvent comme un simple droit d'usage. Sauf quelques rares exceptions, les transferts d'autorité se sont effectués sans heurts, même de l'autorité religieuse puisque le christianisme des colonisateurs s'est implanté solidement dans toute la zone fétichiste. La civilisation rudimentaire de l'Afrique Noire n'a pas tendu à se cristalliser dans ses formes primitives mais plutôt à assimiler celle des conquérants suivant la formule célèbre: "assimiler et non être assimilés". La structure sociale ancestrale s'est peu à peu effondrée et cette évolution n'est pas encore terminée partout, tandis que des structures nouvelles surgissent qui s'adaptent à des groupements nouveaux nés du progrès technique et économique et de l'action administrative. Il importe de noter ici le rôle que les coopératives africaines jouent dans la prise de conscience nationale des populations africaines. En effet, ces coopératives permettent de redistribuer aux autochtones le profit qui primitivement était accaparé par les seuls traitants: elles contribuent donc à rehausser le niveau de vie des masses rurales et à permettre aux meilleurs éléments de se dégager d'un sous-prolétariat jusqu'ici misérable. Elles servent également d'école pratique pour la gestion des entreprises à une multitude d'Africains qui participent de près ou de loin à leur direction. Enfin, elles créent des courants d'échanges nouveaux, par la nécessité où elles se trouvent de s'unir dans des ententes régionales, plus ou moins vastes. Ainsi, les coopératives contribuent grandement à la formation des élites économiques; cette observation est particulièrement valable au Sénégal, au Cameroun et en Côte d'Ivoire.

Dès lors la première revendication de ces populations est celle de l'égalité des droits, telle que la constitution française de 1946 l'a définie en conclusion de son préambule:

La France . . . "écartant tout système de colonisation fondé sur l'arbitraire, garantit à tous l'égal accès aux fonctions publiques et l'exercice individuel ou collectif des droits et libertés proclamés ou confirmés ci-dessus".

Ces derniers mots se réfèrent à l'égalité des droits et des devoirs, sans distinction de race ni de religion.

Dès lors, ce que les Africains exigent aujourd'hui comme hier les Algériens, c'est l'égalité du citoyen français d'Afrique avec le citoyen français de la métropole. Ce n'est pas l'égalité du groupe auquel il appartient avec la métropole et par conséquent un statut d'autonomie pour ce groupe, c'est l'égalité des citoyens, c'est-à-dire des personnes. Sur le plan politique, le vote par un collège unique, sans distinction d'origine ethnique, sur le plan économique et social, l'application des lois sociales métropolitaines et par conséquent, la suppression de tout ce qui rappelle le travail forcé et le pacte colonial; sur le plan administratif, l'égalité de traitement de tous les fonctionnaires et de tous les anciens combattants quelle que soit leur appartenance raciale: tels sont pratiquement les objectifs précis que renferme la notion de revendication de l'égalité des droits, notion qui aux colonies est essentiellement française.

On peut dire que partout, où les desiderata qui viennent d'être exprimés ont pu être satisfaits à temps et dans une assez large mesure, le nationalisme est resté à ce premier stade. Il y a eu fusion entre le peuple colonisé et le colonisateur. C'est le cas des Antilles et du Sénégal où les autochtones jouissent pratiquement de toutes les libertés, administrant leurs communes, occupant la quasi-totalité des sièges du Conseil Général, la totalité des sièges parlementaires qui sont réservés à leur territoire.

La Côte d'Ivoire et le Cameroun, où les phénomènes ci-dessus décrits d'enrichissement économique et culturel (le rôle des missions catholiques et protestantes est considérable dans le Cameroun occidental et méridional) sont de date beaucoup plus récente, et où la France n'a pas encore introduit les libertés municipales ni le collège unique dans toutes les élections, une évolution rapide s'observe vers la revendication de l'autonomie. Les formules du fédéralisme y gagnent de plus en plus en prestige. Si l'égalité n'est pas introduite rapidement dans ces pays, le nationalisme y fera son apparition officielle à brève échéance, comme c'est déjà le cas au Togo français.

C'est aussi le cas dans l'Ouest Africain britannique depuis le lendemain de la guerre. Peut être l'autonomisme ne se serait-il pas développé en Gold Coast et au Nigeria à cette cadence, si les anciens combattants y avaient été traités avec plus de soin. Le Gouvernement britannique comme le Gouvernement français dans les territoires voisins ne s'est pas suffisamment préoccupé du droit à l'égalité de traitement que ces soldats avaient conquis de leur sang sur les champs de bataille du monde entier. Le développement économique rapide de ces pays y a, là comme en Afrique française, donné naissance à des élites dignes d'intérêt. Une politique d'assimilation, pratiquée à temps, eût probablement satisfait ces élites, comme au Sénégal, mais la politique coloniale britannique, qui correspond parfaitement à l'attitude des planteurs et négociants anglais, tend à la reconnaissance de la liberté des groupes ethniques en tant que groupes ethniques plutôt qu'à l'intégration dans la nation britannique d'éléments hétérogènes. Elle est en un mot, outre-mer comme dans la métropole, fédéraliste alors que la politique française est en Europe comme partout dans le monde à tendance centralisatrice. Elle ne pouvait donc laisser d'autre choix aux élites de la Gold Coast et du Nigeria, comme de la Côte Orientale d'Afrique, qu'entre une relative autonomie, le statut de dominion ou l'indépendance pure et simple. Ces considérations expliquent à mon sens la récente évolution de ces deux territoires.

La situation politique au Congo belge pourrait être de nature à infirmer ce caractère de généralité du mouvement des nationalités que j'ai particulièrement tenu à dégager. On n'observe pas dans cette région d'indices sérieux d'une revendication politique ou syndicale quelconque: elle est pourtant l'une des plus prospères d'Afrique et le nombre des enfants scolarisés par les missions chrétiennes n'y est pas négligeable. A mon sens, le Congo en est encore à la phase de désagrégation de la société indigène, désagrégation d'autant plus complète qu'elle a été

l'oeuvre d'une administration qui pendant de longues années fut en fait celle des compagnies à charte. Les facteurs de regroupement n'ont pu s'exercer que très imparfaitement: la densité de la forêt équatoriale s'est opposée à la pénétration de zones immenses; le progrès économique dû à quelques sociétés, qui ont eu longtemps tous les monopoles, n'a laissé qu'une part infime du profit entre les mains des autochtones. Les coopératives indigènes dirigées par des indigènes, sont pratiquement inexistantes. Enfin l'enseignement diffusé semble strictement limité au premier degré. Ces causes ont certainement entravé l'apparition des élites au Congo.

Rien ne prouve que le jour venu ces élites ne réclament un statut qui, par comparaison avec les territoires voisins, leur permettrait si l'on peut dire de rattraper le temps perdu. Le gouvernement belge, qui en raison du faible chiffre de la population métropolitaine peut difficilement accepter les solutions politiques de l'assimilation, se trouvera à brève échéance dans une position des plus délicates.

L'examen de certains cas particuliers, de ceux précisément où l'on assiste à la génération du nationalisme, dispense de rechercher les caractères particuliers qu'il peut revêtir dans les anciennes nations colonisées. Il s'agit moins alors des incidences de la colonisation que des variations dans les rapports de fait pouvant exister entre les conquérants et le peuple conquis, rapports éminemment variables suivant les exigences des premiers et les intérêts du second. Ne suffit-il pas de remarquer que les liens du Pakistan et de la Grande Bretagne sont demeurés plus étroits que ceux de l'Inde et de la Grande-Bretagne? On peut discuter à l'infini sur les limites juridiques de l'indépendance de l'Inde au sein du Commonwealth ou du Vietnam au sein de l'Union Française. L'historien notera surtout que la revendication de l'indépendance n'a jamais été absente chez les dirigeants traditionnels ou chez ceux issus du monde moderne. Les uns et les autres en Indochine, en Birmanie, en Indonésie, dans l'Inde ou au Pakistan, n'ont attendu que les circonstances favorables pour agir. Dans ces pays de civilisation ancienne la colonisation européenne aura eu surtout pour effet d'élargir les bases géographiques du nationalisme et d'en préciser la valeur doctrinale. L'Occident a donné à l'Orient sa conception de la nation: les hasards du partage des impérialismes ont rapproché ou éloigné les peuples, fixé des nations au visage nouveau, à l'intérieur de frontières parfois arbitraires. L'empereur actuel du Vietnam hérite ainsi non seulement de la patrie de ses pères l'Annam, et des terres vassales du Tonkin, mais aussi d'une Cochinchine qui fut presque toujours indépendante.

En somme, dans les pays de vieille civilisation qui ont pu résister à l'action dissolvante de la colonisation, les facteurs de regroupement ci-dessus décrits, se sont exercés dans le sens de la consolidation d'aspirations nationales parfois confuses et dans le sens de leur localisation sur un territoire donné. Ils ont également contribué à faire apparaître entre les peuples qui se jugeaient opprimés les liens de solidarité que l'Histoire n'avait jamais connus ou avait depuis longtemps oubliés.

* * *

L'opinion publique ne retient du nationalisme que ses états de crise. Qu'il explose en un point quelconque on crie au scandale, à l'action criminelle de quelques hommes qui ne sont pas toujours directement responsables des évènements. Quelques châtiments exemplaires font croire à ce que l'on appelle le retour de l'ordre et les naïfs ou les ignorants proclament que la fièvre nationaliste est définitivement tombée.

Les historiens savent, les hommes d'Etat devraient comprendre que de tels accidents ne sont que les incidentes d'un mouvement continu et général chez les peuples coloniaux, mouvement qui dépasse de très loin l'action personnelle de quelques chefs de parti ou de clan. Sans doute, les nationalistes sont-ils quelquefois en avance sur leur époque. En vérité, ils sont le plus souvent conduits par la violence d'un courant dont ils sont bien incapables de deviner où il les mène; en quoi ces meneurs de peuples ne diffèrent pas toujours de ceux d'Occident!

On ne peut nier ni l'ampleur ni la généralité du mouvement des nationalités. Son action peut, sous certains cieux, être retardée, ses modes d'expression peuvent varier d'une terre à l'autre, il n'en existe pas moins et le seul fait de son existence soulève un certain nombre de difficultés, qu'il me suffira ici d'énoncer.

Le nationalisme aux colonies pose d'abord le problème de la survivance des empires.

Avec leur habituel réalisme, s'adaptant à chaque circonstance et sans s'embarrasser de définitions juridiques préalablement établies, les Britanniques règlent l'un après l'autre le sort de chaque territoire où se manifeste une conscience nationale qui peut n'être même qu'un vague sentiment d'originalité. Dès aujourd'hui la Gambie et la Gold Coast ne sont pas soumises au même régime, pas plus que Colombo et l'Inde. Au contraire, fidèles jusqu'à l'absurde au fétichisme du droit écrit hérité de Rome, les Français s'efforcent à grand peine de canaliser les revendications des colonisés dans le cadre quelque peu arbitraire de leur constitution. Il n'en est que plus remarquable de constater que partant de conceptions opposées et usant de méthodes très différentes les responsables de la politique d'outre-mer aboutissent à Londres et à Paris à des solutions voisines très fortement imprégnées de fédéralisme. Le Commonwealth est une confédération très souple; l'Union Française, entre les Etats Associés d'Indochine et la métropole tend également à n'être qu'une confédération. La République Française elle-même est à la fois centralisée (présence de députés africains au Parlement) et fédérale (existence d'une Assemblée consultative de l'Union Française fondée sur une représentation paritaire de la métropole et des pays d'outre-mer), son évolution l'entraîne vers une accentuation de ce deuxième caractère.

Qu'est-ce à dire si ce n'est que la naissance et le développement du nationalisme colonial poussent les métropoles à modifier la structure étatique de leurs empires. Les Européens tentent de neutraliser les forces de dissociation par le recours à des formules fédéralistes c'est-à-dire de synthèse entre la cohésion de l'ensemble et la liberté du groupe.

Si bien que la solution apportée au problème interne propre à chaque

Empire, rejoint celle qu'appelle le problème international soulevé par la conjonction dans le monde des nationalismes coloniaux.

Il ne suffit pas d'observer que sous les auspices de l'O.N.U., le nationalisme colonial trouve un appui considérable auprès des ex-puissances colonisées, les Etats de l'Amérique Latine, les Dominions de couleur, les Etats du Proche Orient, voire les Etats Unis ou pour des raisons particulières les Etats de l'Est Européen.

Il convient surtout de noter que cette attirance modifie profondément les caractères de la revendication des peuples d'outre-mer de même que la politique des puissances ex-colonisées. La première n'était au fond que l'expression de la volonté de vivre de Groupe, une volonté tournée vers la défense du Groupe et toujours prête à s'accommoder d'un modus vivendi entre le Groupe et la Métropole, donc d'une solution interne. De même l'attitude des Etats devenus indépendants était elle jusqu'ici purement pacifique. L'établissement d'une sorte de front commun entre ces derniers et les peuples dépendants place les uns et les autres sur le terrain de l'offensive. Il en résulte au moins cette conséquence que les solutions de force gagnent en faveur dans tous les camps: les élites d'outre-mer ont de plus en plus tendance à miser sur un conflit mondial pour secouer leur joug; les Etats ex-colonisés comptent sur on ne sait quels bouleversements pour asseoir leur influence sur d'éventuels vassaux, telle la Ligue Arabe vis-à-vis de l'Afrique du Nord française; enfin les minorités européennes outre-mer se raidissent dans leurs relations avec les masses indigènes et pour ne citer que celles de la Rhodésie, de Madagascar ou même du Congo Belge caressent parfois le rêve d'une fédération les unissant à l'Afrique de Sud et fondée sur l'hégémonie incontestée du Blanc.

Certes ces vues, fondées seulement sur des indices ne sont pas encore d'actualité. Elles n'en méritent pas moins, au moment où s'ébauchent les groupements internationaux les plus variés, de retenir l'attention des gouvernants qui n'aimeraient pas être pris au dépourvu.

Il s'agit, en un mot, de faire sa place au nationalisme colonial dans l'organisation des Empires d'abord, du Monde ensuite, à moins que cette double entreprise doive être menée simultanément.

Peut-être les nations colonisatrices, surtout celles qui utilisèrent les indigènes sur les champs de bataille de la dernière guerre, méritent-elles ce jugement sévère que Machiavel réservait aux seuls Français:

"Les Français sont des plus humbles dans la mauvaise fortune et fort insolents dans la bonne. Ils sont légers, changeants et gardent leur parole comme la garde un vainqueur".

Il appartient aux métropoles de renoncer à se comporter en vainqueur vis-à-vis des peuples d'outre-mer qui s'éveillent à la vie.

Les techniciens sont parvenus à transformer des torrents dévastateurs en sources d'énergie et de lumière; les gouvernants se révèleront-ils incapables de mettre au service du progrès de la condition humaine l'un des courants les plus puissants de l'histoire contemporaine: le nationalisme colonial?

Summary

The Birth of Colonial Nationalism

THE appearance of nationalism in the Balkans in the nineteenth century, treated as an accident of history, marked the beginning of a new phase in world history. Turkish disruption of ancestral society led to movements based on true or romantic national pasts, favoured by Europe as the freeing of Christians from infidel rule, which set up states without realization of identity between political and ethnical or cultural frontiers. But the surge of nationalism under still greater disruption of conditions of life among dependent peoples in Africa and Asia has not been viewed with the same favour. Yet conquest and colonization break down native societies and new societies grow up on a different national basis. As Europeans, we distinguish arbitrarily between claims for equality, for self-government and for independence, which are only successive phases of one and the same movement.

I. The new social order that grows up to replace a disrupted native society neither respects nor perpetuates the social, religious, political or cultural prerogatives of the past. Disruption is relatively more marked in colonies of settlement (owing to land transfers and changed economic values) than in exploitation colonies. With few exceptions, colonizers and colonized keep apart and the gulf between them is widening because the colonizers, faced with an influx of whites from impoverished Europe, feel compelled to defend their threatened superiority by closing their ranks. When native resentment (coupled hitherto with resignation) flares up, another region is said to be suffering from an epidemic of nationalistic fever; but epidemics only occur in favourable conditions.

II. The most general cause of nationalism is technical and economic progress: there is a link between improved communications and awareness to ethnical affinities. Technical progress cannot be checked, natives cannot be kept to ancestral ways of life; economic progress must come, new strata of society emerge: an *élite* of wage-earners and traders takes its place beside the *élite* formed in the schools and universities (teachers, doctors, lawyers, engineers, civil servants). The mother country's democratic ideals are taken up in so far as they prove useful (equality of status has not altered relations within Mohammedan society in Algeria) as a means of emancipation. Communism as a force for liberation has had more success in Tropical Africa than in North Africa where the formation of an autonomous national party gained more support and almost eliminated it.

The idea of freedom in relation to the colonizer finds support in the present international situation and the formation of an anti-colonial group backed by the U.S.A. gives colonial nationalism an international character. And further, the

impact of the Japanese armies in the Far East, of the Americans in North and West Africa, of the British in Madagascar and the Levant, all willingly or not imparting new ideas, has made the colonial problem more difficult to solve. And other international factors thus intervene: solidarity of race, religion and culture, backed by U.N. solidarity among former colonized powers and by U.S. moral support against political fetters to economic expansion (cf. Europe in Balkans v. Turkey).

III. Manifestations of nationalism vary greatly in form and mode: Claims for equality, for self-government, for independence, may be successive or simultaneous. In Algeria all three are present and the situation is complicated by a European colonization hostile to native aspirations; in Tropical Africa, in exploitation colonies, technical and economic progress, administrative action and the co-operatives have produced an economic *élite* whose demands for equality for the French African citizen with the French citizen have reached the individual basis from the political and administrative point of view.

Where demands for equality are satisfied, nationalism stops there; where they are not, demands for self-government quickly follow (Ivory Coast, Cameroons). In British West Africa where policy tends towards liberty of ethnical groups, the alternatives of relative autonomy, dominion status or independence seem the only possibilities.

In the Belgian Congo the stage of disintegration of native society has hardly been passed, but limitations imposed by colonial policy may eventually create a very delicate situation.

In older nations that have been colonized (India, Vietnam) claims to independence have never been dropped and colonization has only widened their basis by giving the Western concept of nationhood to imperialistic units (*e.g.* the Annamese claim to Cochin-China) and strengthened them by bonds between peoples who believe themselves to be oppressed.

IV. Nationalistic outbursts are manifestations of a world-wide and constant movement among colonial peoples whose leaders are carried along by the current. Its modes of expression are varied, its existence raises a number of problems:

1. French rationalism and British empiricism reach, by different ways, solutions bordering on federalism which are akin. The British Commonwealth, the Franco-Indo-Chinese Union and the centralized yet federal French Republic all tend in that direction. To save their empires, Europeans are attempting a synthesis between cohesion of the whole and freedom of the group, a solution akin to that called for by the international problem of colonial nationalisms.

2. Support by formerly colonized powers for colonial nationalism has profoundly modified the character of claims by overseas peoples as well as of the policy of these powers, placing them on the offensive and favouring solutions by force as well as speculations on world upheaval (as, for example, the Arab League in its desire to take over French North Africa).

3. European minorities overseas are hardening their attitude to natives and thinking of solutions founded on white hegemony, such as federation between Rhodesia, the Congo, Madagascar and the Union of South Africa.

The problem is to find a place for colonial nationalism first in the organization of empires, then of the world, or of both at the same time. Colonial powers must cease to act as conquerors: Technicians have harnessed destructive torrents; will governments prove incapable of putting colonial nationalism to the service of human progress?

Summary of Discussion

PROFESSOR LOGEMANN emphasized the difference between a people and a nation. The term people might merely imply the existence of a common language, a common culture or a common geographical habitat. A nation meant something more positive. As understood in modern times a nation could not exist in a primitive or in a feudal society. The mere negative repugnance to foreigners was vastly different from nationalism which is active and aggressive. Sometimes nations sought to strengthen their identity by the creation of myths. Thus people in Indonesia now spoke of themselves as belonging to a nation which had never been heard of until its existence in the remote past had been revealed by modern French explorers.

This distinction between people and nation impelled him to inquire into the factors which give substance to nationalism. To-day the nationalists in Indonesia not only claimed the whole of Indonesia but Malaya and British Borneo as well. In fact, a kind of imperialism was developing.

The Dutch hoped that a true federation would emerge between Indonesia and the Netherlands. In the Antilles a form of federalism was already evolving.

Mr GALLAGHER believed (1) To be successful a revolution must have the support or the sympathy of the peasantry which would not be given unless the peasants felt that they were not being exploited. (2) In speaking of the factors influencing colonial nationalism Monsieur Alduy should add (*a*) the dynamic impact of fluctuations in world prices; (*b*) the existence of plantation economies directed by Europeans. (3) Colonial revolutionaries were confronting extraordinary difficulties as they were often required to hold together violently antagonistic groups or individuals and sometimes in seeking the support of one party they were driven so far in a particular direction that they alienated other groups.

Professor MALENGREAU said that the only considerable industrial company in the Congo was the Katanga Mines Company. Education in the Congo had not stopped at the elementary stage. There were secondary schools and a university centre. In the Congo the aim was to create a nation. Thus a citizen from Belgium who settled in the Congo lost his metropolitan rights. The Congo administration

was working for the equality of the Congolese, as a group, with all external groups rather than for equality of individuals.

Professor CAETANO asked: (1) If federalism was a panacea for nationalism Brazil was a unitary state before it became a republic and to-day was a federation only in name. (2) What tariff relations existed between France and her overseas territory? Was there freedom of trade or did customs barriers exist? (3) We had been thinking of the nationalism of indigenous peoples. What about the nationalism of colonists, for example, Brazil, Australia, Canada, etc?

Mr. BAYLEY was impressed by the importance attached by Monsieur Alduy to the understanding of colonial peoples. In his experience the average British administrator was prone to regard manifestations of nationalism as proofs of base ingratitude. People who went out to the colonies should receive prior education on the attitude and feelings of colonial peoples.

Monsieur ALDUY agreed with Professor Logemann about the distinction between a people and a nation but the two were sometimes difficult to disentangle. In the same country you might have a nationalist group which demanded separation and independence and an equally strong group which preferred continued association with the metropolitan power, as in Algeria. Certainly it was true in Africa that if a revolution was to be successful it must have the sympathy of the peasantry but the number of revolutionaries need not be large.

People abroad were not aware of the facts concerning capitalist undertakings in the Congo nor of the educational position there.

As for the choice of equality for the group or the individual, representative government did not prevent association in groups but it did mean loss of representation in the French parliament though there is representation in the Overseas parliament.

If the Belgian Congo was educated to be a nation there was a danger that the Belgian Congo might one day not require Belgium.

For federalism to grow there must be a federal spirit.

The tariff relations between France and her overseas dependencies varied according to the nature of the territories in question and the extent to which particular products had to be defended. Any colonial pact would inevitably be suppressed under O.E.E.C.

La Collaboration entre les Puissances Coloniales

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DANS leur forme actuelle, les divers organismes constitués en vue d'assurer une collaboration entre les nations qui assument des responsabilités de caractère colonial, répondent au voeu de l'art. 73 de la Charte des Nations Unies. Suivant le paragraphe de cette disposition, ces Nations ont en effet accepté de coopérer entre elles en vue d'atteindre effectivement les buts sociaux, économiques et scientifiques, qui s'y trouvent formulés. Cependant cette collaboration a été mise en mouvement bien avant la dernière guerre mondiale. Lorsque leurs administrations respectives ont atteint un certain degré de développement, il se pose nécessairement entre des possessions voisines des problèmes, qui requièrent une action commune. Les épidémies tropicales de même que les épizooties ne connaissent pas de frontière. Elles ne peuvent être efficacement combattues que par l'application d'un programme élaboré par les divers services intéressés. Il en est également ainsi pour ce qui concerne la lutte contre les acridiens. L'activité des juridictions indigènes nécessite également une collaboration entre autorités voisines lorsque ces tribunaux ont à connaître de litiges surgis dans les régions frontières. Ce n'est toutefois qu'au cours de ces dernières années que la coopération entre les puissances coloniales a pris une réelle ampleur. Nous en examinerons successivement les modalités d'application dans la mer des Caraïbes, dans le sud ouest du Pacifique et en Afrique.

Quelques années avant la dernière guerre mondiale des émeutes surgies dans certaines îles des Caraïbes attirèrent l'attention des Gouvernements des Etats Unis et de la Grande Bretagne sur la situation de leurs possessions respectives dans cette région. Le rapport de la " Moyne Commission " révéla que le développement économique des Indes Occidentales britanniques avait été jusque-là entravé par la monoculture. L'industrie sucrière, principale production du pays n'ayant qu'un caractère saisonnier, une grande partie des ouvriers qui, dans certaines îles s'élevait jusqu'à 31 per cent., était condamnée à un chômage permanent. D'autre part, le régime des bas salaires maintenait la population à un niveau social extrêmement bas. Les conditions de logement étaient déplorables et favorisaient l'immoralité. La proportion des naissances illégitimes était de 60 per cent. voire même de 70 per cent. Une infériorité manifeste de la formation professionnelle pouvait être relevée aussi bien chez les artisans que chez les agriculteurs. L'érosion du sol se présentait sous l'aspect le plus menaçant. Enfin la surpopulation de certaines

régions et l'insuffisance des communications entre les diverses îles venait encore aggraver cette situation critique. Des enquêtes menées par le Gouvernement des Etats Unis révèlèrent des situations similaires à Porto Rico et aux Iles Vierges. La guerre amena les deux Gouvernements intéressés à entreprendre une action immédiate pour remédier dans une certaine mesure à cet état de choses. En mars 1942 la Commission anglo-américaine des Caraïbes fut instituée.

Elle avait pour but d'éviter les doubles emplois relativement aux études concernant les diverses questions, qui faisaient l'objet de ses travaux. Sa compétence s'étendait à la main d'oeuvre, à l'agriculture, au logement, à l'hygiène, à l'instruction, le progrès social, la vie économique et toutes les matières connexes. La commission organisa immédiatement le ravitaillement en vivres des possessions britanniques et américaines et organisa un pool des schooners. Elle entreprit également une lutte énergique contre la diffusion des maladies vénériennes. D'autre part elle institua un conseil des recherches des Caraïbes composé de spécialistes de l'agriculture, de l'alimentation et de l'hygiène. Afin d'associer plus directement les populations aux travaux de la commission, des représentants des susdites possessions furent réunis en une conférence. Ce fut la conférence des Indes Occidentales qui tint sa première session dans les îles Barbades au mois de mars 1944. En 1945 la composition de la commission fut élargie, la France et les Pays Bas ayant accepté d'en faire partie. Désormais son action s'étend aux territoires suivants: Possessions Britanniques: les îles Bahama, Barbades, Jamaïque, Leeward, Trinité, Windward, ainsi que le Honduras et la Guyane. Possessions des Etats Unis: Porto Rico et les îles Vierges. Possessions Françaises: La Guadeloupe, la Martinique et la Guyane. Possessions des Pays Bas: Curaçao et Surinam. Ces divers territoires groupent une population d'environ 6,000,000 d'habitants. Une convention intervenue à Washington le 30 octobre 1946 donna à la commission son statut définitif. Celle-ci a pour objet d'encourager la coopération entre les puissances intéressées et les administrations locales dans le but d'améliorer les conditions économiques et sociales des habitants de ces territoires, d'éviter les doubles emplois dans la recherche scientifique et de faciliter les recherches en commun. La commission est un organisme purement consultatif dans lequel chacune des puissances intéressées est représentée par quatre délégués. Son rôle est de proposer dans le domaine des questions économiques et sociales des programmes d'action aux diverses administrations locales et de collaborer à la coordination de leurs projets respectifs. La commission est assistée par deux organismes auxiliaires: le conseil des recherches des Caraïbes et la Conférence des Indes Occidentales. Le Conseil des recherches a pour mission toutes recherches scientifiques, technologiques, sociales et économiques à l'avantage des populations des Caraïbes. La Conférence des Indes Occidentales a pour but d'associer plus directement les populations de la région aux travaux de la Commission en leur donnant l'occasion d'exprimer leurs vœux. Chaque territoire est représenté dans cet organisme par deux délégués et autant de conseillers qu'il le jugera opportun.

La Commission de même que ses organismes auxiliaires n'a pas de lien avec l'organisation des Nations Unies, mais elle coopérera avec cette organisation et les organismes spécialisés dans les matières d'intérêt commun. Il est expressément stipulé que la convention n'exercera pas d'influence sur les relations constitutionnelles présentes et futures entre les Gouvernements et leurs territoires dépendants.

La Commission a établi son secrétariat permanent à Port d'Espagne dans l'île de la Trinité. Au cours de ses diverses sessions elle a élaboré un programme tendant à relever le niveau social des populations et à intensifier leur vie économique. Il comprend notamment le développement de la polyculture et de l'élevage, l'amélioration des méthodes agricoles par la mécanisation, la lutte contre l'érosion, et la sylviculture. Il a également pour objet la création d'industries de transformation, l'instruction professionnelle et le développement des moyens de communication et de transport. En vue de coordonner la recherche scientifique, il sera procédé à un relevé de toutes les institutions scientifiques existantes, de leurs travaux et de leur personnel. Des études seront entreprises sur les multiples problèmes intéressant notamment l'hygiène, la nutrition, l'agriculture, la pêche, la démographie, l'instruction publique et le développement industriel. La Commission provoquera également des études socioéconomiques sur le coût de la vie et les budgets familiaux dans les divers territoires. Ainsi qu'en fait foi le rapport sur la troisième conférence des Indes occidentales, qui s'est tenue à la Guadaloupe au mois de décembre 1948, cet organisme apporte une contribution importante aux travaux de la Commission. Cette réunion avait principalement pour objet les nouvelles activités industrielles à envisager. Des propositions concrètes ont été formulées relativement au financement de ces activités. La nécessité de développer le tourisme dans les Caraïbes et de créer à cet effet une institution spécialisée a été également mise en évidence. D'autre part la Conférence a proposé qu'en vue de stimuler le commerce interrégional les tarifs douaniers soient réduits. Elle a enfin formulé le vœu qu'une législation sociale répondant aux recommandations du bureau international du travail soit adoptée dans les divers territoires. Ces diverses propositions ont été ratifiées par la Commission. Enfin celle-ci a déja édité diverses publications, notamment deux études ayant respectivement pour objet: Le développement industriel de Porto Rico et des îles Vierges et le Commerce du sucre dans les Caraïbes.

L'amélioration de la situation économique et sociale soulève des difficultés beaucoup plus grandes dans la région du Pacifique méridional que dans la region des Caraïbes. Le principal obstacle auquel se heurte l'action des Gouvernements réside dans les distances considérables, qui séparent des territoires d'une très faible densité de population. C'est ainsi que les seuls territoires soumis à l'administration des Etats Unis d'Amérique sont disséminés dans une zone maritime de plus de 4 millions de kilomètres carrés. La population de ces territoires, qui se répartit entre 64 groupes d'îles, ne dépasse guère le chiffre de 53,000 habitants. C'est à

l'initiative des Gouvernements de l'Australie et de la Nouvelle Zélande qu'est due la création de la Commission du Pacifique méridional. Une conférence, où étaient représentés les divers Gouvernements administrant des territoires non autonomes dans la susdite région, c'est à dire: l'Australie, la France, les Pays Bas, la Nouvelle Zélande, la Grande Bretagne et les Etats Unis, fut réunie à Canberra le 28 janvier 1947. Au cours de cette réunion, une convention fut élaborée en vue de l'institution d'une Commission qui aurait pour objet de favoriser la collaboration entre les puissances intéressées afin de promouvoir le progrès économique et social dans les territoires administrés par elles et situés dans la région du pacifique méridional.

La compétence territoriale de cet organisme désigné sous le nom de Commission du Pacifique Méridional, s'étend à toute la partie de l'Océan Pacifique située au sud de l'équateur et à l'est de la Nouvelle Guinée Néerlandaise, ce territoire étant compris dans le ressort de la Commission. La population occupant cette région est d'environ 2 millions d'âmes. L'organisation de la Commission s'inspire du statut de la Commission des Caraïbes. La Commission du Pacifique Méridional est un organisme consultatif dans lequel chacun des six Gouvernements intéréssés est représenté par deux délégués. Elle est assistée par un Conseil des recherches et par une Conférence. La Conférence du Pacifique Méridional groupe les délégués des divers territoires à raison de deux délégués au moins par territoire. Cet organisme se réunira pour la première fois au mois d'avril 1950. La Commission a déjà tenu trois sessions au cours desquelles elle a pris les dispositions nécessaires en vue de l'organisation de son secrétariat permanent qui a été établi à Nouméa, en Nouvelle Calédonie. Elle a également. sur la proposition du Conseil de recherches, mis à l'étude les questions suivantes: Dans le domaine de la santé publique: La standardisation des mesures préventives contre les épidémies, le problème de la nutrition dans les diverses communautés et la coordination des recherches. Dans le domaine économique: L'introduction de nouvelles cultures de rapport, l'amélioration des pâturages, la lutte contre l'érosion du sol et les maladies des plantes, le développement des pêcheries et l'organisation du crédit indigène. Dans le domaine social: Le développement de l'instruction professionnelle et technique, l'étude des meilleures méthodes pédagogiques, les recherches linguistiques, le développement des coopératives, et l'étude de types d'habitation adaptés aux diverses zones climatiques. La Commission se préoccupe également de l'amélioration des communications maritimes et aériennes, du ravitaillement des divers territoires en objets de première nécessité ainsi que des divers problèmes intéressant la main d'oeuvre. Enfin la Commission se propose d'organiser une bibliothèque consacrée aux diverses questions intéressant le Pacifique méridional et de publier un bulletin périodique.

