UNIVERSAL
LIBRARY
OU_150585
UNIVERSAL
LIBRARY

392.3/F67F 2085
Folsom, Joseph P. G. Kirk.
Family and the
democratic Society

OUP—23—4-4-69—5,000.

OSMANIA UNIVERSITY LIBRARY

Call No. 392.3 / F67F Accession No. 2085

Author Folsom, Joseph Kirk. P.G.

Title Family and the democratic society

This book should be returned on or before the date last marked below.

THE FAMILY
AND DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY

INTERNATIONAL LIBRARY OF SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL RECONSTRUCTION

Editor: Dr. Karl Mannheim



Advisory Board: Sir HAROLD BUTLER, K.C.M.G., C.B.; Sir ALEXANDER CARR-SAUNDERS, M.A., Director of the London School of Economics; Sir FRED CLARKE, M.A. (Oxon), Chairman, Central Advisory Council for Education; Lord LINDSAY of Birker, C.B.E., Master of Balliol College, Oxford

THE FAMILY
AND DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY

By
JOSEPH KIRK FOLSOM
Professor of Sociology, Vassar College

With Chapters in Collaboration with
MARION BASSETT
Summer Institute for Social Progress at Wellesley

LONDON
ROUTLEDGE & KEGAN PAUL LIMITED
BROADWAY HOUSE · 68–74 CARTER LANE, E.C.4

First published in England 1948

To Jessie Elinor Newcomb

Printed in Great Britain by Butler & Tanner Ltd., Frome and London

PREFACE AND PERSONAL NOTE

This book was at first intended to be a revision of my *The Family: Its Sociology and Social Psychiatry*, published by John Wiley and Sons, Inc., in 1934. Yet so much has happened since then, to the world and to my ideology, that the present volume emerges essentially as a new treatise, with liberal quotations from its predecessor.

Dreading above all to be called "unscientific," or "wishful thinkers," we sociologists, typically, have pictured social changes as something to be ascertained and understood, but not to be approved or disapproved. If we advocated anything we carefully qualified it by saying, "If you want such and such an end, we recommend this means of attaining it." In other words, we left it to the reformer, the moralist, to the vast "Somebody Else" to determine ends and choose values.

Since 1934, we have seen a small group of determined men who knew what social changes *they* wanted plunge the whole world into bloodshed.

Some of us have been stirred to a fundamental reconsideration of the sociologist's relation to values. With Robert Lynd, we cry, *"Knowledge for What?"* Indeed values are *chosen*, not "proved" or "disproved." Yet values have their own interrelations. Perhaps sociology is eminently well fitted to judge one value in terms of another, to say whether several values are consistent or inconsistent, and to discern any historical trend or "logic" in the evolution of values. Perhaps the anthropologist or sociologist is peculiarly well fitted to discern and represent the universal needs and interests of *mankind*, as distinguished from the arbitrary goals set by man's various cultures.

We have been encouraged, perhaps, in this bolder attitude by the configurationist anthropology represented by Ruth Benedict, which shows different societies as choosing different aims and values for emphasis; by psychosomatic medicine and psychoanalytic anthropology which suggest that value-choices may be much "better" or "worse" than one another in terms of life and health, and by progressive education philosophy which holds that it is possible for the school to play a creative role in the tides and currents of social change. Indeed the philosophy of Lester Ward has come alive again with new and better implementation.

Although I believe we should maintain even in wartime important scientific work regardless of its immediate utility, yet I personally, during these last two years of "national defense" and war, could not have held myself to this bookish task had I not felt that it played a direct role, however small, in the struggle for Democracy. I believe that reforms in the family system, in the relations between men and women, and between adults and children, are not to be postponed and awaited as by-products of other democratic changes; but that they are important keys for the release of other forces and constitute in themselves part of the very essence of Democracy.

In 1934 I showed that certain "leading" changes were irrevocable, and conceived human welfare to be promoted largely by hastening the "lagging" changes which would eventually have to follow. My ethical orientation, as far as I dared express it, was in terms largely of functionalist anthropology. "The ethical responsibility is to keep society in good repair." [1934, p. 182.] My specific recommendations for *action* were mainly in terms of "social psychiatry" or "individual adjustments," which I placed in the intellectually dramatic climax position near the end of the book.

The "climax" of the present volume is the study of the needed changes on the societal, cultural level. Individual personality adjustments are studied not as "the only thing we can do about it," but as a source of guidance as to *what social action* is needed. In the spirit of Lawrence Frank's "Society as the Patient," we are rather inclined to take human needs as revealed in case studies as our guide to social reconstruction and the creation of new cultural values.

General, sociological treatises on marriage and the family have been written chiefly by male scholars. Although these, and also the women scholars who are non-mothers, have all been participant observers of family life in the concrete, still we need more of the wisdom of the *observing participant.* Yet few are the women who have given many years to homemaking and motherhood as a full-time job and who have also written about it. The homemaker's intellectual ambitions usually succumb to drudgery, distractions, or the struggle for prestige; and when eventually she finds time to concentrate her mind, she also finds herself many years behind the men and the career women of her own level of ability.

This book is therefore unusually fortunate in having the contributions of my collaborator, Marion Bassett. She has maintained a home and raised a family while continually observing the family and group life of her community with a certain cultural objectivity characteristic

of the anthropologist. She has not only collaborated on three chapters but has contributed many valuable suggestions to the book as a whole. To her it owes a deeper insight into the task and problem of the mother in our society, and the courage to formulate more explicitly the emerging democratic values pertaining to the family and the relations of men and women. Mrs. Bassett's unfinished manuscript, "Mothers on Strike" (referring to the declining birth rate), which I have been privileged to examine, has contributed clues to sources and many valuable ideas.

My book owes much more than one might suppose to the painstaking and tireless accuracy of my secretary, Jean Shostak.

Ruth Mallay, my co-editor of the *Bulletin of Family Research and Education*, has written many of the book reviews which are here quoted. The *Bulletin* and other materials of the National Council of Parent Education have been of great service.

Vassar College has in many ways provided helpful facilities, surroundings and encouragement for the years of study of family life which have culminated in this book. Several studies related to old age welfare, assisted by the Class of 1880 Fiftieth Anniversary Fund of Vassar College, find part of their fruition in the attention here given to the needs of the older woman.

Many other persons, men and women, old and young, have had a part in this work. My colleagues, my students at Vassar College, my fellow-members of the National Council of Parent Education, my fellow-sociologists, the members of my family, and my friends—all have contributed data and ideas, or have helped by kindly forbearance from pressing their rightful claims upon me while I was preoccupied with this work.

My wife, Jean Rodgers Folsom, who is a mother, a social worker, and a natural scientist, has rendered invaluable service on this book and its predecessor. She has read manuscript and proof with a keen eye and a healthy use of common sense, has clarified ambiguities, protected the King's English, and at the same time encouraged me to "hew to the line and let the chips fall where they may."

Not only from other books and printed ideas, but directly out of life itself, has this book grown. Its fabric is one of the joys, the toil, and the suffering of human beings. One of these is my former wife, to whom with deep appreciation this book is dedicated.

JOSEPH K. FOLSOM

New York

CONTENTS

PREFACE AND PERSONAL NOTE *v*

I. FAMILY REALITIES AND SCIENTIFIC THOUGHT WAYS *1*

A. Family Phenomena in Two Contrasting Societies

B. Basic Concepts and Distinctions

II. A WORLD SURVEY OF FAMILY PATTERNS *51*

III. THE FAMILY IN THE GREAT CIVILIZATIONS *81*

A. The History of the Euro-American Family

B. Modern European Family Patterns

C. Asiatic Family Patterns

IV. THE FAMILY IN AMERICA *116*

A. The Major Background

B. Present Characteristics and Differences

C. Minority and Deviant Groups

V. MODERN SOCIAL CHANGES AFFECTING THE FAMILY *145*

A. The General Principles of Social Change

B. The Influence of Mechanical Invention

C. The Influence of Biological and Social Sciences

D. The Ideological Influences of Science

VI. THE TRENDS OF FAMILY CHANGE *169*

A. Current Changes in the Family

B. Germany, Russia, and Sweden

VII. THE FAMILY AND THE EVOLUTION OF DEMOCRACY *209*

A. Theories of Origin and Sequence of Family Forms

B. Democracy and the Epoch of the Person

C. The Family and the Crisis of Democracy

VIII. THE POPULATION PROBLEM 252

A. Introduction to Family Problems in General
B. The Problem of Overpopulation: Negative Eugenics
C. The Problem of Positive Eugenics

IX. PERSONALITY AND ITS DEVELOPMENT 292

A. The Physiology of Personality
B. The Analysis of Personality
C. Frustration and Personality Change

X. PERSONALITY AND THE PARENT-CHILD RELATION 326

A. The Influence of Family Relations upon Personality
B. Social Change and Parent-Child Relations
C. Child Guidance in a Democracy

XI. LOVE AS EXPERIENCE AND RELATIONSHIP 365

A. Love Feelings and Their Objects
B. Universal Features of Love Interaction
C. The Course of Love

XII. PERSONALITY AND MARITAL HAPPINESS 409

A. Marital Happiness: Its Measurement and Prediction
B. Homogamy and Personality Differentials

XIII. MARRIAGE INTERACTION 430

A. Marital Frustrations
B. The Prevention and Adjustment of Conflict

XIV. THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND CONTROL OF MARRIAGE 466

A. Marriage as a Legal Status
B. The Demography of Marriage

XV. DIVORCE 496

A. The History and Demography of Divorce
B. Divorce Trends and Their Evaluation

XVI. COURTSHIP AND UNMARRIED LOVE 525

A. Mate Selection

B. The Changing Mores of Sex and Love

XVII. THE PROBLEM OF THE HOME 568

IN COLLABORATION WITH MARION BASSETT

A. Housing and Home Location

B. The Problem of Homemaking

XVIII. MEN AND WOMEN IN A DEMOCRACY 599

IN COLLABORATION WITH MARION BASSETT

A. The Future of Homemaking

B. "Of Men and Women"

XIX. THE FAMILY AND THE COMMUNITY 635

A. Health and Social Work

B. Education

XX. UNSOLVED PROBLEMS 662

IN COLLABORATION WITH MARION BASSETT

APPENDIX

A. SUPPLEMENTARY READINGS AND TOOL-BOOKS 683

B. JOURNALS AND ORGANIZATIONS 689

C. PROJECTS FOR RESEARCH AND DISCUSSION 692

D. BIBLIOGRAPHY 697

INDEX OF NAMES 733

INDEX OF SUBJECTS 743

Chapter I

FAMILY REALITIES AND SCIENTIFIC THOUGHT WAYS

A. FAMILY PHENOMENA IN TWO CONTRASTING SOCIETIES

In the insular realm known as Melanesia are the Trobriand Islands, just northeast of Australia. The people of these islands live in a system of family relationships strikingly different from our own. This family system has been described in interesting detail by Malinowski in his *Sexual Life of Savages*. The title may be somewhat misleading, since the physical sex relations are only a small part of the total picture. Because this description is so much more adequate than most descriptions of primitive family life, it is chosen for our present study.

The Trobriand Islanders are a primitive, that is, a *pre-literate* people. Their culture is not, however, of the lowest order. They practice agriculture and keep pigs, and are placed upon the second or middle agriculture level in the classification of Hobhouse, Wheeler, and Ginsberg. They are a black-skinned, woolly-haired people, classified physically under the Oceanic branch of the negroid race (geographically remote and somewhat different anatomically from African negroes). Considering the smallness of this population and the probability that it will sooner or later die off or be absorbed into the white man's society, what can be the significance of studying its family system?

The size and the geographic and historic importance of a primitive tribe are no indication of the sociological significance of their ways of life. Strange as it may seem, this study of primitives is one of the most valuable avenues to an understanding of society in general. In recent years sociology and cultural anthropology (ethnology) have come closer together and are now essentially one and the same science. In zoology we do not demand that attention be apportioned to the various animals according to their abundance and the frequency with which we have to deal with them. Such a "practical" zoology might confine itself largely to horses, dogs, and other domestic animals. But

he who would really understand animal life can learn more in the zoological garden than in the barnyard, because of the much wider variety of species exhibited. *Primitive tribes are the "zoo" of sociology.*

Let us compare the family system of the Trobrianders with that of our own society. The description of our own society will have a certain naivete. It is the description which we might imagine would be given to it by a Trobriand sociologist, if such a person existed.

TROBRIAND ISLANDS	AMERICA

I. SPATIAL AND MATERIAL PATTERNS

1. *Arrangement of dwellings and settlements*

Practically all the people live in small villages. These are circular, with two concentric rings of buildings. The inner ring consists of storehouses and the outer of dwellings. Both face toward the center. Between the two rings is the "street," where everyday living goes on. Within the inner ring of storehouses is a circular space which contains the chief's hut, sometimes his storehouse, a burial ground, and a dancing ground. This is the area of public and festive life. Houses, except the chief's, are rather similar in size and quality. The storehouses, which are used mostly to store yams between harvest, are built more elaborately and decoratively than the dwelling houses. The gardens are outside the village.	About a fourth of the people live on separate farms, about a fourth in villages, a half in cities Farms have their own barns and outbuildings near the dwelling. Houses vary tremendously in size and equipment, but the majority far surpass anything in primitive society. The better houses are concentrated in certain areas of cities; their inhabitants do "mental" rather than "manual" work. A large area of suburbs with urban modes of work and play but lesser density of buildings and population surrounds the typical city.

2. *Relation of geographic to social patterns*

One continuous arc of the village circle of dwellings is inhabited by the chief's wives and their children, another by his maternal kinsmen, and the remaining arc by commoners not related to the chief as kinsmen or children.	Proximity of dwelling has little or no relation to kinship or to friendship; it merely classifies people as to economic status and indicates mere chance in the availability of dwellings. People often become friends because they are neighbors, but contacts based upon neighborhood alone
New dwellings are commonly	

erected in the village by newly married couples.

are weak, even in suburbs. With the help of the automobile and telephone people have their main contacts at some distance. The community population divides itself into groups based upon recreational interests, cultural similarities, and personal congenialities having little relation to geography, except that each such group is likely to consist of people having similar economic status and living in the same type of social-ecological area.

In cities and suburbs, change of residence is frequent (average every two years in some). The sentiment surrounding a specific "home" location is less than in the country.

3. *Relation of kinship to geography*

Each village community is owned by one sub-clan. It has its head man, commonly the oldest. If the sub-clan is of high rank, this head man also has power over a whole district and is called a chief.

There is no relation between kinship groups and possession of any village or locality. Small, isolated rural communities tend to intramarry and to have their social relationships somewhat associated with kin relationship.

4. *Composition of the household group*

In monogamous families, husband, wife, and their younger children live together in a hut. Other relatives sometimes live with them.

Husband, wife, and their children (until maturity) live in the same home. Other relatives may live with them but this is regarded as less preferable.

5. *The housing of adolescents and unmarried*

At puberty children leave their parents' home, especially the boys. Boys go to live in bachelors' quarters, girls to live with older maternal female relatives except when living with boys in the bachelors' quarters.

Adolescents tend to be segregated

Both boys and girls remain in the parental home till marriage or occupation takes them elsewhere. In the business classes boys leave sooner because their occupations more often take them away from home. In conservative groups it is regarded as de-

in special quarters, the bachelors' houses, of which there may be several in a village. These are located in the inner circle of the village with the storehouses, apart from the huts of married couples. In these, unmarried youths, with some widowers and divorced men, live with their mistresses, whom they possess in temporary exclusiveness and do not share. These bachelors' houses are owned by groups of boys, the eldest being the titular owner. When liaisons break up, it is usually the girl who moves, to another bachelors' hut or to a home of her parents or maternal relatives.

sirable for the girl not to take an occupation which requires her leaving home, but to remain at home helping in housework and engaging in courtship with possible husbands under parental supervision.

There are bachelors' quarters for unmarried young people, but these everywhere involve rigid segregation of the sexes. They are normally used only by persons working or studying in communities away from their parental homes.

6. *Home ownership*

The houses, garden land, livestock, and trees are owned almost exclusively by the men, who inhabit or use them, and not by women or families as such.

In rural areas, villages, and smaller cities, a majority of houses are owned by their inhabitants. This ownership, however, often involves carrying a debt. It is also common to rent houses, more especially in cities.

7. *Pattern of the dwelling house*

The typical dwelling house has a symmetrical, steep roof of thatched material which may extend to the ground, giving the entire structure the form of a triangular prism resting on its narrowest side, with the two elevated sides slightly convex. The ground plan is thus a rectangle, with entrance at one end under a gable. The dwelling is built directly on the ground, with a floor of beaten earth; it is one-storied and, except for a small antechamber, consists of one room.

Most dwellings are single-family houses, but there are some large apartment houses, especially in large cities. The typical house is of box form, has two or three stories, no interior courtyard, and is divided into rooms. In most localities, porches are attached. Except near centers of cities, each house is surrounded by more or less ground used as a lawn, garden, playground, and space to dry clothes. The more elaborate and esthetic houses emphasize the decorative functions of their yards, but many of the poorer houses, especially in cities, have mainly "back

yards" and conspicuous clothes-drying.

8. *Technology and furnishing of the home*

Along one side wall of the house is the fireplace, which is a ring of stones; along the opposite side wall and one end of the house are wooden sleeping bunks in two or more tiers. At the other end is the door, with shelves above and alongside of it for the storage of property. Water is carried in vessels from a distance. Bathing is done out of doors.

Although there is enormous variation, a typical American standard of living includes piped water in the home, electric light, central heating, a bath tub and frequent bathing, three cooked meals a day with a great variety of food (including animal and vegetable), elevated tables, seats, and sleeping surfaces, table and bed linen, eating utensils, frequent laundering and pressing of clothes.

There are four main forms of furniture: table, seat, bed, and storage box with drawers or shelves.

Numerous machines are possessed and used.

9. *Occupations*

There is little or no lifelong specialization of labor for any individual except that between the sexes. On any one day a person may be engaged principally in agriculture, fishing, construction, manufacture, or trading.

On the farms people produce food, most of it being sold to the rest of the population. Village and city people are engaged in trade, transportation, manufacture, planning, and paper work. Adult males and about 40 per cent of the adult females give full time to these occupations, which are broken down into thousands of specialties. About 60 per cent of the adult females give most of their time to homemaking and care of children.

10. *Work in the home*

Most work of both sexes is performed out of doors near the dwelling or yam house, or in the gardens, although there are occasional distant expeditions, especially of men in canoes or on foot to other villages.

Typically, cooking and serving of meals, minor clothing repair, laundering, and the care of young children still remain as work within the home, and occupy practically the full time of the homemaker. These tasks

Family groups work in close proximity much of the time. Men perform much of the care of children. In transporting food and other large tasks, helpers are commonly used; they are chosen largely according to customary kinship obligations with reciprocity according to custom.

are sometimes shared by other members of the household group, but the great bulk usually falls upon one woman. If there are more than two adults in the group, the extra adult usually does outside work and earns money.

About a fourth of the families have part-time or full-time hired servants who participate in the work, but only to a minor degree in the consumption processes of the home. They retire for limited periods of time to their own homes, of lower standards, elsewhere.

11. *Relation of home to consumption and gratification*

Meals are usually eaten on the ground outside the dwellings. The home serves to store the scanty personal possessions, the yam houses food. Only in cold or rainy weather, at night, or for intimate purposes do people remain inside the dwellings. On a cold or wet night people often sit on the floor or bunks within dwellings in an atmosphere of dense smoke, talking with animation. Visiting from dwelling to dwelling is common.

Ordinary dress, worn most of the time, consists of a pubic leaf for men and a grass petticoat for women. On festive occasions men add skirts and both sexes have more elaborate and decorative costumes. Feet are bare at all times.

Most people eat most of their meals in the home, but there is considerable eating in hotels and restaurants and other large-group establishments. People also like to vary their place of eating within the home or grounds, or by way of picnics.

The home serves as a place to store personal clothing and other possessions and gives privacy required by this culture for dressing, undressing, and sleeping. The great majority of these activities take place within the home. Typically, a married couple has a single bedroom, and among the unmarried above seven or eight years of age the sexes have separate bedrooms.

Dress is based upon the trouser pattern for men and the skirt pattern for women, with numerous variations. "Old" or "working" clothes are worn by the working-class men and farmers in the daytime; business-class people wear clothes approaching the "dressed up" standard most of the time, and all people do

so during leisure spent socially or in public.

Except in a few sports the body is mostly covered and footgear is worn. There are numerous variations of costumes for different activities and occasions.

Love-making or sexual intercourse takes place largely, among children, in the bush; among the married couples, in their dwellings. Privacy is always valued, but no special precautions are taken to prevent observation of the act by children.

Most sexual intercourse takes place in homes. The culture requires strict privacy, yet the taboo upon recognition or discussion of the sex relation is so great that there is no orderly method of insuring the degree of privacy needed for its best development. This puts a premium upon the life of the young married couple alone in their single-family house.

Many forms of recreation take place in the home or on its grounds, but many of these are individual hobbies or activities of age or sex groups rather than of whole families.

12. *Esthetics of the home*

The chief's home is more ornamented than others, and the yam houses more than dwellings. Carved boards and shell ornaments are used largely by higher ranks. Costume, especially the skirts of women and the festive dress of both sexes, dancing, and rituals play important esthetic roles.

Most classes of objects embody the esthetic motive in some degree. Paint, colored papers, artistic forms in external construction and furniture, color schemes and interior decoration are much used. Among the more wealthy, artistic aims are achieved more through basic construction and arrangement as distinguished from separate *objets d'art*. Yet pictures, decorative dishes, and other art objects play a role in all classes. Musical instruments and/or music through radio broadcast are found in most homes.

The esthetics of the household interior are important as symbols and also as sources of prestige.

II. THE STRUCTURE OF MARITAL AND SEXUAL RELATIONSHIPS

13. *Recognition of fatherhood*

The "father" of a child is the mother's husband, who helps her to bring it up. Pre-marital pregnancy (though not intercourse) is shameful, and often leads to the abandonment of a girl by her fiancé, even though he has been the cause. As a matter of fact, pregnancy is a comparatively rare result of the free sex relations before marriage, for some reason unknown even to modern scientists. After marriage fertility is desired and actually quite adequate, but no child of a married woman is attributed to any biological father, even in cases of known adultery during prolonged absence of the social father.

The social father of a child is also the biological father. He should be married to the mother and live with her, exercising more or less authority over her and their children. All sexual intercourse before marriage or with other than the married partner is immoral, in varying degrees. Premarital pregnancy is shameful, because it is evidence of intercourse. But subsequent marriage of the sexual partners removes much of the shame, especially if it takes place before the child is born. Fertility in marriage is generally desired; deliberate infertility is immoral according to more conservative attitudes, though in most classes it is regarded as subject to personal choice. Any evidence that a child's biological father is other than his social father leads typically to anger of the husband and to investigation; if illegitimacy is found to exist, great moral condemnation falls upon the woman.

14. *Social control of marriage and divorce*

Marriage and divorce are subject to no higher legal control than individual will, the approval of the girl's family, and sometimes informal group judgment.

Marriage and divorce are defined, licensed, and in certain respects regulated, by the governmental authority, which in these matters is supreme. The religious authority and the parental families may practically regulate marriage within still narrower limits through their disapproval, but cannot legally enforce such regulations. The adult is protected by law against coercion from any other power.

15. *Monogamy and polygamy*

Marriage is monogamous except for men of high rank or great importance, who generally practice polygyny. The chief motive for this polygyny is to acquire extra wealth, which is necessary for power.

In polygynous families of chiefs there are three classes of wives: older ones inherited from the former chief, with whom there are few sexual relations; women married by the chief in his youth; and younger, attractive women married more recently. Political considerations and personal choice govern selection. There is usually a personal favorite among the second group of wives, and sometimes among the third, but the roles of the several wives are determined by their age and personality, and the chief's preference, rather than by law.

The several wives live in separate huts close to that of the chief, each with her own young children. There is no marked jealousy among them or need for them to be further separated. The chief may make his principal abode, outside his own hut, with one of them.

Marriage is monogamous without exception. A marriage to a second partner before the marriage to the first has been legally dissolved is not legally valid, and in addition is punishable under the criminal law, although it sometimes occurs secretly.

Through divorce, however, there exists a system which may be called consecutive polygamy for a certain minority, which is of intermediate rather than of high or low social approval.

16. *Age differences of mates*

In monogamous families the mates are of about the same age.

The husband is on the average about three years older than the wife. There is no moral taboo or legal restriction, but marriages of great age difference are regarded as undesirable, especially when the woman is older.

17. *Procedure of choosing and obtaining mate*

The great majority of marriages are based upon the initiative of the

All marriages are based upon the initiative of the young people them-

young people themselves, who choose one another freely.

A girl's father has the principal responsibility for guiding her to marriage. Her family usually consents to the marriage, and can usually prevent it by economic power, since it is their function to provide food for the young couple. The man's family exercises no control over the marriage.

selves, who choose freely, although not entirely without parental guidance.

Families, however, approve and disapprove marriages, but the limit of their power is to cut off social contacts and inheritance, which is rarely done even when there is disapproval of the marriage. The powers of families are seldom sufficient to prevent a marriage desired by both partners. Family influence upon marriage is somewhat greater from the girl's family. Cultural sentiments approve love marriages in defiance, if necessary, of the will of families, and the law sanctions and protects such marriages.

Very rarely marriage takes place by elopement in defiance of the will of the girl's family.

There is no wife capture.

There are no matchmakers.

Elopements occasionally occur to avoid the hostile interference of families.

There is no wife capture.

There is no matchmaking save for some informal personal mediation, and some organized "services" used by a very few.

18. *Personal qualifications for marriage*

There are no formal trials or tests through which a young man must go before marriage.

There are no formal suitors' trials. The bridegroom is expected, however, to be able to support the bride economically without other than housework contribution from her.

People marry at an early age.

Defective persons usually cannot win mates.

There are legal age limitations upon marriage, most typically 21 for men and 18 for girls without parental consent, and 18 for boys and 16 for girls with parental consent. In many jurisdictions persons with certain defects and diseases are legally forbidden to marry.

19. *The rituals of mate finding and marriage*

The marriage is ritualized as follows: (1) The girl's parents signify

The marriage procedure is: (1) The boy proposes marriage to the

consent by asking the boy (who has already been having sexual relations with the girl) for a small present. (2) After some interval the girl, instead of returning home, remains all day with her husband, taking meals at the home of his parents (this constituting the public declaration). (3) There is a series of complicated gift exchanges between the families, the larger gifts being exchanged after the next harvest, during which time the couple is "honeymooning" at the hut of *his* parents. (4) After the harvest comes the building of the new home, usually in the boy's mother's village.

girl. He does this usually only after she has shown some evidence of fondness for him, but there is no disgrace if he proposes prematurely or unsuccessfully. A girl must not directly propose; the boy must take the initiative at each step toward closer relations. (2) The girl accepts, usually first making sure of the consent of her parents, in certain classes the boy formally asks the consent of the girl's parents. (3) The engagement is announced to friends; in the upper classes this is done with some ritual. (4) After the engagement the partners must be more or less exclusive in their comradeship. (5) After a certain length of time formal authorization of marriage is obtained from the government authority, and the marriage is soon thereafter consummated by a definite ceremony performed by a governmental or religious officer. Until this ceremony has taken place either party is free to break the relationship. After the ceremony it may be broken only through divorce or annulment procedure. The ideology of the ceremony is religious, the essential union of the partners being regarded as an act of the Deity. (6) On the night after the marriage ceremony the partners sleep together for the first time. Before the ceremony they may not morally be alone together in any situation for a whole night, although they may eat and play and spend whole days alone together throughout courtship. (7) The partners then usually take a honeymoon of a week or more away from friends and relatives, indulging freely in all types of love behavior. This is supposedly the climax of romantic love. (8) The

time and place of founding the new home are matters of individual choice and convenience. It is the bridegroom's responsibility to provide the new home, normally within a short time after marriage.

20. *Status and satisfactions of the married and unmarried*

The unmarried men enjoy a lower social status and lesser economic advantages than the married. No persons remain unmarried except because of personal unattractiveness or defectiveness.

Women gain no economic advantages through marriage, but gain social status and supposedly the power to have children.

There is little or no difference in social status between married and unmarried. About 10 per cent of the people never marry, and this brings no moral condemnation. Many other causes than personal defectiveness or unattractiveness lead to non-marriage.

The desires for morally approved love satisfactions and for legitimate offspring are the motives for marriage; many women expect to get greater economic security.

21. *Divorce: frequency and grounds*

Divorce is permissible on the desire of either party, and is frequent. Usually it is the woman who seeks it, sometimes because of her husband's adultery. Any dissatisfaction with the other party may be the cause; there is no public control or formal adjudication, but informal group judgment has some controlling influence.

Childlessness of a woman is not given special weight as a ground for divorce.

Divorce is permissible only through formal legal procedure, upon specified causes which are practically the same for both man and woman; they must be judicially proved, and they vary from one territorial government to another. Adultery is the most universally accepted ground for divorce. Desertion for a term of years and physical cruelty are valid grounds in most jurisdictions but not in all. The permissibility of a given divorce depends upon technical specifications rather than upon group judgment of its desirability.

Childlessness is nowhere a ground for divorce.

Divorce is always a right obtained by a theoretically innocent party

against a party proved guilty of a specific offense. Double guilt and collusive mutual consent render divorce non-permissible.

Since divorce requires no formal procedure, an actual separation is equivalent to divorce.

Married partners may and do freely separate without divorce, but their legal marriage obligations continue and they may not remarry.

22. *Widowhood*

Widows and widowers have about the same status and love privileges as the unmarried, except for a required period of mourning, which is more severe and more strictly supervised for widows, and is carefully ritualized. After this period they remarry readily.

Widows and widowers have the same social status and love privileges as the unmarried. A period of mourning for each is regarded as proper, but the ritual is very simple and not strictly enforced.

23. *Illegitimacy*

Illegitimate children are pitied because they have no father to nurse and love them. Only those born before marriage are regarded as illegitimate, regardless of biological paternity. Those recognized as illegitimates are readily adopted by kinsfolk and are not especially stigmatized.

Illegitimate children are socially stigmatized but have full legal rights, except as to inheritance. The chief stigma falls upon the unmarried mother, because she has broken an important sex taboo. The father, if he can be identified, can be compelled to furnish economic support. The illegitimate children of a married woman are treated variously; they may cause divorce or they may be accepted by the legal husband.

24. *Extra-marital sex relations*

Extra-marital intercourse of either a married man or married woman is regarded as improper and is typically reacted to by a display of anger by the injured party. How far this anger will go depends upon personalities and circumstances. It may lead to the killing of the unfaithful partner or paramour or his being driven by insults to suicide. Reconciliation

All such relations are taboo. Their legal consequences are the same for an unfaithful husband as for an unfaithful wife, except in some states which judge the wife somewhat more severely. The offended party, if innocent himself, may secure a divorce, but may not use physical violence upon the offenders. In the mores, however, such relations which involve

is usual, however, and no special stigma fastens to the occasional adulterer, though the frequent adulterer may be publicly scorned.

Clandestine adultery is, however, frequent, especially during the absence of the mate. Female adultery is not so readily detected as among civilized groups because an untimely birth is never regarded as evidence thereof.

Extra-marital relations are probably more frequent, and less disapproved, on the part of married men than of married women.

Adultery with a chief's wife is especially desired and especially dangerous.

a married woman are regarded as worse than those involving a married man and an unmarried woman. The man is often excused on the theory of his greater sexual need, whereas the woman is condemned on the theory that her adultery is pure wantonness. A basic motive is the man's fear of having children not his own in the family; a woman has no similar fear in case of her husband's adultery. A man's attitude toward his wife is outwardly more possessive than that of a wife toward her husband. There is also a code of personal "honor" or "respectability" which forces a husband to react dramatically to his wife's adultery regardless of his inner feelings. Meek toleration of it leads to his being held in contempt.

Here, too, a sharp moral line is drawn between completed intercourse and "petting," the latter being tolerated in greater degree in many classes even if extra-marital.

25. *"Promiscuous" classes*

There is no special class of prostitutes, though some men and women are notoriously more promiscuous than others.

There is a recognizable class of women who for financial compensation and at the penalty of social degradation satisfy the purely sexual needs of a much larger number of men. Traditionally these prostitutes are sharply distinguished from "virtuous" married women and virgins, to whom they are socially inferior and yet whom they supposedly help to protect from the excesses of male passion. Yet there are always, and now increasingly so, many women whose concealed sexual life is intermediate between that prescribed by the mores and that which is "promis-

cuous." There are also some male prostitutes.

III. KINSHIP STRUCTURE AND ITS RELATION TO MARITAL STRUCTURE

26. *Endogamy*

Marriages between persons of high and low rank are generally disapproved but not legally forbidden. There are certain despised pariah districts which are endogamous as to the district. Outsiders will not marry into these districts. The highest sub-clan limits its marriages to two or three other sub-clans.

Marriages between persons of high and low rank are usually disapproved by the high-ranking family. Public sentiment regards them with a certain romantic attitude of approval combined with practical disapproval. Marriages between persons of different religions are disapproved by the church authorities and families. The only legally enforceable endogamy, however, is race endogamy, in certain jurisdictions only. Negro-white intermarriages are comparatively rare.

27. *Exogamy*

Marriage with any relative closer than fourth degree (first cousin) is immoral.

Marriage within one's own clan is condemned. Very few cases occur, especially in one particular clan; they are not annulled but regarded with contempt. Marriage within one's own sub-clan is impossible and unrecorded. All persons outside one's own clan, except for the endogamous rules stated above, are permissible mates.

Marriage with any relative closer than the fourth degree (first cousin) is illegal and invalid. Marriage with first cousin is permitted in some jurisdictions but not in others.

Outside the fourth degree there are no rules of kinship exogamy, either legal, religious, or social.

28. *Sib organization*

The whole people is organized into exogamic sibs (clans and sub-clans). Members of one's own clan are regarded as kinsmen. A man uses a different term for a male friend of another clan from the one he uses for a kinsman. His behavior toward women of his own clan is accompa-

There is no sib organization. Maternal and paternal kinsmen are recognized in identical ways, except for the transmission of the family name. Degrees of kinship are matters of purely biological nearness. Beyond the degree of first or second cousin, kinship has no social significance.

nied by much decorum and taboo.

There are four clans. The natives conceive of all human beings and spirits as divided among these four clans. To each clan also belong certain animals, plants, and natural objects. The clans are social rather than religious divisions. Totemic animals are not associated with food taboos.

The sub-clans are more strictly exogamous than the clans. Each sub-clan has a definite rank. Altogether there are five or six categories of rank.

29. *Incest taboos*

Sexual intercourse of a man with a classificatory sister (member of same sub-clan) is immoral, but the taboo is often violated with the help of love magic. The violator may boast of it in certain circles and become the object of envy. Punishment for the act when publicly discovered varies with the conditions. If it provokes sufficient scandal it may lead to suicide of the violator. Commonly it is tolerated quietly. Legally and verbally the act is equivalent to incest with a real sister, but it is not actually *abhorrent.*

The relationship of a boy to his mother is one of affection and bodily contact, which gradually diminishes with age.

Abhorrence attaches to mother-son or father-daughter incest, but these are regarded as unnatural and unlikely. No great psychological conflict seems to occur with reference to them as with reference to brother-

Incest within three degrees of biological kinship is abhorrent. Beyond this degree forbidden sexual relations are immoral rather than abhorrent.

The strictest horror taboo is upon mother-son incest.

sister relations, which carry a much greater horror. To refer to possible mother-incest is only a mild insult bordering upon a joke.

Chief's sons frequently have adulterous relationships with their father's wives other than their own mothers. The reaction varies with circumstances; there is no strong taboo.

It is immoral for a man to have sex relations with his wife's sister, mother, or other near female kin, and also with his brother's wife. These taboos are additional to the general adultery rules and the exogamous rules.

The strictest taboo upon actual sex relationships is the brother-sister taboo. This is a matter of abhorrence, not merely of immorality or illegality. A man must not look at his sister, nor must he know anything about her love affairs or her contemplated marriage. Yet he is her guardian and protector and provides her with food throughout life.

A myth of brother-sister incest is one of the important parts of the tribal mythology. It portrays the incestuous relation as having some innate and secret desirability but always as abhorrent.

To mention the possibility of sex relations with his sister is the second worst insult to a man. To say that he resembles his sister is also a serious insult. To call attention to his resemblance to his brother or other maternal kinsmen is insulting. But it is quite permissible to remark upon resemblances of a person to his father or paternal kinsmen, although there is believed to be no biological connection.

There are no taboos upon affectionate love, and there is some privileged familiarity of social relationships within the family group. The incest horror taboo alone is trusted to prevent these privileged relationships from becoming sexual.

There are psychoanalytic and mythological evidences of a rather general repressed incestuous desire toward parents and siblings of opposite sex. Mother-son incest coupled with son-father hatred is the most typical pattern.

30. *Avoidances and familiarities*

There must be extreme avoidance between brother and sister and special decorum of behavior between persons of the same sub-clan who are of opposite sex.

The relation between a man and his father's sister or the latter's daughter is privileged. It is symbolic of all that is sexually lawful; it permits intercourse, even when the woman is married. The presence of such paternal kinswomen suggests license and calls for sexual joking. One's sister, who suggests the opposite, should never be present at the same time.

The incest taboo is not supported by rules of social avoidance; on the contrary, unusual familiarity of social contact obtains between close relatives, whose sex relations would be incestuous.

There are no privileged familiarities save those of close kinship and of voluntary friendships.

There are no general taboos on the choice of friends. Married persons may have friends of the opposite sex but must avoid all appearance of sexual, romantic, or other love which involves bodily contacts.

31. *Preferential mating*

The levirate and sororate do not exist. The sororate is disapproved.

The marriage of a man with his father's sister's daughter has special social advantages among families of rank and power, and such a marriage is often arranged through infant betrothal. This is the only form of preferential mating and the only ground for parental pre-arrangement of marriage.

There is no levirate or sororate.

There is no preferential mating.

32. *Transmission of names*

The family is matrilineal. A person's full name indicates the name of his (matrilineal) clan, his sex, and certain personal characteristics.

The family is patrilineal. A person's name includes the family name inherited from his father and one or more individual names usually

chosen from a limited stock list. The total number of these personal names is much smaller than of the family names. Some personal names are characteristically male, others female. They have no reference to the characteristics of the person, but are imitative of the names of favored relatives, or quite arbitrarily chosen. These personal names are chosen by parents and usually ritually bestowed soon after birth.

33. *The transmission of property and rank*

A man's property, rights, rank, and duties descend to him from his mother's brother. After maturity he usually goes to live with his maternal kinsmen in their village. Exceptions to this rule are possible only through the personal influence of chiefs, who try to keep their sons with them, and who sometimes secure such a privilege for a son permanently by marrying him to his father's sister's daughter.

All property is transmitted according to the "will" of the deceased, which may be quite arbitrary. If he makes no formal will, property descends to his wife and legitimate children, each child sharing equally.

There are, in the United States, no ranks, titles, or other special privileges which may be inherited. With minor exceptions all property rights refer to material goods and land.

34. *Place of residence*

Marriage is patrilocal though matrilineal. The young man takes his wife to live with him in his own maternal village (not his father's village where he was brought up). Each village consists of: (1) the adult males of a particular sub-clan which owns the village, (2) their wives and younger children who belong to other sub-clans, (3) unmarried, widowed, and divorced women of the owning sub-clan, (4) commoners who claim residence in the village on mythological grounds or as part of hereditary service to the chief.

The husband's occupation is the main determining factor in the location of the new home. He has the right to decide it. In farming communities the new family tends to locate patrilocally more often than matrilocally.

35. *Marriage and property*

The man does not buy his wife. There are mutual wedding gifts, but these exchanges are valued for their own sake, as part of a cultural pattern of reciprocal giving. Economically they tend to cancel. The predominant economic advantage of marriage is meant to be to the man rather than the woman. The compensating advantages to the woman are social; she gets a husband and protector so that she may have children and someone to help care for them.

There is no wife purchase or bride price. The two families contribute gifts to the newly married pair according to their ability. The bridegroom is mainly responsible for accumulating such property as may be desirable at the beginning of marriage; this is his individual rather than his family's responsibility. The bride and her family customarily provide certain kinds of household equipment.

36. *Economic and protective obligations*

A man's economic duties are to his sisters, to whom he carries their food supply even after their marriage. He and his wife in turn are fed by the wife's brothers or male kinsmen.

A husband is responsible for the economic support of his wife and children. Secondary responsibility falls upon other relatives in accordance with their nearness, regardless of whether maternal or paternal. The wife's kinsmen have as much power as the husband's kinsmen.

IV. SOCIAL ROLES AND RELATIONS OF THE SEXES

37. *Sex division of labor*

Exclusively masculine occupations are war, hunting, fishing, canoe building, and overseas expeditions, trade with foreign tribes, wood carving, tailoring their own clothing, heavy garden work, tree tending, timber cutting.

Almost exclusively masculine occupations are the actual fighting in war, police work, seamanship, mining, lumbering, the metal industries, the heavier farm work, preaching, and the law.

Exclusively women's occupations are shellfish collecting, cooking (except on expeditions and on special occasions), water fetching, making mats, amulets, belts, garden weeding, pig tending.

Almost exclusively feminine occupations are most housework, especially cooking, sewing, and laundry, and the care of children.

Both sexes engage in the care of young children, the making of shell

All occupations legally, and the great majority morally, are open to

ornaments, nets, and water vessels.

both sexes, although one sex usually predominates heavily in numbers. Even in the almost exclusively one-sexed occupations, the sex limitation is less sentimentally valued than by most primitive peoples. The entrance of women into highly masculine occupations is resisted because of the chivalric attitude of protecting women from danger or hardship, and also by male jealousy of the increasing freedom of women. The entrance of men into highly feminine occupations is not resisted by the women but regarded as mildly shameful by both sexes.

The work of men is somewhat heavier and more monotonous than that of women.

The work of men is decidedly heavier than that of women, probably equal as regards hours, and greater in interest and excitement.

Women are especially numerous in the lower mental occupations (clerical), in teaching, and nursing. They are relatively few in manual occupations except those in the home or those recently removed from the home to the factory. Women tend to be associated with textiles and foods, men with metals and wood products.

38. *Sex division of property*

Certain kinds of property are peculiarly feminine, such as water vessels and the tools of feminine dressmaking. Weapons, nets, axes, dancing ornaments, canoes, livestock, and real estate are masculine properties. Each uses and repairs his own property in the home; property is not regarded as collective.

No particular kind of property is peculiar to either sex. All property is individual, and acquired through gift, inheritance, or purchase. Most of the household property is practically treated as family collective property although legal title to it is individual.

39. *Rank and power*

Women exercise the same privileges and rituals of rank as do men,

Though there are no legally recognized ranks, social class *prestige* is

such as food taboos, receiving of salutes, wearing of ornaments.

They do not have political power, are never chiefs.

Women are regarded as the progenitors and as the original human beings. It is considered desirable to have a large number of women in the group.

enjoyed by women equally with men.

Women vote and hold some, but relatively few, high offices in government. They are subordinate in *power.*

40. *Personal treatment and conflict*

In personal quarrels physical violence is used by both sexes, women being more often the aggressors. There is no peculiar right of wife beating nor special taboo against it.

The greater physical strength of man is socially institutionalized beyond its actual biological importance. By differential muscular training this becomes further increased. There are taboos against the use of physical force by men upon women, and against heavy physical labor by women. Wife beating is illegal and in most jurisdictions it is a ground for divorce. Husband beating, on the other hand, is regarded humorously.

Neither sex has a superior legal right to use physical violence against the other. All violence by women is regarded as unwomanly, violence by men toward men as natural and manly, but subject to regulation, violence by men toward women as "unchivalrous" and cruel, and as requiring intervention by another man on the woman's behalf.

A man may legally kill his wife for adultery but seldom does. Sometimes he or his kinsmen kill the paramour. He usually becomes reconciled to his wife.

There is no right to kill anyone under any circumstances except in war, legal executions, and in certain self-defense situations.

41. *Domiciliary sex segregation*

There is no general segregation of the sexes in respect to living and sleeping arrangements. It is shameful for a boy and girl to eat together

There is a general, morally imperative, segregation of the sexes as to sleeping rooms from puberty through the rest of life, except for married

before marriage, though not to sleep together. After marriage there is no segregation of the sexes except in certain work activities.

A woman is separated from her husband during the last month of pregnancy and for a time after childbirth, when she lives at her father's or maternal uncle's home. She may not eat with her husband during this period.

couples. There is no sex segregation with respect to eating. It is not immoral or shameful for any male to eat alone with any female.

42. *Sex segregation in play and public activities*

Pre-pubertal boys and girls play together and also in groups of a single sex, according to inclination.

Adolescent youths and girls during the daytime and in public are mostly found in two separate groups.

Segregation of the sexes in leisure and play is greatest between the ages 8 and 15, being less before and after this. At no time is it a rigid and general requirement; it is enforced, however, at certain schools and institutions.

Although certain ceremonies are performed by one sex alone, there are few at which both sexes may not appear together as onlookers. At garden weeding, shellfish collecting, water fetching, and childbirth, men are excluded.

There is no chivalric attitude or idea that women are morally superior, or entitled to more protection than men, except regarding pregnancy and childbirth.

There are practically no ceremonies or public occasions which exclude one sex either as performers or onlookers. There are one-sexed recreational organizations, but these are joined and attended by individual choice.

Women tend to be excused more than men for all crimes except sex violations, for which they are in general punished more severely, by law or by public sentiment.

43. *Inculcation of sex differences*

Sex-personality differences are built up through informal suggestion, but there is no organized formal educational procedure.

Boys and girls now receive about the same basic element of education, but boys are given more training in mechanical arts, girls in textile and culinary arts and care of children. More boys than girls are trained for professions and executive leadership. Subtle and informal pressures are exerted through the whole educational process to mold character to the proper sex-type.

44. *Sex-personality structure*

Men are supposed to have more physical strength and social power, but both sexes have strong sexual desire and love of children. Both have initiative and responsibility, and both have concern for details, and both play esthetic roles, but in different spheres of activity.

Men are supposed to be aggressive, competitive, physically courageous, and governed by reason; women, relatively more docile, sensitive, timid, swayed by emotions, interested in the esthetic and in children, and yet to have lesser sexual needs.

V. AGE GROUPS AND SOCIETAL MAINTENANCE

45. *Responsibility for care of children*

Father and mother both care for children, the father performing many intimate duties.

There is no cruelty toward children, nor infanticide.

A young child is chiefly under the care of its own parents.

The mother gives most of the care to children at all ages. Older boys, however, receive some special attention from the father.

Older children, the father, and female relatives often assist in the care of young children, but their role is secondary to that of the mother. In the business classes special servants and institutions take over some of the work of child care.

46. *Discipline and power*

There is no idea of discipline or child-parent obedience. Either parent or child may strike the other when angry; parents, however, treat the child according to his lesser strength. The idea of deliberate punishment of the child in cold blood is rejected.

The power of parents over children is informal and gradually wanes as the children grow older.

Children are disciplined, and trained with the ideal of absolute obedience to parents. Corporal punishment is used, ideally in cold blood; it must not be excessive or dangerous.

47. *Labor role of children*

Children and adolescents assist abundantly in the work of their elders but without responsibility or com-

Children have minor duties in housework, and at the age of 14 or 16 may go to work outside the home

pulsion. They rest and play when they wish.

to assist in family support. In farm life they assist with considerable responsibility. A sharp ideological line is drawn between work and play; all work is regarded as somewhat distasteful whereas all play tends to be useless for purposes beyond itself.

At maturity one is free to choose his own occupation and place of work.

48. *Education and guidance*

There is no formal education of children by a special class of adults in special places. They learn the customs and practical knowledge of their elders through observation and informal contact.

All children from 7 to 14, and some of those from 2 to 7 and over 14 are educated by a specialist class of adults in special buildings during the greater part of the day. About 24 per cent of the total population are young persons attending school.

Boys and girls are not segregated during education except in certain kinds of schools patronized mainly by the upper classes.

The educational function has been largely taken over from the family and from informal community agencies.

There are magicians and sorcerers, and persons who have visions because of the tasks they have undertaken. These serve as advisers in certain activities.

The schools and some other extra-family institutions do a certain amount of counseling of children and adults, which is made necessary by the extreme complexity of the culture and the wide range of choices and many conflicts. Such counseling is on a common-sense or scientific basis rather than magical. Remnants of magic and supernaturalism, however, still exist and influence the behavior of some parts of the population.

49. *Play of children*

Children have much spontaneous group play and games; they are even

Children give much of their time to play, which is elaborated by many

more independent than American children. They sometimes accompany adults in work expeditions.

artificial toys, imitations of the useful tools and artifacts of the adult world, as well as games.

50. The rituals of maturity

There are no puberty ceremonies.

There are no general puberty ceremonies. There are ceremonies attending the movement of a child through the school system, regardless of age; ceremonies attending the joining of the church, which often occurs about the time of puberty; and ceremonies of social "debut" in the upper classes for girls near the age of 18. Changes of costume occur during early adolescence.

51. Adoption and foster parentage

Adolescents are readily transferred to the homes of kinsmen, and children are so transferred in the case of death of a parent, or if illegitimate. The adoption of a young child by other adults when his parents are living is, however, not usual, since there is a strong personal affection between parents and children.

Adoption and foster parentage are used only for children whose parents are dead or suffer from some economic or social disability. Biological parentage gives a proprietary right and responsibility which is seldom willingly surrendered.

52. Emotional relations of parents and children

Parents have great affection for their children.

The father's affection is particularly notable. The relation of a boy to his father is always friendly and affectionate and without any element of coercion or discipline, whereas the relation of a boy to his maternal uncle is one of duty and obedience.

Parents have affection for their children, variously mingled with a desire to dominate them and to use them for the projection of their own ambitions. The mother's affection is supposedly and probably actually greater. Affection tends to be strongest between parent and child of opposite sex. The boy's attitude toward his father is variously compounded of obedience, admiration, and affection, sometimes combined with a repressed jealousy, hatred, or rebellion. His attitude toward his mother is one of

tender affection. Girls usually do not prefer one parent to the other.

53. *The role of the aged*

There are "honored old men" and "old women" in descending order of respect, the "old woman" being a term of scorn as in some civilized languages. Old age is conceived of as a misadventure and not a natural state, and there are myths of rejuvenation. Old age is regarded as diminishing sex attraction, yet many repulsive old people of both sexes do find sexual partners.

Old age is honored by words and by certain minor courtesies. Yet the general evaluation of it is as something unfortunate and undesirable, which is often a nuisance to the younger. There is great social differentiation in old age. Business-class and intelligent oldsters often increase their power and lose little if anything in general attractiveness; their advice on specialized questions is highly valued; and a very small group of older men constitute the top political and economic leadership. Yet most persons lose influence and general attractiveness after reaching 50 or 60, and tend to become somewhat isolated.

54. *General personality structure and its inculcation*

The Trobriand personality is not built upon moral approval and guilt but through a more spontaneous, natural interaction of old and young, together with fears of magical power. Food taboos, eating in privacy and excretory cleanliness are emphasized. The supreme taboo is that upon the brother-sister relationship; it is enforced by expressions of horror and some physical punishment.

The typical American personality is built upon an internal "conscience," which distinguishes "right" from "wrong," developed from experiences of reward and punishment by the model-setting parent. But later the child transfers his moral loyalty to his age group and then to his ideal "self." Ridicule, disgust, and horror expressions, and corporal punishment are used to inculcate various values. An elaborate development of emotive, evaluative language and of the "preaching" or exhorting type of conversation is used in the process of molding personality.

The chief basic commands are respect for property, cleanliness in regard to excretory functions, restraint

of violence and emotional expression, attention to the uninteresting details of imposed tasks, and avoidance of sexual stimulation. High values are placed upon material comfort, scientific control over nature, competitive acquisition of wealth and power, but violence against persons is condemned. Sex is regarded as a lower order of satisfaction but romantic love, monogamous spousal affection, and affection between parents and children are exalted. There are frequent, and sometimes unconscious, conflicts between love of parents and rebellion against their discipline, between inner hostility and outward kindness to persons, between inward sexuality and outward sexlessness, between inward devotion to a specialized interest and the outward effort to conform and adjust oneself to a complex environment with its frequent and unpredictable demands for attention. These conflicts pervade much of life. A strong sense of moral approval and guilt, instilled by parents and symbolized by an all-righteous, approving, and disapproving God, does much of the work of control, at the expense of much inner freedom and spontaneity. Restraint of emotional expression is required. A certain amount of attention to trivial and artificial amusements is valued and serves as distraction in case of frustration of more serious wishing.

Formal equality of persons on certain levels, such as in voting and judicial procedure, is valued, but in many subtle ways differences of power and privilege are approved. Individuality is outwardly valued, perhaps more than in any other so-

ciety, yet there are also pressures to conform and aggressive urges to compel conformity in others, resulting in much conflict within the personality and within groups.

VI. THE IDEOLOGY AND CONTROL OF REPRODUCTION

55. *The ideology of birth*

These people do not know the relation of sexual intercourse to reproduction. They believe in a spirit world, inhabited by the rejuvenated spirits of the dead. Every newborn child is the reincarnation of one of these spirits, and is brought to its mother by an older, controlling spirit (godfather or godmother) who is identified with some deceased person. The reincarnated person is not identified with a particular deceased person and is assumed to have lost all memory of his past, but he belongs always to the same clan and sub-clan as in his previous existence.

There are no moral ideas of reward or punishment connected with the ideology of reincarnation, nor ceremonies associated with it.

They believe that the penetration of the vagina by some means is an essential condition for pregnancy, but have no idea that male fertilization is necessary. Their myths suppose women to have existed and to have given birth to children before the existence of men.

These people understand the relation of sexual intercourse to reproduction. They believe in a spirit world to which the dead go, but these spirits never return. Every newborn child has a spirit or soul newly created by a personal, anthropomorphic Deity who is ruler of the universe. There is no reincarnation. Personal or family status in the spirit world is unrelated to earthly status.

Their mythology supposes man to have been created prior to woman. Mankind began with a single pair, who were created immortal and without need of sexual function or reproduction. By discovering sexual intercourse this pair became sinful and mortal, thus necessitating the carrying on of the race through biological reproduction.

56. *Contraception, abortion, etc.*

There are no contraceptive methods.

Various methods of preventing pregnancy are used, the only one morally approved by all being ab-

stention from intercourse. But effective contraceptive methods have been recently perfected and are used and approved by roughly a third to two-thirds of the population, particularly the more educated classes. The circulation of contraceptive information, though not immoral, is illegal through certain channels and in certain states.

Abortion is possibly practiced, but rarely. Certain herbs are supposed magically to cause premature birth.

Abortion is common, but is immoral and legally punishable by heavy penalties. It is seldom officially discovered and punished, because of clandestine tolerance.

There is no infanticide. Infants of both sexes are always desired by both parents.

Infanticide is illegal and immoral, without clandestine tolerance; it is a capital offense, like other murder; it rarely occurs.

In general, children are desired, but the attitude is a matter of individual differences. There is some preference for the birth of male children but no emotional preference for either sex after birth.

57. *Intercourse taboos in marriage*

Sexual intercourse is morally condemned during the latter part of pregnancy on the ground of injury to the child; after the birth of each child, until the child can walk, there is a magical belief that it will cause the death of the child.

Otherwise, intercourse is regarded as natural and desirable, and as unrelated to pregnancy.

In conservative mores, sexual intercourse is approved only for reproduction, but these mores have been much liberalized. In most classes now there are no moral taboos regarding the time, amount, or motive of marital intercourse. It is considered somewhat dangerous late in pregnancy.

58. *Pregnancy and birth rituals*

There is an elaborate series of rituals attending pregnancy and childbirth. About the fifth month of the first pregnancy, a long, fiber cloak is

Pregnancy and childbirth involve no ritual, but only a scientific medical procedure. A midwife or a doctor is always called in at childbirth.

ceremoniously put upon the woman and she is attended by public bathing and magical adornment. These ceremonies are performed by women only, maternal kinswomen of her father. The ideology of this ceremony is that it whitens the woman's skin, which symbolizes and encourages the sexual abstinence which she must maintain, even as regards her husband, until the child can walk. About the eighth month of any pregnancy she must go to the house of her father or maternal uncle. Many food taboos are placed upon the pregnant woman.

More recently, childbirth is being transferred to hospitals, and more expert medical assistance is used.

There is a brief ritual at the naming of the child, which ritual, ideologically, dedicates the child to the Deity and improves his status in the spirit world.

VII. LOVE SATISFACTIONS AND FRUSTRATIONS

59. *Sex as a value*

Sex experience in general, apart from the specific taboos, is regarded as inherently desirable for its own sake. Paradise is conceived as a place of free and esthetic sexual life. Considerable time is spent in love-making, and magic is used to assure its success. Skill in sexual intercourse is cultivated.

All sex experience is regarded as a concession to human weakness, as something of a lower order which may be used in the service of higher purposes, but is not inherently valuable. Paradise is non-sexual. The most idealized human experiences are not passionate, although they may involve romantic or tender love. Sexual intercourse itself tends to be brief, lacking in skill, unsatisfying to women, and divorced from the more ideal aspects of love. (This situation is changing.)

Erotic feeling is aroused by various situations and characteristics, mostly related to the opposite sex. These linkages, however, are according to individual experience, discour-

aged by society, and are largely kept concealed within the individual.

60. *Pre-pubertal sex behavior*

Sexual life begins among children of 5 to 10. These play erotic games in mixed groups, and retire in pairs to secluded spots in the bush for love-making to the extent that they are physiologically capable. Adults and parents do not interfere, but are complacently amused. It is not proper, however, for children to carry on these activities in the house.

All sexual behavior on the part of children is prevented by all means at the parents' disposal, although some masturbation and sex play take place in secret. For the sake of prevention it has been usual to cultivate in the child, especially the girl, an attitude of horror or disgust toward all aspects of sex.

61. *Pre-marital sex behavior*

In adolescence both boy and girl typically live through a series of passionate love affairs accompanied by sexual intercourse. These are carried on at first with a great deal of seclusion, but in later adolescence they tend to be more permanent affairs, less concealed, and carried on in the bachelors' quarters. There is no disapproval of these relations; they are sometimes carried on under the parental roof.

Pre-marital intercourse is immoral though not abhorrent. It tends to acquire a forbidden-fruit value like that of intercourse with a classificatory "sister" (member of same subclan) in the Trobriands. Violations are supposedly prevented by the supervision of the girl's parents, the taboo on all-night absence, the general segregation of sleeping rooms, and the taboo upon nudity in the presence of the opposite sex. Being alone together in a sleeping room, or in the nude, or in certain specific costumes, is regarded as presumptive evidence of intercourse, although other situations equally facilitating intercourse are not so regarded.

In certain radical circles pre-marital intercourse is increasingly tolerated; in the more conservative groups the custom of chaperonage is still used to supervise pre-marital interaction. There has been a tendency to use the sex-abhorrence sentiment in girls as a substitute for chaperonage.

A sharp moral distinction is drawn between completed intercourse and all preliminary sexual stimulation and behavior. The taboos upon the latter have relaxed much more than those on the former.

Sexual intercourse with the betrothed partner is less condemned than that with other persons, but is supposed to spoil the romance and to give the marriage a bad emotional start.

Although sexual liaisons become more serious and lasting in later adolescence, both partners continue, however, to indulge in occasional free relations with others, until marriage. These relations with others than the now publicly known partner must be decorous and clandestine. One does not appear in public with, or show unconcealed interest in, other than the recognized partner, and one shows some anger and jealousy at the partner's infidelities. Too frequent infidelity leads to breaking of the engagement.

Tabooed sexual behavior is more severely condemned if it is distributed among several partners than if it is confined to a single illicit partner. Such multiple sex relations are much more severely condemned in girls than in boys. In boys they are secretly admired; in girls regarded as shameful.

62. *Occasions of special erotic license*

Groups of adolescent boys or girls make occasional adventurous expeditions to other villages where they are entertained sexually by the girls or boys of that village. The actual sex relationships are by personal mutual choice and not indiscriminate. Such expeditions commonly lead to jealous quarrels between the boys of the two villages and between boys and their regular partners in each village.

The individual boy, in love with a girl of another village, often goes there alone and by stealth to make

There are no generally recognized times, places, or occasions which permit exceptions to the mores of intercourse. The person rather than the occasion is morally important. There are situations, however, which permit unusual secrecy or anonymity and therefore more violation of taboos. Violations are especially frequent among men traveling away from home, and in large cities generally.

an individual rendezvous with her.

Inter-village sex relationships, established either by group expeditions or individual journeys, often lead to more permanent relationships or marriage.

On festive occasions certain erotic games are played in public by adolescents. At these there is some relaxation of the taboos which conceal amorous behavior.

Dancing is not by couples, and has no amorous significance.

Dancing is by couples and serves as an important erotic stimulus and as a means of social contact between the sexes. It permits a public intimacy of bodily contact not otherwise approved even in private, except between engaged or married couples.

There are no periods or occasions of sexual license participated in by married women, except, reputedly, in certain of the southern islands, where public sexual orgies are said to occur.

63. *Sexual initiative and success*

Overaggressiveness in sex is regarded as contemptible in either man or woman, but especially in woman. Unusual success in love on the part of a man, if not achieved by aggressiveness but by magic and personality, is envied and often leads to the jealousy of other men.

Sexual aggressiveness is regarded as natural in men, shameful in women. Sexual intercourse with a woman by force, against her will, except with a wife, is a major crime.

Success in love affairs is attributed to the use of systems of love magic rather than to personality, ability, or appearance.

Success in love is attributed to beauty in women, to physical strength and somewhat to beauty in men, and to "personality" (attractive behavior) in both.

In all sex relations gifts are given by the man to the woman. In marriage his assistance to his wife and in the care of children is deemed a payment for his sex privileges. Yet sex-

In general, sexual intercourse within and without marriage is regarded as a privilege given to the man by the woman, for which the woman is entitled to economic, social,

ual relations are mutually desired and mutually satisfying. The gifts and services rendered by the man to the woman serve as symbols rather than as economic motives to induce the woman to sex relations.

or other non-sexual compensations. Sexual relations do not yield as much pleasure to the majority of women as they do to men.

64. *Variations of the sexual act*

True sexual perversions, as distinguished from erotic preliminary acts, are rare, and are regarded with amusement rather than horror.

True perversions, found in a small but self-recognizing minority, are regarded by the majority with abhorrence. Variations in the erotic preliminaries of married intercourse have been regarded somewhat disgustedly as perversions, but are coming now to be regarded as legitimate and desirable.

There are defective and unattractive persons, older women, etc., with whom intercourse is regarded as disgusting and impossible.

65. *Sex in the arts*

The sex motive is completely absent in dancing and decorative art. Certain petty arts (making of string figures) are frankly sexual in their symbolism. Several folk tales deal with sexual incidents and some with incest. Art and folklore do not function as sublimations of repressed sex desire in general, but of specific sex repressions such as incest taboos and adultery taboos.

Sex is an important motive in most of the arts, being expressed usually through symbolisms and in terms of its non-physical aspects. Romantic love and parent-child affection are frequent themes. There is little artistic expression of perversions or of incest desires, but much of the desire for the more normal sex and romantic relationships both within and without marriage. Greater freedom to use sex for amusement is allowed on the stage before heterosexual audiences, or in literature, than in heterosexual conversation. (Changing.)

66. *Sexual conversation, information, and symbolization*

There is a great deal of sexual conversation and ribald joking, even where both sexes are present, but

Sex, without personal reference to persons present or their friends, is a common topic of joking among

there are circumstances under which this must be restrained or refined in terms, as in the presence of people of rank. Personal reference to the sex life, licit or illicit, of those present, is usually improper and insulting.

groups of one sex, especially males, and also, with certain conventions of expression, before public audiences. In private mixed groups and unmarried couples sex joking and conversation have been strictly taboo, but this taboo is weakening.

Serious and purposive conversation about the details of sex has been, until recently, avoided, even between mates and between parent and child. Now this is becoming common and approved, but is still limited by taboos upon direct reference to the sex relations of particular persons. It is more or less improper to refer even to the fact of a sexual relationship between two named persons, whether licit or illicit, except where the woman involved is a prostitute or known to be promiscuous, in which case the matter often leads to free and jocular conversation in male groups.

07. *Concealment of amorous behavior*

The act of sexual intercourse is always concealed. The fact thereof is also kept secret except as between unmarried lovers and their regular mistresses. Certain erotic gestures and contacts are permissible in public between unmarried adolescents on certain occasions and in games.

The act of sex is always concealed. But caressing, kissing, and many forms of sexual stimulation are frequently carried on within the sight of others. The essential taboo seems to be upon any exposure of, or verbal reference to, the genital organs or their specific reactions. But a *stimulus* which arouses such reactions is not on that ground taboo, nor is there any taboo upon verbal reference to the erotic feeling if expressed in non-genital terminology. There results a tendency to link eroticism to many indirect stimuli, which both help and hinder normal sex behavior after this becomes legitimate.

It is very shameful for a man and wife to show either erotic or affectionate behavior in public. The man may not even hold his wife's arm while walking with her. The supreme insult to a man is to mention verbally his sexual relations with his wife, although these are wholly proper.

Erotic behavior in public by a married couple is considered as an amusing superfluity but not shameful. Their affectionate behavior is idealized, often photographed, and used as a public symbol of faithful and virtuous love.

68. *Modesty taboos*

The genitals are the central locus of modesty.*

The only everyday clothing worn is a pubic leaf by men and a short grass skirt by women. The removal of these is taboo in public, and normally involves sexual excitement or invitation. There is little variation in the modesty taboos. Men may be completely nude in a male group on a fishing expedition.

Personal beauty is cultivated by both sexes, but it is much used in the interest of economic and superiority motives as well as of sex motives.

The genitals are the central locus of modesty.*

The modesty taboos until recently required the almost complete concealment of the body, but with great variations according to time, place, occasion and fashion. The conflict in women between the desire to be sexually and socially attractive and the desire to avoid the shame of immodesty is a conspicuous and absorbing phenomenon of social interaction. It leads to striking variations of costume and to a most elaborate set of minor rules and taboos of dress. Feminine violations of modesty are stimuli to high emotional excitement, leading to moral condemnation and also to secret envy by other women and to the sexual stimulation of men. Among males the modesty taboos are much more constant. Male violations are regarded not as forbidden fruit, but more as an insult to women and a stimulus to the contempt of other men. The male body is dressed for respectability rather than beauty. Women are attracted by personality, strength, and ability, rather than by the esthetic qualities of men. On the other hand, in women, esthetic attractiveness is

* Not true in all cultures. The exposure of navel, buttocks, mouth, or feet is sometimes equally or more immodest.

the main source of sexual attractiveness, and sexual attractiveness *a* main function of esthetic cultivation.

69. *Role of tender love and affection*

The tender feeling is especially prominent between father and son, and strong between parent and child generally.

Tenderness between brother and sister, as well as sex, is immoral and abhorrent.

The tender feeling is especially prominent in mother toward infant, between mother and son, secondarily between brother and sister, and in any or all heterosexual pairs within the family group. There is also some homosexual tenderness among the female family members, much less among the males. Tender feelings are in general encouraged and idealized. The attitude of a wife toward her husband has been regarded as primarily one of tenderness; that of the husband toward the wife should contain much tenderness but may be more erotic. A change toward equality in this respect is now taking place.

70. *Romantic love*

In adolescence a great deal of excited or romantic love is associated with the sexual affairs. This romantic sentiment is conditioned to unusual situations, tribal festivities, the full of the moon, changes of costume, and perfumes. It is associated mainly with temporary sex relationships.

In adolescence, romantic or rapturous love without eroticism is idealized. Erotic feeling tends to be disapproved in the girl. The romantic attitude, however, is encouraged and idealized in literature. Actually the adolescent tends to experience a series of intense romantic relationships. Ideologically the intensity of the last and permanent affair which leads to marriage is overvalued and the previous relationships are made to suffer by comparison. The individual constructs a rationalization of his past love life which is satisfactory to him and his partner in the present, but which may depart considerably from reality. This rationalization is a compromise between adventure and

wide experience on one hand and the ideal of permanent, exclusive love on the other.

Adventurous and novel situations are important as romantic stimuli.

71. *Friendship*

There are homosexual friendships between boys, expressed by embracing, walking arm in arm, and so forth, with strong personal preferences, often temporary.

Friendships with varying intensities of pleasant feeling are common, principally between persons of the same sex and similar ages. They are expressed by arm and shoulder contact, slapping on the back, especially at younger ages; the more intense ones in girls are called crushes. Some heterosexual friendships are tolerated after marriage but are apt to be regarded with jealousy by the spouse and with disapproval by the community if they become very emotional. Loyalty to a friend commonly takes precedence over civic responsibility.

72. *Hospitality*

There is much friendly visiting in the village street, and parties from other villages sometimes visit and are entertained.

Hospitality is shown by inviting to meals and to recreational affairs in the home of the host or in hotels, theaters, and other establishments. It usually is associated with friendship but sometimes represents only "social obligations" or effort to improve social status or business success.

Sexual hospitality, that is, the willing relinquishment of rights of sexual exclusiveness to visitors, occurs only in the case of unmarried girls, whose lovers permit them to entertain trading expeditions and visitors to a village mortuary wake. There is no sexual hospitality in marriage.

All sexual hospitality is taboo. It is more contemptible to tolerate the illicit intercourse of one's mate or young person under one's control than to commit it oneself. Even when a person tolerates or approves the physical unfaithfulness of his married or unmarried partner, he tends to assume the outward pose of ignorance rather than of knowing permission.

B. BASIC CONCEPTS AND DISTINCTIONS

We have reviewed a long parade of family "phenomena." What is a phenomenon? According to a well-known anecdote in the vernacular, "if you sees thistle growin' beside the road, that ain't no phenomenon; if you hears a canary bird singin', that ain't no phenomenon; if you sees a cow in the field, that ain't no phenomenon either; but if you sees that cow sittin' on that thistle and singin' like a canary bird, that *am* a phenomenon." Of course this popular definition is incorrect in that it refers only to the unusual, in this case the impossible. Phenomena are *the real world as it appears to the senses.*

We have called the things described in this chapter "phenomena" because, relatively speaking, they are things on the level of concrete sense observation rather than of abstraction and reasoning. It may sometimes be fun merely to observe; but our main purpose here is to understand a portion of our world, to manage it in so far as we can, and to manage ourselves in our relations to it. To understand and manage, we must organize the world of phenomena into a world of *concepts.* While avoiding the needless abstractions which make dull reading we must nevertheless learn to think about family life in terms somewhat more generalized and abstract than are used in the foregoing descriptions. The 7 main headings and 72 subheads under which these descriptions were arranged represent concepts.

Whether we deal with raw phenomena or with concepts, all that we find in the book is *words.* Words are one kind—the most common kind—of *symbols.* The things which symbols stand for, whether raw phenomena or concepts, are called their *referents.* Not many of us have been in the Trobriand Islands and personally observed the phenomena referred to in the left-hand columns of words in this chapter. Yet Dr. Malinowski was able to give us through mere words a fairly accurate picture of the life in those islands. When people use words, however, to communicate concepts, the dangers of misunderstanding are much greater than with words which describe concrete phenomena The field of family life is a field especially rife with misunderstanding and controversy. Teachers have lost their jobs and people have been shot for using unfortunate combinations of words referring to family relations.

Hence we may well pause here for a few paragraphs to pay tribute to the new intellectual fashion of *semantics,* which warns us that words are tricky, that they can seldom be defined absolutely but that their

meaning varies with the context. Thus we may inoculate ourselves against needless misunderstandings and controversies. We may do this best not by memorizing precise definitions, but by laying down a mental foundation of a few general concepts which form the basis of modern sociological thinking. The student, presumably, has already acquired this foundation in some degree. Yet it may be well to refresh and to strengthen it by reviewing briefly a few essentials.

1. STATIC AND DYNAMIC. We must always ask ourselves whether we are talking about (*a*) a state of affairs existing at a given instant, (*b*) an *action* or *interaction process* which is going on and which can be described after observing it over a relatively brief period of time, or (*c*) a *change, trend,* or *development* in the state of affairs which is the net result of various, often opposing, processes, and which may not be observable except over a relatively long period of time. Concepts of the (*a*) type are called *static, cross-sectional,* and *structural;* those of (*b*) and (*c*) types are called *dynamic.* Type (*c*) concepts, referring to individuals, are sometimes called *genetic.*

For example, by making an intimate survey of the relations within a group of people at any one time, we may note that a relation of friendship exists between Mary and John. This is a static statement. By watching this relation for a brief period we may note processes of conversation, of mutual lending of property, and of occasional quarreling. These are dynamic concepts of type (*b*); they represent interaction processes. But third, by observing the relation systematically over a still longer period of time, we may notice its gradual change or development into something more intense, called love, or toward increasing unfriendliness and hostility. These are dynamic concepts of type (*c*); they represent change processes.

2. POPULATION AND SOCIETY. We must always ask ourselves whether a statement about people refers to (*a*) all of them, (*b*) some of them, (*c*) the average of them, or (*d*) some group or organization rather than to the persons who compose it; (*a*), (*b*), and (*c*) involve *populational* concepts, (*d*) *societal* concepts. Thus the Rotary Club may be more "active" than a Grange, speaking societally as would be presumed here; yet the individual members of the Grange, speaking populationally, are probably more active on the average than those of the Rotary, because they are farmers whereas the Rotarians sit at desks.

3. BEHAVIOR AND INTERACTION. Closely related to this is the very important distinction between *behavior* and *interaction.* Behavior is said to be the subject matter of psychology, interaction of sociology in its strictest sense. Behavior can be performed only by an indi

vidual. Of course several individuals can behave in the same way at the same time. This may or may not involve interaction. Interaction never refers to the behavior of an individual but to the *relation* between his behavior and the behavior of others. *Quarreling* and *conflict* are interaction concepts. No individual can quarrel by himself, nor can he quarrel with another if the other makes no resistance. When he does succeed in quarreling, the word "quarrel" does not describe his *behavior.* This may consist of fisticuffs, or spoken words, or letter writing. Neither does "quarrel" imply that the two persons are behaving in the same way. They may behave in very different ways. A very successful family quarrel may be conducted by one standing and screaming with rage, and the other coolly sitting in a chair and making sarcastic remarks. "Quarrel" refers to the fact that each intentionally and directly *opposes* the other. E. W. Burgess [1927] has called the family a "unity of interacting personalities." This characterization applies whether the interaction is of the friendly or of the quarrelsome sort.

4. Growth and Learning. There are two types of *change* processes by which human bodies, personalities, and behavior develop. One of these is *growth* or *maturation,* and the other is *learning.* Growth, which is a *biological* process, consists partly in the multiplication of cells and change in the proportion of different kinds of cells. It is still very imperfectly understood. Its character is apparently determined by minute physical or chemical structures which were transmitted in the germ cells from the parents. It is not much affected by the ordinary environmental influences which act upon the individual, but it can be affected considerably by shortages and excesses of certain chemicals in his food over long periods. Yet, although hormones, foods, vitamins or their lack may stunt or distort the growth of a human body, no known treatment applied even to the tiny original bit of protoplasm can change its destiny to become a human being, and make it into a horse or an oak tree. This mysterious process which maintains constancy of form from generation to generation, with only two cells as the bridge between them, has a name—*heredity*—but to name it is not to understand it. There are also the processes of biological *variation* and *mutation,* by which this inherited form very slowly, in the course of thousands of years, changes.

While the body *grows,* the personality *develops,* mainly by the psychological process of *learning.* "Personality growth" is, therefore, a misleading phrase if we use the words in their strictest sense. Learning is the process which changes the minute connections in the nervous

system which determine behavior. It is true that personality development depends in part, especially during the early years, upon the biological maturing of certain organs. Walking, for example, is partly a matter of maturation and partly of learning. The total capacity to learn grows until about the age of fifteen. But the specific patterns of behavior which are developed depend entirely upon the particular circumstances of the learning situations, that is, experiences through which the person lives, and are not predetermined and automatically unfolded as is the gross structure of the body. The "mature personality" is something we hope will develop, not something, like the mature body, which inevitably will develop.

Learning is essentially a process of linking and unlinking of connections in the nervous system. In its simplest form *linkage* is called *conditioning,* illustrated by Pavlov's much discussed experiment with the dog, food, and bell. By repeatedly sounding the bell while food was given, a new link was formed which caused the dog to secrete saliva at the sound of the bell alone, without food. In other situations linkage takes the form of *canalization.* [Murphy *et al.,* 1937, 190.] This is the process by which a general craving, such as hunger or sex, becomes more and more specifically linked or *fixated* to that stimulus which most frequently or adequately satisfies the craving. Thus the infant's hunger responses are inborn, but it takes a certain amount of experience to establish a specific preference for milk; this form of learning is called canalization or fixation.

5. NATURAL AND CULTURAL. Likewise there are two kinds of processes by which social interaction and social relationships may develop and change. First are the *natural* or *subcultural* processes of group formation, group disintegration, competition, division of labor, stratification, social selection, natural conflict, and so on. Second are the *cultural* processes, which consist essentially of imitating, or learning from a model. Thus all groups of animals and human beings naturally develop some kind of leader-follower or domination-submission relation. Some individuals inevitably acquire power, leadership, or prestige over others. Likewise all groups facing a shortage of some essential resource or object necessary to satisfaction will develop competition or conflict within the group or against outsiders. But the specific forms which these relationships take in human society, such as a military formation, a business corporation, competitive "dating" followed by exclusive pairing after betrothal or marriage, "women and children first" in a disaster, and so on, are transmitted by symbols and education from each generation to the next. They are cultural, *cus-*

tomary, institutional, artificial in the broad sense, rather than natural. Those features of group life which would develop spontaneously in any group of human beings thrown together for a time are subcultural or natural; those which develop only among Americans, Russians, Presbyterians, physicians, or some group having a common tradition or model are cultural. The geographic spread of a custom by imitation is called *diffusion;* its transmission from generation to generation is called *tradition.*

It is well to note that "nature" includes not only individual plants, animals, and human beings, but also their relationships and groupings, their societies. "Human nature" is not only what is born in each individual, but also the habits which individuals inevitably and universally acquire from group living. Indeed it has been said that human nature is largely a product of society, and that an individual reared in isolation could not become truly "human." So also the typical pattern of cities, with business at the center and residences toward the periphery, is just as "natural" a development as is the universal pattern of trees with the roots in the ground and the leaves up in the air.

Yet despite all this, there is no natural reason why Trobriand fathers should share with mothers equally the affectionate personal care of the children, while American mothers practice the lion's share of such behavior; no natural reason why New England cities should preserve a park or common at the center while other American cities tend to build their centers solid with high buildings. Such differentiating patterns are part of the traditions of the different peoples, groups, or regions; they are inculcated by elders and followed by each rising generation.

The cultural processes of tradition and diffusion occur not only with patterns of social relationship but also with patterns of individual behavior, and with material constructions and symbol-systems (language, etc.) produced by human behavior. Thus a traveler in Italy and other Mediterranean countries sees working people nearly always carrying burdens on their heads. In Central Europe he sees them carrying burdens upon their backs, walking in a stooped position. Indeed, it is possible, as one travels northward, to see the head-balancing behavior fade out gradually, just as the olive tree and the Italian language fade out, to be replaced by other patterns.

Throughout northern New England a certain type of farmhouse and arrangement of buildings prevails. The local people are wont to ascribe their custom of attaching barns and outbuildings to the dwell-

ing house to the heavy snowfall which makes this arrangement convenient in winter. In other words, they attribute the development of the pattern largely to *natural* processes, i.e., the interaction of thousands of individual farmers with the climatic environment and with their families and neighbors. Yet in upstate New York, where there is an equally great snowfall, the dwelling house is usually of a more symmetrical form with outbuildings at some distance. Therefore cultural processes—differing architectural traditions—must also be recognized in explaining these results. People cannot tell what roles are played by natural and what by cultural processes in their own behavior, until they learn something of other peoples, other places, other traditions.

Cultural processes include *innovation,* or the development of *new* patterns. This is commonly called *invention* when it refers to material construction; but there are also symbolic inventions, social inventions, and ideological inventions. Thus the alphabet, the game of basketball, and the Marxian doctrine of surplus value were innovations, newly invented patterns, just as truly as was the steam engine.

One culture trait may affect another culture trait through natural interaction processes. Thus the automobile is cultural, and the custom of keeping to the right is another cultural trait, developed long before the automobile. The enforcement of this custom through legal penalties and police authority is a further *cultural* development which, however, is a *natural* or *functional* result of the increased volume and speed of traffic produced by the cultural trait of automobiling.

When two similar traits A and A' are invented independently of each other, we speak of parallel invention or *parallelism.* One of the surprising conclusions of modern anthropology is that parallelism is comparatively rare in human history. Cultural diffusion was slow in the prehistoric world, but it was usually fast enough, in important and complex traits, to spread such traits throughout the world before local inventors could originate the trait independently. In simpler traits invented in the very early periods, such as fire making, the bow and arrow, and stone axes, there was probably more parallelism than among the more complex traits.

An interesting controversy exists concerning the origin of the *couvade,* a custom by which the father goes to bed upon the birth of his child, while the mother tries to resume her normal activities immediately. This custom existed in Egypt and the Mediterranean region; it survived until recently among the Basques of the Pyrenees. It has also been found among modern

primitives in Brazil. Outside of these two regions there are few evidences of its existence. [Kroeber, 1923, 194.]

The older, evolutionary school of anthropologists reasoned that the couvade was a "natural" reaction to a certain stage in the development of human knowledge. Namely, when man first discovered the nature of the fatherhood relation, which is not obvious like motherhood, he would experience a sort of surprise. Some primitives, as in Australia, do not yet understand the relation of sexual intercourse to reproduction. When a woman bears a child they claim that this is due to her having visited some sacred spot. The new enlightenment, it is claimed, would naturally lead to some ceremony by which a father would advertise his relationship to a child and establish a claim upon it, and the most natural choice of ceremony would be to imitate the behavior which the mother normally shows on the occasion of the childbirth. This explanation assumes parallelism or independent invention.

The diffusionist school of anthropologists, as typified by Graebner and Elliot Smith, maintains that the couvade was invented only once and hence that its existence in Brazil proves former communication between that region and the Mediterranean. Any such invention, they say, is due to the accidental coincidence of several circumstances, and such a coincidence is not likely to happen more than once in human history. If the result seems natural in the sense that it fulfills a certain purpose, satisfies certain desires, so does the wheel seem a very natural device for transportation. Yet it took ages of human experience before the principle of the wheel was put into application; and throughout America, even in its highest Indian civilizations, it was utterly unknown until Europeans brought it.

Modern anthropologists take a midway position. They believe the couvade could possibly have been invented two or more times independently. At the same time they favor a diffusionist explanation wherever there is no great obstacle to diffusion and the two patterns are similar in details. As to the couvade they still reserve judgment, the decision hanging largely on the possibility of early communication between Brazil and the Mediterranean

There has been a great deal of controversy among sociologists in their efforts to define culture. Some say that culture consists essentially of ideas, and that its material and social elements are merely the products of these ideas. Murdock [1940] summarizes much valuable thinking when he says culture is (1) learned, (2) inculcated, (3) social, (4) ideational, (5) gratifying, (6) adaptive, (7) integrative. The essential difficulty, as it seems to the writer, is that too much time has been spent trying to make a static, phenomenal definition of culture when it is really a *dynamic* concept which ties together the varied meanings. ***Culture is the total, miscellaneous aggregate of the products of human activity and invention which are transmitted and communicated*** to

other human beings and succeeding generations thereof. It therefore includes such diverse phenomena as torpedoes, nursery rhymes, the duel, the city-manager form of government, Gothic architecture, the custom of bundling, monotheism, and terrace agriculture. How are all these things alike? In that they were originated, each at only one or a few places, and from there were diffused widely among human beings, and are not created *de novo* wherever they are needed or found. It is the nature of the process and not of the product which gives unity and sense to the concept of culture.

Is human nature different as between Trobrianders and Americans? Most sociologists substantially agree on the following points. *First,* races and peoples obviously differ in physical characteristics, and probably differ in temperament, that is, in those general characteristics of behavior which depend upon anatomy, gland physiology, blood chemistry, and so on. Such traits as quickness versus slowness, overactivity versus sluggishness, cheerfulness versus sadness, are at least partly *temperamental.* These biological or temperamental differences are partly inherited through the germ plasm. They are partly produced by differences in food, climate, disease and accidents, and other environmental *physical* influences. *Second,* the above-mentioned, inheritable differences have nothing to do with differences in customs, social organization, values, or ways of thinking. All these latter characteristics are, like languages and material tools, *external* to man himself; they are parts of culture or civilization. Any known culture could be practiced by any known race or people. If Trobriand infants could be exchanged at birth for American infants, each would acquire as readily as he does now the habits, customs, beliefs, attitudes, and values of the society in which he is reared, just as he would acquire its language. There would be no inborn tendency to "revert" to the culture of his unknown biological parents.

We may compare a human race to a piano, and its culture to the piece that is played upon it. Pianos, to be sure, differ somewhat in their structure (anatomy). In consequence, they differ also in the quality of sound produced (temperament). But the musical composition (culture) which may be played upon a piano has nothing to do with the quality of the instrument itself. Any composition of the species "Euro-American piano music" can be played upon any normal piano of the species "Euro-American standard piano"; no individual piano within these limits has any special predilection for any special kind of composition.

6. FACTS AND VALUES. Let us consider one more basic conceptual discrimination, and then we shall have a fair working basis for clear thinking. This is the distinction between so-called "facts" and *values*. Years ago the writer, after visiting the Royal Gorge in Colorado, saw a postcard picture of a high suspension bridge across the canyon. He was startled, for he felt sure he had observed all the important points and that no such bridge existed. Then, indeed, he noted more closely the inscription and learned that the picture represented a *projected* bridge. Yet in later years this has become an actuality, and is said to be the highest suspension bridge in the world.

The picture-symbol seen by the writer had no real referent. Alone by itself it was *fiction*. But, coupled with the proper explanation in word-symbols, it referred to a *purpose*. A purpose is not "unreal" except in terms of a specific time, place, or combination of facts. It grows out of real facts. Many such bridges already existed, and Coloradoans felt a need for an additional bridge. Symbols and concepts are essential to purpose, which is therefore uniquely human. Purpose is not a mysterious entity; it is a process of human behavior involving (1) past experience with its satisfactions and dissatisfactions, (2) the conceiving and symbolizing of a goal on the basis of this experience, and (3) behavior guided by this concept and symbol.

Purposes develop out of the feelings and attitudes people have toward things which already exist. When any kind of phenomenon or aspect of the real world is regarded as desirable, when people try to repeat, continue, or increase their experiencing of this aspect of reality, they are said to hold it as a *value*. Values are thus purposes stated in somewhat general terms so as to include the desiring, approving, preferring attitudes toward existing realities, as well as the attempt to create a new specific embodiment of the value. Thus great engineering achievements in general are highly valued in American society as they were in ancient Roman society on a lower technological level.

Just as it made a tremendous difference in meaning to insert the word "projected" on the postcard mentioned above, so it is important in all discussion to make clear what is factual, already existent, and what is desired, valued, or projected. Ordinary language fails to make this distinction sufficiently emphatic. Thus "beautiful woman" is the same form of speech (noun with modifying adjective) as "tall woman." Yet these phrases play unsuspectedly different roles in our communication. "Tall" is what the semanticians call a *referential* word [Walpole, 40]: it refers to an objective characteristic which could be measured or otherwise agreed upon by all observers. It is *descriptive*. But

"beautiful" tells us nothing definite about the woman. It is not descriptive. It tells us about the feelings of those who observe the woman. It tells us that they are pleased to look at her and feel that her appearance, whatever it may be descriptively, belongs to the class of appearances which they have learned to regard as desirable to the eye. "Beautiful" is an *emotive* or *evaluative* word. Other observers might with equal truth say "ugly." A native of Tibet is reported as saying:

> Westerners are not good looking, according to our standards. Your noses are too big and often stick out like kettle spouts; your ears too large, like the pig's ears; your eyes blue, like children's marbles; your eyesockets are too deep and eyebrows too prominent, too simian.*

Yet these differences in values do not justify the common misconception that values are outside the realm of scientific inquiry and treatment, an idea commonly expressed by saying that values are "subjective." That Americans hold certain values and Tibetans others, is a fact, and all such facts *about* human values may and should be studied like any other facts. Indeed they deserve vastly more scientific attention than they have received.

Any part of the phenomenal or conceptual world can be made a purpose or value. Some values are peculiar to individual persons; others are common within groups; still others within whole societies.

Every one of our 72 items of family phenomena is related to some *need.* It *serves* that need; in other words, it has a *function.* Its function may be something rather close to ultimate human-satisfactions, as is item 70, "romantic love." There is no need to explain why people need romantic love. But let us consider item 67, "concealment of amorous behavior." Does this serve a need *in this same sense?* The answer is no, but it must be qualified.

This concealment serves a *societal* need. If amorous behavior were not concealed it would often, in many societies, lead to outbreaks of fighting and rivalry between males who saw one another making love to females, or it might lead to "wasting" time by spectators who need to be about their business in other spheres of life. Of course, which if either of these things is true depends on the given culture and situation. But whatever the function of "concealment," it *indirectly* affects individual human beings. Individuals might suffer, or die, or fail to be born, as a result of some failure to satisfy a societal need. In gen-

* Joseph K. Folsom, *Culture and Social Progress,* Longmans, Green and Co., 1928, p. 164.

eral we may say that traits like 67 have societal functions rather than that they *directly* satisfy human needs. These functions may sometimes be to serve the purposes of *other institutions,* and thereby ultimately serve *people.* Societal functions are instrumental in satisfying human needs.

But there is still more to the story. "Concealment of amorous behavior" may also be felt by the individuals directly concerned as a necessity without which all love-making is unsatisfying. How do they come to feel this way, when nothing in nature dictates it? If and when they do, it is because their feelings have been so conditioned, either in the process of inculcation of culture by their elders or through a personal train of experiences. In other words, they have come to accept either a *cultural* or *personal value* to the effect that concealed love-making is more desirable than exhibited love-making. But this value is not equally strong in all cultures and seems to be absent in some individuals.

Hence item 67 may not only have a societal function or be an instrument or means to an end; it may also become a value in itself, either culturally or to a given person.

Let us use the word "value" whenever we are talking about an *object of a self-approved desire which is sufficiently specific to have alternatives or substitutes, and which sometimes must be chosen at the cost of those alternatives.** [Folsom, 1937.] This definition will rule out neurotic needs, such as that for opium or overeating, which the subject himself wishes to get rid of, and it will rule out such categories as "food," "shelter," "love," and so on, which are so general as to be universal needs; it will rule out those things that are always "free goods," like the air. On the other hand, it will include desires which a person approves in himself even though they violate his culture. Values are most readily detected, and in a rough sense measured, when they can be compared with coordinate values; that is, when a choice, actual or hypothetical, is made.

CULTURAL VALUES AND IDEOLOGIES. Ruth Benedict [1934] says that many cultures have characteristic patterns which are oriented toward certain goal concepts or values. In order to explore these cultural values more widely, the author made a very rough list of some forty characterizations of various cultures which seemed to fit Professor Benedict's concept. A few are quoted below. They are not to be regarded by any means as complete characterizations of the cultures

* Yet a value is usually a concept which is sufficiently general to incorporate several specific purposes or objects.

to which they refer. They are flashes of insight by trained observers, and their adequacy will need to be tested by systematic methods.

Pueblo Indians—no place to heroism and man's will to overcome obstacles. A civilization whose forms are dictated by the typical choices of the Apollonian, all of whose delight is in formality and whose way of life is the way of measure and sobriety. [Benedict, 1934, 129.]

Dobu—lives out without repression man's worst nightmares of the ill-will of the universe and, according to his view of life, Virtue consists in selecting a victim upon whom he can vent the malignancy he attributes alike to human society and to the powers of nature. All existence appears to him as a cut-throat struggle. [Benedict, 1934, 172.]

France—clarity, lucid systematization, balance, care in choice of means, and good taste. The weaker side: overmechanization, the emotional timidity or shallowness, the exaggeration of manner at the expense of content. [Sapir, 1924, 407.]

Russia—the tendency to see and think of human beings not as representatives of types, not as creatures that appear eternally clothed in the garments of civilization, but as stark human beings existing primarily in and for themselves; the curious readiness of the Russian to ignore all the institutional barriers which separate man from man; on its weaker side a personal irresponsibility that harbors no insincerity—personality runs riot in its morbid moments of play with crime, in its depressions and apathies, in its generous enthusiasms and idealisms. For his environment, including in that term all the machinery of civilization, the Russian has generally not a little contempt. [Sapir, 1924, 407.]

China—the tremendous, life-long moral authority accorded to parents, and the associated worship of ancestors; the unusual respect and rewards for learning; a professed contempt for war and emotional activity; aversion for mythological and metaphysical, scientific, or any other sort of speculation, and coupled therewith an unflagging interest in practical ethics, in the cultivation of character, in the finer shapings of the relations of individuals. These and other leanings endow Chinese civilization with something persistently idiomatic, with a quality of coherent originality. [Kroeber, 1923, 466.]

Ireland—Irish attachment to the soil was a very particular place attachment rather than a preference for a rural way of life. The Irish were ready to launch into a rhapsody about their home—where you could look out onto the River Shannon itself, and you standing in the door of the house! [Ware, 216.]

These value-patterns merge into general *ideologies* which include both values and factual concepts. The following are illustrative.

> He [Spengler] distinguishes two great destiny ideas: the Apollonian of the classical world and the Faustian of the modern world. Apollonian

man conceived of his soul "as a cosmos ordered in a group of excellent parts." There was no place in his universe for will, and conflict was an evil which his philosophy decried. The idea of an inward development of the personality was alien to him, and he saw life as under the shadow of catastrophe always brutally threatening from the outside. His tragic climaxes were wanton destructions of the pleasant landscape of normal existence. The same event might have befallen another individual in the same way and with the same results.

On the other hand, the Faustian's picture of himself is as a force endlessly combating obstacles. His version of the course of individual life is that of an inner development, and the catastrophes of existence come as the inevitable culmination of his past choices and experiences. Conflict is the essence of existence. Without it personal life has no meaning, and only the more superficial values of existence can be attained. Faustian man longs for the infinite, and his art attempts to reach out toward it. Faustian and Apollonian are opposed interpretations of existence, and the values that arise in the one are alien and trivial to the other.

The civilization of the classical world was built upon the Apollonian view of life, and the modern world has been working out in all its institutions the implications of the Faustian view. Spengler glances aside also at the Egyptian idea, "which saw itself as moving down a narrow and inexorably prescribed life-path to come at last before the judges of the dead," and at the Magian with its strict dualism of body and soul.*

Linton points out [Kardiner] that there have been three great ways of thinking by which scholars have attempted to discover or set forth the integral unity and "meaning" of culture. *First,* there is the idea of the functionalist school, that every part of culture is interdependent with the rest, so that changes in any part must have adaptive effects elsewhere. This school, represented by Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown [1922], gives us a picture of a culture as a functioning whole, whose parts are nicely geared together but whose vicissitudes and changes are determined in a kind of mechanical trial-error fashion without "meaning." *Second,* there is the "pattern of culture" idea of Ruth Benedict (with similar ideas of Sapir) which portrays each culture as dominated by a special attitude or value, commonly related to some aspect of human emotions or behavior. This thought way seems to apply very well to some cultures, but Linton doubts whether all cultures have such outstanding and specialized goals. The *third* idea, presented by Kardiner and Linton, is that each culture through its primary institutions or folkways gives rise to a certain *basic personality*

* Ruth Benedict, *Patterns of Culture,* Houghton Mifflin Co., 1934, pp. 53–54. By permission.

structure which characterizes practically all the individuals living under it. This basic personality or ego structure is not necessarily built around a single and definite and positive purpose, but consists partly of a pattern of reaction to the frustration of purposes, arising from several causes in the culture. As Linton says, this approach provides "a logical place for cultures which are not dominated by an *idée fixe.*" Such cultures often seem to have pluralistic ethics, often with conflict between different values. For illustration we may take the description given above of the typical American personality (subheading 54). Not a single goal, but several, with typical conflicts within the individual personality, are characteristic.

Values cannot only be studied as facts, but they can also be evaluated in terms of higher values. We may and do choose our values, and whatever comports with our chosen values is "right" and "good." But since mankind, with increasing factual knowledge, seems to have been gradually approaching a super-scheme of values which we call the "democratic way of life," it is "scientific" not only to study the means of realizing particular purposes but also to study what secondary values are consistent, and what inconsistent, with the major scheme.

Chapter II

A WORLD SURVEY OF FAMILY PATTERNS

ADVANTAGES IN THE STUDY OF ALIEN FAMILY PATTERNS. The study of the family systems of other peoples has only an indirect value in understanding our present family system, in adjusting ourselves or friends to this system, or in predicting its future. But this indirect usefulness may be greater than the formerly supposed direct values. *First,* we learn the *how* of social processes as distinguished from the *what, where,* or *when,* and acquire a certain inoculation of the mind against fallacies.

The more we study the facts, the less we can see any grand scheme of evolution of the family system. But at the same time we gain an insight into the *ways in which changes occur.* We thereby become able to make somewhat better than a fifty-fifty guess as to what the next change may be. If we can visualize more clearly the next step forward, even though we do not see the distant goal, science will not have been in vain. That seeming clear vision of the whole road behind and ahead, which the older philosophies gave us, was but a mirage. We give up this whole system of false knowledge; in return we gain a few fragments of real knowledge.

Second, the ethnological study of the family gives us a feeling for the limits of variation of human family patterns. We become better able to distinguish myths and absurd predictions from possible realities. To use an analogy, there are many strange forms of animal life. How, then, can we be reasonably sure that centaurs and three-headed elephants never existed or never will exist? Not by deductive reasoning, but by inductive knowledge of the animals which have been actually observed. This concrete experience gives us some idea of the limits of biological possibility. Similarly, a wide acquaintance with actual cultures gives us a sense of the subcultural limits of cultural possibility.

Third, this ethnological study gives us a rich perspective of the possibilities of human relationships. We are released from the social

fatalism which beset the earlier sociological thinking of the Western world. Rigid thought patterns such as "it *must* be either . . . or," "if you have this, then this must follow," are given a good shaking up. When we see our own culture changing and see interested groups trying to change it in particular directions, we begin to believe that perhaps after all it is possible for man to mold his culture creatively rather than merely to let it drift. With a rich mental panorama of the varied institutions found through the wide world, we are better equipped to participate creatively amid the confusion of modern society.

Among the pitfalls we may hope to escape is the "psychologizing fallacy." The ethnologically unsophisticated person will tend to regard any custom of his people as springing from inevitable laws of human nature. This sense of inevitability and naturalness attaches to customs which are peculiar to one's own society, as well as to customs which are nearly universal among mankind.

Psychological reasoning, or "psychologizing," about culture is the practice of interpreting alien customs (behavior and social relationships) in terms of our own cultural sentiments or values, which we naively assume to be universal. [Lowie, 1925, 93.]

An American audience witnessed a presentation of an ancient Hindu play, the Svapnavasavadatta of Bhasa. Here the king, after mourning his supposedly deceased wife, marries a second wife through whom a valuable political connection is obtained. Then his first wife reappears and confronts him in the presence of the second. The Western audience, although familiar with the cold fact that bigamy is permissible, did not expect such a solution under these very realistically portrayed circumstances, so appealing to its own cultural sentiments. Certainly such a fine king, who so tenderly and sincerely mourned his beloved wife, could not submit her to such an ignominious role. Certainly one of these women will withdraw from the picture. The first will commit suicide, or depart, or the second will abdicate. The obviously high character of both calls for some such noble resignation. Again, one thinks there may be a fight. The drama has been so far peaceful, but there lurk in it the germs of conflict. The situation, for example, has been secretly "framed up" by the Prime Minister for political advantage and maybe vengeance is going to fall upon him. It is quite consistent with Western nobility of character to fight under such conditions. One's honor requires it. The last solution one dreams of is a happy bigamy. In the absence of cultural values it is, of course, the simplest and least painful solution. But the Western values make it emotionally impossible and grotesque. Yet it is exactly the solution which occurs. It occurs quickly, easily, without conflict, and results in the unmitigated joy of all parties.

The audience gasped with surprise. It was already familiar with Oriental polygamy *as a custom.*. But it had imagined this custom to be correlated with the feelings which Americans would have if *they* tried to practice polygamy. It had imagined polygamy to involve a more or less constant strain of jealousy, requiring some special taboos or conventions to control this jealousy. It had imagined the polygamy to be associated with a certain male harshness and sexuality, militating against the more ideal and tender feelings known in Western marriage; it vaguely hoped that the "higher type" of Oriental man would avoid the custom. But now some of the audience learned for the first time what polygamy means in Oriental feelings. They acquired *empathy,* or emotional insight, into what they had known only objectively.

To say that psychology does not explain the family pattern is not to deny that this pattern has its psychology. That is, there are always strong feelings tied up with the social relationships of the family. But these feelings adjust themselves to whatever pattern the social structure may take, within certain wide subcultural limits. The child is brought up expecting to experience certain feelings toward the several persons in his environment. In perhaps nine cases out of ten, he develops the feelings he is supposed to develop, and looks upon them as part of the order of nature.

Another fallacy may be abetted even by those in command of the ethnological evidence. This is to draw sweeping conclusions concerning "human nature" from *majority* practice as disclosed by ethnological surveys such as that made by Hobhouse and colleagues [1930].

Even if a very small minority of small tribes stands as an exception to some widespread pattern of human behavior or interaction, such a pattern loses its claim to universality and hence to a certain subcultural imperativeness which might otherwise be attributed to it. If a given pattern is followed by the great majority of *peoples,* we may indeed argue that this pattern represents a better adjustment *under most conditions.* But we cannot argue that the rare alternative patterns are psychologically abnormal, that those tribes which practice them are "queer," "degenerate," or "pathological." Some individuals in every society may be insane, but no *whole society* is insane, even if it is composed of only a hundred individuals.*

A third fallacy to be avoided is that of accepting the description of family life in the upper class of a given society as typical of the whole society. This fallacy is more likely to arise in the study of the history

* The "society" at a state hospital for mental patients is composed of persons deliberately segregated because of their insanity; it is not a society in this sense.

and social life of civilized peoples. The competent anthropologist who investigates the primitive tribe observes it at all social levels, if there be such. So, also, does the competent sociologist dealing with modern society as, for example, the Lynds in their study of *Middletown* [1929].

Whenever, for example, the typical family is described as having several servants, we may suspect it is merely an upper-class family. These servants have their family life too. Some of the glorification of "good families" and "the best things in life" in our own history is based upon pictures which represent really not typical *families,* but feudal or other *communities* centering about the estate of a nobleman or some high-placed person.

In the remainder of this chapter we shall be making a very incomplete survey of some of the significant and interesting patterns which have been found among primitive societies, following the general classification used in Chapter I.

I. SPATIAL AND MATERIAL PATTERNS. Under this heading we discuss the ecological arrangements and economic life related to family living, rather than the human relations of the family. These material-spatial patterns are largely determined by the technology used by the society and the character of the physical environment. Societies without machines cannot have cities, and peoples of arid highlands cannot spend much of their time fishing and navigating birch-bark canoes. Yet within the limits of nature and technology, culture may have wide variations and the choice among possibilities may be dictated by ignorance and by chance origins. For example, the Hopi and Navaho Indians in our Southwest have long lived in the same environment. Yet the Hopi build adobe houses of several stories like apartment houses; they live by agriculture; they are strictly monogamous; they have their men do the spinning and weaving. The Navaho, on the other hand, live in conical, one-room huts of boughs covered with sticks, grass, and earth; they get their living largely from grazing sheep; they permit polygamy; they assign the spinning and weaving to women. [Lowie, 1917, 45, 59, 61.]

The common pattern of dwelling and sleeping in family homes has many exceptions. In the Oceanic region the men's house is a common phenomenon. In the Banks Islands men neither eat nor sleep with their wives but in a separate club house, to which boys try to gain entrance at the earliest opportunity. [Lowie, 1925, 275.] Among the Masai the bachelors with girl paramours live in a kraal, separate from the area inhabited by married couples.

Most primitive peoples live in villages or compact settlements whose shape depends partly on the character of the terrain. Thus they may be arranged close to the water's edge, as among the Manus. [Mead, M., 1930.] The farm pattern, in which each family lives upon a large, solid block of land which it owns and cultivates, and therefore lives at a considerable distance from other families, is rare among primitives and also among Old World peasants. Village shapes are sometimes cultural rather than natural patterns. This generalization comes from observation of European agricultural villages, which are seen in three distinct types: the long-street village, the circular village, and the irregular or "heap" village. [Husek, 1918.]

Both the single-family dwelling and buildings of the apartment house pattern are found among primitives. Characteristic of primitive societies generally is the small amount of interior space per person. A primitive dwelling makes our worst housing conditions appear like luxury. But it must be remembered that primitives spend much of their time in physical activity out of doors. The variety of forms and materials of dwelling houses sweep a wide range. There are boxes, domes, cones, terraced structures and other forms.

II. THE STRUCTURE OF MARITAL AND SEXUAL RELATIONSHIPS. Under this heading we consider the nature of marriage as a status and the various social schemes of marital and sexual relationships.

POLYGAMY AND MONOGAMY. Polygamy means plural mating and includes *polyandry, polygyny,* and *group marriage* (a rare phenomenon).

Polyandry, or plurality of husbands, as a pattern of legal marriage is comparatively rare. Hobhouse, Wheeler, and Ginsberg found it in only 31 tribes, as against 378½ for polygyny and 66 for absolute monogamy.* Polyandry would seem, deductively, to be correlated with a high sex ratio. Among the Todas, one of the best-known polyandrous people, it is. Actual censuses showed from 127 to 259 men for every 100 women, varying with the particular group studied. This high sex ratio was maintained by the practice of female infanticide. As this custom decreased under white influence, the sex ratio dropped from 140.6 in 1871 to 127.4 in 1901. [Lowie, 1925, 46.] According to earlier theories, this female infanticide is usually a result of poverty. The idea is that on the very margin of existence a male has a somewhat better chance of keeping alive and of aiding the group to keep

* The method of these authors was to tabulate apparent facts gathered from descriptions of varying degrees of thoroughness and accuracy of some 500 primitive peoples.

alive than a female has. The tribe, realizing this, kills some of its girl babies. This *a priori* assumption is itself a debatable one. But, furthermore, among the Todas, there is no evidence of such economic necessity. They are no nearer starvation than many other tribes to whom female infanticide is anathema. They are a pastoral people, and pastoral people usually practice polygyny!

Polyandry also occurs among the agricultural, but not the nomadic, Tibetans. But these people do not practice female infanticide, except where they have been influenced by the nearby Chinese. Yet these Chinese who practice female infanticide are never polyandrous but have a certain amount of polygyny. The expected correlation does not hold in these cases. All we can say is that polyandry *would be naturally favored* by a high sex ratio and polygyny by a low sex ratio, if all other forces were eliminated.

If the sex ratio were the main *cause* of the numerical pattern of mating, then a change in the sex ratio should produce an appropriate change in that pattern. What happened, then, when the Toda sex ratio dropped as a result of their discontinuing the killing of girl babies? We might expect there would be less polyandry and more monogamy as the sexes became more equal. *Some* change had to take place. The one that did take place was this: where formerly three brothers shared one wife, now the three brothers tend to share two wives! Instead of adopting more monogamy they have taken to a form of *group marriage* in which the multiple-husband pattern still prevails. [Lowie, 1925, 46.] This pattern had evidently been a *value,* as monogamy is a value with us, and as such persisted long after the external conditions favoring it had changed.

Thus it is reasonable to suppose that polyandry is often the *cause* of female infanticide and a high sex ratio, rather than a result. There is no single, universal cause. In Tibet, the evidence suggests that the desire to transmit an estate undivided, instead of dividing it among several male heirs, had something to do with it. The property-inheritance system is sometimes a result and sometimes a cause of the mating pattern.

Polygyny (plurality of wives) is very common but is seldom practiced by more than a minority of the men in a group. Among the reindeer Koryak, Jochelson [1908] found that only 6 per cent of the men had two or more wives each, and a single one had three. In Kulp's [1925] Chinese village only 14 out of the 182 families were polygynous. Statistical evidence from most polygynous peoples is lacking, but it is reasonable to suppose that there have been occasional times and places

where excessive warfare and captured women made it possible for a majority of the men to be polygynous.

Polygyny may be the cause or the result of a low sex ratio, or it may be carried on *in spite* of a high sex ratio, as a result of other causes. It has been held that when peoples change from a hunting to a pastoral mode of life they change from polyandry or monogamy to polygyny. The old theory was that man has a greater advantage than woman in a pastoral society because only he can handle the cattle. Women can perform equally well in gardening and root gathering, which require no rapid movement, but man is biologically more mobile and hence better able to control animals. In a pastoral society animals are the chief source of food, as they are not in most other cultures; therefore man becomes the chief provider. The chief provider is able to dominate. So man got the habit of dominating woman, and therefore could compel her to accept polygyny. The frequent amassing of large wealth in the form of cattle further promoted this polygynous tendency. It was possible to support more than one wife.

Moreover, herdsmen, being nomadic and having their chief property on hoofs instead of in barns, have an advantage in attacking an agricultural people. The history of the desert borders is a history of periodic raids by nomadic herdsmen upon peaceful villages. The village is seldom altogether destroyed; the herdsman simply robs the villager of stored-up food and gets away. The villager cannot retaliate, except when his culture develops to a much higher degree than that of the nomad. Only then can he sally forth and "clean up" the desert, as the French did in Africa. In nomad raids it is possible to carry off women as well as food, so the powerful pastoral group gratifies its polygynous appetite and becomes further wedded to the custom.

So, at least, runs the common theory, which attempts to explain this culture trait, polygyny, in terms of environment, natural interaction, and *other* culture traits. But the modern culture-minded sociologist is seldom entirely satisfied with such natural or functional explanations. He wishes to know more about the geographic distribution of the particular trait he is trying to explain, and about its history in the particular culture.

It is a great error to suppose that the chief motive of polygyny is always sexual and its chief difficulty is always sexual jealousy. The Kikuyu wife asks, "Why do you not buy another wife?" An Athabaskan chief may have several wives whom he uses chiefly to transport goods. A Kai chief's wife welcomes a second wife to help her perform

her social obligations; and sexual desire can be so easily gratified outside marriage that it by itself furnishes no incentive to polygyny. One of the commonest motives is the desire for more offspring, or the barrenness of the first wife. [Lowie, 1925, 43.]

THE METHODS OF SECURING A MATE. Hobhouse, Wheeler, and Ginsberg found by their statistical method that in 70 per cent of all tribes (numbering 434 altogether) marriage involves some consideration given for the bride, either in the form of true purchase, gifts, a period of service rendered by the bridegroom to the bride's family, or of another bride, secured by the bridegroom's family for some member of the first bride's family. The tendency to give consideration for the bride increases as we go up the cultural scale.* It is present in about 60 per cent of the lower tribes and 80 per cent of the higher. Bride purchase, which is one of the forms of "consideration," increases from, roughly, 25 per cent in the lowest to 70 per cent in the highest, and shows some correlation with pastoral culture. It is most frequent in the two pastoral groups and in the highest agricultural group. Wife capture, on the other hand, is frequent only with the lower hunters, about a fourth of which practice it. On all the higher levels of culture it is of negligible frequency, occurring only in about 9 per cent of all tribes. [Hobhouse *et al.*, 1930, 154.]

The same investigators also ascertained whether the consent of the bride to her marriage is or is not required: for 103 tribes the data yielded a definite positive answer, for 81½ a negative one. There is a definite correlation with economic culture. A considerable majority of agricultural peoples require consent; a considerable majority of hunting and also of pastoral tribes do not.

Several methods of acquiring a mate may be possible in the same tribe. Lowie says:

> A Crow may get a wife by buying one or by inheriting his brother's widow, he may enter an alliance of love without payment or legitimately acquire additional spouses through the sororate after purchasing the eldest daughter in the family, or capture an alien woman in an attack on a Dakota camp, or under special conditions legitimately take away a tribesman's wife if she has previously been his mistress.†

The buying of a bride with money or service is, however, a form which may harbor very different meanings. In some instances the bride's kin provide a dowry which is greater than the bride price. In

* "Higher" cultures mean here the more complex, technologically advanced.

† R. H. Lowie, *Primitive Society*, Liveright, 1925, p. 25. By permission.

such instances it is more reasonable to hold that it is the bridegroom who is purchased. In the majority of peoples, however, the net economic payment seems to be from the man's to the woman's family; this may reflect the natural fact of man's greater aggressiveness. Among the Thonga, when a family buys a bride for its young man, paying in cattle and hoes, the bride price is supposed to pay not only for the woman but for her offspring. If she dies childless, her husband's family may reclaim the bride price; if he fails to pay the price, her children belong to her family. Again, if his wife elopes, he may claim as a substitute a bride whom the other family may have bought for its son. But among the Kai peoples of New Guinea, though a bride price may have been paid, the wife owns her own property and her children, and the husband must pay her family if he breaks her pottery. He must also do an equivalent amount of work in return for his wife's economic services. [Lowie, 1925, 21, 26.]

THE STABILITY OF MARRIAGE. Hobhouse, Wheeler, and Ginsberg found marriage indissoluble in only 4 per cent of tribes (271½ tribes giving information). In 48 per cent divorce is so easy that these authors regard it as obtainable "at will" by either party or by mutual consent. In 23 per cent it is reported to be at the will of the husband only. In 24 per cent divorce is allowed only under conditions such as infidelity, desertion, cruelty, or barrenness. The conditions may be different for the two parties, but neither is free to divorce at his or her own will. Divorce at will of wife only is practically non-existent. Only two tribes are mentioned as having such a pattern. Superficially it appears that in 70 per cent of all primitive tribes divorce is a matter of personal discretion, either of the husband or both parties, and in 30 per cent of the cases it is subject to specified conditions. It is often impossible to judge the real situation from the data given. Even where divorce is said to be at will, public opinion may keep divorces to a low figure. To say that a person may do something "at will" may mean merely that there is no standardized formal penalty for doing it. But there may be a very real penalty.

Lowie says [1925, 69] "that while the primitive family is not nearly so loose a unit as the theoretical power to divorce might suggest it is nevertheless on the whole considerably looser than our own . . . its instability diminishes markedly after the first years of matrimony." Hobhouse, Wheeler, and Ginsberg find no correlation between the stability of marriage and either the degree of advancement or the kind of economic culture.

EXTRA-MARITAL SEX RELATIONS. In no people is sexual intercourse in practice confined exclusively to marriage. There are wide differences as to the extent and the toleration of extra-marital intercourse. Generally speaking, it is tolerated before marriage more freely than afterwards. Hobhouse, Wheeler, and Ginsberg, counting all the tribes for which information on this point was obtainable, classed 56½ as condemning and 67½ as condoning pre-marital unchastity. They do not give comparable figures for adultery, but found that in 48½ out of some 500 tribes there was public punishment for adultery. The sentiment which permits a husband to punish his wife privately for adultery, in some cases even by death, is much more widespread than is this public punishment. The above investigators found 41½ tribes in which there was some wife lending or exchange, including sexual hospitality, and 8 tribes having "ceremonial unchastity." In general they found "unchastity" to be more frequent in the hunting cultures than in the pastoral or agricultural [1930, 167].

It is difficult to say what unchastity means when the term is applied to a culture radically different from our own. Thus in speaking of polygyny we do not say that it is unchaste because we recognize that it is fully approved by the society which practices it. Yet among many peoples pre-marital sex relations are no more disapproved than is polygyny. Again, whereas our culture makes a sharp moral discrimination between marital and extra-marital relations, other cultures often make discriminations within the extra-marital sphere which seem as important to them as our standards do to us. For example, a Crow Indian belonging to one of two rival military organizations may, during a limited period at the beginning of each spring, steal the wife of a member of the other organization, *provided* that he was formerly on terms of intimacy with that woman. [Lowie, 1925, 25.]

The Chuckchi are reputed to practice sexual communism. Closer investigation shows that the Chuckchi "promiscuity" relates to small groups of not over ten men each, who agree to share wives in common. However, no two members of such a group belong to the same camp. The motive is evidently to provide sexual satisfaction when a man is away from home, and a man rarely has opportunity to exercise his potential rights. Furthermore, bachelors, who would seem to need such a privilege more than married men, are rarely admitted to such agreements, probably because they have nothing to contribute in return. Again, brothers do not enter into such agreements with one another. It is apparent that such a custom, limited as it is, does

not destroy the essential fact of individual marriage, and the basic *principle* of sexual exclusiveness in marriage. That such a custom could have been practiced for an indefinite period without leading to a still greater degree of sex freedom illustrates the tremendous regulating power of culture over sex behavior.

III. KINSHIP STRUCTURE AND ITS RELATION TO MARITAL STRUCTURE. MARITAL SELECTION AND THE KINSHIP STRUCTURE. *Endogamy* is the rule that one must marry within one's own caste or other group. However, it seldom permits marriage of close kin. The group within which marriage must occur is rarely a sib or other kinship group. It may be a large class or *half* of the tribe. Usually it is a social caste or class. India definitely requires caste endogamy. This rule, however, specifically forbids the marriage of a woman to a man of lower caste than herself, but does not in like measure restrain the marriage of a high-caste man to a low-caste woman. This is restrained by social disapproval rather than by religious doctrine. There is a great deal of unwritten and loosely defined endogamy in Euro-American culture. In parts of Europe it takes legal form as far as the church is concerned, in that a Catholic may not marry a Protestant or Jew. This rule is usually relaxed provided an agreement can be made as to the religious education of the children. But in the unwritten social mores it may exert considerable pressure. A somewhat looser regulation disapproves the marriage of a European aristocrat to a person "below his station," although of late even royalty have been violating this rule with much publicity. In America, despite our democratic ideology, this caste feeling still exists. It becomes an absolute taboo in the South as regards inter-racial marriages. There a white person cannot contract a legal marriage with a Negro, and in many states a Negro is defined as one with the slightest trace of black blood. In the North such marriages, though legal in many states, are contrary to the mores, and are regarded as degrading.

Exogamy means that one must marry outside of some group to which he belongs. Every people has some degree of exogamy because certain close relatives are prohibited partners. Relatives nearer than first cousin are, with a few rare exceptions (such as brother-sister marriage in Egyptian royalty), always under the incest taboo. Beyond that, the custom varies in very specific ways. One may marry a first cousin of the proper designation, but may be forbidden marriage with a member of one's own sib whose blood relationship is too distant to be traced.

SIB ORGANIZATION. Exogamy, when it goes beyond the incest taboo upon very close relatives, is usually sib exogamy; that is, "one's own group," which one must avoid in marriage, is a group of real or hypothetical kin who are related through either the male line (*patrilineal*), or through the female line (*matrilineal*), but not both. Matrilineal sibs have been called *clans;* patrilineal sibs, *gentes* (singular, *gens*). It is simpler to call them both sibs. A *sibling* is, thus, one's blood brother *or* sister; or in sib-organized tribes, a member of one's own sib. Thus one is born into one's sib; it is not changed by marriage or place of residence. In some societies, however, it can be socially changed by adoption.

A sib usually has a name, and this name is in some cases attached to every member of the sib. In other cases the person's sib is merely a matter of common knowledge, as is the fraternity of a college undergraduate, but not mentioned as part of his name. Our so-called family names are not really family names but sib names, because they denote our relationship only through the male line. A true family name should include the name of one's mother's family as well, but to continue such an inclusive practice would be obviously impossible, because the number of a person's names might double with each generation. The universal need to *identify* an individual in terms of kin, without using an indefinite number of names, seems to be one basis of the sib pattern. We are not, however, a sib-organized people, because the name is our only sib bond. With a few very special exceptions in the immediate family, there are no rights, duties, or marriage prohibitions which apply to the father's kin differently than to the mother's kin. The family proper is bilateral. In so far as it extends beyond the small group consisting of the married pair and their children, the family extends to mother's kin and father's kin alike.* But the sib is unilateral.

Many peoples are matrilineal or patrilineal, in that they give a greater recognition to the mother's kin or to the father's kin within a limited circle of known relatives, but still do not have a sib organization. Other peoples are sib-organized throughout; that is, a limited number of sibs are extended to include the whole tribe, and every individual is definitely known as belonging to one of these sibs.

In ordinary sib-organized tribes, the great majority of persons in the tribe are, of course, potential mates. In some tribes, however, the exogamous group becomes half the tribe. The Winnebago are di-

* A questionnaire at Vassar College showed that in students' families there were somewhat closer bonds to maternal than paternal kinsfolk.

vided into two *patronymic* * exogamous sibs. Such a scheme is called *dual organization,* and the two sibs *moieties.*

One of the most interesting exogamous systems is that of the Kariera of Australia. The tribe is divided into two moieties, which we might call *A* and *B,* and each moiety into two classes, 1 and 2. Children belong to the father's moiety but to the opposite class of that moiety. Matings thus occur as follows:

Man *Woman*
*A*1 marries *B*1 and their children are *A*2.
*A*2 marries *B*2 and their children are *A*1.
*B*1 marries *A*1 and their children are *B*2.
*B*2 marries *A*2 and their children are *B*1. [Tozzer, 1925, 160.]

Sib-organized peoples are loosely called *totemic* peoples, because commonly the sib is named after some animal or natural object known as a totem. The members of each sib have a special attitude toward their own totem, which is different from the attitude of other persons. There is no universal way of expressing this attitude, however. Sometimes there is a taboo against the eating of the totem animal by the members of the sib, but others may freely eat it. This is far from universal, however. In other instances, all members of a tribe refrain from eating the totem animals of all the sibs. In these instances we may suspect that subcultural forces will see to it that the totems are carefully selected so as not to risk starvation. Sometimes, however, the sib has no totem, but is given a name merely designating some supposed characteristic of its members. The Crow sibs, for example, are called "They-bring-game-without-shooting," "Bad-war-honors," "Bad-leggings," and so on. In some tribes each sib is assigned definite hunting lands. In others each sib has its own special ceremonies. In Siberia each sib sometimes has its own shaman or religious seer. Among the Winnebago each sib has a specialized duty; the Bear people exercise police functions, but the tribal chief is always chosen from among the Thunderbirds. [Lowie, 1925, 119.]

KINSHIP TERMINOLOGY. Sib-organized tribes have what Lowie calls a *Dakota terminology* of kinship terms. This system, which is characteristic of the Dakota and Iroquois, uses for father's brother the same word as for father, but it uses a different word for mother's brother. (The word meaning father sometimes is extended to all of the father's male kin.) It has the same word for mother's sister as for

* When it is wished to indicate that the *name* specifically is transferred through the male or female line, without regard to other privileges, property, or status, we speak of *patronymy* or *matronymy.*

mother, but a different word for father's sister. This may be contrasted with our own system, in which "uncle" means either father's or mother's brother whereas "cousin" means any relative beyond the third degree. The Dakota pattern of tying up the father's male kindred by the use of a single term naturally follows from the fact that these all belong to the same sib. [Lowie, 1925, 115.]

The older ethnology regarded kinship terms as survivals of previous states of marital relation. In Hawaii, for example, no distinction is drawn between maternal and paternal kin. The single term "makua" designates both parents and all their brothers and sisters, a qualifying word being added to indicate whether the given relative is male or female. From this, Morgan inferred that there must have been in earlier days an intermarriage of brothers and sisters. If one's maternal uncle were called by the same kinship name as one's father, then there must have been a time when one's maternal uncle *could have been one's father.* In other words, it was a period of incestuous promiscuity. The idea was that kinship terms survive after the social relationships they indicate have changed. [Lowie, 1925, 57.]

Later ethnologists reject this assumption. The term "father" may not mean "procreator" but merely some particular group of blood kindred. In this case all the near kindred of the parents' generation are given the same term. It is not entirely different from our practice of calling both mother's and father's brother by the same term, "uncle." A much greater number of primitive tribes use separate terms for the mother's and the father's kin, after the Dakota system. [Lowie, 1925, 61.]

The fashion of studying kinship terminology as an index of something else has well-nigh petered out. Kingsley Davis and Lloyd Warner [1937] have found it more profitable to make a really fundamental analysis of kinship structure as a thing in itself. They find that kinship terms indicate or imply five general relationships, to which they give certain symbols: C = birth cycle or the relation of one generation to the next; O = birth order or relation of successive offspring of the same parent; L = sibling link; U = procreative union (marriage); S = sex similarity or difference. In English there are only six "isolating" terms, that is, terms which can refer to only one "relative" (person) when used by a given "ego" (person). These are father, mother, husband, wife, father-in-law, and mother-in-law. All other terms are "classificatory"; that is, they indicate one or several specific relationships which can be occupied by more than one person. One may have several "sons," yet these all belong to one specific rela-

tionship. "Brother," however, covers "older brother" and "younger brother" and can be subdivided further, according to whether one's father or one's mother is the parent shared in common, although usually it is both. Furthermore, there may be several individuals belonging to any one of these classes of brothers. By the same token our word "cousin" covers thirty-two specific relationships. My father's older-(half)sister-by-his-mother's-daughter is only one of these thirty-two. Many languages use several different terms for these. In the Australian system there are 663 specified relatives related to the ego through his father, mother, brothers, sisters, sons, daughters, and 638 more through his spouse and her relatives, making a total of 1,301. [Warner, 1937.] Perhaps it is the Australian who should say, "God gave us our relatives, thank God we can choose our friends." But the Kariera tribe handles the whole 1,301 by twenty-one broad classificatory terms, none of them "isolating."

SOCIAL AVOIDANCES AND PRIVILEGED FAMILIARITIES. Lowie, after studying the attitudes and practices between near of kin in a wide range of primitive tribes, generalizes that "social and sexual restrictions go hand in hand." In other words, to whatever person one's sexual approaches are especially forbidden, toward that person also, generally speaking, custom requires some special restraint in conversation or social intercourse. Lowie also arrives at the converse generalization, that "licensed familiarity obtains between potential mates" [1925, 102].

Parent-in-law taboos are frequent. For example, among the Yukaghir in Siberia, a daughter-in-law must avoid looking into the face of her father-in-law or her husband's elder brother, and a son-in-law must likewise not look into the face of his father-in-law or mother-in-law. Freud explains parent-in-law taboos as devices to aid the repression of incestuous desires. Lowie makes two criticisms of this theory: first, that the taboos have a very capricious distribution, being present, for example, among the Navaho Indians and absent among the neighboring Hopi; second, that the attitude associated with the taboos is one of respect and not one indicative of mental conflict between hostility and incestuous desire. The right kind of explanation is sociological rather than psychological. Tylor makes an approach to such an explanation by showing that the mother-in-law taboo is correlated with matrilocal residence. His statistics, however, are questioned. Lowie shows that diffusion is important, but that the culture patterns of a tribe in matters of residence, and so on, may de-

termine whether or not the tribe will imitate the given taboo when exposed to its diffusion [1925, 84–97].

Lowie tells an anecdote regarding a Kirghiz woman who was prohibited from using the common words for lamb, wolf, water, and rushes because they formed part of the names of her relatives by marriage. One day she was obliged to tell her husband that a wolf was carrying off a lamb through the rushes on the other side of the water. She expressed herself in some such terms as these: "Look yonder, the howling one is carrying the bleating one through the rustling ones on the other side of the glistening one!" [1925, 87.]

PREFERENTIAL MATING. There are tribes which prescribe whom a person shall marry instead of whom he shall not marry. They limit the potential mates under certain conditions, at least, to a few individuals or even to one. They do not require that he remain unmarried; a substitute is possible if the socially correct mate dies or becomes unavailable. The taking of the prescribed mate may be limited to certain conditions, or sometimes optional. Such a system is called *preferential mating.* The most common forms of preferential mating are the *levirate* and *sororate.*

These are more common, and probably older than the sib pattern. Tylor found the levirate in a third of all primitive tribes known to him, and Lowie [1925, 33] says that later investigation makes it more frequent than that. The levirate is a pattern in which a man's wife is taken over, upon his death, by the man's brother. The junior levirate, in which only the younger brothers are thus responsible, is the more common form. It is only in a few cultures that brothers may share the woman at the same time. The sororate is the taking by a man of his wife's sister, usually only the younger sisters. There are two forms: the restricted sororate, in which such a marriage occurs only upon the death of the first wife; and the simultaneous sororate, in which the man has the several sisters at once. Sisters older than the wife are usually excluded, presumably because they are apt to be married already to other men. The simultaneous sororate is more common than the correspondlng type of levirate for the same reasons that polygyny is more common than polyandry.

The sororate and levirate must not be interpreted as *privileges.* They are as much, or more, *duties.* They are partly devices for taking care of certain women, and partly results of the primitive concept which makes a *group* of sisters, or of brothers, a unit. The levirate and sororate tend to go together. They tend to produce the same kinship terminology as does the sib system.

Among the Pawnee, a young brother has sexual relations with his older brother's wife without formal marriage, and is taught to love her as he does his own wife. [Lesser, 1930.]

Another form of preferential mating which may more frequently prove compulsory to the individual is *cross-cousin* marriage. First cousins are cross cousins when their two sibling parents are of opposite sex. If these two siblings are of the same sex, their children are *parallel* cousins. A man may have two kinds of female cross cousins, his mother's brother's daughter and his father's sister's daughter. These two relationships sometimes coincide through the previous marriage of one's mother's brother to one's father's sister. Where this is not the case, the more usual rule is that the man must marry his mother's brother's daughter, rather than his father's sister's daughter. This form of marriage choice appears at scattered points in every continent, but is true of only a minority of tribes in each. It seems to have a center of distribution in southern Asia, which suggests some diffusion. But its appearance at widely scattered points suggests that it has also been independently invented in many places. [Lowie, 1925, 27.]

THE TRANSMISSION OF STATUS AND PROPERTY: MATERNAL AND PATERNAL SYSTEMS. The evolutionary * theory held that the matrilineal family preceded the patrilineal. It explained that at first only the mother of a child was known, and that after the discovery of fatherhood the man assumed ownership of the family and gave the child *his* name. The causes which led to patriarchy also lead to patriliny, *patrilocal* residence, and polygyny. (When the young married couple settles in the man's home or community, the family is said to be patrilocal; when in the woman's, matrilocal.) The data obtainable by Hobhouse do not always distinguish matrilocal from matrilineal, and patrilocal from patrilineal. In only 7 per cent of the tribes was there definitely reported to be patriliny with matrilocalism, or matriliny with patrilocalism, the great bulk of these cases being in the latter class. It seemed reasonable to assume that most matrilineal tribes are matrilocal and most patrilineal tribes patrilocal. In another 12 per cent of the tribes, there was some other mixed pattern of descent which could not be called definitely matrilineal or patrilineal. The tribes were then regrouped as maternal (matrilineal or matrilocal without any reported inconsistency), paternal (patrilineal or patrilocal without

* See p. 209.

any reported inconsistency), and intermixed. The correlations [Hobhouse *et al.*, 1930, 153] follow:

NUMBERS OF TRIBES (NOT PER CENT)

	Maternal	Paternal	Intermixed
Hunters	30	18	22
Pastoral	1	10	3
Agricultural	44	47	19

There is thus a very definite tendency for pastoral cultures to have a father-centered family pattern, and some tendency for the hunters, who are the most primitive, to have a mother-centered pattern. If we eliminate the pastorals, however, who live under conditions favoring patrilocalism, the correlation between stage of development and the system of tracing descent is very weak. The lowest hunters show 23 definitely maternal to 14 paternal tribes; the highest agriculture, 20 maternal to 24½ paternal. Certainly no universal law of evolution can be found here.

If one is looking for such a law, it is further disconcerting to learn about a number of relatively advanced tribes which have preserved a matrilineal system. The matrilineal Iroquois are more advanced than the neighboring Algonkin tribes which are patrilineal. In North America generally, north of Mexico, the matrilineal tribes are on a higher level than the patrilineal. The great majority of hunting tribes which have *not* developed a sib organization are patrilocal. Lowie says:

> To sum up. There is no fixed succession of maternal and paternal descent; sibless tribes may pass directly into the matrilineal or the patrilineal condition; if the highest civilizations emphasize the paternal side of the family, so do many of the lowest; and the social history of a particular people cannot be reconstructed from any generally valid scheme of evolution but only in the light of its known and probable cultural relations with neighboring peoples.*

But even Hobhouse's rough statistical correlations lose much of their significance when we come to analyze "maternal" or "paternal" family. Tylor has shown that the great majority of peoples really have a mixture of paternal and maternal patterns, although it may be possible, as Hobhouse has done, to classify them as predominantly one or the other. There are at least four traits of a completely maternal system: (1) matronymy, (2) matrilocal residence, (3) the inher-

* R. H. Lowie, *Primitive Society*, Liveright, 1925, p. 185. By permission.

itance of property through the female line, (4) the *avunculate,* or the holding of chief authority over children by their mother's brother rather than by their father. The older ethnologists assumed as a matter of course that all these traits went together in one general culture complex, but more careful work has shown that they are so frequently inconsistent that no such general complex can be asserted. Even the transmission of property is often split, some kinds of property being inherited through the male and others through the female line.

IV. Social Roles and Relations of the Sexes. Hobhouse, Wheeler, and Ginsberg by their tribe-counting method find that "the position of women in the simpler societies is not favorable as judged by modern standards." There is, moreover, "no substantial change according to grade or type of culture except that the unfavorable tendency is accentuated in the pastoral state." Woman is inferior in 73 per cent of the agricultural and 87.5 per cent of the pastoral tribes. The regional variation is more marked than the variation according to grade of culture: Asia scores highest, then, in order, Oceania, South America, North America, Africa, Australia, on the scale designed to measure the position of women. This scale was made up by considering: (1) whether the husband has a right to chastise the wife; (2) whether the wife is protected by her own kin; (3) whether the women do the harder work or the work is fairly distributed; (4) whether the wife is reported as generally equal or not equal in power; (5) whether or not women participate in government. [Hobhouse *et al.,* 1930, 170–175.]

Lowie, who is interested in the specific patterns more than the statistics, shows that:

> First of all, it should be noted that the treatment of woman is one thing, her legal status another, her opportunities for public activity still another, while the character and extent of her labors belong again to a distinct category.*

In West Siberia and China woman does not add materially to the food supply and she is also held in an inferior status. Formerly the one fact would have been regarded as the cause of the other. But in South America and South Africa where women plant and harvest they are nevertheless inferior, and among the Vedda and Andaman Islanders, whose women contribute only moderately to the food supply, they rank as men's equals in society. A Kirghiz woman may be bought and sold, and divorced at the will of her husband, yet she shares in

* R. H. Lowie, *Primitive Society,* Liveright, 1925, p. 186. By permission.

the tribal festivities, pays visits to other communities at her pleasure, and is not unfairly burdened with work, since the men till the soil, secure food, and tend the cattle. Lowie shows that there is a definite attitude toward woman which is spread through a number of contiguous peoples in Siberia, indicating probable diffusion. This attiture is that woman is property, but it does not involve her seclusion. In Australia, Melanesia, and New Guinea, there is another widespread attitude which stresses the segregation of the sexes. Here, women are excluded from public life and from ceremonies, and sometimes do not even eat with their husbands. In North America there is no segregation of the sexes except near the Pacific coast; this fact may indicate diffusion from Asia. As Lowie says:

> Only in Alaska have the Eskimo men a house from which women are excluded; only among the Northern Athabaskans are girls segregated from boys and women barred from attendance at any dances; only in California do we encounter men's societies comparable in the jealous exclusion of the female sex to the organizations of Melanesia. The reason why the Hupa men sleep apart from the women is probably that they have had cultural relations with other Californian populations which favored that arrangement.*

Matrilineal descent is no longer believed to be evidence of a former state of *matriarchy,* a hypothetical condition in which women supposedly played the same role of superior power that is played by men in most cultures. Various peoples do give unusual powers to women. Among the most extreme cases is that of the Khasi, where women own all the houses, real estate, and prized family jewels, and transmit them from mother to daughter. In one locality a woman holds the position of pontiff, and her successor is chosen by a group of female kin. Yet, in this same tribe a husband may kill an adulterous wife caught in the act, and the head of the household is always male. Among the Iroquois, women arranged marriages, owned property, nominated and impeached chiefs, but they never held a place in the supreme council of the league. In general the treatment of women in matrilineal societies is no better than in patrilineal. And as Lowie says, a genuine matriarchate is nowhere to be found [1925, 191].

The Marquesan culture, described and psychologically analyzed by Kardiner and Linton [1939], presents an illustration of comparatively high status of women, but this is based upon the extraordinary sex ratio of two and one-half males to one female. Marriage is polyan-

* R. H. Lowie, *Primitive Society,* Liveright, 1925, p. 197. By permission.

drous. The chief husband's permission is necessary for sexual intercourse by the subsidiary husbands. In well-to-do households there are also subsidiary wives, so that a group marriage exists, but still with a considerable excess of males. There are no sexual restrictions except an incest taboo upon very close relatives. Women exercise considerable power over men through their ability to deprive them sexually, and this is reflected in an underlying hostility of men toward women.

One might expect unusual jealousy among males because of the severe competition for sexual privileges. It would be the natural result. Yet this is not the culture pattern; rather, it is the women who are jealous. The potential male jealousy is held in check by institutions of friendly cooperation among men, male solidarity, and the unconscious displacement of their hostility toward the much-needed women whose scarcity is the cause of the male deprivation. This feeling toward women takes the form of a collective disdain and aloofness of men toward women, and a folklore in which woman is put in an unfavorable light and represented as a voracious, cannibalistic beast, often as a beautiful ogress who tempts men to their destruction. This does not prove incompatible with the great need of individual men for women and the large and free use of sexual opportunities. In a household the chief husband uses his wife as a decoy to attract desirable men as secondary husbands, and thus increases his prestige and power. He has much to gain by keeping his subsidiary husbands sexually satisfied, for otherwise they might shirk in their duties or wander off seeking other women. A chief or head of a rich family sometimes marries a young woman because she has several lovers he wishes to attach. Although male jealousy endangers economic cooperation and is repressed, there is no such social need to repress female jealousy, which arises not out of women's need for men in general, but out of their prestige competition for the more desirable men.

In spite of these patterns, men mainly control economic life and war, and occupy the priesthood.

Maternal care is a secondary interest to these scarce and polyandrous women. The child is not breast-fed, and feeding procedure is harsh. The tender relation to the child is weak, and relations between the sexes are erotic rather than tender.

V. AGE GROUPS AND SOCIETAL MAINTENANCE. THE ROLE OF CHILDREN AND AGE GROUPS. The care of children by their own parents is sometimes abbreviated by culture. Thus, in the Andaman Islands,

though faithful monogamy is the rule, there is so much adoption and transfer of children that the social family unit ceases to correspond to the biological. The children, after living for a time in one foster home, are then transferred to another, and so on indefinitely. The children are visited occasionally by their natural parents, and relations of mutual obligation continue between them and all their "parents," past and present. Thus a child is insured against orphanage, neglect, or dependency such as occur in our society. [Mead, M., 1932.] In Samoa the same end is achieved in another way. Ten to twenty persons, including several married couples, may live in a household, and all the children then living in that household are equally protected by the ruler of the house regardless of their biological origin. Moreover, when mistreated and also under other circumstances, they leave their own households temporarily to live with neighboring relatives, who assume a parental responsibility for them. [Mead, M., 1928.]

One of the most interesting patterns is *teknonymy,* the naming of parents after their children. Tylor knew of thirty peoples who practiced this custom. Among the Ewe, for example, when a child is born, its parents are henceforth addressed not by their own names, but as "Father (or Mother) of K——." [Lowie, 1925, 107.]

The role to which children are trained varies enormously. Among the Manus people of Melanesia the child is taught to be skilful in swimming and climbing, and is imbued with such an extreme respect for property that he even comments upon the possible ownership of a morsel of food seen floating about in the water. On the other hand, he strikes and insults his parents with impunity. [Mead, M., 1930.] In Samoa, though trained to give a decorous respect to elders, he is allowed to run about freely in parties which spy upon adolescent love-making and gather to witness the process of childbirth. Free sex play is tolerated and even encouraged among children in many peoples. In Samoa, children of about 6 to 12 are made responsible for the supervision of their younger brothers and sisters, and devise various methods to prevent the latter's annoying adults. When adolescence comes, the child is relieved of this responsibility and enters upon a more interesting and less burdensome life.

The progression from one age group to another is an important feature of life in many societies. Many signalize the coming of puberty by important ceremonies. Schurtz holds that age classification forms the oldest type of grouping apart from kinship and work, and is the basis of the great variety of associations, secret societies, and

the like, which are found in primitive societies. He holds further that men tend to form such associations more than women because man is instinctively gregarious, while "woman is an eminently unsociable being and refrains from forming unions on the basis of like interests." [Lowie, 1925, 297.] Yet Lowie shows by a mass of evidence that there is no need to assume any inherent sex difference of this sort and that associations arise from a great many different origins. There are important regional differences. Among American Indians puberty ceremonies for *girls* are often the main type of crisis ceremony, and the boys' ceremonies, so conspicuous elsewhere, are rare.

The aged are treated in very different ways. In primitive Australia, as in civilized China, the old men rule by virtue of their age. In Polynesia, hereditary rank commonly takes priority over age. Among the Plains Indians, Trobrianders, and others, age is a pitied rather than a highly respected status. Among some peoples living in difficult environments, old people are sometimes killed or abandoned on migrations.

THE FORMATION OF BASIC PERSONALITY STRUCTURE. One of the most significant contributions of recent years is that of Kardiner and Linton [1939] to our understanding of the relation of customs, that is, patterns of external behavior and interaction, to the standard attitudes and values inculcated in the individuals of a society.

Clark Wissler [1923] once outlined a "universal pattern of culture." Kardiner and Linton also have their universal pattern. According to them all cultures have: (1) some form of family organization, (2) some kind of in-group formation, (3) some larger group such as clan or tribe, (4) sustenance techniques, (5) basic disciplines, (6) control of actual aggression, (7) psychological binding forces, (8) distinctive life goals.

The concept of institution here used is somewhat similar to that used by MacIver [1937]. It is defined as any "fixed thought or behavior held by a group of individuals which can be communicated, which enjoys common acceptance, and whose infringement . . . creates some disturbance. . . ." Institutions are thus specific customs and mores rather than organizations like the family, the church, or the state. Other concepts used in this treatment include character structure (meaning the individual variations of personality structure, which is uniform for a culture), dependency, prestige conflicts, security system, and super-ego formation.

As an example let us see how Kardiner analyzes the essentials of Marquesan society as described by Linton. The primary *institutions* of the society are tabulated as (1) a ratio of 2½ males to 1 female, with a corresponding polyandry; (2) maternal neglect of children and absence of tender relations; (3) suppression of male jealousy (making possible economic cooperation in

polyandrous families); (4) expressed jealousy of women (rivalry for power and prestige); (5) food scarcity and certain subsistence techniques; (6) absence of any sexual restrictions except the incest taboo; (7) lack of insistence upon obedience; (8) primogeniture; (9) rank; (10) communal and personal property.

These primary institutions act upon the individual to produce a certain basic personality structure which includes (1) a prevalent anxiety, especially fear of being eaten up; (2) underlying hatred of women by men, which is tied up with the great power of women through their limited numbers and ability to deprive men of sexual satisfaction; (3) sexual deprivation and fear thereof on the part of men but absolutely no guilt about sex and no impotence; (4) fear of having a child stolen (by enemy groups which may use it for ritual sacrifice or cannibalistic practices); (5) hostility of women toward women; (6) great food anxiety, with food used as a means of enhancing the ego; (7) hypochondriacal fears and a fear of disintegration; (8) a super-ego which inflicts shame but not guilt; (9) attenuated prestige conflicts among men; (10) no male anxiety of exploitation by other men; (11) unrestricted sexual development from earliest childhood; (12) property not a means of enhancing ego. This basic personality structure, then, helps to produce certain secondary institutions which may be regarded as defenses against the frustrations imposed by the primary institutions and which make up the basic personality structure. These secondary institutions include such things as male solidarity, homosexuality, *fanaua* (which is the ghost of a man who sold his post-mortem powers and soul to a woman during his life time for the favors of that woman), sorcery against woman, embalming, cannibalism, children's gangs, food thefts and food taboos, suicide, and love murder.

The Tanala of Madagascar have a culture which is less strikingly different from our own. Their personality structure includes: (1) obedience to discipline, ingratiation and submission, with repressed hatred or fear; (2) denial of the importance of sex; (3) lack of food anxiety; (4) property as a means of enlarging the ego. Superficially, the sex code seems to be rather puritanical, but the authors surmise that there is a great deal of clandestine violation which appears to be not so much a failure or a defect but a normal part of the culture.*

VI. The Ideology and Control of Reproduction. There are traits, even more widespread and fundamental than compulsory monogamy, which nevertheless are found not to be universal. Such a trait is the linkage of biological with social fatherhood. Among the Nairs of Malabar, for example, the father-husband role is split into three separate parts. There is, first, the ceremonial husband, who marries the girl with religious ceremony when she is 11 or 12 years of age.

* From review in the *Bulletin of Family Research and Education*, II:2 and 3 (April-June, 1941), 15–17.

This "husband" is then dismissed and never again comes into the picture. Then, after the girl reaches puberty, comes the lover, who is the biological father of the children. He is usually a younger son from Namburuti Brahman groups in the vicinity, among whom no younger son may legally marry. However, this lover-father has no legal or social status; his children belong entirely to their mother. Finally, it is the mother's brother who actually lives with the mother and children and plays the role of social father. If such a pattern of life were in violation of "instinct" or any inborn biological pattern, it could not be carried out consistently and regularly even in this one small people. [Mead, M., 1932.]

In Indonesia, Melanesia, and New Guinea there are tribes which give no social status to the biological father. In Borneo there are peoples among whom the husband must always visit his wife secretly. Where the biological father is not socially recognized, his identity may or may not be known. Many tribes do not appear to understand the biological cause of reproduction. When a woman has a child it is attributed to the fact that she has visited a certain sacred spot or performed a certain ritual. Among the polyandrous Todas, that husband who performs the bow and arrow ceremony at the birth of a child is regarded as the legal father of the child. Which husband is the true father may be unknown. As we have seen, the Trobrianders deny the father's role as progenitor, although they permit him to live with the mother and to care for the children.

Even the maternal relationship is in some cases minimized, though no cases are known in which a mother does not for a time, at least, care for her own children. In Tonga the father's sister, instead of the true mother, is the social mother. In primitive Montenegro it is conventional to deny the child's relation to its mother and to assume publicly that it belongs entirely to its father. [Mead, M., 1932.]

Carr-Saunders [1922] finds that practices which have the effect of controlling population, whether consciously designed for that purpose or not, are and were much more widespread among primitive and historical peoples than the naive Malthusians and neo-Malthusians imagined. Infanticide and abortion were prevalent among the ancients and are found among many primitive tribes. Crude but more or less effective methods of contraception have been known from time immemorial, and are found especially in a survey of primitive Africa. Among the American Indians warfare seemed to keep the population in check, and these other methods are found less prominent.

VII. LOVE SATISFACTIONS AND FRUSTRATIONS. Although a great deal of attention has been given to customs and taboos of human love life, little study as yet has been made of it in terms of feeling. Since our own culture is, comparatively speaking, an ascetic, sex-repressing if not entirely love-inhibiting culture, it is not surprising that we tend to take a clinical if not a condemnatory attitude toward many phenomena in this realm.

Aside from the outward forms of marital and sexual relationship, there is the fundamental issue of whether sexual experience is regarded as a regulated indulgence, a necessary evil, as it were, or, on the other hand, a major value to be cultivated and maximized for its own sake, limited only by its own good rather than by the needs and convenience of other activities. Although there is now some intellectual acceptance of the latter ideology by our independent thinkers, our Euro-American society still basically holds, as it has throughout most of its history, the philosophy that sexuality is "low" and dangerous. Love between the sexes is given a higher value if the sexual element is absent or subsidiary.

Among primitive peoples, the Trobrianders, Samoans, and Marquesans are well-described examples of the opposite philosophy. Perhaps the most significant index is the attitude taken toward childhood sexuality. In these sexually free cultures, children are permitted to engage in sex play and to develop their sexual function as early and as rapidly as their natural development permits; in sex-repressive societies the custom is to restrain and postpone the development of this sexual behavior. This is commonly justified, of course, by the idea that the general development of the child is thereby safeguarded and that he is prepared for a better sex life after maturity. Recent studies upon sexually free cultures have cast a heavy doubt upon this assumption. In those societies sexual behavior pervades life from childhood on, and it is difficult to see what is thereby lost. The repressive character of our sexual philosophy goes much deeper than a condemnation of sex outside of marriage. It is essentially a declaration of the unworthiness of sex. The very acme of the rebellion against it is reached by D. H. Lawrence in his fanciful story, *The Man Who Died,* in which he pictures Jesus himself as returning to live a normal sex life.*

R. F. Fortune [1941] has presented an interesting hypothesis that patrilineal societies taboo female orgasm of the clitoris, whereas matri-

* See Chapter XX and Reich [1935, 1936] on sex-affirmation and sex-denial.

lineal societies enjoin it and encourage sex fore-play directed to that end. He finds this correlation to be perfect for four societies of each type in the region of New Guinea. Samoa, which has patriliny and also clitoral orgasm, contradicts the thesis, and a broader study would doubtless find the social correlate, if any, of this sexual practice to be something less definite than the mere dichotomy between patriliny and matriliny. Still, the sexual practice itself is important from the standpoint of human satisfaction and frustration, and we ought to know more about its distribution among societies, as we know something of the distribution among individuals from the works of Dickinson, Hamilton, and Terman.

Roheim [1932] has gone so far as to construct the picture of a whole culture from knowledge of the detailed patterns of sexual intercourse in that culture. Other psychoanalysts also have gone to great extremes in making sex behavior a key to other things.

Fortune develops his thesis into a more general one, i.e., that there are important, hitherto unrecognized, interdependences between social codes and physiological habit patterns.

> If these reflexes are in the lower vesical pathway, for example, the social codes which condition them have lower vesical pathway supports. If these reflexes are in the stomach and the gut the social codes which condition them have stomach and gut supports. In this sense we may say, for instance, that Arapesh warfare is pegged in brain and lower vesical pathway supports. It is fought over women, but not over food or land or material plunder. In the same sense, cenual New Guinea warfare is pegged in brain and stomach and gut supports. It is fought over food, land, and material plunder, but not over women.*

The natural-social sex relationship is one which encourages and periodically leads to the "normal" procreative sexual act between man and woman. Yet mankind knows hundreds of other patterns of sexual activity, some of which cannot lead to procreation. These variations are sometimes used as excitants toward the normal act and sometimes as substitutes for it.

Homosexuality has been given a normal and recognized role in culture. Among the Greeks, whom we regard as highly civilized, pederasty was common and recognized. The sex life of a leading male citizen might be divided among his wife, a *hetaira* (publicly appearing, intellectual woman companion), and a boy.

* Quoted by permission from MS. by Reo F. Fortune.

The status of "technical virginity" and the experience of first intercourse are highly emotionalized in many societies. Samoan culture, which permits great pre-marital freedom for most individuals, keeps the princess virgin until marriage, under heavy taboos, and in former times her defloration was a public ceremony. [Mead, M., 1928.]

Among some ancient peoples there were sacred women attached to temples, whose function it was to have intercourse with men visiting the temple.

There remains yet a great, poorly explored field in the study of tender love and the various other varieties of love feeling and attitude. Sometimes the tender love emotions are directed toward persons of one's own sex, toward one's parents, or children, whereas only sexual passion is directed toward the mate. Again, as in nineteenth-century Anglo-Saxon culture, there is a tendency to emphasize the tender attitude between man and wife, and to conceal or restrain eroticism, with the frequent result that the married sex relation often becomes less satisfying than relations outside of wedlock.

Trobriand culture stresses tenderness of the father toward the child, yet it represses tenderness in the brother-sister relation, which must be one of distant respect and aloofness.

THE LIMITS TO CULTURAL VARIATIONS. As studies of primitive cultures become more psychological and attempt to discover the motives and meanings of customs, to learn how they "feel" to the people who practice them, we come closer to a true science of culture. We begin to see how culture is related to universal human needs and to discriminate the universal features from the choices between alternate possibilities. We begin to see how these various choices may be consistent or inconsistent within a given culture.

It used to be said that the limiting principle is that culture cannot violate instinct. Later it was found that this involved a misleading concept because most of the so-called instincts, such as the parental, the gregarious, the self-assertive instincts, turned out, upon analysis, to be complex behavior patterns which required a great deal of learning. The very definition of such "instincts" implies that the subject has already *learned* to perceive and recognize such objects as "mother," "crowd," "child," "female." Hence the instinct concept has given place to the concepts of natural habits and relationships. But these newer concepts make it more difficult to think of rigid limits to cultural behavior and interaction. The natural-social patterns are those which most frequently develop when relations are given opportunity

to develop without cultural precedent; but even here the judgment must be largely one of inference.

A survey of the world's cultures seems to indicate certain things to be true of all societies and of most people in them. *First,* the principal sexual behavior is heterosexual. *Second,* there is some continuity of sex and love relationship; persons become conditioned to particular sex partners and do not shift indifferently from one partner to another. There may be some "promiscuity," but it never applies to most of the people for most of the time. *Third,* there are always certain sex avoidances. There are aim taboos (some kinds of sex behavior must not be performed), and object taboos (sexual approaches must not be made to certain persons). *Fourth,* there is always an incest taboo which is enforced through unusually great horror and repulsion. *Fifth,* males always are the more active competitors for sexual satisfaction and their competition is always regulated by some scheme of organization and rules. The incest taboo performs this function within the household group and sometimes as regards a whole sib or moiety, but some additional code, such as that of possessive marriage, seems always to be felt necessary to prevent sexual desire from becoming a source of such frequent competition or conflict that it disrupts other social relations and wastes untold energy. *Sixth,* mothers practically always nurse or care for their own babies and there is a prolonged attachment between mother and child. *Seventh,* some male, or males, always are responsible for looking after the mother and her child, however well or badly this function may be performed, and even though sometimes the male in question is not the biological father.

Thus there emerges in dim outline a kind of subcultural, socio-natural pattern of the family, which Margaret Mead has called, in its bare essence, "a woman with a child, and a man to look after her."

In addition to these practically universal patterns, there are patterns which are so much more frequent than their alternatives in the total census of cultures that they may be deemed to be relatively more congenial to social-human nature (which, as we have seen, is not the same thing as human nature might be among isolated or non-competing individuals). Such relatively natural patterns would include limited polygyny as more natural than polyandry or universal monogamy (within a tribe); inequality of sexual and marital opportunities among both sexes; patriarchal rather than matriarchal power; marriage of older men to younger women rather than the reverse; love toward, and intercourse with, more than one partner rather than strict, lifelong monogamy; some degree of antagonism between children and

their father or male guardian; some concealment or privacy rather than public display of sex behavior.

Yet it may be even more important to study culture patterns which are unusual and presumably not the most natural, because these may hold the key to making human life much happier, or much more miserable, than it naturally might be. Democratic human relations are not "natural," yet they have been created and diffused to a certain extent under a philosophy of social action and social progress. It is true, as Émile Benoit-Smullyan [1941] points out, that we need to investigate the psychological limits to cultural variation as a corrective to the view which sometimes seems to emerge that culture can make people do anything. Yet the demonstration of a given pattern really working successfully in only one place for a period of, shall we say, a year, or a couple of generations, is enough to prove that it is within these limits. From then on the questions are: does it serve human needs better than alternatives and, if so, how can we teach and diffuse it?

Chapter III

THE FAMILY IN THE GREAT CIVILIZATIONS

GENERAL COMPARISON OF PRIMITIVE AND CIVILIZED FAMILY SYSTEMS. America's material culture is far more advanced and complex than that of the Trobriands. Also, a description of the American economic system would require much more space than a description of the Trobriand economic system. Yet, in comparing family systems, America does not seem to require a much greater space than does the more primitive people. Family systems in general have a certain complexity, a certain wealth of detail in their pattern, which is much the same in civilized as in primitive societies. Civilization does not *elaborate* the family system as it does the material culture and the economic organization. In some respects many primitive family systems are more complicated than our own. On the other hand, it cannot be said that the family system as a whole tends to become more impoverished as civilization advances. It grows thinner in spots, but more elaborate elsewhere.

We are not sure whether or not the family culture permits wider latitude of personal behavior as civilization advances. It may perhaps do so in the most modern, liberal civilizations. Rousseau held that primitive man was free and "natural" in his behavior. He inaugurated the doctrine of the "happy savage." Later, Spencer, Westermarck, and others, who studied primitive life in the concrete, came to the opposite conclusion. Namely, they asserted that primitive man was the slave of custom, enjoying less personal freedom than we do. Primitive customs were different from ours, but they had to be obeyed more strictly than we obey ours. The most recent view of primitive life takes neither extreme position. Malinowski, who best represents this modern view, shows that his Trobrianders violate their mores just as we violate ours, and that the penalty for violation differs with the circumstances as it does with us. He narrates several cases of scandal among his Trobriand friends, and the stories read very much like epi-

sodes in our own society. Sometimes the offender "gets away with" a violation of the strictest taboo, and sometimes he pays the extreme penalty. A Trobriand youth violated the exogamy taboo by repeated sexual relations with a "classificatory" sister. Although this violation was known to several persons, nothing was done about it until the girl's regular and legitimate lover became jealous. Then the offending youth was insulted and humiliated until, by jumping from a tall palm tree, he committed the required suicide [1926, 77].

What culture patterns are characteristically "primitive"? Many generalizations that have been made are unsound, because they assume our Euro-American system to be typical of all civilizations and ignore the fact that China, Japan, India, the Mohammedan world, and Soviet Russia are also true civilizations. Surely it would be unsound to generalize from the comparison made in Chapter I between a single civilized and a single primitive culture. Yet from a wide and unprejudiced view of several cultures the following tentative statements may be offered.

1. The ignorance of paternity and the failure to give the biological father a major role in relation to the child are confined to primitive cultures, but not to the most primitive.

2. Magical control of biological processes diminishes and scientific control increases with advancing civilization.

3. There is a tendency for kinship relations to be less specifically discriminated and less socially important in civilized societies.

4. In civilized cultures there is generally a supreme organization of power, known as government, which enforces a code of more or less formal and written law. This legal code is somewhat differentiated from the more informal group mores, so that "legal" and "illegal" cease to be, as they were with primitive peoples, the exact equivalents of "right" and "wrong." The governmental power is differentiated from the family and religious power, and from the powers inherent in mere *rank*. It may override these other powers at certain points and may protect or persecute certain kinds of individual behavior independently of these other powers.

5. Only in civilized cultures is there a differentiated institution (the school) for the education of the young.

A. THE HISTORY OF THE EURO-AMERICAN FAMILY

Let us now trace briefly the history of our own Euro-American family system. This history is interesting and important in itself, but

is no longer regarded as a universal series of evolutionary stages through which all cultures must pass.

PRE-ANCIENT CIVILIZATIONS. The civilizations of Egypt, Sumer, and the Aegean region, in the period between 3000 and 1000 B.C., may be called *pre-ancient* to distinguish them from the more familiar ancient civilizations of Greece and Rome of 1000 B.C. to A.D. 400. In pre-ancient Egypt, at least, there was not quite the patriarchal pattern which characterized ancient civilizations. [Hartley, 1914.] Women participated freely in government and social life. Cleopatra, though belonging to a later period, represented this Egyptian tradition which was in such contrast to the culture of Rome. Women banqueted with men; the goddess Isis took precedence over the god Osiris. In marriage contracts the man was obliged to stipulate in advance the support he would give his wife. A wife was described by one writer as "glad and gladdening like the midday sun." [Messer, 1928, 52.] The husband was counseled to "be not hard on her, for she will be more readily moved by persuasion than force." Men in Egypt were often named after their mothers; this matrilineal tradition greatly surprised the Greek historian Herodotus.

In Babylon there were customs of ritual or sacred prostitution. Priestesses in the temple gave themselves to men who entered.

ANCIENT CIVILIZATIONS: THE GREEK FAMILY. The Aryan peoples, who came from the North and founded the civilizations of Greece, Rome, Persia, and India, had a patriarchal, patrilineal family pattern. After these newer civilizations had become established, family life and the status of woman appeared much changed. We do not know the details of this change. It was more probably the result of the diffusion of Aryan traditions than an adjustment to new economic conditions. Speaking generally of the Greek, Roman, and Hebrew cultures of 1000 to 0 B.C., they were patriarchal, the father originally having power of life and death over his wife and children. He could freely divorce a wife, could take concubines and resort to prostitutes, but the wife had no such freedom. The wife was confined to the home and menial duties; she did not dine or appear in public with her husband. The chivalric, romantic attitude of medieval and modern times seems to have been lacking. Here we have a pattern essentially like that of modern China and the Mohammedan realm.

In the Greek culture, there was monogamy in the sense that only one wife enjoyed full status, but concubines were permitted, as in China. In addition there were the *hetaerae,* prominent in Athenian life. These were intellectual, refined women living in sexual freedom,

who dined publicly with men and wielded considerable influence in government. Many great statesmen enjoyed especially close and affectionate liaisons with them. The homosexual love of boys was also a recognized custom. Society was a men's club. Women, however they were treated in actuality, were verbally pronounced to be inferiors. Hipponax remarked that a wife gives a man two days of happiness, the day of her marriage and that of her death. This should be contrasted with the Egyptian verbalization noted above. Even the radical Socrates advised men to talk little with their wives. Children were under the paternal power and could be married without their own consent. Infanticide by exposure was permitted. It seems, however, that the father did not enjoy such extreme powers in Greece as in early Rome.

In Sparta, women had greater power, but society was regulated by a eugenic ideal. Weak infants were exposed to death in order that the race might be strengthened. Boys were taken from the family home and reared in military barracks.

THE ROMAN FAMILY. The early Roman family was more monogamous, concubinage being more limited. But it was also more intensely patriarchal, the father having power of life and death over the whole family. We do not know how far this legal power was carried in actual practice. At marriage the wife was ceremonially brought under the family gods of the husband and lost all legal connection with her own family, a pattern suggestive of modern China. Cato the Censor expressed the status of women when he said: "If you were to catch your wife in adultery, you would kill her with impunity without trial; but if she were to catch you in adultery she would not dare to lay a finger upon you, and indeed she has no right." [Goodsell, 1915, 122.]

The Roman family of A.D. 200 was very different. Because Rome was the leading civilization during much of this period, the changes may be attributed largely to the inner processes of culture rather than to diffusion from other cultures. Diffusion from the older and more intellectually sophisticated Greek civilization, however, doubtless had some influence. These changes included a decay of the *patria potestas*, or power of the father, a partial equalization of women with men, a general increase in sex freedom and divorce, and an individualistic, pleasure philosophy of life. By A.D. 200 the rigorous, uniform family pattern had given place to celibacy on the part of some persons and sexual promiscuity among others. Infanticide and abortion became common. Children were freely transferred and adopted, and their parents could control them by no greater power than chastisement.

Many writers have pointed out certain similarities between late Roman culture and our own. The point of the comparison is often an effort to show that the loosening up of the family pattern by individualism and pleasure seeking will lead to national disaster. Some have attributed the fall of Rome to her decadent sexual morality. We must suspend judgment as to the predictive value of Roman cultural evolution. Although certain patterns and sequences of Roman change are repeating themselves today, it should be noted that Rome lacked some of the most important culture traits of modern civilization: machinery, scientific biology, and contraception.

THE HEBREW FAMILY. The Hebrew family was frankly polygynous, as were other Asiatic cultures in contrast to European. There are some evidences of an earlier matriarchy. The first five books of the Old Testament contain some detailed accounts of Hebrew family mores. The incest taboo was quite complicated with respect to various degrees of kin and in-law relationships and was enforced by severe penalties. Many sex violations were punishable by death. The levirate was common. The power of the husband over the wife was death in the case of adultery, but otherwise more limited than in Rome. An interesting taboo was the prohibition of a man's remarriage to his divorced wife after she had belonged to another man, or if she had been divorced for barrenness or bad reputation.

At the time of Christ polygyny was passing away. Monogamy is conventionally thought of as one of the basic principles of Christianity. It is notable, however, that monogamy was a characteristic and early pattern of Europe rather than of the region where Christianity was born, and that Jesus himself made few pronouncements about sex mores. The intense emotional correlation between Christianity and monogamy today must be regarded as the result of a gradual fusion of culture patterns in Mediterranean Europe, rather than as one of the main principles of original Christian doctrine.

THE EARLY CHRISTIAN FAMILY. In the early Christian era there was a reaction against the liberal family pattern of late Rome. Instead of taking the form of a return to the earlier Roman pattern, it turned in the direction of celibacy and general asceticism. Celibacy was the most honored state, but it was "better to marry than to burn." * Asceticism came in part from India and Egypt. It offered a way of handling the sex desire. Jewish incest taboos also, which had originated in a homogeneous, semi-nomadic people where there would be

* I Corinthians VII:2.

strong temptation to marry kin because of the small size of the group, were transferred to the very different culture of urban Rome. Theodosius, for example, burned at the stake first cousins who married.

Christianity checked infanticide and abortion, restricted divorce, and gave greater physical protection to women and children and to dependent persons generally. But it did not make a higher social status for women. It tended rather to silence them and to revive certain traditions of the inherent sinfulness and troublesomeness of womankind. These were well supported by the Asiatic legend of Eve the temptress, which Christianity had carried with it from the Hebrew culture. Saint Paul says: "For a man indeed ought not to cover his head, for as much as he is the image and glory of God: but the woman is the glory of the man." * "Let your women keep silence in the churches; for it is not permitted them to speak; but they are commanded to be under obedience, as also saith the law." † "For not Adam but the woman was deceived by the serpent and therefore in transgression." ‡

THE TEUTONIC FAMILY. While Rome was rising, decaying, and falling, and serving as a melting pot for Egyptian, Indian, Persian, Hebrew, and Greek cultural traditions, a very different culture was evolving in the north of Europe among Teutonic and other peoples. This culture is known to us, before the fall of Rome, only through its material artifacts and through the descriptions written by certain Greeks and Romans, such as Julius Caesar. With the invasion of Rome by the northern barbarians, this culture began to make itself felt and to fuse with the Roman-Christian culture.

It appears that one outstanding difference between this North European and all *ancient* historical cultures was the higher status given to women. Kings sat on thrones beside their queens as they had in Egypt. The wife was never given over to the complete control of her husband as in the Mediterranean area. The family was not matrilineal, yet the mother's kin played an important role. Also the father had less absolute power over his children. Until the eleventh century in Europe a father could give his daughter in marriage without her consent, but from then on, under Teutonic influence, the custom of *self-gifta* increased. This was the free giving of herself in marriage by the bride. (Yet we still say in America in the more conservative wedding ceremonies, "Who *gives* this woman?") At the same time it

* I Corinthians XI:7–9.
† I Corinthians XIV:34.
‡ Timothy II:14.

became more common for the bridegroom to give the bride price to the bride herself instead of to her family.

THE MIDDLE AGES: THE CHURCH AND FEUDALISM. In the Middle Ages two influences tended toward a certain uniformity of culture through Europe in spite of the greater decentralization and disorganization of political control. These were the church and feudalism. The church functioned by way of genuine cultural diffusion. It was an internationalizing influence. It converted the remaining barbarians to Christian patterns of life. It crystallized the early Christian ideology of celibacy and asceticism. The canon law of the church regulated marriage and other relations. The church was the only pan-European power. It gained the principal control over the sex life of all Christians. For these matters were regarded as spiritual rather than political. Under the canon law, divorce was forbidden except for adultery, and then no remarriage was permitted.

By A.D. 1000 complete celibacy of the clergy was established, although, as we know, there were periods of wholesale violation. Monastic orders were established and large groups of persons relinquished heterosexual love in return for alleged security and peace of life in other ways. We shall never know just how far sexual abstinence was actually carried out in practice. It is common to regard all religious celibacy past and present with a certain cynicism. But, as we have noted many times before, a cultural ideology is very important even though it be seldom observed in one hundred per cent purity. Celibacy has been and is followed by large numbers of persons of both sexes. The sex drive is powerful, but it is not imperative, and it differs greatly among individuals. If all the actual celibates of today were to be assembled together in certain institutions and were rewarded, honored, and publicized for the behavior they now practice because of necessity, convenience, or fear, we might have an imposing mass of evidence as to the possibility and desirability of celibacy. The Catholic Church, after all, has been practical. It has recognized the subcultural limits. Its pattern is to associate celibacy instead of sexuality with the highest prestige, and then to recognize descending grades of honor to take care of the vast majority—marriage, adultery, promiscuity—keeping even the lowest grade within the fold through confession and penitence. From the standpoint of emotional health, this pattern may be better than the Puritan method of setting up a single, though less rigorous, standard (monogamous marriage with more or less emotional restraint), and then burdening everyone with a sense of guilt who cannot attain that standard.

The other influence toward uniformity was feudalism. This was politically a dividing rather than a uniting force, but it produced similar effects in the four corners of Europe through its similarity of social pattern. It reduced the masses of the people to serfdom and put the power into the hands of local and territorial landowners rather than of centralized national governments. It cultivated a widespread, pan-European aristocratic culture differentiated from the culture of the common people. In places, even the *jus primae noctis,* or right of the lord to the person of any new bride among his serfs, was part of this culture.

THE RISE OF CHIVALRY AND ROMANTIC LOVE. Yet it was in this aristocratic feudal culture that a new institution having far-reaching influence arose. This pattern, chivalry, consisted of love associated with rivalrous courage, a code of personal honor, and migratory exploits. These exploits reached their zenith in the Crusades, stimulated by the Christian movement to recover the Holy Land from the infidel.

The first recognizable pictures of what we call courtly or romantic love date from this period. This ideology is expressed in the Celtic myth of Tristan and Iseult and the Arthurian romances, and in the poetry and song of the troubadours of Provence. [de Rougemont, 1940.] It presents a love relation which is extra-marital, typically one between a wandering knight and the wife of his nobleman host. This relation was supposed to be rapturous, beautiful, reverential, and tender, and restrained on the physical side. It appears, however, to have been especially delectable when the noble lord was absent. In Andreas the chaplain's *De Amore* it is said that "love can deny nothing to love; that marriage cannot be pleaded by a lady as an excuse for refusing love," and, again, that "conjugal affection and the true love of lovers have nothing in common . . . love cannot exist between married people." [Briffault, 1927, III, 428.]

It is useless to speculate concerning the physical expression of these feelings. There is a common view that it was "chaste" and later "degenerated." De Rougemont [1940] perhaps better discerns the true spirit of the cult, which was to intensify the overtones of feeling by imposing or imagining obstacles, thus developing the powerful, unsatisfied desire he calls "passion." These chivalric knights prided themselves upon the esthetic superiority of their love-making to that of the vulgar masses, and they doubtless restrained their physical approaches on many occasions and toward some ladies on all occasions. The mythical Tristan was found with his sword lying, point toward

him, between himself and Iseult, when they were alone and could have had complete freedom. But the ideal and the occasional practice of restraint might suffice to cultivate in these relationships the intense, enriched feelings we call "romantic." Whatever the physiological facts may have been, this cult of chivalric love. by emphasizing its ideal of restrained sexuality, by censoring its songs and making them sing the praises of chastity, was able to gain the tolerance of the Church and later to become the basis of the marriage relation itself.

THE RENAISSANCE. The Renaissance brought a revival of sexual freedom along with Roman art and literature. The *Decameron* of Boccaccio expresses the cynicism and hypocrisy of this period of cultural change. In southern Europe the church made an adjustment, by various subterfuges, to the growing liberalism of family mores. In the north, however, the main drive was for political freedom, and the hypocrisy of the clergy and of southern European culture was capitalized for political ends. The church lost control of marriage in the north; the clergy, including Martin Luther, proclaimed their independence by marrying. Henry VIII of England arranged his successive marriages in defiance of the Pope. The Protestants proclaimed that marriage was a civil and not a religious institution. They appealed for authority to the text of the New Testament. They permitted the clergy to marry, and the divorced, after great difficulties, to remarry.

In England of Elizabethan times there was, as in Italy, an outburst of sexuality in literature, which may be presumed to be some indication at least of a more libertarian code in private life. The early English novel and drama were full of sexual allusions and of jests about sexual irregularities.

PURITANISM. But a new pattern of greater rigor was soon to grip England; this was Puritanism. It was in part a movement of the merchant class to attain wealth and power, but Max Weber [1930] has made a strong case for considering this economic movement a result rather than a cause of the Protestant philosophy of life. With the developing and elaborating commercial activity and the discovery of new lands across the sea, new roads to opportunity and personal satisfaction appeared. One of these roads was emigration. Another was to take advantage of the growing complexity of trade. It was found that by skilful business dealings and thrift a man could raise his economic status and material standard of living. Such a road to prosperity had never before been open to so many people. It became a new cultural value.

People naturally find such an economic aim best attained if love life and the pursuit of pleasure are simplified. Again, the aristocracy were pleasure-loving and licentious. The merchants were despised by the aristocracy; they reacted by scorning the aristocratic culture. They turned also against the Church of England, with its pomp and ceremony and its control over marriage, which they so despised in the Roman church. They set out to "purify" the church, to simplify its ritual and incidentally lessen its burden of expense upon them. The principle was that institutionalized luxury be abolished in order that the individual might devote his whole means to the acquisition of private property.

The Puritan movement influenced the family pattern in both a backward and a forward direction. On the one hand, it reduced the power of the church and contributed to individual liberty. Milton protested against the canon law which permitted divorce for physical adultery but not for "wrongs and grievances of the mind." Cromwell's Marriage Act required all marriages to be referred to a justice of the peace, required the publication of the banns and the consent of both parties. On the other hand, Puritanism tended to bolster up the power of the individual husband. The ideology of Milton and Knox was patriarchal. Knox once said, "An empire of women is the most detestable and damned amongst all enormities that this day abound upon the face of the whole earth."

The aristocratic cult of pleasure tarried later in France than in England. Then came the Revolution. After a short regime of revolutionary license in which the lower classes affected to enjoy some of the privileges for which they had beheaded the aristocracy, and after a regime of relative sex equality, came the stabilizing Code Napoléon. This restored somewhat the powers of the male. It decreed, for example, that a man might secure divorce for his mate's adultery, but not so the wife, unless the man brought his mistress into the home. French women never gained, as in other countries, political power, but probably have as much informal social influence as their Anglo-Saxon sisters.

Anglo-Saxon Puritanism took a somewhat different course. It combined in a unique way with the old chivalric tradition, leading to that cult of idealized feminine purity so characteristic of the Victorian age. In this culture even men were forced to restrain or conceal the sex motive to a degree hitherto unparalleled. The taboos extended themselves also to the things which might be merely seen or heard by vir-

tuous womanhood. It became customary to apologize or ask permission for tobacco smoking and to call a leg a "limb." Even the stage and the novel had to be de-sexualized.

THE FAMILY AMONG THE PEASANTS AND WORKERS. During all these centuries—up to 1800 at least—the great majority of all families in Europe were humble, illiterate tillers of the soil, whose lives are little, if at all, revealed to us through the recorded history and literature of the period. We know them only in a general way. Feudalism gradually passed over into free peasantry, changing first in the thirteenth century in England and disappearing completely only in the nineteenth century in Russia.

LePlay [1879], traveling widely and studying the family life of European workers between 1830 and 1880, found families in various stages of this change. *First,* there were "simple but prosperous" families in Russia and the East, averaging ten members in size, which "combined field labor, craftsmanship and proprietary interests in the same household along with permanent and forced relations between the social classes under the feudal system." [Zimmerman and Frampton, 1935, 103.] These were patriarchal families with strong mores, ignorant of city life and foreign customs. *Second,* there were "complex but prosperous" families in central Europe, Scandinavia, and Spain, averaging six or seven members, engaged in free wage labor or as farm tenants, among whom the "stem family" system was prominent. In this system the family's place on the land or in a vested occupation is passed on without fail from generation to generation, but extra sons or daughters may migrate to cities for work, coming back from time to time. *Third,* there were "disorganized and suffering" families, mostly in western Europe, averaging five to six members, affected by social change, discontent, desires for luxury, debt, Marxism, immorality, and poor relief. The simple peoples received less than half their income in money whereas the others received 70 to 90 per cent of it in money. Thomas and Znaniecki in their monumental study, *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America,* have analyzed this process of change from peasant to urban life. The peasant considered money a temporary substitute for farm capital. If you sold a cow, then you kept your cow in the form of money till you could buy a new one; you didn't spend the money for pleasures.

LePlay was devoted to the cause of restoring thrift, rigorous mores, and social solidarity after the French Revolution, but with all his pleading for this scheme of values we find some informative and de-

tailed descriptions of family life, mostly in terms of their work, income, and articles of consumption. He concluded that "only about half of the European workers have reached a moral level sufficiently high so that the mores enable them to possess homesteads as free saleable property without detriment to themselves." Restrictions on property rights enforced by patrons, institutions, and the mores are necessary to "preserve the women and the children from the natural improvidence and the moral imperfections of the heads of the families." [Zimmerman and Frampton, 1935, 530.]

In general LePlay gives us a picture of the family of the common people as an economic organization, whose happiness lies in adhering to the old mores and living standards, and whose greatest danger lies in the temptation to buy the goods and services of developing industrialism.

Despite LePlay's backward-looking advice, which curiously resembles present-day Fascism in so far as that is thoughtful, more and more European families passed into his "disorganized," individualist type. They secured higher money incomes, spent more money for more pleasures, moved about, became less authoritarian, permitted children to be heard as well as seen, gave women a little more freedom, sometimes even practiced divorce, and forsook the old mores to a degree which would horrify LePlay if he could know about it. Yet today much more than half of them seem to be morally capable of owning property in fee simple. A new thrift has developed which consists in limiting the birth rate. Technology and education have improved living in many ways.

THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION AND FEMINISM. The changes which LePlay saw and deplored were part of the process of urbanization which had been going forward since 1500 or before, and which was greatly accelerated by the Industrial Revolution from about 1750 on. Yet LePlay observed only the early phases of industrialism, and did not see some remedial changes which came later. The more complete story of what industrialism has done to the family will be told in Chapters V and VI. We shall discuss here only one development, feminism, because it ties in with what has gone before.

From 1200 to 1800 such improvements as occurred in the status of women were largely honorific, ideological, and applied largely to the more privileged classes. The Industrial Revolution brought a substantial increase of economic and legal power and freedom to women in all classes, finally bringing them to the highest status so far enjoyed

in recorded history. In the nineteenth century began a genuine class-conscious "woman movement" led by women. The objective has been to secure full legal and political rights with men. The factory system gave women opportunities for independent employment outside the home, which they had not enjoyed before. Marriage became less *economically* necessary to both men and women. The liberalization of divorce laws and the decline of church authority made it easier to get rid of cruel husbands.

The increased freedom and leisure of women in the upper classes contributed greatly to the woman movement and to women's humanitarian activities. They did a great deal to reduce cruelty to children and to establish humanitarian agencies and ideals. At first they were concerned greatly with alcohol and prostitution and other such obvious symptoms, so offensive to the Victorian culture. Later they have turned their attention more to the underlying economic causes of social problems.

When we come, in Chapter XVIII, to evaluate the situation, we shall see that nevertheless we have not yet achieved the kind of relations between men and women that the democratic ideal implies.

THE FAMILY AND THE STATE. Helen Bosanquet [1915] has observed that throughout modern times in Europe the State has used the family to strengthen itself. Prussian and Norman primogeniture were thought to strengthen monarchy. The French Revolution enforced equal division of property in order to weaken the nobility. Napoleon continued this, but he also created new hereditary estates with entails * for his own supporters. England enforced equal partition upon the Catholics in Ireland but allowed primogeniture among the Protestant population of the north. In all these cases the family and its property were used as tools by the State.

Fascist countries today are continuing this policy of using the family as an instrument of the State. In so doing they verbally glorify the family. "Labor, Family, and Fatherland" is the motto of Hitler's new Fascist France, in place of "Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity." In the Democracies also the family's rights have been increasingly curtailed by the State and now its duties are being somewhat reemphasized; but all this treatment of the family by the democratic state is a part of the welfare policy rather than of the economic, political, or military policies.

* *Entail* means that the owner must bequeath his estate to a predetermined series of heirs, and cannot otherwise dispose of it.

B. MODERN EUROPEAN FAMILY PATTERNS*

REGIONAL DIFFERENCES AND DIFFUSION. In the great culture area occupied by Euro-American or Christian civilization, certain fundamental culture traits, such as monogamy and the school education of children, are now practically universal. Within Europe the family shows regional, class, and religious variations to a greater degree than in the United States. Some of them are exceedingly local. In Slavic peasant Europe, for example, there are villages where pre-nuptial unchastity is severely frowned upon, and other villages not far away where it is even connived at by parents eager to find mates for their daughters. [Husek, 478.] Certain broader differences, however, may be distinguished.

Roughly, Europe may be divided into three great sub-areas as regards family culture. Most typical of the north is Scandinavia; of the south, Spain; of the east, Russia. The north is characterized, *relatively speaking,* by sex equality, non-seclusion, and moderate physical labor of women; some acceptance of chivalry; a single standard of sex behavior, whether on a strict or a libertarian level; divorce in preference to toleration of extra-marital relations; late marriage; secular control of marriage and divorce; scientific infant care and rigorous child discipline. The south is characterized by sex inequality or patriarchy and some seclusion of women from public activities; moderate physical labor of women; more male jealousy and possessiveness with less chivalry in the attitude toward woman; a rather frank double standard of sex behavior for married people as well as unmarried; early marriage; church control of marriage and divorce; unscientific infant care and a less austere child discipline. The east is characterized by sex equality; a minimum of seclusion and segregation of women; severe physical labor of women; lack of chivalry; wife beating; and a more or less single sex standard, though with great variations. In the other respects it resembles the south more than the north.

The failure to appreciate these geographic culture differences is partly due to the fact that "backward" countries are becoming more and more like the "advanced" or industrial countries. If Czechoslovakia, for example, becomes culturally more like France or America as it becomes more industrialized, one naturally supposes that its former unlikeness was due to the fact that it had not yet become in-

* The data in this section, often presented in the present tense, refer mainly to conditions before 1939, even more accurately to those before 1920.

dustrialized and that all cultural differences are so many stages in a universal process of evolution. But this taking on of western European and American family patterns by backward countries is due to cultural diffusion as well as to laws of inner cultural growth. Because industrialization led to sex equality and the romantic complex in America, one cannot be sure that industrialization in Spain or Bulgaria would have the same effects if there were no America to set an example. There is, indeed, a strong drive in backward countries to imitate the non-economic patterns of western Europe and America long before their economic patterns have correspondingly developed. In China, in fact, as La Piere and Wang [1931] have pointed out, Western ideology in many respects is being taken over before Western material culture has developed sufficiently to produce that result "automatically." The same can be said of Turkey, where we see the direct borrowing of Western legal codes, including monogamous marriage.

National and Class Differences. There are also differences which appear more or less abruptly at political or linguistic boundaries rather than shade off gradually in the usual manner of cultural diffusion. Such differences may be the expression of national values cultivated through literature and education and sometimes crystallized in national legislation. For example, England, whose puritan traditions are only weakly represented on the Continent, is in many ways unique. Nowhere else in Europe do *urban* people live to so great an extent in single-family houses, although great masses of these in London are of the row-house type like those of Baltimore and Philadelphia. England led all other countries in the aggressiveness of the feminist movement, yet only recently has she permitted divorce on other grounds than adultery. The English tend to develop sharp differences in sex personality through their treatment of their children, and yet they give the adult woman much political power and economic and moral freedom. A common saying among English middle-class families about 1920 was: "He's a man child, you must not break his will." The Russells [1923] have observed that perhaps nowhere is a certain "instinctive" happiness so great as among British upper-class male youth, under the influence of the athletic and emotionally toughening regime so characteristic of English private schools.

Gregory Bateson [1942] has observed that the alleged English "arrogance" often attributed to their speakers in this country is based upon a self-assertive, dominating, and also mildly exhibitionistic behavior which the Englishman assumes as appropriate to an adult and a

parent. On the other hand, the American encourages his children to be the exhibitionists, and hence in order to get attention he has to behave like a child; therefore he often seems to English people to boast and exaggerate. Somerset Maugham told an American audience in 1940 that English emotional family ties, especially between mothers and sons in the upper and middle classes, were much looser than in France, as illustrated by the easy acceptance of youth's going away to school and on foreign expeditions.

The family pattern of the Irish is related to national values, cultivated partly by religion, in combination with economic and populational conditions. Ireland has an unusually high percentage of aged people, a sex ratio of about 103, high emigration, and late marriage. One-half of all women who married in 1930 were between 45 and 55. [Arensberg and Kimball, 1940.] The mores severely condemn sex outside of marriage; the aged are conceived as sexless; there is an aversion to having more than one sexually active couple in a household (as, for example, aged parents who might live with children and still desire privacy for sex relations). Widows do not often remarry among the Irish. Hence we apparently have population control by the methods of late marriage and sexual restraint, whereas many otherwise similar peasant societies practice early marriage and/or premarital sex relations, have high birth rates and population expansion. It has been observed that the Irish take more seriously the ideology of the Catholic Church than do the continental Catholics.

Interwoven with regional differences are class differences. In European aristocracy throughout the Continent are certain chivalric traditions which make woman a protected plaything. It is in the same class that a woman can follow a hetaira pattern of life and still maintain a certain kind of prestige. This pattern may possibly be related to old traditions in which even wife lending was practiced in honor of illustrious guests, and in which to be the mistress of a high-born man was not at all less preferable to being the wife of one of more lowly origin. Among the middle and lower classes, on the contrary, this tradition has been less influential.

Spatial and Material Patterns. European peasant families live mainly in villages and have their land broken up into several pieces of different character, at some distance from the village. This is in contrast to the American pattern of separate consolidated farms with farmhouses. In places there are large consolidated estates, but these require several workers who live in a compact group of buildings resembling a village, similar to our southern plantation pattern. The

northern states farm pattern is, however, approached in Europe in several areas—northern France, Germany, and the plains of Hungary. Urban families, except in Great Britain, dwell mainly in apartment houses; suburbs of the American type, made up of single-family houses, are not extensive.

The homes of Europe are smaller and simpler affairs than ours. There is less elaboration of comfort and of esthetic detail. Although any given task requires more labor because of the lesser machinery, there are fewer tasks to be performed for the sake of luxury and comfort. When a home does adopt standards of living above bare necessity, as in the middle classes, it is customary to employ one or more servants; this practice of course swells the employment figures. A servant is normally to be expected in a business class (brain working, "white-collar") family in Europe, whereas in America only a third of the business class, and only about 5 per cent of the whole population have full-time servants.*

THE STRUCTURE OF MARITAL AND SEXUAL RELATIONSHIPS. Nowhere in Europe is there recognized polygamy. Recently it existed in the extreme southeast, under the former Turkish rule. Europe, except for Soviet Russian cities, has less divorce than America. In France and Scandinavia, however, the theory of divorce is more liberal than in the United States, although the actual rate is less. In these countries marriage and divorce are more completely free from religious control than elsewhere. In Scandinavia, divorce by mutual consent without specified cause introduces an element lacking in most of the Euro-American area. In revolutionary Russia the still more extreme principle of divorce *at the will of either party* obtained. But the general tendency in Europe is toward a greater permanence of marriage than here. In church-controlled Catholic countries divorce is low or practically absent. Adjustment to marital incompatibility is made in other ways. It is interesting that England, the first country to revolt successfully against Catholicism, has remained more true to the church doctrine of indissoluble marriage than have countries like France, Czechoslovakia, and Mexico, whose populations are still nominally Catholic.

In peasant central Europe there is a pattern which approaches a single standard of virginity more closely than do the traditions of southern Europe or of the aristocracy. In rural Poland and Czechoslovakia pre-marital intercourse is condemned or condoned equally in

* *Fortune* survey, October, 1937; Lynd [1929, 170]; Kneeland [1929-B].

both sexes. In the older rural culture, which is fast dying, young men in parts of Czechoslovakia wore feathers in their hats before marriage. If intercourse were discovered the offending youth had his feather forcibly removed and he was thereafter taunted with a term indicating that he was no longer virgin. The girl who had been unchaste was obliged to change her head dress and to attend church with the married women instead of with the unmarried girls. [Husek, 478.] These attitudes, however, differed enormously within small distances. Alongside this tradition was one which tolerated extreme pre-marital love-making under the parental roof, often called *bundling*. [Sumner, 1906, 525.] This consisted in spending part of the night together under blankets partly dressed, or some similar practice which could be outwardly differentiated from the complete freedom of married couples but which yet often actually led to sex relations and pre-marital pregnancy. The custom of bundling was carried to America and practiced in colonial New England.

