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FOREWORD

THE IHUD (UNION) ASSOCIATION in Palestine is a Jewish group which stands for Jewish-Arab co-operation in a bi-national state, on the basis of parity of numbers and parity of political rights. Dr. Magnes, the Chairman of the Association, and Professor Martin Buber and Mr. Smilansky gave evidence on its behalf before the Anglo-American Inquiry Commission. Their testimony made a deep impression; and it is clear from the recommendations of the Commission that it had an influence on the Report.

In this pamphlet the memorandum presented by the Association and the transcript of the hearing are set out in full, with a few minor omissions. That involves some duplication; but it seemed better to leave the statements as they were made than to edit them.

NORMAN BENTWIGH.

Part I

STATEMENT TO THE ANGLO-AMERICAN COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY BY THE IHUD (UNION) ASSOCIATION OF PALESTINE

I

THE IHUD (UNION) ASSOCIATION

THE IHUD (UNION) ASSOCIATION was formed in September, 1942. It is not a political party. It is a group of individuals belonging to different parties and of independents belonging to no party. Though members of Ihud may have varying views on details, they are united in the firm conviction that there is but one way of meeting the Palestine problem—that of Jewish-Arab co-operation. We are appending the declaration made when the Ihud (Union) Association was formed.

The Ihud (Union) Association stands for the union of Jews and Arabs in a bi-national Palestine based on the parity of the two peoples; and for the union of the bi-national Palestine with neighbouring countries. This Union is to be a Regional Union under the auspices of the U.N.O.

JEWISH-ARAB CO-OPERATION

Jewish-Arab co-operation in Palestine has never been made the chief objective of major policy. Sporadic and, at times, serious attempts have been made in this direction. A history of these attempts would be most illuminating.

THE IHUD (UNION) ASSOCIATION

But whenever such attempts encountered difficulties, as they were bound to, they were all too lightly abandoned. The result is that, after twenty-four years of the Mandate, there is more political tension in the country than ever before. Far from securing "the development of self-governing institutions" as required by Article 2 of the Mandate, and far from "fostering the establishment of a full measure of self-governing institutions," as promised in the Churchill-Samuel Statement of Policy in 1922, Palestine is governed bureaucratically by a colonial administration, without a legislature and without the participation of Jews or Arabs in the more responsible positions of Government. The fault lies with all concerned—Jews, Arabs and British.

The establishment of Jewish-Arab co-operation is not an easy matter, and it is particularly difficult in the political sphere to which we shall address ourselves. It is here where the crux of the situation lies. Personal relations between Arabs and Jews are, on the whole, still fair. There is no deep racial animosity between these two related Semitic peoples. There is no present religious animosity. In the cities there is a certain amount of economic co-operation, but less than there used to be, and there would be much more under settled political conditions. There is a large measure of co-operation between villages in the farming districts. It is worthy of note that, even with the present political tension, when the leaders on both sides hardly ever meet, and with the boycott propaganda going on, country Jews and country Arabs meet in a friendly way and co-operate with one another. They do not want to be at war with one another. But in all these fields co-operation is impeded because of political, "national" animosity.

THE IHUD (UNION)' ASSOCIATION

POLITICALGO-OPERATION

Some of our members are old residents here. We know that Jews and Arabs have co-operated and can co-operate in all spheres of life, including the political. But political co-operation will not come of itself. There is one condition for its achievement—that Jewish-Arab co-operation be made the chief objective of major policy, and that this policy be carried through authoritatively, day by day, year by year.

We shall endeavour to give an outline of how we picture this to ourselves. We are well aware of the imperfections in our practical suggestions. On one thing we are absolutely clear: The way out of the impasse is Jewish-Arab co-operation.

PALESTINE NOT A JEWISH STATE AND NOT AN ARAB STATE; BUT A BI-NATIONAL COUNTRY

We do not favour Palestine as a Jewish country or Palestine as an Arab country, but a bi-national Palestine as the common country of two peoples.

One of the leaders of the Jewish Labour Movement in Palestine gave a definition in 1931 of a bi-national country, which we think pertinent:

"In a bi-national country the two nations have equal freedom and independence, equal participation in government and equality of representation, and one people shall not be stronger than the other. . . . They must make the country into a country of nationalities. This is altogether different from a nationalist country."

For proof that a multi-national country is not just an

THE IHUD (UNION) ASSOCIATION

artificial concoction, but "a tried and tested method of government" we would refer you to three recent books, the one by Professor Janowsky, *Nationalism and Nationalities*, published in 1945 by Macmillan; the second by Professor H. Seton-Watson, *Eastern Europe between the Wars, 1918-41*, published in 1945 by the Cambridge University Press; and the third, *National Self-Determination*, by A. Cobban (Oxford University Press, 1945).

PALESTINE NOT JUST AN ARAB LAND OR JUST A JEWISH LAND

Palestine is not just an Arab land like any other Arab land, or just a Jewish land.

For one thing, it is a Holy Land for three monotheistic religions, of which two—Judaism and Christianity—had their origin here, whilst the third, Islam, regards Jerusalem as next in holiness to Mecca and Medinah.

Lord Milner, who declared himself "a strong supporter of pro-Arab policy" and a believer "in the independence of the Arab countries. . . . I look forward to an Arab Federation," is quoted by the Peel Royal Commission (p. 41) as stating in 1923 that:

"Palestine can never be regarded as a country on the same footing as the other Arab countries. You cannot ignore all history and tradition in the matter. . . . The future of Palestine cannot possibly be left to be determined by the temporary impressions and feelings of the Arab majority in the country of the present day."

We agree with the further comment of the Royal Commission (p. 42), that "the case stated by Lord Milner against Arab control applies equally to a Jewish control."

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ARAB LEAGUE: REGIONAL UNION

With Lord Milner we, too, believe in the independence of the Arab countries, and we would want them to achieve this as soon as possible; and we consider the formation of the League of Arab States a step forward. We look forward to a Federation or a Regional Union of some of the Middle Eastern countries. The Pact of the Arab League foresees this (Article 9). We would want the bi-national Palestine to be a member of this Regional Union. We are hopeful that the League of Arab States will take a broad view of the Palestine problem and recognise the necessity of a bi-national Palestine, if not to-day then to-morrow, as being the one possible form of independence for Palestine and as being in the interests of the Arab states themselves. Palestine must be lifted out of the parochialism to which its tiny size might condemn it. Palestine represents an inter-national, inter-religious idea of deep concern to millions of Jews, Christians and Moslems throughout the world.

HISTORICAL RIGHTS OF JEWS IN PALESTINE

Another reason why Palestine cannot be regarded as just an Arab land like any other is because of the indissoluble historical association of the Jewish people and of Judaism with this land. This connection has never ceased ever since the days of the Hebrew Bible, its prophets, legislators, and psalmists. The Jewish religion is universalist in its tendencies; but it is inextricably bound up with the Jewish people and with the Land of Israel for its actual fulfilment. The very idea of Palestine as a modern entity is the result of Jewish activity. Moreover, fifty-two nations of the world recognised this in the Mandate for

THE IHUD (UNION) ASSOCIATION

Palestine, in endorsing the idea of the Jewish National Home in Palestine. The Churchill-Samuel Statement of Policy in 1922 declared that it is essential that the Jewish people "should know that it is in Palestine as of right and not on sufferance."

One of our members, Professor M. Buber, who was one of the founders of the Zionist Organisation, is ready to testify before you as to the profound significance of Palestine for Judaism and the Jewish people.

By their labour and skill here in the past generation, the Jews have shown how truly they love this sacred soil. It is now the home of 600,000 Jews. They have their schools, their farms, their synagogues here. They have introduced science into agriculture and industry, and have thus raised the standard of living for all the population. They have found new sources of water and power. They have brought with them progressive social ideas. They did their full share in the war effort in every way.

It is upon this basis that one may say that the Jews have certain historical rights in Palestine, and have proved themselves worthy of these rights.

NATURAL RIGHTS OF ARABS IN PALESTINE

On the other hand, the Arabs have certain natural rights in Palestine. They are the large majority of the country's inhabitants. They have lived here for centuries and tilled its soil. On every side we see the remains of Arab culture. The holy places and the tombs of their fathers through many generations are here, and they have developed a deep feeling for what they call the Arabism of the country.

THE IHUD (UNION) ASSOCIATION
HONOURABLE COMPROMISE

We regard the historical rights of the Jews and the natural rights of the Arabs as, under all the circumstances, of equal validity, and it is the task of statesmanship to find ways of adjustment between these contending claims. Neither people can get in Palestine all its wants, and both peoples will have to make concessions. The way of honourable and reasonable compromise must be sought.

IMMIGRATION *VERSUS* SELF-GOVERNMENT

In the Report of the Royal Commission it is stated (p. 136) that "what the Arabs most desire is independence. What they most fear is Jewish domination." What most Jews desire is immigration. What they most fear is Arab domination. A chief objective of policy must be to remove this fear of domination on either side. We propose methods of achieving this. As to the Jews, in place of the desired unrestricted immigration, we propose a substantial immigration, but with limitations. As to the Arabs, we propose, in place of the desired independent sovereign Arab State, the maximum amount of self-government in a bi-national country.

THE POLITICAL PROBLEM

The three main elements in the political problem are: Immigration, Land, Self-government. We shall deal first with immigration and land, and then with self-government.

We envisage three distinct periods:

First, the present period and as long as the Mandate lasts.

THE IHUD (UNION) ASSOCIATION

Second, the period of Trusteeship under the U.N.O.

Third, the period when a bi-national Palestine is no longer a Trust Territory but a self-governing unit within a larger Regional Union.

IMMIGRATION

IMMIGRATION: FIRST PERIOD

100,000 Immigrants now

EVERYONE IS DEEPLY concerned with the fate of the many thousands of Jewish displaced persons who are at present languishing without a home, or unable or unwilling to go back "home," and eager to come to their true Home, where brothers and sisters are ready to welcome them with open arms. We regard it as imperative that an interim *ad hoc* compassionate immigration of the 100,000 refugees recommended by President Truman be made possible without delay. As far as practicable, these refugees might be divided into 25,000 children, 25,000 parents, relatives and older persons, and 50,000 young people. This would bring creative forces into the country, and also be an historical act of great mercy.

The financing of this immigration and its accommodation in Palestine might be shared by the Jewish Agency, the American Joint Distribution Committee, the Hadassah Women's Organisation of America and other Jewish bodies, together with U.N.R.R.A. and/or the Social and Economic Council of U.N.O.

The number of Jewish displaced persons exceeds 100,000, and we assume that other countries besides Palestine will open their gates.

Arab Opposition

The immigration of 100,000 persons will doubtless be

IMMIGRATION

opposed by Arab spokesmen. We do not think, however, that this opposition need take on an extreme form. We base our opinion on the following:

1. 100,000 additional Jews are not a threat to Arab numbers. In 1936 the Arab population was increasing at the rate of 24,000 per annum (Royal Commission, p. 282). It is conjectured that the present rate of Arab increase is about 30,000 per annum. It has been established that, during the five years 1939-44, the total Arab increase amounted to about 150,000, and the total Jewish increase to about 83,000. Thus in these five years the net Arab increment exceeds the Jewish by about 67,000. If, therefore, 100,000 Jews were now to come in, the actual proportionate growth of the Jewish population would be no more than about 33,000. This is not a particularly frightening number.

2. If 100,000 Jews come in, the total Jewish population would then be about 700,000. This is less than a figure agreed upon just about ten years ago, in 1936, in talks between some leading Arabs and some leading Jews. These talks took place after the outbreak of the Arab revolt and in an endeavour to find a compromise. The provisional agreement was that after ten years the Jewish population, which was about 400,000 at the time, might become 800,000. Had this agreement come into effect, there might be 800,000 Jews here now, instead of 600,000. The agreement was, most unfortunately, not acceptable in some quarters. But if in 1936 the idea of 800,000 Jews by 1946 did not frighten leading Arabs then, it is difficult to believe that 700,000 should frighten them now.

3. Whereas it was possible for Arab leaders to get the Arabs to revolt in 1936, it would be not so easy now. The plain Arabs have had their fill of fighting. It would not be so easy as in 1929 to trump up the religious issue. The

IMMIGRATION

fellah and the Arab worker have learned a great deal since then, and they are not quite so naïve politically. Moreover, an Arab youth is growing up, which, if nationalistic, is at the same time open to progressive political and social ideas. A mere exercise in arithmetic will suffice to dampen insurrectionary ardour: 1,200,000 Arabs minus 700,000 Jews = a majority of half a million Arabs. That is a large enough figure to keep even the most unlettered from getting excited, much less, ready to risk their lives.

4. The argument of some Arabs, that they oppose the entry of a single extra Jew, because that is one step nearer to the Jewish State, may seem attractive theoretically. But it is, in fact, only a figure of speech, symbolising their very deep opposition to the Jewish State. For a Jewish State there would have to be a majority of Jews. An additional 100,000 is not equivalent to setting up a majority.

