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THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIOLOGY IN THE UNITED STATES

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ABSTRACT

The origin of sociology in the United States.—Why sociology arose in the United States following the Civil War. Character of early sociology in the United States. Characterization of the sociology of the pioneers: Ward, Sumner, Small, Giddings, Ross, Cooley, Thomas. Tendencies in early American sociology. Development of sociology in the United States since the pioneers. Relation of sociology to social work. Sociology as a university subject. Hesitancy to use the term "sociology" in university curricula. The progress of sociology.

Sociology is usually supposed to have begun with Comte. As a matter of fact, however, there were a number of presociological movements, in which certain men manifested the beginning of the sociological attitude. To a sociologist it looks as if those responsible for the abolition of slavery in the British colonies had sociological insight. Chalmers, in his objective study of dependency in his parish in Edinburgh, and in his policy based on that study, showed a sociological attitude. Pinel, who as the result of his study of the results of the traditional methods of treating the insane, struck off the restraints and adopted humane methods, attacked the problem as a modern sociologist. Beccaria, in so far as he faced frankly the effects of age-old methods of treating the criminal and suggested other methods based upon a study of results, was a sociologist.

The striking thing about all of these examples is that the men mentioned adopted a new attitude in the study of social problems. A frank skepticism characterized them. They refused to accept the traditional attitudes and policies. They questioned the working of the dominant policies. They sought to understand the processes by which the observed results were brought about. That is what may be called a presociological approach to sociology.

It is just fifty years since Professor Sumner at Yale gave what is usually thought of as the first course in sociology in the United States. However, Thorpe, in his *Benjamin Franklin and the Uni-*

versity of Pennsylvania, says that Professor Thompson gave such a course at that institution in 1874. As a text Sumner used Spencer's *Sociology* (probably his *Principles of Sociology,* not his *Introduction to the Study of Sociology*), which was then appearing in parts. After a year or so the course disappeared to appear again about 1885 as "social science," under which title sociology has been given at Yale to the present time. In 1881 Professor Dunstan offered a course called "social science" at Michigan. It was not until 1883 that the first American book on sociology, Lester F. Ward's *Dynamic Sociology,* appeared. In 1885 Professor Woodford gave a course in sociology at Indiana. In 1889 President Albion W. Small started a small class in Sociology at Colby University. In the same year Professor Frank W. Blackmar introduced sociology at the University of Kansas. In 1890 Professor Franklin H. Giddings announced a course on "Modern Theories of Sociology" at Bryn Mawr College. In 1891 Professor Edward A. Ross gave his first course in sociology at University of Indiana. In 1892 appeared Ward's *Psychic Factors of Civilization,* and in 1893 the Department of Sociology was opened at the new University of Chicago.[1] In 1894 a chair of sociology was established at Columbia University, and Professor Giddings was invited to occupy it. Such was the origin of sociology in the United States and its development during the first eighteen years of its history.

WHY THE RISE OF SOCIOLOGY AT THIS TIME?

How shall we account for the fact that such great interest was manifested in sociology at just this time? Were there any conditions in the life of the people of the United States which excited an interest in these questions? Were there any conditions in the world situation which contributed to this interest?

It is significant that interest in sociology arose in the United States just after the Civil War. It has been suggested that the War left this country with many problems which challenged the attention of men. It had rocked the social structure of our people to its foundations. It had challenged thinking men to a reconsideration of the fundamental problems of government and social relation-

[1] Since this was put in type Professor Graham Taylor tells me that about the same time, he became the first teacher of sociology in a Theological Seminary.

ships. Like every important war, the Civil War and its after-results disturbed the settled status of classes and raised questions concerning settled opinions, and to thinking minds presented the challenge of re-examining some of our fundamental notions. It was a time when social readjustment was necessary and new relationships had to be established.

It was in 1865 that the American Social Science Association was formed in Boston along the lines of the British Social Science Association founded a quarter of a century before. Mr. Frank Sanborn, one of the founders of the American Social Science Association, attributes its origin to the necessity of studying these new questions raised by the Civil War.[1]

Whatever the causes, about this time a flood of graduate students was going from this country to the European universities, chiefly those in Germany, for study. Professor Small of the University of Chicago readily remembered fifteen important scholars of the United States who studied in the German universities in the seventies. These returned to the United States inspired by a new spirit and by the methods of their German teachers. These men, and men trained under them in the universities of this country, gave a new direction and inspired a fresh interest in such social studies as history, political science, and economics. Even the casual list recalled by Professor Small suggest some of the most important leaders in the development of the social studies in the United States. The spirit of German scholarship had made its mark on the thought of these young Americans who had returned from Europe and were leading the new educational adventures in our growing American universities.[2]

There these American students came in contact with stimulating intellectual personalities teaching in the German universities and expounding new doctrines and using new methods. How this stream of young American students came to be started toward the German universities it is impossible at this time to say. It has been suggested that Francis Lieber, who had come to the United States in 1827 and held the chair of history and political economy in Co-

[1] *Publications, American Sociological Society,* IV, 16, 17.

[2] A. W. Small, *Origins of Sociology,* footnote 2, pp. 325 f.

lumbia University from 1856 to 1860, and from that date until his death was professor of Political Science in the Law School of Columbia University, and who had published his *Civil Liberty and Self-Government* in 1852, may have had some hand in developing this migration and certainly had something to do with the new intellectual interest in economics, political science, and history following the Civil War.

While the influence of the German universities on the young men from America was vital in creating an interest in the various social studies, the specific impetus for the development of sociology in this country came by way of English influence. Three men, one of them a Frenchman, two of them Englishmen, through their published works exercised an undoubted influence upon the minds of young Americans trying to think themselves through a maze of new problems. Comte published in French his *Course of Positive Philosophy from 1830–42,* and his *System of Positive Polity from 1851 to 1854.* His influence reached Americans through his original works or through Harriet Martineau's translation, published in England in 1853, and the second edition in 1875. Spencer published his *Study of Sociology* in 1873 and the first volume of his *Principles of Sociology* in 1874. Bagehot published his *Physics and Politics* in 1869. The pioneers in sociology in the United States all confess their debt to these early sociologists.

Consider, then, the early flowering of this new impulse in the United States. Lester F. Ward published his *Dynamic Sociology* in 1883. As a paleobotanist in the government service at Washington, Ward shows the influence of Comte and Spencer. Until the last years of his life he was not a teacher of sociology. His *Dynamic Sociology,* however, had a great influence upon thoughtful scholars in the social sciences in the United States. In 1888 he delivered an address before the American Economic Association entitled "Social and Economic Paradoxes." In this address he showed the psychological trend of his thought which got complete expression in his *Psychic Factors of Civilization* in 1892. He gave further expression to his emphasis upon psychology in social relationships in an address entitled "The Psychologic Basis of Social Economics" in 1893.

Andrew D. White, president of Cornell, moving in an atmosphere of European thought on university education in the early eighties, had been making plans to introduce a course at Cornell which should acquaint students with the practical social problems of that day. In 1885 he got Frank B. Sanborn, of Massachusetts, to give such a course at Cornell for the first time.

Professor Frank W. Blackmar, of Kansas, was one of that large group of men who had been attracted to the Johns Hopkins to study with Herbert Adams and with Dr. Ely. He returned to Kansas in 1889 as head of the Department of History and Political Science and began giving a course in sociology.[3]

In addition to these men just cited, other leading educators were feeling the necessity of introducing a new spirit and new methods into university education, as was manifested by President Angell at Michigan and some other important leaders. The whole movement was a manifest sign that there was a growing feeling here in the United States for a new interpretation of social relationships as they were being worked out in the new United States following the Civil War. The political scientists, influenced by the new attitudes in political science which had grown up in Germany, began to make new appraisals of the nature of government in view of the new problems before the government of the United States. The historians under German influences were in full cry after a new method in the interpretation of the facts of American history. Most of these early American sociologists had been trained in history, political science, and economics. Coming, however, under the influence of Comte and Spencer, and a little later on under that of Lester F. Ward, they became conscious in a vague way at first that economics, politics, and history did not include all of the field of human association. It is out of this feeling that we see the emergence, among such early sociologists as Giddings and Small, of the contention that more of the social factors must be taken into account and social processes must be invoked to explain the economic theories then held. How much early American sociologists owed in the first place to the sympathetic tolerance of the economists and later to the sharp criticism of their sociological formulations by the

[3] *American Journal of Sociology* (May, 1916), p. 760.

economists it is impossible at this time to state. From one point of view the sociologists might be properly classified as the left wing of the new economists. From another point of view they were simply extending the analysis and the methods of inquiry which the German-trained economists, political scientists, and historians were already using. They were proposing to apply the same methods of study to wider reaches of human relationships. Only gradually did their concepts of sociology become more definite and clear.

THE CHARACTER OF EARLY SOCIOLOGY IN THE UNITED STATES

The early sociologists in this country had been trained as scholars in other fields. Sumner was an economist. Small at first was trained as a theologian, then as a political scientist and historian. Giddings, trained as a journalist, for a number of years was very active in the American Economic Association. Ross was trained as a philologist and economist. Lester F. Ward was a paleobotanist who spent most of his life in the service of the government at Washington. Small and Ross were influenced by their experience in Germany, and all of them were profoundly affected by the writings of Comte and Spencer. Those who became interested in sociology after Ward had written were influenced by his view of sociology. Small and Ross have given personal testimony of their debt to Ward early in their careers, while the debt of Giddings was easily seen in his *Principles of Sociology* published in 1896. The early writings of all these men show the influence of their previous training.

Let us turn, then, to characterize as well as we may the outstanding points among these early sociologists. The earliest American sociologist was Lester F. Ward. His *Dynamic Sociology* appeared in 1883. Unlike those of the other pioneers cited, Ward's ideas were fairly well matured when he wrote his first book. It may almost be said that his later writings were merely elaborations of points which he developed in his *Dynamic Sociology*. To put the matter as briefly as possible, Ward was primarily interested in correcting what he thought were errors in Comte and Spencer. He devoted himself with untiring energy to supplementing Comte's hierarchy of the sciences and to showing that Spencer's correction

thereof was wrong. The other great contribution of Ward was his emphasis upon the psychic factors in the development of culture or civilization. The logical scheme in which he presented his reflections bear the impress of his scientific career. It was incidental to his main contribution, and has not been followed by most other American sociologists. His emphasis upon the importance of the psychic elements in social evolution was a foil to Spencer's materialism and was of the greatest possible significance. He also made important contributions in minor ways, such as suggesting that evolution has not been continuous and direct, but sympodial. Whatever may be said of his scheme of sociology the importance of this vigorous thinker to American sociology is very great.

William Graham Sumner had been studying in Germany during the sixties. He was tutor at Yale from 1866 to 1869. Then for three years he was assistant director of an Episcopal church in New York City; later, a rector of a large church. From 1872 until his death in 1910 he was Professor of Political and Social Science at Yale. Unfortunately for the students of sociology in the United States, before his death Sumner did not publish more than two books in this field. His earliest, entitled, *What Social Classes Owe Each Other*, was published in 1883, and from the standpoint of sociology is quite unimportant. In 1906, however, he published his *Folkways,* a book of the highest significance. It is to be regretted that the proposed textbook of sociology, which, he says in the preface to *Folkways,* he began to write in 1899, was never finished. From his *Folkways* one gets the impression that here was a man of first-rate qualities who allowed his energies to be diverted into other lines and thus failed to give to America a rounded view of his conception of sociology. What his proposed work on the science of society, or sociology, was like we shall have to wait to discover until its possible publication by his colleague and successor, Professor Keller. Anyone acquainted with his *Folkways* will look forward to it with a great deal of interest. His recently published essays, aside from the few which he had worked out as chapters for his *Folkways* and had to omit, probably give us an inadequate notion of what his proposed Science of Society would be like. Most of his essays on sociology were devoted to attacks on what he con-

sidered the vagaries of sociology. The one outstanding illustration of his method is to be seen in the material which he prepared for his *Folkways*. Perhaps his greatest contribution to the development of sociology in this country was his emphasis upon the scientific method. That emphasis he was constantly reiterating.

Albion W. Small, another of the American sociological pioneers, came to sociology through a different experience. After graduating from college he entered the Newton Theological Institute, where his already keen appetite for learning was further whetted, and where he formed the determination to spend several years in Germany and England in the study of history and political economy. At Berlin and at Leipzig he came in contact with the new intellectual ferment of the German historians and political economists. Having married in Germany, he returned home and accepted a position at professor of History and Political Economy in Colby University, from which he had graduated. His studies with Schmoller had awakened his interest in the conflict of classes and the interests which move various classes in their attempts to secure the satisfaction of their wants. In the meantime he had become acquainted with the writers on sociology in France and Great Britain and tried to find some place in this country where graduate instruction in sociology was given. Finally, through the influence of a graduate of the Johns Hopkins University who was a friend of his, and through the influence of one of the early books of Professor Richard T. Ely which was put into his hands, he went to the Johns Hopkins University on a year's leave of absence from Colby, and there entered the atmosphere of that stimulating group of teachers and graduate students. On his return to Colby he was elected President of the institution and introduced a course of sociology, at the same time providing a syllabus called "An Introduction to the Science of Sociology," prepared by himself for his students. During the entire period of his life at Chicago Small contributed steadily to the development of sociological thought in this country.

Within the limits of this paper it is impossible to trace the development of his thought. It must suffice to notice that his chief contributions were: (1) His theory of social forces to be found in the interests. These interests he formulated as those of health,

wealth, sociability, knowledge, beauty, and rightness. This theory of interests shows his indebtedness to his German experience. (2) Perhaps Small's most important contribution to American sociology was his interpretation of Ratzenhofer to American sociologists. (3) During the latter part of his life Professor Small was interested in what he called methodology. While, like Sumner and Giddings, he emphasized the necessity of building sociology as a basis of facts, what he really meant by methodology was the working out of such categories as he thought would give significance to the facts found. His best work on methodology was the comparative study of the works of Spencer, Schaeffle, and Ratzenhofer. He pointed out that the chief trend in sociology from Spencer to Ratzenhofer was from structure to process, or, as he put it, "gradual shifting of effort from analogical representation of social structures to real analysis of social processes." (4) In striking contrast to Sumner, Small was led by his study of conflict between groups to the conception that conflict is resolved through mutual co-operation and socialized control. This theory provided Small a method for his emphasis upon ethics in sociology. He is not interested in sociology except as it contributes to social betterment. His analysis enabled him to sympathize with Adam Smith and Lester F. Ward rather than with Spencer and Sumner. It provided him with a basis for social ethics which he had not found in his philosophical studies. Doubtless the roots of this interest are to be found in his study of Schmoller and Sombart. Its clearest expression is to be found in his little known book, *Between Eras.* (5) Perhaps Small has contributed to the history of sociology more than any other American sociologist. His monograph "Fifty Years of Sociology in the United States," published in the *American Journal of Sociology* in May, 1916, and his address, "The Future of Sociology," in the publications of the *American Sociological Society* for 1920, and his last book, *Origins of Sociology,* give us not only the best sketch we possess of the development of sociology in this country, but also the European background out of which it grew, especially in Germany.