The center of this pre-marital tolerance seems to lie in the Danubian region. In 1927 Austria held the European record for illegitimacy, with 25.2 per cent of her births illegitimate. Detailed study indicates that it is the rural districts there which have the highest rates, particularly where there are large agricultural holdings employing only family members and servants. Practically no stigma attaches to illegitimacy, which seems to be largely a custom of deferring formal marriage until after the birth of a child. [Hecke, 1930.] It is from this region that a large part of our immigration of 1890 to 1920 came. Their illegitimacy rates in America are much lower, being less than those of the native American population, but higher than the Italian-American. [Carpenter, N., 1927, 244.] Austrian illegitimacy rates have risen since World War I, but for decades have stood higher than those of most other European countries. The high-illegitimacy area extends over through Germany to Scandinavia, Sweden usually showing one of the highest rates on the Continent.

In contrast stands the Mediterranean pattern. Illegitimacy rates have been generally much lower in Italy than in central Europe. In Sicily the sex mores are enforced by the fear of the vendetta. Marriage is early, and pre-marital intercourse is said to be rare, because daughters are jealously guarded by their fathers. [Baxter, 1933.]

Dr. Emilio Mira recently questionnaired Spanish married couples as to what they would do upon discovering spousal unfaithfulness. One hundred eighty-seven husbands would try to surprise the adulterers in *flagrante delicto*

and then seek a divorce, 49 would fight a duel with the interloper, 21 would kill the wife, 8 would kill her lover. One hundred eighty-five wives would leave the unfaithful husband without telling their friends the reason, 18 would challenge the mistress to a duel, 11 would kill the husband, 5 would kill the mistress.*

In Mediterranean countries and among the conservative groups in France, chaperonage is more important than elsewhere. This is particularly true of the upper classes. Business-class families are unwilling to permit their daughters to seek a position away from home or to be entertained by a suitor outside the family home. In Spain the courtship supervision reaches perhaps its extreme, and daughters of the upper classes are guarded from free social contacts with men before betrothal. The practices of the upper class of a given culture have a certain importance even though not followed by the majority of the people. They set a certain standard and express an ideology which has influence throughout society.

In general the south of Europe institutionalizes jealousy and links personal honor strongly with family possessiveness. It tolerates acts of violence in defense of honor. These attitudes are here the chief bulwark of the mores, whereas in the north the ideology of the sinfulness of sex plays a larger role. The controls over Mediterranean love behavior are external and do not get "underneath the skin" as does the inner control of puritanism. The Mediterranean tends to assume that sex relations will inevitably take place wherever the vigilance of supervision is relaxed. He is like the eastern European in having no inner taboos upon sex. It is said that Latin brides, in contrast to Anglo-Saxon brides, adapt readily to sex life because they have been brought up to think of it, not as something inherently disgusting, but rather as a desirable thing denied them before marriage by a jealous and vigilant environment. It is suggestive that in both Russia and Mexico the sexual rights of *prisoners* are recognized, whereas in Germany this is a problem in the stage of formulation and in Anglo-Saxon countries unthinkable. In the Federal Penitentiary of Mexico has been established the practice of *visita conyugal.* This is under medical regulation and is not limited to marriage, although change of partner is rarely permitted. [Daniel, 1931.] In old Russia, the punishment of exile to Siberia did not necessarily involve deprivation of love satisfactions, for wives and mistresses frequently followed the prisoners and lived in the vicinity of the prison camps with access to

* *Time,* July 3, 1933.

their men. Russian prisoners are now permitted sex leaves under certain conditions. [Wolbarst, 1931.]

In general, the tendency on the Continent has been to permit and to regulate rather than officially to forbid prostitution. In Germany this tolerance has been more or less indirect and hypocritical; in France and Italy, it was frank and open. Also on the Continent generally the keeping of a mistress by a married man has been less severely condemned and hence necessitated less concealment. There was on the Continent no late-Victorian women's movement attempting to enforce sexual regularity upon the male sex in the name of the single standard. As regards women's behavior, Anglo-Saxon countries drew a sharp line between the virtuous and non-virtuous which to a large extent cut across class lines. There is another kind of "single standard" in this sentiment that all *social classes* should be judged by the same standard in their sex behavior. The Continent, in sex as in other matters, has tended more to recognize different standards for different classes. Unchastity might be regarded with kindly tolerance, and in fact expected, in a girl of one social rank, but severely condemned in one of higher rank.

In general, European parents take more initiative in the marriage of their children than do American, and the romantic free-choice complex is less deeply established in the popular mores. Property considerations still guide marriage, and in some countries there are matchmakers. The amount of property brought by each partner into the union is a matter of importance. Yet all this is not to say that the majority of European marriages are for the sake of property rather than love. Nowhere in Europe can a young man or woman be forced to marry against his or her desire as can be done in the Orient.

Social Roles and Relations of the Sexes. In most of Europe the woman performs more arduous physical labor than in America. She works in the fields and carries heavy burdens on her back or head. One sees commonly, in central and eastern Europe, women working as hod carriers for male bricklayers, women laborers with pick and shovel along the railroads under a male foreman, women hoeing fields of beets, women sweeping the floors of factories and removing trash. One sometimes sees a woman helping a dog to haul a wagon through the streets. These conditions are less characteristic of England and France; they are most characteristic of Russia. The employment of women outside the home in America is a recent development and has been controlled somewhat by the chivalry complex. It puts women largely into clerical work and into certain branches of factory work

such as the textile industry. In Europe the extra-domestic employment of women is of much broader scope in the manual occupations and is not regulated by chivalric attitudes; on the other hand, their employment in the mental and directive occupations is more closely limited by the tradition of male superiority. Only recently have women come into teaching and clerical work. About 37 per cent of the public school teachers of Czechoslovakia are female, as contrasted with 84 per cent of American teachers; only 22 per cent of the personnel of banking and finance is female in Czechoslovakia. Occupational statistics of the industrialized area of Czechoslovakia (Bohemia and Moravia) show nearly 50 per cent of all persons engaged in gainful occupations, whereas in the United States and also in agricultural regions such as Slovakia, the percentage is 40 or less.* The difference is due largely to the great industrial employment of women. In our textile cities such as Manchester, New Hampshire, and in southern mill villages, also about 50 per cent of the population is gainfully occupied, for the same reason. [U. S. Women's Bureau, 1923.]

Northern Europe in general has the old Teutonic tradition of feminine freedom and gives its women the greatest independence. Wieth-Knudsen [1929] expresses a vigorous protest against the northern European "woman and her control of man," which contrasts with the respect of woman for man in southern Europe and the Orient. If he were to observe the American situation, he would probably protest still more vigorously. In the Mediterranean region the family pattern is more patriarchal. France is the one remaining major nation which has not given women the vote; Russian women took readily to public duties after the revolution but they also work in the fields as hard as, if not harder than, the men; in the northwest of Europe women have achieved both independence and protection from the more arduous forms of manual work. In the southeast of Europe we find influences of the Mohammedan pattern of extreme seclusion of women.

In Spain and in Latin American countries which have not, like Mexico, revolted against the Spanish and Catholic traditions, there is a more extreme patriarchy, absence of divorce, franker double standard of sex conduct, a more intense mother complex and brother-sister affection. Langdon-Davies [1929] says that the Spanish woman is like the English woman of many generations ago. But there is reason to believe that these characteristics do not represent merely time stages in

* *Statistická Ročenka Republiky Československé,* Prague, Státní Úřad Statisticky, 1934, pp. 14, 18.

the change from agricultural to industrial civilization. They are in part geographic differences, independent of stages of evolution. Spain was influenced by eastern patriarchal patterns through the Moors, whereas Germany and Scandinavia at all stages have been under the influence of early Teutonic traditions of sex equality.

AGE GROUPS AND SOCIETAL MAINTENANCE. The large family group, in which three generations and several married pairs normally lived in the same home, persisted longer in rural Europe than in America with its isolated farming. Control by grandparents, the sharing of the care of young children by adults other than their own parents and by older children, and the idea of family rather than individual property are features which still linger in rural Europe although they are well-nigh obsolete in America. In general, European children are trained to a more deferential attitude and a more military obedience to their parents and toward adults in general. A European male adult was heard to remark that he would like to thrash a boy who was making so much noise whistling on the public street. European children, though not employed outside their homes substantially more than American, are expected to make most of their time useful to the family when not in school. There is little of the segregated children's activities and juvenile culture complex which are so prominent in America. European ideology does not call so much for the special treatment of children as a class or for the organization of a separate play life for them. It makes children more a part of the general family life.

This difference is partly due to the great wealth of America and the taking over by machinery of so much work which was especially suitable to children. The telephone, for example, has greatly reduced the need of juveniles for carrying messages; the automobile, central heating and water supply systems eliminate much of the petty fetching and carrying of older days. There is another factor of great influence in American life. That is the tendency in the business class, here as in England, for the family to be ranked according to leisure and consumptive activities of the wife and children. Father may go into tantrums when he pays their bills, but at the same time he would be ashamed if their appearance and their good times did not compare favorably with those of other families in his class; of this attitude the wife and children take pleasant advantage. On the Continent, the rank depends more upon occupation, less upon scale of living. [Veblen, 1906.]

Probably in no civilized country does the father of a family have less power over its activities than here. He may no longer beat his

wife, and even the corporal punishment of children is closely limited by cruelty laws and watchful social agencies. But the power to inflict corporal punishment is not the sole bulwark of power. The father's absence from home during the entire day and his competitive preoccupation with earning a living militate against his real ability to influence what goes on in his home. In the American business class, especially in the suburban commuter zones, the mother becomes the real head of the family to an extent elsewhere unparalleled in civilized, patrilineal cultures. The mother controls the use of leisure time and of the bulk of the family income, and of each she has more at her disposal than elsewhere. European social thinkers are more impressed by this pattern than by almost any other which they observe in American family life.

It is suggestive that Freud, who placed so much emphasis on the Oedipus complex and the rebellion of son against father, was reared in a central European and Germanic society where patriarchal authority over children is especially strong. It is suggestive also that it was in this area that people could not "take" freedom and democracy and fell easily under a new and more severe authority than they had experienced under their monarchs.

C. ASIATIC FAMILY PATTERNS *

GENERAL PATTERNS. There is a certain broad unity of family culture throughout the civilized countries of Asia which is worth sketching, even though the details differ enormously from region to region. This unity is perhaps based upon the central pattern of polygyny. Asia has carried over polygyny into a stage of high civilization. Whether polygyny is compatible with an industrial civilization is a question which may never be answered. As Asia takes over European industrialism, she also tends to take over European monogamy. We cannot conclude from this that industrialism *necessitates* monogamy. There may or may not be some strong functional connection between the two patterns.

The great majority of families in Asia are probably monogamous. In the southern Chinese village studied by Kulp [1925, 181], where

* While expressed in the present tense, many of the conditions described in this section are rapidly changing, and are no longer found in large parts of the population. The picture given refers most particularly to conditions in the early part of the present century. It is important to know these as a background for current changes.

concubinage is quite respectable, only 14 out of the 182 families were polygynous. Because the sex ratio is seldom far from the normal 100 except under conditions which lead to an abnormally high death or migration rate for one sex, the majority of men can secure only one wife. Where many men are not married at all, but make use of prostitution, somewhat more polygyny is made possible than the simple sex ratio would indicate. Unfortunately, statistics of sex ratios and marital status are not available for most of Asia. It is significant that whereas, a few years ago, there was reported one recognized prostitute for every 906 of the population in London (about the ratio of doctors to population in the United States), a ratio of one to 582 in Berlin, 481 in Paris, and 437 in Chicago, the ratio was one to 277 for Tokio, 258 for Peiping, and 137 for Shanghai. [Gamble and Burgess, 247.]

Asiatic prostitution is even more taken for granted than is European as a necessary part of the social order. But, unlike the European, the Asiatic prostitute is not conceived of as relegated permanently to that status. She may afterwards marry respectably; many do so, of course, in Europe and America, but in Asia this is looked upon more as a normal expectation. In Japan, daughters of poor families become geisha girls voluntarily or upon parental pressure in order to ease the family finances. To do so is an act of filial duty, honorable rather than otherwise, and may result later in a conventional marriage and elevation of status.

Again, the function of the eastern Asiatic prostitute is not exclusively sexual. She is, especially in the person of the Japanese geisha, an esthetic entertainer of men, a provider of amusement and may be selective as regards her sexual relationships. In China, it is said, many poor men visit houses of prostitution for the sake of this companionship alone, drinking tea or wine with the girls, and not paying the higher fee which is charged for spending the night. Prostitutes thus perform social functions which in Europe are performed by conventional women; the latter in the Orient are under seclusion. [Gamble and Burgess, 252.]

In Asia, age, as well as wealth and power, tends to give a man sexual privilege. The tendency for older men to appropriate younger women is more pronounced than in the West. This prestige given to age follows in part from wealth and power but represents to a large extent an independent culture pattern.

Marriage in Asia is less a matter of free choice than in even the most conventional European classes. In India and China the young are betrothed long before they have any power to choose. In China they

do not have any social contacts and sometimes do not even see each other until the wedding day. [Kulp, 1925, 171.] In India, culture frowns upon the marrying of a person toward whom one has felt love, for that is not the path of duty. [Tagore in Keyserling, 1926.]

The Asian polygynous pattern is also highly patriarchal, patrilocal, and patrilinear. The man has typically the power to divorce at will, although practically he is subject to public opinion; the wife has no such power, although practically she may often return to her parents. The culture also secludes and segregates women to a degree unknown in Europe. Woman's place is in the home or the harem. This seclusion, of course, applies mainly to the upper class women, whereas those of the lower classes may appear considerably on the public streets or in the fields as laborers. It is a matter of observation that women are not seen in the open as frequently in Turkey as they are in similar agricultural countries of Europe; and in North China, though foot-bound women are sometimes wheeled or carried into the fields to weed the crops, their bound feet and cultural requirements generally keep them much more closely confined than women anywhere in Europe. In South China there is less segregation. But even there Kulp found that, though women make marketing trips to nearby cities and trips to gather certain products at a distance, their social contacts on such excursions are much limited. In China a man typically feasts and entertains his guests without the presence of his women folk except in the capacity of servants.

Burma is a notable oasis of feminine freedom and non-seclusion.

THE FAMILY IN ISLAM. In Mohammedan cultures tradition gives essential equality of status to the several wives. In the upper classes, at least, there is a life of ease and comfort for the women; the work outside the home is largely done by men and animals. Seclusion from the public is the rule, and when it is necessary to leave the home the women, until recently at least, were veiled. The ideology is that the women are choice possessions who must be carefully guarded even from the lustful eyes of other men. Prostitution is not characteristic of Mohammedan culture, the brothels of Constantinople being largely European products. Islam places a certain intrinsic value upon every human being; there are no degraded classes as in India; slaves are theoretically eligible to win freedom and power. A slave girl in the old Mohammedan cultures could be elevated to wifehood with the full respect of all. Imagine this happening, for example, to a mulatto slave girl of our own older South!

THE FAMILY IN CHINA. In China the first, who is the betrothed, wife enjoys a superior status. The rest are "concubines." All form a hierarchy, each having privileges denied the next lower. The concubines are chosen at will, commonly for their youth or beauty.

Life is not easy for women in China. They are somewhat less secluded and more hard-worked than Mohammedan women, less protected by their own families from the possible arbitrariness of their husbands.

In China there is an idealization of father-son love, and a tender reverence for the old men. The family pattern of China is closely tied up with ancestor worship. Like many primitive peoples, the Chinese have a system of exogamous sibs or clans. These are patrilineal and patrilocal, and the sib group corresponds in some measure to the locality group. In the village studied by Kulp, practically all the men belonged to the same sib and had the same family name; their mothers and wives had all come from other sibs and originally other villages; their daughters would marry and leave the home village. The important ceremonies are connected with ancestor worship; in these the women are merely spectators and not participants. Children are betrothed by their parents at the age of 10 to 12, but unlike the practice in India, they are of fairly equal age and do not marry until about 20. Marriage means the girl's leaving her parental sib and coming to live permanently with her husband's kin, although, actually, visits to her home are permitted. The idea is, however, that she is under the authority of her husband in all matters. Woman, it is said, passes through three ages. In the first she is under the authority of her father; then, under her husband; finally, if he dies, she is subject to her son. Male children are outwardly preferred, their arrival a cause of rejoicing. Girl babies are deplored, and there is a tradition of female infanticide. Kulp, however, could not find any record of a known case of infanticide in his village.

Despite this cultural overvaluation of the male sex, Kulp found that parents actually came to love their girl children with great tenderness and that the mother is highly revered. These facts illustrate a frequently noted principle, that whenever culture stresses or institutionalizes a certain sentiment at the expense of another which is an equally natural product of subcultural interaction, the deplored sentiment or attitude actually does exist in considerable frequency, but is concealed by verbal negations. Outwardly we love whatever persons we are told to love by our culture: our father in China, our mother in India, our

wife or sweetheart in America. Actually we love whomsoever our particular personal experiences lead us to love; and this differs more as between individuals than as between cultures.

There is a taboo against the remarriage of widows, although nothing like the degradation of widows which occurs in India. In Kulp's village there were 69 widows and only 4 widowers.

Reproduction to the limit of capacity is a duty. The leading cultural value is to beget many sons to the honor of one's ancestors. At funerals families hire mourners in order that the procession be large and impressive.

In China the family system merges with government and the economic system. It is difficult to say where one leaves off and the other begins. Although there is a national government organization with a code of civil law modeled upon European lines, the great majority of Chinese individuals are in practice subject to the authority of their family elders and have little contact with civil law or government. The central government holds the village elders responsible for the behavior of individuals within their communities. These village elders are in fact family elders, for the typical village is a male sib, which may be subdivided into religious families, that is, groups which have a great deal of common ancestor worship. These again may be subdivided into economic families, practicing a joint economy, although not always dwelling in a single house. The economic families again subdivide into natural families, that is, groups consisting of a man and his wife (and occasionally concubines) and their children. Obedience to the father and other male ancestors and elders is obligatory throughout life. Decisions such as those in regard to the sale of property, the taking of a wife, the building of a house, which a Euro-American of 21 years of age could legally make for himself in defiance of parental will, must be referred to one's family elders.

In the cities these patterns are rapidly changing. Women are being educated; there is free courtship and right of divorce to woman as well as man. According to a code recently enacted the duty of a wife to obey her husband is no longer recognized, and women may dispose of their own property without the husband's consent. It will probably be some time before the new civil laws will be enforceable in practice in the rural areas. The individual living under the traditional family regime may have rights which are theoretically protected by the national government, but his personal safety may demand that he do not appeal to the courts against local family authority.

THE FAMILY IN INDIA. India is particularly notable for the seclusion and degradation of widows. Until the British stopped it there was the custom of the suttee, by which a widow committed suicide at the funeral of her husband. Of course this probably did not happen with the great majority of widows.

Kipling gives us the dramatic tale of an official who had a clandestine affair with an attractive young girl living in seclusion. On her invitation, he had entered her quarters through a rear doorway. After many days of love he approached the house and was about to enter, when he was suddenly wounded by a sharp weapon. After recovering he returned to find the doorway walled up, and the girl standing at a window, holding up to his view the stumps of her recently amputated hands. She was a widow and she had also violated a caste taboo. This tale, whether specifically true or not, illustrates the cultural role to which many a widow preferred an honorable death on her husband's funeral pyre.*

Child marriage of girls is the custom in India. According to a report of about 1930 nearly half the girls of India were married before 15. For the Moslems the percentage is about 37, for the Hindus 48. The Sarda bill prohibiting child marriages was passed in 1929 but according to this report it had not been enforced. In 1925 the age of consent, outside of marriage, was raised to 14. Before 1860 it had been 10! [Rathbone, 1931.]

The mother complex is prevalent among the men of India. Love is regarded not only as unnecessary to marriage, but as a moral obstacle. There is little sex repression in India despite its ascetic cults. The idea is rather that sexual desire is something to be escaped by using it up.

Whereas in China the important rule of marriage choice is to marry outside one's own sib, in India it is to marry inside one's own caste. China stresses a specific exogamy; India, a specific endogamy. Theoretically the Chinese has a much wider range of possible mates. Practically the range is great enough in both cultures to permit the families to make a suitable choice.

THE FAMILY IN JAPAN. Japan is not polygynous. However, it adopts many of the patterns of the polygynous culture area which it adjoins. The esthetic function of woman is stressed more than elsewhere in Asia.

Japan is one of the few countries where the divorce rate has actually decreased in recent years. During the period of 1897–1929, it fell from

* "Beyond the Pale," in *Plain Tales from the Hills.*

	Persia	India (Hindu culture)
Structure of Marital and Sexual Relationships	Polygyny respectable, limited to 4 wives. Some child marriage. Fiat divorce for husband. Widows—no remarriage nor property. May become concubines. Choice of mates made by parents, acquaintance unnecessary. Religious control. Death for adultery.	Polygyny respectable. Child marriage—man older. Temple prostitution in south. Respected dancing girls. Fiat divorce for husband. Suttee (formerly). Widows—no remarriage. Spinsterhood after puberty disgraceful. Choice made by parents. Matchmakers; horoscopes used in choice.
Kinship Structure and its Relation to Marital Structure.	Class endogamy. Financial status important. Dowry. Patrilocalism. Patriliny.	Caste endogamy. Cousin marriage. Dowry in high castes. Bride purchase in low. Patrilocalism.
Social Roles and Relations of the Sexes	Women weave, embroider, care for children; in villages—milk sheep, gather herbs. Wife beating. Segregated quarters in house even for mates. Woman heavily veiled. No social relations of men and women. Women meet friends at public baths. All property male. Girl babies deplored.	Upper caste secluded. Peasant women work. Segregated quarters in house. Separate meals for men, women, and children. Women walk behind, not beside, man. Women not at prayers. Girl babies deplored.
Age Groups and Societal Maintenance	Filial piety. Boys moved from women's quarters at age 8, and formal education begins.	
Ideology and Control of Reproduction		Reincarnation.
Love Satisfaction and Frustration	Mainly erotic. Sexual paradise. Tenderness not stressed except between mother and child.	Disapproval of marriage to love object. Duty and love contrasted. Men have strong mother complex. Sex free for male. Sex desire managed by exhausting it.

* Persian and Burman data from a summary from miscellaneous published sources, in unpu

Vassar Co

LE 1

MILY TRAITS*

Burma	China (South, Rural, Traditional)	Japan (Recent)
Monogamy. Mistresses.	Polygyny respectable. Concubines inferior to main wife.	Monogamy. Concubinage illegal.
	Marriage at 20, ages equal.	Marriage 17–25, with parental consent.
Divorce by mutual consent, or by either partner, but checked by ridicule.		Divorce by either party or mutual consent, if over 25.
Widows remarry.	Taboo on remarriage of widows.	Widows can remarry under certain conditions and with consent of husband's family.
Personal choice but consent of both families sought. Some elopements.	Choice made by parents, acquaintance unnecessary. Betrothal at 10.	Free choice after 25.
Courtship.	No courtship. Matchmakers.	Matchmakers.
Some superstitions regarding choice.		
Secular marriage.		Secular marriage.
		Adulterous husband unpunished, adulterous wife may be divorced and imprisoned 2 years.
Prostitution.	Prostitution.	Prostitution often honorable. Geisha girls.
Marry anyone except near kin.		
Dowry.		
Matrilocalism.	Patrilocalism.	
	Patriliny.	Patriliny.
Women active in agriculture.		One-half of female population employed, many in industry.
Kind treatment of wife.		Charm important in woman.
Mingling of sexes.	Strict sex segregation of adolescents.	
Great freedom at several feasts.	Separate meals for men and women.	
Women at bazaars.		
	Woman has some power in household.	
Women have separate property.		
Women vote.		
	Women non-participants in ancestor worship.	
Marriageable girls chaperoned. (No social dancing.)		Sexes separated in secondary schools. Girls study "duties of women" 4 years. A few private girls' schools.
	Girl babies deplored.	
Ceremonial obedience.	Old men enjoy great respect and authority. Obedience to and consultation of elders throughout life.	Orphans reared by relatives.
Tattooing. Nude children. Naming customs. Ear-boring of girls.	Competitive and institutionalized mourning customs.	
	Reproduction a duty to ancestors. Very high birth rate.	Birth rate fell from 36 in 1920 to 27 in 1936. New measures to increase births.
Buddhist ascetism. Certain taboos on touching women.	Great development of erotic. No sex repression.	
Warm affection in family.	Father-son and brother-sister tenderness.	
Tenderness between husband and wife. Some romantic love in courtship.		

blished paper by Hannah Burr Polk Arnold, "A Study of the Family in Burma and Persia," llege, 1936.

about 3 per 1,000 population to less than 1 per 1,000, while the American rate during the same period was rising from about 0.7 to 1.7 per 1,000, and most European rates were rising. [Hankins, 1931.] One is naturally curious as to the reason.

In earlier Japanese culture, marriage was at an early age, was arranged by parents, and was exceedingly patriarchal although not polygynous. Divorce rather than concubinage was the resort of the dissatisfied husband. Iwasaki [1930] attributes the fall of the divorce rate to Western cultural influences, despite the fact that in the West these influences have increased divorce. He mentions the education of women, the increased literature for women as a class, the moving pictures, Christianity, and industrialization. The way these forces have had their effect is to raise the age of marriage, to give woman a chance for an independent living, and to increase marriages of free choice. Western pre-marital courtship (not necessarily sexual) is taking the place of the geisha girl. Marriage and divorce are now more mutually controlled, less subject to the whim of the male. It may be, of course, that a further development of Western culture may lead to individualism and a new upward trend in divorce.

The pattern of prostitution in Japan presents interesting contrasts to that of the Western world. There are 50,000 licensed prostitutes in Japan; 80 per cent of them are from impoverished families. The father signs a contract and is paid on the average $350. The girl consents from filial duty, and may later marry, within her own class, with honor and no disgrace. In 1900, some 51,000 prostitutes received on an average 536 male visits in a year, at $1.25 per visit. The girl received one-fourth of the proceeds, out of which she had to pay for her maid. The houses of prostitution are in attractive locations, are indicated by a bow of a sash in front. Visitors enter in dignified manner as if to pay a social call. A "Licensed Quarters Owners' Association" was founded to fight reform. [Russell, O. D., 1935.] Apparently the institution is threatened by American patterns of prostitution, such as the taxi dance hall.

The tradition is that a god came to earth 3,000 years ago and brought a prostitute with him. There was prostitution in temples and shrines until A.D. 1200, and then it emerged into secular places. The mores approve monogamy but sanction "extra women" occasionally. Geisha girls became a profession about A.D. 1000 as dancing girls. They are not promiscuous but will give themselves to selected

men as mistresses. Their main function is the esthetic entertainment of men.*

The Japanese government is now trying to combat a falling birth rate by methods similar in some respects to those of Germany.

Table 1 presents some of the distinguishing traits of Asiatic family patterns. This must be regarded as a very tentative statement subject to change.

* In Osaki there were 6,000 licensed geisha, 8,000 licensed prostitutes, and 13,000 waitresses who were prostitutes, according to one travelogue report (H. A. Phillips, *Meet the Japanese,* Philadelphia, 1932, p. 113).

Chapter IV

THE FAMILY IN AMERICA

A. THE MAJOR BACKGROUND

CULTURAL PROTOTYPES. In America there are cultural differences between regions and groups which have not been entirely obliterated by the processes of modern social change. We may therefore think of the American family as springing from several somewhat different prototypes existing among the several culture groups which settled the country from 1600 to 1850. These types became somewhat mixed, but regardless of mixture all have been subjected to the influence of frontier conditions, and all have gone through the whole sequence of changes from handicraft economy through the Industrial Revolution to the most modern suburbanism and individualism.

The groups which settled America were not average samples of the countries from which they came. Rather, they represented selected classes and cults. The English Puritan families who settled New England were more like the Dutch of New York than they were like the English adventurers who first settled Virginia. Some of the characteristics of the various groups are summarized in Table 2. Some of these characteristics were brought from Europe; some were special adaptations to the new conditions. None of them should be assumed to have been universally present in the group in question over the whole colonial period. We have here a kind of rough inventory of more or less distinctive culture traits, not a complete description. [Calhoun, 1917.]

The family in the other Northern colonies differed in minor respects from that of New England. Among the Dutch in New York there were a few large estates or "patroonships," which gave a slightly more aristocratic quality to the social pattern. There seemed to be a little less rigor in discipline of children, in enforcement of sex mores, and penalizing of bachelorhood, and a greater freedom for play and recreation. The Pennsylvania Quakers had a rather strict but kindly discipline, and a mutual contract ceremony of marriage.

TABLE 2

AMERICAN COLONIAL FAMILY TRAITS

	New England Puritan	Southern English
Spatial and Material Patterns (and Class Structure)	Compact village settlements and outlying isolated farms. No large estates.	Large estates with slaves, later hired laborers and tenants. Small crossroads hamlets.
	Manual work and skill dignified, combined with brain work.	Manual work regarded more or less servile, hence less manual skill developed.
	No great class stratification.	Wealth aristocracy with leisure and cultured manners; poor whites; slaves.
	Emphasis on thrift.	Less emphasis on thrift.
	Strict Sabbath.	
The Structure of Marital and Sexual Relationships	Marriage by civil magistrate only at first, later modified, but marriage regarded as secular.	Marriage ceremony only by Church of England clergy.
	Divorce rare but permissible.	Divorce practically non-existent.
	Strong social pressure to marry; bachelors taxed and penalized. Fairly balanced sex ratio.	High sex ratio at first, with women later imported for marriage.
	Widows and spinsters often fell under witchcraft persecutions.	Girls often married at 14.
	Severe public punishment and church confession for premarital and extra-marital intercourse; yet many violators.	Considerable illegitimacy through race mixture.
	No recognized class of prostitutes.	Double standard sex mores.
	Bundling in courtship.	
Kinship Structure and its Relation to Marital Structure	No intermarriage with Indians.	Some intermarriage with Indians; none with Negroes (but much of sex relations).
	Primogeniture abolished at outset.	
Social Roles and Interrelations of the Sexes	Women devoted to homemaking and farm chores, but also followed other occupations such as trade and teaching, at early date.	Women's work depends much upon social class. Upper class does less thorough homemaking and chores, lower class more menial labor, than in North.
		Chivalrous, playful attitude of men toward women in upper class.
Age Groups and Social Maintenance	Strict discipline and Spartan treatment of children, early inculcation of industrious habits and fear of hell (theoretical death penalty for rebellious sons over 16 in Connecticut).	
	Compulsory education of some degree by 1649.	Universal education late in developing.

INFLUENCE OF THE FRONTIER. Such differences, never profoundly important, became still less so as the country developed. On the other hand, the frontier conditions and the selective character of the immigration caused the American family throughout the colonies to depart from its European inheritance in several important respects.

The medieval pattern of rural life, already on the decline in western Europe, was still more quickly obliterated on the American frontier. The settlers made "farms" with amply separated homes, whereas most European peasants still live in compact villages. Calhoun [1932, 8] points out that the South was not really settled by English aristocrats, but that an imitation of the English manorial pattern developed there later as a result of slavery, the large fertile areas, and the long growing season, which allowed some families to grow wealthy and leisured. The Southern plantation, with its cluster of slave cabins near the large manor house, indeed did somewhat resemble the feudal manor. But with the ending of slavery and the dispersal of Negroes to cabins on scattered patches of land, the Southern countryside has come to be most unlike the European; compact villages are even fewer and smaller than in the Northeast. Yet a large portion of Southern farms are tenant farms. In Quebec the churchly aspects of medieval culture have persisted even until today, and seignorial rights existed until 1854. But now both the spatial and the tenure patterns are essentially like those of New England. Primogeniture was abolished throughout America.

The frontier required hard work by everybody. It developed a certain type of democracy by breaking down class distinctions; at the same time it frowned upon the finer arts of living, and upon freedom and variety of personality development even when these might have been physically possible.

The frontier household was large, containing often relatives and indentured servants. According to an old manuscript, the average size of the New England household in 1675 was nine. [Lawrence, H. W., 1928, 86.]

Early marriage and high birth rates were encouraged. The American population in the early part of the nineteenth century was doubling itself every twenty-five years through natural increase alone. Cotton Mather mentions a woman who bore twenty-three children and lost only four, and another who bore twenty-two and lost twenty. Bachelorhood and spinsterhood were discouraged, and comparatively rare. Love was not by any means unimportant in choice of mate;

parents on the whole had less power to guide or restrain than they had in Europe. But economic considerations exerted a powerful pressure to get married at the earliest opportunity, and the community often offered small range of choice. The town of Eastham, Massachusetts, in 1695 ordered that "every unmarried man in the township shall kill six blackbirds or three crows while he remains single; as a penalty for not doing it, shall not be married until he obey this order." [Earle, 1893, 37.]

We cannot say whether marriage and sex relations were more effectively controlled by society in those days than now. There is a certain similarity in this respect, in the general pictures we get of colonial life, of European peasant life, and of American small community life in more recent years: namely, intercourse before or outside of marriage is strongly condemned, and occasionally punished by criminal law, yet there is a great deal of it; there is greater tolerance as regards the betrothed; more careful supervision of daughters among the upper classes; and great local and temporal variations in tolerance and in frequency of violations. Mate selection is supposed to be at least approved by parents even though initiated by love, and courtship to be more or less supervised by parents. Yet these rules also are frequently violated in practice. The records of one New Engand church showed that out of two hundred persons owning the baptismal covenant, sixty-six confessed to pre-marital sex relations. [Lawrence, H. W., 1928, 30.] In 1647 Massachusetts passed a statute penalizing by 5 pounds the man who courted a girl without parental consent. Benjamin Franklin wrote to a friend advising him to marry, but "if not" then "in all your amours you should prefer old women to young ones." [Stern, 1938, 208.]

Bundling, the custom of lying together in bed fully or partly dressed, is said to have been the result of cold, and to have been practiced for hospitality as well as in betrothal. It was common in England, Scotland, Holland, and Scandinavia, and was brought over by the Puritans and the Dutch. It seems to have been most common in Connecticut. Some reports indicate that it involved restraint from sexual intimacy through the presence of parents; others that it was restrained by a kind of "honor system"; and others that the restraint often failed. The Reverend Samuel Peters defended the custom as innocent; Jonathan Edwards thundered against it; Washington Irving implied that it was a shrewd hypocritical way of sanctioning a sexual try-out before marriage. He says:

> . . . To this sagacious custom, therefore, do I chiefly attribute the unparalleled increase of the . . . Yankee tribe; for it is a certain fact, well authenticated by court records and parish registers, that wherever the practice of bundling prevailed, there was an amazing number of sturdy brats annually born unto the state, without the license of the law, or the benefit of clergy.*

The triangle and other situations of marital discord were by no means unknown in colonial days, as records testify. Samuel Sewall's son had difficulties with his wife, who refused to turn her newly acquired lover out of the house. The husband went to live with his parents and refused to return to his wife, who had already borne him five children. Each was defended by his or her own family, but when the wife bore a child a year after the husband had left, her family could no longer maintain her innocence. Nevertheless, she asked forgiveness and was re-accepted by her husband along with a payment of $500 fine by her father, and bore her husband two more children. [Sewall, S., 1927, 216–236.]

The family became the unit of enterprise even more than it had been in Europe. Hence there were less opportunities for community cooperation in work and for communal festivity and recreation than in the European village, although the New Englanders created strong community institutions of defense, religion, and government.

WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN FRONTIER LIFE. In this family frontier culture, the women made fully as great an economic contribution as the men, although, as in most patriarchal cultures, they were regarded as mentally inferior. Women varied their productive activities in many directions, carrying on at least part-time jobs outside the home; yet it was not until the nineteenth century that people approved education for girls. Governor Winthrop of Massachusetts, commenting on the intellectually productive wife of Governor Hopkins of Connecticut, who later lost her mind, attributed this misfortune to her meddling "in such things as are proper for men, whose minds are stronger, . . . she had kept her wits, and might have improved them usefully and honorably in the place God had set her." [Hanscom, 1917, 51.] Yet an advertisement in the *Pennsylvania Packet* of September 23, 1780, called for:

> A single Woman of unsullied Reputation, an affiable, cheerful, active and amiable Disposition; cleanly, industrious, perfectly qualified to direct

* Washington Irving, 1880, p. 210, quoted in R. E. Baber, 1939, *Marriage and the Family*, McGraw-Hill Book Co., p. 95.

and manage the female Concerns of country business, as raising small stock, dairying, marketing, combing, carding, spinning, knitting, sewing, pickling, preserving, etc., and occasionally to instruct two Young Ladies in those Branches of Oeconomy, who, with their father, compose the Family. Such a person will be treated with respect and esteem, and meet with every encouragement due to such a character. [Baber, 1939, 108.]

Charles Beard, who well knew the more recent Western frontier, has protested that his fellow historian, James Truslow Adams, ignored the woman's economic role.

My grandfather was a frontiersman. Did he depend upon himself? To some extent, he did, but as I remember the household of my youth, he seemed to depend upon my grandmother quite as much as upon himself—for dressing and preparation of food, for medical care, for spinning, weaving, making his woolen clothes and generally keeping the household going. The real center of that huge establishment was my grandmother—strong, commanding, a mistress of many arts that lifted life above that crudity that is alleged by Mr. Adams and others to be the frontier. Not only was my grandmother manager of the household establishment. She was for a long time the only working doctor in the community—doctor without professional training. She rode on horseback along blazed trails to nurse the sick among the neighbors—men and women alike—without pay, just for the sake of humanity.*

The behavior expected of children in the Northern colonies is illustrated by two choice bits. A Quaker woman wrote to a relative:

ESTEEMED FRIEND: I send my brother Timothy to be under thy charge this winter, while he learns the store business. I know thee will be a faithful guardian, and though it grieveth me to unveil his faults, I must disclose them for thy friendly correction. I have discovered in the lad a worldly and evil spirit, having heard him imitate the unprofitable forms of the light folk of this town—even saying "Mr. Jones" to old Friend Thomas Jones, and though only sixteen years old, he boldly and audaciously directed the woman who maketh his garments to alter their shape. These are bad signs, but I hope thee will prune away such sprouts of sin, and curb these longings after vanity. In other matters thee will find the lad obedient and correct.†

A book of manners for children, called *A Pretty Little Pocket Book*, admonishes:

* *New York Times*, January 25, 1938. By permission.

† Harry Emerson Fosdick, *Twelve Tests of Character*, Association Press, 1939, p. 117. By permission.

> Ask for nothing; tarry till it be offered thee. Speak not. Bite not thy bread but break it. Take salt only with a clean knife. . . . Look not earnestly at any other that is eating. When moderately satisfied leave the table. Sing not, hum not, wriggle not. Spit nowhere in the room but in the corner. . . . When any speak to thee, stand up. Say not I have heard it before. . . . Snigger not. [Baber, 1939, 111.]

The American family culture which thus evolved out of the frontier, with an emphasis upon the values of our most influential frontier group, the Puritans, became somewhat different from the family culture which was evolving at the same time in Europe. In Europe there was a more gradual development of upper class culture, undisturbed either by frontier ideals of frugality or by get-rich-quick ostentation. Chevalier [1839, 142] comments on "the austere reserve of American manners . . . their rigid habits of life and . . . the religious severity of life which exists here by the side of great multiplicity of sects." De Tocqueville [1898, II, 241] attributes the restricted life of the American matron to the "religious opinions and trading habits" of a "puritanical people." At the same time, European upper class culture has not influenced the masses nor has it been checked and controlled by them as much as in America. Each class in Europe has tended to live its own life.

PREDOMINANCE OF THE PURITAN TYPE. Of the several prototypes of American family culture, the Puritan was the one which has dominated and given a certain character to family life throughout the Middle Atlantic States and the West. The culture survives in its purest form among the farming and small town business class of the Northeast, although the present working class of the Northeast has largely Irish, German, Italian, and other more recent European backgrounds. In the Midwest the working class is largely American and Puritan, and if any group there has departed from the Puritan values, it seems to be rather the business class which has done so. But this departure is mainly in the field of ostentatious living and social climbing. In Boston (and also in Baltimore, Richmond, and Charleston) "better families" simply *are;* in Chicago they need to prove their status somewhat more visibly.

The early Puritan family culture has evolved into a modern, native American, Protestant culture which is technologically far more advanced, less patriarchal, less familistic, less religious, more democratic as regards treatment of children and tolerance of individual differences. Yet this culture still carries with it certain Puritan traditions and values. Although the coming of the newer peoples creates a

"melting pot," it also makes the native culture stand out more clearly. "Melting pot" in fact is not an accurate metaphor. The newcomers, regardless of their numbers, gradually *assimilate to* the natives, they become "Americanized," for it is the native culture which has the prestige. The profound changes in the native culture are due to its own inner processes of social change, far more than to any mingling or blending with the culture of the immigrants.

SURVIVING PURITAN VALUES: MARRIAGE AND KINSHIP. As we have seen, changes in values and ideologies often lag behind changes in technology and social structure. One can see certain Puritan values lingering today which developed under earlier conditions. In some ways these are unusually favorable to the development of democratic patterns of living and in other ways they are obstacles.

French writers in the early nineteenth century noted that American marriage was a union of persons and not, as in France, an alliance of families. Carlier [1867, 35] pointed with disapproval to the fact that parental consent was not necessary to the marriage of a boy over fourteen or a girl over twelve. Chevalier [1839] comments that "family sentiment is much weaker than it is in Europe." To Carlier [1867, 115] the divorce situation in America even in 1867 was deplorable. He attributed it partly to the abandonment of wives by their husbands who "seek their fortunes in the West . . . the thirst for gold alters all that is pure and noble in human nature."

The fundamentally secular conception of marriage and divorce among the Puritans has paved the way for modern ease of divorce. "If you don't stop . . . , I'll divorce you," is a careless remark often heard from independent daughters of the Puritans. And so we find higher divorce rates as we go outward from the great Catholic centers of New York and Boston toward Maine or Vermont, although not nearly so high as in the Far West.

SEX ROLES. It is Puritan for women to take considerable pride in their homemaking. This may help to keep many women out of the "nervous housewife" category, but it also blocks others from needed readjustments. Mistress and servant can exchange duties and do teamwork in the New England home better than in the South, with its feeling for the class division of labor and its comparative lack of handicraft perfectionism. Yet the Northern homemaker who might otherwise free her time for an important contribution outside the home is often tied down by this very perfectionism. Puritanism places the economic virtues, as well as cleanliness, close to godliness. Manual labor

is dignified and the true Puritan is proud to do with his own hands what he might otherwise delegate to an employee. This attitude has probably served to maintain a reserve supply of skills in the community, and this makes for a high scale of living apart from money incomes. Men, working in larger units, are able to reorganize their division of labor while utilizing these advantages of surplus skill. Women may be blocked in the needed reorganization of their labor by this same pride in handicraft.

Many observers in both the nineteenth and twentieth centuries have commented on the role of women and the relations between the sexes in America. There is an underlying consistency in all this testimony. American men are hard-driving specialists, addicted to the habit of overwork. They leave responsibility for the home, children, leisure, and art almost entirely to the women. They regard art as feminine. (In France it is masculine.) As elsewhere, they regard their minds as superior. But in America, confronted by the vigorous intellectual and community activities which some of their women have found time for and the excellent performance of girls in school, the men are more apt to pride themselves on their superiority in "practical" matters and to belittle the interests rather than the general ability of the female mind. Ideas, if they cannot be commercialized, are effeminate. Women probably do more of the *routine mental* labor in America than in Europe, since clerical work and teaching belong largely to them. Yet the American male is no more, but perhaps less, inclined to entrust an important decision to a woman, or to be guided by her "behind the scenes."

Furthermore, American men, preoccupied with business, leave their women to do the shopping and largely to determine the recreational program for the family. They do not like the way the women spend money and time, but since they themselves have no time to study the home and the arts of living, they are unable to make any but negative suggestions. Marjorie Kern [1937] says the American formula for treatment of a wife is to give her plenty of money and to leave her alone. According to the Lynds:

> . . . among the business group who belong to the country club, e.g., husbands frequently play eighteen holes of "real golf" with a male "foursome" Sunday morning and possibly a concessionary "one round with the wife in the afternoon just to make her feel good." *

* Robert S. and Helen M. Lynd, *Middletown, A Study in Contemporary American Culture*, Harcourt, Brace, 1939, p. 119. By permission.

In short, American women have become culturally differentiated from men in a way quite unusual in Euro-American culture. This may have arisen from hard work on the frontier and preoccupation of each sex with its own tasks, but it has become something much more than a differentiation of tasks. The effect of different work experiences can be balanced by a strong community of leisure-time interests, but this also is lacking in America. American "femininity" consists not merely in pleasant characteristics of body and personality; it is in large part a *culture*. The chief carriers of this subculture are the women's magazines and department stores. A parallel men's culture, expressed by certain magazines, is growing beside it.

AGE GROUPS. Some insights into this family culture are provided by a study of 400 recipients of old age assistance in New York State. [Morgan, C. M., 1937.] The study was by personal interviews recorded on a schedule. About 200 were upstate native American Protestants. The remainder, called the "mixed group," contained 116 persons from New York City, plus all Catholics and foreign born. The upstate people were mostly of the village and small city working class, but they were not far removed from the farm. They represented the culture we are here describing, as it has survived among the working class descendants of the Puritans.

The parent-child relationship in this culture is not emotionally so close as one often thinks. It is much colored by the duty attitude toward life, so tied up with Puritan economics. It is a duty to accept and care for the children God gives. Of the upstate old people who lived with their children, only 42 per cent did so from choice, as against 75 per cent in the mixed group. Moreover, the subjects were asked, "Do your relatives try to help you manage your affairs?" Twenty per cent of the upstate old people said yes; 50 per cent of the mixed group said yes. One might think, perhaps, that the upstaters had fewer relatives living near them. But they were also asked, "Are you glad to have their help or would you rather do it yourself?" Only 20 per cent of the upstaters are glad to have the help of relatives, as against 55 per cent of the mixed group. The upstaters were much more likely to say that it was better for an old person to live alone rather than with his children. "I've taken more comfort since I lived in this shack alone. Nobody dictates to me." "Better off alone. I tried it. Keep away from the children. They snap you up, and they act like I was a disgrace to them." "All married couples should be by themselves and not have old people interfere." "Do as

you've a mind to, even though it's awful lonesome; and you have your own things, and do what you've a mind to with them."

In the old Yankee culture the father tended to be somewhat austere with his children. There was little show of affection between father and son. Affection of both boys and girls was largely with the mother. Rebellion against the father was frequent. When sons grew up, in turn, they were "boss," and if an elderly parent came to live with them, he was not given the filial reverence one finds in many European and Asiatic cultures. The frontier had largely erased that. These valuations have encouraged the small family system of America and discouraged the living together of kinsfolk in the larger family group.

Another phase of these parent-child attitudes is that child life is considered merely as a means to an end. Children must be made to obey, and must not be given what they want. This is not merely for the convenience of the adults; it is, ideologically at least, in order that the child may be trained to be a good adult. Modern American parents have largely given up the effort to break the child's will; they have become "soft" disciplinarians because modern child society demands it or because psychology tells them the old way was bad. But their troubles are not over because, fundamentally, they cannot give up the old valuation of obedience, even when they have given it up in practice. De Tocqueville was impressed by the abolition of primogeniture, the consequent equal status of children and dispersal of family estates, and the weakening of family ties. In 1830 De Tocqueville [1898, II, 241] also commented on the unusual freedom of children and democratic relation between parents and children.

THRIFT AND DUTY. We noted that in Kardiner and Linton's brilliant analysis of culture and the personality structure, there were certain "basic disciplines" characteristic of each culture. If Puritanism were analyzed in these terms, certain attitudes which we loosely name "thrift" and "sense of duty" would be important elements in the picture. The English Puritans established a way of life which differed from both the luxury of the nobility and the shiftless living and coarse pleasures of the poor. It represented the values of emerging capitalism. One of these was a shrewd concern for money profits whether in business or in the commercial aspects of farm life, such as a trading in land and horses. Business acumen and godliness were associated. A Congregational clergyman in a small New England village, after retiring from the ministry, spent many active years as a real estate and

insurance agent. This might be a little surprising among Anglicans, Catholics, or anywhere in the South or in Europe.

Profits were in part savings made by economical consumption in the family. Life on the frontier magnified the physical aspects of economy; not only should one have cash saved up in advance and avoid borrowing, but he should have a comfortable reserve supply of goods. As James Mickel Williams [1925] says, when visitors in an upstate New York home heard scraping sounds coming from the pantry, they inferred that the flour barrel was nearly empty and felt a condescending pity for their host. "Father told us to eat the partly rotten apples first, and the result was we were eating rotten apples all winter long."

It is not surprising that New England farmhouses are larger on the average than those in other parts of the country; that New England was not merely politically against the New Deal but seemed to feel that it was almost immoral; that a greater proportion of the people have savings than elsewhere. Brookline, Massachusetts, says former Commissioner Payson Smith, is "to my knowledge the only community in the world that has adopted compulsory education in money management." [See Barnard, 1930.]

One finds these attitudes even in living generations of Yankees and they often, under modern conditions, defeat their own purposes. Bargain-hunting women shop about feverishly to save a few cents on each article, and yet the love of the game leads them to spend so much time and buy so many needless articles that their larger economy is defeated. People "swap" and "trade" used goods among relatives and friends, getting a great "kick" out of the apparent profit in a single transaction. Yet many of them would condemn gambling. They overstock with commodities of all sorts, as their ample attics often testify. They hate to be "caught short" of anything. There runs the fiction that money spent for durable goods is somehow "saved," whereas that spent for quickly consumed goods or services is "squandered." One finds serious family conflicts in this group which may be interpreted as due to the differential breaking down of these economic attitudes.

A most pathetic case was that of a family of the last generation. The parents were both farm bred, but the wife accepted newer urban attitudes while the husband clung all the more persistently to the old values because she and the children opposed him. Long after they had moved into a rather modern town house, he hated to sit in the living room, but preferred to sit in the kitchen, with his feet on the stove. He jealously guarded the family purse. He scolded vehemently about extravagance when his wife or children

begged a nickel for carfare or the movies; yet he was continually losing tens or hundreds of dollars in needless real estate transactions and purchases and sales of farm animals for which he had no use.

Many of the children of these families have developed irrational habits of expenditure in certain lines as a rebellion and a protest against the thrift of one or both parents. A "spree" of irresponsible spending comes to have a direct pleasure value; it is used as an "outlet" in emotional disturbances, and there may come a period of repentance: "Why was I such a fool, I really wanted the money much more for my vacation."

Allied to the thrift attitude was an all-pervading sense of duty, an austere attitude that ease and pleasure were sinful, and effort always desirable. The farmer would give his boys a "stent" to do but he also gave himself a "stent."

In Miss Morgan's study [1937] is further evidence regarding the Puritan value of work and pride in one's calling. She asked her subjects: "If you had a chance to live your life over again would you plan for your old age?" Eighty-five per cent of the upstaters said "Yes," and only 28 per cent of the 116 New York City residents. The upstaters show more frequently than the others the attitude that they would like to work now, would be happier if they had a job. When they were asked: "When you first found it hard to keep up with your job would you have been interested in learning some new kind of work that would not have been quite so hard, and that you could do now?" Fifty-two per cent of the upstaters said yes, and only 15 per cent of the mixed group. But those who said "No" among the upstaters did so largely because they were proud of their former work, usually farming or skilled crafts, and rejected the idea of taking inferior work. "No; farming was my life. I never wanted anything else." "I was a champeen at the pitchfork."

LOVE AND COMPANIONSHIP. The general testimony is that love between the sexes is less richly developed in America than in Europe. The American man is a poor lover, not only because of lack of attention to the physical arts of sex, but because of his incapacity for true companionship with a woman. Pre-marital romance in America is of course very "thrilling" and the movies have made the most of it. Married love is pictured as sweet but prosaic; extra-marital love formerly as wicked, but now as merely sordid and unworthy. There is little recognition in our literature, our drama, our everyday conversation, of love as a total, mature, growing—let alone a sublime—experience. It

is not recognized that the highest love grows in a soil which is hospitable also to lesser loves and friendship. After marriage men and women go their own ways. Any real friendship between husband and wife is a surprise, and the only value accorded to an extra-marital friendship is gossip value.

B. PRESENT CHARACTERISTICS AND DIFFERENCES

SOCIAL CLASSES. It is a moot question whether the "melting pot" has produced more similarity than it has difference. At the same time that various national groups were mingling and assimilating, new social differences arose out of the processes which go with urbanization and increased wealth. The larger differences in American life today are not those between regions or nationalities, but those between the social classes. The most realistic division into classes is the one used by the Lynds [1929], business class versus working class, with the addition of the farming class. Within each, of course, many subdivisions can be made.

The Lynds' description of life in Middletown in 1924 (with some comparisons with 1890) and their following up of this by another study [1937] made in 1935 constitute one of the most thoroughgoing pictures we have of American society. It presents also a good illustration of certain methods and concepts of sociology.

Although they call their first book "A Study in Contemporary American Culture," it includes more than the cultural data usually secured by the anthropologist. It might well be called "An American Community; its Social Structure, Processes, and Culture; and their Changes." For example, the Lynds tell us [1929, 94] that four-fifths of a sample of business-class families live in single-family houses of two floors, whereas only one-third of the working-class live in this kind of house; one-third in small, one-floored cottages; one-sixth in new and more prosperous bungalows; and a final sixth in two-family houses and flats. This quantitative distribution of house types is not culture; it is not a pattern which is imitated from or by any other community; it may be approximately duplicated elsewhere but, if so, only through the chance working out of numerous forces. But the various house types are cultural and the Lynds give us descriptions of some of them. Also, the common attitude which in the 1920's preferred bungalows is a cultural attitude or value. The system of purchasing houses by a deed-for-mortgage plan is a cultural pattern, and its substitution in large measure for the 1890 custom of renting houses is a cultural change. In this case the average person is apt to give too little rather than too much credit to cultural processes. He reasons that builders can no longer afford to build houses to rent because

of such-and-such economic conditions, whereas a new custom and ideology ("home ownership" dressed up in new, attractive style, with new credit practices) may be the primary cause. Thus the Lynds are at the same time social anthropologists and sociologists; they show cultural processes working along with natural social processes and describe the total product and its changes.

In Table 3 is a list of traits which in Middletown differentiated business- from working-class families.

TABLE 3

CLASS FAMILY TRAITS IN MIDDLETOWN IN 1924

Business Class	Working Class
Late rising.	Early rising.
"Correct" dress more or less always.	Can eat in vest or without necktie.
Four-fifths live in two-story single-family houses.	One-third live in two-story single-family houses.
All seek respectability through appearance of grounds and car.	Some are apathetic about appearances of grounds, car, etc.
"Correct" interiors, "modern" equipment.	Old and worn furniture and furnishings.
Less than one-half had moved in 5 years.	Three-fifths had moved in 5 years.
Thirty-three per cent have full-time servants.	Five per cent have servants.
All have telephones.	About one-half have telephones.
Secretive about income.	Less secretive about income.
Forms of reference: "my husband," "Mr. Jones."	Forms of reference: "he," "the mister."
Wife should be socially skilful and dress attractively.	Wife should be good cook and housekeeper.
	More cooking and mending by wife.
Majority of wives do no washing or ironing.	All wives wash and iron.
Friendship with "right" people stressed.	
Stress on independence and frankness equally with obedience, in child training.	Strict obedience and loyalty to church stressed more than independence and frankness in child training.
Average family 4.7.	Average family 5.4.
All use contraception.	About one-half use contraception.
One-eighth of wives have no intimate friends, or no friends at all in town.	One-third of wives have no intimate friends, or no friends at all in town.

Lloyd Warner and Paul S. Lunt [1941], with the help of a considerable staff of research workers, have given us the most detailed study of social structure yet made upon any American community. In their "Yankee City," which is an old New England community of about 30,000 people, they have analyzed the class structure into "upper-

upper," "lower-upper," "upper-middle," "lower-middle," "upper-lower," "lower-lower." These contain 1½, 1½, 10, 28, 33, and 25 per cent of the total population respectively. The first three levels correspond to the Lynds' "business class," and the last two levels to the Lynds' "working class," and the "lower-middle" class would be split between the two Lynd classes. The "upper-upper" class is 60 per cent female and the "upper-middle" class 55 per cent female. The "lower-middle" class contains 47 per cent female population. The latter is the only one class with an excess of males.

The median age at marriage for the six classes is as follows: beginning with the highest, 27.9, 26.6, 26.1, 25.1, 24.4, 23.2. On the average the men are about a year older than each figure, and the women about a year younger.

Only in the three higher classes do women belong to clubs and charitable organizations. The women in the three lower classes belong to auxiliary societies attached to men's clubs. There is more segregation of the sexes in the social activities of the lower classes but, on the other hand, the women in those classes use their own first names rather than their husbands' to a much greater extent.

Seventy-two per cent of men marry women younger than themselves; 11 per cent marry women of their own age; and 17 per cent marry women who are older.

The cohesion of families is weaker in the lower groups. People in the higher class derive prestige from the family name. The chief difference between the "upper-upper" and the "lower-upper" classes, which are about equal in size and similar in wealth and occupation, is that the latter have more recently arrived at wealth or prestige and do not have as much prestige connected with their family names nor *savoir-faire* in regard to their social behavior. The "upper-uppers" think the "lower-uppers" behave with unnecessary ostentation in order to prove their status.

Very few children of the two upper levels go to local high schools; they get their preparatory education in private schools.

The two upper levels had an average family income of between $6,000 and $6,500 per year.

THE ECOLOGY OF URBAN FAMILY PATTERNS. Mowrer [1932] maps the city of Chicago in terms of "family areas." These are, roughly, successive concentric zones although with great geographic irregularities. In the center is a *non-family* area, inhabited mostly by men. Then comes the *emancipated* family area, characterized by rooming houses, residential hotels, married couples without children, employed wives,

birth control, unconventionality, and lack of any but casual contacts with neighbors. Next beyond, in rough geographic order, comes the *paternal* family area of the slum and the ghetto, where dwell the immigrants and the lower levels of the native working class. Here the patriarchal traditions of Europe carry over, but they lead to considerable conflict with the younger generation and consequent delinquency. (The traditions of the American farming and working class are also somewhat patriarchal.) Here the husband rules the home, determines the standards of spending, and is the chief medium of contact with the outside. He stands for discipline whereas the mother stands for affection. The family is large; the mother is confined to the home. This is a declining pattern owing to the stoppage of immigration and the gradual assimilation of the proletariat to business-class culture.

Outside of this zone comes the area of the *conventional equalitarian* family, characterized by small families, a minimum of subordination of wife and children, and many activities outside the home for all members. Here are the middle and professional classes. As in the emancipated area, there is an equality of husband and wife, but it is more conventional. The school contacts of the children, the community status and reputation of the family, are important. Mobility is less than in the emancipated area. Finally comes the *maternal* family area of the commuter zones, where dwells the upper business class. Here are almost entirely single-family houses, typically bungalows. Here the father is absent during the greater part of the day and the mother rules the home. Her tastes and standards determine most of the spending. She and the children are the media of neighborhood contacts. There is much rivalrous consumption; family prestige depends partly on family connections and largely upon the physical "correctness" and appearance of the home. In outward behavior, at least, there is rigid conformity, extending to "manners" and the rituals of hospitality as well as to "morals."

Generally speaking, the emancipated family area shows the highest rates of family disorganization, which occurs mainly as divorce and secondarily as desertion and non-support. The conventional equalitarian area shows a little less disorganization, mostly in the form of divorce. The paternal family area has an intermediate rate, taking the form of desertion and non-support, with little divorce. The maternal area shows the lowest rate of disorganization, and it is almost entirely divorce.

According to a Westchester County (New York) survey [Lundberg *et al.*, 1934], suburbs have a great surplus of females. They contain

large numbers of widows and domestic servants and have little attraction for single men. Commuters' families move oftener than noncommuters'. They also spend more evenings together. Two-thirds of suburban families entertain at least once a week, the commuters more than others on the same economic level. Within the limits of this suburban population, the wealthier go to church more than the less wealthy, spend more evenings per week together, and have larger families.

THE RURAL FAMILY. Howard Beers [1937] has given us a good portrait of the farm family in New York State. This family pattern is changing rapidly as is the urban. In his sample, wives averaged 41 years of age and had had 3.6 children each; 2.7 children on the average were now living with the family. "The processes of economic production have largely left the house for field and barn." Specialization of work within the family is more marked than before, when girls often did outdoor work and the boys helped in the house. The wife helps with milking and chores when there are no babies. The children work when at home. The children are often given animals to care for and allowed some of the income from them for their personal use. There is still Bible reading and some ritual in the home, although grace is not usually said. The marriages are performed by clergymen.

In seven out of eight of these farm homes, a decision is preceded by a discussion between the husband and wife, and in nearly half the cases the children are also consulted. Questions of farm business are more often decided by the husband alone. Obedience of children is expected and corporal punishment occasionally used. Forty-three per cent of the wives are licensed drivers. Community participation centers mainly on the church. Wives attend more organizations than do husbands, although town contacts are twice as numerous for husbands. In one-fourth of the households some extra relative is included. The family goes visiting about once a month.

In general the rural family is becoming less patriarchal and more democratic within. At the same time, socio-economic differences between families are becoming greater. They are becoming more like city families *of similar economic level.*

Sanderson and Foster [1930] discovered two types of rural families. In one, the parents were jointly in control; attachment of the children to parents was joint; there were many activities in common inside the home, some active participation in outside organized activities, and much ritual in the home. In the other type, the father was dominant;

attachment of children was divided; there were individual and few activities in the home, little ritual, and little outside participation.

These findings are interesting. Whereas in city life we often find that unhappy families, whether as cause or result, deviate in an experimental or radical direction from the cultural norm, it would appear that in the country a principal type of unhappy deviation is represented by those families which have lagged behind, as it were. Whether from poor schooling, lack of intelligence, or a bad economic start, they carry over patriarchal and isolationist patterns from an earlier culture.

SIZE AND COMPOSITION OF FAMILIES. There are several definitions of the family unit:

(1) The United States Census has defined it as including all persons living together in the same household, and nobody else. The census family averaged, for the whole United States, 5.6 in 1850, 4.7 in 1900, 4.5 in 1910, 4.3 in 1920, and 4.1 in 1930. Preliminary 1940 census data give a population of 3.8 persons per occupied dwelling unit. Before 1850 there are no strictly comparable census records, but some samples of non-slaveholding rural and urban households of 1790 have been recorded. Combining them gives an average household size of 5.9 persons. Somewhat similar samples in 1930, using the same "household" definition, give 4.4 persons. [Ogburn, 1933, 682.]

(2) Miss Parten [1932] has made a very useful analysis of family units among the entire population of New Haven for 1920. She used a second definition, the "social" family, which "consists of all individuals related to the head of the household and living under a common roof." This averaged 4.1 in New Haven in 1920. She applied her definition to Chicago for 1920 and found the average 4.0. In 1930, the family by approximately this definition, for the whole United States, had become 3.8.

(3) A third definition is the "natural" family, which includes the parents and all their own offspring, wherever they live, and excludes stepchildren, adopted children, and other relatives. In fertility studies it is extended to include also stillborn and dead children.

In 1900 each 100 households had 63 servants, lodgers, boarders, and relatives. In 1920 this number had become 49; in 1930, 44. [Ogburn, 1933, 682.]

The South, which represents earlier conditions, has the largest average size of household, 4.4, and the Pacific Coast the lowest, 3.4. [1930 Census.]

When a survey is made of all the families in a city as they are at any one time, it is found that roughly half or more of them are complete families in the sense that they contain husband, wife, and children, with or without other persons. [Parten, 1932; Parten and Reeves, 1937.] From 15 to 26 per cent, differing with the community, are married couples living alone. About 29 per cent of married couples living together have no children living with them at the time. [Parten, 1932.] From 20 to 30 per cent of all families in a community contain no married couple. These include single individuals, who, living alone, constituted 8 per cent of all American "private families" in 1930 (Census); families of widows and widowers, and other groups. There were more two-person families than families of any other given size; 23.4 per cent of all American families were two-person families in 1930.

The *median* size of American families according to the 1930 Census was 3.4 persons. Variations were as shown in Table 4.

TABLE 4

MEDIAN SIZES OF AMERICAN FAMILIES

	Largest		Smallest	
Regions	South Atlantic	3 76	Pacific	2 83
Ecological area	Rural-farm	4.02	Urban	3 26
Nativity group	Foreign-born white	3 74	Negro	3 15
Specific groups	South Atlantic rural-farm, Negro	4 69	Mountain rural-non-farm, Negro	2 07

In New Haven the proportion of families which contained 6 or more persons was 45 per cent for the Italians, 40 per cent for the Poles, 18 per cent for the Irish, 13 per cent for native Americans. Large families (6 or more) constitute 22 per cent of the rich (over $5,000 income) and 23 per cent of the poor (under $1,000). It does not follow, however, that large families consisting mostly of dependent children and having only a single breadwinner are equally common among rich and poor.

A study of rural households shows that about half of them are composed of husband, wife, and children, and a sixth of husband and wife only. [Anderson, W. A., 1939.]

These cross-sectional studies include families in different stages of development. We need also studies which compare families at the

same stage of development or follow them through all stages. For example, the cross-sectional figures above showed that 29 per cent of married couples have no children living with them, but only 17.5 per cent of cohabiting married couples where the husband was *between 35 and 44 years of age* were childless. [Glick, 1941.] The study of the French-Canadian family in the next section gives a picture of the course or development of family life. This may be compared with a similar kind of study upon North Carolina farm families. [Loomis, 1934.]

In the North Carolina study, the average owner-family has its first child born when the father is 28.5 years old; the average tenant-family when the father is 25.9. Loomis divides the life cycle of the family into four stages. The first stage is brief, lasting from marriage until the birth of the first child. The second stage lasts until the first child is 14 years old. It is a period of complete dependence on the labors of the parents. The third stage lasts from the time the oldest child is 14 until he is 35. This is the period when some children are leaving home and others are helping on the farm. There is now help for the parents and the total consuming population begins to fall. The peak size of the household for owner-families is at the beginning of the third stage; it averages 8 persons, that is, about 6 children. The fourth stage begins when the father is about 63 and practically all the children have left the home. It continues until the death of the parents.

THE FAMILY AND THE DEPRESSION. There have been several studies made of the family during the business depression of the 1930's and of the effects of its curtailment of income upon family life. Cavan and Ranck [1938] present a before-and-after picture. Like other studies, this shows that the effect of the depression depended very much upon how well organized the family was at the beginning. Well-organized families, even when greatly affected by the decline of income, continued so. Disorganized families became more disorganized. When families are followed over a considerable period of time, as in this study and in Angell's, the disorganizing effects of the depression do not appear so great as when one observes a number of cases in a static, cross-sectional view.

Angell [1936] used an interesting and fruitful method of research which is coming more and more into favor. Since he had time to study only 50 families in such detail as he wished, he did not attempt to arrive at any general *statistical* conclusion, but studied the different

types within his sample. All 50 families were of "normal" composition and suffered a presumably "lasting" decline in income. He classified them into eight types according to the two variables, integration and adaptability, each rated on a three-value scale, "high," "moderate," and "low." "Integration" included affection, common interests, and sense of economic interdependence. "Adaptability" was the ability to change family practices. Thirty-five of the fifty families were found better integrated than before the crisis. Angell found that high adaptability was more important than high integration in enabling the family structure to resist the pressure of decreased income. The families which best weathered the storm were the "secularized 'modern' ones which do not put too great stock in material and pecuniary values and whose leading members are responsible and energetic."

On the other hand, families which attached great significance to their accustomed standard of living tried to stay on the old level as long as possible and to hide their fall from it by keeping up a good "front." "This usually means a failure to adopt a rational budget, internal friction, and great unhappiness" [p. 17]. A second source of rigidity was any belief or feeling, whether religious, moral, or merely conventional, which hindered the readjustment of the roles of the family members. A third source was irresponsibility on the part of one or both parents, that is, inability or unwillingness to discipline himself in the interests of the group. Angell's study, including the appendix on methodology, is worth reading by anyone attempting serious research on the relationships within families.*

Mirra Komarovsky [1940] made a prolonged and careful study through interviewing. Unemployment lowered the status of the husband in 13 out of 58 families. Yet he suffered some personality deterioration in 23 cases.

These breakdowns were of three patterns: (1) crystallization of an inferior status already existing; (2) breakdown of a coercive control; (3) weakening of the authority of a husband over a loving wife. Out of the 59 families, at the outset 22 were husband-dominated, 14 wife-dominated, and 23 had no clear-cut dominance by either. In 35 out of 59 families, whoever dominated did so on "primary" grounds (love, admiration, or tradition); in 12 families members accepted the authority of the dominant person on "instrumental" grounds (fear or utilitarian consideration). The remaining 12 cases showed mixed attitudes. Sex relations remained unchanged in 16 out of 38 families giving that information, became less frequent in 22, increased in none.

* See also Stouffer and Lazarsfeld, 1937.

Father-child relations improved in some families, deteriorated in others; where they improved they had already been good before unemployment.*

In May, 1935, about one out of every seven persons in the United States was on relief. Five-sixths of all relief "cases" were families and the remainder were unattached individuals. The average relief grant was about $22.50 per month. The peak of relief lagged about two years behind the peak of unemployment, because of (1) the ability of many families to subsist upon their savings or private charity for some time before needing to apply for public relief, and (2) the time required to get the relief machinery functioning adequately. In the worst month of the depression, March, 1933, there were 14.5 million unemployed non-farm workers, representing 6.7 totally unemployed and 4.2 partially unemployed families.†

C. MINORITY AND DEVIANT GROUPS

Certain minority group cultures in North America are especially interesting as regards their family patterns. Some of these are survivals of old, widespread cultures; some are adaptions to special conditions; and some represent deliberate creation of new culture patterns under the influence of ideas. No exhaustive survey is possible, but a few types will be described.

THE FRENCH-CANADIAN FAMILY. The French-Canadians are a minority group in the United States but form a solid regional group in Quebec. An excellent study by Horace Miner [1939] of St. Denis, a Quebec village, not only portrays the culture but also gives us an accurate picture of the population process as it occurs among pioneer, expanding peoples. The average man marries at 26, the woman at 25. When the man is 34, his father, who has lived with him and perhaps helped somewhat, dies. He has now had five children, of whom one has died. The eldest is 7. From age 34 to 42, when the oldest child can do farm work, there is only one adult male on the farm. By the time the man is 42, the couple has had ten children of whom three died. From now on there will be no labor problem.

Miner estimates in general six children per family arriving at full maturity. What happens to these six? Only one out of five boys goes

* From review in the *Bulletin of Family Research and Education,* 1:5 and 6 (Nov.-Dec., 1940), 30.

† *On Relief,* Federal Emergency Relief Administration, Oct., 1935; Don D. Humphrey, *Family Unemployment: An Analysis of Unemployment in Terms of Family Units,* Works Progress Administration, 1940, Government Printing Office.

to college, and half of these enter the priesthood. Half of the girls go to a convent school because this makes them more marriageable. Roughly, one child every other generation becomes a celibate or a professional person. However, let us write off one of the six children as provided for, in some situation where he or she will be celibate or have few offspring. One son—usually a middle son (there is no primogeniture)—will inherit the farm, and will take it over when he marries at age 26 and his father is 60. The father will then live out his remaining eight years of life in semi-retirement on the farm with his son, giving some help and advice. One daughter will normally be married to a young man who is similarly inheriting a farm.

We still have three marriageable, and probably highly fecund, children to provide for. The father helps these either to secure new land or to find jobs in industry. Industry has been expanding recently in Quebec, and at an earlier time many of these surplus people migrated to New England industrial centers. The French population has also been acquiring newly cleared land on the frontier or land purchased from English or other low-birth-rate people. Obviously the process cannot continue indefinitely. Modern public health increases the population problem by reducing deaths. One solution is non-marriage. Twenty-three per cent of the men and 34 per cent of women over 40 are unmarried; these percentages are much higher than in the United States. Yet the crude birth rate in the county was still 30 and the death rate 11 in 1935. The natural increase, 19 per 1,000 population per year, is still a large one.

In this culture, all siblings of the heir must leave the farm, although the aged parents remain. The heir must use the first earnings from his farm to help establish his brothers who are not yet economically independent. The pattern is similar to the "stem family" system in Europe a century ago. When a farmer needs labor, he hires kinsfolk by preference. Out of 91 families in the village, 68 have two generations in the home, 21 have three, 2 have four. There is much interrelationship. Three-fourths of the people have only eleven different family names. All children are named either Joseph or Marie, but only one in each family of each sex is so called. Twenty-three per cent of wives are older than their husbands. The Church requires $100 dispensation for the marriage of first cousins, rarely in full. No child marries without parental consent. Men leave the parish more often than girls.

The seignorial system of landholding formerly prevailed. The seigneurs were not noblemen and had no part in government. They got only rents and a little labor from their *habitants.*

THE APPALACHIAN-OZARK FAMILY. This represents two areas in the United States which resemble Quebec in rapid population expansion. The people are of old Anglo-Saxon stock and their economic level in general appears lower than that of Quebec. Having a less severe climate, they have not developed such substantial houses nor techniques for combatting winter. There is considerable illiteracy and superstition, especially among the older generation. On the basis of psychological tests there is said to be an unusual amount of feeble-mindedness. However, in view of the progress made where schools have been established, this seems questionable. The mountaineers are devoted to the more emotional Protestant religions. Preachings, funerals, and the like supply opportunities for social gatherings. There are strict mores, which are not particularly dependent upon religion or the church. Courtship and marriage are serious. The young mountaineer may do a little "tom cattin' around" but when he "sets up" to one particular girl he usually intends to marry her and his suit must be taken seriously. [Randolph, 1931, 240.] Jealousy is strong. The girl who is "talkin' " to one suitor must not accept attention from others. The suitor may first call on the parents without any previous engagement. He eats one meal with the family and pays little attention to the girl. Early marriages are the rule. Illegitimacy is not severely stigmatized. There is great hospitality and courtesy but people readily resort to violence when someone has "done 'em wrong." Methods of feeding and caring for children are primitive. Kephart [1913, 138] saw a mother feeding whiskey to a small child. On inquiry about it, the mother replied, "Why, if there's liquor about and she don't get none, she just raars."

The highlanders find their population outlet largely in the industrial cities of the Midwest and the new mill towns of the South.

FAMILIES OF LATIN NATIONALITIES. Social workers in the Northeast were often surprised by the reluctance of Italian families to let their boys go to C.C.C. Camps. The willingness of native Americans to send their adolescent children away to boarding schools for long periods of time may seem surprising to an Italian or Spanish family. We talk in America much about the sacredness of the family and we deplore the present influences which threaten its integrity Yet it is doubtful that we ever had the strong emotional family ties which exist, for example, in Spanish-American families. A South American

young woman student gave the writer some insight into the intense feeling and protective attitude which brothers have there toward their sisters—something quite foreign to our native culture. Our family ties are economic and dutiful, not intensely emotional.

Caroline Ware [1935] gives us a picture of the patriarchal Italian family pattern in Greenwich Village as contrasted with the bourgeois-romantic family of the Yankee Ninth Warders and the individualistic, experimental family of the Villagers. The conservative Italian parents regarded courtship as unnecessary, since they would arrange the marriages. This led to a great deal of furtiveness in Italian courtship. The young male Italians went hunting about for girls for sex relationship, but they demanded virginity in those they married, and the more respectable girls were carefully guarded.

THE JEWISH FAMILY. The Jews place high value upon the family as a group and as a complex of affectionate relations. Marriage is thought of as necessary to the fulfilment of personality. Jewish families are cohesive, with a rich content of feeling and shared activity; at the same time, the taboo upon divorce is less strict than in most minority groups. More than any other group, they use study groups and other intellectual methods of dealing with their family problems. They often maintain a high educational cultural level in spite of limited material resources and congested dwellings.

THE NEGRO FAMILY. We are indebted to Frazier [1939] for a study of the Negro family, which, in the opinion of E. W. Burgess, is "the most valuable contribution to the literature on the family since . . . *The Polish Peasant*" (Thomas and Znaniecki, 1927). [Frazier, p. ix.]

Frazier begins by showing the very small relationship between the African background and Negro culture in this country. "Probably never before in history has a people been so nearly completely stripped of its social heritage as the Negroes who were brought to America." Under slavery the sexual and family practices of the Negro were determined by their owners and by human interaction processes only loosely controlled by any culture. Emancipation led to considerable disorganization among many groups, but at the same time permitted other groups of Negroes to develop family mores and customs without outside coercion. Certain traditions and values had already been established, especially among families of mixed-bloods, who had achieved a favorable position even before the end of slavery. This class of mixed-bloods was the important channel by which the white customs and ideals were carried down to the Negroes. The folk culture which thus developed among the Negroes after emancipation showed regional and local differences but in general the mother-centered family was much more prom-

inent among the Negroes than the whites, and continues to be so until this day.

The urbanization of the Negro population since 1900 brought about a still further disorganization and readjustment. In the slums of southern and northern cities there is a certain amount of free sex relations, without stern mores forbidding them as among the whites. At the same time there has developed a Negro middle class and in some rural areas there are communities of "Black Puritans," which have evolved rigid monogamous traditions similar to those of the most puritanical white people.

Dr. Frazier fears that "the travail of civilization" for the Negro family is not yet ended. It will probably become increasingly disorganized. Under present conditions, however, the more educated Negroes with some heritage of family traditions are in position to resist disorganization better than their less educated brethren.*

THE MORMON FAMILY. The Mormon family was an extreme type; it was one of the unusual cases of Euro-American polygamy. The Mormons were religious pioneers. Polygamy began as a secret arrangement among certain leaders about 1840, but it was not publicly proclaimed until 1852, when they were well established in Utah. "The announcement came as a shock to the rank and file." Brigham Young justified it by the need to multiply. Women of child-bearing age had apparently been attracted by the Mormon religion (before polygamy was announced) at a greater rate than men of the same age group. There was an excess of 10 to 30 per cent of women in samples of the age group 20 to 44. Polygamy enabled all the women to reproduce. The women of the group, however, accepted polygamy and even went to prison for it. Only one in ten to one in fifteen families was actually polygamous. However, the church gave prestige to polygamy. No man could hold church office if he did not have more than one wife. In the church dances they devised a grand march for a man dancing with two ladies. Men who became more prosperous than average were urged to take extra wives.

The Mormons were persecuted from the very beginning, because of their claims to divine revelation and other religious deviations. Polygamy, of course, brought still more persecution and was finally outlawed in 1890. "Except for a few preachers . . . or the miners, most of the Gentiles in Utah lived by catching, protecting, or convicting polygamists." [Anderson, N., 1937.] The Mormon family was unusually devoted to education; its ideal was to serve as a church-service unit. The church performed many of the functions of local

* From review in *Bulletin of Family Research and Education*, 1:2, 1940, 13–14.

government. Social contacts between young people were unusually free but seldom involved pre-marital intercourse. There was an average of eight children per mother. The time of aged parents was much taken up with visiting their children and with temple work, which consisted in studying their family trees and getting their deceased ancestors properly baptized by proxy. There was a vivid belief in the unity of the living with the dead; the family was supposed to increase further in the next life. The Mormons still have a birth rate of 30. Now Utah is exporting population; it is one of the few high birth rate areas of the United States.

THE ONEIDA COMMUNITY. The Oneida Perfectionists practiced a sexual pattern that was revolutionary. Their community started in 1838 in Putney, Vermont, and then moved to Oneida, New York. The founder, John Humphrey Noyes, was a religious idealist and at the same time an aggressive, practical organizer. He started the colony by persuading his two sisters to marry two men he found congenial to his ideas. Without great education other than biblical, he thought out a philosophy of economic and sexual communism. It appears that he preached his sexual idea for years before he ever practiced it. His theory came before the public prematurely through the publication of a letter, and the need to defend himself drove him still more strongly toward his objective.

The beginning of admitted sexual pluralism in practice was occasioned by the influence of an attractive and highly sexed woman member upon Noyes and other men. Before entering upon sex relations with this woman to whom he was much attracted, he held a conference with his wife and the woman's husband, who gave permission. This was characteristic of Noyes' procedure. There soon developed a practice by which each member of the community was entitled to sexual relations with any member of the opposite sex belonging to the community. Presumably individuals differed greatly in the range of their amours. The philosophy held that intercourse had two functions: propagative and amative. The tree and plural relationships were made possible by the practice of "male continence," for which Noyes became internationally known, and which was later to be revived by the teachings of Madame Karezza. This practice consisted simply in the male's learning to withhold indefinitely the final stage in the sex act. When children were wanted the community decided who should be parents. When one young couple were in love with each other monogamously, the community chided them for thei selfishness, and although it did not break up their relation-

ship it compelled them to have children by other mates. A touching story is told of the young man, some years later, coming into his beloved's room to remove her child-by-another-man and care for it so that she might be undisturbed during still another courtship. Children, after weaning, spent the daytime in the Children's House under the care of fifteen women delegated to that work. At night they went home to their mothers. When they grew older they ceased regular sleeping at their mother's homes, but could visit them.

The Perfectionists also cultivated simplicity of dress and food. Women adopted dress somewhat resembling men's. Noyes advocated cold meals to save the time of women. He did not, however, believe in the essential equality of men and women. Property, including even clothes, was communal.

In 1879 the community, under strong pressure and criticism from the outside, was obliged to become monogamous. One gathers that the young people especially felt the scorn of outsiders, who often spoke of them as "bastards," and were also influenced by the romantic monogamous values prevailing throughout the rest of the country. The breakdown of the complex marriage system destroyed also the enthusiasm for economic communism. The community made its living by the manufacture of silverware, which continued under the new title, "Oneida Community, Limited." It became so inordinately capitalistic that in later years it was "difficult to borrow a hammer." [Calverton, 1941.]

Chapter V

MODERN SOCIAL CHANGES AFFECTING THE FAMILY

Chapters III and IV dealt with the family at several different periods of European history and then described contemporary family patterns in several different countries. In neither case, however, did they give any insight into the *processes* by which one family pattern changes into another. We have had a series of exhibits, some of past and some of present forms of living, but we have not had a motion picture. The data enabled us to compare, but hardly to understand. For the modern era, we have more data regarding the transitions themselves, hence our history can be more analytical.

As the reader has doubtless been told innumerable times, the inventions of power-driven machinery during the eighteenth century (the famous Industrial Revolution) ushered in a period of more rapid and thoroughgoing social change than mankind, to our knowledge, has ever before experienced. The pace of these changes, in many respects at least, seems to have accelerated continuously, and there is yet no prospect of "time to catch our breath."

A. THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL CHANGE

Analysis of Social Change. The processes which produce change may also maintain permanence. The difference lies in whether processes having opposite results are unequal or balanced. Biological reproduction, growth, learning, and cultural transmission are dynamic from the standpoint of individuals, but they may be balanced by processes of aging, death, and unlearning and thereby maintain the *social* structure unchanged. A new generation comes on and goes through the same cycle over again. Processes on a different level are necessary to produce change from the standpoint of *society*. The following scheme may help. [See Carr, 1932.]

Social change includes:

I. Demographic or populational change (increase, decrease, changes in composition, in physical conditions and characteristics, longevity, general health or general mental capacity).

II. Ecological change (change in distribution or relation of population to physical environments). May result from population increase, decrease, catastrophes, and so on.

III. Cultural-social change (change in tools, symbols, aggregate behavior and personality, or in social structure and interaction).

A. Creative changes. Inventions and discoveries. The designing of a new pattern or combination and its successful use by *some* persons.

1. Technological. Examples: the invention of the airplane; discovery of insulin.
2. Social-organizational (including also space arrangements and symbolizing devices). "Social inventions"—examples: the game of basketball; the common-dining-hall summer camp; the nursery school; city zoning and building codes.
3. Ideological-moral (idea-systems, beliefs, values).
   a. Positive. Examples: the Christian religion; Copernican theory; the cult of nudism; ideals of progressive education.
   b. Negative or liberating. Breakdowns of taboos and false beliefs, which breakdowns are not in themselves creative, but remove obstacles and facilitate creative and distributive changes. Examples: decline of taboos on birth control and sex education; discovery of facts pointing to equal ability of the two sexes.

B. Distributive changes. The widening or shrinking dissemination or redistribution of any cultural trait or condition among individuals, groups, and classes within a society.

1. Material. Example: the dissemination of the automobile to almost the social saturation point, declining use of the horse.
2. Social-organizational, including customs and activities. Examples: spread of bridge playing; increased percentage of people who are high school graduates, 4-H Club members, traffic violators, divorced and remarried, and so on.
3. Ideological. Changing distributions of attitudes and opinions.

THE SEQUENCE OF SOCIAL CHANGES. Perhaps no topic has been more discussed and disputed by social thinkers than the question of what kinds of social changes are primary. Historians emphasized the role of unique and creative individuals. Ideas rule the world, it has been said. A new fashion in thinking was introduced by Karl Marx, who said that economic forces are primary. By this he meant technology and that part of the social structure which is most closely related to technology, that is, the economic system and the social strati-

fication based upon the division of labor. Max Weber [1930] attempted a brilliant refutation to this part of Marx's thinking by showing that the Protestant ideology, with its divinely approved values of personal industriousness and thrift, was more a cause than an effect of the rise of capitalism.

After weighing all the evidence, one tends to agree with Ogburn [1940, 865] that no comprehensive generalization has been established. Change in any field causes changes in other fields, and it is as difficult to identify the starting points as it is to say whether the hen or the egg came first. As Ogburn points out, however, it is more often possible to trace other kinds of change to mechanical inventions (creative technological change) as causes than the reverse. This is partly because these technological inventions have a certain definiteness and can be dated. But the larger truth is that *creative* changes of all sorts are most influential; they are "primary" if anything can be called primary. More mechanical inventions than social inventions are definite, require precise measurement and adjustment for their success, and depend upon prolonged study by highly trained specialists. Social inventions are seldom of such definite and clearly novel form that they could be patented. But all this may be less true in the future.

CHANGE, NEEDS, AND SCIENCE. Creative changes are prompted by human needs, but human needs are always very much the same except as changed by (*a*) the demographic or ecological changes or, more usually, by (*b*) the very inventions which they stimulate. Did the need for transportation cause the invention of the automobile, or did the invention cause the need? Perhaps we may say that a need of which only a few were conscious—a kind of vision, a sense of opportunity to satisfy *potential* but then dormant wants—was a great incentive to the patient research and the invention. But when we think in terms of dissemination and the masses of the people, we must admit that the invention was the cause rather than the result of the great mass need which it satisfies. In a physical as well as a psychological way the automobile created much of the need for itself, for it enabled people to move farther away from their friends and their work, and thereby made them more dependent upon itself for their satisfactions.

An invention requires something more than a need to produce it. It requires something more than breaking down cultural resistances. Necessity may be the mother of invention but it must have also a father. It depends upon *accumulated scientific knowledge.* No matter how much it may be needed, it cannot occur until the state of knowledge, in other words, the accumulation of previous inventions

and discoveries, is ripe for it. It must have a cultural base. Thus Ogburn [1923] has shown that the automobile, no matter how much or for how long it may have been needed, could not come until the gas engine, the differential gear, the carbureter, and other preliminary inventions had been made.

Science is a semi-autonomous part of culture. There is a constantly accumulating body of scientific knowledge, stored in the form of symbols in books, drawings, and so on. This is one part of our total ideology. This scientific ideology has a certain degree of independence of the rest of culture. To be sure, it grows faster when cultural values are favorable, and more slowly in periods of resistance to science such as the early Middle Ages in Europe. But it cannot be hurried beyond a certain speed. No amount of favorable attitude toward invention could have caused man in the Stone Age to discover the process of smelting iron. Nor could Julius Caesar, using the entire Roman army to promote scientific research, have brought about the invention of the airplane in Roman times.


Because of this semi-independent evolution we may well regard science as one of the sources or starting points of social change. A change which springs directly from science is thus not arbitrarily chosen to be called an initiating change. It is the result of past causes *within science,* and from the standpoint of the rest of culture it is a genuine starting point.

The chart in Figure 1 shows in a very sketchy manner the relations between the various forces at work in social change in America today which relate to the family. On the extreme left are the true inventions or initiating changes. In columns 2 and 3 are changes in social structure, cultural attitudes, and some subcultural changes which have resulted from these inventions. The inventions do not affect the family system directly so much as they do through the medium of these other social changes.

In general it appears that changes in the economic system are prior to those in the family system; the family mores tend to lag in social change generally.

B. THE INFLUENCE OF MECHANICAL INVENTION

INDUSTRIALIZATION HAS RAISED THE MATERIAL STANDARD OF LIVING. The inventions and discoveries which have initiated present social changes include, besides the steam engine, the various kinds of machinery for the transmission of power and the application of tools.



Note: The words "increased", "increasingly", etc. should be added to many items to give the precise meaning.

FIGURE 1. Interrelations of modern social changes affecting the family.

These machines, in connection with the new source of power, have made possible a vastly increased production of goods *per worker* and also *per consumer*. One should not exaggerate this increase by thinking only of the efficiency of the particular industry which uses the machine. One should not overlook the number of men required to make the machines, to work in other related industries made necessary by the change, and the increased number of men needed to distribute the product. But with this all considered, the average ultimate consumer in the United States got four times as much in actual consumption goods in 1926 as he did in 1870, and 58 per cent more than in 1900. He was able to exist in 1870, so in 1926 he was obviously far beyond the margin of subsistence.

The "minimum of subsistence" is itself a rising standard. Estimates have placed something like 40 per cent of our working class, or 20 per cent of the whole population, below the calculated "minimum of subsistence." The usual estimate of this "minimum," for a family of five, has run between $1,000 and $1,500 for the decade 1920–1930. Yet families on relief have lived on much less than $1,000, including income "in kind." It is obvious that the calculated minimum of subsistence is not a physical minimum. Even when people ask for charity, as happens with about one-tenth of the population even in normal times, we cannot say that a physical minimum has been reached. Such a real minimum would consist merely in food of sufficient calories, a few sources of vitamins and perhaps medical supplies, and just enough rags and fuel to protect them from the winter cold.

The alleged "minimum" of subsistence is a relative term and includes not only the necessities of physical existence, but also certain other things, such as cheap but conventional textile clothing, leather shoes, a substantial dwelling, which have become social minima in the given culture. It is estimated that 75 to 80 per cent of the income of the *poorest* classes in backward countries goes for food, whereas in America this percentage is about 40 or 50.

MODERN INVENTIONS HAVE LED TO AN UNPRECEDENTED URBANIZATION. Another related set of changes was set in motion by the same industrial inventions. These are changes in the nature and location of labor rather than in the products of labor. The Industrial Revolution brought about a great shift of population from country to city. Factories are usually built in already existing towns and cities, in order to be near labor, power, or transportation facilities. Sometimes, as in the American South, the factory owner himself builds a

new town to house his workers (mill villages). Since there are more goods to be transported and stored, commercial cities also grow in size. Large commercial and governmental cities such as ancient Rome and medieval Venice were in existence long before the invention of machinery. But these pre-industrial cities never contained more than a small minority of the population of a region. In 1880 only 28.6 per cent of our population was urban. Today America lives well with 56.5 per cent of her population urban according to the Census definition, with only 22.9 per cent of her population on rural farms,* and yet without any net importation of food.

This population shift to the cities has been due to the application of machinery to agriculture and transportation as well as to manufacturing. The mechanizing of manufacturing alone would have made necessary the retention of a large farm population in order to feed the country. Agriculture, made more efficient by machinery and by chemical and biological discoveries (fertilizers and breeding), produced a greater product *per worker* but continued to produce about the same output *per consumer.* Manufacturing, similarly affected by machinery, yielded a greater product per worker and also a greater product per consumer. The consumer can eat no more food today than he could in 1700, but he can consume manufactured goods without known limit. His wants for any one kind may be satisfied, but new kinds are continually devised. The whole population grew in size, the number in agriculture remaining about the same, while the increase went to the cities.

Machine industry has led to a minute subdivision of labor. The commercial and transportation occupations have at the same time become more specialized. There is a far greater variety of occupations than before the Industrial Revolution, when the great majority of the people were either farmers or homemakers.

Mobility has been increased. Urbanization and the subdivision of labor have led to increasing social mobility and geographic mobility. Mobility is especially high in America. Dr. James Plant [1930] finds that 78 per cent of the population of certain New Jersey suburbs are to be found living at a changed address after the elapse of 5 years. In Westchester County, New York, 74 per cent of suburban families had lived in their present neighborhoods less than 2 years. [Lundberg *et al.,* 1934.] E. R. Mowrer [1932, 196] found that Chicago families of the telephone subscriber class (more than half of the population) average 2.83 years per address.

* U. S. Bureau of Census, Release, Feb. 27, 1942.

INDUSTRIALIZATION HAS REMOVED MATERIAL PROCESSES FROM THE HOME. Industrialization has transferred labor not only from country to city, and from few occupations to many occupations, but also from the home to the factory, store, and office. As late as the decade 1919–1929, the baking of bread was still being transferred from home to factory; the per capita production of extra-domestic bakeries increased 27 per cent while the per capita consumption of wheat flour decreased 10 per cent. Canning rapidly left the home during that decade. The making of men's clothing had gone several decades ago. Laundering was going, but had not gone so far. About 1929, 88 per cent of farm homes and 33 per cent of city homes, in a sample studied by Hildegarde Kneeland of the U. S. Bureau of Home Economics, were doing all their laundry work at home. [Ogburn, 1933, 665.]

The contrast with past conditions is illustrated by a study by Faith Williams in isolated mountain areas of Kentucky. There, in 1930, 96 per cent of the homes still did churning, 99 per cent fruit canning, 86 per cent fruit drying, 94 per cent pickling of fruits and vegetables, 85 per cent hog butchering, 35 per cent sausage making, 82 per cent lard making, 57 per cent meat salting, 17 per cent meat smoking, 1 per cent shoemaking, 48 per cent shoe repairing, 8 per cent spinning, 7 per cent dyeing, 1 per cent weaving, 15 per cent knitting, 67 per cent quilting, 22 per cent broom making, 4 per cent furniture making, and 76 per cent soap making. [Ogburn, 1933, 667.]

Even farmhouses are becoming limited to a narrower range of functions. Today farming is more like a business; only 8 per cent of all farms are classified as self-sufficient. [Ogburn, 1940.] *

Some women have followed their former work. The loss of economic processes by the home has led to an increase in female labor outside the home. Census figures show that 5.6 per cent of all married women were gainfully occupied in 1900 and 11.7 per cent in 1930. During the same period the gainfully occupied percentage of single women of 15 years and over rose from 43.5 to 50.5. In 1900 the married constituted 15 per cent of all working women, in 1930, 29 per cent. Some married women who work live in apartments or away from their husbands. But figures from 7 states indicate that from 10 to 14 per cent of actual home-makers have regular outside jobs as well.

Census data on occupations and employment in 1940 are yet only preliminary and are not exactly comparable with those of earlier censuses. However, it is clear that the upward trend in percentage of

* The author is indebted to Professor Ogburn for the privilege of examining this most useful paper in manuscript form.

gainfully occupied women has continued during the period 1930–40. Twenty-four per cent of all females of 14 years and over were "in the labor force" in 1940 as compared with 23.5 pr cent "gainfully occupied" in 1930. Since men's corresponding percentages were 77.5 and 83.4, respectively, it appears that there has been a real increase of female employment which was partly obscured by the changed definition. The female age group showing highest employment is that of 20–24 years, 37.7 per cent of it being in the labor force in 1940. For women under 20 and over 65 the trend was downward between 1920 and 1940.

Monroe's study of some 23,000 Chicago families showed that in only 61 per cent were married men the only wage-earners in the family. In Rochester this was found to be true of 56 per cent of families. [Monroe, 1932; Nienburg, 1923.]

The coming of mechanical power to the farms does not change the status of women in quite the same way as it does in the cities. There are few opportunities for the farmer's wife to work outside her own home for wages.

Electricity Has Added Comfort and Reduced Drudgery. Electricity has affected the family somewhat differently from steam. The electric motor, the telephone, and the incandescent lamp have been especially influential. These have reduced household labor and marketing effort. Together with the sewing machine and many specialized types of machinery not sufficiently novel in principle to be called major inventions, they have mechanized much of the work of the home and reduced the proportion of domestic servants. But at the same time they have checked the removal from the home of some functions such as laundry work and the making of women's clothing. Yet the numbers employed in commercial laundries increased 88 per cent from 1920 to 1930. [Ogburn, 1940.] Electric refrigeration has restored ice making to the home. The number of ice dealers had decreased by a third by 1930. Electric and gas cooking have made home cooking easier but have not prevented a great increase in restaurants, waiters, and delicatessen dealers. The last, before 1920, increased three times as fast as the population. [Ogburn, 1933, 668.] The home kitchen probably is used for a lesser number of meals per year, but it is still there with all its equipment.

As Ogburn [1940] has shown, the principal effect of electricity upon the home is to increase the comforts of living and to enrich leisure rather than to restore production to the home. Electricity operates irons, curling irons, dryers, hair clippers, sewing machines, small looms

and spindles, lathes, toys, thermostats, mechanical stokers, fans, air conditioning, ultra-violet lamps, clocks, heat controls, dish washers, garbage disposers, mixers, peelers, cutters, grinders, grills, toasters, coffee makers, waffle irons, washing machines, vacuum cleaners, baby bottle warmers, door openers, bells, buzzers, sound conveyors, heating pads, organs, burglar alarms, flashlights, reducing machines, and massagers.

Borsodi [1933, A, B] and others have advocated a return to household manufacture with the help of small electric machines, and a few families have built new and interesting patterns of living in this way. But for the majority of people, the trend is toward the securing of more and more goods and services from outside the house. The partial checking of this trend during depression years appears to have been only temporary.

TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATION INVENTIONS HAVE INCREASED PERSONAL FREEDOM AND MOBILITY. In combination with the telephone, the automobile has greatly reduced the labor of local transportation and marketing. The homemaker's time is particularly saved as compared with the day when she had to go marketing on foot or by street car and limit her purchases at any one time to what could be carried in the arms. Not only this, but more stores now deliver to homes, and more quickly.

The automobile has helped to upset habits of thrift and has encouraged instalment buying. It has led to excited pleasure and is also an added source of financial and bodily insecurity. Its effect upon the customs of love-making and courtship is well known. The effect, of course, has been upon the city more than the country population. With its speed and closed-in body joined and the inability of the chaperone conventions to keep up with the change, the automobile enables a far greater number of couples per 1,000 population per day to escape oversight. Moreover, as the Lynds [1929, 251] have shown, the horse-and-carriage in its best days was practically limited to the farming and business classes and absent in the working class.

The automobile in limited ways holds the family unit together in recreation. In other ways, however, its influence is to produce separation and conflict. The constant drive of the young people is to get the use of the car for young groups which cut across family lines. Social rivalry compels the parents to yield, and the car becomes in part an agency for segregating youth from age.

The American Automobile Association estimated that 45 million out of America's 122 million people took vacation motor tours during

1929. In an estimate of the annual cost of recreation in the United States, amounting to 10 billion dollars of the 90 billion dollars of national income, Steiner assigns about half of this recreational cost to the use of the automobile. [1933, 922, 949.] In 1920 the average citizen traveled 500 automobile miles per year; in 1936 he traveled 2,000 and the figure was still increasing. [Ogburn, 1940.]

Communication inventions have reduced the importance of distance. Telephones in the United States increased from 17.6 per 1,000 population in 1900 to 163.6 per 1,000 in 1930 (no further increase in 1940) —enough to provide half of all families with instruments after allowing for the commercial subscribers. The per capita telephone calls per year increased from 64 in 1902 to 246 in 1930, a rate somewhat slower than the increase in the number of instruments. [Willey and Rice, 1933, 198.] The telegraphone, a magnetized steel band on which is recorded a message in case the call is not answered, may still further facilitate communication within the community.

The radio brings music and information to the fireside, and television will almost bring speakers and friends in person. [Ogburn, 1940.] The Census of 1930 reported that 40 per cent of the families in the United States had radio sets. To state extremes, in New Jersey about 63 per cent and in Mississippi about 5 per cent were thus provided. Suburbs showed the highest rates, the extreme being 88.7 per cent for Park Ridge, Illinois; rural areas showed lower rates. It was roughly estimated that three-fourths of all the sets were in use sometime every day, and the total daily audience was between 30 and 40 million. [Steiner, 1933, 942; Keppel, 1933, 988.] In 1941 there were 29,700,000 homes with radio sets. This included the vast majority of our people, and there were almost two sets per home.*

The social effects of the radio, like those of the motion picture, are relatively direct. Yet they cannot be readily measured. Ogburn [1933, 153] has listed one hundred and fifty specific effects and, just for illustration, has divided up one of these, "interest in sports increased," into fifteen lesser details. Few of these listed effects, however, involve changes in the family pattern. The major effects seem to be the general diffusion and leveling of culture and the centralizing of the sources of musical entertainment and of information. The rural population is being more rapidly urbanized in cultural attitudes. It is obvious that the radio provides a new reason for spending leisure time in the family group. That it actually leads to the spending of more hours

* "Radio Today," *World Almanac*, 1942, p. 859.

at home, and not merely to the constant auditory stimulation of the hours one would be at home anyway, is not clear. Moreover, whether for good or evil, the radio can be heard at many other places besides our own home.

What are the effects on the home of new reproducing devices such as mimeographing, offset printing, letter-addressing machines? What are the effects of commercial Christmas and birthday cards and the great volume of advertising paper? What about the great increase in wrapping and packing and containers of all kinds? Larger and larger volumes of paper pour through our homes; the forests of Quebec are burned in city dumps; and every man, woman, and child is exposed continually to words, to bits of information which he cannot digest or organize, as well as to more numerous and superficial communications from friends.

Facsimile transmission has been producing a newspaper in the home in St. Louis. [Ogburn, 1940.] This may be especially useful in remote rural homes and help to break down rural isolation still faster.

Moving pictures have increased vicarious living. The moving picture complex, like the toy complex, is one which furnishes vicarious satisfaction. Dr. James Plant [1930, B] has observed in the modern city a growing tendency toward the more introverted type of mental reaction, as a result, he thinks, of the increasing vicariousness of life. In our leisure life of today we have fewer contacts with earth, air, and sea, with animals, plants, and even with people who are doing real things. We play in an unreal world of the imagination. We rely increasingly on fiction for our recreation, especially in the form of motion pictures which make fiction more attractive than ever before.

Here we have an invention whose effect upon the social system and attitudes is direct rather than through the medium of economic organization. In 1930 the weekly attendance at motion picture theaters was estimated as over 100 million, or an average of once a week for every man, woman, and child in the country. This attendance was double that of 1926, and it increased faster from 1926 to 1930 than from 1921 to 1926, owing, it is believed, to the introduction of sound pictures. [Steiner, 1933, 940.] The 1940 figure is 80 million per week.*

In *Middletown,* the Lynds found an average weekly attendance of about 85 per cent of the total population. They found that among the students in the upper three years of high school, only 21 per cent

* *Film Daily Year Book,* 1941.

of the boys and 33 per cent of the girls went to the movies more often with their parents than without them. The movies have contributed much toward the recreational segregation of youth and toward the earlier development of sexual interests and of petting, for which they provide not only a stimulus but also, to some extent, the time and place.

An analysis made by Hart, Mills, and McGarraghy, has showed that in recent years "moving pictures were more apt than any class of magazines studied to present divorce and sexual irregularities in an approving light." A sample of moving pictures analyzed in 1932 approved violations of monogamy in 34 characters, disapproved it in 42. [1933, 419.]

The net influence of the motion picture upon delinquent behavior remains to be determined. Whatever this may be, it seems certain that the effect has been to shift the center of gravity of youthful life toward unreality and vicariousness, and incidentally somewhat away from the family. The home motion picture machine may be expected to enrich recreational life among the more privileged homes, but hardly to reduce substantially the patronage of commercial theaters.

NEW TRANSPORTATION TECHNIQUES HAVE LED TO SUBURBANIZATION. A major effect of the automobile, telephone, and other improvements in transportation is the geographic spread of the city and a new impetus to the development of the suburb. In choosing a residence, the advantage of living near one's work, kinsfolk, or cherished friends is no longer important, since the automobile solves the problem of distance. Although theoretically a device to *reduce the time* spent in daily or weekly personal locomotion, the automobile has, instead, *increased the distances* covered.*

Nearness to the city is no longer a strong argument in selling real estate. The new "development" miles beyond the city limits becomes popular, and suburban settlements take on a scattering distribution, with large areas of unbuilt land lying between. The automobile favors the growth of small cities as well as the suburbs of the large ones. From 1920 to 1930, the growth of population in the 85 metropolitan districts of 100,000 population or more was 19.4 per cent for the central cities and 39.2 per cent for the suburban districts. In the Boston district the population outside the central city is now twice as great as that of the central city; in Pittsburgh it is almost twice as great. In 1940 a sample of cities of over 250,000 had grown 3.4 per

* The war, of course, has brought many conditions which require exceptions to these statements; whether temporary or permanent we cannot yet say.

cent in a decade, but the counties surrounding them had grown 17 per cent. [Ogburn, 1940.] Of course, small industrial satellite cities as well as true (residential) suburbs account for some of this. If we analyze the growth of a large metropolitan district by concentric rings about the center, we find that between 1920 and 1930 there was an actual decrease of population within the four-mile radii of the centers of New York and Chicago and the two-mile radii of Cleveland and Pittsburgh. Although all social classes are represented in this outward drift of population, the movement is most extreme on the part of the upper business class, which formerly lived in handsomely built areas not far from the center of the city, and which is now seeking rural scenery in exclusive developments bearing attractive names. The change of place names from the old rural village or township name to some "Hills," "Heights," "-dale," "-wood," "Park," or "Grove" is culturally significant in several ways. [McKenzie, 1933, 462–465.] In the very largest cities only there are movements of the upper classes which are not toward the suburbs, such as the drift of the wealthy in New York from Riverside Drive to Park Avenue. The replacement of working class by "intellectuals" in Greenwich Village is another unusual phenomenon.

New housing projects, which replace the now partly vacant dwellings in blighted central areas of cities with clean, sanitary apartments accommodating even more people per acre than were living in these areas before the clearance, may retard suburbanization slightly in some places. But the main drift of housing continues to be toward decentralization.

Suburbanization has produced further changes in family life. It is having effects upon family life different from those of the earlier urbanization. A comparison of several samples of districts in New York State showed a sex ratio of 117 for the open country, 101 for the city, and 80 for the suburbs. [Lundberg *et al.*, 1934, 35.] Nineteen cities in various parts of the United States, of the class of 30,000 to 70,000 population, show sex ratios varying from 63.0 to 127.7. [Downing, 1933.]

Young women leave the farms at a greater rate than young men. But they also tend to remain in the suburbs whereas young men leave to find work in the larger cities. The suburb becomes the home of the married man, who is often a commuter, and around him accumulates an excess of females: unmarried daughters, widows, some domestic servants, school teachers, and workers in other feminine occupations. The unmarried males corresponding to these unmarried females, and

some of the husbands of married women in such groups, tend to locate nearer the urban center because of occupational opportunities. An adult man is comparatively unlikely to live in the suburb unless he has a wife there. But an adult woman is very likely to live there even without a husband.

In the New York sample above mentioned the suburb also has a greater proportion of families with young children than has either the country or the city. The number of children increases as the family income increases—the reverse of what we find when we lump all classes of society together. In a sample of 468 suburban families divided into commuters and non-commuters, McInerny found that, holding income levels constant, the commuters' families had higher mobility but also more family unity in several respects. On the same economic level, the commuters moved more frequently, had slightly more children (except in the lowest income group), spent more evenings per week in the family group, entertained more, and went more often to private than to public recreation places. [Lundberg *et al.*, 1934, 172–186.]

The idea that the suburban family is becoming a matriarchate because of the absence of the father from the home is probably exaggerated. He may be at home more in the suburbs than in the city. [Ogburn, 1940.]

C. THE INFLUENCE OF BIOLOGICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

The inventions whose effects have so far been described belong to the inorganic realm of physics and chemistry. The biological sciences have contributed also to modern social change, in some ways more significantly than the inorganic sciences. Two fields of biological discovery have been especially influential: *first,* the field of medicine; *second,* that of heredity and reproduction.

Medical discoveries and inventions have revolutionized medical practice and led to the development of hospitals, clinics, health centers, and public health nursing. They have led the government into public health activities, including sanitary inspection, laboratory services, quarantine, and the collection of medical reports and vital statistics. An increasing proportion of the medical costs are being paid through government, philanthropy, and other collective rather than individual channels, and now there is a vigorous movement toward the spreading of the medical burden over the whole population rather than concentrating it upon the unfortunate sick. [Ogburn, 1933, 149.]

Even though the number of physicians per capita has declined some-

what, the rapid increase in dentists, trained nurses, and hospital personnel has led to a considerable increase in the total health personnel per capita of population. Also, facilities and medical supplies have increased, so that the work of the average doctor involves now a greater financial outlay for drugs, instruments, and materials. [Hurlin, 1933, 301.]

MEDICINE HAS CAUSED IMPORTANT POPULATIONAL CHANGES. *The duration of the average human life has been extended.* Stated in terms of "expectation of life at birth," it has risen from about 35 years for the group of persons who died in 1789 to about 47 for 1900, and then to about 63 years for 1941.* The period of *rapid* improvement began in 1890. Stating the facts in another way: death rates being as in 1930, about 60 per cent of babies born alive may expect to live to the age of 60, about 40 per cent to the age of 70, and about 17 per cent to the age of 80. By the time these babies born today reach the age of 60, conditions may have improved further so that their expectation figures would be raised. Under 1901 death rates, only 30 instead of 40 per cent of newborn babies might expect to live to 70. [Sydenstricker, 1933, 605.]

This increased length of life is due to the fall of death rates at all ages except the oldest. The rates have fallen the most for infants, considerably for the middle ages, but not appreciably for the oldsters. If a person actually reaches 60 today, his average expectation of further life is then about 14 years, *slightly less* than it was in 1789. In other words, the total *span* of life has not increased.†

The greatest effect has been to save youth. The pronounced fall of the death rates of children, and particularly of infants, has given the average parents a much greater hope of raising a given child to maturity. Yet the declining death rate of children under 5 did not begin till 1900. One out of every 10 infants born alive might expect to die within the first year in 1915 (i.e., "infant mortality rate" 100 per 1,000); one in every 20 (rate 48) in 1939. [Sydenstricker, 1933, 656; Frank, 1933, 757.] ‡ This does not tell the whole story. These figures are of course averages for the whole population of the United States. If we compare those classes which enjoy the most advanced facilities

* *Statistical Bulletin*, Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., May, 1942, 23:No. 5.

† This does not mean of course that a person reaching 74 years of age has a zero expectation. If he actually survives to 74, he then falls in a new statistical group which has a further expectation of 7 years. There is now some evidence that expectation in old age is beginning to increase.

‡ See also U. S. Census, *Vital Statistics*, 1939.

of medical science and feeding with classes which represent the conditions of many years ago, we get much more striking comparisons. Thus, infant mortality among American suburban populations now (1940) ranges around 30 per 1,000 births. Among the poorest laboring families it was recently 170; in eastern Europe from 100 to 200; in Japan 142; in Chile 224; New Zealand holds the world's low record with 34. [Phelps, 1932, 57; Thompson, 1930, 140.] *

Once the child has safely arrived at the age of 1 year, his chances of death before he reaches the age of 30, when presumably he will be married and beginning a new family, are about 1 out of 7. Through those 29 years his total risk is only double that of the first year.

Old age diseases are now the problem. These causes of death have declined: typhoid, tuberculosis, diphtheria and scarlet fever, pneumonia, smallpox, measles, whooping cough, diarrhea and dysentery, and malaria. These decreases are due to specific medical measures. Even tuberculosis, the decrease in which the genetic school of biologists has attributed to the natural dying off of tubercular strains rather than to medicine, has been proved to have been decidedly influenced by sanitary measures. One of the most remarkable achievements of mankind has been the fall of tuberculosis from a death rate of nearly 400 per 100,000 before the Civil War to about 80 per 100,000 at present. These causes have shown increasing death rates: cancer, diabetes, cerebral hemorrhage, heart diseases, nephritis, and accidents. These increases have been due in part to the fact that they represent diseases of old age, and there is an increasing number of old people. But we can see that some increase has taken place in most of these "degenerative" diseases if we make the comparison at any fixed age level. Thus, the death rate of 60-year-old males from cancer rose from about 200 to 400 per 100,000 between 1900 and 1929. The most conspicuous upward change was in diabetes. [Sydenstricker, 1933, 627, 657.]

Venereal disease is becoming a medical rather than a moral problem. Efforts to discover methods of immunization against venereal diseases have not been pushed as similar efforts with other diseases, partly because the mores demand continence as the only proper preventive; yet these diseases are being confronted more and more with the medical and less with the moral attitude. It is known that there is much suffering among the morally innocent. Experience reveals many cases of individuals who infect their legal mates and of others who avoid disease in illicit sex contacts.

* See also U. S. Census, *Vital Statistics*, 1939.

The changed policies with respect to venereal disease are not the result of advancing medicine alone, but also of the changed attitudes toward human behavior which will be discussed later.

By far the most important effect of medical science upon the family is the limitation of offspring through contraception. Himes [1936] holds that contraception is socially a more influential invention than even the invention of the steam engine. However, contraception is not an "invention" in the usual sense. It consists largely of the application of several minor (including very simple and ancient) discoveries, encouraged by a new ideology which permits these devices to be used, and economic forces which give incentive to their use.

PSYCHOLOGY AND SOCIOLOGY ARE JUST BEGINNING TO HAVE EFFECTS. A most important new development is the research now being undertaken on human sex life and its relation to love and happiness. New knowledge concerning sexual psychology, personality development, and the interaction of personalities in small groups is making satisfactory marriage *possible* to a larger proportion of people. At the same time, it is creating higher expectations and standards, so that the net effect is not clear, and the long-term results have not yet had time to show themselves.

D. THE IDEOLOGICAL INFLUENCES OF SCIENCE

THE IMPACT OF SCIENCE HAS BEEN DIRECTLY IDEOLOGICAL AS WELL AS TECHNOLOGICAL. According to one theory of social change, science first modifies the tools and techniques of human living and these changes then affect our ideas and values. But the most important effects of psychological and social science, and also of certain physical and biological fields of science, have operated according to another principle; namely, these discoveries have *directly* changed our thinking and our values. Their practical effects are tremendous, but remote and difficult to identify. *No* less important than the *Industrial Revolution* is the *ideological revolution produced by the discoveries of Copernicus, Darwin, Pavlov, Freud, and Ratzel,* and those who have followed their ways of study.

Lawrence Frank [1940] has pointed out that western European culture has been built upon four great organizing conceptions. These deal respectively with (Frank's order slightly changed): (1) the nature of the universe, (2) man's place in the universe, (3) human nature and conduct, (4) the relation of the individual to his society. The traditional conception in each of these spheres has been replaced by a new

one based upon scientific research. The fields of scientific discovery which are mainly responsible for changing the above conceptions are described below in paragraphs 1 to 4. Each should be regarded not as a complete science but as a significant, influential group of discoveries, with its method and its resultant "school of thought" within a science. Paragraph 5 introduces an additional, coordinate category.

1. THE NATURE OF THE UNIVERSE. Copernicus exploded the first of these conceptions and replaced it by a new ideology which could be scientifically verified.* Kepler, Galileo, Newton, and others carried on his work. Astronomy is now the most exact and in a sense the least practical of the sciences. It affords prediction but not control, except in so far as man controls his own behavior in navigation, surveying and almanac making by his knowledge of the uncontrollable heavens. By far the most important influence of astronomy has been upon men's thinking rather than specifically and directly upon their conduct. Well did the church foresee and fear this result. It strenuously opposed Copernicus, persecuted Galileo and forced him under threat to deny his beliefs. But eventually it was the church which revised its beliefs.

2. MAN'S PLACE IN THE UNIVERSE. It was in 1859 that Darwin published his *Origin of Species* and the great fight began. In 1925 John T. Scopes was tried and convicted, under a new law of Tennessee, for teaching in the public schools that man evolved from other animal forms. On the other hand, in 1919 was written into the *constitution* of the new Czechoslovak Republic this clause: "Public instruction shall be given so as not to be in conflict with the results of scientific investigation." †

The lag of popular attitude behind material discovery was thus different in different regions and classes within our Euro-American culture area. On the whole, the lag has been remarkably brief as compared with similar lags in the past, thus giving tribute to the effectiveness of modern communication.

3. HUMAN NATURE AND CONDUCT. Ivan P. Pavlov, the Russian physiologist, during the first decade of this century discovered that a dog's saliva could be made to flow by the ringing of a bell, provided that the bell had previously been sounded on several occasions when the dog was given meat. To the principle thus demonstrated he gave the name *conditioned reflex.* At first blush it might appear that this was

* *De Revolutionibus Orbium Coelestium,* 1543.

† Article V, Clause 119.

merely an application of the principle of "association of ideas," which had been known to the ancients. The ancients, however, did not know the relation of an "idea" to physiological stimulus and reaction; they thought of it as something metaphysical. They had no notion of the mechanism or *process* by which their "ideas" became associated. It was Pavlov and his followers who built the bridge between physiology and these ancient introspections. Furthermore, it had not before been realized that stimuli to *different* sense organs, such as sound stimuli and taste stimuli, could become linked by the same process as that by which ideas are linked. Pavlov paved the way to the breaking down of the old metaphysical distinction between body and mind. His work suggested that mind could be interpreted as the *functioning* of certain parts of the body rather than as a substance or structure belonging to a different realm of reality from that of the body.

In 1895 Sigmund Freud, the Austrian psychiatrist, published with Joseph Breuer a work called *Studies of Hysteria.* In this he brought forth a new theory of the nature of mental disorders, showing them to be in many cases the results of repression of sexual impulses or of fearful thinking in regard to sex. Freud and his followers developed the *psychoanalytic* school of psychology. Pavlov revealed the elementary processes of mental life; Freud revealed its larger integrating processes. He showed that all behavior and thinking are controlled by wishes, and that these, though changing their specific goals and directions, develop in an unbroken continuity from childhood. He showed that there are hidden connections between different parts of a person's mental life and that these connections can be revealed to the person himself, even when he has not been aware of them, by giving him opportunity for completely "talking himself out" to the confidential psychoanalytic listener.

Freud's psychology is a *dynamic* psychology. It is interested in how personality develops and changes, more than in a minute observation of the sensations, feelings, and mental images of any one moment. Although it seems at first glance, to the mid-Victorian type of mind, to present a "low" conception of human nature, it really gives a scientific basis for the cultivation of human nature and the betterment of human relations. As Frank [1940, 882] says, in his portrayal of the process of personality development in infancy and childhood he has provided the most effective support for the ethics of Jesus; the injunction to love little children, and the historic assertion [by Jesus] of the supreme importance of the human personality, find their strongest support and confirmation in Freud's studies and teachings."

4. THE RELATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL TO HIS SOCIETY. There is still another type of scientific discovery whose immediate effects are "ideological" but whose probable ultimate effects are practical and far-reaching. This is the discovery in the *superorganic* realm; indeed, the discovery of culture itself! To be sure, man had known culture and written about it since the time of the first Greek historians, but only recently has he become explicitly conscious of it as an entity distinct from himself. This new enlightenment is much more than the use of an old word in a new sense, as we shall presently see. Although this is not all that is included under Frank's conception of the relation of the individual to society, it is the most specific discovery which operated to change that conception.

It is difficult to single out a particular name as deserving the initial credit for superorganic discovery. Friedrich Ratzel (1844–1904), the German ethnologist, might be especially honored. Ratzel founded a special science of anthropogeography. He traveled and explored extensively and is best known through his great work, the *History of Mankind.* As Wissler says, "The consensus of opinion seems to be that the work of Ratzel stands as a new approach to the problem of man, the particular insight in this case being, that in environment and migration are to be sought the determining factors of culture . . . he set his face against the idea that there is an inner functional development of man by which culture can be explained; he believed that the whole of culture is forced upon man from the outside, claiming that in migrations, and in the borrowing of culture, by one tribe from another, can be found the full explanation of any tribal culture." *

It follows that *any particular culture represents an arbitrary choice among several possible alternatives, this choice having been made through the accidental circumstances of invention, group contacts, and migration, rather than by any inherently superior suitability of the alternative chosen.* Corollary to this is the idea that a race or a people has no inherent distinctive "character," but that nearly all of what we call its character is simply its culture, the origin of which lies in external circumstances rather than in inner qualities.

5. THE RELATION OF WORDS TO THE REST OF THE WORLD. A new science is now developing known as *semantics,* the study of the meanings of words. This holds still further possibilities for the reconstruction of human thinking and, eventually, living. For over two thou-

* Clark Wissler, *An Introduction to Social Anthropology,* Holt, 1929, pp. 303–304. By permission.

sand years Aristotle's *Organon* of logic has been the fundamental guide to correct reasoning. Aristotle, to be sure, recognized that a *word* is not the *thing* it refers to, and that there are many general or universal words which do not refer to any concrete object in particular. He also recognized that the road to knowledge lies largely through the study of things themselves. Yet his carefully formulated rules of verbal thinking have in general led men to trust this "logic" to such an extent that it has proved an obstacle to the communication of scientific knowledge. The active scientists and discoverers in each field may have an understanding of their material which is not clouded by the language in which they express it. But the student and the reader often gain an oversimplified or misleading picture of a scientific theory or discovery because of their unwitting reliance upon the forms of Aristotelian logic.

For example, "love" and "hate" are defined as opposites. Love seeks always to help and not to harm; Jones deliberately harmed his wife, therefore he does not love her. This reasoning is logical, but not psychological. Freud has shown how commonly love and hate go together; he calls this "ambivalence." The Freudian thinking finally prevails, but it would "get across" sooner and with less agony of mind if the student of psychology had also studied semantics. For this would have taught him to examine critically the very meaning of the word "opposite" instead of taking it for granted. He would have learned that there are at least two very different relationships which are denoted by the word "opposite" and would have analyzed these concepts further.

Semantics makes words seem less clear and thereby makes things more clear. Its greatest function will probably be to facilitate learning and thereby hasten the dissemination and democratization of science.

The formal introduction of semantics as a branch of study is credited to Michel Bréal.* It was promoted by Lady Welby and achieved a further development in Ogden and Richards' *The Meaning of Meaning* [1923]. Count Alfred Korzybski [1940] has developed its relation to mental hygiene. In 1941 at a conference on general semantics at Denver, several cures of mental disorders were reported by psychiatrists whose chief technique was making the patient more aware of the meaning of words (and, presumably, of the *lack* of definite meaning of some words).

* *Essai de sémantique,* 1897.

INCREASED DIVORCE AND CONTRACEPTION ARE DUE TO CHANGED IDEOLOGY. At least two of the most important changes in the family have come about largely through the ideological rather than the direct "practical" influences of science. These are the phenomenal increases in divorce and in contraception. It is true that industry and urban life gave women more economic independence and thereby facilitated divorce. It is true that the material techniques of contraception have been improved and some new ones discovered, and that urban life, the abolition of child labor, and rising standards of material consumption have provided incentive for limiting families. Yet wherever Roman Catholic ideology has firmly prevailed, even under modern urban conditions, people have reacted to economic pressure or have limited their offspring by some method other than contraception. Under both Catholic and Anglican religions they have found the solution of marital unhappiness in some way other than through divorce. Divorce and contraception became prevalent modes of adjustment because there was a break in a previously impregnable wall of cultural resistance. This break happened to occur within the century after the Industrial Revolution, but it had nothing to do with the Industrial Revolution, except in so far as the general attitude favoring scientific invention spread to other fields than the mechanical. This breakdown of resistance opened the way to adjustments which otherwise would remain even today under powerful taboo.

Throughout the Christian era, despite cycles of asceticism alternating with hypocritical laxity, despite political and economic changes, two ideas remained powerfully intrenched: the idea of marriage as a relation peculiarly under divine supervision, and the idea of the sacredness of the process of reproduction. Both ideas were tied up with the basic concept of the human being as a soul.

The really significant change in this field during the last century has been not the discovery of essential principles of contraception, but the breaking down of the general thought patterns which prevented the testing and use of such principles.

THE SCIENTIFIC ATTITUDE LIQUIDATES TABOOS AND ENCOURAGES EXPERIMENT. The five developments in the field of science have driven pre-scientific ideologies from their last strongholds. Their total effect has been to transfer the whole field of human emotions and behavior, including sex and reproduction, from the realm of magic, theology, and metaphysics to the realm of realistic, scientific thinking. The difference between scientific and pre-scientific thinking is not merely one of definiteness versus vagueness, mechanical process versus spir-

itual or magical process (which on analysis turns out to be *no process at all* but a refusal to admit the necessity of processes). Scientific thinking carries with it a different attitude toward the subject matter, an attitude of experiment and thorough exploration as contrasted with an attitude of fear and taboo. Scientific thinking is both a cause and a result of curiosity; it indulges curiosity even in spite of fear. Magical and theological and, to some extent, metaphysical thinking stifle curiosity in order to avoid fear. They aim at security.

In brief, modern science has made behavior, including emotions, an object of curiosity and experiment. "Right" and "wrong" are no longer thought of by large numbers of people as inherent qualities of behavior; they are merely practical judgments concerning the results of behavior under specified circumstances. Behavior is no longer "sensual" or "spiritual," but it is "normal" or "pathological"; it is not "brutish" or "noble," but "anti-social" or "social."

The direct, practical and the ideological influences of science have together produced probably the most rapid and thoroughgoing changes which human family life has ever experienced. The family has changed in size, composition, and structure; in the functions which it performs; and in the cultural values which guide family life. In Chapter VI we shall study the nature of these changes in the family itself and attempt to describe and evaluate their general trends.

Chapter VI

THE TRENDS OF FAMILY CHANGE

A. CURRENT CHANGES IN THE FAMILY

In the preceding chapter we studied the impact of modern science upon society in recent years. Let us now examine the resulting changes in the family itself, using the outline of family phenomena in Chapter I as a framework.

In this study we shall also relate these current trends of family change to the more distant past and the whole history of the family. We shall try to see the changes in terms of social structure, societal functions, and cultural values.

I. SPATIAL AND MATERIAL PATTERNS: ECONOMIC AND MATERIAL FUNCTIONS. Most of the items under this heading refer to the home and its location, and the work which is done there, or the relation of this to other work. The general functional concept to which all this is related has been called the "economic function of the family." Economic activities, in terms of personal behavior, are usually called "work." At least one-third of the total work of the United States is homemaking without remuneration. But there are also family "chores" which are done by other persons than the homemaker, and chores done by each person for himself. Many people consider dressing and the care of the person as such a chore. On the other hand, most people consider eating as enjoyment or ultimate satisfaction and not as work. How do we know this? The acid test is to ask them: "If you could get these same results by spending half as much time, or no time at all, would you do so?" Eating, love, and recreational activities are ultimate "gratifications" or "satisfactions." But preparing for these involves work, some of which cannot be in specialized productive establishments but must be done where the activity is to be carried on.

WORK IN THE HOME HAS NOT BEEN REDUCED, BUT CHANGED IN CHARACTER FROM MANUFACTURING TO SERVICE. Taking the historical view, we see that there has been a one-way trend of economic functions becoming specialized and one by one leaving the home to be carried on

in a workshop under the great institutions known as "industry," "business," and so on. "The family is losing its economic functions" is a formula widely used by social scientists. It is a misleading formula, however, for it does not say what it means. It is the *manufacturing* or *processing* of materials which has largely left the home, but storage, transportation, and personal service, in the elaborate detail necessary for modern living, have increased in the home. In one sense the homemaker has become more specialized. She is a specialist in miscellaneous services; she is a kind of executive like the manager of a hotel or pleasure resort. Thus baking has entirely left the homes of at least 71 per cent of the college women studied in a recent survey. [Houdlette, 1939.] Yet in these homes work is done which was not done in earlier homes: elaborate salads with proper vitamin content are prepared; breakfasts are served at different hours to meet the needs of different individuals; and food is carried to various interesting places for lawn parties or picnics. As we shall see later, women have left the home for the factory, but very slowly—not nearly so fast as tasks have left the home. Time studies show that homemakers on the average put in full time. Only a small upper class of women has leisure greater than that of persons employed outside the home. New tasks in the home, or the elaboration of old tasks, use up most if not all of the time gained by removing tasks from the home. Inventions eliminate old tasks and create new ones. Many odds and ends of work are thrust upon the homemaker. The home is cluttered with a great diversification of commodities and burdened with a great miscellany of tasks.

A great deal of our increased productive power goes into commodities and services whose principal or only satisfaction is vanity. We are ashamed to appear poor. "Keeping up with the Joneses" takes many forms, of which crude ostentation, now perhaps less frequent than formerly, is not always the most costly. In his *Theory of the Leisure Class,* Thorstein Veblen [1908] described this process.

A credit economy and installment buying enable many people to consume in advance of earnings by mortgaging future income.

THE HOME ENLARGES ITS INSTRUMENTAL ROLE IN RECREATION. The organization of the individual's leisure life centers in the home, where homes are more adequate and living standards high.

Recreational functions are being transferred, some to, and some from, the family. Many activities formerly carried on in the backyard or in the family living room have been moved to schools, churches, and group work institutions. Yet at the same time the radio, the automobile, the growing

practice of having play and game rooms, and the enforced economy of the depression have operated to restore recreation to the home. It is impossible to estimate the net effect of these opposing trends. In so far as housing becomes more spacious and adequate, the additional space will probably be used largely for leisure-time activities. Families of higher economic status carry on hobbies and other recreations in the house or on the grounds, which among the poorer classes must be conducted in the settlement house, park, or street. While activities themselves may be largely outside, the home becomes more important as a telephonic center for preparation and making contacts, and as a storage place for equipment.*

CHANGES IN THE HOUSING PATTERN AND HOME "OWNERSHIP." In the construction of residences the trends are toward more apartment houses in large cities, but also more floor space per individual. From 1921 to 1928, the last period of extensive building, the new residential construction changed from 58 per cent single, 24 per cent multiple, to 35 per cent single, 54 per cent multiple dwellings. The two-family dwellings made up the remaining percentages. They, on the whole, decreased. This trend toward apartment houses was present in metropolitan cities, independent cities of over 50,000, and suburban cities of over 25,000, but not in independent cities from 25,000 to 50,000. That we are becoming *generally* a nation of apartment-house dwellers is by no means certain. About 1 family out of every 8 lived in an apartment house about 1930.† Apparently the trend is toward both the large apartment and the single-family home, and away from the "flat" which was conspicuous in the past. This is related to certain trends in residence attitudes which go with our increasing wealth.

In the period 1913–1919, the new urban residential construction of all sorts provided about 208 square feet of floor space per person added to the urban population. After the war this figure rose until in 1927 it was 286 square feet. There were great regional differences. In New England, New York, and the Middle Atlantic regions the figure was about 475 square feet, and in each of the remaining statistical regions, among them the Pittsburgh and Central West areas, the figure was 265 or below. Census figures on *farmers'* homes indicate also a much larger number of rooms per person in New England farm houses than in other parts of the country.

* Joseph K. Folsom, "The Changing Role of the Family," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 212:64 (1940). By permission.

† Defined as dwellings containing three or more families. See E. W. Burgess, "Families in Apartment House Areas," *Parent Education*, 4:No. 1, 17–20 (1937).

In the apartment houses of the larger cities there is a trend toward fewer rooms per family, despite the greater floor space per individual. In the apartment houses built from 1913 to 1919 in Chicago, the average apartment unit was 4.6 rooms, and since 1924, 3.5 rooms. In New York the change was from 4.2 in 1913 to 3.3 in 1928. This change reflects in part the smaller size of family. It may be a change affecting only apartment dwellers. [McKenzie, 1933, 473–476.]

Home ownership is decreasing in rural areas and increasing in cities. The rural trend is due to increasing farm tenancy. In 1890, 28 per cent of all farms in the country were tenant-operated; in 1930, 42 per cent. Among non-farm homes, the percentage rented fell from 63.1 in 1890 to 54.0 in 1930. In most of the largest cities, tenancy fell from 1920 to 1930, although the majority of homes were still rented in 1930.* Extreme cases are New York, with 79.5 per cent still rented, and Philadelphia, the "city of homes," with only 48.2 per cent rented.†

In 1920 the percentage of all homes rented varied from the extremes of 35 in North Dakota and 40 in Maine to 69 in New York and Georgia, with an average of 54. Thus we see low home ownership associated, on one hand, with high urbanization and, on the other hand, with an extremely rural but poor population, consisting of many farm tenants. High ownership goes with small cities and with prosperous or thrifty farming.

In "Middletown," which is typical of many small independent cities, the percentage of rented homes fell from 65 in 1900 to 49 in 1930. But this increasing "ownership" was largely due to increased credit facilities which permit a family to "buy" a home on a contract-for-deed plan, whereby one pays about 50 per cent more per month than the rent would be, looking toward ultimate ownership. It is now difficult to rent a house. [Lynd, 1929, 108; 1935, 191.] By the new system, the dweller in the house assumes the risks of ownership in return for the psychological satisfactions of ownership, but does not have to accumulate much of the capital in advance. On the other hand, an entrepreneur finds it more profitable to buy and sell real estate, or to lend money on real estate, than to assume a permanent landlord's responsibility for particular houses.

* A census release of March 27, 1942, using a different classification, gives 43.6 per cent of all occupied dwelling units in the country as owner-occupied. For urban territory 37.5 per cent are owner-occupied.

† 1930 Census, Population, Vol. VI.

Plant [1930, A] says that in New Jersey suburbs 84 per cent of homes are owned in those areas where 78 per cent of the people are found at a changed address every five years. Obviously home "ownership" does not indicate the permanence of residence and of social relationships which it is supposed to indicate. Ely [1920] estimates that in small Western cities about nine-tenths of the population which achieves ownership does so through the mortgage plan. Houses in growing communities are readily bought and sold as the people move from residence to residence. To a large extent modern urban home ownership represents a wider diffusion of financial insecurity and anxiety but not greater social stability.

About 1929 home building declined sharply, reaching a level, from 1932 to 1934, of about 75,000,000 square feet of residential floor space per year, as compared with 500,000,000 during the period 1925–1929. After 1934 it rose again but had reached only 332,000,000 in 1939.*

"HOME" CEASES TO BE A PARTICULAR-PLACE VALUE. The emotional effects of this ecological instability have never been adequately investigated. Plant [1937, 107] noted a great deal of emotional upset among children of families recently moved to new neighborhoods. Certainly there must be a quantitative loss in an important value—the sentiment of "home" which gave rise to such expressions as "The Old Oaken Bucket," and Thomas Hood's nostalgic poem:

I remember, I remember
The house where I was born,
The little window where the sun
Came peeping in at morn.
It never came a wink too soon
Nor stayed too long a day.
But now I often wish the night
Had borne my soul away.

There has been also a loss in the values which go with the joint working group. Parents and children work together less than they did. Husband and wife also are more separated in their work, although in educated classes there is some evidence of a recent increase in the sharing of household duties. [Houdlette, 1939.] A moot question is whether equivalent values of family companionship will develop in the recreational life of the home.

* U. S. Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States*, 1940, p. 983.

On the whole, the spatial and material aspects of family life cover a large share of ultimate human satisfactions. The necessary *societal* functions involved *could* be carried on by other arrangements, as schools and military life demonstrate, and probably more efficiently. The home remains in its present form largely because of values.

II. The Structure of Marital and Sexual Relationships: Control and Status Functions. Marriage, divorce, legitimacy, and associated patterns of status fix responsibility, prevent conflict, and help to maintain reproduction of the race. Yet these societal functions can be performed in many ways, and the particular system of a given society is maintained by cultural values. Every society has some scheme for the specific assignment of responsibility for children, and this usually corresponds to "marriage" or the principal mating relation.

The principal historic trends in this field are related to the changing roles of organized religion and of government. In primitive times "marriage" was merely custom. No license had to be secured from a government office; there was no specialized higher institution, apart from the local community and its leaders, which placed some official sanction upon the union. If a couple had observed the usual customs and rituals, they *were* married. But with civilization came written documents and specialized bodies known as courts to decide judicially whether custom was or was not observed. What really makes a couple married is not any magic in the words "I pronounce you man and wife," but the new attitudes of fellow men which are called forth by this ceremony as a signal.

Recent trends of marriage are not the same in all advanced countries. In America there has been a trend toward earlier marriage and for a greater percentage of people to be married, but since about 90 per cent of people marry eventually, such a trend has its limits and can easily be reversed. In Chapter V we noted that there are creative and distributive changes. There is evidence of a marked creative change [type III (a) (3)] in regard to the valuation of marriage. To get married in spite of obstacles and financial dependence is now increasingly approved. The increase in actual number of marriages is a distributive change [type III (b) (2)], which could not be very great in an upward direction for the reason given above.

The penalties of the unmarried state have also been lessened, and widowhood is no longer a status of protracted mourning and isolation from activities.

There is evidence of considerable increase in pre-marital sex relations and also in the attitude of tolerance toward them. There is no evidence of decrease in prostitution in the United States although its character has changed. There is evidence that extra-marital sex relations are experienced by a much larger proportion of women, both unmarried and married, than before, and that the commercial type of relation plays a lesser role in the total volume of sex relations outside marriage. Divorce has rapidly increased and the attitude toward it has liberalized. The trend of the law is toward liberality but it is slow. Illegitimacy has, in the long run, gradually decreased and at the same time the penalties upon the illegitimate child have been somewhat mitigated.

Primitive peoples had many methods of choosing a mate, including pure freedom of choice and narrow prescription by custom. Civilized peoples also have had free choice and parent-made choice. Recent trends in Europe and America are toward increasing freedom from parental control. At the same time, advanced countries have tended to raise the age and health requirements of marriage.

Frankly polygamous experiments like the Mormon and Oneida groups would be more difficult to carry on today than they were in the nineteenth century. Yet probably a larger proportion of persons throughout the country today are living in virtual polygamous relationships than in the days of Mormonism.

Rules which seem necessary to health and welfare or to maintain the core of the traditional values, such as monogamous marriage, are entrusted increasingly to the government to enforce; hence increased legislation. Yet in other respects the individual is more free to make his own choice. Church, kin, community, and custom, with their more intimate supervision, grow weaker as agencies of social control, while the government, with its more remote control over a few essentials, grows stronger. Individuals may change their status in the family complex more easily, and the values attached to status have in general declined. At the same time there is no trend toward freeing the individual from *responsibility* for the effects of his decisions upon others.

III. Kinship Structure and Its Relation to Marital Structure: Status and Control Functions. The greatest changes in this sphere occurred long ago, with the development of civilized society. In primitive society kinship systems were sometimes very elaborate and sometimes relatively simple. This had no correlation with the stage of technological advancement. Anthropologists reasoned that these sys-

tems have societal functions, such as the prevention of inbreeding. Yet some societies apparently were able to achieve adequate mixture of blood with much less complicated cultural paraphernalia than others. We are obliged to conclude that those systems had cultural values and were not specifically necessary to their functions. The modern also would probably hate to give up all recognition of his uncles and his cousins and his aunts and the sometimes pleasant customs which go with these relationships, even if they were shown to be quite unnecessary.

KINSHIP HAS BECOME GENERALLY LESS IMPORTANT. When the Scotch Highlanders came under English government, and when Cleisthenes established territorial government in Attica, clans and kinship lost much of their function of social control. Under the clan system each man was responsible for his behavior to his clan head, no matter where he was; under territorial government he must answer to the judge of the district wherein he happens to be. A transitional stage is reported by Kulp [1925] in South China. There, modern civil courts have jurisdiction over many matters but regional authorities in practice hold the elders of the village (representing large families and clans) responsible for the behavior of the people of the village and allow them wide discretion in inflicting punishment.

In the more advanced societies there are no incest or marriage taboos upon whole chains of relatives, but usually only upon first cousins or nearer degrees. Yet "marriage with the deceased wife's sister" is still frowned upon in England. Preferential mating, avoidances and familiarities, and other such traits are usually absent. The whole kinship culture seems to get thinner as we advance. In aristocratic groups and countries, some of the older values still obtain. Some people take pride not only in coming from noble or "good" families, but take considerable interest in tracing the details of relationship, in knowing relatives because they are relatives, and so on. But this constellation of interests is but a mere shadow of what it was in many primitive tribes.

One of the needs of every person is an answer to the question, "Who am I?" The child who fears he is illegitimate is often acutely conscious of this need. It is interesting to find a strong concern to identify the individual in societies which we think of as undemocratic and relatively callous to the needs of the individual. There is no contradiction here. Primitive, communal, military, Fascist, and other *solidary* societies (also called "sacred" societies, and *Gemeinschaft)* are not opposed to this kind of individualism. They foster it. When

they are too large or advanced for the kinship principle to be important, they often provide ranks, petty titles, and other designations in great detail which give every person a certain sense of security and "belongingness." He has an assured place in the scheme of things. But to a large extent "he" *is* "his place." He stays there. *Secular,* urban, cosmopolitan, individualistic societies (*Gesellschaft*) are the ones in which an individual may find himself highly unique as a person, but without any prescribed or assured place. But at the same time these societies, especially where they have strong democratic institutions, permit the individual to develop a personality based upon his unique experiences, and to *find* a place to suit this personality.

IV. SOCIAL ROLES AND RELATIONS OF THE SEXES. The more striking changes in this sphere have been in recent years rather than in some earlier period.

It is socially *natural* that most cultures should build their most consequential classification of human beings upon the chief biologically natural classification. This performs the societal functions of distributing labor and assigning responsibility. To the dominant sex it gives the satisfactions of superiority. A great many cultural values have grown up in this sphere, and some of them are strongly conditioned to sexual feeling. A part of the reason for men's resistance to the masculinization of women's costume—a largely unconscious or at least unverbalized reason—is that it disturbs their sexual feelings.

Yet men of fifty today are certainly conditioned to different "feminine attractiveness" stimuli than were the previous generation. New stimuli have become sexualized. Others have become desexualized. Men today can look upon women in scant bathing suits with presumably the same feelings that they had toward women in bloomers and stockings years ago. An old-school army officer in 1918, seeing some women riding near camp, turned to the author in great disgust and said forcefully that he would never "permit" any woman of "his" to ride astride a horse in trousers. The "permit" and "his" were also very symptomatic of an older scheme of values which has now receded farther into the cultural backwoods of America.

WOMEN HAVE GAINED SOME POWER. Mowrer says:

> The husband is no longer the head of the household in many families, in spite of the fact that he still provides the family name, as well as the Christian name which his wife uses upon more formal occasions. Within the family circle, however, he is no longer the autocrat whose word is law. In fact, he is lucky if his children look upon him other than as a meddle-

some outsider, or as an ally to be catered to when support is needed in breaking down his wife's opposition to some program of the children.

The wife, on the other hand, finds herself quite the equal of her husband in the family circle, if not the superior. She rules the destiny of the family group with a sympathetic, but none the less determined, hand. She is no longer the drudge and slave of other days. So far as the children are concerned, her commands are even more to be taken into account than those of the father.*

Largely through their increased economic independence, women have gained social and political power. According to the common law which we inherited from England, and which was in effect with little modification until 1847, the husband had the right to the wife's person and to her marital and domestic services. If she earned money he had the right to that also. His was the right to fix the standard of living and the place of residence. He could administer reasonable discipline. He took his wife's personal property in outright ownership, and her real estate for use and control. He had the custody of the children and the right to determine their education and care. In return he was obligated to supply his family with the necessaries of life and to keep his children off the poor rates. [Breckenridge, 1925.] It has been said that husband and wife were one person, and that one person the husband.

In 1847 began the American feminist movement with the aim of securing greater equality. Its efforts culminated in the Federal Woman Suffrage Amendment in 1920 and the formation of the National Woman's Party in 1913. From 1847 until the present time many new state laws have been enacted, superseding the common law. These laws have tended to give mothers equal guardianship rights over their children and greater rights in the holding and management of property, and have established juvenile courts and other new agencies by which the paternal power over children could be limited when necessary in individual cases, and by which fathers could be compelled to fulfill their responsibilities in more specific ways.

But some legal inequalities still remain. Moreover, women are now placed in a position of inferior economic opportunity and opportunity for personality development. Their status in this respect may even be relatively lower than it was, but it is concealed beneath superficial phenomena which often give the false appearance of matriarchy.

* Ernest R. Mowrer, *The Family*, University of Chicago Press, 1932, pp. 274–275 By permission.

Lester F. Ward [1911, ch. 14] once called the family a device for the subjection of women and children.

Hornell Hart [1931, 356] has devised a combination score or index to measure the status of women and children in different societies. His index stood at minus 40 points in early Roman days, rose to plus 55 in the Roman empire period, then fell to minus 20 about A.D. 600, rose gradually to plus 20 at about A.D. 1700, and rapidly to plus 90 at the present time. It allows credits of from one to six points for these items: equal guardianship, control of own property by wife, control of own earnings by wife if not supported, consent of bride required for marriage, equal divorce rights, equality before courts. Additional points are added if women have interesting work, leisure, access to business and professions, liberal education, or wide social contacts. From one to six points are deducted for wife beating; power of death over infants, over older children, over wife for any cause; or right to sell children or wife.

SEX-DIFFERENTIATING TABOOS HAVE DECLINED, BUT IN ACTUAL DIFFERENCES THE TREND IS NOT CLEAR. Although women are getting less inferior to men in power, it is not certain that they are getting more *like* men. Sex taboos upon activities such as baseball and drinking at a bar have been broken down, with the result that one sees men and women together in more kinds of places. Still this is not the same thing as similarity. Similarity is related especially to (1) occupation and (2) personality or character structure such as described by Margaret Mead in *Sex and Temperament* [1935]. As shown elsewhere, separate cultures for men and women have been developing in this country. The modern homemaker's work in its general approach and point of view is very different from the work of her husband, and also from that of her grandmother. The two sexes feel very different pressures in regard to the spending of money and time.

One thing, however, seems certain—women have become more greatly differentiated among themselves than formerly. The professional woman develops a very different set of attitudes from the homemaker, and from the employed working woman or the farm woman. Again, modern sex liberalism allows women to live radically different sexual lives according to their personalities and needs, instead of forcing them to conform to a common "feminine" pattern. At least we can say that "Woman" is changing into "women."

V. AGE GROUPS AND SOCIAL MAINTENANCE: THE CUSTODIAL AND EDUCATIONAL FUNCTIONS. The societal functions of rearing children, socializing them, and passing down the culture may be carried on in

more than one way. The present scene is marked by great conflicts of values in this sphere.

GOVERNMENT HAS TAKEN GREATLY INCREASED RESPONSIBILITY. The functions of child care and education, like the economic functions, seem to be in the process of transfer from the family to other institutions, particularly the state, the school, and welfare agencies. This, however, is not the whole story. The community and outside institutions are taking increasing responsibility and performing vastly increased services for children, yet at the same time the services of the family in this sphere have also been intensified. The care and education of children are now tremendously elaborated and also subjected to certain minimum standards which are enforced by the community. Women and children are insured by the community against the deprivations and cruelties which at an earlier time were often inflicted upon them through the arbitrary power of the family head. Schools and public health authorities take increasing responsibility for the health of children and no longer leave these matters entirely to the discretion of the individual family. Private and public welfare agencies keep watch over the welfare of children in underprivileged and inefficient families, standing ready to give help in the home or to take the child away whenever parental care falls below the minimum standards set by the community. The Social Security Act of 1935 provided greatly increased aid for dependent children and increased child welfare activities throughout the nation. There has been much new legislation to prevent venereal disease, partly by requiring health examinations for marriage license and partly by requiring examinations of women during pregnancy.

"Orphan" asylums have largely become homes for the children of parents who are neglectful or inefficient. There are fewer orphans than before. The most marked development in the care of children outside their own homes, however, lies in the increased use of foster homes. Child guidance work has been developing in many cities and is practiced by clinics under that name and by other kinds of mental hygiene clinics, by visiting teachers, by school guidance officers, and others.

The increased responsibility of the state and the community for family life is caused in part by the weakening influence of the church and the increasingly "spotty" distribution and uncertain content of the mores. In part it is caused by rapidity of social change and the greater number of situations which need to be controlled.

CHILDREN AND YOUTH HAVE GAINED POWER. There has been a change from the valuation of blind obedience to that of intelligent cooperation. Obedience of some kind has always been, and always will be, necessary. In the days of the writer's grandparents a certain semi-military type of obedience was rather widespread throughout society. It was practiced in the family and in the school. Corporal punishment was customary. Although our forefathers had drawn up the Declaration of Independence a century before, the Democracy they established was largely one of adult males and, according to some of our more discerning historians, more particularly property-holding adult males. Of course our forefathers made a courageous and never-to-be-forgotten step, but it was only a beginning. The real content of American Democracy has been developing gradually in the years that have followed.

Mowrer, after noting the increased power of the wife in the family, says:

> This does not mean, however, that the children hold the same subordinate position which was once theirs. They, in fact, tend to dominate the scene, their wishes determining the policy of the family. Thus the trend seems to be toward the filiocentric family in which the child plays the dominant role. He is, of course, controlled by the parents on occasion, to be indulged the next moment. He soon learns how to get his way by giving his allegiance first to the father and then to the mother, or by holding aloof and pitting the two parents against each other. He has never heard the dictum that "children should be seen and not heard," and parental commands serve the function of suggesting what not to do.
>
> The result is that parents are more and more experimenting with child-rearing along lines quite alien to their grandparents. The child is not to be disciplined or coerced, but is to be given the privilege of choosing for himself. Application of "psychology" takes the place of the older controls. Persuasion and suggestion supplant the more direct methods dependent upon physical force.*

The development and elaboration of the school, the extension of higher education to lower classes of population, the reduction of child labor, the play movement, the increased interest in psychology and use of medical service have contributed to this filiocentricism. The sheer increase in wealth has played an essential role. This wealth has provided the means by which parents can afford to give so much attention to their children; it has permitted a surplus of time, money,

* Ernest R. Mowrer, *The Family*, University of Chicago Press, 1932, p. 274. By permission.

and energy among women and children, which is at the free disposal of whatever specific cultural impulse might come along. The specific impulse which has turned attention toward the child seems to emanate from psychology, education, and medical science. Ellen Key's influential book, *The Century of the Child* [1912], expressed years ago a new attitude which has now become effective in everyday life.

Kingsley Davis (1940, B) has shown that parent-youth conflict tends to be unusually great in our present society because the universal difference of attitude between age and youth now has added to it a difference between what age learned in its youth and what present youth is learning. Thus the rapidity of social change adds to the normal conflict.

Henry Seidel Canby has shown unusual insight into the value differences between his own and a later generation. He implies the thesis that the change in cultural values was greater between the generation born about 1880 and its parents than between the one born about 1920 and its parents. Whether or not this can be verified, Canby is worth quoting at length.

> If change in external circumstance is more rapid now, there was then a *greater difference* between the ideas and convictions of fathers and sons and mothers and daughters than in this age. I know that this statement is against all current belief but I am sure that it is true. We did not respect our parents' opinions unless they happened to be ours; we did not share some of their most important convictions, especially as to manners and religion—and yet we deferred to them as persons.
>
> There was a tacit agreement that parental opinion had the right of way. If you differed, it was by mental reservation; so that the calm of family relations might be broken by anger or obstinacy, but seldom by impudence or youthful dogmatism. There was less honesty and more unity in family life. There was *more affection* between parents and children, and *much less companionship*. Democracy had after all touched the home only superficially, which, a monarchy in form, in spirit was a republic with the elders in office.
>
> . . . and if our parents were felt to be our superiors in the age of confidence it was not for their opinions, or even their judgment, but because they unhesitatingly accepted the responsibility for the family, and we knew it. I do not mean that they were less selfish than parents today, and certainly they were far more dogmatic. Yet that curious atmosphere of home, compacted of rigidities and confidences, was their chief care, and we knew that also. Self-expression for youth is supposed to have brought about the great change in family life which came with the new generation. It was a cause, but an equally potential one was self-expression for parents,

who determined to stay young, live their own lives, while the boys and girls were sent off to camps and schools. Fathers and mothers in the earlier time put fatherhood and motherhood first. To fail in that, letting the children run wild, or be sent off to convenient institutions, or to spend the family income on display while the home and the children's education suffered, set all the gossips talking. When children came, young men and women gave up the right to be young and assumed the responsibility for a home with no reservations, physical or mental. They did it well or badly but with no more protest than a tadpole makes in becoming a frog. Or if they did protest no one listened to them. And the children felt this—it would be too much to say that they knew it.

How many brilliant personalities became housewives or mere bread winners in the process cannot be reckoned. I think myself that the law of compensation operated, and if society suffered the family gained. Middle age came earlier and the thirties were a difficult time, but parenthood, being taken seriously, became a rich experience.*

CHILD LABOR HAS DECREASED AND EDUCATION HAS BEEN GREATLY EXTENDED. In 1870, 13.2 per cent of all American children from 10 to 15 were engaged in gainful occupations. This percentage increased to a maximum of 18.4 in 1910, then suddenly dropped, becoming 8.5 in 1920 and 4.7 in 1930. [Judd, 1933, 327.] Although efforts to standardize child labor restrictions into a federal law have failed, child labor in fact has been decreasing.

Education has been extended to an unprecedented range of persons. Most children from 7 to 14 have been in school, under compulsory education laws, for a good many years. The nature of the more recent change has been the extension of schooling upward and downward on the age scale. The majority of children of high school age are now in high school. The ratio of all pupils enrolled in American high schools and academies to all children of 14 to 17 years of age, inclusive, was 10 per cent in 1900, 14 per cent in 1910, 26 per cent in 1920, 48 per cent in 1930, and 67 per cent in 1938.†

This condition is unprecedented in America or any other country. Estimating from figures presented in *Middletown,* if one were to meet today at random a person 50 years old, the chances would be 1 out of 12 that he or she was a high school graduate. If one met a person of 25 the chances would be 1 out of 3 that he was a high school graduate. The latest figure is based upon 1924 graduations, and high school

* Henry Seidel Canby, "Life in the Nineties," *Harpers* (August, 1934), 276–278. By permission.

† U. S. Federal Security Agency, *Biennial Survey of Education,* and U. S. Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the U. S.,* 1940, p. 113.

enrollment has continued to increase rapidly since then in the country at large. A questionnaire to some 9,000 high school pupils in 1930 showed that only from 25 to 30 per cent of their parents had graduated from high school. The kindergarten likewise has shown a great increase, and the nursery school is growing.

THE ACTIVITIES OF THE YOUNG HAVE BECOME MORE SEGREGATED FROM THOSE OF ADULTS. With the growing cult of the child and the increase in education there has developed a youth *class* in America. This is very different from the youth "movements" of Europe. It has no intellectual culture with independent attitudes upon political, religious, and social questions. American youth is slavishly imitative of its parents in these general social attitudes and in tastes and standards of consumption. Its culture is in many ways a mere carbon copy, and yet there is relatively little functional cooperation and contact between adults and youth, and much activity and social organization within youth as a distinct class. This youth class centers about the extra-curricular activities of the school, some of the activities of the church, the Y.M.C.A., Y.W.C.A., Scouts, and other youth organizations, as well as many small clubs, gangs, cliques, and friendship groups. In these various organizations youth lives and moves and has its spiritual being. Only its material life is carried on in connection with the home and parents. This of course puts the case rather extremely, but expresses the tendency.

There are probably no cultures in which children do not gather in play groups separate from adults. What distinguishes modern America is the lack of participation of youth with adults in the serious work of everyday life. American children "work," but when they do so it is mainly upon artificial tasks in connection with the school or other organizations of their own separate world. This world of childhood imitates the adult world and is supposedly a preparation for the adult world, but it has little functional relation to it. We have an ideology, built partly upon the past abuses of child labor, that a child should be protected from the hardships of life, should be permitted to live in the happy world of childhood during those few precious years until the inevitable day when he must face the problems of adult life.

The writer once visited a Southern mill family. It was evening. As he talked politics with the father and mother in the living room, four children, aged two to ten, were present, sitting on chairs and their parents' laps. All were quiet, and took in as much of the conversation as they could understand. There was an atmosphere of decorum and

of unified family interest such as one seldom sees in business-class families. Business-class people are often annoyed by the custom of the working class of bringing their young children to all kinds of adult gatherings. Whether or not this is a wise practice is not the point here. This constant association of children with the adult members of their families in all kinds of activities represents an older folkway which our business class has abandoned. If we play bridge we want to do so on an adult level of performance. If we converse, we want to make the conversation interesting and witty from an adult point of view. Children, it seems, spoil everything which adults want to do in modern society. Moreover, the children find adults as dull and uninteresting as the adults find them annoying and distracting.

THERE IS AN EFFORT TO DEMOCRATIZE PARENT-CHILD RELATIONS. Yet perhaps the decline of obedience and of enforced silence of children in the presence of elders marks a first step toward democratic family relations. We have not yet generally acquired the technique of managing home life smoothly without this obedience and silence. A few families have done so, but find it difficult to explain *how*. A study by C. C. Peters [1933] indicates that the movies have gone somewhat ahead of general public opinion in their apparent approval of democratic treatment of children by parents. In the nursery schools and child study groups we begin to get some clues as to the nature of further advance in this field. One essential seems to be the learning of adults to accept and participate in values created by children in their own lives. When a parent can enter for a time into his child's play life instead of regarding this as inconsequential and perhaps troublesome, when he can take an intellectual interest in what the child says at the dinner table, learning to interpret it in terms of his own language and feelings, he may be on the way to a solution. At least there is evidence of developing values of this kind.

THERE IS NO TREND TOWARD DEFIXATION OF THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF MARRIAGE AND PARENTHOOD. Some writers have imagined the possibility of a future system in which the state would assume responsibility for children, and the family, being thus deprived of its most essential function, would disappear. Indeed this is the main bogey man of the conservatives who fear every liberalization of family relations. If and when the state undertakes this responsibility, it will in all probability delegate it to couples and groups which not only pass certain impersonal tests but also have a personal interest in the children concerned. [Folsom, 1940.] This would be in accord with natural processes and also with the experience and practice of modern

social work. In other words, the children will in most cases be delegated to their own biological parents for upbringing. Thus the family will be reestablished in practice if and after it is dissolved in theory. Of course a much greater freedom and flexibility of life for parents is possible. But the very giving of parents what they need in the form of vacations and freedom will probably enable them even more to enjoy their children and to maintain stable family relationships. Russia, after a great rebellion against the coercive features of family life, is still raising her children under the primary responsibility of their natural parents, and services such as nursery schools are supplementary.

THE AGED AND CHILDLESS HAVE BECOME MORE SEPARATED FROM NORMAL FAMILY GROUPS. Urbanization and mobility have broken up the large family group of our older rural society. Grandparents, uncles, and aunts less frequently live with the family. Adolescent sons and daughters leave the home community to find work. A new cultural attitude has arisen that it is actually undesirable for a young married couple to live with a parental family. Have we only recently discovered the disadvantages of living with our in-laws, or have we only recently found it possible to get away from them? More probably, we have been *forced* away from them by economic changes, and have hence revaluated the difficulties of the large household, calling them now a *danger to be avoided* rather than a *duty to be cheerfully performed.* While gaining certain values in the marital relation, we have lost other values of the old-time household where grandfather or aunt oftentimes had a personality which held the group together in a rich and beautiful social life. The sketch "Home Life in Grove Manor," in Dawson and Gettys' *Introduction to Sociology* [1935], gives a vivid picture of these lost values.

There are many other means besides physical separation by which conflicts in a large family group can be minimized. But having been forced by changes outside the family pattern to the use of separation as a method, the other possible adjustments disappear from our culture. So when circumstances do force this and that married couple for a time to live with parents, the crude forces of conflict no longer have social mechanisms to hold them in check.

Dorothy Canfield Fisher [1935] has shown how certain problems of present-day child rearing may be accounted for in part by the disappearance of these "extra adults" from the typical family group. These uncles, aunts, and the like rendered a valuable service. They amused children and instructed them. They often acted as buffers between

hard-working parents and inquisitive or mischievous children. Their departure made schools all the more necessary.

The size of the average household unit has been decreased by the lowered birth rate as well as by this separation of kinsfolk. This is of major importance, but since it is discussed fully elsewhere in the book it need not be elaborated here.

Closely related to this is the increasing dependence of the aged upon the community rather than the family. Institutions and old age assistance make it possible for many families in marginal circumstances to escape the economic burden of aged parents. With us, the age groups are at least temporary castes, as they are in most societies. Modern developments in education and recreation have intensified the class consciousness of the younger age groups, and the policy of superannuation in industry has intensified the consciousness of the aged as a class. While youth is only a temporary caste status, the older person can never again go through the earlier stages. To tell him that "once" he had all the privileges and duties of being young and therefore ought now to accept old age does not help him very much. The point is that he is still a human being and if he has the enthusiasm and zest for living that Dr. Lillien J. Martin often puts into elderly people at her Old Age Center in San Francisco, he may want to experience and share anything, within physical limitation, that anyone else might experience.

VI. The Ideology and Control of Reproduction: The Reproductive Function. This, of course, is the most essential societal function of the family. The changes involved are mostly modern. They consist largely of the establishment of rational control. Primitives had many magical ideas about reproduction. Civilized societies until recently were governed by taboos based on religious ideology. The modern trend is to reduce independent cultural values in this field and to make its operations entirely instrumental or functional toward other human needs.

Planned parenthood and lower birth rates gradually supplant laissez-faire procreation. In the nineteenth century began a marked decline in the birth rate in Western countries. Apparently this process began in France, following an increasing subdivision of land under a regime of equal inheritance. It has, however, gone farthest in cities. Most large American cities are no longer reproducing their own population but are replenishing it through migration from the country. Back of this process lie the elaboration of wants and demands for individual pleasure; the lack of opportunity to use the child productively

in an urban environment, especially when there are anti-child labor and compulsory education laws; the spread of contraceptive knowledge and techniques; and the breakdown of the religious taboos which blocked the use of that knowledge. Along with this process has gone an increase in average longevity, and especially a reduction in infant and child mortality. The majority of babies born may now be expected to live to maturity. These changes have continually reduced the size of the average family. The two-child family is now a prevailing social standard or ideal, and yet it is not enough, on the average, to perpetuate the race. Although the American population is not yet declining, the present increase is due only to increasing longevity. Given the present low birth rate, a decline in numbers will inevitably set in between 1950 and 1980.

Planned parenthood, to date, represents mostly individual planning. It has been fostered by voluntary organizations. But governments, under the fear of population decline, are increasingly developing population policies. How far these will limit the freedom of individuals depends on what kind of government and society we shall have.

VII. LOVE SATISFACTIONS AND FRUSTRATIONS. This aspect of the family is not primarily a "societal function"; it represents the ultimate satisfaction of individual needs. But this also becomes a societal function for reasons rather recently discovered. Psychologists and social workers since Freud have seen clearly that emotional satisfaction means emotional health, which is good not only in an axiomatic sense for the person who has it, but also for other persons with whom he is in contact. Emotional maladjustment is also contagious.

SEXUALITY, ONCE A CONCESSION TO "THE FLESH," IS BECOMING A POSITIVE SOCIAL VALUE. In our traditional culture the sexual function was valued purely as an instrument for reproduction. If one could get emotional satisfaction from it incidentally, that was all right provided one was willing to assume the possible consequence of reproduction. The change which has taken place has made sex an instrument and part of love and has sanctioned its use for this as its most frequent purpose. The writer remembers hearing a Y.M.C.A. speaker in 1910 say to a strictly male audience, with a dramatic hush in his voice and with apologies to those who might disagree with him, that he believed sex in marriage to have another purpose beside reproduction, namely, to develop the love life of the partners. This view is now of course a commonplace. Furthermore, the new ideal of sex involves the equal satisfaction of man and woman.

There is a new idealism which regards marriage as a safeguard and as a kind of "decent" observance of custom ritualizing the beginning of a full sexual relation, but not as inherently conferring the right or imposing the duty of the sexual relation. The new idealism attaches to the monogamous personal relation itself rather than the legal status. A corollary view is that, where the real personal relation is irrevocably broken, the marriage may well be broken also by divorce.

Values in the sexual sphere have not only changed but they have differentiated; there is no longer any sure consensus. Apparently only a small minority believe in sex intercourse which is promiscuous or according to momentary inclination. Yet attitude studies [Newcomb, 1937] * show certainly an increased tolerance among young people of deviant sexual behavior by others, even among many who hold strict standards for themselves. The monogamous sex ideal is definitely upheld and the main trend of the changing values is in the direction of allowing monogamy to begin before the marriage ceremony or tolerating temporary lapses under special conditions.

Owing to contraception there is probably a greater frequency in the population of something that can be called normal sexual intercourse than there was before. Although some of this increase is outside of marriage, it must be remembered that marriage also gains, probably more than the unconventional relations.

COMPANIONSHIP AND AFFECTION BETWEEN THE SEXES HAVE BECOME MORE FREE. Sexual intercourse is not the only or chief aspect of the recent changes. Petting and other limited sexual approaches and freedom of companionship between the sexes have increased obviously, even when there was no certain or large increase in intercourse. Such freer companionship, with restrained physical contact, may even decrease the amount of intercourse with prostitutes. The Lynds [1929, 111] point to a great increase in "pairing off" for recreation from 1890 to 1924 and earlier marriage. Whereas young people used to go in crowds which often restrained them by ridicule from too ready an approach to a person of the opposite sex, they now go by couples, and at earlier and earlier ages. Most parents probably still feel less disturbed by an adolescent daughter having a "crush" on another girl or teacher in a girls' boarding school than by hearing her say she is "in love" with a boy. Yet, possibly forced by changes in the adolescent culture, these parents are more and more tolerant of the activities which tend to produce this heterosexual love earlier in life. The most

* See also Chapter XVI.

resistant part of this changing scale of values seems to lie in the attitude toward love in very young or very old persons. We still feel somewhat that the "right to love" is confined roughly to the ages eighteen to sixty for men and sixteen to forty-five for women. But this too is changing.

YET PEOPLE ARE INCREASINGLY DEPENDENT UPON FAMILY RELATIONS FOR LOVE. It is the consensus of opinion among sociologists that for the total emotional satisfactions of love, people are increasingly dependent upon the family. This is due in part to our great social mobility, which makes deep, lifelong friendship with persons outside the immediate family more difficult to maintain at high intensity. Some believe that economic and other insecurities [Frank, 1932] and the nostalgia produced by frequent moving lead to increased demand for some kind of love intimacy with a mate, parent, or child as a compensation. Many young people today, unable to set up homes for themselves, nevertheless enter marriage to find a feeling of security and meaning in an otherwise meaningless existence. A wider and richer field of emotional expression within the family is felt by many to be developing.

Likewise, real affection between parents and children shows signs of increasing. This may be due in part to the lesser number of children. With some families, high standards of child care and education have meant a certain emotional investment in children which did not exist in former times. To be sure, these tendencies have their dangers to individuals. But the apparently greater frequency with which we find pathological parent-child fixations, cramping projection of parental ambitions on children, and so on, may be symptomatic of a general underlying trend which might be evaluated otherwise. Tender love, affection, and companionship are being cultivated within the family without the inhibitions formerly imposed by discipline.

GENERAL TRENDS OF FUNCTIONS AND VALUES. In summarizing all this it may well be said that the family as an institution is greatly changing its functions. In economic functions it is losing the manufacturing processes but elaborating those processes and services immediately preceding consumption, recreation, and enjoyment. In giving status to persons and in maintaining social control, the family is less important than it formerly was in the general scheme of institutions. The state, the school, and other secular institutions have taken over many of these responsibilities. The custodial and educational functions have seemed to be largely transferred to the state and the school, but this is only because these functions have greatly enlarged, under

the needs of a complex society. The family still probably contributes, absolutely, at least as much as it did in earlier years to the education and personality development of the child. Moreover, the state now upholds certain standards of child treatment below which parents may not fall without danger of losing their children to the custody of the juvenile court and a foster home. The reproductive function remains within the family; it is increasingly the interest of the state, and the church is gradually losing its control in this sphere. In the function of giving direct emotional satisfaction to individuals, the family is gaining in importance. As MacIver says:

> In the patriarchal family the adjustment of the partners to one another was imposed, if not otherwise attained, by economic necessity and social pressure. Today the necessity and the pressure are lessened, and the family, no longer strongly if rudely cemented by extraneous functions, has to surmount in its own strength the psychological tests of its cohesion.*

The other societal functions of the family *could* be and are often, for adults and adolescents, performed by other institutions. The *essential* role of the family is hence being greatly narrowed but intensified: namely, the cultivation of love for its own sake and for the sake of the healthy development of personalities.

THE TOTAL TREND IS NOT DISORGANIZATION, NOT DEMORALIZATION, BUT REVALUATION. Many observers, noting the increase in divorce and apparent family conflict, would say that disorganization is a major trend of the modern family. It is true that, from the standpoint of any given family unit, there is a somewhat greater risk of breakdown from divorce, but the risk from death is much less. At the same time marriage rates have increased (except for a depression lag), marriages are taking place somewhat earlier on the average, and a greater proportion of people at any one time are living in the married state. From the standpoint of the individual, these trends might be viewed, not as disorganization, but as a somewhat more flexible system. The concept of social disorganization has been overworked. What is usually meant is *changing organization.* Organizations devoted to particular values break down as those values weaken. But the organization may become changed so as to develop and support other values, or some substitute organization may do so. The family is changing its functions and its values as well as its structure. How far it can go and still be called "the family" is a question of words. In any case,

* Robert M. MacIver, *Society, A Textbook of Sociology,* Farrar and Rinehart, 1937, p. 224. By permission.

barring some catastrophe or revolutionary upset, we may expect *continuity*. In fact, something called "the family" has survived all the revolutions of history. We need not worry about its continued existence.

Others express their forebodings of the future in terms of demoralization or "destruction of values." Indeed some values which were high upon our cultural scale are descending, although they may remain high on many personal scales. But other values go up the scale. Man is an inveterate creator of values. There is always *avvaluation* * as well as *devaluation*. Whether the two processes must remain in some kind of balance is a question requiring much further analysis and research. If there can be a general, average decline of cultural values there is likely to be a strong development of personal and small-group values. Human beings and family groups have shown themselves able to build schemes of values to guide their own lives even amid outward confusion and devaluation.

Let us consider the declining value of "obedience." This was once an end-in-itself. (It has been said that to most peoples obedience is a necessity, but to the Germans a passion.)

> The father gives his kind command,
> The mother joins, approves.
> The children all attentive stand,
> Then each, obedient, moves.

If we have lost our admiration for this, there are new forms of relations in the family to which we may transfer our loyalty. The democratic way of life has never yet been seriously realized on a wide scale within families. Yet we all know individual families where it is realized. We see parents who, by their very personalities, are able to be leaders and guides of their children. There are parents who do not fear to give their children a little more liberty lest the "children take advantage of it," because they find by experience that this is not the result. They have learned to develop a new type of control. They have been helped to do this by making a positive value of Democracy in the home instead of merely "putting up with it" as an evil forced upon them by changing conditions.

Can one change one's own values? One says "no." Another says, "Yes, but only by tricking yourself. You have to make a virtue out of a necessity. You have to learn to want what you really don't want."

* Increased strength of a value.

Yet in the broadest sense, many changes in human life have involved making virtues out of necessities. The significant fact is that man is able to make virtues out of so many different things, to find satisfaction through so many different patterns of living. It is in this process of creating and accepting values that man shows himself to be uniquely human. Certain changes in family life are forced upon us by economic changes. They are in a sense a necessity. Yet we have before us a choice. We can merely deplore these changes, sigh for the good old days, and give up any effort to put values and meanings into the minds of our children. We can merely tell them, "Authorities are disagreed about these big abstract things; let's be practical and use a little common sense," and leave them to flounder in an ideological chaos. On the other hand, we can tell them, "Authorities do disagree but *we* can agree on what things are worth while to *us*, and what kind of family life we want." In other words, we can help our children to choose values and to create new values out of the chaos of the old. If this is "making a virtue out of a necessity," the refusal to do so is cynicism.

B. GERMANY, RUSSIA, AND SWEDEN

If there are certain long-time trends of family change, we might get further clues by examining what those countries are trying to do which regard themselves as giving a foretaste of the world of the future.

Table 5 summarizes *some* significant traits of two societies which were recognized at the outset as having opposite trends. Because they both, for different reasons, were considered menaces to Western capitalistic semi-democracy, and later, because they agreed to support each other to a degree, they were regarded by us with somewhat similar feelings. Now that they are fighting each other, as was originally foreseen by many, a new emphasis upon their very real and basic differences may receive more serious attention from the reading public. In Table 5 a third column sets forth *some* significant traits of the world's most advanced Democracy.

GERMANY AND THE FASCIST-NAZI PATTERN. Some years before Hitler started his Nazi movement, the basic ideology of the movement raised its head in several quarters in Europe, as, for example, in Hungary, which, bristling with a desire for vengeance and overthrowing a temporary Communist regime, showed strong trends backward toward a caste society and authoritarianism. What Hungarians, Italians, and others started, however, Germany carried out with ruthless efficiency.

TABLE 5

FAMILY TRAITS IN GERMANY, RUSSIA, AND SWEDEN

	Nazi Germany	Soviet Russia	Sweden
I. Spatial and Material Patterns	Encouragement of home ownership, homesteading, resettlement of large estates and sparsely settled land by small owners.	Encouragement of further urbanization and industrialization. Collective farms replace many village communities and individualized land tenure. Encouragement of community kitchens, collective eating, nurseries, apartment houses.	Housing subsidies, cooperative houses with nurseries and food shops. Excess of small-sized dwelling units.
II. The Structure of Marital and Sexual Relationships	Divorce for "racial purity" or political nonconformity.	Divorce granted at first on application of either party—later restricted because of excesses—but old moral attitude gone.	Late marriage (30 for men, 27 for women). Divorce by mutual consent after one-year interval. One-quarter of brides pregnant.
	Births outside of wedlock encouraged.	Illegitimacy as a status abolished.	Illegitimate births one-seventh Father must be registered and held responsible. Rights equal. Homemaking loans to enable early marriage, without subsidy for child-bearing and without condition that wife cease employment.
III. Kinship Structure and its Relation to Marital Structure	Prohibition of Jewish-Gentile marriages.	Patriliny now optional.	
IV. Social Roles and Relations of the Sexes	Women theoretically returned to home, actually to lower status occupations, restricted from professions.	Women encouraged to take same work as men, attempts to reduce volume of housework by communal institutions. Maternity leaves with wages.	Law of 1939 forbids dismissal of employee for engagement, marriage, pregnancy, or child-bearing. Right to 12 weeks' leave for child-bearing.
	Woman suffrage limited.	Number of full-time homemakers in large cities reduced	Active woman's movement.
	Sex-personality differences encouraged, but women encouraged to physical exercise and fitness. Organization of women for political purposes.	Women active in government, hold important posts, but not so many as men.	Women in gainful occupations, especially in professions and public service.
V. Age Groups and Social Maintenance	Labor camps, youth organizations, youth taken more out of home.	Crèches for young children; youth organizations.	Nursery schools.

TABLE 5. *Continued.*

	Nazi Germany	Soviet Russia	Sweden
VI. The Ideology and Control of Reproduction	Contraceptive clinics closed.	Contraception approved but not adequately spread.	Anti-contraceptive laws repealed in 1938.
	Abortion severely penalized. Large sterilization program. Motherhood glorified.	Abortion made free at first, later restricted to "good reasons," but old taboo gone.	Abortion on humanitarian, eugenic, and medical, but *not social* grounds, by physicians legalized in 1939.
	Encouragement of births by marriage loans, becoming subsidies. Bachelor and spinster taxes.	Little need for birth encouragement.	Free delivery. Bonus to all mothers below wealthy class.
VII. Love Satisfactions and Frustrations	Homosexuality stimulated by the leader principle and intense life in male semi-military groups; eroticization of devotion to country and female submission.	Encouragement at first of sex freedom- "glass of water" ideology, sex taboos weakened.	Old customs of night courting under control of youth group.
		Discouragement of sexual excitants, of sex in art.	Rather high rate of premarital intercourse.
		Romantic monogamy at first thought an obstacle to social efficiency, but no official attitude.	
		Equalitarian companionship.	Equalitarian companionship

The German Nazis met with such resistance in their program to put woman back into the home that they had to modify it considerably. Employers insisted that in many occupations women are superior, and stoutly resisted the substitution of untrained men for women already trained to their duties. Numerous exceptions were made. It was found that 72 per cent of women teachers were supporting their parents. In June, 1936, there were 1,200,000 more employed women in Germany than when Hitler came into power in January, 1933. Thirty-one per cent of employed Germans in 1936 were women, a higher percentage than obtained in Great Britain, France, or the United States. [Grünfeld, 1937.] Economic realities brought about this situation, but the Nazi ideology of woman's place nevertheless prevailed, its main effect being to take women out of professions and to put them into low-paid occupations.

The original Nazi program called for the abolition of woman suffrage and the complete retirement of women from politics and public office. The women doctors were excluded from the physicians' organization. A spokesman for the Nazi policy claimed that effeminacy had permeated German legislation during the Republic and that it, together with the "sickening cry for 'women's independence,' runs

counter to the high esteem in which, according to the Nordic manner, man should hold woman." *

A writer in *Der Deutsche* said:

> Even among children the following can be proved: A real boy loves uniforms, smoke and battle; he does not play with dolls. But the little girls trot around with their little babies; they wash their dolls' clothes and want most of all to be little mothers.†

The Nazis have wanted to strengthen the family as an instrument of the State. State interest is always paramount. Germany does not hesitate to turn a husband against a wife or children against parents when political disloyalty is involved. Much of the time of children and youth, as well as of adults, is taken from the family for use in group activities. Courts may take custody of children if parents refuse to teach them the Nazi ideology.

The Nazis have favored a kind of Democracy by obliterating lines based upon the old class structure. Leadership now depends more on personality and attitude than on origin. Workmen have been given theater tickets, excursions and trips. Yet the old German pattern of aristocracy persists in the army, as illustrated by the forced resignation of General von Blomberg after he had married the daughter of a carpenter.‡

The German sterilization policy, however, was not a mere turning backward of the clock, but a bold adventure in the untried. The radical direction of change in this sphere was a product of the race ideology of "Aryan" supremacy which has characterized German culture for several decades. If we describe the National Socialist policy merely as "reactionary," we are bound to note that it conflicts on this and some other points with the Roman Catholic family pattern, which is also "reactionary." Movements against liberalism are not all in the same direction; the specific cultural ideals which are to be substituted for liberal individualism vary with the particular culture involved. Italy, also Fascist and anti-liberal, would find sterilization (even of the unfit) quite out of keeping with her values.

The Nazis held the Jews responsible for the sexual immorality which had been reported as abundant in Germany. They encouraged out-of-door-life, the "manly" virtues, and a reenrichment of life within male groups. Lewisohn [1933] suggested that there is a great deal of

* *New York Times*, Dec. 6, 1933.
† *New York Times*, Nov. 12, 1933.
‡ *New York Times*, Feb. 6, 1938.

homosexual feeling involved in these virile activities of male groups with their devotion to their "leaders."

THE RUSSIAN FAMILY POLICY. In Russia, as in Germany, a new collective enthusiasm, a new ideology, was born under the pressure of economic conditions. [Hindus, 1929.] Communism was a new culture.

The difference between Soviet and German policies was partly a natural one, based upon differences in existing economic situations. Germany was overindustrialized in relation to the state of her population and markets after 1919. Her major problem was unemployment. Hence it was natural to discourage the employment of women and to try to put more families on the land. Russia, on the other hand, was trying to industrialize as rapidly as possible. She needed all available man power and woman power for industry. She would naturally try to release labor from farming and housework. As time went on, the policies of both countries came more and more under the influence of military needs. Yet these immediate needs failed to obscure the obvious signs of basic values and ultimate goals.

Russian homes had always been poor and, in the cities, very deficient in space as judged by Western standards. People used parks and gardens rather than homes for recreation, and these public facilities were still further developed. There was a tremendous amount of new building in the cities, and great new towns sprang up in regions like the Arctic where new resources were developed. Moscow doubled its population in 10 years. If there was one room per person, a family might consider itself fortunate.

In the country, peasant production has been leaving the household and people have been organized into collective farms for large scale agricultural production. The principle of large, specialized institutions for services is encouraged. Ninety-eight per cent of Moscow babies are born in hospitals. [Kingsbury and Fairchild, 1935, 155.] A million people are accommodated in sanatoria and convalescent homes. In 1929–30, the total cash wages of the country were supplemented by an amount 45 per cent as great for social insurance, education, culture, medical service, free rent, and vacations.

MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE. Russian marriage is easy. One merely registers it. On registering a marriage the partners may adopt the surname of either, or may keep their own respective surnames. Thus in theory the hoary Euro-Asiatic pattern of patriliny is abolished. The partners must be 18 years of age, of normal mentality, have no close consanguinity, and no other marriages at the time. They must de-

clare that they are informed concerning each other's health. Legally their place of residence must be fixed by mutual agreement; if one moves to another locality, his partner has no legal obligation to follow. Either party, if incapacitated, has the right to material support from the other, and housekeeping is a joint responsibility. All property acquired after the marriage is divided equally. [Lee, I., 1928.]

Much is made of the return of Russia to a less liberal divorce policy. In the beginning either party could get a divorce without even notifying the other beforehand. The divorce rate in cities went high. In 1934 the rate in Moscow was about one divorce to two and one-half marriages, which is about the same as in a few of our Western states. The marriage rate was about 50 per cent higher than in Czarist days and it was believed that many marriages were contracted for convenience—to secure a room in the crowded city, for example—and then followed by divorce. In 1935 a new law made it necessary for both partners to appear in court, and a fee of 50 roubles was demanded. The principle of divorce by mutual consent was thus left in force.

An unmarried woman teacher who was not too attractive felt that she had little chance of meeting men. She asked her friend, a married woman factory worker, to find her a "kindhearted man with domestic taste." For this matchmaking service she would pay 100 roubles. The married friend thought of a scheme. She had her husband meet the teacher, arranged a divorce; the husband married the teacher, and the first wife collected the 100 roubles. It had been secretly understood that after a few weeks the husband was to divorce the teacher and remarry his first wife, but he failed to do so. He preferred to stay with his second wife who, he said, was a better cook and generally satisfactory. The first wife then went to court to have her understanding with her ex-husband enforced. But the court said: ". . . the woman acted from shameful money-grabbing motives reminiscent of the bad old days now happily past in the world's first proletarian republic. Under Soviet power, men and women are no longer cattle to be bartered for lucre." *

WOMEN, WORK, AND CHILDREN. To the economic problems of the family, Communism's solution is collective housekeeping, with women working like men in specialized occupations, and families living in large apartment houses or other grouped arrangements. It discourages the return of crafts to the home, and discourages also the "bourgeois" type of home, as in America. Lenin said: "No nation can be free, when half of the population is enslaved in the kitchen." [Villard, 1929.] There has indeed been some difficulty in getting women to use the collective arrangements: the small private kitchens are preferred

* Walter Duranty in *New York Times*, March 16, 1932.

by many. Expectant mothers, working in factories, are given vacations at full pay for two months before and two months after the birth of the child, are given free medical attention and some baby clothing. Factories and collective farms have nurseries in which mothers may leave infants during the day. The mothers are allowed time off every three hours to nurse them. [Chamberlin, 1930, 366.] There are also office crèches, district crèches, evening crèches, and rural summer crèches.

Strumilin figured that collective cooking takes only one-sixth as many person hours as individual cooking. [Kingsbury and Fairchild, 1935, 202.] Yet in 1936 a design for kitchenless apartments was assailed by the press as a "left deviation." * Women still have the main burden of housework and child care, although fathers were helping more (in 1935), as a result, in part, of the general reduction of the working day.

In 1935 two-thirds of all able-bodied women of working age were employed, contrasting with about two-fifths in the United States. Thirty-three per cent of all employed persons were women [Fairchild, M., 1936, 624], contrasting with 31 per cent in Germany and 24 per cent in the United States in 1940. In 1913 the Russian figure had been about 24 per cent. [Kingsbury and Fairchild, 1935, 29.] The Russian women occupy relatively high posts. Seventy-five per cent of medical, 50 per cent of pedagogical, and 23 per cent of engineering students were women! In 1934 a third of the town Soviet members were women. [Fairchild, M., 1937, 624, 625.]

Zelenko writes:

> Communal feeding is already widely introduced in the U S S.R., but in the socialist cities, it will be the only type of feeding. Communal feeding will save women's labor, emancipating them from household drudgery. It will save a large amount of housing space and fuel. It will make for improved sanitation and, above all, it will help introduce a revolution in the diet habits of the population. The four slogans of socialist feeding are (1) spend as little time as possible on food; (2) have inexpensive food; (3) have tasty food; (4) have wholesome food. . . . Our communal gardens should take up the cultivation of the American vegetables that are now unknown here, but which would be valuable.

A. Lunacharsky, for many years Commissar of Education, said:

> Bourgeois culture accuses socialism of being founded on the herd principle, of interfering with the development of individuality. This is not so.

* *New York Times*, Feb. 21, 1936.

> The growth of culture demands greater division of labor, thus guaranteeing variety in the development of personality, through the variety of trades and professions. A member of the socialist society will have much more free time than a worker of the capitalist world. And his free time will give him a chance to think, read, relax, and develop. Women will be entirely emancipated. Our problem is now to do away with the household and to free women from the care of children. It would be idiotic to separate children from their parents by force. But when, in our communal houses, we have well-organized quarters for children, connected by a heated gallery with the adults' quarters, to suit the requirements of the climate, there is no doubt that parents will, of their own free will, send their children to these quarters, where they will be supervised by trained pedagogical and medical personnel. There is no doubt that the terms "my parents," "our children," will gradually fall out of usage, being replaced by the conceptions "old people," "adults," "children," "infants," etc.*

Yet more recent events in Russia indicate the essential preservation of the family and a great modification of the above ideology in the direction of greater recognition of the values of the parent-child relation.

As in Germany, loyalty to the State took precedence over family loyalty. Where the parents are anti-Communist the children are encouraged to break off their relations with them. In practice the great majority of children are still left in the custody of their own parents, and the parents are held responsible for their support. Experience with institutions has convinced the Russians that care by individual parents is superior. [McCormick, 1928, 192.] It is notable that children of 10 years of age and over cannot be adopted except by their own consent. [Lee, I., 1928.] Kindergartens are maintained for children from 3 to 8 years; in them children are fed three meals daily, given medical inspection, and supplied with communist ideals. [Chamberlin, 1930, 366.] The Communists have extended education and reduced illiteracy to a degree hitherto unknown in Russia. In the schools, however, all instruction revolves about the Marxian ideology, and the minds of Russian children are being standardized as truly as in any ecclesiastical school system with its dogmas and catechism. No instruction contrary to Communism is permitted. Thus the school system is used as an agency to mold personalities according to the dominant cultural value. In addition the Consomol and Pioneer organizations provide training for children somewhat after the

* As quoted by Susan M. Kingsbury and Mildred Fairchild in *Factory, Family, and Woman in the Soviet Union*, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1935, pp. 204–205.

fashion of our Boy Scouts; of course the ideological content is Communism.

Russian education is what we call "progressive" in the United States; it is integrated with life; it uses the project method. The typical project has three clearly indicated aspects: technological, economic, and social. Education reflects the local community life; the village itself becomes a blackboard for the teaching of geography. Where new hydroelectric plants are being built, the children study about them, and in the Donets basin they study coal. [McCormick, 1928, 192.]

Children are organized into Young Pioneer and other groups, with special buildings. The age limit for child labor (1935) was 16, with exceptions for apprentices.

Parents still exact obedience, but affection and convenience play a greater role. Intelligence gives authority in the family. [Fairchild, M., 1937.]

POPULATION POLICIES. Communism is not interested in sterilization because it believes that economic circumstances, rather than race or biological heredity, are the main causes of the differences among men. Contraceptives are sold by the State. Abortion, after a period of availability upon request (unprecedented in civilized countries), has been restricted but not abolished. It can now be done only with permission, after investigation of reasons. It is controlled as a matter of social policy, not as a moral issue as in most countries. Sixty per cent of the abortions in 1927 had been for social reasons. [Field, 1932, 83.] It is reported by a physician who knows something of the Russian experience that legalized abortion as done there under medical auspices showed it to have far less risks than where it is outlawed. The birth rate for the first half of 1937 in Moscow (which was after the restriction of abortion) was double that for the same period in 1936.* The general birth rate of Russia had continued to be very high, but the Soviet leadership became worried over signs of a drop, in view of military dangers and the need for further development of the country.

VALUES. Pre-marital and extra-marital sex relations are tolerated, and actually very common as questionnaire statistics indicate. However, the extreme promiscuity fostered in young groups after the Revolution has died down. It was common to defer the registration of a marriage until after a child was born.

* Harold Denny in the *New York Times*, June 28, 1937.

In 1938 the head of the motion picture industry was removed for injecting politics and also sex interest into a film production of *Treasure Island,* by transforming the cabin boy, Jim Hawkins, into a girl.* The Soviet attitude has been called puritanical. The policy is to give sex plenty of freedom but to avoid its glorification through art and other stimuli. Wilhelm Reich [1936] holds that Russia missed a great opportunity by taking this *laissez-faire* attitude toward sex. It seemed as if Russia were preoccupied with economics and wanted sex to be handled with the least expenditure of energy. The "glass of water" concept (that sex relations should be as free and simple a satisfaction of need as drinking a glass of water) was prevalent; Lenin, however, highly disapproved it, calling it anti-Marxian and anti-social. When great freedom is given without responsibility to cultivate positive values, the freedom may be abused and later curtailed.