IMMIGRATION: SECOND PERIOD

It should be borne in mind that the Churchill-Samuel Statement of Policy in 1922 declared that, for the fulfilment of the policy of the Jewish National Home in Palestine "it is necessary that the Jewish community in Palestine should be able to increase its numbers by immigration."

Parity in Numbers

As a long-term immigration policy, we propose that, in the bi-national Palestine, the Jewish population should have the chance through immigration of becoming one-half of the population. That means that the Jews would, upon the basis of present population figures, have the opportunity of doubling their numbers, there being about 600,000 Jews here now and about 1,200,000 Arabs. It

IMMIGRATION

would really mean more than that, since the Arab natural increase is higher than the Jewish (27:1-3), thus leaving room, even after parity had been achieved, for additional numbers of Jews to catch up each year with the greater Arab natural increase.

Rate of Immigration

How long it would take, approximately, under favourable circumstances, for Jews through immigration and natural increase to reach parity can be estimated upon the basis of the population trends on pp. 281-282 of the Royal Commission's Report. Although these calculations were made in 1936, it would appear that the ratio of Arab increase and Jewish increase has remained stable. We can therefore take the figures of the Royal Commission as roughly correct for 1946. Upon that basis it would take eleven years from now, i.e. up to 1957, for the Jews to reach parity at the rate of 60,000 immigrants a year; fourteen years, i.e. up to 1960, at the rate of 50,000 a year; eighteen years, i.e. up to 1964, at the rate of 40,000 a year; and twenty-four years, i.e. up to 1970, to reach parity at the rate of 30,000 Jewish immigrants a year. Any annual Jewish immigration below 30,000 would never let the Jews catch up with the Arabs.

ECONOMIC ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY

We continue to support the principle laid down in the Statement of Policy of 1922, that immigration is not "to exceed whatever may be the economic absorptive capacity of the country at the time to absorb new arrivals."

In view, however, of the basic importance of this principle, we hold that a change should be made in the method of determining this absorptive capacity. In effecting this change, there seem to us to be three main elements.

IMMIGRATION

Immigration Board

First, a special body, an Immigration Board, is to be set up to determine economic absorptive capacity. This body would consist of representatives of the Mandatory (or of the Administering Authority under the Trusteeship System) and of the Jewish Agency and of the Arab League.

Jewish Achievements

Second, account must be taken, not only of the views of economic, financial, agricultural and other experts, but also of those imponderables which have enabled the Jews to extend the economic absorptive capacity of the country beyond anything the experts had considered possible. When Sir Herbert Samuel was High Commissioner in 1920-5, it was the accepted view that Palestine, with agriculture as its chief industry, could not hold more than 3,000,000. There were 805,000 inhabitants at mid-1924, of whom 628,000 were Moslems. But now Lord Samuel, in his recent speech in the House of Lords, with the general tendency of which we are in accord, mentions the possibility of a population of 4! million within a generation. The conviction that Palestine can absorb economically a much larger population than had at one time been considered possible, is due primarily to what the Jews through their zeal and science and capacity for sacrifice have already shown to be the possibilities. These achievements would hardly have been possible by any other people, simply because we know of no other people with the same enthusiasm and love, and the same determination for developing the capacity of Palestine to absorb their brothers and sisters, their own homeless people. Moreover, we think that the Jews could not have achieved this anywhere else. These are factors that must be reck-

IMMIGRATION

oned with in determining economic absorptive capacity.

Development Plan

Third, a systematic effort must be made, and not by the Jews alone, to develop the economic potentialities of the country. There has been much talk of a Plan of Development for the benefit of the whole country and all its inhabitants. In order that this may be made a reality, we favour the appointment of a Development Board, consisting, as before, of representatives of the Mandatory (or of the Trusteeship Council) and of the Jewish Agency and of the Arab League.

The Development Plan might be financed by a loan at a low rate of interest. Provided there was political peace here, this loan might be attractive to the vast amount of accumulated capital lying idle in lending countries, more especially the United States.

The appointment of these two special Boards—immigration and development—with Jewish and Arab representatives to deal with fundamental problems, illustrates what we mean when we say that Jewish-Arab co-operation should be the objective of major policy.

IF PARITY IS REACHED

We propose further that, when and if parity is reached, the two peoples are to review the immigration situation in the Legislature of the time, and that further Jewish immigration (beyond the difference in natural increase) is to be encouraged if agreement can be reached between the Jews and Arabs. This would mean that Jewish immigration beyond parity would be dependent upon whether the two peoples had found the way of peace and understanding together.

IMMIGRATION

IMMIGRATION: THIRD PERIOD

We propose, further that, if and when there be a union of the bi-national Palestine with neighbouring countries, the question of an enlarged Jewish immigration is to be taken up again in the Palestine Legislature, as well as in the Federal Council of this Union. With the widening of the Arab background through union with other countries, the Arabs of Palestine would no longer need to fear being "swamped" by the Jews. The present acute importance of majority-minority in Palestine would have lost its main point, and the Arabs of Palestine could then afford to look at Jewish immigration with greater liberality. Indeed, by that time a normal admission of Jewish settlers to the other countries of the Union, without, of course, extending the boundaries of the Jewish National Home, might well become a question of practical politics. Arab statesmen have expressed a similar view on more than one occasion. The Jews could certainly be of great service in helping the development of backward parts of the Union.

LAND

This is basic for both Jews and Arabs. For the Jews a return to the soil is essential in order that this city people may be restored to normal health. Land is also of immediate importance in order that new settlements may be established for the absorption of new immigrants. For the Arabs it is important in order that their basic industry—agriculture—may be safeguarded. From every point of view, we think that land reform of a progressive nature is essential. We see every reason why Jews and Arabs should co-operate in this.

We assume that if an answer be found to the question of immigration, a settlement of the land question will

IMMIGRATION

inevitably follow. This is bound up in large measure with the Development Plan which we have mentioned.

One of our members, Mr. M. Smilansky, who has lived in this country for over fifty years and who was for a long time head of the Farmers' Association, is ready to testify before you on the land problem.

Having discussed the question of immigration which is nearest the heart of the Jews, we now come to the question of self-government, which is nearest the heart of the Arabs. These are the two main factors to be weighed one against the other.

TWO ANNOUNCEMENTS

TO PREPARE THE GROUND for this, it is necessary, in our opinion, that two concurrent announcements be made as to the objectives of major policy. The one without the other is not sufficient.

The one announcement would be: There is to be no Jewish State, there is to be no Arab State, there is to be a bi-national Palestine, a common country for two equal peoples; and there is to be the fullest measure of self-government.

The second announcement would be: 100,000 Jewish displaced persons are to be admitted without delay, and the objective of policy is to be numerical as well as political parity for the two peoples.

THE ARAB CONTENTION

The Arabs say that "the existence of the Jewish National Home, whatever its size, bars the way to the attainment by the Arabs of Palestine of the same national status as that attained, or soon to be attained, by all the other Arabs of Asia" (Royal Commission, p. 307). That is so. And they ask if they are not as fit for self-government as the Arabs of other countries. They are.

ARAB CONCESSIONS

But the whole history of Palestine shows that it just has not been made for uni-national sovereign independence. This is an inescapable fact which no one can disregard.

TWO ANNOUNCEMENTS

Although the Arabs cannot have a uni-national independent Arab Palestine, they can enjoy independence in a bi-national Palestine together with their Jewish fellow-citizens. This will afford them a maximum of national freedom. What the bi-national State will take away from them is sovereign independence in Palestine. There are other Arab States with sovereign independence. But we contend that the sovereign independence of tiny Palestine, whether it be Jewish sovereignty or Arab sovereignty, is a questionable good in this post-war period, when even great States must relinquish something of their sovereignty and seek union, if the world is not to perish. We contend that for this Holy Land the idea of a bi-national Palestine is at least as inspiring as that of an Arab sovereign Palestine or a Jewish sovereign Palestine.

JEWISH CONCESSIONS

On the other hand, the bi-national Palestine would deprive the Jews of their one chance of a Jewish State. But this bi-national Palestine would be the one State in the world where they would be a constituent nation, i.e. an equal nationality within the body politic, and not a minority as everywhere else. The absence of a Jewish State would make more difficult direct access by the Jewish people to U.N.O. To compensate for this, some form should be devised for giving the Jewish people a recognised place within the structure of the United Nations Organisation.

Nevertheless, the concessions the Jews would have to make on these matters are, we think, more far-reaching than the concessions the Arabs of Palestine would have to make. But the hard facts of the situation are that this is not a Jewish land and it is not an Arab land—it is the

TWO ANNOUNCEMENTS

Holy Land, a bi-national country—and it is in the light of such hard facts that the problem must be approached.

THE ADVANTAGES OF A BI-NATIONAL PALESTINE

Before proceeding to outline our suggestions as to the political structure of the bi-national Palestine, we should like finally to point out some of the advantages of bi-nationalism based on parity in a country which has two nationalities.

Failure of Minority Guarantees

i. The breakdown of the minority guarantees provided for in the Versailles Peace treaties is proof that in a bi-national country the only safeguard for a minority is equality with the majority. There is no prospect of peace in a country where there is a dominant people and a subordinate people. The single nation-State is a proper form for a country where there is but one legally recognised nationality, as, for example, the United States. But in countries with more than one recognised nationality—and they are numerous in Europe and in Asia—bitterness is engendered among the minority because the civil service, the military, the economic key positions, foreign affairs, are in the hands of the ruling class of the majority nation. Parity in a multi-national country is the only just relationship between the peoples.

Switzerland

2. The multi-national state is an effective method of affording full protection for the national languages, cultures and institutions of each nationality. That there can be full cultural autonomy combined with full allegiance to

TWO ANNOUNCEMENTS

the multi-national political state is proven in Switzerland's history for more than 100 years. The Swiss are divided by language, religion and culture; nor do the linguistic and religious groupings coincide in the various cantons. Yet all of these divergences have not been obstacles to political unity. This is a newer form of democracy which is as important for multi-national states as the more familiar form of democracy is for uni-national states. The Swiss example is most relevant to Palestine, although there are, of course, many points of difference.

Other Multi-national Countries

The Soviet Union is a newer example of a multi-national State. The new Yugoslav State is an attempt at multi-national federalism. Professor Seton Watson outlines a bi-national solution of the age-long problem, of Transylvania. Roumanian domination, Hungarian domination, partition had all been, tried without success.

Bi-nationalism a High Ideal

3. In many senses the multi-national state represents a higher, more modern and more hopeful ideal than the uni-national sovereign independent State. The old way of having a major people and a minor people in a State of various nationalities is reactionary. The progressive conception is parity among the peoples of the multi-national State. The way of peace in the world to-day and tomorrow is through federation, union. Dividing up the world into tiny nationalistic sovereign units has not been the success the advocates of self-determination had hoped for at the end of the First World War. (Cobban, *National Self-Determination.*) The peoples who have been placed by fate or by history in the same country have warred with

TWO ANNOUNCEMENTS

one another for domination throughout the centuries. The majority have tried to make the State homogeneous, through keeping down the minority nationalities. The federal multi-national State, based on the parity of the nationalities, is a most hopeful way of enabling them to retain their national identity, and yet of coalescing in a larger political framework. It results in separate nationalities, yet a single citizenship. This is a noble goal to which the youth of multi-national countries can be taught to give their enthusiasm and their energies. It is a modern challenge to the intelligence and the moral qualities of the peoples constituting multi-national lands.

IV

SELF-GOVERNMENT

WE SHALL DEAL with this as with immigration in periods.

FIRST PERIOD: SELF-GOVERNMENT DURING MANDATE

During the transitional period of the Mandate, i.e. up to the time when Palestine becomes a Trustee Territory, immediate steps should be taken by the Mandatory Power to institute a larger measure of self-government. Towards this end we would make two interim *ad hoc* recommendations:

(a) The appointment of Jews and Arabs in equal numbers to the Executive Council of Government, to the Secretariat, as heads of certain Government departments, and as district commissioners in appropriate places.

(b) The appointment of a consultative body composed of equal numbers of Jews and Arabs. The High Commissioner would act as Chairman, and he would bring before this body such matters as he wished to communicate to the public and as he wished to have an expression of opinion. The consultative body would have no legislative or executive functions.

Both of these interim steps would be good preparation for the future.

SECOND PERIOD: TRUSTEESHIP

(a) We favour the transfer of Palestine to the Trusteeship System of the U.N.O.

SELF-GOVERNMENT

REGIONAL TRUSTEESHIP

(b) We favour the setting up of a regional trusteeship body for Palestine which is to be composed of representatives of the administering authority, the Jewish Agency and the Arab League. The administering authority will be a Christian Power—doubtless, Britain—and will thus be representative of the Christian world. The deep interest of the Christian world in the Holy Land is not to be minimised. The Jewish Agency is representative of the Jewish world in matters affecting Palestine. The Arab League represents the various Arab States, which are for the most part overwhelmingly Moslem, and all of them are concerned with the fate of Palestine.