Another American sociological pioneer was Franklin Henry Giddings, who gave his first course on sociology at Bryn Mawr in

1890. His background was somewhat different from that of either Sumner or Small. Like Sumner and Small, he early became acquainted with the writings of Herbert Spencer and the English evolutionary scientists. Later the writings of the continental sociologists, Comte, Schaeffle, Lilienfeld, Roberty, and De Greef, all played their part in the formation of his sociological ideas. Unlike Sumner and Small, he was denied the benefits of a European experience early in his career. On the other hand, however, he obtained a splendid preparation for his future work in his ten years' experience as a journalist from cub reporter to manager. Moreover, in the early days of the American Economic Association he was active in its work, for a time being the editor of its publications. Even as a journalist he manifested great interest in practical economic problems in Massachusetts, having made a study of profit-sharing in Massachusetts which at the time was recognized as so thoroughly done that no further attempt at investigation of the subject was felt necessary. Likewise, his sociological interests led him to suggest modification in the current political philosophy of his day. His acquaintance with Mill's *Logic* and Lewes's *Problems of Life and Mind* were of primary importance in his analysis of social processes.

What, briefly, have been his contributions to American sociology? (1) More thoroughly than anyone else, except Sumner, he has been a Spencerian in his philosophy. He was, however, much more influenced by Ward and the more recent psychological writers than Sumner. He was not as thoroughly convinced as Sumner of the infallibility of classical economics. Nevertheless there appears in his sociology a rather decided impatience with those who would endeavor to modify social arrangements without reference to the sociological and psychological factors which condition social change. (2) Giddings' early association with Richmond Mayo-Smith at Columbia gave him an appreciation of the importance of quantitative measurements of social phenomena possessed by none of the other American sociological pioneers. It is to be seen in his *Inductive Sociology,* in his address before the American Sociological Society, entitled "The Social Marking System," and in his latest book, *The Scientific Study of Human Society.* Incessantly he has

emphasized the importance of quantitative measurements in sociology. The difficulties of such measurements have not deterred him from attempting to apply his own theories. However imperfect have been his attempts to apply this method to sociological phenomena, they do not detract in the least from the great importance of this contribution to early American sociology. (3) Another important contribution of Giddings to the early development of sociology in this country was his analysis of sociological phenomena. Whatever later scholars may think of his analysis, no one has approached him in his rigid and minute logical classification. (4) None of our pioneers except Sumner and Thomas have made such use of anthropological and ethnological materials for sociology as has Giddings. His picture of historical evolution, which of course must be corrected by the newer anthropological researches, together with Sumner's *Folkways,* tended to bring sociology in the United States and anthropology into close and intimate relations. Doubtless much of this impetus was given him by Spencer. It shares the defects of Spencer's methods, but served to balance with concreteness the rather abstract logical analysis in his systematic sociology. (5) Early Giddings enriched the American conception of social forces by his formula of "consciousness of kind." Later, when he came into contact with the pragmatic philosophy of William James and modern dynamic psychology, Giddings provided a theory for the interpretation of social evolution through the employment of "consciousness of kind," "physical and social pressures," and "pluralistic behavior" which finally furnished him his formula to explain the origin and development of social phenomena. The latest formulation of his theory of sociology is as follows:

1. A situation of stimulus is reacted to by more than one individual; there is pluralistic as well as singularistic behavior. Pluralistic behavior develops into rivalries, competitions, and conflicts, and also, into agreements, contracts, and collective enterprises. Therefore social phenomena are products of two variables, namely, situation (in the psychologist's definition of the word) and pluralistic behavior.

2. When the individuals who participate in pluralistic behavior have become differentiated into behavioristic kinds or types, a consciousness of kind, liking or disliking, approving or disapproving one kind after another, converts gregariousness into a consciously discriminative association, herd habit into society; and society, by a social pressure which sometimes is conscious but

more often, perhaps, is unconscious, makes life relatively hard for kinds of character and conduct that are disapproved.

3. Society organizes itself for collective endeavor and achievement, if fundamental similarities of behavior and an awareness of them are extensive enough to maintain social cohesion, while differences of behavior and awareness of them in matters of detail are sufficient to create a division of labor.

4. In the long run organized society by its approvals and disapprovals, its pressures and achievements, selects and perpetuates the types of mind and character that are relatively intelligent, tolerant, and helpful, that exhibit initiative, that bear their share of responsibility and that effectively play their part in collective enterprise. It selects and perpetuates the adequate.[4]

(6) No man since Spencer among the sociologists has brought under tribute for sociology so much of contemporary philosophy, science, and history. The range of his reading has been unusually wide, as revealed by all his writings. His systematic mind could not be content until this knowledge was given a place in his social philosophy. Whatever we may think of his system, there is no doubt that it was made in full view of a very large part of modern knowledge.

As another example of the early American sociologists, take Ross. Trained as an economist in the University of Berlin and the Johns Hopkins University, he felt the new spirit in German economics, history, and political science. More largely than any of the other pioneers we have discussed, Ross was influenced early by Lester F. Ward. More than any of the others he was also influenced by Gabriel Tarde.

What have been some of his outstanding contributions to American sociology? (1) Ross's interest in language early in his life was so keen that he once thought of being a philologist. Striking phrase and statement have characterized his work in sociology. It can be said of him without dispute that he has made sociology popular. A professor of English at one of our universities once remarked that he read each new book of Ross's as it came off for its English. No one has done more than Ross to make sociology readable. (2) When one thinks of social psychology in America he inevitably thinks of Ross. His *Social Control* is one of the most important contributions to social psychology. In that book with master hand he exposed the processes by which society, through various psy-

[4] Giddings, *Studies in the Theory of Human Society*, pp. 291–92.

chological devices, controls and directs the activities of man. While it has become necessary further to refine the analysis, and while the methods of study of group psychology are rapidly changing, Ross's contribution will remain as one of the important developments of American sociology. (3) Ross has been unique among American pioneer sociologists in making first-hand studies of the social life of various peoples scattered over the earth. History will have to determine the value of his methods. There can be no question, however, that a sociologist visiting various parts of the world and endeavoring by some method to study the social institutions and attitudes of a people quite different from our own is a new thing under the sun. Instead of depending upon the written accounts of other observers, Ross has contended that a sociologist should see these peoples in their native haunts and describe their life, their institutions, and their social psychology. In doing this Ross has pursued what Spengler has called the history method rather than the nature method. (4) Ross's sociology is characterized by hospitality to the ideas of other sociologists, rare among our pioneers. In contrast with the rigid laissez-faireism of Sumner and the rigidly logical system of Giddings based upon the doctrine of "consciousness of kind," and in striking distinction to Small's theory of sociology based upon the interests, Ross has offered hospitable reception to all of these and many other ideas. His system is less logical and more descriptive. No one has analyzed the social processes so minutely as Ross. Out of something more than 700 pages in his *Principles of Sociology,* over 500 are devoted to social processes. He rides no sociological hobby, by reason of the fact that he sees the multiplicity of factors in the situation. Breadth of vision and hospitality to ideas characterize his work.

This brief survey of American sociological pioneers must include Charles Horton Cooley. Son of the famous Michigan jurist and teacher of law, Thomas M. Cooley, Professor Cooley has been the product academically of the University of Michigan. Like most of the others we have surveyed, he came to sociology through economics. Influenced profoundly by William James and Mark Baldwin, Professor Cooley's sociology has the distinctly psychological trend. However, he has been no mere slave of these masters. Their

ideas have been transformed by the subtle alchemy of his mind into new products for sociology phrased with a beauty and charm and penetrated with unusual insight.

Professor Cooley's contributions to sociology may be summarized as follows: (1) No man among our pioneers has brought such an understanding of literature to the illumination of sociological interpretation. The Greek myth and the Greek poetry, the great classics of the whole Western World, are laid under tribute to illustrate his sociological conceptions. Painting, sculpture, architecture—in short, all the aesthetic arts—play through Cooley's sociological writings like sunlight through breaking clouds. (2) Cooley contributed to sociology an explanation of the play of circumstance upon the developing child which gives us a conception of the influence of social life upon the making of personality, which, while based upon James and Baldwin, is unique in its penetrating insight. His *Human Nature and the Social Order* easily stands pre-eminent in the analysis of the social factors in the making of the individual mind and personality. (3) In his second book, *Social Organization,* Cooley contributes his doctrines of the primary groups—family, playground, and neighborhood—in which occur the chief processes of socialization. In these groups human nature is formed. Out of them grow what he calls our primary ideals. Stretching out from them in ever widening circles are the less potent influences in groups which form and fashion us and make us personalities. (4) Cooley is pre-eminently the representative of another trend in American sociology. Living in the midst of a movement which we call scientific and which has achieved its success in the physical sciences, Cooley has stated most clearly the conception of sociological methodology to which Small had given some attention. He points out with great clearness the importance of not only statistics as a method of sociological research, but the importance of coupling therewith an interpretive spirit based upon a broad human culture in philosophy, literature, and art. While this appears in all his books, its best expression is to be found in his article entitled "The Roots of Social Knowledge" in the *American Journal of Sociology* for July, 1926. He doubts the validity of the statistical method in sociology when used alone. Some things

which can be understood by other methods and which cannot be measured by statistics, he asserts, must be taken into consideration in any interpretation of society. He holds that you must use both methods if you would arrive at truth. This trend in American sociology must not be misunderstood or underrated. (5) None of our American sociological pioneers have a system which so easily makes a place for what we usually call social pathology. Cooley's analysis makes necessary consideration of the abnormal in social relationships. He is interested in answering the question as to how social personality is developed. His observation took in the degenerate as well as the normal personality in society. His method of interpreting the normal availed to understand the abnormal. Social degeneration as well as normal society receives due attention in Cooley's thought as in no other. In the face of the historical opposition in American sociology between sociological theory and social work this attitude is of the greatest significance.

Attention must be given to one other important pioneer, William I. Thomas. Thomas was one of the protégés of Dr. Small at the newly established University of Chicago. He made his reputation in social psychology. For the sake of brevity I shall not survey the development of his ideas, but point out as briefly as I can the significant trend which he introduced into American sociology, especially into social psychology. In passing I may remark that he shared with Sumner and Giddings an interest in what the study of primitive peoples could provide for sociology, as shown by his important book, *Source Book of Social Origins*. In this book he showed how the study of primitive society can illuminate not only social structure, but also social process and social psychology.

Two outstanding contributions are to his credit: (1) Perhaps influenced by Havelock Ellis' studies in the psychology of sex, he showed for the first time in American sociology the importance of sex in its relationship to social forms, social ideals, social attitudes. (2) More significant for sociology and social psychology is his contribution to methodology in his study of *The Polish Peasant*. Here, through case studies of immigrants to this country he revealed the changes involved in going from one social complex to another. He studied the shock which comes to some individuals who change

suddenly from a society with one set of ideals, attitudes, and customs to another. He showed the processes by which readjustment takes place, or, if they fail to occur, the consequences of this sudden change. He enabled us to understand how demoralization occurs in this uprooting of family and individual from one kind of social soil and planting it down in another kind. (3) This method also, but in another way than that employed by Cooley, reconciles sociology and social work. Here sociology has shown what light can be thrown upon the problems of social work by providing an understanding of the essential factors in the case.

Summarizing the tendencies in American sociology in its early years, we may see the following characteristics: (1) It attempted to define the scope of its field. (2) It groped after a methodology. (3) It tried to define its relationship to the other social sciences. (4) An analysis of social classes, social institutions, and social processes began to take form. (5) An attempt was made to show how it evolved. (6) Sociologists tentatively analyzed the nature of the social process. (7) The nature of social forces was studied. (8) The meaning of progress was defined. (9) Early a social philosophy, sociology later placed more emphasis upon the application of quantitative measurements to its phenomena, thus attempting to bring it in line in its methodology with the natural sciences. (10) In trying to work out a theory of how social groups were formed, how they became differentiated, and how to account for group conflict and accommodation, a social psychology was originated which worked itself out among some of our pioneers as an analysis of social process. (11) In facing the problem of maladjusted individuals and groups, a theory of social pathology appears, sometimes, as with Giddings, partly on a biological and partly on a sociological basis, or, as with Cooley and Thomas, according to the principles of social psychology. (12) From the standpoint of social evolution it found its most fruitful material in the results of social anthropology.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIOLOGY SINCE THE PIONEERS

The distinction which I have made in this study is artificial, since some of the pioneers whom I have named are still living and their thought has continued to grow. Sumner, Small, and Ward

are gone, but Giddings, Ross, Cooley, and Thomas are still active and creative. Nevertheless, as one looks over the field of sociology in the United States and studies rather carefully the productions of later men, he cannot fail to be impressed with the multiplicity and diversity of points of view in sociology in recent years. Did time permit it would be worth while to give an exposition of the development of each of the more recent writers. It must suffice, however, to point out in broad outline the general development.

One thing which strikes the surveyor of the field of sociology in recent years in the United States is the way in which different sociologists have approached the problems according as they were influenced by this science or another. For example, those who have been trained in psychology have shown a tendency to approach the problem of sociology from that standpoint. Others have been impressed with the importance of geographic factors, while still others have been influenced in their point of view by biology. The anthropological sociologists have been with us from the beginning. Others approach the matter from the standpoint of social pathology, and some are still determined in their treatment by their studies in philosophy. This situation creates a bewilderment to one unfamiliar with the history of sociology, and has caused many of the enemies of the Lord to rejoice. The situation is clear evidence that sociology is still in its formative stage and that much still remains to make it a science.