Soviet Russia has not yet become a Democracy according to American criteria. There is no space here to discuss this general question. Yet much can be said for the Russian view that their dictatorship is a transitional stage whose ultimate aim is a democratic society. They, at least, are planning for Democracy; Fascists deny its desirability. Some evidence of this view is furnished by the *methods* used in Russia to develop desired attitudes and to deal with human personalities. The Communist, when he hates, hates people for *what they do* rather than for *what they are.* He is functionally minded. He does not, like the Nazi, tend to identify good and evil with particular races or nationalities. Indeed, he identifies evil with a social class (the bourgeoisie), but this conception is certainly more rational than the Nazis' theory of race. Communism, when attempting to convert others, appeals to reason and ridicules all that is traditional. Fascism condemns the intellectual approach and, although it also claims to be "new," it appeals to traditional values. It frankly praises emotion and scorns "rationalism." This difference in method is symptomatic of a basic difference in the *content* of the cultural goals.

Furthermore, it is significant that in those spheres of life which are less instrumental and serve more directly the ultimate human values, Russia grants considerable freedom. It is difficult not to sense that the Russian policy toward the family and sex, recreation, and medicine is more concerned with human beings as ends rather than as mere instruments of the State, than the corresponding German policies are.

Certain background elements in German and Russian cultures are also worth noting and comparing. Long before 1914 there were in

* *New York Times,* Jan. 17, 1938.

Germany the Nietzschean value of the "superman" and of the anti-Christian doctrine that might makes right, the contempt for Jewish rationality, and a strong sense of the inferiority of women. On the other hand, even in Czarist Russia, there was unusual participation of women in certain ways [Elnett, 1926], and a kind of communistic democracy in the local peasant community. Perhaps most significant is the typical Russian character structure, which includes a great emotional spontaneity and frankness of self-revelation. The Russian desires to know, to commune with, his fellow man as that man actually is, unhidden by the wall of conventionality with which Englishmen and Frenchmen surround themselves. Russian literature is noted for its detailed and realistic portrayal of human emotions. In effect Russian literature, as well as the Russian science of Pavlov and Bechterev, has been unusually interested in what takes place in human nerves, muscles, and glands. The free emotional expression of Russians is in contrast with the self-control and reserve of Anglo-Saxons and also of Japanese. This attitude toward human personality is thought by Sapir [1924] to be one of the most important and pervasive characteristics of Russian culture. It may provide an unusually good foundation for true freedom and democracy.

This of course is a faith and a hope which in 1940 could be expressed only by those who dared to be suspected of Communism and subversive influence. In 1942, with Russia fighting the world's greatest enemy of Democracy, this faith and hope may commend itself at least to the candid examination of our more conservative citizens.

The New Family and Population Policy in Sweden. To observe an experiment which is indisputably democratic in procedure as well as in aim, the world turns to Sweden. Perhaps her homogeneous population of only 6.3 million has made it easy to practice democratic processes, but the content of her culture for many years has placed her among the foremost exponents of freedom and humanitarianism.

In the past seven years Sweden has been going through a period of welfare legislation which further carries out trends already long in evidence. The motivation of these new enactments is concern over the threatened decline of population. In 1935, under a Social Democratic regime, the Swedish Population Commission was instructed by the Riksdag to investigate the problem of declining population and to suggest a remedy. In the words of the mandate, "No people with unimpaired energy and the will to live can observe such a tendency toward its own decline as is now obvious in this country and at the same time fail to undertake strong measures to combat the situation."

[Myrdal, A., 1941, 161.] By 1939, several measures recommended by the Commission had already been enacted into law. Many of these represented measures advocated for many years by progressive groups of increasing strength, but they required the intense stimulus of a population crisis to put them finally into effect.

There had been a great public interest in housing reform in 1912–1914, but then private enterprise sufficiently met new needs until 1930, and the social housing movement declined. The depression of the 1930's led to renewed government activity. An intensive housing survey of Gothenburg was made. A new plan was drawn up; government loans and grants were given. For the first time, rural housing received attention. One-fourth of the total population was found to be living in overcrowded (over two persons per room) and/or dilapidated dwellings. Sweden ranked above most others in cleanliness and other standards, and the great defect was found to be the lack of space, which in a country well permeated by contraceptive knowledge, discourages reproduction. Illness and nervous troubles were found associated with overcrowding. Careful studies were made of family habits in the use of house space. [Riemer, 1941.] Housing policies were motivated by unemployment, and then by the needs of aged pensioners. The Population Commission thought that new building should be done chiefly for family raising, while the old people could be adequately cared for by the older and inferior houses thereby vacated. Its policy, however, did not prevail. The felt needs of the aged citizens were given priority, and this in itself has a democratic significance.

Marriage loans are made to couples to encourage earlier marriage. These loans differ from the German system in that there is no premium on bearing children, no requirement that the wife cease employment, no limitation on the stores where purchases may be made. They are to be repaid early, while the couple is still presumably without heavy burdens for offspring. Here again we have a recognition of felt needs. Young people wanted to marry earlier, and they were helped to do so, without indirect coercion to serve the needs of the State.

Proposals were on foot for a free school meal for every child in Sweden and a two-price food distribution which would subsidize protective foods for children. Locally these policies were put into practice, but the war intervened to check the larger program. This program was planned also as a way of disposing of agricultural surplus.

The medical care of the Swedish people, says Mrs. Myrdal [1941, 293], is about half socialized if the criteria are public versus private agencies in the distribution of expenditures. In terms of personnel it is about two-thirds socialized; "judging from who is in the final instance carrying the cost burden . . . it is considerably more socialized; and judging finally from the degree of control . . . it is almost completely under public responsibility." Yet in practically all instances the patients defray a part of the costs. Free delivery care and free prenatal care are available to all; free dental care and protective medicine for children. A bonus for all mothers upon childbirth, except the economic upper 10 per cent, without a means test and without regard to legitimacy of offspring, was inaugurated in 1938. There is additional maternity aid for a fifteen-week period for destitute mothers. The State also advances payments for children of divorced or unmarried mothers if the fathers have been delinquent in contributions, but pressure upon the fathers is continued. In addition, there are most of the forms of social security we have in the United States.

The usual divorce procedure in Sweden, as in Norway and Denmark, is one year's legal separation by mutual agreement, after which time divorce may be granted to either party on application. If no separation papers are taken out, three years of actual separation must normally be proved. Eighty-seven per cent of divorces from 1917 to 1933 were obtained by these two methods. Immediate divorce is granted for bigamy, adultery, and exposing the partner to venereal disease. Adultery is rarely used as a ground, and it has ceased to be a criminal offense. Other grounds for divorce are sentence to long imprisonment, conviction for alcoholism, and three years of insanity.

Since 1917 all children are entered in the national register with both mother's and father's name. Any man having had intercourse with the mother at the appropriate time can be designated as the father unless he can prove his innocence by a blood test. A public guardian is appointed to help the mother in case of an illegitimate birth.

In spite of clear data showing a correlation between the working of wives and low fertility, which could easily be used as proof that the former caused the latter if the nation's ideology favored such an interpretation, the new policy makes no effort to restrict mothers, or women generally, from employment. Instead, a new law was passed in 1939 forbidding employers to discharge or reduce the pay of employees who have been in service two years, on account of engagement,

marriage, pregnancy, or child-bearing. Furthermore, any woman employee has the right to 12 weeks' leave of absence at time of child-bearing without dismissal. In government service the woman gets 3 months' leave with over 50 per cent of her usual salary, and this applies to married and unmarried mothers alike.

Before this law was passed, women in love had often entered into liaisons without legal marriage in order to keep their jobs, and even some clergymen defended such action as a measure of protest against the non-employment of married women.

There is a growing tendency to organize housework and child care cooperatively. Cooperative apartment houses with nurseries for children have been established. A privately organized cooperative society built the first collective house in 1934. One large kitchen serves meals both in a restaurant and through food elevators to private apartments; but there are also kitchenettes in the apartments. Floor servants are available by the hour, and children may be cared for overnight in the cooperative nursery. Although such facilities are as yet available to only a few families, they are in some degree being developed in several places, and there is an ideology which favors them.

Day nurseries, pre-kindergarten schools, and kindergartens are well developed in Sweden. The Population Commission inaugurated plans for a state-controlled and state-subsidized system of pre-school care.

Mrs. Myrdal [1941], who has given us a comprehensive picture of the Swedish situation, is one of the few students of the family who has explicitly recognized mothers' need for recreation and vacations. These require blocks of time during which there must be mother substitutes. Only a limited upper class can satisfy this need through private servants; some families may do so through relatives, but a large middle class remains unprovided for. The Swedish leaders also recognize that such provisions are necessary under modern standards of living to induce families to have adequate numbers of children. The cooperative employment of a competent woman to supervise children for several families is suggested. The Cooperative Housing Society has a summer resort with cottages and restaurant and a camp for children.

Under Swedish law, landowners may not bar harmless trespassers from their land except in the immediate vicinity of dwellings. The public, by old tradition, has certain rights in the land for recreational purposes.

Despite the falling and inadequate birth rate, the Swedish Population Commission had no hope of correcting the situation through restraint of contraception. Such knowledge has for some years permeated even the lower economic classes in Sweden, and their birth rate is but little higher than that of the more privileged. Yet from 1911 to 1938 the sale of contraceptives as such was illegal, and was carried on in practice through the legal subterfuge that these articles had also the purpose of preventing disease. In 1938 the anti-contraceptive law was repealed. There is also an educational program for the general dissemination of sex hygiene and birth control information. Sweden does not legalize merely the clinical approach nor the instruction of women already married who can show definite "indications" for birth control. It assumes that such information should be available to everyone before marriage, whenever he or she wishes it. This educational method also assumes male responsibility for contraception, at least in the initial stages of sex life.

Since contraception sometimes fails and the results may be disastrous, Sweden has also legalized abortion within certain limits. Abortion may be had for humanitarian, eugenic, or medical reasons, but not for "social reasons," i.e., disgrace. In this respect Sweden did not go to the full length of the original Soviet Russian Policy. Sterilization is also permitted, and in some cases compulsory, to prevent undesirable parenthood.

The Scandinavian attitude toward love and sexual relations is the result of tradition. Marriage is late because of economic conditions, and pre-marital intercourse has long been a common practice. In 1916 the bride was pregnant in 34 per cent of the marriages; this figure was still 33 per cent in 1926 but it dropped to 26 per cent in 1936. [Myrdal, A., 1941, 46.] Courtship customs permitted great physical intimacies. There was a custom of "night courting," in which a group of boys visited a girl who was sleeping in a separate "girl house," often in the fields, and left one of their number to sleep with her. The rules forbade complete undressing or intercourse, often under severe penalties. Yet it is easy to understand the transition from such situations to others where intercourse took place. Custom assumed intention or at least willingness to marry so that in practice only a small minority of girls were jilted or left unprovided for. When this happened, Swedish society was more tolerant than many others and has provided various ways of protecting the unmarried mother and child.

The new laws have made it easier than formerly to regularize sex relations through early marriage and, in any event, to avoid illegitimacy.

It must be constantly borne in mind that the changes inaugurated by the Swedish Population Commission in this family pattern are designed to *increase* the total birth rate and to achieve this only through those elements of the population which are suited to bear and raise families. The policy is based upon the faith that these elements will have more children when family life and its surrounding conditions are made more attractive and unburdened of avoidable risks and insecurities. The population policy is also a family welfare policy. It has not yet proved that it can raise the birth rate, but no other policy has proved that it can do so substantially and permanently. The Swedish assumption is that if family life is made secure and happy, people will have more children and that, except for a minority of unfit persons, it can be safely left to individuals to decide whether they will join the large-family or small-family category.

Will this system be given a chance to stand or fall on its merits, or will it be engulfed and destroyed by those who believe that progress can be had only through authority and compulsion; national life only through prodigality of individual death? Sweden's vision of a better human life may depend for its realization upon the strength of British, Russian, and American arms.

Chapter VII

THE FAMILY AND THE EVOLUTION OF DEMOCRACY

A. THEORIES OF ORIGIN AND SEQUENCE OF FAMILY FORMS

We have observed that among the hundreds of small tribal cultures in the world there is a great variety of family patterns, but that few sequences or strong correlations of these patterns with stages of cultural development can be established. In Chapters III and IV we reviewed the cultural history of the family in the Old World civilizations and modern America. In Chapters V and VI we traced the changes of the modern industrial era. Can we now generalize as to the nature of these changes and their probable destiny?

Anthropologists and sociologists have tried to formulate a theory of the evolution of the family. It was thought that some one formula might cover the history of the family everywhere. [Tozzer, 1925, ch. 4.]

1. THE CLASSICAL THEORY. The first thinkers to formulate such a general law of family evolution were Plato and Aristotle. Their main thesis was that the family was at first patriarchal, as was decidedly true of the early stages of their own civilization. In 1861 Sir Henry Maine presented this theory to a later generation of sociologists. The earliest Greek, Roman, and Hebrew history seemed to betoken a patrilocal, patrilineal, formally or informally polygynous family. Women-centered families seemed to be a product of civilization and sophistication; the father-centered family was more primitive and natural and hence the original form.

2. THE EVOLUTIONARY THEORY. In the late nineteenth century the study of primitive peoples was first carried to the point of careful observation. At the same time archeology was revealing history much anterior to Romulus, Homer, and Abraham. Evidence appeared to show that human society had not been originally a patriarchate. In fact, it seemed more probably to have started with something like matriarchy, or at least a woman-centered family. Bachofen, in *Das*

Mutterrecht, put forth the new theory. Spencer, Lewis Morgan, McLennan, Lubbock, and Tylor contributed. The burden of their theory in general terms was that the original condition of man was a very loose family life approaching sexual promiscuity, in which the mother-child bond was the only stable and certain family relationship. Under conditions of poverty and scarcity there tended to be female infanticide, leading to a surplus of males. This led to polyandry. Then with increasing food supply the sex ratio decreased (i.e., females increased); man could afford to keep more women as a luxury; polygyny developed. Finally, maturing ethical ideals and the demand for justice led to monogamy. During the earliest stages of promiscuity and polyandry the woman-child relation was the center of the family. The father's relationship was at first unknown to the primitive mind; the child was personally related to its mother only, receiving general protection and food supply from all the men of the group. Under polyandry the identity of the father was of course uncertain. But under polygyny, with a surplus of women and of wealth, and an obvious identification of fathers, the center of power in the family was transferred to the man. He became the owner of his wives and children as well as of his herds. He was now sure what child was his and, although he left the young child in its mother's physical care, he assumed the right to control its destiny. This theory has been called the evolutionary theory of the family and is particularly associated with Herbert Spencer.

The evolutionary theory was based upon much more evidence than was the earlier patriarchal theory. One kind of evidence was the frequency with which ethnologists were reporting matrilineal systems of relationship and matrilocal families among the primitive hunting peoples. These facts, conjoined with the frequency of the paternal family among pastoral peoples and in early civilization, lent support to the hypothesis that the mother-centered family was earlier. The evolutionary theory, however, was not based upon observed evidence alone. It was not entirely an inductive theory. The evidence could have been interpreted in other ways. Two general thought patterns of the time were partly responsible for the interpretation that was chosen.

First, the theory of *general* evolution, resulting from Darwin's work, had taken scientific men by storm. It was natural to interpret all change in terms of evolution. Herbert Spencer's great contribution was to apply the principles of biological evolution to the evolution of society or culture. Since biological evolution proceeded by a series of stages passing gradually from one form of life to the next, the same

process was assumed to hold for culture. Tylor held that the family is first matrilineal, then mixed matrilineal-patrilineal, and then patrilineal. In his words [1889, 258], "the institutions of man are as distinctly stratified as the earth on which he lives. They succeed each other in series substantially uniform over the globe, independent of what seem the comparatively superficial differences of race and language, but shaped by similar human nature acting through successively changed conditions in savage, barbaric, and civilized life."

Lewis Morgan [1877] put the evolution of culture as a whole into three stages: savagery, barbarism, and civilization, with several subdivisions of each. He held that every society must pass through these stages in the given order, just as every child must pass through the same stages of growth. He held that the family pattern passes through five steps in evolution: complete promiscuity, the consanguine family, group marriage, temporary monogamy, and, finally, compulsory, permanent monogamy.

The second controlling thought pattern was the prevalent attitude of regarding civilized man as the antithesis of primitive man. Civilized man was monogamous, therefore primitive man must have been the opposite, in other words, promiscuous. This notion reconciled in a way the new scientific doctrine of evolution with the older religious attitude. Man might have evolved from a brute but, after all, it was comforting to see *how far* he had evolved.

One important bit of deductive reasoning in the evolutionary theory was as follows. Since early man *could not* have understood reproduction and modern man does, there must have been a time when man first discovered that he, equally with woman, was responsible for the birth of a child. This discovery *would tend* to awaken in the man a possessive attitude toward the child and a desire to dominate and control the family relations to which before he had been indifferent. The couvade has been interpreted as symbolizing this new discovery.

3. WESTERMARCK'S THEORY. Then Westermarck [1929] carefully went through the accumulated data upon primitive peoples and came to a very different interpretation. The main pattern he could see in all these primitive data, from lowest to highest tribes, was monogamy. Cases of promiscuity, polyandry, and polygyny seemed to him merely temporary aberrations, which were not any more common in the lower than in the higher stages. He considered also the mammals and the birds, and found monogamy there. Especially among the apes he found it. He concluded that man had not evolved toward monogamy, but had always been fundamentally monogamous. Other patterns

were merely pathological and temporary developments. Healthy, normal human nature would sooner or later eliminate them, or it would degenerate and the degenerating group would die out.

As Calverton [1931] has pointed out, the late Victorian intellectuals seized upon Westermarck's theory with great enthusiasm. It was more comforting than Spencer's theory, because it gave a perfect sense of security about human nature. After all, even though man might have evolved physically, his moral character has been essentially constant. Although occasionally going astray, he has always preferred monogamy, as did even his animal ancestors. Here, at least, was one principle of life which could be regarded as fundamental and unchanging.

Malinowski [1938], who leans toward the Westermarckian type of thinking, says that "monogamy is, has been and will remain the only true type of marriage." For the great majority of persons only a single mate is available; most cultures permit a man more than one mate if he can get her, but in such cases there are usually separate households and separate marriage agreements, and children and property are divided. Polyandry and polygyny are really "compound marriages" of several unions, each "constituted upon the pattern of a monogamous marriage."

Apparently it takes three volumes to refute three volumes; Westermarck's *The History of Human Marriage* is vigorously attacked by Robert Briffault in *The Mothers*. Briffault points out that "the animal family, out of which the human social group must be supposed to have arisen, is matriarchal." He stresses the priority of the mother-child relationship over the father-child and the stable mate relationship and amasses a great volume of evidence against the theory that monogamy is primal or fundamental.

Principle of Diffusion Supplants Evolutionary Sequence. For years there was bitter controversy among anthropologists, centering about the main issues here involved: (1) whether the sequences held by the evolutionary theorists are true, and (2) whether the earliest human societies were promiscuous, or monogamous, or what. The first question has been substantially settled. The consensus of opinion now rejects the Spencer-Tylor-Morgan formulas of universal and natural stages. J. R. Swanton [1905, 1906] and Lowie [1925] showed that in American tribes matriliny is more closely associated with complex than with simple cultures.

Tylor noticed that the couvade is present among peoples of mixed descent but not among the strictly maternal or paternal peoples. He

reasoned that the couvade characterized the change from the maternal to the paternal system. But as Lowie [1925, 175] points out, there may be certain correlations between traits without any uniformity in chronological sequence. Ethnologists are gradually learning that certain pairs of traits do or do not go together, and at the same time they learn that we cannot take several traits and make any general rule as to the order in which they will develop. The chief reason for this lack of regularity in cultural evolution may be diffusion. Each tribe, even in the primitive world, is constantly exposed to influences from neighboring tribes. A given trait may spread through a region and be adopted by many tribes, some of which are at a low and some a high stage of development. This does not mean that a tribe will accept any new trait that comes along. Cultures are singularly resistant to new customs which do not fit into their existing pattern. But there are always several points at which a culture is susceptible to influence from its neighbors.

Some of the very primitive tribes which do not yet know the connection between intercourse and paternity are patrilineal. This is true of certain Australian tribes and of the Toda and Torres Straits Islanders. [Lowie, 1925, 175.]

It is true that the Greeks, Romans, and Hebrews were patrilineal and that the peoples who today make up the bulk of the world's population are descended from patrilineal tribes. This, however, may be a geographic accident. The primitive tribes of Siberia are practically all patrilineal. The predominant patriliny of Europe, Asia, and Africa may be the result of wide diffusion of a trait which just happened to get started in a region where diffusion was more rapid than in other parts of the world. In several traits of culture, Europe and Central Asia show a certain wide uniformity which suggests that the tribes of these continents experienced much migration and contact from an early date. In America, parts of Oceania, and southeast Asia, on the other hand, there has been preserved a greater diversity of cultures, probably because of the slower development of transportation and communication and the less frequent churning up of population by migration.

Does polygyny decrease with cultural evolution? Hobhouse, Wheeler, and Ginsberg found the correlations shown in Table 6. There it is statistically shown that there is a correlation between polygyny and pastoral culture. The relation, however, is not as striking as earlier theories held.

TABLE 6 *

Kind of Economic Culture	Percentage of Tribes who Practice: General Polygyny, i.e., Permissible to All Who Can Afford It	Any Permissible Polygyny, i.e., the Previous Column plus Cases of Conditional or Class-Restricted Polygyny	Monogamy without Permissible Exception	Total
Lower hunters	29	86	14	100
Higher hunters	32	94	6	100
Dependent hunters	33	89	11	100
Lower agriculture	18	77	23	100
Middle agriculture	43	82	17	100
Higher agriculture	64	89	11	100
Lower pastoral	53	93	7	100
Higher pastoral	74	26	0	100
All pastoral		96½	3½	100
All other peoples		88	12	100
			(by unweighted averages)	

* Adapted from L. T. Hobhouse, G. C. Wheeler, and M. Ginsberg, *The Material Culture and Social Institutions of the Simpler Peoples*, London, Chapman and Hall, 1930, p. 160.

If these figures are arranged in order of a scale of advancing culture, without regard to the *kind* of culture, they appear as follows. We use here only the monogamy column.

Culture	Percentage of Tribes Monogamous
Lower hunters	14
Higher hunters	6
Dependent hunters	11
Lower agriculture	23
Lower pastoral	7
Middle agriculture	17
Higher pastoral	0
Higher agriculture	11

These data fail to show any increase of compulsory monogamy as civilization advances. Of course the large major civilizations such as Europe and China are not included here. But the "higher agriculture" in this list includes tribes which use the plow and irrigation. They stand relatively very high in the whole scale of cultural evolution.

With the decline of the debating-society type of anthropology, there has grown up a *critical-historical school* of social anthropologists. They are interested in tracing out the development and diffusion of family patterns of a much more specific and definite sort than the broad "forms of marriage" so loosely and heatedly discussed by the older anthropologists. Their thinking is illustrated by the following passage.

> Though no attempt is made here to exhaust the extant varieties of orthodox marriage, one more additional type may be cited. It is characterized by the marriage of a man not with his mother's brother's daughter, but with the daughter of his mother's mother's brother's daughter. . . . Restricted to Australia, it occurs both in the central and western sections, its area of distribution adjoining that of the cross-cousin marriage.*

"ORIGINAL" MONOGAMY OR PROMISCUITY—AN OVERGENERALIZED QUESTION. The second question, regarding the original form of the human family and sex relationships, is partly a question of words. Malinowski is reckoned as among those who support the monogamous theory, yet he also says [1938]: "Monogamy as the unique and exclusive form of marriage, in the sense that bigamy is regarded as a grave criminal offence and a sin as well as a sacrilege, is very rare indeed." One of these rare cases is, of course, Euro-American culture which spreads its mantle over more than a third of the population of the globe.

So what do we mean by "monogamy"? If we follow Malinowski's thinking, why not eliminate the word monogamy and simply call it "marriage," or vice versa? But this loose use of words has a function in relation to cultural values, as Calverton has implied. The scientist must be accurate in reporting the facts, but in organizing facts into concepts and choosing words for those concepts he cannot help being influenced by the cultural values he wishes to uphold.

Moreover, what do we mean by the word "original"? Do we mean the family of *Homo Sapiens* in the year 20,000 B.C. in southern France, or *Homo Neandertalensis* in 50,000 B.C. in the Alps, or *Pithecanthropus erectus* in 1,000,000 B.C. in Java? The development from an indisputably non-human form to an indisputably human form occupied far more millennia than the entire history of culture and may have involved creatures ranging over the whole earth. The question becomes well-nigh meaningless.

* Robert H. Lowie, *Primitive Society*, Liveright, 1925, p. 38. By permission.

When the data on primitive human societies failed to answer the inherently foolish question or to fit into any simple formula, the apes and monkeys were summoned to testify. Alverdes [1927] accepts a report that the gorilla is monogamous and finds this the natural foundation for human monogamy. Westermarck gives five statements indicating that the gorilla is monogamous; Briffault gives ten to show that the same hairy ape is anything but monogamous. [Zuckerman, 1932, 14.] Gerrit S. Miller [1928] "debunks" a great deal of the past literature on the subject by showing that it is based upon anecdotes and general impressions rather than upon accurately recorded observations.

SEX RELATIONSHIPS AMONG PRIMATES. The English biologist Zuckerman [1932] presents this question with more clarity in a few pages than do the volumes of many social anthropologists. From his own researches and many others which he summarizes, the following generalizations are made.

1. Most primates, like humans, have *more or less* continuous sexuality, being in this way distinguished from other mammals which have sharply defined oestrous (heat) periods separated by long periods of sexual indifference.

2. The sexual responses of lower mammals are largely unconditioned and have small range of variation, whereas those of primates are conditioned to a complex social environment and hence are more variable and less rigidly controlled by inner physiological conditions.

3. Primate sexual behavior takes many non-procreative forms such as masturbation and homosexuality, and is used by both males and females for non-reproductive purposes, such as getting food from a more dominant animal, escaping punishment, or enlisting an ally for attack upon a third party. As Zuckerman says, primates, unlike lower mammals, "prostitute" their sex function by giving sexual satisfactions in exchange for other kinds of advantages.

4. Primate group life is organized on the principle of dominance, but sexual responses temporarily modify the hierarchy of power and enable females, young, and submissive males to have privileges they could not otherwise secure.

5. The usual nucleus of primate societies "is the family party, consisting of an overlord and his harem, held together primarily by the interest of the male in his females and by their interest in their young." [Zuckerman, 1932, 315.] In other words, monkeys and apes have *personal* sex attachments and are not "promiscuous." The group pattern is most commonly polygynous. In some species subsidiary males belong to these harem groups and are allowed occasional sexual privileges by the overlord. There are commonly other "bachelor" males not attached to harem groups, and there is often clandestine promiscuity. The harems often join into larger herds but maintain their own identity and structure.

6. These social forms are neither inherited nor imitated. They develop anew with each generation as a result of natural interaction, being determined by the bodily structure of the particular species, its environment, and food habits. In some species and in some environments, the pattern may vary toward monogamy. Zuckerman thinks that primitive man, if and in so far as he was monogamous, became that way because of his diet, plus the fact that he had the capacity to conceive, symbolize, and transmit as culture the social forms he found advantageous, whereas sub-humans lack this power.

> The polygynous gorilla or baboon can guard his females from the attention of other males while they all forage together for fruits and young shoots. Primitive man . . . largely dependent on a diet of meat, would not have gone hunting if in his absence his females were abducted by his fellows. Reason may have forced the compromise of monogamy. [But] the permanent sexual association of human beings [whether monogamous or otherwise] is a characteristic common to all primates, and one that is not manifested by the majority of lower mammals.*

7. It is impossible to infer the mating habits of one species from those of another, even closely related, species. Monogamy appears in many species of mammals and birds at all levels. It is a result of a certain anatomy functioning in a certain environment. But it is false to suppose that all "monogamy" has some inherent unity or common basis. The monogamy of a pair of robins may be a one-season affair determined by the sex ratio, the flying, singing, and feeding techniques of robins, whereas the monogamous marriage of a Chinese peasant may be based upon lifelong natural affection plus culturally imposed duty and not seriously disturbed in case the man should grow wealthy enough to take also a concubine. It would be equally logical to suppose, every time we found one animal running behind another along a trail or road, that there were some uniform principle or instinct of "following" which unified and explained all such cases.

THEORIES OF CHANGE OF THE SOCIETAL ROLE OF THE FAMILY. The theories so far discussed were overconcerned with certain aspects of the family, particularly the numeric form of mating relations. That very preoccupation suggests motivation by an unconscious desire to uphold or weaken cultural values rather than by scientific curiosity. But there is a larger and more important question about change in the family. What is the general trend of history as regards the existence, the distinctiveness, the function and role of the family in the larger society? Is the family tending to disappear, as some have claimed and, if so, in what sense?

* S. Zuckerman, *The Social Life of Monkeys and Apes*, Harcourt, Brace, p. 316. By permission.

In the material purporting to answer these questions, two general types of theory appear. The first is an oscillatory or cyclical theory; it holds that family institutions swing, like a pendulum, eternally between certain extreme limits. Such is the thinking of LePlay, Spengler, Sorokin, Zimmerman and Frampton, and others. It was the thinking of James Russell Lowell when he said: "There is a tide in the affairs of men, but there is no gulf stream setting forever in the same direction." The second is a theory of one-way or "linear" change, which goes on and on indefinitely toward the bigger, or the more complex, or the better or the worse, or some other goal, even though this goal may also move ahead and never be reached. This is the thinking of Ward, Ogburn, and most of our American family sociologists. It might be called "progressivist."

Here, again, as with the former set of theories, we have more apparent than real controversy over facts, the real conflict being motivated in part by values other than sheer scientific curiosity, for both conceptions are valid. They apply to different aspects of family life.

1. OSCILLATIONIST THEORY. LePlay, who typifies this thinking, has indicated six periods in the history of French family life. According to his scale of values, three were upgoing and three downcoming. There was (1) the early simple "prosperity" of the Gauls from 1600 to 300 B.C.; (2) the period of Roman "degeneration" from 300 B.C. to A.D. 500; (3) feudal Christian prosperity from A.D. 500 to 1270, including a "golden age" from 1226 to 1270 when there were the best institutions ever created; (4) degeneration under corrupt clergy and royalty, and skepticism from A.D. 1270 to 1589; (5) restoration of the mores under church reform, A.D. 1589 to 1691; (6) instability due to wars and revolution from 1691 to the nineteenth century. LePlay emphasizes three correlated variables: strict control by the mores; thrift; and the variation from patriarchal family structure at one extreme through the stem family to the individualistic, unstable family at the other extreme. He seems to favor the stem family, but also to feel that the sufferings and oppressions under the patriarchal regime and strict mores are less than the sufferings under extreme individualism, such as existed for a period after the French Revolution.

Sorokin in his *Social and Cultural Dynamics* [1937], following a similar pattern of thought, sees culture perpetually oscillating between the extremes of the "sensate" and the "ideational," with the "idealistic" stage between. We are now living in a period which Sorokin calls the decay of an extremely sensate culture, and which LePlay would

call a period of extreme individualism, demoralization, and instability. This school of thinkers believes that we must now swing back toward the other extreme and, as we do so, mankind will be, for a time at least, more prosperous and happy.

Zimmerman and Frampton, whose *Family and Society* is an exposition of this ideology which contains condensed translations of some of LePlay's work, have presented numerous case studies of family life among Appalachian-Ozark highlanders. These people are represented as living a stable and not unhappy family life upon their low material standard of living. They exhibit the conditions which seem essential to the maintenance of an adequate birth rate. Of course Zimmerman and Frampton would give them better health facilities and certain other advantages of modern civilization. At the same time they see values in the highlanders' present way of life which our larger society must conserve if it would stem the tide of social disorganization and population decline.

2. PROGRESSIVIST THEORY. On the other hand, it must be obvious even to these thinkers that many social phenomena concerning the family have been changing in a linear, one-way direction without any substantial backswings. Medical science, labor-saving devices, and speed of transportation have moved generally forward. Even the Middle Ages did not involve a backswing from Roman culture in the matter of fundamental inventions and scientific knowledge, although they did involve political decentralization and some re-ruralization of life. History fails to give us sufficient examples of "lost arts" or reversions to the primitive to make anyone believe that we are likely to do any wholesale scrapping of the control man has gained over nature. In some places we "go back to the land" somewhat, but when we do we take along modern machinery and labor-saving devices. Moreover, certain changes in social structure, mores, and values have followed these technological changes, such as universal school education, widespread knowledge of contraception, an approach to the single standard of sex behavior, equalization of the sexes, free self-expression and special activities for children. In brief, a whole constellation of patterns which we loosely call "the democratic family" has developed, partly at least as a result of advanced science and technology. The upholders of the progressivist type of theory believe that the more important changes which have recently occurred in family relations and in the total role of the family are linked to our advancing science and technology. Barring catastrophe or Fascist conquest, they will not reverse themselves, nor is it desir-

able that they should. The reversals and backswings noted by the oscillationist school are relatively unimportant features of the larger picture of social change. There may be cycles of "strict" and "loose" morality, but these may seem less important if it is found that the *content* of morality is continuously changing in one direction. There may be cycles of thrift and profligacy, but are these as important as the generally upward trend of the standard of living?

The long-term effect of science, especially the sciences of personality and society, is to liberate man from the arbitrary choices of his culture and to enable him to choose, on an individual basis as far as possible, his designs for living from among the rich variety demonstrated by other cultures to be possible, or to dare to create something new to meet his needs.

Müller-Lyer [1930] has divided the entire history of the family into three periods: the clan period, the family period, and the personal period. Each of the first two is divided into three sub-stages: early, middle, and late. The personal period is only beginning. Here we have another "evolutionary" theory of the family, but on a different basis from Spencer's. Instead of ringing the changes upon numeric forms of marriage, it is based upon the changing relations between the family, other institutions, and the individual personality. This, in the present author's view, is more fundamental. We are beginning to get at something important. Müller-Lyer is dealing with the relations between one major part of culture and another, and the relation between all culture and man.

> Müller-Lyer suggests a general law to the effect that where the state is strong the family is weak and the position of women is good, whereas where the state is weak the family is strong and the position of women is bad. . . . It is true that in modern Japan the state is very strong, yet the family also is strong and the position of women is bad; but this is a transitional condition. The whole tendency in Japan is for the family to grow weaker and the position of women to grow better. This tendency encounters grave difficulties. I met in Japan only one woman who appeared to be what we should consider emancipated in the West—she was charming, beautiful, high-minded, and prepared to make any sacrifice for her principles. After the earthquake in Tokio the officer in charge of the forces concerned in keeping order in the district where she lived seized her and the man with whom she lived in a free union and her twelve-year-old nephew, whom he believed to be her son; he took them to the police station and there murdered them by slow strangulation, taking about ten minutes over each except the boy. In his account of the matter he stated that he had not had much difficulty with the boy, because he had suc-

ceeded in making friends with him on the way to the police station. The boy was an American citizen. At the funeral, the remains of all three were seized by armed reactionaries and destroyed, with the passive acquiescence of the police. The question whether the murderer deserved well of his country is now set in schools, half the children answering affirmatively. We have here a dramatic confrontation of middle-family ethics with personal ethics. The officer's views were those of feudalism, which is a middle-family system; his victims' views were those of the nascent personal period. The Japanese state, which belongs to the late-family period, disapproved of both.*

B. DEMOCRACY AND THE EPOCH OF THE PERSON

THE NATURE OF A PERSON-CENTERED SOCIETY. The essential character of the latest stage of society according to Müller-Lyer is that its values center about the *person*. Let us see what this means. In primitive and authoritarian societies, the individual is not neglected, nor is he lost in the mass. He knows his "place" and he must stay in it. Some societies have their pariahs and outcasts; others accord a certain honor and dignity to every person, however humble. Yet this honoring of the humble which we find in many authoritarian societies does not make the societies person-centered. The honor is given to the place and not to the person. Authoritarian societies *compel* persons to differ in certain ways; they prescribe *how* women must differ from men, slaves from masters, priests from laymen. Each shall suffer deprivations according to his station. As noted above, many primitive societies specify in great detail a person's "place" in terms of kinship, and upon this depend many duties and rights. But a person-centered society *divorces the person from his social place or role. It allows him to choose his place. It allows him to change his place,* for all the time or for periods of time. A person-centered society is dualistic in structure. It has a structure of places which must be filled, of jobs and duties which must be carried out. Alongside of this is a network of free, developing persons and personal relations which shift about with considerable independence from the formal structure. In most societies the institutional structure and the living network are largely merged together; and so far as they are separate, the former dominates. In a person-centered society the two systems are kept distinct, and the needs of the persons have a chance to influence the institutional structure.

* Bertrand Russell, "Styles in Ethics," *The Nation,* 118:497–499. By permission.

We may profit by an analogy between biological growth and personality development. There are three fundamental ways in which the trees and shrubs may be related to one another on a given piece of land. First they may grow as a forest, which is equivalent to *laissez-faire* competition and other natural social processes among humans. With their surplus of reproduction the plants will crowd each other to the limit. Different species will gain predominance on different kinds of land. But no tree is really free to develop according to its inner potentialities. Each checks the others; they all grow upward instead of outward; and the weak perish.

The second type of relationship exists when a formal gardener imposes a plan or pattern upon the trees. He places each; he cuts, prunes and weeds to bring about some formal pattern of the entire garden. A few of the trees may achieve free and full development of their potentialities. Many will be stunted, maimed, and distorted out of all resemblance to their natural forms, like the square, box-shaped trees in a hemlock hedge. This is analogous to an *authoritarian* society with a homogeneous culture.

The third type of relationship is that obtained by the natural landscape architect who places his trees in their natural habitat, gives each enough room, limits the number of seedlings in accord with the available space, and prunes only to check decay and interference. He thus gives each plant the chance to develop in the way it is naturally tending to develop. This park-like arrangement is analogous to the person-centered human society. It represents *freedom* as opposed to *laissez faire* and *authority*.

Freedom of Personal Development the Essence of Democracy. This concept of a person-centered society is, to the present author, the most essential meaning of "democracy." But democracy is one of those abstract words which means different things to different people. Traditionally it has meant chiefly the equality of adult human beings before the courts and at the ballot box. Some old-school southern gentlemen of the writer's acquaintance used to emphasize that they were "Democrats with a large D." They implied a rejection of ballot box equality for the Negro. But many "democrats with a small d" would go farther than the traditional concept and include also a certain vague social equality, which might mean willingness to mingle with all kinds of people at a church fair or on the street car. Some also think of democracy as applying legislative methods in all kinds of organizations, such as by taking the membership into confidence, or laying questions before them for a vote. About 1920 the phrase "industrial democracy" came into wide use, meaning the recognition of labor unions or the creation of workers' committees. Yet few, and they only recently, have thought of the possibility of democracy within the family. Children are immature and unfitted

to share decisions, and husbands and wives have their customary rights and duties, according to the very nature of marriage.

Yet all these meanings stress the equalization or the redistribution of power as between classes of people. They stress *justice* and this is important, but it is only a condition for democracy. We are beginning, however, to recognize a still more basic element in the concept, and that is the *freedom of opportunity of the individual.* The complete democrat, with a very small "d," wants to provide his housemaid with a decent room and freedom to entertain company, not merely because she is an employee and employees are generally oppressed by employers, but because she is a *person* and has needs similar to those of other persons, *and also needs peculiar to herself.*

PERSONALITY FORMED BY CHANCE EXPERIENCES. The essence, then, of Democracy is freedom, with equality of opportunity of persons to develop, not according to roles assigned them in advance, not according to classifications and categories, but according to the trends of development they spontaneously manifest. But the question arises, do not individuals develop according to their *experiences,* and does not society determine their experiences? Must not society therefore decide what kind of individuals it wants to develop? Is there really any spontaneity or freedom of individuals?

Some answer this by saying that individuals do have inner tendencies that are not determined by society, that the individual is not a *tabula rasa.* "Human nature," says Erich Fromm [1941, 15], "though being a product of historical evolution, has certain inherent mechanisms and laws." But these principles, so far as true, apply mostly to all individuals universally and do not account for individual differences. Of course society should be organized so as to satisfy this general "human nature." But then why not discover the patterns of living which are most natural, which suit average human nature, and establish a culture on that basis? Why not arrange education so that everyone has the experiences which will condition him to enjoy these patterns which have been found to be most natural? We would then have adjustment and contentment, and freedom would be superfluous. The answer to this requires that we think carefully about the nature of "experiences" and the possibility of controlling them.

A boy was brought up in a professional man's family in the midst of a large city. He was given the best education which that environment could provide. Everything conspired to prepare him to follow, vocationally, in the footsteps of his father, to marry a girl from his own social class and background, and to be a successful and respected citizen in that environment.

All the average needs of human nature and all the special needs which might grow out of his class and geographic environment were provided for. He was given more than average freedom, was loved and encouraged by his parents.

Yet this boy developed an intense desire to explore the remotest parts of the earth, to become a geologist, botanist, or forester, to marry a girl of some strange, foreign culture who would be quite unlike any girls he had known. He found little pleasure in the activities readily available about him, for a time became seclusive, timid, and socially ill-adjusted. When he grew old enough to find the more infrequent types of companions who could share his interests, he became sociable and friendly.

It is not necessary to suppose that this boy had inborn, bio-chemical, endocrine, or other constitutional traits which led his development into these special directions. But let us consider his experiences. His parents encouraged his wide reading. His mother stimulated his imagination by stories and scientific discourse. He was whipped in fights when he first went to school. He heard visiting relatives talk interestingly about strange and remote places they had visited. He was often rewarded or put into a kind of holiday mood by being taken by his father on walks to railroad yards, rivers, bridges, and the like. His first sense of romance was on a picnic where the children played "post office" in a pleasant spot in the open country, where there were many flowers about and a girl of unusual type surprisingly reciprocated his attentions.

No society can control these individual, unique configurations of experience, which are often far more potent in giving direction to personality than all the carefully *planned* things which the parents, the school, and the church may do to the child. Even the efforts to provide equal opportunity for all the children lead to a greater variation of concrete items of experience. These *personal* experience patterns are the most *variable* and uncontrollable factor in personality development. The principle of freedom is to allow this most variable factor to be the *independent* variable, *to make plans subject to accident* at the points where accident is most likely to happen, and to minimize accident where it can in fact be reduced.

Democracy implies a *laissez-faire* policy with respect to personal experience, but not with respect to social organization.

FREEDOM A CULTURAL VALUE IN DEMOCRATIC SOCIETIES. "Can society do this?" "Is it practical?" We begin to see worried and amazed looks on the faces of those who accept a great deal of freedom in practice but tighten up their muscles whenever anyone tries to expound any adequate theory of freedom. Perhaps one should not theorize about freedom but only enjoy it in practice when he can

find it. It is this unwillingness to face the full theory of freedom that makes practical freedom so precarious and subject to sudden infringements.

We do not know how far we *can* go in this direction. Of course there are limits and always will be. The acid question is: "Do we want to go as far as we *can*?" "Can" must be understood in a subcultural sense. We *cannot* give a boy freedom to throw stones through the neighbor's window, because the neighbor's resentment at the arbitrary destruction of something useful which represents time and labor is a natural reaction which would occur in any culture. But let us compare this with the following incident.

A housemaid in charge of a three-year-old child was horrified to find her playing naked in her sand pile, as she had often done at nursery school. The maid gave voice to the usual vocal sounds of shocked propriety and tried to give the child a sense of shame and guilt. We *cannot* give the child this freedom, she thought. Obviously in this case "cannot" refers to a cultural taboo and not a natural or subcultural limit. The parents found no difficulty in giving this freedom. A liberal, person-centered society wants to go as far as natural limits allow in following the principle of freedom. It is oriented in that direction but only experience will tell where the limits are.

Freedom is, more or less, a dominant cultural value in Western societies as sobriety is with the Pueblos, wealth rivalry with the Haida, bravery with the Plains Indians, and filial duty with the Chinese. Winnebago Indian culture is said to be unusual among primitive cultures in its valuing of the spontaneous development of the individual. Let us call *liberal* those cultures which value freedom highly. Most of the world's cultures, past and present, are non-liberal. Each has its own distinctive set of values, which makes it very different from other cultures, but it does not value the freedom of *individuals* to differ.

Fascist leaders in Italy, Germany, and other countries have stressed the attitude that liberalism is out of date and needs to be supplanted by a newer philosophy. This Fascist attitude is not merely a condemnation of the economic liberalism of free trade and private enterprise, but of the whole philosophy of freedom, democracy, and individualism. The highly integrated, well-disciplined group, the totalitarian state, cultivates uniformity of values. These outspoken enemies of freedom, however, are in countries which had had some taste of freedom and had developed in some degree the person-centered philosophy of society. They are now reacting against this, for

reasons to be shown later. Fascism is not the essence, the content of anti-liberalism. Fascism is rather a *method* used in certain countries, which had already gone far toward freedom, to reverse the liberal trend. Fascism is hardly an appropriate term to describe the Japanese attitude, yet Japan stands beside Italy and Germany against liberalism. The point is that Japan had never advanced so far toward liberalism, and hence required no Fascist movement to take her back again.

MODERN DEMOCRACY DEVELOPED WITH URBANISM, BUT IS NOT INSEPARABLY LINKED THERETO. Ferdinand Tönnies [1887] made a famous sociological distinction between *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*. This is not the same as authoritarianism versus democracy, or primitive versus civilized, but it is related in significant ways to these two other distinctions. The differences are of degree only. *Gemeinschaft* is a *communal* society in which people know one another personally and are controlled largely by common values (mores) transmitted by the customary teaching of each generation by its elders. Formal law, organized government, and religion may be present but their power to punish does not often need to be used. A *Gemeinschaft* is also, with slight variations of meaning, called a *solidary* society, "organic" society, "sacred" society. [Becker, 1932; Niebuhr, 1935.]

Gesellschaft implies voluntary association rather than association resulting from being born into a society. It means a group of people who are largely strangers, whose values differ because they have come from different culture groups or have personally developed in diverse directions, and who must be controlled relatively more by formal law and police power. It is called also, with slight variations of meaning, "individualistic," "cosmopolitan," "secular." It is said to have a "mechanical" rather than an "organic" solidarity.

In general *Gesellschaft* is found well-developed only in civilized societies and, specifically, in their cities. But in villages, and *within* closely knit groups everywhere, *Gemeinschaft* prevails.

Modern political democracy has developed largely in and through the *Gesellschaft* type of society. The rural villages of the Middle Ages were largely feudal villages under landlords. The first step out of feudal serfdom was the growth of cities, and cities were places of personal freedom. The use of money in place of distribution of goods and services by custom was another means toward freedom. Even today in America the cosmopolitan life of the city seems to provide more of what most people call personal liberty than does life in the country or small town.

However, these concepts of *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* refer to the broad principles of cohesion in societies but not to specific forms of social organization nor to cultural values. A society of *Gesellschaft* type can destroy personal freedom even in its cities by the efficient use of police, political agents, and espionage, as Germany has done. (Germany also uses *Gemeinschaft* methods of control wherever possible.) On the other hand, some pre-industrial *Gemeinschaft* societies such as Bali permit far less spontaneity and free development of the individual than do other *Gemeinschaft* societies such as among the American Indians. In modern America there are intolerant village communities and relatively liberal ones. Freedom is a value which can be chosen by a society and cultivated; it is not a mere mechanical result predictable from environment, population density, and other subcultural conditions.

FREEDOM DOES NOT DENY ALL UNIFORMITIES. The *Gesellschaft,* urban type of society tends to break down the homogeneity of customs and values found in most small communities. It tends to diversify the ways of life and the interests of persons. It is highly organized in its economic system and has certain wide uniformities in its material culture, owing to factory production and extensive trade. But its family, social system, and ideology are exceedingly diverse and heterogeneous. Many customs and cultural values tend to become less universal and more variable in their content. Thus with the growth of American cities the old Puritan values of thrift, Sabbath observance, and pre-marital "chastity," although retained by some groups with undiminished intensity, come in other circles to be looked upon as of less importance.

Yet not all this diversity is produced by new variations; some of it results from the fact that urban society brings together people from widely different backgrounds. At the same time, people of similar purposes and interests find one another in the city and build up new group cultures, each with its own scheme of values. Urbanism does not destroy all uniformities but changes the areas of uniformity.

The *Gemeinschaft* world was, after all, a world of great diversity. Each community had distinctive traits (such as costumes in peasant Europe), and the larger regions were culture areas with utterly different ways of life. The community was uniform, the world diverse. In the modern urban world the opposite is true. Life in Seattle, in general, is not very different from life in Albany, in general. But within any large city we find the whole gamut of customs, values, and

personalities, and diverse types may be as close together in space as Chicago's "Gold Coast" is to Chicago's "slum."

This change comes about "naturally" as a result of urbanization. In a liberal society this natural process of redistributing uniformities may be viewed as having constructive possibilities. Often it is not possible to give freedom to each individual to live as he pleases wherever he may be or with whomsoever he associates. Yet liberty might be obtained by a choice of the place in which he shall live, the group with which he shall associate, or of the social role he will play. Once having made such a choice, he must necessarily observe certain rules-of-the-game applying within his group. Freedom does not require the destruction of all uniformities. It may destroy national, tribal, and geographic homogeneity in many values; but it may retain, for many or most values, homogeneity within particular classes, sects, neighborhoods, or "social sets."

SEGREGATION A METHOD OF FACILITATING FREEDOM. The principle of segregation has been used in dealing with activities like prostitution, which we generally condemn. It can be used also with activities which are merely controversial, or objectionable only under certain conditions. Local option in the sale of alcohol is an application of the principle; so also is the roping off of some streets for play and the reservation of others for high speed traffic. In regard to family patterns there is already a certain amount of voluntary segregation. Business-class families raising small children drift toward the suburbs, childless couples to apartment house areas. Groups with different habits of dress, recreational preferences, and the like, go to different vacation areas.

Segregation may in some instances be a matter of practical necessity in the carrying out of a program, as among employed wives who wish complete services in the care of their children, or homemakers who wish to produce material commodities cooperatively. In other instances it may be desirable for the sake of privacy, as in the case of unconventional costumes. In addition, many of the values associated with love, home, and family require a certain emotional agreement among sizable groups. For example, some persons will doubtless always gain emotional satisfactions from the more or less ritualized activities of courtship and marriage. Formal debuts, "social seasons," announced engagements, elaborate weddings, ritual exchange of gifts, and the like have their values. The realization of such values depends upon the *participation* of a dependable group in the appropriate activities and values.

It has been said that each family should have the courage to make its own design for living, its own little "culture," regardless of what the neighbors think. Again it has been said that this is impractical. One of the chief impracticalities lies in the ridicule and gossip which beset the children of "queer" families in our public schools.

Democratic freedom asks that the individual's choice of life pattern in one sphere, such as family culture, shall not be predetermined by his birth or by his chosen status in another sphere, such as the economic system. The exercise of this freedom may be facilitated by a new type of ecological segregation in which the neighborhood one lives in is determined not wholly by income and accident, but partly by one's tastes and program of living. An area of homogeneity in family patterns need not be so large as in economic culture, but it needs to be larger than the single family group. It should be large enough to provide for the group play of children, for a sufficiently wide range of selection among the mate-seeking generation, and for social hospitality and recreation among married adults.

Freedom Means Free Time. Freedom is facilitated by the segregation of activities in time, as well as the segregation of persons, buildings, and activities in space. A person-centered culture will permit the individual to "change his mind." It is true that all societies expect different behavior at different ages. A liberal society will not prescribe such changes in advance. Free choice among several ways of life might be of questionable value if the individual were compelled to choose once and irrevocably for his whole lifetime. Liberalism means much more than such a choice; it gives opportunity for the individual to try different ways of life *at different periods in his life.*

Perhaps the greatest weakness of our present semi-liberal culture is its failure to provide enough of this kind of opportunity. In many matters, such as housing and the method of caring for children, a rather frequent shifting from one pattern to another might be of great benefit to health. One of the leading sources of emotional illness today is to be found in the repeated conditioning of annoyances and irritations to some particular place or situation. The physician advises the tired business man to take a vacation from his desk, not because the man's physical energy is depleted, but because the desk itself and its surroundings have become conditioned stimuli which keep him in a state of tension even when the more serious problems are absent. By the same token, more marital and parent-child vacations might keep many persons out of the mental hospital. An ideal society would provide practical arrangements by which the nervous,

spiritually exhausted mother could have her vacation and change her social role or pattern of daily life, not at someone else's convenience but *when her own health needed it.*

Indeed the fast and confining pace of modern life is largely responsible for the creation of these needs, but that same life also produces the value of freedom which is necessary to permit the needed adjustment. Hunting, pastoral and agricultural life are adventurous; but when men and women are confined indoors they need new substitutes for the old adventure satisfactions. The only substantial substitutes industrialism has so far offered lie in the variety of material commodities, in vicarious enjoyments such as the movies, and in a limited amount of travel. To satisfy adequately the wish for new experience, to prevent boredom, irritation spread, and their pathological effects upon human personalities, there is need of a much greater variation in the *total environment* of the average individual, a variation which shall occur at intervals of weeks or months rather than of years. We need mobility which is adjusted to the needs of individuals, rather than to the exigencies of business establishments.

Modern industry, by concentrating all the work of some persons within a seven- or eight-hour block of time each day and giving them complete leisure the rest of the time, tends to create similar demands on the part of other persons. Freedom is partly dependent on leisure. A person-centered society will encourage this demand and find ways to satisfy it.

Democracy Linked with the Humanitarian Trend. The past century and a half has seen the humanitarian movement, the discovery of anesthesia, a great decline in the use of the death penalty and of "cruel and unusual" punishments, the repression of wife and child beating, and even a growing disapproval of spanking, the diminution of corporal punishment in schools and prisons, the greater use of "cruelty" as a ground for divorce, the elimination of dueling in several countries, the decline of the harsher methods of physical combat among males, the decline of the more dangerous college hazing, the discontinuance of the practice of jumping on and off moving trains and street cars, and the curtailment of the glorious but gory Fourth of July. Granted that several of these changes have special contributing causes, there is nevertheless a common denominator. It is the elimination of suffering and a greater reluctance to destroy or risk life or health.

The relation of this humane trend to the democratic trend is not altogether clear. Presumably they support each other. Sympathy for

suffering sensitizes us to the greater variety of causes of suffering, and we learn that a humane policy cannot treat persons alike, but according to their different needs. On the other hand, when underprivileged groups are able to gain the hearing of other classes, they make them aware of forms of suffering which had been formerly overlooked.

The complete development of the humane attitude requires *empathy,* or the ability to put oneself in another's place. It may be easier to do this in a *Gemeinschaft* than in a *Gesellschaft.* The democratic attitude gives full value to the needs and wishes of other persons. It pays some attention to their intensity of feeling. It may refuse to satisfy their wishes but, if so, the refusal is based upon an appraisal of *cost,* not upon a categorical rejection of some persons or some kinds of need as unworthy.

Many people say they want freedom when they are working for a particular goal; when they have achieved this, they are no longer interested in freedom. One who holds freedom *as a value* will be devoted to it regardless of whether his own or another's freedom is threatened.

Class Struggle for Power Merely a Means to Democracy. Freedom must not be confused with power. Freedom refers to the life of the individual, power to his ability to influence or control the lives of others. Ownership of a large property which employs and serves other people is really power more than it is freedom. Economic or so-called rugged individualism was appropriate to agriculture and to small business units under certain conditions. For business today to demand freedom from government interference does not present an issue of freedom in the sense meant here. It is a question of the best way of regulating the economic order, which has forever passed out of the realm of freedom and which must be regulated in any event. The place to look for democratic freedom is not in the relations between organizations, but between persons, within the business office, the factory, the school, the neighborhood, and the home.

Yet many steps forward in freedom have been achieved through organization and fighting. According to Marxian theory, technological changes produce changes in social structure (largely in the economic organization) and these produce changes in cultural values. At each stage of social development, some class of persons derives more advantage than others from the existing social structure. This advantage grows, and at the same time an underprivileged class grows in strength and organization until finally it seizes power. Ideas and

values are weapons and also results, but not primary causes. Freedom is not won by setting it up as an abstract ideal, but as a by-product of class struggle.

Yet it must be observed that the Russian revolution came about in 1917, when the economic structure was not "ripe" for it, because of the power and persuasiveness of the Communist ideology.

Not all achievements of social justice come through revolution, and the most seriously exploited class or group does not always become organized and militant. Among immigrants, Negroes, women, farm tenants, one might find good material for rebellion. Herbert A. Miller [1924], in defining "oppression," says that any nationality which feels itself to be oppressed *is* oppressed. An English student commented facetiously that Miller had to make the definition broad like this in order to include the Irish. Nevertheless, there can be no rebellion unless there is some frustration, which is either caused by, or can be believed to be caused by, some other class, plus a rebellious ideology with leaders and organization.

Permanent social classes and conflict groups are inconsistent with Democracy. In the struggle to achieve democracy, class consciousness is a weapon. Persons suffering from similar grievances must combine if they would overthrow their oppression. But when the injustice is in some measure corrected, democracy requires that the persons be free to join new conflict groups, according to their newer needs. Too often the struggle for democracy makes an enduring value out of an instrument which was helpful in one stage of the struggle, as, for example, the entrenched values of the skilled building trades union and its "working rules," which have retarded the development of new and better housing for thousands of workers.

The newer concept of Democracy stresses freedom as the essence, whereas equality plays rather the role of an instrument. We cannot have freedom unless we have a certain degree of equality, but if we set out for mere equality we may fail to get freedom. Fromm [1941] has shown that the "automaton conformity" of Western semi-democracy is not true freedom. The hooting, cat-calling, teasing crowd may stifle spontaneity and individual development as well as does the dictator with his secret agents and firing squads.

THE NOVEL SYMBOLIZES DEMOCRACY. The essence of true democracy is that the pattern of the individual life experience, based upon the individual's pattern of wishes, has become the chief center of human striving, in place of patterns of group life, interaction, or culture. One of the most significant illustrations is the modern novel.

People have enjoyed telling and listening to fictitious narratives in all ages. The stories of the past centered largely about the achievements of whole peoples and of heroes who represented group aspirations. They were *epics*. The modern novel centers about the wishes, frustrations, and the final success or failure of an individual. This individual does not necessarily represent a group or a nation. He represents large numbers of human beings but not any socially defined categories. He represents personality. He may be quite atypical, abnormal in fact, but we are interested in him nevertheless. He may even succeed in his peculiar wish gratifications by violating several important laws and mores of his group and of our group. Nevertheless we are gratified by his success.

A dramatic illustration of this modern "heroism" (if the term can be thus stretched) was a film in which the hero, incarcerated on a prison ship, organized a mutiny, broke through the bars, captured the ship, and, leaving bloodshed and destruction in his wake, escaped in a small boat with his heroine to the shores of a frontier country. Presumably they were to live happily ever afterward in this new country, free and safe from the consequences of their past.

What does our hero stand for? The causes and the justice or injustice of his imprisonment are not at all developed as they would be in a more socially centered narrative. It is implied that he was a good man who was imprisoned unjustly, but that is all. There is no suggestion of his going back to be a leader in a struggle for some great principle. What happened to the other prisoners and the ship's crew is not revealed, except that many were killed in the violence started by our hero.

What social significance can one see as the couple rows the small boat alone toward a wild shore and a romantically setting sun? None, because this is art and not morality? Indeed, there is great social significance. It is the value called personal freedom, individualism. It might read something like this: "Nothing is important save that each and every individual should be free to develop his own pattern of life in accordance with his own unique wishes, regardless of the culture of the family, sect, class, or nation which gave him birth; and among these private wishes the greatest is romantic love for a person of opposite sex." We can overlook the fate of all the other people on the ship because in the last analysis our hero does symbolize something larger than himself, larger than the whole shipload of men. Our hero does represent society after all: a society which is a sum

total of many unique individuals, not an organic group serving a common purpose, unless it is this purpose of individual liberty, for the acceptance of freedom as the common purpose subordinates most of the other common purposes which mankind has pursued.

C. THE FAMILY AND THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRACY

The future can be influenced by human choice. The story is told of Jonathan Edwards that he once agreed to change pulpits with a fellow minister who had a church in a neighboring village. This other preacher had often debated hotly with Edwards over the doctrine of predestination, of which Edwards was a famous exponent. On the appointed Sunday morning the two preachers met, midway between villages, in their journeys each to the other's church. "Mr. Edwards," said the fellow clergyman, "do you believe that you have been predestined to preach in my church this morning and I in yours?" "Yes, assuredly," answered Edwards, "it has been so predestined and foreordained from the beginning of time." "Well, then," replied the other, "you go on back to your own church because I have decided to cancel the engagement," and he turned his horse about and went home to his own congregation.

As scientists we know that every event is caused by something which went before. We are determinists; we believe in an orderly universe. Just what "predestination" may mean, beyond this, this writer will not attempt to discuss. But surely it is obvious that among the causes which determine the future are human *purposes.*

We have viewed the trends of change in the family up to the present time. We have seen that there has been a general trend toward individualism and freedom, which we looked upon as the essential core of democracy. There cannot be any rigidly predestined future *which can be known to us,* because our very knowing about it might possibly al er it. To seek some formula which will tell us what *inevitably must happen* is not scientific but fatalistic (which is a variety of magical) thinking. Science bids us to ask three questions: (1) What is the apparent trend of events and the *probable* future predictable from this trend? (2) What are our purposes; what do we want? (3) How can we influence the trend so as to bring it more, if not entirely, in line with our purposes?

How far we can guide social change in the direction of our purposes we do not know, but if we would play our complete role as

human beings we shall at least know what our purposes are, and make efforts to fulfil them. When we do that, then we can say, "we have done our best."

Democratic freedom is a chosen value, a faith. Although such a decision is never made formally nor at any one time, yet in general we citizens of democratic countries have by implication voted to continue and develop Democracy with its essential component, freedom. With us it is a major cultural value. Moreover, it is not an unreasonable purpose because it is in line with the actual trends of recent history.

But still we should ask ourselves these questions: (1) Why do we want to continue freedom? (2) What are the alternatives?

We believe democracy has the highest potential for happiness. (1) Why do we want freedom and democracy? Are they ultimate values to which we have arbitrarily committed ourselves, which, now, having invested so much in them, we must salvage? To this writer it seems that back of this choice lies the idea that freedom is the most *humane* course, that it makes in the long run for "the greatest happiness of the greatest number," which implies in some sense a minimum of suffering. But although happiness and suffering are very real and definite, being essentially physiological processes in individual human beings, it is very difficult to measure or evaluate their total aggregate in a whole society. How much intense happiness is to be counted as equivalent to a certain amount of mild happiness, or as balancing a given amount of suffering? Shall we count persons, or person-hours, of happiness, or the ratio of happiness to suffering? Do we want the largest possible population that can be moderately happy, or a smaller population with more intense happiness? Such questions have so stumped many sociologists that they will not discuss the happiness concept.

Hornell Hart [1940] deserves great respect for his courage in attempting to measure happiness in the individual. He has devised a "euphorimeter" for measuring happiness in the long run, which consists of a few simple questions similar to those in various mental hygiene inventories; then there is an "at-the-moment" euphorimeter which is used by underlining and crossing out various adjectives. This adjective battery shows a distribution curve roughly similar to the curves of the marriage success scores of Burgess, Terman, and others. By further questionnaires happiness may be measured in the separate fields of recreation, work, love life, vitality and home. Closely related to happiness are the devices for measuring health and vigor, sense

of success, mental harmony, economic status attitude, person-to-person attitudes, friendships, loyalty to groups, religious adjustment, and altruism.*

Although measurement and reliable comparisons of group aggregate happiness are difficult, recent anthropological studies as well as community studies have given new evidence leading to the view that some societies contain much more happiness than others. Most human beings in most societies would rather, if they knew the facts and had the choice, live among the Samoans than among the Dobu. [Benedict, 1932.] Certainly no one would say that there is the same amount of suffering among a hundred college students as among a hundred hospital patients, or that a ward full of manic patients cannot be quantitatively compared in happiness with a similar number of involution melancholics.

Since "happiness" represents what practically all human beings choose when they have the chance to choose it, it may be considered *in some sense* an ultimate value. But different societies condition their members to get happiness through very different objects. Also there are different levels and kinds of happiness. There is the happiness of the contented cow, and there is the happiness of those human beings of highest intelligence and most complex personalities when they are able to formulate purposes and attain them, to maintain physical health and vigor to the ripest possible age and at the same time to live creatively. It is this happiness of maximum personality development, even at the price of some suffering, which we have in mind when we choose freedom as a value.

But perhaps freedom cannot lead to happiness. (2) What are the alternatives to freedom? Are we sure that it is the best road to this kind of developed, complex, human happiness? The answer "yes" seems almost implied in the terms used. Yet it is possible that this kind of happiness is not attainable in sufficient amount to compensate for the sufferings which freedom entails. Again, human beings must choose, and here is a choice which cannot be made altogether by individuals. To a large extent it must be a societal choice. Hence we who are now thinking for our society must examine the evidence and the alternatives.

Certain alternatives should be considered because their advocates in fact do claim that they make for greater happiness. The LePlay school of thought, for example, reiterates constantly that "happy and

* From review in *Bulletin of Family Research and Education*, 2:2 and 3 (1941), pp. 27–28.

prosperous peoples" are to be identified with patriarchal peasant societies of low material standards more than with individualistic, urban societies. Perhaps these thinkers want contented cows. In that case we may merely say our choice is something different, even though it is called by the same name, and we elect to live and fight for our choice. But there is a question of knowledge involved here as well as a question of choice of values. The LePlayists would say that, given even the same concept of happiness, their way to get it is better than the way of freedom and Democracy. Hitler says the same. So does Mussolini. And likewise the Son of Heaven.

Theoretical objections to democratic freedom. There is in fact a theoretical objection to Democracy. Fascism, autocratic nationalism, and religious authoritarianism would not be able to stand up as well as they do if there were not this theory as well as their arbitrary choice of values involved.

The objection, briefly stated, is that Democracy (1) inevitably develops crime and racketeering which will destroy it, (2) cannot make decisions because of parliamentary deadlocks (this had much to do with the overthrow of Italian post-war Democracy by Fascism), (3) increases neuroses through the multiplicity of choices which individuals have to make and thus destroys happiness, and (4) does not and cannot maintain population.

These are all serious charges which the thinking democrat must face if he would insure his faith against disillusionment. Both the charges and the defense are theoretical and qualitative and do not yet admit of measurement. Hence the final decision will still be based upon faith, but upon a faith which is enriched by deeper understanding and facing of possibilities.

Answers to these objections. Briefly, the answers are these: (1) Democracy can control crime by scientific methods and scientific fostering of anti-crime propaganda. (2) Parliamentary bodies *can* be changed and made more efficient; they are not all like the Italian Chamber of 1919 nor like our Senate on the occasion of a great filibuster. (3) Freedom must be paralleled by better organized information and education for making choices (there is a cultural lag here). (4) A democratic population policy is being tried (in Sweden) and it is too early yet to say that it will not work; neither is the Fascist policy working adequately.

Perhaps science makes freedom inevitable, so we must make freedom happy. But there is another, a kind of overhead, argument which Democracy has in its favor, namely, whatever the aims or

values of any society in the modern world, it will surely use the methods of science to pursue these aims and values. Japan has values resembling some of those of European feudalism, yet it uses the most modern science in promoting them. Science will be used because it is there and it is effective. But as we have seen in Chapter V, science leads toward individualism and freedom. For a time, indeed, an authoritarian country like Japan or Germany might distribute certain kinds of scientific knowledge to the right people and keep others in ignorance of things like contraception and protected from "dangerous thoughts." A prominent Japanese scholar was severely attacked for writing a book which implied that the Emperor derived his power from the nation rather than from heaven. Perhaps the authoritarian country could censor and control the social sciences while developing mainly the natural. *But somewhere and sometime scientific knowledge is bound to leak out.* And once it has leaked out it is difficult to put it back again. If it is suppressed, it will leak out again. Enough science will leak out to foster a scientific attitude and a criticism of cultural values, especially when they are founded upon an authoritarian ideology. Therefore, the instrument which authoritarian societies must use for their purposes will eventually liquidate those purposes or make them optional to individuals; this means *freedom.*

The immediate issue is an Axis-controlled world versus opportunity to develop Democracy. Let us come back again to the question: What are the alternatives to Democracy? We mentioned the LePlay school of thought because it deals especially with the family. What is its program? Apparently, to encourage a return to a kind of stem-family system with strong mores and local community life, considerable household production and less money economy, less mobility, and dissimilar spheres for men and women. However, there are many theoretical alternatives to Democracy. There are as many as there are cultures centered in values other than freedom. Both Germany and Japan are trying to check the development of freedom and Democracy, but the positive values they represent are very different from each other. LePlay was thinking of French society before the Revolution. Some of the leaders of Vichy seem to be hankering after something of that order. Yet none of these authoritarian leaders wants to "go back" in any complete sense to the identical culture of his country's past. Certainly Nazi leaders want a society which is technologically advanced and modern but based on the principle of

authority and submergence of the individual. It is they who will dictate a large part of the world's culture if the Democracies lose.

The only real issue for Europe, civilized Africa, and the Americas would seem to be Nazism versus Democracy. If Democracy wins there will be a question of how influential Russian policies and patterns will be in the total picture. However, that question concerns largely the economic and political systems; as regards the family pattern, Russia offers nothing fundamentally distinctive from Sweden and the more advanced groups in the other Democracies.

But even if the Nazis win, they will not necessarily impose their own family policy upon conquered nations, but whatever policy comports with the interests of Germany. It might be in some places a policy checking births; in others a policy such as that of our American slaveholders toward their slaves before the Civil War. Germany might forbid contraception to conquered peoples but she might impose widespread sterilization, hinder love and family life by segregating large numbers of the sexes in labor camps, and move millions of people about for her own purposes in utter disregard of their love of their home, and even break up families. She has already done such things in France, Poland, and elsewhere.

Those of us who may not be fully convinced regarding the theoretical implications of Democracy as set forth above, will nevertheless agree that Germany is a menace to *any* brand of Democracy in the family or society. They will agree that the fate of Democracy and freedom in the immediate future depends not on their merits but upon force of arms.

If the democracies win, the population problem will be the controlling issue. Military victory by the democracies will save us from the worst alternative, but it will still leave other alternatives regarding the family to be decided upon in each country.

After the military problem, the next crucial issue is population. Indeed, if the war is prolonged, the population question may become acute in many countries before the war is over. The need for man power will hasten the crisis which Gunnar Myrdal [1940] predicted, and which Sweden has already taken steps to meet. He says [p. 65], "The development in population [i.e., threatened decline] must sooner or later unleash in Western society an ideological crisis." This crisis is the clash of opinion which will come when the masses of people, in the United States, for example, become really aware that after 1980 our population will diminish unless something is done about it. They think of this now as academic theory, but demagogues will eventually

not fail to capitalize it for political purposes. It will then become predominant over all other social problems. If by that time those who understand the full implications of Democracy and freedom do not have a program ready, as in Sweden, less intelligent, pseudo-democratic leaders will impose their program. This is likely to resemble the German more than the Swedish policy. Our political democracy and our victory over Germany will not save us from resorting to a population and family policy which, like Germany's, sabotages the personal freedom and the democratic relations between the sexes which we have built up through years of effort.

A democratic population policy combines eugenics with happiness. It seeks to maintain population at an adequate level and quality by meeting the needs of individual men, women, and children. It does not use duty to the State as the chief motivation.

> . . . One night I attended a "home evening" at one of the Berlin BDM troop headquarters. The leader pointed to a pale, smiling girl of 17. Grete, she explained proudly, had just given birth to a baby boy and was the guest of honor. . . .
>
> "The Führer wants us to. I am going to do it again. I will do everything the Führer demands." *

As Gunnar Myrdal [1940] points out, the cardinal principle of the democratic policy is that the birth rate shall not be maintained by means of unwanted births. Democracy has faith that the right people really want to have the right number of children if the conditions are made right; that is, if the penalties now suffered by those who maintain the race are removed, and if home life with three or four children is made compatible with the leisure and personal development of the parents. We can say that such adequate family life "ought" to be happier, but the fact is that under present conditions it is not sufficiently so and more preaching will not make it so. It is not likely that any well-organized modern country will allow its population actually to diminish; the problem is, rather, what measures will it take? The democratic method is to secure population by making human beings personally secure and happy.

Both the German and Swedish policies have eugenic features. German eugenics depends upon compulsory sterilization of the unfit in rather liberal numbers and some cultivated enthusiasm for large

* Gregor Ziemer, *Education for Death*, Oxford University Press (New York City), 1941. From reprint in *Reader's Digest*, February, 1942, p. 141. By permission of Oxford University Press.

families among the leaders. Swedish policy sterilizes the few indisputably unfit, but it relies mainly on the theory that, with free contraception and services to families, the more able persons will voluntarily have larger families than those on the border line.

This book advocates a democratic family-and-population policy. So far this book has attempted to present facts and to deal impartially with values in the mode of pure science discourse. From now on we shall be in the field of applied science. Applied science must assume a purpose, a value toward the attainment of which science is to be applied. The assumption of this book, from now, is that we accept freedom as our cultural value and hence Democracy, not only in its present form, but with the full implications of its further development. This means we shall favor a democratic population and family policy. This does not mean the acceptance of the Swedish or Russian policy, or any other, as a creed. It does not mean a Westminster nor a Marxian catechism. It means merely the acceptance of the general objective of freedom as set forth above.

For persons not accepting this broad aim, other books have been written, and in our own country they will not be burned.

In his *Knowledge for What,* Robert Lynd [1939] holds that the social sciences can contribute to the solution of problems in America today if they can re-vitalize themselves and clarify their goals. Their stress must be not on the gathering of data and more data on what is known and what is static, "Knowledge and Order," but rather on the "Unknown and Chaotic." What order there is to be in culture must be "built into it by science," and not merely studied. The day of the "disinterested" and "objective" researcher is perhaps gone. All effort in this field must, he feels, finally lead to action, and this action must be one to which all the social sciences (history, political science, economics, sociology, anthropology, and psychology) will contribute, without fear that in acting they will fall into the hands of power groups. The study of *change* is vital today, and the social scientist must not be afraid to take on the role of a "constructive trouble-maker." If having gathered his material, he is loath to interpret it into programs of action because he feels such is not his field, then others less afraid may interpret it to their ends which may not be for the common good.

An essential element in the formulation of his problem is a "sense of direction" on the part of the social scientist and a knowledge of what is "significant" and what is "insignificant." Lynd feels that the significant things are those the human personality craves, and suggests that these cravings which "fall into contrasting pairs [are]—security and risk, coherence and spontaneity, novelty and latency, rivalry and mutuality." The task of social science

"is to find out ever more clearly what these things are that human beings persist in wanting, and how these things can be built into culture." *

The key problem of Democracy and of its population policy is to actualize the happiness it potentially offers. If we believe in Democracy, we must understand its weaknesses. The one usually thought of is governmental inefficiency. This indeed may be serious in war time, but is being gradually overcome by emergency centralization of power. To hold that this instrumental dictatorship destroys Democracy is to pay no attention either to the details of social organization and values or to history. In the long run the most serious weaknesses of Democracy are related to: (1) psychological conflict from choice making, and (2) population decline. We have already noted that Democracy has hope of solving its population problem through what Myrdal called a happiness policy. This joins itself with the problem of psychological conflict. In order to maintain population and to maintain the democratic way of life regardless of population problems, the central problem is human happiness. But we may also put this the other way around: We want Democracy itself because we think it makes for the greatest happiness of the kind we value and, if we achieve this Democracy and this happiness, we shall want to perpetuate our own flesh and blood to live and enjoy it after we are gone.

In the full meaning of the word, it would seem to be undemocratic to develop a high culture which can be enjoyed only by those who have not the time or willingness to produce enough offspring to inherit it. That is precisely the case with the culture of our "upper" social strata, and is beginning to be true of entire societies such as Great Britain, France, and Sweden. Perhaps it is only a transitional condition. Perhaps there are values in having a relatively childless class of people enjoying the cream of luxury on top of our society and replacing them at each generation with fresh blood from "below." But they are not the values of full Democracy.

Let us therefore face this problem of happiness in a democracy. The Swedish population policy aims to solve it in part by a redistribution of services so that eugenically sound people with large families can have their fair share of the luxuries and privileges of living. But our psychological conflict problem has still another aspect. Much of the unhappiness in democratic societies is due to the difficulty of developing and satisfying stable and consistent personal values in each

* From review in *The Bulletin of Family Research and Education*, I:1 (February, 1940), 23.

individual. Happiness on the level we assume is not a matter merely of enough food, shelter, sex, and so on. It requires the choice of personal aims from among many offered alternatives and the enjoyment of the achievement of those aims. Many a person, for example, surrounded with luxuries and opportunities, fails to live richly and happily because he has never developed any tastes, hobbies, or interests which might adequately use these facilities. Others are unhappy, and even come to suicide, because they have staked too much on one chosen purpose and, having failed, find nothing worth living for. Others are neurotic and unhappy because they are torn in conflict between incompatible goals, with no philosophy of life to help them choose.

Fromm [1941] has brilliantly set forth this problem in his *Escape from Freedom*. He shows that the Reformation and puritanism, which prepared man for modern capitalism and individualism, also isolated him spiritually from his fellows. Under industrialism the individual is free, but powerless and lonely. Hence he tries to escape from this isolation and powerlessness. There are three major methods of doing this. One is destructiveness, which manifests itself in hostility, in thwarting of others and of one's own impulses. A second escape is "automaton conformity," which manifests itself in the competitive luxury and fear of deviation so common among the middle classes in democratic countries. The third escape is found in a return to authoritarianism which characterizes, and in Fromm's opinion largely accounts for, the Fascist-Nazi movement.

Democracy must educate people to make choices. If Democracy would safeguard its own future, therefore, it must greatly develop its educational program. It must distribute interests, tastes, and skills more widely. It must make learning pleasant. It must free people from their puritan sense of guilt about their mistakes, their failures, their choices. It must teach them that they have the right to choose, to deviate as far as they can without harming others, and really to love others while differing from them. It must build a personality structure in individuals which is appropriate to a democratic society.

This will mean more spontaneity, more inner freedom, which must be distinguished from objective, factual liberty of behavior. Inner freedom, among other things, means doing whatever one can intellectually justify without a sense of guilt and remorse based upon "what one's parents would think" and accepting one's own peculiarities and limitations without apology and camouflage.

If each kind of personal choice could be made independently of every other, the problem would be great, but different from what it

is. The fact, however, is that choices are interdependent. Perhaps the trouble is that they are more interdependent in their consequences than in their making. So we witness the tragedy of the family of limited income, which chooses to have expensive and fragile house furnishings and also to have four children; of the man who chooses to own a home and invest much in its upkeep while he also chooses an occupation where success depends on easy mobility; of the extremely jealous husband who chooses an extremely attractive wife and neglects her while he immerses himself for long periods in his work.

Hence another common basic need in modern life is for consistency in the values and choices of each individual. We see successful and happy family life amid a great variety of settings. In the same settings we see failures and unhappiness.

Democracy must also adjust more specific cultural lags. In this writer's view, much of the psychological weakness of Democracy, this need to escape from freedom, is a transitional condition which will disappear if and when Democracy is allowed to develop more fully. It may be that Democracy is in a stage similar to that of a delicate plant which must either have more food and sunlight for its further growth or wither and die. It may be that our present semi-democracy is an unstable arrangement. Men can live without freedom, but if they are given certain liberties they may become less happy until they are given still others.

The story is told of a wealthy sinner who, after death, was duly admitted to hell. Seeing a beautiful golf course and entering a luxurious club house where full sets of golf clubs and caddies were available free of charge, he began to think he was in the wrong place. But when he asked for some golf balls he was told: "There are no golf balls, that's the hell of it."

When culture is changing, we often have *cultural lag.* [Ogburn, 1923.] This is the failure of one part of culture to keep pace with another in some way such that strain and suffering increase. Thus the going of women to work in factories was a change which took the lead over some other changes. For a time there resulted excessive hours of labor, overwork, fatigue, and ill health. Then finally factory legislation was introduced to check these evils. The factory legislation which lagged was an *adjustive* change. If this change had taken place fifty years earlier, as soon as the women started to work in the factories, much suffering would have been prevented. Rather commonly the leading change is something technological and the lagging change something of the nature of social organization or values, but

either may be any type of change. One present lag in the family pattern is that we are placing more value upon a close harmony of interests in choosing a mate, yet we are slow to adopt new mate-finding devices to enable people to find the "right one."

Women have obtained greater freedom and opportunity to enter the professions, such as medicine, where they become competent and interesting personalities. Such a woman is apt to "know her own mind" and have a rather specific idea of the kind of husband with whom she could make joint happiness. Yet society is slow to permit her the greater initiative in courtship which is practically necessary in order for this insight to be used effectively. This is one reason why so many more able and attractive women remain single than do men of like qualities. No legislation, of course, would solve the problem. The needed adjustive change is a change in popular attitudes and values. The movies have done something to build up sanctions for greater feminine initiative. [Peters, 1933.]

In a democratic culture the indexes of progress must be sought in the study of individual lives. In many primitive and other non-liberal, non-democratic cultures of the world, the cultural values attach to particular forms of behavior, interaction, or material products. Thus the Zuni Indians value decorum and emotional restraint, the Plains Indians, courage; the Greeks valued beautiful and symmetrical artifacts. The majority of individuals are of course conditioned to obtain happiness from the cultural value and to suffer when it is threatened. Any culture can change and if the change is toward greater realization of its values, that society will call it *progress.* By implication, progress might consist of a change of the values themselves which would bring them nearer to the actualities of life or in greater harmony with one another. Satisfactions and sufferings in human beings are always important indexes of progress or "welfare" or "cultural integration." But in non-liberal cultures the center of such integration or progress lies outside the individual. It lies in the particular form of behavior or social relationship or artifact which is valued. In a person-centered, democratic culture, however, not only the satisfactions and frustrations are in the individual as they always must be, but the very essence of integration also lies there. Bertrand and Dora Russell have brilliantly stated this difference between authoritarian and democratic cultures, indicating that even many social reformers fail to accept the principle of freedom which is essential to Democracy.

> Among writers of sociology and political theorists generally, a very common way of judging the social structure is by whether it constitutes a pleasant pattern to contemplate. . . . They think of the state as something having a good of its own, quite distinct from the good of the citizens, and what they call the good of the state is usually, unconsciously to themselves, what gives them a certain esthetic or moral satisfaction. . . . It is intolerable to the industrially minded to think of lazy populations sitting under banana trees, eating the fruit as it drops, and being happy in unproductive idleness. Some forms of socialism are not free from this defect: they aim rather at creating the kind of state which is pleasing to theoretical contemplation than the kind that will suit the temperaments of its citizens. . . . Whoever wishes to be a social theorist should daily remind himself . . . that a state is something in which *people have to live,* and not merely something to be . . . contemplated as we contemplate the view from a mountain top.*

Social problems commonly consist of cultural lags. We have seen that social change is a continuous process which, however, has been going on during the last fifty years with unusual rapidity. We have seen that certain types of changes may be regarded in a sense as leading or *initiating* changes, and that these include: (1) changes outside of culture itself, such as those in population and geographic environment; and (2) scientific inventions and discoveries which, although a part of culture, have a certain independence of the remainder of culture. We may note further that initiating changes produce adjustive changes in culture, but that these adjustive changes often take place after the considerable delays, known as cultural lags. The initiating changes and the adjustive changes which follow readily and promptly upon them may be regarded as the *dynamic* forces of the change process. Opposed to these are the *resisting* forces which prevent adjustive changes in certain directions, and which are therefore responsible for the cultural lags.

A cultural lag, the direction of whose readjustment has not yet been determined, is a *social problem.* It appears as a problem because we are aware that something needs change, and yet society as a whole cannot decide what the change should be. Various groups and classes in society conflict about the direction of the readjustment. Even the most conservative groups seldom take the position that *nothing* needs to be done. They may oppose the more direct and "radical" adjustments proposed by the reformers, but they nevertheless would deal

* Bertrand and Dora Russell, *Prospects of Industrial Civilization,* D. Appleton-Century, 1923, pp. 147–149. By permission. The italics are the writer's.

with the problem, frequently by reversing or overcoming the dynamic forces themselves or by making some change in the attitudes of individuals. For example, certain conservatives are aware of the high birth rate of the poor and the higher standards of child welfare. Yet these leaders resist the direct adjustment, which is to provide greater contraceptive information, and would solve the problem by mitigating the intensity of the desire for higher living standards, by further efforts to increase national wealth, and by training the individual to greater sexual abstinence. Father Coughlin, for example, has said that what we need is not more birth control, but more control over the banking system.

Cost, prejudice, and class structure resist change. We have seen that each adjustive social change is usually one out of several possible alternatives. The alternative which is finally used is the one which meets with the least resistance. The resistances and the dynamic forces can be reduced to individual human motives. There are in general two kinds of resistance. One is that of cost, the other, of prejudice. The first is economic; the second is due to adherence to old values in the face of new needs or new knowledge. An economic resistance to a suggested or attempted change may be verbalized by the words: "It is too much trouble," "It would cost too much," "It is too difficult." The resistance to part-time jobs for married women and to the reconstruction of housing to permit more collective housekeeping is in large part an economic resistance. The proposed changes would require extensive rebuilding and also extensive reorganization of the economic system. Usually the property-owning class is the chief seat of an economic resistance. Their own economic security lies in preserving the *status quo;* the proposed changes would compel them to exchange more or less assured property rights and standards of living for new uncertainties which, though they *might* make life better for them, might also make it worse.

Prejudice-resistance is that offered by a cultural value or taboo. The change may require no trouble. In fact, it may be generally recognized that it would usher in an easier and simpler procedure. But it would be "immoral," "dangerous," or perhaps merely "ridiculous." The resistances to mutual-consent divorce, planned parenthood, and organized mate-finding are of this valuational character.

No cultural value deserves to be destroyed or changed for the mere sake of change. Human happiness in general is better obtained by preserving and satisfying the values to which we were conditioned in childhood. Nevertheless we shall have to consider the possibility of

changing certain deeply inculcated values because we shall find them incompatible with *other* aims which we also hold valuable. Most social problems, in the final analysis, boil down to a conflict between cultural values, to which conflict there is no arbiter except the actual balance of wills in the aggregate of individual human beings. All that science can do here is to enable people to see more clearly the possible alternatives and the possible or probable consequences of each. After this is done, the decision must necessarily lie in the feelings of the mass of the people. It is at this point that the old slogan of absolute Democracy applies: *vox populi, vox Dei.*

Prejudices derive strength from *fear.* People resist social change in certain directions because these changes threaten to destroy values to which they have been conditioned and on which their happiness depends. These values do not reside merely in the personal life of each individual separately, but in the relations between individuals. Parents, for example, resist changing standards of courtship behavior because their own happiness requires the maintenance of certain values in the lives of their children as well as in their own lives. A conservative husband dislikes to have his wife earn money when this is not economically necessary because, having been conditioned in early life to certain sentiments concerning the roles of husband and wife, he feels inferior and ashamed when his wife enters a new role. He expresses this by saying, "It will look as if I couldn't support her."

Both the cost and prejudice resistances are commonly marshalled together in the form of *vested interests* of social groups or classes. The clothing industry would certainly resist the genuine *simplification* of costume, although of course it encourages fashions which permit simplicity in some respect only to be compensated by increasing demands and more expensive standards in others. Real estate interests have opposed government-subsidized housing. The well-to-do who control industry resist each surrender of power to organized labor. They fear to lose luxuries and comforts, and they fear anything which threatens to make it difficult to hire cheap labor to whom they may delegate the dirty and less pleasant tasks. But there are also burdens and responsibilities which they cannot delegate, which they are loath to give up, because they value their prestige and indeed they value the class structure itself. In the privacy of his own soul, many a man of wealth curses his formal dinners and evening clothes, his costly house and grounds or his business responsibilities, yet he would rather be a slave to these things for the rest of his days than to see his business controlled by workers or his children going to public schools with

the children of workers. It is not so much his comfort and his pleasure which drive him, but his sense of duty toward social values inhering in the class structure.

In Marxian theory, it is this class structure, this power of one class to exploit another, which largely explains resistance to change. In this view there is certainly much, though not all, of the truth.

The dynamic forces of cultural change, as well as the resistances, can be analyzed into human needs and wishes. It is the desire of someone, of some small class of persons, perhaps, to experience something new, or to gain greater power over something or somebody, which leads to invention, to demands for change.

The solution of a social problem does not necessarily consist in "removing the cause." When James Watt invented the steam engine he had no idea that he was contributing heavily to the work of modern divorce courts, sowing seeds for Margaret Sanger's birth control campaign, or laying the foundations for the parent-education movement. Yet his invention was one of the chief dynamic, initiating causes of all this and much more. Those who think humanity is better off today than ever before may thank Arkwright, Watt, Newcomen, and other inventors. Those who think society is "going to the dogs" may also lay the blame upon the same men.

The above reasoning illustrates the fallacy of trying to solve a social problem by seeking out its "causes." If one means the immediate causes, they are so numerous and require so many qualifications that one cannot lay his finger upon any definite point of attack. If one then, in perplexity, decides to trace the responsibility farther back, he will eventually come to causes of a more definite character, but they will be these mechanical inventions and scientific discoveries which initiate social change. But he will find that they are not only the causes of his social problem, but also of much that he admires in the modern world. The automobile is one of the prime causes of family trouble today, but does anyone expect, or even wish, to abolish the automobile?

If by the "causes" of a social problem one means the previous social changes which led to it, then he cannot expect to solve the problem by removing its causes. The remedy is always a *new readjustment,* not a going back to any earlier state of affairs. The study of causes helps us to construct the remedy more intelligently but does not reveal the remedy ready made. Chesterton [1910, 1] has said, indeed, that in social matters we must find the remedy before we can know the cause. When practical men talk of "causes," they are often talking merely

about the failure to use known remedies! The "cause" of malaria, in this practical sense, is the failure to take quinine! The real cause, or *antecedent,* may have been a germ received through a mosquito bite, but we cannot help that now. The remedy we apply has nothing to do with the mosquito or germ; it was not discovered through a study of them.

Social change never moves backward; history does not repeat itself. As the oscillation theorists have selectively observed, in the course of history certain phenomena do periodically repeat themselves. The problems of the modern family are, for example, similar in some respects to some which existed in late Roman times. Does Roman history, then, teach us any lessons by which we can profit? Some seem to think so. Namely, we must not behave as the Romans did or we shall suffer their fate. But the underlying conditions are different. The Romans did not have modern science. Our solution is not to preach against tendencies which cannot be checked, but *to do something additional which the Romans failed to do.* The remedy lies always in *further adjustment.*

Progress requires readjustment and the integration of values. The process of social change is one thing. Increasing or decreasing happiness, that is, progress or regress, is another thing. It is true that every invention is prompted by somebody's wish and contributes to somebody's immediate satisfaction. But something else is put out of balance, some other wishes are frustrated. Some inventions do seem to add to, more than they subtract from, the net welfare. Doubtless we can say that of the discovery of ether anesthetic by Long in 1842. Could we say it of the invention of gunpowder? But no ethical valuation can be placed upon any single invention. The whole course of invention, the evolution of science as a whole, is man's best insurance against unforeseen enemies. Some unknown plague or pest, or the causes of some unpredictable catastrophe, may even now be evolving in a nip-and-tuck race with human science, with the survival of the human race at stake. Therefore we shall do well to let science develop untrammeled, and encourage it to develop faster.

Whether invention shall lead to greater happiness depends in large part upon how quickly we perform the readjustive processes. Our responsibility is to keep society constantly in good repair, not to prevent its getting out of order. For get out of order it will.

Progress may be furthered also by integrating the value system itself. To make freedom a cultural value was an act of choice based upon faith. But having made that choice, we are not being "unscientific"

if we advocate that lesser values be changed in order to be compatible with freedom. If college students believe in a democratic way of life, they will devaluate college fraternities from the high prestige they hold on many campuses. This does not necessarily mean that they must be eliminated. It does mean the deliberate cultivation of a different attitude toward them.

The family presents a crucial opportunity for progress. Much as we wish to see the military victory of democratic countries and the improvement of relations between countries and between classes, there is much that we can do to make human life better in concrete, local situations. These large aims may depend more than we realize upon specific adjustments in primary groups and in everyday living which can be made under more than one form of government or national economy.

> I am done with great things and big things, great institutions and big success, and I am for those tiny, invisible, molecular moral forces that work from individual to individual, creeping thru the crannies of the world like so many soft rootlets, or like capillary oozing of water, yet which, if you give them time, will rend the hardest monuments of man's pride. (William James.)

Many, though not all, different patterns of family life may be conducive to freedom and happiness. Happiness depends a great deal upon the sequence of events in the life of the individual. When he passes from a worse to a better situation, he is happy. If his situation changes for the worse, he is more unhappy than if he had always been in the worse situation. Something analogous to the theory of relativity seems to apply in the field of human happiness. A large task of the science of family relations is guidance of individuals in particular situations. If in this way it can reduce the sufferings which attend rapid change and prevent people from trying to escape our newfound freedom, it may preserve Democracy against a new onslaught of authoritarianism.

The family is our most important primary group. In large measure it determines personality development. If we believe in Democracy we shall seek to promote freedom in and through the family and to help parents build young personalities which will not sabotage Democracy in the larger world through their frustrations and pent-up hostilities. This is the real significance of the family in modern society.

Chapter VIII

THE POPULATION PROBLEM

A. INTRODUCTION TO FAMILY PROBLEMS IN GENERAL

In the remainder of this book we shall analyze the major problems of the family. If the Western world escapes from its threatened enslavement, the crucial problem, as we have seen, will be population. A democratic population policy, as we have also seen, centers about the general aim of happiness. It treats happiness as an ultimate end and also as the instrumental key which will reconcile population adequacy with democratic freedom of living. In other words, a positive happiness policy may resolve Herbert Spencer's hypothecated contradiction between "individuation and genesis." This is a generalization, namely, that the more individualized or specialized life becomes, the fewer the offspring. It holds roughly true as we ascend the animal scale. The further application of the principle to social evolution also seems to hold true empirically, although it does not follow logically; that is, it is claimed that the more highly individualized human personalities become, the more complex and specialized their activities and scales of living, the fewer offspring they have. Yet there are reasons for believing that this correlation is not inevitable. It has not been universally true. The aim of a democratic population policy is to upset it.

Happiness is perhaps implicit in all cultural value schemes, but the democratic scheme seeks it in a more direct way, and wants to set up indicators by which we may know whether a given cultural change actually does increase or decrease the aggregate happiness. Moreover, since Democracy makes most values less universal and subjects them largely to the option of personal choice, the happiness element stands out as a common denominator separable from the specific values. An authoritarian culture can always defend the cruelty it inflicts upon its rebels, because it always has a majority of persons to whom happiness is implicit in the accepted cultural scheme of values, and who believe that the suffering of the rebel is due to his non-conformity. On the

other hand, when individuals are maladjusted and unhappy it is possible to hold in a Democracy, as nowhere else, that society itself "is the patient." [Frank, 1936.] This argument is a powerful and double-edged sword. It may be used to reform society, but a group of reformers who diagnose society's illness as "too much liberty" may get the upper hand. Freedom as a cultural value is therefore especially vulnerable, and Democracy must be especially vigilant of the types and sources of human suffering.

Thomas Jefferson said: "If there be any among us who wish to dissolve this Union, or to change its republican form, let them stand undisturbed, as monuments of the safety with which error of opinion may be tolerated where reason is left free to combat it." This represents the extreme intellectualism of our nineteenth-century concept of democracy. On the contrary, Democracy is not *guaranteed* by leaving truth and error free to fight it out in the open. It must also look after the feelings and emotions of people and see that no minority can push its own specific scheme of values to the extent of imposing it upon others, as has happened on the legal level in the case of the prohibitionists and the anti-contraceptionists.

Hence our discussion of the population problem will lead immediately to the problems of happiness, which will occupy the rest of the book. Democracy should show *some quick and obvious results in human happiness.* It is often strategic to get *some* immediate results even though they are not the most important in the long run. The Russian Bolsheviki in 1917 won over the peasants by promising them immediately the land they craved above all things and knew to be available, instead of waiting to discuss the matter. To many persons they gave hope of greater sexual happiness. The American Democratic party, which has achieved long-term reforms of greater magnitude than has any government for a generation, went into power partly on the strength of its promise to repeal prohibition.

Certainly the American people are not a Roman mob to whom we propose to offer free corn and public spectacles. That indeed would not be Democracy. But need we lean over backwards, as do some speakers on the family, in couching our recommendations in such solemn and lugubrious terms that they seem like a dose of bitter medicine? Let us rather be aware of the immediate as well as the long-run happiness which we seek to increase. Perhaps no other agency has a greater opportunity to teach people happy family relations than has the church, yet the Protestant Church has been handicapped by the puritan ideology that nothing can be righteous and also rapturous.

We have seen that the function of the family in society has greatly changed. Although it is still an economic and an educational institution it no longer has the major responsibility for these functions, and as far as they alone are concerned it could be dispensed with. The family has come to be peculiarly an agency for the satisfaction of emotional needs and the building of the early foundations of happy personalities. It is not consistent with our philosophy of democratic freedom to make solemn speeches about the family as a "sacred institution." Zimmerman and Frampton [1935, 49] say:

> Since the family is an institution, it is more easily preserved than built up. Long-time social policy probably should be directed as much at the preservation of all major phases of the family as at the treating of the symptoms of family weakness.*

In the present writer's view this, whatever it may mean to its authors, gives an undemocratic emphasis. If we help the family to perform the functions which it now retains in the modern democratic world, we need not worry about its preservation as an institution. The family, like the Sabbath, was made for man, and not man for the family. Nor woman either.

B. THE PROBLEM OF OVERPOPULATION: NEGATIVE EUGENICS

SINCE MALTHUS THE MAJOR PROBLEM HAS CHANGED FROM OVERPOPULATION TO RACE SUICIDE. In Chapter IV we had some insight into the expansion of population in Quebec. This is typical of what happens in countries with plenty of space and resources where there is no limitation of births. The population under such conditions normally doubles itself about every twenty-five years. It did this or better until about 1865 in our own history. We had comparatively little immigration before 1840, yet our population before that increased much more rapidly than it did after we had immigration.

When all land is occupied and new resources are less easily available, an expanding population begins to feel the pinch. This problem was explicitly formulated by Malthus in 1801 in his *Essay on Population*. He saw it as a simple issue between vice, disease, war, and starvation on the one hand, and "moral restraint" on the other. Moral restraint, to Malthus, meant either late marriage or sexual abstinence in marriage. Malthus' theory placed upon the poor the

* Carle C. Zimmerman and Merle E. Frampton, *Family and Society: A Study of the Sociology of Reconstruction*. D. Van Nostrand, Inc., 1935. By permission.

responsibility for their own poverty, thus furnishing the upper classes with a pleasant relief from responsibility and with an argument against socialism.

Since Malthus' time the problem *as he saw it* has been practically solved by events which he did not foresee. The unexpectedly great extension and improvement of agriculture, and of world-wide transportation, have brought a *temporary* solution; that is, they have postponed the evil day when population will need to choose between birth restriction and increased restriction through war, disease, and starvation. That this solution is but temporary was shown in 1923 by East, who carefully calculated that the maximum exploitation of world food sources which can be reasonably expected will feed only 5,000,000,000 persons. He showed, further, that this population, at the actual rates of increase of 1900–1920, would be reached before A.D. 2100. [1923, 69.]

But at the same time a *permanent* solution of Malthus' problem has arisen, in the perfection and widespread use of contraception. A family need no longer choose between "moral restraint, vice, and misery." Modern birth control represents one of the most important changes which have ever affected human society.

THE HISTORY AND PRESENT LEGAL STATUS OF CONTRACEPTION. As early as 1850 B.C. in Egypt was written a probably effective prescription for contraception, which has come down to us in the Petrie or Kahun papyrus. Greek and Roman medical writers considered contraception a legitimate phase of their work. In medieval times there was a regression toward ineffective contraceptive rules, rules dealing with the time and circumstances of intercourse, and toward other superstitions. The matter-of-fact mechanical methods were barred by religious taboo. Francis Place in 1823 began the modern rational contraceptive movement. Although a layman, he made a statement of "indications" (reasons) for contraception which only lately have come to be accepted by the medical profession. He started the neo-Malthusian movement. Dr. Charles Knowlton, an American, followed in the footsteps of this movement and published *The Fruits of Philosophy* in 1832 in Boston. This was the first American treatise by a physician. In 1878 Charles Bradlaugh and Annie Besant were tried in England for circulating Knowlton's book among the working classes. They were acquitted and vindicated, amid much publicity, and since then the resistance to contraceptive education has materially lessened in Europe. "The weight of authority," says Himes [1932], "is now agreed that the decline in the birth rate after 1880 was largely, though

not exclusively, the consequence of these circumstances." In 1878 the first birth control clinic in the world was opened in Amsterdam.

In America, however, the resistance had not then even reached its peak. In 1873, as a result of agitation by Anthony Comstock of the New York Society for the Suppression of Vice, a federal law was enacted prohibiting the mailing of information on contraceptive methods and the interstate transportation of contraceptive devices. Many of the states have laws prohibiting the distribution of contraceptive literature, and some even the giving of oral information. In 1914 Margaret Sanger was arrested for distributing her "Family Limitation," and in 1917 she was jailed for thirty days when she opened the first American clinic in New York. Her case was appealed, and Judge Crane gave the decision that legally practicing physicians may give contraceptive advice for the "prevention of disease."

The controversy then raged over the right of the clinic to give advice for economic and social "indications" as distinguished from medical or health indications. Of course, it is possible to interpret many economic situations as threatening a woman's health in case of pregnancy.

In 1929 the Birth Control Clinic in New York was raided after it had prescribed and sold a contraceptive device to a policewoman who went there to secure evidence against the clinic. This woman claimed to be the mother of three children of one, three, and five years, desiring to prevent a fourth pregnancy, but did not claim to be threatened with venereal or any other specific disease. The medical profession was greatly aroused by the taking by the police of confidential patient-record cards from the clinic. At the trial of the case several prominent physicians testified that it would have been injurious to the presumed patient to have a fourth child under the circumstances she had indicated. The chances of good health for her baby if born within a year after the youngest child would be less than if she waited. Her own physical and mental health would be endangered. The court decided in favor of the clinic and thus interpreted "disease" to mean something more than venereal or other infectious diseases.

In another case in which a manufacturer of contraceptives tried to enjoin a competitor who had stolen his trademark, a court decided that it is not illegal to send through the mails to doctors and their agents an article which has the (lawful) purpose of preventing disease in addition to the (unlawful) purpose of preventing birth. In still another case it was decided that the law against importing contraceptives applies only to the articles themselves and not to literature about them. [Ernst, 1932.]

Thus clinical work is growing largely through more liberal interpretations of the laws rather than through actual changes in the laws.

In 1938 the Massachusetts Supreme Court compelled the closing of the Boston clinic and the others in that state. In 1939 a decision of the Supreme Court of Connecticut resulted in the closing of all clinics in that state. On the other hand, in 1937 North Carolina, in 1939 South Carolina, and in 1940 Alabama opened clinics under the state departments of health. Several counties in Michigan and Minnesota have public health units which make a practice of referring patients to private doctors for contraceptive information. In several states birth control centers receive free space or financial aid from private or public social agencies.

In 1941 there was renewed activity against birth control books through the strict enforcement of Section 211 of the Federal Criminal Code, which still remains in the statute books since the days of Anthony Comstock. This law forbids the mailing of every "card, letter, circular, book, pamphlet, advertisement or notice of any kind giving information directly or indirectly, where, or how, or of whom, or by what means . . . conception may be prevented." For some years this law had been applied with a certain reasonable discretion, but now we find standard books which describe contraception in a general way, which have been circulated and used freely for several years, suddenly coming under the Post Office ban.

As a result of a great protest, supported by the opinion of three-fourths of the population of the state, against the closing of the clinics, a referendum ballot for a change of the Massachusetts law to permit physicians to give treatment and prescription "to married persons for protection of life or health," went before the people of Massachusetts in November, 1942.* It was defeated.

ORGANIZATION FOR PLANNED PARENTHOOD. In 1939 the American Birth Control League amalgamated with the Birth Control Clinical Research Bureau to form what is now called the Planned Parenthood Federation of America. This organization is the center of the movement in America. The local leagues under its auspices were commonly known as "maternal health" or "maternal welfare leagues," but now they also are coming to be called "leagues for planned parenthood." Before this union of national organizations, the American Birth Control League represented the more conservative group which believed in using only well-tried methods and instructing only through clinics. There was a more radical group who wanted more experiment with other methods; some of this group thought that broadcast information was necessary in order to cope with the great extensive-

* See p. 267 and *The Family Guardian*, March, 1942, and subsequent issues.

ness of the problem. Opinions still differ, but there is more integration of action.

In 1923 Dr. Robert Latou Dickinson founded the National Committee on Maternal Health, whose function is to carry on research, whereas the purpose of the Planned Parenthood Federation is to guide the operation of clinics.

The planned parenthood movement is an outstanding example of the work of volunteer women in local communities. Many of these have given much of their spare time for years to this work without financial compensation and without the prestige rewards attending other women's activities, since birth control work is in many places not quite a "smart" activity. The clinics are assisted by volunteer attendants. Many doctors give time free to the work. Only a few professional executives and paid traveling workers are employed.

THE EXTENT AND EFFECTIVENESS OF CONTRACEPTION. Regine K. Stix and Frank W. Notestein [1940] have reported on the experience of the Birth Control Clinical Research Bureau in New York City, "the oldest and largest contraceptive clinic in the United States, and one that has had great influence on the policies of its hundreds of younger associates."

About a thousand records were obtained from white-collar and working-class mothers in the Bronx, who were married, on the average, at twenty-one and for nine years at the time of their first visit to the clinic. About two-thirds of them were Jewish, one-sixth Catholic, and about one-twelfth Protestant. They were found as a group to be more fertile than the general run of the population, which may have accounted for their interest in coming to the clinic. For this group it was found that "without any effort at birth control, the average patient would have been delivered of her first pregnancy a little more than a year after marriage, and of successive pregnancies at intervals of less than two years."

That efforts at contraception before the first clinic visit were not unsuccessful is seen by the fact that the average mother, who should by the above control have had five pregnancies in nine years, had only three. The Catholics, using untutored contraceptive methods, had the highest pregnancy rates, the Protestants the next highest, the Jews the lowest rate; and mothers in white-collar families of all three faiths had a lower pregnancy rate than mothers in working-class families.

Most of these women did plan for some children. Few, however, wanted more than three, and two was the most common number desired. When contraceptives failed, illegal abortion was sometimes a resort, and it was often after such an experience that the mother turned to the clinic for help.

Contraceptive practice after the wife's attendance at the clinic proved more effective in achieving its ends. The psychological factors involved in bringing the patient to the clinic may also have had a part to play in the success of the clinic methods. When accidental pregnancies occurred, several factors were associated: a higher fertility rate of the mother, a higher accidental pregnancy rate pre-clinic, a lower educational background, or a greater slovenliness about self and home.*

Among 4,000 patients admitted to the Cleveland Maternal Health Clinic over a period of 6 years for family regulation advice, only 41 sustained pregnancies which could not be explained by discontinuation or misapplication of the method recommended. [Robishaw, 1936.]

Among women who have had their first pregnancy and who do not practice any contraception, statistics show from 86 to 105 pregnancies per 100 woman-years of exposure to intercourse. Contraception cuts this rate down to 27 to 40, but this rate is among ordinary clinic population. [Pearl, 1937; Beebe and Gamble, 1938; Stix, 1938.] A group of women of college education showing already a rate of 31 (presumably from using partially effective contraception) had this rate cut down still further to 6 unplanned pregnancies per 100 woman-years of exposure. Among this group, when it was decided to have a child, pregnancy occurred within 1 month of ceasing contraception in half the cases, within 3 months in three-fourths of the cases. [Dewees and Beebe, 1938.]

Another way of stating effectiveness is the statement by one medical research authority that the best methods, used consistently according to good instruction, succeed with 97 per cent of all couples who use them. There is yet no evidence of sterility or other harmful effects caused by contraception of the several types taught by the clinics or commonly used in practice.

The rhythm or "natural" method of contraception, based upon the researches of Herman Knaus and K. Ogino, is not condemned by the Catholic Church. A recent study [Fleck, *et al.*, 1940] reports it to be a "workable form of contraception for a selected group of women," reducing their pregnancy rate from 90 to 11 per woman-years of exposure, and showing a corrected failure rate of 3 per cent. The authors report, however, that 37 per cent of the accepted patients discontinued treatment because of dissatisfaction or lack of interest, and conclude that "it is doubtful whether the method is reliable

* From review in *Bulletin of Family Research and Education*, 2: Nos. 2 and 3 (1941), pp. 30–32.

enough for individual cases in which contraception is an essential safeguard of the patient's health." Dr. R. L. Dickinson points out that there is a "safe period" for every woman, but that individual tests are needed to determine it; that there is no time in the menstrual cycle in which conception has not occurred in some women. He agrees with the Ogino-Knaus findings that the premenstrual week is a period of relatively low risk, but holds that the few days immediately following menstruation, rated as "safe" by the Ogino-Knaus calendar, are a period of high fertility in some women.*

The contraceptive situation in America reveals a most extreme lag between actual practice and the formal ideology of law and official pronouncements. Only 21 out of the 200 educated persons questioned by Dr. Hamilton for his *Research in Marriage* said that they were not using some form of contraception. Of 1,000 educated women questioned by Dr. Katharine Bement Davis [1929], 730 were employing contraception and only 79 disapproved its use. Among the business class in *Middletown,* say the Lynds [123], relatively efficacious contraceptive measures appear to be practically universal, whereas only 34 out of 77 working-class wives used it. Among the least privileged classes, contraception is least commonly used. Pearl [1932], studying 2,000 maternity cases in hospitals, learned that 36 per cent of the white women and 15 per cent of the Negroes used contraception.

The contraceptive industry has reached the volume of $250,000,000 per year,† and only a very small percentage of this sum has been spent upon medically prescribed contraceptives. This is $10 worth per married couple per year, which would very approximately supply the total volume of sexual intercourse in America as estimated from questionnaires regarding frequency. But certainly large numbers of the underprivileged are still without such protection.

In 1942 America had about 800 birth control clinics.‡

At the New York clinic in 1930, it was reported, the clients were about equally divided among Protestants, Catholics, and Jews. [Himes, 1932, 55.] The wages of the husbands of the clients of the New York clinic averaged $30.52 per week. In Baltimore and Cleveland clients were 10 to 12 per cent of the business class (which comprises roughly 30 per cent of the urban population). The British

* Summarized by Eric M. Matsner, "The Safe Period," *Birth Control Review,* January, 1935.

† *Fortune,* February, 1938.

‡ For current data see *Human Fertility* and other publications of the Planned Parenthood Federation of America.

clinics get about the same proportion, but Himes thinks that their clientele in general is of lower economic status than the American. The British professional classes use the clinics very little, he thinks, whereas in America, owing to legal restraints and greater ignorance on the part of physicians, the clinics have advised more persons of higher status. [Himes, 1932, 57.]

In Pearl's American sample, contraceptive responsibility has been borne in about half the cases by men, half by women. Clinics emphasize the methods used by women, since in so many cases the husband will not cooperate. Contraception has to reckon not only with cultural values but also with the resistances of adult men to changing their sexual habits.

The sex ratio at conception is about 110 males to 100 females, but the greater mortality of male fetuses reduces the ratio at birth to 105. Winston [1932] found, in a study of a socially superior group, that the sex ratio at birth was 112. A ratio of 109 could be accounted for by the superior pre-natal conditions in such families, which permit more of the excess male fetuses to survive. A ratio of 112, however, requires an additional explanation, since it exceeds even the conception ratio. The ratio among the *last* children of these families was 117.4, indicating that the greater desire for male offspring tends to lead the family to continue child bearing after a female birth but to discontinue after a male birth. Such an attitude, of course, has better chance of showing actual results when contraception is used. Universal contraception may therefore lead to a greater excess of males in society than we now have, assuming the continuance of certain attitudes associated with a patrilineal culture.

ABORTION. Carr-Saunders [1922] has shown that abortion has been a common method of population control among primitives and also historic peoples. Christian civilization stands as an exception rather than an illustration of a general rule in its attitude toward abortion.

About 10 per cent of all pregnancies end in spontaneous abortion ("miscarriage"). In addition, there are induced abortions, some of which are permissible for medical indications such as tuberculosis, and most of which are illegal. "Five per cent is a fair maximum estimate of the proportion of pregnancies terminated by illegal abortion among married white women." [Stix and Wiehl, 1938, 623.] This figure is about 6 per cent of births, or 130,000 cases per year. But there are also many abortions among the unmarried. Taussig [1936] estimates 700,000 illegal abortions in the United States every year. This would be about a third of all births.

According to information secured by Thompson [1932, 7], abortions in Berlin were said to exceed the number of births; in all Germany to be from one-half to two-thirds the births, and to have tripled since 1919. If these estimates were true, they could account partly for the remarkable fall of the German birth rate, which went even lower than the French. Before World War I the Germans had prided themselves on the fact that their birth rate much exceeded that of the "decadent" French. The later increase of the German birth rate under the Nazis was mainly due to decreased abortions rather than increased conceptions.*

Thompson suggests that abortion may account for the relatively low birth rate (compared with other Oriental countries) in India. In Great Britain the First Birth-Rate Commission found much evidence that wives of the poorer laboring classes practice abortion, whereas among the higher paid working families contraception is practiced.

An Italian study indicated an abortion rate of 25 to 30 per cent of conception (i.e., about 33 per cent to 42 per cent of the births) during the decade before 1930.

Soviet Russia, the Republic of Spain, Denmark, and Sweden liberalized the abortion laws so as to permit abortion for a greater variety of reasons. In Russia it was performed by government physicians in government hospitals. At first it was made available to any woman who demanded it, after efforts were made to dissuade her. After 1924 the case had to go before a local commission for approval. In a small city investigated, the commission received applications from 20 per cent of the pregnant women and granted 90 per cent of the applications. [Handman, 1931.] Since 1935, permission has not been granted so readily.

In America, abortion is attended by great social risk for the physician, and physical and social risks and anxiety for the patient and her family or friends. To aid a woman in securing an illegal abortion is itself a crime in some states. Yet the number of criminal prosecutions for abortion is very small compared with those which take place.

The practice of abortion is carried out largely by a special class of physicians of questionable repute and also by women of nurse's or equivalent training without medical degrees. Sometimes the operation is performed in an ordinary office environment so that the danger of detection is minimized, and various other subterfuges are used.

* Taeuber, 1940, with following comment by Hankins; Whelpton, 1935.

Reputable physicians come to know a great many cases of abortion although they themselves do not practice it illegally, because the patient frequently comes into their hands after the illegal part of the procedure, that is, the killing of the fetus, has been performed. In 1937 a prosecution in New Jersey revealed a practitioner who insured clients against childbirth at $2 per month in advance.*

The Roman Catholic position, expressed forcibly by Pope Pius XI in his Encyclical, is that abortion is not permissible even when a physician legally advises it for medical reasons and when the mother's life is gravely imperiled.

STERILIZATION. The eugenic argument, impossible in the days before Darwin and Mendel, has broken down somewhat our cultural resistance to the interference with nature's processes. By 1938, 32 states had laws permitting sterilization of feeble-minded and certain other classes of persons [Kopp, 1938, A.] California is the only one which had made any large use of such a law. The success there has been achieved through the practice of getting parental consent to the sterilization of defective children, thus avoiding legal contests. Over 13,000 patients were sterilized there up to 1940, out of 33,000 in the whole country.† Sterilization "gets by" only because it is limited in its application to a very small percentage of the population. East has said that at least 10 per cent of the population are dullards who should not reproduce their kind. If it were attempted to sterilize all of these, it is not difficult to imagine the resistance which would arise in the name of personal rights, a cultural value much more firmly grounded with us than is racial betterment.

In Oregon in 1931 a 15-year-old daughter of a Syrian-born laborer came to court as a delinquent. On examination she was found to have an I.Q. of only 63, was classified as a moron, and was recommended for sterilization. Her father, however, persuaded a lawyer to help him oppose the measure, the Portland *Oregonian* gave the case wide publicity, and the local Orthodox priest complimented the newspaper on its willingness "to champion the rights of the individual against persecution appearing in the guise of 'psychiatry.'" ‡

For many years German culture has been characterized by an unusually high valuation of hereditary fitness, a belief in the superiority of the Nordic race, and a predisposition among scientific men to

* *Time*, February 22, 1937.

† Human Betterment Foundation, Pasadena, 1940.

‡ *Time*, October 5, 1931.

emphasize hereditary factors in the explanation of pathological behavior. The government of the Third Reich gave these values and beliefs renewed emphasis, and in so doing adopted what promised to be the most far-reaching sterilization policy yet undertaken by any government. It is reported that about 400,000 Germans, already in the care of institutions and physicians, were subject to immediate sterilization: 200,000 "congenital idiots" (presumably including many imbeciles), 80,000 schizophrenics, 60,000 epileptics, 20,000 manic-depressives, 20,000 with serious physical deformities, 16,000 hereditary deaf, 10,000 hereditary alcoholics, 4,000 hereditary blind, 600 with St. Vitus' dance. Dr. Marie Kopp reported an estimate of 600,000.* Scientists not imbued with Nazi philosophy will probably question the hereditary character of many of these types, particularly among the schizophrenics, manic-depressives, alcoholics, and physically deformed. Few will question the hereditary character of most idiocy or other low-grade feeble-mindedness. More recently, Dr. Guett, eugenics expert of the Ministry of the Interior, stated that the 280,000 incurable inmates of Germany's public institutions would not be sterilized, but only those "at large."† Special eugenics courts were created to examine and pass upon candidates for sterilization, the candidates being supplied with or without their own will by criminal courts, physicians, parents, or guardians. Over 200,000 persons were adjudicated by these courts for sterilization during the three years 1934–1936. [Kopp, 1937.]

In 1931 an Encyclical from the Pope stated: "Public magistrates have no direct power over the bodies of their subjects. Therefore, where no crime has taken place and there is no cause present for grave punishment, they can never directly harm or tamper with the integrity of the body, either for the reasons of eugenics or for any other reason."‡

Dr. G. G. Fernald had considerable success in training feeble-minded children in institutions to habits and ideals of good workmanship and sexual abstinence and then liberating them into the community under supervision. Out of 176 girls discharged from his institution at Waverly, Massachusetts, during a period of 25 years, only 27 married. A total of 34 legitimate and 13 illegitimate children came from these 176 women. Of 470 discharged males, only 13 married, and

* *New York Times*, December 21, 1933.
† *Ibid.*, January 5, 1934.
‡ *Ibid.*, January 9, 1931.

there were only 12 children born. Even allowing for possible later births and for unknown illegitimate offspring produced by the males, it would seem that the group as a whole practiced race suicide, as eugenics would wish. [Myerson, 1925, 81.] Yet the number of feeble-minded who have ever been in institutions is a small percentage of all. It may be, as claimed by Myerson and others, that the lower grade defectives do not reproduce even in normal amount; the real danger is from the higher grade defectives, most of whom are not institution cases.

Thus it is clear that the principal control of the birth rate in a Democracy must come not through abortion or sterilization, but through voluntarily practiced contraception.

CONTRACEPTION NEEDED FOR HUMANE AND EUGENIC REASONS, NOT TO PREVENT OVERPOPULATION. When Cardinal Hayes in 1935 gave his much publicized sermon against birth control, in which he argued that "the United States is already a dying nation," a group of Protestant and Jewish clergymen issued a reply denying this danger of race suicide and saying that "in the United States the difference between the birth rate and the death rate at present is so great as to add more than a million to the population every year." These clergymen, in their eagerness to defend birth control, showed ignorance of the mechanics of the population process, and the Cardinal effectively supported his statement.* A simple, obvious, only temporarily valid argument which glosses over deeper lying facts is not always an argument most helpful to a cause in the long run.

Legalization of contraception is needed but not for the purpose of reducing the *general* birth rate. That aim has already been achieved by "bootleg" contraception. Conservatives are quite right if they hold that no further decrease in the birth rate is needed at this time. One may recognize privately that a certain amount of contraception is desirable and, then, since we already have that amount, he may try to prevent further increase by publicly voicing the hypocritical attitude that *all* contraception is undesirable. Such is a common technique of social control.

The difficulty with this method of handling the problem is that, although we may be practicing about the right total amount of birth control now, it is not practiced *where* it is most needed for human welfare. Contraception is needed not only for general population

* *New York Times*, December 9, 16, 19, 1935.

control, but also to prevent the sufferings in individual families, due to such situations as the following:

Transmissible diseases and defects.
Undue susceptibility of a woman to puerperal diseases.
Too short intervals between births.
Defective children already born to parents.
Marriage at early ages before there is economic ability to raise a family.
Financial inability to support another child without hardship and resort to charity. (Families on relief have higher birth rates than any of the more prosperous groups, and higher than the poor who are not on relief.)
Child-bearing begun so soon after marriage that parents have no time to make a normal adjustment or develop their own personalities—"honeymoon pregnancies."

Dr. Sophia J. Kleegman reports:

> . . . The week before I left, on making rounds in the septic ward of one of New York's great hospitals, I came to the bed of a young woman of 26, fine, uneducated but intelligent, conscientious, devoted to her two children and keeping them remarkably well cared for, although the family had been wholly supported on home relief for the past two years. The husband and these two little children were at her bedside as she was dying from the result of a self-induced abortion. "Didn't you know," I asked this patient, "that there are birth control clinics where you could be taught a safe method of contraception?" "No," she said, "I never was told about that"; and yet she had been in continuous contact with social welfare workers for two years.*

The application of contraception to cases which really need it can be obtained only through making it legal and honest. If the result of this is to produce too much contraception *in toto*, causing a decline of the birth rate below the replacement needs of the population, then we shall have another problem which can be treated by methods more suitable. We need also positive eugenics. Birth control clinics now give valuable advice to women who want to have children as well as to those who wish to discontinue. No matter how many children a family wishes, it is a great advantage to be able to have them exactly *when* they want them. If science makes this possible, Democracy will not deny human beings the advantages of science.

Sometimes the birth control advocates argue that birth control information should be given only by advice to the individual after

* Sophia J. Kleegman, M.D., "Medical and Social Aspects of Birth Control," *The Journal-Lancet* (November 15, 1935), pp. 1–6 (Minneapolis, Minn.). By permission.

examining the needs of the case, and that broadcast information is apt to fail because it may not be adapted to the individual. This is a strategic attitude. But the truth is that, if our mores and laws allowed it, a single nation-wide radio broadcast could inform everyone how to use methods of contraception which do not require adaptation to the individual case and which are surpassed in effectiveness and harmlessness by nothing that the clinics have to offer.

PUBLIC OPINION FAVORS LEGALIZED CONTRACEPTION AND YET FAILS TO GET IT. The Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America in 1938 published the statements of nine important Protestant and Jewish religious bodies, holding that birth control is moral.

In a Gallup poll on the question, "Should distribution of information regarding birth control be made legal?" the vote was 70 per cent "yes" in the whole United States.* In Massachusetts in 1940, a similar poll elicited a 64 per cent "yes" vote as regards public clinics; 82 per cent "yes" as regards doctors giving "birth control information in the case of married women for health reasons." Yet the Massachusetts Legislature in 1941 defeated an initiative petition, and the voters in 1942 a popular referendum, for a "medical rights" measure. Campaign placards read: "Vote God's way—No."

As recently as 1935 Representative Pierce of Oregon had introduced a bill exempting the medical profession from the federal ban on shipment of contraceptive material and information. Five times previously in the past eleven years a House committee had held hearings on similar legislation with no result. This time also the House Judiciary Committee pigeon-holed the bill.† Even our political democracy apparently fails to work.

The sociologist is interested in the political process by which a minority is thus able to defeat the will of a well-demonstrated and substantial majority. However, there is no space to analyze this here. From the standpoint of complete Democracy as defined above, which is based on the principle of freedom, *not even a majority* should have the right to deny birth control or any other information to any individual who wants it, unless it is apparent to a reasonable mind that this concerns the interests of the disapproving majority. After all, to use or not to use contraception is an *individual decision.* It does not *need* to be a societal decision as does, for example, the issue of whether we shall drive to the right or the left, or whether we shall have daylight saving time. Majority rule is democratic only with

* *Journal of Contraception*, December 1937, p. 239.

† *Time*, January 29, 1934, and February 18, 1935.

respect to essentially group decisions. In individual decisions which do not concern other individuals through any harmful or coercive consequence, Democracy calls not for majority rule but no rule at all.

But of course, from a realistic point of view, if the people collectively believe any matter to be their business, it is their business, and majority rule must prevail. Only through a slow educational process can it be made otherwise. It should interest us then, to inquire how the people in several Western countries ever came to believe that the sex habits of individuals, especially those practiced within marriage, were the concern of the public. This belief reaches its ludicrous quintessence in the still valid law of Connecticut which penalizes the actual *practice* of birth control by the individual, and which at least one humorist has suggested enforcing by stationing a policeman in every home.

We have already reviewed the history of the contraceptive movement. It appears that the puritan public considered these matters its business because of the general anti-sex-recognition value going under the name of "purity" or anti-"obscenity." But there is a deeper ideological root which goes back through Roman Catholic ideology to early Christianity.

THE BASIC RESISTANCE IS IDEOLOGICAL AND IN A DEMOCRACY WILL GRADUALLY DISSOLVE. Imperial Rome, with all its high degree of civilization, had abortion, infanticide, sex freedom, and divorce, and some, though imperfect, methods of contraception. It is significant to note the ideology by which these culture traits were later suppressed. Two key ideas were prominent in early Christianity: the idea of the immortal *soul* and the idea of *asceticism* as the remedy for wish frustration. The soul ideology held forth an anticipated compensation in the hereafter for the frustrations of this life. It also implied that continuous production of new souls was desirable as glorifying the Deity. Asceticism handled the wishes for sex and wealth, so often frustrated, by substituting for them "sublimated" wishes which are certain of satisfaction because they are satisfied through the individual's own meditations and contemplation. There resulted a certain conflict between the aim of producing new souls and the aim of sublimating sex desire. The conflict was solved by justifying marriage *for the single purpose* of reproduction, and by placing marriage and reproduction under the peculiar supervision of the Deity through the medium of the church.

From the medieval point of view, the unborn child was thus equivalent to the newborn child, and the potential child which might re-

sult from intercourse was almost equivalent to the unborn. For always, a soul or potential soul was involved. Infanticide, abortion, and, later, contraception, all came under the taboo against interference with the divine regulation of the soul. Divorce, polygamy, and sex freedom came under taboo because they implied violations of the ascetic rule of sex for reproduction only.

It is very significant that the taboo on *infanticide* is not behaving under modern influences in the same way that these other taboos are behaving. Infanticide, indeed, would perform the same functions as abortion or contraception. Yet not even the ultra-radical can think of such a solution without horror, although it exists in many primitive cultures and was common in the ancient civilizations until in the Middle Ages Christianity finally suppressed it. Even homosexuality or incest is more acceptable than infanticide. How can this be?

The modern attitude toward infanticide is a phase of the general attitude toward the individual human life. Medieval Christianity, although it had abolished infanticide, gladiatorial combats, slavery, and other cruelties to the human body for the sake of another human's pleasure, did not hesitate to torture the body for the sake of the soul. Modern ideology, on the other hand, regards the individual bodily life as sacred regardless of opinions as to the needs of the soul. It is no longer justifiable to kill a person to save his (or her) soul, or because he (or she) has committed an offense against the soul. Under a fairly recent ideology, for example, it was possible to excuse the father or lover who killed a girl, other means failing, to save her from rape or sexual "dishonor," but this ideology is passing away. At the same time, there are signs of a growing tendency to justify the deliberate facilitation of the death of a hopelessly deformed infant or an incurable invalid.

The Euthanasia Society of America hopes to have introduced into state legislatures a bill permitting an incurable person, with proper safeguards, to request and secure a painless death. Public opinion polls show about half the people in favor. The question has received much attention in Scandinavian countries, and a considerable acceptance of eugenic euthanasia is now reported from Nazi Germany.*

In brief, the ideology arising from modern science makes sacred the healthy, happy individual life. The concept of sacredness or inviolability, once attached to the soul, is now attached to the body. The

* See Ziemer [1942]; and *Merciful Release* (pamphlet), Euthanasia Society of America.

decline of corporal punishment, of the death penalty, and of the crueler types of sport are further evidences of this change.

In reproduction control, the modern value scheme places the taboo of inviolability at the point where true individual life begins. Thus, although contraception ceases to be sinful and abortion becomes somewhat less so, there is no letdown of the infanticide taboo except possibly in the case of incurable defectiveness, and there is an increasing reverence for the bodily life of the individual after he has become an individual. The modern ideology is thus not a reversion from Christianity to Roman paganism, but is something entirely new. Again, Russia's legalization of abortion did not represent a departure from the general drift of Euro-American culture. Russia has shown no tendency to revert to infanticide, foot binding, ear piercing, gladiatorial combats, slavery, or cannibalism.

The greatest resistance to contraception comes from the Roman Catholic Church. That this is beginning to "crack" is suggested by the approval of the rhythm method. It has been charged that the Church is motivated by the desire for large families, for only in that way can it hope to maintain or increase its membership in the face of the tide of social change away from authoritative religion. However, it is as unfair to charge the Catholic leaders with such *conscious* motivation as it is to charge the birth control advocates with commercial motives. There is no question of the sincerity of their belief, and it is shared by the more conservative Protestant elements. It rests upon a pure cultural value, existing independently of any idea of its material consequences or instrumental values. It argues strongly for an ideological interpretation of history as equally valid with the economic or materialistic interpretation. It will stand or fall with the whole ideology of human life of which it is a part.

The defeat of the medical rights referendum will not take away contraception from the Massachusetts people who possess it. It will retard its distribution to the impoverished minority who most need it. Will the Catholic leadership promote family subsidies as vigorously as it strives to withhold knowledge needed for family planning?

C. THE PROBLEM OF POSITIVE EUGENICS

THE BIRTH RATE HAS DECLINED UNTIL IT IS BELOW THE REPLACEMENT FIGURE. Birth control, which only twenty years ago was still advocated as a preventive of eventual overpopulation, has already

achieved that particular result. Although E. M. East in 1923 was still predicting overpopulation in the United States, unless something was done about it, Edward A. Ross and President Theodore Roosevelt in 1905 had already seen the handwriting on the wall and had launched a warning against "race suicide." About 1932 the unseen but true balance of births and deaths in the United States shifted to the negative side and we became what Ross and Roosevelt feared, a non-replacing population. In 1940 the net reproduction ratio was 96.* This statement seems difficult to believe because there still continues to be an actual excess of births over deaths and an increase of population in each census, and this will probably continue until 1980.

The apparent contradiction is due to the fact that an actual increase of population does not always and necessarily mean replacement. The total population is composed of people of all ages, and it is now continuing to increase for the sole reason that people are living to greater age. But unless the average length of life, now 63, increases indefinitely, as is hardly possible, the present birth rate will eventually bring the population to a standstill by 1980 and then into a decline. The median estimate of this maximum population is 154 million. We are in the position of a man who, though still continuing to increase his cash, is imperceptibly sinking into debt. [Lorimer *et al.*, 1940, 9–15.]

That the real replacement of population is below par can now be observed very concretely in the public school statistics. Although the total number of students has been rapidly increasing because of the later age of dropping out of school, the number of children in elementary grades is decreasing. Each year a higher grade is affected by this decrease, as the younger age-crops of children advance through the grades. In many cities the school authorities in planning for new buildings have found their calculations upset.

A study of Mt. Holyoke students showed that they came from families averaging 2.8 children, but their mothers' generation averaged 4.8 children, their grandmothers' 5.5. In 1920 a similar study had given as corresponding figures 3.1, 5.1, and 6.2. [Truex, 1936.]

The actual increase of population, in the absence of immigration and emigration which are now negligible, is of course simply births minus deaths. For several years, up to 1939, the total number of births in the United States was about 2.2 million per year. The crude birth rate (births per 1,000 population per year) in 1940 was 18.0.

* 1940 Census release.

Deaths number about 1.4 million per year, which made a crude death rate of 10.8 per 1,000 per year in 1940.*

The true replacement rate is calculated approximately as follows. First, births are related not to the whole population but to the women of child-bearing age (15–44). Each age group is considered separately with its births. From these data it is calculated to what extent these females, during their whole child-bearing period, will replace themselves by a new generation of females. Obviously they have to produce males also, but if we count only the females in both generations we get the most significant comparison which can be made from the standpoint of continuous reproduction. This ratio of total female births to their mothers during the whole child-bearing period of the mother is called the *gross reproduction ratio.* Second, we estimate from life tables how many of these newborn females will live into their child-bearing period and thus complete the cycle. This somewhat reduced number which represents the future generation of females of child-bearing age is then divided by the present females of that age group, and the resulting ratio is the *net reproduction rate.* This is the rate which really "tells the tale." In Sweden it was 1.41 in the period 1816–1840, thus indicating a substantial increase of 41 per cent of child bearers from one generation to the next; in the period 1901–1910 the rate was still as high as 1.43; then it fell rapidly until it became only 0.86 in the period 1926–1930, thus indicating a failure to replace. In France this rate has been below 1.00 since 1898; in England and Wales and in Germany it fell below unity soon after World War I. In the United States the ratio was above 1.00 until 1930; after that it fell below. In 1935, for white births it was 0.96. [Lotka, 1936, 7; Lorimer *et al.*, 1940, 15.]

Kuchynski has shown that the total populations of most countries in western Europe are now failing to replace themselves, the number of females of 0 to 15 years of age being less than that of females of 15 to 30. On the other hand, most of southern and eastern Europe is still showing a "true" increase of population, which is especially marked in Russia after 1918.

Lotka [1928] found by analyzing 1920 Census figures that out of 100,000 females born in the whole population, 78,207 survive and eventually marry. Out of 100,000 males born, 74,100 survive and marry. For simplicity let us consider for a moment only the females. In order to maintain a stationary population, it is obvious that 100,000 females born today must produce 100,000 female births in the next generation. Since there are 105 male to 100 female births, this means that these present 100,000 female infants must eventually produce 205,000 infants altogether. Since only 78,207 of our female infants will survive and marry, each one who does marry must produce, on the average 205,000 ÷ 78,207 or 2.62 live births. If we figure similarly with the males, we get practically the same result. Two births per

* U. S. Bureau of the Census, preliminary release.

couple are not enough to maintain the population. Among classes where the marriage rate is below average, as among college graduates, even more than 2.62 births per married couple is necessary, but this is partially offset by the greater survival rate of upper class births. Again, since about 17 per cent of marriages are infertile, the necessary average number of births for those who *do* have any children, assuming a normal marriage rate, is $2.62 \div 0.83 = 3.16$. For purposes of comparison, however, let us remember the minimum necessary figure as 2.62 births per marriage (including all marriages).

Net reproduction rates are not available for most countries and periods, and even the simple statistics of births and deaths do not go very far back. For most purposes we have to use crude birth rates and death rates, which give a rough picture. Thompson and Whelpton [1933, 263] estimate that the crude white birth rate of the United States was 55 in 1800. By 1930 it had fallen to 20.

France was the first country in which the nineteenth-century decline of the birth rate became obvious, and from at least the middle to the end of that century it had a lower birth rate than any other country on record. England, Germany, and several smaller western European countries followed in the footsteps of France and now show birth rates as low as or lower than that of France, ranging from about 16 to 19 in 1928.

Crude birth rates of over 50 or 60 are hardly possible. The most prolific populations for which there were any records in the last decade were Russia, Egypt, Chile, and Guatemala, with rates around 45. Japan and India had rates near 35; Italy and Spain 27 to 30. China, which has no reliable records, is said to have a birth rate of 50 or more. [Thompson, 1930, 81.] The declining curve of the birth rate cannot be projected indefinitely into the past or future, but appears to be a phenomenon of the past century, marking a change from a higher to a lower level of birth rates. Thompson and Whelpton estimate a birth rate of 13.5 for 1980. [1933, 263.]

Until recently, population theory held that high birth rates were practically universal before the nineteenth century, and that population was held in check by high death rates in which war, plagues, and starvation played important roles. More recently Carr-Saunders [1922] has shown that infanticide, abortion, and even crude contraception are widely practiced among primitive peoples and were also among historic civilizations. These practices, only the first of which is a factor in the death rate (and that only in infant deaths), could theoretically have kept the growth of population in check without the assumption

of any more war, disease, or starvation than exist in modern times. It is very probable from other evidence, however, that the rate of death from disease and starvation is now less than ever before. It is certain that the turnover of each successive generation of population is now accomplished with less wastage than ever in the past; that is, the birth rate and the death rate are lower and the average length of life longer; a greater proportion of the infants born now live through the full span of life. This high probability of survival for the individual provides a biological basis for individualism and Democracy.

Eugenists and sociologists who favor birth control are well aware of the above facts. Nevertheless they advocate that contraception, now known to probably a majority of the population, be taught also to the remainder. They know that at the same time the birth rate needs to be raised among the more privileged and competent. But in a Democracy they believe this *positive eugenic* aim (increasing the reproduction of desirables) can be achieved more easily if society is not burdened with the excessive multiplication of the underprivileged.

AN IMPORTANT PHASE OF THE PROBLEM IS THE DIFFERENTIAL REPRODUCTION RATE. The death rates as well as the birth rates are higher among the underprivileged, but with modern medicine and public health they are not enough higher to compensate for the birth differential. To what extent this greater net reproduction of the underprivileged existed in past ages we do not know. It is believed that in less advanced societies the biologically unfit are more likely to be eliminated by the harsh conditions of life, so that the reproductive advantage is with the more fit. The underprivileged group in civilized societies is not quite the same thing as the "unfit." However, Notestein [1936, 27] finds evidence that the differential reproduction as between social classes was much less in the United States in 1855 than now, although in the same direction. Lamson [1935] found that in China, as far as his urban samples showed, the differential was reversed and favored the reproduction of the more wealthy. But in most industrial countries today the differential is a large one in favor of the poorer economic classes.

Thompson secured figures from the Census regarding families which had births in the year 1920. The families were classified into occupational groups, and the number of *living* children per family was found to be as in Table 7. The working class thus exceeds the business class in size of family, and the commercial and managerial elements of the business class have larger families than the intellectual elements. A study in England in 1911 showed that dock laborers were

2.3 times as fecund as were physicians, Anglican clergymen, or solicitors. [Cox, 1923, 117.]

TABLE 7

NUMBER OF LIVING CHILDREN IN 1920, OF MOTHERS WHO HAD BIRTHS IN 1920, ACCORDING TO OCCUPATION OF FATHER, U. S. REGISTRATION AREA

Mine foremen, overseers, inspectors	3.9
Mine operatives	3.6
Guards, watchmen, doorkeepers	3.5
Farmers	3.4
Janitors and sextons	3.4
Blacksmiths, forgemen, hammermen	3.2
Carpenters	3.1
Locomotive engineers	3.1
Laborers, not otherwise specified	3.1
Farm laborers	3.0
Laborers, steam and street railroad	3.0
Clergymen	3.0
Hotel keepers and managers	3.0
Mine operators, officials, managers	2.9
Foremen and overseers, manufacturing	2.9
Stationary engineers, cranemen, hoistmen	2.8
Retail dealers	2.8
Barbers, hairdressers, manicurists	2.8
Officials and superintendents, steam and street railroad	2.7
Semi-skilled operatives	2.6
Machinists, millwrights, toolmakers, mechanics	2.3
Managers, superintendents, officials	2.3
Servants	2.3
Chauffeurs	2.2
Lawyers, judges, justices	2.2
Commercial travelers	2.2
Electricians	2.1
Bankers, brokers, money lenders	2.1
Physicians and surgeons	2.1
School teachers	2.1
Clerks (except in stores)	2.1
Technical engineers	1.9
Bookkeepers, cashiers, accountants	1.9
Stenographers and typists	1.8
Soldiers, sailors, marines	1.6
All occupations	2.9

Rearranged from U. S. Bureau of the Census, Census Monograph XI, "Ratio of Children to Women, 1920," by Warren S. Thompson, Government Printing Office, 1931, p. 13. These families are not completed families, but their relative size is significant.

Foreign-born stock, originating largely in European peasantry, makes up much of the rapidly reproducing population of our cities.

The total effective fertility of foreign-born women was about 50 per cent greater than that of native white women for the whole birth registration area of the United States in 1920.* This was due partly to their higher marriage rate and partly to their higher birth rate when married. The standardized death rates of the foreign-born are, however, only 10 per cent greater than those of native whites, so that the foreign-born have a decidedly greater net increase. [Thompson and Whelpton, 1933, 246.]

> The net reproduction rate of United States whites about 1930 was 1.08. It was below 1.00 (meaning, in ultimate effect, a decline in population) in the states of New York, New Jersey, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, Maryland, and the three Pacific coast states. The highest net reproduction rates (about 1.40) were found in Arizona, Arkansas, New Mexico, Utah, and North Dakota. The largest differences, however, are not regional, but lie between large cities, with their rate of .75, and rural farm areas with a rate of 1.70. In every section of the country the counties with the lowest planes of living have the highest reproduction ratios.† [Osborn, 1940.]

It is in the poor farming areas that American birth rates are highest. These areas are responsible for keeping our total replacement as near par as it is.

In 1935 the National Health Survey gave the data in Table 8.

A study by Sydenstricker and Perrot [1934] also showed relief clients to have a birth rate half as high again as non-relief families of below $1,200 income. They also found that families which between 1929 and 1932 fell into poverty from a higher status had higher birth rates than those who maintained their comfortable or moderate status unchanged.

College graduates, as shown in many studies, do not produce enough children to maintain their population stock. In 1916, Phillips [1927] found that the members of the Harvard classes of 1899, 1900, and 1901 had produced 1.55 children per capita, of which 1.45 could be expected to survive (making allowance for deaths). There were 1.93 births per *married* graduate, but the married must produce enough to compensate for those who do not marry.

Rollins [1929] has shown that the birth rate produced by college graduates in New England and the Middle Atlantic States has for a century or more been less than the birth rate produced by the brothers

* Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, *Statistical Bulletin*, March 1931.

† From review in the *Bulletin of Family Research and Education*, II:1 (February, 1941), 13–14.

TABLE 8

NET REPRODUCTION RATES AMONG WHITE URBAN POPULATIONS *

Total population	0.70
Annual family income	
$3,000 or more	0.42
$2,000–$2,999	0.55
$1,500–$1,999	0.63
$1,000–$1,499	0.75
Less than $1,000	0.96
Non-relief	0.79
On relief	1.15
Educational attainment	
College	0.52
High school	0.68
7th or 8th grade	0.86
Less than 7th grade	0.97

* *Source:* Bernard D. Karpinos and Clyde V. Kiser, "The Differential Fertility and Potential Rates of Growth of Various Income and Educational Classes of Urban Populations in the United States." *The Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly* (October, 1939, p. 376). In Frank Lorimer, Ellen Winston, and Louise K. Kiser, *Foundations of American Population Policy,* Harper and Brothers, 1940, p. 26. By permission.

and cousins of these same graduates (most of whom were not college graduates), and that this disparity has increased with time. It appears thus that education tends to reduce the birth rate below that usual even in the family stock from which one springs. Cattell [1917], studying 643 American men of science, found that the families from which they had sprung averaged 4.7 children per family, whereas the scientific men themselves had only 2.3 births per completed family. Willoughby [1930] found the mean number of children among *eugenists* sponsoring a eugenic program was only 2.05, as contrasted with 2.8 for all persons represented in *Who's Who in America.* Robert H. Dann found, among 513 families of Oregon State College students, that the students' own generation had a median of 2.55 children per family, whereas their parents were members of families with a median of 5.04 children. In both generations children dying before the first year were not counted. The families of which the students were members were presumably completed families, since each had at least one child of college age.*

THE DIFFERENTIAL BIRTH RATE IS PROBABLY SOMEWHAT DYSGENIC. The common assumption is that the classes which have the lower birth rates are the ones with the greater biological fitness. Biological fitness

* Unpublished MS., by courtesy.

consists of the absence of inheritable traits which make the individual a poorly functioning animal or a poorly functioning man. *Physical* defects which are inheritable and which cannot be adequately corrected affect a relatively small proportion of the population. Again, persons having such traits in general tend toward earlier death, or non-marriage, or low reproduction. They tend, in other words, to be self-eliminating. By far the most important trait which is not self-eliminating, and which needs deliberate social effort to reduce it, is feeble-mindedness. Of somewhat less importance are certain traits predisposing to insanity, but the degree to which these are really inherited is unknown. When eugenists speak of biological unfitness, race deterioration, and the like, they are talking, for the most part, about *low native intelligence*. Most other mental traits, such as those of personality and character, are not inherited and hence their increase or decrease in society has no relation to birth rates.

The main question, then, is whether the classes with higher rates of increase are relatively low in inborn intelligence.

Within a given social class it seems that high birth rates go with *greater* ability rather than with lesser ability. Thus Phillips [1927] has shown among Harvard graduates, and Huntington among Yale graduates, that the more successful men have larger families. [Huntington and Whitney, 1927, ch. 17.] However, these facts do not erase the difference between the average fertility of *all* college graduates and the average fertility of *all* laborers. They do not erase the fact that the families producing retarded children and mental defectives in Massachusetts have an average of twice as many children as the families which produce college graduates and "gifted" children. [Dayton, 1929.]

Osborn presents a most useful digest of significant research regarding heredity. Some of the strongest evidence for its effectiveness is found in the study of twins. He says:

> Heredity sets limits, in a continuous succession at different levels, to the intellectual development of normal people, even within the great middle group of the distribution. In this very potent manner, heredity is a factor in causing individual differences throughout the entire population. Environment, if leveled off at a standard higher than it is today, would have greater effect than it is now having in influencing the development of intelligence, but heredity would be a more important factor in causing individual differences at this higher level.*

* Frederick Osborn, *Preface to Eugenics*, Harper and Brothers, 1940, pp. 60, 66. By permission of Harper and Brothers.

Osborn believes that there are important differences in hereditary fitness as between individuals and particular family stocks within each class of the population. There are many biologically sound people within every social class who should be encouraged to reproduce at a more rapid rate, whereas others in that class should be discouraged from reproducing. Eugenics, Osborn thinks, is not so much a matter of correcting the differential birth rate between classes as it is of dealing with individuals and enabling them to fix the size of their families according to their own real wishes, tempered with scientific guidance, and not according to chance or ignorance of contraception.

There is not sufficient evidence of heredity's being a cause of intellectual differences between racial and religious groups, in view of the known differences in environment which are sufficient to explain such group differences.

Psychological tests place children of business-class parents significantly higher on the average than those of working-class and farming-class parentage. They place children of native parents significantly higher than those of foreign-born parents except for certain northwestern Europeans and for Jews. On the army mental tests of 1918, educated men and men of the professional occupations scored enormously higher than laborers and farmers. Officers scored much higher than enlisted men; and it is significant that soldiers assigned to "awkward squads" because of their difficulty in obeying drill commands showed test scores substantially below those of enlisted men in general. Their commanders had assigned them to these squads upon purely practical judgment, without knowing their test scores.

Collins' study of 5,000 children, which, says Gardner Murphy [1931, 393], appears to be fairly representative of large-scale investigations of school children, showed a median family intelligence quotient (i.e., all the siblings of a family are averaged and treated as a single case) ranging from 116 for the professional classes to 95 for unskilled labor. Although there was much overlapping among the groups, the professional group yielded practically no defectives; the unskilled group no brilliant children.

YET INTELLIGENCE TESTS ARE INCREASINGLY DOUBTED AS MEASURES OF HEREDITARY QUALITIES. There is a lively controversy over the significance of intelligence tests and the I.Q. Several research workers at the University of Iowa and elsewhere have recently reported marked changes in the I.Q. of children who were placed in foster homes or

whose environment was otherwise improved.* Studies upon Negroes who have lived various lengths of time in the Northern city indicate that the city environment has raised their I.Q. [Klineberg, 1931.]

It is claimed by the environmental theorists that intelligence tests are measures of experience, that is, of the range of environmental stimuli to which a person has been subjected, rather than measures of inborn ability.

One of the most telling arguments against this claim is the fact that the absolute test scores increase rapidly with age until about the fourteenth or sixteenth year, and then fail to increase through all the years of adult life while new experience continues to be gained. Indeed, there seems to be a slight downward tendency in test score after the twenties. An individual whose intelligence score through early childhood rises more slowly than average (i.e., who has an I.Q. below 100), achieves a maximum score (at 14 or 16 years) below the average maximum, and all his experience from 14 to 30 does not enable him to catch up with the average. In other words, intelligence test scores behave very much like biological traits such as stature.

Yet this argument for the fixed biological character of intelligence is not finally convincing, because environment may have a much more powerful influence at early ages than at later. It can be, theoretically, that the intelligence level which we seem to measure by tests is neither a biological property of the individual's brain nor some kind of gross sum of knowledge and experience, but rather a product of mental techniques developed in early childhood, partly by chance, and partly through the peculiar kinds of stimulation given him during his early development. One unpublished study suggests that parents who talk to a child and stimulate his curiosity, mental initiative, and a certain verbal-mental playfulness at early ages may be most effective in raising his intelligence level. It may be that emotional attitudes toward verbal and mental effort may be determining. Statistical studies need to be accompanied by minute observation of the process of parent-child interaction.

THE DIFFERENTIAL BIRTH RATE SHOULD BE REVERSED EVEN FOR SOCIAL REASONS ALONE. But even if we find that there are no important biological differences between the social classes, there are strong social reasons for reversing the differential birth rate. The classes which have few children have the larger houses. They have the re-

* See chapters by H. M. Skeels, B. L. Wellman, and others in *Thirty-Ninth Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education*, Part II, 1940; also G. D. Stoddard, 1939, 1941.

sources to bring up children. These homes could do things for the development of the child's personality which in a poorer environment would have to be done by the school, if at all. They could save children from some of the frustrations which make for delinquency among the underprivileged. What they do for their two (or three) children today they could, at only a moderate increase of cost, do for three (or four).

The program of the American Eugenics Society has in recent years come to stress this social aspect of eugenics. If eugenics means having more children well born, that includes birth not only from biologically sound parents, but also birth in homes that are well fitted to care for them and to develop the kind of personality needed in a democratic society.

PRESENT DIFFERENTIAL BIRTH RATES MAY BE TEMPORARY. There is reason to believe that biological deterioration, if it exists, is only a temporary phenomenon in the history of our society. We review here certain evidence regarding class differentials without passing judgment upon their biological influence. In the cities of northwestern Europe it would appear from several reports that the differential birth rate is growing less and the classes are approaching an equal and low rate. In Stockholm, and in Germany and Holland before 1939, the fertility of the lower classes was but little above that of the higher classes. [Carr-Saunders, 1927; Barnouw, 1932; Edin, 1929.] Edin and Hutchinson [1935] report that in 1919–1922 the fertility of marriages in Stockholm was *positively* correlated with income, and thus the usual differential was reversed. Those of common school or less education had an average of 1.17 children; those of uncompleted secondary education 1.36; those of secondary school examination or higher degree had 1.66. Thompson [1935] criticizes the interpretation by showing that illegitimate children, who are frequent in Sweden, were not counted, and that these would be more common among the uneducated. Yet Thompson's caution fails to reverse the net implication of the Swedish data.

Stouffer [1935] found that white Catholics had higher birth rates than white non-Catholics in Milwaukee in 1919–1920; the Catholics had reduced their rates by 1925–1926 to a much greater extent than the others, and hence the differential became less. White births in New York City from 1933 to 1935 rose from their depression "low" in the higher rent areas, remained constant in the medium, and continued to fall in the low rent areas. [Notestein, 1936, 35.]

There is considerable evidence that educated young people *want* more children than educated young people did fifteen years ago, and than the less educated do now. Stuart Rice [1929], asking University of Pennsylvania undergraduates how many children they *wished* to have, found that they wanted only 1.9 children each, on the average. The women wanted an average of 2.0 children, the men 1.7. Dartmouth men expressed a wish for an average of 2.3. A sample of college and other business-class young women, studied by Blanchard and Manasses [1930, 260], had a median wish for 2.7 children. Twenty-seven per cent of the Pennsylvania men, 24 per cent of the women, and 7 per cent of the Blanchard and Manasses women did not want children.

The "ideal number" of children, as judged by a representative sample of all Maryland youth, was 2. Only 38 per cent of the boys and 38 per cent of the girls idealized 3 or more. [Bell, 1938.] On the other hand, the college students in three Iowa samples in 1929 and 1936 wanted about 3 children each. [Neely, 1940.] Vassar students repeatedly indicate a desire for *3 or more* children by a large majority, although their fiancés in 1932 were about evenly divided between idealizing the two-child family and the three-or-more family. A *Ladies' Home Journal* poll gave 3.3 as the desirable number and the American Institute of Public Opinion found that 31 per cent thought 2 children ideal, 27 per cent 3, and 27 per cent 4, with few votes for larger or small numbers.*

Flanagan's sample of 400 professional men and 300 of their wives indicated 3.2 as the average ideal of family size, although in their first eight years of marriage they had actually had only 1.3 on the average.† Four hundred members of the classes of 1900, 1902, 1912, 1913, and 1921 of Princeton University considered the ideal family to consist of 3.9 children, but they actually had, on the average, 2.4 children. As in the Harvard studies by Phillips, it appeared that the financially more successful men had more children. The average for the $3,000 group was about 2.0 and for the over $20,000 group about 3.00. [Dennison, 1940.]

There is much evidence of increased interest of the more educated girls and also boys in children, and of desire to have children. [Folsom, 1941, 37–39.]

BUT THE PROBLEM STILL REMAINS, HOW TO INCREASE THE REPRODUCTION OF THE MORE FIT MAJORITY. All these data are but straws in

* *New York Times*, April 5, 1941.

† *Birth Control Review*, January, 1939, p. 155.

the wind. They indicate that the attitude toward having children among the more capable is growing definitely more positive, and that there are here and there slight upturns in the actual, previously declining trend of family size. Such changes in values are real and significant, but a democratic population policy will not let them remain in the status of mere hopes and wishes.

Such a policy will study carefully the obstacles which people feel to the realization of their desires. Osborn has said that if every family could be enabled to have the number of offspring it really wants to have, we would automatically achieve a eugenic patterning of the birth rate.

In view of all that has been said, the emphasis needs to be shifted from merely correcting the differentials. Where the differential has been corrected, as in Sweden, the total birth rate is much too low. *We need more birth control among a minority of our population, the minority which is composed of those who are unfitted either by heredity, personality, or hopeless economic factors to raise normal families; and we need planned but numerically greater parenthood among the unhandicapped majority.* Whether this be a majority of 51 or 75 per cent need not be decided at this point.

THE REAL OBSTACLES ARE NOT BIOLOGICAL BUT SOCIAL. The decline of the birth rate was once attributed to a decrease in the physiological power to reproduce, conceived of as some kind of lowered vitality and vaguely associated with the idea of "race decadence." Investigations, however, have proved that the principal factor is the voluntary limitation of the family to 2 or 3 children, and is not an increase in the proportion of utterly childless marriages, although these have increased somewhat. It is estimated that some 17 per cent of American marriages are childless. Hankins [1931 B], who has studied the great bulk of the evidence, concludes that contraception and abortion are probably the chief factors in the decline and that there is no change in actual reproductive power. Indeed, the whole indication of modern biological research is that the germ cells and their production are quite independent of any but the most extreme influences from the general bodily life and its environment; and certainly they are out of the reach of any "mental" effects which civilization may have produced. As Hankins suggests or implies, there are certain possibilities which need to be investigated further. The manner of living and nervous tension of modern society may reduce the frequency of sex intercourse among brain workers and may be responsible for temporary or partial sterility, and for diseases of pregnancy. Yet it is

doubtful that such causes affect a sufficient number of persons to have any appreciable influence on the total birth rate.

An analysis of 100 sterile marriages showed that in 11 per cent the husband was completely sterile and in 30 per cent more the spermatozoa were defective in number, motility, or other qualities necessary to impregnation. [Cary, 1932.] Presumably the other 59 per cent were due to female or unknown causes. In another study of 300 couples with sterility problems, surgical or other treatment cured 21 per cent of the cases involving female causes. [Stein and Levanthal, 1932.]

Modern social changes have made the raising of children more difficult. What are the sources of this increased difficulty? They may be summarized as: (1) the physical and ecological conditions of city life which is gaining upon country life; (2) the increased strain toward higher standards of living; (3) the increased anxiety concerning the health and safety of children and the health of mothers; (4) the decreased opportunity for children to contribute toward their own economic support; (5) the increased demands of the children themselves for economic goods and services; (6) the increasing difficulty of parental control over children.

An unsigned article in *Harper's Magazine* states in a nutshell the economic problem of child rearing in all but the more prosperous layers of the American business class. This statement has been digested as follows:

> In the intellectual and financial middle classes motherhood is a sentence to years of drudgery, confinement, and responsibility. Loss of sleep incident to child care, money worries, lack of servants, confusion and crowding all make motherhood difficult and disappointing when the family income is limited. This condition reacts on the children. The decrease in skill in pursuits followed previous to maternity, the abandonment of activities shared by husband and wife, and the incessant companionship of children substituted for former adult interests make the frustrations of young mothers a problem of equal importance with the much discussed neuroses of thwarted spinsters. If parenthood among these classes is desirable, community effort ought to make it less difficult. Reasonably priced nursery schools, simpler standards of living, and cooperation by mothers in child care are possible means to this end.*

* Social Science Abstracts, 1931: 8160, digest by F. W. Binkley of anonymous article, "This Business of Parenthood." *Harper's Magazine*, 162:173–181 (January, 1931).

Most of Flanagan's 300 couples believed that they could not afford to have as many children as they wanted, even though the median salary of the group was more than $5,000. The high cost of educating children was mentioned as a major deterrent; 92 per cent of the nonsterile were practicing birth control.

When it comes to planning for the future, case studies are often revealing. A salesman said, "No, we can't afford to have any children. Both of us want them. But it's all we can do to pay our own debts You don't sell a car every day."

A correspondent writes:

> Now, to assist in your research work, I will present myself as a guinea pig and submit that I have two sons, two and one-half years between them, 11 and 8½. I myself am 38 years of age, and if I am to have a larger family, must hurry. But we have practiced birth control because I do not want to burden my husband further with responsibility. My sons are sturdy, good-looking and bright, and I brought them into the world with ease, even delight, and I would love to have two more children.
>
> Why is it that our people, our government can assist aliens, but neglects its own families? Why is not a mother entitled to an income? If you can make this a WPA project, "or something," I will gladly give the U. S. some fourth-generation Americans of stalwart ancestry!

After a questionnaire study which obtained data from 400 Princeton alumni, Dennison [1940] makes this report:

The failure of the actual family size to attain the ideal size was accounted for chiefly by four reasons, which in order of frequency were:

1. Limited financial means	57 per cent
2. The physical hazards of childbirth	32 per cent
3. The trials and restrictions of parenthood	24 per cent
4. Inability to have more children	23 per cent

After evaluating the motives in various ways the author concludes that "medical reasons alone probably account for not more than 25 per cent of the discrepancies between the ideal and the achievement."

The positive motives for having children were, in order of frequency:

1. The companionship of young children	82 per cent
2. Perpetuation of the family	66 per cent
3. The creation and development of new life as one of the main interests of living	63 per cent
4. The desire for a real embodiment of the ideal relationship between the parents	59 per cent
5. Companionship in old age	48 per cent

6. Fulfilment of a social obligation	40 per cent
7. The idea of having children accepted as a social convention	35 per cent
8. Birth occurred in spite of some prevention	15 per cent
9. Opposition to artificial prevention of birth	7 per cent *

CLASS-TYPED SOCIAL VALUES AND PERSONALITY PATTERNS MAY BE IMPORTANT. One thing which keeps down the size of families, in the middle classes especially, is "keeping up with the Joneses." The whole pattern of social valuations in our suburban culture is simply not conducive to the raising of families. A considerable percentage of the cost of living in the business class is a cost of *appearance*. In a remote but very real sense, appearances in our culture are the enemy of life itself. The satisfaction of truly personal esthetic tastes is in a different category. Such tastes are among the ultimate goals of life, and each individual is the best judge of his own goals. But every dollar of family expenditure which is dictated by the how-does-it-look-to-the-neighbors ideology means a dollar less for positive personal gratification or for children.

Enid Charles [1934, 202] thinks that in the English upper classes the men are mainly responsible for limiting offspring. The women want to use birth control to *space* children comfortably, the men to get the child-bearing over with as soon as possible; this most commonly means the two-child family. She says:

> The protective attitude of the patriarchal husband to the child-bearing and home-keeping wife is being replaced by a conception of marriage based upon equality of responsibilities and community of interests. The interruption of children into the modern erogamic marriage involves a displacement of the emotional pattern. The woman may gain something. The man more often experiences a loss of emotional and physical intimacy.
>
> Perhaps it would be correct to say that we are approaching a state of affairs when all children will be born either as the result of an accident or through the initiative of the mother with the more or less reluctant consent of the father.†

Although the general character of the pressures which limit population is apparent, these pressures need to be understood in greater detail, and this involves studies of motives and values as they differ

* From review in *Bulletin of Family Research and Education*, II·2 and 3 (April-June, 1911), 19–20.

† Enid Charles, *The Twilight of Parenthood*, W. W. Norton, 1934, p. 202. By permission.

among different classes and groups of the population. Cottrell [1937] suggests a number of clues to marital situations which seem to make for low reproduction. It may be that certain personality types respond much more readily than others to the social pressures which limit reproduction. Many psychoanalysts believe that many more people will enjoy children and have more of them if they are set free from their inner conflicts and neuroses.

McKain and Whetten [1936] find a correlation between size of family and similarity of mates with respect to education, birthplace, religion, age, and national origin. Cottrell [1938] finds that men who were the only child have a less positive, and men who are youngest children, a more positive attitude toward parenthood than men who are not the only child or who are in other birth order positions. Women who are middle children have the most favorable attitude.

It is hoped that additional light upon this problem will be obtained from the results of an extensive "Study of the Social and Psychological Factors Affecting Fertility," conducted by a committee of populationists and psychologists under the chairmanship of Lowell J. Reed. The field work, which included the *interviewing* of about 1,200 married couples after a preliminary canvas of the whole city of Indianapolis in order to select these interviewees, was completed in January, 1942. The study was financed chiefly by the Carnegie Corporation and directed by P. K. Whelpton.*

Such studies, however, will fail of their real social purpose if they are allowed to end in a discussion of why some people are afraid to have more children and some are not. It is to be hoped that they will be used as guidance to large scale social policies. We have preached individual responsibility and it is unlikely that individual psychotherapy or case work will solve the problem. The responsibility lies upon the social order itself, with its economic and family arrangements, and upon those few individuals who have leadership and power to make changes.

POPULATION POLICIES. The policies of Germany, Russia, and Sweden have already been described in Chapter VI. France and Belgium have made much use of family allowances and have passed laws to prevent abortion and to restrict the spread of contraceptive information. Yet some of the most common contraceptive devices are not defined as such because they are also useful for another purpose, that is, the prevention of venereal disease; they thereby escape penalty.

* *Eugenical News*, 27:15–16 (March, 1942).

There is some evidence of higher birth rates in the groups affected by family allowances than in control groups. Yet the total birth rate continues below replacement level. In France in 1938 it was 14.6. Italy, with a higher birth rate, has used various measures of family assistance, bachelor taxes, and vigorous propaganda. Yet the birth rate has continued to fall. [Glass, D. V., 1940.]

Only in Germany has there been an actual rise of birth rate, but the rise has not been great enough to assure population replacement. The German rate in 1938 was 19.7 as compared with 18.4 for 1926–30. The Italian rate in 1938 was 23.6 as compared with 29.7 for 1921–25.*

A Positive Eugenics Program for America. The Population Committee of the National Economic and Social Planning Association has recommended a democratic national population program as follows:

1. *A positive program of economic expansion which will assure greater economic security and equality.*

Educated people must have confidence in their prospects for economic security before they will have children. To achieve this condition, levels of consumption must be increased. Forty million people living at a subsistence level and another forty million who have wants which are far from satisfied can consume a vastly increased amount of goods and services if they have increased purchasing power. To achieve this calls for greater industrial activity and production, with relocation of many industries, plus extensive supplemental activities by the government.

2. *Development of specific measures to moderate the economic handicaps now experienced by families with children, as compared with childless couples or families with only one or two children.*

The Committee does not approve programs, undertaken in various European countries, of cash subsidies which vary directly in proportion to number of dependent children. Such a system provides economic relief and raises consumption levels for families with children where levels of living are lowest, but does little to relieve the economic strain experienced by parents of larger families among the higher-earning industrial and clerical workers and business and professional groups, whose standards are set by their own experience and the expenditure patterns of their associates.

The Committee recommends, instead, subsidies of goods and services essential for family life and child development. Such a benefit program should be similar to that in Sweden which includes proportionate rent allowances for low and medium-rental homes for families with three or more children, public medical services for mothers and children, public nursery school provisions for children, free nutritional lunches for all school children without

* *Health News*, New York State Department of Health, 19:16 (April 20, 1942), 67–68.

regard to income of parents, partial subsidies of purchases of selected foods, with allowances proportional to size of family, maternity leave with pay for employed women. The Committee recognizes that such a program is dependent on the development of broad, financially sound and efficiently administered public enterprises, and emphasizes its belief that such a program may prove essential to the preservation of democracy.

3. *Provision for scientific information under medical auspices concerning appropriate methods of contraception for all potential parents.*

Analysis of birth rates and related data by the Committee indicates that there is small difference in the acceptance of contraceptive practices among various cultural and religious groups which enjoy superior educational advantages and sufficient income to maintain the American standard of living. In the lowest income classes in American cities reproduction is less subject to control, while in rural areas characterized by poverty it remains largely uncontrolled.

In this connection the Committee states: "Along with the trend toward family limitation, there has been technical progress in contraceptive methods, improved information about contraceptive practices, increased accessibility of supplies, and a changing public opinion about their use. In this matter, changes in custom have proceeded much more rapidly than changes in legal regulations. The situation is complicated by the fact that the negative position has powerful sponsorship, whereas the positive position, although generally more popular, has had no effective vehicle of political influence. As a result, the contraceptive services provided by public institutions serving low-income groups have been severely restricted, whereas such services may have been readily available to persons of superior education and larger income." The Committee calls attention to the fact that restriction of information about birth control, instead of preventing the decline in the birth rate, actually increases the disproportionate burden on those who are least able to bear it.

4. *Provision of equality of opportunity, without regard to income, for medical care and educational opportunities.*

The Committee feels that public provision for adequate medical care for mothers and children might well be the first measure in the assumption by the whole community of a larger share in the costs of child bearing and nurture. In educational fields—where public responsibility has already been accepted for elementary and secondary levels, and to an increasing extent in colleges and professional schools—the Committee recommends the extension of such opportunities and the development of maintenance scholarships for students of exceptional ability, the recognition in housing provisions and financial aids of the needs of married students. It recommends increases in the number of teachers per pupil, the extension of vocational training. Complete reliance on local resources for the support of education spells

unequal educational opportunity, according to the Committee, who recommends the transference of a large measure of financial responsibility for the support of schools from local communities to states and from states to the nation. This could be extended without diminishing local authority for direction of education except for maintaining educational standards which are a matter of public interest.

5. *Adjustments to facilitate the combination for women of child-bearing and economic activities outside the home.*

The Committee finds that an adequate population program must include greater opportunities for part-time and periodic employment of potential mothers, with special provisions for maternity leave, and provisions for the part-time care of small children outside the home.*

The most difficult "uphill sledding" for such a policy is at the outset. If and when it gets started it may overcome many obstacles with ease.

Modern men and women, as much as their predecessors, desire children and they have them. The trouble is that with modern contraception, high standards of child care, intense parent-child emotional bonds, and the relative infrequency of children's deaths after the first year, a strong and "normal" parental desire can satisfy itself through having fewer children than racial need requires. A desire for *too few* children is an entirely different thing from a *weak desire* for children. If there is a "parental instinct" (most probably it is a universal subcultural desire), sophisticated man has learned to satisfy it without paying nature her full dividends in the form of adequate reproduction. Educated man has learned to cheat nature in satisfying his *parental* as well as his sex desires! The most desirable parents are discouraged from adequate reproduction by the fact that their financial rewards are not high enough to support the highly specialized, competitive and "standards-ridden" lives which they must lead in order to be successful, and at the same time to permit them to have adequate families.

Thompson questions whether the people who fail to perform their full racial function are, after all, desirable as progenitors:

> It may be true that this failure is due to certain social conditions which these people encounter rather than to any lack of native capacity to make the adaptation, so that it shows unwillingness and perverted education rather than inability. But even if that is the case, it shows that they possess a type of mind rather easily seduced from following the instinctive tendencies calculated to secure survival, and have not yet developed the

* Summary from Frank Lorimer, Ellen Winston, and Louise K. Kiser, *Foundations of American Population Policy*, Harper and Brothers, 1940.

will to make a conscious adaptation which will secure it. In any event, nature says they are not fit in one fundamental respect and decrees their extinction.*

With this the present writer must vigorously disagree. A "type of mind" such as that described is not inheritable; it is an attitude. The human race can neither increase nor decrease this or any other attitude through biological selection. On the other hand, the high intelligence which in general characterizes the class of people described is either inheritable or socially transmissible, and can be made more abundant in society by stimulating the reproduction of these people. Moreover, recalling again our discussion in the last few pages, we have reason to disbelieve that the people referred to are really lacking in any "instinctive tendencies calculated [i.e., by nature] to secure survival." If nature "calculated," then man has "fooled" nature and thereby fallen into a biological error. He may correct the error by "fooling" nature still further by a creative, democratic population policy.

* Warren S. Thompson, "Eugenics as Viewed by a Sociologist," *Publications of American Sociological Society*, 18 60–72 (December, 1923).

Chapter IX

PERSONALITY AND ITS DEVELOPMENT

A. THE PHYSIOLOGY OF PERSONALITY

FREEDOM AND POSITIVE EUGENICS CAN BE RECONCILED ONLY THROUGH HAPPINESS. A democratic population policy must be at the same time a happiness policy. It is a policy which will lead the healthier and more able people to want children and to raise them under such conditions that they in turn will want adequately to replace themselves. During the last century a certain new stage has been reached in the process of evolution. Simon Patten [1896] has called it the transition from a pain economy to a pleasure economy. Lester F. Ward [1903] saw it as a substitution of man's purpose of happiness for nature's purpose of survival. Some thinkers have feared that the human race would die out if it frankly and directly sought happiness. More specifically, there is danger that any people which does mainly pursue happiness will succumb to other peoples which seek group survival and expansion at the expense of individual life and happiness. Good reasons for this fear are to be seen not only in the present war but also in the general failure to replace themselves of those social classes with the higher standards of living and greater individual longevity.

It is too early yet to conclude that the pursuit of happiness and individual development must inevitably mean race suicide. But it is clear that these values must be sought in a different and more effective way. The democratic faith holds that we should not deny but rather reemphasize and revitalize the concept of *happiness through freedom* as our ultimate aim, and that we can find more effective ways of attaining it.

Some thinkers, in effect, compromise this issue by soft-pedaling such words as "happiness" and "pleasure," and emphasize such terms as personal "development," "normality," or "maturity." Maurice Levine [1940] has given us a particularly good definition of "emotional ma-

turity," which is used almost as a slogan by many workers in the field of child development and mental hygiene. Slightly condensed this is:

1. Ability to be guided by the facts of life and long-term values rather than immediate goals and values.
2. A mature conscience, which judges right and wrong in terms of real dangers and possibilities rather than of fears and guilt ideas implanted by controlling adults in one's childhood, and their threats of punishment.
3. A certain balance between independence and aggressiveness on the one hand, and compliance and dependence on the other.
4. The capacity to love someone else, but with an enlightened self-interest.
5. A good sexual adjustment, with acceptance of one's own gender.
6. Healthy defense mechanisms, that is, the ability to accept one's own undesirable impulses and conflicts and to deal with them intelligently, without self-punishment on the one hand or projection of blame to other people on the other.
7. A good work adjustment.*

Yet an analysis of these criteria leads willy-nilly to the concept of happiness. How can we know when a person is "guided" by facts, judges "real dangers," maintains a "balance," has "good" adjustments, has "healthy" defense mechanisms, and "accepts" the universe? The same "fact" may guide two persons to do radically different things according to their aims. The proper "balance" between aggressiveness and compliance would be very different in a commanding general and a Japanese woman. These criteria mean nothing at all, or they mean behaving in such a way as (1) to survive, (2) to be happy oneself, (3) to make others happy, and (4) to make this survival and happiness continuous rather than merely immediate. The physician aims to increase physical health and prolong the lives of individuals; the psychiatrist aims to maximize their happiness where this cannot be done through physical health alone. He is concerned with their "mental" health, which more accurately could be called *emotional health.*

Happiness, like life, is a process, but its variations are only loosely anchored to the variations in life. Of course happiness could not exist without life. But life can go on adequately with very much, or with relatively little, happiness. There is good evidence that excessive and prolonged suffering, apart from any physical cause, may shorten the life of an individual, and continuous happiness prolong it. But these effects concern mainly the duration of life after the reproductive age has passed; hence they are not important to the sur-

* From *Bulletin of Family Research and Education,* 1.2 (April, 1940), 17.

vival of the race. They are, however, tremendously important in terms of human values.

This "emotional maturity" as defined by Levine may be attained on different levels at different ages. Many a person is better adjusted, balanced, and able to accept the conditions of his life, and hence more "mature" in childhood or in his twenties than he is in his forties or fifties when the cares and strains of life may have made him or her into a drunkard, a criminal or a ne'er-do-well, a terrible-tempered Mr. Bangs, a slattern, or a shrew. We see people "go down hill." To say that such a person "never really grew up" begs the question. It implies that surrounding conditions do not vary greatly in their capacity to disturb and that therefore a person's adjustment depends mainly on something within himself. It is possible, by presenting certain confusing series of stimuli, to make even a sheep, a rat, or a pig neurotic. [Maier, 1939.] There are common types of situations in modern social life which may be literally unendurable. Emotional health like gross physical health may go now down and now up until old age is reached. We do not say that continuously good physical health is due to some inner physical maturity. Always it is the net result of many forces.

Likewise, the concept of "growth of personality" is misleading. The only true growth of personality is the biological maturation of the body and nervous system. Learning to walk, the development of sexual function at puberty, and the increase of general intelligence may indeed be regarded as growth. They depend upon actual maturation of tissue. But the great bulk of specific personality changes after the first year or two are learning rather than growth processes. They are determined by environmental situations rather than predetermined from within. Psychology is tending away from the belief in innate stages of personality development, each stage calling for a specific kind of work or play. The theory of recapitulation made famous by G. Stanley Hall, that the individual lives through a series of stages like that through which the race passed in its biological evolution, is no longer taken seriously. The successive changes of interest and activity which seem to characterize the average child are no longer regarded as a series definitely fixed by inner growth. The older psychologists believed that it is normal in adolescence to pass through a period of emotional "storm and stress." Margaret Mead, studying Samoan childhood, found that such storm and stress as exists there is rather during pre-adolescence when children are responsible for their

baby brothers and sisters, and at the same time denied the freedom and privileges of adolescents. After adolescence begins there is greater emotional satisfaction, better adjustment. Miss Mead concludes that the Euro-American adolescent period of conflict is a cultural and not a biological phenomenon. It is due to the conflicting stimuli with which our culture surrounds the individual at that period of his life. [1928.]

To be sure, there are sequences of behavior change which are more or less uniform throughout the mass of individuals in a given culture, and others which are more or less uniform throughout mankind. Practically every child learns his name before he knows right from left, can count to thirteen before he can repeat six digits backward, can make mud pies before he can drive a nail, enjoys Wild West movies before he enjoys a psychological problem play, and so on. But these sequences exist either: (1) because it takes more time to learn some acts than others, (2) because some activities require greater general brain development than others, or (3) because culture assigns certain activities to certain ages.

HAPPINESS, OR EMOTIONAL HEALTH, IS BIOLOGICAL, CONCRETE, AND DEFINITE. We do not need to analyze social relations nor social values in order to arrive at the concept of happiness. Indeed these things may produce happiness (or unhappiness), but they are not identical with it. Some writers say that happiness is a "vague" or "subjective" concept and hence not scientific. On the contrary, it is much more concrete and definable than are the various social patterns and values in which it is said to be implicit. For example, "justice" is a generalized social pattern which is also a high value in our culture and is said to be more or less necessary to maintain happiness. Yet justice cannot be directly and simply observed, but happiness can be. It cannot be defined or measured as readily as happiness can. Perhaps one reason for stressing justice rather than happiness is that it is relatively general and stable and is commonly recorded, while happiness comes and goes in quick time and is completely individualized. Its statistical unit might be the person-minute. The real difficulty with the happiness concept is that of measuring it in an aggregate of persons over a period of time, and not that of defining it or recognizing it when observed. But shall we allow statistical difficulties to determine our judgment as to what is important?

If this writer had his way, no social scientist or philosopher would get his degree and no psychiatrist, psychoanalyst, or teacher would be

allowed to practice, without a careful reading of Frederick Lund's *Emotions* or the equivalent.*

Happiness is not essentially "emotional stability" or "emotional adjustment"; it means the operation of certain kinds of emotions and the quiescence of others. In order to understand this, it is necessary to pay some attention to the structure and fundamental *modus vivendi* of the animal body.

The Physiological Mechanism of Emotions. The *organism* might be said to be a machine which operates in such a way as to perpetuate itself as long as possible and to reproduce its kind. It is built not to perform some specific kind of work, as is the true machine, but to satisfy its own needs. In other words, it *lives.* The plant organism lives because it is attached to the sources of its supplies; it has little or no defense against enemies but its kind survives through the huge surplus of numbers. The life of an animal, however, includes an additional process, which we may call *neurally mediated* behavior or, in the broadest sense, "mind." [Folsom, 1931, 18.] This *psychological* process which distinguishes animals from plants requires a specialized structure known as the *nervous system.* Needs make themselves "felt" by acting as *stimuli* upon sense organs (receptors) specifically sensitive to them. These stimuli are converted into *neural impulses* which travel over numerous complex pathways through the nervous system to the *effectors* (muscles and glands), which then react in such ways as to satisfy the animal's needs. Through this neural-behavioral process an animal is able: (1) to find food which is available only at specific places, or is itself on the move (in the form of prey), instead of being dependent upon food materials widely distributed through the soil and air; (2) to live a mobile life rather than remain attached to a fixed environment (although some animals are attached); (3) to avoid or combat enemies and hence to maintain survival of the species with a lower rate of reproduction.

The total behavior system of the animal may be analyzed into three divisions. First there is the *appetitive* system which responds to needs arising within the organism and its life process. Various chemical and mechanical conditions within, or in contact with, the body serve as the activating stimuli. These conditions are known as *drives* or *tensions.* Thus it has been shown that the composition of the blood or the presence of certain hormones in it will arouse hunger or sexual excitement. [Carlson, 1916; Stone, 1923; Thorek, 1924.] Appetitive behavior includes feeding, digestion, elimination,

* He should also understand and use the more "psychological," "meaningful," integrational concepts of the psychoanalytic, mental hygiene schools, and under present intellectual fashions he can hardly escape these. But he will be less likely to go astray if this thinking is integrated with an understanding of basic physiological realities, which cannot be dismissed by calling them by the unpopular name "behaviorism."

sexual excitation, resting, basking in warmth. It operates through the *parasympathetic* branch of the autonomic nervous system (as a necessary portion of the total pathway). [Lund, 1939, 39.] The inner experiences are generally pleasurable. They include feelings connected with hunger and its satisfaction, excretion, voluptuous relaxation, and sex.

Second is the *defensive* system which responds to outward menaces, or satisfies emergency needs arising in the environment. It includes various patterns of withdrawing, rejecting, struggling, and escaping movements, with visceral reactions designed to lend all possible power to these movements. Defensive behavior operates through the sympathetic * branch of the autonomic nervous system. In general the inner experiences are unpleasant. They include the feelings of pain, anger, fear, and disgust.

The third division of total behavior may be called *exploratory-instrumental* because it has these two characteristics. First, it consists of a great volume of movements which occur in the absence of any appetitive or defensive need, whose biological function is to explore the environment, to gain skill and control. These movements in earliest infancy are *random;* gradually they come under control and become skilled, purposeful movements. Second, this division of behavior is brought into the service of the appetitive and defensive divisions through the learning process. Exploratory-instrumental behavior may operate through the cerebro-spinal nervous system alone without either branch of the autonomic, but it becomes specialized into various patterns of behavior, some of which are linked to appetitive and others to defensive patterns. In this category belong the numerous and complicated movements of locomotion, manipulation, vocalization, and *attention* (i.e., moving body or sense organs so as to get best reception of stimuli). Exploratory-instrumental behavior is especially vigorous when the animal is well fed and rested, when it is hungry or has sexual craving and has not yet located the means of satisfaction, and when defensive behavior (such as anger) has been aroused but the particular source of danger is not clear. Under these conditions the animal is said to be "active," or "restless." The particular form of behavior which takes place depends upon the circumstances and the animal's past experience and developed skills. Exploratory-

* The parasympathetic branch produces slow, regular heart action and respiration, low blood pressure, active digestion and salivary secretion, constriction of the iris, readiness to sexual stimulation and to smiling or laughter. These conditions, in other words, *tend more or less to go together.* On the other hand, the sympathetic branch produces rapid heart action, disturbed and increased respiration, high blood pressure, "stalled" digestion and dry mouth (due to inhibited salivary secretion), dilation of the iris, undue perspiration, inhibition of all sexual behavior with temporary impotence in the male, and a tense rather than a smiling face. An especially significant feature of this sympathetic syndrome of behavior is the secretion of adrenalin, which stimulates heart action, liberates sugar into the blood from the liver, temporarily overcomes fatigue, and thus provides the body with extra energy to meet external emergencies. [Allport, F. H., 1924.]

instrumental behavior is pleasant when it operates freely and attains its goals; it often brings unpleasantness when it is blocked or frustrated. Through frustration it may change into defensive behavior, as when the movements designed to hit a golf ball give place, after failure, to the breaking of the golf club and of the Third Commandment.

When an appetitive need or drive is satisfied, or even when it makes a very slow progress toward final satisfaction, something happens in the body which we call *pleasure*. This may consist of certain glandular reactions, or excitation in a certain part of the brain, or it may be merely the general set toward repetition, continuation, or development of the existing stimuli. In any case, pleasure, in the last analysis and in the broadest sense, is the "substance of all things hoped for." Normally it accompanies the physiological processes which are "good" for the life and growth of the individual and the race. But pleasure comes not only from successful appetitive behavior, but also from spontaneous exploratory-instrumental behavior. There is a pleasure in sheer activity, in using all of one's muscles and organs within the fatigue limit. There is also a pleasure in attaining a goal, whether required by basic needs or developed in the process of playful, spontaneous activity.

On the other hand, *unpleasantness* or *suffering* occurs when an appetitive need goes for considerable time unsatisfied, and when some emergency needs fail to get immediate satisfaction. These unpleasant conditions are the essence of all "evil." If continued long they do harm to the body and personality, yet they are necessary because they prompt the individual to change the situation which is causing the suffering. Unpleasantness or suffering involves: (*a*) local pains and discomforts; (*b*) general bodily disturbances or unpleasant *emotions*. The latter are of four main types: (1) fear or anxiety; (2) anger, irritation, or annoyance; (3) anguish, grief, depression, or, in mild form, "boredom"; (4) disgust or repulsion (derived from nausea). When these unpleasant emotions occur without any local bodily pain or disorder, but rather as conditioned reactions to ideas or external situations, we speak of them as *mental suffering*.

Emotions are behavior processes in which the *visceral* reactions (as distinguished from the somatic) predominate, accompanied by feelings of pleasantness or unpleasantness. The viscera are the internal organs and their smooth muscles, and the glands. They are stimulated through the autonomic system (in its two branches) and are under little if any voluntary control. The soma consists of the bones, skin, and striped muscles, which are under voluntary control through the cerebro-spinal nervous system without the autonomic.

Lund [1939, 14] adds that only when these visceral reactions are aroused centrally are they called emotions. Thus he would probably say that sexual excitement aroused by local stimuli would not be an emotion, but that love, which is aroused by a total situation or idea, and may include the sexual feeling, is an emotion. By making this limitation, Lund finds it difficult to

enumerate any specific pleasant emotions except "pleasure" itself, in various degrees, whereas he is able to enumerate fear, anger, and pain as separate kinds of unpleasant emotion. However, there are many locally aroused feelings which are related to pleasant emotions such as those of hunger and feeding, elimination, and sex. This author prefers to speak of "feelings and emotions" together without making the above distinction.

The nervous structure is such that the unpleasant emotions must have the right-of-way whenever they are adequately aroused. Pleasure can be had only when there are no stimuli present arousing the unpleasant emotions. But unpleasant emotions or suffering can be aroused at any time if the appropriate stimuli come upon the scene, even though the stimuli to pleasure are also present. Thus the appearance of a threatening intruder or receipt of bad news will quickly put a stop to digestion, even while the waiter is bringing in the sizzling platter, whereas no amount of good food will calm fear and restore appetite as long as the threatening situation continues or the bad news remains in the focus of attention. Of course there are limits to this principle, since one can become gradually habituated to some stimuli which produce unpleasant emotions. Although anger, fear, and pain always win at first against hunger or sex, yet an imperious hunger or a long-continued sexual need may eventually overcome a moderate fear. In addition to pleasant and unpleasant emotions, Lund distinguishes a class of *profound emotions* and one of *esthetic emotions*. [1939, 45–51.] The profound emotions are not definitely related to one or the other divisions of the autonomic, and they may involve the operation of both of these divisions (normally antagonistic) simultaneously or in rapid alternation. They include many of the feelings such as "love" and the "emotional stirring" which comes from music or dramatic events. Sexual excitation is parasympathetic, while orgasm is sympathetic in its innervation. Love often stimulates salivary secretion, which is parasympathetic, and also trembling and goose-flesh, which are sympathetic. Weeping is parasympathetic but is most readily aroused when it follows immediately upon sympathetic reactions. True depression and suffering are tearless; weeping is a phenomenon of transition from suffering to happiness.

The esthetic emotions are vague and undifferentiated and cannot be identified with the operation of any one autonomic pathway. They are mild, pleasant, and unpleasant feelings which are stimulated by visual and auditory sensations through their own qualities and sequences. Lund suggests that the main principle of satisfaction here may be the arousal of certain expectations followed by their satisfaction, as with melodies, evenly spaced columns, and so on. We have already noted that exploratory-instrumental behavior develops satisfactions and, through frustration, unpleasant reactions.

Cutting across all these processes, we observe certain general principles of timing. The defensive behavior system clamors for some quick change of stimuli and as long as this is not forthcoming there is intense unpleasant feeling or suffering with tendencies toward increasing vigorous reactions of

some sort or another. If the change of situation comes suddenly we have a "sense of relief." If the previous suffering was very intense and the change very sudden, "relief" may become "triumph" or "exultation." Intense pleasure may thus come from the sudden relief of intense suffering without other cause. Intense pleasure may also come from the sudden or thoroughgoing realization of any purpose which was pursued, without suffering, but with considerable "tension" or "drive." Appetitive behavior does not clamor for immediate relief and is not unpleasant as long as there is some progress toward its goal. Therefore it may involve prolonged mild pleasure.

On the other hand, suffering or the unpleasant emotions may be aroused whenever there is a blocking, a frustration, a change of situation opposite to the direction of one's aim or purpose, regardless of the behavior system in which the activity began.

We have thus considered in some detail a set of physiological processes in human bodies which we call "emotional" or "feeling" processes. These are only a part of the total process of living, and mere life can go on under great extremes of emotional condition. But it is these processes which give meaning and purpose and values to life and which, *with intelligence as an instrument,* make possible a life on this earth which is something more than mere survival, and which on occasion may also be such as to make individuals voluntarily end their lives. The only kind of "balance" in the emotional realm that any individual ever seeks or wants is a maximization of the processes we call pleasure or satisfaction and a minimization of frustration and suffering. This aim may be realized in part by permitting short periods of mild unpleasantness for the sake of the more intense "relief" pleasure which follows. The total excess of pleasure over suffering, measured in units of time and intensity, is the degree of happiness. A liberal, democratic society will have no purpose or value which does not facilitate what its individual members are thus striving to realize in their separate bodies and emotional processes.

