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DELINQUENCY
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COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR

BY

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FIRST EDITION
SECOND IMPRESSION

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PREFACE

During the decade and a half since it was taken off an airy diet of instincts and put on a nourishing diet of factual data, social psychology has been the child prodigy and the problem child of the social sciences. Growing awkwardly and sometimes randomly, but always growing at a tremendous rate, it was bold and meek by turns. Roundly cursed by some for the havoc its virile concepts caused in the elder disciplines, it was just as roundly praised by others for what it contributed to these disciplines.

Social psychology still retains its youthful vigor, but it has now passed its troubled adolescence and has arrived at a mature understanding of its phenomena. That understanding, briefly stated, is that the personality of the human being is acquired in the course of social interactions with other human beings.

So far, sociopsychological attention has been focused on the effects of social interaction upon the personalities of the individuals involved. The results of such attention have been amazingly fruitful, and much is now known concerning the processes by which individuals develop their personalities. Little has been done, however, with that aspect of social psychology which involves consideration of social interactions themselves.

This book was undertaken in the belief that it is now feasible to give more than passing consideration to the problem of the social interactions in which the individual develops his personality and in which he manifests that personality. Data have been accumulating here and there, data which are often conflicting, unrelated, and incomplete but which are in the mass nevertheless impressive. It has been my aim to bring these data together, to supplement them with the results of general observation, and to build therefrom a tentative frame of reference for further study.

In accordance with considerable precedent, I have designated this field of sociopsychological inquiry "collective behavior."

It might just as well, perhaps, have been labeled "the psychology of social interaction," "collective psychology," "forms of group behavior," or some other permutation of these various words. Pedagogically, I think of this field of inquiry, whatever it may be called, as the second course in social psychology.

It is only fair to the potential reader to state that, although this book deals with social phenomena which are intrinsically interesting, which are common to everyday experience, and which are much in the headlines and much on our minds these critical years, this book is more analytical than descriptive and more dispassionate than crusading. It has, I hope, internal logical unity and strict regard for fact. It does not, therefore, contain also the key to eternal understanding or the promise of a utopian tomorrow.

This book, like all books, is based upon the observation, the research, and the reflection of many men. My debt to them is implied in the citations in the chapter appendixes. There are, however, three who contributed directly to my idea of attempting this synthesis: L.L. Bernard, whose *An Introduction to Social Psychology* served to turn my attention into the field of social psychology; E.B. Reuter, whose comment on the need for a systematic analysis of types of social interaction in *An Introduction to Sociology* crystallized my determination to attempt such analysis; and P.R. Farnsworth, whose incisive criticism of loose thinking and of unsupported statement delayed the completion of this book for at least two years. Finally, I am deeply indebted to C.L. Lastrucci for his indefatigable labors in ferreting out half-remembered references and for his stimulating enthusiasm.

RICHARD T. LAPIERE.

STANFORD UNIVERSITY,
June, 1938.

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PART I
INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER I

THE NATURE OF COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR

Collective behavior may be tentatively defined as the interaction which occurs between two or more socialized human beings for the duration of the particular situation in which that interaction occurs.^{1*} By "interaction" is meant that the actions of each individual affect and are in turn affected by the actions of all other individuals. By "socialized human beings" are meant human individuals who have been trained by past experience with other human beings to react in relatively stable ways to any given stimulus. .

The restriction of the time to the duration of the situation in which interaction occurs is necessary in order that the study of collective behavior may be distinguished from sociology. In totality, sociological phenomena may be considered as a series of interrupted but interrelated interactions among human beings. The pattern of family life, for example, is maintained and perpetuated as a system of human relationships by such interactions. That pattern is not, of course, a subject for consideration by the student of collective behavior; it is, rather, of primary interest to the sociologist. The interaction of two or more members of a given family after they have come within communicating distance of one another and until they separate is, however, of concern to the student of collective behavior. .

The need for a clear understanding of the processes of social interaction and of the various forms which social interaction may take has long been recognized. The feasibility of objective study of such interactions is now conceded by both sociologists and psychologists, and such study has been undertaken by social psychologists.² For long, however, collective behavior remained a no man's land of the social sciences. Some early adventurers had strayed into the region—men such as Gabriel Tarde,³ Emil Durkheim,⁴ E.A. Ross⁵—and had returned with interesting,

* Superior numbers refer to the corresponding section of the appendix following each chapter.

however conflicting, reports. But it was not until fairly recent times that anything like a systematic attempt at exploration was undertaken.

The reason is not hard to find. Scientists, like their predecessors the world explorers, will venture out into the unknown only when the known suggests that such a venture may be fruitful.

THE GROUP-MIND MYTH

It was not, however, the contradictory nature of the findings of the early explorers into the subject which was responsible for the feeling that further investigation would not be fruitful. Early investigators of any wilderness observe different things. Interest in the field was discouraged, rather, by the conclusions of the stay-at-homes, who studied the wilderness from their armchairs and spun such fanciful theories about the nature of collective behavior that the entire subject fell into disrepute. Since the conclusions of the stay-at-homes were of such a character that they could not be put to objective test, the entire subject of collective behavior was more or less relegated by the social scientists to the speculative philosophers.

Of these stay-at-homes, the German metaphysicians were the ones who preempted the field and temporarily removed it from the sphere of scientific study. Their interest was not in understanding social phenomena but in justifying the strength and character of German national leadership. In idealizing the political tendencies of their day, the philosopher Kant, and subsequently Hegel, arrived at the concept of the group mind.⁶

This concept can be baldly stated as a belief that, from the interaction of people in social groups, there arises a collective ethos—variously termed mind, spirit, or soul. This mind is supposed to be the directive force of collective activities. To express it otherwise: when men interact collectively, they are thought to lose their identities as individuals and to merge into a whole, the spirit or force of which then determines the behavior of the individual members.

The concept of the group mind is nicely calculated to provide philosophical justification for any kind of collective behavior which the particular philosopher happens to approve. Since it is the "mind" of the group which determines the behavior of that

group, no individual member of the group should attempt to resist the collective imperatives. The group leader, furthermore, is but a representative of the collective spirit and, as such, is beyond criticism. The value of this concept to the process of political consolidation of the various Germanic peoples, which was occurring under Prussian leadership during the time of Kant and Hegel, is quite obvious. No less evident is the value of this concept—as a basis for the “Germanic spirit”—to *Der Führer* of contemporary Germany. But a concept may be politically expedient without its being also scientifically valid.

Unfortunately, the group-mind idea gained adherents outside Germany; and its acceptance long precluded objective study of collective phenomena. The English sociologist Hobhouse, for example, explicitly denied the Hegelian thesis—as the group-mind concept came to be known—and yet arrived at an implicit acceptance of it. It lurks in the writings of the late eminent English political scientist Graham Wallas. And here in the United States the idea was most dogmatically and effectively expressed by the philosopher-psychologist William McDougall, when he published his *Group Mind* in 1920. It has continued to haunt most of those who have ventured to study crowd, mob, and political behavior.⁷

The Group Mind, a Personification.—Actually, the group-mind concept is nothing but the personification of patterns of collective behavior. Just as the government tends to be personified by the average citizen and to become a somewhat benevolent, or perhaps whimsical, Uncle Sam, collective behavior is frequently personified by those who profess to be its serious students. For those who make this error, collective behavior becomes the behavior of a collective person. To this collective person are attributed the qualities of an actual human being. Just as the man in the street may speak and think of Uncle Sam as an entity having the attributes of a person, publicists often speak of the Public Mind, Public Opinion, and the like.⁸ For the German metaphysicians, the State became the personalized representation of all political behavior. To this personalized representation were given the will, the purpose, the passions, and the intelligence ordinarily accredited to individual human beings.

The danger in such personification is that it may not be recognized as such and that the personalized representations of

the collective pattern may become in time personalized representations of the causes for those patterns. The result is a hazardous type of loose thinking rather than a higher form of abstraction. Jack Frost is a charming and justifiable childhood representation of a complex natural phenomenon. As a sprightly old fellow who comes at night to paint the windows white, he serves as an understandable explanation for frosted windows. But, when the personification of complex forces is carried into adult thinking about the abstract patterns of collective behavior and is made the explanation for them, the result is mysticism, rather than science. At this point, concern with the facts of collective behavior is lost sight of in concern over the personalized representation itself; and altars, prayers, and mystical meanings are in order. To explain any given form of collective action, it is then necessary only to describe that action as an outcome of the group spirit—*e.g.*, Public Opinion, Mob Passions, the Collective Will.

The Individual Fallacy.—In violent reaction to such personification, some students have been guilty of an equal error—that of denying the very existence of collective behavior.⁹ They conceptually destroy the body, since they do not like the soul imputed to it. They insist that all social reality begins and ends with the individual human being. To them, there is no group; there are just individuals who stimulate and react to one another. Such thinkers are much in the position of the physical scientist who might claim that there is no water—that there is just oxygen and hydrogen. The trouble with them is that they are in their own way as incapable of handling abstract ideas as are those to whom they so strenuously object.

Present View.—Either to personify various kinds of collective behavior or to deny their existence is absurd, for collective behavior is but a complex form of the behavior of human beings. Consider the observer at an old-fashioned dance. He sees the individual dancers come and go and sees the fixed pattern of the Virginia reel gradually unfold before his eyes. Were he to finish his study of the interaction which occurs upon the dance floor with the conviction that the ultimate reality is the soul of the Virginia reel and that all else is but a manifestation thereof, we should recognize him for an incorrigible mystic. Were he to conclude, on the other hand, that all he had actually

seen was an aggregate of moving individuals and that there had been no pattern of the Virginia reel—all but the individuals being a figment of his imagination—we should be forced to consider him an insufferable egotist.

It is now rather generally recognized that there are patterns of collective behavior and that these patterns are subject to objective study without their being personified. Collective behavior must be considered as a special type of behavior. It involves what might be described as its own "laws." It can no more be understood in terms of the behavior of individual human beings per se than the behavior of water can be deduced from the characteristics of hydrogen and those of oxygen. Yet there is no more reason to impute to behavior of a collective order a collective spirit than there is to resort to a spirit of the water in attempting to explain that hydrogen and oxygen may unite to form a new behavior unit. As the "laws" of molecular substances differ from those of their atomic components, so the "laws" of collective behavior differ from those of individual behavior.

THE NATURE OF SOCIAL INTERACTION

For purposes of illustrating the special character of the interaction which comprises collective behavior, let us consider the various reactions of a golfer who, having driven his ball into the rough, wanders away from his companions in search of it. A none too ardent golfer, he enjoys his little trip into the woods; he sees and responds to many of the stimuli which bombard him from all sides. He observes, however casually, the terrain over which he walks, the high grass, the trees and shrubs, the sun above him, and the passage of a bird across the sky. He hears the crush of dry sticks beneath his feet, the buzz of a bee, and so on. He feels the ground beneath his feet, the heat of the sun on his head, and the moisture trickling down his cheeks.

Nonsocial Reaction.—Some small portion of the reactions which in total constitute the behavior of the golfer who is looking for his ball was learned by unguided trial and error. By direct and repeated experience with stimuli of a certain type, he may have learned specific responses which came into operation during this series of acts. His avoidance of a thorny bush, the way he protects himself from overhanging boughs, and his squinting when

he faces the sun would probably be of this order. Such responses are nonsocial; the experiences which were involved in learning them were of an individual rather than of a social nature.

Social Reaction.—Much less of human behavior belongs to this category than is commonly supposed. If a man enjoys the song of a bird, if he is pleased by the smells of the countryside, or if he wants to find a ball lost in the weeds and brush growing at the side of a fairway, it is because he has learned from social experience to react in these given ways. These reactions, and most human reactions, are social; they have been acquired under the direction, conscious and otherwise, of other human beings.

To understand the origin of the golfer's avoidance-of-the-thorny-shrub behavior, we need study only his personal past experiences with such shrubs. But to gain an understanding of most of his reactions, we should be forced to seek beyond his personal experiences into his social experiences, to examine the society which determined those experiences, and thence to analyze the historical forces which made his society what it is. The game of golf, for example, has a long history of social development, all of which was antecedent to his learning to play the game and, incidentally, to his learning to react as he does to the lost ball.

As long as the golfer remains in the woods looking for his ball, his behavior will be a series of social and nonsocial reactions. Each reaction might be graphically described as the effect of a constant cause. The sun, the wind, the trees, the earth, the bird, and the lost ball would thus be represented as the causes of the man's reactions. For all practical purposes, these causes are constants, since the reactions of the man to them do not significantly affect them.

Social Interaction.¹⁰—When the man rejoins his companions, however, an entirely new sort of behavior arises. His behavior is no longer to be understood as a mere series of social reactions. His reactions to his companions will, of course, be of a social order. But, unlike the sun, the earth, and so on, no one of his companions is a constant; each is a variable. Each reacts to the man's behavior, just as he does to theirs. Thus, his reactions to the behavior of his companions affect their behavior; and that behavior, in turn, affects his further reactions. In other words, his original reactions indirectly affect his subsequent reactions.

We cannot, therefore, study the behavior of the man irrespective of the behavior of all the others. His behavior is but one factor in a complex interaction. Thus, from the social reactions of a number of individuals to one another, we secure social interaction; and, from the concept of social behavior, we progress to the concept of collective behavior.

Social behavior does, of course, involve a slight degree of interaction. Attracted by the song of a bird, a man may approach and frighten that bird away. Angered by the contact with a stone, a man may kick it from his path. In broad terms, however, we may say that such interaction differs so much in degree from the interaction between man and man that it can justly be considered as different in kind.

Man does in time change the wilderness into fertile fields; he develops plants and domesticates lower animals better to meet his needs; he reclaims the desert and drains swamps; he lays roads, builds bridges, and otherwise remodels nature to suit his tastes. As he changes the face of nature, his reactions to it are modified. There is, then, an interaction between man and nature; but it is one in which time is a major factor.

In contrast, the interaction between two human beings when they meet is almost instantaneous. The entire process of interaction may actually have but a few seconds' duration and seldom lasts for a long time. An hour is a long period for any single pattern of interaction to cover, as anyone who has sat through a lecture for an hour well knows. At the end of a day of continuous interaction, the people involved would under most conditions collapse from sheer exhaustion. Yet the extent to which a man can change nature in one day is negligible.

The interactions between man and the lower animals may be rapid, but they are of such a limited order that again we are justified in considering human interaction in a special category. A man and his dog may affect each other, and for some men dogs have served as a partial substitute for human companionship; but the social reactions involved in collective behavior are almost all beyond the capacities of the dog, even of the ape, to acquire.

The Social Situation.—All social interaction occurs in what may be termed social situations. Each social situation has a beginning and an end and may be described as the meeting of a group of people.

In the literature of social psychology, the term "passive crowd" has occasionally been used to indicate a group of people who are spatially but are not otherwise related to one another.¹¹ By this definition, the members of a passive crowd would retain their independent character; and each would behave as though he were alone. Such behavior would be no more than a mixture of social and nonsocial behavior and would not include social interaction. The behavior of the group would be no more than the sum of the reactions of the individuals.

It is questionable, however, whether such a group could exist. Whenever human beings are in proximity, they interact, if only to the slightest degree. No doubt men do occasionally come within sight and sound of one another and yet pass, like ships in the night, unknowing. It is conceivable, for example, that two people might wander up and down a London street during a pea-soup fog without either's becoming aware of the presence of the other. But, except under such circumstances, people in proximity do interact. The people in a busy street are constantly interacting. Although they are hurrying on their individual ways up and down the street, they are constantly making adjustments to one another: motorists adjust to other motorists; motor traffic adjusts to streetcar traffic; both adjust to pedestrian movements; pedestrians adjust to one another; all adjust to traffic signals.

This is not to say that the "group" need be spatially and temporally related in order for interaction to occur. It is a commonplace experience for us to interact with people by such means as the telephone and the written and printed word. It is necessary, however, that people be prepared by past experience so to interact. This preparation for social interaction is what distinguishes the socialized human being from the human animal.

THE SOCIALIZED HUMAN BEING

Into the mechanics of behavior we need not here inquire. The student of railroad transportation need not concern himself with the process by which the railroad locomotive converts coal into traction power. He must, however, understand the potentialities and the limitations of the locomotive. In the same way, the student of collective behavior must understand the

conditions and the limitations placed upon the behavior of the individual by the biological heritage if he is to avoid speculative culs-de-sac of the group-mind variety.

The science of psychology has accumulated a body of verified data upon the psychological attributes and limitations of the individual which now precludes such speculation. At birth, the human being is an organism possessed of certain specific physiological attributes, including an elaborate neurological control mechanism. This elaborate mechanism in itself does not make the human animal able to protect himself from the destructive point of a pin, able to secure the food which his body tissues must have if life is to continue, or, in fact, able to do any of those things which a human being normally does. This mechanism does, however, make it possible for the organism to learn, in accordance with definite processes, a vast number of specific things.

Although the learning process is still imperfectly understood, it is known that the circumstances which permit and foster the acquisition of human characteristics are entirely social.¹² Left to himself, the human infant would die long before he had learned by himself such an elementary thing as how to procure food. Guided by other human beings, he can, however, acquire those characteristics which make it possible for him to continue living and which distinguish the human being from the human animal. Those characteristics never, of course, exceed the innate capabilities of the individual. But the particular use to which he will put these innate capabilities is determined largely by social participation. Thus, when he comes into a specific social situation, it is as one prepared by many previous social situations to behave in socially designated ways.

Individual Initiative.—The individual does not, however, passively take the imprint of social membership, as the sculptor's clay takes shape beneath his fingers. Unlike the clay, the individual is by nature highly reactive. He reacts to hunger pangs and to other stimuli. This reaction is at the outset more or less physiological, but it serves as the basis for the acquisition of social patterns of behavior. In the course of this acquisition, there occurs considerable random—*i.e.*, fortuitous—behavior, from which in the course of time the socially approved patterns are selected and established in the individual as the normal ones.

In considering the behavior of socialized human beings—*i.e.*, individuals who have acquired many social reactions—those learned patterns which serve as the basis for the acquisition of new modes of behavior are usually designated as individual initiative. The term suggests that the individual takes an active part in learning to accomplish some given end. Thus, the intensity of the effort which a given individual expends in trying to climb a mountain, to win a certain girl as his wife, or to earn a million dollars may be described as the initiative which he displays in these regards. But, as will presently be observed, what he wants and how intensely he wants it are, in turn, largely matters of social determination.

Trial and Error.—Occasion will arise in subsequent chapters to use the phrase “trial and error.” It may be advisable to point out, at once that the term is simply descriptive of the process which occurs when an individual wants to accomplish some end and has not yet learned how to do so.¹³ The process is, of course, extremely complex and may occur on a number of more or less distinct levels of behavior: manual, as when the individual tries to find a keyhole in the dark; overt-verbal, as when he tries to talk a customer into spending more money than he intended; covert-verbal, as when he tries to compute a sum in his head; and so on. Whatever its specific character, trial and error is the process of applying established patterns of behavior in a relatively random way to the solution of a new problem.

Fortuitous factors (luck, to the layman) always enter into the determination of results. Normally, however, the rapidity with which the problem is solved is a reflection of the initiative and the skill of the solver. An uninterested child will in all probability take longer to solve a manual puzzle than will an interested one, simply because the latter will have more initiative—manifest as making more trials in a given period of time. The child who has acquired some skill in solving puzzles of this type will in all probability solve this new puzzle with many less trials than will the untutored child, simply because experience has taught him to avoid the more obvious errors. Since initiative and skill operate in trial-and-error learning, it follows that the rapidity of learning in any particular instance is considerably influenced by prior social experience.

Motives.—In explaining our own acts or those of another, we invariably fall back upon such motivational terms as “want,” “wish,” “feel the need of,” “desire,” and so on.¹⁴ Thus, the thief may explain why he stole a car by saying: “I wanted a new car.” To the question “Why did you want a new car?” he might well reply: “Because I wanted to get across the border in a hurry.” Detectives invariably try to find someone who had an understandable “motive” for the crime under investigation. Fictionists, simply by providing motives which appear reasonable, explain to the satisfaction of their readers the reasons why characters act as they do.

If wants, desires, wishes, and the like were innate—*i.e.*, if the human animal were born wanting clothes, elaborate food, houses, cars, the affections of some specific member of the other sex, and whatever else it is that the adult human being wants—motivational explanations would actually explain. It appears, however, that the human animal has no such “wants.” He has only certain physiological needs. Denied food for long, he will die; prevented from excreting, he will eventually die; subjected to too much heat, water, or cold or denied air, he will die. We may perhaps loosely say that he wants to live and that he must have certain things and must not be subjected to certain conditions in order to stay alive.

Physiological “wants” have, however, only the slightest relation to social wants. The fact that the human animal must have food if he is not to die is no explanation for the fact that the child steals a piece of cake from the pantry. Between the physiological need for food and the act of stealing the cake is a wide gap. We may describe the fact that the child steals the cake from the pantry by saying that he wants cake and so is motivated to seek out cake. But the term “wants” does not explain the act. Why does he want cake? Why, wanting cake, does he not ask his mother for some? The why lies, obviously, in the past experiences of the child and in the circumstances surrounding the child at the moment. To describe these, even assuming that they were known, would make dull and extended reading.

Consequently, the social psychologist resorts, as does the fictionist, to the short cut of motivational terminology. Motivational terms facilitate the description of human behavior. They

may also be useful in giving the reader some insight into the complicated events which precede the event so described. But, although the fictionist may assume that the child wants cake because it is natural for children to want cake, the scientist must recognize that the term "wants" is only a descriptive symbol and explains nothing.

The fact that motives must always be imputed to the act makes their use subject to a further danger. In the nature of things, it is impossible to standardize the use of motivational terms. The interpretation put upon a given act will depend almost as much upon the personality of the one who makes that interpretation as upon the act itself. One person might describe the behavior of the child by saying he wanted the cake, etc. Another might as logically say that the child wanted to steal the cake, etc. The implications will be quite different, but the statements are equally valid descriptions of the facts. And so, like Humpty Dumpty, about all that one can do when using motivational terms is to say, "When I use a word, it means just what I choose it to mean."

Interests.—The concept of interests arises from the fact that, when confronted with alternatives—such as the opportunity to play cards, to read a book, or to take a swim—a person may quite consistently show a preference for one rather than the others.¹⁵ Usually the term is used to indicate behavior which is socially atypical. Thus, the fact that a man eats more and more often than is customary for others can be quickly described by saying that he is interested in food. This does not, of course, imply that most men do not eat. To say of a woman that she is interested in housekeeping suggests only that she spends more time and devotes more energy to domestic activities than do most women in like circumstances. It describes neither just what she does while she is at home nor why she does those things. From the simple statement of her interest, nothing can justly be deduced concerning the why.

The use of interest terms, as of motivational terms, is a matter of convenience only. Provided that these terms are recognized for what they are—descriptive symbols, having none too specific meanings—certain advantages in speed, if not in clarity, of analysis are secured.

There is grave danger, however, that these terms will trick the user into thinking that he has found an explanation when

he has found only a name. It is imperative, therefore, that we keep in mind the fact that interests, like motives, are acquired out of experience; that they are in no sense a natural attribute; and that only in the social experiences of the individual are to be found the explanations for the particular interests and motives imputed to his acts.

Variability of Personality.—It would be exceedingly convenient if the student of collective behavior could treat the individual human beings who contribute to that behavior as the student of water can treat the atoms of hydrogen and oxygen which constitute its elements. But the human elements which in interaction make for the phenomena of collective behavior are neither homogeneous, nor stable, nor uniform. Strive as we may, it is, therefore, quite impossible to proceed with the exactitude of the physicist and the chemist.

It is a commonplace observation that the socialized individual is not one "person" but many "people"; which of these latter he will be depends upon time and circumstance. In his professional relationships, the doctor may be a calm, austere person, capable of operating upon his patients with the impersonality of a mechanic who works on an automobile. At home, putting his youngest child to bed, he may, however, play the nursery game of tweaking toes with abandon and evident relish and may break into a cold sweat while removing an infected toenail from one of those toes. On a fishing trip with male associates, he may be unwashed and unshaved for days; back in his office again, he may be the spotless, reserved physician.

The fact that the person is in part the function of external circumstances may be technically explained as a consequence of the fact that the human personality is a reactive mechanism and that there is no necessary relationship between the various reactions of a given individual. So viewed, the human personality may be described as consisting of a multitude of facets (reaction patterns) which, although never operating independently of the total personality, may have little in common one with the others.¹⁰

In some types of collective behavior the role of the individual is, as we shall see, predetermined. He reacts to, and thus interacts with, the other members of this situation in terms of an established personality facet. The situation, in effect, serves only to set that facet of his personality into operation, much as

the cue sets the actor to speaking his designated lines. The role of a bride at a formal wedding is, for example, largely predetermined.

In other types of situations, the role of the individual is in large or small measure a consequence of those facets; *i.e.*, that facet of the personality which will become operative is determined by the course of the interaction itself. The role of a girl who sits out a dance with her partner is so determined. She may be shy and impressionable, coy and enticing, frank and brotherly, or thoroughly sensuous. Which one of these roles she will assume in this particular instance depends on a great many factors which appear in the interaction. The analysis of these factors will constitute the subject matter of the next chapter.

APPENDIX

1. This concept of the phenomena which should be considered as constituting the category "collective behavior" is essentially that which is suggested by R.E. Park in his article on the subject (*Ency. Soc. Sci.*, 3, 631-633):

"Whenever individuals come together even in the most informal way, no matter how strange they may be to one another nor how great the social distances that separate them, the mere fact that they are aware of one another's presence immediately sets up a lively exchange of influences, the first effect of which is to produce in each a mood, a *Stimmung*, under the influence of which the individual's behavior—his thought and sentiments if not his actions—are controlled and directed" (page 631). By permission of The Macmillan Company, publishers.

The most systematic application of the term "collective behavior" has until the present been that of E.B. Reuter and C.W. Hart, who devote a full chapter of their *Introduction to Sociology* (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1933) to the subject.

E. Sapir, in his article "Group" (*Ency. Soc. Sci.*, 7, 178-182), applies the term "group psychology" to the same class of phenomena: "The psychological basis of the group must rest on the psychology of specific personal relations; no matter how impersonally one may conceive the behavior which is characteristic of a given group, it must either illustrate direct interaction or it must be a petrified 'as if' of such interaction. The latter attribute is, however, not the peculiar property of group psychology but is also illustrated in the relations of single human beings toward one another" (page 182). By permission of The Macmillan Company, publishers.

The German sociologists of the so-called formal school have generally conceived of the group in much the same way. See N.J. Spykman's *The Social Theory of George Simmel* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1925, 27) and the concept of L. von Wiese in H. Becker's *Systematic Sociology* (New York, Wiley, 1932, 39).

The term "collective behavior" is, however, to be preferred to the term "group psychology": (1) because the majority of sociologists and of social psychologists with a sociological background have followed the lead of Park; (2) because the term "group" when used in conjunction with "psychology" gains altogether too much of the mystical implication which has long been associated with the term "group mind."

2. For some years the *American Journal of Sociology* included in its classification of abstracts a category entitled "Collective Behavior." Likewise, the now-defunct *Social Science Abstracts* included such a category. Moreover, the term "collective behavior" has at times served to designate a section in the annual meetings of the American Sociological Society; and most of the recent textbooks on social psychology have devoted a few chapters to this aspect of the field.

The strong present trend toward the study of collective behavior is most clearly indicated by the attention which it is being given by the psychologists. At the meeting of the American Psychological Association in 1936 at Hanover, N.H., for example, six of the eleven papers presented at the Round Table on Social Psychology were concerned with collective interactions rather than with the effects of such interactions upon the personalities of the individuals involved. See "The Subject Matter and Methods of Social Psychology" (*Soc. Forc.*, 1937, 15, 455-495). Particularly notable of the papers under this title are the following: G. Murphy, "Personality and Social Adjustments"; F.H. Allport, "The Observation of Societal Behavior"; J.F. Dashiell, "The Need and Opportunity for Experiment in Social Psychology"; and H. Cantril, "The Effect of Modern Technology and Organizations upon Social Behavior."

3. G. Tarde was one of the first social thinkers to break entirely away from the rational psychology which dominated social thought throughout the last century. He endeavored to analyze human behavior in what might now be designated as a behavioristic way--i.e., in terms of the effects of experience upon the neural mechanism. Considered as descriptive of sociopsychological processes, his work still stands as an important contribution. Nevertheless, Tarde's attempt to reduce the complex processes of social interaction to one basic principle--imitation--resulted in a particularization which, like all particularizations, did not stand prolonged scrutiny.

For a critical evaluation of Tarde see F.B. Karpf, *American Social Psychology* (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1932, 93-108).

Tarde's own writings include: *Les Lois de l'imitation* (Paris, Alcan, 1890), trans. by E.C. Parsons, *The Laws of Imitation* (New York, Holt, 1903); and *Les Lois sociales* (Paris, 1898), trans. by H.C. Warren, *Social Laws* (New York, Macmillan, 1899).

4. Tarde was so much impressed with the individual as *the* factor in the social process that he centered his attentions on the individual. E. Durkheim, on the contrary, approached the problem from the opposite pole, the collective or group factor. As he saw it, it is out of group interactions or common experiences that there arise the ideas, images, or concepts which, in turn, serve as the bases for individual behavior. Were we to rework his analysis around the term "ideologies," it would be fairly acceptable today.

Durkheim, however, used the term *représentations collectives* as the symbol for his central concept; and this term has, for some reason, been taken by many to be synonymous with "group mind"—a misinterpretation which has been strengthened by some of Durkheim's disciples, notably L. Lévy-Bruhl (*La Mentalité primitive*, Paris, 1922, trans. by L.A. Clare, *Primitive Mentality*, New York, Macmillan, 1923; and *L'Âme primitive*, Paris, 1927, trans. by L.A. Clare, *The Soul of the Primitive*, New York, Macmillan, 1928).

For a critical analysis of the role of Durkheim in modern social psychology see Karpf (*op. cit.*, 108-122).

The first and most important of Durkheim's own works is *De la Division du travail social* (Paris, Alcan, 1893), trans. by G. Simpson, *On the Division of Labor in Society* (New York, Macmillan, 1933).

5. In 1901 E.A. Ross published *Social Control* (New York, Macmillan), in which he endeavored to analyze the ways by which people exercise a behavior-regulating influence over one another. In 1908, the year in which W. McDougall published his thoroughly instinctivistic interpretation of human behavior (*An Introduction to Social Psychology*, London, Methuen), Ross published *Social Psychology* (New York, Macmillan). In this work Ross applied Tarde's concept of imitation to an analysis of the dynamics of collective behavior—fads, fashions, "crowd" movements, etc. Although this approach was not followed by others in America until enthusiasm for McDougall's instinctivistic interpretation waned, it is probable that Ross, more than any other individual, is responsible for the present status of social psychology in America.

6. G.W.F. Hegel presents his clearest statement of the group-mind concept in *Phänomenologie des Geistes* (Berlin, 1807), trans. by J.B. Baillie, *The Phenomenology of Mind* (New York, Macmillan, 1910).

For the effects of Hegelian mysticism upon German social psychologists in the development of the folk-psychology approach (notably W. Wundt, *Elemente der Völkerpsychologie*, Leipzig, Kröner, 1912; trans. by E.L. Schaub, *Elements of Folk Psychology*, New York, Macmillan, 1916) see Karpf (*op. cit.*, 41-88).

The pre-Hegelian lines of thought which led to the group-mind concept are to be found in the careful, historical analysis by O.F. von Gierke, *Das deutsche Genossenschaftsrecht* (Berlin, Weidmann, 1868-1913), trans. by E. Barker, *Natural Law and the Theory of Society* (New York, Macmillan, 1934, 2 vols.).

A recent reflection of Hegelianism is to be found in the highly scientific *Psychologie des Gemeinschaftslebens* (Report of the Fourteenth *Kongress der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Psychologie in Tübingen*, edited by O. Klemm, Jena, Fischer, 1935). The report is simply a substantiation of the Germanic "spirit" as envisaged by Hitler.

Not all the German social thinkers have followed the Hegelian tradition. For an outstanding exception see A. Vierkandt, *Familie, Volk, und Staat* (Stuttgart, Enke, 1936). Even here, however, the inordinate stress which is placed upon the role of leadership in the shaping of group behavior leads to about the same end as does the group-mind concept—*i.e.*, justification of *Der Führer*.

7. See W. McDougall, *The Group Mind* (New York, Putnam, 1920). The English versions of the Hegelian group mind are to be found in L.T. Hobhouse, *Development and Purpose* (New York, Macmillan, 1913) and *Social Development* (New York, Holt, 1924); and in G. Wallas, *The Great Society* (New York, Macmillan, 1914).

8. Note, for example, the difficulties in which the following writers have become embroiled, simply because they have personified the group which they were professing to study: N. Angell, *The Public Mind* (New York, Dutton, 1927); G. Le Bon, *Psychologie des foules* (Paris, Alcan, 1895), trans. under the title *The Crowd* (London, Unwin, 1917); W. Lippmann, *Public Opinion* (New York, Macmillan, 1922) and *The Phantom Public* (New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1925); and P.H. Odegard, *The American Public Mind* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1930).

9. The most vitriolic attack upon the group-mind concept was that which was launched by F.H. Allport (*Social Psychology*, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1924, 4-10; and "The Group Fallacy in Relation to Culture," *J. Abn. and Soc. Psychol.*, 1925, 19, 60-73). To some extent Allport was fighting a straw man, for American sociological usage of the term "group" has seldom involved personification. Allport's attacks upon the group mind were, however, undoubtedly instrumental in forcing a conceptual stock-taking by both sociologists and psychologists. The idea of the group mind (crowd mind, collective intelligence, public mind, or the like) and controversy over it is, so far as the present writer can see, a thing of the past in American social psychology.

10. The term "social interaction"—sometimes used interchangeably with the terms "social interstimulation" and "human interstimulation"—is used in the literature in two distinct ways: to indicate the relations of an individual to his social milieu and to indicate the relations of two or more individuals at a given time and place. The former is, of course, the more inclusive usage; it covers the entire process of socialization and, hence, the process by which the social heritage is passed down from generation to generation. Because of the nature of their problems, sociologists have favored this usage. Because their attention is focalized on the individual, psychologists prefer the more restricted application, in which the term "social interaction" replaces the older and more cumbersome phrase "action and reaction." For convenience, this more restricted usage of the term "social interaction" will be adhered to in the present study and will in no instance be applied to the sociological aspects of human relationships.

For the more inclusive use of the term see E. Bogardus, *Fundamentals of Social Psychology* (New York, Century, 1924, especially Chaps. VIII-XX), where it is applied to everything from social isolation to fashion imitation. A strict sociological application is to be found in Reuter and Hart, *op. cit.* (Chap. X); in R.L. Sutherland and J.L. Woodward, *Introductory Sociology* (Philadelphia, Lippincott, 1937, Chap. XX); and in D. Sanderson, "Group Description" (*Soc. Forc.*, 1938, 16, 309-319).

11. The term "crowd" has been applied to such a great variety of social aggregates that it has lost all specific meaning and will not, therefore, be used in the present analysis. Apparently its use by sociologists to designate

a number of people who at a given time are related spatially or by communication has been an effort to avoid the use of the term "group," which in sociological usage usually refers to such social units as the family, neighborhood, clan, tribe, *et al.* Unless it is otherwise indicated, the term "group" will herein refer to a specific gathering of human beings, rather than to a social unit of such orders as the family, the clan, and the nation.

This use of the term "group" corresponds roughly to the use of the term "crowd" by such writers as E.D. Martin (*The Behavior of Crowds*, New York, Harper, 1920), Reuter and Hart (*op. cit.*, Chap. XVIII), and K. Young (*Social Psychology*, New York, Crofts, 1930, Chaps. XX and XXI). See also the article "Crowd" by L.L. Bernard (*Ency. Soc. Sci.*, 4, 612-613).

12. For the student who is not thoroughly grounded in the social psychology of personality development, the brief summary in the text of this book can be supplemented by the following books:

Bernard, L.L., *An Introduction to Social Psychology*, New York, Holt, 1926.

Faris, E., *The Nature of Human Nature*, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1937.

Folsom, J.K., *Social Psychology*, New York, Harper, 1931.

Kreuger, E.T., and W.C. Reckless, *Social Psychology* New York, Longmans, Green, 1931.

LaPiere, R.T., and P.R. Farnsworth, *Social Psychology* New York, McGraw-Hill, 1936.

Murphy, G., L.B. Murphy, and T.H. Newcomb, *Experimental Social Psychology*, New York, Harper, rev. ed., 1937.

Young, K., *Social Psychology*, New York, Crofts, 1930.

13. That the human being learns or may learn by experience is obvious. That the process by which he so learns may be described as trial and error is generally conceded. That the trial-and-error process is exceedingly complex can be found from a perusal of the following books on the subject: R.A. Davis, *Psychology of Learning* (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1933), and E.R. Guthrie, *The Psychology of Learning* (New York, Harper, 1935). See also the following special studies of the literature on the subject: J.F. Dashiell, "A Survey and Synthesis of Learning Theories" (*Psychol. Bull.*, 1935, 32, 261-275); E.M. Hanswalt, "Whole and Part Methods in Trial and Error Learning" (*Comp. Psychol. Monog.*, 1931, 7, 1-65); and R.H. Waters, "A Critique of Some Principles of Learning" (*Psychol. Bull.*, 1935, 32, 678).

14. For an extended analysis of the descriptive value and nonexplanatory nature of motivational terminology, see LaPiere and Farnsworth, *op. cit.* (Chap. XI).

A critical and highly technical discussion of the use of motivational terms in social psychology is to be found in P. Sorokin, *Contemporary Sociological Theories* (New York, Harper, 1928, Chap. XI). The following are representative of the many studies of motivation per se which have appeared in recent years:

Panlasigui, I., *The Motivation of Learning*, Philippines, University of the Philippines Press, 1933.

Stone, C.P., C.W. Darrow, and C. Landis, *Studies in the Dynamics of Behavior*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1932.

Troland, L.T., *The Fundamentals of Human Motivation*, New York, Nosstrand, 1928.

Young, P.T., *Motivation of Behavior*, New York, Wiley, 1936.

15. A laboratory approach to the subject of interests has been made by E.K. Strong, Jr. (*Vocational Interest Blank*, Stanford University Press). So far, study has been directed toward trying to find what relationship exists between success in various vocations and interests as measured by the questionnaire. It has been hoped that the results of this study would provide a basis for predicting an individual's probable success in a given occupation. General surveys of the subject of interests are to be found in E.L. Thorndike's *Adult Interests* (New York, Macmillan, 1935) and in his *The Psychology of Wants, Interests, and Attitudes* (New York, Appleton, 1935).

16. The aspect of a human personality which may become operative in any specific kind of situation is usually designated as a trait. For a classification of personality traits and a bibliography and résumé of the experimental literature on the subject see LaPiere and Farnsworth, *op. cit.* (Chap. XIII). J.M. Reinhardt considers the relationship between specific traits and specific situations in "Personality Traits and the Situation" (*Amer. Sociol. Rev.*, 1937, 2, 492-500).

CHAPTER II

FACTORS AND PROCESSES AFFECTING SOCIAL INTERACTION

A considerable number of factors may contribute to the course of a given social interaction. Their presence or absence may either facilitate or hinder that interaction and may do so in small or in large measure. These factors consist of the characteristics of the individuals involved, of certain products of the situation itself, and of some external circumstances. Thus, among the factors which will affect the interaction of a boy and a girl who are sitting out a dance will be: the ability of each to feel out the interests of the other—*i.e.*, to communicate; their ability to arrive at a common objective; the nature of the physical setting in which they spend their time while sitting out the dance; their physiological conditions; and, possibly the most important factor, their psychological feeling-states. This last factor may be largely determined by the intentional efforts of one or the other; *i.e.*, either the girl or the boy may lead the course of the interaction.

COMMUNICATION

The medium of social interaction is communication. Upon the effectiveness of that communication will, therefore, in considerable measure depend the character of any given interaction. The relationship between a girl who speaks only French and a boy who speaks only English will, quite evidently, be of a different order while they sit out a dance than would be their relationship if both spoke one or the other language.

Communication between human beings is effected by means of symbols.¹ Symbols consist of words and gestures which represent covert feeling-states, such as the word "love" and the coy smile; which represent symbols of objects, such as the word "ball"; and which represent abstractions, such as the word "God" and the Fascist salute. It is possible, of course, for

limited interaction to occur without communication. Two men fighting in the dark would so interact. But most interaction involves communication.

During the interaction, each symbol has two aspects: what it represents to the one who uses it and what it represents to the one who responds to it. For effective communication, these two aspects must be comparable. Lacking such agreement, communication is limited. Such is the case when the physician is trying to diagnose a child's illness. The child may use symbols—groans, and so on—which to the child symbolize his specific aches and pains. But, since the physician does not know the meaning of these symbols to the child, communication between the two is halting and ineffective.

Gestures.—Whenever people are in direct association, they depend to an unrecognized degree upon communication by gesture. Included in this category are all facial expressions, body postures, movements of the hands, and the like which reflect the covert feeling-states of the individual and which can, therefore, be used as a basis on which other individuals can adjust. Thus, by observing her facial expressions, a child will often determine whether his mother's "No!" is final or is simply tentative.

Each society has something of its own gesture "language," as becomes evident when members of two cultural groups find difficulty in coming to a "meeting of minds" even though they can speak a common language. Thus, although the Japanese ambassador may speak perfect English, Western diplomats may find him difficult to understand.

Besides general cultural differences in gesture usages, there are those of an individual nature. The growth of intimacy between individuals is in part accomplished by the development of ability to interpret, however unaware, one another's gestures. In any direct person-to-person interaction, communication by gestures is probably responsible for the undescribable but vital overtones of the situation.

Language.—More obviously a means of communication is verbal behavior. Except when an individual is talking to himself, speech serves no other function than that of facilitating social interaction. Language is simply a system of sound patterns which are provided with socially specified meanings.

It does not follow, of course, that, because two people speak a common language, the reaction of one can be determined by the verbal behavior of the other. Linguistic communication is not the only factor which enters into the determination of the course of interaction. The child may disobey his mother's command; the man may only laugh when told by the thug to stick up his hands. The existence of an adequate language common to the members of a situation does, however, greatly facilitate the interaction among them.

Mechanical Aids to Communication.—The development of the technique of writing and subsequently that of printing brought into being a new order of social interaction—interaction between individuals who are separated spatially or temporally or both. By means of the written or printed word, one man may “speak” to tens of thousands of individuals scattered around the world. Through the same means, he may respond to communications from men who have long been dead; or he may provide communications to which future men will respond.

Recent technological developments—the telegraph, telephone, motion picture, radio, and telephoto—have further facilitated the interaction of such separated individuals. As we shall see, a number of new types of collective behavior are dependent upon these mechanical aids to communication.

OTHER FACTORS

Common Intent.—The second factor which facilitates social interaction is common intent or objective. Just as two people on a tandem bicycle must have the same end in view—either to stop or else to speed on—if they are to get along together, any social interaction is dependent in some measure or other upon the existence or development of common intent. Frequently, a common intent brings about the interaction, as when two people meet at a designated time to have luncheon. Having met, they may, however, find that they disagree as to where they shall go to lunch. The interaction will then consist for a time in an effort to arrive at an agreement as to intent. In this instance, common intent is developed during the interaction. In some instances, the interaction ends when an agreement upon intent is reached, as when people argue over and finally agree upon a time and place for a subsequent meeting. As we shall subsequently

observe in detail, directive leadership is often largely the effort to establish common intent.

Comparable Abilities.—Communication and common intent may be all that is necessary for the conversational interaction. In some sorts of interactions, however, ability to act either in similar or in interlocking nonsymbolic ways is necessary. The need for similar patterns of behavior is illustrated by people riding a tandem bicycle; the need for interlocking patterns of behavior, by a girl and a boy on the dance floor. In either instance, the members of the situation must have comparable abilities, if the interaction is not to consist mainly of trial-and-error efforts to work out an effective relationship.

Unless an individual has abilities comparable to those of his associates in a given situation, he is incapable of playing his associational role. Just as the untrained member of an orchestra will hamper the playing of a piece of music, the socially inept individual may disrupt the pattern of a wedding ceremony or spoil a drill formation.

Physical Circumstances.—Collective behavior is often conditioned by the physical setting in which it arises. Quiet, comfortable circumstances facilitate the conversational interchange; wind and rain hinder the course of a game of tennis or golf; the structural attributes of an auditorium influence the interaction between an audience and its leader.

Moreover, the rise of certain forms of collective behavior is at times either precluded or facilitated by the physical environment. Pleasant weather and a delightful countryside, for example, encourage picnics, while inclement weather or a drab terrain will discourage them.² The man-made aspects of the physical environment—gardens, buildings, and so on—operate in the same way.

Physiological Conditions.—The physiological conditions of the members of a given situation may be of great significance in conditioning the inception and the course of their interaction. The physiological conditions of the patients in a hospital, for example, tend to bring about endless discussion of their respective ailments. Fatigue may dampen a party which, if the members had felt more energetic, might have been a great success. An overly heavy dinner may be the "death of conversation." In some social situations, particularly those in which revelry occurs,

such drugs as alcohol may facilitate the situational interaction. On the other hand, too much alcohol may remove a given individual from participation in such interaction. Unquestionably, the physiological condition of an individual influences his behavior and thus affects the character of any interaction in which he is involved.³

Psychological Feeling-states.—The specific mood tones—psychological feeling-states—of the individual are often a function of the interaction in which he participates and always play a significant part in the shaping of that interaction. It is not, for example, an uncommon experience for a person to arrive at a dancing party reluctantly and, during the course of the evening, to generate such enthusiasm for dancing that he leaves the party even more unwillingly than he came.

Just how various types of social interaction operate to bring about changes in the feeling-states of the individuals is not entirely clear.⁴ But that such changes occur and that they are, in turn, of profound significance in affecting the course of that interaction cannot be doubted. Anyone who has attended an evangelical meeting in a spirit of skepticism or has gone to an auction just to “watch the suckers” will recall how very much the situation affected his own covert feeling-states and, in turn, his overt behavior.

Any unaccustomed circumstance is likely to bring about a pronounced change in feeling-states. The man who is habituated to working in the quiet of his study will not perform well at a desk in a corner of a busy boiler factory; the accountant who is accustomed to working in the boiler factory may find the quiet of a study as disturbing as the former man will find the clatter of the factory. The effect of physical setting on an individual's feeling-states becomes of interactional significance when, for example, an icy wind chills the enthusiasm of an audience for a soap-box speaker.

As we have seen, whenever people are together they interact. Thus, the mere presence of other people affects the feeling-states of the individual and thereby is indirectly a factor in shaping the course of interaction. The effect of the mere presence of other people upon psychological feeling-states is clearly illustrated by the fact that most individuals display more initiative and skill when they feel that they are members of a group. It has been

recently discovered that worker performance is greatly improved when the worker feels that he is an integral part of a working staff. Industrial psychologists have belatedly realized that this intangible sense of "belonging" is often more important in determining worker productivity than are monetary incentives, efficient lighting, and so on.⁵

The stimulating effect of the sense of group membership probably comes from the fact that most individuals are accustomed to spending the majority of their waking hours in the presence of others. Estrangement therefrom is disturbing and distracting. Evidently there is no innate basis for this fact; for those individuals who are accustomed to solitary work—such, for example, as the scientist and the scholar—may find that working with others on a given project is distracting rather than stimulating.

THE PROCESS OF INTERACTIONAL AMPLIFICATION

Ordinarily of far greater effect upon the feeling-states of the individuals and, hence, upon the course of an interaction than is either the physical setting or the mere presence of people is the process of interactional amplification. It is, for example, to this process that we must turn for an explanation of the fact that an athlete excels himself in a race and of the fact that an audience grows so enthusiastic and responsive that it laughs at any old joke and applauds the most commonplace statement. Interactional amplification is a process by which the interaction builds itself up, just as vibration once started in a flywheel will build itself up with each succeeding revolution. The process involves an increase in the intensity of the interaction and a parallel increase in the intensity of the feeling-states of the individuals included in membership. This process is usually responsible for those actions which we attempt to justify by saying that we were "swept off our feet in the excitement of the moment."

In any given instance, interactional amplification may be the result of one or a number of more or less distinct processes. It is seldom possible to isolate or to identify these in operation. For purposes of analysis, however, we must treat them as separate elements.

Rivalry.—We have already seen that the mere presence of others may have an effect on the individual; the activities of

those others are, however, even more likely to have significant results. The process by which the activities of others serve to stimulate a person to increased initiative and to more skillful application of effort is described as rivalry. Rivalry has two rather distinct aspects: emulation and competition.

Emulation may be described as a consequence of the desire to equal or to excel another person. It is not, however, a general trait. The small boy who complains bitterly because his elder brother has received a larger piece of cake may be highly gratified at receiving the smaller dose of castor oil. Nor is emulation to be understood as growing out of a desire for the direct consequences thereof. The small boy, for example, may demand a piece of cake equal in size to that of his brother, even though he has already exhausted his capacity for eating cake.

Comparative cultural studies, such as that of Ruth Benedict, seem to suggest that whether or not emulation appears in any specific case is a matter of social determination. Whether a given individual will be stimulated to emulate others by the fact that they are setting a fast pace depends upon what the others are doing and who these others are. If he has learned from social experience to be stimulated under these circumstances, he will be; otherwise, his own performance may decline rather than improve.

Where the desire to equal or to exceed operates, the individual may excel himself. It frequently happens that a number of people who are working on comparable tasks will more or less unknowingly pace one another; and, thus, each will accomplish far more than he would were he working in isolation.

Emulation undoubtedly plays a considerable part in determining the inception and the course of many interactions. Simply not to be outdone by others, people may buy and possibly read the current best-selling books; they may purchase an otherwise unnecessary hat or automobile; and they may learn to play the latest games.

A second aspect of rivalry is to be found in the fact that individuals may be stimulated in the effort to achieve a given end by the fact that others are also trying to gain that same end. This process is usually referred to as competition. Here the goal is to "win" a desirable reward by exceptional energy, initiative, and skill. Just how this interaction serves to stimulate the com-

petitors is not clear. Possibly the fact that others are indicating the desirability of the reward by their strivings for it makes the reward more desirable to the individual. Individual values are drawn rather largely from the examples of others, and competitors set an ever-increasing value upon the reward for success. In addition to this factor, it would appear that competition stimulates the individual by providing him with a means of judging his progress toward the goal. Thus, in a foot race, the fact that a competitor is coming up from behind indicates to the runner that he must exert himself in order to win. Running alone against time, he might lag without realizing that he was doing so. In effect, competitors deliberately set the pace for the individual, a pace which, because of the nature of the situation, tends to rise rather than to remain constant.

From the fact that competition so often accompanies interactions in the modern world and generally serves to stimulate those involved, some have deduced that man is by nature a competitive and greedy animal. The assumption then is that he is endowed with an acquisitive instinct—an organic desire to win from his fellows. The corollary to this assumption is the belief that, to be successful, a social system must be so organized as to incite individuals to effort by appeal to this instinct. No positive evidence has, however, yet turned up to prove the instinctive nature of competitive strivings.

On the contrary, it is easily demonstrated that there is vast individual difference in the competitive efforts of various men. Some men are encouraged in their suit for a girl's heart by the knowledge that others consider her desirable and are making a strong bid for her favor. Some men are completely discouraged by such knowledge. Furthermore, under some conditions and in some regards a man may be incited to competitive strivings, while under other circumstances he may be discouraged by the fact that he is expected to compete. A man who is stimulated by business competitors may withdraw into his shell when his wife and children compete for a monopoly of dinner-table conversation.

Finally, anthropological studies have shown that in some societies the objects of competitive striving are the exact opposite of those which are permissible and acceptable in other societies and that in some few societies all competition of individual with

individual is considered incompatible with social decency and a blotch upon the reputation of the community.⁶ Because we may rather generally consider that all is fair in love, war, and business, it does not follow that we or any men are naturally competitive. Obviously, the extent to which an individual is stimulated to action by the threat of competitors and the objects which he will consider worth striving for are entirely matters of social training.

Stimuli Intensification.—Although in many instances the process of interactional amplification involves rivalry, in some cases it clearly does not. Such is the case in the Negro work gangs of the deep south. As far as productive labor is concerned, the old-type southern Negro cannot be stimulated to increased activity by rivalry. Such Negroes see little sense in trying to earn more money than the next man does or in trying to get a reputation for being the hardest and most efficient worker. Consequently, the commonplace competitive devices used to stimulate other workers will not be effective. The Negroes are, therefore, often organized into noncompetitive work gangs, groups of men who do the same thing—such as hoeing weeds or shoveling dirt—in unison and who are “paced” by singing. So organized, a group of Negro workers will accomplish many times what they could be induced to do as individuals.⁷

In instances such as this, interactional amplification is a consequence of what may be called stimuli intensification. This may occur in three ways: by the increase of the effectiveness of the stimulus itself, by the occurrence of many stimuli at the same time, and by recurrence of the stimulus or stimuli at periodic intervals.

The first, an increase in the effectiveness of the stimulus itself, is possible because any complex act actually consists of a series of specific acts, each one of which is the stimulus for the succeeding act. In the case of a singer, for example, each note serves as a stimulus for the next. Any condition which increases the stimulus value of the first note and of each succeeding one will tend to encourage the singer to ever stronger vocal efforts.

On the basis of such stimuli intensification a man who otherwise does not sing may be encouraged to lusty song during his bath. Here the increase in the effectiveness of the stimulus occurs mechanically. In the first place, the hard, near surfaces of the usual bathroom do not absorb sound; they bounce it back.

Thus, a vastly greater proportion of the sound made by the singer is returned to him as a stimulus for the production of further sound than would be the case in an ordinary room. In the second place, the sound is blurred and is supplemented by that of falling water. The effect is an enrichment of—an addition of overtones to—the original note. However thin and uncertain his first note may be, it comes back to him stronger and richer than it would under normal circumstances and thus encourages him to greater efforts. It is not, in other words, the bath but the bathroom which fosters singing in the bath.

This same sort of increase in the effectiveness of a stimulus for further acts appears in many social situations, although, of course, upon a more complex level. Other people serve as the walls which “bounce back” the smile or greeting which is analogous to the singer’s first note. If they respond fully, the one who smiled is stimulated to more intense action; if not, his subsequent acts will probably be of decreased intensity. This process is usually responsible for the fact that a responsive conversationalist stimulates conversation. The interaction between two unusually responsive individuals will tend, therefore, to build up rapidly into what is usually described as a brilliant conversation.

A similar effect of stimuli intensification may be achieved by the occurrence of many stimuli at the same moment. If two people laugh at the same time at a joke, the joker will, theoretically, be doubly stimulated to tell another joke. If a thousand people applaud simultaneously, the speaker will be stimulated to greater effort than he would have been had only ten applauded.

Stimuli intensification by the simultaneous occurrence of many stimuli appears in many types of social situations but is perhaps most characteristic of the audience. The extent to which such intensification can force people into extreme interaction is evident when we reflect upon the way normally sober individuals may lose control of themselves as members of a hilarious audience.

Under some circumstances, the repetition of a stimulus at periodic intervals has the effect of increasing its effectiveness.⁸ It is a common experience that a small noise which repeats at regular intervals is vastly more disturbing than are loud, varied, and irregular sounds. Although we may be able to develop

great resistance to the scattered and irregular noises of a city, the regular chirp of a cricket may become so irritating that each succeeding chirp has an increasing psychological effect which is totally disproportionate to its physical intensity.

This fact is put to good use in the drum torture and in the water torture practiced by some primitive peoples. In the latter case, water is dropped periodically on the person or in the hearing of the victim. With the drums, complex but steady rhythms are used. Subjected to relatively small sounds over a period of time, the victim becomes so responsive to the beat that further repetition is unbearable. The neurological and psychological processes involved are unknown, but it would appear that the individual tends to develop anticipatory sets or tensions toward periodic stimuli and that these sets serve to intensify the normal response.⁹ At any event, the effects of the periodic repetition of stimuli are matters of everyday experience.

LEADERSHIP

We have seen that a considerable number of factors and processes may enter into the shaping of a social interaction. None of these is subject to the deliberate control of any member of the situation. They provide, therefore, the limits and circumstances within which personal, directive leadership must operate. Even in those situations where the leader is himself a very significant factor, he is only one of many factors. This is clearly seen in the audience situation. The lecturer, for example, cannot change the fact that the theater or auditorium is acoustically inadequate, that the weather outside is such as to turn people's minds to thoughts of a vacation trip, and so on. Furthermore, the members of his audience have been subjected to long social training, from which they have acquired rather specific—however divergent—reactions to any given stimulus. The leader can utilize these specific reactions, but he cannot modify them. Thus, the lecturer cannot teach the members of his audience that a given joke is amusing. If he wants to amuse them, he must tell them jokes which they or a considerable proportion of them already know are funny. And so with all group leaders. Even the despot does not rule irrespective of the people who are ruled. Working skillfully with the materials at hand, he may develop somewhat unusual patterns of collective

action, but only in the sense that a composer produces a new musical pattern within the fixed limitations of the musical instruments.¹⁰ Finally, unlike the composer of music, the leader of the interaction is himself a part of the pattern. He is affected by the behavior of his followers. The leader, in other words, interacts with his followers. Even the thug reacts to the behavior of his victim.

It is evident that the extent to which it is possible for any leader to influence the course of an interaction is determined by the factors present in the particular situation. The extent to which he actually does influence the interaction is, however, further limited by his skill at leadership and his prestige as a leader.

Prestige.—The tendency of people to react to the nature of the source rather than to a stimulus itself makes personal prestige an important element in the leadership of many social situations.¹¹ Just as the sound made by a violin may seem pleasing to the listener simply because it is supposed to emanate from a Stradivarius, the singing of a great diva is never bad simply because she is a great diva. Thus, the prestige of the leader of a situation as a leader may be far more significant in determining his success than what he actually does in the role of leader.

Aside from that prestige which is traceable to the inheritance of a given social status, leadership prestige is in its origin usually a result of skill at situational leadership. The actor, for example, may so consistently satisfy his audiences that in time audiences come to anticipate a satisfying performance from him, and so on. Once he has secured prestige in this way, his audience will tend to respond to him fully as much as to his actual leadership and will continue so to respond even when that skill is gone. Thus, even when the great actor grows old and the great singer's voice loses its quality and range, prestige may bring acclaim.

The Halo Effect.—Furthermore, prestige tends to be generalized; and skill in one type of situation tends to give a leader prestige in situations of another type. The physicist may be accepted as an authority upon metaphysics, the biologist as an authority upon government, the novelist as an authority upon domestic relations, and so on. The extension of prestige which

has grown out of skill in one type of situation to prestige in other types of situations is described as the halo effect.

The halo effect is one consequence of the illogical but commonplace practice of generalization—*i.e.*, the extension of the effects of a particular observation to include an entire category. Among other things, generalization results in the idea that there is such a thing as a “leader of men.” Actually, skill at leadership is, like other skills, specific rather than general. Leaders of a particular type of situation are simply superior at leadership in that specific type of situation. They may have superior initiative and ingenuity in other regards also; but these abilities are not to be deduced from the observation that they provide effective leadership in this, that, or the other type of social situation. The fact that a man is an effective classroom lecturer does not necessarily mean that he can lead the conversation at dinner, speak well over the radio, write interesting articles, or even act the part of an effective classroom lecturer in a stage play. The skills and qualities necessary for effective leadership of one situation may be quite inappropriate in another.

Leadership Qualifications.—It is impossible to generalize upon the qualities which make for effective leadership in any particular kind of situation. In some situations, physical size, general appearance, sex, or age may be important elements.¹² Occasionally sheer energy is no doubt significant, and frequently the loudest voice will become the dominant one. In some situations, status is of primary importance. For example, in drilling soldiers, military rank is all that is necessary to hold leadership. In some situations, the possession of force—physical strength, a gun, or the like—may be about all that is necessary to achieve effective leadership. In many social situations, however, leadership is attained and maintained only by skill at dramatization.¹³

DRAMATIZATION

As an art by which leadership is effected, dramatization consists of a threefold personification and a symbolic manipulation of the various complex forces which affect the welfare of the individual.

Personification.—Personification is the process of imputing human qualities and significance to what is in fact not a human being. Natural forces, social structures and processes, and

human attributes may be so personified that they can be looked upon as persons. This is what is accomplished when the dramatist, for example, personifies an exploding shell as a monster greedy for the blood of innocent women and children. Expressed as a mathematical equation, the exploding shell would be meaningless to most people. Personified as a monster, it becomes understandable.

Personification is possible because people habitually see the forces which affect their welfare in personal terms. The child, to illustrate, tends to personify all the forces about him—the Sandman, the Bogeyman, God, etc. He does so, not only because he is socially encouraged to do so, but also because human beings determine his welfare and because all things which happen to him are associated with persons. He is fed, bathed, dressed, changed, fondled, and spanked by people. It is more or less inevitable, therefore, that, since the source of those forces which first affect him is personal, he should attribute a personal source to the setting of the sun, the pressure of the wind, the fall of rain, and so on. The habit of personification is, in other words, a consequence of the dependence of the young upon persons.

This habit is evidently rather universal and tends to be carried over into adult life. Thus, although the adult may be quite aware that no person is responsible, he may curse the "weather man" when rain spoils a picnic; he may think of a trust as a monstrous person; and he may find government more or less incomprehensible unless it is personified as Uncle Sam, John Bull, or La Belle France.

With these symbolic persons, the observer can identify himself.¹⁴ Thus, he may vicariously react to their joys and pains. Whether the joys of a symbolic person give him pleasure or whether they give him pain depends on whether his identification with the symbolic person is positive or negative in character. With those symbolic persons who represent acceptable factors, the identification is positive. Thus, the successes of "good old Uncle Sam" provide the observer with pleasure. With those symbolic persons who represent reprehensible factors, the identification is negative. Thus, the successes of "the Reds" give the observer displeasure.

The Dramatic Trio.—In the process of dramatization, the factors which affect the welfare of the individual are so personified

that three recognizable symbolic persons result—the dramatic trio of hero, heroine, and villain. The hero personifies everything which assists the individual in securing desirable ends. The heroine personifies these ends, whatever they may be. The villain personifies all forces which thwart the achievement of the desirable ends.

With the hero and heroine, the observer makes positive identifications; with the villain, he makes a negative one. In the symbolic conflict which ensues, the observer then can participate vicariously. In actuality, this conflict is, of course, only a dramatization of the interplay of impersonal forces.

The conflict of hero and villain over the heroine appears in all forms of dramatic leadership. It is evident in the work of novelist and playwright. It appears in the story of the successful *raconteur*. It is present, but not so evident, in the salesman's spiel, the advertiser's blurb, the politician's speech, and the revolutionist's ideology.

Manipulation.—What forces and things the dramatist will personify and which of these forces will be personified as hero, which as heroine, and which as villain depend upon his purpose and upon his leadership problem. When the objective of the leader is simply to amuse his audience, he does not have to establish the dramatic trio. He simply needs to offer his audience a hero, heroine, and villain who are the embodiments of established values of that audience. The hero will embody those qualities which they already consider laudable. The heroine will embody those qualities which they believe to be desirable, such as physical beauty, humility, virtue, and so on. The villain will embody those qualities which they believe to be evil. The major effort of the leader is, therefore, directed toward a satisfying manipulation of the dramatic trio—usually to the end that the villain is defeated and the hero wins the heroine.

When, however, the leader desires to convert his followers to some new course of action, the problem is far more complex. He must select and distribute the forces and factors which he personifies as hero, heroine, and villain in such a way that their conflict will serve his purposes. For example, the political speaker must establish his opponent as the villain of the political drama and himself as the hero. Since his listeners already know that a villain is bad and that a hero is good, his listeners will

then make a negative identification with the opponent and a positive one with him and will, perhaps, act accordingly.

In the succeeding chapters we shall have frequent occasion to refer to the process of dramatization and to examine into some of the specific uses made of it. For the present it is necessary only to see that dramatization facilitates leadership in many situations.

APPENDIX

1. The specific elements of symbolic behavior and the processes by which the individual acquires the ability to use and to respond to socially designated symbols are discussed at length in R. T. LaPiere and P. R. Farnsworth, *Social Psychology* (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1936, Chaps. IV and X).

The term "symbolic" as here used must be distinguished from the term "symbolism" as used by either sociologists or psychoanalysts. See the article "Symbolism" by E. Sapir (*Ency. Soc. Sci.*, 14, 492-495). In the sociological usage, "symbolism" refers to the fact that social practices may lose their original utility and be continued as empty forms and that some social practices are developed to serve as superficial substitutes for former social practices—*e.g.*, Mother's Day, a superficial substitute for the filial practices of the patriarchal family. The meaning of "symbolism" as the term is used by the psychoanalysts is not clear to any but the disciples of this cult.

2. People commonly "explain" their moods by reference to the weather or to some other aspect of the physical setting. Thus, the weather is invigorating or depressing; the house is cozy; the room is peaceful; and so on. Since the causes of our particular feeling-states are beyond our comprehension, we tend, when we are trying to explain them, to refer to something which is tangible. It is, however, easy to overestimate the importance of the physical environment in influencing human behavior.

One entire school of social thought was built around the idea that the physical environment determines the nature of society and is the cause of all sorts of behavior, ranging from the development of civilizations to suicide and crime. See the devastating critical analysis of this school by P. Sorokin in his *Contemporary Sociological Theories* (New York, Harper, 1928, Chap. III).

3. Unfortunately, there are not yet many very reliable data on the relationships between physical well-being and behavior. It is obvious that a man with a broken leg cannot run a race. It is probable that a headache or indigestion will result in atypical behavior. This line of thought leads, however, all too easily to what have been described as the digestive and the syphilitic interpretations of history. Most of the writings on this topic have come from the less cautious of the endocrinologists, of whom the following are, perhaps, the most representative:

- Berman, L., *The Glands Regulating Personality*, New York, Macmillan, 1921.
Cobb, I. G., *The Glands of Destiny*, New York, Macmillan, 1928.
Stockard, C. P., *The Physical Basis of Personality*, New York, Norton, 1931.

The only aspect of the problem upon which there is any considerable body of reliable data is the immediate effects of alcohol on the easily measured forms of individual behavior, such as the performance of manual tasks. See:

- Haggard, H.W., "Physiology of Alcohol," *Yale Rev.*, 1934, **23**, 737-747.
Hollingworth, H.L., "The Influence of Alcohol," *J. Abn. and Soc. Psychol.*, 1924, **18**, 204-237 and 311-333.
Miles, W.R., *Alcohol and Human Efficiency*, Washington, Carnegie Institute, 1924.
Peabody, R.R., "Danger Line of Drink," *Scribner's Mag.*, June, 1936, 370-372.
Rosanoff, A.J., *Manual of Psychiatry*, New York, Wiley, 6th ed., 1927, Part II, Chap. X.
Seward, G.H., and J.P. Seward, "Alcohol and Task Complexity," *Arch. Psychol.*, 1936, No. 206.

4. Some experimental study of this problem has been undertaken by J.F. Dashiell ("Experimental Studies of the Influence of Social Situations on the Behavior of Individual Human Adults," *A Handbook of Social Psychology*, Worcester, Clark University Press, 1935) and by J.C. Gardner ("The Effect of a Group of Social Stimuli upon Attitudes," *J. Educ. Psychol.*, 1935, **26**, 471-478). A strong plea for the situational approach, with special reference to the feasibility of laboratory work, is made by M. Sherif in his *The Psychology of Social Norms* (New York, Harper, 1936, especially Chaps. IV and V). Other experimental and observational studies will be referred to in subsequent chapters. In the succeeding chapter, the problem of measuring feeling-states and, thus, of determining the changes which occur in them will be considered in detail.

5. Industrial psychology, an outgrowth of the earlier fashion for the pseudoscientific "efficiency expert," has been mainly concerned with the effects of fatigue, lighting conditions, posture, etc., upon the productivity of the worker. If the studies reported by E. Mayo (*The Human Problems of an Industrial Civilization*, New York, Macmillan, 1933) are any indication, it would seem that the industrial psychologists are at last becoming aware of the importance of the situational or group factor in human behavior. Mayo describes experiments which were undertaken by the Western Electric Company at its Hawthorne works in Chicago to determine the effects of worker morale—the sense of belonging to a work group—upon worker efficiency. It was rather conclusively shown that morale is the most important single factor in determining efficiency. Militarists have long known the need for morale; industrialists are, evidently, so much preoccupied with mechanical efficiency that the values of worker morale must be proved to them by elaborate psychological studies.

6. See R.N. Benedict, *Patterns of Culture* (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1934).

M. Mead (*Cooperation and Competition among Primitive People*, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1937) has studied and compared the behavior of the

members of primitive societies with this particular problem in mind. Like Benedict, she finds no uniformity between societies in the things which people will competitively strive for or in the forms which competition takes. Like Benedict, Mead concludes that competition—using the term to cover both rivalry and emulation—is entirely social in origin.

The variation in the competitive "spirit" of different members of our own society has been studied more or less experimentally and reported on in the following: J.B. Maller, *Cooperation and Competition* (Teach. Coll. Contr. Educ., 1929), and J. Zubin, *Some Effects of Incentives* (New York, Teachers College, Columbia University, 1932).

7. The organization of the Negro work gang is extremely simple, but the effects of such organization upon productivity are remarkable. Unacquainted with the pattern, the writer once struggled for three days to get a large number of unruly and playful Negroes—members of an Army Labor Battalion—to unload gravel from freight cars. Upon the advice of a person versed in the work-gang pattern, the writer eventually strung the Negro soldiers down the line of the gravel-laden railroad cars, singled out one Negro who seemed to be the ringleader, ordered him to start a song, and then sat down to enjoy the singing and to watch the gravel fly.

The traditional songs of the Negro work gang are simple and usually pornographic and always consist of very short phrases, each of which is ended with a grunt. This grunt is the signal for the act of chopping, shoveling, etc. The nice versions of these songs—versions to which the Negroes revert whenever there is danger of offending their white masters—have been compiled by H.W. Odum (*The Negro and His Songs*, Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1925) and by H.W. Odum and G.B. Johnson (*Negro Workaday Songs*, Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1926).

8. For experimental data on this phenomenon see E.M. Verveer, J. Barry, Jr., and W.A. Bousfield, "Change in Affectivity with Repetition" (*Amer. J. Psychol.*, 1933, **45**, 30-34).

9. The findings of F.H. Lewis ("Affective Characteristics of Rhythm," *Psychol. Bull.*, 1933, **30**, 679-680) and those of B.C. Sarvis ("An Experimental Study of Rhythms," *Psychol. Monog.*, 1933, **44**, No. 1, 207-232) confirm the common-sense observation that rhythmic stimulation sets up in the responding organism a sort of periodicity which then intensifies the responses of the organism to each succeeding stimulus. The effect is analogous to that of the vibration which can be set up in a bridge by marching soldiers, a vibration which may build up to the point at which the structure collapses with one more step of the soldiers or even shakes itself to pieces after they have departed.

People who have been subjected for long periods to rhythmic stimulation may continue to pulsate after such stimulation ceases. Professional dance-band musicians commonly experience rhythmic muscular twitchings which persist long after the night's work is over.

See also "Rhythm Lessens Fatigue" (*Sci. Amer.*, June, 1936, 337); and the popular but interesting article by Q. Reynolds, "Who's Got Rhythm?" (*Collier's*, July 28, 1934, 13).

The effects of rhythm are not, however, entirely mechanical. The individual must be capable, as it were, of perceiving rhythm before he can respond to it. The highly complex rhythms of some primitive music and those of the African drum language are entirely incomprehensible to most Westerners and for those Westerners have none of the affective character that they have for the primitive. Likewise, the relatively complex rhythm of the bolero, which may excite those who are initiated, will seem dull and will not be stimulating to people who have been brought up on the simple rhythms of the waltz and the polka.

For an analysis of the processes by which the individual learns to respond to the rhythms which are typical of his culture, see A.T. Jersild, *Development of Rhythm in Young Children* (New York, Teachers College, Columbia University, 1935).

10. Historians have consistently interpreted social events in terms of the personalities and actions of the leading figures in those events. This practice has resulted in the "great man" theory of history, in which the few are thought to count for much and the many for little. Sociologists, on the other hand, consider that so-called great men are simply symbols of social processes, processes which they themselves serve but do not determine. Recently J. Schneider ("Fame and Social Origin," *Soc. Forc.*, 1936, **14**, 354-361; and "The Cultural Situation as a Condition for the Achievement of Fame," *Amer. Sociol. Rev.*, 1937, **2**, 480-491) has subjected this thesis to careful historical scrutiny. Studying both the cultural and the particular family backgrounds of men of note and the achievements which have led to their historical acclaim, he comes to the conclusion that leaders are products of their age and that what constitutes leadership is determined by the age rather than by the man.

It is not unnatural, however, that during a period of social disorganization, such as our own, the role of leadership, particularly political leadership, should be exaggerated. When the world's dictators are blatantly promising their people everything under the sun and when the publicists of the remaining democratic countries are fervently blaming all the troubles of the world on the ill-advised leadership of these same dictators, the limited long-range effects of leadership, dictatorial or otherwise, are easily lost sight of in myopic concern with the events of the moment. Such has obviously been the case with E. Bogardus (*Leaders and Leadership*, New York, Appleton-Century, 1934) and with M.D. Hoffman and R. Wagner (*Leadership in a Changing World*, New York, Harper, 1935).

For a relatively cautious study of leadership see P. Pigors, *Leadership or Domination* (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1935). Pigors endeavors to analyze the social circumstances which produce leaders from among the members of the group and those social circumstances which encourage the appearance of leaders from outside the group. Throughout his analysis, the social causation of the rise of leaders is stressed. For a brief but excellent summary of the thesis that it is social circumstances which foster the rise and determine the character of political leadership, see the article "Leadership" by R. Schmidt (*Ency. Soc. Sci.*, **9**, 282-286). A special study in the

same vein is reported by G.B. Johnson, "Negro Racial Movements and Leadership in the United States" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, 1937, **43**, 57-71).

11. The specific effects of prestige upon the determination of the person of a leader will be discussed in subsequent chapters. For a general analysis of the social determination of prestige see the excellent study by L. Leopold, *Prestige* (London, Unwin, 1913).

For special studies of the effects of prestige see: I. Lorge, "Prestige, Suggestion, and Attitudes" (*Psychol. Bull.*, 1935, **32**, 750); and A.O. Bowden, F.F. Caldwell, and G.A. West, "Halo Prestige" (*J. Abn. and Soc. Psychol.*, 1934, **28**, 400-406).

12. A. Adler has advanced the theory that the psychological qualifications for leadership are developed as a compensation for physical inferiority; thus, a small boy develops the techniques of leadership to offset the fact that he cannot meet his contemporaries as a physical equal. The only effort which has so far been made to subject this theory to scientific scrutiny is that of E.B. Gowin (*The Executive and His Control of Men*, New York, Macmillan, 1915). Gowin found, however, that the recognized leaders in various fields of activity were in general both taller and heavier than others in the same field of activity. The evidence is hardly conclusive, but it does indicate that Adler's theory is simply a generalization from limited observation. See the study by G.C. Bellingrath, *Qualities Associated with Leadership in the Extra-curricular Activities of High School* (New York, Teachers College, Columbia University, 1930).

13. The fact that we so commonly stereotype people as "leaders," "followers," "honest," "dishonest," and so on makes necessary the stressing of the point that there is no such thing as leadership per se (see LaPiere and Farnsworth, *op. cit.*, Chap. IX, "Personality and Personality Stereotyping"). Leadership is a personality trait which becomes operative in a specific situation and which may be irrelevant to any other kind of situation. The fact that a person is a leader in one situation does not of necessity mean that he will function in the same capacity in other situations. It is a commonplace experience of everyday life that the man who bosses his clerks at his store may, when he pleads for a loan, humbly submit to the leadership of his banker, who may, in turn, be subject to a nagging wife, who may, again in turn, do anything to please her darling son. The personality that dominates on the lecture platform may be quite submissive at home. Although there is frequently a carry-over of prestige from one situation to another, as is the case when an audience listens with rapt attention to a great physicist's inept comments on social problems, there would seem to be no such thing as a generally dominating personality.

Furthermore, the point that leadership in any given type of situation is an exceedingly complex matter and that the trait of leadership is seldom acquired by deliberate intent deserves strong emphasis. Pseudo psychologists are constantly offering to the naive simple rules for leadership, and even the best of the attempts to analyze the arts of leadership smack of the scientific. Representative of the latter are O. Tead's *The Art of Leadership* (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1935) and H.E. Tralle's *The Psychology of Leadership* (New York, Century, 1925).

14. The term "identification" has been borrowed from psychoanalysis. See T.D. Eliot, "The Use of Psychoanalytic Classification in the Analysis of Social Behavior: Identification" (*J. Abn. and Soc. Psychol.*, 1927, **22**, 71-78; and the same title in *Publ. Amer. Sociol. Soc.*, 1927, **21**, 185-190). As it is here used, the term is, however, descriptive of an observable phenomenon and is entirely devoid of explanatory implications.

The reactions which are consequent upon the identification of one person with another must be clearly distinguished from the reactions of that person to the behavior of the other person. Identification can best be described as the process of putting oneself in the place of another and behaving—at least covertly—as if one were subject to the stimuli which affect that other person. For example, the mother who observes her child run unthinking onto the highway may be afraid, although the child is happy in chasing a ball. We may describe the behavior of the mother by saying that she appreciates the dangers of being on the highway and responds as if she were in her child's place; *i.e.*, she is identified with the child.

Identification, however, takes two diametrically opposed forms: positive identification (or empathy) and negative identification (or antipathy). As a consequence of positive identification the mother is vicariously distressed when her child runs unthinking onto the highway, vicariously pleased when he eats a piece of cake. With some individuals, the mother may, on the other hand, make negative identifications. She then puts herself in the place of the other but reacts vicariously in ways which are the antithesis of what her reactions would be if she were that other person. Thus, she may feel a glow of satisfaction when cries of anguish indicate that the nasty little boy across the street is receiving a much-deserved and long-delayed thrashing.

It is, evidently, as a consequence of vicarious reactions of these two orders that people secure satisfactions from hearing a story, from seeing a play or motion picture, and from reading a book or newspaper story. For an extended analysis of the processes of positive and negative identification, see LaPiere and Farnsworth, *op. cit.* (Chap. X).

Somewhat different descriptive systems which are used with reference to the same phenomena will be found in C.H. Cooley, *Human Nature and the Social Order* (New York, Scribner, 1902, Chaps. IV and VII); E.T. Krueger and W.C. Reckless, *Social Psychology* (New York, Longmans, Green, 1931, Chap. VIII); and K. Young, *Social Psychology* (New York, Crofts, 1930, 131-137). Most of the attempts to study objectively the phenomena of identification have taken the form of questionnaire measurements of person-to-person attitudes, and these will be referred to in succeeding chapters as occasions arise.

CHAPTER III

THE CLASSIFICATION OF COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR

The first stage in the development of any science is the classification of phenomena into categories of kind as mutually exclusive as is possible and as definitive as the qualitative nature of variations among the phenomena permits. Once the categories are established and their outstanding attributes perceived, close and specialized study of each becomes possible.

At the present stage in the development of a science of social psychology, the establishment of categories of collective behavior is imperative. We have at hand masses of data upon social interactions. Extensive and intensive study has gone on apace. But the data need sorting, classification; and, to accomplish this, a system of logical concepts must be devised.¹ It will be our purpose to establish such a system in the present chapter.

Specialized Approach.—At the outset it must be clearly recognized that the phenomena which are to be classified into types are limited to those which pertain to the interactions which occur in specific social situations. Our concern is irrespective of those patterns which may arise through a sequence of such interactions. Just as the plot and the action of a motion picture are the products of many separate and specific photographs, social organization and any social process are the consequences of many specific interactions. The study of such organization and processes is the prerogative of the sociologist. The student of collective behavior must, if he is to perform his function as specialist, content himself with the analysis of the social interactions which occur in situations of comparatively brief duration—by analogy, with the action which occurs in the specific photographs of the motion picture.

The history of the American Federation of Labor is not, for example, a sociopsychological problem. Neither is the social organization of the Pueblo Indians, the rise of Calvinism, the disintegration of Chinese society, the northern migration of

American Negroes, the enactment of the Eighteenth Amendment and its subsequent repeal, or any comparable social organization or process.

Such organizations and processes do, however, operate through and arise out of many situations in which collective interaction occurs. Our concern is with the nature of these situations. To illustrate, a great variety of situations contributed to the making of the historic pattern which may be described as the rise of the Anti-Saloon League. Among these situations were some in which women threw bricks at the windows of saloons. Our task is to discern, in so far as is possible, the processes by which arise such collective actions as the throwing of bricks at saloon windows.

This limitation upon the scope of our inquiry focalizes attention and effort, but it does not preclude our encountering severe difficulties. In the entirely hypothetical, static society—one in which the social structure would be so well equilibrated that each part would balance with all the others and the totality would be completely adapted to the forces external to it—collective behavior would fall into a few clear types; and the analysis of each type would be a comparatively simple task.

Under conditions of social change, however, such as is characteristic of our own society, it is quite impossible to reduce the forms of collective behavior to a few or even to many distinct types. Social change blurs distinctions and brings new forms of collective behavior into prominence—strikes, boycotts, and lockouts; race riots, economic discrimination, and lynchings; political revolts, mass uprisings, and revolutions. These add zest to the study of collective behavior but complicate the problems of scientific analysis. And even a tentative effort at analysis taxes the observer's mind and poses more problems than it solves.

Differences in Degree and in Kind.—The analysis of differences in degree in terms of categorical differences in kind is a time-sanctioned scientific device. It is, however, well to call to mind the fact that there are no clear-cut distinctions in kind to be found in natural or in social phenomena. There are, for example, such infinite gradations in organic life between the unicellular amoeba and the complex, multicellular human being that to break up these variations in degree into categories of kind is unrealistic.

Even to draw a sharp line between the organic and the inorganic, between the vegetable and the animal, is quite impossible. In dealing with social phenomena, the same difficulty is faced and perhaps to a greater extent.

There are, however, such vast differences in degree between the amoeba and man that, for all practical purposes, the biologist must treat them as different kinds of organisms. Likewise, the social scientist must consider differences in degree of social phenomena as differences in kind.

The danger in such a classification into types is that it may lead to the treatment of these types as mutually exclusive and to the explanation of the types in terms of themselves.²

Types as Norms.—Never, so the students of the Bertillon criminal-identification system tell us, have there been two men exactly alike. Likewise, there is no doubt that each instance of collective behavior is in some minute regard unique. Possibly never in the history of man has a given social interaction been subsequently repeated in exact detail. Even with attention upon the salient aspects of social interactions, these interactions would no doubt appear to fall into a series of infinite variations. But, just as we may simplify the infinite physical variations between men and may study the norms into which these variations tend to fall, we may typify the norms of situational variation and may thus gain in our understanding of the characteristic attributes and processes of collective behavior.³

Any actual instance of collective interaction may, of course, deviate in some degree or other and in some direction or other from the type category. Not infrequently, moreover, a specific interaction is a mixture of two or more categorical elements, such as would be the interaction when business and pleasure are mixed at a luncheon meeting of business associates.

Basis for Classification into Types.—Social interactions might be classified in any of a considerable number of ways. The statistical-minded person might, for example, classify them in terms of the number of persons involved.⁴ The moralist might, and usually does, classify them into those which he considers good and those which he considers bad.

For sociopsychological purposes, social interactions can be most fruitfully classified on the basis of five indexes: the origin and function of the interaction; its ideologies; the membership

of the situation; the relationship between the overt behavior of the members and their covert feeling-states; and the personnel, the character, and the role of leadership.⁵ Before attempting to treat the types of collective behavior which result from analysis of social interactions on the basis of these five indexes, it will be well to consider each index in turn.

ORIGIN AND FUNCTION

Origin.—Social interactions occur in situations which range in origin from those which are socially predetermined to those which are fortuitous. The extreme of the former type of situation is illustrated by the gathering of people in the Cathedral of Chartres for Mass on Easter Sunday. Such a social situation is “planned,” not only in terms of the individuals involved but in terms of the social system which it represents. Such situations are most deeply rooted in the social system of their members and are simply a manifestation of that system.⁶

At the other extreme are social situations which have no place and which play no significant part in the functioning of the social organization. They arise as an unanticipated consequence of the prior behavior of the individuals who compose them. They cannot be described either as socially or as individually purposive. In this sense, therefore, they are fortuitous.⁷ Such certainly is the gathering of people at the southwest corner of Fifth Avenue and Broadway at any given moment before the traffic signal changes to “Go.” These people will not have planned to meet at this particular place at this particular time; probably they are all strangers to one another; and improbable is their all coming together again in any place at any time. The situation which they form plays no vital part in the life of any one of them, and the interaction is simply a matter of momentary significance.

Function.⁸—The function of a social interaction is inseparably bound up with the origin of the situation in which it occurs. Those situations which arise as a direct consequence of the social heritage of their members tend to serve ends which are sociological in character. It is usually necessary, therefore, to refer to the sociologist in an attempt to discern the functional significance of the interactions which occur in such situations. Such a procedure would be necessary in the case of the interaction which occurs at Mass on Easter Sunday. In those situations

which arise as a result of individual effort, the function of the interaction will, however, tend to be of psychological rather than of sociological import. This is true, for example, of the interaction which occurs among people who have gathered in a theater because they wanted recreational satisfactions and believed that such satisfactions could be secured by membership in this specific situation.

We shall, therefore, frequently have occasion to turn to the sociologist and to the psychologist—and, in fact, to all the other social scientists—for data on the function of various types of collective behavior.

IDEOLOGIES

There is, however, one source of material upon the function of collective behavior which must invariably be ignored as such and must be treated as a special attribute of the behavior itself. This is the “explanation” for an interaction which may be offered by members of the situation.

People are usually prepared to justify any interaction in which they have taken part. When “explanations” for collective behavior are socially provided for the members of the situation—*i.e.*, when ready-made justifications are supplied by their social heritage for them to use when occasion warrants—they are ordinarily termed ideologies.⁹ When “explanations” are a product of the given interaction, they are usually termed rationalizations. Since in either case the sociopsychological function of such explanations is the same—to satisfy the question “Why?” however it may arise—we may cover all situational justifications by the former term.

The distinction between the ideologies and the actual functions of social interactions is most clearly evident in those sorts of collective behavior ordinarily described as involving ulterior motives. Here the reasons given are patently false. A political campaign invariably resolves—according to the politicians—about the purest of motives. Each aspirant for office claims that his ambition to secure office stems from his desire to serve his country, his people, and his God. Only the most naïve believe, however, that he means what he says; and only the stupid or willfully deceitful find in a politician’s acts the noble motives to which he has traced those acts. The actual reasons why a

politician does as he does are to be determined only by laborious study of his personal life history and of the political circumstances of his time.

To accept the ideologies of social interaction as evidence of the function of that interaction would, therefore, be much like taking the politician's professions as gospel truth. On the latter basis, political history would become a catalogue of politicians' lies. On the former, the study of collective behavior would result in nothing more than a record of what people think they do and what they say is the reason for so doing.

It does not follow that, because there often is no relationship between the function of a given interaction and its ideology, such a relationship never exists. Sometimes people know what they are doing and why and are capable and willing to impart this knowledge to others. But the student of collective behavior must never proceed upon the assumption that people can and will give a valid explanation for their behavior. As every competent student of political science well knows, even the decisions handed down by such an august body as the Supreme Court of the United States are not to be understood in terms of the constitutional explanations by which that body justifies its decisions.

The analysis of ideologies does not aid us in discerning the actual functions of social interactions. It does, however, assist in the classification of these interactions.

MEMBERSHIP

The membership of a social situation may be large or small and may be either socially predesignated or the fortuitous consequence of individual action. As we shall see, there is a close relationship between the origin and function of a situation and the character of its membership. With the exception of an occasional tourist, for example, it is only the Roman Catholics of the community who will attend Easter Mass in Chartres; but almost anyone may, by force of individual circumstances, happen to become a member of the group waiting for the lights to turn at Fifth Avenue and Broadway.

The members of a given social situation may have been systematically and rigorously trained for the interaction which will occur therein, as are the priests around the altar at Mass. They may be relatively unprepared by past experience to interact,

as are the Chinese peasant and the missionary who come face to face on a narrow, swinging bridge. They may have been born to membership, as are the children who sit around the family table at mealtime. They may have been rigorously selected for membership, as are those present at a socialite gathering. Or they may have come together as the consequence of unrelated individual initiative, as have the passengers on a boat. Upon the character and the source of the membership of a social situation will depend in part the character of the interaction which occurs therein.

OVERT AND COVERT ASPECTS OF INTERACTION

For purposes of clearer analysis, it is frequently necessary to distinguish between behavior which is externally manifest—as is a smile—and that which occurs entirely within the organism—as does a digestive pain. The former is termed overt; the latter, covert. This distinction is made imperative by the fact that there is no necessary relationship between these two aspects of human behavior. A man may smile overtly, although covertly grieving at the news that his newborn is a girl. The actor may wail loudly and beat his breast, as demanded by the script, while covertly gloating over the approval of his audience.

The overt-covert dichotomy is exceedingly useful as an analytical tool and will be so used in the following chapters. It must be admitted, however, that the tool can easily run away with the craftsman. Overt behavior can be more or less objectively measured, but there is no known scientific procedure by which we can determine exactly how a person feels. How he says he feels is no certain index; for, as has already been mentioned, there is no necessary relationship between overt behavior—including speech—and covert—including thought and feeling.¹⁰

Whether or not the overt and covert aspects of the behavior of a given individual in a given social situation will be of the same order depends upon two variables: the previous training of the individual and the nature of the specific circumstance in which he behaves. It is a tradition of the theater that the play must go on, and the professional actor is trained to play his part regardless of how he may be feeling. Possibly there are individuals trained into such a high regard for literal truth that they invariably say what they feel. And there are perhaps occasions in the life of

most people when they act exactly as they feel like acting. But in general there is no assurance that the overt and covert reactions of an individual will be either of the same or of a different order.

Since covert behavior cannot be objectively measured, it must be deduced from observation of that which is overt. And, since there is no consistent relationship between these two aspects of behavior, the accuracy of the deduction will depend ultimately upon the sympathetic understanding and the freedom from subjective bias of the one who makes the deduction.

Within different social situations, various degrees of spread will be found between the overt and the covert aspects of the interaction. In some, the two will merge to one; in others, the overt will be the antithesis of the covert. The former circumstance may be illustrated by the behavior of the casual group on the street corner. They have no fixed method by which to adjust to one another; their behavior is largely a consequence of trial and error. Their diverse interests, their conflicting feelings, and their divergent personalities rise somewhat to the surface. One wants to dash ahead the instant the light turns green, and so he pushes up to the curb. Another changes his mind, deciding to go south instead of north, and promptly plows back through the group. A young man stares frank interest at a pretty girl. She glares reproof at him. There is, in brief, a close relationship between how the members of the group feel and how they act.

The relationship between the overt and covert aspects of interaction is not so evident when we are considering such a situation as that of the Easter Mass at Chartres Cathedral. The people attending probably run through the fixed ritual with the skill of long practice. Outwardly they evidence respect for the priests, calm satisfaction at the chanting, and solemn reverence for the symbolic flesh and blood of Christ. They are overtly indicating their subjugation to the Roman Catholic God. What they experience covertly is, however, impossible to ascertain. For all the observer can tell, the motherly woman may be worrying about the soup simmering at home; and the young man across the aisle may be planning a fishing trip.

The varying relationships between the covert and overt aspects of interaction can further be seen in a comparison of a doctor at the bedside of a patient and a father squabbling with his

eldest son. The doctor and his patient interact largely in terms of socially designated forms. The irate father and his son "let go," and their actions are expressive of their covert feelings. For all the observer can tell, the doctor may feel that the patient is a tiresome old hypochondriac; the patient may feel that the doctor is losing his grip on things. Seldom, however, will they let such feelings, if they exist, become apparent. On the other hand, the father may feel, for the moment, that his son is a thoughtless, thankless, thriftless fool and may act accordingly. The son may feel that his father is a stingy, stupid, sour old man and treat him as such.

LEADERSHIP

Every social interaction involves some degree of focalization of attention, however transitory, upon one member. That person is for the moment the leader of the situation. Quantitatively and qualitatively the other members react more to him than he does to any one of them. Although a speaker reacts to his audience, the reactions of each member to the speaker are greater than are his reactions to any one member.

In some social situations, actual leadership is at a minimum; the interaction follows a more or less predetermined pattern, and the leader is nominal only. Such is the character of the leadership of a priest at an Easter Mass. In other situations, however, the leader may play a significant role. Thus, the person who has the lead sets the pace for the other three players in a game of bridge; the lecturer guides the behavior, mainly covert, of his audience; and the officer directs the movements of his troop.

Some aspects of leadership have been considered in the preceding chapter, and others will be treated in detail later. At this point it is necessary only to indicate that the character of the leadership which appears in a given social interaction is frequently one of the clearest indexes to the type of that interaction.

The Use of Descriptive Materials.—In the analysis of types of collective behavior an inherent danger will be encountered. Many specific instances of social interaction possess such color and human interest that they are likely to draw attention away from the search for an understanding of the processes involved in such interactions. It is largely instances of collective behavior which fill our daily newspapers, which serve as the themes of

novels, and which are the materials for plays and motion pictures. The temptation, therefore, is to describe such instances in technical verbiage and then to let the matter rest—a temptation to be studiously avoided.¹¹

APPENDIX

1. E.B. Reuter and C.W. Hart (*Introduction to Sociology*, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1933, 478) express this need in the following words: "Any thoroughgoing classification of crowds, as of similar groupings, must result from concrete study of the groups and their behavior. It must follow study that will reveal the modes of interaction and the bonds of unity. No such study has been made; there has been very little scientifically reputable work done along this line. The various writers on the crowd have been content, for the most part, with common-sense groupings."

As has already been remarked, many of the writers on social psychology have not ventured even to discuss the subject of collective behavior and, having traced the social genesis of the human personality, have left the individual to behave, if at all, in a vacuum. See, for example, E.T. Krueger and W.C. Reckless, *Social Psychology* (New York, Longmans, Green, 1931).

Those who have endeavored to round out their analyses of personality development with a consideration of the collective situations in which people behave have been forced to devise their own systems of classification and have used various bases for classification. Compare those which have been devised by Reuter and Hart (*op. cit.*, 437-450), by L.L. Bernard (*Social Psychology*, New York, Holt, 1926, 411-581), by J.K. Folsom (*Social Psychology*, New York, Harper, 1931, 296-402), by K. Young (*Social Psychology*, New York, Crofts, 1930, 505-673), and by R.T. LaPiere and P.R. Farnsworth (*Social Psychology*, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1936, 365-484).

2. As a frame of reference for scientific study, a classificatory system is necessary in any discipline. As the mass of data grows, categories must be established in which the various findings can be placed in orderly relationship, through which the gaps in knowledge can be perceived, and so on. The problem here is not, in the first instance, unlike that of classifying books in a library or objects in a museum. Every science has gone through a period in which its classificatory system was gradually established.

There is, however, always the danger that the less perceptive members of a scientific discipline will misunderstand the function of such classification. Frequently, a classificatory system has been taken by some to be final and absolute; and explanatory value has been imputed to class names. This is what occurred with social instincts. Again, the "four wishes" of W.I. Thomas and F. Znaniecki (*The Polish Peasant in Europe and America*, Boston, Badger, 1918-1920, 5 vols.), which constituted a motivational classificatory system for the analysis of case-history materials, were for a time considered by some as representing innate drives to specific modes of behavior. Perhaps the most striking misinterpretation of the function and

complexities of classification was that which occurred in the field of psychiatry. Many of the lesser students of abnormal behavior fixed upon the categories which were established by W.A. White (*Outlines of Psychiatry*, Washington, Nervous and Mental Diseases Publishing Company, 14th ed., 1935) for clinical usage as both final and explanatory. For them, the study of abnormal behavior was completed when the attributes of each type had been described. In point of fact, the description of psychopathic types was but the beginning of psychiatric study.

The dangers and difficulties of classifying have led some to reject the procedure as entirely futile. In the case of social psychology, the alternative to classification is, according to J.F. Brown (*Psychology and the Social Order*, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1936, Chap. VI), the field theory of K. Lewin (*Principles of Topological Psychology*, trans. by F. Heider, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1936). In the topological approach, the varying motives of the members of a social situation would be shown graphically by the use of vector analysis. That which each of the individuals likes can be given a positive valence and that which he dislikes a negative one. The attempt here is, of course, to construct a special universe of discourse which might permit more accurate communication than is possible by means of our culturally provided language.

G.A. Lundberg and M. Lawsing ("The Sociography of Some Community Relations," *Amer. Sociol. Rev.*, 1937, 2, 318-335) have applied a method of graphic representation to the description of friendship relations, with interesting results. The writer feels, however, that it will be some time before we know so much about collective behavior that we cannot communicate all we know by means of strict usage and careful manipulation of the more than 200,000 words which are defined in the current edition of *Webster's New International Dictionary*. It is true, as the serious students of semantics have pointed out (e.g., C.K. Ogden and I.A. Richards, *The Meaning of Meaning*, New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1926) and as S. Chase (*The Tyranny of Words*, New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1938) has expressed in popular language, that verbal symbols devoid of external reference may be used to arrive at the wrong conclusion or to describe nonexistent phenomena; but substituting cabalistic symbols for more traditional words does not eliminate the dangers of empty symbols.

3. The method which is to be used here is not unlike that which was proposed for the analysis of historical data by H. Becker in his article "Culture Case Study and Ideal-type Method" (*Soc. Forc.*, 1934, 12, 399-405). The student who is interested in methodological problems should refer to this article and to the sources, mainly Max Weber, from which Becker derives his concept.

Another approach, with special reference to social situations, will be found in M. Sherif, *The Psychology of Social Norms* (New York, Harper, 1936, Chap. VI).

4. An interesting approach to collective behavior, one which is in marked contrast to that undertaken here, is that of J.L. Moreno in *Who Shall Survive?* (Washington, Nervous and Mental Diseases Publishing Company, 1934). In spite of its title, the book presents the results of an intensive

study of psychological attractions and repulsions which were found among the students of a girls' school. Although the same descriptive method is not employed, the relationship between Moreno's approach and that which is advocated by Lewin (*op. cit.*) is obvious.

Another approach to collective behavior is provided by F. Znaniecki in his *Social Action* (New York, Farrar & Rinehart, 1936). Undoubtedly impressive and possibly profound, Znaniecki's analysis is much too philosophical, evaluatory, and unsystematic to serve as a frame of reference for the scientific study of collective behavior.

5. The classification of types of collective behavior in terms of these five indexes does not, of course, lead to the traditional categories of public opinion, the public mind, and so on. Nor does it lead to the classification of behavior either in biological or in sociological categories. All behavior which leads to the sexual act might, for example, be considered as belonging to a single category "sexual behavior." Considered in terms of the five indexes of collective behavior, no such category results. The sexual act may be the end product of any one of a considerable number of types of collective interaction: institutional (Chap. IV), when the situation involves a bride and groom who have entered marriage in accordance with the precepts of the patriarchal family; congenial (Chap. VIII), when a man and woman come together mutually seeking sexual satisfaction; exchange (Chap. XIV), when a man employs a prostitute; nomothetic (Chap. XV), when a girl is raped; revelous (Chap. XVIII), when the sexual act is the consummation of an orgiastic dance or a drunken orgy.

6. That social systems are a product of human experience, rather than of divine or natural law, is now recognized by practically all social scientists. Some of the earlier anthropologists, such as J.F. McLennan (*Primitive Marriage*, Edinburgh, 1865), H.J. Main (*Ancient Law*, London, 1861), and L.H. Morgan (*Ancient Society*, New York, Holt, 1878), devised elaborate theories in which social organizations were supposed to evolve in accordance with fixed and natural stages. Some later writers, such as E. Westermarck (*The History of Human Marriage*, London, Macmillan, 1921, 3 vols.) and the pseudo anthropologist R. Briffault (*The Mothers*, New York, Macmillan, 1927, 2 vols.), have found the origin of society in natural rather than in human forces. In the main, however, there has been little doubt on the part of present-century anthropologists and sociologists that society originates in human endeavor and that it is a product of human history rather than of natural law.

With this view established, sociologists have abandoned the search for the ultimate origins of society in general or of any society in particular and have turned their attention toward the examination of the processes to be observed in the changes which are taking place in contemporary societies. Such has been the approach of W.F. Ogburn (*Social Change*, New York, Huebsch, 1922; and, under his editorship, *Recent Social Trends*, Report of the President's Committee on Social Trends, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1933, 1 vol. ed.) and F.S. Chapin (*Cultural Change*, New York, Century, 1928). Less representative and more moralistic are such works as C.A. Ellwood's *Cultural Evolution* (New York, Century, 1927) and C.M.

Case's *Social Process and Human Progress* (New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1931).

In anthropology, the problem of social origins long centered around controversy over where man's society was invented. One school (represented in England by G.E. Smith, *The Ancient Egyptians*, London, 1911; by W.J. Perry, *The Growth of Civilization*, New York, Dutton, 1924; and by W.H.R. Rivers, *Psychology and Ethnology*, New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1926) contended that man's cultural elements were devised in Egypt and were diffused throughout the world. The other school (represented in America by F. Boas, "Review of Graebner's *Methode der Ethnologie*," *Science*, 1911, 34, 804-810; by A. Goldenweiser, "Principle of Limited Possibilities," *J. Amer. Folk-lore*, 1913, 26, 259-290; and by many others) has rejected the idea that there was any one center of cultural development and has stressed the possibility of parallel invention. All anthropologists agree, however, that all the cultural traits which go to make up any society have been invented by man at some time and in some place. For a brief summary of this interpretation of the origin of society see the article "Invention" by C. Brinkmann (*Ency. Soc. Sci.*, 3, 247-250).

7. The term "fortuitous" as used throughout this work means having unascertainable antecedents; it does not mean uncaused. Although the religious-minded persist in deriding what they call the mechanistic theory and although a few of the physicists have charged up their ignorance concerning the behavior of some electrons to willfulness in nature, science must of necessity proceed upon the assumption that every effect has its antecedent cause—that, in other words, this is an ordered, not an erratic, universe. There is, however, often no way of ascertaining the immediate antecedents of phenomena. Thus, we cannot predict the outcome of a throw of the dice because we cannot ascertain before or during the throw the forces which are at work. At the most, we can only state the probabilities—i.e., the chances—that any given number will appear; but the fact that the appearance of whatever number does turn up was caused is not denied by our statement of the chances. In a like way, the term "fortuitous" refers to the fact that an event which has already occurred could not have been predicted except, perhaps, in terms of probabilities.

8. According to H.M. Kallen ("Functionalism," *Ency. Soc. Sci.*, 6, 523-524), the functional approach to social studies grew out of Darwinism. At any event, the shift in emphasis from the description of form or structure to the analysis of consequences or function, which occurred toward the close of the last century in sociology and psychology and, more recently, in political science and in economics, parallels the shift in biological interest from the description of the structure of organisms to the analysis of their adaptive characteristics. There is, however, a deeper significance than might at first appear in the shift from structural description to functional analysis in the social sciences. This shift represents a break with the social absolutism and moralism of Christian theology. If the important aspect of any social structure is its function, it follows that no structure can be judged in terms of structure alone. In practice this means, for example, that the patriarchal family system is collectively valuable only if and to

the extent that it functions to the satisfaction of collective ends. As a social structure, it has no inherent value, since its functional value will vary from time to time and from place to place.

The functional approach to collective behavior will, undoubtedly, affront all those who believe that specific sociopsychological structures have inherent values. Thus, to those who believe that a church service is good because it is a church service, the statement that some church services are formal motions which are devoid of religious significance, that others are functionally comparable to theatrical performances, and that still others are a form of revelry and are therefore comparable to a drunken spree will be an affront to common sense, an attack upon the integrity of decent people, or, at the least, the ravings of a poor fool.

9. The original application of the term "ideology" was in reference to the sensationalism of the eighteenth-century philosopher Condillac. In this philosophy, ideas—*i.e.*, mental patterns—were derived directly from sensations. Ideas, as we now understand them, are of social derivation and, as such, may have no relationship to nonsocial reality. Thus, people may have the idea that spinach is a highly desirable food, whereas it is quite possible that the physical organism finds the ingestion of spinach a waste of energy. The idea that spinach is a good food is an ideological part of social reality. It may or may not be valid in terms of nonsocial reality.

All ideas concerning the nature of reality which are derived from social reality but which are not verified in terms of nonsocial reality are herein designated as ideologies. Verified ideas will be treated simply as symbolizations of reality. This use of the term "ideology" seems to stem from Karl Marx, who, at least according to M. Eastman ("The End of Socialism in Russia," *Harper's Mag.*, February, 1937, 302), used it as "a term of contempt which he [Marx] borrowed from Napoleon Bonaparte, and which, freely translated into American, means 'applesauce.'"

The fact that ideologies are not verified in terms of nonsocial reality does not, however, make them any less significant for social reality. To put it simply, men accept ideas which are not subject to objective verification. The fact that no proof of the existence of heaven has ever been advanced does not lessen the value of the idea of heaven to those who believe in it.

An extensive analysis of the nature and the social role of ideologies is to be found in K. Manneheim, *Ideology and Utopia* (New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1936, trans. by L. Wirth and E. Shils). See also H.E. Barnes and H. Becker, *Social Thought from Lore to Science* (Boston, Heath, 1938, Vol. I). For an analysis of the psychology of ideologies see H. Lundholm, *The Psychology of Belief* (Durham, Duke University Press, 1936). For an excellent analysis of one ideological system—that of professional social workers in America—see W. Waller, "Social Problems and the Mores" (*Amer. Sociol. Rev.*, 1936, 1, 922-933). The fact that modern science has as yet done relatively little to modify the social role of ideologies is discussed at length by H. Fergusson in *Modern Man, His Belief and Behavior* (New York, Knopf, 1936). For an example of one attempt by a politician to establish an ideology compatible with his interests see the news item entitled "Gospel According to Saint Hitler" (*Time*, Jan. 25, 1937, 20).

The study of ideologies as specific phenomena has been approached in three ways. The first approach is that of the literary-minded historians, of which the best example is, perhaps, V.L. Parrington's *Main Currents in American Thought* (New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1927-1930, 3 vols.). The second approach is that of the historians of social theory, such, for example, as C. Gide and C. Rist, *A History of Economic Doctrines* (Boston, Heath, 1913, trans. by R. Richards). The third and more recently developed approach is the endeavor to measure the specific ideologies which come into operation in any given kind of situation by means of attitudinal questionnaires. Unfortunately, those who have engaged in attitudinal measurement have not clearly conceived their problem and have quite generally assumed that the statement of ideas concerning action is the same as preparation for nonverbal action. For a criticism of this assumption see R.T. LaPiere, "Attitudes vs. Actions" (*Soc. Forc.*, 1934, **13**, 230-237). Properly applied, the technique of attitudinal measurement may prove a fruitful source of data on specific ideologies and their distribution. See R.T. LaPiere, "Type-rationalizations of Group Antipathy" (*Soc. Forc.*, 1936, **15**, 232-237), and "The Sociological Significance of Measurable Attitudes" (*Amer. Sociol. Rev.*, 1938, **3**, 175-182).

10. The present use of the term "overt" corresponds to that which is given by the *Dictionary of Psychology* (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1934). As here used, the term "covert" corresponds to the definition which is given to the phrase "implicit response"—*i.e.*, "any response involving muscles or glands or both, which is not easily observable by another person without instrumental or experimental aid." By assumption, "implicit response" includes the phenomena which are vaguely designated as thought, feeling, and emotion—the problem children of psychology.

In the Watsonian brand of behavioristic psychology (J.B. Watson, *Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist*, Philadelphia, Lippincott, 1924), that kind of behavior which is herein termed covert was categorically divided into thought and emotion; and both were simple and understandable processes. Subsequent experimentation has proved that neither thought nor emotion is simple; and the rise of Gestalt psychology with its emphasis on the functional contributions of the organism in perception has suggested just how incomprehensible covert behavior actually is.

The Watsonian concept of thought reduced that process to implicit, muscular behavior, in which the muscular motions served as symbols. The nearest to actual evidence which has so far been advanced in support of this theory is the work of E. Jacobson ("Electro-physiology of Mental Activities," *Amer. J. Psychol.*, 1932, **44**, 677-694), which showed that fine, but electrically measurable, movements of the tongue and lip muscles accompany thinking. At least this much does seem certain: thought is not a process which occurs in the brain, irrespective of the rest of the organic mechanism. Undoubtedly there is an intimate connection between speech and thought. Thought may, perhaps, be described as a process of covert symbolization, involving verbal, visual, auditory, and gesture mechanisms. The process of thought, the relation of thought to noncognitive behavior, how people learn to think, and when they do think are, however, still to

be discovered. See C.J. Herricks, *The Thinking Machine* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1929); G.A. de Laguna, *Speech; Its Function and Development* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1927); F. Lorimer, *The Growth of Reason* (New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1929); J.F. Markey, *The Symbolic Process and Its Integration in Children* (New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1928); and J. Piaget, *The Child's Conception of the World* (New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1929).

The Watsonian concept of emotions consists of three specific categories of implicit, mainly visceral, reactions—fear, rage, and love—each of which is overtly expressed in definite ways. Today no more can be said than that the nature of emotional behavior is uncertain; that the emotions are just as likely to consist of varying degrees of a single order of response as of the three categorical responses of Watson or of the hundreds of affective emotional states indicated by the terms in our language; and that there is no known method of measuring emotions and, therefore, no ascertainable relationship between emotions and overt behavior.

The literature on emotional behavior at least proves that the emotions are not located in the heart and that, whatever else they are, they involve exceedingly complex bodily changes. (A survey of the literature from 1910–1933 is to be found in H.F. Dunbar, *Emotions and Bodily Changes*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1935.) The moment that we proceed from this general statement to such a specific problem as the relationship between emotions and digestion, we are on highly speculative grounds. Compare, for example, P. Bard's "Emotion: I, The Neuro-humoral Basis of Emotional Reactions" (*A Handbook of General Experimental Psychology*, Worcester, Clark University Press, 1934, 264–311) with W.B. Cannon's *Bodily Changes in Pain, Hunger, Fear and Rage* (New York, Appleton, 1929).

Even more difficult is the problem of presumed differential emotional responses, as will be evident from a comparison of the views of F. Brown ("The Nature of Emotion and Its Relation to Anti-social Behavior," *J. Abn. and Soc. Psychol.*, 1934, **28**, 446–458), R.R. Willoughby ("The Condition of Human Vasomotor Responses to Verbal and Other Stimuli," *Psychol. Bull.*, 1935, **32**, 730–731), and H.E. Jones ("The Conditioning of Overt Emotional Responses," *J. Educ. Psychol.*, 1931, **22**, 127–130).

Considerable effort has been devoted to the study of the relationship between overt behavior and deliberately induced feeling-states. It was quickly discovered that Watson's descriptions of specific behaviors as expressions of fear, rage, and love were invalid. On the basis of the behavior of the infant, nurses who are accustomed to dealing with infants will disagree as to the emotion which that infant is experiencing. Refined experiments confirm the view that there is no possibility of judging feeling-states on the basis of facial expressions. See L. Kanner, "Judging Emotions from Facial Expressions" (*Psychol. Monog.*, 1931, **41**, No. 186, 1–91); and L.W. Kline and D.E. Johannsen, "Comparative Role of the Face and of the Face-body-hands as Aids in Identifying Emotions" (*J. Abn. and Soc. Psychol.*, 1935, **29**, 413–426).

Some progress has been made in ascertaining bodily changes by electrogalvanic measurement of the skin; see C. Landis and H. DeWick, "Electrical Phenomena of the Skin" (*Psychol. Bull.*, 1929, 26). H.E. Jones ("The Galvanic Skin Response As Related to Overt Emotional Expression," *Amer. J. Psychol.*, 1935, 47, 241-251) has found a measurable relationship between certain aspects of overt behavior and body changes. But the most fruitful method so far devised to measure emotions objectively is the much publicized and misunderstood psychogalvanometer; see H.V. Gaskill, *The Objective Measurement of Emotional Reactions* (Worcester, Clark University Press, 1933), and H.R. Crosland, *Objective Measurement of Emotions* (Eugene, University of Oregon Publication in Psychology, Vol. I, No. 3, 1931).

This instrument indicates changes in body states, but it does not discriminate the various emotions which we try to designate when we refer to such feelings as the sense of guilt, fear, love, disgust, and so on. The application of the psychogalvanometer to crime detection is entirely unwarranted; and, although scientific study by this instrument may help materially in unraveling the complexities of emotional behavior, it has done little but confuse the issue so far. See L. Keeler, "Debunking the 'Lie-detector'" (*J. Crim. Law and Criminol.*, 1934, 25, 155-159); F.E. Inbau, "The 'Lie-detector'" (*Sci. Monthly*, 1935, 40, 81-87); and P. Solomon, "The Psychogalvanic Reflex: Applications to Neurology and Psychiatry" (*Arch. Neurol. Psychiat.*, 1935, 34, 818-827).

In view of the fact that the specific emotions—always assuming that there are specific emotions—cannot be measured, it is not surprising that, as W.A. Hunt points out ("Ambiguity of Descriptive Terms for Feeling and Emotion," *Amer. J. Psychol.*, 1935, 47, 165-166), emotional terms mean only what the user wishes them to mean. Nor is it surprising that there is little general agreement on the subject of emotions. Compare *Feelings and Emotions; the Wittenburg Symposium* (Worcester, Clark University Press, 1928); E. Duffy, *Tensions and Emotional Factors in Reactions* (Worcester, Clark University Press, 1930); and C.A. Ruckmick, *The Psychology of Feeling and Emotion* (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1936).

11. In so far as it is possible, illustrations from primitive societies will be taken from W.I. Thomas' *Primitive Behavior* (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1937). Because Thomas approaches materials on primitive peoples from the angle of social psychology and because he has in this work drawn together an excellent selection of case data from the entire literature of anthropology and ethnology, his book is the best single reference book for students of collective behavior.

For illustrative materials from contemporary society, use will be made, whenever possible, of *Time*, the weekly news magazine (published by Time Inc., 350 East 22d Street, Chicago; indexed quarterly). As a source of current news items, *Time* has a number of advantages: its volumes are more generally available to the student than is any newspaper except the *New York Times*; in contrast to the latter, the news stories in *Time* are weekly summaries and are, therefore, more complete than are the items

provided by any newspaper; the items are brief and to the point; and the bound volumes are easy to handle.

Time has been accused by spokesmen both for democracy and for communism of being fascist in sympathy; by fascist sympathizers of being anti-fascist and anti-Nazi; by radical and quasi-radical journals (*e.g.*, *New Republic*) of being anti-labor; by advertisers (*e.g.*, Remington Rand) of being pro-labor; by churchmen of being agnostic and immoral; by the writers of Letters to the Editor of being prudish and sentimental; and so on. The circulation of *Time* runs into the hundreds of thousands. The writer holds no brief for this or any other news source. *Time* is a commercial enterprise. But any news organ which can be so roundly condemned by spokesmen of all factions and which can be so consistently read as *Time* must certainly have in rare degree that exceptional bias of impartiality.

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PART II
CULTURAL TYPES OF INTERACTION

CHAPTER IV

INSTITUTIONAL BEHAVIOR

In the more stable and highly integrated societies of the past, group life was maintained and group membership was replenished largely through what are called institutions—the family, the feudal manor, the church, and so on. These institutions were not, of course, tangible entities, but were, rather, patterns of social organization which could be perceived in the behavior of many human beings. For example, the institution of the patriarchal family in China was a pattern which could be perceived in the behavior of millions of Chinese people for more than two thousand years.

The Institution as a Constellation of Social Situations.—Any specific institutional pattern, such as the Chinese patriarchal family, is manifest as a constellation of a multitude of distinct but related social situations. In the institution of the Chinese family these included, among the more colorful, the various ceremonies surrounding birth, death, and marriage.

How a constellation of situations goes to make up an institutional pattern may best be seen by analogy.¹ Just as the plot of a play is conveyed by the enactment of a number of specific scenes, the pattern of the institution is revealed by the interaction which occurs in a number of separate situations. Each such situation builds upon the previous situation and contributes to the succeeding situation in much the same way as each stage scene adds to the previous one and contributes to the succeeding one. The full cycle of such situations constitutes the institutional constellation, just as the cycle of stage scenes constitutes the play.

Obviously, then, any given situation of an institutional constellation is significant only as a subordinate element of the total constellation. When, by way of illustration, a Chinese boy and girl of a century ago came together to go through the marriage ceremony, that situation was but one of a multitude of others which went to make up the Chinese institution of the family. In

itself, the marriage was, therefore, unimportant. It was no more than an instrument of the institution. All aspects of the ceremony—the place in which and the time at which the bride and groom met, the presence of others, and the interaction which occurred—were almost entirely determined by institutional factors. Any particular marriage ceremony had social significance, therefore, only as it, too, contributed to the making of the institutional constellation.

Internal Unity of the Institutional Situation.—Like the stage scene, the institutional situation does, however, have a unity of its own. Each stage scene is a little playlet; it begins in the meeting of certain members of the cast. The characters may come on to an empty set, or the beginning of a scene may be marked simply by one character's leaving the stage or by some new character's coming on. The action of the scene unfolds. To mark the termination of the scene, the curtain falls; or some new character is introduced to change the "situation."

Likewise, each institutional situation has internal unity. Thus, the marriage ceremony begins with the meeting of the bride and groom and ends when they have completed the procedure which makes them man and wife. Consequently, although the institutional situation is of sociological significance only as it contributes to the making of an institutional constellation, the interaction which occurs within the limits of that situation has the internal unity which is necessary if it is to be considered collective behavior.

As a Type of Collective Behavior.—Institutions differ widely among societies, even as plays differ one from another. The situations which contribute to the making of a specific institution also differ, even as do the scenes of a specific play. All situations of all institutions have, however, certain common sociopsychological attributes, even as all scenes of all plays have certain common elements. The behavior which occurs in these situations falls into a comparatively distinct, although somewhat broad, category. Such behavior may for convenience be termed institutional behavior.

During some periods of social history, such, for example, as our Middle Ages, institutional behavior has been the predominant type of collective behavior. Today, institutional behavior is so foreign to our experience that the analysis which follows may seem

foreign to reality. Our age is one of rapid social change, in which older institutional patterns have lost their functional values and in which the remnants of those patterns persist as curious anachronisms. We participate far more in other types of collective behavior than we do in the institutional type. But, before we can gain an understanding of these other types, it is necessary that we comprehend the nature of the institutional type with which these others are in sharp contrast.

ORIGIN AND FUNCTION

Sociologically and in terms of its functional consequences, a social institution might be described as originating in collective need for a long-run plan of action.² A social group cannot maintain itself on the basis of day-by-day, trial-and-error adjustment. The activities of today must be planned in terms of their effects upon tomorrow. Consequently, a social plan must be devised. Such a plan serves to reduce human dependence upon trial and error and to make individual behavior a contribution to collective long-run welfare. In time the plan becomes an established institution, handed down more or less intact from generation to generation. Sociologically, therefore, the institution is to be considered as a behavior-controlling mechanism for the satisfaction of one or a number of group needs—economic, educational, religious, and the like.

Origin and Function of the Situation.—Since each institutional situation is but an element in the institutional constellation, the origin and function of the institutional situation must be referred back to the institution itself. The origin and function of any particular situation cannot be deduced from study of that one situation any more than the origin and function of a cog of a machine can be discerned by examination of the cog itself. Nor can the origin and function of that situation be discerned from a study of the interests and initiative of the individuals involved, any more than the origin and function of the scene of a play can be explained as a consequence of the ambition of the players to display their talents.

Individual initiative and human interests do, of course, appear in the making of any specific institutional situation; *e.g.*, in the making of a marriage ceremony, the wedding date is fixed by people, parents select the bride for their son, etc. But individual

initiative is so highly channelized that it serves only to foster the fulfillment of the institutional plan, much in the sense that a minister by his efforts to encourage attendance at the Sunday morning service in a given church fosters the maintenance of religion. Without human beings who possess some initiative, no social situation, institutional or otherwise, would arise. But the origin and function of a given institutional situation are not to be explained as the consequence of individual initiative, any more than the fact that a religious service is held in a given church on a given Sunday is to be explained on the basis of the initiative of the minister who officiates.

Even more evident is the fact that, although interests may be antecedent to the coming together of people in an institutional situation, those interests are institutional rather than individual. Those interests are a part of the mechanism of the institutional constellation of which the given situation is simply one manifestation.

The forces which make for the meeting of a group of human beings in any particular institutional situation are complex and may never be completely understood. But it may be stated as a general principle that behind that situation is a series of social events, each building in accordance with the institutional pattern toward that situation and toward subsequent institutional situations. Those events and their effects upon the individuals involved constitute the forces of institutional life. In these forces lie the origin and function of the given institutional situation.

Origin and Function of the Pattern of Interaction.—Even as the situation originates in the forces of institutional life, the pattern of the interaction resolves largely in accordance with the institutional formula. Without knowing the particular individuals involved, it would have been possible, for example, to describe in rather complete outline the various patterns of interaction which would appear in any Chinese wedding ceremony.³ This being true, it is quite evident that the individuals concerned simply enacted these patterns and had no part in their determination.

We can say, therefore, that the patterns of interaction which arise in institutional situations, like the situations themselves, originate in the forces of institutional life and function to institu-

tional ends. Thus, when during the course of a Chinese marriage ceremony the bride and groom kowtow to the ancestral spirits, they do so because it has, as it were, been "written" and because this act in some way contributes to the operation of the family system. Individual initiative, self-interests, and trial and error play no greater part in the devising of the pattern of interaction than they do in the devising of the situation in which that interaction occurs. Thus, the interactions which occur during the course of the Chinese marriage ceremony, like the ceremony itself, are to be understood only in terms of the larger pattern of the Chinese family.

The origin and function of any particular institutional pattern of interaction can, therefore, be discerned only by a study of the institution and its place in the total social system. Institutional behavior has no significance, individual or collective, apart from the context in which it appears.

To gain any comprehension of the origin and function of any given instance of institutional behavior, we must, therefore, refer to the findings of the anthropologist and sociologist, who can perhaps tell us something of the development of the social institution which forms the background of the particular behavior under consideration.⁴ Long, careful, objective study is necessary before the long-run collective significance of a given instance of institutional behavior can be explained. That explanation will never be simple, and seldom can it be clear.

IDEOLOGIES

For every institutional situation, however, there is a socially provided explanation. These explanations have no relation to objective fact; they are merely the ideological justifications of institutional behavior. They do not give the real reasons for the appearance of the situations or for the behavior which occurs therein, but they do serve to answer any question which might arise among the participants.

Ordinarily the members of an institutional situation do not feel called upon to question or to explain the reason why they behave as they do; they act their special roles with mechanical ease and with automatic unconcern. What they do is, for them, entirely normal and to be taken for granted. Thus, ethnologists have sometimes found it rather difficult to secure from their

primitive informants the why of primitive practices. Apparently it does not occur to the primitive that any reason or explanation is necessary,⁵ although the primitive informant is usually able to provide some sort of explanation when it is required of him. Perhaps it is only, "We do this because, if we did not, the spirits would be offended."

In Terms of Individual Advantages.—In any event, the ideology is one which satisfies the participant; it justifies his role in terms of personal advantages accruing to him.⁶ Thus, burial practices may be explained as necessary to prevent the spirits of the dead from returning to annoy the living or, possibly, as necessary to assure that these spirits will be happy in the after-world. In the former instance, the self-interest nature of the explanation to those who bury the dead is obvious. In the latter case, proper burial affects only the welfare of the departed. Those who provide that burial have, however, a personal interest in it, in that, by setting a good example, they increase their own chances of being given a proper burial upon death.

To those who hold them, ideological explanations for any mode of institutional behavior are quite logical and intelligible. Evident to the scientist, however, is the fact that ideological explanations for participation in institutional behavior are sheer social fictions. The ideological reasons, for example, for the participation of an individual in situations of a religious order are always in terms of his personal interests—threat of punishment, promise of rewards, etc., in the afterlife. Actually, of course, the reason for the participation of an individual in religion is, under a going social order, that such participation contributes to the fulfillment of long-run, collective ends. It may be that in the long run and on the average, such participation is individually advantageous. But for any specific situation, participation is far more likely to run counter to actual self-interest.

Institutional ideologies normally are kept in the background. Only when the stresses of social change prevent the maintenance of a given institutional pattern do these ideologies loom large in the minds of people.⁷ In contemporary America many people cling to and constantly refer back to ideologies which surrounded the institution of the patriarchal family. This is particularly evident in regard to sex behavior and only less apparent in regard

to the relationships between parent and child. It still happens occasionally that a father will stand upon his rights as a father to prevent his child from being taken to public school or from being given modern medical care.⁸ For such resistance to legal pressure he will advance explanations quite in keeping with a system of family life which began to go out of practice more than a century ago. It often happens, therefore, that ideologies outlive the institutional practices which they once served to justify.⁹

MEMBERSHIP

To assure that a play will unfold in accordance with the script, the members of the cast are carefully selected and are then trained for their specific roles. Toward the same end, the members of every institutional situation are selected and trained, in accordance with a designated system, to play their special situational roles.

Kinship.—Although the human individual does not biologically inherit the ability to play his institutional roles, he may be assigned to a specific role because of his parentage. Kinship—blood relationship—has frequently been the basis for institutional membership. A primitive tribe, for example, is usually a kinship group; even the primitive village may be bound together by kinship ties.¹⁰ In the patriarchal family, both Occidental and Oriental forms, kinship is the primary determinant of family membership; all but the adult females are born to family membership.

When kinship is a prerequisite for institutional membership, the institutional role of a given member is determined by his kinship status. The character of his role is indicated by his kinship title—father, uncle, brother, sister, and the like.¹¹ The study of kinship terminology is, therefore, frequently one of the best possible approaches to the study of the institutional behavior of a particular people. To illustrate, the Chinese male distinguishes between his maternal female cousins and his paternal female cousins by the use of different kinship terms. The terminological distinction suggests their different institutional roles as far as he is concerned: his paternal female cousin has much the same role as his sisters, while his maternal female cousin has the role of potential wife.

In most societies membership by birth undoubtedly facilitates training for institutional membership. There is, perhaps, a certain logic in making those who are responsible for the birth of a child responsible also for training the child into his institutional roles. When those who are responsible for his birth and his training are also those who in time will profit or suffer by the quality of that training, a further incentive is present. That is to say, it is probable that a man and woman will be better parents to their son if he is one upon whom they are to be economically and socially dependent in later life than they would be were he a child born of others and destined to assume institutional roles in which they would not figure.

This point must not, however, be pressed too far. There is no reason to suppose that blood relationship predisposes people to amiable social relationships. There is adequate evidence that institutions can, as Plato long since surmised, function effectively with a membership composed of individuals who are selected but are unrelated by birth. Indeed, when we reflect upon the frequency of adoption, it is evident that blood ties, as such, are of no great social importance.