However, out of this confusion of tongues some lines of tendency have begun to appear. (1) The chaos is not as great as it appears at first sight. The work of these various specialists, each approaching the problem of sociology from his own point of interest, has had the effect of bringing above the horizon of consciousness for us all certain factors which we ourselves perhaps otherwise would have neglected. (2) It has begun to be clear that sociology must build upon the materials furnished it by other sciences which affect social relationships and social groups just as psychology must build upon physiology. Any science which can throw light upon how groups are formed, what ties bind men together and what separate them, why certain people fail to adjust themselves to the social relationships which have been established by groups, what factors revealed in whatever field of knowledge have influenced the

formation, re-formation, and decadence of social structures the sociologist may lay under tribute. (3) It has begun to be clear, however, that sociology must define its problems and attack them by its own methods. The social survey, the census, case studies of communities and of individuals are indications of this tendency. Just as biology, in spite of the fact that it never forgets its fundamental sciences of physics and chemistry, and takes into account whatever these sciences can contribute to an understanding of its problems, nevertheless has its own field and its own problems, and attacks them by its own methods, so sociology, while fully conscious of its dependence upon geography, biology, even physiological chemistry, psychology, and anthropology, has its particular problems and attempts to understand them by its own methods. The statistical method is common to all these sciences. Sociology is using it more and more in an endeavor to study quantitatively those elements in its problems which are subject to statistical measurement and interpretation. There are certain problems in sociology, however, as in psychology and biology, to which the statistical method has not yet been successfully applied. We have not yet succeeded in measuring the comparative influence of different social factors in the production of certain group reactions. Nevertheless, through the study of instances and cases it is possible to get some light upon the motives moving masses of men in certain directions and some indication of the conflicting emotions and motives which in a given situation account for certain otherwise unexpected results. (4) It is usually assumed that sociology is not an experimental science. It is said that we cannot coop up groups of human individuals in a laboratory and vary the conditions of their existence in order that we may know how they will react under different conditions. That is true as far as it goes. However, we should not be blind to the fact that great social experiments are constantly going on. Scientifically, the difficulty is in the control. That it is not impossible, however, is indicated by the attempt to study groups of delinquents and groups of non-delinquents, but with different or the same social surroundings and with the same or different heredity. In the field of education and social legislation experiments that certainly have value for human society are constantly being tried. The changes in

our school system, in methods of teaching, etc., the different methods used in advertising, in caring for the dependent, in handling prisoners, and in rehabilitating demoralized families, provide an experimental basis for sociology. Social legislation provides a rich field for sociological study. In the field of social pathology new methods are constantly being tried. Statistical treatment of the results is quite possible and in some cases is being carried out to great advantage. Just as in the physical sciences, hypotheses to explain what is found by experiment and by statistical treatment are necessary. In general I think it can be said, therefore, that sociology, in spite of its complexity and the difficulty of applying scientific controls to the study of its prenomena, has arrived at certain definite conclusions, which, while tentative and awaiting further investigations, do throw light upon practical problems. It may be said, however, that its tentative conclusions are no more tentative than some of those in the natural sciences. (5) Recently a tendency has appeared, such as emerged long ago in the physical sciences, to abandon armchair generalizations, and for each sociologist to select what seems to him to be a promising and important problem and endeavor to study it by the best scientific methods which he can devise. Thus, Park and Burgess have set themselves the problem of urban sociology, specifically the problem of understanding what occurs in urban life. Ross has devoted himself recently to a careful study of population, and numerous scholars are addressing themselves to the problems that arise in connection with our pathological classes. The first task seems to be to describe what we see, leaving generalization to a later time when we have a sufficient body of facts on which we can safely generalize, but at the same time suggesting hypotheses to explain the phenomena observed. The predominant note in this tendency is research, and by research the sociologists mean studying a given social problem or phase of human relationship by all the scientific methods now known and any others which may be devised. Where quantitative measurements can be employed they are being used. Where statistics is too clumsy a method to measure the facts we want, such as the subtle interplay of emotional and mental activities in relation to conduct, we shall have to be satisfied with a study of the mechanics by which certain

social results come about in a concrete case. Woolston's studies of overpopulation are illustrations of the former, while Thomas' studies of the Polish peasant and the unadjusted girl show us the possibilities of the latter. (6) Small for many years urged that the water-tight compartments of the social sciences should be abandoned, that in the study of social relationships we have to take into account all sorts of factors and influences. In the physical sciences this suggestion has been operating for some time. In studying bird life, for example, in any area it is necessary to take into account not only the biological factors but the geographic and even the social, since it has been found that bird life varies with psysiographic features, with temperature, with altitude, and also with the presence or absence of mankind. The most promising development along this line in recent years in the social sciences has been the organization of the Social Science Research Council. It is based upon the recognition of the interdependency of the various social sciences in the study of numerous social problems. The study of human migration, of the mechanization of industry, of pioneer belts, of prohibition, and of crime require the work, not only of sociologists or economists or political scientists or anthropologists, but of all of them. Moreover, this Council has recognized that not only one method must be employed, but every method which will throw light upon the problem. The strictest canons of scientific criticism and caution, it has been recognized, must be employed. This tendency marks the beginning of co-operative effort in the social sciences. There are so many facets to human experience and social relationship that no one specialist can see them all. As a corollary to this tendency sociology as social philosophy is enlarged to sociology as social science. (7) The trend in social psychology is equally striking and important. In American social psychology we have had four great systems or tendencies: (*a*) the social-mind theory, typified by Giddings, Ross, and Ellwood; (*b*) the social-instincts theory, represented by Professor McDougall; (*c*) the social attitude and social habit tendency, represented by Thomas and Dewey; and (*d*) the personality and society theory, perhaps typified best by Professor Cooley. A number of other scholars have of course contributed to each of these tendencies in social psycholo-

gy. Each of these schools of thought has had its adherents and has helped in the clarification of the problem. Perhaps the most outstanding tendency of the present time is a kind of synthesis and simplification of these various theories and the emergence of a fifth tendency which takes account of the mechanisms revealed by psychology, but brings to the consideration, as individual psychology often does not, the interplay between developing personality and the surrounding situation. As Professor Young has phrased the new tendency, "Social psychology is the study of the personality as affected by social and institutional stimuli, and as in turn affecting these." This tendency, while not accepting fully the Freudian analysis, finds suggestions here which help to explain the mechanism of the interplay between personality and social environment. Here, as in general sociology, there is a tendency to stress the need of more research as to the effect produced on the individual personality as shown by his attitude toward others by what has been called the social frames of behavior laid down by others. The most hopeful thing is that in social psychology it is now being recognized that we need carefully observed and recorded objective data of the interplay between persons and institutions. What social psychology seems to be about is the endeavor to understand how the individual becomes socialized, i.e., conformed to the frames of conduct coming down from the past through tradition and custom, and how in turn the individual affects changes in these institutions and customs. The method now recognized is careful scientific research, especially on the social side. Anthropology's study of culture patterns and their influences upon individuals is here of the greatest importance.

THE RELATION BETWEEN SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL WORK

Sociology in the United States had two roots. One of these was European study of political economy and political science already noted. The other was interest in what we call now social pathology, once known as charities and corrections.

The recent tendencies, however, in general sociology and in social psychology have provided a bridge over this gulf. The recent emphasis upon research with the endeavor to study objectively spe-

cific social problems, the emphasis in social psychology upon processes in the formation of social personality, and an endeavor to trace the disintegration of personality and group bring into proper perspective again the pathological individual and the pathological group. One cannot study the interrelation of the person with his inherited tendencies, and the environment that plays upon him, and in turn the influence of this personality upon groups with which he associates without emphasizing not only the process by which the socialized personality is formed but also how the disorganized personality and group come into being. In nature these two things occur together. It is a hopeful tendency in the study of sociology at the present time that they are being studied together as they occur. Personality and its social products further adjusted to the social environment in which it lives, or disorganized in the sense that it is not adjusted to its environment, is seen to be a function of variables in the individual and in the environment. It is thus becoming apparent that what nature has placed together even a sociologist must not put asunder.

The converse of this is also true. While for many years the social workers have gone their own way without reference to the light cast upon their problems by sociology and social psychology, they are now coming to see that in the work of reorganizing individual personalities they must take into account racial and cultural backgrounds, the psychology and the psychopathology of individuals, the inherited tendencies of individuals, the culture patterns of the group in the midst of which they have been born and have grown up, if they are to attack the problem of the disorganized personality with any hope of success.

SOCIOLOGY AS A UNIVERSITY SUBJECT

I take for granted your acquaintance with Tolman's articles on the study of sociology in the United States in Vols. VII and VIII of the *American Journal of Sociology*. In the twenty-five years since these articles were written some few changes have taken place in the number of institutions in which sociology is taught. Greater changes have taken place in the nature and content of the course as well as the methods of teaching.

Perhaps the most significant tendencies in the teaching of sociology in the United States at the present time are: (1) The in-

crease in the number of courses under the title of sociology. Instead of the social science of the early nineties, by which term was meant chiefly charities and social reform and a course in theoretical sociology based upon Ward or Spencer, a rich variety of courses, both graduate and undergraduate, now appear in the catalogues of most universities where sociology has been established for some time. This enrichment has come about by recognition of the close relationships of sociology with other sciences, giving rise to such courses as the Physical Basis of Society, Social Geography, Social Psychology, Human Ecology, Urban Sociology, and Rural Sociology. Specialization has also appeared in the field of social pathology, giving rise to courses upon the dependent classes and others upon the criminal classes, and unadjusted child or child problems, the family, social adjustment, and courses in case work. (2) With the attempt to apply scientific methods to the study of objective phenomena in connection with social relationships a number of courses have been developed to study, by statistics or through the study of cases definite sociological problems. The social survey which has been introduced in some institutions represents one method. (3) As sociology has grown older, inevitably there emerged a tendency to introduce courses on the history of various phases of sociology. Hence we have courses on the history of social thought, on the history of philanthropy, and on the history of penology. (4) As the result of increasing recognition of the close relationships between anthropology and sociology, in a number of universities, courses in cultural anthropology, courses on primitive society and on social origins have been established in either the department of sociology or in a department closely allied with sociology. (5) Recently there has appeared a recognition of the close relationships between sociology and education, which has given rise to courses in educational sociology either in the department of sociology or in the department of education. (6) Just recently a tendency has appeared which recognizes the close relationship between religion and sociology, giving rise to courses in the sociology of religion.

In spite of the rather rapid expansion of sociology as a college and university subject, it must be frankly admitted that there are a number of institutions which do not recognize the subject by this name. While some of them are teaching what is usually called so-

ciology in other institutions under some other name, such as social economy or social science, thus recognizing that there is a body of material which deserves to be studied and which was not covered by the older social studies, nevertheless the fact that they do not call it sociology registers the feeling in some quarters that the term "sociology" has a bad connotation. A recent inquiry by Professor Odum of the University of North Carolina has shown that the objection to the term is partly due to the fact that it is often misunderstood as something like, if not the same, as socialism, and partly to the objection of scholars to what they think is the historical content of sociology. Sometimes the explanation given as to why the subject is not called sociology in a given institution is that the subject was started under another name in an earlier time and it has not been found necessary or convenient to change the title of the department.

Viewing the history of sociology in the United States impartially, one can see some reasons for the objection to the use of the term. Doubtless the similarity of sound between the two words, "sociology" and "socialism," the ill odor in which socialism has been held among our scholars, and the lack of discrimination by the common man have given some reason in certain quarters of the country for the unwillingness to introduce the term. In certain of our institutions it has unfortunately been true that sociology has been advocated by men who had no adequate understanding of scholarship. In their hands it was a mass of undigested, unsystematized, unscrutinized generalities which made a popular appeal to sophomores and attendants at chautauquas. They mouthed loudly of science but really had neither part nor lot in the matter. Flamboyant propaganda and silly sentimentalism made up the major portion of such sociology. It consisted largely of what they thought ought to be done with a minimum of fact as to the picture of the exact situation or a rigid comparative study of human experience. While some of these, unfortunately, are still with us, the application of the scientific method and the increasing emphasis upon objective data have been acting as selective agents in consigning these enemies of sociology to a deserved innocuous desuetude. Doubtless we shall have to put up with some of them longer, inasmuch as there is no sociological orthodoxy and no sociological

inquisition or holy office by which these fellows can be eliminated. Emphasis upon rigidly scientific methods will attend to them. Nevertheless the objection to sociology by sane, sensible men should give serious sociologists food for thought and help them to sounder methods of teaching and research.

In looking back thus briefly over the history of sociology in the United States, we see much to keep us humble and something to encourage us. Its progress has been as rapid as anyone had any right to expect, and in some cases more rapid than was good for the subject.

A solid basis has been obtained in anthropology and ethnology for the history of society. The outlines of the origins of social institutions, social ideas, customs, traditions, etc., have been fairly well made out. The study of the fossil remains of present-day social survivals has been of as great value to sociology, as the study of fossil remains of former generations of life has been to biology. Again, real progress has been made in assimilating the results of kindred sciences upon which sociology rests, such as psychology, biology, eugenics, and geography. By slow but certain steps, with numerous windings into by-paths and with frequent retracing of steps, sociology has gone its way. In spite of false steps and frequent stumblings sociology has gone on toward an understanding of a field neglected but vital. It proceeds on the hypothesis that it is possible to explore and understand social reality, the processes by which human relationships are formed and disintegrate. It proceeds in the faith that the formation and change of social institutions can be understood. It believes that it is possible to discover generalizations concerning human action under varying conditions. It proposes to borrow, invent, and apply methods by which to discover the truth concerning social movement, social inertia, and social change. By its works—both as to method and results—it stands or falls. So far as we can see at present, it will be judged by the willingness of its devotees to face courageously the drudgery, the loneliness, the sneers, and the patience inevitable in the path toward its goal. Its method is patient research, hypothesis carefully tested, and cautious interpretation; its glory, the satisfaction of understanding human relationships and of helping thus to build a better world-society.