Nous ne trouvons pas en Afrique, comme dans les Caraïbes et le Pacifique un organisme permanent destiné à assurer la collaboration entre les puissances coloniales. Mais le principe de cette collaboration a fait l'objet de conventions entre

les divers Gouvernements intéressés. Ces conventions tendent à établir tant sur le plan des métropoles que sur le plan des territoires d'outre-mer, une coopération sur des sujets d'ordre technique ayant pour but final l'élévation du standard de vie des habitants de ces territoires. Cette coopération implique une action coordonnée des divers ministères par le moyen d'instructions parallèles établies après contacts des services techniques intéressés et la mise en œuvre sur le terrain des mesures pratiques d'action concertées par les techniciens responsables agissant en étroite liaison. Elle est appelée à s'exercer dans les domaines suivants: la formation du personnel colonial, l'enseignement indigène, l'agriculture, l'élevage et les forêts, la protection du sol, des cultures, de la flore et de la faune, la santé publique et l'amélioration des liaisons. La collaboration entre les divers services spécialisés sera notamment réalisée par des échanges de vues et des échanges de documentation ainsi que par l'organisation de conférences techniques. Ces conférences ne seront nullement exclusives, mais seront également accessibles aux délégués des autres états, possessionnés en Afrique. Au cours de ces dernières années, les conférences suivantes ont été tenues tant en Europe qu'en Afrique: la conférence médicale à Accra en 1946; la conférence vétérinaire à Dakar en mai 1946; la semaine agricole à Yangambi en février-mars 1947; la conférence des communications à Dakar en mai 1947; la conférence de l'enseignement à Londres, en juin 1947; la conférence de la nutrition à Paris en décembre 1947; la conférence phytopathologique à Bruxelles en décembre 1947; la conférence de la trypanosomiase à Brazzaville en février 1948; la conférence de la main d'œuvre en Nigérie en février 1948; la conférence Africaine des sols à Goma en novembre 1948; la conférence de la nutrition à Destchang (Cameroun sous tutelle française) en octobre 1949; la conférence de la recherche scientifique à Johannesburg en octobre 1949; et enfin, la conférence de l'économie rurale à Jos (Nigérie) en novembre 1949.

La collaboration entre puissances coloniales n'a été jusqu'à présent réalisée que dans le domaine des questions purement techniques. Pour ce qui regarde les problèmes d'ordre politique elle ne donne lieu qu'à un échange d'informations. Mais ces informations ne font pas l'objet de discussions en vue de l'élaboration de directives communes. Il semble cependant opportun que les puissances coloniales se préoccupent d'apporter plus d'unité dans leurs doctrines respectives et les moyens mis en oeuvre pour les appliquer. En effet, ces puissances sont solidaires aux yeux des autochtones. Vis à vis de ceux-ci leurs ressortissants apparaissent avant tout comme des Européens; comme des blancs, bien plus que comme les représentants de telle nation déterminée. Dans ces conditions, des divergences trop marquées dans les conceptions politiques et les méthodes d'administration ne peuvent que jeter le désarroi dans l'esprit des autochtones. Si les populations de telle colonie se rendent compte que l'émancipation de leurs frères de race se poursuit à une allure plus rapide dans une colonie voisine, pareille constatation ne peut qu'engendrer chez eux du mécontentement. Par contre, si telles populations jouissant d'un

régime libéral se rendent compte qu'une politique plus conservatrice est appliquée dans une colonie voisine, elles seront incitées à mettre en doute les bonnes intentions de leur propre gouvernement. Sans doute peut-on imaginer que l'évolution des nations européennes vers une organisation fédérale déterminera nécessairement la création d'institutions superétatiques, qui soumettront les diverses administrations coloniales à des directives communes. Mais cette éventualité ne se réalisera selon toute vraisemblance que dans un avenir plus ou moins éloigné. En attendant, diverses considérations militent cependant en faveur d'une unité de plus en plus accentuée dans les méthodes d'administration des territoires coloniaux. Les débats qui s'engagent dans certaines institutions de l'organisation des Nations Unies nous permettent de constater qu'un fossé de plus en plus profond se creuse entre les puissances coloniales et celles qui n'assument aucune responsabilité dans ce domaine. Ces dernières s'inspirant d'un radicalisme théorique, ne veulent voir qu'une manifestation d'un impérialisme périmé dans le souci des puissances intéressées de n'assurer que graduellement et dans la mesure de leurs capacités l'émancipation politique et économique des populations de leurs territoires dépendants. Elles ne paraissent guère se douter qu'en renonçant prématurément à leurs responsabilités, ces puissances ne pourraient que créer le chaos dans d'immenses régions, dont elles livreraient ainsi les populations au régime arbitraire de minorités tyranniques.

Ce qui doit inquiéter davantage encore les puissances coloniales c'est la prétention de certains membres de l'organisation des Nations Unies, d'étendre à tous les territoires dépendants un contrôle, que la charte de San Francisco n'a prévu que pour les seuls territoires sous tutelle. La charte prévoit en son article 73, que les membres des Nations Unies qui assument la responsabilité d'administrer des territoire non autonomes, communiqueront régulièrement au secrétaire général, à titre d'information, sous réserve des exigences de la sécurité et de considérations d'ordre constitutionnel, des renseignements statistiques et autres de nature technique relatifs aux conditions économiques, sociales et de l'instruction dans les territoires dont ils sont respectivement responsables. Une commission spéciale de caractère purement temporaire a été constituée au sein de la Commission des Tutelles en vue de l'examen de ces documents. Disons tout d'abord que rien ne justifiait la création de pareille commission, qu'aucun article de la charte ne prévoit. Il n'est pas besoin " de commission " pour recevoir des renseignements statistiques fournis à titre purement documentaire. Cependant une tendance de plus en plus accentuée s'affirme de donner à cette Commission un caractère permanent et d'étendre ses attributions. La prétention est même mise en avant d'obliger les puissances intéressées à joindre aux renseignements statistiques et techniques qu'elles se sont engagées à fournir, des renseignements de caractère politique. Bien plus, au cours de l'assemblée du mois d'octobre le vœu a été émis de voir les puissances coloniales formuler les programmes qu'elles comptent mettre en œuvre pour préparer à l'autonomie les territoires dépendants soumis à leur administration.

Les puissances coloniales ne peuvent répondre à pareille prétention qu'en lui opposant un front commun et en se refusant à fournir d'autres renseignements que ceux qui sont expressément prévus par la Charte. En effet, cette prétention ne repose sur aucune base juridique. D'autre part, une discussion dans un esprit constructif est impossible au sein d'une Commission dont les membres seraient nécessairement divisés en deux camps s'inspirant de conceptions radicalement différentes.

Il est intéressant à ce point de vue, de faire un rapprochement entre l'ancienne Commission des Mandats et les organisme de l'ONU s'occupant de territoires non autonomes. Ces organismes ne sont pas formés de personnalités choisies à raison de leurs connaissances spéciales, mais d'Etats. Les délégués de plusieurs de ceux-ci n'ont aucune expérience coloniale et s'inspirent d'instructions gouvernementales systématiquement hostiles à toute forme de statut colonial. Au contraire, les membres de la Commission des Mandats étaient des experts, entièrement indépendants de leurs gouvernements respectifs. Des personnalités éminentes furent ainsi appelées à siéger au sein de cet organisme. La somme de leurs expériences fut mise au service des puissances mandataires dans un esprit de collaboration constructive, se préoccupant uniquement de l'intérêt des populations indigènes. L'on peut dire que les travaux de cette commission ont apporté une contribution des plus importantes à l'élaboration d'une doctrine, qui a exercé son influence sur la plupart des administrations coloniales.

C'est dans un tout autre esprit que les problèmes coloniaux sont examinés au sein des organismes dépendant de l'ONU et l'on peut dire que les discussions y sont rarement dégagées de passions partisanes et d'arrières-pensées politiques. Cependant les puissances coloniales ne peuvent se borner à opposer une attitude négative aux prétentions abusives dont elles font l'objet. Il n'est pas douteux qu'elles sont obligées d'accomplir leur mission civilisatrice dans une atmosphère de suspicion et de dénigrement. D'aucuns leur reprochent même de vouloir retarder indéfiniment l'émancipation de leurs pupilles en alléguant une déficience mentale, qui ne serait en réalité qu'une ignorance délibérément entretenue. Mais les responsabilités et les difficultés qu'elles supportent en commun doivent développer entre elles plus, encore que par le passé, un sentiment puissant de solidarité et un esprit de collaboration de large envergure.

L'on peut se demander dans cet ordre d'idées s'il ne serait pas opportun que les diverses questions dont la Commission des Tutelles voudrait abusivement se saisir, fassent l'objet de discussions périodiques entre les puissances coloniales. Ces discussions seraient préparées par les travaux d'un collège d'experts, dont la composition rappellerait dans une certaine mesure l'ancienne Commission des Mandats et qui serait chargée de l'examen préalable de ces questions. Ces experts seraient chacun non pas nommés mais simplement proposés par leurs gouvernements respectifs et agréés par l'ensemble des puissances intéressées. Leur rôle se bornerait à l'examen et à la discussion de la documentation qui leur serait soumise et à formuler des avis à ce sujet. Ces avis pourraient alors servir de base à l'élaboration de

directives communes par les divers gouvernements. L'application de pareille procédure aurait pour effet d'apporter plus d'unité dans les conceptions et les méthodes d'administration coloniale. Elle contribuerait aussi à dissiper dans une certaine mesure l'atmosphère de méfiance qu'une propagande tendancieuse suscite dans l'opinion publique internationale et parmi les populations des territoires dépendants. En attendant que les gouvernements s'engagent dans la voie d'une collaboration plus étroite, l'initiative privée peut déja réaliser celle-ci sur un plan officieux. Les universités et les grandes institutions scientifiques ont un rôle important à jouer dans ce domaine. Elles peuvent organiser des réunions internationales ayant notamment pour objet l'étude des problèmes soulevés par l'application dans les territoires d'Outre-mer des principes proclamés par la Charte des Nations Unies. Elles peuvent également éclairer l'opinion publique au sujet de ces diverses questions par une documentation exacte. Des réunions de ce genre ont déja été tenues aux Universités d'Oxford et de Cambridge. Il convient également de signaler dans ce domaine les initiatives de l'Institut des Hautes Etudes d'Administration Musulmane à Paris, de l'Institut Universitaire des territoires d'Outre-mer à Anvers, et de l'Institut Internationale des Sciences Politiques et Sociales appliquées aux pays de civilisations différentes (Ancien Institut Colonial International) à Bruxelles. Mais le congrès de l'Université de Bristol se distingue assurément par l'ampleur et la variété des sujets figurant à son ordre du jour. Nous formulons le vœu que ce bel exemple soit bientôt suivi dans d'autres pays.

Summary

Co-operation between Colonial Powers

CO-OPERATION between colonial powers in Africa as well as in the Caribbean Islands and the South-West Pacific has until now only borne upon questions of a purely technical nature, but it would seem desirable that it should take place at the political level too.

On the one hand, it is plain that greater unity should come about in colonial administrative conceptions and methods. On the other hand, certain U.N.O. commissions are at present putting forward the claim to subject dependent territories to a type of investigation only provided for in the case of trust territories alone. Difficulties of this kind with which the colonial powers in general have to contend should create a feeling of profound solidarity between them. They cannot reply to the above-stated claims except by making common cause against them and by refusing to supply the Secretaries of U.N.O. with any information other than what is specifically provided for in the Charter, for in point of fact, these claims have no legal basis. But, on the other hand, a constructively-minded discussion is impossible in a commission whose members are necessarily divided into two camps inspired by radically differing conceptions.

From this point of view, it is interesting to draw a parallel between U.N.O. organs dealing with non-autonomous territories and the former Mandates Commission. This latter, exclusively composed of experts, examined the administration of mandatory powers in a technical and constructive spirit. It was thus able to make a considerable contribution to the elaboration of contemporary colonial doctrine.

The colonial powers cannot, however, limit themselves to facing the excessive claims of which they are the victims with a negative attitude. It can be asked, whilst on this line of thought, if it would not be opportune that the various questions which the Trusteeship Commission would wrongly arrogate to itself should form the object of periodic discussions between the colonial powers. These discussions would be prepared for by the work of a body of experts whose composition would be reminiscent of some of the former Mandates Commission and this body would be entrusted with the preliminary examination of these questions and the formulation of opinions about them. These opinions could then become the basis for drafting common directives on the part of the various governments concerned.

Until such time as governments take the step towards closer collaboration, this collaboration can be achieved at unofficial level by the universities and great scientific institutions.

Summary of Discussion

MONSIEUR ALDUY thought both external and internal forces were working for the liquidation of the colonies. The former included the influence of the United States, of U.N.O. and of the U.S.S.R. He believed that the most effective method of meeting these onslaughts was for colonial powers to collaborate. Indeed that collaboration had already started, as was shown by the various conferences of experts which had taken place in recent years, but he was sceptical of the results. He suggested that a preparatory conference should be convened, followed by a Round Table Conference which would work out precise terms of collaboration. Secondly he suggested that the European Assembly should be induced to set up a commission for overseas territories which should contain representatives from those territories. This body should keep precise objectives clearly in view such as, for example, the co-operation of France and Great Britain in the production of groundnuts or the avoidance of duplication between Belgium and France in aerial transport. It was unnecessary to have large aerodromes at Brazzaville and Leopoldville when one would suffice. There should be adequate representation of indigenous populations. There were plenty of competent people. Effective international agreement, however, could only be attained by the surrender of some sovereign rights to ensure peace.

Miss GOVEIA felt that one of the difficulties in the way of collaboration between colonial powers was the different aims they pursued. Some were moving towards self-government while some were seeking to keep the people in the state in which they were found.

The population of the West Indies was very largely an immigrant one but in other areas the aboriginal population preponderated.

She wondered how we were to determine what constituted suitable qualifications for responsible government. If literacy—India was largely illiterate. If economic self-sufficiency—several countries in Western Europe are no longer economically self-supporting. If political maturity—how could this be acquired?

Professor STEWART asked if the Brussels Pact established study commissions? He said the Dunkirk Treaty set up a mixed commission to study cultural relations between France and England and suggested to the Conference that it might ask the commission to inaugurate a study of the work and aims of Great Britain and France in non-autonomous territories.

Professor CAETANO believed that informal personal contacts between people from different countries were more valuable than formal congresses. These were largely concerned with questions of procedure, national susceptibilities and discussions about sovereignty. Informal exchanges of experience were more useful because the information so acquired could be applied in action with less difficulty.

In conferences on social policy in non-autonomous territories you were confronted with the prejudices of settlers and questions of economic competition bulk largely.

Monsieur LANDRY believed that collaboration would be useful if it enabled colonial powers to harmonize their policies, for example, with regard to the movement of Africans from French territories to Gambia and Sierra Leone to avoid taxation. Such economic co-operation did not involve questions of sovereignty and therefore was simpler to achieve. These questions were of increasing importance since they concerned the well-being of colonial peoples who were directly interested, for example, in the international transport system which affected the prices they obtained in the world market.

He believed that the Conference of the Sahara had been a notable success.

Professor MARZORATI agreed that indigenous peoples should be represented on any body of experts which might be set up. The Mandates Commission had produced excellent results.

The proposal that the European Assembly should appoint a commission for overseas territories went too far. The right of the non-colonial powers in the Assembly to assume such responsibility would be questioned. In the long run it might be possible to extend the Pact of Brussels to overseas territories. He suggested that the Caribbean Commission, with extended powers, might reasonably be asked to examine the problems of the West Indies.

The co-operation of colonial powers would raise many problems, but, nevertheless, there was much common ground between them.

The adherence to the San Francisco Charter entailed the approval of the goal of independence for non-autonomous peoples. In view of this adherence there should be, he thought, a common policy for non-autonomous territories.

As to the question of the amount of education necessary as a criterion for self-government it would be, he thought, sufficient if a considerable proportion of the population was educated.

The Brussels pact did not extend to colonies.

The body he would like to see set up would be composed, as the Mandates Commission, of personalities, not of governments. It would be a group of representative experts who would have the personal contacts suggested by Professor Caetano.

He agreed that co-operation of metropolitan powers in dealing with economic problems was desirable.

Le Développement Économique des Territoires non autonomes

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Il est certain que le développement économique des pays non autonomes est l'une des questions qui se posent avec le plus d'acuité dans le monde de 1950. Si l'on tente de définir ce monde dans sa réalité économique, l'on peut sans doute affirmer que malgré la diversité des formes sociales et des formes politiques qui vont jusqu'à la plus extrême opposition, il tend cependant vers l'Unité: unité non pas superficielle des méthodes économiques employées de manières diverses par des régimes politiques différents, mais unité profonde des moyens de base utilisés pour permettre aux hommes de jouir de plus de bien-être, de vivre une vie pleine, complète et meilleure, en un mot de développer leurs possibilités économiques par une toujours croissante satisfaction de leurs besoins, afin d'assumer le plus possible d'humanité, suivant la belle parole d'André Gide; mais ce programme que d'aucuns qualifient d'utopique, ne saurait être concevable que, si, précédant le développement de la personnalité humaine, certaines conditions économiques objectives préexistent, permettant non seulement la satisfaction des besoins marginaux de l'homme, mais encore ce léger superflu sans lequel il ne saurait y avoir ni civilisation, ni culture.

Pour les pays autonomes, nations européennes, américaines ou communautés blanches d'Afrique de Sud et d'Australie, la question se pose simplement: les biens et techniques obtenus grâce au travail des générations antérieures se trouvent naturellement accrus, dans une plus ou moins forte proportion, au moyen des cadres qui ont déjà été forgés dans le passé: régime des échanges, monnaie, production même, continuent à se développer suivant un rythme en général positif (à l'exception des périodes de crise économique et de guerres) mais qui n'est pas qualitativement différent dans un cours laps de temps. La Révolution industrielle, célébrée dans les manuels d'histoire du 19ème Siècle, s'est en fait étagée sur plusieurs générations et, commencée en Angleterre vers 1760, on ne saurait même pas prétendre qu'elle est aujourd'hui terminée, si l'on en croit les possibilités nouvelles offertes par le contrôle de l'énergie.

En outre, les états nationaux organisés de manière moderne possèdent également en principe la pleine souveraineté de leur économie, sous réserve des accords passés avec les organisations internationales ou entre eux-mêmes: pourvus d'un Gouvernement central qui influence plus ou moins fortement selon ses conceptions propres la vie économique du pays, ils disposent d'organismes susceptibles de modifier dans un sens ou dans un autre l'orientation de leur production, de leur

commerce ou de leur structure financière: leurs administrations centrales peuvent agir directement sur leurs monnaies.

Tout autre est le cas des pays non autonomes: par leur définition même, ils ne possèdent pas cet attribut éssentiel de la souveraineté qu'est un Gouvernement: ils sont dépendants et cette absence d'autonomie politique recouvre une autre sorte de sujétion: la dépendance économique.

Il parait d'ailleurs intéressant de remarquer qu'il existe d'autres territoires économiquement dépendants: les nouveaux Etats de l'Asie du Sud-Est par exemple sont à la recherche d'un compromis entre leur jeune indépendance politique et l'interdépendance économique ou ils demeurent vis-à-vis de leur ancienne métropole, mais si, dans leur situation, l'équilibre reste à trouver, il n'en demeure pas moins qu'ils sont libres, soit de conserver les liens étroits qu'ils avaient dans le passé, soit d'élargir leur sphère économique au mieux de leurs intérêts.

Les Territoires non autonomes ne peuvent au contraire envisager pleinement de telles perspectives non pas tant en raison de leurs liens politiques, mais par suite de facteurs économiques bien précis. On serait tenté de dire que du simple point de vue des faits économiques, ils sont pour le moment dans la situation du mineur qui ne peut pas agir sans le secours de son tuteur: parvenus à un âge plus avancé, ils pourront certainement penser par eux-mêmes, et sous toutes ses formes, leur propre réalité économique; pour le moment, un simple aperçu de leurs possibilités montrent qu'il ne saurait en être ainsi.

Où se situent, en effet, ces territoires dépendants? A l'exception de l'Afrique du Nord française (au reste l'Algérie fait partie intégrante de la France métropolitaine) qui présente des caractères fort semblables à ceux des autres pays méditerranéens, les territoires qui nous occupent sont situés dans les zones tropicales et équatoriales d'Afrique, d'Océanie et d'Amérique. Si l'on laisse de côté les Caraïbes et les archipels océaniens (Nouvelle-Guinée comprise), tous ces pays se trouvent situés approximativement entre les tropiques du Cancer et du Capricorne, dans l'Afrique au Sud du Sahara.

Cette zone immense, d'une superficie de 20 Millions de Km2 (plus de 80 fois le Royaume Uni) comprend essentiellement ce que le géographe français Gourou nomme "l'Afrique chaude et pluvieuse"; seule une bande comprise entre le tropique du Cancer et le 12ème degré Nord échappe au second terme de cette définition; mais dans l'ensemble tous ces pays peuvent être considérés comme présentent des caractères absolument semblables, au point de vue géographique.

Il semble qu'avant de définir ces caractères dans leur identité propre, il convienne de chercher auparavant quelles sont les conditions nécessaires pour que dans un pays donné, on puisse parler de développement économique; alors, il sera possible, en se servant de points de comparaison avec des pays déjà développés, de prétendre donner un aperçu exact du potentiel existant dans les territoires en question et de déterminer plus longuement les mesures destinées à pallier leur insuffisance actuelle.

Certes, il existe de nombreux facteurs pour qu'un territoire donné puisse se voir développé, mais parmi ceux-ci deux d'entre eux apparaissent comme prédominants, d'abord les facteurs géographiques (sol et climat d'abord) puis les facteurs démographiques, ensuite seulement, il convient de tenir compte d'autres conditions: capitaux, facilités de communications, etc. . . .

Or, du point de vue du sol et du climat, la presque totalité des territoires non autonomes jouit de conditions particulièrement défavorables: les sols de l'Afrique au Sud du Sahara sont, sauf de très rares exceptions, acides et pauvres en phosphore et en potasse; la plupart du temps et malgré leur apparence, l'humus qui constitue la richesse des terres européennes ou américaines est médiocre et si les sols tropicaux sont souvent profonds, l'action chimique se fait sentir beaucoup plus rapidement que dans les contrées tempérées; les averses torrentielles, l'action solaire emportent ou dissolvent rapidement les éléments fertilisateurs qui ne se reconstituent que lentement; enfin, une partie de ces régions est couverte d'une couche latéritique, d'une infertilité absolue. Les seuls sols intéressants d'origine récente (alluvions quaternaires de Basse-Guinée et du Bas-Niger, roches volcaniques du Cameroun et du Ruanda) ne forment que de petites taches sur la carte géologique de l'Afrique au Sud du Sahara; ces points, nous les retrouvons sur la carte démographique: les habitants y sont venus s'agglomérer, séduits par de meilleures conditions de vie.

Le climat de l'Afrique "chaude et humide" ne présente pas des caractéristiques bien meilleures: l'insalubrité des régions tropicales est un fait depuis longtemps relevé; en dehors des maladies détectées dans les zones tempérées règnent toutes sortes d'endémies communes aux régions tropicales: la malaria, les dysentries amibienne et bacillaire, l'ankylostomiase, la lèpre, le pian, la fièvre jaune et la maladie du sommeil n'en sont que les plus connues.

Ces deux facteurs: sol et climat, expliquent la faiblesse démographique de ces contrées: l'Afrique tropicale ne compte pour son énorme superficie que 105 millions d'habitants, soit à peine 5 au kilomètre carré; même si l'on soustrait de ce chiffre les parties désertiques du nord de l'Afrique occidentale et de l'Afrique Equatoriale française, ainsi que du Soudan anglo-égyptien, la densité ne dépasse pas 8, alors qu'elle est de plus de 200 en Belgique, en Angleterre et dans les Pays-Bas, de 95 au Portugal. Encore est-elle très inégalement répartie.* La Nigéria possède à elle seule 22 millions d'habitants pour 875,000 Km2; la côte sud du Golfe de Guinée, certaines régions de la boucle du Niger, les montagnes du Cameroun et du Kenya manifestent également un peuplement dense; de même les bords de l'immense fossé tectonique constitué par les grands lacs africains (Ruanda Urundi–Nyassaland–Ouganda) comptent parmi les régions les plus peuplées d'Afrique. Partout ailleurs, et spécialement dans les bas districts de la grande forêt équatoriale, ainsi que dans les zones nord et sud en bordure des tropiques, la densité est extraordinairement réduite (1, 7 pour l'ensemble de

* For note see page 157.

l'Afrique Equatoriale française, 2 pour les Rhodésies, 2, 4 pour la province de Katanga au Congo Belge), moins encore pour la Mauritanie, le Bechouanaland ou pour les régions Sud des provinces de Bié et de Huila au Sud de l'Angola où la densité tombe à 3 ou 4 habitants pour 10 kilomètres carrés).

On pourrait ainsi appliquer à toute l'Afrique non autonome ce qu'un ancien Gouverneur Général disait de l'Afrique Equatoriale française: "c'est un pays formé d'îlots de peuplement, d'oasis plus ou moins vastes où la population est venue se grouper. Il y a là un fait d'ordre géographique qu'il faut avoir présent à la mémoire quand on examine les problèmes particuliers à ces territoires français".

Encors ces conditions physiques défavorables et cette faiblesse démographique ne seraient-elles pas trop de nature à empêcher le développement économique de ces pays si le continent tout entier n'apparaissait pas comme un bloc extrêmement massif: côtes peu découpées, barrières montagneuses proches de la mer, fleuves dont les seuls grands biefs navigables se trouvent dans le cours moyen; alors que l'Amazone, le Missisipi, le Yang Tsé Kiang ou le Gange apparaissent comme autant de voies de communication faciles et peu couteuses, les pays d'Afrique se trouvent donc isolés, bloqués dans leur immensité: de vastes régions, parmi les plus peuplées se situent à plus de 1.200 kilomètres de l'océan à vol d'oiseau, alors qu'en Europe occidentale et centrale aucun point n'est situé à plus de 500 kilomètres d'une côte.

Cette solitude des pays non autonomes se retrouve dans les archipels océaniens: qu'il s'agisse de la Mélanésie ou de la Polynésie, ce ne sont que fouillis de petites iles coralliennes, réparties sur des distances considérables; de temps à autre une terre volcanique plus vaste, mais à la jungle impénétrable; des voies maritimes de

*Repartition de la Population en Afrique au Sud du Sahara en 1949

	millions
Territoires Britanniques (55 millions)	
Afrique Occidentale	28.8
dont—Nigéria	23
Gold Coast	4
Sierra Léone	1.6
Gambie	0.2
Afrique Orientale	19.2
dont—Kenya	4
Ougande	3
Tanganika	7
Rhodésie du Sud	1.8
Rhodésie du Nord	1.6
Nyassaland	1.8
Swaziland, Basutoland et Bechuanaland	1
Soudan Anglo Egyptien et Somaliland	7

	millions
Territoires Français (30 millions)	
Afrique Occidentale	17
Togo	0.8
Cameroun	3
Afrique Equatoriale	4.2
Madagascar and Côte des Somalis et Comores	4
Territoires Belges (10.5 millions)	
Congo	10.5
Territoires Portugais (9.5 millions)	
Angola	4
São Tomé e Principe—Guinée	0.4
Mozambique	5.1

Total, 105 millions d'habitants.

communication très longues et situées à l'écart des grands courants mondiaux; une population ne dépassant pas 2 millions d'habitants . . . en fait un isolement presqu'absolu, au sein d'un immense océan.

Enfin les pays non autonomes sont mal pourvus en ressources naturelles: dans quelques régions, la cueillette est encore un mode usuel de récolte; dans d'autres la pêche et la chasse, jointes au ramassage, suffisent à nourrir des populations entières; enfin dans le reste de ces territoires, l'agriculture, à laquelle se consacre la grande majorité des habitants, est extensive: la culture sur brulis est la principale méthode employée pour donner au sol des éléments fertilisateurs; les fumures sont inconnues, ainsi que l'emploi d'engrais; des villages entiers sont donc contraints à se déplacer après avoir épuisé leurs meilleures terres, qui quelquefois ne se reconstitueront jamais. Quant aux pasteurs, on peut dire qu'ils ne diffèrent guère de ceux des temps bibliques.

Le niveau de vie reste ainsi bas et précaire: l'économie des territoires non autonomes est, par essence, régionale: les habitants se contentent de subsister dans la zone où ils se trouvent, sans chercher à échanger leurs produits où à créer des marchés. Seules existent des possibilités limitées de commerce pour certains produits de base (bétail, huile de palme, kola et sel en Afrique), et encore seulement dans les régions les plus ouvertes à la circulation: on peut dire que la zone forestière centre équatoriale ignore même jusqu'à ces minimes commodités.

Sans économie de marché, il ne s'est bien entendu constitué ni capitaux, ni monnaie, ni possibilité de conserver sous une certaine forme des biens destinés à être redistribués plus tard.

Quant aux produits du sous-sol, qui sont autant de possibilités latentes (cuivre, fer, étain), ils sont peu connus, encore moins utilisés: rares sont les peuples parvenus à les travailler et encore s'ils le font, c'est au moyen d'une technique élémentaire.

Ainsi l'on peut vraiment parler, en considérant l'essentiel de ces contrées, d'une économie de pays sous développé.

Ayant donc clairement la perception de ces données de base, il est maintenant possible de montrer comment s'est effectué, d'une part, et comment va s'effectuer d'autre part, le passage de cette économie primitive à une économie plus largement ouverte.

On pourrait nettement distinguer trois phases dans ce processus.

La première s'ouvre avec les grandes découvertes: l'africain, l'océanien prend contact au XVI^{ème} siècle avec l'européen. Dans ses immortelles "Lusiadas", Camoëns nous montre comment son navire allant mouiller dans une aiguade, un noir qu'il nomme, d'après les idées de son temps, "un éthiopien" vient échanger avec l'équipage quelques produits. C'est sur cette côte, la première fois qu'un fait de cet ordre se produit et l'étonnement n'est pas moins grand d'une part que de l'autre. Ce simple fait, mais combien symbolique, marque la prise de contact entre deux modes de vie: l'échange s'est établi, le développement économique va

s'ouvrir, mais fort lentement: des européens vont s'installer sur ces côtes, où pendant 4 siècles, ils se contenteront de faire du commerce sans se préoccuper de pénétrer dans l'intérieur: le bénéfice sera donc pratiquement inexistant; le commerce est une activité secondaire par rapport à l'agriculture et à l'industrie et ne saurait suffire à développer d'immenses territoires; la traite installée à peu près en même temps que les colonisateurs, loin d'apporter quelque chose au pays en prendra bientôt les éléments les plus sains et les plus robustes, au grand dommage de celui-là. Il faut d'ailleurs reconnaître objectivement que s'il eut été possible d'éviter plus tôt la traite, il aurait été par contre bien difficile de réaliser à cette époque un développement appréciable de ces contrées: transports incertains, métropoles lointaines, pauvreté des connaissances géographiques, faiblesse des techniques, manque d'une volonté d'ensemble.

Enfin les idées du temps ne sont nullement favorables au développement économique de ces pays. En France une ordonnance royale de 1698 interdit aux colonies de raffiner le sucre; dans les colonies anglaises, une législation sévère réprimait absolument toute création de manufacture.

La seconde phase commence avec la pénétration intérieure de l'Afrique et la répartition à différentes puissances des archipels océaniens. On pourrait la nommer "l'age colonial du développement économique des territoires non autonomes".

Cette période se caractérise en fonction de différents facteurs:

En premier lieu le développement des territoires d'outremer s'effectue en accord étroit avec les besoins et les nécessités de la Métropole: au souci d'acquérir des produits qu'ils ne possèdent pas se joint chez les peuples colonisateurs celui de vendre les biens qu'ils produisent en toujours plus grande quantité dans leurs manufactures.

Par suite, le peuple colonisé est considéré par la Métropole comme apte à produire certaines matières premières et en contre partie à acheter un grand nombre d'objets qui lui seront plus ou moins utiles. Les nécessités propres des populations, leurs besoins, qui sont énormes ne sont pas plus estimes qu'à l'époque des comptoirs. Certes, maintenant l'européen est installé partout, au coeur même de continent africain, comme dans tous les archipels océaniens, mais ses rapports économiques avec l'autochtone n'apparaissent guère différents: il y a séparation absolue entre une économie européenne d'importation, privilégiée et pourvue de capitaux et une économie intérieure attardée et sous-développée; le producteur de base, s'il voit ses revenus s'accroître durant les bonnes années souffre terriblement lorsque des crises économiques, qu'il ne comprend pas, font baisser le prix des denrées qu'il apporte au marché, alors qu'il achète aussi cher que précédemment les articles manufacturés.

On pourrait parler, en considérant cette période, d'un véritable "apartheid" économique en raison du fait qu'il n'y a pas transformation des techniques existantes, mais seulement juxtaposition entre deux formes de techniques, la main d'oeuvre non spécialisée représentant l'unique transition entre ces deux formes.

Les exemples de ces faits pourraient être multipliés à l'infini:

Certaine Métropole européenne désire du sucre et du café . . . on plante des cannes et des caféiers . . . par suite de circonstances particulières, la Métropole est conduite à cultiver sur son propre territoire une plante sucrière, qui revient par ailleurs trois fois plus cher que la canne . . . on invite alors les colonies à produire moins de sucre, mais par contre le gout des bananes s'étant développé en Europe, plus de bananiers; dans un autre territoire non autonome, l'on plante de la canne à sucre, beaucoup de canne à sucre, puis, de nouvelles techniques aidant, on rationalise la production sous la couvert d'un protectionisme rigoureux: les paysans salariés se trouvent tout à coup en chômage, à côté de sociétés qui réinvestissent leurs bénéfices dans la Métropole. . . .

Si l'on passe du sol au sous-sol, on s'aperçoit que la population étant trop faible dans certaines régions, on la transporte dans les zones minières, souvent par de véritables accords de troc de gouvernement à gouvernement: cela contribue certes au développement de la région en elle-même et certains bénéfices profitent directementaux habitants, mais une grande part sort du pays même de production pour n'y plus revenir.