EMOTIONS AND LEARNING. We have seen that personality develops by a process of learning and not, as does the body, by the unfolding of a predetermined pattern. Only the most general behavior patterns for satisfying needs are inborn; the specific methods are learned by trial and error. Whatever satisfies or relieves a drive is called the *goal* of the drive. The animal, first experiencing a drive, does not know what the goal is; he keeps on trying different movements until satisfaction comes by accident. The object which satisfies the need makes an impression on the brain; it is "remembered" and more quickly found on the next occasion. Likewise the emotions, which are com-

monly associated with drives and needs, acquire all but the simplest and most rudimentary of their provoking stimuli through learning.

The developing person's pleasant emotions tend to become *canalized* to or *fixated* upon those objects and stimuli which produce the greatest satisfactions. Whether a child learns to enjoy chop suey or scrambled eggs, classical music or martial airs, is partly a matter of chance. At any given moment he is played upon by many stimuli from his environment. Some of these are biologically adequate (i.e., linked by inborn connections to definite reactions); some are stimuli which have been conditioned by past experience to various intensities of pleasant or unpleasant feeling; some are emotionally neutral or indifferent stimuli. Many of these neutral stimuli, as time goes on, will tend to become conditioned either to the pleasant or unpleasant emotional systems. It is therefore important to emotional health that unfamiliar or other neutral stimuli, unless they are biologically harmful or related to anti-social behavior, be introduced when the situation is pleasant. Since many of the situations in which we learn cannot be controlled, it is inevitable that a person will be unpleasantly conditioned to many things which are harmless, and which in fact would be beneficial if it were not for the unpleasant psychological link; spinach and budgeting are examples. Emotional health is favored by a flexible and yet guided environment which makes it easy to change situations frequently so as to *recondition* these disliked objects by placing them in other and strongly pleasant contexts. But, again, there are many situations in life, such as filthy housing and prolonged, monotonous labor, which are biologically harmful or inevitably disagreeable; here emotional health can be aided only by environmental changes and social reforms.

Healthy personality development thus requires two things of society: first, individualized guidance (not coercion) and education; and second, policies of directed social change based not upon preconceived theories of "the good society" but upon the study of the common feelings and needs of categories of individuals and of all mankind. *A truly democratic educational or social policy requires more careful observation of human emotions and more respect for them. This does not mean that pain and suffering can be entirely eliminated or that they cannot be constructively used.* They are constructive only when limited, within any one person, in their intensity and frequency. Individuals differ greatly in their emotional sensitiveness. The "hard-boiled," "emotions-don't-matter" policy, which some societies and persons want to reintroduce in their impatience with certain alleged ex-

cesses of individualism, might result in a new domination of our emotional pachyderms over our more sensitive souls.

All *learned* connections or linkages (conditioned responses, etc.) may be termed "habits." But the word "habit" carries a tradition which is misleading. It tends to imply that *repetition* is the main principle of learning and personality formation. It is true that practice makes perfect, but it does not always make enthusiasm for the thing practiced. Great masses of laboriously acquired habits, such as piano playing or a foreign language, may be neglected and unused for years because it is no longer satisfying to use them. One of the major contributions of psychoanalysis is that it gives this principle of satisfaction, as distinguished from the principle of mere repetition, its due importance by showing how it controls the major trends and decisions of the individual's life.

Learning always involves some pleasure and some pain, but it can be planned so as to make the one or the other predominant. The satisfaction which operates in learning may consist in only occasional relief of long-continued tensions and unpleasant feelings, or it may be more prolonged and may permeate the learning process, accompanied by relatively little tension or unpleasantness. A democratic society is interested in fostering the latter type of education. It will make learning as pleasant as possible. Some people confuse this issue by talking of the dangers of "soft pedagogy" and the need for effort. Effort is not the same thing as unpleasantness, as any athlete or any enthusiastic worker knows. If the goal is accepted by the student as his own, he can enjoy putting forth a great deal of effort in the process. On the other hand, many a person brought up in our traditional schools has learned to submit in docile fashion to requirements quite remote from any felt needs or purposes of his own, and has known little, if any, of the joy and spontaneity which are possible in mental work. As an adult in the community or on the school board he is a constant menace to the creative efforts of the modern educator.

B. THE ANALYSIS OF PERSONALITY

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN PERSONS MAY BE CONSTITUTIONAL OR DIRECTIONAL. The former are partly, the latter wholly, the results of learning. Obviously this process of personality development produces very different types of persons. Let us now look at the ways in which personalities differ. This, for the moment, will be a static, cross-sectional view of a varied sample of persons as they actually are at

any one time. There are many ways of classifying persons into types, and there are hundreds and thousands of alleged "traits" or characteristics. Psychologists have had a jolly time for years trying to measure and correlate these traits. But let us take an overview of the whole field of traits.

Only by a figure of speech can it be said that a trait is something a person "has in him." It is rather a characteristic of his behavior, which is process, movement. We can say that a motor runs smoothly or noisily, but "smoothness" and "noise" are not things inside the motor. Noise is a simple characteristic of the motor's functioning, but it may be due to a great many different and complex conditions in the structure. By the same token, a person's behavior may be said to be aggressive, and this aggressiveness may be measured on a scale, but it may be due to a great many different causes in his personality and bodily structure.

As we survey the vehicles traveling at any one moment on the highways, we may classify them according to: (1) starting points, (2) destinations, and (3) character of motion (speed, regularity, noise, and so on). Analogously, behavior can be described (1) in terms of the aversions or negative objects and situations which the person is trying to get away from or to eliminate; (2) in terms of the goals, purposes, or positive objects which he is trying to approach, possess, or create; (3) in terms of qualities, such as style, form, method, and speed, which are independent of the direction of the behavior. The first two criteria may be called directional or motivational; the third includes constitutional traits and also certain habits.

There are some characteristics whose surface appearance fails to tell whether they are directional or constitutional. Thus a person may show a certain quickness or impulsiveness in everything he does. This may be indeed a true constitutional trait which characterizes all his behavior regardless of what he is trying to do. In such a case it is probably due to his bodily set-up, is based upon inborn or grown characteristics of his glands and muscles and nerves. But on the other hand, there are persons who have made an object or value of speed and efficiency. They cultivate certain kinds of quick movement, but when at leisure or "off their guard" may actually be slow and dilatory. In such cases quickness is part of their goals or purposes; it is a directional trait.

Psychoanalysis goes beyond orthodox psychology in making motives out of apparently constitutional qualities. It reveals that many traits of many persons, such as tics, stammering, fatigue, poor memory,

absent-mindedness, which appear to be constitutional, are unconsciously motivated. They may be obstacles to the person's apparent purposes, but they save him from some hidden suffering. We carry around with us many constant, sometimes hidden, purposes and values while we are giving temporary service to a more obvious goal.

For example, two men are trying to catch a train to the city. Even though both are under the same conditions and the same need, A. appears perfectly calm while B. pushes, plunges, fidgets, scolds the driver and the traffic. Shall we say that A. possesses self-control and that B. lacks it, or that A. is constitutionally serene and B. nervous and excitable? These verbalizations are of course appropriate but they are apt to be overgeneralized. Perhaps it is more understanding to say that A. has the constant purpose of maintaining his dignity and the neatness of his clothing as well as the immediate purpose of catching the train, whereas B. has only the purpose of catching the train. Or perhaps B. has an additional, partly unconscious need of venting pent-up anger and hostility, and this situation provides him with an excuse and opportunity. At another time and place these differences between A. and B. might not appear; they might even be reversed. A. might even make a better football player.

The directional traits of personality include many of these values which we carry about with us constantly, as well as our temporary purposes. The former, indeed, bulk larger in importance.

CONSTITUTIONAL TRAITS. Even when all the constant and hidden motives are laid bare, there remain certain characteristics of every person which are truly *constitutional.* These include: *first,* capacities and, *second,* temperament.

Capacities refer to levels or degrees of performance which a person reaches at his best rather than to his average behavior. Hence they are commonly ascertained by test situations. They include general intelligence, some special intellectual abilities such as verbal, mechanical, and social intelligence, and neuro-muscular traits such as reaction time, muscular coordination, endurance. These merge with physical abilities, such as strength, which depend mainly on the size and attachment of muscles.

Temperament was classified by the ancients into four types: choleric (irascible), sanguine (hopeful), melancholic (sad), and phlegmatic (apathetic). It supposedly relates to the intensity or quickness of arousal of emotions in general, to their range of stimuli, or to the general predominance of pleasant, unpleasant, profound, or esthetic types of emotion. [Allport, G. H., 1937, 64–65.] Any truly *general* characteristic of a person's muscular movements or mental activity as well as of his

emotions is also placed under temperament, such as quickness, impulsiveness, persistence. [See Downey, 1923.] Temperamental traits are related to body chemistry: excessive thyroid secretion produces overactivity, sleeplessness, and tremors; lack of calcium is said to produce irritability and, in extreme cases, tetanus. The clearest way to differentiate temperament theoretically from other kinds of traits is to think of the way alcohol affects behavior. These effects vary with different persons and under different conditions, but in any case they permeate the entire behavior of the person at the moment. Alcohol reduces the conflict between motives and allows whatever motive is dominant to enjoy within limits a certain freedom and spontaneity, at the same time dulling the intellectual processes. Strong tea produces quicker, keener, intellectual activity; opium intensifies imagination and daydreaming. Fatigue also behaves like a temperamental trait. In general we may say that temperament consists of those characteristics of behavior which are of the generalized, qualitative type such as are produced by a drug, a nutritive or endocrine deficiency, or other chemical alteration in the body and its blood stream. Temperament is carried through the blood rather than through the nervous system. When such traits are only temporary we speak of them as "influences," "intoxications," and so on; when more or less continuous, as temperament.

The word "temperament" has been used also to refer to (*a*) frustration reactions [Humm and Wadsworth, 1934] and (*b*) certain culturally imposed traits [Mead, M., 1935], but the present author prefers to adhere to the narrower definition given above. When we say that capacities and temperament are constitutional, we do not mean they are necessarily inborn. They are governed partly by inborn factors, but they depend also upon nutrition, growth, illnesses, and injuries, and the whole physiological history of the individual.

DIRECTIONAL TRAITS. A *third* type of trait is the *motives,* variously called wishes, purposes, desires, goals, objects, objectives, urges, aversions, interests, tastes, likes, dislikes, attitudes, and values. These, by analogy, are the *directions* in which a person is behaving. They may be always described both negatively (what is he escaping?) and positively (what is he seeking?). If a child wishes and approaches a toy, he is also trying to escape the boredom of a toyless situation. If he is afraid of a dog, he is also desiring the safety of a dogless situation.

Motives are always built up by *learning.* They begin with inborn reflexes but these reflexes begin to be conditioned or canalized at birth and *in their original form* they constitute a very small and insignifi-

cant part of a person's behavior. Motives involve specific stimuli and reactions connected by the nervous system, and are not carried through the blood stream or determined by other chemical influences.

MOTIVES CAN BE GENERALIZED INTO A FEW CATEGORIES COMMON TO EVERYONE. W. I. Thomas [1923] has said that there are four great type-wishes: security, new experience, recognition, and response. The various lists of "instincts" which psychologists and sociologists have set forth are mainly lists of generalized motives. Spranger [1928], emphasizing the differences between persons, classifies values as theoretic, economic, political, esthetic, social, and religious, but each of these is present in *some degree* in every person. The following classification of motives was worked out by the author after considering many other schemes and the subtle discriminations which they imply but do not always clearly express. It is in terms of positive goals rather than avoidances.

A. SENSUAL MOTIVES (emphasis on sensations).
   1. Desire for physical *comfort,* rest, ease, freedom from effort.
   2. Urge toward muscular effort, enjoyment of *physical activity* for its own sake.
   3. Desire for and enjoyment of food and *taste.*
   4. *Sex* urge: craving for genital excitation and orgasm.
   5. *Esthetic* desires: enjoyment of sights, sounds, odors, and "feels" (touch) for their immediate sensory qualities.

B. ACHIEVEMENT OR STATUS MOTIVES (emphasis on results or relationships).
   6. *Collecting-possessing* motive: desire to accumulate objects or experiences in given categories, to possess or record them with a feeling for the particular and concrete.
   7. *Economic* or practical motive: desire to control things, money, or services in an impersonal way, without sentiment for particular things or special enjoyment of process; desire for efficiency and avoidance of waste.
   8. Political or *power* motive: desire to control people and their behavior.
   9. *Excellence* or competitive motive: desire to equal or excel persons or standards in some respect, to achieve status or superiority; rivalry.
   10. *Reverential* or masochistic motive: desire for sense of absorption into someone or something outside oneself.

C. ACTIVITY MOTIVES (emphasis on process and participation by self).
   11. *Curiosity:* desire to see, explore, study, know, learn, predict, compare, classify, understand, without possession or control.
   12. *Constructive* urge or workmanship: desire to manipulate constructively, to design, invent, create, enjoying the process as well as the result.

13. *Destructive* urge: desire to take apart, or destroy, persons, things, plans, ideas.
14. *Sociability:* desire for and enjoyment of company of persons, gaiety, conversation, friendship.
15. *Affection:* desire for love, intimacy, contact, mutual understanding and sharing with one or few persons; also tender feelings toward things, animals, or places; nostalgic sentiments; rapturous or romantic love.

D. Generalized Instrumental Motives.

16. Desire for *security:* for guarantee of certain tools and minimum standards of satisfaction and for protection against dangers. Largely based upon fear or anxiety.
17. Desire for *freedom:* for absence of restraints upon one's own action imposed by other human beings—usually implies desires for satisfactions beyond the security minima—partly based upon anger.

All of above type-motives operate in everyone. Each person may be characterized by the relative prominence of some of them. The Allport-Vernon [1931] test of the Spranger values attempts to measure the relative strength of motives roughly corresponding to numbers 5, 7, 8, 10, 11, and 14–15 in the above scheme. But the more promising use of these concepts is as a guide and framework for the description and comparison of personalities. It might be difficult to measure the total strength of the curiosity motive in A. and in B., but it is much easier and more meaningful to ascertain what specific objects are linked to this motive in A. and what in B. Also the same object, let us say a certain piece of music, may be linked to the esthetic motive in A., the curiosity motive in B., the reverential motive in C. In other words, A. enjoys the music for its sheer sensory appeal to his ear; B., a trained musician, intellectually; C. gets from it a religious thrill.

We can also use these seventeen concepts as a guide for following the development of a child's personality. Instead of following the child's changing reaction to food, dogs, and music, we may try to follow the changing situations which satisfy the child's curiosity, esthetic desire, and sociability desire. Either of these methods has a certain artificiality, but unless we organize our observations according to some conceptual framework, we are apt to become lost in a mass of details.

Psychoanalysis has written the life history of the sex urge and there has been some genetic description of the collecting and curiosity mo-

tives. However, there is room for much more systematic study by this method.

The development of personality may be conceived as the gradual acquisition, by each of these motives, of new and more specialized objects. The process, of course, is learning, in the form of conditioning or of canalization. In part this development is free and fortuitous. In part it is guided by the suggestions of elders and their manipulation of the child's environment. In part it involves frustration and forced reconditioning of motives.

C. FRUSTRATION AND PERSONALITY CHANGE

WHEN WISHES ARE FRUSTRATED, THE PERSONALITY IN SOME RESPECTS HAS TO CHANGE IN ORDER TO REDUCE SUFFERING. Personality development is not always free and unrestrained. There is conflict within the personality; one wish interferes with another. There is frustration of the wishes by outside obstacles. The path of "normal" development is blocked, and some wish is forced by frustration into some other channel. Psychoanalysis gives the name *dynamisms* to these reconditionings which take place as a result of frustration.

Free changes are analogous to the ways in which the branches of a growing tree develop when there is plenty of room and no interference. Dynamisms are like the growth of this same tree when it is closely hedged about and shaded by other trees, or when one branch interferes with another, or when one branch is cut off by an outside agency and its growth energy thereby transferred to other branches. This analogy, however, must not be pursued into detail, for personality change is not a growth process.

Healy, Bronner, and Bowers [1930, 200] have listed seventeen dynamisms: displacement, transference, condensation, unconscious fantasy, repression, reaction-formation, projection, isolation, undoing, conversion, introspection, identification, sublimation, rationalization, idealization, and dream work. To these might be added regression, which the Freudians conceive mainly as a characteristic of the free, unconstrained activity of the libido; and compensation, which is an Adlerian rather than Freudian concept.

> Dynamisms are various unconscious devices for the mastering of inner stimuli, that is, for eliminating or reducing tension. They are processes conceived as existing as a result of the activity of the pleasure and reality principles. Freud speaks of them as making paths which will ultimately

put an end to or avoid "pain." Dynamisms are used by both normal individuals and neurotics, only the degree to which they are employed characterizing the two groups.*

The frustrating situations which are most important are not external things like mice and mosquitoes, traffic signals, and falling downstairs. They are the internal, symbolic stimuli from which we cannot get away. They are our own ideas: humiliating memories, mental reminders of our own weaknesses, follies, and failures, gloomy forebodings, the knowledge of what might have been but now can never be. The only way we can get away from these stimuli is by some *internal* readjustment. We cannot deliberately forget. But by chance occurs some course of thinking, some attitude, or some overt muscular reaction which does bring relief. The nervous system tends to perpetuate that happy technique. Do you ever have the feeling that there is some unpleasant idea in your mind but that you cannot remember what it is? When in such a state you may be in the process of repression or dissociation.

Frustration may result from conflict between two wishes which cannot both be satisfied, or from the blocking of one wish by an outside obstacle. But this second type of situation usually resolves itself into the first type, conflict of wishes. Seldom does our modern society refuse a personal wish with an absolute "no." When it does so the suffering is intense but not indefinitely prolonged, the readjustment is clear-cut and, in the long run, healthy. Such is the case, for example, when a girl's desire to marry a man is frustrated by his death.

But more frequent is the type of situation in which the obstacle does not present an insuperable bar to satisfaction of the wish, but requires that some other wish be sacrificed. In other words, it imposes the necessity of making a choice. Thus a girl's desire to marry a man is frustrated by the decree of the school board that it will not employ married women. But she is not barred from the marriage. She must choose between marriage and keeping her job. Commonly there is a third latent or assumed value which complicates the decision. The girl in the above case may really have a choice, not of one out of two, but of two out of three values: marriage, her job, and honesty. She may conceal her marriage and keep her job. In an urban, liberal society she may possibly realize three out of four values:

* W. Healy, A. F. Bronner, and A. M. Bowers, *The Structure and Meaning of Psychoanalysis*, Alfred Knopf, 1930, p. 198. By permission. See also Folsom, 1934, pp. 84–89, and 1931, pp. 209–215, for descriptions of dynamisms.

her job, technical honesty, and a personal relationship similar to marriage, sacrificing only the respectability or convenience of legal marriage. But the imposed choice represents a frustration, which may sometimes be more unhealthy than that resulting from an absolute bar to marriage. Moreover, some of the most harmful frustrations arise after a decision has been made and action taken. These are the regrets and remorse which arise when we begin to doubt the wisdom of the decision already made. Of course we "should" never do this, but sometimes we do, and cannot help it. Our only recourse then is to still further dynamisms to reduce the pangs of remorse.

FRUSTRATION-REACTION TYPES. *The frustration-induced changes, or dynamisms, account for an important type of personality difference.*

This *fourth* type of personality trait may be called the *frustration-reaction* type.* These types have been defined and classified in several ways. Each involves a certain combination of the *dynamisms* previously listed.

1. Frustration, as we have seen, always produces fear, anger, anguish, or other unpleasant emotions in some degree and for some period of time. One type of frustration reaction is to take the brakes off the expression of these feelings, to "let oneself go," even exaggerating the expression a little. Some writers have recommended this *emotional catharsis.* This can never be done completely with respect to all these feelings, but in various degrees and with various emphases it appears in the form of violent temper tantrums, "hysterical" weeping, fits of screaming or moaning, and the exaggerated moods of the manic-depressive psychosis. Alcohol helps. Persons who react in these ways are dramatic, and if their expressions do not involve any show of hostility toward others, they may win a great deal of sympathy and often have their frustration removed by the action of their fellows. They are said to be extroverted. On the other hand they may, after many repetitions, incur the contempt of their fellows. If their reactions involve outward hostility, they may incur retaliations; their inner conflicts and frustrations thus become social conflicts between themselves and others; they may eventually land in jail. This reaction type is the most simple and direct and, in fact, is not included by the Freudians as a dynamism.

2. A second major type of frustration reaction is that of *fantasy.* A person who indulges in this type of reaction withdraws from reality

* The first three were capacities, temperament, and motives.

and builds his own inner dream world and lives in it. In extreme cases he becomes the schizophrenic or dementia praecox patient. In such cases he *believes* his daydreams and they are now called delusions.

3. Another type of reaction is called *rationalization.* This consists in continuing to think about the real world, but changing one's ideas in such a way as to make reality more endurable. There are two very different kinds of rationalization which have very different consequences.

(*a*) The first consists in changing one's *beliefs* so as to make them more pleasant. Usually this consists in learning to believe that someone else is at fault, or that the causes of one's frustrations are different from what reason would tend to conclude. Such a person "fools himself"; he is known as unreasonable, and in extreme cases becomes a paranoiac.

(*b*) The other type of rationalization consists in changing one's *values.* This is a more successful method of dealing with a frustration. Such a person may often be called a wishful thinker and self-deceiver, but if he remains clear as to the facts and changes his mind only as to how he values or appraises the facts, he is sane and possibly fortunate. Such is the reaction of a girl who, being disappointed in love, decides that she does not really love the man so much after all, and that she values the "experience" so much that it compensates for the disappointment.

4. A fourth general type may be called *dissociation,* which takes many forms. The essential technique is a trick of memory. It consists in putting something, under some circumstances, out of mind, forgetting. Alcohol is sometimes used also to help this technique.

(*a*) It includes the *hysteroid* phenomena of sleepwalking, functional paralysis, shell-shock, dual personality, and hypnosis. Some persons develop headaches and other illnesses which they really believe to be genuine, which in a sense are genuine, but which are found to be caused purely by the emotions and to be relieved quickly when the frustrating situation is removed. Thus the shell-shocked soldier satisfies both his desire for safety and his desire to be courageous by unconsciously developing a condition which makes him feel really helpless and unable to continue fighting. In 1918 thousands of shell-shocked soldiers suddenly got well when the armistice was announced. The more intelligent persons are inclined to neurasthenia more than to these hysteroid reactions. This is a great and paralyzing fatigue, often known as nervous breakdown.

(*b*) A second sub-type dissociates or forgets not by escaping into illness but into *activities.* These may be distracting pleasures such as "jags" and spending sprees, or constructive activities in which one becomes absorbed and thereby forgets the frustration. A certain preoccupation or "feverishness" is often to be noted. Much that is called "sublimation" belongs under this head. W. S. Taylor [1933] studied the sex life of forty single men in an institution which requires celibacy. He concluded that there was no real sublimation in the Freudian sense of converted libido energy. The men devoted their time and energy to other activities. This also, on the whole, is a constructive type of readjustment. It differs from the revaluating type (3*b*) in that, instead of thinking about the problem in new ways, it ceases to think about it at all through preoccupation with other activities. Its success depends largely upon what motives are drawn upon in the new substitute activities and how these develop. In a sense, the person "starts out all over again" with a whole new set of possibilities for satisfaction and renewed frustration.

(*c*) A special variant of this last sub-type is to be seen in the performance of *ritual.* This is the accepted mode of reaction to bereavement in our culture. One suffers a great frustration, and one is immediately given new things to do. The details of the funeral must be attended to. One feels responsible for others who share the grief or express sympathy. Some individuals have personal rituals into which they escape when frustrated.

We have seen that rationalization of values and distraction through constructive activities are relatively successful or "normal" types of reaction. But these vary according to *what motives* are stressed by the substituted activities or values. These motives which are developed as substitutes for frustrated motives often lead to exaggeration and further difficulties. The man who throws himself into a piece of creative intellectual work as a substitute or compensation for failure in love or business competition is apt to be much more "serious" and neurotic in the carrying on of that work than if it were a task originally chosen for its own sake alone. He must now use it as a defense against motives which he is trying to forget; and he is apt to overvalue results as distinguished from process. Reaction types vary also according to what motive is frustrated.

SOME FRUSTRATION-REACTION TYPES ARE MORE OR LESS CHARACTERISTIC OF CULTURE GROUPS. The culture of the Plains Indians and that of the Russians encourage violent and dramatic displays of emotion. The Dobuans encourage the development of paranoid sus-

piciousness and hostility. The people of Bali relax through a kind of schizoid detachment from interrupting stimuli while they preoccupy themselves with observing an elaborate and meaningless set of rules. The Pueblo Indians cultivate sobriety and calm through ritual. Continental Europeans rationalize and revaluate with a certain earnestness and emotional expression; the British are more inclined to favor dissociation through activities and ritual, with a minimum of emotional expression. The Englishman, when frustrated, has tea.

INTERACTIONAL EXPERIENCES IN CHILDHOOD SET LIFELONG PATTERNS OF REACTION. Although one's culture predisposes one toward one or the other type of reaction, it never succeeds in imposing uniformity upon all individuals. The person's experiences in childhood, most of which vary according to the *particular situation* rather than according to the culture, determine the main features of his positive motives and his frustration reactions. Kimball Young [1930, 4–5] calls these *personal-social* influences.

The Rankian psychologists think that even the experience of birth has a profound influence. If birth is slow and prolonged, the individual is likely to have a personality which fights, struggles, and plunges. This is purely hypothetical but in time will doubtless be tested by research.

There are certain types of "personality structure" or "personality pattern" which are thought to arise very early and to persist throughout life. If so, these are determined by culture plus individual situations, and they consist of motives plus frustration reactions. They depend not only on the type of reaction to frustration, but also upon which motive is chiefly frustrated. Karen Horney [1939] recognizes three types of neurotic personality, but "normal" people also tend toward one or the other of these types. These are the narcissist, the perfectionist, and the masochist.

More recently Dr. Horney [1942] has extended this list of neurotic trends to ten, with two sub-types of one of them. These are given below.

1. The neurotic need for affection and approval (see *The Neurotic Personality of Our Time,* Chapter 6, on the need for affection):

Indiscriminate need to please others and to be liked and approved by others;

Automatic living up to the expectations of others;

Center of gravity in others and not in self, with their wishes and opinions the only thing that counts;

Dread of self-assertion;
Dread of hostility on the part of others or of hostile feelings within self.

2. The neurotic need for a "partner" who will take over one's life (see *New Ways in Psychoanalysis,* Chapter 15, on masochism, and Fromm's *Escape from Freedom,* Chapter 5, on authoritarianism; also the example given below in Chapter 8 [Horney]):

Center of gravity entirely in the "partner," who is to fulfill all expectations of life and take responsibility for good and evil, his successful manipulation becoming the predominant task;
Overevaluation of "love" because "love" is supposed to solve all problems;
Dread of desertion;
Dread of being alone.

3. The neurotic need to restrict one's life within narrow borders:

Necessity to be undemanding and contented with little, and to restrict ambitions and wishes for material things;
Necessity to remain inconspicuous and take second place;
Belittling of existing faculties and potentialities, with modesty the supreme value;
Urge to save rather than to spend;
Dread of making any demands;
Dread of having or asserting expansive wishes.

These three trends are often found together, as might be expected, because they all entail an admission of weakness and constitute attempts to arrange life on that basis. They are the opposite of trends toward relying on one's own strength or taking responsibility upon oneself. The three of them do not, however, constitute a syndrome. The third may exist without the other two playing any noteworthy role.

4. The neurotic need for power (see *The Neurotic Personality of Our Time,* Chapter 10, on the need for power, prestige, and possession):

Domination over others craved for its own sake;
Devotion to a cause, duty, responsibility, though playing some part, not the driving force;
Essential disrespect for others, their individuality, their dignity, their feelings, the only concern being their subordination;
Great differences as to degree of destructive elements involved;
Indiscriminate adoration of strength and contempt for weakness;
Dread of uncontrollable situations;
Dread of helplessness.

4*a*. The neurotic need to control self and others through reason and foresight (a variety of 4 in people who are too inhibited to exert power directly and openly):

Belief in the omnipotence of intelligence and reason;
Denial of the power of emotional forces and contempt for them;
Extreme value placed on foresight and prediction;
Feelings of superiority over others related to the faculty of foresight;
Contempt for everything within self that lags behind the image of intellectual superiority;
Dread of recognizing objective limitations of the power of reason;
Dread of "stupidity" and bad judgment.

4*b*. The neurotic need to believe in the omnipotence of will (to use a somewhat ambiguous term, an introvert variety of 4 in highly detached people to whom a direct exertion of power means too much contact with others):

Feeling of fortitude gained from the belief in the magic power of will (like possession of a wishing ring);
Reaction of desolation to any frustration of wishes;
Tendency to relinquish or restrict wishes and to withdraw interest because of a dread of "failure";
Dread of recognizing any limitations of sheer will.

5. The neurotic need to exploit others and by hook or crook get the better of them.

Others evaluated primarily according to whether or not they can be exploited or made use of;
Various foci of exploitation—money (bargaining amounts to a passion), ideas, sexuality, feelings;
Pride in exploitative skill;
Dread of being exploited and thus of being "stupid."

6. The neurotic need for social recognition or prestige (may or may not be combined with a craving for power):

All things—inanimate objects, money, persons, one's own qualities, activities, and feelings—evaluated only according to their prestige value;
Self-evaluation entirely dependent on nature of public acceptance;
Differences as to use of traditional or rebellious ways of inciting envy or admiration;
Dread of losing caste ("humiliation"), whether through external circumstances or through factors from within.

7. The neurotic need for personal admiration:

Inflated image of self (narcissism);
Need to be admired not for what one possesses or presents in the public eye but for the imagined self;
Self-evaluation dependent on living up to this image and on admiration of it by others;
Dread of losing admiration ("humiliation").

8. The neurotic ambition for personal achievement:

Need to surpass others not through what one presents or is but through one's activities;
Self-evaluation dependent on being the very best—lover, sportsman, writer, worker—particularly in one's own mind, recognition by others being vital too, however, and its absence resented;
Admixture of destructive tendencies (toward the defeat of others) never lacking but varying in intensity;
Relentless driving of self to greater achievements, though with pervasive anxiety;
Dread of failure ("humiliation").

Trends 6, 7, and 8 have in common a more or less open competitive drive toward an absolute superiority over others. But though these trends overlap and may be combined, they may lead a separate existence. The need for personal admiration, for instance, may go with a disregard of social prestige.

9. The neurotic need for self-sufficiency and independence:

Necessity never to need anybody, or to yield to any influence, or to be tied down to anything, any closeness involving the danger of enslavement;
Distance and separateness the only source of security;
Dread of needing others, of ties, of closeness, of love.

10. The neurotic need for perfection and unassailability (see *New Ways in Psychoanalysis,* Chapter 13, on the super-ego, and *Escape from Freedom,* Chapter 5, on automaton conformity):

Relentless driving for perfection;
Ruminations and self-recriminations regarding possible flaws;
Feelings of superiority over others because of being perfect;
Dread of finding flaws within self or of making mistakes;
Dread of criticism or reproaches.*

* Karen Horney, *Self-Analysis,* W. W. Norton, 1942, pp. 54–60. By permission.

We may compare these neurotic trends with the "motives" on page 306. They seem to correspond approximately as follows.

Trends (Horney)	*Motives* (Folsom)
1. Affection-approval	15. Affection
	14. Sociability
2. Partner-dependence, masochism	10. Reverential-masochistic
3. Restriction	(7. Economic) *
4. Power	8. Power
	(13. Destruction)
4*a*. Control through reason	(8. Power)
4*b*. Belief in will power	(8. Power)
5. Exploitation	(7. Economic)
6. Prestige	9. Excellence
7. Personal admiration—narcissism	(9. Excellence)
8. Personal achievement	9. Excellence
9. Independence	17. Freedom
10. Perfection	(9. Excellence)

* Parentheses indicate more doubtful correspondences.

Several "motives" have no corresponding concepts in Horney's scheme: the five sensual motives and collecting-possessing, curiosity, construction, and security. Perhaps these motives are more "natural" and primary, and less likely to serve as substitutes or to be overdeveloped through frustration reactions. Horney's "trends" represent frustration reactions described in terms of positive goals. She says that these neurotic trends have the same *objective* as corresponding normal strivings, but that their basis and meaning are entirely different [p. 61]. They "are almost a caricature of the human values they resemble. They lack freedom, spontaneity, and meaning . . . Their value is only subjective, and lies in the fact that they hold the more or less desperate promise of safety and of a solution for all problems" [pp. 62–63].

Horney adds that these neurotic goals are not what a person really wants; he is driven to want them [p. 63]. Elsewhere [1939, pp. 91, 92, 97, 207, 218–223] she describes the child-parent relations which she thinks in general produce certain of these neurotic trends. Thus the narcissist and the perfectionist are likely to have had authoritarian, righteous parents, who stunted the child's spontaneity and forced him into conformity. One might almost say that both of these neuroses are the product of the unusually effective working of the "normal" method of inculcating character in our culture. The narcissist is more likely to have parents who controlled him by giving

and withholding admiration. The perfectionist, relatively more often, may have experienced unfair treatment or sense of injustice. The masochist also is a person whose spontaneity was warped in childhood, but the feeling of loneliness and of being surrounded by a hostile world is especially prominent.

All three of these neurotic types seem to be based upon insufficiency of parental affection, or the undue restraint of affection in the interests of authority and control.

A CASE OF ANTI-SOCIAL AGGRESSION. Whereas some types of neurotics hurt themselves more than they do society, others tend toward criminality. Shaw [1930] describes a personality development which seems to involve narcissistic, perfectionist, and power trends, with aggression against society. Shaw distinguishes the concept of personality pattern from the "social types" into which it may fit.

Stanley, his subject, had the following traits:

1. Early rise and persistence of a sense of injustice.
2. Self-pity.
3. Hypercritical of others.
4. Always right; never takes blame but readily blames others.
5. Readily makes friends and as easily breaks with them.
6. Excessive interest in attention.
7. Lacks insight into his own motives and those of others.
8. Suspicious toward others without sufficient cause.
9. Ideas of persecution.
10. Substitutes rationalization for insight.
11. Builds up rational system of explanation.
12. Absorbed in his own ideas and plans and relatively immune to suggestions from others.
13. Resentment of correction and resistance to direction.
14. Tendency to escape from unpleasant situations by the method of protest.
15. Tendency to moralize.
16. Speed of decision and strength of reaction.*

Stanley could be called "egocentric" or "self-centered." His is the type of personality which becomes *paranoiac* when it breaks utterly with reality and becomes a case for the mental hospital. Stanley was distinctly not a "disorganized" personality. As Shaw says, his type may better be described as "overorganized."

If we look into Stanley's childhood, we find that he was reared from the age of five by a stepmother who discriminated against him in favor of her

* Clifford Shaw, *The Jack-Roller,* University of Chicago Press, 1930, pp. 190–191. By permission.

own children. He and his seven brothers and sisters, for example, were forced to wait at the none too copious meals while the stepmother's seven children were served first and best. He states that beatings were the usual thing at meal times. His father took the side of the stepmother. The result was a deep sense of injustice. He ran away from home, lived in several institutions where he learned the ways of crime. Older inmates narrated their experiences in crime to the wonder and admiration of the newer boys. In these institutions his sense of injustice was further strengthened by the treatment received. This was not so much physical ill treatment or deprivation as it was the support by higher officials of tyrannous subordinates and their refusal to listen to the "under dog's" side of a grievance. He developed a grudge against society and wanted to get even. He learned to escape feelings of guilt by blaming everything upon someone else. Thus he developed ideas of *persecution.* In order to maintain these rationalizations and protect himself from mental suffering over his own mistakes, he had to lose his *insight,* to close his mind to the suggestions of others, to become absorbed in his own ideas.

Such was Stanley's "fundamental pattern of personality." It was developed as a result of the personal-social, not the cultural, features of his early environment. The death of his mother, an unjust stepmother, a not-understanding father, fifteen children in a poor and crowded home, commitment to institutions; certainly these are not uniform and regular patterns of our American culture or even of any class or sect within it.

That Stanley became a criminal was not the inevitable result of his personality pattern. Some persons, under similar influences, elaborate inwardly their ideas of injustice and persecution, and thus become cranks rather than criminals. Occasionally they find a way to work off their grudge in some socially useful way; they become reformers and even statesmen. Others, finding no such outlet, retreat more and more into their own thought life. Ideas of persecution become *delusions* of persecution; that is, they now really believe them. Then some day they do some foolhardy act in response to a delusion, and the authorities commit them to the state hospital for the insane, as incurable schizophrenics or paranoiacs. Again, many of Stanley's personality pattern become hoboes—the paranoid type of hobo whom Nels Anderson [1923] describes so well, unable to hold a job because of disputes with employers, leaning to radicalism, often becoming eloquent soap-box orators.

That Stanley became a criminal, and the mean cowardly type of criminal who robs drunks (i.e., "jack-roller"), was due to the fact that this pattern was fortuitously placed before him as a model at the time he was in need of some kind of escape. Such a pattern of behavior is a "social type." It is imitated. In Stanley's case a companion taught it to him, and they worked together, robbing drunken men, sexual perverts, and others whose weaknesses rendered them easy prey. Whenever Stanley's companion failed to appear at the proper time, he lost his courage and feared to carry out the

crime. At other times Stanley had been a "truant," a "delinquent," a "hobo hitting the road" on the freights. These also are social types. Any of these modes of behavior could probably be invented by an ingenious and desperate individual without previous experience with them; but if they were dependent entirely on such personal originality, they would be exceedingly rare. Their great prevalence is due to their being imitated by novices from the groups already experienced with them.

Stanley at several times in his career became a law-abiding citizen. When working steadily and earning plenty of money, he liked to dress and act so as to attract attention. He even enjoyed it when former humble companions called him a "snob." His personality pattern could find self-expression through the law-abiding-successful-young-employee type as well as through the jack-roller type. That he repeatedly lost his job was not due to lack of intelligence and everyday industry, but to boredom and to failure to deal properly with social accidents. On one occasion he had overslept; on another he had played a practical joke upon a co-worker; on another had "sassed" back the bundle girl he was helping in the store. It appears that he could have held his job on these occasions had he taken an apologetic attitude as soon as he found himself technically in the wrong. Another personality would have been able to take such an attitude, would have swallowed pride temporarily for the sake of ulterior aims. But Stanley, under the strain of conflict, lapsed into his fundamental habit of thinking the world unjust and resenting all criticism. He impulsively reacted in such a way as to put himself still further in the wrong and arrogantly withdrew from the situation with all its promise for the future.

After several failures, Shaw finally succeeded in placing him in a social role which has appeared to be permanently successful. He got him a job as commercial salesman. In this work, for the first time, Stanley took no direct orders from his employer and was rarely subject to criticism or correction. On the other hand his attractive manners, forceful mode of address, and ability to make friends were positive assets. He now has a wife and child.

Stanley was thus "reformed." But as Shaw points out, what had been done was simply to find a social role in which Stanley's fundamental personality could function without running into interferences. That personality pattern had not been changed. He says, "I get a great kick out of putting over a deal on a customer, especially a stubborn customer." One dreads to think of his coming again under the close supervision of a dictatorial superior, or getting into some accidental conflict which would re-excite his old grudges.

Every type of personality pattern is competent to play several, but not all, social roles. Every social role or type includes persons of several varied personality patterns, but some of these are more prevalent than others. As Stanley's case illustrates, the highly egocentric personality pattern does not fit easily into certain social roles, such as

that of minor employee under constant orders and supervision. But, of course, a socially minded employer might create a different employee-role to which persons like Stanley could adjust.

"Social type" or "social role" is acquired at later ages; it may be changed even after maturity. It is usually acquired from some model which culture provides. Thus the clergyman, the movie actress, the wealthy society woman, the college boy, the football hero, the ambitious and over-Americanized young immigrant, the stenographer, and the political radical are social types. This does not mean that all clergymen, for example, are alike in personality. Their likenesses may be limited and superficial. But there are certain characteristics and reactions which can be fairly safely predicted in all clergymen. Society quickly recognizes it when a clergyman's appearance and behavior depart from "type." There are more general social types of personality which belong to whole classes or cultures. They may be called cultural types. The "typical" Englishman, the typical Southern Mountaineer, the typical native New England farmer, for example, are more than mere statistical averages. They represent certain patterns of behavior which, although they may not be followed faithfully by all members of the class concerned, nevertheless serve as ideals and models for imitation.

Social Interaction Produces Personality Differences. *It does so by reinforcing original differences which may be accidental or temporary.* If we put two strong, vigorous male animals together, especially in a group with females, there will, in many species, be severe fighting. The conflict does not continue indefinitely, however. Sooner or later one becomes dominant and the other submissive. What determines which animal shall be the victor? Relative strength or energy, other things being equal. But the accidents of the first encounter may have a great deal to do with the final outcome. Whichever animals incurs the greater pain during the first few fights is likely to become conditioned toward submissiveness.

Similar processes are observed in human groups. A research worker, observing nursery school children, found one child who was the leader in 95 per cent of all the group situations in which he participated, whereas another was leader in only 5 per cent. Thus the first was getting about nineteen times as much training in leadership per day as the other. *Slight* original differences in energy or motivation may lead through learning to great final differences. Chance differences in behavior at the outset may assign several persons to their permanent roles in the interaction process. Repeated perform-

ance of an interactional role changes the behavior pattern of the individual—makes it more constantly and accurately adapted to the role. Thus, interaction itself determines the growth of personality. *Individuals become specialized in personality through their interaction with one another.*

If the male animals which were placed together had both been much smaller and weaker the same results would have occurred. An interaction pattern depends upon the *differential* between two individuals rather than upon any absolute characteristic of either.

It is only in a few kinds of interaction patterns such as mob action that the several individuals behave in the same way and reinforce one another through similarity. Most interaction processes involve *differentiation* or specialization of the behavior patterns of the participating individuals. Such differentiation may be only temporary, as when one becomes the speaker and others the listeners at a family party. Or it may be a cumulative and permanent differentiation, as when one spouse becomes gradually more talkative or assertive, the other more quiet or submissive. Again, the differentiation may be the cause or the effect of the interaction process. Usually it is both, as in the examples presented above.

When it is said that childhood environment determines most of the fundamental traits of personality, we are apt to think of such standardizable factors as the large house versus the small house, the country versus the city environment, the kindly or cruel father, the truth-telling or deceptive mother, the loving or quarreling parents. But any one of these environmental features may produce several different results in the personality of the child. The tyrannous father may produce a timid, weak-willed son, or he may produce a rebellious, revenge-seeking son, or a sneaking, deceiving son. The idyllic country village may condition the young girl to a lifelong fondness for lowing herds and whispering forests or it may lead her to a passionate fondness for Broadway. The result depends upon the *kind of relation* into which the child enters with the environmental factor. This is a matter of accidental combinations of circumstances.

An arbitrary and dominating father had two daughters, whom he frequently punished or threatened with punishment. There was also a discordant relation between father and mother, and the girls both took the side of the more even-tempered and reasonable mother. The older daughter reacted defiantly to her father's ill-tempered chastisement. She endured his beatings as long as she could, before asking for mercy or promising to mend her ways. Even after submission she sometimes muttered, like Galileo, a

denial of the words of surrender she had previously spoken. She developed a certain stubborn attitude which pervaded many segments of her personality. The younger daughter made apologies and begged mercy as soon as a beating was threatened. She became, by contrast, a conciliatory, forgiving, easily influenced personality. Sheer accident may have determined their original reactions. Their difference in reaction naturally led to a difference in the father's treatment of them. This difference further reinforced their original reactions. It was natural for the father to continue longer the whipping of the defiant child; natural for that child to develop, in consequence, a greater hatred of the father.

It is futile to search for the accidental circumstances which started these differing interactions. For all practical purposes we must regard the interactions themselves as the causes of the later personality developments.

YET THE CONTENT OF PERSONALITY CONTINUES TO DEVELOP AND CHANGE THROUGHOUT LIFE. Our observation so far relates to the basic patterns of personality. These, it may be, are more or less irrevocably fixed in childhood. But they can be filled with many kinds of content. No one has proved that the total rate of personality development is faster in childhood than in later life because no one has taken any quantitative inventory of the full content of personality. Efforts to change personality in adult life are by no means hopeless. The development of personality in these later years consists largely of the acquisition of new objects by each of the several motives. Old objects are not necessarily eliminated as fast as new ones are acquired. Normally there should be a continuous net accumulation of interests and sources of enjoyment. General observation suggests that people, as they grow older, also become more pronounced in their aversions and dislikes. This may or may not be inevitable but, even if it is, the losses of satisfactions thereby incurred may be compensated for by the increased skill in controlling one's environment and by the increase in positive interests and pleasures.

OTHER PERSONALITY DIMENSIONS. There are certain other general dimensions of a person's total set of values which could be theoretically measured. One of these is deviation from the cultural norm of his group. In classifying a number of student papers in reply to the question: "What do you want to get out of life and what kind of mate do you think will best help you get it?" the author was impressed by the fact that about half of the papers seemed to have a certain similarity which conformed to the general attitudes and ideals of young people of this age, as they are widely known through personal observation and various studies. The other half seemed to be deviant,

but in several directions, there being few of any particular kind of deviation. It is not accurate to say the deviations were in opposite directions; most of them seemed to be simply different.

Unless specifically asked to do so, the average person fails to distinguish between the values he holds in relation to people in general and the values he holds in relation to himself as an individual. In fact, people do usually behave according to their general values rather than according to the alleged principle of "selfishness." If a person seems selfish because he is overconcerned with his own prestige, he is likely to be more than ordinarily concerned with the prestige of others also. His value scheme stresses prestige. A woman who seemed selfish and inconsiderate of others in many ways and given to exaggerating her own illnesses became a most devoted nurse whenever someone else was ill. A man who seriously humiliated others proved to be a person who could not easily be humiliated. His value scheme did not emphasize this type of unpleasantness for himself and hence he did not realize the intensity with which others could suffer from causes which left him unmoved. The ideal, thoroughly "unselfish" personality is of course one who learns this ability to put himself in the place of another with different values.

Yet with full awareness one may hold a scheme of values which assigns different roles to different persons. The traditional person holds a "double standard" of behavior for men and women. One may likewise hold a double or multiple standard which classifies people in some different way. This will not necessarily mean an easier standard for the class of persons to which he assigns himself. He may feel that he belongs to a special class which "deserves" special liberties in return for special contributions. This may be a dangerous doctrine, but it is implicit in the attitude that males, adults, and the upper class have always had toward the other part of society. Whether or not such an attitude is democratic can be judged only when we consider the nature of the values themselves. It is not always undemocratic for a physician to regard himself as "privileged" in regard to traffic regulations, nor for a scientist to judge himself by stricter standards of honesty than those by which he judges the advertising man.

Thus a *second* important dimension of a person's values might be called his *role-specialization*. This is the extent to which his value-pattern involves a difference between the values he cherishes for other people, or people in general, as embodiments, and those he holds for himself as embodiment. In other words, it is the extent to which he

approves of himself as playing a specialized role in human society and thus realizing or attaining values which he does not regard as necessarily desirable characteristics for others. High role-specialization does not necessarily imply selfishness, for the person may be very willing to help others to realize their different values. Spranger's classification of values, upon which the Allport-Vernon test is based, is concerned largely with individual types of value patterns which tend to imply a rather high degree of role specialization. "Be what you can," says Spranger, "but be it wholly." Persons are typologized as the "economic," the "political," the "theoretic," the "esthetic," the "social," and the "religious" man.

Closely related to this role-specialization is a *third* variable which has been only dimly recognized in the study of marriage and choice of partner. This is the extent to which a person values a close similarity or sharing of values between his partner and himself. From another point of view, we might define this variable as the extent to which the person requires or values a close association of love experience with the realization of his other values. We might call this his need for moral sympathy. A hypothesis very worth testing is that high role-specialization is correlated with high need for moral sympathy by the person with whom one has or seeks greatest intimacy. Both the specialized role and the high demand for "perfect" mutual understanding in love are features of the modern, secular, rational, democratic, individualistic social order.

Chapter X

PERSONALITY AND THE PARENT-CHILD RELATION

A. THE INFLUENCE OF FAMILY RELATIONS UPON PERSONALITY

HEREDITY OR ENVIRONMENT ALONE CAN PRODUCE LARGE PERSONALITY DIFFERENCES. Families of low economic status produce more than their quota of low I.Q.'s, school retardation, truancy, and delinquency. Families of high status produce children who are more competent, especially in the handling of words. They produce at least their quota of emotional problem children. There is abundant evidence that the cultural environment of underprivileged groups is mainly responsible for the inferiorities they show on being tested.

Ten years ago, Gesell discussed the possible future development of thirty-three infants. Today he checks on his prognosis of thirty of these children and his findings seem to indicate that there is reliability in early predictions of future mental growth. These are based on evidence of infant behavior in test situations dealing with "posture, locomotion, prehension, manipulation, and adaptive language, and social behavior." [Gesell *et al.*, 1939.]

Seen as a whole, these biographies seem to indicate that there exists at birth an inherent capacity for a particular rate and limit of growth and that environmental conditions, although they play an enormous part in the development of this capacity, are nevertheless limited in the extent of their influence by the hereditary constitutional factors.*

In his *Developmental Diagnosis* Gesell provides a description of tests which the average baby should be able to pass at each given age level. These can be given in 20 minutes' time, and afford a measure, the *developmental quotient* (D.Q.), which, like the I.Q., is the ratio of test age to actual age.

Thus at twenty-eight weeks, the average baby is "socially pretty wise, recognizing strangers, grows impatient as he sees his mother prepare food, shakes a rattle, sucks his toes, plays with his image in a mirror, talks to his

* From review in *Bulletin of Family Research and Education*, I:5 and 6 (November-December, 1940), 31.

toys." At forty weeks he "uses the index finger, poking and prying, sits up by himself, plucks a string, creeps, pulls himself to his feet against the railing of his pen, can say 'mama, dada,' and one other word; at mealtime, holds his bottle." At eighteen months, "walks alone, seats himself with care, looks at pictures, turns pages two or three at a time, knows ten words, helps feed himself, hands his empty dish to his mother, runs stiffly, constantly shifts his attention." *

Kingsley Davis [1940] actually observed a child who, for the first five years of her life, had been kept in a remote room of a farmhouse away from other people, with very inadequate care. After being taken to a country home, then to a foster home, and then to a school for defective children, the little girl improved slowly. She is still, however, at this report, on an idiot level.

Putting together the various facts of the case and comparing it with several others which have been reported in literature, Davis believes that the backwardness of the child is due mainly to her isolation and not to a congenital defect. The case furnishes additional evidence for the Cooley-Mead-Dewey-Faris theory of personality development, namely, that personality develops mainly through contact and communication with other persons. If this communication has been absent or seriously defective up to the age of eight or ten years, there is little or no hope of the child's ever "catching up." Davis thinks that with this child, who was removed to a better environment before the age of six, there will be some improvement, but never the development that could otherwise have been expected.†

In 1920 Rev. J. A. L. Singh, a missionary in India, discovered two children living in a den with wolves and brought them up in his orphanage. They habitually went on all fours and had to be taught to walk upright. They craved raw meat and preferred the company of dogs to that of children. In time one of them became socialized to the extent of a fifty-word vocabulary, ability to run simple errands and play with other children. Neither became "normal" (nor lived beyond seventeen). [Zingg, 1941.]

A study by Marie Skodak found sixteen children, whose mothers were feeble-minded, and who had been placed in a foster home above the average economically and socially at an early age (under six months) "indistinguishable in mental development from children whose mothers are not feeble-minded. The results indicate that if a child is physically normal and if placement is made at so early an age that the child experiences essentially only the environment of the foster home, the mental status of the mother ought to be no bar to the placement of the child in a permanent foster home." ‡

* From review in *Time*, August 25, 1941.

† From review in *Bulletin of Family Research and Education*, I:2 (April, 1940), 17-18.

‡ From review in *Bulletin of Family Research and Education*, I:1 (February, 1940), 17.

During the last few years the old controversy over the relative importance of heredity and environment has been reopened by a number of striking studies. Several of these were made at the University of Iowa.*

Although many questions have been raised about the methods of these studies, Burks, reviewing both sides of the controversy, finds: . . . that there is however a basic consistency in much of the Iowa data as seen in the light of the now large body of material on environmental effects on the I.Q. contributed by other research workers in the last twenty years. The I.Q. of children of deprived classes, such as some of the southern mountain children, fell with long residence in their depressed environments as did the I.Q. ratings of the control orphanage children in the Iowa study. Elsewhere also a study of orphanage children who attended nursery school showed that their I.Q. ratings did not decline, but rather rose. Again, other studies of foster children show similar results in rise in I.Q. as does the Iowa study. Burks says that she "is unable to see any need for a controversy, but does see the need for a cooperative research set-up in which skill in statistical reduction of data shall meet skill in the handling of child subjects." †

As Regards Personality Formation, Social Classes Are Different Cultural Worlds. Whether native intelligence is the real determiner or not, it is proved that social classes differ greatly in the behavior and problems of their children. Practically all studies agree in showing that delinquent children are the products of the lower economic classes. Most striking are the ecological studies of Clifford Shaw [1929] in Chicago, showing that the rate of boy delinquency varies from 370 cases per 1,000 boys of juvenile court age in certain downtown areas to a rate of zero in some of the suburban areas. The rate shows, with minor exceptions, a constantly downward movement as one proceeds from the "Loop" toward the suburbs in any direction. Similar studies have brought similar results from other cities. It would seem that if one were asked to state the probability of a given boy's becoming a delinquent, and were allowed to ask only one question about the boy, that question should be: "What is your address?" Of course, nobody thinks that mere latitude and longitude cause delinquency. The significance of Shaw's study is that delinquency is not determined by socio-economic status alone, but by a complex of causes, socio-economic status being among them, and that the boy's address is the simplest and perhaps best possible

* Skodak, 1937; Skeels *et al.*, 1938; see Burks, 1940.

† From review in *Bulletin of Family Research and Education,* I:5 and 6 (November-December, 1940), 31–32.

indicator we can get of the total influence of all the combined causes. Some areas, because of the presence of criminal gangs and traditions, are much more productive of delinquency than other areas of the same social level. Shaw's findings may ultimately be explained in terms of culture patterns more than in terms of economic status or intelligence.

The native-born of foreign parentage show unusually high delinquency rates. This may be partly a function of their low economic status, but it is also due to the conflict of cultures in the immigrant family and the resulting inability of the parents to control their children.

Truancy also is associated with low economic status and school retardation. [Mead, L., 1931.]

Emotional problems are *relatively* more prominent in the upper classes. Some studies would seem to indicate that they exist at an absolutely higher *rate* there. Thus Hopkins and Haines [1931], studying 100 child guidance clinic cases, found them superior in economic status to a control group taken from the general population. They also found that the control group had more disintegrating family conditions than the clinic group.

Plant [1929] says that 80 per cent of the child clinic cases in one Essex County, New Jersey, district were from families which had recently moved to a "better" neighborhood where their children were not well received socially. Levy [1931, A] studying 700 cases coming to the Institute of Juvenile Research in Chicago, found that as one goes up the intelligence scale the proportion of personality or emotional problems increases and delinquency decreases. The same can be said if we substitute "wealth" for "intelligence." But Levy's significant contribution is that *this difference in type of problem is more closely related to intelligence test score than to socio-economic status* as measured by father's occupation. A group of 50 poor, intelligent children were 60 per cent "personality problems" and 40 per cent "social (delinquency) problems." A group of 70 rich, dull children were 41 per cent "personality problems" and 59 per cent "social problems."

Studies of this kind do not tell us the probability that a child of any given characteristics will become a problem. They tell us merely what the child's problem would be most likely to be *if* he should come before a social agency.

Davis and Dollard [1940] present case studies of Negro children as examples of the influence of caste and class distinctions on the forma-

tion of individual personality patterns. There are examples from lower, middle, and upper classes of Negro society. Caste restrictions imposed by the white man on the Negro are seen to be less powerful a factor than are the social class distinctions among the Negroes. It must be noted, however, that the intensity of this intra-Negro stratification may be due ultimately to the Negro-white caste system. Middle class morality in regard to sex, recreation, schooling, aggressive behavior is almost puritanical and differs markedly in this respect from morality of lower class Negroes. Upper class standards are in some cases even more rigid. These vivid case studies show the growth of Negro children at almost every point to be frustrated by restrictions and conventions.

A Child's Order of Birth Has a Minor Influence upon His Attachments and Attitudes. A question which has called forth an abundance of research studies is that of the relation between the child's adjustment and the fact of his being the older, younger, or only child. Before 1900 child psychologists were theorizing that the only child is at a disadvantage in adjusting to life. Bohannon in 1898 made the first statistical study to test this hypothesis, under the direction of G. Stanley Hall. He found the expected disadvantages, but his study has been discredited for faulty method: he sent questionnaires to teachers asking them to describe the "only" children in their classes and thus probably caused them to select outstanding cases.

Goodenough and Leahy studied 293 kindergarten children, all from a superior residential district, thus eliminating variation in socio-economic status. *Oldest* children were found relatively low in traits of aggressiveness and leadership and tending toward seclusiveness and introversion. *Middle* and *youngest* children were more "ordinary." *Only* children were more aggressive and self-confident, more gregarious, fond of physical demonstration of affection, and somewhat more unstable in emotional mood. Not merely "onliness," but each ordinal position, involved special problems of adjustment. Fenton corroborates the finding that only children are more self-confident. Levy [1931, A] found that only children come to child guidance clinics at practically the same rate as other children. Among those who do come to the clinics, however, the only children are more apt to be intelligent and to be troubled with restlessness, food fads, and nail biting, and less given to lying, stealing, and truancy. This doubtless reflects the superior social status of only children. Maller [1931] found, in a group of 802 children from all social classes, that only children

excel in intelligence, moral knowledge, honesty, and cultural background. Children from large families excel only in persistence, and stand low in intelligence, moral knowledge, honesty, cooperativeness, cultural background, and inhibition. Here again is the class difference.

The oldest child has a greater probability of becoming a clinic case than do children on the average, according to careful statistical analysis by Rosenow [1930]. The ratio of actuality to chance is 113 to 100 for two-child families, and 121 to 100 for three-child families. Other studies show that intelligence rises somewhat and continually with ordinal position, other factors being held constant. The oldest child tends to be the least intelligent. [Steckel, 1930; Thurstone and Jenkins, 1931.] It must be emphasized that these differences are very slight, and of no predictive value for any given child.

Matching 361 delinquent girls with 361 non-delinquents of the same age and nationality, Parsley [1933] found that the delinquents came from *smaller families,* contained a larger proportion of only children, and a smaller proportion of youngest children.

Two studies at the college and adult level fail to show any certain relationship between maladjustment and size of family or ordinal position. [Stuart, 1926; Wile and Noetzel, 1931.] Yet Hayes [1938] finds in a Mt. Holyoke sample that the more older siblings a subject has, as long as she has at least one, the more neurotic, less self-sufficient, and less dominant she is likely to be. Again, for those having at least one sibling, having older siblings makes one more introverted, less self-confident, and more sociable than one's older brothers and sisters. These results are consistent within the sample, and are opposite to some of the findings of Goodenough and Leahy.

SIBLING POSITION IN DETAIL IS SOMEWHAT PREDICTIVE OF EMOTIONAL RELATIONSHIPS. By far the most adequate study of ordinal position is that by Krout [1939].

He distinguishes 26 types of position, 13 for each sex. Thus the male types are: (1) only child, (2) older of two males, (3) older male followed by female, (4) younger of two males, (5) younger male preceded by female, (6) oldest male followed by male, (7) oldest male followed by female, (8) youngest male preceded by female, (9) youngest male preceded by male, (10) male between two males, (11) male between two females, (12) male between female and male, (13) male between male and female. One thousand ninety-three cases were used. Females preceded or followed by females tended to be rejected by both parents. Eight types out of the 26 were equally favored by both parents. More types are favored by the mother than the father;

they include all male types except the younger of two males. The mother also rejects one female type: the younger of two children preceded by a male. The father favors the younger of two children, male or female, who is preceded by a male. The displacement of an older child by a younger is a frequent source of change in parental affections. The "filial" value of a child to his parents appears to be in inverse proportion to the number of children of the same sex. Parental rejection and parental discipline are not synonymous, but *punishment,* as distinguished from discipline, tends to be somewhat associated with rejection. Submission within the family has no correlation with submission outside the family. Failure of a female to dominate a younger sister is correlated with failure to dominate either males or females outside the family. The ability to dominate either males or females outside the family seems to go with bi-parental favoritism, whereas the child rejected by the father, even if favored by the mother, tends to lack the ability to dominate. Both boys and girls who are attached to brothers tend to be attached to members of their own sex outside the family but not to members of the opposite sex, whereas both boys and girls attached to their sisters tend to be attached to both sexes outside the family. Lack of attachment to any siblings tends to make a girl lacking in attachment to both sexes outside, and to make a boy attached only to males outside.

These correlations found by Krout are not high enough to warrant prediction for any individual, but they are more meaningful than those of the older studies because they deal with more definitive concepts. When one tries to correlate "oldest child" with "aggressiveness" one is trying to relate two concepts, each of which includes a great many different things, hence it is not surprising that results should be contradictory.

Miss Sewall's [1930] study of jealousy among small children undermines the popular belief that if one prepares the child's mind for the coming of his little brother, he will not be jealous of him. From 70 cases she found that this made no difference. Whether the new baby was wanted or not by the mother also made no appreciable difference. Yet some factors did make a great difference. Jealousy was more frequent when the age difference between the new and the jealous child was between 18 and 42 months. Jealousy decreased markedly with each increase in the number of children in the family. Jealousy was highly associated with oversolicitous mothers, inconsistent discipline, and discordant parents. Miss Foster [1927] found that jealousy was not usually an isolated form of maladjustment, but was strongly correlated with other personality difficulties in the child.

One of the most significant studies is that by Ruth Smalley [1930] showing that *jealousy is much more likely to occur when the siblings*

differ greatly in intelligence. An older, duller child is especially apt to be jealous. Jealousy was most frequent in girl-girl pairs and least in boy-girl pairs. Several studies agree in finding more jealousy among girls than among boys and more jealousy, as one might expect, among oldest children. [Murphy *et al.*, 1937, 458, 466, 467.]

THE BROKEN HOME PRESENTS A RISK TO PERSONALITY DEVELOPMENT. Most investigators have found that delinquency is correlated with broken homes. It is estimated that not over 20 or 25 per cent of all homes in the United States are broken (by death, divorce, desertion, etc.); 17 per cent of New York City school population comes from broken homes. [Wallenstein, 1937, 37.] Yet studies show that from 30 to 60 per cent of delinquents are from broken homes. One industrial school (containing more serious offenders) had 75 per cent of all its boys from broken homes. Most of these studies, however, have failed to take account of the very real class difference in broken homes. Do broken homes produce delinquency, or does poverty produce delinquency while it at the same time produces broken homes?

Shaw and McKay [1932] attempted to answer this question by comparing the home conditions of delinquent boys with those of a control group of the same age, nationality composition, and socio-economic status. The control group showed 36.1 per cent of broken homes and the delinquent group 42.5 per cent, a very small difference. The suitability of the control group has been questioned by some. Shaw found that the incidence of broken homes rises rapidly as the child's age rises, and also that it varies greatly with nationality, from the Jews with 16.3 per cent to the Negroes with 46.0 per cent. Delinquent girls show higher rates of broken homes than do delinquent boys.

Matching 362 delinquent girls for age, nationality, and race with the same number of non-delinquent school girls from approximately the same parts of Chicago, Hodgkiss [1933] found that 67 per cent of the delinquents and 45 per cent of the non-delinquents came from broken homes. Thirty-eight per cent of the mothers of the delinquents and 29 per cent of those of the non-delinquents worked for wages. Yet when broken homes were held constant, there was no relation between delinquency and the fact that the mothers worked.

In brief, the relation between broken homes and delinquency is much less than the earlier crude studies showed, but has not been altogether disproved, especially in the case of girls.

Marian Campbell [1932] reports that broken homes have little effect upon a child's school achievement but some upon conduct, and

that the average child is not affected by the broken home either in school achievement or in conduct after the period of stress is passed.

Bonapart [1930] reported on the relationship between adolescent children and their natural parents when they are placed in foster homes. He found that the separation tends to make the child the center of attraction, and that in its effect upon the child's emotional life it is neither so complete nor so deleterious as is popularly believed.

The chief risk of a broken home to the child lies in the sense of insecurity it gives. As Margaret Mead says, "Children who have learned to rely on their parents for all things cannot see the bond between the parents broken and the home disturbed without suffering a severe shock, and a profound disturbance of their sense of social solidarity." * In other words, the child may suffer from severe *nostalgia* even though he remains in the same physical location and even though there are frequent and affectionate visits with the absent parent. The child has not lost any person or any concrete object out of his life; yet he has lost something which may be very real and emotionally very important. The frequency and extent of such frustrations and emotional damage cannot be measured by delinquency rates, because delinquency is only one of many symptoms.

In a Democracy we are concerned for the welfare of persons rather than the preservation of institutions or groups. Yet, since the child often fastens upon a group or an environment as a value, quite in addition to his feelings for the individuals who compose it, there are strong reasons for making every effort to preserve enough of a marriage or a home situation to give growing children the security they need. In some cases the preservation of a marriage may be even worse for the child than its breaking; but only thoughtful and prolonged consideration of the individual case can guide us.

THE MOST IMPORTANT INFLUENCE IS THE EMOTIONAL ATTITUDE OF PARENTS. The studies of the relation of behavior to social class, to broken homes, and to sibling position in family were undertaken to test particular hypotheses, originating several decades ago. It should now be clear that these factors have little consistent, generalizable influence. The investigation of these simple, formal factors misses the factors which are really important in determining the child's personality. It is the *emotional relationships* to parents and siblings which really count. Those are more difficult to measure, and hence

* M. Mead, 1929. "Broken Homes," *Nation*, 128 (February 27, 1929), 253–255.

have been explored more through case studies and through the expansive type of questionnaire with more complicated questions or descriptive answers rather than check marks. Fortunately the trend of research is now toward the quantification, however crude, of these more important though less definite factors of personal relationship and interaction. The human environment matters much more than the material surroundings; and in that human environment, the actual behavior relationships matter more than formal status.

Helen Witmer summarizes many research studies as follows:

> These, very briefly, then, are the findings of the students' investigations: that problem children, delinquents, pre-psychotics, manic-depressives and schizophrenics are much more apt to have been subjected to adverse parental attitudes than individuals who are socially well adjusted; that the degree of maladjustment in parent-child relationships is the chief factor (among those studied) determining the results of social-psychiatric treatment; that the cycle of maladjusted individuals producing maladjusted children is sometimes broken by a marriage that shields the maladjusted one from the consequences of his early disappointments.*

What are these adverse parental attitudes?

EMOTIONAL REJECTION BY PARENTS HAS MORE SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES THAN ANY OTHER PARENTAL FAULT. Jessie Taft presents a classic case study which illustrates several important principles of parent-child interaction.

Mary, a pale, thin, nervous child, is found to be an habitual thief, and is brought by her mother to the psychologist. The father is a skilled mechanic with fair income, good habits, and a real fondness for his family. The mother is a dignified, intelligent, conscientious woman who devotes herself to the care of her family and struggles to maintain high social and moral standards. Mary is the oldest child. There are four others, all healthy, happy, well-adjusted children.

Mary's mother describes her as nervous, full of fears, very prying and curious, and full of wants. Nothing satisfies her for long. She craves personal adornment, is personally clean and neat. She is an efficient worker when interested, but is not very reliable or responsible. She teases and bosses the other children, and is always afraid she will not have everything they have. She is markedly without affection, which the other children show. She seems to care about nothing but herself. She has no special friends. She is afraid of punishment but shows no remorse. She lies habitually. Her intelligence is average but she is failing in school work. She has no constructive

* Helen Witmer, 1937. "The Influence of Parental Attitudes on the Social Adjustment of the Individual," *American Sociological Review*, 2:763 (1937).

interests. She is essentially queer, difficult, unloving, and unlovable. What is the matter with her?

Clinical interviews with Mary show that she is extremely curious about sex, and that she has not been adequately informed. Her stealing episodes at school coincided with the periods when her mother had gone to the hospital to be delivered. When the psychologist satisfies Mary's curiosity about sex, Mary bursts forth in an attitude of exulting triumph over her parents. She has none of the ordinary adolescent emotion about sex, no interest in it on her own account, but only a joy in finding out what her parents had concealed from her. Soon Mary loses interest in the matter, and at the same time her stealing ceases and is not repeated. Her personality pattern, however, is unchanged. She continues to have a consuming hunger for possessions and a lack of objective interest in other persons and things. She wants to appear in the movies.

Mary was born at a time when her mother was passing through a serious disillusionment with her marriage. The birth was unusually difficult, and breast feeding ceased at three months. Mary suffered from indigestion and undernourishment, developed constipation, and for a long period her bowel habits were sources of conflict between her and her parents. Circumstances had trained her to concentrate her attention on her own physical functions and to be resistant and antagonistic to other persons.

During this period the father became involved in speculations with his firm's money and lost his job. The shock of this situation, together with Mary's ill health, made it impossible for the mother to take any pleasure in her care of Mary. Mary, likewise, failed to get the normal pleasure of a child from its experiences with its mother. Mary until the age of twelve never cared much about food.

Mary has improved, and she has ceased stealing. Her personality continues to be egocentric, unloving, and unlovable. The psychologist doubts that it can be fundamentally changed. Adolescence and sex interest may succeed in transferring her "libido" to another person but, as Miss Taft remarks, one fears "a use of sex which will merely gratify her desire for power, possession, and ability to wound." If the personality pattern cannot be changed, then some useful expression must be found for the present pattern, as in skilful dressing, intelligent use of money, dancing, athletics, and so on.*

Through personal letters to collaborators Symonds [1939] secured descriptions of 31 rejected children who were matched with 31 accepted children of similar age, intelligence, and other characteristics. He also secured reports on 28 whose parents were dominant and 28 matched children whose parents were submissive. From a great variety of patterns which we find

* Jessie Taft, "The Effect of an Unsatisfactory Mother-Daughter Relationship upon the Development of a Personality," *Family*, 7:10–17 (1926).

among parent-child relationships, Symonds thus abstracts the two variables: (1) acceptance and rejection, and (2) parents' dominance and parents' submission. By far the most seriously maladjusted type appears to be the rejected child. He tends much more than others to show lack of concentration and effort, attention-getting behavior, truancy, lying, and stealing. The children of submissive parents also show a more-than-average frequency of disobedience, laziness and lack of interest in school, aggressiveness, and food fads. But the picture of such a child lacks the desperation, unhappiness, and anti-social qualities of the rejected child. In some respects the children of the submissive parents have advantages: they are found to be talkative and to express themselves effectively. The picture of the accepted child is somewhat similar to that of the child of dominant parents. Both are courteous and neat, attentive or careful. Of course a parent who loves and accepts his child may also be either dominating or submissive. But the children who were selected to illustrate acceptance seemed to have a healthier emotionality underlying their "good behavior." They are reported as calm, deliberate, and emotionally stable, whereas the children of dominant parents are reported as self-conscious, submissive, and docile. Again, it seems to indicate more than a mere arbitrary choice of words that the accepted children are described as "cooperative" whereas the children of dominant parents are described as "obedient." Rejection seems to have three main forms which may be more or less combined: neglect, cruelty, and strictness. Over-acceptance may be overprotection due to fear, or overindulgence.*

THE VARIETIES OF PARENTAL ATTITUDE AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES. Legally, and in popular parlance, a parent may "neglect" a child. If a child is seen to be running about the neighborhood with unusual freedom for his age, and possibly getting into mischief sometimes, his mother is put down by the gossipy neighbors as negligent. If she happens to be an employed mother whose family could possibly exist without her earnings, the explanation is then very definite and the damnation complete.

Yet all the studies show that it is the mother's attitude toward the child which counts, and that several different attitudes may be associated either with spending much time or little time with the children.

The two basic dimensions of parental attitude, acceptance-rejection and dominance-submission, when they deviate from the "normal," average range, will of course present four type combinations. Let us see what the evidence shows regarding the effects of these combinations. Let us think here of "rejection" not as outright rejection, but

* From review in *Bulletin of Family Research and Education*, II:1 (February, 1941), 18–19.

as something less than normal affection toward the child, and "submission" of parents as less than normal tendency to dominate the child. Such a parent may not be submissive in his relation to people in general; he may be too preoccupied or too "softhearted" or too "progressive" to practice average discipline, and the result, good or bad, is usually that the child is able, more than average, to "have his own way" and in some respects to control the parent.

1. *Acceptance and dominance together,* both in high degrees, constitute roughly what is called "overprotection." This, however, varies in content. About 25 per cent of all children have been overprotected, according to estimates made from three studies which agree rather closely. [Foster and Anderson, 1930; Hopkins and Haines, 1931; Tilson, 1929.] Miss Brunk found that 41 per cent of overprotected children had been breast-fed for 12 months or more, whereas this was true of only 8 per cent of other children. The overprotective mother is distinguished by prolongation of infantile care, by excessive contact with the child, prevention of development of child's independence, and by either a lack or an excess of control over the child.* Brunk concludes that overprotection does not affect the child's physical development but is a very significant indicator of the mother's personality. Levy [1931, B] and Miss Foley * both find, independently, that overprotective mothers are more likely to have had an unhappy childhood with lack of affection and early development of a responsible role, and to be maladjusted in their marital relationship. The overprotected child, more often, is a boy, is an only or younger child, has a high I.Q., and has some defect or peculiarity which in the mother's mind creates an extra risk.*

The rejecting or underprotective mothers themselves are also more likely than average to have had an unhappy childhood and to be maladjusted in marriage.* Their childhood, however, is more likely to have been one of *affection and irresponsibility* in contrast to the overprotective mothers.* Their unhappy marital situation is characterized more by thwarted social and professional ambitions, financial pressure and the necessity to earn, and dread of pregnancy. They nurse their children for a shorter period than normal,* that is, less than six months. [Pearson, 1931.] Childers and Hamil [1932] found that children breast-fed beyond eleven months had fewer undesirable

* Christine Brunk, Margaret Figge, Margaret Freeman, Patricia Foley, Elizabeth Hough, Martha Lewenberg, in "Studies in Overprotection and Rejection," *Smith College Studies in Social Work,* 2:181–282 (1932).

behavior traits than those weaned at one to six months, but all the children in their study were pathological cases.

Overprotection commonly leads to the submissive, weak-willed child, emotionally dependent upon the parent [Levy, 1931, B], never "growing up." The most serious results to the child may not come during his childhood but rather when he becomes an adult. Some children, however, eventually rebel under such treatment and become independent at the expense of their love for their parents.

Many parents apparently relinquish "authority" and treat their children as "pals," yet attempt to retain control in some matter which is more important than all the small privileges they have granted. They say in effect to the child: "I have given you many liberties and privileges which my parents would not have dreamed of giving me; now do this one thing to please me." This one thing often turns out to be something which frustrates one of the child's most important needs. It may be to give up a certain friend or marriage plan, or to choose a certain vocation rather than another. Many of these demands represent the projection of unsatisfied ambitions of the parents. It would have been better for the child to hold him under greater discipline in the small things of life and to give him freedom in his major goals.

2. *Acceptance with parental submission* commonly appears as "overindulgence" and leads to the "spoiled," selfish, aggressive child. Such a child, if a girl, is likely to become underprotective toward her own children later. It is commonly said that such a child lacks gratitude toward his indulgent parent, does not love the parent in return. The situation is more likely that the child does love his parent but, since he is not trained to responsibility and finds his wishes gratified with little effort on his part, he becomes resentful when there is a change in later years, as there must be. He tends to regard as unkind an environment which merely treats him as it treats the average person. Hence his originally normal affectionate attitudes may turn into ingratitude, grudges.

In one study it was found that four out of the five carefully studied delinquents had been excessively catered to when very young, and then at about 3 years had been pushed aside. The fifth child had been rejected from the very beginning. In contrast to these cases, four out of five of the well-adjusted brothers and sisters of these same children had always been accepted and approved of by their families, but not spoiled. The fifth also had been well treated in this way, only her adolescent desires brought disapproval from her mother.

[Witmer, 1937, 761.] Thus the most significant factor may not lie in any fixed level of parental treatment, but in the changes which occur at critical periods in the child's life. At least two periods are critical and especially likely to be the time of such changes in parental treatment: (1) the arrival of a younger sibling when a child is about 3 and (2) the beginning of adolescence.

3. *Dominance with rejection* is especially typical of immigrant parents who cannot adjust to the American family culture. It is found also among "old school" American parents who believe in authority and cannot adjust themselves to social change. We find it common among formerly rural families which have moved to the city. Their affection may not be deficient or their control excessive in the older culture pattern. In the new pattern, their stubborn efforts to retain their former control, against the forces of change, often cause their originally adequate love of their children to turn into antagonism. The child may react by rebellious acts, delinquency, running away from home, or sometimes by becoming submissive and seclusive. It is said that Thomas Jefferson was the son of an overdomineering father. [Barnes, 1925.] Jefferson, rebelling against his father's domination, hated all authority and devoted his life to effecting an extreme decentralization of political and economic power in America. E. Klein [1925] has found a correlation of +.60 between radicalism of opinion and father-antagonism. Of course the situation is apt to be complicated by the relation to the mother, and a possible Oedipus complex.

The girl who has experienced early responsibility with lack of parental affection seems more likely than average to become an overprotective mother.*

4. *Rejection with submission* is found among parents of all social classes. It is associated with underprotection or "rejecting mothers." The unwanted child who is neglected or allowed to shift for himself falls in this class. So do many children of broken families. But the situation may exist also with parents who try hard to do their duty to the child, but who cannot give the love and security that the child needs. They may be overworked, overambitious, or discouraged parents with good intentions. The situation may spare the child from the domination which is present in the previous type, but the child does not appreciate this as an advantage, for it is a purely negative freedom and is coupled with serious deprivations. He tends to re-

* Foley in *Smith College Studies, op. cit.*

sent his parents' neglect and regard them as unfit. From such situations arise many neurotic personalities.

The two parents usually behave according to different patterns and there are some frequent combinations in this respect. A study of all the children who lived on a given street in an underprivileged area in Providence [Boggess, 1936] revealed:

> In nine families the children were socially well adjusted; in ten, most of them were shy and retiring; in eight, they showed varying degrees of aggressive behavior. All of the children in the first group were secure in the affection of their parents or other relatives. Each family appeared to be close-knit, co-operative, affectionate. In contrast, most of the children who were shy and retiring had mothers who, by one means or another, were in complete control of the household. Some of them achieved dominance by neurosis or psychosis, others by native ability or by providing the family with economic support. For the most part, they over-protected their children, either through excessive solicitude or by undue control of their activities. The fathers were either easy-going, quiet, submissive men or no longer lived at home. On the other hand, the children who were unsupervised and neglected through the mother's laxness or were subjected to the father's violent temper escaped the tense, quarrelsome atmosphere of their homes and became the mischief-makers of the neighborhood.*

B. SOCIAL CHANGE AND PARENT-CHILD RELATIONS

"Good" Parent-Child Relations Are Always Relative to Customs and Cultural Values. The content of a good or a bad parent-child relation cannot be stated in absolute, universal terms. Parental behavior must always be relative to the cultural patterns of the country, region, neighborhood, social class, and sect to which the family belongs. We may approve or disapprove this culture, but we must first understand it fully and use it as a point of reference in our judgments. Many parents are not aware of all the customs which affect their children, of how they have changed since they were children. They are often not aware that their children are being torn between two conflicting and incompatible cultural standards, each coming to the child's mind with a certain voice of social authority. If certain kinds of language or ways of dress are actually the custom in the group with which a child associates, the parent cannot make them seem wrong to the child by telling him that *he* didn't do these

* Witmer, *op. cit.*, p. 762. By permission.

things when a child. Again, if the parent experienced severe corporal punishment in childhood and yet grew up loving his parents, it does not follow that the same treatment will produce the same results today. The child compares the treatment he receives with that received by other children. Any treatment is brutal and severe if it is generally *regarded* as brutal and severe in the culture in which one lives. Of course, one can educate the child to desire and work for better standards than the present ones, but he must accept the present standards as a point of departure.

The results of statistical studies vary greatly according to the sex, social class, or cultural group which is investigated. This does not prove their inconsistency, but merely illustrates the variety of cultural patterns which exist within even the same community. Differences between economic classes must be regarded as culture-pattern differences and not merely as mechanical results of differences in wealth. It is true that lack of wealth places certain limits upon the possible adjustments to life in the working class. But the way they *do* adjust is only one of several possibilities and is determined by their specific customs and values. Thus delinquency is not caused directly by the *poverty* of the families of delinquents, but certain patterns of behavior arise in areas of poverty and those patterns are *imitated*. The boys who imitate them are not always from the poorest families, but are selected by their proximity and their personality maladjustments. Again, sex differences must be regarded as mainly cultural differences, that is, as due to the different roles which culture assigns to the sexes. That boys are more often delinquent than girls means absolutely nothing as regards any universal masculine or feminine trait. It is simply a reflection of the different social roles to which boys and girls are assigned by culture.

As Levy [1931, B] shows, in a small rich community, one-child homes may produce problem boys more frequently than larger families, but the same does not hold true for girls. In the city, boys come to the attention of the child psychiatrist more than twice as often as girls, and in a small wealthy section this rate is even higher. Sender has shown that girls from poor homes show personality disturbances, such as hostility to society, at first menstruation in about half the cases, whereas girls from better homes show the same disturbances in only a few cases. Negativism is more common among upper class than lower class boys; the reverse is true among girls. [Goodenough, 1928.]

Thus several studies of different traits suggest that upper class environment is especially hard on the boy's personality and the lower class environment on the girl's. Shall we say that boys, being more natural little animals, require a rougher, cruder environment? But science is outgrowing the old theory of inborn differences between the sexes in matters of interest and attitude. A more probable interpretation of these sex differences is that upper class culture tries to teach the boy two conflicting attitudes. It still encourages his "manliness" which to the boy means being more rough-and-ready, more adventurous than girls. At the same time, it tries to teach the boy cleanliness, delicacy of tastes, criteria of class superiority, which require behavior of the traditionally "effeminate" kind. The boy, hence, is more exposed to inner personality conflict in that class. Yet, when the upper class boy becomes an adult, he is not necessarily more exposed to frustrations than his upper class wife.

Lower class boys are given relatively more to delinquency and less to personality problems. Lower class girls experience both kinds of problems. They become sex delinquents and also suffer inner conflicts. As Levy [1932] says, every form of society and type of culture develops its own type of maladjustment.

In "Middletown," the Lynds [1929, 354] find, business-class mothers emphasize frankness, independence, and tolerance in teaching their children; working-class mothers emphasize economy, good name in the world, good grades in school.

Under the title "He Could be Envied," a current newspaper editorial describes the large family of a Negro who runs a junk yard. When questioned by a stranger these children "answer promptly without giggling or scraping the ground with their toes . . . say no more and no less than necessary . . . stand straight and perfectly still, with arms at sides and head lifted." To their father the answer is always followed by "sir," even among the grown-up married sons and daughters.*

Allison Davis [1941] points out that in Mississippi lower class white or Negro pre-adolescents and women smoke, drink, or curse in public with impunity, but that such behavior in the lower middle class (which is entirely white) is forbidden. In the lower middle class of the South, parents strenuously motivate their children to study their lessons, repress aggression at school, inhibit sex impulses, avoid lower class playmates, avoid beer parlors and the like. In lower class white or Negro society very different goals and values are set. Fighting, cutting, shooting, grumbling, magic, and extra-

* *Poughkeepsie Eagle News*, November 20, 1936.

marital partnerships of both husband and wife are accepted class folkways. The school system and the teachers are essentially middle class. They humiliate and punish lower class children because they have lower class folkways which their families accept. Also the school fails to motivate these children because the emotional and social rewards "are systematically denied to the lower class child by systems of privilege existing in the school and in the larger society."

THE RECENT DEVALUATION OF AUTHORITY CAUSES TROUBLE THROUGH ITS INCOMPLETENESS. The parent-child problem of today, like the other problems of the family, may be viewed as a cultural lag. Here again the dynamic force is individuation. The forces working upon children through the school, the community, the movies tend to differentiate their interests and attitudes. The traditional family culture, on the other hand, calls for assimilation, for homogeneity of attitudes and values within the family group. Adjustment lies either in regaining genuine authority in substance as well as name, or in giving up the symbols, attitudes, and pretenses of authority. The giving up of family authority does not mean the giving up of all social control over children and a regime of juvenile anarchy. There are other avenues of control. Progressive parents have already discovered these. The child, in practice, is controlled by the actual mores of the community and through the school, his companions, and various community agencies. More boys and girls than ever before, through juvenile organizations and the schools, are conscious of *civic* duties. Again, children can be reasoned with as equals to a much greater extent than the conservative parent believes possible. One can recognize their rights to have independent wishes of their own, and at the same time demonstrate the necessity of accommodating their wishes to those of others. Mowrer [1932, Ch. 6] has shown that, whereas the interaction between married partners normally changes from accommodation to assimilation, that between parents and children and children and children normally makes the opposite change. That is, their goals and personalities grow more unlike rather than more similar with time, but these dissimilar personalities can nevertheless tolerate one another and live happily together. This technique of accommodation is even more important today than formerly.

It has been said that modern liberal-democratic government is a government of laws rather than of men. Within the family the old

government of personal authority lingers on; it needs to be modified somewhat toward the liberal-legal-impersonal regime of the community. In the family there are undeveloped possibilities in the method of democratic legislation.

A child was in repeated conflict with her parents over the wearing of an overcoat to school. Morning after morning she protested that she was too warm, while the parents insisted that she might catch cold. Finally they all talked the matter over and the child agreed that 50 degrees Fahrenheit was a proper dividing line. It was then ruled that if the thermometer exceeded 50 degrees on a sunny morning, or 55 on a cloudy morning, she could go without the coat, and otherwise would wear it. There was a sudden end to the chronic mutual irritation at breakfast time. Instead, the child cheerfully went out and looked at the thermometer.

RISING MATERIAL STANDARDS HAVE INTENSIFIED THE DIFFICULTIES OF FAMILY MANAGEMENT. The writer asked a number of college students to state the chief causes of conflict in their families. The items in the replies are grouped in Table 9. The conflicts appeared to be chiefly those between parents and children or children and children. The question of who was to blame was not raised; the causes were stated quite objectively.

TABLE 9

CAUSES OF FAMILY CONFLICT

Tastes and attitudes which directly irritate another person, including differences between generations and between individuals	45
Material disorder, untidiness, etc.	27
Tardiness, time-unreliability, schedule	23
Distribution and performance of household tasks	23
Friends	19
Money	19
Use of car	19
Annoyances of a mechanical kind caused by personal tastes and activities: use of equipment, hobbies, pets, noise, etc.	19
Privileges, partiality, injustice	15
Meddlesomeness, prying into another's affairs, offering untimely advice	13
Borrowing	13
Poor cooperation in transmitting information, such as telephone calls	12
Late nights	12
Obedience, domination	9
Disagreements of parents in discipline of children	9

The Lynds secured questionnaire replies from 348 boys and 382 girls in "Middletown" high schools, showing the frequency of

sources of disagreement with their parents. The results are shown in Table 10.

TABLE 10 *

SOURCES OF DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN 348 BOYS AND 382 GIRLS AND THEIR PARENTS

Source of Disagreement	Per Cent of Boys who Checked	Per Cent of Girls who Checked
1. Use of the automobile	35.6	29.6
2. The boys or girls you choose as friends	25.0	27.0
3. Your spending money	37.4	28.8
4. Number of times you go out on school nights during the week	45.1	47.6
5. Grades at school	40.2	31.2
6. The hour you get in at night	45.4	42.7
7. Home duties (tending furnace, cooking, etc.)	19 0	26.4
8. Clubs or societies you belong to	5.5	10.5
9. Church and Sunday school attendance	19.0	18.6
10. Sunday observance, aside from just going to church and Sunday school	14.4	13.9
11. The way you dress	15 8	24.6
12. Going to unchaperoned parties	15.2	27.5
13. Any other sources of disagreement	9.5	8.4
14. "Do not disagree"	2.0	2.1

* Adapted from Robert S. and Helen M. Lynd, *Middletown*, Harcourt, Brace, 1929, p. 522.

On the farm the authority of the father had reason in nature. If boys were dilatory about getting in the hay, and if the father did not have full discretion to decide what tasks were most urgent, a lean and hungry winter might ensue. In the modern city home there is nothing, except perhaps medical attention and the feeding of babies, which makes such a natural, inexorable requirement that it cannot be neglected, under- or overemphasized, or otherwise subjected to personal whim. The child who breaks an expensive lamp may be no more a *saboteur* than the parent who bought the lamp in the first place under the impulse of vanity or personal taste without due regard to the whole household scheme or the state of the treasury.

The invasion of the home by the money economy has increased the problems of parent-child relations. The modern home exists for consumption and recreation rather than for *material* production or manufacture. Disorder and non-cooperation take serious toll of its happiness, yet because the effects of these are less obvious and often difficult to explain to children, they are difficult to prevent through appeal to self-interest.

Under the title "An Exhausted Parent Speaks," a writer says:

> Frankly I am fed up with this younger generation. I am fed up with pouring every drop of available effort into the yawning, bottomless pit of my children's demands and the demands of their friends, and about me I see other exhausted parents.*

In a wealthy suburb it is reported that children leave expensive articles carelessly in and about school and that many are never claimed. Roy Helton [1940] asks: "Are we doing too much for our children?" He regards this as a major problem of our society and as crucial to the population problem. The upbringing of a child has become so inconvenient and expensive that fewer and fewer couples undertake the rearing of more than two, and those who do "frequently live to regret bringing into the world young human beings who do not enjoy the advantages to which all our young have become accustomed."

> Will we . . . have more and better clothes for our young and in every respect humor their inferiority complexes, about which they have become informed, and keep them up to the little Joneses, or will we ourselves keep up to the big Joneses? . . . Any civilization in which children absorb too much of the economic surplus is probably . . . losing its incentive to progress, and all from the best motives . . . but motives perverted by marketing pressure exerted on women or through the avenues of their largest interest.†

If children were put upon allowances, trained in the use of money [Andrews, 1931], and, when adolescent, held rigidly within a financial budget, the greatest real strain upon the parents might be relieved, and the child's *personal* liberty (i.e., within the limitations of his budget) might cease to be so vexing a problem. As the Lynds point out, "At no point is parental influence more sharply challenged than by these junior-adults; so mature in their demands and wholly or partially dependent upon their parents economically but not easily submitting to their authority." ‡

Among the "new designs for living" which need to be invented and demonstrated is a house for raising children, furnished with a mini-

* Anonymous, "An Exhausted Parent Speaks," *Harper's*, July, 1936, p. 120. By permission.

† Roy Helton, "Are We Doing Too Much for Our Children?" *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 212 (November, 1940), 231–234. By permission.

‡ Robert L. and Helen M. Lynd, *Middletown*, Harcourt, Brace, 1929, p. 142.

mum of breakable, stainable, and otherwise damageable equipment, with a wide door and inclined plane rather than steps between indoor and outdoor play areas, with safety hazards eliminated, with sheltering roofs for equipment kept out of doors, ample built-in shelves and cabinets, and many other material conveniences which will doubtless suggest themselves to any mother. People of sufficient means often add such facilities to what they already have; what we essentially need are homes designed *primarily* for this purpose, saving expense by omitting many conventional features, and thus within reach of a larger proportion of the population. There have been religious cults which elected to live in poverty in order to serve the Lord. We may develop a modern cult of families which agree to live without conventional esthetic luxuries for the sake of raising and enjoying children. It is not meant that this is the only way. It is one way, and would commend itself to many, if they could find one another and give one another moral support.

THE PROBLEM OF DISCIPLINE PRESENTS A CHOICE BETWEEN FUNDAMENTAL VALUES. It is true that parents face an immediate practical issue in the matter of family discipline and that they must be governed in part by the actual standards of their community, unless they have unusual courage. The family of "strict" or "old-fashioned" standards, even though imposing these with justice and kindness, finds its position increasingly difficult and gradually succumbs to outside pressure. Because of the changing mores and the example set by older children, standards are more lenient for the younger than they were for the older children. Studies indicate a tendency to give each privilege at an earlier age to younger children.

Yet something more is involved than opportunistic adjustment to the current folkways. We must decide eventually whether to accept without regret the changing scheme of values. Is modern "democracy" in the family (or "lack of discipline" when seen in its unpleasant, poorly managed phases) absolutely and eternally better for human beings? If we accept the general philosophy of democratic freedom the answer is *yes*.

THE SUPERIORITY OF DEMOCRATIC RELATIONS HAS BEEN SCIENTIFICALLY DEMONSTRATED. Lewin, Lippitt, and White [1939], in a much cited and significant experiment, used controlled observation to study group interaction processes. .

The experiment was carried on with groups of 10-year-old boys organized in clubs engaged in a craft work, such as painting and toy airplane con-

struction, operating under authoritarian, democratic, or *laissez-faire* conditions. Sound experimental techniques seem to have been used in setting up the experiments and gathering the data. Aggression, which may be assumed by a democratic philosophy to be a bad symptom, is observed to be promoted by three conditions. First, there is tension, which occurs more frequently in the authoritarian group as a result of pressures exerted by the leader. Second, there is "restricted space of free movement," again greater in the authoritarian group and producing tension. "In *laissez-faire,* contrary to expectations, the space of free movement was not larger but smaller than in a democracy, partly because of lack of time perspective and partly because of the interference of the work of one individual with the activities of his fellows." Third, there is "rigidity of group structure," again greater in the authoritarian group and also productive of tension. Finally, there is "style of living (culture)" which determines the form the expression will take. In the authoritarian groups it may be aggressive or apathetic behavior; in the democratic groups it appears as social activity to gain recognition of one's colleagues.*

Although the boys came into the experiment with certain attitudes already formed by our culture, these presumably were not wholly democratic. Most boys have experienced more than one kind of control in their total family, school, and group life. All the leaders, including the authoritarian ones, had congenial relations with the boys outside of the club. All the groups were subjected in sequence to all three conditions over a period of 5 months, and there were marked changes in the group behavior when the leader and atmosphere changed. Nineteen out of 20 boys liked their leader in the democratic group better than in the authoritarian, and the boy who did not was the son of an army officer! Under the authoritarian condition, 73 per cent of the boys' language was of the egoistic type (hostile, resistant, demanding attention, hostile criticism, expressions of competition), and under democratic conditions only 31 per cent. Authoritarianism developed two scapegoats. Hostility in one experiment was thirty times as frequent in the authoritarian as in the democratic group.

Democracy in this experiment consisted in (1) having the group discuss and choose what projects it would undertake, (2) an equal amount of directive and compliant behavior by the leader (it was 63 to 1 directive under the authoritarian leaders), (3) participation by leader over twice as great as under the *laissez-faire* conditions, (4) leaving members free to work with whom they chose and to divide work tasks by informal discussion and personal choice, (5) using "objective" rather than "personal" praise and criticism.

One feature of democratic culture is the stressing of love and friendliness. Cultural anthropology suggests that there may be some degree of subcultural incompatibility between authority and love. The Tro-

* From review in the *Bulletin of Family Research and Education,* I:3 (June, 1940), 12.

briand father secures a remarkably affectionate relation with his son while the authority is in the uncle-nephew relation. The Arapesh, who have a non-rigid social structure, in which the individual shifts easily from one group to another, show extremely little aggression and hold the "growing" of the individual as a high value. [Mead, M., 1937.] Affection has gained in the modern family as authority has declined. Many sociologists believe not only that there is more affection between parents and children today than a generation ago, but even that there will be still more in the future. Plant [1932, 71–74], from his intimate psychiatric knowledge of suburban families, thinks that there will be greater real affection in the future although the symbols may be disappearing. He remarks that the clinic patient today "quite shamefacedly 'admits' loving his parents and depending upon them as did he, one hundred years ago, 'admit' his abhorrence of his family group."

Hence it is not enough to say that authority is merely ill-adapted to our particular, present culture. Authority is contrary to the whole value scheme of democratic freedom which we have chosen although not yet fully put into effect. It is our democratic faith that the smooth order, the good manners, and all the other advantages of authoritarian society are purchased at too high a price, and that the greatest happiness, despite difficulties and many individual breakdowns, lies in the long run in a freer social order in which family and primary group life are the most important segment.

C. CHILD GUIDANCE IN A DEMOCRACY

A NEW DEMOCRATIC FAMILY CONTROL IS DEVELOPING AMONG INTELLIGENT FAMILIES. Democracy does not mean *laissez-faire*. It does not mean the absence of all discipline and all punishment. It means that obedience is valued only when a necessary means, and not as an end. It means that the parents, adults, or any other class of persons who hold power are not to impose *ends* or *values* by authority, except the value of freedom itself. A democratic group must have *social control* within itself in order to preserve its democracy, for *laissez-faire* or anarchy eventually leads to the seizing of power by the strong and the imposition of an authoritative regime. This social control may make use of explanation, suggestion, rewards, or even punishments where other means do not avail. But these controls are used for the aim of freedom plus any other ends which are compatible with essen-

tial freedom and are approved by the particular group. The parent must of course do some of the thinking for younger children, but in so doing the democratic parent will represent, in a sense, their future mature selves, and also their present conscious interests so far as not clearly incompatible with their future welfare.

HARMFUL AGGRESSION, NOT ANGER ITSELF, SHOULD BE REPRESSED. Intelligent modern parents realize that the child needs and often wants to be controlled in certain respects. This is particularly true of aggressive impulses, complete freedom in which is a menace to Democracy. Dr. Harry M. Tiebout, in a lecture at Vassar College in 1936, developed this thesis, i.e., that the child often wishes to repress hostile behavior and wants the parent's help in doing it. The parent must share the burden of saying *no*. A child who was playing "cat" to some other children who were "mice" said, "You'll see I don't really eat them up," indicating that he was aware of the need to keep his attacking, biting impulses within the bounds of playful harmlessness.

Katharine Taylor [1937, 37] has pointed out that there is often a need for "atonement" on the part of children and adolescents. This is a desire to pay compensation or make voluntary sacrifice for a wrong done. The encouragement and acceptance of this by the parents is constructive, and very different from "punishment," which may be accepted as just or regarded as unjust. The so-called "need for punishment" is a need for atonement.

Gerald Pearson [1939] discusses the causes, expressions, and possible treatment of overaggressive children, those who do not early in life learn to socialize their natural aggressive feelings. Most children, as they grow up, learn that some of these feelings can be directly expressed without social disapproval or self-harm. Against other of these feelings defenses have to be built up. Loving and understanding adults can help a child in this process. The chronically aggressive child, the one whose defenses are inadequate to socialize him, may be one who was born with a greater degree of aggressive drive than most children have. Another cause may be the presence of brain injury or disease. However, the most common causes are psychic, growing out of guilty feelings on the child's part or resulting from rejection by his parents. "The basic . . . factor is serious frustration . . . The child is frustrated in his desire to love and to be loved. He reacts with chronic anger and hate in order to punish those persons who have contributed to the painfulness of his frustrations or to ensure himself that he will not again suffer the pain of further frustration. He avoids any love relationship, loves no one, and wishes no one to love him . . . His aggressive reaction begets hostile reactions from his environment which in turn beget more aggresssions from him and a vicious circle of chronic aggressive reactions

develops which spread far beyond the original persons to involve perhaps all other human beings with whom he comes in contact." Psychiatric help at this point aims at removing the fear and anxiety which prevent the child from loving and allowing himself to be loved, and then helping the child to learn to direct his great energies in ways that will not only be acceptable to society, but will also be beneficial to him.*

Many mental hygienists believe that chronic aggressive and deep-seated hostilities would be prevented if there could be greater freedom to express anger spontaneously within the family group, both for children and for parents. [See Levy and Munroe, 1938.] They think it is good for the child to be allowed to attack his parents physically without having a moral issue made of the matter, and for spouses to begin quarreling before their anger accumulates and produces continuous tension. They say we must learn to "accept" our own anger and hostilities and not regard them with a sense of guilt. This means that we should teach the child to think of anger as he does of an illness, and not as something which "deserves" punishment or calls for retaliation. We need to discuss anger objectively as we need to discuss sex and all other feelings and emotions.

Each family needs to develop a consistent, democratic policy for dealing with its internal hostilities. This does not mean that all members must be expected to express or control anger in the same way, for their glands and their experiences have produced differences which Democracy will respect. But a family could have a guiding philosophy such as in the following hypothetical cases.

In our family, we do not want to hurt one another. It is very unpleasant to be angry, and the person who has a temper is punished enough already. If others will not make it harder for me when I am mad, I will try not to hurt them in my anger.

In our family, we never hold anything against a person which he said when he was angry. I say what I feel, and I let others do the same. We sometimes enjoy hearing how wild a person will talk when he is mad. No command or statement made in anger has to be taken seriously unless ratified in a cooler moment.

In our family, everyone has to pay in some way for damage he does to property because of anger. As a result, we have a wood pile or a punching

* From review in the *Bulletin of Family Research and Education,* I:4 (September, 1940), 13–14.

bag and some old junk in the cellar which we can smash when we get mad. We keep the cellar door unlocked so we can get there quickly enough.

In our family, we make a practice of going off alone when angry, because we want others to see us only when we are attractive. Anyone can be excused from what he is doing when he gets mad, just as if he were going to the bathroom.

In our family, we have a time every evening at which it is agreed anyone can get anything off his chest. When the complaining person is making his speech, the others must listen without interruption till he declares he is finished no matter what he says.

Perhaps no one of these policies can ever be carried out perfectly. Some of them might be combined, but to a certain extent they represent different value schemes from which a definite choice must be made. The trouble with many families is that they have no consistent policy of managing hostility, and as a result some persons are enabled to dominate or exploit others through the way they express anger, or even through their control or lack of it.

It is a serious mistake, however, to be guided, in our management of hostility, by the mental-hygiene–spontaneity doctrine alone. To provide adequate, "healthy," spontaneous expression to anger is indeed one objective. But there is another principle and objective which must be recognized, namely, that there is a very natural tendency for anger to provoke the anger of others if it is expressed in such a way as to hurt them. It may sometimes be better to "keep the peace" than to allow an individual the expression which is most immediately "healthy" for him. We must guide anger into channels which do the least damage to social relations.

Alice Keliher [1939], writing on "What Shall We Do About Hatred?" suggests: (1) helping children to understand the psychology of hate, using among other devices such films as *Fury, Black Legion,* and *Zola* with adolescents; (2) keeping our own adult group relationships as free as possible from tensions; (3) directing hostile feelings toward cleaning up the evils of our society.

Finally, the ultimate objective, both of accepting and expressing anger, and of controlling or guiding it into safe channels, is to *reduce its total amount.*

Anger is of an entirely different character from hunger and sex. It is an emergency reaction called forth by various threats to the safety of the animal organism. It is no more necessary to health to exercise anger than it is

necessary to exercise a fire alarm signal to keep it in practice. Anger, physiologically speaking, is a necessary evil and the more we can reduce the occasions for its use the better off we are. Not so with hunger and sex, which are positive, constructive processes contributing to growth, development, and happiness.*

A person does not generate hostility within himself at some constant rate so that he must inevitably discharge the accumulation at certain intervals. Indeed something like this seems to happen in many persons who have inner conflicts, memories of past injustice, or long-lasting frustrations. Yet even with these, the outer situation makes a tremendous difference. The mental-hygiene–psychoanalytic theory is valuable, but it should not be allowed to blind us to the situational causes and control of anger. When we find people generally happy and friendly it is well to observe carefully the situations which make them so, and not to discount these observations because of a suspicion of deep, unconscious accumulations of hostility.

HEALTHY PARENT-CHILD RELATIONS REQUIRE SKILLS IN MANAGING THINGS, MONEY, AND TIME. This management of anger and hostility is only one part of the problem of social control in the family. A large part of it, in modern society, relates to the management of possessions, money, and time. A great deal of the tension in modern parent-child relations is due to the necessity of protecting fragile or vulnerable property—all the so-called "nice things" which go with our high standards of living—from the unskilled handling of little children or the animal spirits of older children and adolescents.

Another large part of family tension is due to our exacting time schedules. Most of the things we have done to enrich and improve daily life require watching the clock. The child must be taken to the nursery school and brought home at the right time. Children must be dressed and ready to go when a busy parent is ready to go. Living by the clock is not natural and requires special training. A curious social lag inheres in the fact that we have largely given up the dignity and placid rhythm symbolized by the grandfather clock or the chimes in the church tower, the simple but punctual school programs of the small community, the regularity of early rising and family prayers, while at the same time we have increased the need for this healthy obedience to time through the multiplication of our activities. It is

* From review of Lund, *Emotions*, in the *Bulletin of Family Research and Education*, I:2 (April, 1940), 16–17.

safe to say that in many families tension and discipline are in major part problems of time management: dilatoriness, tardiness, and hurry.

Much of the conflict in modern families is a struggle for *attention.* Children learn to whine and scream because only in that way do they get attention. Adolescents come to hate the family dinner table and to prefer the refrigerator or the outside "feed," partly because they cannot find a sympathetic hearing. Father buries himself in his newspaper because there is "no use in trying to talk to his family anyway, they are so preoccupied with other things." The person who is best able to get a hearing and to dominate the family scene is the one, be he father, mother, or child, who can talk in the way a good taxi-driver drives: in brief, ruthless spurts, pressing every advantage, his attention on the immediate purpose and not upon any long-run objective or constant direction. *Family life education might well include a study of conversational techniques and manners.* This should be analytical and not "preachy."

The art of selecting children's *toys* needs to be cultivated. Many toys are bought because the child sees them in store windows, because other people have them, or because Christmas or a birthday has come along and one must simply get something now, regardless of long-run plans. Many are the gifts of ill-informed friends who have frantically ransacked their imaginations and then decided to buy the first thing they could find. Many American toys are miniature and useless imitations of something in the adult world. Their most efficient performance is to come apart and scatter their parts over the entire house where they can never be found when father may be in the mood to repair them. There are some toys which really "work," such as electric trains, but they are expensive and father guards them and operates them. They are really *his* toys. We often buy the child toy furniture, and he prefers to use his strength to move the real furniture around the room; we provide the lone child with a fine set of apparatus in a lonesome corner of the backyard, but he prefers to spend his time "under mother's feet," or where other people are.

Perhaps in the more progressive urban families we are beginning to learn some things which farm families know and primitive peoples knew; that participation in a useful family enterprise, such as making a garden or building a henhouse, is real fun, that sticks and stones and little streams can be talked to and manipulated with as much pleasure as painted objects bought in stores. The child needs large, integral objects: wagons, tricycles, and pets. Toys consisting of many small separate parts are of dubious value, unless the parent can give enough

supervision to teach the child to use them and keep them in order, or unless the child has shown a definite interest, as in painting. The nursery school is a most important agency in toy education and playground engineering, and is setting new standards which better meet the real needs of children and families.

MORAL EDUCATION IN A DEMOCRACY SHOULD BECOME PARTLY TECHNICAL EDUCATION. The remedy for these difficulties seems to lie in shifting emphasis from the moral to the technical or workmanship attitude. Instead of exhorting children to promptness, thrift, and orderliness as self-justifying virtues, we need to teach these as techniques of living. Instead of saying, "Do not do this because it is wrong, or be this because it is right and good," we should say, "Here is the way we do so-and-so."

Since the breakdown of religious authority, some educators have tried to set up various codes of morals or good citizenship. These are based upon social sanctions and make various patriotic and broad ethical appeals, but they are still couched in the form of the Ten Commandments. They are essentially puritanical in approach. The Puritan was a step ahead of ecclesiastical authoritarianism. He refused to accept the priesthood as mediators of the divine authority, and instead he quoted scripture directly. He transferred to his own soul the full responsibility for deciding between right and wrong. But this Puritan authoritarianism was only a step toward Democracy and needs now to be superseded. A democratic society needs to inculcate *uniformly* only a central core of ultimate values which is simpler in content than that found in most "codes of morality." This central core would contain such ideas as the humane attitude or prevention of suffering, freedom and justice. *These should carry the entire motivation.* Their fewness and simplicity would enable them to do this. Most other values should be treated as *instruments* and taught as *techniques of living,* just as we teach children *how* to brush their teeth. Some values might be taught as options for personal choice.

Thus, in practice, instead of having ten or fifteen great moral principles or commandments we might have three, and all the rest should be taught as part of the "how," incorporated into concrete instruction regarding work and play. Such standards as promptness and neatness could be broken down into specific techniques. Technical instruction carries a critical and discriminating attitude. For example, in teaching neatness as a technique, one would bring discussion and evidence to bear on the questions: "When is neatness helpful toward realization of the ultimate values of Democracy, and why? When is it not essen-

tial?" When neatness is taught as a moral virtue, on the other hand, one does not suggest that it is sometimes unnecessary, for it is felt that this would "weaken" the moral code. It is probable that the important neatnesses of life will be more effectively taught when this discriminating, instrumental, technical attitude is substituted for the older moral attitude. Children will see it as a skill leading to certain results instead of as an absolute value imposed upon them.

In brief, a democratic moral education will link the ideas of right and wrong to a *few goals to be achieved,* rather than to *the things a person does.* It will substitute a sense of positive responsibility to one's fellows and the "instinct of workmanship" for puritan "conscience" and sense of guilt.

A DEMOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY OF PARENTHOOD. There is no space here to discuss the set-up and many useful findings of recent research in child development, nor the various insights which have grown out of nursery school work and other observation of children. Some good guides to such knowledge are given in the supplementary readings to this chapter in Appendix A. One child psychologist has expressed the opinion that accurate information about child development is less current today than it was ten years ago, because the trend in parent education has been toward informal discussion and sharing of experiences by mothers, with less authoritative and factual teaching by experts. If this is true, it is not necessarily bad. The research is certainly valuable, but it is now felt by many of the experts themselves that the greater immediate need is to overcome prejudices, emotional blocks, and unfavorable ways of home living which prevent the use of scientific data.

Dr. Thomas W. Salmon once remarked, "What we need is not so much children's clinics as parentoria where parents could be made over." [Williams, F., 1930, 149.]

One clergyman would rewrite the Fifth Commandment: "Honor thy sons and thy daughters and all the children of men, that their days may be blessed by what thou art able to accomplish for them and for those who shall come after them." * Many parents, responding to the appeals of modern psychology, are becoming "child idolaters" in place of "potentates," as Dr. John Levy recently pointed out.†

The problem cannot be solved simply by transferring the emotional burden of guilt from the child to the adult. Today's parent is no more "to blame" than yesterday's child was "to blame." Both are the

* *New York Times,* March 7, 1932, p. 15.

† *New York Times,* January 20, 1934, p. 16.

victims of maladjustments in culture. The parent must learn to satisfy the child's fundamental wishes without enslaving himself and surrendering his own efficiency as a person to the child's momentary desires. The problem calls not for the ideology of self-sacrifice but for the ideology of the engineer or artist. The art of good parenthood in a democracy is based on seven major principles.

1. *We need to observe the whole behavior of the child.* Gertrude Laws [1927], by a rating experiment, found that parents tend in general to *underestimate* the quality of their own treatment of their children and to judge overgenerously the responses made by the children. But there are three significant exceptions. The parent thinks himself better than he is and thinks the child worse than he is, when (*a*) the child's response is a source of continuous irritation to the parent, (*b*) higher standards are expected by the parents than by observers, (*c*) the response is one in which the child is apt to make a better showing outside the family.

In another study once quoted by Ruth Andrus,* 143 fifth grade girls wrote papers on what they resented. Sixty-seven of these 143 described false accusations, and only 3 of the 67 reported that any apology was made.

A mother, whose thinking was on the border line between the old and the new child training, was very much troubled by the bad table manners of a 10-year-old daughter. Efforts to correct these at the table brought about resentment and made the whole family unhappy. "But," said the mother, "if we let her continue this way, these habits will be more and more deeply fixed and she will not be acceptable when she goes out in company." A little further observation disclosed that the girl in fact had very good manners elsewhere and when there were guests. Once she disclosed that she felt home to be a place where she could "let down" from many standards she felt imposed upon her outside the home; she also felt a need for some environment where she could be spontaneous and careless. She really had developed two sets of table habits and it was the situation which caused one or the other to operate. Being in the home, with her mother nagging at her and her father preoccupied with his own work, was a situation which called for the "bad" manners.

Another child said to her mother, "Isn't there some place where I can be myself?"

2. *The art of parenthood requires that the parent respect his own needs and pursue his own health and happiness effectively by planning, which is a very different thing from becoming arbitrary or*

* Lecture, Vassar College, 1938.

"mean" when his patience is exhausted. "The first duty of parents to their children is to live happily themselves," reports one high school class of adolescents after a discussion. [Taylor, K., 1937, 53.]

One suggestion toward greater parental happiness is that parents learn to play with their children spontaneously, to "let themselves go," to behave as they did when children. It does not have the beneficial effect on the parent if he plays only at the request of the child. Often he is not in the mood at that time, and merely acceding to the child's request is another one of those sacrificial acts performed with inner strain. The parent must feel free to initiate play, noise and "rough house" when *he* feels in the mood for it as well as when the child asks it.

One way to take the sting out of children's noise is to make more noise oneself. Occasional, deliberate noise contests in the cellar or backyard have a strangely soothing effect (sometimes because they are hoarsening) upon the child's vocal cords. One way to deal with the annoyance caused by the child's untidy dissemination of porridge or garden earth over his face and surroundings is that the parent himself get into old clothes and delightfully wallow with the child in some such "mess." Both children and parents need vacations from cleanliness as they perhaps do from godliness. The healthy personality is one which enjoys *both* dirt and cleanliness, *both* noise and quiet, *both* rest and strenuous activity. Our efforts to preserve "happy media" all the time often result in getting no satisfactions of either sort. The emotionally healthy life is one of spontaneity, of contrasts, of going now to one extreme and now to the other, within the limits of physical safety.

Perhaps more than ever before the art of managing children is primarily an art of managing oneself. If the parent has control over his own daily work and routine, if he makes purchases, chooses his recreations and his volunteer community activities comfortably within the limits of his time and his income, resisting the constant social pressure to have, do, and be everything, then he may be able to keep the poise and serenity which are commanding and often magnetic in dealing with all other human beings. The parent who is unfatigued and unhurried is able to give to the petulant child just that extra half-minute of attention and personal interest which may make the difference between screaming negativism and cheerful cooperation. He has the time and mental freedom to think out a tactful or strategic course of dealing with a problem, where the harassed parent can only choose between further threatening and complete abdication of his will.

But if parents in a modern urban environment are to manage their own lives wisely they must give each other strong moral support against the actual or fancied criticism of neighbors, relatives, and colleagues. Herein lies a yet ill-developed but peculiarly needed function of the modern family. Whereas the old-fashioned family was largely an instrument of the church or the state or the general mores (which were then more simple and uniform), the modern family needs to be a fort of resistance against pressures from outside. It needs to develop a certain culture of its own with which it may enjoy some degree of complacency. This does not mean unfriendliness to the community; it means an independence which may earn respect.

To achieve this function it is needful that mate selection be based more than it is now on similarity in those values which are costly in time and money or which concern children. Prospective partners might well take inventory not only of the positive interests they can share, but also of the interests they are willing to eliminate when pressure increases, and of the standards they are willing to fall short of. They need to discuss their standards in regard to the behavior and control of children. For example, parents with their young child on a journey may stop to call briefly on friends. The mother wants to leave the child out in the car because "she doesn't look well enough to go in." The father angrily replies that if that is the case he will not go in either. Yet such destructive experiences might be avoided, even if the couple did not fully agree at the outset, by thoughtful discussions begun early in their joint life.

Second, and perhaps more difficult, is the need to win children, and especially adolescents, away from slavish subservience to standards imposed by their gang or their "set." To do this it is necessary to begin philosophizing about such standards and building up other, family standards, before the youngsters are exposed to the full pressure. Cooperation among like-minded families holds important possibilities. Recently in a Massachusetts suburb, parents discussed and made some approaches to controlling adolescent standards of recreation and expenditure through the medium of a parents' organization. Even where no interfamily cooperation in child care or in collective feeding is feasible (and these now loom upon the horizon), ideological and moral cooperation might be possible

3. *The art of parenthood requires communicating a philosophy as well as habits.* In the home of many years ago the authority of parents was supported by an atmosphere of religious authority, kept before the attention by family prayers and other ritual. The building

of a new, democratic family discipline would be facilitated by the development of new rituals or revitalizing the old with new content, consisting of ideas of social responsibility and Democracy. The need for cooperation in the home is indeed based upon something beyond the immediate comfort of the family members and should be taught through some kind of dramatic, pleasantly impressive means, and not merely through the irritable scolding of the parent who has lost his patience. In modern family life we tend to verbalize our values only when they are outraged and we are thereby annoyed. It is no wonder that children often learn to dislike these values and come to accept them only in later years when they are expressed by other persons in other words. We are ashamed to be "sentimental," and too much in a hurry to be philosophical, hence there is no dignified, positive inculcation of values like that practiced by our more reverent and less hurried grandparents.

4. *The democratic philosophy of parenthood stresses service rather than sacrifice.* The older ideology of child-rearing prescribed reciprocal "sacrifice" by the parent and the child. Neither was supposed to do what he really wanted to do but only "what he ought to do." In return for their sacrifices, parents often expected returns from their children which thwarted the children's own development.

Kimball Young [1927, 374] has described several cases of the *projection* of parents' unsatisfied ambitions onto their children. One father, for example, had missed through youthful misbehavior an opportunity for a musical career. He developed a fantasy that his son had the makings of a musical genius and gave him nine years of costly musical education in spite of the boy's obvious unfitness and lack of interest. Finally the son refused to continue, to the tragic frustration of his father and the injury of their relationship. The father lost all enjoyment of music.

The doctrine of parental sacrifice, coupled with birth control, has contributed to the falling of the birth rate below replacement needs. We live for our children; they cannot repay us, but they in turn will live for their children, and so on *ad infinitum,* and, perhaps it would be uncharitable to add, *ad absurdum.* What is the ultimate purpose of all this self-sacrifice? In a sense the final term of the series would seem to be typified by the single child in the highest social stratum, who will inherit the combined wealth of his two parents and indirectly a large share of the wealth of his four grandparents. Then the line will die out and the stock will be replaced, if at all, by new generations of

social climbers from poorer strata of population, or from immigrant (or invading!) peoples.

The newer philosophy is neither more nor less "selfish" than the old. It likewise stands for cooperation and reciprocal services. It would guide this relationship by the real needs of both children and parents.

5. *"Real" needs are ascertained by the principle that fundamentally each person is the best judge of his own needs.* This is not to be taken as an absolute formula. It is subject to qualification. Immediate, felt needs are often contrary to long-run needs. But we must begin with the conscious needs, by giving each person, regardless of age or sex, complete freedom to express them. The next step is for the parent to understand more clearly and accurately the child's expression of need. A busy family found its 3-year-old child one morning angrily refusing breakfast and rejecting every attempt to please and pacify her. They tried everything. Finally they discovered the real source of frustration: Father had brought in the newspaper from the front porch instead of waiting for the child to fetch it as she had expected to do. Of course the child "should" learn to "accept" variation in such routines and not always to insist upon "having his own way." But before that can be done it is necessary to understand exactly what the child wants, no matter how whimsical or unreasonable. Then it is possible to reason, to compromise, to offer substitutes, to overrule intelligently when this must be done.

6. A related principle may then be applied: *Satisfy those needs of each person which involve disproportionately low costs to other persons.* Cases may be categorized; there is not time to judge every individual act separately. But the categorizing must be realistic and based on the experience of the particular family, and not derived from vague, abstract verbalizations about rights and duties. For example, a principle might be adopted that any person would generally "wait upon" another when requested, except when doing mental or creative physical work, or when the request makes necessary an immediate trip to another floor of the house.

7. *Good personality development demands that we help the child to develop many positive values and interests and to minimize aversions and dislikes.* Ruth Andrus described a mother seen at a railway station with her young child, about to board a train. As the train approached, the mother directed the child's attention to the sight of the approaching train, then to its increasing sound, then to its smell. All this was done in reassuring, enthusiastic tones. The parent who thus

uses every opportunity to link pleasant emotions to some new stimulus favors a rich, healthy, personality development in his child.

Lawrence Frank holds that early childhood education properly handled is more effective as a solution to our social and economic problems of the future than any amount of legislation to those ends. Those who work with children should realize that children need to grow and develop at their own rates. Feeding and elimination, for example, cannot always be managed by standardized rules and every consideration must be given a child's individual and particular rates of growth. Moreover, in establishing these routines the adult's emotional overtones should be as free as possible from tenseness and disgust. Weaning and toilet training, says Frank, as often handled, are important sources of personality twists and biases, and may give rise to persistent needs in the child.*

The essence of the new philosophy is that "babies are human beings," and "children are people." They are not plants which one waters and cultivates according to universal formulas. They are not something to be "used" for the convenience, the amusement, or the pride of their parents, nor even to be bossed and bullied "for their own good" (conceived in terms of culture-centered values). Each child develops an inner world of values and purposes. It is just as real a value to a certain child that "teddy-bear" should sit on a certain chair next to "pink bunny" in order to feed him, as it is a value to the fastidious adult that the color scheme of the living room should be just right. Widely divergent substitutes are possible in either case. Children's personal values are perhaps less well adjusted to general social values and needs than are those of adults, but on the other hand they are much more malleable. Yet to overrule them ruthlessly and arbitrarily on the ground that they are "merely childish whims" is to miss the very essence of Democracy in its primary seedbed of the family group.

When parents thus respect the private worlds and personal values of their children, they may safely demand greater respect for their own needs. The mother will find she can afford to delegate some of her work and to be physically absent from the home for longer periods, in order to enrich other aspects of her own personality, if she has more sympathetic insight into the child's needs *when she is present.* Many a mother feels that the father has a better relationship to the children despite the much less time he spends with them. Likewise parents

* From review in the *Bulletin of Family Research and Education,* I.1 (February, 1940), 18–19.

may well demand time and space for their own love life together without interference by children. All these things would be favored by certain modifications in the physical home and the division of labor within it. These will be discussed in later chapters. If the fundamental philosophy here suggested commends itself, the correlated material and economic changes will be more easily undertaken, and there may be hope of restoring the average family to a racially adequate size by making it a happier family.

Chapter XI

LOVE AS EXPERIENCE AND RELATIONSHIP

Democracy calls for fully developed and happy personalities. The most important factor contributing to this end is the attitudes of parents. Work with maladjusted children in clinics has commonly led to a study of the parents themselves and the love relationship between them, for it was found that herein lay the key to the remedy. The child at first was the patient, but soon it was found to be the marriage of the parents which was sick. As we have seen, in modern urban, liberal society, the health of a marriage depends, more directly and to a greater degree than in earlier days, upon satisfying love.

A. LOVE FEELINGS AND THEIR OBJECTS

WHAT IS LOVE? "Love" is a broad, loose concept which has different meanings to different people. It is unnecessary to formulate an exact definition; there is a common core of meaning upon which all will agree. We shall use it, however, as a descriptive and not an evaluative word. Hence let us not enter into moralistic controversies as to what constitutes "true love," "higher love," "lower love," and so on, but rather let us try to describe and analyze the actual experiences which people call by this name. We note, first, that "love" refers to certain kinds of behavior (including feeling) and, second, to certain kinds of social relations or interaction which seem to be based upon this behavior.

Behavior, as we have seen, always involves stimulus, linkage, and reaction. The original, inborn stimuli which first arouse love behavior are tactual or internal (although possibly in some animals they include smell). But these, after all, are of little significance except as starting points; the great bulk of love behavior in childhood, adolescence, and maturity is composed of conditioned or canalized responses. There are some stimuli of a purely sensory, impersonal kind which sometimes arouse various love reactions even in adults, such as genital

friction, perfumes, and music, but for the most part love stimuli are configurations of persons and their characteristics. Hence in practice it is common to speak of the *objects* rather than the stimuli of love, and it is understood that love objects are mainly persons. However, animals, inanimate objects, and places occasionally play the role of love objects.

LOVE AS FEELING. What are the types of reaction which constitute "love"? We have seen that they belong to the appetitive system of behavior and that their feeling elements belong to the pleasant group. If and when any kind of love is painful, it is the frustration of desire and not the love experience itself which is unpleasant. However, intense love experiences involve the profound emotions as described by Lund, and these, although intensely pleasant, may involve the sympathetic nervous system along with the parasympathetic. Most people would agree that the most intense pleasures of human life are within this section of our behavior called love. Moreover, it would be agreed that the supremely intense love experiences occupy much less time than do love feelings of a milder intensity, accompanied by anticipation or retrospect which give a pleasant tone to fairly long periods of time during the process of living.

While feelings are the central core of love reactions, there are overt muscular reactions also, such as those of caressing and "love-making," and even ordinary acts of walking, dancing, and talking, which are so closely associated with the love feelings that they belong to the total love picture.

But let us examine the love feelings, for they are from many points of view the center of the picture. Using common or literary words, we may roughly distinguish: (1) sexual or erotic feelings, (2) "tender" feelings, (3) "rapturous" or ecstatic feelings, and (4) miscellaneous pleasant or "joyful" feelings which are difficult to classify. Sexual feelings seem definitely localized in the genital region, although they may have "overtones" which seem to spread throughout the body. Tender feelings are more difficult to localize but they seem to involve sensations in the skin, particularly of the chest, face, lips, and inner surface of the arms. Elsewhere the author has called them "dermal love." [1934, 67.] Rapturous feelings seem to involve the chest, heart, and respiration, hence they have been called "cardiac-respiratory love" [1934, p. 68]. Miscellaneous pleasant feelings seem not localized at all; but when they become intense they may merge into laughter and hence involve the chest and diaphragm, and the facial muscles used in smiling.

Let us refer now to the list of generalized motives of human personality on page 306. These concepts are neither stimuli nor reactions specifically, but broad classes of goals toward which whole systems of behavior are oriented. Four of these motives are closely related to love behavior as we have here described it. The relationships are roughly sketched in Table 11.

TABLE 11

LOVE MOTIVES AND FEELINGS

Type of Motive	Type of Contact between Lover and Love Object	Type of Love Feeling
(4) Sex urge	Extensive or heavy bodily contact	Sexual
(10) Reverential-masochistic motive	Light bodily contact or no bodily contact. Face-to-face and/or distant communication, sometimes through imagination.	Rapturous (Joyful) (Tender)
(14) Sociability	No bodily contact. Face-to-face communication.	Joyful
(15) Affection	Light bodily contact when possible. Face-to-face (and occasionally distant) communication.	Tender (Joyful) (Rapturous)

The Psychoanalytic and Behavioristic Theories of Love. The Freudian or psychoanalytic theory is that all these kinds of love behavior are expressions of one basic kind of sex or love energy known as *libido.* This, in some ill-defined sense, is regarded as constant in quantity for any given individual at any one stage of his development. It changes its bodily localization during the course of development according to the following stages [Healy *et al.,* 1930, 86, citing Abraham's theory of erotogenic zones]:

1. Oral-erotic stage—infancy.
   (*a*) Lips (sucking).
   (*b*) Gums and teeth (biting).
2. Anal-erotic stage—infancy.
   (*a*) Pleasure in defecation.
   (*b*) Pleasure in retention of feces, and urethral pleasure.
3. Genital stage.
   (a) Phallic or early genital—normally established by end of infancy.
   (*b*) Complete genital primacy—reached at puberty—masturbatory impulses awaken.

Other Freudian writers mention the skin, the muscles, the eyes as erotic zones in some individuals. Sadger regarded the extreme pleas-

ure of some persons in athletic activity as muscle-eroticism. [*Ibid.*, 89.]

There are also, according to Freudian theory, three stages of development from the standpoint of *objects* [*ibid.*, 100–104]:

1. *Auto-erotism,* an infantile cathexis (direction of expression, conditioning) in which the infant gets satisfaction from parts of his own body, as in thumb sucking and masturbation, but without conscious recognition of the distinctness of self from the outside world.

2. *Narcism,* or love of self as a recognized entity, distinct from the outside world (after the classical story of Narcissus); includes love of own body.

3. *Allo-erotism* or *object cathexis,* love of external objects, including parent love, homosexual and heterosexual love.

Freudians hold further that in this third stage two types may be observed: (1) the narcistic type which is a displacement of narcistic self-love onto another person, and in which the person selected resembles the self in some significant respect; (2) the dependence type, which is genuine object love, seeking a person who satisfies one's needs, perhaps supplies what one lacks in oneself. The dependence type, it is said, resembles more nearly the relationship to the parent of opposite sex and, barring conflicts which might arise out of this resemblance, is the more likely to be lasting.

F. H. Allport [1924, 67–69], on the other hand, holds that there are inborn "sensitive zone reflexes" which form the basis of tender and parent-child love, and which are entirely distinct from the sexual reflexes.

The biological stimuli to the sensitive zone reflexes are rubbing, patting, rocking, contact with the warm skin of another person, and the like. The original reactions include smiling, and "cuddling" movements to maintain and increase the stimuli. The sensitive zones are the skin areas peculiarly sensitive to such stimuli: nipples, arm pits, and mouth. Sensitive zone reactions are pleasant but not "sexual." The sexual reflexes are stimulated by accumulation of semen, blood hormones, and warmth or friction in the genital region; and it is through the linkage of these reflexes to person-objects that true sexual love develops, and not through transfer of energy from the sensitive zone reactions.

Although he is not sure that the origins of love can all be put into these two clear-cut categories, the present author agrees with Allport that the development of love behavior is a process of learning, that is, of linking and unlinking of stimuli and reactions through neural path-

ways, and not a process of growing through a series of stages. He rejects "libido" as a misleading figure of speech. There is no special kind of energy which is sexual or love energy.

Subject to some very few limitations which may be imposed by inborn reflexes and by the delayed anatomical maturity of the sex organs, any of the love reactions can become linked to almost any stimulus, and to one another (for every reaction also produces inner stimuli which may be linked to further reactions). Love behavior may thus be organized by the learning process into a single system or several somewhat separate systems. Its larger patterning is done by the environment and not by anatomy.

The sucking reflex is one of the few inborn patterns of behavior. The linkage of this reaction to the stimulus of a warm, soft object which touches the lips may also be inborn, but in any case it develops quite universally within the first few days of life. Any infant of which this were not true would be greatly handicapped in satisfying the basic need for food. Moreover, there is some evidence to suggest that there is an inborn need to do a certain amount of sucking even if adequate food is obtained with less than this amount. [Murphy *et al.*, 1937, 304.] The child who is weaned early is frequently found to be addicted to thumb sucking, nail biting, or lip biting, although this writer knows of no rigorous statistical proof of such a correlation greater than would be due to chance. However, many psychiatrists and psychologists feel quite certain that there is such a correlation and they have set up the concept of the "oral personality," or mouth-centered person, who derives an unusual proportion of his satisfaction from stimuli to the lips. He may take to public speaking, or playing of wood winds [*ibid.*, 304], or become an inveterate pipe smoker.

From these facts and partially supported hypotheses, many thinkers of the Freudian school jump to a further conclusion for which there seems no such good evidence. They say that sucking is an early mode of expressing the "libido" (which apparently includes all appetitive behavior). They regard kissing as a survival of this early expression, and speak of women who have indulged a great deal in petting and kissing but cannot achieve sexual orgasm as cases of "oral fixation." These are said to be immature in their libido development, fixated at the childish, oral stage.

Yet there is no evidence of any *inborn* connection between sucking behavior and the sexual reflexes. The much later maturing of the sexual reflexes would tend to argue against such an innate connection.

On the other hand, there is plenty of opportunity for such a connection to be developed by *learning.*

In our culture, when the boy first begins to have either sexual or rapturous feelings vaguely directed toward girls, it is abundantly suggested to him, by the combined efforts of comrades, literature, and the movies, that there is something peculiarly delectable about kissing the lips of a girl other than one's sister. Perhaps he experiences this occasionally in games through his own adventurous experiments, and the vaguely anticipated, slightly feared pleasure becomes more and more a reality. At the same time it is quite likely that he finds a similar kiss from older female relatives as highly disgusting. But the kissing of the girl becomes linked to rapturous and, later, erotic feelings. The kiss which thus becomes a source of keen pleasure during adolescence is commonly a light touch of closed lips and bears little resemblance to sucking behavior. The "deep" kiss is more likely to develop later, and some persons never care for it. Other persons become so positively conditioned that kissing may even produce sexual orgasm.

There are whole societies, such as the Chinese, which do not regard the kiss as a source of pleasure, but which practice nose rubbing or some other form of caress instead. In French society the kissing of a male by a male on cheek or forehead is pleasant though not sexual; in American society it seems repulsive. In our society and many others, adults learn to secure a certain pleasure, known as tender love, from kissing babies or small children, without sexual or rapturous feelings. Our "orally fixated," sexually frigid women develop largely because our society permits a rather general pre-marital freedom of petting while at the same time there are still many groups and families and experiences which tend to create in girls a deep-lying fear or repulsion concerning the functions of the sex organs.

The libido theory was partly responsible for the prolonged resistance to another Freudian doctrine which appears to be sound and useful. This is the Oedipus theory. Oedipus was a mythological Greek king who unwittingly killed his father and married his mother. On discovering this he blinded himself in his horror and shame and abdicated his throne. The legend is regarded by Freud as symbolizing a common, if not universal, experience in personality development. The mother-fixated male is said to have an *Oedipus complex.* The woman whose love is fixated on her father is said to possess an *Electra complex* (from the heroine of the tragedies of Sophocles and Euripides). These two complexes are known as the *family romance.* When intense they are commonly repressed, and give rise to various

emotional maladjustments whose true origin is often not recognized. [Flügel, 1926; Healy *et al.*, 1930.] Much of the resistance to this theory is due to the fact that it implies erotic feeling within the family and a desire for incestuous sex relations. In some cases this may be true. But in most cases the feelings involved may be merely those of intense tenderness and joy. To assume that tender love must be a façade which hides a "repressed" sexual desire is just as arbitrary as to assume that a craving for ham and eggs indicates a repressed sexual desire.

Tenderness is in itself a strong pleasure. An extreme fixation of tender love upon the parent may prevent the personal separation which is necessary to developing new love relations, even though the genital reaction be not aroused by the parent. The Freudians attach much "unconscious" meaning to the oft-expressed desire of young children to be married to the parent of opposite sex. Yet this is not evidence of a universal incest desire. Young children play with the idea of marriage without any concept of its sexual implications.

Among the psychoanalyst leaders, Jung breaks away from the orthodox Freudian position in this respect. He holds that the principal motive in the child's love of the parent is a dependence or security motive rather than a sexual motive. The child is at first absolutely dependent on his parents for the satisfaction of all his desires, for food, warmth, and so on. With more or less painful effort he gradually learns to satisfy his desires himself. It is his non-love desires rather than his love desires in which he must become independent of other persons. The most common failure in personality development is this failure to achieve independence, this shirking of the "life task." [Flügel, 1926, 32–34.] Horney [1939] also presents a theory of personality development in which sexual attitudes follow the general pattern of the personality rather than determine it. Thus there is a masochistic, dependent type of personality which results from various childhood frustrations and parent-child relations. Sexual masochism may develop out of such a personality pattern but does not initiate it.

1. EROTIC FEELING. It is not the province of this book to describe the physiological details of sex behavior. These are ably presented in many recent books, some of which have been banned by the United States Post Office Department, an important organ of our democratic government, because they are too specific regarding contraception.

Love, or pleasure, is sexual whenever the genitals are directly or indirectly stimulated, and whenever they are not involved the pleasure is non-sexual. If a man were to enjoy ever so much the sight of the

female body, but without any reactions in the genital zone, his pleasure would be non-sexual. If on the other hand he were to experience even mild genital reactions from whipping his dog his pleasure would be sexual (in this illustration, a case of sadism).

Genital pleasure, or passion, may be secured either through biologically adequate (contact, friction, warmth, chemical hormones, or internal pressure) stimulation of these organs directly, or through their conditioned stimulation through vision or thought processes.

Several investigators have been attempting to measure the strength of drives. It has been found that individual rats differ enormously in the strength of sex drive. The method of measurement is as follows. The male rat in a cage is given access to a female which is in heat. But to reach her the male must cross an electric grid which gives him a shock, or he is punished by being suddenly dropped through a trap door into cold water. Some animals are thus quickly trained to avoid the female in the cage situation, to inhibit sex. Others continue the effort despite repeated and intense punishments. The number or intensity of punishments necessary to bring about inhibition measures the strength of the sex drive. [Stone, C. P., 1922.] If the animals of a single species show such individual differences, it would seem that human beings might differ similarly, in strength of sex drive, not as a result of training alone, but of their bodily chemistry. These chemical differences might be the result of heredity, or of feeding and growth factors.

According to a critical summary of research in sexual development [Willoughby, 1937], and other studies, the following generalizations may be roughly made. By the age of 20, in our society, about 75 or 80 per cent of men and 40 per cent of women have masturbated. Before the age of 12, about a fourth of the male masturbators reach orgasm, by the age of 20 the great majority do so. However, only from one-sixth to two-fifths (depending on age) of the female masturbators reach the climax. The median age of onset of masturbation and involuntary sexual emissions in boys is about 15; of the first love for the opposite sex, 16. Coitus first becomes physiologically possible for the boy at about 13. In the more inhibited cultures including our own more conservative groups, boys "probably do not indulge to the extent of 10 per cent until about 17, after which they rise sharply to about 25 per cent at 20, but in less inhibited European societies this rise begins about four years earlier and reaches about 70 per cent at 20." * In the Bromley and Britten study [1938] the college men students showed a rate of 55 per cent. In the more inhibited cultures and groups the figure for girls before 20 is probably somewhere between 10 and 20 per cent; in the Bromley study it was 26 per cent for college girls.

* R. R. Willoughby, *Sexuality in the Second Decade*, Washington, National Research Council, 1937.

Harvey [1932, A], summarizing the questionnaire and interview findings of Davis, Dickinson and Beam, Hamilton, and Pearl, computes the median frequency of coitus in marriage among the more intelligent classes as approximately 8 times per month, with the middle 50 per cent of the cases ranging from 3 to 15 times per month. The Terman study [pp. 268–274] indicated 6 times per month for those in their twenties, declining to 4 times per month for those in their forties.

Coitus practically always leads to orgasm in the male, except when, as with the Oneida-Karezza technique, it is deliberately prevented. The available studies indicate that a considerable minority of women fail to achieve orgasm in intercourse so frequently that it is felt to be a serious dissatisfaction. In the Terman study, out of the 760 wives, 168 said they "always" experienced orgasm, 338 "usually," 191 "sometimes," and 63 "never." Dickinson and Beam [1931] found that a much larger proportion—2 out of 5 women—had never experienced orgasm, but 1 out of 5 had it "sometimes." In the Hamilton study [1929, 150], 46 per cent were "inadequate" and 26 per cent never had an orgasm or were not sure of it. In the Landis study [1940, 100] about one-third of the women never had orgasm.

The Myth of Female Sex-Apathy. It is traditionally believed that the male has more sexual drive than the female. As evidence for this is cited the periodicity of female mammals. Zuckerman [1932] and others, however, have clearly shown that in primates periodicity is much less marked and that in some species both male and female are practically always physiologically "ready" for coitus. However, there is evidence for fluctuations of sex desire among primate and human females, and tradition still insists that woman can "do without" sex more easily than man. This ideology is used to justify the double standard of sex mores for the unmarried, and also to justify the "duty" of a wife to give herself to her husband even when she does not feel any sexual need.

Increasing evidence shows that this hoary doctrine regarding the human female is, except in a very limited sense, false. What is meant by "amount of sexual drive"? Does it mean frequency of conscious need, or of underlying need, or frequency of actual orgasm, or the effort and risks one is willing to undertake in order to secure sexual satisfaction? Only a brief and generalized summary of the findings can be made here.

First, there is much clinical evidence that many women in our culture have unconsciously repressed their sexual feelings because of the attitudes of repulsion and fear implanted in their childhood.

In the Terman study [p. 272] the wife's *preferred* frequency of intercourse shows a dropping from about 7 times per month at age below 25 to 3 times at about age 50. The actual frequency of intercourse at each age, on the average, equals that indicated as the wife's preference. The average husband at each age says he wants intercourse only 1 to 1½ times per month more than the wife wants it and than he actually gets it. Thus at age 35 the average husband wants intercourse 6½ times per month. His wife, who is about 32, wants it 5 times a month, and this is what they have. Forty-four per cent of husbands and 22 per cent of wives want more than they get; 3 per cent of husbands and 23 per cent of wives get too much.

Terman's couples do not represent the lower social classes, in which coitus is reliably believed to be more frequent, and they include many women who are not altogether liberated from their early conditioning to Victorian attitudes and taboos. In any event the difference between 6½ and 5 times per month is not seriously great. The more significant question is why both sexes are satisfied with so little.

Terman [p. 376] points out that the tremendous shift from prudish to liberal sex attitudes has not appreciably reduced the proportion of women with poor orgasm capacity, although it may have increased their willingness to experiment. He finds further that if orgasm is not established within the first year of marriage it is unlikely ever to be. Hamilton finds that low orgasm capacity is rarely improved by change of sexual partner. Terman raises the question "whether the causes of orgasm inadequacy in women may not be biological rather than physiological, perhaps largely of genetic origin." [P. 375.] He finds associated with it items indicating neurasthenic tendencies, diminished responsiveness, lack of zest, vigor, and colorfulness of personality. This agrees with findings in studies of other kinds and with Horney's thesis that sexual behavior is a phase of the general personality pattern. But such personality patterns are not necessarily inborn and may not even be constitutional. They can be initiated by early experiences. Landis inclines to the belief that anatomical and constitutional factors play a primary role, although early experiences and attitudes are associated with these.

Yet it is the experience of many physicians and marriage counselors that "frigidity" can be and is cured by treatment, sometimes of the woman and sometimes of her partner. Sexual intercourse is an art,

and it can be improved by study and practice. Dr. Sophia J. Kleegman, who has had wide experience in treating cases of this kind, reports that whereas roughly a third of women fail to achieve orgasm frequently enough to consider their sex lives satisfactory, this proportion is reduced to a tenth by simple instruction in physiology and technique, and without any "deep" psychotherapy.*

The treatment problem is sometimes one of dealing with the attitudes implanted in the wife and sometimes one of guiding the husband to develop greater sexual skill. This skill consists partly in approach and preliminary love-making and partly in the ability to control the timing of his orgasm. One counselor reports a case in which the wife obtained her first orgasm after eight years of marriage, several of which were spent in deliberate effort by both partners to improve their sexual technique. Terman does not report how many of his cases had the aid of skilled assistance, but presumably they were few.

Second, it must be noted that a woman with adequate orgasm capacity (two-thirds of all women in the Terman sample) is often able to have several orgasms in much more rapid succession than the average male is physiologically capable of having. Twelve per cent of Terman's women [p. 305] and 5 per cent of Hamilton's report multiple orgasms during the same act of intercourse. Work on primates as well as humans suggests that although sex desire may be retained at a more constant day-to-day level in the male, yet in its peak periods it may be capable of satisfaction followed by re-excitation more repeatedly in the female. More research is needed, and it needs to be planned and interpreted to a greater extent by women scientists. Most of the work in the field has been done by men, and there is in our culture a male ideology with its tacit assumptions and values just as there are social class and age-group ideologies. The superior urgency of the male sex drive has been used as a dogma to justify the double standard regarding plural relations and to condemn female initiative in love-making. It may be a vested interest. It might be interpreted by an emancipated woman as a formula for insuring the male's exclusive control of his mate during periods when her desire is too great for him to satisfy completely.

Third, and most important, urgency of sex need is not the same thing as the potentialities of sexual satisfaction and of its enrichment of the whole process of living. That males in most societies will fight

* Personal report.

harder or risk greater immediate penalties to gain sexual satisfaction does not prove that their capacity for sex enjoyment is more intense or that it is a condition occupying more hours per lifetime. The male is more aggressive in seeking other ends also, and his general position of dominance leads the female to use relatively passive techniques and acquire habits of patience in pursuing aims of all kinds. Moreover, sex entails certain constant risks to the female which the male does not have; contraception and the single standard may reduce these and make her more willing to undergo some of the more immediate inconveniences and risks of humiliation and frustration.

The general dominance of males in sexual and other activities characterizes the great majority of cultures. Whether it is based upon a biological difference other than the obvious superiority of bodily power, or is merely a natural pattern built upon that alone, it is greatly modifiable. It might serve nature's purpose of survival very well to put excess sexual drive in the male, although it is not clear from the evidence that nature has done so in primates and humans. Nature's greatest gift to human beings is the ability she has given them to create culture and to vary their behavior. They would be indeed fools not to use these powers to secure survival and to increase happiness as well.

2. TENDER FEELING. Among other things, tenderness involves light pressure stimuli to the skin. The sense organs for light pressure are separate organs from those which register deep pressure. These light touch stimuli and their pleasant reactions are not dependent upon sexual behavior and they do not necessarily become conditioned to it, although sometimes they do. McDougall [1926] has identified tenderness with the parental emotion. He makes it one of his 17 "innate tendencies." It may be a mechanism for slowing down the usual speed and vigor of muscular movements to avoid injuring the young. An outstanding characteristic of tender behavior is the slowness of those movements which are usually much more rapid, and the use of just-necessary force instead of that excess force commonly used to insure the success of a given movement. Many normal movements of mature animals would injure their young unless there were some *gentling* process, such as that by which playful biting is developed. This is probably entirely a learning process, but it may involve a general attitude which can be learned in one situation and transferred to others. There is ample punishment to train the puppy or child to bite harmlessly, and there are rewards in the form of sociability and play. It

may be that long training in playful activities serves as a basis for parental behavior.

The mother, however, has an additional reward in the satisfaction she gets from the nursing process. There is a satisfaction of biological need in the relief of the pressure of the milk-distended breasts. It is natural that the touching of the breasts by a warm soft object should become a conditioned pleasure stimulus, and that hugging a person to the breast should become a common expression of tenderness. The male, under most cultures, probably develops pure tenderness in lesser degree and to a narrower range of stimuli; and indeed among some animal species he sometimes attacks his offspring. His conditioning is primarily to the female, whereas the female's conditioning is relatively more to the young. He is not entirely lacking, however, in the "sensitive zones" of the breast, and under some cultures he develops a tender and protective attitude toward offspring rivaling that of the female. Tenderness seems to develop, in either sex, in proportion to the amount of experience in caring for the child.

Nature, indeed, provides a sensitive and elaborate equipment for the development of many and varied feelings. The particular patterns which develop are determined by cultural training and personal experience.

The love of the child toward the parent involves also some of these tender feelings. A young child referred to his mother's skin as "soft fur." The feelings of the cuddler and the cuddled are to some extent reciprocal. However, there seems to be in the child's feelings an additional element which resembles "rapturous" feelings to be described later.

There is also a great deal of tenderness in the love between the sexes. Our traditional culture conditioned many men so that it was difficult for them to feel the extremes of eroticism and tenderness toward the same woman. With their wives they were tender but sexually inhibited and restrained, not to the point of impotence but enough to curtail seriously the intensity of sexual release both for themselves and for their wives. On the other hand they often experienced extreme sexual pleasure with a prostitute whom they treated with little tenderness and sometimes with even considerable roughness. Yet the experience of many men and women today is that of complete fusion of the two feelings at their highest intensity. The beloved may at first be embraced with unalloyed tenderness, like a child. The tenderness soon passes into erotic feeling, and there may be again new outbursts of tenderness before the process of love-making is finished.

3. RAPTUROUS LOVE. Pietro Aretino in the sixteenth century described a man "in love" as one

> . . . Who prowls around his mistress' house, who clambers up the wall . . . who is kicked out by the serving man, who goes mad with anxiety . . . who wastes away in gazing, who cuts snooks with hope, who lets himself be hoodwinked . . . who saps his mistress' chastity with threats, who conjures her with prayers . . . who extols the flame that burns him, who curses the cause of his heart's conflagration, who cannot eat for grief, who cannot sleep for joy, who composes sonnets, who scribbles billet-doux, who dabbles in enchantment . . . who mumbles at a flower the wench has touched, who twangles the lute . . . who dies for longing of the strumpet.

The author has chosen the word "rapturous," after careful scanning of synonyms, as the most accurately suggestive of a feeling which occurs in several types of situations. Etymologically, it means "being seized." The feeling is akin to the awe one feels in the presence of something "majestic" or "exquisitely beautiful." It is closely akin to the submissive feeling of reverence which occurs in religious worship when sincerely and not perfunctorily performed. It is very significant that in emotional religions, of both the less educated and the upper class (Oxford group), there is emphasized the idea of surrendering one's will, of being guided, of acting without strain or effort as if moved by a power outside oneself. The feeling is sometimes called "serenity"; when accompanied by great activity or profound emotions it is called "thrill" or "ecstasy." It is intensified by the sudden relief of a previous tension or unpleasant emotion; sometimes it comes on with weeping.

Such a feeling characterizes romantic love in its moments of full realization and success. Presumably the feeling is reciprocal. Each lover feels a kind of submissive, reverential attitude toward the other, or perhaps they may say they feel it toward their love as if toward an external reality. They are in love with love as well as with each other.

The writer is admittedly upon speculative and uncertain ground. It is difficult to prove the above statements or even to cast them in such form that they can be proved or disproved. Our thinking here is an attempt at the more accurate conceptualization of common experience. Little has been done to organize our knowledge of this type of feeling; it lags behind our knowledge of sex behavior. It is better for the scientist to risk making a few errors than to ignore the most

meaningful human experiences because they cannot yet be cut, dried, and measured.

It has been suggested that the bodily locus of rapturous feelings is in the chest, that is, inside, and not in the breasts or skin. It seems to involve cardiac-respiratory phenomena, sometimes an accelerated heart beat (one is said to "palpitate" with love), sometimes a deep sigh, sometimes a "catching of the breath," followed by deeper or faster breathing. Yet some persons will have abdominal sensations and others a trembling of the limbs. In the moments and hours dominated by rapturous love there may be little of the other kinds of love feeling. The desire for sexual contacts often seems remote; extensive kissing and touching out of place. One does not want dermal or genital pleasure particularly; one uses the occasional kiss merely to revive and intensify the rapturous thrills. One thrills at the mere presence of the beloved person and at receiving her (or his) undivided attention. Yet these feelings commonly become linked to the erotic and the two may mutually reinforce each other. Some persons have fused them so completely that to them the present analysis will have little personal meaning.

4. FRIENDLY ENJOYMENT. We have seen that "love" sometimes refers to feelings which cannot be placed in any of the above categories; we called them miscellaneous joyful or pleasant feelings. The prototype of these is seen in the gleeful delight of the little child when surprised by finding a lost toy or a person who is playfully hiding from him. It may be that tickling is an original source of these feelings, yet they become mainly conditioned to visual, auditory, and muscular stimuli and, as personality develops, they become linked very much to mental images and ideas. The feelings are diffuse and not concentrated in any one part of the body. But at the more intense levels one tends to breathe deeply and sometimes rapidly, and often feels a pleasant muscular urge to run and jump ("exultation," "going wild"), and laughter is a common expression. The gay and playful feelings which enter into many and perhaps, at times, all love relations, and into light sociability are included here. There is also the calmer pleasure which is commonly produced by the mere presence of friends, relatives, or persons upon whom one is dependent, without excitement or physical contact.

THE OBJECTS OF LOVE FEELINGS. The feelings which enter into love may become linked to almost any stimulus if it is not linked to defensive behavior or unpleasant emotions which, as we have seen, always hold right of way over appetitive behavior and pleasant emo-

tions. One can fondle the old family Bible with tenderness, or one can feel enraptured on hearing a symphony. Although sometimes we use the word *love* for any strong pleasure, as when we say "I love fried chicken," yet let us reserve the amorous word for cases where a *person* (other than self), either directly or symbolically, is the object of the feeling.

The love object may be a specific person, or an unspecified individual of a given type or class. There may be a tendency to feel some tenderness toward almost any child. Sexually starved men may tend to feel erotic toward almost any woman.

To say that a given person is the love object and to state how much of each feeling is involved does not tell the whole story. The object always is perceived in some setting, and sometimes only through some indirect medium such as a picture or the long distance telephone. Tenderness may be aroused by the portrait of one's absent parent or spouse. Erotic feeling sometimes requires actual touch; at other times the mere sight of the exciting person is sufficient. Sometimes a mental image serves to arouse the feeling.

A given object may be linked to one or several of the types of love feeling. The feelings tend to become interlinked through the object as a "bridge"; there is a tendency for an object of partial love to become an object of total love unless blocked by personal or cultural inhibitions. At the same time there is the opposite tendency toward fixation or canalization, by which each feeling or group of feelings becomes more intensely and exclusively linked to whatever object has achieved dominance over it. The actual development in each case occurs through the interplay of these forces.

Cultural values and taboos guide the love feelings toward objects and away from objects. They join them and they separate them. Freud acknowledged this in general; he did not elaborate it with the specific detail which is warranted. The development of the love life is not so much a process of inner maturation as it is the inculcation of a cultural pattern from without, varied by the accidents of individual circumstance, which are so great that some persons in every culture deviate widely and indeed "immorally" from the norm.

LOVE IS FIXATED UPON CHARACTERISTICS AND RELATIONSHIPS, NOT MERELY SIMPLE OBJECTS. We often do not love a *whole person,* and we seldom love him in complete independence of the environmental background of the relationship. Love may be compared to a white spotlight thrown upon a person in the darkness, while at the same time a red light, representing our aversions and annoyances, is focused

upon an adjoining area. Some of the person-object and also some of the background are illuminated by the white light of our love. Sometimes the illuminated environmental setting is so potent that it may serve as a bridge to transfer love to some other person who might frequently be seen in this setting. A part of the person-object is dark, that is, neutral to our feelings, and still another part may be in the focus of the red beam representing our unpleasant feelings. Of course these "parts" are not meant in a spatial, physical sense. They are circumstances or characteristics.

The focal bright area may be structured with items of greatest potency at the center, and somewhat less essential items toward the periphery. We may speak of the *focus* of a person's love as this area or group of characteristics and circumstances (some of them concretely tied up with a given object person, others somewhat abstract and separable from it), which has greatest potency to arouse his love feelings. We may say that his love and his aversion are both canalized toward certain constellations of concrete phenomena and of concepts; that neither constellation is identical with a whole person. There are many stories of men who loved peasant girls or South Sea maidens, but when they brought these girls into a different environment they found their love much weaker. A wife may love three-fourths of her husband, but the one-fourth of him which is drunken, abusive, or parsimonious, not only leaves her love cold but also rouses her anger.

The term *ambivalence* is frequently used to denote the existence of opposite feelings toward the same object. This is often regarded as an example of the mysterious complexity of the human mind which only the intricate concepts of psychoanalysis can unravel. In many cases, no doubt, this is the situation. However, the matter might often be adequately explained by analyzing external objects and situations. We do not feel love and hate toward the same identical segment of reality. If we dislike some particular group of characteristics we shall come to enjoy this only by reeducation (reconditioning), which may take some time. If at the very next moment we find ourselves pleased apparently by the same object, then we are really seeing the object in a different setting, we are focusing our attention on a different part of the larger situation.

If we must look at the whole picture with both its pleasant and annoying features, and cannot narrow our attention, then our reaction tends to become either pleasant or unpleasant, and the unpleasantness, unless it is of low intensity, has the power to dominate and drive out the pleasure. The two do not readily mix.

A young woman was undecided whether to marry a man who had been courting her. When she focused her attention upon his gaiety and charm, his love of home and children, his outwardly strong, masculine characteristics, she was deeply moved. But when her attention turned to his unreliability in performing obligations, his lack of thrift and ambition, she was frightened and annoyed.

The several types of love feeling may have somewhat different foci although they all overlap upon the same object. It would be helpful if each could know specifically the foci of the other's feelings. If the woman, for example, wishes to awaken tenderness in her man, shall she behave somewhat like a child, or be somewhat motherly? When she wishes to stimulate erotic feeling, shall she dress anatomically, or in the neat-and-tailored convention, or in the colorful dirndl of the peasant? If she wants to awaken his supreme rapture shall she keep him in suspense about some date and then surprise him with a sudden and eager "yes," or shall she keep him always feeling secure, or shall she contrive that many meetings shall be in the moonlight?

The answers to these questions are individual. One can go seriously astray through generalized "advice to the lovelorn" or armchair statements about what "most men like" or "the way to get a woman." The way to one man's heart may be through his stomach, but to another's it may lie through his nose, his eyes, or even through his intellect! Folklore and many counselors tell men that women, "down deep," prefer the masterly and commanding male, but men will do better to study their individual women. Of course there are limits to the picture which any person can present of himself. He must essentially "be himself"; otherwise he may purchase a temporary love at the expense of later disillusionment. Yet the healthy and well-developed personality has a capacity for variation and further change.

Love has a tendency to *idealize* the object and to become blind to characteristics which otherwise would be annoying. One should be aware of these blind spots. Yet sometimes the outside observer thinks there is blindness when the lover has really acquired a positive attachment to the supposedly unpleasant trait. Characteristics which are neutral or only superficially annoying may become reconditioned into pleasure stimuli by the intense power of the positive love feelings. But those which are more deeply offensive to the lover may be merely covered with temporary "blinders" and in later years become a source of disillusion.

Disillusionment may be due to the cessation of blindness, or to the appearance of some trait which the loved one had effectively concealed during the earlier period, or again it may be due to an actual change of the loved one in a direction displeasing to the lover.

Specialized foci of erotic feeling are called *fetishes;* in extreme cases a fetish may be preferred to a person-object. Thus there are some men who are erotically more excited by a woman's handkerchief or high-heeled shoe than by the whole body or personality of any particular woman. Such cases are rare; more common is the erotic emphasis upon some part of the body or clothing or some type of behavior which, if the desire is gratified by the loved person, only serves to intensify the total feeling toward that person.

Various methods of using the body of the opposite sex in sexual gratification are sometimes spoken of as *perversions.* Modern sexologists on the whole consider these not undesirable as preliminary acts, provided normal coitus remains the preferred method, and no mental conflict is produced in either party.

Two common types of attitude are *sadism* and *masochism.* Sadism is the conditioning of sexual reactions to cruelty, the person himself being actually or in imagination the one who inflicts the pain. When the person gets satisfaction from suffering the pain, or imagining himself as so doing, he is said to be a masochist. Some small degree of sadism seems to be normal to men, and of masochism to women, but often these attitudes are reversed. *Exhibitionism* is sexual pleasure derived from exhibiting one's own body, especially the more tabooed portions. *Voyeurism* is sexual pleasure in seeing the exposure of others. One man is reported as getting his chief sexual satisfaction from being alone at a certain location along a country road. It would seem that the sexual reactions could become conditioned to almost any stimulus. To the person so conditioned, the given stimulus is sexual, regardless of how unexciting it might be to other persons. On the other hand, there are many persons who are not at all sexually excited by stimuli which do excite the majority.

It should be noted that any sexual object can also be an object of non-sexual pleasure. One's overt behavior does not reveal to the observer just what kind of feeling he has. Intense interest in an object or situation does not indicate sexual pleasure. Furthermore there is a difference between deriving a preliminary, mild sexual pleasure from an object and using it for the attainment of final sexual gratification (orgasm). Many more objects are used in the first way than in the second. Finally, we do not know the whole story unless we know whether the touch, the sound, the sight, or the mere thought of an object is the stimulus which produces the given sexual reaction. The "object" may be a complex situation. Many persons derive sex-

ual pleasure from imagining various kinds of situations. Thus an idea may play the role of a fetish. One woman reported erotic feelings linked to the idea of a man and woman working together as equals upon a creative task, quite apart from the image of particular persons.

"Normality" is used in two senses: statistical and ethical. Many of the above fixations of sex or other love feelings are "abnormal" simply in the statistical sense that they are rare. It does not follow that they are unhealthy for the individual or society. A democracy will respect differences in sexual taste as in esthetic taste. It will seek to suppress, by educative and positive methods, those which are socially harmful, which include some of the more common attitudes such as sadism. Homosexuality is dangerous because it is contagious and thus threatens to substitute an inherently less satisfying mode of satisfaction for one which has the greatest possibilities of enriching life. It is not to be condemned merely because it is repulsive to others who do not share the taste. An alert democratic society will check its spread but will not persecute individuals who have already acquired it. It will also seek out and cultivate fixations which, though "abnormal" in the sense of being rare, have possibilities for reinforcing other measures of social welfare. Some of our advertising has tended to eroticize the "sheik" type of man with slick hair. The educational arm of our society might seek to canalize love feelings toward socially courageous and unselfish personality types.

HOMOSEXUALITY. A study by Glass, Deuel, and Wright [1940] reports androgen content and androgen-estrogen ratios in male homosexuals which are lower than those in a normal control group. This may give new lease of life to the popular theory that homosexuality is chemical or constitutional. Yet the major evidence is against this view and favors a social-learning, and in part a culture-group, explanation of the great bulk of homosexuality. In fact a biologist, Alfred Kinsey [1941], has furnished a refutation which adequately covers the sociological reasoning. He points out the statistical inadequacies of the Glass-Deuel-Wright study. He presents results from 1,600 life histories of sex behavior obtained by interview from socially average people, a majority of them from college populations. Of the 1,058 males in this "normal" sample, 354 have at some time been involved in homosexual behavior. "This figure includes only those cases in which one or both parties in the relation have come to ejaculation as a result of stimulation provided by another male." Figures for college students are a little lower than the whole sample. The

curve, since it represents a question in the form "Have you ever . . . ?" naturally rises with age, and by age 30 it stands at 50 per cent for the entire sample. Homosexual and heterosexual activities may occur in a single period in the life of a single individual; there is every gradation from "active" to "passive" in homosexual relations, and it is impossible to distinguish between acquired, latent, and congenital types. There are many patterns and degrees. The sex feelings themselves may be heterosexual and the other love feelings homosexual, or vice versa. Many combinations exist.

These findings do not deny that there are some "hormonal" homosexuals, as there are indeed also occasional anatomical hermaphrodites. But no constitutional explanation suffices for a behavior which has been practiced by half the male sex. Moreover, the most strongly addicted are often very "masculine" in appearance and behavior.

Among women, Katherine Davis [1929] found that about a fifth have had physical homosexual contacts, and over half have had intense emotional attachments to other women, with or without sexual contacts.

The great majority of homosexuals are anatomically and chemically normal persons who have been unusually conditioned. The Freudians distinguish two kinds. The one has acquired through circumstances an unusual attachment to the parent of the same sex and in his later love life seeks a person of that same sex. The second type formed an attachment to the parent of opposite sex. He is so strongly fixated on this parent that he cannot substitute another person unless that person closely resembles the beloved parent. But this awakens incest feelings. His only defense is to seek a person of his own sex, thus avoiding altogether the conflict between parent love and incest horror. There are probably many other, besides these two, situations, through which a person's love desires may be conditioned to his own sex.

INDIVIDUALS DIFFER ENORMOUSLY IN THE PATTERNS OF THEIR LOVE LIFE. Every person is unique, but investigators have seemed to discover certain statistical "types," *syndromes,* or *constellations.* A syndrome is a combination of traits and experiences which go together much more frequently than would happen by chance assortment. "Diseases" are physiological syndromes. Thus if hands of four cards each are dealt out of a shuffled pack, there is about one chance out of 380 that one will get four cards of the same suit. But if as much as one out of ten hands were all hearts, and another one out of ten were all diamonds, and so on, leaving only six out of ten mixed hands,

we would have to conclude that some process of syndrome formation was at work, that a heart had some affinity for other hearts and a club for other clubs. (In a facetiously metaphorical sense this is quite true.) It is not easy to say which elements of a syndrome are causes and which are effects, except to say that those later in time cannot in themselves be causes of those which occur earlier. But if we can establish the fact that the elements are associated we have at least gained some clues toward explanation.

Pathological syndromes are often keys to the delineation of normal types. Thus Horney's classification of neurotic people into narcissists, perfectionists, and masochists may be extended with qualifications to persons who have never been diagnosed as neurotic. Narcissism was recognized by Freud, but he gave it a more specifically sexual definition whereas Horney sees it as a more general personality pattern. Freud's "object-love" in its extremely dependent variations resembles the masochistic type.

Gladys Terry [1929] studied Hamilton's [1929] 200 subjects looking for "psychodynamic patterns" or syndromes. Since the number of questions asked was over 300, there was small probability that as many as 8 out of 100 cases would agree in a large number of specific details. Yet Mrs. Terry found 8 women whose histories agreed in the following respects, and differed in these same respects from those of a control group of 8 non-pathological women:

They had frightening or repelling sexual aggressions during childhood or adolescence.
They tended to disparage their fathers.
They preferred their mothers.
They received evasive sex instruction during childhood.
They learned where babies came from at 6 to 12 years of age, rather than earlier.
They had hasty thoughts.
They had had sexual opportunities before puberty and were ashamed.
They still have sex daydreams.
Sex occupied their minds very much between 18 and marriage.
They were distressed by the thought of their parents' sex relation.
Their husbands were unlike their fathers.
If by pressing a button they could dissolve their marriage, they would do so.
They attributed their distaste for sex to themselves.
They wished there were no sex desire in the world.
They do not like their husbands to see their sex organs.
They admit that other women might be attractive to them.
They lacked orgasm capacity.

Again, Hamilton (himself) found 4 other women who agreed in a very different pattern. They had inadequate orgasms, their husbands were sexually unattractive and undersexed; they masturbated, loved other men, had many love affairs; were narcistic, literary, and artistic, fonder of their fathers than of their mothers, were unfriendly with their mothers, and jealous of other family females (mothers, sisters, etc.).

Hamilton [p. 528] found 3 men who agreed in a pattern including sex inferiority, lack of self-confidence, dislike of male affection, absence of any homosexual feeling in their history, slovenly personal habits, unsatisfactory father relation, greater fondness for mother.

Bernard Glueck [1935] distinguishes excessive narcism, the man who is incompletely differentiated sexually (i.e., partly homosexual), the parentally fixated type, and the impulse-ridden personality.

Harriet Mowrer [1940] studied 75 married couples over a period of 3 years or more. None of the 150 individuals showed any personality disorganization, but some had maladjustments as indicated. Twenty-five of the men were alcoholics; 25 persons, mostly women, belonged to the type of personality which "escapes through illness." The remaining persons and couples were normal and acted as a control group.

Mrs. Mowrer's results tend to refute several prevalent theories about alcoholism: that it is a symptom of homosexuality; that it tends to be transmitted from one generation to another; that it is a substitute for sex when sexual relations with the wife are unsatisfactory; and that it generally involves a "ruining" or degeneration of a personality. Attributes characterizing the alcoholics with much more than chance frequency were: a dislike or hatred for the father, a marked dislike or jealousy of a brother favored by the father, a strong attachment for the mother or a sister who in turn favored the subject. None of the alcoholics were oldest children, only two were "only" children. On the other hand, of the wives of alcoholics 17 were oldest and middle children. The alcoholic typically shows an ambiguity of role, derived from his childhood experience. His drinking commonly symbolizes to him masculinity and strength, and its main satisfaction to him seems to be that it gets him attention from members of his family of which he is otherwise deprived. Twenty-three of the 25 alcoholic men had sexual experience prior to marriage; only 12 of 25 non-alcoholic men had. The first sexual experience was always given as several years earlier than the onset of the drinking, and hence could not be a result of the association between alcohol and prostitution. Mrs. Mowrer points out that the alleged homosexuality of alcoholics is a cultural association, since it was customary for men only to drink together, but now this situation has changed.

The "escape through illness" people were characterized especially by the fact that all of them were either youngest children or played the role of the youngest. Typically, they were the favorite of both parents, had the close

attachment of siblings, were protected from early responsibility, and received no challenge to their role as favorite. Thus the group differs strikingly from alcoholic men and also from the women who are the wives of alcoholic men (i.e., a more or less unselected group of women).*

Landis and co-authors [1940] have given us a valuable study of the love life of women which delineates certain types and also shows some other interesting correlations.

One hundred and fifty-three normal and 142 abnormal (dementia praecox, manic-depressive, psychoneurotic, psychopathic personality) women were his subjects. They came from New York City and vicinity and it is admitted that the normal subjects (secured through contacts with numerous women's organizations) may have been selected partly through their interest and felt need for some kind of help in problems of adjustment. All were given controlled interviews, general information inventories, vocational interest blanks, physical examinations, roentgenological studies of the pelvis, and psychiatric interviews. To the married subjects a marriage inventory was also given. Dr. Agnes T. Landis interviewed all the subjects.

Certain rough types seemed to stand out: the *homoerotic* (homosexual) woman, the *psychosexually immature* woman, the *narcissistic* woman, and the *masculine protest* type of woman. Homoerotic women were of three types: (*a*) the temporary homosexual who had one or more homosexual affairs before 20 but later became heterosexual; (*b*) the consistent homosexual who never had any lasting affection for men; and (*c*) the bisexual who had overt affairs with both men and women. Only 8 women were "overtly homoerotic" but 73 had "homoerotic trends." Four of these "overts" had tendencies toward a male body form.

The psychosexually immature woman seemed generally retarded in the development of attitudes, experiences, and practices characterizing most women of her age. Many had an aversion to sex; some remained attached to their parents with a child-like attitude even in adult life; many had no strong emotional attachments. There were 70 women diagnosed as having "extreme psychosexual immaturity"; 22 of these had a hypoplastic (undeveloped or childish) body form, whereas only 6 of the 81 cases of "little or no psychosexual immaturity" showed such a form.

About a third of the group had narcissistic trends and about one-sixth were "markedly narcissistic," having such traits as overemphasis on dress and personal appearance, overreaction to criticism, self-consciousness, conceit, feelings of superiority to family and friends. There was no relation found between narcissism and homoeroticism, sex experience, masculine protest, unresolved family ties, or marital adjustment.

* From review in the *Bulletin of Family Research and Education,* I:5 and 6 (November-December, 1940), 36–37. By permission.

About one-fourth of the group had "masculine protest" tendencies, such as the wish to be a man, resentment at being a woman, desire to dominate men emotionally, satisfaction in putting men at a disadvantage.

The authors failed to establish any certain correlation between homoerotism and male bodily characteristics.

A favorable childhood home environment characterized 50 per cent of the normal women, 41 per cent of the manic-depressive, 27 per cent of the dementia praecox, 12 per cent of the neurotic, 10 per cent of the psychopathic personality cases. The normal married women had a much higher frequency of father fixation and father preference than did the abnormal married, or the normal or abnormal single women.

Except in the "immature" there is little evidence in this study for determination of personality or love-behavior type by constitutional factors. "The weight of evidence inclines us to interpret the neurotic personality as a *style of life* (italics are Landis') which is consistent from a very early age. The style is not due to the effect of any one incident but rather is a gradually developed mode of emotional maladjustment." *

Bromley and Britten also classify their 1,300 college students into types with regard to sex behavior (see Chapter XVI).

B. UNIVERSAL FEATURES OF LOVE INTERACTION

Love feelings are usually but not necessarily reciprocal. The development of the lover's feeling toward the object is patterned by the reactions of the object and of third parties. Certain broad patterns seem to be common to all cultures.

1. THE PARENT-CHILD BOND. Parental behavior and tenderness are furthered by the cuddling, nursing, and other behavior of the offspring. Most young mammals, by the end of the nursing period, are capable of locomotion speedy enough to follow the mother wherever she goes. It is to be expected that they would follow this individual who is a canalized stimulus to all pleasant experiences.

In Trobriand society the social relations between the child and his elders are fundamentally different from those in Euro-American society in which Freudian theory was developed. In Trobriand Island society, as Malinowski shows, there are no evidences of an Oedipus complex, but there is strong evidence of an analogous repression in the relation between the boy and his maternal uncle. There are no

* Landis, Carney, *et al., Sex in Development,* Paul B. Hoeber, Medical Book Department of Harper and Brothers, 1940, p. 234. Above report taken in part from review in the *Bulletin of Family Research and Education,* II:1 (February, 1941), 22–24.

myths of parricide, but there are mythological and realistic indications that boys often hate their maternal uncles and perhaps unconsciously wish to kill them. The situation is readily understandable. At puberty the boy must leave his father, who has reared him and given him great affection, and go to live in the village of his uncle, from whom he receives his status and property, and to whom it is his duty to render obedience. The father tries to keep his son as long as possible, and some chiefs manage to keep theirs in spite of the prevailing custom.

Certainly this uncle-hatred cannot be interpreted as sexual rivalry, but is rather a general rebellion against authority. The boy naturally wants to continue all the pleasures associated with his childhood home, including his affectionate relation to his father as well as to his mother. The uncle symbolizes the frustration of these wishes, and hence tends to become an object of hatred. By the same token, it is probable that much or most of the son-father antagonism in our society is due to the father's general role as austere authority and frustrator of wishes, rather than to his frustrating the specific wish for the mother. It is suggestive that in Germanic and northern European countries generally this austere role of the father and the obedient role of the son are more pronounced than in America. It is in those countries that Freudian psychology had its birth.

Freudians tend to assume culture to be a constant and to be more a result than a cause of the family interaction processes which they have so well revealed. Rather, the present writer would say, culture patterns are determined by a great many causes outside of family relationships and the love-behavior system, and these culture patterns then force the family and love relationships into certain specific channels.

2. Preference for Heterosexuality. The data given above on homosexuality ought to be enough to demonstrate that the general preference for the opposite sex is not inborn. It is learned in animals through trial and error, and in men partly through cultural, verbal teaching. [Allport, F. H., 1924, 70.] 'A minority of human individuals grows up to be homosexual by preference; a few become sexually fixated upon non-human objects. Kempf [1917], from observing primates, reports that homosexual interests predominate and normally precede heterosexual until adulthood is well established, the homosexual interests being more common in the male. The transfer to the heterosexual object is a delicate process and must not be inhibited by fear. Reversion to homosexual behavior occurs in isolated

groups of males or females. Monkeys will often adopt other kinds of animals such as kittens or dogs for sexual satisfaction. C. P. Stone [1922], experimenting with rats, found that the *movements* of the female seemed to be the adequate stimuli to the male to induce copulation. He removed eyes, olfactory and gustatory sense organs and *vibrissae,* and partially desensitized the ears. The rats, thus deprived, nevertheless copulated, if placed in contact, at the same age and in the same way as normal animals. The earliest copulation observed was at the age of 64 days. It was found, however, that movements of another male simulating those of a female provoked the sex act. The conclusion is that the skin senses and certain deep sense organs are responsible for the coitus pattern. Everyday observation of male dogs indicates much homosexual experimentation.

While the sex act itself is indeed determined by inborn neural pathway patterns which automatically mature at certain ages, regardless of the environment, the object chosen for satisfaction is in no way represented by such inborn patterns. It must be acquired by learning. Is it not surprising, however, that the great majority of animals do *learn* to be heterosexual?

This learning is largely predetermined, because the stage is set for it by two basic conditions. One is the fact of exploratory behavior, of ceaseless experimentation when not fatigued, which is common to all animals. The other is the fact that the sex organs of the opposite sex and the same species usually provide the mechanically most perfect contact for the completion of the sexual act, and that this opposite-sexed animal is also actuated by a similar drive which is most perfectly satisfied by the same interaction process. Sooner or later most animals find this sex object which gives easier satisfaction than any other. Once found, this goal (the opposite sex) becomes a canalized stimulus, an aim of behavior, which is thenceforth sought in preference to all other goals.

With human beings this physical experimentation is largely circumvented through symbols. Although few parents tell their children the details of the method of sex satisfaction, the very emotional secrecy by which the subject is surrounded stimulates the child toward getting the information long before he has any drive to use it. The child absorbs an atmosphere of attitudes surrounding the opposite sex, steering his emotional education in the heterosexual direction.

The love preference for the opposite sex is thus not inborn, but acquired subculturally and universally (by all societies although not by all individuals) through universal processes of social interaction.

3. Sex Avoidances and the Incest Taboo. Since all cultures have some taboos upon sex, we may assume natural interaction processes to be operative. One cause of sex avoidance which may form the basis for a taboo is the unwillingness of the desired partner. Male animals soon learn that it is difficult to secure satisfaction through an unwilling female. Kempf reports that female monkeys adopt catatonic (fixed abnormal) postures to resist male advances. One observed female, by this method, caused all the males to abandon her without satisfaction. She was then examined by the investigator and found to be menstruating.

Some have suggested that the lack of sex desire immediately following satisfaction leads to a dislike of anything which calls for further sexual activity at that time. This might seem more true of female animals than of males, since all the latter need do is simply to fail to make advances. With humans, however, there are purposes and values which often lead a male to attempt sexual approach even during the short periods of time when his physical drive is incapable of being aroused. The impotence shown on such an occasion may cause his loss of a desired female or humiliate him. It might be expected that he would develop certain habits of avoidance, such as absenting himself from females during such periods. Some psychologists have attributed the whole philosophy of sexual asceticism and the whole structure of sexual taboos to overindulgence. Man, being a thinking animal, sometimes makes a mental connection between a lassitude which may inhibit his full strength in some emergency, and the fact of his having indulged recently in sex. He reasons that sex indulgence is a cause of weakness, and develops an inhibition of sex under certain conditions, which conflicts with the recurring sexual desire on the more biological level.

Experience shows, furthermore, that sexual desire does not continue to increase indefinitely as sex abstinence continues. In time the intensity of desire diminishes, one becomes habituated to a sexless life, relieved only, in the case of the male, by occasional, involuntary, nocturnal orgasms. Experience shows also that, when sexual satisfaction is dangerous, or infrequent, or uncertain, complete habitual abstention is easier upon the emotions than is a policy of constant alertness toward rare opportunities. A month's absence from each other is much more sexually frustrating to married persons than it was to those same persons when they were celibate.

Another cause of sexual avoidance is conflict. Male animals commonly fight over a female, and the loser learns to inhibit sexual ap-

proach toward that female, as he learns to inhibit pugnacious behavior toward the male who repeatedly defeats him in combat. Pain and fear inhibit sex.

The one universal form of sex avoidance is that relating to near relatives in the family group. The parent-child relation is always under sex taboo, and with rare exceptions also the sibling relationship. Some cultures extend this incest prohibition to a long chain of relatives or group of fellow clan members, but the intensity of the taboo seems to "fade out" with the remoteness of the relation. There is a real difference in both the inner and outward penalties for true incest as versus other prohibitions. The incest taboo is felt with an emotion of horror or disgust; many other sex taboos are enforced only by a fear of being discovered, often counteracted by a definite pleasure at the thought of the possible surreptitious indulgence.

Westermarck [1922] holds that there is an inborn connection between familiarity and sex avoidance. The sex instinct, in other words, is predisposed toward excitement by new individuals and toward inhibition by familiar individuals. He explains the development of the "instinctive aversion" to incest by natural selection. Tribes which did not have it, he theorizes, practiced incest, and therefore died out owing to the bad biological results of inbreeding. But as Flügel [1926, 202] says, "the supposed ill effects of inbreeding in men and animals are by no means as yet universally admitted." East and Jones [1919], summarizing the evidence, concluded that inbreeding in itself is not productive of ill effects, but is harmful only when there are bad hereditary qualities to be transmitted. At the same time they admit that outbreeding is relatively more advantageous. But if, as Flügel puts it [p. 204], "the evil effects of inbreeding are so relatively slight . . . then it is not easy to understand how such a widespread and powerful human characteristic as the aversion to incest can have arisen *solely* as the result of natural selection, working through the bad effects of incest or the superior advantages of outbreeding."

Moreover, evidence shows that propinquity and familiarity lead to sex desire as well as to sex aversion. As Flügel says, "alongside of the horror [of incest] there exists an attraction towards incest which corresponds in intensity to that of the horror itself." [Flügel, 1926, 202.] According to the Chicago Vice Commission, out of 103 girls examined, 51 reported that they had received their first sexual experience at the hands of their father.

The Freudian position, to which Flügel adheres, is that incestuous desire is subculturally more natural and primary than is the desire for sex novelty; that incestuous desires represent a normal stage in the personality development and hence all cultures must erect a barrier against them. But why must they? Flügel says that this universal incest taboo is due to a number of factors working in combination, among which are the sexual jealousy of the father, the needs of individual development, and the interests of the larger social organization. But he fails to show how these broad, remote interests of the individual and of society can operate upon the love mores. Primitive society is not capable of knowing what is good for itself in the long run. The explanations more convincing to the modern sociologist are those which show how the immediate and conscious interests of certain classes of persons, or persons in certain roles, are affected. Flügel's jealousy explanation satisfies this criterion, but it does not avoid the objection that societies have many ways of dealing with competitive situations, such as that which Freud imagines to exist between a father and adolescent son in relation to the mother.

Vetter [1928] adds the thought that there is a universal tendency on the part of parents to check sexual expression by their children within the family group, because this would be incompatible with the authority necessary for control over children.

Still the basic Freudian assumption that strength of taboo corresponds to the strength of the desire it represses is not convincing. It is difficult to believe that the majority of people ever do, in any sense, unconsciously or consciously, desire to commit incest, even if many of those who go to psychoanalysts may have such a desire.

The author advances a different thesis for further examination. Society tends to place a strong taboo against anything for which most persons never develop a desire, but which, if granted to the deviant minority which does desire it, would tend to introduce great competition or conflict, or put the aforesaid majority to immediate and obvious disadvantage. To be concrete, it would be natural for most sons to seek satisfaction of their adolescent sexuality away from the home with its authority, its uninteresting familiarities, and the necessity of sharing satisfactions with father and brothers. Given a normal sex ratio and age distribution, there would in the course of a month or a year be available a greater number of yet-unappropriated sexual partners outside the home. Yet if one dependent, timid son were allowed to satisfy his need within the home, the others would be forced frequently to feel envious, unless this envy were counter-

acted by an emotional revulsion which would deprive the privileged brother of his temporary sensual advantage. Furthermore, the sex relation would tend to create favoritism toward this incestuous son in other respects and give him other advantages.

But would not this same thesis require that husbands seek sexual satisfaction outside the home rather than with their wives? Not so, because here only the desire for novelty could gain, and other elements are unfavorable. The husband already possesses his wife, and naturally he will tend to guard his rights in her rather than to "take a chance" on losing her for a possible new partner. Hence he practices extra-marital relations only in secret and occasionally, believing that thus he will avoid having to reciprocate the privilege to his wife and some other man who may wish her. His net advantage is to adhere to what he has, whereas the youth who has not yet found a partner finds his net advantage in going outside the family circle, where there will normally be found an unappropriated girl of his own age.

This hypothesis may be inaccurate but it represents the *kind* of explanation toward which sociologists lean and which they feel was neglected in the older natural selection and instinct schools of thought. It is an interactional explanation. The older thoughtways tended to conceive a society as a mass of individuals behaving uniformly and as expanding or dying out according to whether their behavior happened to represent a lucky or unlucky choice of policy. Modern sociology, on the other hand, conceives of society as made up of different persons and groups of differing strength, playing differing and often oppositional roles at any one time. Practices which tend to reduce the competition and conflict, and thus to save energy for the pursuit of non-conflicting purposes, tend to become institutionalized. These may be unjust and often oppressive, but they are in the interests of order and economy. Justice comes more slowly through intelligence and through pressure from the underprivileged.

4. Competition and Property in Love Relationships. Competition, conflict, and jealousy are universal characteristics of group life. They are always governed by some code. The object of struggle finally becomes the *property* of the winner. After that, the attempt of another person to gain it is a *trespass* rather than rivalry, and awakens the reaction called jealousy. [Davis, K., 1936, B.] But why do human beings need to struggle for love? Is there not, approximately, a woman for every man, and a man for every woman? And even if one steals another's mate, he must leave his own free for such

time as he possesses the stolen one. Does not our culture create an artificial scarcity of love just as our industrialists and farmers are accused of creating artificial scarcities of their product? Does society do this to raise the value of love, as the producers thus raise the prices of their products?

Thus reason the advocates of free love. One immediate answer is of course that throughout many large societies, at least, we value exclusiveness and monogamy, and in this sense culture is maintaining values. But monogamy is always violated to some extent in practice; why has man not learned in all these years to modify the ideal itself just enough to make these deviations guiltless and convenient for those who through lack or temporary absence of partner are suffering from deprivation? Would not a more free and abundant love thereby be possible?

But possessiveness in love relationships has deeper roots than those springing from any particular culture. It is a natural, subcultural pattern. It is found among animals as well as humans. This does not mean that it is instinctive, but that it springs from the essential nature of groups and the balance of biological forces. To forestall the development of possessive attitudes, there needs to be much more of a good thing than merely "enough to go around." Many animals as well as humans hoard their private supplies of life's various goods even though the total supply under this system of decentralized storage far exceeds the immediate needs. Everyone learns this lesson, that by the device of property he avoids the risk of having to search for something *at the moment* when he particularly needs it. When another person is the object which satisfies a need, ownership of that person, bulwarked by a code of rules and penalties, makes the possessor feel more secure against a possible loss during his absence. The possessor is able even to command the services of the possessed when the latter does not like the owner. Slavery is the cruder form of man's possession of man. Marriage, betrothal, and even the agreement "to keep steady company" are also, in various degrees, expressions of this basic natural-social tendency to stake out claims. Probably it will never be eliminated, but since it is canalized very differently under different cultures, mankind today has some choice between patterns of greater and patterns of lesser total satisfaction.

There is still another reason why love is competitive and possessive: the members of any group are very unequal in their average desirability to the opposite sex. This means severe competition for the more attractive. Competition, conflict, and possession occur

where the goal is sexual satisfaction and also where sexual intercourse is ruled out by the mores, and the stakes are friendship, petting, romantic love, and the ego satisfactions of courtship.

5. MALE DOMINANCE AND SEXUAL INITIATIVE. The same competitive forces also act upon females, and whether there are just enough men to go around, or less than enough, the women also seek to gain possessive right and thus security. But the net result of male and female competition is to place the sexes in a very unequal position. In nearly all human and mammalian societies, males are the more active competitors and they dominate females. This inequality can be explained simply by the superior physical power of the male. Male superiority is not necessarily great in degree, nor is it true of every individual and on all occasions. Yet social interaction often builds up a great social difference upon a moderate and fluctuating biological difference. If one individual conquers another at the first encounter, or on the majority of occasions, he develops habits of domination toward the other and the conquered develops habits of submission. They may continue to live by these habits even after the ratio between their physical powers has changed. The same principle obtains for groups and for categories of individuals. Among humans these patterns of interaction tend to become cultural and thus even more definitely to "freeze" the individuals in a given status.

It is usually held that males have more intense or frequent sexual needs and that this accounts for male possessiveness and aggression. We have examined this thesis and found it highly questionable. But even if true it would be quite superfluous as an explanation, for stronger individuals usually succeed in organizing a group in such a way as to give their satisfactions priority, whatever the nature of the desire to be satisfied. The sex need, although often intensely felt, is not a matter of life and death to the individual, since it *can* be inhibited physically, and it *is* inhibited or diverted as a result of interaction processes. In many animal groups there is a surplus of females, but even then the males do not share equally in the sexual opportunities but fall under the power of one dominant male, or form a status hierarchy. Among howler monkeys the sex ratio within integrated groups is about 3 males to 7 females. Yet there are large numbers of additional bachelor males outside the groups. [Carpenter, C. R., 1934.]

Because of this domination of males over females, and of stronger males over other males, the actual frequency of sexual satisfaction enjoyed by different individuals would seem, in many groups, to bear

little relation to their differences in need. Our pattern of monogamy doubtless brings us nearer to a fair distribution in this respect than did the patriarchal-polygynous pattern of many other human societies, but there are still injustices and unsolved problems. It is a tenable hypothesis that during long periods of history there was more progress in equalization of privilege among males than among females or between the sexes.

6. CLASS-LINKED POLYGAMY. It is natural that the stronger, more sexual, more able, or more attractive men would appropriate more




FIGURE 2. Normal mating pattern under male dominance, class inequality, and a sex ratio of 100.

than their quota of the women. Reacting to threatened loss, they would attempt to monopolize these women, to hide and to guard them from other men. A mating pattern such as illustrated in Figure 2 would tend to develop.

We note a certain tendency toward the polygynous sex relation pattern even where the pattern of formal marriage is monogamous; that is, the wealthier and more powerful men actually do gain *control* of a disproportionate share of women. It is they who keep mistresses while they also have wives, leave opulent widows, support idle daughters, and employ female servants and business assistants. Even though the great bulk of these relationships in our culture may not be sexual, the whole effect is to transfer a surplus of women to areas of higher social privilege and prestige, leaving a dearth of women in the areas of hardship. The result tends toward both polygynous sex relations and female celibacy in the more privileged groups, and

polyandrous relations and male celibacy in the great outside areas. But under our culture male celibacy exerts a greater pressure than female, and the result is usually prostitution or informal polyandrous arrangements, where males are in excess; an excess of females does not so often bring an analogous result. Neither men nor women are instinctively monogamous nor polygamous, nor is there any evidence of an inborn difference between them in this respect. Each person tends to behave according to his needs and his position in the total social situation, guided or limited by such values as he feels important for him to observe.