DIVISION ON HISTORICAL SOCIOLOGY

THE FATE OF SOCIOLOGY IN ENGLAND

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I. INTRODUCTORY: ABSENCE OF FORMAL SOCIOLOGY IN ENGLAND

The history of sociology in England is essentially a record of the development of more adequate knowledge, more precise methods, and a more synthetic orientation in the special social sciences. There has been little formal sociology. The modern evolution of the social sciences may be divided into two general periods: one from 1750 to 1850, characterized by the gradual transition from deductive social philosophy to a more empirical type of social science; the other from 1850 to the present, marked by the acceptance of the evolutionary theory and of the psychological analysis of the increasing body of social data. Spencer's demonstration of the validity of the evolutionary viewpoint as applied to the study of human society had a tremendous influence upon the subsequent development of sociology, yet his distinctively sociological contributions affected but little the growth of sociology in England. Contributions to sociology since Spencer include the work of Bowley and others in statistics; of Buckle and his successors on the influence of geographical factors upon social processes; of the social Darwinists; of the neo-Malthusians; of the social psychologists; of the cultural anthropologists; of the students of social, economic, and political institutions; and of those who introduced the sociological viewpoint into social ethics and social reform. L. T. Hobhouse, at present the outstanding English sociologist or social philosopher, holds that social evolution has come more and more to rest upon conscious control by the human mind, and that, from this stage on, progress, as the growth of harmonious adjustment in society, must depend primarily upon the conscious direction of social conduct by the social mind. The strongest force

in the English sociological movement has been, however, the Sociological Society of London. While Professor Carver has not hesitated to declare Spencer's *Principles of Sociology* the greatest work ever written in this field; though Mr. Laski proclaims Graham Wallas to be "the wisest of sociologists"; and in spite of the fact that many American sociologists would rank Professor Hobhouse as the dean of the world's sociologists, it nevertheless remains true that there has not yet been, strictly speaking, a single sociologist in England, if we mean by that either a comprehensive systematizer like Professor Giddings or a specialist with a previous broad general training in sociology, such as Professor Bernard or Professor Ogburn.

Spencer was really a cosmic philosopher who turned to social problems as an incidental phase of the application of his laws of physical development to social evolution. He called this department of his evolutionary encyclopedia "sociology" because an earlier French philosopher had invented this barbarous Greek compound to christen his socio-theological effort at utopia-building. This is not to belittle Spencer, in his admiration of whom the present writer would yield to no reasonable person, but it does show that he was not a professional sociologist, and that only a small portion of his writings were even incidentally sociological in character. Hobhouse, likewise, is chiefly a philosopher whose outlook has been freshened and his materials rendered concrete and vital by an excellent preparation in biology, psychology, anthropology, and political science. Yet it would be difficult to prove him more of a sociologist than John Dewey or Professor Tufts, and he has never yet written a book which bears the title of sociology. His holding of one of the Martin White professorships in sociology at the University of London is a fortunate academic accident, which no more proves him a sociologist than it does the ethnographer, Edward Westermarck, who holds the other White Professorship in sociology. Graham Wallas is best described as a "publicist" with a penchant for a somewhat archaic psychological type of social analysis, and possessed of a most enviably exact and illuminating mastery of the facts relating to the social philosophy and public figures of Bentham's period and to the evolution of English local government. Even the London Sociological Society derives its

spiritual parentage from the French philosopher, Comte, from the French social economist, Le Play, and from the French anthropogeographer, Demolins.

Likewise, though there has been much invaluable work by specialists in various branches of social science which can be exploited by sociologists, scarcely a one of these specialists has been adequately oriented by reading or instruction in that basic or synthetic discipline, sociology, which presents and illumines the social process as a whole and should form the background for every specialized form of research in the social sciences. Hence, the history of sociology in England is essentially a record of the development of more adequate knowledge, more precise methods, and a more synthetic orientation in the special social sciences of anthropogeography, biology, psychology, anthropology, history, economics, political science, and social reform. There has been accumulated in such specialized endeavor a wealth of material to be organized and exploited by future English sociologists.

II. STAGES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF ENGLISH SOCIAL SCIENCE

While it is only a rough general line of separation, one may divide the modern evolution of the social sciences in England[1] into two general periods. The first was that of the gradual transition from deductive social philosophy to a more observational empirical and tentative type of social science. This period lasted from around 1750 to about 1850. The second stage is that from approximately 1850 to the present time, synchronizing with the gradual acceptance of the evolutionary theory, the growth of the genetic attitude toward social problems and sociological issues, the more accurate and profound psychological analysis of human motives and be-

[1] For general surveys of this material, see H. J. Laski, *Political Thought in England from Locke to Bentham;* W. L. Davidson, *Political Thought in England from Bentham to J. S. Mill;* E. Barker, *Political Thought in England from Spencer to the Present Day;* W. A. Dunning, *A History of Political Theories from Luther to Montesquieu; A History of Political Theories from Rousseau to Spencer;* C. E. Merriam and H. E. Barnes, *A History of Political Theories: Recent Times;* J. Bonar, *Philosophy and Political Economy;* C. Gide and C. Rist, *History of Economic Doctrines;* G. P. Gooch, *History and Historians in the Nineteenth Century;* F. Thomas, *The Environmental Basis of Society;* L. Rockow, *Contemporary Political Thought in England.*

havior, the progress of more exact statistical methods of measuring social phenomena, and the ever increasing richness of more dynamic and more complex social data as a result of the Industrial Revolution and of the advances in geographical discovery and ethnographic investigation.

III. SOCIOLOGICAL TRENDS IN ENGLISH SOCIAL SCIENCE PRIOR TO 1850

First and foremost in the sociological tendencies prior to 1850 in England we should note the effect of the general philosophy of the English Deists and Rationalists.[2] The Christians had represented corporeal and mundane humanity as vile and base beings significant only as the possessors of immortal souls to be snatched from perdition more through the grace of God than their own merits or achievements. Theology—or the technique of salvation—was naturally and logically regarded as the "queen of the sciences," and the study of man's secular behavior as man in an earthly settling was deemed of little consequence. Similarly, with social reform, the orthodox frowned upon social improvement, as the more attractive this world was made the more likely would the faithful be to surrender to the temptations of the world, the flesh, and the devil. The English philosophers from Francis Bacon to Tom Paine repudiated all of this. Bacon sounded the note of the Rationalists when he demanded that scholars renounce their previous absorption in the Kingdom of God and turn their attention to the improvement of the kingdom of man through the application of natural science to the solution of human problems. The Deists vindicated man as man and as the most notable and commendable exhibit of divine creative ingenuity to date. The Rationalists emphasized the possibility and desirability of social improvement through the application of reason and science to social, economic, and political problems. Such points of view as these offered the first real justification of social science.

In the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, anthropogeography was escaping from the realm of the mysterious and the

[2] J. H. Randall, Jr., *The Making of the Modern Mind,* chap. xii; A. C. McGiffert, *Protestant Thought before Kant,* chap. x; L. Stephen, *History of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century;* C. Becker, *The Declaration of Independence.*

occult where it has been associated with astrology and Hippocratic medicine.[3] Reflecting the recent invention of the barometer, Dr. Richard Mead (1673–1734) published his *Treatise Concerning the Influence of the Sun and Moon on Human Bodies* in the first half of the eighteenth century. Here was the first study of the effect of atmospheric pressure upon human behavior, and the first step was thus taken in the path that led to the contemporary work of Hellpach and Dexter. At about the same time (1733) another English physician, John Arbuthnot, wrote his *Essay Concerning the Effect of Air on Human Bodies*. He not only covered the subjects dealt with by Mead, but also outlined the theory of climatic determinism which Dedieu has proved to have adopted by Montesquieu in his *Spirit of Laws,* published fifteen years later. If Arbuthnot inspired and informed Montesquieu, the latter furnished ample suggestions to Adam Ferguson, who devoted a chapter of his *History of Civil Society* (1765) to a discussion of environmental influences.

In the field of social biology[4] during this period the outstanding development was the elucidation of the Malthusian law of population, indicating the necessity of artificial control of human population increase if we desire to augment human prosperity and happiness. While Malthus, as a pious Anglican, did not sanction birth control, others, such as Francis Place, James Mill, and Jeremy Bentham did so, and paved the way for Carr-Saunders and Marie Stopes. The forerunners of Darwin were carrying on those investigations and amassing that concrete information which enabled Darwin to launch his *Origin of Species* in 1859. The progress in microscopic investigation of bodily processes laid the basis for that definitive study of the processes of genetic biology so significant for biological sociology. The rational attitude toward sex problems exhibited by Godwin, Place, Bentham, and others in the period of Rationalism and Utilitarianism was, unfortunately, obstructed by the recrudescence of the hypocritical Puritanism and arid asceti-

[3] For the bibliography and doctrines of these writers, consult the index in F. Thomas, *The Environmental Basis of Society.*

[4] J. Bonar, *Malthus and His Work;* H. F. Osborn, *From the Greeks to Darwin;* J. W. Judd, *The Coming of Evolution;* A. C. Haddon, *A History of Anthropology;* A. D. White, *A History of the Warfare of Science with Theology;* H. E. Barnes, "Representative Biological Theories of Society," in *Sociological Review,* 1924 ff.

cism of the Victorian age, thus obstructing by more than a half-century the emergence of Havelock Ellis and the beginnings of a scientific study of sex problems in England. The early physical anthropologists like Barclay, Grattan, Charles White, *et al.*, were helping to found anthropometry, so indispensable to any scientific study of the problem of race.

In this transitional period suggestive work was done in the field of the psychological analysis of society.[5] Bishop Berkeley (1685–1753), in his essay on the *Principles of Moral Attraction,* forecast both Giddings' formula of the consciousness of kind and Spencer's interpretation of society in terms of physical analogies. Hume, Hutcheson, and Adam Smith indicated at length the social significance of sympathy, and Hume offered both a psychological explanation of social genesis and social organization and a psychological refutation of the theory of geographical determinism. Blackstone anticipated Fouillée by his effort at a psychological statement of the theory of an implicit contractual basis of social relations. Burke, in his essay on the *Origins of our Ideas of the Sublime and the Beautiful* showed keen insight into the social significance of sympathy, imitation, and emulation. Godwin presented a pleasant, if exaggerated, conception of the importance of rational factors in social control and social reconstruction. Finally, Bentham's felicific calculus, while resting on an untenable set of psychological assumptions, furnished the impulse to the most extraordinary and varied set of proposals for social reform that have ever emanated from a single human mind.

In clarifying the historical approach to society there were contributions of import for the subsequent development of this field.[6] The geologists Hutton, Woodward, and Lyell produced the indispensable background and perspective from which to view social origins as soon as the evolutionary biologists and the anthropologists had brought forward the evidence making necessary the re-

[5] Cf. H. E. Barnes, "Sociology before Comte," in *American Journal of Sociology,* September, 1917; M. M. Davis, *Psychological Interpretations of Society;* F. H. Giddings, *The Principles of Sociology,* 3d ed., Introduction.

[6] J. W. Judd, *The Coming of Evolution;* W. A. Dunning, *Political Theories From Rousseau to Spencer;* E. Fueter, *L'Histoire de l'historiographie moderne;* G. P. Gooch, *History and Historians in the Nineteenth Century;* W. Riley, *From Myth to Reason.*

linquishment of the Adam fiction. The rudimentary and preliminary studies being made of the culture of primitive peoples served to prepare the way for the more intelligent appreciation of the facts and processes of human evolution, once the biologists, physical anthropologists, and archeologists had demonstrated the great antiquity of man and human society. Ferguson's *History of Civil Society* may rightfully be called the first true harbinger of historical sociology from the standpoint both of its scope and its attitude toward the problem. Burke based his sweeping criticism of the rationalistic and utopian philosophy of the French Revolution upon the genetic point of view with respect to the gradual and orderly development of society and political institutions. Gibbon, Robertson, Hallam, Mackintosh, and Grote exhibited the growing accuracy of historical method and documentation in the interval between the Humanists and Von Ranke. Both the historical writings and the doctrinal position of the Rationalists, such as Middleton, Collins, Hume and Paine, aided notably in breaking down that reverential attitude toward the past and in discrediting that acceptance of the orthodox Jewish and Christian cosmology, chronology, and anthropology which were alike fatal obstacles to any intelligent study of social and cultural evolution.

The economic philosophy of the age, associated chiefly with the writings of Adam Smith and the classical economists, was rich in sociological interests.[7] As Professor Small pointed out in his *Adam Smith and Modern Sociology,* Smith took an essentially sociological attitude toward the whole problem of the production and use of material wealth, and institutional economics might have been born with him rather than with Sombart, Weber, the Webbs, and Veblen had it not been for the unfortunate capitulation of economics to the metaphysics of value and distribution which set in with Ricardo and his successors. Even though the classical economists embraced an individualistic rather than a social point of view, yet their writings were not without their value for sociology. Malthus's famous law of population was an outgrowth of his atti-

[7] A. W. Small, *Adam Smith and Modern Sociology;* J. Bonar, *Philosophy and Political Economy;* Gide and Rist, *History of Economic Doctrines;* E. Cannan, *A History of the Theories of Production and Distribution in English Political Economy from 1776 to 1848.*

tude toward welfare economics, and the deep concern of his contemporaries with the problems of social and factory legislation was based upon essentially social and economic interests, of which their metaphysical economics was to no small degree a rationalization. The studies conducted by the factory investigating commissions and other similar groups brought together a vast body of relevant information in the field of social economics.

In the field of political philosophy[8] the varied types of speculation and analysis associated with Blackstone, Ferguson, Burke, Charles Hall, and Bentham had a common denominator in the tendency to look upon political institutions as the outgrowth of general antecedent and environing social conditions.

Finally, the great increase of social problems forced upon the attention of England by the onset of the Industrial Revolution suggested to Bentham the necessity of working out a science of social reconstruction, and was, as Professor Small has so well demonstrated, a powerful impulse to the subsequent development of sociology as a science for the scrutiny and guidance of social reform programs.[9]

IV. THE PLACE OF HERBERT SPENCER IN ENGLISH SOCIAL SCIENCE

The development of the social sciences in England since 1850 has consisted essentially in further progress along the lines of the specialisms just described, but we may pause before resuming the story to indicate the contributions to sociology made by Herbert Spencer in his cosmic philosophy as applied to an interpretation of social processes.[10]

In a recent penetrating reinterpretation of Spencer's sociological doctrines, Professor Frank H. Hankins has contended that Spencer's contributions consisted chiefly in: (1) the demonstration of the validity of the evolutionary viewpoint as applied to the study of human society (2) the discovery of the data of sociology

[8] Cf. the works of Laski, Dunning, and Davidson cited in footnote 1.

[9] Cf. A. W. Small, *General Sociology,* chap. iii.

[10] W. A. Dunning, *Political Theories from Rousseau to Spencer,* chap. ix; E. Barker, *Political Thought in England from Spencer to the Present Day,* chap. iv; H. E. Barnes, "The Social and Political Theory of Herbert Spencer," in *American Journal of Sociology,* November, 1921; F. H. Hankins, in H. E. Barnes (ed.), *History and Prospects of the Social Sciences,* pp. 297 ff.

in the reciprocal reactions of primitive man and his environment; (3) the first elaborate statement of the organismic theory of society; (4) his individualistic analysis of human groups and institutions; (5) his ghost theory of the origin of religion; (6) his view of social and political evolution as essentially a transition from a militaristic to an industrial basis; and (7) his biological generalization that the key to the understanding of population growth is to be found in the alleged antithesis or inverse correlation between individuation and genesis.