(c) We favour making the Immigration Board and the Development Board mentioned above responsible in the first instance to the regional trusteeship body.

CONSTITUTION

(a) The working out of the first draft of a basic Constitution for a bi-national Palestine would be entrusted to a special commission, on which, among others, the Jewish Agency and the Arab League would be represented, and which would in the first instance be responsible to the Regional Trusteeship Body. This Draft Constitution Commission would receive directives from the U.N.O., the main directive being the necessity of Jewish Arab co-operation in all spheres in a bi-national Palestine based on the parity of the two peoples. The Draft Constitution Commission would have to secure the aid of competent experts, especially from the successful multi-national countries.

(b) The draft Constitution thus worked out would be

SELF-GOVERNMENT

presented to a Constituent Assembly of Jews and Arabs equally represented, in the hope that through clarification, open debate, give and take, an agreed constitution might result. In case no agreed constitution resulted, the matter would be referred for decision to the Trusteeship Council of the U.N.O., both the Jewish Agency and the Arab League being invited to participate in the discussion before the Trusteeship Council.

(c) The constitution would contain, among other things, a Bill of Rights guaranteeing religious, educational, economic and national freedom to all the inhabitants as individuals, and to the national communities and the religious bodies.

ORGANS OF GOVERNMENT

(A) *Federal Executive*

(a) *Head of the State.* He is to be appointed by the U.N.O., if possible upon nomination by the Palestine Legislature. His term of office is to be four years, and he is to be eligible for re-election.

(b) His functions are to be:

To preside over the Legislature.

To cast the decisive vote in case of a tie.

(c) *Federal Administration.* To appoint, with the concurrence of the Legislature, the Heads of Central Government Departments.

(d) *Federal Executive Council.* To preside over the Federal Executive Council, which is to consist of the heads of a given number of Government departments.

(B) *Federal Legislature*

(a) A Legislature is to be elected democratically.

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(b) The country is to be divided into a number of districts (cantons or counties). Some of these districts will be mainly Jewish, some mainly Arab, and some mixed. In some districts, such as Nazareth and Bethlehem, the Christian Arabs would be the important part of the population. The Legislature is to consist of an equal number of Jews and Arabs.

We prefer election by geographical districts rather than election on a communal basis. Regional patriotism is highly developed in some parts of Palestine. The difficulties of communal elections are apparent in India. Election by districts has the advantage (i) of giving increased importance to local bodies, which is desirable generally; (2) of enabling Jews and Arabs in mixed districts to vote for members of both communities. In general we assume that "in vital matters some Jews and some Arabs will vote together" (Royal Commission, p. 960). This would mean that separate national interests would not dominate every situation. There are economic interests, social security, standards of life, trade, agriculture, industry, labour, commerce abroad and other factors which will draw some Jews and some Arabs together.

(c) The Legislature is to have the normal functions of a federal legislative body, including the passing of the Budget.

(d) In case of a tie, the head of the State is to have the casting vote.

(C) *Local Districts (Cantons, Counties) including Municipalities*

These are to have wide autonomy, including the right of taxation. As to the Swiss cantons and their relation to the Federal Government, Professor Janowsky says (pp. 37, 38, 42, 44, 45):

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"The Swiss State is a confederation of 22 cantons each enjoying broad powers of self-government. . . . Within 14 of her 22 cantons German is spoken by over 90 per cent, of the people; one canton is overwhelmingly Italian in speech, and three French. The four remaining are linguistically mixed. . . . The people are further divided by 'confessional' differences, 57-3 being Protestant and 41 per cent. Catholic. However, the religious and linguistic groupings do not coincide. . . . German, French and Italian are all recognised as official languages in relation to the Central Government. The individual cantons, too, where the population is sufficiently composite, have assured equality of language. . . . The peoples of the particular cantons also possess organic unity: a Swiss nation, yet a Bernese and a Genevese people. . . . Swiss Federalism rests solidly on the decentralisation of governmental functions and on respect for local sentiment. Cantonal and communal institutions are zealously guarded by the population. . . . Clinging to their ancient usages local and cantonal communities preserve the character of nationalities. . . . Federalism has left the cantons some of the most essential functions of Government—law and order, education and direct taxation. . . . To be sure, the development of commerce and industry has led to a strengthening of the Central Government. But its sphere of activity has been mainly economic and social—railroads, factory legislation, insurance, contracts, sanitary precautions. Educational and cultural affairs remain predominantly the province of local bodies. . . . It is the multi-national State which has rendered possible both political unity and cultural freedom."

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(D) National Communities

(a) In the bi-national Palestine there would be two national communities. The Jewish National Council and the Arab National Council, with powers of taxation. Their practical province would be cultural.

(b) On the other hand, there would be a joint commission of these national councils for the purpose of devising ways and means of familiarising the one people with the culture of the other.

(c) Members of the Civil Service down to the lowest grades would have to be bi-lingual. This is not difficult to achieve, as the experience of the past twenty years has shown.

(E) The Central Religious Bodies

The Central Religious Bodies are to have recognised judicial functions in questions of personal status, such as marriage and divorce (Mandate for Palestine, Article 9).

It has been our purpose to give a bare outline of the problem of political structure in some of its aspects.

THE UNION OF THE AUTONOMOUS
BI-NATIONAL PALESTINE WITH
NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES

THIS HAS BEEN referred to above. This Union is called for by historical, geographic, economic and political considerations.

It is beyond the frame-work of this Statement to discuss the political structure of this Union.

IF THE ONE OR THE OTHER REFUSED

IT MAY BE ASKED what would be the position if the one or the other of the two peoples refused their co-operation in carrying out such plans as we have proposed.

Our answer is that both peoples would eventually co-operate, that, indeed, there would be no other way for them—*provided that Jewish-Arab co-operation in a bi-national Palestine based on parity be clearly and sincerely and determinedly made the main objective of major policy.*

OFFERS OF LEGISLATIVE COUNCILS

The history of the offers of a legislative council by the British Government is instructive in this connection.

The offer of 1922-3 was accepted by the Jews and rejected by important sections of the Arabs. It was therefore suspended.

That of 1930 was accompanied by the following statement by the British Government:

"His Majesty's Government desire to make it quite clear that, while they would deeply regret an attempt on the part of any section of the population to prevent them from giving effect to their decision, all possible steps will be taken to circumvent such an attempt, if made, since they consider it in the interests of the population of the country as a whole that the further step now proposed should no longer be deferred."

IF THE ONE OR THE OTHER REFUSED

The offer of 1935 was accompanied by a similar declaration, but it was not implemented. The Jews refused, and the Arabs half refused and half accepted, waiting to see what the Jews might do.

The two peoples may be excused for thinking that these proposals had strings attached and were not made seriously.

JERUSALEM MUNICIPALITY

Last year Government made the interesting and constructive proposal for tripartite parity in the political structure of the Jerusalem Municipality. The Jews accepted, the Arabs refused. Immediately, without further attempt, the proposal became a dead letter.

NEITHER PEOPLE COULD STAY OUT

Our contention is that, if any of these proposals had been gone through with sincerity and authoritatively, the side staying out would eventually have come in. Life itself would have been too strong, the insistence of their people would have been too compelling, to justify their abstention for any length of time. The issues at stake, the welfare of the individual and the community, are too important for any responsible body to have maintained its opposition for long.

If a regional trusteeship body is to come into being, if the Jewish Agency and the Arab League are to be invited to sit on this body, if immigration figures, and absorptive capacity, and development, and a Constitution are to be discussed in this body; and if there is to be a constituent assembly, and self-government, a federal executive, a legislature, autonomous districts, national councils and other organs of government—if these are to be, no side can stay out for long.

DECLARATION OF THE ASSOCIATION "UNION" (IHUD)

(I) The Association "Union" adheres to—

(a) The Zionist Movement in so far as this seeks the establishment of the Jewish National Home for the Jewish people in Palestine;

(b) The struggle throughout the world for a new order in international relations, and a union of the peoples, large and small, for a life of freedom and justice, without fear, oppression and want.

(2) The Association "Union" therefore regards a union between the Jewish and Arab peoples as essential for the upbuilding of Palestine and for meeting its basic problems. The Association "Union" will strive for co-operation between the Jewish world and the Arab world in all branches of life—social, economic, cultural, political—thus making for the revival of the whole Semitic world.

(3) The main political aims of the Association "Union" are as follows:

(a) Government in Palestine based upon equal political rights for the two peoples.

(b) The agreement of the steadily growing *Tishub* and of the whole Jewish people to a federative union of Palestine and neighbouring countries. This federative union is to guarantee the national rights of all peoples within it.

(c) A covenant between this federative union and an Anglo-American union which is to be a part of the future union of the free peoples. This union of the free peoples is to bear the ultimate responsibility for the

IF THE ONE OR THE OTHER REFUSED

establishment and stability of international relations in the new world after the war.

AN AUTHORITATIVE POLICY

What is required is that Jewish-Arab co-operation be made truly and intelligently the basis of major policy, that this be announced with authority, that it be carried through with authority. The result would be such, as we are convinced, that Jews and Arabs would find the way of life of friendship and partnership with one another, not only in Palestine, but throughout this whole part of the world.

A PALESTINE SOLUTION

WHAT A BOON TO mankind it would be if the Jews and the Arabs of Palestine were to strive together to make their Holy Land into a thriving, peaceful Switzerland situated at the heart of this ancient highway between East and West. A "Palestine Solution" is required for the Palestine problem. This would have an incalculable political and spiritual influence in all the Middle East and far beyond. A bi-national Palestine could become a beacon of peace in the world.

Part II

*TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE
INQJJIRT COMMISSION AT JERUSALEM
MARCH 14th, 1946*

MR. JUSTICE SINGLETON PRESIDING

The Ihud Association was represented by Dr. J. L. Magnes, Professor Martin Buber, Mr. M. Smilansky.

DR. MAGNES: We shall ask your permission to proceed as follows: Professor Buber will present a brief paper on what our Zionism means to us and why we so ardently believe in the return to Zion. I shall then try to bring out some of the points in our written statement. Mr. Smilansky will in the course of the discussion want to emphasise two points: first, that Jewish-Arab co-operation is possible; and, second, that there is sufficient land in the country for the absorption of a large Jewish immigration. Mr. Smilansky has lived and worked in Palestine for more than fifty-five years, and I venture the statement that there is no one who has so intimate a knowledge of these subjects. Professor Buber is not only an internationally known writer and scholar, but he was also one of the pioneers of the Zionist Movement since the days of Theodor Herzl.

Professor Buber and I wish to make it clear that we are not speaking in the name of the Hebrew University. There are various opinions there as elsewhere. We are speaking as residents of the country and as Jews who feel it to be their duty to give voice to a view which, though

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different from the official Zionist programme, is nevertheless shared, as we know, by large numbers of the population.

PROFESSOR BUBER: Mr. Chairman, it is impossible to survey the problem you are trying to meet without an understanding of the very roots of Zionism. For only through this understanding will the observer realise that he faces something quite different from the well-known national antagonisms, and therefore that methods other than those of political routine are called for.

Modern political Zionism, in the form it has taken during my nearly fifty years of membership in this movement, was only developed and intensified but not caused by modern anti-Semitism. Indeed, Zionism is a late form assumed by a primal fact in the history of mankind, a fact of reasonable interest at least for Christian civilisation. This fact is the unique connection of a people and a country. This people, the people Israel, was once created by the power of a tradition that was common to some semi-nomadic tribes. Together these tribes migrated, under very difficult conditions, from Egypt to Canaan because they felt united by the promise to them of Canaan as their "heritage" since the days of the "Fathers." This tradition was spectacular and decisive for the history of mankind in that it confronted the new people with a task they could carry out only as a people, namely, to establish in Canaan a model and "just" community. Later on, the "prophets"—a calling without any historical precedent—interpreted this task as obliging the community to send streams of social and political justice throughout the world. Thereby the most productive and most paradoxical of all human ideas, Messianism, was offered to humanity. It placed the people of Israel in the

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centre of an activity leading towards the advent of the Kingdom of God on earth, an activity in which all the peoples were to co-operate. It ordered every generation to contribute to the upbuilding of the sacred future with the forces and resources at their command. Had it not been for this idea, neither Cromwell nor Lincoln could have conceived their mission. This idea is the origin of the great impulse that, in periods of disappointment and weariness, ever and ever again encouraged the Christian peoples to dare to embark upon a new shaping of their public life, the origin of the hope of a genuine and just co-operation among individuals as well as nations, on a voluntary basis. But within the people that had created it, this idea grew to a force of quite peculiar vitality. Driven out of their promised land, this people survived nearly two millennia by their trust in their return, in the fulfilment of the promise, in the realisation of the idea. The inner connection with this land and the belief in the promised reunion with it were a permanent force of rejuvenation for this people living in conditions which probably would have caused the complete disintegration of any other group.