7. CONTINUITY AND CHANGE OF PARTNER. Nowhere is there a complete promiscuity. The tendency to repeat coitus with, and to remain for a season in proximity to, a specific individual of the opposite sex, is universal and subcultural. It exists with most birds and mammals. It does not always involve monogamy, but there are specific mate relationships which long outlast the sexual excitement of the moment. It is no more necessary to assume an inborn desire for permanent union than an inborn preference for the opposite sex. The phenomenon is readily explained by principles of emotional fixation and interaction. When an individual has gained sexual satisfaction, he tends to fixate his pleasure reactions upon the sight, sound, and other stimuli from the particular individual with whom he had coitus. There is always some difficulty, or at least uncertainty, about beginning sex relations with a new partner, and relatively less difficulty about repeating the experience with the original partner. The uncertainty lies partly in the less-known behavior of the new partner, and partly in the danger of conflict with rivals of one's own sex.

At the same time sexual infidelity and the quest for a new partner are founded, not in human nature as such but in the nature of social interaction. Whether familiarity as such reduces sexual stimulating power and leads to desire for novelty is debatable. It is not any one condition, but rather the great number of changes which may occur in a relationship which lead to infidelity. Absences, the presence of a new potential partner in an unusually exciting background, the development of unpleasant, sex-inhibiting emotions through petty but repeated conflicts with the old partner—some one of these events is likely at some time to happen during the life of any love partnership. Temporary or permanent change of partner, but not frequent change, would seem to be the most natural phenomenon. Culture may prevent it, or encourage it.

C. THE COURSE OF LOVE

Love Does Not Wear Out, But Can Be Damaged. There is a melancholy theory which has been put this way: love is like an arrow shot at a high angle into the air. If the initial force is great enough, the arrow may not come to the ground until the death of the lovers. If it is not so great, the lovers outlive their love. This trajectory does resemble the course of love in many cases, yet it is a false analogy; it does not correctly represent the normal process. We have seen that it is in the nature of human beings and their interaction to develop permanent love relationships. The familiar has a natural advantage which only under unusual circumstances is overcome by the novel. Love tends to become fixated rather than easily transferred to new objects. Yet it may be asked whether, in the long course of an active life, the accident which transfers love to a new object will not probably occur at least once. No categorical answer is possible. In many cases it seems to be yes, and in many cases no.

Instead of leaving this outcome to be decided fortuitously by the circumstances of each individual case, most human societies tend to prejudice the outcome culturally. They set up values. In one society the transfer of love is expected and treated as a normal occurrence, if not encouraged; in another it is discouraged by taboos. Hobhouse, Wheeler, and Ginsberg found only 11 out of 271 primitive cultures in which divorce was strictly forbidden.

Let us take a closer view of the processes involved. It is the common experience that some time after marriage, there begins a decline of excitement and intense rapturous feelings. This continues until the partners are said to "take each other for granted." At the same time tender, erotic, and joyful feelings do not diminish at the same rate, and they may in fact become intensified. The art of sexual intercourse often does not reach its highest perfection for some years after marriage. If people do not fall prey to popular notions about middle age, they may maintain a high level of sexuality into old age. People do not "get tired" of sex, whether it is monogamous or otherwise.

Yet after some years of marriage, love becomes "married" or "conjugal" rather than "romantic." There may now be a greater susceptibility to rapturous, romantic interest in new partners, but whether this shall be actualized or not depends upon cultural and personal values, and upon circumstances. Such an interest is often

but not necessarily an indication of dissatisfaction with the marriage, and it may sometimes lead to such dissatisfaction. Extra-marital affairs may begin romantically or they may begin on a more erotic level.

Yet there is no inevitable eclipse of the marital love relation, even when these extra-marital affairs develop. There is of course a serious danger of such eclipse, and indeed G. V. Hamilton [1929] in his observation of 28 of 100 men and 24 of 100 women who had committed adultery concludes that adultery is the cause rather than the result of marital unhappiness. Yet we must note also the many cases of equally great marital unhappiness which develops without any extra-marital love. The decline of an old love relation and the development of love for a new partner, though either may be the cause of the other, are two distinct phenomena, and the ups and downs of one may be quite independent of those of the other.

In the simplest and most direct terms, the main cause of the decline of love is *anger*. Other causes are disgust, ennui, and fear. These unpleasant defensive emotions, having the physiological right of way on the nervous system, will destroy love if they are aroused often enough by the love object or by situations which include the love object. The problem of marital failure boils down ultimately to the question of why and how people become angry or disgusted with each other.

In the absence of such intrusion by the unpleasant emotions, love normally continues indefinitely, for it is self-renewing and not dependent upon some original impulse. One does not tire of love merely because it is always directed toward the same person. It does not "wear out" except as the body and life itself wear out; but it may be damaged by hostile forces. These forces may come from within or without the love relationship.

Terman [1938, 175] finds no appreciable correlation between happiness and duration of marriage, except that there is a small drop from the honeymoon till about the seventh year (from 73 to 65 points for husbands, 74 to 67 for wives). After that the curves are practically level, with slight rises after the twentieth year. The quality of feeling may be greatly changed but the net satisfaction is not. Mrs. Bernard [1934] found a greater drop in happiness with the passage of time, but her cases at each age were too few and her measure of happiness less complete than Terman's. Hamilton also finds little correlation except that the early years are slightly happier. The younger couples in Terman's group have more common interests, but

this may be due to the culture of their generation rather than to the newness of their marriages.

RAPTUROUS LOVE CAN BE REVIVED. Although a love relation in its totality may persist through life, it seems natural and almost inevitable that the quality of feeling must change, excitement and rapture declining while other elements persist or strengthen. If "constancy" in love means faithfulness to the same person, then we must be prepared to accept some inconstancy of feeling qualities. Those lovers who are most tolerant of such changes of feeling toward each other are the ones most likely to achieve permanency of love relationship. We must be prepared to accept the fading out of excitement, to look without guilt upon the growing importance of erotic feeling even if at the expense of those feelings which in pre-marital life were called "purer" or more "innocent." We must be prepared also for the diminution of erotic feelings at times, and for such as may come physiologically in old age. The Don Juan type of person, on the other hand, is "faithful" to a particular feeling; he is in love with love itself, and to maintain this feeling he is unfaithful to the love object.

It is wise to be prepared for the insidious onset of "calm" or "habit" in married love, and yet the outlook is not so uninspiring as is conventionally pictured. There are undeveloped possibilities for the maintenance and revival of rapturous love with the same partner. Instead of saying that "perpetual romance" is a "pipe-dream," as some advisers seem to suggest in their effort to prevent disappointment, we might better examine more carefully the conditions which favor or prevent romance. The marriage institution in our culture tends to kill rapturous love, although it may commonly favor tender and erotic love.

The conditions for rapture seem to be that the love object should occupy the center of attention for a period of time with no compelling distractions. Many novel and beautiful settings for courtship are "romantic" in part because they contain no interrupting or annoying stimuli. The lover is free from any sense of responsibility to anything except his beloved. Childless couples have a natural advantage in the perpetuation of romance, and a democratic population policy will see to it that similar advantages are guaranteed to parents. The perpetuation of the race will be more certain when it is made compatible with the perpetuation of romance.

It is often felt that the easy availability of the partner in marriage is an enemy of romance. As de Rougemont says, the cult of "passion"

seeks obstacles, and values absences because these raise the intensity of feeling. But the matter is not so simple. In one case, a romantic love affair characterized by nightly rendezvous under the stars at a summer resort became even more intense after the partners withdrew to their respective home towns and could meet only once a month. This would seem to support the thesis that love becomes dull through lack of obstacles. But in this case there was no increased *difficulty*, but a decrease of *frequency* of meeting with a *decrease* of difficulty at the same time. At the summer resort the above-mentioned lovers had been obliged to plan and contrive each day anew for their evening meeting. Their irregular duties and need for concealment of their relation in the *Gemeinschaft* situation made this necessary. At home they lived in cities and when they visited each other they had more freedom and could make plans with fair assurance of carrying them out. There was less tension in the preparations, and at their meetings, though less frequent, there was more complete relaxation. By the same token, it may be found that the unromantic qualities of marriage are not due to its being too easy but too difficult; that is, difficult as regards finding private time and space for undistracted companionship.

In the early stages of romance much time is spent in daydreaming about an absent loved one. The lover, in a sense, is in love with his own daydreams. It would be quite unusual to make daydreams the main focus, yet they always play an important role in rapturous love. It is often more comfortable to daydream about a distant loved one than to have that person physically present but preoccupied with other matters.

It may be, however, that mere familiarity, sameness, even without tensions or annoyances, tend to destroy romance. However, this may be the familiarity of the total situation rather than specifically of the love object. Many married couples find that if situations resembling those of courtship come again: absences, departures, arrivals, vacations together, eating in strange places, and the like, rapturous thrills may again appear from time to time.

Books and counselors tell us that we should "grow up emotionally," own a home and "put down roots," and learn to accept routine. These are said to be the intelligent things to do. *Yet real intelligence might plan for variety and novelty.* It is the unplanned or poorly planned married life which yields dullness and monotony.

To many couples "marital vacations" will be the most suitable method to revive romance. How far these will involve freedom of

companionship with other partners will be a matter for individual couples to decide according to their values, within whatever limits may be set by society. The risks are obvious; they are probably less when such vacations are taken for the expressed good of the marriage than when entered furtively with concealed motives on the part of one or both partners.

Somewhere between continuous presence and long absences there must lie an ideal pattern which would best maintain a love relationship. This would differ with different couples, and would make a useful subject of study. "Week-end marriages" might prove to be unusually satisfying.

There is still another emotional resource, and it gains rather than loses power with the elapse of years. It has received more recognition from poets and song writers than from psychologists. It is the linkage of rapturous feelings to memories of past experiences with the partner and to ideas of trends and destinies. It is perhaps the feeling Floyd Dell has expressed in *Homecoming*. It is a nostalgic yearning for the old, the familiar, or the permanent after a period of physical or emotional separation. It is the rapture which often comes on with tears and culminates in something akin to religious ecstasy.

In order to perpetuate romance the partners must be able and willing to plan their goings and comings, their separations and their reunions according to psychological needs. They cannot have their personal schedules utterly enslaved to the ends of practical efficiency. It is not the permanence of marriage nor its legality which too often makes it dull and uninspiring. Rather it is its sordid "practicality," its still-surviving tetherage to the economic functions, which kills romance. What the wealthy sometimes achieve through surplus personal funds, others may achieve through cooperative schemes and new designs for home living.

WE NEED RESEARCH ON LOVE HISTORIES. Hamilton's [1929, 220–222] 100 men and 100 women subjects had had on the average 6.8 heterosexual love affairs per person, counting from earliest childhood to the present and including the affairs which led to marriage and those after marriage, if any. These figures were practically alike for the two sexes. Of the total of 1,358 love affairs reported, the extent of intimacy reached (outside of marriage) was as shown in Table 12.

Hamilton comments that the termination of love affairs by marriage is "less tautological than it seems: for some of the spouses marriage did not seem to be the termination of the love affair that led

TABLE 12

LOVE AFFAIRS

Degree of Intimacy Reached	Per Cent
No demonstration of affection	34
Holding hands, exchanging presents	11
Kissing and embracing, not consciously erotic	18
Erotic "petting" but no specific stimulation of sex organs	9
Specific stimulation of sex organs without intercourse	8
Sexual intercourse	14
Uncertain answers	6
	100

Mode of Termination	Per Cent
1. Marriage between the lovers	15
2. Geographic or social separation (usual with pre-adolescent affairs)	20
3. Drifting apart without any particular event	12
4. Transfer of affection by subject to another	9
5. Dissatisfaction of subject with object person	13
6. Terminated by object person (reasons not given but probably would come mostly under 4 and 5)	10
7. Loyalties to other persons, including mates	2
8. Interference of family or friends	3
9. Quarrels, misunderstandings, wrongs done	4
10. Never reciprocated	6
11. Death of object person	1
12. Not yet terminated	4
13. Other causes	1
	100

to such a venture, for others it soon meant an abatement of the affair . . ."

Kirkpatrick and Caplow are conducting a study of courtship at the University of Minnesota. Each relationship is represented by a curve which rises and falls through time between "dislike," "indifference," "attraction," and "love."

Two research needs are apparent. *First,* we need life histories of individuals emphasizing the sequence and development of all love experience, in which sexual relations are described according to their meanings and role in the total history, and not as peculiar objects of interest in themselves. *Second,* we need case histories in which the enamored pair is the unit of study, which begin and end with the love relationship. We need to observe the *natural* course of love, which is seldom allowed to be followed. Love's "style is cramped" by unconventionality and inability to marry; and it is also cramped by marriage.

BEREAVEMENT. Every year about 400,000 wives in the United States become widows.* The average age at which they lose their husbands is 55. This is the most common type of serious bereavement, but there are many cases of other types. Loss of sexual partner is but a small element in the total frustration, and bereavement often serves to bring out the latent intensity and meaning of love feelings other than the sexual. Loss of parents and of children are major frustrations in many lives.

T. D. Eliot [1932] notes nine types of *immediate* reaction to bereavement: abandon, refusal of the facts, preternatural or detached calm, shock, exalting self-injury, repression, blame of others or self, revenge; and always the intense longing of grief. The first eight occur in various combinations and sequences with the last. After some elapse of time and social interaction with others, the reactions tend to fall into the following six types, which correspond more or less to certain types of frustration reaction in general: (1) escape (by drugs, changing residence, suicide, social distractions, illusions); (2) defense and repression (by self-control, removal of reminders, and so on); (3) compensation (rationalization, beliefs and cults, rituals of contrition, perpetuation of memory or supposed will of deceased, revenge, penance); (4) masochism and exhibition (recluses, ascetics, "enjoyment" of grief); (5) identification (stepping into role of deceased); (6) transference or substitution (attachment to new love object, charities, causes, and so on). Any of these methods may be successful or unsuccessful from the standpoint of the individual, success being roughly estimated by the relaxation of unpleasant tensions and by constructive achievements of various kinds. Yet cultures, cults, and groups approve or condemn various of the frustration reactions regardless of their psychological success. As Eliot points out, refusal to commit suttee would have been considered failure in old Hindu culture. Family members are often worried because they do not show grief in the way other persons approve. In our culture there is probably a greater variety of grief reactions than are tolerated by most simple cultures.

Bereavement affects the family group also in many ways. Some families increase in solidarity, others decrease; some experience a considerable shifting of roles.

Bereavement is sometimes socially constructive, as when it motivates a family or an individual to some creative achievement under

* *Statistical Bulletin*, Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, 21:8, 1940, p. 1.

the influence of the believed desires or ideals of the departed. Perhaps it might be made much more frequently and largely constructive if our funeral and mourning customs could be varied somewhat more to meet the needs of individuals. With the decline of the vivid, concrete conception of immortality, no one ideology of similar moving power has arisen to take its place. Each grieves and imagines in his own way, and there seems a trend toward silence. We who mourn not, feel and show various degrees of sympathy toward those who mourn; seldom do we enter enough into their feelings, however, to make their experiences constructive in our own lives. If we did so, we might thus soften many of the hostilities among the living and rejuvenate many deteriorating love relations. It requires the poet to bring out the meaning and the constructive possibilities of this human experience of sorrow which we may factually observe about us on almost any day.

My heart was heavy, for its trust had been
Abused, its kindness answered with foul wrong;
So, turning gloomily from my fellow men,
One summer Sabbath day I strolled among
The green mounds of the village burial place;
Where, wondering how all human love and hate
Find one sad level; and how, soon or late,
Wronged and wrongdoer, each with meekened face,
And cold hands folded over a still heart,
Pass the green threshold of our common grave,
Whither all footsteps tend, whence none depart,
Awed for myself, and pitying my race,
Our common sorrow, like a mighty wave,
Swept all my pride away, and trembling I forgave! *

LOVE CAN BE CONSTRUCTIVELY CONTROLLED AND YET SUPREMELY VALUED. We may respect and value every genuine love relationship which has established itself and at the same time hold that self-control is possible and desirable in the forming of love relations and directing their course. We should look upon a love relationship as we do upon a human being. There are often many good reasons why a child should not be brought into the world; and yet if and when he is, we should treat and value him as we do the child who has been fully "wanted" and wisely planned for. It is difficult to do this, but it can be done and is done. The essential task of emotional hygiene is to teach people how to do it.

* John Greenleaf Whittier, *Forgiveness.*

Similarly there are many love relationships which before the event were unwise. But after the event, the "unwise" love relation must be respected as having an independent value of its own. The lovers may recognize it as a mistake and decide to deal with it by whatever method and tempo best comport with their values. They may decide upon a quick, painful break in their association in the manner of a surgical operation, or upon a gradual separation, or they may choose to preserve part or all of their relationship permanently against all interfering forces. But in a democracy we shall try to bring it about that the decision is really *theirs,* not his alone, nor hers, nor that of the community.

Effective control of love by the individual is exercised primarily through the control of situations, sometimes through mental techniques and psychiatry, never through mere "acts of will." A direct frontal attack by will power upon unwise love, or upon the unfortunate decline of love in marriage, is a kind of intra-personal Fascism which bodes no good to the parties concerned. On the other hand, the common attitude that love is wholly spontaneous, unpredictable, uncontrollable, and by these very qualities valuable, is fatalistic *laissez-faire.* Both within the individual personality as within the group, *art* is superior both to authority and to *laissez-faire.*

Marjorie Greenbie [1932] points out that a love relationship can be developed to unexpected heights of satisfaction through the use of art. Some attention has been given to sexual art and more needs to be given to the study and cultivation of the other love feelings. Physical self-discipline, including a certain austerity of diet, is an important part of the love art. Married love has learned a great deal from some of the things which have been written about unmarried love. The two greatest emotional experiences of mankind are religious conversion and love. Conversion, as Havelock Ellis [1923, 218–19] suggests, is the joyful organization of an emotional relationship to the world conceived as a whole. Rapturous love resembles it in feeling; it is mainly the object which is different. But the most intense experiences of love may also be achieved when the lover is fortunate enough to be able to think of the beloved as not merely an individual, but as an embodiment of broader human qualities and values. In this way, and not through renunciation and asceticism, love in a democracy may at its best closely approach religion.

Chapter XII

PERSONALITY AND MARITAL HAPPINESS

And so "they lived happily ever after."

Such is the expectation, as found in the romantic folklore and fiction of our culture. But there is also in our culture a body of "common sense" wisdom which foresees considerable unhappiness in many marriages, and some decline of happiness in all, and nevertheless holds that marriage is desirable because it holds people together even when they are not altogether happy. George Devereux [1941, B] has shown that even a primitive culture can hold two inconsistent ideologies; it is not surprising that our complex culture is inconsistent. In more recent years our mores have come to hold that, where persons are very desperately and hopelessly unhappy, they should be divorced. Yet divorce is still regarded in some groups as a disgrace, and rather generally as unfortunate, and as a reflection upon the character of one or both parties. Only very recently has it become common to say, "they were both grand people, but they just weren't suited." It is unusual to hold that marital troubles are not due to the natural decline of love, nor to the incompatibility of the partners, but to the defects of the marriage institution itself in meeting normal human needs under modern conditions. Yet this view will bear examination, and will receive it.

Marital happiness has recently become a problem. We do not know whether marriages on the average are more or less happy than a hundred years ago. The divorce rate is the only index of marital failure which permits comparison with the past. It is not an adequate measure of the extent of marital unhappiness but only of the disorganization of marriage; in fact only one form of disorganization. The rising divorce rate may indicate nothing more than a change in the cultural mode of adjustment to unhappiness. Couples who formerly would have remained legally together in unhappiness or in personal relationships of great aloofness, now meet the problem by a legal break.

That all was not entirely well in the past in America is suggested by the appearance of a book in 1891, entitled *How To Be Happy Though Married.**

Unhappiness gives rise to a social problem when we begin to think something can be done about it. But where there is no unhappiness there is no cultural lag and no social problem. When we talk about "family disorganization" and "marital conflict" or "discord" we should remember that it is only when and because these phenomena involve the suffering of individual human beings that a democratic society should be concerned with them. There are some cases of friendly separation or divorce which leave the parties better satisfied; and some marriages seem to involve habitual quarreling interspersed with reconciliations and love, without serious harm to anyone and sometimes even with beneficial effects. We are concerned with the great volume of frustration and actual suffering in modern marriage, whether or not it leads to divorce and whether or not it involves quarreling or the progressive estrangement of the partners.

A. MARITAL HAPPINESS: ITS MEASUREMENT AND PREDICTION

FROM 13 TO 50 PER CENT OF MARRIAGES ARE UNSATISFACTORY. Success and failure, of course, are matters of degree. The study of failure throws light upon success and helps to preserve and increase success.

Three studies have given us some idea of the extent of marital unhappiness. In Katherine Davis' study [1929] of 1,000 married women, of whom 691 were college graduates, 87 per cent reported themselves as happy. But the simple question which was asked: "Is your marriage a happy one?" would tend to elicit answers giving the benefit of any doubt to happiness. The subjects were not interviewed personally. Hamilton [1929] had lengthy interviews with his subjects. His method was to present 334 questions on printed cards while he sat at a constant distance from the subject and wrote down the answers without comment. He estimated the degree of happiness in two ways. *First,* he scored the answers to 13 questions diagnostic of happiness, expressing them on a scale ranging from 0 to 14 points. *Second,* using his general impression of each case as a whole, he classified the marriages into five descriptive grades: obviously successful, fairly successful, doubtful success, intolerably bad, separated or divorced. He then

* Anonymous, Scribner's, 1891.

found that the dividing line between the second and third grades corresponded to about 6½ points on the scale obtained from rating the detailed answers, and also split the group into about two equal parts. He could say then that about half his cases were obviously or fairly successful marriages. These are henceforth called the "happy," or the "more happy," the others the "unhappy" or "less happy." The happy group contained 51 men and 45 women. The average happiness point score for the men was 6.6; for the women 5.9. The men felt both the economic and sex tensions less, but felt personality dissatisfactions with their mates in about the same degree as the women.

One question gave some absolute indication of happiness. The subjects were asked: "If by some miracle you could press a button and find that you had never been married to your husband (or wife) would you press that button?" To this only 66 men and 64 women answered with an unqualified "no"; 8 each gave a qualified "no"; 17 men and 16 women said "yes," with or without qualifications [p. 69].

Dickinson and Beam [1931] found, that out of 770 women living with their husbands, 47.4 per cent made no complaint of any kind, whereas 48.7 per cent had complaints which they were willing to discuss with the doctor. However, Dickinson's data emphasize sexual maladjustment, and 275 of his women were diagnosed as sexually pathological. Mrs. Jessie Bernard [1933] estimates that if all Dickinson's cases whose unhappiness *might* have been based upon their sexual difficulties were eliminated, the figure for unhappiness (i.e., on non-sexual grounds) would be 13 per cent, the same as Davis' figure. Hamilton's group yielded 36 per cent of women who failed to give an unqualified "no" to the question of pressing the button. Mrs. Bernard says that Hamilton's group is overloaded with clinical cases, since 23 of the 200 persons (11 per cent) are divorced or separated. But in view of Ogburn's finding [1929] that 6 per cent of married couples in one large city in 1920 were living apart, and of the additional fact that the number of divorced persons is about 3 per cent of the number of married persons, Hamilton's group does not seem to include a great excess of divorced and separated. If we eliminate Hamilton's 15 separated and divorced women, we find $(36 - 15) \div (100 - 15) = 25$ per cent unhappy among the women who are living with their husbands.

All the studies rating marital happiness have been made upon fairly educated groups. Within such groups we can say of couples who are living together that the admitted unhappiness will amount to some-

thing between 13 and 53 per cent according to the standards and definitions used. [Bernard, J., 1942, 103.]

RECENT PREDICTION STUDIES. Two outstanding statistical studies of marital adjustment have been made in recent years, one by Terman [1938] and one by Burgess and Cottrell [1939]. Burgess and Cottrell distributed about 7,000 questionnaires and got 1,300 replies, or 19 per cent. Several methods of distribution were used. From 30 to 60 per cent of the persons who received questionnaires through a friend who was a student taking part in the research answered them. Questionnaires placed in apartment house mail boxes and sent to persons whose names appeared in newspaper divorce reports yielded returns of about 5 per cent. [*Ibid.*, 18, 19.]

From the 1,300 replies, 526 were selected for actual use, in order to provide a homogeneous sample. This sample consisted of: residents of Illinois, answering the questionnaire in 1931, 1932, or 1933, and married not less than one nor more than six years previously. This selection of relatively "green" marriages is an important limitation of the study. The sample was 90 per cent urban or small town, over half admittedly Protestant, about three-fifths college graduates, three-fourths business class (including professional), with a median income of about $2,500. Three hundred and seventeen of the questionnaires were filled out by the wife alone, 153 by the husband alone, 30 by both together.

Terman's subjects were 1,250 couples in all, of whom 792 couples were included in the main experimental group. These 792 couples were Californians, also three-fourths business class, median income about $2,300, and about 43 per cent college graduates. Their average length of present marriage was 11.4 years, with 12 per cent married over 20 years; only 32 per cent were childless.

Terman did not, like Burgess and Cottrell, rely upon one spouse to furnish the material—he required questionnaires from both spouses. These were collected in an ingenious way, which guarded against any possible identification of the persons, and also against the collaboration of husband and wife in making their answers. The subjects were invited to various meetings at which each couple received an envelope containing the blanks for husband and wife. They had to appear together at the desk *as a couple* to receive the blanks and also to return the blanks filled out, but their writing was done in separate portions of the room. Their blanks, each in its own sealed envelope, were mixed in with others in a basket in their presence so that they could see there would be no chance of spotting them later.*

* From review in *Bulletin of Family Research and Education*, 1·3 (June, 1940), 6.

Both studies construct a numerical score measuring actual present *adjustment* in marriage, and a *prediction* score based upon facts which could have been obtained before the persons were married. The Burgess-Cottrell adjustment score was constructed from 27 questions about (1) extent of *agreement* between spouses on handling various practical matters in the home, (2) extent of common interests and activities, (3) demonstrations of affection and confidence, (4) dissatisfactions with marriage, and (5) personal feelings of anomie or depression. Their book contains the complete text of the questionnaires and scoring key, by which a couple or a person may measure their own marital adjustment on the scale, which runs from 0 to 200 points, with a median of 152. With 66 couples it was possible to get pairs of schedules filled out independently by husband and wife, and the adjustment scores obtained from husbands' answers correlated $+.88 \pm .027$ with those obtained from wive's answers [p. 70]. One question asked for a general appraisal of one's marriage in the grades: "very unhappy," "unhappy," "average," "happy," "very happy." The tetrachoric correlation of this rating with adjustment score was $+.92$ [p. 71], and on a new sample of 68 cases, $+.95$. It was possible to get a simple self-rating from husbands and wives independently from 251 couples; 71.7 per cent of these agreed exactly and only 3.6 per cent of couples disagreed more than one step in the five-step rating scale of their happiness. This makes a tetrachoric correlation of $+.89$ [pp. 38–39].

The Terman study has a similar adjustment score, which is called the "index of marital happiness." It omits demonstrations of affection (except as a question under agreements) and feelings of depression except as these are implied in the general happiness of marriage, and elaborates considerably the details of marital dissatisfactions by presenting a list of 57 complaints or grievances to be check-marked. The happiness score (i.e., adjustment score) ranges from 0 to 87 points with a median of about 75 points. Husband's score correlates $+.59$ with wife's score [p. 81], and this brings out more clearly than the Burgess-Cottrell study the fact that there is often considerable divergence between the partners in the degree of happiness they feel in their marriage. In simple rating of happiness, which each husband and each wife in this study had to make on a seven-step scale, the correlation was $+.67$, also considerably below the Burgess-Cottrell spousal correlation of $+.89$. Terman thinks that the greater differentiation of husband's and wife's happiness in his study is due partly

to the greater care in preventing collaboration in answering the questionnaires [p. 368].

The score for adjustment or happiness in these two and several other studies has a highly skewed distribution, with the bulk of the cases near the top or happy end of the scale. Even when asked to rate their happiness in relation to the average, 84 per cent of Terman's subjects, 63 per cent of Burgess' and 65 per cent of Lang's subjects [1932] rate themselves as happier than average. They do not know, of course, where the average actually is. Only 21 per cent of the Burgess, 16 per cent of the Lang, and 5 per cent of the Terman subjects are willing to make a check-mark opposite any category which says "unhappy" or "less happy than average." Jessie Bernard [1934] thinks the form of the curve of marital happiness is partly genuine; that is, that *actual* marital satisfaction varies farther from its norm in a downward than in an upward direction. But the nature of the scale used and the sampling errors, she finds, probably exaggerate the skew. The several studies and methods of measurement do not show any consistent finding as to whether men or women are happier in marriage.

The prediction score in the Burgess-Cottrell study is based upon facts about the pre-marital backgrounds of the two partners (place in family, attachment to siblings, residence, education, occupation, employment, income, savings, religious activity, membership in social organizations, friendships with opposite sex, status and happiness of parents' marriage, and relations to parents) plus length of courtship and age difference.

The correlation of prediction score with adjustment score was +.51.* It will be remembered that the adjustment score was based upon an-

* When the prediction score was broken down into basic-factor categories ("psychogenetic," "cultural impress," "social type," "economic role," and "response patterns" [p. 328]), and each of these was correlated separately with the adjustment score, and a multiple correlation of these five correlations was computed, this multiple correlation was found to be +.56. When certain "contingency" items (post-marital facts in the field of economic and residential conditions, children and desire for children [p. 241]) are added to this refined prediction score, its correlation with adjustment is raised still further to +.61. It should be noted that to get a higher correlation by juggling the weights of the different items making up each variable is perfectly sound; the statistician is entitled to the highest correlation he can find in this way. When, however, he raises his correlation by changing the composition of the variables themselves, he must always justify it by showing that the variables still retain whatever logical distinction from each other they originally purported to have. Burgess and Cottrell recognize the logical questionability of including these contingency items, but show that they are at least partially admissible since

swers of one, but not both, of the spouses. If answers from both had been scored, the correlation might have been somewhat raised.

The comparable Terman prediction score, based purely upon background factors which could have been known before marriage, correlates only +.35 with happiness of husbands and +.29 with happiness of wives; with each person's happiness is correlated his or her individual background.

Terman introduces two additional measures which, because they relate to present attitudes and experiences, *could be* in some degree the results or indicators of the marital happiness and not wholly its causes or predictors. One of these, called "personality factors," is an inventory of attitudes (Bernreuter-type questions on emotional attitudes and emotional difficulties; Strong-type questions about likes and dislikes for occupations, activities, and types of people, and personal "opinions"—really values—regarding the "ideal marriage"). The other is an index of present sexual adjustment (frequency of intercourse, relative sex hunger, ability to prolong intercourse, refusal, female orgasm, sexual complaints, pre-marital intercourse, desire for extra-marital intercourse, contraceptive practices, and sleeping arrangements). The personality index of husbands correlated +.47 with their marital happiness and the personality index of the wives correlated +.46 with their marital happiness.

Terman [1939] has tested by several methods the possibility that the marital happiness might influence the attitudes which make up the personality index, and even that it might influence one's memory of childhood experiences (such as happiness of parents) which he reports under the background questions. He has found absolutely no evidence of such influence and concludes that it is safe to consider his personality factors as determined prior to or independently of the marital happiness. He therefore combines them with the background items to form prediction scores (for each person) which correlate +.54 with marital happiness among husbands and +.47 among wives. The average prediction score of the husband and wife correlates about +.60 with their average happiness score.* [Johnson and Terman, 1939.]

they are partially the post-marital reflections of pre-marital conditions. Conservatively, however, we may regard their highest correlations as +.56.

* It is interesting that Terman, a psychologist, naturally treating his individual personality data relatively more and his social background data relatively less intensively than sociologists Burgess and Cottrell, did not get as high a correlation as they did of pure background items with adjustment, but made up for it when

E. L. Kelley [1937, 1939], following up 300 married couples after giving them an elaborate battery of tests, finds a correlation of +.60 between a prediction score similar to the Terman measure, averaged for the two partners, and the average happiness score of these partners two years later.*

Winch [1941], using data collected by Burgess and Wallin upon *engaged* couples by the use of Thurstone's neurotic inventory [1930] and by an index of "adjustment in engagement," found that 28 of the 42 Thurstone items, which differentiate most reliably between neurotics and non-neurotics, yielded significant differences between the men well adjusted to engagement and those poorly adjusted. A similar study was made by Frieda Brim, correlating the neurotic scores with the women's as well as the men's engagement scores. Essentially similar results followed. "The general pattern revealed . . . in these studies and in Terman's is one of association with marital [or betrothal] unhappiness of a personality characterized by a sort of overreactive touchiness and a sense of inferiority." This lends additional evidence to support Terman's thesis that the personality factors are the pre-existing cause, and not the result or reflection of the marital adjustment.

Yet all these prediction scores give no very reliable prophecy for the individual case, and the outcome would be still more uncertain if the individual knew his score well before marriage and was influenced thereby in his educational program or choice of partner. Such a result, nevertheless, might be the most useful consequence of the prediction tests.

Yet, as Terman points out, these predictions are as reliable as those used in selecting students for college entrance. Aptitude tests or average high school grades alone rarely yield correlations of more than +.50 or +.60 with later academic record in college, and the best prediction obtained by combining them is in the neighborhood of +.70. [Terman, 1938, 363.]

MARITAL HAPPINESS RUNS IN FAMILIES. Reviewing the studies and combining related items in each study, we may say that it is definitely favorable to married happiness to have had happy parents; a happy childhood with attachment to, and little conflict with, parents; firm

he added his personality items. The final result was about the same. The greater homogeneity of the Burgess sample and the failure to questionnaire both spouses within it are other factors which doubtless influenced the size of correlations, but in ways too complex to be discussed here.

* See also Terman and Johnson, 1939.

but not harsh discipline; to have had some sex instruction in childhood and no aversion toward sex; to have been reared in the country, small town, or suburb in a moderately religious, conventional family: to have avoided very early marriage (i.e., before 22 for man, 20 for woman), and pre-marital intercourse (unless with future spouse only, in Terman's study), to have had an engagement of at least six months and acquaintance for a year or more, to have had several friends of both sexes and participated in several organizations.

Of 754 unhappy husbands and wives who consulted the Los Angeles (now "American") Institute of Family Relations, 45 per cent came from family backgrounds described as unhappy. Of 1,138 unhappily married persons in an educated control group, only 34 per cent came from unhappy families. Here the criteria of unhappiness may have been somewhat different; but only 17 per cent of the 2,490 *happily* married from this same control group with same criteria came from unhappy parental families. [Popenoe and Wicks, 1937.]

HAPPINESS SEEMS ASSOCIATED WITH GOOD EDUCATION, BUT THE WHOLE RESEARCH IS CLASS-LIMITED. In general these studies picture the happily married person as one who was a loved child of happy parents and has not deviated widely from upper-middle-class culture. Yet the samples are taken mainly from that cultural group. The upper class may be unimportant because of its small size, yet studies limited to its narrow membership might throw important light upon the cultural relativity of these findings. More adequate lower-middle-class samples and studies of the much-overlooked lower class would have not only this value but also the more immediate practical value of enlightening our policies and counseling with respect to the great and needy masses of the people.

Burgess and Cottrell [p. 359] compare the findings of nine studies, including their own and Terman's. The results are not altogether comparable, but there are few conflicting results. Four of the studies agree that marital happiness is favored by having happily married parents and a high level of formal education. In interpreting the latter result it should be noted that these samples do not give us a wide representation of educational levels, but contain a disproportion of college graduates. It may be that the non-college people included in them are not representative of their levels, but may consist of rather ambitious people having unusual intellectual curiosity or awareness of their problems. However, the results certainly give no aid and comfort to those who claim that higher education goes with unhappiness and discontent. In the Burgess-Cottrell study the adjustment

score of wives increases steadily from those with grade school education only to those with graduate or professional study [p. 391]. Terman's findings would indicate a moderate superiority of highly educated women over others in respect to marital happiness and an equality with others in sexual adequacy.

MARITAL HAPPINESS GOES WITH GENERALLY HAPPY PERSONALITIES. The "background" factors in these studies are roughly of three kinds. *First* are those having to do with general culture and socio-economic status; *second,* those having to do with parent-child and other social relations which vary greatly within each class or culture group Thus in every such group or class there are sociable, popular persons and shy, seclusive persons; happy, cooperative families and families having deep conflicts, frustrations, and emotional rejections. Of these two classes of factors, the second shows more items significantly related to later marital success. A *third* class of factors has to do with the circumstances of the courtship and marriage itself, but includes only a few items. If we combine the second class—the interactional ("personal-social" as Kimball Young calls them) factors with "personality" factors which Terman separates from "background" but which are known to be largely the results of early interactional experiences—we get a large group of personality-interaction-social-role traits which account for the great majority of significant correlations in all these studies.

The gist of all these findings seems to be that people are more likely to be happy in marriage if they have happy, well-adjusted personalities in general. From a very different research approach, Harriet Mowrer [1932] brings in the idea, which she says is gaining ground, that domestic discord is the result rather than the cause of personality disorganization.

It is quite certain that marital discord is correlated with individual mental abnormality. Statistics from hospitals for the insane show that at age 50 and over divorced persons are 4 to 6 times as likely as married persons to be mental hospital patients, and from 1.8 to 3 times as susceptible as the single and widowed. [Dayton, 1930; Elmer, 1932, 155–157.] In other words, some factor is involved in addition to the mere loss of mate or failure to get married. Mental disorder may, of course, be either the cause or the result of divorce, and is probably both. In eleven states it is a legal ground for divorce, but is used in only about 100 cases per year in the whole United States. [Lichtenberger, 1931, 406.] More often it leads to behavior which brings divorce on other legal grounds.

Dr. W. J. Hickson, psychiatrist of the Chicago Court of Domestic Relations, believed the principal causes of *divorce* to be: (1) feeblemindedness plus dementia praecox, (2) dementia praecox, (3) feeblemindedness. [Cahen, 1932, 45–50.]

Jessie Bernard [1935] reports a correlation of +.41 between marital dissatisfaction and neuroticism as measured by the Bernreuter inventory among women. There is no such correlation among her male subjects.

Divorce Represents a Different Personality Type from Marital Unhappiness. There have been very few findings of personality traits which are especially dangerous to marriage and not correspondingly bad for social living in general. Such traits as dominance-submission, masculinity-femininity, extroversion-introversion, as measured by tests, show no correlation with the marital success of the individual possessing them.

Some low but interesting correlations with psychological tests are found by Johnson and Terman [1935]. Happy husbands tend to have traits which may be generalized as cooperative, conservative, cautious, and emotionally stable. Unhappy husbands incline to be neurotic, irritable, seclusive, and timid. Divorced men are gregarious, wilful, daring, and more gratified by admiration than achievement. Happy wives are kindly, docile, placid, methodical, cautious, and conformist. Unhappy wives are relatively neurotic, careless, lazy, tactless, and unsympathetic. They seem to comprise several sub-types. Divorced women are self-reliant, self-assertive, and tolerant.

These comparisons suggest that divorce does not represent a more extreme stage of marital unhappiness, but rather a deviation from the norm in an entirely different direction from that followed by the unhappy person who remains married. It seems to be associated, to a greater extent than either happy or unhappy marriage, with aggressiveness, courage, and narcissistic traits.

Social Function and Limitations of These Prediction Methods. The studies so far described have indicated that happiness in marriage tends to run in families and that it is correlated with the general happiness of the personality. One wonders what would be the result if all persons could take a marital prediction test and be informed of their scores. At least 13 per cent of the 90 per cent of persons who marry would have to look forward to being definitely unhappy, and many more to only the claimed "average" happiness which is really below the statistical average. It is not likely that knowledge of test scores by those now destined to single blessedness would lead

many of them to marry. Would it lead many of the poor prospects now destined to the altar to avoid marriage? The tests, be it noted, apply unconditionally to the individual; there is nothing in them to indicate whether he will be more happy with one type of partner than another, except that his prospects are probably more favorable if he marries someone with a higher prediction score. What would happen, moreover, if everyone could know the score of a prospective mate? Reasoning in terms of natural interaction, it would seem that if people really took the tests seriously, a new scale of courtship desirability would be established, and the low-score people would in general have to marry other low-score people because they would fail in competition for the better prospects. The existent *homogamy* with respect to wealth and education might be supplemented with some degree of marital-prediction-score homogamy.

It is well to raise these questions even though they are very hypothetical, for they suggest the possible function and limitations of such scientific procedures in social change. It seems that the tests so far devised might be valuable in promoting more serious consideration of marriage and choice of partner. They might enable the more fortunate personalities to avoid marital mistakes, possibly at the expense of the less fortunate. Any direct general improvement in marital happiness would seem to require tests which would not rank individuals on a linear scale but indicate matches which would be favorable to both parties concerned. In other words, what type of person should marry what type? In what respects is similarity of partners favorable, and in what indifferent or unfavorable?

B. HOMOGAMY AND PERSONALITY DIFFERENTIALS

IN GENERAL, "LIKE" TENDS TO MARRY "LIKE" RATHER THAN OPPOSITE. One approach to such knowledge is a study of actual homogamy under present conditions. [Anderson, C. A., 1938.]

Bossard [1932] recorded the residences of parties in 5,000 consecutive marriage licenses in Philadelphia. He found that one-third of all the couples lived within five blocks or less of each other, and the percentage of marriages decreased steadily with increasing distance between residences of bride and groom. About a half of all were within eighteen blocks, and this held true also for New Haven couples. [Davie and Reeves, 1939.] In New Haven, 43 per cent of all marriages were of couples who lived in the same socio-ecological area

of the city. Geographic proximity in cities usually means also social similarity.

Marvin [1919] showed from Philadelphia marriage licenses that partners much more frequently have *similar occupations* than they would by random assortment.

Negroes, whites, Protestants, Catholics, and Jews are to a large extent in-marrying groups. The number of intermarriages is much less than mere chance would produce. Ernst Kahn [1931] finds that in Germany of about 1925–30, 1 Jewish marriage in every 4 was a marriage with a Gentile, as compared with 1 in 12 about 1900. But, by a pure chance assortment, the great majority of Jewish marriages would be with Gentiles, because the Gentiles are the much more numerous group. (Of course the vast majority of Gentile marriages would also be with Gentiles.) In New York only 1 per cent of Negro women and 3 per cent of Negro men marry white persons. [De Porte, 1931.]

Several studies have shown the correlation between husband's intelligence and wife's intelligence, in samples broadly representative of the population, to be in the range of +.40 to +.60. [Jones, H. E., 1929.] When the sample, however, represents only one stratum of population, the marital correlation is very low. It was +.08 for royal marriages [Woods, 1903], +.10 for mentally deficient [Morees, 1924], and +.19 for college students [Smith, M., 1941]. The workers of the Pearson School of Biometrics at the University of London have rather consistently found that there are low positive correlations of the order of +.10 and +.20 between spouses in physical traits, such as stature, span of arms, length of forearm, eye color, and longevity. Jones summarizes these and other studies by saying that there is an average correlation of about +.25 in physical traits and +.50 in intelligence.

The tendency toward similarity between mates in many physical and mental traits may be largely explained by group endogamy. Measured intelligence varies roughly with socio-economic status and according to occupation. If persons tend to marry within their own broad occupational class and on their own social level, they will for this reason alone tend to marry persons of similar intelligence level. It is not proved that there is any tendency to choose a mate specifically on the basis of intelligence, although a more refined analysis of the statistics might show that such a specific tendency also exists. Physical homogamy can be due in part to social and cultural selection, for it has been shown that certain social groups differ from their neighbor

groups in physical traits. But there are some facts which suggest that social endogamy is not the sole cause. Pearson and Lee have found physical homogamy among sheep, deer, and paramecia. [Jones, *op. cit.*]

It seems theoretically quite plausible that there is a natural interaction process of selection by which an animal tends to be attracted somewhat more toward a mate of his own size, and having the characteristics of his kin, than toward one radically divergent. There would seem to be psychological resistances to the pairing of two persons of very unequal stature or weight.* Again, when we come to a trait like deafness, we find no difficulty in understanding the tremendous homogamy which Schuster found, 72.5 per cent of marriages of deaf persons being with another deaf person.†

Belle Schiller [1932], in a group of 46 couples, married 2.5 years on the average, found spousal correlations mostly of the order of +.30 and +.40 in height, weight, an intelligence test, and in *association type* as measured by the Kent-Rosanoff test. The correlations were practically zero with vocabulary tests and with extroversion-introversion and mental hygiene inventory. The average agreement (not a correlation coefficient) between man and wife on an attitude test relating to current topics was 72.4, the average agreement of man with woman chosen at random was 55.8.

A questionnaire study was made at Vassar College by Muriel Davis and the author [1933] to try out a possible method of measuring similarities and differences in personality among engaged couples.

Fifty questions, each answerable by two alternative answers, were presented to 65 engaged couples in which the girl was a college student. The questions dealt with attitudes toward love, children, recreational pursuits, social situations, and various annoyances. Questions which either theoretically or statistically differentiated the sexes in marked degree had been eliminated. The degree of similarity of any two persons was measured by the number of questions upon which they agreed. Perfect similarity would thus be indicated by a score of 50. The similarity to be expected by chance, if the 65 college women were paired at random with the 65 fiancés, was 29.2. The actual average similarity of the engaged couples was 33.5, or 4.3 points (probable error 0.4 points) above chance. To get some indication of the validity of this measurement of attitudinal similarity, the questionnaire was given to a group of 6 mature persons known to be intellectually congenial. The

* A worker in the Newark "Introduction Service" reports that stature is more important in making satisfactory "dates" than the service originally supposed.

† *Biometrika*, 4·473.

average similarity for the 15 possible pairs among this group was 36.8. Twelve other pairs of persons known to be uncongenial gave an average similarity of 26.9.

The experiment was repeated several years later by Elaine Levy, using the same questionnaire, upon 50 couples, mostly college students or recent graduates, in a different setting. Roughly the same degree of general homogamy appeared, but the ranking of the 50 questions in their degree of homogamy correlated only +.50 with their ranking in the Davis study. From the two studies the following questions were consistently homogamous (similarity of partners over 1.25 times chance in both studies) or consistently non-homogamous (similarity less than 1.05 times chance in both studies).

Homogamous Attitudes

(C) 6. How do you feel about receiving affection from the person you love? (*a*) Want it only when you want it, believing that there is such a thing as too much? (*b*) Want it constantly, believing that there can't be too much?

7. Are you more annoyed by: (*a*) conceited persons; (*b*) dull persons?

9 How do you feel about having children providing you are physically and financially able? (*a*) Does it seem like a part of love which would deepen your love for your mate? (*b*) Does it seem unimportant as an expression of love, but desirable for the sake of future happiness? (*c*) Want them because you like them?

22. Do you want: (*a*) no children; (*b*) one or two children; (*c*) three or more?

48. In the course of a year do you suffer more anxiety or timidity because of: (*a*) physical situations and dangers (including sickness, accidents, etc.); (*b*) social situations and dangers (what people may say, do, or think)?

Non-Homogamous Attitudes

12. Do you: (*a*) take pride in doing things about a home with your own hands, such as caring for the car, constructing, repairing, decorating, gardening, elaborate cooking, and generally "puttering around"; (*b*) leave such activities to others, if possible, while you devote your leisure mainly to social activities, sports, or amusements?

(C) 20. You are to make an important decision. Do you: (*a*) drift along and let others make the decision for you, if possible; (*b*) make the final decision yourself?

(C) 28. When saddened by the loss of some previous happiness, do you: (*a*) try to forget it entirely and avoid anything which reminds you of it; (*b*) find enough beauty and sentiment in the pathos itself to give you some relief and courage?

(C) 29. Are you most irritated by the discomfort of: (*a*) a room ten degrees too warm for you; (*b*) a room ten degrees too cold for you?

30. Does it annoy you most to notice a minor imperfection in: (*a*) the appearance of your car; (*b*) the mechanics of its operation?

(C) 45. Which annoys you most: (*a*) to be hurried; (*b*) to be forced to wait?

46. When not invited to some affair to which you feel that you may have some reason to be invited, do you: (*a*) feel annoyed; (*b*) tend to think of reasonable grounds for your not being invited?

It seems to the author that only one out of the five homogamous attitudes suggests a constitutional or temperamental basis (marked "C") while four of the seven non-homogamous attitudes do so. The other attitudes seem to represent choices of values or learned motivations attached to particular objects.

It would appear that some degree of homogamy is usually to be expected in physique, in capacity traits, and in motivational traits, that is, in abilities, interests, and values. The traits which show decided lack of homogamy are mainly of the types we called temperament and frustration reaction. If there is any truth in the popular theory that "opposites attract," it would seem to be true only of opposites in these particular respects. But the statistical evidence so far available does not show that opposites even in these traits tend to marry, but rather that there is merely a lack of the homogamous correlation found in other traits.

Kretschmer [1926] makes the astounding assertion that among 170 married couples of his acquaintance, the great majority were of dissimilar physical-temperamental type. His "types" are: the pyknic (stout body build), which is said to be extrovert; and the asthenic (slender), which is said to be introvert. But an unpublished study by C. Leroy Garvey, together with other studies, indicates that there is nothing in this Kretschmerian correlation between body-build and extroversion-introversion except what can be explained by age changes. Since the "types" themselves are unproved, we can place little reliance upon their alleged negative association with each other in marriages.

The burden of proof is still upon those who claim that opposites tend to marry; unless they mean, perhaps, opposite sexes.

Similarity of Values and Interests Favors Successful Marriage. These homogamy studies are merely preliminary to the real question: What *combinations* of personalities are favorable to marriage and enduring love? The prediction studies have given us little help in

this matter. Only sidelights are so far available, and new research needs to be concentrated on this purpose.

Baber [1939, 160–173] has given us some useful data on *intermarriage,* which refers to marriage between racial and cultural groups. In Hawaii marriages between the different nationality groups on the whole show higher divorce rates than those within groups, but there are exceptions. Romanzo Adams [1937] says that the high divorce rate of Hawaii is not so much due to inter-racial marriages as to the emancipation of people from traditional control. According to Baber's samples, yellow and black men marry white women much more often than white men marry these other races; Jewish men marry Protestant or Catholic women much more often than the reverse; but Protestant-Catholic marriages are about equal in the two directions. Baber gives a happiness rating averaging 62 out of 100 points to his 48 inter-racial marriages. Although this is not exactly comparable with other measures of happiness, it represents a point midway between "moderately happy" and "neutral," and appears to be lower than the average happiness of homogeneous marriages.

His 159 inter-faith marriages are somewhat better: 73 points, or about the midpoint of "moderately happy." The Jewish-Protestant combinations average 79; the Jewish-Catholic 70; the Catholic-Protestant 69. More significant are Baber's case studies which illustrate the kinds of things which happen in intermarriages.

In one case an educated, white woman married a poor and ignorant Negro man because he was the only man who could satisfy her sexually. They quarrel and fight, she dominates him with her superior culture, and he hates her for it although it gives him prestige among Negroes; still they remain together. A Russian Jewish man married an Irish Catholic girl, and the couple were disowned by both families. They agreed to have no children, but nevertheless two came. They quarreled continually. Circumcision and baptism became issues for fighting and deceiving each other. The husband twice sought divorce but the wife refused it because she was a Catholic. Her parents refused to admit her when she tried to return home with the two children. They said she "made her bed and must lie in it." Once the father picked up his little girl and asked, "Whose little girl are you?" The child replied stoutly: "I'm Mother's little girl, and you're not my Daddy—you're a Jew!" Yet in another marriage, between a Catholic man and Jewish wife, the grandparents were finally reconciled by interest in the baby boy; the marriage ceremony, originally performed by a justice, was repeated by a priest and a rabbi, and there is no longer any discord.

Baber has recorded also 118 cases of marriage between different nationality groups, but every one of these is also an inter-faith marriage.

Kirkpatrick [1937, B] has measured the "community of interest" between spouses among 58 well-adjusted and 47 poorly adjusted couples. He did this by having them check-mark a list of 60 activities, first according to whether they enjoyed the activity, and second according to whether they enjoyed performing it with the spouse. A score called "relationship family interests score" (R.F.I.) was the percentage of all different items checked by either party as individual interests, which were also checked as "with-my-spouse" interests by both parties. Because of its possible value to future research, this list of 60 interests is shown in Table 13. The well-adjusted couples had

TABLE 13

INVENTORY OF INTERESTS SHARED IN MARRIAGE

1. Exchanging visits with old friends (——)
2. Attending a particular church (——)
3. Playing with children (——)
4. Playful scuffling (——)
5. Talking about oneself (——)
6. Discussing social problems (——)
7. Demonstrating affection (——)
8. Meeting new acquaintances (——)
9. Engaging in outdoor sports (——)
10. Helping unfortunate people in your community (——)
11. Arranging and preparing meals (——)
12. Planning Christmas gifts (——)
13. Making plans for children (——)
14. Planning family budgets (——)
15. Inspecting newly-purchased clothes (——)
16. Planning for the future (——)
17. Listening to the radio (——)
18. Discussing relatives by blood and marriage (——)
19. Discussing matters of right and wrong (——)
20. Taking part in club or lodge affairs (——)
21. Discussing intimate personal experiences (——)
22. Confiding worries (——)
23. Buying books and magazines (——)
24. Exchanging visits with relatives and "in-laws" (——)
25. Reading new birth control literature (——)
26. Discussing work done outside the home (——)
27. Discussing childhood sweethearts (——)
28. Explaining moods (——)
29. Gambling (——)
30. Discussing literature (——)
31. Listening to music (——)
32. Discussing politics (——)
33. Drinking (——)
34. Planning home decorations (——)
35. Working for civic reforms (——)
36. Theater going (——)
37. Exchanging jokes (——)
38. Having picture taken (——)
39. Discussing scientific topics (——)
40. Dancing (——)
41. Discussing friends (——)
42. Going swimming (——)
43. Observing outdoor sports (——)
44. Singing or playing (——)
45. Reading essays aloud (——)
46. Card playing (——)
47. Planning saving or investment (——)
48. Reading the newspaper (——)
49. Motoring (——)
50. Smoking (——)
51. Acting on impulse (——)
52. Following hobbies (——)
53. Going away for long trips (——)
54. Reading poetry (——)
55. Training children (——)
56. Gardening (——)
57. House cleaning (——)
58. Going shopping (——)
59. Attending lectures (——)
60. Visiting art exhibits (——)*

* Clifford Kirkpatrick, "Community of Interest and the Measurement of Marriage Adjustment," *The Family*, 18:133–134, 1937. By permission.

an average R.F.I. score of 42.1 per cent; the poorly adjusted 25.8 (difference 16.3 with a standard error of 2.9).

In the Johnson-Terman [Terman, 1938, 28] comparison of happy, unhappy, and divorced couples, 34 out of 545 items on the attitude tests gave a husband-wife correlation which was markedly higher or lower for the happy group than for the unhappy, or divorced, or both. In 30 out of these 34 items spousal similarity favored happiness as opposed to unhappiness and/or divorce. The four similarities most highly associated with happiness were in the answers to these questions: "Do you try to avoid arguments?" "Do you like the work of a life insurance salesman?" "Do you like the work of teaching adults?" and "Do you prefer a play to a dance?" In other words, for example, if both liked to avoid arguments, or both welcomed arguments, they were likely to be happy; but if one avoided and the other welcomed arguments, they were likely to be unhappy. The only four points in which it appeared favorable for husband and wife to be opposite were: accepting just criticism without getting sore, attitude toward library work, attitude toward landscape gardening, and the habit of crossing the street to avoid meeting someone.

Not Dissimilarity Per Se, but Incompatibility of Purposes, Is Harmful. Having thus checked upon the fragmentary statistical evidence, we may get along faster with this problem by considering it in what Sorokin would call a logico-meaningful manner.

It is obvious that spouses become unhappy in marriage because of anger and other unpleasant emotions, which are largely caused by frustration of wishes. Of course one may be very unhappy in many activities and relations and yet happy in the marital relation. The marriage can become unhappy through blind conditioning or transfer of anger from the other unpleasant situations, but it is most likely to become so when one thinks of his spouse as the *cause* of his frustration, in other words, "blames" the spouse.

We have seen that the most important aspects of a personality are its motives rather than its constitutional qualities. There is a German saying, "Was man isst, so er *ist*," but we might better say, "What one *wishes*, that he *is*"; in other words, a person *is* most "really" what he is trying to do. Obviously, a person is happy if his environment, including his spouse, satisfies his desires. We should not be surprised to find a correlation of +1.00 between an individual's marital happiness and the degree to which his spouse satisfies his total battery of wishes and values.

In fact, the marital happiness scores themselves are made up principally of items of spousal agreement, common interests and activities, and dissatisfactions and complaints mathematically inverted. They are, in the last analysis, inventories of the detailed ways in which spouses through their behavior may satisfy or frustrate each other. A few general "ratings" are included, and also a few items of satisfaction which seem only distantly related to the spouse's behavior.

We would expect that greatest happiness would be produced by neither dissimilarity nor similarity of personalities *per se,* but rather by the presence of those precise traits in each spouse which are necessary for the satisfaction of the other. This condition is not so easy to measure, but it makes more sense. We would expect, however, that similarity would be more favorable than dissimilarity in all those items which refer to purposes or values, because the pursuit of similar purposes usually makes possible pleasant joint activity, cooperation, and economy of the wherewithal (time and money). Dissimilar purposes do not necessarily entail conflict and anger, but they will more often do so than do similar purposes. Items which refer to the style and manner of behavior without involving incompatible goals or competition for a limited supply of money or time will naturally give no great advantage to similarity. If we could make up a list of items where complementary or opposite behavior is required by the situation, such as: "Do you prefer to lead or follow in dancing?" or "Do you always insist on driving when you are in the family car?" we should doubtless find complete dissimilarity favorable to happiness. *Marital conflict is not a difference in traits but a collision of wishes.*

It would be natural for spouses of similar cultural backgrounds to have greater chances of happiness, first because they are less subject to incompatible aims and values, and second because there is less chance of external frustration by their in-laws and the community. Yet this strong presumption in favor of cultural homogamy is partly discounted in advance by the process of selection. Cross-cultural marriages are actually much rarer than a chance assortment would produce. Hence, in effect, the majority of persons have already taken the advice of common-sense wisdom on this subject and avoided such marriages.

Those marriages which do occur in spite of this warning of the facts will include, among others, two types of cases. *First,* there is the intermarriage of more intelligent and attractive persons who may be presumed to have unusual resources for overcoming the obstacles of which they must be more or less aware. With them it is only a guess

as to whether their unusual resources and their personal loyalty to their own non-conformity will be great enough to overcome the unusual difficulties they face. *Second,* there is the intermarriage of the less intelligent or attractive, the "only-thing-I-can-get" type of marriage. Here we may expect unhappiness, but perhaps no more than these persons would have to suffer if they gave each other up and married someone else, or remained unmarried.

Not much attention has been paid to the marriage of persons having divergent political and economic beliefs. In Switzerland it is said that canton loyalties cause many marital conflicts. [David-Schwartz, 1931.] *A priori,* there is reason to fear trouble here as in the case of religious differences. When persons identify themselves personally with political and social programs, it is difficult to live with a partner who does not sympathize. Class-cultural differences are also risks; at least the upper, the upper-middle, the lower-middle, and the lower class, and perhaps finer gradations represent values which in marriage often become incompatible because dependent on the same pocketbook and the same family schedule.

Harriet Mowrer [1935, 212] has observed, however, that cultural conflict in marriage often serves as a rationalization for "more fundamental" factors, especially unsatisfied love life. This, she thinks, is more true today than earlier, because our liberal urban society makes for tolerance of cultural differences. Hence in themselves these cultural differences can be managed more easily but, if there is conflict over personal-social relations, the cultural difference becomes a symbol which may intensify the conflict.

Chapter XIII

MARRIAGE INTERACTION

A. MARITAL FRUSTRATIONS

We come then to the heart of the problem of marital conflict. Personality defects and personality differentials are important only because they produce frustrations. But the bulk of marital frustrations are produced by very specific conflicts of interest which cannot be attributed to definite weaknesses of either person nor to degrees of similarity or difference between them. The partner's behavior, indeed, always plays a part in causation, but it is some specific phase of his behavior in relation to some wish of his partner which in other situations might produce no trouble. It is often a phase of his behavior which would not easily be noted before marriage as a danger. Both partners at first may be well adjusted to life in general, but they may develop maladjustments to each other which then spread to wider spheres.

AN ANALYSIS OF MARITAL FRUSTRATIONS. E. R. Mowrer [1927, Ch. 9] has made an analysis of marital conflicts. He places them under four major "type-tensions": incompatibility of response, economic individualization, cultural differentiation, and individuation of life patterns. These concepts are based upon the idea of personality differentials; it would be helpful to analyze further, in terms of the frustrations of individuals. A case of "incompatibility of response," for example, may involve very different frustrations and meanings to the two partners. The husband may feel a serious deprivation of his sex need through his wife's low degree of sexuality; she may feel adequately satisfied in that area but frustrated in her desire for amusement and gaiety. It may be that the annoyance of this frustration makes her sexually indifferent, or it may be her sexual indifference which leads the husband to prefer other recreations than taking her to the movies. Mowrer takes care of all this by showing that several type-tensions may be present in any case of conflict, and that one type may lead to another. It seems more accurate to say that one frustration in H. leads to a certain frustration in W., and that to another frustration in H., and so on.

First let us distinguish frustrations which arise from *extra-familial* causes (external to the marriage or family life), but which so affect the personality as to make the family life less happy and eventually thereby to make the spouse unhappy. Such would be the frustration of a chronically overworked business man who was too tired at night to enjoy his wife's companionship, resulting in her becoming discontented. Her frustration, on the other hand, is *intra-familial,* since it is caused by the failure of the marital relation to produce the affectionate companionship she needs. Perhaps all intra-familial frustrations can be traced eventually to extra-familial, but not all with the same definiteness.

It is the intra-familial frustrations, whatever their ultimate causes, which will concern us for the moment. In order to analyze them let us go back to the list of seventeen generalized human motives given on page 306. Numbers 4 (sex) and 15 (affection) are motives whose satisfaction is peculiarly and in some ways exclusively the function of the marital and parental relationships in modern culture. The other fifteen motives may be satisfied partly, and in varying degrees, through the home and family living, but they are not dependent upon the family. However, marriage and family life may *frustrate* any of these motives by blocking the satisfactions they might obtain from other sources.

Number 9 (excellence-competitive motive) is subject to frustration by marriage in a peculiar way. Its frustration is often known as the "inferiority complex." This may arise from comparison or rivalry with the spouse himself or with persons connected with the spouse, such as his parental family or his friends. The other 12 motives are frustrated by marriage largely through an economic medium, that is, shortage of money or time. Thus a husband's desire for good food could not be wholly frustrated by his wife's poor cooking unless he cannot afford to eat out; a wife's desire for sociability is frustrated because with small children she may not have the time to go to parties. But there is also another medium of frustration which is less prevalent than in former days but which still exists, especially against the wife. This is coercion, imposed by culturally approved authority or by the *de facto* powers of an individual. Even if the wife has time and money to go to parties, the husband may forbid her. When there are several frustrations through the economic medium, the situation may be felt as a generalized insecurity (frustration of No. 16); if there are several frustrations through coercion the person may feel them as a restraint of freedom (No. 17).

The writer made a rough analysis of 115 cases, 58 derived from the literature of marital discord and 57 from personal observations by himself and students. The published cases were taken from a great variety of sources such as Breckinridge, Keyserling, Waller, the Binkleys, Bartlett, Lindsey, and Reuter and Runner's various sources, representing divorce, desertion, reconciliations by social workers, and so on. The data were given rough treatment because the procedure was only exploratory.

Of the 115 cases 32 per cent were reconciled or never had serious discord; 16 per cent remained in discord but not separation; 52 per cent were divorced or separated; thus 68 per cent were unreconciled.

Among the cases where it was possible to judge that one party was frustrated more than the other, 42 per cent showed the husband, and 58 per cent the wife, to have the chief frustration. It is interesting to note by way of comparison that Hamilton found women more dissatisfied, and that women get 71 per cent of divorces.

Each case was diagnosed as to the chief frustration of the husband and the chief frustration of the wife. In some cases it was necessary to tabulate several frustrations of one or both parties, so that the total figures refer to frustration items noted, which is more than the total number of cases. For 87 of the 115 cases this analysis was made by another judge independently, using a somewhat different set of categories and using only brief digests of many cases prepared by students. This procedure with the 87 cases is hereafter called the first analysis; the main procedure on the 115 cases, the second analysis. Because of these ambiguities of method and the incomplete nature of the original data, it was decided not to work for any greater reliability in the classification of each individual case, but only to compare the mass results of the two analyses. These were substantially similar. For more specifically valid results it would seem better to get a fresh crop of original data than to manipulate these further. All frustrations were divided into three categories, as follows.

1. *Love* frustrations (sex and affection). Here belong sexual dissatisfactions, such as those due to the partner's being oversexed, undersexed, or unskilful in sex; unrequited cravings for affection or spousal companionship; sufferings due to cruelty or sadism of the spouse.

2. *Ego* frustrations (excellence or competitive motive). The problem of a jealous or envious person or one with "inferiority complex" is very different from that of a love-frustrated person. It is true that the former, like the latter, may be dissatisfied with the marital love life. But the love-frustrated person suffers from the objective inadequacy of the love behavior of the spouse, whereas the jealous one suffers from his own inability to enjoy the partner's love, which may be objectively quite adequate. His love frustration is thus indirect and subjective; his primary frustration is best described as inferiority rather than as unsatisfied love.

3. *Economic-restrictive* frustrations. These include most of what Mowrer implies under economic, cultural, and pattern-of-life tensions. They involve

desires for financial security, intellectual or esthetic life, travel, or higher living standards. They involve all our motives except Nos. 4, 9, and 15. In such cases the partner may provide adequate sexual and love satisfactions and, as far as his direct behavior goes, satisfy one's ego cravings; but he interferes with other aims, through some incompetence or defect in his personality, through his domination or intolerance or other behavior.

Economic-restrictive frustration characteristically expresses itself through anxiety and through *rebellious* anger; love frustration through "love sick," "clinging vine," or "overaffectionate" types of behavior, sometimes directed toward a third party; inferiority frustration through jealous anger, attempts to restrain or dominate the partner; and sometimes coldness and sulking. But these reactions vary enormously among individuals.

All "marital frustrations" are attributed by the frustrated partner to the spouse or to the marriage. A person may be frustrated *as a result* of something his spouse does or fails to do, but if he is not aware of the causal connection, he does not "blame" the marriage or the spouse, and his sufferings, though part of his general adjustment to life, are not directly or by definition a part of his marital adjustment.

Economic-restrictive frustrations constitute 52 per cent of all frustrations in our data; 44 per cent of the men's and 60 per cent of the women's. Love frustrations are about equally frequent in the two sexes, comprising 25 per cent of the men's and 26 per cent of the women's frustrations. Ego frustrations are 31 per cent of the men's and 13 per cent of the women's.

The greater proclivity of the men toward ego frustrations and of the women toward economic-restrictive frustrations is significant. It seems explainable in terms of culture. In the first place, our present marriage system conflicts with present-day women's desires for personal freedom and higher standards of living more than it does with these same desires in men. These desires may be stronger in women, or they may more often be in collision with marital duties. They are often interfered with by the dominance of the male in economic matters. Second, jealousy, to a man, more often remains a pure ego frustration. The attitude of possessiveness is outraged. Culture tends to throw scorn upon *him* for the unfaithfulness of his wife but does not equally scorn her for the unfaithfulness of her husband. If his jealousy could be relieved by his indulging in extra-marital relations himself, he has probably done so already, and encountered little restraint of this liberty. On the other hand, the jealous woman has greater difficulty in finding an outlet through personal freedom, because of the still-lingering double standard, and hence her ego frustration is more likely to translate itself into a general freedom frustration or rebellion which is economic-restrictive.

Next, it was attempted to establish a new set of relationship or interactional categories rather than personality categories, by the simple device of using the nine possible permutation pairs of the three frustration types. Combining the first and second analyses, these nine permutations appeared in the order of frequency shown in Table 14.

TABLE 14

ORDER OF FREQUENCY OF FRUSTRATION PAIRS

Frequency Rank, both Analyses together (115 cases)	Husband's Frustration	Wife's Frustration	Frequency, by 1st Analysis	Frequency, by 2nd Analysis	Frequency, both Analyses Combined, in per cent	Frequency, 31 Fictional Cases, in per cent
1	ER	ER	28	43	29.7	24
2	Ego	ER	16	32	20.1	24
3	Ego	Lov	13	13	10.8	11
4	Lov	ER	8	17	10.5	21
5	Lov	Lov	7	14	8.8	14
6	ER	Ego	9	9	7.5	3
7	ER	Lov	6	10	6.7	0
8	Lov	Ego	6	8	5.9	3
9	Ego	Ego	0	0	0.0	0
			93	146	100.0	100

Lov = love.
ER = economic-restrictive.

Table 15 shows the actual frequency of these frustration pairs as compared with the distribution which would be produced by chance.

TABLE 15 *

FREQUENCY OF FRUSTRATION PAIRS IN 115 MARRIAGES

Chance Distribution, in per cent

H→ W ↓	ER	Lov	Ego	Total
ER	26.5	15.2	18.7	60.4
Lov	11.5	6.6	8.1	26.2
Ego	5.9	3.4	4.1	13.4
Total	43.9	25.2	30.9	100.0

Actual Distribution, in per cent

H→ W ↓	ER	Lov	Ego	Total
ER	29.7	10.5 too low	20.1	60.3
Lov	6.7 too low	8.8	10.8	26.3
Ego	7.5	5.9	0.0 too low	13.4
Total	43.9	25.2	30.9	100.0

* See explanation in text.

The results demonstrate that there is no *generalized* tendency for a given type of frustration in one partner to produce the same type in the other partner. In only 38.5 per cent of the cases are the frustrations the same on both sides. Pure chance would make this figure 37.2 per cent. The presence of economic-restrictive frustrations in both partners together occurs in only 29.7 per cent of the cases, slightly more than the chance 26.7 per cent.

In both analyses, the cases of ego frustration coupled with ego frustration were zero in number, whereas chance would call for 4.1 per cent. It may be that this result was somewhat determined by a bias inhering in the very definition of ego frustration. Both judges held the *a priori* opinion that both members of a pair are not likely to feel an ego frustration from their personal relationship. Although the superior mate might also have some ego frustration in relation to life as a whole, such frustration is likely to be inconspicuous in relation to the marriage situation, and to be overshadowed by other kinds of frustration which result from the greater inferiority feeling of the mate. The normal result of inferiority behavior by one party would seem to be, on socio-psychological grounds, to produce an economic-restrictive frustration in the other, who is likely to feel irritation or rebellion. Theoretically, the inferiority feeling of the one person makes him abnormally sensitive. It may also cause him to make needless efforts to dominate, "needless" meaning that no end is served by the dominating behavior except the subjective satisfaction of the one who practices it. A person who is unduly sensitive or dominating has the effect of placing abnormal restraints upon the behavior of persons living with him. Their reaction to these restraints may be described as a rebellion complex rather than inferiority complex. They are pretty sure to sense that the domination is not altogether natural or successful, and are apt to feel contempt rather than respect for the would-be dominator. They develop techniques of evasion and escape to secure greater freedom, and in so doing feel superior rather than inferior to the person they are evading.

A second result in which both analyses agree is that an economic-restrictive frustration of either party is less likely than chance to be coupled with a love frustration in the other party. This also seems theoretically reasonable. If one mate is balked in his personal aims and ambitions, his pattern of life, by the marital situation, there is likely to be conflict with the other, but the other is more likely to interpret his own role as struggle for opposite external aims or as a role of inferiority than as a frustration of his love desires.

Third, there is some tendency toward more than chance linkage of love frustration in one partner with ego frustration in the other, as we might expect theoretically.

Janet Cutler and Jane Wolf at Vassar College, using this same method, analyzed 31 fictional marriages portrayed in ten recent novels by Aldous Huxley, Jules Romains, André Gide, Jakob Wassermann, John Dos Passos, Glenway Wescott, D. H. Lawrence, Sinclair Lewis, John Galsworthy, and

Sigrid Undset. They found proportions of marital frustration pairs roughly similar to those found in the 115 actual cases. Their findings are given in the last column of Table 14. The combination of love frustration of husband with economic-restrictive frustration of wife was much more frequent in the fictional than in the real cases. Love frustrations made up 41 per cent of all male frustrations in the fictional cases as against 25 per cent in the real cases.

Let us now examine the various types of frustration.

1. LOVE, INCLUDING SEXUAL, FRUSTRATION. Some evidence was given in the preceding chapter regarding so-called "frigidity" or lack of orgasm capacity, which in varying degrees seems to affect from a fourth to a half of all wives. Hamilton [1929] classified his 100 wives into 54 more adequate and 46 less adequate. Of the 54 more adequate women only one had ever been regarded as psychoneurotic. Of the remaining 46, 20 had at some time in their lives been diagnosed as seriously psychoneurotic, by other psychiatrists than Hamilton. Yet the correlation of orgasm capacity with general marital satisfaction was quite low. Sexually inadequate women were more likely to be adulterous than were the adequate women. [Ch. 15.]

Sexual inadequacy and psychoneurotic symptoms, thinks Hamilton, are not so much cause and effect as they are the joint results of an earlier cause. The earlier cause seems to be bad sexual conditioning in childhood. One of the most significant facts was that, of the women who learned *before the age of six* that babies were born of their mothers' bodies, 84 per cent were sexually adequate, whereas, of those who learned *at twelve or over,* only 42 per cent were adequate [p. 298]. The adequate women showed more often a history of parental encouragement of sex curiosity, whereas the inadequate more often had found their childish sex questions met with embarrassment and lies.

Terman found that the wife's orgasm capacity correlates +.30 with her own and also her husband's happiness score, which is slightly higher than the correlation of one's marital happiness with the happiness of one's parents [1938, 374]. Similarity of degree of sex drive also has an appreciable correlation with happiness. Although there is a higher correlation here than in Hamilton's study, Terman in his interpretation minimizes the importance of sex factors. "The data in fact indicate that all of the sex factors combined are far from being the one major determinant of success in marriage" [p. 373].

Impotence in the husband is rarer than lack of wife's orgasm capacity, but the husband's inability to delay orgasm is a very frequent cause of the wife's inability to experience orgasm. Unless the husband

has achieved this control of his own function, it is not sound to assume that the wife lacks orgasm capacity.

According to Popenoe's [1931] experience at the American Institute of Family Relations, a sexual maladjustment is present in practically every case of marital maladjustment. These sexual difficulties are said to be due in greatest number to the inconsiderateness of the husband; next, to the wife's emotional block toward sex acquired in childhood; and in 15 to 20 per cent of cases, to psychosexual difficulties of the husband. It is the wife who feels the chief frustration in nearly all the cases.

Harriet Mowrer [1936] finds that sex has always been present as a factor in every case of domestic discord known to her, but has never appeared as the exclusive factor.

Even if anatomy and other constitutional factors play a part in causing "frigidity," clinical evidence seems to indicate that this *in most cases* could either have been prevented by proper childhood sex instruction or by pre-marital or early-marital counseling of both partners. Furthermore, there are many cases on record in which an originally good sexual adjustment was lost through frustrations and conflict in other areas.

According to Terman's complicated statistical evaluation of marital grievances, the six most serious of the husband are, in order: "wife nags me," "not affectionate," "selfish and inconsiderate," "complains too much," "interferes with hobbies," "slovenly in appearance." For the wife the most serious are: "husband selfish and inconsiderate," "unsuccessful in business," "untruthful," "complains too much," "does not show his affection," "does not talk things over" [p. 99]. Many of these items do not reveal whether they involve mainly love, ego, or economic-restrictive frustrations. "Selfish and inconsiderate" is a particularly undefined category from this point of view. "Interference with hobbies" and "lack of success in business" clearly involve economic-restrictive frustration, and "lack of affection" or expression thereof is typical of the category of love frustrations. Perhaps the most important aspect is that almost any behavior trait of the spouse which repeatedly causes any kind of frustration can develop into a love frustration. Repeated annoyance tends to inhibit affection as well as sexual response. Often the partner who feels the greatest love frustration has brought this about by some other frustration he or she has imposed upon the spouse.

However, there appear to be cases where love frustration is primary. No sharp distinction is possible, but the criterion would be: Does the

subject feel dissatisfaction with the partner's body, personality, or expression of love, rather than with impersonal conditions *resulting from* the partner's behavior? Such dissatisfaction with the very person of the spouse may be due to changes in the spouse since marriage or to disillusionment following early overidealization or to changes in the love needs and values of the frustrated subject. Of course these events always involve an interaction process and are never due to one partner alone. The following case seems to be of this type.

Cottrell [1933] reports the case of a young man, Mr. A., whose mother and sisters were of active, dominating personality, and whose father like himself had played a meek and passive role. Mr. A., grieved by the death of his mother, married a woman who at first seemed to give him a sense of security, but who turned out to be of a dependent, clinging-vine type. He became unhappy with his wife and often went home to his sister with whom he found comfort. He could not "stand that sagging, droopy look" of his wife when she was tired. The wife, on the contrary, needed an independent, dominating man, and he failed to play this needed role.

Psychoanalysis might interpret this as a case of sister-fixation and incestuous desire which was repressed by the man's assuming a feminine role, thereby identifying himself with his sister in order to escape the incest guilt.

But Cottrell interprets his case as a problem of two basic roles (or personality patterns) resulting from early family relationships which come into conflict in marriage. He does not deny that incest repression may exist in the man, and that the specifically sexual attitudes of the two partners are part of the situation. But he sees these sexual features against a larger background. The basic desire of the man was for a "solicitous, protecting, aggressive, decisive, parent environment which the wife, who expects something of the same sort of environment, cannot supply." He admits that the man may be classed as homosexual if that word merely means a passive role, but points out that this classification fails to describe the "role pattern Mr. A. represents. He is not only passive but has an infantile dependent attitude or role which is not necessarily characteristic of the homosexual." Further, other important features of homosexuality are lacking.

2. EGO FRUSTRATION. The one who marries a partner of higher social status is peculiarly exposed to inferiority feeling. This seems more often the case when the woman is higher, because this is contrary to the cultural pattern. There is much clinical evidence of inferiority feelings in men when their wives are of higher education or intelligence, or even of equal intelligence. Many of our college girls said they wanted a man who was more intelligent than they but none said the reverse. Beside these scales of superiority-inferiority, there is the scale of general attractiveness or desirability in the courtship market.

Waller [1938, 349–352] describes a case in which the dominance of the wife appeared to be a continuation of the "principle of least interest" in the courtship period. The wife had been much sought by others, and the husband had won her only after long and arduous wooing. He greatly resented her interest in dancing; her costume, which was "always successful," caused him much pain. Whenever the issue was clear and sharp, the wife won. She was always able to bring him to his knees by threatening to leave. Yet in periods of tranquillity the husband, with his more stable emotions and desires, rewon the lost ground. The wife, although outwardly dominant and superior, was a sufferer from ego frustration. She needed constant admiration and reassurance, and secured this from her husband and by capitalizing upon her attractiveness to men in general

In some social classes, constituting perhaps the majority of our population, one can predict the almost certain failure of a marriage when extra-marital relations are discovered by the innocent spouse. Even when the outside relation goes no farther than romantic companionship, the outlook is bad. To "put up with" what one's culture regards as intolerable subjects most persons to a serious ego frustration. This is particularly true of men, as the old derisive term "cuckold" illustrates. Women whose husbands are physically unfaithful often escape ego frustration where the "other woman" is of lower social status. If she is of the same status, however, serious ego frustration is probable in the form of personal jealousy, as distinguished from disgrace.

In the more tolerant circles, the reaction to the spouse's flirtations or infidelities is less direct and preemptory, and jealousy shows great variations among individuals. It may take considerable time before the ultimate results work themselves out. In Hamilton's group, not over 6 men and 11 women seemed to complain of the relation of the spouse to other persons of opposite sex, when asked various questions as to the causes of their marital dissatisfactions. Compared with these 17 complaints were 45 existing situations to complain about, as ascertained through the question, "Are you in love with some other person than your spouse?" How many were concealed, we do not know. [Hamilton, 1929, 60, 72, 77, 369.] Twenty-nine of the 100 men and 24 of the 100 women had at some time had extra-marital love affairs; 28 of the men and 24 of the women had committed adultery. Concealment of the relationships and concealment of the jealousy may explain the difference in part. Six men and 2 women complained of the spouse's jealousy. Six men and 11 women would reduce their spouse's flirting. Seven men and 6 women would increase it. It is probable, on the whole, that women in our upper classes suffer jeal-

ousy more than do men. This may be due to the surplus of women in these classes. There is reason to suspect that in the lower classes, where there is a keener competition of men for women, the situation is reversed.

Jealousy sometimes involves love frustration more than ego frustration. Pure love jealousy would seem indicated when the injured partner feels primarily a loss of intimacy, when he does not care much who the paramour is, or if his degree of tolerance increases with the similarity of the paramour to himself. On the other hand, ego jealousy is more apt to be marked by a tolerance which varies with the social class of the paramour and with the attitude and knowledge of the community, and only secondarily by a sense of lost intimacy.

A common type of ego frustration occurs when one feels inferior in relation to the in-laws or the friends of the spouse. There are also some cases of professional jealousy between husband and wife who are engaged in similar occupations.

Kirkpatrick [1939] finds that patriarchal attitudes in husbands within his middle class groups tend to be associated with marital maladjustment. He finds that extreme feminist attitudes on the part of wives do not predispose them any more than average wives to marital maladjustment.

There is some evidence to indicate ego frustration in husbands when the wife is more dominant or more obviously superior to her husband than the group culture approves. But personal dominance or superiority is not the same thing as holding feminist attitudes.

3. ECONOMIC-RESTRICTIVE FRUSTRATION. There is no great general correlation between *income* and marital happiness. Hamilton found a slight tendency for his women to be better satisfied with marriage where the family income was greater, but no correlation at all in the case of his men subjects. Thirty-nine per cent of all his subjects said that there had been family friction on account of money, 21 per cent that there had been *much* friction. The women were more inclined than the men to be dissatisfied with the economic behavior of the spouse. Mrs. Woodhouse [1932], answering from the experiences of 344 persons the question, "Does money make the marriage go?" says that it is the management rather than the amount of the income which correlates with happiness in her study. Fifty-one per cent of the husbands gave money as their chief source of worry. Financial tension is the major situation in 30 to 40 per cent of divorces, if Mowrer's sample is representative, but this tension may take place on any economic level.

The following case illustrates an economic-restrictive frustration which led to sudden, acute conflict. It also illustrates the kind of marital failures which could not be predicted by knowledge of personalities and backgrounds before marriage.

Mr. and Mrs. Conroy were both hard working, sober, efficient persons of the skilled working class. They were quiet, uncomplaining, and presumably happy together. Both had borne family illness and other difficulties with superb patience. On a modest income they raised two conscientious, industrious, unspoiled children. Their home was a model of cleanliness and good order, the most comfortable in their drab neighborhood. They had gone into debt to raise children and buy a home. Through scrupulous economy they had paid back all their debts except three hundred dollars still owing on the house.

Then came disaster in the guise of good fortune. A relative of Mrs. Conroy bequeathed her the small fortune of three hundred dollars. Mr. Conroy thought this should be used to pay off the remaining debt on the house. Mrs. Conroy thought it should be put in the savings bank and used as a fund for occasional luxuries, allowing the mortgage to be paid off according to the original plan. Neither had been extravagant; both had contributed all their time and energy to the joint enterprise. Mr. Conroy could not understand why Mrs. Conroy would not continue in the same policy. She, on the other hand, could not see why he did not want her to use the unexpected freedom that came with this little fortune. She was taking nothing from the family; this was something extra and, moreover, was hers by legal right.

For six months they debated the issue ceaselessly. They nagged; they made the children miserable. Their attitudes began to polarize. Both, for example, had gone conventionally to church; now Mr. Conroy came to dislike religion and Mrs. Conroy became more religious. They became self-conscious with each other; sex relations were disturbed. Finally they decided to rent a part of the home and live apart.*

We noted that 52 per cent of all frustrations found in the sample of 115 cases were of the type outside the realm of love and sex wishes and of personal inferiority feelings attributed to the marriage relation. These frustrations represent dissatisfactions which are incidental rather than essential to marriage itself. Recent social changes have rendered conventional marriage less compatible than it was with these many diverse wishes of the individual. It is apparently more difficult than before to be a good spouse and a good parent, and at the same time to fulfil the other needs of one's personality.

* Neva R. Deardorff, "A Puzzle in Cross Words," *Survey*, 59:288–290 (December, 1927). Cited by Reuter and Runner, *The Family*, McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1931, p. 503.

Mrs. Harriet Mowrer writes:

> Differences in personal aims may be present at the time of marriage to a greater degree than realized and in the interest of the romantic ideal be repressed. On the other hand they may actually exist in slight degree but as the conflict sequence develops, these differences take on symbolic meanings and become so intertwined in the conflict pattern as to become more pronounced.*

In general the following seems to be a common sequence. One partner is frustrated by something outside the marriage, and as a result makes greater demands upon marriage and the home as a compensation; or he finds that marriage and the partner interfere with some personal interest, or need of his work, which he would be able to satisfy without the partner's help. As a result of either of these frustrations he becomes less affectionate or more complaining. Either of these may cause the second partner to become less affectionate in return, or perhaps to seek more affection in such a way as to make the first partner feel still more cramped and frustrated. The original extra-familial or economic-restrictive intra-familial frustrations gradually lead to love frustrations. These love frustrations are usually the immediate cause of the final break if such occurs. People will endure a great deal of other frustration if they can become periodically "reconciled" through intense experiences of tenderness, rapturous love, or sex. But when these love relations, always threatened by the anger and hostility engendered through the non-affectional frustrations, come to the point of suspension, then the marriage has lost its chief bond.

Very common also is the "sense of pride" which blocks a person from seeking amorous reconciliation after he has felt rebuffed or humiliated too intensely or frequently. Now the expression of love, rather than the deprivation of it, becomes a threat to one's ego; an additional conflict of the motives has been introduced. An outsider or an unusual event often can precipitate a powerful reconciliation after the partners through pride are no longer able to achieve it themselves. Again let us recall Ferenczi's observation that the greatest tragedy of his counseling experience was the people who wanted to love each other but could not do so.

One speaker at a conference on marriage stated the situation very well when he said that neither a woman nor a man can expect perfect marriage and, at the same time, the satisfaction of her or his other

* Letter to author. By permission.

wishes to the degree that could be attained by remaining single. Even the husband must be content with a somewhat lesser degree of excellence or achievement in his vocation than would be physically possible to him if he remained unmarried, for the simple reason that time and money are limited. But although this principle may always be true, it is true in greater degree in our present society than in that of our grandparents.

Many psychiatrists and moral counselors attempt to solve the problem by preaching a philosophy of acceptance and inner adjustment. They argue that the individual cannot have everything he wants and that happiness lies in learning to make a choice and to accept the inevitable limitations of life. Although this philosophy is sound in general, many of its exponents fail to recognize that this intelligent choosing among the good things of life may be much more difficult in some cultures than in others, and that it is peculiarly difficult in our present culture. [Fairchild, 1934.] They overlook the facts of social change, particularly of modern individuation. This trend cannot be changed by preaching against it. The remedy lies in further social changes which will reduce the incompatibility between love needs and other needs. Among such changes might be new employment arrangements suitable to married women, a reorganization of household labor, a reduced economic parasitism of children, social insurance and medicine, and family subsidies. When family members become more *independent* of one another economically and morally their *dependence* upon one another for love may involve less frustration and greater happiness. Even though the greater economic independence of women has been a factor in modern family disorganization, still it may be that a further decline of the family as an economic unit may strengthen it as an emotional unit. Also, in the past, family love was closely tied to authority. Hence, when authority was threatened, love tended to be smothered by anger and rebellion, even though the marriage held together. When love is fully divorced from authority and coercion it may become more loyal and permanent.

Frustration Reactions and Secondary Annoyances. The outcome of marital discord cannot be predicted by a knowledge of the primary frustrations or "wrongs" involved. Much injustice is often involved in the practice of making moral judgments and legal decisions regarding a case on the basis of just what the parties "did to" each other, unless there is an act which by universal standards would be a crime. Partners can become reconciled and happy after a serious

assault and battery, whereas other couples may be permanently estranged by one subtle but unforgivable insult. We need also to study the interaction process itself. It may be that marital discord is one of those diseases which can be *cured* more easily than foreseen or prevented. In other words, symptoms appearing during the early stages of a marriage may offer the best clues as to what is likely to happen later, and also make possible a treatment which will prevent failure.

In every marriage there are serious conflicts of interest. Whether or not these shall wreck the marriage depends upon how the partners handle the conflict. Here it is important to note those characteristics of each personality which in Chapter IX we called "frustration reactions." These were probably concealed or overlooked in the courtship period when the partners were getting acquainted mainly with each other's positive values and interests.

In conflict a person often defends his frustration reactions more vehemently than he does his primary interests. A drinking husband who loves drink for itself and the sociability may reduce it at the request of his wife; but if he drinks, actually or in his fancy, mainly to drown a frustration or annoyance which he feels she has thrust upon him, then woe be to her if she interferes. It seems like "adding insult to injury." So, too, the husband who chides his wife for extravagant buying when she feels that her spending spree was a compensation for his neglect of her may expect "to get the works."

We need more study of marital interaction and the very specific habits and attitudes which it involves. Some shorthand or dictaphone records of marital conversations and quarrels would be very enlightening. Dramatists rather than psychologists are skilled in the kind of observational technique which is needed in the study of marriage, but they have not organized their keen observations for scientific purposes. We may find that certain specific habits of conversation and ways of handling emotions in oneself or one's mate are more important than we have thought.

INTERACTIONAL TYPES OF CONFLICT. Mrs. Harriet Mowrer [1932, 1935] thinks that the pattern of interaction in marital discord is determined by the form of *personality disorganization* in the individual. An individual who is frustrated in some major wish may make three types of attempted but unsatisfactory adjustment. The first is "personal conflict," or conflict of wishes within the person. It appears in the person who "doesn't seem to know what he wants" and is in perpetual tension between two incompatible goals. The second type is

the "dual role." In this case the person suffers little inner tension; he keeps his two incompatible systems of behavior separate. An illustration is the man who carries on a secret life apart from his home, which would be incompatible with his family objectives if it became known. The third type is the "escape response." It is illustrated by the person who tries to escape conflict by banishing one of the conflicting roles through sickness, fantasy, drink, or some delinquency irrelevant to his problem. Suicide is an extreme example of this type.

Although it is obvious that the form of the personality disorganization must influence the specific events of the discord process, it is difficult to see how genuinely *interactional* patterns can be formulated which will correspond respectively to these three categories. It would seem that Mrs. Mowrer is really analyzing *personal disorganization* throughout, and not interaction. The two partners may have different patterns, but the resulting interaction pattern is no mere mixture of these.

We need, therefore, a new set of concepts for analyzing the interaction process or relationship between two persons—concepts which shall be independent of wishes, frustrations, or other phenomena of the separate personalities.

1. Groves [Groves and Ogburn, 1928, 79, 85, 87] has spoken of *concealed* marital discord, in which the conflict is entirely within one of the personalities. Really it is frustration without conflict. The other partner may be frustrated also, but does not attribute his frustration specifically to the partner. Groves says this type was relatively more common in the authoritarian family of the past; with the greater freedom of women and children today the inner conflict is more likely to burst forth into the social arena. Still, there are families even today in which one partner carries his or her sufferings silently to the grave.

2. Following Groves with some modification, we may distinguish *progressive* conflict, which grows worse and worse. The hostility spreads to wider and wider areas; reconciliations become less frequent and more difficult. The following case is illustrative.

Mr. Q. was of farm background, but had become a successful artisan in a small city, earning a comfortable living. He never became urbanized in his attitudes, preferring always to follow farm habits of living, with abundant food, old clothes, early rising, and hard manual work. Even after the family had a modern urban home, he liked to spend his evenings in the kitchen with his feet on the stove. He scorned urban amusements, and even when

possessing considerable money, resented his family's spending it for these pleasures. He wished his wife to play the role of a typical old-fashioned farm housewife, kept full control of financial matters, was niggardly and arbitrary in allowing spending money to his wife and children.

Mrs. Q. came from the same background. She reacted more favorably to the urban mode of life and sought through meager amusements and esthetic activities a relief from the harshness of life in which she had been raised and which her husband continued to follow. A process of mutual irritation set in, marked by increasing nagging by the husband and a gradual cooling of the wife's affections. For years they held together as they raised a family. Children, religious revivals, and the man's periodic spells of elated generosity and kindness, suggestive of a cycloid type of personality, prevented many threatened breaks from becoming actual. Economic circumstances grew worse, with increasing tension. Response frustrations increased. After the children had grown up, the partners separated without divorce and never saw each other again.

3. There is *acute* conflict, which is characterized by a sudden onset. It may be healed, or it may lead quickly to a break. If healed, it may recur. If it recurs frequently it becomes either progressive or habituated. It is well illustrated by the Conroy case, given on page 441.

4. There is *habituated* conflict ("chronic" in Groves's terms). This reaches a certain level and continues there indefinitely. Waller has given an excellent example of this type on a very severe level under the title, "Forty Years of Marriage Conflict." [1938, 363–379.] One might almost say that it got no worse because it could not. Such relationships were perhaps more frequent when divorce was taboo, but they are still plentiful. Yet in a sense all marriages are habituated conflicts on some level or other. The realistic objective, perhaps, is to keep them on as mild a level as possible. Levy and Munroe [1938] think this is accomplished best if we discard the old valuation placed upon complete absence of quarreling. To feel that the "first cross word" is serious and to make strenuous efforts to repress all verbal expressions of anger toward each other is more dangerous than to expect a certain amount of quarreling and reconciliation as normal and natural.

A husband thought that his wife was chiefly to blame for their conflicts because she used sarcasm and became emotional and vituperative in argument, whereas he presented his case with cool logic and little show of anger. Further investigation showed that basic frustrations were involved on both sides. To a seriously frustrated partner, the kindness or coolness of the other partner takes on a new meaning. It

is no longer the symbol of love, but a weapon of combat. People of good breeding often try to deceive themselves as to the nature of the situation which exists. Conflict is conflict, whether fought with soft words or empty beer bottles.

Are there corresponding types in the *alleviation of conflict* (accommodation)? Is there a sudden and a gradual recovery? Experience suggests that the recovery is usually rather sudden. In other words, if a curve is drawn to indicate the degree of conflict, high levels meaning harmony and low levels disharmony, it would seem that the upward movements of the curve are usually abrupt, whereas the downward movements may be either abrupt or gradual. The forces of love seem to behave like the spring mechanism of a curtain, always ready to jerk the curtain all the way back as soon as the external pulling force ceases to act at some point between the "catches." However, this elastic mechanism may be dislocated or broken by extreme pulling.

Increasing conflict may be called *estrangement,* which must be distinguished from the mere process of conflict on an unchanging level. Decreasing conflict may be called *reconciliation.* This is more usually thought of as a sudden event than as a gradual process, but it is nevertheless a process.

There are, however, two or three variants of the process of reconciliation. One may be described as *mutual rapprochement* and the other as *alternating approach and withdrawal.* In the first, an increase in tenderness in one partner immediately brings a similar reaction in the other, and the reconciliation is hence very swift. In the second, the partner who takes the initiative is rebuffed by the other, who feels a desire to inflict further punishment before yielding to reconciliation. The initiating party, being rebuffed, withdraws and waits for the next advance to come from the other. When that advance does come, he retaliates by rebuffing on his side. The result may be that the initiative zigzags several times from one side to the other before reconciliation finally occurs. In other cases, only one partner shows this rebuffing behavior, and the other shows only repeated initiatives. This alternating approach and withdrawal takes place also in the negative direction, when the partners are undergoing estrangement rather than reconciliation.

ACCOMPANYING PROCESSES. There are several other interaction processes which may accompany one or more types of conflict and which may occur also in normal, reasonably happy marriages.

1. One of these is *spousal rivalry.* Many annoying marital habits are devices to satisfy the superiority wish or to relieve inferiority feeling. Among these are the belittling of the mate's enthusiasms, "showing off" one's own skill in some line to the point of boredom, sulking, "fishing" for compliments, especially for assurances that one excels some specific person, "bossy" manners toward the mate, boasting of various successes outside the home, great persistence in trying to win a trivial point in argument. There are families in which the struggle between the mates for superior feeling is amusingly obvious even to the visitor. This rivalry is seldom great enough to constitute a major conflict and, indeed, it may act as a check upon other disruptive tendencies, for a break in the marriage would deprive one or both of his only sure means of superiority satisfaction. The use of the marital relation itself for the satisfaction of this wish, however, tends to injure its power to satisfy love.

Perhaps narcissistic and perfectionist personalities are especially prone to spousal rivalry.

2. Another such process is *competitive neurosis* in which each partner tries to get the sympathy of the other through physical illness or through excessive verbalizing of his frustrations and emotional suffering. [Pratt, 1930, 1932.] This is sometimes called "emotional immaturity." It suggests Horney's masochistic personality. It resembles indeed the process by which the child, through crying and complaining, gets the attention of the parent. The only unnatural thing about it in adults is that most adults in our culture have learned to control it through ideals of strength, "toughness," or "self-control," expressed by the modern aphorism, "I can take it." In competitive neurosis, the opposite reaction is developed to unusual degrees, so that one or both partners may become even more dependent, in some ways, than children.

3. Another process to be observed is what Waller [1938, 398] calls *rapport devices.* The partner less annoyed at the moment tries to bring about some harmony and love by some type of behavior which is not spontaneous, or not characteristic of the normal love interaction of the partners. He cannot bear to make the natural affectionate approach because he knows or fears that he will be rebuffed. At the same time the frigidity of the present atmosphere is too great to endure. Hence he resorts to attempts at humor, "heavy geniality," coarse jokes, baby talk, singing or whistling, or to giving uncustomary gifts, doing unexpected favors, minor flatteries, or reminiscences about the happy past. These devices seldom relieve the basic conflict but

may help the immediate situation. They may be initiated by one or both partners, each in his own way.

Certain gestures and expressions of good cheer made a husband attractive to outsiders but were irritating to his wife. She herself was an optimistic personality and enjoyed symptoms of optimism in other persons in general. Outsiders failed to understand her irritation toward her husband. No general law of craving the opposite temperament explained the situation. Again, she did not resent the admiration he received from outsiders. The anger conditioning occurred rather through the medium of his dilatory behavior in performing small duties. Whenever he evaded a responsibility which she felt that he ought to assume, or put off until tomorrow what she wanted him to do today, he uttered these expressions of cheerfulness and good humor. The wife, frustrated repeatedly in many small wishes, had conditioned her irritation to the husband's accompanying mannerisms. These became annoying even in situations where his behavior was altogether cooperative and correct.

4. There is the process of *mutual annoyance*. Rarely can a person repeatedly annoy another without becoming himself annoyed in return. A husband may begin the process by some habit of untidiness in the home. For a time his wife's protests may rest lightly upon his nervous system. Sooner or later he is likely to find himself annoyed by the repeated nagging of his wife. He may come to think she is the original annoyer; and, indeed, by this time her nagging habit may be spread to so many things that the mere correction of his original mistake may not stop the process.

Mutual annoyance is often progressive; it expands its scope. When it does so, it is accompanied by an injurious process within the individual personalities. We may call this *irritation spread*. The nature of this process is that the minor anger reactions, or irritations, become conditioned to wider and wider ranges of stimuli. Each anger experience paves the way for an easier or more violent anger on the next occasion. Such couples develop irritations against each other's small mannerisms which at an earlier stage were actually pleasing. They may often grow to dislike each other on this level while they still love each other on the deeper emotional level and also approve and admire each other on the level of rational judgment.

Among the common annoyances are the methods which the mates use when in conflict. When the conflict is a minor one, a secondary and more serious conflict often arises over the weapons (i.e., methods) used in the minor conflict. Each comes to dislike the other's style of fighting more than he dislikes anything else about the mate. What

we have now is really a conflict about the conflict. The wife may threaten court action against the husband for his violence; he may despise her for her sulking instead of coming out "straight from the shoulder." Severe injury and illness may be pretended as a device to make the other suffer remorse, and the pretense may be discovered, only to cause renewed conflict. There are cultural rules of marital conflict, the code differing as among social classes and nationality groups, but within each such code there is a wide latitude of permissible methods of combat. In marital conflict the contestants seldom use the same weapons, as is done in an athletic contest. Each party will naturally use the weapons with which he is most skilled.

5. A common process is *polarization.* The partners develop toward opposite extremes in one or more respects.

A wife, for example, had a somewhat more executive mind than her husband, who was a professional man. She helped him in his work and came to take over more and more of its practical details. The husband became more and more the forgetful dreamer, interested in ideas rather than immediate problems, and became more and more dependent on his wife. She, on the other hand, found less time to philosophize and became even more a "practical" person than before.

Some polarization may be useful and may be regarded favorably by both partners, but commonly a process of mutual annoyance lurks underneath, so that each becomes what he does become, not so much from constructive motives but rather as a protest against the partner's shortcomings or "overemphasis." Divorce, with or without remarriage, sometimes leads a person to develop an aspect of his personality which he had neglected or concealed in his conflict with his former partner.

B. THE PREVENTION AND ADJUSTMENT OF CONFLICT

Some writers have said that we need to know more about normal, happy family life. Sanderson and Foster [1930], Rockwood and Steel [1935] Pratt [1935], and others have presented case studies. Mrs. Chase Going Woodhouse [1930] investigated 250 successful families by an elaborate questionnaire. She found the factors producing *happiness* to occur in the order of importance represented by the numbers 1, 2, 3, etc. (The order of the items after each number is not significant.)

MENTIONED BY HUSBANDS

1. Companionship with wife.
2. Mutual understanding and accommodation.
3. Love, sexual adjustment, children, and specific traits of wife's character. (No mention of freedom and relatively little of money.)

MENTIONED BY WIVES

1. Companionship with husband.
2. Interesting work, freedom of personality, and outside interests.
3. Children, specific traits of husband's character, and good management of money.
4. Love and sex adjustment.

From wide experience with cases, Groves [1930] has said that successful and unsuccessful families present substantially the same problems. If this is true, then a study of successful families will not tell us much more about the nature and frequency of problems than we can get from a study of the unsuccessful families alone. It is easier to get the information about the unsuccessful, because they are the ones which come to various agencies. Moreover, it is more illuminating to study a problem when it appears in extreme form. The ultimate purpose is to help the unsuccessful out of their difficulties and to help the successful to remain successful. Therefore we concentrate our study upon the factors which seem important in guidance, regardless of whether they seem "normal" or "morbid," encouraging or depressing.

THE TECHNIQUES OF CASE TREATMENT. The Mowrers [1928] have described some actual techniques for the treatment of domestic discord. Their method begins with a thorough socio-analysis. This includes a study of premarital environment, parental family, culture patterns, social interaction of the couple, factors in their conflict, and their rationalizations. This may be distinguished from psychoanalysis and other common psychiatric methods in that it places more emphasis upon the interpersonal relationships involved and less upon the detailed explanation of the individual's motives.

Helen Myrick describes an illustrative case in which a wife needed a rest cure. There was no difficulty in deciding what treatment this individual needed; the problem was to treat the social situation so as to enable the individual to get the treatment. Financially the rest treatment was easily arranged; but the wife refused to leave home because she believed that her husband was unfaithful and was trying to get her out of the way. When

the husband talked over the telephone with a woman relative concerning his wife's welfare the wife accused him of arranging a rendezvous. The social worker, studying the situation through interviews with several persons, diagnosed it as a case of paranoid trend in the wife, based partly upon a former infidelity of the husband, and decided that he could now be trusted to put his wife's welfare first. She arranged a joint interview with the couple, at which, with the husband's help, she disarmed the wife's suspicions and persuaded her to go immediately to a convalescent home, with results satisfactory in every way. [Myrick and Sheffield, 1925.]

Mrs. Mowrer [1935] treated 120 cases of marital discord and made a complete adjustment in 70, a partial adjustment in 32. By comparison, she notes that among 569 similar types of cases handled by two leading family welfare organizations in Chicago, only 6 per cent were successfully adjusted.

The simpler treatments which were used, and with little success, by these busy agencies, included: taking case to the Court of Domestic Relations, securing physical or psychiatric examination, holding joint conference, persuasion, and the "ordering-and-forbidding" technique.

The *joint conference* technique, often used in the past, brings the discordant couple into the office together and attempts to solve the problem by a supposedly impartial hearing of both sides as in a courtroom. This method, as Mrs. Mowrer points out, is based upon a false assumption. The theory was that a sense of justice was obtained through the fact that each partner could hear and reply to everything which was said against him. Actually such a joint hearing becomes not a revelation of truth, but a stage for the reopening of the conflict, which may be further embittered by the shame of exhibiting it to a third person.

The modern policy is separate interviews with the discordant mates. The sense of fairness can be obtained through the adviser's showing a sympathetic, non-moralizing, non-coercing attitude toward each party separately; the flames of conflict are not fanned by the direct hearing of mutual accusations. The open debate pattern may often be suitable for making decisions where the important objective is the decision itself and not the relationship between the antagonists. This is one aspect of the larger question, discussed below, of solidarity versus justice.

The *persuasion* technique includes getting the parties to make pledges, appealing to fear, appealing to love of the children. The *ordering-and-forbidding* technique includes implicit coercions, the

prestige mechanism (using the worker's own prestige, or appeal to the "better self" of the client), and declaring to the clients that their conflict is a trivial one.

All these methods, so simple and natural from the common-sense point of view, are comparatively useless. Indeed, there is hardly any more conspicuous failure of common sense than the oft-repeated failure to produce a change in someone's attitude by merely appealing to his "better self" or telling him that he has nothing to complain about when he is in fact complaining. In the emotional subtleties of human relations, common sense, to use the celebrated words of Dickens' Mr. Bumble, is, like the law, "a ass—a idiot."

A great deal of interest has been aroused in several centers by Dr. Moreno's work at his Psychodramatic Institute at Beacon, New York. Dr. Moreno treats mental and nervous disorders by putting his patients upon a stage where they are encouraged to act out their difficulties. There, persons known as "auxiliary egos" play the complementary roles to help bring out the problems of the patient-actor. The experience seems to be that, through the spontaneity thus induced, many patients will reveal a great deal more than through the interview technique. There is much promise in the psychodramatic method.*

SOLIDARITY AND JUSTICE IN MARRIAGE. In a *Gemeinschaft* society, the question of justice or exploitation does not easily arise. Organic solidarity prevails; rights and duties are determined by custom. There is little bargaining or contract. The questions of whether man is fair to woman or whether master exploits servant are as academic as the question of whether there is justice between men and their dogs. Each class of persons is prepared by early teaching to accept its status without question. Even classes having equal intelligence can be so trained that one can be made masters, the other slaves, without question or rebellion. But when they are nearly equal in inborn capacities, as most classes of adult human beings are, inequality of status cannot be forever maintained. It may be maintained as long as there is no great internal change in the culture, and no break in the wall of isolation from other societies. Human relations in a *Gemeinschaft* society are largely of the type Sorokin [1941, 167] has called "familistic." Such relationships, he holds, especially characterized European society from the eighth to the twelfth century. Although he regards these as the most ideal of the three types of social relation-

* From review in the *Bulletin of Family Research and Education*, 1940, 1:3 (June), 8. By permission.

ships in his classification—familistic, contractual, and compulsory—one suspects that they often serve as a cloak for compulsory relations. For example, the old formula, "husband and wife are one person, and that person the husband," implies a familistic, organic unity, yet there is no clear line between this and compulsion.

Town life and money enabled people to exchange a *customary* right or duty for another, *freely chosen,* privilege. The question of how much of one good thing was to be exchanged for how much of another could be determined only by bargaining. Since both sides of a bargain could often not be fulfilled at the same moment, people learned to bargain present against future goods, that is, to make contracts and incur debts. Thus were ushered in capitalism, free enterprise, and the first stage of democratic freedom. Equality of goods was not achieved and was not considered desirable, but equality of opportunity was supposed to exist, because through bargaining each person could get the equivalent of whatever he contributed, that is, "what he was worth." Familistic relations gave way in considerable degree to "contractual" relations, even within the family. [Sorokin, 1941.]

Then came Marx and the socialist and labor movements, which questioned the bargaining process and pointed out that a whole class of persons, through inferior bargaining position, may be systematically exploited even though politically and legally free. The concept of *social justice* was developed and used to correct the maladjustments of contractualism. Sorokin does not give appropriate place to this, but rather sees the remedy in a return to "familism."

Yet during all these changes it was customary to think of the family as an economic unit, *within* which, although it might claim to be exploited by outsiders, there were complete organic solidarity and fixed relationships. But such a conception could not indefinitely hold out against the changes in the outside world. Wives and children began to weigh and compare their rights and duties as individuals. Families came to vary in their internal structure, and so the question of justice arose between husband and wife, and later between parents and children. This question of justice within the family was given added impetus by the question of justice between men and women in general which was raised by the feminist movement.

The analysis of marriage as a trade has been delayed also by the romantic complex and the Christian idea of love as joyous sacrifice. As one counselor put it, the only way to make a happy marriage is not to demand a fifty-fifty basis but for each partner to be willing to

give a hundred per cent! Then they will be sure to meet somewhere and be happy. This conception is indeed useful in many cases, but something more realistic is needed. Suppose one of the partners is able and willing to *take* one hundred per cent!

Perhaps two different principles of harmony must be recognized and applied, one in one type of marriage and one in another. Perhaps both principles can be applied within the same marriage, each within its own limits. These are the principles of solidarity and of justice.

When we experience true solidarity, the concept of justice seems superfluous and often "selfish" and "sordid." The marriage counselor, enthusiastic over his techniques which often do restore real solidarity to a discordant marriage, is apt to say in effect to his clients: "Do you want justice or do you want reconciliation, peace, and love? Your relationship is the important thing, and it is damaged by putting the idea of justice first. In such a complex situation with so many intangible factors no one can objectively define where justice lies." Yet the counselor in a democracy must always recognize that this attitude represents a fundamental choice of values, which should be made in accord with the long-run values of the clients, and not necessarily according to the counselor's social philosophy. In many cases Democracy requires that some assessment of objective justice be made (though not necessarily by the counselor), even if this intensifies the conflict and endangers the relationship. For modern marriage is inevitably in some respects contractual, and it may be better for a person's development that he free himself from a relationship in which, because of some ineradicable blindness or prejudice of his partner, he is likely always to carry a grudge and a sense of injustice.

Yet let us see how each principle applies.

MARRIAGE SOLIDARITY. In many marriages the feeling that "we are one" may be the best basis for maintaining happiness or restoring it if it has been disturbed. If neither party tends to dominate or exploit, if they are fairly well balanced as regards abilities, popularity, friends, and relatives, no injustice may result.

Marriage can be made a process of "growing together." Partners learn from each other. They acquire interests they did not have before. In one case, for example, a wife who had thought that the study of birds was silly became, through sharing it with her husband, a more earnest devotee than he himself. The continuous growth of the personality in adult life is one of the reasons why the pre-marital prediction scores can probably never be reliable in high degree. One

cannot tell whether the partners will grow into greater community of interest or greater incompatibility. Mary Fisher once said to young women: "Husbands are not chosen, they are developed."

A few helpful hints toward maintaining solidarity might be given:

1. Play together, fret separately. Tell each other the interesting things which have happened to you during the day. Don't hash over the disagreeable things except to get positive advice or help. Don't use your mate for a mere outlet. Spend your times of leisure and relaxation together. Spend your moments of anxiety or strain as much as possible apart. If you cannot, then at least don't get each other's personalities mixed up with the situation which causes the unpleasant emotion. If the wife is irritated over the behavior of a child, let her either handle the situation herself or turn it over to the husband to handle, and retire from the scene. Let her not stand there in a state of irritable indecision until finally her anger spreads itself over the whole situation and she flings at her husband the acid question, "Well, why don't you do something?"

The old-fashioned philosophy held that love is strengthened by the troubles we endure and the burdens we bear together. Love *is* strengthened by the knowing that your mate has endured something with courage; it is strengthened when you really can do something which helps him in trouble. But in the multitude of tensions and petty troubles, in which you cannot help, your mere useless presence on the scene does not strengthen love. Blessed are the conditioned reflexes of those who are together in joy, but apart during irritation.

2. Cultivate some recreations together even if these are not highest on the list of preferences of both partners, for the mere sake of sharing.

3. Philosophize together during periods of tranquillity. Your acts during time of strain and crisis are determined by schemes of values which you often work out slowly and too often silently during the years of life. Learn to *talk* more together about the values of life, less about petty details. Family worship and religion have helped to provide this common philosophy in the past. Today, perhaps, we need also more discussion of values and ideals in secular and scientific terms. They may be none the less values and ideals. Perhaps the Conroy case would not have ended in tragedy if the couple had discussed how they would spend money if they had it. Since they never had it, and were hard-working, practical people, they were not prepared for the shock of discovering that they had radically different values worked out in the silence of their souls.

4. Learn a little of the dramatic arts; learn to play more than one role, to distinguish between descriptive and evaluative conversation. Let both partners have the privilege of not being taken seriously at times. Do not make one partner bear all the burden of managing conversation, sparing the feelings, doing the explaining, and the like. Talk can exaggerate bad

feelings and improve good ones. Learn to describe your ill feelings without making the partner feel he is to blame for them.

5. Learn to bestow praise when it will help; do not let approval be signified only by silence.

6. Learn to think of your relationship as something more than yourselves individually. Cultivate it as you would a tender plant. When it is injured, think of these words of Edna St. Vincent Millay:

> Looking askance you said:
> Love is dead.
> . . . .
> . . . .
>
> I have forgotten which of us it was
> That hurt his wing.
> I only know his limping flight above us in the blue air
> Toward the sunset cloud
> Is more than I can bear.
>
> You, you there,
> Stiff necked and angry, holding up your head so proud,
> Have you not seen how pitiful lame he flies, and none to befriend him?
> Speak! Are you blind? Are you dead?
> Shall we call him back? Shall we mend him? *

JUSTICE AND THE BALANCE-OF-TRADE ANALYSIS. Nobody could accuse the Binkleys of other than an optimistic and idealistic view of marriage. Yet in their book, *What Is Right with Marriage?* they have employed a balance-of-trade analysis.

They stress the point that the positive, tangible contribution ("benevolent activity") of one mate to the other's happiness does not need to be balanced by an equal *tangible* contribution from the other side. It may be balanced by a compensating flow of *appreciation* from the other side. A husband may, for example, have everything to give, economically, educationally, and socially, while the wife's inferior ability and status make impossible an equivalent return. But if the wife appreciates the greater contribution of the husband, if she loves him the more because of it, and does not develop a resentful inferiority feeling, the marriage may be very happy. Some persons enjoy giving more than receiving. It is doubtful, however, that any human being can indefinitely maintain an "excess of exports over imports" in benevolent activity, unless he is compensated by "invisible import

* "There at Dusk I Found You," from *The Buck in the Snow*, published by Harper and Brothers. Copyright, 1928, by Edna St. Vincent Millay. By permission.

items" in the form of emotion. The emotional return must be something more than mere habitual or conventional expressions of thankfulness; it must show genuine feeling, and must be responsive to the actual contributions given.

Sometimes the exchange of contributions both visible and invisible appears to be one-sided for a considerable period of time. In that case, as in economic exchange, something analogous to credit is piled up on the side whose contribution is greater. In time the other party is expected to pay back the debt. The balance sheet is seldom mentioned between the partners; indeed, they may be reluctant to think about it privately as long as love remains strong.

Yet whenever serious conflict comes into one of these happy marriages, a balance sheet is dragged forth into the open, revealing that "in the backs of their minds" the partners had been keeping accounts all the while. It influences the conflict in this way. If either partner feels that the other is in debt to him, he is likely to demand stiffer terms in the settlement of the dispute. He demands a sixty-forty settlement in his favor. The other partner is not likely to agree on this assessment of the balance sheet. He may feel that there is no debt either way, and hence that a fifty-fifty settlement is called for; or he may hold that the debt is on the opposite side, and demand a sixty-forty settlement in his favor. In any case the concept of debt, unless both parties agree in its assessment, makes compromise more difficult to achieve.

In marital conflicts we hear expressions like these: "I've slaved for him all my life, now it's his turn to be a little generous." "He had his way, now it's time I had my way a little." "She married me for my money anyway, I don't owe her anything."

Justice is often not apparent. Families which seem to the observer to present a very one-sided balance sheet may often be quite just in terms of the values of the persons concerned.

Observers describe Mrs. K. as "a little tin god on wheels." Her husband and son "wait on her hand and foot," but she does most of the talking and monopolizes the attention of visitors. Her husband is simply her background, a devoted and willing servant to her every whim. He earns an excellent salary and stands well in his profession, but his wife spends most of his money and tells him how to spend most of his leisure time. A truly mid-Victorian, bourgeois, romantic family. By almost any objective standard, the wife here is the getter and the husband the giver. Yet the people concerned do not, cannot, in fact, feel that there is any unfairness. If they did feel so, trouble would develop and there would need to be a readjustment. Human

beings do not go on suffering injustice year after year without showing "symptoms" of some kind. But in that family there are no symptoms. The answer to the enigma is that this husband gets a large vicarious satisfaction out of the role his wife plays. His wife is his hobby, his plaything. The money and time he spends on her are not spent for her satisfaction exclusively, but also for his own.

Other families may contain an injustice which is not apparent on the surface, or which may be opposite in direction to what does appear.

THE POLICY OF POSITIVE GENEROSITY. The author has often recommended in counseling a policy which aims at a fair balance with a minimum of self-denial. Briefly the advice is this, to both partners: "Help your partner satisfy his positive desires and interests as much as possible, and you need not cater so much to his aversions or dislikes when they interfere with *your* positive interests." This policy emphasizes "do" rather than "don't," the "service" rather than the "sacrifice." It implies mutual encouragement in overcoming distastes and annoyances and in acquiring new sources of pleasure and satisfaction. For example, instead of ruling that "we shall invite no guests which either of us dislikes," a couple might resolve that "we shall invite anyone whom either of us really wishes, and the other will try to overcome his aversion."

Needless to say, this policy would need to be more specifically defined in each area of possible conflicts and sometimes it would be difficult to decide whose desire is positive and whose negative. Yet such a decision need not be based upon logical meanings but upon inner meanings. The discussion evoked by the effort to classify a given issue might help each partner to understand the other's inner meanings and therefore his true personality. For example, the positive policy might logically mean, expressed in the wife's words, "I shall let you drink when you wish without going to the extra trouble of concealing it from me; and I shall waste my time playing solitaire, even in your very presence, when I feel the need." But it might be that these "vices" are mainly frustration reactions or secondary desires which would both largely disappear if the partners helped each other in the pursuit of more important individual interests.

Whatever might be defined as positive or negative, there will be necessary limits to reciprocal generosity. It is helpful to think of these limits in terms of cost. "How great is the cost to me of granting you this help or privilege?" Some costs can be measured in terms of money or time, and a more careful accounting of these factors,

though seemingly ungenerous in method, might be more generous in results. The time cost of catering to a partner's personal hobbies which one does not share is a large element in many marriages; if it were recorded and studied this might result in surprising discrepancies between apparent and real spousal fairness.

Exploitation must be distinguished from *domination* although they tend to be linked. The latter is more usually apparent on the surface; it is largely a matter of commanding, obeying, and rebelling. Exploitation is the use of another person for one's own ends which are not shared by that person, and to a large extent it is the use of his time or of an undue share of money which is supposedly for joint use. The partner who is more submissive in outward behavior is *sometimes* the greater exploiter in terms of time or money use.

DOES THE GENEROUS POLICY WORK? "Therefore if thine enemy hunger, feed him; if he thirst, give him drink: for in so doing thou shalt heap coals of fire on his head." *

Most persons recognize that there is truth in this theory. Yet in practice they more often reject it. Recently psychology seems to have come out against this doctrine of self-sacrifice. It maintains that continued unselfishness toward a selfish person simply leads the latter to become more selfish. It is beyond question that children who get too much and give too little tend to become permanently "spoiled." Modern psychology cautions the parent against his own generous impulses to overindulge his child. Does one rule apply to adults and another to children? Where does the real truth lie?

The following fictional case illustrates the failure of generosity to awaken gratitude because of differing scales of values without empathy.

In the motion picture play, *The Right to Love,* a young woman bears a girl child by a man whom she deeply loves, but who is killed before they can marry. The death of the man is indirectly caused by the girl's father, who also had prevented their marriage. A less attractive man who also loves the woman marries her and accepts her illegitimate child as his own. As the little daughter grows up the mother is determined that she shall receive that supreme privilege which the mother was denied: the right to love. So when the daughter becomes interested in a young man, who is opposed by the narrowly religious and unromantic foster-father, the mother deceives the father and permits the girl to elope. But at this moment the daughter learns the circumstances of her own birth. She is overcome with gratitude and admiration for her reputed father. She turns against her romantic-liberal mother,

* Romans 12:20.

and instead of eloping with the young man she runs off with missionaries, friends of her foster-father, to convert the heathen. The mother, from her own point of view, has risked her own comfort and marital relation to give her daughter the supreme value, the right to love. The daughter, ungrateful wretch, has turned against her mother and rejected the precious gift, to subject herself to the prejudices of her narrow-minded foster-father and grandfather. But from the daughter's point of view, the right to love is no precious gift; her mother is a woman lacking in character. The real generosity lies in her foster-father who for love of his wife had borne silently through the years a situation which must have been very humiliating to him. Presumably, also, the mother's constant espousal of the "right to love," through the years when the daughter could have had no experience of what it meant, caused the latter to react somewhat against that ideal. Generosity failed to awaken gratitude because the "precious gift" was valued very differently by giver and recipient, as was also the price paid for the gift. Later on, in far-away China, the daughter falls actually in love with a hero and, finding her love opposed by her missionary guardians, learns for the first time the need of a "right to love." Mother and daughter now dream of each other, but the mother dies without seeing her daughter again.

Perhaps the answer to the enigma may be somewhat as follows. If two persons have perfect insight and empathy, or if, lacking these, they have the same attitudes and valuations, then generosity by one will lead to gratitude and reciprocal generosity by the other. An interaction process of *competitive unselfishness* will actually be established in accordance with Christian theory. Insight is the ability to see one's own behavior or personal relationships from the viewpoint of a disinterested, psychologist-observer. Empathy is the ability to value another's feeling toward something as that other actually values it, rather than according to one's own feeling toward the same thing. If one has empathy, one can value someone else's benevolence to him as the giver values it, regardless of its crude external value to the recipient. If one has insight, one can see how his own behavior appears to another and thus banish any illusions he may have about the value of his own services or the attractiveness of his own personality.

If mates lack insight and empathy and also differ widely in their personal or cultural schemes of values, then there is no common denominator by which they can agree on what constitutes selfishness or unselfishness. *He* may perform what seems to him an act of generosity, but *she* may feel that this act was merely his duty, or may regard it even as a piece of disguised selfishness. At the same time she

may be doing something for him which she regards as generous, while he blindly accepts it as part of the normal course of events. Each may deserve the gratitude of the other, yet neither receives gratitude. The conventional reserve on such matters sooner or later breaks down under the continued strain, and they begin to accuse each other of ungratefulness. When the conflict reaches that stage, it becomes even more difficult for them to achieve mutual empathy. The more he accuses her of ingratitude, the more she is inclined to regard his benevolent actions as calculating selfishness, and hence the less grateful she becomes. The same thing is true in the reversed relation.

It commonly happens that one partner has more empathy and insight than the other. The person more deficient in those abilities tends to be the more selfish person by the judgment of outside observers. The generous one cannot arouse gratitude or reciprocity in the selfish one by performing merely what seem to himself acts of generosity. As Waller [1938, 356] says: "In conflict situations it becomes brutally clear that the person who has insight must assume the burden of the adjustment." The neurotic person tends to exploit the normal.

In such cases the person with insight must have a confidential "outlet" through some third person, or he himself may become neurotic. As Ada Sheffield says: "No person can continue indefinitely to take an objective and normal attitude toward himself unless there is some expression of approval by other persons." * There is a limit to the tolerance of the "understanding" person. He will probably not lose his insight, but may develop other frustration reactions which will make further harmonious living impossible. Even if both have complete insight, the time may come when each must say: "I understand you but I cannot *stand* you."

Perhaps all this amounts to saying that *some* cases are hopeless. Perhaps marriage counseling needs to recognize two levels of cases: *first,* those in which feelings can be changed through the correction of misinformation or prejudice or the suggestion of new valuations; and *second,* those in which the parties have already "looked at the matter" from every conceivable "point of view" and still find themselves "raging inside." One gets the impression that many of the less educated couples belong in the first class; a better educated couple in the same degree of conflict have already probably tried many of the resources the counselor can suggest.

* *Social Forces,* 3:665 (1925).

In a case of progressive conflict, there may come a stage when there is a real choice between preserving *marriage* and preserving friendship with a certain deep and enduring love. The possibility of living together, in the kind of interdependence which our marriage institution prescribes, may be ended, at least for a long, long time. Both partners in all truth have done the best that they know and can! Perhaps that which is most important to save is the kind of thing illustrated by this record.

I dreamt that I was saying goodbye to her. We had walked together through a beautiful countryside; we were walking along a country road which followed around the slope of a green hill on what seemed to be a sunny afternoon in May. The grass was fresh and a deep rich green—dandelions and other spring flowers were about. We came to a junction with a lane which turned through some bars and went up the hill. Somehow it seemed that she was predestined to go up that lane to some kind of a country house, there to remain, while I was to continue on the main road down lower into the valley where a train was to take me away in late afternoon. It seemed accepted by both of us that this parting was a kind of a finality—not that we would never see each other again—but that a certain period of constant companionship was now over—our ways parted—each seemed predestined to go his own way. The idea of parting was suffused with a kind of beautiful pathos, not bitter, not violently tragic, yet certainly not weak or indifferent. There was a feeling of love and yearning and a feeling of fate and its acceptance—one of those strange experiences in which the dreamer, like an emancipated soul, contemplates with a kind of detached serenity the tragedy of his own life.

HAPPY MARRIAGE REQUIRES REFORMS IN MARRIAGE ITSELF. We have seen that many of the frustrations of marriage come originally from frustrations outside of marriage, or begin as economic-restrictive frustrations and only later become love frustrations. We have seen also that, whatever the primary source, the process of conflict feeds upon the close confinement of the partners to their own company and home situation when they are under periods of strain. We know the psychological processes which tend to spread the irritation to surrounding stimuli. Common experience as well as psychiatric advice tells people that what they need is to "get away" for a time, to have a vacation. Yet marriage and the home are not arranged to make this easily possible at the time it is most needed. It is more often possible for the husband, and this differential opportunity in itself often leads to resentment and increased conflict, if it does not lead to suspected infidelity and jealousy. It would seem that one of the cry-

ing needs of marriage is opportunity for vacations, sometimes from the partner, sometimes from the home, sometimes from both, and such opportunity for both partners equally. The need is for such change of scene not merely at fixed times long planned in advance, but *whenever emotional conditions call for it.* This need is often greatest when there are small children in the home, and yet it is then that it is most difficult to meet.

The partner needing such a marital vacation holds off as long as possible for fear that this will be resented by the other, and thus the tension increases. Sometimes he or she is deterred by lack of economic means. But such vacations could be made inexpensive if families were to cooperate in providing facilities, such as low-priced camps and cabins, by making available unused summer homes, and through more "free and easy" customs of reciprocal visiting.

The immediate obstacles to such adjustments are economic. The wife especially is tied down by the fact that money is paid to the husband and she gets no socially determined share of it for her services, but only what he chooses to give her. He can give her very little, or he can conceal his income, and still be within the law. Sometimes she may get a larger share than would be fair in a business-like distribution, but if she uses it in a way the husband disapproves she has no certainty of keeping it. But even if the partners both approve, they may feel that they cannot afford to have the extra housekeeper or to pay hotel bills. Yet these things would not be too expensive if enough people frankly admitted their need for them and organized themselves to supply them.

The ultimate resistance to such arrangements is not expense but prejudices. We are ashamed to let others know we need a change of scene until the need becomes so great that it is serious. This reluctance is part of the whole ideological pattern of marriage. If a couple took many marital vacations people might gossip. If they took vacations together, their relatives, their neighbors, or their conscience might say they were neglecting their children. Society puts people under strains and then tells them they must be tied to their loved ones during these strains. We are not thinking now of major calamities when people are spontaneously glad to be near their loved ones and to help them, but of periods of persistent petty annoyance and tension.

There is a story of a cruel king who, as punishment to two lovers, ordered them tightly bound together for a period of several days. It is said the lovers came to hate each other. We cannot verify the fact, but we know that it is quite in accord with known psychological proc-

esses. Thus does society, in the supposed interest of institutions called marriage and the family, sabotage that upon which modern marriage must rest: love.*

Marriages, to be sure, are less uniform than they were in the days of our grandparents, but individual personalities are still less uniform. In occupations, school work, and community life our society encourages persons to specialize and to develop in many varied directions. Then, when they marry, they are placed in a relationship which gives them unusual power to interfere with each other's use of money and time, to observe and to like or dislike each other's habits, and to further or thwart each other's personal development. Differences of taste and values which are quite acceptable in a school dormitory or a business office often become intolerable in a marriage because of the close interdependence in other ways, and difficulties of escape. Yet these difficulties could be handled if the partners in each marriage could make their own constitution and by-laws, decide wherein they would be interdependent and wherein free. We might then develop many *Gemeinschaft* marriages and many *Gesellschaft* marriages, but both types could be *cooperative.*

In the autobiography, *Two Ends to Our Shoestring,* Kathrene Pinkerton describes a very successful and happy married life which was guided by the policy of never "putting down roots." Most important possessions included the car and complete camping equipment. Both partners made their living by writing. They lived in many different kinds of places, including large houses, boats, apartments, and a log cabin on the shore of a lake in Ontario, which they inhabited for five years. When asked where was their home, they always said "here." They managed to bring up a child.

Couples need to be more utterly frank with each other from the outset. They need to express their innermost desires, need to talk less about "marriage" and more about "our marriage." They need the courage to make their own design for living and to defend it against the pressures of in-laws, friends, and neighborhood gossips. Instead of being slaves to culture, the modern couple might conceivably make their own culture!

* For this institutional interpretation of marital maladjustment I am largely indebted to my collaborator, Marion Bassett, who has further developed the idea in her forthcoming *Mothers on Strike.*

Chapter XIV

THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND CONTROL OF MARRIAGE

The three preceding chapters have dealt with love and marriage from the standpoint of the individual couple or their counselor. We have seen, however, that the things these individuals can do to improve marriage are limited by the community and the larger social order. We live under a culture and although some of us, finding it oppressive, may defy it in some ways and some of the time, yet our little personal rebellions are less effective than joining with others to study and attack the difficulties which we feel in common with them.

In this and the next two chapters we shall shift our point of view; we shall view marriage, divorce, courtship, and love relationships *en masse,* from the standpoint of the community and the larger social order.

A. MARRIAGE AS A LEGAL STATUS

THE LEGAL NATURE OF MARRIAGE. Let us look into the underlying legal patterns of marriage as it is today. It is often referred to as a contract between two persons. This is misleading. The parties may make a contract to enter the state of marriage and financial damages may be secured by the loyal party against the one who refuses to go through with the ceremony. But if the parties actually marry, their relations thereafter are relations of *status* and not of *contract.* That is to say, their rights, duties, are now standardized by law and custom, uniform for all couples. The contract that binds them is like the printed "form contracts" often used in business, but without written-in amendments or exceptions. In drawing up this uniform code the individuals concerned have had no part. They may now make contracts with each other in business matters and with relation to their separate property, but the rights and duties of marriage itself cannot be altered by special agreements.

The wife has the right to "support," which in amount may be very largely at the discretion of the husband, and she must "follow" him. If they disagree upon where it is best to live or to seek employment, or upon which party has the better chance of earning, the husband has the right to decide. Only in 1937 did New York State make it law that "a married woman has a right of action against her husband for his wrongful or tortuous acts resulting to her in any personal injury . . . or resulting in injury to her property, as if they were unmarried, and she is liable to her husband for her wrongful or tortuous acts . . ."

In many states husband and wife are still legally unequal in rights of guardianship, divorce, and testation. Even where legal rights are equal, the husband has superior power and discretion because of his earning money, whereas the wife receives support "in kind."

The status known as Christian, Euro-American marriage has come down to us, with some modifications, from the medieval church. In those ages the church gradually took over the control of marriage from the civil authorities, which had held such control in ancient Rome. It embodied the rules of marriage in its "Canon Law." With the Reformation, the church in northern Europe lost its unconditional power over marriage, although it retained a large practical control through public opinion and the power of dismissal from the church. In some Catholic countries, such as Austria and Poland, the state until recently has rubber-stamped the laws of the church as far as the members of that church are concerned, and required no "license" or ceremony other than what the church itself provided. In France, on the other hand, the state long ago took complete control, so that a couple could not be married at all except by a state officer, the religious ceremony being an optional superfluity. It is interesting that England, which broke from the Catholic Church in earlier days, gave and still gives the Church of England some of the authority formerly held by the Church of Rome. No government license or permit is required for a Church of England marriage, although civil officers grant licenses and perform ceremonies for persons who wish to marry outside of church auspices. Also there existed in England the "common-law" marriage, which under certain conditions treated a couple as legally married even if there had been no civil or religious ceremony or permit. The conditions were either: (*a*) that they had mutually agreed that they *were* married (*per verba de praesenti*) or (*b*) that they had agreed that they would be married (*verba de futuro*), and then fol-

lowed this by actual cohabitation. Of course it was easy to prove the existence of such agreements if both parties wanted to do so. The difficulties arose when they came later into disagreement as to the continuance of their relationship. If one party could prove that the prescribed conditions of agreement had existed, then the party wishing to break the relation was held as he would be by legal ceremony, and even a subsequent ceremonial marriage of his could be held bigamous and void and its offspring illegitimate.

In 1932 much publicity was given to a New York case in which a woman, who had been presumed to be the mistress of a deceased man of wealth, proved that she was his common-law wife, and thus secured her right to half of his estate. Surrogate Judge O'Brien of New York City wrote the decision. On one occasion, testimony proved, the couple had appeared together in public with the woman wearing a new wedding ring, and met a third party who, remarking upon the ring, was told "we are doubly married now." This statement the judge found to constitute sufficient *verba de praesenti,* and since it was followed by actual cohabitation, the couple were judged to have had full married status. They did not have a ceremonial marriage, and could not have done so without risking bigamy prosecution, because the man had been divorced by a former wife under the New York law which forbids the remarriage of the defendant.*

Although England herself abolished common-law marriage in 1753, requiring then an Anglican Church ceremony for every marriage, except in the case of Quakers and Jews, and later admitting a civil ceremony as alternative, most of the American colonies had already inherited common-law marriage, and several states still retain it. In 1933 New York State abolished it.

New England has no common-law marriage in her history or traditions, and in general gives unusually strict control of marriage to her civil authorities. There the Puritan reaction against the Church of England outlawed at the very outset both the religious authority over marriage and also the common-law marriage, and regarded marriage as a status to be granted to individuals exclusively by the civil government. Until 1686 there were no religious marriage ceremonies in New England. Since then, the custom has become similar to that in the other states: the state grants the permissive certificate and a minister may perform the ceremony. In so doing he is regarded as

* *New York Times,* August 2, 1932, p. 9.

an officer of the state; he may not perform marriages without a clergyman's license, which is good only in the state granting the license.

The term marriage "license" comes from the days when a bishop could grant special permission to a lower clergyman to perform a given marriage without the previous publication of the *banns,* which was generally required. The license is now a permit granted by the state rather than by higher church authorities, and it is a standard requirement rather than a permit for a special privilege.

About one-fourth of all marriages in the United States are estimated to be performed by civil officers. [Richmond and Hall, 1929.] A study at the University of Minnesota showed, however, that clergymen performed at least 95 per cent of the marriages in a rural sample of the past generation. [Sorokin *et al.,* 1931, Vol. II, 23 *ff.*]

REQUIREMENTS FOR MARRIAGE ARE INCREASINGLY STRICT. Beginning in 1897, except for the much earlier action of Maine in 1858, the states have been enacting new laws requiring a period of waiting between the announcement of intention to marry and the actual performance of the marriage. There are two types of law, one granting the license upon application but forbidding the ceremony until after a specified time, the other withholding the certificate itself until after the time has elapsed. The latter type, which is followed in most of the New England States, is more effective since it prevents evasion by a misdating over the signature of the officer who performs the marriage. The most commonly prescribed waiting period is five days; but many states have less. A three-day law of the first type was enacted in New York in 1937 but later repealed because the blood test law of 1938 provided a three-day waiting period. These laws reestablish through governmental procedure a principle which was formerly embodied in the ecclesiastical banns. In New England, until 1850, the town governments were obliged to publish all marriage intentions. Mere publication of intention today proves an ineffective control, since nobody in the public may care to investigate or complain; the new laws in theory place the responsibility of investigation upon the government officials.

"The purpose of these laws," says Groves [1933, 175], "is to prevent illegal marriage, to discourage the marriage of non-residents of the state, and to give those who are marrying hastily and impulsively time to ponder before making the final decision."

The marriage license is commonly obtained from the town or city clerk of the place where the marriage is to take place. The states

vary in procedure. To note extremes, Maine had (about 1929) 626 officers who are empowered to issue marriage licenses, New Jersey 578, while California had 63, Rhode Island 39, and Maryland 25. In some states and Canadian provinces notaries may issue licenses. In Toronto it was found that four-fifths of the notaries empowered to issue licenses were jewelers.

In American states, the most common age requirement for marriage without consent of parents is 21 for men and 18 for women. With consent of parents, the most common requirement is 18 for boys and 16 for girls, but several states place lower limits, a few holding to the old English common-law provision which permits a boy of 14 and a girl of 12 to marry with parental consent. There is a trend toward raising the legal minimum age of marriage, but it is very gradual and much resisted. Much of the resistance is due to the attitude that a young girl who has become pregnant should not be forced to bear her child illegitimately. [Groves, 1933, 158.] Resistance is also due to the fear that higher age requirements would cause a larger volume of pre-marital sex relations.

The age requirements of marriage are frequently violated because the law allows the license issuer to take the sworn statement of the parties without compulsory investigation, or does not require the presence of both parties at the issuing office. In some instances license issuers have taken the statement of parents over the telephone, or of persons who merely pretended to be parents. The trend is toward the requirement of more adequate proof.

There is also a trend toward raising the age of consent, that is, the age at which a girl may voluntarily give herself to sexual intercourse without causing the man to be guilty of rape.

Most states forbid marriage to insane persons and idiots, but it is impossible to detect and eliminate all such cases without a thorough examination, which the law seldom requires. North Carolina and North Dakota took a forward step by requiring of every one a medical certificate of freedom from tuberculosis in the infectious stages (modified in North Carolina in 1933). In 1926 New York State added to its requirements a statement by the applicants that they are free from venereal disease.

In 1935 began, with Connecticut, a new wave of legislation requiring a blood test of freedom from communicable syphilis of all applicants for marriage within forty days or some similar prescribed period before the marriage. About twenty-six states now have such

laws. Of course these laws cannot prevent sex relations outside of marriage, but they represent the best legal device yet found in the United States for discovering syphilis and inducing people to protect themselves against it or secure prompt treatment. During the first six months of the New York law, 1.4 per cent of all applicants were found to have syphilis. [Baber 1939, 118; Johnson, B., 1939.]

Marriage between relatives closer than first cousin is almost everywhere forbidden. Some states forbid marriages of first cousins, some of second cousins, some of certain classes of in-law relatives.

In the South, marriage between a white and a person of any appreciable degree of Negro blood is forbidden. The tendency is toward the tightening of this provision. Virginia, which had formerly defined the Negro as a person with one-sixteenth of Negro blood, now defines him as one having any trace whatsoever of Negro blood, and has instituted a system of personal certificates for the more careful enforcement of the law.

Not all the bars to securing a marriage license, however, cause a marriage to be null and void if by chance the law is evaded and the ceremony actually occurs. This is true of some age requirements, for example. A person may be forbidden to marry because of his age, yet if he does so, the marriage may be binding. Marriages solemnized by unauthorized persons, or by evading certain other technical requirements, may nevertheless be legally binding. Such are matters of court decision.

Bigamous marriage is everywhere in the United States forbidden, and is legally null and void even if the marriage ceremony is performed. States vary in the measures taken to prevent bigamy, some requiring the divorce certificate to be filed by a person who was previously married and divorced. In many cases the law is evaded and a person lives for years, supposedly legally, with a second mate while the first is still living and undivorced.

Under our laws either man or woman, in case of an engagement broken by the other, has had the right to institute a civil suit for damages for "breach of promise." In practice, awards were made only to women. A few women abused the privilege for mercenary ends, reaching damages as high as $450,000 in a 1929 Michigan case. [Baber, 1939, 121.] Then public opinion became aroused against the practice and by 1937 eight states, including our three most populous ones, enacted "anti-heart-balm" laws forbidding such suits.

Criminal laws against seduction still remain in force, however, and these can be used as threats to force men, against their will, to marry women with whom they have been intimate. There is a growing opinion that marriages forced by "shotgun" tactics are worse than the broken hearts or reputations, or even illegitimate births which might otherwise ensue. Social work policy now favors compelling the seducer to support but not to marry. In a sample of 134 forced marriages, 57 per cent were unstable. [Mudgett, 1924.] The protection which the older method purported to give women is desirable, but a sounder protection could be secured in other ways. [See Seagle, 1937.]

An obstacle to the effectiveness of marriage requirements is the fact that most persons are within reach of some state where the requirements are less strict, or of some locality where the officers are known to be lax in checking up the facts. Richmond and Hall [1929] discovered 57 marriage market towns in the United States, so-called Gretna Greens, where officials and often clergymen make a business of marrying out-of-town couples with the least possible investigation and delay. Not one of these towns was in a state having a complete advance-notice law. Marrying parsons have split fees with taxi drivers who brought couples to their offices, and often advertise their business with large signs. In one town even the railroad men were in the game, signaling by whistle how many prospective couples were aboard the incoming train.

A well-known "marrying parson" who recently died estimated that in his 15 years of function in Elkton, Maryland, he had joined 50,000 persons in holy matrimony. Only 12.4 per cent of Philadelphia marriages involved brides under 20, but 56.5 per cent of Elkton, Maryland, marriages of Philadelphians did so. [Hart and Shields, 1926.] But in 1938, Elkton had to go out of business because of a new state law requiring a two-day waiting period, and some other "marriage mills" have been eliminated. Six states have passed marriage evasion acts, which declare a marriage of a resident null and void if it violates the state requirements and was contracted in another state for the purpose of evading those requirements.

The following newspaper advertisement tells us a great deal about the attitude toward marriage which pervades certain social areas in our country. It comes from a state which has a very liberal divorce law. Out of respect to the community, which has achieved recogni-

tion for its family life education program in the high school, identifying marks are deleted. Spelling is as in original.

WANTED

The ——— Amusement Corporation will substantilly reward any young lady of Greater ——— —— who will arrange to marry her boss on the stage of the Capitol Theatre next Monday night, September 2nd.

Please do not answer unless you are serious. Telephone 7842 for details.

Evidence concerning the relation of happiness to age at marriage and to age differences of partners is conflicting and unreliable. The only consistent generalization is that the marriage of women before 20 is somewhat unsafe and also, to a lesser degree, that of men before 22. [Terman 1938, 180–183.] Hart and Shields [1926] found that a marriage with both partners under 20 is ten times as likely to come to a court of domestic relations as the most favorable marriages. But as Terman points out, these writers were comparing a random control group with a group which came to the court of domestic relations, which represents an undue proportion of the underprivileged.

Popenoe [1938, A] found that among 738 elopements, 63 per cent turned out happily when "economy" was the motive, 60 per cent when "avoidance of publicity," 45 per cent when "parental objection," and 33 per cent when "pregnancy" was the motive.

For years, public policy with regard to marriage was largely governed by the aim of preventing sex relations outside of marriage and illegitimacy. Judges are usually permitted to make exceptions to marriage laws in order to get a pregnant girl "safely" married. This aim is still held to be a worthy and important one, but now that premarital sex relations seem to be increasing anyway, without substantial increase in illegitimacy, the tendency is toward making marriage more difficult and giving it higher standards.

B. THE DEMOGRAPHY OF MARRIAGE

Among most primitive groups practically every individual marries; those who do not are disapproved or regarded as abnormal. The same tends to be true in general of civilized agricultural peoples, such as the Chinese and European peasantry, and was true of colonial America.

Several European countries and New Zealand record death statistics according to marital status. These figures in general lead to the concluson that bachelors and widowers, at most age levels, have mortality rates 50 per cent greater than married men. Among women, excluding deaths due to child-bearing, which substantially increase married women's death rates, spinsters have death rates 10 to 15 per cent greater than married women, and widows about 20 per cent greater. If these greater death rates were true only of the single, we might attribute them to a selective tendency of unhealthy and defective individuals to remain unmarried. But when widows and widowers also show substantially higher death rates at any given age, we are led to believe that marriage itself, especially for men, is a status with which is correlated a lesser risk of illness and accident. [Harvey, P. N., 1930.]

THE MARRIAGE RATE AND STATISTICS OF MARITAL STATUS. Vital statistics such as those of marriage are commonly expressed in three kinds of rates. There is the *incidence* rate, or the number of happenings of the given kind of event during one year per 1,000 (or sometimes 100,000) of population. Second, there is the *prevalence* rate, or the number of individuals of which the given condition is true at any one instant of time (the typical or average instant if the rate fluctuates rapidly) per 1,000 (or 100,000) population. Third, there is the *expectation* rate, or the chances per 100 that an average individual of given age, class, etc., will experience a given event within a specified time, or within his lifetime. The expectation rate may be expressed also in another way, as the most probable period of time before the given event will happen to the said individual.

The 1930 marriage rate, as given, for example, in the United States Bureau of the Census Annual Report on Marriage and Divorce, is an incidence rate. It stood around 9 per 1,000 during the years 1887–1900, rose irregularly to a level between 10 and 11 per 1,000 in the prosperous decade from 1920 to 1930, dropped to 9.2 in 1930, then to 8.5 in 1931, and to 7.9 in 1932. Since we are a monogamous people,

the *number of persons who get married* per 1,000 population per year is of course just double the marriage rate. Both the marriage and divorce incidence rates fluctuate with the business cycle, being high in prosperity and low in depression. [Thomas, D., 1925.] But even when these business cyclical fluctuations are smoothed out, there seem to be certain longer time fluctuations.

With the 1932 report, the Federal Government ceased to publish annual statistical reports on marriage and divorce throughout the country. Since that time we have been indebted for such knowledge as we have about American marriage and divorce rates to the studies of Stouffer and Spencer. [1936, 1939.] Their procedure was simply to collect reports from as many states as they could and then to estimate from these what the national figures would be. According to this latest estimate the American marriage rate, which was considerably cut during the beginning of the depression, went back to normal (10.3) in 1934, and in 1937 had climbed to 11.0, which was about the highest figure in 15 years. The divorce rate was also cut by the depression but by 1934 had come back to the trend, and in 1937 had reached a figure of 1.93 divorces per 1,000 population, the highest figure so far on record in American history.*

As to the prevalence rate of marriage, about 60 per cent of the total population of 15 years and over in 1930 was married. The remainder consists approximately of: single (in census reports this means never married) 30 per cent, widowed 8 per cent, divorced 2 per cent. It is believed by statisticians that the reported percentage of 1.2 for divorced persons represents an undercount, caused by the reluctance of many persons to report themselves as divorced. The incidence rate of divorce, since it is obtained each year from court records which cannot be concealed from the census enumerator, is obviously more trustworthy than the prevalence rate of divorced persons, which is obtained from the say-so of the persons themselves visited every 10 years in house-to-house canvass. Ogburn shows that it would be necessary to have each divorced person, on the average, either remarry or die 22 months after his divorce in order to keep the prevalence rate (persons living in a state of divorce at any given time) as low as it is stated to be. [Groves and Ogburn, 1928, 362 *ff.*] But there is good evidence to indicate that the average divorced person who does remarry does so after three or four years rather than two, and that at least 20 per cent never remarry. Hence the number of persons living in the di-

* From review in the *Bulletin of Family Research and Education*, I:2 (April, 1940), 12.

vorced state must actually be considerably greater than reported in the decennial census. A very rough estimate would be that there are twice as many persons in the divorced state as actually report themselves as such.

Table 16 shows that the prevalence rate as well as the incidence rate of marriage has been increasing since 1890.

TABLE 16 *

PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL POPULATION 15 YEARS OF AGE AND OVER IN THE UNITED STATES, WHICH WAS SINGLE (NEVER MARRIED) 1890–1930

	Males	Females	Both sexes
1890	41.7	31.8	36.9
1900	40.2	31.2	35.8
1910	38.7	29.7	34.3
1920	35.1	27.3	31.3
1930	34.1	26.4	30.3

* Fifteenth Census of the United States, 1930, Population, Vol. II, chapter on marital condition.

Table 17 shows that the percentage volume of widowhood has remained constant among females, and increased from 1890 to 1900 among males but not since then. It shows that the divorced state has become continually more frequent among both sexes.

TABLE 17 *

PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL POPULATION 15 YEARS OF AGE AND OVER IN THE UNITED STATES WHO ARE WIDOWED AND DIVORCED, ACCORDING TO DECENNIAL CENSUS REPORTS

	Widowed		Divorced	
	Males	Females	Males	Females
1890	3.9	11.0	0.2	0.4
1900	4.6	11.2	0.3	0.5
1910	4.5	10.6	0.5	0.6
1920	4.8	11.1	0.6	0.8
1930	4.6	11.1	1.1	1.3

* Fifteenth Census of the United States, 1930, Population, Vol. II, chapter on marital condition.

If it is true that there are twice as many divorced persons as appear in the census figures, then the decrease in the single state might be a little greater than appears in Table 16.

But neither the crude marriage rate (incidence) nor the percentage married of the entire population of 15 years of age and over (preva-

TABLE 18 *

PERCENTAGE OF PERSONS OF EACH AGE AND SEX GROUP, IN 1930, WHO

	Were in Married State at Time of Enumeration		Had Been Married at Some Time (i.e., married + widowed + divorced)	
	Males	Females	Males	Females
15 and over	60.0	61.1	65.7	73.5
15–19	1.7	12.6	1.7	13.0
20–24	28.1	51.6	28.8	53.7
25–29	61.3	74.3	63.1	78.2
30–34	76.0	81.5	78.7	86.7
35–44	81.5	81.5	85.6	89.9
45–54	81.6	75.2	88.4	90.8
55–64	78.0	62.0	89.7	90.9
65 and over	63.7	34.7	91.4	91.7

* Fifteenth Census of the United States, 1930, Population, Vol. II, chapter on marital condition.

lence) tells us exactly what is happening. Both of these rates are strongly influenced by the *age distribution* of the population, and this has been changing. In order to determine the precise nature of the change we must keep the age factor constant in making our comparisons.

The age at which a woman is most likely to be in the married state is from 30 to 44; a man, from 45 to 55. Women tend to enter the married state earlier and to leave it earlier. This results from several factors: the usual age discrepancy between husband and wife (in the median case the husband is 2.4 years older) [Bossard, 1933], the greater longevity of women (amounting on the average to about two years), and the greater tendency of widowers than widows to remarry and to remarry a younger person. As age advances, the differences between men and women, in respect to whether they were ever married or not, gradually disappear, until, among the oldsters of 65 and beyond, about 92 per cent of each sex has at some time married. But at that period of life only 64 per cent of the men and only 35 per cent of the women remain in the married state, chiefly because of the deaths of their spouses. The equalizing of the two sexes in their marital record is partly due to the fact that married men have a lower death rate than others, and for this reason, in addition to others, those who survive beyond 65 are more likely to be married than are a group of men at an earlier age.

A most concise statement of the marital chances of the individual is presented in Figure 3.




FIGURE 3. Chances per 100 that a white single person of specified age will eventually marry. (From *Statistical Bulletin*, Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 1942, 23:No. 5, p. 5. Based upon data for the United States, 1930. By permission.)

WHILE MARRIAGE RATES FLUCTUATE, MARRIAGE IS BECOMING EMANCIPATED. Marriage rates go up and down with economic and other conditions, but within narrow limits, because the great majority of every generation eventually marries. Underlying these statistical fluctuations there has been a continuous trend toward the making of marriage in practice a freely chosen status without regard to family wishes, financial status, or readiness to raise children. Contraception plus the newer values placed upon individual personality have contributed to this trend.

Generally speaking, those generations and groups which marry young also have higher expectation rates of eventual marriage. Baber and Ross, studying a large sample of mid-Western native American families which were the immediate or collateral relatives of college students, ascertained *average* ages at marriage to be as shown in Table 19.*

* "Changes in the Size of American Families in One Generation," *University of Wisconsin Studies in the Social Sciences and History*, 1934, No. 10.

TABLE 19

AVERAGE AGE AT MARRIAGE

	Persons of the Generation Born about 1834	Persons of the Generation Born about 1866
All men	25.58	27.32
Professional men	26.65	28.01
Farmers	25.32	26.89
Skilled labor	24.68	26.74
All women	21.34	24.08
Women of college education	22.08	26.10
Women of elementary school education	21.05	22.98

The Victorian generation showed later marriage in all classes than the generation which preceded it. The class differences also are interesting.

Loomis [1930] found the average age at marriage of a sample of 482 college men who had attained recognition in agriculture, and who were presumably born in the period 1865–1885, to be 27.7 years.

Persons born about 1870 have shown at each age, as revealed by successive censuses, a slightly higher proportion of singleness than the generations born earlier and also those born later. The generations from the 1870-born to the 1900-born show a continuous trend toward earlier marriage and more marriage. [Groves and Ogburn, 1928, 152, 159, Ch. XI; Thompson and Whelpton, 1933, 204–207; Folsom, 1934, 319–322.] Roughly this corresponds to the change in the marriage rates from 1890 to 1920.

Thompson and Whelpton [1933, 226], although admitting that the post-1890 trend toward earlier marriage arises from a complex of many social conditions, "wish to call attention to the fact that earlier marriage has been taking place concomitantly with the rapid spread of contraceptive information." They think it reasonable that young people, no longer forced to choose between continence, parenthood, and abortion, would be more ready to marry at an earlier age; and that this presumption is strengthened by the fact that an increasing proportion of people live in cities where the raising of children is more expensive and difficult than in the country. They admit that easier divorce might also have some influence, but the present author agrees with them fully when they say that "it seems unlikely that many young people are influenced by such knowledge [of easier divorce] at the time they marry."

The percentages of married among males and females of 20–24, which had increased markedly from 1890 to 1920, fell slightly from 1920 to 1930. There are evidences that the trend toward earlier marriage had already ceased or reversed itself before the depression set in. Bailey and Carpenter [1939] show a general, downward trend in absolute number of marriages in Buffalo from 1921 to 1932, and after that a slow rise. The marriage rate of New York State was generally downward from 1923 to 1932.

Jessie Bernard [1940], in a study of marriages in Multnomah County (including Portland), Oregon, found that the girls who became 21 in 1934, when followed up for 3 years, showed no signs of catching up in percentage married to the girls of the two previous birth-years or later birth-years. The period of time and the area observed were limited, but there is here evidence that "certain generations are rather heavily penalized" in opportunity for marriage "by the very irrelevant fact that they happen to pass through their most marriageable years in times economically unfavorable to marriage."

The marriage rate in New York State fell in 1938 because of the new health certificate law and, probably, economic causes, but in 1940 rose again to 9.8. The coming of Selective Service and war in 1941 brought rapid increases in marriage. New York City had 39,000 marriage permits for the first half of 1941, as compared with 29,000 during the first half of 1940 and 38,000 per half-year during 1917, which was a comparable war year. A great increase in marriages, as evidenced by license bureau figures from many scattered localities, began in July and August, 1940. Some draft boards deferred all married men; others used the case work method, drafting or exempting according to the needs of the case.

This rush to get married is not to be interpreted mainly as a desire to avoid military service. As Mrs. Street [1941] points out, the greatly increased employment had much to do with the increase. Janet Fowler Nelson said that among the girls she worked with, the marriage rush "represents a speeded-up relationship rather than any question of draft evasion." *

Although the depression reduced general marriage rates it did not do so in all social classes and groups. Bossard [1937, 1938, 1940] found that in Philadelphia certain districts actually had increased marriage rates. Relief had something to do with this.

* Press report, 1941.

Yet these districts were those characterized by high percentages of Negro, Russian Jewish, and to a lesser extent, Italian population. Bossard suggests that, with these groups the insecurity of the depression (in the case of Jews, coupled with the Jewish tradition of marriage as fulfillment), led to the seeking of security by young people *through* marriage, contrary to the usual pattern of the native-born and the older foreign-stock groups of "saving" for marriage.*

In the winter of 1940–41, 100 Vassar College students were asked their opinions about the effect of the national emergency on marriage and courtship. [Lukens and Weil, 1941.] Thirty-one of these were engaged or "in love." Of these 31, 14 would rather have a baby if the man were going to war; only 4 think it would be unfair to "bring the baby into a world like this"; and only 7 think the success of their marriage might eventually be affected unfavorably by marriage in these times and under these stresses. Of the whole group of 100, including the non-engaged, 90 do not think that shorter courtships affect unfavorably the security of the marriage. From many sources there appears evidence of a new value: that marriage is not something to wait for until one has security and everything else, but as something to be taken as soon as one is sure of the partner, with the feeling that no matter what the outcome, something important is gained which one can never lose.

NATIONAL, REGIONAL, AND CLASS DIFFERENCES. There are some interesting differences in marriage among the various classes of the population.

The native white of foreign and mixed parentage show lower percentages of married at all ages than do either those of native parentage or the foreign-born white. Thompson and Whelpton [210] suggest as reasons their difficulty of adjusting to American life, and the unusually large gap between their desired and actual standards of living. Ogburn adds the suggestion that foreign parents are more apt to take a large part of their children's earnings and thus delay their marriage. [Groves and Ogburn, 484.] Negroes show unusually high percentages of married in the very young age groups and unusually low percentages in the older groups, largely because of high widowhood and high divorce. [Thompson and Whelpton, 211.]

In the South, in 1930, the percentage of women of 20 to 24 who were married was 59.3 as compared with 55.2 for the West, 50.8 for the North Center, and 42.0 for the Northeast. Moreover, the *white* women of the South marry earlier than those of other regions. In general, early marriage increases as we go West and South, among

* From review in the *Bulletin of Family Research and Education*, II:1 (February, 1941), 14–15.

both sexes. The comparatively low marriage tendency of the women of the Northeast is due both to a low sex ratio and to the greater opportunity for independent work for women in the Northeast.

The rural population has a higher percentage married than the urban, for both sexes and at all ages. The difference is particularly great among women. Among rural men, the percentage of married at all ages lumped together became in 1930 lower than that for urban men. [Thompson and Whelpton, 215–219.] That this could be true despite the continued higher married rate at each specific age is due to a difference in age distribution. The country has a relatively small percentage of men at the ages of high marriage and relatively more at the ages of 15 to 25. The high rates of youthful marriage among rural people, however, reflect village more than they do farm conditions. This was discovered through the 1930 census, which for the first time separated farm from non-farm rural population with respect to marriage statistics. Only at the later ages is farm marriage higher than non-farm rural marriage.

TABLE 20 *

MEAN AND MODAL AGE AT MARRIAGE OF WOMEN ACCORDING TO SOCIAL CLASS OF HUSBAND

Social Class of Husband	Average Age of Women at Marriage	
	Mean	Mode
Total urban	22.4	20.5
Professional	24.8	23.5
Proprietary	23.3	21.7
Clerks	22.9	21.3
Skilled workers	21.8	19.6
Semi-skilled workers	21.2	19.5
Unskilled laborers	21.4	18.5
Total rural	21.4	19.2
Farm owners	22.3	20.0
Farm renters	20.9	19.0
Farm laborers	20.1	18.1
Urban and rural combined	21.9	

* F. W. Notestein, "Age at Marriage and Social Class," *American Journal of Sociology*, 37 (1931), p. 40. Reproduced by permission. The sample consists of women of native-white parentage under 40 years of age at the time of their marriage, who were married between April 16, 1900, and April 15, 1905, and who were living with their husbands at the census of 1910.

[3] F. W. Notestein has studied the difference between social classes as to the age of marriage. His samples consist of women of native-white

parentage, living at the time of the 1910 census with their husbands, who were also of native-white parentage. Neither the women nor their husbands had been married more than once. Two samples having these qualifications were taken. One was urban, representing 33 northern cities of populations from 1,000 to 500,000. The other sample was rural, representing the unincorporated parts of 74 counties adjoining these same cities. To eliminate certain errors Notestein confined his samples used in the final comparisons to those women who had been married before the age of 40 and who had entered marriage not less than 5 nor more than 10 years previous to the census.

His results are shown in Table 20. Notestein found that these American women married considerably earlier than Englishwomen, in each social class respectively. The proportion of persons married under 20 years of age is from 2.7 to 4.9 times as large as that for similar English classes. If we wish to adjust Notestein's percentage data to compare exactly with Table 21, we can do so by multiplying them each by 0.96, thus getting a percentage based upon all marriages under 50 instead of under 40.

TABLE 21 *

PERCENTAGE OF WOMEN MARRIED BEFORE AGE 50, ABOUT 1920, WHO ENTERED MARRIAGE AT GIVEN AGES

	Under 20	Under 25
Australia	12.4	51.6
New Zealand	9.9	51.8
England and Wales	8.3	53.7
Sweden	7.3	47.9
Germany (1925)	7.3	53.5
France	12.2	53.7
Italy	21.3	60.6
Spain	8.5	66 5
Hungary	27.5	67.3
Bulgaria	26 5	74.4
United States—Notestein samples, 1900–1905, adjusted to base of all marriages under 50		
Urban	26.2	69.5
Rural	36.0	75.3
United States—Philadelphia marriages, 1931, Bossard, adjusted to all marriages under 50 as base		
Women	18.4	66.9
Men	1.4	42.0

* *Sources:* Warren S. Thompson, *Population Problems*, McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1930, p. 93; Notestein, *op. cit.*, p. 30; Bossard, *American Journal of Sociology*, 38, p. 536.

Marriage tends to be late in Europe; even in countries like France and Italy it is later than in the United States. Also there was comparatively little change in this respect in Europe from 1880 to 1930. When we compare the countries which fought in World War I with those which did not, and compare 1911–1920 with the periods preceding and following, we gather the impression that neither the war nor the peace had much effect on these variables. Furthermore, high percentages of marriage at early age seem to go with high percentages at later ages, and with a low average age of marriage. It would seem that the differences among regions and countries are differences in the *whole tendency to marry* and not merely in the *age at which the average marriage takes place.*

Sociological writers are wont to ascribe these differences in the tendency to marry to "social and economic conditions"; in other words, to various influences from the material culture, the physical environment, the economic system, and so on. But the family mores seem to have a certain stability and independence. Throughout most of Europe, for example, they decree that marriages shall be made with the consent and often at the initiative of parents, and that a child cannot through marriage escape obligations to his parents. In the United States, on the other hand, culture favors the romantic marriage of free choice. Just as among the Todas decided changes in "conditions" which would subculturally tend to promote monogamy, nevertheless failed to upset the ingrained family pattern of polyandry, so economic changes in Euro-American culture may be very slow to change our more fundamental family patterns.

Bossard [1933], studying all of the 13,449 marriage licenses granted in Philadelphia and neighboring counties during 1931, in which one or both parties were residents of Philadelphia, found the following results:

TABLE 22

AGE AT MARRIAGE IN PHILADELPHIA

Percentage of All Marriage Licenses	Men	Women
Under 20	1.4	18.0
Under 25 (adjusted by interpolation)	41.2	65.6

These figures, adjusted to a base of "marriages under 50" instead of "all marriages," are shown in Table 21 for comparison with foreign countries. Bossard was particularly interested in finding the age difference between partners. In 10.1 per cent of all the marriages, the woman was the older; in 10.5

per cent, both parties were of the same age (i.e., in whole years at last birthday); in 79.4 per cent the man was the older. In two-thirds of these cases in which the man was older, the age difference was 5 years or less, their median difference being a little over 3 years.

The United States Census computes the *median* age at first marriage for the whole United States in 1930 as shown in Table 23.

TABLE 23 *

MEDIAN AGE AT FIRST MARRIAGE, UNITED STATES, 1930

	Male	Female
All classes	25.6	22.4
Native white of native parentage	25.0	22.0
Native white of foreign or mixed parentage	27.3	23.9
Foreign born white	27.6	23.4
Negro	23.3	20.5

* From Fifteenth Census of the United States, 1930, Population, Vol. II, p. 838.

THE SEX RATIO. This is the number of males in a population per 100 females. The sex ratio at birth for the white population of the United States birth registration area (most of the country) in 1929 was 105.7. It had not differed materially from this since 1915. Massachusetts figures going back to 1851 show a sex ratio at birth varying, for five-year periods, between the rather narrow limits of 104.8 and 106.7. The Negro ratio has always been a little lower, standing at 103.8 in 1929. The various white nativity classes vary but little from the mean. The death rate of males is higher than that of females in infancy and at most later ages. As a result, the sex ratio becomes less with age, except that it increases temporarily in the twenties owing to male immigration. For persons of 80 and over it was 83.9 in 1930. For the population 15 years of age and over it was 105.0, and for the entire population, 102.5. [Thompson and Whelpton, 177.]

In the United States the sex ratio does not decline with higher ages as much as it normally would, because we have been recently a country of immigration, and immigrants contain a large surplus of males. The sex ratio of immigrants into the United States stood around 150 from 1840 to 1895, then it rose to about 230 during the heavy, industry-attracted immigration of the 1900's, and since then has gradually fallen. During the last few years, when immigration has consisted more largely of wives and other relatives of men already here, the sex ratio has fallen below 100. Our population still shows the effects of the large surpluses of males admitted during the past; but

it is now showing the effects of reduced immigration, having fallen from an all-time high sex ratio of 106.0 in 1910 to 101.0 in 1940. However, the sex ratio of the native whites has also declined, because of upward changes in age distribution and because female mortality has been reduced faster than male during the past fifty years.

The American sex ratio is highest in the Mountain states (108.2 in 1940) and lowest in New England (97.2 in 1940), partly because these regions have been, respectively, regions of immigration and emigration. The Western sex ratio has fallen from 278.9 where it stood in the pioneer days of 1850. The sex ratio varies with the type of community as shown in Table 24.

TABLE 24 *

SEX RATIOS IN URBAN-RURAL CLASSES, UNITED STATES

Population Class	1930 Sex Ratio
Farm	111.0
Non-farm rural	105.0
Cities 2,500– 25,000	97.2
Cities 25,000–100,000	96.3
Cities 100,000–250,000	97.1
Cities 250,000–500,000	95.6
Cities 500,000 and over	100.5

* Adapted from Thompson and Whelpton, Population Trends in the United States, McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1933, p. 187.

WOMEN ESPECIALLY SUFFER FROM EXISTING SEX RATIOS AND MARRIAGE-AGE DIFFERENCES. It would seem that women, whose marriage rate varies so much with the demographic conditions, must suffer more frustrations than men because of the difficulty of securing a mate. Or shall we say that women adapt themselves with more docility, to both the married and the single state? It is not likely that the large surpluses of single women in our suburban and some other communities represent a selective migration to these places of women who are relatively indifferent to marriage. It rather seems reasonable that the bulk of female residents of such communities must desire marriage as much as do women elsewhere.

What is a person to do when he finds himself to be on the excess side of the marriage market? If marriage alone be the goal, the thing to do is of course to migrate, geographically or socially. Many of the spinsters in their thirties in Eastern cities could easily achieve marriage were they to migrate to certain Western and industrial communities where men are in excess. Pure black Negro girls in Northern

cities might return to the South. The surplus men of mining communities might migrate to suburbs where there are great surpluses of females. The reason why these simple adjustments are not made is not ignorance, but economic difficulty. Here, as at many other points in modern society, the wish for love has been placed in opposition to the economic need, which represents almost all the other wishes of the person. In our earlier society it was not thus.

The probability of marriage for a given person who desires marriage may depend more upon the sex ratio *in the class or group to which he belongs* than upon the sex ratio in his entire community. Within each community are many social strata which do not mix socially and between which marriage is rare. It is impossible to define such a social stratum exactly and hence to determine its sex ratio. There are always marginal persons who do not quite "belong," but who nevertheless may be brought into one's circle if there is sufficient motive. The desire to marry would seem to be a sufficiently strong motive to lead a person who has it to extend his acquaintance into the border strata or into neighboring communities. One *can* marry outside his own class or community, but yet the statistics show that relatively few do so.

Whichever sex has the larger numbers in a given community generally and quite naturally has the lower percentage living in a married state. Slight variations from this rule occur because some persons have their spouses outside of the community under study. It would seem, further, that the highest percentage of *all persons* who are married would be greatest where the sex ratio is 100 (that is, no excess of either sex). This assumption, however, does not follow necessarily from the earlier one and is, moreover, shown by the facts to be false. On the contrary, the largest percentage of married persons is found where the sex ratio is about 125 men to 100 women. How can this be true?

It could not be true, of course, if all the members of the less numerous sex were to marry. But always there is a certain residue of unmarried among both sexes, no matter how much one preponderates. The facts indicate that where men are the less numerous sex, they do not take marital advantage of the situation as readily as do women where they are the less numerous. Ogburn has assembled the data regarding sex ratios and percentages of each sex married in 281 American cities of over 25,000 population in 1920. The sex ratios of these cities range from 62.5 to 167.5. If we arrange these cities in order from the most highly female (62.5) to the most highly male, and

proceed in order from one city to the next, we find, as might be expected, that the percentage of males who are unmarried (males not now in married state divided by all males over 15) becomes greater, and that the percentage of females who are unmarried becomes less, as shown in Figure 4. The two curves cross each other at a sex ratio of about 104. But the curve for the males rises only half as fast as the female curve falls. Never, in any single case, are the males less




FIGURE 4.* Relation between sex ratio of city populations and percentages unmarried of males, females, and both sexes.

than 35 per cent or more than 47 per cent unmarried. But the females range from an extreme case of 24 per cent to one of 63 per cent unmarried. Because of this differing behavior of the male and female curve, the curve representing both sexes together continues to fall after passing the point of equality and reaches its lowest level at sex ratios from 125 to 150. Only after males become so excessive as to outnumber the females three to two does the percentage of total unmarried persons begin to rise again.

* E. R. Groves and W. F. Ogburn, *American Marriage and Family Relationships*, H. Holt and Co., 1928, pp. 195, 202. Reproduced by permission of H. Holt and Company. The cases are 281 cities of over 25,000 population. The two small circles and two small crosses represent the most extreme single cases (cities) as regards unmarried men and unmarried women, respectively.

A study of 19 cities of 30,000 to 70,000 population in 1930 lends concreteness to this picture. [Downing, E., 1933.] It includes 4 northern and western industrial cities, 4 suburban cities, 7 independent cities (far from larger metropolises), and 4 southern cities. The study gives special attention to the 35–44 age group, because this group marks the end of the rapidly falling part of the curve of singleness. Most of those who have not married by this time never marry. Among these 19 small cities the percentage of men who remain bachelors near the age of 40 does not vary greatly from the countrywide figure of 14.3. The extremes are 10.3 and 20.4 for individual cities; the four types of cities vary only from 12.7 to 14.7. But in the case of the women of this same age, all cities but two show greater spinsterhood than the country as a whole, and there is a much larger variation. Individual cities vary from 7.4 to 33.0, and the suburban cities average 22.7 per cent spinsterhood as against about 13.0 for the other types of cities and 10.0 for the national figure. It is striking that Brookline, which has the highest percentage of single women and the lowest sex ratio, at the same time almost makes the high record for bachelors. A greater percentage of men remain bachelors in Brookline where they have a large surplus of women available, than in Pueblo where they are handicapped by a shortage of women in their own age class and a still greater shortage in younger age classes.

Cox [1940] has shown that this pattern is even more extremely true for Negroes than for the general population. The percentage of Negro men who are married (in 200 cities) runs close to 61 per cent regardless of whether there is an excess of men or women. On the other hand, the percentage of Negro women married increases sharply as the sex ratio rises.*

Ogburn [1935] later made similar calculations for the whole population from the census figures for 1930, and he found that the same pattern held but in less extreme degree than in 1920. In 1930 the women were 2.0 times as dependent on the sex ratio as were the men, instead of 2.8 times as in 1920.

Various interpretations of this phenomenon are possible. One is that women are economically more dependent and therefore seek marriage more than do men. But Negro women, who are much less dependent upon their husbands economically than are whites, show the same pattern. Perhaps the important factor is that in our culture women have more to lose by remaining unmarried, or feel a greater social pressure to marry. This could be very largely because a woman's chance to marry diminishes more rapidly with age than does a man's.

* From review in the *Bulletin of Family Research and Education*, I:5 and 6 (November-December, 1940), 27–28.

We need, however, a more thoroughgoing study of sex ratios according to social classes, cultural groups, and ages. Popenoe [1935; 1940, 36–37] gives some figures which suggest that effective sex ratios may be quite different from what is apparent. He tabulates the ratio of native-white single men of 25 to 34 to corresponding women of 20 to 29. Only four states, in this ratio, show an excess of men, and the lowest ratio is 52 per cent, for the Carolinas. In the Carolinas, there are apparently two marriageable women for every marriageable man.

Popenoe is probably correct in the implication that there are fewer marriageable men than the crude sex ratios seem to indicate. This is partly because of the apparently irreducible minimum of "confirmed" bachelors, which is not balanced by a corresponding group of constitutional spinsters. Perhaps physiological research enabling us to secure a higher proportion of male births may some day solve the problem. But this writer is not sure that we will not solve it rather by changed economic and educational policies which will reduce this "irreducible minimum" of bachelors. Furthermore, Popenoe's assumption in his choice of figures obscures another important truth. To match women of 20 to 29 with men of 25 to 34 overlooks the fact that these single young women are actually in demand by single, widowed, and divorced men all the way from 20 to 60, whereas older women are compensatingly less in demand. By 35, all but 3 or 4 per cent of the women who will ever marry have already done so; the same cannot be said of men till they are 45. [See Thompson and Whelpton, 1933, 204.] This *age-gradient* is a frustrating aspect of the demographic picture of marriage. It is an obstacle to a democratic marital structure. Our marriage market scraps the older woman even when there is a total shortage of women. It says to the sexes: "You have equal chances of marriage, but you women must hurry up if you don't want to be left out; you men can take your time about it while you develop yourselves in other ways also."

THE MATING GRADIENT. This refers to the fact that, on the average, men tend to marry "downward" in socio-economic status. (We have just seen that they also marry downward in age.) In one California sample, the average I.Q. of husbands was eight points higher than their wives'. [Popenoe, 1937, A] In another study it was found that two-thirds of the men were married to women of lower I.Q.'s than their own. In still another sample, 43 per cent of the men had more years of formal education than their wives, and only 24 per cent of them less than their wives. This tendency would seem to leave an unmarried residue on the upper rungs of the female social ladder and

on the lower rungs of the male ladder. In other words, bachelors of 40 and over are presumably of a lower average socio-economic-educational status than are spinsters of 40 and over.

Unfortunately there is no very accurate evidence for this generalization, though it seems to be supported by general observation. There is statistical evidence for it in the case of college graduates. It is vaguely indicated by the fact that spinsters tend to be concentrated in suburban communities with their greater wealth and prestige, whereas the bachelors of the country tend to be concentrated on farms, in mining and lumbering regions, and industrial cities. A very indirect indication (and perhaps a cause) is our greater sentimental objection to a marriage between a woman of high status and a man of low status than to a marriage in which this pattern is reversed. There is glamour in the story of a prince's choice of a milkmaid, but much less dramatic capital has been made out of the princess' interest in the common sailor or stable hand. Whenever she does give her love to such a lowly male, he must later turn out to be a nobleman in disguise. This love-rank pattern is related to the cultural patterns regulating *initiative* in social interaction. The man must take initiative in love. But the lower in rank of any two persons must not take initiative. Hence, not much can be done unless the male is also higher in rank. Related also is the cultural sentiment that values woman for her beauty but man for some kind of power. Beauty, according to popular ideology, is independent of rank, whereas the qualities most desirable in a man are related to rank.

Thomas C. Hunt [1940] measures the tendency to marry within one's own occupational class, using several years of marriage license records from the town of Norwood, Massachusetts. He finds that there is such "endogamy" of occupational classes; roughly, about one-third of people marry on their own level, about one-third above and one-third below. However, those who marry above or below their level tend to marry in the next higher or lower level much more than one extremely removed from their own. Male levels are classified as: (1) professional, (2) semi-professional and business, (3) white collar, (4) skilled, (5) semi-skilled and unskilled. Female levels are classified as: (1) professional, (3) white collar, (5) semi-skilled and unskilled. Because of the nature of women's occupations it was impossible to find sufficiently numerous representatives of females corresponding to levels 2 and 4 of the male series. If levels are defined in this way, then there is found no tendency for men to marry "down." However, if the skilled males are given the same status as the white-collar males and females, then a very real tendency for men to marry down shows itself. It should be noted that the definition of "status" in this study is entirely occupational. A complete measure-

ment of the tendency to marry upward or downward would seem to require a definition of status which would assume the same average and standard deviation for all males as for all females. Otherwise we are confronted with the kind of problem involved in the fact that in many families the typical occupational level is skilled labor, while the women, if and when they work, may be school teachers or stenographers, thus enjoying a higher status than the male members, according to definitions made in this study.

About 65 per cent of unskilled men marry women of their own level; from 31 to 52 per cent of professional men marry women of their own level.*

There are certain minor forces which oppose the general tendency of men to marry downward. Donald Young has observed that the men of minority groups in the United States wish to marry women who resemble the dominant group. Young men of immigrant stock seek Americanized companions and wives and tend to avoid those of old-country appearance or habits.

In the North, where inter-racial marriages are legally permitted, the marriage of a Negro man to a white woman is much commoner than the opposite type of union. In Boston, where the prejudice against inter-racial marriage is perhaps less than in any other large American city, the eight years from 1900 to 1907 recorded 203 marriages of colored men to white women and 19 marriages of white men to colored women. The urban Negro youth, furthermore, seeks a mulatto girl. The whiter the partner he can secure for a social event, the greater his prestige.

But we need to know more about the statistics of success of these various "seekings."

THE MARRIAGE EXPECTANCY OF HIGHLY EDUCATED WOMEN HAS INCREASED. A great deal of publicity has been given to the fact that the woman college graduate is less likely to marry than is the average woman. Even in 1932, when the condition referred to had become much modified, a popular article charged the women's colleges with being "spinster factories." † In making the simpler comparisons, the soundest method is to consider only the women of about 35 years of age and over or, in other words, those at least 15 years out of college. In 1918, Miss Van Kleeck and others found the combined marriage rate for eight Northeastern women's colleges plus Cornell women to be 51 per cent for graduates of 15 years' or more standing. In 1916,

* From review in the *Bulletin of Family Research and Education* (1941), 2:No. 1, pp. 15–16.

† W. J. Ballinger, "Spinster Factories." *Century and Forum*, 87:301–305 (1932).

the women graduates of 11 years' standing of Ohio State were 54.0 per cent married; of the University of Wisconsin, 51.8 per cent; of the University of Illinois, 54 per cent; of Oberlin, 65.2 per cent; of Kansas Agricultural College, 67.6 per cent; of Iowa State College, 72.7 per cent. Thus, although the marriage rate was apparently higher in agricultural colleges and smaller coeducational institutions, in the large state universities it was practically the same as in the Eastern women's colleges. Harper found considerably higher rates for Southern women's colleges.

There is some scant evidence to the effect that marriage rates among college women of classes before 1890 were higher than those of the 90's; in other words, that the same historic cycle which we have noted for marriage in general applied also to college women. Thus, Banker gives the following percentages of graduates of Syracuse University as married in 1917:

TABLE 25

PERCENTAGE OF SYRACUSE GRADUATES MARRIED

Classes	Women	Men
1862–1871	87	87
1872–1881	81	90
1882–1891	55	84
1892–1901	48	73

The last group of classes was from 16 to 25 years out of college and hence sufficiently aged to show almost its final marriage rate. It would seem that the low marriage tendency of the generation born about 1870–1880 affected even the college men.

The "unmarriageable girl graduate," however, has largely dropped out of the picture. It may be that in absolute numbers she exists as much as formerly, but is now lost in the much larger and more-marrying class of girls who now go to college. The smoothed-out trend of marriage for successive Vassar classes rises from 65 per cent for those graduating around 1905 to 80 per cent for those graduating about 1925. Since these data were obtained in 1938,* the classes since 1925 naturally show less marriage owing to their youth. Smith College reported 51 per cent married of the class of 1895 and 77 per cent of the class of 1927; the gap between graduation and marriage dropped from 5 years to between 1 and 2 years.† The marriage rates

* Ruth Adams, unpublished study, Vassar College, 1938; compare also Newcomer, 1931.

† *New York Times*, May 24, 1936.

of college women are now approximately the same as those of college men, although for a long time they had been much lower. Several studies of college men show eventual marriage of from 73 to 81 per cent (in classes between 1892 and 1918), which is not as high as for men in general. [Goodsell, 1928, Ch. 18; Phillips, 1927; Hart, 1941, p. 107.]

A study of 1,000 women in the 1929 *Who's Who in America* yields the figures shown in Table 26.

TABLE 26 *

MARRIAGE AND COLLEGE EDUCATION AMONG 1,000 WOMEN IN *Who's Who in America*, 1929

Profession	Per Cent Married	Per Cent who are College Graduates
Physicians	38.0	100.0
Lawyers	50.0	100.0
Librarians	22.2	85.2
Educators	35.8	76.1
Missionaries	54.5	72.7
Scientific women	48.6	70.3
Miscellaneous	60.0	70.0
Journalists	55.8	60.5
Social workers	75.0	54.7
Politicians	68.7	50.0
Authors	59.9	46.6
Artists	51.0	20.0
Musicians	67.1	19.7
Actresses	64.2	19.4

* Adapted from Bertha B. Tharp, "Relation of Education to the Success of Eminent Women," *Scientific Monthly*, August, 1933, pp. 134–138.

It is apparent that type of occupation as well as degree of education influences the marriage chances of an educated woman. Library work and teaching, for example, probably do not involve more years spent in education than do the law and social work, yet the marriage chances of the two former groups are much lower than those of the latter. The women physicians may owe their low marriage rates to the time required for training or to the type of relation to the opposite sex which is involved. It is interesting that nurses show much higher marriage rates than women physicians.

Harold H. Punke [1940] gives statistics showing a marriage rate for women teachers in their twenties as being only one-half to five-eighths as high as the rate of native young women of comparable age in the general popula-

tion. However, at 40 years of age or over, the marriage rate for teachers is higher than for the general population of women of that age.*

Popenoe [1932] had 100 educated women rank women's occupations according to their degree of marriageability. The average ranking according to these 100 opinions was: secretarial, drama, bookkeeping, stenography, journalism, selling, hostess, buyer, nurse, lawyer, teacher, dietitian, librarian, social worker, physician. In a study of Wisconsin teachers, high school teachers of home economics were found to have the highest marriage rate, general elementary school teachers the next, and general high school teachers the lowest.

Eleanor Wembridge [1932] has dramatized the situation in an article "Why Jennie Gets her Man." Why does the educated girl so often fail to get a husband while the less educated more often succeeds? Because, Mrs. Wembridge suggests, the less educated goes in her work and play to the places where there is a surplus of men, whereas the educated girl places herself in a social environment where there is a plethora of women. However, the educated girl has a greater number of desires other than marriage, and she often voluntarily chooses these other advantages in spite of their association with poor marital chances.

The educated man, however, finds that his ambitions and his marital desires can more often be satisfied in the same locality without his being forced to make a major choice.

* From review in *Bulletin of Family Research and Education* (1941), 2 No. 1, p. 16.

Chapter XV

DIVORCE

A. THE HISTORY AND DEMOGRAPHY OF DIVORCE

THE HISTORY OF DIVORCE. Among the Romans of the Empire period and among the ancient Teutons marriage and divorce were matters of civil contract. During the Middle Ages the church gradually arrogated to itself the control over marriage and divorce. These came under the canon (church) law rather than the civil law. Ecclesiastical control reached its climax in the declaration of the Council of Trent in 1563, which redeclared marriage indissoluble for any reason. This has remained the official doctrine of the Roman Catholic Church to this day. Catholics cannot be prevented, of course, from making use of the civil divorce legislation, but if they do so they risk expulsion from the church.

However, loopholes have always been necessary. The church, during the Middle Ages and later centuries, while refusing to *dissolve* a marriage, would *annul* a marriage for at least fourteen different causes. That is, it would declare that the marriage was invalid and never really existed, thus giving the parties freedom to remarry. Among these causes for annulment were impotence, disparity of worship, and consanguinity. Again, the church would grant separation from bed and board where it regarded the continued cohabitation of the parties as dangerous, but this divorce *a mensa et thoro* did not allow the remarriage of either party. During the more corrupt centuries of church history, the granting of annulments to wealthy or powerful individuals became a profitable business.

The Protestant Reformation demanded that marriage be restored to the control of the civil authorities and that it be regarded again as a private contract which could be dissolved for just cause. This demand succeeded temporarily in England in Cromwell's Civil Marriage Act of 1653. But this act soon became inoperative under the counter-revolutionary Restoration, and the Church of England came to control marriage by rules similar to the canon law of the Roman Church. Until 1857, divorce was possible only by act of Parliament,

which cost a minimum of £500. After 1857 the high court at London and after 1912 certain provincial courts were allowed to grant divorce with adultery as the only ground. In 1912 the Royal Commission on Divorce reported, after a five-year study of the problem. It recommended that five other causes for divorce be added, but until recently the cultural resistance, supported by both the Roman Catholic and Anglican churches, has prevented any change. [Hankins, 1931; Salvesen, 1931.]

Finally in 1937, after years of struggle led by A. P. Herbert, M.P., and dramatized by his novel *Holy Deadlock,* Parliament extended the grounds for divorce to include desertion, cruelty, and insanity.

In Italy, Spain, and the Irish Free State the canon law of the church has prevailed and absolute divorce has been practically nonexistent. In old Austria the Catholic law of no absolute divorce applied to persons who were Catholics at the time of marriage, but not to members of other churches. Jews could secure divorce by mutual consent after three attempts at reconciliation.

The Orthodox Church in Eastern Europe has never been so ascetic as the Roman Church in its family ideology. Orthodox priests may marry, and the retention of this privilege was specially permitted to the Uniate Church of the Ukrainian people when it joined the Roman Catholic body. Absolute divorce on several specified grounds, including physical cruelty, has long been legal in Orthodox countries, and remarriage was permitted. The Orthodox Church does not permit judicial separations, but only absolute divorces. In modern Greece a man could get a divorce on the ground of the wife's attending a theater without his consent.

In France, divorce by mutual consent was established by the Revolution but subsequently repealed. French divorce, however, is comparatively liberal in that it can be granted for *injure grave,* which covers almost any serious offense to the plaintiff; that publicity is forbidden; and that the court listens receptively to the parties' "own stories," including hearsay evidence, which would be unrecognized in an American court. But recently French courts have become less inclined to accept jurisdiction over aliens.

Norway, Sweden, and Denmark introduced divorce by joint or "mutual" consent in the period of 1918–1922. Before that their laws were more liberal than those of England, wilful desertion having been the common ground used. Now, however, 75 per cent of the divorces are by mutual consent, alleging "incompatibility." A year's waiting period is required except in divorces for adultery, criminality, venereal

disease, or incurable insanity, and, in Sweden, three years' wilful absence. The parties are regarded as having equal rights in money, property, and children; the wife has no inherent right to alimony. The parties usually make their own contract regarding the children. Damages for breach of promise are also abolished except where illegitimate children have been born. [Tillotson, 1931.] The mutual consent law, as might be expected, caused the divorce rate to rise in all three countries, but their rates are all much less than half the American rate despite greater legal freedom.