Enfin certains procédés d'exploitation du sol sont nettement défavorables aux intérêts des territoires. Le systéme des grandes concessions, telle qu'il en existait autrefois dans les régions riveraines du Congo, la déforestation de certaines zones riches en peuplements de qualité, sans reconstitution de la forêt aboutit à des résultats économiques extrèmement fâcheux.

Par contre, il est juste de dire que la Métropole en revanche protège les productions d'outre-mer contre la concurrence d'autres pays: une large part de celles-ci sont réservées à la Métropole, d'où de la part de ces territoires, une certaine tendance à la facilité, à une sorte de malthusianisme économique qui les empèche d'accéder à la concurrence mondiale.

D'autre part, financièrement, les colonies sont étroitement associées à la Métropole: la monnaie est commune, ainsi que les organismes de direction financière (banques et administrations centrales), dirigés par des personnalités dont beaucoup n'ont des pays d'outre-mer qu'une vue théorique.

Les techniciens sont également issus de la Métropole: on estime, à tort ou à raison, que parmi les habitants des pays sous-développés, l'on ne saurait former une élite, en tout cas qu'il est aussi facile, puisque l'on possède sous la main des techniciens métropolitains, de les utiliser immédiatement outremer à construire des chemins de fer, des ports, des routes, à entretenir des voies d'eau destinés à drainer la production vers l'extérieur et à distribuer dans l'intérieur les objets manufacturés qui sont essentiellement fabriqués par la Métropole.

Cette économie est donc par nature, égoiste, visant à développer les territoires, non pas dans leur propre intérêt, mais bien surtout dans ceux de leur tuteur qui en revanche leur concède certains privilèges et leur apporte différentes techniques.

Il faut reconnaître cependant que cette période a permis de grandes réalisations: il est difficile, en effet, lorsqu'un chemin de fer ou une route sont établis de distinguer la part des avantages revenant au pays même et celle du pays tuteur: une ligne ferroviaire comme celle du Dakar-Niger ou du Lagos-Kano, construite primitivement pour drainer les arachides vers la côte, transporte annuellement des centaines de milliers de voyageurs autochtones, dont une grande partie voyage pour son simple plaisir; il n'est que de parcourir les routes africaines pour juger de l'avantage apporté aux habitants des pays traversés par l'organisation d'un service de camions et même souvent de confortables autocars.

D'autre part, la consommation de produits manufacturés qui, au début de l'ère coloniale, n'intéressait que de bien faibles zones situées autour des comptoirs maritimes, s'est fortement accrue, et a pénétré partout: c'est une chose remarquable que dans tous les points d'Afrique, à tous les noeuds de route, gares de chemins de fer ou confluents de rivières, l'on puisse rencontrer au moins une petite boutique où se trouvent les objets de première nécessité, là où il y a cinquante ou soixante ans l'existence de tels objets n'était pas même soupçonnée: or si, à des échelons plus élevés se posent des problèmes plus graves, pour l'immense majorité des habitants de l'Afrique, pour le "paysan noir", comme le définit si bien le Gouverneur Général Delavignette dans son livre, c'est cette petite boutique répandue à l'infini qui le met en contact avec une technique plus développée que la sienne, sans toutefois—et on peut le constater avec regret—réussir à le placer dans le champ d'action de cette technique: enfin les distances à la ville voisine, ou tout au moins au bourg voisin, se sont rétrécies grâce aux facilités de communication: dans quelques endroits, comme sur la côte occidentale d'Afrique entre Douala et Dakar, l'on peut dire que certains pays non autonomes sont déjà, grâce à une production agricole importante, fruit du labeur des habitants eux-mêmes guidés par l'aide intelligente de leurs tuteurs, et grâce à des facilités de communications naturelles, améliorées par des techniciens européens ou américains, entrés dans le circuit de l'économie mondiale.

Mais seules avant la guerre certaines régions avaient eu le privilège de passer du stade d'une économie basée sur la subordination aux intérêts métropolitains à celui d'une économie consacrée au développement des intérêts proprement autochtones.

Ainsi, si la phase proprement "coloniale" de la vie des territoires non autonomes a eu ses servitudes, elle a également possédé ses grandeurs et il serait injuste, à l'aube d'une nouvelle époque, de négliger les secondes pour ne considérer que les premières, qui, contrairement à ce qui s'était passé au temps de la traite, n'ont point pesé d'un poids trop lourd sur le destin des pays sous-développés.

La troisième phase de la vie de ces derniers s'ouvre au cours de la seconde guerre mondiale: ou pourrait distinguer de prime abord trois faits, l'un plus particulièrement politique, l'autre économique, le dernier technique, qui ont conduit à repenser le problème des territoires non autonomes.

Le premie de ces faits est l'évolution politique qui s'est produite dans la plupart des pays non autonomes: elle semble avoir pris deux formes: chez les autochtones, la revendication de droits économiques n'excluant pas le désir sincère de travailler en collaboration avec la puissance tutélaire mais invitant celle-ci à consacrer le maximum de ses efforts au développement du territoire pour lui-même (tendances qui apparaissent plus spécialement en Afrique Occidentale Française et anglaise et au Cameroun); dans les territoires où l'élément européen était important ou jouissait d'une influence particulière, volonté des immigrés de plus en plus nombreux, de former dans la mesure du possible des gouvernements ou des conseils locaux gestionnaires de leur économie (Rhodésies, Kenya et territoires portugais).

De toutes parts, la vision de l'indépendance, sa consécration quelquefois, l'apparition de mouvements nationalistes vigoureux, ouvrent la voie à la revendication en faveur de l'indépendance ou de l'autonomie économique: l'évolution politique modifie forcément les rapports établis sur le plan de la dépendance économique à l'égard de la Métropole.

Le second de ces faits est le conflit en lui-même; alors qu'au cours de la conflagration '14–'18 les pays coloniaux (sauf l'Allemagne) avaient maintenu leurs contacts avec leurs Métropoles, il n'en fut plus de même cette fois-ci: de nombreux pays non autonomes d'Afrique et d'Asie furent coupés brutalement de leurs Métropoles et les courants d'échanges se virent détournés et même temporairement bloqués: des relations interrégionales ou régionales naquirent: c'est ainsi que les pays du Sud Est asiatique furent amenés à modifier totalement le fondement même de leur vie économique, que les Etats-Unis, l'Afrique de Sud et l'Australie furent obligés de donner assistance à des pays dépendant d'autres souverainetés que la leur. Une seconde conséquence fut que là où les conditions économiques en laissaient la possibilité, les pays non autonomes créèrent des industries souvent importantes (filatures, usines de traitement des minéraux, huileries, etc. . . .)

Le troisième fait me semble être l'apparition de l'aviation utilisée comme moyen de transport de voyageurs à l'échelle mondiale et de marchandises à l'échelle régionale. Du jour où le Congo n'est qu'à 20 heures de Bruxelles et Nouméa à 100 heures de Paris, au lieu de 18 et 50 jours respectivement par voie maritime, les problèmes se modifient totalement: à ce moment les techniciens peuvent se déplacer, enquêter sur place, reprendre contact dans les Métropoles avec les centres de recherches, les usines, les administrations même dont ils dépendent, puis repartir pour chercher un complément d'information: de même les représentants économiques des territoires peuvent se rendre facilement en Europe et en Amérique du Nord dans le but de créer de nouveaux marchés ou pour développer l'importation des produits réclamés par leurs consommateurs.

A l'échelle régionale, l'aviation a apporté la souplesse de son trafic, le coût peu élevé de l'infrastructure permet la multiplication des liaisons "en toile d'araignée" autour d'un aérodrome centre: l'on peut donc prospecter tout le territoire et

s'installer dans la plupart des endroits économiquement intéressants sans être dans la nécessité de consacrer préalablement des sommes considérables à l'établissement d'une voie de terre: c'est ce qui se passe actuellement pour la recherche des centres d'exploitation des forêts gabonaises.

Ainsi donc, différents facteurs ont joué dans le sens d'une séparation des intérêts coloniaux avec ceux de la Métropole, de la modification des courants traditionnels et de la technique des échanges.

Toutefois d'autres facteurs ont contribué à rapprocher pays non autonomes et pays autonomes: ces derniers voient en effet augmenter chaque année la part de denrées qu'ils demandent aux territoires d'outre-mer: café, cacao, bananes, huiles végétales, caoutchouc, coton, autant de productions dont disposent ceux-ci: d'autre part les pays d'Afrique au Sud du Sahara ne possèdent pas les céréales des pays tempérés. Le blé est en quantité infime et le riz même est loin de satisfaire aux besoins: le manioc ou le mil, qui occupent la première place dans la culture vivrière autochtone sont loin d'être comparables au point de vue nutritif à nos pommes de terre ou à nos légumes européens.

En matière de corps gras tropicaux le marché naturel se trouve être l'Europe: une grande partie du cacao ne peut aujourd'hui être vendue que dans des régions économiquement développées, d'où la nécessité d'une liaison économique étroite entre ces deux groupes de contrées.

Quant aux ressources du sous-sol, les grandes richesses conçues des territoires non autonomes sont les métaux non ferreux (cuivre, étain, nickel, zinc, manganèse) qui se trouvent aussi dans d'autres régions (Amérique, Asie Centrale), mais dont l'Europe est pratiquement dépourvue, quoique grosse consommatrice, d'où des possibilités d'échanges particulièrement intéressantes.

Enfin, la volume du commerce entre Métropole et colonies, de plus en plus élevé au fur et à mesure de la mise en valeur des territoires, rend aujourd'hui l'imbrication de leurs intérêts extrêmement sensible.

Aussi l'économie des pays dépendants se trouve dans la situation présente en pleine évolution: on constate en effet à la fois des facteurs de dissociation économique entre la Métropole et les Territoires d'outre-mer (situation politique troublée, ouverture de courants commerciaux nouveaux) et des facteurs permettant l'association sur une plus vaste échelle qu'autrefois (productions complémentaires—baisse du taux des frêts ouverture de communications rapides—amélioration des techniques européenne et américaine).

Ainsi s'ouvre aux tuteurs comme aux habitants des territoires non autonomes un nouveau chapitre de l'histoire de leurs rapports respectifs.

L'Afrique, les archipels océaniens, certaines parties des Caraïbes, sont à équiper: on est déjà passé de la piste à l'avion, du travail à la houe au moteur, de la sous-alimentation chronique à des récoltes excédentaires, mais l'expansion des ressources minières ou agricoles suppose et exige un équipement de base en grands travaux ainsi que la formation et la préparation technique de la population (éducation de

base, éducation technique, recherche et prospection scientifique) qui seront la condition préalable de la production rentable ainsi que de l'élévation du genre de vie, et du niveau social.

L'un ne va pas en effet sans l'autre: Comme le déclarait le Gouverneur Général Ryckmans à la fin de la dernière guerre à Léopoldville: "La fonction de l'Etat est de faire et de garantir le bonheur des hommes . . . la prospérité d'un pays est la prospérité de la masse de ses habitants . . . il faut faire entrer cette masse dans le circuit économique".

Le recensement des ressources du territoire considéré, puis l'établissement d'un programme de développement permettent d'atteindre ce but qui est en quelque sorte de promouvoir au maximum l'économie du territoire dans toutes les branches susceptibles d'y prospérer, tant agricoles qu'industrielles.

Selon la grandeur du pays, sa diversité en ressources, l'abondance de sa main d'oeuvre et la facilité de ses moyens de communication, la marche au développement d'une économie complexe sera plus ou moins aisée et plus ou moins rapide.

D'une part donc, il s'agit de rénover et d'équiper l'économie intérieure des pays dépendants, d'autre part de la faire entrer dans l'économie mondiale, en ouvrant à leurs productions les marchés mondiaux, et en permettant aux produits mondiaux d'entrer facilement chez eux, en corrollaire avec un niveau de consommation accru.

Comment va donc s'effectuer ce processus? Telle est la question à laquelle il fait répondre maintenant, puisque dans les faits une telle évolution est inscrite.

On pourrait évidemment faire appel, comme dans la période précedente, aux capitaux et aux techniciens privés: certaines sociétés importantes, dans le domaine de la production de matières premières agricoles (coton par exemple) et minérales ou des transports, ont réalisé, dans les 30 dernières années une oeuvre considérable, et acquis au cours de cette période la pleine possession des moyens techniques modernes: il ne saurait donc s'agir que de les inciter à développer raisonnablement leurs productions, au besoin même grâce à des investissements nouveaux et à tenir compte du fait que le territoire doit bénéficier de plus en plus largement des gains ainsi réalisés. C'est à ce titre que l'on peut citer la politique belge au Congo où une décision du Gouverneur Général a exonéré de taxation tous les bénéfices investis dans ce territoire.

Toutefois ces mesures paraissent insuffisantes pour insuffler à des pays sous-développés une vie économique nouvelle: certains secteurs en effet n'intéressent guère les activités des sociétés privées: dans le domaine de l'élevage ou dans celui de l'agriculture vivrière, les efforts ne sauraient guère venir que de la puissance tutrice: au reste, tant dans des territoires américains comme Porto Rico, qu'en Océanie ou en Afrique française, belge, anglaise ou portugaise, la Métropole a toujours considéré comme de son devoir d'assurer la protection de l'éleveur ou de l'agriculteur autochtone, et celui-ci, trop négligé jusqu'à présent, doit être un des principaux bénéficiaires de l'amélioration des conditions existantes.

On en a donc été conduit à la notion de Plan. Le philosophe anglais "BURNHAM" estimait qu'avec le XX^{ème} siècle s'ouvrait l'ère des organisateurs: dans ces territoires sous développés où tout est à faire, les organisateurs ont à oeuvrer, plus peut être que partout ailleurs.

Qu'est on au juste au Plan? C'est en premier lieu un inventaire des besoins et des ressources, puis un objectif à atteindre. Cet objectif implique une hiérarchie des urgences et des valeurs, un choix par conséquent basé sur des critères économiques et sociaux, une discipline enfin sans laquelle les efforts pourraient être ruinés d'un seul coup. Du point de vue financier, le Plan est avant tout une prévision de dépenses et une prévision de rentabilité.

Le Plan ne saurait être cependant d'une rigidité absolue: les buts cherchés ne sont pas d'accroître considerablement la production de certains produits aux dépends d'autres, sans tenir compte des besoins sociaux des populations: le plein emploi de la main d'oeuvre, l'amélioration des normes du travail doivent en fin de compte profiter essentiellement au pays lui-même: c'est dans la recherche d'une économie harmonieuse (s'il s'agit de territoires importants et disposant de ressources variées) élevant le standing de vie des habitants que doivent être faits les efforts.

Enfin le Plan ne s'adresse pas qu'au secteur public et c'est ce qui en fait son originalité par rapport aux plans quinquennaux soviétiques; une large partie de ses objectifs seront couverts grâce à des investissements privés, dirigés, aiguillés pourrait-on dire, avec l'accord des intéressés—sociétés, coopératives, producteurs mêmes.

Toutes les nations qui ont charge actuellement de territoires non autonomes suivent en ces matières des méthodes communes.

Le plan décennal belge du Congo met l'accent sur la nécessité de développer une économie intérieure à peine amorcée: le Ministre des Colonies, P. WIGNY, écrit dans la préface qu'il consacre à ce travail "L'économie congolaise est encore inorganique. C'est le moment de se demander comment ses traits peuvent être pétris afin que sa physionomie soit harmonieuse et quelle est la voie la plus courte qui conduit à la prospérité". Et sur l'application du Plan . . . "ces propositions pourront être améliorées: l'experience en sera la meilleure conseillère . . . la pratique nous montrera où nous nous sommes trompés . . . d'ailleurs le Plan décennal n'a pas un caractère contraignant. . . . Son approbation n'engage pas l'avenir". Le Plan consacre 25 milliards d'investissements publics pendant la période décennale et on estime à 25 autres milliards les investissements à effectuer par le secteur privé.

Le "Fundo de Fomento" ou plan d'équipement portugais pour l'Angola insiste sur les besoins actuels de ce territoire, sur la nécessité d'y promouvoir de nouvelles techniques, grâce à des apports massifs de capitaux (250,000 contos, soit £2.5 millions en 1948) sont prévus à cette fin. Le Mozambique dispose lui aussi d'un Plan de cet ordre, base sur les mêmes objectifs.

Les territoires britanniques possèdent également leur plan.

Le "Colonial Development and Welfare Act" de 1945 prévoyait une somme de £120 millions à répartir sur 10 ans (1946–1956) pour le développement et la recherche dans les territoires dépendant du "Colonial Office".

Dans le préambule de l'acte, il était indiqué que "dans les années à venir, des possibilités s'ouvrent pour l'amélioration des conditions sanitaires et sociales des peuples coloniaux, pour l'utilisation plus complète des ressources naturelles des colonies et pour l'extension des entreprises et des activités humaines". Il était également précisé que la somme prévue ne correspondait pas à la totalité des besoins des colonies pour la période indiquée, mais qu'il appartenait aux Gouvernements coloniaux d'augmenter les crédits qui leur étaient alloués en faisant appel aux fonds publics locaux et à l'assistance de l'entreprise et du commerce privé. Enfin, l'attribution d'une juste proportion de cette somme à chaque gouvernement colonial fut effectuée en tenant compte de l'étendue des territoires, de leur population, de leurs ressources et possibilités économiques, de leurs conditions actuelles de développement et de leurs moyens financiers locaux.*

Depuis lors, le Gouvernement britannique a créé deux grandes entreprises: "l'Overseas Food Corporation", chargée des études relatives à l'approvisionnement et aux besoins en matière agricole de la totalité des territoires britanniques, et la "Colonial Development Corporation", chargée de promouvoir à la recherche et à l'application de projets concernant le développement industriel, commercial et agricole (à l'exception des produits alimentaires) dans ces mêmes territoires.†

Le plan décennal général est suivi dans ses grandes lignes par chaque territoire: c'est ainsi que le Nigéria, qui dispose d'un budget Plan d'environ £25 millions, cherche à développer ses industries secondaires afin d'équilibrer au mieux l'économie de ce grand territoire, encore fortement centrée sur l'exportation des matières premières. Au Tanganyka, le Plan s'intéresse surtout aux arachides en raison des sols de la région Sud Est de ce pays qui conviennent particulièrement à cette plante, des facilités d'évacuation dans un district voisin de la mer et d'une main d'oeuvre suffisamment abondante. A l'ile Maurice, c'est la création de fermes produisant des denrées vivrières à quoi s'attache "l'Overseas Food Corporation". Ailleurs encore, dans les pays du Sud Est Asiatique, le riz est encouragé.

La Rhodésie du Sud, territoire qui ne dépend pas du "Colonial Office", possède son propre plan, assez ambitieux puisqu'il prévoit £53 millions à dépenser en quatre ans.

Le financement en est prévu par un emprunt placé à Londres de £25 millions et le restant par des valeurs locales (fonds de réserve, surplus budgétaires, capitaux

* Circulaire du 12 Novembre 1945 adressée par le Secrétaire d'Etat aux Colonies CH. HALL aux Gouvernements coloniaux de l'Empire britannique et présentée au Parlement en Décembre 1945.

† *Overseas Resources Development Act* 1948, chapitre 15.

privés, etc. . . .). Il faut distinguer dans les dépenses celles qui concernent les différents départements ministériels (£1 million pour l'irrigation, £8 millions pour les Travaux Publics et les routes), celles destinées aux organismes constitués spécialement en vue du développement de certaines branches (Rhodésian Iron and Steel Commission £4 millions—Electricity Supply Commission £5 millions, etc. . . .) et celles destinées à l'urbanisation des villes de Salisbury et de Bulawayo (£8 millions).

C'est là un excellent exemple de territoire insuffisamment développé, désireux par un "bond en avant" rapide de se moderniser totalement.

La France elle aussi a fait un gros effort. La loi du 30 Avril 1946, tendant à l'établissement et à l'exécution de plans d'équipement et de développement des territoires relevant du Département de la France d'Outre-Mer, prévoyait que des plans de développement économique et social de ces territoires seraient établis.

"Ils comporteront", disait l'article 1er de la loi "la transformation de ces territoires en pays modernes pour tout ce qui concerne leur équipement public et privé et engloberont la production, la transformation, la circulation et l'utilisation des richesses de toute nature desdits territoires".

Il était également précisé qu le Ministre de la France d'Outre-Mer se voyait investi des pouvoirs nécessaires pour orienter et coordonner les activités privées dans la mesure exigée par l'accomplissement des programmes.

Pratiquement le Plan a été mis en oeuvre par les moyens suivants:

Le financement est effectué par un fonds d'investissements pour le développement économique et social des territoires d'outre-mer (FIDES) alimenté en recettes par une dotation de la Métropole d'une part, par des contributions ou avances des territoires intéressés d'autre part. Des sociétés dites d'économie mixte, dans lesquelles l'Etat, les Collectivités publiques et les établissements publics d'outre-mer possèdent une participation majoritaire, ont été créés dans le but de développer certaines activités bien précises (Compagnie des Oléagineux Tropicaux, Electricité du Cameroun ou d'A.E.F.). C'est en somme un système qui rappelle un peu celui des "Corporations" britanniques, mais a objectifs plus près et plus limites.

Si l'on prend un cas concret, celui de l'Afrique Equatoriale Française, dont le Plan, après avoir été définitivement approuvé est en cours d'exécution, l'on voit qu'il dispose d'un crédit décennal de 108 milliards de francs français (environ £120 millions). Cette somme est particulièrement importante, car il s'agit d'un territoire notoirement sous développé avant la guerre (on estime qu'il n'y avait environ que 2 milliards de francs or investis dans cette Fédération en 1940).

Ce plan engage des dépenses qui s'élèveront depuis 1947 d'année en année de façon à atteindre leur maximum vers 1951–1952 et décroître ensuite jusqu'en 1957.

Ces investissements intéressent le secteur public mais le secteur privé peut également faire appel à des crédits de la Caisse Centrale de la France d'Outre-Mer, organisme qui gère les crédits du FIDES mais joue également le rôle d'une banque

d'affaires chargée de permettre l'investissement de fonds intéressant les secteurs plus particulièrement propices aux buts proposés.

Les dépenses sont divisées en deux parties, celles d'équipement économique (84 milliards), utilisées à l'amélioration des moyens de transport, à l'encouragement à certaines cultures, à la création d'une centrale hydro-électrique et au développement de l'industrie, et celles d'équipement social (24 milliards), consacrées à l'Enseignement, au Service de Santé ou à l'Habitat.

Les autres territoires de l'Union française, suivant l'état économique qu'-ils ont atteint jusqu'ici et suivant les possibilités qui s'offrent devant eux possèdent des plans de plus ou moins grande amplitude, mais fondés toujours sur les mêmes principes.

En Océanie, ce sera le développement de la production du coprah et l'organisation des pêcheries, en Nouvelle-Calédonie, l'implantation de nouveaux procédés dans l'extraction du nickel, en Afrique Occidentale, par l'intermédiaire de la Compagnie des Oléagineux Tropicaux, la création d'une culture mécanisée de l'arachide et d'une industrie de transformation des huiles végétales, au Sud et au Nord du Sahara enfin l'amélioration du cheptel bovin et ovin, par la construction de stations zootechniques et le forage de nouveaux points d'eau nécessaires au moment de la transhumance.

Ainsi toutes les puissances qui sont amenées à penser ces problèmes—et les Etats-Unis ainsi que les Pays-Bas ne font pas exception—aboutissent aux mêmes solutions: les mêmes buts ont été proposés à leur activité: elles ne faillissent pas à ce qu'elles considèrent leur mission de colonisation dans le meilleur sens d'un terme qui est souvent si ardemment et si injustement critiqué.

Si, quittant les détails souvent trop techniques de l'élaboration de ces plans, on veut envisager l'avenir des territoires non autonomes, l'on peut dire qu'au terme de cette période de dix ans fixés par ces programmes, l'Afrique au Sud du Sahara va passer du stade du sous-équipement à celui des pays partiellement développés.

Nous avons déjà reconnu que trois facteurs jouaient principalement en défaveur des pays non autonomes: l'homme, le sol, la distance, autant de difficultés à résoudre, autant de problèmes à envisager. Cela revient-il à dire que toutes ces difficultés et tous ces problèmes, du fait d'investissements financiers considérables et de l'apparition de nouvelles techniques vont pouvoir brusquement se trouver réduits à zéro: Je pense que tout homme qui a étudié un certain temps ces problèmes, qui a parcouru ces territoires et qui s'est penché sur leur actuelle évolution économique, ne peut répondre par l'affirmative. L'Afrique au Sud du Sahara, les archipels océaniens, certaines parties de l'Asie du Sud Est ou des Caraïbes vont certainement se trouver dans une situation bien meilleure que leur condition présente, mais ce ne peut être que par l'introduction des pays dépendants dans l'économie générale du monde que ceux-ci deviendront réellement des facteurs influents d'une économie mondiale pleinement consciente de ses possibilités. Certaines nations ont été ainsi conduites à se demander si par l'introduction d'une

population d'origine européenne la résolution du problème de l'évolution humaine, qui conditionne tous les autres, ne pourrait pas se trouver facilitée.

C'est une bien grave question que celle-ci: dans beaucoup de pays sous-développés où se sont constitués des noyaux européens, il y a souvent eu conflit entre eux et la population autochtone: mais il s'agit là d'un problème politique pour lequel des solutions bien diverses peuvent être préconisées. Si nous envisageons l'aspect purement économique de ce fait, il parait évident que dans certaines terres riches et non (ou faiblement) cultivées, la présence d'un colonat apportant des techniques modernes peut être un exemple extrèmement salutaire à des populations attachées à un outillage rudimentaire; l'exemple de la Lybie avant la guerre, des hauts plateaux de Rhodésie et d'Angola aujourd'hui, montre comment on peut parvenir, sur un sol peu fertile naturellement et jadis à peine cultivé à obtenir des rendements remarquables, grâce à une direction appropriée résidant sur ses propres terres.

Cependant, en général, et en dehors de certaines zones particulièrement favorisées, il semble que la colonisation européenne trouve son meilleur emploi lorsqu'elle se borne à encadrer, à choisir et à organiser des disciplines économiques plus qu'à participer directment à ces disciplines.

Enfin il n'est pas douteux que l'introduction massive de travailleurs non qualifiés en provenance de l'Europe se heurte à des obstacles que l'on doit d'autant plus fortement souligner que la Convention de Coopération Economique européenne prévoit dans son article 8 que l'établissement des travailleurs doit être assuré "dans des conditions satisfaisantes au point de vue économique et social". Dans la plupart des zones tropicales, le climat leur interdit en fait une activité physique suffisante pour qu'ils puissent obtenir une rémunération satisfaisante. Les modes et niveaux de vie différents, et généralement inférieurs, de la main d'oeuvre autochtone peuvent rendre la concurrence de celle ci redoutable. Il est à craindre que ces travailleurs soient au bout de peu de temps remplacés dans leurs emplois par des éléments locaux acceptant des salaires plus bas et ne finissent pas constituer une classe de "poor white" qui poserait des problèmes sociaux très graves.

Il reste cependant qu'une main d'oeuvre qualifiée en provenance de pays possédant des techniciens est nécessaire pour le développement des travaux à entreprendre dans le cadre des programmes prévus; mais l'intérêt qui s'attache à la constitution de sociétés importantes (de travaux publics par exemple) ne doit pas faire oublier la nécessité d'une grande prudence en ces matières, afin de ne pas créer, une fois terminés les travaux pour lesquels la main d'oeuvre a été engagée, un hiatus dans l'évolution économique du territoire.

Néanmoins, et quelque intéressants que soient les exemples que peut fournir un colonat européen, cette évolution doit avant tout profiter aux habitants autochtones des territoires non autonomes: Les gouvernements ayant souscrit à certains principes définis dans la Charte des Nations-Unies, ou s'étant engagés à

respecter ces principes, ne peuvent s'en écarter: Or, aux termes de l'article XI de la Charte, ces pays "reconnaissent le principe de la primauté des intérêts des habitants de ces territoires et acceptent comme une mission sacrée l'obligation de favoriser dans toute la mesure du possible leur prospérité . . . d'encourager les travaux de recherches, de coopérer avec eux . . . et avec les organismes internationaux spécialisés, en vue d'atteindre effectivement les buts sociaux, économiques et scientifiques" auxquels ils ont souscrit.

De plus, certains territoires d'outre-mer ont été placés sous le régime de tutelle créé par les Chapitres XII et XIII de la Charte des Nations Unies, les anciennes puissances mandataires devenant les autorités chargés de l'Administration.

L'évolution actuelle s'effectue dans le sens de l'intégration progressive des populations autochtones aux techniques en provenance des pays développés: des efforts importants avaient déjà été faits, au temps de la période proprement "coloniale" pour l'éducation et la formation professionnelle des populations: les projets et les plans actuels prévoient un accroissement de cet effort. Même dans les contrées où la population, en raison de ses dispositions naturelles et de son degré d'évolution est particulièrement apte à fournir une main d'oeuvre spécialisée, il est nécessaire de lui offrir les moyens de formation qui lui permettront d'acquérir une qualification.

Dans les territoires qui ne jouissent pas du même avantage et où le manque de main d'oeuvre spécialisée est d'autant plus sensible, la formation professionnelle revêt une importance particulière pour le développement de tous les secteurs d'activité et notamment du secteur agricole: cette oeuvre, difficile et de longue haleine ne saurait donc être différée.

Mais si la question de la main d'oeuvre ne semble devoir être résolue immédiatement car elle met en jeu trop de facteurs humains pour que l'on puisse négliger ce point de vue, il n'en est pas de même des techniques que les nations qui ont à leur charge des territoires non autonomes se sont engagées à promouvoir au cours des années à venir. Aussi est-il important de souligner les prévisions de certains objectifs de production qui permettront d'ici à quelques années une certaine intégration de ces contrées dans l'économie mondiale, but qui demeure l'essentiel des programmes proposés par les Nations tutrices.

Ces objectifs ne sont pas limitatifs: les plans d'équipement du secteur public, d'une part, les investissements privés de l'autre, sont suffisamment souples pour laisser une marge assez large aux possibilités. Néanmoins, dans une certaine mesure, on peut s'efforcer de chiffrer certains objectifs.

Dans la production agricole, par exemple, si l'on prend l'arachide, un des principaux produits faisant l'objet des exportations africaines, l'on reconnaît que les chiffres moyens de 1936–38 étaient les territoires dépendants de 5 puissances dites coloniales (Belgique, France, Pays-Bas, Portugal, Royaume-Uni) de l'ordre de 370.000 tonnes d'huile; en 1953, ces mêmes territoires disposeront vraisemblablement d'une quantité exportable de l'ordre de 640.000 tonnes. Pour

l'huile de palme on compte que ce chiffre atteindra 725.000 tonnes à la même date contre 338.000 avant la guerre.

Le sisal passerait de 250.000 tonnes à 271.000, le coton de 156.000 à 243.000, le caoutchouc de 791.000 à 1.587.000. Au contraire le cacao, qui au cours de l'époque d'avant guerre semble avoir atteint un équilibre et dont la consommation se développe dans les territoires mêmes qui le produisent ne verra pas favoriser un développement de ses exportations.

Du côté des matières premières d'origine minérale, les mêmes progressions sont envisagées:

3 milliards de tonnes de charbon contre 2 avant guerre,
483.000 tonnes de cuivre contre 367.000,
162.000 tonnes d'étain contre 113.

Du côte des productions destinées à la consommation locale, un effort égal, sinon supérieur sera entrepris: mil, maïs, produits de l'élevage, font l'objet d'un gros effort de développement, qu'il est sans doute plus difficile de chiffrer exactement, compte tenu de l'inégalité des récoltes, mais les programmes comportent des sommes considérables à cette fin. Le plan de l'A.E.F., pour en citer un example, prévoit pour le riz la création de plantations pilotes dans les régions déjà productrices, ainsi que l'aménagement d'une zone rizicole entièrement nouvelle, travaux pour lesquels des investissements de l'ordre de 4 milliards de francs sont prévus. L'Angola consacre une importante partie de son "Fundo de Fomento" à l'amélioration de l'élevage dans le sud de ce territoire et la construction de nouvelles stations zootechniques munies de tous les derniers perfectionnements (procédés d'insémination artificielle, etc.) des stations européennes—Les territoires belges et britanniques font des efforts analogues car la condition de tout développement industriel, de toute activité secondaire est évidemment la création d'une agriculture susceptible de fournir à la population des centres urbains tous les produits nécessaires à sa vie de tous les jours.

Cet accroissement des activités complexes nécessite d'autres moyens pour lesquels les territoires sont d'ores et déjà passés à l'exécution: en premier lieu, l'extension et la multiplication des sources d'énergie pour lesquels des crédits considérables sont inscrits au plan de développement, en second lieu l'industrialisation progressive des territoires non autonomes.

Il est reconnu en effet qu'un territoire ne peut entrer dans le jeu de l'économie mondiale que s'il dispose d'une économie intérieure déjà complexe par elle-même: avant la guerre cette notion avait été reprise par certains géopoliticiens qui estimaient que seuls étaient viables économiquement les grands espaces politiques: en fait il n'en est pas forcément ainsi; un territoire, petit par lui-même, mais jouissant d'une économie heureusement équilibrée, construite si l'on peut dire "à l'échelle humaine", peut être un organisme parfaitement vivant au sein de la communauté des nations: c'est une question de ressources, de mode de vie, de

symbiose entre les facteurs économiques et sociaux—même si quelques parties des territoires non autonomes sont déjà parvenues à créer une industrie répondant à certains besoins primordiaux de leurs populations, on ne peut toutefois dire qu'il en est de même pour tous—La création d'industries nouvelles (filatures—huileries, savonneries—métallurgie—chantiers fluviaux et maritimes—ateliers de construction de matériel de chemin de fer) répond à cette tendance; toutefois il parait essentiel de limiter l'industrialisation des territoires d'outre-mer à des activités économiquement rentables: il serait en effet contraire à leurs intérêts et également aux conceptions internationales actuelles d'installer des industries dans des conditions telles qu'elles ne pourraient vivre que sous la protection de mesures restrictives, barrières douanières ou autres qui, en entravant les échanges, provoquent la hausse des prix et ralentissent en fait l'élévation du niveau général de vie.