Adoption.—Even with those institutional groups which are essentially of the kinship type, adoption both of infants and of adults has always been possible as a crisis measure. When adequate members for the maintenance of a kinship grouping are not biologically forthcoming, such members may be recruited from other sources. Although the circumstances surrounding adoption and the mechanisms of adoption have varied with different institutional patterns, adoption is invariably accomplished in accordance with some predesignated procedure.¹²

Where adoption involves the taking of an adult into institutional membership, the adopted individual is selected from all those who are available to the end that he will assuredly be one who is capable of fulfilling his institutional roles. Qualifications, selective methods, and adoption procedures are, of course, varied. An illustration of one such procedure can be drawn from the Chinese family. The male members of a family were born into the group. The female members married into the group. Nature might not, however, keep up the supply of male members; consequently, the family might have no sons but only daughters. The family would then be faced with gradual extinction. It

would be possible, however, for that family to arrange to adopt the husband of one of its daughters. Upon marriage, he would come to her family, instead of, as normal, her going to his. He would then adopt her family name; and in all institutional situations of the family order, he would thereafter take the role of the elder son of his wife's father.

Where adoption has involved infants, the selective procedure seems never to have had concern for more than sex and physical health. In none of these procedures do we find concern for those qualitative differences which loom so important in the minds of modern eugenicists; *i.e.*, empirical experience is all against the eugenic assumption of qualitative racial and class differences between individuals. An Indian tribe, for example, adopted a white infant without fear that in later life his "white blood" would cause him to deviate from the tribal roles which were institutionally assigned him. A well-to-do Chinese family purchased a needed male infant from a peasant source without fear that he would be of inferior biological quality. Apparently kinship groups have always proceeded upon the assumption that they were taking no greater chance with the healthy infant of any other family source than they were with one who was born to membership.

Selection of Members.—The membership of some institutional situations is entirely, and of others is partially, composed of individuals who are unrelated by birth. In the patriarchal family, for example, the adult women were unrelated by birth to all except their sons and daughters. Where blood relationship does not determine membership, rigid social selection of individuals for such membership has invariably occurred. Selection operates, as does the selection of a theatrical cast, to the end that each member will be qualified to play his predetermined role.

A form of selection which has been characteristic both of the patriarchal and of the matriarchal family systems is that of contractual marriage. In the Chinese family, for example, the selection of a wife was a family rather than an individual matter; and the marriage contract was between families rather than simply between husband and wife. The contract might, in fact, be initiated before the birth of the future husband and wife. The standard of selection was not, obviously, the individual

but was, rather, the family into which that individual had been or would be born. Elaborate, devious, ritualistic, and time-consuming, the procedure of contractual marriage in the Chinese family nevertheless served to define the behavior of the individuals involved and to reduce trial and error to a minimum. It assured, through time-tested devices, that the new daughter-in-law would be a useful addition to the family and that she would be a good wife and an efficient mother. It assured that in marriage the son would be a satisfactory husband and a good father. Since even the most highly institutional procedure might fail, a wife might under certain circumstances be returned to her family or under others be recalled from the family of her husband. In general, however, contractual marriage operated to the end that the girl joining the family of her husband would be adequate to her various institutional roles.

Only where the marital relationship does not presuppose larger institutional roles do we find "free choice" entering into the selection of marital partners. And only where the patriarchal family as an institution has broken down do we find the conceptions of romantic and idealized sex love as a basis for marriage.

Training of Members.—Whether members of institutional situations have been born into, adopted into, or selected into membership, the basic end is that they will have been trained to take their proper roles. From one point of view, any institutional constellation is an elaborate educational mechanism. This is not the place to discuss the processes by which membership in institutional situations affects the personality of the members—particularly the younger, apprentice, members. But that such training is accomplished almost entirely through participation and with almost none of that dependence upon those pedagogical procedures which we normally think of as education is worthy of passing mention.¹³

Participant training occurs, of course, in all institutional situations in which children are present. It is most strikingly evident, however, in those situations which we describe as ritualistic. Rituals appear to have been used in all highly integrated societies. Birth rites, puberty rites, marriage rites, and death rites, however much they have differed from society to society, have their main significance as training mechanisms

for the induction of an individual or individuals into institutional status.

The great Chinese social philosopher Confucius was a firm believer in the educational value of elaborate rituals in which the young would participate.¹⁴ He argued that, if a child is thereby taught to display the outward signs of reverence of elders, respect for their wishes, intense anguish at the death of a relative, and so on, he will come in time to feel these things. Thereafter, his observance will be a response to his feelings; and no external pressure will be necessary to maintain conformity to the predetermined pattern of situational interaction. This argument was Confucius' justification for his stress upon rituals in family life.

Complex, elaborate, and on the surface meaningless though these rituals may seem to the nonparticipant observer, they may serve a useful institutional function in marking the transition of the individual from one role to another or in impressing upon novice members the vital importance of institutional sentiments. It does not follow, however, that a single ritual, unsupported by the total pattern of social life, can instill specific, covert responses. The child who is taught the ritual of schoolroom pledging allegiance to the flag may never learn therefrom the sentiments and loyalties which that ritual is supposed to reflect. There is no doubt, however, that in a stable social system rituals may assist in developing the covert feeling-states which are necessary to adequate membership in any truly institutional situation.

OVERT AND COVERT ASPECTS OF INTERACTION

However they may be developed, the sentiments, interests, wishes, and so on which become operative in institutional behavior are never in opposition to that behavior. The overt aspects of institutional interaction are, in other words, simply an expression of covert feeling-states.

In some types of collective behavior, as we shall see, there is as little necessary relationship between what the members feel and what they do as there is in the artificial situation on the stage. Although the actors are selected for their roles and are then carefully trained therein, no one expects the actor to "feel as he acts." He is an actor; and how he feels is, in a sense, his own

affair. Although he may be silently cursing her for having moved down stage and having placed him to disadvantage, the hero will outwardly make fervent love to the heroine. Although he may actually be in love with her, the villain will threaten the heroine, as required by the script.

In contrast, the members of an institutional "cast" live their roles.¹⁵ The small child must, of course, at times be coerced into playing his institutional role; but, once he has learned his part, he will play it because he wants to. Since institutional patterns generate their own appropriate feeling-states, these patterns are self-enforcing.

The fact that the overt aspects of institutional interaction are a direct expression of covert feeling-states largely accounts for the fact that institutional constellations are self-perpetuating and for the tendency of such constellations to persist in whole or in part long after changing circumstances have rendered them functionally inefficient.

LEADERSHIP

Nominal Status of Leader.—In each scene of a play some one member of the cast will be the lead. Thus, in *King Lear*, Act I, Scene IV, the character Fool takes the lead upon his entrance; and the other members of the cast are subordinated to him. He is, however, simply the focal point for the interaction. He does not devise the pattern of interaction which occurs. That pattern is designated by the script. In a general way, therefore, it may be said that Shakespeare provides leadership for this and for all other scenes of the play. He is not present, but he has designated what each member of the cast of *King Lear*, including the lead of each scene, will do.

Analogously, the real leadership of institutional behavior is maintained by the institution. Another way to express this same fact is to say that the people behaving in the present are being led by people, multitudes of them, who have lived in times past. The leader of an institutional situation, like the lead in a scene of a play, is, therefore, merely the central figure for a predetermined pattern of interaction. He does not form that pattern; he does not even initiate it. His role, although perhaps somewhat more important than is that of any other member of the situational cast, is designated for him by the institution.

Social Designation of the Leader.—Moreover, who will be nominal leader of such a situation also is designated by the institution. The patriarch “rules” his family, not because he is necessarily the strongest, the most skillful, and the most aggressive member, but simply because the patriarchal family system designates that the patriarch shall rule. The matriarch rules over her daughters-in-law, not because she is necessarily best qualified to do so, but because she is the matriarch. The king rules, not because he is the most competent in the land, but because he is king. Who will be the leader of any institutional situation is socially predetermined.

Whatever the particular social mechanism by which the person of the institutional leader is determined, that mechanism serves to assure that the leader will be fully prepared to play his special role. In the patriarchal family the institutional leader was determined by the hereditary mechanism. Leadership passed on the death of the patriarch to the patriarch’s eldest son, who might, of course, be younger than his paternal uncles. Older in years, these uncles would not, however, be fitted for the role of leadership, since they had long been accustomed to positions of subordination. Of the sons of the patriarch, the eldest son was most likely to have received, for fairly obvious reasons, the greatest amount of personal supervision by the patriarch, who was himself most qualified to train a successor to his role as leader. Thus it was probable that the eldest son of the patriarch would be the best candidate for the role of leader at the death of his father. This probability no doubt accounts for reliance upon the hereditary mechanism in this instance.

Whatever the mechanism by which the institutional leader is determined, selection always operates on such simple and absolute bases as sex, age, and descent. The use of such bases is possible because institutional leadership does not require those unmeasurable and personal attributes—individual initiative, ingenuity, and persuasive skill—which are necessary for leadership in some other types of collective behavior.

Although we may at present reject the entire philosophy of authoritarianism and may insist that there are neither derived nor natural rights which accrue by birth or by advancing age, it should be realized that the authority of the leader of institutional situations is nominal. The function of such a leader is entirely

different from that of modern financial, social, or political leaders. As will be indicated in detail in subsequent chapters, the modern leader may to a degree determine both the inception and the pattern of collective interaction; the leader of an institutional situation determines neither.

QUALIFICATIONS

The Nuances of Institutional Life.—It must not be assumed from the foregoing that institutional behavior is mechanical, as accurately predetermined as are the movements of the various parts of a fine watch. Whatever else they may be, human beings are never robots. Thus, although the actors in a given scene behave according to the script of the play, that scene will never be reenacted in exactly the same way. Even the same cast will give a variable performance from night to night. This variability may arise from one or both of two circumstances: although he endeavors to play his role as it is written, an actor may prove inept; although he knows his role well, the actor may display initiative and may thereby embellish his part by deviating from the script. It is by deviations of this latter order that the superlative performance is achieved. Mechanized exactitude kills the spirit of a play, just as meticulous rendering of a symphony makes dull music.

In much the same way, each institutional interaction is in some ways unique. Institutional factors set the basic patterns; but human beings play the roles—meticulously, blunderingly, or superlatively. No people have been human marionettes, responding automatically to the dictates of the social system under which they live and which makes possible the maintenance of their group life. Although study of a great number of comparable institutional situations may lead to the perception of a common social pattern, each situation in itself is in some small part the product of the individual initiative and the trial-and-error efforts of its members.

Social Life and Institutions.—Furthermore, it must not be supposed that even in a stable society all collective behavior is institutional in character. Thus, under the patriarchal family system, the members of a family do not necessarily behave in terms of their institutional roles all the time. The children of such a family might, for example, behave in their institutional

roles during the family dinner, only to behave in ways quite improper for brothers and sisters the moment they leave the table. Upon their leaving, their father and mother might relax and indulge in banter more fitting to lovers than to stern parents.

In the highly integrated society, the basic collective needs are satisfied through institutional mechanisms. By these, the fundamental patterns of collective life are fixed. But it may be suspected that no social system yet devised has been so well equilibrated that it could mold all its incoming members to fit that system perfectly. Inevitably, some individuals will try to shape the system to suit their particular tastes.

APPENDIX

1. The term "institution" is one of the most frequently used and constantly abused words in the language of the social sciences. In common usage, the term is likely to mean the personnel and the physical properties of such organizations as a chamber of commerce, a university, or a large and long-established business. By sociologists, the term "institution" is used to refer, not to persons or properties, but to systems or patterns of social behavior. Unfortunately, sociologists commonly apply the term to such dissimilar cultural units as the family and private property. Frequently, they apply it indiscriminately to those organizations which are arrived at deliberately and to those which are an integral part of the social heritage. For example, L.V. Ballard (*Social Institutions*, New York, Appleton-Century, 1936) treats as comparable social elements the family, the school, the public library, the health center, and the state. A similar lack of discrimination in the use of the term "institution" is to be observed in F.S. Chapin's *Contemporary American Institutions* (New York, Harper, 1934). Other writers have used the term even more loosely.

The best single work on institutions is J.O. Hertzler's *Social Institutions* (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1929). Even here, however, the confusion over the concept of what constitutes an institution is clearly evident. It has been necessary, therefore, to provide a definition in this text which gives the term "institution" specific and limited meaning, even though Hertzler's theoretical position is essentially that which is taken by the writer.

Previous efforts to analyze from the sociopsychological viewpoint what has at least been termed institutional behavior include: L.L. Bernard, *Social Psychology* (New York, Holt, 1926, 564-581); C.H. Judd, *The Psychology of Social Institutions* (New York, Macmillan, 1926); F.H. Allport, "The Nature of Institutions" (*Soc. Forc.*, 1927, 6, 167-179); and J.R. Kantor, "An Essay toward an Institutional Conception of Social Psychology" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, 1922, 27, 768-779) and "The Institutional Foundations of a Scientific Social Psychology" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, 1924, 29, 674-687).

F.H. Allport's *Institutional Behavior* (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1933) is more a psychologist's diatribe on the malfunctioning of institutional remnants in contemporary society than it is an analysis of institutional behavior per se.

2. For a sociological analysis and survey of the sociological and anthropological literature on the various points made in the text concerning the nature, origin, and functions of social institutions, see Hertzler, *op. cit.* (material on the relationship of the specific situation to the institutional constellation, 1-15; on the origins and functions of institutions, 16-33 and 104-122). Although many of the older sociologists and anthropologists treated institutions as fixed cultural patterns, most contemporary students approach them from the functional viewpoint.

3. The more dramatic episodes of institutional life are usually designated as rites, rituals, or ceremonials. They are simply special institutional situations, comparable, perhaps, to the "events," such as the signing of a treaty, which punctuate the stream of the less dramatic happenings that constitute history. See R. Benedict's article "Ritual" (*Ency. Soc. Sci.*, 13, 396-397).

The pattern of the Chinese wedding ceremony, as an example of an institutional situation, was fairly uniform throughout all the provinces of classical China and was fairly constant at least throughout the thousand years which preceded the nineteenth century. For a fictional description of this protracted ceremony and the specific institutional interactions which occurred during the course of that ceremony, see R. LaPiere's novel *Son of Han* (New York, Harper, 1937, 244-263).

By contrast, the modern marriage ceremony, whether Chinese or American, is at best but a quasi-institutional procedure. Only in the vaguest sense has this particular situation been planned; its place in the system of family life is an experiment which is undertaken in hope, to be abandoned, perhaps, when hope fades and this particular trial proves to be an error. Originating in trial-and-error fumbblings toward a rather elusive collective goal—to get married and live happily ever after—the marriage service is itself dependent more upon the personalities of the people who are involved than upon a fixed and invariable routine. It does not, therefore, run a predetermined course, although it is limited by legal and some sentimental factors.

Modern marriage is not an institutional matter but a "problem." It is treated as such by sociologists. See, for example, E.R. Groves, *Marriage* (New York, Holt, 1933). The tremendous controversial literature on the subject of marriage simply demonstrates the great extent to which individual initiative and trial and error enter into the determination of modern marital relations and of the marriage ceremony. See, for example, the views which are expressed in the following:

Hart, H., and V.F. Calverton, "Morals in Marriage," *Forum*, June, 1937, 345-351.

Popenoe, P., "Is There a Scarcity of Good Husbands?" *Read. Dig.*, February, 1936, 21-22.

- Stouffer, S.A., and L.N. Spencer, "Marriage and Divorce in Recent Years," *Ann. Amer. Acad. Pol. and Soc. Sci.*, 1936, **188**, 156-169.
- "I Want a Man," *Amer. Mercury*, August, 1936, 27.
- "Why Get Married?" *Amer. Mercury*, April, 1936, 65; August, 1936, 156.
- "Marriage Riddle Studied Intensely," *Lit. Dig.*, Mar. 13, 1937, 30-32.
- "Marriage without Romance," *Lit. Dig.*, Dec. 21, 1935, 30.
- "Contract Marriage," *Time*, Dec. 28, 1936, 18.

For an excellent popular summary of the long-run consequences of the modern marriage ceremony, see "Fortune Survey" (*Fortune*, April, 1937, 204).

4. Unfortunately, data on specific institutional mechanisms are exceedingly difficult to secure. Limited by the scarcity of source materials and, because of their concern with events, prone to overlook such materials as are available, historians have provided us with only fragmentary and diffuse descriptions of the institutional systems of the societies of the past. Although anthropological materials are an excellent and a comparatively reliable source of data on the institutions of primitives, these materials and data are usually embodied in technical monographs having, as it were, low readability. The following selected list of references will, however, provide the student who is interested with a starting point for the study of one particular institution or of the institutions of one particular society:

The Patriarchal Family in the Occident:

- Cleveland, A.R., *Woman under the English Law*, London, Hurst & Blackett, 1896.
- Cross, E.B., *The Hebrew Family*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1927.
- Donaldson, Sir James, *Woman: Her Position and Influence in Ancient Greece and Rome*, New York, Longmans, Green, 1907.
- Epstein, L.M., *Jewish Marriage Contract*, New York, Jewish Theological Seminary, 1927.
- Goodsell, W., *A History of Marriage and the Family*, New York, Macmillan 1935.
- Hearn, W.E., *The Aryan Household*, London, Longmans, Green, 1891.
- Howard, G.E., *A History of Matrimonial Institutions*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1904, Vol. I.
- Schuster, E.J., *The Wife in Ancient and Modern Times*, London, Williams & Norgate, 1911.

The Patriarchal Family in China:

- Bard, E., *Chinese Life in Town and Country*, trans. by H. Twitchell, New York, Putnam, 1905.
- Carus, P., *Chinese Life and Customs*, Chicago, Open Court Publications, 1907.
- Howard, G.E., *A History of Matrimonial Institutions*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1904, Vol. II.

Kulp, D.H., *Country Life in South China: the Sociology of Familism*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1925, Vol. I.

Su, S.G., *The Chinese Family System*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1922.

Wilkinson, H.P., *The Family in Classical China*, Shanghai, Kelly & Walsh, 1926.

The Ancient Civilizations of the East (source material for which is almost exclusively Hammurabi's Code, formulated about 2000 B.C.):

Delaporte, L.J., *Mesopotamia: The Babylonian and Assyrian Civilization*, trans. by V.G. Childe, New York, Knopf, 1925.

Huart, C.I., *Ancient Persian and Iranian Civilizations*, trans. by M.R. Dobie, New York, Knopf, 1927.

The Ancient Societies of the Mediterranean:

Carter, J.B., *The Religious Life of Ancient Rome*, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1911.

Davis, W.S., *A Day in Old Rome*, Boston, Allyn & Bacon, 1925.

Fowler, W.W., *City-state of the Greeks and Romans*, New York, Macmillan, 1893.

———, *Social Life at Rome in the Age of Cicero*, New York, Macmillan, 1909.

Glotz, G., *Ancient Greeks at Work*, trans. by M.R. Dobie, New York, Knopf, 1926.

Gulick, C.B., *Life of the Ancient Greeks*, New York, Appleton, 1903.

Lammens, H., *Islam: Beliefs and Institutions*, trans. by E.D. Ross, New York, Dutton, 1929.

Zimmern, A.E., *The Greek Commonwealth*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1911.

The Middle Ages (with special reference to the feudal pattern):

Boissonade, P., *Life and Work in Medieval Europe*, trans. by E. Power, New York, Knopf, 1927.

Coulton, G.G., *The Medieval Village*, Cambridge, University Press, 1925.

———, *Life in the Middle Ages*, New York, Macmillan, 1931.

Davis, W.S., *Life on a Medieval Barony*, New York, Harper, 1923.

Seebohm, F., *The English Village Community*, London, Longmans, Green, 1896.

Seignobos, C., *The Feudal Régime*, trans. by E.W. Dow, New York, Holt, 1904.

Primitive Societies (nontechnical descriptions):

Benedict, R.N., *Patterns of Culture*, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1934.

Krige, E.J., *The Social System of the Zulus*, New York, Longmans, Green, 1936.

Lowie, R.H., *The Crow Indians*, New York, Farrar & Rinehart, 1935.

Malinowski, B., *Argonauts of the Western Pacific*, New York, Dutton, 1922.

Mead, M., *Coming of Age in Samoa*, New York, Morrow, 1928.

———, *Growing Up in New Guinea*, New York, Morrow, 1930.

Murdock, G.P., *Our Primitive Contemporaries*, New York, Macmillan, 1934.

Powdermaker, H., *Life in Lesu*, New York, Norton, 1933.

Warner, W.L., *A Black Civilization*, New York, Harper, 1936.

5. A great deal of material on the ideologies of primitives, much of it with reference to institutional practices, is to be found in L. Lévy-Bruhl's *Primitive Mentality* (trans. by L.A. Clare, New York, Macmillan 1923).

6. Scientists have at times endeavored to substantiate the idea that institutions are in fact, as well as in theory, based upon individual self-interest. See, for example, the specious discussions of "the higher psychology of the family" by K. Dunlap in his *Social Psychology* (Baltimore, Williams and Wilkins, 1925, 84-90).

In general, however, the scientific justification for social institutions has taken the form of finding their origins in some natural law; in the case of the family, in a law of progress or in some biological law. The law-of-progress ideology was elaborately amplified by E. Westermarck (*The History of Human Marriage*, London, Macmillan, 1921, 3 vols.); the biological-law ideology, by R. Briffault (*The Mothers*, New York, Macmillan, 1927, 2 vols.).

7. The fact that institutional ideologies become important only as the institutional constellations lose their functional significance is exhaustively discussed by W.H. Hamilton in his article "Institutions" (*Ency. Soc. Sci.*, 8, 84-89).

8. Illustrating the persistence of some of the ideological elements of the old patriarchal family, usually much distorted and torn from their context, are the following news items:

"An inquisitive crowd of neighbors and newsmen last week clogged Hastings-upon-Hudson's unpaved Ridge Street to watch a motorcycle patrolman and a physician try to enter the residence of Mr. & Mrs. John Vasko, first-generation Czechoslovakian immigrants. The Vaskos had locked in themselves and their three children against invasion, barricaded their doors with furniture, prepared tubs of boiling water with which to douse anyone trying to force an entrance. . . .

"The Vaskos' stand was the outgrowth of a three-month fight by Westchester County doctors, lawyers and welfare workers to gain custody of two-year-old Helen Vasko long enough for surgeons to remove the child's left eye. Last January in Grasslands Hospital it was discovered that she had a malignant tumor on the retina, that she would die as soon as the growth reached her brain, perhaps within a month.

"Industrious, impoverished, devoted to their three children, the Vaskos had persistently refused to surrender their daughter to surgery" (*Time*, Apr. 7, 1933).

"In Sneedville, Tenn., lanky Hill-Billy Charlie Johns, 22, married blue-eyed third-grader Eunice Winstead, 9. Reverend Walter Lamb said he had performed the ceremony on a lonely road when they accosted him, told him that 'if I didn't marry them some one else would.' For a wedding present the groom gave the bride a doll. Said Eunice's mother, who had

another daughter married at 13 and is herself a grandmother at 33: 'I haven't brought up my children to marry what men has got, but to marry for love.' Said Tennessee's Governor Gordon Browning, upon finding the State powerless to annul the marriage: 'It's nothing short of tragedy!'" (*Time*, Feb. 8, 1937).

See also the item entitled "What God Hath Joined" (*Time*, Feb. 15, 1937, 41-42).

9. Some effort has been made to study the remnants of institutional ideologies in contemporary society by means of the attitudinal questionnaire. Such, for example, are the studies of H. Woolston ("Religious Consistency," *Amer. Sociol. Rev.*, 1937, 2, 380-388) and R.L. Schnack ("A Study of Change in Institutional Attitudes in a Rural Community," *J. Soc. Psychol.*, 1934, 5, 121-128).

Under the editorship of L.L. Thurstone, the University of Chicago Press is publishing *Scales for the Measurement of Social Attitudes*, some of which (*No. 1: Attitude toward the Church; No. 21: Attitude toward Birth Control; No. 22: Attitude toward God*) have bearing on the subject of institutional ideologies.

Some, but by no means all, of the studies by Allport (*Institutional Behavior*) on what he calls conforming behavior have to do with institutional ideologies.

See O.L. Harvey, "The Institutionalization of Human Sexual Behavior: A Study of Frequency Distributions" (*J. Abn. and Soc. Psychol.*, 1935, 29, 427-433).

For historical data on institutional ideologies, one must turn to the *Bible* and the *Koran*, in which such ideologies are given religious sanction; i.e., they are supported by appeal to the supernatural. See E.W. Hopkins, *History of Religions* (New York, Macmillan, 1926), and J.F. Moore, *History of Religions* (New York, Scribner, 1913 and 1919, 2 vols.).

10. For descriptive materials on kinship as the basis for social situations in primitive societies, see W.I. Thomas, *Primitive Behavior* (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1937, Chap. V, "Kinship Behavior").

11. The role of the father in the family of the Melanesian primitives is described by B. Malinowski in *The Father in Primitive Society* (London, Kegan, Paul, Trench, Trübner, 1926). See also his *The Sexual Life of Savages* (New York, Halcyon House, 1926, especially 179-210).

12. The Chinese, for example, had another method by which needed "sons" could be adopted: a male infant could be purchased from a poverty-stricken family or "borrowed" from a family who happened to have, in the current generation, an abundant supply of male children. In the latter case, the borrowed infant would be "returned"—some generations later.

In any case, an adopted son became in all respects a son in fact as well as in theory. No stigma whatever was attached to adoption, a fact which indicates that, to the Chinese, sociological parenthood was more important than biological paternity.

For an analysis of adoption as it has operated in Western societies, see the article on that subject in the *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, 1, 459-460.

For descriptive material on the changes in social roles which accompany adoptions in some primitive societies, see Thomas, *op. cit.*, 140-171.

13. The educational effectiveness of a growing institutional mechanism is illustrated by the way in which a group of monks, the membership of which had of necessity to be recruited from external sources, was able to maintain intact its social heritage for generation after generation on the Holy Mountain, Greece, while the life of the Greeks underwent constant changes. See M. Choukas, *Black Angels of Athos* (New York, Day, 1934).

14. To Confucius, the ideologist of the classical Chinese system, and to his disciples are imputed *The Classics*, the great books. Unlike *The Old Testament*, in which Hebrew social practices are sanctioned in terms of divine law, *The Classics* justify the patriarchal family in terms of utility, much as Plato argued in defense of his utopian ideal in *The Republic*. *The Classics*, however, stress the necessity for adhering to the many rites and rituals laid down in *The Book of Rites*, an aspect of Confucianism which was bitterly attacked by modern Chinese social philosophers. See:

Cameron, M.E., *The Reform Movement in China*, Stanford University, Stanford University Press, 1931.

Giles, H.A., *Confucianism and Its Rivals*, New York, Scribner, 1919.

Steele, J., *The I-li or Book of Etiquette and Ceremonial*, London, Probsthian, 1917.

Williams, E.T., *China, Yesterday and Today*, New York, Crowell, 1929.

15. Some appreciation of the serious way in which the members of an integrated society take their institutional roles, however unreasonable those roles may seem to an outsider, may be gained from the description of primitive puberty ceremonies by Thomas (*op. cit.*, 340-357), from the analysis of burial rites by E. Bendann (*Death Customs*, New York, Knopf, 1930), and from LaPiere's fictional description of a Chinese funeral ceremony (*op. cit.*, 284-300).

CHAPTER V

CONVENTIONAL BEHAVIOR

In addition to one or a number of institutional constellations, every stable social system includes a large number of other patterns of behavior which are recurrent and persistent. These are variously described as customs, folkways, and conventions. Included within these categories are patterns of adjustment to nature, such as the wearing of a hat as protection against the sun, and patterns of adjustment to other human beings, such as the raising of that hat in greeting to a woman. The former patterns of behavior constitute social techniques of nature control and are not, of course, directly related to the subject of collective behavior. The latter patterns of behavior, on the other hand, are patterns of social interaction and enter into the making of a type of collective behavior which for convenience may be designated as conventional behavior.¹

Distinguished from Institutional Behavior.—Conventional behavior is like that of the institutional type in that the patterns of interaction are socially predetermined. It is clearly distinguished, however, (1) by the fact that the conventional patterns of interaction do not form functional constellations and (2) by the fact that the conventional situations are not themselves socially predetermined.

From the viewpoint of the observer, a conventional pattern might be described as a time-tested formula by which individuals may adjust to each other in a specific kind of social situation, if and when that situation arises. From the point of view of the participants, the conventional pattern constitutes behavior which is right and proper, although not imperative, under the circumstances.

As a Type of Collective Behavior.—Conventional patterns of interaction differ widely among societies. Thus, the conventional pattern which is used by acquaintances when they encounter each other may be their bowing to each other, their shaking

hands with each other, or, perhaps, their ignoring each other's presence. Furthermore, within a given society the appropriate conventional pattern for a particular situation will vary as to age, sex, and other status. Thus, as a passing greeting, a man may raise his hat to a woman but merely nod to another man; and a woman may rise when an elderly woman enters the room but remain seated when a young woman enters. All conventional patterns of interaction have, however, so much in common that they may be considered as constituting a single type of collective behavior.

ORIGIN AND FUNCTION

Origin of the Pattern of Interaction.—Although sociologists and anthropologists have long since abandoned as futile the attempt to discover social origins, it is now generally agreed that a given conventional pattern is to be explained only in terms of social invention. The fact that the members of a certain society use a specific conventional pattern does not, however, mean that these members have themselves invented it. The conventional pattern may have developed out of social experience during ages past and have been handed down more or less unchanged; or it may have been invented by some other society and have been borrowed therefrom.

Occasionally the diffusion of a particular conventional pattern can be more or less accurately traced, as in the case of the spread of the Western handshake to Oriental peoples. Usually, however, the ultimate social origin of any conventional pattern is so complex and so distant in time that we must be satisfied with the general statement that conventional patterns develop out of social experience. That social experience is, of course, conditioned by a multitude of factors, including geographic setting, frequency and character of cultural contacts, and such historic events as wars.

Although each conventional pattern has its own developmental history and each may operate irrespective of other conventional patterns, the various conventional patterns of a given society tend to harmonize one with the others. In a stable society, furthermore, the conventional patterns of interaction will be linked up with those which are institutional in type and will not, at least, run counter thereto. Thus, if the institution of the

family dictates that children make certain respectful observances in the presence of older members of that family, the conventional interactions of those children with adults outside the family will never be of a disrespectful character.

The relationship between a conventional pattern and existing institutional behavior is not, however, so close that a change in the convention will disturb the institutional system to which it is related. The Chinese, for example, were able to substitute the Western handshake for their conventional bow without disturbing the pattern of their family life. A conventional pattern may, therefore, have a life history somewhat irrespective of the life history of the institution to which it was originally related.

Nor is the relationship so close that the use of a conventional pattern necessitates use of the institution to which it originally was related. The Western practice of clothing the body heavily, regardless of physical comfort, in the presence of members of the opposite sex was originally related to the sex mores of the patriarchal family. This convention could, however, be thrust upon the primitives of the South Seas without doing damage to their sex mores and without necessitating their adopting the patriarchal family system.

Law and Conventions.—Institutions develop slowly and, although they constitute a complex social plan for living, are not arrived at consciously. Conventions may, on the other hand, grow out of the conscious, legal solution of problems of social life.² For example, few modern motorists give signals for turns and stops simply because the law so requires. They do so because these acts are now conventional patterns of motorist interaction. Such behavior was, however, originally established and enforced by law.

It does not, of course, follow that, since conventions may originate in law, laws invariably become accepted as conventions. There are ample illustrations of the failure of laws to break old conventions and to establish new ones. It is probable, however, that, when a law is expedient—in the sense that it is a legal enforcement of a newly invented conventional pattern—it speeds the establishment and diffusion of that new conventional form. The preponderance of legal failure to establish conventional patterns may simply reflect the fact that a vast majority

of the inventions in any field of life prove to be inexpedient when they are put in practice.

Much of law is undoubtedly an attempt to establish new conventional patterns which are believed to be necessary because of new social circumstances. But, as we shall see later, during periods of rapid social change an even greater proportion of law is the codification and legal enforcement of what were originally conventions. The behavior which follows those patterns is, of course, not then conventional in type.

Function of Conventional Patterns.—In a general way, it may be said that all conventional patterns function to satisfy minor and momentary collective needs.³ Entirely incidental to the satisfaction of such major needs as those for food and shelter, a great many minor needs appear even in a stable society during the course of a day, a week, or a month. For example, on the way to market a man may encounter another man on a narrow path; he may meet a friend who has recently become a father for the tenth time; and he may arrive at the shop which was his objective, only to find the merchant engaged with a local housewife. Such situations are not of vital moment to any of the individuals involved. Each such situation does, however, present minor problems of adjustment which need to be solved in one way or another if those individuals are to accomplish their major objectives. Conventional patterns operate to solve such collective problems without resort to trial and error. Thus, conventional patterns function for the welfare of the group as a whole and for the welfare of each of its members. Obvious, then, is the fact that, although conventional behavior is like institutional behavior in that it fulfills collective needs, it is unlike such behavior in that it also serves individual interests.

Collective dependence upon conventions, even in the simplest of fortuitous circumstances, is illustrated by the possible consequences of a casual meeting of two men on a narrow path. If they are prepared with a conventional pattern by which to adjust to this encounter, the situation will be resolved easily and quickly. It makes no difference, of course, what the conventional pattern is, so long as it permits each man to continue on his chosen way.⁴ One may doff his hat, step aside, and let the other have the right of way; each may step halfway from the path; they may pass to the right or to the left of each other. In any event, the ends

of both are served by conventional procedure. If, however, they have no conventional pattern for this encounter, they must resort to trial and error. Resolution by trial and error might require considerable time and might lead to a solution which is satisfactory to only one or to neither of them. It might be anything from a stalemate to a free-for-all in which the physically stronger dominates the weaker, pushing him aside or turning him around and marching him in the direction from which he has come.

Although, like institutional patterns, they serve collective ends, conventional patterns have only a short-run objective. The function of the conventional pattern is, therefore, generally apparent without reference to past and future behavior. The two men who pass on the narrow path may never have met before and may never meet again. The pattern of their interaction has served its purpose of the moment and nothing more.

At times, however, conventional behavior may have more than momentary significance. Of only momentary import is the conventional interaction between strangers who are thrown together in a streetcar, an elevator, and the like. But when friends begin an extended conversation with a conventional interchange or when newly introduced people interact conventionally, the conventional pattern then has some long-run significance. The conventional interchange between friends permits each to feel out the mood of the other and thus serves to facilitate subsequent interaction of some other type.⁵ The conventional interaction between new acquaintances serves to provide each of them with time and opportunity to evaluate the other and to arrive at a decision regarding further association. Even more evident is the long-run value of conventional behavior in the case of those elaborate procedures by which the new members of an old-fashioned community were welcomed by the natives.

Generally we become aware of the functional value of conventional patterns only when such patterns are lacking. The advantages of a conventional formula for greeting acquaintances, for calling upon strangers to the community, for replying to invitations, for meeting the fact that a friend has just announced his engagement or become a father, and so on are constantly evident in contemporary life. These advantages are evident

to us, however, only because we at present so frequently have to work out individual patterns of adjustment.⁶

Inception of the Conventional Situation.—Whenever a conventional pattern is put into operation, the situation becomes conventional in type and continues as such until the interaction either terminates or takes some other form. The conventional situation may, therefore, be complete in itself, as when the men pass each other on the narrow path; it may simply be a prelude to another type of collective behavior, as when good friends discuss the weather before turning to more interesting topics; and, more rarely, it may be the epilogue to some other type of behavior, as when friends politely separate after a bitter argument.

In any case, although the eventuality of the conventional situation was prepared for in advance, the occurrence of the specific situation was not socially predetermined. While the conventional situations which can possibly arise are limited by the character of the social system, those which do arise are not a direct consequence of that social system. The origin of a conventional situation, unlike that of an institutional situation, is therefore to be traced either to fortuitous factors or to individual initiative.

Even in stable societies conventional situations may be brought about by fortuitous meetings of neighbors, friends, and acquaintances and are almost certain to arise as an indirect consequence of many fortuitous events. The birth of a child, for example, may set off a whole series of conventional situations—the father may distribute cigars among his male friends and acquaintances; these may conventionally profess both surprise at the event and envious congratulations; women may descend upon the mother and child to shower both with the conventional, extravagant praise; announcement notes may be sent in return, as convention dictates. In the modern world fortuitous meetings and events are, of course, a commonplace. Strangers are constantly coming together on street corners, in streetcars, elevators, hotel lobbies, and so on. The modern individual lives much of his life among strangers and depends far more than he may realize upon conventions to facilitate adjustment.⁷

Conventional situations may, on the other hand, be brought about as the consequence of individual initiative. People may

deliberately arrange for the occurrence of conventional situations, or such situations may be incidental to initiative which is directed toward other ends. In the settled American community of a generation or two ago, many conventional situations were brought about by individual initiative or were incidental thereto. The conventional call of a minister upon his parishioner was the result of his initiative; the conventional invitation to dinner at the home of a neighbor was, of course, the result of the initiative of the neighbor and led subsequently to the conventional dinner party; and the conventional calls on a new neighbor were likewise the result of individual initiative. Today, however, individual initiative is more likely to lead to the making of other than conventional situations.

IDEOLOGIES

Conventional behavior, unlike institutional behavior, is not generally supported by elaborate ideological justifications. Since the conventional pattern functions to the satisfaction of immediate ends and accomplishes a collective objective without sacrificing the interests of any individual, it does not need justification. As a rule, therefore, the conventional pattern appeals to the participants simply as the proper, the sensible, the "logical" thing to do under given circumstances.

There are, however, two modifications which must be made to this statement. In the first place, conventional patterns between groups—intergroup conventions—tend to have some more or less systematic justifications. In the second place, some societies tend to consider their particular conventional patterns not only as the "logical" patterns but as the only possible patterns.

Intergroup conventions are, as we shall see in detail later, those which operate between the members of two cultural, racial, class, age, or sex groups.⁸ For example, it is conventional for men to rise in the presence of women; and in the old south it is conventional for Negroes to ride only in the Jim Crow cars. These conventions are supported by socially provided ideologies: women are the weaker sex; and Negroes are an inferior race.

In those societies which consider their own conventions not only as right and proper for them, but as right and proper for all human beings, a sort of ideological aura surrounds conventional usages. The result is a sort of cultural snobbishness which leads

to contempt for all peoples who have different conventional usages. Among modern Western people this ideological aura is most clearly seen in the English assumption that English conventional patterns are the only possible ways of adjusting to given circumstances. To the average Englishman the conventional practice of driving a motorcar on the left of the street is the only conceivable way to drive a motorcar. The fact that in almost all other countries motorcars are driven on the right of the street only confirms his viewpoint that the English are the vanguards of social progress. In the same way, the English conventional practice of disregarding the presence of a stranger is to the Englishman the only possible way of treating a stranger. Pressed for an explanation of why this is the only decent and right way, the Englishman will usually offer some variant of the stock ideological phrase "It isn't cricket to do it otherwise." In effect, he and his kind behave as they do because it is the way of self-respecting people. Only raw barbarians, it is implied, would fail to behave in the true English mode.

Such ideologies for conventional patterns are not, of course, peculiar to the English. But in these days of incessant social change, most people are none too certain of the value of their own conventions and are at least willing to recognize that the conventions of others may be quite satisfactory to those others. The blanket idea that their conventions are the only possible conventions is, therefore, somewhat peculiar to the English people.

MEMBERSHIP

As we have seen, the individuals who compose a conventional situation may have come together as a result of entirely fortuitous factors. They do not, however, enter such a situation unprepared for membership. In order that the situation be conventional, each member must assume and must more or less expertly adhere to a conventional pattern. Each must, therefore, know his special role in this particular kind of conventional situation.

Unselected Character of Membership.—The members of an institutional situation are, as we have observed, highly selected. The membership of a conventional situation, on the other hand, is fortuitously determined; and the members are, therefore,

entirely unselected as individuals. The members of those conventional situations which arise among the passengers on a train or a ship are unselected except to the extent that they all happen to be headed for a similar destination and happen to be able to use this mode of transportation. The members of those momentary conventional situations which occur when people pass on the street or the highway are not socially guided into these encounters. Even the new neighbor upon whom convention may require the earlier residents to call is not of their choosing.

The potential membership of conventional situations is, however, limited by the fact that the individuals must know and behave in terms of the specific roles which the conventional pattern requires of them. The person who does not know the conventional pattern cannot, therefore, be a member of a conventional situation. Thus, only from those who have either common or else parallel social backgrounds can the membership of conventional situations be formed. Because they have common backgrounds, any two southern gentlemen may come together fortuitously and be able to interact conventionally. Because they have somewhat different backgrounds, a southern gentleman and a Yankee may be unable to interact conventionally and may be forced to fall back upon trial and error to accomplish an adjustment to their fortuitous encounter. Likewise, a southern gentleman and a southern Negro might behave conventionally, but a southern gentleman and an African Negro would probably have even more difficulty getting along together than would the southern gentleman and the Yankee.

Training for Membership.—The peculiar thing about training for membership in conventional situations is that it is in the first instance training to behave in specific ways to specific people. The child is taught how to behave toward Mr. and Mrs. So-and-so when they come to call. He is taught how to reply to a particular invitation to a particular birthday party, how to reply to a particular hostess should she suggest a second helping of ice cream, and so on. Most of this training is casual, and much of it comes about through example.

Having learned the conventional pattern of a specific situation, the child must then learn to apply this pattern to all comparable situations. Thus, from the fact that it is right and proper to say

convincingly, "No, thank you," when Mrs. Jones asks if he wants more ice cream, the child eventually learns to use this conventional response when any similar question is asked by any hostess. He must, however, if he is to be a conventional child, learn also to make fine distinctions between kinds of situations. Thus, he must learn that the situation is of a different kind when the "hostess" who asks the question is a waitress in a restaurant. Furthermore, as a child he must learn the role of a child in such situations. As he grows older or as other factors change his social status, he must learn new conventional roles for these situations. His conventional childhood role when Mr. and Mrs. So-and-so come to call, will, for example, be quite inappropriate for him under the same circumstances when he is an adult.

From even so brief an analysis as the foregoing it is evident that training in conventional patterns is an exceedingly complex process. As a matter of fact, a large part of the process of socialization consists in training the individual for conventional behavior.

Training for conventional interaction is socially predicated on the assumption that fortuitous factors and individual initiative will in the course of time bring the individual into membership in particular kinds of conventional situations. For example, during such training it is assumed that the preacher will call; that the individual will be introduced to strangers; that he will meet people on ship, railroad, bus, or street corner; that he will someday move into a new community or have others move into his; and so on *ad infinitum*.

OVERT AND COVERT ASPECTS OF INTERACTION

As the individual is trained into his conventional social roles, he is trained also to feel that these roles are for him right and proper. He tends to accept his roles uncritically. Behavior in terms of these roles is for him a matter of personal integrity.

This is not to say, however, that in any specific conventional situation the overt behavior of the individual is necessarily a literal representation of his covert feeling-states. For example, if his conventional role demands that he smile and say, "I am pleased to meet you," upon introduction to a stranger, he will do so whether or not he actually feels pleased to meet that stranger. Moreover, that stranger will not assume that he

actually is pleased. No one of the members of the conventional situation places a literal interpretation on the overt aspects of the interaction which occurs.

The Sense of Personal Integrity.—Each member does, however, feel that his conventional role is an appropriate one—appropriate in the sense that it is the right, reasonable, and decent thing to do under the circumstances.⁹ Behavior in terms of this role is thus a consequence of a sense of personal integrity. This attribute of the conventional role may clearly be seen when conventional patterns are carried over into inappropriate circumstances, as when the English gentleman puts on a dinner jacket to eat a solitary meal in the wilds of Africa. Obviously there are no ulterior motives in such behavior. To him, the wearing of dinner clothes is an essential part of dining properly. Consequently, he may find it disturbing to his sense of personal integrity to dine in informal dress.

Since each member of a conventional situation reflects his own sense of personal integrity by his overt behavior, he tends to judge the integrity of others by the extent to which they adhere to their conventional roles. It is, as we all know, quite disconcerting to have our "Good morning!" elicit a realistic, but unconventional comment upon the state of the weather. No matter how bad the weather may be or how regrettable the state of the nation, we consider it only right and proper for the one to whom our greeting was addressed to agree that it is a good morning. We assume, since he does not agree properly, that he cannot be expected to do the proper thing in other circumstances—*i.e.*, that he lacks personal integrity.

Because behavior in terms of the conventional role is taken as an indication of personal integrity, the overt aspects of such a role may be used for ulterior purposes. Thus, a salesman may use a conventional greeting when he calls upon a housewife in order to convince her that he is a man of integrity. The interaction in such a situation is not, obviously, conventional in type.

LEADERSHIP

As with all types of predetermined behavior, the leadership of conventional behavior is limited in scope. The function of the leader, as in institutional behavior, is that of being a focal point for interaction. The leader does not designate or design the

pattern of that interaction. Furthermore, who will be the leader is designated by the character of the situation. In conventional behavior, individual initiative and rivalry between individuals plays almost no part in determining the person of the leader.

At the inception of a situation, any of the individuals may, however, take the initiative in determining whether their subsequent interaction will be conventional in type or otherwise. Thus, when a man and woman find themselves seated together in a bus or a railroad coach, one or the other may proceed to prevent that situation from becoming a conventional one by immediately treating the other person as an intimate.

Once a conventional interaction has been established, there is no place for the dominating personality. The limits placed by the conventional pattern upon the initiative of the designated leader are close and rigid. The situation ceases to be conventional when any individual, the designated leader or otherwise, takes control of it and shapes the interaction to his own desires. Such a person is, by definition, unconventional; and, when he has also leadership ability, there is no need for those who interact with him to rely upon conventional patterns. They can rely, as it were, upon him.

Designation of the Leader.—Ordinarily, designation of who will be the nominal leader of a conventional situation is one function of the conventional pattern. The basis for such designation is usually some simple and obvious variation between the members of the group. This may be social rank, individual prestige, sex, or age.

The last is, perhaps, the most common basis, particularly in those societies where advancing age brings increasing social prestige. In the old Chinese system of social life, the eldest member of a conventional situation was conventionally the leader.¹⁰ No individual, however old, ever addressed an elder until that elder indicated his or her desire to be spoken to. Even today there persists with us, if only as a legend, the idea that children should be silent in the presence of their elders. Understandable, then, is the story of the child who wandered lost in a park for hours unable to ask the way out because no adult spoke to him.

With us, the nominal leader of a conventional situation is often designated on the basis of sex. A generation ago it was conven-

tional for women to be the nominal leaders of many conventional situations. Thus, it was considered very bad taste for a man to recognize a female acquaintance until she indicated her willingness to be so recognized. At the same time, however, it was conventional for a man to be the leader in an emergency. Thus, a man might offer aid to a strange woman who had dropped her bundles at his feet; it would be quite improper for her to assume leadership by appealing to him for assistance.

TYPES OF CONVENTIONAL BEHAVIOR

There are, of course, as many forms of conventional behavior occurring within a given society as there are kinds of conventional situations. A thousand or more forms of such behavior might appear in the collective life of a small and homogeneous primitive community. Tens of thousands might appear in the life of a large, heterogeneous social population. All these forms of conventional behavior would, however, fall into three main types: general, intragroup, and intergroup.

General Conventions.—Those forms of conventional behavior which may arise between any two or more individuals of a society regardless of age, sex, social status, or the like, are general in type. The more homogeneous the social membership, the greater is the proportion of conventional behavior which will fall into this category. For reasons which will presently become obvious, this is, however, never the largest type.

The conventional pattern of passing on the left—*i.e.*, walking on the right side of the road—is the simplest illustration of general conventions in modern American life. Although the convention is never strictly adhered to, any two members of our society who meet on a public thoroughfare tend to pass on the left, whether they be male or female, old or young, or rich or poor. This convention has been carried over to motor traffic; all cars, whatever their quality, age, and condition, and whoever may be driving them, pass each other on the left.

More complex illustrations of general conventions are those of language usages and those of other communication usages. Certain qualifications must, of course, be made. In the first place, communication is essential to any kind of collective behavior and does not constitute a special type of behavior.

In the second place, communication usages will vary considerably between various groups within a society. Many communication usages are, however, common to all the members of a society and may be considered as general conventions. Thus, to take a striking illustration, the complimentary close "Very truly yours" in written communication is a conventional usage common to all the members of a society. This convention is used regardless of the character and status, either of the particular writer or of the particular recipient.

Intragroup Conventions.—As we have seen, the potential membership of any conventional situation is always limited to the members of a given society or to some group or groups therein.¹¹ Those conventions which are restricted to the members of some single and fairly well-defined group within the larger society are of the intragroup type. Such groups may be defined by age, sex, social or economic status, political affiliation, occupation, and so on.

All societies have conventions which apply only to individuals of a given sex or a given age. With us, conventional patterns of a sex group can be illustrated by the conventional masculine practice of offering a cigar to another man and by the conventional feminine practice of exchanging recipes. Many of the so-called sex differences in personality are actually no more than differences in the intragroup conventions of the sexes. It is a commonplace observation that in any society children have a somewhat different "society" from that of youths, that both these "societies" are different from that of adults, etc. These differences consist in large part of differences in the conventions of the various age groups.

The most striking intragroup conventions are perhaps those of class and occupational groups. Wherever social stratification exists, each class has its own special conventional patterns.¹² It is conventional for English, and to a lesser extent for American, gentlemen to dress for dinner. It is, on the other hand, conventional for laborers to take off their coats and eat in their shirt sleeves. Each class has, also, some language usages peculiar to it. Thus, language usage is often a good index to class position. Not even democratic education has been able to eliminate class distinctions in language usages from contemporary America.

Occupational specialization, so characteristic of the modern world, has brought about a great many forms of conventional behavior which are limited to the members of a given occupational group. Each occupational group, like each class, tends to have something of its own "universe of discourse." Because each occupation involves its peculiar objects, techniques, and concepts, the members thereof must use special communication symbols.¹³ In some instances this necessity is made the basis for the indefinite expansion of specialized intragroup communications, until in the end a conversation between the members of an occupational group becomes incomprehensible to an outsider. The universe of discourse used by the members of a highly specialized occupational group reveals the specialized interests, attitudes, and viewpoints of the group. These in turn have been the basis for the historic development of other special intragroup conventions.

In the days of the craft guilds, each guild membership had its own peculiar and special conventions, which did much to give a romantic flavor to the history of the guild period. Today the number of specialized work groups is legion, and each has some peculiar conventions of its own. Some groups, such as the English servant class, have such distinct conventions that they are set apart from the members of the larger society. Even with us, carpenters relate themselves in ways which differ from the relationship patterns of masons; shoe merchants, in ways foreign to tailors; doctors, in ways which contrast to the ways of lawyers.

Although occupational conventional patterns have developed to facilitate occupational relations, they are often carried over into nonoccupational life. This carry-over is, perhaps, most notable with doctors and academicians. Even in the use of titles of address, the extension of occupational conventions to private relationships can be observed. In America, a physician usually addresses another physician as "Doctor" in social as well as in professional relationships. In most of the larger American universities, where almost all professors are Doctors of Philosophy, it is conventional for professors to address each other as "Mister." In some academic circles, however, the professional usage of titles is extended to social life; and a professor addresses another as "Professor" or, if he has the

degree, as "Doctor." The extension of occupational conventions to nonoccupational life is most apparent in Germany, where a man may be addressed in all seriousness as "Herr Doktor Professor."

Intergroup Conventions.—Just as there are special conventions for use within special groups of a social population, there are special conventions for use between two or more such groups. These conventions may be called intergroup conventions.

Such conventions will appear in the relations of the sexes to each other and in the relations of different age groups to each other. Thus, with us, it is conventional for men to remain standing as long as women do. And it is, or at least was, conventional for children to offer their chairs to any older person. In some societies conventions between classes have developed. In some instances, these have included a special language for use between the aristocracy and the commoners.¹⁴

More common to American experience are the conventions between professional groups and those whom they serve. These conventions have been dignified by some with the term "professional ethics."¹⁵ Over the course of time, the medical profession has developed a fairly definite set of conventions which guide the individual physician in his relations with patients. Thus it is conventional for a physician never to disagree with another physician in the presence of a patient and to exert every possible effort to keep his patient alive, regardless of circumstances. In the legal profession, conventions, as such, seem to play little part. In the medical profession, on the other hand, conventions, for rather obvious reasons, play a significant role. The status of a physician within professional circles—and thus, indirectly, his professional reputation outside those circles—is in considerable measure dependent upon his adherence to conventional relationships with his patients. The unconventional physician is likely to be labeled and treated as a quack, regardless of his abilities as a technician.

Perhaps most familiar to Americans are those conventions which have developed over a period of two hundred years between the whites and blacks of the old south.¹⁶ Almost every situation which might arise between a white and a black has its conventional pattern of interaction. Such conventions allow effective adjustments on the basis of unequal status. Of such

prestige to the whites are these conventions that the failure of a black to conform to his role as inferior may lead to his being lynched.

APPENDIX

1. The term "conventional" is here used in a definitive and highly limited sense. The usage is, therefore, unconventional. In the conventional, contemporary, everyday application, "conventional" is a term of mild scorn often used as a synonym for "old-fashioned." In the conventional sociological usage, the term seems to mean any form of behavior which is socially established and approved.

E. Sapir comes close to the meaning of the term "convention" as it is here used when he says ("Custom," *Ency. Soc. Sci.*, 4, 658): "Convention emphasizes the lack of inner necessity in the behavior pattern and often implies some measure of agreement, express or tacit, that a certain mode of behavior be accepted as proper." M. Ginsberg defines conventions ("Social Conventions," *Ency. Soc. Sci.*, 4, 351-352) as "rules or standards of conduct or behavior prescribing what is to be done or not to be done by the members of a community." Neither Sapir nor Ginsberg, however, distinguishes between those patterns of behavior which involve one person (such, for example, as wearing a hat, eating with the fingers, or smoking cigarettes) and those patterns of interaction which involve two or more people (such, for example, as tipping a hat to a female acquaintance, shaking hands, or offering a cigarette to a companion). As it is here used, the term "conventions" will apply only to the latter patterns, those which pertain to collective behavior.

2. In the early days of motoring, necessity and a sense of *esprit de corps* among the pioneer drivers fostered the rapid development of motoring conventions. Among these were such conventions as greeting every fellow motorist with a blast of the horn, stopping to offer assistance to any motorist who was stalled by the roadside, backing up a narrow road until a turnout was reached so that the man coming up the hill could pass, and so on. As cars and roads were improved and as traffic became heavy, most of these conventions became inexpedient and dropped from usage. At the same time the problems of interaction among motorists changed so rapidly and became so acute that conventions could not develop to meet them. At this point legal attention shifted from the protecting of nonmotorists toward the establishment and enforcement of standards of relationship between motorists; in the course of time new conventions have grown out of legal enactments.

The reverse tendency, for the legal codification and enforcement of conventions, is equally apparent. Much of what is called customary law consists of conventions which have for some reason lost their self-enforcing character. See C.S. Lobingier, "Customary Law" (*Ency. Soc. Sci.*, 4, 662-667); and *The Legacy of the Middle Ages* (edited by C.G. Crump and E.F. Jacob, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1926, 287-319).

3. Although some sociologists, notably W.G. Sumner, have insisted that there is nothing reasonable about conventional patterns, this position seems to result from a confusion of the idea of rational with that of expedient. Certainly, conventional patterns are not utilized by the individual because he sees in them a rational value, in the sense in which "rational" was used by the old rational psychologists. He behaves conventionally because he was trained so to behave; and he seldom, if ever, subjects his conventional behavior to intellectual examination. But that conventional patterns are expedient should be evident. Individual trial and error in the attempt to solve any adjustment problem results in a great many errors. Conventional patterns reduce those errors. Thus, although they may not be rational, they are always reasonable, in the sense that they facilitate collective adjustment. The two most enthusiastic assaults upon the nineteenth-century straw man—the "rational man"—are W.G. Sumner's *Folkways* (Boston, Ginn, 1907) and V. Pareto's *Mind and Society* (trans. by A. Bongiorno and A. Livingston, New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1935). See also E.C. Parsons, *Fear and Conventionality* (New York, Putnam, 1914).

4. Any such social situation as the encounter of friends may, of course, be resolved in any one of a number of ways with equal satisfaction as long as those involved adhere to the same convention. For those who use them, the handshake (as in America), the embrace (as in France), the bow (as in China), and an exchange of spittle (as in some Bantu tribes) serve identical functions.

For descriptive material on the various conventions of various peoples see the references listed in note 4, appendix to Chap. IV. No one has as yet assembled the vast number of anthropological and historical data which are scattered through the literature.

For a considerable number of primitive language conventions, see the descriptions in W.I. Thomas' *Primitive Behavior* (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1937, 70-79 and 95). In the same work, see the "joking relationship" (129-130); the use of the identity token (175); exchange of smoke (719-720); and exchange of saliva (761).

5. To the hurried modern, the conventions of exchanging banal comments on the weather at the outset of a meeting with a friend may seem a useless waste of time. Such a convention serves, however, to forestall the possibility of acute embarrassment or grievous misunderstanding. Since he was last encountered, a friend might, for example, have lost his wife. To greet him unknowingly with a happy smile and a genial "Well, how's the wife?" would be embarrassing to both. The conventional greeting, whatever it may be, would permit the bereaved to take charge of the interaction and to direct it toward the statement that his wife has died. In most encounters between friends, the conventional prelude serves the less important but by no means insignificant function of permitting each of the friends an opportunity to feel out the mood of the other and to adjust himself accordingly.

Apparently it is during the conventional interchange between people who have met for the first time that the socially imperative process of personality stereotyping occurs; this fact is, perhaps, responsible for the

saying that it is first impressions which count. See R.T. LaPiere and P.R. Farnsworth, *Social Psychology* (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1936, Chap. IX, "Personality and Personality Stereotyping").

6. Much of the difficulty of traveling in a foreign land arises from the fact that the conventions of the traveler may differ widely from those of the natives. On the basis of considerable experience, the present writer calculates that twenty-seven conventional patterns are involved in the relatively simple matter of securing dinner and lodging for the night in a small, provincial French inn. These range from how the price of the room is determined to how the host is bid good night. An entirely different set of conventions is involved in achieving the same ends—food and housing—in an English hotel.

7. Among the many special conventions which have developed as a consequence of the mobility of modern peoples are those which permit strangers on a ship to get along together. Such acquaintances are hardly likely to have in common those things which are necessary if they are to be friends. After a week or more in the intimate relationships necessitated by life at sea, it is, however, difficult for such acquaintances to separate casually. To meet this situation, the convention has developed of exchanging addresses and promises to get together at some unspecific time in the future. Only the naïve take this convention for more than what it is—an agreeable way of resolving what otherwise might be a rather difficult situation.

8. The ideologies which appear in the conventional relations of Negroes and whites in the south can all be summed up in the sentence "The Negro is a racial inferior." This ideology has, however, been elaborated in countless pseudoscientific books and researches. Suffice it to say that it still remains to be proved that the biological capacities of dark-skinned people differ on the average from those of their pale-skinned brothers. The entire matter is discussed at length by O. Klineberg in *Race Differences* (New York, Harper, 1935).

The ideologies which surround the biological differences between the sexes are an aspect of the patriarchal family, in which males were accorded a different status from females. In the West, such institutional ideologies have carried over into the conventional relationships between the sexes. Thus, such conventions as a man's walking on the outside of the sidewalk, relieving a woman of her packages, and assisting her up a curb are explained on the grounds that women are the weaker sex, that they are more sensitive, and so on. Such are the "reasons" advanced for many of the intersex conventions which E. Post describes in *Etiquette* (New York, Funk & Wagnalls, 1st ed., 1922; 2d ed., 1937).

9. Ginsberg (*op. cit.*, 353) describes the covert aspects of conventional behavior thus: "Conventions are best understood as habits . . . which have become generalized and almost automatic in their operation. The more automatic an act the greater the difficulty experienced by one acting in opposition to it, and a distinct sense of discomfort is felt when one observes others acting in a manner contrary to one's fixed modes of behavior. . . . In the sentiments, or groups of emotional dispositions, associated with con-

ventions and condemning their breach there is present a rational element, the recognition, however vague, of the importance of order and the necessity of knowing what to expect and what is expected in given situations." (By permission of The Macmillan Company, publishers.)

10. The Chinese used, in addition to age, a concept of status which is unknown to us—generation status. On the basis of generation status, the eldest son of an eldest son is superior to his paternal uncles, however inferior he is in terms of age. In many conventional situations, leadership was determined in accordance with generation status; it might therefore happen that a small boy would treat an old man as though the old man were a junior.

11. For an interesting and amusing treatment of conventions which are peculiar to the Chinese, see C. Crow's *400 Million Customers* (New York, Harper, 1937). This book, the story of an American businessman in China, gives the reader a vivid picture of the importance of conventions in social life and of how widely our own conventions may differ from those of other people.

12. The rules of etiquette, according to Post in 1922 (*op. cit.*), were largely the conventions of a small class of American people—the "best families" of prewar New York. For other people, adherence to these conventions simply because they are "right" according to Mrs. Post is, as we shall see in a subsequent chapter, not conventional but formal behavior.

13. An excellent illustration of the degree to which occupational conventions may set the members of an occupational group apart from the society at large is the mien of what is sometimes described as the legal mind. Legalists adhere to the belief that judicial procedure is a "scientific" process by which the absolute justice of any case is determined. To the inadvertent bystander, homicide is a crime and the observed act of homicide clear evidence that a specific crime was committed by a specific person. To the legal mind, however, nothing is self-evident. By pure legal reasoning, it may, for example, be proved on the basis of some technical error in the indictment that the accused has not committed homicide; that no homicide was committed; that, even had the accused committed homicide, it would not be murder. See E.S. Robinson, *Law and Lawyers* (New York, Macmillan, 1935).

Following the lead of F. Tönnies (*Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft*, Leipzig, Fues, 1887), E. Durkheim (*De la Division du travail social*, Paris, Alcan, 1893) made what still stands as the most penetrating analysis of the special mental patterns of the members of various occupational groups. E.C. Hughes ("Personality Types and the Division of Labor," *Amer. J. Sociol.*, 1928, **33**, 754-768) has applied the Durkheim approach to the study of occupational groups in contemporary society.

14. In caste systems, such as those found among the various peoples of India, intergroup conventions have developed, apparently as the consequence of the conquest of a native population by a strong minority. In time these intergroup conventions have become sanctified and formed into quasi-institutional constellations. For a brief analysis of the development

and character of caste relationships, see the article "Caste" by A.L. Kroeber (*Ency. Soc. Sci.*, 3, 254-256).

According to Thomas (*op. cit.*, 83): "Among the Polynesian Yonga, where class distinctions are excessively developed, there is a corresponding change in the vocabularies of the classes, the use of terms depending on the rank of the person addressed or referred to, and it is possible by listening to a conversation to tell whether those conversing are of equal rank. . . .

"In Java as many as five vocabularies are employed in connection with the system of social ranking."

15. For material on professional ethics, medical and legal, see:

Archer, G.L., *Ethical Obligations of the Lawyer*, Boston, Little, Brown, 1910.

Cohen, F.S., *Ethical Systems and Legal Ideals*, New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1933.

Cohen, J., *The Law; Business or Profession?*, New York, Banks Law Publications, 1916.

Davis, S., *History of Medicine with the Code of Medical Ethics*, Chicago, Cleveland Press, 1907.

Flint, A., *Medical Ethics and Etiquette*, New York, Appleton, 1883.

Principles of Medical Ethics of the American Medical Association, Chicago, American Medical Association, 1929.

Warvelle, G.W., *Essays in Legal Ethics*, Chicago, Callaghan, 1920.

16. In his excellent and intimate study *Caste and Class in a Southern Town* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1937) J. Dollard describes a great many of the conventions which operate in the relations of whites and blacks and of the ideas and sentiments which both have toward these conventions. See also B.W. Doyle, *The Etiquette of Race Relations in the South. A Study in Social Control* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1937).

CHAPTER VI

REGIMENTAL BEHAVIOR

Institutional and conventional patterns of interaction are the socially provided mechanisms for the solution of the normal problems of collective adjustment. The adjustment problems of the members of a society are not, however, always normal. Exigencies may arise which threaten the welfare of the group. Flood, fire, plague, attack by an enemy force, and so on may occur; and social changes may disrupt the course of normal life.

Such exigencies present problems which cannot be solved by institutional and conventional patterns. The specific conditions imposed by an exigency cannot be anticipated; consequently, the specific problems it presents cannot be solved in advance. The problems of an exigency must, as it were, be solved on the spot.

Regimental Preparation for Exigencies.—For any exigency which a society recognizes as a future possibility, however, some preparation can be made in advance. This preparation consists in establishing a system of what may be called regimental behavior.¹ Such a system is designed to accomplish the same ends under exigent conditions as institutional and conventional patterns do under normal circumstances.

Each system of regimental behavior consists of a number of regimental situations. In any specific situation, the pattern of interaction is predetermined. The members of that situation recognize and respond in predictable ways to a predesignated leader. Thus, when on the parade ground the drill sergeant shouts "Right face!" all his company will respond to him and will obey his command.

The commands to which the members of a regimental situation will respond are, of course, limited by physical possibilities on the one hand and by the regimental system on the other. The most dictatorial drill sergeant cannot cause his company to rise into the air, nor can he expect obedience to the unprecedented command "Dance a two-step!"

Within these limits, however, the leader of a regimental situation can, by his selection of commands, determine the course of collective action. By choosing the proper commands, the sergeant may march his company in any one of a large number of formations and in any direction which the terrain permits. Thus, the interaction is predetermined; but the collective action which results is determined by the leader. During an exigency, therefore, the leader of a regimental system may decide on an expedient course of collective action and may directly apply his decision to collective welfare.

Regimentation during an Exigency.—For unprecedented exigencies, such as those crises which appear during periods of social change, there can, of course, be no such regimental provision. During the course of an unprecedented crisis, however, strong individual leadership may arise and, by the regimentation of those involved, attempt to establish a new system of regimental behavior. This attempt will result in a great many situations in which the pattern of interaction is only partially regimental in character. Moreover, these situations will be only partially related to one another and will at the most form only a loose system of regimental behavior.

As a Type.—In contemporary society we may see many examples of both established and partially established systems of regimental behavior with their respective fully and partially regimental situations. The interactions between a soldier and his superior officer are fully regimental. The relations between a priest and his bishop are, generally speaking, somewhat less regimental in character. The interactions between the members of a great business organization are at the most only partially regimental. Furthermore, the collective actions consequent upon regimental situations may vary as widely as military conquest of Ethiopia to business conquest of the market for gasoline. All situations which are to some degree regimental in character have to that degree, however, sociopsychological attributes in common and can, as we shall see, be considered as belonging to a single type of collective behavior.

ORIGIN AND FUNCTION

Origin of Regimental Systems in Social Experience.—When any particular kind of crisis has occurred with sufficient severity

and frequency to make the members of a society aware of its possible recurrence, that society is likely to develop a system of regimental behavior as preparation for this kind of crisis. When, for example, fires have repeatedly occurred in school buildings and have frequently resulted in the death of panic-stricken school children, there may be established for school children a system of regimental behavior by which subsequent disasters can be averted.

Historically, the crisis of warfare is the one for which most societies have systematically and consistently prepared.² This preparation has consisted either of the maintenance of a standing army or of a system by which a fighting force can be quickly mobilized. The crises of flood and famine have in rarer instances been prepared for, in some degree or other, by the maintenance of a regimental system. In any case, the origins of an established regimental system are seen to lie in the historic experiences of a people with crises of a given kind.

Origin of Regimentation in Social Disorganization.—By far the most serious crisis to which a society can be subjected, or at least that crisis which is most keenly felt by modern peoples, is that which arises from social disorganization consequent upon rapid social change. Such disorganization constitutes a crisis in that it lessens or destroys the functional efficiency of institutional and conventional patterns. Obviously, such an unprecedented disorganization cannot be prepared for in the organization of the society. The disorganization of a social system is never, it would seem, considered as a possibility by that system.

When the crisis of social disorganization becomes acute, the result is a complex form of panic behavior, roughly analogous to that of untrained school children in a burning building. As panic intensifies and spreads, the members of the disorganized society tend to abandon the institutional and conventional forms of behavior which have been established through their social heritage; and, since they have no established regimental system by which to meet this crisis, they turn to personal leaders for social guidance.

This they do, however, in a random and unsystematic way. Before the problems which are occasioned by the crisis can be solved, it is first necessary that some leader attain control over all the members of the society. The effort to establish such

control may take the form of regimentation—the attempt to establish a system of regimental behavior—during the course of the crisis.³ In this case, the origins of regimental behavior may be seen to lie in the efforts of a people to adjust to a given crisis.

Origin of the Situation.—Many of the regimental situations which arise within an established system of regimental behavior are predetermined. Soldiers stand daily reveille and retreat at hours designated by the military system; firemen test and warm the motors of their trucks at stated periods; and so on. Any regimental situation may, however, be the result of the initiative of regimental leaders, who exercise discretionary powers. This is particularly true of regimental situations during periods of actual crisis. Military officers, for example, decide upon the feasibility of all troop movements during a campaign; and the fire chief may order his men to their stations whenever he deems this advisable. Finally, a regimental situation may arise fortuitously, as when a soldier and an officer happen to pass in the street and, passing, salute in the predetermined manner or as when a fire alarm calls firemen from their beds to their official stations.

Function of Regimental Behavior.—The function of an established system of regimental behavior is, as has been suggested, to permit a predesignated leader to solve the collective adjustment problems which arise during exigent circumstances and to put his solution into effect.

The problems which an exigency presents cannot, obviously, be solved in advance. We may, of course, prepare for possible fire in a school building by having fire extinguishers, an automatic signal system, and so on. But we are unable to tell just where a fire will start, what course it will take, etc. The particular adjustment problems of the particular fire must be worked out through trial and error by individual initiative.

When the problem is an individual one, the trial-and-error efforts of a single individual may lead to an effective adjustment for that individual. A single child in the burning school building might, through his own individual initiative and trial and error, discover that he could escape from the building by a certain route. When, however, one hundred children are in the school building, the problem is of a quite different order. If each of a hundred school children should individually attempt to work out an adjustment by trial and error, they would get in one

another's way, etc. Their combined efforts would, no doubt, result in collective behavior of the panic type. Consequently, if a collectively advantageous solution is to be made, individual leadership which directs and coordinates their activities is necessary.

Whatever the end, the coordinated behavior of two people is certain to be more fruitful than the unrelated behavior of three or thirty would be. We may see this principle simply illustrated in the sport of crew racing. In the conventional practice, eight strong men, each with an oar, respond as one to the beat or stroke dictated by the coxswain. Their behavior as individuals is regularized and coordinated, to the end that the sum total of that behavior will contribute most efficiently to the end in view, moving the boat through the water toward the goal. Unregulated, each oarsman might expend as much or more effort; but a considerable proportion of the total effort would be wasted in terms of the end in view. Obviously, in this instance, organization of individual effort is collectively and individually desirable.

In a similar way, the coordinating and directing efforts of a regimental leader may achieve the maximum of efficiency which is necessary if people are to survive such an exigency as war, flood, famine, or fire. Whether or not in any given instance the solution which is made and put into effect by regimental leadership is expedient is dependent, of course, on the personnel of that leadership. Furthermore, the validity of a regimental solution to a collective problem cannot be discerned in the consequence of a single regimental situation. A general may sacrifice one group of soldiers in order to win a war; a fire chief may deliberately withhold water from a burning building in order to save another which is not yet afire. Only as a series of related regimental situations blend into a pattern of regimental action can the functional significance of any one of them be discerned.

During the process of establishing a regimental system, the function of a regimental situation is even less apparent. Not until the history of the twentieth century has been written, for example, will the consequences of any of the current efforts at regimental control in business and national life become at all evident.

ORIGIN AND FUNCTION EXEMPLIFIED

Regimental behavior may arise as a consequence of a great variety of historical factors. No two systems of regimental behavior will have quite the same structure. Furthermore, since the exigencies which have brought about regimentation are varied, the specific ways in which regimental behavior will accomplish the regimental function are also varied. The following brief statements will serve to indicate the complexities of the origin and function of regimental behavior.

Military Regimentation.—Perhaps military organizations most clearly exemplify the origins and functions of established systems of regimental behavior. Military organization is the traditional method by which societies prepare for the possible exigency of warfare. The recognition of warfare as a possibility lies in the historical experiences of the society, and the search for the ultimate origins of warfare as an exigency would take us into historical and sociological analysis. Cultural differences, economic conflicts, personal ambitions, and all the other factors which make for the history of human events are involved.⁴

In the need for systematic and controllable coordination of individual activity during warfare lies, however, the immediate origins of military regimentation as the traditional preparation for this exigency. This need for coordination under directive leadership is quite evident. There can be no predetermined collective pattern of adjustment to this possible exigency. War, like fire in a school building, may be predicted as a possibility; but where and how a warlike foe will attack is no more to be anticipated than where and how a fire will break out. The conditions of warfare are never twice the same. Even were we to imagine the impossible circumstance of the same armies fighting a return engagement in the same locale, with weather and other factors uniform, the pattern which had been successful in the former engagement would be inexpedient in this one. Obviously, the army which failed in the first encounter will not, since it wants to win, repeat the losing pattern. The army which won the first engagement cannot, therefore, hope to win the second without resort to a new strategy. In coordinating the various units of an army and in devising a plan of action to fit the particular exigency, individual initiative and absolute

authority are necessary. In order to permit this authoritative leadership, most societies have established a military system of regimental behavior as their preparation for the possible exigency of war.

Religious Regimentation.—Military organization illustrates the establishment of regimental systems for possible future exigencies. Probably the most striking example of the establishment of a new system of regimental behavior as a means of adjusting to an unprecedented exigency is provided by the history of the various Roman Catholic orders.⁵

During the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, social changes in western Europe disrupted the functional integrity of the Roman Catholic church. Unable to keep pace with the times, the church fell into general disfavor. Torn with interminable strife, the personnel of the church became corrupt. With the disintegration of the church as an institution, the survival of the church was in jeopardy. Faced with this exigency, the personnel of the church became, as it were, panic-stricken; and the way was opened for the rise of strong individual leadership. In the course of time, this leadership succeeded in regimenting the priesthood into quasi-military orders, which made possible the coordination and direction of priests in the fight to perpetuate the church. Although this regimentation did not save religion for the church, it did postpone the decline of the church and permitted the orders, under the guise of religious authority, to take a significant part in the economic aspects of world expansion.

Even today the various Roman Catholic orders persist as regimental organizations. The relationships of priest to priest and of nun to nun are now regimental. The pope is commander-in-chief; the cardinals in Rome constitute his staff; the other cardinals, his field marshals; the bishops, his majors; and so on. Authority comes in systematic fashion from the top down, and response thereto is fully as complete and channelized as is the response to military leadership. Undoubtedly the persistence of the Roman Catholic church, while Protestant sects have come and gone in disorderly succession, is mainly attributable to the regimentation of the personnel of that organization.

Regimentation of Business.—Far less complete, but no less significant, than the regimentation of the personnel of the Roman

Catholic church, is that which has gradually developed in the field of modern business organization.

The technological and other changes of the past two centuries have occasioned constant and intensifying exigent circumstances for Western people. The society as a whole and every productive and distributive unit within it have constantly faced the necessity of dynamic adaption in order to survive. The efforts to achieve a coordination of individual action under the control of directive leadership have ranged from downright enslavement of primitive peoples, through utopian communal schemes, to capitalistic dependence on the relatively free interplay of profit-motivated individual initiative. With increasing mechanization of industrial processes and a parallel growth in the size of the business unit, the need for coordination has grown correspondingly acute. Industrial organizations, particularly those involving thousands of workers, have increasingly resorted to regimentation as the only feasible way of meeting the exigency.⁶

Under the intensely competitive conditions of modern economic life, the management of a large business organization presents problems of leadership closely paralleling those of an army at war. If it is to survive, the business organization must be operated with a maximum of economic efficiency. Efficiency here, as elsewhere, depends more upon the coordination of individual effort than upon the extent of individual effort. And in business, as elsewhere, such coordination can be assured only by the regimentation of the personnel of the organization. Consequently, the relations of official and worker, of worker and worker, and even of worker and customer are in many cases as thoroughly regimental as are the relations of the members of a military system.

National Regimentation.—The progressive decadence of our preindustrial social institutions has of recent years in some countries constituted an acute exigency. Normal political procedures have been discarded, and efforts to establish a national system of regimental behavior have been made.⁷ Such regimentation differs from that of business and religion in that it is all-inclusive; it extends to all aspects of social life—religious, economic, political, military, etc.

Theoretically, national regimentation will lead to an established system of regimental behavior which will permit maximum social

efficiency in the face of the crisis of social disorganization by the planned coordination of all parts of the social system. Obviously, a regimental system would facilitate the coordination of the variegated activities of a nation. Whether any individual or group of individuals would be able to provide the necessary leadership for such a system remains to be seen. So far national regimentation has nowhere succeeded in establishing a system of regimental behavior. All leadership effort has been directed toward regimentation of national populations rather than toward leading regimental peoples. The problem of regimental leadership on a national scale has, therefore, not yet arisen.

IDEOLOGIES

In some instances, the function of regimental behavior is so evident that ideological justification is unnecessary. This is obviously the case with the regimentation of school children for the possibility of fire in the school building. Because the potential value to the individual of fire drill is so apparent, neither child nor parent is likely to doubt the desirability of it.

The regimentation of soldiers, workers, or the members of an entire nation may, however, run counter to established self-interests and may require, therefore, ideological justification. The ideologies by which the subordination of the individual to a regimental system is justified may be no more than a loose collection of beliefs, or they may constitute a highly integrated social philosophy. The ideologies by which some systems of regimental behavior are justified are so highly intellectualized that they may seem realistic not only to the participants but to others as well. Appealing to history, to pseudo science, and by rhetoric, the makers of some ideologies have apparently succeeded in convincing even themselves that what they say is literal truth.

Military Ideologies.—The justification for the military system is always a systematic appeal to collective self-interest. Military biographers and historians invariably advance some sort of philosophy of warfare, the gist of which is that national security is dependent upon national combativeness and individual welfare upon national security.⁸ If in the modern world this is much like saying that one lives only by dying, so much more the credit due to ideological control. In any event, all high-rank-

ing professional soldiers subscribe to some such justification for the maintenance of the military system which they represent. Military ideologies undoubtedly serve during times of peace to justify a standing army and during actual warfare to justify the sacrifices demanded of the civilian population.

Perhaps because the maintenance of Western military systems is so thoroughly supported by ideologies, the justification for the subjugation of the individual to those systems requires little more than vague reference to the glories of courageous action, the ecstasies of death on the field of combat, and the virtues inherent in dying for one's country. Contrary to popular assumption, however, such ideologies give little consolation to soldiers in combat, who are more likely to consider themselves the victims of unfortunate circumstances than the courageous defenders of something or other worth saving.

In tribal and feudalistic societies, on the other hand, military systems of regimental behavior are supported not only by ideologies of the system but by highly efficacious justifications for individual participation in warfare. The Amerindian brave was fortified by the belief that the spirits of those who died in combat received special rewards in the happy hunting grounds.⁹ Similarly, the Moslem and the Japanese fighters of today are given religious justifications for dying in combat.¹⁰ The Japanese soldier is likely to believe that there is a personal advantage to him in death which occurs under military circumstances.

Ideologies of Religious Regimentation.—The theological justifications for the Roman Catholic church which developed as the church became less a religious and more a political and economic organization are too well known to deserve much comment here. These justifications for the church became in time justifications for the regimentation of the personnel of the various orders. Today each order has something of its own ideological system. Basic to them all is the monumental work of St. Thomas Aquinas, who, by specious logic and the piling of unsupported assumption upon unfounded premise, succeeded in justifying anything which the leaders of the church might choose to command.¹¹

Ideologies of National Regimentation.—More important today than either the ideologies of military systems or those of religious regimentation are those which are used to justify

attempts to establish national systems of regimental behavior.¹² Each such attempt has its own particular ideological system. All may be divided, however, into two general categories: the theory of manifest destiny and the theory of a social utopia.

The fascist leaders who are today attempting to regiment whole nations have resorted to the concept of manifest destiny.¹³ As propounded by Mussolini and Hitler, this ideology consists in essence of the idea of a "chosen people," who have special virtues and a mission in the cosmic scheme, a mission which involves the subjugation of the individual to the collective "spirit." That spirit is manifest, of course, through the person of the leader—hence, the phrase "manifest destiny." With the Japanese, the idea of manifest destiny is embodied in a pseudoreligious philosophy of the divine emperor and his chosen people. In every instance, the concept of manifest destiny justifies national regimentation in terms of a cosmic imperative, rather than in terms of individual self-interest.

In contrast to the ideology of manifest destiny, that of a social utopia appeals, though somewhat distantly, to individual self-interest. As used by the U.S.S.R., this ideology consists of the idea that the perfect society in which the individual will prosper can be attained only through the temporary subjugation of the individual to collective necessity. The basis for this ideology is found in Marxian philosophy, which justifies, on the grounds of historic inevitability, conflict between classes and subordination of the individual to the group during the period of that conflict. Beyond this conflict period, Marxian philosophy does not justify regimental behavior. But, in order to support the so-called dictatorship of Stalin, Marxian philosophy has been warped to justify the continuation of national regimentation beyond the actual conflict period. As a result, the ideology which supports regimental behavior in Russia today is, perhaps, more one of manifest destiny than one of a social utopia.¹⁴

MEMBERSHIP

In order that the members of a regimental system will be prepared to respond in predetermined ways to a predesignated leader, they must be selected for membership and then trained for their roles.

Selection of Members.—The members of any fully or partially regimental system will have been selected from the general social population. Only in the loosest sense are individuals ever born to membership. An army does not reproduce its members; they must be recruited from external sources. A religious organization, such as the Jesuit order, secures its members from outside that organization. The business organization employs workers, most of whom will be unrelated by kinship ties. The nearest approach to membership by birth is in those regimental situations of a national character. Even here, however, other factors operate to determine whether, being born to national membership, the individual will be selected as a member of the regimental situations of that nation. Theoretically, at least, German-born Jews are excluded from membership in regimental Germany.

In established regimental systems, two interdependent factors operate to determine those of the general population who will be selected for membership: traditional membership standards and the initiative of the regimental leader. Every military organization, primitive or modern, has its minimum standards for membership. Likewise, the various Roman Catholic orders and, to a lesser degree, those business organizations which are highly regimental, have minimum standards for membership. These standards have developed through time and are incorporated in the traditions or the legal rules surrounding the organization. They may include considerations of nativity, sex, age, financial and social status, technical and educational attainment, body size, and so on. These standards are not subject to rapid modification; hence they place a distinct limitation upon the initiative of the regimental leader. The traditional standards determine the qualitative bases for selection, but the regimental leader has more or less autocratic control over the number of members to be included within the regimental organization. He may expand or contract the organization.

Where a system of regimental behavior is not fully established, as in many modern business organizations, the standards of selection, since they are not established by tradition, will be under the control of the leader. Thus, if the corporation executive believes it desirable, he may set a maximum-age limit upon employees.

Acceptance of Membership.—Membership in a regimental system is always at the outset more or less calculated: the soldier “joins” the army, the monk “enters” an order, the citizen “becomes” a Fascist. Acceptance of membership in a regimental system is, therefore, a matter of self-interest.¹⁵

The ideologies surrounding an established system of regimental behavior, such as a standing army, foster the illusion that to belong is desirable. In the modern world, however, such ideologies are often supplemented by more tangible self-interest appeals.¹⁶ The Japanese militarists, for example, have followed the old Prussian practice of making the life of the soldier attractive by giving him a social status above that which he could normally secure in private life.

During the process of establishing a regimental system, strong appeals to self-interest are necessary to induce those who are selected to “join.” Since the regimental system which is in process lacks the support of tradition, it is necessary to make the conditions of nonmembership less attractive than the conditions of membership. In the regimentation of business, this is accomplished through appeals to economic interests, such as employee-pension plans and the promise of systematic promotion. In the regimentation of a nation, membership is made attractive by systematic and ruthless persecution of nonmembers, on the one hand, and the promise of ultimate, however vague, rewards for membership, on the other hand. For example, German, Russian, and Italian citizens are both threatened into and bribed into accepting membership in the various, partially regimented systems of these nations.

Training of Members.—The more or less traditional standards by which the membership of established regimental systems is selected are invariably supplemented by some system of membership training. This may be quite informal, as in the training after maturity of the braves of our old Amerindian Plains tribes; or it may be formal, as in the case of modern soldiers, sailors, and priests. The modern armies and navies have their rigorous colleges for officers, and Roman Catholic orders have their colleges for priests. During his novitiate, the young man who desires to enter a Roman Catholic order goes through an intense and systematic training in the ideals, sentiments, and procedures of that order. Similarly, the future officer is so drilled in obedience

and mechanical procedures that his behavior in military situations is entirely predictable. He learns to act and to think in accordance with the rule book and to respond unflinchingly and without initiative to the dictates of his superiors.

In any case, training for regimental membership is directed far more toward the perfection of the ideologies of the regimental system and to the ideal of obedience in the regimental role than toward the purely technical aspects of that system.¹⁷ Even the parade-ground drill of the common soldier is directed primarily toward the establishment of the habit of response to command, rather than toward the establishment of a means whereby mobile troops can be handled in an orderly and systematic manner. The unremitting drill and interminable inspections which constitute the life of the soldier or sailor are necessary to establish and maintain the habit of obedience. As experience in the World War has shown, the technical skills of the modern soldier can be rapidly acquired; but months of intensive drill are necessary to establish in the enlisted or conscripted civilian the habit of automatic response to authority.

The same training problem is faced by those modern industrial executives who would regiment their personnels. All the larger corporations have methods whereby they endeavor to make their employees, particularly those who represent the organization in association with the public, automatically responsive to employer dictation. In some instances, this is superficial, involving perhaps no more than occasional loyalty talks. In others, it is so thoroughgoing that it reaches down into the employee's private life, dictating where he shall live, how he shall live, with whom he shall associate, etc. All such rules are calculated to make the employee more dependent on and subservient to the authority of the employer.

In the effort to assure ultimate acceptance of regimental roles, modern so-called dictators all concentrate upon the youth of the nation. Through various youth organizations, they endeavor to train the immature into complete acceptance of the ideologies of national regimentation, into the habit of unquestioning obedience, and into the designated patterns of that obedience.¹⁸

OVERT AND COVERT ASPECTS OF INTERACTION

Even in established systems of regimental behavior there is no necessary parallel between the covert feeling-states of regimented

individuals and their overt behavior in a given situation. The soldier salutes his superior officer as a symbol of his submission to authority, but he may at the same time be inwardly cursing the man who wears the stripes or bars of authority. The soldier responds automatically to the command "Fire!" but he may feel only pity for the man he kills. The soldier moves across the field of battle as he is ordered, but he may be thoroughly afraid.

Regimental Loyalty.—Whatever the nature of these covert responses, the regimented individual will, however, feel impelled to behave in the designated fashion by a kind of loyalty. This is not a loyalty to his superiors, nor is it loyalty to himself. It can be described only as loyalty to an abstraction—the Service, the Order, the Corporation, the Nation. When the individual responds in a regimental situation, his feeling-states are, therefore, of two orders: his covert responses to the specific situation—hate, rage, fear, and so on; and his feeling of abstract loyalty to the system of authority into which he is regimented.

Personal loyalties may, of course, either supplement or oppose this abstract loyalty. No doubt the beloved officer has more personal influence with his soldiers than has the hated officer. It does not follow, however, that the beloved officer secures more obedience. In regimental behavior, abstract loyalties are more efficacious than are those of a personal order.

The basic problem in establishing a system of regimental behavior is that of developing this abstract loyalty in the members of the system. The reason such loyalties are necessary in the regimentation of a large business organization is fairly evident. The employer of a small number of men can supplement economic control over them by warranting their personal loyalty. But the president of a vast and far-flung corporation will be unknown as a person to most of his employees. Those representatives of corporate authority whom the employees know may or may not secure their personal loyalty. If loyalty to the corporation can be inculcated in its personnel, the person who represents authority becomes of minor importance. The workers will obey, not only because they are afraid of being discharged, but because they are loyal to the business organization. Their overt behavior will be unaffected by their personal feelings toward the individual who represents authority.

To the extent that abstract loyalty to a regimental system is lacking, regimentation of the members of that system is incom-

plete. Under sufficient pressure even the German Jew will go through the motions of "Heil Hitler" with outward enthusiasm. But if he feels neither personal loyalty to Hitler nor abstract loyalty to Nazi Germany and if he feels only fear of punishment for disobedience, he is in no sense a truly regimented member of a regimental system.

LEADERSHIP

The leader of an established system of regimental behavior is predesignated, and he is in the true sense a dictator. Likewise, the leader of every regimental situation within that system is designated by the situational pattern and is empowered by that pattern to dictate the course of regimental action.

The regimental leader secures obedience to his commands on the basis of abstract loyalties. His leadership is, therefore, entirely impersonal and is independent of the personal preferences, interests, and sentiments of the situational members. He is free to consider his followers in the same impersonal manner that the chess player treats his pawns, bishops, knights, etc. They are for him simply pieces in the game of war, religion, or business. They have definite attributes, and their behavior can be anticipated.

Consequently, the leader of an established system of regimental behavior is free to devote his full time and energies to the strategy of leading. Undoubtedly it is the freedom from the necessity of striving to secure and maintain control which in considerable measure accounts for the efficiency of such regimental leadership. The advantages of this type of leadership under exigent circumstances are self-evident.

Limitations.—The leader of an established system of regimental behavior is not, however, in any sense a free agent. He dictates only in terms of and within the limits of the regimental forms. Like the chess player, the regimental leader plans the strategy and initiates the moves; but, even as the chess player must abide by the rules of the game, the regimental leader must abide by the rules of the regimental system.

The rules of an established regimental system are, of course, vastly more complex than those of chess but are almost as stable. Their purpose is to limit the initiative of all but the regimental

leader and to assure predictable response to his commands. Often they are codified in a "manual of procedures." While they are subject to gradual modification, they are, at any given moment, fixed.

Only within these rules is the regimental leader an absolute authority. The result is that, while a regimental system facilitates the application of leader initiative, it also places fixed limits upon that initiative. The leaders of established regimental systems are consequently highly conservative.

Selection of Leaders.—In addition to the limitations placed upon his initiative by the rules of the system, another factor operates to make for conservatism in the leader of an established system of regimental behavior—the process of selection. Leaders of a regimental system are invariably drawn from within the membership of that system in accordance with a fixed standard of values. These values are seniority and performance as members of regimental situations. The standard of selection assures, therefore, that the more loyal and obedient members of the regimental system will rise to the position of leaders. As leaders, they will consequently be highly conservative and lacking in initiative.¹⁹

Perhaps this consequence of the selective process is most evident in the case of military leaders. In all the greater war machines of history the commanders have been professional military men who have come up through the organization. They have been promoted because they were good soldiers, and a good soldier is one who accurately and efficiently obeys commands. Inevitably, therefore, most military commanders have been good soldiers and poor leaders. Some have been conservative even to the point of working out their military strategy in terms of precedent. Frequently, therefore, military engagements are not won by the technically strongest side but by the one which, as a consequence of the partial breakdown of the military system, is possessed of unorthodox leadership. It has often happened that bad generals have won the most battles, a fact which taxes the apologetic abilities of military historians.

What is true of military leadership is equally true of the leadership of all established systems of regimental behavior. The more completely regimented the system, the more the leadership thereof tends to become static.

Modern National Dictators.—The modern political leaders who are attempting to establish regimental control over the populations of entire nations are in no respect similar to the autocratic leaders of established regimental systems. These so-called dictators are not selected in terms of a regimental system; they are not subject to the limitations imposed upon the leaders of established systems of regimental behavior; and they do not have the autocratic powers possessed by such leaders.

The so-called dictator has more or less by his own initiative appointed himself leader of those he endeavors to regiment. Until he has succeeded in training them to the habits of regimental response and in inculcating in them loyalty to the regimental system, his position is always precarious; and he cannot command unquestioning obedience. Consequently, most of his time and energy are devoted to the strategy of being leader; little is left for the strategy of leading.

The power of such a leader is necessarily both secured and maintained by a mixture of brutality, bargaining, and dramatization. Obviously, such a leader is not conservative. Unless he possesses considerable initiative, he will quickly be supplanted by some other aspirant for his position.

ULTIMATE CONSEQUENCES OF REGIMENTATION

There can be no doubt that some established systems of regimental behavior are social insurance against panic behavior in exigent circumstances. Perhaps the best provision for collective insurance against death by fire is systematic fire drill, regimentation in anticipation of this eventuality. It does not follow, however, that, since some regimental systems may be good insurance against the hazards of some exigencies, all regimental systems work to the same end.

Theoretically they do. Actually, a regimental system may at times contribute to the making of an exigency. This tendency is clearly seen in German and Japanese military history. It is no doubt impossible to ascertain who or what is responsible for any given war, but it is certain that the existence of a military system is conducive to warfare. The prestige of the military leaders in society at large will to a great extent depend upon the importance of the military system to the country. This will, in turn, depend upon the frequency and extent of wars. Thus, military leaders

may come to feel it to their personal advantage to embroil the society in warfare and, to the extent that they have the power, may endeavor to do so. In other words, the existence of preparation for a possible crisis may contribute to the occurrence of that crisis.

Furthermore, the conservatism of the leadership of established systems of regimental behavior makes for rigidity within the system and incapacity of that system to adjust to changing circumstances. Under stable social conditions, such conservatism might be functionally adequate; but in our dynamic world adaptability is essential to continued life. So common has been the decadence of large business organizations as a consequence of conservative regimental leadership that the classical economists have come to the conclusion that the tendency for business organizations to grow old and static is a law of economic life. In the case of governmental bureaucracy, which is to a considerable degree regimented, the tendency to become static is even more apparent.

For rather different reasons, it is quite impossible to evaluate the ultimate consequences of national regimentation as a means of meeting the exigency of social disorganization. Such regimentation is directed toward the establishment of a new system of regimental behavior. Theoretically, coordinated collective action can then be directed by the initiative of the leader so that the problems of adjustment to the exigency of social disorganization can be solved. But, as we have seen, once a system of regimental behavior is established, the process by which leaders are selected precludes their having the initiative and originality which is necessary if they are to solve the dynamic problems of social disorganization. Thus, the regimental system which is designed as a means of facilitating the adjustment to changing conditions will, once it is established, prevent adaptation to subsequent changes. This is, perhaps, the dilemma of contemporary life.

Some social theorists nevertheless believe that national regimentation is the only possible means of socially surviving the crisis of acute social disorganization and that such regimentation does not defeat its own ends. As they see it, the achievement of a regimental system means that the crisis is passed, since organization has replaced disorganization. Initiative and originality

in leaders would, of course, be no more desirable than than under conditions of institutional life. In fact, so this line of thought runs, regimental behavior blends into institutional behavior. This line of thought, however, carries us from our avowed socio-psychological purpose into sociological problems. It can, therefore, be dropped with impunity and a sigh of relief.

APPENDIX

1. No other word so fully characterizes the type of behavior under consideration as does "regimental," and no other word so clearly defines the process by which such behavior comes about as does "regimentation." Unfortunately, however, the term "regimentation" became a political shibboleth during the presidential campaign of 1936, when "regimentation" was made the villain in almost every conversational drama which was concocted by Republican party partisans. The use of shibboleths will be discussed in a subsequent chapter. It is here necessary only to point out that the terms "regimental" and "regimentation" are used to symbolize a social phenomenon, not to arouse a covert feeling-state. For the latter usage of the term see H. Hoover, *The Challenge to Liberty* (New York, Scribner, 1935); and for a critical analysis of this usage see D. Aikman and H. Jones, "The Bogey of Regimentation" (*Harper's Mag.*, November, 1934, 641-650).

2. For a brief survey of the role of military systems of regimentation in various societies and of the social circumstances which have encouraged the establishment of such systems, see E. Colby's article "Army" (*Ency. Soc. Sci.*, 2, 210-218). For more extended treatments see S.A. Coblentz, *Marching Men* (New York, Unicorn Press, 1927); O.L. Nickerson, H. Nickerson, and J.W. Wright, *Warfare* (New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1925); and A. Vagts, *The History of Militarism* (New York, Norton, 1937).

3. There are two ways to interpret the rise of strong national leaders and the tendency of such leaders to attempt to regiment their national populations: as a consequence of the leaders themselves and as a consequence of acute social difficulties which in turn produce such men. Those who take the former stand would explain Italian fascism and German Naziism in terms of Mussolini and Hitler respectively. Those who take the latter stand will seek the rise of Mussolini and of Hitler in the complex historical factors which brought the Italian and subsequently the German people to a state of general discouragement and, thus, to a condition in which the appearance of a leader was a cultural imperative. The former interpretation is made by those who either strongly approve or violently oppose the forms which such regimentation is taking. The latter interpretation is that which is made by students who are endeavoring to ascertain the facts.

That social change is a prolonged crisis is ably demonstrated by H. von Beckerath in "Crisis and Reform of the Western World" (*Soc. Forc.*, 1935, 14, 167-185); the relationship between long-run, collective leadership and regimentation is discussed by H. Speier in "Freedom and Social Planning" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, 1937, 42, 463-483); and an effort to reconcile the need for

regimental leadership in the modern world and the desire for the maintenance of the democratic process is made by B. Allin in "Is Planning Compatible with Democracy?" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, 1937, **42**, 510-520).

4. The problem of the origin of the military systems of the Plains Indians is discussed at length in "Handbook of American Indians North of Mexico" (edited by F.W. Hodge, *Bur. Amer. Ethnol., Bull.*, 1907, **30**, Part I). See W.I. Thomas' *Primitive Behavior* (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1937, 417-514) for interesting descriptions of primitive military systems, drill practices, military tactics, and codes.

5. The story of the historical circumstances which imperiled the power of the Roman Catholic church during the eleventh century, of the development of regimental monastic systems as a means of resisting internal disintegration and external attack, and of the temporary strength which the monastic orders gave to the church are impartially told in *The Cambridge Medieval History* (New York, Macmillan, 1913-1936, Vol. V, *Contest of Empire and Papacy*, and Vol. VI, *Victory of the Papacy*). See also A. Bertholet, "Religious Orders" (*Ency. Soc. Sci.*, **13**, 276-278); "Religious Orders" (*Hastings Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*, **10**, 693-726); H.B. Workman, "Monasticism" (*Ency. Soc. Sci.*, **10**, 584-590) and *The Evolution of the Monastic Ideal* (London, Epworth Press, 1927); and F.A. Gasquet, *Monastic Life in the Middle Ages* (London, Bell, 1922).

Out of the medieval crusades there developed a number of regimental systems, known as military orders, in which military efficiency and Christian ideology were blended. These military orders, through which the crusading zeal was long perpetuated, provide the best examples of completed regimentation. See J.L. La Monte, "Military Orders" (*Ency. Soc. Sci.*, **10**, 459-464); G.G. King, *A Brief Account of the Military Orders in Spain* (New York, Hispanic Society of America, 1921); and F.C. Woodhouse, *The Military Religious Orders of the Middle Ages* (New York, Pott, Young, 1879).

The military orders were disbanded in the course of time by secular authorities. Some of the religious orders have, however, persisted. Although they are no longer militant on behalf of papal authority, these orders still are highly regimental systems. For obvious reasons, data on the actual organization of these orders are not easily obtained. The "official" interpretations can, however, be secured from *The Catholic Encyclopedia* (New York, Appleton, 1911: "Augustinians," **1**, 79-81; "Benedictines," **2**, 443-465; "Carmelites," **3**, 354-370; "Dominicans," **12**, 354-370; "Franciscans," **6**, 221-230; "Jesuits," **14**, 81-110).

6. For the sake of logical consistency, those who bitterly decry governmental regulation of business also vigorously deny that there is anything even vaguely resembling regimentation within business organizations. The liberty about which they talk so glibly (W. Lippmann, *The Method of Freedom*, New York, Macmillan, 1934; W. Russell, *Liberty vs. Equality*, New York, Macmillan, 1936; and J. Shotwell, *The Heritage of Freedom*, New York, Scribner, 1934) is actually the liberty of the business leader to guide his regimented business phalanx in the conquest of profits.

The need for regimentation in business is perhaps most evident in railroad and telephone operations. Just how a railroad system could be operated

without serious restrictions on the "freedom" of all the workers is not clear. If trains are to run, if freight and passengers are to be picked up and delivered to their destinations, if the chances that two engineers will try to pass each other on the same rails are to be avoided, if, in other words, a railroad system is to be run systematically, it is necessary that all the human beings in that organization respond in predictable ways to the dictates of coordinating and directive leadership. To the extent that they do, they are regimented.

In the operation of such widespread mechanical properties as the railroad, regimentation is what might be described as a technological necessity. In the operation of such widespread businesses as branch banks, oil companies, chain mercantile establishments, etc., regimentation grows out of economic necessity. Such regimentation, however, never reaches the mechanical precision of military organization. The service-station operator, for example, must evidence some initiative in his relations with varying customers. In one instance, however, that of a nation-wide chain store, the clerks are given as little scope for initiative as are the private soldiers on the drill field; and the store managers are given as little freedom of action as are the drill sergeants. The organization has rules of procedure which are quite as detailed as is the manual of an army. Almost every contingency, except the dissolution of the business, has been anticipated and ruled for by the central office.

An interesting illustration of the advantage to efficiency which is inherent in business regimentation appeared during an influenza epidemic in 1937. One morning, the manager of a bank in a California city found seven of his twenty-one subordinates on the sick role; the total rose to sixteen the following day. Under ordinary conditions, such a loss of personnel would have paralyzed his organization; for, not only is banking highly specialized, but each private bank has its particular practices. Since, however, his bank was a branch bank, this particular manager was promptly supplied with "shock troops" from headquarters; and because all branches of this bank follow a common procedure, these substitutes were able to fit into the working of this particular branch. Except for the fact that the substitute tellers did not personally know the customers with whom they dealt, the organization functioned as usual.

7. One of the more dispassionate analyses of the historical emergence of national regimentation is J.B. Holt's *Under the Swastika* (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1936). A symposium of views on national regimentation is to be found in *Dictatorship in the Modern World* (edited by G.S. Ford, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1935).

In general it may be said that the literature on national regimentation proves only that some people approve of it and many disapprove of it. The pious hopes of the two leading exponents of national regimentation in the Western world are to be found in the following: A. Hitler, *My Battle* (trans. by E.T. Dugdale, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1933); and B. Mussolini, *The Political and Social Doctrines of Fascism* (trans. by B. de Ritis, New York, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1935).

Various intensities of antagonism to national regimentation as it has been developing of recent years are evidenced in the following:

- Brisson, T.A., *The Rise of Fascism in Japan*, New York, Foreign Policy Association, 1932.
- Chamberlain, W.H., *Collectivism*, New York, Macmillan, 1937.
- Salvemini, G., *Under the Axe of Fascism*, New York, Viking, 1936.
- Schuman, F.L., *The Nazi Dictatorship*, New York, Knopf, 1935.
- Strachey, J., *The Menace of Fascism*, New York, Covici-Friede, 1933.
- Swing, R.O., *Forerunners of American Fascism*, New York, Messner, 1935.
- Van Paassen, P. (Ed.), *Nazism: An Assault on Civilization*, New York, Smith & Haas, 1934.

8. For material on the idealization of militant nationalism see any primary-school textbook in history. The credit for making a philosophical cult of military might goes, of course, to the German philosopher Nietzsche. He combined Hegelian mysticism with the struggle-for-survival aspect of Darwinism to secure the superman, who will arrive, it seems, on the full tide of a sea of blood. See the article "Nietzsche" by C. Andler (*Ency. Soc. Sci.*, 11, 373-375).

During the latter half of the last century a number of social ideologists predicated the view that physical combat was the mechanism of group evolution. See F.N. House, *The Development of Sociology* (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1936, Chap. XIV, "Social Darwinism").

9. The idea that death in battle is personally advantageous appears only among those primitives who frequently engage in war, and the idea is always an integral part of the system of religious beliefs. For a survey of various systems of belief regarding death and the spirits, see Thomas (*op. cit.*, 273-339).

10. For the ideological systems from which the Moslem soldier derives the comforting belief that death in battle assures his spiritual welfare, see the article "Islam" by J. Schacht (*Ency. Soc. Sci.*, 8, 333-343). For an analysis of the ideological system from which the Japanese soldier secures a similar encouragement to die, see D.C. Holtom, *The Political Philosophy of Modern Shinto* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1922). The following news item indicates how death is made more attractive for the Japanese soldier:

"Atop Kidan Hill, in the heart of Tokyo, stands the famed Yasukuni shrine. There last week 3,000 Japanese stood in solemn silence as lanterns were dimmed and Shinto priests, carrying a small ark, wound their way behind a military band through the courtyard to the main Temple.

"Two hours later, when due rites had been observed, Japanese had 1,148 more gods to worship, the spirits of those who died last year fighting in Manchukuo. This new battalion brought the total of Japan's deified warriors up to 130,967" (*Time*, May 3, 1937).

11. The ideological system of St. Thomas Aquinas still serves as the basis for the training of the members of the Roman Catholic orders. To such members, the final truth was achieved in the thirteenth century by St. Thomas and was embodied in his *Summa Theologica*. See J.P. Lichtenberger, *Development of Social Theory* (New York, Century, 1925, Chap. V), and W.A. Dunning, *Political Theories, Ancient and Medieval* (New York, Macmillan, 1913, Chap. VIII).

12. Modern corporate organizations have in the main depended upon exchange appeals (Chap. XIV) and the occasional use of coercion to secure and to hold regimented workers. Of late, however, some such organizations have endeavored to reinforce these means by developing ideologies comparable to those operating in military and religious regimental systems. In 1936 *Forbes Magazine* conducted an essay contest on the subject "Why I Like to Work for My Company" (*Forbes Mag.*, Apr. 1, 1937; Apr. 15, 1937; May 1, 1937). These essays may have been written with tongue in cheek, but they inadvertently reveal the efforts which corporations are making to perfect regimentation of employees.

13. With the Japanese the concept of manifest destiny is an integral part of Shinto as that system of beliefs has been made into a state cult. See Holtom, *op. cit.*, and the article "Shinto" by M. Onesaki (*Ency. Soc. Sci.*, 14, 24-25).

The ideas that the state has a higher and imperative destiny and that the leader is the agent of that purpose have been repeatedly expressed both by Hitler and by Mussolini in their public speeches. No attempt has yet been made to reduce these pronouncements to a philosophical system. The view that Germany has a predetermined destiny, dictated by some mystic spiritual force which somehow resides in the state, and that Hitler is the embodiment of that spirit is scattered through his *Mein Kampf* (Munich, Nachf, 1929) and is expressed sometimes implicitly, occasionally as explicitly as the mysticism of the author permits. Neither of the English translations of this document (*My Struggle*, as published in England; *My Battle*, as published in the United States) is more than a pale shadow of *Mein Kampf*.

14. Such, at least, is the view of the embittered Marxian M. Eastman, as expressed in "The End of Socialism in Russia" (*Harper's Mag.*, February, 1937, 302-314).

15. The self-interest basis of membership in a military regimental system is most evident in the case of mercenary troops. In some periods most of the fighting has been done by such "hired hands." See the article "Mercenary Troops" by P. Schmitthenner (*Ency. Soc. Sci.*, 10, 339-342).

The mercenary soldier is highly regimented but is capable of shifting his loyalty from one leader to another. The career soldier of a modern standing army differs in that he is ordinarily imbued with loyalty to a specific command.

Because of the difficulty of securing a sufficient number of willing recruits for the large forces which are necessary to the waging of a modern war, most nations have resorted to conscription. For the conscripted soldier, regimental appeals, such as they are, are supplemented by coercion.

16. England, which has so far resorted to conscription only during actual warfare, has had difficulty in making military life sufficiently attractive to assure a standing army during peacetime. In 1937 the problem became acute and led to such devices as are reported in the following news item:

"A shortage of army recruits has long been a catch in Britain's armament plans. . . . new applicants for the army are not only few but mostly

down-and-out, therefore undernourished. Three out of five are rejected as physically unfit.

"Since 1934 the Government has struggled ingeniously to make soldiering attractive. In recruiting offices, handsome male mannequins were hired to parade in a range of colorful uniforms; recruits were given the opportunity of choosing a regiment by its regalia. Special blue walking-out uniforms were provided. Out-of-workers were warmly invited to spend a free holiday with the Army. Prospective Tommies were escorted through spick & span, comfortably-furnished barracks. A trial enlistment scheme whereby young men could join up for six months was inaugurated. Such chores as scrubbing and peeling potatoes were eliminated from regular military duties. Finally, haircuts and new equipment, formerly paid for by each soldier, were thrown in free" (*Time*, Aug. 23, 1937).

17. Militarists refer to the habit of unthinking obedience as discipline. According to Major H. Brooks (*Do's and Don't's for New Soldiers*, New York, Macmillan, 1918, vii-viii):

"The most essential trait or characteristic of a soldier is absolute *discipline*. . . . The essential spirit of discipline is subordination of self for the good of the whole. This is the kernel of democracy, this is the spirit of Christ, this is the most noble and heroic principle of all philosophies and in all history.

"The primary requisite of discipline is *obedience*. The reason may not always be apparent to you, but Don't Forget, Obey first and promptly, discuss the reason and its wisdom later if you must." (By permission of The Macmillan Company, publishers.)

The same view is expressed over and over in military manuals and in general treatises on the function and the training of the soldier. See No. 850, "List of War Dept. Pamphlets on Military Training"; No. 454, "Army Regulations"; No. 574, "Manuals for Non-com-officers and Privates of Infantry" (War Plans Division, General Staff of U.S. Army, Dept. of War, February, 1920). For a general treatment of the subject see E. Colby, *The Profession of Arms* (New York, Appleton, 1924). See also J.S. Roucek, "The Sociology of the Soldier in Peace Time" (*Sociol. and Soc. Res.*, 1935, 19, 406-419).

18. An excellent description of the procedure by which small boys are being regimented in fascist Italy is provided by E. Poole in his article "Sons of the Wolf" (*Harper's Mag.*, October, 1937, 460-469).

See also H.A. Bellows, "Follow the Leader" (*Forum*, February, 1936, 90-95); "Tyro Fuehrers; Future Hitlers in Strenuous Mental and Physical Training for Leadership" (*Lit. Dig.*, May 9, 1936, 15); and G.E. Sokolsky, "Giants in These Days" (*Atlantic Monthly*, July, 1936, 691-700).

19. An attempt to measure the personality qualifications for leadership among men undergoing regimental training at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point has been made by D. Page ("Measurement and Prediction of Leadership," *Amer. J. Sociol.*, 1935, 41, 31-43). See also F. Watson and G. Watson, "Relation between Success in Military Training and Intelligence, Extreversion, and Adequacy" (*J. Abn. and Soc. Psychol.*, 1937, 8, 243-250).

CHAPTER VII

FORMAL BEHAVIOR

In the three preceding chapters we have been concerned with types of collective behavior which have in common the fact that they are integral parts of a social system. These types of collective behavior consist of predetermined patterns of interaction which might be described functionally as the social tools of communal life. They have been devised out of collective experience, each to serve some collective function, and have then been passed on for the use of succeeding generations.

Just as technological changes may destroy the original utility of a physical tool, such as a water jug, so may social developments destroy the functional significance of a social tool. Even as the archaic physical tool may be kept as an object of art, the predetermined pattern of interaction which once served as a social tool may be perpetuated and used to gratify personal interests.¹ When a predetermined pattern of interaction appears in a social situation as a calculated result of the self-interest of one or more of the members of that situation, the behavior which occurs in that situation may be designated as formal in type. That is, when institutional, conventional, or regimental patterns of interaction are used with ulterior motives, the collective behavior which results is no more than an outward form, devoid of or at variance with its inner significance.

Thus, when the old-fashioned conventional practice of leaving calling cards is today carried out for the purpose of impressing the host or hostess, that behavior is formal, rather than conventional. Formal also is the practice, so common in England today, of addressing an erstwhile army officer by his former military title. Once his title was a symbol of his status in a system of regimental behavior. When that title is used after his retirement simply to please or to flatter him personally, such use is devoid of regimental significance; *i.e.*, it is merely formal. The most significant kinds of formal behavior are those which

involve the use of what were formerly institutional patterns of interaction. When people attend an Easter Sunday service merely to display their new clothes, their behavior is formal rather than institutional.

Formal Behavior as a Type.—It is never possible in a specific instance to distinguish categorically between collective behavior which is institutional, conventional, or regimental in type and that which is only formal. Unlike buildings which are demolished by earthquake, social systems do not collapse. Under the impact of social change, they disintegrate more or less slowly or are remodeled to fit new conditions. Consequently, at any point in time, the predetermined patterns of behavior of a given people will range in infinite degrees from those which are functional elements of a functioning social system to those which are simply outworn elements, entirely devoid of collective significance. In periods of social stability most predetermined patterns will, no doubt, be of the three types previously considered; in a period like our own, however, the majority will be formal.

Impossible though it is to make a categorical distinction between behavior which is institutional, conventional, or regimental in type and that which is formal, we may, nevertheless, contrast the former types with the extreme of the latter type, considering this extreme as the typical of formal behavior.

ORIGIN AND FUNCTION

Origins of the Patterns of Interaction.—Since the patterns of interaction which constitute behavior of the formal type are parts of the social heritage, all that has been said of the origins of institutional, conventional, and regimental patterns applies to the origins of formal patterns. In addition, however, we must, in considering the origins of formal patterns of interaction, take into account those factors which have removed the formal patterns from the type of behavior to which they originally belonged. In some instances, these factors are found in the complex forces of social change. In other instances, they lie in the individual initiative of a single person.

In order to understand the origins of many patterns of formal behavior, it is necessary to refer to the complex historical circumstances which have destroyed the functional integrity of a specific institutional constellation. With the disintegration of the insti-

tution, the functional significance of its patterns of interaction disappears. There is a tendency, however, for some of these patterns to be perpetuated by individual initiative and self-interest. They survive their period, as it were, and continue as formal patterns of interaction. Thus, a modern mother may for selfish reasons use the filial sentiments which were a part of the old patriarchal family system to prevent her son from entering into marriage and thereby "deserting" her. Behind the fact that a modern mother may exploit the filial sentiments of her son lies the whole series of events which have culminated in the decline of the old family system and which have made some modern mothers socially dependent upon one or another of their children.

The historical factors which have brought about the disintegration of an institutional constellation will not, however, in themselves explain why some of the institutional patterns have persisted as formal behavior. This persistence constitutes the complex process which is called by the sociologist social lag. The disintegration of the family, for example, has made filial observance on the part of modern children a rather formal matter. That these children should evidence these filial sentiments by sending presents, telegrams, and flowers to their mothers on Mother's Day is, however, clearly a consequence of the economic interests which established and which maintain Mother's Day.² Thus, the persistence of filial sentiments as patterns of formal behavior can be traced in part, at least, to the initiative of commercial interests.

In some instances formal behavior involves the perversion of a current conventional or regimental pattern. The origin then lies in the relatively simple factor of individual initiative rather than in the more complex factors of social change. For example, when a salesman, in order to impress his customer, introduces that customer to the president of the company, the entire interaction loses its normal, conventional character and becomes simply formal. The overt aspects of the interaction will parallel those of the conventional introduction between friends, but the covert elements are all inappropriate to the professed conventional nature of the situation. The salesman has, thus, by his individual initiative and for his own purposes converted what is normally a conventional pattern of interaction into a formal one.

Origin and Function of the Situation.—The situations in which formal behavior arises are neither predetermined, as are institu-

tional situations, nor fortuitous, as conventional situations often are. Occasionally, a formal situation may be instituted by someone during a casual meeting with others, as when a quick-witted man introduces his charming wife in a fortuitous encounter with his employer. Generally, however, the situation, as well as the behavior which arises, is entirely "staged"; *i.e.*, it is planned by one or more of the individuals who are involved. Such is obviously the case when the employee invites his employer to dinner. In any case, the situation is instituted by individual initiative as a calculated means of securing some personal advantage.³

The self-interest behind the inception of a formal situation may be obvious or hidden and simple or complex. The missionary who establishes a mission in China and induces heathens to attend his services may be an idealist intent upon saving souls; but he is just as likely to be a realist intent upon keeping his job. The motives of the diplomat who gives an embassy dinner are, as everyone realizes, always ulterior; but just what these motives may be is seldom evident. They may be idealistic—toward better international relations; of routine order—in accordance with the traditions of the service; or simply personal—as when used to further his own career.

The function of any formal situation is invariably short-run and individual. To the minister, the modern wedding ceremony may be no more than a financially profitable enterprise—the more elaborate the ceremony, the larger his emolument will be. To the bride and, perhaps, to her mother that ceremony may be a means of personal display, a means of impressing the community with her or their importance. To the wedding party, it may be a charming show or perhaps a duty which as individuals they cannot expediently evade. Whatever their particular interests as individuals in it, that ceremony has no significance apart from the satisfaction of these various individual interests. The behavior which occurs within any formal situation serves no collective or long-run ends.

ORIGIN AND FUNCTION EXEMPLIFIED

Although conventional and regimental patterns may become or may be used as formal patterns, the most significant formal patterns are those which have institutional antecedents. Rituals in particular tend to be perpetuated because some class of

individuals has a vested interest in them. Some of the more significant ways in which rites and rituals which were once institutional have become formal patterns in contemporary society may be seen in the following examples.

Religious Rites and Rituals.—The perpetuation of religious rituals, pagan and Christian, by the Roman Catholic church provides us with a striking example of the origin and function of formal behavior. As long as the church functioned to the satisfaction of long-run collective ends, largely of a control nature, religious rituals were assuredly institutional. When, however, in the latter Middle Ages, the church became a politicoeconomic organization, its religious rituals became empty formalities. Used as appeals to the laity, these rituals were then no more than devices by which the personnel of the organized church attained its economic and political ends.

The formal character of religious rituals was most evident, perhaps, in czarist Russia, when the Greek Orthodox church became an agency of the government. The church offered little in the way of religion to the Russian peasantry.⁴ It did, however, bemuse the peasants with elaborate and meaningless rituals, which served to distract their attention from the exploitative character of the government. Because these rituals were devoid of real religious significance and were employed by the church with political intent, all religion came to be derided by the Marxists as the opiate of the masses.

A specific illustration of the formalization of a religious rite may be seen in the baptism of Chinese infants by Jesuit missionaries during the eighteenth century. Their success as missionaries was judged in part by the number of converts which they made. Since the Chinese were reluctant to be taken into the church, the missionaries, for the purposes of their reports, considered the application of a little holy water, under the guise of medicine, to be a proper baptism ceremony by which the newborn heathen became a Christian convert.

Funeral Rites.—More commonplace today is the persistence of elaborate funeral ceremonies. Under the family system, funeral rites were an integral part of the institution of the family. The prospect of being the central, if unfeeling, person in such an elaborate ceremony was some consolation to those who approached the end of life. Furthermore, the burial rites stressed for the

living the importance of the one who was dead and gave an object lesson in the advantages of living the "worthy" life. Finally, the funeral rites served to symbolize the unity of the family group, a unity which did not end with death.

In the modern social scene, however, there is no functional place for the old-style funeral ceremony. The prospect of being driven in a long motor caravan through city streets, while disinterested motorists speed by, of being buried with mechanical perfection in a vast cemetery, even of being interred in an elaborate casket guaranteed to provide eternal peace can be of little comfort to the one who is about to die. To the living, such a ceremony is at best an attempt to "do what dear old Mother" would have liked. At worst, such a ceremony is a grievous financial drain upon the relatives and an irritating duty to all others who attend.

Obviously, then, the modern funeral serves no collective, long-run function. It does, however, gratify the fancy of some one or a number of those involved. Perhaps the deceased has specified in his will a funeral ceremony of such and such a character. Perhaps one or another of the relatives is putting on a display for the neighbors. More probably, those involved have been led by organized commercial interests into spending far more than they can afford. As many investigators have shown, undertakers, manufacturers, and cemetery corporations have made a thorough-going "racket" out of death.⁵

The Dragon Ceremony.—More colorful is the Dragon Ceremony, now a formal, annual procedure in San Francisco's Chinatown. Under the old Chinese social system the Dragon Ceremony was one of the rituals which occurred during the New Year period as a functional part in institutional life. The Dragon symbolized the reawakening of life forces. In modern Chinatown, the Dragon Ceremony is but a means of raising funds for local charities. The Dragon ambles down Grant Avenue on the Day of Man, soliciting money for charity from those who have assembled to witness his passing. All the institutional meaning has disappeared from the ceremony.

The Debut.—An obvious formality is the present-day use of the old institutional debut, at which girls were introduced to society. Among the more wealthy people of a few generations ago, it was the practice to keep girls more or less isolated until

they reached maturity. At that time they became marriageable and were offered to the market at an elaborate social affair. The debut undoubtedly had a distinct, functional place in the social life of the period, particularly in regard to the system by which marriages were arranged.

Today, however, few girls are so much sheltered during childhood and youth that they cannot make the acquaintance of a large number of matrimonial candidates. Elaborate debuts are, nevertheless, no rarity. Their formal character can be clearly seen in the following account of one such affair in the *San Francisco Chronicle*, November 15, 1935: "The young girls who will be members of her receiving line at Miss . . . formal debut party this afternoon were entertained with their escorts at dinner last night by the beautiful debutante. Reversal of the usual order of debut parties was made necessary because all the young people wanted to attend the Opera-Tunities at the Opera House tonight, and Mrs. . . . obligingly changed the date for the usual after-debut dinner to meet her daughter's wishes. . . ." Obviously, this debutante needed no introduction to society.

The modern debut is a matter of the individual interest of one or more of the individuals involved. The parents of the debutante may find such a procedure a means of displaying their wealth or of cultivating the favor of social insiders. The debutante herself, particularly if she has failed in other ways to secure the attentions she desires, may find it an excuse to have a party in her own honor.

The British Coronation Ceremony.—The crowning in 1937 of George VI was a formal ceremony of world-wide interest. That ceremony was patterned carefully on old traditional procedures, each element of which had some significance under the institution of monarchy. In modern England the king is, however, a monarch in name only. The coronation ceremony is, therefore, only a political device, subject to political expediency.⁶

IDEOLOGIES

Every pattern of formal behavior brings with it from its original setting the ideological justification which it had in that setting. The ideological justification for the costly British coronation ceremony, for example, like that of its institutional prototype, is that the ceremony invests the king with rights and obligations

of a monarch. Such ideology is, of course, retained only as the merest pretention and in order to provide a polite subterfuge for the actual reason for the occurrence of the ceremony.⁷ Few of the members who participate in such patterns actually believe in the professed explanation for them.

For his own participation, each of the members has, however, some ideological justification of his own devising. It is the exceptional individual who clearly perceives and admits to himself his selfish reasons for participating in any formal situation. For example, the bride who has an elaborate formal wedding can easily convince herself that she should have such a wedding, not because she will derive a good deal of attention from it, but because it will please her parents.

Even when he accepts the ideology which is carried over to a formal situation as a valid reason for that situation, the individual will also have his own personal ideological reason for participation. Thus, a man may believe that only the highest ideals motivate all the persons involved in a funeral ceremony. He may find it most shocking should anyone question the wisdom of having silver handles on a casket, of painting the face of the corpse, or of depleting greenhouses in honor thereof. He may actually consider as sacrilegious the statements that powerful commercial forces are behind the maintenance of old funeral customs and that petty personal prides and fears prevent those bereaved by the death of an intimate friend or relative from treating the matter of burial in a practical and realistic manner. He may even believe that an elaborate funeral ceremony provides a fitting tribute to the memory of the deceased. Nevertheless, when it comes to attending the funeral, this same person will have his own altruistic ideology either for his going or for his staying away. He will probably not admit, even to himself, the self-interest considerations which determine his decision.

In some instances the difference between the ideological justification and the actual reasons for a formal situation is not great. Such is the case when, under the pretense that it affords the student body and the president an opportunity to get acquainted, the president of a university holds a reception. No one actually gets acquainted at the modern mass version of the once-conventional reception. Many people are introduced; but the mumbled names, the fixed smiles, and the banal sentences

which are exchanged in a receiving line make no actual contribution to the establishment of friendly relationships between human beings. The reception does, however, create the fiction of acquaintanceship; and this fiction may serve as the beginning for the cultivation of actual acquaintanceship.

MEMBERSHIP

Even as the formal situation originates in individual self-interest, so the specific membership thereof is determined by self-interest factors. On the one hand, the individual or individuals who initiate the situation select those whom it seems profitable to include in the membership. On the other hand, those who are invited accept or refuse in terms of individual expediency.

The Selection of Members.—The first factor which determines the membership of a formal situation is selection by the initiator of that situation. In a regimental situation a soldier does not, of course, select those whom he will address as "Captain." All captains must be so addressed. When, however, an individual addresses an erstwhile army officer as "Captain" simply to flatter him, that individual has selected that particular officer to be a member of a formal situation. In a conventional situation, membership is generally fortuitously determined. When, however, a conventional pattern is used for ulterior purposes by an individual, that individual selects the members for the formal situation he thereby initiates; *i.e.*, he decides that this individual is one with whom it is expedient to be polite. In the institutional situation, membership is, of course, institutionally determined. When, however, a minister invites individuals who may have been born into other religious affiliations to come to his services, he is personally selecting members for those formal situations. Thus, since individual initiative operates in the selection of members for a formal situation, the determination of membership for that situation is often at variance with the procedure by which the membership of the original institutional, conventional, or regimental situation was determined.

Acceptance of Membership.—The second factor which enters into the determination of the membership of a formal situation is the willingness of those who are selected as members to participate in that situation. This, too, is largely a matter of individual

self-interest. In any given instance, various people may have various reasons for accepting membership. Those who accept an invitation to a debut may, for example, do so to enjoy the food and entertainment, to be seen mingling with the "right" people, or to avoid hurting the feelings of the hostess. Of the members of a church congregation, some will have come to enjoy the music, some to display their Sunday clothes, and some because it is good business to be seen in church. Perhaps a few will have come to worship their God.

Since the interests of those who are selected for membership in formal situations are so varied, the appeals which are used to induce them to accept membership are of many orders. The debutante may use as an appeal the promise of much champagne and an excellent dance orchestra. The minister may use as an appeal to children the promise of parties; as an appeal to adults, the prospect of a good lively show.

The Training of Members.—Since the membership of each specific formal situation is determined by momentary self-interest rather than by institutional, conventional, or regimental processes, the individuals who compose that membership are not systematically trained for their formal roles. Since the formal interaction follows a predetermined course, each member must, however, know his part reasonably well.

One factor which tends to assure that each member will know his formal role is the care which the initiator of the formal situation exercises in selecting members for that situation. The hostess at a formal party will probably limit her invitations to those individuals who are "eligible"; *i.e.*, capable of wearing the correct clothes and of conducting themselves decorously. It may, of course, be socially or economically expedient to invite some who are socially inept. If she has a choice, however, the hostess will invite only those who will know their formal roles.

Organizations which are interested in the maintenance of formal situations may provide membership training, and individuals who find it expedient to participate in some formal situations may deliberately seek out such training. Various churches provide membership training in the Sunday schools and confirmation classes. Governments provide training for diplomats who are to represent their countries at many formal functions. For the girls of our "upper classes," finishing schools

have developed to provide training in the once-conventional manners of a former aristocracy. Social secretaries, individuals who know all the formal procedures, may be hired by the inept hostess. Finally, the untrained individual who is faced with a formal situation may refer to one of the many books on etiquette which are intended for just such a predicament.⁸

All this—the selection of members, their acceptance of membership, and the modes of preparation for the prescribed formal roles—is well illustrated by the circumstances surrounding the annual presentation ceremony at the Court of St. James. This ritual was once a part of the institution of monarchical government in England. Originally, of course, eligibility for presentation was a matter of birth; and membership was therefore more or less predetermined. Originally, too, those who attended did so because this situation fit into the pattern of their lives.