NATIONAL AND REGIONAL VARIATIONS IN DIVORCE. Table 27 presents some very loosely comparable data regarding divorce rates in

TABLE 27 *

DIVORCES PER 100,000 POPULATION

	Years	Rate	Rate in or about 1900
United States	1921–1929	153	73
England and Wales	about 1920	17	2
Scotland	1921	11	4
Canada	estimated from 1931 census of marital status	12	
Australia	1921–1922	24	10
New Zealand	about 1920	38	12
France	1921–1923	71	25
	1932	52	
Germany	1921–1922	60	15
Switzerland	1921–1922	52	32
Czechoslovakia	1923–1932 (fairly constant)	38	
Belgium	1921–1922	49	11
Netherlands	1921–1922	29	10
Denmark	1921–1922	40	17
Sweden	1921–1922	22	8
Norway	1921–1922	22	6
Uruguay	1921	17	0
Japan	1921–1923	92	143
	1931	79	
Leningrad	1923 and 1926	347	
	1927 (after new law)	983	
Moscow	1926	212	
	1927 (after new law)	959	
Irish Free State	39 divorces in a period of 65 years		

* *Sources*. E. R. Mowrer, *Family Disorganization*, University of Chicago Press, 1927, p. 33. J. P. Lichtenberger, *Divorce*, McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1931, p. 110. Paul Lublinsky, "Marriage and Divorce in Soviet Russia," *Family*, 10 (1929), pp. 28–31. Zprávy Státního Úřadu Statistického Republiky Československé, 14:171 (1933). Also Hankins, 1931; U. S. Bureau of the Census, 1909.

foreign countries. These figures are derived from many sources. Some refer to single years and others to averages of several years. Divorce has been increasing everywhere that records are available except in Japan. There the rate exceeded the American rate until 1915, and has been progressively falling while Euro-American rates have been rising. The excessive Russian figures refer to two large cities only, and do not tell us the rate for the country as a whole. These figures may appear less startling when we recall that for six years after the French Revolution there were more divorces than marriages in Paris. The rates for Catholic countries such as Ireland, Spain, Italy, and Poland are practically zero, except for the small non-Catholic groups which are sometimes allowed divorce. Many European governments have followed the practice of allowing divorce to be regulated according to the laws of the church of which the applicant was a member. Thus, in Poland from 1877 to 1886, while there was 1 divorce to 1,470 marriages among Roman Catholics, there was 1 to 405 among the Russian Orthodox, 1 to 217 among the Reformed Evangelical, 1 to 181 among the Augsburg Evangelical, and *1 to 4* among the Jews, the last rate exceeding even that of the United States in recent years.

Divorce may be graded as to liberality according to the scheme shown in Table 28. Not placeable on this scale is the pattern of Mohammedan and some other patriarchal societies which grants divorce to the husband only, frequently under certain conditions such as the return of dowry.

The variations in the American state laws in part reflect the early cultural differences of the several colonies. Certain regional uniformities of attitude are discernible. In general the civil contract concept of marriage, with its divorce for just "causes," the ideal which found expression in Milton's writings and Cromwell's legislation, prevailed. But this was most characteristically true of Puritan-settled New England. New York follows more closely the canon law and the Church of England traditions. Traces of the patriarchal double standard of aristocratic England still survive in some Southern states. Thus a North Carolina decision held that a single act of adultery by a husband was not sufficient to constitute ground for divorce, even though that single act was the cause of venereal disease which he transmitted to his wife. In Texas the husband's adultery must be accompanied by desertion; in Kentucky a single adultery of the husband is not sufficient ground unless through it he contracts venereal disease. A New York judge in 1935 ruled that a husband's discreet adultery with a

TABLE 28

GRADES OF DIVORCE LIBERALITY

1. No complete divorce, i.e., no privilege of remarriage.	South Carolina; canon law of Roman Church; Ireland; Italy.
2. Adultery only; remarriage of guilty party forbidden or subject to special conditions.	New York; several Protestant Church codes; England until 1937.
3. Other wrongs and grave personal defects: cruelty, desertion, habitual drunkenness, insanity, impotence, felony, etc.	Middle Atlantic and Southeastern states generally; Orthodox Church countries.
4. Same with more liberal interpretation, taking the sufferings of plaintiff more as criterion rather than specific immorality or defect of defendant: mental cruelty, indignities, neglect, invincible aversion, etc.	Many Western states; France; Czechoslovakia.
5. Joint consent; unnecessary to prove either party guilty of an offense or defect.	Ancient Greeks; Scandinavia (after delay); several Mexican states; Cuba; Jewish law; special procedure in Japan, Roumania, China (by recent law).
6. Upon request of either party, without grounds, regardless of will of other.	Soviet Russia until 1935; Yucatan (1923–1926).

maid, concealed from his wife and the public, does not "measure up to the test of adultery as ground for separation." *

Except in South Carolina, which grants no divorce, and New York, which permits divorce for adultery only, the American states do not greatly differ as to the grounds for divorce. Adultery, desertion, and cruelty are everywhere admissible (except as above). Other grounds, acceptable in some states but not in others, are drunkenness, impotence, conviction of felony, imprisonment for crime, insanity, concealed pregnancy, non-support, bigamy, fraud, drug addiction, indignities, crimes against nature, duress, membership in certain religious societies, venereal disease, outrageous temper, incompatibility, and *de facto* separation. A study by Barbara Thomas [1936] reveals some interesting geographic distributions which sometimes seem to be the result of diffusions. Thus the states which have drunkenness as a ground are mainly concentrated along the Atlantic seaboard from Vermont to North Carolina; a one-year desertion is almost universal west

* *Poughkeepsie Eagle-News*, July 6, 1935.

of Lake Michigan, whereas most of the more easterly states require two or three years.

Divorce rates vary enormously among the several regions. The refined divorce rate for 1929 is shown in Table 29. These rates fall into




FIGURE 5. Divorces per 1,000 married population, 1929. (Source: United States Bureau of the Census, Marriage and Divorce, 1929.)

three well-defined orders of magnitude as shown. Figure 5 shows the variations of rate among the several states.

TABLE 29 *

DIVORCE RATES IN GEOGRAPHIC DIVISIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1929

Geographic Divisions	Divorces per 1,000 Married Population
Middle Atlantic	1.49
New England	2.39
South Atlantic	2.57
East South Central	4.32
West North Central	4.46
East North Central	5.00
Pacific	6.51
West South Central	7.15
Mountain	7.50
United States	4.05

* Adapted from U. S. Census, Marriage and Divorce, 1929.

If we exclude those few states whose laws are extremely liberal or extremely illiberal, we find that there is little relation between the strictness of the letter of the law and the actual amount of divorce which takes place. Nevada, Idaho, and Arkansas are the outstanding liberal states, because of their low residence requirements rather than of other liberal characteristics of their laws. Nevada is also the leader in divorce rate. Idaho and Arkansas have not yet had time to show the effects of their recent liberalization of law. New York, the District of Columbia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Louisiana are the unusually stringent states, and they show low rates, at least in comparison with the rates in their respective regions. Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, and New Mexico consist of populations more than one-third Roman Catholic, and therefore show lower rates than would be expected from their laws and the general tendencies in their respective regions. The remaining 39 states may be considered as a standard divorce area where law is fairly uniform and religion predominantly Protestant. But within this legally standard area tremendous variations of rate occur. [Cahen, 1932, 52.]

It is interesting that New York and the District of Columbia, with stringent divorce laws and low divorce rates, have unusually high annulment rates. In New York, annulments are about one-fifth of divorces. But certain Western states with high divorce have still higher annulment rates than New York or the District of Columbia.

Up to 1930 these regional differences were not lessening but growing more extreme. [Ogburn, 1933, 693; Cahen, 1932, 25.] The rates were increasing faster in the states which already had the higher rates. But the 1937 figures, as far as they go, give doubt as to the further continuation of this differential trend.

National and regional differences in divorce are not adequately explained by differences in industrialization or other economic conditions. Japan's divorce rate fell under the same influences (urbanization, industrialization, and some degree of emancipation of women) which brought a rise in American and European rates. The differences are partly explained by religion, but any formal classification of religions fails to get at the real difference. The Protestants of the South Atlantic region behave in respect to divorce much as do the Catholics of New England, whereas the Western Protestant areas are given to high divorce. Evidently the amount of divorce depends very much upon cultural values which cut across economic, class and religious lines.

Lichtenberger [1931] shows that there is little relation between the number of grounds for divorce in the several states and their respective divorce rates. He also tabulates the new grounds for divorce legislated in twelve of the eighteen states in which significant changes were made. He then shows the divorce rates in the five years following each of these twelve new pieces of legislation. "In not a single instance is there the slightest suggestion that the divorce rate in any state has been influenced materially by the introduction of new causes." (P. 185.) Furthermore, the new cause of divorce was itself made use of in such a small percentage of all divorce cases that its influence was obviously negligible. Both the relaxations and changes toward stringency have served mainly to register changes of public attitude without affecting materially the conditions they were supposed to control.

Migration to Lenient States a Mere Trifle. It has been alleged that a large part of modern divorce is due to the leniency of states like Nevada. In 1889, Dr. Dike, Executive Secretary of the National Divorce League, came to the conclusion that migration to more lenient states accounted for only 3 per cent of the divorces in the United States. Cahen, analyzing the statistics up to 1929, comes to the same conclusion for the present time. According to the United States Marriage and Divorce Report for 1922, 26 per cent of all divorces of persons known to be married in the United States were obtained in a state other than the state where they were married. But (in 1920) 22 per cent *of all* the native-born persons in the United States, those who did not get divorces as well as those who did, were living outside the state of their birth.

To get a more accurate estimate, Cahen analyzed the figures relating to New York, known for its stringency of divorce laws. Almost half of all the American divorces granted to people married in New York in 1922 were granted in other states (3,100 out of 6,400). Of these 3,100, 200 were granted in Nevada, and 900 in the states contiguous to New York. A few hundred additional, non-American divorces were granted in Paris, Mexico, etc., to New Yorkers. But after allowing for the normal migration, Cahen concluded that only 20 per cent of the divorces of New Yorkers were obtained by migration for the purpose of divorce. [1932, 70.]

New York's cosmopolitan population, with attitudes quite different from those which inspired her strict divorce laws, was second only to the people of Washington, D. C., in this tendency toward migratory

divorce. The District of Columbia has recently eased the situation by permitting divorce for desertion as well as adultery.

South Carolina, which allows no divorce at all, would be expected above all other states to resort to migratory divorce. During 1922, only 221 South Carolinian couples were divorced in the United States, and, of course, all of these outside the state. This amounts to a total divorce rate of 0.30 per 1,000 married population, a rate one-twelfth of the average American divorce rate. Only one of these divorces took place in Nevada. It is hardly reasonable, therefore, to expect that any considerable number happened abroad. More of them took place in the strict state of North Carolina than in the liberal state of Georgia. That was because the ordinary flow of migration was northward rather than southward. The conclusion is simply that South Carolinians are not given to divorce, wherever they may be. If there were any great demand for divorce in South Carolina, as Cahen points out, the legislature would probably be forced to enact a divorce law in order to get the business which would go to lawyers and associated agencies in neighbor states. [Cahen, 1932, 72.]

The one obvious divorce market, Nevada, granted in 1929 only 2,553 out of the 201,468 divorces in the United States, or 1.3 per cent. It granted 3,629 in 1936. The number granted abroad is estimated as a few hundred.

Weighing all these figures, Cahen finds that 3 per cent is still a liberal estimate of all migratory divorces.

Yet by now five states, Nevada, Wyoming, Idaho, Arkansas, and Florida, have established very short periods of residence (the first three, six weeks, the latter two, about three months) with apparently deliberate intent to serve the needs of outsiders. In view of these moves, and the stubborn resistance of our largest state to divorce reform, it will not be surprising if there is an increase in migratory divorce. Mexico and Cuba have also provided easy divorce opportunities, which have been advertised in New York, and divorces have even been secured by mail. Their legality is much in question. [See Baber, 1934, 461–465.]

Divorces obtained by migrating to other states, and especially to foreign countries, are subject to legal attack on the ground that the plaintiff did not have a *bona fide* residence in the state or country which granted his divorce, but went there in order to evade the laws of his domicile. But whether this view will be supported by the court to which the protest is made depends upon a host of legal technicalities and judicial opinions which we cannot examine here. One promi-

nent lawyer has declared that not one in ten Nevada divorces would stand up if tested in a court elsewhere. Yet New York courts have been somewhat favorable to recognizing Mexican divorces. An out-of-state divorce may satisfy social requirements and conventions and permit remarriage in practice, even though it is legally questionable. Though questionable, it will not actually be questioned in court except on the initiative of the one of the parties who has something, usually financial, to gain, or at the initiative of a state officer prosecuting for bigamy. Where the divorce is by mutual desire and neither party is greedy or vindictive, final and mutually satisfactory property arrangements are likely to be made at the time of the divorce. A state does not go out of its way to prosecute for bigamy. It does so only in flagrant cases. Again, only the state in which the alleged bigamous marriage took place can prosecute. So in practice this risk is small.

EXTENT AND INCREASE OF FAMILY DISORGANIZATION. The all-time record for divorces in the United States was in 1937, when 250,000 were granted. This makes a rate of 1.93 per 1,000 of total population [Stouffer and Spencer, 1939], or of 1 divorce to every 5.7 marriages performed. A previous high-water mark for divorce was reached in 1929, about 200,000 divorces, and after that there was a depression decline, along with the decline of marriages, until 1934 when a sharp upturn began in both figures. Annulments of marriage in 1929 were 4,408, making a rate of 1 to 280 marriages. Yet probably greater than all divorce and annulment together is the volume of other family separations, some of which are by mutual consent and some by desertion.

From a large sample of families in the Midwest in 1930, including both rural and urban population, 14.6 per cent of the families were found to be broken by death, divorce, annulment, or separation. In 1900 a corresponding sample of population showed 14.3 per cent of broken homes. While the total figure remained about the same, the homes broken by divorce, annulment, or separation increased from 6.7 to 9.8 per cent, and those broken by death, because of the falling death rate, fell from 7.6 to 4.9 per cent. The percentage of broken homes varies with the size of the community: in 1930 it was 19.0 for the metropolitan area of Chicago, 16.7 for cities of 100,000 population, 14.7 for villages, and 8.1 for the rural area. [Ogburn, 1923, 688–696.] In interpreting these figures, we should note that one family, breaking up by separation, yields two broken families, but that some of those broken by divorce lead to remarriage and when so doing do

not permanently increase the number of families. This sample omitted all families in which the wife was over 45 years of age, and thus eliminated many older families broken by death.

Can we tell from these figures how frequent separation is as compared with divorce? In 1920 the ratio of the widowed to the divorced and separated in the Chicago part of this sample was 135 to 100. [Ogburn, 1923, 696.] If the same ratio held for the whole city, the total number of divorced and separated in the city would have been 48,000. But the census reported 10,567 divorced for Chicago. As we have noted before, the decennial census probably under-reports the divorced, possibly to the extent of half their true number. The actual number of divorced was probably 15,000 to 20,000. Thus, separated, non-divorced persons are at least as numerous as divorced persons at any given time in the city, and may be twice as numerous. Legal "separation," or divorce *a mensa et thoro,* is counted in the annual census figures as divorce, no distinction being made. This limited divorce does not give the right to remarry. According to Maryland 1929 figures, only 5 per cent of all the divorces were of this type. [Marshall and May, 1932.]

Separation is an ambiguous term. The census enumerators were instructed to report temporary absentees as living at their normal place of abode and not as separated. The enumerators who talked to Professor Ogburn seemed to think that wherever one married person was found living without a spouse, and his or her mate was not reported as divorced or dead, a genuine separation existed. Separation may not originate in marital discord, but sometimes in occupational necessities, and these may later lead to desertion or to a permanent separation based on discord.

The crude divorce rate in the United States has increased from 0.29 per 1,000 population in the period 1868–1872 to 1.93 per 1,000 population in 1937. Each year showed a higher rate than the previous year, with a few exceptions which were all years following business depressions. As Cahen [1932, 19] points out, the most ideal statistical unit for comparing divorce rates is divorces per 1,000 *married* population, which refined rate in 1929 was 4.05. The crude rate per total population neglects changes in the number of marriages and in the age distribution. Again, the familiar unit of one divorce to x marriages gives a ratio between the divorces of any one year and the marriages of that same year, between which there is no logical connection. Nevertheless, we are frequently compelled to use these cruder rates in order to make comparisons with data from other countries. From 1867 to

1929, Cahen's rate advanced about fivefold, not seriously different from the crude rate in the long run. Its advance was about equivalent to that of a sum of money compounded annually at 3 per cent interest. It is remarkable that Dr. Walter F. Willcox in 1891, working with the limited figures then available, predicted almost exactly the divorce rate as it actually was for 1930. If the present rate of increase continues, one-half of all marriages will end in divorce by about 1963.

THE PROBABILITY OF DIVORCE FOR THE INDIVIDUAL. Cahen has shown that the probability that the average marriage will result in divorce is a little greater than is indicated by the familiar ratio of 1 divorce to 6 marriages, or 16.7 per cent. He calculates the probability by more refined processes, following the course of marriages contracted and ascertaining what proportion of the total ends in divorce for each year of married life. He finally arrives at 17.92 per cent as the probability of an American marriage ending in divorce according to the divorce rate of 1928. If the rate goes higher the probability will correspondingly increase. [Cahen, 1932, 118. See also Rubinow, 1930; and Sorokin, Zimmerman, and Galpin, 1931, Vol. II, 5 *ff.*] Monahan [1940] calculates the probability of divorce as reaching a high-water mark of 18.4 per cent of marriages contracted in 1929 and falling off slightly thereafter.

An American marriage at the time it is contracted has an average expectation of continuing 20 4 years before either death or divorce breaks it. If it could be predicted at the outset whether it was to be broken by death or divorce, the average duration to be expected by the marriage destined to divorce would be 7 years; by the marriage destined to death of one partner, 23 years. [Cahen 1932, 125.] Of course, these are only averages. The probabilities for any given marriage could be more specifically stated if we knew the ages of the partners.

All the above calculations are based upon the assumption that the annual census reports on divorces granted are substantially correct. Their correctness has been called into question by some investigators. Thus, Sanderson [1930] compared actual court records in four counties in central New York with the census reports for those counties for 10 years, and found that one-third of the actual divorces had not been reported to the Federal Census Bureau. On the other hand, some careful students of the problem think that under-reporting is not a general phenomenon and that the error in some areas may be in the opposite direction. Marshall and May's exhaustive study of Mary-

land court records for 1929 ascertained the total number of divorces to be in substantial agreement with the census figures.

Chaddock [1937] has presented another refined technique for measuring divorce by comparing the divorces of a given year with the average annual number of marriages for the preceding 10 years, including the year for which the divorce figures are taken. The point of greatest frequency of divorce is now in the fourth year of marriage, whereas in 1867–1886 it was in the seventh year. If you are still alive at your silver wedding, your chances of being divorced in any one year then will be about one-fourth what they were during the dangerous third, fourth, and fifth years. But, still, during a four-year period at that older age you will be exposed to the same total amount of danger as during one year in the early period. There is no deadline; divorces occur in substantial numbers into old age. [Cahen, 1932, 120.]

Seventeen families in a sample of 101 domestic relations court cases studied by Hixenbaugh [1932] had been through the divorce court, and a total of 27 divorces were found in the history of these 17 cases, indicating that divorce is to *some extent* a repetitive phenomenon. In a Cincinnati study of 100 applications for divorce, it was found that remarried divorcees furnish a quota which is proportionately two or three times as large as that of the remarried widows and widowers. [Hart, 1941, 151.] The repeated divorces of several motion picture actors and actresses are well known. These may be due to the narcissistic personality type which presumably is attracted by the stage, or to the intense sexual stimulation and competition which would seem to be natural in dramatic work, or simply to Hollywood *mores* which make divorce relatively less disgraceful and more glamorous than anywhere else. Probably all three factors play a part. Since divorce is to some extent a habit of certain persons, the risk of divorce for the *average couple* may be somewhat less than the 18 per cent calculated for the *average marriage.*

Hall [1934] found that American marriages contracted in 1919 and 1920 have resulted in a disproportionately high number of divorces. This result was obtained by following that particular group of marriages down through the years. These marriages involved an unusual number of couples who had waited until the war was over to get married. This does not imply that waiting was bad. Presumably there were many men who were changed physically or mentally by the war experience, and many marriages were based upon past promises more than on current judgment of fitness.

DESERTION. Desertion has been called the poor man's divorce. As we have seen, much of it leads neither to divorce nor to permanent cure, but becomes a chronic and indefinitely repeated phenomenon. Real desertion, as distinguished from the often framed-up type of desertion which is used as a convenient ground for divorce, is a phenomenon coming primarily under the purview of family welfare societies and similar social agencies. Through their case investigations many facts are known about deserted families which are not known about families which go merely to the divorce courts.

Most desertions are by men. Only 14 per cent of the cases studied by O'Neill and Glover in 1929 involved deserting women. About half the deserters had had previous court or penal records. Also about half had deserted previously. Seasonal occupations and occupations involving mobility seem to provide the greatest proportional quotas of deserters. The very poor seem not so much addicted as those with some degree of skill. The results of the various studies differ greatly in the importance they attach to size of income, nationality, health, interference of relatives, defective intelligence, hasty marriage, size of family, and broken parental homes. The general tendency of the evidence is to show desertion as a psychological phenomenon, related to certain types of personality in the deserter and the deserted mate, and to cultural background.

In 1928 social agencies in 93 cities estimated desertion rates from 28 to 203 per 100,000 population. Assuming an average rate of 100 for the urban population of the United States (50,000,000), the National Desertion Bureau made an estimate of 50,000 total annual desertions, or about one-fourth the number of divorces. A small proportion of these overlap the divorce cases. Yet Patterson * found that the number of new cases of desertion and non-support in Philadelphia during the period studied were almost three times as great as the number of divorces granted. Since the divorce data are nearly complete, although many desertions never lead to court action, the actual rate of desertion may be much greater than the estimate given above. Because of the highly repetitive character of desertion, the number of families affected by it in the long run may be only about half as large as the number of families affected by an equal number of divorces. Yet since desertion involves children in over two-thirds of the cases [Mowrer, E. R., 1927] as compared with one-third for divorce, and since this usually means destitute children and mothers,

* S. H. Patterson, "Family Desertion and Non-Support," University of Pennsylvania thesis (unpublished), 1922, p. 328.

desertion *in toto* may well be a greater cause of human suffering than is divorce. It has been estimated as causing about 20 per cent of dependency in normal times. It was, according to most studies, an increasing phenomenon up to 1930; during the depression it decreased. Both employment opportunities and relief policies favored the family man during the depression years. [Phelps, 1932, Ch. 14; Bossard, 1938 B, pp. 628–632; Merrill and Elliott, 1941, pp. 703–713; Gillin, 1939, pp. 250–257.]

The National Desertion Bureau finds that desertion, like divorce, is greater in times of prosperity than in depression.*

VARIATIONS AMONG SOCIAL CLASSES IN DIVORCE RATE. Let us now examine some differences between social classes in divorce. These are not furnished by annual or decennial census data and are fragmentary. But they may prove more important than the regional and nativity data given by the census.

E. R. Mowrer [1927], in his studies of the ecology of family disorganization in Chicago, found a crude divorce rate for the whole city in 1919 of 1.6 per 1,000 population, about the same as the United States divorce rate in the late 1920's. The 70 local areas into which he divided the city varied, however, from 0 to 6.4, with very low rates in the suburban commuters' neighborhoods and also the immigrant communities, and high rates in the areas characterized by rooming houses, kitchenette apartments, childless couples, and also in the "equalitarian" family areas of the "middle" classes.

The U. S. Bureau of the Census [1909] studied divorce in relation to occupation of husband for the period of 1887 to 1906. Farmers supplied much less than their proportionate quota of the divorces; males in manufacturing, trade, and transportation, about their quota; professional workers, more than their quota; workers in domestic and personal service, about twice their quota. The divorce rate as shown by these data appears to have no correlation with socio-economic status. Commercial travelers, bartenders, and barbers have high rates, but so do actors, musicians, and physicians. Clergymen have low rates, but so do carpenters and blacksmiths. It would appear that occupations favoring unrestrained contacts with the opposite sex tend to have higher divorce rates.

European divorce statistics collected by Sorokin, Zimmerman, and Galpin [*op. cit.*, 6–91] show strikingly low rates in every country for agricultural pursuits. The highest rates were among the official class

* *New York Times*, September 15, 1933.

in Italy, England, and Norway; among various commercial and industrial classes in France, Switzerland, Sweden, Bavaria, and Prussia.

A comparison of nativity groups by Ogburn [Groves and Ogburn, 1928, 372] showed the ratio of divorced to single or widowed persons of 25 years of age or over to be 7.02 for Negroes, 4.49 for native whites of native parentage, 3.23 for native whites of foreign or mixed parentage, and 2.09 for foreign-born whites.

The American Youth Commission's study of 13,000 youth in Maryland showed these percentages of homes broken by "divorce, desertion, or separation": Jewish homes, 4.6; Catholic, 6.4; Protestant, including mixed, 6.8; mixed, 15.2; no religion, 16.7. [Bell, 1938, 21.]

There is no adequate study of divorce rates among college graduates from all parts of the country, but the available evidence indicates that they stand much lower than average. In 1929 Mabel Newcomer [1931] found that all the recorded divorces of Vassar alumnae of the classes of 1902–1916 amounted to 54, bearing a ratio to all their marriages of 1 to 31. In the general population about 1923, which would have been approximately the average date of divorce for members of these Vassar classes who did divorce, the divorce-marriage ratio was about 1 to 8; in the Eastern states from which most Vassar women come about 1 to 15. In addition to those reported as divorced, 30 of the women of this Vassar sample had married "more than once," and if we gratuitously assume that half of these cases involved an unreported divorce (rather than a death), we get a divorce-marriage of 1 to 25. Thus at the most liberal estimate the Vassar graduates are much less given to divorce than the average population of their geographic region. At Wellesley, a crude ratio of 1 divorce to every 49 marriages is cited. [Lee, M., 1931.]

E. R. Mowrer [1927, 118-119] has shown that divorce in Chicago is correlated with high mobility of population. By tracing the past addresses of the persons in 1,000 Chicago divorces by means of telephone directories, he found that these persons showed an average residence of 1.81 years at each address. For a control group he used names immediately following these names in the directory (an alphabetical and hence purely random selection). The members of the control group showed an average residence of 2.83 years per address. The difference between the groups was 1.02 years, with a probable error of only 0.07 year. The divorced group also showed a shorter period of residence per community in which they had resided, the difference being 1.49 years. The divorced group showed a tendency to move toward areas of higher family disorganization, whereas the

control group tended to move toward areas of lower disorganization. The disorganization of an area was measured by its combined rate of desertion and divorce.

A study of divorce in Spokane showed the rate to be correlated by districts positively with percentage of rented homes and inversely with percentage of Catholics. [Weeks, 1940.] Weeks also found lower divorce rates in the white-collar than in the laboring classes regardless of religious affiliation. In a study of divorce in a Midwestern industrial city [Leevy, 1940, A], 738 out of 784 were known to be employed as factory labor, and only 10 belonged to the business-professional class. It is apparent that the social-class distribution of divorce varies greatly from region to region. It would make a good research project to test out the "hunch" that the lower and lower middle classes vary greatly from region to region whereas the higher classes may be more uniform.

In any event, it seems that divorce, like crime, is merely a legal judgment which represents several different types of social situations. There are not merely different "causes" of divorce; there are different "social types" of divorce which should be delineated. This would be more valuable than merely studying the frequencies of various simplified "causes."

B. DIVORCE TRENDS AND THEIR EVALUATION

CHANGES IN ALLEGED "CAUSES" REFLECT INCREASING JOINT CONSENT. One sidelight comes through a study of the changing frequencies of the various grounds for divorce. Three legal grounds account for the great bulk of divorces, and have always done so since the beginning of the statistical record. They were, in 1929: cruelty, 40.8 per cent; desertion, 29.6 per cent; and adultery, 8.3 per cent. In the period 1887–1906, these percentages were: cruelty 21.8, desertion 38.9, adultery 16.3. Adultery and desertion have proportionately decreased, cruelty increased. This change does not mean that people were more cruel and less adulterous in 1929 than they were 35 years earlier. It is not at all explained by the addition of the cause of cruelty to state laws which formerly did not include it. It means that the mores and the interpretation of law have changed. In the District of Columbia and the states of New York, North Carolina, and Louisiana, the large majority of divorces, up to 1930 at least, were granted for adultery, other causes being lacking or difficult. The adultery divorces of these

states, divided by their combined population, give an adultery divorce rate of about one-fifth the national divorce rate for all causes. From this Cahen argues that it is fair to assume that adultery is a real cause in 20 per cent of all divorces, but is disguised under the charge of cruelty in the more liberal states, thus reducing the recorded adultery percentage to 8. While the present national figures underestimate adultery, they overestimate cruelty. They also overestimate desertion. In Louisiana, where 7 years' desertion is necessary, 16 per cent of all divorces are granted for desertion. Since her total divorce rate is about half that of the country at large, Cahen estimates that about 8 per cent of all divorces involve bona fide, long-time desertion. Allowing 20 per cent of all divorces for adultery, 8 per cent for long-time desertion, 2 per cent for drunkenness, and 3 per cent for minor grounds, he concludes that 33 per cent of all divorces are on grounds which would be valid in the stricter states. The remaining two-thirds, listed under cruelty, desertion, and neglect to provide, are really divorces for incompatability by mutual consent, in which the alleged "cause" is chosen according to convenience rather than according to facts. It is these divorces which account for the great increase in rate. Attitudes have changed so as to render divorce for mere incompatability justifiable where before it was regarded as unethical; and the interpretation of courts has changed so as to allow this incompatability to fit itself into the broad formulas of cruelty and desertion [Cahen, 1932, 32–44.]

In Ohio in 1868 only 8 per cent of divorces were granted for "gross neglect of duty" although it was then, as now, a valid ground. In 1929, 60 per cent or more were secured on this ground. [Marshall and May, 1933.]

In the period 1867–1886 about 65 per cent of divorces were granted at request of the wife; in 1929 the figure was 71.3 per cent. Does this mean that husbands have become worse and wives better? It may mean that wives are more dissatisfied with marriage in general, as they probably have reason to be, and the recent liberalization has given them a better chance to show it. It may mean merely that, in these modern, framed-up divorces based upon general dissatisfaction or incompatability, man is able to take the blame with less emotional cost. We still have several kinds of "double standard" morality. It is less disgraceful for the husband than the wife to admit adultery, and most men, perhaps, would rather have a divorce court record of "cruelty" against them than to be suspected of such "softness" that they could not stand up against the "cruelty" of their wives. Cruelty

is the ground in 44 per cent of divorces granted to wives and in only 32 per cent of those granted to husbands. Perhaps the mere judgment of a court on such an issue does not weigh too heavily upon the masculine sense of moral guilt.

TRENDS AND FUTURE OF DIVORCE. What is the probable future of divorce? Ogburn expressed the view that there is no limit yet in sight. [Groves and Ogburn, 1928, 346.] Cahen points out that divorce tends to increase by a momentum of its own: the more divorces there are, the less a disgrace it is, hence the easier a further increase becomes. [P. 141.] We may have reached a point where the *liberalizing attitude* toward divorce, rather than economic and other conditions, has become the most dynamic factor. The rising divorce rate in each area would seem to be more a process of internal cultural change than of diffusion from other areas. It is significant that, although in any given region city leads country (except in New England and a few other states), the leading region is the West with its relatively low industrialization.

Despite Professor Willcox's accurate estimation in 1891 of the 1930 divorce rate, it is questionable that the further projection of the statistical curve into the future will give us a reliable prediction for 1971. Any secular trend has its limits, and it might seem that the divorce rate would reach its limit whenever it became high enough to relieve all serious marital dissatisfaction. It is unlikely that the majority of persons are sufficiently dissatisfied with marriage to request divorce even if it could be had for the asking. If in the future it became the custom for *everyone* to marry, divorce, and then remarry, there would then be about one divorce to every two marriages. The state of Oregon from 1925 to 1929 had 1 divorce to 2½ marriages (we ignore Nevada because of its catering to non-residents).

In Moscow the divorce rate quadrupled in one year (1926–1927) under the influence of a new law, and in 1935 it reached the high peak of 1 divorce to about 2¼ marriages.* Then under a restrictive law in 1936 it dropped to one-tenth its former figure. But these phenomena may represent merely the changeability of behavior and the readiness to legislate in a new revolutionary society.

According to Lichtenberger [1931] who carefully tabulated changes in divorce laws over 50 years, divorce is now granted upon more grounds, but the process of getting it is attended by more legal regulations. In particular those regulations have increased which would

* *New York Times*, September 29, 1935.

discourage the getting of divorce for the purpose of remarriage. States have tended to prolong the time of waiting between divorce and remarriage; to forbid remarriage to the guilty person for a longer period than the innocent; to require longer residence periods before beginning divorce action; to require more adequate notice to the defendant or more adequate defense of the suit. The relaxations in these matters have been much less numerous than the changes toward greater stringency. In the matter of grounds, however, Lichtenberger says: "On the whole there seems to be, as a total result, a wider possibility for the selection of grounds upon which divorces may be secured although, it should be observed, many of the revisions in the direction of leniency are of minor importance." *

A review of the last decade, however, gives reason to modify Lichtenberger's generalization to the extent of saying that the beginnings of a real liberalization are now in sight. Nowhere yet in the United States is there direct, immediate divorce by joint consent; such frank consent is apt to be regarded as evidence of collusion, and this prevents either party from getting the decree. Nowhere in this country until 1933 was there divorce for "incompatability," despite the common use of that phrase by persons in explaining their divorces. Always the case as brought to court had to represent the plaintiff as innocent and the defendant as guilty or defective. To represent the case as one of quarrelsome social interaction without allocating blame or fault was to have it thrown out of court.

Yet since 1933 in New Mexico and 1935 in Alaska, the concept of divorce for incompatability has entered our legal system. Still more significant is the almost unnoticed acceptance, as ground for divorce, of voluntary separation for a certain period, usually 3 to 5 years. By 1937, 12 states had such provisions. No charge of desertion nor assumption of guilt is necessary; if the parties voluntarily live apart for the given period, either may get the divorce on this ground alone. In 1933, North Carolina reduced the period of such separation from 5 years to 2. Baber [1939, 502] points out that this trend "may conceivably reduce all other grounds for divorce to the ranks of relics."

In 1935, the District of Columbia, which since 1899, like New York, had had an adultery-only law, widened its grounds to include 2 years' desertion, 5 years' voluntary separation, 2-year felony sentence, and cruelty. A similar move to reform the New York law has several times been defeated, through the powerful influence of the Catholics upon the legislature.

* J. P. Lichtenberger, *Divorce*, Whittlesey House, 1931, pp. 167–168.

DIVORCE IS CRUEL—ESPECIALLY TO MOTHERS. Children were involved in only 37.2 per cent of all divorces in the United States in 1929. Thus the majority of divorces are really broken "companionates" rather than broken "families." Cahen estimates that the probability of eventual divorce is only 8 out of 100 for marriages with children and 71 out of 100 for childless marriages (which are only about one-fifth as numerous). Yet the seriousness of the problem of broken *families* is not mitigated by the fact that there are also many other divorces that are not so damaging.

Alimony has been abused. There are a few "gold diggers" and there are a few vindictive and perhaps paranoid ex-wives, who in the quoted words of one of them, would like the non-paying ex-husband to remain in jail "until he rots to death." * Some ex-husbands who are sent to jail for contempt of court in failing to pay alimony are really unable to pay in any realistic sense. But the emphasis upon these facts has somewhat misled the public, since they represent only a small segment of the divorce problem.

Several states have recently passed laws that alimony must cease upon the remarriage of the wife, or that it shall not be granted unless the wife's income is insufficient to care for her needs. In 16 states, it is now possible for a husband to obtain alimony, in case of need, from a wife, although this power is seldom used. Marshall and May [1932] find that in Ohio alimony or property is granted to the woman in 75 per cent of the cases where there are minor children, but in only 19 per cent of the cases where there are no children. In only 2 per cent of the childless cases does this award involve periodic payments over a long period of time; in 9 per cent there is a lump sum. When a wife is defendant she gets custody of the children in about half the cases; when plaintiff, she gets them nearly always.

The large injustice which is apt to be obscured by minor difficulties is that represented by the wife with children, who is left with a meager and often defaulted alimony after she has given up her opportunity for an independent, well-paid career in order to raise children. This is a part of a much larger injustice which we shall discuss more fully in Chapter XVIII. The divorce problem merely helps to reveal it.

By tabulating and mapping the addresses of divorced women in Philadelphia, it was found that they were concentrated in narrow linear areas parallel and close to North Broad Street and West Market Street. [Bossard and Dillon, 1935.] The lot of the divorced

* *Time*, July 22, 1935.

woman is not a happy one, and she tends to drift to those areas of anonymity and loneliness which adjoin the business areas of the city.

Many persons who oppose easier divorce on the ground that it would encourage divorce seem to overlook the fact that the separation of two former lovers is painful and tragic in itself regardless of how the law treats it. It is only after prolonged conflict and suffering that a sensitive man and woman break such a bond as marriage. Frequently the legal difficulties merely divert the mind from the essential problem of whether the divorce is desirable to the extraneous technical problem of how it can be obtained. Partners who might become reconciled or amicably separated if nothing more than the common wish were necessary for divorce, instead become absorbed in "getting something on" each other, and in so doing develop additional and needless hatreds which bar any reconciliation. From many cases one gets the impression that the legal obstacles are not so much deterrents as they are annoyances which merely make people hate each other all the more.

Whether or not we regard increased divorce as a desirable solution of the marriage problem, it is certain that it is a very incomplete solution. Waller, in *The Old Love and the New,* and Groves, in *Marriage,* have given us several pathetic case studies of what happens after divorce. It is clear that divorce does not "end it all." The difficulties of readjusting to life afterward may be as great as those which were encountered in marriage. The emotional conflict over breaking a relationship in which so much love was invested involves suffering comparable only with that produced by the death of a beloved person. Indeed, that suffering is apt to be more prolonged in divorce than in death. To say that one is seeking divorce because "love is dead" is often a false and pitiful rationalization.

THE PRESENT OBSTACLES TO DIVORCE ARE ALSO CRUEL—AND DISHONEST. The New York divorce law has been vigorously and widely attacked. A questionnaire study of 500 persons by the National Divorce Reform League in 1938 found that infidelity *per se* accounts for less tnan 2 per cent of divorces of New York State couples, 70 per cent being due to incompatability.* Ninety-eight per cent of New York State divorcing couples must thus use adultery as a subterfuge. The common method is to "frame up" a case, often using a professional corespondent. Some judges claim they know the stereotyped story so well that they can take it up at any point and complete it, knowing just where the "blonde in the pink nightgown" will appear. [Baber,

* *New York Times,* October 29, 1938.

1939, 465.] Despite these well-known facts, and strong newspaper support, Assemblywoman Jane Todd's bill to permit desertion as a ground was defeated 93 to 35 in the Assembly in 1936. During the same year a bill was passed to lengthen the period of residence necessary for annulment. This "Enoch Arden" law is a loophole commonly used by New Yorkers desiring to dissolve their marriages. The attempt (Quinn bill) to make even this more difficult was vetoed by Governor Lehman.*

After reviewing a controversy between Cahen [1932] and Rubinow [1930, 1936] over the extent of remarriage of divorcés, with Baber's [1939, 477] comments and Ogburn's limited study [Groves and Ogburn, 1928, 363], we may say that probably a half of divorced persons remarry. Popenoe [1933] finds that the remarrying divorced person has a 62 per cent chance of happiness as compared with about 70 per cent for first marriages.

Many states require an interval of time between the final divorce decree and remarriage. The idea back of this is that such a compulsory delay places an additional check upon persons who seek divorce for the purpose of remarriage. But an opposite idea is coming forward, i.e., that such a delay may simply encourage cohabitation without marriage. Moreover, the delay often encourages premature divorce and prevents many possible reconciliations; that is, couples who have not fully made up their minds to divorce, nevertheless rush the procedure in order to shorten the waiting period between the decree and the right to remarry. [Lichtenberger, 1931, 176.]

Several state laws provide that the guilty party in a divorce for adultery may not remarry, except after a period of years or at the permission of the court. Thus in New York the defendant may not remarry at all, unless, after 3 years have elapsed, he can prove to a court that his conduct has been uniformly "good." An effort in 1936 to reduce this to 1 year failed. Some states compel the defendant on any charge to wait longer than the plaintiff for remarriage.

These laws reflect the traditional cultural attitude toward extramarital love, singling it out for special punishment over all the other behavior which may have led to a broken marriage. Such an attitude is, of course, a natural corollary of the attitude which produces a law singling out adultery as the only valid cause for divorce. On the other hand is the conservative but more realistic attitude that obstacles to desired marriage simply encourage illicit sex relations. There is also

* *New York Times*, April 11, 1936.

a more liberal attitude that, if it is justifiable to break a marriage at all, it is humane and emotionally healthful to facilitate the earliest possible remarriage of both parties. If they are unfit for remarriage that will have to be learned through evidence other than that submitted in divorce procedure.

Because it does not meet human needs, our whole divorce procedure is permeated with dishonesty. The widespread use of secret collusion is made possible by the Anglo-Saxon principle that the court takes no initiative to ascertain the facts independently for itself. It assumes that the plaintiff will bring in all facts that support his claim, and the defendant all facts in opposition.

Judge Harry A. Lewis of Chicago tells us that 50 to 60 per cent of the decrees there are obtained on fraudulent grounds of cruelty, "while as a matter of fact there was nothing but incompatibility which had become so unbearable that the wife would perjure herself in order to get relief." Judge C. W. Hoffman of the Domestic Relations Court of Cincinnati investigated cases in his court and found that 75 per cent of the defendants had grounds for defense which they could have used but did not. An observer, while listening to undefended divorce cases in a Chicago court, heard the judge recess the court for five minutes, instructing a lawyer to have his witness "get his dates straightened out." But even in the East, where judges are probably less lax, one hears from Judge Callaghan of the New York Supreme Court that "it is almost impossible for a judge to prove collusion even though he strongly suspects its existence, for the attorneys are always careful to satisfy every technical requirement of the statute." *

In 1925, 84 per cent of the divorce decrees in the United States were undefended. The law everywhere insists that the defendant be notified of the time and place of the proceedings against him and acknowledge that notification. Therefore it must be assumed that the great majority of defendants are either so definitely guilty of the offense charged against them that they regard any attempt at defense as hopeless, or else that they are willing to be divorced. In no other class of litigation do defendants show so little effort to defend themselves. Marshall and May reported a study of 3,306 divorce petitions in Maryland and Ohio, only 55 of which were denied by judges. In only 8 to 12 per cent of Ohio divorces were cross-petitions filed.

In about half the cases dismissed, there is a new petition for divorce at a later time.

* Dorothy D. Bromley, "Civilized Divorce," *Nation*, 128 (May 22, 1929), pp. 608–609.

The principle that there must be an innocent party and a guilty party does not prevent each party from bringing suit against the other. The second suit is then called a "cross-suit." The judge may find that both parties are guilty and in that case neither is entitled to divorce. "The plaintiff must come to court with clean hands." But again, the guilt of one party may be judged as less, or insufficient, and the decree granted to him.

The following episode shows that collusion is so much taken for granted in some circles that even a lawyer becomes careless of exposing it to the judge:

DIVORCE COLLUSION ADMITTED IN COURT

Lawyer Naively Submits Compact Whereby Wife Foregoes Alimony for Evidence

Supreme Court Justice —— got a new and rare exhibit for what he calls his "curiosity file" in Brooklyn yesterday.

The justice was hearing the undefended divorce suit of Mrs. —— of ——, Brooklyn, against her husband, ——. Justice —— called attention to the omission of alimony provisions in the decree submitted by Mrs. ——'s lawyer.

The lawyer hastened to reassure the judge. He said that had been taken care of outside of court; that there was an agreement on alimony.

"In writing?" inquired the court.

The lawyer answered affirmatively.

"Let's see it," said the court.

The lawyer handed him a paper. Justice —— read it and looked at the lawyer in evident amazement for a moment.

"Of course, we never suspect collusion in these cases," he said at length.

The agreement read:

"In consideration of the fact that you are willing to furnish me and my witnesses with evidence that will give me grounds to secure a divorce from you, I, ——, do hereby agree not to request any alimony."

It concluded with the sentence:

"I further agree to pay all expenses for divorce proceedings."

"They now put collusion in writing," Justice —— observed, speaking more to the ceiling than to the lawyer. "I shall have a copy made of this and shall put it in my curiosity file. Case dismissed." *

Much has been written about the inconsistency and confusion of our varying state divorce laws, and several efforts have been made to introduce uniformity through federal constitutional amendment or through voluntary acceptance of a "model law" by the several states.

* *New York Times*, July 27, 1933. By permission.

Ninety-four per cent of replies to a *Ladies Home Journal* poll * said there should be a uniform law.

Speaking of the federal amendment proposed by Senator Capper in 1923, Lichtenberger says:

> It appears that the bill was originated and is sponsored in the main by conservatives who regard divorce as an evil *per se*. Throughout the arguments of the advocates, therefore, is the assumption, tacit or expressed, that divorces, as such, should be controlled and if possible reduced, in the interest of greater marriage and family stability, and that this is the best means of accomplishing the purpose. Such persons are more inclined to put their trust in measures of legal repression than in constructive efforts to remove the causes and conditions which give rise to divorces. In this, if our generalizations in the preceding chapter in regard to the effects of law are well founded, they are likely to be disappointed.†

In the early days of this agitation, Mrs. Elizabeth Cady Stanton, one of the leading champions of feminism, warned that the movement was inspired by persons who regarded our divorce laws as too liberal and who sought, under the guise of making them uniform, to make them narrow. Again, a federal law would discourage experimentation in legislation and curb the progressive states while also forcing upon the more conservative divorce laws which they consider too advanced.

The National Divorce Reform League, however, proposes a *uniform* law which would make divorce easier, without going as far as the much-opposed principle of mutual consent. Alimony would be according to circumstances. The League also advocates domestic relations courts and more stringent marriage prohibitions. ‡

Intelligent supporters of democratic human relations will not favor a uniform divorce law in the United States unless it is *more* liberal, humane, and honest than the present state laws.

In 1931, the House of Bishops of the Episcopal Church in America met the demand for liberalized divorce in a manner which well illustrates the principles of cultural resistance.§ No church in America, of course, can take away from any one rights which the civil law gives him. It can, however, refuse to give a church remarriage ceremony or can take away church membership from a person not complying

* February, 1938, p. 15.

† J. P. Lichtenberger, *Divorce*, Whittlesey House, of McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1931, pp. 201–202. By permission.

‡ *New York Times*, July 9, 1933.

§ *New York Times*, September 29, 1931.

with the marriage and divorce canons of the church. To many people it is important to be in good standing with the church. Since 1808 the church had permitted the remarriage of the innocent party in a case of adultery, but had refused to sanction the remarriage of most divorced persons. In the 1931 action, the Bishops struck out the adultery exception and thus made even more stringent the church's verbal stand against divorce and remarriage. But at the same time, they provided for church courts to which people could apply for "annulment" of their former marriages. Several grounds for such annulment were included, but each case was to be decided on its merits by the court. To annul is simply to declare judicially that the former marriage, having involved certain "impediments," was not a valid one in the eyes of the church and hence did not really exist. The party who obtained such an annulment could then be remarried by the church under the verbal formula that he had never before been really married. Thus a mere phrase, "no remarriage," becomes the last resisting element of the old culture pattern after everything else has changed. It stands, like a lone turret amid the ruins of a demolished city wall, hindering few from actually passing, yet proclaiming through its sturdy tenacity that the wall is not yet gone.

THE "TRIAL MARRIAGE" CONCEPT OF DIVORCE IS A TEMPORARY COMPROMISE. M. M. Knight used the term "companionate" in 1924 to refer to a marriage entered for the sake of companionship rather than children. Judge Benjamin Lindsey [1927] proposed legal recognition of "companionate marriage" by allowing divorce *by mutual consent* to childless couples while retaining the usual divorce procedures for others. No American state has yet adopted this proposal. Strictly used, the term implies no change in the *marriage* laws, nor any approval of cohabitation without marriage. With this, Lindsey would associate two other principles: complete legalization of birth control information, and the regulation of alimony according to the actual needs of the divorced partners instead of by the traditional principle that alimony is a normally presumed right of the woman against the man. The companionate marriage automatically becomes an ordinary marriage upon the birth (or perhaps conception) of the first child.

Lindsey's proposal was attacked in a public debate by a reputable speaker who took a much more radical stand. This speaker contended, in effect, that Lindsey's plan merely gave love a little more rope and then tied it up securely to a new and firmer legal hitching post, whereas the ideal was to

set love completely free from law. Lindsey answered that law was still needed to protect the girl from the risk of bearing a child without a father who could be held legally responsible for support and care.

The avowed object of Lindsey's companionate proposal is not to increase the actual amount of divorce, but to make more honest and direct the procedure of trial and error which is now carried on through evasion of the law. Lindsey would abolish "bootleg" divorce. Or, as one Nevada official justifies his liberal state policy (which does not, however, technically accept the mutual consent principle), "You cannot change human nature by law; so what we are doing is to make human nature legal." [Bromley, 1933.]

Many persons think that a liberalization of marriage and divorce laws would tend to keep love more closely within marital bounds. In Lindsey's solution they see a desirable alternative to free love. Others, such as Floyd Dell [1930] and Groves [1928, A], while approving of more humane and intelligent divorce, do not like the ideology of Lindsey's proposal. Marriage, says Dell, should be the public ratification of a choice regarded by the parties themselves as final. Divorce should be offered by society as a way out of mistake, but not incorporated in the marriage pledge as a loophole of escape.

In the present writer's opinion, we should indeed have *easier* divorce, not only for childless couples but for any couple when it can be shown to a competent tribunal that divorce is the best solution. The tribunal should consist, however, of one or more experts trained in social work and psychiatry. It should function without publicity and with the informal equity procedure as used in our juvenile courts. Joint consent should be one of the weightiest arguments in favor of granting the divorce, an all-sufficient argument for childless couples. Each partner should be heard in person and separately, and the partners should also be heard together. The presence of immature children would weigh heavily against divorce and require something more than joint consent. Lest these social work tribunals become too omniscient and paternalistic in deciding what is good for their petitioners, divorce as a matter of absolute right should be made possible under certain conditions through appealing the decision to the regular courts.

Yet with all this, divorce reform should not be regarded as a major solution of our modern problems of love and marriage. Some divorce reformers seem to represent a middle-of-the-road attitude, which overestimates the effectiveness of laws and may sometimes overemphasize

legal honesty and clarity at the expense of substantial human freedom. Let us, of course, try to make the letter of the law say what we really mean, but let us not put too much trust in the enforcement of laws which merely place limitations upon human behavior. Some legal limitations will perhaps always be necessary. But the main progress comes through giving greater freedom and educating people in the use of it.

Chapter XVI

COURTSHIP AND UNMARRIED LOVE

Modern conditions call for increased wisdom in the selection of a life partner, and at the same time for the achievement of more complete love relationships. The laws of marriage and divorce have been or can be improved, but their role is essentially negative. They interfere with matters essentially personal and such interference, although sometimes necessary, should be kept at a minimum.

The major opportunity of organized society to improve love and marriage lies in positive, constructive measures. The best marriage law is one which forbids nothing, but appropriates money for a marriage counseling service, a family life education program, or a recreation program facilitating courtship. A democracy will take positive responsibility for love, courtship, and marriage.

A. MATE SELECTION

In the many groups and classes in which there is a poor balance of the sexes, many persons greatly desiring marriage, and well fitted for marriage, are deprived of it. On the other hand, there are many persons ill fitted for marriage or relatively indifferent to it, who have nevertheless had it thrust upon them by their situation.

INDIVIDUATION HAS INCREASED THE DIFFICULTY. An additional difficulty has entered in, namely, the greater differentiation of personalities, quite regardless of the social classes to which they belong. It might seem that with our greater freedom and mobility it should be easier for the young man or young woman to find a suitable marriage partner. But it is probably more difficult. In the older rural societies there was a certain uniformity of attitudes and tastes among the marriageable young people of a community. An old-fashioned Boer mother said:

> I am sick of all this talk of choosing and choosing. . . . If a man is healthy and does not drink, and has a good little handful of stock, and

a good temper, and is a good Christian, what great difference can it make to a woman which man she takes? There is not so much difference between one man and another.*

Rights and duties, in earlier days, were definite and well understood. With modern individualism, the demands which prospective mates make upon each other may not be greater in total amount, but they are more specific and unique. More and more the question becomes: Will this man or woman help me to develop my own life and personality, according to my ideals, or will he, or she, prove a stumbling block?

Though in marriage
He and she go
Each retains
His separate ego.

MATES ARE NOW CHOSEN ON THE BASIS OF PERSONALITY. Baber [1936], studying the attitudes of 642 university students and their parents, found that the girls want their husbands to have a good disposition and personality, good health, to be intelligent and well educated, to belong to their own religious faith, and to maintain good moral standards. The boys want the same qualities in girls, *plus beauty*. Wealth, family status, and age are regarded as unimportant. When asked to vote for the one most essential characteristic, parents overwhelmingly voted for health, whereas both boys and girls made it a poor second to disposition and personality. Eighty-one per cent of fathers and 87 per cent of mothers would be willing for their son to marry a person of lower economic rank, but only 66 per cent of fathers and 69 per cent of mothers would be willing for a daughter to do so. Ninety-three per cent of boys and 82 per cent of girls would be willing to marry a person of lower economic rank. Only from 14 to 20 per cent of parents would be willing to have their children marry a person of different religious faith, but 58 per cent of boys and 42 per cent of girls would be willing to make such a marriage.

Honesty, disposition, health, and education rank among the traits most desired by both sexes in Neely's [1940] study; ambition ranks high in the requirement for husband. The following trends of change were noted:

. . . a growing indifference to sex purity; a decline in religious interest; the lifting of taboos among women on sex attraction; the unsettled, con-

* James G. Leyburn, *Frontier Folkways*, Yale University Press, 1935, p. 129. By permission.

fused point of view with regard to the use of liquor by women; a devaluation by men of the housekeeping role of women . . .*

Investigating the male concept of the "ideal girl," Goodman and Parks [1935] sent out 195 questionnaires to men college students and graduates and received 128 in return. They give their findings as follows:

Her most important traits are, in order: sense of humor, tolerance, conscientiousness, frankness, tactfulness, orderliness, economy, and energy. The least-asked-for qualities are docility, impulsiveness, sensitiveness, and sophistication, in order of non-importance. She is interested primarily in children and homemaking, but music, literature, and sports also claim her attention. She is able to mix well in any company and is a good dancer. She is more popular with women than men, but she is also popular with these. She discusses sex frankly. She may smoke but probably doesn't drink at all and if she does, not to excess.

Thirty-two questionnaires expressed approval (17 qualified by "being in love" or "engaged") and 27 disapproval of pre-marital sex relations, but the ideal is definitely not promiscuous. She pets in moderation and her response in love is more warm than restrained. She has a modern, scientific attitude toward sex. She is sincere and discreet in all her relationships.

The ideal girl is attractive but not beautiful. Above all, she is neat, clean, and healthy. Her posture is excellent. She uses cosmetics only in moderation. She has a good figure, inclined toward the athletic build. She weighs 118 to 120 and is 5 feet 5 or 6. She is a clear-skinned, blue-eyed brunette. She dresses attractively and in good taste.

About twenty-five women students in a class in "The Family" were asked to write descriptions of the man they would like to marry. These freehand descriptions seem to give better insight than the material gathered by check-mark questionnaires such as were used in the above-mentioned investigations. The most important pattern which seemed to appear from these papers was the division of the group into a central type to which about half the group more or less conformed, and several deviant types varying in different directions. The conventional type is represented roughly by the following.

MY IDEAL. Brilliant mind and strong interest in intellectual things. (1) A "smoothie." Dresses well, dances well, has poise, can take his liquor, has good line of small talk. (2) A man of action. Must be doing interesting work and really getting somewhere in it (without reference to money). (3) Modern, sane attitude toward sex, and thorough knowledge

* Wayne C. Neely, "Family Attitudes of Denominational College and University Students, 1929 and 1936," *American Sociological Review*, 5:512–522 (1940).

though not necessarily first hand. (4) Personal charm. Attractive smile or small mannerisms, physical appeal though not necessarily good-looking, rather tall, virile. (5) A good companion, shares intellectual interests and enjoys plays, concerts, pictures, and so on. (6) Large sense of humor.

With this may be compared the two following highly individualized descriptions:

PHYSICAL CHOICE. My Prince Charming would have to be tall and preferably heavy. I have a fondness for pallor and blondness and dimples. A round head and rather heavy face would be nice. The rest wouldn't matter if he had a nice mouth and hair.

As for mannerisms, I like a person who looks at me as much as possible and laughs through his nose. I don't mind silences at all, as long as they are not preoccupied, but hate forced conversation, stories about trips, fraternity brothers, mechanical misfortunes, i.e., flat tires, etc., or people that he would know and I not.

Concerning more fundamental things I definitely want a medical student without much money and a liking for sports and out-of-doors. A sense of humor is essential, a gently cynical one if possible. Self-confidence I find winning, or wanting that, the ability to bluff that he is or plans to be a big man some day—with a little feminine help. Introspections and interest in other people's minds, especially mine, are fun to talk about. Tact and discretion are valuable. Drink and flirtatiousness no objections.

I choose someone who is powerful and protecting, someone who by his attention and concern, shows he is interested in my health and comfort. He must be good-looking in an outdoorish sort of way, not necessarily handsome. I prefer a man who compliments me, not by his attentions and verbal expressions, as much as by his disregard of other women. I dislike violently the type known as the "ladies' man." Also, he must be a shrewd buyer and business man, one who can voice an intelligent opinion on popular topics of the day. I may not agree with him, but I want to discuss things with him. I want him to be a good mathematician, mainly because I admire my father who is, and because I am not.

He must be a handy-man, like my practical New England father; one who can change the washer in a faucet or regulate the cold in the refrigerator himself instead of calling a plumber or a service man. I like to feel that he is superior to me, and that I need him around to keep things going smoothly. At the same time, I do not want him to feel that I am actually inferior to him, but rather that I can do things for him as well.

Of course, individuals differ not only in the degree of non-conformity of their actual values, but also in the frankness with which they are able or willing to express those attitudes which they recognize as being somewhat unusual.

Hausheer and Moseley [1932] questioned 65 unmarried women and 55 unmarried men on why they had failed to marry. Business and professional women gave the desire for a career as the major reason for their spinsterhood. Female clerks and domestics gave, as major reasons, social obstacles such as lack of contacts. The main reasons given by the men were economic, but they also mentioned social factors such as lack of time to attend social functions, inability to meet the right kind of girl, shyness, or disapproval of modern conditions and of the women of their acquaintance. Seventy per cent of all judged that it was difficult to meet young people of their own age and opposite sex in their community. The younger persons of both sexes mentioned desire for a good time, belief in free love or trial marriage as reasons for remaining single. Office girls and clerks were inconsistent and idealistic in the qualities they desired in a husband, usually stipulating money and college education. Professional and business women desired, rather, common interests and common cultural background. Male salesmen and clerks desired good looks and style in a wife, while professional and business men stressed personality and native ability.

Of course one must allow for a great deal of rationalization among persons who have failed to achieve something which society highly values. Personality difficulties are often blamed upon social conditions. Such appears to be the case of one attractive young man who complained of his inability to find any desirable girl to marry, despite unusual opportunities. In his case there were strong indications of mother-fixation. But when a given type of difficulty is shared by a great many persons and this varies with social factors or increases with time, personality difficulties are less relevant. It is also a rationalization, to which successful persons are prone, to hold that "anyone who's got the stuff in him" can get what he wants. Such pontificators should read Lawrence Frank's article on "Society as the Patient" [1936].

THE INSTITUTIONS OF MATE SELECTION HAVE LAGGED. Even in more communal and less highly individualized societies, there are institutions for mate finding. The Jews in New York City still have their traditional marriage brokers. [Berger, 1938.] Churches recognize the increasing need and sometimes intensify their programs for young people, with greater acceptance of dancing and other popular modes of recreation. Some persons attempt to perform the office of matchmaker without being too explicit about it. They pride themselves upon their success in bringing together suitable young people and

giving them a start toward the altar. A society leader, for example, keeps an index of eligible unmarried men who may be invited to social events. Thus she helps solve a very real problem which faces the upper-class young women and their parents.

Yet the improvement in mate-finding institutions has not kept pace with the increase in individualism. Some of the older folkways serving this purpose have lapsed.

In European village society of the last century, there was a rich culture of courtship practices and institutions. From one district in Czechoslovakia, for example, we have a description of the yearly round of festivals and dances, of age groups and their privileges, of customary gifts and love letters, the annual election of leaders of the unmarried group. [Husek, 1918.] In this culture, church, dancing, festivals, and farm work such as harvesting all played a part and created a background for courtship. Folklore and song suggest a romantic atmosphere surrounding these practices.

Modern urban life has become differentiated into work and play, situations of tension and responsibility versus situations of relaxation and irresponsibility. The latter have become differentiated into the "proper" or conventional, and the unconventional. The contacts which lead to marriage are largely made in the "proper," relaxing situations, and these situations have been in many respects and for many groups impoverished.

The writer informally questioned a group of 48 young people representing many social classes in Chicago, in 1940, asking, "How many persons of the opposite sex have you known well enough to pass judgment on whether they would be a fit marriage partner for you?" The median answer for the young men was "4 persons," with a range from 0 to 15. The young women gave "3 persons" as median answer, with a range from 0 to 15. A similar question asked a Vassar class gave a median of 4½, with a range of 0 to 10.

Popenoe [1940, 161] found that, by the time she is 30, the average woman may be expected to have received three proposals of marriage. Only 11 out of his sample of 208 claimed never to have had a proposal, but most of these were quite young. Of course, many or all of the proposals are not acceptable, and since a girl must wait for proposal, it would seem that only three are hardly enough for the best choice under modern conditions.

If close acquaintance with three potential mates was enough to provide a sufficient basis for choice under earlier conditions, then modern conditions might require from 6 to 20 similarly close friend-

ships for an equally good choice. Yet Dr. Plant [1937, 192], from his keen psychiatric observation of urban society from the vantage point of the Essex County Juvenile Clinic (New Jersey), says:

> Another new problem of the Family might be termed the increasing difficulty in finding the person one is to marry. It is our experience that girls (it is the same for boys) seem to meet a great many more boys than girls used to meet but know fewer of them on a basis adequate for judging their availability as husbands . . .
>
> The cultural pattern in our area has been very definitely increasing the facilities for acquaintance at the same time that it is quite as insistently decreasing those for deeper friendship.*

CONDITIONS UNFAVORABLE TO COURTSHIP. The improvement of the mate-finding process must overcome four conditions: (1) overconcentrated, single-scale competition in certain groups, (2) social "ruts" or lack of fluidity of social contacts, (3) inhibiting conventions and atmospheres, (4) overdependence on male initiative.

1. SINGLE-SCALE COMPETITION. Courtship is naturally a competitive process, and the generally more desirable persons secure generally more desirable mates. Some kind of a hierarchy of total personal attractiveness or "popularity" seems inevitable in any society. But the hierarchy is less obvious and oppressive in modern urban society, where each person moves in several circles. He may rate "high" in one circle though "low" in another. The average urban-dweller knows many persons, and yet they are not so repeatedly thrown together into the same arena where they can be easily compared, as in a communal society.

Our schools and colleges revive the communal form of society, without some of its softening folkways. Here we often get a hard, intense and obvious competition for popularity among a group of persons who have a great deal of measured and recorded information about one another. Waller [1937, 1938] has described this "rating and dating complex" so very well in easily available publications that this author will merely outline the problem here. [See also Hooker, 1938.]

Competition for prestige is especially prominent in state universities with a vigorous fraternity culture and social stratification. Such institutions are attended by students from an unusually wide range on the social scale; there is a tendency to protect one's social ranking

* James S. Plant, M.D., *Personality and the Cultural Pattern*, Commonwealth Fund, 1937, p. 192. By permission.

in college through a certain snobbishness, and there is also a great drive toward social climbing. Fraternities are important agencies in this struggle for prestige. The fraternities and sororities apply considerable social pressure to the "dating" of their members. One gets merits, whether formally recorded or not, for dating with a co-ed of a high-ranking sorority, demerits for associating with an "independent." The net result of this competition might seem to be to match each person with one of fairly equal rank, as happens in society in general. But there is another result. It is to discourage pairing altogether among the lower ranks. The fire of competitive dating burns hot at the top, smoulders at the bottom. The low-ranking student often has more to gain by abstaining altogether than from dating with a person of his own rank. He may possibly climb higher in the social scale through individual achievements, but his chances of so doing would be hindered if he were to identify himself with the plebeians by publicly appearing with them. Thus affection and mate selection, supposedly important advantages of coeducation, are prostituted in considerable degree to the wholly irrelevant motives of power and prestige rivalry.

Miss Dorothy Newberg reported to the author in 1940 on the "dating situation among men and women on the University of Minnesota campus." A few significant excerpts from this, quoting in part the 1934 published survey, *Student Social Life at the University of Minnesota,* are illuminating. She writes:

> The lowest percentage of women having dates was found in the dormitory group (43 per cent); about half of those living in cooperative cottages and in homes where they worked had dates in contrast with about three-fourths of those who lived at home or in sorority houses . . . About 10 per cent of the men living in fraternity houses seldom or never had dates in contrast with 28 per cent of those living at home and about 40 per cent of those in all other groups . . . Among the men students it was found that "the men whose parents had a very limited education had definitely fewer social contacts than did those whose parents had gone to college . . . About one-half of the men wished for more women friends while about two-thirds of the women wished for more men friends. Friends which students make at the university are very largely of the same sex . . .
>
> Both men and women stressed their dissatisfaction in regard to the lack of opportunity to meet members of the opposite sex. Many expressed the desire to have dates but lacked the initial step of becoming acquainted . . .
>
> As a result of the survey an effort was made to improve social conditions on the campus so as to make it easier for students of opposite sex to meet

each other. The Women's Self Government Association organized a dating bureau which was at the disposal of all students. But this soon proved unsuccessful. Not many students took advantage of the bureau. Also the bureau was confronted by the problem of obtaining the proper identification from those people who registered. In such a large institution it is very difficult to know whether the person registering is a student or is merely someone who is using the fee statement of a student in order to obtain registration.

But a 1942 report says:

The student social life at Minnesota is no longer dominated by fraternities and sororities and all students have an opportunity for a wide range of social contacts. The results of these opportunities are felt on every hand. Just now the major problem is how to absorb into the social life of the campus the hundreds of men in the various military services who are stationed on the campus.

In a study this past year it was found that 70 per cent of the students who were enrolled in the University participated in the Union activities for which students were asked to sign their names when they entered. In addition many more undoubtedly made other use of the Union facilities.*

The Union activities showing the larger numbers of participants in 1941–42 were: exhibits, dances and dance instruction, movies, concerts and symphonies, hobby shows, coffee hours, "mixers," snow week outings, sings, talent shows and talent coaching, tournaments, "Charm, Inc." program and clinic, and "swing sessions." Many of these are no-charge events; others usually cost 5 or 10 cents admission.

Several colleges and universities have had "date bureaus," and several of these have ceased operation. A study of the whole movement, and of the experiences in all these attempts, would be a most worthwhile project. Date bureaus naturally tend to attract the less successful, and if this comes to be recognized openly, the "inferiority complex" may cause the project to fail even though on all other grounds it is sound and useful.

These effects of competition become less when a group becomes more diversified, either in its activity interests or its valuations of personality characteristics. The theoretically ideal pattern of courtship would be one in which every person stands at the top of *some* rating scale, and there is someone who accepts *that* scale as "trumps" in love choice. This would mean at least as many rating scales as there are persons, which of course would mean devaluation of the

* Letter from Clara M. Brown of the University of Minnesota, Division of Home Economics.

general rating scale. Each boy would choose a girl (and vice versa) not because of how high she stands, but because of what she qualitatively is. In this sense, among others, the process of free, monogamous mate selection among diversified personalities has something peculiarly democratic about it. This observation also implies that there might lurk a certain danger to democratic relations in the overuse of scientific rating scales such as the prediction tests for general marriage success. In love as well as in business, *laissez-faire* competition is only a first step away from authority toward democratic freedom, a step which may liquidate itself if not followed up by the development of organized, democratic controls.

If the leaders of student bodies and other such communal groups wish to be creatively democratic, they may try to build up customs which will reduce the handicaps against the less attractive. Perhaps *noblesse oblige* on the scale of attractiveness as well as on the scales of wealth and social status would be the solution. Popular persons could take more responsibility for bringing out the wallflowers, sometimes through their own companionship and sometimes by inviting, introducing, and being otherwise encouraging. Personalities and habits might actually be changed. Moreno [1934] has given us a new technique for analyzing a group in terms of the personal attractions and repulsions between individuals. This is not the same thing as the scale of ascendance-submission. Individuals have to vote secretly their choices for other individuals, and only the research worker knows the names. One might study a group of 25 to 500 persons in which there was considerable courtship or dating within the group. Someday a student committee may set up an experiment to see what happens when a group consciously and consistently practices democracy.

No small part of this program would deal with money practices. The isolation of the less privileged groups is in part due to the lack of money plus a tendency to value a date (under certain limits) according to money spent. Even these limits might be removed. Empty-pocket dates might be cultivated, also the "dutch" date, and, on occasion, the girl-financed date.

2. SOCIAL "RUTS." The cramping influences of social competition could be overcome partly by a more frequent mixture of different groups. Courtship could be improved by training and encouraging young people to explore their social environments actively. Many people have no idea that it is possible to seek friends outside their habitual circles. Of course, the kind of person who would take such initiative might be the kind of person who would have plenty of

friends already. Yet there are persons who are shy in their habitual surroundings and who yet may develop their social courage most easily through adventurous contacts with strange groups.

A study by Frances Mitchell at Vassar College [Folsom, 1934, 340] showed that married Vassar alumnae of the classes of 1925–1931 had first met their husbands in the same kinds of situations as the alumnae of 1869–1881 and 1904–1909, namely, through conventional social events and mutual friends and through early childhood contacts. Work and study situations failed to produce many contacts.

Popenoe says:

> For profitable acquaintance, the best opportunities are offered by groups in which young people share some common interest. In every city there are almost countless organizations devoted to sport, religion, recreation, philosophy, art, music, literature, science,—everything under the sun. One who wants to make acquaintances should canvass systematically all such groups in whose objects he has, or could acquire, an interest. He (or she) can visit them one at a time, drop them at once if no "worth-while" young people are found, cultivate them further if they promise to be worth cultivating. Such groups are usually anxious to get new members who share their enthusiasms . . .
>
> Taking two a week, a young person in a large city could visit a hundred such groups in a year. It would be surprising if at least one of them did not prove to be repaying! *

There is a need for institutions which will sometimes tear people loose from their familial, neighborhood, and social-class contacts and reassort them according to personally chosen interests and aims. This is democratic in two different ways: through the mixing of classes and groups, and through encouraging individuality.

Most persons feel the need for a certain minimum of social contacts each day. It would be helpful also for a person to set for himself some standard insuring that a certain proportion of his social life each month would consist in meeting strangers and making new acquaintances.

3. INHIBITING CONVENTIONS AND ATMOSPHERES. No matter how wide the range of speaking acquaintance may be, satisfactory matching of personalities is not possible without some means of more intimate acquaintance. These means are dependent upon the customs of conversation and social intercourse. The cut-in dance, for example, may

* Paul Popenoe, "Mate Selection," *American Sociological Review*, II:735–743 (1937). By permission. For suggestions as to co-recreational activities, see Breen, 1936.

permit a greater variety of contacts during an evening, but the brief time spent with each partner and the superficial and stereotyped conversation give little opportunity for a person to decide even whether it is desirable to renew the contact. It takes time to get acquainted. Is there any way of shortening this time?

In general, social informality aids in the process of getting acquainted. Not hindered by a rigid ritual of approach, two young persons may "come to the point" with greater speed, that is, to a discussion of their personal interests, enthusiasms, and dislikes, and to what they like in each other's personality. Recent changes in social convention have doubtless contributed to this more rapid acquaintance. But still more effective measures are needed to bring an adequate adjustment. The general wartime speeding up of activities and social interaction will doubtless operate in this direction, but at the same time there will be still greater local inequalities in the numbers of the sexes.

Some 20 women college students were asked to give free descriptions of situations in which romantic acquaintances were begun. The elements mentioned most frequently as classified by the author were, in order of frequency:

Sudden physical proximity of man and woman alone	7
Informality, cocktail parties, etc.	6
Boat or sea voyage	5
Discovery of common interest	5
Sports	4
Girl admires man because of his greater intelligence, age, etc.	4

One girl writes:

> No circumstances can be more conducive to making romantic acquaintances than those one is placed in on shipboard on a transoceanic passage. The reasons may be briefly stated:
>
> (*a*) One's lust for adventure is roused and therefore one is more sensitive to romantic adventure.
>
> (*b*) Being on the sea, in such a novel and heightened esthetic situation.
>
> (*c*) Usually there is a greater percentage of young people aboard to those of the older generation.
>
> (*d*) There are not so many opportunities to expend one's energies on shipboard except running around with the young crowd.
>
> (*e*) There is no fear of making lasting acquaintances if one doesn't want to and one can engage in freer and more personal contacts without having to commit himself.
>
> (*f*) The Captain can marry any couple.

Another writes:

> I was at a supper party at the home of an elderly and conservative friend of my mother. The crowd was young and mixed, and all strangers to me. I stepped out on the sun porch for a moment, found a very attractive but very bored boy listening to the radio by himself. We got to talking and spent the evening there laughing and joking with each other. He was one of the few "crushes" I ever had . . .

Paris used to be envied by many Americans as a place where a couple could walk lovingly through the park or caress one another in public, without danger of interference or attracting undue attention. But the American scene has become more tolerant in this respect than it was 25 years ago. In 1918 an American camp commander ordered that his soldiers be allowed to pet with girl friends visiting camp if they did so openly. Students in certain colleges demanded "petting parlors," but now, for milder intimacies, every parlor and cocktail lounge is a petting parlor. The increase in outdoor recreations, public parks, and motoring (till 1942), and the beautification of some cities and highways have presumably been helpful to courtship.

In spite of these changes, the environment is still very poorly arranged from the standpoint of mate selection. The office, the classroom, the workshop, the meeting place, the situations where men and women often share their most vital non-amorous interests, are romantically sterile. A person is apt to meet the one best suited to be his mate in such a dignified and "proper" place that romance is frost-killed in the bud. To say that if they are really well suited people will arrange to meet elsewhere is to indulge, again, in the "individual-can-do-anything" fallacy.

Something might be said for the customs of those regions, peoples, and occupations which permit personal attraction between men and women, and on occasion even some display of affection, to intrude itself into the realms where Yankees expect an atmosphere of cold efficiency or stuffy decorum. However, there must be much more study of this problem before specific recommendations can be made. It may be that there should be "a time and a place" for courtship, but it seems probable that it needs more time and more place than it now has.

4. MALE INITIATIVE. We could have better mate selection if initiative were taken by both sexes. Women, in finding mates, have been much more at the mercy of social circumstances. The right to say

"yes" or "no" ten times may not be as valuable as the power to say for once precisely what one wants and "to go out after it."

Mate selection involves a competitive interaction process similar to that found in the operation of other markets, exchanges, and clearing houses. A general principle is that initiative tends to go with specificity. If a seller has many different things to sell he needs to take no initiative except that necessary to keep up with his competitors under existing customs of advertising. If he has a very specific article to sell he needs to take special effort to describe it and broadcast this knowledge among all possible buyers. Under industrialism, marketing initiative has passed more to producers and sellers as the consumer wants have become more luxurious and inter-substitutable. Yet the modern buyer who requires a very specific article must "shop" and search.

Likewise in courtship, the natural procedure would be for those persons who are more "particular," who have formed more specific ideals of their desired mate, to seek and search more actively than those who feel they could get along pretty well with many kinds of people. These persons with more specialized needs would probably be women as often as men. Perhaps for half our existing marriages, better matches could have been substituted if the women had done the real searching and planning.

Yet this need contravenes those deeply entrenched values which attach to the whole picture of "masculine versus feminine" character in our culture. A change in values (to be discussed later) as well as new forms of organization, is needed. There have been some value changes in this direction. The resistances do not form a solid barrier but might be evaded by skilful steering.

Fortunately the older culture provides certain forms through which the woman may take initiative, such as the invitation to dinner at home. Young women join together to rent an apartment which may be called home, or to arrange a social gathering to which they may invite the desired men. Under such circumstances they may escape both the charge of "chasing after men" and also the supervision of the older generation.

A woman can make as many telephone calls per day to friends of the opposite sex as can a man, and nobody need count them. But does this require that she imitate the male in his assertiveness and abruptness of manner? Skilful women cultivate greater sex differences in these superficial and esthetic traits while gaining more equality in real power.

Popenoe says:

> The demand that woman be allowed to become the aggressor in mate selection is sometimes merely a reflection of the "masculine protest" which Alfred Adler has described so fully. No law now prevents a woman from proposing, but common observation shows that it is, as a rule, not worth while for her to do so. The woman who is not clever enough to maneuver a man into a position where he will propose, might not be clever enough to hold a man after she got one.*

Popenoe has provided much useful information about existing procedures for the benefit of young people contemplating marriage, but something more is needed than a fatalistic acceptance of existing mores when they are found to be out of line with the democratic trend.

Many well-educated young women, intelligent about marriage and knowing definitely what they want, despair of any improvement in mate selection because they feel helpless in the passive role which they are forced to play to attain any success whatsoever. If and when a girl receives attention from several men she has power and may truly do the choosing. But if she has been unsuccessful in the preliminary stage of attracting attention, she has no opportunity to use her skill and knowledge. When a man desires love or marriage, he at least can begin immediately to do something about it. He may be unsuccessful, but he can always keep on trying, and this constantly active policy spares him the very serious type of frustration to which women are subject. The woman must pursue her goal through the method of setting traps and lying in wait, while the man pursues his by active search and chase. The woman's method, from what we know of psychiatry, would seem to cause a greater volume of suffering and of neurotic maladjustments.

Young people of social idealism may render a good service by trying out ways and means of securing a less passive role for the woman in mate selection.

A Most Promising Development Is "Co-recreation." At a meeting of the American Eugenics Society in 1938, Weaver Pangburn suggested that increased opportunities for the sexes to play together might promote better mate selection and happier life after marriage and therefore more children among the planned-parenthood section of our population. Camping, hiking, bicycling, and youth-hosteling

* Paul Popenoe, "Mate Selection," *American Sociological Review*, 2:735–743 (1937). By permission.

are increasingly done by the sexes together, quite within the mores, and offer unusually good settings for better mate selection among those who enjoy these types of recreation.

ORGANIZED INTRODUCTION SERVICES WILL PLAY A NEEDED ROLE. With all these suggested improvements, society's provision for adequate selection is not complete without some kind of organized exchange for making acquaintances between persons of opposite sex according to personality needs. This must not be thought of as the last resort of persons who have been unsuccessful in courtship, but as a supplementary device for widening constructive friendship in many communities. It may serve especially persons of unusual tastes and interests who have not had time or opportunity to find suitable partners through the usual activities.

Although much ridicule has been poured upon this idea, it persists in coming up again and again, demonstrating the real social need on which it is based.

It may be well to combine this with the broader function of making acquaintance for recreational purposes, and acquaintance within the same sex.

There are many "matrimonial agencies" of undesirable types. Marcellus W. Meek of Chicago writes the author:

> I am now completing a survey and analysis of the printed matter sent out in response to inquiries by about 150 present-day "matrimonial agencies," and with the exception of the presentation and service promised by The American Service of New York City, and two others, I can truthfully say that I have waded through the most astounding and puerile assortment of mental "tripe" that I have ever seen in thirty-seven years of active [legal] practice.
>
> Matrimonial club advertisements are acceptable to only a very few publications and these are of the less desirable type.

Dr. Popenoe of the American Institute of Family Relations [personal letter, 1938] wrote the author:

> We made a pretty careful study of all those [agencies] in Southern California five or six years ago. Practically all of them were bona-fide, but not one of them had any really worth-while men on the list . . . I believe the best advice to women is that they cultivate . . . groups . . . right in their own neighborhood.

In 1935, a "Widows and Widowers Social Club," Chapter 1 of Jersey City, was incorporated "for social friendship between widows, widowers, and divorced people who perhaps may find new partners

for future happiness and probably marry again, to start life anew." * In 1935, a magazine, *Husbands,* was started in the interests of the 20,000,000 unmarried females who the publisher fears will "go decidedly haywire as they grow older."

A Philadelphia pastor established a non-sectarian "Body, Mind, and Soul" clinic.†

"Many of the people who need these services would make fine mates. They may not have what superficial people call attractiveness, but they have the essential elements of faithfulness, loyalty and devotion so much needed in marriage . . .

"My church is a matrimonial agency," he added, "and I believe a church should be. I have a standing agreement with my young members to marry them without fee if they have met in the church and plan to be married in the church. There is no reason why a decent, honest, properly supervised matrimonial agency shouldn't work and work well—but it certainly should not be run for profit." ‡

A pastor in Oklahoma City was reported in 1937 to be sponsoring a "lovers' church" for serious-minded unmarried men and women who have a hard time meeting socially.

The American Service § is a "clearing house for men and women who want to defeat loneliness." In the past 5 years 500 of the couples they brought together have been married. One or more marriages have taken place as a result of reference to the Service by this author of persons seeking his advice. A study of this Service in 1938 by several students and collaborators disclosed that about one-sixth of their clients were college graduates and over a half were at least high school graduates. Under 25 years of age there were 2 men to 1 girl, from 35 to 45 the sexes were about equal, and from 50 to 60 there were 2 women to 1 man; in the small group over 60, the sexes were equal. One student of the Service was struck by "the total absence of any element of obscenity, indecency, or licentiousness."

In 1938 the writer met in New York Mr. Joseph Clawson, who, influenced by the felt needs of his friends and by some of the literature on mate finding, had built up a practical service for the bringing together of young men and young women. It was called "Introductions by Clawson." His clientele was composed of normal young people of fairly high education who were not problem individuals;

* *New York Times,* June 25, 1935.

† *Christian Century,* September 14, 1938.

‡ Newspaper account of a reporter's interview with the pastor.

§ 236 West 70th Street, New York City.

he tried to avoid the latter. Marriage was not featured as an object, but merely friendship for those living in New York and for those who, though able to find some companionship, were eager to be more selective as regards tastes and interests. Mr. Clawson later went to Harvard to make studies helpful in the further development of this work. In May, 1941, he made the following report on his experiments and recommendations:

As it worked out in practice, the majority of the young men were college graduates and the majority of the girls had had at least two years of college. They were an exceptionally fine type of young people, and their high average education, as well as conversations I had with them, indicate they approached the idea with a minimum of emotional resistance against the "stigma" of a dating bureau (which, after all, it was) and especially against a plan using a methodical, scientific approach to something which is not, under present social customs, ordinarily susceptible to anything but the usual haphazard, accidental, inspirational, romantic approach. In other words, these young people were better qualified than the average to perceive the breakdown of the older system and the necessity for something new and better.

It was interesting to note that a large percentage of the participants joined "on the principle of the thing." From the standpoint of numbers, the plan was definitely not a success, the few score we had representing only a small proportion of the people who had been reached by the publicity. Once we got them in, it worked; but there were too many to whom the idea did not appeal at all.

As a result of the experience obtained from the experiment, in addition to further courses I have taken in psychology and conversations I have had with Dr. Allport and with countless young people since then, I have come to the conclusion that the difficulties might be overcome fairly well. The *method,* consisting of tests, ratings, references, and matching according to principles developed in recent researches (referring here to such tests as the Moss-Hunt-Omwake Social Intelligence Test, the Pressey Senior Classification (intelligence) test, and Bernreuter Personality Inventory furnished by the Psychological Corporation and to the researches of Dr. Kelley) is, I believe, fundamentally sound. If we are going to accept people as they are, and try to find the best combinations under those circumstances without trying to change the people themselves, something of this very nature must eventually be adopted. This concerns social characteristics almost entirely, but it is not to deny the worth of linking social with physiological tests for eugenic ends. The *procedure,* however, should be thoroughly revamped, in the light of current social customs. It appears

to me that the principal emotional resistances are as follows: (1) the fear (often based on past experience) of getting "stuck" when on a "blind date," (2) the dislike of anything which approaches romance and luck from a "cold-and-calculating" angle, based (*a*) on the scientific methods employed and (*b*) on the fact that it was necessary to make a charge for the service, which was self-supporting.

Therefore, any new plan, if it is to succeed in numbers reached, must operate on a non-profit, "unintentional" basis. It occurs to me that this would be done best by adopting the program in some already existing organization which is of such a nature that the interviews and tests can be given ostensibly for some regular purpose of the organization.*

In 1941, Social Service, an "experimental acquaintance bureau," was set up by Herbert Gersten in Newark, New Jersey, for the purpose of helping young people to make dates with persons of common interests but not yet known to them personally. It published a bulletin which suggests recreational facilities. It aims to "operate with a trial, experimental group of 2,000 people who will represent a cross-section of the city's youth . . . The ideal of Social Service is to establish a culture pattern conventionally accepted that will permit young people to meet when and whenever they want to without depending upon accidental encounters which cripple the social lives of so many youths." This service has been recently launched upon a more adequate basis, under the new name, "Introduction: A Service for Sociability." †

These social inventions for the planned direction of interpersonal acquaintance have been regarded as "crackpot schemes," but so was the first airplane! We have the essentials of invention: (1) the definite social need and (2) the demonstrated effectiveness of the various elements of the procedure (interviewing, personality inventories, card-indexing, central office with telephone, etc.). The putting together of the elements into a workable pattern and the dissemination of the pattern to areas of need is merely a matter of time. In fact, it has already been achieved in the form of at least one good, respectable, "going concern." From the standpoint of social dynamics or change, one such success proves more than do statistics indicating thousands of failures.

* Mr. Clawson is now American Vice-Consul in Peru.

† Raymond-Commerce Building, Newark, N. J. The service is non-profit making and owes its development and promise of permanence to the volunteer work of several citizens under the leadership of Mrs. Leonard Puth.

B. THE CHANGING MORES OF SEX AND LOVE

THE ROMANTIC COMPLEX HAS EXALTED LOVE IN OUR CULTURE. A most important cultural change was the development of the romantic complex which is said to have come into our Western culture with the French troubadours of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries and the Celtic myth of Tristan and Iseult. We no longer hold, as did earlier sociologists, that this introduced a new type of feeling into human experience. It rather placed feelings in new settings. It was a constellation of traits, including individual freedom and social irresponsibility in choice of partner, with frequent ideas of predetermined "affinity" or mysterious destiny; exclusive devotion to the one love partner; the man's preparedness to seize the beloved woman, if necessary, from any other possessor; the honoring of love, sometimes by idealized sexual restraint, sometimes by a glorified adultery; idealization, esthetic appreciation, and worship (but yet possession) of woman by man; adventure and braving of dangers in the process of courtship; esthetic and dramatic settings for courtship; and the elevation of this love between the sexes to a supreme value.

Sociologists have generally held that the romantic complex, while contributing new values to our culture, has also greatly intensified the problems and pains of modern marriage. Although originating in the twelfth century, romantic ideas gained new power and wider diffusion with the late nineteenth century and its age of individualism. The popular magazine, the short story, the movie found romantic plots the best material for the entertainment of the masses. A British king gave up his throne for love. In America especially, with its democracy, its mobility of population, and its breakdown of family authority, young people have been encouraged by romantic literature to follow the caprice of their feelings in choosing a life partner. Youthful marriages with insufficient foresight have contributed to the rising divorce rate.

Romance at first connoted extra-marital love (ideally, and perhaps to a large extent actually, without sexual intercourse). Marriage was arranged, hence it was assumed that only outside of marriage could people make true love choices. But in modern days romance has come to be the ruling ideology of the marriage choice itself. It has received aid and encouragement from our traditional mores because it apparently helps to keep sex within marriage and to keep erotic feeling on an inferior level in the general scale of values, subordinate to the great

moving thrills of rapturous love. Actually the romantic complex has probably helped to break down the traditional sex mores, but if so that has been an indirect result. The romantic ideology demands monogamous love but does not require the indissolubility of marriage. The net effect in America seems to have been to channel marital discontent into the pattern of divorce and remarriage, which some have called "serial polygamy," as against the older and more European pattern of "simultaneous polygamy" through extra-marital relations.

Denis de Rougemont [1940] has attacked the romantic ideology with a most scathing denunciation, in which he attributes to it much of the evil and suffering of the Western world. Beginning with the Tristan myth and the Provençal poetry, he traces the "cult of passion" through the Catharist religious cults, Spanish mysticism, chivalry, the literature of Petrarch, Cervantes, Rousseau, the music of Wagner, the French Revolution to modern social disorganization. He views even modern nationalism and total war as results of "the transplanting of passion into politics."

De Rougemont's basic idea is that the modern world idealizes not the *satisfactions* of love, but the *unsatisfied passion* of love. The ancient world also knew the "frenzy of love," but treated it as a frenzy. Only in the twelfth century did we begin to exalt it. The complete romanticist, says De Rougemont, is not really in love with a person, but with love itself; he contrives in various ways to create obstacles to frustrate love in order to increase its intensity; in the last analysis what he really craves is death.

The church and, later, Puritanism made the romantic complex virtuous by emphasizing its restraint of sex. One result, pronounced in Victorian England, was an unnatural separation of sexual feelings from tender and rapturous feelings. Another was to place woman upon an honorific, sexless pedestal, to exalt feminine chastity to extreme heights on the scale of values. A man expected his wife to show sexual behavior of a much more restrained type than the prostitute, while he himself failed to awaken her full sex passion because of his perverted sense of delicacy. Married sex relations, in certain social classes at least, became a tender but lukewarm ritual, in which only the passion of the male was regularly satisfied, and even his satisfaction was obtained without resort to the more voluptuous and thoroughgoing stimulations.

MODERN SCIENCE HAS EMANCIPATED AND INDIVIDUALIZED LOVE. Against this Victorian puritanism there has been gathering, since 1890, a sexual revolution. The basic causes of this were discussed in

Chapter VI. Calverton [1926] has traced this revolution as it is expressed in literature. The break began with Hardy and Butler and Ibsen, and is represented by such recent writers as Dreiser, Dell, Anderson, and Joyce. Leon Blum [1937], ex-Premier of France, has given with utmost frankness his views about love, although perhaps these are not so new in France as in England. Among other things he advocates that girls sow their wild oats before marriage to exhaust the "polygamous instinct" and that experienced women prepare men for marriage by teaching them the art of sex.

The modern emancipation of love is part and parcel of modern individualism and freedom. (The romantic-chivalric complex exalted love but did not emancipate or individualize it.) It is not a mere repetition of past cycles of sexuality. It is not primarily a freedom of love from marriage, but from the supernatural. No Rabelais or Boccaccio could have effected this emancipation; nor could a Watt or an Edison have done so; but Darwin, Pavlov, and Freud, indirectly, have been among the emancipators, and contraception has been the material technique of emancipation.

With shorter hours of work, it is natural that a part of the increased leisure should lead in the direction of love behavior. A great deal of our recreational life has become pervaded with at least the milder forms of stimulation by the opposite sex. We recreate more in couples whether married or unmarried; there is less of the one-sexed group with its conscious "sprucing up" of manners for an occasional meeting with a group of opposite sex. Gentlemen "join the ladies" earlier and more naturally, and stay later. Moreover, the ladies may now go almost anywhere that gentlemen go, into taverns, the wilderness, and the army.

CHANGES IN SEX BEHAVIOR. All studies point unmistakably to a recent and rapid increase of non-virginity at marriage. Harvey [1932], summarizing questionnaire studies up to 1923 upon persons of *superior intellectual and social status,* found the approximate median percentages of pre-marital intercourse to be about 35 per cent for men and 15 per cent for women. Terman's more recent study [1938, 321] gives approximate figures of 60 per cent for men and 37 per cent for women. Bromley and Britten, whose subjects were college students for the most part not yet finished with the pre-marital period, gave about 55 per cent for men and 25 per cent for women. Wile [1941] finds 60 per cent of college fraternity men admit intercourse. Both Terman and Hamilton found the younger persons in their studies to have lesser percentages of virginity at marriage than the older per-

sons, except for Hamilton's 41 male subjects born since 1891, who were more inclined toward virginity than the older group. [1929, 384.] This group, however, is too small and perhaps too specialized to be considered as serious evidence of a trend toward greater sex restraint on the part of men. The Lynds [1937, 169] in a small sample of business-class persons in their twenties, found that 7 out of 10 of both sexes equally admitted pre-marital sex intercourse.

Much of this increase, at least as far as women are concerned, is due to the beginning of sex relations with future or intended spouse before the marriage ceremony. Thus in Terman's study there were four age groups of married women, each containing 60 or more persons: those born before 1890, between 1890–1899, between 1900–1909, and born in 1910 or later. There was a continuous increase of non-virginity at marriage from the oldest to the youngest group, from 5 per cent to 23 per cent when only the relations with other than spouse are counted, and from 9 per cent to 45 per cent with spouse only. This makes the total non-virginity at marriage increase from 14 per cent among women approximately in their fifties, to 26 per cent among those in the forties, 49 per cent among those in the thirties, and 68 per cent among those in their twenties.

A study of tourist camps near Dallas, Texas [Hooker, 1936], was made by noting license numbers on parked cars and by interviewing managers and employees. It was found that inordinately large proportions of Dallas people stayed at the camps, which were near their own homes, that in one sample only 7 out of the 109 Dallas couples gave their correct names and addresses, that many remained only a few hours. The investigators estimated that 2,000 Dallas couples use the camps over a weekend. The couples and the camp personnel cooperate to preserve anonymity. One proprietor remarked that *bona fide* tourists were a nuisance because they stayed all night and thus limited the income. About 60 per cent of the owners of the parked cars in one sample belonged to the business-professional-white-collar class (whose quota of urban population is only about 30 per cent). The customers whose addresses (without specific publication, of course) were approximately spotted on a map, were found to come from better residential areas rather than slums or disorganized areas. Investigators judged that the commercialized sex relations were practically negligible as compared with "couple trade." Several girls were seen to arrive in evening dresses.

In the Landis study, about 24 per cent of the normal and 18 per cent of the abnormal (combined single and married) admitted pre-marital complete intercourse; this was relatively more common among native stock and Protestants than among Catholics, Jews, or foreign stock; among socially attrac-

tive normal women than among the unattractive normals; and among those who had good adjustment in marriage than those who had poor. Petting was much more common among the normals, both single and married, than the abnormals.

CHANGES IN ATTITUDES TOWARD SEX BEHAVIOR. Despite these tendencies in behavior, an opinion poll [Pringle, 1938] cross-sectioning American women found only 14 per cent answering "yes" to the question, "Do you think the difficulty of getting married nowadays ever justifies young people in having sexual relations before marriage?" Twenty-two per cent of the women under 30, however, said "yes." Only 41 per cent of all the women said "yes" to the question, "Do you believe it is right for young people to pet or kiss any person but the one they expect to marry?" A *Fortune Magazine* poll,* asking, "Do you think it is all right for either or both parties to a marriage to have had previous sexual experience?" got an answer of "all right for both," from 22 per cent of all persons questioned, 27 per cent of persons under 40, and 38 per cent of students.

Hornell Hart has attempted to measure the changing attitude toward free love by counting approving and disapproving magazine articles, motion picture films, and the like. It is clear from all indicators that public toleration is much greater than it was in 1900. In 1931–1932 the movies were the most radical of all the mediums studied; the "intellectual" magazines were next; the women's magazines next. The sensational magazines were the most conservative in expressed attitude, although at the same time devoting the most attention to *narratives* of sex irregularities. Hart [1933, 421], while admitting the causal influence of the automobile, birth control, industrialization, urbanization, and the breakdown of patriarchal ideology, believes that "a major factor in recent shifts of attitudes toward sex behavior has been the breakdown of traditional religious control and partially worked out attempts to substitute scientific criteria." One indicator in fiction is the change in the nature of the obstacle used to create suspense. In the older novel the hero struggled, before marriage, to win his heroine against the obstacles of her unwillingness, parental opposition, or the interference of the villain. In recent literature the obstacle is often a triangle situation developing after marriage, and the hero is not always the husband. [Neumann, 1928.]

Peters, Dysinger, and Ruckmick attempted to find out whether the moral code of the moving pictures is "higher" or "lower" than that

* April, 1937, p. 188.

of their audiences. By questioning 18 social groups as to what they approved in actual life they learned that the movies prevailingly represent girls as more aggressive in love-making than the audiences approve, and that in respect to kissing scenes they represent the audience code rather accurately. In the treatment of children by parents, the movies were found to represent a code more democratic than that of the audience! [Charters, 1933.]

We have less information about attitudes or behavior which concern extra-marital sex relations of married persons.

Hamilton's subjects divided themselves (in general) into the groups shown in Table 30.

TABLE 30 *

ATTITUDES TOWARD ADULTERY

	Men	Women
Conservatives—adultery impossible or difficult to justify	15	32
Liberals—adultery justified under certain circumstances	69	55
Radicals—adultery needs little or no justification	16	13
	100	100

* G. V. Hamilton and K. MacGowan, *What Is Wrong with Marriage?* 1930, Boni, p. 241.

Probably the group was more radical than average, and not very representative of American public opinion. Twenty-eight per cent of the men and 24 per cent of the women had engaged in extra-marital relations. Yet the ratio of all divorces to all marriages in the group was only about 1 to 17. It was interesting that in men illicit behavior before marriage was strongly correlated with illicit behavior after marriage, whereas the women showed no correlation between pre-marital and post-marital unconventionality. Terman's group were not asked this question, but were asked if they ever desired extra-marital relations, to which 73 per cent of wives and only 28 per cent of husbands replied "never" [p. 336].

Blanchard and Manasses [1930] made a study of attitudes among 252 girls, of whom about half were college students and the rest mainly employed in higher grade occupations. Forty-seven per cent regarded extra-marital (evidently understood as pre-marital) sex relations as immoral; 45 per cent as not immoral but unwise; 7 per cent as permissible. Fifty-five per cent would not disapprove such relations in their girl friends, and 71 per cent would continue the friendship after such a fact was discovered. Yet also 71 per cent would definitely not break an engagement with a man who had had pre-marital sex relations. When it comes to behavior after marriage, only 16 per cent say that a married woman should go out (i.e., on purely social

"dates") with men friends; 20 per cent are undecided; and the remaining 64 per cent answer no. Their attitudes toward a married man taking out women friends have almost exactly the same distribution. Apparently the girls hold a double standard, which is not entirely a stricter standard for girls than for boys, but largely a stricter standard for themselves than for other girls or for boys.

In a questionnaire study of attitudes in a large Eastern university student body, 69 per cent of the women, but only 50 per cent of the men, said that there were no acts which were worse for a woman than for a man. [Katz and Allport, 1931.]

Several studies suggest that the still greater conservatism of young women than of men in sex behavior today is at least partly due to the fear of the girls that they will not make desirable marriages. Many of the girls, it appears, would like to have a single standard of behavior, but they fear the still-lingering double standard among the men and feel obliged to submit to it.

Cuber and Pell [1941] have made a study of attitudes by a new and promising technique. Instead of asking simple generalized questions they presented twelve concrete situations, in about two hundred words each. All situations were taken from fiction or from actual personal experience. About each situation a few questions of moral judgment were asked. There were 106 male and 111 female subjects, all college or graduate students. This situation is illustrative:

> Betty is suing Andrew for divorce. She says that he was a good husband, a good provider—in all, a model man. But she has fallen "out of love with him." Not that she has fallen in love with anyone else; just out of love with him. Several of her friends have tried to influence her to "go on" with Andrew and try to fall back in love with him. "Time may make a change," and all that. She is determined to get the divorce. She says that, if she isn't happy, sooner or later he'll become unhappy too, "and then he'll hate me. Before that happens I will just pass out of the picture as his wife. Soon he will forget. I'm sorry about the whole thing, but I made a mistake when I married him. I did it all in good faith at the time, however."
>
> (*a*) Is it wrong for Betty to secure a divorce for this reason?, (*b*) is it wrong for Andrew to try to dissuade her?, (*c*) would it be wrong for Andrew to try to contest the divorce? *

* John F. Cuber and Betty Pell, "A Method for Studying Moral Judgments Relating to the Family," *American Journal of Sociology*, 47:12–23 (1941), University of Chicago Press. By permission.

It was found that people's actual moral judgments do not fall readily into the logical categories often used in generalized questionnaires. To the general proposition, "Common-law marriage is always wrong, and every individual entering into such a relationship is to be morally condemned," 93 per cent answered "yes." Yet a half hour later a short story was read to the group portraying a woman, who was obviously a common-law wife, in a favorable light. When asked, "Was the behavior of this woman morally wrong?" 91 per cent of the same informants said "no." Eighty-three per cent of the informants disclaimed all regard for the double standard, but when asked to evaluate concrete situations, 56 per cent of these "single standard" believers condemned identical moral deviations more severely in women than in men.

Attitudes were found to be more differentiated according to the sex of the informant than according to age, church affiliations, or Catholic-Protestant difference. Only 29 per cent of the men condemned a case of pre-marital intercourse with one's fiancé, but 41 per cent condemned intercourse with a prostitute. The women were much more disapproving of both of these deviations, and curiously enough they condemned the pre-marital intercourse (68 per cent) more than they did the prostitution (59 per cent).

Only 41 per cent of men and 52 per cent of women condemned a case of extra-marital vacation affairs frankly admitted by both partners. This combined with other presented situations seems to indicate that the attitude toward extra-marital love varies enormously with the circumstances, and is not clearly or uniformly less tolerant than the attitude toward other deviations.

The Harts [1941, 23] present a graph of Terman's findings that virginity at marriage steadily decreased (in his sample) from the generation born in 1880 to that born in 1910. The graph shows that *if the trends continue,* virginity at marriage will become zero for men born after 1925 and for women born after 1935. Elsewhere [pp. 231–238] the Harts summarize evidence from several studies whose total effect is to show that "a somewhat smaller percentage of couples who have had pre-marital intercourse do later attain marital happiness." If we put these two things together, we must conclude that society is rapidly moving toward a condition which promises somewhat less happiness in marriage. However, the Harts recognize that attitudes have been changing and that the younger couples probably have been less disturbed by conscience and other factors which subjected the older couples to greater risk of unhappiness as result of pre-marital intercourse. In any case, of course, the ultimate influence of a social deviation which later becomes customary cannot be judged from its effects upon

the early rebels, who like other innovators have to suffer penalties whether their innovation turns out to be good or bad.

A couple born about 1870 had intercourse before marriage with good satisfaction. After marriage their sex and other relations became unsatisfactory and they were finally divorced. The wife often blamed the later sexual maladjustment upon the "wrongdoing" before marriage, which gave them a "bad start" and "spoiled it all." This case is perhaps typical of many of its generation.

TYPES OF SEX BEHAVIOR: NEW DIFFERENTIATIONS. Many of the studies cited have been preoccupied with the statistics of virginity. Indeed, this was a socially meaningful concept, not only because it drew the line between pregnancy risk and complete safety, but also because it had a kind of moral-magical significance. Virginity also implied a certain restraint in total sex behavior. Today, however, the phrases "technical virginity" and "completed intercourse" in themselves tell a large part of the story of change. They reflect a tremendous increase in the social extent and the individual intensity of petting, which is still sharply differentiated from complete intercourse in safety, and considerably as regards moral appraisal, but which as an emotional experience often closely approaches intercourse. Some thirty years ago the attitude was rather general among young women that they should not allow a man to kiss them except after engagement or under rare circumstances. Today the question of "how far to go" beyond kissing may come up with almost any "date."

It would seem that a more useful classification of persons would be in terms of their total sex behavior pattern, including the frequency, partnership, and circumstances of petting, intercourse, and other sexual activities, rather than in terms of the semi-magical status of virginity versus non-virginity. Indeed such a classification has been made by Bromley and Britten [1938] in their study of 1,300 college students. As a result of 1,088 questionnaires and 276 personal interviews with students, they classified them as follows, recognizing that many individuals are near border lines and could be classified into more than one type.

Among the girls, about 12 per cent are Victorian-virginal, completely unawakened sexually and accepting parental standards without question; about 24 per cent belong to the "wait-for-marriage type," who have decided, either through idealism or prudence, to defer intercourse until after marriage; about 37 per cent belong to an ill-defined type which is technically virgin

but approves of intercourse outside of marriage under some circumstances so that its future is uncertain; about 11 per cent, called "the loving," have gone the whole way with sex because they have placed the claims of a particular love relation above those of any conventional code; about 9 per cent are "experimenters" who have dared to indulge in sex because of their ideas or emotional maladjustments, in a rather serious way; about 3 per cent are "sowers of wild oats," who have indulged rather promiscuously after the fashion of the traditional male; about 2 per cent are homosexual; ½ of 1 per cent are married and ½ of 1 per cent are "remorseful."

Among the boys, 44 per cent are uninitiated sexually; 7 per cent are homosexually inclined, with or without experience; 14 per cent are pragmatists, who indulge sexually but with an awareness of the practical results of their behavior; 7 per cent are "discriminating: inheritors of the epicurean tradition"; 7 per cent are "romantics," who have also had sexual experience but are much influenced by their ideals; 21 per cent are "hot-bloods," whom the authors describe as "inveterate hunters" who have had relations with from 5 to 50 girls each.*

PROSTITUTION IN RELATION TO GENERAL SEX FREEDOM. The simple and, in some ways, meaningless statistics of female sex behavior are significant, however, in relation to trends in prostitution.

The trend in both Europe and America is toward the repression of institutionalized prostitution. In the nineteenth century, prostitution was accepted as a necessary evil and even as a safeguard for virtuous women against the excess passions of men. In France, Italy, Belgium, Austria-Hungary, and Russia it was licensed and regulated; in Anglo-Saxon and Scandinavian countries it was silently tolerated. Around 1911 it was estimated that there was about one professional prostitute per 330 population in New York, 440 in Chicago, 500 in Philadelphia. [Elliott and Merrill, 1934, 180–181.] In the period 1909-1919 prostitution in America became the subject of many investigations, and many new state laws were enacted to prevent it. The campaign to prevent venereal disease in the army in 1918 lent further impetus to the reform movement. By 1921 all but three states had enacted laws punishing those who forced women into prostitution, who pandered, or lived off, the earnings of prostitution. A federal law called the Mann White Slave Act had been enacted forbidding the interstate transportation of females for immoral purposes.

Yet despite the efforts of reformers and much legislation, the American Social Hygiene Association found that prostitution conditions in

* From review in the *Bulletin of Family Research and Education*, 1:2 (April, 1940), 11–12.

American cities were no better in 1935–1936 than they were in 1932–1933 or 1927–1928. [Johnson, B., 1936; Johnson and Kinsie, 1933.]

Yet the meaning of these trends cannot be deciphered without some analysis of the different kinds of "prostitution" and "prostitutes." Studies of prostitutes have shown that they are disproportionately of lower class origin, disorganized home backgrounds, and inferior intelligence. It must be remembered, however, that the subjects who are studied are the ones who have gotten themselves into court. In most social phenomena, court cases represent the less intelligent, the less skilful, and the less prosperous individuals—those who are less able to conceal their behavior or purchase immunity. Prostitution develops especially where there is a great excess of men over women. Prostitutes have been always in our culture a degraded class, whereas in the Orient they enjoy a more respectable and even esthetic status.

But perhaps the character of Western "prostitution" is changing, and this is not easily measured by the gross figures.

Dr. Ben Reitman [1931], whose practice gives him access to many intimate sources of information, estimates that in the city of Chicago there are fully 100,000 women (prostitutes and others) who give illicit sex satisfaction to 500,000 men. This makes about 12 per cent of women aged 15–44, and 45 per cent of all men aged 20–65.

It might be more important to know the number of illicit *acts* rather than of persons who at some time had committed such an act. If statistics were gathered from this angle, it is quite probable that all illicit sex behavior would prove to be a very small quantity compared with sex behavior within marriage. If we assume that 30 per cent of adult men are violators with an *average* violation rate of once per month and that 50 per cent are leading a conventional married life, with an intercourse rate of 8 times per month (estimated to be the median by Harvey), and the remaining 20 per cent are practically celibate, we get the ratio of 1 illicit to 13 married sex acts.

Reitman in 1931 distinguished eleven categories of unconventional women:

(1) "Juvenile" prostitutes, girls from ten to fifteen who often appear in Juvenile Court on sex charges; (2) "potential" prostitutes, who are willing to accept money for sex relations which, however, may also be on a voluntarily free basis; (3) "amateur" prostitutes, who sell themselves occasionally but who continue to live at home; (4) "young professional" prostitutes, who have recently entered the regular life of a wanton; (5) "old professional" prostitutes, established residents of houses of prostitution; (6) "field workers," streetwalkers, who take men to their cheap rooms or to hotels:

(7) "bats," superannuated prostitutes, rendered unattractive by drink and drugs to all but the least particular among the bums and homeless men; (8) "gold-diggers," called "boulevard" women, living in residential hotels and fine apartments; (9) "kept women," who may supplement their income from their regular patron by mercenary relations with other men; (10) "loose" married women, who deceive their husbands and receive pay; (11) "call girls," who receive remuneration from relations with men arranged by telephone calls from disorderly-hotel keepers and the like.*

These types are all technically prostitutes in that they receive economic benefits, directly or indirectly, in exchange for illicit intercourse. Apart from them are the modern women who engage in pre-marital and extra-marital relations purely for love, for physical satisfaction, or to express their "freedom," indignantly rejecting any economic compensation other than incidental social entertainment. Presumably most of Hamilton's and Terman's women sex violators were governed by these motives. Non-commercial sex unconventionality is not confined, however, to the educated classes. In some working-class communities there is much pre-marital intercourse of couples who later marry. As to the "middle" class, Judge Lindsey estimated that among high school girls in a large western city, eliminating those who have no social contacts with boys at all, 90 per cent engage in hugging and kissing, 50 per cent in more extreme sexual stimulation, and 15 to 25 per cent in intercourse; and that at least 50 per cent of high school boys experience intercourse before leaving school. He says further: "We found from our records that of 495 girls we dealt with who confessed to illicit sex relations, only one in twenty encountered pregnancy." †

The conditions, of course, may vary greatly among regions. In a disorganized New England community, suburban to a large city, it is reported that illicit sex relations became so common among the young people connected with a large church, that half of a class of girls in their teens had a record of illegitimacy as a result of relaxed vigilance during the summer of a single year. These girls had for years enjoyed the advantage of trained and devoted teachers and church leadership. [Steiner, 1928, 131.]

* Ben Reitman, M.D., *The Second Oldest Profession,* Vanguard Press, 1931. Statement arranged by Mabel A. Elliott and Francis E. Merrill, *Social Disorganization,* Harper and Brothers, 1934, pp. 182–183. By permission of Harper and Brothers.

† Benjamin B. Lindsey and W. Evans, *The Revolt of Modern Youth,* Brentano, 1925, p. 105. See also pp. 56–66.

In Peck and Wells' study, two-thirds of the men college graduates who confessed to illicit intercourse said that none had been had with prostitutes; only about a fifth had their relations confined to prostitutes. [1923, 1925.]

The situation of the 1930's was complicated by the depression. This may have led to a temporary revival of old-fashioned prostitution through economic necessity. Furthermore, the weakening taboos plus economic need may have led many women to drift into a habit of taking pay for sexual relations which they were originally and sometimes willing to practice for their own pleasure alone. Such a life often pays better both in money and in pleasure than the industrial job which the woman might otherwise hold; and the dangers, while not by any means to be ignored, are rightly or wrongly believed to be less inevitable than in earlier days. As Reitman shows, there are many who live in the indistinct borderland between "prostitution" and "free love."

In Germany, regulated prostitution, formerly tolerated in certain districts at the discretion of the police, was definitely forbidden in 1927. The number of publicly recognized prostitutes had decreased since 1870, and the men who promoted the business sank lower and lower in social repute (in 1860–1870 they were "solid businessmen"). On the other hand, it was estimated (before the Nazi regime) that the "free prostitute," as distinguished from the organized and regulated variety, was five times as numerous as 50 years ago. [Albrecht, 1930.]

If "prostitution" were defined as the same type of person and behavior to which the word referred before 1920, it might well be found that there has been a decrease.

Only in Russia, with its rather sudden revolution of sex mores, does the picture of these trends become clear. It must be remembered, of course, that even before 1917 there was probably more extra-marital intercourse there than in the United States, and that there was some faint trace of an approach toward the single standard, at least in comparison with Latin Europe. Yet in Soviet Russia, sex freedom has gone far beyond anything we know in the United States. Of 1,450 Moscow working men questioned, only 22.6 per cent had had their first sex experience with wife, fiancée, or mistress; 50.1 per cent had had the first experience with an acquaintance, 7.3 per cent with a stranger, 20.0 per cent with prostitutes. [Barash, 1926; Hindus, 1929.] Among Moscow students more than half had had intercourse before the age of 16. During the Revolution, intercourse between acquaintances became prevalent and largely displaced prostitution. [Hart,

1931, 381.] Only 1.7 per cent of the women and 2.4 per cent of the men in a large Moscow school admitted that they expected to find the ideal sexual life in marriage. [Pinkevich, 1929.] But in a study of 550 women students about 1925 by Dr. Weissenberg [1925], 55 per cent of the unmarried anticipated their future happiness through marriage; 42 per cent through a permanent love relationship; and only 3 per cent through casual affairs. Of the married, 53 per cent favored extra-marital intercourse. Thirty-seven per cent of 20–24-year-old peasant women in Russia reported pre-marital sex experience, as against 23 per cent of women of all ages. [Gurewitsch and Woroschbit, 1931.]

Russia more than any other country has definitely reduced prostitution, but at the same time has experienced a great increase in free sexual relationships by mutual desire. Russia's campaign against prostitution has used these methods: (1) educating men as to dangers of venereal disease; (2) removing economic incentive of prostitution by giving women equal wages and opportunities; (3) restoring self-respect to former prostitutes through vocational training for both manual and mental occupations; and (4) removing the economic hindrances to marriage by subsidizing mothers and children, enabling mothers to continue earning, and so on. [Elliott and Merrill, 1941, 264.] The ideology of the campaign, instead of centering upon the protection of marriage or the immorality of sex outside marriage, centers about the immorality of exploiting, injuring, and degrading a specialized class of women for the physical pleasure of men, and of spreading disease through these impersonal and irresponsible sex contacts.

In New York City Judge Anna Kross, without going into the broader ideology of sex, has recommended a practical policy of treatment of prostitution, which has some implications similar to the above. She would make disease prevention and cure the main objective, would use social workers in place of policemen, informal tribunals and clinics instead of criminal courts, sex and mental hygiene guidance for the entire community.*

UNMARRIED COHABITATION. According to Groves [1929] in his summary of changes in the family during the year 1928, observers reported the belief that in large cities there was a considerable increase in the number of young couples living together without legal marriage.

In form this tendency looks like a reversion to the principle of common-law marriage. In its social role and significance it is, how-

* *New York Times*, March 9, 1935, p. 2c.

ever, something quite different. Common-law marriage was related to ignorance, to unexpected pregnancies, to a policy of drifting on the part of the less educated classes. This modern tendency is a more deliberate policy, backed more or less by a definite philosophy, and practiced by young people of high education and "good" social background. It thrives in the Greenwich villages, and the rooming-house and downtown apartment areas of large cities where anonymity can be had and landladies ask no questions. It is encouraged by social mobility.

From a study of relief clients in an upstate city of New York State it was estimated that out of 1,200 open, recurrent, and closed cases on home relief, about 200 involved unmarried cohabitation. A study of 100 such couples definitely known to be unmarried disclosed that in about 70 cases there was a legal obstacle to marriage (usually one of the partners being married to another and unable to get a divorce). One man had in fact served a jail sentence for immoral living in Ohio, where divorce and remarriage are easier to arrange. In the other 30 cases, there was an unconventional or other attitude unfavorable to marriage, mental defect, parental objection, desire to conceal their illegal status, and the like.

Social workers run across underprivileged families in shacks and hovels in rural districts or on the outskirts of towns, which they designate as "immoral." Descriptively the term is often very apt, in that (1) these families fail to conceal from the general public their sexual irregularities, (2) they practice them in unesthetic and "sordid" physical surroundings, accompanied by dirt, disorder, and vulgar language, and (3) the woman's illicit sex behavior is known to her husband or father and often exploited for financial gain, and (4) this behavior is often known to the children. Thus such a family violates four important taboos in addition to the simple taboo against sex outside of marriage. Under some modern codes of mores, it may indeed be asked whether those four accessory violations do not constitute the whole of the immorality!

One relief client, in fact, told the investigating visitor with some heat that he had a right to cohabit with two women in his home. In view of his poor education it seems unlikely that he had acquired any "modern" ideas of sex freedom. His apparent mentality was so low that it was suggested he might be unable to observe or absorb the community mores; that he was "unmoral" rather than immoral. Yet it seems more probable that he represented something of a real culture group, a crude, localized ideology within the "lower-lower" class. Studies of cultures and cultural learning suggest that a person has to

be much more feeble-minded than this man to be truly "unmoral" in the sense of not being aware of the mores to which he is actually exposed.

ILLEGITIMACY. Illegitimate births in 1938 were 20.5 per 1,000 of all births among the white population, 41.1 per 1,000 for the whole population.* There seems to have been a small rise in this rate since World War I, the estimates for 1915 and 1920 being about 15 per 1,000 for the white population. However, in absolute terms illegitimacy has not increased since the total birth rate has decreased greatly since 1915. New York City, both in 1915 and 1930, had the lowest illegitimacy rate of all large cities, 12 and 13 per 1,000 births; in 1930 Boston had a rate of 44, Pittsburgh 42, St. Paul 45, Denver 56, Kansas City 95. The low rate reported for New York may be due to false statements by mothers, or to greater use of contraception or abortion. Ruth Reed [1934] says the real rate in New York is shown by social agency records to be much higher. The excessive rate for Kansas City is due to the presence of maternity hospitals and homes which make a commercial business of caring for unmarried mothers, many of them having good family backgrounds, from the surrounding country. These hospitals even advertise in the small-town papers. The infants are placed for adoption and every effort is made to keep the girl's motherhood a secret. [Elliott and Merrill, 1934, 168–169.]

The foreign born have generally lower illegitimacy rates than the native whites in the United States. Yet in general, Europe shows higher rates of illegitimacy than does the United States. There is an area of high illegitimacy, with rates of 100 to over 200 per 1,000 total births, extending from Hungary and Austria through Germany to Denmark and Sweden. England, Italy, and Switzerland show much lower rates, around 40, but these are higher than the American rates. Latin American rates are very high, as far as known, ranging from 200 to 700 per 1,000 births.†

The evil or suffering which results from illegitimacy is not indicated by the rate. It is probable that the consequences are less severe where the rates are high, because a high rate reflects a culture which tolerates the situation and makes easy adjustment possible. In a mountain community which may be more or less typical of the Southern Appalachian region, it is reported that little or no stigma attaches

* *U. S. Vital Statistics*, 1938.

† Elliott and Merrill, 1934, 170–172, and article on "Illegitimacy" in *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 1929.

to unmarried motherhood. [Steiner, 1928, 169.] A similar tolerance exists in Austria, Sweden, and other European countries.

A follow-up study of 501 illegitimate children in Boston in 1924 gave the following results: died, 14 per cent; foster homes, 24 per cent; living with relatives, 32 per cent; adopted, on trial for adoption, or permanent custodial care, 7 per cent; unknown, 23 per cent.

A follow-up study of 82 unmarried mothers found that 2 had died and 9 could not be located. Of the remaining 71, 35 were married. Thirty of these had had no further sex irregularities, although many were promiscuous before marriage. Of the 71, 28 were classified as having better social status than at the time of the illegitimate maternity, 27 as the same, 16 as worse.*

A study of 161 unmarried mothers gave a median intelligence quotient of 76. Only 20 per cent were of normal intelligence. [McClure, 1931.] Ruth Reed [1934] found only 3 per cent of New York City unmarried mothers to be college or normal school graduates. The typical case is a domestic servant with only grammar school education, aged 16 to 24.

In the United States mothers usually separate from their illegitimate children although some states forbid this separation during the early months. In Europe there is a greater tendency to keep the children with their mothers, and this tendency is gaining here. Under the Social Security Act unmarried mothers may secure aid toward supporting their children in their own homes.

One of the most serious results of illegitimacy is the mental suffering felt by illegitimate children over their status. [Lundberg and Lenroot, 1920, 60–61.] This is also reflected in a common fear entertained by many other children that they might be illegitimate, although in fact they are not.

HISTORY OF ILLEGITIMACY. In order to suppress infanticide the church established foundling hospitals to care for illegitimate and other unwanted offspring, beginning in the sixth century in Italy. In Rome in the twelfth century, these hospitals began to fix *tours* or turn boxes in their walls so that a mother might place her baby in the box and depart undiscovered, knowing that the child would be received and cared for. Foundling hospitals have been abolished in France and Germany, but linger on in Austria, Italy, and the United States. The turn box was widely adopted in Spain, Portugal, and Italy, but was not introduced into France and Belgium until 1811. After fifty years' trial it was abolished by these two countries after it became evident that it was causing more infant deaths than it prevented. [Goodsell, 1930, 234.]

* I. R. Parker, 1923; see also Elliott and Merrill, 1934, 176–177.

A medieval law commanded that "ye shall not seek out the father of an illegitimate child." The early common law of England recognized no legal relationship of an illegitimate child to either father or mother, but in Queen Elizabeth's time a law was enacted compelling support by the father if he could be identified. American state laws have tended to ease the situation of the illegitimate by legitimizing the offspring of certain void or annulled marriages, by declaring that subsequent marriage of the parents legitimized the offspring, and by creating certain rights of inheritance. In California a father, even if married to another woman, may legitimize his bastard child by publicly acknowledging it and receiving it into his home with the consent of his wife. In other states, practically the same result can be achieved by legal adoption. In the great majority of states there are bastardy laws similar to the English law, by which the mother can compel support of the child by the father regardless of whether the child is legitimized. The sums of money provided by law or by court action are, however, usually inadequate.

A Connecticut court recently introduced into this country the use of the Landsteiner blood-grouping test which is widely used in Europe as evidence for or against fatherhood. The test was applied to a child, its unmarried mother, and the man alleged to be the father. The test showed that he was not the father, and the woman, confronted by the scientific evidence, dropped her charge. On the other hand, in a recent South Dakota case a man was sentenced to 16 years for rape and was refused permission to take a blood test to produce evidence of his innocence.*

The most advanced legislation on illegitimacy is that of Norway, adopted as a result of the efforts of John Castberg. There the state rather than the mother has the burden of establishing paternity and fixing the obligation of maintenance; full inheritance rights from the father are given; the child of an illegal or void marriage is deemed legitimate; support until the age of 16, according to the means of the better situated parent, is enforced. If the identity of the father is uncertain, several suspected men may be forced to contribute. [Clarke, 1940, 320.]

Arizona and North Dakota legitimize *all* children and give them equal rights regardless of birth out of wedlock, except that the "natural" child has no right to live in the home of his married father. New York, Massachusetts, California, and Texas no longer enter any record of illegitimacy on the birth certificate.

* *Time*, January 30, 1933, and January 15, 1934.

Although the inferior legal status of the illegitimate is thus being removed in accordance with democratic values, and although he may more easily conceal his status because of urban conditions and new legislation, yet where the facts are known he, and particularly his mother, are not "socially acceptable." Kingsley Davis [1939, B] thinks that society must always give a socially inferior status to the illegitimate unless it is willing either to abolish the family or to *compel* the use of contraception or abortion in illicit intercourse. But Russia has apparently evaded this drastic dilemma. Davis' clear but rigid analysis of this problem leaves out of account the fact that there are methods of social control other than punishment, and that society may set up positive values and preferred patterns without necessarily penalizing the non-conformist, and especially his innocent offspring.

It is significant that illegitimacy has increased very little despite the probably large increases in the number of women who engage in premarital or extra-marital sex relations.

Homosexual Affection as a Reaction to Increased Love Needs. One result of the cultural lag between the increasing need for love and the practical arrangements to promote it is an increase in homosexual love relationships. There is indeed much evidence of an increase in the homosexual conditioning of the physical sex reactions. To some observers the increase is alarming. Just why this should occur when the opportunities for heterosexuality are becoming more free is an interesting question. Homosexuality spreads; devotees in the effort to find partners educate younger persons whose attitudes are near the border line and thus bring them into the homosexual class. Furthermore, many persons still live in one-sexed institutions where they unconsciously develop homosexual attachments of a non-physical type. They may feel the impact of individualism and general emotional freedom before they gain practical opportunity to become reconditioned toward heterosexuality; their emancipation then takes the form of intensifying the personal contacts they have already learned to enjoy.

The great bulk of homosexual love is not, however, physical sexual expression. Most of it lies in the domain of affection, and on occasions it flares up into reactions essentially the same as those in heterosexual romance. Strong homosexual affection may exist even though the sexual reactions themselves are normally conditioned toward the opposite sex.

This less physical homosexuality, in America at least, is much more common among women than among men. Dr. Esther Harding sees

this tendency among women as playing a new and distinctive role in our culture. It is somewhat analogous to the idealized phases of male homosexuality of Greece, as described in Plato's symposium, and to the fraternal relationships of Knights in the Age of Chivalry.

> In the last fifty years friendships between women have come in a similar way to hold a place of unprecedented importance in the community. This change in the emotional life of women is significant not only for the individual but also for our whole civilization, for we are passing today through a distinct phase of culture like those which affected men so profoundly in the past.*

Many women today, especially in the more educated classes, are making a major relationship with another woman instead of marrying and raising families. The earlier unmarried feminists affected masculinity of dress, manner, and interests. Their present successors have reverted toward distinctly feminine symbolisms. In many cases women who formerly lived at a club or residential hotel are joining forces and setting up housekeeping together. They are setting up true homes with the same interaction patterns as in the normal family home.

EVALUATION OF CHANGING LOVE MORES IN RELATION TO DEMOCRATIC VALUES. It is clear that not only behavior, but also standards of behavior, or mores, are changing. The mores apparently lag behind the behavior changes, so that for some period of time we have increasing violation of the existing mores. In this sense there is more "immorality." But according to apparent trends and the history of other comparable social changes, we may expect this to reach limits and eventually to diminish. This will happen not by a reversal of the trends of behavior, but by the changing of the mores to fit more closely the actual behavior, so that some new position of stability will be reached. However, the love mores may not only be changing but diversifying. The codes of different conservative and radical groups may not altogether represent stages in a one-way movement, but departures in different directions. In any event, the present state of our love and sex mores is chaotic, inconsistent, and transitory. It cannot endure.

Having given up the supernatural, absolute sanctions of the past, the nearest we can come to a permanent authoritative standard is the principle of Democracy, in which we have decided to place our faith. This, as we have seen, implies the minimum of suffering, justice be-

* Esther Harding, *The Way of All Women*, Longmans, Green, 1933, p. 107. By permission.

tween individuals and groups, and the greatest possible freedom of individual development.

It is quite appropriate therefore that we evaluate the on-going changes in terms of the larger scheme of values we call Democracy, and that we try to guide changes by that criterion. This does not preclude the development of a more flexible code than we have had in the past, with greater provision for individual variations. But certain values may be found inconsistent with one another or out of line with the general aim.

The immediate task of Democracy is to remove injustices and to equalize opportunities. Its long-run task is to study the needs of human beings and to contrive how to raise the general level of satisfactions and opportunities for personal development.

The older pattern of sex life was in effect a caste system. Not only were women (and they still are) a caste apart from men, but women were subdivided into castes: the virtuous, and the "immoral" woman or prostitute. The virtuous were again subdivided into two status groups: the married, who if they were lucky might get a good sex life, and the unmarried, who could have no such life without serious risk of falling into a degraded status which blended gradually with that of the prostitute. Men were never thus categorized on the basis of their sexual behavior. Whenever society attempted to control sex relations outside of marriage, it penalized the women rather than the men. Men could vary their sexual behavior throughout a wide range of possibilities to suit their individual needs; women were confronted with a categorical "either—or."

However we may deplore certain aspects of it, the "single standard" which is slowly developing is at least in the direction of greater democracy.

But this single standard is still far from realization. Even among young unmarried people, where it is perhaps best developed, the risks and penalties attached to sex are still much greater for the woman, as the Bromley-Britten study well shows. But there is reason to suspect that the gains in equality among youth may be accompanied by an increased injustice as between older and younger women.

The transitional condition of the mores places the older woman in an especially unfair position. In the effort to break the "holy deadlock" of hopelessly unhappy marriages, we have made her, particularly if she has brought up children, the chief loser. According to the weight of evidence, divorced men are more likely to remarry than are divorced women. The greater freedom of the younger women gives

them added opportunity to attract older men. Also, the increased tolerance of the mores toward female initiative in courtship applies mainly to the young. An older woman will be ridiculed and held in contempt for doing, under stress of painful need, what a young woman with her much "rosier" prospects may "get away with."

In Denmark, it was reported by Dorothy Bromley, the law of divorce by mutual consent has resulted in the frequent discarding of middle-aged wives for younger women. In Europe there is a certain respect for the love needs of older men. We are told that it is common for the wife to consent to the divorce, although she herself does not wish it, for the sake of the husband. The Danish divorce rate on the whole is only half as great as the American, but the above-mentioned pattern seems to play a more conspicuous role.

Mrs. Bromley cited in *New York Times Magazine* several cases which outrage our sense of justice:

> A prominent member of the government divorces his wife to marry an actress, and his wife allows him to keep their 12-year-old boy, perhaps because she feels that the father can do more for him than she can. Friends express the greatest sympathy for the first wife, who is left quite alone, and yet no one criticizes the husband's action.
>
> Even highly educated men who might be expected to have a sense of values break up their marriage late in life. Two professors at the university, both of them married for more than twenty-five years—quite happily, everyone thought—divorce their wives to marry younger women. A lawyer, whose wife had waited for seven years to marry him and had helped him in his office all of that time, asks her for a divorce after ten years of married life, when he meets a woman whose beauty appeals to him . . .
>
> The lot of the divorced older woman is especially difficult in Denmark because she receives comparatively little alimony, even if unable to earn her own living. The amount is usually agreed upon in advance by the husband and wife, and the authorities have nothing to say about it. When the civil official or the judge fixes the alimony it is likely to be quite a small sum.
>
> This practice, in some cases, works an injustice on women who have small children to look after, or on others who are too old to find a gainful occupation. A milliner, for instance, was awarded but $10 a month for the support of her two children. An expectant mother, whose working-class husband had won a separation, was allowed $7.50 a month for four months, and after that $3 a month for the child.*

* Dorothy Dunbar Bromley, "Divorce in Denmark," *New York Times Magazine*, October 2, 1932, p. 6. By permission.

There will, no doubt, be further changes in our mores regarding sex and love outside of marriage. Democracy would seem to urge that these changes be guided with special consideration for the needs of widowed, divorced, unhappily married, and mature single women. Something also needs to be done for both men and women who are unattractive according to conventional standards.

Dora Russell, in an article entitled "Is Divorce Worth the Price?" says:

> Roughly speaking, the English have thought it more indecent to break a marriage than to have affairs *sub rosa,* while Americans on the whole have thought that it was more indecent to be unfaithful without accepting the consequences of a fairly prompt divorce.
>
> Lately the idea that it is right to set one's partner free when he or she really wishes it has gained ground in England. In order to give freedom to each other, men and women possessed of a higher standard of morality than is allowed for in our law have been increasingly willing to go through real hardships and disgrace to comply with the law's absurdities when cheating it by subterfuge no longer avails. At the same time, Americans seem perhaps to have been discovering that there may be greater disadvantages in insisting on the break-up of a pretty good home at the bidding of an uncertain romance than in mutual tolerance of infidelity.
>
> If this is so, then the American and English views have come nearer together, and there may be ground for hope that a new family morality built upon practical experience rather than taboos is being evolved.*

As long as the sex ratio remains near 100, we could largely if not entirely meet these unsatisfied human needs without any further increase in non-monogamous behavior. We might even reduce the technical violations of monogamy by a policy based frankly upon the needs of individuals. But such a policy would require the further development of organized, scientific mate finding. It would require a fuller and franker sex education and perhaps the willingness of the individual to discuss and to register his psychosexual peculiarities as readily as he does his recreational tastes. It might require some provision for temporary trial unions, whether called "marriage" or something else.

But the sex problem is tied up with the economic, and a fuller consideration of alternatives will be given in Chapter XX, after we have considered the economic problems of family life. Perhaps, however, the confusion of our values is partly a *semantic* problem; that is, we

* Dora Russell, "Is Divorce Worth the Price?" *The Nation* (1933), 136:84–85. By permission.

may have to decide exactly what we mean by the "conservation of monogamous marriage." If we define this technically in terms of sexual statistics such as presented in this chapter, we are on shaky ground. If, however, we decide that it means conserving a *value,* a preferred, creative way of life, and that the end is more important than the steps taken to achieve it, we may not only conserve but strengthen it.

Much of the older philosophy carries the subtle implication that sexual monogamy is not naturally desirable to most people, hence it must be upheld by stern laws and strict customs. If this is true, we ought to face it and study how to make plural sex relations practical and open instead of how to prevent them. The present writer does not believe it is true.

According to the older ideology we are all born "chaste," like Adam and Eve; we can only stay on that level or "fall." But perhaps we could develop a new ideal of a sex and love life toward which we could "rise."

Much if not most of the demand for greater sexual freedom today is really a desire to be unfettered in the search for a monogamous mate. What most people really want is not mere sex, but *total love,* in which romance plays a large part. They also want permanence and security of love. The real *need* for the permanent love of a single partner is greater than ever before. We can count less than before on being near our adult children or retaining their intense devotion. We can count less on remaining in a familiar and cherished home. So it becomes more important that we have security and permanence in the love of a mate. We say, "Whatever happens is not important so long as we have each other."

Chapter XVII

THE PROBLEM OF THE HOME

In collaboration with Marion Bassett

We have seen that the future of Democracy requires population replacement and happiness; and that happiness depends upon the early personality of the child achieved through good parent-child relations; we have seen that these depend in large part upon happy marriage, and that this in turn depends upon good mate selection and the art of married living. Some thinkers might be willing to end the discussion at this point with a closing chapter on education for marriage and on guidance and mental hygiene. They would imply that the main thing we have to do is to *teach individuals,* in as large numbers as possible, *how to live.* This teaching might include, perhaps, a chapter or two on how to manage the material phases of home life. The student might go away from all this with the impression that the American middle and upper classes have the best homes in the world, and all we need is to extend their equipment and methods to the underprivileged, and to adjust the personalities of the privileged so that they can live more happily in the fine homes they already have.

The present authors, however, conceive their duty otherwise. They agree that it is well for people to learn *how* to live better under existing conditions, with what they have. Yet it is still more important to learn to *think.* We Americans, British, French, and others did learn to live with some satisfaction and complacency in our world as it was from 1920 to 1940. It was a world supposedly made safe for Democracy. As a result of certain of our complacencies, we have almost lost that world.

It is interesting to note how many stories of happy, "normal" home life in this and other ages imply the presence of a domestic servant in the home. Is the normal home, after all, something pertaining only to the more privileged classes which can afford servants?

Home economics needs the same kind of critical study which our general economic system has been receiving since about 1910, and which, although painful and disillusioning to many, has resulted

already in some steps toward greater justice and equality of opportunity.

If we wish to help the rising and future generations to build happier marriage and home living than now on the average prevails, we must encourage them to reexamine the basic structure and assumptions of our present household economy. Guidance in operating under the present system is provided by other and excellent books; it is necessary and valuable. Yet it should be possible for intelligent persons to use this wisdom and to live within whatever limitations they must, without adopting the Pollyanna-like attitude of uncritical optimism which so often is a bar to progress.

There is a success-literature of homemaking today which is analogous to the Horatio Alger stories of a generation ago, which narrated how bright, industrious boys came to be bank presidents. Women who have been successful in their own lives often tend to attribute success mainly to good management or "mature" personality. Others, less successful, fear to complain, lest they thereby admit personal incompetence or emotional immaturity. The successful women are indeed to a large extent those who through luck have married "good providers."

A. HOUSING AND HOME LOCATION

While factories, stores, and schools have become larger, homes have remained small. The average household membership has decreased rather than increased. In the United States there were, in 1940, 34.8 million dwelling units and 3.8 persons per dwelling unit, as compared with 4.1 in 1930. Whereas there is a long-time trend toward the multi-family dwelling, this is true mainly of large cities and is not characteristic of the small, independent cities. [McKenzie, 1933.] America, like England and quite unlike Continental Europe, is a country of single-family houses. In cities over 100,000, the excess of the number of dwelling houses (buildings, not units) over the number of families in 1930 was only about 37 per cent. The retention of the single-family residence in America is due to: (1) the great separation of home from work place (less true of the Continent) which has involved greater distances with the coming of the automobile, (2) to the strong value placed upon the single-family home in Anglo-Saxon and frontier culture, and (3) to the great wealth of America which has made possible the extra expense of constructing a separate home for every family and, in the more prosperous classes, the great elaboration and beautification of the home.

SUBURBANIZATION, SLUM CLEARANCE, AND DECENTRALIZATION. Since 1929 the rate of new home building has been greatly retarded and, although the fact is not new, we are made increasingly aware that a third or more of our nation is ill-housed. In a broader sense, nearly all the nation is ill-housed because we have not built intelligently even when we have built expensively.

There is no space in this book to discuss economic or governmental machinery through which our housing may be improved. This is quite fully treated in other books.* We shall discuss only the results to be attained.

We have seen that there has been recently a strong trend toward suburbanization and that the residential populations of the congested central areas of cities have declined. This is on the whole a salutary development, but there is some waste involved in the decay of housing in the central areas which gives rise to slums and blighted areas. Many central areas, particularly in our Western cities which have not built tenements and tall apartment houses, could house far more population than they now do, with better light, air, health and play space. This could be done through the substitution of modern housing projects of a few stories in height for the present dilapidated two-story dwellings. One needs only to look out the train window during the first half-hour out of New York and again for a similar period before arrival in Chicago to see that there would be room for a greater increase of population within the built-up areas of Chicago than within the built-up areas of New York.

The major trend, however, unless automobile and tire shortage continues indefinitely, will probably continue toward decentralized living. The regional planners are hoping to guide this in a somewhat different direction than it has taken, namely, while the population has been drifting toward the suburbs of large seaboard and lake shore cities, it would be desirable to develop the more widely scattered interior cities and their suburbs, and to develop more semi-rural, semi-suburban residences in areas now sparsely populated. At the same time those rougher areas which are unfit for farming are being withdrawn more and more from cultivation, bought up by government, and reserved for forest and recreational purposes.

But between these extremes of the forest and the congested metropolitan areas there are vast lands in the United States which could be made into areas of good homes surrounded by ample space, through the development of farming and small industries in those areas. In-

* See Muntz, 1938, Ch. 6–11; Aronovici, 1939; Bauer, 1934.

deed it is only in recent years that responsible leaders have begun to plan the location of industry according to the needs of human living and the home. Until now the immediate needs and often foresight-lacking economics of industry have been the controlling factors in the location and growth of communities. The Tennessee Valley Authority and similar projected plans illustrate what can be done by the *socialized* planning of human localization.

It is misleading to talk about "*the* home" and "*the* community" of the future because we shall always have a great variety of homes and communities from which individuals may make a choice. Democracy asks that this variety be made even greater and above all that the freedom of actual choice be increased. This requires the development of our system of employment agencies and the establishment of more centralized machinery, both nationally and locally, for the finding of homes and home sites.

Yet the outcome will not be merely a net unplanned result of millions of individual choices, but is and will be guided by certain social movements and ideologies. Wherever one lives and whatever kind of home one has, one's life will be richer and more satisfying if one sees a meaning, a consistent scheme of values, in one's choice of a home, rather than something one comes upon merely by accident.

THE DECENTRALIST MOVEMENT. There is one broad movement with an ideology which is called the decentralist movement. It is represented by the School of Living at Suffern, New York, founded by Ralph Borsodi, and the monthly journal, *Free America.**

Borsodi has advocated the return-to-the-household type of solution for America. He thinks that factory production has gone farther than real efficiency justifies, and that the next epoch will witness a return to greater household production. This will be facilitated by numerous types of small machinery which can be operated in household establishments by electricity. Thus the factory system, by producing household machinery, comes to limit its own field in other sorts of production. Borsodi [1933, A, B] thinks that some goods will always be produced in factories, but that there are many commodities now factory-produced which could be made with more total satisfaction in a well-equipped household. Even the household loom might be revived.

It is illuminating to consider the real economic implications of Borsodi's plan. They are not what they appear to be superficially. *First,* the plan implies *more machinery* rather than less in the home.

* 112 East 19th Street, New York City.

It is really a plan looking toward decentralization of manufacturing. *Second,* if this household machine production were to prove efficient it would probably prove *more* efficient with a group of families cooperating and specializing somewhat, than with a complete outfit of the necessary equipment in every single household. What we would really achieve would be small, local, cooperative workshops; the women engaged would be employed much of the time either outside their own immediate domiciles, or else in producing within their own homes goods for sale or exchange. Thus, women would tend *toward greater specialization of labor* as they would under the frankly specializing "radical" proposals and the Russian policy. At least, their work *of any one day or any one week* would involve a greater concentration upon some one task than is practicable under modern conventional homemaking.

In consequence of these two implications of Borsodi's plan, a *third* seems to follow; namely, his plan seems to imply a movement away from national economy not toward family economy but toward *community* economy.

Lancelot Hogben [1937] blames urbanism for race suicide and thinks that ruralism rather than family subsidies will prove the effective remedy. This is the remedy urged by Zimmerman and Frampton [1935] and was heavily endorsed by the Nazis in Germany in their homesteading program.

If Germany had put all her efforts into this solution, which was well adapted to her situation of decreased markets for manufactures after World War I, instead of trying to regain markets and manufacturing supremacy through conquest and total control over Europe, the world would now be much better off. But America could not efficiently use an increased proportion of its people in agriculture unless this were combined with other occupations. We already have surplus food-producing capacity and a surplus of population on farms.

However, a ruralization based upon decentralized manufacture has large possibilities. A program which would permit a much larger proportion of the people to have rural homes and practice part-time agriculture, or merely to *live* part of the year in the country on simpler standards of living, while continuing to work part-time in the cities, would be ideal. It implies an increase in weekly rather than daily commuting, and more small apartments in the city to be occupied only part of the time, and the spreading of urban employment over a larger number of persons by having each work only part time. This requires a pattern of training for two or more alternate persons

to hold each specific job within a certain range of jobs. All this would be healthful, interesting, and democratic. An apparently increasing but yet small number of persons, up to the outbreak of the war, were living according to this pattern. It is particularly conspicuous in the area surrounding New York City by a hundred miles or more. It offers improved environment for the bringing up of children and for an interesting home life for adults. It would offer plenty of employment, including self-employment, after the war, in building, repairing, installing heating systems in rural houses, and other services.

However, this design for living will not prove democratic if it means that the women, regardless of their capacities and interests, are forced generally into the role of remaining in the rural home, taking care of children and the local details of work, while the men enjoy most of the variety and new stimulations thereby added to life. Such a program could be ideal, however, if (1) women could share the part-time urban jobs as much as they wished, if (2) the families which so lived could be large families containing more than two adults, or could live in small, compact groups of homes so that no one adult would have to be on duty all the time in the home, and if (3) the conflict between older rural values and mores and the more advanced urban codes could be solved, especially because of the strains placed upon children in the schools.

Socialized Planning of the Physical Communities. However, a large proportion of people will continue to live most of the time in cities and suburbs, and to buy most of their goods and services rather than produce them at home. Much needs to be done to clear slums, to build new housing projects, to separate houses from the main traffic arteries and face them inward toward greens, to construct footpaths and bicycle paths which under- or overpass the highways, to provide for better spacing of houses. Radburn, New Jersey, Greenbelt, Maryland, and Norris, Tennessee, are among the communities which illustrate what might be done.

For many families which will continue to live on a money economy, it will be well to provide more well-serviced apartment houses, or closely grouped single dwellings with various communal services. To a greater extent wives also may earn outside the home and have less labor in the home, which they may thereby enjoy more. Houses need to be planned with a view toward the cooperative employment of servants, the convenience of collective nursery rooms and nursery schools, and restaurants or other communal cooking and eating arrangements.

The typical summer camp for families, with its central dining hall and kitchen and its individual family lodges, constitutes a pattern which could be increasingly used in year-round living. It is strange that it has not been much more developed for this purpose. One suspects that it is not impractical but simply too different from the prevalent values.

SOCIAL PLANNING AND PROMOTION OF HOUSING. Something has been said about the housing schemes of Sweden and Russia. Austria also had an extensive governmental housing program before she was taken over by Germany. In 1933 there was a revival of the public housing movement in America under the spur of the depression. In 1934 the Federal Housing Administration was created to encourage banks to make loans for housing purposes by insuring them against loss. The United States Housing Administration, established in 1937, consolidated the efforts of several other federal agencies and received the right to make loans and to give contributions aggregating not over $28,000,000 per year to public housing authorities set up by state and local governments. New state legislation such as that of New York made it possible to use this federal assistance by permitting cities to acquire land and build houses to be rented to private dwellers. In 1942 the USHA and other federal housing agencies were combined into a National Housing Agency.

There were already some projects, such as Knickerbocker Village (in New York City), set up by private corporations which had limited dividend charters and therefore could borrow public money. Far-seeing architects and housing leaders are trying to persuade private builders that housing is a worth-while investment and enterprise if done under the best conditions. [Stein, C., 1940.] Prefabrication is being experimented with, and efforts are being made to reduce the burden of craft union rules in the building industry. After the war, rehousing may prove the most important opportunity to employ idle labor usefully.

Edith Elmer Wood [1939] exposes the fallacy that "bad housing is a problem only in big cities." It occurs in farms and villages as well where poor systems of water supply and sewage disposal exist. Another fallacy, that "the slums are made by the people who live in them" has been often disproved by the increase in living standards in transplanted slum dwellers.

Housing needs may be met in three ways. The author suggests: (1) houses for the well-to-do third of the nation by private builders for profit; (2) houses for the middle third by limited dividend or cooperative companies, and these at cost; (3) houses for the lowest third by public housing authorities with

subsidy. In the next ten years the author predicts that we will need roughly thirteen million housing units for replacement and to meet additional population needs. The latter, about 580,000 units a year, has always been in the hands of private builders and is still open to them. Replacement needs (about 527,000 units a year) might be the field of public housing beyond which it need not go.*

Aronovici [1939] questions the call for slum clearance played up from the point of view of charity or social service which stresses the filth and degradation involved. He suggests that the emphasis today might better be a consideration of the economic and business reasons for the continuance of the slums, and that "land speculation, low wages, high interest rates, bad planning, banking and investment policies" need rethinking and revising.

Although a believer in government participation (from local to federal agencies) in providing houses for low income groups, he nevertheless asks if we may not be destroying a democratic tradition in this country. He says, "But even assuming that the government would be in a position to meet all of the present demands for better housing for those who can not meet the cost, it seems to me that we would be creating a separate class of citizenry who would become 'housing wards' of the state. Such a situation is wrought with political, economic, and social dangers which I dare not contemplate."

Like others in this field the author feels that home ownership for the small and middle income group is an unwise economic investment today, housing finance being what it is, the wage-earner's income unsteady, obsolescence in housing so rapid, neighborhoods impermanent, the motility of many workers not of their own making, increasing and ever-growing tax rate. "The time may come when provisions will be made to meet all these contingencies, when cooperative housing will mean flexibility and security, when unemployment insurance and old-age pensions will be adequate to meet home ownership obligations, and when taxation will be shifted to the sources where it most logically belongs. When this is achieved we shall have no concern with the problems of home ownership. Until that time comes, the agencies which conspire to encourage and promote home ownership are a menace to the economic structure of the country. They are leeches sucking the lifeblood of the workers and their families." †

HOUSING MOVEMENT NEEDS MORE GUIDANCE BY FAMILY NEEDS. In view of a possibly enormous revival of house building after the war, it is urgent that the real needs of family living be made emphatically clear to the planners and architects. We can rebuild according to

* From review in *Bulletin of Family Research and Education*, 1:4 (September, 1940), 19–20.

† From review in *Bulletin of Family Research and Education*, 1:3 (June, 1940), 13–15. Quotation from Carol Aronovici. *Housing the Masses*, John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1939, p. 121. By permission.

traditional patterns, and thereby be saddled for generations with obstacles to the best development of democratic family living, or we can rebuild according to new patterns.

What new patterns are desirable? We have already discussed some desirable trends as to regional location. It may be suggested that the most up-to-date commercial housing already includes many types of houses admirably suited to the care of children. Still, these might be much better suited. The adaptation of houses to the needs of human inhabitants has never been studied as carefully as the adaptation of factory buildings to the needs of particular industries, or of barns and stables to the needs of various animals. Our cultural value of permanent home ownership, which comes down from our agricultural past, gives us a concept of "home," more or less standardized in its essential features, suitable for a childless couple and also for a couple with two or three children at any age. The tradition of the permanent family home has great values where it can actually be carried out. In practice it is increasingly violated by "moving" as the family income and needs change. A quicker and happier adjustment would occur if the past could be discarded ideologically where it must be discarded in practice. Then people would *plan* to move several times during their lives, as for example when the first child arrives and after the children are grown. They would come to expect a great deal more of built-in furniture and equipment and to diminish somewhat the equipment they move about with them. They would not have to give up all sentimental attachments to furniture; they might make these sentiments more worth while by limiting their scope.

The house of the future will place more stress upon function. It will be adapted, like a machine, to the services it is to perform. A special type of nursery house may be expected, giving so much space for children's play, feeding, and care, that such a house would be exceedingly wasteful for the childless. Another possible type will be a house to which units can be easily added as the family grows.

Gray and Staples [1929] secured opinions from 60 child welfare workers on the specialized housing needs of children. Prominent among the needs mentioned were a large, fenced yard *within the mother's view;* a shelter or other place to keep yard equipment without bringing it through doors into the house; a large room for noisy, violent play; a room in which children can study separate from bedroom and playroom; hooks, hangers, bathroom and kitchen fixtures placed at an elevation suitable for children; and a safe footway between home and school.

Only a few persons have looked at architecture from the standpoint of the sociologist. One of these is Svend Riemer, who has made careful studies of the use of the home in Sweden. [1941, A, C.] He has measured such things as the overcrowding of the kitchen around meal times and the relatively small use of the living room before dinner time.

The shifting from the central furniture arrangement to the modern arrangement of groups of furniture for different functions in different corners is shown as correlated with increasing individuation of family activities. The sociologist "cannot overlook the perhaps irrational and sentimental but important function of the traditional 'parlor.'" The smaller the apartment the greater is the tendency of adolescents to spend evenings outside the home.

Dr. Riemer admits that the sociologist himself will never be able to plan a home. His task is to give his judgment to the architect regarding social consequences of the different designs that are economically and technologically possible. On the other hand, the architect who is not equipped with insight into prevailing conditions and a knowledge of the problems of modern family life "is guided by unreliable prescientific intuition." *

Chapin [1940] has found that families rehoused in a USHA housing project improve in social participation, in social status, in the condition of the furnishings of the living room, and in getting away from "use-crowding" of rooms. The latter term refers to a room used both for a living room and bedroom, or the like. There was, however, no significant improvement in morale or general personal adjustment. All these improvements or non-improvements were compared with those of a control group of 38 families residing in the same slum, similar in other respects but not rehoused. The improvements noted were relative to this group, and also absolute.†

THE PATTERN OF THE INDIVIDUAL HOUSE. The traditional house is a box. It is made to look well from the outside; it faces the street, and, as with many of its inhabitants, the "front" hides a multitude of evils. There are of course many interesting variations, and the whole history of domestic architecture, with its successive innovations and styles and "movements," is a most fascinating subject. About the time of World War I it became fashionable to have small houses or bungalows and to emphasize neatness, equipment, and compactness at the expense of space. The "love-nest" ideal and the two-child family ideal reflected themselves in housing styles. Since then, floor

* From review in *Bulletin of Family Research and Education*, 2:2–3, April-June, 1941), 30.

† From review in *Bulletin of Family Research and Education*, 1:5–6 (November-December, 1940), 28. By permission.

space has tended to increase and now there is a trend toward large living rooms, different corners of which may be used for different purposes.

Under the influence of Le Corbusier and other modern architects, new houses more frequently show "functional" characteristics. The new idea, slowly emerging, is that a house should be built from the inside out. Light, air, and living convenience are most important. In some of the extreme designs there are overhanging roofs, low ground floors, and one hardly knows where the house ends and the garden begins. But it will be many years yet before any substantial proportion of the populati n can have houses other than the traditional types. Housing is a part of culture in which there must be a long lag between invention and generalized diffusion. While the old houses endure, they must, through sheer economic laws, be used—by someone. Fortunately many of them were jerry-built.

In general, our needs call for more houses of adequate size for families, and especially for various types of grouped houses to facilitate cooperative living.

B. THE PROBLEM OF HOMEMAKING

As a guide to the multitudinous facts and figures of homemaking, one should consult such books as Dr. Andrews' *Economics of the Household* [1935]. Here we are concerned with the crucial problems of the home.

THE DRIFT OF WOMEN AWAY FROM THE HOME IS VERY SLOW. The number of women engaged in homemaking was not directly ascertained by the Census until 1930. Then it was found to be 24,481,778. For earlier years careful estimates were made by Kyrk and Reid, by deducting from the known number of women those known to be employed and in school, and estimated numbers of disabled, aged, and in boarding houses and hotels. This estimate for 1930 was 25,500,000, or a million more than the census figure. Accepting Kyrk and Reid's estimates, however, because they are the only means of comparison with earlier times, the homemakers have formed a continually (except for a very slight rise in 1920) decreasing proportion of all women of 15 years of age and over. This proportion was 67.7 per cent in 1890 and 59.5 per cent in 1930 (57.1 per cent if we accept the Census figure for 1930). During the same period the average size of private households was decreasing from 4.9 to 4.1. Homemakers constituted an

unchanging 21 per cent of the total population at every census period from 1890 to 1930, but since there is now a greater proportion of the population in the older age groups, homemakers have declined relative to the number of females of *homemaking age*. [Kyrk, 1933, 42.]

The constancy of the 21 per cent figure during 40 years, however, suggests that there has not yet been any decline of private homemaking personnel except what is accounted for by the relatively smaller number of children to be cared for and the relatively greater number of adults.

NEW TASKS AND HIGHER STANDARDS. Hildegarde Kneeland [1929] had several hundred homemakers keep time records for the Bureau of Home Economics. Considering only the 82 city homes which employed less than 7 hours per week of outside help, the average time per week used in all housework was 66 hours and 48 minutes, of which 56 hours and 39 minutes were provided by the homemaker herself. Most of the remainder (because of restricting the sample as above) was provided by members of the family. The average family was 3.9. The total time spent in housework where there was only a married pair was 43 or 44 hours, or two-thirds of that spent by the families with children. The first child adds 45 per cent to the work! Apartment living tends to reduce the labor 24 per cent. [Kneeland, 1929, A.]

Certainly it cannot be said that the average homemaker's job is a half-time job, even where she has only herself and her husband, and enjoys the modern conveniences.

No comparison with the past is possible because there were then, unfortunately, no questionnaires. A suggestive comparison is possible, however, by considering Miss Kneeland's farm families which are presumably typical of earlier conditions in many respects. In these homes the average weekly household labor was 63 hours and 32 minutes, of which 53 hours and 50 minutes were done by the homemaker. The farm homemaker, however, had about 10 hours' additional work on the farm itself, so that her total working week was about the same as if she had done all the housework, namely 63 hours. The average farm home contained 4.8 persons.

The most interesting difference was in the distribution of time. It appears that the city wife spends much more time in the care of children than the farm wife.

A study by the Committee on Household Management of President Hoover's Conference on Home Building and Home Ownership found the average working weeks shown in Table 32. This study indicates

TABLE 31

PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF ALL HOUSEWORK TIME

	Farm Homes	City Homes
Meals and dishes	43	33
Housecleaning	14	13
Washing and ironing	10	8
Mending and sewing	9	6
Other house care	6	3
Essential economic labor	82	63
Care of children	10	24
Purchasing, management, and other	8	3
	100	100

TABLE 32 *

THE HOMEMAKER'S WORKING WEEK: HOURS

	Representative Rural Homes		City Homes of the Business and Professional Class	
Activity	559 farm homemakers	249 other rural homemakers	175 homemakers in cities of 50,000 to 250,000 population	222 homemakers in cities of 250,000 population or more
Purchasing and management	2.2	2.7	4.2	5.3
Care of family	3.9	4.7	9.8	9.3
Meals	22.8	20.7	14.6	11.7
Care of house	9.6	9.4	7.4	7.2
Laundering	5.3	5.2	3.2	2.5
Mending and sewing	5.5	6.2	4.1	4.1
Other homemaking	2.3	2.6	4.3	4.8
Total homemaking	51.6	51.5	47.6	44.9
Farm and other work	9.6	4.5	2.0	2.4
Homemaker's total work	61.2	56.0	49.6	47.3
Help received from others in homemaking	9.3	9.6	30.5	36.6
Average size of household (persons)	4.3	4.0	4.0	3.9

* Committee on Household Management, President's Conference on Home Building and Home Ownership, Household Management and Kitchens, Washington, 1932, pp. 27–28. Arranged by Hazel Kyrk, *Economic Problems of the Family*; Harper and Brothers, 1933, p. 93. By permission.

that more time is spent in homemaking and family care by the city housewife and her assistants than by the farm wife and her assistants, when farm work is not counted. This is due to the greater elaboration of living together with time spent in child care in the city home.

The general attainment of the week of 48 hours and less by indus-

trial workers may be kept in mind as we note the 61-hour week of the farm homemaker, the 56-hour week of the other rural homemaker, and the 49- and 47-hour weeks of those in the smaller and larger cities respectively.

MOTHERHOOD IS MORE THAN A FULL-TIME JOB. It is notable in this sample (Table 32, last two columns) that homes of the business class require, including paid help, some 82 woman-hours of work per week (while the rural homes require only about 60 woman-hours). Even if we allow for the possibly less efficiency of the employed help, the standard business-class urban home with children clearly is much more than a full-time job: it is a time-and-a-half job and almost a double-time job when there is a child under 1 year of age.

The homemaker is necessarily overworked during those years when her children are under 10, unless she has a servant. Otherwise, the performance of some household duties by men or children is called for by a just distribution of labor. In Maud Wilson's Oregon study, the average weekly homemaking time, including that of servants and helpers, was about 50 hours in childless families, 68 hours where the youngest child was between 1 and 6, 94 hours (in towns; 81 on farms) where there was a child under 1.

With increased productivity on farms and in factories labor has shifted toward repair work, transportation, trade, and the service industries, since these functions are unable to cut unit costs as much as is manufacturing. As these industries feed more abundant commodities and more services into the homes, more labor is required at the point of ultimate consumption. There is a general displacement of labor from the extraction toward the service end of the economic process. We have been enabled to have more conveniences in our homes, yet it takes more time to take care of the modern home. In bringing up a small child we increasingly call upon the help of the physician and the nursery school, yet these people tell us more things to do in the home, and to do them more carefully.

Even the average business-class mother with a servant will work 35 to 50 hours per week in her home, and since her work is much scattered through the day and the week, she finds it difficult to get even a solid half-day of time for work outside. The only married women who can spare as much time as men for a paid vocation are: childless wives with servants, childless wives living in self-serviced apartment houses, or mothers with servants, relatives, husbands, or children who are able to take over much responsibility and planning as well as performance.

A great deal of scorn has been heaped upon the idle, bridge-playing

woman, but this "freeing of women's time by machinery" has been grossly exaggerated. The problem must be conceived not as finding of work for idle hands, but as reorganizing the whole homemaking industry. Women do not "go haywire" because they have too little to do, but because they have to work under conditions which, though esthetically perfect and charming, are psychologically frustrating.

EARNING WIVES ARE MAINLY AMONG THE LESS PRIVILEGED. Yet how is it possible for many women to work outside the home? In 1930, 11.5 per cent of all married women were gainfully employed.

Most of these were in the working class. They have simpler homes, from necessity they take less care of their children, or they have older daughters or relatives who can help. The working-class daughter normally expects to help her mother. Then, too, the mothers themselves work overtime, for they do much housework in the evening. When both husband and wife have outside jobs, it is still the wife who usually does most of the housework.

Only one of 40 business-class wives interviewed by the Lynds in *Middletown* [pp. 26, 29] had worked for money during the years 1920–1924. Fifty-five of 124 working-class wives had done so. Only 27 of 102 *mothers* of these working-class women had worked for money during their entire married lives. Middletown, however, is a small city with the typical bourgeois attitude that a working wife reflects some discredit upon her husband. In larger cities, and in cities where clerical or other women's work is especially available, the employment of business-class wives may be greater.

In the textile mill population of Manchester, New Hampshire, representing the extreme of gainfully occupied, 50 per cent of the whole population worked outside the home, a figure which resembles that of highly industrialized areas of Europe. [U. S. Women's Bureau, 1923.] Of the whole American population only 40 per cent is gainfully occupied. Only 25 per cent of those Manchester women who worked, however, were either wives or mothers. Employment of adolescent children made up an unusually large proportion of earners. Only one-fifth of the families of over 3 persons had but a single breadwinner.

A third of all Negro married women in the country in 1930 had employment outside the home. [Kyrk, 1933, p. 133.]

G. H. Berry [1929] asked 728 working *mothers* in Philadelphia why they worked. Sixty per cent were forced to do so by the husband's death, illness, desertion, or non-support; 29 per cent by his insufficient income; 11 per cent because they would rather work.

The idea of "emancipation" from the home has affected the busi-

ness class more than the working class. At the same time the chivalric concept of the sheltered woman is stronger in the former and it is supported by the modern ideology of rivalrous consumption. The business class expresses "chivalry" and "protection" in the form of a well-dressed and properly "social" wife.

Table 33 shows the occupational distribution of women as compared with that of men. Occupied women, relatively to their total number, are more numerous than men in the professions and also in domestic and personal service. But professional women occupy mainly the less well paid and less honorific professions, and they occupy the lower posts. The married group is less associated with the professions and with clerical work, more with manufacturing and domestic and personal service, than is the total female group. This is because the married group of gainfully occupied women represents disproportionately the poorer classes of the population, and also represents women who have interrupted their careers to bear children and have to come back into the earning field at a lower level.

TABLE 33

OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF MALES, FEMALES, AND MARRIED WOMEN, UNITED STATES

(Percentage Distribution)

	1920		1930		1930
	Males	Females	Males	Females	Married Women Only
Agriculture	29.0	12.7	25.1	8.5	9.2
Forestry and fishing	.8		.7		
Extraction of minerals	3.3		2.6		
Manufacturing and mechanical industries	33.0	22.6	32.1	17.5	19.8
Transportation and communication	8.7	2.6	9.4	2.6	2.3
Trade	10.8	7.9	13.4	9.0	11.3
Public service (not elsewhere classified)	2.2	.1	2.2	.2	.2
Professional service	3.5	11.9	4.5	14.2	9.6
Domestic and personal service	3.6	25.6	4.7	29.6	36.1
Clerical occupations	5.1	16.6	5.4	18.5	11.8
All occupations	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Fifteenth Census of the United States, 1930, Occupation Statistics.

Of the 2,473,000 occupied married women in 1930, 493,000 were servants. The second most frequent occupation was saleswoman, then laundress (not in laundry), then school teacher, then textile opera-

tive, then clerk (not in store), then stenographer or typist, then bookkeeper, cashier, or accountant, then operative in clothing industry.

NEW DEMANDS UPON THE HOMEMAKER. What are the functions which have been elaborated in the home?

A most important one is that of recreational service and leadership. The wife has become, in effect, the manager of the family leisure. This does not imply that woman's proper function is to dictate to men and children how they shall spend their free time. But she may study the leisure needs and interests of the various members of the family and assist each one to do more adequately what he really wants to do. This role could be further developed; it could be used to promote family cooperative activities.

The assistance rendered may consist in assembling information about community recreational facilities and events, caring for equipment, and arranging schedules. The more constructive and valuable recreational impulses of human beings tend to be blocked by a certain inertia; one tends to fritter time away with less valuable and less interesting activities simply because of the mental effort involved in preparing for the superior kinds. The inertia of "getting at" the more unusual and varied activities of a superior recreational program is more easily overcome when some one person makes it his or her special business to study the causes of that inertia and to overcome them. The causes will often be found to be of a mechanical sort, such as equipment out of place and in need of repair, and inadequate information.

The homemaker has become the family chauffeur. Among the suburban business class she may drive her husband to the 8:13 train, her children to one or more schools, go shopping, bring a child home to lunch, take him back again, take another child to a music lesson, go to the club meeting, and then meet her husband at the 5:58. In the suburbs it has been said that woman's place is not in the home, but behind the steering wheel.

Another function is the esthetic perfection of the home and its members. Women make curtains and draperies, experiment with various forms of "interiors." These interests become self-propelling; the more one pursues them, the more enticing they become. This culture is an integral part of *laissez-faire* capitalism with its high-pressure salesmanship, its incessant appeal to the rivalrous motive, its advertising, its separate magazines for men and women—so well calculated to differentiate the sexes in material wants and thereby sell more goods—and now business even "sells" things to families

through the children and their magazines. Incidentally, the system has developed under male leadership. The businessman who in the evening complains of his wife's extravagance may spend his mornings trying to convince other men's wives of the absolute necessity of spending their money for his goods.

In general the homemaker is the *residual legatee* of many small tasks which get left out of other people's jobs. No matter how many services we delegate to others, every such delegation requires someone to plan, fetch, telephone, make inquiries, receive and inspect goods, send them back again for exchange, pay the bills, and keep the accounts. The homemaker's work becomes like that of an executive. But it lacks the prestige which goes with outside executive work. Unless there is adequate paid service, the homemaker lacks power to delegate to others as much as is delegated to her. She is an executive who does all her own detail work. It is not rewarded according to its efficiency. Except where there is adequate paid service, the home executive has to be her own stenographer, office boy, and janitor at the same time that she caters to demands requiring the judgment, tact, and "front" which men associate with the polished mahogany desk and the buzzer.

THE TROUBLE WITH HOMEMAKING. Why should there be any problem about the homemaking job? If it is really a full-time job, why not do it and take one's pay in the customary form of "support" from the husband's income, if that is adequate, without yearning for some other "career"?

First, because the job itself as now organized is needlessly frustrating, needlessly cramping to the development of the average person who holds it. *Second,* because it is unfair and undemocratic that this job should be imposed peculiarly upon women except by their own free and enlightened choice. *Third,* because love and marriage would be more stable and more satisfying to both sexes if homemaking were reorganized and made truly optional to women. *Fourth,* because by such a change children would profit through happier and more creative relations with their parents and thereby develop personalities suitable to maintain democratic society. *Fifth,* because such a change will be eventually necessary to maintain an adequate birth rate in a democracy!

These are bold assertions. If the first one can be shown to be well founded, the rest may appear as more or less natural consequences.

We have seen that many if not most of the situations which produce marital conflict are in the last analysis due to overwork, within

the home itself, and in outside occupations which send the husband or the gainful worker home in a state of fatigue and irritability, ready to express his hostilities within the home atmosphere. The husband expects the wife to comfort him and to be relaxed and gay. But he is often unaware that her work, frustrations, and tensions may be as great as his, and may be more continuous. Overwork is not merely "hours put in," but essentially it is working under strain, which means undue muscular tension plus undue frequency or duration of unpleasant emotions.

Maier [1939] and others have shown by experiment that even rats can be made to "go haywire" by subjecting them to conflicting and inconsistent stimuli. The psychiatrist Myerson [1920, 75] in *The Nervous Housewife* holds "that the neurosis of the housewife has a large part of its origin in the increasing desires of women, in their demands for a fuller, more varied life, than is afforded by the lot of a housewife."

In analyzing a frustrating situation on the human level, we must take account not only of the immediate external stimuli, but also of the ideas which have become linked to the picture. Human beings always compare the present situation with situations elsewhere: actual ones in the past, or those which are imagined as possibilities. Happiness and unhappiness, it is said, are "relative." Indeed, they are *produced by the relativity of situations and purposes,* but in themselves they are absolute and physiological.

It is not frustrating to a healthy lover of the out-of-doors to hike ten miles along a country road. To walk ten miles on a similar road merely because one's car has broken down is a different story. If the car broke down purely through the stupidity of someone else who drove it when one could have driven it safely oneself, then there is still more frustration.

As Myerson well suggests, modern homemaking frustrations are partly to be considered as cultural lags, since homemaking has not advanced according to the potentialities demonstrated and in line with satisfactions gained in other spheres of life. But this is not the whole story. Homemaking has actually changed its character in directions which are emotionally unhealthy. It was never a very inspiring occupation, but it has become even more like the situations by which psychologists have produced neurotic behavior in rats, sheep, and pigs.

AN INQUIRY INTO THE PROBLEMS OF MOTHERS. Marion Bassett secured questionnaire replies from 128 mothers, three-fourths of them

college graduates.* One question aimed to discover the *relative* importance of the various dissatisfactions said to be felt by mothers in the home.

The question was: "From your own experience, do you feel in general any of the following dissatisfactions, which have been expressed by various women?" The following list is in the order of the number of persons who check each (not in the order they were given in the questionnaire).

	Number of Persons Who Checked
1. Leisure broken up; insufficiency of large blocks of free time for recreation, such as week-ends or whole days	54
2. Time too interrupted for study or concentrated effort in some field	52
3. Necessity of performing too many different kinds of tasks without opportunity to specialize or do anything really well	48
4. Too much menial work involved	38
5. Lack of opportunity to use your mind constructively and creatively	34
6. Lack of opportunity for contacts with people you might find most congenial	32
7. Lack of incentive to keep mentally alert, to continue learning	26
8. Failure to get a feeling of financial security	25
9. Lack of opportunity to use the subject matter or full power of your education	24
10. Lack of freedom to use your mind in aiding the community or dealing with social problems of the day	22
11. Lack of opportunity, after years of hard work, to gain financial independence and freedom for study, travel, hobby, social service, or other desired uses of your time	20
12. Lack of contacts with outside world, through lectures, organizations, etc.	19
13. Absence of responsibility worthy of your capacities	17
14. Disillusion as to former hopes for happiness and achievement	13
15. Your opportunity to serve community and your position of security too dependent upon husband's ability and position, and not sufficiently determined by your own efforts and ideas	10
16. Absence of responsibility worthy of your past achievements	9
17. Lack of freedom to use your best judgment in raising children	8
18. Lack of incentive to take care of your health	5
19. Lack of appreciation by family and society of your contributions	5
20. Time required by husband to help him maintain his hobby, such as garden, dogs, farm, collections or some kind of entertaining	4
21. Lack of participation in control of savings accumulated through husband's earning and your work in the home	3

* Marion Bassett (Luitweiler), "One Hundred and Twenty-Eight Mothers Consider Our Family Pattern," *Bulletin of Family Research and Education*, 1:5 and 6 (November-December, 1940), 6–22. This study was a volunteer project of its

Some of these items refer to almost the same unhappy feeling arising from similar conditions, such as "leisure broken up, insufficiency of large blocks of free time" (item 1), and "time too interrupted for study or concentrated effort in some field" (item 2). These two together received 106 checks.

Likewise, items 4, 5, 9, 13, and 16 all refer to a feeling among mothers that their mental powers are not used as fully as they would like. The five items together received 122 checks, some mothers marking more than one of these.

These two groups, the first relating to broken time and the second to lack of opportunity to use one's mentality, are closely related; we all know that a certain amount of uninterrupted time, and freedom to plan time, are prerequisites to constructive mental work.

A Minnesota mother with 3 young children presented the problem which many mothers face at that period to a greater or less degree: "One of the most awful things to me about my job is that I never have a chance to be alone. I like to write, and I can't write with the children around—and I can't write when I am too tired. For five weeks now I have not had one minute alone, when I could sit down and write for a while. All I ask is an hour a day. If I could have that to myself I could stand, even enjoy, quite an amount of routine work, and all the noise and children's confusion. If I can pour my heart out on paper and get my mind straightened out—get my perspective again—it's all I ask. I'd like to find a way to figure it out. Of course, when the children get older and are all in school, I'll have more time than I want, other mothers tell me; but I don't want to wait that long, and I don't think I should have to."

Item 3—"necessity of performing too many different kinds of tasks without opportunity to specialize or do anything really well," which received 48 checks, is closely allied to the frustrations due to lack of freedom to plan and concentrate.

We may also say that items 8, 11, 15, and 21 all express an uneasiness which is due to the fact that the mother's position is too completely conditioned upon the ability and character of her husband. These items received 58 checks. It is true that fathers often have a feeling of insecurity and dependence upon the will of their employers; but conscientious work and ability and training usually allow them a fair income. There is a rough correlation between the grade of the work they perform and their income. The correlation, however, between a mother's income or facilities with which to look after her family, and the efficiency of her work, is low and doubtful. The most capable and industrious mother may live within a family income

author, with technical assistance from the Class of 1880 Fiftieth Anniversary Fund of Vassar College. The 128 subjects consisted of 64 Vassar alumnae, and 64 Minnesota women of whom about half were college graduates. It will be quoted extensively, with necessary adaptations of form, in this and the following chapters. It will be referred to as the Bassett study.

of about $2,000 a year, during the 40 years of her adult life, and an indolent one may luxuriate with $20,000 a year. One frequently hears protests against this luxurious idler; but the other situation, in which the mother does a good job, raising several children on a low income, is several hundred times more prevalent.

The frustrations may be summarized into these groups: (1) broken time-spans, (2) unused abilities, (3) unrelated tasks or lack of "specialization," (4) social isolation, (5) non-relation of reward to contribution.

1. BROKEN TIME-SPANS. Interruption is a major problem in homemaking. There are two ways of dealing with it: suppress the interruptions, and cultivate personalities and attitudes which "do not mind it." It is clear that the possibility of the latter method varies greatly with the individuals. Some people do learn to work serenely through most distractions and interruptions; others never do. There are suggestions of a constitutional basis for this difference. Psychological research has measured "perseveration" by laboratory tests and found some consistent correlations with the type of the person's general adjustment or maladjustment to life. [Murphy *et al.*, 1937, 812–816.] But the data also show many persons to be changeable and inconsistent in this respect. Furthermore, there are environments which produce similar frustrating or facilitating effects upon such large proportions of persons that it would be folly to try to select and train individuals without first seeing if the environment itself cannot be controlled.

We do not cure the smoke nuisance by examining for smoke tolerance all families proposing to live in smoky cities. We "go after" the smoke itself. This policy of environmental sanitation has still many undeveloped possibilities in the field of the less tangible nuisances. It might be possible to measure objectively the total distraction potency of different situations, or to reduce this potency by constructive planning.

Urbanism and industrialism have doubtless increased the things which distract most people. The very processes which enable us to have more services at less effort also compel us to shift our attention more rapidly. The modern homemaker may not have to shovel coal, carry water, or bend for long hours over the wash tub, but she has to spend much of the saved time in a state of alertness to telephone calls, deliveries, errands, and burning toast. A greater variety of tasks can be handled serenely if one can integrate them without regard to fixed clock hours, as a man does in building a house with his own

hands, or in most farm operations, or as the older rural homemaker was able to do in some degree. But the modern urban homemaker has too many operations of unpredictable length which must be finished at predictable times.

This leads to the emotional condition known as "hurry." Hurry is an attitude. It consists of doing something rapidly while at the same time worrying about whether it can be done still faster. When really convinced that no more speed is possible, and if freed from any blame for the results, one may move at the same or greater speed, yet with the accompaniment of pleasant rather than unpleasant emotions. In specialized occupations speed and rhythm tend to become habitual; unspecialized jobs, made up of many small tasks under unpredictable demands, invite hurry.

To overcome other frustrations of homemaking such as the social isolation and unused intelligence, women develop some social activities outside the home, sometimes by the use of employed service. But these frequent "goings out" and "comings in," though supplying a need for social contacts, often increase the hurry frustration, because they are usually clock-governed and cannot easily be timed according to the needs of the housework.

Hurried parents—fathers as well as mothers—are among the causes of frustrated and irritable children. "Yes, isn't that nice, dear," to a child showing pride in a new construction as the mother puts on her coat and rushes to drive her husband to the station, is not the kind of attention children need nor the kind of valuation of child life (see Chapter X) which makes for the best personality development.

Women want leisure. Whether or not they desire "careers," homemakers want "leisure time" such as men and adolescents enjoy. But "leisure" does not mean idleness. It may mean study, or even a single creative task in the home. It means personal *autonomy in the use of time.* Its most extreme antithesis is not constructive work but rather the experience known as "being on duty."

Modern women also want to play more adventurously, more lightheartedly, and more companionably with their husbands than was regarded possible by the previous generation. They *want* this enrichment of leisure partly because its possibility is now abundantly demonstrated on all sides. People want what they see others having. This enriched leisure may require more of material goods, but more particularly it requires solid blocks of free time. These are precisely what the married woman with young children lacks. This period when the married woman's play is limited by her children is a period

of youth, vigor, and adventuresomeness. It is becoming increasingly a period of discontent. The real psychological forces working against the traditional home cannot be gauged by studying the attitudes of young women before marriage. These girls naturally tend to look upon marriage and homemaking as preferable to their present status as students or employed workers. It is after a woman has had some experience with raising children on a limited income in modern culture that she begins to question the desirability of the present system. By that time, however, it is too late for most women to make readjustments in their marital or family status, and their lips are sealed by the mores. They hesitate to speak all their thoughts to their daughters for they realize that marriage with all its problems is apt to be more satisfying than the single state. They may complain loudly—about the plumbing, the inefficiency of the garbage collector, the behavior of their children, the dilatoriness of their husband in repairing the doorbell, or any other specific problem. But to complain about the system itself is almost as much tabooed as to complain about sex frustration during the prolonged absence of the husband. Mothers are expected to be entirely satisfied with their calling.

There is increasing need for agencies and persons to whom home responsibility can be safely and completely delegated for limited periods. This does not imply a tendency to weaken the mother-child relationship but, if anything, to make that relationship better through the occasional absence and the greater freedom of the mother as a person.

2. UNUSED ABILITIES. The male population is distributed among several levels of occupations which require different degrees of intelligence. The Edwards' [1938] scale of occupations, modified as described below, distributes them (1930 data) as in column 1 of Table 34 (page 593). The gainfully occupied females were more heavily represented than the males in grades A and B and also in E and F. But there were only 10.8 million gainfully occupied females as compared with 38.0 million males. A fair comparison would seem to require that we recognize the 24.5 million homemakers as also "occupied," making a total of 35.2 million females, corresponding approximately to the 38.0 million males. If we change the percentages of females to 35.2 million as a base instead of 10.8, and include the homemakers, we get the percentages in column 2.

Although Edwards places the farmers (owners and tenants) in his second grade from the top (2*a*), it seems more accurate, from the

standpoint of skill and intelligence requirements, to place them between the skilled workers and the semi-skilled workers. Edwards' classification is apparently based on the principle that any group which has a large proportion of owners or managers should be in grade 2. But in fact the *average* of all owning and tenant farmers does not represent a measured intelligence nor complexity of required skills meriting a rank above the skilled workers; and to give him a rank above the semi-skilled and unskilled is more than is warranted by the U. S. Army psychological tests of 1918.

The essential fact is that farming is an unspecialized occupation which makes place for men of all degrees of intelligence and ability, from top to bottom; and the same is true of homemaking, which is therefore ranked at the same level.

The wholesale and retail dealers, though placed by Edwards on an equality with the other proprietors, managers, and officials, are made up largely of small-store owners and the like; and the mere fact of their being proprietors should not, it seems, entitle them, *on the average,* to an ability rank as high as the salaried officials and proprietors of the fewer and larger business concerns in the fields outside of trade.

In Table 34 the outstanding fact is that the great majority of women are concentrated at the D level, whereas men are spread throughout the whole range in a distribution which roughly corresponds to the actual distribution of ability among human beings. If we consider only the gainfully occupied women, we find that a higher percentage of them are professional (Edwards 1) than are men (13.5 per cent versus 3.9 per cent). If we base our percentages on all women, we find that the women have about the same percentage as the men in the professions (4.1 and 3.9 respectively).

It may be a good thing to have many people in less specialized occupations like farming and homemaking, which permit each individual to use whatever ability he has, and do not require some fixed degree. But all our other evidence suggests that while the 6.0 million farmers are encouraged by the conditions of their work to use whatever intelligence they have, 24.5 million homemakers do not, on the average, find a similar encouragement.

In the first place, to subject 69 per cent of all women to the conditions of one occupation is quite different from placing 15 per cent of all men in a single occupation. In the second place, the structure of the homemaking job itself, as evidenced by our data and as might be judged by common-sense deduction, is much less adapted to human

nature. The farmer goes into the field and uses his large muscles in his own spontaneous rhythm; he comes into the house whenever he is ready to do so, physically fatigued but nervously relaxed. His wife, who has been using her smaller muscles, and attending to the demands of cooking and children which bear no relation to her own spontaneous rhythms, then serves and feeds her husband. He may sit at his dinner and relax; his wife must keep her attention on the stove and the behavior of the children; it is she who does the "jumping." She also is fatigued—but in a less healthful manner. The middle-class urban wife, with her higher standards of esthetic perfection and her overstimulated children, lives a life still more lacking in nervous relaxation and spontaneous, healthful rhythm.

TABLE 34

OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF MEN AND WOMEN, 1930 *

Modified Edwards' Classification	*Column 1* All Gainfully Occupied Males	*Column 2* All Gainfully Occupied Females, plus Homemakers
A. 1 (Professional) + 2*c* (other proprietors, managers, and officials)	8.5	4.5
B. 2*b* (Wholesale and retail dealers) + 3 (clerks and kindred workers)	17.2	9.0
C. 4 Skilled workers and foremen	16.3	0.2
D. 2*a* (Farmers—owners and tenants) + homemakers	15.1 †	70.3
E. 5 Semi-skilled workers	14.3	7.2
F. 6 Unskilled workers	28.6	8.8
Total	100.0	100.0

* Adapted from Alba M. Edwards, *A Social-Economic Grouping of the Gainful Workers of the United States,* Bureau of the Census, Government Printing Office, 1938, Table 2, p. 7, with supplementary data from Hazel Kyrk, *Economic Problems of the Family,* Harper and Brothers, 1933, p. 42. Taken from 1930 Census.

† These are all farmers.

In the Bassett study, one Vassar alumna wrote the following:

> With two small children I spend innumerable hours washing and feeding, and it takes most of my energy, both mental and physical. For a few years . . . I find I must be placid and bovine . . . My job . . . however, is more worth while than anything else I could do. However, I am impatient enough with my mental stagnation to wish desperately that I had more time to give to intellectual things . . . When the time comes when I do have more leisure, I hope my intellectual ambitions will not have decayed.

3. UNRELATED TASKS—LACK OF SPECIALIZATION. Housework today is less a matter of skilled operations, and more a problem of management and petty organization. [Kyrk 1933, 48.] Often it may be described as a "wearisome attempt to balance every day of work between the greatest possible number of pretty requirements."

It is possible that this is inherently less interesting than the older housework. Many women, even of the highest education, get more real joy from cooking a meal or making a dress than from manipulating a card index, an account book, a set of electric switches, making telephonic inquiries about goods, and keeping in order the numerous utensils of modern complicated domestic life. Muscular effort, indeed, is less, but so also is the role of manual skill. Ruth Lindquist [1931, ch. 3], questionnairing about 300 mothers, found fatigue, worry, and friction very common. Replies indicated that modern high standards and desires for perfection in homemaking contributed to these sufferings. In Maud Wilson's Oregon study, the chief cause of *dislike* among town homemakers was cleaning and straightening, with laundry work a poor second, and dish washing third. Among farm homemakers laundry work, presumably more difficult there, rivaled cleaning and straightening for number one "peeve." Cooking, sewing, mending, and care of children were disliked by relatively few.

Of course there are individual differences which should be studied. One homemaker, for example, conspicuous for the neatness of her home, enjoys dish washing, cleaning up, and putting away more than she does cooking. Another is able to do the routine work of preparing meals and setting a table while apparently concentrating her mind upon the conversation with a guest. Another cannot give attention to anything else during the same process. Perhaps it is the perfectionist or some other type of personality which suffers most. But in any case, the number who are frustrated constitute a mass problem and not merely a problem of maladjusted individuals requiring psychiatric treatment.

While factory work has become unsatisfying through extreme specialization and monotonous repetition of processes, housework has become frustrating through going to the opposite extreme.

4. SOCIAL ISOLATION. Modern homemaking is usually a job without a boss, without an assistant, and without a working companion. Many, no doubt, can do without the boss. But this pleasant sense of freedom is overbalanced by the deprivation of social contacts.

Work is not only the handling of things; it is normally a social interaction process. By definition it would not be performed for its

own sake. It is a means to an end. The objectives of most work are set either by impersonal conditions, such as the weather, the seasons, the state of the market, or by the dictation and demands of other persons. The worker may set goals for himself, but these are usually confined within the limits set by his idea of what other people will buy or what will please them. These things are true also of homemaking. But in certain ways homemaking represents a rather extreme situation. The demand forces are peculiarly indefinite and inconsistent. There is no supervisory authority, and little agreement upon standards. To a large extent the homemaker has to rely upon herself for drive and direction.

Perhaps we should regard this as a fine example of "democratic freedom," but in its very nature work cannot be freedom. Work is always done under some "master," some purpose outside itself. It must satisfy requirements made by others, or by another part of oneself. The trouble is that the modern homemaker often has no master but her conscience—and the Joneses. The puritan conscience, at least, is an arbitrary and often unreasonable master, and the Joneses may be worse. They notice appearances more than substance.

The modern homemaker lacks not only direct human supervision or guidance, but she usually lacks also subordinates whom she can command. This, too, seems "democratic," but there is more to the story. To be the ultimate subordinate, the buck private or servant within a *work* situation, is not altogether bad, because this person is relatively free from responsibility and mental conflicts. But our modern homemaker is mistress and servant combined. Her conscience (super-ego) makes her undertake tasks which her "lower" self (*id*) rebels against carrying out.

The farm home and the old-fashioned home operated with more parental authority, assistance from children, and performance of essential "down to earth" processes. So much attention has been paid to the sometimes harsh methods of parental control that we have overlooked its purpose. To a large extent it was directed toward material efficiency on the existing level of techniques and under the silent but relentless coercion of nature. More physical labor was necessary than now to get the sheer essentials of living: food, drinking water, warmth, and clothing. The homemaker was able to perform greater labors, partly because she could secure economy in her movements by a swift, authoritative repression of any interference by children. If the child left his clothes on the floor or failed to eat his breakfast

within normal time, the mother could correct the difficulty by mere word of command. The child played, but as soon as his playthings got into the way, they were immediately ordered aside without any emotional conflict within the parent about "understanding the child's purposes." The children and adolescents, indeed, spent much of their time "helping" in the housework instead of pursuing their private hobbies or group play. This is one of the most outstanding features of European family life which the author observed in 1920.

Operating a household without order and authority is like operating an automobile in which the brake and pedal sometimes work and sometimes don't. In our eagerness to give freedom for development to the adolescent and the child, we have often tolerated conditions which increase the emotional burden upon the mother and indirectly upon the father. If housework neuroses have increased, it is not surprising. There is great need to contrive ways of management which will make everyday life in the home a source of relaxation and reassurance to both children and their parents.

The "servant" problem. In 1890 in the whole United States there was one domestic servant to every 43 persons, or about 9 families; in 1920 about one to 83 persons, or 20 families. [Lynd 1929, 170.] Hildegarde Kneeland [1929, B] also estimated that only 5 per cent of the families in the United States had paid help. The *Fortune Quarterly Survey* [October, 1937] found 10 per cent of people to have full-time servants, and 14 per cent part-time, but this sample may be unrepresentative. *Fortune's* "lower middle class" figure, 3.6 per cent, is probably nearer the true average than is the average they compute by their weighting system. Machinery of course compensates for servants. In such periods as the decade of 1900–1910 and today in the war situation, when servants leave their jobs to take employment in factories, it is commonly felt that the higher wages and greater prestige of factory work lead them to do so. Is increased household machinery the cause or result of the decrease in domestic servants? It is both. Both changes are related as parts of one larger process of industrialization.

During the last few years, several organizations have made efforts to put domestic employment upon higher standards. The Y.W.C.A., the Women's Division of the WPA, and the National Committee on Household Employment have cooperated in this program. It involves training courses and school camps; plans to secure social insurance; educational material for employers; counseling and place-

ment; trade unions; voluntary agreements; labor codes dealing with wage payments, discharge, living conditions, and time off. Suggested standards include a maximum of 60 hours per week on duty and 2 half-days or 1 full day off.

A study by Gladys Boone [1937] of Negro maid service in Lynchburg, Virginia, found typical wages to be $5 or $6 a week for those living in, hours to be 72 per week on the average. Fifty-five employees could entertain friends in their own room, 24 in the kitchen, and 35 not at all.

Democracy implies full sympathy with children's need for freedom and with the protecting of domestic servants against the very real exploitation which was, and still in many cases is, theirs. But these emancipations have transferred more of the burden to the homemaking mother and now it is time to make further changes in order to set her free.

In many cases, young couples would do well to defer their purchasing of new rugs and furniture and material perfection of their home until after their children have grown to a certain age. They might better put the same money into a fund to be used for domestic service and vacations away from the children while the children are small; furthermore they would not have to worry about damage.

5. NON-RELATION OF REWARD TO CONTRIBUTION. The homemaking mother is economically rewarded according to her husband's ability and fairness, not her own ability. Hence class injustice is even greater among women than among men. Among the underprivileged classes, men are exploited and underpaid, but in general their hours of work, though more arduous physically, are not much greater than those of men of the more prosperous classes. But the mothers with the lowest family incomes bear the most children and carry the heaviest burdens of work. The extreme poles of social injustice are best represented among women.