Spencer had a tremendous influence upon the subsequent development of sociology, yet he affected but little the growth of sociology in England. Not only did he have enthusiastic followers upon the Continent, but the early American sociologists, Ward, Sumner, Giddings and Small, were profoundly influenced by him. Giddings' early work was chiefly an original synthesis of Spencer's physical philosophy with the psychological conceptions of Adam Smith and Gabriel Tarde. Professor Carver seems to retain as fresh and unabashed an enthusiasm for Spencer today as Giddings exhibited toward him in 1894. Yet Spencer's influence upon formal social science in England was almost negligible. The prevailing trend toward somewhat narrow and unco-ordinated specialization was not checked in the interest of a more general synthetic tendency. Moreover, the one writer on sociology in England since Spencer who has made any effort to systematize, Leonard T. Hobhouse, differs diametrically from Spencer in nearly every phase of his doctrine except in the adoption of the evolutionary approach. While there were many factors which account for this strange lack of influence of Spencer upon English social science, it would seem that the following are the most important: (1) the type of English mind which tended towards calm reflection and broad generalization in the field of social science was still under the spell of the arid a priori metaphysics of Thomas Hill Green and the Scotch dialecticians; (2) the specialists were too narrow or too absorbed professionally to interest themselves in Spencer's sweeping generalizations and dogmatic formulas; (3) the reformers and uplifters were repelled by Spencer's harsh, uncompromising, and mechanical individualism. Hence, Spencer remains a gargantuan, but nevertheless a lonely and isolated, figure in English social science.

V. THE PROGRESS OF SOCIOLOGICAL INTERESTS IN ENGLISH SOCIAL SCIENCE SINCE 1850

We shall now endeavor to trace briefly and concisely the outstanding developments in English social science since Spencer, keeping in mind the general background of: (1) an improving methodology in social research and analysis; (2) a vast increase in social data; (3) the growing complexity of social phenomena; (4) real progress in a secular and evolutionary outlook; and (5) better differentiation and distribution of scientific labor in these fields.

There have been numerous contributions to better types of methodology in social science.[11] The outstanding contribution here is to be found in the improvement of the statistical technique, particularly in the field of social statistics, founded in large part by Stanley Jevons, Galton, and Pearson. Here the most productive figure has been A. L. Bowley, who has trained and inspired a large body of students and associates. Even more abstruse contributions have been made to this field by Yule, Keynes, and others. The most important specialized phase of the quantitative method as applied to sociology which has been worked out in England has been associated with Karl Pearson, with his biometrical concepts and his justly famous coefficient of correlation. The statistical approach to social measurement has been applied to contemporary social problems by a host of English students, and Hobhouse has made a rather less successful effort to introduce it in the study of primitive institutions. Frédéric Le Play has exerted a wide influence upon English methodology. His technique of the social survey has been elaborated and applied in patient detail by Booth, Rowntree, and others in their classic investigations of poverty in London and York. His regional plan for social reconstruction has been warmly espoused by Geddes, Branford, Mumford, and others, and Geddes has achieved no little practical success in applying

[11] Cf. Westergaard, in *Quarterly Publications of the American Statistical Association,* Vol. XIV, pp. 1–121, Vol. XV, pp. 225–91; J. Koren, *A History of Statistics;* F. H. Hankins, "Individual Differences: the Galton-Pearson Approach," in *Social Forces,* December, 1925; Geddes and Branford, *The Coming Polity;* A. A. Goldenweiser, "Cultural Anthropology," in H. E. Barnes (ed.), *The History and Prospects of the Social Sciences;* H. E. Barnes, *The New History and the Social Studies;* C. E. G. Catlin, *The Science and Method of Politics;* H. J. Laski, *A Grammar of Politics.*

these doctrines in Edinburgh and elsewhere. The cultural method of social analysis has been promoted by the English anthropologists, such as E. B. Tyler, R. R. Marett, A. C. Haddon, W. H. R. Rivers, F. C. Bartlett, and others. A broader basis for the historical study of institutional and cultural evolution has been forwarded by Maine, Maitland, Pollard, Vinogradoff, Marvin, Tawney, and others. The monographic method in historico-economic analysis has been impressively demonstrated by the Webbs, the Hammonds, and the like.

The study of the influence of geographical factors[12] upon social processes was initiated in the modern period by a philosophical historian, H. T. Buckle, a much-misunderstood and misinterpreted man. Writing to prove the growing primacy of cultural and psychological factors in human society, he has most frequently been expounded and condemned as an unthinking and uncritical apostle of geographical determinism. In anthropogeography the trend since Buckle has been away from the well-intentioned efforts of amateurish physicians, philosophers, travelers, and historians toward the work of well-trained and socially minded geographers. A. J. Herbertson, Andrew Reid Cowan, and James Fairgrieve have compiled general works for the purpose of presenting an illuminating and moderate description of the manner in which the history of human culture has been conditioned rather than determined by geographical factors. H. B. George has treated the geographic conditioning of military history. E. J. Payne has written upon the geographical factors involved in the European settlement of the New World, and Miss Newbigin and Mr. Mackinder have elucidated the geographical conditioning of the ancient and modern history of the Near East and the Balkans. Mackinder especially stresses the crucial importance of the possession of this pivotal area in the Near East for any state desirous of maintaining the supremacy of political power in the Old World. Lucas has inspired and edited an extensive work on the geographical basis of British colonization and imperialism. Fleure has worked on the physical and anthropogeography of England and Western Europe, particu-

[12] On these writers consult the index in Thomas, *Environmental Basis of Society*. See also H. E. Barnes, *New History and Social Studies*, chap. ii.

larly in relation to race and racial differentiation. Geddes and Branford have accepted the geographical basis of Le Play's regionalism as one of the chief clues to the reconstruction of contemporary urban and industrial society. Chisholm and McFarlane have treated in detail the geographical basis of modern commerce and industry. Especially important has been the introduction of the basic concepts of Paul Vidal de la Blache relating to the regional technique in anthropogeography by Herbertson, H. R. Mill, and Fleure. This represents the most advanced phase of development in physical and human geography, and it will doubtless be conceded that Fleure is the outstanding exponent of up-to-date anthropogeography in contemporary Britain.

In the realm of biological sociology[13] it will be conceded by all that the most significant and far-reaching achievement was the triumph of the evolutionary hypothesis and the proof that man, as a higher type of mammal, is a definite part of that process. Evolutionary biology helped to create the time perspective and mental attitudes essential for any valid consideration of human society as a naturalistic problem. This was more important than the "social-Darwinism," moderately espoused by Spencer, Bagehot, and Jenks, which emphasized the social function of war as the social analogue of the struggle for existence. The evolutionary analysis of man naturally led to a more detailed and precise study of the mechanisms of human heredity, thus establishing the science of genetics. Out of this has arisen the well-grounded cult of eugenics, the high priests of which in England have been, in succession, Francis Galton and Karl Pearson, the former the more seductive prophet and the latter the more skilled technical scientist.

This interest in the qualitative aspect of the population problem has been paralleled by further developments of the quantitative analysis founded by Malthus. The neo-Malthusians have proved that, when accurately interpreted, the Malthusian doctrine

[13] H. E. Barnes, "Representative Biological Theories of Society," in *Sociological Review*, 1924 ff; R. Mackintosh, *From Comte to Benjamin Kidd;* V. Robinson, *Pioneers of Birth Control;* A. Dendy, *The Biological Foundations of Society;* F. H. Hankins, *The Racial Basis of Civilization;* "Individual Differences," *loc. cit.;* A. A. Tenney, *Social Democracy and Population;* W. S. Thompson, *Population: A Study in Malthusianism.*

has been fully vindicated by the history of modern population growth since 1800. They have further established the fact that the need for an artificial restriction of the population in the interest of social comfort and prosperity is far greater today than when Malthus penned his famous essay. The birth-control movement, led by Marie Stopes and others, has suggested a technique for restraining population increase which is far more rational and effective than the weak and watery method of delayed marriages suggested by the pure and pious ex-clergyman, Malthus. The striking work done on the psychology and sociology of sex by Havelock Ellis and others has served to dissolve the almost incredible impurity complex which paralyzed Victorian social thought, and has thus prepared the way for a civilized attitude toward birth control and other sexual aspects of social improvement. The neo-Malthusian writers in England have varied from the erudite and specialized work of A. M. Carr-Saunders to the effective propaganda of Swinburne and Cox and the introductory but comprehensive textbook of Wright. As indispensable data for both quantitative and qualitative social biology, students have been able to draw upon the vital statistics ever more accurately and thoroughly compiled by government agencies and sifted and analyzed by such authorities as Sir Arthur Newsholme.

In the field of the psychological study of social phenomena[14] the most important development in the last three-quarters of a century in England has been the annihilation of the intellectualistic psychology, exemplified by the Benthamite felicific calculus, which not only furnished the philosophico-moral basis of Bentham's elaborate series of social inventions and reform schemes, but has also constituted the foundation of most of the so-called "psychological economics" and political science. This indispensable destructive work has been the result of the labors of Graham Wallas in his *Human Nature in Politics,* of McDougall with his emphasis on the importance of instinctive drives, of Trotter, who has elucidated the significance of the herd control of individual thought and behavior, of Tansley, Rivers, Hart, and others who have exploited

[14] Cf. my summaries of English psychological sociology in the *American Journal of Sociology,* 1922–23; and Kimball Young, "Social Psychology," in *The History and Prospects of the Social Sciences.*

the newer dynamic psychology which stresses the potency of subconscious factors in human behavior, and of the social psychologists and anthropologists who, from Bagehot's day onward, have emphasized the importance of custom, habit, and convention in conditioning the thought and conduct of man. Valuable also is the exposition of the social importance of sympathy and altruism by Drummond, Kidd, and Sutherland, which opposes the cold, calculating individual selfishness of the felicific calculus, as well as the bellicose assumptions of "Social Darwinism." No little progress has also been made by C. S. Myers and others in introducing psychology into the reconstruction of industrial processes. Although at the present time psychology is in excellent shape in England to be exploited in the service of psychological sociology, there has not appeared in England either a systematic synthesis of work already done in this field, such as Ellwood's *Sociology in Its Psychological Aspects* and his *Psychology of Human Society*, or an application of strictly up-to-date psychology to a comprehensive study of social processes, such as is to be detected in the works of Professors F. H. Allport and L. L. Bernard.

As in America, so in England, the cultural analysis of social processes and institutions has been established chiefly by the anthropologists.[15] The older evolutionary or comparative approach was espoused by Avebury, Tylor, Frazer, and others. The opposed or diffusionist position has been exploited moderately by Haddon and Rivers, and with uncritical exuberance by G. Elliot Smith and his disciples, such as D. A. Mackenzie and W. J. Perry. A more critical and tentative viewpoint, roughly resembling that taken by Boas and the American school of historical ethnology, has been maintained by R. R. Marett and F. C. Bartlett. Bartlett appears to be about the only English student of primitive culture who is alive to the revolutionary work done in cultural anthropology by Boas and the American group. There has been no English sociologist to take over and utilize the technique of cultural analysis for sociology in such a manner as have Professor W. F. Ogburn and such disciples as M. M. Willey and M. J. Herskovits

[15] A. C. Haddon, *A History of Anthropology;* A. A. Goldenweiser, "Cultural Anthropology," in *History and Prospects of the Social Sciences;* C. Wissler, "Anthropology," in E. C. Hayes (ed.), *Recent Developments in the Social Sciences.*

in the United States. Yet Professor Hobhouse has shown a commendable cordiality toward the cultural point of view and has made wide use of it in his writings.

The genetic study of social institutions and cultural development has been pursued by a varied group of scholars.[16] John Richard Green repudiated the episodical political history of Freeman, along with the dictum that "history is past politics." He wrote a history of English life and culture quite as much as an account of English politics. The contributors to the Trail and Mann series have compiled a vast social and cultural history of England. Maitland and Pollard have founded an institutional approach to English political history. The Webbs, Ashley, Tawney, the Hammonds, Slater, Mrs. Knowles, and others have made precious and voluminous contributions to our knowledge of the social and economic history of England. The cultural anthropologists mentioned previously have amassed a vast body of material on cultural and institutional origins, and such physical anthropologists as Arthur Keith and a large number of competent prehistoric archeologists have clarified the complicated problems relating to human origins. Excellent work on the history of institutions has been done by Maine, Maitland, Pollock, Vinogradoff, and others in the field of legal origins; by Hobhouse and Edward Jenks in tracing the evolution of the state; by a large number of competent economic historians and genetic economists, led by Archdeacon Cunningham, in analyzing the evolution of economic life; by Westermarck in his monumental studies of the evolution of the family and human marriage; and by Lang, Frazer, Marett, and others in the field of the history of religion and comparative mythology. F. S. Marvin has done more than anyone else in England to arouse an interest in the "new history," associated in this country chiefly with the work of James Harvey Robinson and his disciples.

Certain trends in contemporary English economic science have been of the greatest significance for sociology.[17] Among these we

[16] Fueter, *op. cit.;* Gooch, *op. cit.;* H. E. Barnes, *New History and the Social Studies;* "History," in Hayes, *op. cit.;* "History: Its Rise and Development," in *Encyclopedia Americana;* G. E. G. Catlin, *The Science and Method of Politics.*

[17] There is as yet no adequate survey of English institutional and social economics. There are fragmentary American appreciations by such writers as W. C. Mitchell, Walton H. Hamilton, *et. al.*

should certainly list: Ashley's contributions to genetic economics and economic history; the institutional economics of the Webbs, Tawney, Clay, and others; the work of Pigou, and especially, Hobson, in welfare economics; and the functional approach to socio-economic life in the methods and assumptions of Cole and the guild socialists. For the most part these men represent the sociological point of view which characterized Adam Smith, but functioning through a more precise analytical technique, buttressed with more information, and dealing with post-Industrial Revolution materials and problems.

There have been many trends and attitudes in British political science which partake of the sociological orientation and have brought forward much material and many concepts rich in value for sociology.[18] Maitland, Pollard, Jenks, Hobhouse, and others have devoted themselves to the historical evolution of political institutions. The pluralistic revolt from the conceptions and practices of the absolute and omnipotent state and from the doctrine of unified, concentrated, and unlimited sovereignty was organized in England by Frederick William Maitland under the inspiration of Otto Gierke, who was himself much influenced by his studies in the socio-political doctrines of Johannes Althusius. This movement has been further developed with particular reference to ecclesiastical groups and interests by J. N. Figgis, and in relation to professional and vocational groupings and programs by Harold J. Laski. Particular emphasis has been laid by Maitland and Figgis on the real personality of the corporate group, and this contention has been utilized as the basis of a powerful argument for a certain amount of group autonomy and volitional independence.