Sous ces réserves le développement industriel est un des principaux moyens d'améliorer la balance des payements de chaque territoire et de lui permettre d'investir et d'acquérir des quantités plus importantes des biens d'équipement. Dans certains cas enfin, la transformation sur place des produits du cru permet, en évitant les frais de transport de la matière première et du produit fini, laisse à la disposition de la consommation locale des marchandises à meilleur prix.

En dernier lieu le développement économique nécessite des créations de voies de transport modernes et de grand débit: équipements portuaires, constructions de chemins de fer et de routes, amélioration des voies navigables, tel est le moyen qui pourra seul permettre ces échanges accrus qui représentent la caractéristique d'une économie moderne. Dans l'état actuel des choses, les voies de communication ne sont guère destinées qu'à assurer le trafic des produits exportés et importés et dans le bilan de rentabilité les échanges internes ne constituent qu'un poste de peu d'importance. Là, un programme de coopération internationale pourra être mis sérieusement en action car l'étroite imbrication des divers territoires sous-développés au sein d'un même ensemble géographique réclame impérieusement des solutions d'ensemble. La conférence des transports africains qui s'ouvre à Johannesburg en Octobre prochain, des mesures locales tendant à assurer au meilleur compte les transports intérieurs, sont autant de marques de l'intérêt que les puissances administrantes apportent à l'examen de ces questions un peu négligées jusqu'ici.

Enfin, de nouvelles perspectives s'élèvent, en matière de coopération générale, dans certains cas l'équipement des anciens pays coloniaux ne sera pas le seul fait des Unions qui les protègent, mais pourra exiger un effort d'une portée internationale à la mesure des ressources immenses des U.S.A. C'est là le but du 4ème Point TRUMAN.

Ainsi le développement économique des territoires non autonomes est-il maintenant solidement pensé, sérieusement étudié: loin de vouloir créer de toutes pièces une économie artificielle, basée sur l'exportation et l'importation de quelques denrées, comme c'était le cas au cours de la période précédente, les pays qui

ont à leur charge ces contrées appliquent ils tous leurs efforts à faire entrer petit à petit celles-ci dans le circuit mondial; investissements, plans d'équipement ne sont pas fonction des besoins des pays développés, mais bien fonction des besoins des pays non autonomes: que tout, dans cette oeuvre actuelle, ne soit pas remarquable, que des considérations égoïstes accompagnent certaines mesures, il ne servirait à rien de n'en pas tenir compte: aucune oeuvre humaine n'est parfaite, mais il semble cependant que les territoires non autonomes soient entrés ou commencent à entrer dans une nouvelle période de leur vie économique, celle de la maturité.

Après une venue au monde bien pénible, une adolescence traversée de crises souvent sévères, ils débutent dans une vie nouvelle, aidés par leurs tuteurs naturels. L'essentiel, ces programmes que l'on a pu nommer "la justification morale du rapport des forces", sont aussi la prise de conscience du territoire sous développé par lui-même: l'homme reste le facteur essentiel et c'est grâce à ses efforts, qu'il soit producteur autochtone ou technicien venu de pays plus développés, qu'une vie meilleure sera possible pour toutes ces contrées et qu'elles pourront, économiquement comme socialement, s'intégrer en définitive dans un monde uni.

Summary

Economic Development in Non-Autonomous Territories

NOWADAYS there is underlying unity in the basic means used to develop economic possibilities towards an ever-increasing satisfaction of human needs, means which derive from the tools (the exchange system, money, production itself) forged in our Industrial Revolution. Autonomous states have, moreover, full sovereignty over their economy within the limits of international agreements. The new states of South East Asia now politically independent have the choice of finding a stable economy by keeping past links or by widening their economic contacts; but non-autonomous territories without political or economic sovereignty are like minors unable to act without the help of their guardians.

French North Africa excepted, these territories lie in the tropical and equatorial zones of Africa, Oceania and America and mainly in Africa south of the Sahara, a vast region with certain definite geographical characteristics. Economic development depends on factors of soil, climate and population and, after these, on capital, ease of communications, etc. In these respects conditions in non-autonomous territories are particularly unfavourable: poor soils lacking in humus exposed to rapid chemical action, erosion and laterite deposits; a hot and humid climate conducive to endemic diseases of all kinds; and, in consequence, population density is low (fourteen to the square mile or, without desert areas, less than twenty-one) and it is unevenly distributed. Such conditions would not prevent

economic development, but communications are hampered by waterways navigable only in their middle reaches (in Oceania a similar isolation, in the midst of an immense ocean, is noted in the small archipelagos). Further, natives still go on exploiting natural resources primitively (natural crops, hunting, fishing, agriculture, etc.), life is precarious, economy is local, commerce restricted, native capital and money practically non-existent, mineral wealth little known and still less worked.

Development towards a more advanced economy can be seen to pass through three stages:

1. Exchange at trading posts along the coast without penetration inland: ultimately detrimental to economic development by draining away raw materials and excluding local processing of goods.

2. The colonial stage (exploration and the carving up of Africa and Oceania) with economic development keyed to the needs of the colonizing power: raw materials for goods of doubtful utility, prices according to world market fluctuations, little or no development of technique, the drain of mining and lumbering by concessionary companies with transferred labour; yet with a measure of protection and financial association with the colonizing power, and development of communications for trade indirectly benefiting native peoples (facilities for travel, consumption of new types of goods); in fact, development in the interests of the natives only in rare privileged regions.

3. The stage opened by the Second World War. Three factors (political, economic and technical) to be noted:

(*a*) Political evolution under two forms: a claim to economic rights not excluding collaboration with the trustee power, or, in settlement colonies, a will to direct local economy by means of local governmental bodies; everywhere a claim to economic self-rule or independence linked with nationalism.

(*b*) Economic developments brought about during the recent conflict by severance of links with home countries: the birth of regional or inter-regional relations and the creation of industries.

(*c*) Transport by air facilitating travel and research, permitting the creation of new outlets, freeing regional travel from road-making and loss of time.

Against these factors disruptive of existing relations may be set others that tighten existing links: a rising demand for tropical products and non-ferrous ores in Europe and, in Africa, a growing need of nourishing foodstuffs.

A new chapter has opened: non-autonomous countries must be equipped for large-scale production, technical training given to the population, standard of life improved and development planned according to resources, manpower and ease of communication. Private capital and private technicians have in the past

achieved much, but the essential is now large-scale development for the benefit of the territories and the trustee power must in large measure take up the task. Whence the need for a Plan with an inventory of needs and resources, definite objectives with priorities based on economic and social criteria, and an estimate of financial expenditure and returns, aiming at raising the status of the people in a harmonious and flexible economy and making use of both public and private enterprise.

Large-scale regional and local plans of this kind are being worked out and applied in Portuguese Africa, the Belgian Congo, the British Colonial Empire and French Africa, as well as by the Dutch and the Americans, the aim being the fulfilment of the colonial mission assumed, and the result will be at least part development of the territories. But difficulties of human evolution, of soil and distance, will not entirely disappear and some countries have wondered whether the introduction of a European population might not speed up the process; a European population is best used for direction and guidance, climatic conditions and native labour competition preclude the introduction of unskilled labour from Europe; skilled workers are needed to implement the plan, but their introduction must not retard or prevent the technical training of the native; and such immigration can only commend itself to the signatories of Art. IX of the U.N. Charter if it benefits the inhabitants of the territories.

Plans must aim at increased facilities for technical training of natives to meet the need for skilled labour, particularly in agriculture. Techniques to be favoured depend on certain objectives towards integration of territories in the world economy; there are, for example, plans for marked increases in the production of groundnuts, palm oil, sisal, cotton, rubber, coal, copper and tin for world markets, but not of cocoa; and of millet, maize and cattle for local consumption. Such increases will need accessorily greater power resources and progressive industrialization. A country entering the world economy must have a balanced economy to survive and balance means economically profitable enterprises without protection to create or maintain artificial internal prices which check the rise of the standard of living. Sane industrial development can ensure balance of payments, local transformation industries reduce local prices. Economic development means development of ports, railways and waterways, a matter which will call for international co-operation, and large-scale operations will mean calls on U.S. capital in implementation of President Truman's Point Four.

Economic development of non-autonomous territories is being seriously thought out, not to create artificial economies as in the past, but to give an overall plan for bringing them gradually into the orbit of world trade; with all their shortcomings, these plans promise a new period of economic maturity for non-autonomous peoples. Man himself remains the basic factor and thanks to his efforts all these territories will be able to find their place in a united world.

Summary of Discussion

Mr GALLAGHER: (1) Believed that State control would preponderate in the planning under discussion, for example, land erosion. (2) He doubted whether Western Europe would be able to produce enough capital for these plans and whether public corporations were the best instruments for carrying them out. American capital was necessary and this would have to be public capital. (3) Only recently had any attempt been made to evaluate the national income of colonies but this was essential. (4) We must avoid industrialization for prestige value. Industrialization in Africa should be done so as to fit in with world requirements. (5) The linkage of Africa with the world economy might lead to a fall in the standard of living.

Professor MARZORATI said various metropolitan states had drawn up plans of development which aimed at raising the purchasing power of colonial peoples—agriculture was all-important but some industrialization must take place. European planters exercised a didactic influence on indigenous peoples. For them cheap native labour was necessary and it was therefore in their interests to maintain the existing standard of living. Certain crops were reserved for Europeans and here there was no didactic influence. The first generation of settlers were picked people but their sons were not always so able. Hence there arose a colour bar and various ambitions of the transplanted Europeans which ran counter to the wishes of the mother country and to the interests of the indigenous peoples. While the existence of a European agricultural population could be useful it also could be harmful when it checked development among the people of the country.

Dr MAIR thought that the objection to the public corporation was not that it was amenable to political pressure but that it was subject to no control and could draw on public funds. People tended to be prejudiced in favour of such organizations since they assumed that the state would be the model employer. In public corporations the conditions under which labour was recruited were not notably better than those under private corporations backed up by a sufficiency of capital. The groundnuts scheme started under great difficulties. It had to draw upon people who had never been wage earners before and the experts in charge had no experience of handling tribal people.

Mr FLEMING believed that the Four Point programme was not widely accepted or even understood in the United States. It was looked upon as a humanitarian rather than an economic idea. As the capacity to produce was greater than that to consume in the United States, in time, a surplus would be available for export. How those exports were to be disposed of had not yet been decided. Much private investment by Americans abroad was unlikely and the programme would be left to the government. Twenty-five million dollars had been appropriated for use on initial educational and exploratory work. Americans required to be educated

and the needs abroad made known. Large sums would be available no doubt for future developments.

Monsieur LANDRY considered that State control was necessary until territories could look after themselves. All French plans were subject to the approval or amendment of the local assembly as well as to that of the National Assembly. There was no slavery to the plan and he looked upon return to private enterprise, without a plan, as retrogression. While the Marshall Plan would free some European resources for colonial developments the carrying of the Four Point programme into effect would be essential after 1952.

African revenues were well known, consisting of political taxes, duties or various kinds and production figures. He agreed that industry must be self-supporting and that questions of political prestige were irrelevant but the place of Africa in the world economy was far too small. The ordinary life of the European planter was not an ideal for the native inhabitant of Africa. White colonization was not in the latter's interest though pilot plantation schemes could be useful. It should be the role of the European to educate and advise the indigenes rather than to establish an old-fashioned plantation economy. Therefore he favoured the establishment of local research stations and believed that the best results could be obtained from a state plan. The natives needed from America equipment for agriculture and industry, not an agricultural surplus. There was a disequilibrium between American exports and imports in her African trade. America must buy from Africa as well as sell to her (for example, timber).

Discussion was continued in the afternoon. Monsieur LANDRY said that by affecting the Bantu in the South and East of Africa more than other parts of the continent white civilization had destroyed their adaptability. For some reason mixed Bantu and other races learned things easier than the pure Bantu. Again, in the Gold Coast and in the Cameroons, people had developed techniques of their own. The West African learnt more quickly than Africans elsewhere. Where whites predominated the Bantu tended to withdraw within himself. A norm for judging peoples was not possible because sometimes a people excels in one thing, sometimes in another. He believed that development might have been held up to some extent by tariff frontiers but, since customs duties constituted the main resources from which the colonies derived their funds, they were necessary if developments were to be carried out. Plans of development, properly conceived and directed, were of great value provided the interests of the people themselves were borne in mind. State-controlled industries were not a new thing.

The Role of the Anthropologist in Non-Autonomous Territories

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THE approach of the anthropologist to the problems we are discussing here is rather different from that of anyone directly engaged in the tasks of government, evangelization or economic development. The " practical " man, as he is so often called in contrast to the seeker after knowledge, has before him certain more or less clearly defined aims—to establish law and order, to raise the standard of living, to spread Christianity, to increase production. All these aims are assumed to be desirable, and this assumption being made, they are further assumed to be attainable.

The anthropologist is not primarily concerned with these attempts to transform the societies among which he works. He is certainly not committed to the belief that the transformations proposed are desirable, though he may see that the attempt to make them is inevitable in view of the values and interests characteristic of the European societies from which the initiative comes. Anthropology is the comparative study of those societies which are sometimes described as " simpler " or " small-scale ", the analysis of the organization by means of which they maintain themselves and hand on knowledge and values through the generations. Anyone engaged in such a study must divest himself of prejudices in favour of the institutions and values among which he has himself grown up; it is a part of his task to see the society he is studying through the eyes of its members. This makes him aware, as the layman often is not, of the relativity of human values. He questions the simple proposition that the customs and standards of his own compatriots are inherently better than anyone else's, though he accepts the fact that those of what is loosely called the Western world are more appropriate to modern conditions of mass production and large-scale economic co-operation than are those which the first European penetration encountered in Africa and Asia. Since, however, he makes himself the interpreter of the indigenous values, he is often accused of romanticizing the primitive, of seeking to retard the development of colonial peoples and preserve them like specimens in a human zoo, and of opposing changes in their institutions which, it is argued, are essential for their adaptation to modern conditions. Some critics of the point of view ascribed to the anthropologist dispense with reasoned argument and simply assume that he is an enemy of something undefined called " progress ".

If the charge were sufficiently carefully framed, it might be successfully pressed

home, for two reasons. One is that anthropologists, in their intensive first-hand studies, are brought up forcibly against the evidence of strain and difficulty in the adjustment of colonial societies to the new world of the twentieth century. They see the human picture, as those who conceive the situation in terms of opposed abstractions, " progress " and " reaction ", rarely do. The other, related, reason is the anthropologist's conception of an integrated society as something desirable, an idea which to most laymen is quite unfamiliar. An integrated society might be described as one in which the established institutions, with the rights, obligations and values associated with them, are generally accepted; to its own members it forms an intelligible world in which their place is clear. Idealized pictures of primitive societies have assumed, implicitly or explicitly, that the value of this social integration is so great as to outweigh the physical insecurity, the very low material standards, and the limitations on individual opportunity, which also generally characterize them.

Few anthropologists to-day would consider themselves entitled to draw up such a balance sheet, but all are aware that modern developments, whatever benefits they have brought in other directions, are at least temporarily destructive of social integration, and that we do not see at present how it will be re-created. The anthropologist's contribution to the study of modern colonial problems consists in his analysis of the changes in social structure which modern influences have produced.

While the practical man is concerned with bringing about in colonial territories the changes which he considers ought to take place, the anthropologist observes those which are in fact taking place. He sees certain common features throughout the colonial world and indeed beyond its limits—common because of the general similarity of the forces at work and the situations in which they operate.

The recipients of the new influences are in the main small political units, largely self-contained economically, in which subsistence is secured by the co-operation of kindred and defence by the organization for war purposes of the whole man-power of the community. In the field of obligation, each man's dependence on co-operation with his neighbours is direct and obvious; in that of morals, he is exposed to the constant judgment of a public opinion from which there is no escape. Specific obligations and general standards of behaviour may be flouted in particular cases, but their validity is not questioned. The obligations may bear hardly on certain members of the community, the moral standards be considered by some Europeans inferior to their own, but it is the fact of their general acceptance that makes an integrated society. They are accepted in part because they are inescapable, and in part because they are solemnly impressed on each generation as it grows up and supported by the sanctions of religious belief.

The new values and opportunities that Western influences have brought to these societies are often summed up in the word " individualistic ", which even in these days is usually regarded as a term of approval. Their general effect is to

make it possible for any given person to maintain himself without assistance from his fellows, and even to enrich himself by disregarding recognized obligations, or raising recognized claims to an exorbitant level, and in the process, if need be, to detach himself completely from his own people and the possibility of their censure. New opportunities are offered for enterprise, undoubtedly, and greater material rewards than any qualities could have earned in the past, but these opportunities are only too often also opportunities to escape from the restraints which, irksome as they are to the individual, are necessary for the maintenance of any social order.

In the old systems respect for authority and for seniority, which went hand in hand, were impressed on every member of society from childhood, and were reinforced by religious beliefs and by the concentration in the hands of the older generation of such wealth as existed. The new order has shifted the economic balance. Not only is the younger generation independent of the elder, but the elders are coming to depend on them for all the newly-found wants which can only be satisfied through the medium of money. To acquire money, a man must attain standards of technical performance acceptable on the impersonal world market, but social approval of his conduct in general is not a necessary condition. In a world where the means to material advancement is knowledge not possessed by the elders, their authority is no longer accepted on the ground of their superior wisdom. More often than not new employments take the wage-earner far from his own people and from any public opinion to which he feels accountable.

Thus the day-to-day sanctions for social obligation of personal contact and dependence on the approval of others are losing their force, and at the same time, the more remote, but nevertheless important, influence of religious belief has been weakened by the introduction of a new religion which has successfully suppressed most of the manifestations of the old. The result, for a very large number of people in every colonial territory, is a breakdown of the restraints and an abandonment of the duties imposed by custom without the acceptance of other restraints and duties more appropriate to the new system.

" Individualism " has indeed set in, but it too often operates to distort traditional institutions without superseding them. Examples of the introduction of commercial values into customary relationships are the young men in West Africa who demand a wage for working on their fathers' land, the husbands on the copper belt who regard their wives as employees hired by the marriage payment, the fathers everywhere who demand higher and higher bride-price, the trustees for group land who make a profit from their right to allocate it.

Moreover, full opportunity is rarely given for an effective adaptation to the new commercial world, and there are many places where deliberate policy has made such adaptation impossible, where the indigenous population is debarred from participation in the new system except on the terms laid down by the alien rulers. Where no such limitations are imposed, one sees the development of a

middle class and an intelligentsia—overlapping though not identical groups—who move wholly in the world of cash transactions, have adopted European ways of living, not only in externals but to a large extent in values and are building up or taking over, with or without external aid, appropriate economic, political, educational and religious institutions. This is what one finds in British West Africa, and, of course, to a far greater extent in the Far East, in countries which have ceased to be, or have never been, colonies in the political sense, and it is perhaps by considering all these together that we shall see the essential sociological problem of the non-autonomous territories. The problem can be obscured by too much insistence on the fact that they are not autonomous. It may well be that, so long as they are in a state of political subordination, it can never be solved; but it is certain that no change in political status by itself will solve it. That merely puts the responsibility for the solution on other shoulders.

The problem is that of the unequal rate of adaptation of different sections of a population which forms a single political unit. Often the position is complicated by the fact that the population is not culturally homogeneous, but even within the limits of a single traditional culture, we find the wide gulf between those who still look to the old customs and values as a guide to conduct and those who have rejected them for the commercial " individualistic " way of life, while between the two are the large number to whom the new conditions offer an escape from restraint without demanding new loyalties to replace the old.

Mr. Furnivall, in his illuminating writings on South-East Asia, has found one reason for this maladjustment in the changed character of education. Dealing with a region where formal education was part of the indigenous culture, he points out that whereas the schools used to teach people how to live, now they teach only how to get a living; or rather, as his own description shows, it is only for the latter purpose that the pupils attend them. In his view, as education becomes the vehicle of nationalism instead of the instrument of paternal government, it will again inculcate the sense of obligation which schooling in colonial territories, as he sees it, so signally fails to give. It is certainly true that in China, where great efforts have been made to increase the extent of literacy, they have been accompanied by a considerable amount of indoctrination, and that nationalist doctrine, not unnaturally, evokes a wider response than the Christian morality which is its counterpart in the schools organized by missions for colonial governments.

One question is, how far this new generalized loyalty can be made to issue in specific actions of the kind that were previously dictated by the claims of the small interdependent kin-group. The old, the sick, the widow and the fatherless looked for succour to the claims of kinship. As these claims lose their force, what is to take their place? Europe found the answer, at one stage in the giving of alms as a religious duty, later in the voluntary activity of public-spirited persons, to-day in social insurance, which is too seldom translated, in the minds of either contributors or beneficiaries, into terms of the responsibility of a community for all its

members. Where will the newly-emerging nations, lacking as they are in the resources necessary for large-scale insurance, find *their* answer?

Given that means be found to replace the family as an insurance against calamity, there still arises the question of its function as a source of moral authority. In western Europe this function has come to be shared with the school, and though there is disagreement about the value of the result, at least everybody goes to school and there is no direct contradiction between the standards of teachers and those of parents. In the colonial territories by no means everybody goes to school, and the school as the agency of dissemination of the new values often exerts its influence in opposition to that of the family. Modern education is the indispensable bridge between the old world and the new, but so long as only a small minority cross the bridge, it is a force of disintegration for the society as a whole. Not only does it create a sharp division between the many and the few, but to those who do not fully appreciate it or know it only at second-hand, it appears merely as an encouragement to despise as old-fashioned the restraints imposed by custom and not as the source of any alternative standards.

These are the problems of the more fortunate colonial territories, those where conditions making adaptation difficult have not been deliberately created. The essential favourable elements in their situation are two; that those individuals who have assimilated the new techniques and standards are able to take their place as full members of the new commercial society, and that the new economy does not involve the separation of men from their wives and children. Over a great part of Africa and the south Pacific these essentials are not present.

In very few colonies is agricultural production for the world market based on the enterprise of individual peasants. Where this has not been attempted, or, as is often the case, has not been found possible, estate production has called for the concentration at a small number of points of a labour force larger than can ever be found in the immediate neighbourhood. Mines, with their armies of thousands and hundreds of thousands of workers, have made the same demand on a far greater scale. Had the situation been met by the migration of whole populations, the social problem of developing common standards for the new communities, and standards appropriate to an entirely new type of life, would have been hard enough. Historically, this solution was not possible. The new enterprises could not wait for such spontaneous migration as has built up the large industrial centres of Europe. Indeed, in order to obtain the labour without which they could not have established themselves at all, they had recourse to, or at the best condoned, measures of force or fraud which world opinion to-day condemns; and justified their action by the argument that in primitive society the whole burden of production is borne by the women, so that to oblige the men to work for wages is to confer a benefit upon the community. The question of the ethics of compulsion is no longer a live issue; it is the impersonal force of circumstances that to-day sends Africans journeying hundreds of miles to the gold mines of the Rand or the

Rhodesian copper belt, and we are now beginning to discuss the ethics of compulsory restriction on this movement. But the legacy of the early days remains in the assumption that the African man—and the South Sea islander and the coolie from Indo-China too—is a detachable part of the society to which he belongs, yet at the same time a part which can be returned to its place whenever European enterprise does not need him. This assumption is convenient to those who hold it, for it absolves them from many responsibilities which are held in a modern industrial society to fall on employers or the State—the provision of family accommodation, the payment of a family wage, social services, insurance against those risks which in the old subsistence society either did not arise or were met through the sense of solidarity among kinsmen. Where these provisions are not made, there is no possibility of the emergence of an integrated society drawing its subsistence from the wage-labour of its able-bodied men.

Yet the fact is that the tribal societies are themselves in a state of disintegration, of which the migration of the men to centres of employment is the prime cause. It is not only anthropologists who have noted this; as soon as any considerable proportion of the men begin to go away to work, the results are apparent almost to the casual observer; on the economic side in houses falling down, ground not cleared for planting and consequent shortage of food, on the social, in deserted wives and children growing up without paternal control. Government agencies in most African colonies have counted the number of men away and know their proportion to the total man-power, and the figures themselves are regarded with alarm; in certain areas, anthropologists have examined the facts more closely and traced out in detail the effects on the societies concerned. Their studies reveal the profound internal contradictions of a society in which wage-labour is indispensable and which yet is not allowed to be a society of wage-labourers—a society whose accepted necessities include some which can only be bought for cash and others which can only be produced by direct labour, so that though work abroad is necessary, its product is not a substitute for work not done at home.

The most striking fact that these inquiries have shown is that under this system the economic requirements of the " labour reservoir " societies cannot be met by the available man-power, since to meet them the same man would have to work simultaneously in places thousands of miles apart. The younger men, working for their father's tax, their marriage payment, the equipment of a house, clothes for their children, now have the role which in Europe we call the bread-winner's —but bread is the one thing which they do not procure, and which, in their absence, their families lack. Examination shows that the periods of absence of the wage-earners from their homes are growing longer and longer, their visits home not only more infrequent but of shorter duration. There is not, as might once have been hoped and is still in some quarters assumed, a rhythm of alternate work in the town and on the farm; there are long absences at work with short holidays at home. At the best, the absentees send money and goods home to their

dependants; at the worst, they forget them and form new ties in the towns. In either case, the village in the tribal area is a place of women, children and old men.

The population of the towns equally lacks the essentials of a coherent society. It consists predominantly of young men, either unmarried or separated from their wives, not long resident in one place, periodically travelling to and from the native areas or moving from one town to another as they change employment. The assumption that the entire urban native population is of this character has not been pushed to its logical conclusion, and some provision is made for the housing of families by most of the large cities, in addition to the allocation of land where natives can build their own houses. A few mining companies provide married quarters for their employees. Nowhere, however, except on the Katanga mines, is there a house for every African who in fact has a wife, and the ideal of married quarters for the whole industrial population seems Utopian in relation to what has actually been found possible anywhere in southern Africa. Where housing is provided, it is almost never adequate for a family with adolescent children or adult dependants. In these circumstances, men hesitate to bring their wives to town and parents to let their daughters go. Parents in the towns who have a sense of responsibility for their children send them away to relatives in the country as soon as they are past infancy. It is almost impossible for old men past work to live in the towns. Yet old people in the tribal areas may find themselves without support because all the members of the younger generation from whom they could claim it are away at work.

Thus, while the traditional society of the native areas is being broken down, there is no new community growing up outside. That continuity between the generations on which the transmission of social values depends is impossible for all but a small minority of the population, and there is equally lacking the stability of residence and continuous personal contact between adults which make public opinion an effective social force. I say nothing of the poverty which drives Africans in the towns to illegal means of livelihood; this is the major social problem from the point of view of administration, and does indeed disastrously aggravate the difficulty of building up a coherent society with new standards. But the root of the difficulty is the lack of continuity, if not deliberately engineered, at least regarded with indifference.

The impossibility of a new integration becomes complete where the policy of racial segregation is accepted, and the African is debarred from entering into competition for employment with the European, at the same time that he is the indispensable source of unskilled labour for European enterprise and unable to live without supplying it. Exponents of this policy profess to believe that a complete modern African society, representing all classes and professions, should and could, grow up in those areas which have been reserved for African occupation. Perhaps its more ingenuous supporters do believe this. I think I have given sufficient reasons why it is impossible.

I have been dealing not in esoteric mysteries, but in facts that are widely known, and matters of concern to many persons besides anthropologists. I have tried to present them, however, in such a way as to show what the special approach of the anthropologist can contribute to their interpretation. It remains to discuss the question whether his role must be limited to that of interpreter. The answer depends not only on whether he is in fact in a position to prescribe practical courses of action but also on whether the public in general are prepared to regard him as qualified to do so.

On the first point, the anthropologist is under the same difficulty as most other social scientists, namely that he is dealing in a material capable of only very partial control—the sum total of the actions of whole populations. The anthropologist may sometimes think that the " practical man " needs to be warned against the assumption that colonial societies are infinitely malleable, but if he expects, on the ground of his knowledge of them, to pronounce with authority on what policy ought to be, he is making the same false assumption about his own society, whose vested interests and cherished prejudices will not melt away at a word from him. Moreover, the complex nature of the phenomena that he studies is such that he can rarely offer specific solutions for particular problems. A pessimistic social scientist once went so far as to say that all that any social science can do is tell you how not to make things worse. It is certainly true that many of the findings of social science have done more to reveal unsuspected difficulties in the way of securing desired ends than to smooth the path to those ends. In the field of anthropology, although we can trace in many places the disintegration of the small-scale societies, we cannot prescribe a cure. We can only say, as I have tried to say, that the existing circumstances are more favourable to recovery in some places than in others. If we were to urge, as some of us have urged in the past, that the destructive forces should be restrained, and social integration preserved by deliberate action to maintain traditional institutions in being, we should be silenced by the voices of the colonial peoples themselves, among whom the older generation may sigh for the good old days, but the rest demand full participation in the modern world. Moreover, we must all now recognize that change has gone too far for deliberate retardation to be possible; only further adaptation can remove existing maladjustments.

The second limitation on the role of the anthropologist arises from the context of values and interests in which he is working. It is, alas, not enough to have special knowledge in order to claim authority; it is also necessary that the lay public should recognize the existence of the knowledge and wish to act on it. Expert advice is sought on malaria control because it is accepted that malaria is an evil and that the experts can recommend effective measures against it; on the building of roads and bridges because there is agreement on the qualities desired in them and the knowledge necessary to secure those qualities. But it is vain to offer social integration—even if we could do so—to persons to whom the words

are meaningless—though they may be aware of some of the consequences of social disintegration such as crime. Yet this is the only ground on which the anthropologist can claim to be heard *as an expert*. He may—and most anthropologists do—criticize colonial policies on general ethical grounds, and data obtained by anthropologists have been used by others to support such criticisms; but when he appeals to such criteria as social justice, he is not speaking as an expert, and has no right to claim that *because he is an anthropologist* his view of social justice must prevail over opposing views.

What then is the anthropologist's contribution to the ends of colonial policy? Those in authority are apt to welcome information only in so far as it helps them to achieve ends already decided upon; if they are told that they are pursuing unattainable or contradictory ends, they dismiss such conclusions and the studies which have led to them as "unpractical". The subjects on which governments expressly ask for anthropologists to provide them with facts are limited by this consideration.

A typical official attitude towards anthropological research has been that knowledge of indigenous institutions is relevant if it is desired to give them some form of express recognition; otherwise they are anachronisms of no interest. In the main, the decision whether they are worthy of recognition or respect has been made by those in authority in terms of their own values and not on the basis of the anthropologist's estimation of their value to indigenous society. It is not surprising, therefore, that it should have been the West African colonies, the Gold Coast and Nigeria, where it has been the policy to give the maximum respect to indigenous institutions, that full-time anthropologists were appointed in Government service, or that the principal field for officially sponsored anthropological studies should have been that of political systems. In the early days of colonial rule, the indigenous institutions were still flourishing almost intact, and it was they that the anthropologist described; the result is a valuable record and a starting point for the student of to-day in his analysis of change. It is true too that the anthropologists of fifty years ago were interested in the untouched primitive, but it is a serious misconception to imagine that this is so to-day, and that because it has been decided as a matter of policy to modernize the system of rule through traditional political authorities, or even in some cases supersede these institutions by others created *ad hoc*, there is no room left for anthropological study. To suppose so is to misconceive the field of interest of the modern anthropologist, which is the contemporary organization of all societies capable of being investigated by his technique of direct personal observation. It would be a more serious misconception still to suppose that to modernize the agencies of local government would create a state of affairs in which there were no problems worthy the attention of a student of society.

This, the most up-to-date form of the argument against the practical value of anthropological study, has fortunately not been officially adopted. On the contrary, the official provision for such study in British territories has been much

increased since the creation in 1940 of the Colonial Development and Welfare Fund, with its special provision for research which no longer depends, as it largely did before that date, on the generosity of American foundations. Some of the investigations that this fund has made possible have been dictated by the personal interests of the workers, but others have been carried out at the request of governments who believe that they can utilize the results. Most of the major regions of the British colonial empire have been surveyed from the point of view of their needs in sociological research.

The type of work that is being done under these auspices concentrates on the process of change and its results. One field in which these consequences call for practical action is that of customary law—those systems of enforceable rights and obligations which all governments, however much they may have made rapid Europeanization their aim, have found themselves forced to recognize to a very large extent, since they reflect the relationships of daily life which are not changed by a stroke of the pen. Records of customary law may be obtained in various ways—by the comments of assessors on cases brought before European judges, for example, or by questioning selected informants. The special contribution of modern anthropological technique to this study is that it observes how the rules operate in practice, with all the evasions and compromises that are not mentioned when they are formulated in response to questions. Though there has seldom been much response to legislation intended to enable individual Africans to place themselves under the provisions of European law, abandoning those of their own custom, we are finding to-day that custom does not provide rules for all the situations that arise, notably in relation to commercial dealings. The gaps and uncertainties in the law administered by native tribunals to-day have engaged the attention of lawyers and could profitably be studied by anthropologists also.

In the special field of land tenure a number of studies are being made by anthropologists at the request of governments. The holding of land in a subsistence economy is so intimately bound up with the organization of groups for economic co-operation and so with the general social structure, that this is emphatically a subject on which the anthropologist's approach is important.