Presentation at the Court of St. James is today, however, only a formal matter. The king presides because it is one of his formal duties as nominal king. The lists of those who are to be presented to him are made up by political leaders and consist of people who, for some reason, deserve to be rewarded for their services to the British empire or who can exert sufficient pressure to justify their being granted this “distinction.” Today, those who accept the royal “command” come for personal reasons, including the notoriety or prestige which in certain social circles is granted to those who can claim to know the king. Because they are probably unprepared by past experience to play the role of the aristocrat, most of those who are presented will require the assistance of a professional tutor to prepare them for the role demanded by this formal occasion.

OVERT AND COVERT ASPECTS OF INTERACTION

Like actors on a stage, the members of a formal situation play their overt roles irrespective of their covert feeling-states. In some other types of situations the individual may behave in terms of subjective realities. If the shoe hurts, it may be removed; if the trend of collective action offends, bores, or irritates, he may pick up and go home. In the formal situation, however, he adheres to his formal role, regardless of his covert feeling-states. Whatever they may actually think of her and however bored they may have become with her party, the guests at a debut will

tell a debutante that she is a lovely hostess and that her debut is a most delightful event. Whatever they may actually think, the guests at a wedding ceremony never, it would seem, respond to the minister's formal request: "Therefore if any man can show any just cause, why they may not lawfully be joined together, let him now speak, or else hereafter for ever hold his peace."

A further similarity between the members of a formal situation and the actors on a stage may be seen in the selfish motives which keep them playing their parts. The actor plays his role, however he may feel, because he wants to earn a livelihood, to secure audience approval, and to avoid the disapproval which he would suffer were he to break from his stage role. Likewise, the members of a formal situation continue to play their roles, however they may feel, because they want to secure economic advantages, to secure social position, and to avoid social disapproval. It is the very essence of formal behavior that the overt pattern of interaction serves as a cloak for the true, self-interest functions of the situation. Just as we all realize that the actors on the stage are playing their parts for money and prestige, we all realize that the members of a formal situation are playing their roles for personal reasons. We ignore the actual motives of the actors in order that we may more fully enjoy the play. We overtly ignore the ulterior motives of formal interaction because it is to our personal advantage to do so.

In addition to individual self-interest there is another factor which may operate to keep the actor playing his role and, likewise, to keep the member of a formal situation playing his. This is a sort of loyalty. In the theater, this loyalty is expressed in the traditional phrase "The show must go on." Such loyalty is not to the members of the cast, but to an abstraction—the traditions of the theater. In the formal situation, the same sort of loyalty exists. Here it is not loyalty to the specific group, but, rather, loyalty to an abstract concept—the traditions of the best people.⁹ Every member of the formal interaction may realize that it is nothing but a game, and each may feel that the game is not worth the playing. Nevertheless, all will play it to the bitter end.

LEADERSHIP

Since the pattern of a formal interaction is predetermined, both the person of the nominal leader and the scope of his leadership

are predetermined. There will be no striving for the status of nominal leader. The formal situation will, in other words, involve no overt rivalry between the members. The interaction, polarized upon the person of the nominal leader, will follow the predetermined pattern and will be unaffected by the particular interests of the members.

Beneath the orderly, systematic, overt interaction which centers around the nominal leader, there will be, however, considerable undercover rivalry. Each member of the situation will struggle covertly to secure whatever it was he came for. In all formal situations there occurs to an exceptional degree "more than meets the eye." The subtle interchange which takes place beneath the formal facade will defy description. It is so intangible that, when trying to indicate our perception of it, we usually fall back upon such statements as "The atmosphere was charged with tension." Consequently, in any formal situation there are actually two interaction patterns: the formal pattern, which may be perceived by the observer; and the subtle interchange, which can be detected only by those who are actually participating in the situation.

About all that can be said about the actual leadership of formal behavior, therefore, is that such leadership represents individual self-interests, grows out of individual initiative, and is secured by that member of the group who is most skilled in covert domination.¹⁰ The attributes which make for successful leadership in formal situations may be suggested by the cynical description of the perfect gentleman—the sort of man who begs your pardon as he stabs you in the back.

APPENDIX

1. The sociologist characterizes the tendency for some elements of social organization to change more slowly than others as social lag. For a brief analysis of this phenomenon see W.F. Ogburn's article "Social Change" (*Ency. Soc. Sci.*, 3, 330-334).

2. Mother's Day has been cynically defined as an annual ritual in which children present their mothers with gifts of flowers or candy in lieu of the letters, little kindnesses, or financial support which they have neglected to provide throughout the year. The actual origin of Mother's Day is not known; but the recent efforts of merchants to establish a Father's Day, a Brother's Day, etc., suggests that it may well have started in similar commercial efforts.

The commercial aspect of Mother's Day has been frequently attacked. C.S. Lingle writes:

"Flowers for Mothers' Day,' 'a box of candy for mother,' 'give her gloves, a hat, a dress, a handkerchief for Mothers' Day,' all these may be good business for the merchant and the telegraph company with its ready-made message; but if mothers have anything to say about it, we would rather have that money spent to outlaw war and to bring peace into a troubled world" (*Lit. Dig.*, May 21, 1932).

In the following news item the contrast between the formal observance of Mother's Day and the lack of actual attention to mothers is bitterly remarked:

"In Manhattan last week was held the annual Mother's Day luncheon of the Maternity Center Association. Cried Yale's Physiologist Thomas Wilcox Haggard: 'In this country 16,000 women give their lives every year in childbirth, and 10,000 of those deaths are needless. Meanwhile, we celebrate Mother's Day. How utterly typical of the worst of adolescent public opinion is that flower of commercialized sentiment. A rather shameful procedure that, a hypocritical gesture typical of a people who believe they can replace a deep obligation by a shallow sentimental flourish!'" (*Time*, Apr. 23, 1936.)

3. How individual interests determine the inception of formal situations is strikingly illustrated in the establishment of the "birthday" of George VI:

"Albert, the obedient Duke of York, succeeded his brother to the throne of Britain six months ago with an understanding from the British Government that henceforth his name should be George. Last week, again at the suggestion of the British Government, obedient George VI, born Dec. 14, 1895, celebrated his birthday. From now on, it was announced, the official birthday of George VI shall be June 9.

"Celebration of the King's birthday has become one of Britain's most impressive spectacles, drawing thousands of gaping tourists to London. Not the least of sanctified George V's services to his empire was the fact that he was born on June 3, when the weather is fine, when trade is apt to be dull. A king's birthday in the fog and rain of December and in the midst of the Christmas shopping rush is poor business. No reason whatever was given for choosing June 9 as George VI's birthday but the natural supposition was that weather records had been consulted" (*Time*, June 21, 1937).

4. M. Hindus (*Humanity Uprooted*, New York, Cape, Smith, 1929) and many others have pointed out that the early Bolshevik antagonism to the Greek Orthodox church was not the result of distaste for religion per se but rather a result of the fact that the church in Russia had long been an agent of the czarist government. The rapidity with which the Russian peasant broke from the church after the revolution is explained by the fact that the peasant had little truly religious reverence and had long gone through the motions of religious observance simply because he had been taught to make those motions.

The steadily falling attendance at church services, the increasing stress which is placed upon entertainment in those services, and the public criticism

of those services indicate that the Protestant churches do not now, if they ever did, play an institutional role.

The proportion of the American population on church roles—55 per cent, according to C.L. Fry (*Recent Social Trends*, Report of the President's Committee on Social Trends, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1933, 1 vol. ed., 1020)—has remained relatively constant over the past twenty-five years. Such membership is, however, largely nominal. The number of churches in the United States has steadily declined, and the attendance at those remaining is constantly dwindling. The purely formal character of much church attendance is reflected in the sharp rise in such attendance on Easter Sunday, when, obviously, this increased attendance has little to do with religious observance. People who go to church to display their new clothes are, of course, making a formality of the church service.

The increasing stress which is placed upon entertainment in the church service in an endeavor to compete successfully with the attractions of the open highway, the motion-picture theaters, the beaches, the radio, and so on is suggested by the extent to which urban churches have resorted to advertising in the newspapers. The following sermon titles appeared in the religious advertisements of the *San Francisco Chronicle*, Sept. 16, 1937: "Running Interference: One of the Football Series of Morning Sermons"; "The Fate of the Family in the Modern World"; "Mind and Body Beautified"; "The Heart's Whisper"; "Power for Living"; "Do We Want a Revival?"; "Is There Anything Impossible for God?"

The tendency for many churchmen to treat religion as a commodity to be sold in the same way as cigarettes and patent medicines are sold is described by C.W. Ferguson in "Goodwin Tries to Save the Church" (*Harper's Mag.*, June, 1934, 23-29).

The critical attitude of many modern people toward the church is revealed in the following articles:

Buck, P.S., "God Becomes a Convenience," *Forum*, September, 1936, 99-105.

Davis, J., "Capitalism and the Church," *Harper's Mag.*, January, 1937, 208-213.

Kunkle, H.R., "Cheap Religion," *Christian Century*, Oct. 28, 1936, 1423-1425.

"Methodist Money Speaks!" *Christian Century*, Aug. 14, 1935, 1029-1031.

Preston, T.H., "D.D. vs. M.D.," *Scribner's Mag.*, May, 1930, 554-559.

"Why Preach, or Listen?" *Christian Century*, Aug. 19, 1936, 1102-1103.

5. No other type of formal behavior in contemporary society has received such exhaustive study or has been the object of such devastating ridicule as the modern funeral service.

The institutional backgrounds of the modern funeral service can be secured from B.S. Puckle, *Funeral Customs* (London, Stokes, 1926).

For studies of the unreasonable financial burden which is placed upon descendants by such services and of the ways in which commercial interests exploit bereavement, see: Q.L. Dowd, *Funeral Management and Costs*

(Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1921); and J.C. Gebhart, *Funeral Costs* (New York, Putnam, 1928).

The sociopsychological aspects of the modern funeral service are touched on by H. Becker in "The Sorrow of Bereavement" (*J. Abn. and Soc. Psychol.*, 1933, 27, 391-410); and by T.D. Eliot in "Family Bereavement—A Field for Research" (*Publ. Amer. Sociol. Soc.*, 1930, 24, 114-115) and in "A Step toward the Social Psychology of Bereavement" (*J. Abn. and Soc. Psychol.*, 1933, 27, 380-390).

For an analysis of the nature of a funeral service in a large modern city and of the reason why that service can be nothing more than a painful formality for all concerned, see the article "But I'd Hate to Die There" by B. Sparkes (*Sat. Even. Post*, Apr. 24, 1937, 20-21).

See also:

Berry, J.B., "High Cost of Dying," *Read. Dig.*, November, 1936, 74.

Blanshard, P., "It Costs Money to Die," *Nation*, Dec. 19, 1928, 682.

Castle, M.J., "Decent Christian Burial," *Forum*, April, 1934, 253-255.

Fowler, B.B., "When the Ultimate Consumer Dies; Bury Yourself at Half Price," *Forum*, November, 1936, 230-232.

Harkness, S., "No More Funerals," *Scribner's Mag.*, October, 1931, 393-396.

The burial of a personage, particularly a motion-picture star, may involve a type of social interaction which is more like revelous behavior (Chap. XVIII) than it is like formal behavior. Such a burial may consist of a magnificent pageant or spectacle and may, in fact, be the occasion for a prolonged festival. Thus, the death and burial in 1926 of Rudolph Valentino generated excitement and involved pageantry not unlike that accompanying the coronation of George VI in 1937. For a description of such a burial pageant see the news item concerning Jean Harlow's funeral in *Time* (June 21, 1937).

6. The following is a partial description of the coronation ceremony of George VI:

"The silver trumpets blew and loud shrilled the choir boys: 'Vivat! Vivat Georgius Rex!' . . . and down the deep blue carpet that stretched the full length of the Abbey came George VI to his Coronation with all the pomp and panoply of a medieval ceremony more than 1,000 years old.

"It was the Middle Ages in the midst of Modern Times—arc lamps, newsreel cameras, a radio microphone hanging high above the chancel, pneumatic tubes to speed copy from the pressbox to the telegraphs downstairs. The crowd that rose in the Abbey to greet their King was aware of all this. Five months of intensive propaganda had told them what this 1937 Coronation was held for: a gorgeous and expensive pageant of the solidarity of the British Empire and the permanence of British institutions in a changing world. . . .

"Legally and technically George VI was every inch as much a King the moment after Edward's abdication was signed as he was after last week's ceremony. What went on in the Abbey was a purely religious rite sanctifying King George as a monarch, anointing him as a *persona mixta*

(half priest, half layman) and inheritor of the divine right of kings" (*Time*, May 24, 1937).

7. Although almost everyone realized that the crowning of George VI was a formal procedure which did not make him a ruler, few people publicly discussed the coronation in any but ideological terms, a fact which is remarked in the following:

"The coronation is over, the water-soaked garlands and flags are on the rubbish heap, and London workmen are cleaning up after the most expensive ceremony ever put on by the British government. . . .

"It is interesting to note that practically all American newspapers and press services played the coronation 'straight,' that is, took it at face value with all the mystical significance thrown in. One of the few American sheets—excluding magazines, of course—that did not do this was *Variety*, the theatrical newspaper, which viewed the proceeding solely as an exhibition and appraised it on its merits as such. . . . But in the main, the ceremony received unrelieved solemnity as far as reporting went." (Editorial comment in *Harper's Mag.*, July, 1937.)

8. Any pattern of behavior which is followed because "the book says so" is formal in type. As has been indicated (see note 8, appendix to Chap. V), E. Post's *Etiquette* (New York, Funk & Wagnalls, 1st ed., 1922), which sold more than half a million copies in ten years, was originally a compilation of the conventions of New York's "best people." Those who followed these conventional patterns because Mrs. Post said they were proper did so, however, with ulterior motives—to impress their friends, etc. The popularity of books of etiquette is a fair index to the decadence of conventions. Conventions are a matter of social convenience; "etiquette" is a matter of individual advantage, real or imagined. See the article "Etiquette" by A. M. Hocart (*Ency. Soc. Sci.*, 5, 615-616).

Books like *Etiquette* presumably appeal to the social climber. Recently a comparable book was brought out as a guide for those who wish to climb in the business world. See E. G. MacGibbon, *Manners in Business* (New York, Macmillan, 1936).

9. The following account, provided by a student of sociology who was taking graduate work at a certain university, suggests the tenacity with which people may cling to formal patterns:

"The university town is a small village providing few amusements. Yet there appeared to be none of the casual life to which I had been previously accustomed. Every occasion was an 'occasion.'

"Invited to my first student party, I strove to follow the local conventions. Although the party was not a big affair, there was an interchange of formal notes, invitation and acceptance, a note to the 'date,' a corsage for her, and formal clothes. I felt like a diplomat attending his first state affair.

"There was nothing spontaneous, nothing casual, about the party. Dancing was painfully decorous, and the exchange of partners was accomplished with exceeding formality. The only off note was the consumption of amazing quantities of vitriolic 'corn,' bootlegged because of local option.

"About midnight I rejoined the party after a brief absence to find that it had become an ordinary brawl. The formerly soft, modulated voices of the

girls were now shrill and loud. The courtly gentlemen were still dressed in 'tails,' but they were now just ordinary drunks. Gone was all dignity and all reserve.

"This was Saturday night, or Sunday morning, and I had a 'church date' with the girl I took to the party. I assumed that, the masks having been removed at the party, she would not expect me to keep up the dignity which I had learned to assume for a 'church date.' But going to church this Sunday was the usual staid, dressy, formal affair that it had been in the past. Most of those who had attended the party appeared, but from their behavior no one could have learned that a few hours before they had been engaged in an uninhibited, maudlin brawl. Dignity and reserve were once again in order."

10. It is evident that in some communities trial by jury, in so far as a Negro is concerned, is simply an elaborate formality. Seldom, however, do judge and prosecutor treat judicial procedure as peremptorily as they did in the case of Haywood Patterson, one of the eight Negroes involved in the notorious Scottsboro case:

"In the course of the trial he [the judge] ruled out testimony relating to Victoria Price's poor past, objected to defense procedure which the State had let pass as satisfactory, was vague about noting defense exceptions and, when the defense tried to illustrate physical details about the freight train, complained: 'It won't help anyone to see anything. It will just delay things.'

"In summation, the State asked for the death penalty, otherwise 'we might have to buckle six-shooters about our waists.' 'Don't go out and quibble over the evidence,' roared the young county prosecutor who was helping Prosecutor Knight. 'Say to yourselves: "We're tired of this job" and put it behind you. Get it done quick and protect the fair womanhood of this great State.' The defense was for the protection of womanhood, too, but also asked for 'the protection of the innocent.'

"The jury got it done fairly quickly . . ." (*Time*, Feb. 3, 1936).

PART III
RECREATIONAL TYPES OF INTERACTION

CHAPTER VIII

CONGENIAL BEHAVIOR

Predetermined patterns of interaction constitute the most socially significant part of any stable social heritage. By these patterns people meet their collective needs. Even in the stable society, however, people will have some needs which are individual in character. These needs will be satisfied in situations in which the patterns of interaction are not defined by the social heritage but are, rather, determined by the particular interests and the initiative of the situational members. These patterns, even as do those of a predetermined order, fall into a number of types of collective behavior.

Significance of Congenial Behavior.—Perhaps the most nearly universal need of an individual order is that for recreation. Many patterns of interaction arise as a consequence of individual effort to satisfy this need. Those which satisfy it directly rather than vicariously constitute what may be designated as congenial behavior. Such behavior is always an end in itself and consists of a symbolic interchange between the members of the situation.

Behavior of the congenial type is unspectacular and is, perhaps, the least complex of those types of collective behavior which arise as a consequence of individual initiative and individual needs. In the modern world, however, congenial behavior is difficult to achieve; and the lack of truly congenial situations has resulted in the appearance of many complex phenomena. Clubs and associations and games of all orders have evolved to assist the individual in his attempts to satisfy directly his needs for congeniality. The theater, the motion picture, the newspaper, the radio, and many other devices have developed to provide vicarious satisfaction of these needs. And such fugitive patterns of interaction as the fad, the fashion, and the craze have resulted from individual attempts to be congenial under conditions adverse to congeniality. In order to understand the complexities of these phenomena and their significance in modern

life, it is necessary first to understand the attributes of their prototype congenial behavior.

ORIGIN AND FUNCTION

The origin of congenial behavior and its various supplements and substitutes lies in the psychological needs of the socialized individual for play. By play is meant all behavior which is an end in itself. Adult needs for play are, of course, derived from social experience and are usually referred to as needs for recreation, a reference which implies that they are psychological in character. Ultimately, however, the needs of the individual for recreation can be traced to participation in animal play.

Animal Play.—Any attempt to explain the origins and function of animal play would undoubtedly take us into the realm of biological, physiological, and neurological factors.¹ Play behavior is evidently a direct consequence of the nature of the organism and is to be explained, in the first instance, in the same way as are the random movements of the newborn organism. All the multiparous animals—dogs, cats, pigs, bears, and so on—spend much of their infancy in what is obviously play activity. They cuff, maul, chew, tumble over, and otherwise engage in random give-and-take with their fraternal companions. Lacking such companions, they will play with anything which their actions affect. The kitten, for example, will play for long periods with nothing more responsive than a ball.

The infants of anthropoids and of human beings show the same predisposition to animal play as do the infants of the multiparous animals. Aside from the differences which are due to differences of opportunity—young apes and young humans seldom enjoy the opportunity to play with a number of siblings of the same age—and those differences which are a consequence of different body structures, the play of young anthropoids and young humans is of the same order as is that of kittens and puppies.

Psychological Need for Play.—Originally arising on the physiological level, the act of playing would seem to become habitual; and the physiological need for play, to be replaced by a psychological need therefor.

When it reaches maturity, the animal is ordinarily preoccupied with activities which are significant only as a means to an end—

self-preservation, the search for food, and so on. Thus, the adult cat stalks a bird as a means of securing food; and the bird takes to flight to avoid death. We are all aware, however, of the fact that a well-fed cat may stalk a bird and that occasionally a bird may be observed placing itself in jeopardy apparently to tease the cat by delaying resort to flight. It is, of course, impossible to be certain that the cat is stalking the bird merely for the satisfaction to be derived from the act or that the bird is deliberately delaying its flight merely to tease the cat. In this case the act of stalking and the act of flight would seem, however, to be ends in themselves—*i.e.*, play activities.

Obviously an end in itself, however, is the behavior of a mature dog in repeatedly retrieving a stick or a ball tossed by his master. Such activity satisfies no physiological wants. The satisfactions which it provides the dog are entirely psychological, and the needs for such satisfactions are derived from experience. And just as the domesticated dog may, during his experience as a puppy, acquire a psychological need for play, the adult human being may, out of his early experience, acquire a similar need.

The intensity of the need for play activities will vary between different societies and between individuals within a given society. Where small children are not permitted or encouraged to play, they do not, of course, become accustomed to—and, thus, do not develop a need for—play activities. In some societies, notably in some of the Amerindian tribes, children are discouraged from playing. Ethnologists have reported on the fact that in these societies children may be observed sitting passively in the midst of adult activity. On the other hand, the children of most Polynesian societies are so much encouraged to play activities that their adult life is characteristically frivolous. Furthermore, within any society, individual variation in the need for play activities may result from accidents of social experience. Thus the children of a given family may be put to work in field or shop the moment they are capable of doing the simplest tasks; the only child may be denied playmates; and so on. Most of the members of most societies will, however, develop needs for play outlets.

The Function of Congenial Behavior.—Although congenial behavior may have inadvertent social by-products, such as rumor and legend, its function is individual and short-run.

Originating in individual needs for play, it serves no collective needs. Since it is an end in itself, it serves no long-run purpose. The function of any congenial interaction is the immediate satisfaction of individual needs for play. In a sense, then, congenial behavior might be considered to serve the same purpose for the adult human being as the romplings of a mature dog do for that dog.

There is, however, a difference between the romplings of the dog and the congenial interactions of human beings. The mature dog satisfies his needs for recreation on the same level of behavior as does the puppy. Both the dog and the puppy use actions themselves as the basis for play. The adult human being, on the other hand, satisfies his needs for play on an entirely different level of behavior than does the infant. Whereas the infant, like the dog, uses actions as the basis for play, the adult human being talks and gestures, using symbols of actions, rather than the actions themselves.

Although the interaction in a congenial situation occurs on a symbolic level, it satisfies the need of an adult for play in the same sort of way as does the interaction of animal play.² Through the nonsymbolic give-and-take of animal play—the interchange of blows and the like—the animal satisfies his play needs. Through the symbolic give-and-take of verbal interchange, the adult human being satisfies his recreational needs. Apparently it is from the giving of blows that the puppy secures most of his satisfaction. Likewise, it is evidently in the conveying of his ideas and opinions to others that the individual secures most of his satisfaction from participation in a conversational interchange. If each participant in that interchange is to secure such satisfactions, a rotation of conversational leadership must occur. Within the limits of the situation, however, the members of a congenial situation are free to express themselves, even as the puppies are free to express themselves during play with their litter companions.

The Origin of the Situation.—The situations in which congenial behavior occurs are in no sense socially predetermined. All such situations arise as the result of individual interest and individual initiative.

The interest of a given individual in initiating a congenial situation depends upon a number of factors. No individual,

of course, is constantly interested in securing congenial satisfactions. Even the pleasuremonger will frequently interrupt his search for recreation in order to eat and sleep. For most people, interest in congenial association is subordinate to other interests and will become operative only at intervals and for relatively brief periods. Thus, only when he is free from economic concerns, the pressure of social obligations, etc., will the individual seek to initiate congenial situations. When the wash is out, the housewife may run next door for a short chat with her neighbor; during his lunch period, the laborer may move over to sit beside another; on his way home, the clerk may pause for a glass of beer and some chaff with fellow clerks.

Even when an individual is interested in initiating a congenial situation, the inception of such a situation is not assured. If that individual is a night watchman, he will want to play when most people are engaged in productive activities. If, on the other hand, that individual is a passenger on a pleasure cruise to the West Indies, his interest in congeniality is likely to coincide with similar interests on the part of ship companions. But the availability of others who are interested in congeniality does not of itself assure that the individual will initiate a congenial situation. Congenial satisfactions are not to be secured from conversation with everyone who has the time and inclination for conversation. Unless they have comparable interests, people cannot be congenial, however much their need for congeniality. The physicist will hardly enjoy a chat with a dressmaker who has no comprehension of the things which interest physicists, nor will the dressmaker enjoy a conversation with a physicist who knows nothing about dresses or their making.

Particularly in the modern world, individuals have rather specialized conversational interests. Consequently, the possibilities for congenial situations are always limited. The narrower and more unusual the interests of the individual, the more limited are his opportunities for initiating congenial situations. On a cruise to the West Indies, a society woman or a businessman would find it relatively easy to initiate congenial situations. The physicist whose interest is limited to the theory of relativity would, on the other hand, find it exceedingly difficult to initiate such situations under the same circumstances.

Thus, the inception of any congenial situation depends upon the existence of two or more individuals who are closely related in space, who have time and inclination to be congenial, and who have the comparable interests which are necessary if they are to interact congenially. Obviously, the mobility and heterogeneity of modern peoples is not conducive to the rise of congenial situations.

In addition to the purely social factors, certain factors of an environmental nature may at times operate to encourage or to preclude the rise of congenial situations. For example, rain may drive farmers from their fields and encourage them to form congenial groupings in a barn or a crossroad store. Rain may, on the other hand, prevent the formation of the congenial situations which would otherwise arise in a city park on a Sunday afternoon.

Origin of the Congenial Pattern of Interaction.—In the types of behavior discussed in the previous chapters the patterns of interaction are socially predetermined and can be understood only as a direct outgrowth of the social heritage. In any congenial situation, on the other hand, the pattern of interaction is limited by the interests of the members of the situation but is determined by fortuitous factors. It is never possible, therefore, to predict the specific topic of conversation which will be chosen or the direction which conversation on that topic will take.

The interests of the members of any given congenial situation will, of course, place rather rigid limits upon the possibilities of interaction, even as the physical limitations of musical instruments place limits on the music they will produce. We are fairly safe in predicting that a piano and a flute will not attempt a composition for the strings. Likewise, we are fairly safe in predicting that a group of women around the tea table will not discuss the art of fly casting and that their husbands who are gathered in the local bar will not debate the culinary advantages of pressure cookers. But what either group will discuss cannot be predicted from knowledge of what they will not discuss, any more than what the piano and flute will play can be deduced from knowledge of what they will not play.

All that can be predicted about the pattern of interaction is that it will involve some sort of discussion about some one or a number of the mutual interests of the members of the situation.

Thus, it may be spirited debate on some specific political, economic, or religious issue; critical expression of opinion about some mutual acquaintance; desultory crosstalk about the weather; an exchange of data on personal health; and so on and on.

The process of give-and-take, as we shall see, mechanically limits the pattern of the congenial interaction. But the origins of that pattern and the directions it will take are as unascertainable as are the forces which affect the movements of a falling leaf. The students of rhetoric have tried to find a logic in conversation, but to no avail. The logical conversation is, it may be categorically stated, not a congenial one.

IDEOLOGIES

Ordinarily congenial behavior is not provided with any ideological justification. Perhaps a mother may excuse her son's preoccupation with play activities by the stock phrase "All work and no play makes Jack a dull boy." But so far as the boy is concerned, play needs no such excuse. Since he enjoys playing and is in no way restrained from playing, he will not question the desirability of play nor offer explanations for playing. Likewise, when the participants in congenial behavior can indulge in that behavior for its own sake, the desirability of that behavior is never questioned. It is behavior which is an end in itself and is recognized and accepted as such.

Disguised Congenial Behavior.—When, however, extraneous ideologies preclude indulgence in activities for their own sake, such activities, if they exist, will be surrounded by an ideological aura which justifies them on the grounds that they are purposeful. Thus, if people who believe, for social or individual reasons, that all action must be productive action are to engage in congenial behavior, the true nature of that behavior must be disguised by supplementing it with some activity which has, or seems to have, productive value.³

It should be observed, however, that when congenial behavior is so disguised by ideological justification, such justification is never a social incentive to participation. It is merely an ideological means by which those who want to participate in congenial behavior can circumvent inhibiting ideologies.

The ideologies which necessitate disguising congenial behavior may be common to all the members of a society. If this is the case, those who profess to be working while they are actually enjoying congenial companionship are not, perhaps, aware of the fact that the work is but a justification for play. American women of the Calvinistic tradition used to find permissible congeniality at quilting bees, where under the auspices of the church they sat around a quilting frame and gossiped. Occasionally, no doubt, a quilt was finished and sent off to cover the poor, naked heathen; but these quilts were a comparatively irrelevant by-product of the behavior of the group.

The disguise for congenial behavior may sometimes be one which is individually advantageous. The classical Chinese considered work a burden to be avoided if possible. It was, nevertheless, to the personal advantage of some individuals to maintain a reputation for diligence. Since the middle-class Chinese matriarch set an example for her daughters-in-law, it was inexpedient for her to admit that she was wasting precious hours in play. Consequently, she disguised that play by assuming great concern for the role which the gods were playing in the welfare of her family. To study and, if possible, influence the gods, she could spend much time in the temple with the gods—and with congenial friends who were doing likewise on behalf of their families.

MEMBERSHIP

The membership of a congenial situation is in no sense socially predetermined. It is, as we have seen, limited by both social and environmental factors. Within those limits, however, the membership is determined by individual initiative. In any given instance, the membership is at once self-elected and group-selected.

Process of Membership Determination.—The twofold process by which the membership of a congenial group is determined may be most clearly seen in the addition of new members to a group which is already formed. In the first instance, membership is a matter of individual self-election. The mere presence of a congenial group does not, as we have seen, mean that an individual will elect himself to membership. Thus, a passenger on a boat may, feeling no need for congenial associations, remain

leaning against the rail and gazing dreamily at the moonbeams on the water while other passengers laugh and talk. On the other hand, a passenger who feels the need for congenial association may avoid a group of women whose conversation is far removed from his interests. Only when the congenial group promises to satisfy his particular congenial needs will he seek to elect himself to membership in that group.

The fact that an individual has elected to join an established congenial group does not of itself, however, assure his being accepted as a member therein.⁴ The members of the group always exercise the power of selecting or rejecting new members. Thus, the stranger who would like to be friendly may be rebuffed by a cold stare; or the acquaintance who seeks to elect himself to membership may be rudely ignored or thoughtfully evaded.

Aside from the fact that individuals may deliberately reject the stranger or the uncongenial acquaintance, there is a rather automatic limitation upon the acceptance of new members. When a congenial interaction has got under way, the situational membership tends to become self-sufficient; and the intrusion of a new individual may be resented. We are all familiar with the plight of the individual who flutters around the edges of a "closed" congenial group. Individually, the members of this situation may be friendly; but collectively they resist the efforts of the newcomer. The reason is not difficult to find. The introduction of an individual into an established congenial group may result in a complete disruption of the interaction pattern. It is, for example, a common experience to find, after being accorded a welcome by an animated group of friends, that conversation languishes and the group gradually breaks up. Once established, an interaction pattern is disturbed by the introduction of any new factor; and a new member to the situation is, of course, a new factor which cannot be ignored.

Basis for the Determination of Situational Membership.—In any large social gathering in which the membership is heterogeneous, individuals tend to sort themselves, on the basis of compatibility, into small congenial groups. This tendency is clearly illustrated in the sorting of the congregation of an old-fashioned rural church after the service into a number of more or less independent congenial groups. During the service, the people usually sat together as family units; and the congregation

interacted as a whole. Outside the church, the congregation reassorted itself into a number of small congenial groups, based upon commonness of interests in recreational activities. Thus, the younger boys and girls formed active play groups; the young men joined one another in self-conscious conversation; the young women did likewise at a distance; the matrons gathered together in one place; their husbands assembled in another; and so on. Each such group was composed of individuals who had wanted to join the others and who had been accepted by all the others.

In stable societies, the sorting of heterogeneous groups into congenial units is in terms of social status, age, and sex. These factors are, however, simply a reflection of the fact that each such group has similar interests, attitudes, and so on. A generation or so ago, for example, most adult women were primarily interested in domestic activities; and most adult men were interested in activities of a nondomestic order. These differences in interests made for few congenial interactions between the sexes. Today, in contrast, few such differences in interests exist between the sexes.⁵ As a consequence, sex is now less likely to be the basis for sorting into congenial groupings.

OVERT AND COVERT ASPECTS OF INTERACTION

The satisfactions which are secured from participation in a congenial situation are in considerable measure a consequence of the fact that in such a situation, as in few other social circumstances, the individual may freely express his covert feeling-states. This does not mean, of course, that the overt and covert aspects of his behavior are identical.

In the first place, that part of his overt behavior which enters into the congenial interaction is entirely symbolic. During the course of the interaction he may, obviously, behave overtly in nonsymbolic ways. Thus, he may light his pipe or sip his drink during the course of a conversation. In the disguised congenial situation, the members may sew on a quilt or otherwise occupy their hands in productive work. But all this overt nonsymbolic behavior is irrelevant to the interaction itself. That part of the overt behavior of a man in a congenial situation which enters into the congenial interaction is entirely symbolic; *i.e.*, it is limited to words and gestures.

His covert feeling-states, on the other hand, may not be limited to symbolic feelings but may include such nonsymbolic elements as hunger, thirst, rage, etc. In any given instance, his covert feeling-states may, therefore, be of a nonsymbolic order. Thus, the feeling that he wants to punch a certain policeman in the nose is a nonsymbolic feeling which, even in a congenial situation, he will express only symbolically. He will talk about wanting to hit the policeman; obviously, he cannot actually hit a policeman who is not there. In that he can symbolically express his covert feeling-states, however, the overt and covert aspects of his behavior approach unity.

Unless the overt and covert aspects of the behavior of an individual are comparable, the situation will not be congenial in type. In the presence of the policeman whom he wants to hit on the nose, the man will be restrained by ulterior considerations from expressing his covert feeling-states, even symbolically. Obviously, if he has any regard for ultimate consequences, he can neither punch the policeman in the nose nor tell the policeman that he should like to. Such a situation is in no wise congenial.

LEADERSHIP

Leadership in the congenial situation consists in securing the attention of the other members, determining the interest of the group, and expressing oneself thereon. Such leadership usually consists in telling a story about some event of mutual interest, in expressing an opinion on some topic or other, or in describing more or less dramatically some object, person, or some covert feeling-state. In some instances, however, the act of asking a question may in itself constitute leadership, however transitory.

The satisfactions of participation in a congenial situation usually come from exerting leadership. It is not, of course, universally true that human beings prefer talking to listening. As a member of an audience, an individual may prefer listening; but the satisfactions which are derived from listening to a speaker are of a different order than are those which are secured through membership in congenial situations. Moreover, individuals vary considerably in the intensity and character of their desire for leadership in congenial situations. Some would seem more or less consistently to prefer listening to

talking. Some seem to have an almost insatiable desire for the attention of and control over others. Under most circumstances, however, most human beings would seem to derive a rather mild satisfaction from the conversational leadership of a congenial situation.

Mild Rivalry for Leadership.—Since each of the members of a congenial situation will usually desire the satisfactions to be derived from leadership, the desire of each is in opposition to the desires of all the other members. Consequently, a mild rivalry for leadership ordinarily occurs in the congenial situation. Sometimes, of course, some individuals secure considerable congenial satisfaction from a “companionable silence.” In such a situation, interaction is reduced to a minimum; and rivalry is so subtle that it defies analysis. Ordinarily, however, rivalry for leadership is clearly evident.

Mechanical Limitation on Rivalry for Leadership.—The very nature of the congenial situation normally limits this rivalry. If the situation is to continue as a congenial one, each member must secure his turn at leadership. Otherwise he will move on in search of more congenial association, even as a child who is thwarted by his playmates from asserting himself will pick up his toys and go home. If any member of the group usurps and holds leadership, the other members will become restive and will lose interest in membership. This sort of thing happens when someone persists in telling a long-winded story, to the end that he soon has no one to listen to him. It is necessary, therefore, that the leadership of a congenial situation shift frequently and in a random way among the various members. Rivalry for leadership is, thus, mechanically limited.

In any given situation, of course, exceptional skill at leadership may make it possible for one member to hold the role of leader for a disproportionate time. A skilled *raconteur*, for example, may gain and hold the attention of the members of a congenial situation. When this sort of thing happens, however, the situation shifts in type, becoming less a congenial situation and more an audience. The “life of the party” is not so much a conversationalist as a showman, and the “party” he leads will have more of the attributes of an audience than of a congenial group. As a matter of fact, the most appreciated member of a truly congenial group is not the one who is skilled at conversational

leadership but the one who is skilled in the arts of listening. It is because the function of the congenial situation is to provide each member with an opportunity for being leader that the art of being a conversationalist consists mainly in the art of giving others an opportunity to speak.

VARIANTS OF CONGENIAL BEHAVIOR

Throughout the foregoing discussion attention has been focused on the characteristics of truly congenial behavior. Under stable social conditions such behavior was the typical means of securing recreational satisfactions. Under the dynamic conditions of modern life, social circumstances and individual peculiarities frequently make it necessary for those who are interested in recreational satisfactions to seek them in and secure them from situations which are either substitutes for or variants of congenial situations.⁶ The remainder of the chapter will, therefore, be devoted to a consideration of those variants which most nearly approach the truly congenial type of behavior.

Community Disorganization and Congenial Behavior.—Under stable conditions, the social structure was such that the individual had many opportunities to satisfy his needs for play in casual congenial situations. His leisure hours were certain to coincide with the leisure periods of many who shared his interests and could provide him with congenial outlets. Even his working hours permitted congenial opportunities. The workman at his bench paused frequently to converse with fellow workmen. The old-fashioned merchant gossiped with his customers, who were also his friends and acquaintances.⁷ Since work and play were mingled in the older societies, a special time and specialized activities for the satisfaction of recreational needs were unnecessary.

In the modern world, the disorganization of community life has brought about an almost complete separation of work from play. As a result, the individual must secure all his recreational satisfactions during his leisure hours. The same factors of disorganization have, however, made it increasingly difficult for him to secure these satisfactions through casual congenial situations.

In the first place, the population of a modern community is exceedingly heterogeneous. In the community where a man

spends his leisure hours, there will, as a consequence, be relatively few individuals who have compatible interests, attitudes, values, and so on.⁸ Exceptions are not, of course, lacking. The small town of today retains much of the neighborliness of another day, although the forces of social change—symbolized by the automobile and the motion picture—have done much of their disruptive work. And the city tenement even now has some community character. But by and large the modern man is likely to find few congenial companions within his community. His business associates may have nothing in common with him but the fact that they work for the same establishment; his neighbors, little except the fact that they live in the same area; his relatives, little other than the fact that they have a common ancestry. And his wife may be no better off. She may find enjoyable an occasional conversation with the woman in the next apartment; they will have in common at least the fact that they pay rent to the same landlord. But aside from this, their interests, ambitions, ideals, and values may represent opposite social poles.

Moreover, the mobility of modern peoples makes it difficult for the individual to develop congenial associations. This difficulty results in a great deal of conscious and deliberate seeking for congenial companions. The hobo drifts from jungle to jungle, in each finding satisfaction for his need for congeniality, as well as other things. The college student roams through his dormitory in search of a "bull session" or goes to the student restaurant ostensibly for coffee but primarily to secure companionship. The traveling salesman hunts up a poker game; and the lonesome and inept traveler tries to strike up an acquaintanceship with barber, bellhop, or washroom porter. Satisfying companionships cannot, however, be developed in a day.

Furthermore, the daily life of the modern individual is patterned by the clock and is not subject to variation in terms of the availability of congenial companions. An individual may find that his periods of leisure do not coincide with those of people with whom he is congenial.

Finally, even when their periods of leisure do coincide, those who are congenial may be separated by such distances that deliberate planning is necessary before they can hope to come together.

ARRANGED CONGENIAL SITUATIONS

Thus, for a variety of reasons related to community disorganization, the modern man must not only seek out congenial companions in the mass of the general population, but must, when he finds them, arrange with them for meetings at stated places and times. Such meetings are arranged congenial situations, the best substitutes for casual congenial situations which are possible under modern circumstances.

The Commercial Meeting Place.—The simplest method which has developed to facilitate the arrangement of congenial situations is the commercial provision of a meeting place. Such provision takes many forms: the beer garden, the café, the smoke shop, the pool hall, the rummy club, and so on. All these are places where congenial companions may foregather and where the seeker for congenial companionship may perhaps find fellow seekers. The phrase "poor man's club" has been used in reference to the old-type saloon to suggest that its primary function was the provision of opportunity for congeniality.

More complex in function is the brothel, the taxi-dance hall, and the other commercial enterprises which offer to provide congenial companionship as well as a place for congeniality. Here the stranger may perhaps secure the satisfaction of other needs than that for congenial companionship. The congenial aspect should not, however, be overlooked. To their patrons, the prostitute, the café girl, and the dime-a-dance girl may be quite as important as congenial companions as they are as outlets for sex interest.⁹

The Club.—The characteristic modern means for the arrangement of situations in which the individual can satisfy his needs for congeniality is the highly organized club.¹⁰ Although it takes many forms, the club is a group of people who are more or less selected to the end that they will be congenial, who are formally bound into membership, and who have established methods of coming together for congenial interaction. Such clubs vary greatly in respect to the size of the membership, the method of selection and election to such membership, and the mechanism for bringing members together. They may, however, be classified into two general types: the frankly recreational club, an arrangement which brings about substitutes for truly

congenial situations; and the "uplift" club, an arrangement which brings about substitutes for disguised congenial situations.

The Recreational Club.—To facilitate the rise of congenial situations, those members of a community who have a common recreational interest may band together, establish a common meeting place, and determine convenient times for such meetings. Once established, such an organization must, for self-protection, also restrict further membership to those individuals who are likely to prove congenial. Hence, membership rules, standards, and procedures for selection are established. The organization must also solve the problem of a meeting place and, perhaps, provide facilities for the enjoyment of the common recreational interests.

The predecessor to the club is the sort of relatively casual organization which is always in process of development and of dissolution in any modern community. A number of men or women or both will discover a basis for congeniality; and some one of them will point out that they should get together more often. Arrangements follow, culminating in a small local garden or bridge "club." After a few relatively casual and perhaps delightful meetings, it frequently happens that matters of individual convenience, conflicting interests, and so on reduce membership attendance and threaten dissolution.

It is at this point that some intensely motivated member may take control and organize a true club. Without such a leader, few recreational groups survive for long. Under such leadership, the club organization and activities will tend to acquire the characteristic complexities of the typical yacht, equestrian, or country club.

Such a club is never without a skillful "boss." The function of this leader is to direct the activities of the members in such a fashion that each will feel he is getting sufficient out of his membership to compensate for time, energy, and expense. This means, first, rigid selection of members to the end that the club is composed of people who are as nearly congenial as possible. Evidently it is quite impossible to obtain enough members who are sufficiently congenial that they can secure the necessary satisfactions through random give-and-take interaction. At any event, the club "boss" resorts to various devices for assuring that members will continue to be interested in the club.

The most common device is that of organizing the membership into a hierarchy. Those members who have special interests are assigned to appropriate official positions. For example, the publicity-minded member is made responsible for the reporting of club affairs. Once the hierarchy is set up, the official positions within it are used by the "boss" as incentives for membership. By rotating the presidency, vice-presidency, and other offices of the club, the man or woman who might otherwise lose interest in club membership may be encouraged to continue by the prospect, retrospect, or actuality of official rank. Such a procedure constitutes a substitute for the shifting of leadership which is characteristic of truly congenial situations. By the rotation of officers, each member is assured his turn at leadership over the club members.

The "Uplift" Club.—The difficulties which are encountered in maintaining the membership of a frankly recreational club are frequently overcome by attaching nonrecreational significance to club activities. The result is an "uplift" club which brings people together in disguised congenial situations. Thus, clubs and societies are established for the prevention of cruelty to animals, for better babies, for book reviews, for discussion of civic problems, for the promotion of welfare work, for reform of public morals, for the establishment of universal brotherhood, and so *ad infinitum*. Perhaps the most interesting of such clubs are the local "burial societies" which are common to the Negroes of the deep south.

All such clubs have some "uplift" activity which will sound interesting and attractive to a sufficient number of people to make up a club membership. "Charity," general or specific, is a favorite disguise, especially for women's clubs. "Culture," consisting of books, music, art, and even political problems, is another. "Spiritual" matters constitute a third vague category. The professed function of all such clubs is contribution to the mental, spiritual, or moral welfare, either of the members or of society at large.¹¹

The function of this professed function, however, is simply to encourage the rise of congenial associations among the members. This is not to imply that the activities of such clubs will never accomplish anything other than the satisfaction of recreational needs. But, in these activities, as in their prototype the dis-

guised congenial situation, productive work is incidental to congeniality.

The professed function promotes congenial behavior in two distinct ways. First, it provides a common interest, or an interest around which otherwise uncongenial people may gather. The diversity of modern peoples is in part manifested through diversity of interest. At best, we can group ourselves only in terms of common denominators of diverse interests. For example, even though all the members of a community who are interested in household pets were to come together, they would find their interests highly diversified. Some would prefer cats, some canaries, some goldfish. A very limited number would be able to converse satisfyingly upon any one pet. All, however, have in common an interest in pets. They might, therefore, be united in a club for the avowed purpose of preventing cruelty to animals. Likewise, no matter how diverse in other respects, a considerable number of women of our society will have in common an interest in, or a feeling that they should be interested in, charity. Upon this ground, if upon no other, they can be brought together.

Secondly, and equally important, the "uplift" program can be minutely subdivided to permit an indefinite expansion of official positions. Each office so established is a bid to the interest of club members. When such offices are surrounded with ritual and impressive symbolism, the appeal of club status may go far to offset the fact that the other members of the club are not wholly congenial.

The value of both these factors is clearly illustrated by the Masonic order, which historically has been the most successful of the "uplift" clubs.¹² Now international in scope, the Masonic order has through the years perfected the mechanism of membership selection, even to the point of training members, and has established elaborate ideologies of function, a complex hierarchy of membership status, and a mystic system of ritual and symbolism.¹³

In general, the increasing uncongeniality of modern people has necessitated the addition of further appeals to the "uplift" program. Frequently, as with the Junior League organizations in most large American cities, this appeal is the prestige which membership brings. In many instances, the appeal is to economic interests. Almost every business and professional man has

felt impelled for business reasons to join one or a number of clubs. Through such membership he expects to secure, not congenial associations, but desirable "contacts." When the majority of the members of any club are members only for ulterior reasons, the club ceases to have significance as a means of providing opportunity for the rise of congenial behavior.

MECHANIZED CONGENIAL BEHAVIOR

Congenial interaction is, as we have seen, an adult human substitute for animal play. Where it is difficult to secure congenial interaction, rules of interaction may be developed to assure common interest and to place limits upon the rise of dominating, uncongenial leadership. The result is the game, which serves as a mechanized variant of truly congenial behavior.

The Passive Game.—The most nearly congenial of passive games are those called hostess games, which make a game of conversation—solving riddles, composing limericks, playing charades, etc. Such games are often resorted to when a hostess finds that her guests are not congenial one with another. Other passive games—bridge, chess, checkers, etc.—substitute some other symbolic action for conversation; and the interaction consists largely of the manipulation of these nonverbal symbols to achieve designated ends.

Passive games are usually substitutes for congeniality. Sometimes, however, they may be no more than the overt nonsymbolic accompaniment to truly congenial interaction. Thus, congenial people may play a game of "conversational" bridge, in which the manipulation of the cards is hardly more than occupation for the hands. Usually, however, the passive game is resorted to because it provides about the only common interest which members of a group of people can find. It will be interesting, not only because it is known to all, but also because, as a game, it offers an opportunity for each member of the group to assert his mastery over the others—to have his turn at leadership.

The rules of any passive game are calculated to mechanize the shifting of leadership opportunities. In any game, each player takes his turn at taking the initiative. No one player can grasp and dominate the game situation as he might try to do in a conversation. Moreover, the scope of leadership of each player when his turn for leadership comes around is also limited by the

rules of the game. Thus, in a bridge game he may lead trumps and suffer the consequences; but he cannot decide that deuces are wild. This mechanical rotation of the opportunity for leadership and limitation on the scope of leadership prevents any one member from dominating the others and assures that each of the players will have an opportunity for some degree of leadership. In this way, each member is provided with a substitute for congenial satisfactions. Furthermore, the opportunities which each individual will have when his turn as leader comes up are in part determined by fortuitous factors. Only if he happens to have been dealt an ace can he lead it. In this way, a semblance of the random shifting of leadership which occurs in truly congenial behavior is secured. Finally, a semblance of congenial rivalry between the players is maintained by the keeping of a score and, perhaps, by the acclaim which is accorded the winner of the game.¹⁴

The Active Game.—Participation in the active game may, of course, be merely a health measure to those who feel the need for physical activity and do not satisfy it in ways incidental to ordinary life routine. For them, the game is a stimulating, hence effortless, way of obtaining exercise.

For many people, however, the active game is actually a substitute for congenial companionship. Either because they have not been trained to the adult practice of substituting symbolic self-expression for the nonsymbolic expression of childhood play or because they cannot secure adequate congenial companionship, they secure their recreational satisfactions in small or in large measure through the active game.

The active game appeals to such people in much the same way and for much the same reasons as the passive game appeals to others. Like the passive game, the active game provides a basis for congeniality—a common interest in the game; it assures the shifting of leadership; it limits the scope of leadership; and it makes leadership opportunities a consequence of luck and skill. In fact, the active game differs from the passive game only in that nonsymbolic actions are substituted for symbols of such actions.

A distinction must be drawn, however, between active games, such as tennis and golf, in which individuals compete with one another, and those, such as basketball, baseball, and hockey, in

which the competition is between groups of individuals. In the latter games, a dual process of interaction occurs: an interaction occurs between the teams, and at the same time an interaction occurs among the members of each team. Both types of interaction will have all the game attributes.

The complexity of these interactions is self-evident. Each team strives to win; at the same time each member of each team strives to equal or excel the performance of his teammates. Furthermore, each team and each member of each team is assured by the rules of the game an opportunity for leadership. Finally, the scope of leadership is in part a matter of individual skill and luck and in part a matter of team skill and luck.

Even as the passive game ceases to be a substitute for congenial behavior when the winning of money is the object of situational membership, the active game ceases to be a substitute when the players play for spectators rather than for the sake of the game.¹⁵ The spectator game—professional baseball, semiprofessional football, and the like—is not a game at all. It is a mode of providing satisfactions to others rather than a means of securing congenial satisfactions through participation.

APPENDIX

1. The origin of animal play has long been a favorite subject for theoretical speculation. H. Spencer (*Principles of Psychology*, New York, Appleton, 1910, 534) advanced the idea that play was an aimless dissipation of surplus animal energy. Many students have followed this lead. See, for example, A.E. Wood, *Community Problems* (New York, Century, 1928, 286–291). K. Groos (*The Play of Animals*, New York, Appleton, 1898) advanced a telic explanation which has had many followers. In this theory play has the biological function of preparing the animal for adult life. Other writers have advanced some version or other of the idea that play is the expression of a specific instinct.

For recent studies of play see E. Claparède, "Sur la Nature et la fonction du jeu" (*Arch. psychol. Genève*, 1934, 24, 350–369); E.B. Hurlock, "Experimental Investigations of Childhood Play" (*Psychol. Bull.*, 1934, 31, 47–66); and G. Murphy and L.B. Murphy, *Experimental Social Psychology* (New York, Harper, 1931, Chap. VI).

2. Most congenial interaction is verbal and occurs in direct-contact or face-to-face groups. Exceptions are, however, to be noted.

The congenial activities of professional dance-band musicians frequently take the form of "jam sessions," situations in which musicians play for the fun of playing. The principal attribute of a "jam session"—the quality which makes it definitely congenial—is that the musicians do not follow an arrangement; i.e., each musician is a free lance and contributes to the rendi-

tion of the particular composition in much the same way as any one of a group of conversationalists contributes to discussion of a particular subject. Whereas most people exchange words, the musicians exchange musical notes during a "jam session." See R. Dickerson, "Hot Music" (*Harper's Mag.*, April, 1936, 567-574).

The old-fashioned party line was often used for three-way, four-way, and more-way conversations among people who were spatially separated. An even more interesting form of distant-contact congenial interaction is the modern "conversation" between short-wave radio amateurs, or "hams," as they style themselves. Thousands of boys and men who are scattered throughout the world devote much of their leisure time to sending and receiving radio messages by continental Morse code. Some of this communication is utilitarian, and the "hams" have played a significant part in getting messages into and out of flood and other disaster regions. More of the intercommunication is chitchat. How an operator can develop a sense of intimacy with operators of stations halfway around the world is puzzling to an outsider. How an operator can identify another operator simply by the way that operator sends his messages is simply mystifying. According to W.M. Rowland (unpublished study of The American Radio Relay League): "Much of the expressiveness of speech is incorporated in the very process of code transmission. Habits of thought, mannerisms, and nervous temperament are conveyed from one operator to another unavoidably. Repartee, humor, perseverance in the face of resistance, irritation—all those characteristics which may and do creep into the process of code communication. . . . Many of the hams feel that they know distant operators better than they can ever know the man next door."

3. The camouflage of congeniality in disguised congenial behavior should not be confused with the semicongenial nature of such situations as the old-fashioned husking bee. In the former case, diligence is the excuse for congeniality; in the latter, congeniality is the by-product of and stimulus for working. In many societies, notably early rural American, collective work activities were frequently the occasion for much congeniality. Many productive tasks could be made a community affair, especially such things as shingling a barn, husking corn, or reaping grain by hand. Work of this type could not be broken down into units of labor specialization; but it could be divided into any number of equal units, such as bushels of corn, to each of which an individual or a work group could be assigned. When this was done, rivalry among the work units, supplemented by congenial banter within and among these groups, and the prospect of feasting when the day was done so interwove work and play that the former was accomplished with a minimum of tediousness.

4. The factors which are involved in the determination of the membership of congenial groups have been studied intensively by J.L. Moreno (*Who Shall Survive?*, Washington, Nervous and Mental Diseases Publishing Company, 1934), who approaches the problem in terms of attractions and repulsions rather than interests. G.A. Lundberg and M. Lawsing ("The Sociography of Some Community Relations," *Amer. Sociol. Rev.*, 1937, 2, 318-335) have endeavored to describe friendship relations by a graphic

method. R. Bogardus and P. Otto ("Social Psychology of Chums," *Sociol. and Soc. Res.*, 1936, 20, 260-270) report an attempt to measure the bases for congeniality by questionnaire. The subject of congeniality has not, however, received much intensive and persistent study.

5. That in Western societies sex differences in personality are less pronounced today than they were a century ago seems obvious. The significance, at least for congenial behavior, of the remaining differences between the sexes is not so evident. For an elaborate study of these differences see L.M. Terman and C.C. Miles, *Sex and Personality: Studies in Masculinity and Femininity* (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1936).

In some primitive societies free congenial interaction occurs between men and women; in others, little congenial interaction takes place between the sexes. See M. Mead, *Sex and Temperament* (New York, Morrow, 1935).

6. The effects of social disorganization upon recreational activities have received a great deal of attention from sociologists and social workers. Not all such attention has been in the nature of objective study, however. Much of the writing on the subject has, unfortunately, been moralistic in tone. See, for example, the many articles quoted by S.E.W. Bedford in *Readings in Urban Sociology* (New York, Appleton, 1927, 599-719). See also M.H. Neumeier and E.S. Neumeier, *Leisure and Recreation* (New York, Barnes, 1936).

G. Lundberg (*Leisure: A Suburban Study*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1934) has, with the help of many assistants, shown by a careful, factual study the difficulties which the modern urban dweller experiences in satisfying his recreational needs and his dependence upon commercial facilities and upon community-organized facilities.

A broader survey of the relationship between social disorganization and recreation, the most objective study of its kind available, is J.F. Steiner's *Americans at Play* (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1933). See also C. Delisle, *Leisure in the Modern World* (New York, Century, 1932).

7. This fact is overlooked by those who feel that the short workday of the modern worker is an evidence of social progress. It is doubtful whether the man who now works eight hours a day in shop or store enjoys life more than did the worker of fifty years ago, for whom twelve hours was a normal workday. The modern worker "concentrates" his labor; the old-time worker interspersed work with periods of play. Even today, however, the merchants of San Francisco's Chinatown play while they work. Their stores are community centers, equipped with chairs and tea bowls for any of their friends and acquaintances who would pause for a bit of recreational chatter. Under such conditions, it is no burden to spend twelve or more hours on the job.

8. For an analysis of the factors which make human relations in the modern urban community impersonal and for a résumé of the literature on the subject, see N.P. Gist and L.A. Halbert, *Urban Society* (New York, Crowell, 1933, 261-309).

9. See P.G. Cressey, *The Taxi-dance Hall* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1927); L.E. Bowman and M.W. Lambin, "Evidences of Social

Relations as Seen in Types of New York Dance Halls" (*Soc. Forc.*, 1925, 3, 287); and E. Gardner, *Public Dance Halls* (Washington, Children's Bureau Publications, No. 189, 1929).

10. R.S. Lynd and H.M. Lynd (*Middletown*, New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1929, 285) found that in 1929 a city of some 35,000 people had a total of 458 active clubs—one club for every 80 inhabitants. This figure does not include the innumerable informal bridge and other "clubs" which are often more effective, although more transitory, arrangements for securing congenial satisfactions than are formal clubs.

There appears to be a fairly direct relationship between the size of a city and the proportion of clubs relative to the total population. According to a study made for the writer, the second largest city on the Pacific coast had, in 1935, one formal club for every 62 inhabitants, whereas a town of 15,000 had but one club for every 151 inhabitants.

11. For a realistic treatment of the functions of the "uplift" clubs see C.F. Marden's *Rotary and Its Brothers* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1935) and C. Brinton's article "Clubs" (*Ency. Soc. Sci.*, 3, 573-577).

For data on club ideologies consult the official organ of any national organization or the secretary of any local club.

12. For the history and ideology of the Masonic order see F.H. Hankins' article "Masonry" (*Ency. Soc. Sci.*, 10, 177-184).

13. Although they do not play a comparable role in the social organization, modern secret societies are in many respects remarkably like the secret societies found in many primitive social systems. For descriptions of the latter see W.I. Thomas, *Primitive Behavior* (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1937, 358-416). For descriptions of the former see the relentless survey of American clubs and lodges by C.W. Ferguson, *Fifty Million Brothers* (New York, Farrar & Rinehart, 1937). For a technical analysis see N.P. Gist, "Structure and Process in Secret Societies" (*Soc. Forc.*, 1938, 16, 349-357).

The American Negro has unconsciously parodied the white fraternal organizations, as the following news item indicates:

"Just as the Ancient Arabic Order of the Nobles of the Mystic Shrine for North America has its Negro counterpart in the Ancient Egyptian Arabic Order of the Nobles of the Mystic Shrine of North and South America and Its Jurisdictions, so the Benevolent Protective Order of Elks has its black copy in the Improved Benevolent Protective Order of Elks of the World" (*Time*, Oct. 28, 1935).

14. Frequently the desirability of winning a game is symbolized by a prize. As long as the value of the prize—such as that given to the winning player of a bridge game—is mainly extrinsic rather than intrinsic, the prize simply serves as a mild stimulus to congenial rivalry among the players. But when a passive game is played, not for the fun of the game, but for material gains to be secured by winning, there is nothing congenial in the behavior. Gambling, aside, perhaps, from that for exceedingly small stakes, appeals to other than recreational interests.

15. The tremendous interest of Americans in sports does not indicate a comparable indulgence in active games. Most American interest in sports is spectator interest, rather than participant interest. The English, on the

other hand, are far more inclined to participate in active games than to treat such games as spectacles. For comments on what has been termed American "spectatoritis," see J.R. Tunis, "Nation of Onlookers?" (*Atlantic Monthly*, August, 1937, 141-150).

Furthermore, when Americans do play games, they tend to play, not for the sake of the game, but for the sake of winning. Whereas the English schoolboy thinks nothing of going into game competition with another school team, even though he is a rank amateur at that game, the American schoolboy enters game competition only when he feels equally skilled at playing. The American schoolboy, therefore, "practices" more than he "plays." See:

Reynolds, Q., "All Expenses Paid: The Amateur in Sports," *Collier's*, Aug. 18, 1934, 22.

Tunis, J.R., "Who Cares about Amateur Sport?" *Amer. Mercury*, January, 1937, 91-95.

———, "American Sports and American Life," *Nation*, June 25, 1930, 729-730.

"What Is an Amateur?" *Nation*, Oct. 1, 1930, 340.

For data on the money and time which the American people devote to active games and for evidence which suggests an increase in participant, as opposed to spectator, sports, see Steiner, *op. cit.*

CHAPTER IX

CONGENIAL BEHAVIOR: II. FUGITIVE PATTERNS

The direct and immediate consequence of participation in congenial-type situations is the satisfaction of individual needs for play. The patterns of interaction which constitute the random give-and-take of such situations have, for the most part, no further significance, either for the individual or for his society. After a pleasant evening of conversation, companions may separate, fundamentally unchanged by the experience and with nothing to show for it except a temporary glow of satisfaction. Since congenial behavior is an end in itself, there need be and there frequently are no long-run consequences.

Social By-products of Congenial Behavior.—In an entirely incidental way, however, the participant in congenial behavior may acquire or may contribute to new patterns of individual behavior. From hearing another tell a story, he may learn to tell that story. From striving to gain attention, he may devise an embellishment to that story. Neither the things he learns from participation in congenial behavior nor his contributions are in themselves of any moment, either to him or to others. The cumulative effect of many such small acquisitions and contributions by many individuals in many congenial situations may, however, be the creation and diffusion of a new and collectively significant pattern of behavior.

Fugitive Patterns of Behavior.—The patterns which thus develop as by-products of congenial behavior are fugitive in character. They are both transitory and of no particular importance in themselves. All human behavior, individual or collective, is, of course, temporal; the action begins and ends. But, as we have seen, some patterns of behavior are recurrent; they appear, disappear, and reappear over and over through time. The recurrent patterns comprise the institutions, the conventions, and the other persistent elements of the social heritage. Fugitive patterns, on the other hand, appear, spread, and disappear,

never, perhaps, to reappear in a similar way and under similar circumstances. They have, so to speak, a unique and transitory life and are not parts of the social heritage.

Occasionally, it is true, a fugitive pattern may persist and become incorporated in the social heritage. During the course of its inception, development, and diffusion among the members of society, such a pattern cannot, however, be distinguished from those which are destined to rapid disappearance.

Many patterns of human behavior are at times transitory. Riots, panics, booms, etc., may be unique. Such patterns of behavior are, however, vastly significant in themselves and cannot, therefore, be considered fugitive in character. In contrast to fugitive patterns, these transitory patterns leave their marks on social history.

Fugitive patterns of behavior are, thus, seen to be limited to those patterns of behavior which are both transitory and of little significance—those elusive patterns which constitute the rumors, fads, crazes, and fashions of contemporary life.

ORIGIN OF FUGITIVE PATTERNS

Whatever its particular character, the fugitive pattern arises in and spreads through congenial-type situations, either those of the truly congenial order or those of the disguised, the arranged, and the mechanized types. Rumors may rise and spread in any of these situations. Fads, crazes, and fashions, however, make their appearance only in those situations which are substitutes for the truly congenial type.

The fugitive pattern is a product of the rivalry for leadership which occurs in all such situations. Ordinarily, such rivalry is mild. Occasionally, however, the process of interactional amplification may stimulate an individual to creative efforts in his attempts to gain leadership of the situation.

The creative efforts which occur in a congenial-type situation are, however, always limited by the nature of that situation. In the first place, the creation must be made then and there. A man cannot retire to his study or workshop to emerge ten years later with a new philosophic idea or a new machine for peeling potatoes. What he invents will, therefore, be but a trivial modification of a trivial element of current behavior.

In the second place, his invention, if it is to give him temporary leadership over his companions, must appeal to situational interests. Even though he should, perchance, discover on the spur of the moment a solution to a puzzling mathematical problem, such a discovery is unlikely to be an effective bid for congenial leadership. He must create something which will be interest-arousing to his companions. They are present because of an interest in congeniality; and a discourse upon some abstruse mathematical problem is hardly congenial, however informative.

Consequently, to be successful in securing leadership when rivalry for leadership is relatively intense, the individual must invent something at the moment and appropriate to the moment. Thus, under some circumstances, a new slang word may be ideal; it may arouse a laugh, break the pattern of conversation, and turn attention to the innovator.

A fugitive pattern originates somewhere in someone's bid for congenial leadership. As it spreads, however, it gathers embellishments. Other individuals under the stimulation of rivalry for leadership add their little contributions. In the end, therefore, the fugitive pattern is likely to be the synthesis of a great many individual creations.

Few people can, however, rise to the moment and create a new use for an old word, a fresh and interesting topic of conversation, or a new way of discoursing about an old topic. However trivial the new element which goes to make up a fugitive pattern, the creation of such an element is evidently beyond the capabilities of most members of congenial-type situations. The tendency is, therefore, for those who strive for leadership to rely upon past inventions—*i.e.*, to use as a leadership bid a device which has been used by somebody else in another congenial-type situation. This tendency is apparent in the use of a joke, slang word, or other conversational item with the stop-me-if-you've-heard-it air. The speaker who repeats such innovations is not adding to the development of a fugitive pattern. He may, however, be diffusing an element of such a pattern to others who can subsequently add new elements. Thus, although he himself is not an innovator, he does help to give the fugitive pattern its widespread character and to contribute to its eventual disappearance.

RUMOR

Perhaps the most common, certainly the most nearly universal, attention-getting device which is used in the truly congenial situation is that of telling a dramatic story about somebody or something. When leadership takes this form, the congenial situation becomes momentarily akin to the audience. Such a leader is, however, always in danger of losing his "audience." Unlike the leader of a true audience, he does not have assured leadership status. In order to be successful, he must, therefore, tell his story quickly. Since he has not time to arouse interest in the subject of the story, this subject must of necessity be a person or a thing which is already interesting to the members of the situation. The efforts of many individuals over the course of many congenial situations to tell such a story leads to the rise and spread of the rumor story.

The Rumor Story.—The rumor story itself is not significant. It is the process by which such stories develop, spread, and influence the nonsymbolic behavior of individuals that is our primary concern. In order to understand the rumor process, we must, however, first analyze the nature of the rumor story.

The rumor story may be based upon fact, but it never is a factual account. It invariably distorts and exaggerates its factual beginnings. The story will not, however, do violence to generally known facts. Furthermore, if, as is usual, it is a story concerning people, those people will be known in person or by repute to those among whom the story circulates.¹ Moreover, whether it is a story concerning people, animals, or inanimate objects, it will contain all the dramatic elements and will follow the dramatic pattern. Finally, although these generalizations can be drawn concerning the structure of a rumor story, the reason why a given story has risen, developed, and spread is quite unascertainable. In the fullest sense, the rumor story is a fugitive pattern.

The Rumor Process.—The rumor process operates within definite limits, but it is entirely uncontrollable within those limits. Political and commercial interests have frequently tried to control rumor to their own ends.² As often as not, however, a rumor story which is deliberately fabricated in praise

of a political figure or of a commercial product fails to spread or else comes back damning that figure or that product. Likewise, efforts to check rumor stories are just as likely to encourage as to discourage their rise and spread.

Except for those which are told with deliberate intent, rumor stories, as do all other fugitive patterns, arise as a consequence of a bid for leadership in situations with attributes of congeniality. When the members of a congenial situation have exhausted their interest in commonplace chitchat, rivalry for leadership tends to take the form of "gossip." This is simply the telling of unusual items about persons or things known to the group. If the conversational interchange, by the process of interactional amplification, sufficiently intensifies the desires of the various members to secure leadership, each member will endeavor to tell a more striking story than did his predecessor. This effort leads him to creative endeavor. Perhaps he only adds a new detail or a new interpretation to what has already been said. Or he may, if he is sufficiently original, tell a completely new story about the person or thing under discussion.

The story which is in this way made the common property of the members of this particular situation may then be used by any one of them as a bid for leadership in subsequent situations. It will, however, be distorted by memory, supplemented by individual bias, and perhaps elaborated in the retelling to make it still more effective.³ Thus, in the act of spreading, the story grows and changes in detail. Having passed through the mechanism of a number of congenial situations, the original item may be quite unrecognizable.

As the story is developed, it is also made increasingly dramatic; for, as we have seen, the effectiveness of any conversational topic is largely dependent upon the dramatization of that topic. Almost any new item about the experiences of a mutual friend will be interesting. If, however, an item is no longer new or if it is to be used as an appeal to the interest of people who are not intimately concerned with the person to whom the item pertains, that item must be dressed up with all the trappings of the true drama. It must have its hero, heroine, villain, their conflict, and the element of suspense as to the outcome of that conflict.

Among the things which the rumor process invariably contributes to the rumor story is authenticity. This comes about

by the attributing of the origin of the story to one whose veracity cannot be questioned and whose opportunity to know cannot easily be doubted. An impression or a suspicion about a mutual friend may be interesting conversational material. If an impression or a suspicion about someone known only by name is to circulate, it must acquire not only dramatic form but authenticity as well. We are not inclined to be interested in an event vaguely reputed to have happened to somebody known only by name; but, if the story is reported to have come directly from an authoritative source, it is more credible and, hence, more likely to receive attention.

Many versions of a story will be in circulation at any one time. From these different versions, the most credible and entertaining elements are selected to make a standard story. Ordinarily, it is at this point in the rumor process that the story begins to languish and disappear. For, once most members of a community know that standard version, the story ceases to be an effective bid for leadership in congenial situations.

Rumor and Reputation.—Since the initiative of many individuals will be involved in the development of the story, that development is necessarily a matter of fortuitous factors. Rumors do not, however, run wild; the rumor process is highly selective. Each story tends more to reflect what people already believe than it does to contribute to the formation of that belief. That which will be interesting must be reasonably credible; consequently, it must not do violence to previous knowledge or belief. A scandalous tale about a beloved member of a community will immediately be discounted. A story casting the local Scrooge in the light of a public benefactor will gain little currency. If a story is not credible, it will be ignored or contradicted or, perhaps, attached to persons of appropriate community status. In general, then, it may be said that damaging rumors are attached to people whose reputations are already, justly or unjustly, damaged; and vice versa. A sort of loose social control is, thus, exercised over the development of the rumor.

Rate of Spread.—Rumors are often described as spreading like the wind, and even sober students have asserted that there is involved in the spread of a rumor something unfathomable which permits rumors to spread faster than the speed of known

means of communication. Stories indicating an almost instantaneous transfer of rumor from one side of the country to the other are not lacking; but these stories, like the stories said to spread so rapidly, are themselves rumors and are not to be taken as evidence.

The spread of rumor depends upon a multitude of circumstances. Never, however, does the rumor story spread at a rate greater than the travel speed of the people who carry it. In these days of airplane transportation, it is quite possible for a rumor which originates in Wall Street to reach San Francisco before it finally gets into the New York office of the *Wall Street Journal*. A San Francisco correspondent might well, therefore, inquire by wire of the editor of that journal concerning this rumor before the latter had heard of it. This sort of thing is responsible for the aura of mysticism which surrounds the rumor process.

Rumor as a Substitute for Knowledge.—In those times of social crisis when significant events are transpiring and when the normal channels of communication are disrupted, suspected of being censored, or otherwise disturbed, rumors become a substitute for knowledge.⁴ Heightened interest in and lessened means of ascertaining distant events make for many rumor stories. Speculations and expressions of opinion or hope will quickly become metamorphosed into highly "authentic" and dramatic accounts of those distant events. The moment that war is declared, for example, the people of the belligerents immediately proceed to discount their usual news sources—and not without good reason—and to become dependent for their knowledge of what is happening outside their immediate range of observation upon the rumors which sweep helter-skelter up and down the land. Likewise, in every period of social crisis, a tangled maze of conflicting rumors spreads within the crisis area and from it to the outside world.

The Legend.—Most rumor stories are of transitory interest. Some, however, because they are effective bids for the attention of strangers to a community or for the attention of children in the community, persist as legends. The legend is, thus, a rumor story which has ceased to be fugitive and has become a fixed part of the social heritage. It is a story which, like other parts of the social heritage, spreads down through the genera-

tions, rather than among the contemporary membership of the society.

Legends may or may not be based upon fact. They are, however, always neat little dramas concerning the origins of points of interest in the physical environment, the origins of local customs, the early experiences of local characters, or the like.

In the stable community, legends generate slowly and gain their perfected form only after a generation or two. In those communities, such as the college campus, which have a rapid turnover of population, however, legends become established with great rapidity. This year's rumors may be next year's legends.⁵

MODERN SUPPLEMENTS TO RUMOR

Since the members of a truly congenial group are selected in terms of commonness of interests, similarity of social background, and ability to converse and derive satisfaction therefrom, it is unnecessary for any member to break into song or to stand on his head to attract the attention of his fellows. The child among adults might find one or the other of these devices an expedient method of securing recognition. In the truly congenial situation, however, the most effective means of gaining attention is through contributing to the rise and spread of a rumor story.

The stories which rise and spread through congenial situations may be in constant flux; but, in the settled society in which such situations occur, other aspects of behavior are quite stable and follow time-sanctioned patterns which are little subject to modification by individual initiative. Although the individual who strives for leadership in the truly congenial situation may modify an old story or design a new one, he will not become creative in regard to other aspects of behavior. In the first place, there is no need for him to apply himself to creative endeavor outside the scope of the purely conversational; in the second place, the social conservatism of his companions will not permit his securing favorable attention through such devices. Under conditions of social stability, rumor is, therefore, the principal form of fugitive behavior which makes its appearance.

Exhibitionism as a Leadership Device.—It has frequently been remarked that the art of conversation is today decadent.

This is but a way of saying that the truly congenial type of situation appears with comparative infrequency in contemporary society. As we have seen, the possibilities of participating in truly congenial situations have declined with the rise of modern modes of life. Modern society is highly impersonal. The truly congenial friends of an individual may be few and may be infrequently encountered. The modern man is, therefore, forced to secure many of his congenial satisfactions through gaining the attention of strangers and acquaintances.

It has also been remarked that modern people tend to be exhibitionists. This is but a way of describing the fact that, in order to secure the attention of strangers and acquaintances, the modern individual often resorts to bizarre forms of behavior which are comparable to the child's standing on his head to attract the attention of disinterested adults.⁶ These bizarre forms of behavior constitute the fads, crazes, and fashions which are so characteristic of contemporary life.

The process by which fads, crazes, and fashions rise, develop, and spread is comparable to that by which rumors rise, develop, and spread.⁷ Except for the facts that different aspects of behavior are involved and that this behavior may have intrinsic as well as extrinsic value, such fugitive patterns might be considered as the counterparts of rumor. In the modern world fads, crazes, and fashions supplement rumors and in large measure substitute for them.

Limitations upon the Rise of Fugitive Patterns.—In congenial and congenial-like situations, any innovation has for the innovator only extrinsic utility. That is, only in so far as the innovation—whether it be an act, an article, a word, an idea, or a story—secures the favorable attention of the other members of the situation is it of value to the one who invents it.⁸ Whether or not that innovation has intrinsic value as well is beside the point. For example, whether or not the hat makes a good covering for the head is irrelevant; as long as it serves as an effective bid for attention, it has extrinsic value to the wearer.

No innovation which conflicts with established intrinsic values—*i.e.*, with basic sentiments and attitudes—will, however, have extrinsic value in congenial-like situations. Even as the *raconteur* cannot successfully tell a story which is contrary to prevailing belief, the modern exhibitionist cannot secure favorable

attention by doing that which conflicts with and affronts the sentiments, attitudes, and so on of his associates.

These sentiments and attitudes reflect established intrinsic values which change only as the social system disintegrates. The rapid innovations which lead to fugitive patterns cannot, therefore, develop in the fundamental sentiments and attitudes of social life. Although for some people religious beliefs may be a matter of craze, they are for most people a basic inheritance from the past. Although for some few people the pattern of marriage is a question of fashion, for most of us marriage is still something to be viewed in terms of a tenacious ideal.

Fads, crazes, and fashions are, thus, restricted to the less socially significant phases of social life and within those phases are limited by the basic sentiments and attitudes of the social system. The extent of these fugitive patterns would seem, therefore, to reveal the degree of social disorganization rather than to constitute a cause of that disorganization.

THE FAD

Those strivings for leadership in congenial-like situations which take the form of minor deviations from normal behavior and which can be adopted by others with little effort and at little or no financial cost may become fads.

The fad is more closely related to rumor than is either the craze or the fashion. It involves only a slight innovation; it is never a preoccupation for those who take it over; and it does not require authenticity. Although some few fads cease to be fugitive patterns and settle down to persistent life, the vast majority disappear once they have become the common property of the members of society. As a consequence, fads come and go in rapid succession and in utter confusion.

Faddy Aspects of Contemporary Behavior.—Language usages are always susceptible to slow modification, and no language is ever entirely static. The exceedingly dynamic character of modern languages is, however, evidently a reflection of social circumstances which are peculiar to modern societies. In part, this dynamic character of modern languages is a consequence of adaptation needs; *i.e.*, social and technological changes make changes in our symbolic systems imperative. In a larger measure, however, changes in modern languages are simply a

consequence of individual strivings for leadership in congenial-like situations. Such changes are of the fad order; *i.e.*, they are random and irresponsible shifts in word meaning and word structure.⁹ Although academic English may remain fairly stable through the years, colloquial English is so dynamic that it was once a fad to call it the "English slanguage."

Just as word usages may be fugitive, so, too, may gesture symbols. We have a more or less standardized language of gestures—the raised eyebrow, the shrug, the frown, the smile, etc. Occasionally, however, some simple and easily controllable action will gain specific meaning as a gesture and will be used as such for a while, only to disappear.¹⁰ Early in the "speak-easy" days of the 1920's, for example, it was the fad with some people to suggest the act of taking an illegal drink by lifting one foot as though to place it upon a bar rail.

Dress fads are a commonplace, particularly with Americans. Only those articles of dress which can be changed quite cheaply will, of course, be subject to fad. Thus, while styles in dresses and suits change rather slowly, ornaments, hats, and the like may be very faddy. It may be "the thing" for women to wear green or gold nail polish one month and "bad taste" to do so the next. Men may wear a bit of feather in the hatband—Alpine fashion—one month and discard it the next. In general, it may be said that women's dress is more subject to fad changes than is men's and that adolescents are more interested in the latest fads than are their more stable elders.

Belonging to the same category as dress fads are those which involve the purchase and, possibly, the use of some "gadget." Even when these devices have utilitarian virtues, their first popularity is a fad matter. Fireless cookers, egg boilers, electric mixers, ricers, cigarette lighters, electric razors, etc., have all been fads at one time or another.

Of recent years food usages have become increasingly faddy. Most people, no doubt, continue to eat the traditional foods prepared in the traditional ways. Some, however, seem to be more dependent for their nourishment on the "latest" foods and the "latest" manners of consuming them than upon a stable diet.¹¹ To mention but a fraction of the many foods which have been faddy during the last few years, there have been "Bulgarian milk," yeast, raw carrots, spinach, raisins, and bran. Among

the diets, reducing and otherwise, which have been fads are the pineapple-and-cottage-cheese diet and the milk-and-banana diet. Even methods of eating—*e.g.*, Fletcherizing—have been fads. Some individuals have so wholeheartedly devoted themselves to the latest food fads that the term “food faddist” has come into use to describe them.

Although some music is classical and is, therefore, highly stable, that which appeals to the masses of modern people is very faddy. A number of highly popular dance tunes are always current, but few are popular for long. Most dance tunes steadily gain popularity during the course of the first month or so, then hold a position of high esteem for a month or so, and then start the swift decline to total oblivion.¹² There seems to be some relationship between the life span of a tune and the rapidity of its rise and intensity of its popularity. That tune which bursts into popularity usually drops right out again. Occasionally, however, a tune is more a craze than a fad; *i.e.*, it becomes a preoccupation. Such, certainly, was the case with the historic *Yes, We Have No Bananas* and the later *The Music Goes 'Round and Around*.¹³

Just as dance music undergoes fad changes, so, too, may the pattern of the dance.¹⁴ Most dancers, no doubt, follow a rather fixed dancing style year after year. Some, however, particularly the “younger set,” are apt to follow—quite literally—the latest fad in dancing. Such fads are likely to be very short-lived. Some rise to such frenzied, although brief and limited, popularity that they become a craze. Such was the case with the “Shimmy,” the “Charleston,” and the “Black Bottom” of a generation ago and the more recent “Big Apple.”

As an Innovation.—Although it is quite impossible to predict the directions which tomorrow’s fads will take, we can be confident that they will consist of nothing more than slightly new versions of old cultural elements.¹⁵ The faddy word is usually an old word used in a peculiar way; the latest food fad is likely to be a commonplace food raised to a relatively new dietary status; the newest thing in dress ornament is probably only an old one given a new quirk; the popular tune is almost always a new version of a traditional air; the best seller is probably the story of Cinderella, or some other hardy perennial, in a new setting.

Although modern people may eagerly seek the "new and unusual," actually the new and unusual must not be too new or too unusual. In the fugitive phases of their behavior modern people are only a little less conservative than they are in other regards. They rather consistently prefer the familiar to the strange. Even American youth is, in its way, conservative regarding the dance music it finds acceptable. The result is that only the initiated can distinguish between the latest popular tune and the one whose place it has usurped. Moreover, even though the new tune is but a slightly new synthesis of old musical elements, it must be made familiar before it will be demanded of dance orchestras. This need to make the new tune familiar is the basis for the standard commercial practice of "plugging"—*i.e.*, thrusting the tune upon music audiences in the hope that they will learn to like and demand it.

Authenticity.—The origin of any given fad is quite unimportant and is quickly lost sight of. Unlike the rumor, the value of the fad as a device for gaining attention is not dependent upon its authenticity. Comedian Eddie Cantor may deliver a catchy verbal quip over the radio; but those who use that quip the next day and subsequent days are unlikely to feel that it will be more attention-getting if it is prefaced by "As Cantor says . . ." Those who wear the green nail polish or follow the new dance step will not find such fads more effective as bids for attention if they are "sponsored" by Jessie Matthews or Fred Astaire.

People may, of course, turn on the radio in the hope of securing a usable quip and may attend a motion picture with an eye for a new dance step. When they subsequently use the quip and the dance step, they do not, however, make it more attention-getting by saying where it has come from. Consequently, the fad is never attributed to an authoritative source and never gains authenticity during its rise and spread. The fad stands, as it were, on its own feet.

In the field of dress, women may turn to such fashion sources as *Vogue* for guidance in the matter of fads. In fad matters, however, such magazines simply report fads which have already developed in the more cosmopolitan centers. They do not, therefore, give authenticity to the fad; they merely contribute to its spread.

The appearance of any given fad is quite beyond the power of any individual or group of individuals to predict or to dictate. Commercial interests are, it is true, constantly endeavoring to make fads of articles which they have to sell; but commercial success in the production of faddy goods would seem to depend upon either exploiting that which has already become a fad or else offering a succession of articles, one of which may chance to become a fad. At any event, neither the prestige of the originator nor the efforts of commercial interests will explain why one of twenty dance tunes and perhaps one of thirty trade books become faddy while the remainder are passed by more or less unrecognized.

Fad Survival.—Like the rumor, the fad usually disappears once all the members of society are acquainted with it. The book which has been read by many and discussed by everyone from every possible angle becomes a tiresome topic of conversation and drops, therefore, from the best-seller list. The too frequent repetition of a slang word or a dance tune soon makes further repetition anything but entertaining. Consequently, the fad pattern tends to disappear as a fad when its diffusion has become complete.

Like some rumors, however, some fad patterns may prove of durable worth and may become fixtures of the social heritage. Only a very small proportion of the current fads are destined so to survive, and it is quite impossible to tell which of the multitude will in time prove to have survival value. Out of the vast number of slang terms which have been briefly current in America over the past generation, some few have settled down to a long and sedate life and have become recognized as permissible, if not entirely proper, elements of English, even by the lexicographers. Of the countless popular tunes which have appeared since the great success of *Alexander's Ragtime Band*, a few have become folk songs. One of the many best sellers may, perhaps, be eventually accorded academic recognition and persist as a contribution to American literature.

When the pattern ceases to be a fugitive one, it loses all the attributes of a fad. It is then persistent but not "popular" and is used as is any other element of the social heritage, rather than as a bid for leadership in situations of the congenial type.

THE CRAZE

The fad plays but an incidental role in the life of the one who adopts it. The person who uses the latest slang word, for example, does not devote every available moment to saying it. Some fugitive patterns, however, become definite, although temporary, preoccupations of those individuals who adopt them. These patterns are given such frenzied social acceptance that they have been distinguished as a special type—the craze. The term “craze” is not used to suggest that the behavior pattern is necessarily an insane one, but, rather, to suggest that those who take it over become obsessed with it. They make it their primary interest and, in so far as circumstances permit, arrange their lives to facilitate their indulging in the fugitive activity.

Both in the way it originates and in the way it spreads, the craze pattern is much like that of the fad. The number of people who take up any given craze are, however, comparatively few. Apparently most people are for the most part preoccupied with more stable interests, interests which cannot be displaced by a fugitive pattern. Furthermore, a given craze is likely to involve something which is appealing only to a single age or sex grouping of the general population.

Occasionally, the craze has a quasi-economic appeal, as was the case, for example, with the Send-a-dime craze of 1935.¹⁶ Such a craze assumes some of the attributes of fanatical behavior, a subject which will be discussed at length in a later chapter. Even here, however, the principal appeal to the individual would seem to be exhibitionistic; *i.e.*, the craze gives him something interesting to talk about and, possibly, something which will attract the attention of others. In some instances—notably the craze for tree sitting and flagpole sitting and the more recent craze for sit-down “striking”—the element of pure exhibitionism is very obvious.¹⁷

In any event, since it is a preoccupation and since it is taken over by a comparatively small segment of the total population, the craze is invariably self-liquidating. As a form of behavior, it seldom has any intrinsic value. Its value to the participants is, of course, entirely extrinsic and is derived from the fact that others also are interested in the activity. This extrinsic value disappears the moment that all those who are susceptible of

becoming "crazed" have taken over and have exhausted the interest-arousing possibilities of the pattern. The pattern is then abandoned, and the craze has run its typical course to self-liquidation.

Activities which have developed as crazes, such as crossword puzzles, may, when the craze for them has liquidated, persist as minor elements in the behavior of some individuals. Furthermore, an activity of long standing, such as bicycle riding, may become a craze activity from time to time.

Typical Craze Activities.¹⁸—The field of passive games is especially subject to crazes. Although some passive games, such as bridge, are established and persist in popularity year after year, there is hardly a season which does not have its new craze in passive games. Mah-jongg, backgammon, charades, Monopoly, crossword puzzles, and jigsaw puzzles are a few of those which have risen to brief and frantic popularity during recent years. When no new game is forthcoming, bridge or some other standard game may take on craze attributes.

Active games and sports are not so likely to become crazes, possibly because it requires considerably more time to develop the skills which are necessary. Occasionally, however, a new active game, or a new way of playing an old one, or even an old one comes into craze popularity. Miniature golf is perhaps the most spectacular of the active-game crazes which we have experienced in recent years. Ping-pong and badminton have had a somewhat less hectic and more prolonged career.

Long a regular activity with children, roller skating has become a craze for adults in various localities at various times. A remarkable craze for the old-fashioned bicycle occurred following the economic collapse of 1929. Once an honored means of transportation and more recently a mechanism relegated to children, the bicycle sprang into great popularity, particularly with youths, during the course of a few months. For no apparent reason, members of the "younger set" abandoned the motorcar and their usual recreational activities in favor of the sport of riding a bicycle. Young people who a month earlier would have ridiculed the idea of using this practical means of locomotion, suddenly began to appear on city streets and country roads on the lowly bicycle.¹⁹ It was, for the moment, the only thing worth doing. Skiing, for long a standard sport in some European

countries, became definitely a craze here in the United States during the winter of 1936-1937.

The possibility of the acquisition of craze attributes by dance tunes and dance patterns has already been mentioned. No matter how annoying to those who are not involved, such crazes do not, however, have the spectacular character of the craze for endurance dancing which, because it soon gained the additional attractions of economic remuneration and much newspaper publicity for the participants, persisted in some localities for a considerable time.

Occasionally, an otherwise productive activity becomes a craze. Knitting as a form of recreation became a feminine craze during the World War. Encouraged by public agencies and by the wool industry, the knitting of socks, scarfs, and sweaters for soldiers served as a kind of occupational therapy for the female civilian population. It made these women feel that they were doing their parts in fighting the war. Abandoned after the war, knitting has occasionally been revived as a craze for quite limited periods.

Almost any activity which does not run counter to established concepts would seem to be subject to craze development. In Japan, where suicide has a certain traditional sanction, the practice of jumping into an active volcano threatened for a time to become the characteristic bid of Japanese youths for the attention which they desired but could not otherwise secure.

FASHION

It will be recalled that only trivial aspects of behavior or of dress are subject to fad. Fugitive changes in the more vital aspects of behavior and the more costly items of dress cannot occur unless the individual is given some assurance that the "new" will have reasonably prolonged extrinsic value. This assurance depends upon the prestige of the innovators of the new patterns. Because they involve considerable effort or expense to adopt, these fugitive patterns spread more slowly, persist longer, and disappear more gradually than do fads and crazes. Such relatively lethargic fugitive patterns which have identifiable and authentic origins are generally designated as fashions.²⁰

Never, however, is the fashion in any field of action universal. Not all people will or can be fashionable. Some are more than usually conservative and wear clothes of an antiquated pattern or think out-of-date thoughts. Some who might wish to be fashionable in dress, in thought, or in action are prevented by economic or other factors from keeping up with the fashions. At any given time, the fashion is, therefore, for most people more an ideal than a general realization. The striving of individuals to achieve that ideal results in progressive degrees of general achievement which, looked upon as a movement, is designated as a fashion trend.

Fields of Fashion.—Values in the pictorial arts are especially subject to fashion changes. For a time, one classical school will be predominantly popular; and the paintings of that school will soar in sales price. To have a Dutch master of a certain period will, perhaps, be the goal of every collector. In time, the fashion will change. These pictures will decline in value; they will be relegated to an inferior place in art galleries; and they will be superseded by paintings of another school. Possibly, they may regain popularity a decade or more later. Just as fashions in classical art change, so, too, do the fashions in contemporary art. Brief, limited, but violent popularity has successively been accorded such "masters" as Rivera and Picasso and such schools as cubism, futurism, and surrealism.²¹

Domestic and other architecture also goes through slow fashion changes, as a trip through any one of the older American cities would reveal. The colonial and the plantation types of houses have had recurrent, regional vogues since colonial and plantation days. The "gingerbread" era and the period of the brownstone house have left their marks upon the American city. The California-bungalow, the pseudo-Spanish, and the English-manor types are more recent American fashions in houses. Of late, the trend has been toward the functional structure. Just as house styles have changed, so, too, have the fashions in household furnishings.²²

Of the fashion changes in pure and in applied science, the most dramatic are those which occur in the field of medicine. It was, for example, once the fashion for physicians to draw off the "bad" blood of the patient. Subsequently, the practice of administering heroic doses of physics came to be the fashion

and gave rise to the term "physician." Later, perhaps as a reaction to the extreme dependence upon physics, homeopathy became fashionable. Following the development of anesthetics, indiscriminate surgery became so fashionable that the wags of the time spoke of hospitals as *abattoirs*.²³ More recently, treatment by the injection of hormones, radiotherapy, physiotherapy, and so on have come into style among the medical profession. These fashions in medical procedure are in their origins often new discoveries in the field of scientific medicine. As fashions, however, they are in part traceable to the desire of the physician to prove to his patients that he is ultramodern and in part a consequence of the fact that many people are anxious to have the very latest in diseases and their treatments. The bulk of the medical profession may move slowly and cautiously toward an improvement of knowledge and technique, but the fashionable physician will always be able to supply his patients with the current style in sickness and treatment therefor.

Fashion changes in the physical, the biological, and the social sciences are always justified on intrinsic grounds; *i.e.*, they appear under the guise of new knowledge. The fact remains, however, that many changes in scientific theory, methodology, and problems are simply fashions. Undoubtedly, the fashion swings in the sciences are a part of the process of scientific development. They constitute, as some have pointed out, the spearheads of future accomplishment. Many scientific fashions, however, like many dress fashions, contain so much which is old and so little which is new that much of the scientist's time and energy is devoted to the thankless but necessary task of discerning the little which is new in the newest scientific fashion.²⁴ In any scientific field there are always a number of current, timely topics and points of view. These constitute the fashionable problems and theories of the moment. From about 1914 to 1921, for example, it was the practice of most social scientists, sociologists in particular, to devote their attention to the instinctivistic interpretation of social life. Today, this approach and, indeed, the whole subject of instincts, is as out of date as is last year's hat. This fact, however, does not of necessity mean that the instinct theory may not be revived and, under a somewhat different guise, become very fashionable again. Instincts were succeeded by behavioristic interpretations and they, in

turn, by the Gestalt movement. For some years, attitudes and attitudinal measurement have been the dominant interests of social psychologists. Only time can tell what will supersede them.

Fashionable early in the 1930's, particularly among technicians, was the theory of the so-called technocrats. Fashionable in much the same circles since 1934 has been the pseudosociological, political philosophy of the Italian engineer and economist Pareto.²⁵

Philosophies, both the philosophic principles and systems of philosophers and the philosophies of the man in the street, are subject to marked fashion changes. Fashion trends are also to be observed in the field of religion. Buchmanism was, for example, a fashionable "religion" in university circles for a time. Even some aspects of ethical behavior are subject to similar change. During the 1920's, for example, it became so fashionable to break the Eighteenth Amendment that many formerly abstemious people took up drinking.

It is in the field of dress, however, that fashions are most apparent. Men's clothing styles change so slightly and so slowly that, while last year's suit, hat, shoes, and so on may not be the most stylish, they continue to be serviceable. A man is likely to boast that his suit is of such excellent quality that he has been able to wear it for several years, rather than to exhibit it as the last word in styling. Over the course of the years, trousers and coats grow tighter or looser; trims and other details change; shoulders become square or rounded; and so on. Men are, however, far less "fashion-conscious"—far less interested in clothing styles—than are women. It is, therefore, in the seasonal changes in women's dress that the fashion process can be most clearly seen.

The fashion changes in women's dress are ceaseless, a fact which had led some students to the conclusion that there are laws of fashion. Because the styles of today may bear a strong resemblance to the styles of a previous generation, the theory of fashion cycles has been advanced. Many students of the subject believe in the existence of cyclical laws of fashion change and have gone so far as to predict future trends on the basis of past styles.²⁶

The cyclical theory is, however, no more than a rationalization of irrational practices in the field of style leadership. It is true

that past styles often serve as the basis for those of the present. But the illusion of a cyclical trend can best be explained as a result of the limitations upon style creativeness. A dress may or may not have sleeves. If it does, the possible variety of sleeves is finite. Skirts can grow only about so short before ceasing to be skirts and only about so long before becoming an intolerable nuisance to the wearer and to others. Thus, the possible range of changes is definitely limited. Repetition in dress styling simply must occur if styles are to change frequently. The fashion leader is in much the same position as is the composer of popular music—limited in the number of elements and combinations thereof, but expected to have a new creation every few weeks or months.

Authenticity.—As has been suggested, fashions, unlike fads and crazes, have ascertainable origins. It takes effort or costs money to adopt these fugitive patterns. There must be, therefore, some assurance that the new coat or new theory is “authentic” and that it is not only new but is the trend and will become and remain fashionable for some time.

In each fashion field there are a number of names which have, for historic reasons, gained standing or prestige as authorities in that field. Only “creations” vouched for by one of these names have a chance to become the fashion. Few young physicists, for example, are likely to devote years of work to a new theory which is advanced by an unknown. But a theory credited to Einstein, to Milliken, or to the California Institute of Technology may become the lifework of a number of such young men. No coat designed by John Doe has a chance of being bought by one of the fashionable women of America; but she might buy a new design created by Adrian of Hollywood or by any one of the Paris *couturières*. The name prestige of the innovator is assurance to others that the new coat or theory has a chance to become in time the fashion. In art, science, philosophy, and dress, “names make news.”

Prestige names may be place names or personal names or both. The factors which determine the prestige of any name in any fashion field are complex. Over the course of many years, a particular university may become the recognized leader in some academic field or other. Over the course of his lifetime, a man may come to represent the “sound trend” in some field of science.

Presumably, the recognition which is accorded to the university or to the man is originally based upon the quality of productive works. Once established, however, prestige may persist long after productiveness has ceased.

The long-time prestige of the name "Paris" in women's fashions was a carry-over from the days when France represented culture in the Western world and Paris represented France. French court circles set the styles in morals, in manners, and in language, as well as in clothes. The courtesans of the French kings, therefore, set the fashion in women's dress for all European courts. The industrial revolution democratized women's fashions: cheap production and rising standards of living made it possible for an ever larger number of women to treat clothing as display rather than as covering. At the same time, the *couturières* who had catered to the women of the French court retained their prestige; and Paris continued for many years to be the style center.

Of recent years, the prominence of Hollywood in the production of motion pictures and the appeal of the motion picture to the people of both East and West have brought a gradual shift in prestige from Paris to Hollywood. The motion-picture stars originally depended upon Paris for the clothing they wore in pictures. But the fact that a Paris creation was likely to be out of style by the time the picture reached the public led to the practice of bringing Parisian designers to Hollywood. Now, those of the motion-picture stars who are recognized as fashionable help, through their pictures, to give authenticity to a new trend; and Hollywood designers have much of the prestige which was once attached to Parisian *couturières*.²⁷

Scope of Fashion Leadership.—In no field of action affected by fashion trends do the prestige leaders dictate styles. Fashion leaders invariably suggest or offer a considerable number of innovations. Which, if any, of these will be taken up and developed into the style of the moment depends upon factors entirely beyond the control of the innovator. For a given woman, dress styles are in a sense dictated: if she would dress well, she must adopt one of the current offerings. By her choice from the available alternatives, she does, however, affect the development of a particular fashion. The synthesis of the individually unimportant decisions of many such women ultimately

determines whether a given offering will or will not become the fashion.

No one can, therefore, predict or dictate which of the many offerings in a given field will become fashionable. Commercial interests have frequently endeavored to turn the trend of women's dress fashions in a direction which is favorable to those interests.²⁸ They have employed prestige names to "dictate" a new style; they have filled the fashion magazines and other publications with favorable publicity on that style; and, in fact, they have done everything possible to assure that this style will be the fashion with the women of America. Such a procedure has seldom, if ever, succeeded. The fashion for bobbed hair which followed the World War threatened, among other people, hairnet manufacturers. These manufacturers spent great sums of money in the effort to stem the trend and to bring long hair back into fashion. It came back, to a degree, ten years later, without help from the hairnet manufacturers and much too late to save that industry. For some years after the war, textile interests here and abroad fought, to no avail, the fashion for short skirts. Long skirts came back into fashion when skirts had become as short as people conceded feasible and when further change simply had to be in the other direction.

We can, of course, indicate something of what will not become fashionable. For, even in the realm of fugitive behavior, economic, moral, and other considerations operate. It is highly improbable that the theory that the world is flat or the theory that man is a product of special creation will become fashionable again among scientists. It is highly improbable that the hula skirt will become fashionable for street wear in North America. No scientific theory is at all likely to become fashionable which does obvious violence to known facts. No dress design is likely to become fashionable which leaves its wearer shivering in the cold. However much the impartial observer doubts the intrinsic value of fashions, he must recognize that, although fashions, like other fugitive patterns, are random and uncontrollable, they do occur within relatively fixed limits.

APPENDIX

1. Because the rumor story usually concerns the behavior of people or events occurring to people, many writers refer to it as gossip. See F.E. Lumley, *Means of Social Control* (New York, Century, 1925); A. Blumenthal,

Small Town Stuff (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1932), and "The Nature of Gossip" (*Sociol. and Soc. Res.*, 1937, 22, 31-37); and K. Young, *Social Psychology* (New York, Crofts, 1930, 572).

The term "rumor" is, however, much to be preferred, since it does not imply moral disapproval of the stories, a disapproval which, for example, appears throughout Lumley's (*op. cit.*) discussion of gossip. A popular statement of the thesis that people enjoy only the worst is to be found in "The Complete Scandalmonger" by G. Boos (*Harper's Mag.*, August, 1937, 270-274).

Experimentation does not bear out the assumption that people prefer to talk about the misfortunes of others or to distort stories to make them scandalous. See C. Kirkpatrick, "A Tentative Study in Experimental Social Psychology" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, 1932, 38, 194-206). E.E. Clark (unpublished study) collected the rumor stories which circulated among the students of Stanford University during a period of two months. He found forty-two fairly well-standardized stories in which faculty members played the central roles. Of these forty-two stories twenty-five were complimentary—in terms of student values; only seventeen cast the faculty member in an unfavorable light.

2. An ingenious attempt to start rumors which are favorable to commercial products is reported by R. Littell and J.J. McCarthy, "Whispers for Sale" (*Harper's Mag.*, February, 1936, 364-372). A certain advertising organization employed actors to start rumors concerning a product; thus, posing as a prosperous businessman, an actor would travel on a train crowded with commuters and would greet and discuss the advisability of buying so-and-so's tires with another actor who was posing as a chauffeur. Needless to say, so-and-so's tires would be warmly recommended in a loud voice by the "chauffeur"—who "should know about tires." The stories thus started either did not take and spread or, when they did, were attached to the wrong brand of tire or else were detrimental to the advertiser. At any event, the practice of starting rumors in this way was quickly dropped.

During every bitter political campaign, rumors concerning the candidates make their appearance. As is often charged, some of these may be deliberately started. Rumor undoubtedly contributes to the reputation of a public figure. There is, however, no reason to suppose that it makes that reputation. People accept and believe those stories which fit in with their preconceptions and reject those which do not. See M.W. Childs, "They Hate Roosevelt" (*Harper's Mag.*, May, 1936, 634-642).

For material on the making of rumors see "Whispering Reds as Bank Wreckers" (*Lit. Dig.*, Jan. 10, 1931); J.T. Adams, "Our Whispering Campaigns" (*Harper's Mag.*, September, 1932, 444-450); and the news item "Hysterics" (*Time*, July 22, 1935).

3. The analysis of the rumor process in the text follows partly that made by L.L. Bernard in his *An Introduction to Social Psychology* (New York, Holt, 1926, 557-558). At least two experimental studies, in addition to that of Kirkpatrick (*op. cit.*), lend support to the interpretation given in the text. J.F. Dashiell ("Legal Rules of Evidence as a Neglected Experimental Field," *Psychol. Bull.*, 1931, 28, 576; and Chap. XXIII in *A Hand-*

book of Social Psychology, Worcester, Clark University Press, 1935) has found that a secondhand story of an event is about 60 per cent as accurate as the original account and that a thirdhand account is only a little over 40 per cent as accurate as the original account. The accuracy rapidly declines with the passage of time. F.C. Bartlett (*Remembering*, Cambridge, England, Cambridge University Press, 1932) has found that fairly consistent forms of distortion occur when people read and then write a report on a report of an event.

4. Dependence upon rumor may be artificially stimulated by any effort at governmental control of the normal means of communication. The mass of the Russians have, for example, depended for their "knowledge" of what is happening in Russia and in other countries far more upon wild and contradictory rumors than upon the state-controlled organs of the government. The result is, as E. Lyons ("Stifled Laughter," *Harper's Mag.*, April, 1935, 557-567) points out, that governmental control of the press in Russia has more or less defeated its own ends.

The extent to which people depend upon rumor stories during a natural—as contrasted to a political—catastrophe is illustrated by what happened during the earthquake in India in 1934, as reported by J. Prasad ("The Psychology of Rumor: A Study Relative to the Great India Earthquake of 1934," *Brit. J. Psychol.*, 1935, 26, 1-15).

5. For an extended discussion of legend making and of the role of legends in social life see Young (*op. cit.*, 431-452). For the story of how one persistent legend—that of George Washington as the superhuman—developed, see H. Kellock, *Parson Weems of the Cherry Tree* (New York, Appleton-Century, 1934).

6. As defined here, "exhibitionism" is not necessarily an abnormal trait of personality. It refers to the atypical actions to which contemporary social circumstances drive people in their efforts to satisfy a presumably normal desire for attention. The need for attention may, of course, itself be atypically intense in some individuals as a consequence of peculiarities in their social training. See H. Christoffel, "Exhibitionism and Exhibitionists" (*Int. J. Psychoanal.*, 1936, 17, 321-345); and H. Grimmsbach, "Exhibition und Exhibitionismus" (*Krim. Mh.*, 1935, 9, 52-55).

7. For earlier definitions of and general discussions of fads, crazes, and fashions see Bernard (*op. cit.*, 541-556) and Young (*op. cit.*, 552-568). The interest of American sociologists in the study of fugitive patterns was stimulated by E.A. Ross (*Social Psychology*, New York, Macmillan, 1908), who utilized the imitation concept of Tarde. The analysis in this text is an effort to interpret the fugitive process without resort to dubious psychological "principles."

8. Analysis of fugitive patterns might well be based upon the distinction between the intrinsic and extrinsic psychological values of objects and acts. The significance to an individual of any article, such as a hat, of any idea, belief, or system of beliefs, such as theosophy, or of any act, such as speaking a word, may lie in its intrinsic utility or in its extrinsic virtues or in a mixture of both. The hat has intrinsic value as a covering for the head; theosophy has intrinsic value as a comfort to the mind; and the speaking of the word

has intrinsic value as a means of communication. Any one of these may, however, be utilized by a given individual only because it has for that individual an extrinsic value. This is what happens when a person uses a hat as an ornament, uses theosophy as something to talk about, or uses a word as a "wisecrack."

In congenial and congenial-like situations most satisfactions are derived from the extrinsic value of objects or acts. Thus, the rumor story is told not because it is of importance to the teller but because in the telling the teller will secure the desired attention of others. The little boy stands on his head and cries, "Look at me, everybody!" not because he enjoys the act but because he enjoys the attention which may be secured by the act.

Throughout the discussion of fads, crazes, and fashions the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic values must be kept in mind; for these patterns rise and spread in terms of extrinsic values alone. Although the patterns may also have some slight intrinsic values, their fugitive character is solely a matter of their extrinsic values.

9. The turnover in slang words is not, on the average, particularly rapid. Any word or phrase which persists for long is presumably then used for its intrinsic value; and, although it may subsequently disappear, it is hardly a fugitive pattern. Definitely fugitive, however, are such phrases as that reported in the following news item:

"Over the radio boomed the Commander's soggy voice [broadcasting a naval review]:

"The whole fleet is lit up!—er—by lights! It is like fairyland. The ships are covered by fairy lights. . . . Even the destroyers are lit up! The big boats are lit up!

"It's all right, ladies and gentlemen, I'm telling the people around me to shut their damned mouths. . . . Everything is lit up. . . ."

"In less than 24 hours 'The fleet is all lit up!' had become the joyful cry of all Britain. Undergraduates, shopgirls, peers, clubmen and pub-crawlers were repeating, 'The fleet is all lit up!' *ad nauseum*" (*Time*, May 31, 1937).

10. The following news story describes the rise of a short-lived but widespread gesture fad:

"Sweeping the U.S. last week was a simple-minded new game called 'Handies' or 'Dillies.' Kansas City attributed the game to University of Missouri undergraduates, who declined the credit. Cleveland believed it originated from some antics in the film *Millions in the Air*. Manhattan guessed that it sprang from the sign language used in broadcasting studios. The Chicago *American* was offering daily prizes for new 'Handies.' Fox Movietone issued a 'Handies' film.

"To play 'Handies' a person attempts by manual manipulation to portray a familiar phrase, title, personage or situation. . . ." (*Time*, June 8, 1936).

11. For descriptions of some food fads see H. Morgan, "Dietary Delusions, Past and Present" (*Hygeia*, April, 1936, 313-315); and H. Gauss, "Food Fads" (*Hygeia*, March, 1935, 210-212).

Although most people—certainly the sick—would agree that good health is man's most precious possession, the methods of preserving and of regaining health are peculiarly subject to faddy changes. For an analysis of fads in popular and professional medicine see T.S. Harding, *Fads, Frauds, and Physicians* (New York, Dial, 1930); and M. Fishbein, *Fads and Quackery in Healing* (New York, Covici-Friede, 1932).

12. *Variety* (published weekly by Variety, Inc., at 154 W. 46th St., New York) lists "Last week's 15 best sellers" and [25] "Most played on the air" songs.

13. The following fragments of news items tell in brief the short but violent history of a song which rose to craze popularity:

"Last week the nation was once again in the violent grip of a crazy song [*The Music Goes 'Round and Around*]. The successor to *K-K-K-Katy* (1918) and *Barney Google* (1923) was selling a-copy-a-minute over sheet music counters, might well go on to the fabulous two million high of *Yes, We Have No Bananas* (1923). . . .

"To students of native U.S. music *The Music Goes 'Round and Around* seemed to be something more than another *Yes, We Have No Bananas*. Like all previous successful nut songs, that ludicrous melody remained in the straight popular ballad tradition. *The Music Goes 'Round and Around*, on the other hand, was fundamentally a 'swing' tune. It was jazz, and it came significantly at the precise moment when jazz music was reaching a second peak in U.S. musical history" (*Time*, Jan. 20, 1936).

"Unfortunately [since a motion picture was being produced around it], by last week *The Music Goes 'Round and Around* had definitely ceased to be a hit. For four weeks it has failed to appear on *Variety's* list of the 25 tunes most played on the air. Sheet sales have dropped 95% since their peak in early January. To most radio addicts, over-familiarity has made the song something in the nature of an auditory emetic" (*Time*, Mar. 2, 1936).

14. In 1936 Americans suddenly became "swing" conscious. The fad for "swing" music developed into something approximating a musical cult; and many articles and not a few books appeared on the subject, among them *Le Jazz hot* by H. Panassie (Paris, Correa, 1934; trans. by L. Dowling and E. Dowling, *Hot Jazz*, New York, Whitmark, 1936) and *Swing That Music* by L. Armstrong (New York, Longmans, Green, 1937). Every band leader who professed to play "swing" offered his definition of this music style, and no two of them agreed. The fad was, however, less a fad for a music style than a fad for the word "swing."

The following statement was prepared for the writer by C. Lastrucci:

"The term 'swing' is as old as jazz and has been used by dance musicians since the advent of the Original Dixieland Jazz Band. Very simply, it means to play the number in such a manner as to emphasize the rhythmic, rather than the melodic, pattern. Synonymous with the term 'swing' are such terms as 'kick it,' 'ride it,' 'sock it,' 'lift it,' 'get in the groove,' and others, varying with the particular locale. The tempo is immaterial; swing style can be used with either slow (although not drag), moderate, or fast (although not rat-race) tempos.

"In the main, it is used as follows: Since the usual dance arrangement consists of four choruses of the melody, the repetition of a sweet tune

becomes tiresome by the time the last chorus is reached; or, when a popular tune begins to wane in appeal, monotony sets in sooner. Hence, a leader will call out before the last chorus, 'Let's swing it,' meaning, colloquially, 'Let's wake them up and put some pep into the music.' When the melody is not adaptable to faster tempo, the leader simply plays the usual sweet arrangement but with everyone laying on the rhythm—or getting into the groove. Hence, when a band swings, it falls into, gets into, or goes into, the groove—the groove being the beat.

"Swing is not jam. Jam is a hot chorus—i.e., improvisation by one soloist around the chord structure of the melody, with a rhythmic background. All jam must be swung, since strong definite rhythm is needed to hold together some semblance of pattern during the ad lib chorus. Public use of the term [swing] has led, among musicians, to the substitution of other synonyms, unless the audience is within hearing distance of the leader."

15. Many fads are simply revivals of old cultural elements, although those who take over such fads generally believe them to be the "latest thing." See the interesting and amusing deflation of the "latest thing" idea by W. Funk, *So You Think It's New* (New York, Funk & Wagnalls, 1937).

Illustrating both the fact that all that is new about a faddy act or article is that it has suddenly acquired new extrinsic value and the fact that commercial interests are not responsible for this extrinsic value is the history of the zipper. This fastening device had been on the market for over fifteen years before it was "discovered" and made a fad object late in the 1920's. See the news item "Zippers" (*Time*, Aug. 23, 1937).

16. The Send-a-dime craze appeared in May, 1935, engaged the attention of thousands of people, became a prime topic of conversation and printed news, and disappeared before the end of June. The silliest get-rich-quick scheme of the century, it for a time taxed the resources of the postal system. See T. Olson, "Brother, Can You Share a Dime?" (*New Republic*, May 22, 1935, 43-44).

17. For the story of the flagpole-sitting craze, which some (*Time*, Dec. 17, 1934) traced to the fanatical "Pillar Hermits" of early Christian Europe, see "Pity the Poor Trees in the 'Silly Season'" (*Lit. Dig.*, Aug. 9, 1930).

Sit-down striking began as a labor-union technique in Akron, Ohio, in 1935. It was used by French workers on a large scale in 1936. It was adopted as a standard strike device by the C.I.O. later in that year. See J. Bowisounouse, "Paris Sets a Strike Style" (*Survey Graphic*, September, 1936); and E. Levinson, "Labor on the March" (*Harper's Mag.*, May, 1937, 642-650). In the spring of 1937 sitting down at the job became a widespread craze. Workers—and employers—"sat down" for the extrinsic value of the act, a fact which brought considerable discredit to organized labor. See "Sit-down Spread" (*Time*, Mar. 1, 1937).

18. The following are a few of the crazes which have appeared in the United States during recent years:

Endurance Crazes:

"In 1928 it was tree-sitting. In 1930 it was dance marathons. In 1932 it was Walkathons. Last week it appeared possible that in 1936

the U.S. appetite for preposterous endurance might take an even more eccentric form: the Roller Derby. In Chicago 25 young men & women were roller-skating in circles around the Coliseum. They had been doing so since Christmas Day. It was the fourth Roller Derby held in the U.S. since last August. Crowds averaged 10,000 a day" (*Time*, Feb. 3, 1936).

Passive Games:

Backgammon, fall, 1930. See "Back to Backgammon" (*Lit. Dig.*, Nov. 15, 1930).

Monopoly, fall, 1936. See "Monopoly" (*Fortune*, December, 1935).

The Numbers (gambling game) reached craze intensity in fall, 1936. See "The Numbers" (*Time*, Jan. 4, 1937).

For other passive games see the following: "Morons and Highbrows at Play" (*Arts and Decorations*, October, 1934, 51-52); J.A.G. Rice, "Play's the Thing: Story behind our National Crazes" (*Sat. Even. Post*, Apr. 7, 1934); "4-5-6 Pick Up Sticks" (*Fortune*, May, 1937); and "1937 Games" (*Time*, Feb. 1, 1937).

Suicide:

In Japan, by jumping into the volcano *Mihara-yama* (350 suicides and 1,386 attempted suicides during 1933 and 1934). See *Time*, Jan. 28, 1935. In Europe, to the accompaniment of the song *Gloomy Sunday* (17 suicides in Budapest alone during 1936). See "Suicide Song" (*Time*, Mar. 30, 1936).

Nudism:

In Europe and to some participants in America nudism was a form of fanaticism (a new way to health and happiness). See J. Strange, *Adventures in Nakedness* (New York, Knopf, 1934). For the majority of American participants, however, nudism was only a craze, since for them the value of going nudist was the attention secured from doing so. For the craze aspect of nudism see "Health Wedding" (*Time*, Dec. 4, 1933, *et seq.*).

The Candid Camera:

The small, wide-focus camera was adopted by many amateur photographers as a replacement for the motion-picture camera during 1936 and 1937. The taking of unconventional "shots" assumed, for a time, the proportions of a major nuisance in American life.

19. Undoubtedly economic factors were not without their effect in the establishment of the bicycle craze, which reached its peak about 1933. See M.B. Ray, "Going to Beat Ninety; Gibson Girl Is Back on Bicycles and Roller Skates" (*Collier's*, June 3, 1933). The financial exigencies of the period precluded the maintenance of the more normal recreational activities of youth and induced, as it were, both the need for a cheap means of transportation (it costs money to drive a car to work) and a cheap recreational activity (it costs money to drive a car into the countryside). But, as a means of recreational activity, the bicycle was for a time a typical craze.

In 1935, for the first time since 1899, the national production of bicycles passed the half-million mark. The production total of 639,439 in 1935 was 54 per cent of that in 1899 (news release, Census of Manufactures, Sept. 5, 1936). Unlike most craze patterns, that of riding a bicycle had more, therefore, than extrinsic value.

20. There is a vast literature on the subject of fashion changes. The following are the most quoted of the more recent books on the subject:

- Barr, E.DeY., "A Psychological Analysis of Fashion Motivation," *Arch. Psychol.*, 1934, 26.
- Calthrop, D.C., *English Dress from Victoria to George V*, London, Chapman and Hall, 1934.
- Cunnington, C.W., *Feminine Attitudes in the Nineteenth Century*, New York, Macmillan, 1936.
- Flügel, J.C., *The Psychology of Clothes*, London, Hogarth, 1930.
- Hurlock, E.B., *The Psychology of Dress*, New York, Ronald, 1929.
- Kellett, E.E., *Fashion in Literature, A Study in Changing Taste*, London, Routledge, 1931.
- Walker, S., *Mrs. Astor's Horse*, New York, Stokes, 1936 (descriptive, including material on fads and crazes).

21. For data on dadaism, surrealism, and other forms of pictorial art by or for psychopaths, or both, see the news item "Marvelous and Fantastic" (*Time*, Dec. 14, 1936).

22. For data and comment on architectural and decorative fashions see:

- Brown, I., "Pendulum of Taste," *Atlantic Monthly*, August, 1935, 165-169.
- Cox, G.J., "Modern Art and This Matter of Taste," *Amer. Mag. of Art*, August, 1932, 79-82.
- Perrine, J.O., "Beauty and the Science Beast," *Sci. Monthly*, May, 1932, 465-468.
- Schoen, M., and B. Cabell, "Art, Beauty, and Balderdash; a Review of Art and Beauty," *Sat. Rev. Lit.*, July 18, 1932, 789-790.
- Wright, R., "Coming and Going of Tides of Taste," *House and Garden*, April, 1935, 35.

23. In his *The Story of San Michele* (New York, Dutton, 1936, 294-295) Axel M.F. Munthe, himself a physician, describes the time when indiscriminate surgery was fashionable:

"I tremble at the thought of what would have happened to me had I fallen into the hands of one of the other leading surgeons in Paris in those days. . . . The famous Professor Péau, the terrible butcher of Hospital St. Louis, would have chopped off both my legs on the spot and thrown them on the top of some stumps of arms and legs, half-a-dozen ovaries and uteruses and various tumours, all in a heap on the floor of his amphitheatre besmeared with blood like a slaughterhouse. Then, his enormous hands still red with my blood, he would have plunged his knife with the dexterity of a conjurer into his next victim, half conscious under insufficient anaesthesia, while half-a-dozen others, screaming with terror on their braucards, were awaiting their turn of torture."

For data on more recent medical fashions see Fishbein (*op. cit.*) and Harding (*op. cit.*).

24. At present the field of academic study which is most subject to fad and fashion changes is education. Primary- and secondary-school teachers no sooner master one procedure and become reconciled to one "philosophy" of education than the fashion leaders at Teachers College, Columbia University, start a new trend. See H.E. Buchholz, *Fads and Fallacies in Present Day Education* (New York, Macmillan, 1931).

The difficulty of keeping a perspective during the crest of a fashion move in any of the scientific fields is carefully analyzed—with particular reference to sociology and the vogue during the early 1930's for social planning—by J.H.S. Bossard in "Sociological Fashions and Societal Planning" (*Soc. Forc.*, 1935, 14, 186–193).

25. Sponsored by a Howard Scott, the word "technocracy" drifted into the news during August, 1932. The idea behind the term was that technological changes had brought about malfunctioning of the social mechanism—a concept which can be traced at least as far back as Auguste Comte (*Positive Philosophy*, begun in 1818, trans. by B. Martineau, New York, Blanchard, 1855) and which has long been familiar to American sociologists. By March, 1933, at least six books had been published on "technocracy." See reviews by L. Whipple in *Survey Graphic*, March, 1933, 174–177. The *Reader's Guide* lists sixty-three articles on this subject between July, 1932, and June, 1935, but none before and none after these dates.

Although long known to American sociologists as a minor contributor to European sociological thought, V. Pareto became, after the publication in 1935 of a translation of his work (*Mind and Society*, trans. by A. Bongiorno and A. Livingston, New York, Harcourt, Brace, 4 vols.), the sociologist to talk about among all except professional sociologists. A number of interpretative books followed (*e.g.*, L.J. Henderson, *Pareto's General Sociology*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1935; and F. Borkeman, *Pareto*, New York, Wiley, 1936); the class magazines printed many articles about his system; and the books about him were much reviewed even in the newspapers.

26. Most of the serious students of fashion who lean toward the cyclical theory (*e.g.*, Young, *op. cit.*, 554–555) cite as their sole evidence a study made by the anthropologist A.L. Kroeber ("On the Order in Civilization as Exemplified by Changes in Fashion," *Amer. Anthropol.*, 1919, 21, 235–263). Kroeber's data are, however, exceedingly complex and, like all data on "cycles," subject to various interpretations. If women's dress fashions change—as some have concluded on the basis of Kroeber's findings—in accordance with a definite, cyclical pattern, it is indeed strange that commercial interests, which have many millions at stake on the turn of fashion's wheel each year, have not discovered that pattern.

27. For the present role of Parisian *couturières* in the leadership of women's dress fashions see the news item "Haute Couture" (*Time*, Aug. 13, 1934).

For the rise of Hollywood as a fashion center see Adrian, "Setting Styles through the Stars" (*Ladies' Home J.*, February, 1933, 10–11); E.L. Hamp-

ton, "1,200 Mile Style Parade; World's Style Capital Moved to Hollywood" (*Nation's Business*, April, 1937, 78); and E.K. McDonnell, "Fashion and the Hollywood Handicap" (*Sat. Even. Post*, May 18, 1935, 10-11).

28. Kroeber's own interpretation of his data on fashion cycles (see note 26) is mainly a refutation of the idea that style leaders determine the fashion. The fashion "cycle" is, as he puts it, independent of any one designer and is, therefore, beyond the control of the most powerful costumer. For a satirical description of the frantic, though futile, efforts of fashion leaders to dictate styles see E. Hawes, *Fashion is Spinach* (New York, Random House, 1938).

See R. Benedict's article "Dress" (*Ency. Soc. Sci.*, 5, 235-237); and E. Sapir's article "Fashion" (*Ency. Soc. Sci.*, 6, 139-144).

CHAPTER X

AUDIENCE BEHAVIOR

In any congenial or congenial-like situation, each member, as we have seen, secures his recreational satisfactions largely from directing or affecting the behavior of the other members of the situation. Being so directed or affected is, in the main, a means to the end—the securing of leadership—rather than the end itself. The recreational satisfactions thus secured are derived from actual experience, even as the satisfactions which a boy secures from eating a piece of cake are the result of actual experience.

There is, however, a type of social situation into which the members enter for the specific purpose of securing recreational satisfactions from submitting to leadership. In these situations, being directed and affected is the end itself. The recreational satisfactions are derived from vicarious rather than from actual experience, even as the satisfactions which a mother secures from watching her small son devour a piece of cake are the result of vicarious rather than actual experience. Such situations are of the audience type, and the interaction which occurs therein is audience behavior.¹

As a Type of Behavior.—Audience situations fall into a considerable number of classes, each one of which has some more or less distinct attributes. It is quite obvious that the theater audience and the lecture audience are of different orders and that the kind of interaction which occurs in a legitimate theater differs from that which occurs in the motion-picture theater. It is further evident that the behavior of a theater audience which witnesses a comedy is in considerable contrast to that of an audience which attends the performance of a tragedy.

All audience situations, however, have more in common with one another than any one of them has with any other type of social situation. In this chapter we shall endeavor to analyze these common attributes, leaving for the subsequent chapter

the problems which arise from the fact that there are many kinds of audience situations.

ORIGIN AND FUNCTION

Origin in Individual Recreational Needs.—Audience behavior, like that of the congenial type, serves and grows out of individual rather than collective needs. Although the partially regimented audience, of which the classroom is a commonplace example, has, no doubt, some collective and long-run significance, the true audience is primarily of individual and temporary value.

The origin of any given audience situation lies, then, in the individual needs for recreation of the members of that audience. It is not a socially imperative situation. We may say, therefore, that the given audience exists because the members "want" it to.

On the grounds that the members of an audience seek vicarious rather than direct experiences, participation in audience situations has been described as a compensatory mechanism for the inadequacies of real life. So interpreted, the function of audience leaders is the provision of ready-made daydreams for the audience members. Audience satisfactions would then be highly specific. Thus, the young man who has acquired a desire to kiss a pretty girl but is unable to do so would satisfy that particular desire vicariously by seeing a hero kissing a heroine. Likewise, the middle-aged woman whose husband is not attentive would compensate for that fact by seeing a romantic motion picture.

There is, however, no reason to suppose that all or even any large part of the vicarious satisfactions of audience participation are of this compensatory—and, hence, specific—character. The youth who has a sweetheart and does kiss her seems quite as prone to enjoy seeing a romance as does the solitary youth. The woman with an attentive husband is just as likely to go to see romantic motion pictures as is the woman who is discontented with her husband.

As a matter of fact, the character of audience satisfactions has never received intensive study.² Individually, we recognize that membership in an audience—whether it be seeing a motion picture or a play or hearing a concert or a speech—may be a very gratifying experience. The large proportion of the national income which goes to secure membership in audiences indicates

that our individual experience with audience satisfactions is representative rather than unique. Aside from the rather esoteric efforts of the aesthetes, however, little attention has been given to the problem of how and why the individual may secure significant satisfactions in audience situations.

It is, nevertheless, reasonable to assume that the satisfactions which are derived from audience membership are of the same recreational order as are those which people secure in congenial groups. If such is the case, audience satisfactions are of a general rather than a specific character.

As a Substitute for and a Supplement to Congenial Behavior.—Audience behavior should not, therefore, be looked upon as an escape from reality. It should, rather, be considered as a supplement to or, in some instances, a substitute for congenial behavior.

The audience type of situation is not, however, peculiar to contemporary life. Most primitives have occasionally gathered around a noted storyteller; the classical Chinese had their theater and their semiprofessional spinner of folk tales; the lords of the medieval manors are supposed to have welcomed as entertainers the itinerant professional minstrels. But, in the main, the members of more settled social systems than our own seem to have secured their recreational satisfactions largely through participation in congenial situations.

Large dependence upon audience membership as a means of securing recreational satisfactions is typical only of modern peoples and would seem to have its ultimate origin in the same circumstances which limit the congenial life of the modern man.³ The decline of the possibilities for participation in recreational activities has been closely paralleled by an increasing membership in audience situations. The rise of the modern opera, for example, parallels the disintegration of medieval life and the development of the city. In the city, rural folk procedures could not be maintained; and the folk music and drama became professionalized. All but the professionals were relegated to the status of spectators, and the recreational satisfactions which had formerly been derived from participation in folk music and folk drama were derived vicariously from attendance at the opera. Similarly, with the decline of community life, the old-fashioned practice of taking the family to call on the neighbors

has given way to the practice of taking the family to the motion pictures.