The psychological factor in politics was discussed with great acumen, if with imperfect psychological knowledge, by Walter Bagehot in his *Physics and Politics,* where he stressed in particular the operation of imitation and discussion. Graham Wallas dealt the death blow to the political rationalism and intellectualistic psychology which had pervaded British political thinking from Blackstone and Bentham to James Bryce. He has also indicated

[18] Cf. Barker, *op. cit.;* L. Rockow, *Contemporary Political Thought in England;* Catlin, *op. cit.;* Merriam and Barnes, *op. cit.;* H. J. Laski, *A Grammar of Politics* (this is probably the best exhibit of the new political science in England); R. M. MacIver, *The Modern State.*

the irrational methods and processes which prevail in party government in a democracy. His efforts to suggest a constructive way out of these perplexities have been less successful than his critical work, though his plea for some adequate method of international co-operation to prevent war in his *Our Social Heritage* is a notable one. While this paper is limited to English sociology, we cannot fail to mention here the important work of MacIver, of Toronto, in relation to the place of the community in social and political life, which has so profoundly influenced Cole and the guild socialists in their political doctrine. The virtues of artisocracy versus democracy have been threshed out, with Maine, Stephen, Lecky, Mallock, and others defending the aristocratic tradition, while Hobson, Hobhouse, and Bryce have espoused the cause of democracy. Bryce has provided the most voluminous exhibit of the achievements and defects of democracy in action.

The sociological viewpoint has been introduced into ethics[19] through Leslie Stephen's attempt to restate ethical theory in terms of the evolutionary hypothesis, and through the comparative and historical studies of Hobhouse and Westermarck. Havelock Ellis and others have made no little progress in bringing about the beginnings of a civilized attitude toward sex, and Webbs and others have done much to emphasize the vital sociological contention that social ethics should be concerned, not so much with furnishing a rationalized basis for the defense of asceticism and gloomy Puritanism as with the establishment of a comprehensive scheme of social justice.

A sociological orientation in social reform[20] is to be seen in such things as an ever greater reliance upon statistical investigation in social economies and social legislation; in the growing popularity of the birth-control movement and the eugenics cult; in the regional town-planning program of Geddes and Branford; and in the repudiation of the theological and metaphysical assumptions

[19] Barnes, *History and Prospects of the Social Sciences,* chap. ix; L. T. Hobhouse, *Morals in Evolution;* Mackintosh, *op. cit.,* chaps. x, xi, xiii; H. Ellis, *Little Essays of Love and Virtue;* C. E. M. Joad, *Thrasymachus;* F. Kirchwey (ed.), *Our Changing Morality.*

[20] Cf. Rockow, *op. cit.,* and W. J. Brown, *The Underlying Principles of Modern Legislation.*

underlying conventional English criminology and penology. Nor should one overlook the sociological cast in such contemporary English literature as the works of Shaw, Wells, Arnold Bennett, Galsworthy, and W. L. George.

VI. THE PLACE OF L. T. HOBHOUSE IN ENGLISH SOCIAL SCIENCE

As Herbert Spencer stood out as the great systematizer at the close of the transition from social philosophy to social science, so Leonard Trelawney Hobhouse is the synthetic social philosopher of present-day England.[21] Like Spencer, Hobhouse developed his sociological system as a part of a general philosophy of evolution. There is still more intimate similarity between the two systems, in that while Spencer conceived of the evolutionary process as one of progressive differentiation and adjustment, Hobhouse views it as a growth in correlation and harmony, and both look upon society as an organic unity. But here the resemblance ceases. Spencer held that the course of evolution moved on automatically, regardless of the interference of man, believing that the latter could at the best have only a slight positive effect and was extremely likely to hinder the process. Hobhouse claims, on the contrary, that however much the evolutionary process may depend upon automatically working factors, such as the struggle for existence, social evolution has come more and more to rest upon conscious control by the human mind. He holds that, from this stage on, progress must depend primarily upon the conscious direction of social conduct by the social mind. Again, while Spencer's conception of the organic nature of society rested upon a large use of the biological analogy, Hobhouse eschews the use of biological terms and only implies the essential unity and interdependence of social life. Further, while both are avowed Liberals in English politics, Spencer's liberalism was of the laissez faire "mid-Victorian" brand of Cobden and Bright. Hobhouse, in contrast, is a supporter of that newer liberalism of Asquith and Lloyd George, which has abandoned most of the laissez faire tenets of the earlier period and is the group in England which has been the most consistent of the

[21] Cf. H. E. Barnes, "The Social and Political Theory of L. T. Hobhouse," in *American Journal of Sociology*, January, 1922. A survey based on Hobhouse's more recent works is in preparation by Professor Hugh Carter.

pre-war political parties in advocating and carrying out an extensive program of social reform and remedial legislation. It was the growth of this modern phase of liberalism which compelled Spencer in his latter years to find himself more inclined to favor the Conservative party. One thus finds in Hobhouse the interesting combination of a writer who approaches the problems of politics from the standpoint of a philosopher of evolution of the most thorough and recent type, of a social philosopher unsurpassed in any country for breadth and profundity of learning, and of a liberal democrat in politics.

Hobhouse carries his general evolutionary doctrines over consistently into his sociological system as a means of interpreting social processes. His specific sociological doctrines are to be found mainly in his suggestive little work on *Social Evolution and Political Theory* and in his more recent *Social Development,* which might be said to bear much the same relation to Spencer's *Study of Sociology* that Hobhouse's volumes on the philosophy of evolution do to the *Synthetic Philosophy.*

In the first place, as to the general field or scope of sociology, Hobhouse holds that it may be regarded chiefly as the science of human progress. The fundamental element in the social process which emerges as the central theme of social evolution is, he believes, "the interplay of human motives and the interaction of individuals."

This social progress, which is the prime object of sociological study, is not synonymous with social evolution. The latter term is the wider, and may include retrogression as well as advance. "By evolution I mean any sort of growth; by social progress, the growth of social life in respect to those qualities to which human beings attach or can rationally attach value." Nor is social progress primarily dependent upon biological factors. It is almost exclusively a result of psychological and social forces.

Social progress, in last analysis, Hobhouse regards as the growth in the harmonious adjustment of: (1) man to society, (2) the different types of social organization to each other, and (3) society as a whole to its environment. "Social progress may be regarded as development of the principles of union, order, co-operation, and harmony among human beings." The ideal society toward

which social progress should lead is one in which harmony is realized. This growth of harmonious adjustment in society, which is the essence of social progress, is not, however, solely the result of automatically working factors; it can only be completely achieved by the conscious action of will and intelligence. The growth of rational control by society over the conditions of life may thus be taken as the measure of social progress.

The strongest force making for a sociological movement in England has been the Sociological Society of London, the moving spirit in which has been Mr. Victor Branford.[22] This has done much to promote discussion of sociological subjects, to encourage social reform, and to bring prominent Englishmen together for the ostensible purpose of dealing with sociological problems. It has also published an excellent journal, the *Sociological Review*. What there is in the way of formal sociology in England is due chiefly to Mr. Branford and his associates. Yet the society has suffered from a number of limitations. In the first place, it has been rather provincial and little in touch with sociological progress elsewhere. Next would come the handicap of discipleship. The leading members of the Sociological Society have been those who are still under the spell of Comte and of Le Play and his disciple, Demolins. Finally there has been more interest in social reform, particularly in regional planning for urban reconstruction, and in social work than in the theoretical discussion of major sociological issues.

VII. SOME REASONS FOR THE NON-EMERGENCE OF SOCIOLOGY IN ENGLAND

It is a subject worthy of speculation as to why sociology, as such, should have taken such slight root in England. There are doubtless many reasons. Academic sociology is a symptom of contemporaneity in curriculum and pedagogical ideals. With the notable exception of the University of London and a few other recently established municipal universities, British education is still primarily medieval or humanistic, being concerned chiefly with the classics and dialectic and metaphysics. The ideal is still to train a cultured gentleman in terms of the older criteria of culture and

[22] See his articles and addresses in the *Sociological Papers* and the *Sociological Review*.

learning. The objective is to prepare one to move easily and urbanely in formal social circles rather than actually to understand the processes of human society—to be in "society" rather than to understand social life. The more aristocratic groups in the colleges look forward to public life, and here the rhetorical and dialectical technique is viewed as the main avenue to success. Men are trained to argue with charm and lofty detachment rather than to investigate with precision. The whole process is a dignified and seductive flight from reality. The generalized approach to nature and society is through dialectic and metaphysics—Platonic rather than pragmatic and empirical. The gap between normative and a priori social philosophy on the one hand and the inductive and specialized social sciences on the other has never been bridged as it should be by general sociology.

In contrast to this unreality of the education of the English gentleman and philosopher, we have the specialized training of those going into the civil service or the professions. The specializing social scientists have neither the time, inclination, nor capacity to provide that generalized and synthetic view of the social process as a whole which is the true function of the principles of sociology, and cannot be executed by any brand of social metaphysics. Further, the long-established position and prestige of history, political philosophy, and economics in England have made it difficult to realize the need of a more basic and elemental social science, such as sociology. The reformers engaged in the active strife of partisan struggle and class collisions cannot well be expected to pause for sociological orientation and direction unless they have been previously accustomed to such attitudes and procedure by systematic discipline and instruction.

Therefore, the net conclusion of this hasty summary of sociological trends and developments in England would seem to be that the specialists in the various branches of social science have accumulated a vast body of data and generalizations which would make possible a remarkable flowering of sociology in England if the inclination and personnel to do so were present. Yet the seductive and promising nature of the invitation to synthetic achievement here is only exceeded by the prospect that nothing will be done about it for a long time to come.

THE PRESENT SITUATION OF GERMAN SOCIOLOGY

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ABSTRACT

The present situation of German sociology.—German sociology may be typified by its emphasis upon the problem of the relation of mind and spirit as "the problem of problems." The common European and American stock of sociological thinking—organismic, ethnological, and historical—is represented in the work of various German sociologists. But uniquely symbolic of German sociology are Marx's insistence upon a materialistic philosophy and his faith in reform, and Simmel's search for a Kantian a priori in the "form" of the social process.

Its development may be described under the names of Max Weber, Ferdinand Tönnies, and Max Scheler. Weber turned the tables on economic determinists. Outstanding aspects of his work are his search for a border district between the generalizing natural sciences and the individualizing mental sciences—"understanding sociology"—his "ideal types" corresponding to the "pattern" concept of English and American physiology and psychology, and his struggle against "value judgment" in sociology. Tönnies adds a criterion of "values" in his community and association phases of the development of modern capitalism. The two counteracting tendencies to Kantian domination of German sociological thinking—Wilhelm Dilthey's shifting of the mental a priori to a relative and historical sense which originated the "sociology of knowledge," and the culmination of the work of the Catholic scholastico-Aristotelian tradition of Austria in the phenomenological method of Edmund Husserl—are in the background of Scheler's sociological work. Scheler reconciles in his thinking the opposing issues central to German sociology. He shifts Comte's phases from a subordinated to a co-ordinated arrangement, and has a three-phase theory of the development of social organization: racial, through political, to economic.

If we try for a moment to approach the problem of national co-ordination in sociology from the viewpoint of differential national character, we might very well seem to recognize types of sociological thinking in harmony with well-known traits in the development of the different nations. Anglo-Saxon sociology would all along appear to have followed the trend of industrial society taking its stand against the remnants and recursions of the feudal order of things. Romance sociology, and more particularly that of France and Italy, would assume the aspect of a ceaseless struggle between the irrational elements of the Roman Catholic church and the rationalism evolved out of it from the Age of Enlightenment down to the secularization of 1900. The sociology of the Slav races under the leadership of Russia could be even more perfectly

described as a dialogue between the primitive features of their popular organization and the influx of Western capitalism. Could one also think of such a national type to characterize German sociology?

I think both the fact of Germany being for a long time opposed, much more determinedly than even Russia, to the "Western" science of sociology, and that of her being, at the same time, the birthplace of some of the most fundamental and far-reaching sociological ideas can be accounted for by the peculiar position of her mental culture, that for the last two or three centuries has been singularly independent from her torn and confused political fate, and therefore given to ideologies far distant from, and even in most cases incapable of criticizing, any social reality. As a consequence, what in other countries used to be considered as a sure starting-ground for sociological observation and theory, Germans have constantly been inclined to make the problem of problems: What is the relation between matter and spirit in society, i.e., between the tangible objects and institutions of external, physical, and economic life on the one hand, and the mental interpretations and values composing cultural systems, such as politics and law, art and religion on the other. You see that this is precisely the question that was most sweepingly and sensationally answered by the so-called "historical materialism" of Karl Marx, and I should like to emphasize at the outset both the immense importance of socialism for German sociology and the peculiar connection of socialism with the predetermined direction of German social thought.

For if the teaching of Marx was descended on one side from the positivism and naturalism of Western science, it looked on the other to Hegel and through him to the subjectivist and idealist philosophy of Kant. The socialist explains what wrong he finds in a given social system by the inevitable workings of material and economic forces, yet does not at all mind believing it possible to construct a whole new system out of the ideal postulates of reason and justice. So German sociology has always centered round the social concept of body and soul and progressed according to the various refinements of which the scientific study of the one and the philosophical study of the other have been capable.

As Germany slowly entered the circle of political and economic world-powers, the same streams of social experience that had swelled the sociological thinking of England and France since Hobbes and Montesquieu began to pour in upon her scientific system. Albert Schäffle became, as it were, a German Spencer, at least as an admirer of the organism of industrial society. Adolf Bastian, who went out to the continents of primitive civilization with the pioneers of German world-trade and colonization, rose to an even greater position as the most original of international ethnologists in his sociological theory of what he called the "thought of nations" (*Völkergedanke*), meaning the striking parallelism of independent mental development the world over. In the strangely stimulating atmosphere of pre-war Austria, Ludwig Gumplowicz the Pole, the teacher of Gustav Ratzenhofer, established himself as a great German writer on that terrible social mechanism of selective struggle which was Darwinism applied to the human races. And last, but not least, what was termed the "historical school" of German political economists culminated in the attempt of Gustav Schmoller to treat economic theory as a part of the general theory of society, an attempt that was continued and is intensified at the present day in the systematical work of Franz Oppenheimer, Werner Sombart, and Othmar Spann.