This serves as an explanation of the fact that, in the age of national movements, Judaism did not simply create another national movement of the European type but a unique one, a "Zionism," the modern expression of the tendency towards "Zion." In this age the hostile forces which, consciously or not, see in Judaism the Messianic monitor, quite logically attacked it more and more violently. Yet simultaneously in Judaism itself a great regeneration had started. Out of an inner necessity this movement of regeneration chose for its aim the reunion with the soil and, again out of an inner necessity, there was no choice other than the soil of Palestine and its

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cultivation. And with an inner necessity the new Jewish settlement on this soil centres in the village communities which, in spite of their differing forms of organisation, all aim at the creation of a genuine and just community on a voluntary basis. The importance of these attempts surpasses the frontiers of Palestine as well as of Judaism. Given the chance of unhampered development, these vital social attempts will show the world the possibility of basing social justice upon voluntary action. Sir Arthur Wauchope, who, as High Commissioner in the years 1931-8, had the opportunity of acquainting himself with this country and this work, was right in pointing out that these "astonishingly successful" communal settlements are an example of co-operation for the whole world, and can be of great importance for the foundation of a new social order.

At one time the productive strength of the people Israel in this country was a collective strength in the most sublime sense. To-day the same might be said of the productive strength which the returning Jews have started to display in this country. It is the productive strength of a community directed towards the realisation of real community, and as such, it is important for the future of mankind. Mankind is fundamentally interested in the preservation of a vital and productive Jewish people such as can grow only if fostered by the unique connection of this people and this country.

From this the principle of Zionism results. It is concentration in Palestine of the national forces fit for renewing their productive strength. This principle again results in the three irreducible demands of Zionism. They are:

First: Freedom to acquire soil in sufficient measure to bring about a renewed connection with the primal form of production from which the Jewish people had been

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separated for many centuries, and without which no original spiritual and social productivity can arise.

Second: A permanent powerful influx of settlers, especially of youth desiring to settle here, in order incessantly to strengthen, to amplify and to revive the work of reconstruction and to protect it from the dangers of stagnancy, isolation and the forms of social degeneration particularly threatening colonisation in the Levant.

Third: Self-determination of the Jewish community about their way of life and the form of their institutions, as well as an assurance for their unimpeded development as a community.

These demands, formulated simply in the concept of a "National Home," have been recognised, but not yet adequately understood by large parts of the world. The tradition of justice, which I have mentioned, and which must be realised within every community and between the communities, makes it clear that these demands must of necessity be carried out without encroaching upon the vital rights of any other community. Independence of one's own must not be gained at the expense of another's independence. Jewish settlement must oust no Arab peasant, Jewish immigration must not cause the political status of the present inhabitants to deteriorate and must continue to ameliorate their economic conditions. The tradition of justice is directed towards the future of this country as a whole, as well as towards the future of the Jewish people. From it and from the historical circumstance that there are Arabs in Palestine springs a great, difficult and imperative task, the new form of the age-old task. A regenerated Jewish people in Palestine has not only to aim at living peacefully together with the Arab people, but also at a comprehensive co-operation with it in opening and developing the country. Such co-operation is an

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indispensable condition for the lasting success of the great work, of the redemption of this land.

The basis of such co-operation offers ample space for including the fundamental rights of the Jewish people to acquire soil and to immigrate, without any violation of the fundamental rights of the Arab people. As to the demand of autonomy, it does not, as the greater part of the Jewish people thinks to-day, necessarily lead to the demand for a "Jewish State" or for a "Jewish majority." We need for this land as many Jews as it is possible economically to absorb, but not in order to establish a majority against a minority. We need them because great—very great—forces are required to do the unprecedented work. We need for this land a solid, vigorous, autonomous community, but not in order that it should give its name to a State; we need it because we want to raise Israel and *Erez Israel* to the highest level of productivity they can be raised to. The new situation and the problem involved ask for new solutions that are beyond the capacity of the familiar political categories. An internationally guaranteed agreement between the two communities is asked for which defines the spheres of interest and activity common to the partners and those not common to them, and guarantees mutual non-interference for these specific spheres.

The responsibility of those working on the preparation of a solution of the Palestine problem goes beyond the frontiers of the Near East, as well as the boundaries of Judaism. If a successful solution is found, a first step, perhaps a pioneer's step, will have been taken towards a juster form of life between people and people.

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DR. MAGNES: Our view is based on two assumptions, first, that Jewish-Arab co-operation is essential for a satisfactory solution of the difficult problem, and, second, that Jewish-Arab co-operation is not only essential, it is also possible. The alternative is war, but the plain Jew and the plain Arab do not want war. There are many thousands here, Jews and Arabs, who stand aghast at the revelation that Jewish and Arab militarists seem to be eager to fight it out on the field of battle. We do not know who would win this war. We only know that thousands of innocents would be the victims.

The militarist mentality throughout history is not able to believe that complicated situations can be resolved other than by force of arms. I would like to assure you gentlemen that the vast majority of plain, inarticulate Jews and Arabs are not anxious for war. They want understanding and co-operation, and to achieve this they would make many concessions and sacrifices. It is necessary to give them the chance for this. But hope must not be too long deferred. All the world to-day is pressed for time; time presses also in this ancient land.

At the beginning of the war there was a real opportunity for bringing Jews and Arabs together in the face of the common danger. A proposal was therefore made to Government for the appointment of what was called a consultative body, consisting of equal numbers of Jews and Arabs, for the purpose of bringing Government and the population closer to one another in the war effort. This proposal was rejected, the more is the pity. A great opportunity has come again. Who knows if there will be another? It is the fervent prayer that your Committee will be able to meet the challenge with which destiny has faced you.

This is a land *suigeneris*, a Holy Land for three monotheistic

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religions. It is, therefore, not just a Jewish land or just an Arab land. The Arabs have natural rights here. They have been here and tilled the soil for centuries. The Jews have historical rights here. They have yearned for this land for centuries. The Bible was created here, and the Jews by their labour latterly have shown themselves worthy of these historical rights.

We regard the Arab natural rights and the Jewish historical rights as, under all the circumstances, of equal validity. We look upon Palestine as a bi-national Jewish-Arab land, a common motherland for these two Semitic peoples who have the privilege of acting as trustees for millions of their co-religionists all over the world. In such a land it is not fitting that one people should dominate the other. A Jewish State means domination of the Arabs by the Jews; an Arab State means domination of the Jews by the Arabs. The fear of this domination is deep and genuine in both peoples. This fear is the double-edged sword of the problem. It becomes the task of statesmanship to find the way of dissipating this fear and of supplanting it with co-operation, development, peace.

You are thus faced with the necessity of trying to establish an equilibrium between two forces. What is it that most Jews want? It is immigration. Give us the chance of an ample immigration, and many of the sincerest advocates of the Jewish State will forgo the State. What is it that most Arabs want? It is self-government. They are certainly not behind other Arabs in their capacity for self-government. Give them the chance of ample self-government and many of the sincerest opponents of Jewish immigration will acquiesce. But to achieve this double objective, immigration and self-government, concessions have to be made by both peoples. No one can have all he wants in

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this country. A feasible and honourable compromise must be sought.

The purpose of our statement to you is to help you, Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, to find the way of reasonable, constructive compromise. We therefore suggest to you that you adopt concurrently two basic principles, and that you announce these principles concurrently. One without the other would be but fragmentary.

These principles are, first, that Palestine is a bi-national country for two equal peoples, both of whom are to have equal political rights and duties. We call this political parity. Second, that Jewish immigration is to be encouraged up to parity with the Arabs. This is numerical parity. And the immediate thing to be done in this direction is to admit without further delay President Truman's 100,000 displaced persons.

Let me first deal briefly with immigration. We postulate three periods. The first period is now, to-day. You are authorised to make *ad hoc* recommendations as to the unhappy thousands languishing without a home. We pray you to help these 100,000 come back home to this Jewish National Home, and this without further delay. They might be divided into 25,000 children if there are so many left, 25,000 parents, relatives, older persons, and 50,000 young people. You would thus help to bring creative forces into the country, and you would be performing a historical act of great compassion.

These 100,000 are not a threat to Arab numbers. In reality, they would constitute a net gain for the Jews of not more than 33,000. According to Government figures, the Arab natural increase during five years of war was about 150,000, 30,000 a year. The Jewish increment was only about 83,000, including natural increase and all forms of immigration. Thus there is a net Jewish gain of

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not more than 33,000, and this is not such a frightening number. The total Jewish population would then be 700,000. This is a smaller number than was envisaged during discussions between some Jews and Arabs in 1936, after the outbreak of the Arab revolt. They were trying to find the basis of an understanding, and it was agreed between them that after ten years—this very year 1946—the Jews would constitute 40 per cent, of the population—that is, 800,000 persons. I find it difficult to reconcile myself to the thought that this agreement was not ratified. Had it been, there would be 800,000 Jews here to-day instead of 600,000, and that with Arab goodwill.

If some Arabs say they oppose the entry of one single extra Jew, because that is one step nearer to the Jewish State, it is but a figure of speech symbolising their deep opposition to Jewish domination through a Jewish State. But to achieve a Jewish State there would have to be a Jewish majority, and an additional 100,000 Jews are far from being equivalent to a Jewish majority.

As to the second immigration period, we envisage the opportunity for the Jews of becoming one-half of the population. How long might this take? Government figures show that at the rate of 60,000 a year it would take eleven years from now—that is, up to 1957; at the rate of 50,000 a year, up to 1960; at the rate of 40,000 a year, up to 1964; at the rate of 30,000 per annum, twenty-four years—that is, up to 1970. Any annual Jewish immigration below 30,000 would never let the Jews catch up with the Arabs, owing to the much larger Arab natural increase.

As to absorptive capacity, I recall that during Sir Herbert Samuel's administration it was believed that the country which in 1924 had 805,000 inhabitants, of whom 628,000 were Moslems, was capable of absorbing up to 3,000,000, with agriculture as the chief industry. In his

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recent speech in the House of Lords, with the general tenor of which we are in accord, Lord Samuel speaks of the possibility of 4½ millions within a generation. He can say this because the Jews, through devotion and capital and service, have proven that the absorptive capacity is much larger than the experts once thought. But to enlarge the absorptive capacity to the full requires the implementation of a great co-operative development plan for the benefit of all the inhabitants.

For these two basic matters, absorptive capacity and development, we propose the creation of two boards, to consist of representatives of the Mandatory, of the Jewish Agency, and of the Arab League. We look upon the Mandatory as representative of the Christian world, the Jewish Agency as representative of the Jewish world, and the Arab League as representative of the Arab and the Moslem world. This may indicate also the stress we lay upon the international and inter-religious aspects of the Palestine problem.

In the third stage of the immigration policy the question arises as to the situation if and when parity in population may have been reached. The answer to this would depend upon two factors: first, upon whether by then the two peoples have found the way of peace together, and, second, upon the formation of a wider United Nations Regional Organisation, a regional union of neighbouring countries in which the bi-national Palestine would be an autonomous member. Such a union would afford the Palestine Arabs a wider Arab background, and would thus help to remove the present acute importance of majority-minority in Palestine.

The second principle, the adoption of which we urge, is the bi-national Palestine based upon political parity. This brings us to the problem of self-government. Concessions

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will have to be made by both peoples. The Arabs would have to yield their ambition to set up an independent Arab State. But the whole history of Palestine shows that it has not just been made for uni-national sovereign independence. Yet the Arabs will be able to enjoy the maximum of national freedom in a bi-national Palestine equally with their Jewish fellow citizens. What the bi-national State will take away from the Arabs is sovereign independence in Palestine. We contend that sovereign independence in this tiny land, whether it be Jewish sovereignty or Arab sovereignty, is not possible. It is, moreover, a questionable good in this post-war period, when even great States must relinquish something of their sovereignty and seek union if the world is not to perish.

We contend that for this Holy Land the ideal of a co-operative, peaceful, bi-national Palestine is at least as inspiring as that of an Arab sovereign Palestine or a Jewish sovereign Palestine.

On the other hand, the bi-national Palestine would deprive the Jews of their own opportunity of a Jewish State. Nevertheless, this bi-national Palestine would be the one country in the world where the Jews would be a constituent nation—that is, an equal nationality within the body politic and not just a minority, as everywhere else. Moreover, the absence of a Jewish State would make more difficult direct access by the Jewish people to the United Nations Organisation. To compensate for this, some form should be devised for giving the Jewish people a recognised place within the structure of the United Nations Organisation.

Bi-nationalism based on parity has distinct advantages in a country which has two nationalities. It is a comparatively new way. Full cultural autonomy is combined with full allegiance to the multi-national State. National

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identity is safeguarded, yet there is coalescence in a larger political framework. That this is possible is proven by Switzerland during the past 100 years. The Swiss are divided by language, religion, and culture. Nor do the religious and linguistic groups coincide in the twenty-two cantons. Yet all these divergences have not been obstacles to political unity.