Furthermore, although arranged and mechanized congenial situations have developed, these do not, apparently, fully satisfy recreational needs. They are, at best, substitutes for congeniality. Consequently, attendance at political rallies, at popular lectures, etc., may be quite as adequate and may be far less difficult to arrange.

Behind the individual origins of any given audience situation may lie, therefore, all the complex factors which have brought about the disorganization of contemporary society and which have, in turn, made it impossible for the modern individual to satisfy his recreational needs in congenial situations.

The Casual Audience.—In some instances, a given audience situation develops casually. Perhaps a number of people, having nothing more interesting to do, detach themselves from the stream of traffic on a busy street and pause to watch workmen excavating for a building, a boat steaming beneath a bridge, or two taxi drivers exchanging opinions of each other. Into such an audience, individual members will come and go in a casual, unpredictable fashion. The entire situation is whimsical.

However whimsical the membership, that membership is, nevertheless, for the moment polarized and is potentially subject to directive leadership. Unlike the people who throng a park on a pleasant Sunday afternoon, the members of such a situation interact primarily with a common leader, rather than with each other. The fact that the leadership is unintentional—the workmen, for example, do not strive to please their audience—removes the casual audience in degree only from the true audience.

The Deliberately Initiated Audience.—Casual audiences are a relatively unimportant yet commonplace part in the life of modern peoples. The audience situation which is deliberately initiated by a self-appointed leader is a vital as well as commonplace part of that life.

The fact that the need of many modern individuals for recreational satisfaction is not adequately fulfilled through congenial-like situations makes possible and gives rise to individually initiated offerings to provide these satisfactions. The history of entertainment during the past few hundred years is the

story of the rise of professional audience leaders and the systematic commercialization of recreational provisions. Although attempts have been made to rehabilitate folk music and folk drama, the day of the amateur entertainer seems past; and self-entertainment is the exception rather than the rule. One might say that, just as music has passed from the hands of "the folk" to specialists in music, conversational leadership has passed from the people to professional performers. Ours is an age of economic and social specialization, and nowhere is this more self-evident than in the field of entertainment.⁴

In the economic self-interest of professional audience leaders and their business associates lies, in general, the inception of any specific audience situation. The popular-lecture audience is initiated when the lecturer offers his services in a particular place at a particular time; the theater audience is initiated when the cast offers to entertain the members of a specific community at a specific place and time; the motion-picture audience is initiated when the theater manager offers a program at a particular place and time.

Such offerings are not made unless there is reason to expect that a sufficient number of people will want to and will be able to seek at the given place and time the kind of recreation indicated. Forms of and places and times for audience behavior are fairly well established; and these change but slowly through time. It probably would be commercial and professional suicide, for example, to make an operatic offering in midsummer. The opera season is traditionally a winter event. Likewise, only rarely is it possible to be successful with unique offerings. Few playwrights would venture to violate established legitimate-theater practice with such an unconventional play as Eugene O'Neill's *Strange Interlude*. Many factors, therefore, operate to limit the initiative which is responsible for the rise of a given audience situation.

IDEOLOGIES

The function of audience behavior is, as has been implied, the satisfaction of member interest in recreation and the satisfaction of leader interest in economic and professional welfare. Audience behavior is, thus, of far greater psychological than sociological importance.

There are, however, some who insist upon the great social implications, for good or bad, of the motion picture and the stage play. This is the view of those who would use the play and the motion picture as a means of educating the mass of the population to the better life. Perhaps because it is so unrealistic, this view has not resulted in any concerted effort to provide audiences with "educational" plays and pictures, although such has frequently been threatened.⁵ In the main, this ideology has led only to the censorship of those plays and pictures which religious and other moral interests have deemed to be highly undesirable from an educational viewpoint.⁶

Most people are fairly free from the necessity of disguising the recreational nature of their membership in most audiences. But just as the members of an "uplift" club disguise the congenial nature of their activities behind a screen of social-welfare activity, both the members and the leader of an audience may profess and may at times actually believe that their behavior contributes to other than recreational ends.

In some instances, this ideological disguise is vague and intangible. It is reflected in the supercilious attitude which those with esoteric tastes in audience recreation display toward those with exoteric tastes. This attitude is characteristic of those who feel that attendance at the opera, the concert, or the dance recital, unlike attendance at the motion picture or the musical comedy, provides other than recreational satisfactions. What these are is never specified; they are something, it would seem, to do with "culture."⁷

Either because they have been trained into the ideology or else because of expediency, the audience leaders who appeal to those of esoteric tastes are prone to profess to have a function which is almost anything except the provision of entertainment. Most playwrights, producers, actors, musicians, and so on are frankly merchants of recreation. Thus, one will find in *Variety*, the journal of the popular theater, no hint that the professional entertainer has any function aside from satisfying the recreational needs of his audiences. Presumably, to the thousands of readers of *Variety*, show business is a business. Nevertheless, there is what might be described as the cult of the theater surrounding grand opera, certain actors and actresses and their "art," concert music, concert leaders, and, above all, the dance.

The verbal vagaries of such aesthetes as the late Isadora Duncan suggest the extremes to which such ideological developments may go.⁸ All these verbal vagaries may, however, be summed up in the trite phrase "Art for art's sake."

Like the aesthete of the stage, the popular lecturer never confesses to being an entertainer. Whether he actually takes himself as seriously as the ideologies surrounding the popular lecture would suggest is not clear. Evident, however, is the fact that the conversional lecturer, such as the political speaker, must realize his true function as a speaker if he is to achieve his objective. Equally evident, as we shall see, is the fact that he must surround his actual function as an entertaining converter with some such ideology as that his whole concern is with the welfare of the people. The opposition between these ideologies and the actualities of the leadership of conversional audiences will be discussed in detail in the next chapter. At the moment it is necessary only to observe that the members, as contrasted to the leaders of conversional audiences, seldom possess elaborate justifications for membership in such audiences.

MEMBERSHIP

The members of any audience are a more or less selected group of people. In the first instance, the size and character of an audience is affected by the initiator. In accordance with his economic and other interests, he sets minimum standards for membership. The operator of a theater, for example, sets price, time, and place standards upon attendance. The standards imposed by the initiator of the situation operate to bar many who might otherwise become members. The initiator of a situation thus limits the membership of his audience.

Once a potential audience leader has made his offering and has set his standards for membership, he has done all that it is in his power to do in determining the character of his audience. His offering may take such "high-pressure" sales forms as elaborate advertising and controlled publicity; and his standards for membership may be exceedingly low. But he is, in the end, dependent for his audience upon the willingness of those individuals who can meet his standards to submit to his proffered leadership.

In the first place, only those individuals in a community who feel the need of the particular form of recreational satisfaction

which the audience leader offers will be interested and will be likely to attend. Furthermore, many of these who are so interested may be diverted by other recreational offerings. For example, a man may be interested in a political speech which is offered at the Town Hall but may go instead to see a certain motion picture which, to his mind, offers greater entertainment. Moreover, occupational and other duties may prevent some from accepting a given recreational offering. In the end, therefore, the membership of any given audience is determined by a great many factors over which the initiator has no control. (To the extent that the membership of a situation is determined by coercion—on the part of the initiator or anyone else—that situation recedes to that extent from the audience type.)

Although the leader cannot determine the membership of his audience, the fact that his audience is a group of people selected in terms of a common interest in recreation of a specific order facilitates his leadership over them once they have assembled. The more selected and, hence, the more homogeneous the members of an audience, the simpler is the task of leadership. The professional terpsichorean, for example, may easily satisfy devotees to the dance; but he is certain to have grave difficulties with an audience composed of unselected college students.

OVERT AND COVERT ASPECTS OF INTERACTION

Member Behavior.—The reactions of the members of an audience to the leader are ordinarily covert; only at intervals does significant overt response occur. Mild and undisturbing overt expression is, of course, permissible at all times. A smile, a frown, waving the head to the rhythm of music, and shedding a few tears for the poor heroine of a play are some of the overt ways by which audiences may express their covert responses without depriving the recognized leader of his leadership.

Active overt response, however, such as applause, loud laughter, etc., occurs only at appropriate periods and in fairly traditional ways. To this extent, the significant overt behavior of audience members is conventional. Different audiences, of course, have somewhat different conventions; and some members of a given audience may not abide by the conventions of that audience. The untrained child may gleefully jump up and down in his seat and otherwise actively express his response

to the antics of Mickey Mouse; and occasionally an adult is so unconventional as to talk during the progress of a play. In general, however, it is the practice of audience members to remain fairly passive for most of the time, reacting to words, music, or motion covertly, and to express their responses actively only at the appropriate intervals.

While the audience is passive, the designated leader provides the principal stimuli which affect the audience members. Each is more reactive to him than to other stimuli sources, such as physiological states, physical setting, and the presence of others. As long as the audience remains passive, each member reacts to the leader more or less independently of the other members. Except for the strangeness which such a situation would produce, each might almost as well be the only member of the audience.

This polarization of the audience upon the designated leader may not, however, be constant.⁹ Since the members vary as individuals, some are more likely than are the others to experience an overpowering desire to laugh aloud at a joke, to clap approval at something the lecturer has said, or otherwise to give active overt expression to their covert responses to audience leadership. When such an exceedingly responsive member so expresses his responses, the audience reacts for the moment to that member. Their attention is diverted from the stage or platform leader and is repolarized temporarily on that member. If his action is an irritating interruption, the other members may "shush"; and he subsides. If, however, that member has expressed overtly what any considerable proportion of the audience feels, the act which he has inaugurated may "sweep over the audience." His laugh, hiss, gasp of surprise, or clap of approval becomes infectious; and the audience members interact with one another rather than with the leader. When this occurs, the entire character of the audience situation is temporarily changed to an activated audience situation.

Leader Behavior.—Through his overt actions, the leader of an audience affects the covert behavior of audience members. His overt behavior is, therefore, always purposive; *i.e.*, he behaves in terms of a distant end, the approval of his audience. Consequently, how he feels at the moment does not determine his overt behavior. The popular lecturer may be covertly wondering what he should do with his wayward son, but he will

go right on developing his lecture theme "The Joys of Family Life." To say what he really thinks might offend his audience, give him an unfavorable reputation, and hurt his earning power. Besides, it would be "bad form." The musician may feel sorely distressed by toothache or some other difficulty; yet, if he is a competent performer, he plays the composition in the designated mood. To play it in the mood of his toothache would hardly gain the approval of his listeners. The cast of a play may be covertly torn by internal friction; but, if the script requires them to, they will act as one happy family. The overt behavior of the leaders of an audience may, therefore, have no relationship to the covert feeling-states of those leaders.

Even when his audience becomes highly activated, the overt reactions of the leader to their behavior—laughing, clapping, hissing, etc.—will not be determined by his covert reactions thereto. The heckler from the floor may irk the political speaker; but, if the speaker is a good performer, no one will ever know this.

LEADERSHIP

Audience leaders are, in the first instance, self-elected; *i.e.*, a given man, a theatrical cast, or the like, offers to lead an audience. The members of a community, however, select, as we have seen, from all such offerings those which they will accept. Any audience leader has, therefore, been "elected" to membership in the same sense that a politician is elected to office under the democratic process. The act by which the audience members "elect" a given leader depends, of course, upon the type of audience. It may consist of buying a ticket or simply of walking into an auditorium and sitting down.

Once an audience has assembled, however, its behavior is, within limits, determined by the character of its leadership. Two factors, not necessarily related, are involved: the name prestige of the leader and the skill of the leader.

Name Prestige.—Individuals join a given audience in anticipation of certain satisfactions. Occasionally, this anticipation is based on past experience with the leader involved. Thus, people may attend a recital by Roland Hayes because they enjoyed his singing on a previous appearance. Ordinarily, however, anticipation is based on less tangible grounds, usually

what has been heard and read about the speaker, the play, the actor, the musician, or the motion picture. The result is that anticipation tends to be founded upon what may be described as name prestige—the prestige of the name of the play, motion picture, or opera, or the concert program; or else the name of the lead of the play, the star of the motion picture, the star of the opera, or the conductor of the orchestra; or the names of both the play and the lead, etc. It is because of the fact that name prestige has a strong audience-drawing power that some few orchestras, actors, singers, and the like can command exceedingly high fees, while the majority are paid little above a living wage.

Not only does the name prestige of an audience leader attract audience members, but it also plays a considerable part in determining audience behavior.¹⁰ Just as the reputation of a person conditions the treatment he will be accorded by new acquaintances, the reputation of an audience leader conditions the treatment he will be accorded by an audience. Having submitted to his leadership with great expectations, the members of an audience may figuratively amuse themselves; *i.e.*, they may enjoy the play, picture, or music mainly because they “know” it is enjoyable. If, however, they have for some reason submitted to an audience leader doubtfully, or in a spirit of “try and please me,” they will be exceedingly critical and will be disinclined to read into his performance enjoyable attributes.

The effect of name prestige upon audience behavior has been repeatedly demonstrated. In the literary trade, it is spoken of as “snob appeal,” a reference to the fact that a writer who has name prestige will be received with acclaim when he speaks to an audience, no matter how poor a speaker he may be. The beloved politician has frequently been wildly and widely acclaimed upon reading a patchwork of dull platitudes. On the other hand, the great musical or theatrical artist has been scornfully received when he appeared, as was something of the fashion a generation ago, anonymously on an amateur program.

Since name prestige influences the effectiveness of the audience leader, publicity directors frequently attempt to make up for the inadequacies of a bad performer or performance by the intensification of audience anticipation. It is a rather fixed belief among publicity men that almost anyone can be made a great performer by sheer “ballyhoo.”

Leadership Skill.—Name prestige is, however, merely an initial advantage for the audience leader. In the long run, the effectiveness of the leader is determined by his skill at leadership. Name prestige may reflect that skill and assure the skilled leader a receptive audience; and once skill has given rise to name prestige, that prestige may make it possible for a leader to exploit his reputation for a time. Even name prestige which is developed by publicity or is consequent upon the halo effect—*i.e.*, skill at something other than audience leadership—may give the unskilled leader a brief acceptance. In the long run, however, name prestige cannot in itself assure success at leadership. Such success is a matter of skill in providing real, rather than imputed, audience satisfaction.

It is doubtful if there is anything universal in the art of audience leadership, although certain of the philosophers will certainly disagree with this statement. At any event it is evident that we cannot point to any specific human attribute and say, "Here is a trait of audience leadership!" Skill at leadership in the audience situation, as in all situations, is not a general skill. Effective leadership of a given audience requires a specific skill appropriate to that situation. What constitutes such a skill in any particular situation is, of course, impossible to say. At most, we can say, tautologically, that leadership skill in any audience situation consists in so affecting the feeling-states of the audience members that they secure the satisfactions for which they have come.

In the following chapter some of the characteristic practices of audience leadership will be described. Here we shall be concerned with the more or less general process, rather than the practices, of such leadership.

Dramatization.—It does seem that the process, as contrasted to the skills, of effective audience leadership consists in telling a story which is satisfying to the particular audience and which is told in ways which will be effective with that particular audience. For, in the audience situation, as in the congenial situation, the leadership procedure is dramatization. This is as true of the popular lecture as of the play and the motion picture.

What particular method of dramatic leadership will be employed depends (1) upon the medium of communication and (2) upon the kinds of satisfactions anticipated by the

audience. The lecturer tells his story in words, whereas the cast of a play tell their story by enacting it. The comedian tells his audience an amusing story, whereas the tragedian tells his audience a sad one.

The procedure in all dramatization is, as was indicated in Chap. II, the manipulation of forces in conflict and the ultimate resolution of that conflict. Such conflict is made meaningful by personifying that which would seem to be a desirable end, by personifying the forces which thwart the attainment of that end, and by personifying the forces which assist the attainment of that end. The result is the dramatic trinity of heroine, villain, and hero, respectively. The conflict between the forces of evil and the forces of good for the desirable end—*i.e.*, the conflict between villain and hero for heroine—constitutes the “story” which is told by the audience leader. (Two or more interwoven stories may, of course, be involved; but one of them will always be primary.)

The possible exception to the statement that the process of audience leadership consists in telling a story is the leadership of a musical audience. The title of a composition may give the listener a clue to the “story” he should “feel,” but such symbolic value as a musical passage may have for an audience is mainly a consequence of association with some other communication medium. Thus, the air of a popular song may suggest to listeners the words which usually accompany it; and an aria may suggest the operatic scene with which it is usually associated. Contrary to the claims of some mystics, it is doubtful if nonvocal music has the power of doing much more than bringing about dynamic mood changes. Certainly music *per se* cannot tell listeners a story.¹¹

The musician can, no doubt, increase the effectiveness of his music by dramatizing his role as a person. By appropriate gestures, the concert pianist may impress his audience with the difficulty of the composition he is playing. The conductor of an orchestra or a band may contribute to his musical effects by dramatic gestures which may have no functional place in the actual production of that music. The conductor need not rise tensely on his toes, lean forward, and commandingly stab his baton in the direction of the brasses to set them into action. Such a gesture may, however, contribute greatly to the effect

on the audience of the sudden burst of horns. The conductor thereby gives the audience something to watch while they listen. His behavior assists them in following the movement of the music. Possibly, he acts as a symbol of the orchestra: his actions may suggest that the orchestra is fighting a winning battle with the hazards of musical rendition, and a certain personalized element of dramatic conflict may thereby be interjected into the performance. "Platform presence" is, thus, often almost as important to such a leader as is his excellence as a musician.

In all other kinds of audiences, leadership consists in telling a story by the manipulation of symbolic persons. The members of the audience identify themselves with these symbolic persons and vicariously participate in the action of the story. It is through such vicarious experience that the members of the audience secure those recreational satisfactions for which they have come.

Leader Reaction to Audience Action.—Although the members of an audience react more to the leader than he does to any one of them, every audience situation nevertheless involves an interaction between the audience members and the leader.¹² The reaction of the leader to the responses of his audience may be of quite a different order than is the reaction of a speaker in intimate conversation to the responses of his listeners. In the first place, the reaction of the audience leader is to a mass of complex stimuli, as is the case when the actor responds to the "mood" of his audience. In the second place, leader reaction may occur as an anticipation of audience behavior, rather than as an instantaneous adjustment thereto, as is the case when the lecturer writes a speech. The audience situation is, however, in the strictest sense a social situation, since there is always some sort of interaction between the leader and the members.

Both the periodic active reactions—the hissing, hand clapping, laughing, etc.—and the constant passive reactions—the smiles, frowns, nods, changes of position, etc.—of the audience members constitute stimuli to which the audience leader must respond. The former types of stimuli are obvious, and the necessity of the leader's adjusting to them is apparent. The latter types of stimuli are subtle and are often barely perceptible. The necessity for his responding to them is just as great, but his ability to do so is not easily acquired. If a leader can interpret and react

to the subtle stimuli, it is only because he has had long practice in audience leadership; for often these stimuli are so slight that neither he nor his audience is aware of what is involved. This is not to say that anything "extrasensory" is involved. The stimuli which emanate from audience members and to which the leader responds are of the ordinary visual and auditory orders.

In interpreting and reacting to the stimuli which emanate from his audience, the lecturer has an advantage over many other audience leaders. He receives some visual as well as auditory indications of the reactions of his audience to his leadership. Ordinarily, he can observe the changes in facial expression, the body movements, and the direction of visual attention of the members of his audience, as well as hear their coughing, sighs, and shuffling of feet.

Such evidence as is available indicates that those who are habituated to lecturing to comparatively small audiences utilize more or less consciously one of two techniques: either they fasten upon some one member and use him as a representative of the total membership, or else they perceive the audience as a totality. In the latter case, the audience becomes a sort of synthetic person who is seen and heard, not as separate individuals, but, as one professional lecturer has expressed it, as "a vast, vague, upturned face, without form or substance, but with a definite personality." In other words, the lecturer synthesizes all the visual and auditory stimuli which come to him from the various members of the audience and responds to the totality rather than to any particular part.

The method by which the lecturer interprets and reacts to the responses of his audience is simple in comparison with that by which an actor judges those of his audience. The distance of the actor from the audience and the fact that the stage is bright and the pit dark combine to make the actor dependent largely upon auditory stimuli for his clues to audience reaction. The old-time "trouper" could, nevertheless, get the "feel" of his audience the moment he stepped onto the stage. The rustle of programs, the shuffle of feet, the murmur of voices, perhaps the very absence of sound, told him how his audience felt.

Even when the leader of an audience has a set "story" to tell, he constantly makes adjustments to the audience. The

public speaker may have a written speech, but his delivery is varied according to the response of his audience. The cast of a play follows the fixed script; but the tempo, the tone, and the nuances of its presentation are subject to variation in accordance with the response of the particular audience.

Because they are accustomed to depending on audience reaction, professionals of the legitimate theater are often incompetent when they attempt to perform for an unknown, unseen, and unheard radio public. It was, in fact, to overcome this difficulty that broadcasters originally provided studio audiences for some types of performers.

Activation as a Leadership Device.—The slight and subtle stimuli which emanate from an audience are important mainly as they affect the leader, since in its normally passive state the members of the audience interact with the leader rather than with one another. At the periods of active overt expression, however, the direction and nature of situational interaction is changed. Interaction among audience members, as well as between leader and members, occurs.

Such interaction among the audience members may, however, directly contribute to the effectiveness of the designated leadership. The members of the audience so stimulate one another that they become more responsive to the leader. This interaction follows the principle of interactional amplification which was described in a preceding chapter.

In many cases, as we shall see, the audience leader deliberately attempts to activate the members of his audience to interaction among themselves. This is what the popular speaker attempts to do when he opens his speech with words calculated to invoke a laugh. The leader will then be temporarily renouncing his status as leader so that his effectiveness as a leader will subsequently be greater.

What theatrical people call "warming a cold house" is essentially the generation of a particular audience mood by activating the audience to mild interaction as a preparation for ready response to some other leadership device. Such activation, of course, works both ways. Just as the leader may increase the responsiveness of his audience by activating it, the activated audience may stimulate the leader to exceptional efforts. A superlative performance, for example, is frequently the con-

sequence of the exceptional ovation which greets the performer upon his appearance.

It is to assure and control audience activation that the traditional claque is employed in theaters. By scattering throughout the audience men who know when overt expression is desirable for the leader, untimely applause can be checked and vigorous approval assured. A quick but pointed hiss may prevent the untimely clap from spreading; a burst of applause at the right moment may be picked up and spread until it rings from the rafters.

Activating the audience is, however, a dangerous leadership device. The activated audience may get out of hand, as when it becomes so "hysterical" from laughing that any attempt of the designated leader to resume control immediately induces further laughter. When this occurs, all semblance of systematic organization has disappeared. The group is actually providing its own leadership, and the situation has ceased to be of the audience type.

THE HYPOTHETICAL LISTENER

The audience leader whose performance is wholly guided by the reactions of his audience has a certain advantage over the one with a fixed procedure.¹³ He remains, as it were, constantly *en rapport* with his audience. His speech or action has, therefore, an intimate and personal tone. He may simply start off with some conventional phrase or gesture, feel out his audience's reaction to it, and thereafter guide and be guided by his audience from point to point.

The lecturer who writes an address or the actor who rehearses a play must anticipate the reactions of his audience to his leadership. He must, therefore, react to his audience before they react to him. His problem is, as a consequence, a more difficult one than is that of the extemporaneous speaker. Both kinds of audience leaders, however, adjust themselves to their audiences—the one in anticipation and the other on the basis of audience cues—in terms of what may be called the hypothetical listener.

As a Conceptual Person.—Whatever the nature of the leadership he wishes to provide, the object of the leader is to secure a series of specific responses from the largest possible number of the members of his audience. To this end, he endeavors to

use communication symbols which will in each instance secure the maximum number of desired responses and the minimum number of undesired responses. In selecting the symbols which he uses, he adjusts himself, not to any one person, but to a conceptual person, the hypothetical listener.

The audience leader cannot direct his attention to any one person in the audience. In the first place, all human beings do not react to any one symbol in a common way. For example, one person may be amused and another angered by the expression "easy divorce." In the second place, not all human beings will react to every symbol. For example, although most people may respond to the word "prevaricate," others may not know the meaning of the word and, hence, will not respond to it.¹⁴ In the third place, no one individual is consistent as to the kinds of symbols to which he responds. For example, the laboring man may not respond to the multisyllabic words of science; but he may respond to those multisyllabic terms of his particular craft.

As a consequence, the audience leader must endeavor to use only those symbols which all the members of his audience will understand and to which, furthermore, they will all respond in a common way. The composite of the separate judgments which he passes in selecting these symbols—whether he is writing an address or delivering an extemporaneous speech—constitutes his concept of the hypothetical listener.¹⁵

Effects of Audience Selectiveness and Size.—The less effectively selected the membership of an audience, the more limited the stature of the hypothetical listener. The effects of membership selection are obvious. If only members of the medical profession attend a lecture, it is safe to assume that the hypothetical listener of that audience can understand and will react in the desired ways to the more common technical terms of medical science. If the lecture is open to the public, on the other hand, the hypothetical listener will respond satisfactorily to few technical terms. The lecturer will, therefore, find it necessary to call a pain in the neck a "pain in the neck" and not "cervical myalgia."

There is usually a relationship between the selectness of an audience and its size. An audience composed of practicing physicians from the state of Wisconsin will be both more select

and smaller than will one which is composed of American physicians. At the same time, audience size, irrespective of selectness, is an important factor in determining the stature of the hypothetical listener. As we have seen, the hypothetical listener represents the symbols to which all the members of the audience will respond in the desired ways. The addition of a new member to the audience who cannot react properly to one or more of these symbols will, thus, decrease the stature of the hypothetical listener—the fact that the new member may be able to respond to some symbols to which the hypothetical listener cannot respond is beside the point. Because of the tendency for each additional member to reduce the stature of the hypothetical listener, while he can never add to that stature, there is, in general, an inverse relationship between audience size and the stature of the hypothetical listener.

Criticism of the low quality of the speeches made by politicians neglects the fact that such audience leaders are appealing to exceptionally large audiences. The size of a political audience impels the politician to speak in words of one syllable, to deal with such simple ideas as the fact that taxes have been rising, and to appeal to such elementary stereotypes as “mother love” and “national loyalty.” Whatever we may think of professional politicians, this much must be said in defense of them: they are seldom so simple-minded as their speeches would lead us to suppose. The simple-mindedness which is reflected in his public speech may simply be a consequence of the fact that the politician has effectively gauged the stature of his hypothetical listener.¹⁶

What is true of the political speaker is likewise true of other leaders who appeal to large audiences. The relationship between the number of people to whom a leader appeals and the stature of the hypothetical listener will be even more evident when we turn to a consideration of public behavior. There are, it may be said at this point, occasional and unanticipated exceptions; but the general rule seems to be that the play, the motion picture, the book, the dance tune, etc., which will reach the larger national audience must have a simple theme and must be conveyed in simple symbols.

This does not, however, mean that such an offering need be devoid of artistry. The play *The Green Pastures*, which had a

tremendous run in the United States during 1935, for example, received critical acclaim. Because it expressed simple personifications of Christian theology in such a way that the average child could understand them, it reached the hypothetical listener of an audience numbered perhaps in tens of thousands. That it was an artistic success simply indicates that there are subtle as well as crude ways of conveying simple themes through simple symbols.

OTHER FACTORS AFFECTING AUDIENCE BEHAVIOR

Audience Density.—The spatial relationships of the members of an audience have a significant effect upon audience behavior. The tendency of an audience to become activated is in part a matter of these spatial relationships. Activation, it will be recalled, involves interaction between members of the audience.

Many of the overt reactions of an audience member to the leader will have only short-range effectiveness. In the closely packed audience, the sigh, the nod of agreement, the slight body movement which is indicative of inattention, the inadvertent but half-checked clap of palms, etc., of one member might stimulate other members to similar overt action. In a scattered audience, however, such slight overt responses may die a-borning. Furthermore, the individual in a scattered audience is inclined to be more conscious of himself than he would be were he rubbing elbows with other people. If he laughs aloud and others do not immediately take up his laugh, he may feel conspicuous. In a closely packed audience, his laugh may be effective in stimulating others; and, as a person, he will be more or less anonymous. Thus, because of two interdependent factors, the dense audience is far more likely to become actively responsive than is the scattered one.

Since most audience leaders depend in part upon audience interstimulation to intensify the effects of what they do as leaders, most actors and speakers will prefer having an audience uncomfortably packed into a small theater or auditorium to having the same audience scattered throughout a large one. Playing to a half-empty house is perhaps the most difficult task which the actor and the musician ever face. Speaking to a scattered audience is one of the most trying experiences of the politician

and the popular lecturer. This is, of course, a consequence of the fact that the process of interactional amplification does not operate in such audiences to assist the leader in getting his effects. From his point of view, the members of such an audience are hard to amuse and difficult to convert.

Physical Setting.—The physical setting of an audience contributes considerably to its initial "set." A barren and inconvenient auditorium or theater tends to make the members of the audience irritable and inattentive, especially if those members are accustomed to better facilities.¹⁷ To tramp down a cluttered aisle, stumble over the knees of earlier arrivals, sit in an uncomfortable and hazardous folding seat, and stare for some time at barren or unsightly walls is poor preparation for a rendition of Beethoven's moonlight sonata or for the enactment of a drama laid in a royal setting.

In the days when "trouper" made one-night stands in the "opera houses" of the land, these houses were rated by the theatrical fraternity as easy or difficult. For the audiences in difficult theaters, a special initial effort had to be made to secure attention and to dissipate the impression which the theater itself had made.

Lecture audiences, as well as theater audiences, are affected by their physical surroundings. Lighting facilities, seating arrangements, room temperature, ventilation, and any external distractions all influence audience mood.

The Weather.—Even the state of the weather may influence the initial "set" of an audience. People who have struggled with icy streets or high snowdrifts to reach a theater or auditorium may arrive with chips on their shoulders. They have paid a tangible, sacrifice price for membership and may feel supercritical, at least at the outset. Occasionally, the reverse effect upon mood is evidenced. People are so much relieved to be out of the storm that they will be more than usually responsive to leadership.

When local weather conditions are exceptional, this fact in itself often constitutes a distraction from the theme of the audience leader. In the midst of a sudden blizzard or heat wave, it is difficult to get the attention of people off the weather and onto politics, science, literature, art, or the doings of a character from history.

Weather which is in marked contrast to that which is indicated in a play may inhibit audience response. The audience which has left subzero weather outside the theater may not "feel" the soft caress of tropical winds as readily as an audience which has just left behind a fine June night. The audience which has for days been sweltering in midsummer heat may not be inclined to sympathize with little Eliza on the ice. In the heart of winter, that same audience might be quickly aroused to sympathetic shivers.

Social Influences.—In addition to the foregoing, local social circumstances may be an important factor in audience behavior. Audience members assemble because they are interested in the program which has been announced. The degree of interest in any given play or lecture may, however, vary from time to time. The timeliness of any offering is determined both by general, and by local, social circumstances. These latter may make a given audience respond abnormally to a particular theme. The audience in a community which has just experienced a shocking murder case, for example, will be more or less disinclined to approve of the play or motion picture which treats the subject of murder lightly. The town which has just elected a reform administration will likely provide a poor audience for the political muckraker. The community which has just suffered from some disaster will probably turn out rather critically to see the play or hear the speech with a message of goodness and light.

SUMMARY

Audience behavior is, thus, a product of many factors. The members of the audience assemble more or less keenly anticipating certain recreational satisfactions. In the endeavor to provide these desired satisfactions, the leader "tells" a story, into which the audience members may project themselves and may thereby secure vicarious experiences. To be effective, the story and the manner of its telling must be adapted to the particular audience. Thus, the leader endeavors to adjust himself to that audience in terms of a hypothetical listener, a conceptual person whose attributes depend upon the source and the size of the audience membership. Since his effects are in part dependent upon audience interstimulation, the leader

must take into account the density of his audience. Since many other extraneous factors, such as physical setting, will affect the responsiveness of his audience, these, too, must be taken into consideration. To say that the behavior of an audience is determined by its leader would, therefore, be to tell but a small part of the story.

APPENDIX

1. In view of the considerable proportion of their time and money which modern people devote to audience membership, remarkably few factual data are available on the subject of audience behavior. Histories of the theater, manuals on the drama, monographs on the technique of debating, and so on, are abundantly available. Studies of the behavior of audiences are few and so tentative in character that the findings are no more than suggestive.

The pioneer monographic work on the audience is C.H. Woolbert's "The Audience" (*Psychol. Rev. Monog.*, 1916, 21). The only recent book on the audience situation is H.L. Hollingworth's *The Psychology of the Audience* (New York, American Book, 1935). This work is marred by the fact that the author approaches his problem largely in terms of leadership, with the result that the book is more "practical" than analytical. Suggestive of the inadequacy of researches on audience behavior is the fact that Hollingworth, although he professes to cover the experimental literature, succeeds in compiling only seventy-five references. Of these, only thirty-three are references to studies which by any stretch of the imagination can be considered factual. Of these thirty-three studies, only fourteen bear directly on the subject of audience behavior. Of these fourteen relevant studies, only five were made less than a decade ago.

For some reason, however, Hollingworth ignores the Payne Fund Studies on Motion Pictures and Youth which appeared in 1933. These studies were conducted at the instigation of the Motion Picture Research Council. Although they were all too obviously intended to substantiate the currently popular idea that the idealization of the gangster by the motion pictures is an important factor in the cause of actual gangsterism, some significant and reliable data on the behavior of motion-picture audiences were obtained in these studies, to which reference will be made in subsequent notes.

2. K. Young (*Social Psychology*, New York, Crofts, 1930, 544) considers that the satisfactions derived from recreational audience membership are of the same order as those secured from daydreaming—*i.e.*, of an escape order. Hollingworth (*op. cit.*) evades the issue. An experimental approach to the problem of how audience members secure their satisfactions has been made by W.S. Dysinger and C.A. Ruckmick (*The Emotional Responses of Children to the Motion Picture Situation*, New York, Macmillan, 1933). These investigators secured the responses, as measured by the psychogalvanometer, of various age and sex groups to scenes enacted on the motion-picture screen. Such measurement, as has been mentioned previ-

ously, does not indicate the order of covert response, but indicates only the fact that some sort of response occurs. The findings are, however, interesting and may be briefly summarized as follows: (1) The intensity of response to a given scene differs widely among individuals in all sex and age groups. (2) Children under twelve years of age were most responsive to action scenes (fights, hard riding, etc.) and were least responsive to scenes involving love making. (3) Youths around sixteen were more responsive to scenes of love making than either the twelve-year group or the adult group. (4) No sex difference in responsiveness to scenes involving love making were discovered. (5) Males respond more intensely than females to scenes involving physical danger. (6) The younger the subject, the more he responds to specific scenes and the less he responds to the story as a whole.

3. Few sociologists would doubt that there has been a close historical relationship between urbanization and dependence on audience membership for recreational satisfactions. The history of the drama, for example, has in every instance—Greek, Roman, and modern drama—been one phase of the history of urban development. See:

Cheney, S., *The Theatre: Three Thousand Years of Drama, Acting, and Stagecraft*, New York, Longmans, Green, 1929.

Flaccus, L.W., *The Spirit and Substance of Art*, New York, Crofts, 1926.

Hastings, C., *The Theatre, Its Development in France and England, and a History of Its Greek and Latin Origins*, London, Duckworth, 1901.

Hughes, G., *The Story of the Theatre*, New York, French, 1928.

Nicoll, A., *Masks, Mimes, and Miracles*, London, Harrap, 1931.

Some appreciation of the extent to which modern Americans depend upon audience membership as a source of recreational satisfactions may be gained from the annual expenditures for such membership as estimated by J.F. Steiner (*Recent Social Trends*, Report of the President's Research Committee on Recent Trends, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1933, 1 vol. ed., 949). On the basis of all the available data, Steiner concludes that the American people spend something over \$1,500,000,000 a year to secure membership in motion-picture and other recreational audiences. According to the Motion Picture Producers and Distributors Association, average weekly motion-picture attendance in the United States increased from 40,000,000 in 1922 to 95,000,000 in 1929 and to an estimated 115,000,000 in 1930 (*New York Times*, Nov. 9, 1930). Some of this gain was at the expense of the legitimate theater; most of it, however, represents an increased reliance upon audience membership for recreational satisfactions.

The moralists are prone to consider such facts as the foregoing as evidence that modern people are "pleasure mad." For a sociological interpretation see D.W. Harding, "The Place of Entertainment in Social Life" (*Amer. Sociol. Rev.*, 1934, 26, 393-406).

4. Of recent years there has appeared a slight trend toward the non-commercial community theater, in which members of a community take turns at being actors and spectators. There has also been some concerted

effort to revive folk drama in America. Nevertheless, even when the most is made of such trends (see, for example, A.E. Wood, *Community Problems*, New York, Century, 1928, Chap. XVII), they do not appear to be very significant.

5. For an overstatement of the possibilities of substituting motion pictures for books and teachers see D.C. Ottley, *The Cinema in Education* (London, Routledge, 1935).

The motion picture is a poor substitute for the teacher. It may, however, be used to supplement demonstration in certain types of classroom work. See F. Devereux, *The Educational Talking Picture* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1933) for an exaggerated, but nevertheless interesting, statement of this use of the motion picture.

For another approach to the relation between the motion picture and education see P.G. Cressey, "The Social Role of the Motion Picture in an Interstitial Area" (*Publ. Amer. Sociol. Soc.*, 1934, **28**, 90-94), and "The Motion Picture as Informal Education" (*J. Ed. Sociol.*, 1934, **7**, 504-515).

6. Censorship of newspapers and books, which will be discussed in a subsequent chapter, may be a matter of political expediency. Censorship of plays and motion pictures, on the other hand, is almost invariably moralistic in origin. The latter is a peculiarly English and American phenomenon and seems to stem from the Calvinistic tradition, wherein secular authority is made responsible for the enforcement of God's will.

Moralistic censorship may be described as the effort of a strong pressure group—such as ministers, women's clubs, or the like—to dictate to the members of some other group—such as those who enjoy burlesque—what they shall and shall not have available in the way of entertainment. It is analogous to the "censorship" of nudity among the Polynesians by Christian missionaries. The standards of what is and what is not permissible in plays or motion pictures are entirely a matter of personal taste; as a consequence, censorship has always been entirely whimsical. What is acceptable in one place may be objectionable in another; what is permissible today may be unthinkable tomorrow. For example, in 1937 burlesque was prohibited in New York but permitted in San Francisco.

The following news item illustrates the whimsical nature of such attempts:

"Publisher Hearst ordered Hearstpapers to throw out all advertisements and news of Mae West's new cinema *Klondike Annie*, start an editorial campaign against it. Editorial excerpts: 'It is an *immoral* and *indecent* film. . . . The story, scenes and dialog are basically libidinous and sensual. . . . Decent people will protest against . . . showing a white woman in the role, even inferred, of consort to a Chinese vice lord.' . . ."

"In the same issue they found a large advertisement of a Negro burlesque show, displaying two nude Negro women with the caption: 'It's a hot, sizzling performance of black & brown skin revues! Daring, intimate, greatest array of beautiful brown-skin models, with 89 teasing beauties on the stage!'" (*Time*, Mar. 9, 1936.)

For further descriptive material see H. Clark, *Oedipus and Pollyanna* (Seattle, University of Washington Press, 1927); F. Fowell, *Censorship*

in *England* (London, Palma, 1913); and O.J. Martin, *Hollywood's Movie Commandments* (New York, Wilson, 1937).

The justification for moralistic censorship has generally been that that which is censored would be bad for public morals. Some—e.g., the Legion of Decency—more realistically have placed censorship on the basis of taste. Occasionally, as the following news item attests, the justification is simply ludicrous; the occasion was the trial of an American girl who was arrested in Paris for near-nude dancing in a French theater:

“‘Let us remind this Court,’ continued M. Boverat, ‘that public morality and the birthrate are intimately interrelated. Our researches incontrovertibly substantiate this fact. French Canada, a country with the highest morals, has the highest birthrate. . . . Since Adolf Hitler suppressed nude dancing the Nazi birthrate has risen 35,000 a year. Finally, I submit that this is not Chicago. This is Paris! How are people to know that she is an American and not a Frenchwoman? We have the good name of Paris and of France to think of! I demand that she be punished on principle!’” (*Time*, July 22, 1935).

M. Boverat is not, however, the only ingenious ideology maker for the censors. The publicity-seeking band leader Emery Deutsch offers the following reason for his censoring his own musical programs: “‘Swing music should be barred from the networks. Perhaps music has charms to soothe the savage breast, but swing music can and does induce barbaric emotions in listeners. . . . We cannot control radio programs so that only the normal people may listen. For this reason, my orchestra will not play swing music over the air. And I will try my best to get as many of my colleagues as possible to keep swing off the air, and in this way reduce the number of sex-crimes!’” (*Down Beat*, September, 1937.)

In the United States the attempt to find sociological justification for moralistic censorship has taken its most impressive form in the Payne Fund studies of the effects of motion pictures on children (see note 1). Chief ideologist was H.J. Forman (*Our Movie Made Children*, New York, Macmillan, 1933). Assistant ideologist was W.W. Charters (*Motion Pictures and Youth*, New York, Macmillan, 1933). The pseudosociological argument, drawn from the Payne Fund studies and advanced by both Forman and Charters, in defense of strict censorship of the motion pictures can be briefed as follows: (1) The motion pictures convey a high proportion of antisocial stories, and this proportion is constantly rising (E. Dale, *The Content of Motion Pictures*, New York, Macmillan, 1935). (2) Children's attitudes, as measured by questionnaires, are significantly affected by what they see in the motion pictures (R.C. Peterson and L.L. Thurstone, *Motion Pictures and the Social Attitudes of Children*, New York, Macmillan, 1935; F.K. Shuttleworth and M.A. May, *Social Conduct and Attitudes of Movie Fans*, New York, Macmillan, 1933; and P.W. Holaday and G.D. Stoddard, *Getting Ideas from the Movies*, New York, Macmillan, 1933). (3) Children tend to apply in action what they learn from motion pictures; consequently the motion-picture idealization of criminals has been the cause of a great deal of juvenile delinquency (H. Blumer, *Movies and Conduct*, New York,

Macmillan, 1933; and H. Blumer and P.M. Hauser, *Movies, Delinquency, and Crime*, New York, Macmillan, 1933). (4) Even when motion pictures do not make criminals out of children, scenes of violent action are emotionally upsetting to children (Dysinger and Ruckmick, *op. cit.*), and disturb their sleep (S. Renshaw, V.L. Miller, and D.P. Marquis, *Children's Sleep, etc.*, New York, Macmillan, 1933).

Actually, however, the evidence provided by the Payne Fund studies does not impel the conclusion that motion pictures should be censored for the welfare of American youth; and in fairness to the investigators it should be stated that they did not draw from their data such specious conclusions as did Forman and Charters. Some of the relevant points which were not considered by Forman and Charters are: (1) The classification of stories into such categories as "favorable to crime" and "unfavorable to crime" is at best a highly subjective process. Perhaps the motion pictures have been growing more antisocial, perhaps not. (2) The fact that children's measurable attitudes are affected by motion pictures indicates nothing regarding the effect of those pictures on the nonsymbolic behavior of those children. R.T. LaPiere ("Attitudes versus Actions," *Soc. Forc.*, 1934, 13, 230-237) has shown that attitudes, as measured by questionnaires, may correlate negatively with actual behavior. (3) The fact that 24.4 per cent of delinquent boys attend motion pictures five or more days a week while only 1.2 per cent of nondelinquents attend as often (Blumer, *op. cit.*) does not prove a causal relationship between motion pictures and delinquency. It may be that the conditions which cause boys to attend motion pictures frequently are the conditions which cause delinquency—*e.g.*, inadequate homes, indifferent parents, poor play facilities. (4) If the fact that motion pictures are emotionally disturbing and induce restlessness during sleep is any justification for censoring motion pictures, censorable also are the playing of games, particularly after dinner, calls made upon the family of the child during the evening, and so on; for these and many other things are inclined to arouse emotional responses and to disturb subsequent sleep.

If the danger of permitting children to see antisocial acts in motion pictures be as great as the moralists claim, one may be permitted to wonder why American boys have not destroyed themselves trying to jump over barns, etc., in emulation of their great breaker of physical laws Mickey Mouse; and why the small girls of America have not become perfect little angels these past few years in imitation of their idolized Shirley Temple.

7. The effort to reduce socially determined tastes in art, literature, music, and drama to absolute and final standards is unceasing. The thesis, however stated, is invariably that there is one good standard of artistic values and that all deviations therefrom are lacking in aesthetic merit. See:

Baudouin, C., *Psychoanalysis and Aesthetics*, New York, Dodd, Mead, 1924.

Chandler, A.R., *Beauty and Human Nature*, New York, Appleton-Century, 1934.

Ducasse, C.J., *The Philosophy of Art*, New York, Dial, 1929.

- Flaccus, L.W., *The Spirit and Substance of Art*, New York, Crofts, 1926.
 Hammond, W.A., *A Bibliography on Aesthetics and of the Philosophy of the Fine Arts from 1900-1932*, New York, Longmans, Green, 1934.
 Munro, T., *Scientific Method in Aesthetics*, New York, Norton, 1928.
 Rader, M.M., *A Modern Book on Aesthetics*, New York, Holt, 1935.

8. For the most amusing of all efforts to make one form of recreational leadership—dancing—a higher, spiritual activity, see I. Duncan, *My Life* (New York, Boni & Liveright, 1927).

For a realistic analysis of the "art for art's sake" ideology see A. Guérard, *Art for Art's Sake* (Boston, Lothrop, Lee & Shepard, 1936).

9. For a summary of the studies, none of which is very informative, on the maintenance of polarization in an audience, see Hollingworth (*op. cit.*, Chap. VI, "Holding the Audience").

10. Any person who can get his name in the national headlines, for whatever reason, and at the same time keep out of prison is assured at least one offer of a contract to appear in public. The promoter's assumption is that audiences will be attracted by name prestige or notoriety prestige alone. The following news item describes one of many such instances:

"In a brown ermine coat trimmed with blue fox, France's famed Widow Stavisky last week stepped off the *Ile de France* in Manhattan to keep an engagement in a Broadway night club. The onetime mannequin said that she is all but penniless, having given her jewels to her late husband Sacha, the Great Swindler who did Frenchmen out of \$18,000,000 and nearly provoked a French Revolution amid the stink of official corruption. . . . She does not dance, sing or act, simply walks around" (*Time*, Feb. 10, 1936).

11. The nonsymbolic character of the leadership of an audience through music has been discussed in detail by R.T. LaPiere and P.R. Farnsworth in *Social Psychology* (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1936, 168-170), a part of which is quoted below:

"But has music per se a symbolic value? A portion of it, undoubtedly, has some meaning. In our own culture, for example, slow music of a minor mode tends to mean sadness; and that of a major mode with quicker tempos frequently implies joy. To most people of our part of the world music which resolves well seems finished, at rest, and that left unresolved appears so unfinished that the story has been repeatedly told of musicians who could not be restrained from rushing to the most readily available pianos to complete unfinished resolutions. There are numerous other musical situations in this and in other cultures which somewhat similarly offer a trace of symbolism. Yet, in the main, the amount is so small in comparison with verbal or gestural behavior that we usually think of music as largely nonsymbolic. . . .

"The composer may be motivated by a love of communism, by the visceral drives which arise in neural syphilis, or by the exuberance of youth, for all the listener can tell. There is no procedure by which one can be informed what 'message' is supposedly being told. The listener cannot even be certain that the composer is earnestly endeavoring to tell him something. He may be 'pulling his leg,' as it were; for there is no sincerity

test or any other measure to tell us what is good in music. About all the composer can 'get across' is in the field of vague moods, except when he uses some musical form which has a definite meaning in a specific culture. The military march can be taken as an example of such an exception. But to say that music tells a real story is palpably absurd. Its effect on a person depends upon that individual's associations with the particular type of music in question. If he has had no association with it, he may be charmed with the innovations or angered by the lack of familiarity; but he is either deluded or tampering with the truth if he says he 'understands just what the composer is trying to say.'

See:

- Bahle, J., "Zur Psychologie des Musikalischen Gestaltens," *Arch. f. d. Psychol.*, 1930, **74**, 290-390.
- Gundlach, R.H., "Factors Determining the Characterization of Musical Phrases," *Amer. J. Psychol.*, 1935, **47**, 624-643.
- Hennig, R., "Beobachtungen zum Problem des Charakters der Tonarten," *Zsch. f. Psychol.*, 1932, **125**, 38-52.
- Hevner, K., "The Mood Effects of the Major and Minor Modes in Music," *Psychol. Bull.*, 1933, **30**, 584.
- , "The Affective Character of the Major and Minor Modes in Music," *Amer. J. Psychol.*, 1935, **47**, 103-118.
- Lee, V., *Music and Its Lovers*, London, Allen & Unwin, 1932.
- Lurje, W., "Wohnt der Musik ein bestimmtes Ethos inne?" *Arch. f. d. ges. Psychol.*, 1933, **87**, 351-363.
- Mursell, J.L., "Psychology of Music," *Psychol. Bull.*, 1932, **29**, 218-241.
- Phares, M.L., "Analysis of Musical Appreciation by Means of the Psychogalvanic Reflex Technique," *J. Exper. Psychol.*, 1934, **17**, 119-140.
- Roberts, H.H., "Variations in Melodic Renditions as an Indicator of Emotion," *Psychol. Rev.*, 1927, **34**, 463-471.
- Schoen, M. (Ed.), *The Effects of Music*, New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1927.
- Seashore, C.E., "Phonophotography as a New Approach to the Psychology of Emotion," *Feelings and Emotions*, Worcester, Clark University Press, 1928.
- Sherman, M., "Emotional Character of the Singing Voice," *J. Exper. Psychol.*, 1928, **11**, 495-497.
- Van Vliet, T.V., "The Emotional Effect of Intervals as Found in a Study of Art Songs," *Peabody Bull.*, 1935, **31**, 30-35.
- Wells, F.L., "Musical Symbolism," *J. Abn. and Soc. Psychol.*, 1929, **24**, 74-76.

12. For previous analyses of the reaction of the audience leader to audience members see Hollingworth (*op. cit.*, Chap. XI, "The Influence of the Audience") and Young (*op. cit.*, 546).

As audience leaders, individuals will, of course, vary considerably in the extent to which they respond to the behavior of their audiences.

The importance of the behavior of audience members in determining the performance of responsive actors and actresses is discussed in the following articles:

Bragdon, G., "Part an Audience Plays," *Theatre Arts Monthly*, November, 1932, 938-939.

Cowl, J., "Actress Appeals to Her Audience," *North American*, January, 1930, 7-11.

"Need for Hisses," *Review of Reviews*, January, 1930, 99.

"Weep No More, Ladies," *Lit. Dig.*, May 28, 1932, 17.

13. H.T. Moore ("The Attention Value of Lecturing without Notes," *J. Educ. Psychol.*, 1919, 10, 467-469) found that students are much more responsive to the teacher who talks extemporaneously than to one who reads notes, however well prepared. Presumably the increased attentiveness is a consequence of the fact that the man without notes adjusts to the responses of his audience more readily than does the one who lectures from notes.

14. The necessity of using the symbols—in this instance theatrical symbols—to which a given audience is responsive is vividly illustrated by the veteran showman W.A. Brady (*Showman*, New York, Dutton, 1937, 18-19):

"We were theatrical connoisseurs from the cradle. The small fry in the Old Bowery gallery had strict theories of how the villain ought to die when the hero did him in in the final scene. The old melodrama villains had a specialized technique for kicking the bucket—elbows stiff, spine rigid, then fall over backward square on the back of your head. It took skill to do it right and not kill yourself in good earnest. . . . When J.B. Studley, a fine old-time actor, started doing villains at the Old Bowery and tried dying like a human being—a natural, sprawling collapse—the whole house came right over the footlights at him with hisses and catcalls and roars of protest—they wanted a real fall. It wasn't till Studley had learned to stiffen up and crash in the conventional way—and he got to be one of the best fallers in the business—that they'd tolerate him at all."

15. For a professional version of the differences between audiences see R. Frank, "Out Front; Four Audiences: a Case Study" (*Theatre Arts Monthly*, May, 1936, 379-383).

For an interesting and suggestive sociological approach to the concept of the hypothetical listener see J.E. Foster, "The Group in Terms of Propaganda" (*Amer. Sociol. Rev.*, 1937, 2, 247-252).

16. Even Herr Hitler is not, according to the following news item, so stupid as some of his political speeches make him appear:

"If Adolf Hitler had what psychologists call a split personality he could scarcely present himself more differently than he actually does to Germans on the one hand and to foreigners on the other. When addressing his own people on domestic issues Orator Hitler is alternately brawling and sentimental, repetitious, diffuse, coarse and ever more amazingly repetitious. His anxious care is to 'talk down' to the stupidest German lout who can possibly be listening. With the 'Little Man' ever in mind, Realmleader Hitler, the 'Apotheosis of the Little Man,' hammers away coarsely, repeating his points over & over again for hours at a stretch until his more cultivated radio listeners are ready to scream.

“Emotional and intuitive Little Adolf can also ‘talk up’ to logical, cerebral Latins and to Britons whom he humbly delights to consider superior persons. Broadcasts by Orator Hitler on foreign policy are so comparatively smooth, so well-turned and of such reasonable length as to amaze many Germans and lead to rumors that some be-monocled old-school diplomat of the Wilhelmstrasse must write them. But Adolf Hitler confronted face to face by a foreigner is also different from Adolf Hitler overpowering a dazzled German” (*Time*, Aug. 2, 1937).

17. J.W. Armstrong and T.D. Eliot (“External Conditioning Factors in Public Behavior,” *Soc. Forc.*, 1927, 5, 583-590) claim that the shape of the hall, the location of the stage or platform, its relation to seating arrangements, “atmosphere,” etc., all play an important part in audience behavior.

CHAPTER XI

AUDIENCE BEHAVIOR: II. TYPES OF AUDIENCES

Audience situations can be classified in terms of the type of dramatic story which is conveyed, the method by which it is conveyed, and the purpose which the audience leader has in conveying it. Thus, the story may be adventure in type, enacted as a play on the stage, and used as a means by which the cast secures its livelihood. A story of the same type might, however, be told through the words of a lecturer for the purpose of converting an audience to the desirability of electing a candidate to a political office.

For clarity of analysis, however, we shall first consider the types of dramatic stories which may be conveyed, regardless both of the method by which and of the purpose for which they are conveyed by audience leaders.

TYPES OF DRAMATIC STORIES

It is impossible to typify in terms of locale, characters, and events the dramatic stories which are used to entertain an audience. Dramatic stories are almost as varied as are the stories of actual life. One may be laid in the South Seas and may have as its heroine a Polynesian girl. Another may be laid in the mountains of Tennessee and may have as its heroine a rural nurse. Of the thousands of new stories created each year for American audiences, no two will be quite alike.

All dramatic stories may, however, be typified in terms of the various usages which are made of the dramatic trio and in terms of the various ways by which the conflict between the members of this trio is resolved. In these terms, we find a small number of fairly distinct and highly standardized types of dramatic stories.

Romance and Adventure.—The simplest and, at least to Western audiences, the most common is the story which comes out “happily” in the end. In such a story, the dramatic conflict resolves to the end that virtue—defined in terms of the particular

audience—secures its just reward and sin is put to rout. The audience members secure their satisfactions by identifying themselves positively with the hero or the heroine or both and by identifying themselves negatively with the villain. Vicariously, they may glory in the ultimate success of the hero and the heroine; vicariously, they may enjoy the defeat of the human symbol of evil.

The corollary to the assumption that the audience functions as a compensatory device is the assumption that the members of an audience identify themselves with characters of their own age and sex. Thus, the young man would identify himself with the young hero; the young girl, with the young heroine; the older man, with an older and perhaps secondary hero; etc. Actually, the process of vicarious experience through audience identification is not so simple as this theory would imply. A member of the audience may identify himself positively first with one and then with another of the characters. There is no reason to suppose that a middle-aged woman cannot in some measure identify herself with the sweet young thing as she runs her difficult course toward the hero's embrace. Possibly, what the members of an audience do is maintain a shifting identification, feeling with the commendable character, male or female, young or old, who is "front and center" in each of the scenes, as it arises.

In the modern world, where the relationship between the sexes has been so highly idealized that the ideal can, perhaps, seldom be realized, the romantic theme predominates in plays and motion pictures, although of recent years it has to some extent lost favor on the legitimate stage. By implication at least, lack of the attainment of the ideal relationship between the sexes has made relations of the sexes of strong interest to modern audiences. Certainly, it is true that scenario writers still devote most of their attention to the production of romantic stories. The theme "Boy meets girl" is their stock in trade.

A close second, however, is the adventure story. In this case, the heroine is the acquisition of wealth, the conquest of a nation, the completion of a bridge, the safe landing on a distant shore, or the like. The villain may be natural forces—wind and waves or desert wastes. Usually, to make the role of the hero more obvious and more difficult, one or a number of human villains

are thrown in—the unscrupulous man who would steal the hard-won wealth of the hero, savage tribes, mutinous seamen, or some such.

If there is any possibility that the audience may consider the goal unworthy of the hero's heroic efforts, romance may be added in the form of a lovely and lovable girl to go with the bridge, the wealth, or whatever the goal may be. When the romance aspect of a romance-adventure story outweighs the adventure phase and the whole has a happy ending, the result is melodrama. In melodrama the hero struggles to achieve two interrelated goals, neither of which can be secured without the other. He must, for example, finish the bridge in order to gain the respect and the devotion of the heroine. The villain directs his efforts more or less indiscriminately toward hampering the hero in both endeavors. Thus, he may belittle the hero in the eyes of the heroine by so thwarting the completion of the bridge that the hero appears to the heroine as a villain and the villain appears to her as a hero until the end, when all is disclosed. Melodrama was a very popular type of story a generation ago and still is, for that matter, although melodramatic techniques have been somewhat more subtle of recent years.

The mystery-thriller, now a particularly popular formula both in the theater and on the screen, is an adventure story, with or without romance, in which the villain is a constant threat to the life of all other characters. He is known to the other characters only by his effects until the end, when his person or his nature is uncovered.

In some contrast is the detective-mystery. This is simply an adventure story of a modified form, in which the conflict resolves largely around the hero's efforts to identify the villain and the latter's efforts to prevent such identification. In this kind of story, audience satisfaction may be derived in part from vicariously solving the complex puzzle which the hero faces.

Neither the romance nor the adventure formulas have much resemblance to real life.¹ Evidently, however, we so strongly wish that life followed these simple patterns that we are willing to overlook the banality of theme and the superficiality of treatment upon the stage, screen, and platform.

Tragedy.—The tragic story is one which does not come out "happily" in the end and, as such, is both much more akin to

reality and, as we shall see, far more difficult to handle. Most great plays have been tragic plays. Certainly, most of the plays which have "lived," such as those of Shakespeare, have been tragic in theme.

In marked contrast to the romance and adventure formulas, that of the tragedy is one which ends either in the defeat of the hero and the success of the villain or in a state of disequilibrium wherein hero and villain are still engaged in conflict. To make such a theme satisfying to an audience requires unusual technical skill and dramatic artistry. The members of the audience have come to be entertained, not distressed. To give them vicarious experience which is at once tragic and satisfying is to accomplish a difficult objective.

Apparently one of the necessary ingredients of successful tragedy is a villain who is either nonhuman or else is impersonal. Few tragedies in which a human villain achieves his reprehensible ends have proved satisfying. Human agents of impersonal forces are, however, often present. A meticulous judge may sentence the hero to death because the law so requires, a stupid law which works grave injustice on mankind. The procurer may set the heroine down the dreary path, but it is not he who is victorious; the victory belongs to detestable social conditions, which all righteous people heartily deplore but fatalistically accept. Not the ruthless banker, but impersonal drought, sterile soil, or rampant flood press the rural hero into debt and ultimate despair. Earthquake, fire, tornado, etc.—these are nonhuman villains of tragedy. War, revolution, depression, etc.—these are social, but impersonal, causes of human wretchedness.

The villains of tragedy defeat the hero and bring disaster to the heroine; but they can neither gain by their successes nor be hurt by human agencies. In tragedy the forces of evil are not personified. Consequently, the audience cannot make a negative identification with them. The successes of these forces are, therefore, accepted with resignation and do not in themselves give the audience a sense of displeasure. Were these forces personified, the sense of displeasure which the success of the villain would arouse, added to that which is induced by the defeat of the hero, would apparently be more than the ordinary, recreational audience would tolerate in the name of pleasure. Circum-

stances bring tragedy to the hero and heroine, but the victory of circumstances brings sorrow rather than displeasure.

Contrary to the opinion of some, the so-called social-problem story makes its appeal to recreational interests. It is simply a tragedy in which the villain is rather pointedly made out to be "the system"—with the implication that the system is not beyond the control of man himself. Although the appearance of such stories no doubt indicates public interest in social problems, the problem story is simply a tragedy with a timely villain. And, although playwright and lecturer may flatter themselves by thinking that they are forces for good, there is no reason to suppose that the social-problem story has the slightest effect upon the "problem." The tragedy of divorce, particularly to the children of broken homes, has been the theme of countless plays, sermons, and motion pictures; but the divorce rate continues its steady rise.

Why the tragedy is enjoyable is not difficult to see. By playing upon the feeling-states of the audience and by keeping those feeling-states in dynamic disequilibrium, the tragedy provides the audience with an emotional outlet. In the conventional phrase, it leads them to "run the gamut of emotions." This constant shift of covert feeling-states seems in itself to be pleasing to those who must lead humdrum emotional lives. Perhaps of equal importance is the fact that the dramatic tragedy may be comforting to the members of the audience. The trials and tribulations of the central characters, their bitter struggle, and their final despair are so great that, having lived vicariously for an hour or two in their world, the audience member can leave the theater or auditorium feeling that his life is by comparison one of happiness and contentment.

Comedy.—Technically, comedy is a general category including all nontragic stories. It is here used to indicate only those stories which are intended to make the audience laugh, to amuse it as well as to please it. Comedy, therefore, may take such forms as farce, parody, travesty, buffoonery, etc.

The comedy may have no plot at all but may consist, rather, of a series of unrelated, brief stories—"gags" or comic situations—with no more in common than the cast of characters. Even when the comedy has a definite plot, the plot is only a mechanism to permit the rise of amusing episodes. In other words, the

comedy effect is achieved by the resolution of a series of specific conflict situations.

Why some things amuse people is an unsettled question, and the theories of the comic are as various and as different as are their proponents. Two generalizations may, however, be derived from study of the practices of comedians.² In the first place, the practice of using stock situations in the building of a comedy suggests that people are amused by those things which they have been taught to consider funny. In the second place, the fact that the plot of the comedy may not differ essentially from that of a romance, an adventure, or a tragedy indicates that treatment of the plot, rather than plot per se, is of vital importance. By the very manner in which the cast treats it, a romance can be made to seem silly to an audience. Treated seriously, it might be taken with equal seriousness by that same audience. Likewise, a mere difference in treatment may make a tragic story into a comedy. When in the tragedy the hero stumbles on a toy and falls down the staircase, breaking a leg or, perhaps, landing to his utter consternation at the feet of his hostess, the audience feels vicariously something of the pain or anguish which he is supposed to feel. This same scene might, however, be treated as a comedy. The audience then laughs at, rather than weeps with, the hero as he falls down the staircase. In comedy a personal villain may be added in the character of one who deliberately pushes the hero to encourage his falling.

In this connection, it is to be observed that, although the comic actor who plays a "tragic" role is the hero, his characterization is one which makes impossible a tenacious, positive identification with him. The abnormal appearance or abnormal behavior of the comedian may not be funny in itself, but either or both of the factors serve to make it difficult for the members of his audience to put themselves in his place and to suffer the series of discomfitures to which he submits in the interest of humor.

The comic treatment of the tragic plot is evidently accomplished mainly by so controlling audience identification that at the "tragic" moment they can break identification with the hero. They may vicariously struggle with him to keep him from falling down the stairs. But, when the fall becomes inevitable, that identification may break; and, as it were, they let him

fall alone, experiencing a sense of relief which they express in laughter.

TYPES OF AUDIENCES

Any one of the foregoing types of dramatic stories may be conveyed by being enacted on the stage, by being projected on the motion-picture screen, or by being told on the lecture platform. These three methods of conveying a story result in three types and a number of variants of audience interaction. Each of these types has some peculiar attributes of its own.

THE THEATER AUDIENCE

For many centuries in classical China and for some two centuries in the Western world, the most characteristic form of audience entertainment has been the legitimate theater. Although of recent years the motion picture has challenged the supremacy of the legitimate theater, the motion picture has in large measure built upon the traditional devices of the legitimate theater.

In the theater the dramatic story is conveyed in a more or less realistic manner. In the first place, the characters of the story are represented by actual persons—the actors. In the second place, the dramatic conflict is conveyed through the speech and the action of these actual persons—the dialogue and the gestures and other movements. In contrast, the story which is told by a speaker is far less realistic. The characters are represented by verbal symbols, and the conflict must be conveyed by verbal symbols alone.

In point of fact, however, the manner of conveying a story to a theater audience is highly symbolic, no matter how realistic it may be. Theatrical effects are not secured by a stage reproduction of real persons, things, and events, but, rather, by symbols of reality. All phases and aspects of theater leadership involve the use of symbols to represent persons, things, and events. The fact that on the stage the story may be conveyed in a realistic way does not make it any the less a matter of symbolization.

Theatrical Symbols.—The members of a theater audience are more or less completely trained to respond to some relatively specific system of theatrical symbols as though those symbols were reality. These systems vary widely from place to place

and from time to time. Consequently, the symbols which appear vivid and real to one audience may appear stilted and highly artificial to another. Unless the story is enacted in that system of theatrical symbols to which the audience is accustomed, the enactment will seem unreal. Thus, the way in which a Chinese actor represents a corpse would seem ludicrous to Western audiences.³ Having indicated the occurrence of the death of the character by gently assuming a prostrate position, the actor may then rise and wander off the stage; or, if the action of the play will soon again center about the corpse, he may remain in a reclining position, passing the time until the corpse comes into the action by exchanging remarks with other actors who are momentarily out of character. Western audiences have been trained to more realistic symbolization and require that the actor who represents a corpse at least remain inanimate. He may, however, take a curtain call at the end of the act without destroying the illusion of the death of the character.

The physical background against which the dramatic story is portrayed in the theater may be either a starkly simple set or an elaborately complex, realistic set. In both cases, however, the set is symbolic of reality, rather than real. No matter how costly or how meticulously designed, the stage set of a royal palace is not a royal palace.

During the course of its development, the classical Chinese theater came to depend largely upon the actors to convey not only the action of the story but the physical setting as well. Buildings, trees, animals, and other objects which pertained to the story were in the main represented by gestures made by the actors whenever such objects became important to the action. To illustrate, the action which was supposed to be transpiring in a room would take place on an unadorned stage. If the story required a character to leave the room, the actor who represented this character simply turned his back to the audience and stepped away from them. To symbolize the opening and closing of the door of the room, he simply brought the tips of his fingers together and then drew them apart. Once this gesture had been completed, the story character was no longer present, although the actor might remain in full sight of the audience. To reenter his characterization and the "room," the actor faced the audience, repeated the gesture which symbolized the opening and closing

of a door, and stepped toward the audience. Similarly, other gestures were used to symbolize the presence and action of a horse, a dog, a book, etc.

In the Western theater, there has been a growing tendency to relieve the actor of responsibility for symbolizing the physical setting and to place it on the stage designer. The result is costly and elaborate scenery, properties, and costumes. When we compare the stage settings of a modern play with those used so recently as a generation ago, the elaboration of stage settings is striking. To the modern audience, the simple, crude backdrops and the equally crude stage properties which were used in the best of the original productions of such plays as *East Lynn*, *Uncle Tom's Cabin*, *Way Down East*, etc., would seem to detract from rather than to contribute to a sense of reality.⁴

There is, however, no inherent virtue in elaborate stage representations of real settings. Modern Western people find these symbols necessary only because they have been trained to need them. Our stage snow must look like and fall like snow if it is to convey the sense of actual snow. Our grandfathers could secure that same response when a handful of white confetti was thrown from somewhere off stage to indicate to the audience that it was supposed to be snowing. The Chinese can react similarly to a gesture which is made by one of the characters on the snowless stage.

Not only the settings but also the characters of the story are symbolic.⁵ As we have seen, the characters of a story personify that which is desirable, that which thwarts the attainment of the desirable, and that which leads to the achievement of the desirable. The characters which the actors represent are thus themselves but symbolic persons. For example, Fagin of *Oliver Twist* is villainy personified. The actor who is playing the role of Fagin is, therefore, symbolizing a dramatic symbol. Even when the actor represents a historical figure, the characterization of that historical figure is only a dramatic personification with an historical name attached. The Napoleon in a drama is a villain or a hero according to the uses which the playwright chooses to make of him.

The symbolic nature of theatrical characters is clearly evident when we consider the elaborate devices which are often used to make certain that the audience will realize which of the dramatic

roles an actor is playing. In the early English theater, for example, it was the practice for each actor to announce his character for the benefit of the audience. "I am the villain," said he, in an aside to the audience. During the latter half of the last century, when melodrama was greatly in vogue, particularly here in America, the villain usually wore black "handle-bar" mustaches, which he stroked gloatingly, and other obvious symbols of his symbolic role as a villain.

Of late, there has been a tendency to provide characters with somewhat mixed roles. The modern villain is likely to have some few desirable qualities as well as many vices; the hero need not be wholly virtuous; and the heroine need not be wholly pure. Such vagueness of modern theatrical symbolic persons only reflects contemporary uncertainty regarding all social values. For example, if there is any doubt that chastity is an inherent virtue, the heroine of a play may be a woman lacking chastity.

Even as the setting and the characters of the story are represented symbolically, the action of the story is represented symbolically. The actors do not live the story; they simply convey it by words and actions. In the Chinese theater, the symbolic words and actions are specifically theatrical. The dialogue, for example, is "sung" in a high pitch. In the early English theater, the characters often thought out loud, as the soliloquies of Shakespeare's characters attest. Although some of the more typical of modern theatrical symbols for conveying action, such as the raised voice and the exaggerated manner, are devices which are necessary in order to reach the back row of the audience, the majority are simply established theatrical mannerisms. At any event, should an actor behave in real life as he does on the stage, we should find him affected, to say the least.

Finally, it is evident that plot and plot continuity are entirely matters of symbolization. In at least three major respects every dramatic plot is thoroughly unlike reality. In the first place, the plot distorts reality by giving only those events which are interesting. The play omits the humdrum and commonplace occurrences which make up most of the life of most human beings. In the second place, the play compresses events into a brief span of time. The conflict which is supposed to have occurred during the lifetime of an individual or through the generations of a family

may transpire in two hours or so on the stage. Thus, the plot may do almost any violence to time and space. In the third place, the play brings characters and events into artificial juxtaposition. In order to tell the story in the background of a small number of stage settings, it brings characters together in accordance with plot requirements and, thus, in ways which are usually beyond the range of actual possibility.

The very essence of the leadership of the theater audience is the provision of vicarious experience through a manipulation of symbols. That such manipulation has no more than a temporary effect on the audience should be equally evident. Daydreaming has never changed the course of human history, nor has a theater performance ever changed the personality of an audience member. That the theater can influence subsequent behavior of the audience members and that it should, therefore, be subject to rigorous social regulation is an ideology of the moralists, not a verifiable fact. Of all types of audiences, that of the theater is least likely to convert its members to new forms of behavior, good or bad. The theater is a recreational agency.

Variants of the Theater Audience.—Although the play is, no doubt, the characteristic form of theater-audience leadership, leadership may take such forms as the production of music and the exhibition of dancing.⁶ Music may be built around a play, as in opera or musical comedy; and the words of songs may be used to convey story elements. In general, however, music does not consist of dramatic symbolization. In some instances dancing as a form of theater leadership would seem to secure its effects in much the same way as does music. What is generally termed interpretive dancing certainly does not in itself tell a story to the audience, although the dancers may find in such dancing a higher form of emotional symbolization. The violent gymnastics of some dancers may possibly convey a sense of dramatic action—at least, a sense of the conflict of physical skill against the laws of gravity. The type of dancing which is provided by such artists as Trudy Schupp, on the other hand, is definitely a means of telling a dramatic story. Here the dance consists of rhythmic pantomime in which the symbols used are comprehensible without a probing of the subconscious. Vaudeville, a form of theater leadership which was popular a generation ago on the stage but is now restricted largely to night-club shows and radio programs,

consists of a mixed offering of many types of theater leadership—brief plays, music, and dancing.⁷

THE MOTION-PICTURE AUDIENCE

From the point of view of the leadership involved, people who attend the showing of a motion picture constitute a public rather than an audience; for there is no direct interaction between them and the actors. At any particular showing of a motion picture, however, the group which assembles constitutes an audience; for interaction among the members of that group may occur. At present, our concern will be with the motion-picture audience, as opposed to the many such audiences which comprise the motion-picture public.

On the motion-picture screen, as on the stage, the dramatic story is conveyed by enactment. The symbols which are used in the enactment of the story on the screen are, however, quite different from those which are used on the stage. Whereas the characters are represented on the stage by actual persons, the characters are represented on the screen by magnified shadows of actual persons. And whereas the setting on the stage is symbolized by backdrops and properties, the setting on the screen is represented by shadows of actual settings. Thus, the motion picture provides a magnified two-dimensional world which is, in general, lacking in color.

The very nature of the symbols which are used in the motion-picture enactment of a story makes possible the use of some techniques not available to the stage. The symbols of the motion picture permit both wide scope of action and the picturing of elaborate settings, neither of which is possible on the stage. They also permit more elaborate devices to indicate a passage of time and to give a sense of continuity.

At the same time, the nature of the symbols used by the motion picture prevents the use of some stage techniques. In the early days of the motion picture, stage symbols were used in the enactment of motion-picture stories. The result on the screen was strikingly artificial. In being projected, the picture magnified the gestures of the stage. The stage gesture which had to be sweeping if it was to be seen by all the theater audience became grotesque on the screen. Consequently, in carrying over the stage gestures to the screen, the exaggeration of expressions

and mannerisms made the stories told thereby obvious and crude.

As motion-picture actors learned to use and as audiences learned to interpret more subtle gestures, the stories which could be conveyed by the motion picture became more complex, until as detailed a story could be conveyed by action alone on the screen as could be conveyed by action and speech on the stage.⁸ Because it is such a limited means of communication and yet can be used to convey a complex story vividly, pantomime, particularly as it developed in the motion picture, has been considered by many as one of the highest arts.⁹ Obviously, it is more difficult to convey to an audience the idea "My heart is breaking, not violently, but bit by bit, to the end that I am feeling the utmost in agony" by fine shadings of gesture than by shouting the words.

With the advent of sound to the motion picture, the techniques of pantomime were lost sight of in the enthusiasm for the new medium. As long as the talking picture remained a novelty, the story became of secondary importance. Gradually, however, the story again became of paramount interest to audiences; and producers resorted to the photographing and recording of theater acts and plays, particularly those of a musical character. Even as the adaptation of stage gestures to the screen necessitated modification, the adaptation of stage speech required modification. The vocal inflections which had to be used on the stage if the back row was to get the implication of a word became vocal absurdities when mechanically amplified for the screen.

Although gradual acquisition of skill at using sound made possible mechanized transcription of the stage play, experience has shown that the talking picture of a play does not ordinarily satisfy the motion-picture audience. Play techniques do not take advantage of the range of action permitted by the motion picture and the ability to use real or highly realistic settings. Furthermore, stage techniques are devoid of such effective devices as the fade-out and the cutback, which were developed for the silent picture. In the course of time, therefore, the talking picture has developed a special technique of enacting stories. This technique combines most of the devices of the silent motion picture, much of the dialogue of the stage play, and many devices

which are entirely new. Each communicative medium requires, it would seem, a special treatment.

The motion picture is directed toward so many more people than is the legitimate play that story elements must be relatively simple. The audience which views each presentation of a motion picture may be no larger than that which attends a theatrical performance; but, through time, the total number of people who view the former may run to millions to the latter's thousands. The playwright, stage producer, and stage actors appeal, therefore, to a hypothetical listener who is of vastly greater stature than is the hypothetical listener of the scenario writer, screen director, and screen actor. As a consequence, the motion picture tends to be elemental and to run to simple and obvious stories of romance and adventure.¹⁰

It is mainly because of the number of people to whom they appeal that motion-picture producers hesitate to deviate from the trite and true. Tragedy is rarely attempted; for, although the artistic possibilities here are great—which fact is attested by such notable pictures as *The Informer*—box-office results are seldom satisfactory. When motion-picture producers do attempt a tragic theme, they tend so to admix it with romance and adventure that the result is bland and tasteless to the sophisticated palate. Frequently, also, they provide the tragedy with an alternative happy ending for use in some communities.

Inevitably, the attempt to please millions of people who range in social backgrounds from southern California to New England and from London to Shanghai results in the elimination of so much which might be incomprehensible or offensive to some that little story material is left with which the producer of pictures may work. Since this small residue of dramatic material must serve for the creation of a steady and heavy stream of pictures, the inevitable result is stories which are thin and repetitious. The amazing thing is that producers have been able so largely to make up in technical ingenuity what they lack in the way of economically feasible materials.

THE POPULAR-LECTURE AUDIENCE

The leader of a lecture audience is reduced to word and gesture symbols as a means of conveying his story. Ordinarily, he does not attempt to represent story characters; he seldom uses

dialogue; and he almost never has anything but words with which to symbolize the locale of his story. The lecturer may, nevertheless, make the dramatic trio, their action, and the setting almost as effective for an audience as can be done by means of the play or the motion picture.

Most lectures for which a fee is charged belong to a type which may be designated as popular. They serve, in a different way, the same functions both for audience members and for audience leaders as do the theater, the concert, and the motion picture. The members of a popular-lecture audience are interested in being entertained. The leader is directly interested in his fee and less directly in his prestige, which will influence the scale of future fees. From this point of view, there is, therefore, no difference between the professional lecturer and the professional actor or actress. To both, audience leadership is an occupation.

Ordinarily, however, the popular lecture goes under some pseudoeducational or, perhaps, under some pseudoreligious label. Traditionally, the lecture is a serious business; and so the topic announced will be of a serious nature: *Currents in Contemporary Literature*, *The Flora and Fauna of Darkest Africa*, *The Psychology of Personality*, *Europe in Chaos*, *Where and What Is God?*

Should the lecturer take this announced topic seriously and treat it in a labored and objective fashion, however, his booking agent would promptly take him to task. Rather than treating his topic factually and systematically, he treats it dramatically. He tells a story of romance, adventure, or tragedy.

By casting the facts or, if they are resistant, then some fictions into the dramatic trio, personifying them as hero, heroine, and villain, he is able to provide his audience with an entertaining story, differing in character from the story enacted on the stage or screen only in the way it is conveyed. The plight of Europe, for example, may be his theme. In this instance, the poor, bedeviled peoples of Europe will serve for heroine. They are, of course, described in terms which will make them an acceptable heroine to the audience. A few stories about the hard-working and well-meaning peasantry may suffice; or incidental references to the glorious cultural heritage which they possess, to their colossal and priceless cathedrals, etc., may establish the European peoples in the role of heroine. For a villain, the complex forces

of fascism, Naziism, and communism or the personal leaders thereof may be used. For a quite sophisticated audience, the impersonal forces of ruthless, social change may serve as a villain. And for the hero, Democracy, American ideals, peace, or whatever the lecturer thinks that the audience approves of and considers worth keeping or seeking will be used.

Having established his dramatic persons, the leader than sets them into action. He suggests the struggle of the hero and the villain and describes the heroine as a helpless creature dependent upon the outcome of that struggle. If he is confident of his skill, he may tell the story of a tragedy and end his lecture on a pessimistic note with the villain still pursuing the heroine. Much simpler is the ending wherein right prevails. In the story of the plight of Europe, for example, the forces of Democracy would then, at the end, be seen on the ascendancy; and peace, prosperity, and contentment would be predicted for the peoples of Europe.

The foregoing is a simplification of the process of dramatization. The popular lecturer uses vocal shadings and gestures as well as words; he builds up his symbolic persons gradually; he implies more than he says; and he avoids evident injection of his personal opinions or feelings. He may so construct his lecture that the action of his characters is shown before their dramatic roles are established. He may, for example, picture in sweeping terms, which are made to seem detailed by an occasional specific reference or a briefly told intimate incident, the rise of a new political, economic, literary, or religious movement before he reveals its *dramatis personae*. In the end he will, however, have three major characters—hero, heroine, and villain. The audience may not see them as such, and, indeed, neither may he; but, as such, the audience will react to them.

In popular lectures on science, science is usually given the role of hero; ignorance or some aspect thereof, the role of villain; and mankind, that of heroine. Thus, medical science fights against dread diseases which threaten the life and happiness of humanity; or physical science wrests from nature knowledge which may contribute to the welfare of man.

The lecturer on travel, who tells adventure stories, is a variant; for he himself assumes the role of hero. He is the one who has plunged into the dark unknown. Uncompromising nature and,

perhaps, uncomprehending savages are cast as villain. The struggle resolves in his having returned home with the spoils of knowledge to lay at the feet of the heroine, the audience.

In the chapter on formal behavior it was observed that many modern church services, particularly those of the Protestant sects, serve a recreational rather than a religious function. The church, as ministers have regretfully commented, must now compete with the motion picture, the radio, and the automobile. One consequence of this competition has been the increasing tendency to make the sermon a popular lecture and, thus, to make attendance at church services a matter of recreational interest. In generations past, the sermon was usually conversational. Today, it is usually a recreational story, in which, perhaps, God figures as the hero who will lead his people out of chaos into peace and prosperity.

THE CONVERSATIONAL-LECTURE AUDIENCE

The popular lecturer is interested only in pleasing his audience. That they forget everything he has told them as soon as they leave the auditorium is no concern of his, as long as they remember that they were entertained by him and so inform their friends. Presumably they come to hear the lecture because of his prestige as a good lecturer; so it is to his economic interest to maintain that prestige. As a lecturer, the politician who has sufficient prestige with his constituency to assure future reelection also may have no other interest than the maintenance of prestige. When he speaks to an audience of his constituency, he raises no important political issues and treads on no thin ice. He simply gives a pleasing, popular lecture.

Many lecturers, however, notably campaigning political aspirants, have a more vital objective in mind—the conversion of their audiences to new points of view and, thus, to new ways of action. The political aspirant, for example, endeavors to convert his audience to the desirability of voting for him in the coming election and to dissuade them from voting as they did in the prior election. To this end, he attempts to do more than amuse his audience: he—as well as every other conversational lecturer—attempts the more or less permanent modification of more or less significant aspects of the personalities of the audience members.

The method of the conversional lecturer is a modification of the process of dramatization which is used by the popular lecturer. If the conversional lecturer succeeds in converting some members of his audience, it is presumably because he has aroused them to assume in fact the dramatic role in which he has verbally cast them. The entire procedure of conversion—political, religious, economic, scientific, and so on—revolves around dramatic conflict in which “spectators” to the dramatic conflict become actively embroiled as participants in that conflict.¹¹

The Conversional Story.—The political speaker is, perhaps, the most common example of the conversional lecturer;¹² and his procedure will be used to illustrate the general process of conversion. It should, however, be noted in passing that the same process may be utilized by anyone who has something to “sell,” whether it is a religious faith, an economic ideology, a bottle of medicine, a vacant lot, or a war.

The villain of a political drama may be almost anything or anyone except the audience or the political speaker. To blame the members of an audience for the difficulties which they are supposed to be experiencing would be to make them the villain and immediately to alienate them. To make himself the villain would likewise defeat the purpose of the speaker. It is, therefore, the first problem of the political speaker to find for his story an appropriate villain. The favorite villain of political speakers is some abstraction—such as the unnamed “enemies of the people,” the opposing party organization, or the bogeyman of the moment. The particular abstraction which is made the villain depends upon what is timely and upon the nature of the particular audience. For laboring people, he might present Big Business as the villain; for a middle-class audience, The Communists may be more expedient.

During a political campaign, each party strives to make the opposing party serve as villain. For the party which is in power, the villain represents a threat to the welfare of the people. For those parties which are out of power, the villain represents an obstacle to the attainment of public welfare. Thus, every political campaign involves a paradox: the people are in danger of losing the welfare which they have not yet attained.

Since the essence of the dramatic story is conflict, the political speaker relies upon political controversies. In times of economic

and social stress, these are at hand. In other times, when there are no real political issues available, controversies are fashioned out of the whole cloth. The need for new and better highways, the need for cheaper streetcar fares, or the need for lower taxes may serve as one element of the conflict. For the desperate national candidate, there is always the crying need for two chickens in every pot and two cars in every garage. For the local politician, there is the shame of local vice and the urgent necessity for a reform administration.

Having found a conflict theme and a villain, the political speaker then establishes his hero and heroine. At the outset, he builds himself up into the role of hero. If he is up for reelection, he personifies the forces which have fought and will continue to fight valiantly against the forces of disaster. If he is an aspirant for office, he is the one who will do these things, if given an opportunity. How he will proceed to establish himself in this role depends upon circumstances. Speaking to a rural audience, for example, he might use the traditional device of gradually conveying his rural origin and rural interests and then indicating his heroic successes in the past. At the same time, the political speaker establishes the audience in the role of heroine by indicating that they deserve more than they have received, that the villain is plotting against their best interests, and that it is necessary for them to be rescued from their plight and to be brought face to face with their glorious social destiny.

There is, however, an element of duplicity in the procedure of the conversional lecturer. Having established the audience as heroine and himself as hero, he subsequently contrives to interchange the roles. The heroine, it will be recalled, is passive; she is the object of action but is not one who acts. Consequently, he cannot let the audience remain heroine if he wishes them to play an active part in the action drama on election day. Therefore, he shifts his role as hero to the audience and assumes for himself their role as heroine. He attempts to convince them that he or his party is worthy of saving from the villain, the opponents, by the heroic action of the voters on election day. In effect, the conversional lecturer composes two distinct, yet interwoven, dramas. These dramas have no real interdependence, but the speaker makes them appear as two aspects of the same thing. If he is a competent leader, he succeeds in mak-

ing the audience feel at once a worthy maiden in distress and a valiant hero.

Variants of Conversational Leadership.—In most instances the conversational lecturer attracts his audience by the fact that his conversational story is itself entertaining. There are, however, two variants to the typical conversational-lecture audience. Under some circumstances, the conversational leader may, as it were, thrust his spiel on the members of his audience. This is what the side-show barker does in trying to sell entertainment to the people who throng the midway at a circus, fair, or exhibition. In sharp contrast to the barker is the pitchman, who offers recreational leadership in order that he may subsequently subject the audience thus secured to a conversational lecture on behalf of some goods he has for sale. A generation or two ago the pitchman was a commonplace in American life. Frequently he sold some cure-all and styled himself a medicine man. He traveled from town to town, pitching camp to hold his show. Occasionally pitchmen will still be encountered in rural regions. Most of them have, however, abandoned the road and, as we shall see, taken to the air.

The Marginal Listener.—The members of a conversational audience are usually enticed by the promise of entertainment. Most people, for example, go to hear a political lecture because they expect it to be a good show. Some may come because of partisan interests. Either they are loyal to the speaker, or they are antagonistic to him. The former members he need not convert; the latter, he cannot convert. His success in converting, if he has any, will be with those members of the audience who are neither for nor against him or what he represents but who are for some reason discouraged with their present status. These members may be described as his marginal listeners. No matter what his traditional party affiliation, the man who has lost his job during one political administration, for example, is a marginal listener for the representative of the opposing party.

It is easy to exaggerate the possible effects of a clever and forceful speaker on an audience.¹³ He can probably arouse and direct their covert feeling-states while they remain under his immediate leadership. In the heyday of the temperance movement, for example, "signing the pledge" was a routine event for large numbers of habitual alcoholics. Under the

influence of a temperance lecturer, almost anyone, drinker or not, could be induced to sign the pledge. It is, however, doubtful whether such "conversion" ever affected the drinking habits of any considerable proportion of American people.

The majority of the members of any audience will have established and relatively stable patterns of behavior, either favorable or unfavorable to the purposes of the conversional lecturer. These behavior patterns are the consequence of many and mainly actual experiences. They are the product of years, not minutes. Only the most sanguine speaker would hope to effect changes in such patterns during the course of a few hours of vicarious experience. The behavior of the members of the audience after they have passed beyond the sound of the speaker's voice will return to normal unless these members were already at the point of changing it and needed only a further push to make them converts. To these marginal listeners, the conversional lecturer may give a final push. The remainder, however, will be unaffected.

THE EDUCATIONAL-LECTURE AUDIENCE

The exception to the rule that the members of a lecture audience are interested in recreational satisfactions is found in the membership of the educational-lecture audience. Under contemporary conditions, such audiences are restricted almost exclusively to the classroom situations of educational institutions.

Provided that the members of such an audience are sufficiently prepared and sufficiently motivated, the lecturer need do no more than present such data as are at his command. His lecture then consists in the selection and presentation of data in a clear, concise, and orderly fashion. In theory, this is the method of the lecturer on any academic subject. Often, however, the members of a classroom audience are insufficiently motivated to acquire any information from this kind of presentation. For such an audience, dramatization may be necessary if the leader is to accomplish his object.

No one, it may be suspected, has ever objected to the fact that an authority upon some subject has been able to make his material alive, vivid, and fraught with meaning to his listeners. It may not, however, be realized that he accomplishes this end by the same process of dramatization which is used by the

political speaker and by all other conversational lecturers. The scholarly dramatist simply makes ignorance his villain and makes the knowledge which he is trying to convey his heroine, passive but desirable. The audience he casts into the active role of hero, who will acquire, against all the inertia of ignorance, the desirable knowledge. Dramatization does not necessarily mean a retreat from scientific accuracy; but it does require that the lecturer divert some effort away from what he is going to say toward how he is going to say it.

Experience indicates that written exposition is less effective for most students than is the educational lecture. Many factors, no doubt, contribute to making the lecture more forceful—the stimulating effect of the activity of the lecturer; the communicative value of his gestures, which are lost in the written word; and, often, the interstimulation of the audience members. Probably far more important than any of these factors, however, is the fact that the scholarly lecturer will often “let himself go” in the classroom and will, consciously or unconsciously, dramatize his material in a way which would be considered unthinkable in reducing that material to writing.

APPENDIX

1. The idea that there is anything realistic about story plots or situations on the stage or in motion pictures is, as J.M. Brown (“Will to Make Believe,” *Theatre Arts Monthly*, November, 1936, 892–895) has suggested, simply a satisfying social fiction. It is an adult counterpart of the belief of an older child in the “reality” of Santa Claus. See also J.M. Brown, “Unreality of Realism” (*North American*, September, 1936, 105–116); and C. Dave, “What Is Love? Is It What We See in the Movies?” (*Forum*, December, 1935, 335–338).

2. A very serious if none too illuminating analysis of the nature of the comic is to be found in R. Piddington’s *The Psychology of Laughter* (London, Figurehead, 1933). A very amusing and no less informing discussion of the comic is M. Eastman’s *Enjoyment of Laughter* (New York, Simon & Schuster, 1936).

It is the writer’s opinion that humor is largely a matter of social definition and that most of the philosophical and psychological analyses of humor have been more a demonstration of the comic than a successful study thereof.

3. Further descriptive material on the symbolism used in the classical Chinese theater can be secured from A.E. Zucker, *The Chinese Theatre* (London, Jarrolds, 1925).

4. For historical data on the recent development of “realistic” symbolism in the Western theater see:

- Cheney, S., *The Theater*, New York, Longmans, Green, 1929.
- Hornblow, A., *A History of the Theatre in America*, Philadelphia, Lippincott, 1919.
- Hughes, G., *The Story of the Theatre*, New York, French, 1928.
- Odell, G.C.D., *Annals of the New York Stage*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1936, Vol. VIII.
- Quinn, A.H., *A History of the American Drama from the Civil War to the Present Day*, New York, Harper, 1927, 2 vols.

For modern techniques of stage design see S. Cheney, *Stage Decoration* (New York, Day, 1928); and S. Selden, *Stage Scenery and Lighting* (New York, Crofts, 1934).

5. Even the traditional use of a female to personify the passive virtues is a matter of social symbolism. It is apparently an extension of the ideology of the patriarchal family that the male is strong—hence, active—while the female is weak—hence, passive. In actuality, of course, the human female, in or out of the patriarchal system, may in any specific instance be the stronger sex.

Evidently as a belated reflection of the fact that women have been assuming a more active role in social life, ideologically as well as actually, some of the more adventurous of modern dramatists have broken to some extent from the tradition that the passive virtues should be personified by a female and the active virtues by a male. As a result, it is sometimes difficult to tell whether the male in a romance wins the female or vice versa.

6. The simplest and apparently for many people the most satisfying form of dramatic enactment is the modern exhibition wrestling bout. Once, perhaps, a sport, wrestling has become a dramatic "art" wherein hero and villain conflict physically for the desirable goal of winning the match. Professional wrestlers now tour in pairs and take turns playing the roles of hero and villain. The hero always wins. The following description gives some concept of the dramatic technique employed:

"In the other corner was his [Ali Baba's] opponent, Dick Shikat. One of the few professional wrestlers whose repertoire includes some genuine wrestling holds. Shikat was diligently working up a great hate with which to defend his 'world's wrestling championship' against the Terrible Turk for the second time. . . .

"As last week's bout began, both wrestlers yammered, screamed, snorted, grunted, growled, moaned. Shikat's nose dribbled blood from Baba's crushing headlocks and resounding slaps. Each diligently tied the other into knots. Shikat stood the Turk on his head, bounced him up & down. When, after 53 minutes of mauling, Shikat began to lose enthusiasm and the shoe polish from Baba's mustache dripped onto his hairy chest, the latter pinned Shikat with what Announcer Joe Humphreys identified as a flying crotch hold and body press. With this hold, Ali Baba become the fifth person in the U.S. currently claiming the World's Wrestling Championship" (*Time*, May 18, 1936).

For the story of the rise of modern showmanship wrestling see M. MacKaye, "On the Hoof" (*Sat. Even. Post*, Dec. 14, 1935).

7. When the romantic story is set to or is told with music and the love theme is treated mockingly, the result is burletta, or, as it is now called, musical comedy.

Burlesque was originally a travesty of the romantic theme. What is now called burlesque is a series of highly traditional vaudeville skits tied together only by the fact that the same actors and actresses appear throughout the performance. The popularity after 1930 of the modern form of burlesque is generally attributed to the development of a new element, the so-called strip tease, briefly described in the following:

"Like the *commedia*, Burlesque has developed a cast of traditional characters with formalized costumes. The tramp, the Jew, the policeman, the soubrette and the straight man are as persistently unvarying as Harlequin, Pierrot, Columbine and the Captain were 250 years ago. . . . But, unlike the vanished *commedia*, Burlesque has continued its raffish existence against the competition of cinema and radio through the ministrations of a new character, possibly the U.S.'s only original contribution to the drama: the strip woman.

"Strip women (or strip teasers, as they are called in the trade) do not dance, and the ability to sing is by no means an essential. They stalk about the stage, exercising blandishments and removing as many clothes as local authorities will permit. They are largely responsible for the fact that, with eight empty first-class theatres in Manhattan, three burlesque houses on 42nd Street alone are jampacked nightly" (*Time*, Dec. 3, 1934).

8. For a brief description of the development of the motion picture as a form of recreational-audience leadership see the article "Motion Pictures" by H.T. Lewis (*Ency. Soc. Sci.*, 11, 58-65). No very adequate analysis of the motion-picture technique has yet appeared, although the work of H. Munsterberg (*The Photoplay: A Psychological Study*, New York, Appleton, 1916) is of considerable value.

The following historical treatments contain, more or less inadvertently, a considerable number of data which have sociopsychological significance: B. Hampton, *History of the Movies* (New York, Covici-Friede, 1931); A. Nicoll, *Film and Theater* (New York, Crowell, 1936); and T. Ramsaye, *A Million and One Nights* (New York, Simon & Schuster, 1926, 2 vols.).

See also W.C. Munro, "Cameras Don't Lie" (*Current Hist.*, August, 1937, 37-42); "Fortune Survey: Moving Pictures" (*Fortune*, April, 1936, 222); and "Fortune Survey: Movies and Movie Stars" (*Fortune*, July, 1937, 103-104).

9. For a detailed analysis of gesture as a means of communication see R.T. LaPiere and P.R. Farnsworth, *Social Psychology* (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1936, Chap. IV, "Symbolic Behavior: I. Gesture").

The experimental studies of gesture communication include the following:

Davis, R.C., "The Specificity of Facial Expressions," *J. Gen. Psychol.*, 1934, 10, 42-58.

Dunlap, D., "The Role of Eye-muscles and Mouth-muscles in the Expression of the Emotions," *Genet. Psychol. Monog.*, 1927, 2, 197-233.

- Kanner, L., "Judging Emotions from Facial Expressions," *Psychol. Monog.*, 1931, **41**, 1-91.
- Kline, L.W., and D.E. Johannsen, "Comparative Role of the Face and of the Face-Body-Hands as Aids in Identifying Emotions," *J. Abn. and Soc. Psychol.*, 1935, **29**, 415-426.
- Krout, M.H., "Artistic Gestures; an Experimental Study in Symbolic Movement," *Psychol. Monog.*, 1935, No. 208.
- , "The Social and Psychological Significance of Gestures (A Differential Analysis)," *J. Gen. Psychol.*, 1935, **47**, 385-412.

10. When motion-picture producers do attempt to tell a complex story in a subtle mode, they do so, as the following news item suggests, with a small, select audience in mind:

"The cinema has a special category for what it calls 'prestige pictures.' Made with an eye to pleasing serious critics, these productions are intended primarily to stimulate the self-respect rather than fill the purses of their makers. Prestige pictures are such films as *The Green Pastures*, *Winterset*, *A Midsummer Night's Dream*, *Romeo and Juliet*, *Camille* and the like. Many prestige pictures lost money. Many are bores" (*Time*, Aug. 16, 1937).

There is often a striking difference of opinion between professional dramatic critics and the theatergoing public at large. Thus, when Ann Nichols' *Abie's Irish Rose* was opened in New York in 1922, the critics almost unanimously described it as "terrible." Nevertheless, the play ran five continuous years in New York, was performed 20,528 times, and grossed \$22,000,000. It was reopened in 1937. In 1922 the critic Heywood Brown described it as the "worst play of the season." In 1937 he amended his judgment to read the "worst play of any season."

11. Trial by jury has come to be a conflict between conversational-audience leaders. The prosecutor tries by every available dramatic trick to convert the jury—serving in capacity of audience—to convict the accused; the defense attorney endeavors in like manner to convert the jury to acquit the accused. Stripped of its formal, judicial façade, the situation is simply one of cross dramatization, in which victory goes to that conversational leader who can induce the jury to assume the role (hero who saves society from the criminal villain or hero who saves the accused from the tyranny of villainous circumstances) in which he casts them.

The following extracts from a news biography of the noted trial lawyer Sam Liebowitz illustrate this point:

"A debater and dramatic star at Cornell, he quickly found his genius to be mastering juries. A natural showman, daring, quick-witted, with expressive eyes, a mobile face, a wide-ranged resonant voice, the gift of oratory and an intuitive awareness of jury reactions, Lawyer Liebowitz' court successes came so unbelievably as to make him appear hypnotic.

"Lawyer Liebowitz' jury miracles are for the most part based on his understanding of human reactions and on simple tricks. Witnesses who will tell the truth on big things, often lie about little ones. . . .

“Featured in a recent movie was a trick of Liebowitz’s in the Romano murder trial. All Romano had was an alibi that he had been working in a fishmarket at the time the murder happened. The prosecutor brought in a basket of fish, held them up one by one. Romano named all wrong. The prosecution grinned, rested. Liebowitz jumped up, appealed to the Jews on the jury. Romano had been working in a kosher fish market. ‘Why they’re trying to convict him on Christian fish!’ he thundered. The jury acquitted” (*Time*, Aug. 2, 1937).

12. Not all political speakers, however, have the dramatic skill to construct a conversional story. See, for example, H. Hoover, *The New Day; Campaign Speeches of Herbert Hoover* (Stanford University, Stanford University Press, 1928).

13. In the following chapter the limited effects of all forms of so-called propaganda will be discussed. For an excellent demonstration of the limited effects of political campaign speaking, however, see the study by J. Neprash, *The Brookhart Campaigns in Iowa* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1932).

CHAPTER XII

PUBLIC BEHAVIOR

The development of mechanical means of communication has made possible and has given rise to a new kind of situation in which the recreational needs of modern peoples may be satisfied, a kind of situation which supplements congenial and audience situations in the modern world. Such situations are like those of the audience type in that the members secure their satisfactions vicariously from relatively passive submission to leadership. They are distinct from those of the audience type in that the leadership is distant in either time or place or both, in that the members of such situations may not be spatially or temporally related to one another, and in that interaction between leader and members is effected through some mechanical means of communication. Although the behavior which arises in such situations might be roughly described as the behavior of a distant-contact audience, it may be more accurately described as the behavior of a public.

The situations in which public behavior occurs are undoubtedly the most indefinite of those with which the social psychologist deals. The interaction which occurs within such situations is seldom subject to quantitative analysis. The subject of public behavior has, therefore, been a fertile field for philosophical speculation; and a tremendous literature, including such titles as *The Public Mind*, *Public Opinion*, *The Propaganda Menace*, *Principles of Advertising*, and *Ballyhoo*, has grown up around the subject of public behavior. Although the nature of public behavior makes objective analysis difficult, it does not necessitate relegating the subject to mystics and publicists.

The Nature of Public Behavior.—The written word, the telephone, and the telegraph are usually no more than extensions of normal means of communication. Any one of these mediums may, for example, be used for the purpose of congenial interactions, as is the case when friends chat over the telephone or

exchange letters. Such usages involve no striking changes in the processes of interaction.

On the other hand, the use of the printed word to convey a story to the thousands of members of a newspaper, magazine, or book public and the use of the transmitted spoken word to convey a similar story to the thousands of members of a scattered radio public result in a type of interaction which is impossible without these communicative mediums. Although the interaction of a public may have some attributes of congenial behavior and some of audience behavior, it will certainly have some attributes peculiar to itself.

The members of a public do not often interact with one another at the time they are reacting to leadership stimuli. Except when some members of a public are members of an audience, as is the case when people attend a motion picture, the members of a public are unrelated to one another. Often so little significant interaction takes place among them that the reactions of a public to the leader may be thought of as consisting of a great many individual responses to the stimuli which emanate from a single leadership source.

The responses of the members of a public to the leader are, moreover, of a peculiarly impersonal order. Neither the listener to a radio performer, the viewer of a motion picture, nor the reader of a book reacts to the person of the leader. Each reacts only to specific communicative symbols created by the leader. Thus, the reader of a book reacts only to printed words on a page. He in no wise reacts to the appearance, voice, or mannerisms of the author. Even in the case of the man who sees a motion picture, reaction to the actress is entirely impersonal. He reacts only to idealized pictures of her. What she actually looks like is immaterial.

The combined responses of the members of the public do, however, eventually affect the welfare of the leader of that public. The readers of a book may never write letters to the author, but they buy or fail to buy subsequent books by that author. The listeners to a radio program may never send fan mail to the performer, but they buy or fail to buy the goods advertised by the sponsor of that performer. Such reactions on the part of the members of a public eventually determine the

professional welfare of the leader. He must, therefore, endeavor to adjust to them.

The reaction of a leader to the members of his public is always delayed, and it may not directly affect the members of that public but may affect only the members of a subsequent public. To his first public, he may need to react in advance. In writing, for example, the author of a book must try to adjust himself in anticipation to his public, just as does the lecturer who writes a speech to be read on a platform. The methods by which a leader anticipates public reaction or judges that reaction when it does occur may not be so accurate as he might like, but inaccuracy and delay do not remove response from the category of reaction.

The interactions of various publics will differ according to the medium of communication and according to the intent of the leader. Such interactions have, however, so much in common that they may be considered as constituting a single type of collective behavior. All are slow, inexact, and indirect.

ORIGIN AND FUNCTION

Sociological Antecedents of Public Behavior.—Antecedent to any public are the historical circumstances which have made necessary the conscious seeking of recreational satisfactions and which have made possible the securing of these satisfactions through membership in newspaper, magazine, book, motion-picture, and radio publics.¹

The former aspect we have already considered in detail. It is necessary to indicate here only that membership in a public is generally an alternative to membership in an audience. Whether one goes to a play or reads a book is probably dependent upon individual taste and personal convenience. In a broad sense, both are, however, substitutes for association with congenial friends. Both must be seen in relation to the social circumstances of the modern world which make difficult the securing of recreational satisfactions in situations of the congenial type.

The latter aspect—the ability of the modern man to secure recreational satisfactions through membership in publics—is, however, a consequence of another but related series of historical events. Publics have been made possible by the inventions

of the techniques of paper making, printing, cinematography, radiotelephony and by the applications of these techniques to the production of newspapers, magazines, books, motion pictures, and radio programs. Publics have been made available by the commercial interests which have arisen as a consequence of the character of contemporary society. The entire complex matter can be suggested in the brief statement that modern capitalistic society makes necessary and makes possible the rise of many kinds of publics.

Individual Interest in Recreation.—In so far as the members are concerned, the function of public behavior is, by and large, the provision of recreational satisfactions. Exceptions are to be seen in the assigned reading of the student and the acquisitive reading of the scholar and the technician. Occasionally, public behavior has no function, as is the case when an individual is forced by circumstances to listen to a radio program. Occasionally, the function of public behavior is the indirect provision of recreational satisfactions, as is the case when a person reads a book in order that he may talk about it later. Normally, however, the function of public behavior is, for the members, the direct, although vicarious, provision of recreational satisfactions.

That most public behavior functions to satisfy recreational needs is evident from observation of the uses to which modern communicative devices are put. The major production of the printing presses consists of things written to amuse and entertain the reader. Whereas a few hundred copies of an informative monograph or article may be printed, a book of pure fiction may be printed in editions of ten thousand or more. Whereas a carefully prepared textbook in any of the fields of science can hardly expect to run to more than a few thousand copies, a journalistic blurb about some inconsequential topic may run to tens of thousands of copies. Probably more ink and paper is devoted annually in the United States to the recounting of the fictitious solution of entirely imaginary murders than to the exposition and analysis of the findings and thinkings of all the men and women who devote their lives to the pursuit of knowledge. Moreover, the phonograph and the phonographic technique are applied to little but entertainment. The various dictating devices which are used to expedite stenographic work are practically the only nonrecreational applications of phono-

graphic technique. Furthermore, although the telephone is used largely as a matter of practical convenience, the radio makes its primary appeal to people who wish to be amused—whether by opera, concerts, dramatic episodes, or dance music. Finally, although photography has many technological and scientific uses, the primary use of photographic film is that of recording fictitious people, settings, and events for the amusement of the motion-picture public.

Commercial and Political Interests.—The recreational offering around which a public forms originates in individual initiative and individual interest in other than recreational satisfactions. Because of interest in money or in prestige, the author writes a book, the journalist writes a news story, and the radio artist performs; and for economic reasons, the publisher publishes and the broadcaster broadcasts these offerings. To this extent, the inception of any public is like that of an audience.

Many such offerings are, however, made at less than cost. The newspaper usually sells for about the cost of the paper on which it is printed; and the radio program is freely available, at least in the United States, to anyone with a receiving set. Such recreational offerings are made in the hope that, once the public is "assembled," some of its members can be converted to forms of behavior which are economically or politically advantageous to those who directly pay for the offerings.

The result is a complex form of interaction in which it is often difficult to separate the recreational from the conversional aspects of public leadership and in which it is equally difficult to determine whether the members of such a public are responding to both aspects of leadership or to the recreational aspect alone. Thus, whether those who make a given recreational offering secure from their public a commensurate satisfaction in votes or in the sales of a specific goods can never be determined. About all that can be said is that, in general and over the long run, the members of publics pay for their fun.

Long-run and Collective Consequences of Public Behavior.—The techniques of communication which are utilized by the members of a society are both a reflection and a determinant of the character of that society. Thus, there is a vast difference between the isolated tribal life of the Amerindians, with no other technique of intertribal communication than the sign

language, and the greater unity of tribal Africans, secured through their effective, rapid, long-range drum language. There are, furthermore, significant differences between the social consequences of the impermanent drum language for the Africans and those of the written language for the peoples of early Egypt, Greece, and China. Each new medium of communication has been a consequence of social changes and in some measure a cause of further changes.²

The character of modern society has been to a large extent conditioned by the development of the printing press, the telegraph, the telephone, the wireless, the radio, the motion picture, the telephotograph, and, now, the promise of efficient television. Each of these devices has been hailed in turn as a revolution in man's ways of living, even as it was a revolution in techniques of communication.

The spectacular character of revolutionary developments in techniques of communication does not, however, mean equally revolutionary changes in the nature of social life. This fact can, perhaps, be seen by analogy. Year after year, the automobile industry has been "shaken to its foundations" by some "revolutionary" discovery. Low-pressure tires, four-wheel brakes, high-compression motors, body streamlining, and a host of minor "gadgets" have appeared and in turn have aroused afresh the hope that the transportation millennium was in sight. Yet today, after decades of fundamental, "revolutionary" developments, the automobile is essentially what it was in 1905—four wheels and a body, motivated by an internal-combustion motor. The skilled motorist of 1905 could step into the automobile of today and, within a few minutes, learn by trial and error how to drive it, so little does it differ in essentials from the one of 1905.

Since colonial days, the crude printing press has become a vast mechanism capable of rapid and efficient production of newspapers, magazines, and books. Since those days, the telegraph, telephone, motion picture, and radio have been invented and incorporated into the daily life of the modern American. Nevertheless, the good citizen of colonial America could step into the home of a modern American and adjust himself to the latter's way of life in a comparatively short time. He would find an amazing number of strange and miraculous devices surrounding and affecting him. He would find life changed and troubled,

confusing and distressing; but its salient aspects he would recognize.

The new mediums of communication have extended the range of effective interactions. They have, therefore, made possible the inclusion of vast numbers of human beings in one public and under one leader. It is doubtful, however, whether they have greatly modified the underlying processes of leadership. The modern actor may reach his public by means of the motion picture or the radio; but his dramatic devices are largely those which were developed in ancient Greece, and the stories he tells are but modifications of those which were written by the Bard of Avon. The modern politician uses a modern language and speaks through newspaper and radio, but his appeals for leadership differ in few essentials from those of the senators and the demagogues of ancient Rome.

This does not mean that our modern distant-contact mediums of communication are not important for modern life; they are essential to it. The point is that they have not changed the basic sociopsychological processes which are involved in collective behavior.

IDEOLOGIES

It is, however, easy to exaggerate the effects of public behavior. Unquestionably, public behavior plays an important role in the lives of modern peoples. It is, possibly, their principal means of securing recreational satisfactions. But that public behavior has permanent effects for good or for evil on those who secure their recreational satisfactions from it does not follow.

Few subjects, however, have been so hotly debated as has that of the right to exercise a controlling influence over the leaders of various kinds of publics. This debate has involved every conceivable charge and countercharge, claim and counterclaim. In the heat of the controversy, books and articles by the score have been published on the subject of public behavior; and innumerable and conflicting ideologies have developed around the subject. To reduce these ideologies to anything like an orderly analysis or to sift the ideological chaff from the facts of public behavior is almost impossible.

At the outset we may, however, divide all the ideologies which surround public behavior into those which are intended to justify

some or all aspects of the leadership of publics and those which are intended to justify restricting the leadership of those who at present exercise it. In each of these categories there are ideologies which surround the recreational and ideologies which surround the conversional aspects of the leadership of publics. All the ideologies of public behavior have, however, this much in common: they grossly exaggerate the permanent effects of public behavior on the members of publics.

Propaganda versus Education.—The ideological controversy over public behavior, in so far as the effects of conversional leadership are concerned, has centered on a specious distinction between propaganda and education. Those who object to the efforts of some conversional leaders and approve of the efforts of other conversional leaders cannot, obviously, damn the means of conversion per se. They therefore divide conversional efforts categorically into those which they consider good and those which they consider bad by labeling the former education and the latter propaganda.³

Ideologically, the distinction between propaganda and education is objective. Propaganda is, thus, defined as a selfish appeal of an irrational character to the emotions of a public. Education is, in contrast, defined as an appeal of a rational character to the intellect of a public. Actually, the distinction between propaganda and education is entirely subjective.⁴

The rational-intellect and irrational-emotion dichotomy was abandoned by scientific psychology early in the present century. The word "propaganda" is, thus, simply a euphemism for "bad"; and its application is a matter of personal preference. Thus, if a political speech over the radio is disapproved, it is bad because it is propaganda; and it is propaganda because the politician appeals to the emotions of his public. If, however, this same political speech is approved, it is good because it is educational; and it is educational because it appeals to the intellect of the public.

The division of conversional efforts into propaganda and education is no doubt an effective rhetorical device, particularly when the propaganda evil is associated with and made responsible for that vague entity known as "public opinion." Unfortunately, the division does nothing to settle the controversy over the effects of conversional leadership of publics.

From the sociopsychological point of view, there is no particular difference between the efforts of a preacher to convert a public to Christian ways and those of an advertiser to convert a public to the use of so-and-so's laxative. Each leader is manipulating symbols to the end that the members of his public will behave in ways which he considers desirable. Both are, if you will, propagandists; both are, on the other hand, educators. Whether either or both or neither is contributing to the welfare of humanity is for the moralists to debate and for history to decide.

One of the more interesting consequences of the belief that anything labeled as propaganda is a menace and anything labeled as education is a boon has been the efforts of spokesmen for conversional leaders to take cover under their term "education." The ideologists of modern journalism have labored mightily to prove that the newspaper is the greatest educational factor in modern life. The ideologists of advertising have defended advertising on the grounds that it educates the public to the better things in life. A vast literature has developed in defense of advertising. Through it all runs the theme that the advertiser educates the public by showing people the rational advantages in purchasing whatever it is that is advertised.

It is interesting to observe that almost the only people to face the subject of conversional leadership in a pragmatic way have been the master converters of the modern world—the so-called dictators of Europe. Like the Roman Catholic missionaries, they have not been frightened by the word "propaganda"; and, however unrealistic the ideologies to which they have tried to convert their people, they have never pretended that their efforts were other than conversional.

Censorship.—The controversy surrounding propaganda and education has resulted in little control of the conversional leadership of publics. All effective restraint of leaders of publics has come, in the form of censorship, from those who are less concerned with the conversional efforts of leaders of publics than with the moral effects of their recreational offerings.

Moralistic censorship of the recreational offerings of the leaders of publics, like that of recreational offerings to audiences, lacks any empirical foundation. It is based on two ideologies, neither of which is substantiated by fact: first, that the reader of a

book, the viewer of a motion picture, or the listener to a radio program may be permanently affected by the vicarious experience he secures as a member of such a public; and, second, that the way to prevent him from securing morally undesirable vicarious experiences is to exercise censorship over the publication of printed matter, the production of motion pictures, and the broadcast of radio programs.⁶

The first assumption was considered in detail in connection with the audience. Here it is necessary only to point out that the human personality is the product of actual, not vicarious, experience; and it develops slowly over the years. The long-run consequences of participation in various kinds of publics is by no means clear. It is evident, however, that if all the highly "moral" books, plays, and motion pictures which have appeared over the years have not brought about a moral millennium, a comparatively few "immoral" books, plays, and motion pictures are not going to send the delinquency and criminal rates skyrocketing. Moralistic censorship of the recreational offerings of publishers, motion-picture producers, and radio broadcasters is, therefore, misdirected.

Furthermore, the assumption that legal prohibition of "immoral" books, motion pictures, etc., is effective in preventing the appearance of "immoral" recreational offerings does not appear justified in the light of historical experience. As we shall see in a subsequent chapter, it is practically impossible to legislate morals. It is, likewise, practically impossible to legislate tastes in recreation. When censorship succeeds in preventing "immoral" stories on the screen, those stories will appear in some other medium if there is a public demand for them. The problem of control here is much the same as that which baffled the prohibitionists. If the people want alcoholic beverages, nothing short of turning the country into an armed camp will prevent such beverages from becoming available. Likewise, if a public demand exists for recreations which offend the moralists, these recreations will be made available unless all the channels of communication are completely shut off.

Moral censorship has had no significant effect upon public morality, for better or for worse. It has, however, frequently made the recreational offering which is distasteful to the censors abnormally attractive to the public. Years ago, the

commonplace painting *September Morn* was made famous and interesting in America by the denouncements and consequent newspaper discussion of moralists.⁶ For long, a recreational offering gained added attractiveness if it could be labeled "Banned in Boston." Evidently there were a great many people who considered the moral leaders of Boston such bad judges of the recreational value of books, plays, and motion pictures that anything which these moral leaders might ban was almost assured a large public. It is not known, however, whether this principle worked in reverse and led to the avoidance of such offerings as were accorded acclaim by the moralists.

As a means whereby the political leader can check his opponents in their efforts to convert the members of a public, censorship may have some effect. No doubt the censorship which European so-called dictators exercise over press and radio has its values to them.⁷ Even here, however, the censor is in danger of defeating his purpose. The people of a country which is ruled by a dictator learn in time to discount their newspapers, preachers, and political speechmakers and to come to depend for "news" upon uncontrolled and uncontrollable rumor. The so-called voluntary silence of the press during the constitutional crisis in 1936 in England is perhaps the best illustration of really effective censorship.

Professional Ideologies.—In addition to the foregoing ideologies of public behavior, there are a great many unverifiable beliefs which have developed among the leaders of various kinds of publics. These might be described as the theories of the practices of leadership. They range all the way from the belief that fan mail is an accurate indication of the size and the reactions of a public to the assumption that advertising practices are founded upon the science of psychology.

So little is actually known about the behavior of publics that the leadership of publics is almost entirely a matter of trial and error without any certain basis of determining whether a given trial has been a success or an error. Particularly in the field of advertising, professional leaders of public behavior are constrained to "prove" that their efforts produce the desired results; and the advertising technician is more likely to concern himself with selling himself to his clients than with selling their products for them. The literature upon the principles of advertising is,

therefore, to be viewed as a rationalization of advertising practices rather than as a set of scientific discoveries upon which those practices are based.⁸

MEMBERSHIP

Much of what has been said regarding the determination of the membership of an audience applies also to the determination of the membership of a public. Like the members of an audience, the members of a public accept such membership because they are able to and because they feel that such membership will provide them with desired satisfactions. The size of a given public, like that of a given audience, may, however, indicate little regarding the recreational satisfactions provided by its leadership. This is especially evident in the case of newspaper and motion-picture publics. As a matter of habit, people may read all the newspaper to which they subscribe, regardless of the quality of a given issue. Because they are accustomed to attending the motion picture on certain nights each week, people may go on these nights, irrespective of the program.

Unlike the membership in an audience, however, the membership of a public is unselected in character. Although in all publics some limits are placed on membership by the leader, in many instances these limits are nominal only. To become a member of a motion-picture public it is necessary to become a member of a motion-picture audience and to buy a ticket and to abide by time and place limits set by the leader. To become a member of a magazine public, however, it may be necessary only to pick up a magazine from a waiting-room table. To become a member of a radio public, it may be necessary to do no more than turn on the radio to the particular station at the particular time the program is broadcast.

The membership of a public is, moreover, usually very much larger than is that of an audience. Whereas the membership of audiences may range from a very few people to a few hundreds of people, the membership of publics is always computed in thousands, often in hundreds of thousands, and sometimes in millions.

The size of any given public is, however, indeterminate. Whereas the membership of an audience can be determined accurately by a count of the number of seats occupied, the

membership of a public can only be estimated on the basis of circulation, sales, box-office reports, and fan mail. When a motion picture is shown as a road show, box-office figures will, no doubt, indicate accurately the size of the public of the picture. When, however, it is distributed, as is usually the case, to various theaters to be shown as only a part of the program, this program varies from theater to theater. Under such circumstances, it is impossible to ascertain whether this picture or some other part of the program at any one theater is seen by those who have bought tickets.

Sales figures on newspapers, magazines, and books are an even less accurate index to the size of publics. The public of any such offering may be larger or smaller than the sales figures indicate. From casual observation it is evident that newspapers and magazines are frequently subscribed to and not read and that books or entire sets of books may be purchased as ornaments rather than as reading matter. On the other hand, a single issue of a newspaper or a magazine may be read by all the members of a large family; and a single copy of a book in a circulating library may have hundreds of readers. The actual size of a given magazine, newspaper, or book public cannot, therefore, be determined.⁹

The size of the public of any given news or magazine story is even more indeterminate. What part or parts of the newspaper or magazine are read depends upon a considerable number of variables, none of which can be accurately measured. The public which a news writer will secure for a particular item that he has written depends upon the circulation of the newspaper, the spot it gets in the paper, and the spread it is given. These factors, in turn, are determined by the comparative value of the item in the mind of the editor, etc.

Still more indeterminate in size is the membership of radio publics. The radio broadcaster lacks even those crude indexes which are possessed by the newspaper publisher.¹⁰

The indeterminate size and unselected character of the membership of publics means that the leaders of publics are usually groping more or less blindly in the effort to determine "what the public wants." It is seldom possible to do much more than speculate upon the size of a given public, to say nothing of determining what it wants. No doubt it is these factors which

have led some leaders, notably the novelists, to set an arbitrary hypothetical listener and to address this listener, regardless of the consequences. These same factors also are responsible for the so-called shotgun method, whereby a radio sponsor offers a program consisting of vocal and instrumental, popular and classical music, together with romantic, comic, and tragic stories conveyed by dialogue. The same technique is used, as we shall see, by the publishers of newspapers and of the popular magazines.

OVERT AND COVERT ASPECTS OF INTERACTION

Member Behavior.—The satisfactions which are derived from membership in a public are of the same vicarious order as are those which are secured from membership in an audience. The reader of a story, the viewer of a motion picture, or the listener to a radio program ordinarily responds covertly to the symbols which are provided by the leader and only rarely responds overtly. A man may laugh aloud at something he is reading, or he may interrupt his reading to comment to his wife about it. Usually, however, his response is entirely covert.

Except for the members of the motion-picture public, who form audiences, the members of publics are usually separated in space or in time or in both. Occasionally people gather around a radio to hear a program, and occasionally people gather to listen to the reading of a book. At such times, some of the members of the public interact with one another. Ordinarily, however, the members of newspaper, magazine, book, and radio publics are not together. Such overt action as does occur while they are responding to leadership does not affect the behavior of the public as a whole.

In so far as the recreational offerings of leaders are concerned, the significant overt action of the members of publics is delayed; it occurs after rather than during membership in the public itself. Significant overt action takes such forms as reporting favorably or otherwise to friends and acquaintances about a book, a motion picture, or a radio program; as writing letters to the editor of a newspaper or magazine; and as sending fan mail to authors, motion-picture actors, or radio performers.

Unreliable as is fan mail, it is often the only means of judging the effects of the recreational offerings of a particular leader.

Letters to the editor and fan mail are in some instances supplemented by such devices as the sampling method and the "squawk test." The former consists in "testing" the reactions of a newspaper or radio public by telephone or personal interviews with a small proportion of that public. The latter consists in temporarily dropping items from the newspaper or the radio program and judging the popularity of those items from the number of people who protest against their discontinuance.

In so far as the conversional efforts of leaders are concerned, the significant overt behavior of the members of a public is also delayed. It may take such forms as telling a friend about the virtues of such and such a political candidate or brand of cigarettes, as voting for that candidate on election day, and as buying the advertised brand of cigarettes.

Again, there is no reliable index to the effects of leadership. Many attempts, it is true, are made to measure the effects of political speeches and articles, of news items and editorials, and of the like upon some question of public interest. Such studies take the form of a questionnaire sampling of what is usually described as public opinion.¹¹ These studies may indicate a considerable change in public opinion during the course of a political or other conversional campaign. They do not, however, reveal the effects of a given conversional effort on the overt behavior of the members of the public of a given leader. In the first place, it is impossible to make such a study just before and just after the leader has made his effort. In the second place, it is equally impossible to limit that study to the members of his public. In the third place, the opinions which are measured by questionnaires are at the best simply symbolic responses to a symbolic situation. They may indicate nothing about the effects of the conversional leader on the nonsymbolic behavior of the members of his public. About all that can be said is that there are as many public opinions as there are topics on which to have opinions; that on any given topic there will be a great variety of opinions; and that these opinions are in every instance the result of a great many factors, only one of which is the effort of the conversional leader.

Determining the effects of advertising on the overt behavior of the members of publics is no less difficult. The advertiser has the sales figures of his product to go on and can study the effects of an

advertising campaign by observing changes in those figures. Experience shows that in highly competitive fields where goods are so highly standardized that the major difference between brands of goods is brand name, there is a close relationship between advertising appropriations and sales. It is not possible, however, to determine the relative effectiveness for a given commodity of various kinds of advertising, such as newspaper and radio, or of varieties of a given kind, such as testimonials and dramatization. Moreover, there is no way of ascertaining whether the total advertising of all brands of a given commodity affects the total demand for that commodity. Thus, whether the extensive advertising of cigarettes has been responsible here in America for the growing popularity of cigarettes is at best a matter of speculation. Factors other than advertising may determine the total demand for such a commodity. Advertising of a particular brand of cigarettes may be effective only in influencing that proportion which is directed toward that brand.

Leader Behavior.—As is the case with the leader of an audience, the overt behavior of the leader of a public has no necessary relationship to his covert feeling-states. Because he is interested in the sale of his books, the author may write sentimental romances, although he privately considers such romances so much drivel. Because such a procedure is the policy of his newspaper, the editorial writer may write convincingly on behalf of the Republican party, although he himself is a staunch Democrat. The opera singer may give a glowing testimonial over the radio on behalf of so-and-so's cigarettes, although she does not smoke at all.

In so far as the overt and the covert aspects are concerned, there is, however, one rather important distinction which must be drawn between the recreational offerings made to most audiences and those made to some publics. Aside from the publishers of books and the producers of motion pictures, those who sponsor recreational offerings to a public do so more or less in the guise of public benefactors, offering free recreation. Once it has "assembled," however, they then endeavor to convert the public. Thus, there is a close parallel between the old-time pitchman, who "pulled" together his audience with a banjo, a pretty girl, and a stock of jokes and then drifted rapidly and easily to his dramatic

spiel on behalf of his nostrum, and the sponsor of the modern radio program, which is interrupted periodically to urge the purchase of some commercial product. No one actually believes, perhaps, that the sponsor is making his recreational offering, as the announcer assures, "for your pleasure." He is, as everyone realizes, doing so in order to be able to slip in the blurbs on his product. The pretense is, however, constantly maintained.

LEADERSHIP

The indeterminate character of public behavior makes the problem of leadership exceedingly intricate and makes analysis of the processes of leadership difficult. The factors which enter into the selection of leaders and the processes by which such leaders attempt to entertain or to convert their publics necessarily vary greatly from public to public. Practically the only general statement which can be made is that the leaders of publics, like the leaders of audiences, must constantly strive to react to their publics; but, unlike the leaders of audiences, they have only the haziest notion of the behavior of those publics.