The study of leisure time in Westchester County [Lundberg *et al.*, 1934, 93] showed that the categories of persons with the least leisure and also the most leisure, if we omit unemployed persons, were female. Average leisure hours per day (including meals) were 9.2 for housewives (many of whom had servants), 7.4 for all men, 7.2 for all women, and 5.6 for female labor (women who mostly did outside jobs and some housework as well).

There are also psychological rewards. Yet one of the frustrations of modern homemaking is the lack of praise which is given for it by

the husband, the children, the community. To a large extent it is a pain-economy, with criticism and complaint and other penalties ready to fall whenever one falls short of perfection, but with little reward or expressed appreciation when things do run smoothly.*

* See Foster and Wilson, 1942, esp. pp. 48–50, 78–88, 235–236, for additional evidence for several generalizations made in Chapters XVII and XVIII.

Chapter XVIII

MEN AND WOMEN IN A DEMOCRACY

In Collaboration with Marion Bassett

A. THE FUTURE OF HOMEMAKING

What are the possible solutions of the modern problem of homemaking? In the Bassett study of 128 mothers, the possible readjustments are viewed in terms of seven major type-patterns. The seventh of these, requiring more description, is presented later in a different form.

> . . . Commercial enterprises such as clothing factories, bakeries and laundries, largely managed by men, have been gradually taking away women's former work. Money has become a more important factor in living. Earning mothers are overworked; non-earning mothers have become more powerless and dependent than before. Both men and women feel the increased strain, and the more prudent are reluctant to raise enough children to maintain the race. To lessen these burdens upon mothers, and to encourage somewhat larger families among thoughtful people, various new social arrangements have been proposed.

Six suggested remedies, presented in the questionnaire itself, are placed below in the order of the number of checks they received.

	Number of Persons Who Checked
1. The greater sharing of housework by men and children	70
2. More emphasis on education in home economics and less upon other fields (Some people think this would make women more contented with their traditional status.)	52
3. The greater participation by women in the control of our economic and social life outside the home, through community, political, consumers', educational organizations, etc.	52
4. A return to a more rural type of life, with more home production of food, clothing, furniture, etc., with the help of small household machines (This might involve more manual work, less flexibility and less knowledge of the world, but also less nervous strain and more security.)	47

	Number of Persons Who Checked
5. Subsidies paid to sound and well-qualified families to defray in whole or part the costs entailed by raising children, financed by taxes or wage deductions falling upon childless persons	33
6. Large cooperative housekeeping units made up of several families so that homemaking functions could be done on a large scale, the families working closely together in almost all lines (These units might involve apartment houses, or single-family homes located near one another.)	8

In a number of cases mothers who checked the first item qualified it by saying that they thought children should help more with the housework, but not men. Several in checking item 2 said they would like more training in home economics but *not* less in other fields. In checking item 4 many expressed an interest in a more rural and simple life, but would not like the manufacture of various products returned to the home.

Let us consider these solutions in an order based upon their relationships rather than their popularity, and with their various implications.

IMPROVING THE TRADITIONAL PATTERN (REMEDY 2). Education in home economics is the remedy that is most acceptable to our traditional culture. It implies that homemaking be raised to the dignity of a true profession by education and standards. The home economics movement, from the New York Cooking School of 1874 to the George Deen Act of 1936 which appropriated $4,000,000 of federal money for the subsidizing of home economics programs throughout the country, has had this aim. The American Home Economics Association, founded in 1908 as a result of Ellen Richards' work and the Lake Placid conferences, has ably led the movement. The efforts of the National Committee on Household Employment to standardize domestic service also imply that the homemaker herself, as well as her maid, may be helped to find professional dignity and prestige in housework. Yet it is highly questionable that an occupation can be thus professionalized when there is no direct economic compensation, and even the indirect compensations are not proportioned to the ability of the worker or the service rendered.

There is no doubt that, with adequate facilities, homemaking can be carried on under standards as high and as difficult as those of any profession. At the same time, unlike other professions, homemaking is an occupation which one can practice upon much lower standards and still "get away with it."

An implied objective of the home economics movement is to make homemakers more contented with their present role by teaching them greater skill in that role. It is to be noted, however, that a great many of the home economics graduates go permanently or temporarily into teaching home economics or into the position of dietitian for schools, institutions, and the like. Women trained in home economics or in schools for maids are stimulated, willy-nilly, to want to do a few things well, and in so doing limit the variety of their tasks and their hours. Also they are likely to wish to do *more* of those tasks which they do well, and less of others; this means an urge to serve other families as well as their own, and to be served in return.

There is no doubt that traditional private homemaking, through making use of the best discovered methods, can be made a more satisfying job for substantial numbers of women who will certainly, for the immediate future, remain in it. But this hope is conditioned also upon having certain minimum standards of housing and equipment and security of income, which do not obtain among a third or more of our population.

This book will not attempt to repeat the practical wisdom which can be found in our abundant literature of home economics. Perhaps the point needing emphasis here is the importance of attitudes and general philosophy of living. Mrs. Lillian Gilbreth, who is among other things an efficiency expert, once told the story of a homemaker who designed a small, mechanically efficient kitchen where from one spot she could reach anything as easily as she could the various keys of a typewriter. This "perfect" kitchen, however, proved to be most unsatisfactory for the mother was condemned to wash her dinner dishes alone. In another house with a large, old-fashioned, highly inefficient kitchen, the same family had been wont to gather for one of the most sociable half-hours of the day, while they did the dinner dishes together.

If we are to have more sharing and sociability in housework, we shall need more standardization of the places where things are put, more pencil-and-paper work in labeling these places and in writing lists and instructions. The largest part of many household tasks consists in finding tools and putting them away. If the homemaker gives this storage function its due attention, she may find help from children, husband, and servants more willingly forthcoming and more helpful.

Cooperation is also greatly encouraged by a family's agreeing upon standard names for various utensils and procedures, and names or

numbers for parts of the house and storage places. An economy of words in the "shop talk" of the home might release time and good spirits for more interesting family conversation. When chores must be done and emergencies met, instead of grumbling and worrying "out loud" about them we might say: "Let's *do* it while we *talk about something else.*"

A common difficulty is lack of sufficient subdivision and labeling of storage space. Very few homes have adequate closets, shelves, cabinets, filing cases, drawers, desks, hooks, and hanging devices. A book could be written about the money wasted in purchasing household articles which are seldom used because they are not kept in condition or not stored so as to be quickly available when needed. The storage of traditional household equipment such as cooking and eating utensils may be well done, while newer categories of objects which have more recently become important in the household economy, such as writing materials, electric fixtures, parts of machinery, drugs and sanitary articles, and toys, are jumbled in a chaos which is none the less real although it may be hidden beneath a superficial neatness.

Another need is for the more liberal use of trays, baskets, and other large receptacles by which many small objects can be assembled temporarily for moving to another room or to await some action in the near future. Each object should have not only its one "fixed" place, but also a standardized route of travel when it is in use or process.

Time as well as space needs to be organized. We have been told this hundreds of times, and we dutifully make our schedules, and then break them. But perhaps the emphasis has been misplaced. We need to be flexible as regards the day as a whole and yet to try out and then learn by heart some quick, efficient sequences for particular tasks. What often wastes our time and emotional energy is our indecision and hesitancy in meeting situations which recur again and again. Especially when there are young children, daily home life is largely a succession of emergencies; it requires something of the mental set of the fireman, the truck driver, or the telephone operator, combined with a good proportion of experimental attitude. Instead of studying what we should do at 10 A.M. or 3 P.M., it would be well to outline procedures to be followed when a child spills his milk, when a salesman calls, when we decide suddenly to go on a picnic, when we have to make a quick departure from the house or leave a message for somebody, when a sudden shower comes up or the first snowfall threatens to immobilize the car in a slippery driveway, or when the maid fails to appear on a busy morning.

We need also long blocks of time to do creative, absorbing tasks without interruption. "Try to get them," the homemaker will say, and her skepticism is based on real experience. Yet it may be helpful to face frankly what we really need in order to be creative and efficient persons: namely, periods of prolonged concentration *and* periods of soldierly alertness, and the ability to take the one attitude or the other wholeheartedly and without inner strain.

The above suggestions are not made under the assumption that we are telling the intelligent homemaker anything she has not already tried in practice. They are merely ways of thinking which may add meaning and confidence to what she does, and build up that inner mental order which makes for quick decision and for physical performance without tension.

GREATER SHARING BY OTHER FAMILY MEMBERS (REMEDY 1). The abolition of child labor, though in general very desirable, has intensified the economic problem of raising children.

We need new devices for making children economically useful. The earlier gross evils of child labor in the factories and on the streets have caused the pendulum to swing to the opposite ideology, which limits children to study and play, reserving all the work of life for later years. Many are beginning to feel that this ideology has now gone too far and has produced undesirable results. They feel that in the business class, somewhat more numerous children with a little more contribution by these children toward their own economic support would be desirable not only from the eugenic standpoint but also from the standpoint of the mental health of children and their families. Certainly no one wants a return to the factory or a decrease in the amount of schooling. The solution must lie in two directions: (*a*) part-time jobs for children which cannot injure their health or schooling, (*b*) a reorganization of household life and discipline which will give children a greater role in the work of the home—boys as much as girls.

On the farm the problem solves itself through the adaptability of various farm tasks to children. There the problem is often the reverse: how to prevent the undue exploitation of children in farm work. In certain regions where there is an abundance of simple, mechanical work such as cotton picking or beet weeding, children are overworked. Child labor laws usually do not apply to agricultural work; the compulsory education law is the only check. It is to the urban population that our problem of insufficient juvenile work applies.

There seems now to be an increasing tendency, among families of college women at least, for husbands to share in the housework. [Houdlette, 1939, A.] The teaching of home economics and child study to boys, which is now being done in a limited number of high schools, is a promising development. [Folsom, 1941, 62; Nowlin, 1937.]

Under modern conditions, each family needs the freedom to determine for itself how tasks shall be assigned, untrammeled by general community culture or the traditional sex division of labor. The important questions become: *how much* work is each person doing, and how well does his work befit his *individual* capacities and preferences?

The greater sharing by other family members in the housework makes possible in many cases the part-time earning of the mother outside the home, and thus facilitates more thoroughgoing solutions. The democratic objective might be that all work regarded as undesirable be minimized in quantity and this minimum residue shared by all persons equitably. Some professional couples make a practice of sharing all housework equally.

Sharing of housework requires cooperation and sometimes authority. There could also be a partial sharing which would greatly reduce the strain upon the homemaker, if other family members were to cooperate in making her work easy. Sharing could vary with the time of year and the occasion. All of this requires a new, planned democracy in the family. True democracy in the family would consist partly of discussion of aims and policies. Is it more important to the consumers to have meals ready exactly on time or to have them more perfect in quality? Sometimes we can have both, but a choice of policy should be made in advance to govern those unpredictable occasions when "we can't have both." Can the family agree upon this? "Wait till the occasion arises," is a common reply. No! There, precisely, is the trouble. The family sitting at ease after a good dinner is better able to agree upon policies than it is when there is an active issue.

There could be more freedom in the choice of personal activities, with more obedience during a work program. Authority could sometimes be given to a child or adolescent for a limited task. Possibly a bell could be rung to indicate the beginning and end of such a period. Schools have long used these devices. With the passing of absolute authority there was a decline in ritual and schedule. These could be revived and used democratically.

WOMEN'S COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION (REMEDY 3). Women's volunteer work in the community is often thought of as a solution of our homemaking problem. The immediate utility of this is limited to a relatively small number of women of the business class who have servants, who are childless, or whose children are grown. These women are enabled to have a more interesting life, and to use constructively any surplus time they may have. But the average mother of young children has no time or means to engage in such activities extensively, and she will be frowned upon by the average husband and community if she does so.

Women's community work by those who can afford it may *indirectly* serve to reduce the burdens of other homemakers and set more of their time free. This will be more likely to happen if educated women go into those volunteer activities which contribute to social change—political, civic, and labor organizations, social welfare agencies with progressive programs—and not so much into club or church work of the traditional varieties. In the Bassett study it was found that the college graduates were giving more time than the non-college mothers to community and health work. The birth control movement is almost entirely the work of educated, volunteer women, and it has been one of the major sources of improvement in the condition of mothers of all classes. A woman who devoted her leisure time to the organization of a welfare council for her county, another who gave practically her whole time to fighting a political machine and finally electing a reform city government, another who worked actively for years in the consumers' movement—these represent women's volunteer work which is invaluable for Democracy.

Women's volunteer work should be a training experience leading to positions of power and responsibility. Yet women are expected to remain "auxiliaries" and volunteers, and when a few of them break through into paid positions of real power, they are held by the masculinist cult and its female disciples to be "out of place." We shall not realize the potentialities of our woman power to improve either society or the home until we give women equal opportunity for full-time, paid, responsible jobs. Both the upper class pattern which limits women to the "charitable" and less powerful civic roles, and the lower-middle and lower class pattern, which makes most women's organizations "auxiliaries" to those of men [Warner and Lunt, 1941] seriously

restrict the contribution of women to society. Outside the home as well as within, there is still the prevalent conception that

> Men can be great when great occasions call.
> In little duties women find their spheres,
> The narrow cares that cluster round the hearth.
>
> R. H. STODDARD

FAMILY SUBSIDIES (REMEDY 5). These are used in several countries as a population measure. In France before the war many industries had organized associations and pooled funds out of which a "family extra wage" was paid to employees who had children. In 1930 some 1,820,000 employees were affected by the system. The average scale of payments was 28 francs per month for one child, 67 for two, 116 for three. Organized labor was at first opposed to the system; later it accepted the principle but demanded that it be made compulsory and universal in all industries. [Clark, M., 1931.] A few institutions in the United States pay their employees according to the principle of basic wage and dependency allotments. [Waggeman, 1939.] The German, Russian, and Swedish policies have been noted in Chapter VI. The Commonwealth of Australia has adopted a Child Endowment Scheme:

> . . . providing a payment of 5 shillings per week in respect to every child in a family except the first child without discrimination as to the income of the parents. This principle of child endowment has the support of the Australian Labor Movement which twenty years ago, by resolution affirmed that the service rendered to the community by the mother in the care and nurture of the child must be recognized as a community service and compensated and that payment for such services must be regarded as a right and should be charged against the total resources of the nation.*

It should be noted that *general* relief, as practiced throughout the United States by state and local governments, is similar in that payment is according to whole family need. Family wages and subsidies, however, are paid as a matter of right to employed breadwinners and not as relief on proof of destitution.

These family wage schemes may somewhat lessen the economic burden in the lowest classes—sometimes enable mothers to remain in the home instead of earning wages in addition, and encourage a some-

* Muriel Heagney, "The Family in Australia in the War Emergency," address at meeting of National Conference on Family Relations, in New York, December, 1941.

what higher birth rate in some classes. They do not directly solve the problem of homemaking.

According to the philosophy of the Swedish and the recommended American population policies [Lorimer, Winston, and Kiser, 1940], more is to be hoped for by emphasizing subsidies in *services* rather than in money: increased provisions for free higher education, cheaper but adequate living arrangements for students away from home, socialized medicine and universal health insurance, public financing of maternity care and childbirth, public subsidy of nurses, public provision of nursery schools and institutions for the temporary care of children. Such services, financed wholly or partly by society, would distribute the benefits more nearly according to need than could any system of fixed money payments graded according to size of family. Moreover, the entire fund available for the purpose would be spent under community and expert direction. If the same money were to be paid to individual families, it might be spent in less efficient ways. To be sure, a family would have to produce the child before it could claim the subsidy or increase in subsidy. The roles to be played by cash subsidies and by services "in kind," respectively, would need to be worked out through experience. Good consumer education would make safe a larger use of cash.

Return to a More Rural Type of Life (Remedy 4). This has been discussed under "decentralization" (page 571).

Cooperative Housekeeping Units (Remedy 6). This got only 8 votes among these 128 mothers. The proposition as stated may sound "communistic" and thus deter many people. Perhaps many are not aware that it could be combined with the return to a more rural life and, if so, it would answer one of the main objections to that solution, since it would make greater specialization possible among families and among individuals. However, this solution is a broad principle and includes many possible kinds of cooperation.

Instead of every mother of young children being on duty all the time, it is suggested that only one out of three or four mothers needs to be on duty at a time. The reply made to this proposal is that it is not practicable. This is simply another way of saying that the theory does not take account of all the cultural resistances. One resistance is in the ecological arrangement of living quarters. As long as each family has a separate dwelling house, with no collective nurseries for children, it would be very difficult for one woman to supervise several families of children at once. Even under the existing ecological conditions, however, the possible opportunities are not made

use of. Certainly there are many situations in which mothers could cooperate by pairs, the off-duty mother taking her children temporarily to the home of her cooperating partner who is on duty. More extensive cooperation would require a collective playground, nursery, kitchen, and feeding equipment for each cooperating group, which might comprise from four to ten families. Such things are now actually being done by families whose fathers are in the armed forces. War dissolves many cultural resistances and shows them to have been irrational.

But another and more serious resistance lies in our *attitudes* toward cooperation in housework. There is the attitude of intolerance toward another woman's methods of housekeeping and child management. Yet many mothers are willing to entrust their children for considerable periods to servants or nursemaids in their own employ. Apparently they feel that a servant acting more or less mechanically under their own orders is safer than the independent judgment of another mother with children of her own. Sometimes this is true. But as cooperation grows, this enforcement of each mother's limited wisdom upon her own child may give place to the use of collective wisdom and standards better than those of most individuals. The nursery school is perhaps the most potent force to change this attitude.

Overnight nurseries and children's all-year camps may provide relief and vacations for mothers. In Sweden this function is recognized.

Reports have come from several communities in which there is more or less systematic cooperation of mothers in the care of children. The more common type is the informal play group which occupies only a few hours each week.

A major difficulty with most of these schemes and also with the nursery school is the need for transportation. The mother may secure a morning of three hours' free time but in exchange she may have to drive to a school or friend's house twice. These rigid clock-hour obligations before and after the free period limit somewhat its usefulness. More is to be hoped for through whole communities and housing projects where the people who want to cooperate may live near to each other, and children may make more trips on foot. Gas rationing is also helping people to learn the art of cooperative transportation.

A Major Solution Would Be in Larger Food-Serving Units. Many of the efforts to free the mother's time are handicapped by a mistaken emphasis on child care as the chief function to be placed under communal auspices. There is little danger that mothers will be separated from their own children more than is good, but still the

fear of such an outcome runs counter to the new ideology of child study and the happy parent-child relation.

A better emphasis might be placed upon the communalizing of eating. Instead of suggesting a reduction in the time mothers spend with their children, we might try to cut the time they spend in purchasing food, preparing meals, and washing dishes. Perhaps the resistances to change are just as great in this area as the other. It would seem that the obvious economic advantage of the larger unit for cooking and dish washing would long ago have relegated the family kitchen to a secondary role, had it not been for powerful cultural values inhering in the old system. A family, having acquired a full set of dishes and equipment, feels that it is extravagant to "eat out." At the usual prices this is true, unless they can find ways to earn the difference in cost. Restaurants are not located sufficiently near to residential areas. Conventions of dress require extra time when dining out. Few restaurants are equipped to feed and care for young children adequately. Family dining is often preferred because it is associated with quiet, informality, and relaxation.

Yet all these difficulties might be overcome. There could be cooperative, commercial, and institutionally operated dining rooms. There could be an "as-you-were-room" where people could dine in whatever costume they happened to be wearing. We will let the censors fix the limits. There could be special nursery dining rooms. The gradual development of attractive tea houses and dining places in suburban neighborhoods, and school and factory lunches, may be an opening wedge leading to a new social pattern of larger group eating. It is not necessary that it should wholly displace family eating. The home equipment will probably be found worth having even if it is used for only a third or less of all meals. People will always want to vary the place and manner of eating. They like picnics and dinner on the lawn even at the expense of much extra labor.

To advocate more communal eating is not to force it on people against their will. It is, rather, to break down prejudices which prevent many people from "eating out" when it would be to their advantage to do so. Restaurant advertising, with its "home cooking," "next best to mother's," attempts to motivate people in terms of making a pardonable exception to a traditional and highly valued custom. Commercial enterprise "sneaks" new customs into our culture while singing the praises of old values. A social movement without profit motive might move things even faster, because it could appeal to new values emerging out of social change. Thus a reasonable amount of

eating away from home might be represented as desirable in order to get families better acquainted, to give married couples more evening leisure, to save social waste, and to give the mother *more* time to care for her children or work for the community; and even to win the war! If the main meal of the day were eaten outside, the other meals could be so simplified that the total time consumed in meal preparation and cleaning up could be reduced by two-thirds. The movement toward eating in larger units, in restaurants and tea rooms, is proceeding more rapidly than people generally realize.

Numerous optional schemes are possible, such as the partially prepared food which has become popular in some sections of Sweden, and hot cooked-food service, which has been tried out in many places, often to be discontinued, and never to spread very far. A most valuable research project would consist in a study of such efforts and the causes of their success or failure. In general, an important obstacle is the geographic scattering and mobility of the people who like to try any given experiment. We need planned communities which people may choose to live in because of the definite patterns of living these offer.

PROPOSALS FOR BUSINESS-LIKE REORGANIZATION OF HOUSEKEEPING. In England, Clementina Black [1918] long ago advocated *A New Way of Housekeeping* which would involve "domestic federations." A typical federation might consist of some fifty homes. It would have a center, which might be in one of the homes, with storehouses, kitchen, dining rooms, offices, and lodgings for servants. Some servants would be on duty at the center, and others would be available for service in the individual homes, moving about as needed. Meals could be eaten at the center or carried to individual homes in heat-retaining receptacles. Mrs. Black thinks that cooperative housekeeping has not progressed because of (1) the practice of delegating the catering to an outside entrepreneur, (2) amateur management, (3) too much community of life. "People do not want to pool their lives. They only want to get their food and their service properly organised."

Mrs. Black also condemns the wastefulness of traditional household construction and decoration. "Labour-making houses," she calls most of our homes. "Let us be ashamed to desire a decoration that demands a perpetuity of slavish toil for some fellow creature." [P. 37.]

Clementina Black points out that the principle of "domestic federation" would extend throughout the population the advantages of

employed domestic service now enjoyed by only a privileged few. The fact that people who can afford it hire servants is eloquent testimony to the unsatisfactory character of the homemaking job as carried on by one woman alone under existing conditions. Moreover homemaking is characterized by great fluctuations of load. The work of a home may require from 30 to 90 hours a week according to the family situation, and the fluctuations of need are too rapid and unpredictable to be met by the continuous hiring and firing of servants.

Another plan, congenial to individualism, for the reorganization of household labor to meet human needs was proposed in the Bassett study of 128 mothers. Instead of proceeding from the ideology of giving everyone what the upper classes have—servants—the plan starts with the more typically American middle class assumption of having no servant.

Another pattern, which is actually developing though in piecemeal fashion, and which could be accelerated by the mothers themselves, was then presented as follows.

"Some mothers find it necessary to supplement the family income by working outside the home. Some prefer outside work to housework. Some would like to keep sufficiently in touch with some outside activity while their children are young, to be able to return to it later. All these groups have difficulties in securing competent service to aid in their home duties.

"The present business world is prejudiced against giving the more responsible jobs to women, especially married women, still more especially to mothers. It is reluctant to create part-time jobs.

"The following is a suggested plan which would allow women to build their own business units and adapt them to their own needs. Each of these seven types of establishment might be set up within a single family home; each would provide work of professional or managerial grade and also work for one or more women, now employed as domestic servants, to act as assistants.

"Suppose that in a neighborhood: (1) One mother who was interested in the care of young children established a nursery school in her home with adequate grounds; (2) another took skillful, motherly care of babies or young children for a few days at a time, while their mothers were away; (3) another was prepared to serve meals in a homelike atmosphere or a neighborhood restaurant, or to deliver such meals in thermos containers to your home; (4) another provided a thorough weekly cleaning of homes with sufficient workers and the best mechanical devices; (5) another was prepared to do any kind of mending or sewing; (6) another provided

various specialized laundry services such as for silks and baby clothing; (7) another was prepared to do economical shopping and undertake special errands for other persons.

"Would you feel relieved to have such services available at times of sickness, or when you wished to make a trip?"

The number who answered *yes* to this was surprisingly large (105). Only 8 answered *no* and most of these explained that they had sufficient means to buy all the assistance which they needed.

The subjects were asked (1) which of these services they would patronize, (2) which, if any, they would like to manage or participate in. The answers were as shown in Table 35.

TABLE 35

SPECIALIZED HOME SERVICES

	Number Who Would Patronize	Number Who Would Like to Manage the Service
1. Cleaning service	68	5
2. Care of babies or young children	54	11
3. Nursery school	48	14
4. Meals	43	5
5. Mending and sewing	39	2
6. Shopping	25	10
7. Special laundry services	24	1
Total number of persons (omitting duplicates)	90	39

Although only 39 wanted to manage these services, 55 said they would like to work in "some other occupation—ordinary professions, businesses, etc., not necessarily related to homemaking—and patronize some of these seven types of service." Since three-fourths of these women were college women, it might be expected that many would prefer work of a more professional character, and that nursery school work would be the most popular of the listed items. Of the "other" occupations, not on this list, chosen by those who would like to work, 40 out of 51 were the occupations in which the women had already earned at some time.

If the population thus organized were to include the less educated classes in their normal proportion, it might come nearer to employing all the mothers who were served by the scheme.

The data of this study do not tell us how many mothers are discontented, and how seriously, in the population at large. The sample

is admittedly not representative. They do tell us more than we could have guessed about the relative strength of the different foci of dissatisfaction, and of the various demand and supply factors in a group at this educational level. A similar study of a group of rural homemakers is being made by Lita Bane at the University of Illinois, using the same questionnaire.

It is significant that 90 persons gave assent to some feature of this plan and that 71 of the 128 expressed a definite interest in specializing and earning in one way or another.

The whole movement here advocated is in line with the general trend toward specialization and large scale production which began with the Industrial Revolution. These trends have influenced the home, but only to a moderate extent. The thesis here presented is that the salvation of democratic society, which requires the reconciliation of happiness with adequate population replacement, lies in the speeding up and encouragement of these trends in the domestic sphere, rather than in trying to reverse them. For a part of our population decentralization is doubtless the happy solution, but even those families who "go back to the country," if they wish to preserve the real advantages of industrialism, must find designs for living which involve more cooperation, specialization, and exchange of services than are implied in the concept of "subsistence homestead."

B. "OF MEN AND WOMEN"

"So God created man in his *own* image, in the image of God created he him; male and female created he them." *

ECONOMIC PRESSURE IS THE DIRECT CAUSE OF WOMEN'S LEAVING THE HOME. We have considered the frustrations of homemaking in women's work. At the same time, many women are pulled out of the home regardless of their inclinations and even against them by the need for extra family income. This need may be for sheer adequacy of food and other necessities, or it may be the urge to maintain a higher standard of living. Coit and Harper [1930], asking several hundred married women why they worked outside the home, found that economic pressure far outweighed other reasons such as interest in outside work or being "lonesome at home." Most of them earned because they were obliged to. A study of the family incomes of our country explains this pressure to earn—one-third below $780 per year

* Genesis 1:27.

and two-thirds below $1,450.* The majority of earning women occupy jobs to earn food and shelter for themselves and their families. The next largest group strive to raise their families' scale of living beyond the bare essentials: for example, to obtain a better home, to provide a washing machine, or keep an adolescent from having to leave school to earn.

A study of 12,000 women in business and professional life was made in 1937. It revealed that one-half of them were supporting wholly or in part someone besides themselves.†

Indeed, advertising, instalment buying and credit economy, and the whole psychological atmosphere created by modern business stimulate the desire for additional luxuries, and impel some childless wives, or mothers of older children, to raise the family living scale through extra money rather than through economies, home production, and self-service. This is in line with the general trend of industrialism, urbanism, and personal specialization of labor, which has made the modern world what it is. This whole trend may find its natural limits, or it may prove wise to check and divert it, but Democracy insists that it be controlled without discrimination between the sexes.

Probably, for their own welfare and that of their families, we should have an increased number of business-class wives earning outside the home, either part or full time, and fewer working-class wives than at present. The latter might better be aided to permit them to care for their families at home. Housework, given adequate facilities, is probably better for the physical and emotional health of mothers when there are young children, and gives greater scope for intelligence than most of the jobs women perform in factories, stores, and domestic and personal service. On the other hand, the more educated woman can often find more scope for her abilities outside the home. Society would gain by providing her with greater opportunity. Some educated women, however, have the personality which finds satisfaction, and not excessive tension, in the administration of home tasks. When there are young children, home is the center of their concern, and they are usually happiest there during a large part of every day.

No Sound Argument for Restricting Employment of Married Women. One of the most unsound and prejudicial attitudes found in our society is the protest against the employment of married women.

* National Resources Committee, *Consumer Incomes in the United States*, 1938, p. 101

† Public Affairs Committee, *Why Women Work*, 1938, p. 16. Based on a study by the National Federation of Business and Professional Women's Clubs, Inc.

It is claimed that these working wives cause the unemployment of men and single women. This is unsound reasoning. In times of depression the refusal to employ married women may seem to spread employment and keep down the number of families needing relief. Yet it also holds down the purchasing power of those families whose women are not employed but could be, and the net result is no better. The effects are obvious when the discharge of the married woman worker leads to the discharge of a servant she may be employing at home. If an industry employs a married woman rather than a man, presumably it gets more efficiency that way. In the last analysis the difference lies not in the total amount of relief, but in *which* family shall be on relief and *which* family shall help to maintain employment, purchasing power, and taxable income through its greater purchasing power.

In ordinary times the employment of married women merely helps to provide the needed labor supply of expanding industry. We do not protest against a gradual increase of population on the ground that it creates unemployment. From the economic point of view, married women are the same as any other part of the total labor supply. The industrial nations have grown to several times their population of two centuries ago, and have employed practically their full labor supply at each successive period of prosperity.

Cecile Lafollette [1934] found that her 652 married women homemakers supported 676 dependents and employed 540 servants and other workers. The employment of women outside the home, if it takes jobs which others might have, also *creates* new jobs. Moreover, most of the women who do earn outside the home need the jobs as much as any other competitor might need them.

The protest against giving particular kinds of jobs to married women is unsound for additional reasons. Since they are more limited in their mobility, society might rather give them preference in many jobs, so that it could make use of their services while allowing them also to be with their families. In the case of school teachers, the mother, other things being equal, has a personality and experience better fitted to deal with children than has the unmarried woman. The avowedly married teacher has also a better influence upon the students than she would have if frustrated by the postponement of her marriage because she needs to keep her job, or if worried by trying to conceal a secret marriage or a liaison unblessed by clergy.

The Federal Marital Status Law, which declared that husband and wife may not both work for the government, was charged with encouraging illicit

cohabitation. The attacker declared that he personally knew of nine such cases, and that the marriage rate among government employees was falling; but a congressman retorted that "men have been tarred and feathered in this country for saying less than that." * Soon thereafter the law was changed. Lorine Pruette [1924] has recommended the deliberate policy of establishing part-time jobs for married women.

In New York and Philadelphia, bureaus of part-time work for women have been established. The fees from placed individuals cover a little more than half of the expenses of these bureaus. In 1928 the New York bureau had 2,000 new registrations, and 2,400 available jobs were reported to it by employers. The principal kinds of work were stenography, typing, and other clerical work, the care of children, teaching and tutoring, and selling. [Pruette, 1929.]

However, the actual opportunities for part-time jobs are far less than the potential workers because industry resists the idea, as it does the policy of shorter hours in general. The resistance is a complicated one, involving the unwillingness of employers to set a precedent of a short working day even though they have to shut down their plants for whole weeks at a time, and their reluctance to shoulder the extra expense of training a larger personnel per hour of labor performed.

THE "CAREER" IDEOLOGY HAS DECLINED. In a questionnaire to 150 Vassar seniors in 1937, Nancy Phillips asked:

> Under the following conditions would you choose to combine an outside vocation with homemaking, including child raising? If (1) you could earn at least $1,500 a year; (2) make the extra income pay for all additional expenses in connection with the children, e.g., nursery school, governess, etc.; (3) have sufficient time out from your work for child bearing, nursing, etc.; (4) have a six hour day so that you could have several hours a day with your children?

Seventy-three said *yes*, 70 *no*. A personal check-up of the girls who had not answered the questionnaire showed that they too were evenly divided. People who answered no were much more vehement than those who answered yes.

Janet Fowler Nelson noted in 1938 a marked change in the attitudes of young couples in the groups with which she deals. Four years previously the men, with the traditional male pride in being able to support their wives, were reluctant to let them work, and the girls wanted to do so. In 1938, with the same economic need, objections were coming from the girls, who resented the willingness of their fiancés to

* *New York Times*, April 28, 1935.

accept this financial help and were afraid that a situation eagerly embraced for the early marriage years might become permanent.*

From Pennsylvania State College in 1936 came the report of a poll of 190 senior women among whom the majority opinion was "that a young woman cannot continue her business career after her wedding . . . except in the case of real financial need." †

Yet Mary Fisher, in a yet unpublished study of 50 homemaking and 50 professionally occupied college women with children, found that the latter actually spent slightly longer hours per week with their children than did the former. ‡ There were no substantial differences between the homemakers and earners as regards health or the problems of their children. The 50 homemakers had 104 children, and the 50 earners 74. Such data are often used to show that working mothers cut down the birth rate, but of course it is equally possible that mothers who for various other reasons have fewer children are the ones most likely to take jobs.

The "marriage versus career" formula is a red herring drawn across the trail of the real issue. Most women will choose marriage, if they must choose. The advantages and disadvantages of both alternatives are well known. Rather it would be humane and democratic if public opinion were to bolster up and support each individual in her own personal and difficult choice, and at the same time support measures making such choice less necessary.

If women in increasing numbers work outside the home, a great deal of this work will be in the same fields in which they worked in the home, but it will be more specialized and organized in a more rational way. The nursery school, the laundry, and the restaurant are examples.

The "career" ideology has declined for men also. No longer are boys brought up on the Alger and Henty books, which suggest that any boy can become President and that only the "right attitude" is necessary to insure a steady rise from office boy to general manager. Men as well as women are learning that vocational life is unpredictable and subject to many forces outside their control. They are learning to seek security and meaning by preparing themselves for some

* *New York Times*, November 27, 1938.

† *New York Times*, November 15, 1936.

‡ Earning mothers engage service for cooking, cleaning, and laundry, and this substitution for their own labor does not change the amount of time they have available for children. They are more likely to plan so as to give the children periods when they can enjoy the full attention of their mothers.

broad group of occupations, and for marriage, parenthood, leisure, and citizenship. [Folsom, 1941, 7.]

NEEDED: A CONTINUOUS EDUCATIONAL PROGRAM FOR MOTHERS. A most urgent need is for a program of part-time work and education for women during years when their children are young, to prepare them for later years. Such a program should help them to keep in contact with the special field for which they earlier prepared themselves and in which they perhaps engaged before marriage. The Bassett study indicates that the great majority would continue in this same field if they returned to outside work after their children were grown.

A woman before marriage was well on the road to becoming a dean or a college president. After many years of successful marriage, raising of children, and sharing with her husband a career full of rich social contacts and constructive experiences, she became a widow. Now she finds herself limited to a low-paying job in a preparatory school. Her interruption of the established ritual of academic degrees and promotions sets her back in the professional scale in spite of the fact that she may be really better qualified than many who go through the usual sequence.

A rough analysis of the records of several hundred married college alumnae has shown that at least a fourth of them by the age of fifty have suffered either widowhood, divorce, serious family illness, or financial set-back, or other misfortunes which would not have been economically disastrous if these women had maintained their earning power and vocational contacts. In other words, these women, however personally satisfied, were economically deceived by marriage; and their potential contribution to society in terms of a whole lifetime has failed to be what it might be merely because they trusted too much in "marriage" without "career." We may say that during the child-raising years they rendered the service which society most needed from them; it is regrettable that this fact should prevent them from rendering their best service and getting an appropriate reward during the later years.

These facts commend themselves to the attention of college girls who put their whole faith in marriage and, still more, to our colleges which think in terms of preparing women for "either" marriage "or" career. We need less of this distinction and more preparation for life. The problem of women's education is basically the same for all women and is more complex than that of men's education. It involves training for both marriage and a vocation, which *should* be equally

true of the education of men. But with women there is an additional problem: namely, woman's education should arouse inner forces of personality which will enable her to maintain through homemaking and child-raising the mental alertness, the vocational contacts, the continuous and cumulative study of a given field, which will allow her to be a creative and happy citizen after 40 and to contribute in her chosen field.

At Smith College from 1925 to 1928, Ethel Puffer Howes [1928, A, 1928, B, 1929] operated an Institute for the Coordination of Women's Interests. This provided a cooperative nursery group, and a cooked food service adjusted to moderate incomes in order to free the time of mothers and enable them to study or earn.

Many are skeptical of such efforts because, they say, with all these aids a mother of small children cannot carry on a "career" in competition with the men. She may perhaps "work" for money, and she may even hold a "job," in Mrs. Howes' terms, but a "career" requires a ruthlessness toward her family which few women have or want. But mere "work" outside the home may be of great value to the community and to the woman herself.

The world which lies before us may be less a competitive world for men as well as women, and rather a world which will need every person to do whatever he or she can do, whether it be a full-time or part-time job outside the home. Work will be carried on to fill human needs rather than for profit, and "the devil take the balance sheet."

IDEOLOGY IS MORE IMPORTANT THAN JOBS. We may expect that for many years to come women's vocational opportunities will fluctuate and they will drift from the home and back again as economic conditions change. Women in some regions shift seasonally between home and canning factories, or between field work and housework, to a much greater extent than we realize. Men also shift in the same way. They also show large cyclical fluctuations of paid employment. In years of depression, women, adolescents, and men, who would otherwise be earning money, stay home and do what they can by way of repair, construction, and other self-services for which there is not time in periods of brisk employment.

In several European countries, before the war, women were employed outside the home much more than in the United States, and yet they had less of sex equality. The more important question is the ideology or scheme of cultural values which governs the roles and relations of men and women both in and outside the home. What people are actually doing at the moment may be less important than

what they have the right to do. The ideology of the social roles and relations of the sexes is of crucial importance. It is both a symbol and an important content of the democratic culture system.

The modern feminist movement is sometimes dated as beginning in 1798, with Mary Wollstonecraft's *Vindication of the Rights of Women,* which opens with these words:

> Contending for the rights of woman, my main argument is built on this simple principle, that if she be not prepared by education to become the companion of man, she will stop the progress of knowledge and virtue.

In 1848 was held the first Women's Rights Convention. Elizabeth Cady Stanton. Lucretia Mott, Jane Hunt, Charlotte Perkins Gilman, Carrie Chapman Catt, and others have carried on the torch.

In 1869 John Stuart Mill wrote his epochal essay, *On the Subjection of Women:*

> The disabilities of women are the only case, save one, in which laws and institutions take persons at their birth and ordain that they shall never in all their lives be allowed to compete for certain things . . . Among all the lessons which men require for carrying on the struggle against the inevitable imperfections of their lot on earth, there is no lesson which they more need than not to add to the evils which nature inflicts, by their jealous and prejudiced restrictions on one another.

The nineteenth century was devoted largely to removing political and legal disabilities. Some leaders devoted themselves to getting special protective legislation for women employed in factories, and this was an opening wedge to the securing of similar legislation later for men. These achievements relieved the most crying needs of women; that is, they made some restrictions on hours and wages which helped the groups of poor women with little education, most of whom were carrying the double job of raising a family and earning. Such protective legislation was merely the beginning of a movement to provide some of the most fundamental needs of women. Several legal inequalities were removed during that period. When the Woman Suffrage Amendment came in 1920, many people thought that feminism had now reached its goal.

In the late nineteenth century many women entered lines of earning previously occupied by men only. Some of them remained unmarried in order to do so. These women emphasized their need for independence and opportunity to work in their fields of interest; they had strong influence in the liberal arts colleges for women. Other

women developed the home economics movement and thereby sought to give professional status, or at least a professional ideology, to the work of the married woman in the home.

Women slowly drifted into occupations outside the home, and certain occupations, such as elementary school teaching and secretarial work in this country, came to be definitely women's occupations. In World War I the women went temporarily into many occupations formerly alien to them, and then were discharged or withdrew without greatly changing the traditions by their war work. Many occupations are still practically barred to women through custom and at the same time men shamefacedly try to withdraw from vocations which get to be known as feminine. Women, however, are not ashamed of being in men's occupations and do not try to withdraw from them, although they may be forced to do so. This very fact is evidence of the real subjection of women, however much it may be hidden beneath our lip-service to "sex equality" and Democracy.

The major economic limitations upon women are now: (1) lower pay for the same work, (2) the reservation of positions of greater skill and authority mainly for men, (3) the customary family pattern, which is supported by the common law and which in practice limits most mothers of young children to the one occupation of housekeeping, with compensation at the discretion of the husband as long as he provides a certain minimum known as "support," and (4) the economic dependence of the mother upon the ability and life of her husband.

There is still a long distance to go, as we can see when we compare our own or British laws with those of Sweden and Russia. Yet many say feminism has sufficiently served its purpose; *we* do not need to go farther. In the 1920's this let-well-enough-alone school of thinkers could point, although not with logic, to peace, prosperity, and a world made "safe for Democracy."

Yet the threat of authoritarianism and Fascism is causing intelligent women, and the more thoroughgoing believers in Democracy of both sexes, to revive their thinking about the woman problem. The present roles of the sexes in America are ambiguous and confused, and it may be that if we do not go forward to a more outright sex equality, we shall be forced backward.

THE GAINS MADE BY FEMINISM ARE THREATENED. A study by Kirkpatrick [1936, B] illustrated this ambiguity. He distinguishes the roles which may be played by the married woman: the wife-and-mother role, which implies dependency, subordination, limited interests, and domestic service; the companion role, which implies romanticism,

estheticism, entertaining, sociability, pleasure-sharing functions; and the partner role, which implies independence and equality. Each role has its privileges and its obligations. By an attitude questionnaire Kirkpatrick shows that women want the privileges of more than one role, and men wish to load them with the obligations of more than one role. Thus 51 per cent of the male students say "yes" to the proposition: "The working wife who claims economic equality has no more right to alimony from her husband than he has right to alimony from her"; and they also say "yes" to the proposition: "The husband should be regarded as the legal representative of the family group in all matters of law."

Kirkpatrick implies that both sexes are equally "inconsistent"; a moralist might say they are equally "selfish" or "greedy." But let both the moralist and the measurer of attitudes "hold their fire," because all these data fail to tell us how far these roles are *actually* inconsistent, nor do they tell us how many inconsistent privileges are wanted by men or inconsistent obligations placed upon them by women. Why is it the women who are "on the carpet"?

During the 1930's there were many subtle ideological influences working against the democratic trend in the relation between the sexes. The idea was widely expressed that women have gone far enough toward equality and some have held that the situation is now unfair to men. These tendencies may be due in part to depression and unemployment, but they can easily be capitalized for ulterior ends.

Paul Popenoe quotes modest figures showing that only 47 per cent of wife-ruled homes were happy as against 61 per cent of husband-dominated homes. The editor then captions the story, "Wife-Ruled Homes Held Least Happy . . . Speaker Urges Dominance of Family by Husband," despite the fact that in the same breath Popenoe says that where the fifty-fifty basis exists, 87 per cent were happy.*

Field and Stream † prints a two-page series of photographs of men and women together on camping expeditions. It is entitled, "If She MUST Go" (capitals as in original), and offers this cheerful patriarchal advice: "If your wife insists on going camping with you, take her along. I've taught mine to help me. She does right well."

At the same time that we have been mixing the sexes increasingly in work and in play, business, advertising, and the men's and women's magazines and clubs have been developing separate sex cultures.

* *New York Times*, June 28, 1934.

† June, 1939, by John Mills, Jr.

In Moss Hart's play, *Lady in the Dark,* the heroine is an able business woman who has to consult a psychiatrist because of her extreme nervous tension. When she falls in love with a male competitor, marries him, and hands over to him the leadership of the enterprise, everything "ends" happily. The implication is that women cannot have love unless they either give up business or subordinate themselves to masculine leadership therein. In a recent moving picture, *Woman of the Year,* the woman leader, active outside the home, is pictured as a most exaggerated and unreal type. She is a woman of straw set up to be ridiculed and thereby to reindoctrinate us with the old tradition that a woman should give up her specialized, extra-domestic interests whenever they interfere with her husband's comfort in any way.

A number of articles have appeared in the more serious popular magazines recently, presenting the experiences of women who have had jobs and then retired to the home to live more happily thereafter. [Anon., 1939.] But experiences of the reverse pattern are not so well publicized.

In 1938 the newspapers featured a girl of 17, just entering college, who had been chosen in a contest sponsored by a New York store from a thousand competitors to represent the "Ideal American College Girl." Over her picture was the caption, "Ideal College Girl Puts Marriage before a Career," and then it was explained below that this attitude was one of the requirements drawn up by the sponsors.

That college girls should idealize marriage, before marriage, and prefer to make child-raising their main job is in itself highly desirable. There is a good chance that the economic needs of *their* families will be supplied. The ominous feature is that this neo-familism, cultivated by the schools and colleges, can be used through upper class prestige and adroit publicity to bring into disrepute the movement for equal opportunity and thus prepare the way for a resubjection of women.

Let us recall now our discussion of homemaking. We saw that as an occupation it has lagged in development and has acquired features which tend to make it frustrating to a large proportion of persons practicing it, regardless of who they are.

MEN AND WOMEN CONSTITUTE CASTES. Regardless of how far we may be able to reorganize homemaking or make it more satisfying, there is the question of whether and why it should be almost exclusively a woman's job.

Our Western culture, like the great majority of all cultures, embodies a sex-division of labor which is not merely a result of the natural process of interaction in millions of individual situations, but is also definitely crystallized as a value. This is more than a mere division of labor; it is part of a complete pattern of differentiation including dress, personality, social role, and style of living. This, as Margaret Mead [1935] points out, may enrich culture but it often cramps individuality.

It is in the nature of human society to categorize individuals, in terms of sex, age, kinship, economic function, social rank, and other factors. Large civilized societies have additional differentiations according to race, language, and religion. Some of these categories, in some societies, are *castes;* that is, people are born into them to stay. Some societies have relatively few caste lines and the general trend and motive of the democratic movement has been to reduce caste and to give social mobility to the individual. In our American society the only caste lines remaining completely intact are two: the line between White and Negro, and the line between Males and Females.

To What Degree Are Sex Differences Biological? The persistence of the sexes as castes is of course strongly bulwarked by the fact that they constitute two distinct biological forms. To most thinkers, including even social scientists, this is a finality about which no further thought is necessary. It is only recently that cultural anthropology has become a dynamic force in our social science, and not many of our social scientists have yet seen its full implications. These are two: *first,* the roles of women and men can be prescribed in many extremely different ways as demonstrated by actual practice in various cultures; and *second,* cultural patterns are only indirectly and loosely tied to biological sex-differences. Biology makes patriarchy a more "natural" (i.e., frequent) development than sex-equality, but it does not make it inevitable; it takes only one culture to refute the hypothesis of inevitability. Although the ultimate *criterion* of "goodness" is biological (i.e., predominance of pleasant over unpleasant emotions), this does not mean that blind biological forces working through the blind natural processes of social interaction will produce the "good life." These forces produce merely what will survive (and that perhaps only temporarily); but intelligence can devise social patterns, as it can tools, which are "better" in terms of the higher neuro-biology of mind, emotions, and happiness.

Therefore, as students of sociology let us free ourselves from one of the deepest surviving prejudices of our culture, and consider objec-

tively how much of the difference between the sexes is fixed by "eternal laws of nature." Briefly stated, women must bear the children, and they must nurse them. (Even the latter can be eliminated but it is not desirable.) Population replacement calls for the average marrying woman to have three children. This, on good health standards, might *require* from three to six years of her life to be reserved, without any other demanding activity. Yet woman has three years longer in her average lifetime than does man.

> The masculine key quality . . . is the aggressive, adventurous, enterprising . . . disposition; the tendency to pugnacity (in the wider sense) and self-assertiveness . . . The . . . feminine traits are the actively sympathetic . . . disposition . . . the maternal impulse and the tender feelings and an interest in personal relationships.*

Johnson and Terman [1940] find that there is indication from studies of young children that there is a difference in aggressiveness, with boys less timid, more aggressive, and more interested in material things than girls, and girls more conforming, more interested in social relationships, and more dependent on them for their security; this sex difference seems to hold in later life as well. Sex differences in emotionality seem to have a physiological basis; evidence shows that physical homeostasis is greater in man than in woman. This would have its effect on what the authors term "mental homeostasis" and this they indicate is superior in the male than in the female. "The results of [such] studies are almost unanimous in indicating less emotional balance in the female." The authors do not attempt to answer here whether these sex differences are biologically or culturally determined but they suggest that the extreme view which overemphasizes the cultural factors is as misleading as the older emphasis on heredity is all-determining.†

Greater emotional balance may indicate, however, no superior ability in any important field. Women through history have surprised men with their ability to perform tasks, when given an opportunity, which have formerly been regarded as beyond their sphere. Women's performance in certain lines of manufacturing at present is an example. Don Wharton's observations of women in airplane factories, ‡ which tell how they have cut the production time of men

* L. M. Terman and Catherine Miles, *Sex and Personality*, McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1937, p. 389.

† From review in *Bulletin of Family Research and Education*, 1:4 (September, 1940), 13.

‡ *Reader's Digest*, June, 1942.

in many fields, and similar studies will lead to new experiments by psychologists.

It would be unscientific to deny the possibility of a genuine, inborn, temperamental difference between the averages of the two sexes, although this is less than many such differences between individuals of the same sex. Yet human occupations and social roles are such that a wide range of temperament can fit into almost any occupation or role. This is true even of primitive tribes with their comparative simplicity. In his study of Fiji chieftains, Ford [1938] found that some of them were bullies who ruled by fear and the use of their legal power, whereas others ruled by their friendly personalities. Not many occupations in modern society require a narrowly defined personality type to fill them, and when they do, persons can very well be selected according to their personal qualifications unprejudiced by their sex.

Leta Hollingworth [1914] has presented telling experimental evidence against the old idea that women are inferior workers because of their menstrual function. Tests of steadiness, manual speed, motor fatiguability, color naming, typewriting, and mental quickness failed to reveal any *periodic* inefficiency or efficiency among women. Curves representing pulse, blood pressure, temperature, caloric radiation, and so on, showed no relations to curves representing efficiency in these tests. In a few cases experiencing physical pain on the first day of menstruation, there was some slowing down; but otherwise the variability of women's performance was unrelated to their menstrual periodicity. Thus a heavy shadow of doubt is cast upon the thesis of some writers, such as Havelock Ellis, who, though idealizing women and favoring the elevation of their status, persist in regarding Woman as a mysterious and somehow "different" species of the human animal.

However, there remains the question whether the temperamental differences of the sexes might produce desirable cultural changes if large numbers of men and women were to change roles as they well might if we abolished all prejudice. For example, the suffragists argued that women would have a humanizing influence upon public policy and many anti-feminists claim that the "feminine" influence has "softened" the democracies. The "emotional instability" which the psychological tests seem to find in women is, partly, a greater sensitiveness to stimuli which arouse fear, anguish, or disgust. This might cause women to shrink more from inflicting pain and to work harder for measures alleviating suffering. It may also be related to the disapproval of women executives, by many women as well as men,

on the dubious ground that an executive needs to be "hard-boiled" and not too sensitive emotionally. If there is a constitutional sex difference of this kind, as many people in both the feminist and anti-feminist camps believe, it would argue for placing women in the majority in our legislative bodies and executive offices dealing with human relations, leaving the men to staff the engineering and military services where some ruthlessness might be useful. However, many who place large stress upon native sex differences will not accept this implication of their theory.

In any event, however, representative democratic government would seem to call for proportional representation of women in legislative and judicial bodies. If women are "more interested in social relationships," as Terman claims, they might well introduce a constructive influence.*

SOCIALLY RELEVANT SEX DIFFERENCES ARE ENTIRELY CULTURAL. Margaret Mead [1935] has given us a most significant exhibit of evidence in her study of three primitive societies. Among the Arapesh both men and women are gentle and "feminine" in the Euro-American sense; among the Mundugumor both sexes are harsh, aggressive, and "masculine" in our sense. Among the lake-dwelling Tchambuli, our roles are reversed; the men are artists and graceful dancers, they are coquettish, and they leave sexual initiative largely to women. In a group of men there are strain, watchfulness, and petty quarrels; the women are efficient, comradely, and jolly. The men remain much of the time in the seclusion of the men's house, and they depend upon the women for support, food, and affection.

The Tchambuli are a small tribe, but they are enough to upset a world-wide fallacy.†

Let it be said here quite emphatically that no school of thought, so far as this writer knows, wants to make the sexes as nearly alike as possible. But since sex differences are cultural we may consider which ones we might desire to abolish and which to retain and perhaps even intensify. Democracy requires that this decision be made in accordance with three governing principles: justice, freedom, and sexual attraction.

* Similar implications of sex differences in personality are developed by William M. Marston, "Women: Servants of Civilization," *Tomorrow*, February, 1942.

† In many other primitive cultures also, sex-temperament differences are found which are much unlike our own, varying in many different directions. See various works of Margaret Mead and Ruth Benedict.

DEMOCRACY AND SEX DIFFERENCES. Few thinkers have fully seen the problem of *justice* between the sexes One who has is the Russian writer Nemilov [1930]. In *The Biological Tragedy of Women* he points out that biological nature has actually been unjust to woman by giving her the entire pain and bodily risk of reproduction. But nature is not governed by any law of justice. Justice is a value which grows out of human intelligence and even then it does not develop fully until all caste patterns are swept away. A completely democratic culture is completely human and implies Nemilov's principle that women should be compensated for their biological burden. He says: "It is absolutely necessary to go beyond social equality and seek such patterns of life which might alleviate the 'tragedy of sex.'"

Because her body is called upon to carry on the continued life stream of the race, in all fairness woman should have special assistance and protection at times of pregnancy, childbirth, nursing, and other periods when her reproductive organs are making serious demands on her vitality. But it does not mean that she lacks desire for the fundamental opportunities for a full physical, emotional, and mental life. At present there is no rational plan for the life of women. Social justice, which is far from realized among people in general, is still more lacking as among women. A young mother with a few-weeks-old baby and no helper usually has far too much work in relation to her strength, whereas the older woman whose children have left home often has too little. Strong mothers with great ability and health are often led by our cultural influences to a life of petty refinements. Worn and tired women with young children work in our factories.

Burgess and Cottrell [1939, 341] whose marital prediction study had purposes quite other than finding any general relation between the sexes as such, obtained as "an outstanding, if not the most significant finding," that "wives make the major adjustment in marriage." This was based upon the fact that the pre-marital characteristics of the husband were much more closely correlated with marital adjustment than those of the wife. The authors appear somewhat surprised by their own conclusion, which they admit is contrary to the prevalent American conception of marriage as a "fifty-fifty proposition." They speculate that perhaps our apparent equality in marriage is superficial, that the domineering wife and "henpecked" husband is a pattern characterizing only a small proportion of marriages. The findings imply that the majority of wives are making concessions and adjustments to please their husbands.

The principle of *freedom* also demands more than a mere balancing or equalizing of the two sexes. It requires that each person be given a choice from the full range of occupations, social roles, and other opportunities of which he or she is *personally* capable. It is not satisfied to give the sexes equally green pastures; it removes the fence between the pastures. The traditional pattern is not only *unfair* to women; it is also *oppressive* to women and in some degree to men.

The principle of *sex attraction* can be left till last because it is able to make use of whatever is left after justice and freedom are satisfied. Like esthetic principles it is exceedingly flexible in its use of methods. Anything which does not seriously hamper or unbalance justice and freedom could be chosen as an erotic value. Differences in dress, perfume, and manners, added to the biological differences of voice and bodily form, admirably satisfy these criteria. If desired, these differences could be made qualitatively even more extreme, while at the same time they might be arranged to provide equality of cost, of comfort, and of dressing time.*

Sex Differences and Erotic Fixations. It is a sorry confusion of ideas which leads to the attitude that if women want equal vocational opportunities, they must expect to stand up in the subway; or that a woman who aspires to be a high executive instead of a stenographer is usually one who wears mannish clothes or disseminates a chill atmosphere. This is only a cultural stereotype; in practice both men and women of affairs know that there can be sex attraction among professional colleagues, and that women executives combine warm human sympathy with good technical judgment at least as well as do men.

Perhaps the deepest root of the resistance of men to changing the status of women is their sexual conditioning. Are they unconsciously afraid that the supply of "real women" will decrease, making for serious male sexual competition? The assumption here is that only restricted, dumb, and docile women can be true sex objects. Many educated women know this, and by cleverly feigning a naivete which is not theirs, they help to perpetuate this male attitude

But we know full well that erotic stimuli are subject to change. In fact they are considerably a matter of fashion and not altogether of long, slow trends. A magazine like *Esquire,* which reflects the current fetishisms, can also subtly guide their changes.

* The Life Extension Institute found that a man's total costume, put aside for physical examination, weighed 9 pounds, on the average; a woman's, about 2½.

The original linkage of love in the man, so much emphasized by psychoanalysts, is to the mother. Of course this is contrary to the prevalent adult sex fixation. The mother is a superior person, one who gives commands and makes decisions. The later love of the grown-up boy for a younger, dependent, submissive girl represents not a modification of his earlier love, but a violent revolution. Perhaps, as some psychoanalysts might say, this is the normal escape from the incest fantasy and guilt. But on the other hand, a substantial number of men do marry women older than themselves, and according to Terman's data [p. 184] are just as happy as other husbands. Many marry a distinctly "motherly" type of woman and are happy.

Research should be undertaken to tell us more about these erotic fixations of men as regards the social role and rank of women they prefer. Certainly there is no uniformity or inevitability; and certainly there is no reason so far to regard as unnatural or difficult a widespread erotic fixation of men upon intelligent women who share with them equally positions of social power and prestige. Some of the most admired love affairs have been of this type, such as that of Robert and Elizabeth Browning.

INTER-SEX COMPETITION AND ANTAGONISM. But perhaps the difficulty to be feared lies not so much in women's being "higher" or "lower" than men as in their competing with men for the same positions. Competition naturally leads to more or less conflict, and conflict is not conducive to sex attraction. Thus Margaret Mead [1940, B] raises this question on the cultural level.

The feminist movement of the nineteenth century sought to give women opportunities similar to those for men. Margaret Mead [1940] holds that this was bad mental hygiene for both women and men. The accepted biological roles of woman as the mother and man as the provider were threatened and no genuine satisfaction has come to women in their attempt to escape their more fundamental role. Dr. Mead would not have the new role for women which is in the making take the extremes of the total emancipation of Soviet women, or the total return to the home of Nazi women, but sees woman's chief tasks as best a projection of home tasks into the larger community. (Although she does not specifically discuss this here, the writer has heard Dr. Mead in a lecture give as an example of this point of view a greater interest and activity in consumer economics as one of the problems to which women might lend their efforts.) Woman has been given many more free hours at home than she has ever had, through contraception, artificial feeding, and labor-saving devices. In looking about for new worlds

to conquer in which her individuality may be expressed, she had better, Dr. Mead suggests, for her mental health and that of her male partner, first look for these new worlds in complementary rather than in competitive fields.*

Let us grant for the moment Mead's thesis that woman's most appropriate role under modern social change is a "projection of home tasks into the larger community." What, concretely, does this mean?

Years ago spinning and weaving were projected from the home into the larger community. Women went with their original tasks into the textile factories. But men took over the management of the industry, and plenty of men were also employed in the laboring ranks. Some of the preparation of food was projected into restaurants. Here men took over very largely as managers and chefs, kitchen workers, and waiters, and women have increasingly been employed as waitresses, but lately many women have come to manage tea houses and the like. Child care was projected partly into the elementary school, the kindergarten, and the nursery school. Here women "followed their occupations out of the home," but men still largely manage the school system. Laundry work was projected; women operate laundries and men manage them. The situation is similar in the food industries.

The rather considerable variety of industries into which women go outside the home tends to conceal their rather uniform subordination within each industry they enter. Men can dominate women not only within the home, but also outside. They are less secure in their domination, however, when women are outside, because there the women earn money and have mobility. Their situation as earners is open to public view. Trade unions and managers of competitive businesses are concerned with women's hours and wages. The plan presented on page 611 would assist women to develop their own business projects in which they could carry on managerial responsibility as well as the detailed work.

It was only by conflict that women obtained the suffrage, which almost everyone today admits to be their logical right. Perhaps a few women will always have to sacrifice their "femininity," whatever that is, for the sake of their fellow women who will thereby benefit. This is not very different from the sacrifice by male leaders of their jobs, their security, and often their lives for revolutionary movements which brought about a better life for others. We cannot ignore the reality

* From review in the *Bulletin of Family Research and Education*, 1:5 and 6 (November-December, 1940), 26.

of sex-class struggle although, fortunately, it can probably never attain the overt violence of some other class struggles.

Government services are also increasingly supplementing, or substituting for, home services, particularly in the fields related to recreation, health, and food. The women of Sweden realized that new government jobs in these lines were being created and were being obtained largely by men. The leading Swedish women's organizations united in demanding that some of these positions be given to qualified women, and their "pressure group" action brought results.

Democracy will not be served by any policy which limits women to some particular field which is "auxiliary" or "complementary" or somehow contingent upon men's prior choice, whether this field be in the home or outside the home.

THE ALTERNATIVES BEFORE US. If we want to maintain population it is quite possible that we shall be obliged either to subordinate one sex much more completely than now to authority and a limited role (and let us guess which one it would be!), or we must attain some more stabilized level of inter-sex justice, personal freedom, and happiness. The present ambiguous relation between the sexes wobbles dangerously on a divide.

The dilemma is part and parcel of the larger issue between Fascism and Democracy. To say that the question of the roles of men and women can be postponed until that larger issue is settled is to ignore an important part of the strategy which will determine the final outcome. Our practical war policies in regard to the use of women are encouraging. The danger lies in what happens after the war is over and the men come home and look for jobs. But the ideological preparation for that event can begin now.

The question regarding men and women is essentially similar to the question regarding races and culture groups and that regarding social classes. Shall we, or shall we not, remove discriminations—legal, economic, social and moral—which prevent in practice the equal opportunity we have long espoused in theory? Shall we have the courage to use the agencies which form our public opinion, not only to build morale for fighting the foreign enemy, as we are doing, but also to discredit the scientifically disproved ideology on which his whole program is based? If so, we shall wage relentless ideological warfare upon all myths alleging the superiority or the special mental limitations of some race, sex, or other class of human beings.

Long before World War I, a young German philosopher stated with astounding boldness the ideology of sex and "race" which was

later to permeate the Nazi movement. Otto Weininger's [1908] *Sex and Character* is a most remarkable psychosis. All women should read it.

Weininger finds a great similarity between the mentality of women and that of Jews. "There is no real dignity in women," and the character known as "gentleman" "does not exist among Jews." "Jews and women are without extreme good and extreme evil": they are incapable of genius or of extreme stupidity. Their intelligence is simply "the alertness of an exaggerated egotism," due to their "boundless capacity" to pursue "any object with equal zeal, because they have no intrinsic standard of value." They have "nothing in their own souls by which to judge the worthiness of any particular object." The Jews, in their extreme adaptability, their talent for journalism, the mobility of their minds, their lack of deeply rooted original ideas, resemble women. The Aryan man on the other hand has a "transcendental standard" and shares the "higher metaphysical life."

There is some descriptive truth in Weininger's characterizations, and indeed he courageously refutes some popular fallacies such as that of the weaker sexual nature of women. The important thing is the scale of values which he applies to human traits. According to this, the very type of intelligence which has fostered humanitarianism and Democracy is ignominiously lower than the type of mentality which can be blindly enslaved to some arbitrary value, which though seeming to come from the soul, is really a part of the culture. It is now painfully apparent that such transcendental values emanating from the chaste metaphysical souls of Aryan men have helped to plunge the world into bloodshed and to butcher thousands of Europeans of meaner "souls" who were trying to build up Democracy and human brotherhood.

Yet, toward the end, Weininger considers "the inclusion of women in the conception of humanity." *

Here we see the antithesis of the democratic ideology. It is something more than an antagonism toward particular groups such as might have arisen from past wars or conflicts of economic interest. It is an attitude which readily transfers itself from one object to another. It is a passionate need to believe that some human beings are inherently less worthy than others. It is almost a refusal to accept the fact that mankind is a single species, a protest against nature for not having created more useful types of animals immediately below man.

* See Weininger, esp. pp. xxii, 302–320.

We in this country have dedicated ourselves to the opposite course: to seek to understand all groups, to furnish them with opportunity for life and growth, and to bring about human brotherhood. It is a long and complicated task but the only one which recognizes the sacredness of the individual and the only one which contains the possibility of peace. It offers the greatest hope for the continued life of the human race.

Pearl Buck [1941, 202–203] suggests a companionship of free men and free women working together on equal terms in all the processes of life. Democracy requires justice and equality not only between races, nations, and classes, but between the two most basic divisions of mankind: men and women. Indeed, the prophets have been saying something like this since the days of Mary Wollstonecraft. But, although our social values have been changed in this direction, and sex equality has come to be regarded as *desirable,* the forces of reaction have found new weapons for a last-ditch resistance and possible counter-revolution. These weapons are fashioned in the image of Science. They consist of two pseudo-scientific arguments. The first is that social sex equality, even if desirable, is *impossible* because of the biological differences between the sexes. The *belief* that something is impossible of course tends to weaken the *value* which asserts that it is desirable. The second pseudo-scientific argument is that we already have sex equality—indeed that we have something like a matriarchate with the women lording it over the men.

The two arguments, of course, contradict each other, but one is used in one setting and with one audience, and the other elsewhere. It has been the purpose of this chapter to expose their fallacy and thus to help clear the way for what we have accepted as our value scheme and our goal—what we call Democracy.

Chapter XIX

THE FAMILY AND THE COMMUNITY

A. HEALTH AND SOCIAL WORK

There is a great deal which might legitimately be included in this book which is omitted for want of space and because it is adequately treated in other books. This pertains particularly to the relations of the family to other institutions and the larger community.

In the primitive tribe all institutions were one. Family life, industry, religion, and government were merely different aspects of social activity. With the development of early civilization, religion and government came to have specialized officials and buildings, and to carry on activities which did not involve the whole group at the one time. Industry was still largely a family function but later came to be separated from the home.

MODERN SUPPLEMENTARY INSTITUTIONS. In modern times the family system fails to take care of a certain minority of destitute or dependent families. In a simpler society they would have been cared for by their kinsfolk, or in medieval society by the church and the guilds. They have become so numerous that a new set of institutions has grown up to take care of them; these, once known as "poor relief" and "charities," are now called *social* or *social welfare agencies.* Some of these agencies are a part of the governmental organizations (federal, state, or local) and are supported by taxation; others are "private" or "voluntary' welfare agencies supported by gifts, directly or through community chests.

The health needs of both self-supporting and dependent families were met, if at all, mainly through the services of physicians compensated through private fees. In modern times, however, there are many things which can be done better by larger scale organization. So hospitals and public health agencies have developed, financed partly by the patients' fees, partly by taxes, and partly by gifts. The advance of medical science itself has exerted a pressure which calls for

its wider application among the people, regardless of their ability to pay.

Education was once undistinguished from everyday living. With the development of writing, people came to be divided into the literate and the illiterate. Literacy required special teaching and was the possession of only a small minority until the last century. It continued to increase with the development of the public school, which now far surpasses the private schools and other educational agencies in volume of activity and service.

Agencies for recreation and "character building," particularly of youth, have also taken over some of the former work of the family. Some of them are brought under the title of *group work*, a subdivision of social work, which thereby becomes more educational in function and less exclusively a channel of material relief.

Social case work comes into close relation with educational and vocational *guidance*, and other forms of guidance or counseling agencies, including legal aid, child guidance, and family counseling, develop.

These modern activities and institutions can be classified in various ways; in the local community they tend to group themselves as "health and welfare" agencies, coordinating through a welfare council, sometimes with a separate council for health agencies, and "educational" agencies, which are not yet clearly defined or coordinated except for the public school system. The church extends its activities into several of these fields.

SOCIALIZATION OF SERVICES. One outstanding feature of these developments is the great increase in all kinds of *socialized* services; that is, services which are paid for in whole or in part through taxation or gifts and are given to the people wholly or partly according to needs. They operate roughly, therefore, on the principle "from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs," in contrast with the commercial principle of payment for each service received. A closely related feature is the gradual extension of these socialized services, once mainly given to the underprivileged, to wider and wider ranges of people ("filtering up," the British call it).

Since the socialized services must be paid for (so far as not met by direct fees) out of taxes or gifts coming from the profits of commercial enterprise, many people are alarmed by this trend. Others maintain that this merely means a wider divergence of the channels of service from the channels in which money flows; society can always "pay" for services if it has the man power to produce them.

In 116 urban areas of the United States, the total expenditure for public and private assistance, including WPA wages, was $880,000,000 for the year 1941. Only 1.2 per cent of this was from private funds, although in 1929–31 about 25 per cent had been private. In absolute amount, the private contributions in 1941 were about the same as in 1929, 10 or 11 million dollars, although they had reached a high peak of 59 million in 1932, when private charity was making unusual efforts to stem the tide of the depression not yet adequately met by public relief. Since 1935 private charity has remained on approximately the same level. The great variations have been in public assistance. The peak of the total expenditure was in 1938, when WPA was at its highest. The peak of public general relief (not work relief) was in 1935. Special types of public assistance (mainly old age and dependent children) have gained steadily since 1934, whereas other forms have decreased since 1938.*

NUTRITION, HEALTH, AND THE FAMILY. Modern nutritional and health programs, whose ultimate objects are of course individuals, find it helpful to think of their problems in terms of the family and to work through the family.

The essentials of the nutrition situation are given by Hazel Stiebeling [1941] in a Department of Agriculture pamphlet as follows:

> About one-third of the families in the United States are living on poor diets.
>
> More than a third have fair diets.
>
> Only about a fourth have good diets.
>
> The great lack in poor diets is in the protective foods. These are milk, the green, leafy vegetables, the less refined cereal foods, and fruits and other vegetables.
>
> We need at least 10 to 20 percent more milk; 10 to 25 percent more butter; 25 to 70 percent more tomatoes and citrus fruit; and about twice as much of leafy, green and yellow vegetables.
>
> Two possible ways to remedy the situation exist. Better incomes will bring better diets. But at any income, better management of food money can provide better diets.†

Recent discoveries regarding vitamins and minerals have suggested that feeding may be far more important in preventing disease and raising the level of national vitality, longevity, and efficiency than we have ever imagined. The federal government, through several agencies, is now engaged in a nation-wide nutrition campaign.

* Social Security Bulletin, 5:No. 5 (May, 1942).

† From review in *Bulletin of Family Research and Education*, II:2 and 3 (April June, 1941), 29.

VENEREAL DISEASES. The prevalence rate of syphilis in the United States in the period 1935–1940 has been estimated as 3 per cent of the adult population. [Clarke *et al.*, 1941.] In Stockholm, Sweden, where treatment has been free and compulsory for some time, the rate of syphilis in 1936 was 0.1 per cent. New York State, with approximately the same population as Scandinavia, has 25 times as many new cases of syphilis annually. [Clarke, Helen, 1939.] Venereal incidence (new cases) rates for the United States, on the basis of information from communities totaling 2,000,000 population, were estimated as 5.71 per 1,000 per year for gonorrhea and 3.45 for syphilis. Gonorrhea, thus, is the more frequently contracted, but because of its more rapid cure is the less prevalent at any one time. As to expectation rates, it was estimated that before the age of 25, 95 per 1,000 males and 62 per 1,000 females have at some time contracted syphilis. [Parran and Usilton, 1930.] Estimates for gonorrhea are greater but very uncertain. The largest share of venereal infection is pre-marital for men and post-marital for women, indicating that most women are infected innocently. Some investigators, however, believe that the actual rate among women is greater than appears, owing to the fact that gonorrhea is less easily detected among them. There is also a mild but prevalent form of gonorrhea which infects pre-pubertal girls through innocent contacts with persons and objects.

The United States army has succeeded in reducing its annual incidence rate of total venereal disease from 103 per 1,000 in 1914 to 79 in 1920, 48 in 1930, and 39 in December, 1941.* The Metropolitan Life Insurance Company reports a decrease of 35 per cent in deaths caused by syphilis, and a reduction of over 50 per cent in gonorrheal blindness in infants, during a period of twenty years. Public health educational campaigns and the increasing use of personal prophylactic methods appear to be reducing the extent of venereal disease without corresponding reduction in illicit sex relations.

Venereal diseases, as well known, are due to specific germs transmitted through physical contact. No amount of excess or of illegality in sex behavior will produce them unless the germs are there to be transmitted. However, it must be obvious that the spread of such germs through a population is promoted by promiscuity and restricted by monogamous sex relations. Many infections are acquired innocently, especially by women who have married infected men, and syphilis is acquired by children through the mother's blood. A small

* *Journal of Social Hygiene*, 28:8–9 (1942).

percentage of syphilis incidence is due to non-genital contacts, as in kissing.

The campaign against venereal disease, led by the U. S. Public Health Service, state health departments, and the American Social Hygiene Association, has stressed sex education and marriage happiness as preventives of prostitution, and therefore of venereal disease. But although "moral" measures are still used, medical measures are now being taken with increased vigor. No longer are these diseases neglected because thought to be punishment for sin, and no longer is it taboo to mention their names in public discussion. In 1938 Congress passed the LaFollette-Bulwinkle Act, providing the Public Health Service with funds to assist the states in venereal disease control programs.*

In 1941, 25 states had laws requiring a blood test for syphilis as a condition for a marriage license, and 25 states had laws requiring a physician who attends a pregnant woman to make a serological test for syphilis.†

SOCIAL WORK: THE SHIFT FROM CATEGORICAL TO FAMILY WELFARE CONCEPTS. A most significant development since 1920 has been the increasing recognition of the family and the family-sized group as desirable channels for social services. The ideology of social work is increasingly that of service to families rather than to individuals. Poor relief (now general relief) and family case work have always dealt with families as such. "Child welfare," which once took a great many children from dependent or neglectful parents and put them into large institutions, now tries to keep the original family together or, if it cannot, to place the child in a foster home, which is simply another family.

It is urged that foster-home care is not only cheaper for the state, but also far better for the development of the child. In the past 25 years, even many feeble-minded children and delinquents, which are classes commonly assigned to institutions, have been successfully placed in foster family homes. [Warner, Queen, and Harper, 402.] Massachusetts has been a leader in this trend. There is also a rapid increase in the use of mothers' assistance, by which children lacking the support of a father, who would otherwise have to be placed elsewhere, may continue to live with their mothers.

Experience everywhere seems to indicate the superiority of the small home, even if it is a foster home, to the larger institution. There is

* See "Milestones," *Journal of Social Hygiene*, 27:428–432 (1941).

† *Journal of Social Hygiene*, 27:277–278 (1941).

thought to be a mysterious "something" existing in the personal relation of mother to child which gives an advantage over the most sanitary and scientifically run institution. That "something," however, needs to be analyzed. It may consist mainly in the fact that a mother, or foster mother, is more sensitive to the physical condition and needs of the child from moment to moment, and that this flexible treatment is more valuable than a routine treatment even with better facilities and techniques. Again, the important thing may be the better satisfaction of the child's needs for love and security. Theoretically, an institution could be so staffed and administered as to meet these needs, but under our culture such an ideal institution seems difficult to create.

It is true that the large development of *categorical relief* (old age assistance, aid to the blind, aid to dependent children, and so on) has involved, for a time, a certain shift of emphasis away from the family. It was found possible to get higher relief standards by asking legislatures to appropriate money for specific types of need rather than for the "poor in general," whom the taxpayer always tends to visualize as a mixture of worthy and unworthy. Yet now, through the administration of several types of categorical relief through the same public welfare office, and often the same case workers, there is a new integration of service to the family as a unit.

The aged (65 years and over) constituted 6.8 per cent of our population in 1940 and will become, it is estimated, 14.3 per cent by 1980. Yet the percentage of aged men reported gainfully occupied decreased continuously from 74 per cent in 1890 to 58 per cent in 1930. About 33 per cent of the country's aged are self-supporting; 47 per cent are supported in part or whole by relatives and friends and 30 per cent by public assistance or private charity. A sample of New York State recipients of old age assistance, all over 70 years of age, showed 60 per cent to be living in their own homes, 15 per cent with children, 18 per cent with relatives, and 17 per cent boarding elsewhere. [Morgan, C., 1937.]

A small and fairly constant number of the dependent aged are in almshouses, now usually called "city" or "county homes." Since about 1930 there has been a rapid increase of the aged on the old age assistance rolls of the states, all of which have now qualified for federal subsidy under the Social Security Act. In time, the building up of the contributory old age *insurance* system, which will provide for approximately all members of the working class, will probably reduce

the needs for old age assistance, which is given only on a relief basis after proof of need. [Folsom, 1940, B.]

Relief authorities still try to place the burden of dependent aged upon their children or grandchildren, but these increasingly find it possible to plead their inability.

It is recognized more and more that the aged need more than economic support. Rehabilitating case work such as done by Dr. Lillien J. Martin in San Francisco, club activities and group work, political movements such as that led by Dr. Francis Townsend for exaggerated pensions, recreation and hobby programs, attractive institutional homes with interesting activities—these are among the developments. But there is also need of greater study of the possibilities of making the aged genuine participators in the life of family groups.

"All married couples should be by themselves and not have old people interfere." "I've taken more comfort since I lived in this shack alone, nobody dictates to me." These attitudes [Morgan, C. M., 1937] have much to do with the separation and loneliness of the aged among our native American people. Perhaps with an educational program planned to that end, people could learn to live with other age groups *without* interfering and to the advantage of all. A return to the three-generation family group might help to solve our problems of child-raising.

The 1940 White House Conference on Children in a Democracy gave much emphasis to the family as a medium of service. Four of the eleven discussion groups carried the word "family" in their titles, one of them being called "The Family as the Threshold of Democracy." *

The philosophy back of this trend is that the family is so essential in its emotional and personality development functions that these other institutions should supplement it and serve people through it as a medium rather than act as substitutes for it. Typical of the ideology was a recommendation of the New York State Conference on Marriage and the Family in 1939 which called upon the government of New York State to set up a coordinating council among the state departments dealing with family life to insure greater recognition of the family as a unit to be protected.

AGENCIES GIVING COUNSELING SERVICE TO FAMILIES. There have arisen certain agencies which devote their whole time to the performance of family guidance or closely related functions. Four important types of such agencies may be mentioned here: domestic rela-

* U. S. Children's Bureau Publication No. 266.

tions courts, family welfare societies, psychiatric child guidance clinics, and marriage clinics. These deal, to a greater or less extent, with the whole problem of a family; there are in addition agencies limited to special phases of family problems, such as birth control clinics, legal aid bureaus, child-placing agencies, and medical social service agencies.

Courts of domestic relations, or *family courts,* have been established in several cities. This innovation began in 1910 in Buffalo and in New York City, where the domestic relations courts were established mainly for desertion and non-support cases but did not treat juvenile delinquency. This is the general practice in New York, Massachusetts, and Illinois. On the other hand, in New Jersey and Virginia family courts were established by adding to the juvenile courts certain powers to deal with adults. Offenses which contribute to the delinquency of children, or which are committed by one member of a family against another, are dealt with by this expanded juvenile court and may be treated by the flexible procedure used in dealing with juvenile delinquents. The system differs greatly among the several states and cities. In some cities special family powers are given to the regular city court without setting up a separate family court.

A few of the family courts employ trained social workers, and some of their judges and social workers effect family adjustments without using legal compulsion. The domestic relations courts of Chicago, of Cincinnati, and of Dayton, Ohio, are especially notable. In general these specialized family courts do not have divorce powers. They are popularly regarded as desertion courts and as the resort of the working class. It is alleged that the judge who is trained to deal with such cases is not the same man who should adjudicate divorce. Divorce is a procedure associated with a somewhat higher social level, and is legally a *right* rather than a matter for judicial discretion. The function of the divorce judge is to decide whether the plaintiff has or has not a right to divorce, under rigid rules of law, and not according to equitable judgment or discretion. A few divorce courts employ investigators to discover facts, but none employ social workers. The flexible proeedure used in the family courts, if following careful investigation by social workers, would be a more humane method of deciding divorce cases than is the present method.

Juvenile courts, not covering domestic relations, began in 1899 and are now practically universal throughout the United States.

Family welfare societies, formerly known as "Associated Charities" and by other titles, were designed for the material relief of destitute

families. Their funds are obtained by voluntary contributions, and they supplement the work of tax-supported government relief agencies. Their function has been changing from one of pure relief to one of economic rehabilitation through social adjustment. Recently they have tended to leave to government the families which need relief only, and to concentrate their work upon families whose economic problem is complicated by personality and interaction problems. Leaving aside the great mass unemployment of depression years, many cases of family poverty are due to personal maladjustments which express themselves in desertion, non-support, the personal inability of the breadwinner to hold a job, or in the unwise use of money and time by the homemaker. Sometimes a marital conflict is the cause of the economic dependency. When these personality difficulties are remedied, the family is able to maintain itself without charity. The family welfare agency is becoming increasingly a socio-psychiatric agency, and is using more and more psychiatry in its case work.

Child guidance clinics serve primarily the families whose children have "personality" or emotional problems. Many delinquents also are treated, although the bulk of these are handled by juvenile courts without special psychiatric study. Child guidance clinics began in 1909 with the work of Dr. William Healy with delinquents in Chicago. In 1932, 674 such clinics were listed in a directory. Harper says that probably 40 to 50 of every 1,000 elementary school children are seriously maladjusted and may become delinquents or problems in other ways. Possibly three-fourths of these, he thinks, can be handled by visiting teachers; the other one-fourth require the clinic. [Warner, Queen, and Harper, 333.] Much child guidance work is done by visiting teachers connected with school systems, and some is done by probation officers and juvenile court judges.

Child guidance clinics, whose function is personality adjustment, must be distinguished from the child-placing agencies known as "child welfare societies," "children's service bureaus," etc., whose function is to initiate court action or to find foster homes in behalf of dependent or neglected children.

Marriage and family counseling agencies are the newest and most significant type of agency for dealing with family problems. Such agencies deal with the personal marriage relationship as a whole problem, in all its aspects, since the seeking of advice is voluntary and there is no compulsory decision to be rendered. These "clinics" have been established by universities, churches, courts, and several kinds of

social agencies. They are so far experimental, and there is no uniformity in their organization and procedure.

American marriage clinics give advice as to sexual relations in marriage, but they are under considerable restraint as to contraceptive information. This important function is therefore left to completely separate agencies, the birth control clinics, and to private physicians. A few private physicians give the combination service of contraceptive and psychiatric advice.

A survey of the practices of family consultation centers has been made by Marie Carden [1941]. She lists 26 definitely active centers. Many others have discontinued or merged their work with other work; and new ones are being established all the time. A thoroughgoing study of the practice of marriage counseling is in preparation by Dean Ralph Bridgman of Brooklyn College.

Five professions contribute more or less to the work of family adjustment: the ministry, law, education, medicine, and social work. Of these the first three are more or less cramped in style by culture patterns and taboos. It is to medicine and social work that we must look mainly for adequate solutions of individual problems.

It is seldom that a patient can or will "tell everything" to his clergyman, his lawyer, or his college dean. He will more often tell everything to a physician or psychiatrist. The Hippocratic oath is the Magna Charta of humane case treatment. To be sure, the members of other professions can generally be trusted to respect personal confidences given as such, but their institutional duties and conscience may make it impossible for them to help many individuals in the only way they can be helped. In social work also the aim of service to the individual family, of adjustment in the individual case, is gaining over the aim of protecting cultural norms. Social workers are still not sufficiently trusted by many classes of persons because it is believed they are in league with the agencies of compulsion.

The educator, like the minister and the lawyer, must necessarily observe a certain loyalty to an institution. It is hopeless, therefore, to expect a school executive to perform the function of individual guidance with the completeness and singleness of purpose which some difficult cases require if they are to be helped. The function of enforcing general laws, rules, or mores cannot be joined in the same person with the function of adequate treatment of maladjusted individuals. This might not be true in a rigid homogeneous culture or in a wholly liberal culture, but is true in partly liberal cultures such as ours.

B. EDUCATION

EDUCATION AND FAMILY LIFE. In family counseling we see a direct service of social work to the integrity of the family itself. The educational agencies have also undertaken such a service. It is called "education for family living." Its philosophy, history, and current practice have been described by this author in *Youth, Family, and Education* [1941]. The movement, in the broadest sense, is part of the progressive education movement which seeks to make education realistic and directly useful not only as a preparation for life but also as a part of life itself.

Some thinkers see beyond these tentative efforts to a possible future state where education is correlated with work and play throughout a lifetime. In such a state, education would carry on through adult years by means of periodic educational vacations from work. At the same time serious work might begin earlier in childhood, in small doses at first, but so arranged as to give the child a practical idea of what the problems of work are. On returning to school after such a brief experience in actual useful work, he would have the intellectual motivation, now sadly lacking, to use his books in the solution of real problems. Under such a regime the child would be less an economic parasite than he is today. Instead of passing abruptly from a life of play and study to a life of work, he would pass gradually into a life of longer work hours and greater responsibility, but this adult life would be interrupted daily, weekly, or yearly by periods of continued education and by longer periods of leisure than at present. Education would cease to be merely a preparation for life and a means to an end. It would be a part of life, balanced with work and play throughout.

A forthcoming report of a long study at the Merrill-Palmer School will show how poorly our colleges and universities educate women for life. A detailed analysis was made of the personal problems of 100 women college graduates. Their major problems were personality, finances, health, husband-wife relations, relations with associates, recreation, housekeeping, relations with relatives, parent-child relations, and crises. The personality problems were primarily those of shyness, sensitivity, and nervous tension. "Probably the most important conclusion . . . is that educators of these women . . . as well as their parents, had almost completely ignored the evident need of women to have preparation for the certain inevitabilities of life."

Colleges choose instructors for subject matter rather than teaching ability or interest in students as persons; the liberal arts curriculum "seemed not broad at all when viewed in relation to women's life needs"; and rigid course offerings and sequences deprived the students of any certainty that their education would contribute a more effective approach to life. [Foster, 1942.] * President Constance Warren [1940] of Sarah Lawrence College has written interestingly of a program which attempts to overcome some of these difficulties.

A round table at the Northwest Conference on Family Relations in Wenatchee, Washington, April 28, 1941, reported:

> The difficulty is in interesting parents and other adults in education after the period of required education has been passed. This is in part the natural result of a culture which puts material possessions and physical comforts first; as generally conceived at the present time the father's role is primarily that of making money, and he is often badly driven both by the rigors and vicissitudes of the competitive system and by the demands of his family, which wants to "keep up with the Joneses." The mother's role is still largely conceived as primarily that of housekeeping, cooking and sewing, rather than educating of children, planning for the cultural and recreational needs of the family and the coordinating of family relations. As long as parents do not see the latter as their main job it will be difficult to interest large numbers of them, even of mothers, in taking courses directed toward improving them.

PARENT EDUCATION. The parent education movement operating through nursery schools, parent-teacher associations, and other agencies is a good example of a new social invention deliberately designed to meet a new social problem created by cultural lags. When parental authority was unquestioned and parent-child relations fairly uniform throughout society, there was relatively little need for a special parent education. With the waning of parental authority, the increasing control of the school over the child, the conflicts between the ideology taught in the home and that taught in the school or acquired from juvenile companions, a social lag developed. Parent education was one of the solutions. Never before had there been so much scientific interest in children and their treatment. The research in this field is far more abundant than in any other field of family problems. It is a favorite activity at higher educational institutions which have nursery schools. It will be impossible in this chapter to do it justice. The interest in the subject is spreading far beyond academic circles. In fact child behavior has become the center of a

* This report has now appeared: Foster and Wilson, 1942.

definite culture complex. In a lecture Eduard C. Lindeman remarked that adults who seek further education in Europe are usually seeking personal culture, but those taking adult courses in America are largely parents interested in child psychology. To most Americans "the" problem of the family is the problem of raising children among the perplexities of modern science, ancient traditions, and the insistent demands of the children themselves.

Yet only recently a friend said to the author, "I am dubious of the value of some of these mental hygiene and parent education programs. It seems to me that some people work so hard at this business of personality study and family relations that they often defeat their purpose. If they would just use a little common sense and stop worrying so much about these things they might get along much better with their children and their mates and their friends."

This person was very much on the wrong track. He had grasped a certain truth, namely, that people can defeat any purpose by getting "too nervous" about it. But he had drawn the entirely false conclusion that this nervousness and tension, by and large, is the result of too much study and that it will be dissipated by substituting old-fashioned common sense for the kind of analytical study which has lately become somewhat more widespread. This has not become sufficiently widespread. The remedy for anxiety produced by study is still more study. Of course this implies guidance by trained leaders who have sanity and balance. If there are quacks and charlatans and false prophets and bogus psychologists in our midst the remedy is not to round up these people and silence them, but to put more and more trained people into the field and develop a higher level of lay intelligence.

THE NURSERY SCHOOL. The nursery school began, in the United States, with the Bureau of Educational Experiments in New York City under Harriet M. Johnson in 1917. It developed rapidly and there are now about 800 private, presumably permanent, nursery schools and in addition, 1,500 WPA schools. [Langdon, 1940; Davis, M. D., 1942.] Approximately 100,000 children are in nursery school each year; this is only 1 per cent of all children within nursery school age limits. Apart from the federal WPA program, which also requires the sponsorship of school departments or other local agencies, nursery schools are operated by school departments, universities, private individuals, settlement houses, cooperative parent groups, and other agencies. Some of the older day nurseries, which took physical care of the children of working and mainly underprivileged mothers,

have developed their educational methods and become nursery schools.

Yet the function of the American nursery school is not to substitute for the mother but to enrich the education of the young child and to help the family in dealing with him. It emphasizes consultation with parents and, in many centers, systematic research upon child behavior. At the Vassar College Nursery School, for example, motion pictures of child behavior have been developed which can be used in educating parents and guiding further research.

In private and university nursery schools children of more privileged families prevail; in WPA schools the underprivileged prevail.

Obviously the nursery school does, even though this may be regarded as incidental to its main purpose, set free a great deal of time for mothers from their routine, often poorly organized, daily care of children, and makes possible the use of some of this time for consultation and other more specialized services to their children. Not a little of it is used in transporting the child to and from the school, and transporting older children hither and yon.

The experience is that there has been a decrease in worry and an improvement of morale as a result of the contacts between parents and nursery school, and a better understanding by parents of the needs of their children. [Folsom, 1941, 75.]

In general the nursery school is one of the most important agencies for the development of democratic parent-child relations, and it offers a strategic approach to the reconstruction of family life. It also plays a key role in wartime programs for children, as will be discussed below.

Educational Preparation of Youth for Family Life. In colleges and universities several courses are being given which deal specifically with the problems of marriage and the family. One of the most notable of these pioneer courses is one given by Professor Ernest R. Groves at the University of North Carolina. The interest among college students and administrations is spreading. The course given by Professor J. S. Burgess at Temple University has been evaluated and described in some detail. [Burgess, 1938.]

Among some 300 marriage courses established in the United States in recent years in colleges and universities, none has had its results evaluated and reported in such a thoroughgoing way as the course at Temple University. This course began in the fall of 1937 under the leadership of Professor J. Stewart Burgess of the sociology department. Professor Burgess had already been giving a somewhat more academic course on the family several years

previous to this, but upon the request of students the new course, framed to meet students' needs and questions rather than fit into an academic niche, was inaugurated. Its subject matter of course cut across departmental lines and many lecturers from other departments and from the outside cooperated in giving it. Nevertheless, it was made a credit course.

Tentative conclusions are that a marriage course should use several lecturers but have a single coordinating chairman; it should be advantageously planned by an interdepartmental faculty group; it is helped by having small groups of students, discussing under their own leadership and initiative, intimate and personal questions; it is best conducted without newspaper publicity and undue conspicuousness.

It was found satisfactory to place the sex material fairly early in the course, thereby creating an atmosphere of frankness and lack of fear. Student reaction in the course seemed to show that the sociology and psychology courses, and the academic curriculum generally, had not made very close connection with the student's actual life and problems, and that there was an emphatic need for individual personal guidance facilities on the campus.*

A person actually developing a new marriage course in one institution writes:

> The president, the dean, . . . the professor who will be in charge, are all approaching the coming marriage course with considerable trepidation. The name of the course will be so disguised in the catalogue that none of the good citizens of . . . will get an inkling as to what it's about.†

High schools are giving courses in child care. The work of the public schools is more largely confined to instruction in the material phases of family life, and this work has been greatly extended in recent years.

Churches are moving toward a more positive policy in education for family life. Instead of merely attacking the factors which are injurious to the family, many are giving lectures and courses in the art of family making.

Education for Family Life, the Nineteenth Yearbook of the American Association of School Administrators, makes five practical proposals for the consideration of every school superintendent and his staff:

> (1) That the school in its program and practice shall recognize and respect the developing personality of the individual as well as the needs of society and give guidance to the home in the same direction.

* From review in *Bulletin of Family Research and Education,* 1:2 (April, 1940), 23.

† Joseph K. Folsom, *Youth, Family, and Education,* American Council on Education, 1941, p. 138.

(2) That the school at every point shall take the home into account as a coordinate educational agent, a partner, whose cooperation is not only desirable but necessary.

(3) That the content of the elementary curriculum as it becomes integrated around social studies shall include the family as a basic social institution.

(4) That the secondary program which increasingly is being adapted to the needs of adolescent boys and girls shall make specific and adequate provision for their present and future needs as members of families.

(5) That the adult education program as it expands for the good of the community shall assume responsibility for helping husbands and wives, fathers and mothers, as they strive to make the American home realize its fullest possibilities.*

Almost simultaneously with the above-mentioned *Yearbook* there appeared a book prepared by the Joint Committee on Curriculum Aspects of Education for Home and Family Living of the Home Economics Department of the National Education Association and the Society for Curriculum Study. [Goodykoontz and Coon, 1941.] It deals in great detail with the curriculum-planning aspects and gives abundant descriptive material about programs actually in operation in various schools, with names of persons contributing information.

Thus we learn in detail about a program in East Orange where a school "board of health" was organized, with representatives from the various classrooms; of a program in Grand Rapids where parents participated actively in the school program; about Glencoe, where seventh- and eighth-grade pupils conducted a survey of community resources; about the Shaker Heights plan, under which parents helped the teachers to devise a form of report card; about the core program in the Senior High School in Oakland, which includes personal management, social living, and consumer education; about the program of the General College of the University of Minnesota and what its home life orientation course means individually to typical students studied by counselors; and many other local experiments.†

Yet these efforts still meet with resistance as witnessed by letters received by the author:

You will probably find that public high schools of this section are afraid to face the situation. Efforts to deal with problems of family life in a realistic manner might easily be misinterpreted to the disadvantage of

* From review in *Bulletin of Family Research and Education,* II:2 and 3 (April-June, 1941), 35–37.

† From review in *Bulletin of Family Research and Education,* II:2 and 3 (April-June, 1941), 37.

our teachers . . . who are unprotected by tenure from temporary public emotion.

The fact that we do not have such a report (on education of youth for parenthood and family life) does not, however, mean that there is not effective work of this nature being done in some of the schools . . . Thus far work of this type has for the most part been developed by teachers of unusual competence.

[This region] is very conservative . . . the present educational authorities cling to the classical standards and are slow in recognizing the need for a more vital policy. We have to work with great care and wisdom . . . We have a great many authorities here who would be shocked if they really knew how much we are able to accomplish. [Folsom 1941, 116–117.]

CONTENT OF FAMILY LIFE EDUCATION: 1. HOME AND CONSUMER ECONOMICS. Broadly speaking, all education is in greater or less degree a preparation for family life, as it is for vocational life, community life, and life in general. There are, however, three special fields of subject matter of peculiar importance to family relationships, and there is a trend toward increased emphasis upon these fields. One field is the study and practice of the material tasks of the household. There is a growing recognition of the need of *boys* for certain phases of this training, and of changes needed in the traditional household training for girls.

In the improvement of homemaking one important line of effort is consumer education and information. The problem of the modern consumer consists not so much of the inferiority of modern industry's products to those of the past as of the vast increase in the number of commodities and the various brands and qualities of each. To judge intelligently the goods on the market requires much more knowledge than formerly. Decisions in purchasing make up a greater proportion of the mental work of the modern homemaker. But the choices between one brand of canned fruit and another, one silk fabric and another, are not the only kind of decision required. Increasingly the chief problem is to decide whether canned fruit or silk cloth is worth purchasing at all. The problem of securing the bare physical necessities is solved for the majority of the population. What most of us worry about is whether we ought to buy this luxury or that. Our per capita income has increased, but the sales pressure of business has increased still more. We find ourselves in a constant state of indecision as to what we can best do without. Too often the decision

is precipitated by the untimely visit of some glib salesman, or the seductive display of some article in a shop window.

To meet this need several consumer information bureaus have been established, some in connection with women's magazines. There are Consumer's Research, Incorporated, of Washington, New Jersey, and Consumers' Union, 17 Union Square West, New York City—organizations founded in complete independence of any business firm or of anyone interested in selling goods. These agencies were established by men with a genuinely scientific, consumer's point of view. For a small annual fee they provide detailed and critical information concerning the products of specific manufacturers covering the whole range of household and personal goods. They do not hesitate to recommend and "not recommend" these by name. Of necessity they draw their entire financial support from consumer-subscribers and gifts. The federal government has several agencies of consumer information, but these obviously cannot discriminate between manufacturers in any direct way. Many look forward to a time when people will pay much less attention to advertising and more to impartial sources of commodity information.

From high school to college, students should be trained, Norton [1940] says, in standards of values and in spending wisely for food, clothing, shelter, health, and recreation. They should be taught moreover to understand the reason for public expenditures, and the wise use of savings. This information should be given not only from the technical point of view, but it should also "stress the social responsibilities of the consumer" as, for example, making students aware of the conditions under which the commodities they buy were produced and distributed. "The duties of economic citizenship take rank with those of political citizenship." *

One of the most important parts of consumer education has been relatively undeveloped. It is an evaluation of our *standards* of living themselves and a knowledge of how to break away from them, temporarily or within a given area. There is a little-suspected relation between this knowledge and emotional hygiene. People would not dread poverty so much if they knew just what to do when they saw it coming. They could greatly enrich their lives if they knew how to cut expenses quickly and drastically to make way for a readjustment or an adventure.

* From review in *Bulletin of Family Research and Education*, 1:2 (April, 1940).

H. Thompson Rich [1939] tells "How to Live Beyond Your Means": by traveling on freighters, cooking your own food while traveling, taking rooms in less popular parts of cities, shopping in the pushcart market, buying a used car, and doing several other things which fail ignominiously to meet conventional standards but which enable you to live more abundantly.

2. SEX EDUCATION. A second special field is that of sex education. Three stages are discernible in its history. In its early stage sex education aimed merely to bolster up the existing sex mores by teaching the dangers of illicit intercourse and the advantages of complete continence until marriage. The fears implanted by cultural sentiment were given corroboration through some factual instruction. In the second stage efforts shifted in the direction of removing pathological fears, but without condoning sex violations. It came to be realized that youth suffered a great deal from unreasonable fears about sex. Many sexologists believe that more harm is done, for example, by fears of the consequences of masturbation than by the practice itself. We are now entering a third stage, in which emphasis is shifting toward the positive values of sex. "Behave yourself and don't worry about sex" is no longer the final synthesis of the instruction. To arrive at marriage physically and mentally healthy is not the final achievement. It is only the beginning. This third stage of sex education seeks to present two new kinds of practical knowledge although it does not recommend their actual use until marriage: how to obtain genuinely safe contraception, and how to make sex experience fully satisfying to both partners. The latter objective is the most recent to be recognized, but it may gain the more rapid headway because it may be so stated as to evade the still lingering taboo upon contraception. Thus the most modern phase of sex education is concerned with married persons as well as with youth.

In recent years a number of books have appeared which deal with the techniques of physical love-making and of contraception. For the present, the most practical avenues of reliable sex instruction are the book and the private interview with a physician, clinical expert, or some other adequately informed adviser. There is some oral instruction in schools and colleges, but this must be very general, academic, and impersonal, and it dare not answer many of the specific questions which will inevitably arise in the minds of its hearers.

Many persons rationalize that sex information is inherently unfit for broadcasting. They point out that individual needs differ, and that information needed by one might be dangerous to another. Yet we do not demand that the chemistry instructor teach the subjects of

explosives and poisons to individuals in private, because such knowledge might be dangerous in the hands of some individuals. In the last analysis, it is impossible to keep any department of human knowledge in a series of closed books, to be opened selectively for various ages and classes of persons. The more practical details of sexual instruction may seem to be appropriately reserved for persons who are married or about to be married. Yet if it is found that some of these facts are disseminated widely through uncontrolled and unreliable private conversation, it might be better to communicate them "prematurely" through authoritative channels. When this policy, however, is blocked by taboos, the best solution is perhaps to teach to the mass the attitude of seeking expert advice individually when problems arise. Every high school student could at least learn what are the authoritative sources of information. Some physicians are now giving pre-marital physical examinations and sexual counsel. These services could be widely extended if their existence were made generally known.

Early sex education is to be regarded as emotional preparation. The above comments are concerned with the sexual instruction which is a more or less specific preparation for marriage and which should normally be given to the adolescent or young adult. Quite a different problem is that of teaching younger children the basic facts about sex differences and reproduction. This knowledge, it is now agreed by most sex educators, should be given at an age much earlier than our traditional culture has favored. The purpose of this early sex education is not technical, but is rather emotional preparation for adult life. Many investigations have shown that women who received this basic sex information before six are better adjusted sexually than those who received the information at twelve or later. The reason for this lies not in any practical need for such information before twelve, but in the emotional shock which is likely to occur when the information is belated. The late-informed child has spent several years in near proximity to a closed book about whose contents he has had more or less curiosity. During this period of ignorance he has developed certain personal attitudes and ideas concerning these contents, often of a more or less esthetic sort. When the book is finally opened, there is a great discrepancy between the reality and the imaginary picture he has built up. Disgust or shock often results, and in many, especially women, there follows a lifelong antipathy to sex, predisposing toward non-marriage or toward unhappy marriage. These unhealthy attitudes are fostered, moreover,

by the self-consciousness and embarrassment of the parents in talking about sex.

Helen Witmer [1929] describes an experiment conducted by the Women's Co-operative Alliance of Minneapolis in the *education of parents to give sex education to their children.* This organization follows the sex educational program of Dr. Maurice Bigelow [1936] and Dr. T. W. Galloway [1934], which is typical of the "modern" policy now advocated by many educators. This policy is as follows:

1. Sex education should be given at home by *both* parents as a natural, casual part of the "home drama."

2. It should start at the beginning of the child's life through training in habits of cleanliness and in the use of the proper sex vocabulary.

3. Questions should be answered truthfully as they arise.

4. Although any item of information should not be given before it can be comprehended, yet information should *precede* somewhat the asking of questions, should *anticipate* questions, so that there is never any accumulated feeling of great curiosity about sex.

5. Parents should make use of the incidents of everyday life in giving sex instruction.

6. The first question as to where babies come from should be answered by "they come from the joining of a father and mother cell in the mother's body." Comparison with the flowers and the birds and teaching that "God lets a little seed grow under the mother's heart" are regarded as inferior methods. To say the babies come from the hospital or from fairyland, or to say that "you are not old enough to understand, and I will tell you when you are old enough," are utterly disapproved by this modern policy.

7. The best way to teach the child the anatomical difference between the sexes is to let him, quite casually, see his parents undressed while bathing, etc. To approve his seeing other children undressed is somewhat less desirable, the use of pictures and statues still less so, and the seeing of other children undressed without the parents' approval is the worst method.

8. Seminal emissions and menstruation should be explained to the child of the appropriate sex *before the event first occurs,* and by the parent.

3. EDUCATION FOR INTERPERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS. The third special field of education for family life is that of practical social psychology, or the art of getting along with people in general. This applies to both the marital and the parent-child relation. Although family case work gives some of this kind of instruction to individuals, mass education in this field is much less developed than in the other two fields. The field is well adapted to mass instruction and is not limited by taboos as is the field of sex education. It is surprising that it is not better developed.

Of course much that goes by the name of "moral education," "religious education," and "education for citizenship" performs this function. Most of this traditional education is colored by the moralistic ideology which classifies persons or motives as "good" or "bad." This interferes with the genuine understanding of one's fellows and one's adjustment to them.

Oliver M. Butterfield [1939] has prepared a book based upon experience with some 1,100 young people in 24 discussion groups.

> The most common problem is "When is petting right and when wrong?" Then follow in order of frequency "kissing an unengaged girl," "what is true love?" "girl-made dates," "friendships that become too serious," "marriage differences: race—religion," "engaged petting," "trial marriage," "long engagement," "'two-timers,'" "blind dates, pick-up dates," "birth control," "proper age differences," "educational differences," "how to break off engagements."
>
> For example, the question is raised, "Are youngsters of fifteen and sixteen capable of 'true love'?" Butterfield's answer is, "Certainly, but the reason more of these affairs are not lasting is not so much a lack of sincerity as it is a lack of skilled and experienced judgment . . . if young people are allowed to love with all the sincerity they possess, . . . a few months' observation . . . will serve to reveal both the strength and the weakness of such a friendship. Under no circumstances should their normal problems be complicated by having to defend themselves against charges of insincerity brought by their own families." *

A woman student representing what appears to be a minority opinion on sexual and love education, writes:

> My only other criticism about the presentation of love in the textbooks is that the physical aspect of love is too thoroughly described and discussed. Many details which an individual would like to find out himself are described in quite detail, which makes the romantic value of it lessened. It would, perhaps, be much better to leave out many of the details and let the individual find out about them for himself.

FAMILY LIFE EDUCATION AS A SOCIAL MOVEMENT. The activities described above have become closely associated into what might be called a social movement.

> This movement for family welfare and education for family living represents the gradual coming together of several distinctive movements led by several great national associations, including those concerned with child

* From review in *Bulletin of Family Research and Education*, 1:3 (June, 1940), 17.

study and parent education, social hygiene, home economics, birth control, eugenics, mental hygiene, and family social work. Several of the associations representing these movements were established during the nineteenth century, but their federation or co-ordination around the central concern of the family took an important step in 1928 with the establishment of the National Council of Parent Education, which now calls itself, by subtitle, "An Association for the Advancement of Family Life." In 1936 was organized the New York State Conference on Marriage and the Family, a prototype for several regional and state organizations. The National Conference on Family Relations was established in 1938.*

A most recent feature of this movement is the setting up of *whole-community programs* of family life education. These are variously inaugurated: by the local school system with the help of the federal funds allocated to home economics education; by foundations, by welfare councils and social agencies. Regardless of who starts the program, a wide range of agencies is enlisted representing the welfare, health, and educational fields. In 1938 the U. S. Office of Education selected four community programs for special assistance so they might prove demonstrations for the guidance of other communities. These were Toledo; Wichita; Obion County, Tennessee; and Box Elder County, Utah.†

THE FAMILY IS BECOMING MORE INTEGRATED WITH THE LARGER COMMUNITY. A review of all these activities does not justify the view that the family is passing out of the picture. In a sense all the traditional institutions are becoming less distinct. They are being tied together by new interstitial agencies. The functions of our total society are becoming more and more differentiated, and no large "function" can be thought of as exclusively the work of any large "institution." All this seems to many people like a needless elaboration or duplication of social machinery. Indeed it is often wearisome to the mind of one who tries to study it, but it necessarily goes with the enrichment of modern living and the widened range of personal interests. Totalitarianism would not greatly simplify the performance of functions, but only reduce the number of points where decisions are made and initiative is taken.

If we reorganize the functions now embraced in homemaking along the lines suggested in Chapter XVIII, we shall still further tie the

* Joseph K. Folsom, "The Changing Role of the Family," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 212:70 (1940, A). By permission.

† U. S. Federal Security Agency, Misc., No. 2503.

family in with other institutions. This would be a continuation of trends already operating.

The continuous differentiation and shifting of functions represents in part a trend toward more economical units of operation, which may change continually under the influence of mechanical and social invention. The modern home is too small a unit for operating many of the functions still performed in it. A few years ago babies' laundry work was thought of as essentially a home task, even when other laundry was sent out. Yet now we find trucks calling at many homes for infant laundry while these families do their other washing at home in a washing machine. In part the shifting is due to the finding of better motivations. Thus parents tend to leave discipline, relating to conduct outside the home, to schools, group work agencies, and even the police, while they "take sides" with the child or act as his confidential adviser. From the standpoint of good family relations, this may be desirable.

The important objective is that all this erasing of old lines and drawing of new ones be guided by the needs of individual human beings. In a democratic society this is the basic motivation. As long as it is maintained, we do not need to worry about the disappearance of the family or about the dangers of centralization. The performance of many functions on a large scale or with a more centralized guidance gives the family group opportunity to become a more friendly, emotionally satisfying unit and makes for the greater freedom and development of the individual personality. To decide which functions these shall be is a human engineering problem to be solved as we go along. The decision is not helped by generalized prejudices in favor of uniformity and the state nor in favor of localization and "familism."

WARTIME PROGRAMS FOR FAMILIES AND CHILDREN. The indications are that this war will produce greater and probably more lasting changes in the family pattern in America than did World War I. We have had 25 additional years of more or less scientific thinking about human problems; we realize that there is greater need than ever before to marshal all our energies. Under these influences the role of women and the distribution of responsibilities between family and community may undergo changes which will not be erased by "backsliding" after the war is over. Social workers observe a new attitude toward interfamily cooperation. Families are cooperating not only in transportation but also in the care of one another's children where such measures were strongly resisted a few years ago.

The Bureau of Labor Statistics estimated that by the end of 1943, five million additional women will be in the labor market. Some leaders have expressed even greater expectations. Surveys are being made to determine the needs for child care produced by mothers going into employment. Many stories are current regarding children being locked in houses and in cars while their mothers are at work, but accurate information is not yet available. Apparently there is considerable lag between the development of these needs and their adequate satisfaction; families cling to traditional and makeshift methods and neither the nursery school facilities nor the conscious demand for them are yet fully developed. Mothers of pre-school children are being advised to stay with their children "unless it is necessary" to go to work. This day care of children of working mothers is, however, only one phase of a larger program of child welfare which is being developed and which will be suitable for times of peace as well as of war.

The Children's Bureau has set up a Commission of Children in Wartime, which in March, 1942, adopted "A Children's Charter in Wartime":

I. Guard children from injury in danger zones.
II. Protect children from neglect, exploitation, and undue strain in defense areas.
III. Strengthen the home life of children whose parents are mobilized for war or war production.
IV. Conserve, equip, and free children of every race and creed to take up their part in democracy.

The Children's Bureau has set up a Day Care Section but its chief concern, at this point, is with establishing need—that is, collecting facts and statistics on which to base its own work, and to answer inquiries from other agencies.*

The WPA has a nursery school program, established during the depression years, and a recent appropriation bill earmarked $6,000,000 for this. The Office of Defense, Health and Welfare Services has the authority to coordinate federal programs and to promote nursery schools for children of mothers working in industries, and has chosen Charles P. Schottland to direct this coordination. The federal agencies involved are the WPA, the Children's Bureau, Office of Education, Bureau of Public Assistance of the Social Security

* Quoted from *Survey Midmonthly*, August, 1942, p. 217.

Board, the Farm Security Administration, and the Federal Public Housing Authority.*

Temporarily, at least, the Lanham Community Facilities Act provides a method of getting money for child care services. New Haven is the first community to have set up a child care project under the Lanham Act funds, but several other communities such as Cleveland, Detroit and Hartford have already expanded their facilities without Lanham Act funds.

Meanwhile several non-government national agencies have been at work. A new National Commission for Young Children has been organized under the sponsorship of the National Association for Nursery Education, Association for Childhood Education, Progressive Education Association, American Association of University Women.† The purpose of this Commission is to support federal and other well-planned programs for young children, to stimulate action, to bring together local and national resources, and to urge that all children's groups be under professional supervision.

Both the federal and the voluntary efforts intend to work with local defense councils. These are under the guidance of still another federal agency, the Office of Civilian Defense. The civilian defense machinery is concerned not only with working mothers and general child welfare, but also plans for action in case of bombing or other emergency. The OCD issues a pamphlet, "Volunteers in Child Care," suggesting how to build up a body of volunteer workers who can be called upon to care for children at once if and when needed. Many such courses are now being conducted under various auspices in many communities, and the nursery school and parent education professional people now have a large task and opportunity to add to their numbers and to supplement their services by well-trained volunteers.

Dr. Martha M. Eliot of the Children's Bureau has made a most valuable report of her observations in Great Britain in 1941, when she was a member of the United States Civil Defense Commission. ‡ Dr. Eliot studied the effects of the evacuation in British cities on families and children. The first evacuation in 1939 was the greatest child-placing project ever undertaken. Nearly a million children

* *New York Times*, August 15, 1942.

† In pamphlet of the National Commission for Young Children, 3314 Cathedral Avenue, N. W., Washington, D. C.

‡ Martha M. Eliot, M.D., "Civil Defense Measures for the Protection of Children," United States Department of Labor, Children's Bureau, Bureau Publication No. 279, U. S. Government Printing Office, 1942. See pp. 26, 27.

were removed from their own homes and placed in foster homes in the country within a period of four days. The return home of about half of these children during the first few weeks after evacuation "was apparently due more to the absence of bombing in London and to the desire of the parents to have the children with them, or the unwillingness of parents to leave children in a community the life of which was very strange to them, than to maladjustments of the children themselves to their new homes, though naturally 'misfits' did account for the return of a good number." Not more than 10 or 15 per cent of the children in sample areas were estimated as "difficult for placement." In an analysis of a series of cases, enuresis accounted for 28 per cent of the original complaints, other psychosomatic disturbances accounted for 10 per cent, psychoneurotic disorders contributed 25 per cent, aggressive behavior, 25 per cent, educational difficulties, 11 per cent.

It has been reported that in general the anxiety and frustration due to separations of children from their parents had greater ill effects than the actual bombing.

Juvenile delinquency, which went low during depression years, has been on the up-grade during wartime in both England and America. Intensified efforts are now being devoted to it. The need to assure that children get vitamins and other protective foods is also recognized and plays an important part in the national nutrition campaign.

Those who accept the general scheme of values of a more complete democracy as set forth in this book will work to the end that the economic opportunities and leadership gained by or thrust upon women during the war should not be lost when the war is over, and that the greater cooperation and community services in the raising of children will not be scrapped under some unintelligent "back to the home" slogan. The home will survive, and it will be a better home, by retaining the methods and using the experience which we shall gain as a by-product of history's greatest catastrophe.

Chapter XX

UNSOLVED PROBLEMS

In Collaboration with Marion Bassett

If we succeed in putting an end to the Fascist threat and in continuing the general trend of social reforms of recent years, we shall be on the way toward the betterment of our family life, which is a part of progressive Democracy.

Yet the way is still not entirely clear. There are still unsolved major problems—unsolved in theory as well as in practice. Before we close, let us face these squarely.

There seems to be two unsolved fundamental problems: *First,* how can people find the mates who will assure monogamous, creative, enduring love in time to bear children in early adult years? *Second,* how can we harmonize the need for adult achievement and self-realization, especially of women, with the needs of young children for that almost continuous attention which their development apparently requires?

It may seem startling to present the major problems of family life in these terms. Yet it is done after much thought. How can one say that these needs of adults are in conflict with the needs of children and must be harmonized? Are they not essentially interdependent and harmonious?

The *objectives* themselves are in harmony, but the facilities and instruments for their realization are such that choices must be made which very often seriously thwart the realization of one or both objectives.

Let us consider a brief analogy. A man needs to go to Florida for business reasons. His wife needs to go to Florida for her health. The objectives are not only compatible, but they may be mutually reinforcing. Each needs to go even more, because the other is going. If they can drive, the two needs are also compatible as regards instrumentation. But let us suppose that gasoline rations prevent their doing this and they only have enough money for one railroad fare.

With this kind of instrumentation, their needs may be said to be in conflict.

It is easy to say, "Let the needs of the child take precedence." This will provoke a vigorous moral clapping of hands; but we have been saying it a long time and it has failed. It has defeated its own end. The time has come to see whether the needs of the child cannot be better satisfied by giving more attention to the needs of its parents and of other adults. Also it is easy to say, "Let the country's need to maintain population take precedence over individual happiness." But Germany, which has been saying this loudly, has not yet restored its birth rate to an adequate level.

1. THE PROBLEM OF ADULT LOVE. Essentially the problem must be stated in the following lengthy fashion. *How can modern men and women, imbued with all the idealism of monogamous total love, needing a high degree of rapport and mutual emotional support in marriage, find their "right" mates soon enough in life to begin their families at the early age which the woman's best health and population replacement strongly urge?* That many are able to do so under present conditions is indeed true, but such success is a matter of happy accident and, in view of all the facts given in this book, it is untrue of a large proportion of marriages.

Young people, when they dare, ask us: "How can we *know* we are fitted for lifelong exclusive mating until we have actually lived together, with all the intimacies of marriages?" We tell them: "Sex nearly always works out right, if you check up by a pre-marital physical examination, and if you really love each other and have all the right attitudes. You should work and play together a great deal before you marry, and maybe if you are very high-minded about it you should do some petting, but you can safely let intercourse wait till after marriage. If everything else is all right, sex will be all right; to experiment with it beforehand is dangerous and may spoil it."

That such is the course of wisdom and safety under our present mores and social conditions is indeed true. Yet we have also a duty to *think* beyond immediate conditions, and to guide our individually feeble, but in the aggregate powerful, influence upon our culture into directions promising a better human life.

The issue of sexual experiment before marriage has been clouded and misrepresented. The practical issue is not sexual freedom. This already exists in such measure that the guardians of the traditional mores, when they cannot control sexual behavior, often play the ostrich and deny that there is any serious problem in their bailiwick.

Statistics cited in this book indicate that the prohibition of intercourse outside of marriage is now violated by so many persons that it is difficult to say whether there is any effective taboo against the act itself, or only against acknowledging and approving it and carrying it out in normal and convenient settings such as enjoyed in marriage. In any case, it is a taboo which is felt very unequally by different classes and types of persons. The really and effectively "forbidden fruit" is the opportunity for prolonged periods of natural companionship in a variety of situations. The present wavering and uncertain mores place a premium upon relatively brief periods of furtive privacy, which tend to emphasize petting and sex as something apart from the rest of life. It is also true, as our counsels of wisdom assert, that if anything can be learned by sexual experiment it is not likely to be soundly learned under these conditions.

It may be, as Floyd Dell [1930] suggests, that young people do not wish to hurry into complete intercourse; that they need and should have a long period to educate their erotic feelings before these are fully consummated, first by petting with a number of persons and then by more intensive intimacy with a chosen partner, with economic opportunity to marry as soon as they feel ready for full and presumably permanent sexual partnership.

But still the ease and promptness with which individuals find this ideal partnership, or find marriage socially practicable, vary enormously, and without regard to the needs of the persons concerned. To a large extent it is a matter of "luck." Our traditional mores not only accept luck or chance as the prime factor in mate finding, but they also even glorify it and idealize it. The person who proceeds with rational calculations toward this goal is rather frowned upon, especially if a girl.

But there is a still more serious aspect of the problem. Even if we apply all the wisdom we have to early courtship, the sex urge and also the conditions favorable to child-bearing reach their maximum at an age when personality is still very incompletely developed. In a complex, individualistic society, the probabilities of personality change after marriage are greater than under a simple, homogeneous culture. We have seen in Chapters XII and XIII that perhaps only a half of marital failures could be predicted beforehand. Subsequent development of the partners and their social roles may greatly alter the picture of their suitability or unsuitability which could be obtained by the most careful pre-marital study. If they wait until they are "sure," they may wait too long for good family raising; if they

obey the romantic impulse they may raise children whose development will later suffer from their parents' separation by law or their separation in spirit.

Another side of this picture is the problem of the sex and love life of those who never marry. This seems, superficially, not to affect the security and welfare of children. Yet it does. The need for sex or for total love induces many people to marry, and some to have children, when they are not well fitted for these roles. Especially menacing to democratic love and family life is the superior power, in practice, of the male to seek and find "what he wants" and to reject what he doesn't want. As a result, more women than men are probably ill-adjusted to their marital (or non-marital) role. Many unmarried, widowed, and divorced women are better fitted for the positions occupied by many of their married fellow women than are the present incumbents. Hence they constitute a threat to the stability of existing marriages. On the other hand there is some degree of truth in the statement that all the marriageable men are already married, and the bachelors are not fitted for marriage.

But let us not jump to the conclusion that the solution is legal companionate marriage or easy divorce.

POSSIBLE POLICIES. *Theoretically,* if we put aside for the moment the values and assumptions of our culture, we can envisage at least six possible policies which might enter into the solution of the problem of adult love.

1. Scientific selection at the outset.
   a. Better sifting of those who should marry from those who should not.
   b. Better matching of those who do marry.
2. Training in marital adjustment, which, ideally, would enable almost *any* two persons to make a successful marriage.
   a. Mass education.
   b. Counseling and special treatment for those in difficulty; in some cases psychoanalysis, which may be simplified and made available to many more persons.
3. Recognition of the need for trial and error in selection, by encouraging early marriage, making divorce more humane and friendly, and preparing the minds of children to accept the possible divorce of parents without damage.
4. Trial and error through pre-marital freedom, not merely of sex, but of total living and companionship; with marriage delayed as long as population needs permit, and perhaps until pregnancy occurs. Medicine may make late child-bearing more safe than it is.

5. Indissolubility of marriage where there are children, with privilege of both partners to develop extra-marital love relations according to their needs and with full cooperation of married partner.
6. A general devaluation of love between the sexes, making it less important, regarding it as a necessary evil or "concession to the flesh," as was the case in many earlier cultures. Marriage might be idealized, as Count Keyserling suggests [1926], as a "tragic tension."

These six policies are not mutually exclusive but could be combined in many ways with many emphases. Every one of them is actually used in individual cases in our American society, although some are not legally recognized or socially approved. In regard to the sixth, it should be observed that many peoples have had less marital problems than we, partly because they have demanded less, not only of marriage but also of adult heterosexual love in general. They have been trained to satisfy their love desires to a greater extent through their parents, their children, members of their own sex, their ancestors, or the Deity. But our whole analysis of recent cultural change argues against the probability of returning to this older solution. Only Fascist force could reestablish it, and then only if the "storm troopers" were excepted from its requirements. The third, fourth, and fifth policies are not undemocratic, but they are not approved by our present mores and values. The third, divorce, now enjoys qualified acceptability throughout large classes of the population, but the fourth and fifth, according to the standards of the great majority, are definitely immoral. Just why pre-marital cohabitation and extra-marital love should be more immoral than divorce we need not discuss here; we merely record the facts of our mores.

THE NEED FOR VALUES. A naive, *laissez-faire* individualism, such as progressive thinkers are often wrongly accused of entertaining, would say: "Let each person choose his own solution freely and without prejudice, then we shall count cases and measure success, find out which solutions are better adapted to 'human nature' and then 'recommend' those solutions without compulsion." But we know the success or failure of any pattern is only partially dependent upon subcultural human nature. It depends mainly upon the values already inculcated in the persons concerned. Almost any solution will work tolerably if we sufficiently "believe in" it. Extra-marital liaisons are carried on with some success under those cultures and in those sub-groups of our own society which believe in them, but where people have been taught to abhor them they may lead to remorse, suicide, or murder.

There must therefore be some *societal choice* of values. Conceivably, a democratic society might choose as its dominant values in this area *complete individual liberty and social variety of behavior.* It might maintain that all the policies were equally valuable and honorable as long as people treat one another with kindness and consideration. Possibly that can be—at some time in the remote future. But to set that up now as a goal, in the present imperfect state of our knowledge, and in the face of the powerful forces within and without which seek to impose rigid and definite patterns upon us, might be suicidal to Democracy in its present state of development.

Of course we believe in the first and second solutions. We shall encourage them and study how to make them work to the very limit of their possibilities. The question is, what are these limits and what shall we do with the cases which fail? It is at this point that we face the real tests of democratic policy and strategy.

What shall we say to those who fail to adjust their love life through wise initial selection, marital education, and counseling? Shall we say, "You must endure and suffer for the sake of the others?" We *have* said that, and yet many have doubted the value or the necessity of such suffering, and they have rebelled. Those who have rebelled in theory have often rebelled little in practice. Yet the rebellion and the protests have been sufficient to make divorce possible and common, though with much dishonesty and unfairness, and to make extra-marital love quite common although distorted by the need for secrecy. Shall we—can we—"tighten up" on these loopholes without violating the essential values of Democracy? Can we not, perhaps, better serve the purpose by rewarding and honoring monogamy rather than by penalizing the deviations therefrom? Of course a reward implies, *relatively,* a punishment to the unrewarded, but yet there are different absolute levels of cruelty or humaneness in punishment. Certainly there is a difference between a regime which inflicts death upon the adulterer and one which merely deprives him of certain positions and respectability. There could be a still more humane regime in which we might feel sorry for him as we do for the sick or the insane and at the same time give positive admiration to the person who was able to achieve a monogamous love life. One important characteristic of Democracy lies in its methods of social control, its kindly, understanding treatment of the deviator, regardless of what the content of its mores may be.

Our present treatment of these sexual deviations in fact defeats its own end. It carries a subtle implication that they are inherently

desirable and attractive. Even our movies paint them in a glamorous light, and then, to satisfy the mores and the censor, have a "moral ending."

The traditional sex ideology of our culture has been expressed in these words:

"Matrimonial faith demands that husband and wife be joined in an especially holy and pure love, not as adulterers love each other, but as Christ loved the Church." But this is a scheme of values which is peculiarly dependent upon religious authority for its maintenance and peculiarly vulnerable to independent thinking and human experience. When its authoritative buttresses break down, the result is to make people all the more susceptible to the "forbidden fruit."

If we would really increase people's faith in the possibilities of a once-for-all mate selection and the art of maintaining love, we need to clothe the *idea* of monogamous marriage not with the cold atmosphere of hard duty, but with a warm and rich erotic *feeling.*

But a society cannot use the tremendous power of sex to enrich and beautify marriage and at the same time maintain a gutter-concept of sex-apart-from-marriage. Our society has a very fundamental decision to make. It is making it every day, and anything which any one of us says or does about sex is doing its little bit in making that decision. The decision is not in regard to sex *behavior,* which so easily eludes social control, but in regard to sex *values.*

In the past, indeed, our society has been concerned mainly with sex behavior. Its major aims have been (1) to keep sexual intercourse within marriage and (2) to keep its amount, even within marriage, as small as possible. Such aims would be a natural result of population crowding and capitalistic society's need to fix parental responsibility for the care and support of children, when accompanied by ignorance of contraception. But the development of contraception alters this picture. It offers to modern society a range of sexual possibilities comparable with the range covered by primitive societies. It gives modern society a chance to decide what positive values it wants to realize through sex.

SEX-AFFIRMATION AND SEX-DENIAL. Wilhelm Reich [1936] characterizes societies as sex-affirming and sex-denying. *Sex-affirmation* does not necessarily imply promiscuity. In general it means that love-making is cultivated and given considerable time; that it is pictured in a respectable light by art, literature, and conversation; that, although not necessarily exhibited, its observation by third parties is

not necessarily an occasion of shame or horror; that erotic feeling and tumescence are regarded as desirable conditions whenever they occur; that children's sex play is not to be discouraged but regarded as preparation; and that celibacy is to be pitied rather than honored.

Sex-denial never means actual celibacy for any large proportion of the population; this would transcend the limits of human nature. It means the honoring and valuing of sexual restraint, the concealment of sexuality, its classification with excretory functions, and the official repression of all exciting stimuli. It is typified by the early church attitude that marriage was a necessary but inferior status.

Ancient, oriental, Samoan, Trobriand, and many primitive cultures appear as more or less sex-affirming, with, of course, variations. Our Euro-American cultural stream has been basically sex-denying, with occasional outbursts of partial sex-affirmation, such as during the Renaissance. The twentieth century has seen a slow but definite drift toward more sex-affirmation. Yet this is only a general, briefly operating trend. We have certainly not yet attained the enrichment of love and sex life which Reich pictures as possible. Yet we are not sure that some of the features of primitive sex-affirmation are at all desirable, or necessary, to the ends we might accept.

Let us take a look at some tendencies toward the higher valuation of sexuality. The more liberal attitudes toward sex which we have gained in recent years are largely derivatives of (1) the romantic complex and (2) of health and mental hygiene ideologies. The majority now seem to recognize sex as a useful instrument of married love as well as of reproduction, and we are sometimes willing to forgive sex relations outside of marriage if they are prompted by "true love." We have learned from Freud that sexual repression is bad for emotional health and we are more tolerant of sexual deviation by the unmarried or the unhappily married. Some practitioners have even privately advised sexual relations for their patients as they might prescribe medicine. But true sex-affirmation looks upon the sex function not merely as an instrument to something "higher," but as an integral part of that high value.

The Communist attitude toward sex, in the first years of the Soviets, was also far from true sex-affirmation. The saying then was that one should be as free to take a sex experience as a glass of water. But this "glass of water" concept implied that sex was unimportant, and should be relegated to its lowly place in life by the method of surfeit rather than the method of repression. Through this negative, *laissez-faire* policy, Soviet Russia, in Reich's opinion, missed a golden opportunity

to use sex constructively, to develop it as a positive value. Likewise much of the sex liberation of Western countries since 1920 has been negative. Aldous Huxley in *Antic Hay* portrays the sex life of modern English students, free from many taboos and yet searching vainly for an ideal.

The kind of sex-affirmation which *might* be constructive in human development would not repress sexuality, but neither would it make it "free and easy." It would manage it in such a way as to develop its greatest satisfactions. It would treat sexuality not as an ugly tool to be used when necessary and then put away out of sight, but would associate it with things which are interesting, beautiful, and inspiring. Sex would cease to be funny or "vulgar."

Such a development of sex in life is not likely to be obtained under complete *laissez faire*. It implies the development of social standards and values and active guidance, though not coercion, of the developing individual.

We do not know exactly what laws or codified mores of sexual behavior would best serve human needs in the long run. Perhaps several different schemes are possible. The question awaits prolonged and unfettered investigation by research. One trouble is that we have been too much concerned with getting specified results in terms of behavior, such as to reduce the proportion of sexual acts which are outside of marriage. Actual behavior has run circles around all our laws and codes and preachments. We need to be more concerned with the formulation of the positive values which we wish to set up and to realize.

Decisions regarding values always involve choice. Something must be put first; other ends may be realized also but they are contingent. For example, do we want to exalt the ideal of a paramount, lifelong love relation *even if* there are interludes and subsidiary loves; or shall the ideal rather be perfect exclusiveness as long as it can last and then a change to another exclusive partnership? Would we flavor our work life with erotic feeling, encouraging the closer physical proximity and mingling of men and women on their jobs, with tolerance, within limits, of flirtation, of stimulating costumes and demonstration of feeling? Or do we want work or other large areas of our lives to be definitely "zoned" and "restricted" against all avoidable sexual stimulation? Do we wish to tell our growing youth that (1) erotic feeling "cheapens" affection, (2) that erotic feeling is a worthy spice to be added if true affection has already developed, or (3) that erotic feeling may always earn moral acceptability if it is accompanied by

tenderness and unselfishness? Every one of these attitudes will be found in some persons, whatever society does, but society, through school, parents, and literature, may mold the mass values.

One married woman protested to her counselor that her husband was much stimulated, and outspokenly so, by the beauties of the women about him. The counselor asked whether she suspected unfaithfulness. "No," she replied, "he is very faithful to me, physically, but I wish I could be the exciter and not merely the end result of his passions." This suggests that sex-affirmation might take the form of an enlarged range of exciting stimuli, with monogamy in the sexual act itself. The writer is not advocating this or any other pattern, but merely presenting it as one of the possibilities before us. It might be a way of reconciling certain more or less conflicting values. It would be somewhat different from what the woman in the above case apparently experienced. She felt that her husband wanted mainly her body. On the other hand, it would be possible for partners in marriage to want each other so completely and so exclusively for the climaxes of their emotional experience that they would feel themselves welcoming and absorbing all other pleasant observations and excitements of the partner. Such a pattern would be democratic, however, only if women's interest in younger men were regarded with the same attitude as men's interest in younger women.

This suggests another choice before society which is, perhaps, the key to other problems; namely, how far will it continue to emphasize female "youth and beauty," in the conventional sense, as love stimulants? The present pattern may be "natural," but culture has overcapitalized it, with unhappy results. It would be possible for culture to develop a much higher valuation of women's personality, intellect, and bodily health, apart from youthful beauty. In this case the needs of the older women would be more nearly met and their capacities used. It would be possible to develop a much wider range of male esthetic and erotic appreciation of women, which might even be of more benefit to the men than what they gave in return to the women. Not a little of the present sexual maladjustment is due to this very subtle factor of the *erotic age-gradient*. Whatever the actual sex relationships, which are of course mainly controlled by marriage and "duty," the erotic *desires* of *many* men of all ages are today concentrated upon a *few* women, who are mostly young. Because of this pattern the men are largely deprived of that association of sex feeling with women of maturity, of experience equal to or greater than their own, of sympathy and understanding which could deepen and enrich their lives,

regardless of how far this feeling might be permitted to express itself in action.

A favorite popular song of the Victorian era, *Wait for the Wagon,* represents the ardent young suitor as saying:

> Oh, do you think, my Phyllis dear,
> Old Mike with all his wealth
> Can make you half so happy
> As I with youth and health?

In the changing sex mores of youth today, there is some evidence that this attitude, requiring age equality of mates, may be developing into a *mos* or social value which will replace some of the traditional sex mores. If so, there will be increasing resentment by younger men against older men who take young partners, whether in marriage or extra-marital relationships. But if this change of mores is to be carried through, the older men will have to learn to appreciate the qualities of women of their own age. They will more readily learn this if they are sensitized while still young to the potential sex-attraction of women of all ages.

Some years ago there was a play in which the hero, a bachelor in his late thirties, having fallen in love with the obviously attractive heroine, suddenly hears something to the effect that she is a grandmother. In spite of himself he is thrown into an inner panic. His cultural conditioning is too much for him. Then it all turns out right when he learns that his enamorata is only a step-grandmother, having been married previously to a much older man. But nobody is shocked by hearing about this marriage, which suggests still another side of the picture which needs to be changed. Namely, we must encourage young women to put aside the more or less unconscious association of financial power and luxury with sexual desirability. They will more readily do this if they can look forward to equal economic opportunities for the sexes and to some form of guaranteed compensation or mother's assistance while raising children.

To many young women the idea of increased competition with older women in the arena of courtship is very distasteful, especially now that men seem more "scarce" than ever. Yet the acceptance of this idea is a part of a larger change which offers them collectively a happier future, regulated by a balanced give-and-take between the sexes rather than by masculine prejudices. Thoughtful young women will turn the shafts of their anger away from the "merry widow" and the gay divorcée toward the stereotypes portrayed in *Esquire.*

With such a program two theoretical type-patterns of sex attraction are possible: (1) a strict limitation of sex attraction to partners within the same age group and (2) an equal tolerance and appreciation of relationships involving an older woman and relationships involving an older man. In practice something intermediate between these types might be realized: the important consideration is *balance* or equality of attitude toward the two sexes at every age.

It is probable that the sex morality of the future will be more concerned with these factors of balance and interpersonal adjustment rather than with definitions and limits of individual behavior.

SUPPORTING BELIEFS AND FALLACIES. Some of these decisions require further knowledge. There are three common beliefs linked with our present sexual mores. These beliefs may contain some truth, but there is strong reason to suspect they are but false rationalizations for the attitudes they claim to justify. They will bear investigation.

First is the belief that the sexual act is exhausting. This leads to the "debauchery" theory, that a sexually unrestrained society will exhaust its creative energies through sex and therefore stagnate or succumb to other, more restrained, societies. It is curious that this fear of "excessive" sexuality is associated always with the idea of promiscuity or, at least, of sex outside of marriage, although the latter is seldom as easy and frequent as sex within marriage. It is curious that no one has ever made a study to see whether persons who have very frequent intercourse in marriage are less creative or efficient in their daily work than others, or whether, with the same person, periods of frequent intercourse are periods of low physical and mental efficiency, of diminished zest for learning and art, of relative indifference toward social aims. It is true that men temporarily away from their wives often display unusual energy, some of it in the pursuit of other women. It is no doubt true that great works of art have been produced by presumed celibates and presumably sex-frustrated persons. Yet unless we know the complete physiological condition of these persons, including the details of endocrine function, masturbation, involuntary orgasms, and so on, we can come to no conclusion regarding the relation between their sex life and their productivity.

A more important consideration may be that a person living alone can usually manage his time more efficiently and concentrate it upon specific purposes, whereas in most marriages there are many interrupting demands, and temporary freedom from these may produce increased efficiency in spite of, rather than because of, reduced sexual frequency.

In *Hopousia* [Unwin, 1940] the author imagines a future Utopia in which two types of marriage are provided: an *alpha* marriage for the energetic, creative persons, to be strictly monogamous and preceded by pre-nuptial continence, and a *beta* marriage, terminable at will and not demanding pre-nuptial continence. This dresses up in modern garb the old belief that creative effort can be fostered by self-denial in general and sex deprivation in particular. It is based in part upon a most remarkable piece of research. [Unwin, 1934.] In this study of *Sex and Culture,* Unwin correlated the degree of sexual opportunity (pre-nuptial chastity, irregular or occasional continence, pre-nuptial freedom) with the type of religion (deistic, manistic-cult, manistic-tendance, and zoistic) among 80 tribes. He finds an almost perfect correlation of these two scales. Pre-nuptial chastity and deistic religion are each found in 10 cases, and in every one of these they occur together. Using also historical evidence regarding the great civilizations, Unwin concludes that sexual restriction, especially of women, causes cultural advancement. By his statistical data he thinks to have found a remarkable support for the psychological theory that sex energy, through restraint, can be sublimated or redirected into creative channels. Mrs. Gladys Groves [1942, 348] in her valuable book on *Marriage and Family Life* gives wide circulation to Unwin's thesis.

Unwin's correlations are suspiciously high. We find Samoa among his pre-nuptially chaste societies, although he explains that he is judging cultures by their historical rather than present-day conditions. Hobhouse found only a very weak correlation between sex mores and degree of economic advancement. But what does even more to make Unwin unconvincing is his use of the type of religion as his measure of social energy and cultural advance, and his implied assumption that monogamous limitation of sex partner means limitation of the amount of sexual intercourse. Also, it is a little strange to find that the state of cultural development is more closely related to the pre-marital chastity of girls than to the post-marital behavior of men.

A *second* belief is that erotic excitement is injurious unless followed by intercourse (which may be also condemned on other grounds). This is peculiarly a belief regarding the male, although what truth there is in it applies at least equally to the female. Related to this belief is our concern to repress sexual stimuli even when we may be somewhat tolerant regarding sexual behavior. Admirers of the Russian family policy praise the "wholesome" freedom from undue sex

interest. Advocates of social nudism hasten to intimate that the experience is "wholesome" because it is not erotic.

Yet according to the theory of the Oneida Community and Madame Karezza, prolonged sexual excitement without consummation may be beneficial and energizing. The experience of many persons suggests that a rather high level of sexual readiness, with moderately frequent but securely anticipated release, is beneficial to achievement. The precise condition of the sexual mechanism is less important than the absence of anger, fear, and other unpleasant emotions. It is not too frequent, or too infrequent, sexual release which injures mental productivity; it is rather the defensive emotions or tensions which are aroused by frustrations of the broader love aim. These frustrations may come at any point in the physiological sex cycle; they are produced by temporary impotence and also by extreme potency with disappointment of the anticipations of release; by sense of injustice; by misunderstood rejections; by unaccepted interferences with one's love life.

A *third* belief is that the male is more sexual than the female. We have already discussed that in Chapter XI, to the detriment of the said belief.

As to the sexual aspects of love, Democracy can at this time commit itself only to the following. Whatever the future of sex as a value, it should be a value applying equally to the two sexes. True democrats will seek to eradicate completely the "double standard" and the inequality of social power between men and women. Whatever standards then emerge will balance the needs of men and women. Liberties which are destructive when monopolized by one social class may often be constructive if democratically apportioned. This may prove to be true of some controversial phases of family behavior. If in the present stage of our societal development, forward-looking people will concentrate upon the objective of sex equality, if we build a society which prevents the stronger sex from exploiting the weaker, then we may trust men and women together to work out sexual standards which will satisfy human needs.

2. The Problem of Adult Personality Development. The second great problem is the mutual interference between adult self-realization and achievement and the needs of child development. In our culture this problem bears primarily upon women. We have discussed it with its possible solutions in Chapters XVII and XVIII. We shall consider here how it affects men also, and its relation to the love problem.

Many of the seemingly unpredictable cases of marriage failure involve a parting of the ways of husband and wife after the birth of children. Parenthood produces conflicts which are natural and subcultural.* It emphasizes the culturally approved role-differences of the sexes, but does so in such a way as to reduce the companionship of husband and wife. Thus people suffer from an indirect but natural result of their conformity to our culture, a result which can be rationally foreseen but whose anticipation is tabooed by our mores. Moreover, modern child training, encouraging self-expression of children, tends to impoverish marital companionship except when the children are asleep, and even then the mother is frequently too exhausted to be a good companion. It is difficult for husband and wife to get blocks of free time away from the home or to devote to each other their exclusive attention. Such companionship might often be easier in the husband's factory than in the home.

The wife for her amusement and relaxation finds herself more limited to the home and neighborhood activities common to mothers as a class, and largely debarred from many pleasures which she might otherwise share with the husband, who has a wider "cruising radius" and can command more prolonged periods of uninterrupted leisure.

Our society, instead of encouraging husband and wife to share and exchange their duties as far as possible, puts pressure upon the man to work even more intensely in his specialized field in order to support his enlarged family. Feeling this pressure, he often demands more complete freedom from other responsibilities when away from his office, and he may even be less inclined than formerly to share his wife's duties or worries. This often means his greater absence from home and the separation of much of his leisure life from that of his wife. This causes her to feel neglected, and she commonly responds by a still further elaboration of her separate interests and absorption of the general feminine culture. This, added to the increased needs of growing children, tends to place increased emphasis upon material possessions, which leads the husband to feel still more financial pressure, thus completing the vicious cycle of interaction.

Many ways of dividing duties might seem feasible. Our way gives all the money earning, competitive responsibility to the man and gives to the woman practically all the responsibility for young lives and health, for "being home" in person or by substitute, available to

* In distinction from the conflicts of cultural values, which are more common in the case of earning wives and conservative husbands.

every unpredictable demand for every minute of time during several years. Is this separation of husband's and wife's worlds *naturally* compatible with a continued love relationship? Many men and women have made it so. It is time to reappraise the magnitude of their task and effort and to consider whether some other division of labor between husband, wife, and outsiders would not be more favorable to enduring love and companionship.

A greater sharing or more frequent exchange of duties between husband and wife would lead each to cooperate in reducing the drudgeries of the other's task. A husband is impatient with his wife's complaints of boredom because he feels that he is bored too at his office. She tends to discount his complaints of overwork because she is overworked too in the home. If they were to help each other, each would have a smaller dose of his peculiar frustration. If both were bored and both overworked *in the same ways* they might struggle together to do something about it.

There are roughly two levels of frustration in human life. There is the level of absolute want and deprivation, where it seems not to matter how one spends one's time, as long as it results in some relief from cold or hunger or pain. Then there is the level where absolute needs are supplied, but where one has to labor and to forego day after day the satisfactions of one's spontaneous impulses and interests in order to keep one's financial head above water. Standards and tastes, often felt to be imposed from without, and the fear of being unable to pay one's bills constrain the movements of one's body and the play of one's mind. Whether it is in a paid job, in a household chore, a volunteer committee assignment, "waiting upon" some person, or hanging on the subway strap without being able to read the part of the newspaper one wishes, the element of *drudgery* is what makes life on this level inglorious, frustrating, and deadening to the spirit. Drudgery can never be eliminated, but it can be reduced. It will not be reduced by the competitive whining of husband and wife about their respective burdens, nor yet by their stoical resolutions to bear them alone and in silence. It will be reduced by their sharing each other's experiences and building together a common philosophy regarding work, money, and leisure. By so doing they may contrive to simplify the mechanics of living, and learn to perform the irreducible minimum of "chores" with enjoyment and inner freedom.

If husband and wife had equal opportunity to continue their individual development in marriage, which involves equal opportunity to

concentrate their attention upon their spontaneous and creative interests and to escape drudgery, we would find fewer couples "growing apart" and seeking escapes from marriage and the home. A friend of the author's recently remarked: "When we see a man hustling with eager steps down the street, we ask ourselves where he is going in such haste. We might better ask, what is he hurrying away from?"

Thus a very important part of the solution of the love problem may lie in this unsuspected direction of distributing the drudgery, not of caring for children for this is not drudgery, but of the confinement and preoccupation with routine details, which are so inordinately expanded by the raising of children under the modern home set-up. There are several ways to redistribute this drudgery, and each family will need to find its best way by experiment and study. It must always be remembered, however, that the primary, thwarting impact is upon the personality and development of the mother, whereas the effect upon the man is indirect, depending upon his sensitiveness and other traits. If we solve this problem of adult personality development and self-realization we shall go a long way toward the realization of creative, enduring love.

By so doing we shall also go far toward eliminating the spiritually neglected, unhappy child. We shall develop parents whom children can respect and enjoy. We shall enable millions of dutiful, drudging, and harassed parents to discover something little known: What it is really to *love children for themselves as they are.* We shall make parenthood a rich, creative experience which will bring father and mother closer together, because they will both be able to evaluate the child and the home in the same terms. We shall liquidate the pattern of the financially harassed father and the virtually imprisoned mother. We shall be guided by those happy parents of today who have solved the problem for themselves. Yet we shall recognize that their fortunate emotional adjustments, their successful patterns of living, cannot be extended to their less fortunate fellow men and women by uniform prescription nor by high moral parade, but only by a combination of educational policies and economic-social measures.

Saint Paul said: "For not Adam but the woman was deceived by the serpent and therefore in transgression." We shall say: "Neither Adam nor the woman but the serpent is in transgression, and the serpent is our culture."

THE NEED FOR COMRADESHIP BETWEEN MEN AND WOMEN. Whatever the equalized sex standards shall be, Democracy calls for a richer

and freer *companionship* between men and women. The family in a true Democracy may be thought of as a point of intense concentration of a larger life of friendship and affection between the sexes. This should be enriched for its own sake, and everyone should be encouraged to participate according to his or her needs. If this broad friendliness, this world brother- and sisterhood were more fully developed, we would have better marriages also. People would be less likely to rush into unwise marriages because of the fear of loneliness. They would be less likely to develop cynicism, homosexuality, and hostility toward the opposite sex. Indeed, we might hazard the guess that there would be less meanness and cruelty in the world.

One of the acknowledged weaknesses of our democracy so far is the bewilderment and sense of powerlessness of the highly developed and specialized individual whose life is segmented among several different groups and activities, and the loneliness of other individuals who have been stranded in the great, impersonal world. Some very discerning thinkers have agreed that there are many people in the modern world who are weary of freedom. Their nostalgic cravings for "home," for emotional security, their passion to fuse themselves with somebody or something outside themselves, are the stuff of which Fascism is made. [Fromm, 1941.]

By encouraging differentiation among individuals, Democracy weakens traditional bonds and seems in a sense to pulverize society. But there is a further step in the development of Democracy which needs now most urgently to be accelerated if Democracy is to survive. It is the development of new groupings of persons based upon congeniality and common interests and values. Individualism may lead a person to differ from his relatives and his neighbors, and yet elsewhere it is developing individuals who resemble him or who might very much enjoy his company. But these new spiritual comrades do not know and cannot find one another. They pass one another without recognition on the streets and highways of the world. When these naturally and culturally congenial persons are able to find one another there will be less loneliness and homesickness, and less danger that Democracy will be sold for a *Fuehrer.*

Where these like-minded are of opposite sexes, their comradeship will be a still more powerful force to buttress Democracy. Furthermore, if we give men and women more opportunity to share the same work and interests, abolishing the tradition that each has a hereditary unchangeable "sphere," there will be still more and better like-

mindedness between them. We shall have more marriages based upon real sharing and sympathy. But if we build *merely* a narrow program to conserve *The Family* as a sacred institution," if we are more concerned about preventing the possible excesses of this broader basic comradeship than we are about realizing its positive values, then we shall not be saved.

Erich Fromm [1941] has for many years been studying the character structure of modern man in Germany and America. He observes that to escape the meaningless, negative freedom of our modern culture people use three common neurotic mechanisms of escape: a return to authoritarianism, destructiveness, and "automaton conformity." The last is the most typical in America, but it paves the way, as the German experience shows, for a return to authority. The only hope lies in our learning to embrace true freedom, which in Fromm's terms means *spontaneous activity.* He sees this spontaneity realized, though much too seldom, in work and in love. Spontaneity in work appears when one participates joyfully in the process and is not enslaved by the demand for results. Spontaneous love involves neither absorption into, nor possession of, another person, but the affirmation of oneself in union with the other.

It may be a long time yet before the *work* of the majority of the people can be made to be a spontaneous, creative experience. It will require both education, guided by these psychoanalytic insights, and further economic reforms. Both character structure and economic structure must be changed.

Since the technological difficulties are less, *love* would seem to offer a field for an earlier and speedier development of spontaneity, of positive, individualized values, and inner freedom. As Fromm [1940] says, the person who truly loves others also loves himself; he loves life. Thus he differs from the frustrated, destructive person who wishes to restrain others and to destroy their values while he denies and punishes himself also. He differs also from the person who dares not to be himself, but to be only what is expected of him, and who forces others into the same conformity.

If love is to become a more creative force in our culture, we must use and not deny its most biological, and hence most powerful, component. It is getting late, and it may be time for Democracy to play its trump card, which is a *positive, constructive policy toward companionship and affection between the sexes.* At this perilous state in the development of the democratic way of life, it may be that this

part of it will save the whole. Given a general encouragement of love, more men and women will find and keep those personal bonds which will enable them *to be themselves.*

Only—but this is rare—
When a beloved hand is laid in ours,
When, jaded with the rush and glare
Of the interminable hours,
Our eyes can in another's read clear,
When our world-deafen'd ear
Is by the tones of a loved voice caress'd,
A bolt is shot back somewhere in our breast
And a lost pulse of feeling stirs again:
The eye sinks inward, and the heart lies plain,
And what we mean, we say, and what we would, we know.
A man becomes aware of his life's flow
And hears its winding murmur, and he sees
The meadows where it glides, the sun, the breeze.

And there arrives a lull in the hot race
Wherein he doth for ever chase
That flying and elusive shadow, Rest.
An air of coolness plays upon his face,
And an unwonted calm pervades his breast.
And then he thinks he knows
The Hills where his life rose,
And the Sea where it goes.

MATTHEW ARNOLD, *The Buried Life.*

Appendix A

SUPPLEMENTARY READINGS AND TOOL-BOOKS

This list below is selected to supplement the text and not to indicate, necessarily, the most important works in the total field. Where chapters and parts of books are not specified, the teacher or student will presumably select those portions bearing most closely on the subject. Some of the items are to be used mainly as reference books. Each work here cited is also included, with fuller bibliographical data, in Appendix D. Chapters are grouped and their titles slightly changed.

CHAPTERS I AND II. PRIMITIVE FAMILY SYSTEMS

KARDINER, ABRAM, 1939, *The Individual and His Society,* Chapters 5, 6, 7, 8.
LOWIE, R. L., 1925, *Primitive Society,* Chapters 2–8.
MEAD, MARGARET, 1939, *From the South Seas.*
STERN, B. J., 1938, *The Family,* Chapter 1.

CHAPTER III. THE FAMILY IN CIVILIZATIONS

DE ROUGEMONT, D., 1940, *Love in the Western World.*
GOODSELL, WILLYSTINE, 1934, *A History of Marriage and the Family.*
KULP, D. H., 1925, *Country Life in South China.*
STERN, B. J., 1938, *The Family,* Chapters 2, 3, 4.
ZIMMERMAN and FRAMPTON, 1935, *Family and Society,* Part IV, an abridged translation of the essential parts of LePlay, 1879, *Les ouvriers européens.*

CHAPTER IV. THE FAMILY IN AMERICA

American Sociological Review, October, 1937, articles by Beers, Anderson, Frazier, Hayner and Reynolds, 2:591–637.
BABER, R. E., 1939, *Marriage and the Family,* Chapter 4.
CAVAN and RANCK, 1938, *The Family and the Depression.*
DAWSON and GETTYS, 1935, *Introduction to Sociology,* pp. 90–96.
FRAZIER, E. F., 1939, *The Negro Family in the United States.*
LYND, ROBERT S. and HELEN M., 1929, *Middletown,* Chapters 9, 10, 11, 12; 1937, *Middletown in Transition,* Chapter 5.
MINER, H., 1939, *St. Denis, a French-Canadian Parish.*
PARTEN and REEVES, 1937, "Size and Composition of American Families," *American Sociological Review,* 2:638–649 (October).
STERN, B. J., 1938, *The Family,* Chapters 6, 7, 8, 9, 10.
WILLIAMS, J. M., 1925, *Our Rural Heritage.*

CHAPTERS V AND VI. FAMILY CHANGE

FAIRCHILD, MILDRED, 1937, "The Status of the Family in the Soviet Union Today," *American Sociological Review*, 2:619–629 (October).

FOLSOM, J. K., 1940, B, "Old Age as a Sociological Problem," *American Journal of Orthopsychiatry*, 10:30–38; see also pp. 27–87.

FRANK, L. K., 1940, B, "Freud's Influence on Western Thinking and Culture," *American Journal of Orthopsychiatry*, 10:880–882.

KINGSBURY and FAIRCHILD, 1935, *Factory, Family, and Woman in the Soviet Union.*

KIRKPATRICK, C., 1937, "Recent Changes in the Status of Women and the Family in Germany," *American Sociological Review*, 2:650–658 (October).

——, 1938, *Nazi Germany: Its Women and Family Life.*

MCKENZIE, R. D., 1933, "The Rise of Metropolitan Communities," in *Recent Social Trends*, Chapter 9.

MYRDAL, ALVA, 1941, *Nation and Family.*

OGBURN and TIBBITTS, 1933, "The Family and Its Functions," in *Recent Social Trends*, Chapter 13.

STERN, B. J., 1938, *The Family*, Chapter 5.

WILLIAMS, A. R., 1937, *The Soviets*, pp. 287–305.

CHAPTER VII. FAMILY AND DEMOCRACY

FRANK, L. K., 1936, "Society as the Patient," *American Journal of Sociology*, 42:335–344.

FROMM, E., 1941, *Escape from Freedom.*

MEAD, M., 1942, *And Keep Your Powder Dry.*

PLANT, J. S., 1937, *Personality and the Cultural Pattern.*

STERN, B. J., 1938, *The Family*, Chapter 13.

——, 1939, "The Family and Cultural Change," *Amer. Sociol. Rev.*, 4:199–208.

ZIMMERMAN and FRAMPTON, 1935, *Family and Society.*

CHAPTER VIII. POPULATION PROBLEM

CHARLES, ENID, 1934, *The Twilight of Parenthood*, Chapter 6.

FAIRCHILD, H. P., 1939, *People.*

GLASS, D. V., 1940, *Population Policies and Movements in Europe.*

HAGOOD, MARGARET J., 1939, *Mothers of the South.*

LORIMER, WINSTON, and KISER, 1940, *Foundations of American Population Policy.*

OSBORN, F., 1940, *A Preface to Eugenics.*

"The American People: Studies in Population," 1936, *Annals*, vol. 188.

CHAPTERS IX AND X. PERSONALITY DEVELOPMENT AND PARENT-CHILD RELATIONS

ALDRICH, C. A. and MARY M., *Babies Are Human Beings.*

BERNARD, JESSIE, 1942, *American Family Behavior*, Chapters 10, 11, 12, 13.

BLOS, P., 1941, *The Adolescent Personality*, especially Chapter 2.

FRANK, L. K., 1938, D, "The Fundamental Needs of the Child," *Mental Hygiene*, 22:353–379.

GESELL, A., 1934, *An Atlas of Infant Behavior.*
HORNEY, KAREN, 1939, *New Ways in Psychoanalysis.*
——, 1942, *Self-Analysis.*
LUND, F. L., 1939, *Emotions.*
MEAD, MARGARET, 1941, "Administrative Contributions to Democratic Character Formation at the Adolescent Level," *Journal of National Association of Deans of Women* (January).
MURPHY, MURPHY, and NEWCOMB, 1937, *Experimental Social Psychology.*
TAYLOR, KATHARINE W., 1937, *Do Adolescents Need Parents?*
WITMER, HELEN L., 1937, "The Influence of Parental Attitudes on the Social Adjustment of the Individual," *American Sociological Review,* 2:756–763 (October).
WOLF, ANNA M., 1941, *The Parents' Manual.*
YOUNG, K., 1940, *Personality and Problems of Adjustment,* especially Chapters 11, 12, 13.

CHAPTER XI. LOVE

BERNARD, JESSIE, 1942, *American Family Behavior,* Chapters 15, 16.
FLÜGEL, J. C., 1926, *Psychoanalytic Study of the Family.*
LANDIS, C., *et al.,* 1940, *Sex in Development.*
WALLER, W., 1938, *The Family,* Chapters 7–11, 19–21.
ZUCKERMAN, S., 1932, *The Social Life of Monkeys and Apes.*

CHAPTERS XII AND XIII. MARITAL HAPPINESS AND INTERACTION

BURGESS and COTTRELL, 1939, *Predicting Success or Failure in Marriage.*
HART, HORNELL and ELLA B., 1941, *Personality and the Family,* Chapters 5, 6, 11.
LEVY and MUNROE, 1938, *The Happy Family.*
LOCKE, HARVEY J., 1941, "Tentative Knowledge about Marriage and Family Relations," *Marriage and Family Living,* 3:73–378.
MOWRER, HARRIET R., 1935, *Personality Disorganization and Domestic Discord.*
TERMAN, L. M., 1938, *Psychological Factors in Marital Happiness.*
WALLER, W., 1938, *The Family,* Chapters 12–17.

CHAPTER XIV. MARRIAGE LAW AND STATISTICS

BABER, R. E., 1939, *Marriage and the Family,* Chapter 5.
GROVES and OGBURN, 1928, *American Marriage and Family Relationships.*
MAY, G., 1929, *Marriage Laws and Decisions in the United States.*
MAY and BLINN, 1937, "Legislative Trends in Family Law," *American Sociological Review,* 2:696–704 (October).
RICHMOND and HALL, 1929, *Marriage and the State.*
VERNIER, C. G., 1931–1938, *American Family Laws,* 5 vols.

CHAPTER XV. DIVORCE

BABER, R. E., 1939, *Marriage and the Family,* Chapters 14, 15.
BARNETT, J. H., 1939, *Divorce and the American Novel.*
DRUMMOND, ISABEL, 1931, *Getting a Divorce.*

HANKINS, F. H., 1931, A, article on "Divorce," *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences.*
LICHTENBERGER, J. P., 1931, *Divorce.*
MERRILL and ELLIOTT, 1941, *Social Disorganization,* Chapter 27, pp. 703–713.

CHAPTER XVI. COURTSHIP AND MORES

BROMLEY and BRITTEN, 1938, *Youth and Sex.*
DAVIS, K., 1937, "The Sociology of Prostitution," *American Sociological Review,* 2:744–755 (October).
HART, HORNELL and ELLA B., 1941, *Personality and the Family,* Chapters 1, 4, 7, 8.
MERRILL and ELLIOTT, 1941, *Social Disorganization,* Chapters 8, 9, 10.
NEWCOMB, T., 1937, "Recent Changes in Attitudes toward Sex and Marriage," *American Sociological Review,* 2:659–667 (October).
POPENOE, P., 1937, "Mate Selection," *American Sociological Review,* 2:735–743 (October).
WESTERMARCK, E., 1936, *The Future of Marriage in Western Civilization.*
WILE, I. S., ed., 1934, *The Sex Life of the Unmarried Adult.*

CHAPTER XVII. HOUSING AND HOME

ADAMS, CHARLOTTE, 1942, *The Run of the House.*
ANDREWS, B. R., 1935, *Economics of the Household.*
ARONOVICI, CAROL, 1939, *Housing the Masses.*
BIGELOW, H. F., 1936, *Family Finance.*
FOLSOM, J. K., 1939, "Home Management and Self Management," *Journal of Home Economics,* 31:519–523.
JONES, GLADYS BECKETT, 1938, "The Philosophy of the Budget," Chapter 8 in Folsom (ed.), *Plan for Marriage.*
MUNTZ, E., 1938, *Urban Sociology,* Chapters 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11.
PICKERING, R., 1941, *Shelter for Living.*
SAIT, UNA B., 1938, *New Horizons for the Family,* Chapters 21, 22.

CHAPTER XVIII. THE ROLE OF WOMEN

BERNARD, JESSIE, 1942, *American Family Behavior,* Chapter 21.
BUCK, PEARL, 1941, *Of Men and Women.*
FOSTER, R. G. and PAULINE P. WILSON, 1942, *Women after College.*
PIDGEON, MARY E., 1937, *Women in the Economy of the United States of America.*
SAIT, UNA B., 1938, *New Horizons for the Family,* Chapters 14, 15, 16.
TERMAN and MILES, 1937, *Sex and Personality.*

CHAPTER XIX. FAMILY AND COMMUNITY

AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF SCHOOL ADMINISTRATORS, 1941, *Education for Family Life.*
"Children in a Depression Decade," 1940, *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,* vol. 212, especially pp. 27–end.
FOLSOM, J. K., 1941, *Youth, Family, and Education.*
FOSTER, R. G., 1937, "Servicing the Family Through Counselling Agencies," *American Sociological Review,* 2:764–770 (October).
FOSTER and WILSON, 1942, *Women after College.*

GOODSELL, WILLYSTINE, 1936, *Problems of the Family*, Chapters 10, 11, 16.
GOODYKOONTZ, COON, *et al.*, 1941, *Family Living and Our Schools.*
GRUENBERG, SIDONIE, ed., 1942, *The Family in a World at War.*
KNOX, SARAH, 1941, *The Family and the Law.*
"Marriage and Family Counselling," *Parent Education* (April, 1936).
MERRILL and ELLIOTT, 1941, *Social Disorganization*, Chapters 4, 5, 6, pp. 404–422.
MOWRER, HARRIET R., 1937, "Clinical Treatment of Marital Conflicts," *American Sociological Review*, 2:771–778 (October).
SAIT, UNA B., 1938, *New Horizons for the Family*, Chapters 9, 10, 11, 12, 13.
VERNIER, C. G., 1931–1938, *American Family Laws*, 5 vols.
WALLER, W., 1940, *War and the Family.*

SOURCES ESPECIALLY RICH IN CASE STUDIES, INCLUDING LONG NARRATIVES

BLOS, P., 1941, *The Adolescent Personality.*
BURGESS and COTTRELL, 1939, *Predicting Success or Failure in Marriage*, Chapters 11, 15.
CAVAN and RANCK, 1938, *The Family and the Depression.*
COIGNARD, J., 1937, *The Spectacle of a Man.*
FRAZIER, E. F., 1939, *The Negro Family in the United States.*
GROVES, E. R., 1941, *Marriage.*
GROVES, GLADYS H., 1942, *Marriage and Family Life.*
GROVES and BROOKS, 1934, *Readings in the Family.*
HART, HORNELL and ELLA B., 1941, *Personality and the Family.*
MOWRER, HARRIET, 1935, *Personality Adjustment and Domestic Discord.*
PRATT, G. K., 1935, *Three Family Narratives.*
REUTER and RUNNER, 1931, *The Family.*
SHAW, C. R., *The Jack-Roller.*
TAFT, JESSIE, 1933, *The Dynamics of Therapy.*
WALLER, W., 1938, *The Family*, especially pp. 363–379.
WATSON, MAUD E., 1932, *Children and their Parents.*
ZACHRY, CAROLINE B., 1940, *Emotion and Conduct in Adolescence.*

FICTION AND BIOGRAPHY

No adequate bibliography of fiction dealing with family life is possible here, because practically all fiction deals with family life. Certain authors and works, however, have been selected as giving unusually good pictures of family situations and problems. A useful approach to the study of the factual life history is given in John Dollard, 1935, *Criteria for the Life History* (Yale Univ. Press).

The following books contain good lists, selections, or evaluations of fiction, drama, biography, etc., illuminating family life.

AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF SCHOOL ADMINISTRATORS (also the publishers), 1941, *Education for Family Life* (19th Yearbook), pp. 210–220.
BARNETT, J. H., 1939, *Divorce and the American Novel*, Univ. of Penna. or the author, pp. 151–156.
GROVES, E. R., 1934, *The American Family*, Lippincott, pp. 456–459.

ROSENBLATT, LOUISE M., 1938, *Literature as Exploration,* Appleton-Century.*
THURSTON, FLORA, 1932, *A Bibliography of Family Relationships,* National Council of Parent Education. Out of print.
WUNSCH, W. ROBERT, and ALBERS, EDNA, 1939, *Thicker than Water: Stories of Family Life,* Appleton-Century.*

The following is a brief list of fictional and biographic works which have seemed to this author to represent significant, in some cases unusual, experiences, understandings, attitudes, or emotional overtones.

BUCK, PEARL, *The Good Earth.*
CATHER, WILLA, *My Antonia.*
DAY, CLARENCE, *Life with Father.*
DELL, FLOYD, *Homecoming.*
DREISER, THEODORE, *An American Tragedy.*
ELLIS, HAVELOCK, *My Life.*
GLASGOW, ELLEN, *Barren Ground.*
KELLEY, JUDITH, *Marriage Is a Private Affair.*
LAWRENCE, D. H., *Lady Chatterley's Lover.*
——, *The Man Who Died.*
LAWRENCE, JOSEPHINE, *If I Have Four Apples.*
LEWIS, SINCLAIR, *Babbitt.*
LINCOLN, VICTORIA, *February Hill.*
MARQUAND, JOHN P., *H. M. Pulham, Esq.*
MORGAN, CHARLES, *The Fountain.*
MORLEY, CHRISTOPHER, *Thunder on the Left.*
PINKERTON, KATHRENE, *Two Ends to Our Shoestring.*
PRUETTE, LORINE, *Saint in Ivory.*
SPENCER, CLAIRE, *Gallows Orchard.*
STEAD, CHRISTINA, *The Man Who Loved Children.*
STEINBECK, JOHN, *Grapes of Wrath.*
WELLS, H. G., *Experiment in Autobiography.*
WOOLF, VIRGINIA, *A Room of Your Own.*
——, *Mrs. Dalloway.*
WOLFE, THOMAS, *The Web and the Rock.*
WRIGHT, AUSTIN T., *Islandia.*

* Progressive Education Association. Commission on Human Relations series.

Appendix B

JOURNALS AND ORGANIZATIONS

JOURNALS

The following list presents considerable material on the family. By following carefully those marked (*), including their book reviews, digests, news notes, etc., the student may keep abreast of most developments in the field.

American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, 1790 Broadway, New York City, organ of the AMERICAN ORTHOPSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION.

* *American Journal of Sociology*, University of Chicago Press.

* *American Sociological Review*, U. S. Dept. of Agriculture, Washington, D. C., organ of the AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY.

The Child, Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C., organ of the U. S. CHILDREN'S BUREAU, Department of Labor.

* *Child Development*, also *Child Development Abstracts*, National Research Council, Washington, D. C., organs of the SOCIETY FOR RESEARCH IN CHILD DEVELOPMENT.

Eugenical News, 3110 Elm Ave., Baltimore, organ of the AMERICAN EUGENICS SOCIETY, INC., 1790 Broadway, New York City.

* *The Family*, 372 Broadway, Albany, organ of the FAMILY WELFARE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, 122 E. 22nd St., New York City.

* *Family-Community Digest*, Vassar College, Poughkeepsie, N. Y., organ of the NATIONAL COUNCIL OF PARENT EDUCATION, in cooperation with PROGRESSIVE EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, VASSAR SUMMER INSTITUTE, INSTITUTE ON PERSONALITY DEVELOPMENT, and MERRILL-PALMER SCHOOL; replaces *Parent Education* (1934-1938) and *Bulletin of Family Research and Education* (1940-1941).

* *Human Fertility*, Williams and Wilkins Co., Baltimore, an organ of the PLANNED PARENTHOOD FEDERATION OF AMERICA, 501 Madison Ave., New York City; formerly called *Journal of Contraception*.

Journal of Educational Sociology, 26 Washington Place, New York City, editorial office, New York University.

* *Journal of Home Economics*, 620 Mills Bldg., Washington, D. C., organ of the AMERICAN HOME ECONOMICS ASSOCIATION.

* *Journal of Social Hygiene*, 1790 Broadway, New York City, organ of the AMERICAN SOCIAL HYGIENE ASSOCIATION.

* *Journal of Social Psychology*, Provincetown, Mass.

* *Marriage and Family Living*, 1126 E. 59th St., Chicago, organ of the NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON FAMILY RELATIONS.

* *Mental Hygiene*, 372 Broadway, Albany, organ of the NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR MENTAL HYGIENE, 1790 Broadway, New York City.

Rural Sociology, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, organ of the RURAL SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY.

* *Social Forces*, Williams and Wilkins Co., Baltimore, editorial office, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill.
Sociology and Social Research, University of Southern California Press, Los Angeles.
Sociometry, a Journal of Interpersonal Relations, Beacon, N. Y.

OTHER ORGANIZATIONS AND PERIODICALS WHICH ARE CONCERNED WITH FAMILY LIFE AND WHICH OCCASIONALLY PUBLISH MATERIALS

Major Councils

American Council on Education, 744 Jackson Place, Washington, D. C. (*Educational Record*): American Youth Commission, Washington, D. C.; Educational Policies Commission, Washington, D. C. (with National Education Association).
National Research Council, 2101 Constitution Ave., Washington, D. C.
Social Science Research Council, New York City.

Other Associations, Foundations, etc., and the More Relevant of Their Journals

American Academy of Political and Social Science (*Annals of*), Philadelphia.
American Association for Economic Education, Boston.
American Association of University Women, Washington, D. C. (*Journal of*).
American Association for Family Relations, Los Angeles.
American Association for Social Security, New York City.
American Library Association, Chicago.
American Psychiatric Association, New York City (*American Journal of Psychiatry*).
American Psychological Association, Columbus, Ohio (*Psychological Abstracts, Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology* and others).
American Red Cross, Washington, D. C.
Association for Childhood Education, Washington, D. C. (*Childhood Education*).
Association for Family Living, Chicago.
Association for the Study of Personality Development, New York City.
Catholic Conference on Family Life, Washington, D. C. (*Catholic Family Monthly*).
Child Study Association of America, New York City (*Child Study*).
Commonwealth Fund, New York City.
Conference on the Education and Position of Women in a Democracy, Keuka Park, N. Y.
Elizabeth McCormick Memorial Fund, Chicago.
Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America: Committee on Marriage and the Home, New York City.
General Federation of Women's Clubs, Washington, D. C.
Institute for Consumer Education, Columbia, Mo.
Institute of Women's Professional Relations, New London, Conn. (*Women's Work and Education*).
Josiah Macy, Jr., Foundation, New York City.
Maternity Center Association, New York City.
Milbank Memorial Fund, New York City (*Quarterly*).
National Association for Nursery Education, Iowa City.
National Catholic Welfare Conference, Washington, D. C.
National Committee on Maternal Health, New York City.
National Conference of Social Work, Columbus, Ohio (*Proceedings of*).

National Congress of Parents and Teachers, Chicago (*National Parent-Teacher*).
National Council for Mothers and Babies, Washington, D. C.
National Education Association, Washington, D. C.: American Association for School Administrators; National Association of Deans of Women.
National Jewish Welfare Board, New York City.
National Public Housing Conference, New York City.
Population Association of America, Washington, D. C. (*Population Index*).
Progressive Education Association, New York City (*Progressive Education*).
Sage Foundation, New York City.
Scripps Foundation for Population Research, Oxford, Ohio.
Young Men's Christian Association, National Council, New York City.
Young Women's Christian Association, National Board, New York City (*Woman's Press*).
William A. White Psychiatric Foundation, Washington, D. C. (*Psychiatry*).

Federal Government Agencies, Washington, D. C.

U. S. Department of Agriculture: Bureau of Agricultural Economics; Bureau of Home Economics; Extension Service; Farm Security Administration; *Consumers' Guide.*
U. S. Department of Commerce: Bureau of the Census.
U. S. Department of Labor: Bureau of Labor Statistics (*Monthly Labor Review*); Children's Bureau (*The Child*); Women's Bureau.
U. S. Executive Office of the President: National Resources Planning Board; Office of Price Administration.
U. S. Federal Security Agency: National Youth Administration; Office of Education (*School Life*, now *Education for Victory* for duration of war), Public Health Service; Social Security Board (*Social Security Bulletin*).
U. S. Federal Works Administration: Works Progress Administration.
National Housing Agency.

State Agencies

State Departments of Education. Two states have specialized bureaus within these. California: Bureau of Parent Education; New York: Bureau of Child Development and Parent Education. Others promote family education work through other kinds of subdivisions, including home economics.

Other Journals, Professional and Popular

Good Housekeeping, New York City.
Harper's Magazine, New York City.
Journal of Genetic Psychology, Provincetown, Mass.
Journal of Heredity, Baltimore.
Journal of the Social Work Process, Philadelphia.
La famille et nos enfants, Montreal.
Ladies' Home Journal, Philadelphia.
Parents' Magazine, New York City.
School and Society, Lancaster, Pa.
Smith College Studies in Social Work, Northampton, Mass.
Survey, New York City.

Appendix C

PROJECTS FOR RESEARCH AND DISCUSSION

(Unavoidable overlapping of categories is to be expected.)

THE FAMILY IN GENERAL: ITS HISTORY, GEOGRAPHY, AND CHANGES (CHAPTERS I–VII, XIX, XX)

1. An analysis of the family of the ..... culture, according to the pattern used in Chapter I.

2. A statistical study of the degree of resemblance of different family cultures, based upon a true-false or limited-possibilities analysis of the family pattern as given in Chapter I, resembling the Hobhouse, Wheeler, and Ginsberg study.

3. A quantification of certain variables, such as freedom of women, from the data of family systems as analyzed in Chapter I, according to method of Hornell Hart [1931, p. 355]. Study of correlations between them.

4. The impact of modern Euro-American culture upon the family pattern of: Turkey, Persia, India, China, Japan, etc.

5. Study by interview of the ideology of marriage and child-raising, and family life among various social classes and cultural groups in a community.

6. A study of variations in family life as portrayed by regional or "local color" fiction.

7. A study of family changes as revealed by fiction, drama, movies, etc.

8. Studies of participation of families in community life.

9. Evaluation of guidance programs and marriage counseling.

10. An inventory of individual, concrete, family problems, classified and analyzed to show what are the most serious points of conflict and/or ignorance in our present family system and the culture surrounding it. What are the "breakdowns" in our culture? See Plant, 1937, ch. 3.

POPULATION AND EUGENICS (CHAPTER VIII)

11. Studies of motivations among husbands and wives, in various social classes and cultural groups, for starting, timing, and ceasing the production of offspring.

12. Study of personalities of persons who want many children, in comparison with those who want few or none.

PERSONALITY AND THE PARENT-CHILD RELATION (CHAPTERS IX, X, XI)

13. Studies of personalities to see what kinds of traits are most and least likely to change in the course of the life history.

14. Studies of frustration and readjustment life histories of a number of mature persons.

15. Study of personalities of children whose record of easy or difficult birth is available.

16. Comparison of personalities of children as seen in nursery or other school with those as seen in the home.

17. A study of various attempted tests and rating scales for good parenthood and construction of a short measuring instrument with validity.

18. Construction of a measure of personality *individualism* and its correlation with various other personal and social factors.

19. Study of personality differences and types as regards reacting to love frustrations.

20. Psychosexual studies of men along lines of the Landis [1940] study.

21. Collection and analysis of love histories of individuals.

MARRIAGE AND LOVE INTERACTION (CHAPTERS XI, XII, XIII)

22. Sociometric studies of attraction between the sexes, dating, etc., in large primary groups such as college student bodies. Are the patterns of relationship similar to those in one-sex groups? What types of persons are found in what positions in these sociometric patterns?

23. Study of particular pairs from standpoint of relative status of partners in "general desirability in courtship."

24. A study of personal values in relation to mate selection.

25. Sex differences and personality-type differences in love behavior and attitudes.

26. Deep analysis of couples whose success or failure departs widely from that expected from prediction scores.

27. Close-up studies of marital interaction, looking for such things as polarization, spontaneity, secondary annoyances and their roles compared with primary frustrations, relation of marital problem to personality characteristics which appeared as problems apart from marriage.

28. Correlation of marital success with a refined instrument for indicating similarities and differences in personal interests and values.

29. Analysis of a few cases of marital maladjustment on several levels: (*a*) in terms of the values of the two partners regarding life and people in general; (*b*) of their values regarding their own personal roles in life; (*c*) their reactions to frustrations and habits of emotional expression and communication. See whether one of these levels of analysis seems better than others in interpreting the situation, and then combine the three in the light of these findings.

30. Graphic analysis and use of graphic symbols in study of family relationships. [See Lewin 1940 and 1936.]

31. Studies of couples successfully readjusted after serious conflict; inquiry into the effective factors in treatment.

32. A study of talkativeness and talk habits in relation to marital adjustment. Types of talk and their effect upon dominance and love.

33. Studies of conversation and everyday language in family life, by shorthand, participant-observer taking frequent detailed notes, by dictagraph, etc. These might be used to show how attitudes and mores are actually transmitted to children, how quarrels begin and cease, etc.

34. Analysis of cases of marital frustration and conflict in terms of Horney's neurotic concepts.

35. Social class differences in the process of marital conflict.

36. A study of initiatory and "holding factors" in love relationships.

37. Inventory of typical dilemmas and conflicts in love and marriage; inquiry as to frequency of each.

38. Study of love triangle situations.

39. The psychodrama as a means of solving marital conflicts.

MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, COURTSHIP, AND SEX IN TERMS OF SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND CONTROL (CHAPTERS XIV, XV, XVI)

40. Comparison of random samples of bachelors with spinsters of forty years of age.

41. More refined studies of effective sex ratios among different groups or "sets" within which marriage meets a low level of resistance.

42. Study of remarriages. How do second spouses differ from first? Compare success of second with first.

43. More refined studies of divorce differential between different classes, occupations, groups.

44. Studies of divorce and remarriage among groups reported to have highly unstable marriages, such as actors, the movie colony, etc.

45. A comparison of divorce rates of the upper, middle, and lower (to be defined) social classes as between high and low divorce states, to see whether upper class has less variation, etc.

46. A study of current popular opinions about marriage, divorce, courtship, and their control.

47. Correlation of divorce and marital unhappiness with other indexes of personal disorganization, such as crimes, accidents, litigation, etc.

48. Studies of media and situations through which acquaintance with opposite sex and love are developed.

49. A study of trends in co-recreation of the sexes.

50. Design of a record form for "dating bureaus."

51. A more intimate study of sex and love mores by interviews and by listening to conversations.

52. Recent activities in the suppression of sex education and birth control information.

53. Study of effects of war upon family life, courtship, sex, and marriage.

THE HOME, WORK, PLAY, AND ROLES OF THE SEXES (CHAPTERS XVII, XVIII)

54. Studies of needs and functions in regard to housing, rooms, equipment.

55. New types, experiments, and inventions in the housing field.

56. Types of local housing; comparison of functional adequacy on some level of cost.

57. Study of the effects of rehousing and housing projects upon women's employment, inter-family cooperation, etc.

58. Studies of food habits and resistances to scientific diet.

59. Compare a sample of families in which husband earns all the income and a matched sample of same total income, of which a substantial part comes from wife's own property. Family patterns of expenditure should especially be compared.

60. Analyses of family expenditures in terms of "the cost of being in a hurry," "the indirect cost of a professional or creative occupation," etc.

61. Psychological studies of various standards of living; motivations for different types of expenditure.

62. Study of the effect of curtailed use of the automobile upon family life.

63. Construction of a "homemaker's intelligence test."

64. Time studies of housework or of the "mechanics of living."

65. A study of personality types in relation to housework, tasks which one prefers to delegate and to assume oneself, etc.

66. Detailed time-cost analyses of homemaking processes and different patterns of homemaking.

67. The application of science to clothing and resistances thereto.

68. Study of personality types with reference to the use of leisure.

69. Study of women who have been successful in maintaining a high level of intellectual or other specialized interest while raising children.

70. Study of women who have shifted from homemaking to outside job, and vice versa: motives, experiences, results.

71. Study of small community business enterprises run by married women.

72. A design for continuous study and mental development for a woman during child-bearing years.

73. Study of various types of housing and homemaking in which some functions are collectivized.

74. Study of cooperative living projects actually in operation.

GENERAL TYPES OF PROJECTS FOR STUDENT RESEARCH

75. Study of one's own personality; life history.

76. Study of one's own community as regards agencies serving the family, and family-community relations.

77. Intensive study of some one local institution or agency, such as family welfare society, planned parenthood league and clinic, nursery school, "dating bureau," housing project.

78. Study of available data on alumni of institution.

79. Verbatim records of family conversations and interactions.

80. Construction of family budgets, time schedules, and other plans.

A FEW TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION

81. In marriage and other close personal relations we often say: "A. drove B. into [this behavior]." Yet in other situations we would say, "B. had the freedom to do as he thought best and was under no legal or social compulsion to respond to A.'s pressure; therefore, B. is responsible." How can we define "pressure," "coercion," and so on, so as to interpret personal behavior consistently and objectively? Is the concept of "blame" responsible for these confusions?

82. One theory of marital adjustment is that the "stronger" partner should be mainly responsible. If he accepts this responsibility in full and for a prolonged period, will he remain "strong"?

83. What kinds of adults get along best with children?

84. What features of present conflict between parents and adolescents are common to all generations and what are peculiar to the present stage of social change?

85. What are the criteria we use in deciding, "Is it love?"

86. What is the optimum interval between successive rendezvous at different stages of courtship?

87. What do we really wish to get out of the home? What would be the physical characteristics of such a home?

88. What would be some practical methods of cutting a standard of living to meet reduced income?

89. To what extent is the "nervous housewife" a personality phenomenon which might be cured by psychoanalysis or other individual treatment? To what extent is it a general social maladjustment?

90. How can recreational activities be organized so as to enrich family life and affection?

Appendix D

BIBLIOGRAPHY

ABBREVIATIONS FOR JOURNALS

AJO	*American Journal of Orthopsychiatry*
AJS	*American Journal of Sociology*
Annals	*Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*
ASR	*American Sociological Review*
BFRE	*Bulletin of Family Research and Education*
HF	*Human Fertility*
JASP	*Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*
JHE	*Journal of Home Economics*
JSH	*Journal of Social Hygiene*
JSP	*Journal of Social Psychology*
MFL	*Marriage and Family Living*
MH	*Mental Hygiene*
RS	*Rural Sociology*
SF	*Social Forces*

All publishers are in New York City except Houghton Mifflin (Boston), Lippincott (Philadelphia), Little, Brown (Boston), Government Printing Office (Washington), the university presses, and others as specified.

Each item is listed only once, under its senior (or first mentioned) author. *For junior authors,* see pages 727–731.

Some books first published long ago are listed with dates of recent and available editions.

When an author published several items in the same year, these are distinguished arbitrarily by using "A," "B," the year number without a letter, etc. Because of late or deleted entries, no consistency of form is to be expected here, except that the precise symbol in text refers to same symbol in bibliography. Joint works are sometimes referred to in text by giving the two names without the date. In this case a number in the bracketed reference in text refers to a page.

When an author appears as a senior joint author, all such items are placed after all items of which he is the single author.

BOOKS WITH GOOD BIBLIOGRAPHIES

(For further identifying data see below.)

AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF SCHOOL ADMINISTRATORS, 1941, *Education for Family Life.*

AMERICAN HOME ECONOMICS ASSOCIATION, 1938, *An Annotated List of Simplified Materials in Parent Education.*

BERNARD, 1942, *American Family Behavior.*

FOLSOM, 1941, *Youth, Family, and Education.*
FURBAY, 1942, *Workbook Manual for Marriage and the Family.*
KOMAROVSKY, 1940, in *American Sociological Review,* 5:558–565.
MERRILL and ELLIOTT, 1941, *Social Disorganization.*
MURPHY *et al.,* 1937, *Experimental Social Psychology.*
YOUNG, 1940, *Personality and the Problems of Adjustment.*

• • •

ADAMS, CHARLOTTE, 1942, *The Run of the House,* Macmillan.
ADAMS, ROMANZO, 1937, *Interracial Marriage in Hawaii: A Study of the Mutually Conditioned Processes of Amalgamation,* Macmillan. London:
ALBERTI, SALVATORE, 1934, *La Mortalità Antenatale,* Milan.
ALBRECHT, HANS, 1930, "Prostitution un Bordellwesen in Hamburg." *Monatsschr. f. Kriminalpsychol. u. Strafrechtsreform,* 21:628–630.
ALDRICH, CHARLES A., and MARY M. ALDRICH, 1938, *Babies Are Human Beings.* London: Black.
ALLEE, W. B., 1938, *The Social Life of Animals,* London: Heinemann.
ALLPORT, FLOYD W., 1924, *Social Psychology,* London: Amer. Bk.
——, 1937, *Personality, a Psychological Interpretation,* Holt.
ALLPORT, GORDON W., and PHILIP E. VERNON, 1931, *A Study of Values, A Scale for Measuring the Dominant Interests in Personality: Manual of Directions,* London: Constable.
ALSCHULER, ROSE, 1937, *Two to Six,* Morrow (revised).
ALVERDES, F., 1927, *Social Life in the Animal World,* Kegan, Paul, Trench, Trubner (London).
AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE, 1940, "Children in a Depression Decade," *Annals,* Vol. 212.
AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF SCHOOL ADMINISTRATORS, 1941, *Education for Family Life,* 19th Yearbook.
AMERICAN COUNCIL ON EDUCATION, 1940, *What the High School Ought to Teach* (Washington, D. C.).
ANDERSON, C. ARNOLD, 1938, "Our Present Knowledge of Assortative Mating," RS 3:296–302.
ANDERSON, NELS, 1923, *The Hobo,* University of Chicago.
——, 1937, "The Mormon Family," ASR, 2:601–608.
ANDERSON, W. A., 1939, *The Composition of Rural Households,* Cornell University Agricultural Experiment Station, Bul. 713.
ANDREWS, BENJAMIN R., 1931, "Money in Parent-Child Relationships," *The Home and the Child,* White House Conference on Child Health and Protection, Century.
——, 1935, *Economics of the Household,* Macmillan (rev. ed.), London.
ANGELL, ROBERT C., 1936, *The Family Encounters the Depression,* Scribner's.
ANONYMOUS, 1939, "Lady in the Shoe," *Harper's* (November). A case study of a woman who was employed and then returned to the home.
ARENSBURG, CONRAD M., and SOLON T. KIMBALL, 1941, *Family and Community in Ireland,* Harvard University.
ARONOVICI, CAROL, 1939, *Housing the Masses,* Wiley.
ARONOVICI, CAROL, and ELIZABETH MCCALMONT, 1936, *Catching up with Housing,* Beneficial Management Corp., Newark, N. J.

BABCOCK, RUSSELL B., 1936, "A Seventh Grade Course in Sex Education," *Progressive Education* (May), 374–382.

BABER, RAY E., 1936, "Some Mate Selection Standards of College Students and Their Parents." Reprint from *JSH*.

——, 1937, "A Study of 325 Mixed Marriages," *ASR*, 2:705–716.

——, 1939, *Marriage and the Family*, McGraw-Hill.

BABER, RAY E., and EDWARD A. ROSS, 1924, *Changes in the Size of American Families in One Generation*, University of Wisconsin Studies in the Social Sciences.

BAILEY, GRACE, and NILES CARPENTER, 1939, "Marriage and Economic Fluctuations in Buffalo, 1921–1938," University of Buffalo Bureau of Business Research, Statistical Survey 14:No. 5A.

BAIN, READ, 1935, "Our Schizoid Culture," *Sociology and Social Research*, 3:266–276.

BANNING, MARGARET CULKIN, 1935, "They Raise Their Hats," *Harper's* (August).

BARNARD, FLORENCE, 1930, "Money Management in the School Curriculum," *JHE* (January), 22:21–24.

BARNES, HARRY ELMER, 1925, *Psychology and History*, London: Appleton.