There are various forms of the multi-national State. In some ways the United Kingdom is one form, Soviet Russia is another, South Africa another, the new Yugoslavia another. Professor Seton Watson, in his new book, *Eastern Europe Between the Wars, 1918-1941*, tells of a plan under discussion now for bi-national Transylvania. Hungarian domination, Roumanian domination and partition had been tried in vain.

Multi-nationalism based on parity is a newer form of democracy which is as important for multi-national States as the more traditional form of democracy is for uni-national States. The old way of having a major people and a minor people in a State of various nationalities is reactionary. In many senses the multi-national ideal represents a higher ideal, more modern and more hopeful than even the uni-national sovereign State. There is no prospect of peace in a country where there is a dominant people and a subordinate people. Parity in a multi-national country is the only just relationship between the peoples. This is the progressive conception. It is a noble goal to which the youth of multi-national countries can be taught to give their enthusiasm and their energies.

Let me take up briefly the question of self-government in the bi-national Palestine. We divide this also into three periods. As to the short term, for, as long as the Mandate persisted, we ourselves favour transfer to trusteeship, two immediate steps should be taken: One, the appointment

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of Jews and Arabs in equal numbers to responsible positions in the central government—as members of the Executive Council, as members of the Secretariat, as heads of departments, as District Commissioners, as Presidents of Courts. There are no Jews or Arabs in any of these positions. It is a sad commentary that after twenty-five years of the Mandate, which requires the establishment of a full measure of self-governing institutions, the country is further away from this goal than ever.

We renew also the proposal for a consultative body to be presided over by the High Commissioner. It would have no legislative or executive functions, but the High Commissioner would bring before it all matters of public concern on which consultation was regarded by him as beneficial. This would be good preparation for the next stage, and that is the second period of trusteeship.

We have presented you with certain suggestions as to the political structure of Palestine under trusteeship. We may be charged, perhaps justly, with engaging in the favourite pastime of constitution-making, and we make no claim that better suggestions cannot be put forward. Yet our justification is that we have given these matters considerable thought.

The first step which we propose in this period of trusteeship is the setting up of a regional trusteeship body, to be composed of representatives of the administering authority, the Jewish Agency, the Arab League. The Absorptive Capacity Board that I mentioned before and the Development Board that I mentioned before are to be responsible, in the first instance, to this regional trusteeship body until other provisions are made.

We propose further the appointment of a committee on Constitution, on which there should be representatives of the administering authority, the Jewish Agency, and the

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Arab League. When this Constitution, with its **Bill of Rights**, is drafted, it is to be brought before the regional trusteeship body. Then a constituent assembly, composed of equal numbers of Jews and Arabs, is to be convened. Where they don't agree, the decision is to be left to the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations Organisation.

I am near my conclusion. I shall give, but very sketchily, some of the headings we presented in our written document for the consideration of the proposed Constitution Committee.

The head of the State is to be appointed by the United Nations Organisation. He is to appoint the heads of departments, with the concurrence of the legislature, and preside over the Executive Council. The legislature is to consist of equal numbers of Jews and Arabs. In case of a tie, the head of State, who presides, is to have the casting vote. A Legislature is to be elected democratically by districts, or they may be called counties or cantons. Some districts would be mainly Jews, some Arabs, some mixed; some districts would be mainly Christian-Arabs, as, for example, Bethlehem, Ramallah, and Nazareth.

The two national councils, Jewish and Arab, would have cultural autonomy, and there would be a joint commission for the purpose of planning how to familiarise the one people with the culture of the other.

It may be asked what if the one or the other of the people refused?

Our answer is that both peoples must eventually co-operate. Indeed, there would be no other way for them provided, and this is basic to our whole conception, provided that Jewish-Arab co-operation in a bi-national Palestine based on parity be clearly and sincerely and authoritatively made the main objective of major policy. It has never been the main objective of major policy.

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The issues at stake are so important for the welfare of the individual and the community that no responsible body could stay out for long. Offers of a legislative council were made in their day and then abandoned. A tripartite political structure for Jerusalem was proposed and then dropped.

Our contention is that, if any one of these proposals had been gone through with sincerity and authoritatively, no side could have stayed out for long. If now, under these proposals, a regional trusteeship body is to come into being — if the Jewish Agency and the Arab League are invited to sit on this body; if an Absorptive Capacity Board is to be appointed; if a Development Board is to be appointed; if appointments are to be made in high, responsible positions in the central government; if, then, a constitutional committee is to be appointed, if there is to be a constituent assembly and self-government, federal executive, legislature, autonomous districts and other organs of government—no side can afford for long to withhold its adherence. The demand of life itself, the insistence of the people would be too strong.

Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, what a boon to mankind it would be if the Jews and Arabs of Palestine were to strive together in friendship and partnership to make this Holy Land into a thriving, peaceful Switzerland in the heart of this ancient highway between East and West. This would have incalculable political and spiritual influence in all the Middle East and far beyond. A bi-national Palestine could become a beacon of peace in the world.

MR. JUSTICE SINGLETON: Thank you, Dr. Magnes, for your instructive address. I am not proposing to ask you

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any questions about the details of it, but I'm not sure whether you would like to answer this question or not. Have you been able to discuss this matter with those whose views have been put before us at all in the last few days or weeks?

A. Well, incessant discussion is going on. Our little organisation issues a monthly publication that is taken up and answered, and the discussion goes on in that way. If you refer to a *tête-d-tête* discussion recently on these problems, I regret to say that such has not taken place.

DR. AYDELOTTE: I imagine the Members of the Committee heard with a great deal of satisfaction your statement that the problem before us is a complicated one. We have been repeatedly assured on both sides that it was extremely simple. But it looks difficult to us, and we are glad to know other people think it difficult.

You said that you thought co-operation between Arabs and Jews was possible. You said that you thought the situation had deteriorated in recent years. I would like to ask you whether you think the setting up of political Zionism as a goal for the Jews has had the effect of preventing friendly relations between Jews and Arabs—whether that had been partially responsible for the deterioration in these relations.

A. Would you permit me to formulate your question a little differently? Perhaps you mean to say, not the setting up of political Zionism, but setting up the programme of the Jewish State.

DR. AYDELOTTE: Yes.

A. Might I formulate the other part a little differently? Not to prevent friendly relations, because there are friendly relations between Jews and Arabs to-day, but whether

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these friendly relations are as consistent and as intensive as they used to be.

DR. AYDELOTTE: Didn't I understand you to say that relations between Jews and Arabs had somewhat deteriorated in recent years?

A. I didn't use that phrase. I did say that in 1936, even after the Arab revolt had broken out, a number of Jews and a number of Arabs—not the least in their communities—met in order to try to find the way of understanding. I said, further, that in the beginning of the war, at the end of 1939 and the beginning of 1940, Arabs and Jews came closer together in face of the common danger, and I contended that at that time there was the opportunity of establishing a consultative body which might bring Arabs and Jews and Government in closer touch with the purpose of co-operating the better in the war effort. Since then, I think it is true to say that the relations between Jews and Arabs have not improved—that, on the contrary, in many senses, they have deteriorated.

Then, in order to answer your question fully: There is no doubt that setting up the programme of the Jewish State as the official programme of the Zionist Organisation has helped in this deterioration.

DR. AYDELOTTE: That was the question that I wanted to ask. And I would like to ask you another question about this matter of parity. I think you know about Professor Notestein's paper, which indicates that in his opinion, at least, equal numbers of Jews and Arabs would be forever impossible because of the different rate of natural increase. Suppose, for one reason or another, parity were impossible; suppose it were impossible for that reason, or suppose that the economic absorptive power of the country was found not to be great enough to admit that many

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Jews. Would the fact that parity could not be attained be fatal to your plan?

A. On your assumption, which I do not share, as to absorptive capacity, because I believe the absorptive capacity of this country is very great, that would not invalidate the conception of a bi-national State. Even though the Jews remained a minority over a period of years, the conception of a bi-national state based on parity would give this minority—or if the Arabs ever became a minority—equal political rights as a community. That is the basic thesis of our contention. That is what we mean when we put forward this idea of the multi-national State, based upon parity among the various nationalities.

There are two aspects to it in our case. One is the political aspect; the other is the numerical aspect.

I assume you accept in your question the political aspect.

DR. AYDELOTTE: I was assuming for the moment the numerical one seems to be harder to predict.

A. It is harder to predict, and in these figures that I gave, you will observe that if the Jewish immigration is ever less than 30,000 a year, there is absolutely no chance for the Jews to catch up, because the Arab natural increase is greater than the Jews. It is 2-7 for the Arabs and 1-3 for the Jews. Might I add a word on that:

Assuming that 60,000 Jews a year were permitted to come in for eleven years so that the Jews would reach parity with the Arab population, there would always be this difference, owing to the increase in the Arab population, and the further chance for Jewish immigration to catch up to the Arab increase, which is larger than the Jewish increase. I don't know if I have made myself clear.

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DR. AYDELOTTE: Yes, I see the point. Yet you have also got to contemplate the possibility that there wouldn't be enough Jews in the world who would want to come to Palestine to keep pace or bring the population to parity in the long future.

A. I don't know on what grounds you base that, but my own opinion is this.

DR. AYDELOTTE: I would like to ask another question. You spoke with greater regret that the agreement of 1936 wasn't accepted and, consequently, 200,000 Jews who might be in Palestine at this moment are not here. I think the Committee would be interested to hear you say anything you think it wise to say about the circumstances of that agreement—the reasons for its not being accepted—but I don't want you to say anything you don't think wise to say.

A. I should have to consult those who with me signed the document, who were among those who conducted these discussions, before I should feel free to tell you who the people were or to let you know further about it.

DR. AYDELOTTE: If you feel free to make any further comments on the subject in written form, it would be a matter of great interest. I would like finally to ask a question of Professor Buber. Did I understand you to say, sir, that the majority of the Jews do not, in your opinion, favour a Jewish State in Palestine?

PROFESSOR BUBER: I think that State and majority are not the necessary bases for Zionism.

DR. AYDELOTTE: I gathered that, but I thought I saw the sentence in your paper to the effect that the majority of Jews do not favour a Jewish State.

A. There are no statistics for it. A great part of Jewry

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cannot tell what it thinks about it. We have no communication with them, but I think a very great part of the Jewish people think a Jewish State is necessary for Zionism.

Q. You think a great part of the Jewish people think a Jewish State is necessary?

A. Yes, a great part—a very great part—think it is necessary.

MR. CROSSMAN: I would like to say two sentences before I question Dr. Magnes. I was asking about you this morning, and somebody told me you were the only reasonable man in Palestine. When I was listening to you, I began to see why he paid you that compliment.

I am not going to discuss the details of your plan, because I feel, if that were possible, nobody would possibly not want to see it done. The real problem is whether it is practical, and it is entirely on that question of the practicability of your ideas that I wanted to get your advice. I would like to put something to you first:

Do you agree that the success or failure of your complete scheme depends upon the following four things:

i. Agreement between the political leaders on both sides.

2. Decrease on both sides of nationalistic fervour among the rank and file.

3. Confidence on both sides that the other side is going to keep to its agreement to give up its ultimate desires—confidence that it will go on agreeing to that later on.

4. An administration capable of the extremely skilful job of conducting this together.

Those four are very important elements for success?

A. Permit me not to deal with the fourth for the moment.

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MR. CROSSMAN: Yes.

A. You question the practicability of this plan.

MR. GROSSMAN: Just discussing it.

A. I question the practicability of your questions (*Laughter*). I will tell you what I mean. This plan, or a plan similar to this, is designed to do those very things that you have in mind and that you have these grave doubts about. Your doubts are not only grave, but justified. But how are you going to get agreement among the political leaders?

MR. CROSSMAN: That is what I was going to discuss.

A. Yes, how are you going to get this confidence? How are you going to get the other point that you made? Our answer is through life and not just through discussion, through establishing vital interests for both of the peoples, by establishing contact, not in a debating society, but in boards that have to do with the determination of the absorptive capacity of the country. Both peoples are interested in that—maybe one pro and the other contrary. There will be a third man representing the Mandatory or administering authority. Through establishing a Development Board. I should say both peoples are interested in that affirmatively. Both peoples would benefit from it. If you, therefore, establish a regional trusteeship council representing both peoples, and go through all these organs of government that I have mentioned, that is the way to bring people together who are at the present time unhappily far apart, and who simply can't be brought together by appealing to abstract qualities.

Q. Thank you, sir. You have been putting forward your pamphlets for some time since 1943, and therefore these

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ideas of yours are pretty well known in Palestine. What is the size of the membership of your organisation?

A. The membership is a small membership—a few hundred. The organisation is not a political party. It has never attempted mass meetings for the purpose of gaining membership; it has never distributed membership blanks around; its purpose is to clarify some of those problems; to put forward a programme; to arouse discussion. This little publication that I mentioned to you, this monthly, I think has about 500 regular subscribers, aside from the number that are sold here and there. But we do know this little publication penetrates into every editorial office and to other places, and arouses thought.