THE SELECTION OF LEADERS

Leaders of publics, even as leaders of audiences, are both self-elected and member-selected. In the first instance, the offerings of recreational and conversational leaders to potential publics are the result of the individual initiative of the leaders or, when such offerings are sponsored by others, of both leader initiative and sponsor initiative. Thus, the President may of his own initiative offer a speech over the radio; or a publisher may select from available manuscripts those which he will publish, and a manufacturer may select an orchestra and an announcer to give a program for him over the radio. In the second instance, from the offerings thus made available, the leaders of actual publics are selected by those who become members of the publics. Thus, from all the available radio programs, the individual who is interested in listening to the radio selects one. It is by many such individual selections that the leaders of actual publics are determined.

Name Prestige.—The members of a public, like the members of an audience, select a given offering in anticipation of specific satisfactions; and, as do the members of an audience, the members

of many publics make this anticipation largely in terms of the name prestige of the one who makes the offering.

The established author, motion-picture star, or radio speaker, singer, or orchestra leader will attract a public on the basis of his name. A new book by a well-known novelist has public appeal which is entirely lacking for a first novel. A magazine article by a noted publicist or journalist draws to it those who recognize the writer's name. The radio program with a nationally known orchestra, band, comedian, singer, or the like presumably attracts listeners. The book or article by a great scientist assures the attention of all scientists in his field. The motion picture with a popular star can be expected to command attention, whatever the name and the nature of the picture may be. Name prestige may, in other words, be sufficient in itself to attract a public, irrespective of the offering of the leader.

The name prestige of a leader will gain attention not only for a new offering in his special field of entertainment, but also, as a consequence of the halo effect, for any offering he may make in any field. The popular novelist who turns philosopher, the popular philosopher who turns novelist, the scientist who turns philosopher, the dance-band leader who turns for the moment into an impresario, the opera star who turns motion-picture actress, and the motion-picture actress who turns writer will, on the basis of name prestige, gain attention in the new field.

The effect of name prestige does not, however, end with the attracting of a public to a given offering. The extent to which members of publics secure their recreation from the name prestige of the leader rather than from his leadership skill is often astonishing. Simply because an author has a reputation for writing interesting and entertaining novels, many readers will find his novels interesting and entertaining, regardless of their actual merit. They look for and therefore tend to find the qualities which are promised by the name of the leader. The conditioning factor of name prestige therefore makes possible command and satisfaction of publics long after the leader has ceased to keep his work up to the standards he originally set for himself.

The power of name prestige to command and to hold attention is responsible for the selection of many leaders of potential publics by sponsors in terms of name prestige. The magazine editor would often rather have a poor story or article by a well-

known name than a good one by an unknown name. The publisher can ordinarily expect greater sales from a poorly devised book by a popular author than from a carefully written one by an unknown author. The motion-picture producer may anticipate far greater returns from casual acting by a great motion-picture name than from artistry by an actor who is unknown by name to the general public. Just as "names make news," so names make publics.

Adjudged Name Prestige.—Although those who sponsor the leaders of publics—editors, publishers, motion-picture producers, etc.—strive to select leaders of potential publics on the basis of name prestige, the difficulties of measuring name prestige often prevent their actually doing so. Selection of leaders by sponsors is, therefore, often made on the basis of adjudged name prestige, which may or may not reflect the name prestige of a leader with his public.

The difficulties of measuring actual name prestige may be clearly seen in the case of magazine publishers. Whereas the publisher of books can judge fairly accurately the actual name prestige of a particular author from the sales figures on the latter's previous books, the magazine publisher cannot judge the actual name prestige of any writer by the sales figures on his magazine. Each issue of that magazine contains a number of stories by a number of writers. The actual name prestige of any given writer can, therefore, only be estimated by the publisher.

Because magazine editors, motion-picture producers, and particularly the sponsors of radio programs are inclined to place considerable reliance on fan mail in adjudging name prestige, some leaders have resorted to the practice of sending themselves fan mail in an effort to impress their sponsors.¹² Although the trick is an old one, it has become of especial importance in the case of radio performers. Organizations have grown up which are able and willing to send a designated quantity of fan mail from various localities to a specified person or agent. When fan mail is thus bought and paid for, the name prestige which is adjudged on the basis of it has no relation to public popularity.

Even when the fan mail originates with members of a public, its use as an index to the popularity of leaders is highly unreliable. The proportion of the members of any public who will have the time and the inclination to write letters to authors, singers,

actors, and so on is small and is by no means representative of the membership of that public. Fan-mail writers are, as it were, a special breed, who, by the fact that they write fan mail, indicate peculiar interests. To the extent that leaders are selected on the basis of their actual fan mail, fan-mail writers will determine the sorts of magazine stories and articles, of motion-picture stars, and of radio programs which will be provided the general public.

Professional Prestige.—The leaders of many publics are never known by name to the members of those publics. Consequently, they cannot be selected by sponsors either on the basis of actual name prestige or on the basis of adjudged name prestige. Except for those who write under a by-line, all newspaper writers are anonymous. Newspaper editors must, therefore, rely entirely upon professional prestige—the adjudged leadership ability—in the selection of newspaper writers. For much the same reasons, the minor actors in motion pictures and radio programs must be selected wholly in terms of professional prestige. Likewise, most conversational leaders do their work anonymously and do not develop name prestige. Whether this or that advertising artist, copy writer, editorial writer, or radio announcer will be chosen to convert a public to the desirability of purchasing such and such an article or objecting to such and such a political move will of necessity depend entirely upon his professional prestige. As with adjudged name prestige, the professional prestige of a given leader is dependent wholly on the personal opinions of those who select him rather than upon measures of his actual ability to command the attention of a public.

DEVELOPMENT OF NAME PRESTIGE

The origin of the name prestige of any name is always complex. In some cases, name prestige develops as the consequence of accidental factors. Not infrequently, a relatively new name derives sudden and spectacular prestige from some newsworthy incident which was associated with that name. For example, the little-known author who breaks into the national news for whatever reason is almost certain to gain name prestige and, thus, to gain increased royalties for his writings, regardless of their character or quality.

In most cases, however, name prestige develops as the result of deliberate effort. Since name prestige may have a commercial value amounting to millions of dollars, it is often to the advantage of those who will profit from name prestige to expend considerable sums of money in developing that name prestige. The efforts to build up or to maintain name prestige for persons, corporations, and commercial products has become a thriving business in the modern world. Such efforts are usually described as publicity.

Publicity as the Control of Printed Rumor.—Within the relatively small and stable community, as we have seen, rumors about the members of a community generate and circulate through congenial interactions. In the disordered and impersonal community of the modern world, however, rumors about public figures generate and circulate largely through newspapers and other printed mediums. Because few members of a public know the public figures who are concerned in the printed rumors except by name, the name prestige of the public figure is largely dependent upon the nature of the printed rumors. The printed rumors, therefore, unlike the verbal rumors of the stable community, may determine rather than reflect the reputations of those who are the subject of such rumors.

Although the verbal rumor cannot be controlled, some control is always possible over the printed rumor. It is the task of the publicity directors to direct and initiate news stories about a person, a political party, a minority-interest group of any kind, or a commercial product so that the name of the person, party, corporation, or product will have the desired name prestige. Unquestionably, persistent and skillful control and dissemination of news stories will often generate a more or less specific public personality for a given name. Controlled publicity undoubtedly made a benevolent figure of the late Andrew Carnegie, and careful publicity has in the course of years given the name "Standard Oil" a wholly new prestige with the American people.¹³

Publicity for Persons.—The most spectacular use to which publicity is put is in the development and maintenance of the name prestige of motion-picture and radio performers. Every important star has his or her publicity director. Motion-picture producers will expend vast sums on publicity for a new

“find,” realizing that public reaction to an actress’s first picture will in considerable measure depend upon her name prestige before the picture is offered to her potential public. In trying to develop such prestige for her, a simple stereotype is selected—such, for example, as America’s Sweetheart, the Glamour Girl, or the Mystery Woman; and story items casting her in this light are provided the fan magazines and the newspapers. Once a star has an established name prestige, the producers continue their publicity efforts in an endeavor to maintain that prestige and to prevent stories of an adverse character from getting into print.

The value of any news story to the development and maintenance of name prestige depends upon the character of the story and the public personality of the person. The story which might hurt the prestige of one public figure might well enhance the prestige of another. America’s Sweetheart must not, of course, do anything naughty; the Glamour Girl must not act like a middle-class housewife; and the Mystery Woman must not be seen in public.

The publicity stories may not, however, have anything to do with the actual skill of the person as a public entertainer. There is no logical relationship between the love affairs of a woman and her ability to entertain as a singer or an actress. It has often happened, however, that a celebrity has received considerable name prestige from the fact that her name was studiously associated with a famous scandal.

There is no essential difference in the use of publicity to develop name prestige for an entertainer and the use of publicity to develop name prestige for a political or industrial figure. If he is relatively unknown, the presidential candidate must be developed as a public personality by publicity men of his political party. In any political campaign a considerable proportion of party effort is devoted to fashioning or to maintaining a public stereotype for the principal candidate. Depending upon circumstances, this stereotype may be the Great Liberator, the Staunch Conservative, the Humanitarian, the Great Builder, or something else. Once the stereotype is selected, publicity effort is directed toward the dissemination of news stories which are in keeping with the stereotype and toward the prevention of adverse stories.

The personification of political parties is probably as old as is party politics. A half-century ago the "party personality" was largely an outgrowth of verbal rumors and personal knowledge concerning the politicians of the party and their political speeches. Today the newspaper and the radio provide our major contacts with representatives of the various political parties. Consequently, some control over the development of the name prestige of political parties is now possible. The importance of news in fostering the development of party personification is so great that some have considered the party affiliations of newspapers to be the key to party power.

Since the great "trust-busting" epoch of a generation ago, American corporations have devoted considerable attention to the name prestige of the corporation. Early advertising had been concerned entirely with the product or the service which was offered for sale. Personification of corporations as ruthless monsters by the "trust busters" had a serious effect upon the sale of products sponsored by those corporations. Eventually it was realized that buyers are motivated, not by purely economic concerns, but by many personal considerations, among them their idea of the "person" who produces the goods. Since this discovery, corporation interests have devoted a great deal of attention to "public relations"—*i.e.*, to the building up and the maintaining of the idea that the corporation is a benevolent "person" who is mainly concerned with humanitarian ends.

Publicity for Commercial Products.—The fact that name prestige influences public response to actors, actresses, dance bands, politicians, etc., has led the manufacturers of such products as cigarettes, gasoline, and laxatives to attempt publicity for the brand names of their products. The devices which are used to give name prestige to persons and personifications cannot, however, be used to give prestige to inanimate goods. Few news stories can be circulated about the love affairs or the adventures of such and such a brand of cigarettes. In the attempts to secure comparable results, publicity directors for products have, therefore, developed devices of their own.

One of these devices is based on the old saying that a man is known by the company he keeps. If this be true, a package of cigarettes or a box of pills should also be known by the company it keeps. *Ergo*, these products should be represented as being

in good company. In keeping with this line of reasoning, a package of cigarettes or some other trade-marked product will be pictured associating with a pretty girl, a handsome man, or someone else who may be reasonably considered to represent "good company" to the potential public of that brand.

Another device is presumably based upon the old saying that to be spoken well of by the great assures acclaim. Here, someone with name prestige is represented as recommending the purchase and the use of the advertised commodity. The impressiveness of such testimonials depends upon the halo effect, since those who give the testimonials are seldom actual authorities in the field of the product for which they testify.¹⁴ The publicity for a certain brand of coffee, for example, does not usually consist of the testimony of expert coffee tasters, who would have no name prestige. Publicity consists, rather, of the testimony of a noted athlete, a motion-picture actress, or a society woman, depending upon the particular public which the publicity director has in mind.

Limits to Publicity.—Publicity is unquestionably an important factor in determining the development and the maintenance of the name prestige of motion-picture stars and radio performers. It is probably of some significance in determining the name prestige of a presidential candidate and in maintaining that of the current president. It has proved its value in assuring that a corporation will have a good public personality. Whether the publicity devices which are used to give name prestige to products of those corporations are also effective is, however, a matter of speculation.

At any event, the effects of publicity upon name prestige are temporary rather than permanent. Skillful publicity may give name prestige to a new actress, but in the long run her public will demand something more than publicity from her. Publicity may briefly revive the name prestige of a waning star, but the star will promptly wane again. Adverse publicity may hurt, even ruin, the name prestige of a public figure; but a figure who has lost his name prestige cannot be reestablished by favorable publicity.

Moreover, since it is never possible completely to control news, the actual behavior of a person, the actions of a political party or a corporation, or the quality of a product may ultimately defeat

the efforts of publicity directors. In the words which have been attributed to Lincoln, "You can fool some of the people all the time, and all of the people some of the time, but you can not fool all of the people all of the time."

THE PROCESS OF LEADERSHIP

Although the mediums of communication are different, the same underlying processes are involved in the leadership of publics as are involved in the leadership of audiences. Although his public is addressed through the printed word, the novelist tells his story in much the same way as does the teller of tales; and the writer of a popular article tells his story in much the same way as does the popular lecturer on a platform. Although the public is addressed through the medium of the screen, motion-picture actors enact their story on the screen in much the same way as do the actors on a stage. Although he addresses his public by transmitted words, the political speaker on the radio tells his story in much the same way as does the politician on the stump.

Like the leadership of some audiences, the leadership of some publics may be directed toward entertainment alone. The efforts of novelists and motion-picture actors are, for example, directed simply toward entertaining their publics. The leadership of other publics is directed toward conversion alone. The political speaker, for example, is interested merely in converting his public. The leadership of still other publics may be a mixture of or a combination of conversional and recreational efforts. Radio programs, newspapers, and magazines usually provide a combination of recreational and conversional leadership. Like the old-time pitchman who gave his audience a show in order that he might later convert them to the purchase of a bottle of medicine, the sponsor of a radio program, for example, often provides musicians, comedians, or other entertainers whose recreational leadership will attract a public which can later be subjected to the conversional efforts of the announcer on behalf of the products of the sponsor. Like the side-show barker, the advertiser of motion pictures and of other forms of entertainment offers conversional leadership in order to attract publics to the recreational leadership which can be secured "just inside the tent." In any given instance, furthermore, the recreational

and the conversional aspects of leadership may be so interwoven that separation is impossible. For purposes of analysis, however, conceptual separation is necessary. The conversional aspects of leadership will be considered briefly in the remainder of this chapter, and the recreational aspects of leadership will be treated at length in the next chapter.

The Conversional Drama.—The great stock in trade of the conversional leaders of publics is the dramatization of the role of the product, idea, or person. Although the specific methods which are used may vary in accordance with the medium of communication and in accordance with the size of the public to which the appeal is addressed, the process of dramatization is in no wise different from that used in the conversional-lecture audience. Every political campaign and every charity drive is, to the extent of the abilities of the leader, a great and vital drama. So, too, is every commercial campaign to extend or to hold a market.

In commercial advertising the potential loss of everything which the members of publics may be presumed to value—friends, health, long life, wealth, teeth, or hair—has served at one time or another as the basis for the villain.¹⁵ The product advertised will, therefore, have in the advertiser's drama the role of the hero who will save the member of the public from the potential tragedy of falling hair, falling arches, or falling teeth; from a poverty-stricken old age; from the loss of friends as a consequence of bad breath or body odor; from some specific or from every general form of ill health; from "washday hands"; from unattractive eyes; from excess flesh; and so on and on.¹⁶

One of the more recent of the popular advertising techniques may serve to illustrate the process by which products become involved in a dramatic conflict. Presumably upon the assumption that their hypothetical listener was hardly literate, advertisers of everything from soap to cathartics told their dramatic stories by means of a series of cartoons. In such cartoons, Mary Housewife, for example, would lose her husband's love Monday night. On Tuesday she would be informed by her kindly confidante that it was all caused by the villainy of rough, hard soaps which caused her to have red, rough, "washday hands." Mary Housewife would then be advised that she could be rescued from "washday hands" by so-and-so's soap. On the following

Monday, Mary would regain her husband's affections all on account of using that soap. These painfully juvenile devices were rapidly carried over into radio advertising, and the little drama was enacted over the air with Mary Housewife as a good example for the listener with "washday hands."

The Marginal Person.—The effectiveness of conversional leadership depends in part upon the skill of the leader and in a larger measure upon the number of his public who are marginal persons in regard to the behavior which he is trying to influence. The former factor is, in a sense, controllable. The latter is, however, entirely beyond the control of the conversional leader or of his sponsor. By providing bigger and better recreational offerings, the sponsor may increase the number of members in the public of the conversional leader. He cannot, however, increase the proportion of marginal persons in that public.

The marginal persons in any given public are those members who have no fixed habits in regard to the field of action in which the leader is interested or who have, as a consequence of repeated displeasing experiences, lost faith in their established habits of action. Over these marginal persons, the conversional leader may exercise some influence. With all other members of his public, his efforts will be ineffective.

In the first place, the reader of a newspaper, for example, need not read the advertisements in that newspaper and will not do so unless he is for some reason already interested in them. The members of a radio public can ignore the interruptions to the recreational aspects of a program or, if these interruptions are too frequent and too insistent, turn to another station or abandon the radio in favor of a book or a magazine. As a consequence, it is probable that modern people are constantly making impulsive adjustments to the increasing stream of conversional pressures, just as the people of the Middle Ages did to the scourge of, say, body lice.

In the second place, even though people do read the advertisements, editorials, and so on, and even though they do listen to the conversional efforts over the radio, they will not participate in the conversional drama which is provided for them unless they are, as it were, prepared by their own prior experiences for the role. Established habits, the product of long-time social experiences, govern the voting, buying, and similar behaviors

of most individuals most of the time. It should be evident, therefore, that the conversional leader cannot himself prepare the members of his public for conversion.

The political speaker who would convert his listeners addresses a public, most members of which have voted consistently year after year for one or another political party. His marginal listeners will be those few members who have no traditional party affiliation and those few who have just about decided that the "old party" is hopeless. The former he might conceivably convert to his party. The latter he might conceivably convert to staying with the "old party," if he represents that party, or to drawing over to the other side, if he represents the other side.

The factors which determine what proportion of the public of a political speaker will be marginal persons are complex and are more or less beyond the control of any individual or group of individuals. The prolonged and progressively acute economic despair of the German people following the World War provided Hitler with a high proportion of people who were dissatisfied with traditional German government. The acute economic despair of the American people in 1931 provided Roosevelt with a somewhat abnormal proportion of people who were dissatisfied with the Republican party. Neither Hitler nor Roosevelt, however, made those people whom they converted to their support marginal persons. Such persons had already been made marginal.

The advertiser likewise addresses a public, the majority of whom are habituated to the buying of a particular brand of a product. His marginal persons will consist of those people who have no established buying habits in regard to this product or who have become dissatisfied with other brands of that product.

When his product is simply one of many standard brands of an established product, the marginal persons in his public will be few and will be likely to be people with whimsical buying habits, who must be reconverted daily if they are to be kept as purchasers for the brand he represents. Buying habits are, perhaps, among the least consistent and stable aspects of contemporary behavior; but even here persistent tendencies are to be observed. Even in such a minor matter as the selection of a brand of soap, most individuals will choose that to which they are accustomed.

When the product of the advertiser is an improved substitute for an old device, as was the electric light for the gas lamp, the automobile for the horse and buggy, and the electric refrigerator for the icebox, the proportion of marginal people in his public will be somewhat larger. Even here, however, most of his members will not be marginal. However superior the new device is to the old, the old usage must be broken before the new can be accepted. Often the shift is a matter of gradual replacement over the course of a generation or two and is accomplished by converting young people who are not yet habituated to the old device.

If the advertiser is laboring on behalf of an entirely new product, he may have many marginal people in his public. Such was undoubtedly the case with radio advertising in the days before almost every household contained a radio set. In such instances, most members of the public will have no established habits in regard to the product.

Social Role of Conversational Leadership.—The fact that the conversational leader of a public can at the most exert leadership only over the marginal members of that public means, as we shall see, that significant social changes grow out of a multitude of factors, none of which are under the control of the conversational leader, and that conversational leadership, as well as other forms of leadership, is the function rather than the cause of those changes.¹⁷ The expanding role of conversational leadership in the modern world is simply an inevitable concomitant of the steady decline of predetermined patterns of group life. To charge conversational leadership of publics with responsibility for the social disorders which engenders its use is comparable to blaming the gun for the war in which guns are used.

APPENDIX

1. For data on the history of communication techniques see: T.F. Carter, *The Invention of Printing in China and Its Spread Westward* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1925); L. Mumford, *Technics and Civilization* (New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1934); and D.O. Woodbury, *Communication* (New York, Dodd, Mead, 1931).

2. The sociological consequence of developments in the field of communication is variously interpreted. At the one extreme is C.E. Ellwood (*Cultural Evolution*, New York, Century, 1927), who endeavors to trace the evolution of human society in terms of inventions in communication.

To him, the developments of writing, of printing, of telegraphy, etc., were turning points in cultural history. Most sociologists, however, do not consider communication technology to be the social determinant. See:

Case, C.M., *Social Process and Human Progress*, New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1931.

Chapin, F.S., *Cultural Change*, New York, Century, 1928.

Hart, H., *The Technique of Social Progress*, New York, Holt, 1931.

Ogburn, W.F., *Social Change with Respect to Culture and Original Nature*, New York, Huebsch, 1922.

The specific question of the relationship between communication techniques and the character of a society is examined in detail by M.W. Willey in *Communication Agencies and Social Life* (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1933). See also M.W. Willey, "The Role of Radio in the New Social Order" (*Publ. Amer. Sociol. Soc.*, 1935, 29, 141-153); and L.L. Bernard, "The Conflict between Primary Group Attitudes and Divided Group Ideals in Modern Society" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, 1936, 41, 611-623).

3. The literature on the subject of propaganda and on its presumed consequence, public opinion, is appalling, from both the quantitative and the qualitative points of view. The very problem which has occasioned this literature is itself ideological, since it arises from the belated realization that government is not, after all, an expression of the rational will of those governed. This latter ideology—fundamental to the political system called democracy—was devised by the so-called social-contract theorists (Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau) during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as a justification for the overthrow of monarchy. It consists of the postulate of a presocial state of nature from which men establish government by contract with one another and as a consequence of rational recognition of the advantages to be secured thereby. Others, notably L.F. Ward (*Dynamic Sociology*, New York, Appleton, 1883, 2 vols.), contribute to this ideology the idea that general education of the citizenry will lead to progressively better government.

The term "public opinion" came into use to designate the reasoned collective will which was supposed to direct the personnel of popular government. In 1925 the political publicist W. Lippmann discovered in the interim between two books (*Public Opinion*, New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1922; and *The Phantom Public*, New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1925) that public opinion is controlled by the manipulation—propaganda—of political leaders and that, therefore, democratic government is not necessarily an expression of the reasoned will of those who are governed. World War experience was drawn upon to prove that we are the irresponsible puppets of propagandistic leaders. More recently, the rise of dictators in Europe has stimulated a new flow of books on the subject of propaganda.

Perhaps the most objective analysis so far made of the subject is L.W. Doob's *Propaganda, Its Psychology and Technique* (New York, Holt, 1935).

The most spectacular recent effort to make propaganda the bogeyman of current sociopolitical difficulties is F.E. Lumley's *The Propaganda Menace* (New York, Appleton-Century, 1933).

Other books include:

- Bernays, E.L., *Propaganda*, New York, Liveright, 1928.
- Biddle, W.W., *Propaganda and Education*, New York, Teachers College, Columbia University, 1932.
- Childs, H.L., *A Reference Guide to the Study of Public Opinion*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1934.
- (Ed.), *Pressure Groups and Propaganda*, The Annals, May, 1935.
- Eastman, M., *Artists in Uniform*, New York, Knopf, 1934.
- Gruening, E.H., *The Public Pays: A Study of Power Propaganda*, New York, Vanguard, 1931.
- Irwin, Will, *Propaganda and the News*, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1936.
- Lasswell, H.D., *Propaganda Technique in the World War*, New York, Knopf, 1927.
- Lasswell, H.D., R.D. Casey, and B.L. Smith, *Propaganda and Promotional Activities*, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1935.
- Leland Stanford Junior University, *A Catalogue of Paris Peace Conference Delegation Propaganda in the Hoover War Library*, Stanford University, Stanford University Press, 1926.
- Maddox, W.P., *Foreign Relations in British Labour Politics*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1934.
- Millis, W., *Road to War: America 1914-1917*, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1935.
- Riegel, O.W., *Mobilizing for Chaos*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1934.
- Wisn, J.E., *The Cuban Crisis as Reflected in the New York Press (1895-1898)*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1934.
- Young, K., and R.D. Lawrence, *Bibliography on Censorship and Propaganda*, Eugene, University of Oregon Press, 1928.

The extent to which propaganda has become one of the established villains of contemporary life is indicated by the fact that a group of professional psychologists, sociologists, educators, etc., established in 1937 an Institute for Propaganda Analysis and undertook to publish a monthly letter under the title *Propaganda Analysis* (published at 132 Morningside Drive, New York).

Those who see a new "menace" to civilization in the conversational use of modern means of communication overlook the facts that the ancient societies were able to disintegrate without the assistance of the newspaper and radio; that Napoleon Bonaparte was able to consolidate a greater part of Europe than has since been possible; and that political demagoguery is as old as human history and is therefore much older than modern communicative mediums. See E.E. Kellett, *The Story of Dictatorship: From the Earliest Times Till Today* (New York, Dutton, 1937).

4. For a detailed analysis of the subjective character of the term "propaganda" as it is commonly used, see R.T. LaPiere, "Propaganda and Education: The Need for a Quantitative Distinction" (*Sociol. and Soc. Res.*, 1935, 20, 18-26).

5. The moralistic censorship of books, paintings, and other artistic works is based upon the same ideology as that which is used to justify the censorship

of plays and motion pictures (see note 6, appendix to Chap. X). For data on the history of moralistic censorship, particularly the censorship of books, see:

Bowerman, G.F., *Censorship and the Public Library*, New York, Wilson, 1931.

Dennett, M.W., *Who's Obscene?*, New York, Vanguard, 1930.

Faber, G.C., *A Publisher Speaking*, London, Faber and Faber, 1934.

Gillett, C.R., *Burned Books*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1932.

Seldes, G., *Can These Things Be!*, New York, Brewer, Warren & Putnam, 1931.

The best source of current reports and comments on book censorship is *Publishers' Weekly*.

Since of recent years the attention of censoriously inclined moralists has turned from books to the motion pictures, it was possible for the Junior League in New York to hold a public exhibit of previously banned books. See L.L. Mackall, "Banned Books" (*New York Herald Tribune Books*, Jan. 26, 1936).

Whether literature and art reflect social life, influence social life, or simply provide a pleasant relief from social life is a matter of opinion. The present writer is inclined to believe that the last-mentioned view comes close to reality. The sociopsychological bases for this opinion will be found in R.T. LaPiere and P.R. Farnsworth, *Social Psychology* (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1936, Chaps. VI and VII). See also A. Guérard, *Literature and Society* (Boston, Lothrop, Lee & Shepard, 1935).

It is exceedingly difficult to secure factual data on the actual relationship between, for example, the types of novels people read and the ways in which they behave. Historical evidence suggests, however, that there is either no relationship or else a negative one. No student of literature would question the statement that most of the literature of the past century has reflected the highest moral values; *i.e.*, virtue wins, and sin receives its just deserts. Few if any moralists would, however, deny that the last hundred years have brought a steady deterioration of public morality; certainly the divorce rate has risen steadily!

The succinctly stated view of S.A. Rice in his review (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, 1936, 41, 694-697) of B.B. Hampton's *A History of the Movies* might well be extended to include the novel, the short story, the play, and the radio program:

"Attitudes toward the motion picture as a social institution are of two main types, which I shall call the *moralistic* and the *realistic*. The terms are not adequate, but they will serve to make a distinction which is important in appraising the present volume. Moralists tend to view the movies as a menace to social and individual standards, as distorters of social values, as baneful educational influence which inculcates false ideas and ideals in the young and dissipates the energies and serious purposes of adults. They recognize the potential power of the silver screen for good, and urge its utilization for social control in directions which these critics would approve.

The realists, on the other hand, view the movies as a tremendously vital agency of escape from the harsh actualities which surround life for the masses of the population. In themselves they are neither to be praised nor blamed, since they accurately reflect the aspirations of the *genus homo* as does no other form of sublimation. If criticism there must be, it should be directed against man himself, for being what he is, or against his maker."

6. Censorship efforts have frequently provided valuable publicity for books, plays, motion pictures, actresses, and even paintings. The efforts of Chicago preachers to have the so-called fan dancer Sally Rand removed from the Streets of Paris during the 1933 World's Fair raised her to a position of national prominence and made her the biggest attraction at that fair. The classical story is, however, that of the famed picture *September Morn*:

"In May 1913, white-whiskered officious old Anthony Comstock [noted, self-appointed guardian of public morality] was strolling along 46th Street in Manhattan when he was halted in his tracks by the shocking sight of the original painting of *September Morn* boldly displayed in the front window of Braun & Co. Into the shop he stormed, displayed his police badge, ordered a salesman named James Kelly to take the picture out of the window.

"'There's too little morning, and too much maid!' roared Anthony Comstock. 'Take her out!'

"The gallery refused. Next morning the story flamed all over the front pages of Manhattan, and crowds were blocking the sidewalk before Braun & Co. The rest is history. Reproductions of *September Morn* burgeoned on calendars, candy boxes, cigars, suspenders, post cards. . . .

"And whenever the excitement seemed likely to die out there were always rival Comstocks in provincial cities ready to blast the picture all over again.

"Artist Chabas took his picture back to Paris and promptly sold it to a rich Russian collector named Leon Mantacheff for \$10,000 . . ." (*Time*, Mar. 18, 1935).

Similarly, tremendous national interest was aroused for a motion picture of the birth of a baby, produced under the auspices of medical men, when reproductions from the motion picture appeared in a magazine and were promptly censored in many parts of the country. See the news item "Facts of Life" (*Time*, Apr. 18, 1938).

7. In a democracy, the party and the politicians in power may need to defend their status against the attacks of opposing parties and politicians. A corporation which has a satisfactory market for its products may be forced to defend its position against an aggressive competitor. Such defense measures are generally designated as counterpropaganda—efforts to prevent undesired conversions from occurring.

There is, however, no necessary difference between the techniques of propaganda and those of counterpropaganda. The difference lies largely in leadership motive—*i.e.*, in the reasons for making the conversational effort; and the distinction between propaganda and counterpropaganda is of necessity a highly subjective one. The problem is often, for example, that of trying to distinguish between advertising which is directed toward the maintenance of a market and that which is calculated to expand a market. The concept of counterpropaganda is, therefore, useful mainly

in suggesting that much propagandistic effort is expended in the effort to offset the effects of other propagandists.

Under certain conditions those whose interests are jeopardized by the propagandist may resort to censorship rather than to counterpropaganda. The difference is essentially the same as that between silencing an opponent and outtalking him. Powerful vested interests—religious, political, or commercial—rely upon censorship as cheaper and as more certain to be effective. Thus, the spokesman for religious bodies may succeed in having “immoral” books, plays, and motion pictures prohibited; and a political dictator may censor out all news which he considers inimical to his interests. See J.E. Foster, “Censorship as a Medium of Propaganda” (*Sociol. and Soc. Res.*, 1937, **22**, 57–66).

Political censorship—as distinct from moralistic censorship—has proved to be a useful tool for the dictators of the so-called totalitarian states; but censorship, like anything else, can be carried to idiotic extremes, as is evident from the following:

“The Imperial Japanese Government, acting upon a bill passed by the Japanese Diet, announced that next week it will establish 22 Thought Control Offices in such leading Japanese cities as Tokyo, Osaka, Nagoya, Hiroshima, Sendai, Sapporo and Fukuoka, with Thought Control Sub-stations in 15 other cities.

“Hitherto Japanese police have performed the greater part of Japanese thought control upon political prisoners. . . .

“In the new 1936-style Thought Control Offices, several hundred Japanese instructors will gravely impart to Japanese subjects in batches what they are to think and are not to think. . . . Since 1928, police have arrested some 60,000 Japanese on the charge of ‘thinking Dangerous Thoughts’” (*Time*, Oct. 26, 1936).

It is practically impossible, as O. Millard (*Underground News*, New York, McBride, 1938) has shown, for even the most rigorous political censorship to prevent the publication of news. How the Japanese can control thoughts is evident only to the Japanese.

8. For realistic considerations of the noneducational function of advertising and of the techniques employed by advertisers, see C.C. Hopkins, *My Life in Advertising* (New York, Harper, 1927); J. Rorty, *Our Master's Voice—Advertising* (New York, Day, 1934); and the editorials and news items in any issue of *Printers' Ink*, the advertisers' trade journal.

For advertising ideologies see any textbook on the subject or one of the following:

Baster, A.S.J., *Advertising Reconsidered*, London, King, 1935.

Calkins, E.E., *The Business of Advertising*, New York, Appleton, 1915.

Donovan, H.McC., *Advertising Response*, Philadelphia, Lippincott, 1924.

Hall, S.R., *Theory and Practice of Advertising*, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1926.

Hotchkiss, G.B., *The Measurement of Advertising Effects*, New York, Harper, 1927.

———, *An Outline of Advertising*, New York, Macmillan, 1933.

———, *Advertising Copy*, New York, Harper, 1936.

Lucus, D.B., *Psychology for Advertisers*, New York, Harper, 1930.

Poffenberger, A.T., *Psychology in Advertising*, New York, Shaw, 1925.

9. Upon the rather dubious assumption that newspaper editors know what newspaper readers are interested in and that, therefore, the content of newspapers is a reflection of public interests, attempts to study public opinion by studying the newspapers have been made by J.L. Woodward ("Quantitative Newspaper Analysis as a Technique of Opinion Research," *Soc. Forc.*, 1934, **12**, 526-537); by A.A. Tenney ("The Scientific Analysis of the Press," *Independent*, 1932, **73**, 895-898); by H. Hart ("The Reliability of Two Indices of Newspaper Behavior," *Soc. Forc.*, 1932, **10**, 318-323); and by G. Gallup ("A Scientific Method for Determining Reader Interest," *Journalism Quart.*, **7**, 1-13).

10. For a discussion of the techniques used in the effort to determine the size, interests, and responses of radio publics, see note 27, appendix to Chap. XIII.

11. The term "public opinion" has been abused beyond all endurance and may be struck from the vocabulary of social psychology without the slightest loss. A late eighteenth-century substitute for such terms as "public will," "collective spirit," and so on, it has historical implication but has never acquired exact meaning. See W.T. Laprade, *Public Opinion and Politics in Eighteenth Century England* (New York, Macmillan, 1936). In most instances it is used by political scientists in reference to that non-existent collective spirit or mind which was so basic to the Hegelian metaphysical concept of the state.

The effort to define public opinion and to determine whether public opinion is a determinant or a creature of political leadership has, as is always the case with any metaphysical concept, resulted in interminable debate and no factual findings. The more recent writings on the subject were stimulated by the speculations of Walter Lippmann (*op. cit.*) and include the following:

Angell, N., *The Public Mind*, London, Douglas, 1926.

———, *From Chaos to Control*, New York, Century, 1933.

Childs, H.L., *A Reference Guide to the Study of Public Opinion*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1934.

Graves, W.B., *Readings in Public Opinion*, New York, Appleton, 1928.

Odegard, P.H., *The American Public Mind*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1930.

Raup, R.B., *Education and Organized Interests in America*, New York, Putnam, 1936.

See also the following articles: W. Bouer, "Public Opinion" (*Ency. Soc. Sci.*, **12**, 669-674); V.R. Sedman, "Some Interpretations of Public Opinion" (*Soc. Forc.*, 1932, **10**, 339-350); E.H. Paget, "Sudden Changes in Group Opinion" (*Soc. Forc.*, 1929, **7**, 438-444); R.C. Binkley, "The Concept of Public Opinion in the Social Sciences" (*Soc. Forc.*, 1928, **6**, 389-396); G.A. Lundberg, "The Newspaper and Public Opinion" (*Soc. Forc.*, 1926, **4**, 709-715); E.L. Bernays, "Manipulating Public Opinion" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, 1928, **33**, 958-971); and C.H. Woody and S.A. Stouffer, "Local Opinion and Public Opinion" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, 1930, **36**, 175-205).

Of recent years sociologists and psychologists have attempted to approach the subject of public opinion quantitatively. This effort has led to the practice of sampling, by means of the questionnaire, the "opinions" of individuals on one or many subjects and obtaining a norm from their responses, which is then taken to represent the public opinions on the subjects involved. If nothing else, this type of study has revealed the great diversity of opinions on any subject at any time and the rapidity with which such expressed opinions may change. In view of the findings, to talk about a public with an opinion on any subject is ridiculous. See S. Eldridge, *Public Intelligence: A Study of Attitudes and Opinions of Voters* (Lawrence, University of Kansas Press, 1935); D.D. Droba, "Methods Used in Measuring Public Opinion" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, 1931, **37**, 410-423); G.A. Lundberg, "Public Opinion from a Behavioristic Viewpoint" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, 1930, **36**, 387-405); P.S. Achilles and J.C. Link, "Measuring Changes in Public Opinion" (*Psychol. Bull.*, 1935, **32**, 725-726); and S.C. Menefee, "Stereotype Phrases and Public Opinion" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, 1938, **43**, 614-622).

For some years *Fortune* has conducted quarterly surveys of public opinion. See, for example, "Quarterly Survey: X" (*Fortune*, October, 1937), in which a representative sampling of the American population is asked questions on timely topics, ranging from "What automobile will you buy next time?" to "What is your attitude toward Congress as a whole?" A journal devoted entirely to the subject of public opinion—*Public Opinion Quarterly* (published at Princeton, New Jersey, by the School of Public Affairs)—was established in 1936.

Opinions as measured by questionnaires are, obviously, what others term attitudes; and, as has already been indicated, the significance of measured attitudes is by no means evident. Even the attitudes or opinions expressed by voters in an election or a nation-wide poll may have little evident significance in any except that specific voting or poll situation. In the fall of 1916 a sufficient number of Americans expressed a favorable opinion toward "peace at any price" to reelect Woodrow Wilson to the presidency. A few months later the United States was hysterically engaged in a war to save democracy. In 1935 twelve million English voters expressed, through a poll, their strong desire for peace. Early in 1937 the Baldwin government launched the greatest peacetime program for armament in England's history.

12. According to W.A. Brady (*Showman*, New York, Dutton, 1937, 132-133), the use of fan mail as a measuring stick of name prestige, as well as the trick of supplying oneself with fan mail in order to impress sponsors, antedates the motion picture and the radio:

"As soon as Rignold [a nineteenth-century actor] opened, he began to receive the richest, lushest, frankest collection of mash notes from ardent females that ever a young man with a profile had to read. Rignold knew nothing at all about the actual source of the things—that Tooker [Rignold's manager] was having them written to order. . . .

"There's nothing new under the sun. The present system whereby a radio or movie star can arrange with an agency to have himself written

50,000 fan letters in three months is just an adaptation of the commodore's fine Italian method."

See also M. Schuler, "Applause by Mail" (*Christian Science Monitor*, Nov. 4, 1936); and "Fan Mail" (*Lit. Dig.*, May 22, 1937).

13. The story of publicity director Ivy Lee and his remarkable work in making "Rockefeller" over from a greedy, ruthless ogre into a kindly old man is told in brief in the following news items:

"Newsmen well knew that Ivy Lee would give out just what information he considered helpful to his clients, and no more.

"The identity of those clients who had made Ivy Lee a millionaire was partly an office secret. Everyone knew about the Rockefellers, and the Pennsylvania Railroad, Ivy Lee's first account, which he held until his death. With the Pennsylvania, Pressagent Lee first applied his theory that a corporation should 'take the public into its confidence.' He 'humanized' tracks and freight rates, dividends and dollars. The idea worked well for Pennsylvania, and even better for Ivy Lee, who came to hear himself called 'Physician to Corporate Bodies'" (*Time*, Nov. 19, 1934).

"But John D. Rockefeller, the sinister master of old Standard Oil, has long since been replaced in the public mind by John D. Rockefeller, the gentle oldster who gave away more money than any man who ever lived. For that astonishing handspring in public opinion, John Rockefeller could thank in large measure the late famed Ivy Ledbetter Lee, his longtime pressagent. Without Ivy Lee's subtle guidance the Rockefeller giving might have been interpreted as a miser's attempt to ease his conscience—as indeed his early philanthropies were interpreted" (*Time*, May 31, 1937).

For further descriptive material see J.T. Flynn, "Edward L. Bernays: The Science of Ballyhoo" (*Atlantic Monthly*, May, 1932, 562-571).

14. It is highly improbable that any considerable number of listeners believe or are to the slightest degree impressed by the opera singer who announces over the radio that, because singing is so hard on her throat, she can smoke only so-and-so's cigarettes. They probably reflect, if they respond at all, on the old saying that everyone has his price, as indeed is indicated by the frank article "The Inside of the Testimonial Racket" in *Advertising and Selling* (Jan. 7, 1931), a medium which circulates among members of the advertising profession.

15. For a list of some of the more imaginary villains which have been invented by writers of advertising copy, see LaPiere and Farnsworth, *op. cit.*, 458-459.

16. Once in a blue moon an advertising-copy writer steps down from the pedestal of professional pomposity and addresses a hypothetical listener endowed with adult human attributes. Such, for example, is the following refreshing and amusing travesty of the conventional advertising drama:

"A very wealthy man had once forgotten everything about his early life except the name of the town he came from. He had not given a thought to his dear old mother for twenty years, being too busy stacking up the shekels. One night his cook sprang a new one on him. It looked like a dishful of gold. It had a big gob of butter melting on it. He took a helping and tasted—lo! it was 'Corn-on-the-cob-without-the-cob.' It was Del Maiz

Niblets Corn. That big-kerneled, tender corn made scenes of his boyhood flash before his eyes. The old home. His mother standing over the wash-tub. The red-checked table cloth. The platter of sweet, golden ears of corn he used to love. The man ate and reminisced—and vice versa. He was a boy again. So the very next morning he dropped his mother a post-card with a picture of Radio City on it" (Adv. of Minnesota Valley Canning Co., in *Time*, Dec. 6, 1937).

17. The idea that conversional leaders determine the course of human history—*i.e.*, that "propaganda" is a "menace"—is exceedingly naïve. Conversional leadership plays its small part, but the converter is only one of a great complex of interacting forces which *in toto* are history. The following are but a few of many available illustrations of the limited power of conversional efforts.

By a meticulous study of voting behavior by counties in presidential elections, E.E. Robinson (*The Presidential Vote*, Stanford University, Stanford University Press, 1934) has shown: (1) that most people vote consistently for one or another of the parties, regardless of socioeconomic conditions, the character of the candidate, or the intensity of conversional pressures; (2) that some counties are marginal (*i.e.*, the traditional vote is fairly well divided between the two major parties); (3) that in these marginal counties the outcome of the election depends upon the behavior of a comparatively few marginal voters; (4) and, thus, that the outcome of a presidential election depends upon the marginal voters in the marginal counties.

Largely by an analysis of the data of Robinson, W.F. Ogburn and A.J. Joffe ("Independent Voting in Presidential Elections," *Amer. J. Sociol.*, 1936, 42, 186-201) have shown that youth and economic condition are the principal factors in determining the marginal voter.

The term "marginal man" has been applied by R.E. Park and others to those classes of people, such as the American Negroes, who are brought up in two contrasting worlds and who are, therefore, always torn between two patterns of adjustment to any given situation—*i.e.*, who are "marginal," in the sense used herein, in most of their life situations. E.V. Stonequist (*The Marginal Man*, New York, Scribner, 1937) has made an exhaustive study of this subject.

To most Americans, W.R. Hearst has been *the* persistent and powerful "propagandist." He is frequently held up as a terrible example of the power and danger of the press. Nevertheless, his ability to secure his political ends has never been considered noteworthy. See O. Carlson and E. Bates, *Hearst: Lord of San Simeon* (New York, Viking, 1936); and F. Lundberg, *Imperial Hearst: A Social Biography* (New York, Equinox Cooperative Press, 1936) for the record of his many defeats.

The conversional power of the press has long been overestimated. In the presidential election of 1936 Candidate Roosevelt received over 60 per cent of the popular vote, 523 of the 531 electoral votes, although, as the following news item indicates, the newspapers of the country were very strongly opposed to him:

"The Roosevelt avalanche last week left many a U.S. news publisher wondering if writing and printing an editorial page was worth the trouble.

All through the land, voters thumpingly disregarded the editorial politics of an estimated 80 % of the nation's daily Press . . . " (*Time*, Nov. 16, 1936).

In August, 1935, *Reader's Digest* published the article "—And Sudden Death" by J.C. Furnas, which described in an exceptionally dramatic fashion the dangers of careless driving. The article aroused national interest and within a month:

" . . . *Reader's Digest* has sold more than 1,500,000 reprints of the Furnas article. Magazines, newspapers, the radio have quoted it. Judges have read it aloud to traffic offenders, made them write it long-hand or recite it. Wyoming sends it with every set of license plates. The Port of New York Authority gives it to all motorists using the Holland Tunnel or the George Washington Bridge. Copies of it accompany all official correspondence of the Province of Ontario" (*Time*, Sept. 30, 1935).

Nevertheless, the curve of automobile-accident deaths continued its steady rise, as is indicated by the following statistics (compiled from *Accident Facts*, 1937 ed., and *Public Safety*, June, 1937, both published by the National Safety Council, and from a 1938 news release by that body):

Year	Deaths
1933	31,363
1934	36,101
1935	36,369
1936	37,800
1937	39,700

For an analysis of the underlying causes of automobile accidents, which themselves suggest why neither conversional nor dramatic efforts are of the slightest effect, see "Traffic and Highways" (*Fortune*, August, 1936).

To those who think that modern people are simply marionettes controlled by advertisers and publicity men, the following news item may be significant:

"To discover the type of home desired by the average U.S. citizen, Niagara Hudson Power Corp. lately questioned 250,000 customers in up-state New York. From plans based on a composite of 11,000 replies, the big utility will build model homes as a promotional push. Last week *Architectural Forum* which prepared and interpreted the survey, published its findings.

"In the face of enormous publicity in behalf of modern style, emanating from glass, plumbing and building supply companies, from the architectural profession and its trade papers, from Hollywood in the form of a constant procession of modern cinema sets, the citizens of New York State plumped for Colonial. Only 11 % expressed any desire for Modern" (*Time*, Nov. 9, 1936).

CHAPTER XIII

PUBLIC BEHAVIOR: II. RECREATIONAL ASPECTS OF LEADERSHIP

In the preceding chapter the general attributes of public behavior and the conversational aspects of the leadership of publics were considered. Here we shall be concerned with the recreational aspects of leadership in various types of public situations, with only such reference to the intent of the leader as may be necessary to understand the character of his recreational offerings.

THE NEWSPAPER PUBLIC

In spite of the increasing dependence of modern people on the motion picture and in spite of the development of radio as a source of recreational satisfactions, the newspaper has not lost its popularity.¹ None of the developments of recent years in the field of recreation has adversely affected the circulation of newspapers. Few literate people are without a daily newspaper, although they may subscribe to a number of periodicals, attend the motion picture, and possess a radio set. These latter means of securing recreational satisfactions apparently supplement, rather than substitute for, the newspaper.

The newspaper provides its public with two sorts of satisfactions: those of an informational order, which come indirectly from knowing facts which are useful in the conduct of life; and those of a recreational order, which come directly from reading an interesting story. For the vast majority of the members of any newspaper public, the recreational satisfactions are far more important than are those of the informational sort. Relatively few people have any vital interest in the tabulated data of current events, such as stock-market reports, shipping news, and birth, death, and marriage statistics, which are published in the modern newspaper. The bulk of any newspaper, therefore, consists of short, short stories, distinct from the stories of the

writers of fiction only in that they are concerned with actual people and actual events.²

Recreational Appeal.—The old-time country newspaper had a comparatively small and homogeneous public.³ Since the members of this public knew one another, accounts of the commonplace activities of one another were interesting to them. Even when an item lacked particular entertainment value to most of the subscribers of the newspaper, it was certain to please at least those whose names appeared in the item. Since, without much effort, the country editor could get the names of all his subscribers into the news during the course of a few issues, his public was assured. His news consisted, therefore, largely of accounts of the activities of people who were known at least by name to all the readers and of the activities of the readers themselves.

The modern metropolitan daily, on the other hand, has a large and heterogeneous public. To hold its preeminence in the recreational field, the newspaper has of necessity developed a new technique of recreational leadership. About all that the readers of the modern public have in common is that they can read and that they live in the area which is reached by the given newspaper. Should the editor treat his readers as one public, his hypothetical listener would be of such exceedingly small stature that, like the political speaker over the radio, the editor would be limited to banal comments on mother love and the glories of the nation. He therefore resorts to the shotgun technique and addresses a number of hypothetical listeners, disregarding the fact that what he provides for one may prove uninteresting or even displeasing to some of the others. Many of his subscribers may, for example, be disinterested in or irked by the space he gives to the gory details of murders and the disgusting details of the more spectacular divorce cases.⁴ Consequently, he provides a number of kinds of items—items concerning international, political, financial, sport, social, garden, literary, and motion-picture news—from which each reader can select those kinds of items which are appropriate to his particular tastes. The modern newspaper editor does not, therefore, appeal to one public, but rather to a number of overlapping, special-interest groups. The range of his recreational offerings is thereby far greater than it would be if he were to attempt

to include in each issue only those items which would prove interesting to all his public.

Newsworthy Events.—From the point of view of the editor, events are selected in terms of their recreational value to his readers. Only those which will make interesting reading are newsworthy. Few of the members of any one of the special-interest groups will be known by name to any considerable number of the members of that group. As a result, the only items which will prove interesting to the members of that group are the commonplace events about the relatively few persons and places which are known by name to most of that group or else the extraordinary events which involve unknown persons or places. For example, the sporting section of a newspaper has something of its own following. Those who read the sporting section have a common interest in sports. They will, however, be interested in commonplace events in the world of sports only when those events are associated with well-known names. The activities of an unknown person in the world of sports will be newsworthy only when they are extraordinary. Likewise, a local wedding may be interesting to a considerable number of the editor's public if the principals involved are local public figures; otherwise, a wedding is newsworthy only if it has a spectacular "angle," such, for example, as would be the case were the bride a child bride.

Dramatization.—The fact that an event is newsworthy is not, however, sufficient to make it entertaining reading. Few of such events can have any direct significance for many of the readers of a newspaper. To make them recreationally significant, the journalist does for those events what the rumor process does for the grain of truth which may serve as the basis of a rumor; he gives it dramatic form, intimate detail, and authenticity. Ordinarily, he follows simple dramatic formulas, although these may be varied somewhat by the so-called "sob sisters," who utilize a melodramatic technique. Whatever the dramatic form, the recreational value of a newspaper story is dependent quite as much on that dramatic form as on the factual basis for the story.

The importance of dramatization can be seen in the fact that, when newsworthy events are scarce, incidents which at other times would be covered in a brief paragraph or passed by unmen-

tioned will be expanded into a column or more of story. On dull news days, the most trivial incident or something which is invented in a journalist's mind will serve as the excuse for some newspaper melodrama.⁵ A fire, an arrest, a murder, a divorce, a heavy rain, the death of somebody's dog—these and countless other commonplace incidents form the material from which news writers may fabricate their breathless dramas when newsworthy events are not available.

The Cartoon.—Perhaps the simplest, yet in some respects the most forceful means of newspaper dramatization is that of the cartoon. Although he deals more with graphic forms than with words, the cartoonist is a master storyteller. In his story, as in all effective stories, the dramatic pattern is always in evidence. In the one-frame cartoon, the generation of dramatic conflict is implied; and only its climax is portrayed. In the strip cartoon, on the other hand, the growth of the conflict is portrayed through a series of frames; and the resolution is portrayed in the last frame. The forcefulness of the cartoon as a means of communication is attested by the extent to which both one-frame cartoons and strip cartoons are used in the conversational efforts of political interests. If actions sometimes speak louder than words, drawings often tell stories more forcefully than do columns of words.

News as Current History.—It should be evident from the foregoing that the newspaper gives its readers a distorted picture of current events and that, although it may at times be the only source of historical data, it is an exceedingly poor source.⁶ In the first place, the events which may be newsworthy from day to day are unlikely to have much historical significance. The modern editor prints but a small fraction of the news which comes into his editorial office. From all that which is available, he selects those items which in his judgment will be the most interesting on the particular day to the largest number of his various readers. A local divorce may receive many times the coverage of an ultimately revolutionary development in medical science; and a local election may dominate the headlines while a fundamental change in some aspect of the political system receives a few lines on a back page. Local and momentary public interests therefore determine the contents of a daily newspaper.

Furthermore, neither the commonplace events in the lives of local notables nor the spectacular events in the lives of commonplace people are likely to have much effect upon history, current or ultimate. Atypical people and atypical events are the newsworthy items of the newspaper. But neither atypical people nor atypical events constitute the important data of social life and social development.

Finally, the dramatization which is necessary to make all newsworthy events interesting reading means that, even when a news story concerns historically significant events, it is a poor source of data on that event. Before the event has run its full course, it will usually have lost its dramatic appeal and will have been abandoned for some new and more exciting event. Aside from its day-by-day recreational significance, the newspaper is, therefore, mainly important as a record of the day-by-day recreational interests of the members of the community which it serves.⁷

PERIODICAL PUBLICS

Membership in a newspaper public is usually regular but brief. For most people, the newspaper fills some definite niche in the daily routine—breakfast time, the period just preceding the evening meal, or the time spent in commuting to and from work. Many people will, however, exhaust the recreational possibilities of one or a number of daily newspapers before they have satisfied their interest in recreational reading. For those who have, for whatever reasons, exhausted the recreational possibilities of the daily papers, there remain the variegated offerings of the periodicals.

Although the periodical usually makes its appeal to a national public, the size of that public is not necessarily larger than is that of the newspaper. Most, but not all, periodicals are directed toward a selected reading public, a fact which will become apparent as we examine into the interest appeals made by various kinds of magazines.

Classification of Periodicals.—It is impossible to draw a clear distinction between the dramatic story which is based upon actual persons and events and that which is frankly a piece of fiction. In the first place, although the news story, the auto-

biographical story, and the story which is based on history purport to be factual, they may actually be either dramatized fact, straight fiction, or an inseparable admixture of both. In the second place, as every author knows, much of that which goes into the making of a purported fictional story is actually drawn from experience. Consequently, it is nearly impossible to classify stories into those which are factual and those which are fictional. Any endeavor to classify periodicals into those which are factual and those which are fictional in appeal is further thwarted by the fact that many magazines are something of each. Therefore, it is possible to say only that, while some magazines seem to appeal mainly to interest in what is supposed to be fact, others appear to make their principal appeal to interest in what is supposed to be fiction.

General-news Magazines.—The general-news magazine weekly provides a somewhat selected and national public with much the same sort of news as that which the newspaper daily provides an unselected and local public. The news magazine is not, however, a competitor of the newspaper. For its readers it supplements, rather than substitutes for, the newspaper.

The reason is not difficult to find. Although the newspaper and the general-news magazine cover the same news, the stories in the latter bear little resemblance to those in the former. The events which appear in the news magazine are selected on the basis of national rather than local interests. The local divorce which occupied the front pages of a newspaper will come into different focus in the news magazine; and many events of national significance which did not appear in the newspaper will be reported in the news magazine. Furthermore, the items in the news magazine are selected in terms of a week rather than a day. The "big" story which momentarily excited the newspaper editor may, in view of a longer perspective, be ignored by the editor of the news magazine; and the important event which was ignored by the newspaper because it started to develop in a small way may be given considerable space in the news magazine. Consequently, the news magazine can present a fairly complete and coherent account of the newsworthy events of the week, whereas the newspaper provides at best only a fragmentary, episodic, and frequently incomplete story of some of the same events.

Nevertheless, the general-news magazine does not provide a factual account of the nationally significant events of the week. It provides, rather, a dramatic account of the nationally interesting events of the week.⁸ The publishers of the news magazine *Time*, for example, take rather justifiable pride in appealing to a public which wants the facts on national and international events. These events are, however, seldom presented as factual accounts. They are usually incorporated in neat and readable little dramas. The discovery of some scientist becomes a vivid, meaningful, resolution of conflict between nature, who is reluctant to give up her secrets, and the scientist, who is striving to save humanity from the consequences of ignorance. Likewise, items concerning sports, politics, music, the theater, motion pictures, books, etc., are handled dramatically. Thus, although the news magazine may be a vastly better source of data on current history than is the newspaper, its accuracy is limited by the fact that, like the newspaper, it is designed to provide recreation for its public rather than facts for the social student.

An interesting development of recent years is the pictorial news weekly, an outgrowth of the daily tabloid. The latter was a definite competitor of the regular newspaper, appealing, as the more cynical put it, to the illiterate. Whether the pictorial news weekly is a substitute for, or a supplement to, the general-news magazine remains to be seen.

Personal-news Magazines.—A large number of magazines belong to a category which can be described only as gossip about some specific class of persons. Presumably these magazines serve to supplement daily newspaper accounts. Even as the general-news magazine selects its items on a national and weekly basis, the personal-news magazine selects its items on a national and, usually, monthly basis.

There are a variety of personal-news magazines, each of which specializes in news about some single class of persons. For the socially élite, there is *Town and Country*; for the shopgirl, a host of motion-picture magazines; for the members of a fraternal order, the particular personal-news organ of that order. Thus, the stories contained in *Town and Country* concern nationally prominent socialites. Those in the motion-picture magazines concern popular stars. Those in the organs of fraternal orders concern the more prominent sisters or brothers of that order. The

appeal in all cases is to personal interest in persons who are known either directly or by repute to the reader.⁹

Trade Journals.—Trade journals, of which there are many hundreds published in the United States alone, are also news magazines, usually monthly, for the members of special, occupational groups.¹⁰ A trade journal may contain a somewhat higher proportion of factual material than does the newspaper, but its primary appeal is recreational. Aside from advertising and other conversational matter, it provides news about events in the technical and social aspects of a given occupation. Although some trade journals, such as the *Engineering News Record*, border on the technical journal, the vast majority give such technical information as they may contain in the dramatic style of the Sunday supplement.

Avocational Magazines.—Further illustrating the tendency for magazine publics to be limited in membership by the specific nature of the leadership appeal are those which are concerned with specific recreational interests. Almost no field of activity which serves as an avocation for any considerable number of people lacks one or a number of periodicals. For the amateur angler, dog breeder, poultry fancier, photographer, and so on there are magazines which make their appeal on the basis of news in these particular fields. For those who are interested in art, the dance, the stage, architecture, fashion, and so on, other special magazines are published. For those whose avocation is the doings and ways of the so-called smart set, there are such beautiful, frivolous, and unspecialized magazines as the *New Yorker*, *Esquire*, and *Coronet*.

Although the clothing merchant may find *Esquire* a supplement to his trade journals and although architects may find *Architectural Forum* of considerable technical interest, the majority of the publics of such periodicals read them for their purely recreational value. For a reader who is interested in such things, the skilled writer can make a dramatic story out of the latest fad in men's cravats or the latest method of adapting colonial design to the modern house.

Class Magazines.—So distinct that even journalists, publishers, and dealers characterize them by the term "class," are those monthly magazines which make their appeal to people who are more or less vitally interested in social and technical

matters of long-run significance.¹¹ *Current History*, *Scribner's Magazine*, and *Harper's Magazine* belong to this category. Although a dash of fiction and poetry of the more esoteric type may be thrown in, the bulk of such magazines is devoted to timely considerations of socially important matters in the fields of politics, industry, science, technology, social morality, and so on.

The topics treated in class magazines are often those which directly concern academicians, and frequently the articles are the product of more or less recognized authorities. Class magazines are not, therefore, scorned by scholars. Such periodicals are, however, anything but scholarly in the way in which they present their facts and opinions. As far as content is concerned, there may be little difference between an article in a technical journal and an article in one of the class magazines. The same author may write both articles. Since, however, the class magazines appeal to a larger and less selected public, the members of which are less interested in the acquisition of information than in the enjoyment of recreational reading, the technical article is embellished for the class magazine and is given dramatic appeal.

To the average intelligent reader, the class magazine provides an enjoyable means of passing some leisure time and, at the same time, of painlessly keeping up with the more interesting trends of the times. For the scholar and the scientist, such magazines may provide almost the sole means of keeping in touch with developments in fields beyond their particular specialities.

The Digest.—Of recent years digests of current literature have been steadily increasing in popularity. Such digests draw their material mainly from the class magazines and from books of comparable quality. The digest seems to supplement the class magazines, rather than to compete with them. Certainly the publishers of the latter believe so, for they have looked with favor upon the "digestion" of the articles which they publish.

For any given reader of class magazines, one or two will probably be sufficient to fill protracted periods of leisure. For brief periods of leisure, he can rely upon the short articles in the digest to give him small doses of much the same sort of recreational satisfaction. The amount of time he has available for reading

may, therefore, determine whether he will plunge into an article in the latest issue of *Harper's Magazine* or whether he will nibble at an article which originally appeared in *Scribner's Magazine* and is now available in digest form in the *Reader's Digest*.¹²

The Popular Periodical.—The largest selling weekly and monthly magazines are the popular periodicals which provide the reader with a little of everything, or, more accurately, which endeavor to appeal to readers of varying recreational interests. The *Saturday Evening Post*, for example, which evidently tries to provide a balanced ration, with something for everyone, is composed of a mixture of articles and fictional stories. The articles are on timely economic, political, and social questions; on more personal matters, ranging from food to furniture; and on personalities.¹³ The topics are sufficiently varied and the treatment sufficiently journalistic to assure that almost every habitual reader will, in the course of a week or a month, encounter something interesting to him.

The articles, however, constitute the smaller part of the content of the popular periodical. Its chief appeal is probably its fictional stories. Like the articles, the fictional offering is varied in topic and treatment in order to meet the needs of a varied public. The *Saturday Evening Post*, for example, rather systematically provides one story of romance, one of adventure, and one of comedy, and occasionally one tragedy. In the main, these stories follow simple formulas. Presumably upon the assumption that any particular issue may fail to provide some readers with sufficient satisfactions to assure their continued subscription to the magazine, the editors of popular periodicals invariably insert one or two overlapping continued stories, usually of different orders.

Although there is no evidence to support it, the general view of editors of popular periodicals would seem to be that each type of fictional story tends to appeal to a special age or sex group. The editors of those popular magazines, such as *Good Housekeeping* and the *Ladies' Home Journal*, which are intended to reach a feminine public at least restrict their fictional offerings to romance. The result is a combination of articles on cookery, dressmaking, and other domestic crafts and of stories in which the heroine is engaged in anything but domestic routine.¹⁴

The Pulp.—Fifty years or more ago it was discovered that there was a large and constant public in America for cheaply produced action stories.¹⁵ The dime novel developed to meet this demand. Hack writers sprang up to supply the needed stories and soon devised simple and effective formulas for such stories. Most of the stories were laid in a mythical Wild West and concerned the conflict between bold, frontier adventurers and Indians or outlaws. Decried as cheap, trashy, and a pervertive influence upon the youth of the nation, the dime novel nevertheless flourished and has metamorphosed into the modern pulps, more than one hundred of which are published. Presumably to assist in the illusion that the contents are of superior quality, many comparable magazines are printed on slick paper, rather than on the rough pulp paper from which the pulps derive their name. Such, for example, is the case with many of the Hearst and McFadden publications.

The pulps cover various fields of romance and adventure; they seldom treat comedy; and they never treat tragedy. Although some verge on the pornographic—*Snappy Stories*, for example—the majority reflect the most conservative attitudes and moral values. All provide action stories—*i.e.*, stories in which little time is wasted on description and in which the characters act with a minimum of feeling and reflection. Thus, pulp stories concentrate on the overt behavior of human beings.¹⁶

Scorned by men of letters, the pulps nevertheless seem to draw their publics from all walks of life.¹⁷ Although their publics are composed largely of the just-literate, they include many people who are also capable of securing enjoyment from the best of fiction. For these people, the pulps seem to serve as a sort of mental sedative. Men whose work involves a good deal of mental effort—doctors, lawyers, scholars, and the like—may find that, under conditions of mental fatigue, the fast, simple, pulp story provides a particularly effortless way of securing diversion from normal living.

Certainly, if there is any such thing as “escape” literature, it must be the pulps.¹⁸ Each pulp magazine is specialized, not only as to the type of story—romance, adventure, etc.—but also as to the type of hero or heroine which appears in a particular type of story. Thus, some pulp magazines are concerned wholly with adventure stories in which the hero is a cowboy; others, in

which the hero is a sailor; others, in which the hero is an industrial worker. Still other pulp magazines consist entirely of romantic stories in which the heroine is a shopgirl. The dealers in these magazines are generally of the opinion that purchasers pick their pulps in terms of their own age, sex, and social status; *e.g.*, the shopgirl selects those magazines which specialize in romantic stories about shopgirl heroines. To the extent that this is so, the reader may possibly secure some vicarious escape from the inadequacies of his life by identifying himself with a story character who represents him. The story would then serve the reader as a sort of ready-made daydream.

BOOK PUBLICS

Like the old-time pitchmen, the publishers of all newspapers and those of most periodicals offer recreational material simply to secure a public which can be subjected to conversational pressures in the form of editorials and advertising. The publishers of books, on the other hand, ordinarily offer either information or recreation and nothing else. Although the author of a book may write with conversational intent, the book will find a public only if it provides interesting reading.¹⁹ The exception to this general rule is the textbook which may be assigned to students in schools and universities.

A second distinction between newspaper and periodical publics and those of books arises from the fact that the authors of some books may never react, even in anticipation, to many of their readers. The book is a relatively permanent record and may attract readers long after the author has died. It would obviously be unrealistic, for example, to say that, in writing his *Republic*, Plato anticipated the reactions of his modern readers. Plato was writing for a public composed of the men of ancient Athens. His leadership has been given limited but relatively persistent value only as the result of historic accident. To speak of Plato the author as the leader of a modern public is, therefore, to stretch the application of the term "leader" beyond reason and to make the term "public" so general as to be meaningless.

Types of Books.—The publishers of books make a rather categorical distinction between trade books and schoolbooks. The latter general field consists of textbooks for elementary and

secondary schools, of textbooks and reference books for college use, and of technical books for scholars. Schoolbooks will not be considered here, since their use grows out of educational, scientific, and occupational interests.

Trade books, on the other hand, appeal primarily to interest in recreational satisfactions. Much of what has been observed in connection with periodical literature applies also to trade books; for, although the stories told in book form may be longer, they fall into much the same vague classes as those which appear in magazines—fiction and nonfiction. Indeed, many books appear first or subsequently in serial form in periodicals.

Nonfictional Trade Books.—Nonfictional trade books are in the nature of elaborated articles of the type which appear in popular and class magazines—biography, autobiography, and nontechnical treatment of timely topics of science, art, and literature. The adventures of a modern Marco Polo become in book form the biography or autobiography of personal adventure.²⁰ The latest facts and theories of the physical sciences become, under the pen of a Sir James Jeans, a dramatic story of man's conquest of the unknown.²¹ The development of medical science becomes, through the writings of a Paul de Kruif, the dramatic story of human conquest of disease. The life of a society woman becomes, by the grace of a skilled ghost writer, the autobiographical story of a woman's conquest of society.

Typical of the way in which "fact" is made the basis for recreational appeals to large publics is the popular historical biography. Biographers treat the few facts which are known about historical personages in much the same way as the magazine writers treat the facts known about contemporary personages. As a consequence, the popular historical biography is concerned mainly with the historically irrelevant but, no doubt, interesting aspects of the private life of its central character. Since there is ordinarily very little available evidence upon this aspect of history, the biographer is far more dependent upon his imagination than upon the archives of history. The result is that popular historical biographies are actually fiction in the form of biography. Such writings may, however, be exceedingly pretentious and may involve the use of that traditional biographical device—the "discovery" of quantities of new and intimate letters written to or by the central character.

The number and variety of nonfictional trade books is tremendous. Hardly an academic subject has escaped the attention of some popularizer. Such books, however, ordinarily command only small publics. Although the demand for them is steady, the sales of the best sellers in this field are usually small in comparison with the sales of fictional best sellers. Exceptions are, however, to be noted. James Harvey Robinson's *Mind in the Making*, Axel Munthe's *The Story of San Michele*, Alexis Carrel's *Man, the Unknown*, and some others have secured great public acclaim.

In general it appears that the popularization of science is far less likely to secure a large public than is the scientific appeal to interest in personal welfare. Books of this latter type are essentially recreational; but they utilize the conversational technique of casting the reader first into the role of heroine, and then into the role of hero. The trade designates them as "uplift" books; and they are, in fact, simply extended sermons.²² There seems to be a rather close correlation between the temper of the times and the themes of scientific books. Presumably they reflect dominant, current interests. During the late 1920's, their general tenor was Making Millions on the Market. The depression years brought a deluge of promises of a new social order. When it finally became evident that a new social order was not imminent, the market became flooded with books telling the unhappy and discontented how to be happy in spite of the existing social order—*Life Begins at Forty*, *Live Alone and Like It*, *How to Win Friends and Influence People*, *Orchids on Your Budget*, etc.

Fictional Trade Books.—Quantitatively, fiction makes up the bulk of trade books; and the principal demand upon circulating libraries and public libraries is for fiction. Fictional stories are variously classified. In terms of period and setting, novels may be designated as historical, contemporary, or utopian. In terms of the symbolic hero, novels may be classified into those which concern a person, those which concern a family, and those which concern a group—such as the "poor whites" of the south. In terms of the nature and the resolution of the dramatic conflict, novels may be classified into such categories as romantic, adventurous, comic, tragic, and combinations of these.

Whatever the type of story and whatever the method of telling it, the essential result is the establishment of dramatic persons

and of conflict between them. The novel without a hero, heroine, and villain, or a number of each, has yet to be written; and, if written, it would probably remain unread.

The Best Seller.—Although name prestige is a considerable factor in determining the size of a book public, as it is in determining the size of other publics, the public appeal of the name prestige of authors does not account for best sellers. Just why one book should sell a hundred thousand copies, while ten or twenty other books which were published during the same week should average no better than ten thousand copies is a question, the answer to which any publisher would give a fortune to know. Once a book has become popular, the reason for its success becomes clearly evident to all concerned. The explanation then advanced is some variation of the theme that it is a best seller because it was a best seller.

How to determine the best seller before publication is anybody's guess, usually the publisher's.²³ To some extent, it is possible to designate minimum limits, below which no book can expect to receive popularity. Unfortunately, however, it is not even possible to say that a story must be written in comprehensible English, to say nothing of good English, in order that it secure a large public. Consequently, the minimum below which an acceptable book cannot fall is likely to be embodied in some such meaningless statement as "Books in Greek will not sell to English-reading people."

It would appear that people must already be more or less interested in a subject before a book on that subject will appeal strongly to them. Timely books, timely in terms of subject, background, or tone and mood, undoubtedly have a better chance to become popular than do those which are not timely. Again, however, of a number of books on a timely subject which appear together, one may be a great success while the others are failures.

How to ascertain what is timely until success has proved a book to have been timely is unknown. The fact that a topic dominates the news for months does not always indicate that such a topic is timely for fiction. Perhaps in the midst of war a novel on peace will prove to be timely. Certainly, it was during the peace after 1918 that war stories became appealing.

Books do seem to run in cycles, but there is no way of predicting the duration of a given cycle or the beginning of a new one.

Following the great popularity of the very long adventure novel *Anthony Adverse*, the belief was prevalent that the reading public was "fed-up" on bulky books and was ready to put quality above quantity. This belief, however, proved to be ill founded; for another long book, *Gone with the Wind*, then became the best seller of all times.

According to one belief, publicity makes or breaks the best of books. Choice of title, format, and dust jacket, advertising, sales pressure on dealers, and skillful determination of the proper moment to bring the book on the market are the elements which make up publicity. Many a book which was tossed casually on the market has, however, become a best seller; and many another which was pushed with all the craft and force of a great publishing house has failed to become popular.

Another belief is that the commercial success or failure of a book is a clear indication of the leadership skill of the author. This is, however, hardly an explanation, since again the problem is how to determine before publication what constitutes skillful leadership. At any event, publishers know that, except for writers with established name prestige, the publication of a book in the trade field is simply a commercial gamble. The publisher may have a reasonably accurate idea of what will not succeed, although in this regard no two editors may agree. Many a manuscript has been repeatedly rejected before finding a publisher, and some of these have subsequently proved to be very successful books. Even so, the publisher's skill is mainly negative; *i.e.*, he avoids the improbable and gambles on the probable. Out of every ten or twenty careful selections, he may have one best seller.

Finally, there is the factor of critical acclaim. For books of light fiction, which appeal so strongly to the shopgirl public, the published opinions of book reviewers can have no significance. The people who read such books are not interested in books as such and do not, therefore, read the comments of professional critics. Even with books which are directed toward the more literate, many of whom no doubt follow the book reviews in newspapers, on the radio, and in magazines, the effects of critical acclaim or critical depreciation are difficult to evaluate. Many books which have appealed strongly to reviewers have been denied popular recognition; many others which reviewers rather

generally considered mediocre have become best sellers. Critical acclaim may turn the balance, but there is no reason to suppose that it plays a determining part in the success of a book.

In the end, therefore, we are forced to the conclusion that the fugitive process determines the popularity of any book.²⁴ Of books on a common topic, of equal intrinsic merit, and equally backed by their publishers, the book which succeeds is the one which receives word-of-mouth advertising—*i.e.*, the one which becomes the object of fugitive behavior. Having sold fifteen or twenty thousand copies as the result of public anticipation of recreational satisfaction, a book may then become *the* book to buy as a matter of conversational necessity. It is, therefore, the unpredictable and uncontrollable fugitive process which makes a book a best seller.

Book-public Liberalism.—The quality which most strikingly distinguishes the book public from other publics is its characteristic liberalism. The members of a book public seem far more shockproof than do the members of a newspaper, magazine, or radio public. It was, for example, considered a major victory for public-health officials when, in 1936, they succeeded in breaking down the old newspaper tabu against the use of the commonplace terms "syphilis" and "gonorrhoea." These words had long since appeared in many novels and in nonfictional books without arousing adverse comment. Although censorship of books has frequently occurred, the writer who is directing his efforts toward a book public is, in general, less subject to tabus than is any other. Although he may have an exceedingly moral hypothetical listener in mind, he is more likely to labor than to avoid the immoral.

The liberalism of the book public includes more than the mere acceptance of frank treatment of the animal facts of life. The heroes and heroines of the writers of books can be far more fallible and far less stereotyped than the heroes and heroines provided for other publics. Furthermore, tragedy is more acceptable to the book public than it is to the motion-picture, magazine, or radio public. Whereas the untempered tragedy is rarely successful as a motion picture and is almost never found in any magazines but those of the class type, some of the most successful novels in the history of publishing have been tragedies.

Just why book publics are more liberal than are other publics is not clear.²⁵ Public protest against unmoral or immoral treatment of life in newspapers, magazines, motion pictures, and radio usually centers on the charge that such treatment will contaminate the minds of children. By implication, children can be guarded from unmoral and immoral influences when they appear in book form. There is no reason to suppose, however, that it is actually more difficult to keep children from reading newspapers and magazines than it is to keep them from reading books.

To some extent a more plausible hypothesis is that the profane word or immoral idea which is amusing or pleasantly stimulating in private becomes embarrassing when encountered in the presence of others. This would, however, explain only the difference in reaction to the word or idea on the motion-picture screen and over the radio as against that same word or idea in written form. It does not explain why a word or idea when it is printed in the newspaper has a different value than when it is printed and placed between book covers. It also fails to account for the fact that theater audiences often tolerate as much, or more, than do book publics.

Another interpretation of book-public liberalism is that the book public is composed of more liberal and more tolerant individuals than is any other. It is probable that many people who habitually read newspapers and see motion pictures seldom read books. Obvious is the fact that the motion-picture public is normally much larger than is that of even the more popular books. Yet those who have had experience with the reading publics, such as circulating-library or public-library clerks, are under the impression that the very people who disapprove of a motion picture because it is not quite nice may calmly accept a book such as Herbert Asbury's *The Barbary Coast*. And it is notable that, although the class magazines may publish a tragic story, they seldom print anything which might conceivably be termed indecent. Yet the subscribers to the class periodicals are considered the best potential market for books of the type which may have unmoral heroines and a frank treatment of earthly matters.

Probably the explanation of book-public liberalism lies mainly in historic factors, factors which are comparable to those which

account for the fact that a woman is adequately dressed for certain public occasions when her breasts and pelvic regions are covered but would be scandalously undressed should she so appear on other public occasions. There is nothing logical about such distinctions. The argument for morality in all but book literature is, thus, no more than a rationalization of the fact that people feel shocked when profanity or immoral behavior is encountered in most public offerings but view the same things complacently when they occur in a book. The book form in our society is simply a traditionally more liberal medium of recreation than are most other means of public leadership.

RADIO PUBLICS

Obvious is the fact that the development of radio telephony has had far-reaching social consequences. Travel and safety at sea have been vastly improved by radio communications, and commercial activities have been greatly facilitated. Two-way radio communication has made commercial aviation feasible and has made blind flying less hazardous than is ordinary motor travel. These applications of radio communication are of great significance for human behavior and should not be ignored.

The fact remains, however, that the major application of radio technology has been to the field of entertainment.²⁶ Millions of dollars are spent in the recreational and conversational use of radio for each hundred which is spent in its use as a means of direct, practical convenience.

Leadership Techniques.—In a previous chapter it was remarked that each medium of communication would seem to require its particular leadership devices. This point is nowhere more clearly illustrated than in the case of radio communication.

The techniques of leadership which have become traditional with those publics which are reached by the printed word are not satisfactory techniques over the radio. Silent reading is more rapid than is reading aloud. Were the news commentator to read standard newspaper stories to his radio public, that public would soon grow impatient. What would happen should anyone attempt to read a novel over the radio can easily be imagined. What is read over the radio must, therefore, be reduced to its barest elements.

This does not mean, however, that the effect will be a skeleton story. The radio speaker, unlike the writer, can imply the details of his story. The meaning of the spoken word can be varied by inflection; the spoken sentences can be punctuated with pauses of varying lengths; and even more important, emotional states can be simulated by tone of voice, rapidity of speech, and so on.

The inflections of the stage and platform are, however, amplified on the radio, even as they are amplified on the motion-picture screen. At the same time, the meaningful gestures which accompany the spoken word on the screen are not possible on the radio. Consequently, the techniques of the motion-picture screen are ineffective for the radio.

As a result of these factors, the radio has developed verbal techniques of its own. These techniques manage somehow to convey to the listener a sense of the nonvocal attributes of the performer, who is thereby given what is often described as a radio personality. The girl who has a "golden" voice filled with charm may be a radio success, although she may not, in fact, be personable. Provided that he has a "gentleman's" voice, the radio speaker can look and act like a thug. Radio has, therefore, offered leadership opportunities to many people who could never have succeeded on stage or screen.

As a means of leadership, the radio does, however, suffer from the fact that people are not habituated to listening without seeing the source of sound. This is probably a consequence of training rather than of any inherent tendency to visual "listening." Until people have developed "radio ears," however, the effectiveness of radio leadership is definitely limited.

The Radio Program.—Early interest in radio was not in program offerings per se, but in exploration of the American continent via radio. Early radio enthusiasts were more concerned with fishing for stations than with listening to the generally haphazard programs provided. As the novelty of such exploration wore off, the program became more important than the station; and today few but the short-wave fans care where their program comes from.

In the development of commercial broadcasting, program makers have of necessity proceeded upon a hit-and-miss basis. Sponsors and broadcasters have had so little to go on in the

making of programs that their offerings have hardly been better than a reflection of personal whim or of the current professional fancy. Within the profession, there has been a tendency for judgments to be faddy. For a time the people connected with broadcasting have been enthusiastic over amateur hours, the show with guest stars, or some other type of program. As a consequence, there has been some tendency for program offerings to go in cycles. These cycles, however, probably run courses which are entirely irrelevant to such changes as may occur in public interest.

Although radio technicians have perfected the process of broadcasting and program directors have developed remarkable skill at putting on their offerings, the only new form of entertainment which has emerged is that of verbal reporting of events as they happen. In the main, therefore, programs are made up of broadcasts of sound from theater and dance hall and of studio adaptations of theater, newspaper, and magazine devices. The amateur-hour type of program is, for example, a radio adaptation of the old vaudeville amateur night; the radio show is an adaptation of the traditional minstrel pattern; news reports, sports, gossip, style, and housekeeping chats are simply the adaptation of sections of the daily newspaper; the program of the Amos-and-Andy type is a protracted vaudeville dialogue; and the various serials are adaptations of the serial newspaper cartoon. If any principle has been used in determining program offerings, it is that variety is the spice of successful radio leadership. As a consequence, the daily diet which is offered by any major station is a series of hors d'œuvres.

The Functions of Radio Programs.—In part as a consequence of its natural limitations and in part, perhaps, as a consequence of the ways in which it has been applied, radio seems to serve a rather limited recreational function for its publics. The excitement which accompanied the rapid development of radio technique and broadcasting during the 1920's fostered the prediction that radio would become a substitute for newspaper, magazine, and theater. There is, however, no evidence that the elaborate programs which are now broadcast have secured publics at the expense of other recreational mediums.²⁷ Although the motion picture has undoubtedly become a partial substitute for the legitimate theater, the radio seems to be in the nature more

of a supplement to than a competitor of other recreational offerings.

For the sick, the crippled, the blind, the socially isolated, and those who are forced by economic considerations to remain at home, the radio program may be a substitute for other recreational activities. Such people are not, however, taken from the newspaper, the theater, and so on; they are, rather, people who secure, through radio, entertainment which would not otherwise be possible. Such people undoubtedly constitute a large part of the public of radio shows and serials. For the person of very limited social contacts, such offerings may serve as a partial compensation for lack of normal recreations.

Seldom, however, do normally active people become fully responsive members of a radio public. Although we should indeed think it strange to divide attention between a motion picture and knitting or between a newspaper and a game of cards, division of attention between the radio and other activities is a commonplace procedure with, perhaps, the majority of active people. The radio program then functions as little more than a background, much as chamber music was once used as a background for eating and conversing.

For the broadcaster, the function of the recreational offering is the attraction of a large public which can then be subjected to conversational pressures.²⁸ Unfortunate from his point of view, therefore, is the fact that those people who are most likely to be converted are least likely to prove profitable converts and that those who might be profitable converts are least likely to respond to conversational pressures. The sick, the crippled, and the socially isolated, who constitute the most responsive members of a radio public, seldom go to market to purchase the goods which are advertised by program sponsors. Those who do the buying in the retail markets are generally so much preoccupied with other activities, recreational or otherwise, that they relegate the radio program to the status of background noise. It is debatable, therefore, whether the sponsors of radio programs or the members of their publics secure sufficient satisfactions to justify the millions of dollars which are spent annually on radio broadcasting.

If radio is to serve a recreational function which is comparable to that of the newspaper, the magazine, and the book, programs

of all sorts must be available at all times for the potential member of the public to choose from at those odd times when he has nothing more pressing or interesting to engage his attention. There is no way of calculating when any considerable number of individuals want radio entertainment or what they will want when that time comes. As a result, many programs of the same and of different orders are broadcast simultaneously and continuously by a multiplicity of broadcasting stations. Since no one person can listen to more than one station at a time and since few people will listen to the radio for any considerable number of hours, waste is inevitably high. The only statement which can be made with confidence concerning the function of radio programs is that the development of these programs has been a great boon to professional entertainers.²⁹

APPENDIX

1. Although, as has been previously indicated, it is impossible to determine the size of a newspaper public, the following figures for 1937, compiled from the *International Year Book* (New York, Editor and Publisher, 1937, 124 and 147), suggest that recently developed recreational mediums, such as the radio, have not detracted from the popularity of the newspaper:

Number of daily newspapers published in United States.....	1,989
Average circulation per newspaper.....	20,258
Number of Sunday newspapers published in United States....	520
Largest number of copies circulating on a weekday.....	40,292,266
Largest number of copies circulating on a Sunday.....	29,962,120
Average circulation of foreign newspapers in U.S. daily.....	609,656
Average circulation of foreign newspapers in U.S. on Sunday..	582,622

In an excellent quantitative analysis of the number and character of printed mediums which reach publics in America, H. Punke ("Cultural Changes and Changes in Popular Literature," *Soc. Forc.*, 1937, 15, 359) estimates that the publication of newspapers and magazines was 3.1 per capita in 1810, 11.5 in 1840, 41.2 in 1880, 107.5 in 1900, 165.9 in 1929. Punke's article contains the most complete record available of the changes which have taken place in communication through the printed word (exclusive of books) in the United States over the course of a century.

2. No two newspapers and no two issues of a given newspaper will devote the same proportionate amounts of space to the various news categories. The average distribution of space, by column inches, for twelve weekday issues (six during January, 1936, and six during June, 1936) of a fairly conservative newspaper—the *San Francisco Chronicle*—is, however, suggestive:

General news.....	945	Editorials and letters to editor	69
Society and clubs.....	189	Shipping, births, deaths, etc.	167
Features.....	231	Screen and radio.....	273
Financial news.....	420	Comics	189
Sports.....	567	Advertising.....	1,281

Any attempt to separate the wheat from the chaff in a news story is, of course, certain to be highly subjective; and no two investigators will get the same results. Some of the classifications given in the foregoing were, however, broken down, with the following results:

	Statement of fact	Opinion, comment, elaboration, pictures, and obvious chitchat
General news.....	146	799
Society and clubs....	28	161
Sports.....	32	535
Screen and radio....	36	237

For detailed analysis of the content and structure of newspapers see K. Young, *Social Psychology* (New York, Crofts, 1930, 599-625). See also A. Lee, *The Daily Newspaper in America* (New York, Macmillan, 1937); and S.M. Kingsbury, H. Hart, and associates, *Newspapers and the News* (New York, Putnam, 1937).

3. The decline of the country newspaper is charted by M.W. Willey and W. Weinfeld in "The Country Weekly: Trends in Numbers and Distribution, 1900-1930" (*Soc. Forc.*, 1934, 13, 51-56).

4. Newspaper writers and editors are, nevertheless, subject to a great many tabus. In so far as these are concerned, the newspaper is addressed to one hypothetical listener rather than to a number of separate ones. The slowness with which established tabus break down is illustrated by the fact that before 1929 the commonplace word "syphilis" had not, apparently, appeared in the public print. When it did appear, the discussion in print of its appearing in print was considerable; and, evidently, publishers were surprised to find that their publics were not so thin-skinned as had long been supposed. The following news item indicates something of this surprise:

"The ice of journalistic reticence was first broken in 1929 when the St. Louis *Post-Dispatch* specifically mentioned syphilis in a report of a St. Louis meeting of the National Society for the Prevention of Blindness. Last year breaks in the taboo began appearing far & wide. The Chicago *Tribune* published three full-page articles on syphilis in its Sunday editions. In New York, the *News* (circulation 1,629,000) put on a campaign to publicize syphilis with news stories, editorials, cartoons, has sold 16,054 reprints at 5¢ each. The more conservative New York *Herald Tribune* and New York *Times* began putting the word 'syphilis' into their headlines. By last week some 125 newspapers of some 100 communities had mentioned 'venereal disease' or 'syphilis'" (*Time*, Oct. 26, 1936).

5. In spite of modern newsgathering and wire services, many of the news items which are published are simply printed rumors or printed legends.

On December 31, 1936, provided by Pardee Lowe, a San Francisco Chinatown interpretation of the kidnaping of the Chinese generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek appeared in the San Francisco *Chronicle* in the form of a "Letter to the Editor." On January 6, 1937, this same interpretation appeared in a rival San Francisco paper, the *Call-Bulletin*, as an Associated Press dispatch from New York. The original version had been a scholarly and undramatic analysis. Notice the typical rumor-story attributes which the interpretation acquired:

"From New York's Chinatown comes a theory that the sensational kidnaping of the Chinese generalissimo was a ruse to deceive Japan and to permit Chiang Kai-Shek to move troops in an effort to offset aggression against China's northern provinces. . . .

"Our Chinese merchant, who gave his views over the dinner table in a secluded spot in Chinatown, says Chiang resorted to this ruse in order to move troops northward over the energetic protests of Japan."

The following news item briefly describes the making of one newspaper rumor:

"Ill lay kinky-bearded, 64-year-old Thorvald Stauning, Premier of Denmark, after breaking a leg. The New York *Times* said he tripped over a 'grassy knoll' near Loekken while he was showing friends a short cut across sand dunes to the main road from his seaside bungalow. The Associated Press said he fell aboard the yacht *Nordsee*. The United Press said he was holidaying at his bungalow atop a dune, got out of bed for a stroll in his nightshirt, stumbled in the dark" (*Time*, Aug. 16, 1937).

The following news item tells the story of one of the lesser newspaper legends:

"In the 1890's reporter Ralph Delahaye Paine, famed young Yale rowing man breaking into journalism on the Philadelphia *Press*, was inspired to perpetrate a monumental hoax. With rich detail he told readers about one Pierre Grantaire who made a good living by raising and selling spiders for the spurious cobwebbing of wine bottles. . . .

"Though Mr. Paine forgot about it, the spider story continued to turn up here & there. Last year, the monthly *Mechanics & Handicraft* featured the story in its July number under the title 'Webs for Sale.' This time Pierre Grantaire was back in his native France, operating from a 'little village in the department of the Loire.'

"Last week, the hoary hoax raised its head once more, in highly respectable surroundings, when readers of the June *Atlantic Monthly* spied the yarn as the leading article in the 'Contributors' Club' department. The anonymous *Atlantic* contributor, borrowing many a phrase from the 40-year-old original, credited the spider farm to 'my grandfather'" (*Time*, June 7, 1937).

The story of another persistent newspaper legend is told in the following news item:

"News stories from flooded Cincinnati pointed out that that city, with no water to bathe in, is generally credited with the origin of the bathtub,

Adam Thompson having installed a mahogany-and-sheet-lead tub in his Cincinnati home in 1842. Thompson, a merchant, acquired the bath habit in England. The pipe which carried cold water to the tub from a tank in Thompson's garret was a direct line. The hot-water pipe coiled down the chimney. The bathtub, seven feet long and four wide, weighed 1,750 pounds. Medical men denounced the tub, the controversy spread, and in 1845 Boston made bathing unlawful. After the invention of the zinc-lined common-pine tub in 1847, however, the bathtub made steady progress in the United States. When President Millard Fillmore visited Thompson's house, took a bath, and in 1851 had a tub installed in the White House, the popularity of bathing was assured. An interesting story, is it not? The only trouble is that not a word of it is true. Written by H.L. Mencken as a hoax, it appeared in the New York *Evening Mail* on December 28, 1917. Since then it has appeared 10,000 times, usually as sober history. It will doubtless continue to appear as long as bathtubs exist" (*Today*, Feb. 13, 1937).

6. L. Greene (*America Goes to Press*, Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill, 1936) has collected newspaper accounts of events, significant and trivial, beginning with the Boston Tea Party, which, when read from our present perspective, seem ludicrous. From the vantage point of 1950, today's news interests and values will, no doubt, appear equally silly. See L.M. Salmon, *The Newspaper and the Historian* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1923); and F.L. Allen, "One Day in History" (*Harper's Mag.*, November, 1937, 606-616).

The newspaper editorial writer C.H. Rowell describes the relationship between news and history in the following words:

"The scales of value of news and of history are strikingly different. What makes the front page today may be forgotten tomorrow, while what is nearly or quite overlooked in the news may be the only thing which history remembers, a hundred years hence. The difference is not merely that news measures things by their interest and history by their importance, but also that the importance itself depends less on the event than on its still unpredictable consequences. The small beginning of what afterward became great is history. The startling incident which came to nothing remains only news" (*San Francisco Chronicle*, June 7, 1937).

For an analysis of the factors determining the news value of any event, see G.W. Johnson, *What Is News?* (New York, Knopf, 1926).

The use of the newspaper as the source of certain sociological, as distinct from historical data, is indicated by J.W. Ruley, Jr., in "The Country Newspaper as a Sociological Source" (*Amer. Sociol. Rev.*, 1938, 3, 39-46).

7. See E.J. Emig's interesting book *Reading Habits of Newspaper Readers* (Gainesville, University of Florida Press, 1928).

8. Presumably as an appeal to the reader who believes that he reads news "to improve his mind," *Time* publishes a semiannual *Current Affairs Test*, prepared by A.C. Eurich and E.C. Wilson.

9. While even the most staid and conservative newspapers contain a high proportion of printed rumor, the printing of rumors about persons reaches its pure form in the various popular motion-picture magazines. These

periodicals contain little but highly dramatized stories about trivial events, mostly fictitious, and about characteristics of the personages in the motion-picture world. See the amusing and informing analysis by M. Taggart, "Flimflam for Film Fans" (*Vanity Fair*, July, 1933).

10. According to *N.W. Ayer and Son's Directory of Newspapers and Periodicals* (Philadelphia, Ayer, 1936, 11), there were 2,713 trade journals published in 1935 and 2,423 published in 1936.

Technical journals, like technical books, are mediums for the exchange of craft or scientific information and opinion and can usually be distinguished from trade journals by their lack of advertising and editorials and by the impersonal character of the articles which they contain. Furthermore, readers of technical journals are, ordinarily, also contributors to them. Technical journals, therefore, belong in a category apart from the professionally produced, commercialized journals which appeal to recreational needs.

11. It is interesting to observe the change which has taken place in the content of the class magazines over the course of a generation, although they presumably still appeal to comparable elements of the population. The issues of a few decades ago were devoted largely to fiction of the "goodness and light" variety and an occasional serious article on some such trivial subject as "Should Ladies Speak Before Being Spoken To?" Today they are essentially journals of semipopular economics, politics, and sociology. The following are the contents of two issues of *Harper's Magazine*:

October, 1894	November, 1937
<p>The Happiest Heart. A Poem Salvation Gap [a story] The Royal Marine: an Idyl of Narragansett Pier People We Pass. I. A Day of the Pinochle Club The Streets of Paris In the Piny Woods. A Story Iberville and the Mississippi The Golden House. A Story Golf in the Old Country The Old Gentleman of the Black Stock. A Story Unafraid. A Poem</p>	<p>The Tyranny of Words Shall Marriage Be Subsidized? Surplus. A Poem "The White House Is Calling" I Was on the Hindenburg In Memoriam: Third Ypres. A Poem The Orchestra Conductor One Day in History Our Tax Jungle Paris, 1937 More Precious Than Rubies The Economics of the Founding Fathers Turtle Sanctuary</p>

The article on Paris in the 1894 issue was a picturesque account of charming incidents which had occurred to Richard Harding Davis in that city. The article "Paris, 1937" was, in sharp contrast, a study of the social disorders of that city, disorders which seemed at the time to be a revolution in the making.

12. For the history of the *Reader's Digest* see "Reader's Digest" (*Fortune*, November, 1936).

This pioneer of the magazines-in-brief started in 1921, was well established by 1923, had eleven imitators in 1936, and had fifty-nine competitors by April, 1937. See the news item "Dandelions" (*Time*, Apr. 26, 1937); the item "Digested Digest" (*Time*, June 28, 1937); the article "Parade of the New Magazines" (*Business Week*, Oct. 24, 1936); and S.C. Bartley's article "Parade of the Pocket Press" (*Christian Science Monitor*, July 14, 1937).

13. H. Hart ("Changing Opinion about Business Prosperity: A Consensus of Magazine Opinion in the U.S., 1929-32," *Amer. J. Sociol.*, 1933, **38**, 665-687) has found that the articles and editorials in the large, popular periodicals are almost an unrealistic regarding economic conditions as the fictional stories are concerning love and romance. For the unrealistic character of the latter see the review of *Post Stories of 1937* in *Time*, Apr. 18, 1938.

14. R. Inglis (unpublished study) has made a detailed analysis of the physical, psychological, and social attributes of the heroines of 420 romantic stories which appeared in the *Saturday Evening Post* between 1900 and 1935. Her findings suggest that, if there is any relationship between fictional and real-life characters and events, that relationship is exceedingly vague. For example, although the period under study was one during which women secured increasing recognition in business and industry, the authors did not grant their heroines a comparably greater economic competence and independence. The heroine of 1935 was quite as likely to be an economic parasite as was the heroine of 1915.

15. According to A.A. Wyn ("Letter to the Editor," *New York Times*, Sept. 5, 1935), there are 125 monthly publications in the pulp class and 10,000,000 sales per month in this field. As Wyn is the publisher of a notable collection of pulps, perhaps he knows. In any event, no better data are available, although a count of newsstands in the San Francisco Bay area, conducted in 1936 by R. Mayer (unpublished study), indicates that on the larger stands an average of 74 pulp publications are available. On the basis of all available data Mayer estimated that pulp publishers gross in the neighborhood of \$25,000,000 per year.

See *Pulpwood Editor* (New York, Stokes, 1937) by H.B. Hersey, one such editor. For recent events in the realm of pulp publication see the following news items: "Drivel Racket" (*Time*, Apr. 17, 1933); "Pulp Pride" (*Time*, Sept. 16, 1935); "No. 1 Pulp" (*Time*, Oct. 21, 1935).

16. The *Writer's Digest* conducts a section in which the editors of magazines define the types of stories which they want. Culled from various issues are these statements by the editors of pulps, each of whom has a specific need, but all of whom want "action":

"Interested in short, fast moving detective stories."

"Action must be dramatic, crisp and fast paced. . . ."

"We want crime-detective stories with a likable hero; fast-running, action stories."

". . . fast moving stories with new twists in the plotting. I am looking for 'formulae' stories."

"Requirements [*Daring Detective*] same as *Startling Detective Adventure* except that we use a bit more woman interest."

"We want love stories of all types, told in the first person only. . . ."

"Menace must be so strong that the reader following the hero is really frightened lest he can't extricate himself."

17. Apparently men of letters sometimes depend for their livelihood upon writing for the pulps. See the anonymous article "A Penny a Word; Writing for Pulp-paper Magazines" (*Amer. Mercury*, March, 1936, 285-292).

18. M. Macmullen ("Pulps and Confessions," *Harper's Mag.*, June, 1937, 94-102), A. Barclay ("Magazines for Morons," *New Republic*, Aug. 28, 1929), and M. Duffield ("The Pulps—Day-Dreams for the Masses," *Vanity Fair*, June, 1933) are among those who have expressed the view that the pulps constitute an "escape" literature.

19. A great many books have been written on the subject of books and how to write them. The following are typical: D. Warren (Ed.), *What is a Book?* (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1937); and E. Weeks, *This Trade of Writing* (Boston, Little, Brown, 1937).

20. As a consequence of factors which defy analysis, nonfictional books on some special topic or of some particular order will often appear in runs. It is understandable that a flood of books about economic troubles should appear during a prolonged and general economic crisis. Why a wave of books, such as that reported in the following news item, should occur is not, however, easily explained:

"The U.S. book publishing season of 1935-36 will probably be long remembered for its flood of able memoirs by U.S. foreign correspondents: The Chicago *Tribune's* Vincent Sheean and New York *Time's* Walter Duranty led off respectively with *Personal History* and *I Write as I Please*. The Chicago *Daily News's* John Gunther turned in *Inside Europe*, and its Negley Farson followed with *The Way of a Transgressor*" (*Time*, Oct. 19, 1936).

21. In 1937 the Williams & Wilkins Company of Baltimore, publishers of scientific books, brought out a series of books specifically labeled "Science for Entertainment." The advertising circular reads, in part: "Time was—and not long ago—when science books were regarded as useful, but scarcely to be looked at for the fun of it. It's different now. . . . No longer are science books read merely for information. Science entertains. . . ."

22. In an amusing and ironic biography of Dale Carnegie, whose book *How to Win Friends and Influence People* sold three-quarters of a million copies in 1937, M.C. Harriman ("He Sells Hope," *Sat. Even. Post*, Aug. 14, 1937) explains the appeal of this book as follows:

"To a detached observer, the secret of the book's success seems fairly simple. Every man or woman who buys it is instantly handed, for the sum of \$1.96, the information that he, or she, is potentially as powerful, brilliant, rich and successful as anybody in the world, and perhaps a good deal more so than most. Like the beauty doctors and the professors of charm, Dale Carnegie sells people what most of them need. He sells them hope."

Critics of the "uplift" books (see, for example, D. Rose, "How Happy Are You?" *Sat. Even. Post*, May 15, 1937) are, of course, entirely correct in labeling such books as the worst sort of pseudo science—a sort of patent nostrum for the reader's ego; but their criticism is all misdirected. Such books are recreational and in no sense "educational." They simply offer the reader a conversational drama in which he is cast in a heroic role and is thus led to feel momentarily that life is vital and that he is a significant part of that life.

23. A book reviewer, in reviewing W. Wilkins' *And So—Victoria* (New York, Macmillan, 1937), describes the selection of best sellers as follows:

"For accuracy and ingeniousness of theory, publishers as predictors of best-sellers are about on a par with those obstetricians who attempt to predetermine the sex of their clients' babies. Because *Anthony Adverse* and *Gone with the Wind* were big novels, publishers have lately favored what might be called the Weights & Measures Theory. This week Publisher Macmillan again subscribed to this theory with the announcement that *And So—Victoria* weighed 7¾ lb. in typescript, ran to over 1,600 pages in manuscript, 618 pages in print, and was going to be a successor to *Gone with the Wind*. Critics were not so optimistic . . ." (*Time*, Aug. 2, 1937).

For various interpretations of the causes and consequences of best sellers see the following:

Foel, G., "How to Predict a Best Seller," *Publishers' Weekly*, Oct. 27, 1934.

Fuller, R.F., "Bookseller Counts His Books," *Atlantic Monthly*, January, 1937, 50-60.

McDevitt, W., "Matter of Quantity," *Publishers' Weekly*, May 26, 1934.

Quercus, Y., "What Becomes of Best Sellers?" *Sat. Rev. Lit.*, Oct. 6, 1934, 196.

Seldes, G., "Over the Tops," *Sat. Even. Post*, Apr. 25, 1936, 20-21.

Stevens, G., "Lincoln's Doctor's Dog," *Sat. Rev. Lit.*, Jan. 22, 1938.

Wright, L., "Staggering through the Best Sellers," *Publishers' Weekly*, Feb. 1, 1936, 599-600.

"Best Sellers, 1936 Bibliography," *Publishers' Weekly*, Jan. 16, 1937, 213-214.

"Best Sellers: 'Gone with the Wind' Passes Million Mark in Six Months (With List 1875-1936)," *Lit. Dig.*, Dec. 26, 1936, 24.

"Best Sellers as Social History," *Publishers' Weekly*, May 2, 1936, 1767.

"Best Sellers," *Time*, Mar. 7, 1938.

24. Presumably each editor has something of his own "system" for picking future best sellers, just as each professional gambler has his "system" for picking the horse which will win a race. No systematic and exhaustive study of the best seller has, however, been made, although O.H. Cheney (*Economic Survey of the Book Industry, 1930-1931*, New York, National Association Book Publishers, 1931) supports a multitude of dogmatic statements by vague references to unspecified studies conducted under his direction.

As an exploratory study the present writer traced, as far as possible, the history of ten of the many novels which were published during the first

week of March, 1935. (Sales figures could not be secured for any of the others.) All ten novels were "better class" books—*i.e.*, books selling for \$2.50 or more. The quantity and quality of critical attention devoted to each was determined by analysis of the London *Times Literary Supplement*, the New York *Herald Tribune Books*, the New York *Times Book Review*, the *Christian Science Monitor Magazine Section*, and syndicated and independent reviews in a number of local newspapers. Initial advertising—during the first month after publication—was determined from the same sources and, in addition, from *Publishers' Weekly*.

Rank Order of Ten Novels		
Sales during the twelve months following publication	Amount of critical attention and character (+ favorable – unfavorable)	Amount of initial advertising and publicity
1	8 +	3
2	3 +	8
3	5 +	2
4	6 + and –	1
5	4 –	4
6	1 + and –	6
7	9 +	10
8	10 + and –	7
9	7 +	9
10	2 +	5

25. For an attempt to analyze the factors which are responsible for the liberalism of book publics, see B. De Voto, "The Frustrated Censor" (*Harper's Mag.*, June, 1937).

26. Professional educators have been exceedingly distressed to see the latest means of communication—radio—preempted by commercial interests and devoted to recreational and conversational purposes. They feel that radio should be made a great educational medium and that it should, of course, be under the control of educators. An ideological center has grown up at Ohio State University, and annual conferences on education by radio have been held for some years. A National Advisory Council on Radio in Education has been established under a Rockefeller endowment (see "Radio Conference," *Time*, Dec. 21, 1936). Educators are exerting considerable pressure on the Federal Communications Commission and upon broadcasting stations, and broadcasters have had to make many concessions and gestures in the direction of education by radio.

The ideologies of the enthusiasts for education by radio are embodied in the various *Yearbooks* of the Institution for Education by Radio. See, for example, the unsupported statements and pious hopes in *Education on the Air: Fifth Yearbook of the Institute for Education by Radio* (edited by J. Mac-

Latchy, Columbus, Ohio State University Press, 1934). See also B.H. Darrow, *Radio: The Assistant Teacher* (Columbus, Adams, 1932).

Such actual studies as have been made indicate that, even if a radio educational public could be assembled, the effects of the radio educator would be far less than those of a classroom lecturer. See the studies by E.S. Robinson ("Are Radio Fans Influenced?" *Survey Graphic*, November, 1932, 546-570), by W.H. Wilke ("An Experimental Comparison of the Speech, the Radio, and the Printed Page as Propaganda Devices," *Arch. Psychol.*, 1934, 169), by M.D. Beuick ("The Limited Social Effect of Radio Broadcasting," *Amer. J. Social.*, 1927, 32, 615-622), and by H.V. Gaskill ("Radio Broadcasting vs. Lecturing in Psychology; Preliminary Investigation," *Proc. Iowa Acad. Sci.*, 1933, 40, 187-188) and the researches reported by H. Cantril and G.W. Allport in *The Psychology of Radio* (New York, Harper, 1935).

An excellent illustration of the paucity of knowledge and the chaotic character of opinion about the function and effectiveness of radio is to be found in the articles contained in *Radio and Education* (edited by L. Tyson, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1935).

27. Because the size of radio publics is of great economic concern to program sponsors, to broadcasting-station operators, to program directors, and to performers, heroic efforts have been made to devise some way of measuring the publics which are secured by specific radio programs. The techniques now in use range from stimulated mail response (an announced offer of something free) to telephone sampling of a local population (calling telephone numbers at random and asking what program, if any, is being listened to). Proposed is an elaborate and prohibitively expensive mechanical device which would be attached to all sets and by which power-line load would reveal the number of sets tuned to a given station at any time.

A lively controversy between broadcasters and newspaper publishers has centered on the subject of the size of their respective publics. Both claim to secure publics for advertisers at the lowest cost per head. See "The Future of Radio Advertising in the U.S." (*Ann. Amer. Acad. Pol. and Soc. Sci.*, January, 1935); G. Gallup, "Radio against the Field" (*Business Week*, Jan. 12, 1935); "Ink & Air" (*Time*, Oct. 19, 1934); "Yardstick to Radio" (*Time*, Sept. 9, 1935); and "Fortune Survey" (*Fortune*, January, 1936).

For an excellent statistical analysis of the contents of the programs of nine American radio stations see W. Albig, "The Content of Radio Programs, 1925-1935" (*Soc. Forc.*, 1938, 16, 338-349).

F.E. Lumley (*Measurement in Radio*, Columbus, Ohio State University Press, 1934) has made a careful study of all the measuring devices and of the many commercial agencies which undertake to determine, for a fee, the size of a given radio public. Although Lumley does not commit himself, it is evident from his work that the program sponsor has even less factual data upon which to judge the size of his public than has the newspaper publisher in trying to judge the size of the public which reads his editorials. When it comes to measuring the actual effectiveness, from the sponsor's point of view, of a given program, the problem becomes even more complex. It might, for example, conceivably be possible to measure the attitudes of

the American people to their president before and after he addressed them via radio. How much of the change in their attitudes—if some change were indicated—would be due to the actual radio address and how much of it would be a consequence of newspaper reporting and of discussion of that address in congenial situations would, however, be impossible to determine. The same problem confronts those who would like to know the effect of radio advertising. Radio is not an isolated or isolable influence; it runs along with and is inseparably bound up with the newspaper, the magazine, and person-to-person interactions.

The best and most fruitful effort to study radio as an isolated factor in contemporary life is that of C. Kirkpatrick, *Report of a Research into the Attitudes and Habits of Radio Listeners* (St. Paul, Webb, 1933).

28. The following bit of self-analysis appeared as an advertisement of Erwin, Wasey and Company in *Fortune*, January, 1936: "Step closer, folks: Radio is only the old torchlight salesman with a bigger opportunity. To make it *pay*, you have to put on a show that will draw the crowd and you have to know how to sell your snake oil before your listeners turn the dial."

29. The group of articles which were selected by H.S. Hettinger for the symposium "Radio: The Fifth Estate" (*Ann. Amer. Acad. Pol. and Soc. Sci.*, January, 1935) provides an ideological interpretation of the radio industry. The following newspaper comment on radio by the down-to-earth newspaper commentator on radio Herb Caen gives an entirely different version:

"No phase of the amusement industry has mushroomed to such gigantic proportions in so short a time, and yet—

No branch of the same business has shown less willingness to tackle new ideas, or has stuck to tried and true formulae so tenaciously, or has fallen for so many ancient gags and stunts.

"No industry prattles so endlessly about 'guarding the sanctity of the American fireside' or 'insulting the intelligence of the American public,' and yet—

No amusement medium dishes out as much trivia, or spreads as many ridiculous advertising claims.

"No industry boasts so loudly about 'raising the musical standards of America,' and yet—

No field of entertainment offers such lucious pastures for vocalists who can't vocalize, dance bands who can't play dance music, song writers who can't write songs.

"In 1926, when it cost you \$250 for a radio set, sponsors produced trans-continental shows for \$1,000 per program and less, and yet—

In 1937, when you can buy a satisfactory receiver for \$15, a sponsor can't hope for a dialing response unless he pours \$15,000 and more into each show. . . .

"In all, radio is the craziest business in the world, and yet—Millions (including us) will continue to watch it avidly, if only to see whether it gets even goofier!" (San Francisco *Chronicle*, Sept. 12, 1937.)

PART IV
CONTROL TYPES OF INTERACTION

CHAPTER XIV

EXCHANGE BEHAVIOR

The study of the economic processes, defined as the wealth-getting and wealth-using activities of man, is the prerogative of the economist. Such study leads to the perception of social patterns—such as those of land ownership and control, those of the system of industrial production, etc.—which operate through time and which in their totality constitute the economic organization of the members of a given society. The study of the skills and procedures which are involved in wealth getting is a technological matter of primary concern to agronomists, metallurgists, etc. Neither study is, therefore, a study of collective behavior itself. The economic processes do, however, operate through a number of types of collective behavior; and man's technical activities often involve social interactions with his fellows.

In many societies many, and in all societies some, economic activities involve collective behavior of the types which we have discussed in the preceding chapters. Securing a livelihood is never an activity completely apart from other aspects of living; *i.e.*, getting the material goods which are necessary for the maintenance of life is an integral part of that life.

In stable societies, as we have seen, socially predetermined patterns of collective interaction satisfy all fundamental needs of the individual. In the primitive tribe, for example, hunting may be conducted through regimental interactions; and the meat so secured may be apportioned to the various members of the tribe in accordance with institutional and conventional procedures. Even where, as in modern societies, the old predetermined patterns have been disrupted, the economic activities of people will be in some measure a matter of predetermined social interactions. The economic maintenance of children by their parents is but one of many possible illustrations to be found in contemporary society.

Moreover, many of the nonpredetermined types of collective behavior which we have discussed and shall subsequently discuss have their economic elements. Fugitive patterns of interaction may involve the purchase of a faddy article or a fashionable dress. Leadership of audiences and publics is usually a means whereby the leader secures a livelihood and is often a means whereby the leader endeavors to convert people to the purchase of economic goods. As we shall see in subsequent chapters, revelous behavior may at times be a liberation from economic restraints; fanatical behavior is commonly a flight from economic realities; and rebellious behavior is usually an attempt to change these economic realities.

Obviously, then, the wealth-getting and wealth-using activities of men do not operate in a single type of collective behavior but may, rather, run through all types thereof.

Exchange Behavior.—There is, however, one type of collective behavior which has only economic aspects. The situations in which such behavior occurs arise as a consequence of the deliberate interest of each member in securing desired goods, services, or rights from the other member or members by exchanging with him or them other goods, services, or rights. Although what is exchanged in such situations varies and although the process of interaction by which an exchange is effected varies, we are justified in considering the behavior which occurs in all such situations as constituting a general type of collective behavior. For convenience, such situations will be designated as exchange situations, and the behavior which occurs therein as exchange behavior.¹

The definitive attribute of exchange behavior is not, however, the fact that an exchange occurs. The exchange of stimuli is the essence of social interaction, and the exchange of satisfactions is characteristic of many types of collective behavior. The exchanges which occur in exchange behavior are, however, of a completely different order than are the exchanges which occur in other types of behavior. In the first place, the exchange is recognized as such by the members of the exchange situation. The housewife, for example, clearly recognizes that she is effecting an exchange when she buys bread from the grocer. Furthermore, the exchange involves a definite opposition of the interests of the various members. The more bread the housewife gets

for her money, the less money the merchant gets for his bread. Finally, exchanging is a means to an end, rather than an end in itself. Thus, the satisfactions which are derived from an exchange are dependent upon what the individual takes away from the situation with him—whether this be a loaf of bread, a theater ticket, a fur coat, or money to put in the cash register.

There is every reason to believe that exchange behavior occurs in all societies—modern and ancient, primitive and civilized.² Although clan, tribal, familial, and feudal societies have depended mainly on institutional and conventional behavior for their material goods, some limited forms of property were procured through exchange behavior. Some primitives, for example, secured their food, clothing, and habitation through institutional mechanisms but nevertheless considered magic a personal possession to be exchanged at will.

The extension of exchange behavior to include most of the collective aspects of wealth getting and wealth using is, however, a peculiarly modern phenomenon. A great proportion of the time of every individual is now spent in exchange behavior. To a large extent every individual is dependent upon the workings of exchange situations for the satisfaction of most of his needs. Such situations have very generally replaced the institutional and conventional mechanisms of more stable societies. The result is what is usually termed capitalistic society—*i.e.*, a society which is largely dependent upon the long-run, collective consequences of a multitude of specific exchange situations. Why this is so is a question to be answered by the social historians. Whether this should be so is a matter for the philosophers to debate. Neither question can be profitably approached from the psychological or the sociopsychological side.

ORIGIN AND FUNCTION

The sociological origins of any exchange situation are complex and difficult to interpret. The fact that a given primitive secures his food through socially guided modes of behavior but secures his magic through exchange behavior is to be understood only as a consequence of the particular, long-run, social experience of the people who contributed to the making of his social heritage. Similarly, the fact that modern people depend very largely for their economic welfare upon exchange behavior, as

contrasted to institutional, conventional, and regimental behavior, is to be understood, if at all, only in terms of the history of our society. A century ago, most individuals in the Western world procured their food and other material goods through membership in a family and through institutional mechanisms of the family order. Today a considerable proportion of them rely entirely upon the outcome of exchange situations for their physical maintenance—they seek employment as wage earners; they procure money in return for their labor; and they exchange their money for food, clothing, and habitation. Consequently, behind most modern exchange situations lie the complex historical factors which led to the disintegration of European feudalism and to the commercial and industrial revolutions.³

Individual Interests.—The immediate antecedents of any given exchange situation are individual interests in securing satisfactions which can be obtained in no other way. Desiring a new hat, a woman will seek out those who have hats which they want to exchange for money; and, thus, she and they establish one or a number of exchange situations, in which each member of each situation endeavors to satisfy his interest in one thing at the least possible sacrifice to his interests in other things.

What these interests will be and whether they will be satisfied through exchange behavior are entirely a matter of social determination. Although no two members of a given society will have identical interests, the interests of any individual are simply an individual manifestation of social interests. Furthermore, the social interests from which the individual derives his particular interests vary from society to society and from time to time in any given society. Finally, whether the individual must seek the satisfaction of any socially derived interest through participation in exchange behavior or through participation in some other type of collective behavior depends, as we have seen, upon the structure of his particular society.

All this can be simply illustrated in the case of the woman who goes to market to buy a hat. Since biological nature does not impel her to seek covering for her head, her desire for a hat is a product of her social experience. Since in some societies women do not wear hats, the fact that this woman acquired a desire for a hat is a consequence of the particular character of her society. Furthermore, since hats may be made at home, the fact that a

woman goes to market to buy a hat indicates that her society has taught her to satisfy her interest in obtaining a hat by participation in an exchange situation.

We cannot, therefore, generalize about the individual interests which result in the inception of exchange situations. At the most, we can say that the inception of a given exchange situation lies in the particular, but socially derived, individual interests of those involved, who, under the given society, can satisfy those interests in no other way.

Individual Function.—Since the exchange situation grows out of individual effort to satisfy individual needs, it functions toward the satisfaction of individual, short-run interests, rather than toward the satisfaction of collective, long-run interests. Within the institutional framework of the patriarchal family, a son may labor in the fields with little calculation of what he, as an individual, may profit from such labor. A father may provide for his young sons without being aware that he is, in effect, providing for his own economic security in his old age. A mother of a family may labor at her domestic tasks without being conscious of the fact that in caring for her family she is also contributing to her own maintenance—*i.e.*, that she is working for her husband and her sons and that they are working for her.

Where such ends are accomplished through exchange situations, however, each of the individuals involved is motivated by his own interests and is guided by his calculation of how those interests can best be served. The farmer hires the farm hand if and when he believes such labor will be worth more than its hire. The laborer takes such employment if he is interested in securing what the farmer offers in exchange and if he believes that this particular arrangement will procure the most possible return with the least possible effort on his part. The modern man who would provide security for his old age deliberately purchases an annuity. The restaurateur who prepares and serves food for his guests at a price calculates the advantages to be secured by so doing.

When two or more individuals engage in an exchange situation, they do so as antagonists, each trying to get the most and to give the least. If they have interests of varying intensity regarding the things involved, an exchange may be effected which permits each to feel that he has “won”—*i.e.*, that he has

profited by the transaction. Thus, if the woman who wants a hat is more interested in it than in ten dollars, the exchange of hat and money will be satisfying both to her and to the milliner. In this sense, then, the fulfillment of individual interests through an exchange situation may be collectively gratifying.

Theoretically every exchange must of necessity be mutually satisfactory, or it would not be effected. As we shall see, however, there are many factors which may preclude the achievement of this theoretical necessity in any given instance. Since exchange behavior is a consequence of individual trial and error, not every trial will be a success. In any given exchange situation, one of the individuals may err in his effort to satisfy his particular needs. He may overestimate the satisfaction which he will receive from the thing he secures through the exchange. For example, a man may buy a large car, subsequently to discover that owning it is more expensive than pleasurable. Or he may underestimate his opponent in the exchange situation. For example, a man may believe the claims made for a patent medicine, only to discover later that it is a fake. When, therefore, exchange situations do have mutually or collectively satisfying results, such a consequence is largely fortuitous. It is certainly no part of the intent of the individuals involved, nor is it in any sense a predetermined outcome of their interaction. Since the economic welfare of modern societies depends in considerable degree upon a multiplicity of exchange situations which are resolved in terms of individual interests and trial and error, the fact that collective economic needs are not always satisfied should surprise no one.

Qualifications.—Two general qualifications must be made to the statement that the exchange situation originates in individual interests and functions directly to satisfy individual rather than collective ends.

In the first place, although the exchange situation originates in individual interests, the behavior which arises therein may be tempered by other than individual-interest considerations.⁴ Such is the case when an employer feels and acts toward an employee in terms of personal sympathy and when a merchant behaves toward his customer somewhat in the role of friend and neighbor. There is undoubtedly more of this sort of altruistic behavior involved in contemporary economic life than the critics

of capitalism will admit. The tempering of exchange behavior by other than selfish considerations must, however, be the exception rather than the rule. Under conditions of intense competition, the producer or seller of goods or services who permits personal feelings for the welfare of his buyers to influence his exchange behavior tends to be displaced by those who do not.

In the second place, the individual interest of a member of an exchange situation may be representative of a collective interest. Such is the case when a housewife purchases food for her family, when a merchant strives to make a profit for his family, and when a worker takes employment to support his family. In other words, some degree of collective interest is generally antecedent to the individual interest which results in exchange behavior. The term "individualism," which is used so commonly in reference to contemporary economic life, is a relative one. Although there are exceptions, the interests which the individual endeavors to fulfill through exchange situations are ordinarily the interests of a small commune—wife, children, and other dependents.

IDEOLOGIES

In primitive societies there seem to be no ideologies associated with exchange behavior other than those which may give value to an intrinsically worthless thing, such as a magic power. Possibly the primitive may consider that skillfulness in the exchange situation is *per se* a virtue; but, with rare exceptions, primitive peoples have not surrounded their exchange behavior with ideological justification. In this respect, exchange behavior and conventional behavior in primitive societies are comparable; *i.e.*, they are looked upon quite pragmatically.

Much the same thing can be said of exchange behavior in early western Europe and in classical China. The great ideologists of these two cultures—the impractical medieval scholastics and the very worldly Chinese scholars—ignored the subject of trade and the arts thereof. Within the last few centuries, however, the justification of exchange behavior has become the primary concern of an entire class of scholars in the Western world—the classical economists; and the social desirability of free and unlimited exchange behavior is probably the most vital ideological issue of contemporary life.

Individual Ideologies.—In any given situation, individual ideologies, comparable to those which support the primitive when he buys magic, may be involved. The man who purchases a cold "cure" at the corner drugstore will probably justify his doing so on the grounds that it will cure his cold. The cold "cure" is his magic. The man who buys an expensive car may justify his doing so on the grounds that it is, after all, an economy to discard his old car. Salesmen have their ideological justifications for the techniques of the supersalesman; and the members of the advertising profession have, as we have seen, elaborate justifications for the conversional devices which they use. The cult of the supersalesman has gone so far that one supersalesman could even interpret Jesus Christ as *the* supersalesman without arousing public disapproval. The art of salesmanship has come to be one of the most prized skills of modern man; and the effort to train men to this skill, probably as futile as trying to teach men to paint pictures or to write poems, has become a major preoccupation of schools of business.

Ideological Systems.—The fact that collective economic welfare in the modern world depends in considerable degree on exchanges which are resolved in terms of individual interest and trial and error has led to the development of elaborate systems of ideologies. Largely under the auspices of the classical economists, ideologies in justification of collective dependence on exchange behavior have developed. At the same time, various systems of ideologies have arisen in opposition to the economic *status quo*. It is no part of our task to review or to evaluate the tremendous literature which has gathered around the subject of collective dependence on exchange behavior. We shall here consider only the basic contentions of the ideologists.

Capitalistic Ideologies.—Defense of the economic *status quo* was apparently made necessary in the first instance by the fact that in early industrial Europe extension of exchange behavior encountered the opposition of prior and more or less institutional ways of life, such as feudalism and, more immediately, guild organization.⁵ Subsequently, however, ideological defense of the economic *status quo* became an attempt on the part of those who were interested in maintaining the *status quo* to prevent further changes. Thus, capitalistic ideologies began as a justification for the rise of capitalism and continued as a defense

against threats to the maintenance of capitalism. To put it otherwise, capitalistic ideologies originated as a justification for social change and persisted as a defense against social change.

The fundamental attempt of the capitalistic ideologists has been to prove that exchange behavior is either natural—and, hence, inevitable—or else that it is ethically desirable—in that it somehow contributes to collective, long-run welfare. The former effort is directed toward a justification on biological grounds of the evident consequences of capitalism, especially the maldistribution of wealth. The inescapable fact is that, under the capitalistic system, some few members of society secure a large measure of human satisfactions, as gauged by material wealth, while the majority secure a comparatively small measure of such satisfactions. Those individuals who secure, under the system, an excessive share of material satisfactions are said to do so because they are the biologically superior members of society and, as such, naturally do so. The argument is an old one and was used by Aristotle to justify Athenian slavery.⁶

Those who favor the greatest-good-to-the-greatest-number philosophy argue that dependence upon exchange behavior has a cumulative social advantage which far outweighs any disadvantages which may accrue from the fact that the outcome of such behavior is a matter of trial and error. They point to the rapid technological advances, the efficient exploitation of natural resources, and so on, which have been accomplished under capitalism. These collective gains, they contend, have been made possible by capitalism, which, as they see it, liberates individual initiative and invokes such initiative through appeal to man's acquisitive instinct.⁷

Anticapitalistic Ideologies.—The ideologists of capitalism have until recently had the weight of numbers and the strength of prestige on their side. Since 1917, however, the Western world has experienced a series of violent reactions to the capitalistic system. The anticapitalistic ideologies of Marxianism and fascism have in a number of countries functioned to justify political prohibition and regulation of exchange behavior.

Although antedated by many writers, such as Saint-Simon, Karl Marx is generally recognized as the father of socialism; and his *Das Kapital* has become the bible of a great variety of

economic utopians. His attack is directed first toward disproof of the ideologies of the classical economists and secondly toward the erection of a substitute and anticapitalistic ideology. The first aspect of his thesis need not detain us here. The second involves a concept of historical evolution, in which capitalism is simply a stage or a step in the achievement of the perfect social state—socialism.⁸

Although the fascists would be the first to deny it, the anti-capitalistic aspects of fascist ideology are closely related to Marxianism. Fascism is a national application of the inevitable, historical, evolutionary thesis, with, as we have seen, the addition of the idea that the forces of evolution are manifest in the person of the fascist leader. Whereas Marx saw mankind progressing inevitably through intensified capitalism to revolution and, thence, toward a social state in which individual interest is subordinated to collective, economic welfare, the fascist ideologists see the fascist state escaping degenerative capitalism and achieving its historical destiny via regimentation under the leadership of the collective spirit, embodied in the person of the dictator.

MEMBERSHIP

The membership of an exchange situation, like that of an audience situation, is neither predetermined nor fortuitously determined. In that it grows out of individual initiative and trial and error, membership is not socially designated. In that it is a consequence of a calculated seeking of satisfactions, membership is not a matter of chance.

The forces which determine the membership of an exchange situation are indicated in the meeting of a housewife and a merchant in the establishment of the latter. In the first place, the housewife is not impelled by irresistible social pressures to seek whatever she has come to purchase. Whether it is a dress or a pound of peas, the initiative is hers—as is evidenced by the fact that she may abruptly change her mind and decide to buy a hat instead of a dress or carrots instead of peas. Nor is she, desiring peas, socially impelled to seek them at this particular store—as is evidenced by the fact that she may subsequently decide to go elsewhere to buy them. The presence of the merchant is also a matter of individual initiative and trial and

error. In the effort to secure satisfactions of his own, he has of his own initiative engaged in the occupation of merchant and has established a business in this particular place. He might, if he felt it to his interest to do so, close his shop door at the approach of the housewife.

In the second place, the meeting of housewife and merchant is not a matter of chance. The housewife wants to effect a certain type of exchange and goes where past experience has indicated that this can most readily be accomplished. The merchant has established himself where customers are likely to come and has stocked his shop with the merchandise which experience has indicated that people are likely to want. In other words, the meeting of housewife and merchant is a calculated event.

Many of the calculations of those who would enter into exchange membership go astray. Within the limits of their respective abilities, however, the members of an exchange situation have come together as the result of individual initiative in the calculated seeking of specific satisfactions.