The type of work he would do in this connection may perhaps be taken as an example of the contribution which anthropologists believe they can make towards the understanding of colonial problems. They do not seek to recommend action so much as to lay a finger on maladjustments, to indicate trends, and to check the accuracy of current assumptions. In this case, how is the system of land rights changing in response to pressure on the land, to the introduction of ploughing, to commercial cultivation, to changes introduced perhaps as a result of other influences in the accepted principles of inheritance? Does it still give security to the cultivator in occupation? Is every man still able to claim somewhere the right to land for subsistence? Does this claim conflict with the aims of commercially-minded farmers who seek to establish unrestricted control over the land they have

cultivated with cash crops? Is it a fact that a few individuals have secured large areas of land in a manner which renders others landless?

Another example of a recent study carried out by official request was an investigation of the social position of women in the British Cameroons, made with a view to finding out how education for girls could be best introduced. Anthropologists have taken part in nutrition surveys, in the studies of labour migration that I have mentioned, in some places they have compiled handbooks of native law. A number of social surveys have also been made which cover such points as changing family structure and marriage law, family budgets showing how the balance is changing between subsistence and cash economy, the structure and composition of newly-formed urban populations, emergence of new types of association, and so forth.

Not many of these studies produce proposals for specific action, and I would suggest that it is really a mistake to judge the ultimate value of the anthropologist's work by this criterion. In the long run, he can take his stand securely on the contention that every addition to our knowledge of the processes at work in colonial societies must be valuable. Its benefit is more likely to be felt as the indirect result of its gradual diffusion among persons having administrative responsibility, increasing their understanding of the situations with which they are dealing, than in direct recommendations on policy. In the conflict of values which is the central feature of colonial societies to-day, the anthropologist cannot claim to be the arbiter. The question, for example, whether a particular departure from customary behaviour is enterprise or exploitation is not capable of objective determination; it is determined in fact by a complex of competing interests and competing values, and no longer, in modern days, by paternal governments who can at least profess Olympian impartiality. It is better then that the anthropologist should be content to put his knowledge at the disposal of the framers of policy, leaving to them the responsibility for decisions into which other considerations must enter. He can fairly claim that governments would be unwise to disregard altogether the facts that he lays before them, and dismiss as " reactionary " all those aspects of indigenous custom and social structure which present obstacles to the attainment of the ends they have chosen. Facts cannot be annihilated by ignoring them, and in the complexity of social change in the modern colonial world there is more, not less, need to know what they are than in the past.

Résumé

Le Rôle de l'Ethnologue dans les Territoires non autonomes

L'ETHNOLOGUE s'intéresse tout spécialement à l'étude de sociétés de proportions restreintes et non pas, comme le réformateur, aux tentatives de les transformer. Il se fait l'interprète des valeurs indigènes, de sorte qu'on l'accuse

parfois de romanciser le primitif. Il est vrai que l'ethnologue pense à une société intégralement équilibrée comme à quelque chose de désirable, et il sait bien que les influences modernes se sont montrées, du moins temporairement, destructrices de l'intégration sociale dans les sociétés coloniales. Les valeurs individualistes propagées par ces influences permettent aux membres de ces sociétés d'ignorer les obligations traditionnelles et de se soustraire aux servitudes traditionnelles; en même temps les sanctions imposées par la religion traditionnelle n'ont plus de force. Mais d'autres servitudes, d'autres obligations ne les ont pas remplacées.

En certaines régions on voit se créer une classe moyenne et une élite qui ont adopté des modes de vie européens et qui en développent les institutions appropriées. Mais il existe partout le problème de l'inégalité de l'adaptation entre différentes sections d'une même population formant une unité politique, et de l'absence de tout développement de valeurs nouvelles pour remplacer celles qui sont devenues périmées, notamment dans la sphère de la responsabilité sociale—ce sentiment de l'obligation qui incombe à une collectivité de venir en aide à ses membres les moins fortunés, obligation qui découlait autrefois de l'acceptation des devoirs familiaux.

Dans plusieurs colonies une autre influence désintégrante se montre dans le système qui oblige les hommes à s'absenter de leurs familles pendant de longues périodes pour gagner de l'argent dans des centres industriels. Sous ce système il est impossible de développer dans les villes une société équilibrée, tandis qu'à la campagne les bases de l'intégration tribale sont en pleine voie de destruction. Dans les sociétés " réservoirs de main d'oeuvre " le village devient l'endroit réservé aux femmes, aux enfants et aux vieillards, tandis que la population urbaine, instable, se compose presque uniquement de jeunes hommes, le plus souvent séparés de leurs femmes. La politique de la ségrégation poursuivie à dessein accentue la gravité de ce problème.

L'ethnologue peut-il prescrire des règles d'action en de telles circonstances? Comme tous ceux qui s'occupant de sciences sociales, il traite une matière où les moyens de contrôle lui échappent pour la plupart, et il peut rarement indiquer des solutions précises à des problèmes déterminés. D'ailleurs la public, mal informé sur ces questions, ne lui demande pas son concours parce qu'il ne se rend pas compte des problèmes de la désintégration sociale. L'ethnologue peut bien exprimer ses vues personnelles quant à la *justice* de telle ou telle politique, mais alors il cesse de parler en expert et devient tout simplement un citoyen exceptionnellement bien informé.

Il y a, néanmoins, plusieurs domaines où il peut fournir des données d'une valeur incontestable pour la formulation de la politique à suivre; il a été tenu compte de ce fait par l'allocation de ressources pour les recherches ethnologiques dans la Caisse britannique pour les recherches coloniales (*Colonial Research Fund*).

Parmi les recherches ethnologiques ayant une valeur pratique, il faut citer celles qui ont été faites sur l'adaptation des systèmes légaux indigènes, ou du régime

foncier aux conditions commerciales modernes, ou les investigations de conditions sociales qui font ressortir les changements de structure familiale. L'ethnologue ne peut s'ériger en arbitre dans les conflits de valeurs que peuvent produire ces changements; mais, à la longue, il peut justifier son travail du fait que toute contribution à notre connaissance des processus du changement culturel vaut la peine. Sa contribution à l'oeuvre administrative proviendra plus probablement de la diffusion de connaissances pareilles que d'efforts faits pour prescrire telle ou telle ligne de conduite.

Summary of Discussion

MR G. I. JONES said that since anthropology dealt with human beings it was not an exact science. Politicians were liable to go farther and faster in development than anthropologists. He presumed that in defining anthropology as the study of non-civilized groups of human beings Dr Mair drew a distinction between this subject and sociology which would then be the study of civilized groups. This differed from "*anthropologie*" which the French regarded as a classification of races. For them sociology was applied both to civilized and uncivilized groups. In America the term covered both types and social psychology as well.

He wondered whether a civilized society was less balanced than a non-civilized one? In other words, could it tolerate a greater measure of disequilibrium without breaking up? He regarded plans in the social domain of colonial policy as dangerous when they were not made by experts or based on expert knowledge. Moreover, plans tended toward relaxation of effort and over-centralization and they were sometimes valued mainly as international ammunition.

There must be a desire for change within the peoples themselves and anthropologists could produce data for the plans and link themselves up with the real needs of the people. They could also give some idea of the immediate and long-term effects to be expected from plans.

Professor MALENGREAU said that applied anthropology was needful but without being separated from sociology. Little place had been given to the need for a scientifically worked-out policy. At the moment policy was sometimes at the mercy of native demand. In the Congo, for example, problems had to be solved as they arose from day to day.

Professor MARZORATI thought the problem of uprooting the population, touched upon by Dr Mair and Professor Caetano, was linked up with such problems as soil erosion. Professor Logemann had mentioned the uprooted elements in Indonesia and their strong revolutionary movement but this problem was not merely a colonial one. As Barrès and Gide had shown, it applied to Europe as

well. Gide held that uprooting was sometimes desirable like that of a plant which was placed in good new soil that gave it fresh vigour. He instanced Australians and New Zealanders as illustrating uprooted European populations. Uprooting most easily broke up small communities that were not strongly organized since the tendency was for the younger generation to drift off to urban centres and so leave the community without a future.

Monsieur LANDRY stressed the importance of the individual peasant cultivator whom he considered should often be the basis of economic development. In support of this he instanced examples from the British and French Cameroons where cocoa production was entirely in African hands but where help had come to the cultivator through co-operation and in other ways. He asked if segregation meant depopulation and if it was possible to determine whether tribal or urban centres make for greater happiness among African people

Miss GOVEIA asked if Dr Mair had overlooked the fact that the anthropologist had destroyed the impression that Africans had no form of social and cultural equipment before the advent of the European. How far could the anthropologist contribute to the study of the psychological impact of civilized people upon the indigenous population? In the West Indies where the negro had originally been in slavery this fact had produced an inferiority complex, since the view that the negro was inferior to the white man had persisted not only among white but among coloured people.

Professor LOGEMANN said that Professor Marzorati in speaking of the uprooted populations had said that these people were the bearers of revolution. "I am a bit afraid that you might conclude that I disapprove of revolution. I do not though I am sorry that revolution was necessary in order to achieve the ends which the revolutionaries had in view."

Dr MAIR said it was true that anthropology had rehabilitated the reputation of simpler, non-European societies. It had shown that these have their own organization which is worthy of serious consideration. Anthropologists had been accused of conservatism and of advocating that such societies should remain in their natural state. The whole trend in anthropology was now against the idea of a distinctive racial mentality. Thus the negro had not certain special psychological characteristics which arose from the fact that he was a negro.

She agreed with Monsieur Landry about the social advantages of an economy based on peasant proprietorship but asked if it was not the case that it was only in West Africa that such developments had been possible. West Africa in fact had special advantages in this respect.

As for segregation and depopulation etc., anthropologists had not made special population studies to any great extent but ordinary census material did not show that there was depopulation in countries where segregation occurred. As for the relative happiness of urban and tribal dwellers and the question of disequilibrium and disintegration she felt conscious of a suspicion that the anthropologist tended

to be regarded as a person who wanted to keep things as they were. Anthropologists did not regard all change as disintegration but it was possible to have disintegration without reintegration. When a society was in that condition it was most unhealthy. Disintegration was being deliberately produced over a large part of Africa, not with any idea of making a new African society on a larger scale, but with a view to excluding Africans from certain callings. The British colonies did not favour the South African solution but did little to encourage any alternative policy. In the Belgian Congo transplantation had occurred without disintegration. Elsewhere in industrial areas, for example, the Rand, there had been uprooting without transplantation. When she spoke of integration she had in mind a community in which common values and obligations were generally accepted: this was rarely the case among the urban populations which had come into being in Africa in response to the demands of modern industry.

Africans went to urban areas because they thought they would find something that would give them satisfaction there. They wanted to see city life and they might enjoy it while they are there. In practice, however, it was found that family life was impossible to maintain by legitimate earnings in the new surroundings. Therefore people turned to beer brewing, prostitution and gambling. There was no reason why Africans should not be as happy as Europeans in urban surroundings, if a reasonable existence was made possible for them, but it was not possible for Africans in a great many of the largest African cities as they existed to-day to be happy.

As for sociology and anthropology, in Britain and, she thought, America anthropology was regarded as a branch of sociology. Though the theory was the same practical techniques required specialization according to whether the work was being done in modern communities or among smaller-scale societies.

Educational Problems in Non-Autonomous Territories

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Introduction

THE colonial powers are at a critical stage in their relations with the colonial peoples. The series of political crises which we face to-day, both within the colonies and from the Communist-inspired world outside, has caused this immediate period to be a turning point in the history of education. Never before have we had such a challenge to our past work, our present efforts, our future planning. To those of us who are concerned with education in colonial territories, it is a challenge to take stock, to reflect, and in the light of our reflections to plan wisely and to execute speedily.

This then is the setting in which colonial education problems must be discussed, in the cold light of realism, and not in that rosy glow of idealism which so often pervades educational discussions. No one of us, whatever his field of interest may be, has any doubt about the importance of education in colonial development. There may be, there probably is, some scepticism about the extent to which education can be pushed horizontally, and about the intensity with which the higher stages can be developed vertically. No one of us, though, is unaware of the clamour for education at every level among the vocal few and the awakening multitudes of the colonial peoples.

We are all aware, grimly aware, of the limiting factors of money and trained personnel in carrying out what we would like to do. This does not make it any easier to face the critical eyes of the world upon our colonial administration, whether focused through United Nations and its councils or through the anti-imperialist press.

At this turning point in educational history, when we want to lay emphasis on planning and carrying out, we find ourselves tossed about by the winds of educational doctrine. There is no steady direction in these air currents of educational thought, except in the totalitarian countries, and our responsibilities are not made easier by this uncertainty of conviction and direction found in educational circles.

In this paper we shall be considering educational planning and administration as much as, if not more than, curriculum content. We shall be looking at the full range of education in the colonial territories from the " bush " school to the university, or, in the words of a recent publication from Indonesia, *From Illiteracy to the University*.

We cannot help being aware, in all the territories with which we are concerned, of the wide differences in the degree of education reached in different parts of one colony, and between one colony and another. Such variations make generalizations difficult, but not necessarily meaningless.

The first part of this paper will be a review of some general considerations about education in colonial areas, finishing with a brief reference to some independent countries which have a large " backward " population. The second section will take up some fundamental practical issues, which are common to most areas, such as the financing of education, the agencies responsible for it, and the needs of predominantly rural communities. In the third section, we shall look at some particular current problems, as they appear in British Africa and the West Indies.

Some general considerations about education in non-autonomous areas

We have called the present time a turning point in the history of education, because of the challenge to the colonial powers of the illiterate masses and the undeveloped potentialities in the areas for which they are responsible. Though the history of education in Europe has been written and re-written from many angles, there is a strange lack of historical material on the educational side of European contact in Africa, the West Indies and S.E. Asia.

In colonial education we are dealing with a historical process which began on a certain date, and has certain defined and recognizable stages which follow one another chronologically. It is surely of the first importance that there should be a history of education, conceived and carried out in the best objective traditions of historical research and presentation, for each colonial territory, to be used by those who are planning education and the teachers who are carrying it out. In this historical survey the initial impetus and motives for introducing " western " education, as well as the agencies by which it was introduced, need making clear. The successive systems of education from the initial start up to the present time should be traced, whether under voluntary agencies or the State, or a combination of both. The process of welding together diverse systems into an administrative whole can be studied in educational codes and ordinances, including as it does establishment of financial provision on an increasing scale. It should be possible, too, through an examination of reports, speeches and legislative debates, to get some idea, even though an incomplete one, of the ideology held at different stages in educational development by those who were responsible for its planning and practice.

There is a wide field here for co-operation between students of social history and educational workers, who want to know about the foundations on which they are building. It is a task which is partly " investigation " and partly, more strictly speaking, " research ". In any case it involves a great deal of correlation and

writing up of existing known material, as well as seeking for other sources which may be known but have not been examined.

The present crisis is in itself a sufficient reason for a historical study of educational achievement in the past. It is, moreover, essential in order that the present stage reached and the present system of education can be properly assessed and evaluated. This is important both for the Europeans taking part in colonial education, and for the colonial peoples themselves. An objective approach to educational development in any one area will assist Europeans to understand present difficulties and anomalies instead of merely being impatient with them. It will also assist them to understand the perplexing psychological reactions of colonial peoples to suggested reforms in the curriculum or in pedagogical techniques. This historical process of education is something which the colonial peoples themselves have experienced, and as we know the educated group sets a high value on what it has done for them. When the winds of educational doctrine blow at gale force, and the colonial peoples are asked to accept this and that new proposal, their answer is often conservative and apparently reactionary. Nothing but an adequate history of this process will show us who are outsiders the reasons for this perplexing attitude.

If we can achieve these histories of educational development in colonial areas we shall at least have a firm basis of facts. The need for this equipment, of an objective and indisputable character, is the more apparent when we come to look at the other general considerations, which have been grouped under the following headings: political, ideological and cultural.

It is difficult for colonial powers to-day not to feel that they are standing at the bar of the world, justifying their retention of colonial territories and their conduct towards them. This arraignment at the bar is generally conceived of in political terms, namely that colonial status must be exchanged, sooner or later, by consent or by force, for independence within or outside a commonwealth or similar grouping of states. In the process of achieving independence, what part does the education of the colonial peoples play? To what extent is educational planning dominated, or at least partly determined, by this political goal?

The answer to the first of these questions lies in the historical process of education, and its evaluation in terms of present-day needs. Putting the second question to a group of educationalists has the same effect as opening Aeolus' bag of the winds. To a group concerned with colonial administration it appears as a sensible and pertinent question. The answer can therefore be given to them while the educationists listen to the howling of the winds.

It is clear that if an educational system is to play a part in training a people for self-government, it must train the future citizens to assist in the production of greater wealth for the territory in order to finance social services, and therefore it must be closely related to the plans for economic development. This will affect educational planning at the top level where technicians of a high order are trained

in engineering, agriculture and forestry for example. It will affect also at the lower levels the man who is going to be the peasant farmer or agricultural worker or mine worker, so that he may do his work with increased intelligence and effort.

In areas such as the British colonies, where there is a strong tendency to develop local government, certain limited spheres of administration must be handed over to the local authorities. The enthusiasm for education and the passionate belief in it in many areas makes the primary schools a suitable field for local responsibility. As we shall see later on in this paper, this local enthusiasm often takes the form of additional local taxation for their own schools.

A less concrete problem which presents itself to educationists is that of creating the concept of a common citizenship among children and adults whose loyalties had hitherto been on a very restricted scale. This may, to some people, savour of indoctrination, but that is no argument for evading the challenge. Citizenship can be a matter of practice as well as of teaching, and school societies, management committees of schools, parent-teacher associations, can be a means of bringing together groups of people concerned with the common good of their children and with service to the community. In colonial areas where there is a " plural society ", this task of creating a common citizenship is far more formidable, especially when the schools and colleges are on a segregated pattern.

The educationist and the administrator will have to get together on one problem which is common to both—the degree to which increased educational facilities can be provided, and the whole process speeded up. This feature of the colonial situation is one in which European experience has little to offer, outside the Soviet Union. The educational process in Europe has been so slow and so gradual over the centuries, that European educationists are at a loss when faced with the present challenge. We all know advocates of the slogan " It will take a thousand years to change these people ". The majority of us cannot accept that, but our perplexity in the present crisis is another argument for a speedy assessment and evaluation of what we have done in the past.

From the earliest days of European contact with the colonial peoples, whether as explorers, traders, missionaries or administrators, the dominant group, that is the Europeans, were putting across new ideas. The ideas thus transferred may have been in the field of social relations, religion, economics or politics. A great deal of unconscious teaching went on in the process of these early contacts, but it was with the establishment of schools and training centres that this teaching took formal shape. In this way the educational institutions from their earliest days and in their earliest forms became the spearhead of new ideas and these ideas were reinforced in the market place, the law courts and the churches.

This transference of ideas appeared to be a one-way traffic, since the Europeans assumed a dominant role, and assumed also that the colonial peoples had no ideologies. The old adage that African languages have no equivalent for abstract ideas dies hard, and is still widely held.

Through ignorance therefore on the part of the European, the traffic in ideas was a one-way process. Yet the ideologies in the metropolitan countries changed in course of time, and the colonial peoples had to adapt themselves to a series of new ideas, with the inevitable time-lag. Some of the early Protestant missionaries, for example, who went to Africa believed very sincerely in eternal damnation and hell fire for the heathen, and taught these ideas in their schools. Fifty years later the strength of that ideology was weakening, and after a hundred years, it had almost disappeared.

Foremost in this changing pattern of European ideas have been those embedded in what are called " principles of education ". It would be illuminating, if it were possible, to trace the evolution of what has been, and still is, taught under this heading in teacher-training centres in colonial areas. The doctrine of original sin at one time made it laudable, indeed essential, to coerce and correct the child until he conformed to the pattern of a " good boy ". How utterly disturbing then to colonial teachers was the modern extremist doctrine of " the child is always right ", and its crystallization in a " child-centred " education.

More serious in its effects on educational progress was the complex of ideas held by European teachers and administrators about racial characteristics, involving, as such ideas inevitably do, the development and maintenance of certain attitudes towards peoples of different physical characteristics. Under the guidance of eminent scholars who put forward very definite views, many European educationists have accepted and acted upon theories about the mental capacity of so-called " primitive " peoples, and have handed on these ideas within the educational system in which they worked.

It is difficult to assess the results of these changing European ideologies on the education of colonial peoples. Much of the difficulty is due to the formerly held assumption that the people had no similar or comparable ideas for interchange. A fundamental educational principle was therefore violated, in that the imported curricula and systems were imposed on, and not grafted into, the indigenous ideas of the people. This appears even more clearly in discussing cultural considerations. It seems, however, that we can draw at least one conclusion. The colonial peoples have not lost faith in education itself but they have been bewildered by the succession of changing ideas, each of which in turn was stated positively and emphatically as true. There is little doubt that this is one of the contributing causes of that racial misunderstanding which is so prevalent to-day.

Dr. Otto Raum in his book on indigenous education, *Chaga Childhood*, has defined education as the process by which the culture of a people is transferred from one generation to the next. The key concept here, familiar to all sociologists and social anthropologists, is that among every recognizable group of people there is a " pattern " of " culture " which is peculiarly their own, though it may have affinity with the culture patterns of neighbouring or more distant groups. In

colonial areas such patterns of culture may be relatively uniform as in a homogenous society, or very diverse as in plural societies.

In the early days of European contact there was a vast gulf between the pattern of culture of the indigenous people, and that of the immigrant European. The missionaries had a certain pattern of culture, the traders a slightly different one, but they had many common elements of language, dress, food and other characteristics which were completely alien to the local people. In many areas the early missionaries and other Europeans despised all aspects of the indigenous culture, and proceeded to teach this attitude in their schools. The outstanding exception to this was the widely held attitude of respect for the Moslem faith and the culture patterns based on Islamic society.

It was mainly, though not entirely, due to the influence of social anthropology that a new and more tolerant attitude began to appear among officials and missionaries towards the indigenous culture of the people among whom they worked. It is only now, and very slowly, having any influence on the techniques and approach of educationists. This conversion, limited to some areas only, to the possibilities of using indigenous cultural elements in education, has in some cases been too late. The attitude of despising indigenous culture, adopted by European educationists and handed on by them to their pupils, has caused psychological conflicts and mental stresses of which we are only now becoming fully aware.

There are indeed, both among Europeans and among the colonial peoples, two markedly divergent currents of thought about the place of indigenous culture in the modern education system. One school of thought would aim at producing from the schools, at least from the secondary schools, the complete "évolué"—the man or woman who has abandoned all the external forms of his own culture, and lives henceforth entirely according to a European way of life, in so far as his economic circumstances permit. The other school of thought would develop and assimilate elements of the indigenous culture. They would introduce in the schools a true bi-lingualism, raising the indigenous language to the status of a language to be studied and offered as a subject for examination and research. They would develop literature in the local languages, and make use of proverbs, myths and legends, and local traditional history in school textbooks. They would encourage and teach indigenous music, art and dancing. All this would be incorporated with the recognized elements of a European education which would enable colonial peoples to take their place in the modern world.

Fortunately for us, in the study of education in colonial areas, we can escape from a threatened myopia in our outlook, by examining the theory and practice of education in independent territories which have some similar problems to our own, namely large areas of undeveloped or under-developed lands, limited financial resources and large numbers of illiterate and "backward" peoples. Of these areas, the Asiatic Soviet Republics, where undoubtedly interesting developments have taken place, are more or less closed to investigation. China has presented some

very illuminating developments in the last twenty-five years, particularly in dealing with an illiterate peasantry, but conditions at the present time make any assessment of recent achievements extremely difficult. Turkey and Mexico offer promising comparisons, and Turkey particularly as a stronghold of Islam shows how at least in some externals of modern life Moslem conservatism can be overcome. It seems that in these two countries there have been certain emphases in their educational drive which we can well examine. The first is the pace of the educational drive, for speed has been one of the keynotes in planning and carrying out reforms in schools, the training of teachers and the improvement of impoverished rural areas. The second emphasis shows that it is possible in an educational system to combine a high degree of modernization with the preservation of part of the national culture. Modernization can be seen in the type of new school buildings, the village institutes in Turkey for training village teachers, the technical training and the use of mechanization in agriculture. At the same time, cultural elements in language, art, peasant crafts, history, drama, folk lore, are encouraged and developed. The third point to be noted is the attention being given to work among adults, especially illiterate and " backward " peasant farmers. Where the keynote is speed, it is felt that working through the schools only is too slow.

Some fundamental practical issues in education

We have been considering in the previous section aspects of colonial education which can be called theoretical. They have, of course, a practical outcome in that they have some influence on decisions on policy, but they are in the main concerned with problems which call for study, reflection, discussion, rather than for immediate action. They are problems too which appeal primarily to the scholar and research worker at the university, and to the top-level planner and administrator.

The education authorities in the colonial territories may well be impatient at hearing such problems raised and giving time to discussion and elucidation of them. They have to keep the educational machine running and accelerate the pace of development. The type of problems they are concerned with are directly practical, and several of these are found in most colonial areas.

A common feature in colonial territories is the existence of voluntary agencies running and directing schools and colleges. In most of the African colonies it is a historical fact that the missionary societies were the first agencies to set up schools. At the present time a wide variety of conditions prevail. Education may be entirely in state hands; mission schools may be tolerated outside a state system; they may be aided financially and inspected for efficiency; or there may be a complete " dual system " which recognizes mission and church schools as part of the territorial system of education.

Mission and church schools are not the only voluntary agencies engaged

in education. Private individuals and corporate bodies run primary and secondary schools and such centres as commercial institutes, and these too are treated with varying degrees of tolerance, recognition or aid by the education authority.

The existence of these voluntary agencies poses a number of problems for the education authorities and indeed for the citizens of the colonial territories themselves. The position of " foreign " missions within a territory who are engaged in education is one of these problems. Missionaries who come from other countries than that of the metropolitan country are directed by boards which have no cultural or political ties with the responsible governing power.

Another problem is that of the control of local teachers who are recruited and trained by these voluntary agencies. Where they are paid by the state, they come to some extent under the discipline of the education authority. Where they are paid by the voluntary agency, the position is more complicated. Since the teacher is the main factor in any education system, the co-existence of two authorities over the teacher is often a severe strain on his loyalties and demands clear thinking and co-operative action from both authorities. It is well to remember that the children, the future citizens now in school, are the most important element in this administrative problem, and in the long run it can only be solved satisfactorily by focusing on what is best for these future citizens.

The problem of whether education in the colonies should be secular or religious has been to some extent settled by the policy adopted in the metropolitan countries. It is still a very much debated issue, and in the kind of conditions which obtain in most colonies it should be examined afresh at intervals without too much doctrinaire emphasis from the European countries.

The ultimate goal in all colonial territories is universal education for all. When that is achieved, probably the state will take over full responsibility for the whole system. Until that goal is reached, is it wiser to encourage education by all agencies who are prepared to undertake it? Or is such a policy tinged with opportunism, and may its adoption be laying up trouble for the future?

The most constant problem in all colonial areas is that of financing the education system. It is part of the general problem of financing social services, which are inspired by European standards, from the revenue of territories which are for the most part under-developed from the point of view of material resources. In the British colonial areas there are at least five sources of income for educational work. There are central funds voted from general colonial revenue and administered by the colonial government. There are local rates levied by local authorities for education within their own area. Eagerness to vote special education rates has been a marked feature of recent years in many parts of British Africa. School fees at the primary and secondary level are paid in many areas. Voluntary agencies make contributions in varying degrees through payment of teachers' salaries and upkeep of buildings. The Colonial Development and Welfare Funds

from the United Kingdom provide grants for specific purposes, especially in relation to higher education.

It is all too clear in colonial areas that funds are very limited for educational development. The problem then arises of the direction which progress should take. Where illiteracy is widespread, should the policy be one of extension of the lowest level of schooling, with the aim of providing a minimum of education for all? Or should additional expenditure where it is available be allocated to increase facilities for secondary education, technical training and higher education, all of which cost proportionately far more than primary schooling? The second policy produces an *élite*, at the expense of a vast uneducated proletariat. The policy of colonial governments is partly determined by the fact that the historical development of education has by now provided facilities for a more or less complete " ladder " of education for a proportion of the population in all areas. But the problem is a real and an urgent one in view of the popular pressure for increased facilities for education, and the limitations of available funds. In the solving of this problem the political situation in the territory, and the ideological beliefs about education held by the metropolitan power, will have a dominant part to play.

The problem of language teaching and usage has different aspects in different colonial regions. In Africa, it is, on the whole, a more practical issue in British areas than in French, Belgian and Portuguese, where somewhat different policies have prevailed up till lately. In British African areas there have been attempts to apply the educational principle of teaching young children to learn to read and write in their mother tongue. A multiplicity of languages and the impossibility of using each one as a vehicle of modern education has led to a selection of vernacular languages for educational purposes, and in some areas to the use of a dominant vernacular such as Hausa and Swahili.

Several further education problems arise from the application of this principle. One is the need for study and research into the vernacular languages, including questions of standardization and orthography. Another is the best methods for teaching a European language, which at the primary-school level at least is seldom heard or used outside the school. Yet another is concerned with the most satisfactory methods of establishing bi-lingualism as a principle of the school system, so that both the vernacular and the European language can be adequately taught and studied as school subjects in the curriculum.

A concomitant problem to the teaching of the vernacular for first reading lessons and as a language to be studied is the need of literature written in it. In this connection the setting up of Literature Bureaux is an interesting recent development. The encouragement of African authorship in the vernaculars has for many years been promoted by the International African Institute.

A practical issue which is to-day giving concern to many education authorities is the content of the curriculum in primary schools in rural areas. The history of

education in colonial territories, when it is written, will show that this was not a problem in the early pioneer days. It was taken for granted that the curriculum would be the three R's, with some religious knowledge in missionary schools. It is true that some pioneer missions set up printing presses and apprenticeship systems for building and carpentry and other crafts. Probably further research into the history of education will show more of these early endeavours to add practical skills to academic attainments.

There are two main reasons why this problem is an important one to-day. One concerns the pedagogical principle of relating the content of education in the primary school to the young child's environment. This has only been accepted as a principle in relatively recent years in Europe and the United States, and it is by no means everywhere practised. It is not surprising therefore that the principle is only slowly receiving attention in colonial schools and training colleges.

The other reason is directly concerned with the improvement of rural areas and with increasing production. In former days no science was taught in rural primary schools, and children had no opportunity of relating school teaching to their future work on the land. A beginning has been made in several areas to introduce rural science in the primary schools, through specially trained teachers, in order that rural schools may play their part in relating children to the work and interests of their community.

Particular current issues in the British West Indies and West Africa

It may appear a somewhat arbitrary selection to pick out four among the many problems now being discussed in the British African colonies and the West Indies. The four selected are relevant to other colonial areas, however, and they are sufficiently diverse to merit individual attention.

The first concerns the provision for and the scope of higher education. By this term is meant further education and training beyond the secondary school level. As everyone is aware, there is a tremendous popular demand for higher education in British colonies, irrespective of the question of whether there can be financial provision for this most costly form of education, as well as for extension at the lower levels. There are at present 3,500 colonial scholars in Britain taking courses at universities and technical colleges, the majority on government scholarships. Many of these will in future be absorbed by the university colleges now set up in the West Indies and West Africa, leaving scholarships to Britain available for advanced degrees and research.

In these new university colleges the outstanding educational issue is that of equivalence, of degrees, of teaching, and of professional standards, with universities in Britain. The reaction to a former experiment of granting diplomas in colonial colleges which had only a local validity, showed that at the university level the colonial peoples would be content with nothing but equal opportunities

of study and equal recognition of degrees. This demand for equivalence, which has now been recognized and provided for, gives rise to many problems, the most important perhaps being the need to attract professors and lecturers of real scholarship to fill the posts in these universities.

The second issue is not one which concerns policy but research. There is an acute need for the development of psychological research in Africa and the West Indies which can be of service to educationists. Practically no work has been done on the study of children, their play and their home life, which can be used to teach psychology to teachers, with some real reference to the children they see and teach and observe. It is a field of research in which psychologists will need the help of social anthropologists, and as a basis for new and relevant textbooks on psychology it is essential.

In another field the psychologist is needed to prepare and apply different types of selection tests, especially for secondary schools and for technical training. In the secondary schools there is a much greater demand for entry than there are places. Technical training at the higher levels is still less popular than a literary education, and some means have to be devised of detecting technical ability and advertising its merit as a career.

In a less well defined field, which overlaps with that of psychiatry, there is need for psychological studies of adjustment to new occupations, new forms of social grouping, new ideas in political and economic life, and in the relation of maladjustment to retardation in school and college work. It is a field almost untouched and as strewn with potential dangers as a minefield. Modern education has, however, brought in its train so many unsolved problems of adjustment, that it is as dangerous to neglect these studies, as it is to plunge into them.

The third issue is one which is common to all expanding systems of education, since it affects mainly the lower levels, in the primary and " bush " schools. It is the recruitment and training of teachers for those schools which are the foundation of the whole education system. Ideally, for young children and for beginners, the best teachers should be available. Practically, for financial reasons and the shortage of trained personnel, this is seldom if ever the case, and these basic schools have to get along with a minimum of trained teachers and with the majority having had little education themselves. As education systems develop and primary schooling becomes available for the majority, this problem begins to solve itself. Since in an expanding system with many pioneer areas, the choice is often between poorly equipped teachers or no teachers, the urgent demand for primary schools forces the education authorities, and especially the voluntary agencies who work under them, to accept whatever personnel are available as teachers.

If this is admitted as a feature of the present situation, as far as the supply of primary teachers is concerned, there follow certain problems which have to be resolved by those responsible for their training. These problems are connected with the content of a training college curriculum and with the length of time to

be spent there. For young teachers who have had very little education themselves, the period spent in a training centre must aim partly at giving them some further education as well as helping them to learn pedagogical techniques. There are advocates of giving these young teachers lesson outlines and teaching them to teach them. Other educationists are shocked at the rigidity and lack of initiative in such a system.