Q. So that there has been time for these ideas to get fairly well known here?

A. Yes. Might I add, it isn't only our organisation that believes in the bi-national Palestine; there are other organisations who are political parties and who are out for large numbers of members, who also believe in this programme. There may be differences between us and them on this or that point, but our general tendency and theirs is the same.

I should like to add to that, that we know from ever so many indications that a large part of the inarticulate section of the population believes more or less as we do. This inarticulate part of the population isn't organised, either because of our fault, or because a moderate programme doesn't have the same attractiveness in days of war as an extreme programme has. The point I would like to make is there are large numbers of inarticulate persons in the community who also feel more or less as we do.

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Q. But, because they have no political form of expression, they vote for the more extreme policy?

A. I don't say they even vote for the more extreme position; they aren't counted.

Q. But still you feel that Arab-Jewish relations have deteriorated lately, despite all the efforts of getting together?

A. Yes.

Q. Taking the leadership on both sides, do you feel in the Jewish Agency to-day there are men in the key positions who sympathise with your ideas?

A. I hesitate to speak for them.

Q. It is a vital question, because here you have an organisation which you agree has a very strong control over the Jewish community here.

A. I think you would get a clearer answer by asking them.

Q. Yes. Now, do you agree that since the Jewish Agency is mentioned as a key agency in the conciliation, the question of whether or not it would accept your views is a key to the success or failure of the scheme?

A. Put these things before the Jewish Agency and the Arab League and see.

Q. You feel that the Agency as at present constituted could, in fact, take part in this conciliation?

A. What do you mean by "as at present constituted"?

Q. With its present Executive and its present structure?

A. Well, I'm talking of the Jewish Agency as an organisation that has been recognised internationally by the

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Mandate. It isn't a Jewish Agency composed of this or that person or this or that number that I have in mind. I have in mind the Jewish Agency.

Q. I see. Then, on the side of the Arab League, what part could the Arab Higher Committee play in your* plan?

A. That is a problem, of course, that undoubtedly would arise, and I can't give a clear answer because I am not authorised to give that answer. But what I should like to say is this:

That we make the Jewish Agency and the Arab League parallel. Why? We haven't put in here the Vaad Leumi, which might perhaps be parallel to the Arab Higher Committee. The Vaad Leumi is a local body. The Arab Higher Committee is a local body. We mention international bodies, including the administering authority as representing the trusteeship council—the Jewish Agency as representing the Jews all over the world, and the Arab League as representing the Arabs and Moslems of the world in so far as Palestine is concerned. So that there is a counterpoise. There is the Jewish Agency, an international body here, and the Arab League, an international body there. What would be the relationship later on between the Vaad Leumi and the Jewish Agency or the Arab Higher Committee and Arab League is something we haven't dealt with here. It is something we have discussed, but we believe that would be complicating the problem if we discussed it now.

Q. On the fourth point I made on the administering of it, you feel there would have to be changes in the structure of the Palestine administration, apart from the addition of the Arabs and Jews, as suggested, in key positions in order to carry this out?

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A. Yes, I feel there would have to be self-government, but I have been talking about self-government upon the basis of parity.

Q. I meant in the transitional period.

A. Yes, in the transitional period during the Mandate, I think that there ought to be immediate changes. It seems to me—well, I was going to say inexcusable. You will excuse me if I use the word. It is probably inexcusable that there isn't a larger measure of self-government in this country; and that doesn't mean that the hundreds of English officials who are here are not good men. They are. They are all interested and they all do their work as far as it is required of them. But they are not part of this country. There are hundreds of minor positions which would be very well filled by Jews and Arabs, and, I venture to say, very often as well, and perhaps in some instances even better. I am not directing criticism at anyone; I'm only talking about the situation as it has developed. What I referred to here, however, was not these hundreds of minor positions here and there; I referred to these important responsible offices in the central government.

I realised that when reading I made a mistake by saying there wasn't a single Arab or a single Palestine Jew in the Secretariat. There is a Palestine Arab in the Secretariat. There is no Palestine Jew, so far as I am aware, in the Secretariat. But aside from that little error, there is no Jew in the Executive Council of the Government, or Arab. There is no Jew or Arab in what is called the Advisory Council; there is no Palestinian Jew or Arab at the head of any department. I could name departments to you that could be very well filled by Jews and Arabs. There is no

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Jewish or Arab District Commissioner; there is no Jewish or Arab President of a Court.

That is a situation which we contend is impossible. It is treating a community as though they were children. This is a mature community. The only way, after all, to teach self-government is to distribute responsibility. You can't get self-government by governing other people. That is something which we contend ought to be done now. And this consultative body that we have suggested to you, that ought to be done now.

Q. What it comes to is you feel there would have to be a profound change of heart in the government and in the Arabs and Jews; and the declaration of policy and principle which you outlined would be the beginning?

A. Not a mere declaration; it would have to be really meant.

Q. Quite.

A. It is a very important point.

Q. I agree.

A. You probably know of that passage in the White Paper of 1930, when the British Government proposed the establishment of a legislature similar to that proposed in 1922, and in the statement it was declared that, no matter what side stayed out, this thing was going to be put through. But it wasn't.

One can't blame the communities for thinking that, when these declarations of policy are made, there is a string attached to them.

What we propose to you is that this declaration of policy be meant and be put through authoritatively. It can't be put through overnight. Dr. Aydelotte said this

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was a complicated problem. We regard it as a very complicated problem.

What we mean by making Jewish-Arab co-operation the main objective of major policy is this: That it has to be done day by day and year after year, and people have to be trained especially for the service. There is a great English colonial service in the Sudan. You have to train them to understand what it is all about and not regard this as merely the day's job, and that is the end of it.

I remember years ago having a talk with a good friend of mine, who is unfortunately not now in the British Administration, an Englishman, on this very problem, and when I advanced arguments similar to these, he said, "But this is not our job; this is your job"—that is, the Jews and the Arabs. It is indeed primarily the job of Jews and Arabs.

But it can't be done unless there be this authoritative body with all of the weight that government everywhere has standing behind it.

MR. CRUM: Suppose that this Committee recommended a bi-national State to our respective Governments, and that that suggestion also included the suggestion that the Mandatory Power attempt to put it into force or into effect. Is it your suggestion that British and American arms be used for that purpose, if need be?

A. Well, Mr. Crum, I don't know just how many arms in general would be necessary. It would depend, I think, very largely on the way it was put, on the conviction with which it was meant, on the men who are going to try to work all of this out.

If your Governments will decide on the policy of a

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bi-national Palestine, you just can't put it into effect overnight. You have to go through a long process, and it is some of the steps in this long, rather wearisome education process that we have tried to outline.

Q. In one of your articles, which I think was filed here, you suggested, I believe, that the English and American Governments should back the proposal.

A. Yes, I did. I proposed that in an article in the *Foreign Affairs* in January, 1943. And I proposed a Commission like this at that time.

Q. I would take it you meant by "power," by force, if need be.

A. I suppose so, in the last analysis, I don't want to shirk that problem. If one starts out on the assumption, however, that force is going to be used, one will have much less patience in trying to work it through without force. You have to try to determine in advance that this is reasonable; that this is just, more or less, all around; that there are men of goodwill to be found everywhere, and, of course, committees or boards who are going to try and pick out good men, who are going to have expert advice, who are going to do it gradually. You can't introduce a bi-national State all at once. But if, in the last analysis, the time comes when the show of arms will have to be made, well, then I don't want to invite the United States Army here. I should regret very much to see it here, if you want to ask me my personal opinion. May I add one more word:

At that time, presumably there might be the agreement in the Security Council of the U.N.O. which would know how to do this thing better than if we invited the British Army or the American Army or any other army.

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MR. CRUM: Does your organisation reject completely the idea of partition?

A. I would like to give you my own opinion. We have no official stand on that. I reject partition absolutely. I think it is a moral defeat for everyone concerned. It is a confession of failure.

Q. Let us assume that.

A. But you mustn't assume that.

Q. It might be the only answer.

A. No, it isn't at all the only answer. You have, in the first place, in these two tiny partitioned States, the same problems *in toto* as you have in this larger bi-national State. You have a majority and a minority. How are you going to treat them? If you are going to treat them as majorities and minorities—one dominant people and one subservient people—that is one way to do it. If you are going to treat them as we propose, on the lines of parity in the Jewish State or in the Arab State, why not do it in the complete State? Moreover, you would find, I think, that the administrative boundaries would be very hard to set up.

And what is of greatest importance to me is this: That you then separate the Jews from the Arabs instead of bringing them together. You separate them as though they were two dogs fighting on the street and you had to put them into separate kennels. That is not the case. Some people may use that figure of speech, but it isn't true. The only way to get people to work together is to get them to live together, to get to know one another, and you can't do that by putting them into separate compartments.

If you put them into these compartments, what is going

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on now in both the Arab and the Jewish schools will be accentuated to a very large degree. Unfortunately, at the present time you have a large amount of the bitterest nationalism, which you might call chauvinism, being given expression to both here and there.

I dread the day when, in a few years' time, after this partition, you will get a group of young Jews and a group of young Arabs, on both sides of this irredentist border, going after one another in just the same way as the militarists to-day want to have the field for a trial of arms. Why do that? It's a large problem. No one can guarantee its success, but it is worth trying. It is a great challenge; it is the Holy Land. Why mangle this conception of the Holy Land? Here are two people, descendants of the great Semitic peoples of antiquity. They can naturally work together. We have to find the way; we have to try to convince everyone this is just and that is sound. You don't have to do this partitioning. It is entirely artificial. It may seem simple; it is only facile.

MR. MANNINGHAM-BULLER: YOU regard the desire on the one hand to maintain a majority and the desire on the other to attain a majority as perhaps the chief factor in keeping the Arabs and Jews apart; is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. You spoke of an internationally guaranteed agreement between the partners. I wasn't quite clear about it, but you said something to Mr. Crossman about it being imposed in advance. If it was imposed in advance, you would not be suggesting a guaranteed agreement, would you, stopping one side from going on in its desire to attain a majority?

A. Pardon me if I say I don't quite catch the implication

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of your question. I don't think I used the words "imposed in advance." What I did mean to say was that a policy should be declared in advance—a policy of the bi-national Palestine, based upon parity between the two peoples. I said that that policy would have to be adopted and announced concurrently with a further statement about immigration. Then I said, in order to have this policy carried out, this policy of political parity, there would have to be a number of stages, and we propose a number of these governmental institutions.

Q. If you made that declaration of policy now, it would in no way silence the clamour for a majority, would it?

A. It certainly would not, in the beginning, at least. It wouldn't silence anything at the beginning. The declaration of the policy is the beginning. That policy has to be carried out, as I tried to indicate before, over a period through these various channels.

Q. Assume you declare that policy and assume you carry it out in the way you suggest. Would you not still be met with the demand, perhaps, on one side to maintain its majority and a demand on the other side to attain its majority?

A. Yes, undoubtedly, and that would be fought out in this regional trusteeship council in the first place, and we propose this absorptive capacity board, or call it immigration board, and other boards and communities.

Q. Do you think it would be fought out within the conciliation which you suggest?

A. Oh, no. Naturally, it would give rise to a large discussion everywhere.

Q. In your paper, in the paragraph about the rate of immigration, you said: "Although these calculations—

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meaning the Royal Commission's calculations—were made in 1936, it would appear that the ratio of Arab increase and Jewish increase has remained stable."

A. Yes.

Q. It is a fact, is it not, that the Royal Commission trends of population figures have been subject to a certain amount of criticism?

A. Well, I took the precaution of discussing these figures with officials in the Immigration Department of the Government. We went over them rather carefully, and what I have said here is the result of those discussions.

Q. Thank you.

MR. PHILLIPS: Assume for the sake of argument that your plan met with the interest of other governments, how would you begin? What steps would be the first ones to take to set your plan in operation? I think I understood you to say you regarded the centre as the most important part of the machinery. Would you therefore start by appointments at the centre of Arabs and Jews? If so, how would you attract them? Would you give them portfolios at once, that form of responsibility, or would they be in the first instance merely assistants to the High Commissioner? How would you start the ball moving?