Social Limitations on Membership.—Social factors—institutional, conventional, and legal restraints—tend always to channelize and to limit individual initiative in becoming a member of exchange situations. The institutional precepts of the patriarchal family, for example, once prevented women from becoming merchants; and even today the ideological remnants of the patriarchal family impose many limitations upon the role of women in business. On the other hand, the patriarchal family system made the matriarch the domestic purchasing agent for her household and prevented men from doing the family marketing. In some instances, the traditions which surround the membership of a given class may preclude engagement in exchange behavior. Fear of social disapproval, for example, may prevent the needy aristocrat from establishing himself as a merchant. In other instances, religious factors may check individual initiative. Finance, for example, fell into the hands of Jews because the Roman Catholic church prevented its lay members from becoming money merchants. At times, law may discourage the formation of an entire category of exchange situations. In our society, for example, the buyer and the seller of narcotics are prohibited from freely coming together; and limitations are in some instances placed upon the hours and conditions of labor. In sum, the

ability of the individual to participate in exchange situations is always subject to social restraints.

Since in no two societies will these restraints be of the same order or will they operate in the same way, we cannot generalize concerning their character. At the most, we can say that potential membership in any exchange situation is limited by some or many social factors.

The Training of Members.—Every member in an exchange situation has been socially prepared for the situation to the extent that he has acquired the interests and the abilities which brought him into membership. For example, if he goes to buy an automobile, he has learned to want an automobile; and he at least knows where automobiles can be purchased. He may, in addition, bring to the situation a great deal of technical knowledge of automobiles and a full knowledge of current automobile values. This preparation he may have acquired deliberately and systematically, as by study in a technical school, or casually, as by practical experience with previously purchased automobiles. On the other hand, he may have received no training whatever for the expedient negotiation of the purchase. When we turn to a consideration of the various types of exchange situations, the importance of equal and of differential preparations of the members for those situations will become apparent.

In some instances and for at least some types of membership, considerable and at times systematic training is involved. Thus, the old-fashioned family undoubtedly taught its daughters a good deal about the arts of household marketing. The old-fashioned merchant certainly taught his apprentices many things, including the techniques of barter. Some modern business organizations have schools for clerks and salesmen; and public and private colleges attempt, particularly in their law and business schools, to provide students with skills which they may market and with some knowledge of marketing these skills most advantageously.

The Seller and the Buyer.—Where, as was common in pre-capitalistic societies, exchange behavior has consisted of a direct exchange of goods or of services or of both, without the use of money as the medium of exchange, the members of the situation have been described as traders. Small boys still engage occasionally in trading—they might call it swapping—the various objects

which small boys value.⁹ The introduction of an exchange medium, such as Indian wampum or modern money, has given rise to the distinguishing of the members of an exchange situation as buyers and sellers or as employers and employees.

It is now traditional to think of that trader who gives money for goods as the buyer, and of the trader who gives the latter for the former as the seller. The fact that the goods offered in the exchange by one trader is a current standard of value may somewhat simplify a trade, since at least one factor—the money—may be a constant. The seller need not, perhaps, question the intrinsic worth of the money. There is, however, no necessary difference in the sociopsychological character of exchange behavior which is effected with money and that which occurs without the use of money.

The change in terminology from traders to buyers and sellers and to employers and employees is significant only to the extent that it is an indication of the sociopsychological character of modern exchange behavior. In modern capitalism the terminological distinction between the members of an exchange situation has, as we shall see, taken on a peculiar significance. The terms "buyers" and "sellers" and "employers" and "employees" reflect the differential exchange status of the members. As a seller of goods, one may do many things which are not permissible for a buyer of goods. For example, the seller may in many instances adulterate and misrepresent his goods without violation of law. Were the buyer to give adulterated money, however, he would become a counterfeiter or a debt evader. As an employer of services, one may do many things which are not permissible for an employee. Thus, it is taken for granted that an employer will give as little money as is possible in return for services; but it is expected that the employee will give maximum service in return for money.

OVERT AND COVERT ASPECTS OF INTERACTION

In many types of exchange situations, the overt behavior of the members is analogous to the overt behavior of two or more conversational lecturers, each of whom is endeavoring to convert the other or others. As a result, the overt behavior consists of a verbal conflict. The verbal conflict is, however, the antithesis of the actual covert conflict. From the verbal conflict, one might

be led to assume that the last thing any member wanted for himself was to effect an exchange. In fact, each is covertly anxious to do so.

The member of such exchange situations, like the conversational lecturer, subordinates his covert feeling-states in order that he may dramatize the situation, making himself or his goods appear in the role of hero. However much he may want that for which he is bargaining, and however little value that which he offers in exchange has for him, these covert facts will not be made overtly evident. Indeed, he will act out the fiction that the exact reverse is true.

It does not follow, however, that the overt behavior of the member of such an exchange situation is invariably the opposite of his covert feeling-states. He may speak the truth, but he does so only if the truth serves his ends better than does a falsehood.

In addition to subordinating his own feeling-states, each member attempts to judge the feeling-states of the other member or members and to shape his own overt behavior accordingly. Thus, each member endeavors to ascertain the interests, values, sentiments, fears, and so on, of the other member or members in order that the conversational drama which he erects will be effective.

The overt interaction which occurs in any exchange situation is unlikely to reveal the covert feeling-states of those who are involved. In this respect, exchange behavior, like formal behavior, is not what it seems on the surface. To be successful in securing from the exchange situation that which he wants, a man must be capable of acting a part and of doing so with conviction. The salesman who expressed his actual feelings, either concerning the goods he has to sell or the people to whom he is trying to sell them, might defeat his own ends. He might enjoy the experience of telling the customer that her foot is too big for the shoe; but, if he did, he would lose the sale and, under modern circumstances, his job as well. Likewise, the employee who is incapable of laughing heartily at his employer's pointless joke is soon unemployed.

LEADERSHIP

Unfortunately for purposes of clear analysis, the rise of modern capitalism has brought about so many types of exchange situ-

ations that it is impossible to characterize the leadership process in exchange behavior per se. It is necessary, therefore, to treat leadership in terms of each type of exchange situation. The analysis of these types will serve to clarify the matter of leadership in exchange behavior of the modern world.

It is already evident that each member of an exchange situation has come seeking individual satisfactions and that his interests conflict with those of the other member or members. The way in which leadership will be determined and what leadership will consist of depends, however, less upon the intent of the various members than upon the characteristic interaction of the type of exchange situation in which they are involved.

As a Result of Barter.¹⁰—When the process of interaction in an exchange situation is barter, the whole of the interaction is a struggle for conversational leadership. Each member endeavors to erect a drama in which the other member—or members—is cast in the role of heroine in need of saving from some villain and in which himself or his goods is cast in the role of benevolent hero. Except that his “audience” consists of a very few people or of just one person and that each member of his “audience” is hostile and is also himself striving for conversational leadership, the conversational efforts of any one member do not differ in principle from those which are used by the conversational lecturer on the platform. It is, therefore, unnecessary to consider again the various techniques of dramatic conversion.

To the modern mind, barter consists largely of haggling over price, quality, and quantity. The verbal interchange is seen as a free-for-all in which, as it were, there are no rules of fair play. The seller is observed to demand far more for his goods than he can possibly expect to secure, to exaggerate his unwillingness to sell, and to lie regarding the character of that which he has for sale. On the other hand, the buyer is observed to offer for the desired goods far less than their current worth, to depreciate his desire for them, and, in fact, to belittle their general desirability.

All such haggling actually amounts to nothing more than counterconversion; *i.e.*, each member of the situation erects during the verbal interchange the conversational drama which, if fully effective, would satisfy his own interests. When the members of an exchange situation are equally prepared to barter, no one of them is actually converted by the conversational efforts

of the other. Barter, then, has no effect upon the interests or the values of those involved. It serves primarily as a verbal sparring bout, during which each member feels out the interests and values of the other. In the course of the interaction, each member concedes more and more to the other, until that other agrees to effect an exchange or until it is no longer to the interest of that member to make further concessions.

When the highest price which the buyer will pay is lower than the lowest price at which the seller will sell, no exchange will be effected. When an exchange is effected, the seller may not secure the highest price which the buyer would pay, nor does the latter necessarily pay the lowest price which the former would take. Through a compromise of their interests, however, each "wins" in equal degree; and the greatest good to the greatest number is achieved. The consequence of the barter process is, thus, either stalemate, in which no exchange takes place, or compromise, in which no one gets all he asks for and each gets what he wants.

Until very recently most exchanges were effected through barter. Even today, the European housewife will barter with her local merchants. And, outside the most fully Westernized regions, standard prices and goods are unknown in China; every exchange of goods is accomplished through the ancient and respected barter process. Here in America, barter is generally considered beneath the dignity of either buyer or seller, particularly in exchanges involving consumers' goods. Less than a generation ago, however, it was a common thing for merchants, particularly in the smaller towns, to barter with their customers. And employers did not "hire" a workman; they "struck a bargain" with him.

As a Result of Selling and Hiring.—The process of interaction in most of the exchange situations of modern capitalistic societies is not barter. It is a kind of interaction which involves either actual conversational leadership or else a kind of interaction in which leadership is the result of coercion. At any event, the interaction does not consist of a struggle for leadership; nor does it resolve in compromise.

Modern exchange situations fall into two general categories—situations involving goods and situations involving services. In the former, the seller usually dominates the buyer; and

in the latter, the employer usually dominates the employee. In both of these categories, however, there are a number of situations in which leadership is comparable to that which occurs in the barter process.

EXCHANGES INVOLVING GOODS

Modern merchants do not barter in goods; they "sell" them. Behind this verbal distinction lies one of the vital differences between capitalistic and precapitalistic societies.

The Status of the Modern Consumer.—As a consequence of the commercial and industrial revolutions, it is quite impossible for the ordinary consumer to have any significant knowledge concerning either the intrinsic or the extrinsic worth of the goods he buys and uses.¹¹ In the first place, the multiplicity of economic goods which are exchanged in modern markets makes knowledge of any one of them a matter of specialization. The diamond merchant may be able to judge the quality of diamonds; but he is unlikely to have special knowledge of hats, shoes, textiles, foods, automobiles, and so on. As a purchaser of anything except diamonds, he enters the market as a novice. In the second place, the elaboration of technical processes has made useless the old-time rule-of-thumb principles of evaluation which were once used by housewife and horse buyer. Today, only the specialized technician can distinguish new wool from reworked shoddy, pure silk from that which is loaded, fast dyes from those which will fade, top leather from splits, real vanilla from synthetic, and so on. Furthermore, in most instances even the specialist would need to run a series of complex laboratory tests before he could pass judgment.

Large purchasers of goods, such as government departments, may be able to enter the market equipped with knowledge of goods comparable to that of the seller. It is, however, impossible for the ordinary buyer to apply specialized technical knowledge to each of the great variety of things which he will purchase during a lifetime. He is, therefore, dependent upon a posteriori knowledge, derived from experience with each article after the purchase of it.

In the case of small, frequently purchased, branded goods, this experience may guide him in future purchases. If, for example, he finds upon trial that he dislikes a certain brand of cigarettes, he

has this much knowledge to assist him the next time he buys cigarettes. Experience is, however, usually an expensive teacher; and the knowledge so secured may be of no advantage in subsequent exchange situations. Thus, experience may teach a buyer the serious shortcomings of a certain model and make of automobile; but such knowledge will not help him to evaluate the new models of the various makes of automobiles when he next goes to market. A posteriori knowledge is of even less value after a man has invested his life savings in a jerry-built house or a block of worthless stocks.

For reasons which are far more difficult to understand, the consumer of goods has a further disadvantage in that he must take a passive role in exchange situations, whereas the seller can take an aggressive role. Under the mores of capitalism, the seller of goods is expected to put forth every effort to convert his prospective buyers to act in ways advantageous to him.¹² Those same mores, on the other hand, prohibit the buyer from attempting to convert the seller. The buyer must, as it were, remain the passive heroine, active only to the extent of deciding to buy or not to buy—to be saved or not to be saved.

The modern market of goods is, in other words, a seller's market. Conversational leadership is the prerogative of the one who has goods to exchange for money. With some exceptions, the modern merchant would consider it a shocking affront to his integrity were a customer to dare to question the desirability of his merchandise or the fairness of his prices. In this attitude he is supported by the weight of modern market-place traditions. No one questions his right to advertise his wares and to endeavor to "sell" them—*i.e.*, to convert the customer to the advisability of purchasing them. Should the customer publicly question the desirability of those wares, however, he will promptly be accused of trying to hurt business or, perhaps, of attacking the foundations of the social order.

The Clerk.—Much buying is habitual, a fact which acts as a challenge to the modern aggressive salesman. People become habituated to buying a certain brand of cigarettes, of gasoline, and of other things, and, perhaps, to making their purchases in certain places. Thus, the "sale" is made before the customer comes to the merchant by the merchant who originally introduced the buyer to this particular commodity or by advertising.

When a buyer comes into the market already prepared to purchase a specific article at a fixed price and succeeds in doing so, the exchange situation involves no conversational leadership. The behavior of the buyer is predetermined. All that the seller does is serve his customer. He does not "sell." Much so-called selling is of this order. The dealer in cigarettes, the ten-cent-store clerk, the waitress, and the like are not salesmen but clerks. They need not, and probably will not, strive for leadership.

It must be pointed out, however, that the distinction between clerk and salesman is in many cases blurred.¹³ Wherever clerks work on a commission basis, the attempt to sell goods is taken for granted. Thus, if the shoe-store customer asks for a pair of laces, he is urged to buy a pair of shoes; if he comes to purchase replacements for those he is wearing, the ambitious salesman-clerk will try to sell him more expensive shoes, two pairs rather than one, or at least a set of shoe trees to go with the shoes. The habit of salesmanship may be so strong that the salesman-clerk cannot, or is not permitted to, let slip an opportunity to sell more than the customer wants or an article of higher price.

The Salesman.—Whenever a potential buyer enters an exchange situation unprepared by past experience to want a specific article, the exchange situation involves conversational leadership by the salesman. By the fact that he has sought out a particular salesman or sales place, the potential buyer indicates an interest in the possibility of buying some type of goods. For many possible reasons, he may, however, be uncertain as to what, where, when, and how to make his purchase. By salesmen, such a potential buyer is defined as a customer. The goal of the salesman is to convert the "customer" to the purchase of some specific article.

In the last analysis, the salesman is simply a lecturer who is attempting to convert a mute and naïve "audience" to the purchase of his wares. His potential converts are generally ignorant of the intrinsic merits of the things which he is trying to sell and are untrained in the arts of counterconversion. Unlike the old-time trader, such a salesman does not engage in barter. Once a prospective buyer has come to him, tradition permits the salesman to take and to hold conversational leadership.

The Sales "Argument."—The modern sales "argument" is not an argument but is, rather, a conversational drama. The buyer does not parry the verbal assaults of the seller as he would in an argument. He simply listens and indicates, directly or indirectly, whether he is being converted or not.

The problem of devising a sales "argument" is much, therefore, like that of writing a conversational lecture. Since the salesman will not fully interact with his potential buyers, he must anticipate their reactions. The result is that the sales "argument" often tends to become a stereotyped pattern, delivered with the same disregard for the individuality of the potential buyer as would be the case were a phonograph to replace the salesman. Training salesmen often amounts to little more than teaching them to go through a fixed routine, which, once started, may run its course regardless of the reaction of the potential buyer.

If it is to be effective, the "argument" of the salesman will not, of course, be fixed. The conversational drama will be built to fit each particular "customer"—which procedure is not a particularly difficult feat in view of the characteristic inability of the modern buyer to hide his feelings. Whether the car which the salesman is trying to sell becomes an efficient piece of machinery which will carry its owner safely and cheaply through the years or whether it becomes the magnificent automobile which will make its driver feel and look like a man of wealth will depend upon the salesman's judgment of his potential buyer rather than upon the car he is trying to sell.

The Peddler.—When a buyer has sought out a seller, he has evidenced an interest in some commodity. When the seller seeks out the buyer, on the other hand, he must arouse the interest of the prospective buyer in his goods. Such a seller is a peddler. His prospective buyer is not a "customer," but is, in the language of the profession, a prospect. By a process of trial and error—house-to-house canvassing, for example—the peddler seeks out those who might have some interest in the type of goods he has, but not sufficient interest to set them seeking for a seller, or those who have no interest in the type of goods he has, but in whom some interest can be created.

Peddlers of some goods, such as life insurance, tend to locate rather than to create interest in what they are selling. Life

insurance is one of those things which most men have learned to feel that they need but which few men get around to buying on their own initiative. Their direct interest in life insurance is so weak that purchase may be postponed year after year. The peddler of life insurance tries to locate such potential buyers and to convert them to buying a specific policy.¹⁴

Most peddlers, however, must create interest, however momentary, in their goods; or, failing this, they must appeal to extraneous factors in order to make the exchange seem desirable to the prospect. The peddler who expounds upon the intrinsic virtues of his wares is trying to accomplish the former end; the one who is working his way through school or is saving his family from starvation by selling magazines, newspapers, aluminum pots, or needles is attempting the latter objective.

The Auction.—Exchanges involving raw materials, such as leaf tobacco and cotton are often effected through the auction process.¹⁵ This process is characteristic of exchange situations in which there are many sellers and many buyers. All the sellers are represented by a single auctioneer, and each of the buyers is represented by a professional purchaser. All the members of the situation tend, therefore, to have comparable knowledge of values and to be immune to conversational efforts.

The auctioneer asks for bids on each lot of goods and sells when the most keenly interested buyer has been forced to indicate his highest possible offering. Although the auctioneer does not attempt to convert the prospective buyers nor do they attempt to convert him, the effect of the auction process is much like that of barter. In each exchange, a compromise of interests occurs at that point which is mutually satisfactory to buyer and seller.

A less direct way of achieving compromise without barter occurs when the buyer of large quantities of goods asks for bids from all sellers of such goods and buys from the lowest bidder. Such an exchange situation might be considered as a sort of auction in reverse—a situation in which the “auctioneer” auctions off the right to sell him goods. This is a common practice of government agencies and a growing practice on the part of consumers who pool their market demands through some sort of consumers’ cooperative and purchase through an agent.

The so-called auction of such consumers' goods as used household furniture, objects of pseudo art, and so on, is not an auction, but is, rather, a revelous situation. To build up intense enthusiasm, the "auctioneer" depends upon the same interstimulation of audience members which makes for religious converts in an evangelical meeting. Such an "auction" has, of course, nothing in common with the true auction.

EXCHANGES INVOLVING SERVICES

By far the vast majority of those who must exchange their services for money in order to secure a livelihood in contemporary Western societies do so through a type of exchange situation which is dominated by the employer.

The Status of the Modern Worker.¹⁶—Like the peddler of goods, the worker—technologist, clerk, skilled laborer, and common laborer—must seek his markets. He must, in effect, make a shop-to-shop canvass. Unlike the peddler of goods, however, the worker can only "offer"; he cannot "sell." With rare exceptions, the worker does not, by his behavior, arouse the interest in his services which is necessary if he is to have a market for them. That interest is determined entirely by forces beyond his control. Although he may be active in seeking buyers, he is passive in so far as market demands are concerned. In other words, the laborer does not play the role of a salesman in disposing of his services.

Nor does he barter. Under our system, the labor market is almost completely dominated by the employer, who would be disdainful of the worker who attempted to haggle with him. The role of the employer is, in this respect, much like that of the seller of goods, although, unlike the latter, the employer does not attempt to convert. He simply decides whether it will be to his interest to offer money for services at the wage rates which are determined by what economists euphemistically term the supply and demand for labor.

There is a peculiar distinction between exchanges involving goods and those involving labor. The purchaser of a house, a suit of clothes, or an automobile takes possession of these objects. In making the exchange, the buyer commits himself, as it were, for all time. In so far as the seller is concerned, the transaction, once made, is final. In slavery, where the body of the worker

is treated as an economic goods, something of the same sort exists. In modern society, however, the "seller" of labor disposes of his services in daily, weekly, or monthly installments.

In the short run, this unitary exchange may be advantageous to the worker. Thus, he can quit an unsatisfactory job at will. In the long run, however, the unitary nature of modern exchanges involving labor is to the disadvantage of the worker. He must continuously "sell" his services, if he is to continue to live. The employer, on the other hand, need buy the labor of any particular worker only when he feels that it is to his advantage to do so. The essential distinction between exchanges involving goods and those involving labor can be suggested by the fact that, when a man buys an automobile, he does so for better or for worse; but, when he hires a worker, he does so only for better.

Collective Bargaining.—In a broad sense, the whole of the labor movement during the last century has been an effort on the part of workers to make barter the process by which labor is exchanged for money. In the first place, there has been the attempt to establish, through organization, equality with the employer. Under modern capitalistic conditions, there are many workers and few employers. The hope has been that through unionization many laborers could, as a group, barter their services. Dependent upon no one of the workers individually, the employer is, nevertheless, dependent in the long run upon them all collectively.

The endeavor to establish collective bargaining has encountered the resistance of market-place traditions. The right of labor to organize has been conceded only after long struggle. The right of those who represent established organizations to negotiate exchanges with employers is not yet fully established. So far, strikes, boycotts, and similar coercive means have usually been necessary before employers are willing to barter with the representatives of organized labor.

The Negotiation of Contracts.—Some services—literary, artistic, theatrical, and so on—have the quality of uniqueness and are, therefore, exchanged for money on the basis of barter. This is generally accomplished through the mechanism of an agent, who represents the possessor of these unique skills and does the actual haggling over contract terms.

Although literary and theatrical people constantly complain about the "agent racket," the agent is a necessary factor in the effective marketing of unique skills.¹⁷ Seldom are the actor, actress, writer, and artist prepared for barter; and seldom are the employers of such services unprepared. Through the barter process—usually referred to as the process by which contracts are negotiated—the agent exchanges the unique services of his client most advantageously for that client. Such negotiation may require weeks or months before a contract is agreed upon. Often the barter which is involved in the negotiation of contracts is more in keeping with diplomacy than with business.

Professional Services.—The exchange of medical and legal services for money is, in general, peculiarly free from obvious aspects of exchange behavior. Although some lawyers may at times openly arrange a financial deal with a client and although some lawyers treat their services as something to be sold aggressively in the market place, most lawyers consider their profession above the bickerings of the market place. In both England and France, devices have been developed to remove the slightest taint of salesmanship from transactions involving the exchange of legal services for money.

The medical profession has gradually established codes of professional conduct which rather successfully temper the exchange character of services to the sick. Although the practice of medicine is for most physicians a means of securing a livelihood, it is a pursuit considered to belong to another category than that of business.¹⁸ The doctor who treats his patient as a "customer" and "sells" his services in ways comparable to those which are used by the sellers of goods is labeled a quack, whether he is a quack or not.

In theory, and to a large degree in practice, the relationship between the seeker after medical services and the physician are like those of customer and clerk; *i.e.*, the physician serves the needs of the patient. Even the most ethical of medical men must, however, convert potential patients to the desirability of his services. This the physician may do in such ways as taking a prominent part in civic affairs or as providing those patients who come his way with such excellent service that he acquires name prestige in the community.

Political Barter.—In a democracy, political services are frequently exchanged in a type of situation involving barter.¹⁹ Here the exchange is of services for services. Such services consist of votes, political appointments, treaty rights, and so on. Every politician barter his way to power within his party, and every political machine barter for votes.

At the bottom of the political hierarchy, in a manner of speaking, is the ward heeler, who endeavors to control the voting behavior of the voters in a given region. Although conversional lecturing is one of the means which are used to secure votes, the safest votes, as every practical politician knows, are those which have been "bought." In that "purchase," the ward heelers exchange, through a sort of slow barter, political concessions in return for votes.

The loyalty of the politician to the party is "purchased" by his being paid off by the party, in various ways, for his services. Indeed, the essential distinction between the exchange situations of business and the exchange situations of politics is that barter still operates in most political transactions. Up the political ranks, from ward heeler to president, the determination of political rights and rewards and of duties and obligations is achieved through deals, each one of which involves a compromise of individual interests through barter.

Ordinarily the role of barter in political life is denied or ignored. It is somehow considered undignified to admit that the status of congressman, senator, and even president is secured in considerable measure by bartering with various minority groups. The fact is, however, that political skill is in large measure a matter of shrewdness in trading.

International diplomacy, the effecting of exchanges between the political representatives of various nations, is simply a glorified form of political barter. Diplomats haggle in a special language of their own and over the interests of millions of people. Diplomatic barter is complex and protracted and is conducted with the utmost dignity. Nevertheless, the making of a treaty is much like the making of a bargain in the market place. Although the diplomat may have to wait for, or even attempt to create, a national or international "crisis" in order to dramatize the issue which he represents, the techniques which he uses and the results which he accomplishes are pretty much those of any

trader. Skillful diplomacy and expert horse trading are comparable methods of achieving mutually satisfactory compromises.²⁰

APPENDIX

1. The present usage of the term "exchange behavior" has no precedent in sociopsychological literature. This usage is, however, in accord with the established concept of exchange among economists. For example, F.H. Knight ("Exchange," *Ency. Soc. Sci.*, 5, 666) says:

"Exchange in modern economic usage implies a mutual and voluntary transfer of property (including services) and a fundamental equivalence in the things exchanged, an equality in value which rests upon economic rationality [*i.e.*, self-interest] and developed market institutions. In this sense exchange in the central concept of economic science, whether of the theoretical or empirical type, in so far as the exchange economy is the characteristic form of economic organization in the modern capitalistic world." (By permission of The Macmillan Company, publishers.)

2. Among the studies of exchange behavior in primitive societies are: E.E. Hoyt, *Primitive Trade* (London, Kegan, Paul, Trench, Trübner, 1926); R. Thurnwald, *Economics in Primitive Communities* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1932); and R. Firth, *Primitive Economics of the New Zealand Maori* (New York, Dutton, 1929).

M. Mead (*Growing Up in New Guinea*, New York, Morrow, 1930) finds exchange behavior so important in the economic maintenance of the Manus that she compares their economic life with that of modern capitalistic societies. Such dependence upon exchange behavior is not, however, in any sense characteristic of primitive societies in general. See M. Mead, *Cooperation and Competition among Primitive Peoples* (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1937); B. Malinowski, *Argonauts of the Western Pacific* (London, Routledge, 1922, Chap. XIV); and R. Benedict, *Patterns of Culture* (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1934).

3. The history of the rise of capitalistic social economy has commonly served as the basis for special pleading, sometimes for capitalism and sometimes for an anticapitalistic system. Thus, the German economist Max Weber (*Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte*, Tübingen, Mohr, 1924) uses economic history to support his thesis that the decline of religion in the latter Middle Ages opened the way for the rise of capitalism, an historical transition in which rationalism replaces traditionalism. On the other hand, the English economist R. Tawney (*Religion and the Rise of Capitalism*, London, Murray, 1926) uses the same history to verify the opposed thesis that the rise of capitalism spelled the doom of religion. The novice had, therefore, best approach the subject of the historical emergence of capitalistic economy via some such critical survey of the study of economic history as is contained in the article "Economic History" (*Ency. Soc. Sci.*, 5, 315-330).

A simple and fairly objective treatment of recent economic history is to be found in *Economic Development of Modern Europe* by C. Day (New York, Macmillan, 1933) and in *Some Origins of the Modern Economic World*

by E.A.J. Johnson (New York, Macmillan, 1936). A stimulating and sweeping analysis, from the liberal point of view, of the industrial revolution and its economic and social consequences is to be found in *Technics and Civilization* by L. Mumford (New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1934).

4. The classical economists conceptually abstracted man's economic nature from his social nature. The result was the "economic man." This conceptual man was endowed, by assumption, with an acquisitive instinct and, in accordance with eighteenth-century rational psychology, with the ability to proceed in a mechanical, logical manner to satisfy this instinct in so far as the similar efforts of other men would permit him to do so. Needless to say, there is no such creature as the economic man, although the concept of the economic man might have been of analytical value. The classical economists and their descendants, however, have been so much enamored of their intellectual creation that they have cut the facts of economic life to fit him.

5. In eighteenth-century England, guild restrictions surrounded the fabricative and distributive processes. The guild rules made it exceedingly difficult to exploit the new machine techniques. Exploitation of these new techniques was even further limited by the laws which had grown up to encourage the enlargement of gold reserves—then believed to constitute the wealth of a nation—within the country. It was Adam Smith who, in his *Wealth of Nations* (1776), offered the struggling independent entrepreneurs a "rational" argument for freedom from guild and political restraint and who thereby became the father of classical economics. The substance of the classical ideology is that the wealth of a people—defined as their material productivity, regardless of what is produced—is most increased when productive and distributive processes are least subject to political or any other (such as labor-union) control.

6. Ideologists have developed the biological thesis along two rather independent lines: that man's inherent nature does not permit any economic system but capitalism; that only under capitalism can man evolve biologically toward perfection.

The idea that economic life is a direct expression of the inherent nature of the human animal was basic to Aristotle's justification for Athenian slavery. In classical economics this idea appeared in the form of the economic man. If, as the classical economists claimed, man be an acquisitive animal who will engage in irksome productive activity only when it is to his rational advantage to do so, it follows that a profit-motivated economy—i.e., capitalism—is the only feasible system.

Liberal and radical economic theorists have scoffed at the economic man and in his place have postulated a natural man possessing an instinct of workmanship or a spirit of communal life. See:

Dickinson, Z.C., *Economic Motives*, Harvard Economic Studies, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1922.

Hobson, J.A., *Incentives in the New Industrial Order*, London, Parsons, 1922.

Parker, C.H., *The Casual Laborer, and Other Essays*, New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1920, Chap. IV.

Veblen, T., *The Instinct of Workmanship and the State of the Industrial Arts*, New York, Viking, 1918.

It was not, however, until psychologists, sociologists, and anthropologists brought their findings to bear upon the problem of the origin of motives that the question of the native bases for economic activity ceased to be a matter of pure speculation. Today it is recognized by all except the classical economists that man's so-called nature is actually a consequence of socialization. In a profit-motivated society, men tend to be motivated only by the prospects of profit. Under another form of social organization, men tend to acquire the motives which are appropriate to that social system. Recent anthropological attack upon the problem has taken the form of comparing the extent and specific character of competitiveness in various primitive societies (see note 6, appendix to Chap. II). For a sociopsychological analysis of motives and their social origins see R.T. LaPiere and P.R. Farnsworth, *Social Psychology* (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1936, Chap. XI). See also H.F. Ward, *In Place of Profits: Social Incentives in the Soviet Union* (New York, Scribner, 1933).

The idea that capitalism best serves the ends of progress has been used to get around the obvious fact that under this system men may starve while land, machines, and men lie idle and that, furthermore, under this system it has been characteristic for some few to have much material wealth while the many have little of such wealth. The argument can be best described as an extension into the social realm of the Darwinian hypothesis of biological evolution, in which many organisms are born to a struggle in which only the best fitted survive.

The earliest expression of the idea that it is a law of nature that many should not survive appears in the Malthusian "law" of population (T.R. Malthus, *Essay on the Principle of Population as It Affects the Future Improvement of Society*, 1798). The Malthusian doctrine was comforting to English taxpayers, since it ideologically released them from the necessity of supporting England's many poor. As the birth rate among Western peoples steadily declined—in violation of the Malthusian law—emphasis has shifted from population quantity to population quality. The thesis now is that, in the competitive struggle of capitalistic society, the biologically superior individuals rise to the top; *i.e.*, they survive. Any political action which prevents the inferior biological stocks from falling to their appropriate social level thwarts the evolutionary process.

Data to support the contention that the socially élite are the biologically superior members of the population began to accumulate with the publication of F. Galton's *Heredity and Genius* (New York, Macmillan, 2d ed., 1892). Among subsequent contributions were such studies as those of R.L. Dugdale (*The Jukes*, 33d Annual Report of the Prison Assoc. of New York, 1877) and H.H. Goddard (*The Kallikak Family*, New York, Macmillan, 1912) and such deductions as were made during the 1920's from the results of intelligence tests, all of which are uncritically summed up by J.C. Schwesinger in *Heredity and Environment* (New York, Macmillan, 1933).

Perhaps the worst of the many attempts which have been made to justify capitalistic maldistribution of wealth on biological grounds is the work by F.W. Taussig and C.S. Hoslyn, *American Business Leaders* (New York, Macmillan, 1932). At the present writing, the worst and the most recent attempt to interpret social phenomena in terms of biological differentials is that of the Harvard anthropologist E.A. Hooton in his *Apes, Men and Morons* (New York, Putnam, 1937). A philosopher's attempt to justify the economic *status quo* is W.E. Hocking's *The Lasting Elements of Individualism* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1937).

7. The neoclassical school of economics is best represented in England by A. Marshall (*Principles of Economics*, New York, Macmillan, 8th ed., 1925) and in the United States by F.W. Taussig (*Principles of Economics*, New York, Macmillan, 3d ed., 1924, 2 vols.).

8. The ideologists of capitalism have put their faith in the naturalness and inevitability of the capitalistic system. History has already proved them to be false prophets. The socialists—and there is every kind and degree of socialistic ideology—have been equally sanguine concerning either the ease or the inevitability with which a noncapitalistic society would come about. History has already shown that, although social change is possible, it comes slowly, painfully, and by no means certainly.

For a realistic description and comparison of capitalistic and anticapitalistic ideologies see C. Gide and C. Rist, *A History of Economic Doctrines* (trans. by R. Richards, New York, Macmillan, 1913); J.H. Haney, *History of Economic Thought* (New York, Macmillan, 1911); or W. Scott, *The Development of Economics* (New York, Century, 1933). A brief and for the present purposes adequate analysis of the various ideological schools will be found in the article "Economics" (*Ency. Soc. Sci.*, 5, 344-395). The most interesting analysis of capitalistic ideologies is, however, T.W. Arnold's *The Folklore of Capitalism* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1937).

In addition to the more or less systematic ideologies by which the capitalistic system of economic life is justified, there are a great many specific ideologies by which specific business practices are justified. In a previous chapter the ideological bases of advertising practices and procedures were mentioned. According to T. Nelson (forthcoming book to be entitled "The Theory of Enterprise Accounting"), even such a presumably realistic practice as accounting is at basis ideological: "Accounting schedules are essentially statements of opinion about the future of the enterprise; they are not assertions about things that are known to exist. . . . Enterprise accounting is a ceremony that produces figures in books. It is only the belief that certain future events will or will not occur that makes these figures, for any period less than the life of the enterprise, resemble reality."

9. According to the following news item, the major activity of the boys who assembled at the 1937 National Jamboree in Washington, D.C., was swapping:

"But more fascinating than spectacles, drills or speeches by oldsters about Scout ideals was the extra-curricular activity in which all 25,000 assiduously engaged—swapping.

"To Washington they had brought a strange assortment of impedimenta: wampum, pine cones, stuffed birds, sharks teeth, shells, sponges, live hoot owls, pickled scorpions. Texans (dressed in chaps) brought a large consignment of live horned toads. West Virginians brought hunks of coal shellacked for paperweights. Californians brought 20-ft. strips of movie film. With these trade goods, the young merchants wandered around, to the wooden fence near the camp of the Bahamians, the barbed wire fence of the Texans, the Paul Bunyan display of the Wisconsin Scouts, the Florida encampment hung with Spanish moss. All day, every day the tent cities echoed with the wrangling of Young America trading what it possessed for something else it wanted" (*Time*, July 12, 1937).

10. During the early 1930's there were established a considerable number of consumers'-goods exchanges. To the trading which occurred the term "barter" was attached; as a consequence it has become customary to think of barter as any exchange which does not involve a medium of exchange. The term "barter" is herein used, however, in a broader and more significant sense to mean any exchange which is effected by compromise. For a technical discussion of this concept see N.S.B. Grass, "Barter" (*Ency. Soc. Sci.*, 1, 468-469).

11. Particularly in the United States, government bureaus, such as the Department of Agriculture and the Department of Commerce, have worked on behalf of sellers (business interests) rather than on behalf of consumers. Thus, to cite just one instance, the Department of Commerce has recently developed and made available to orange producers a technique for coloring green oranges to deceive the consumer, although there must be tens of thousands of families who are interested in consuming oranges to every family which is interested in the production and sale of oranges.

There is a long, and in the main disastrous, history of consumers' cooperatives, consumers' leagues, and other organizations of consumers, which endeavor to gain for consumers equality with sellers. See M. Nathan, *The Story of an Epoch-making Movement* (Garden City, Doubleday, 1926); J.P. Warhase, *Cooperative Democracy through Voluntary Association of the People as Consumers* (New York, Harper, 3d. ed, 1936); S. Webb and B. Webb, *The Consumers' Cooperative Movement* (London, Longmans, Green, 1921); and the excellent article by C. Gide "Consumers' Cooperation" (*Ency. Soc. Sci.*, 4, 285-291).

The publication of *Your Money's Worth* by S. Chase and F.J. Schlink (New York, Macmillan, 1927), which raised the question of what the modern consumer does and does not get when he goes to market, aroused great attention. The flood of requests from readers of the book for further data on consumers' goods led Schlink, a technician, to establish Consumers' Research, Inc., in 1929. This organization, cooperative in nature, provides members with research data and trade knowledge on every conceivable commercial product and attempts to evaluate the various brands of a given product. In 1937, Consumers' Research began publication of *Consumers' Digest*, a monthly magazine for the general public.

Recently a number of informational services, patterned superficially upon Consumers' Research, have been established—including *National*

Consumer News (published monthly at 205 E. 42d Street, New York) and *Consumers Union* (published by Consumers Union of the United States, Inc., 55 Vandam Street, New York). The latter periodical includes as a basis for the evaluation of products the labor conditions under which they are produced.

Stimulated, presumably, by criticism of its producer orientation, the Department of Agriculture has begun to publish, through the Consumers' Counsel, *Consumers' Guide*. This periodical contains nothing which might possibly offend business interests and, therefore, nothing which could possibly be of value to consumers.

The Consumers' Research data have served as the basis for a number of rather spectacular books, intended, apparently, to fight the advertiser's fire with fire. See:

Kallen, H.M., *The Decline and Rise of the Consumer*, New York, Appleton-Century, 1936.

Kallet, A., and F.J. Schlink, *One Hundred Million Guinea Pigs*, New York, Vanguard, 1932.

Matthews, J.B., *Guinea Pigs No More*, New York, Covici-Friede, 1936.

Matthews, J.B., and R.E. Shallcross, *Partners in Plunder*, New York, Covici-Friede, 1935.

Phillips, M.C., *Skin Deep*, New York, Vanguard, 1934.

Schlink, F.J., *Eat, Drink and Be Wary*, New York, Covici-Friede, 1935.

A slightly official flavor was given to the attack upon modern seller tactics with the publication of *American Chamber of Horrors* by R. deF. Lamb (New York, Farrar & Rinehart, 1937). Lamb, who had long been Chief Educational Officer of the United States Food and Drug Administration, drew her data from the official files.

An academic version of the problems of the consumer in capitalistic society is provided by C.S. Wyand in *The Economics of Consumption* (New York, Macmillan, 1937).

12. The economists have devoted a great deal of attention to the creation and maintenance of capitalistic ideologies. Business technicians—such as those who teach advertising, selling, personnel management, industrial management, and the like in schools of business—on the other hand, rarely inquire into the ethical consequences of business practices. By and large, these “practical” economists assume without examination the idea that what is good for business is good. See, for example, W.B. Cornell, *Industrial Organization and Management* (New York, Ronald, 1928); D.A. Laird, *What Makes People Buy* (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1935); H.C. Metcalf (Ed.), *Scientific Foundations of Business Management* (Baltimore, Williams & Wilkins, 1926); N.M. Ohrbach, *Getting Ahead in Retailing* (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1935); or E.K. Strong, *Psychological Aspects of Business* (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1938).

For attempts to evaluate capitalistic business practices on ethical or legal grounds, see:

Dennison, H.S., *Ethics and Modern Business*, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1932.

Filene, E.A., *Morals in Business*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1935.

Flynn, J.T., *Graft in Business*, New York, Vanguard, 1931.

Harding, T.S., *The Degradation of Science*, New York, Farrar & Rinehart, 1931.

Radin, M., *The Lawful Pursuit of Gain*, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1931.

13. For a detailed analysis of the differential roles of clerk and salesman see the article "Salesmanship" by L. Galloway (*Ency. Soc. Sci.*, **13**, 519-521).

14. See E.K. Strong, *The Psychology of Selling Life Insurance* (New York, Harper, 1922).

15. For a brief survey of the history of the auction and of the use of this device in the disposal of producers' goods see P.T. Cherington, "Auction" (*Ency. Soc. Sci.*, **1**, 309-310).

16. The literature on the subject of the laborer in modern society is so large and has been written from so many divergent points of view that the novice to the subject had best approach it by way of some general text, such as C.R. Daugherty's *Labor Problems in American Industry* (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1933), or by way of the brief treatments of special topics in the *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*. For the development of the exchange status of the modern worker see "Labor Contract" by R.F. Fuchs (*Ency. Soc. Sci.*, **8**, 629-633) and "Methods of Remuneration for Labor" by H.S. Person (*Ency. Soc. Sci.*, **8**, 677-681). For the efforts of laborers to improve their exchange status, see "Labor Disputes" by J.A. Fitch (*Ency. Soc. Sci.*, **8**, 633-636), "Labor Movement" by J.R. Commons (*Ency. Soc. Sci.*, **8**, 682-696), "Collective Bargaining" by W.H. Hamilton (*Ency. Soc. Sci.*, **3**, 628-631), "Trade Unions" by various authors (*Ency. Soc. Sci.*, **15**, 3-57), "Strikes and Lockouts" by J.A. Fitch (*Ency. Soc. Sci.*, **14**, 419-426), and *Dynamite: The Story of Class Violence in America* by L. Adamic (New York, rev. ed., Viking, 1931). For the devices with which employers have endeavored to retain their advantageous exchange status, see "Labor Injunction" by F. Frankfurter and N. Green (*Ency. Soc. Sci.*, **8**, 653-657) and *The Labor Spy* by S. Howard and R. Dunn (New York, Republic Publishing Co., 1924).

Those who wish to pursue the subject further will find the following useful:

Catlin, W.B., *The Labor Problem in the U.S. and Great Britain*, New York, Harper, 1935.

Commons, J.R., *History of Labor in the U.S.*, New York, Macmillan, 1935.

Hicks, J.R., *The Theory of Wages*, London, Macmillan, 1932.

Hutt, W.H., *The Theory of Collective Bargaining*, London, King, 1935.

Murphy, J.T., *Modern Trade Unionism*, London, Routledge, 1935.

Page, K., *Collective Bargaining*, New York, Doran, 1921.

Seidman, J.I., *The Yellow Dog Contract*, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1932.

17. Various interpretations of the function of the literary agent are to be found in the following articles:

Braley, B., "Gentle Art of Selling Manuscripts," *Amer. Mercury*, August, 1935, 482-484.

De Voto, B., "Author and Publisher," *Sat. Rev. Lit.*, Mar. 27, 1937.

Ford, F.M., "Sad State of Publishing," *Forum*, August, 1937, 83-86.

Jewett, S.O., "Advice to a Young Writer," *Yale Rev.*, December, 1936, 430-432.

"When Authors Meet," *Publishers' Weekly*, Oct. 5, 1935, 1261-1264.

18. Although the exchange character of the situations through which medical services are provided has been tempered by ethical codes, the result has not, on the whole, been satisfactory, either to doctors or to patients. See *American Medicine: Expert Testimony Out of Court* (edited and published by The American Foundation, New York, 2 vols.).

19. In *Boss Rule: Portraits in City Politics* (New York, Whittlesey House, 1935) J.T. Salter describes many specific instances of political barter as they appear within the municipal machine. See especially the case of Nicholas Tishbourne (159 ff.), in which the method of buying votes is described. Salter designates the ward heelers as "sales agents" and the ward area as the "sales territory."

20. For a diplomat's description of diplomatic negotiation as simply a complex form of horse trading see the article "Diplomats Pay to Work" by H. Gibson (*Sat. Even. Post.*, May 8, 1937).

CHAPTER XV

POLITIC BEHAVIOR

In a capitalistic society, as we have seen, collective economic welfare depends in considerable measure on the consequences of a multitude of specific exchange situations. This dependence on exchange behavior is supposed by the ideologists of capitalism to be socially advantageous because it arouses individual initiative by appealing to individual interests. Thus, it is assumed that the individual will exhibit maximum initiative, since he himself will directly profit by the results of that initiative, and that society will profit by this initiative, which otherwise would not be aroused.

In those instances where the results of initiative can be measured, this assumption may be valid. The productivity of the man who is working on the lathe, the man who is working with the hoe, and the man who is working by himself in a chemical laboratory can be measured and directly rewarded in exchange situations. The initiative which such men display might well be the result of exchange appeals to their individual interest.

Wherever the results of individual initiative cannot be measured, however, such initiative cannot be rewarded and, consequently, cannot be aroused by appeal to individual interests. Unfortunately for the ideologists of capitalism, most of the socially significant initiative which appears in modern society is of this order. In the effective operation of religious, political, educational, and other organizations, the initiative of any one person is useful only to the extent that it is coordinated with the initiative of the others. Such coordination of individual initiative means cooperation among a number of people. In so far as any one of them is concerned, the amount of initiative which he displays in cooperating with the others cannot be measured and cannot, obviously, be bought and sold.

When such initiative is forthcoming, it arises, therefore, as the consequence of other than exchange appeals. As we shall see,

such initiative results from the direct antithesis to individual self-seeking—from willingness to subordinate individual interests in cooperating with others. Willingness to cooperate with others may be designated as *esprit de corps*. In most instances, *esprit de corps* results from participation in a specific type of collective behavior—politic behavior.

Politic Behavior.—Politic behavior may be briefly defined as a form of collective interaction during which the members of the situation are led to feel that they are personally responsible for a program of coordinated activity which has in actuality been provided for them by a leader. This sense of personal responsibility on the part of each member of the situation is the basis for the *esprit de corps* which facilitates putting that program into action.

Politic situations are not peculiar to modern society. The primitive tribal leader relied upon a politic situation—the council of elders—to secure the *esprit de corps* of his subordinates. The primitive war chief established *esprit de corps* among his various warriors through the politic war council. In early New England, a degree of *esprit de corps* was generated in all the members of a town through the politic town meeting.

Peculiar to the modern world, however, are the great variety of politic situations which are used by a great variety of leaders. Thus, modern people are perpetually having conferences, becoming members of committees, and attending conventions. Through such situations, business, political, religious, educational, and other leaders are constantly endeavoring to establish and to maintain *esprit de corps* among those whom they wish to direct into given channels of action.

ORIGIN AND FUNCTION

Politic behavior may be said to originate in the need of a leader of a business, political, religious, educational, military, or other organization for *esprit de corps*—willingness to cooperate with one another—among those of his subordinates who must exercise initiative in carrying out his programs.¹ To understand the origins of any politic situation it is, therefore, necessary, first, to understand the circumstances which make *esprit de corps* necessary and, second, to understand how politic behavior develops such *esprit de corps*.

The Leader of Leaders.—When a small number of people are organized to facilitate the achievement of any objective, a single individual may serve as leader, solving the problems of group adjustment as they come along and guiding the group in terms of his solutions. Such is the case when a man directs the activities of a small crew in sailing a boat and when a man runs a small business enterprise.

When, however, the members of any organization which requires similar directive leadership are too many for a single individual to direct personally, the leader of that organization must of necessity delegate authority to some of his subordinates. Thus, the captain of a large ship has a staff of officers; and the president of a corporation has a number of executives under him. Each of these subordinates is responsible for the leadership of a particular element or phase of the organization. The leader of the organization is not, therefore, so much a leader of the members of that organization as he is a leader of the leaders of those members.²

As a leader of leaders, the function of the head of any large organization is to design general plans of organizational action. He sets objectives and determines the role of each of his immediate subordinates in achieving those objectives. The commanding officer determines a military campaign and the role of each unit of his army in that campaign; the manufacturer of an automobile determines the objectives for the coming year and the role of each department in achieving those objectives.

The leader of leaders does not, however, work out the details of leadership. The commanding officer does not work out the exact manner in which his officers shall shell an objective, take an enemy position, and so on; the manufacturer of an automobile does not determine exactly how his departments shall design a new model, prepare for its production, advertise it, and so on. During the course of putting his plan into effect, these details must be worked out by his subordinates, each of whom, as a leader in his own right, must display considerable initiative.

The Coordination of Leadership.—The plan of the leader of an organization will ordinarily be devised in terms of the organization as a whole. Thus, in the program of an automobile manufacturer, the activities of the advertising department are arranged in terms of the activities of production, sales, and other depart-

ments. In a military campaign the role of artillery is determined in terms of the roles of infantry, machine-gun, and other units.

The leader of each department or unit will, however, be more interested in the activities of his particular part of the organization than in the extent to which those activities contribute to the whole. Thus, the advertising manager will feel it to his economic advantage to secure a large appropriation for advertising; the artillery officer will see opportunities for promotion in making a spectacular showing with his command.

If each of the subordinate leaders in an organization were to fulfill his role in an organizational program in terms of his own interests, the result would be uncoordinated activity, profitable to each of the subordinates, perhaps, but fatal to the welfare of the organization. The interests of an artillery officer might lead him to shell an enemy concentration long before the infantry was ready to attack this objective; the interests of an advertising manager might lead him to launch a skillful advertising campaign before the new model of automobile was ready to go on the market. The role of each of the subordinates in the plan for the whole organization is, therefore, one which to some degree conflicts with the economic and other interests of that subordinate.

The Need for *Esprit de Corps*.³—In order to get his subordinates to subordinate their personal interests to the needs for coordination, the leader of leaders must, therefore, establish an appeal which is stronger than their individual interests. He must develop their willingness to cooperate with one another in face of the fact that he cannot measure and suitably reward such cooperation. In this need of the leader of leaders to develop in his subordinates the desire to do that which he considers they should do—in other words, to develop their *esprit de corps*—lies the origin of politic behavior. The commander of an army may plan a campaign, but he must depend upon the willingness of his officers to cooperate in putting that plan into effect; the manufacturer of automobiles may make plans for the coming year, but he is dependent upon the willingness of his subordinates to work together in carrying out those plans.

The Development of *Esprit de Corps*.—In some instances *esprit de corps* is more or less traditional for a given group and can, therefore, be taken for granted. In the modern world this is

most evident in the field of amateur sports. In high school and college, the coach and the captain of a basketball or football team can assume that the individual players will subordinate themselves to the group, take their assignments without protest, and do their utmost as individuals to further the collective end. Teamwork—cooperation—is normal under such circumstances. The one who puts himself ahead of group interest is immediately decried as a “grandstander,” since he plays up to the audience rather than plays with his team.

The *esprit de corps* which may be normal to the members of a football team does not, however, ordinarily obtain in military, business, and other group activities. It sometimes happens that the loyalty of his subordinates to the leader of leaders is sufficient to result in cooperation among them. Usually, however, the leader of leaders must deliberately develop and maintain *esprit de corps* among his subordinates. To this end, he initiates politic situations.

Although, as we shall see, there are a number of variants to the politic situation, the basic means of securing *esprit de corps* is by leading each member of the group which will be responsible for the administration of a plan of group action to feel a sense of responsibility for the origin of that plan. If each individual feels that he has been in large or small measure the originator of that plan, he will be anxious to prove its virtue and will, therefore, do his part more energetically and more efficiently than had the plan, and his part therein, been dictated to him by his superior. If he has a personal interest in the success of the plan, he will willingly cooperate with his associates, subordinating other and possibly conflicting interests to his interest in the success of the plan. How the leader of leaders can formulate a plan of collective action and then, through politic situations, make his subordinates believe that it is of their own devising will be indicated later in the chapter.

Function.—Politic behavior is thus seen to serve a leadership purpose. It is, in effect, a device used by the leader of leaders. For the leader of an organization, the purpose of politic situations is simply that of making his leadership effective by making his subordinates feel that they are providing their own leadership.

For those subordinates, on the other hand, participation as members of politic situations may serve one or a number of

purposes. It may serve to give them a stimulating enthusiasm for the work which they must undertake; it may give them a sense of importance and integrity which would be wholly lacking were they dictated to by their superior; or it may, more or less incidentally, provide them with congenial satisfactions.

Whether or not politic behavior functions to the fulfillment of long-run, collective ends depends upon the leader of the organization. The leader of a business, for example, may secure the full and willing cooperation of his subordinates but may succeed only in leading those subordinates into unemployment. He may, on the other hand, lead them in such a way that their cooperation ultimately brings them tangible rewards in the form of increased salaries, bonuses, etc.

IDEOLOGIES

The very existence of the politic situation depends upon the belief of the members of that situation in the ideology of collective invention. The members of a politic situation do not, however, justify their membership in that situation by the ideology of collective invention; they must, rather, fully accept the ideology before they can become members. Politic behavior, unlike the types of collective behavior which have so far been discussed, is, therefore, based upon, rather than justified by, an ideology.

The Ideology of Collective Invention.—The ideology of collective invention consists of the vague and implicit assumption that a group of people, through collective interaction, can work out a more efficient adjustment to a problem than can any one of them working alone.⁴ This ideology can be suggested by the old proverb that two heads are better than one. In so far as sum of knowledge is concerned, evidence does support this proverb. Given a list of questions to answer, a group of individuals will do much better than will any one of them working alone; for a pooling of knowledge occurs. Thus, the sum of the knowledge of ten men is greater than that of two; that of two, greater than the knowledge of one.⁵

In the solving of problems, however, as distinct from the simple answering of questions, two heads are certainly not better than one. The solving of any problem, whether it be the problem of designing a building or of forming a plan of action for a business, religious, educational, or other organization, is a matter of

individual trial and error. Collective interaction in the trial-and-error efforts to solve a problem is likely to result far more in utter confusion than in a solution to that problem. It is as reasonable to assume that ten rats turned loose in a maze will, through interaction with one another, solve the maze problem more efficiently than would any one of them interacting with the maze itself as to assume that ten men discussing a problem will arrive at a solution more efficiently than will one of them working on that problem. The ideology of collective invention confuses problem solving with knowledge pooling and confuses person-to-person interaction with person-to-problem reaction. Collective solving of any problem is per se a sociopsychological absurdity.

The Individual Nature of Invention.⁶—A glance at the history of creative endeavors in fields where results can be measured should be sufficient to reveal the fallacy of assuming the possibility of collective invention in any field. No pictures of note have come from the cooperative brushes of a number of interacting artists. Occasionally, fine results have been secured by a division of creative problems—notably in the construction of large panoramic canvases. In these cases the totality was envisaged—invented—by a single person and was then broken down into specific problems which were solved by the various artists, each working as an individual. They did not “sit” as a committee to fight out one complex creative problem.

In the history of literature, music, and drama there is to be found no evidence of collective invention. Most books are the product of one synthesizing mind; most music is composed by one person; most plays are written by a single pen. When a book, a musical score, or a play is the result of the efforts of two or more people, each has worked as an individual. Gilbert and Sullivan, for example, did not sit down together and collectively work out their problems of book and score. One wrote the book; the other tried to fit the score to it.⁷

In science and technology, most developments are the consequence of individual efforts. In those developments which involve the efforts of two men, one of two procedures is employed: either one person acts simply as an assistant and does tasks set by the other; or else the problem is divided between them, and each takes for his individual task the solution of one of the

elements. In industrial-research laboratories, where the division of scientific labor probably is more complete than it is elsewhere, the former procedure is usually resorted to.⁸ Edison, for example, generally acted as the "master mind" over his many technicians, setting specific tasks for each one of them to solve. Although each technician utilizes and builds upon the work of his predecessors, his contribution to the scientific heritage is a product of his own efforts. He is a creator in his own right; he does not arrive at the solution to his specific problem by resort to the politic method—by going into a huddle with his colleagues and arriving at a solution of his problem through verbal interaction with them.⁹ Instead, he takes his problem to his laboratory or study and works on it.

The comparatively simple problems of invention in the realm of the arts and sciences have invariably been solved by individual trial and error. That the more complex problems of business, military, and other organizations can somehow be solved more easily by collective than by individual means is, therefore, pure assumption. This ideology is, nevertheless, the basis for the existence of the politic situation, in which the members discuss a problem and seemingly arrive at a workable solution in the form of a plan of collective action. What the verbal interaction in such a situation actually produces is *esprit de corps* for the plan of collective action, rather than the plan itself. That plan is, obviously, the product of one mind.¹⁰

MEMBERSHIP

The members of any politic situation are selected by the leader in terms of the desirability of their willingness to cooperate with their colleagues in the carrying out of some specific plan of action. The general calls a conference of the officers of his staff because he needs their cooperation if his campaign is to be successful. The business executive calls a conference of department heads because they must work together if his program is to be put into effect. The department heads may, in turn, call conferences of their subordinates for similar purposes. In other words, it is those who must willingly cooperate with one another in putting a program into action who will be selected as members of politic situations.

The importance of a given individual to a given organization is, therefore, roughly indicated by the frequency of his being selected by his superior for politic situations. This index is, however, by no means reliable. In the first place, the judgment of the leader concerning the importance of any one subordinate may be in error; or his selection of members to politic situations may be more a matter of habit or of organizational tradition than of calculation. In the second place, the leader may be using a given politic situation as a means of tabling some suggested plan which he considers inexpedient. He then tends to select members who are more important in the organization for their prestige than for their ability. In the third place, he may pass over that subordinate who is so loyal to the organization that he will be willing to cooperate in the execution of any plan. It is, obviously, unnecessary to generate *esprit de corps* when *esprit de corps* already exists. Finally, but perhaps more rarely, the leader may have discovered by experience that this or that subordinate is too sophisticated to be a member of a politic situation. With such a subordinate, *esprit de corps* cannot be secured by politic means.

Training of Members.—Aside, perhaps, from a little schooling in rules of parliamentary procedure—which may or may not be utilized in a given politic situation—there is no systematic preparation of members for participation in politic situations. The members of a politic situation have, however, been prepared for politic behavior at least to the extent that they believe in the ideology of collective invention. How they come to believe in the possibility of collective invention need not here concern us. It is not a systematic ideology, and the individual is not systematically trained into it. Suffice it to point out that this belief is a part of our culture and is generally accepted by the individual member of society as uncritically as he accepts other elements of that culture.

Interesting is the fact that the executive who manipulates his subordinates in politic situations can serve as a member of politic situations under the leadership of his superior. Whether such a person simply becomes a formal member of the politic situations in which he is a member is not clear. Possibly he, like the professional salesman who buys in the market place, is as

gullible as a member as he is sophisticated as a leader. At any event, the popularity of the politic situation as a leadership device suggests that most people are sufficiently prepared by social, however unsystematic, experience to become satisfactory members of such situations.

OVERT AND COVERT ASPECTS OF INTERACTION

On the overt side, politic behavior is usually symbolic. The members of a politic situation do not "solve" the problem which is brought before them by collecting relevant facts, by making statistical analyses of factual data, or by experimental procedure in a laboratory. They sit around a table and discuss the problem. Superficially, the interaction which occurs in a politic situation might seem to consist simply of a random exchange of opinions regarding or vaguely related to a problem which is of interest to all the members of the group. Out of this general discussion there may eventually arise what appears to be a collective solution to that problem, usually described by the leader of the politic situation as the "consensus of opinion." The interaction which may actually occur in a politic situation is, however, anything but simple; and the members of the situation are never aware of its actual nature.

Leader Behavior.—The leader of a politic situation behaves in overt ways which are calculated to effect desirable changes in the covert feeling-states of his subordinates. He wishes, in effect, to generate their *esprit de corps* in carrying out his plan of action. What his behavior will be depends, therefore, not upon his immediate feelings, but upon the nature of his politic problem.

The overt behavior of the leader of a politic situation is, therefore, at variance with his own covert feeling-states. He may feel that what so-and-so says is verbose and irrelevant, but the fact that he wishes to secure so-and-so's willing cooperation deters him from expressing this opinion. He might like to say, "This is what I want you to do. Now go do it!" If he were to, however, he would defeat his own purpose.

The motives behind the overt behavior of the leader of a politic situation, to put it otherwise, are not evident from that behavior.

As the leader of a politic situation he is a Machiavellian, acting a part in his relations with his subordinates, just as does the member of a formal situation, and proceeding on the assumption that the end justifies the means.

Member Behavior.—The overt behavior of the members of a politic situation, on the other hand, is a direct expression of their covert feeling-states. It is by unrestrained self-expression that the members of a politic situation are led to feel that they have contributed to the forming of a plan of collective action and, thus, come to have *esprit de corps* in regard to that plan.

It is not important, however, that overt expressions actually be relevant to the plan which emerges. The politic function will be served as long as the overt expressions of the members can be vaguely related to that plan. In some instances, the politic function is served when the members merely air their petty grievances, settle grudges with their colleagues, or talk feelingly and at length about the state of the nation.

At any event, the leader of a politic situation does not expect to secure a solution to a problem from the overt actions of the members. To him, the value of such actions is that they may directly or indirectly serve to induce changes in the covert feeling-states of the members of that situation. As self-expression, the statements of a member may dissipate his covert tensions. As the expression of an opinion, the statements of a member may subsequently be used by the leader as the basis for a compliment to that member.

The Formal Member.—It must not be assumed from the foregoing that all those who participate in a politic situation are truly members thereof. Some may be members in form only and may, in the spirit of playing the game, simply pretend to express their feelings. Although politic ideologies are generally accepted uncritically, training in them is, as we have seen, left to chance; and the leader of an organization cannot be sure that all his subordinates will be equally prepared for membership in politic situations. Some one or more of them may not be taken in by his Machiavellian manipulations. They may more or less accurately see through his actions to his motives. For such a sophisticated individual, membership in a politic situation can be no more than a formal matter—a matter of individual expediency.

LEADERSHIP

The leadership of politic situations is an outgrowth of some other type of leadership. It might be said that the leader of any politic situation has appointed himself to the role of leader; he calls the situation into being, determines the membership, and of his own initiative designates the problem which the members will consider. He does this, however, only because he is for some reason or other already the leader of an organization, in the operation of which the politic situation is but one incident. As the leader of such an organization, he may be a political boss who has fought his way to power, the president of a business who derives his status from the fact that he owns a majority interest in that organization, the president of a university who has been elected by the board of trustees, the general of an army who has gone up through the ranks, etc.

Whatever the source of his leadership of the organization, his self-election to leadership in politic situations arises from the fact that much of his effectiveness as a leader will depend upon the *esprit de corps* of his subordinates. We are not here concerned with his leadership in inventing a plan of action for his organization but, rather, with his leadership in the politic situations through which he secures *esprit de corps* among those who will carry out the plans which he devises.

Leadership by Persuasion.—In distinction to the process of conversational leadership which has been discussed in previous chapters, that which occurs in situations of the politic type may be described as persuasive. The conversational leader appeals to recognized interests. If a man responds to such leadership, he does so because he believes that it is to his personal advantage to do so. The persuasive leader, on the other hand, endeavors to persuade those whom he wishes to control that they have freely initiated the desired action. The distinction between conversational and persuasive appeals can be clearly illustrated by a comparison of the mother who bribes her child to practice the piano with the mother who secures the same result by persuading the child that he wants to practice—*i.e.*, that it is his idea. In the first instance, the appeal is to the child's recognized interest in candy, cake, or what not. In the second instance, the appeal is made to the child's pride in himself or his ambition—such as

that of becoming a great pianist; and the child will not recognize that he is responding to his mother's leadership.

The persuasive methods by which the leader of a politic situation induces the members to want to do what he wants them to do are, of course, far more complex. He is dealing with a number of adults who must work together rather than with one child who practices alone.

The Persuasive Process.—Persuasion is at once the most complex and subtle and the most potentially effective of all leadership techniques. In a general way, persuasive leadership may be described as calculated appeal to the pride of each of the members of the group. It does not follow, however, that the leader of a politic situation is necessarily what is commonly designated as a "good fellow" or a "gladhander." The crude techniques which are suggested by those terms would be too obvious to be successful with a group of staff officers, a group of department heads, or a faculty committee.

To secure acquiescence to his wishes and at the same time to secure *esprit de corps*, the leader of a politic situation takes the long way around: He encourages his subordinates to talk themselves into what he wants them to do. He patiently and subtly guides them into arriving at a foregone conclusion. He professes a modesty and a dependence upon their collective wisdom which, presumably, no leader ever actually feels. He sits for hours or days through many politic situations in which he encourages the random discussions from which he will eventually derive the "invention"—the plan of collective action—which he had in mind at the outset. In sum, the persuasive leader patiently maneuvers, knowing that no momentary acquiescence on the part of his subordinates is worth the sacrifice of their *esprit de corps*.

The Training of Leaders.—Leaders of politic situations ordinarily develop such persuasive skills as they may have by unguided experience. Some of the larger business schools make a small concession to the need of the business executive to be a persuasive leader by offering a course or two in what is usually called "personnel management." Judging from the books which have appeared on this subject, these courses must serve more to reinforce the ideology of collective invention than to facilitate a realistic utilization of this ideology.¹¹ Indeed, it is doubtful

if the arts of leadership in politic behavior are any more subject to deliberate inculcation than are the arts of leadership in any other type of collective behavior.

TYPES OF POLITIC BEHAVIOR

In all politic situations the efforts of the leader are directed toward developing or maintaining *esprit de corps* among the members. Such situations will, however, vary greatly one from another, since in any given instance the politic problem will depend upon the size of the group and upon the particular circumstances. Furthermore, any specific politic situation may be significant to *esprit de corps* only in its relationship to a number of other such situations. In terms of the procedures of the leader, three general types of politic behavior can, nevertheless, be perceived.

THE CONFERENCE

The conference consists of a group of people who have been called together to consider one or a number of issues which are of interest to them. Ordinarily, the membership of such a situation is small enough to permit each member ample opportunity to participate in the discussion.

In a given conference, the politic function may be accomplished in a number of ways. When a number of these ways are intermingled, the interaction is a single complex process; *i.e.*, the leader does not, as it were, accomplish one objective and then proceed toward another. For analytical purposes, however, it is necessary to consider each of these ways of achieving a politic function in turn, as though the conference interaction always were, as it may sometimes be, pure in type.

The Personal Conference.—Perhaps the most complex and circumspect type of politic behavior is that which may occur during the course of a number of personal conferences between a leader and a single subordinate. This is not to say that the personal conference is always a politic situation. It may be a straightforward seeking of factual information. But the very fact that the personal conference between leader and subordinate is so often of this character makes the politic use of such conferences all the more feasible.

When the leader of an organization anticipates considerable difficulty in persuading one or many of his subordinates to accept a plan or program, he may prepare the way for a group conference by one or many personal conferences. The result, if he is successful, is a slow or delayed interaction of the order which is usually achieved in a group conference. The personal conference, however, utilizes two principles which do not operate in the group conference: the fact that memory is a tricky servant, and the fact that a subordinate is usually flattered by being taken into the confidence of a superior.

In order to prepare the way for a group conference, the leader of an organization may select a key subordinate, usually that subordinate who is most likely to resist the plan he has in mind. In his first conference with this person, he may discuss some matter which is irrelevant to the plan. During a subsequent personal conference with the same person, the leader of the organization refers to the "problem," saying in effect: "I have been thinking over that suggestion you made the other day. At the time it struck me as rather radical, but the more I think it over the clearer your reasons appear. As I recall, you proposed. . . ."

It is unimportant whether or not the subject was mentioned in the first conference and even less important that the subordinate did not express the opinion accredited to him. Apparently, many men cannot recall the topics of yesterday's conversations and are quite unlikely to recall the opinions which were then expressed. Furthermore, few men would seem to be able to resist accepting credit for what a superior deems worthy of esteem or of convincing even themselves that they have said the worthy things imputed to them.

Although the use of the personal conference as a politic situation has many variants, the function is always that of persuading subordinates to accept a plan of action by making them feel responsible for its origin. Each such conferee becomes an agent of the leader of the organization, who, when he deems the time right, may call a group conference to consider the problem, confident that the "solution" will be the one which he already has in mind.

The Problem-solving Conference.—When the leader of an organization anticipates no great difficulty in persuading his

subordinates to cooperate in the execution of a plan, he may proceed directly from the formation of that plan to a group conference, during which he hopes to make the members feel that they have invented the plan which he has already devised. Such a conference is usually called for the avowed purpose of considering a problem; seldom is its intent stated to be the consideration of a given solution thereto; and never, of course, is the politic purpose revealed.

Although complex in execution, the technique which is commonly used to lead conference members into thinking that they are responsible for the solution of an administrative problem is simple in principle. The problem is stated by the leader of the organization, and the opinions and the advice of the conference members are requested. As chairman, he then sits back while the various members express themselves on this or, as is quite probable, some irrelevant subject. In the cross fire of conflicting ideas, it is highly probable that some one of them will suggest a procedure, a part of which fits in or can be warped to fit in as an element of the leader's plan. At an opportune moment, the leader calls the attention of the group to this suggestion as a point worth elaboration. The member who made the suggestion can be depended upon to respond willingly and, in elaborating the point, to develop a paternalistic feeling for the views he expresses.

Out of all the random expression which arises in group discussion, the leader of the politic situation picks out and warps to his end those suggestions which come nearest to being elements of his own program. In the end, he may say something as follows:

"Gentlemen, I see a program formulating around this table. With your permission, let me try to reduce it to precise terms, in order that we may consider it in its entirety. I believe that you, Mr. A, have suggested that . . . This seems to me a most advantageous starting point. As I recall, you, Mr. B, expressed the opinion that . . . ; and I am rather impressed by the results of your research, Mr. C. . . ."

"Suppose, then, that we express the plan which has grown out of our discussion thus: . . ."

In expressing "the plan which has grown out of our discussion," the executive will actually describe his own plan.¹² So many

things have been said, and hardly anyone can remember just what he did say in the heat of discussion, that each conference member can easily see therein something of his own work.¹³ All the members may, therefore, defend the entire program against attack because each feels that a piece of it is his.¹⁴

The Exploratory Conference.—In devising a plan of collective action, the leader of an organization faces a twofold problem: the invention of an ideal program; and the modification of the ideal program in view of the character of those who must be depended upon to put it into action. This latter aspect of his problem may lead him to use a conference as an exploratory measure for determining the amount of resistance to that program which he is likely to encounter. Months before it is necessary to decide upon some matter, the leader of an organization may sound out his subordinates during the course of one or a number of exploratory conferences.

The Safety-valve Conference.—The fact that the members of a politic situation tend overtly to express their covert feeling-states makes the conference an excellent device for the harmless dissipation of individual discontent. Group discussion may, in other words, serve to liberate and to dispel psychological tensions. When it is of such a nature the conference is, for the members, a limited form of revelry.

Tension between the leader of an organization and his staff or among the members of that staff can often be harmlessly dispelled during the course of conference discussion. The subordinate who would not think of expressing his discontent in a personal conference with his superior can often be induced to do so under the stimulation of group interaction, and the antagonism between two staff members may be brought to the surface during the course of a verbal tiff in a conference. In either instance, the process of interactional amplification encourages self-expression; and the presence of an audience makes such self-expression a gratifying experience.¹⁵ The man with something on his mind has an opportunity to "talk it off" in conference, and the reaction of the group may go further to placating him than could anything his superior might say in a personal conference. For example, the head of a department may resent not having the latest equipment in his department. If the leader of the organization does not wish to make the outlay

for that equipment, he may, as an alternative, suggest bringing the matter up in conference, certain that other members of the group will have plenty of countercomplaints to make. All these complaints can be humorously brushed aside by the leader with some remark to the effect that what the organization really seems to need is a completely new building and completely new equipment.

The Congenial Conference.—In some instances, the conference serves a politic function by providing a somewhat artificial but none the less gratifying congenial outlet for the members. This is particularly characteristic of periodic conferences—those conferences which convene according to calendar dates, rather than as the need for them arises. American businessmen especially are prone to use the daily or weekly conference, during which major and minor executives can discuss their joint problems and, in lieu of pressing problems, can discuss whatever happens to interest them at the moment.¹⁶

For the members, such conferences supplement the briefer chats in the washroom, in corridors, etc. By the very nature of their tasks, the officials of any large organization tend to be isolated; they are somewhat estranged from those who work under them and are separated, because of organizational departmentalization, from those of their own occupational status. Periodic conferences provide a systematic means of lessening such isolation. By giving each individual a sense of "belonging," such conferences contribute to the maintenance of *esprit de corps*.

THE COMMITTEE

Ordinarily the committee is an offshoot of the conference and is appointed by the conference chairman for the avowed purpose of dealing with some problem which has arisen during the conference but which is either of an incidental character or else is too much specialized in nature to be considered by the conference body as a whole.¹⁷ In either case the committee will probably be charged with the duty of investigating and subsequently reporting to the conference body.¹⁸

Undoubtedly the committee, even as the personal conference, is often used by the leader of an organization as a means of securing factual information. The committee is, however, so

often simply a politic means of tabling undesired suggestions that it is often said of the committee that it keeps minutes and wastes hours.

To maintain *esprit de corps* among his subordinates, the leader of an organization must be responsive to all their suggestions. Since, however, his subordinates will tend to have special interests, their suggestions will frequently be inappropriate in terms of the organization as a whole. Rather than directly disregarding any such suggestion and thereby offending the subordinate, the leader may refer the suggestion to a committee, the members of which are selected to assure that nothing of consequence will come of their investigation and deliberation. The subordinate who advanced the suggestion may be made chairman. In any event, prolonged debate, time, and the emergence of new and pressing problems are likely to cure the subordinate of his interest in the unacceptable suggestion.

As a device for tabling undesired suggestions, the committee is popular, not only in business, religious, and educational organizations, but also in national and international politics. The appointment of a committee to kill an idea is a stock political stratagem. This use of the committee in the League of Nations was so common that even enthusiastic supporters of the league came to consider any matter shelved when it had been referred to a committee.

A variant of the foregoing procedure is the use of the committee by politicians to divert public attention from matters which are distasteful to them. Such use of the committee is most strikingly illustrated by the establishment in 1929 of the President's Research Committee on Social Trends. This committee was a serious, fact-finding body, ostensibly charged with the duty of providing a factual "basis for the formulation of large national policies. . . ." ¹⁹ The results were sociologically significant; but, long before the report was in, the political problem—as distinct from the social problem—which had been met by the appointment of this committee had become a matter of history.

The appointment of a fact-finding committee as a means of diverting attention from politically dangerous issues has been a favorite device with some politicians.²⁰ When there is pressure upon a political leader to do something about something which

he prefers to let alone, he can often divert attention by establishing such an investigational committee. The committee then serves him as a front. Although potentially useful facts may be uncovered and assembled by such a committee, the findings seldom actually serve as the basis for constructive political leadership. By the time that the facts are in, public attention has swung elsewhere, the problem has solved itself, or the politician who appointed the committee is out of office.²¹

CONVENTIONS

Conventions which are held by politicians, by business executives, by people who are interested in some question of a public nature, or by scientists fall into a number of types. Whatever its specific type, however, the convention is a sort of three-ring circus, consisting of a series of distinct but related collective situations—audiences, small congenial groups, conferences, and committees.

Each of these situations has its persuasive leader and serves as a politic situation which contributes to the generation and maintenance of *esprit de corps*. Usually, however, the activities of the leaders of such situations are coordinated by a convention leader in politic situations behind the scenes. A convention without such coordinating leadership would rapidly degenerate into a mild free-for-all.

The Political Convention.—The convention is a standard American means of “solving” political problems. It is a mechanism of party organization and of the organization of any large, minority-interest group. The politic function of political conventions is to secure *esprit de corps* among party workers. To this end, such workers are ostensibly made responsible for the selection of party representatives and for the determination of party programs.

In some few cases, leadership of a political convention is a relatively simple matter. Thus, although an American Legion convention has definite political implications, the majority of the members are so little interested in the political affairs of the convention that persuasive leadership is necessary only with relatively few members.²² The majority of delegates are so much preoccupied with revelry that they will complacently

vote for almost anything which can be brought out of committee onto the convention floor.

Leadership of most political conventions is, on the other hand, far more complex. In the state and national conventions of the Republican and Democratic parties, the delegates are mainly professional politicians who are definitely interested in the issues which are discussed in the convention. Leaders of such conventions often have stiff battles in controlling the rank and file.

When, as in the Republican convention of 1920, a party boss is in power, the politic problem is to enforce his will upon the delegates without impairing their loyalty to the party. To accomplish this, various conference stratagems of the sort which have been already described are employed. When, however, a number of behind-the-scenes leaders are struggling for their platforms and their candidates, there may be battles in the official committee meetings and in the unofficial but vital conferences in hotel rooms. Each leader then brings to bear every pressure at his command. Perhaps, to avoid stalemate, these struggling leaders find a "formula"; *i.e.*, they pick a candidate, who then is rushed out onto the convention floor as a great discovery.

However the platform and the candidate are determined, it is then necessary to convert the delegates to voting for the platform and the candidate. By so voting, the delegates assume a responsibility for offering the platform and the candidate to the electorate. Thus, indirectly, they develop *esprit de corps* for the political campaign.

It is interesting to note, in passing, that on the floor of the convention, action frequently reaches the revelous pitch of revival meetings. The prolonged falderal—including elaborate and noisy parading around the convention floor, interminable nomination of obviously unacceptable candidates, fiery speeches, and insistence upon the casting of ballot after ballot—is simply good showmanship, calculated to render the delegates susceptible to conversational leadership.²³

The Safety-valve Convention.—Those conventions which upon occasion are called by governmental or other leaders for the consideration of a problem of public interest are frequently intended as a safety valve. Social workers, for example, may become concerned with the question of professional standards, objectives, or something of the sort. A rather excellent method

of checking the rise of any active movement is the calling of a convention to consider the problem. After a few days and innumerable hours of discussion, the conference members will ordinarily pass a few harmless resolutions and then return home, satisfied in the feeling that they have done their best to solve the problem.

Should the convention members prove difficult to divert from action and to guide toward making resolutions, the leader may resort to the establishment of a special "committee of investigation." In the course of time the committee will hold a number of meetings, out of which will come, most characteristically, a leader-determined report, guaranteed to impress everyone concerned and to incite none to action.

Statesmen have long utilized the convention as a safety valve in quieting public agitation for the establishment of equable international relations. The calling of an international "conference," as such international conventions are termed, will almost always quiet public clamor for assurance of continued peace. Furthermore, the inclusion in the membership of that "conference" of important agitators for internationalism can often drain the energies of such agitators into harmless channels. While the actual leaders in international affairs are, perhaps, conducting political barter behind the scenes, the "conference" exhaustively discusses itself into fine-sounding but futile "agreements," even as less imposing conventions discuss themselves into harmless "resolutions."

The Congenial Convention.—Just as periodic conferences may contribute to maintaining *esprit de corps* among otherwise isolated officials of a business organization, periodic conventions may serve in the same way for larger numbers of scattered workers in business, educational, scientific, and other fields of human endeavor. Here, as in periodic conferences, the end is achieved by establishing the opportunity for informal congenial associations.

Tradition requires that the congenial aspects of such conventions be disguised behind some purported serious purpose. For a business executive to give his salesmen a three-day holiday at Atlantic City would be much less effective, from his point of view, than for him to hold a three-day convention. His purpose is to get his salesmen to feel that they belong to a friendly

“family” of salesmen. He cannot simply say: “Well, boys, we’ve had a good year. Let’s meet in Atlantic City and generate some *esprit de corps*.” He calls a convention, therefore, “to study plans for the coming year.”

To many observers, this type of convention may seem nothing more than an excuse for revelry; but such conventions undoubtedly serve much the same ends as do the less hilarious, more dignified, and intellectual conventions which are held annually by educational and scientific societies. The latter conventions are traditional mechanisms, and no leader is deliberately calculating the advantages of holding such a convention. Some scholarly, politic manipulation occurs in such conventions to the end that the proper individuals are elected to the proper offices, etc.; but the primary consequence of the convention is the generation and maintenance of some sense of *esprit de corps* within the scientific discipline by providing the members an opportunity for congenial association with their fellow workers.

Like the salesman of a big corporation who spends most of his year on the road, the scholar is usually rather isolated from the other men who work in the same field. He may exchange ideas and data with them through the medium of books and periodicals, but he depends mainly upon the annual convention for an opportunity to make or to continue personal acquaintance with his scattered colleagues. What he says when he addresses them in meetings could be as well said in print; but what he says outside the meetings in small, intimate groups is gratifying to him and may also be highly stimulating to his associates. Through membership and participation in casual, congenial groupings which occur among convention members, the individual may gain much insight and a definite sense of “belonging,” neither of which would he secure were he to stay in his study reading books and articles.

APPENDIX

1. The more highly regimented the personnel of any organization, the less the need for *esprit de corps*. For efficiency, the morale of the highly regimented soldier must be maintained; *i.e.*, his faith in the successful outcome of a military engagement must be assured. He need not, however, have any sense of responsibility for the tactics of that engagement. Contrary to civilian belief, an army is anything but a closely knit group of loyal workers and fighters. Since the common soldier is required only to obey orders and

since no initiative is demanded of him, his personal feelings about those orders are unimportant. It is only the officers of high rank who must exercise some initiative, of whom *esprit de corps* is required, and who, therefore, are called into staff conferences with their superiors.

2. It is not to be supposed, however, that the official head of an organization is *de facto* a leader of leaders. He may simply be the "front" for the actual director of that organization. In business, as in politics, the boss may find it expedient to work from behind the scenes.

3. The term "*esprit de corps*" is here used with its French implication of willingness to accept responsibility for the welfare of the group as a whole. In English usage the term is often used to mean personal loyalty to the members of the group.

4. The idea of collective invention is, of course, a part of the group-mind concept, according to which the interactions of a number of individuals are supposed to result in a sort of superindividual intellect. See note 6, appendix to Chap. I.

5. For attempts to measure the gains of pooling of knowledge, see the following:

Bursch, J.F., *A Study of Mental Work Done by Consulting Pairs*, Ph.D. Dissertation, Stanford University, 1927.

Carr, L.J., "Experimental Sociology: A Preliminary Note on Theory and Method," *Soc. Forc.*, 1929, 8, 63-74.

Shaw, M.E., "A Comparison of Individuals and Small Groups in the Rational Solution of Complex Problems," *Amer. J. Psychol.*, 1932, 44, 491-504.

South, E.B., "Some Psychological Aspects of Committee Work," *J. Appl. Psychol.*, 1927, 11, 348-368 and 437-464.

Watson, G., "Do Groups Think More Efficiently than Individuals?" *J. Abn. and Soc. Psychol.*, 1928, 23, 328-336.

———, "A Comparison of Group and Individual Performance at Certain Intellectual Tasks" *Proc. Ninth Int. Cong. Psychol.*, New Haven, 1929, 437.

6. Undoubtedly, the role of the individual in invention is simply that of synthesizing preexistent cultural elements by trial-and-error effort. For analysis of and historical data on this aspect of the inventive process see:

Barwick, E.B., *Man's Genius*, London, Dent, 1932.

Gilfillan, S.C., *The Sociology of Inventions*, Chicago, Follett, 1935.

———, *The Invention of the Ship*, Chicago, Follett, 1935.

Mason, O., *The Origins of Inventions*, London, Scott, 1895.

Van Loon, H.W., *Man, the Miracle Maker*, New York, Liveright, 1928.

It is, however, an entirely different matter to say that invention is a collective process in which the cultural elements which constitute the innovation are synthesized by a number of interacting individuals. Nevertheless, there is a tendency among sociologists to take the fact that invention is a cultural phenomenon to mean that invention is a collective process.

The story of the designing in 1917 of the much-publicized Liberty motor for heavy-duty bombers by a conference of technicians has long been used as a stock illustration of the advantage of "collective invention." A recent reference to this story is to be found in K. Young's *An Introductory Sociology* (New York, American Book, 1934, 39). The trouble with this story is that it illustrates only the impossibility of successful invention by the conference technique. As every Air Service technician knew to his sorrow, the original Liberty motor was a hodgepodge of well-designed but completely unintegrated elements and was a miserable failure from the start.

7. For a description of the collaborative technique of the famed comic-opera team of Gilbert and Sullivan see the article "Gilbert and Sullivan" by H. Pearson (*Harper's Mag.*, October, 1935, 601-613).

8. Division of labor, so large a factor in modern productive processes, does obtain in certain fields of creative endeavor. In the physical and social sciences a research worker often concentrates upon some single aspect of a major problem. In the course of time a number of such workers will contribute to a major invention, which is itself achieved through the agency of some synthesizing mind. In the solution of large technical problems (less frequently, of major social problems) the individual who is charged with the duty of finding a solution may break down his problem and assign each element to a specialist. This is what happens, for example, in the planning of a construction project—dam, skyscraper, ship, or even automobile. The final plan, if it is successful, will, however, be an integration by the master creator of the elements provided him by subordinate creators. He must as an individual find that synthesis of elements, just as each one of the specialists must as an individual have found the solution to his specific problem.

For a description of the way in which Edison used his many technical assistants when he was engaged upon some inventive enterprise, see the article "Edison in His Laboratory" by M.A. Rosanoff (*Harper's Mag.*, September, 1932, 402-417).

Planned and organized research work, which has seemed so attractive to many social scientists, does not, in fact, appear to be very fruitful, even in the physical sciences. C.E.K. Mees, research director of the laboratories of the Eastman Kodak Company, expresses in the following news item his opinion of organized research:

"The best person to decide what research work shall be done is the man who is doing the research. The next best is the head of the department. After that you meet increasingly worse groups. The first is the research director, who is probably wrong more than half the time. Then comes a committee which is wrong most of the time. Finally there is the committee of company vice presidents who are wrong all the time" (*Time*, Nov. 4, 1935).

9. Acceptance of the ideology of collective invention appears in the literature of sociology at least as far back as W. Bagehot's *Physics and Politics* (New York, Appleton, 1884), in which the final stage of social evolution is considered to be the substitution of "discussion" for group

conflict. The idea that discussion is the mechanism of social progress in the "great society" appears also as the core of the theory of G. Wallas (*Social Judgment*, London, Allen & Unwin, 1934).

For other ideological versions of collective invention see:

Bechterew, W., and M. de Lang, "Die Ergebnisse des Experiments auf dem Gebiete der kollektiven Reflexologie," *Zsch. f. angew. Psychol.*, 1924, **24**, 305-345).

Bogardus, E., "Leaders of Panel Discussion," *Sociol. and Soc. Res.*, 1935, **20**, 71-74.

Elliott, H.S., *The Process of Group Thinking*, New York, Association Press, 1928.

Judson, L., and E. Judson, *Modern Group Discussion, Public and Private*, New York, Wilson, 1937.

Leigh, R.D., *Group Leadership*, New York, Wharton, 1936.

Parker, J.W., *International Conferences*, Geneva, Switzerland, International Student Service, 1933.

Sheffield, A.D., *Creative Discussion*, New York, The Inquiry, 1933.

Tead, O., *The Art of Leadership*, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1935, Chap. X, "The Leader as Conference Chairman."

Tead, O., and H.C. Metcalf, *Personnel Administration*, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1920, 350-374.

Walser, F., *The Art of Conference*, New York, Harper, 1933.

Although he specifically states that thought is not a product of the group, K. Manneheim (*Ideology and Utopia*, New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1936) becomes so much involved in his efforts to trace the interactional antecedents of individual thought that in the end he seems to accept the ideology of collective invention. See especially page 25 of this work.

10. There are, no doubt, some instances when talking over the creative problem with another person may aid the individual who is attempting to solve it. That other person may be of assistance by pointing out fallacies in reasoning processes—*i.e.*, by forcing the creating individual to abandon unrecognized errors in his procedure. Or the other person may be of assistance merely as a listener; *i.e.*, his effort to put the problem into words may cause the creating individual to refine his position and to recognize his errors. Moreover, some problems cannot be solved without the passive assistance of others. Such is the case with the problems of the stage director. He may plan his production in the solitude of his study, but it is in the effort to carry out that plan with a cast on the stage that he encounters and solves many production problems which could not be anticipated in his study. Although such group assistance may be termed interstimulative, it is certainly not collective invention. In such instances one individual makes the integration which is an invention; and his efforts are, at the most, merely facilitated and stimulated by the others.

11. For books which are intended to assist the business leader in learning the techniques of leadership but which actually do little more than elaborate the ideology of collective invention, see:

- Gow, C.R., *Foundations of Human Engineering*, New York, Macmillan, 1930.
 Gowin, E.B., *The Executive and His Control of Men: A Study in Personal Efficiency*, New York, Macmillan, 1927.
 Tead, O., *The Art of Leadership*, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1935.
 Tead, O., and H.C. Metcalf, *Personnel Administration*, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1920.

12. The problem-solving conference may not solve anything. Politic leadership can often go astray, as was the case in the conference reported by Drew Pearson and Robert Allen in their column "The Washington Merry-round" (*San Francisco Chronicle*, Apr. 29, 1937):

"Just one agreement was reached at the Secretary Frances Perkins' business-labor-government conferences on the Wagner labor law. It was this: That nothing had been agreed to. That, seriously, was the sum total in results of the imposing confab.

"The five A.F. of L. and five C.I.O. big shots glared at each other, while the five business men eyed both groups suspiciously. Sixteen speeches were made during the day, with Miss Perkins delivering a little sermon on each speech. Finally, when the tidal wave of words had subsided, Miss Perkins undertook to summarize the day's results.

"I think,' she announced sweetly, 'that the conference has developed these thoughts. That we can agree—'

"Just a minute, Madame Secretary,' broke in C.I.O. Chief John L. Lewis, 'speaking for myself, I have agreed to nothing.'

"And that goes for me, too,' observed Sidney Hillman, head of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers and a close Lewis ally. Others voiced similar objections.

"In the end Miss Perkins was directed to issue no statement to the press and the conferees picked up their hats and departed. As they waited for the elevator they were overheard to remark: 'Well, that sure was a wasted day.'"

For the story of one safety-valve conference which went astray (a conference of "Little Businessmen" called by Secretary of Commerce Roper in February, 1938), see the news item "Little Men" (*Time*, Feb. 14, 1938, *et. seq.*).

13. The idea that the conference is a means whereby a group arrives at a collective solution to a problem has been carried over into the practice, so strongly advocated by some professional educators, of substituting panel discussions for lectures. The theory is that out of the random discussion of a panel of authorities there will somehow come a conclusion which will enlighten the audience.

Sometimes the panel discussion is a staged affair, in which case it takes on the attributes of a theatrical performance. During 1936, for example, the British Broadcasting Corporation conducted a series of programs in which various parties to current controversies were supposed to engage in free argument before the microphone. Actually, each broadcast was a well-devised and carefully rehearsed playlet, put on by professional per-

formers. The result was, according to reports, highly entertaining, if not particularly enlightening.

Usually, however, the panel performance is put on by amateurs; and the pattern of interaction is left to chance. The result is that the panel discussion has all the disadvantages of and none of the virtues of both the truly congenial discussion and the formal lecture.

14. The use of the conference as a device for politic leadership is not limited to modern societies. The so-called council of elders, which is a part of the political structure of some primitive communities, is simply a traditional politic situation. Among some primitive peoples, notably the tribes of the Iroquois federation, large councils of the adult males were a common occurrence. In the Iroquois councils, extensive speechmaking was encouraged; probably the principal function here was to let the would-be important members of the tribe be important in harmless ways.

For brief descriptions of politic behavior in primitive societies see W.I. Thomas, *Primitive Behavior* (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1937, 461-462 and 464-466).

15. That business executives recognize the safety-valve value of conferences would appear certain from the fact that in a *Kiplinger Washington Letter* (a confidential service to business executives, published in Washington, D.C.) dated Mar. 3, 1934, an NRA conference was evaluated as having arrived nowhere but as having served as a psychologically valuable opportunity for disgruntled people to "blow off steam."

16. It is significant in this connection that the English, who have retained the ancient practice of calling a halt in the day's work for a "spot" of tea in midafternoon, do not use periodic conferences so extensively as do American businessmen. The English teatime half hour apparently serves much the same function as does the "executive conference," an integral part of the pattern of many American business and industrial organizations.

17. A remarkably adroit use of the politic technique was recently made by the mayor of a small western city. In a determined effort to check automobile accidents, he had enlarged the traffic squad and had demanded stringent enforcement of traffic laws. The results had been spectacular but incomplete. A number of prominent citizens, notably one physician, continued to break the traffic laws and placidly to pay their fines. To check these reckless drivers, the mayor formed a citizens' safety committee, calling upon his problem citizens to serve as members. The offending physician was made chairman. The results have, to date, been entirely satisfactory.

18. For the history and ideology of legislative committees see the article "Legislative Committees" by L. Rogers (*Ency. Soc. Sci.*, 4, 40-44).

19. The quotation in the text is from *Recent Social Trends* (Report of the President's Research Committee on Social Trends, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1933, 1 vol. ed., xi).

20. For a realistic, factual analysis of the use by the national government of committees of investigation as problem-killing devices see L. Symes, "The Great Fact-finding Farce" (*Harper's Mag.*, February, 1932, 354-364).

21. In general it would appear that conferences and committees are essentially politic stratagems of good executive leadership. There are, however, instances when the reverse is true and when the conference becomes a means whereby the executive simply gratifies his pride. The executive is then the solitary member of the situation, and each of his subordinates is a politic leader. A conference of this sort is usually termed a "yes-man" conference. The pretense of conferring to solve problems may be maintained; but the real purpose is to provide an occasion on which the executive leader, scorning politic stratagems and more interested in asserting himself than in securing efficient support from his subordinates, may bask in the adoration of those who must indicate respect or lose their jobs. In so far as a conference functions only to satisfy the ego of an executive, it is not politic but is exchange in character. Such a conference checks individual initiative, acts as a means of forcing "cooperation," and results in bickering and dissension outside the committee room.

It is almost traditional in the motion-picture industry for executives to devote a considerable part of the working day to conferences. Some of these, such as the "story conferences" held by writers who work jointly on a script, are probably informative or else serve as a congenial outlet for the members. Many people in the motion-picture industry feel, however, that the majority of conferences are of the "yes-man" type.

22. During national conventions of the American Legion, the small attendance of delegates at the official meetings has frequently been commented on in news reports of these conventions. See, for example, the item "Elmers in St. Louis" (*Time*, Oct. 7, 1935).

23. For descriptive material and for comment on the national political conventions see the following articles:

"After the Ball," *Collier's*, Aug. 8, 1936, 50.

Broun, H., "Roosevelt Comes Up Swinging," *Nation*, July 4, 1936, 9.

"Conventions," *Amer. Mercury*, June, 1936, 221-222.

Creel, G., "Statesmanship in High C," *Collier's*, June 27, 1936, 22.

Davis, E., "Post-convention Reflections," *Harper's Mag.*, September, 1936, 412-420.

de Sales, R. DeR., "Notes on the Conventions," *Atlantic Monthly*, September, 1936, 308-312.

Keun, O., "Elephant and Donkey," *Living Age*, October, 1936, 160-162.

Mitchell, J., "Mr. Roosevelt's Convention," *New Republic*, July 8, 1936, 258-259.

Shaw, A., "Convention Comparisons," *Review of Reviews*, July, 1936, 19-21.

Villard, O.G., "Donkey Brays Again," *Nation*, July 4, 1936, 10-12.

See also the following news items: "Drama of the Roosevelt Renomination" (*Lit. Dig.*, July 4, 1936), "The Elephant Show" (*Time*, June 22, 1936), and "Donkey Doings" (*Time*, July 6, 1936).

The development of the radio promises to alter the entire character of national political conventions. It is probable that the floor activities of

these conventions will more and more take on the attributes of a well-staged political drama, in which, for the benefit of the radio public, the usual hullabaloo of convention behavior will be kept quietly "off stage." More than ever, politicians will be forced to keep political processes in the background and to provide for public view interesting and dramatic but good and clean "window dressing."

CHAPTER XVI

NOMOTHETIC BEHAVIOR

In the types of collective behavior which have so far been discussed, neither physical force nor the threat thereof is involved in the interaction. Interactions between human beings in which force appears and plays a determining role are not, however, unknown. The mother may threaten her small son with punishment and, when threat has proved insufficient, may try to influence his subsequent behavior by spanking him. The thug may threaten his victim with death and, if the desired response is not obtained, kill that victim. The soldier may try to take an enemy position and, in the attempt, use force and, in return, become subject to force. The enraged husband may kill his wife and, as the law has threatened, be forcibly hanged by the neck until dead.

Law.—Some uses of force do not enter into the category of social interaction. In many instances the use of force is more or less purposeless. Two men may batter each other into insensibility for no good reason and to the profit of neither. In many other instances, the use of force is intended only to prevent further action. One man may shoot another to prevent that other from shooting him.

When, however, force is a threat which is used to secure obedience to a command, a social interaction does take place between the one who makes the command and threat and the one who responds in some way to that command and threat. Any such command and threat of force constitutes what may be designated as a law. For purposes of simplicity in analysis, the term "law" will hereafter be used in reference to any command which is supported by any sort of threat of force.

The Nature of Nomothetic Behavior.—All social interactions which arise from, are based on, or pertain to law belong in a general type of collective behavior—nomothetic behavior. Although the situations in which such behavior occurs may

vary as widely as does that in which a man gives his wallet to a thug from that in which a man pays his income tax, all have in common the fact that the behavior of the members of the situation is a response to leadership in terms of threat of force.

Two general types of nomothetic situations may be discerned: those situations which are significant in themselves; and those situations which are significant only as they fit into a constellation of related situations—a nomothetic system.

The first type of nomothetic situation is illustrated by the meeting of a thug and his victim during a holdup. In such a situation, the thug decrees, judges, and exercises the law. That is, he lays down the law of the holdup in demanding the valuables of the victim at the point of a gun; he judges whether the victim has obeyed his command; and, if the victim has not, he administers the threatened force. Such situations are significant in terms of themselves; the law of the situation does not extend beyond that specific situation. If the victim subsequently calls a policeman and the policeman pursues the thug, an entirely new situation arises, in which, obviously, the law of the thug is not involved.

The pursuing of the thug by the policeman illustrates the second type of nomothetic situation—that which is significant only as it fits into a constellation of situations. The law which is involved in such a situation is not the law of the situation but is, rather, the law of a nomothetic system. The policeman does not make or judge the law; he merely takes one role in administering it. In the process of catching, convicting, and punishing the thug, a multitude of related nomothetic situations involving that law will arise.

The law of a nomothetic system is seldom, if ever, decreed, judged, and administered by a single individual. That person who decrees the law, whether he is a king, a congress, or a dictator, is the leader of all nomothetic situations which involve that law. Those who, in any given situation, judge or administer that law merely represent the leader, although each representative of the leader exerts leadership to a slight degree.

In general, it may be said that the laws of nomothetic systems are in direct opposition to laws of isolated situations. Thus, the law which the policeman represents is directly opposed to the law of the thug. When such is the case, a nomothetic system

constitutes an established government. Nomothetic systems may, however, operate in opposition to an established government. Such would be the case were the thug in holding up his victim simply representing the law of a gang. Moreover, two established governments may come into opposition, as is the case when two nations go to war.

The interaction which occurs in nomothetic situations which involve a law of a nomothetic system is vastly more complex than is that which occurs in the isolated nomothetic situation. In the case of the isolated situation, the members and the leader are usually face to face; and the interaction is direct and immediate. In the case of any situation involving a law of a nomothetic system, the interaction between leader and member is as intangible, indirect, and delayed as is that which constitutes public behavior. Like the leaders of some publics, the leader of a nomothetic situation which grows out of a nomothetic system is distant in time and place; the members of that situation are scattered and indefinite; and the interaction between the leader and members is always delayed.

As long as an individual deliberately tempers his behavior in view of some law or other, he is, however, in a vague sense reacting to the leadership of the maker of that law. When an individual does not steal, murder, or beat his wife only because to do so would be contrary to law, he is reacting to the maker of the law which is involved. Although the maker of that law may long since have died, in making the law he was trying to adjust to all those who, like the individual in question, might feel tempted to steal, murder, or to do whatever it is. In this sense, then, an interaction has taken place between the legally controlled individual and the legislator.

It would be fanciful, however, to carry this line of analysis to the conclusion that the Supreme Court of the United States and all those who are affected by its decisions are interacting with the framers of the Constitution of the United States. We may now be in some measure reacting to that document; but it would be farfetched to assume that the founding fathers anticipated, and thus reacted to, us.

Our concern shall be primarily with those nomothetic situations which arise within the framework of established governments. Such situations are vastly more commonplace and more

socially significant than are either those which are complete in themselves or those which arise as the consequence of a nomothetic system which is in opposition to established government.

ORIGIN AND FUNCTION

In so far as human beings are concerned, the opportunity for nomothetic leadership is a consequence of the absence or inadequacy of social controls. The more integrated and stable the social system, the less opportunity there will be for any individual to display initiative in making laws; consequently, the less the behavior of the members of that society will be of the nomothetic type and the more it will be tempered by institutional, conventional, economic, politic, and other sociopsychological factors.

During periods of relatively gradual social change, the historical tendency has been to attempt to supplement or to replace malfunctioning social mechanisms by the development or expansion of systems of nomothetic behavior. As social instability increases and as integration breaks down, the proportion of nomothetic behavior increases, until all semblance of social organization disappears and the law of the brute is the law of life. During a period of social collapse, such as that of revolution, much of collective behavior will be of the nomothetic type; and a good deal of this will involve the law of the isolated situation; *i.e.*, the most aggressive and the strongest individuals will forcibly rise to leadership. This relationship between social inadequacy and the appearance of nomothetic behavior is amply illustrated in the history of all the older societies and in the facts of contemporary life.

The Sociological Antecedents of Law.—Neither the law of the thug nor the law of the king, congress, or dictator can be understood apart from the social context in which it appears. Although individuals and specific groups of individuals make all laws, whether they be the law of the holdup, the law of the constitution, or the law of the dictator, no law—and, hence, no nomothetic situation involving that law—is to be considered as having been caused by individual factors. The lawgiving individual is simply a function of his society in this as in other regards. The thug has been trained to want the wallet of his victim and to satisfy this want through the making of his law of the holdup.

The constitution is a product of social forces. The dictator and his laws are the result of other social forces. In considering the origins of any kind of nomothetic behavior, we must, therefore, recognize the sociological character of all making of law by human beings.¹

The sociological antecedents of any nomothetic situation are exceedingly complex, and those of no two such situations are quite alike. Furthermore, our knowledge of those antecedents may be exceedingly limited. The mere recognition that every nomothetic situation has its complex sociological antecedents is, however, an insurance against mistaking the ideologies of the situation for the realities of that situation. In other words, however limited our positive knowledge, we can at least eliminate as invalid any idea that the origin of nomothetic behavior is to be found in the nature of the leader of such behavior—such, for example, as the idea that the thug is by nature a vicious and antisocial creature, that the king can do no wrong, that the dictator is responsible for the plight of his people, or the like.

Long-run, Collective Function of Systematic Law.—When the laws of established nomothetic systems are considered in terms of their long-run, collective consequences, such laws fall into three functional types: customary, palliative, and dominative. The nature of any law is not to be determined from its operation in a single nomothetic situation. Only as a constellation of such situations is examined in retrospect can the long-run, collective function of any systematic law be discerned.

Customary Laws.—Some of the laws which are enacted and are more or less stringently enforced by any established government are simply nomothetic props to the *status quo*.² Such laws may be described as customary, since they are legal statements of the customary and normally self-enforcing social ways of the members of the society. Customary laws represent the efforts of the majority of a society to make an atypical minority—*e.g.*, the “criminal,” the “immoral,” the “radical”—conform to established majority ways. Customary laws tend, therefore, to check social changes of any order.

When social changes of an internal order disturb the functional equilibrium of established institutional and conventional mechanisms, the result is a maltrained and discontented social membership. To force this membership to conform to the old ways,

those ways are made mandatory by law. For example, as the disintegration of the old family system made the family incapable of socializing its young and of feeding, housing, and otherwise providing for its members, many individuals broke from the institutional controls of the family. The result, in this instance, was a resort to law as a means of maintaining the old, and to the majority still desirable, family system. Thus, marriage, which was once an element in an institutional system, became a matter of contract to be enforced by law.³

The same sort of problem arises when any considerable number of people who represent a divergent culture are imposed on the members of a society. In order to maintain the established ways of the original group, those ways become matters of law. Undoubtedly a considerable proportion of American laws, particularly those which have been enacted by municipalities, have been efforts to force large numbers of immigrants to conform to American institutional and conventional practices. Our inability to enforce such laws successfully, especially with the children of immigrants, who are trained wholly neither into the old-world nor into the new-world patterns, is the basis for the claim that immigration has been responsible for the lawless character of American life.⁴

Palliative Laws.—When discontented minorities become so large that customary laws themselves are threatened—and, hence, the *status quo* is endangered—laws may be passed to appease these minorities. In contrast to customary laws, which are simply legal codifications of the *status quo*, these laws are palliative in nature. They are efforts to maintain the salient aspects of the *status quo* by modification of minor elements of it.

Many contemporary laws are undoubtedly of this order. The social chaos which has followed the industrialization of Western peoples has been in some degree tempered by the gradual establishment of legal controls to replace the inappropriate institutions and conventions of feudalism. The history of the English poor laws, for example, is the history of the effort of the English people to solve, through government, the problem of poverty in a society which was disordered by the introduction of new techniques of production.⁵ All of what is vaguely designated as social legislation is supposed to be directed toward similar ends. Such legislation ranges from the establishment of baby clinics to vast

legislative programs for the attainment of permanent peace and prosperity.

So far, all efforts of established nomothetic systems to further the process of social adaptation have been of this order—legal patches, rather than legal reconstructions. The basic structure of an established government has never been remodeled within the framework of that government. Every attempt to bring about a new social structure through nomothetic means has been a matter of revolution and the establishment of a new nomothetic system.

Dominative Laws.—Customary and palliative laws presumably function for the benefit of the majority of the members of a society. Many laws, however, function to satisfy the interests of a strong minority. When such is the case, laws are dominative in character.

No governmental system has yet been devised which prevents the strongest members from gaining ultimate control thereof, and the strongest often are numerically the fewest. No political realist seriously questions, for example, the fact that the so-called democratic system does much more than hamper the strong, vested minority from making laws which serve the ends of that minority.

Perhaps the simplest illustration of a dominative law is that of the situational law which is set by the thug who exacts tribute at the point of a gun. When, as in the modern world, a number of thugs are organized to exploit the majority by means of force, we have a sort of extralegal nomothetic system—the dominative law of the racketeer. It is but a step from such dominative law to conquest—the taking by force of an established system of government. In the first instance at least, the law of the conqueror is always dominative. Such exploitation of a population for minority interests provides history with some of its most spectacular material.

Less spectacular but probably more significant is the dominative law which has developed within an established system as the consequence of the breakdown of functional arrangements of classes of people. In all the larger societies, there has been a division of labor which made for more or less hereditary classes, including a ruling class. As long as the class arrangements are functionally adequate, nomothetic leadership by one class is, in a

general way, benevolent. When, however, social changes destroy the functional efficiency of class arrangements, the law of one class becomes law for the benefit of that class—neither customary nor palliative in character, but dominative.

Such, certainly, was much of the law of the feudal aristocrats in early industrial England, France, and Germany. Such was the character of the king's law, from which our forefathers revolted in 1775. Such, too, has become much of the law which was dictated by the industrial aristocracy which rose in time to supplant the dispossessed, dominant class of the old feudal order. Such is all dominative law which has arisen in the desires of a powerful minority to maintain themselves, at whatever cost to the society at large.

The Individual, Short-run Consequences of Law.—The fact that a given law falls into one of the foregoing classifications indicates nothing whatever regarding its short-run consequences to the individual members of nomothetic situations involving that law.⁶ The only generalization which can be made concerning this functional aspect of a law is that any law is opposed to the immediate interests of the members of any nomothetic situation. The fact that a palliative law, such as one which establishes minimum sanitary conditions, may work to the ultimate advantage of all does not mean that it works to the immediate advantage of any of those who are affected by that law. For the members of any nomothetic situation, obedience to the commands of law is simply the selection of the less distasteful of two distasteful alternatives—obedience or punishment for disobedience.

IDEOLOGIES

The very fact that individuals must be coerced into obeying the law indicates their unwillingness and implies their doubt as to the "reasonableness" of the action required of them. To put it otherwise: if the behavior which is demanded of the members of nomothetic situations were not contrary to their own immediate interests, the threat of force would be unnecessary; and the situation would be other than nomothetic.

Every nomothetic situation has, therefore, some sort of ideological justification; and every established system of such situations—*i.e.*, every government—has its elaborate system of

ideologies. Although ideological justifications cannot make people any less displeased with membership in nomothetic situations, they serve to reconcile people to the behavior which is demanded. Thus, the idea that life is more precious than wealth does not make the victim of the holdup any more pleased with the holdup; but it does reconcile him to the loss of his wallet. Likewise, the belief that democratic government is desirable does not make the taxpayer like to pay taxes; but it does reconcile him to the necessity of paying taxes.

A very large proportion of social theory has consisted of attempts to justify the existence of various nomothetic systems and to justify the laws of those systems.⁷ Greek, Roman, and latter medieval philosophers were largely preoccupied with the question of government and its justifiable scope. Historians have devoted their major attention to the making of laws and the events connected with the development and expansion of governments and governmental leadership. Social scientists have studied and written extensively upon the role of law in social life. And recently a naïve biologist even ventured to interpret differences between established nomothetic systems in terms of differential racial heritages.⁸

It is quite impossible to reduce all the ideologies which have been advanced in support of governments, either particular governments or government in general, to a few basic concepts.⁹ No two ideologies will have much in common, and a given ideology may be logically inconsistent. All we can do, therefore, is analyze some of the more typical, ideological justifications for the existence of government.

The Ideology of the Survival of the Fittest.—Whenever the laws of a government are clearly dominative in character, that government is justified in terms of itself. That is, whenever the laws of a government function for the benefit of the few who make them, such laws are justified on the grounds that the makers of the laws are, as is evident, more powerful than the majority and that, as is not evident, those who are more powerful than the majority are so because they are naturally the fittest.

This thesis has appeared time after time in the history of Western social thought. It secured its most impressive support during the last century from the biological determinists, who assumed that social status—*i.e.*, class position—is an indication

of biological quality. Distorting the Darwinian hypothesis of the biological struggle for survival, they argued that the rule for the benefit of the few is but a social manifestation of the biological struggle for existence.¹⁰ Such rule, therefore, would be both inevitable and desirable—inevitable because it is natural, and desirable because it assures that the socially inadequate will not survive to reproduce their kind.

However complex in its statement, the biological justification for the domination of the many for the benefit of the few is no more than a contention that might makes right. This is, in turn, no more a justification of might than the observation that the sun rises each morning is an explanation for the rising of the sun.

Law for the Survival of the Group.—Of recent years the survival-of-the-fittest ideology has fallen into disfavor, and none but a few die-hard biological determinists have a good word to say for it. Sociologists, economists, political scientists, and social philosophers are fairly unanimous in agreement as to the ends to which law should be put. They decry the use of law as a method whereby a strong minority exploits a weak majority. The only law which, as they see it, is socially justifiable is the law of that established government which represents the social whole and not one of its parts—*i.e.*, law which subordinates the individual to the welfare of the group and, thus, permits the survival of the group.

Here, however, agreement ends; and social thinkers split into opposing camps—capitalism, communism, fascism, and a bewildering confusion of other isms.¹¹ There is no agreement as to what laws are “good” for the group; and, hence, almost any form of law may be justified on the grounds that it facilitates the survival of the group. Thus, socialists base their plea for more governmental control of business and classical economists base their plea for less governmental control of business on the same greatest-good-to-the-greatest-number claim. We in America enact and enforce social security legislation upon these grounds, while Hitler brutalizes German Jews and subjects his subjects to the hardships incidental to national economic self-sufficiency in order that “Germany may survive.”

Legal Absolutism.—The ideology of legal absolutism, which is so comforting to those who make a profession of law, has many ramifications. It may be stated simply as the belief that law is prior to man, an expression of some superhuman force and pur-

pose, and that it is, consequently, beyond the machinations of man himself. Under this ideology, the lawgiver is simply the agency of that higher purpose.

In primitive societies, this ideology is bound up with tabus. Tabus are the laws of the spirits. To break a tabu is evil, not because of the act, but because of the fact that the act will enrage some spirit or other, who will then spitefully work harm to the society. The offended spirit must, therefore, be appeased, either by social punishment of the breaker of the tabu in the prescribed manner, or, possibly, by tricking the spirit into believing that the punishment has been administered.

Although in the Western world the ideology of legal absolutism has been elaborated in various ways, the fundamental thought has been the same—that law is fixed and absolute and that, at the most, man can only evade the consequences of breaking the law by finding “legal” proof that he is not guilty.¹² To the Roman Cicero, for example, law served no utilitarian purpose; it stemmed from nature’s perpetual urge to perfect society. Lawgivers did not, therefore, make laws. They only “discovered” the laws of nature. To attempt to evade, to change, or to disobey the “discovered” laws was contrary to the higher purpose of nature and was the sole cause of human distress.

The theory of the divine right of kings is but another, and later, version of legal absolutism. Although the term “God” is substituted for the Roman term “nature,” the ideology remains intact. The higher purpose is God; the king, the lawgiver, is the agency of God; the laws of the king are, therefore, temporal expression of God’s will. And, like the laws of nature, those of God are not subject to change or to criticism.¹³

The decline of monarchy brought another terminological change but no embarrassment to the legal absolutists. Among people who are excessively proud of the fact that theirs is a democratic government, of, by, and for the people, legal absolutism still thrives. The divine right of kings has become the divine right of the people, who, like the king, can do no wrong, and who, also like the king, are subject to a higher will. That will is inflexible; and so, too, in the end, are the laws made by the people. The most profound of such attempts to make the people’s law superior to the people is that of the German metaphysician Hegel. In his analysis, a people have a collective soul,

just as, by assumption, the individual has a superorganic spirit. This soul is the product of social interaction and becomes in time the determinant, through government and by its law, of the nature of this interaction. Although many ideologists have developed the same thesis, none have done so in so ponderous and impressive a manner as has Hegel.¹⁴

Antinomothetic Ideologies.—It must not be supposed that all social thinkers have condoned government.¹⁵ The French philosopher Rousseau charged that government and law were the source of all evil; and, although he subsequently changed his ways, his antinomothetic point of view reappears later as the theory of anarchy. According to this theory, the forces which make for harmonious social relationships are inherent in men; and all law is unnatural and exploitative—a view which is diametrically opposed to that of the legal absolutists.¹⁶ An indirect antinomothetic ideology appears in the Marxian thesis that government is a crisis measure, that law is necessary only during the establishment of a functioning social order, and that government and law will gradually disappear as the patterns of that order become established in the psychological nature of the members of a society.¹⁷

MEMBERSHIP

The membership of any given nomothetic situation is in the first instance selected by the law which is involved in that situation, whether it be a situational law or the law of an established nomothetic system. In the second instance, whether any person to whom that law applies will become a member of a nomothetic situation involving that law depends upon the behavior of that person. The membership of nomothetic situations is, thus, both selective and elective. As a consequence, the factors which determine the membership of any nomothetic situation are complex and are often unascertainable. For example, the law of the holdup may select prosperous-looking gentlemen as victims; but what prosperous-looking gentlemen are so unfortunate as to become victims of the holdup depends upon their own behavior, which is determined by circumstances that are irrelevant to the law.

Selective Factors.—Some laws apply to all people who happen, for whatever reason, to be within the jurisdiction of a given

nomothetic system. The visitor who is traveling through the city of New York becomes, by his very presence there, subject to many laws of the city of New York, the state of New York, and the United States of America.

Many laws, on the other hand, apply only to those who are legally members of a particular nomothetic system—the nation, the state, or the municipality. Thus, it is only the citizens of France who, wherever they may be residing, are legally obliged to report for military training in France. The income-tax laws of the state of California apply only to legal residents of California. The motor-vehicle license laws of the city of New York apply only to the residents of the city of New York.

Moreover, some laws apply only to special groups of people within a given nomothetic system. Kings, dictators, and legislative bodies may single out certain people within the national membership for special legal attention. Germany has made many acts and conditions illegal for Jews which are legally permissible for non-Jews; our federal income-tax laws apply only to people whose incomes exceed a stated figure; and so on.

Elective Factors.—It is evident that the fact that a given individual is subject to a law does not *ipso facto* make him a member of a nomothetic situation involving that law. Although we are all constantly subject to innumerable laws, for most of us laws rarely condition our behavior. Only when an individual behaves in a stated way because such behavior is required by law or when he knowingly behaves in a way which is contrary to law is he in any sense a member of a nomothetic situation.

For example: All motorists on a given highway are subject to the maximum-speed law which has been established for that highway. Not all motorists on that highway will, however, become members of nomothetic situations involving that law. The motorist who does not exceed the legal maximum because he considers it hazardous to drive faster is not an actual member of a nomothetic situation. His behavior is not conditioned by law. On the other hand, the motorist who holds to the legal maximum only because to drive faster would be to break the law is an actual member of a nomothetic situation, since he is adjusting to the law. Thus, in every instance, an individual must do something or want to do something which brings him into the jurisdiction of

a law before he becomes a member of a nomothetic situation involving that law.

The indefinite character of the membership of nomothetic situations is evident from the fact that an individual may unknowingly break a law of an established nomothetic system. In breaking that law, his behavior is not conditioned by that law. Whether or not, as the result of his act, he will subsequently become subject to the penalties of breaking that law—and, hence, then be a member of a nomothetic situation—depends upon a multitude of circumstances. Thus, a motorist may unknowingly “run” a stop signal. Whether or not he will become a member of a nomothetic situation as the result of this act will depend upon whether or not he is arrested.

On the other hand, anyone who willfully breaks a law of an established nomothetic system is a member of a nomothetic situation, although the representatives of the law may never detect that fact. In willfully breaking the law, he adjusts himself in some way or other to the fact that, if he is caught, he will become subject to the penalty of that law.

The Training of Members.—Excluding the matter of what is vaguely designated as patriotism, those who are subject to the laws of an established nomothetic system seldom receive any systematic preparation for membership in the situations which may arise under that system. The citizen ordinarily secures casually such knowledge as he may have of the laws under which he must live and the mechanisms by which those laws are enforced. In contrast, the lawgivers and their representatives are more or less highly trained.

Where law plays relatively little part in social life, this inequality of training between the members and the leader of a nomothetic situation may have no significant consequences. With us, however, it has given rise to the legal profession—men with special knowledge of laws and legal procedures who sell their services to those who, for whatever reason, have become involved in nomothetic situations. Acting as an agent for the member of a nomothetic situation, the lawyer is supposed to supply the knowledge of law and skill in legal procedure which are necessary to equalize those of the administrator who represents the lawgiver. By thus bringing equality of knowledge between the member and

the leader of a nomothetic situation, the lawyer is supposed to assure that legal justice will ensue.

One of the characteristics of societies which are bound together by law—ancient Greek, Roman, and the modern Western societies—is the existence of a legal profession. In classical China, however, where, because of the effectiveness of institutional controls, there was little occasion for the rise of nomothetic situations, there was no legal profession and, by inference, no need for one.

OVERT AND COVERT ASPECTS OF INTERACTION

Although the overt behavior of the leader of a nomothetic situation may be a direct expression of his covert feeling-states, the overt behavior of the members of a nomothetic situation is always in direct opposition to their covert feeling-states.

Leader Behavior.—Laws which are laid down by a lawgiver are sometimes no more than a forcible expression of the covert wants, interests, and so on, of that leader. A king or a dictator may want that which can be directly secured by the laws he prescribes, and the thug usually wants the wallet of his victim.

The lawgiver may, however, be himself acting under compulsion and may therefore have no more desire to enact a law than the members of the situations which will involve that law will have to conform to it. Even a king or a dictator may be forced by circumstances to enact laws which he considers unjustifiable but necessary for reasons of state. Thus, to pacify his subjects, a king may decree the death of his dearest friend; and the dictator may declare a war which he cannot hope to win. The members of legislative bodies commonly enact laws which have been dictated by party or personal considerations rather than by their own personal convictions. Thus, a legislator may, to avoid alienating his constituents, vote for a bill, although he is convinced that that bill is contrary to the commonweal.

The representatives of established law, such as judges, prosecuting attorneys, and police, may occasionally want to enforce the laws for which they are responsible. Undoubtedly, our Supreme Court justices usually vote as their consciences direct. The majority of representatives, however, are motivated by ulterior reasons. They want to make a living, and to do so they must enforce the law. The policeman who makes an arrest may feel

that the act works a grave injustice. The judge may covertly regret the decisions he must make. The executioner may feel no antipathy toward the man he hangs.

There is, therefore, no necessary relationship between the overt behavior of the leaders or the representatives of the leaders of nomothetic situations and their covert feeling-states.

Member Behavior.—As has been suggested, it is impossible for those who respond to nomothetic leadership to want to do so. The overt behavior of the members of any nomothetic situation is determined by threat of force. In terms of their covert feeling-states, their overt behavior is simply the lesser of two evils. When the motorist wants to drive rapidly but drives at a moderate speed because he “wants to keep within the law,” his slow-driving behavior is plainly the lesser of two undesirables. For him, going slowly is less undesirable than is the potential legal consequence of driving rapidly. Likewise, the man who willfully breaks the law does so because he considers it less painful to accept the risks of punishment than to behave as the law requires.

Respect for Law.—Although the member of a nomothetic situation invariably resents being subject to the law which is involved in that situation, he may not be opposed to that law *per se*. He may actually have considerable respect for that law as a law. Thus, although the motorist will resent being fined for speeding, he will probably believe in the advisability of maximum-speed laws.

Respect for law in the abstract varies among various societies and among the members of a given society.¹⁸ The English people have great respect for their government—a fact which is suggested by the high status of governmental employees, even the police, in England. On the other hand, the French people characteristically resent government and tend to hold the representatives of their government in contempt. These cultural differences in this regard are the result of historical factors. Individual differences between two Englishmen or between two Frenchmen are the results of the accidents and incidents of individual experience.

Respect for law in the abstract has, however, little direct bearing on the covert feeling-states of the members of a nomothetic situation. If the Englishman is more law-abiding than is the Frenchman, that obedience cannot be traced to the Englishman's

greater respect for law in the abstract. The fact that a man believes that the laws of his government are desirable does not make him want to pay taxes, want to go hungry rather than steal, and so on. The type of "respect" for law which operates in specific nomothetic situations is fear of force. If the Englishman is more law-abiding than is the Frenchman, such is the case because he has more cause to fear the consequences of breaking the law. This fear of legal enforcement may in time develop respect for law in the abstract. Thus, a government which is lax in the enforcement of its laws secures neither fearful obedience nor respect.

The Letter versus the Spirit of Law.—The contrast between the overt and the covert aspects of the behavior of the members of nomothetic situations is suggested by the commonplace distinction between the letter of the law and the spirit of the law. If people wanted to behave in the ways which are prescribed by law, they would adhere to the spirit of the law; *i.e.*, they would do as the lawgiver intended they should. No one, however, least of all the lawgiver, expects anyone to obey the intent of the law. Since there is nothing willful about obedience to law, the maximum which is expected by nomothetic leaders is adherence to the letter of the law. The result is a sort of conflict between the leaders and the members: the former endeavor to adjust the letter to achieve the spirit, while the latter endeavor to find loopholes in the letter of the law which permit evasion of the spirit thereof.

This conflict between the leader and the members of nomothetic situations is universal, but the complexities and extremes to which it may lead are suggested by the struggle between governments who are trying to collect money through income taxes and the citizens who are trying to evade those taxes. The spirit of an income-tax law is self-evident. The moment that such a law is enacted, however, a host of "income-tax experts" set to work to devise ways by which taxpayers may evade that spirit and still adhere to the letter of the law. Their skill is for sale in the open market; and no one, however respectful of law in the abstract, considers either the seller or the buyer of such skill as a lawbreaker.¹⁹

LEADERSHIP

Although the view that great nomothetic leaders—kings, senators, dictators, and so on—have determined the course of

human history is extremely naïve, it is nevertheless true that the role of the leader is more significant in nomothetic than in any other type of collective behavior. This is in part a consequence of the fact that the nomothetic leader is concerned only with the control of overt behavior. Unlike conversational and persuasive leaders, he does not attempt to manipulate the covert feeling-states of the members in order to secure the desired overt effects. The nomothetic leader simply makes laws which are calculated to coerce the members into behaving overtly as he wants them to behave. Furthermore, although the nomothetic leader interacts with the members of a nomothetic situation, the extent to which he acts rather than reacts is far greater than is the case with the leader of any other type of collective behavior. The thug adjusts to the behavior of his victim, and the king makes his laws in terms of the character of his subjects. Both thug and king, however, react only to the extent which is necessary to secure obedience to their commands.

It must not be thought that the individual initiative and individual interests of the leader are the only determinants of the behavior of the members of nomothetic situations. The thug cannot make his victim hand over a nonexistent wallet; and, however much he may wish to do so, the dictator cannot make his subjects walk on all fours. Although individual initiative always plays a considerable role in nomothetic leadership, individual initiative never has full sway.²⁰

All established systems of nomothetic behavior involve a more or less complete limiting of the extent of nomothetic leadership and some designation of the way by which the person of the nomothetic leader is determined. Variations in the means by which the leader is determined and the way in which that leader exercises leadership result in a number of types of nomothetic systems.

TYPES OF NOMOTHETIC SYSTEMS

The classification of nomothetic systems into types is necessary for purposes of analysis, but it should be pointed out at the outset that established governments are never actually true to type. Although we may conceptually distinguish between monarchical, bureaucratic, democratic, and dictatorial governments, any particular government will at the most simply tend to be more

one than the others. Furthermore, the character of any government is not to be deduced from its apparent form. The paper powers of the monarch may be far greater than are his actual powers. The legal limitations which surround the democratic leader may be surmounted without breaking the letter of the law. The political dictator may be subject to all sorts of dictation.

Monarchy.—When the person of the leader of a nomothetic system is determined by a mechanism similar to that which designates the nominal leader of an institutional constellation, the result is a monarchial type of government. Historically, absolute monarchy seems to have come about as an extension of institutional leadership—family, clan, tribal, or feudal—to nomothetic leadership. Once established, however, it tends to be self-perpetuating and to have quasi-institutional permanence.

Under a monarchial system, the leader secures his status by right of birth. Such leadership may, therefore, be described as traditional or as acquired by accession in accordance with a fixed pattern of inheritance. Associated therewith is an ideology of the divine-right-of-kings order.

The absolute monarch does not, however, have truly absolute powers or a completely assured status. The hereditary leader may be assassinated by or on behalf of his successor. Splits may occur within the reigning house, and the strongest faction may seize control. The power of the monarch may be taken from him by conquest. In the long run, therefore, the person of the monarch is determined in part by the forces of individual initiative.²¹ All of this has been summed up in the phrase "Uneasy lies the head that wears a crown."

Furthermore, the leadership of the absolute monarch is always rigorously limited by existent institutions, conventions, and so on. To the extent that he exceeds these limitations, he jeopardizes his position. In the long run, his use of law must be such as to contribute to rather than lessen the welfare of his subjects; otherwise, general unrest may culminate in revolt against his person or, possibly, against the system which he represents. Such revolt may be long delayed. It may, in fact, be delayed a generation or two; and, as so often happened in Chinese history, a good ruler may be dispossessed as a consequence of the misrule of his predecessor. In the long run, therefore, if a monarchy is to survive,

a slow interaction must take place between monarchical leadership and those who are subject to that leadership.