But behind all this, which after all was only a branching out of the common European and American stock, stood something peculiarly German, viz., the restless curiosity with which the background of general knowledge, its methods, and presuppositions were searched for an answer to the last questions of possibility and structure of the concept sociological. Marx had not been content with pursuing the old paths of the ethical socialists of England and France; he must have a materialist philosophy to determine once for all the nature of man and society. In quite an analogous sense Georg Simmel—as need not be repeated in view of the masterly account by which Professor N. Spykman of Yale has introduced his work to American readers—deepened the teaching of Bastian and Schmoller with the intention of discovering a Kantian a priori in the "form" of the social process. Since then the philosophical outlook has remained sometimes the weakness and sometimes the

strength of German sociology, whether socialist or non-socialist. An author like the Greek Professor A. Eleutheropoulos, who in his lecturership in the University of Zürich is still the widest-known sociologist of German Switzerland (while G. L. Duprat in Geneva and R. Michels in Basle play the same part for the French and Italian side), may be right or wrong in his protests against aprioristic methods in sociology; at any rate he is thereby entirely out of tune with the present main current of our national sociological work.

This current is perhaps best described under the three great names of Max Weber, Ferdinand Tönnies, and Max Scheler. To Max Weber the first place is due, not only on account of his premature death in 1920, but also because he joined, in an altogether unique fashion, the depth of the theoretician and methodologist with the breadth of the economic and historical institutionalist; and I can only express a hope that his obituary, written by Professor Karl Diehl, of Freiburg (Breisgau), for the *Quarterly Journal of Economics* (pp. 28, 87 ff.), may soon inspire American sociologists to help his countrymen exploit the almost inexhaustible mine of suggestive thought contained in the volumes he has left us.

Very broadly speaking, Weber may be said to have hailed, as to the empirical side of his work, from the institutionalism of Schmoller; as to its philosophical side, however, from the so-called "Southwestern school of German philosophy," that, under the leadership of Windelband and Rickert, had begun to enlarge the old system of classical logics so that it should embrace the logical foundations of the more recent historical and social sciences. On both sides, I think, he went far beyond what he found. Instead of merely insisting, as most of the Southwesterners have done, on what they conceived to be the hard and fast borderline between the generalizing natural sciences and the individualizing mental or cultural sciences, he inquired after the possibilities of a border district between the two. Indeed, what dissatisfied him in most of the average sociological generalizations was not so much, as with other philosophers, the theoretical ambition, but the lack of such ambition. Beyond the external and statistical or (as you would say) behavioristic regularities of institutionalism he strove to reach a level of the social process to which he might apply an "understand-

ing" sociology. But again the undoubted rationalist character of this program must by no means be pressed to exclude the subterranean ranges of irrational social motivation. On the contrary, while Marxian materialism had still shown a lingering rationalist tendency of the Voltairean type to explain things spiritual from conscious motives of self-interest, Weber's most famous achievement consisted in turning the tables upon the economic interpretation of history by showing, in the example first of Calvinism and later of other world-religions, the reverse action of religious forces molding economic organizations.

As to his favorite methodical instrument, the construction of "ideal types" of institutions and processes, I should also like to caution against playing it out too directly against either the conception of sociological or historical laws or a realist interpretation of economic theory. Every line of his books shows he was a firm believer in social "determinism," merely demanding that a social problem be described and "understood" in all its material and mental complexity before the quintessence of underlying "laws" be distilled from it. So that his "ideal type," far from revealing any mystical qualities, comes to much the same as the idea of "pattern" so much used in modern English and American psychological and physiological theory. The whole rigor of Weber's positivism (if I may use that expression) shines very forcibly out of his well-known struggle against the "value-judgment" in social science. To understand the bitterness of his attack it is not sufficient to think, as is often too one-sidedly done, of the happy-go-lucky way in which Schmoller and the German institutionalists had sometimes drawn practical political conclusions from their theoretical results. That, after all, was only a shortcut on the way to a legitimate aim. More important it is, I believe, that Weber was the first non-socialist German thinker to part company resolutely and inexorably with the cheap and not often disinterested ideologies that lay thinly covered under the veil of much of the German "idealism" of his time. It was what made the flower of Germany's youth flock to his teaching in the war and after the revolution, and surely we all had to pass through some such purgatory before we could win a juster appreciation (less full itself of the deprecated "value judgment") of the inevitable place of values in social theory.

If it will probably take many workers to exploit and adapt the work of Max Weber, that of Ferdinand Tönnies of Kiel, for some years now President of the German Sociological Society, is so deeply ingrained in the thought of the last generation in my country that its results are common property and new thinking in its field has moved rather by interpreting than by superseding it. It is usually summed up in the title of Tönnies' classical book, first published in 1887 and since run into four editions, *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft* (*Community and Association*), i.e., the contrast of the two successive stages of social development leading up to modern capitalism and the criticism of its socialist opponents. Weber leaves his readers without a clue, not only to social values, but (and perhaps consequently) also to social systems. Tönnies provides one of the very simplest by pointing to the important direction in which the progress of social organization is driven by the unfolding of social consciousness; but the fact that he is today claimed as a sort of Heros Eponymos both by socialist and conservative writers shows how careful we must be of oversimplifying his clue. Surely when he points to the dissolving process changing primitive and generally precapitalist community into capitalist association, he follows (and he himself has granted that) Karl Marx in his powerful rejection of the Spencerian value-judgment that conversely extolled the conscious and the rational over the primitive and the irrational. But as surely he does not let the matter end there. More important for him than criticizing the principle of modern society is studying its antecedent, the principle of "community," and here his indebtedness (as he again acknowledges) is less to Marx than to Sir Henry Maine's theory of the relation between status and contract. Only where Maine's decisive insight into the peculiarities of a régime of status, of habitual and traditional social organization, was chiefly derived from the tribal customs of non-European peoples, Tönnies' "community" principle was meant to apply first and foremost to the broad and deep understructure of traditional life on which European rational civilization itself rests, from which it probably draws its best forces, and which accordingly might be capable of healing the deadening and emptying influences of its counterpart, the "association" or contract principle.

The immense echo that responded to the work of Tönnies, es-

pecially in after-war Germany, you will understand only by attending to this double aspect of the theory of community and association. It was socialism without its bitterness and negativeness, conservatism without its self-interest or aestheticism, and yet all this not the product of weak compromise or eclecticism, but unmistakably pervaded by the spirit of the great liberalism of our "classical" age that, sure of the last values of humanity, revered the traditional mostly for its human sides and therefore did not despair of the march of the rational, for all the deserts it led through. In this attitude there was at the same time a hidden sense of proportion between the bodily and mental elements of society that appealed very much to a generation that had grown weary of the eternal contrast between official ideologies and oppositional materialisms. Precisely at this point new succor was to arrive in the sociological writings of Max Scheler.

Having pointed out the deep philosophical background of all German sociology, I need not enlarge upon the fateful part played in it by the predominance in modern Germany of one great school of philosophy, viz., that of Kantian idealism. Besides, you have a measure for it yourselves in the Kantian influences upon American philosophy. The famous subjective turn the speculation of Kant had given to all modern knowledge and thought was as great an achievement as modern experimentalism at a particular epoch of the history of the occidental mind, and I have already mentioned Simmel as an instance of the critical and co-ordinating force of this subjectivism in German sociology. Only, as is indicated by the constant struggle of Western empiricism against Kantian domination, the critical turning of the question of knowledge back upon the mind of the questioner may harden into a new dogmatism regardless of being taught even by the most undeniable of facts. Thus any tendencies that counteracted the absolute rule of the Kantian school or schools came to be of special importance for German sociology, and more particularly for its relations with Western experimentalism. Such tendencies sprang from two different sources. One was the philosophy that Wilhelm Dilthey developed out of a curious and very fruitful blending of the methods of modern historiography and modern experimental psychology. Although opposed to a particular science of sociology such as he saw Simmel

build on Kantian foundations, he is ever to be remembered as one of the real fathers of German sociology on account of the entirely unprejudiced liberalism with which he shifted the question of the mental a priori from the absolute to the relative and historical sense. He thereby originated the great branch of our science which we today call the sociology of knowledge.

On the other hand, there were the mighty substructures of medieval philosophy that had never been quite effaced by Kantianism. Comprising not only the scholastic fundamentals of Roman Catholic theology, but in fact the whole tradition of Aristotelian empiricism, they were bound to become a source of new life to German philosophy in general, and German sociology especially, in the situation just indicated. Catholic Austria, in opposition to Protestant Prussia, was the seat of this scholastico-Aristotelian tradition; and Franz Brentano, the brother of Lujo Brentano, the economist, was its great author and teacher. His school has now reached its greatest splendor in the phenomenological method of Edmund Husserl; but right from its beginnings, when Brentano himself greeted Auguste Comte as a serious contribution to modern thought, it far surpassed the neo-Kantians and even Dilthey in its understanding and sympathy for the ways of Western empiricism. Out of these surroundings has grown the sociological work of Max Scheler (see chiefly *Schriften zur Soziologie und Weltanschauungslehre* [Leipzig, 1923 f], 4 vols., and *Die Wissensformen und die Gesellschaft, ibid.*, 1926). What I have ventured to call the national problem of German sociology, the co-ordination of cultural value and social determination, is here grasped most powerfully at its root, because the mutual interdependence of the two, hitherto studied pre-eminently in the objective processes of society, is for the first time seen to contain the key for an answer to Simmel's question of the possibility of social knowledge.

Characteristically, Scheler's starting-point is Comte's law of the three phases of the development of the human mind, that first attempt at explaining social movement not merely by the change of institutional systems but by the dependence of these systems on systems of mental attitude. Scheler succeeds in showing that this law is itself the product of such a mental attitude, that of scientific and mechanistic nineteenth-century society, and that Comte's three

determinative principles—religion, metaphysics, and "positive" science—instead of being subordinated in a chain of development, ought to be co-ordinated in a parallelism of fundamental and unchanging needs of the mind. I cannot here enter upon the new shape assumed under this aspect by the old controversies of historical materialism, where Scheler's theory of the social process as composed of spiritual "determinants" and material "catalyzers" (*Realisationsfaktoren*) seems at last to reconcile the inheritance of German idealism with that of Karl Marx. Even less can be said of his construction of a new triad of social phases, passing from racial through political to economic organization. Nor is this what matters in a broad view of sociological progress in my country. What does matter is that Scheler's sociology has first let into an atmosphere poisoned by the clash of biassed idealisms and materialisms the fresh air of a philosophy that takes both the concepts of mind and those of matter deeply enough to replace their superficial conflicts by an understanding of their fundamental intertwinings.

Scheler occupies a symbolical place in German academic life. He is a professor of philosophy and sociology in the University of Cologne, which is the youngest of German universities, resting on the one hand upon one of the broadest and most elaborate German faculties of economics and political science, and on the other continuing the name of the older University of Cologne from the Middle Ages down to the close of the *ancien régime*, a bulwark of Roman Catholic, and especially Jesuitical, teaching. The Cologne Institute of Sociology is the first teaching and research institution of its kind in my country, and edits the first scientific journal exclusively dedicated to the subject, the *Kölner Vierteljahrshefte für Soziologie* (1921 ff.). It is, by the side of Scheler, ably managed by Professor Leopold von Wiese, who has come from political economy and is well-known as the founder of what he terms the "doctrine of relations" (*Beziehungslehre*), a method removed from the main body of German sociology in so far as it tries to keep off philosophical ground altogether and to proceed entirely on empirical lines, deducing a whole network of sociological categories chiefly from the data of contemporary life and fiction.

Looking over the wealth of suggestive contributions made by

dozens of special subjects to the central task of German sociology, an impartial observer cannot but see the advantages of the slowness with which this task has begun to constitute a separate academic discipline. Nor has, so far, the development in Germany been different from that in most parts of continental Europe or even in England. It is the number, thickness, and mixture of the layers of European civilization, as well as the checks of vested interests, that retarded the process of its self-conspection in the mirror of sociology. But of course that is what makes any other except the main features of the situation very difficult to report to, and be appreciated by foreign observers, and any attempt at a rounded-off account necessarily defective. So I may, with the risk of arbitrary selection, just mention in conclusion some of the sociological work done in the universities of Berlin and Heidelberg. At Berlin the traditions of Schmoller, Dilthey, and Simmel are to some extent continued by Kurt Breysig and Alfred Vierkandt, the former combining a broad knowledge of modern history with a keen interest in the ethnology of the primitive races, particularly of America, and just publishing the sum of his earlier research in a compendious *Sociology of History* (*Vom geschichtlichen Werden* [Stuttgart, 1925 f.], 2 vols.), the latter a trained ethnologist taking part from the outset in big questions of social inertia and progress, such as those raised by Tönnies. At Heidelberg Alfred Weber and the writer have followed the example of Max Weber and Othmar Spann, also of excellent sociological lawyers such as Hans Kelsen of Vienna and Karl Rothenbücher of Munich, in keeping the doors of political economy and political science open for communication with sociology as a science of principles. Weber, the younger brother of Max Weber, has above all labored the problem of what he calls "cultural sociology," i.e., of the regularity and continuity of the original and creative, as distinct from the technical and scientific sides of civilization, whereas the writer's work has been chiefly bestowed on the systematic questions of social psychology, such as the place of law and normative thinking generally in social consciousness and organization, and the diversity and unity of psychological activities with regard to their social functions.

RUSSIAN SOCIOLOGY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

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ABSTRACT

In the second half of the nineteenth century Russian sociology was very successfully progressing. The principal differences between the Russian sociology of the nineteenth and of the twentieth century are: a less speculative and more inductive character of the sociological works of the second period, and an appearance of new currents of sociological thought. The principal schools in sociology of the twentieth century are: the Marxian, the Subjective, the Psychological, the Behavioristic, the Formal, the Mechanistic, the Juridical, and the Historical schools. In all these schools, especially in the Behavioristic and the Psychological ones, there have been made valuable contributions to sociology. During the years of the Revolution sociological work has been greatly handicapped. Nevertheless the extraordinary experience of the Revolution has enriched the knowledge of the Russian social thinkers. As "the mechanical obstacles" to publication of sociological works in Russia are removed, it is possible to expect an intensive "flaring up" of Russian sociological thought.