A. If I venture to mention the names of certain Government departments, I am sure that those who head them will not think that I am directing my attention to them personally. I would start by appointing Arabs and Jews in equal numbers as heads of certain departments; as, for example, I would begin with the most innocuous department in all of government, the Department of Archaeology. I know the Director of the Department; he is a most efficient man, most obliging, a good head of this department; but I know some Jews, I know some Arabs who

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could be equally good heads of that department. Take, for example, the Department of Health. The Director of the Department of Health who served in that capacity for over twenty years has now gone. The present Director is about to resign. I think I read in some place a new Director had been appointed or was about to be appointed. I said to myself at the time: Are there no Jews and no Arabs in this country who are medically well enough trained and who know enough of administration to head this most humane of all the departments of government? Take, for example, the Department of Agriculture and of Forestry. We have a large number of Jews and of Arabs here who know a great deal about agriculture and about forestry. My friend, Mr. Smilansky, knows a great deal about agriculture. He was Chairman of the Farmers' Association for a large number of years. Take the Department of Posts and Telegraphs; the Director has resigned and is now the Chairman of the Jerusalem Municipal Commission, an excellent man, if he will pardon me saying so; he may be here or he may not; but at any rate, a man who is very well liked everywhere. But when he left the Department, it was only natural that the Englishman—his name is Irish, so he may be an Irishman—was appointed in his place. I said to myself at the time: Is there no one here in Palestine who is fit to be the head of the Department of Posts and Telegraphs? Take the railroads. The Director of the Railroads is an excellent man. He has improved the service, he knows his job and he is an expert at it. I am sure there are some men who could handle that job.

I would not put a Jew or an Arab as head of the police; I would not put a Jew or Arab at the head of the Department of Education; I would not make a Jew or an Arab at the present time, at any rate, a Chief Secretary; I would

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not make a Jew or an Arab Chief Justice. There may be some others, perhaps. I would riot make him the Financial Secretary at the moment, although I think you could find Jews and Arabs who know something about figures. They might come in later. I have just tried to give you an indication of what I think can be done without too much delay. It has been delayed long enough, and if this Commission is really—pardon me saying this—is really to do something vital, as I know it wants to do, here is the field for it, living men. Take the districts. The District Commissioners are most important people. They are important because they come into contact with the population. They and their associates or the Assistant District Commissioners know what is going on in the village and in the farms and the factories and the rest of it. They do the best they can; most of them get to know at least one of these two languages, Hebrew and Arabic—for the most part Arabic. But that is just the place where people living in this country and making it their permanent home, born here, educated here, would fit in very well. They could come into touch with the population through all of its stratifications in a much more thoroughgoing way, I think at any rate, than the best of men with the best of goodwill who come from the outside. The Consultative Assembly that I mentioned I believe would be a wonderful training ground for the future legislature.

Q. And so you would begin first at the centre?

A. Yes, as the first step.

Q. And the second step might be the Consultative Assembly?

A. Yes.

Q. Just one other thought. In describing the set-up of

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your Council, did you or did you not refer to the world-wide interest, the Christian interest, in the Holy Places?

A. Yes.

Q. Have you thought of any representation of that in the Government?

A. Well, I tried to indicate that in our view the Administering Authority, the Mandatory Authority, Great Britain, is the representative of Christianity. In the Mandate for Palestine—I think it is Article 9—you have a paragraph giving to the religious courts certain jurisdiction. We have not really addressed ourselves with any detail to that. There are a number of views about it. As far as the holy places are concerned, I believe you would not find a single person—I think that is not exaggerated—you would not find a single person who will not agree that, as far as the holy places are concerned, there must be some kind of special dispensation so that they could remain holy places, and that one could have free access to them for pilgrims and for others who want to visit them. I think if you would seek that area where there is least difference of opinion, you would find it right there.

MR. MCDONALD: Just one question, Dr. Magnes. Perhaps you will remember we last discussed problems of refugees and interrelated matters in Brooklyn some seven, eight, nine years ago, and since then there has come this supreme tragedy which even the most pessimistic of us then did not imagine. So my question to you on your scheme is just this: Could it be put into effect, in your judgment, in time to be instrumental in saving this last remnant which many of us have seen in our recent tour through Europe?

A. I emphasised that. I said in all the world time presses,

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and time presses also in this ancient land. I said, further, there are three stages in connection with this immigration policy: the first stage is now, to-day. We pray, let us have these 100,000 people. What is the delay? When the terms of reference to this Committee were published on November 15th, there was a great deal of discussion in the country, and I happened to be one of those who thought he could find within it a large number of positive aspects. I thought the association of America with it was one of these; I thought the emphasis on the desire for an agreed settlement was there, and I thought this was the positive side of it, that your Committee was authorised to make *ad hoc* interim recommendations. In the first place, the policy declared there would be no interruption of the then quota of Jewish immigration. There was this interruption, unfortunately, though the numbers have been made good since. I would like to tell the Committee I have never seen quite so much distress, quite so much tension among all persons, whatever political views they held, as one could observe and feel then, when it was realised that this quota of 1,500 a month had stopped. It stopped, I do not remember exactly for how long, but for a couple of months, I think.

It is said in this document by the Secretary of State, that everything was to be done to ensure that there was to be no interruption of the present rate of immigration, but it was nevertheless interrupted. The Committee was authorised to make *ad hoc* interim recommendations upon its findings in Europe and it seems to me the Committee did a wise thing, that was discussed here pro and con, in going to Europe first, because there is the scene of this tragedy. You have been there. Will you pardon me if I ask a question? Why are not the 100,000 permitted to come in? I am asking you now instead of you asking me.

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Q. I suppose your question is why did we not recommend in an interim report that they should be admitted?

A. That is what we are interested in, not in the interim report. We are interested in having them come. We want them, and I can tell you I have been attending these sessions and I have heard questions as to the administrative absorptive capacity. We think administrative absorptive capacity is a criterion of immigration in the long-term policy, but not with these 100,000. We want them in, and we will share with them, if the country has not enough work. There is enough work, we think, there is enough money here; there is more money in this country, unfortunately, I would like to say, than there ever has been in its long history. Well, let some of that money be spent. There are some houses that have more rooms than they ought to have; let them be occupied. The people here are ready—I think you can accept it literally—people here are ready to share what they have; give them the opportunity for it. These 100,000 will open their hearts; it will be a saving work. I cannot put it in any other way. Why should it not be done? Why not? You have the authority to recommend it.

Q. May I say, first, so far as the interim report is concerned, I am sure its not having been issued was no indication that every member of this Committee did not feel the poignant tragedy and also the urgency of the problem. But I come back to my question. Would it not be assumed that the admission of these 100,000 on the basis of your conception of the agreement between Jew and Arab would be dependent upon Jewish-Arab agreement on that point?

A. Absolutely not.

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Q., You mean you would ask the Mandatory Power to open the door?

i4..Yes.

SIR FREDERICK LEGGETT: I take it you make your proposal with one important objective in mind: that is, to provide a basis upon which these two parties can get together and get away from the two extreme courses to which they are now attached?

A. Yes.

Q., I take it you do that because the whole history of mankind shows agreements are not made between equals; they are often made between people each of whom can do the other very great harm. Now, taking the evidence we have heard, is it not true that, unless both sides see clearly the objective to which they are going and can agree upon it, to bring new people here now would be to bring them into a battlefield.

A. No, I do not think so.

Q., Do you agree it is absolutely essential that the two sides should agree upon the objective?

A. I think it is very very desirable, but I do not think you are going to get that now. I think that is just chasing a will-o'-the-wisp. You will get it, not by sitting down and working for agreement in advance; you will get it through life, through these steps or other steps in actual practice that you take. It depends what the steps are. If they are steps directed to that end, I am sure you will get it in the course of many years. It will not come from to-day to to-morrow.

(£. I am afraid I did not make myself quite clear. Is it

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not your view that, if these steps are taken, minds which are at present locked on one particular idea will begin to see the practical ways in which they could get to greater agreement, just as, for example, between the employers and workpeople in a particular industry, if there is a means by which they can get together and discuss matters? Though they are not equal, they will probably find a way in which they can live together?

A. All the better if you can achieve that, if you can bring the Jews and Arabs together you will be fulfilling one of your great functions. I do not know if that is an answer to the question.

Q. It is partially, I think. Now, may I raise another point? You were talking about urgency; and all of us who have been in Europe agree upon that urgency, but we saw there young men who were thinking they were coming here to fight. Since we have been here we have found something of that atmosphere. I again ask you whether it would be right to bring those young children here if the only way open or the only way determined upon by either side is to fight.

A. I am going to give you an extreme answer. Even though it were the only way, I would bring them; but that is not the only way. All over the world young people have learned how to fight; that is what this war has been, teaching them how to fight. It is impossible after a war of these dimensions to unlearn that to-day or to-morrow. That fighting atmosphere is unfortunately going to persist for years and years to come; a whole generation has been brought up on it. Unfortunately also, a generation of my own people. A generation of Americans too has now been brought upon something entirely new. There is probably

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going to be conscription or compulsory military service. Why should our young people be regarded by you as exceptions? It is we, the Jews, should take exception to this militarism among our people. I take exception to that. I take exception to this militarism, to this chauvinism, to this—I cannot use any other words—to this atmosphere of terror. We know it; you hear about it. We feel it in our flesh and blood; you read about it. You do not know the forms that this terror takes. It is not only the terror of the bomb, and there are those among us who know what this is very well from their own experience. Nevertheless, I answer you again. If this were the only way, if we knew they were coming here in order to do this fighting, yes. But they are not coming here to do this fighting. Mr. Smilansky would just like to say a word. He says it becomes our duty to try to create conditions so that this spoiling of our young ceases. That is what we want.

I cannot tell you how we condemn these things. I would like to say one more thing which will not be particularly popular, I am afraid. I have heard here in these sessions people express their great regret at what our youth are doing—some of our youth are doing. They mean that very sincerely. What I would like to say is: this is not just a question of our youth. Some of these young men who go out with bombs and guns are among our most idealistic youth, idealistic men and women, just as you find in other countries where rebellion goes on, ready to sacrifice their lives for what they believe to be a higher cause, to save their people. And the question I ask is: Who sends them? It is not the young men who send them. It is older men who send them. Those are the people you should be directing your attention to.

SIR FREDERICK LEGGETT: May I just say how wonderful

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it has been to hear this afternoon a counsel of conciliation put forward.

MR. BUXTON: YOU said something on a subject which may go to the very heart of the decision we are trying to make. You said that perhaps a great many Jews would forgo their aspirations, their passion for a Jewish State, if liberal immigration were allowed; if that is your belief or conviction, not merely a hope or expectation, would you give me two or three reasons for that belief?

A. One reason is this. I know some of my friends, not all who are for the Jewish State, have no hesitation in saying when they argue privately that, although they believe in the Jewish State with all their hearts for the various reasons that have been adduced here, they feel it probably will not be granted, and what they really do want is immigration. The argument oscillates between State and immigration. Some say if we cannot get a Jewish State in all of Palestine, we want a Jewish State in part of Palestine, partition, because in that way the Jews would be recognised internationally as a unit, as an entity, and that has its advantages in helping Jews in other parts of the world. The argument is put forward: supposing Jews had a seat in the United Nations Organisation, it would not be necessary for somebody else to come and plead their cause. There are very good reasons for wanting this political representation, so that there are some who say, if we cannot get the State, give us immigration; some will say, if we cannot get the State, give us partition. There are many people, if you would talk to them, who say, to be sure, "immigration is the thing that we want, and the reason we want the State is because in that we will get immigration." There are, on the other hand, some

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who want the State for the State's sake. They are State mad, not realising that the State is something these days that perhaps needs revision in its whole conception and the practice of the State; they want the State for the sake of the State. There are others, however, who want the State for the sake of immigration. That is another reason why I say, if immigration were given without the State, there would be many people who would not be satisfied 100 per cent., but who would acquiesce, would forgo the State.

Q. You are inclined to think that the fervour of these folks would die down somewhat if they had this immediate relief to the Jewish problem?

A. If you could arrange in some way the immediate release, you might say from captivity, of these 100,000 human beings who are our brothers and sisters, I can almost guarantee you that the tension that fills our lives and that destroys the morality of so many of our young people would be relieved.

Q. There is another question somewhat more abstract. In your discussion of the bi-national State, you would set up a new agency, a group of Arabs, and you refer to the Jewish Agency. Is not that in a way, Dr. Magnes, an indication of a lack of trust in the ability of the Jewish population as a population, the Jewish people and the Arab people to manage their own affairs without the intervention of outside agencies?

A. This little country, which has been fought over through the centuries by all the armies of antiquity and by the armies of modern times, is a place *sui generis*. It has the interest of millions of people throughout the world. It is not as though it was Bulgaria, for example, which is of interest to the Bulgarians, perhaps also to another Power

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at the present moment. It is a little country that revolves on its own axis, and of which one hears nothing concerning its literature, its music, its schools or its ideals. This is a country that is peculiar. Our Bible calls the Jewish people a peculiar people. They are a peculiar people, as Professor Buber pointed out—peculiar in this, that they have this peculiar relationship to this peculiar country. You cannot therefore say that the Jews of Palestine are the only Jews in the world concerned with this country. The same thing, if not to the same degree, applies to the Arabs. The third holy mosque in Islam is the Mosque al Aqsa. The Dome of the Rock is one of the most beautiful architectural monuments in the whole Moslem world. Therefore Moslems outside of Palestine are also concerned with this country. Mahomet's mystic flight is said to have had its origin here; therefore turning this over to the Arabs of Palestine is just as short-sighted, we should say, as turning it over to the Jews of Palestine. Now, there are organisations representing these Jews and these Arabs on the outside. There is the Jewish Agency. That has been the great instrument for the building up of this country. You go around this country, and most of what you will see is due to the efforts of the Jewish Agency. The Arab League is but a young creation. It has not had the opportunity, let us say, of doing anything at all comparable to what the Jewish Agency has been able to do for Palestine, but it is the only body that we know of representing the Arabs and the Moslems on the outside. This Jewish Agency is recognised by the Vaad Leumi here, and this Arab League is recognised by the Arab Higher Committee, accepting them for the moment as counterpart of the Vaad Leumi.