The American emphasis on in-service training as supplementary to pre-service training merits a great deal of attention in these expanding systems. Experiments are going on everywhere along these lines and should in time yield results which can guide educational administration.

Another issue which arises out of the historical past of the voluntary agencies' part in education is the multiplication of small training centres for teachers. Many arguments are put forward for maintaining these small centres, but few of them are based on educational criteria. It seems clear that in any expanding system, with a great leeway to make up in the lowest levels of education, there must be one or more large teacher-training centres in a territory, where experience can be pooled, experiments tested, research carried out, and the best use made of the few individuals who are equipped to train teachers to work under pioneer conditions and to give advice on this subject.

The last issue is one which has received increasing attention in British territories in Africa and the West Indies in the last ten years. It is the education of adults, including the further education of those who have had some schooling, and the education of those who have had no formal schooling. The last group covers the adult literacy campaigns now in process in many areas.

This field of education which is outside the usual school system is given a number of names: adult education, mass education, fundamental education, community development. At one end of the scale it has parallels in Britain where adult education has long been a concern of the extra-mural departments of the universities, and of well-established voluntary agencies such as the Workers' Educational Association; while in more recent years the state system of education has included this field in the plans for further education. Following this pattern of development, all the new university colleges in Africa and the West Indies have extra-mural departments of adult education.

At the other end of the scale are the adult literacy campaigns and the various experiments in community development, including agriculture, village hygiene, and homecraft—a field which is partly covered by the American system of the Agricultural Extension Service, from which we can learn much.

There is already evidence that such experiments in adult education contribute to the education system as a whole, by arousing interest in schools, relating school teaching to the work of the community, and giving support through self-levied taxes for local schools.

Résumé

Problèmes de l'Education dans les Territoires non autonomes

LES conditions actuelles ont créé dans l'éducation une demande d'expansion à la fois dans la direction de l'enseignement supérieur et vers une dissémination plus générale des matières enseignées. Cette demande se produit à un moment où il y a, en même temps que des limitations imposées par des questions d'argent et par le manque de personnel ayant les qualifications nécessaires, une incertitude quant aux buts à poursuivre dans l'éducation par rapport aux objectifs politiques à atteindre.

On a urgemment besoin d'une étude du point de vue historique sur l'éducation dans l'Empire colonial (britannique) pour établir un point de départ réel pour l'examen du problème de l'adaptation de l'éducation à des buts politiques acceptés Ces buts politiques supposent une compétence économique efficace—donc l'enseignement technique à tous les niveaux—et en même temps une compétence administrative, notamment au niveau de l'administration décentralisée (*local government*)—donc le civisme comme sujet d'instruction.

Dans le passé les Européens ont eu l'initiative pour ce qui concerne l'introduction d'idées neuves. Mais chez les Européens les idées changeaient aussi et transformaient ainsi la théorie et la pratique de l'éducation, comme, par exemple, dans les concepts théologiques tels que celui du péché originel ou dans les idées sur les caractéristiques raciales. Dans ces conditions on a imposé sur les peuples coloniaux non seulement des programmes et des systèmes d'enseignement, mais des programmes et des systèmes mutuellement contradictoires.

Le mépris dont on a témoigné à l'origine vis-à-vis des systèmes culturels indigènes a été en grande mesure remplacé par une attitude qui leur est plus favorable; il en résulte une diversité de vues sur la valeur des cultures indigènes et un désaccord correspondant sur les buts de l'education. Dans certains territoires non coloniaux (p. ex., la Turquie et le Mexique), l'expérience suggère que la modernisation est compatible avec une certaine mesure de conservatisme.

Lorsqu'on quitte ces questions plutôt théoriques pour aborder des considérations d'ordre pratique, un problème de toute première importance qui se présente est celui du rôle qu'il faut attribuer dans l'éducation à l'Etat et à d'autres organes: par exemple, les missions étrangères qui n'ont pas d'étroits liens culturels ou politiques avec la puissance gouvernante responsable, présentent des difficultés, ainsi que les droits relatifs de l'enseignement civil et de l'enseignement religieux, et la surveillance à exercer par l'autorité publique sur le personnel enseignant au service d'organes soutenus par des contributions volontaires.

Comme les ressources disponibles sont limitées, il faut surtout étudier des questions de toute urgence:

.(*a*) la direction du progrès dans l'éducation: son but doit-il être quantitatif ou qualitatif?

(*b*) les langues à employer aux divers niveaux comme véhicule de l'instruction.

(*c*) les programmes à employer dans les écoles de campagne, notamment par rapport au principe (accepté dans certains pays) de rattacher les matières enseignées au milieu social du jeune enfant.

Quatre questions importantes que l'on discute à présent en Afrique tropicale et aux Antilles offrent des sujets de portée très générale pour les études dans l'Empire colonial (britannique):

(*a*) Les difficultés d'ordre pratique qui surgissent lorsqu'on considère les réclamations instantes faites sur l'équivalence des grades, etc., dans les universités coloniales et britanniques, etc.

(*b*) Le besoin de recherches psychologiques pour aider les éducateurs spécialistes.

(*c*) L'éducation des instituteurs dans les conditions d'une expansion générale de l'enseignement.

(*d*) Les méthodes (adoptées ou à adopter) dans l'éducation des adultes.

Summary of Discussion

MR TURNER thought that (1) In the colonies there should be a more effective relationship between the child's life at school and at home. Home life is the traditional peasant life but it had not been adjusted to the child's life at school, for example, the hours of meals have not been related to the hours spent in school. If life at home was better adapted to the school the child would get far more out of school activities. Thus there was need to educate parents as well as children. (2) There was an intense conservatism in the minds of Africans against which we had to contend. The educational pioneers were confident that what they knew at home in Europe was better than anything in Africa, and Africans in time had accepted this. Thus it was difficult for them now to realize that education did not consist of sitting in rows and listening to someone speaking. When in Africa he spoke against the examination system this was considered almost blasphemy. Now the School Certificate had been abolished but this had occurred just when it was getting going in Africa. The great time-lag between Africa and Europe must never be forgotten. (3) We should never be able to help in the way we desired until every European who was associated with Africans in education was genuinely and deeply interested in the life of the people among whom he lived, and understood them.

Professor SIMEY said that what a child learnt at school might be destroyed at home.

The mass education campaign in Jamaica had shown that the people believed in the magic of the printed word but being practical, commonsense people they soon came to the conclusion that the elaborate paraphernalia of the campaign was largely ballyhoo.

"Each one teach one" had been a dismal failure since only twenty-five people were taught in two years through the mass education campaign. What we had learnt from this experience was that we must start with humble minds and identify ourselves with the people. We must show that we cared about the work they were doing with their crops and their market problems and so on. He felt that in this education campaign we should have done more to enlist the help of the churches. Good intentions were not enough. We must have faith, intelligence and skill.

Mr PAGET agreed that the Jamaica mass education campaign had been most disappointing. Although the people were told that they would all be literate in two years, 70 per cent. were still completely illiterate at the end of that period. Literacy campaigns were useless unless they were part of a larger campaign, that is to say, community education. We did not want a ready-made, but a tailor-made, system of education. Often the education given did not fit the colonial for life in his own country in the twentieth century but for life in England in the nineteenth century. Thus on enquiry in one part of Africa it came out that the favourite British author was Marie Corelli. In other words the time-lag, as had already been said, was very great and should not be forgotten. It was essential to think out our problems afresh and to proceed with humility.

It must not be forgotten that education as a preparation for life had always existed in the colonies. What we had done was merely to alter it in nature and tempo.

Professor MALENGREAU thought it was necessary for us to understand what was meant by the term culture. In the first place it was used in a general sense, that is, a manner of thinking and learning to discover the truth. Secondly it had a more particular meaning, for example in the Congo where a culture was developing from a way of thinking towards a critical faculty. He knew of a case of a community in which a native Catholic priest who had passed through a boarding school and seminary and then taken up his duties in a native environment proved to be more acceptable to the people because he was in closer contact with them than the Belgian curé. Indeed it was a question of contact between clergy and their flocks.

Mr CHADWICK said the purpose of the mass literacy campaign was to teach the mechanics of reading and writing not to make people literate. By doing this the Africans got over an inferiority complex. He believed that, if people were taught by correct mass literacy methods, they felt they were getting civilized and wanted

the things of civilization. For example, there was a village where as a result of this impulse they built a road, bridges, a maternity home and they were still demanding other things. At the present rate of development people would probably receive self-government before they were ready for it and so there was great urgency in the matter of education and many other things as well. Numbers of great problems had to be got over somehow, for example, land erosion, and the only way to achieve things quickly was to induce the people to follow with complete faith. They would follow if they trusted you and he believed that the true road was community development.

Formal education was promoted by mass education. Thus where the latter had been started bush schools had increased in size and number and buildings were put up by the people themselves.

Professor REVERT stated that he had been for four years a Director of Education in Martinique. There were 40,000 children in the island of whom 30,000–35,000 were being educated. Teachers were local. In 1880, fifty teachers had been sent out from France. By 1920, a thousand local teachers had been recruited. Primary and secondary education were provided in the island. There was also an Institute of Law there but for their university education the young people went to France.

A policy of integration was demanded by the people and the funds came mainly from local resources but loans were raised.

The French tradition was the identity of human reason. It was not necessary to develop natives in native culture. There was no difference of basic elements between races though differences arose according to environment. The French maintained a philosophy class in the schools in order that people should learn how to learn. Uniformization of teaching leads to uniformization of minds. Modern civilization should promote liberation, not technocracy. An individual had a right to be unlike his fellows. Education must allow the individual to develop freely.

Dr CAETANO considered there was a confusion between school education and mass education. Reading and writing were merely instruments but the important question was what would the people read or write? Education should improve conditions of housing, food, health and professional techniques. General education and technical training should also help to evolve an *élite*. In the social services not sufficient stress had been placed upon the transformation of family conditions.

Professor MARZORATI pointed out that there were communities of different races in Africa (Europeans and natives). The application of the principle of segregation was necessary at the primary school stage because of the differences of objective and environment of the pupils but what about secondary, higher and professional education?

Monsieur LANDRY said that in North Africa Arabic was used in Koranic and

French schools but in West Africa, where there was a confusion of languages, French was used as the medium of education. Though this was necessary he nevertheless regretted the loss of certain native cultures.

Professor READ thanked Mr Turner for emphasizing what she had said in her paper about the " winds of doctrine ", that is, educational ideas emanating from metropolitan centres which take time to get established in the colonies. These " winds " when they reach there were not always tempered to the shorn lamb. As for examinations, we should bear in mind the fact that Africans and West Indians were looking for a yardstick by which they could measure their intellectual progress against ours. It was unwise, therefore, to throw away these yardsticks too lightly, even the School Certificate. So it came about that we might for educational reasons be withdrawing something which for psychological reasons was much appreciated. As for higher education, the new colonial universities wanted to have equivalent degrees and as high a standard of teaching as that in home universities.

The more information we got about why certain plans failed or schemes miscarried, such, for example, as the " each one teach one ", the better, and the more readily will the people in the colonies be able to decide what they want themselves. She warned Mr Paget about the tailor-made education metaphor, for we must be careful that it did not become " a strait jacket ".

Professor Malengreau's experience of native Catholic clergy was borne out by her own experience. She well remembered African women trained by Catholic missions who became Catholic sisters. They had a particular contribution to make and she was much impressed by their standard of education and the work they were doing for their own people.

Africans from English colonies were deeply interested in French educational policy and they wanted to know more about it but, not being able to speak French, they had to depend upon what they heard in London as to what it was seeking to achieve. It would be a great advantage if some more direct contact could be established.

In the British colonies a bilingual system of education was used. The local language was necessary, but English was taught in the second and third years at school. In this connection a study of the bilingual Welsh system by Africans might be helpful and was in fact being made.

In reply to Professor Marzorati, who raised the question of common schools for Europeans and natives and noted their separation in British colonies, she stated that in Indonesia there were mixed schools and in Malaya for Chinese and Indians but not for Malays. At university level there was no separation.

Social Advance in Non-Autonomous Territories

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A STATE of conflict must be recognized to have arisen between the political, social and economic elements in contemporary colonial policy. Broadly speaking, their respective aims are unexceptionable, but it must be asked whether they, or even a substantial measure of each of them, can be realized simultaneously.

For instance, much importance is attached by the leaders of the peoples of the colonies, and rightly so, to the raising of the standard of living, which is often dangerously near starvation level. Unfavourable comparisons are made between the labour legislation and the social services operative in the colonies and in Great Britain, and the annual income per head of the population prevailing in the one is sharply, even dramatically, contrasted with that in the other. But, it must be asked, how are the immense political operations to be carried out whereby additional sources of capital are to be made available to the colonies without overburdening the economies of Great Britain and other " colonizing powers ", or, and this is even more important, overstraining the political framework of the colonies themselves? The national budgets of the Western powers cannot be regarded any longer as an inexhaustible cornucopia from which grants in aid of projects for the development of industry, agriculture, communications, and so on, pour forth. The only remaining source which can be tapped is the economies of the colonies concerned. But it is more than doubtful whether the colonial peoples will be willing to endure the amount of compulsory saving and restriction of liberty in the economic sphere which is now more or less taken for granted in Great Britain, let alone in Russia, where the need for capital development is on a scale much more in keeping with that of the colonies.

Vigorous economic development in the colonies therefore appears at first sight to clash with the endeavours which are being made to promote as quickly as possible the growth of a political structure on which responsible government can be based. A similar collision has also to be remarked on between social policy on the one hand and economic and political policies on the other. Racial equality between the colonial and " Western " peoples implies similar social standards and customs in family as well as public life, in law, justice, and the professions. All the evidence there is goes to show that the Negro and any other " coloured " race is perfectly capable of attaining these standards, given an adequate opportunity to do so. The problem has thus arisen as to how these opportunities can in fact be created. A great deal, for instance, depends on formal education, but the provision of even a rudimentary system of education, comprising at least a minimum

of places for the favoured few at secondary schools and universities, imposes a crushing and quite intolerable burden on the economies of countries which are economically backward. Without education in the three R's for the masses, however, and without higher education for the more intelligent, a people must always remain in a condition of social dependence. This will be even more the case if the standards of health and housing do not permit the common decencies to be observed in family life, or provide for the care of the sick, and the welfare of the aged and the afflicted.

The process of action and reaction between the three elements in the problem of colonial government amounts indeed to a vicious spiral. The more there is of government from " outside ", the more the self-respect of the people is undermined, the greater the degree of their " shiftlessness ", their poverty, and their need for strong rule from above. It is no wonder, therefore, that there has been a reluctance in the past to face the major problems of colonial government squarely, when so many problems of such appalling magnitude immediately present themselves for solution. A tacit understanding has, in fact, frequently been established that they must be regarded as insoluble, and attention restricted to the day-to-day activities of administrative routine with the vague hope that something, like atomic energy, will turn up to relieve us of our burdens.

Our fathers and grandfathers did rather better than this. They elevated the tag *solvitur ambulando* into a political philosophy, sincerely and competently; they refused to be blinded by what they would have termed Utopianism, and stuck firmly to the present, and to the troubles they saw before them in the relatively small communities they encountered in the tropical territories when they first entered them. We cannot follow in their footsteps too closely, because we are compelled to face the problem of One World, for better or for worse. But we can profit greatly by attempting to understand how they set about their tasks. They saw as clearly as we do that political self-determination is dependent on a measure of general social advance in the communities concerned, that responsible government is a part of the culture-pattern of " Western " civilization which is interlocked with the other parts, such as constitutional conventions, the rule of law, the liberty of the subject, and even more personal and intangible qualities such as self-discipline and self-denial. It is for these reasons that many of the more profound thinkers about the problem of colonial government concentrated on the humble task of, as it were, nourishing the grass roots of civilization, in the belief that a sound democracy can only be built on the foundations laid in the family and in the village. Such persons have preferred to tackle the problems of rural co-operative societies and village boards, designed to serve the needs of the illiterate masses, rather than the more spectacular task of building new social orders and policies on what would seem to them to be a grandiose scale. Generations of statesmen in India and Africa have laboured with the problems of the humble, content in the conviction that, if the next step ahead can be achieved, if

a new food crop can be introduced, a village credit society established, or a new school or clinic opened, the way will lie ahead along a secure path towards social progress. The proposal that the time has come for the creation of the institutions of responsible government has often seemed to such people to be a dangerous form of day-dreaming, worthy only of the careerist, the crank, and the merely corrupt.

In the confusion of policies and the everyday expedients of the "practical" administration of to-day, the vision and the sacrifices of such pioneers must not be forgotten. Too many of them have been allowed to pass away unknown and unpraised, far from the clamour and the notoriety of Secretariats, Councils and Ministries, and suchlike places where reputations are made and rewards are bestowed. Nevertheless, their work will endure. The anthropologist has provided a scientific justification for those whose maxim has been to make haste slowly. Writing in 1929 of possibilities of social advance in Africa, Professor Malinowski said:

> "If we define dependent rule as the control of natives through the medium of their own organization, it is clear that only dependent rule can succeed. . . . All social development is very slow and, therefore, it is infinitely preferable to achieve it by slow and gradual change coming from within. . . . Indirect control is the only way of developing economic life, the administration of justice by natives to natives, the raising of morals and education in indigenous lines, and the development of truly African art, culture, and religion."*

This argument provides the theoretical justification for the policy of gradualism which has flourished in the Netherlands East Indies and in the British Colonies of Africa. As a result, a very strong case indeed has been made out for this method of colonial government. Painstaking research in Java, rarely equalled in quality and scope by the work conducted elsewhere, has laid bare much of the complicated pattern of the customary law, tradition, institutions, and behaviour of the people.† Careful attention has been paid to the problem of understanding the ways in which existing social institutions function, before new institutions are introduced; the ways in which the Western pattern of society can be fitted into the traditional structure typical of Eastern and African communities have been studied in order to show how it is possible to avoid "the Scylla of rigidification and the Charybdis of the uprooting of Eastern communities by Western institutions."‡

The devotion of a chapter in Dr de Kat Angelino's great work on Colonial Policy

* Quoted J. Coatman, *Magna Britannia*, Jonathan Cape, 1936, pp. 343–4.

† Lord Hailey, *The Future of Colonial Peoples*, Oxford University Press, 1943, pp. 40–41.

‡ Dr A. D. A. de Kat Angelino, *Colonial Policy*, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1931, vol. i, pp. 439–40.

to the theoretical discussion of the problems raised by the " synthesis of cultures " demonstrates his sound and perhaps unrivalled understanding of the difficulties of colonial government in their true perspective, historical and philosophical. The general outcome has been an attempt to show how the whole apparatus of colonial administration, in each of its several parts, can be made to serve the end of the re-adaptation of an existing social organization to serve the needs of humanity more adequately. In brief, the objective which has been established in this way may be said to utilize popular education to create a sense of citizenship, to develop the co-operative system to its fullest extent, and by these means to weld old and new social organizations together into the larger unity of the great society, and to open as wide an opportunity as possible for every talent to unfold itself for the common good.*

Indirect rule, first conceived in Africa as an administrative expedient, has had similar ends in view; in Lord Lugard's words, its purpose has been " to promote the evolution and adaptation of native institutions as opposed to Europeanization and assimilation ". As developed by Lord Lugard and Sir Donald Cameron, it implies a philosophy of slow evolution of institutions, of natural growth, of education in the exercise of responsibility by experience, of learning through mistakes, and of the deliberate limitation of " outside " interference.† The conception thus evolved is very similar in its nature and implications to the " ethical " policy of the Dutch Government, carried into effect in Indonesia from 1901 onwards. The similarities also extend to the political and social consequences of the two policies.

Looked at from the narrow point of view of the officials who first conceived them, the systems of administration based on these policies can only be regarded as both enlightened in their design and skilful in their execution. Nevertheless, their *total* effect on the communities to which they have been applied has been as unexpected as it has sometimes been unfortunate. Who could have foreseen fifty years ago, for instance, that the superstitions of Africa would have endured with such tenacity, and that they would indeed thrive in the social environment of " liberal " government. The rapid growth of the problems of urbanization has been as surprising in at least the same degree. So far as the attitude of the governed to the forms of government is concerned the most remarkable feature of indirect rule to the intelligent young man in Nigeria or in Indonesia is, as Mr Hodson has pointed out, its indirection. Though the ultimate aim of the policy may be the fitting of dependent peoples to govern themselves, there is no guarantee, nor even an inherent likelihood, that when the time comes for a new political advance, the social and political institutions that have been fostered in this way will be " at all

* Dr A. D. A. de Kat Angelino, *Colonial Policy*, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1931, vol. i, pp. 439–40.

† *The Colonial Problem*, Royal Institution of International Affairs, Oxford University Press, 1937, pp. 258–60.

appropriate elements in a regional or national system of self-government". Furthermore, a collision has often occurred between social and economic policies; a complicated administrative apparatus may be evolved in the interests of "efficient" government which is far beyond the powers of the people to work, having regard to their present state of development, when political advances take place. Again, demands for political power of a small but vociferous "white collar" group in the towns may have to be resisted when the masses of the people are unfit to undertake the responsibilities of self-government, and they may moreover even be "more or less insulated from the contagion of desire for it".* As Mr Coatman was forced to admit in 1936, even before the problems of colonial government reached their present critical state, there is a certain validity behind the criticisms brought against the system of indirect rule, based on the charge that it tends to stabilize autocracy and to "perpetuate institutions which are outworn and no longer adequate to the needs of the times".† In other words, a certain justifiable measure of doubt has arisen that indirect rule has in fact made social and political advance possible.

There has been allowed to arise in this way a conflict between statesmen and administrators on the one hand, and colonial intellectuals (the so-called *élite*) on the other, which has gone a fair way to make the formulation and execution of any sort of policy impossible. The doctrine of slow change, of small beginnings devoted to the betterment of the details of everyday life, and of self-education through experience is as sound as it ever was, but situations have rapidly developed in recent years in which it has become impossible to rely on it any longer. The description which Mr Edward Thompson gave in his *A Farewell to India* of the meeting of a village board devoted entirely to the making of political capital out of the death of a somewhat unpleasant member, rather than to the prosaic tasks of building and repairing roads, hospitals, village schools, and dispensaries, is a classic, particularly because it paints in such living colours the frustration, the exasperation, and the inwardly self-destructive conflicts of the British members of such boards who sought to dedicate their lives to the service of India's peoples.‡ There is no need to labour the point, and to illustrate the argument with references to chapter and verse, for the state of affairs is only too familiar to all who have carried any part of the burden of colonial administration in the mid-twentieth century. British, like Dutch, rule has been a success at the level of law and order, the protection of minorities and the liberty of the subject, and with the beginnings of village "uplift". Beyond that, it has, for the most part, failed to arouse a dynamic response within the peoples who have been ruled, of sufficient strength to enable them to co-operate willingly in the critically difficult task of re-building their cultures and their civilizations so as to meet successfully the challenge of the

* H. V. Hodson, *Twentieth-Century Empire*, Faber & Faber, 1948, pp. 93–95.

† *Op. cit.*, p. 335.

‡ Edward Thompson, *A Farewell to India*, Ernest Benn, 1931, pp. 155–160.

times. In particular, the intellectual leaders of the colonial peoples who have been trained in schools and universities fostered by the colonizing powers have turned out to be hostile to them, seeking to drive them out. They have certainly not, as a class, turned out to be the interpreters of Western to Eastern and African culture, and the architects of a new and more hopeful cultural synthesis constructed out of what is best in each. There are, of course, notable examples to the contrary, such as Dr Aggrey, but these are few and far between.

The problem was discussed at length by Dr de Kat Angelino, but the intervening period has thrown little more light on it than he did nearly twenty years ago. He recognized the need for creating " proto-parliaments " as a means of " securing the collaboration of the *élite* and persuading its nationalism to exchange negative tendencies for true civic spirit ", but he equally decried the value of the institutions of " individualistic democracy "; " what a fallacy ", he wrote, " to think that one can lift up a population merely by the brittle thread of politics! " In the development of a colonial democracy, universal suffrage was, in his opinion, merely one part of a larger whole, in which sound general popular education, the care of the health of the people, local self-government, and the co-operative movement all had their place. " The Eastern *élite* ", he concluded, " should not despise modest work in rural surroundings and should help in the fight against social evils and encourage its backward brethren to strive after self-renovation."* His whole work was, indeed, largely regarded by him as " an appeal to the Eastern *élite* in and outside the colonial world, and to all the colonizing nations . . . to enrol under the banner of synthesis and to march against antithesis ". But he left unanswered the question as to the ways in which the *élite* were to be persuaded to accept the personal responsibilities which he sought to impose on them.

The future of colonial government, as such, depends on the finding of a satisfactory answer to this question. Dr de Kat Angelino suggests that an attempt should be made to explain to the East the fact that it undervalues the example of the West because it lacks the social responsibility, civic spirit, love of truth, and the sense of freedom which are assumed to be characteristic of Western civilization.† Even in the 1930's, such a task of persuasion would have been hard indeed; in the 1950's it will be impossible, for any attempt of this kind would be brushed aside as the crudest form of hypocrisy. The idea of Western superiority has been destroyed as much by Japan's victories as by Germany's crimes. The only way ahead which offers a reasonable measure of hope for the future is through the justification of colonial government by its works. We are forced back again into the position of the great pioneers of colonial administration, such as Lord Lugard, when we must formulate a policy which is both administratively viable, and which satisfies the chief political and social standards of our times. The policy of indirect rule must be thought out again in these terms.

We are greatly assisted in this task by the thought which has been given to the

* *Op. cit.*, vol. i, pp. 438–47; 474; 519–20.

† *Ibid.*, vol. i, p. 478.

problems of colonial government by administrators who have had to bear the responsibility for carrying on the business of government under appallingly trying conditions during the past twenty years. There are now available to us a number of accounts of the problems that were faced in this way which are both courageous, responsible and well informed. The time has therefore arrived when it is both possible as well as highly desirable to take stock, and survey the assets on which we can draw to carry us through the troubles which lie immediately ahead of us. Foremost amongst the accounts of this kind available to us are those produced by former members of the Civil Services of India and Burma, which are equally relevant to the problems of any dependent colonial territory. Our system of government is seen to have the defects of its qualities and something more. If protection was given to the liberty of the subject, this was in large measure due to the " very backwardness in economic policy " for which British administration is often criticized to-day. The freedom that was guaranteed was of a negative rather than a positive order; what was lacking was the " positive freedom " of creating, by means of the power of the State, an environment worthy of man. " Let a man visit the Indian village, or one of the spreading industrial towns such as Ahmedabad," writes Mr Wint, " let him see the filth, illiteracy, and stagnation, and see what organization and discipline will be required to clean the streets, house the workers, and remove the social debris of ages, and . . . he may well doubt the value of a political life regulated nicely by liberal principle, in which the government finds its hands tied by law, and the individual is free to engage in activity other than what it decrees."* The same may be said of village and town as far away as the West Indies, and indeed in any colonial territory where " Western " and " primitive " patterns of life have collided.

This criticism extends to the very basis of contemporary colonial policy. A damaging comparison has been drawn between the attitudes of Tsarist governments towards the governed, and those of British colonial governments. History has, it has been suggested, repeated itself in so far as governments have come into existence which began with attempts to reform, and ended by growing remote from, and suspicious of, the people at large and the educated classes in particular. British government has not been oppressive, but a gulf has been allowed to open up between the British official and the " native "; the culture and institutions of colonial peoples have been grossly undervalued because officialdom has too readily assumed the superiority of the Western " way of life ". Other cultures have been regarded with indifference as museum curiosities. " The British public ", it has been said, " has a limitless capacity for becoming bored about the Orient ". Can it be wondered at, therefore, that we have been unable to complete our work by capturing the imagination of Indian and other peoples, and thus win them over to support our rule?†

* Guy Wint, *The British in Asia*, Faber & Faber, 1947, pp. 122, 215.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 69, 82, 215.

This attitude of boredom and indifference has set in motion a complicated chain of social causation. A lack of interest in other cultures, and an assumption of the superiority of our own, has led to an inability to understand the processes whereby colonial cultures have changed, and to control the processes whereby new cultures are produced from the old. " British influence ", it has been said, " has set afoot revolutions, but has not completed them by forming a new society with a stability of its own; instead it has created everywhere, in institutions and in minds, combinations which are radically unstable."* This process has been going on for at least a century. The signs were plain enough during the period of emancipation. The ex-slaves in the West Indies, for instance, had been torn up from their cultural roots in Africa, but no serious effort was made to replant them in a more healthy soil when an attempt was made to set right the wrongs that had been done to them. Almost precisely a hundred years ago, a far-sighted Governor of Trinidad wrote: " One of the many errors that have been committed since [the abolition of slavery] is the little attention that has been paid to any legislation having for its end the formation of a society on true, sound, and lasting principles. That such an objective could have been attained at once was and is not to be expected, but undoubtedly, had proper methods been adopted, much greater progress might have been made. As the question now stands, a race has been freed, but a society has not been formed."†

To some extent, this may have been due to the crude application of the social doctrine of individualism, which prevailed at the time, to the problems of colonial government. But this does not excuse us now from the obligation to evolve a new colonial policy based on a new technique of social control, taking into account uncomfortable facts which have hitherto been ignored. The time is, indeed, very much overdue when this should be attempted. There can be no doubt that something of a revolution in our thinking about the problem will be necessary before it will be possible for us to do so. As has been pointed out with cogent force, the virtues of the suburb, on which so much of the structure of the Welfare State has been erected, do not impress the revolutionary in the East or anywhere else.‡ Mere respectability is not enough. The situation must be faced that the only consequences of the application of existing policies to the situation in colonial territories in Africa and elsewhere must inevitably lead to the birth and rapid growth of nationalism, which, in turn, can only have as its outcome, as in the East, the severing of the ties that have hitherto bound Great Britain and her colonies together. All that can be hoped for on the basis of developing the expedients of colonial government that now prevail is some means of diminishing the pain of the process of amputation, and of so guiding the course of events that it shall take

* *Ibid.*, pp. 130–31.

† Quoted W. L. Burn, *Emancipation and Apprenticeship in the British West Indies*, Jonathan Cape, 1937, p. 370.

‡ Wint, *op. cit.*, p. 215.

place in a way which favours the growth of a healthy independence amongst the colonial peoples to the greatest possible extent. If this gloomy conclusion is to be avoided, new knowledge and new ideals must be found to provide the motive power and the technical skills to make it possible to bring what may perhaps be termed the Tropical Democracies into being.

Whence are these new truths and this new inspiration to come? The area of contact between the British and the colonial peoples at which pain is felt most acutely is without doubt that at which the British official comes into contact with the educated colonial, and it is to this area to which social research should be most urgently directed. The " primitive " man in the bush is reasonably happy because he is " unspoilt ". However, he cannot remain in his social solitude much longer, partly because his educated fellow citizens will see to it that he is aroused from his slumbers. Research which is directed towards the social institutions of the " simpler " peoples has its own justification on scientific grounds, but it is not relevant to the really urgent problems of colonial government which must be faced to-day. It is unhappily true that the much more difficult task must be faced at once of conducting research into a series of problems in which our own behaviour is an essential part. British rule has hitherto been based simultaneously on the consent of the governed, and on the assumption of their inferiority. A heavy strain is thus imposed on the personalities of those who can justifiably consider themselves entitled to a measure of social as well as political freedom. The keynote of the situation is frustration, and the aggression that goes with it. Self-respect is fatally wounded, and the colonial citizen, " like the pre-Revolutionary Russian ", has been apt " to round in peevish despair " on the society which has produced him. The new personality that has been thus produced has been aggressive because it has been inwardly insecure; an "almost unbelievable capacity for detecting insult and intrigue in quarters where none was intended " has developed, together with an extreme unwillingness to accept a responsibility for the shortcomings of the prevailing social order. " By attracting all criticism to themselves ", it has been said, " the British robbed India of the power of self-criticism."*

The result is tragic. Not only does the colonial fail to pull his weight in the struggle for social and political progress; he is often a serious embarrassment or even obstacle to those who are endeavouring to discharge responsibilities of this kind in the daily round of administrative affairs. This troubled situation is, indeed, likely to get much worse before it can get better. The " simple peasant " so often and so short-sightedly idealized by the colonial administrator, is a man who has learned to tolerate the superiority of his white masters (as has the " good nigger " in the Southern States of the U.S.A.). As soon as such a person begins to rise in the social scale, however, he tends to become class-conscious, and to recognize and resent differences that he has hitherto accepted. He becomes aggressive, and

* Wint, *op. cit.*, pp. 68–75.

generally " difficult ". Any policy of social advance, therefore, which encourages the growth of an emergent middle class, is bound to produce political and social tensions where they did not exist before. Not only are the personal activities of such individuals more troublesome, but the increase in individual competitiveness makes the creation of any institution founded on co-operative or group activity more difficult.* All of which is a hard truth for the colonial administrator to have to swallow.

As has already been pointed out, it is no use telling the educated colonial citizen that he ought to devote himself to " modest work in rural surroundings ". The time when such a policy was really practical is now long past. It has, nevertheless, been emphasized recently that " the governments in Africa have now to elicit a social will to progress among all sections of the inhabitants of British Africa, to mobilize their energies in support of development of all kinds, and to organize and direct a planned forward movement. . . . Any effort at social progress must be allied with African nationalist feeling ".† This is entirely true, but the administrator " on the spot " is entitled to ask for guidance as to how it is to be done. The obstacles to be overcome are immense. How, for instance, are the peasantry of the Gold Coast to be convinced of the need for destroying cocoa trees infected with witchbroom disease? How is the appalling practice of female circumcision to be eradicated amongst the peoples of the Sudan? How is the problem of illiteracy to be dealt with in Jamaica? How is the rapid growth of the population in Barbados and elsewhere to be brought under control? Above all, how is the politician to be persuaded to deal with these problems conscientiously, rather than exploit them for his own purposes? All these questions are difficult enough in themselves; even considered as isolated problems in themselves their solution may be thought by many to defy the wit of man. In their social context they assume an even greater degree of complexity. Schemes for the development of representative and responsible government have been frustrated time after time by attempts that have been made to use political status for corrupt purposes.‡ These are realities, and are not to be disposed of merely by the scurrilous abuse of colonial politicians on the one hand, or the windy platitudes of British statesmen and administrators on the other.