Bureaucracy.—Theoretically, the administrators of any established government do not make law, but merely represent the lawgiver. Actually, however, all administrators interpret the law and, to that extent, make law. When such administrators are appointed or elected to their positions for life, the result is bureaucratic government. The bureaucratic leader retains his status as a right, irrespective of his administrative initiative or skill.²²

Theoretically, and to some extent, no doubt, actually, bureaucracy makes possible leadership by the fittest and leadership in terms of the long run rather than in terms of momentary expediency. In a comparatively stable society, the existence of a hereditary, administrative class does tend to assure that administrative leaders will be men who have acquired the skills and the social traditions which are necessary for the administration of law. Somewhat the same advantages are found in bureaucracy, since the bureaucratic leader will tend to acquire, during the course of years, the skills which are necessary to his position. The judges on the bench, for example, will not be a succession of elected amateurs but will be men who are seasoned by long experience. Furthermore, the security of the bureaucrat's status makes possible his administering the law in terms of distant ends. He does not, in other words, have to cater to the momentary interests or whims of those over whom he exercises authority.

Democracy.—Historically, monarchical government has broken down under the stresses of social change. The monarchical mechanism tends to stability, just as does the institutional mechanism, and lacks the adaptability which is necessary for effective functioning during periods of social change. The continuous and intensifying social crisis of the industrial revolution led to a gradual abandonment of monarchical forms of government in favor of the type which we term democratic.

The essence of democracy is popular election of the personnel of leadership, but the significant attribute of democracy is the instability of the personnel of leadership.²³ The complex mechanism of popular franchise, political parties, and short terms of elective office makes the determination of the person of the leader a matter of regulated competition between self-nominated aspir-

ants for office. Individual initiative, therefore, plays a far greater part in the attainment of leadership status in a democracy than in a monarchy.

Theoretically, individual initiative in securing leadership status is limited to the attempt to convert the electorate; in practice, it generally includes persuasive efforts and exchange appeals. The use of coercion is the exception rather than the rule, although in the United States local political machines have not hesitated to resort to force to secure the "election" of their candidates. The truly democratic leader is, however, one who has achieved his status through conversion alone and in open competition with all other aspirants.

In small communities, leadership may be actually as well as theoretically democratic. The mayor and the other officials of a small town may be elected by popular acclaim and be reelected or replaced at the expiration of their terms in accordance with popular judgment of the social adequacy of their leadership. The result would then be leadership which is highly reactive to those who are subject to it. Since the electorate can periodically and directly express its satisfaction or dissatisfaction with its leaders, a sort of interactional accounting is possible; and, since those leaders presumably wish to retain their status, they will be exceedingly sensitive to every momentary reaction of the electorate. To keep his status, the democratic leader must "please" the electorate; to the extent that he controls them through the threat of force, he alienates them. To control their behavior and at the same time to retain their willing acceptance of him as leader, he must resort to politic devices; *i.e.*, he must make them want to be led. To the extent that he uses politic devices, he ceases to be a nomothetic and becomes a persuasive leader. The wholly democratic leader is, therefore, not a nomothetic leader at all.

In the large, impersonal communities which are characteristic of the modern world, the interaction between leader and electorate is by no means so simple, direct, and complete. The voter has only slight ability to distinguish between the many men who might aspire to become the mayor of a great city, to serve as judge in a court, to act as governor of a state, or to be president of a country. The voter has only slight basis for deciding whether or not to reelect an incumbent or to replace him with an unknown. Furthermore, aspirants for office cannot as independent indi-

viduals make themselves known to—to say nothing of converting—the thousands or millions of voters upon whom election to office depends. Historically, therefore, the democratic process has of necessity been modified by the establishment of the party system.

The political party is a nonnomothetic organization for the achievement of nomothetic leadership. The leadership of the party is in part determined by economic behavior and in part by politic behavior. In a sense, the party as a whole, represented by party candidates, runs for political office. The direct consequence is competition between parties rather than between individuals and the introduction of exchange and politic manipulation into that competition.

The ultimate result of the party system is a lessening of the rate of political turnover. The party in power has control of the established government and can use the laws of that government to retain control: it can bargain with the electorate in subtle or obvious ways; and it can exercise control over the various agencies of communication and thus have a conversional advantage over the other party or parties. In other words, the organization of the party permits a stability of leadership which would not otherwise be possible.

Theoretically, the social advantage which is inherent in democratic leadership is the sensitivity of such leadership to the needs of the electorate.²⁴ If that electorate is a large proportion of the population, then there would exist a rather complete interaction between leader and led. Theoretically, then, the result would be a maximum of socially constructive legislation, expressive of the "will" of the people. Exploitative law would be minimized, since the exploiter would soon be found out and then be turned out of office.

In point of fact, the democratic system does serve to permit frequent and bloodless political revolts. It speeds up the effective reaction of the led to the leader. Although party machinery may inhibit such reaction, the popular revolts against governmental personnel will be much more frequent under democracy than under monarchy.

The critics of democracy charge that this dependence of democratic leaders upon the "will" of the people renders such leadership ineffectual. If leadership is to be truly constructive, it must

operate in terms of long-run ends. The critics contend that the democratic leader, since he is at the mercy of public whim and fancy, cannot lead in terms of long-run needs. His policies must be determined by considerations of the moment—or at the least by considerations of the next election. Since he needs votes to keep him in office, the leader tries to please everyone at the moment and succeeds in pleasing no one in the long run.

Moreover, according to the critics of democracy, although the electorate may in a vague way know what it wants at any given moment, it has no idea of what it can actually secure through law and never, as it were, thinks beyond the immediate present. Possibly the democratic leader of a small community can secure desirable ends through politic leadership, but this tedious means of making people want what they need cannot be utilized in a large, impersonal society. As a result, according to this view, most of democratic leadership effort is directed toward remaining in power by assuring the electorate that it is getting what it wants. Very little of the time and energy of the leader is actually applied to the solution of problems of social organization. In the end, therefore, the democratic system would, as the critics see it, mean complete absence of constructive nomothetic leadership, degradation to demagoguery, and consequent acute social crisis, when the mechanism itself would break down, new types of nomothetic leaders would emerge, and a social revolution would be in progress.

Dictatorial Leadership.—In some instances, the failure of democracy to maintain a social population in the status to which it has become accustomed—whether this failure has grown out of the nature of the democratic mechanism or out of other factors is unimportant—has opened the way for the rise of dictatorial leaders.

Although the comparison may be odious, the great national dictators who have risen in Europe since the World War have achieved their power in much the same way as have the racketeering overlords of our American cities—*i.e.*, by liberal use of force. It must not be supposed, however, that the dictator achieves his status entirely by coercion. He simply uses force to supplement the conversational, exchange, and politic appeals of the political aspirant in a democracy. Moreover, because he can seldom keep the bargains or fulfill the verbal promises which he made during

his rise to power and because he cannot depend for long upon sheer coercion, he immediately sets about the task of regimenting those over whom he would rule.

The ideologists of dictatorship contend, among other things, that dictatorial leadership permits the establishment of long-run, constructive policies by men who have, in arriving at the status of leader, proved their skill and initiative and that dictatorial leadership is, therefore, the only feasible type of nomothetic leadership during conditions of social crisis. Their opponents charge, on the other hand, that dictatorship places the welfare of a people entirely in the hands of one individual who has, during his struggle to power, proved himself ruthless, selfish, and otherwise unfit to control the destinies of a people. Objectively, it is necessary only to point out here that the dictator is neither entirely free to establish and put into operation long-run, constructive social programs, nor is he entirely free to determine the destinies of a people in accordance with his selfish interests.²⁵

APPENDIX

1. Early sociological analysis of the function of government can be described only as ideological. Thus, Auguste Comte viewed government with Platonic optimism and believed that it would soon be the agency for the scientific control of society; Herbert Spencer considered all coercion contrary to natural law and, consequently, a check to social evolution; and L.F. Ward believed that government was the means through which the governed could express their rational concern with collective welfare and that, therefore, the more educated a population, the more effective their government. See J.P. Lichtenberger, *Development of Social Theory* (New York, Century, 1925, 236-399).

Modern sociologists tend to view government as a crisis agency which expands when other modes of social control lose their functional effectiveness. They are, however, disinclined to generalize regarding the success with which collective problems are solved through government. Stripped of its aura of Hegelianism, R.M. MacIver *The Modern State* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1926) is, perhaps, representative of the contemporary sociological view of government.

For an exhaustive technical analysis of the problem of sociological study of nomothetic behavior see N.S. Timosheff, "What is 'Sociology of Law'?" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, 1937, 43, 225-235).

Early anthropological analysis of government, also, was entirely ideological (e.g., H.J. Main, *Ancient Law*, London, 1861). Even today anthropologists are by no means agreed as to the extent, nature, and function of law and government in primitive societies. Anthropological findings may, however, be tentatively summarized as follows: (1) There is great variation among

primitive societies both as to the character of and as to the role of government. (2) Many of what were originally thought to be primitive laws are actually self-enforcing institutional mores. (3) The ideological structure of a primitive governmental system is no certain index to its actual operation. As with civilized societies, a hereditary king may be run by one or a number of his subjects; and a democratic council may be run by a political boss. (4) In general, nomothetic controls play a relatively small role in primitive societies.

For an excellent collection of descriptive materials on various primitive governments see W.I. Thomas, *Primitive Behavior* (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1937, Chaps. XIV and XV).

For more specialized and technical considerations see:

Carpenter, W.S., and P.T. Stafford (Eds.), *Readings in Early Legal Institutions*, New York, Crofts, 1936.

Diamond, A.S., *Primitive Law*, New York, Longmans, Green, 1935.

Hartland, E.S., *Primitive Law*, London, Methuen, 1924.

Lowie, R.H., *The Origin of the State*, New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1927.

Malinowski, B., *Crime and Custom in Savage Society*, New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1926.

2. Students of law usually use the term "customary law" to distinguish law established by usage from law established by statute. See, for example, the article "Customary Law" by C.S. Lobingier (*Ency. Soc. Sci.*, 4, 662-666). The definition used in the text is, however, based upon a functional rather than a purely historical approach to law.

3. The historical tendency to resort to coercion in the effort to maintain a threatened *status quo* is illustrated by the history of the Roman Catholic church. Resistance of the church to the changes which were taking place in Western society during the Middle Ages gradually became nomothetic in character. In the end, the church became a nomothetic system based upon a religious ideology. The long conflict between church and state in early modern Europe was, thus, a conflict of two nomothetic systems.

In Protestantism the conflict received an ideological reconciliation; secular control became responsible for the maintenance of religious mores. Particularly where Calvinism gained a hold, government took over the responsibility for the enforcement of moral behavior. See, for illustrative material, J.H. Trumbull, *True Blue Laws of Connecticut and New Haven* (Hartford, American Publishing Co., 1876).

Data on the historical tendency to attempt to maintain the patterns of the old patriarchal family by making them matters of law can be secured from the following articles in the *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*: "Abortion" by M.S. Handman (1, 372-374); "Alimony" by W. Seagle (1, 641-643); "Birth Control" by F.H. Hankins (2, 559-565); "Divorce" by F.H. Hankins (5, 177-184); "Family Desertion and Non-support" by J.C. Colcord (6, 78-81); "Family Law" by W. Seagle (6, 81-85); "Illegitimacy, Legal Aspects" by A.C. Jacobs (7, 582-586); and "Prostitution" by G. May (12, 553-559).

The nomothetic enforcement of old institutional and conventional patterns has not been limited, however, to modern societies. The ancient Code of Hammurabi reads like a catalogue of institutional and conventional practice. Evidently Babylonian society of twenty centuries B.C. was as highly disorganized as is Western society of the twentieth century A.D. See C.H.W. Johns, *Babylonian and Assyrian Laws, Contracts, and Letters* (New York, Scribner, 1904).

4. The adjustment problems which arise when people of divergent cultures come together are usually treated by sociologists in terms of the processes, including far more than specifically nomothetic elements, of conflict, accommodation, stratification, and assimilation. See R.E. Park and E.W. Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1924, Chaps. IX, X, and XI); and K. Young, *An Introduction to Sociology* (New York, American Book, 1934, 418-516).

For a brief but excellent discussion of immigration per se and an extended bibliography on this subject see C.F. Ware, "Immigration" (*Ency. Soc. Sci.*, 7, 587-595).

5. See S. Webb and B. Webb, *English Local Government: English Poor Law History* (New York, Longmans, Green, 1927-1929, Vols. VII-IX).

6. Nomothetic behavior which grows out of the whimsy of authorities originates in fortuitous factors and functions to no particular end, individual or social. Just as the mother who happens to dislike the skin of a baked potato may prevent her child from exploring the gustatory possibilities thereof, kings, legislative bodies, and dictators may try to force general adherence to their petty idiosyncrasies. Such law can be described only as whimsical. Our present statute bodies are littered with it; the judiciary often passes whimsical judgments; and legal administrators are prone to whimsical efforts.

7. In addition to the general ideological system which has developed to justify a system of nomothetic behavior, there are always specific ideologies which justify or explain specific practices within that system. Thus, penal practices in Western societies have had various, specific ideological justifications. In Roman theology, crime was willful response to the temptations of the devil. Later, the cause of criminal behavior was located in biological peculiarities as evidenced by physiognomy. See G. Lombroso-Ferrero, *The Criminal Man* (New York, Putnam, 1911). Ultimately, sociologists took the problem somewhat out of the realm of ideologies by studying rather than speculating about the causes of crime. See, for example, E.H. Sutherland, *Principles of Criminology* (Philadelphia, Lippincott, 1934). Nevertheless, the punishment of criminals today is predicated upon the ancient precept of "eye for eye, tooth for tooth"; i.e., the criminal is punished mainly in the spirit of vengeance. See J.L. Gillin, *Taming the Criminal: Adventures in Penology* (New York, Macmillan, 1931).

8. See F.W. Inman, *Biological Politics* (Baltimore, Williams & Wilkins, 1935).

9. For analyses of the historical development of various nomothetic ideologies see:

- Doyle, P., *A History of Political Thought*, New York, Holt, 1933.
- Dunning, W.A., *A History of Political Theories*, New York, Macmillan, 1902, 3 vols.
- Gettell, R.G., *History of Political Thought*, New York, Century, 1924.
- Rosen, S.M., *Modern Individualism: The Development of Political Thought and Its Present Crisis*, New York, Harper, 1937.
- Thomas, E.D., *Chinese Political Thought*, New York, Prentice-Hall, 1927.

For an excellent summary of nomothetic ideologies and an extensive bibliography on the subject see H. Heller, "Political Science" (*Ency. Soc. Sci.*, 12, 207-224).

Illustrative of the specious logic of all nomothetic ideologies is the innovation in democratic ideology devised by G.F. Eliot ("Men-at-Arms," *New Republic*, Mar. 23, 1938), who argues that democratic peoples will win "the coming war with the totalitarian states" because the mechanization of modern armies puts a premium on individual initiative and because that initiative is fostered under democracy but atrophies under dictatorship.

10. The following is a simple expression of Inman's (*op. cit.*) thesis by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court judge W. Maxey, as reported by H. Broun (*San Francisco News*, Aug. 12, 1935):

"Charlatans mislead the people by promise of an abundant life obtained through the magic of legislation. They talk as though the puny laws of man could nullify the laws of creation which ordain that life is a trial and a struggle. The "struggle for existence" is not a mere rhetorical phrase but a biological fact; the Creator meant it so to be. Why try to legislate against the Almighty's purposes?"

Judge Maxey evidently does not recall that for fifty years the spokesmen for God called the Darwinian hypothesis an anti-Christian falsehood.

The idea that government should, or does, operate in accordance with the laws of biological nature is, of course, simply a new version of the theory of the divine right of kings.

That even the divine-right-of-kings ideology still has many adherents would appear from the following news item:

"Strictly off the record, eight Japanese statesmen out of ten will readily admit to not believing the official legend that their Emperor is descended from the Sun Goddess. . . . Yet last week in the Japanese Parliament, sturdy old Premier Admiral Okada was put sternly on the record. Did he or did he not, demanded Baron Kiyozumi Inouye, hold with Japan's eminent Constitutional authority Dr. Tatsuki Minobe who has just created a nation-wide furor by alluding to the Son-of-Heaven as 'an organ of the Constitution.'

"Instantly fire-eating patriots organized the Organ Theory Destruction League with shouts of 'Death to Dr. Minobe!' and last week they were only too eager to put Premier Okada on the spot. Cried the Admiral-Premier: '. . . Of course I do not agree with the Minobe theory and I will carefully consider what my government can do about it'" (*Time*, Mar. 18, 1936).

11. The utter confusion among those who agree upon the fundamental point that government should function for the survival of the group is

evidenced by the following recent books, which have in common mainly their dates of publication:

Arnold, T.W., *Symbols of Government*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1935.

Laski, H.J., *The State in Theory and Practice*, New York, Viking, 1935.

Schilling, K., *Der Staat*, München, Reinhardt, 1935.

12. For an analysis of the legalistic view of law see E.S. Robinson, *Law and Lawyers* (New York, Macmillan, 1935).

The terrific outcry which followed President Roosevelt's so-called court-packing plan for the reorganization of the Supreme Court early in 1937 illustrates the strength of the idea that law, once it is made, becomes inviolable. See the editorial "The Nature of Government" (*Sat. Even. Post*, May 15, 1937); and the article "What Are a Man's Rights?" by I.J. Williams and I.J. Williams, Jr. (*Sat. Even. Post*, May 29, 1937).

13. For the history of the divine-right-of-kings ideology in Western societies see J.N. Figgis, *The Divine Right of Kings* (Cambridge, University Press, 2d ed., 1914).

14. For an analysis of the relation between the Hegelian group-mind concept and political theory see Chap. I. Although himself something of an unconscious Hegelian, L.T. Hobhouse provided an excellent criticism of this ideology in his *Social Evolution and Political Theory* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1911).

15. It has already been indicated that the sociologist H. Spencer considered all governmental efforts at social control contrary to the laws of social evolution. All the laissez-faire theorists have been to some or to a considerable degree opposed to government, at least in so far as government interferes with exchange behavior (see note 6, appendix to Chap. XIV).

One of the more recent proponents of the laissez-faire view, originally expounded by Adam Smith, is the ex-liberal political commentator W. Lippmann (*The Good Society*, Boston, Little, Brown, 1937). For an excellent review of the changing intellectual outlook of Lippmann see the news item "Elucidator" (*Time*, Sept. 27, 1937).

16. Anticapitalistic and also antisocialistic is the ideology of anarchy. It consists, in brief, of the belief that all government is directed toward the maintenance of capitalistic economy, an economic system which runs counter to nature. According to the anarchists, man is naturally a communal animal. Released from the compulsion of government, man's nature would express itself in the creation of a utopian society. This concept has its Oriental counterpart in the philosophy of the ancient Chinese social thinker Lao Tze.

Best known of the philosophical anarchists was the Russian humanitarian Prince Kropotkin (*Mutual Aid: A Factor of Evolution*, New York, Knopf, 1922).

The ideology of anarchy secured its strongest hold in France and Spain. For the history of this ideology see C. Gide and C. Rist, *A History of Economic Doctrines* (trans. by R. Richards, New York, Heath, 1913, 614-648).

Although anarchism never secured a strong hold in the United States, it had a proponent in B.R. Tucker, who published the journal *Liberty* from 1882 to 1910. See V. Yarros, "Philosophical Anarchism: Its Rise, Decline, and Eclipse" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, 1936, 41, 470-483).

One rather common, specifically American, antinomothetic ideology is the so-called unwritten law. According to this idea, murder is under some conditions socially permissible; *i.e.*, the individual may use force in spite of the accepted nomothetic system. For a discussion of the social consequences of this idea see R. Vance, "Folk Rationalization in the 'Unwritten Law'" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, 1934, 39, 483-492).

17. For a detailed analysis of the Marxian view of government as a temporary, crisis mechanism see S.H. Chang, *The Marxian Theory of the State* (Philadelphia, Spencer, 1931).

18. The professional criminal, as distinct from the person who commits a crime unknowingly or under duress, is a person who has no respect whatever for the laws of the established nomothetic system. He may, however, have great respect for the laws of some nomothetic system which operates in conflict with the recognized government. Thus, a criminal may go to prison refusing to "squeal" on his associates because he fears their laws more than he does the laws of the state.

For the viewpoint of the professional criminal see E.H. Sutherland (Ed.), *The Professional Thief: By a Professional Thief* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1937); and J. Black, "A Burglar Looks at Laws and Codes" (*Harper's Mag.*, February, 1930, 306-313).

Those who uncritically accept the ideology that crime never pays would find the following somewhat disconcerting: R. Cooper, *Here's to Crime* (Boston, Little, Brown, 1937); and M. Mooney, *Crime Incorporated* (New York, Whittlesey House, McGraw-Hill, 1935).

19. Indicative of the way in which the distinction between the spirit of the law and the letter of the law is developed is E.G. Lockhart's study *The Attitudes of Children toward Law* (Iowa, University of Iowa Press, 1930).

20. American people generally have great faith in the potentiality of law to correct any socially defined evil. This view is summed up in the ironic phrase "There ought to be a law." It is an intrinsic part, of course, of the ideology of the so-called totalitarian states.

Nevertheless, it has long been recognized by some social theorists that law never functions irrespective of the social heritage. Machiavelli pointed out that the Prince must adjust himself to the traditions of his people. In 1746 Montesquieu (*Spirit of the Laws*, trans. by Nugent, London, Bell, 1894) elaborated the point, as have many others since his time. Systematic coercion is a powerful means of control. Nevertheless, it is the least effective of the means of social control. Unless supported by institutional and conventional elements and unless accorded ideological support, the threat of force is limited in its effectiveness by the range of the threatener's actual exercise of force.

A dramatic example of the inability of law to change deeply embedded social practices—and, in fact, an example of the negative value of some laws—is to be found in the inability of political effort throughout the entire

United States and off and on for nearly a century to stamp out prostitution by legal measures. See, as one thread of this story of nomothetic failure, W. Waterman, *Prostitution and Its Repression in New York City* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1932).

A descriptive treatment of the limited effectiveness of nomothetic control is to be found in E. Ehrlich, *Fundamental Principles of the Sociology of Law* (trans. by W.L. Moll, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1936).

The pessimistic views of one who has had much experience in endeavoring to enforce laws are to be found in A. Vollmer's *The Police and Modern Society* (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1936).

An attempt to study the matter psychologically appears in J. Frank's *Law and the Modern Mind* (New York, Brentano, 1930).

21. An amusing study of the qualities of leadership under the monarchical system has been made by E. Thorndike ("The Relation between Intellect and Morality in Rulers," *Amer. J. Sociol.*, 1936, **42**, 321-334). Thorndike has attempted to measure the intellect and the moral integrity of European royalty. He professes to find that those of greater intelligence are also those of greater moral character.

22. M. Handman ("The Bureaucratic Culture Pattern and Political Revolutions," *Amer. J. Sociol.*, 1933, **39**, 301-313) finds in bureaucracy the cause of revolution. In bureaucracy political positions become quasi-hereditary. As Handman sees it, those who for this reason cannot secure such positions become a restive group. Eventually these nonbureaucratic "outsiders" attack the system in order that they may become the "insiders." The cycle starts over.

For other interpretations of bureaucracy see:

Dodds, H.W., "Bureaucracy and Representative Government," *Ann. Amer. Acad. Pol. and Soc. Sci.*, 1937, **189**, 165-172.

Hewart, G.A., *The New Despotism*, New York, Cosmopolitan Book, 1929.

Laski, H.J., *A Grammar of Politics*, London, Allen & Unwin, 1925, 368-410.

Sharp, W.R., "The Political Bureaucracy of France since the War," *Amer. Pol. Sci. Rev.*, 1928, **22**, 301-323.

23. In France, where the personnel of the national government is determined by the multiparty parliamentary system, which makes the government highly responsive to the whim and fancy of the electorate, there were eleven governments in power between 1933 and 1937. See "What's Wrong with France?" by G. Chaput (*Sat. Even. Post*, Sept. 18, 1937).

In England, where there is a two-party parliamentary system, one of the parties is so strongly entrenched that the government is only slightly responsive to the electorate. Here there have been two prime ministers and one government during the period which saw the rise and fall of eight premiers and eleven governments in France.

24. Until rather recently, political scientists have concentrated their attention upon the paper form of government, implying that political life followed this paper plan. As a result, there was practically no relationship between government as seen by political scientists and government as run by politicians.

Of recent years some political scientists have descended from the clouds and have attempted to study the political process irrespective of the paper plan. They have discovered amazing things. For example, J.T. Salter (*Boss Rule: Portraits in City Politics*, New York, Whittlesey House, McGraw-Hill, 1935) found after careful case investigation that the mayor of the typical American city is only a "stooge" for a behind-the-scenes political boss. Salter's study is not without its value, especially to those political scientists who believe that a government is determined by its paper setup.

For other recent studies of the partial nullification of the democratic process by the party mechanism see:

Agar, H., *The People's Choice*, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1933.

Brooks, R.C., *Political Parties and Electoral Problems*, New York, Harper, 3d ed., 1933.

Gosnell, H., *Negro Politicians*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1935.

———, *Machine Politics: Chicago Model*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1937.

Kurtzman, D.H., *Methods of Controlling Votes in Philadelphia*, Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1935.

Peel, R.V., *The Political Clubs of New York City*, New York, Putnam, 1935.

Reynolds, G.M., *Machine Politics in New Orleans, 1897-1926*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1936.

Rice, S.A., *Quantitative Methods in Politics*, New York, Knopf, 1928.

Rosen, S.M., *A Functional Study in American Government*, New York, Harper, 1935.

25. There are two ways to approach the subject of dictatorship as a type of nomothetic leadership: the common way and the way of the objective scientist. In terms of the common way, which is ideological, dictatorship is either all good or all bad. The problem is much like that of whether garlic is or is not fit for human consumption. Some people consider garlic a prerequisite to good living; some others believe that it makes life intolerable. The writer confesses that, judging solely by the smell, garlic is too strong for his digestion. For one thing, this book could not have been published under a garlic-flavored government.

Nevertheless, in the interests of scientific objectivity, it must be granted: that dictatorship is a historical actuality, not a problem of ethical tastes; that dictatorship is no more an unmitigated evil than democracy is an unending blessing; that dictatorship has historically emerged in some instances out of the blundering failures of presumably democratic governments; that dictators have been largely accepted by a considerable fraction of their subjects; and that dictatorships have proved far more durable than the opponents of dictatorship believed possible.

Dictatorship is not, however, democratic in character, as is claimed by some of the ideologists of dictatorship. The difference between political leadership in democratic and in dictatorial countries may not be a difference in kind, as the advocates for democracy claim. Contrary to the claims as reported in the following news item, however, the difference in degree is appreciable:

"In Europe today, standers for Democracy have become a subway crush in which everyone gets on the other's feet. Great Democrat Adolf Hitler recently described Germany as 'the perfect Democracy.' Great Democrat Joseph Stalin recently gave his Soviet Union what he called 'The Most Democratic Constitution in the World,' then riveted his dictatorship tighter by the shooting of 13 Old Bolsheviks.

"Meanwhile great Professor Thomas Garrigue Masaryk, revered 'Father of Czechoslovakia,' . . . has retired from its Presidency tranquil in his own mind that the so-called 'dictators' of today are in fact a genuine expression in new guise of the popular will—that is of Democracy. . . . [H^o] philosophically points out that the German people, the Russian people, the Italian people and certainly the people of the U.S. are by overwhelming, real majorities convinced that they are following a Leader who is pure, wholesome and efficacious" (*Time*, Feb. 15, 1937).

For recent books on the rise and character of dictatorship in Europe and on the personalities of the European dictators, all more or less anti in tone and all, therefore, more or less ideological in character, see the following:

- Ashton, E.B., *The Fascist: His State and His Mind*, New York, Morrow 1937.
- Borgese, G.A., *Goliath: The March of Fascism*, New York, Viking, 1937.
- Dennis, L., *The Coming American Fascism*, New York, Harper, 1936.
- Ford, G.S. (Ed.), *Dictatorship in the Modern World*, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1935.
- Gunther, J., *Inside Europe*, New York, Harper, 1936.
- Heiden, K., *Hitler*, New York, Knopf, 1936.
- Kellett, E.E., *The Story of Dictatorship: From Earliest Times Till Today*, New York, Dutton, 1937.
- Ludecke, K.G.W., *I Knew Hitler*, New York, Scribner, 1937.
- Olden, R., *Hitler*, New York, Covici-Friede, 1936.
- Rourke, T., *Gómez, Tyrant of the Andes*, New York, Morrow, 1936.
- Salvemini, G., *Under the Axe of Fascism*, New York, Viking, 1936.
- Schuman, F.L., *The Nazi Dictatorship*, New York, Knopf, 1934.

PART V
ESCAPE TYPES OF INTERACTION

CHAPTER XVII

PANIC BEHAVIOR

The introduction of any strong and irrelevant stimulus into a situation of any of the foregoing types will disrupt the normal course of interaction. Thus, the clamor of a fire engine outside the theater or auditorium will disrupt audience interaction. When such a stimulus is defined by the members of the situation as a source of danger, the situation may become a panic situation. Thus, the definition of smoke in a theater as a source of danger may turn a passive audience into a shrieking, milling mass which clogs the aisles and jams the exits.

The behavior which occurs in a panic situation may be thought of as the collective "solution" to the sudden adjustment problem which is presented by a crisis. As has been suggested, regimental behavior is essentially a means by which the enforcement of an individual solution to a collective crisis problem is assured.¹ Panic behavior is, thus, the antithesis to regimental behavior. Since its salient attributes are the uncoordinated nature of the interaction and the unpredictability of the consequences of that interaction, panic behavior is always inadequate in terms of the majority of the group.

During a prolonged crisis, particularly a crisis of a large-scale and violent order, varied and changing types of panic behavior will occur. In each of the panic situations which arise during a severe earthquake, a disastrous flood, a major conflagration, a tidal wave, or the like, the same process of interaction occurs; but the various kinds of action which are consequent upon that process differ widely. In a given panic situation, the people involved may dissipate their energies in fruitless individual ways; they may destroy one another; or each may destroy himself.²

ORIGIN AND FUNCTION

The ultimate origins of panic behavior lie in two complex circumstances: (1) in the occurrence of a crisis—any unusual event which is defined by the members of the situation as a source of

danger; and (2) in the lack of regimental leadership for that crisis—the result either of lack of regimentation for the particular kind of crisis or, when such regimentation does exist, lack of a person who can exercise regimental leadership.

Social Definition of Crises.—No circumstance, however unusual, is a crisis unless it is so defined by human beings; that is, if the circumstance is to be a crisis for them, the individuals involved must either be aware of the danger which is actually present or else must believe that danger is present.

The more knowledge a people possess regarding natural and social phenomena, the more likely the social definition of crises will be in terms of actual rather than of imagined danger. To modern peoples a total eclipse of the sun is a predictable and understandable natural phenomenon. The modern observer may feel a sense of profound awe at the abnormal light effects which occur during such an eclipse, but he will hardly consider the eclipse as a crisis. Before the rise of modern astronomy, however, a total eclipse of the sun was defined as a crisis of the first magnitude.³ More exact means of predicting the probable outcome of events has in considerable measure released us from fear of unusual events simply because those events are unusual.

Moreover, the more knowledge a people possess, the more readily actual danger will be recognized as a crisis. To those who know the "storm signals," the calm which precedes a hurricane constitutes a crisis. To the uninitiated, on the other hand, only the violent winds themselves will be defined as a crisis. At the first signs of the outbreak of an epidemic, we know that we are faced with a more or less important crisis. Lacking such knowledge, we should not recognize a crisis until widespread sickness and death appeared.

Environmental Crises.—Some natural phenomena can be predicted and are not, therefore, subject to social definition as crises. Since an eclipse of the sun can be predicted, the occurrence of that eclipse will not be considered as a crisis. Likewise, since the coming of winter demands adjustments on the part of people, these adjustments can be made in advance—food supplies can be accumulated; fuel can be made available; roofs can be repaired; etc.

Many environmental phenomena are, however, unpredictable; and, when such phenomena occur, they are definitely subject to

social definition as crises. The hurricane, the flood, the drought, the earthquake, the forest fire, and so on may be recognized as possibilities; but when and if they will occur cannot be predicted. In the same category should be included abnormal biological phenomena—the plague of grasshoppers, the epidemic diseases which affect human beings or affect animals upon which human beings are dependent, and the diseases which attack plants upon which man relies for food or raw materials.⁴

Also subject to social definition as crises are accidents to or within such man-made structures as boats, houses, trains, mines, and airplanes. The sinking of a ship, the wreck of a train, the collapse of a mine tunnel, or the burning of a house, an office, a factory, or a theater cannot be anticipated and may constitute a crisis.

Social Crises.—The occurrence of an unpredictable social event also may be subject to social definition as a crisis. To the members of a community, any unexpected disruption of normal, social processes may appear as a crisis.⁵ Thus, the belief that a bank is financially unsound may be a crisis to those who are dependent upon the stability of that bank. A railroad strike or other strike may be a crisis to the people who are directly or indirectly affected by that strike.

Seldom, however, is the gradual disintegration of a social system defined as a crisis, although periodic evidences of such social disintegration may be so defined. The banking system, for example, may be gradually approaching dissolution without arousing public or professional interest. The closing of one bank may, on the other hand, be defined as an acute crisis.

A distinction should be made between socially defined crises and politically defined crises. The latter are defined by political leaders and are based upon real or imaginary functional disorders of the social structure. Every election is a politically defined crisis; it is not necessarily a social crisis and is quite unlikely to be the occasion for panic behavior.⁶

Situational Crises.—Where large groups of people congregate, the normal course of interaction may be interrupted by a stimulus which is generated by the interaction itself. Such a stimulus may then be defined by some of the members of the group as a crisis. For example, when the people who throng a public square begin to press upon those in front, that pressure may be a stimulus

which is defined by those in front as a source of danger. Under such circumstances, the crisis originates in the situation; and the behavior then becomes more or less panic in type.

Lack of Preparation for Crises.—Those crises which have occurred often enough to impress people with the possibility of their recurrence will be more or less prepared for, as we have seen, by regimentation. Children may be prepared for the eventuality of fire in a school building by fire drill. Ordinarily those people who live in regions which are subject to winds of hurricane intensity have traditional means of riding out the storm:⁷ the early settlers of the Great Plains region had their cyclone cellars and, at the first sign of an approaching storm, took systematic defense measures; the natives of the South Seas seem to have a number of defensive techniques to fall back upon; and the people of Florida are well versed in the art of surviving violent storms.

Many crises, however, come so infrequently to the people of a given region that adjustment techniques do not become established parts of the social heritage; and, when a crisis does occur, systematic organization of collective effort is impossible. Moreover, by their very nature, some crises cannot be prepared for. It is possible to prepare for behavior during a ship disaster, since a ship seldom sinks without warning. It is, however, impossible to prepare for behavior during a railroad wreck or during an earthquake. In the main, the collective behavior which occurs during crises for which no preparation has been made is of the panic order.⁸

Origin in Individual Adjustments to Crisis.—The immediate antecedents of panic behavior are individual rather than collective. The occurrence of a crisis while people are together interrupts social interaction and momentarily reduces the situation to an aggregate of shocked individuals. For a moment, all action is suspended.

Following this period of inactivity, the members of the situation behave, not as the members of a group, but as isolated individuals. Each individual fumbles by himself to find a way to respond to the crisis. Since he usually falls back upon some old habit pattern which may or may not be relevant to the circumstance, it would seem that the individual is impelled to action but is incapable of determining upon a course of action. During a severe earthquake, for example, a few of the people who are hav-

ing dinner together may "keep their heads" and step beneath the arch of a doorway where, it has been calculated, they are in the least danger. At such a time, however, most of them will "lose their heads" and do peculiarly irrelevant things.⁹ One may crawl under the table; another may run screaming out of the house, to be struck, perhaps, by some falling object. One may put down the baby and pick up a worthless vase; another may run to the telephone to call the police. At any event, the behavior of each individual is a reaction, however irrelevant, to the crisis rather than an interaction with the other members of the situation.

No aggregate of reacting individuals can, however, long refrain from interaction with one another, if for no other reason than that they are likely to come into physical contact with one another. Inevitably, therefore, the period during which the members of a group react as individuals is brief and is followed by some form of collective behavior. Unless regimental leadership operates, the collective behavior will be panic in type. The immediate origin of panic behavior is, thus, seen to lie in the individual heterogeneous reactions of a group to a crisis.

Function as Escape Behavior.—Panic behavior is an effort on the part of the members of the situation to escape the presumed consequences of the crisis. The term "escape" is used to suggest that an attempt is made to adjust to the unexpected circumstance by avoidance; *i.e.*, escape is not an adjustment to the crisis, but is, rather, an adjustment away from the crisis. The panic-stricken people in a theater do not attempt to put the fire out; they adjust to the presence of fire by attempting to escape from the burning building. The panic-stricken passengers of a ship do not direct their efforts to the prevention of its sinking; they attempt to escape from the ship.

In view of the consequences of any kind of panic behavior, the function of panic behavior can be described only as individual and exceedingly short-run. As a collective "solution" to a crisis problem, panic behavior is never expedient, either in terms of the individual members or in terms of the group. Perhaps the most significant commentary on the inability of group effort to achieve a solution to an adjustment problem is the fact that, within a short time after the inception of a catastrophe, political and other leaders, ordinarily jealous of their rights, usually

thrust dictatorial powers upon some one individual, asking him to organize individual effort and to lead his panic-stricken fellows out of chaos.

IDEOLOGIES

Since panic behavior occurs infrequently and has consequences which are clearly disadvantageous to everyone, panic behavior is neither based upon nor justified by ideologies. Such behavior is, however, often explained ideologically.

Panic behavior is sometimes explained as the expression of man's inherent, bestial nature. It is thought that this bestial nature is normally subordinated by society and that crisis conditions decivilize man, reducing him to the level of the unsocialized beast. This ideology is based upon the observation that during panic men may bash one another over the head, ruthlessly push others out of a lifeboat in order that they themselves may get in, trample the weaker underfoot in the effort to escape from a building, and so on.

By way of contrast, panic behavior is sometimes explained as the expression of man's inherent, heroic nature. This ideology has been advanced by the Russian anarchist Kropotkin and is based on the observation that people often behave under crisis conditions in the most considerate, humane, and heroic ways.¹⁰ The people on a sinking ship may urge one another to take precedence in getting into the lifeboats. During a flood, people may try to save others rather than themselves.

In addition to the explanation of panic behavior as an expression of man's nature—good or bad—there sometimes appears the equally ideological explanation of panic behavior as the consequence of the mental inferiority of the lower classes. In point of fact, however, no class differences appear in regard to susceptibility to panic behavior. Panic behavior during theater fires has occurred with upper-class audiences as well as with lower-class audiences. Panic behavior during earthquakes has not been restricted to the people who live on the wrong side of town.

Moreover, whether panic behavior will be bestial or heroic does not depend upon the cultural status of those involved. The first-class passengers of a sinking ship have in given instances behaved more heroically than have those in the steerage. On

the other hand, the uncultured men of the steerage have in many cases behaved like gentlemen, while the "gentlemen" of the first class have behaved like beasts.

Panic behavior cannot, therefore, be explained in terms of man's bestial nature, man's heroic nature, or the mental inferiority of the lower classes. Panic behavior is fortuitous; that is to say, it is the consequence of the coming together of a great many factors in entirely unpredictable ways. About the only thing which can be said with any certainty is that the behavior of the individuals in a panic situation will not be a direct consequence of their inborn natures. It will be a fortuitous synthesis of their acquired patterns of response.

MEMBERSHIP

The membership of a panic situation is determined entirely by fortuitous factors. The firemen, policemen, soldiers, and others who are organized and trained to deal with a crisis may appear purposively at the scene of a panic. Membership in the panic situation itself is, however, unintentional. It is the fortuitous consequence of membership in some other type of situation.

Membership in any situation, therefore, involves an incalculable panic hazard. Whenever and wherever people congregate, the possibility of the occurrence of a crisis and of the appearance of panic behavior exists. No individual, however, engages in situational membership anticipating a crisis. He establishes himself in this region or that for any one of a number of reasons; he travels by boat, train, or other devices in pursuit of recreation or other objectives; he engages in a given occupation as a means of securing a livelihood; he goes to a theater to enjoy a play. That a crisis and, subsequently, panic behavior occurs where he happens to be present is entirely incidental to the factors which have brought him there.

Perhaps in rare instances we may say that an individual knowingly accepts exceptional crisis risks—and, hence, panic risks. Seamen know the hazards of their occupation, including the danger of panic at sea. The passengers who embarked upon the ill-fated *Lusitania* knew that the ship was about to run the German submarine blockade. People who move to Florida are aware of the dangers of hurricane. Those who live in California know of the faults which present a constant earthquake risk.

Immediately following a major catastrophe, knowledge of risks may deter some people from putting to sea, from going to a theater, or from traveling in California or Florida. It is doubtful, however, whether knowledge of exceptional risks plays any considerable part in the determination of situational membership.¹¹ Potential flood lands may be considered choice regions for settlement. The attraction of fertile soil or of a pleasant terrain may far outweigh the very real and evident possibilities of disastrous floods. Many times over the course of the centuries, for example, the Yellow River, China's Sorrow, has broken its banks and has devastated the farms and cities of its great valley, decimating the population. Each time after the waters have receded, the refugees have proceeded about the business of reclaiming the flood lands. Time after time during the course of the past century, the same cycle has been repeated in our own great valley of the Mississippi.

Training for Membership.—Although membership in a panic situation is entirely fortuitous, the members will ordinarily have received some training for panic behavior. That training is not, of course, of a systematic or a socially intended nature but is largely fortuitous. Although Western people are more or less generally trained to the women-and-children-first tradition, training for panic behavior is not ordinarily for some specific type of panic behavior, but is, rather, simply training to define an event as a crisis. In general, such training does not even include training to be conscious of the crisis risks of a particular situation. Thus, people may be trained to define fire-in-theater as a crisis, without, however, their being aware of the dangers of fire—and, hence, panic—while they are attending a theater.

Following a spectacular crisis, however, there is a tendency for people to define as a crisis anything which may be vaguely related to that kind of crisis. For some years after the Iroquois Theater fire, for example, all theater audiences were inclined to be panicky.¹² The slightest incident might set people fighting for the doors. Smoking on the stage during the course of a performance became inexpedient, for the smoke of an actor's cigar might set someone who could not forget the story of the Iroquois disaster to shouting "Fire!" A so-called fireproof curtain, with the reassuring words "Asbestos Curtain" painted in large letters upon it, was devised and displayed before performances began.

Following the spectacular sinking of the *Lusitania*, and, again, following the tragic fire aboard the steamship *Morro Castle*, steamship officials had to take extraordinary precautions to reassure their passengers and to prevent the unreasoned definitions of some event as a crisis.

Likewise, a series of disastrous accidents to transport planes during the winter of 1936-1937 made airplane passengers hypersensitive. According to reports, passenger travel was not seriously affected; but the traveling passengers were jumpy. Pilots were warned by officials to explain to the passengers any event which the passengers might possibly interpret as a sign of danger.

OVERT AND COVERT ASPECTS OF INTERACTION

Shock.—The covert feeling-states of people before they become aware of a crisis will depend upon the type of the situation in which they are members. The occurrence of a crisis interrupts these feeling-states and results in shock, during which all behavior, overt and covert, is momentarily arrested. The members of the theater audience, for example, do not immediately respond to the smoke, the sight of flames, and so on. The people who are gathered in the saloon do not react promptly to the list of the ship. The people who are walking in the streets do not respond instantaneously to the tremors of the sidewalks and to the swaying buildings. It requires time for people to comprehend the occurrence.

The Sense of Panic.—The period of shock may be more or less prolonged. It is terminated whenever the individuals begin to respond to the crisis. On the covert side, this response consists of an intense feeling-state, usually described as that of panic, fear, or terror. Whether or not this covert feeling-state precedes, accompanies, or follows overt action is not evident. All that can be said is that there would seem to be a covert imperative to overt action and that this covert imperative does not determine what the overt action will be. Apparently, then, the sense of panic is simply a generalized, rather than a specific, feeling-state. At any event, the sense of panic does not predispose the individual to a specific form of overt action, since the overt action of an individual may be of any order and may, in fact, be of a changing order. During an earthquake, as we have seen,

individuals may do any one of a number of things. Presumably, however, the covert feeling-state of each one of them is a sense of panic. There is, therefore, no constant relationship between the overt and the covert aspects of the reactions of the individual to a crisis.

Although panic behavior presupposes a sense of panic on the part of the individuals involved in the situation, the sense of panic does not necessarily mean that, when they begin to interact with one another, their behavior will invariably be of the panic type. During attack, regimented soldiers presumably experience much the same sense of panic as do the people who are caught in a burning theater. The soldiers proceed, however, in accordance with regimental orders as though they were unafraid. Whether the panic-stricken theatergoers sit in their seats, stand quietly in their places, or dash frantically toward exits depends upon factors which are unrelated to their sense of panic. The direction which the overt aspect of interaction takes depends largely on external factors.

When the interaction is of the panic order, the sense of panic is probably somewhat intensified by the interaction itself and in accordance with the process of interactional amplification. Thus, it is typical of panic behavior that overt action grows more and more intense until physical exhaustion or some other factor prevents further overt action.

LEADERSHIP

As has already been indicated, the appearance of a crisis will cause the people involved to experience a sense of panic; but it need not result in panic behavior. If the people are regimented and if adequate regimental leadership arises, the interaction will be of the regimental type. Even when systematic regimentation is lacking, it is still possible that a leader may arise to effect regimentation on the basis of some simple command.

Only in the absence of either of these forms of antipanic leadership does panic behavior occur. When it does, the transition from individual reactions to collective interaction is effected through the process of mimicry. During the course of some types of panic behavior, as we shall see, leadership which synchronizes the mimicked pattern may arise. When such leadership does arise, it may be followed by coordinative leadership.

MIMICRY

While the members of the group are individually fumbling for a mode of adjustment, each is attempting to respond to the stimuli which were defined as a crisis. Should some one individual cry "Fire!" or "Help!" or simply scream, the members of the group may then be led to respond again to stimuli of social origin—*i.e.*, to direct their attention to the source of the cry. The cry itself is but the fumbling effort of one member of the group to adjust to the crisis. It is individual, purposeless action which is comparable to other random actions. Unlike other random actions, however, the cry has the potentiality for invoking attention and, thus, response from others.

With the attention of his fellows focused on him, the one who cried may become the leader of the situation. He does not lead the other members of the situation in the sense that a lecturer leads an audience or an officer leads his soldiers. On the basis of the nonvocal actions which accompany his cry, he leads those who have been attracted by his cry only to the extent of providing them with a pattern of action which they can mimic.

Panic interaction is a direct consequence of the mimicry by many panic-stricken individuals of the overt behavior of some one of them. The behavior of the one who sets the example may be of almost any order. Often it is a pattern of behavior which might be expedient for him alone but becomes highly destructive when it is taken over by the others.

In any given disaster, particularly a ship disaster, it is probable that two or more panic situations are established more or less simultaneously. The people in the smoking room may mimic one pattern; those in the saloon, another; and so on.

TYPES OF PANIC BEHAVIOR

Individualized Suicide.—In many instances mimicry results in what may be described as individualized suicide. During panic on shipboard, for example, it is not uncommon for some one individual to start a wave of jumping into the sea.¹³ Apparently all that is necessary to bring about wholesale individualized suicide is for some individual fortuitously to attract the attention of his fellows as he climbs over the rail and drops over the side.

Others, few or many, may follow the pattern of action which his behavior suggests.

Collective Suicide.—More common, perhaps, is the collective suicide which results from a stampede. The process here is the same as that which leads to individualized suicide; but the mimicked pattern is of such a nature that, while it may be expedient in terms of itself, the sum of the behavior of the individuals involved is mutually destructive.

A potentially effective adjustment for one or a small number of people who are caught in a theater fire, for example, would be running for an exit. If, however, the theater is crowded and if this individually adequate pattern of action is mimicked by any considerable proportion of the audience, the result is a jamming of aisles and doorways with the consequence that no one can escape from the building.¹⁴ In such a stampede for the exits, interactional amplification intensifies the efforts of each individual. The mimicked behavior of each individual constitutes, in effect, the basis for mimicry by others. Thus, in such a stampede, action rapidly rises to a crescendo, until further action is impossible. The blocking of exits, the trampling of the weaker and those who stumble, and the crushing of others may constitute a far greater danger to the members of the panic situation than does the fire which brought about that situation.

In the case of panic aboard ship, collective suicide may result from a stampede for places in lifeboats, the swamping of those lifeboats, and so on.¹⁵ Panic-stricken passengers and crew may take their cue from someone who dashes for a lifeboat, struggles to take possession of it, and tries to launch it. A stampede, perhaps for that single lifeboat, may follow. It has happened that a considerable proportion of the people who were caught in a ship disaster have tried to escape in one or two of the available lifeboats, leaving the remainder empty or at least lightly occupied.

Whenever people assemble in a compact mass, the danger of a somewhat different form of collective suicide is always present. When the attention of the group is focused on something, the efforts of one individual to move toward that object may be mimicked by a sufficient number of others to create a crush. In this case, the pressure of those in the rear of the group upon those immediately in front may be sufficient to constitute a crisis for the latter, who individually may press forward, creating panic

and further pressure in front of them. Through mimicry, increasing pressure is exerted until those in the front of the group are crushed against some barrier or are trampled underfoot. For example, those in the rear of a massed audience in a public square may push forward in the effort to get closer to the speaker on the platform and may thereby cause panic to spread before them until the front ranks are crushed against the platform or are trampled underfoot.

Collective Self-sacrifice.—The mimicry process may lead to individualized or collective suicide. It may, on the other hand, lead to collective self-sacrifice. Evidently, all that is necessary to bring about collective self-sacrifice is that someone establish by his behavior the pattern of self-sacrifice before another pattern arises. What pattern will arise and become mimicked is, of course, a matter of chance.

In some crises, notably mine and ship disasters, the preparation for crisis includes the heroic tradition. As has been indicated, modern Western people are familiar with the maritime women-and-children-first tradition. Presumably on the basis of training in this tradition, one man of a panic-stricken group may heroically refuse to enter a lifeboat; or, giving preference to women, he may push back away from the avenue to safety or otherwise indicate his willingness to be sacrificed for the welfare of others. He is, then, acting in the role of the heroic male. Although women and children are unlikely to mimic his behavior, other men may do so. If this happens, the passengers divide themselves into two groups—adult males following one pattern; women and children, a different one.

The division of the panic-stricken group into two groups may facilitate the establishment of synchronizing and, subsequently, of coordinative leadership. Frequently, however, such division results in collective suicide by one group and collective self-sacrifice by the other: assisted by the men, the women and children crowd into lifeboats and are capsized into the sea or else are set adrift without men to man the boats; and the men remain on board to sink with the ship.¹⁶ Upon objective analysis, most heroic panic behavior is found to consist of heedless self-sacrifice.

Mutual Aid.—Under some crisis circumstances, panic behavior may take the form of mutual aid. Here the mimicked pattern

consists of each individual's disregarding his own safety in the effort to assist some other individual.

Frequently, the survivors of a severe earthquake will be found energetically trying to assist other survivors.¹⁷ Men and women will labor with complete disregard of their own serious injuries; merchants will stand beside their merchandise, offering goods to anyone who passes by; doctors and nurses will labor untiringly with the injured; and so on. The story has been told of the man who, after an earthquake, staggered into a field hospital with a dead body over his shoulder and who, when told by a startled surgeon that he had lost an eye, commented on the fact that the surgeon had a broken arm.

Although many such stories which come out of major catastrophes have a legendary character, it does seem that panic behavior may sometimes consist of mimicked patterns of mutual aid. There is some truth in the old statement that, when people cannot help themselves, they try to help others. Certainly the panic-stricken person who is futilely trying to find some way to extricate himself from the ruins of a crumbling city might find the assisting of a man with a broken leg an acceptable individual adjustment to that crisis, especially when he does not know in which direction safety lies. When patterns such as this are mimicked by any considerable number of others, the result is mutual aid which may or may not be individually or mutually expedient.

Mutual aid can be quite as destructive as is collective suicide. It has often happened that those who have escaped a sinking ship in a lifeboat have started pulling floating survivors in with them and have not stopped until the boat floundered.

Rapacity.—Mutual aid as a form of panic behavior is usually short-lived and is often followed by another form of panic behavior, rapacious in character. Within a few hours after people have been helping each other, looting may become so general that police and soldiers who are rushed to the scene are ordered to "shoot at sight and shoot to kill." Those who have been freely giving their goods or services to the survivors may begin to demand exorbitant remuneration. Following heroic efforts to save the victims of a mine disaster, workers may demand pay for the time that they put into rescue work; and employers may try to take advantage of the general confusion

to lower wages or to break the local union. After having helped each other into a lifeboat, the survivors of a ship disaster may start to lighten the load by throwing each other off, until, perhaps, only the strongest remain.

Although it has been assumed that rapacity is a manifestation of recovery from panic, there is reason to believe that, for most of those involved, it is simply another form of panic behavior on the basis of mimicry. Looting is not, for example, confined to members of the criminal class. People who, under normal circumstances, are reasonably law-abiding may, following a period of mutual aid, be found running frantically from corpse to corpse and picking up valuable articles. Possibly the professional criminal and the exceptionally avaricious merchant or physician may establish the rapacious patterns, but the general diffusion of these patterns occurs on the basis of mimicry. The extreme measures which are often necessary to check looting and economic exploitation of the victims of a disaster suggest that this behavior is a type of panic behavior rather than an evidence of recovery from panic.

SYNCHRONIZING LEADERSHIP

Panic behavior is characteristically lacking in coordination. The mimicry process may give some degree of similarity to the behavior of the individuals involved in the panic situation, but it does not result either in the synchronization or the coordination of individual actions. During the course of a panic, however, it has sometimes happened that some one individual has managed to effect a synchronization of the mimicked pattern of individual action.

Synchronization does not determine the behavior of the individuals involved, nor does the synchronizing leader set an example for others to mimic. He provides leadership only in the sense that he establishes, in some way or other, a rhythm to the mimicked patterns which are already in operation. If, for example, panic-stricken men are pulling at a rope, he may be able to synchronize their efforts by crying "Pull!" at stated intervals. In the lifeboat, frantic men may be pulling at their oars in wholly unrelated ways. An authoritative voice may bring some order out of this chaos by providing a rhythm for the various individuals to follow.

COORDINATIVE LEADERSHIP

Following such a minor degree of leadership as this synchronization of mimicked patterns, there occasionally arises leadership which actually coordinates the patterns of behavior. This occurs most often, perhaps, in ship disasters. If a lifeboat survives the haphazard launching which it secures during a panic and if it gets away from the sinking ship without too many people aboard, there is some chance that one or another of the survivors will recover his normal senses sufficiently to provide some synchronizing leadership. Once a degree of synchronization is established, he, or someone else, may then gradually secure organization—directing the establishment of patterns of action, checking others, and so on. At this point, panic behavior gives way to regimental behavior.¹⁸

One curious fact about the emergence of coordinative leadership is that there seems to be no predicting on the basis of normal behavior which one of a group of people will prove capable of such leadership. The person who, under normal circumstances, might be judged to have a "cool head" is just as likely to give way to hysteria during panic as is the one who is normally timid and ineffectual. It has often happened that the individual who rose to coordinative leadership during a panic was, on the surface, fitted for such leadership neither by past training, by past performance, nor by appearance.

ANTIPANIC LEADERSHIP

All human beings are accustomed to responding overtly to some regimental leadership and will do so regardless of their covert feeling-states. Consequently, there is always some possibility of preventing the rise of panic behavior either following the period of shock or during the period of individual adjustment. This prevention of panic behavior is dependent upon two factors: first, the uniformity of the responsiveness of the individuals involved in the situation to specific leadership symbols; and, second, the appearance of a leader who is capable of manipulating those symbols.

Obviously, a group of individuals who have different language and cultural backgrounds will not be uniformly responsive to the same symbols. Thus, a theater audience composed of

Germans, Americans, Russians, Japanese, and Chinese is quite certain to be uncontrollable during a crisis. With people of similar social antecedents, however, there are quite likely to be some symbols to which they will respond with a degree of uniformity. Most Americans, for example, have been more or less inadvertently trained to stop at the command "Stop!" and to go at the command "Go!"

Rather rarely, however, does a leader arise who is capable of perceiving the particular symbols to which the group will respond and of manipulating these symbols to the end that panic behavior is prevented. In the first place, such a leader must be one who does not feel panic-stricken or one who, feeling so, is nevertheless capable of thinking and acting rapidly. Antipanic leadership must assert itself before panic interaction begins. Once mimicry has started, antipanic leadership cannot operate to stem panic interaction. In the second place, few people are normally accustomed to exercising the dictatorial kind of leadership which is necessary.

When the membership of the situation includes some individual who recognizes and can manipulate those regimental symbols to which the members of the group happen to be responsive, such a leader can prevent panic by a sort of forced regimentation. Thus, some member of the theatrical cast may, by repeatedly commanding the panic-stricken members of the audience to stay in their seats, hold them there while ushers systematically empty the theater. When the membership of the situation includes a number of regimented individuals and a recognized regimental leader, the regimented individuals may be used in controlling the others. Thus, the presence of a well-trained crew will make antipanic leadership possible in the case of a ship disaster. If the ship disaster has been precipitated by an incident, such as the ship's crashing into another ship, the fact of crisis is automatically communicated to all on board. When the crew and officers are well trained in their duties, the primary problem of the captain is to prepare the passengers for the possibility of abandoning ship and at the same time to prevent the actions of any passenger from serving as the basis for mimicry. If at the time of the crash the passengers are assembled in dining rooms or other public rooms, the problem of the captain is relatively simple: He need only present a reassuring face and

order them to stay where they are, post subordinates through the group to talk down or, if necessary, knock down anyone who starts to break for the open, and then proceed to his duties with the crew. Unless listing of the ship or other signs of what may seem like imminent sinking intensifies their fears, the captain can forget the passengers for a while. If the accident occurs when the passengers are sleeping, his problem is to get them assembled before some one of them gets the idea that it would be well to launch a lifeboat or to jump overboard. If the crisis occurs when the passengers are scattered over the ship in groups of various sizes and are engaged in various activities, the problem is an acute one; and the possibility of antipanic leadership is slight. While his officers are working through the ship to assemble the passengers, someone in an isolated group is almost certain to start a stampede for a lifeboat or to provide a bad example by jumping overboard. Once this happens, panic behavior may take a course in which only the strongest and most fortunate of men survive.

In the case of theater crises, another mode of antipanic leadership is feasible. It is based on the fact that the theater audience is normally attentive to the stage and is normally passive. The smell of smoke or the sight of flames may at first act only to distract the audience from what the cast is doing on the stage or from what the lecturer is saying.¹⁹ If the action on the stage goes on uninterrupted, the audience may be temporarily reassured; *i.e.*, they will not define the situation as a crisis and will remain passive. For some time after the spectacular Iroquois Theater panic, it was a standing rule of the theater that the show must go on, come "hell or high water." Old-time theatrical people were proud of reciting the occasions when they gave a good performance while firemen worked backstage.

Although the effectiveness of histrionics in preventing theater panic has, no doubt, been exaggerated, the device has antipanic value. All professional audience leaders who operate in the earthquake regions of California are familiar with the power of the leader to keep an audience passive, simply by proceeding as though nothing had occurred, when a tremor shakes the theater or auditorium. Such control would, of course, break down if walls began to crumble and the floors began to sag.

Such control can, however, prevent panic which might otherwise result from even a mild tremor.

In addition to the foregoing technique of preventing theater panics, there is that of musically dictating a specific mode of action. Most modern people are more or less prepared to stand in their places during the rendition of their national anthem. This fact has been utilized to prevent theater and, less frequently, ship panics. Provided that the orchestra gets under way before mimicry is established and provided that it plays loudly enough to drown out any outcry which may arise, there is a good chance that the members of the audience will respond overtly in the accustomed way.

English experiences with a number of tragic theater panics led to the establishment of the theatrical custom of closing every performance with the playing of the national anthem, during which the members of the audience remain standing in place. Such a practice amounts to systematic regimentation as preparation for potential crisis in the theater. Experience shows it to be a remarkably effective antipanic means; for, although there have been a good many serious theater fires since the practice was established, none have, apparently, resulted in collective suicide.

APPENDIX

1. For the discussion of regimentation as systematic preparation for preventing panic adjustment to crisis circumstances, see Chap. VI.

2. The term "panic" is used by the economists in the limited sense of collective response to an economic crisis, real or imagined; and some literature has grown up around the subject of stock-market panics. Sociological and sociopsychological concern with the panic type of collective interaction is, however, scattered and fragmentary; and there is practically no technical literature on the subject. When it has been described and discussed, panic behavior has been considered as one aspect of crowd behavior. Such treatment will be found in the following:

Bernard, L.L., "Crowd," *Ency. Soc. Sci.*, 4, 612-613.

Bogardus, E.S., *Fundamentals of Social Psychology*, New York, Century, 1924, 254-265.

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For an analysis of the various theories of crowd behavior see F.B. Karpf, *American Social Psychology* (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1932, 93-144).

3. For descriptive material on the various circumstances which primitive peoples have defined as crises, many of which we ourselves would not so define, see L. Lévy-Bruhl, *Primitive Mentality* (trans. by L.A. Clare, New York, Macmillan, 1923, Chap. IX, "The Mystic Meaning of Accidents and Misfortunes").

An interesting illustration of the social definition of an unhazardous situation as crisis is reported in the following news item (the children involved had previously been subjected to protracted bombing):

"In Southhampton, England, last week arrived the first shipment of Basque refugees, 4,000 children on the steamer *Habaña*, high-water mark in one of the greatest mass evacuations of children in history. . . . Next day in a tent city in which they had been installed the Basque children suddenly lost all bravado. A squadron of British planes on practice flight hammered overhead. Screaming in terror, the Basque children stampeded for their tents, holes in the ground, anywhere they could hide" (*Time*, May 31, 1937).

Early in 1938, Europe was treated to an exceptionally brilliant display of the aurora borealis, with the results indicated in the following news item:

"In Portugal, terrified villagers rushed through the streets shouting '*O fim do mundo!*' (the end of the world). In war-minded France, the cry was '*C'est la guerre!*' In Austria and elsewhere in Europe, kneeling peasants gibbered prayers. . . . In London . . . someone, thinking that Windsor Castle was on fire, called the Windsor Fire Department" (*Time*, Feb. 7, 1938).

4. Historical sources would lead one to believe that the so-called Black Death which swept over Europe between 1346 and 1350 caused panic types of adjustment in many instances. At least some of the measures which were taken to escape this plague can be interpreted only as random, panic measures. See C. Creighton, *A History of Epidemics in Britain* (Cambridge, England, The University Press, 1891-1894, 2 vols.); and G.G. Coulton, *The Black Death* (London, McBride, 1932).

Also panic in type was much of the reaction to the influenza epidemic of 1918. The unfathomable character, rapid spread, and severe consequences of this disease aroused a rather general sense of calamity. Since there was no known method of preventing the spread of the disease, medical men resorted to such devices as the gauze mask. The general sense of panic

which was felt during this epidemic is described by B. De Voto ("The Easy Chair," *Harper's Mag.*, April, 1937, 558):

"The Easy Chair has many memories of 1918, when the pestilence walked by noonday and the nation experienced the most widespread terror that any disease has ever inflicted on it. A headline in a Boston paper, in August, that twenty cases of Spanish influenza has been landed at Charlestown. . . . A trip southward with the streets of cities curiously forsaken, gauze squares over the windows of ticket offices, the lovely Red Cross debutantes in the railroad stations wearing masks and looking like characters in an H.G. Wells fantasy. Camp Lee, Virginia, stunned and all but paralyzed, . . . Even so there were disturbing flare-ups of pure panic. Civilians were experiencing the same impulses of mass terror throughout the country and all cities had that strange, expectant numbness. Old books you had read once grew live in your mind: this was the feel life had had in the plague years, when black-hooded figures carried bell and torch about the streets by night and the death carts rumbled. . . ."

5. For an analysis of the type of crisis which arises as a consequence of the functional inadequacy of our economic system, see the article "Crises" by J. Lescure (*Ency. Soc. Sci.*, 4, 595-599). The reader will no doubt recall the widespread sense of panic which accompanied the closing of banks in 1933. This crisis was precipitated by panic—evidenced in runs on banks—and, in turn, aroused a new sense of panic.

6. During the presidential campaign of 1936, the political commentator William Allen White suggested the artificial character of the political crisis by referring to the campaign as "our quadrennial *papier-mâché* crisis."

7. C.B. Nordhoff and J.N. Hall (*Hurricane*, Boston, Little, Brown, 1936) have described fictionally the traditional Polynesian methods of trying to ride out the violent winds which infrequently strike a South Sea island.

8. In some instances, the crisis is so severe and brief that panic interaction never arises. Here such behavior as does occur is individual rather than collective. There appears, for example, to have been practically no interaction among the passengers of the airship *Hindenburg* from the time it burst into flames until its passengers either died or somehow escaped. See the news item "Oh, the Humanity!" (*Time*, May 17, 1937); and the autobiographical article "I Was on the Hindenburg" by M.G. Mather (*Harper's Mag.*, November, 1937, 590-595).

Another instance of crisis in which there was insufficient time for the development of panic interaction was the capsizing of the lake steamer *Eastland* at her pier on July 24, 1915 (see the magazine *Outlook*, Aug. 7, 1915, 777).

9. After every general crisis, such as an earthquake, stories circulate concerning the irrelevant things which various individuals did during the first impact of that crisis. The following news item reports what is probably the first record of an individual's reaction to disaster made at the time of that disaster. The individual was a radio commentator, who was recording the landing of the *Hindenburg* for later broadcast:

"It is practically standing still now. The ropes have been dropped and they have been taken hold of by a number of men on the field. It is starting

to rain again. The rain had slacked up a little bit. The back motors of the ship are holding it just enough to keep it—

“IT'S BURST INTO FLAME!

“Get out of the way! Get this—Charley, get out of the way *please!* It is bursting into flames. This is terrible! This is one of the worst catastrophes in the world! . . . Oh, the humanity! Those passengers! I can't talk, ladies and gentlemen! Honest, it is a mass of smoking wreckage. Lady, I am sorry. Honestly, I can hardly—I am going to step inside where I can't see it. Charley, that is terrible! Listen, folks, I am going to have to stop for a minute because I have lost my voice' ” (*Time*, May 17, 1937).

10. See Prince Kropotkin, *Mutual Aid: A Factor of Evolution* (New York, Knopf, 1922).

11. The tendency of people to disregard exceptional risks is illustrated in the following news comment, provoked by a disastrous fire which had just occurred at Hakodate, Japan:

“Fire has been the bane of Japanese cities from time immemorial. In Yeddo, now called Tokyo, fires were so frequent that they were called ‘flowers of Yeddo.’ . . .

“Today most big Japanese cities have modern equipment and firemen. But flimsy wooden construction persists. Even Tokyo, which boasts many fireproof buildings, is more than 50 per cent pine and cedar.

“Japanese firemen also worry about narrow winding streets and the open braziers which most of their countrymen, unlike the stove-using residents of cold Hakodate, use for heating and cooking” (*Newsweek*, Mar. 31, 1934).

12. For vivid descriptions of the Iroquois Theater fire and of the prolonged aftereffects see H.D. Northrop, *World's Greatest Calamities, The Baltimore Fire and Chicago Theatre Horror* (Philadelphia, National Publishers, 1904).

13. According to reports, most of the deaths which occurred when the steamship *Morro Castle* caught fire at sea on September 7, 1934, were the result of people's jumping overboard, many without life preservers, while the ship was still in motion. See P. Keating, “*Morro Castle Disaster*” (*New Republic*, September, 1934); and R.G. Skerrit, “*Fire at Sea*” (*Sci. Amer.*, February, 1935).

On June 15, 1904, the *General Slocum*, an excursion steamer, crowded with women and children, caught fire in the East River, New York. Over one thousand lives were lost, in part because the captain proved incapable of handling the situation, more particularly because the passengers adopted a jump-off-the-boat panic pattern.

14. An account of the panic behavior which occurred during the Iroquois Theater fire is given by W.A. Brady (*Showman*, New York, Dutton, 1937, 254):

“The theater itself never burned—they could have given performances in it a couple of days afterward. But it didn't have to burn to kill its hundreds. The people from the balcony were piled in the narrow arch at the head of the big gilt stairway—and already many of them must have

been crushed to death. Many of those in the orchestra had mobbed the side doors, which had never been inspected to see if they would open at all. And there was another fearful jam at the main orchestra entrance.

"The jam at the balcony door was the worst. The victims had climbed over one another until, after it was over, they were found jamming the doorway from top to bottom."

The following news item describes a recent theater panic:

"Thirty-five persons were believed killed and many were wounded tonight when a false fire alarm stampeded spectators in a movie theater here [São Paulo, Brazil].

"A majority of the victims were children, knocked down and trampled when panic seized the audience. Several spectators jumped from the balcony to their deaths" (San Francisco *Chronicle*, Apr. 11, 1938).

While theater panics are pretty much a thing of the past, it occasionally happens that fire will cause panic behavior in some other type of poorly constructed and crowded building. The consequences of such a panic are reported in the following news item:

"In San Francisco's Shamrock Club, Dancer Betty Blossom swirled onto the floor, swinging a pair of benzine torches. A drunk rose, foolishly pawed at Dancer Blossom. Up went her arm, up in flames went the flimsy papier-mâché ceiling. When firemen fought their way in to smother the blaze, they found a Chinese cook, three orchestramen hidden in the icebox. Dead from flames and trampling were the hatcheck girl, a woman patron, two men. Torch-Dancer Blossom was arrested for violating San Francisco's fire laws" (*Time*, May 25, 1936).

15. On the *Lusitania*, torpedoed in British waters on May 7, 1915, collective, rather than individual, suicide appears to have been the predominant panic pattern. Early in the course of the disaster, a number of overfilled and badly launched lifeboats sank. This fact, combined with the fact that the ship leaned so much that the remaining lifeboats had to be launched either down the sloping side or out over the water, seems to have been responsible for the establishment of a refuse-to-leave-the-ship pattern. People huddled hopelessly along the rails until the ship sank. Of the 1,954 passengers, 1,189 drowned. The hero of the occasion was an eighteen-year-old boy, under whose leadership a few lifeboats were successfully filled and launched. See C. Vale, "Titanic and Lusitania" (*Forum*, June, 1915) and "Sinking of the Lusitania" (*Living Age*, June 5, 1915).

For the story of a similar incident, the sinking of the *Empress of Ireland*, with the loss of 1,024 lives, on May 29, 1914, see the magazine *Literary Digest*, June 20, 1914, and the magazine *Independent*, June 8, 1914.

16. Much was said, at the time, of the heroic behavior of the men who went down singing with the *Titanic*. On her maiden voyage in April, 1912, this ship struck an iceberg and went down within two hours. Although the sea was calm, although few of the lifeboats were damaged in the collision, and although two hours should have been ample time for the orderly filling and launching of them, only 700 passengers all told were taken off in boats which had a capacity of 1,176. Women were put to sea in undermanned boats, and men went down with the ship. See *Report of the U.S. Investi-*

gating Committee on the Titanic Disaster (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1912); "Disaster to the Titanic" (*Current Lit.*, May, 1912); "Loss of the Titanic" (*Living Age*, May 11, 1912); and "Titanic and Its Heroes" (*World's Work*, June, 1912).

17. Excellent descriptions of mutual aid during the early part of a general crisis are to be found in *The Story of San Michele* by A.M.F. Munthe (New York, Dutton, 1930); in *The Psychology of Suggestion* by B. Sidis (New York, Appleton, 1898); and in *Catastrophe and Social Change* by S.H. Prince (New York, Columbia University Studies in History, Economics, Public Law, XCIV, 1920). Certain theoretical implications of panic behavior are discussed by L.J. Carr in "Disaster and the Sequence-pattern Concept of Social Change" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, 1932, **38**, 207-218).

The study by Prince provides the most exact and complete record available of prolonged and widespread panic behavior. It covers the social events which followed the great Halifax disaster of 1917. The city of Halifax, Nova Scotia, is built around the inner circle of the high hills which surround the bay. Because of its sheltered nature and easterly position, this port was the taking-off place for Allied shipping to Europe during the World War. On Christmas Day, 1917, a munitions ship and a hospital ship collided, the former exploding and literally flattening out the city of Halifax. For some time the survivors rather generally behaved in terms of a help-the-other-person pattern. This phase was succeeded, not by normality, but by a rather general help-oneself-at-any-cost panic pattern. A similar but less general sequence of responses seems to have occurred during the earthquake and fire in San Francisco, Calif., in 1906.

18. In every instance of widespread and prolonged crisis, such as earthquake or flood, the organization of collective effort is ultimately secured by strong dictatorial leadership, usually through the agency of soldiers. Since they are responsive to regimental leadership, soldiers can be used to enforce dictatorial control over the general population. For descriptions of recent crises in which such leadership was resorted to, see the following news reports: "Hell in the Highlands" (*Time*, Mar. 30, 1936); "Hell and High Water" (*Time*, Feb. 1, 1937); and "Yellow Waters" (*Time*, Feb. 8, 1937).

For a technical analysis of antipanic leadership see I.T. Malamud, "A Psychological Approach to the Study of Social Crisis" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, 1938, **43**, 578-592).

19. In describing his experiences with the Iroquois Theater fire, Brady (*op. cit.*, 255) expresses his faith in the power of the leader of an audience to prevent the rise of panic interaction:

"Before long, plenty of rescuers were on hand, more than could do any conceivable good, and I began to think of my own audience at the Garrick. If the news of the Iroquois ever reached there, we'd have another panic of equal proportions. A single whisper of the two words 'fire' and 'theater' would be fatal. I tore downstreet to the Garrick and back-stage to see Lackaye, telling him what went on.

" 'I'm counting on you to save this audience,' I said.

" 'My Lord!' he said. 'What on earth can I do?'

“‘Hold them in their seats between acts,’ I answered. ‘Don’t give anybody a chance to get out in the lobby where they’ll hear something. Tell ’em stories—walk on your hands—anything to keep ’em in their seats.’

“He promised. And he certainly came through on that promise. As one of the best after-dinner speakers in the theatrical world, he was a natural for the assignment. He was never so brilliant, so easy, so humanly entertaining as when he was talking against time in this emergency, conscious all the while of the hundreds dying in agony only a block away.”

CHAPTER XVIII

REVELOUS BEHAVIOR

More common, less spectacular, and of far greater significance than panic behavior, which is an escape from abnormal circumstances, is that type of escape behavior which provides those involved with a temporary release from the humdrum routine of normal life. Such behavior may be designated as revelous in type.

Like recreational types of behavior, revelous behavior is complete in itself; and the satisfactions which are derived from it are immediate and direct. Unlike recreational types of behavior, however, revelous behavior involves a breaking of normal restraints. It can best be described as the behavior of people who have, as it were, agreed to suspend, for the moment, the usual rules of social interaction. The nature of such behavior is suggested by the popular admonition "Eat, drink, and be merry, for tomorrow we die!"

Revelous behavior occurs in most, possibly in all, societies. Even among the primitives and among such staid and complacent peoples as the peasants of Europe, there are occasions when normal restraints are removed and excess is the order of the day. At stated intervals or in celebration of some event, the primitive villager abandons all routine and enjoys a day and night of feasting, singing, and dancing. On religious holidays, the peasant drops his hoe and satiates himself with food and drink—more decorously, perhaps, than the primitive, but none the less satisfactorily. With highly civilized peoples, the occasions when man may "let joy be unconfined" may be more frequent and may take somewhat more complex manifestations. All situations in which revelous behavior occurs, however, have in common the fact that the behavior of the members consists of doing that which is for them unusual and doing that for its own sake.

ORIGIN AND FUNCTION

Although revelous behavior is not without its social significance and social antecedents, it originates in individual needs and individual initiative. Even when the time and place for revelry are socially designated, participation in the revelous situation is a matter of individual initiative and individual need for revelry.

The Need for Revelry.—The need for revelry would seem to be a consequence of the psychological tensions which are brought about by the maladjustment of the individual to his socially designated role. Theoretically, the plastic human animal can be trained to accept almost any type of social role, provided that the social mechanism assures the satisfaction of his physiological needs—for food, water, shelter, etc. There would then exist a perfect equilibrium between the individual and the demands made upon him by his society. Actually, however, this theoretically possible equilibrium is never achieved. The individual is never completely adjusted to his social role; and between him and his society, there is always some friction.¹

The extent to which any individual will be maladjusted to his society depends ultimately upon that society. It is now recognized that opposition between the individual and his society is not inevitable and that such opposition as may exist is social in origin. In general, it may be said that the more integrated the social system, the less any member of the society will find his social role irksome; and that the more disorganized the society, the more members of that society will be badly prepared to accept their social roles. The ultimate origins of social maladjustment are, therefore, sociological in character. The immediate consequences of such maladjustment are, however, psychological in nature.

Maladjustment of the individual to his normal social role may have one or another psychological consequence. These are commonly designated as a sense of monotony or a feeling of frustration, of restraint, of discontent, or the like.² The neurology of such feeling-states is practically unknown. They may, however, be described as psychological tensions. Apparently, such tensions accumulate over periods of time until the particular feeling involved—the monotony of life or whatever it is—becomes

distressing to the individual. In these psychological tensions, which result from the maladjustment of the individual to his social role, lie the immediate origins of the need for revelry.³

As a Tensional Release.—Through revelous behavior, the person who has become bored with the monotony of life or frustrated by social restraints may secure a release therefrom and may thereby reestablish a degree of equilibrium between himself and his society. In most instances, therefore, revelry functions as a means of discharging the psychological tensions which accumulate over a period of time.⁴

It is a commonplace experience that the daily routine of normal life is welcomed after a period of hilarity. However discontented he is before he reaches port, the sailor is usually gratified to resume sea duty after a few violent days on shore. Presumably, the regularized *fête* and *fiesta*, the periodic orgy of the primitive, and so on are simply socially provided devices for the discharge of such tensions as may have generated between the members of a society and the impositions made upon them by that society.

Moralists are prone to find the forms which modern revelry takes an affront to their sense of moral propriety. Other serious-minded men are prone to view these forms of revelry as unreasonable and inexpedient behavior. All agree, at least, that such behavior should be prohibited by law. That revelry may have regrettable by-products—social disgrace, sickness, or death—is not to be questioned. The wild party may end in a highway disaster, a painful headache, or a scandalous pregnancy. These are, perhaps, the chances which the reveler takes. Nevertheless, revelry per se is not to be condemned, since it serves the function of discharging the psychological tensions of the individual and of returning him to his usual pattern of life, content for a while to follow its course. Perhaps it saves his sanity; perhaps it helps to save the social system which generates those tensions.

As a Social Safety Valve.—The fact that definite occasions for revelry are laid down in the social heritages of most peoples suggests the social desirability of revelry. Obviously, the collective function is not a socially constructive one. No positive social control arises through revelous interaction. The essence thereof is release from such controls. Whatever form—*fête*, orgy, or bullfight—revelry takes, it can contribute nothing positive to the social welfare. It always involves unproductive

dissipation of human energies. It may, furthermore, involve some form of wasteful consumption—*e.g.*, overeating at the harvest festival.

It would seem, therefore, that the social provision of occasions for and of patterns of revelous behavior serves a negative social function. Such provision for revelry is a sort of collective insurance against the hazards of individual seeking for the satisfactions of revelous needs. Such provision channelizes the means by which these satisfactions are secured and, thus, minimizes the social disadvantages of individual liberation from restraints.⁵

Undoubtedly it was to prevent individually initiated revelous behavior that harvest and other periodic festivals developed. In agrarian societies, the cyclical character of labor results in a concentration of work during the spring and summer months. This long period of strenuous activity would, no doubt, be unbearably tedious if the worker could not look forward to its termination. The harvest festival marks the end of this period and permits the release in a systematic way of tensions engendered during it. Thus, the harvest festival is a socially provided promise of revelry, which consoles and encourages people during the laborious months preceding the harvest itself.

In a similar way, other periodic festivals, such as the religious festivals of western Europe and the Chinese New Year festival, provide a systematic way of dissipating psychological tensions. As has been indicated, the daily routine of life in even the more stable social orders must have had some tensional by-products. The socially provided opportunity for the periodic release of these tensions would simply serve as general social insurance against the accumulation of such tensions or their liberation through socially destructive or inconvenient channels.

Initiation of Revelous Situations.—The factors which are immediately antecedent to the rise of any revelous situation may be cultural or individual or a mixture of both.

When revelous behavior occurs at socially designated times, the revelous situation has its inception in social factors. This is obvious in the case of harvest festivals, religious festivals, the Chinese New Year, our own New Year's Eve, the primitive orgy, the old-fashioned camp meeting, and so on. Individual initiative operates only to the extent of carrying out socially designated formulas. Tradition designates when, and perhaps where,

individuals will come together for free and hilarious interaction. This aspect of the initiation of a revelous situation is, therefore, a sociological rather than a sociopsychological problem.

Much revelous behavior, however, does not occur at socially designated times. When for any considerable number of individuals sufficient revelry is not socially provided, opportunity exists for the provision of revelry by individual initiative. In many instances, revelous situations are initiated by political or religious leaders, as is the case when the village chieftain declares a holiday to celebrate success in war or in some other event or when an evangelist comes to a town and offers the populace a rousing attack upon the devil.

Evidently there is today insufficient social provision for revelry; for most modern revelry is initiated by individuals and, furthermore, by individuals whose interest is not in the satisfaction of revelous needs but in the commercial profits to be derived from providing others with that satisfaction. Such provision of revelry is comparable to the commercial and professional provision of recreation. Just as the club may provide a place for congenial-like associations, the barroom may offer facilities for revelry. Even as the theater provides a place and leadership for the satisfaction of recreational needs, the night club offers a place and leadership by orchestra and entertainers for those who need revelous outlets. Likewise, many festivals are commercial and professional offerings of revelry. When there is already present some general need for revelry, the initiation of such a festival is a matter of individual interest. Such is the character of the little fairs which occur in the smaller towns of France, the county fairs of the United States, the various expositions, and so on.

IDEOLOGIES

Apparently most primitives have felt under no compulsion to justify their revelry by elaborate systems of ideologies. In some instances, primitive revelry was vaguely associated with the spirit world; but in general it was, like congenial behavior, just taken for granted. Even the orgiastic dance, a more or less established form of revelry in some primitive societies, does not seem to have been considered as anything more than what it was—a time to indulge in excesses.

The civilized peoples, on the other hand, have usually justified periodic revelry on some ideological grounds. Revelry is then undertaken in a good cause, rather than because it is satisfying to those who so indulge themselves. Thus, the Greeks justified their revelous behavior on the grounds that such behavior was amusing or gratifying to the gods. The revelous behavior of the New Year festival and the various periodic family and clan festivities of the Chinese was justified on quasi-religious grounds.

It is, however, to the Christian peoples that we must turn for the most fully developed ideologies of revelry. The religious festivals of the Middle Ages were usually "in honor" of saints. The borrowed Amerindian harvest festival of Thanksgiving was a "giving thanks to God for His blessings." The ancient pagan festivities which surrounded Christmas were a "rejoicing for the birth of Christ." Even today the hysteria which is induced under the guidance of professional evangelists is to the "glory of God and eternal salvation." All such activities, however, are simply revelry which is justified by religious ideologies.

Much modern revelry is more or less satisfactorily justified on the grounds that it is productive. Such an ideology is in keeping with the current assumption that man's primary function is to store up material wealth. Thus, the county fair is ideologically justified as a means of furthering agricultural progress.⁶ The political, business, or other convention is ideologically justified as a means by which the members can collectively achieve some political, economic, or social end. Upon such grounds, indulgence in "painting the town red" is justified by the American Legionnaire at his annual convention.⁷

MEMBERSHIP

Although the means of and the bases for selection may not be evident, some social selection always operates in determining the membership of any revelous situation. Only those who live in the primitive village, and, perhaps, their invited guests, can participate in a village orgiastic dance. Only adult, unmarried males of the primitive community of the Manus could engage in the sexual excesses of the bachelor house.⁸ Only adult whites who are wearing evening clothes and who are able to pay the stiff tariff can join the New Year's revelry at one of our more pre-

tentious night clubs. Only invited guests can join a private host in a drinking bout in his penthouse. Only members of a family and their guests and relatives can sit down to Thanksgiving dinner to gorge themselves on turkey and the usual trimmings. Thus, some social qualifications are prerequisite to membership in any revelous situation.

In those societies which systematically provide occasions for revelous behavior, participation is a community affair. In the modern world, however, the tendency is for each individual to seek out revelous satisfactions from among the various, and often commercial, offerings which are available to him. From those revelous situations which are available, the individual will select that which promises to satisfy his particular need for revelry. The sailor may find an outlet for his tensions in a brothel or a barroom. The college student may go to a football game and its subsequent celebration; or he may go on some other kind of mild week-end spree. The society matron may break her self-imposed diet at an afternoon tea. The penurious country youth may secure comparable satisfaction by recklessly spending a few dollars on his girl at the county fair. The membership of a given revelous situation is, therefore, self-elected in much the same way as is the membership of a modern recreational audience.

The individual who elects himself to membership in any revelous situation must, obviously, want to participate in that situation. The man who is fortuitously caught in a revelous group and is kept in it against his will has not, of course, elected himself to membership. The man who goes on a hilarious party because to do so is "good business" or "good politics" is not seeking revelous satisfactions. His membership is formal only. With the exception of such people, the members of any revelous situation are self-elected in terms of their individual interests in the specific kind of revelry.

OVERT AND COVERT ASPECTS OF INTERACTION

In congenial situations, it will be recalled, there is a close relationship between the overt and the covert aspects of interaction. The members of the congenial situation freely express their opinions, interests, and so on. This expression is not, however, completely unrestrained. In the first place, it is

tempered by leadership considerations. If he is to obtain leadership, each member must overtly express himself in such a way as to secure the attention of his associates; he must conform to their interests; and he must at times subordinate himself to their leadership. In the second place, the expression of covert feeling-states is limited almost exclusively to verbal outlets. The member of the congenial situation may, for example, verbally express his approval of a pretty girl; but he does not express his appreciation through nonsymbolic actions. He may verbally complain of the irksome burden of clothing which has been imposed upon him by social tradition, but he does not divest himself of that clothing.

Revelous behavior, on the other hand, is neither tempered by leadership considerations nor limited to verbal outlets. It involves complete and unrestrained expression of the covert feeling-state, which might be loosely described as the desire to release tension by doing that which is unusual. In satisfying this desire, each member is a "leader" in his own right. The result is analogous to the behavior of a group of people who are all talking at once. Furthermore, expression may take the form of nonsymbolic action. The member of the revelous situation may, for example, kiss the girl; or, if he feels like doing so, he may remove his irksome clothing.

Revelry is, however, never spontaneous. No matter how intense the individual needs for revelous outlets, revelous behavior must always be induced; that is to say, people never announce that the normal social restraints are suspended and then proceed immediately to revelous action. The normal—whatever it may be—is too habitual to permit this. Revelry does not, therefore, spring into being; it generates slowly. Each member of the situation gradually becomes stimulated to revelous action by the situational interaction and, in turn, contributes his part to the amplification of that interaction. In other words, revelous behavior both stimulates and liberates the individual. It induces as well as represents the overt expression of his covert feeling-state.⁹

Pseudorevelous Behavior.—Under contemporary social conditions, people are so much accustomed to subordinating their immediate impulses to the dictates of good form and good business that they find it difficult to "let down." In business,

trade, and industry, in the drawing room, and even at home, the behavior of the modern man may be largely formal, conventional, and exchange in type. The habit of subordinating his covert feeling-states intensifies his need for revelous behavior and, at the same time, makes indulgence in revelry difficult for him.

What appears to be revelry is, therefore, often no more than a well-staged show in which the members simply play the roles of revelous people. The middle-aged playboy who feels that he must play up to the idea that he is still young in spirit if not in years, for example, is not truly revelous. He is, rather, playing the part of a revelous youth. Dining and dancing are just matters of doing what he "ought" to do, however he may feel. If his feet hurt, his head aches, and his girdle strains his patience and his avoirdupois, he is not letting down. The tensions which have generated in his home and his office are not being released.

Because so many modern people, old and young, male and female, are so much accustomed to playing roles which do not express their covert feeling-states, modern "revelry" is likely to be strained and artificial. Such real revelry as does occur generally requires so much skillful induction and then takes such violent forms that it may become undistinguishable from fanatical or even rebellious behavior.

LEADERSHIP

In the generation of revelous behavior, some sort of directive leadership always appears. What form directive leadership takes depends upon the particular revelous situation. The character of such leadership will, therefore, become evident in the discussion of the various types of revelous behavior. In general, however, it may be said that directive leadership consists of inducing revelry by facilitating the process of interactional amplification.

The primitive may find the beat of a drum, the chant of many voices, and the rhythmic movements of his fellows adequate to induce revelry. In this case, the directive leadership is provided by the musicians. The simple fellow may find the prospect of and the activities which culminate in the *fiesta* sufficient to arouse him to revelry. In this case, directive leadership is provided by the organizers of the *fiesta*. The more civilized of modern

men, who find it difficult to forget their pride, their prestige, and their usual roles, may resort to the use of alcohol in an effort to induce revelous behavior. The one who provides or encourages the consumption of such alcohol is then in some measure the directive leader of any revelry which may be forthcoming.

Once the revelous interaction is established, each member is, however, a "leader"; *i.e.*, he is free to express himself as he sees fit. The way in which he expresses himself is, of course, likely to be rather largely determined by the type of revelous interaction. At the feast, he will eat; at the dance, he will dance; and so on. He will, however, neither eat nor dance unless he wants to; and what he eats or how he dances depends largely upon him.

TYPES OF REVELRY

The varieties of revelous behavior are limited only by individual ingenuity in devising methods for releasing psychological tensions. The more characteristic forms of revelry, however, may be grouped in terms of the directive leadership which is involved in inducing revelous interaction. Three general categories result: that in which leadership is congenial-like in character; that in which leadership is comparable to the leadership of a theater audience; and that in which leadership is comparable to the leadership of a conversational-lecture audience. Each of these general categories includes a number of types of revelous behavior.

The Festival.—The festival is not a specific type of revelous behavior but is, rather, a socially designated period of general revelry. It usually includes a number of related types of revelous behavior: the feast, the spectacle, the participant audience, and, for some societies at least, the orgiastic dance. The festival ordinarily lasts a number of days, during which all behavior takes on festival coloring. Indulgence in revelous activities becomes a preoccupation in much the same way as does a craze.

When, as was the case in the older societies, the festival is traditional, the prefestival preparations serve to induce the general spirit of revelry; and deliberate, directive leadership is unnecessary. The prefestival period involves a general redirection of activities from normal channels to the preparation of food for feasting and the preparation of homes, streets, and so on, for the various festivities. The attention of all is upon the coming

events, and little else will be thought or talked about. As a consequence, the entire membership of the community is involved in a process of protracted interactional amplification.¹⁰

The modern community, on the other hand, is usually so lacking in organization that traditional festivals are likely to be nothing more than gestures; and a good deal of deliberate, directive leadership is necessary to induce a general sense of festivity. The combined efforts of religious, political, and economic interests are, for example, necessary to arouse the spirit of festivity in modern peoples during even our most venerated period of festivity—Christmas. The generation of this spirit for such events as a county fair, an exposition, or a celebration of some such community accomplishment as the completion of a bridge requires heroic effort on the part of civic leaders. This effort will be forthcoming only when merchants and others are sufficiently interested in the possibilities of commercially exploiting the revelers to provide financial and other support for the proposed festival.¹¹

Superficially, festivals may differ greatly. Each people has worked out its own traditional form. There is, for example, considerable difference between the events which occur in a Spanish *fiesta* and those which occur during a German harvest festival. The old New Orleans Mardi Gras has no great outward resemblance to a Chinese New Year celebration. On the surface, a county fair is quite unlike the celebration of the completion of a bridge.

All festivals, however, are alike in that they are preceded by activities which generate the spirit of revelry to the point at which revelous behavior becomes a preoccupation and in that they are justified as a celebration or thanksgiving for something or other. Moreover, most festivals have in common a parade which marks the termination of the period of preparation for revelry. In the Spanish *fiesta de los toros*, for example, it was generally the practice to hold an *encierro* on the morning of the bullfight—preceded by the excited citizenry, the bulls were run through the streets to the ring. In other festivals, the parade is martial in character; in still others, it consists of an extravagant display of floats, effigies, etc. Whatever its particular character, the parade seems to bring about interactional amplification among the spectators.

CONGENIAL FORMS OF REVELRY

In some instances revelous behavior is induced by congenial-like leadership—*i.e.*, leadership which is shifting and random. Such revelry may be unintended and unanticipated by the members of the situation. People who have come together seeking congenial satisfactions may remain to liberate their psychological tensions.

The Confessional.—The simplest and most common form of congenial revelry is that in which two or more intimates “confess” to one another their innermost ambitions, hopes, or despairs. Before the fire on a blustery evening, beneath a moon on a summer’s night, or whenever the external conditions are favorable, the conversational barriers may gradually fall, until the congenial interaction becomes a mildly revelous one. That state is brought about by progressive interstimulation: one member of the situation reveals a little of his usually reserved sense of futility, or whatever the feeling is, thereby encourages another to go a step farther, and so on, until, perhaps, all are reveling in the opportunity to pour out their troubles, their ideals, or their true feelings about any one of a number of things.¹²

Usually such a confessional is limited to verbal interchange. It is not unheard of, however, for a group of women to work themselves into a state of weeping. It is not infrequent, furthermore, for conversational revelry between a girl and boy or a man and woman to be the preface to or to lead to sexual behavior.

The collective confessional can be a most salutary safety valve. The feeling of relief which follows such indulgence is familiar to all who have experienced it. It serves to secure to a higher degree and more or less unintentionally what a mother attempts when she encourages her daughter to “tell all” and what the psychoanalyst tries to do when he probes the patient’s “subconscious.”

The Spree.—A second type of revelry which grows out of congenial-like leadership is the spree. Although people sometimes deliberately set out on a spree, it is ordinarily a fortuitous achievement of outlets for psychological tensions.

It is, perhaps, inevitable that those whose work removes them for considerable periods from the opportunity for recreation and

revelry should try to make up for lost time in one night of violent activity. Furthermore, those men whose work is fraught with considerable hazard must, perhaps, either periodically "blow off steam" or ultimately "blow up." The members of such occupational groups as soldiers, sailors, lumberjacks, and oil-field workers tend to indulge in unruly and violent activities whenever they get to town. With such men, the line between recreation and revelry is particularly vague. The man who is just off a ship or away from a construction job may start his evening with a picture show; but, before the night is out, he will likely be indulging in revelous situations.

The appearance of brothel and barroom in the boom town, along the waterfront, and in towns located near army camps is not to be blamed upon the operators of such establishments. Proprietors, barkeepers, gamblers, and dance-hall girls are an effect rather than a cause. When the need for revelous outlets is established by circumstances of an occupational nature, the means for revelry will be found; or the men will desert their employment or become unmanageable. The boisterous character of activities in saloons and dance halls of waterfront, cow town, and boom town is simply a reflection of the fact that the men who patronize such places have more than normal need for revelous outlets.¹⁸

The spree is, however, by no means limited to those whose occupations remove them from normal social life or subject them to extreme hazards. What starts as a reasonably sedate party of settled, urban dwellers may develop into hilarity which liberates the members from their normal restraints. Such a spree has been described as a wild party.

Today certain occasions more or less traditionally favor the development of the spree during the progress of what is at the outset no more, perhaps, than a dancing party. New Year's Eve parties tend so to degenerate. During the latter stages of an after-game dance, the celebrators of a football game may drift to private rooms for more freedom of action. Large conventions are, as has already been mentioned, the occasion for revelry of all sorts, including the spree. The so-called rent parties which are held by the Negroes of Harlem quite commonly consist in behavior which starts as a party and ends as a spree.

RECREATIONAL-AUDIENCE FORMS OF REVELRY

The line between the purely recreational and the predominantly revelous audience is never clear. The basic distinction can, however, be grasped from a comparison of the usual theater audience and that which attends a prize fight or wrestling match or from a comparison of the usual concert audience and that which attends a football game, a bullfight, or a gladiatorial contest. In the former instances, the audience reaction is primarily covert. In the latter instances, audience members cheer, jeer, and otherwise overtly express themselves; *i.e.*, their vicarious participation in the conflict which takes place on the stage or in the arena is overt as well as covert. Whenever the interaction between the members themselves is more important and more prolonged than is the interaction between each member and the leader of the audience, that audience is more revelous than recreational.

Ordinarily, the membership of a revelous audience assembles for the explicit purpose of revelry. In any event, the revelous audience begins as a passive audience. Its activation to revelry is a consequence of deliberate, directive leadership. The various methods which are used by leaders to induce revelous interaction result in a number of types of recreational-audience revelry.

The Orgiastic Dance.—The traditional dancing of primitives is, perhaps, the clearest illustration of the orgiastic dance, in which rhythmic leadership is used to induce complete physical abandonment. Such dancing starts as a relatively passive audience which has assembled for revelry. At the outset, a few of the group dance, sing, and beat the drums, while most watch and listen. As rhythmic interstimulation progresses, more and more members are induced to join in the dancing until all are involved. The final effect is the forcing of the participants to violent and ever more unrestrained action. Frequently, the primitive orgiastic dance involves movements which are suggestive of, or related to, those of the sex act. When this is the case, it is easy to see how the frenzy which is induced by prolonged dancing can culminate in a sexual orgy.¹⁴

The orgiastic dance is not restricted to primitive societies. Such dancing has in a number of instances spread as a sort of craze through ordinarily sedate populations. Furthermore,

during the course of a drunken spree, it is not uncommon for the rhythms of the modern dance to lead to violent and unrestrained action. Moreover, conversational-audience revelry—such as that of the “church meeting” of the southern Negro—may culminate in orgiastic dancing.

Not all dancing, of course, is of the orgiastic type. The musical leadership of folk dances and ballroom dances provides stimulation through rhythm; but it keeps the intensity and the tempo stable. As a consequence, there is little possibility for the interactional amplification which might otherwise encourage the dancers to progressive abandonment.¹⁵

Participant Audiences.—In the old-time melodrama and in the early days of vaudeville it was traditional for some audiences to be participant in type. Such participation consisted of unrestrained overt reaction of the audience to the performers and was definitely encouraged by those performers, who used special techniques—such as a coy glance at the audience—to arouse overt expression. The fun of hissing the villain of a melodrama and calling advice to the desperate hero might make up for any deficiencies of the performance as a drama.

The use of actors simply as the leaders of participant audiences was carried to an extreme in the old-fashioned amateur night, with its inevitable hook, in which every effort was made to make the performers an object of ridicule. Some of the reputations of the last century were founded on the fact that the actor was so poor that he always gave his audience a good time. In some instances, in fact, this ability to appear at the worst was deliberately cultivated; and the ability of the audience to amuse itself by revelous participation was definitely exploited.¹⁶

Likewise, the entertainment which was offered by the old-time beer hall depended for its effect largely upon audience participation. With their beer mugs, the patrons could beat out the rhythm of such music as was provided; and, if the orchestra was a bit off key, it was overlooked. They could join a singer in her songs; and, if she did none too well herself, they did not notice. The comedian's jokes might be humorless; but the members of the participant, beer-hall audience could get as much fun out of jeering at him as from laughing with him.

The Spectacle.—The spectacle is a performance presented to a large audience which has assembled in a high state of anticipation

for revelry. This state is the consequence of a more or less protracted period of build-up, during which a number of other situations—*e.g.*, the football rally—are involved.

Spectacle leadership generally involves the working out, before the audience, of some simple but dramatic form of conflict. Usually the dramatic roles are of a traditional character—lions and Christians, bull and matador, titleholder and the contestant for the title, the team of X and the team of Y universities, etc. Usually the performers are of such a nature that the audience can more or less take sides. The Spanish, for example, have a fondness for *El Toro* and may be quite as pleased when he is winning as when the matador has the upper hand.

In any event, the issue of the conflict is so clearly drawn that the members of the audience can vicariously participate; and the conflict itself is so intense that some members are aroused to overt expression of this participation. Their expressions then act as stimuli for other members to express themselves overtly. Audience interaction continues to build up, until the behavior of the audience is of greater importance than is the behavior of the performers in the spectacle.

The audience may, in fact, finally become so enthusiastic that it literally joins in the fray. The Roman gladiatorial contest terminated in a general free-for-all fight.¹⁷ Bullfight enthusiasts often jump into the arena and, even when they stay in their seats, quarrel violently with their neighbors. The spectators at a modern football game may take the conflict so much to heart that at the conclusion of the game they swarm down on the field and uproot the goal posts.

Such subsequent behavior is, however, more or less incidental. The revelous effect of the spectacle is secured mainly by the vicarious participation of the spectators in the conflict which is enacted. The excited spectators expend their wrathful energies in vicariously and symbolically assisting their favored combatant. The spectacle is, therefore, one of the least hazardous modes of large-scale revelry.

The effectiveness of the spectacle as a liberator of psychological tensions has led to its purposive use by political leaders in the attempt to exhaust the discontent of a populace. Notable in this connection was the use during the period of the Roman republic of "bread and circuses" to check the growth of popular

rebellion. Whenever the unemployed mobs of Rome became too restive, they were given a little bread to stem their hunger and a great spectacle to dissipate their anger.

Of recent years, this use of the spectacle has been consciously revived by those political dictators who have found their subjects becoming unruly. Latin-American politicians have discovered that a bullfight is an excellent social palliative and that it may considerably postpone the outbreak of revolution. The pageantry of Mussolini's Italy, Hitler's Germany, and Stalin's Russia can only be so interpreted.¹⁸ Although our American spectacles are not so purposively used, they undoubtedly fulfill a revelous function for certain classes of the population. One of the strongest arguments for college football, for example, is that it serves to dissipate the tensions of the college student and, thus, to prevent their liberation through less socially desirable channels.

CONVERSIONAL-AUDIENCE FORMS OF REVELRY

When the interaction among the members of the conversional audience becomes more important than the interaction between that audience and the conversional lecturer, the situation is revelous in type. Such is the case when the members of an audience turn from heckling the leader to heckling one another and pass, as it were, out of control.

Usually such revelry is leader induced. It is often to the advantage of the politician or other speaker to arouse his audience to intense interstimulation and to make audience membership a source of revelous satisfactions.

Rabble Rousing.—Politicians who are skilled at arousing conversional audiences to a revelous pitch are often spoken of as rabble rousers. Unquestionably the outstanding rabble rouser of recent years is Adolf Hitler; it has been said of him that he intoxicates his audiences to wild enthusiasm for himself and for the salvation that he promises. In the building of such enthusiasm, audience interstimulation is quite as important as is the behavior of the leader.

The rabble rouser who is well known as such tends to draw an audience which is selected in terms of the desire of the members for revelry of this order. They are not necessarily the rabble—

i.e., the lowest class. They will, however, tend to be malcontents and discontents who are in need of self-expression. In view of the character of his audience, the noted rabble rouser need only build his audience up to such an intensity that the more responsive members break over into overt expressions of enthusiasm. From that point on, the problem of the rabble rouser is mainly one of guiding revelous interaction. When the audience is fully aroused, his slightest and most trivial word may be sufficient to start waves of response moving through the audience.

The Camp Meeting.—A religious form of conversational-audience revelry appears in the camp meeting. A century ago, the camp meeting was a regular event in the lives of many rural people. Like the festival, the camp meeting usually lasted a number of days. In some regions it still persists in its original form, although its more characteristic form today is that of the summer-camp affairs which are held for young people by certain religious organizations.¹⁹

The camp meeting might be described as a kind of vacation which is held under the guise of interest in religious welfare and during which the vacationists are aroused to revelous frenzy by more or less professional leadership. The usual pattern—and it has been little changed through the years—is for people to gather in family groups at some traditional meeting ground “to hear preaching.” For the youth of today, the pretext for a meeting is usually the discussion of some pressing social problem.

The early stages of the camp meeting resemble nothing so much as a festival.²⁰ The normal excitement which is attendant upon making camp and renewing old acquaintances is gradually aggravated by preachers; and, after some days of professional preaching and continuous audience interstimulation, hysteria usually becomes so acute that self-appointed leaders arise. It has not been uncommon for adolescents to “get taken” and to preach, with or without the support of listeners, for hours on end. Before such a meeting ends, excitement, plus physical exhaustion, usually results in the collapse of a considerable proportion of those who are attending.

The Audience *Fanatique*.—Another religious form of conversational-audience revelry, distinct because it follows a designated pattern, is that of the audience *fanatique*. The members of this

type of audience assemble with the avowed purpose of saving their souls and proceed, under professional guidance and by rather fixed stages, to revel in the "glory of God."

The best known forms of the audience *fanatique* are the "church meetings" of the southern Negro, the congregations of the Holy Rollers, and the audiences of such noted evangelists as Aimee Semple McPherson and the late Billy Sunday.²¹

The audience *fanatique* grows out of and apparently ameliorates the tensions which are engendered by social maladjustment. For some people, attendance at an evangelistic meeting may be no more than a means of securing recreational satisfactions. For a considerable proportion, however, it is a means of temporarily escaping the restraints of an oppressive society. Although the evangelist thrives on social decadence, it should not be supposed that he serves no function. He serves in his curious way much the same function as does the political demagogue. So effective as a release of psychological tensions is the revelry of an evangelistic audience that, it has been claimed, noted evangelists have been employed by industrial interests to hold revivals for discontented employees.

The audience of the professional evangelist is always highly select. In the first place, the evangelist, since he is interested in leadership as an occupation, selects those communities in which there is a considerable proportion of pseudoreligious, ignorant, and discontented people. In the second place, the evangelist draws to his meetings only the susceptible members of a community. These members are prepared to be "converted"; *i.e.*, they are prepared for revelry. Furthermore, they are generally habitués of evangelistic meetings and are fully conversant with the procedure.

The evangelistic meeting usually begins with the singing of a few rousing hymns. The effect of this is to initiate audience interaction. The next phase is a conversional lecture or sermon, in which the audience is cast in the role of the desperate heroine about to be saved by the divine hero.²² Some evangelists, notably the late Billy Sunday, skillfully introduce a considerable proportion of pornography, presumably upon the assumption that many of their listeners are sexually thwarted. During the sermon, overt action—particularly the spontaneous cry of "Amen!"—is encouraged.

At the conclusion of the sermon, overt evidences of "conversion" are secured. The procedure may follow one of a number of patterns. The late Billy Sunday usually urged converts to come down forward or to come up on the platform and confess their sins. The noted Aimee Semple McPherson professed to be a miracle healer and urged the sick of body, as well as of soul, to limp to the platform and joyfully cast aside their canes or crutches. Some evangelists have had so little confidence in their power to induce hysteria in members of the audience that they have employed confederates who were skilled at "confession" or at being "cured" of some faked disability. At any event, the effect of such action is to fortify the leadership of the evangelist. As the more responsive members come forward, their behavior acts as a stimulus for the behavior of others, until at the climax of the meeting even the least susceptible member will have been drawn into the general interaction.

The extent to which such religious liberation will go depends, apparently, upon the desires of the professional evangelist. Ordinarily, the revelry will be checked when the entire membership of the audience has been "converted"—especially, converted to the desirability of making some financial contribution.

The effects of evangelistic "conversion" are, of course, as temporary as are the effects of any revelous behavior. They cure nothing, neither the cause of psychological tensions nor the physiological ills of their converts. As a temporary outlet, however, revelous behavior of this type apparently serves well those who are, for whatever reason, inhibited from joining in other forms of revelry.

APPENDIX

1. For an extended analysis of the origins and character of personality maladjustment and for surveys of the literature on this subject see R.T. LaPiere and P.R. Farnsworth, *Social Psychology* (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1936, 174-194 and 313-362).

2. There are a number of rather distinct ways by which partial maladjustment of the individual to his society arises. One of the more commonplace circumstances is the failure of a society to train the individual to complacent acceptance of repetitious tasks. For most individuals, the frequent repetition of a given pattern of action produces a sense of monotony.

Although the sense of monotony is thought by some to be a sort of fatigue and, thus, a natural consequence of doing the same thing over and over, more likely it is of psychological rather than physiological origin. Even

under conditions of strict social control, life cannot fail to be varied for the growing child. The sheer necessity to learn makes for a variety of experiences. When, however, socially standardized patterns of action have been fully acquired, their steady repetition is in opposition to the need for variety which has developed during the acquisitive period. To the child, learning to hoe corn, for example, is a new and exciting experience. While learning to do this, he also—to oversimplify the process—learns to want new and exciting experiences. Once he has learned to hoe the corn and then is forced to do so continually, an opposition exists between this repetitious action and the desire for new experience which he acquired while learning. It would seem to be this opposition, rather than repetition per se, which produces monotony.

Under the term "the wish for new experience," W.I. Thomas and F. Znaniecki (*The Polish Peasant in Europe and America*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1918, 4 vols.) have treated extensively the problem of monotony and the seeking for variety. Further treatment of this subject is given by W.I. Thomas in *The Unadjusted Girl* (Boston, Little, Brown, 1923).

3. The term "tensions" has an unfortunately Freudian flavor. It has, however, been used in the sociological literature in the same non-Freudian sense in which it is used here. This usage is that which has been advocated by L.K. Frank ("The Management of Tensions," *Amer. J. Sociol.*, 1928, **33**, 705-736; and "Physiological Tensions and Social Structure," *Proc. Amer. Sociol. Soc.*, **22**, 74-82) and adopted by W.I. Thomas (*Primitive Behavior*, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1937, Chap. X).

4. Thomas (*op. cit.*, 264) describes the role of revelous behavior in primitive societies thus:

"A further feature of primitive behavior is the relaxation of inhibitions and the release of tensions periodically—on occasions of stress and excitement, during and following painful ceremonies, as conciliatory approaches to others in critical situations, in connection with death, during routine collective labor, and even as stimulant of the interest and activity of spirits."

5. The use of regularized revelry as a social safety valve in primitive societies is described by Thomas (*op. cit.*, 264) as follows:

"Stealing, sexual orgies, disregard of incest barriers, and obscenity accompany these temporary conventionalizations of license. . . .

"The disorder [conventionalized license] is a social pattern substituted temporarily for the conventional one, and in some cases the periodic release of tension may be regarded as a physiological relaxation preparatory to the resumption of the state of sustained tension."

6. The county fair and the state fair are traditional, festive periods in American rural life. Ideologically, and to some slight extent actually, the fair is an occasion for the acquisition and the exchange of technical knowledge. The primary function of the fair, however, as is suggested by the following news item, is to give rural people a revelous outlet after the tedious summer months:

"Last week as August gave way to September the time had come for the gala event of the farm year—the State Fair. In twelve great agricultural states the exciting aroma of hot dogs filled the noses, the brave piping of

calliopes filled the ears and the bright glare of rockets filled the eyes of some 3,000,000 U.S. country folk celebrating Fair Week. September would not see the end of this rural revelry, for the South, busy with its tobacco and cotton, cannot frolic much before frost. . . .

"One visitor out of ten wants to see the agricultural exhibits. The other nine prefer the auto races, rodeo, Midway and girls 'undraped, unveiled and unashamed.' . . . Nobody ever got trampled inspecting a colt in the Horse Barn. But last week [at the Iowa State Fair] many a toe got stepped on while its owner ogled a filly named Jade Rhodora [strip dancer] in that brawling half-moon of tents pitched east of the race track" (*Time*, Sept. 9, 1935).

7. For descriptive material on the revelous aspects of recent American Legion conventions see the news item "Colossal Convention" (*Time*, Oct. 4, 1937).

L. Mumford (*Technics and Civilization*, New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1934, 309-311) and L.C. Rosten ("Men Like War," *Harper's Mag.*, July, 1935, 189-197), among others, have suggested that even warfare constitutes for many participants a form of revelry. The thesis is that the breakdown of normal restraints during warfare relieves bored wives of their husbands, provides bored husbands a relief from their wives, and gives the harassed heads of families an opportunity and an excuse for leaving their responsibilities behind them.

8. See M. Mead, *Growing Up in New Guinea* (New York, Morrow, 1930, 173). For other descriptions of the membership limitations which frequently surround revelous situations in primitive societies, see Thomas (*op. cit.*, Chap. X).

9. The way in which interactional amplification operates to induce revelous behavior is briefly described in the following news report of a wild form of dancing which spread as a fad over the United States in 1937:

"The fun began at this particular dance when Jack Wardlaw and band swung out on the new dance . . . the 'Big Apple Stomp.' . . . The huge crowd, besides shouting every minute at the top of their lungs . . . started clapping out of tempo and stamping their feet. . . . Imagine five hundred people all shouting and clapping and stamping. . . . Pretty soon the band ceased playing and the big apple dance continued, carried on by the worked-up emotions and stomping of the multitude. Beautiful girls in gorgeous evening dresses were going to town out there in a wilder orgy than the feasts of Bacchus. Shortly after this the plaster started falling off the walls, but that had no effect whatsoever on the dancers, the participants of this weird ritual, 'The Big Apple,' continuing on and on" (*Down Beat*, September, 1937).

10. For descriptive materials on some of the historic festivals see:

Ferguson, E., *Fiesta in Mexico*, New York, Knopf, 1934.

Fowler, W. W., *The Roman Festivals of the Period of the Republic*, New York, Macmillan, 1899.

Hemingway, E., *Death in the Afternoon*, New York, Scribner, 1932.

Ibañez, V. B., *Blood and Sand*, New York, Dutton, 1919.

- Pérez de Ayala, R., *Política y Toros*, Madrid, Casa Editorial Calleja, 1918.
 Spicer, D.G., *The Book of Festivals*, New York, Womans Press, 1937.
 Swain, B., *Fools and Folly during the Middle Ages and the Renaissance*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1932.
 Tinker, F., *Old New Orleans*, New York, Appleton, 1931.

11. For descriptive materials on some of the recent, commercially sponsored "festivals"—the Texas Centennial, the San Francisco Bridge Festival, and the Paris Exposition of 1937, respectively—see: "Bluebonnet Boldness" (*Time*, June 8, 1936); "Bay Bridge" (*Time*, Nov. 23, 1936); and "Success" (*Time*, Aug. 9, 1937).

12. The fact that the confessional has considerable revelous value has led to its being exploited by pseudoreligious leaders. As utilized by the Oxford Group (Buchmanites), for example, the confessional has little or nothing to do with religious ideology and everything to do with revelry. See the news items "Buchmanites at Berne" (*Time*, Sept. 23, 1935) and "Men, Masters and Messiahs" (*Time*, Apr. 20, 1936) and the article "Betraying the Confessional" by F.J. Nicketes (*Christian Century*, Jan. 13, 1937, 43-45).

13. That the cause of the drunken spree lies in social circumstances which demand an occasional escape, rather than, as moralists assume, in the commercial provision of opportunities for such indulgence, is illustrated by the history of an attempt to check the week-end sprees of English industrial workers. Motivated, no doubt, by the best of intentions, the stringent closing of the "pubs" in the depressing East End of London some years ago had, however, such unanticipated consequences that it was soon found advisable to remove the harsh restrictions. Withholding alcohol from workers who were accustomed to a week-end drunk reduced drunkenness and disorderly conduct, but it caused a striking increase in the frequency of wife beating, murder, and suicide.

T. White ("Building the Big Dam," *Harper's Mag.*, June, 1935, 117) gives an excellent picture of the revelous needs and outlets of the men who built Boulder Dam. He says:

"To men who have pushed concrete fifteen days, or nights, with no more emotional outlet than a pool table can absorb, Las Vegas becomes a natural and compelling magnet. The liquor is vile and no one trusts the wheels; but all drink and play furiously. It is pay-day, and it matters not what the night of the week. Where Sunday and Christmas are days like any others, traditional Saturday-night revels lose all significance. By ten-thirty things are well under way. By two everyone is drunk and begging for more. Rooms, as large as small auditoriums, are packed to bursting with sweating inebriates fighting for the edge of the gambling tables."

14. For explicit descriptions of the pattern of the orgiastic dance in primitive societies see: B. Malinowski, *The Sexual Life of Savages* (New York, Halcyon House, 1929); and B.Z. Goldberg, *The Sacred Fire* (New York, Liveright, 1932, 143-196).

For the upper classes of ancient Rome, sexual excess was the climax of a feast rather than a dance. See O. Keifer, *Sexual Life in Ancient Rome* (New York, Dutton, 1935).

15. There is no doubt that modern dancing occasionally approaches the orgiastic type. For various opinions on the character and functions of what might be described as normal modern dancing, see the following articles:

- Burke, O., "Ideology of the Dance," *Nation*, July 31, 1937, 139.
 Flanagan, H., "Word Became Flesh," *New Republic*, May, 1936, 65-67.
 Jones, I. W., "Ordeal by the Dance," *Scribner's Mag.*, January, 1936, 53-55.
 Love, P., "New Forms of the Dance," *Nation*, June 12, 1937, 679-680.
 Oliver, G., and P. Davis, "Modern Dance Program," *New Republic*, July, 1936, 244.
 Price, L., "All-man Performance," *Atlantic Monthly*, November, 1936, 602-606.

16. In his book *Showman* (New York, Dutton, 1937, 20-21) W. Brady describes the revelous participation which seems to have been traditional for the New York Bowery audiences of the last century:

"The management, knowing its customers, had stretched a net across the stage, but not high enough to shield the Count [a ham actor] from the plunging fire of the galleries. As soon as the Count got going on 'Angels and ministers of grace defend us,' the gallery let him have it—carrots, eggs and tomatoes. . . .

"Cabbages were flying toward the end. During the graveyard scene, the Count picked up a cabbage instead of Yorick's skull, held it out toward the audience and amended Shakespeare for the customers:

"'Alas, poor cabbagehead,' he said, 'gaze upon thy brothers out there!'

"That drew fish-heads, riper eggs and more cabbages.

"The Bowery hadn't had such a swell time since the Civil War draft riots. Night after night the Count played Hamlet and the boys kept up the fun. They were happy, and so was the Count, because his Hamlet was actually outdrawing Edwin Booth's, playing at the Academy of Music."

17. For descriptive materials on the Roman spectacles which, as has frequently been remarked, were given along with a little bread to quiet the restive populace of that decadent city, see: T. G. Tucker, *Life in the Roman World of Nero and St. Paul* (New York, Macmillan, 1910, 260-288); and L. Friedländer, *Roman Life and Manners under the Early Empire* (New York, Dutton, 1908, Vol. II, Chaps. I and III).

18. Unable to throw Christians to the lions in true Roman fashion, ingenious Adolf Hitler provided his people with substitute spectacles of giving Jews to the Storm Troops. One of these spectacles is described in the following news item:

"Jolly Berlin crowds in the brightly-lit Kurfürstendamm nightlife district had more fun last week than these beery, sausage-stuffed revelers have had in months. Well-dressed German women and their swank, duel-scarred escorts vied with shopgirls and mechanics in spurring on with laughter, cheers and songs the most savage Jew hunt since those which immediately followed Adolf Hitler's elevation to power [in 1933]. . . .

"The Jew hunters, tall, blond, mighty-muscled Nazi youths in civilian clothes, appeared suddenly on the Kurfürstendamm but seemed at first not to know quite what to do. Soon group leaders dashed up in snorting

Mercédès and the Jew hunt was on, a peculiar feature being that the sidewalk crowds joined in a hunting chant taught them by the hunters. . . .

"Suiting action to words, the Jew hunters plunged into night clubs, theatres, and cafés, dragged out every customer who looked like a Jew, beat him bloody on the sidewalk, and slugged any women who seemed to have been with Jews irrespective of whether they were Jewesses or not" (*Time*, July 29, 1935).

19. With the gradual decadence of interest in religion here in America, a new form of camp meeting, the Chautauqua system of summer camp meetings, arose. The Chautauqua system fortified waning religious interest with appeal to the growing concern over education. Although the meetings appealed to a more stable segment of the population than did the old-fashioned camp meeting and were, therefore, less violent, the function seems to have been much the same. See A.E. Bestor, *Chautauqua Publications* (Chautauqua, Chautauqua Press, 1934); J.S. Noffsinger, *Correspondence Schools, Lyceums, and Chautauquas* (New York, Macmillan, 1926); and R. Tozier, "A Short Life-history of the Chautauqua" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, 1934, 40, 69-73).

20. A widespread and intensive religious revival was set off in America in 1741 by Jonathan Edwards. Checked by the Revolutionary War, this movement reappeared early in the nineteenth century in the form of the camp meetings. Of these camp meetings G. Seldes (*The Stammering Century*, New York, Day, 1928, 49) says:

"The camp-meeting originally performed the function of a carnival, or a Kermesse, or an orgy—festivals established by the wisdom of ages in three great civilizations to give release to the impassioned body or the tortured mind. In that view, it matters comparatively little that [religious] conversions were unsubstantial and fleeting. Possibly even the rapes and seductions and drunkenness, the loosing of tongues and the liberation of carnality, contributed, in spite of the hysteria which accompanied them, to a hearty life."

For further material on the camp meeting see the following:

Cleveland, C.C., *The Great Revival in the West 1797-1805*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1916.

Davenport, M., *Primitive Traits in Religious Revivals*, New York, Macmillan, 1905.

Gewehr, W.M., *The Great Awakening in Virginia, 1740-1790*, Durham, Duke University Press, 1930.

Loud, G.C., *Evangelized America*, New York, Dial, 1928.

One of the more exotic forms of religious revelry among Christian peoples today is the annual period of penance enjoyed by the Penitentes. This religious cult is supposed to be an outgrowth of the Third Order of St. Francis. The following news item briefly describes the peculiar form which revelry takes with these people:

"Prayers, wailing chants and the mournful notes of reed pipes sounded last week in many a dusty, sparsely settled district of New Mexico and

southern Colorado. On Ash Wednesday swart, hot-eyed Mexicans and half-breeds ceased their labors, stole into the *moradas* which are the secret churches of *Los Hermanos Penitentes*—the Penitent Brothers. In each *morada* the Elder Brother of the community presided over ceremonies which were a prelude to the 40 days of Lent, spent by all Penitentes in bloody emulation of the sufferings of Christ. One by one the brothers bowed before a *Sangrador* who with a jagged piece of glass gouged crisscrosses on their backs. The penitents would keep their wounds open and raw until Easter, often by rubbing rock salt in them" (*Time*, Mar. 9, 1936).

21. In *Sister Aimee* (Garden City, Doubleday, Doran, 1931) N.B. Mavity gives an excellent description of the leadership technique of one of the most successful evangelists of the present century.

22. A fictional description of a Negro revival sermon is to be found in the story "A Man and His God" by D. Thibault (*Harper's Mag.*, March, 1937, 346-357). In general it may be said that the revelous religious service of the Negro involves much more singing and much less preaching than does the evangelical service of the white man.

In 1933 the Columbia Broadcasting System began national broadcasting of the services of Elder Solomon Lightfoot Michaux, a Negro preacher of Washington, D.C. Although these are a slightly dressed-up version of the typical Negro church service, they follow the general revelous pattern, consisting of high-sounding bits of preaching which are interrupted frequently by cries from the congregation and are interspersed between stimulating, rhythmic singing. Although the following quotation from a part of one such service indicates how little the sermonizing will stand intellectual scrutiny, the way in which the sentences are delivered more than makes up for their lack of relationship, one to another:

Elder Michaux: "We're broadcastin' our spiritual exercises. . . . Remember, words are the spirit, the very spirit of life. No matter how big and strong the body may be physically, it's dead without the spirit. When a man pulls a gun and says 'Run,' the word 'run' with the knowledge of the gun does you a spiritual wrong. For, as a man thinketh, so is he. . . . Whatsoever is true, whatsoever things are honest, whatsoever things are pure, whatsoever things are lovely, whatsoever things are of good report—if there be any virtue, think on these things. . . ."

Cries from Congregation: "Amen! Yassuh! Praise de Lawd!"

Elder Michaux: "The sun is shinin'. The birds are singin'. They're not complainin' 'bout the depression. Why should we?"

Cry from Congregation: "Ain't dat de truth!"

Elder Michaux: "Then sing, brethern and sisters!"

Cries from Congregation: "Praise de Lawd! Yeah, man! Amen!"

All sing: "*Happy Am I!*" (a rollicking hymn).

CHAPTER XIX

FANATICAL BEHAVIOR

Under conditions of social disorganization, there appears in addition to revelous behavior another type of collective escape from normal circumstances. Unlike revelry, such behavior is predicated on an ideology and consists of a collective flight from reality. Unlike revelry, also, it occurs at irregular intervals and is never a specific part of the cultural heritage. Because behavior of this type involves an intensification of activity, a preoccupation with some single pattern of behavior, and a direct denial of what is ordinarily recognized as fact, it has been termed by some as mass hysteria or mass insanity. More descriptive, however, is the term "fanatical behavior."¹

Fanatical behavior is a collective device of much the same character as is that by which the individual fanatic escapes from the painful realities of nature or of society.² Thus, the boom may lift people from economic discontentment; the mass movement to a new promised land may give a hopeful outlook to countless disgruntled people; and the spectacular rise of a miracle man may offer new hope to thousands of physically disabled people.

Fanatical behavior, however, unlike individual fanaticism, is not easily recognized as such. The atypical individual who is a fanatic on the subject of diet, hygiene, perpetual motion, or some other topic stands out in marked contrast to his fellows. When, however, the pattern of individual fanaticism spreads and engulfs a considerable proportion of the members of a society, that pattern becomes at least momentarily more or less typical and may not be recognized as fanatical.

Moreover, fanatical behavior never persists for long. Whereas the individual who believes in the possibility of perpetual motion may never lose faith, fanatical behavior, like some of the diseases which afflict the human body, runs a limited course and never becomes chronic.

ORIGIN AND FUNCTION

The immediate origins of any form of fanatical behavior lie in widespread and acute individual discontent with social status or physical condition and in the appearance of a socially sanctioned belief that some new pattern of action will provide relief from the causes of such discontent. Behind this discontent, however, lie the complex historical factors which have brought about social disorganization and which have resulted in the chronic maladjustment of many individuals to their social roles. The ultimate origins of fanatical behavior are, therefore, sociological in nature.

Social Disorganization and Maladjustment.—In a relatively stable social system, the structural parts interlock to make one functional whole in which the role of the individual is socially designated and socially assured. Such opposition as there may be between the individual and his society is a consequence of the fact that he has not been completely trained into the acceptance of his social role. In a disorganized society, on the other hand, the malfunctioning of the parts of the social system results in incessant change of that system. The role of any individual is more or less socially designated but is seldom socially assured. In a changing social system, opposition between the individual and his society is, thus, aggravated by the fact that his social role is itself subject to change.

Were the individual as adaptable in maturity as he is in infancy, changes in his social role would not be disturbing to him. As his role changed, he would change. In fact, however, the mature individual has acquired relatively fixed patterns of adjustment. These cannot be unlearned in order that new patterns can be learned. As a result, any divergence between the actual social role of the individual and that role for which he has been prepared results in acute maladjustment.

Under conditions of social disorganization, two distinct factors are at work to assure that the social roles of a considerable proportion of the population will be at variance with those roles for which they have been trained.³

In the first place, downward shifts in economic and social status are inevitable. Although many individuals will be rising in the social scale, many others will be falling. The man who has been brought up to the role of bank president may, as the

result of bank mergers, become a second or third vice-president. The man who has been trained to the role of a laborer may, as a consequence of social changes, lose that status. His particular task may be taken over by a machine; shifts in economic demand may throw him out of employment; a rise in the cost of living may reduce the goods value of his wages; and so on. In periods of social disorganization, there are countless ways in which the members of even the lowest social stratum may be dispossessed of that to which they have grown accustomed.