For that reason, because of the international character of Palestine, because of its inter-religious character, we talk about this regional trusteeship council which

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is to be composed of a representative of the Mandatory or of the administering authority, Great Britain, which is also interested in this country, not because the British live here, not because their officials are here, but because this is the Holy Land of Christianity. This is where Christianity had its origin, where it had its great decisive historic experiences. It was organised by Jews at the time, and Great Britain is interested and the rest of the world is interested because of that. Therefore we say it is not sufficient to have a local government—as you see, we propose local self-government. But on certain of these basic problems we propose, at first at any rate, that this international body represented through the administering authority, the Jewish Agency and the Arab League, should come together and try to work out a number of these things such as we propose.

Q. I dare say you are right, but what you say seems a little paradoxical to me. A few minutes ago you were stressing the value of allowing native Arabs and native Jews to assume active management of their own affairs. On the other hand, you say: let us bring together two international groups to manage their affairs for them. Will you not reconcile those two points of view for me, please?

A. It is a perfectly legitimate question. The objective is to have the local Jews and the local Arabs conduct their own affairs, conduct their own government. How are we going to bring that about? That is our whole argument. We are going to bring it about, so we think, by steps something like this. We do not go at once to the Vaad Leumi and the Arab Higher Committee for that, because we feel that the problem of immigration, taking that in the first place, is something that goes beyond the borders,

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beyond the confines and the ability of just local groups. Immigration concerns the rest of the world. One of the sources of Jewish immigration is the rest of the world; it is the source of Jewish immigration, and it is the Jewish Agency, which is an international body, that has thus far been dealing with immigration. All of the Jews are interested in that, just as all the Arabs throughout the world are interested in that. Therefore as a first step we say, in order to help bring this about, do not go to the local people. Local people are fighting around too much. Go to the international authority. Go to the wider background. It is our conviction—at least, our hope—that the Arab League is going to be much more moderate than any local Arab body in any country. I think the Arab League has thus far given evidence of that in its constituent documents. If you read the paragraph on Palestine, you will find that, I think. Statements made by one of its representatives indicate that we have to encourage them.

It will not be easy for the Arab League to be more moderate than the local people, any more than it is so easy for the Jewish Agency to be more moderate. But I do think that will be the case, and for that reason we feel at the beginning, however it may turn out afterwards, in order to bring this about, in order to bring people together, which is what we want, in order to bring them together upon the basis of actual, live, practical things, their own interests, you have to bring into the picture these larger international forces to persuade and to be persuaded. If it were possible just to say that this thing could be carried out, as we propose it, through turning it over to the local people, it would be very good. The way we propose is more complicated. I think, however, it is more practical.

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Q. You foresee the time when the local people will take over their own affairs? Will that be in a decade, or a couple of decades?

A. However long it may be that is the objective.

MR. CRICK: A few miscellaneous questions. First, a domestic one. You are the head of a relatively young seat of learning, which I suppose is governed by a trust deed or some such instrument. Is that so?

A. No. It is not so. As I said at the beginning, I am not representing the Hebrew University to-day, so this question . . .

Q. . . . is purely personal.

A. Is asked in the knowledge of that statement. The Hebrew University is organised upon the basis of what is called the Hebrew University Association, which is a society registered in accordance with the laws of Palestine—an educational association.

Q. How many students have you?

A. I think there must be 700. At the peak of the registration before the war there were over 1,200. On account of enlistment—this might also be interesting to you as being characteristic of what the Jewish community tried to do—during the war the number went from 1,200 to 500. It has now risen to 700 or 750.

Q. What proportion of the student body is non-Jewish?

A. A very small proportion. You mean the Arab? There are a few Arab students at the University even to-day. I say, even to-day.

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Q. I take it there are no restrictions on a religious basis on entry into the University?

A. On the contrary, we can furnish you with a copy of the Constitution of the University, and the first paragraph says that entrance to the University is open to all persons regardless of religion, race, colour or social standing.

£. I take it you would greatly welcome an influx of non-Jewish students?

A. We should indeed.

Q. Would you be prepared—you personally—would you be prepared to consider as one gesture of invitation the possibility of changing the name, let us say, to the University of Palestine?

A. I am not inclined to laugh at that question at all.

MR. JUSTICE SINGLETON: If I may suggest it, I am not sure that Dr. Magnes ought to be called upon to say whether he personally would consider changing the name of an institution of which he is the head.

A. I would nevertheless like to answer that question, with your permission.

Q. Just please yourself.

A. I think it a very serious question. The choice is open to the Hebrew University to be either the University of Palestine or the University of the whole Jewish people. With our eyes open, and quite conscientiously thinking that we knew what we were doing, we chose the Hebrew University, the university of all the Jewish people, for a very simple reason. It has to do in a measure with the basic remarks that Professor Buber presented here. We, are here in order that we may fructify and revive Judaism.

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That is the basic reason. The reception of displaced persons is something we had not any knowledge of when the Hebrew University was established, although there was a sufficient amount of persecution of the Jews, but not to that extent. Our basic conception is that by the establishment of this Jewish community here we shall be strengthening the Jewish people in its mind and in its spirit, in its ethical and in its religious aspirations. You may ask why. The reason is peculiar to this peculiar people. If you will permit me to say so, in Christianity it is primarily the Church that is the visible society which Christianity is, in accordance with its basic principles, bound to see incorporated in the world. In Judaism it is not the Church. In Judaism it is the people. That is one of the basic peculiarities of Judaism. It is hardly a Church at all. It certainly is not an *ecclesia*. It has no head; it has no synod; it has no *sanhedrin*. It is a voluntary association, as Professor Buber has pointed out, for the purpose of trying to establish a just society. It is the conception of Judaism that this just society has to be established first of all by the Jews among the Jews, and that, through establishing it first of all among the Jews, perhaps it will be possible to help establish the just society in other parts of the world. The Hebrew University is there in order to study Judaism, in order to delve into its sources, in order to study Judaism and bring it into touch with all the disciplines of mankind.

The Jewish people has had contact with almost all the cultures and civilisations and races of mankind, and we have our experience of them. It is something every one of us round here has seen and has known, and we must try to get at the source of our own life and of our own mind. One of the sources of our life is this country itself, this Holy Land where our mind, our spirit reached its greatest florescence. We have to try to get to our sources of

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literature. We have therefore a great library. I say great, because it is great for this part of the world. This is the largest library in existence anywhere round here. It has 460,000 volumes on its shelves. It has a large manuscript collection. It is endeavouring to become a great spiritual centre. That is the reason I have tried to convey to you why we have accepted this choice. A Hebrew university has to be the university of the Hebrew people, of the Jewish people. On the other hand, I should not like you to have the impression that we are not trying to serve this country, that we are not trying to be as far as we can the University of Palestine. Our University is open to everyone, and I am glad to say that people of various kinds have availed themselves of the facilities of the Hebrew University. If you come to our library any day, you will probably see some monk in his gown, and in our Department of Arabic Studies, the Hebrew University has a greater library of Arabic and Moslem literature, in the European sense of the term, than any Arab university or any Arab library. The Arab libraries have more manuscripts than we have, more Arab editions, but the Hebrew University is one of the great libraries in the world bearing upon Arabic studies. I recall the day several years ago—the fact that it does not happen now is an indication of this deterioration you were speaking of—when pupils attending Arab institutions were brought into our Library in order that they might see with their own eyes for the first time what their own people in times gone by had created. Moreover, there are many other ways. I do not wish to go into the whole thing.

MR. JUSTICE SINGLETON: I think you have answered it.

A. This is the purpose now of my remark. We extended an invitation to the Committee to visit the University.

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We have not yet had an answer from the Committee, and we do hope you will come.

JUDGE HUTCHESON: I would like to ask a question. I would like to preface my questions by saying, Dr. Magnes, I am not ready to assess your proposals, but I am a fairly old man, and I recognise moral power when I see it. I want to say, sir, that I can say in the words of my Leader: "Behold an Israelite indeed in whom there is no guile." I would like to take up the illustration which was presented to us. I do not know whether it was by Mr. Ben Gurion or somebody else. I have lost the author of it, but the illustration sticks, of some person coming in here from Africa or some other place, knowing nothing about this business, sitting down hearing what we have been hearing in this room. I want to ask you as a man who has wisdom to gather together, and the courage to propound, what seems at first blush without more careful analysis certainly to be inspired by a sense of justice and fairplay, whatever its other merits. I want to ask you a question as to how this stranger coming in here would see these proceedings. I ask you, first, would he see the Jew in this way, chafing under and in rebellion against his minority status? In all the countries in the world the Jew has for some time now been engaged in a determined effort to acquire majority status and a Jewish State in Palestine, which he claims is his home, by converting the Arab majority there into a minority. Is that a fair statement, not a full statement, but a fairly close statement of the effect of these various demands on a stranger who knew nothing about the underlying situation?

A. I am afraid it is.

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(£. The Arab, claiming Palestine as his home and quite unwilling to accept minority status, the Arab proposes to resist to the utmost all efforts to bring this about and demands the immediate setting up of an Arab State. Is that a fair analysis of what we have been hearing?

A. I think it is.

Q. The Mandatory desirous of propitiating and ultimately reconciling the dissidents and unwilling, therefore, to take a firm and final stand for either, the Mandatory, like Veblen's famous legerdemain, has throughout this whole period exhibited a certain amiable inefficiency when confronted with force or fraud, and then he goes on: "The Christian, neglected if not completely forgotten by both warring factions, the Christian with his Holy Places sacred to all Christendom, many of them Arabs having equal and in many instances better birthrate claims to Palestine, their very existence apparently ignored by the great Christian nations of the world, stand helplessly by, caught in the whirl of the conflict but unchampioned and undefended." Have you heard anyone do anything much for the Christian people in this land during these controversies, or say anything much? I have not. •

A. Do you mean during the years?

Q. I am talking about in these hearings. Now I want to ask you whether that person, having gone through all that business and then come here to-day and heard you, might begin to think maybe there are some more like you. Would he have any real justification for thinking so? Are there any moderates like you who have the moral courage to stand against a stream of vigorous tendency and propound the theory he thinks is just?

A. If you will just modify the question a bit and, instead

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of saying moderates like me, say moderates, my answer is in the affirmative. I have two friends here. I look about this room and I see many friends over here, and as I look around I can point out large numbers to you.

Q. You think there are other moderates here with the courage and the character that you exhibited.

A. That I exhibited, I do not know; the courage and character, yes.

Q. I would like to ask you one final question. You are not denominated a Christian, but you talk as I should like Christians to act. Are you also by any chance from America?

A. I seem to be better known to this gathering than I am to you.

MR. JUSTICE SINGLETON: YOU have Mr. Smilansky with you. Is there anything he wishes to say? There is also one question I want to ask you.

A. Mr. Smilansky says he has handed in his statement in writing and is not particularly anxious to talk. He would be talking in Hebrew, and I would be translating.

Q. If he will hand in the statement translated, will that serve the purpose? Then if we have anything to ask him on that, we can do so another day.

A. I would like to repeat that I wish you could get something of the fervour of his conviction that Arab-Jewish relations are possible of adjustment. He has written about it, he has talked about it, he has worked for it—worked in it. That is the point; and I think just

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his presence here without his having said a single word, the presence of a man who has been faithful to this ideal for more than fifty-five years, is eloquent testimony of the fact that Arab-Jewish relations are not incapable of being improved. He believes it with his whole heart. He is older than any of us here, and he is struggling every day in order to prove it in life.

Q. I notice in your scheme, the document you have let us have, you talk about the Legislature. The Legislature would have to deal with the question of immigration, I suppose, or some officer under the Legislature.

A. That is a basic question.

Q. What I am leading up to is: you say, in case of an impasse the head of the State is to have the casting vote. I wonder, have you considered in such circumstances, where you would find the head of the State?

A. I say among members of this Commission.

Q. I am sure, Dr. Magnes, it would be the wish of every member of the Committee that I should thank you and those with you for coming to see us this afternoon, and above all for your very helpful answers to questions.

A. Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you in the name of my friends here, in the name of all of those who believe in reconciliation between these brother peoples, who speak languages that are very closely related to one another, who have a long, ancient and honourable tradition together. I want to thank you for your patience and kindness.