If the present trend of events is left to proceed unchecked, the conclusions for the future welfare of the colonial peoples cannot but be exceedingly pessimistic.

* Cf. C. V. D. Hadley, *Personality Patterns, Social Class, and Aggression in the British West Indies. Human Relations*, 1949, pp. 356–7.

† The Rt. Hon. the Earl of Listowel, *The Modern Conception of Government in British Africa. United Empire*, 1949, p. 173.

‡ A distressing account of corruption in Burma is given by Mr. G. E. Harvey, in his *British Rule in Burma*, 1824–1942, Faber & Faber, 1946. " We imposed a modern administration, a good and progressive administration, but it required an ever-increasing variety of departmental subordinates who applied modern rules, rules unintelligible to the simpler public, and applied them largely for purposes of extortion." See pp. 37–38, 87–90.

In the West Indies, poverty and ignorance, and the feelings of inferiority that are still the fate that a negro people has to face, exert a compelling force towards the social standards of the common people of Haiti, and the political standards of Latin America. Boss rule, promiscuity, and superstition, all go together; that has already been revealed in Jamaica, and it is, to say the least of it, exceedingly possible that the same tragic consequences may be experienced throughout the Colonial Empire sooner or later. The solution of the problem boils down, in its essentials, to the discovery of a means of social advance that is directed towards the improvement of the standards of living of the colonial peoples without at the same time weakening the social bonds which unite them. That necessarily involves the giving of an entirely different shape to the forms which government assumes in the Gold Coast, and in Great Britain; the amounts of external authority which the two peoples can tolerate are of entirely different orders. The machinery of social democracy and the " welfare state " cannot, for instance, be operated without the use of political power on a scale which would be regarded as tyrannical in the extreme by many colonial politicians. These goals cannot therefore be achieved until a new social order has been established in which, as it were, political authority has been acclimatized. The question naturally arises as to what can be put in their place, but it cannot be answered directly in this contemporary world of shifting values. Only one answer has been produced in the twentieth century which has any significance, and that is Mr David E. Lilienthal's concerning the objectives of the Tennessee Valley Authority.* It applies equally well to colonial administration and to the general theory of planning. " In the last analysis in democratic planning ", he has written, " it is human beings we are concerned with. Unless plans show an understanding and recognition of the aspirations of men and women they will fail. Those who lack human understanding and cannot share the emotions of men can hardly forward the objectives of realistic planning. *Here is the life principle of democratic planning—an awakening in the whole people of the sense of this common moral purpose. Not one goal, but a direction.*" Put in Mr. Lilienthal's way, the answer begins to lead somewhere. We must ask ourselves how people (not that meaningless abstraction " the people ") behave, what they want, and why they want it. We must consider all over again the problems of the demagogue, the idle workman, and the delinquent youth, and these are also our own unsolved problems in Great Britain.

The investigation of the social problems of any region, " white " or " coloured ", will immediately involve the investigation of the problems of culture-contact and of the control of cultural change, to which far too little attention has as yet been devoted by British, as distinct from American, authors.† It is necessary

* *T. V. A.: Democracy on the March*, Penguin Books, 1944, pp. 164–173.

† An attempt was made by the present author to develop this line of thought in relation to the problems of the West Indies in his *Welfare and Planning in the West Indies*, Clarendon Press, 1946, pp. 241 *seq.*

to display an interest in the cultures of colonial peoples, especially of the more highly developed amongst them, not only for their own sake, but because it may make it possible to improve our own side by side with them. No true friendship can be possible between two cultures, unless there is a two-way traffic between them. The social malaise of our time is a world-wide phenomenon which has manifested itself in an inability on the part of the individual to adjust himself to the group; this is as typical of life in England as it is of life in Jamaica, and it may be said to be connected with an atrophy or frustration of emotional life which extends from Bombay to Birmingham. As soon as the social pathology of any single people is treated as a unique situation, the very terms in which it is defined bar the way to diagnosis and cure of disease. If this is true, cannot we appeal in some measure to the educated peoples of the colonies for help in the solution of our own social problems? The success of the anthropologist in understanding the patterns of behaviour of the peoples he studies is in no small measure attributable to the fact that he is an " outsider " who has everything to learn. Is not the African as well placed in this respect in England as the Englishman is in Africa? It may be expected that if the educated colonial citizen were asked to help solve the social problems of Great Britain a long stride would have been taken towards winning the confidence and securing the collaboration in the business of colonial administration of the intellectual and the " *élite* " of which he forms an important part. The probability is that if the British people could be persuaded that the difficulties they have to face are shared with other races, an interest, and a willingness to assist, in the business of colonial development would grow far more quickly than it appears to do from the ineffectual attempts that are being made to clothe the idea of the " white man's burden " in garments more appropriate to social democracy, in which it is apt to look merely comic.

Mr Hodson has called for the education of the coloured peoples to enable them to advance on both social and economic fronts, to which he adds that " much of the basic data are not available, or have not been seriously studied. Political research in colonial territories is behind the need for it."* Lord Hailey has expressed a similar opinion. The demand for liberation must, he has said, " be rewritten in more realistic terms. It must imply the grant of self-government to areas which are already fitted for it, and this active promotion in others of a graded political education which will enable them eventually to manage their own affairs without external control, but on terms consistent with modern ideas of civilized rule."† The "basic data " on which a " graded " educational policy of this kind can be based are only to be found in the study of the history of colonial government from two angles; from that of the social, economic and political institutions which have gradually been evolved to meet the needs of the peoples, on the one hand, and on the other from that of personal histories of the leaders of the colonial peoples who have acquired power and have made their mark on the

* Op. cit., pp. 96–97. † Op. cit., p. 24.

societies in which they have lived. In the field of social welfare, the characteristic merits and defects of government departments, co-operative societies, and voluntary agencies need to be discovered and assessed. Examples of researches which should be carried out may be gained from the West Indies. Jamaica Welfare Ltd. has now been nationalized; what was its success in the past? Is this part of a plan for social development, and if so, what is it? Is its future likely to be as profitable as its past? The Social Welfare Department of British Guiana has weathered storms which sank the Department in Trinidad. How has it done so? What type of colonial official has been most successful in this or that type of environment? What may be said to have been the characteristic personality traits of the West Indian politicians and the civil servants brought into association with them, during the first half of the twentieth century; to what extent are these now in process of change? What is the influence of the formal educational system on the working-class leader? How can more satisfactory standards of achievement be attained in the future by means of the adaptation of existing institutions? Similar researches are urgently required in the African colonies; comparisons between the results may be expected to be most illuminating. Work of the kind has hardly yet been begun. It can only possess validity and usefulness if the colonial peoples themselves are associated with it. In so far as British institutions and personalities should be made as much the subject of research as things colonial, it has not been started at all.

Mr J. H. Huizinga has concluded the remarkable series of articles he recently produced on the theme of "Empire in Africa" by emphasizing that we are running a race with time. His last thoughts are pessimistic: it seems to him probable that the political demands of our colonial fellow-subjects will outrun our capacity to meet them because twentieth-century Europe has lost the "indispensable will to empire", and the moral stamina on which it must be based. "There is always at the back of one's mind", he writes, "the doubt whether the task Europe has set itself is not beyond all human power, whether we are not trying to do the impossible. Can we really hope to build a Nigerian or a Gold Coast nation? Can we really hope to build a plural society in East Africa? Can the French really hope to make a black province of France out of their colonies?"* Mr Huizinga thus points the moral that has been drawn earlier in this essay. Not only do we need a new technique of government to make it possible to take the next step from time to time in the advance towards the goal of colonial self-determination, but we also need a new source of motive power to enable us to use this technique after we have discovered it. Which is another way of saying that we must collaborate with the peoples of the colonies in an endeavour to overcome our own problems as well as theirs.

Superficially, of course, collaboration of this kind is not asked for, and may even be indignantly rejected, so far as outward appearances go. For all that, the

* The *Manchester Guardian*, August 5th, 1949.

case for co-operation is so strong that it may be put with a large measure of confidence in its ultimate success. The economic problems of the dependent territories are so intimidating that it would be a rash man rather than a bold one who would set out to tackle them unaided. The problems of illiteracy, family relationships, and urbanization, are of a similar order of magnitude. The demand of the colonial politician to settle things in his own way is really a counsel of despair which the downright stupidity and inefficiency of colonial government has occasioned. The colonizing powers have thus given such demands too much justification in the past. No reasonable grounds for the plea for isolation should be left in the future.

The characteristic social evils of the twentieth century, racial distrust, political antagonism and social insecurity can only be solved, by their very nature, through co-operative action. By learning to work together in solving the daily problems of colonial administration, new theories and new ideals may be revealed to us which may yet make the history of the second half of our century a tribute to man's nature rather than an indictment of it. The problems of colonial government are, in other words, an opportunity even more than a threat. It is to be hoped that it is not only the unpractical idealist who sees in the possibilities of racial collaboration something which humanity may one day look back on with pride, overshadowing the concentration camp, the atomic bomb, and the miseries of unemployment which have so deeply stigmatized our age.

The colonial administrator will never feel wanted himself unless he possesses a genuine affection for those he governs. He has, in a very real sense, to learn to love before he will receive the confidence and the affection which he needs so desperately in order to protect his own personality from harm. And, moreover, he has to learn that the problem of social advance in non-autonomous territories is insoluble unless it is made part and parcel of a much more general and an infinitely determined attack on the basic problems of human relations in the twentieth century. The English statesman, official, scientist and common citizen must learn willingly to accept his colonial opposite number as a colleague and a friend. And *vice versa*. If this is impossible, there is no future open for colonial empires.

Résumé

Le Relèvement social dans les Pays non autonomes

BIEN que l'on puisse regarder les systèmes de gouvernement colonial fondés sur l'administration indirecte comme étant à la fois éclairés quant à leur plan et habiles pour ce qui est de leur exécution, leur effet *total* sur les sociétés auxquelles on les a appliqués a été aussi inattendu qu'il a été parfois malheureux. Il en est résulté un conflit qui a surgi entre hommes d'état et administrateurs d'un côté et intellectuels coloniaux de l'autre et qui est déjà en voie de rendre impossible toute formulation

et toute application de n'importe quel genre de politique. L'avenir de l'administration coloniale comme telle dépend d'une révision à fond de la politique coloniale: il lui faudra une nouvelle formule qui soit administrativement viable et qui satisfasse en même temps aux exigences des théories sociales et économiques à la base de l'Etat social (*Welfare State*), et à la conception d'un Monde uni.

On admit généralement et depuis longtemps que le relèvement politique dépend de la mesure du progrès économique et social dans les collectivités en question. L'impossibilité de trouver les fonds nécessaires au programme de placement de capitaux qu'exige la réorganisation économique a créé, par consequent, une attitude d'extrême pessimisme à l'égard de la possibilité du progrès en n'importe quelle direction. On en vient à regarder les effets combinés de l'action et de la réaction des éléments politiques, économiques et sociaux de la politique coloniale comme la création d'un cercle vicieux qu'on ne peut pas rompre. C'est pourquoi beaucoup d'administrateurs et d'hommes d'état ont concentré leur attention sur la tâche plus modeste du relèvement des populations villageoises (" *village uplift* "), dans la croyance qu'une démocratie saine peut se construire sur des fondements établis dans la famille et le village. Mais cette politique n'a pas de portée sur les problèmes qui demandent instamment une solution. L'époque actuelle exige un système de gouvernement et d'administration énergiques et on ne pourra le réaliser qu'en se servant des connaissances et de l'énergie du citoyen colonial instruit. On aura a surmonter bien des obstacles avant d'arriver à pouvoir s'en servir; il faudra donc concentrer notre attention sur l'étude du problème des qualités essentielles du chef politique dans les territoires coloniaux, ce qui entraînera des recherches dans le rôle joué à la fois par l'homme politique et le fonctionnaire.

La politique de relèvement social a inévitablement produit des tensions politiques et sociales là où il n'en existait pas auparavant. De telles tensions sont, cependant, caractéristiques de la société contemporaine partout dans le monde; on ne peut arriver à les faire disparaître qu'en faisant naître dans la population entière la conscience d'un but moral commun. Cela nous offre l'occasion de collaborer avec les peuples des colonies pour résoudre des problèmes qui sont aussi bien les nôtres que les leurs. Il est à espérer que ce n'est pas seulement l'idéaliste qui voit dans les possibilités de la collaboration raciale quelque chose dont l'humanité pourra un jour se ressouvenir avec orgueil.

Summary of Discussion

PROFESSOR MARZORATI agreed with the view that, particularly in small units, traditional society was declining. With a view to preventing this tendency he pointed out that the government of the Congo was trying to consolidate these groups. Nevertheless the younger generation was still breaking away and the

movement from country to town continued. The need existed, therefore, for the creation of a new social order to meet the requirements of the people. He agreed that the conception of indirect administration had to be thought out again. He contended that the objective was not the crystallization of a feudal or tribal society but it was the provision of means by which African society could be adapted to modern conditions. This problem was social, political, economic and technical. The data for its solution was available in many colonies and it was already possible to trace in outline the new structure that would arise. The Belgian Congo was confronted with the problem of transplantation, that is to say, the employment of unmarried men outside tribal areas and their subsequent return home. Indeed, the need for stable labour had made the recruitment of workers with wives and children necessary. Their establishment in large agglomerations which resembled their home villages amounted to a policy of resettlement. Artificial communities exclusively urban in character which lay outside the customary existence of the Africans were only relatively stable. Recurrent periods of industrial boom and slump caused unemployment. There was no chance to return the native to his home district without bringing about disorder but as a matter of fact no society could be exclusively urban. It should be both urban and rural and so there should be a developed agricultural population as well. Since, however, there were few permanent fertile areas adapted for intensive cultivation the problem of land erosion at once arose. He believed that it was desirable to induce the Africans to abandon nomadic life and for selected natives to settle down as cultivators of the soil in selected areas where they could work under direction. It would be necessary to develop a special cadre of trained men to fight land erosion who would not be sent back to the plough as ordinary peasants. In the long run a community of small farmers and others who employed labour would evolve. Such communities already existed in the Sudan and in Nigeria and in our search for a solution of this problem, they should be carefully studied.

Professor LOGEMANN regretted that Professor Simey's experience had been limited to the Antilles and moreover, that it was limited to an area where the culture was not indigenous. As he saw it, the problem was of two communities (Western and colonial) moving along the same road but with the colonial community following. As far as the colonials were concerned they were confronted with the problem of rapid social change. In groups that had been changed by the impact of Europe and where the African, the East Indian or the West Indian had to adjust himself to the new situation there was a great deal of careful work to be done. This interaction of two communities, one advanced, the other backward, gave rise to many very grave difficulties.

Professor REVERT believed that paternalism must be avoided and that, if Africans and Europeans were treated as equals, effective co-operation would result. Our problem was that principles, studies, plans, however good, were useless unless there were men available to carry them into effect. In the training of colonial

experts theory was not so useful as general culture. Flexibility in the framework of the plan, the capacity to understand and a feeling of equality were necessary, if plans were to succeed.

Mr JONES pointed out that West Indian society was primarily European but the position was entirely different in Africa. Colonial administrators were able to get on with the peasants but not so easily with the urban intelligentsia and there has been a shift in political and social emphasis from the country to the towns. He did not think that social and anthropological research were likely to promote inter-racial co-operation unless they were carried out equally by trained African and European workers thereby breaking down tensions which at present existed between them.

Mr CHADWICK thought that the accent on colonial society must be that it was one society. Sometimes the administrator had the idea that he stood outside that society but he must get rid of that notion. It was his duty to give advice, but if advance was to be made a leader must be produced by the village itself. He knew a case where, because a local leader was corrupt, all development stopped as the people would not trust him. It was misleading to say that the government of Nigeria was stupid but administrators were well aware that they were sometimes unfairly attacked in the British press. In his view unjustifiable attacks by people who were ignorant of the situation did much harm as colonial spivs were only too ready to exploit it. The genuine nationalist, he believed, recognized that the people are not yet ready for self-government and it is our difficult task to determine the way to self-government.

Professor READ said that there were two kinds of rural reconstruction. First there was reconstruction on the grand scale promoted by governments and teams of experts; then there was local reconstruction encouraged by administrators. This latter variety was best carried out without the apparatus necessary in the first type. There was a danger that this latter local reconstruction may end too soon because it was not recognized that, having reached a certain number of objectives, there were still others to be attained. Therefore the promoters of such reconstruction should be continually concerned with this work and see that it did not come to a premature full-stop. We had something we could turn to in American techniques of rural reconstruction.

Mr GEORGE raised the spectre of Malthus. Development meant an increase in births. This was immediate since medical services reduced infant mortality from the outset. It did not necessarily follow that increased scientific knowledge also cancelled out the effect of such reductions in infantile mortality. For example, recently in Japan, the American administration had encountered strong popular resistance against the policy of birth control.

Mr BAYLEY said the British press was not the only source of trouble in the colonies. Sometimes the action of administrators produced trouble. It was always difficult to stimulate the peasants to action but he believed that Professor Simey's

policy had great potentialities in it. There were, however, many difficulties to be expected in its execution. One of the chief difficulties in administration was to establish a common ground between administrator and administered. Was private enterprise which is individualistic and disintegrating a cause of failure? The movement towards nationalism could be used as an integrating force and it would be wise to render nationalism less terrifying by co-operating with the nationalists and so giving direction to nationalism.

Professor SIMEY: The fundamental problem of apathy was to be connected not only with malaria, hookworm and malnutrition, but even more with emotional frustration. In the West Indies, for example, the frequently repeated statement that there is no indigenous culture undermined the very foundation of social life. The highly organized contemporary culture must be carefully examined, and compared with other cultures taking shape in the twentieth century. The same process could be observed at work in all of them. The same principles of analysis could be applied in Indonesia as in the West Indies, though of course special difficulties such, for example, as that of the variety of languages, arose in Indonesia.

It was the fact that moral indignation was too often allowed to take the place of practical investigation of this kind that made him believe that colonial governments were sometimes guilty of "downright stupidity". After all, who must be made responsible for the very existence of the African spivs referred to in the discussion? Had they not been brought up in an environment over which colonial governments had a large measure of control? Surely we must show reasonable enterprise in this emergency, for despair of improvement bred a desire for independence. The spiv must be denied the chance to exploit grievances, and this could only be done if those who had accepted the responsibility for good government kept the initiative in their own hands. In general, he agreed that irresponsible criticism of governments was dangerous and in the long run useless and he had great sympathy with administrators and admiration for their work. Lastly he expressed his deep and sincere sympathy with the troubles of the Dutch in Indonesia.

The One World and the Diversity of Cultures

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THE intention of this paper has not been to provide for a summing up of our discussions, which at once may become clear to you from the fact that its title and scope were decided upon more than a year ago, during a talk at my home with Professor MacInnes.

It was written after I had taken cognizance of the other contributions, except of course those of Messrs Alduy and Landry. It is amazing to see how much of it has been made superfluous by our oral debates, so it may appear to you as a rather imperfect résumé and many remarks now sound to me rather pedantic.

Unfortunately, Professor MacInnes has made us work so hard that I did not get the leisure to recast my paper and so you will have it as it is.

We have been listening then to an admirable series of papers expounding the principles governing the colonial activities of our several nations. It appears to me that they are largely sharing or at least anticipating the same difficulties and that none of them sees her way clear before her. However, it seems apparent also from the political papers that all nations prefer sticking to their own way of approach. The more so while the considerable amount of agreement in this conference has little chance to be shared by home and colonial governments.

Colonial policy thus proves to be predominantly a metropolitan affair. Methods may vary according to differences in the social, economic and cultural conditions in different colonies, and for the same reasons find their analogies in comparable circumstances elsewhere, but the aims and standards of policy are dictated by the social ideals and by the interests of the colonizing nation.

With the exception of fascist racism, no colonial power ever denied to a dependent people—although possibly holding it out in a remote future—the prospect of enjoying the same human dignity as it might attain for its own nation. To be sure, in order to get a more realistic apprehension of principles that really govern the practice of colonial policy, one has to investigate the actual tendencies of colonial administration and then one will not fail to detect that ethical colonial policy—as we Netherlanders used to style it—is always and everywhere limited by the principle that adequate room be given to Western economic activity. For this reason, and for the fact that colonial rule, however beneficent, constitutes a denial of liberty, a slight note of apology and—which means the same thing—of overstressing its virtues is seldom missing in any exposition of a colonial policy.

I cannot see, however, how exalting our achievements could contribute to our understanding of the problems we are up against, and on the other hand I can find no good reasons for apologizing for our initial sin that we have started colonizing at all. For colonialism has been for centuries as inevitable a phenomenon as any other historical category. It is a specific form of human migration and migrating people always tend to continue in their accustomed ways of life and business. Given the diversity of cultures on this blessed earth, migration therefore often entailed a clash of cultures and especially the impact of a technically and sometimes spiritually more powerful culture on a weaker one. Colonial domination in many of these cases has proved the natural way—often all too natural—to settle the outcome of that clash. We have, however, to acknowledge that the said impact could never ultimately have been evaded—as China and Japan have attempted to do—and perhaps we may add that although in former ages colonial rule often added to the hardships of the clash, in modern times it has done much to attenuate them.

For a clear understanding of our subject it is more important to note, with Dr Mair, that the same meeting and clashing of Western and non-Western civilizations equally took place in countries which never were dominated.

Colonial policy then does mean the framing of a social order that provides for an acceptable *modus vivendi* in an oriental society (take these words " oriental " and " occidental " please as paradigmatic) wherein Westerners have penetrated, have settled and are carrying on business. A dualistic society therefore, which means one where both main components are expected to live according to their own cultural pattern but cannot evade the influence of the other culture.

I note again that the same necessity for grappling with the problems which ensue from the interaction of two essentially different cultures applies to national governments in independent oriental countries as well. Of course, I do not intend to minimize the differences. The fact that in a colony ultimate political power lies in Western hands adds as well to the intricacies as to the possibilities involved in the basic situation. The clash of cultures, however, constitutes the more general and the more fundamental problem.

All governments concerned, for instance, will have to realize that the factors in their problem are no constants. There is a continuous process—be it progress or deterioration—an incessant interplay of forces, the stronger of them being, according to experience, the Western influences penetrating into the Eastern ways of life. Governmental policy never can be more than one factor and not always the mightiest one in this social process. In many respects it will have to " accept the facts " as defining the character of the social order which it is called upon to frame politically.

From all this it may become clear, that it is most unsatisfactory to attempt a definition of a colonial policy in terms of the ultimate aims of the metropolitan government and to illustrate its success and seriousness by the steps taken, which

are intended to lead in the desired direction. For it may be that the proposed aim is an illusion and that the separate measures work out quite differently from what was intended. It is for this reason, I frankly acknowledge, that I have found much more consolation in the anthropological papers laid before us, than in the expositions—however lucid and instructive—of policy. I concede, however, that our discussions for the greater part led into another way.

For what I missed in the political papers was a definite analysis of the social problem with which every separate colonial power is coping and of the means deemed applicable for a solution. I did not look for a smooth and painless evolution, erasing all imaginable difficulties and hardships. I cannot see that such an ideal could ever become real in so intricate a problem, whereas we saw so many clashes—and even bloody ones—occur in the purely national lives of culturally homogeneous peoples. I agree with those who hold that national independence is not the solution of the problem. But the danger seems imminent that colonial policy in too many cases tends to end in crisis—either in bloody conflict such as historical events have thrust upon Indonesia and the Netherlands or in a social breakdown.

Discussing principles and methods of colonial policy therefore means to me analysing the problem as a clash of cultures, which implies recognizing that it is by no means restricted to colonies, nor ends at the moment the colonizing power is abdicating.

I think this has proved to be a common conviction in this company and the thesis is by no means refuted if one should point out that newly arisen national governments in many cases show themselves eager to follow an autochthonous cultural and economic policy and to isolate themselves from Western influences. For they can never afford to reject technical progress and one cannot accept this and at the same time keep aloof from the other aspects of occidental civilization.

I make it my second point that the world is in urgent need of a careful restatement of the problem and I think we have been making some contribution to that. I have already remarked that all factors in it are constantly changing. We can leave aside the question whether oriental cultures *in se* are essentially static. At any rate their spontaneous development everywhere has been intercepted by intruding Western influences and they are all moving now in a Western direction. For this reason my compatriot *van Baal* speaks of "Western civilization as the constant factor in the present process of acculturation" (*Indonesië*, II, 102), but I want to stress that the face of Western civilization has radically changed since the early beginnings of colonialism and that in this our own time we are witnessing again a thorough change in the economic, cultural and political structure of the Western world. We are fighting hard in order that we may save, for ourselves and perhaps the world, the essential values of Christianity, humanism and democracy, but they stand no longer unchallenged and they cannot remain unaffected by the structural changes which are taking place.

I wish to point out some essential facts. The world is no longer divided into

West and East—the terms still used in a paradigmatic sense—a third political and spiritual power—spiritual even if you are pleased to call it satanic—has arisen: Communism. We will find, on further analysis, that to the East it is by no means self-evident that it should prefer the West above Communism. We cannot claim such preference unless we find ourselves able to show to the East the way out of a burdening difficulty and at the same time a glaring human evil: the utter poverty of its multitudes of which it has, by now, become conscious. What promise does capitalism hold out to a pre-capitalist world and what even a socialism whose social justice presupposes in the West capitalist-accumulated wealth?

A second essential I find in the fact that Eastern countries no longer are apportioned to separate Western powers as private hunting grounds for their national capitalist expansion. All are becoming knit together in an all-embracing world economy, which more and more requires careful co-ordination and planning. Economic progress and cultural progress are interdependent as our anthropologists well know. All this involves political co-ordination. Colonial powers may justly resent inexpert and even biased interference by international agencies but they will be forced sooner or later to accept supra-national direction. Constructive policy therefore has to seek for the means of improving international machinery rather than to repel its activities.

In the third place the distance between Western and Eastern civilization, expressed in terms of technical performance, science and social wealth has grown enormously since the beginnings of the colonial period. It seems ominous that it has continued growing in the period of progressive colonial policy. Western influence exerted on Eastern society is dangerously more powerful than ever before and small is the part even governments are able to manage deliberately.

I now turn from the Western partner in the meeting of cultures and I proceed with some remarks on the changed situation in the oriental one. Conditions of oriental peoples are still widely different all over the world, but all are on the road to acculturation—maybe it leads to an end, maybe it proves to be a blind alley.

Professor Simey has rightly pointed out that the implications of indirect rule are for a large part no longer valid in a world in which the impact of the West on the East is rapidly intensifying and accelerating. All the emphasis must necessarily be laid on the guidance to be given to the process of acculturation. Now even in the searching analyses of the anthropological papers I occasionally found some ambiguity about the fact that acculturation does not simply mean the bridging over of a more or less wide economic and cultural distance between East and West, finding themselves, however, on the same road. Eastern peoples themselves are often inclined to see it that way.

I think we are agreed that the case is far more serious. Acculturation does mean the breaking up of a definite social structure and its moral and religious system. For this reason the process has more of a revolution than of an evolution and there is always the danger present that it will adopt the outward shape of the

former. The problem is whether people can be enabled to adapt themselves, at the same time that their own social and spiritual conceptions are crumbling, to another social structure in order to regain firm moral standards and their suitable place in a social processs which again appears to them operable and acceptable. Or at least that their young generation may attain this. If not, they are threatened by the ominous process of *Vermassung*, as the Germans call it—I do not know if your language has forged a term for this specific deteriorated moral condition.

In the former slave colonies—and here I meet the thoughtful remarks of Miss Goveia—there never existed a sound autochthonous culture and emancipation, effected at a time when social studies were in their infancy or non-existent, without adequate measures being taken, in most cases initially led to deplorable results. Acculturation was left at random. For this reason the study of those societies seems extremely important to any student of the colonial problem in general.

The acculturation process involves the dissociation of individuals from their customary social environment. Now it occurs to me that a critical point in this development will be reached whenever this process will have grown so intense that we are justified in speaking of the formation of new social classes. As a rule there will be at least two of them: a class of *évolués*—intellectuals the Netherlanders style them—and the class of the urban proletariat, driven out from the agricultural village communities and largely thrown dependent on the demand for labour in the Western commercial and industrial sphere. Some countries have been so lucky as to engender a national industrial middle class: elsewhere a leading capitalist class has sprung up, *nisi fallor* in close connection to autochthonous feudal groups.

The new class structure of a transforming society is of course essential to the policy of its government. I do not propose to look deeper into it here, but I submit that, initially, in those new classes only the concept and the consciousness of national feeling are apt to arise. The awakening of national feeling amongst oriental peoples is an outstanding feature of the present-day world. It goes without saying that it is greatly complicating the problem for the colonial powers but, in this company, I need not enlarge thereupon.

I think, however, I have said enough to make clear that, taking for granted the common aim to impart to dominated peoples the values of our Western civilization, there is *ample reason for a restatement of the practical colonial problem in terms of the actual world situation.*

Modern historical science presses the view that its discipline goes no farther than the interpretation of bygone facts in terms of present-day thinking. There is no other objectivity in history. This implies that as long as we have not restated the colonial problem in terms adequate to the conditions of the present-day world, an investigation into the history of principles and methods of colonial policy is of little use to us. It is rather apt to blind our eyes and to force upon us

an attitude of defence against inevitable developments and to prevent us from framing a constructive policy.

I now proceed to some analysis of the problem as I see it. At the foundations of colonialism lie the impact of capitalism in a pre-capitalist world. This even holds good for the former slave colonies in so far as they are the upshot—and often the ruins—of early capitalist enterprise detached from the environment in which it was born. With the exception of those areas, we can state, generalizing, that in Eastern countries the bulk of the population was and is living in small village communities, mostly agricultural, whose inner social and political life is more akin to that of our family than of our modern municipality. Illiteracy is widely prevailing, but literacy in the sphere of the village is of little use. Village economy is largely self-supporting, it is subsistence-economy. Trade is following traditional lines. Money plays an insignificant rôle. Mutual aid is an efficient substitute. Custom is king.

Where larger political entities occur they are feudal in structure. They execute indeed some of the primordial functions we attribute to the state, but they are not expected to carry on a welfare policy. Custom prevails in this sphere too.

The impact of capitalism on this world involves the introduction of new social needs; of money economy; market production, hired labour, migration of labourers, dissociating them from their village community, its morals and customs. It implies also that the political body has to develop into a social welfare service state. It will have to counteract the evils inherent in the meeting of unequal social forces; it must provide the means for the people to hold their own under the new conditions; it must build up capable and incorruptible administrative machinery to be equal to these tasks.

This applies both to autochthonous and colonial governments, the difference being that the latter are as a rule more adequate to this task but, on the other hand, they feel as a rule unable to draw on national self-consciousness as a constructive force and they used to act on the assumption that the promotion of capitalist enterprise is a legitimate aim *in se*. The doctrine of the dual mandate formulated the obligation of making the colonies contribute to the world's wealth as an ethical postulate, but I fear this means little—to say the best of it—to dominated peoples. Monsieur Landry has shown us that we are turning away from this view.

I need not enlarge on the specific tasks which necessarily fall to the state in these conditions, nor on the fact that the cultural pattern of primitive society will be ruined. The spreading of the Christian faith can do much to relieve moral distress on condition that its missionaries show full understanding of the moral and religious conflict with which the proselyte has to struggle. In this respect perhaps more than with regard to their admirable social work, the attitude towards missions ought to be a very important item in the colonial government's policy. I note in passing that other world religions in these countries are usually

so intertwined with the ancient social structure that they are, in most cases and at least initially, inclined to take a conservative stand.

The common characteristic of all areas in the world where subsistence-economy prevails are (1) a very low *per capita* production (2) paucity of social capital (3) a low level of techniques and as a consequence often (4) undernourishment and widespread popular diseases.

The Western impact causes import of capital: profits flow back to the shareholders but in part they return as new investments: part is retained by the government levying taxes and investing in public works, schools, hospitals, etc. But there ensues no sound distribution of wealth. The autochthonous population is mainly interested as wage-earners. In sparsely populated areas like the Congo, the withdrawal of labour from the villages may eventually lead to disruption. In densely populated countries, like Java, a generous remuneration of industrial labour could at best create a small privileged class of workers. For the fundamental fact in far the majority of cases seems to be that a general rise of the economic level cannot be brought about by economic activities which directly affect a small percentage only of the population.

On the other hand, the social services of the state—however low their level as compared to Europe or the U.S.A.—are offered to the mass of the people. Their effect is just powerful enough to disturb the demographic equilibrium and the pressure of the growing population may eventually disrupt the farm system in the villages and flood the labour market. In Java there is a constant ebb and flow between the cities and the countryside, regulated by harvest results on the one side and the business cycle on the other.

As long as subsistence economy in the villages in the main is able to hold its own the protection of their social and cultural structure not only seems sound policy but it even proves extremely difficult to introduce technical improvements, schools and other modernisms. The attempt to introduce parts of an alien social system is firmly resisted by the coherent forces of the prevailing one. But, we have discovered that the old fortress is becoming severely battered. The moment comes, when circumstances dictate an attempt to raise the general level of production. But then it appears that a new system requires a tremendous amount of capital, which is lacking; a substantial amount of technical knowledge and capacity for handling it, which both are lacking too. An ever growing proletariat is outmeasuring the labour demand in agriculture and must be absorbed by industry. But industry requires markets and, although the domestic markets are large, the average purchasing power is extremely low. Thus there is little prospect for a speedy and spontaneous rise in prosperity for the people as a whole. Countries endowed with mineral wealth may have a start of others, but I do not think that this essentially alters the problem.