Any degradation of the economic or social status of the individual will inevitably result in some degree of maladjustment. Society trains the individual to take for granted a certain standard of material living and a certain level of social status. That standard may be far above that which is actually necessary to maintain life and animal comfort. Once it is established, however, any decline from it makes the individual maladjusted and causes him to strive to reattain that to which he was accustomed.

In the second place, a disorganized society prepares many individuals for roles which they cannot possibly attain. Where class and other group lines are vague and shifting, as has been the case in Western societies since the breakdown of the feudal system, the rise of one poor man to a position of wealth will provide an example for many other poor men to emulate. Because others have done so, the ambitious country boy may want to go to the city and become a great financier; the ambitious Ghetto Jew may want to follow the footsteps of Marshall Field or of some other Jew who rose from obscurity to great prestige; the school-girl may want to be a great motion-picture actress; the Negro may want to pass the color line; the son of a laborer may aspire to a higher standard of living and greater social recognition. In contemporary society, many factors contribute to the formation of individual ambitions, ideals, values, and social objectives which, in turn, lead to intense striving for attainment. At the same time, other and equally strong factors make it impossible for any considerable proportion of the social population to realize their ambitions. Any thwarting of individual desires to achieve a higher economic or social status makes for maladjustment of the individual to his actual role.

Acute maladjustment of the individual to his social role is, thus, not a result of the nature of that role per se. In a stable society, the individual in one class is unlikely either to acquire an ambition to rise to a different class position or to lose the status to which he was trained. Class training includes inculcation of the idea that "one stays where one is born"; and class stability assures one's staying there. Only where, as under conditions of social disorganization, the role of the individual, whatever it may be, is inappropriate to his training, will he be chronically maladjusted to that role. In other words, it is not "bad" social conditions which make men maladjusted; but it is, rather, conditions which are either worse than those to which they have become accustomed or worse than those which they have been led to expect.

Individual Discontent.—Whether maladjustment of the individual is a consequence of failure to retain or of failure to attain the status which the individual has been trained to want, that maladjustment results in such a considerable amount of psychological tension that periodic revelry will not be sufficient to dissipate it.

The ability of revelry to dissipate tensions is always limited by the fact that, to be revelous, behavior must be unusual. Resort to revelry is, therefore, subject to diminishing returns. Whereas a night a week at night club or barroom might provide tensional release for a maladjusted person, seven nights a week at night club or barroom will not provide seven times as much tensional outlet and may, in fact, become the source of further tensions. Whenever activity becomes the usual rather than the unusual, it is no longer revelous.

When the need for tensional outlets is so great that revelous possibilities do not satisfy that need, a piling up of tensions occurs and results in a chronic state of what may be described as discontent. Such discontent may lead to individual fanaticism—the perpetual search for the fountain of eternal youth, for the pot of gold at the end of the rainbow, or for the land of milk and honey. Before that search can become general and assume collective attributes, acute individual discontent must also be general. In such widespread individual discontent lie the immediate and psychological origins of fanatical behavior.⁴

The Precipitation of Fanatical Behavior.—Just as a disordered system fosters random changes in social matters of little moment—the fad, the fashion, and the craze—it also fosters random changes in vital aspects of social behavior. In our acutely disordered society, the ways through which modern people endeavor to gain wealth and prestige are sometimes as fantastic as are their endeavors to secure the attention of their fellows.

When acute individual discontent is general, almost any incident may serve to activate and to channelize those who are discontented. From this incident there arises an idea—and many supporting stories—which spreads in accordance with the rumor process. As it spreads, this idea provides discontented individuals with the basis for a new pattern of behavior, which, as more people take it over, constitutes a fanatical collective pattern.

In some instances the idea or belief which sets off a pattern of fanatical behavior can be traced more or less directly to a given individual, who serves, perhaps inadvertently, as the ideology maker. In the case of the Florida land boom, for example, the idea which set off the boom can be traced directly to C.E. Merrick, who thought Florida would be a nice place to establish a colony for retired ministers. In other instances, the idea which precipitates a fanatical pattern can be traced to the real or reputed discovery of a new source of some valuable substance. To the pauperized inhabitants of the town of Bolinas, the discovery of some strange substance which was cast up on the shore and a schoolboy's vague statement that it might be ambergris was sufficient to precipitate a wild boom in a perfectly worthless substance.⁵

In many instances, however, it is quite impossible to trace the origin of the idea which precipitates fanatical behavior. In such instances, it would appear that the need for fanatical outlets is so great that the idea generates "spontaneously." Thus, the region of the lower Mississippi was known for centuries to the people of Europe before the sudden generation of the idea that here was a veritable gold mine. That idea was the basis for one of the wildest periods of land speculation known to history.⁶ Likewise, tulip-bulb cultivation was an old business in Holland when, for no ascertainable reason, the production and trade in bulbs became invested with the Midas touch. Moreover, the

salubrious climate of Florida had been known to most of the people of the United States for years before the "spontaneous" outbreak early in the 1920's of the urge to migrate there culminated in a vast "tin-can" mass movement to this region.

As a Denial of Reality.—Just as individual fanaticism provides the individual with an escape from painful realities, fanatical behavior provides those who are involved with an escape from all concern with the social or other conditions which have made them acutely discontented. As long as they are involved in a fanatical interaction, discontented people can ignore realities and live, as it were, on hope.

Fanatical behavior, like individual fanaticism, is not an attempt to change the conditions which have brought about that behavior. Although fanatical behavior may reflect the need for change, it does not direct action toward change. The boom, for example, is never an effort to devise a new and more efficient system of economic realities. It is, rather, a flight from the unsatisfactory realities of the economic *status quo*. Such social changes as fanatical behavior may bring about are entirely incidental. The land boom may result in the building of a new boom town, but the boom itself passes without affecting the social system which caused it to arise. Likewise, the "old-age" boom in America in 1934 and 1935 may have played some small part in speeding the establishment of the Social Security Act; but the boom did not, of itself, lessen the insecurity of the aged. It was a prolonged flight from the reality of insecurity, rather than an effort to change the circumstances which made for the lack of security.

Fanatical behavior may, in effect, be described as a substitute for constructive or destructive efforts to change social realities. It constitutes an escape from distressing reality by the disregarding of that reality, much as some pressing problem may be temporarily forgotten by indulgence in a daydream.

As a means of adjustment to socially unsatisfactory conditions, fanatical behavior is, however, temporally limited. Although the fact is completely disregarded during the course of a boom, the price of stocks, or bulbs, or land cannot rise indefinitely. While new technological processes and devices or the opening of new land may prolong boom exploitation, they cannot for long continue to do so at an accelerative pace.

This point is clearly illustrated in the history of radio development. Beginning about 1923, the production of radio sets and the establishment of new and larger broadcasting stations expanded at what might be termed a boom rate. For some years, many people considered radio manufacturing and broadcasting the key to eternal wealth. Perhaps people could support two radios in every home and one broadcasting station for every ten thousand radios; but they could not continue to purchase radios at a constantly progressing rate. There was here, as experience has repeatedly shown elsewhere, a saturation point. When that was reached, the boom collapsed; and radio production became largely a matter of radio replacement.

Whether of the boom or of some other order, fanatical behavior is invariably self-liquidating. The new hope burns out and soon returns those who have been involved in the pattern to face the realities from which it has provided an escape—realities which may in the meantime have grown even less bearable, as is the case when a man returns from a gold rush to find that somebody else now has his old job.

IDEOLOGIES

Most ideologies, as we have seen, are justifications for various kinds of action. For example, people read the newspaper because they find recreational satisfaction in that reading. They do not read newspapers because they believe that such reading contributes to their useful knowledge. The ideology that the newspaper is an educational medium is simply an excuse, to be used when necessary, for the reading of news stories.

As the Basis for Behavior.—In the case of fanatical behavior, on the other hand, the ideology actually serves as the basis for action. Although the ideology is not the cause of fanatical behavior, it is necessary before a specific mode of such behavior will arise. Fanatical behavior springs, as it were, from an idea; and the generation of that idea is prior to behavior upon non-symbolic levels. The idea that in some place or other gold is to be had for the asking precedes the gold rush, and the idea that permanent prosperity will follow automatically upon a migration to this region or that precedes the mass movement.

The fact that fanatical behavior is founded on ideologies distinguishes it from most other types of collective behavior; but the

fact that those ideologies have no foundation in reality does not distinguish them from other ideologies. As we have seen, the ideologies of all kinds of collective behavior are unrealistic. The difference between the ideologies of fanatical behavior and those of other types of behavior is simply that the ideologies of fanatical behavior are not in contrast with the behavior itself. If human beings can be so generally sanguine as to behave in ways which are in contrast to the beliefs by which those ways are justified, it is not surprising that occasionally they should behave in terms of their beliefs.

The innovators of the ideology which is responsible for starting fanatical behavior are usually lost sight of, even as the initiator of a rumor is lost sight of after the story has progressed from mouth to ear a few times. Once under way, however, fanatical behavior, whether the innovator of the ideology is known or not, gains many noisy advocates, who either take credit for originating the idea or at least encourage their listeners to join in with the movement which is based upon that idea. These advocates are the people who write and lecture upon the new-found way to wealth or physical well-being.⁷ They are, obviously, simply the personal representatives of the current, fanatical ideology. By spreading and elaborating the ideological aspects, they contribute to the diffusion of fanatical behavior.

Types of Ideologies.—Although each instance has its particular ideological basis, all ideologies of fanatical behavior fall into three general types: the ideology of an El Dorado, the ideology of a promised land, and the ideology of a messiah. Interesting is the fact that each of these types has its prototype both in ancient mythology and in Christian theology. Whether or not the modern ideologies stem from these traditional sources is debatable. At any event, the modern ideologies are frequently supported by appeal to the Christian Bible; and all have obviously traditional elements.

The Ideology of an El Dorado.—The ideology of an El Dorado consists of nothing more substantial than the belief that some new source of old wealth or some new form of wealth has been discovered. Thus, such ideas as that gold can be secured in unlimited quantities from the alchemist's crucible, from sea water, or from this or that specific region are simply specific versions of the ideology of an El Dorado. Likewise, such ideas as

that tulip bulbs, certificates of landownership, or shares of stock in the Panama Canal are a new and unlimited source of wealth are simply other versions of the same ideology.

In order to authenticate a current version of the ideology of an El Dorado, appeal is invariably made to history. Fabulous stories about previous gold rushes, for example, will be revived in order to intensify a current gold rush. History books will be culled for illustrative materials; half-forgotten legends will be recalled and revised. Only success stories, however, will circulate. The ultimate consequences of previous gold rushes are not called upon to temper enthusiasm for the current one. It is such selective uses of history as this which have led to the observation that men learn from history only that men do not learn from history.

In addition to historical support, those ideologies which serve as the basis for prolonged booms are given systematic form by economists and pseudo economists. The Holland-bulb "craze," for example, generated its own peculiar "laws" of economic life to justify the assumption that tulip bulbs have great intrinsic value. The systematic "economics" of our New Era—by which shares of stock in corporations were assured a perpetually increasing extrinsic value—is still a vivid and embarrassing memory to many present-day economists.⁸

The Ideology of a Promised Land.—The ideology of a promised land consists of the idea that social welfare—and, hence, individual welfare—is a matter of geography and that, therefore, the circumstances which make for discontentment can be escaped and those which will induce contentment can be secured by finding and moving to a promised land. For this belief there is ample historic precedent and, in some instances, not a little pseudo-scientific backing. The importance and tenacity of this basic concept is illustrated by the divine implications which it was given by the Hebrews during their early history—the idea the Jehovah had set apart for them a land of milk and honey.

All the more recent mass movements to various regions have been based upon ideologies which are simply special versions of the idea of a promised land. The mass movement of Dust-bowl refugees to California in 1936–1937, for example, was based upon the assumption that California was the promised land of sunshine and oranges.

The Ideology of a Messiah.—The ideology of a messiah is the belief that some person, or the spirit of that person as manifest through some object, can provide leadership which transcends the mundane. This leadership may be of almost any type—spiritual, physical, economic, or political.

The most common version of the ideology of a messiah is, perhaps, the belief in a miracle man—a messiah who is capable of suspending the laws of nature in God's name and so of curing the hopelessly incurable and even of raising the dead. Belief in a miracle man has its precedent in the Biblical stories of the healing miracles performed by Christ. The persistence of this belief in an age which gives great lip service to science only illustrates the "escape" character of fanatical behavior.⁹

If it be possible for a man to suspend the laws of nature, it must be just as possible for a man to suspend the laws of logic and the processes of social life. When the latter powers are imputed to any individual, the result is a political messiah—a leader who is capable of guiding his people out of social chaos and into a social state in which the normal laws of life are inoperative. Such are the powers which have at various times and for more or less protracted periods been imputed to Jeanne d'Arc, Huey Long, Dr. Townsend, Adolf Hitler, and many others.¹⁰

The ideology of the messiah—physical, spiritual, or political—has much traditional but seldom any systematic support. The "logic" of the messiah's powers is usually attested by nothing more profound than a random assortment of dogmatic statements. The miracle man can cure the incurable and the political messiah can spin the most fanciful theories because, being inspired by God, they and their followers are not subject to any higher law.

MEMBERSHIP

Fanatical behavior is always speculative; *i.e.*, the man who gives up his job to seek gold in distant hills is sacrificing an unsatisfactory certainty for the prospect of great wealth. Membership in fanatical behavior is, therefore, limited to those individuals who are sufficiently discontented with reality to find the ideological promises more attractive than are the certainties of normal life. Ordinarily, only a small proportion of people in a society will be ready to drop the routines of their lives in order to chase a will-o'-the-wisp. Even the great California gold strike

of 1849 infected a relatively small proportion of the American people with gold fever. Most of the farmers, merchants, and craftsmen of America went along with their normal pursuits. There is reason to believe that, in the main, those persons who were swept into the gold rush were already marginal in an economic sense—southerners who were distressed by the economic difficulties which preceded the Civil War and northerners who were displaced by the wave of cheap immigrant labor which began after the War of 1812.

Not all those who are sufficiently discontented that they might become members of a given form of fanatical behavior will, however, actually become members. In order to participate in a particular pattern of fanatical behavior, the individual must be exposed to the ideology of that pattern; and he must be free from external restraints. It is conceivable, for example, that a man who is isolated from normal means of communication might entirely miss the opportunity to join in a gold rush, a stock-market boom, or a mass movement. It is, moreover, likely that other and stronger considerations will prevent many individuals from behaving in accordance with a known pattern of fanatical action. Poverty, economic or social responsibilities, physical disability, and so on no doubt prevented many men from joining the gold rush to California in 1849.

Since all fanatical behavior is based upon fancy and involves a lack of foresight, it may follow logically that those people who have factual knowledge available and who have been trained to logical processes of thinking will avoid joining in a collective flight from reality. Actually, however, the well-educated individual may be fully as discontented and may find fanatical behavior just as temporarily gratifying and "reasonable" as does the illiterate. Every boom, every mass movement, and many a political messianic movement has its full quota of college graduates and is likely to have its share of college professors.

The process by which a fanatical pattern gains members is comparable to that which is involved in the spread of fugitive patterns. Just as there are countless individuals who are constantly offering up new or revived slang words, dance tunes, and so on, a few of which will serve as the basis for a fugitive pattern, there are always people who are doing things, saying things, and discovering things which might, but probably will

not, start a new fanatical pattern under way. Stories about a new El Dorado, promised land, or messiah spread and, in accordance with the rumor process, become stronger and more convincing as they go. The first individuals who act upon these stories set examples for those who are less susceptible, and so on. More and more individuals are swept up to further a fanatical movement until, in the end, it collapses and membership dissipates.

The extension of the membership of a fanatical pattern is the result of a slow and exceedingly complex form of the process of interactional amplification. Once a pattern of fanatical behavior becomes at all general, it tends to foster discontent in individuals who are otherwise fairly well adjusted. Not at the outset susceptible to the fever, they may be made discontented by the constant and steadily intensifying pressure from without. The man who was content and at first scoffed at the prospect of seeking gold in California or of migrating to Florida may gradually develop new values and, hence, become discontented with his lot. The boom or mass movement educates him, as it were, to become discontented and thus makes him susceptible to membership in the fanatical pattern. The relatively stable individual may be no more than amused by the rumor that great wealth or permanent health is to be had for the asking just across the hills. He may be angered at the stupidity of those among his friends and acquaintances who act upon that rumor. But when all those about him are enthusiastic and more and more of them leave to cross those hills, the pressure may be more than he can resist. Few men possess the integrity which is necessary to hold out for long against exposure to general fanaticism. One need only reflect upon the extent to which professional economists joined in with the stock-market boom of 1927-1929 to realize that the pressure of fanatical behavior may become almost irresistible.

OVERT AND COVERT ASPECTS OF INTERACTION

Fanatical behavior is simply a collectively provided outlet for the feeling of discontent. On the covert side, such behavior consists of hope, faith, anticipation, or the like, which has arisen from a belief in a specific way of escape from the causes of dis-

content. On the overt side, such behavior consists in acting directly upon that belief.

Some who participate in a fanatical pattern may experience mild doubts. They feel what they might describe as "It cannot last, but I hope it does"—a covert feeling-state which is comparable, perhaps, to that which most of us have known during certain half-dream states. Furthermore, some few individuals may treat fanatical behavior realistically and exploit those who are actually caught in the enthusiasm of the movement. For the vast majority of members, however, participation in fanatical behavior is entirely sanguine. During the land boom, for example, even the professional speculators are inclined to be as gullible as are the people to whom they sell small lots at ever-rising prices. Every land seller is in fact also a buyer. As seller, he may designate buyers as "suckers"; as buyer, he will certainly consider himself a man of foresight. The miracle man may start as a faker, but it is more likely that he will believe in the powers which he professes. At any event, only when there is a direct relationship between the overt and the covert aspects of fanatical behavior can that behavior serve as an escape from reality.

LEADERSHIP

The spread and development of fanatical behavior is random and uncontrollable. Such leadership as is involved in fanatical behavior is, therefore, determined by fortuitous factors. The person who sets off a fanatical pattern does not do so deliberately or with foresight. He simply happens to provide a pattern which is at the moment acceptable to a number of people. His innovation does not assure the spread of the pattern, any more than the invention of a new slang word assures its general acceptance. The fact that one possible pattern of fanatical behavior succeeds when many with equal potentialities gain no following is as fortuitous as is the fact that one of many verbal innovations becomes current slang.

Occasionally efforts are made to prevent the rise of a pattern of fanatical behavior which experience indicates might appear. Often the discoverer of what is, or what is thought to be, a new source of gold or other precious substance endeavors to keep his discovery secret. For evident reasons, he does not want to be the innovator of a rush which may engulf his properties or

prevent him from exploiting the strike himself. Foreseeing the possible consequences if the news got out, Sutter, for example, endeavored to keep the finding of gold at Sutter's Mill a secret. The fact that he failed to prevent the greatest gold rush in history illustrates how little influence any single individual has upon the rise of fanatical behavior.

More common, but equally futile, is the attempt of self-interest groups to initiate a pattern of fanatical behavior. Real-estate operators are persistent in their efforts to boom the properties which they hold. They may, of course, succeed in forcing a local market for those properties; but there is no case on record in which a land boom grew out of realty promotion which was directed to that end.¹¹ The opening of new territory by railroad construction has led to settlement of that territory; but such migration was never of the mass-movement order. Southern California, for example, was accessible by sea and by rail for many years before the great mass movement to that region during the 1880's.

Equally persistent are the efforts of political aspirants to secure a mass following on behalf of this or that political panacea. The rise of political messiahs is, however, a matter of the man and the moment; and the man cannot make the moment. Experience indicates that, when the moment comes, those who rise to leadership are usually upstarts who literally had leadership thrust upon them. The case of Dr. Townsend is one in point. Politically unambitious, he simply happened to make a false observation at the proper moment and in the proper place. This observation caught and channelized the acute discontent of old people, who then elevated him to the status of a messiah.¹² Once the movement was well under way, subordinates to Dr. Townsend organized it in order to make financial exploitation easier. Neither he nor they, however, actually made the Townsend Movement. It grew up fortuitously about a minor innovation which was made by Dr. Townsend without his intending to become a political leader.

Time after time, would-be political, religious, and medical messiahs have thrust themselves into print. The man who gets a large, fanatical following is, however, likely to be one who made little, if any, effort for leadership—upon whom, in effect, leadership was thrust. Every newspaper carries almost daily

stories and advertisements promising eternal youth or permanent prosperity to the followers of so-and-so. The actual messianic movement is, however, likely to be well under way before it breaks into print. It would seem to be as impossible to bring about or to prevent the rise of a given pattern of fanatical behavior as it is deliberately to initiate or to check a given craze pattern.

TYPES OF FANATICAL BEHAVIOR

In terms of the ideologies upon which fanatical behavior is predicated, three general types can be discerned: the boom, the mass movement, and the messianic movement.¹³

THE BOOM

Any fanatical behavior which is based upon the idea that there has been discovered a new and infallible way to material wealth constitutes a boom.¹⁴ This idea may arise from the real or reputed discovery of a new source of established values—gold, silver, diamonds, etc.—or it may arise from the assumption that some article—tulip bulbs, land, stocks, etc.—has acquired new values. In the former case, the place of discovery becomes the boom object; in the latter, the article becomes the boom object.

The clamor for the boom object gives it a speculative value; and this value, in turn, stimulates the demand for it. During the course of a boom, behavior is predicated upon the basis of the constantly rising extrinsic worth of the boom object. For example, people buy tulip bulbs, stocks, etc., because they expect others to buy at a higher price; and these others buy at that higher price because they fully expect others to buy from them at a still higher price. In a rush for gold, the same process operates.¹⁵ Here, the fact that more and more people are going to the site of the rush gives being there a constantly increasing extrinsic value. For those who believed that there was gold to be had for the taking in California, passage there and maintenance while there became worth almost any money cost. Thus it was that some shipowners even abandoned their ships in San Francisco Bay during the gold rush in order to go to the mines. What value has a ship, when there is an unlimited quantity of free gold in the nearby hills? What if an egg does cost one dollar, or five, if it will provide the energies necessary

to take hundreds, thousands, or millions of dollars in gold from the ground?

Whether or not the boom object actually has intrinsic value is a matter of no importance. Booms operate on the basis of extrinsic values alone. Not until the boom has collapsed will consideration again be given to the intrinsic value of the boom object.

A boom in any article or place tends, however, to disturb all extrinsic values. The constant rise in the extrinsic worth of the boom object has a sort of halo effect upon the values of all those goods and services which are deemed essential to the production or fabrication of the boom object. The boom town, for example, is made fantastic by the distortion of all normal values. The "ghost town," with its brick buildings and other evidences of being boom-built in expectation of permanence, is everywhere a monument to the disturbance which can be caused to all values when some single object becomes the basis for fanatical behavior. Anyone who has seen Nevada's Virginia City, perched on the top of a steep mountain and accessible only by long and tortuous roads, will realize the intense frenzy which was necessary to the building of that boom town.

The boom procedure is no less unreasonable than it sounds. Inevitably, the time comes when this sort of buying to sell reaches its limit or when reaching the site of a rush ceases to have extrinsic value, if for no other reason than that there is no longer standing room. It may be said categorically that the boom cannot continue on a plateau. Once prices stop rising, they plummet downward. Once the rush to a new gold field or real-estate Mecca stops, the boom is over. For at that moment the ideology behind the boom vanishes. People lose confidence and shift from buying toward selling, or from rushing to toward rushing away from. The entire boom structure then collapses. The process of collapse is the readjustment of extrinsic value to intrinsic worth. It often happens that a sort of overcompensation occurs and that for a time following a boom the extrinsic value of the boom object will be far below that which is justified by its intrinsic worth.

Although it is possible to predict that every boom will ultimately collapse, during the course of a boom there is no objective basis on which to predict what the final limit will be or what will

determine it. Many factors—such as the possibilities of credit expansion—may be involved. Sometimes, perhaps, the boom ends only when the limit of human credulity—whatever that may be—is reached. In the case of mining and similar booms, boom fever may be dampened by the discovery that there was no discovery or by the end of the minor discoveries of new sources which follow every great find.

During the course of time, almost every conceivable object has served as the basis for a boom. Land and gold have, however, been the perennial favorites in the past and will, no doubt, continue to be in the future. Both have the support of long tradition. Both are tangible, understandable, economic goods.

It should be observed, however, that neither of these qualities is necessary to give an object boom value. Stocks in some specific or simply in any joint-stock company have frequently served as the basis for spectacular booms; but, if the gilt used in printing the stock certificates is excluded, there is nothing either tangible or understandable about the worth thereof. Many of those who speculate during a stock boom never even see the paper symbols of what they are purchasing, and few have any understanding of why a stock might have intrinsic worth.

THE MASS MOVEMENT

The term “mass movement” has been used to refer to such large-scale changes in behavior as widespread strikes and the rise of a new political party. Here the term “movement” is taken to mean action, of whatever order. The true mass movement is, however, a “spontaneous” uprooting of a considerable proportion of the social population in a movement to a new promised land. It is a collective flight from reality, taking the form of a flight from the setting in which discontent and distress were experienced. It is a collective movement which is analogous to the movement of a sick individual to a new climate in order to regain health. In other words, the mass movement is a fantastic seeking for peace and security by the selection of a new residence.

To those who are distressed by social disorders, the promise of a land both fertile and untroubled by social conflicts is exceedingly attractive. When social disorders have generated widespread and intense individual discontent, the reputed discovery of a promised land may act as a spark to set off a general mass

movement, in which many people abandon the familiar to set out upon the quest of that which is known only by report. Once the movement has started, it progresses toward ultimate self-liquidation in much the same way as does the boom.

Although the medieval crusades have long been used as classic examples of mass movements, the events which occurred during the period of the crusades are so little known that they do not provide reliable data on mass movements. It is not, however, necessary to refer back to the legendary crusades for data from which to derive the sociopsychological processes of, or the illustrative materials for, the mass movement. Less spectacular but more verifiable migrations to a promised land have occurred time after time during the course of the last century or two.

Three distinct mass movements—one in the 1880's, one just after the World War, and one during 1936–1937—have converged on southern California. Although no one of these was a frenzied struggle of a horde to reach an earthly paradise, all three were definitely mass—*i.e.*, large-scale and unorganized—migrations consequent upon the idea that permanent peace and prosperity were the lot of anyone who could reach southern California.

Perhaps the most interesting of all mass movements which have occurred in America during recent years was the "tin-can" migration to Florida during 1925. This mass movement was related to, but was not a part of, the Florida land boom. During the industrially prosperous years following 1923, agricultural incomes steadily declined; and the marginal farmers—particularly the tenant farmers—and farm workers were greatly distressed. About 1923, there began a boom in Florida lands which was based upon the belief that unlimited money could be made by the purchase of these lands. For the depressed agricultural people of the middle west, this El Dorado ideology gave rise to a promised-land ideology. With the spread of the belief that Florida offered all comers peace and prosperity, more and more discontented rural people set out, in ancient cars and with all their worldly possessions, on the long trail to Florida. At the height of the movement, the roads leading into this state were literally choked with a motorized mass of pauperized humanity, seeking the land of milk and honey.

Distinguished from Migration and Conquest.—The fanatical mass movement must be distinguished both from systematic migration and from conquest of new territories.

Systematic migration is characteristic of those peoples who have been economically dependent upon grass or upon wild game. Pastoral peoples have normally followed the grass; *i.e.*, they have moved with the cycle of the seasons to keep their herds upon verdant pasturage. Ordinarily, such migration has followed a definite pattern, such as the highlands during the summer and the lowlands during the winter. Although abnormal climatic conditions might drive such a people to break the normal migratory pattern and to seek grass in new lands, such movement would be a process of economic adaptation, rather than a flight from reality.

Conquest of new territories takes the form of gradual encroachment, a movement of peoples in a trial-and-error settlement of new lands. Conquest is, therefore, a process of social adaptation, rather than a fanatical mass movement. There is a vast difference between the so-called conquest of Mexico and Latin America by early Spanish Conquistadores and the conquest of North America by colonists. The former was in actuality not a conquest, but a prolonged gold rush with many aspects of fanatical behavior. In contrast, the conquest of North America by colonists was a true conquest—a slow seeking out of new lands from which a livelihood could be secured by labor.

Unfortunately, historians have tended so to dramatize conquest that the movement which required centuries may appear to have occurred as one great, rapid rush of people into a new region. The Goths and the Huns are, for example, often pictured as wild hordes which swept abruptly out of the northeast to crush the civilization of Rome. Actually, however, the barbaric inroads on the ancient societies were not of the order of a mass movement. The barbarians, driven presumably by economic exigencies, moved slowly from their native habitats and slowly penetrated western Europe. In military terms, they infiltrated, mingling with the native populations and more or less absorbing them. Such a conquest is, obviously, a process of social adaptation rather than a fanatical mass movement.

THE MESSIANIC MOVEMENT

The messianic movement may be briefly described as a collective flight from reality by following a new form of leadership

which will bring health, wealth, or happiness. The movement begins with the rise of an idea that some person or some object—such as the grave of a saint, a spring, etc.—is a messiah who has come to deliver the faithful from whatever it is that ails them. On the basis of this idea, large numbers of people may abandon the normal routine of their lives and move into the orbit of the messiah. The result is a messianic movement, which may or may not involve spatial movement.

Three general forms of the messianic movement appear: that which is based upon the idea of a miracle man; that which is based upon the idea of a miracle cure; and that which is based upon the idea of a political messiah.

The Miracle Man.—In all stable societies, the sick and disabled are socially reassured by established faiths, cures, and medicine men. Although these beliefs may not be based upon empirical knowledge, they are culturally established and persistent. Acceptance of these beliefs is simply a matter of social training. Under conditions of social disorganization, however, the socially provided beliefs regarding physical welfare tend to be disturbed; and the sick and disabled are likely to lack the social reassurance which is provided by a stable society. Many of them are, therefore, susceptible to fanatical behavior.

Those who are sick or disabled can, however, have relatively little interest in the wealth which is promised by the boom or in the material and social boons which are promised by the mass movement. To those who are tortured by physical ailments and to those who believe that their troubles are of physical origin, physical well-being looms as the greatest desire.

Modern medicine provides hope for many physically unhappy people, but the development of the science of medicine seems to have done little to lessen the faith of Western peoples in miracles. Perhaps the fact that medical science is an endeavor to be realistic, and does not, therefore, offer cures to the incurable, has actually encouraged belief in pseudoscientific methods of healing. Having tried every specialist in his disability and having received no assurance that he will be cured, the modern rich man may in desperation take up Christian Science or some other faith.¹⁶ Having consumed many bottles of patent medicine, the poor and equally sick man may find some "spiritual" consolation in the revelry of an evangelistic meeting.

When the constant individual seeking for cures by many sick and disabled people happens to focalize upon one person and to raise him to the status of a messiah, that person becomes what is usually called a miracle man.¹⁷ To such a man, supernatural healing powers are imputed; and around him a fanatical movement will center. Once such a movement has sprung up, the behavior which follows is in some measure dependent upon the leadership of the miracle man. If he sets himself up in a tent in the wilderness, his followers must do likewise. If, on the other hand, he establishes himself in the slums of a city, his followers must join him in tenement living. At any event, masses of people will gather around the miracle man, waiting for days, weeks, or months for the miracle to strike them. Gradually faith wavers and then breaks. Those who are disillusioned trek back home, to await, perhaps, the coming of a new—and the “true”—messiah.

The Miracle Cure.—When the seeking of the sick and disabled focalizes on an object, such as the grave of a saint, the result is much the same, although the messianic behavior is a movement to a miracle cure rather than to a miracle man.¹⁸

The revival of enthusiasm for the miracle cure, with the designation of some specific curative source, is spasmodic. What precipitates the particular movement is quite inexplicable. For no evident reason, news will spread that a marvelous cure has been effected at this place or that and by this or that agency. The sick and the crippled who have become discouraged will then “spontaneously” flock to the site of the reputed cure. Some hypochondriacs may cast away their crutches, and the stories of their miraculous “recoveries” may incite still others to join the movement.

People who are discouraged with the usual methods of treatment are susceptible to any new hint of hope. Aware of this fact, medical scientists make it a standing practice to avoid publicity on tentative cures. Occasionally, the inadvertent publication of a rumor that a cure—notably, a cancer cure—has been discovered will start a stampede on the hospital where the new miracle is supposed to be performed. This persistent and entirely unrealistic willingness of those who are physically disabled to grasp hopefully at the idea of miracles is not to be wondered at when such a reputable medical scientist as the famed

Dr. Alexis Carrel has publicly confessed his belief in Christian miracles.

The Political Messiah.—The rise of upstart political leaders is made possible only by acute political discontent. As their bid for power, all politicians offer some sort of political panacea—*i.e.*, some sort of political cure-all—guaranteed to bring whatever the politician believes the people want. The cynical person may lump all swings in political alignment under the general category “fanatical” and may find little significant difference between the processes by which the world’s Hitlers, Mussolinis, and Roosevelts came to power and the ways by which popular sentiment developed around such figures as the late Huey Long, Dr. Townsend, Father Coughlin, and Father Divine. Sociopsychologically, the difference between a Hitler who leads a desperate German people and a Dr. Townsend who leads a discouraged mass of indigent elders may be one of degree only; and, in terms of long-run consequences, there may be no difference at all. There is, however, sufficient difference in degree between political leadership which is arrived at by deliberate effort and that which is secured more or less fortuitously to justify their being considered as different orders of leadership.

In the former instance, the status of leader will have been secured by deliberate conversion and persuasion, by political barter, and, perhaps, by various forms of coercion.¹⁹ The leader of a fanatical political movement, on the other hand, is made by his followers.²⁰ He is lifted to political power on a wave of political fanaticism. He achieves his status as leader more or less inadvertently by offering a political panacea which appeals to some element of the population. He does not, at least at the outset, use any of the usual devices of persuasion, barter, and coercion to secure his following; and he may not even make conversional appeals. He is a political messiah and, as a person, almost as much a victim of circumstances as is the object which serves for a boom or the region which serves for a mass movement.

The political messiah is simply the personal representation of the hopes of people who are in need of political reassurance. He functions for such people in much the same way as does the miracle man for the physically distressed.²¹ He is supposed to have discovered the key to political welfare. The specific nature of that key is of no real moment.

Except that it involves a different ideology and does not necessitate spatial movement, the political messianic movement runs a course which parallels that which generates around the miracle man. For a brief period, enthusiasm for the new panacea and the new leader grows and spreads and receives more or less violent expression. During this period, there is no relationship between beliefs and political realities. For those involved, the movement is a complete flight from reality. Inevitably, the growing contrast between rising hopes and static realities stretches faith beyond the breaking point; and the movement collapses with the abruptness which is characteristic of the reaction to all types of fanatical behavior.

APPENDIX

1. In *Leaders, Dreamers and Rebels* (New York, Viking, 1935) R. Fülöp-Miller provides a historical survey of the larger fanatical "movements" which have occurred in Western societies. Although his interpretations are not always acceptable, Fülöp-Miller's book is the best single source of data on fanatical behavior.

For some recent attempts to classify and analyze the various forms which fanatical behavior takes, see:

Dawson, C.A., and W.E. Gettys, *An Introduction to Society*, New York, Ronald, 1929, 771-787.

Reuter, E.B., and C.W. Hart, *Introduction to Sociology*, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1933, 505-519.

Young, K., *Social Psychology*, New York, Crofts, 1930, 442-447 and 511-518.

2. For a brief analysis of the origins and nature of individual fanaticism see M.C. Otto's article "Fanaticism" (*Ency. Soc. Sci.*, 6, 90-92). See also "Fanatics, and How to Know Them" by J.W. Krutch (*Nation*, Feb. 27, 1937); and "Fads and Fanaticism" by G. Seldes (*Catholic World*, February, 1929).

3. Psychiatrists are prone to consider the disorganization of the individual personality as the antecedent of social disorganization, a view which seems to the sociologist somewhat comparable to considering the ignorance and laziness of those who are poor as the antecedent of poverty. For a sociological view of the relationship between individual and social disorganization see H. Blumer, "Social Disorganization and Individual Disorganization" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, 1937, 42, 871-877).

For a study of the character of social disorganization and its manifestation in such social pathologies as poverty see S. Queen, W. Bodenhafer, and E. Harper, *Social Organization and Disorganization* (New York, Crowell, 1935).

H. Lasswell (*World Politics and Personal Insecurity*, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1935) has attempted to show how the maintenance of the social and

economic status of the individual in modern societies is ultimately dependent upon the stability of international relations. Thus, a war which is no concern of a given individual may ultimately result in degradation of the status of that individual and in his acute maladjustment.

Some of the more general contradictions encountered in our disorganized society are outlined by R. Bain in "Our Schizoid Culture" (*Sociol. and Soc. Res.*, 1935, 19, 266-276).

4. An excellent illustration of the social antecedents of collective fanaticism is found in the history of the peyote cult, a form of religious fanaticism involving the use of a narcotic, peyote, which is obtained from the root of a cactus. Appearing some twenty-five years ago among the Winnebago of Nebraska, the use of this drug has spread to a number of Indian communities. For these Indians, peyote seems to provide an escape from the baffling contradictions of tribal-civilized life. See V. Petrullo, *The Diabolic Root: A Study of Peyotism, the New Indian Religion among the Delawares* (Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1934); and W.I. Thomas, *Primitive Behavior* (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1937, 696-701).

5. The story of the "ambergris" boom at Bolinas, Calif., told in the following news item, illustrates how little, when circumstances are favorable, is required to precipitate fanatical behavior:

"Out for a stroll on Bolinas Beach, north of the Golden Gate, one afternoon last fortnight went Alf Harrodon, 33-year-old radio operator. Striding along with head in air he stumbled on something soft. Looking down, he saw a large mass of greyish stuff, mottled and opaque. In his hands it felt and smelled like limburger cheese.

"Never in his life had Alf Harrodon seen ambergris, which begins as a secretion in the bowels of a sick sperm whale, ends as a base for precious perfumes. But he had been raised on the coast of Norway and like coast children throughout the world had been taught to keep his eyes peeled for it. With shaking hands he scooped up the cheesy stuff, 60 lb. of it, and carried it home. Next day he got a schoolboy friend to take a sample to his chemistry laboratory. That night the boy came back to report that the sample had assayed 70% ambergris. Ambergris, he had heard, was worth \$26 an oz. His find would bring him \$17,500.

"While Alf Harrodon sat dazed the news shot through the poverty-stricken little colony of 250 at Bolinas. All that night the beach was bright with torches and bonfires, moving with bent shadows. . . .

"Late last week a first report, from the New York Essential Oil Co., arrived in San Francisco. It was crushing. There was, it said, almost no market for ambergris. A fresh supply of 300 lb. would glut the market, force the price down to \$2 from \$5 an oz. But still crowds flocked to sift the sands of Bolinas and the Peppers, the Henrys, the Kenyons sat tight, held fast to their faith in miracles" (*Time*, Mar. 7, 1934).

Subsequently it was definitely proved that the find was not ambergris. For months, however, the boom in "ambergris" continued its ecstatic and profitless course, the last reported find occurring in Islesboro, Maine. See the news item "Again, Ambergris" (*Time*, Dec. 17, 1934).

6. The term "bubble" came into use early in the eighteenth century as descriptive of the more fanatical land-stock booms. See W.L. Thorp's article "Speculative Bubbles" (*Ency. Soc. Sci.*, 3, 24-26). The most prolonged, intense, and spectacular of these bubbles have been:

(1) The Holland-bulb Bubble (sometimes termed craze or mania), which began about 1634 when the people of Holland became aware of the money which was being made by professional growers of tulip bulbs. Rapidly people entered the market for bulbs; soon they had run the price up to hundreds of dollars per pound; and by 1636 it was generally believed in Holland, and to some extent elsewhere, that there was no limit to the world demand for Holland tulip bulbs. The bubble burst in February, 1637.

(2) The South Sea Bubble began in 1711 with the organization in England of the South Sea Company, a large and complex quasi-governmental organization which was formed to engage in trade with Spanish America. Although it had a monopoly on the slave traffic with this region, the South Sea Company was only moderately successful. Reorganized in 1719, it assumed, in return for special privileges, the English debt. Holders of government obligations were encouraged to exchange them for stock in the company. Soon the bubble began to swell; and, as more and more people became convinced that South Sea Company stock would rise to infinite heights, the market value rose so rapidly that it reached the breaking point in 1720.

(3) The Mississippi Bubble began with the foundation in 1717 of a stock company which held land in the lower Mississippi Valley. The conditions of the French currency at this time made the purchase of stock in this company seem advantageous; the company, associated with the Banque Générale, soon secured control of French national finances; and a period of monetary inflation sent the paper values of the stock of this company into astronomical figures. For a time, it was believed in France that the company was the way, not only to personal wealth, but to national economic salvation. In 1721 the bubble burst, and French national finances were so badly shaken that the government itself was endangered.

For the story of these and other bubbles see C. Mackay, *Memoirs of Extraordinary Popular Delusions* (London, Routledge, 2d ed., 1852, 2 vols.); N.W. Posthumus, "The Tulip Mania in Holland in the Years 1636 and 1637" (*J. Econ. and Bus. Hist.*, 1928, 1, 434-466); and L.S. Benjamin, *The South Sea Bubble* (London, O'Connor, 1921).

7. In "New Thought: A Cult of Success" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, 1934, 40, 309-318) A. Griswold describes one of the more curious of the fanatical patterns which have developed in America. It appeared in 1890; and around it there developed a remarkable literature, as is evidenced by the long list of references provided by Griswold.

8. During the period 1927-1929 the financial sections of newspapers, business magazines, etc., were filled with hosannas for the New Era, in which prices—particularly stock-market prices—were to continue indefinitely upward at an accelerative rate. The few writers who ventured to express doubt were quickly shouldered out of print by those who had caught the spirit of the new age. Not a few academic economists who wrote on

the contemporary scene wrote in the New Era vein. Typical of the ideology of the day is *The Road to Plenty* by W.T. Foster and W. Catching (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1928).

9. The development of modern science seems to have had slight effect upon the beliefs of people at large. Fortunetelling—astrology, palmistry, numerology, etc.—thrives today as it did in premodern times. See T. Hoke, "The Heyday of the Fortune Tellers" (*Harper's Mag.*, January, 1932, 236-246); and C.W. Ferguson, "Superstition Up-to-Date" (*Christian Century*, Feb. 17, 1932). Furthermore, although the old-fashioned folk remedies, such as the wearing of asafetida to prevent infectious diseases, have in general been replaced by Listerine, Ex-lax, Dr. Pierce's Golden Remedy, Lydia E. Pinkham's Vegetable Compound, *et al.*, the latter are no more effective and are considerably more expensive than the former.

It comes, however, as something of a shock to find such a noted man of science as Alexis Carrel accepting as perfectly valid the divine nature of the so-called miracles of Lourdes. What doctors often describe as miracles can, no doubt, be explained on natural grounds—perhaps as recoveries from hysterical illnesses or as errors in medical judgment. Dr. Carrel, however, ignores such possible natural explanations of so-called miracles and puts his faith in the healing powers of prayer. See his book *Man, the Unknown* (New York, Harper, 1936, 148).

10. The idea that the political messiah, like the healer, represents supernatural law and that, therefore, his plan of political action is above criticism, is illustrated by the following news item:

"One day last week Dr. Clinton Wunder of Los Angeles swept aside all workaday objections to the Townsend Plan. 'We believe that God is on our side,' cried he, 'and with God all things are possible.'

"'Amen! Amen!' answered many & many a man and woman who, [are] passionately convinced that it would be possible to pay every U.S. citizen over 60 a pension of \$200 per month . . ." (*Time*, Nov. 4, 1935).

11. Although it started as a realty promotion, even the great Florida land boom of 1926 was not induced by deliberate leadership. G.E. Merrick, who originally owned the land in Miami, center of the boom, was a victim, rather than a cause, of that boom. His Coral Gables development, first of the boom-time subdivisions, was intended as a colony for retired ministers, who, he thought, would appreciate the pleasant climate and the low cost of living in Florida. The son of a minister, Merrick undertook the enterprise in a spirit of humanitarianism. Construction started in 1922. It was not until the boom was well under way that Merrick caught the fever and permitted his associates to advertise and otherwise exploit Coral Gables.

During 1925 and 1926 the Florida land boom reached unprecedented intensity. Lots which had brought \$1,500 or less in 1915 sold at the peak of the boom for upwards of \$2,000,000. Jazz bands enticed buyers into the Everglades, where people bought sections of swamp at fabulous prices. Late in the spring of 1926 construction began to slow down; a hurricane in September washed out the last of the hopeful; and the boom was over. See "Florida I: Miami" (*Fortune*, January, 1936); "The Florida Land

Boom" by H.B. Vanderblue (*J. Land and Public. Utility Econ.*, 1927, 3, 113-131 and 252-269); and *Florida* by K.L. Roberts (New York, Harper, 1926).

12. The Townsend Old Age Plan, which became a nine-month wonder during 1935-1936, was originated by the inconspicuous, elderly doctor F.E. Townsend in Long Beach, California, late in 1934. It consisted, in brief, of a plan whereby permanent prosperity would be assured the American people through the establishment of a "revolving fund" from which each person in the United States over sixty years of age would be given \$200 per month to spend during the month on consumers' goods.

At the time, countless political leaders and would-be leaders were loudly offering their particular plans for national salvation. Although at the outset Townsend made slight effort to sell his plan—he started with an office in the rear of a small Long Beach real-estate salesroom—that plan was rapidly made the ideology for a political messianic "movement" of national proportions. See the news items "Simple Plan" (*Time*, Jan. 14, 1935), "Townsend to Burst" (*Time*, Oct. 15, 1934), and "Messiah on the March" (*Time*, June 1, 1936).

For critical analyses of the Townsend ideology see "The Old People's Crusade" by R.L. Neuberger and K. Loe (*Harper's Mag.*, March, 1936) and *The Townsend Crusade* by the Committee on Old Age Security (New York, Twentieth Century Fund, 1936).

13. Some forms of fanatical behavior are based upon an ideology which might well be described as a collective persecution complex. In this ideology social difficulties are blamed upon some element of the population, and that element must be destroyed if those difficulties are to be escaped. Perhaps the behavior predicated upon such an ideology might best be termed panic fanaticism. Examples of such behavior include: the popular support given the medieval Inquisition (see A. Verrill, *The Inquisition*, New York, Appleton, 1932); the witchcraft scare which rose to epidemic intensity in New England during the last decade of the seventeenth century (see J.M. Taylor, *The Witchcraft Delusion in Colonial Connecticut*, New York, Grafton, 1908); the waves of fanatical Jew persecution which occasionally sweep central Europe; and the equally fanatical waves of "Red baiting" which appear in the United States whenever social difficulties become acute.

Occasionally there has appeared a form of fanatical behavior which is seemingly unique. Such, for example, was the dancing "mania" which seems to have been an escape from the disorders which followed the Black Death. This "mania" appeared first among a group of Germans who had come to Aix-la-Chapelle early in 1374 and subsequently spread to the Netherlands, southern Germany, northern France, and elsewhere. It consisted of wild group dancing in the streets, during which the participants are reported to have been in a trancelike state. The dancing either began with or culminated in epileptoid convulsions. There seems to have been nothing in the way of a systematic ideology behind this "mania." See J.F.C. Hecker, *The Black Death and the Dancing Mania* (trans. by B.G. Babington, New York, Cassell, 1888).

A recent, somewhat similar, although far more limited, "mania" is reported in the following news item:

"Four hundred unformed young women tend the machines which sew and fill sacks of granulated sugar, fold and fill boxes of lump sugar in a factory at Lille, France. Flitting fingers, fixed eyes, bent heads heed every zip, snip, swish, zoop, bupp, bopp of the machines—60 seconds every minute, 60 minutes every hour, 40 hours every week.

"Last week the pounding monotony became too much for one work-woman's clattering brain. She silently fainted. Another, noticing her, fainted. That attracted the attention of a third, who screamed. Another screamed, and set off a concatenation of emotion, in which startled women yelled, fought, fainted, writhed hysterically.

"Finding no intoxicant gases in the sugar factory, doctors concluded that the monotonous machines had driven the young women into a mass hysteria, the psychic phenomenon used with striking effect by Charlie Chaplin in his last picture, *Modern Times*" (*Time*, June 21, 1937).

Another recent, and in this instance rather widespread, "mania" is to be found in the fanatical aspects of the wave of sit-down strikes which reached its crest during the spring of 1937. As a technique of collective bargaining, the sit-down strike had a rather slow development. It was first used in the United States by the United Rubber Workers at Akron, Ohio, in 1934. See the news item "Strike and Settlements" (*Time*, May 10, 1937). During the same year it appeared as a "suicide strike" among Hungarian miners. Early in 1936 a form of irresponsible "sitting down" occurred when unemployed people tried to force favorable legislation by camping in public buildings. See the news item "Jobless Invasion" (*Time*, May 4, 1936). In the same year the sit-down was adopted as a standard device by the Committee for Industrial Organization. See E. Levinson, "Labor on the March" (*Harper's Mag.*, May, 1937, 642-650). Sit-down striking soon, however, got beyond the control of labor leaders and, as is suggested by the following news item, took on the attributes of a "mania":

"Appointment of a parson and a rabbi to help Rev. Frederic Siedenberg, executive dean of the Jesuit University of Detroit, mediate Detroit's pandemonium of sit-down strikes was not the only thing which reminded observers of the medieval dance mania last week as they watched the U.S. Sit-Down epidemic of 1937 spread out across the land. From Salem witchcraft persecution to Ku Klux Klan, from Gold Rush of 1849 to Bull Market of 1929, the U.S. has shown itself no less subject than its sister nations to seizures of mass hysteria" (*Time*, Mar. 29, 1937).

For an extended discussion of fanatical "manias" see M. Greenwood, *Epidemics and Crowd Epidemics* (London, Williams & Norgate, 1935).

14. For an analysis of the boom from the economic viewpoint see M.S. Handman, "Boom" (*Ency. Soc. Sci.*, 2, 638-641).

15. For material on the California gold rush see:

- Allen, W.W., *California Gold Book*, San Francisco, Donohue and Henneberry, 1893.
- Buck, F.A., *A Yankee Trader in the Gold Rush*, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1930.

De Groot, H., *Recollections of California Mining Life*, San Francisco, Dewey, 1884.

Quiett, G.C., *Pay Dirt*, New York, Appleton-Century, 1936.

Shaw, D.A., *Eldorado*, Los Angeles, Baumgardt, 1900.

Taylor, B., *Eldorado*, New York, Putnam, 1884.

Webster, K., *The Gold Seekers of '49*, Manchester, Standard Book, 1913.

White S.E., *The Forty-niners*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1921.

For the story of the building of the fabulous boom town of Virginia City, Nev., see G. Lyman, *Saga of the Comstock Lode* (New York, Scribner, 1934); and S. Paine, *Eilley Orrum, Queen of the Comstock* (Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill, 1929).

The story of an equally fantastic boom town, Panamint, located in Death Valley, Calif., is told by N.C. Wilson in *Silver Stampede* (New York, Macmillan, 1937).

For descriptions of the Alaska gold rush see H. Lynch, *Three Years in the Klondike* (London, Arnold, 1904), and S.H. Young, *The Klondike Clan* (New York, Revell, 1916).

During recent years oil has tended to replace gold as a boom object. In "It Was Fun While It Lasted" (*Sat. Even. Post*, Oct. 16, 1937) B. House describes the oil boom which followed the drilling of the McCleskey well in Ranger, Texas, in 1917. The pattern of this boom has appeared over and over with little variation except in so far as duration is concerned, a factor largely controlled by the size of the oil pool involved.

Even Californians have generally forgotten that the great boom in southern California lands actually occurred in 1887, when in some regions values rose to peaks which were not equaled in the more prolonged and possibly less fanatical boom of the 1920's. See the following:

Gwinn, J.M., "The Great Real Estate Boom of 1887," *Ann. Publ. Hist. Soc. of Southern Calif.*, 1890.

Nets, J., "The Great L.A. Real Estate Boom of 1887," *Ann. Publ. Hist. Soc. of Southern Calif.*, n. d.

Sanborn, F.R., *Bursting of a Boom*, Philadelphia, National Publishers, 1889.

Van Dyke, T.S., *Millionaires of a Day*, New York, Fords, Howard, Hulbert, 1890.

16. S. Zweig (*Mental Healers*, trans. by E. Paul and C. Paul, New York, Viking, 1932) has shown the positive values of such systems of faith healing as Christian Science to those who are sick of body or of mind. Unquestionably, the mental state of a sick person is often an important factor in determining the ability of his body to overcome the ravages of some diseases; here faith may actually have some curative significance. And obviously what we describe as faith is the only cure for those who suffer from imaginary diseases. It does not, however, follow that faith can heal the broken leg or check the course of a malignant growth.

17. The story of one miracle man is briefly told in the following news item:

"Hobbling, crawling, shoving, shrieking, the crowd of blacks and whites pushed five policemen into the Mississippi River in their inordinate eager-

ness to reach John Cudney. For his 'miracles' of healing the scrawny, bearded, old Canadian who used to peddle kindling prescribed no medicines, charged no fees.

"That was in New Orleans in 1920. Next spring Los Angeles police stopped John Cudney's meetings on 'Miracle Hill' because lepers were mixing with the crowds. . . .

"In August 1921 the Event Bureau of Venice, nearby beach resort, built a 'Miracle City' for him. The Bureau had to make him quit at 8 o'clock every evening to give its other concessions a chance. . . . Seattle had him for a while, and other towns in the Northwest. Four years ago he turned up in Oroville, Calif., an old mining town, a little whiter, a little scrawnier and no longer plain John Cudney. He was now Brother Isaiah, 88th & last incarnation of the prophet Isaiah" (*Time*, Aug. 6, 1934).

18. The following news item describes a recent miracle cure: "Bangkok is being invaded. Not by the Cambodians nor the Burmese, ancient enemies of Siam, but by the lame, the blind and the diseased from all parts of the kingdom. They are not coming for treatment at the Pasteur Institute nor the modern hospitals, of which Bangkok is proud, but to a tiny garden at the end of a squalid alley where a famous 'medicine tree' has been discovered.

"News that the tree possesses extraordinary powers has spread through the land, and pilgrims are hastening to it from remote districts firmly convinced that they are soon to be rid of their suffering. . . .

"The district around the tree has become the camping place of hundreds of pilgrims who have come on foot, astride tiny Siamese ponies, in rickshaws or in motor cars. Each morning they approach the tree and after suitable religious ceremonies and prayers they partake of the medicine. Wondrous cures are reported almost daily, and the grateful patients have hung testimonials and money on the tree, until the branches are filled with the offerings" (*San Francisco Chronicle*, Mar. 8, 1937).

For descriptions and discussions of some of the miracle cures which have had brief popularity in the United States see:

"American Lourdes," *Outlook*, Nov. 27, 1929, 497-498.

"Miracles at Malden," *Lit. Dig.*, Dec. 7, 1929, 22-23.

"Miracles," *Nation*, Nov. 6, 1935, 526.

"Rumored Miracle Draws Curious to Cleveland Cemetery," *Newsweek*, Nov. 21, 1936, 44.

"When Is a Cure Miraculous?" *Commonweal*, Dec. 21, 1934, 234.

Wilbur, R., "How Miracles Happen," *Commonweal*, Dec. 7, 1932, 151-155.

19. F. Schuman (*The Nazi Dictatorship: A Study in Social Pathology and the Politics of Fascism*, New York, Knopf, 1935) and T. Able ("The Pattern of a Successful Political Movement," *Amer. Sociol. Rev.*, 1937, 2, 347-352) are among those who stress the fanatical aspect of the rise of Hitler to political leadership.

20. Perhaps the most complete account of a truly political messiah is J. Kastein's *The Messiah of Ismir: Sabbitai Zevi* (New York, Viking, 1931).

Sabbitai Zevi was a seventeenth-century Jew who secured, more or less without deliberate effort, a tremendous following in Smyrna on the basis of a politicoreligious ideology of salvation.

One of the more atypical messianic "movements" was that which arose in the 1840's in the eastern part of the United States on the ideology, propounded by W. Miller, that fire was to destroy the earth in October, 1844; that at this time Christ and the angels were to come to gather up the faithful; and, therefore, that those who wished to be saved had better become numbered among the faithful. The faithful assembled on various nights during this period to await the end of the earth and their personal salvation. See C.E. Sears, *Days of Delusion* (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1924).

21. In 1933 there appeared in New York's Harlem a Negro messiah, "Father" Divine, who claimed to be God and who offered an inconsistent mixture of political and religious salvation to the distressed people of this district. By 1936 he had secured a large, devoted, fanatical following.

For the story of "Father" Divine, who passed into more or less complete oblivion in 1937, see J. Hoshor, *God in a Rolls-Royce* (New York, Hillman-Curl, 1936), and R.A. Parker, *The Incredible Messiah* (Boston, Little, Brown, 1937).

CHAPTER XX

REBELLIOUS BEHAVIOR

Under conditions of increasing social disorganization, there may appear, in addition to revelous and fanatical behavior, a third type of collective escape from the *status quo*—rebellious behavior.¹ Unlike fanatical behavior, such behavior does not constitute a denial of reality, but, rather, a protest against reality.

In that it is directed against a symbol of the *status quo* rather than against the *status quo* itself, rebellious behavior must be categorically distinguished from all calculated nomothetic attempts to effect desired changes in the *status quo*. Just as a man may attempt to escape intolerable domestic discord by doing violence to his wife rather than by attempting to change the underlying causes of his domestic discord, a rebellious group may collectively attempt to escape from intolerable social circumstances by attacking a person, a class of persons, or a class of objects rather than by attempting to change the social system which has generated those circumstances.

Rebellious behavior may have a great variety of specific social antecedents; it may take a great many specific forms; and it may have any one of a considerable number of consequences. Enraged peasants may destroy the manor house of their lord and be slaughtered by the king's soldiers. Unruly sailors may exchange blows in a waterfront saloon until the riot squad arrives to provide distraction. Strikers may break from control and wrathfully attack police, scabs, and company property. Aroused citizenry may storm a jail and hang, burn, or otherwise wreak vengeance on a fellow citizen. Whatever its specific form, however, rebellious behavior is a blind and violent attack upon some collectively designated symbol of the *status quo*.

ORIGIN AND FUNCTION

The ultimate origins of rebellious behavior, like those of fanatical behavior, lie in the historical factors which have led to

disorganization of the social system. The more immediate origins, however, lie in the desperation which is engendered by the repeated failures of discontented people to achieve satisfactory adjustments to their social roles.

Social Maladjustment and Discontent.—In the preceding chapter, it was observed that social disorganization, whatever its origin, fosters the more or less acute maladjustment of many individuals to their social roles and results in chronic discontent. In so far as a single individual is concerned, this discontent may be resolved in one of two general ways: The individual may struggle to achieve the desired status, in which case he becomes an ambitious and, perhaps, successful man. On the other hand, the individual may resort to a flight into an imaginary world, in which case he becomes psychopathic.

It is evident that, when any considerable proportion of a social population are chronically discontented, they cannot all, nor can any great number of them, possibly achieve satisfactory adjustments by individual strivings to secure more desirable social roles. In any society, the saturation point for "successful" men and women is quickly reached. The majority of the chronically discontented people will, therefore, ultimately resort to some sort of escape behavior in the effort to achieve a satisfactory equilibrium between themselves and their social roles.

As we have seen, resort is often made to fanatical behavior. Only those who are able to accept the ideologies upon which this behavior is predicated will, however, be able to resort to it.

Discontent and Desperation.—As a social system progressively disintegrates, more and more chronically discontented individuals will lose hope for their future and faith in themselves. The result is what may be described as desperation. When social circumstances have reduced any considerable number of people to a state of desperation, they may collectively turn to rebellious behavior as an escape from the social system which has at once made their life possible and their status intolerable. In such general desperation lie the immediate, psychological origins of rebellious behavior.

Because even the disorganized society trains its members to accept the social system as more or less inviolable, individual and collective efforts to achieve a satisfactory adjustment to that system may continue for months, years, or even generations,

before hope and faith in the possibilities of eventual success will be worn away by repeated failures. As long as there is the slightest hope that individuals may succeed by heroic effort, by a change in luck, or by the grace of God, the attempts to adjust to the *status quo* will continue. Not until the very faith in the possibility of improvement within the *status quo* is exhausted can rebellious behavior arise.²

Since discontent must give way to desperation before rebellious action can occur, a considerable proportion of the members of a society, even the vast majority, will passively submit to constantly increasing social degradation over long periods. The Chinese peasants frequently submitted to a century or more of bad government before they were aroused to violent protest. The wretched mobs of republican Rome submitted to progressive starvation for nearly a century before they resorted to overt violence. The sea lords of Great Britain were long able to make increasing demands upon seamen before morale broke and the British fleet experienced a series of mutinies.

In view of the fact that comparatively little is required to keep discontented people from becoming desperate, it would seem that a large part of the responsibility for rebellious behavior rests upon the leaders of the malfunctioning social order. Almost any small concession on the part of political, religious, or economic leaders will be sufficient to revive the hope of the discontented and to postpone the growth of desperation. Historically, however, those leaders have invariably had a sort of vested interest in the very elements of the *status quo* which must be changed if desperation is to be prevented; and they have seldom shown the foresight to make a compromise between their interests and those of the discontented people.³

The Incident.—Even when, for whatever specific reasons, the malfunctioning of a social system has brought about a sense of desperation in a considerable segment of the population, an incident is necessary before rebellious behavior will occur. Although radical theorists are fond of designating the growth of widespread desperation as the growth of class consciousness, there is actually no particular awareness of common interests until an incident occurs. Any event which provides the desperate people with a common grievance—a political scandal, an

inadvertent insult, a rumor of murder, a brutal flogging, or any unprovoked violence—may serve as the incident.

In some cases, the incident directly precipitates rebellious behavior. Such is the case when one of a group of restive men vents his wrath on another. The crack of fist on chin may be a sufficient incident to precipitate a general *mêlée*. The forcible eviction of a Negro boy from a Harlem store in 1935 served as the incident which directly precipitated rioting among the Negro customers of that store, rioting which spread to engulf the whole of Harlem.⁴ The unprovoked clubbing and shooting of massed waterfront strikers by the police during the general strike in San Francisco in 1934 served as the incident which directly precipitated warfare.⁵

More often, however, the incident merely precipitates verbal interaction which, in turn, leads to rebellious action. In any event, the incident is necessary before rebellious behavior can occur. Whether or not it is related to the actual source of discontent and desperation is unimportant, as long as that incident provides a desperate people with a common grievance.⁶

The Symbol.—That which becomes the object of rebellious action may have no relationship whatsoever to the incident. The American execution of Sacco and Vanzetti was the incident which led to the Paris riots of 1927; but the object of attack was, as is usually the case with Paris riots, private property. The wholly irrelevant shooting, by a Chinese magistrate, of Chinese people who were petitioning for consideration against a bankrupt Chinese-owned railroad was the incident which led to the tragic Boxer Rebellion; but the object for attack was Occidentals and all things Occidental.⁷

Whether it is related to the incident or not, the object of rebellious action is always concrete and tangible. It would obviously be impossible to attack such abstractions as capitalism, corrupt politics, etc. Attack is, therefore, directed toward some concrete person, class of persons, or class of things which is considered as responsible for the occurrence of all such incidents. The object of attack may be the police, as when enraged strikers break from control. It may be a frightened Negro, as when the poor whites of our southeast form into a lynching mob. It may be a ship's captain, as when resentful sailors are goaded into mutinying.

In any event, the object of rebellious attack is no more than a symbol of forces which are too complex and too intangible to be otherwise comprehensible—the villain of the action drama in which peace and prosperity are the heroine sought by the desperate people as hero.

Function.—The immediate and psychological function of rebellious behavior is simple and evident. To the members of a rebellious group, violence of whatever order provides an outlet for their feelings. The action is analogous to the behavior of a man who wrathfully kicks a chair: the act expresses his feelings and provides him with at least the satisfaction of expressing those feelings.

The long-run consequences of rebellious behavior, however, are never simple and are seldom evident. The fact that attack is blind and uncalculating and is directed toward a symbol of circumstances precludes such action from being directly effective against those circumstances. Just as the man who kicks the chair does not diminish the causes of his despair, the members of a rebellious group do not directly change the circumstances which brought them to such action. The indirect long-run consequences of rebellious behavior may, however, be any one of several orders. Quite often rebellious action only aggravates the conditions which have brought it about and detracts from constructive efforts to improve those conditions. The riots which occurred during the general strike in San Francisco alienated public support of the strikers and lessened their chances for winning the strike. In some cases, rebellious behavior would seem to have no evident long-run consequences. The poor whites of the southeast have lynched many a Negro over the course of the years; and, if the consequences to the victims be excluded, nothing socially significant has come of these lynchings. In other instances, however, rebellious behavior indirectly has contributed to minor or major changes in the social system which fostered such behavior. Although the sailors who participated in the series of mutinies which occurred in the British fleet during the latter part of the eighteenth century were usually hanged for their protest, those mutinies undoubtedly led to the maritime reforms which followed.⁸ Although the people who participated in the sporadic rebellions which led to the French Revolution and the Russian Revolution undoubtedly suffered as

a consequence of that participation, each of those rebellions contributed in some small measure to the profound social changes which followed these revolutions.

In the case of any specific incident of rebellious behavior, it is never possible to predict the long-run consequences. Even when many such incidents blend into a revolutionary constellation, the long-run consequences of such behavior are a matter for the ideologists to debate and for social history to arbitrate.

IDEOLOGIES

The ideologies of a stable social system always preclude rebellious action against the *status quo*. Basic to the stable order are institutional mechanisms; and these, as we have seen, are vested with either divine or naturalistic sanction. Ideologically, the *status quo* and the personnel of its leadership are inviolable.

The persistence of this idea into a period of social instability is, no doubt, in part responsible for the fact that attack upon even a symbol of the *status quo* is the last resort of a desperate people. Apparently, such attack awaits the gradual growth of what might be described as a traditional ideology—a belief that some person, class of persons, or class of objects is responsible for trouble and is susceptible to attack. So long as the king is considered as unable to do wrong and as immune from attack, he will not become the object of rebellious action. If his people rebel, they will direct their action to some thing or some person other than the king.

The growth of any particular traditional ideology depends upon complex historical factors. In America a number of distinct, rebellious ideologies have become traditional in certain times and places. During one period, industrial workers developed the belief that immigrants were the cause of low wages, bad working conditions, and unemployment and that they could be dispossessed by violence. Subsequently, employers replaced the immigrants as the cause of the difficulties of the industrial workers. In the southeastern regions, the poor white farmers developed the idea that Negroes were the cause of low incomes and that they could be put in their place by an occasional lynching.⁹ Perhaps the most curious ideology of all those which have developed in America is that of extralegal "justice."

This ideology is vaguely related to the concept of democratic government and consists of the idea that, when government does not function to the satisfaction of the members of a community, they are justified in constituting themselves a temporary and informal substitute for government. This ideology is the basis for violence which is not so much an attack upon a symbol of the *status quo* as it is an attack upon persons who seem to threaten the *status quo*.

Systematic Ideologies.—In addition to these simple, traditional ideologies are the systematic ideologies of rebellious behavior, products of intellectuals rather than of the people who engage in rebellious behavior. With one exception—that of syndicalism—systematic ideologies have apparently played no part in determining the specific kind of rebellious action which appears. Furthermore, no systematic ideology has been the cause for the rise of specific rebellious situations, although the coordination of many such specific situations into revolution may be predicated on such grounds.

In Western social philosophy, the first clear statement of the idea that the leadership of the *status quo* is subject to modification through violence is that of the political theorist John Locke during the period when English “absolute” monarchy was under attack by the rising bourgeois class.¹⁰ Unlike his contemporary Hobbes, Locke saw government as a social pact or contract of the people with the king, a contract which could be revoked by the people when the king failed to fulfill his obligations. Although Locke’s contract theory did not specifically justify sporadic and violent rebellion against agents of the established government, it did serve to justify the events which culminated in English “constitutional” monarchy. In a broad way, it may be said that Locke’s theory was an attack upon the ideology of the divine right of kings.

It remained for Karl Marx to develop a systematic ideology to justify general revolution against the leadership of the *status quo*. In his philosophy, rebellious behavior is justified on the grounds of inevitability—*i.e.*, that violence is the historically imperative mechanism by which a new society will be brought about.¹¹ Although Marx was the intellectual father of the Russian Revolution, it would be ludicrous to suppose that the specific rebellious situations of which this revolution was com-

pounded had any direct relationship to the Marxian ideology of rebellious behavior. The rebellions which gave Bolshevik leaders their opportunities were simply the sporadic efforts of a desperate people who had lost faith in the *status quo*, in their traditional leaders, and in themselves.

Still another systematic ideology of rebellious behavior is that which is found in French syndicalism. This philosophy pertains specifically to labor unionism. According to the syndicalists, the efforts of labor unionists should not be reformative—*i.e.*, the unions should not engage in collective bargaining, but should, rather, direct their efforts toward eventual revolution. To hasten the coming of the economic millennium, the unions should hamper the working of the capitalistic order by the use of violence.¹² We need not here concern ourselves with the details of their argument. It is interesting to note, however, that syndicalism has many proponents among the industrial workers of France and that rebellious behavior in France is almost invariably directed toward the destruction of property. There would appear, therefore, to be an actual relationship between the syndicalistic ideology of rebellious behavior and the predisposition of French unionists to sabotage.

MEMBERSHIP

The term "mob" has been loosely used to designate any number of social groupings—the spectators at a prize fight, the audience to a campaign speech, the revelers at a sales convention, etc. We shall, however, restrict the term "mob" to the members of a rebellious situation.¹³

Determination of Membership.—Although the members of a mob are never consciously selected, there are always some limitations on membership. Only the members of a ship's crew can join the mob which mutinies against the ship's captain. Only whites can join a mob which is intent upon lynching a Negro. Such a mob would certainly draw the color line; it might even resent the presence of a deputy sheriff who had neglected to remove his badge. In some instances there are sex and age limitations on mob membership. A barroom riot, for example, is traditionally a masculine affair.

Aside from limitations of this order, however, the determination of mob membership is, like the determination of the membership

of most audiences, a matter of individual willingness and individual ability to join. Ability to join the mob is no more than a matter of proximity. Willingness to join is a matter of training.

Training for Membership.—The members of a mob are, of course, never deliberately trained by society for rebellious action. Certainly no social system involves systematic preparation of the individual for mob membership. All conscious educational efforts on the part of a society are directed toward the maintenance of the *status quo*. Furthermore, although the "educational" efforts of radical organizations may prepare potential mob members to respond to specific leadership when rebellious action does occur, such efforts cannot train men to be potential mob members. All the verbal lashing in the world will not rouse to rebellious action people who are satisfied with the sorts of lives they lead.

The actual training of people to become mob members is accomplished by their being subjected to experiences which make them discontented and ultimately desperate. Training is complete when, through repeated individual and collective failures, people have lost all hope for improvement and have come to feel that there is nothing to lose and that there is a chance for gain in rebellious action.

There is, however, always the possibility that some or many members of a mob are untrained for their roles and become members only by necessity. The bystander may be swept up by the mob—taken along in spite of himself. Moreover, under some circumstances, good judgment dictates that an individual join a mob in order to avoid being mobbed; when revolt sweeps the land, running with the pack may be a matter of expediency. Finally, when rebellious behavior becomes at all general, the process of interactional amplification tends to induce people who are not desperate to join in the "new movement." For such members, rebellious behavior is actually no more than a fanatical pattern.

OVERT AND COVERT ASPECTS OF INTERACTION

The overt behavior which occurs in a rebellious situation is a direct, although channelized, expression of the aroused, covert feeling-states of the members. In this respect, rebellious

behavior most closely resembles that of the revelous type; *i.e.*, latent feeling-states are both intensified in the situation and are given a path of discharge. Except possibly for the leader of the situation, the behavior which occurs in a mob is never motivated by ulterior considerations. It is entirely uncalculated.

The Generation of Wrath.—It is a relatively commonplace individual experience to pass progressively through a sense of irritation to desperation and, thence, to action-impelling wrath. When a person is striving grimly to accomplish some end, any interruption may be irritating. A series of such interruptions may result in a growing sense of desperation, until the point is reached at which one more such interruption is just one too many; and the person wrathfully slams the door in the peddler's face, tears the telephone off the wall, or otherwise gives violent outlet to his wrath.

A comparable, although vastly more complex, process is involved in the generation of the wrath which is expressed in rebellious behavior. The members of the rebellious situation have long been trying to reach a psychologically imperative destination. Their efforts have been fruitless, and they have individually arrived at a state of desperation. The incident which precipitates rebellious behavior has, for all these individuals, much the same effect as the one-too-many interruption has for the man who has despaired of completing his work: it converts a group of desperate individuals into a wrathful group which is impelled to violent action.

If the incident is one which directly affects the group, such as indiscriminate shooting into their midst, the transition from desperation to wrath is quick and involves little verbal interaction among the members of the group. When, as is more commonly the case, the incident does not directly affect any member of the group, the transition occurs through and during the verbal interaction which is based on that incident.¹⁴ This is the period when the mob "mutters."

As group wrath generates, symbolic behavior becomes incapable of providing a satisfactory outlet for the feeling-states of the individuals involved, until some form of overt, nonsymbolic behavior is imperative. Such overt behavior is, of course, always violent and destructive. Within certain limits, however, the specific direction which it takes will depend upon the leader

or leaders who rise to the occasion. In any event, the behavior will be a collective expression of the wrath of the group, comparable to the wrathful action of the individual who slams the door, pulls off the telephone, or, as the case may be, bangs his head against the wall.

LEADERSHIP

Contrary, perhaps, to general opinion, rebellious behavior is not caused by leadership *per se*.¹⁵ Even when the leader of a rebellious situation actually serves to direct the energies and activities of the mob, he does not, by his own initiative and activities, make the rebellious behavior which he directs. That behavior is brought about by circumstances over which neither he nor any other individual has control. As we have seen, rebellious behavior originates in the chronic discontent and desperation of those who are involved and is precipitated by some sort of incident.

Depending in part upon the character of the membership of the mob, in part upon the nature of the incident, and in part upon fortuitous factors which arise within the situational interaction itself, rebellious behavior will have one of two types of leadership: leadership on the basis of mimicry, or leadership of a directive order. The specific nature of these two forms of mob leadership will become apparent in the discussion of the various types of rebellious behavior in which such leadership is manifest. In general, it may be said that any fool can clot his fellow over the head and, thus, set an example for others to mimic, whereas the establishment of mob polarization, collective purpose, and systematic interaction requires the presence and efforts of a competent mob leader.

UNCOORDINATED RIOTS

When the members of a rebellious situation mimic the action pattern of one member, the result is an uncoordinated riot. If the members of a mob situation have, through random symbolic interaction, generated sufficiently intense feeling-states, it is always possible that one of them will express his feelings in an overt nonsymbolic way. This member of the group, like the one who sets off a theater-fire panic, does something to attract the attention of his fellows and, more or less simultaneously,

expresses his wrath by striking a neighbor or by throwing a rock at a window. If the strike-one's-neighbor pattern or the throw-a-rock pattern is mimicked, the result will be a general and indiscriminate bashing of one another's heads or an indiscriminate destruction of property.

In either case, the mimicked pattern has no collective objective. Although the actions of each member are similar to those of all the other members, each member has his own object upon which his energies are directed. The actions of each are not so directed as to contribute to the effectiveness of the actions of all.

Indiscriminate Sabotage.—The unsystematic destruction of property is a favorite sport of the political and economic radicals in the larger urban centers of Europe. Real property—buildings, motorcars, etc.—serves as the villain in the action drama of such rebellious behavior. As has been indicated, the selection of property as the object of attack is related to the theory of the syndicalists—*i.e.*, that to impair the workings of the present social order through sabotage will speed the dawning of a new social system. At any event, the riotous smashing of store windows, street lamps, etc., is peculiarly a European phenomenon.¹⁸ In America and in England, uncoordinated rioting seldom takes this direction, although property damage may be incidental to rioting.

European street rioting, which results in wholesale and indiscriminate damage to public and private property, follows a commonplace pattern. This is well illustrated by the uncoordinated riots in Paris in 1927. The population of Paris has long included a large proportion of malcontents. The news that the American martyrs to capitalistic injustice, Sacco and Vanzetti, had at last been electrocuted was a sufficient occasion for street rioting. The news appeared in the morning papers. When evening came and the day's work was over, the streets in certain favorite spots filled with casual crowds of laborers and malcontents. For some time, they simply roamed restlessly up and down, gathered in small discussion groups, and were peaceful enough. As time went on and this outlet for pent-up tensions proved inadequate, uncoordinated riots broke out in many sections.

Where these developed, no individual striving for leadership was evident. Overt nonsymbolic behavior was set off by the

least responsible member of the group when he turned over a convenient wagon, struck a street light with a stone, or succeeded in ripping off the shutters with which all European shopkeepers protect their windows at night. His action, whatever it may have been, was simply mimicked by other mob members, some contributing leadership elements of their own by finding other ways to destroy property. Soon all the members of the mob were industriously destroying every destructible object they could find—tearing up cobbled streets and tearing down doors, shutters, and signs; turning over all movable objects, such as carts, wagons, and automobiles; and smashing everything smashable, such as windows, statues, etc.¹⁷

An evening devoted to this exhaustive work seems to have much the same effect upon the participants as does an evening of revelry. Ordinarily, an outburst of general uncoordinated rioting is followed by a considerable period of calm, during which the police can relax, assured that the riot call will not come in.

Indiscriminate Assault.—Uncoordinated riots in England and in America generally take the form of indiscriminate assault on persons. For whatever reason, English and American people are less inclined to mimic the leadership of one who breaks a window than they are inclined to mimic the leadership of one who cracks his neighbor's head. The processes involved here are identical with those which lead to indiscriminate destruction of property.

Indiscriminate assault on persons has been in some places and at some times a regular occurrence. A generation ago in the East End of London, in the notorious Limehouse district, in the Bowery, and in the Beal Streets and the Barbary Coasts of American cities, such rioting was almost certain to occur on Saturday night.¹⁸ Perhaps it served for the desperate members of these communities much the same sort of function as did the weekly spree for the less violent and embittered elements of the social population. In some communities it was the regular practice for the police to keep well away from "riot centers" during those times when the streets were thronged with people who were out in search of something to do.

Frequently these uncoordinated riots started with some semblance of coordination; local gang leaders would gather their

forces for systematic combat. But since it was difficult to distinguish between friend and enemy in these clashes and since there was so little real distinction between the members of one gang and another, action usually degenerated to an indiscriminate bashing of heads. Such "gang" fighting was quite unlike the systematic, highly organized, and purposeful warfare which is conducted by modern gangsters.

In contemporary America, this sort of rioting occurs at irregular intervals, usually in some place of amusement rather than in the streets and usually among the shifting population of a city—the transient laborers, the sailors, and the riffraff. Perhaps because they have so few social privileges, such men are characteristically insistent upon their "rights." Perpetually discontented, restless, and ready for action, whatever it may be, they are, thus, likely to be "spoiling for a fight." Particularly is this true when their normal activities are interrupted, as in times of general unemployment.

Around a bar, or drifting up and down in groups of a more or less congenial order, men of the sort described above seek recreation or revelry in drinking and talking. Because of their dissatisfaction with life in general, their conversations tend to be argumentative. It is always possible that what starts as a more or less congenial interchange between casual acquaintances will build up into a bitter controversy. This verbal exchange may generate feeling-states which demand nonsymbolic outlet—as when, during the heat of argument, one calls the other a "fighting word." Blow then leads to retaliatory blow.

Fights of this order are commonplace enough and do not always lead to general rioting. The tendency is, however, for the spectators to become participants. Each sees in one or the other of the fighters a counterpart of himself and mimics the behavior of that counterpart. Thus, the fight-one's-neighbor pattern spreads until all the members of the group are involved. Although such fighting may be nothing more than violent revelry, it tends to take on the attributes of protest behavior, in which the person assaulted serves for the one who assaults as the villain who has caused his discontent.

Prison Riots.—The population of a prison, particularly a state or federal prison to which men or women are committed for long sentences, provides an example par excellence of a dis-

contented and discouraged group of people. Ordinarily, segregation and strong nomothetic controls prevent free verbal interaction among prisoners and, thus, make the generation of mob wrath impossible. It sometimes happens, however, that undercover organization of an element of the prison population will ultimately result in an attempted prison break. Such an attempt involves limited coordinated rioting between some prisoners and their guards and usually is not difficult to deal with. If, however, general prison discipline breaks down during the course of such an attempt, random verbal action between large numbers of prisoners may occur to arouse group wrath and may lead to widespread uncoordinated rioting, in which prisoner strikes prisoner or guard with complete impartiality.

Once well under way, such a riot is practically uncontrollable and may continue until all the participants are either exhausted or incapacitated. The use of small cell blocks and the prison rule of limited communication is not so much an attempt to prevent individual prisoners or small groups from organizing a break as it is a preventive against the far more serious hazard of uncoordinated prison rioting.

COORDINATED RIOTS

When the members of a rebellious situation follow direction rather than example, the result is a coordinated riot. The interaction of the members is more or less polarized; and the behavior of the individuals, rather than being alike, is organized into a pattern. When mobs of this order storm a building, they do so, not as a group of individuals, each endeavoring to tear the building apart by his own efforts, but as an organization of individuals, each doing his special part in furthering the collective end.

In the simplest form of the coordinated riot, directive leadership consists merely of somebody's issuing an activating command. Such leadership is possible only when the members of the group are already converted to the desirability of action. If, for example, a crowd of pedestrians who have been previously prepared by a newspaper campaign against hit-run drivers were to gather around the victim of such a motorist, that group might be formed into a coordinated mob if some one of their number were to point toward a passing car and cry, "There he goes!

Catch him!" Ordinarily, however, two distinct kinds of leadership are necessary before coordinated rioting appears.¹⁹

The Agitator.—The reason that a man is lying, crushed and battered, in the street is usually fairly obvious. He was struck by something, and that something becomes the "cause" of his unfortunate plight. That something—streetcar, truck, or automobile—is tangible. The attention of the group can be focalized upon it or upon an equally tangible substitute, and mob attack can be direct and effective.

When, however, the incident itself does not provide a tangible object for attack and merely precipitates random, verbal interaction, some member of the group may, during the course of this interaction, rise as an agitator. The agitator temporarily converts the "muttering mob" into an audience and proceeds to convert that audience to the acceptance of an action drama. To accomplish this, he uses the standard dramatic formula, building up stereotypes which are appropriate for the group and for the ends he has in view. His technique is comparable to that of any conversational-audience leader. Building on the incident, he personifies the forces of opposition and casts his audience in the role of a collective hero, who by a designated course of action will rescue the heroine from the machinations of the villain. The heroine is all those things which the members of the group want but have been unable to secure by individual strivings. The villain can be almost any person or group of persons, preferably someone who is accessible. Assisted by audience interaction, the agitator may succeed in activating his audience to such an extent that they are ready for overt action.

The Mob Director.—In some instances, the agitator, when he has his audience sufficiently activated, steps from the role of agitator to that of mob director and crying "Follow me!" leads the mob to direct attack on the villain which he has built up for them. More frequently, however, the agitator simply harangues the group until some member of the audience cries out "Let's go, boys!" at which point leadership shifts from the agitator to that member. The typical labor agitator, for example, seldom attempts to do more than convert disgruntled laborers to the idea that some particular employer or employers in general are responsible for their troubles. He provides them with inflamma-

tory oratory in the hope that, from the group, there will arise someone who will lead the mob into action.

When the agitator does not follow through to direct mob action, it is always somewhat problematic whether the directive leadership which does arise will take the mob in the direction which the agitator desires. Many an agitator has succeeded in activating his audience to mob action, only to find that the directive leader which the mob has accepted is headed for the wrong object.

Even when the direction of action has been established, the mob tends to remain fickle. Like a pack of hounds, it is likely to follow the loudest voice. The agitator may, for example, have established the fact that the strikebreakers are the villains who stand in the way of economic plenty; and the mob may have turned actively to the task of routing this enemy. Anyone who comes to hand, however, may then serve as a satisfactory enemy to be chased. Once the pattern of the chase is established, the mob may, in fact, shift attention from the original victim to the nearer, and equally satisfactory, directive leader. The leader becomes the hunted, and someone else takes his place of leadership. This characteristic irresponsibility of the coordinated mob makes directive leadership of such a mob a rather hazardous occupation, particularly during periods of intense and prolonged social stress.

Mutiny.—One of the most interesting, although no longer important, forms of the coordinated riot is mutiny.²⁰ It consists of mob rebellion on the part of the crew against the captain of a ship.

The efficient operation of a ship presupposes a high degree of regimentation. The captain must, for obvious reasons, have dictatorial control; and his crew must be unquestioningly obedient. In spite of this obvious requisite for well-trained sailors, it was long the practice, particularly of the British, to recruit the personnel of the merchant marine by hiring or shanghaiing men from among the least responsible elements of the population and, when this source was inadequate, by impressing men from other classes. The net result was a crew which was discontented at the outset. Such discontent was rapidly aggravated by the physical conditions of life at sea.

Even though acute discontent was characteristic of crews on sailing vessels, mutiny appears to have broken out only when, as a consequence of bad judgment on the part of officers or owners, treatment became even more brutal than normal. Thus, it was undoubtedly the incompetence of British marine officialdom and the frantic efforts of shipping interests to increase their profits which combined so to increase the bitter lot of English sailors that toward the close of the eighteenth century mutiny became common throughout the British merchant marine.²¹

Labor Riots.—Coordinated riots of laborers against what they consider to be the causes of inadequate working conditions and wages have been frequent since the earliest days of the industrial revolution. In the miserable mill towns and in the craft cities of early industrial England and in the industrial towns and cities of the United States, violent and protracted rioting on the part of disgruntled laborers was commonplace.²² Much of this rioting was uncoordinated in type. More, however, was coordinated against a common villain—the machine, the person of the employer, or the police who represented the employer.

The growth of the labor movement during the past fifty years has tended to check the frequency of such rioting. Early in the development of trade unionism, it was realized that rioting—even that which is coordinated—seldom improves the status of the laborer. As a result, the activities of organized labor usually take exchange and nomothetic forms—strikes, boycotts, struggles for legislative control, and so on—rather than rebellious forms.

Unorganized laborers may riot because they have no other way to protest against the conditions which seem intolerable.²³ Organized laborers, on the other hand, riot only when established means of collective bargaining have broken down. The organized worker has usually been trained to follow a specific and designated leader. During the course of a strike, he takes his orders and follows them much as does a soldier. Only when labor leaders have been so inept as to lose their following or, as is more frequently the case, when police, militia, or strikebreaker activities disrupt the labor organization will violent, irresponsible rioting occur.

From the point of view of the police it is, perhaps, an advantage to break down systematic labor leadership during the course of

a strike and thereby encourage the outbreak of riots. As a mob, the strikers will spend their energies in destructive action and thus alienate the community at large, making it politically feasible for the police to side openly with the employers.

Political Riots.—When a mob which represents a discontented political majority takes violent action against the dominant political minority or its representatives, the result is a political riot. In minor outbreaks, it is usually the police—representatives of political privilege—who take the brunt of the attack.

The conscription riots of the Civil War period are a classic example of political rioting in the United States.²⁴ The protest was against conscription for the army; and anger was directed against the police, who, while in no sense responsible for the conscription order, were tangible and available objects for the mobs to attack. In the city of New York rioting was completely out of control for some days. Mobs ranged the streets at will and, when policemen were not available, attacked anything that a leader suggested.

In certain countries, political rioting is commonplace. An election may be a sufficient incident to arouse the various political factions to bitter physical combat. Presumably the protest here is against the dominant political machine which operates to make elections little more than a gesture. Cuba and Mexico have experienced recurrent periods of political rioting, which, since it has lacked consistent leadership, has led to general and indiscriminate destruction. Such rioting indicates the prevalence of discontent and the tendency to place the blame upon the political system, but it seldom proves a serious threat to that system or to those who control it.

When the villain of political rioting is the members of the dominant class, rather than their representatives, the political *status quo* is seriously threatened. Although the policeman may represent a dominant class, he is actually a member of the class that riots. When, therefore, social conditions become sufficiently critical, the tendency is for the representatives of the dominant class, or some of them, to go over to the other side. When some or many of the political representatives of the vested-interest minority join in rebellious behavior, attacks by the mob tend to shift directly toward members of this minority; and a political revolution is in the making.²⁵

Race Riots.—When the members of any mob have taken the members of another racio-cultural group as the symbol of the unsatisfactory *status quo*, the result is a race riot. For centuries in those regions of China where the population consisted in part of Moslems, riots of Moslems against the Chinese majority occurred periodically. In Turkish Armenia the Moslem majority frequently rioted against the Armenian minority, a practice which was encouraged by the government as a good and inexpensive way of keeping the Armenians under control. Of recent years, rioting by the Arab majority against the Jewish minority has occurred sporadically in Palestine.

Perhaps the best example in the United States of the race riot is that which occurred in Chicago in 1916.²⁶ The migration of Negroes into industrial Chicago had displaced white labor, which was none too contented at best, and had led to considerable tension between Negroes and whites. A squabble between a white boy and a Negro boy in a public swimming pool served as the incident to arouse the whites to action. The story that the Negro struck the white boy spread and became "proof" that the troubles of the whites were caused by the Negroes. Within a few hours, mobs of white laborers began to form and to attack any Negroes whom they encountered. Soon coordinated rioting against Negroes became general.

The Lynching of Negroes.—A highly traditional form of race rioting, directed toward specific members of a class of persons rather than toward that class in general, is the lynching of Negroes by the poor whites in the more backward regions of the southeast. Although some students of this phenomenon have considered it simply as a bad habit in those regions, such lynching is actually rebellious behavior, a traditional form of protest against discontent and dissatisfaction. The fact that the Negroes who are lynched are in no way responsible for the social conditions which generate discontent and dissatisfaction does not alter the fact. The lynched Negro is a symbol of the complex social forces which have led to the social degradation of the members of the lynching mob—forces which they could never comprehend.²⁷

The incident which precipitates the lynching of a Negro may consist of almost anything. In those communities which are addicted to the lynching of Negroes, the whites habitually blame

their social and economic difficulties upon the presence of Negroes. Any incident is, therefore, easily raised to one of the first magnitude by rumor and inflammatory addresses. Frequently, the incident consists of the charge by some white girl that she has been attacked or threatened with attack by a Negro. Whether the charge is true or not makes little difference. Soon it becomes a generally accepted fact that, unless this crime against the sanctity of white women is vindicated, the Negroes will get the upper hand; and the whites will be driven from the region. Anyway, the argument runs, it would be well for the Negroes to be put back in their proper place so that the price of tobacco, yams, and other local products will rise and the land will be restored to fertility.

When the local authorities are interested in the maintenance of normal judicial procedure, they endeavor to capture the accused and rush him, for his own safety, to some distant and impregnable jail. Frequently, however, local authorities do no more than assure that there will be only one victim for the lynching. To this end, they pick up and establish in the local jail the first young Negro to come to hand, preferably, of course, one who is already in local disrepute. The mob then attaches the alleged crime to this Negro. Sometimes, however, the mob must find its own victim or, if the mob has split into two sections, two victims.

Aroused by rumor and speeches, the more actively disgruntled of the males in the community assemble in some convenient place—probably before the jail, if the police have made an arrest. Anonymous cries will arise with increasing frequency, until some one of the group climbs to a place of prominence before them, gets their attention by shouting above their mutterings, and proceeds to act in the capacity of an agitator for direct action.

From this point on, the only difference between the lynching mob and other coordinated mobs is that the action of the former follows the traditional lynching pattern. Under the leadership of one member, the mob storms the jail, drags the victim to a convenient tree, ties a rope around his neck, and proceeds to strangle him to death. To make vengeance more satisfying, they frequently mutilate the body and keep it hanging in public view as long as possible in order to "put the fear of God into

nigger hearts." In 1937, a variation in this routine procedure appeared when two Negroes were lashed to trees and burned to death with blow torches.²⁸

Extralegal "Justice."—A generation or so ago it was a commonplace event in northeastern and middlewestern American communities to have unofficial local leaders threaten socially irritating individuals with a tarring-and-feathering.²⁹ Such threats were applied to people who were considered by a large proportion of the members of a community as dangerous to that community but who were for some reason or other either beyond the law or not sufficiently restrained by the representatives of the law. A swindler who had robbed members of the community, but who could not be convicted of the crime; a person who was generally believed to have committed some breach of local morality, but who had not broken a law; an "agitator" who was intent upon disrupting the normal life of the community, but who was beyond the reach of judicial procedure—such people as these might be threatened with mob violence. Frequently, the threat was carried into action. The pattern of mob behavior under such circumstances was traditional. Led by a determined member, the mob would capture the offending person, strip him, coat him with hot tar, sprinkle him with feathers, and parade him out of town on a fence rail.

The old-fashioned practice of disposing of the undesirable members of a community by tarring-and-feathering can best be understood as a mob protest against political anarchy—a feeling that, if the political authorities will not take action in accordance with established nomothetic means, the people will take action in accordance with mob procedure. Such assumption of nomothetic controls is often designated as extralegal "justice," and the mob is given some degree of social sanction by the euphemistic term "vigilantes."

In the west, the ends of extralegal "justice" were usually accomplished by hanging the victim, rather than by tarring-and-feathering him. In the days when the mining towns and cow towns of the western frontier were centers of social turmoil and lacked regular and systematic judicial controls, it was inevitable that the community occasionally took steps to punish and to wreak vengeance on outstandingly irritating individuals.

Although the law of the "quick draw" operated in so far as most differences between individuals were concerned, some differences between individuals were considered to be a community matter. The theft of a horse was, for example, a crime against the community. The logic in this is rather evident. In sparsely settled and arid regions, the loss of his means of transportation might well mean the death of a man. The horse thief was, therefore, looked upon as a potential murderer who was dangerous to the members of the community. If a man would steal one man's horse, he would likely steal other men's horses. When a horse was stolen, the community was incensed and took action. If there was a so-called sheriff handy, he organized a posse. Otherwise, the members of the community themselves would form a posse, without benefit of sheriff, and round up the suspect. Should he be captured alive, which was done as infrequently as possible, the members of the posse would feel it incumbent upon them to go through the formalities of trying him. If he had friends in the group, he no doubt had some sort of hearing. Otherwise, the trial was by rope; if the rope broke, he was innocent.

Wherever political organization is lacking and men of diverse inclinations foregather, it is inevitable that some sort of crude nomothetic control come into operation. The hangings by an extralegal frontier posse, by aroused gold-rush miners, and by enraged Alaskan sourdoughs were rough substitutes for judicial procedure and, no doubt, reflected such mores as could be agreed upon by the members of the community. Although the justice which was meted out by such mobs was probably no more systematic than that which is meted out by coordinated mobs in the streets of the crowded centers of civilization, there was, in a sense, a social justification for such hangings.

Occasionally, extralegal hanging is to be traced directly to the failure of the police or the judicial system to achieve the normal standards which are set for public protection. Such was undoubtedly the case with the lynching in San Jose in 1933 of two men who had kidnaped and murdered a young man. Exceedingly rare in the west since the days of the vigilantes, extralegal hanging was in this instance a mob protest against the uncertainties of court procedure—an expression more of irritation with the cumbersome and inept judicial system which

found difficulty in punishing admitted felons than an expression of irritation with the kidnapers.

ANTIRIOT LEADERSHIP

Although the frequency, intensity, and scope of rebellious behavior depends upon the character of the social system and cannot, therefore, be affected by individual effort, rioting may, in any given instance, be prevented by the rise of antiriot leadership at the critical moment during the growth of a mob. The lack of such leadership is, in a limited sense, immediately responsible for the occurrence of rioting.

The Prevention of Uncoordinated Rioting.—Uncoordinated rioting may be prevented by checking the rise of a pattern of action which can be mimicked or, when such a pattern appears, by converting the situation into a type of situation in which mimicry does not ordinarily occur. Thus, the moment two barroom patrons show an inclination to fight or to engage in a bitter argument which may lead to fighting, the barroom bouncer may insure against general rioting by evicting the fighters. In many instances, however, such a procedure is not expedient, since the very act of eviction might precipitate a coordinated riot against the bouncer. Under such conditions, the technique of converting a potential riot situation into one of another type is far more effective. To this end, the old-time bartender frequently resorted to the "fair-fight" device. At the moment when two men began fighting, he organized the other patrons into an audience. He himself assumed the position of impartial referee, urging the spectators to give the fighters room and pretending concern with fair play for the combatants. Under such leadership, the patrons would more or less automatically fall into the role of spectators at a prize fight. Obviously, neither of these techniques can be employed with large and heterogeneous groups.

The Breaking Up of Uncoordinated Riots.—Once uncoordinated rioting has become general, it is impossible to reorganize the situation in terms of directive leadership. Each member of the mob is so much engaged in his own affairs that it requires a powerful stimulus to disrupt his behavior pattern. Called to the scene of a riot, the police do not attempt to organize the

situation and thus to bring about a desirable mode of collective interaction. They attempt, rather, to break up all interaction.

Various techniques are used to accomplish this end, all of which are simple and direct in nature. Since uncoordinated rioters are usually striking about in a rather aimless way, a single policeman with a well-managed night stick can often check a small riot. Numbers may be against him; but, since there is no organization of individual efforts, he has only to take the rioters as they come, one or two at a time. Furthermore, since they are fighting in a purposeless way while he has a definite object in view, he can usually survive encounter after encounter. In many European cities it has long been the practice to set mounted police or guards against small uncoordinated mobs. The sheer bulk and strength of a horse can be depended upon to break through the preoccupation of a rioter.

To quell a very large and violent uncoordinated riot by manpower alone is, however, often difficult. No sooner is the rioting in one section broken up, than rioting breaks out in another section. In some instances, it is difficult for the police even to make their way into a mob. The entrance to a street or building in which a large uncoordinated riot is occurring may be so small as to mean that only one or two men can get in at a time. Experience with such situations has led to reliance upon the "cooling" influence of a strong stream of water from a fire hose. Until the advent of tear gas, the fire department was a useful adjunct to the riot squad. Against an uncoordinated riot, both water and tear gas are effective, simply because they distract the individual rioters, detaching them from the general *mêlée*. Furthermore, whereas the individual rioter may fight back with a policeman, he cannot as an individual fight against a fire hose or a tear-gas bomb.

The Prevention of Coordinated Riots.—All the methods which may be successful in quelling an uncoordinated riot depend upon the fact that the mob is unorganized. None of these methods can, therefore, be very effective when they are directed against a coordinated riot. In a small and less efficient way, a coordinated mob is comparable to an army and can usually defend itself against night stick, fire hose, or tear gas. Consequently, attempts to break up a coordinated riot usually result in a resort to the tactics of warfare.

The prevention of coordinated rioting does not, however, require such drastic measures, although it does necessitate foresight on the part of those who are responsible for the maintenance of law and order. Unfortunately, those who are so responsible are likely to assume that the cause of rioting is the agitators who direct the verbal interaction of potential coordinated mobs and that the elimination, by arrest or otherwise, of the agitators will prevent rioting. Actually, a potential mob can provide new agitators from its membership as fast as the police can remove them.

The two most effective means of preventing coordinated rioting work upon somewhat opposed principles. One method is the prevention of any verbal interaction between potential mob members. The other method is the encouragement of verbal expression of discontent at times when nonverbal action is unlikely to generate.

The technique of preventing the rise of coordinated riots by breaking up all group formations before they have an opportunity to develop into mobs is commonly utilized in Europe. During periods of excessive stress, when at any moment an incident which might precipitate rebellious behavior may occur, it is generally the practice to order the populace to their homes and otherwise to prevent the formation of groups which might generate mob inclinations. It is with this in mind that rules or laws against assemblage are often established.

Only the English have had the foresight to use the second and more subtle technique of preventing the rise of coordinated riots. The government makes legally permissible, and, in fact, encourages, free speech in designated public places. The designated places and the times at which a group will gather are such that verbal interaction will tend to remain on the verbal level. Thus, although on any pleasant Sunday London's Hyde Park is the scene of many inflammatory orations and many bitter discussions of a rebellious nature, no riot has yet broken out there. A park is not, after all, the place for a riot; Sunday is not the day; and one's Sunday best, however threadbare, are not the proper clothes.

APPENDIX

1. Credit is usually given to G. Le Bon (*The Psychology of Revolution*, trans. by B. Miall, London, Unwin, 1913; and *The Crowd*, London, Unwin, 1899)

for having pioneered in the study of what is now usually called mob behavior —i.e., collective behavior which is extraordinary and therefore unpredictable. Le Bon's analysis is stimulating but is often mystic and is frequently inconsistent. His central thesis, that an individual behaves differently in a group than he does in isolation, is incontestable. His explanations of this fact are, however, little short of Hegelian.

E.D. Martin adds a confusing element of instinctivism to the Le Bon point of view in his *The Behavior of Crowds* (New York, Harper, 1920).

A careful, systematic, and objective analysis of rebellious behavior is still wanting.

2. Rebellious behavior may be "unreasoned," but it is never "uncaused."

A suggestive analysis of the specific ways by which social and economic insecurity induces discontent and ultimately desperation is provided by J.M. Reinhardt and G.R. Boardman in "Insecurity and Personality Disintegration" (*Soc. Forc.*, 1935, 14, 240-249). The disorganizing effects of the industrial revolution are ably summarized by L. Mumford in *Technics and Civilization* (New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1934). For a statement of the thesis that, as this disorganization becomes more and more acute, the proportion of the population who despair of surviving under the *status quo* rises to the point where general rebellion is inevitable (a view long since expressed by Le Bon, Marx, and others), see J. Ortega y Gasset's *The Revolt of the Masses* (New York, Norton, 1932).

The fact that extreme and prolonged social degradation is necessary before any considerable proportion of people will break from the controls of the *status quo* is indicated in M. Hallgren's study *Seeds of Revolt* (New York, Knopf, 1933).

Objective evidence of the relationship between atypical social conditions and rebellious behavior is found in the fact that in the United States the frequency of lynching rises during periods of general economic difficulty and falls during periods of comparative economic prosperity. See A.F. Raper, *The Tragedy of Lynching* (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1933, 30).

3. One of the few cases on record in which the leader of a vested-interest group has had the foresight to lessen the causes of incipient rebellion rather than wait for and battle with a rebellious group is the agreement with CIO which was effected by the large steel corporations in 1937, through the agency of M.C. Taylor. The following news item summarizes the change in leadership policy which made this agreement possible and which subsequently saved the large steel companies from the bitter and costly strife which occupied the smaller independents for months:

"*Fortune* found that the real story dates back to last June, when Steelman Taylor sailed for Europe 'in a peculiarly philosophic mood.' Just before he sailed he had opposed, though not strongly enough to stop it, the manifesto published in paid advertisements last summer by the American Iron & Steel Institute declaring war on John L. Lewis. It was evident to Mr. Taylor that Steel's traditional 'blood and brimstone' labor policies were thoroughly outmoded. Yet 'to give in to Labor spinelessly meant to lose control over the business one had been hired to manage. To fight Labor adamantly meant, for a long time, no business at all'" (*Time*, May 3, 1937).

4. The trivial incident which precipitated the Harlem riots of 1935 is recounted in the following news item:

"In Manhattan's Harlem one afternoon last week a dusky little Puerto Rican of 16 wandered past the cutlery counter in a Kress 5-10-25¢ store on 125th Street. . . . Into the pocket of Lino Rivera's leather coat a moment later popped the 10¢ knife.

"Two floorwalkers spotted the theft, pounced on Rivera. Someone threatened to 'take him down in the basement and beat the hell out of him.' Lino began frantically biting his captors' hands. A salesgirl fainted. Some 500 Negro customers, thrown into a panic by the commotion, began upsetting counters of goods, yelling, breaking things. An Irish policeman went in, saw he could not quell the hysterical confusion single-handed, sent for emergency reserves. It was almost twilight before the police had driven the disturbers from the débris-strewn store" (*Time*, Apr. 1, 1935).

5. It has long been a favorite stratagem of industrial leaders to bring discredit upon strikers by sending in *agents provocateurs* to cause an "incident" and, thus, to precipitate overt mob violence on the part of the strikers, which violence may, in turn, alienate public support of the strike. Sometimes the police are charged with this duty. At other times professional strikebreakers are employed to use this or some other device. See E. Levinson, "Strikebreakers Incorporated" (*Harper's Mag.*, November, 1935, 719-730); and the news items "Pinkertons Pinked" (*Time*, Feb. 22, 1937) and "Medieval, Shocking" (*Time*, Mar. 22, 1937).

Perhaps the most publicized recent case where the representatives of vested interests uncalculatingly provoked mob violence was the so-called Memorial Day massacre in Chicago in 1937. See the news items "Strikes of the Week" (*Time*, June 7, 1937), "Frightful Film" (*Time*, June 28, 1937), and "Cops" (*Time*, July 12, 1937). A newsreel record of the incident gave rather convincing evidence that the police were responsible for precipitating mob action, a conclusion which was reinforced by the ridiculous testimony given during a subsequent investigation of the affair by some of the police involved.

6. The Paris riots of 1934, which became so general as to lead many observers to believe that a revolution was in prospect, were precipitated by a political scandal which became public property as a consequence of the suicide, or murder, of "swindler" Stavisky.

The story of this rioting is told, in brief, in the following fragmentary news items:

" . . . the Government grew so nervous as debate [in the French Chamber] on the Stavisky scandal was resumed that 5,000 foot and mounted police were thrown around the Chamber of Deputies. Angry citizens resumed their anti-Government demonstrations, shouted hour after hour in the direction of the Chamber 'Assassins! Thieves! Staviskys!' Royalist demonstrators shouting 'Down with the Republic!' and 'Long live the Duc de Guise!' (the Bourbon pretender to the Throne of France who lives in Belgium) smashed windows, tore up paving stones which they hurled at the police and thoroughly frightened U.S. tourists in a nearby hotel" (*Time*, Jan. 29, 1934).

"For the second week ferocious rioting over *L'Affaire Stavisky* appalled Paris. . . . Citizens screamed 'Down with the Stavisky Cabinet!' . . .

"Police worked like beavers wiring down iron gratings, removing fences from tree trunks, piles of paving blocks and other impromptu weapons, and warning café proprietors to clear their terraces of siphons and heavy saucers" (*Time*, Feb. 5, 1934).

"Unlike the bourgeoisie of other lands, middle-class Frenchmen are quick to quit their snug hearths and do battle in the streets when they think their rascally politicians need a lesson. Last week some of the most substantial families in France were represented in two days of spirited assaults upon luckless police assigned to the painful duty of guarding the Chamber of Deputies" (*Time*, Feb. 22, 1934).

"No man knew better than Gaston Doumergue that the crisis that still grips France will not end until the entire Stavisky rotteness is exposed, explained and paid for in the penitentiary. Gaston Doumergue was called from sunny retirement in Southern France a month ago to save France. The country was on the verge of violent revolution. Hundreds were wounded and more than a score killed in the bloodiest riots Paris has seen since 1871. . . . But Gaston Doumergue knew and every French politician knew that the barricades would rise again amid the crack of rifles, the clatter of charging troops and the dreadful roar of marching mobs if the Stavisky scandal is not blotted out of memory by an era of honest government" (*Time*, Mar. 12, 1934).

For analysis of these prolonged riots see the anonymous article "The Paris Riots" (*Harper's Mag.*, May, 1934, 704-713); and A. Wirth, *France in Ferment* (New York, Harper, 1935).

7. For the story of the Boxer Rebellion and the incident which precipitated it, see J.G. Anderson, *The Dragon and the Foreign Devils* (Boston, Little, Brown, 1928); and P.H. Clements, *The Boxer Rebellion* (New York, Harper, 1915).

For a vivid description of one of the most violent and in some respects most interesting periods in Chinese history, that of the Taiping Rebellion, see B.M. Allen, *Gordon in China* (London, Macmillan, 1933).

8. Suggestive of the exceedingly complex nature of the long-run consequences that may come from even a small and isolated rebellion is the story of the Pitcairn Island colony, founded as an aftermath of mutiny on the English ship *Bounty*. See H.I. Shapiro, *The Heritage of the Bounty* (New York, Simon and Schuster, 1936).

9. Raper (*op. cit.*, 20) reports the traditional ideology of Negro lynching in the old south as follows: "Regardless of the cause of a particular lynching, there were always those who defended it by the insistence that unless Negroes were lynched, no white woman would be safe, this despite the fact that only $\frac{1}{6}$ th of the persons lynched in the last 30 years were even accused of rape."

For some of the more systematic ideologies which have been advanced to justify racial persecution, see E.R. Clirichy's *All in the Name of God* (New York, Day, 1934).

10. See J. Locke, *Civil Government* (London, Routledge, 1884), and T. Hobbes, *Leviathan* (London, Routledge, 1885).

11. Marx's thesis that violence is the *modus operandi* of social evolution is to be found, supported with ponderous appeal to history, in his *Das Kapital*. See F.B. Becker, "Lenin's Application of Marx Theory of Revolutionary Tactics" (*Amer. Sociol. Rev.*, 1937, 2, 353-364). The most explicit statement that the masses must willfully resort to force in order to secure an improved social status is to be found in Marx and Engel's noted appeal to rebellion *The Communist Manifesto*, translated and published in England in 1848. For a brief analysis of the Marxian ideology see K. Korsch, "Marx, Karl" (*Ency. Soc. Sci.*, 10, 172-175).

12. A brief history and description of the ideology of syndicalism is provided by L.L. Lorwin in the article "Syndicalism" (*Ency. Soc. Sci.*, 14, 496-500).

13. The use of the term "mob" to designate specifically the members of a rebellious group is in accord with the definition made by L.L. Bernard in the article "Mob" (*Ency. Soc. Sci.*, 10, 552-554), the best brief analysis of rebellious behavior.

14. K. Young (*Social Psychology*, New York, Crofts, 1930, 522-531) has attempted to analyze the covert aspects of mob behavior in terms of "ego expansion." According to his theory, there occurs during the generation of mob action an identification of the individual mob member with the "group"; i.e., the ego of each member expands to include all the other mob members. This rather subjective approach to mob behavior follows the precedent set by Le Bon and involves the danger that it may mislead the reader into a mystical, Hegelian concept of the controls which operate in the mob.

15. Agitators took advantage of the incident which precipitated the Harlem riots (see note 4) and no doubt contributed in some measure to furthering those riots. But, as R.W. Searle is reported to have stated, agitators were not the cause of the Harlem riots:

"We cannot make the Communists the scapegoats for a basic condition which made possible such hysteric outbursts.' Most sociologists agreed with Dr. Searle that the 'basic condition' was economic discrimination against New York's Negroes, which had in turn set up a tragic train of unemployment, undernourishment, bad housing, disease, vice, unrest and, last week, resentful disorder" (*Time*, Apr. 1, 1935).

16. It is possible that the traditional predisposition of French rioters to attack property rather than persons—a tradition which has been violated frequently of recent years—dates back to the stringent and strongly enforced laws against assault upon persons which were passed after the French Revolution. Another possibility is that Catholicism, still the basic religion of France, Spain, and Italy, places an extremely high value on human life. At any event, the fact remains that assault and battery is a commonplace crime in the Protestant, English-speaking countries but is comparatively rare in France.

In the Paris riots of 1934, the damage to property, as is indicated by the following news item, was all out of proportion to the casualties (nineteen were killed):

"Reckoning up the cost of the riots, the Paris authorities find they have a bill for 5,000,000 francs, or about \$350,000, for damage to city property alone. They are disputing with the national government as to which shall pay.

"Demolished [in addition to a large amount of private property] were 1433 iron tree protectors, 450 street lights, 250 traffic lights, 150 benches, 89 lampposts, 20 newspaper and flower stands, 13 comfort stations and 10 clocks. In addition, 43 trees were uprooted for barricades" (San Francisco *Chronicle*, Mar. 11, 1934).

17. The author bases his summary of the Paris riots of 1927 on a considerable amount of personal observation and a regrettable degree of personal participation.

18. Vivid descriptions of barroom, brothel, and street rioting can be found in H. Asbury's *The Gangs of New York* (New York, Knopf, 1928) and *The Barbary Coast* (New York, Knopf, 1933). Asbury has drawn his materials largely from newspaper files and does not hesitate to use his imagination to fill in details. Nevertheless, his descriptions of uncoordinated rioting are the best available.

In passing, it is worth noting that in the midst of the World War, soldiers out for a night of revelry commonly climaxed the evening's round of pleasure by staging a riot. Such riots usually started in a quarrel between members of two organizations, such as Company A and Company B, or between members of two allied armies, such as American and Australian. Once started, however, a general and indiscriminate bashing of heads and smashing of property occurred.

19. The role of leadership in rioting has never been subjected to careful, scientific study. On the one hand, the commonplace assumption that orating agitators cause riots may be dismissed as a silly superstition, comparable to the idea that witches cause disease and death. On the other hand, the Marxian thesis that the direction of social evolution—and, hence, the direction of its *modus operandi*, mob action—is predetermined can be dismissed as wishful thinking. Probably the truth lies close to midway between the personal and the impersonal interpretations. Such, certainly, is the view of most professional agitators, particularly those of the neo-Marxian school. Experience seems to indicate that it is impossible for agitators to start the general rioting which is necessary before any revolutionary movement can gain a foothold. Marxian revolutionaries, for example, labored in Russia for decades before the widespread and largely uncoordinated rioting of 1917 gave them an opportunity for leadership. When, however, general rioting does break out, the course of riotous action may be influenced by directive leadership.

20. For reasons not at all evident, many of the great political revolutions of recent centuries have begun with mutiny on the part of sailors. Thus, the French Revolution was preceded by months of sporadic mutiny at sea in the merchant marine and, later, on naval vessels and by rioting on the part of sailors when they reached port. Likewise, the first serious rioting of the Russian Revolution occurred among Russian sailors. Although

soldiers and subsequently sections of the civilian population soon joined in the general rioting, seaports continued throughout the revolution to be focal points of action.

Soldiers are not the loyal and respectful fighters of fiction and of fictionalized nationalistic history. Rebellions, large and small, occurred off and on in all the armies involved in the World War. Of these, the rebellion of French conscripts in 1915 was, perhaps, the most extensive. In modern mechanized land warfare, the maintenance of morale is a serious problem.

Nevertheless, military rebellion is, on the whole, less frequent than is mutiny of naval forces. There was, for example, little rebellion among the badly equipped and poorly managed Russian soldiers during the Russo-Japanese War, while the Russian navy suffered grievously from mutiny during its disastrous trek from the Black Sea to engage Japan. See A. Novikoff-Proboy, *Tsushima* (New York, Knopf, 1937).

21. For a fictionalized version of one of the mutinies which occurred in the English fleet during the late eighteenth century, see C.B. Nordhoff and J.N. Hall, *Mutiny on the Bounty* (Boston, Little, Brown, 1932).

In *The Saga of the Bounty* by I. Anthony (New York, Putnam, 1936) the story of the *Bounty* is told in extracts from the journals of the officers and men who remained loyal to the captain. See also G. Mackaness, *The Life of Vice-Admiral William Bligh* (New York, Farrar & Rinehart, 1936).

A factual, straightforward account of the mutinies at Spithead and The Nore in 1797, which brought to public attention the conditions in the British navy, is to be found in *The Floating Republic* by G.E. Manwaring and B. Dobrée (New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1936). The conditions of life in the navy as described in this book are summed up as follows by a reviewer:

"By the end of the 18th Century it was roughly true that Britannia ruled the waves, but the Britons who made that rule possible were in truth not much better than slaves. Shanghaied by a press-gang, crammed into noisome quarters, half-starved on verminous victuals, paid a pittance, rarely allowed shore liberty, liable to a flogging at an officer's whim, condemned to this servitude for years on end, a British tar's lot was not a happy one.

"Bad food, low pay and brutal officers were undermining the Fleet's morale, though the Admiralty was woodenly unaware. England was at war with France, Holland and Spain; it was no time to talk about grievance or reforms. When the Admiralty received identical petitions from eleven ships' crews of the Channel Fleet, it did not even acknowledge them. By the time the authorities woke to the fact that trouble was brewing, it was too late" (*Time*, Jan. 20, 1936).

22. For a brief sketch of rioting in early industrial England see K. Smellie, "Riot" (*Ency. Soc. Sci.*, 13, 386-387).

23. Among the more violent and widespread labor riots which have occurred in the United States are the following: the Great Riots of jobless and hungry men during the prolonged economic crisis of the 1870's; the violent Haymarket riot in Chicago in 1886; the Homestead, Pa.,

riots—provoked by Pinkerton detectives—of 1892; the massacre at Herrin, Ill., in 1922; and the Gastonia, N. C., riots of 1929. See:

Adamic, L., *Dynamite: The Story of Class Violence in America*, New York, Viking, rev. ed., 1934.

Davis, H., *The History of the Haymarket Affair*, New York, Farrar & Rinehart, 1936.

Hunter, R., *Violence and the Labor Movement*, New York, Macmillan, 1914.
McCabe, J.D. (E.W. Martin), *The History of the Great Riots*, Philadelphia, National Publishers, 1887.

Symes, L., and T. Clement, *Rebel America*, New York, Harper, 1934.

Vorse, M.H., "Gastonia," *Harper's Mag.*, November, 1929, 700-710.

For a brief description of the Homestead riots see the news item "Home to Homestead" (*Time*, July 13, 1936).

Perhaps the most extensive labor rioting of recent years was that which occurred during San Francisco's general strike of 1934. For a description of the rioting which broke out on July 3 and again on July 5, see the news story "On the Embarcadero" (*Time*, July 16, 1934).

Agrarian, as contrasted to industrial, rioting was a commonplace in England during the period of the enclosures, when peasants were denied the use of quasi-public lands by the gentry. In the United States agrarian rioting has frequently occurred as a protest against the low prices paid for farm products—milk riots, for example—or, as was the case during the early 1930's, against mortgage foreclosures. See C. Hicks, "Upheaval in the Corn Belt" (*Harper's Mag.*, October, 1934, 621-632); and the news items "Behind the Iowa Farm Riots" (*Lit. Dig.*, May 13, 1933) and "Farm Riots: Martial Law in Iowa" (*Newsweek*, May 6, 1933).

24. Political riots were a feature of the class warfare which finally destroyed the Greek city-states. Uncontrollable rioting was the principal symptom of the decline of the Roman empire—the Goths simply fed on a decadent civilization: riots of slaves undermined the stability of the government at home, while riots of the depressed majorities in the provinces taxed the resources of the Roman legions.

It is difficult today to distinguish categorically between labor and political riots. Under present conditions, any attack upon the representatives of the economic order is, for evident reasons, an attack upon the political *status quo*. If, however, we exclude the riots which preceded the Revolution, it may be said that so far in American history most labor rioting has had relatively little political implication, whereas all labor rioting in Europe has been politically significant. The Civil War draft riots, during which the city of New York was dominated by irresponsible mobs, and the abolitionistic riots which preceded this war are the best examples of truly political riots in American history.

The following news stories briefly describe political rioting which has occurred of recent years in Cuba, France, and Spain, respectively: "Loot the Palace" (*Time*, Aug. 21, 1933); "Cabinet of Premiers" (*Time*, Feb. 19, 1934); "Red Flags" (*Time*, Mar. 2, 1936).

25. L. Steffens, who observed the Russian Revolution gain form, came to the conclusion that there is a typical revolutionary pattern. He presented his idea of this pattern in rather fictional style in *Moses in Red: The Revolt of Israel as a Typical Revolution* (Philadelphia, Dorrance, 1926). For other versions of the pattern of revolution see:

Brooks, R. C., *Deliver Us from Dictators*, Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1935.

Colton, E., *Four Patterns of Revolution*, New York, Association Press, 1935.

Edwards, L. P., *The Natural History of Revolution*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1927.

Martin, E. D., *Farewell to Revolution*, New York, Norton, 1935.

For descriptive material on the gory aspects of revolution see P. A. Sorokin, *The Sociology of Revolution* (Philadelphia, Lippincott, 1925, Chap. VI).

It should be observed in passing that most writers on the revolutions of history tend to exaggerate the extent of rioting and the quantity of blood which is shed. The systematic killing of nationalistic warfare is far more effective than are the random efforts of revolutionary mobs. As a corrective for the dramatic version of revolution see D. Greer's statistical study *The Incidence of the Terror during the French Revolution* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1935).

For material on the mobs of the French Revolution see the following recent interpretations: F. B. Artz, *Reaction and Revolution* (New York, Harper, 1935); and C. Briton, *A Decade of Revolution* (New York, Harper, 1935).

For the forms of mob behavior which occurred during the Russian Revolution, see:

Bunyan, J., and H. H. Fisher, *The Bolshevik Revolution*, Stanford University, Stanford University Press, 1934.

Chamberlin, W., *The Russian Revolution*, New York, Macmillan, 1935, Vol. II, Chap. XXIII.

Reed, J., *Ten Days That Shook the World*, New York, International Publishers, 1926.

Speransky, Princess (*née* Grant), *Revolutionary Days*, Boston, Small, Maynard, 1919, Chap. IX.

For the rioting which preceded and accompanied the American Revolution, see: G. E. Howard, *Preliminaries of the Revolution, 1763-1775* (New York, Harper, 1905); and C. H. Van Tyne, *The American Revolution* (New York, Harper, 1905).

For the rioting which one author thinks will accompany a revolution which has not yet occurred, see G. Soule's *The Coming American Revolution* (New York, Macmillan, 1934).

26. Coordinated race rioting, which always has its economic implications and sometimes has political significance, has been particularly common in American history. The influx of Irish laborers after 1815 led to intense antagonism toward them on the part of the natives; this antagonism

culminated in a wave of rioting against the Irish during the 1830's. In Boston in 1837 there was a riot between the fire companies and the Irish immigrants which involved some 15,000 persons. The friction between the Irish and the natives led to the formation of an Irish secret society, the Molly Maguires, and to still further rioting, notably the Native American riots of 1844. See J.W. Coleman, *The Molly Maguire Riots* (Richmond, Garrett and Massie, 1936); and A. Bimba, *The Molly Maguires* (New York, International Publishers, 1932).

More persistent, however, has been the rioting between whites and Negroes. Although Negroes rioted against whites in Philadelphia in 1838, ordinarily whites have rioted against Negroes. Following the prolonged race riots in Chicago in 1915 (see the report of the Chicago Commission on Race Relations entitled *The Negro in Chicago*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1922), similar riots in which whites were the aggressors broke out in East St. Louis, Ill., in 1917. The most recent so-called race riot involving Negroes, that which occurred in New York's Harlem in 1935, was, however, essentially uncoordinated in character. Theoretically, the lines were drawn between Negroes and Jews. Actually, Negro beat Negro and Jew beat Jew, while the police beat everyone with fine impartiality. See the news item "Mischief Out of Misery" (*Time*, Apr. 1, 1935).

An interesting form of race rioting—a sort of rebellion of the natives—occurred in the Bahamas in 1937 and is described, in part, in the following news story:

"Fortnight ago, ran the mumbled story of one of the Negroes, he—Dr. Dudley Arthur Fields, representative of the Governor-General of the Bahamas in Great Inagua—sent out an order for arrest of a native accused of molesting a young boy in Mathew Town, largest island village. Armed natives blamed Josiah Erickson of Swampscott, Mass., co-owner of Inagua's \$500,000 salt factory, for the issuance of the order. They stormed the Erickson West Indies store, killed one employee, then roamed the island searching for other 'Yankees.' The enraged natives fired the store, radio station, salt buildings, the Commissioner's residence, the warehouse. Erickson, four other American residents, Commissioner Fields, eight Negroes grabbed rifles, tear-gas guns, cartridges, shot their way clear to the launch" (*Time*, Sept. 6, 1937).

27. For a sociological analysis of Negro lynching see A.F. Raper, *The Tragedy of Lynching* (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1933). See also J.E. Cutler, *Lynch Law* (New York, Longmans, Green, 1905); Southern Commission on the Study of Lynching, *Lynchings and What They Mean* (Atlanta, The Commission, 1931); F. Shay, *Judge Lynch: His First Hundred Years* (New York, Washburn, 1938); W.F. White, *Rope and Faggot* (New York, Knopf, 1928).

Raper (*op. cit.*) reports that between 1889, the earliest date for which figures are available, and 1930, 4,724 people were lynched in the United States. Seventy-five per cent of these were Negroes.

For news stories of some of the more spectacular of recent Negro lynchings see the following: "Missouri Heads 1931 Lynching Parade" (*Lit. Dig.*,

Jan. 31, 1931); "Alabama's Race War" (*Lit. Dig.*, Aug. 1, 1931); "At Princess Anne" (*Time*, Oct. 31, 1933); "Lesson Learned" (*Time*, Dec. 11, 1933); "Hernando Hanging" (*Time*, Mar. 26, 1934); "468th & 469th; 248th" (*Time*, May 11, 1936); and "Lynch and Anti-Lynch" (*Time*, Apr. 26, 1937).

28. The incident in which the customary rope was replaced by a blow torch is described in the following news item:

"Negroes Townes and McDaniels were led handcuffed from the courtroom. . . . Everything was according to law. But when they stepped out of a side door of the courthouse, they found themselves face to face with what so often handles cases like theirs in the South. An angry mob surged forward, took them from the custody of their guardians without a struggle, threw them into a school bus. . . . When the motorcade from Winona arrived, the mob closed in to watch as the terrified Negroes were dragged from the bus. People in the back rows could hear heavy chains clink as the two blackamoors were made fast to trees.

"Bootjack McDaniels, a lanky Negro with powerful shoulders, was asked to confess first. He gibbered that he was innocent. A mobster stepped forward with a plumber's blow torch, lighted it. Another ripped McDaniels' shirt off. Again he refused to confess. Then the blue-white flame of the torch stabbed into his black chest. He screamed with agony. The torch was withdrawn. He reiterated his innocence. Again the torch was turned on him and the smell of burned flesh floated through the woods. Again he screamed, and when it was withdrawn this time he was ready to confess. He was with Townes, he sobbed, when Townes poked a shotgun through the grocery window, fired into the grocer's back. When his confession was delivered in sufficient detail, the lynchers fell back and a volley of bullets crashed into Bootjack McDaniels, 1937's lynching victim No. 2.

"Despite what he had just witnessed, Negro Townes was not yet ready to repeat the confession which county officers had said he signed with his X after he was arrested last fortnight. But the blow torch soon burned the story out of him. . . . Then they piled brush high about sobbing Negro Townes, drenched it with gasoline, touched him off—1937's lynching victim No. 3. . . . Said Deputy Sheriff Hugh Curtis: 'It was all done very quickly, quietly and orderly'" (*Time*, Apr. 26, 1937).

29. In some instances extralegal "justice" has been nothing more than organized fanatical mobbing. Such was the murdering done by the infamous Ku-Klux Klan and by its recent manifestation, in Detroit, Mich., the organization entitled Black Legion. See the news story "Black Legion" (*Time*, June 1, 1936).

In western frontier days extralegal "justice" was more clearly a protest against the inability of the established government to enforce the law. S.A. Coblenz (*Villains and Vigilantes*, New York, Wilson-Erickson, 1937) has shown that the two vigilance committees, composed largely of business and professional men, which administered justice in a bloody sort of fashion in San Francisco between 1851 and 1856, developed as a consequence of the fact that over one thousand murders were committed in that city in the four years preceding 1851.

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