BARNETT, JAMES H., 1939, *Divorce and the American Divorce Novel, 1850–1937*, University of Pennsylvania.

BARNOUW, A. J., 1932, "The Differential Birth Rate in Holland," *Birth Control Review*, 16 81–82.

BARR, FRANK E., 1918, "A Scale for Measuring Ability in Vocations and Some of Its Applications." Master's thesis, Leland Stanford.

BARTLETT, GEORGE A., 1931, *Men, Women, and Conflict*, Putnam's.

BARUCH, DOROTHY WALTER, 1939, *Parents and Children Go to School, Adventuring in Nursery School and Kindergarten*, Scott, Foresman.

BASSETT, MARION (LUITWEILER), 1940, "One Hundred and Twenty-Eight Mothers Consider Our Family Pattern," *Bulletin of Family Research and Education*, Vol. 1 (November-December), 6–22.

BATESON, GREGORY, 1942, "National Character," *Yearbook of the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues*.

BAUER, CATHERINE, 1934, *Modern Housing*, London: Allen & Unwin.

BAUM, MARIE, 1930, "Uber das von einer Familie täglich zu leistende Arbeitspensum und den Rhythmus des Familienlebens," *Arch. f. Sozialwissensch. u. Sozialpol.*, 64:595–615.

——, 1932, "Family Life as a Social Institution," *Family* (April).

BAXTER, CELENA A., 1933, "Sicilian Family Life," *Family*, 14:82–87.

BECKER, HOWARD, 1932, "Processes of Secularization," *Sociological Review* (British), 24:138–154, 266–286.

BEEBE, GILBERT W., and CLARENCE J. GAMBLE, 1938, "The Effect of Contraception upon Human Fertility," *Human Biology*, 10.372–387.

BEERS, HOWARD W., 1937, "A Portrait of the Farm Family in Central New York State," *ASR*, 2:591–600.

BELANE, GEORGE, 1934, A, "Faculty Wives," *Harper's* (March).

——, 1934, B, "Faculty Husbands," *Harper's* (April).

BELL, HOWARD M., 1938, *Youth Tell Their Story*, American Council on Education (Washington, D.C.).

BENEDICT, RUTH, 1932, "Configurations of Culture in North America," *American Anthropology*, 34:1–27.

BENEDICT, RUTH, 1934, *Patterns of Culture*, London: Routledge.
BENOIT-SMULLYAN, ÉMILE, 1941, "Psychological Limits to Cultural Variation." Paper presented before Eastern Sociological Society, 1941. To be published.
BENTHAM, JEREMY, 1821, *Liberty of the People.*
BERGER, MEYER, 1938, "Profiles: Bearded Cupid," *The New Yorker* (June 11).
BERNARD, JESSIE, 1933, "The Distribution of Success in Marriage," *AJS*, 39:194–203.
——, 1934, "Factors in the Distribution of Success in Marriage," *AJS*, 40:49–60.
——, 1935, "Some Biological Factors in Personality and Marriage," *Human Biology*, 7:430–436.
——, 1940, "The Differential Influence of the Business Cycle on the Number of Marriages in Several Age Groupings," *Social Forces*, 18:539–549.
——, 1942, *American Family Behavior*, Harper.
BERRY, G. H., 1929, "Mothers in Industry." *Annals*, 143:315–323.
BIGELOW, HOWARD F., 1936, *Family Finance*, Lippincott (Philadelphia).
BIGELOW, MAURICE, 1936, *Sex Education*, American Social Hygiene Association, New York.
BINKLEY, R. C., and F. W. BINKLEY, 1929, *What Is Right with Marriage*, Appleton.
BLACK, CLEMENTINA, 1918, *A New Way of Housekeeping*, W. Collins' Sons (London).
BLANCHARD, PHYLLIS, and CAROLYN MANASSES, 1930, *New Girls for Old*, Macaulay.
BLANSHARD, PAUL, 1929, "How to Live on Forty-Six Cents a Day," *Nation*, 128:580–581.
BLOS, PETER, 1940. *The Adolescent Personality*, Appleton-Century.
BLUM, LEON, 1937, *Marriage*, London: Jarrolds.
BOGGESS, VIRGINIA, 1936, "Some Factors Accounting for the Variation in the Social Adjustment of Children Living in a Tenement Area," *Smith College Studies in Social Work*, 6:324–359.
BOHANNON, E. W., 1898, "The Only Child in a Family," *Pedagogical Seminary*, 5:475–496.
BONAPART, JOSEPH, 1930, "Reciprocal Attitudes of Parents and Adolescent Children where These Children Are Being Cared for Away from Home," *Proceedings of National Conference of Social Work.*
BOONE, GLADYS, 1937, *Household Employment—Lynchburg Study, 1936–1937*, Y.W.C.A., Lynchburg, Va.
BORSODI, RALPH, 1933, A, *This Ugly Civilization*, Harper.
——, 1933, B, *Flight from the City: The Study of a New Way to Family Security*, Harper, London.
BOSANQUET, HELEN, 1915, *The Family*, Macmillan.
BOSSARD, JAMES H. S., 1932, "Residential Propinquity as a Factor in Marriage Selection," *AJS*, 38:219–224.
——, 1933, "The Age Factor in Marriage," *AJS*, 38:536–547.
——, 1937, "Depression and Pre-Depression Marriage Rates: A Philadelphia Study," *ASR*, 2:686–695.
——, 1938, "Ecological Areas and Marriage Rates," *AJS*, 44:70–85.
——, 1938, B, *Social Change and Social Problems*, revised, Harper, London.
——, 1939, "Nationality and Nativity Factors in Marriage," *ASR*, 4:792–798.
——, 1940, *Marriage and the Child*, University of Pennsylvania.
——, 1941, "War and the Family," *ASR*, 6:330–344.
BOSSARD, JAMES H. S., and THELMA DILLON, 1935, "The Spatial Distribution of Divorced Women—A Philadelphia Study," *AJS*, 40:503–507.

BRANDT, LILLIAN, 1905, *Five Hundred and Seventy-four Deserters and Their Families,* Charity Organization Society, New York.

BRECKINRIDGE, SOPHONISBA P., 1925, "The Family and the Law," *JSH,* 11:385–395.

——, 1933, "The Activities of Women Outside the Home," *Recent Social Trends,* Chapter 14, McGraw-Hill.

——, 1934, *The Family and the State,* University of Chicago.

BRECKINRIDGE, SOPHONISBA P., and EDITH ABBOTT, 1912, *The Delinquent Child and the Home,* Russell Sage Foundation, New York.

BREEN, MARY J., 1936, *Partners in Play,* Barnes.

BRIDGMAN, RALPH P., 1932, "Guidance for Marriage and Family Life," *Annals,* 160:144–164. See also *Social Work Yearbook,* 1933.

——, 1937, "Parent Education," in *Social Work Yearbook,* Russell Sage Foundation, New York.

BRIFFAULT, ROBERT, 1927, *The Mothers,* Macmillan, 3 vols., London.

——, 1931, *The Mothers.* Macmillan, 1 vol. (condensed).

BROMLEY, DOROTHY DUNBAR, 1933, article in *New York Times Magazine,* December 10, 1933, VI, p. 10.

——, 1934, *Birth Control, Its Use and Misuse,* Harper.

BROMLEY, DOROTHY DUNBAR, and FLORENCE HAXTON BRITTEN, 1938, *Youth and Sex: A Study of 1300 College Students,* Harper.

BRUNK, CHRISTINE, *et al.,* 1932, "Studies in Maternal Overprotection and Rejection," *Smith College Studies in Social Work,* 2:181–282.

BRUNO, FRANK J., 1930, "What about the Taboo in the Program of Sex Education?" *JSH,* 16:520–524.

BUCK, PEARL, 1941, *Of Men and Women,* Day.

BURGESS, ERNEST W., 1926, A, "The Growth of the Romantic Impulse," in Edward B. Reuter and Jessie R. Runner, *The Family,* p. 116.

——, 1926, B, "The Sociological Approach," in Edward B. Reuter and Jessie R. Runner, *The Family,* p. 49.

——, 1927, "The Family and the Person," *Publ. American Sociological Society,* 22:133–143.

BURGESS, ERNEST W., and LEONARD S. COTTRELL, JR., 1939, *Predicting Success or Failure in Marriage,* Prentice-Hall.

BURGESS, J. S., undated (1939 or later), *A Joint Course on Marriage and Family Relationships,* Temple University (Philadelphia).

BURKS, BARBARA S., 1940, "Review (of Three Iowa Studies)," *JASP,* 35:457–462. Reviewed in *BFRE,* 1 (November-December, 1940), 31 *ff.*

BURNHAM, WILLIAM H., 1924, *The Normal Mind,* Appleton, pp. 61–62.

BUTTERFIELD, OLIVER M., 1939, *Love Problems of Adolescence,* Emerson Books.

CABOT, HUGH, M.D., 1940, *The Patient's Dilemma, the Quest for Medical Security in America,* Reynal and Hitchcock.

CAHEN, ALFRED, *Statistical Analysis of American Divorce,* Columbia University.

CALHOUN, ARTHUR W., 1917, *A Social History of the American Family from Colonial Times to the Present,* Clark (Cleveland), 3 vols.

——, 1932, "The Early American Family," *Annals,* 160:7–12.

CALVERTON, V. F., 1926, *Sex Expression in Literature.* Boni.

——, 1928, *The Bankruptcy of Marriage,* London: J. Hamilton.

——, 1931, "The Compulsive Basis of Social Thought," *AJS,* 36:689–720.

CALVERTON, V. F., 1941, *Where Angels Dared to Tread,* Bobbs-Merrill.

CALVERTON, V. F., and S. D. SCHMALHAUSEN (eds), 1929, *Sex in Civilization,* London: Allen & Unwin.

CAMPBELL, MARIAN, 1932, "The Effect of the Broken Home Upon the Child in School," *Journal of Educational Sociology,* 5:274–281.

CANBY, HENRY SEIDEL, 1934, A, "Life in the Nineties: Home and Parents," *Harper's* (August).

——, 1934, B, "Sex and Marriage in the Nineties," *Harper's* (September).

CARDEN, MARIE, 1941, "Organization of Family Consultation Centers." Master's thesis, Boston University.

CARLIER, EDMOND, 1867, *Marriage in the United States.*

CARLSON, A. J., 1916, "Control of Hunger in Health and Disease," University of Chicago.

CARPENTER, C. R., 1934, "A Field Study of the Behavior and Social Relations of Howling Monkeys," *Comparative Psychology Monthly,* Vol. 10, No. 2 (May).

CARPENTER, NILES, 1927, "Immigrants and Their Children," Census Monograph 7.

CARR, LOWELL J., 1932, "Disaster and the Sequence-Pattern Concept of Social Change," *AJS,* 38:207–218.

CARR-SAUNDERS, ALEXANDER M., 1922, *The Population Problem,* Clarendon Press (Oxford).

——, 1927, in *Economic Journal* (December).

CARY, WILLIAM H., 1932, "Some Facts about Sterility," *Birth Control Review,* 16:73–76.

CATTELL, J. MCKEEN, 1917, "Families of American Men of Science," *Science Monthly,* 4:252–257.

CAVAN, RUTH SHONLE, and KATHERINE HOWLAND RANCK, 1938, *The Family and the Depression,* University of Chicago.

CHADDOCK, ROBERT E., 1937, "Methods of Estimating Proportional Frequencies of Divorce," *ASR,* 2:398–405.

CHAMBERLAIN, WILLIAM H., 1930, *Soviet Russia,* London: Duckworth.

CHAPIN, F. STUART, 1933, *The Measurement of Social Status,* University of Minnesota.

——, 1935, *Contemporary American Institutions,* Harper.

——, 1940, "An Experiment on the Social Effects of Good Housing," *ASR,* 5:868–879. Reviewed in *BFRE,* 1 (November-December, 1940), 28.

CHARLES, ENID, 1934, *The Twilight of Parenthood,* Norton.

CHARTERS, W.W. (ed.), 1933, *Motion Pictures and Youth, Payne Fund Studies,* Macmillan.

CHASSELL, JOSEPH O., 1928, *The Experience Variables,* published by author at Rochester, N. Y.

CHESTERTON, G. K., 1910, *What's Wrong with the World?* Dodd, Mead.

CHEVALIER, MICHAEL, 1839, *Society, Manners, and Politics in the United States,* translated from the third Paris edition, Weeks, Jordon (Boston).

CHILDERS, A. T., and B. M. HAMIL, 1932, "Emotional Problems in Children as Related to the Duration of Breast Feeding in Infancy," *American Journal of Orthopsychiatry,* 2.134–142.

CLARK, MARJORIE R., 1931, "Organized Labor and the Family-allowance System in France," *Journal of Political Economy,* 39:526–537.

CLARKE, CHARLES W., MARIE DI MARIO, and MARY S EDWARDS, 1941, "How Many People Have Syphilis?" *JSH,* 27.269–276.

CLARKE, HELEN, 1939, "Sweden *vs.* Our Shadowed Land," *JSH,* 25:221–225.

CLARKE, HELEN I., 1940, *Social Legislation: American Laws Dealing with Family, Child, and Dependent,* Appleton-Century.

CLAUDEL, PAUL, 1928, "The Soul of Japan," *Dial,* 85:363.

COIGNARD, JOHN, 1937, *The Spectacle of a Man,* Jefferson House.

COIT, ELEANOR, and ELSIE HARPER, 1930, "Why Married Women Work," *Survey,* 64:79–80.

COMMONWEALTH FUND, 1932 (and later editions), *Directory of Psychiatric Clinics in the United States.*

COTTRELL, LEONARD S., JR., 1933, "Roles and Marital Adjustment," *Publ. American Sociological Society,* 27:107–115.

——, 1937, "Research in Causes of Variations in Fertility," *ASR,* 2:678–685.

——, 1938, "Research Note on Differential Fertility with Respect to Birth Order," *JSP,* 9:49–56.

COX, HAROLD, 1923, *The Problem of Population,* London: J. Cape.

COX, OLIVER C., 1940, "Sex Ratio and Marital Status among Negroes," *ASR,* 5:937–947. Reviewed in *BFRE,* 1 (November-December), 27.

CUBER, JOHN F., and BETTY PELL, 1941, "A Method for Studying Moral Judgments Relating to the Family," *AJS,* 47:12–23.

CUNNINGHAM, BESS V., 1936, *Family Behavior: A Study of Human Relations,* Saunders (Philadelphia).

DANIEL, G., 1931, "Zum Sexualproblem im Strafvollzug," *Monatsschr. f. Kriminalphychol. u. Strafrechtsreform,* 22:422–423.

DAVID-SCHWARTZ, H., 1931, "Kantönligeist als Ursache eines Typisch Schweizerischen Ehekonfliktes," *Psychol. Rundschau,* 2:311–314.

DAVIE, MAURICE R., and RUBY JO REEVES, 1939, "Propinquity of Residence before Marriage," *AJS,* 44:510–525.

DAVIS, ALLISON, 1941, "American Status Systems and the Socialization of the Child," *ASR,* 6:345–356.

DAVIS, ALLISON, and JOHN DOLLARD, 1940, *Children of Bondage, The Personality Development of Negro Youth in the Urban South,* American Council on Education (Washington, D.C.).

DAVIS, KATHERINE B., 1929, *Sex Factors in the Life of Twenty-two Hundred Women,* Harper, London.

DAVIS, KINGSLEY, 1936, A, "The Application of Science to Personal Relations," *ASR* (April).

——, 1936, B, "Jealousy and Sexual Property," *Social Forces,* 14:395–405.

——, 1937, A, "Reproductive Institutions and the Pressure for Population," *Sociological Review,* 29· No. 3 (July).

——, 1937, B, "The Sociology of Prostitution," *ASR,* 2:753.

——, 1939, A, "The Forms of Illegitimacy," *Social Forces,* 18:77–89.

——, 1939, B, "Illegitimacy and the Social Structure," *AJS,* 45:215–233.

——, 1940, A, "Extreme Social Isolation in a Child," *AJS,* 45:554–565. Reviewed in *BFRE,* 1 (April), 17–18.

——, 1940, B, "The Sociology of Parent-Youth Conflict," *ASR,* 5:523–535.

DAVIS, KINGSLEY, and W. LLOYD WARNER, 1937, "Structural Analysis of Kinship," *American Anthropologist,* 39:291–313.

DAVIS, MARY DABNEY, 1942, "National Association for Nursery Education, Ninth Biennial Conference." *School Life,* 27:113 (January).

DAVIS, MURIEL, and JOSEPH K. FOLSOM, 1933, "Similarities of Attitude among Engaged Couples." Unpublished study at Vassar College.

DAWSON, C. A., and W. E. GETTYS, 1935, *Introduction to Sociology* (rev. ed.), Ronald.

DAYTON, NEIL A., 1929, "Intelligence and Size of Family," *Journal of Heredity* (August), 370.

——, 1930, "Size of Family and Birth Order in Mental Disease," Publ. American Sociological Society, 24:123–137.

DEARDORFF, NEVA R., 1927, "A Puzzle in Cross Words," from *Survey*, 59:288–290, in Edward B. Reuter, and Jessie R. Runner, *The Family*, p. 503, headed "The Economic Type of Tension."

DELL, FLOYD, 1930, *Love in the Machine Age*, Farrar and Rinehart.

——, 1933, *Homecoming*, Farrar and Rinehart.

DENNISON, CHARLES PUGH, 1940, "Parenthood Attitudes of College Men," *Eugenical News*, 25:65–69. Reviewed in *BFRE*, 2 (April-June, 1941), 19–20.

DEPORTE, J. V., 1931, "Marriages in the State of New York with Special Reference to Nativity," *Human Biology*, 3:376–396.

DE ROUGEMONT, DENIS, 1940, *Love in the Western World*, Harcourt, Brace.

DE SCHWEINITZ, KARL, 1928, *Growing Up*, Macmillan.

DETOCQUEVILLE, ALEXIS, 1898, *Democracy in America*, Century.

DEVEREUX, GEORGE, 1941, A, "Social Structure and the Economy of Affective Bonds," paper before Eastern Sociological Society.

——, 1941, B, "Mohave Beliefs Concerning Twins," *American Anthropologist*, 43:573–592.

DEWEES, L., and G. W. BEEBE, 1938, "Contraception in Private Practice," *Journal of American Medical Association*, 110:1169–1172.

DICKENS, CHARLES. *David Copperfield*, Harvard Classics, Collier (New York), 1917. 2 vols.

DICKINSON, ROBERT L., 1942, "Today's Mothers and Tomorrow's Children," *Survey Midmonthly*, January, 1942, p. 11.

DICKINSON, ROBERT L., and LURA BEAM, 1931, *A Thousand Marriages*, London: Bailliere.

DIKE, SAMUEL W., 1889, "Statistics of Marriage and Divorce," *Quarterly Publ. American Statistical Association*, pp. 206–214.

DOLLARD, JOHN, 1935, *Criteria for the Life History*, London: Oxford.

DONHAM, S. AGNES, 1933. *Spending the Family Income* (rev. ed.). Little, Brown (Boston). (First ed. 1921.)

DORN, HAROLD F., 1940, "Changes in Infant and Child Mortality Rates," *Annals*, 212:32–37.

DOUGLAS, PAUL, 1925, *Wages and the Family*, University of Chicago.

DOWNEY, JUNE, 1923, *The Will-Temperament and its Testing*, London: Harrap.

DOWNING, ELEANOR, 1933, "Marriage and Sex Ratios in 19 Selected Cities of 30,000 to 70,000 Population in 1930." Unpublished study, Vassar College.

DREIS, THELMA, A., compiler, 1936. *A Handbook of Social Statistics of New Haven, Conn.*, London: Oxford

DRUMMOND, ISABEL, 1931, *Getting a Divorce*, Knopf.

DUBLIN, LOUIS I., 1931, "Birth Control—What It Is Doing to America's Population," *Forum and Century*, 68:270–275.

—— (ed.), "The American People: Studies in Population," 1936, *Annals*, Vol. 188.

EARLE, ALICE M., 1893, *Customs and Fashions in Old New England,* Scribner's.
——, 1899, *Child Life in Colonial Days,* Macmillan. See p. 191.
EAST, EDWARD M., 1923, *Mankind at the Crossroads,* London: Scribner's. See p. 69.
EAST, EDWARD M., and D. F. JONES, 1919, *Inbreeding and Outbreeding,* Monographs on Experimental Biology.
EDIN, KARL A., 1929, "The Birth Rate Changes, Stockholm Upper Classes More Fertile than Lower," *Eugenics Review,* 20:258–266.
EDIN, KARL A., and EDWARD P. HUTCHINSON, 1935, *Studies of Differential Fertility in Sweden,* P. S. King (London). Distributed by Population Association of America.
EDWARDS, ALBA M., 1938, *A Social-Economic Grouping of the Gainful Workers of the United States,* U. S. Bureau of the Census, Government Printing Office.
ELIOT, THOMAS D., 1932, A, "The Bereaved Family," *Annals of American Academy of Political and Social Science,* 160:184–190.
——, 1932, B, "Why Family Harmony?" *Mental Hygiene,* 16:85–100.
ELLIOTT, GRACE L., 1936, *Women after Forty.* Holt.
ELLIOTT, MABEL A., and FRANCIS E. MERRILL, 1934, *Social Disorganization,* Harper, pp. 180–181. For revised edition see Merrill.
ELLIS, HAVELOCK, 1923, *The Dance of Life,* London: Constable
——, 1939, *My Life,* London: Lane.
ELMER, MANUEL. 1932, *The Family and Social Change,* Long and Smith. See pp. 155–157.
ELNETT, ELAINE, 1926, *Historic Origin and Social Development of Family Life in Russia,* Columbia University.
ELY, RICHARD, 1920, foreword to *Mortgages on Homes,* Census Monograph 2.
ENGEL, ERNST, 1895, "Die Lebenkosten Belgischer Arbeiterfamilien früher und jetzt," *Bull. Instit. Internatl. Statis.,* 9:1–124.
EPSTEIN, ABRAHAM, 1928, *The Challenge of the Aged,* Vanguard.
ERNST, MORRIS L., 1932, "How We Nullify," *Nation,* 134:113–114.

FAIRCHILD, HENRY P., 1934, B, "But You Can't Have Both," *Harper's,* 168:438–447.
——, 1939, *People: The Quantity and Quality of Population,* Holt.
——, 1940, "Race Building in a Democracy," *Living Age* (March).
FAIRCHILD, MILDRED, 1937, "The Status of the Family in the Soviet Union Today," *ASR,* 2:619–629.
FAMILY WELFARE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, 1935, *Family Consultation and Family Case Work.*
FEDERAL COUNCIL OF CHURCHES OF CHRIST IN AMERICA, 1938, *Moral Aspects of Birth Control.*
FENTON, M., 1928, "The Only Child," *Journal of Genetic Psychology,* 35:546–556.
FIELD, ALICE, 1932, *Protection of Women and Children in Soviet Russia,* London: Gollancz.
FISHER, DOROTHY CANFIELD, 1935, "Family Problems—New and Old Vanishing Folkways Lead to Modern Schools," *Journal of American Association of University Women* (June).
FLANAGAN, JOHN C., "Family Planning among Professional Men," *Birth Control Review* (January, 1939), 155.
FLECK, STEPHEN, ELIZABETH F. SNEDEKER, and JOHN ROCK, 1940, "The Contraceptive Safe Period," *New England Journal of Medicine,* 223:1005–1009.
FLÜGEL, J. C., 1926, *A Psychoanalytic Study of the Family,* Wolff (London).

FOLSOM, JOSEPH K., 1928, *Culture and Social Progress*, London: Longmans, Green.
—, 1931, *Social Psychology*, Harper, London.
—, 1934, *The Family: Its Sociology and Social Psychiatry*, London: Chapman & Hall.
—, 1937, "Changing Values in Sex and Family Relations," *ASR*, 2:717–726.
—, (ed.), 1938, A, *Plan for Marriage: An Intelligent Approach to Marriage and Parenthood*, Harper, London.
—, 1938, B, "Human Conservation and the Family," *Plan Age*, 4:10, pp. 261–278.
—, 1938, C, *Adjustment in Marriage*, U. S. Department of Agriculture Graduate School, Washington, D.C.
—, 1939, "Home-Management and Self-Management," *Journal of Home Economics*, 31:519–523.
—, 1940, A, "The Changing Role of the Family," *Annals*, 212:64–71.
—, 1940, B, "Old Age as a Sociological Problem," *AJO*, 10:30–38.
—, 1941, *Youth, Family, and Education*, American Council on Education (Washington, D.C.).
FOLSOM, JOSEPH K., and C. MARGARET MORGAN, 1937, "The Social Adjustment of 381 Recipients of Old Age Allowances," *ASR*, 2:223–229.
FORD, CLELLAN S., 1938, "The Role of a Fijian Chief," *ASR*, 3:541–550.
FORTUNE, REO F., 1941, "Social Forms and their Biological Basis" (Communications), *ASR*, 6:571 and 725. Fuller statement kindly furnished to author by letter.
Fortune Quarterly Survey, 1937, X (October). See p. 21.
FOSDICK, HARRY EMERSON, 1923, *Twelve Tests of Character*. London: Eng. U.P.
FOSTER, JOSEPHINE, and JOHN E. ANDERSON, 1930, *The Young Child and His Parents*, University of Minnesota.
FOSTER, ROBERT G., 1933, "A National Survey of Family Consultation Centers," *Journal of Social Hygiene*, 19:355–366.
—, 1937, "Servicing the Family through Counselling Agencies," *ASR*, 2:771–778.
—, 1942, "Education and Women's Needs," *Educational Record*, 23:106–115.
FOSTER, ROBERT G., and WILSON PAULINE P., 1942. *Women after College, A Study of the Effectiveness of Their Education*. Columbia University Press.
FOSTER, S., 1927, "A Study of the Personality Make-up and Social Setting of Fifty Jealous Children," *MH*, 11:53–77.
FRANK, LAWRENCE K., 1932, "Social Change and the Family," *Annals*, 160:94–102
—, 1933, "Childhood and Youth," in *Recent Social Trends*, Chapter 15, McGraw Hill, p. 757.
—, 1936, "Society as the Patient," *AJS*, 42:335–344.
—, 1938, B, "The Philosophy of Home Management," Seventh International Management Congress (Washington, D.C.).
—, 1938, C, "Towards a Re-Orientation of the Birth Control Movement." Paper presented at Conference on Eugenics and Birth Control, American Eugenics Society (New York). Mimeographed.
—, 1938, D, "The Fundamental Needs of the Child," *Mental Hygiene*, 22:353–379.
—, 1939, "Projective Methods for the Study of Personality," *Journal of Psychology*, 8:389–413.
—, 1940, B, "Freud's Influence on Western Thinking and Culture," *AJO*, 10:880–882.
—, 1940, C, "Opportunities in a Program of Education for Marriage and Family Life." *Mental Hygiene*, 24:578–594.
FRAZIER, E. FRANKLIN, 1932, *The Negro Family in Chicago*, University of Chicago.

FRAZIER, E. FRANKLIN, 1937, "The Impact of Urban Civilization upon Negro Family Life," *ASR*, 2:609–618.

——, 1939, *The Negro Family in the United States*, Univ. of Chicago.

FROMM, ERICH, 1939, "Selfishness and Self-Love," *Psychiatry*, 2:507–523. Reviewed in *BFRE*, 1 (June, 1940), 13.

——, 1941, *Fear from Freedom*, London: Kegan Paul.

FURBAY, JOHN H., 1942, *Workbook Manual for Marriage and the Family*, Appleton-Century.

GALLOWAY, T. W., 1934, "Sex and Social Health," American Social Hygiene Association (New York).

GAMBLE, S. D., and J. S. BURGESS, 1921, *Peking, a Social Survey*. Doran, p. 247.

GESELL, ARNOLD, 1928, *Infancy and Human Growth*, Macmillan, London.

——, 1934, *An Atlas of Infant Behavior*, 2 vols., London: Oxford.

GESELL, ARNOLD, *et al.*, 1939, *Biographies of Child Development*, Hoeber. Reviewed in *BFRE*, 1 (November-December, 1940), 31.

GESELL, ARNOLD, and CATHERINE S. AMATRUDA, 1941, *Developmental Diagnosis*, Hoeber.

GILBRETH, LILLIAN M., 1929, *The Home-Maker and Her Job*, Appleton, London.

GILES, RAY, 1937, *How to Beat the High Cost of Living*, Simon and Schuster.

GILLIN, JOHN L., 1939, *Social Pathology*, Appleton-Century, London.

GLASS, DAVID V., 1940, *Population Policies and Movements in Europe* (Oxford), London.

GLASS, S. J., H. J. DFUEL, and C. A. WRIGHT, 1940, in *Endocrinology*, 26:590.

GLICK, PAUL C., 1941, "Types of Families: An Analysis of Census Data," *ASR*, 6:830–838.

GLUECK, BERNARD, 1935, "Some of the Sources of Marital Discontent," *Family*, 16:3–8. (March.)

GOLDENWEISER, A. A., 1913, "Principle of Limited Possibilities in the Development of Culture," *Journal of American Folklore*, 26:259–290.

GOLDFELD, ABRAHAM, and BEATRICE ROSAHN, 1937, *Housing Management*, Covici-Friede.

GOODENOUGH, F. L., 1928, *The Kuhlman-Binet Tests for Children of Pre-School Age; a Critical Study and Evaluation*, University of Minnesota.

GOODENOUGH, F. L., and A. M. LEAHY, 1927, "The Effect of Certain Family Relationships upon the Development of Personality," *Journal of Genetic Psychology*, 34:45–72.

GOODMAN, RUTH T., and BARBARA PARKS, 1935, "The Ideal Girl." Unpublished paper, Vassar College, sociology office.

GOODSELL, WILLYSTINE, 1915, *A History of the Family as a Social and Educational Institution*, Macmillan. See revision of 1934, but many page references are to 1915.

—— 1928, *Problems of the Family*, Appleton-Century, London.

——, 1934, *A History of Marriage and the Family*, Macmillan (a revision of the 1915 ed.), London.

——, 1936, *Problems of the Family* (rev. ed.). Appleton-Century, London.

GOODYKOONTZ, BESS, BEULAH I. COON, *et al.*, 1941, *Family Living and Our Schools*, Appleton-Century.

GORDON, LELAND J., 1939, *Economics for Consumers*, American Book. Reviewed in *BFRE*, 2 (April-June, 1941), 29.

GRAHAM, A. B., *Recreation in the Home,* National Recreation Association (315 Fourth Ave., New York City)

GRAY, GRETA, and RUTH STAPLES, 1929, "Housing Needs of Children," *Social Forces,* 7:250–252.

GREENBIE, MARJORIE B., 1932, *Personality,* Macmillan.

GROVES, ERNEST R., 1928, A, *The Marriage Crisis,* Longmans.

——, 1929, *"The Family [Changes in 1928],"* *AJR,* 34:1099–1107.

——, 1930, "Are Successful Families Different?" *Social Forces,* 8:536.

——, 1933, *Marriage,* Holt. See also the 1941 ed.

——, 1934, *The American Family,* Lippincott (Philadelphia).

——, 1940, A, *The Family. Its Social Functions,* Lippincott (Philadelphia), London.

——, 1940, B, "A Decade of Marriage Counseling," *Annals,* 212:72–80.

——, 1941, *Marriage* (rev. ed.), Holt.

GROVES, ERNEST R., and L. M. BROOKS (ed.), 1934, *Readings in the Family,* Lippincott (Philadelphia).

GROVES, ERNEST R., and GLADYS H. GROVES, 1931, *Sex in Marriage,* London: Horne.

——, 1934, *Sex in Childhood,* London: Muller.

GROVES, ERNEST R., and WILLIAM F. OGBURN, 1928, *American Marriage and Family Relationships,* Holt.

GROVES, GLADYS HOAGLAND, 1942, *Marriage and Family Life,* Reynal and Hitchcock.

GRUENBERG, BENJAMIN C., with the assistance of J. L. Kaukonen, 1939. *High Schools and Sex Education,* U. S. Health Service, Washington, D.C. Reviewed in *BFRE,* 2 (February, 1941), 22.

GRUENBERG, SIDONIE M., 1939, *We, the Parents,* Harper.

—— (ed.), 1942, *The Family in a World at War,* Harper.

GRUENBERG, SIDONIE M., and BENJAMIN C. GRUENBERG, 1933, *Parents, Children, and Money,* Viking.

GRÜNFELD, JUDITH, 1937, "Women Workers in Nazi Germany," *Nation* (March 13), 295.

GUREWITSCH, Z. A., and A. J. WOROSCHBIT, 1931, "Das Sexualleben der Bauerin in Russland," *Zsch. f. Sex.-wiss u. Sex.-pol.,* 18:51–74.

HAGOOD, MARGARET JARMAN, 1939, *Mothers of the South,* University of North Carolina (Chapel Hill, N. C.).

HALL, CALVIN, 1934, "The Instability of Post War Marriages," *JSP,* 5:523–530.

HAMILTON, G. V., 1929, *A Research in Marriage,* Boni, p. 69.

HAMILTON, G. V., and KENNETH MACGOWAN, 1930, *What is Wrong with Marriage,* Boni.

HANDMAN, MAX S., 1931, article on "Abortion" in *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences,* Vol. VII, Macmillan.

HANKINS, FRANK H., 1931, A, article on "Divorce," in *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences,* Macmillan.

——, 1931, B, "Civilization and Fertility," *Eugenics Review,* 23:145–150.

——, 1937, "German Policies for Increasing Birth," *AJS,* 42:630–652.

HANSCOM, ELIZABETH D. (ed.), 1917, *The Heart of a Puritan,* Macmillan.

HARDING, ESTHER, 1933, *The Way of All Women,* Longmans, p. 116.

HARMSEN, HANO, 1931, "Krise der Deutschen Bevölkerungsbewegung," *Volk. u. Reich,* 7:624–627.

HART, HORNELL, 1931, *The Technique of Social Progress,* Holt.

HART, HORNELL, 1933, "Changing Social Attitudes and Interests," in *Recent Social Trends*, McGraw-Hill.

——, 1940, *Chart for Happiness*, Macmillan.

HART, HORNELL, and ELLA B. HART, 1941, *Personality and the Family* (rev. ed.), Heath.

HART, HORNELL, and WILMER SHIELDS, 1926, "Happiness in Relation to Age at Marriage," *Journal of Social Hygiene*, 12:403–407.

HARTLEY, C. GASQUOINE (Mrs. Gallichan), 1914, *The Truth about Women*, Dodd, Mead.

HARVEY, O. L., 1932, A, "A Note on the Frequency of Human Coitus," *AJS*, 38:64–70.

——, 1932, B, "Some Statistics Derived from Recent Questionnaire Studies Relative to Human Sexual Behavior," *Journal of Social Psychology*, 3:97–100.

HARVEY, P. N., 1930, "Notes on the Relative Mortality of Married Men and on an Experiment in Forecasting Mortality over a Limited Period," *Journal of Institute of Actuaries*, 61:293–330.

HAUSHEER, HERMAN, and JESSIE O. MOSELEY, 1932, "A Study of the Unmarried," *Social Forces*, 10:394–404.

HAYDON, A. EUSTACE, 1933, "Patterns of Family Control in Historic Cultures," *Religious Education* (October).

HAYES, SAMUEL P., 1938, "A Note on Personality and Family Position," *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 22:347–349.

HAYNER, NORMAN S., and CHARLES N. REYNOLDS, 1937, "Chinese Family Life in America," *ASR*, 2:630–637.

HEAGNEY, MURIEL, 1941, "The Family in Australia in the War Emergency," National Conference on Family Relations, Chicago.

HEALY, WILLIAM, AUGUSTA F. BRONNER, and ANNA M. BOWERS, 1930, *The Structure and Meaning of Psychoanalysis*, Knopf.

HECKE, WILHELM, 1930, "Die Unehelichen in Osterreich," *Jahrb. f. Nationalökon u. Stat.*, 132:572–591.

HELTON, ROY, 1940, "Are We Doing Too Much for Our Children?" *Annals*, 212.231–234.

HILL, JOSEPH A., 1929, *Women in Gainful Occupations, 1870 to 1920*, Census Monograph 9.

HIMES, NORMAN E., 1932, "Birth Control in Historical and Clinical Perspective," *Annals*, 160:49–65.

——, 1936, *Medical History of Contraception*, London: Allen & Unwin.

——, 1940, A, *Your Marriage. A Guide to Happiness*, Farrar and Rinehart.

HINDUS, MAURICE B., 1929, *Humanity Uprooted*, London: J. Cape.

HIXENBAUGH, ELINOR R., 1931, "Reconciliation of Marital Maladjustment," *Social Forces*, 10:230–236.

HOBHOUSE, L. T., G. C. WHEELER, and M. GINSBERG, 1930, *The Material Culture and Social Institutions of the Simpler Peoples*, Chapman and Hall (London).

HODGKISS, M., 1933, "The Influence of Broken Homes and Working Mothers," *Smith College Studies in Social Work*, 3:259–274.

HOFFMAN, FREDERICK L., 1928, "A World Survey of Venereal Disease," *Survey*, 60:238–239.

HOGBEN, LANCELOT, 1937, "Planning for Human Survival," in G. D. H. Cole, *et al.*, *What is Ahead of Us?* Macmillan.

HOLLINGWORTH, LETA S., 1914. *Functional Periodicity, An Experimental Study of the Mental and Motor Abilities of Women During Menstruation,* Teachers College, Columbia University.

HOOKER, ELBERT L., 1936, "The Urban Tourist Camp," *Studies in Sociology,* Southern Methodist University (Dallas, Texas), 1:1, pp. 12–18.

——, 1938, "The Greek and the Independent," *Studies in Sociology,* Southern Methodist University (Dallas, Texas), 3:1.

HOPKINS, CORNELIA, and ALICE R. HAINES, 1931, "A Study of One Hundred Problem Children for Whom Foster Care Was Advised," *AJO,* 1:107–128.

HORNEY, KAREN, 1939, *New Ways in Psychoanalysis,* London: Kegan Paul.

——, 1942, *Self-Analysis,* Norton.

HOUDLETTE, HARRIET AHLERS, 1939, A, "The American Family Today," *Journal of American Association of University Women,* 32:136–142.

HOWES, ETHEL PUFFER, 1928, B, "Report of the Director of the Institute for the Coordination of Women's Interests 1925–1928," *Annual Report of the President of Smith College 1927–1928.*

——, 1929, "The Meaning of Progress in the Woman Movement," *Annals* (May).

HOWES, ETHEL PUFFER, and DOROTHEA BEACH, 1928, A, *The Cooperative Nursery School,* Institute for the Coordination of Women's Interests (Northampton, Mass.).

HOYT, HOMER, 1939, *Structure and Growth of Residential Neighborhoods in American Cities,* Federal Housing Administration (Washington, D.C.).

HUDSON, R. B., and J. O. WALKER, 1934, *Radburn, a Plan for Living,* American Association for Adult Education (60 East 42nd Street, New York City).

HUMAN BETTERMENT FOUNDATION, *Human Sterilization Today* (pamphlet revised annually) (Los Angeles).

HUMM, DONCASTER G., and G. W. WADSWORTH, JR., 1934, *Humm-Wadsworth Temperament Scale,* D. G. Humm (157½ Kenmore Ave., Los Angeles).

HUNT, THOMAS C., 1940, "Occupational Status and Marriage Selection." *ASR,* 5:495–504.

HUNTINGTON, ELLSWORTH, 1935, *Tomorrow's Children, the Goal of Eugenics,* London, Chapman & Hall.

HUNTINGTON, ELLSWORTH, and LEON WHITNEY, 1927, *The Builders of America,* Morrow: Chapter XVII.

HURLIN, RALPH G., and MEREDITH B. GIVENS, 1933, "Shifting Occupational Patterns," in *Recent Social Trends,* McGraw-Hill.

HÚSEK, J., *et al.,* 1918, Národopis Lidu Československého, Díl. 1, *Moravské Slovensko,* Czechoslovak Ethnographic Museum (Prague).

HUXLEY, ALDOUS L., 1923, *Antic Hay,* London: Chatto & Windus.

IRVING, WASHINGTON, 1880, *Diedrich Knickerbocker's A History of New York,* London, Macmillan.

ISAACS, SUSAN, 1937, *The Nursery Years,* London: Routledge.

IWASAKI, YASU, 1930, "Divorce in Japan," *AJS,* 36:435–446.

——, 1931, "Why the Divorce Rate has Declined in Japan," *AJS,* 36:568–583.

JOCHELSON, W., 1908, "Material Culture and Social Organization of the Koryak," *American Museum of Natural History Memoirs,* X.

JOHNSON, BASCOM, 1936, "Current View of Prostitution and Sex Delinquency," *JSH,* 22:389–402.

JOHNSON, BASCOM, 1939, "New Laws to Protect Marriage and Birth," *JSH* (June), 285.

JOHNSON, BASCOM, and P. M. KINSIE, 1933, "Prostitution in the United States," *JSH*, 19:467–491.

JOHNSON, CHARLES S., 1937, "The Present Status and Trends of the Negro Family," *Social Forces* (December), 247–257.

JOHNSON, ROSWELL H., 1929, "Marriage and Birth Rates at Bryn Mawr," *Eugenics*, 2:30.

——, 1941, *Johnson Temperament Analysis*, California Test Bureau (3636 Beverly Blvd., Los Angeles).

JOHNSON, WINIFRED B., and LEWIS M. TERMAN, 1935, "Personality Characteristics of Happily Married and Unhappily Married and Divorced Persons," *Character and Personality*, 3:290–311.

——, 1940, "Some Highlights in the Literature of Psychological Sex Differences Published Since 1920," *Journal of Psychology*, 9:327–336. Reviewed in *BFRE*, 1 (September, 1940), 13.

JONES, GLADYS BECKETT, 1938, "The Philosophy of the Budget," in *Plan for Marriage* (Joseph K. Folsom, ed.), Harper.

JONES, H. E., 1929, "Homogamy in Intellectual Abilities," *AJS*, 35:369–382.

JUDD, CHARLES H., 1933, "Education," in *Recent Social Trends*, McGraw-Hill.

JUNG, MOSES (ed.), 1940, *Modern Marriage*, Crofts.

KAHN, ERNST, 1931, "Die Deutschen Juden in der Auflösung," *Jüdische Wohlfahrtspflege u. Sozialpol.*, 2:177–183.

KARDINER, ABRAM, 1939, *The Individual and His Society*, Columbia University. (With collaboration of Ralph Linton.)

KATZ, D., and F. H. ALLPORT, 1931, *Students' Attitudes*, Craftsman Press (Syracuse, N. Y.).

KELIHER, ALICE V., 1938, *Life and Growth*, Appleton-Century, London.

——, 1939, "What Shall We Do About Hatred?" *Progressive Education* (November), 16:485–487.

KELLEY, E. LOWELL, 1937, "A Preliminary Report on Psychological Factors in Assortive Mating," *Psychological Bulletin*, 34:749.

——, 1939, "Concerning the Validity of Terman's Weights for Predicting Marital Happiness," *Psychological Bulletin*, 36:202–203.

——, 1941, "Marital Compatability as Related to Personality Traits of Husbands and Wives as Rated by Self and Spouse," *JSP*, 13:193–198. Reviewed in *BFRE*, 2 (September, 1941), 18–19.

KEMPF, E. J., 1917, "The Social and Sexual Behavior of Infra-Human Primates." *Psychoanalytic Review*, 4:127.

KENYON, JOSEPHINE, 1934, *Healthy Babies Are Happy Babies: A Handbook for Modern Mothers*, Little, Brown (Boston).

KEPHART, HORACE, 1913, *Our Southern Highlanders*, Outing Pub. Co.

KEPPEL, FREDERICK P., 1933, "The Arts in Social Life," in *Recent Social Trends*, McGraw-Hill.

KERN, MARJORIE DOBBINS, 1937, "Why American Women Marry Foreigners," *Forum* (January).

KEY, ELLEN, 1912, *The Century of the Child*, Putnam's.

KEYSERLING, COUNT HERMANN, *et al.*, 1926, *The Book of Marriage*, London: Cape.

KILPATRICK, WILLIAM, 1940, "Discussion of Some of the Fundamental Values in Family Living for Which We Should Strive in a Democratic Society." Report of Family Life Conference in May, 1940, New York State College of Home Economics, Cornell University (Ithaca, N. Y.).

KINGSBURY, SUSAN M., 1939, *Economic Status of University Women in the United States of America*, U. S. Government Printing Office.

KINGSBURY, SUSAN M., and MILDRED FAIRCHILD, 1935, *Factory, Family, and Woman in the Soviet Union*, Putnam's.

KINSEY, ALFRED C., 1941, "Homosexuality: Criteria for a Hormonal Explanation of the Homosexual," *Journal of Clinical Endocrinology*, 1:424–428.

KIRKPATRICK, CLIFFORD, 1936, B, "The Measurement of Ethical Inconsistency in Marriage," *Int. Journal of Ethics*, 46:444–460.

——, 1936, C, "An Experimental Study of the Modification of Social Attitudes," *AJS*, 41:649–656.

——, 1937, A, "Comments on Hankins, 'German Policies for Increasing Births,'" *AJS*, 43:122–126.

——, 1937, B, "Community of Interest and the Measurement of Marriage Adjustment," *Family*, 18:133–137.

——, 1937, C, "Factors in Marital Adjustment," *AJS*, 43:270–283.

——, 1937, D, "Recent Changes in the Status of Women and the Family in Germany," *ASR*, 2:650–658.

——, 1938, *Nazi Germany: Its Women and Family Life*, London: Jarrolds.

——, 1939, "A Methodological Analysis of Feminism in Relation to Marital Adjustment," *ASR*, 4:325–340.

KLEEGMAN, SOPHIA J., 1935, "Medical and Social Aspects of Birth Control," *Journal Lancet* (Minneapolis), 45:22 (November 15).

KLEIN, E., 1925, "The Relation Between One's Attitude to His Father and His Social Attitudes," master's essay in Columbia University Library. Reported in Murphy and Murphy, 1931, p. 665.

KLINEBERG, OTTO, 1931, "The Question of Negro Intelligence," *Opportunity*, 9:366–367.

KNEELAND, HILDEGARDE, 1928, "Limitations of Scientific Management in Household Work," *JHE*, 20:311–315.

——, 1929, A, "Woman's Economic Contribution in the Home," *Annals*, 143:33–40.

——, 1929, B, "Is the Modern Housewife a Lady of Leisure?" *Survey Graphic* (June 1), p. 301.

KNIGHT, M. M., 1924, "The Companionate and the Family, the Unobserved Division of an Historical Institution," *JSH*, 10:257–267. Referred to in Reuter and Runner, *The Family* (1931, p. 597), under heading "The Companionate and the Family."

KNOX, SARAH T., 1941, *The Family and the Law*, University of North Carolina (Chapel Hill, N. C.).

KOMAROVSKY, MIRRA, 1940, A, *The Unemployed Man and His Family*, Dryden.

——, 1940, B, "Selected Bibliography on the Family, 1935–1940," *ASR*, 5:558–565.

KOPP, MARIE, 1933, "The Development of Marriage Consultation Centers as a New Field of Social Medicine," *American Journal of Obstetrics and Gynecology*, 26:122.

——, 1934, *Birth Control in Practice*, McBride.

KOPP, MARIE, 1936, A, "Legal and Medical Aspects of Eugenic Sterilization in Germany," *ASR*, 1:761–770.

——, 1936, B, "The German Program of Marriage Promotion through State Loan," *Eugenical News*, 21:121–129.

——, 1937, "Eugenic Sterilization Laws in Europe," *American Journal of Obstetrics and Gynecology*, 34, p. 499.

——, 1938, A, "Surgical Treatment as Sex Crime Prevention Measure," *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology*, 28, pp. 692–706.

——, 1938, B, "Marriage Counseling in European Countries: Its Present Status and Trends," *Journal of Heredity*, 29:153–160.

KORZYBSKI, ALFRED, 1940, *Science and Sanity*, Science Press (Lancaster, Pa.).

KRETSCHMER, E., 1926 ["Mixture of Constitution in Healthy Mates"], *Deutsche Med. Woche*, 52:20–22.

KROEBER, A. L., 1917, "The Superorganic," *American Anthropology*, N.S., 19:163–213.

——, 1923, *Anthropology*, London: Harrap.

KROUT, MAURICE, 1939, "Typical Behavior Patterns in Twenty-Six Ordinal Positions," *Journal Genetic Psychology*, 55:3–30.

KUCZYNSKI, ROBERT R., 1928, "The Balance of Births and Deaths," Vol. I, *Western and Northern Europe*, Macmillan

——, 1931, "The Balance of Births and Deaths," Vol. II, *Eastern and Southern Europe*, Macmillan.

KULP, DANIEL H., 1925, *Country Life in South China*, Columbia University.

KYRK, HAZEL, 1933, *Economic Problems of the Family*, Harper.

LAFOLLETTE, CECILE T., 1934, "A Study of the Problems of 652 Gainfully Employed Married Women Homemakers," *Teachers College Contributions to Education*, No. 619.

LAMSON, HERBERT D., 1935, "Differential Reproduction in China," *Quarterly Review of Biology*, 10:308–321.

LANDIS, CARNEY, *et al.*, 1940, *Sex in Development*, Hoeber.

LANG, R. O., 1932, "The Rating of Happiness in Marriage." Unpublished thesis, University of Chicago.

——, 1937, "Population Characteristics Associated with Educational Levels and Economic Status in Chicago," *ASR*, 2:192.

LANGDON, GRACE, 1940, "Nursery School Plus," *School Life*, 26:48–51.

LANGDON-DAVIES, JOHN, 1929, "The Spanish Woman," *Harper's*, 159:711–719.

LAPIERE, R. T., and CHENG WANG, 1931, "The Incidence and Sequence of Social Change," *AJS*, 37:399–409.

LAWRENCE, H. W., 1928, *The Not-Quite Puritans*, Little, Brown (Boston).

LAWRENCE, JOSEPHINE, 1935, *If I Have Four Apples*, Stokes.

LAWS, GERTRUDE, 1927, "Parent-Child Relationships," *Teachers College Contributions to Education*, No. 283.

LEE, IVY, 1928, *Present-Day Russia*, Macmillan.

LEE, MARY, 1931, "College Graduates and Civilization, with Special Reference to Women's Colleges," *Harper's*, 162:719–724.

LEE, PORTER R., and MARION E. KENWORTHY, 1929, *Mental Hygiene and Social Work*, London: Oxford.

LEEVY, J. ROY, 1940, A, "Family Discord in an Industrial City," *Ohio Valley Sociologist*, 13:No. 3.

LEPLAY, PIERRE GUILLAUME FREDERIC, 1879, *Les ouvriers européens* (2d ed., rev.) (Paris).

LESSER, A., 1930, "The Levirate and Fraternal Polyandry among the Pawnees," *Man*, 30:98.

LEVINE, MAURICE, 1940, "Normality and Maturity," *Family*, 21:18–26.

LEVY, JOHN, 1931, A, "A Quantitative Study of Behavior Problems in Relation to Family Constellation," *American Journal of Psychiatry*, 10:637–654.

——, 1931, B, "Maternal Over-Protection and Rejection," *Archives of Neurology and Psychiatry*, 25:886–888.

——, 1932, "The Impact of Cultural Forms Upon Children's Behavior," *Mental Hygiene*, 16:208–220.

LEVY, JOHN, and RUTH MUNROE, 1938, *The Happy Family*, Knopf.

LEWIN, KURT, 1936, *Principles of Topological Psychology*, McGraw-Hill, London.

——, 1940, "The Background of Conflict in Marriage," in Moses Jung (ed.), *Modern Marriage*, Crofts.

LEWIN, KURT, ROLAND LIPPITT, and RALPH K. WHITE, 1939, "Patterns of Aggressive Behavior in Experimentally Created 'Social Climates.'" *JSP*, 10:271–299. Reviewed in *BFRE*, 1 (June, 1940), 12.

LEWISOHN, LUDWIG, 1933, "The New Kultur." *Nation*, 136:695–696.

LEYBURN, JAMES G., 1935, *Frontier Folkways*, London: Oxford.

LICHTENBERGER, JAMES P., 1931, *Divorce, a Social Interpretation*, Whittlesey House, p. 406.

——, 1932, "Divorce Legislation," *Annals*, 160:116–123.

LINCOLN MEMORIAL LIFE FOUNDATION, 1934, *A Consideration of Public Education as a Prime Factor in the Control of Syphilis* (Fort Wayne, Ind.).

LINDEMAN, EDUARD C., 1927, "Newer Currents of Thought on Parent Education," *New Republic*, 51:172–174.

LINDQUIST, RUTH, 1931, *The Family in the Present Social Order*, University of North Carolina (Chapel Hill, N. C.), Chapter III.

LINDSEY, BENJAMIN B., and WAINWRIGHT EVANS, 1925, *The Revolt of Modern Youth*, Boni and Liveright.

——, 1927, *The Companionate Marriage*, Boni and Liveright.

LOCKE, HARVEY J., 1941, "Tentative Knowledge about Marriage and Family Relations," *Marriage and Family Living*, 3:73–78.

LOOMIS, CHARLES P., 1930, "A Comparison of Marriage Ages of City and Farm-Reared College Men Who Have Achieved Recognition in the Field of Agriculture," *Social Forces*, 9:93–94.

——, 1934, *The Growth of the Farm Family in Relation to Its Activities*, Raleigh Agricultural Experiment Station of the N. C. State College, Bulletin 298 (June).

LORIMER, FRANK, ELLEN WINSTON, and LOUISE K. KISER, 1940, *Foundations of American Population Policy*, Harper.

LOTKA, ALFRED J., 1936, "Modern Trends in the Birth Rate," *Annals*, 188:1–13.

LOWIE, ROBERT L., 1917, *Culture and Ethnology*, London: Harrap.

——, 1925, *Primitive Society*, London: Routledge.

LUKENS, MARGARET, and SUZANNE WEIL, 1941, "A Survey of 100 College Girls' Opinions of the Possible Immediate and Ultimate Effects of the National Emergency on the Family as an Institution." Unpublished paper, Vassar College.

LUMPKIN, KATHERINE D., 1933, *The Family : A Study of Member Roles*, London: Oxford.

LUND, FREDERICK L., 1939, *Emotions*, Ronald.

LUNDBERG, EMMA O., and KATHERINE LENROOT, 1920, *Illegitimacy as a Child Welfare Problem*, Children's Bureau Publication 66, Government Printing Office (Washington, D.C.).

LUNDBERG, G. A., MIRRA KOMAROVSKY, and MARY A. MCINERNY, 1934, *Leisure, a Suburban Study*, London: Oxford.

LYND, ROBERT S., 1939, *Knowledge for What. the Place of Social Science in American Culture*, London: Oxford.

LYND, ROBERT S., and HELEN M. LYND, 1929, *Middletown, A Study of Contemporary American Culture*, London: Constable.

- -, 1937, *Middletown in Transition, A Study in Cultural Conflicts*, London: Constable.

MACIVER, ROBERT M., 1937, *Society, a Textbook of Sociology*, Farrar and Rinehart.

MCCLURE, W. E., 1931, "Intelligence of Unmarried Mothers," *Psychological Clinic*, 20:154–157.

MCCORMICK, ANNE, 1928, *The Hammer and the Scythe*, Knopf.

MCKAIN, WALTER C., and N. L. WHETTEN, 1936, "Size of Family in Relation to Homogeneity of Parental Traits," *Rural Sociology*, 1:20–27.

MCKENZIE, R. D., 1933, "The Rise of Metropolitan Communities," in *Recent Social Trends*, McGraw-Hill.

MCLEAN, HELEN V., 1941, "The Emotional Background of Marital Difficulties," *ASR*, 6:384–389.

MCNEMAR, QUINN, 1940, "A Critical Examination of the University of Iowa Studies of Environmental Influences upon the I.Q.," *Psychological Bulletin*, 37:63–92. Reviewed in *BFRE*, 1 (November-December, 1940), 31 *ff*.

MAIER, NORMAN R. F., 1939, *Studies of Abnormal Behavior in the Rat*, Harper.

MALINOWSKI, BRONISLAW, 1926, *Crime and Custom in Savage Society*, London: Kegan Paul.

- —, 1929, *The Sexual Life of Savages in Northwestern Melanesia*, London: Routledge, 2 vols.

——, 1938, "Marriage," in *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, Vol. 14, 14th ed., pp. 940–950.

MALLER, J. B., 1931, "Size of Family and Personality of Offspring," *JSP*, 2:3–27.

MARETT, R. R., 1920, *Psychology and Folklore*, Methuen (London).

Marriage and Family Counselling, a reprint from *Parent Education*, 3:1 and 2 (April, 1936), National Council of Parent Education, Vassar College (Poughkeepsie, N.Y.).

MARSH, MARGARET, "Prostitutes in New York, July 1939–June 1940," Welfare Council Research Bureau.

MARSHALL, LEON C., and GEOFFREY MAY, 1932, *The Divorce Court*, Vol. I, Johns Hopkins Press (Baltimore, Md.).

——, 1933, *The Divorce Court*, Vol. II (Ohio). Facts referred to reported at American Sociological Society meeting, 1931.

MARVIN, DONALD M., 1918, "Occupational Propinquity as a Factor in Marriage Selection," *Publ. American Statis. Association*, 16:131–150.

MASTELLER, KENNETH C., 1941, *How to Avoid Financial Tangles*, American Institute for Economic Research (Cambridge, Mass.).

MAUGHAM, W. SOMERSET, 1941, "The Family in England in War Time," *Marriage and Family Living*, 3:No. 4.

MAY, GEOFFREY, 1929, *Marriage Laws and Decisions in the United States*, Russell Sage.

MAY, GEOFFREY, and ROBERT BLINN, 1937, "Legislative Trends in Family Law," *ASR*, 2:696–704.

MEAD, LAURA L., 1931, "Report on the Survey of Truancy for the Year 1929–1930," *Commonwealth Review* (University of Oregon), 13:245–265.

MEAD, MARGARET, 1928, *Coming of Age in Samoa*, Morrow.

—, 1930, *Growing up in New Guinea*, Morrow.

—. 1932, "Contrasts and Comparisons from Primitive Society," *Annals*, 160:23.

—, 1935, *Sex and Temperament in Three Primitive Societies*, London: Routledge.

— (ed.), 1937, *Cooperation and Competition among Primitive Peoples*, London. McGraw-Hill.

—, 1939, *From the South Seas*, Morrow. A reprinting in one volume of Mead, 1928, 1930, and 1935.

—, 1940, A, "Conflict of Cultures in America," *Proceedings of Middle States Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools.*

—, 1940, B, "Toward a New Role for Women," *The Woman's Press*, 34:466–467. Reviewed in *BFRE*, 1 (November-December, 1940), 26.

—, 1941, "Administrative Contributions to Democratic Character Formation at the Adolescent Level," *Jour. National Association of Deans of Women* (Jan.).

—, 1942, *And Keep Your Powder Dry*, Morrow.

MERRILL, FRANCIS E., and MABEL A. ELLIOTT, 1941, *Social Disorganization* (rev. ed.), Harper.

MESSER, MARY BURT, 1928, *The Family in the Making*, Putnam.

MILLER, HERBERT A., 1924, *Races, Nations, and Classes*, Lippincott, London.

MILLER, NEAL E., 1941, *Social Learning and Imitation*, Yale University.

MINER, HORACE, 1938, "The French-Canadian Family Cycle," *ASR*, 3:700–708.

—, 1939, *St. Denis: A French-Canadian Parish*, University of Chicago.

MITCHELL, FRANCES, "Propinquity in the Marriages of College Women," unpublished study at Vassar College.

MONAHAN, THOMAS P., 1940, "The Changing Probability of Divorce," *ASR*, 5:536–545.

MONROE, DAY, 1932, *Families: A Study of Unpublished Census Data*, University of Chicago.

MOOREES, V., 1924, "The Immediate Heredity of Primary Aments Committed to a Public Institution," *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 8:89–127.

MORENO, J. L., 1934, *Who Shall Survive?* Nervous and Mental Disease Monograph Series, No. 58.

—, 1940, "Psychodramatic Treatment of Marriage Problems," *Sociometry*, 3:No. 1. Reviewed in *BFRE*, 1 (June, 1940), 8.

MORGAN, CHRISTINE MARGARET, 1937, "The Attitudes and Adjustments of Recipients of Old Age Assistance in Upstate and Metropolitan New York," *Archives of Psychology*, No. 214. Columbia University.

MORGAN, LEWIS H., 1851, *The League of the Iroquois*, Dodd, Mead, 1922.

—, 1870, *Systems of Consanguinity and Affinity of the Human Family*, Smithsonian Contributions to Knowledge.

—, 1877, *Ancient Society*, Holt, 1907.

MOWRER, ERNEST R., 1927, *Family Disorganization, an Introduction to a Sociological Analysis*, University of Chicago.

—, 1932, *The Family, its Organization and Disorganization*, University of Chicago.

MOWRER, ERNEST R., 1938, "The Trend and Ecology of Family Disintegration in Chicago," *ASR*, 3:344–353.

——, 1941, "Recent Trends in Family Research," *ASR*, 6:499–511.

MOWRER, ERNEST R., and HARRIET R. MOWRER, 1928, *Domestic Discord, Its Analysis and Treatment*, University of Chicago.

MOWRER, HARRIET R., 1932, "Personality Disorganization and Domestic Discord," *Social Forces*, 10:388–394.

——, 1935, *Personality Disorganization and Domestic Discord*, American Book.

——, 1936, "Sex as a Factor in Domestic Discord," *ASR*, 1:252–263.

——, 1937, "Clinical Treatment of Marital Conflicts," *ASR*, 2:771–778.

——, 1940, "A Psychocultural Analysis of the Alcoholic," *ASR*, 5:546–557. Reviewed in *BFRE*, 1 (November-December, 1940), 36–37.

MUDD, EMILY H., 1937, "An Analysis of One Hundred Consecutive Cases in the Marriage Counsel of Philadelphia," *Mental Hygiene*, 21:198–217.

MUDGETT, MILDRED D., 1924, "The Social Effect Upon the Family of Forced Marriage," *Family*, 5:16–21.

MÜLLER-LYER, F., 1930, *The Evolution of Modern Marriage*, Knopf.

MUMFORD, LEWIS, 1940, *Faith for Living*, Harcourt, Brace.

MUNTZ, EARLF, 1938, *Urban Sociology*, Macmillan, London.

MURDOCK, GEORGE P., 1940, "The Cross-Cultural Survey," *ASR*, 5:361–370.

MURPHY, GARDNER, and LOIS MURPHY, 1931, *Experimental Social Psychology*, Harper.

MURPHY, GARDNER, LOIS MURPHY, and THEODORE M. NEWCOMB, 1937, *Experimental Social Psychology* (rev. ed.), Harper.

MURRAY, HENRY A., 1938, *Explorations in Personality: A Clinical and Experimental Study of Fifty Men of College Age*, Oxford University Press (New York).

MYERSON, ABRAHAM, 1920, *The Nervous Housewife*, Little, Brown.

——, 1925, *Inheritance of Mental Diseases*, Williams and Wilkins (Baltimore, Md.).

MYRDAL, ALVA, 1939, "The Swedish Approach to Population Policies," *Eugenical News* (March), 3–7.

——, 1941, *Nation and Family: The Swedish Experiment in Democratic Family and Population Policy*, Harper.

MYRDAL, GUNNAR, 1938, "Population Problems and Policies," *Annals*, 204:200–215.

——, 1940, *Population: A Problem for Democracy*, Harvard University. Reviewed in *BFRE*, 2 (April-June, 1941), 18–19.

MYRICK, HELEN L., and ADA E. SHEFFIELD, "Reflective By-Products of a Social Treatment Interview," *Social Forces*, 3:657–665.

NEELY, WAYNE C., 1940, "Family Attitudes of Denominational College and University Students, 1929 and 1936," *ASR*, 5:512–522.

NEMILOV, A., 1932, *The Biological Tragedy of Woman*, Covici.

NEUMANN, HENRY, 1928, *Modern Youth and Marriage*, Appleton, London.

NEWCOMB, THEODORE M., 1937, "Recent Changes in Attitudes Toward Sex and Marriage," *ASR*, 2:659–667.

NEWCOMER, MABEL, 1931, "Marriages and Children of Vassar College Alumnae," *Vassar Quarterly*, 16:98–101.

NIEBUHR, REINHOLD, 1935, "The Revival of Feudalism," *Harper's*, March, pp. 483–488.

NIENBURG, BERTHA M., 1923, *The Woman Home-Maker in the City*, Bureau of the Census, Washington, D.C.

NIENBURG, BERTHA M., 1939, "Women in the Nation's Economy," *Journal of American Association of University Women*, 32:131–135.

NIMKOFF, MEYER F., 1934, *The Family*, Houghton Mifflin.

NORTON, JOHN K., 1940, *Education and Economic Well-Being in American Democracy*, Educational Policies Commission.

NOTESTEIN, FRANK W., 1936, "Class Differences in Fertility," *Annals*, 188:26–36.

NOWLIN, GENEVIEVE A., 1937, "Home Economics for Boys," *JHE*, 29:289–293.

OGBURN, WILLIAM F., 1923, *Social Change: With Respect to Culture and Original Nature*, Huebsch.

——, 1929, *The Changing Family, Publ. American Sociological Society*, 23:124–133.

——, 1935, "Recent Changes in Marriage," *AJS*, 41:285–298.

——, 1940, "Inventions and the Family." Paper presented at National Conference on Family Relations.

OGBURN, WILLIAM F., and MEYER F. NIMKOFF, 1940, *Sociology*, London: Kegan Paul.

OGBURN, WILLIAM F., and CLARK TIBBITTS, 1929, "Birth Rates and Social Classes," *Social Forces*, 8:1–10.

——, 1933, "The Family and Its Functions," in *Recent Social Trends*, McGraw-Hill.

O'NEILL, E. F., and R. J. GLOVER, 1929, "Report on a Study of One Hundred Cases of Desertion," *Family*, 9:287–291.

OSBORN, FREDERICK, 1940, *Preface to Eugenics*, Harper.

OSBORNE, JOHN J., 1939, "Fertility Differentials among Princeton Alumni," *Eugenical News*, 24:79–81.

PARK, ROBERT A., and ERNEST W. BURGESS, 1924, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, University of Chicago.

PARKER, IDA R., 1924, "A Follow-Up Study of 550 Illegitimacy Applications" (Boston).

PARKER, ROBERT A., 1935, *A Yankee Saint*, Putnam's.

PARRAN, THOMAS, 1937, *Shadow on the Land—Syphilis*, Reynal and Hitchcock.

PARRAN, THOMAS, and LIDA J. USILTON, 1930, "The Extent of the Problem of Gonorrhoea and Syphilis in the United States," *JSH* 16 (January).

PARSLEY, M., 1933, "The Influence of Ordinal Position and Size of Family," *Smith College Studies in Social Work*, 3:274–283.

PARTEN, MILDRED, 1932, "A Statistical Analysis of the Modern Family," *Annals of American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 160:29–37.

PARTEN, MILDRED, and RUBY JO REEVES (KENNEDY), 1937, "Size and Composition of American Families," *ASR*, 2:638–649.

PATTEN, SIMON, 1896, *The Theory of Social Forces*, American Academy of Political and Social Science (Philadelphia).

PEARL, RAYMOND, 1932, "Contraception and Fertility in 2000 Women," *Human Biology*, 4:363–407.

PEARSON, GERALD H. J., 1931, "Some Early Factors in the Formation of Personality," *American Journal of Orthopsychiatry*, 1:284–292.

——, 1939, "The Chronically Aggressive Child," *Psychoanalytic Review*, 26:485–525. Reviewed in *BFRE*, 1 (September, 1940), 13.

PECK, M. W., and F. L. WELLS, 1923, "On the Psycho-Sexuality of College Graduate Men," *Mental Hygiene*, 7:697–714.

PETERS, CHARLES C., *et al.*, 1933, *Motion Pictures and Standards of Morality*, London: Macmillan.

PHELPS, HAROLD A., 1932, *Contemporary Social Problems*, Prentice-Hall.
——, 1938, *Contemporary Social Problems* (rev. ed.), Prentice-Hall.
PHILLIPS, JOHN C., 1927, "Success and the Birth-Rate," *Harvard Graduates' Magazine* (June).
PICKERING, ERNEST, 1941, *Shelter for Living*, Wiley.
PIDGEON, MARY E., 1937, *Women in the Economy of the United States of America*, U. S. Dept. of Labor.
——, 1939, *Employed Women and Family Support*, U. S. Women's Bureau, Bulletin 168.
PINKEVICH, A. P., 1929, *The New Education in the Soviet Republic*, Day.
PLANT, JAMES S., 1929, "Sociological Factors Challenging the Practice of Psychiatry in a Metropolitan District," *American Journal of Psychiatry*, 8:705.
——, 1930, A, "Social Factors Involved in Personality Integration," *American Journal of Psychiatry*, 9:113–120.
——, 1930, B, "The Effect of Population Concentration upon Temperament," *Publications of the American Sociological Society*, 24:282.
——, 1932, "The Child as a Member of the Family," *Annals*, 160:71–72.
——, 1937, *Personality and the Cultural Pattern*, London: Oxford.
POPENOE, PAUL, 1930, "Feeble-Mindedness Today," *Journal of Heredity*, 21:421–431.
——, 1931, "A Family Consultation Service," *JSH*, 17:309–322.
——, 1932, "How Can Young People Get Acquainted?" *JSH*, 18:218–224.
——, 1933, "Divorce and Remarriage from a Eugenic Point of View," *SF*, 12:48–50.
——, 1935, "Where Are the Marriageable Men?" *SF*, 14:257–262.
——, 1936, "Fertility of Divorcees," *JH*, 27:166–168.
——, 1937, A, "Mate Selection," *ASR*, 2:735–743.
——, 1938, A, "A Study of 738 Elopements," *ASR*, 3:47–53.
——, 1938, B, "Re-Marriages of Divorcées to Each Other," *ASR*, 3:695–699.
——, 1940, *Modern Marriage: A Handbook for Men* (rev. ed.), Macmillan.
POPENOE, PAUL, and DONNA WICKS, 1937, "Marital Happiness in Two Generations," *MH*, 21:218–223.
PRATT, GEORGE K., 1930, "Some of the Psychopathology of Marital Maladjustment," *American Journal of Psychiatry*, 9:861–870.
——, 1931, "Some Psychiatric View on Maladjustments in Marriage," *Social Forces*, 9:554–559.
——, 1935, *Three Family Narratives*, National Council of Parent Education, Vassar College (Poughkeepsie, N. Y.).
PRESIDENT'S RESEARCH COMMITTEE ON RECENT TRENDS, 1933, *Recent Social Trends in the United States*, McGraw-Hill.
PRESCOTT, DANIEL A., 1938, *Emotion and the Educative Process*, American Council on Education, Washington, D.C.
PRESSEY, LUELLA C., 1931, "Some Serious Maladjustments among College Students," *Social Forces*, 10:236–242.
PRESTON, JOHN, 1938, "Collective Living," *Harpers* (May).
PRINGLE, HENRY F., 1938, "What Do the Women of America Think about Morals?" *Ladies' Home Journal* (May).
PRUETTE, LORINE, 1924, *Women and Leisure*, Dutton.
——, 1929, "The Married Woman and the Part-Time Job," *Annals*, 143:301–314.
PUNKE, HAROLD H., 1940, "Marriage Rate Among Women Teachers," *ASR*, 5:505–511.

RADCLIFFE-BROWN, A. R., 1922, *The Andaman Islanders*, Cambridge University Press (Cambridge).

RAINWATER, CLARENCE E., 1922, *The Play Movement in the United States*, University of Chicago.

RATHBONE, ELEANOR, 1931, "Child Marriage in India," *Hibbert Journal*, 29:609–622.

REAM, M. J., 1922, "Temperament in Harmonious Human Relationships," *JASP*, 17:58–61.

RECKLESS, WALTER C., 1933, *Vice in Chicago*, University of Chicago.

REED, RUTH, 1934, *The Illegitimate Family in New York City*, London: Oxford.

REICH, WILHELM, 1935, *Der Einbruch der Sexualmoral*, Verlag für Sexualpolitik, Kopenhagen.

——, 1936, *Die Sexualität im Kultur Kampf: Zur Sozialistischen Umstrukturierung des Menschen*, Sexpol-Verlag, Kopenhagen.

REITMAN, BEN, 1931, *The Second Oldest Profession*, Vanguard, Chapter 1.

REUTER, EDWARD B., and JESSIE R. RUNNER, 1931, *The Family*, London: McGraw-Hill.

RICE, STUART, "Undergraduate Attitudes toward Marriage and Children," *Mental Hygiene*, 13:787–793.

RICH, H. THOMPSON, 1939, "How to Live Beyond Your Means," *Reader's Digest* (May, 1939), 1–4.

RICHARDSON, HELEN M., 1939, "Studies of Mental Resemblance between Husbands and Wives and between Friends," *Psychological Bulletin*, 104–120.

RICHMOND, MARY E., and FRED S. HALL, 1929, *Marriage and the State*, Russell Sage Foundation (New York).

RIEMER, SVEND, 1941, A, "A Research on Sociological Home Planning," *AJS*, 46:865–872. Reviewed in *BFRE*, 2 (April-June, 1941), 30.

RILEY, JOHN W., and MATILDA WHITE, 1941, "Actual and Preferred Sources of Contraceptive Information," *ASR*, 6:33–36.

ROBINSON, GILBERT KELLEY, 1936, "The Catholic Birth Rate: Further Facts and Implications," *AJS*, 41:757–766.

ROBISHAW, RUTH A., 1936, "A Study of 4000 Patients Admitted for Contraceptive Advice and Treatment," *American Journal of Obstetrics and Gynecology*, 31:426.

ROCKWOOD, LEMO DENNIS, and MARION H. STEELE (ed.), 1935, *Pictures of Family Life*, American Home Economics Association, Washington, D.C.

ROHEIM, G., 1932, "Psychoanalysis of Primitive Cultural Types," *International Journal of Psychoanalysis*, 13:2–224.

ROLLINS, W. A., 1929, "The Fertility of College Graduates," *Journal of Heredity*, 20:425–427.

ROSENBACH, A. S., 1932, *The All-Embracing Dr. Franklin.*

ROSENOW, CURT, 1930, "The Incidence of First-Born among Problem Children," *Journal of Genetic Psychology*, 37:145–151.

ROSENOW, CURT, and ANNE H. WHYTE, 1931, "The Ordinal Position of Problem Children," *American Journal of Orthopsychiatry*, 1:430–434.

ROSS, BERTHA M., 1931, "Some Traits Associated with Sibling Jealousy in Problem Children," *Smith College Studies in Social Work*, 1:364–376.

RUBINOW, I. M., 1930, "After Divorce—What?" *New Republic*, 63:226–228.

——, 1936, "Some Statistical Aspects of Marriage and Divorce," Pamphlet No. 3 of the *American Academy of Political and Social Science.*

RUSSELL, BERTRAND, 1924, "Styles in Ethics," *Nation*, 118:497–499.

RUSSELL, BERTRAND, and DORA RUSSELL, 1923, *Prospects of Industrial Civilization*, London: Allen & Unwin.

RUSSELL, DORA, 1933, "Is Divorce Worth the Price?" *Nation*, 136:84.

RUSSELL, O. D., 1935, "Prostitution in Japan," *American Mercury* (November).

SAIT, UNA BERNARD, 1938, *New Horizons for the Family*, Macmillan, London.

SANDERSON, DWIGHT, 1930, "Science and the Changing Modern Family," *JHE*, 22:812.

SANDERSON, DWIGHT, and ROBERT G. FOSTER, 1930, "A Sociological Case Study of Farm Families," *Family* (June), 107–114.

SANGER, MARGARET, 1931, *My Fight for Birth Control*, Farrar and Rinehart.

SAPIR, EDWARD, 1924, "Culture Genuine and Spurious," *AJS*, 29:401–429.

——, 1928, "Observations on the Sex Problem in America," *American Journal of Psychiatry*, 8:519–534.

SCHILLER, BELLE, 1932, "A Quantitative Analysis of Marriage Selection in a Small Group," *JSP*, 3:297–319.

SCHMALHAUSEN, S. D., and V. F. CALVERTON (ed.), 1931, *Woman's Coming of Age*, London: Amer. Bk.

SCHMIEDELER, EDGAR (ed.), 1931, *Readings in the Family*, Century, London.

SCHOOLEY, M., 1936, "Personality Resemblances among Married Couples," *JASP*, 31:340–347.

SEAGLE, WILLIAM, 1937, "Heart Balm and Seduction," *Nation* (April 17).

SENDER, S., Master's essay in Columbia University library, reported by Murphy and Murphy, 1931, p. 430.

SEWALL, M., 1930, "Some Causes of Jealousy in Young Children," *Smith College Studies in Social Work*, 1:6–22.

SEWALL, SAMUEL, *Samuel Sewall's Diary* (edited by Mark Van Doren, 1927).

SHAW, CLIFFORD, 1929, *Delinquency Areas*, University of Chicago.

——, 1930, *The Jack Roller*, University of Chicago.

SHAW, CLIFFORD, and HENRY D. MCKAY, 1932, "Are Broken Homes a Causative Factor in Juvenile Delinquency?" *Social Forces*, 10:514–524.

SKEELS, HAROLD M., RUTH UPDEGRAFF, BETH L. WELLMAN, and HAROLD M. WILLIAMS, 1938, *A Study of Environmental Stimulation: An Orphanage Preschool Project*, University of Iowa Studies: Studies in Child Welfare, 15:No. 4.

SKODAK, MARIE, 1937, "The Mental Development of Adopted Children Whose True Mothers are Feeble-Minded," *Child Development*, 9:303–308. Reviewed in *BFRE*, 1 (February, 1940), 17.

SMALLEY, R. E., 1930, "The Influence of Differences in Age, Sex and Intelligence in Determining the Attitudes of Siblings toward Each Other," *Smith College Studies in Social Work*, 1:23–39.

SMITH, EDITH L., and HUGH CABOT, 1916, "A Study of Sexual Morality," *JSH*, 2:527–537.

SMITH, MAPHEUS, 1941, "Similarities of Marriage Partners in Intelligence," *ASR*, 6:697–701.

SOROKIN, PITIRIM A., 1937–1941, *Social and Cultural Dynamics*, 4 vols., American Book, London: Allen & Unwin.

——, 1941, *The Crisis of Our Age*, Dutton.

SOROKIN, PITIRIM A., CARLE C. ZIMMERMAN, and CHARLES J. GALPIN, 1931, *A Systematic Source Book of Rural Sociology*, University of Minnesota (Minneapolis), 3 vols., Vol. II, pp 23 *ff*.

SPENCER, HERBERT, 1878, *Principles of Sociology*, Appleton, Vol. I, pp. 3–16.
SPENGLER, J. J., 1932, "Fertility in Providence, Rhode Island," *AJS*, 38:377–397.
SPENGLER, OSWALD, 1926, *The Decline of the West*, London: Allen & Unwin.
SPRANGER, EDWARD, 1928, *Types of Men*, Niemeyer (Halle), p. 315.
STEAD, CHRISTINA, 1940, *The Man Who Loved Children*, Simon and Schuster.
STECKEL, MINNIE L., 1930, "Intelligence and Birth Order in Family," *JSP*, 1:329–344.
STEIN, CLARENCE S., 1940, "Investment Housing Pays," *Survey Graphic*, 29:75–77 *ff*.
STEIN, IRVING F., and MICHAEL L. LEVENTHAL, 1932, "Infertility and Sterility—An Analytic Study of Three Hundred Couples," *Journal of American Medical Association*, 98:621–632.
STEINER, JESSE F., 1928, *The American Community in Action*, Holt.
——, 1933, "Recreation and Leisure Time Activities," in *Recent Social Trends*.
STERN, BERNHARD J., 1927, *Social Factors in Medical Progress*, Columbia University.
——, 1937, "Resistances to the Adoption of Technological Innovations," *Technological Trends and National Policy*, National Resources Committee, Government Printing Office.
——, 1938 (ed.), *The Family, Past and Present*, Appleton-Century.
——, 1939, "The Family and Cultural Change," *ASR*, 4:199–208.
STIEBELING, HAZEL K., 1938, "Human Conservation and Nutrition," *Plan Age*, 4:279–291.
——, 1941, *Are We Well Fed?* U. S. Department of Agriculture, Washington, D.C., Misc. Pub. No. 430. Reviewed in *BFRE*, 2 (April-June, 1941), 29.
STIX, REGINE K., 1937, "Research in Causes of Variations in Fertility: Medical Aspects," *ASR*, 2:668–677.
——, 1938, "The Medical Aspects of Variations in Fertility," *American Journal of Obstetrics and Gynecology*, 35:571–580.
——, 1939, "Birth Control in a Midwestern City." Reprinted from *The Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly*, 17:Nos. 1, 2, and 4.
STIX, REGINE, and FRANK W. NOTESTEIN, 1940, *Controlled Fertility*, Williams and Wilkins (Baltimore, Md.).
STIX, REGINE K., and DOROTHY G. WIEHL, 1938, "Abortion and the Public Health," *American Journal of Public Health*, 28:No. 5.
STODDARD, GEORGE D., 1939, "The IQ: Its Ups and Downs," *Educational Record Supplement* (January), 44–57.
——, 1941, "The Growth and Decline of Intelligence," *Educational Record Supplement* (January), 77–88.
STONE, C. P., 1922, "The Congenital Sexual Behavior of the Young Male Albino Rat," *Journal of Comparative Psychology*, 2:95–153.
——, 1923, "Further Study of Sensory Functions in the Activation of Sexual Behavior of the Young Male Albino Rat," *Journal of Comparative Psychology*, 3:469–473.
STOUFFER, SAMUEL A., 1935, "Trends in the Fertility of Catholics and Non-Catholics," *AJS*, 41:143–166.
STOUFFER, SAMUEL A., and PAUL F. LAZARSFELD, 1937, *Research Memorandum on the Family in the Depression*, Social Science Research Council.
STOUFFER, SAMUEL A., and LYLE M. SPENCER, 1936, "Marriage and Divorce in Recent Years," *Annals of American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 188:56–69.
STOUFFER, SAMUEL A., and LYLE M. SPENCER, 1939, "Recent Increases in Marriage and Divorce," *AJS*, 44:551–555.

STREET, MRS. ELWOOD, 1941, "Hasty Marriage and the Draft," Report at Conference on Conservation of Marriage and the Family, Chapel Hill, N. C. Mimeographed by National Maternal and Child Health Council, Washington, D.C.

STUART, J. C., 1926, "Data on the Alleged Psychopathology of the Only Child," *JASP*, 20:441.

SUMMER, WILLIAM GRAHAM, 1906, *Folkways*, Ginn.

SWANTON, J. R., 1905, "The Social Organization of American Tribes," *American Anthropologist*, 7:663–673.

——, 1906, *The Reconstruction of the Theory of Social Organization, Boas Anniversary Volume*, pp. 166–178.

SYDENSTRICKER, EDGAR, and G. ST. J. PERROT, 1934, "Sickness, Unemployment, and Differential Fertility," *Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly*, 12:No. 2 (April).

SYMONDS, PERCIVAL M., 1939, *The Psychology of Parent-Child Relationships*, Appleton-Century, London.

TAEUBER, CONRAD, and IRENE B. TAEUBER, 1940, "German Fertility Trends, 1933–1939," *AJS*, 46 150–167.

TAFT, JESSIE A., 1926, "The Effect of an Unsatisfactory Mother-Daughter Relationship upon the Development of a Personality," *Family*, 7:10–17. Reprinted in Reuter and Runner, *The Family*.

——, 1933, *The Dynamics of Therapy*, Macmillan, London.

TAGORE, RABINDRANATH, in Keyserling *et al.*, 1926, *The Book of Marriage*, Harcourt, Brace, pp. 98–122.

TAUSSIG, FREDERICK J., 1936, *Abortion, Spontaneous and Induced*, Mosby (St. Louis, Mo.).

TAYLOR, KATHERINE W., 1937, *Do Adolescents Need Parents?* Appleton-Century, London.

TAYLOR, W. S., 1933, "A Critique of Sublimation in Males: A Study of Forty Superior Single Men," *Genetic Psychology Monthly*, 13:No. 1.

TERMAN, LEWIS M., 1938, *Psychological Factors in Marital Happiness*, London: McGraw-Hill.

——, 1939, "The Effect of Happiness or Unhappiness on Self-Report Regarding Attitudes, Reaction Patterns, and Facts of Personal History," *Psychological Bulletin*, 36:197–202.

TERMAN, LEWIS M., and PAUL BUTTENWIESER, 1935, "Personality Factors in Marital Compatibility," *JSP*, 6:143–171 *ff*.

TERMAN, LEWIS M., and WINIFRED JOHNSON, 1939, "Methodology and Results of Recent Studies in Marital Adjustment," *ASR*, 4:307–324. Reviewed in *BFRE*, 1 (June, 1940), 7.

TERMAN, LEWIS M., and CATHERINE MILES, 1937, *Sex and Personality*, London: McGraw-Hill.

TERRY, GLADYS C., 1929, "A Study of Psychodynamic Patterns," *American Journal of Psychiatry*, 8:881–899.

THOMAS, BARBARA, 1936, "Divorce Grounds and Their Terms in the United States." Unpublished study, Vassar College.

THOMAS, DOROTHY S., 1925, *Social Aspects of the Business Cycle*, Dutton.

THOMAS, W. I., 1923, *The Unadjusted Girl*, Little, Brown (Boston).

THOMAS, W. I., and FLORIAN ZNANIECKI, 1927, *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America*, Knopf, 2 vols.

THOMPSON, WARREN S., 1930, *Population Problems*, McGraw-Hill, London.

—, 1938, "Review of Edin and Hutchinson," 1935, *AJS*, 43:1009–1013.

THOMPSON, WARREN S., and P. K. WHELPTON, 1933, *Population Trends in the United States*, McGraw-Hill.

THOREK, M., 1924, "Experimental Investigations of the Role of the Leydig, Seminiferous, and Sertoli Cells and Effects of Testicular Transplantation," *Endocrinology*, 8:61–90.

THORNDIKE, E. L., 1939, *Your City*, Harcourt, Brace.

THURSTON, FLORA, 1932, *A Bibliography of Family Relationships*, National Council of Parent Education (Poughkeepsie, N. Y.). Out of print.

THURSTONE, L. L., and R. L. JENKINS, 1931, *Order of Birth, Parent-Age, and Intelligence*, University of Chicago.

THURSTONE, L. L., and T. G. THURSTONE, 1930, "A Neurotic Inventory," *JSP*, 1:3–30.

TIEBOUT, HARRY M., 1938, "Mental Hygiene Problems of the College Student," *Preventive Medicine*, 8:188–197.

TILLOTSON, HARRY S., 1931, "Scandinavia's Solution of the Divorce Problem," *Current History*, 34:551–554.

TILSON, M. A., 1929, *Problems of Pre-School Children*, Teachers College Contributions to Education, No. 356.

TÖNNIES, F., 1887, *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft* (Leipzig).

TOOPS, LAURA C., 1929, "The Measurement of Success in Marriage and Parenthood," *Teachers College Record*, 30:579–588.

TOZZER, ALFRED M., 1925, *Social Origins and Social Continuities*, Macmillan, Chap. IV.

TRUEX, RUTH C., 1936, "The Size of Family in Three Generations," *ASR*, 1:581–591.

TYLOR, E. B., 1889, "On a Method of Investigating the Development of Institutions; Applied to Laws of Marriage and Descent," *Journal of Royal Anthropological Institute*, 18:245–272.

UCHARD, MARIO, *French and Oriental Love in a Harem*, Falstaff.

U. S. Bureau of the Census, 1909, *Special Report on Marriage and Divorce*, 1867–1906, Part I (Washington, D.C.).

U. S. Department of Labor, Children's Bureau, 1940, *Proceedings of the White House Conference on Children in a Democracy*, Superintendent of Documents (Washington, D.C.).

U. S. Federal Emergency Relief Administration, 1935, *On Relief* (Washington, D.C.).

U. S. Federal Works Agency, 1940, *Family Unemployment*, Government Printing Office (Washington, D.C.).

U. S. Office of Education, 1940, *A Summary of Achievements to Date in Four Experimental Family Life Education Programs*, Misc. 2,503 (Washington, D.C.).

U. S. Women's Bureau, 1923, *The Share of the Wage-Earning Woman in Family Support* (Washington, D.C.).

UNWIN, J. P., 1934, *Sex and Culture*, Oxford University Press.

—, 1940, *Hopousia: Or the Sexual and Economic Foundations of a New Society*, Oskar Piest (New York City).

USILTON, LIDA J., 1930, "Prevalence of Venereal Disease in the United States," *Venereal Disease Information*, 11:No. 12 (December 20).

VAILE, ROLAND S., and HELEN G. CANOYER, 1938, *Income and Consumption*, Holt.

VEBLEN, THORSTEIN, 1906 (also 1915), *Imperial Germany and the Industrial Revolution*, London: Secker.

VEBLEN, THORSTEIN, 1908, *The Theory of the Leisure Class*, London: Allen & Unwin.
VERNIER, CHESTER G., 1931–1938, *American Family Laws*, 5 vols., Stanford University (Stanford University, California).
VETTER, GEORGE B., 1928, "The Incest Taboos," *JASP*, 23:232–240.
VILLARD, OSWALD GARRISON, 1929, "Russia from a Car Window," *Nation*, 129:515, 542, 576, 619, 654, 712, 777, esp. 657.

WAGGAMAN, MARY T., 1926, "Family Allowances in Foreign Countries," Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bulletin 401, U. S. Department of Labor (Washington, D.C.).
——, 1939, "Family Allowances in 1937 and 1938," *Monthly Labor Review* (May), of the Bureau of Labor Statistics, U. S. Department of Labor (Washington).
WALLENSTEIN, NEHEMIAH, 1937, *Character and Personality of Children from Broken Homes*, Teachers College, Columbia University.
WALLER, WILLARD, 1930, *The Old Love and the New*, London: Amer. Bk.
——, 1937, "The Rating and Dating Complex," *ASR*, 2 727–734.
——, 1938, *The Family, a Dynamic Interpretation*, Cordon.
——, 1940, *War and the Family*, Dryden.
WALPOLE, HUGH R., 1941, *Semantics: The Nature of Words and Their Meanings*, Norton.
WARD, LESTER F., 1903, *Pure Sociology*, Macmillan, London.
WARE, CAROLINE, 1935, *Greenwich Village: 1920–1930*, Houghton Mifflin.
WARNER, A. G., S. A. QUEEN, and E. B. HARPER, 1930, *American Charities and Social Work*, 4th ed., Crowell, p. 333.
WARNER, W. LLOYD, 1937, "The Family and Principles of Kinship Structure in Australia," *ASR*, 2:43–54.
WARNER, W. LLOYD, and PAUL S. LUNT, 1941, *The Social Life of a Modern Community*, Yale University. This is Vol. I of *Yankee City Series*.
WARREN, CONSTANCE, 1940, *A New Design for Women's Education*, Stokes.
WATSON, AMEY E., 1932, "The Reorganization of Household Work," *Annals*, 160: 165–177.
WATSON, GOODWIN B., 1930, A, "Happiness among Adult Students of Education," *Journal of Educational Psychology*, 21 79–109.
——, 1930, B, "Some Factors Related to Happiness," *Ninth Internatl. Congress of Psychology, 1929, Proceedings and Papers*, pp. 473–474.
WATSON, J. B., and L. S. LASHLEY, 1920, "Consensus of Medical Opinion upon Questions Relating to Sex Education and Venereal Disease Campaigns," *Medical Hygiene* (October).
WATSON, MAUD, 1932, *Children and their Parents*, Crofts.
WEBB, SIDNEY, and BEATRICE WEBB, 1936, *Soviet Communism: A New Civilization*, London: Longmans.
WEBER, MAX, 1930, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, London: Allen & Unwin. Translated by Talcott Parsons.
WEEKS, H. ASHLEY, 1940, "An Ecological Description of Divorce in Spokane, Washington," *Research Studies of the State College of Washington*, 8:133–142.
WEININGER, OTTO, 1908, *Sex and Character*, Putnam's.
WEISSENBERG, S., 1925, ["The Sex Life of Russian Women Students"] *Pritomnost*, 2:713 (November 19) (Prague, Czechoslovakia).
WEMBRIDGE, ELEANOR, 1932, "Why Jennie Gets Her Man," *Survey*, 67:364–367.

WESTERMARCK, E. A., 1922, *The History of Human Marriage*, 3 vols., Allerton, 1922; Macmillan, 1929, London.

—, 1936, *The Future of Marriage in Western Civilization*, Macmillan, London.

WHELPTON, P. K., 1935, "Why the Large Rise in the German Birth-Rate?" *AJS*, 41:299–313.

WHETTEN, NATHAN L., 1933, "Education and Size of Family," *Journal of Heredity*, 24:275–278.

WHETTEN, NATHAN L., and WALTER C. MCKAIN, JR., 1937, "A Sociological Analysis of Relief and Non-Relief Families in a Rural Connecticut Town," *Connecticut State College Bulletin 219* (July) (Storrs, Conn.).

WIEHL, DOROTHY, 1938, "A Summary of Data on Reported Incidence of Abortion," *Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly*, 16 (January).

WIETH-KNUDSEN, K. A., 1929, *Understanding Women*, Holt.

WILE, IRA S., 1941, *Sex: In Terms of Personal and Social Hygiene*, National Interfraternity Conference.

— (ed.), 1934, *The Sex Life of the Unmarried Adult*, London : Allen & Unwin.

WILE, IRA S., and ELINOR NOETZEL, 1931, "A Study of Birth Order and Behavior," *JSP*, 2:52–71.

WILE, IRA S., and MARY DAY WINN, 1929 *Marriage in the Modern Manner*, Century.

WILLCOX, WALTER F., 1891, "The Divorce Problem, a Study in Statistics," *Columbia University Studies in History, Economics, and Public Law*, Vol. I.

WILLEY, MALCOLM S., and STUART RICE, 1933, "The Agencies of Communication," in *Recent Social Trends*, McGraw-Hill.

WILLIAMS, ALBERT RHYS, 1937, *The Soviets*, Harcourt, Brace.

WILLIAMS, FAITH, and CARLE C. ZIMMERMAN, 1935, *Studies of Family Living*, U. S. Department of Agriculture, Misc. Pub. 223 (Washington, D.C.).

WILLIAMS, FRANKWOOD E., 1930, *Adolescence*, Farrar and Rinehart.

—, 1934, *Russia, Youth, and the Present-Day World*, Farrar and Rinehart.

WILLIAMS, JAMES MICKEL, 1925, *Our Rural Heritage*, Knopf.

WILLOUGHBY, RAYMOND R., 1930, "The Small Families of Large-Family Advocates," *JSP*, 1:318–319.

—, 1936, "Neuroticism in Marriage" (conclusion of a series of articles), *JSP*, 7:19–48.

—, 1937, *Sexuality in the Second Decade*. Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development, Vol. 2:No. 3, Serial No. 10, National Research Council (Washington, D.C.).

—, 1938, "The Relationship of Emotionality of Age, Sex, and Conjugal Condition," *AJS*, 43:920–931.

WILSON, MAUD, 1929, "Use of Time by Oregon Farm Home-Makers," *Oregon Agricultural Experiment Station*, Bulletin 256.

WINCH, ROBERT, 1941, "Personality Characteristics of Engaged and Married Couples," *AJS*, 46:686–697.

WINSTON, SANFORD, 1932, A, "Some Factors Related to Differential Sex Ratios at Birth," *Human Biology*, 4:272–279.

—, 1932, B, "Birth Control and the Sex Ratio at Birth," *AJS*, 38:225–231.

WITMER, HELEN L., 1929, *The Attitude of Mothers toward Sex Education*, University of Minnesota (Minneapolis).

WITMER, HELEN L., 1934, *The Field of Parent Education,* National Council of Parent Education, Vassar College (Poughkeepsie, N. Y.).

——, 1937, "The Influence of Parental Attitudes on the Social Adjustment of the Individual," *ASR,* 2:756–763.

WOLBARST, A. L., 1931. See his article in *Medical Journal and Record,* 134:5–9, 62–65.

WOLF, ANNA W. M., 1941, *The Parents' Manual,* Simon and Schuster.

WOOD, EDITH ELMER, 1939, *Introduction to Housing, Facts and Principles,* Superintendent of Documents (Washington, D.C.).

WOODHOUSE, CHASE G., 1930, "A Study of 250 Successful Families," *Social Forces,* 8:511–532.

——, 1932, "Does Money Make the Marriage," *Survey Graphic,* 67:355–358.

——, 1938, "Some Trends in Women's Work," *Social Forces,* 16:543–552.

WOODS, F. A., 1903, *Mental and Moral Heredity in Royalty,* Harvard University. Reprinted from *Popular Science Monthly,* August, 1902–April, 1903.

WOOLF, VIRGINIA, 1929, *A Room of One's Own,* London: Hogarth.

YERUSHALMY, J., 1938, "The Effect of Order of Birth and Age of Parents upon Neonatal Mortality," *ASR,* 3:868–872.

YOUNG, DONALD (ed.), 1932, "The Modern American Family," *Annals,* 160 (March).

YOUNG, KIMBALL, 1927, *Source Book for Social Psychology,* Crofts, pp. 374–378.

——, 1930, *Social Psychology,* London: Kegan Paul.

——, 1940, *Personality and the Problems of Adjustment,* London: Kegan Paul.

ZACHRY, CAROLINE B., and MARGARET LIGHTY, 1940, *Emotion and Conduct in Adolescence,* Appleton-Century.

ZIEMER, GREGOR, 1942, "Education for Death," *Reader's Digest* (February), 129–144.

ZIMMERMAN, CARLE C., and MERLE E. FRAMPTON, 1935, *Family and Society,* Van Nostrand.

ZINGG, ROBERT M., 1941, "India's Wolf Children," *Scientific American* (March), 164:135–137.

ZUCKERMAN, S., 1932, *The Social Life of Monkeys and Apes* (American edition), London: Kegan Paul.

NAMES OF JUNIOR AUTHORS AND NAMES OF UNCERTAIN ALPHABETICAL POSITION

ABBOTT, EDITH, see Breckinridge, Sophonisba P.

ALDRICH, MARY M., see Aldrich, C. A.

ALLPORT, F. H., see Katz, D.

AMATRUDA, CATHERINE S., see Gesell, Arnold.

ANDERSON, JOHN E., see Foster, Josephine.

BEACH, DOROTHEA, see Howes, Ethel Puffer.

BEAM, LURA, see Dickinson, Robert L.

BINKLEY, F. W., see Binkley, R. C.

BLINN, ROBERT, see May, Geoffrey.

BOWERS, ANNA M., see Healy, William.

BRITTEN, FLORENCE HAXTON, see Bromley, Dorothy Dunbar.

BRONNER, AUGUSTA F., see Healy, William.
BROOKS, L. M., see Groves, Ernest R.
BROWN, A. RADCLIFFE, see Radcliffe-Brown.
BURGESS, ERNEST W., see Park, Robert A.
BURGESS, J. S., see Gamble, S. D.
BUTTENWEISER, PAUL., see Terman, Lewis M.

CABOT, HUGH, see Smith, Edith L.
CALVERTON, V. F., see Schmalhausen, S. D.
CANOYER, HELEN G., see Vaile, Roland S.
CARPENTER, NILES, see Bailey, Grace.
COON, BEULAH I., see Goodykoontz, Bess.
COTTRELL, LEONARD S., JR., see Burgess, Ernest W.

DEUEL, H. J., see Glass, S. J.
DILLON, THELMA, see Bossard, James H. S.
DI MARIO, MARIE, see Clarke, Charles W.
DOLLARD, JOHN, see Davis, Allison.

EDWARDS, MARY S., see Clarke, Charles W.
ELLIOTT, MABEL A., see Merrill, Francis E.
EVANS, WAINWRIGHT, see Lindsey, Benjamin B.

FAIRCHILD, MILDRED, see Kingsbury, Susan M.
FOLSOM, JOSEPH K., see Davis, Muriel.
FOSTER, ROBERT G., see Sanderson, Dwight.
FRAMPTON, MERLE E., see Zimmerman, Carle C.

GALPIN, CHARLES J., see Sorokin, Pitirim A.
GAMBLE, CLARENCE J., see Beebe, Gilbert W.
GETTYS, W. E., see Dawson, C. A.
GINSBERG, M., see Hobhouse, L. T.
GIVENS, MEREDITH B., see Hurlin, Ralph G.
GLOVER, R. J., see O'Neill, E. F.
GROVES, GLADYS H., see Groves, Ernest R.
GRUENBERG, BENJAMIN C., see Gruenberg, Sidonie M.

HAINES, ALICE R., see Hopkins, Cornelia.
HALL, FRED S., see Richmond, Mary E.
HAMIL, B. M., see Childers, A. T.
HARPER, E. B., see Warner, A. G.
HARPER, ELSIE, see Coit, Eleanor.
HART, ELLA B., see Hart, Hornell.
HUTCHINSON, EDWARD P., see Edin, Karl A.

JENKINS, R. L., see Thurstone, L. L.
JOHNSON, WINIFRED, see Terman, Lewis M.
JONES, D. F., see East, Edward M.

KAUKONEN, J. L., see Gruenberg, Benjamin C.
KENNEDY, RUBY JO, see Reeves, Ruby Jo; Davie, M. R.; Parten, Mildred.
KENWORTHY, MARION E., see Lee, Porter R.
KIMBALL, SOLON T., see Arensburg, Conrad M.
KINSIE, P. M., see Johnson, Bascom.
KISER, LOUISE K., see Lorimer, Frank.
KOMAROVSKY, MIRRA, see Lundberg, G. A.

LASHLEY, L. S., see Watson, J. B.
LAZARSFELD, PAUL F., see Stouffer, Samuel A.
LEAHY, A. M., see Goodenough, F. L.
LENROOT, KATHERINE, see Lundberg, Emma O.
LEVENTHAL, MICHAEL L., see Stein, Irving F.
LIGHTY, MARGARET, see Zachry, Caroline B.
LINTON, RALPH, see Kardiner, Abram.
LIPPITT, ROLAND, see Lewin, Kurt.
LUITWEILER, MARION, see Bassett, Marion.
LUNT, PAUL S., see Warner, W. Lloyd.
LYND, HELEN M., see Lynd, Robert S.

MCCALMONT, ELIZABETH, see Aronovici, Carol.
MACGOWAN, KENNETH, see Hamilton, G. V.
MCINERNY, MARY A., see Lundberg, G. A.
MCKAIN, WALTER C., JR., see Whetten, Nathan L.
MCKAY, HENRY D., see Shaw, Clifford.
MANASSES, CAROLYN, see Blanchard, Phyllis.
MAY, GEOFFREY, see Marshall, Leon C.
MERRILL, FRANCIS E., see Elliott, Mabel A.
MILES, CATHERINE, see Terman, Lewis M.
MORGAN, C. MARGARET, see Folsom, Joseph K.
MOSELEY, JESSIF O., see Hausheer, Herman.
MOWRER, HARRIET R., see Mowrer, Ernest R.
MUNROE, RUTH, see Levy, John.
MURPHY, LOIS, see Murphy, Gardner.

NEWCOMB, THEODORE M., see Murphy, Gardner.
NIMKOFF, MEYER F., see Ogburn, William.
NOLTZEL, ELINOR, see Wile, Ira S.
NOTESTEIN, FRANK W., see Stix, Regine.

OGBURN, WILLIAM F., see Groves, Ernest R.

PARKS, BARBARA, see Goodman, Ruth T.
PELL, BETTY, see Cuber, John F.
PERROT, G. ST. J., see Sydenstricker, Edgar.

QUEEN, S. A., see Warner, A. G.

RANCK, KATHERINE HOWLAND, see Cavan, Ruth Shonle.
REEVES, RUBY JO, see Davie, Maurice R.; Parten, Mildred.
REYNOLDS, CHARLES N., see Hayner, Norman S.
RICE, STUART, see Willey, Malcolm S.
ROCK, JOHN, see Fleck, Stephen.
ROSAHN, BEATRICE, see Goldfeld, Abraham.
ROSS, EDWARD A., see Baber, Ray E.
ROUGEMONT, DENIS DE, see de Rougemont.
RUNNER, JESSIE R., see Reuter, Edward B.
RUSSELL, DORA, see Russell, Bertrand.

SCHMALHAUSEN, S. D., see Calverton, V. F.
SCHWEINITZ, KARL DE, see De Schweinitz.
SHEFFIELD, ADA E., see Myrick, Helen L.
SHIELDS, WILMER, see Hart, Hornell.
SNEDEKER, ELIZABETH F., see Fleck, Stephen.
SPENCER, LYLE M., see Stouffer, Samuel A.
STAPLES, RUTH, see Gray, Greta.
STEELE, MARION H., see Rockwood, Lemo Dennis.

TAEUBER, IRENE B., see Taeuber, Conrad.
TERMAN, LEWIS M., see Johnson, Winnifred B.
THURSTONE, T. G., see Thurstone, L. L.
TIBBITTS, CLARK, see Ogburn, William F.
TOCQUEVILLE DE, see DeTocqueville.

UPDEGRAFF, RUTH, see Skeels, Harold M.
USILTON, LIDA J., see Parran, Thomas.

VERNON, PHILIP E., see Allport, Gordon W.

WADSWORTH, G. W., JR., see Humm, Doncaster G.
WALKER, J. O., see Hudson, R. B.
WANG, CHENG, see La Piere, R. T.
WARNER, W. LLOYD, see Davis, Kingsley.
WEBB, BEATRICE, see Webb, Sidney.
WEIL, SUZANNE, see Lukens, Margaret.
WELLMAN, BETH L., see Skeels, Harold M.
WELLS, F. L., see Peck, M. W.
WHEELER, G. C., see Hobhouse, L. T.
WHELPTON, P. K., see Thompson, Warren S.
WHETTEN, N. L., see McKain, Walter C.
WHITE, MATILDA, see Riley, John W.
WHITE, RALPH K., see Lewin, Kurt.
WHITNEY, LEON, see Huntington, Ellsworth.
WHYTE, ANNE H., see Rosenow, Curt.
WICKS, DONNA, see Popenoe, Paul.
WIEHL, DOROTHY G., see Stix, Regine K.
WILLIAMS, HAROLD M., see Skeels, Harold M.

WILSON, PAULINE P., see Foster, Robert G.
WINN, MARY DAY, see Wile, Ira S.
WINSTON, ELLEN, see Lorimer, Frank.
WOROSCHBIT, A. J., see Gurewitsch, Z. A.
WRIGHT, C. A., see Glass, S. J.

ZIMMERMAN, CARLE C., see Williams, Faith; Sorokin, Pitirim A.
ZNANIECKI, FLORIAN, see Thomas, W. I.

INDEX OF NAMES

The Preface, Appendices, and Bibliography are not indexed.

A

Abraham, 209, 367
Adam, 89, 567
Adams, James Truslow, 121
Adams, Romanzo, 425
Adams, Ruth, 493
Albrecht, Hans, 556
Alger, Horatio, 569, 617
Allport, Floyd W., 368, 390, 550
Allport, Gordon W., 304, 307, 325, 512
Alverdes, F., 216
Anderson, C. Arnold, 420
Anderson, John E., 338
Anderson, Nels, 142, 319
Anderson, Sherwood, 516
Anderson, W. A., 135
Andreas, 91
Andrews, Benjamin R., 347, 578
Andrus, Ruth, 358, 362
Angell, Robert C., 136, 137
Arensburg, Conrad M., 99
Aretino, Pietro, 378
Aristotle, 166, 209
Arkwright, 249
Arnold, Hannah Burr Polk, 113
Arnold, Matthew, 618
Aronovici, Carol, 570, 575

B

Babbitt, Ray E., 121, 122, 425, 426, 471, 478, 504, 515, 517, 518
Bachofen, 209
Bailey, Grace, 480
Ballinger, 492
Bane, Lita, 613
Banker, H. J., 493
Barash, M., 556
Barnard, Florence, 127
Barnes, 340
Barnouw, A. J., 281
Bartlett, George A., 432
Basslt, Marion (Luthweiler), 465, 568, 587 ff., 593, 599, 611, 662
Bauer, Catherine, 570
Baxter, Celina A., 101
Beam, Lura, 373, 411
Beard, Charles, 121
Bechterev, 203
Becker, Howard, 226
Belbe, Gilbert W., 259
Beers, Howard W., 133
Bell, Howard M., 282, 511
Benedict, Ruth, 50 ff., 236, 627
Benoit-Smullyan, Emile, 83
Berger, Meyer, 529
Bernard, Jessie, 401, 411, 412, 414, 419, 480
Berry, G. H., 582
Besant, Annie, 255
Bhasa, 55
Bigelow, Maurice, 655
Binkley, F. W., 284, 432, 457
Binkley, R. C., 432, 457
Black, Clementina, 610
Blanchard, Phyllis, 282, 549
Blomberg, von, 196
Blum, Leon, 516
Boccaccio, 92, 516
Boggess, Virginia, 341
Bohannon, E. W., 330
Bonapart, Joseph, 334
Boone, Gladys, 597
Borsodi, Ralph, 154, 571, 572
Bosanquet, Helen, 96

Bossard, James H. S., 420, 477, 480, 481, 483, 484, 510, 516
Bradlaugh, Charles, 255
Bréal, Michel, 166
Breckinridge, Sophonisba P., 178, 432
Breen, Mary J., 535
Breufr, Joseph, 164
Bridgman, Ralph P., 644
Briffault, Robert, 91, 212, 216
Brim, Frieda, 416
Britten, Florence Haxton, 372, 389, 516, 552, 564
Bromley, Dorothy Dunbar, 372, 389, 519, 523, 546, 552, 564, 565
Bronner, Augusta F., 308, 309
Brown, Clara, 533
Browning, Elizabeth, 630
Browning, Robert, 630
Brunk, Christine, 338
Buck, Pearl, 634
Burgess, Ernest W., 42, 141, 171, 235, 412 *ff.*, 416, 417, 628, 648
Burgess, J. S., 107
Burks, Barbara S., 328
Butler, 546
Butterfield, Oliver M., 656

C

Caesar, Julius, 89, 148
Cahen, Alfred, 419, 502 *ff.*, 506 *ff.*, 513, 514, 516, 518
Callaghan, Judge, 519
Calverton, V. F., 144, 212, 215, 546
Campbell, Marian, 333
Canby, Henry Seidel, 182, 183
Caplow, Theodore, 405
Capper, Senator, 521
Carden, Marie, 644
Carlier, Edmond, 123
Carlson, A. J., 296
Carpenter, C. R., 397
Carpenter, Niles, 101, 480
Carr, Lowell J., 132
Carr-Saunders, 78, 261, 273, 281
Cary, William H., 284
Castberg, John, 561
Catt, Carrie Chapman, 620
Cattell, J. McKeen, 277
Cavan, Ruth Shonle, 136
Cervantes, 545
Chaddock, Robert E., 508
Chamberlin, William H., 199, 200
Chapin, F. Stuart, 577
Charles, Enid, 286
Charters, W. W., 549
Chesterton, G. K., 249
Chevalier, Michael, 122, 123
Childers, A. T., 338
Clark, Marjorie R., 606
Clarke, Charles W., 638
Clarke, Helen, 638
Clarke, Helen I., 561
Clawson, Joseph, 541 *ff.*
Cleisthenes, 176
Coit, Eleanor, 613
Collins, J. E., 279
Comstock, Anthony, 256, 257
Cooley, C. H., 327
Coon, Beulah I., 650
Copernicus, 162, 163
Cottrell, Leonard S., Jr., 287, 412 *ff.*, 417, 438, 628
Coughlin, Father, 247
Cox, Harold, 275
Cox, Oliver C., 489
Crane, Judge, 256
Cromwell, Oliver, 496, 499
Cuber, John F., 550
Cutler, Janet, 435

D

Daniel, G., 102
Dann, Robert H., 277
Darwin, Charles, 163, 210, 263, 546
David-Schwartz, H., 429
Davie, Maurice R., 420
Davis, Allison, 329, 343
Davis, Katherine B., 260, 373, 385, 410 411
Davis, Kingsley, 67, 182, 327, 395, 562
Davis, Mary Dabney, 647
Davis, Murifl, 422
Dawson, C. A., 186
Dayton, Neil A., 278, 418
Deardorff, Neva R., 441
Dell, Floyd, 404, 523, 546, 664

DENNISON, CHARLES PUGH, 282; 285
DENNY, HAROLD, 201
DE PORTE, J. V., 421
DE ROUGEMONT, DENIS, 91, 402, 545
DE TOCQUEVILLE, ALEXIS, 122, 126
DEUEL, H. J., 384
DEWEES, L., 259
DEWEY, JOHN, 327
DICKINSON, ROBERT L., 80, 258, 260, 411
DIKE, S. W., 503
DILLON, THELMA, 516
DI MARIO, MARIE (with Clarke), 638
DOLLARD, JOHN, 329
DOS PASSOS, JOHN, 435
DOWNEY, JUNE, 305
DOWNING, ELEANOR, 158, 489
DREISER, THEODORE, 546
DURANTY, WALTER, 198
DYSINGER, W. S., 548

E

EARLE, ALICE M., 119
EAST, EDWARD M., 255, 271, 393
EDIN, KARL A., 281
EDISON, THOMAS, 546
EDWARDS, ALBA M., 591 *ff.*
EDWARDS, JONATHAN, 119, 234
EDWARDS, MARY S., 638
ELIOT, MARTHA M., 660
ELIOT, THOMAS D., 406
ELIZABETH, QUEEN, 92, 561
ELLIOTT, MABEL A., 510, 553, 555, 557, 559, 560
ELLIS, HAVELOCK, 408, 626
ELMER, MANUEL, 418
ELNETT, ELAINE, 203
ELY, RICHARD, 173
ERNST, MORRIS L., 256
EVANS, WAINWRIGHT, 555
EVE, 89, 567

F

FAIRCHILD, HENRY P., 443
FAIRCHILD, MILDRED, 197, 199, 200, 201
FARIS, ELLSWORTH, 327
FERENCZI, 442
FERNALD, W. E., 264
FIELD, ALICE, 201
FIGGE, MARGARET, 338
FISHER, DOROTHY CANFIELD, 186
FISHER, MARY, 617
FLANAGAN, JOHN C., 282, 285
FLECK, STEPHEN, 259
FLÜGEL, J. C., 371, 393, 394
FOLEY, PATRICIA, 338, 340
FOLSOM, JOSEPH K., 49, 50, 171, 185, 282, 296, 309, 422, 535, 604, 618, 641, 645 *ff.*, 657
FORD, CLELLAN S., 626
FORTUNE, REO F., 79, 80
FOSDICK, HARRY EMERSON, 121
FOSTER, JOSEPHINE, 338
FOSTER, ROBERT G., 133, 450, 598, 646
FOSTER, S., 332
FRAMPTON, MERLE E., 94, 95, 218, 219, 254, 572
FRANK, LAWRENCE K., 160, 162, 164, 165, 253, 363, 529
FRANKLIN, BENJAMIN, 119
FRAZIER, E. FRANKLIN, 141, 142
FREUD, SIGMUND, 106, 162, 163, 166, 310, 311, 367 *ff.*, 380, 385, 386, 389, 390, 394, 546, 669
FROMM, ERICH, 243, 314, 679, 680

G

GALILEO, 163, 322
GALLOWAY, T. W., 655
GALLUP, 267
GALPIN, C. J., 507, 510
GALSWORTHY, JOHN, 435
GAMBLE, CLARENCE J., 259
GAMBLE, S. D., 107
GARVEY, C. LEROY, 424
GERSTEN, HERBERT, 543
GESELL, ARNOLD, 326
GETTYS, W. E., 186
GIDE, ANDRÉ, 435
GILBRETH, LILLIAN M., 601
GILLIN, JOHN L., 510
GILMAN, CHARLOTTE PERKINS, 620
GINSBERG, M., 58, 61 *ff.*, 213, 214, 400
GIVENS, MEREDITH G., 160
GLASS, DAVID V., 288
GLASS, S. J., 384

Glick, Paul C., 136
Glover, R. J., 509
Glueck, Bernard, 387
Goodman, Ruth T., 527
Goodsell, Willystine, 87, 494, 560
Goodykoontz, Bess, 650
Gray, Greta, 576
Greenbie, Marjorie B., 408
Groves, Ernest R., 445, 446, 451, 469, 470, 475, 479, 481, 488, 511, 514, 517, 518, 523, 557, 648
Groves, Gladys Hoagland, 674
Grünfeld, Judith, 195
Guett, Dr., 264
Gurewitsch, Z. A., 557

H

Haines, Alice R., 329, 338
Hall, Calvin, 508
Hall, Fred S., 469, 472
Hall, G. Stanley, 294, 330
Hamil, B. M., 338
Hamilton, G. V., 80, 260, 373 *ff.*, 386, 387, 401, 404, 410, 432, 436 *ff.*, 546, 547, 549, 555
Handman, Max S., 262
Hankins, Frank H., 114, 262, 283, 497, 498
Hanscom, Elizabeth D., 120
Harding, Esther, 562, 563
Hardy, Thomas, 546
Harper, E. B., 639, 643
Harper, Elsie, 613
Harper, R. M., 493
Hart, Ella B., 551
Hart, Hornell, 157, 179, 235, 472, 473, 494, 508, 548, 551, 556
Hart, Moss, 623
Hartley, C. Gasquoine (Mrs. Gallichan), 86
Harvey, O. L., 373, 540, 554
Harvey, P. N., 474
Hausheer, Herman, 529
Hayes, Cardinal, 265
Hayes, Samuel P., 331
Heagney, Muriel, 606
Healy, William, 308, 309, 367, 371, 643
Hecke, Wilhelm, 101
Helton, Roy, 347
Henty, 617
Herbert, A. P., 497
Herodotus, 86
Hickson, Dr. W. J., 419
Himes, Norman E., 162, 255, 260, 261
Hindus, Maurice B., 197, 556
Hipponax, 87
Hitler, 96, 193, 237
Hixenbaugh, Elinor R., 508
Hobhouse, L. T., 1, 56, 58, 61 *ff.*, 70 *ff.*, 213, 214, 400, 674
Hodgkiss, M., 333
Hoffman, C. W., 519
Hogben, Lancelot, 572
Hollingworth, Leta S., 626
Homer, 209
Hood, Thomas, 173
Hooker, Elbert L., 531, 547
Hopkins, Cornelia, 329, 338
Hopkins, Governor, 120
Horney, Karen, 313 *ff.*, 371, 374, 386, 448
Houdlette, Harriet Ahlers, 170, 173, 604
Hough, Elizabeth, 338
Howes, Ethel Puffer, 619
Humm, Doncaster G., 305
Humphrey, Don D., 138
Hunt, Jane, 620
Hunt, Thomas C., 491
Huntington, Ellsworth, 278
Hurlin, Ralph G., 160
Husek, J., 58, 97, 101, 530
Hutchinson, Edward P., 281
Huxley, Aldous L., 435, 670

I

Ibsen, Henrik, 546
Irving, Washington, 119, 120
Iseult, 91, 544
Iwasaki, Yasu, 114

J

James, William, 251
Jefferson, Thomas, 253, 340
Jenkins, R. L., 331

Jesus, 88, 164
Jochelson, W., 59
Johnson, Bascom, 471, 554
Johnson, Harriet M., 647
Johnson, Winnifred B., 415, 419, 427, 625
Jones, D. F., 393
Jones, H. E., 421, 422
Joyce, James, 546
Judd, Charles H., 183
Jung, Carl J., 371

K

Kahn, Ernst, 421
Kardiner, Abram, 52, 73, 76, 126
Karezza, Madame, 143, 373, 674
Karpinos, Bernard D., 277
Keliher, Alice V., 353
Kelley, E. Lowell, 416, 542
Kempf, E. J., 390, 392
Kent, 422
Kephart, Horace, 140
Kepler, 163
Keppel, Frederick P., 155
Kern, Marjorie Dobbins, 124
Key, Ellen, 182
Keyserling, Count Hermann, 108, 432, 666
Kimball, Solon T., 99
Kingsbury, Susan M., 197, 199, 200
Kinsey, Alfred C., 384
Kinsie, P. M., 554
Kipling, Rudyard, 111
Kirkpatrick, Clifford, 405, 426, 440, 621, 622
Kiser, Clyde V., 277
Kiser, Louise K., 271, 272, 277, 290, 607
Kleegman, Sophia J., 266, 375
Klein, E., 340
Klineberg, Otto, 280
Knaus, Herman, 259, 260
Kneeland, Hildegarde, 100, 152, 579, 596
Knight, M. M., 522
Knowlton, Charles, 255
Knox, John, 93
Komarovsky, Mirra, 132, 137, 151, 158, 159
Kopp, Marie, 263, 264
Korzybski, Alfred, 166
Kretschmer, E., 424
Kroeber, A. L., 46, 51
Kross, Anna, 557
Krout, Maurice, 331, 332
Kulp, Daniel H., 59, 106, 108 *ff.*, 176
Kyrk, Hazel, 578 *ff.*, 582, 593, 594

L

Lafollette, Cecile T., 615
Lamson, Herbert D., 274
Landis, Carney, 373, 374, 388, 389, 547
Landsteiner, 561
Lang, R. O., 414
Langdon, Grace, 647
Langdon-Davies, John, 104
La Piere, R. T., 98
Lawrence, D. H., 79, 435
Lawrence, H. W., 118, 119
Laws, Gertrude, 358
Lazarsfeld, Paul F., 137
Leahy, A. M., 330, 311
Le Corbusier, 578
Lee, 422
Lee, Ivy, 198, 200
Lee, Mary, 511
Leevy, J. Roy, 512
Lehman, Herbert H., 518
Lenin, 198, 202
Lenroot, Katherine, 560
LePlay, Pierre Guillaume Frederic, 94, 95, 218, 219, 236 *ff.*
Lesser, A., 70
Leventhal, Michael L., 284
Levine, Maurice, 292, 294
Levy, Elaine, 423
Levy, John, 329, 338, 339, 342, 343, 352, 357, 416
Lewenberg, Martha, 338
Lewin, Kurt, 348
Lewis, Harry A., 519
Lewis, Sinclair, 435
Lewisohn, Ludwig, 196
Leyburn, James G., 526
Lichtenberger, James P., 418, 498, 503, 514, 515, 518, 521
Lindeman, Eduard C., 647
Lindquist, Ruth, 594
Lindsey, Benjamin B., 432, 522, 523, 555

LINTON, RALPH, 52, 53, 73, 76, 126
LIPPITT, ROLAND, 348
LONG, 250
LOOMIS, CHARLES P., 136, 479
LORIMER, FRANK, 271, 272, 277, 290, 607
LOTKA, ALFRED J., 272
LOWELL, JAMES RUSSELL, 218
LOWIE, ROBERT L., 55, 57 *ff.*, 61 *ff.*, 66 *ff.*, 212, 213, 215
LUBBOCK, 210
LUBLINSKY, PAUL, 498
LUKENS, MARGARET, 481
LUNACHARSKY, A., 199
LUND, FREDERICK L., 296 *ff.*, 354, 366
LUNDBERG, EMMA O., 560
LUNDBERG, G. A., 132, 151, 158, 159, 597
LUNT, PAUL S., 130, 605
LUTHER, MARTIN, 92
LYND, HELEN M., 57, 100, 124, 129 *ff.*, 154, 156, 189, 260, 343, 345 *ff.*, 547, 582, 596
LYND, ROBERT S., 57, 100, 124, 129 *ff.*, 154, 156, 172, 189, 241, 260, 343, 345 *ff.*, 547, 582, 596

M

MACGOWAN, KENNETH, 549
MACIVER, ROBERT M., 191
MCCLURE, W. E., 560
MCCORMICK, ANNE, 200, 201
MCDOUGALL, WILLIAM, 376
MCGARRAGHY, F. L., 157
MCINERNY, MARY A., 132, 151, 158, 159
MCKAIN, WALTER C., 287
MCKAY, H. D., 333
MCKENZIE, R. D., 158, 172, 569
MCLENNAN, J. F., 210
MAIER, NORMAN R. F., 294, 586
MAINE, SIR HENRY, 209
MALINOWSKI, BRONISLAW, 1, 40, 52, 84, 212, 215, 389
MALLER, J. B., 330
MALTHUS, 78, 254, 255
MANASSES, CAROLYN, 282, 549
MARSHALL, LEON C., 506, 507, 513
MARSTON, WILLIAM M., 627
MARTIN, LILLIEN J., 187, 641
MARVIN, DONALD M., 421
MARX, KARL, 146, 147, 202, 231, 241, 249, 454
MATHER, COTTON, 118
MATSNER, ERIC, 260
MAUGHAM, W. SOMERSET, 99
MAY, GEOFFREY, 506, 507, 513, 516, 519
MEAD, LAURA L., 327, 329
MEAD, MARGARET, 58, 75, 78, 81, 82, 179, 294, 295, 305, 334, 350, 624, 627, 631
MEEK, MARCELLUS W., 540
MENDEL, 263
MERRILL, FRANCIS E., 510, 553, 555, 557, 559, 560
MESSER, MARY BURT, 86
MILES, CATHERINE, 625
MILL, JOHN STUART, 620
MILLAY, EDNA ST. VINCENT, 457
MILLER, GERRIT S., 216
MILLER, HERBERT A., 232
MILLS, 157
MILLS, JOHN, JR., 622
MILTON, JOHN, 93, 499
MINER, HORACE, 138
MIRA, EMILIO, 101
MITCHELL, FRANCES, 535
MONAHAN, THOMAS P., 507
MONROE, DAY, 153
MOOREES, V., 421
MORENO, J. L., 453, 534
MORGAN, CHRISTINE MARGARET, 125, 128, 640, 641
MORGAN, LEWIS H., 67, 210 *ff.*
MOSELEY, JESSIE O., 529
MOTT, LUCRETIA, 620
MOWRER, ERNEST R., 131, 151, 177, 178, 181, 344, 430, 432, 440, 451, 498, 509 *ff.*
MOWRER, HARRIET R., 387, 418, 429, 437, 442, 444, 445, 451, 452
MUDGETT, MILDRED D., 472
MÜLLER-LYER, F., 220, 221
MUNROE, RUTH, 352, 446
MUNTZ, EARLE, 570
MURDOCK, GEORGE P., 46
MURPHY, GARDNER and LOIS, 43, 279, 333
MUSSOLINI, BENITO, 237
MYERSON, ABRAHAM, 265, 586
MYRDAL, ALVA, 204 *ff.*
MYRDAL, GUNNAR, 239, 240
MYRICK, HELEN L., 451, 452

N

Napoleon, 93, 96
Neely, Wayne C., 282, 526, 527
Nelson, Janet Fowler, 480, 616
Nemilov, A., 628
Neumann, Henry, 548
Newberg, Dorothy, 532
Newcomb, Theodore, 189
Newcomen, 249
Newcomer, Mabel, 493, 511
Newton, 163
Niebuhr, Reinhold, 226
Nienburg, Bertha M., 153
Nietzsche, 203
Noetzel, Elinor, 331
Norton, John K., 652
Notestein, Frank W., 258, 274, 281, 482, 483
Nowlin, Genevieve A., 604
Noyes, John Humphrey, 143, 144

O

O'Brien, Judge, 468
Ogburn, William F., 134, 147, 148, 152, 153, 155 *ff.*, 218, 411, 445, 475, 479, 481, 487 *ff.*, 502, 505, 506, 511, 514, 518
Ogden, 166
Ogino, K., 259, 260
O'Neill, E. F., 509
Osborn, Frederick, 276, 278, 279, 283

P

Pangburn, Weaver, 539
Parker, Ida R., 560
Parks, Barbara, 527
Parran, Thomas, 638
Parsley, M., 331
Parten, Mildrel, 134, 135
Patten, Simon, 292
Patterson, S. H., 509
Pavlov, I. P., 43, 162 *ff.*, 203, 546
Pearl, Raymond, 259 *ff.*, 373
Pearson, Gerald H. J., 338, 351
Pearson, Karl, 421, 422
Peck, M. W., 556
Pell, Betty, 550
Perrot, G. St. J., 276
Peters, Charles C., 185, 245, 548
Petrarch, 545
Phillips, H. A., 115
Phillips, John C., 276, 278, 282, 494
Phillips, Nancy, 616
Pierce, Rep., 267
Pinkerton, Kathrene, 465
Pinkevich, A. P., 557
Pius XI, Pope, 263
Place, Francis, 255
Plant, James S., 151, 156, 173, 329, 350, 531
Plato, 209, 563
Popenoe, Paul, 417, 437, 473, 490, 495, 518, 530, 535, 539, 540, 622
Pratt, George K., 448, 540
Pressey, Lufula C., 542
Pringle, Henry F., 548
Pruette, Lorine, 616
Punke, Harold H., 494
Puth, Mrs. Leonard, 543

Q

Quinn, S. A., 639, 643

R

Rabelais, 546
Radcliffe-Brown, 52
Ranck, Katherine Howland, 136
Randolph, 140
Rank, Otto, 313
Ratzel, Friedrich, 162, 165
Reed, Lowell J., 287
Reed, Ruth, 559, 560
Reeves, Ruby Jo, 135, 420
Reich, Wilhelm, 79, 202, 668, 669
Reid, 578
Reitman, Ben, 554 *ff.*
Reuter, Edward B., 432, 441
Rice, Stuart, 155
Rich, H. Thompson, 653
Richards, Ellen, 600
Richards, I. A., 166
Richmond, Mary E., 469, 472
Riemer, Svend, 204, 577
Robishaw, Ruth A., 259

ROCKWOOD, LEMO DENNIS, 450
ROHEIM, G., 80
ROLLINS, W. A., 276
ROMAINS, JULES, 435
ROMULUS, 209
ROOSEVELT, THEODORE, 271
ROSANOFF, 422
ROSENOW, CURT, 331
ROSS, EDWARD A., 271, 478
ROUSSEAU, 84, 545
RUBINOW, I. M., 507, 518
RUCKMICK, C. A., 548
RUNNER, JESSIE R., 432, 441
RUSSELL, BERTRAND, 221, 245, 246
RUSSELL, DORA, 245, 246, 566
RUSSELL, O. D., 114

S

SAINT PAUL, 89
SALMON, THOMAS W., 357
SALVESEN, LORD, 497
SANDERSON, DWIGHT, 133, 450, 507
SANGER, MARGARET, 249, 256
SAPIR, EDWARD, 51, 52, 203
SARDA, 111
SCHILLER, BELLE, 422
SCHOTTLAND, CHARLES P., 659
SCHURTZ, 75
SCHUSTER, 422
SCOPES, JOHN T., 163
SEAGLE, WILLIAM, 472
SENDER, S., 342
SEWALL, M., 332
SEWALL, SAMUEL, 120
SHAW, CLIFFORD, 318, 320, 328, 329, 333
SHEFFIELD, ADA E., 452, 462
SHIELDS, WILMER, 472, 473
SINGH, J. A. L., 327
SKEELS, HAROLD M., 280, 328
SKODAK, MARIE, 327, 328
SMALLEY, R. E., 332
SMITH, ELIOT, 46
SMITH, MAPHEUS, 421
SMITH, PAYSON, 127
SOCRATES, 87
SPENCER, HERBERT, 51, 84, 210, 212, 220, 252
SPENCER, LYLE M., 475, 505
SPENGLER, J. J., 218
SPRANGER, EDWARD, 306, 307, 325
STANTON, ELIZABETH CADY, 521, 620
STAPLES, RUTH, 576
STECKEL, MINNIE L., 331
STEEL, MARION, 450
STEIN, CLARENCE S., 574
STEIN, IRVING F., 284
STEINER, JESSE F., 155, 156, 555, 560
STERN, BERNHARD J., 119
STIEBELING, HAZEL K., 637
STIX, REGINE K., 258, 259, 261
STODDARD, GEORGE D., 280
STONE, C. P., 296, 372
STOUFFER, SAMUEL A., 137, 281, 475
STREET, MRS. ELWOOD, 480
STRONG, 415
STRUMILIN, 199
STUART, J. C., 331
SUMMER, WILLIAM GRAHAM, 101
SWANTON, J. R., 212
SYDENSTRICKER, EDGAR, 160, 161, 276
SYMONDS, PERCIVAL M., 336, 337

T

TAEUBER, CONRAD, 262
TAEUBER, IRENE, 262
TAGORE, RABINDRANATH, 108
TAUSSIG, FREDERICK J., 261
TAYLOR, KATHARINE W., 351, 359
TAYLOR, W. S., 312
TERMAN, LEWIS M., 80, 373 *ff.*, 401, 412 *ff.*, 417 *ff.*, 427, 436, 437, 473, 546 *ff.*, 551, 555, 625, 627, 630
TERRY, GLADYS C., 386
THARP, BERTHA B., 494
THEODOSIUS, 89
THOMAS, BARBARA, 500
THOMAS, DOROTHY S., 475
THOMAS, W. I., 94, 141, 306
THOMPSON, WARREN S., 161, 262, 273 *ff.*, 281, 290, 291, 479 *ff.*
THOREK, M., 296
THURSTONE, L. L., 331, 416
TIEBOUT, HARRY M., 351
TILLOTSON, HARRY S., 498
TILSON, M. A., 338
TODD, JANE, 518

Tönnies, F., 226
Townsend, Francis, 641
Tozzer, Alfred M., 66, 209
Tristan, 91, 544, 545
Tylor, E. B., 68, 69, 71, 75, 210 *ff.*

U

Undset, Sigrid, 436
Unwin, J. P., 674
Usilton, Lida J., 638

V

Van Kleeck, Miss, 492
Veblen, Thorstein, 105, 170
Vernon, Philip E., 307, 325
Vetter, George B., 394
Villard, Oswald Garrison, 198

W

Wadsworth, G. W., Jr., 305
Waggaman, Mary T., 606
Wagner, Richard, 545
Wallenstein, Nehemiah, 333
Waller, Willard, 432, 439, 446, 448, 462, 517, 531
Wallin, 416
Walpole, Hugh R., 48
Wang, Cheng, 98
Ward, Lester F., 179, 218, 292
Ware, Caroline, 51, 141
Warner, A. G., 639, 643
Warner, W. Lloyd, 67, 68, 130, 605
Warren, Constance, 646
Wassermann, Jakob, 435
Watt, James, 249
Weber, Max, 92, 147
Weil, Suzanne, 481
Weininger, Otto, 633
Weissenberg, S., 557
Welby, Lady, 166
Wellman, Beth L., 280
Wells, F. L., 556
Wembridge, Eleanor, 190
Wescott, Glenway, 435
Westermarck, E. A., 84, 211, 212, 393
Wharton, Don, 625
Wheeler, G. C., 1, 58, 61 *ff.*, 72, 213, 214, 400
Whelpton, P. K., 262, 273, 276, 287, 479 *ff.*, 485, 486, 490
Whitten, Nathan L., 287
White, Ralph K., 318
Whitney, Leon, 278
Wicks, Donna, 417
Wirth, Dorothy, 261
Wirth-Knudsen, K. A., 104
Wise, Ira S., 331, 516
Willcox, Walter F., 507, 514
Willey, Malcolm S., 155
Williams, Faith, 152
Williams, Frankwood E., 357
Williams, James Mickel, 127
Willoughby, Raymond R., 277, 372
Wilson, Maud, 581, 594
Wilson, Pauline P., 598, 646
Winch, Robert, 416
Winston, Ellen, 271, 272, 277, 290, 607
Winston, Sanford, 261
Winthrop, Governor, 120
Wissler, Clark, 76, 165
Witmer, Helen L., 335, 340, 341, 655
Wolbarst, A. L., 103
Wolf, Jane, 135
Wolfsohn-Craig, 620, 634
Wood, Edith Elmer, 574
Woodhouse, Chase G., 440, 450
Woods, F. A., 421
Woroschbil, 557
Wright, C. A., 384

Y

Young, Brigham, 142
Young, Donald, 492
Young, Kimball, 313, 361

Z

Zelenko, 199
Zirmir, Grigor, 240, 269
Zimmerman, Carle C., 94, 95, 218, 219, 254, 507, 510, 572
Zingg, Robert M., 327
Znaniecki, Florian, 94, 141
Zuckerman, S., 216, 217, 373

INDEX OF SUBJECTS

The Preface and Appendices, including Bibliography, are not indexed.

To make certain of finding all points of reference, examine preceding page and two following pages with each indicated page. Ordinarily a new entry for a given subject is not made until three pages after the previous entry. Where entries are followed by "*ff.*" it will be well to examine at least the ten following pages, or the following text up to the next side head, section head, or chapter, as subject matter suggests.

Titles of books are included in the index only in exceptional cases. Names of states and cities are usually not indexed when occurring in mere enumerations and lists. Laws and psychological tests bearing personal names are usually included in this index of subjects.

A

Abilities, capacities, 304, 391
Abortion, 29, 78, 87, 201, 207, 261 *ff.*
Adolescence, adolescents, 2, 24, 32, 295, 360
Adoption, 26, 65, 75
Adultery (legal concept), 8, 13, 35, 496 *ff.*; *see also* Divorce; Sex, intercourse
Adults, "extra," 186
Advertisement, for theater marriage, 473
Affection, *see* Love
Age, at marriage, 131, 473, 477 *ff.*
  differences, 9
  distribution. 477
  gradient, 490, 671
  groups, 24, 27, 74, 105, 117, 125, 179, 194
  of consent, 470
  requirements, 470 *ff.*
Aged, status of; old age, 27, 161, 186, 640
Aggression, 318, 339, 349
Alcohol, alcoholism, liquor, 140, 305, 378
Algonkin, 71
Alimony, 516, 622
Alternating approach, pattern of, 447
Ambivalence, 381
American Eugenics Society, 281, 539
American family, history of, 116 *ff.*
American Home Economics Association, 601
American Service, 541
American Social Hygiene Society, 553
Ancestor worship, 110
Andaman Islands, 72, 74
Anger, 351 *ff.*, 401, 433
Anglo-Saxon culture, 81, 93
Annoyances, 229, 359, 443 *ff.*; *see also* Irritation
Annulment, 11, 502 *ff.*
Apartments, apartment houses, 4, 58, 100, 171, 206, 559, 573
Appalachia, Appalachian highlanders, 104, 219
Arapesh, 80, 350
Art, 35
Aryans, 86, 196, 633
Asceticism, *see* Celibacy
Asiatic family, 106 *ff.*
Athabaskans, 60, 73
Attitudes in mate selection, 422 *ff.*
Australia. 66, 73, 76, 213, 606
Austria, 101, 467

Authority, authoritarianism, obedience, 105, 133, 181, 192, 221, 243, 251, 339, 344, 349, 595
Automobile, 154, 157, 584
Avoidances, 18, 68, 392
Avunculate, 72
Avvaluation, 192

B

Babylon, 86
Bachelors' quarters, 2, 32
Bali, 313
Baltimore, 98, 122, 260
Banks Islands, 57
Banns, 93, 469
Basques, 45
Behavior, behaviorism, 41, 292 *ff.*, 367
Behavior problems, 328 *ff.*
Beliefs, 311
Bereavement, 406 *ff.*
Berlin, 107
Bernreuter test, 415, 419, 542
Betrothal, engagement, 11, 18, 107, 416
Bible, 92, 133
Bigamy, 55, 471, 505
Biological science, discoveries, 159
Birth, 30, 75
Birth control, *see* Contraception
Birth order, 330 *ff.*
Birth rate, 139, 187, 201, 265 *ff.*
  differential, 274 *ff.*
Blame, *see* Guilt
Blood tests, 470, 561, 639
Borneo, 78
Boston, 122, 157, 560
Boy Scouts, 201
Bride price, 20
Brookline, Mass., 127, 489
Buddhism, 115
Buffalo, N. Y., 480
Bundling, 101, 119, 207
Burma, 113
Business cycle, 475; *see also* Depression

C

California, 263
Canalization, 43, 301
Cannibalism, 74, 77
Canon law, 90, 93, 467, 497
Case work, social, 451, 636; *see also* Counseling
Cases, Boer mother, 525
  Conroy, 441
  cruel king, 464
  Mrs. K., 458
  Mrs. Q., 445
  Mary, 335
Caste system of sex relations, 564, 624
Categorical relief and its philosophy, 639
Cathexis, 368
Catholics, 99, 167, 258 *ff.*, 425, 497, 512, 515
Celibacy, asceticism, 88, 139, 268, 312
Century of the Child, 182
Ceremony, *see* Rituals
Change, social or cultural, changes in family, 145 *ff.*, 169 *ff.*, 217, 244, 341 *ff.*
  initiating, 147
  personality, 300 *ff.*, 308 *ff.*, 323, 326 *ff.*, 400 *ff.*
  populational, 146 *ff.*, 160, 254 *ff.*, 270 *ff.*
Chaperonage, 32, 102
Character, *see* Personality, patterns
Charleston, S. C., 122
Chicago, 107, 122, 131, 153, 158, 172, 228, 328, 393, 505, 510, 570
Chiefs, 9, 17, 626
Child, children, care, 5, 20, 24, 34, 74, 581 *ff.*
  development, 326 *ff.*
  discipline, 24, 28, 338, 348; *see also* Authority
  divorce and, 516
  guidance, 180, 350, 643
  "idolatry," 357
  labor, 24, 105, 183, 596, 603
  role and power of, 181, 198, 596
  spoiled, 339
  welfare, 639
Children's Bureau, U. S., 659
Children's Charter, 659
Children's institutions, 639
Chile, 161
China, 51, 59, 72, 76, 86, 98, 106, 109 176, 225, 370
Chivalry, 21, 91, 103, 546, 583

Christianity, Christian culture and mores, 88, 269, 454, 467
Chuckchi, 63
Church, the, 90, 92, 139, 467 *ff.*, 496 *ff.*, 521
  and courtship, 541
  and education for family life, 649
Civilization, 84 *ff.*
Civilian Conservation Corps, 140
Clans, 15, 29, 65
Classes, social; class differences, stratification, struggle, 56, 98, 130, 231, 247, 280, 286, 328, 343, 398, 417, 479, 482, 510, 558, 581, 605
Classical civilization, 52
Classical theory, 209
Clergy, 90, 92, 472
Cleveland, 158, 259
Clothing, costume, dress, 5, 7, 26, 37, 228, 629
Cohabitation, unmarried, 557
College graduates, 277, 285, 492 *ff.*, 511, 588, 604
College students, 282, 331, 389, 531 *ff.*, 618
Collusion in divorce, 512 *ff.*
Comfort, 153
Common law, 470
  marriage, 467, 558
Communication, 154
Communism, 193, 197 *ff.*, 232, 669
Community of interests, comradeship, between sexes and spouses, 426, 678
Community (physical) planning, 573
Companionate marriage, companionate, 516, 522
Competition in sex and love relations, 395, 531, 630, 672
Concealment of sex behavior, 36
Concepts, 40 *ff.*, 48
Concubinage, 86, 106
Conditioning, conditioned reflex, 43, 163, 301
Conference technique, joint, 452
Confession, 90
Conflict, general, 22, 42, 396
  marital (or discord), 120, 345, 418, 428, 445 *ff.*
Connecticut, 257, 268, 470, 561
Conscience, 27, 357
Constantinople, 108
Constitutional traits, 302 *ff.*
Consumer education, 651
Consumers' Union and Consumers' Research, 652
Consumption, 6, 346; *see also* Rivalry, social
Contraception, birth control, 29, 78, 162, 166, 207, 255 *ff.*, 478, 546
Contract, contractual relations, 454, 466
Conversation, 35, 355, 444, 602
Conversion, 408
Cooperation, in the home, family, 600, 653, 677
  of homemakers, mothers, families, 607, 658
Co-recreation of the sexes, 539
Cost, 231, 247
Counseling, 25, 451 *ff.*, 641 *ff.*
Courts, domestic relations, family, 452, 508, 642
  juvenile, 642
Courtship, 119, 140, 154, 207, 525 *ff.*, 664
  initiative in, 491, 531, 537 *ff.*, 665
Cousins, cross and parallel, 70
  marriage of, 15, 471
Couvade, 45, 212
Crisis ceremonies, 76
Crow Indians, 61, 63, 66
Cruelty, 230, 496 *ff.*
Crusades, 91
"Crushes," 39
Cuckold, 439
Culture, cultural, 43 *ff.*
  alternate possibilities in, 81, 165
  differentiation in marriage, 428, 442
  diffusion, 44, 68, 212
  ideational, 218
  lag, 244
  pastoral or nomadic, 60, 71
  prototypes, 116
  sensate, 218
  variations or differences, 81, 129
Cultures, Apollonian, 51
  Euro-American, 85
  Faustian, 51
  Magian, 52
  medieval, 90, 219, 226, 453, 496

Custodial function, 179
Czechoslovakia, 97, 100, 104, 530

D

Dakota Indians, system, 61, 66
Dallas, Tex., 547
Dancing, 7, 34
Dating and date bureaus, 43, 531 *ff.*
Day nursery, *see* Nursery school
De Amore, 91
Death rates, mortality, 474; *see also* Longevity
Debut, 26
Decameron, The, 92
Decentralization, 570 *ff.*
Defloration, public, 81
Delinquency, juvenile, 157, 328, 333, 342, 661
Dementia praecox, 419
Democracy, 184 *ff.*, 209 *ff.*, 252 *ff.*, 267, 349, 455, 563, 628, 662 *ff.*
Denmark, 497, 565; *see also* Scandinavia
Dependence, 438, 443
Depression, 136, 481, 510, 536, 622; *see also* Business cycle
Desert, 60
Desertion, 12, 509 *ff.*
Designs for living, 347
Devaluation, 192
Developmental quotient, 326
Discipline, *see* Child
Discord, *see* Conflict
Diseases, 161
Dissociation, 311
District of Columbia, 502
Divorce, 11, 62, 90, 100, 108, 111, 123, 166, 197, 205, 418, 496 *ff.*, 565
  and children, mothers, 516
  "bootleg," 523
  joint consent in, 512 *ff.*
  law, 496 *ff.*
  legal causes, 498 *ff.*
  map, 501
  migratory, 503
  probability, 507
  uniform law, 520
Divorced persons, personalities, 419
Dobu, 51, 312
Domestic employment, servants, 16, 24, 57, 100, 581, 596 *ff.*, 610
"Domestic federations," 610
Dominance, domination, 340, 397, 460, 630
Double standard, 550, 564
Dowry, 61, 103
Drudgery, 153, 677
Dual organization, 66
Dutch, 116
Duty, 126
Dynamisms, dynamic psychology, 164, 308 *ff.*

E

Eastham, Mass., 119
Ecological patterns, processes, changes; ecology, 2, 57, 99, 131, 146, 158, 194, 328, 569 *ff.*
Economic obligations, 20
Education, schools, 25, 85, 97, 120, 179, 183, 200, 417, 492, 645 *ff.*
  adult, 618
  for family life, 648, 656
  for interpersonal relations, 655
  for life, 650
  moral, 356
  parent, 646
  progressive, 645
  sex, 653
Egypt, 45, 52, 64, 86, 88
Electra complex, 370
Electricity, 153 *ff.*
Elkton, Md., 472
Elopement, 10, 62, 473
Emotions, emotional, 203, 293, 296 *ff.*, 366 *ff.*, 675
  catharsis, 310
  stability, 626
Empathy, 56, 461
Endogamy, 15, 64, 420, 491
Engagement, *see* Betrothal
England, 92, 94, 98, 100, 103, 178, 260, 286, 313, 467, 497, 660
Enoch Arden law, 518
Epic, 233
Eroticism, *see* Sex, desire
Escape from Freedom, 243, 679 *ff.*

Escape through illness, 387
Eskimo, 73
Essex County, N. J., 329, 531
Estrangement, 447
Eugenics, eugenic programs, 87, 240, 254 *ff.*, 288
Europe, 44, 91, 97, 124, 510, 530
Euthanasia, 269
Evolution, 54, 210
Evolutionary theory, 46, 70, 209
Ewe, 75
Exhibitionism, 99, 383
Exogamy, 15, 64
Experiences, 223
Exploitation, 460
Extroversion and introversion, 422 *ff.*

F

Familiarities, 18, 68
Familistic relations, familism, 453
Family, areas, 132
-community relations, 657
composition, 134
courts, 642
disorganization, 136, 191, 505
origins, 215 *ff.*
problems, in general, 662
romance, 370
rural, 133; *see also* Farms
size, unit, 134
stem, 94, 139
subsidies, allowances, extra wages, 606
Family Welfare Societies, 639 *ff.*
Fanaua, 77
Fantasy, 310
Farms, farmers, farmhouses, 44, 58, 99, 118, 127, 152, 171, 579, 595, 613
Fascism, 95, 193 *ff.*, 225 *ff.*, 621, 632, 679
Fatherhood, 8
Feeblemindedness, 264 *ff.*, 278, 419
Feminism, 95, 178, 440, 620 *ff.*, 630
Fertilization, 29
Fetishism, 383
Feudalism, 90, 94
Fiction, novels, literature, 35, 48, 232
Filiocentric family, 181
Fixation, 43, 301, 380, 400
Flirting, 439
Food, meals, 5, 10, 17, 20, 27, 31, 60, 204, 608, 637
Fortune polls and surveys, 548, 596
Foster homes, parents, 26, 75, 639
France, 51, 96, 99, 102, 124, 187, 238, 273, 370, 497, 546, 606
Fraternities, 251, 532
Freedom, liberty, liberalism, 154, 222 *ff.*, 292, 595, 629
French Canadians, 136, 138
French Revolution, 93, 499
Friendships, 18, 39, 379, 542, 563
Frigidity, 374, 436
Frontier, 118, 121, 126
Frustrations, 28, 79, 195, 308 *ff.*
ego, 438
homemaking, 585 *ff.*
love, 436
marital, 430 *ff.*
table of, 434
reactions to, 310, 443
Function, functional point of view or theory, 49, 52, 174, 190
Funerals, 407

G

Gallup polls, 267
Games, 36
Geisha girls, 107, 114
Gemeinschaft, 176, 226 *ff.*, 403, 453, 465
Genitals, 36
Gens, gentes, 65
George Deen Act, 600
Georgia, 172
Germany, 100, 103, 193 *ff.*, 238, 262, 556
Gesellschaft, 177, 226 *ff.*, 465
Gifts, 11, 20, 34
Glass-of-water concept, 202
"Gold-diggers," 516
Gothenburg, 204
Government, 85, 91, 176, 180, 344, 627
Gratification, 6
Greeks, 80, 86, 563
Greenbelt, Md., 573
Greenwich Village, 141
Group marriage, 58, 74, 143
"Grove Manor, Home Life in," 186

Guidance, *see* Counseling, Child; Vocational guidance
Guilt, blame, sin, 28, 90, 357

H

Habits, 302
Haida, 225
Happiness, 235, 252, 292 *ff.*, 401
  and marriage, 409 *ff.*, 450, 551
  relativity of, 586
Harems, 108
Hawaii, 67, 425
Health, 635
Hebrews, ancient, 86
Heredity, 42, 278, 326
Hetaerae, 80, 86, 99
Heterosexuality, 390
Highlanders, 140
Hindus, 55, 112
Hollywood, 508
Holy Deadlock, 497
Home, household, dwelling, 3, 6 *ff.*, 19, 39, 75, 134, 173, 569 *ff.*
  broken, 333, 505; *see also* Divorce; Family disorganization
  economic functions, housekeeping, housework, homemaking, 5, 20, 24, 123, 152, 169, 578 *ff.*, 599 *ff.*
  economics (science), 568 *ff.*, 601, 651
  ownership, 4, 130, 171
Home Economics, U. S. Bureau of, 579
Homesteading, 572
Homogamy, 420 *ff.*
Homosexuality, 39, 80, 87, 384, 388, 562
Honeymoon, 11
Hopi, 57, 68
Hormones, 296
Hospitals, foundling, 560
  maternity, 31
Hostility, *see* Aggression, Anger
Household employment, *see* Domestic employment
Housewife, nervous, 123, 585 *ff.*
Housing, 3, 4, 171, 204, 569 *ff.*
  needs of children, 576
Human nature, 55, 163, 523
Humanitarianism, 96, 230, 265, 633
Hungary, 100, 193
Hunt test, 542
Hupa, 73
Hurry, 590
Hysteria, 164, 311

I

"Ideal" mate, girl, 527
Ideologies, career, 616, 623
  philosophy of life, 50, 162, 268, 360 *ff.*, 619, 666
Illegitimacy, 8, 13, 26, 101, 140, 175, 559 *ff.*
Imitation, 44
Immaturity, psychosexual, 388
Immigrants, *see* Minority groups
Impotence, 392, 436
Inbreeding, 393
Incest, incest taboo, 16 *ff.*, 35, 65, 88, 392
Income, family, 614
Incompatibility, 427, 515
India, 86, 88, 108, 111
Individualism, individuation, individual and society, 165, 219, 252, 525, 545, 664, 679
Indonesia, 78
Industrialism, Industrial Revolution, 95, 98, 116, 148, 613
Infant mortality, 160
Infanticide, 24, 30, 58, 78, 87, 269
Inferiority feeling, complex, frustration, 416, 431 *ff.*
In-laws, 68, 440
Innovations, inventions, 45, 147 *ff.*
Insight, 56, 319, 461
Instinct, 81
Institutions, institutionalization, 76
Intelligence, tests, I.Q., 278 *ff.*, 327, 338, 421, 490, 592
Interaction, social, 444
"Introduction" services, 540 *ff.*
Introversion, 424 *ff.*; *see also* Extroversion
Invention, *see* Innovation
Iowa, University of, 328
Ireland, Irish, 51, 99, 232
Iroquois, 66, 71, 73
Irritation, spread of, 230 449; *see also* Annoyances

Isis, 86
Isolation, social, 594
Italy, Italians, 92, 101, 141, 237, 262

J

Jack Roller, The, 318
Japan, 107, 111, 220, 226, 238, 502
Jealousy, 9, 21, 26, 33, 39, 60, 71, 102, 332, 394 *ff.*, 440
Jews, 141, 196, 333, 421, 468, 481, 529, 633
Jus primae noctis, 91
Justice, 222, 453 *ff.*, 628

K

Kai, 60, 62
Kariera, 66
Khasi, 73
Kikuyu, 60
Kindergarten, 206
Kinship structure, organization, terminology, 3, 15 *ff.*, 64, 69, 117, 123, 175, 194; *see also* Sibs, Gens, Clans
Kirghiz, 69, 72
Kissing, caressing, 36, 369, 549; *see also* Petting
Kitchens, 198, 601
Knowledge for What, 240
Koryak, 59

L

Labeling, 602
Labor, work, workers, 94, 169, 173, 595, 680
  division of, specialization, 5, 151, 179, 572, 594, 604, 652
  workmanship, 357
Ladies' Home Journal, 282
Lady in the Dark, 623
Laissez-faire, 222, 349, 408
Lanham Act, 660
Latin America, 104, 141
Learning, 42, 300 *ff.*
Least interest, principle of, 439
Leisure, 7, 229, 581 *ff.*, 590
Levirate, 18, 69, 88
Libido, 312, 369
Life, expectation of, *see* Longevity
Linkage, neural, 43
Logic, 166
London, 98, 107, 661
Longevity, expectation of life, 160, 271
Los Angeles, American Institute of Family Relations, 417, 437
Love, 37, 79, 188, 195, 299 *ff.*, 365 *ff.*, 680
  affairs, 404 *ff.*, 439; *see also* Sex, intercourse, extra-marital
  affectionate, *see* tender
  constancy, continuity, loyalty, 399 *ff.*
  control of, 407
  dermal, *see* tender
  disillusionment, 383
  free, *see* Sex mores
  idealization, 383
  mores, *see* Sex mores
  objects, 379 *ff.*
  problems of, 663
  rapturous, romantic, 11, 18, 28, 31, 35, 38, 49, 91, 370, 378 *ff.*, 402
  tender, affectionate, 21, 28, 38, 74, 81, 104, 182, 189, 350, 371, 376
Lovers' church, 541
Lynchburg, Va., 597

M

Machinery, household, 571
Madagascar, 77
Magic, 16, 25, 30, 34, 168
Maine, 172
Manchester, N. H., 104, 582
Mann Act, 553
Mannerisms, 449
Manus, 58, 75
Marital Status Law, 615
Marquesans, 73, 76, 79
Marriage, marital relations, 8, 20, 30, 58, 100, 117, 123, 174, 194, 197, 464
  ceremony, ritual, 93, 189, 469
  clinics, *see* Counseling
  conflict, discord, *see* Conflict
  counseling, *see* Counseling
  courses, 649
  demography, 474 *ff.*
  expectation of, 478, 492

Marriage, generosity in, 459
laws, legislation, 174, 466 *ff.*
license, 174, 469
loans, 204
mixed, inter-racial, etc., 64, 421, 471, 492
prediction of success in, 412 *ff.*
reform of, 463 *ff.*
rural, 482
selection, choice of mates, 9, 61, 64, 119, 234, 525 *ff.*, 566, 663
status, statistics of, 474 *ff.*
success and failure, 412 *ff.*
trial, 522
vacations, 403, 464
Maryland, 282, 506, 511
Masai, 57
Masculine protest, 388, 539
Masochism, 313 *ff.*, 383
Massachusetts, 257, 267
Masturbation, 32, 372
Match-makers, 10, 102, 529 *ff.*
Mate selection, attitudes in, 422
Maternal family, matriarchy, 73, 132, 634
Mating gradient, 490
Matriliny, maternal family, 18, 65, 209 *ff.*
Matrilocalism, 68, 70
Matronymy, 66
Maturation, maturity, 42, 292
Medicine, medical discoveries, 159, 205
Melanesia, 1, 73, 75, 78
"Melting pot," 123, 129
Men's house, 73
Menstruation, 342, 626
Mental disease, disorder, insanity, 56
Mental hygiene, 293
Merrill-Palmer School, 645
Mexico, 100, 102, 104, 505
Middle Ages, medieval culture, 90, 219, 226, 453, 496
Middletown, 57, 124, 129, 156, 172, 183, 269, 343, 345, 582
Midwife, 30
Migration, 503
Minnesota, University of, 532, 588
Minority groups, 138, 481 *ff.*, 492
Mississippi, 343
Mistresses, 4, 36
Mobility, social, geographic, 151, 154, 173, 186, 190, 511
Modesty, 37
Mohammedan culture, 86, 104, 108
Moieties, 66
Monasteries, monasticism, 90
Money, and family, 346, 354, 440
Monogamy, 9, 58, 86, 210 *ff.*, 667
chart, 398
Montenegro, 78
Moon, 38
Mormons, 142, 175
Mortgages, 173
Moscow, 197, 201, 514, 557
Moss test, 542
Mothers' problems, study, 587 *ff.*, 599 *ff.*
Mothers, The, 212
Mothers, unmarried, 560
Motion pictures, 156, 185, 548
Motives, 304 *ff.*, 367, 431
list of, 306
Multnomah County, Ore., 480
Music, 7
Mutual consent, *see* Divorce
Mutual rapprochement, 447
Myths, mythology, 17, 29, 54

N

Nairs, 77
Namburuti, 78
Names, 15, 18, 65, 205
Narcism, narcissism, 313, 368, 388
National Commission for Young Children, 660
National Committee on Maternal Health, 258
National Economic and Social Planning Association, 288
National Woman's Party, 178
Nationalities, Latin, 140; *see also* Minority groups
Nature, "natural," 43
Navaho, 57, 68
Nazis, 193 *ff.*, 633
Needs, 49, 147, 362
Negativism, 342 *ff.*, 359
Negroes, 64, 117, 141, 260, 280, 329, 333, 343, 421, 471, 481, 489, 492

Nervous system, 296 *ff.*
Neurasthenia, 311
Neurosis, neurotic trends, nervousness, 50, 294, 309 *ff.*, 585 *ff.*
  competitive, 448
Nevada, 503 *ff.*
New Deal, 127
New England, 44, 101, 116, 171, 468, 499
New Guinea, 73, 78, 80
New Haven, Conn., 134, 420
New Jersey, 329
New York City, 125, 158, 172, 260, 333, 421, 480, 557
New York Cooking School, 600
New York State, 45, 125, 133, 468, 480, 500, 558, 570
New York State Conference on Marriage and the Family, 641
New Zealand, 161, 474
Nomadism, *see* Culture, pastoral
Normality, 384, 451
Normans, 96
Norris, Tenn., 573
North Carolina, 136
North Dakota, 172
Norway, 497, 561; *see also* Scandinavia
Nostalgia, 404
Novel, *see* Fiction
Nudism, nudity, 32, 37, 675
Nursery school, 206, 321, 356, 647 *ff.*
Nursing, 377
Nutrition, 637, 661

O

Obedience, *see* Authority; Child, discipline
Occupations, 5, 20, 583 *ff.*, 591
Oedipus or mother complex, 106, 111, 340, 370, 389, 630
Ohio, 513, 558
Old age, *see* Aged
Old Age Center, 187
Old Love and the New, The, 517
Omwake test, 542
Oneida Community, 143, 175, 675
Only child, *see* Ordinal position
Oppression, 232
Oral love, 369
Ordering-and-forbidding technique, 452
Ordinal position, 330 *ff.*
Oregon, 263, 514, 581, 594
Orgasm, *see* Sex
Orphans, 180
Orthodox Church, 497
Osaki, 115
Oscillationist theory, 218
Osiris, 86
Overpopulation, 254 *ff.*
Overprotection and underprotection, 337 *ff.*
Ozark highlanders, 140, 219

P

Parallelism, 45
Paranoia, 318
Parent-child relations, 125, 182, 317, 341 *ff.*, 354, 357 *ff.*, 389 *ff.*, 678
  emotional aspects, love, 26, 35, 38, 74, 334 *ff.*, 678
Parent education, 357 *ff.*
Paris, 107, 537
Paternal family, patriarchy, 132, 191, 209 *ff.*, 440
Patriliny, 18, 65, 209 *ff.*
Patrilocalism, 19, 70
Patronymy, 66
Pawnee, 70
Peasants, 94, 99
Peiping, 107
Pennsylvania, 116
Perfectionist, 313, 318
Persecution, ideas of, 319
Persians, 86, 112
Personality, 42, 221 *ff.*, 302 *ff.*
  change, 323
  development, 675
  differences, differentiation, 321, 326 *ff.*, 385
    in sex behavior, 552
  disorganization, 444
  happiness and marriage, 409 *ff.*, 526 *ff*
  patterns, structure; character structure 24, 27, 52, 76, 165, 286, 313
  problems, 329
Personal-social influences, 313
Persuasion technique, 452

Petting, 14, 36, 369, 537, 552, 664
Phenomena, 40
Philadelphia, 98, 172, 420, 421, 472, 480, 484, 509, 516, 582
Physicians, 159
Pittsburgh, 157
Plains Indians, 76, 225, 312
Planned parenthood, 187, 257 *ff.*; *see also* Contraception
Poland, 100, 467
Polarization, 450
Polish Peasant, The, 94, 141
Polyandry, 58, 73
Polygamy, polygyny, 9, 58, 106, 142, 175, 210 *ff.*
  chart, 398
Polynesians, 76
Population, population policies, 41, 160, 188, 201, 203, 239, 252 *ff.*, 272
Positive policy or generosity in marriage, 459 *ff.*
Poverty, 342
Power, 21, 24, 231
Pre-ancient civilizations, 86
Preferential mating, 18, 69
Pregnancy, 8, 29, 470
Prejudice, 247
Prestige, 7, 21, 531
Primates, *see* Sex, among animals
Primitive family systems, 54 *ff.*, 84, 211
Primogeniture, 96, 118
Prisoners, 102
Professions, and counseling, 644
  and women and marriage, 494
Progress, 245, 250
Progressivist theory, 218 *ff.*
Projection of parental ambition, 361
Promiscuity, *see* Sex, intercourse
Property, 19, 27, 395
Prostitution, 14, 36, 81, 86, 103, 107, 114, 553 *ff.*
Protestants, 92, 147, 425
Providence, R. I., 341
Psychoanalysis, 17, 80, 164, 287, 303, 307, 313, 367, 390 *ff.*, 630
Psychodrama, 453
Psychodynamic patterns, 386
"Psychologizing" fallacy, 55
Psychology, 162
Puberty, 26, 75
Pueblo, Colo., 489
Pueblo Indians, 51, 313
Punishment, 106, 181, 230, 351, 562
Puritanism, 90, 92, 102, 116, 122, 227, 253, 356, 468, 545
Purpose, 48, 427
Putney, Vt., 143

Q

Quakers, 116, 121, 468
Quarrels, 33, 42
Quebec, 118, 138
Quinn Bill, 518

R

Radburn, N. J., 573
Radicalism, 340
Radio, 155
Rank, 15, 19; *see also* Classes
Rape, 34
Rapport devices, 448
Rationalization, 311
Rats, experiments on, etc., 294, 372, 391, 586
Recapitulation theory, 294
Reconciliation, 447
Recreation, play, 7, 23, 25, 155, 170, 189, 228, 533 *ff.*, 584
Referents, 40
Reflexes, 296 *ff.*
Regional differences, 116 *ff.*, 498
Reincarnation, 29
Rejection, maternal, 335 *ff.*, 351
Relief, relief clients, 138, 276, 510, 558 637
  categorical, 637
Religion and love, 408
Remarriage, 505 *ff.*, 518
Renaissance, 92
Reproduction, 29, 77, 187, 195
  dysgenic, 274
  rates, 272; *see also* Birth rate
Research in Marriage, A, 260
Restaurants, 609
Revaluation, 191
Rewards in homemaking, 597

Rhythm method, 259
Richmond, Va., 122
Right to Love, The, 460
Rituals, 10, 21, 26, 30, 312
Rivalry, social, "keeping up with the Joneses," etc., 170, 347, 595, 646
  spousal, 448
Rochester, N. Y., 153
Roles, childhood, interactional, 320, 321
  specialization of, 324
Romans, 86, 87, 250, 268
Romantic, complex, 98, 402, 544 *ff.*
  situations, 536; *see also* Love
Russia, 51, 94, 97, 102, 186, 194 *ff.*, 232, 239, 262, 270, 312, 499, 556, 669

S

Sacrifice ideology, 361
Sadism, 383
St. Denis, Que., 138
Samoa, 75, 79, 294
San Francisco, 187
Scandinavia, 94, 97, 100, 105, 205, 262, 269, 497
School, *see* Education
School lunches, feeding, 204
School of Living, 571
Science, 147, 168, 220, 238
Seduction, 472
Segregation of sexes, seclusion, 4, 6, 22, 25, 32, 73, 104, 107, 157, 184, 228
Seignorial rights, 118
Selective Service, 480
Self-gifta, 89
Selfishness and unselfishness, 339, 455, 461, 622
Semantics, 40, 48, 165
Sensitive zones, 369
Separation, 13, 506 *ff.*
Servants, *see* Domestic employment
Sex, sexual, sexuality, affirmation, 79, 188, 202, 668
  aggression, 34
  among animals, 216, 397
  attraction, 27, 629, 671 *ff.*
  character or personality, 633
  childhood, 79
Sex, sexual, sexuality, desire (eroticism, passion) stimulation, 31, 34, 74, 81, 368 *ff.*, 629, 668 *ff.*
  differences, 23, 179, 196, 342, 373, 624 *ff.*, 675
  division of labor, 179, 604, 652
  drive, 90, 372
  education, 436, 653 *ff.*
  hospitality (wife lending), 39, 63, 99
  intercourse, physical relations, 7, 11, 29, 33, 46, 119, 189, 260, 373, 391, 546 *ff.*
    extra-marital, illicit, promiscuous, etc., 14, 36, 63, 67, 87, 143, 175, 189, 204, 439, 518, 544 *ff.*; *see also* Adultery
    pre-marital, 32, 97, 175, 201, 207, 473, 544 *ff.*
  mores and taboos, 31 *ff.*, 103, 128, 201, 207, 324, 395 *ff.*, 544 *ff.*
  novelty, 394 *ff.*
  orgasm, adequacy, etc., 79, 143, 372, 415, 436
  perversions, 35, 383
  ratio, 58, 73, 107, 260, 398, 485 *ff.*, 566
    chart, 488
Sexes, roles and social relations of, 20, 72, 103, 117, 124, 177, 194, 397, 604, 679
Shamans, 66
Shanghai, 107
Shell shock, 311
Siberia, 66 *ff.*, 72, 102, 213
Sibs, 15, 64, 110
Sicily, 101
Slaves, slavery, 108, 118, 141
Slavs, 97
Slum clearance, 570
Smith College, 619
Social climbing, competition, *see* Rivalry
Social control, 174, 350
Social group work, 636
Social problems, 246, 249, 662
Social "ruts," 534
Social science, 159
Social Security, 180, 560, 640
Social type, 318
Social welfare agencies, social work, 635 *ff.*

Socialization of services, 636
Societal maintenance, 24, 74, 105, 117, 179, 194
"Society as the Patient," 529
Socio-analysis, 451
Sociometry, 534
Solidarity, 176, 226
  in marriage, 453 *ff.*
  rules, 456
Sororate, 18, 61, 69
Soul (ideology), 167, 268
South, southern states, 64, 117, 134, 150, 184, 481, 499
South Carolina, 500 *ff.*
Spain, 94, 97, 101, 104, 262
Sparta, 87
Spatial and material patterns, 2, 57, 99, 117, 169, 194
Spokane, Wash., 512
Spontaneity, 28, 359, 680
Standard of living, 92, 95, 148, 345, 652
State, The, 96, 196
States of the U. S., *see esp.* Chaps. IV, XIV, XV
Status, social, 12, 39, 70, 174; *see also* Rank; Classes
Sterility, 283
Sterilization, 196, 207, 263
Stimuli, 296 *ff.*
Stockholm, 281, 638
Storage function of home, storehouses, 2, 602
Subcultural, 43
Sublimation, 268, 312
Submission, 340
Subsistence, minimum of, 150
Suburbs, suburbanization, 2, 100, 106, 151, 157, 347, 570, 584
Suffering, 298; *see also* Frustrations, Emotions
Suicide, 13, 16
Super-ego, 76
Superorganic, 165; *see also* Culture
Suttee, 111
Svapnavasavadatta, 55
Sweden, 194, 203 *ff.*, 239, 262, 281, 498, 577, 607, 632; *see also* Scandinavia
Symbols, 40
Sympathetic nervous system, 297 *ff.*
Syndromes, 385

T

Taboos, 17, 22, 30, 33, 66, 167, 380, 394, 664; *see also* Incest; In-laws; Sex
Tanala, 77
Tantrums, 310
Taxes, 636 *ff.*
Taxi-dance hall, 114
Tchambuli, 627
Teachers, 615
Technology, material culture, 57, 146, 162, 214, 219
Teknonymy, 75
Telephone, 105, 155
Temperament, 47, 179, 304, 422
Tenancy, 172
Tennessee Valley, 571
Teutons, 89, 104
Thonga, 62
Thrift, 126
Tibet, 59
Time, use and management of, time studies, free time, 229, 354, 579 *ff.*, 589, 602
Todas, 58, 78, 213, 484
Tokio, 107
Tonga, 78
Torres Straits, 213
Totemism, 16, 66
Tourist camps, 547
Toys, 26, 156, 355
Transportation, 154, 157
Trespass, 206, 395
Triangle, love, 120, 548
Trobriand Islands, 1 *ff.*, 76, 78, 81, 389
Troubadours, 91
Truancy, 329
Turkey, 98, 100, 108

U

Uncle, 390; *see also* Avunculate
Unemployment, 136, 615
Uniformities, 227
Universal traits, needs, culture pattern, 76, 82, 389

Universe, man and the, 163
Unmarried, the, 2, 6, 12, 36, 495, 529, 665
Urbanization, 95, 142, 150, 186, 226
Utah, 142

V

Values, 47, 50, 59, 190, 201, 224, 247, 250, 307, 311, 324, 341, 363, 380, 424, 514 *ff.*, 544 *ff.*, 563, 629, 662 *ff.*
Vassar College, 351, 358, 481, 493, 511, 535, 588
Vedda, 72
Venereal diseases, 161, 470, 553 *ff.*, 638
Victorian Age, Victorianism, 93, 96, 103, 479, 545, 616
Villages, 58
Virginia, 116, 471
Virginity, 14, 546 *ff.*; *see also* Sex
Visita conyugal, 102
Vocational guidance, 636
Volunteer work, 605
Voyeurism, 383

W

Waiting period, 469
War, 235, 480, 508, 658 *ff.*
Waverly, Mass., 264
Weeping, 299 *ff.*
West, western states, 122, 481
Westchester County, N. Y., 132, 151, 597
Who's Who in America, 277, 494
Widowhood, widows, widowers, 13, 110, 540
Wife capture, 10, 61
Wife lending, *see* Sex, hospitality
Wife purchase, 20, 61
Winnebago, 65, 66, 225
Wishes, *see* Needs; Motives
Wolf children, 327
Woman of the Year, 623
Women, and community work, 605
  education of, 120, 646
  employment of, 152, 205, 578 *ff.*, 613 *ff.*, 659
  status, roles, 72, 124, 177, 195, 198, 397, 620 *ff.*; *see also* Sexes
  suffrage, 178, 631
Women's Bureau, U. S., 582
Work, workers, workmanship, *see* Labor
Works Progress Administration, 647

Y

"Yankee City," 130
Yankees, 126, 537
Y.M.C.A., 184
Y.W.C.A., 184, 596
Youth, 184
Yukaghir, 68

The International Library of

SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL RECONSTRUCTION

Founded by KARL MANNHEIM
Late Professor of Education in the University of London

Edited by W. J. H. SPROTT
Professor of Philosophy in the University of Nottingham

PLAN OF THE LIBRARY
(Sections)

Anthropology and Colonial Policy, p. 8
Art and Literature, Sociology of, p. 3
Communities, Sociological Studies of Modern, p. 8
Criminology and the Social Services, p. 4
Documentary, p. 12
Education, Sociology of, p. 2
Family and Allied Topics, Sociology of the, p. 7
Foreign Affairs, Their Social, Political and Economic Foundations, p. 5
History, Sociological Approach to the Study of, p. 3
Law, Sociology of, p. 4
Personality, Approaches to the Problem of, p. 11
Planning, Economic, p. 6
Planning, Town and Country. Human Ecology, p. 7
Politics, Sociology and, p. 5
Present Crisis, Sociology and Psychology of the, p. 9
Religion, Sociology of, p. 3
Social Psychology and Psycho-analysis, p. 10
Sociology, General, p. 12
Sociology, Foreign Classics of, p. 12
Thought, Philosophical and Social Foundations of, p. 11

ROUTLEDGE & KEGAN PAUL LTD
68-74 Carter Lane, London, E.C.4

SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION

Mission of the University
by JOSÉ ORTEGA Y GASSET. Translated and introduced by Howard Lee Nostrand *Second Impression. 12s. 6d.*

Total Education: A Plea for Synthesis
by M. L. JACKS *Third Impression. 15s.*

Education in Transition
A Sociological Analysis of the Impact of the War on English Education
by H. C. DENT *Fifth Impression. 14s.*

The Social Psychology of Education
An Introduction and Guide to its Study
by C. M. FLEMING *Seventh Impression. 9s. 6d.*

Education and Society in Modern Germany
by R. H. SAMUEL and R. HINTON THOMAS *14s.*

The Museum: Its History and Its Tasks in Education
by ALMA S. WITTLIN *Illustrated. 25s.*

Comparative Education
A Study of Educational Factors and Traditions
by NICHOLAS HANS *Third Impression. 21s.*

Educational Thought and Influence of Matthew Arnold
by W. F. CONNELL, with an Introduction by Sir Fred Clarke *21s.*

New Trends in Education in the 18th Century
by NICHOLAS HANS *18s.*

From School to University
A Study, with Special Reference to University Entrance
by R. R. DALE *In preparation*

Education and Society
An Introduction to the Sociology of Education
by A. K. C. OTTAWAY. With an Introduction by W. O. Lester Smith *18s.*

SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION

Sociology of Religion
by JOACHIM WACH *30s.*

The Economic Order and Religion
by FRANK KNIGHT and THORNTON W. MERRIAM *16s.*

SOCIOLOGY OF ART AND LITERATURE

Sociology of the Renaissance
by ALFRED VON MARTIN, translated by W. L. Luetkens
Second Impression. 8s. 6d.

Chekhov and His Russia: A Sociological Study
by W. H. BRUFORD *16s.*

The Sociology of Literary Taste
by LEVIN L. SCHÜCKING *Third Impression. 8s. 6d.*

Men of Letters and the English Public in the 18th Century, 1660-1744, Dryden, Addison, Pope
by ALEXANDRE BELJAME, Edited with an Introduction and Notes by Bonomy Dobrée. Translated by E. O. Lorimer *25s.*

SOCIOLOGICAL APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF HISTORY

The Aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars: The Concert of Europe—An Experiment
by H. G. SCHENK *Illustrated. 16s.*

Military Organization and Society
by STANISLAW ANDRZEJEWSKI. With a Foreword by A. R. Radcliffe-Brown *In preparation*

SOCIOLOGY OF LAW

Sociology of Law

by GEORGES GURVITCH. With an Introduction by Roscoe Pound *21s.*

The Institutions of Private Law and their Social Functions

by KARL RENNER. Edited with an Introduction and Notes by O. Kahn-Freund *25s.*

Legal Aid

by ROBERT EGERTON. With an Introduction by D. L. Goodhart *Second Impression. 12s. 6d.*

Soviet Legal Theory: Its Social Background and Development

by RUDOLF SCHLESINGER *Second Edition. 25s.*

CRIMINOLOGY AND THE SOCIAL SERVICES

Juvenile Delinquency in an English Middletown

by HERMANN MANNHEIM *12s. 6d.*

Criminal Justice and Social Reconstruction

by HERMANN MANNHEIM *Second Impression. 18s.*

The Psycho-Analytical Approach to Juvenile Delinquency: Theory, Case Studies, Treatment

by KATE FRIEDLANDER *Fourth Impression. 21s.*

Social Service and Mental Health

An Essay on Psychiatric Social Workers
by M. ASHDOWN and S. C. BROWN *16s.*

The English Prison and Borstal Systems

by LIONEL FOX, C.B., M.C., Chairman of the Prison Commission for England and Wales *30s.*

Voluntary Social Services since 1918

by HENRY A. MESS, in collaboration with Constance Braithwaite, Violet Creech-Jones, Hilda Jennings, Pearl Jephcott, Harold King, Nora Milnes, John Morgan, Gertrude Williams and W. E. Williams. Edited by GERTRUDE WILLIAMS *21s.*

The Social Services of Modern England

by M. PENELOPE HALL *Second Edition (Revised). 25s.*

SOCIOLOGY AND POLITICS

Social-Economic Movements

An Historical and Comparative Survey of Socialism, Communism, Co-operation, Utopianism; and Other Systems of Reform and Reconstruction

by H. W. LAIDLER *Second Impression* ***Illustrated.*** *35s.*

The Analysis of Political Behaviour: An Empirical Approach

by HAROLD D. LASSWELL *Third Impression.* *21s.*

Dictatorship and Political Police

The Technique of Control by Fear

by E. K. BRAMSTEDT *18s.*

Nationality in History and Politics

A Psychology and Sociology of National Sentiment and Nationalism

by FREDERICK HERTZ *Third Impression* *28s.*

The Logic of Liberty: Reflections and Rejoinders

by MICHAEL POLANYI, F.R.S. *15s.*

Power and Society

A Framework for Political Inquiry

by HAROLD D. LASSWELL and A. KAPLAN *23s.*

FOREIGN AFFAIRS, THEIR SOCIAL, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS

Patterns of Peacemaking

by DAVID THOMSON, E. MEYER and ASA BRIGGS *21s.*

French Canada in Transition

by EVERETT C. HUGHES *15s.*

State and Economics in the Middle East

A Society in Transition

by A. BONNÉ *30s.*

Economic Development of the Middle East

An Outline of Planned Reconstruction

by A. BONNÉ *Third Impression.* *15s.*

The Danube Basin and the German Economic Sphere
by ANTONIN BASCH *18s.*

Peasant Renaissance in Yugoslavia, 1900-1950
A Study of the Development of Yugoslav Peasant Society as Affected by Education
by RUTH TROUTON *28s.*

Transitional Economic Systems
The Polish-Czech Example
by DOROTHY W. DOUGLAS *25s.*

The Regions of Germany
by R. E. DICKINSON *Second Impression. 12s. 6d.*

Political Thought in France from the Revolution to the Fourth Republic
by J. P. MAYER *14s.*

Central European Democracy and its Background
Economic and Political Group Organization
by RUDOLF SCHLESINGER *30s.*

ECONOMIC PLANNING

Retail Trade Associations
A New Form of Monopolist Organization in Britain
by HERMANN LEVY *Second Impression. 18s.*

The Shops of Britain
A Study of Retail Distribution
by HERMANN LEVY *Second Impression. 21s.*

Private Corporations and their Control
by A. B. LEVY *Two volumes. 70s. the set.*

Plan for Reconstruction
A Project for Victory in War and Peace
by W. H. HUTT *21s.*

SOCIOLOGY OF THE FAMILY AND ALLIED TOPICS

The Family and Democratic Society

by J. K. FOLSOM *30s.*

Nation and Family

The Swedish Experiment in Democratic Family and Population Policy

by ALVA MYRDAL *Second Impression.* *25s.*

Adolescence

Its Social Psychology: With an Introduction to recent findings from the fields of Anthropology, Physiology, Medicine, Psychometrics and Sociometry

by C. M. FLEMING *Third Impression.* *18s.*

Studies in the Social Psychology of Adolescence

by J. E. RICHARDSON, J. F. FORRESTER, J. K. SHUKLA and P. J. HIGGINBOTHAM

Edited by C. M. FLEMING *21s.*

The Deprived and the Privileged

Personality Development in English Society

by B. M. SPINLEY *18s.*

TOWN AND COUNTRY PLANNING. HUMAN ECOLOGY

The Social Background of a Plan: A Study of Middlesbrough

Edited by RUTH GLASS. Illustrated with Maps and Plans *42s.*

City Region and Regionalism

A Geographical Contribution to Human Ecology

by ROBERT E. DICKINSON. With Maps and Plans

Second Impression *25s.*

The West European City: A Study in Urban Geography

by ROBERT E. DICKINSON. Illustrated with Maps and Plans *42s.*

Revolution of Environment

by E. A. GUTKIND *Illustrated.* *30s.*

The Journey to Work
Its Significance for Industrial and Community Life
by K. LIEPMANN. With a Foreword by Sir Alexander Carr-Saunders
Second Impression. 15s.

Stevenage: A Sociological Study of a New Town
by HAROLD ORLANS 30s.

The Genesis of Modern Town Planning
by W. ASHWORTH *In preparation*

SOCIOLOGICAL STUDIES OF MODERN COMMUNITIES

Negroes in Britain
A Study of Racial Relations in English Society
by K. L. LITTLE 25s.

Co-operative Living in Palestine
by HENRIK F. INFIELD. With a Foreword by Gen. Sir Arthur Wauchope *Illustrated.* 10s. 6d.

Co-operative Communities at Work
by HENRIK F. INFIELD 18s.

Colour Prejudice in Britain
A Study in Liverpool
by ANTHONY RICHMOND *In preparation*

Social Mobility in Britain
Edited by DAVID V. GLASS *In preparation*

ANTHROPOLOGY AND COLONIAL POLICY

The Sociology of Colonies: An Introduction to the Study of Race Contact
by RENÉ MAUNIER. Translated from the French by E. O. Lorimer
Two volumes. 63s. *the set*

A Chinese Village: Taitou, Shantung Province
by MARTIN C. YANG 21s.

A Japanese Village: Suye Mura
by JOHN F. EMBREE. With an Introduction by A. R. Radcliffe-Brown
Illustrated. 21s.

The Golden Wing: A Sociological Study of Chinese Familism
by LIN YUEH-HWA. Introduction by Raymond Firth *16s.*

Earthbound China: A Study of Rural Economy in Yunnan
by HSIAO-TUNG FEI and CHIH-I CHANG *Illustrated.* *18s.*

Under the Ancestors' Shadow: Chinese Culture and Personality
by FRANCIS L. K. HSU *Illustrated.* *21s.*

The Mende of Sierra Leone
A West African People in Transition
by K. L. LITTLE *28s.*

Transformation Scene: The Changing Culture of a New Guinea Village
by H. IAN HOGBIN *Illustrated.* 30s.

Indians of the Andes: Aymaras and Quechuas
by HAROLD OSBORNE *Illustrated.* *25s.*

Religion, Science and Human Crises
A Study of China in Transition and its Implications for the West
by FRANCIS L. K. HSU. *14s.*

Colour and Culture in South Africa
A Study of the Status of the Cape Coloured People within the Social Structure of the Union of South Africa
by SHEILA PATTERSON *30s.*

SOCIOLOGY AND PSYCHOLOGY OF THE PRESENT CRISIS

Diagnosis of Our Time
Wartime Essays of a Sociologist
by KARL MANNHEIM *Fifth Impression.* *14s.*

Farewell to European History or the Conquest of Nihilism
by ALFRED WEBER *16s.*

The Fear of Freedom
by ERICH FROMM *Sixth Impression.* *21s.*

Freedom, Power, and Democratic Planning
by KARL MANNHEIM. Edited by Hans Gerth and E. K. Bramstedt *25s.*

Essays on Sociology and Social Psychology
by KARL MANNHEIM. Edited by Paul Kecskemeti *25s.*

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY AND PSYCHO-ANALYSIS

Psychology and the Social Pattern
by JULIAN BLACKBURN *Fifth Impression.* *14s.*

The Framework of Human Behaviour
by JULIAN BLACKBURN *12s. 6d.*

A Handbook of Social Psychology
by KIMBALL YOUNG
Fourth Impression. *25s.*

Solitude and Privacy
A Study of Social Isolation, Its Causes and Therapy
by PAUL HALMOS *21s.*

The Human Group
by GEORGE C. HOMANS *25s.*

Sigmund Freud: An Introduction
A Presentation of his Theories and a Discussion of the Relationship between Psycho-analysis and Sociology
by WALTER HOLLITSCHER *Second Impression.* *10s. 6d.*

The Social Problems of an Industrial Civilization
With an Appendix on the Political Problem
by ELTON MAYO *Second Impression.* *15s.*

Oppression
A Study in Social and Criminal Psychology
by TADEUSZ GRYGIER. Foreword by Hermann Mannheim
In preparation

APPROACHES TO THE PROBLEM OF PERSONALITY

The Cultural Background of Personality
by RALPH LINTON *Third Impression.* 12*s.* 6*d.*

The Feminine Character. History of an Ideology
by VIOLA KLEIN. With an Introduction by Karl Mannheim 14*s.*

A History of Autobiography in Antiquity
by GEORG MISCH. Translated by E. W. Dickes
Two volumes. 42*s. the set.*

Personality and Problems of Adjustment
by KIMBALL YOUNG *Second Edition (Revised).* 35*s.*

PHILOSOPHICAL AND SOCIAL FOUNDATIONS OF THOUGHT

Homo Ludens: A Study of the Play Element in Culture
by J. HUIZINGA 18*s.*

The Ideal Foundations of Economic Thought
Three Essays on the Philosophy of Economics
by WERNER STARK *Third Impression.* 15*s.*

The History of Economics in its Relation to Social Development
by WERNER STARK *Third Impression.* 10*s.* 6*d.*

America: Ideal and Reality
The United States of 1776 in Contemporary European Philosophy
by WERNER STARK 10*s.* 6*d.*

The Decline of Liberalism as an Ideology
With Particular Reference to German Politico-Legal Thought
by J. H. HALLOWELL 12*s.* 6*d.*

The Political Element in the Development of Economic Theory
by GUNNAR MYRDAL. Translated from the German by Paul Streeten
25*s.*

Society and Nature: A Sociological Inquiry
by HANS KELSEN *25s.*

Marx: His Time and Ours
by R. SCHLESINGER *Second Impression.* *30s.*

The Philosophy of Wilhelm Dilthey
by H. A. HODGES *28s.*

Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge
by KARL MANNHEIM *25s.*

GENERAL SOCIOLOGY

A Handbook of Sociology
by W. F. OGBURN and M. F. NIMKOFF *Third Edition (Revised).* *28s.*

Social Organization
by ROBERT H. LOWIE *25s.*

FOREIGN CLASSICS OF SOCIOLOGY

Wilhelm Dilthey: An Introduction
A comprehensive account of his sociological and philosophical work, with translations of selected passages.
by H. A. HODGES *Second Impression.* *12s. 6d.*

From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology
Translated, Edited, and with an Introduction by H. H. GERTH and C. W. MILLS *Second Impression* *25s.*

Suicide: A Study in Sociology
by EMILE DURKHEIM. Translated by J. A. Spaulding and George Simpson *25s.*

DOCUMENTARY

Changing Attitudes in Soviet Russia

The Family in the U.S.S.R.
Documents and Readings, Edited with an Introduction
by RUDOLF SCHLESINGER *28s.*
(Two further volumes on National Autonomy and Foreign Policy are in preparation.)

All prices are net

9.9.53. THE WESTMINSTER PRESS, LONDON, W.9