The production by native farmers of crops for export may be more helpful. But I wonder whether M. Landry could appreciate or share the pessimism of my

Leyden colleague Boeke who holds that the native farmer used to growing food crops for the subsistence of his family only, rarely shows himself capable of running a rationalized market production.

An outstanding symptom of this process of transition is the rise of urban centres, where proletarians and *évolués* are concentrating. Ancient Eastern cities were little more than agglomerations of villages. Modern cities show all the typical aspects, well known to us, including extreme poverty in their lower strata. There is a striking contrast between the solidarity in the villages and the forlornness of the urban pauper. Again, the amount of capital needed to provide for adequate social care is enormous and even then no solution can be hoped for unless a sufficient supply of work is available. It is to be feared moreover, that in many cases urban social care will prove to be filling the vessel of the Danaides, since the country has an unlimited excess of labour hands, always ready to pour in.

I have often wondered, remembering the rôle of our medieval cities, whether the smooth evolution of dualistic society could be promoted by a deliberate distinction in the administrative and legal fields between urban centres and the country. I feel that in Indonesia at least the process of transition has already spread too wide. However, I should like to know more about the function and prospective development of the non-customary native centres and the native cities (*centres indigènes extra-coutumiers et cités indigènes*) in the Congo.

You will have found, I hope, that the essential problem placed before governments is not social dualism, but precisely its transition. Take for instance the matter of education. As long as a marked dualism prevails, the school is in the closed village society an alien element, except in matters of religion. Pressure is needed to have its classrooms filled. A sharp distinction is possible between the village schools and those in urban centres, which latter are rightly said to fill a need. Government seems justified in providing in rural areas for inchoate education only and in saving higher expenditure which as a matter of fact could not be yielded by the village. In a later phase one may observe that school teaching is welcomed as a means enabling one to leave the village and to strive for what is regarded as a higher social status. But a fundamental change takes place when the traditional social pattern is so far uprooted that the school is asked for in order to live properly within the village. For this general widening of the horizon—both cause and outcome of this development—implies also that politically the rural population is going to surpass the village sphere and is ripening to citizenship. The demand for schools rather suddenly will change its extent and character. Training for citizenship requires far more than the three R's can give. It cannot be entrusted to the school only. I need not emphasize that here again a huge financial problem arises.

It will be the new social classes, engendered by the Western impact on an oriental society, that are predestinated to awaken first to the consciousness of a wider community, to citizenship and national feeling. Here autochthonous

governments and colonial governments part ways. True, the proletarian class—in the main illiterate unskilled labourers in a sparsely industrialized society—finds itself in an awkward position in both cases. On the other hand, the intellectuals, the *évolués*, have far better chances in their own soverign state, although they will have to oppose in many cases the old feudal aristocracy. Their taking over of power, however, implies the crumbling of the feudal hierarchy and they are at once facing the huge problem: how their small *élite* group can manage to rule its millions and command their obedience. It must clearly appear to you that here democratic ideals will find a meagre opportunity to prevail in the practice of life. The insurmountable fact, for the time being, is that—if anybody—the *élite* only will be able to carry on modern rule. If they fail, they will simply become the *homines novi* in a restored feudal system. If they stick to their ideals of modernizing national life a very strong hand in government will be required and consumption will have to be severely restricted in order that an adequate amount of national capital be built up. Nationalism far more than democracy will be their main stimulus. Masses must be managed, at least as long as they cannot manage themselves. We must be prepared therefore to face the possibility that governmental systems will arise which are in their practical working but faintly akin to our concepts of democracy and which perhaps even reject the name. *We* have learnt to see Communism as the enemy of humanism (taking this word in its broader sense). To oriental peoples contrasting their own spiritual values with all those of the West, the difference may seem simply one between two social and governmental systems and they could find reasons why democracy will not suit them best. The fact, of course, that this would cause a certain affinity to Soviet Russia impresses us less favourably. However, we would commit a serious fault if we unduly hastened to an identification.

I have been apparently swerving far from the subject-matter of this symposium. I do not think I actually did; the essential problem is identical for independent and for dependent countries. Only it is seriously complicated in dependent areas. Firstly because colonial rule *in se* is repugnant to national feeling. Secondly because the aims of colonial rule are always more or less stained by metropolitan interests, and the interests of the Western colonists. Thirdly because a justified reluctance to hand over power to an inexperienced and weak *élite* collides with the ardent aspirations of that group, which can easily command the support of the masses in resisting the foreign ruler. Fourthly, that for these three reasons colonial governments and occidental employers have long been slow to admit orientals to leading posts; often the *évolués* have to compete for adequate jobs, severely handicapped by race prejudice; the class as a whole is necessarily given to resentment. Professor Simey rightly says that frustration is the keynote of the colonial situation.

It appears to me that the one thing which could be done is that colonial governments exert themselves to frame and execute a policy, devised from an

exclusively national viewpoint. I mean the dominated nation's viewpoint. Attainment of national independence in as short a space of time as possible must be the main target. It is the only policy that could possibly inspire confidence and placate the intellectuals. It takes away many of the objections against a whole-hearted political and social co-operation on both sides. And this is absolutely necessary because no lasting results can be achieved without the co-operation of the national *élite*.

On the other hand, any policy that gives pre-eminence to metropolitan or pretended world interests; any policy, also, holding that the settling of important but small foreign groups permanently characterizes the originally oriental society as a mixed one and forbids a purely oriental national standpoint, bears the seed of future conflict.

Even along this way the task of colonial governments of preparing for the transfer of power to a free and truly democratic national rule is a sufficiently delicate one. I know I have not even touched upon a multitude of difficulties and I strongly support the view that a large amount of sociological research is absolutely indispensable to enable man to cope effectively with the concrete issues.

I think I have given plenty of reasons for the thesis, that the colonial problem *in se* and as part of the wider issue of the so-called under-developed countries has grown into a world-problem. Not for the reason that colonial dominion should be any more the bone of contention between competing imperialisms. Nor, I submit, because colonizing nations lie under the obligation of making the colonies contribute to world economy. To be sure, world economy has much to do with my thesis, but I should formulate the relation in the same way as Truman did: that the advanced nations for the sake of their own prosperity no longer can afford the neighbourhood of uncounted millions lacking purchasing power, health and wealth. Neither can they afford it politically. We cannot hope to live peacefully together in this world unless we take care of the world's proletariat and promote its emancipation in the same way as we do already or ought to do for our own domestic proletariats. This task will require an enormous amount of capital, and a good deal of it will not bear visible interest. Therefore it must not be dissipated in senseless competition. Even then we must prepare ourselves for the probability that part of it, spent on ill-devised schemes, will be lost. The task may seem superhuman; it is indeed and we can scarcely hope that we can avoid along this line all more serious failures. But then, for the efforts required and for the dangers involved we should acknowledge that this task is super-national and asks for international co-operation, planning, machinery and above all for super-national political prestige.

I stressed the economic side first, because it is the irrestrainable economic forces which dictate our way. But we must never forget that the real subject-matter is human. We will have to take oriental man earnestly as a free human

being. If we were entitled to guardianship over him as long as he dwelt in his pre-capitalist cultural patterns, we should bear in mind that in an advanced state, education—of nations and individuals alike—should modestly do no more than offer assistance where man has to find his own way through life.

One may justly doubt whether the Western world is by now prepared to take this attitude. There still remains much race prejudice and superiority feeling. I submit that this too the world can no longer afford.

Indeed in world politics Western social and political ideals have by now been proclaimed the common standard for all. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights for the moment may still seem little more than an impotent gesture, this international document will prove to vindicate all claims against Western domination. And again I think, therefore, that the remaining burden of colonialism presently can be borne only with the assistance, and justified by the assent, of the international community.

I well know, international machinery is still very defective, true international spirit largely lacking. I fully understand the objections valid against the United Nations Organization and some of its agencies. Nevertheless, it is as impossible as undesirable to ignore them. Action as recommended in this paper is going to be realized in Truman's programme for technical assistance, necessarily completed by Unesco's exertions to promote the understanding of the diverse cultures of the world and of the process of acculturation.

In defining principles and methods of colonial administration for this present day we will have to start from these realities. For the colonial system in the past has been at its best—and it could be no more at its time—a half-way attempt to reconcile occidental self-interest with true respect for oriental man.

There is growing one world now. The variegated diversity of cultures is dwindling fast. We will have to act from this assumption and the only way to save oriental peoples from losing, together with their traditional culture-patterns, their specific character is to enable them as soon as possible to frame politically, economically and culturally their own national destinies.

Résumé

Le monde indivisible et la diversité des cultures

(Communication préparée après lecture de la plupart des études, mais en partie avant les séances du *Symposium*)

Nos diverses nations rencontrent, ou s'attendent à rencontrer, les mêmes difficultés dans leurs sphères coloniales et ne sont pas arrivées à en prévoir la solution; mais chaque nation semble préférer les aborder de sa propre façon d'après ses propres idéaux sociaux et ses intérets politiques et économiques. Il est donc très

peu probable que la grande mesure d'unanimité qui a caractérisé nos séances puisse être partagée par les gouvernements de nos pays.

La fascisme excepté, aucune puissance coloniale n'a refusé à un peuple dépendant l'espoir, peut-être lointain, de jouir de la même dignité humaine qu'elle désire elle-même; mais partout la politique coloniale est dominée par l'intérêt économique occidental. Par suite de cela, et puisque tout régime colonial est une négation de la liberté, on a l'habitude, pour le justifier, d'enchérir sur ses vertus dans tout exposé de politique coloniale. Comment la louange de nos réalisations coloniales peut-elle faire comprendre nos problèmes ou, d'un autre côté, justifier le péché initial d'avoir entrepris la colonisation? La colonisation est inévitable, c'est une migration qui provoque un choc de cultures auquel on met fin par la domination coloniale. Il faut noter d'ailleurs que ce choc de civilisations se rencontre aussi dans des pays qui n'ont jamais été assujettis.

La politique coloniale implique donc la formulation d'un ordre social qui permette aux occidentaux de vivre acceptablement et de commencer dans une société orientale (*occidental* et *oriental* ayant ici une valeur d'exemple), c'est à dire dans un ordre dualiste où les deux cultures s'influencent réciproquement. Ce problème peut aussi se présenter sous les gouvernements nationaux de pays autonomes mais dans une colonie la possession par les occidentaux du pouvoir politique éventuel complique singulièrement la situation. Les gouvernements devront comprendre que les facteurs du problème ne sont pas toujours les mêmes, mais que le plus fort est celui de la pénetration dans la manière de vivre indigène d'influences occidentales. Il est donc peu satisfaisant de vouloir définir une politique coloniale d'après les buts du gouvernement métropolitain ou de l'apprécier d'après les mesures prises, le but pouvant être illusoire, les mesures pouvant donner des résultats inattendus.

Ce qui manquait donc aux études politiques c'était l'analyse du problème social qui se présente à chaque puissance colonisatrice et des moyens qu'on croit aptes à le résoudre. L'indépendance nationale n'en est pas en soi la solution, mais la politique coloniale tend trop souvent à aboutir à une crise, conflit sanguinaire ou effondrement social. *La discussion des principes et méthodes de la politique coloniale exige l'analyse du problème du point de vue d'un choc de cultures, ce qui implique qu'il ne se limite pas aux seules colonies et qu'il ne prend pas fin avec l'abdication de la puissance colonisatrice.* Cette thèse n'est pas infirmée par le désir manifesté par certains gouvernements nationaux nouvellement créés de suivre une politique culturelle et économique autochtone: le progrès technique est indispensable et il est intimement lié aux autres aspects de la civilisation occidentale. Et, en deuxième lieu, le problème demande urgement à être mis au point: Ce n'est pas seulement que les civilisations orientales, statiques ou non entre elles, évoluent dans le sens occidental, c'est aussi que la civilisation occidentale a beaucoup changé depuis le commencement de l'ère coloniale et que sa structure économique, culturelle et sociale change complètement en ce moment même: Nous luttons pour en sauver les valeurs

essentielles (christianisme, humanisme, démocratie) qui sont menacées et seront affectées par les changements structurelles qui se produisent. Notons certains faits essentiels:

1. Le monde n'est plus divisé entre l'Ouest et l'Est: le communisme existe et il n'est pas prouvé que l'Est ne doive le préférer à l'Ouest. Force nous est de montrer à l'Est comment sortir de ce grand mal, la pauvreté extrême, dont sont conscientes ses multitudes. Quelle promesse offrir?

2. Les pays orientaux ne sont plus distribués entre diverses puissances occidentales comme champ d'élection de l'expansion capitaliste. Ils entrent tous dans une économie mondiale qui exige de plus en plus une coordination soigneusement agencée et qui imposera à la longue une direction supranationale et nous obligera à perfectionner plutôt qu'à entraver le fonctionnement de la machine internationale.

3. La distance qui sépare les civilisations occidentale et orientale va toujours en augmentant même dans cette époque de politique coloniale progressive: l'influence de l'Ouest sur la société orientale est de plus en plus puissante, et d'une façon dangereuse.

Pour passer maintenant à la situation changée de l'associé oriental, on note que dans des conditions très variées, les peuples orientaux sont tous en pleine voie de développement culturel. Il faut donc souligner l'importance de la direction à donner à ce développement qui ne consiste pas seulement à jeter un pont à travers la distance qui sépare économiquement et culturellement l'Est et l'Ouest sur une même route. Le processus, beaucoup plus fondamental, implique le bouleversement d'une structure sociale déterminée avec son système moral et religieux—une révolution plutôt qu'une évolution—et l'accession à une nouvelle structure sociale munie de valeurs stables, sans quoi on aboutit à un abrutissement moral total. Dans les colonies autrefois esclavagistes, l'émancipation sans directives a eu d'abord des résultats déplorables; sans culture antérieure, les populations sont allées comme à tâtons vers cette culture nouvelle.

Le développement culturel impliquant la séparation de l'individu de son milieu social habituel, le point critique est atteint au moment où se forment les nouvelles classes sociales dont il y aura au moins deux: les évolués et le prolétariat urbain déraciné et à la merci de la demande de main d'œuvre dans la sphère commerciale ou industrielle occidentale; il se formera parfois une classe moyenne et même, dans les groupes indigènes féodaux, une classe moyenne industrielle. C'est seulement dans cette structure, ces classes sociales que le sentiment national peut éclore.

Il y a donc toute raison de mettre au point ce problème coloniale pratique par rapport à la situation mondiale actuelle. Sans cette mise au point en des termes adéquats aux conditions du monde actuel, une investigation de l'histoire des principes et méthodes de la politique coloniale pourrait même nous empêcher de formuler une politique constructive. Si on analyse le problème on trouve que c'est l'impact

du capitalisme sur un monde précapitaliste qui est à la base, même dans les colonies autrefois esclavagistes, du système colonial; dans les pays orientaux la population reste villageoise et agricole, à l'état de la famille plutôt que de notre municipalité moderne, soumise à une économie de subsistance, à un système commercial traditionnel où l'argent entre à peine, à une vie où la coutume fait loi. Les entités politiques plus amples sont, par structure, féodales et la coutume y règne également. L'impact du capitalisme y crée de nouvelles conditions sociales, économiques et morales et impose un développement vers un état à services sociaux pour défendre et assurer la vie du peuple. Les tâches à faire par l'état n'ont pas besoin d'un plus long examen, mais les missionaires peuvent rendre d'énormes services moraux à condition de comprendre que leurs convertis se trouvent complétement désaxés.

Une économie de subsistance se caractérise par une production individuelle très basse, une pénurie de capitaux industriels, un niveau technique très bas et, par conséquent, une nourriture insuffisante et des maladies endémiques très répandues. La rémuneration des capitaux occidentaux ne reste qu'en partie dans le pays pour financer des travaux publiques, hopitaux, etc.; dans les pays à population faible l'attrait du salaire peut détruire à la longue la vie villageoise; dans une population nombreuse, la rémunération industrielle peut créer une petite classe d'ouvriers privilégiés, mais le relèvement économique ne s'accomplira pas par des activités économiques intéressant une minime partie de la population. D'autre part les services sociaux seront offerts par l'état à la totalité de la population, leur effet pourra à la longue rompre l'équilibre démographique et la pression de la population pourra détruire le système agricole villageois et inonder le marché de main d'œuvre. Mais tant que l'économie de subsistance durera, l'introduction d'amélioriations techniques, d'écoles et d'autres modernisations sera entravée, jusqu'au moment où on visera à une augmentation du niveau général de la production; ce sont alors les capitaux qui manqueront, les connaissances et aptitudes techniques également; le prolétariat, en nombre toujours croissant, et que l'agriculture ne pourra plus absorber, demandera à être absorbé par l'industrie qui aura à chercher des débouchés, le marché intérieur étant, potentiellement seulement, grand mais de pouvoir d'achat bien faible. On ne semble donc pas pouvoir s'attendre à une augmentation de prospérité spontanée dans une population entière.

Un symptôme dominant de ce processus de transition c'est l'expansion des centres urbains et la concentration dans ces centres des évolués et d'un prolétariat chez qui, la solidarité villageoise étant perdue, il peut exister une misère individuelle extrême dans les classes inférieures; ce qui exige des dépenses énormes pour l'assistance publique, elle-même capable d'attirer de nouvelles vagues de main d'œuvre. On est donc amené à se demander si l'évolution d'une société dualiste serait peut-être facilitée par une distinction administrative et légale, posément réfléchie, entre les centres urbains et la campagne. *En effet, le problème n'est pas le*

dualisme social mais la transition de ce dualisme. A la différence des centres urbains, l'école, étrangère à la société villageoise, n'attire les élèves que par la compulsion (tant que le dualisme persiste), à tel point qu'on se demande si ces écoles ont une fonction à remplir. Le cas est différent dés qu'on demande l'enseignement dans les villages, c'est-à-dire, dés que se fait sentir le désir d'atteindre un statut social plus élevé, et il s'agit alors d'une éducation civique qui dépasse les ressources de l'école.

Ce sont les nouvelles classes sociales chez qui s'éveille tout d'abord la conscience d'une société plus large et chez qui naît le sentiment civique et national. Ici le gouvernement autochtone se sépare du gouvernement colonial: dans un état autonome, les quelques évolués peuvent évincer l'hiérarchie féodale et accéder au pouvoir; mais, pour gouverner les masses, ils devront faire appel au nationalisme plutôt qu'à la démocratie et recourir peut-être à des systèmes plus rapprochés du communisme que du nôtre. Le problème des pays dépendants et indépendants est sensiblement le même; il est seulement plus compliqué dans les premiers parce que (1) le régime colonial répugne au sentiment national; (2) les buts du régime colonial sont toujours colorés par les intérêts de la métropole et des colons; (3) la répugnance à transférer le pouvoir à une élite inexpérimentée est en conflit avec les aspirations de cette élite qui dispose de l'action des masses; et, de la, (4) la répugnance à admettre cette élite aux hautes fonctions du gouvernement ou des affaires provoque dans ce groupe des sentiments de frustration. Il faudrait donc que les gouvernements formulent et mettent en œuvre une politique conçue du point de vue de la nation dépendante pour lui permettre d'accéder aussitôt que possible à l'indépendance. Toute politique qui réserve des intérêts métropolitains ou soi-disant mondiaux, ou qui vise à perpétuer des groupes étrangers importants mais peu nombreux au sein de la société orientale, sera à l'avenir une source de conflits.

Il faudra donc développer les recherches sociologiques pour arriver à une solution concrète. Le problème colonial, en soi et comme partie de la question plus grande encore des pays sous-développés, est devenu un problème mondial, les puissances colonisatrices ayant maintenant le devoir de faire entrer les colonies dans l'économie mondiale; on ne peut plus tolérer le voisinage de millions d'âmes sans pouvoir d'achat, sans santé et sans richesses. Politiquement aussi, pour vivre en paix, il faudra partout protéger et émanciper le prolétariat et cela demandera des dépenses de capitaux, parfois peut-être sans résultats tangibles; c'est donc une tâche supranational qui exige la coopération internationale.

Mais le vrai sujet de notre problème est l'homme et il faut accepter l'oriental comme un être libre; si nous avons assumé le rôle de précepteur dans son état précapitaliste, l'éducation qu'on lui offre doit maintenant avoir pour but de lui fournir les moyens de faire son chemin dans la vie. Le monde occidental ne peut plus se permettre des préjugés de race et des sentiments de supériorité. Dans la politique mondiale les idéaux sociaux et politiques de l'Ouest sont devenus une norme pour tous. La Déclaration universelle des Droits de l'Homme, peut-être

à présent tout simplement un geste, justifiera à la longue toutes les revendications contre la domination occidentale; le fardeau colonial ne pourra donc pas être porté sans la coopération ou justifié sans l'assentiment de la communauté internationale. La machine internationale est encore très imparfaite, l'esprit international n'existe presque pas; mais il incombera à l'O.N.U. et à ses organes de réaliser le programme avancé ici, le programme Truman appuyé par les efforts de l'UNESCO pour faciliter la compréhension des diverses cultures du monde et des processus du développement culturel.

Un monde uni et indivisible est en voie de formation, la diversité des cultures disparaît. Le seul moyen de sauvegarder les caractéristiques spéciales des peuples orientaux, ainsi que leurs cultures traditionnelles, est de les mettre, au plus vite possible, en état de disposer politiquement, économiquement et culturellement de leurs destinées nationales.

Select List of Institutions, Government and University Departments and Journals concerned with Colonial Affairs

Belgium

Principaux périodiques coloniaux paraissant en Belgique et au Congo

BELGIQUE

Zaire (Revue Congolaise, Kongolees Tijdschrift, Belgian African Review)—Mensuel
Rédaction: 2 rue des Doyens, Louvain.
Administration: 163 rue du Trône, Bruxelles.

Bulletin des Séances de l'Institut royal colonial belge—Trimestriel,
25 avenue Marnix, Bruxelles.

La Revue coloniale belge—Mensuel,
34 rue de Stassart, Bruxelles.

Kongo-Overzee—Bimestriel,
Rédaction: 18 Brusselse steenweg, Melle-lez-Gand.
Administration: 116 Lamorinièrestraat, Anvers.

Bulletin agricole du Congo belge—Trimestriel,
Ministère des Colonies, Place Royale, Bruxelles.

Journal des Tribunaux d'Outremer—Mensuel,
26 avenue de la Toison d'Or, Bruxelles.

Belgique coloniale et commerce internationale—Mensuel,
24 avenue Michel-Ange, Bruxelles.

Les Veterans coloniaux (Revue congolaise illustrée)—Mensuel,
34 rue de Stassart, Bruxelles.

Bulletin des Missions—Trimestriel,
Abbaye de St. André-lez-Bruges.

Grands Lacs (Revue missionnaire)—Mensuel,
8 rue Grandgagnage, Namur.

CONGO

Bulletin du Centre d'étude des problèmes sociaux indigènes—Trimestriel,
B.P. 1621, Elisabethville.

Bulletin des Juridictions indigènes et du Droit coutumier congolais—Mensuel,
B.P. 510, Elisabethville.

Revue juridique du Congo belge—Mensuel,
B.P. 510, Elisabethville.

Aequatoria—Trimestriel,
Mission Catholique, Coquilhatville.

Lovania (Bulletin de l'Association des anciens étudiants de l'Université de Louvain)—Trimestriel,
B.P. 1259, Elisabethville.

Bulletin de l'Association des anciens étudiants de l'Universite coloniale d'Anvers—Trimestriel,
B.P. 3071, Kalina (Léopoldville).

Congopresse—Bimensuel,
Secrétariat général du Congo Belge, Léopoldville.

La Voix du Congolais—Mensuel,
B.P. 3096, Kalina (Léopoldville).

Congo Mission News (Missions protestantes)—Mensuel,
Léopoldville.

PUBLICATIONS OFFICIELLES

Bulletin Officiel du Congo Belge.
Bulletin administratif du Congo Belge.
Bulletin Officiel du Ruanda-Urundi.
Comptes-rendus analytiques des séances du Conseil colonial.
Rapports annuels à la Chambre des Représentants sur l'administration du Congo Belge.
Rapports annuels à la Chambre des Représentants sur l'administration belge des territoires du Ruanda-Urundi.
Statistiques du commerce extérieur du Congo belge.

The British Empire

INSTITUTIONS, ETC.

Aberdeen University.
Anti-Locust Research Centre, British Museum, South Kensington, London.
Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protection Society, Denison House, 296 Vauxhall Bridge Road, London, S.W.1.
Bristol University.
The British Council, 65 Davies Street, London, W.1.
Bureau of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, Keppel Street, Gower Street, London, W.C.1.

Cambridge University.
The Church Missionary Society, 6 Salisbury Square, London, E.C.4.
Colonial Development Corporation, 33 Dover Street, London, W.1.
Conservative Central Office (Colonial Affairs Section), Abbey House, Victoria Street, London, S.W.1.
Empire Parliamentary Association, Westminster Hall, Houses of Parliament, London, S.W.1.
Fabian Colonial Bureau, 11 Dartmouth Street, London, S.W.1.
Imperial College of Tropical Agriculture, Trinidad, B.W.I.
Imperial Institute, South Kensington, London, S.W.7.
International African Institute, Seymour House, 17 Waterloo Place, London, S.W.1.
The Librarian, Colonial Office, London, S.W.1.
The Librarian, Foreign Office, London, S.W.1.
Liverpool University.
Liverpool University (School of Tropical Medicine).
London Missionary Society, Livingstone House, 42 Broadway, S.W.1.
London University:

- London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, Keppel Street, Gower Street, London, W.C.1.
- Colonial Department, Institute of Education, W.C.1.
- School of Oriental and African Studies, W.C.1.
- King's College, Strand, W.C.2.

Makerere University College, Kampala, Uganda, East Africa.
Oxford University.
Oxford University (Institute of Colonial Studies).
Royal African Society, 18 Northumberland Avenue, London, W.C.2.
Royal Empire Society, Northumberland Avenue, London, W.C.2.
Royal Institute of International Affairs, 10 St. James's Square, London, S.W.1.
Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, S.P.C.K. House, Northumberland Avenue, London, W.C.2.
University College of the Gold Coast, Accra, Gold Coast.
University College, Ibadan, Nigeria.
University College of the West Indies, Mona, St. Andrew, Jamaica, B.W.I.
University of Malaya, Singapore.
The West India Committee, 40 Norfolk Street, London, W.C.2.

Periodicals

Africa (quarterly, published by International African Institute).
The Anti-Slavery Reporter and Aborigines Friend (published by Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protection Society).

Caribbean Quarterly, University College, Jamaica.
Colonial Review, Institute of Education, University of London.
Corona (monthly, the journal of H.M. Colonial Service).
The Crown Colonist, 33 Tothill Street, Westminster, London, S.W.1.
International Affairs (Quarterly, published by Royal Institute of International Affairs).
Journal of the Royal African Society.
Malayan Educator, Malayan Teachers' Union, 331 North Bridge Road, Singapore.
Makerere, Makerere College, Kampala, Uganda.
Mass Education Bulletin, Institute of Education, University of London.
Nigerian Teacher, Education Department, Lagos, Nigeria.
Northern Rhodesia, African Education Journal, Department of African Education, Mazabuka, Northern Rhodesia.
Oversea Education, Colonial Office, London.
Path of Learning, Hong Kong Teachers' Association, c/o Northcote Training College, Hong Kong.
The Round Table, 15 Ormond Yard, Duke of York Street, London, S.W.1.
Sierra Leone School Notes, Education Department, Freetown, Sierra Leone.
The Torch, Jamaica Teachers' Journal.
Uganda Teachers' Journal, Education Department, Kampala, Uganda.
United Empire, Journal of Royal Empire Society.
Venture (monthly, published by Fabian Colonial Bureau).
The World To-day (monthly, published by Royal Institute of International Affairs).

France

Liste des Universités, Instituts et Écoles Enseignant les Sciences Coloniales

École Nationale de la France d'Outre-Mer, 2 Av. de l'Observatoire, Paris, 6ème.
Institut de la France d'Outre-Mer (Université de Bordeaux), Palaise de la Bourse, Place Gabriel, Bordeaux.
Institut des Sciences administratives, sociales et coloniales (Université d'Alger), Rue Michelet, à Alger.
Chaires de Géographie Coloniale:

Faculté des Lettres (Université de Bordeaux),
Faculté des Lettres (Université de Paris),
Faculté des Lettres (Université de Strasbourg),
Faculté des Lettres (Université de Lyon),
Faculté des Lettres (Université d'Aix).

Chaire de Droit et Science coloniale, Faculté de droit (Université d'Alger).
Chaire d'Economie et Legislation coloniales, Faculté de droit (Université de Montpellier).

Chaires de Legislation coloniale:

Faculté de droit (Université de Lyon),
Faculté de droit (Université d'Aix).

JOURNAUX

En dehors des statist ques officielles on peut signaler parmi les publications coloniales les plus importantes:

Les publications de l'Académie des Sciences coloniales, 15 Rue de la Pérouse, Paris, XVI^{ème}.

Les Cahiers d'Outre-Mer, Palais de la Bourse, Place Gabriel Bordeaux (Gironde).

Les Cahiers Coloniaux, Institut Colonial de Marseille, Palais de la Bourse, Marseille.

Porte Océane, Revue havraise, Boite Postale 619, Le Havre, (Seine Inférieure).

France Outre-mer (Le Monde Colonial illustré), 37 Rue Marbeuf, Paris, VIII^{ème}.

Bulletin de la France d'Outre-Mer, Comité central de la France d'Outre-Mer, 41 Rue de la Bienfaisance, Paris, VIII^{ème}.

Marches Coloniaux du Monde, 190 Boulevard Haussmann, Paris VIII^{ème}.

Revue Internationale des Produits Coloniaux et du Matériel Colonial, 97 Rue Saint Lazate, Paris IX^{ème}.

Tropiques: Revue des Troupes Colonalies, École Militaire Batiment H, Paris.

Revue Internationale de Botanique appliquée et d'agriculture Tropicale, 57 Rue Cuvier, Paris V^{ème}.

L'Agronomie Tropicale, 46 bis, Avenue de la Balle Gabrielle, Nogent sur Marne, (Seine).

Fruits d'Outre-Mer, 7 Rue Saint Dominique, Paris VII^{ème}.

Bois et Forêts des Tropiques, Comité National des bois tropicaux, 16 Rue de la Paix, Paris II^{ème}.

Bulletin de l'Institut Francais d'Afrique Noire, Larose, 11 Rue Victor Cousin, Paris.

En outre de nombreuses études et publications (officielles ou non) paraissent dans les différents territoires. On en rencontre également de fort importantes dans des publications métropolitaines qui ne sont pas essentiellement coloniales en particulier dans *La Documentations Française* (Notes et études documentaires), 14–16 rue Lord Byron, Paris VIII^{ème} ; *Les Annales de Géographie*, Librarie A. Colin, 103 Boulevard Saint Michel, Paris V^{ème}, etc.

Netherlands

INSTITUTES

Amsterdam, Koninklijke Vereeniging Indisch Instituut (formerly Kolonial Instituut), 1910.

Batavia, Koninklijk Bataviaasch Genootschap van Kunsten en Wetenschappen, 1778.

'S Gravenhage:

Indisch Genootschap, 1854.
Koninklijk Instituut voor de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde van Ned.-Indië, 1851.

Leiden:

Adatrechtstichting, 1909.
Instituut Kern, 1925.
Oostersch Genootschap, 1920.
Rijksmuseum voor Volkenkunde (formerly 's Rijks Ethnografisch Museum), 1837.

Rotterdam, Museum voor Land- en Volkenkunde en Maritiem Museum "Prins Hendrik", 1884.
Tilburg, Ned. Volkenkundig Missie-Museum, 1925.*
Utrecht, Volkenkundig Instituut, 1920.*

PERIODICALS

Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde van Ned.-Indië, 1852–to date.
Bulletin of the Colonial Institute, 1937–1940.
Cultureel Indië, 1939–1946.
Indische Gids, 1879–1941.
Indisch Tijdschrift van het Recht, 1849–to date.
Indonesië, 1947–to date.
Koloniaal Tijdschrift, 1912–1941.
Koloniale Studiën, 1916–1941.
Nederlandsch-Indië Oud en Nieuw, 1916–1934.
Tijdschrift voor Indische Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde, 1853–to date.
Verhandelingen van het Bataviaasch Genootschap van Kunsten en Wetenschappen, 1781–to date.
Verhandelingen van het Koninklijk Instituut voor de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde, 1938–to date (i.e. vol. 1–8).
West-Indische Gids, 1919–to date.

Portugal

PERIODICALS

Boletim Geral das Colónias, Lisbon.
Anais da Junta de Investigações Coloniais, Lisbon.
Anais do Instituto de Medicina Tropical, Lisbon.
Estudos Coloniais, Revista da Escola Superior Colonial, Lisbon.

* University training for the Civil Service overseas.

Boletim Cultural da Guiné Portuguesa, Bissau.
Agronomia Angolana, Luanda.
Arquivos de Angola, Luanda.
Pecuária, Luanda.
Moçambique, Documentário Trimestral, Lourenço Marques.
Boletim da Sociedade de Estudos de Moçambique, Lourenço Marques.
Arquivos de Macau.
Boletim do Instituto Vasco da Gama, Goa.

United States

Institutions

Institute of Pacific Relations.
Foreign Policy Association.
Pan-American Union.
The American Academy of Political and Social Science.
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
World Peace Foundation.

Periodicals

Pacific Affairs.
The American Political Science Review.
Foreign Affairs.
Far Eastern Survey.
The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science.
Foreign Agriculture.
The American Journal of International Law.
Foreign Policy Report.
International Conciliation.
International Organization.
World Politics.

The following government institutions issue publications on the U.S. dependencies:

U.S. Congress.
Department of the Interior.
Navy Department.
Department of Agriculture.
Department of State.
U.S. Tariff Commission.

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Monsieur Paul Alduy, Conseiller de l'Union Française, Paris.
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