I. RUSSIAN SOCIOLOGY IN THE SECOND HALF OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

Though up to the beginning of the twentieth century sociology was not offered under its own name in the Russian universities and colleges, nevertheless it was intensively cultivated outside of the Empire's educational institutions, as well as in the universities, under the names of "philosophy of history," "social foundations of economics," "introduction to a general theory of law," "social psychology," and so on. As a result the Russian sociology of that period was scarcely behind that in any other country. This is shown, first of all, by the prominent rôle played by a series of the Russian sociologists in the development of European sociology. The names of P. Lilienfeld, who published his fundamental work in Russian before H. Spencer's *Principles of Sociology;* of J. Novicow, P. Kropotkin, E. de Roberty, M. Kovalevsky, B. Kistiakovsky, L. Metchnikoff conspicuously show this. But these names are only a few among those of the many Russian sociologists whose works are not known outside of Russia, but are as valuable as the works of the foregoing sociologists. It is enough to mention N. K.

Mikhailovsky, who, several years before G. Tarde, and probably not less brilliantly than Tarde, developed his theory of suggestion-imitation, mob psychology, and psychology of crowd. Mikhailovsky also was one of the earliest and one of the deepest critics of the organismic theory of society, and of social Darwinism. It is enough further to mention the name of Danilevsky, who, already in 1869 in his *Russia and Europe,* laid down a theory which in all its substantial principles has been recently repeated (possibly without knowing Danilevsky's work) by Oswald Spengler. Engelgard's *Progress as an Evolution of Cruelty* is to be regarded as one of the most original and suggestive books in the field of a "realistic interpretation of social evolution." K. Leontieff's social philosophy set forth in his *Byzantinism and Slavs* can possibly rival the best works of J. de Maistre and Carlyle. The works of M. Kovalevsky, N. Kharouzin, Ephymenko, Ziber, Sergeevitch, and others were some of the best pioneer works in the field of early civilization and evolutionary sociology. The works of P. Lavroff, N. Kareeff, Iujakoff, and others built what is now known under the name of "psychological school in sociology." M. Tougan-Baranovsky, P. Struve, G. Plekhanoff, and in part V. Lenin, produced a series of valuable works in "the economic interpretation of history and social phenomena." V. Kluchevsky, A. Lappo-Danilevsky, N. Korkunoff, Chicherin, and other historians and theorizers of law contributed a great deal to juridical sociology or to sociology of law and ethics. These brief remarks are sufficient to show that in the nineteenth century sociology and social sciences generally were intensively and successfully promoted in Russia.[1]

II. RUSSIAN SOCIOLOGY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY[2]

ITS EXTERIOR SITUATION

Since approximately 1909, sociology, under its own name, began to be taught in a series of Russian colleges. The number of such colleges was progressively growing up to 1917. In 1917 so-

[1] See J. F. Hecker, *Russian Sociology* (New York: Columbia University, 1915). Hecker's work gives, though inadequate, a more detailed characterization of Russian sociology of the nineteenth century.

[2] A somewhat more detailed characterization of Russian sociology in the twentieth century is given in my paper, "Die Russische Soziologie im zwanzigsten

ciology began to be offered in many of the Russian universities. At the beginning of its career the Soviet government assumed a very favorable attitude toward sociology and tried to introduce it even into the secondary schools. The reason for such a policy was the Soviet government's assumption that sociology and Marxian socialism were about the same. Having learned that the assumption was wrong, and that sociology was taught by many of the professors along lines considerably different from Socialism and Communism, the government practically forbade sociology-teaching in the schools, discharged many sociologists, and, instead of sociology, ordered "drill" in so-called "political science," that is "the Marxian and Lenin's interpretation of history," "Communism," "history of Communism," "history of the Communist revolution," and "the constitution of the U.S.S.R." In this way sociology has been again expelled from the schools—at least formally—and is now in a position rather worse than it was before the revolution of 1917. Its place is now occupied by the foregoing "political science," called in Russia "Communist theology."

An increased interest in sociology on the part of the Russian educated groups since the beginning of the twentieth century called forth, besides many books and papers, a publication of special sociological monographs under the title of *New Ideas in Sociology*. Edited by M. Kovalevsky, E. de Roberty, and by the writer, the monographs were a substitute for a sociological journal. The death of Kovalevsky and de Roberty, and the world-war, put an end to the publication. After their death, in their memory, there was founded in 1916 the Russian Sociological Society, with a member of the Russian Academy of Science, A. S. Lappo-Danilevsky, as the president, and with the writer as the secretary of the Society. Many prominent Russian biologists, psychologists, historians, political scientists, and other scholars entered the membership of the Society. Unfortunately, the Revolution, the death of the president, and other factors interrupted the work of the Society at its be-

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Jahrhundert," *Jahrbuch f. Soziologie,* II Band (1926), pp. 462–83, translated into Ukrainian and published in the Ukrainian sociological journal, *Souspilstvo (Society),* Nos. III–IV (Prague, 1926). *Society* is a publication of the Ukrainian Sociological Institute in Prague, founded in 1925 by the Ukrainian-Russian emigrants from Soviet Russia.

ginning. In 1920 the work was "illegally" resumed, but imprisonment, banishment, and death of many of the leaders of the Society again interrupted its existence. Similar was the fate of another sociological society, the Society for an Objective Study of Human Behavior. It was started in 1921 with an Akademician, Ivan Pavlov, as the honorary president, and with the writer as the chairman. Owing to the conditions mentioned, the Society's work was interrupted at its very beginning. Furthermore, the Soviet's nationalization of almost all printing houses, and the severest censorship, introduced by the present government, have made physically impossible a publication of any sociological work which has not been a mere repetition of the "Communist and the Marxian theology." Such a situation continues to exist, in a somewhat milder form, up to the present. This is enough to show that today's exterior situation of the Russian sociology is far from being better than it was before the Revolution. In fact, it is much worse. This partly explains why, during the years of the Revolution so few non-Communist sociological works were published in Russia. So much for the exterior position of the Russian sociology in the twentieth century.

PRINCIPAL DIFFERENCES OF THE RUSSIAN SOCIOLOGY OF THE TWENTIETH FROM THAT OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

They are as follows: first, the sociological works of the twentieth century as compared with those of the nineteenth century have become less philosophical and less general; second, their methods of study have tended to be less and less speculative; third, the popularity of the sociological schools of "economic interpretation of history" and of "the Russian subjective sociology" dominant in the previous period, began to go down; fourth, the various currents of sociological thought have increased in number; fifth, there have appeared new sociological schools, with new leaders who did not play a conspicuous rôle in the preceding period.

PRINCIPAL SOCIOLOGICAL SCHOOLS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

1. *The Marxian school.*—At the end of the nineteenth century this school produced several valuable works like G. Plekhanoff's *A Monistic Interpretation of History,* M. Tougan-Baranovsky's

Periodical Industrial Crises, P. Struve's *The Destinies of Capitalism in Russia,* and so on. In the twentieth century the school's creative power went down. Possibly the most serious work of that period is Professor Solntzeff's *Social Classes* (1917), a monograph devoted to a survey and analysis of the concept of social class. Since the Communist Revolution there have been published an immense number of various Marxian sociological works; but all these "Communist theologies" amount to nothing from a scientific standpoint. Even N. Boukharin's *A Marxian Sociology,* which is possibly the most valuable work among all the Communist sociological publications, contributes very little new, either to an economic interpretation of history or to sociology generally. The Marxian sociology in Russia degenerated into a kind of a dogmatical theology and is innerly dead.

2. *Russian subjective sociology.*—Being very near to L. Ward's psychological sociology, this school made many a valuable contribution to sociology in the nineteenth century. In the twentieth century it also began to show a decrease of its creativeness. Nevertheless several valuable works have come from it. Among them the most important are J. Delevsky's *Social Antagonisms* and E. Kolosoff's *The Principles of a Simple and a Complex Co-operation according to N. Mikhailovsky.* Delevsky's book represents a systematic analysis of the concept, the forms, the causes, and the effects of social antagonisms. As far as I know, it is probably the most complete and systematic monograph in this field in the sociological literature of all countries. Kolosoff's work develops Mikhailovsky's theory of "the technical" and "the social division of labour." The author analyzes their forms among various societies, criticizes Simmel's and Durkheim's corresponding theories, studies the effects of both forms of social differentiation, and pleads for a social reconstruction on the basis of "the simple" co-operation. With the exception of the last part of the work it is valuable and suggestive.

3. *Petrajitzky's psychological sociology.*—"Psychological sociology" in the sense of Tarde's, L. Ward's, C. H. Cooley's, F. Giddings', or E. A. Ross's and C. A. Ellwood's sociological principles was embodied in the works of E. de Roberty, Mikhailovsky, P.

Lavroff, N. Kareef, V. Lesevitch, W. Chernoff, and of many others in the Russian sociology of the nineteenth century. Quite different from it is "the psychological sociology" founded by L. Petrajitzky, formerly (up to 1917) a professor of general theory of law at the University of St. Petersburg, now a professor at the University of Warsaw and a vice-president of the International Institute of Sociology. Having begun his scientific activity with his volume, *Lehre vom Einkommen,* in which, among other things, Petrajitzky set forth a theory later on developed by R. Stammler in his *Wirtschaft und Recht,* Petrajitzky, in his later works, *Essays in a Philosophy of Law, Introduction to the Theory of Law and Ethics, A Theory of Law and Ethics* (2 vols.), revised fundamentally the principles of logics, of scientific methodology, and of psychology. It would scarcely be an exaggeration to say that from the standpoint of scientific methodology his mentioned works are among the few important treatises published after J. S. Mill's *Logic.* As a result of such a revision, Petrajitzky created his own "emotional psychology," and, on its basis, his own interpretation of social phenomena, of law, of ethics, of social organization, and of social processes. In a few words it is impossible to give an idea of Petrajitzky's theory. I can only say that it is quite original, extraordinarily logical, and, at the same time quite factual and inductive. And what is more important, it "works" in an analysis of the most complex and concrete social phenomena. Unlike too many psychological sociologists, Petrajitzky not only outlined the fundamentals of his theory, but, with its help, has given a real "psychological anatomy" of the phenomena of law, of ethics, of association, of state, and of social organization in its various forms. Further, perhaps more clearly than anybody else, he has shown a psychological mechanism of social processes. The extraordinary value of his works is responsible for the immense influence of his theory upon the Russian social and political scientists, upon philosophers, psychologists, economists, and theorizers of law and ethics. The same value is responsible for an appearance of "Petrajitzky's school "in jurisprudence, sociology, political science, and psychology. The Revolution forced Petrajitzky to leave Russia; many of his pupils have been dispersed throughout Russia or imprisoned or banished (though Petrajitzky

himself, as well as his followers, in no way belonged to the old régime); in this way the work of the school has been interrupted. Nevertheless, there are all reasons to expect that in the future the work will be resumed; the theory belongs to the type of the scientific contributions whose influence is long and durable.

4. *Russian behavioristic school.*—As it is known, modern behaviorism in psychology originated in Russia through the works of Ivan Pavlov and, partly, V. Bechtereff, and Pavlov's pupils (Boldyreff, Krasnogorsky, Orbelli, Zeleny, Froloff, Lenz, Zavadsky, Anrep, Babkin, Arkhangelsky, Voskresensky, Deriabin, Foursikoff, Zytovitch, Krestovnikova, Makovsky, Petrova, and others). Beginning with a study of relatively simple physiological processes, Pavlov and his followers have gradually passed to the experimental study of more and more complex nervous processes among animals, and finally among human beings. As a result they have formulated the basic laws of the "unconditioned" and "conditioned" responses, and the laws of "inhibition," "stimulation," "extinction," "inculcation," "reconditioning," and "transformation" of the forms of behavior. The most valuable results obtained by the school naturally have stimulated its representatives to apply its methods to the study of social phenomena. As a result we have Dr. Zeleny's sketch of a "social physiology,"[3] V. Bechtereff's, K. Korniloff's, and M. N. Lapinsky's attempts to interpret social phenomena from the behavioristic viewpoint,[4] Savitch's and Vasilieff's behavioristic sociology of mental phenomena,[5] W. Wagner's "Bio-Psychology,"[6] and P. Sorokin's two volumes of *A System of a Behavioristic Sociology, Influence of Food-Factor on Human Behavior, Social*

[3] Zeleny, "Über die zukunftige Sozio-Physiologie," *Arch. f. Rassen- und Gesellschaftsbiologie* (1912), pp. 405–30.

[4] V. Bekhtereff, *General Foundations of Reflexology* (Russian), 1918; *Collective Reflexology* (Russian), 1921; K. N. Korniloff, *Theory of Man's Reactions* (Russian), 1922; M. N. Lapinsky, *Development of Personality in a Woman* (Russian), 1915.

[5] V. V. Savitch, *An Attempt of a Behavioristic Interpretation of a Process of Mental Creative Activity* (Russian), in Krasnaia Nov.—, 1922, No. 4; I. Vasillieff, *Studies in Mind's Physiology* (Russian), 1923.

[6] W. Wagner, *Biological Foundations of Comparative Psychology* (Russian), 2 vols., 1913.

Processes, and Social Organization, and *The Sociology of Revolution,*[7] to mention only some of the works of this school.[8]

In spite of some differences in the severity of an application of the behavioristic principles to the study of social phenomena, all these works have some common characteristics which may be styled the characteristics of the Russian behavioristic school in sociology. They may be summed up as follows: First, a concentration of scientific attention on the study of those social phenomena which are repeating in time and space (sociological "constants"). Second, a thorough objective, and, where it is possible, an experimental and quantitative method of their study. Third, in view of the great flexibility of human speech-reactions (and ideologies), in view of the fact that they are often only a "minor reaction" in human behavior, in view of their unreliability to serve as an adequate basis for a study of real human behavior or of real social process—in view of these and similar reasons, the school intentionally tries to disregard them in a study of social phenomena, at least at the beginning of such a study. Only when other objective data are studied thoroughly they may be taken into consideration. Contrariwise, they may be misleading and in fact are very often misleading. This may explain why, in the opinion of many of the representatives of this school, a great many historical, sociological, political, and other works are quite unsatisfactory. Being based principally on "the speech-reaction material" (of a historical personality, of the writers of the epoch, of various letters, "speech-reaction questionnaires," and so on), such works, as a rule, are fallacious and unscientific. Fourth, a complete expulsion from a scientific study of all evaluative judgments and concepts (of what is good and bad, useful and harmful, moral and unmoral, "progressive" and "reactionary," "just" and "unjust," and so on). Fifth, such an application of

[7] Sorokin, *Systema soziologii* (Russian), 2 vols., 1920–21. *Influence of Food-Factor,* in Russian, was to be published in 1922, but in the process of printing was destroyed by the Soviet Government. All that the author has left from the book of about 600 pages is 252 pages of its proofs and two chapters published in the *Russian Ekonomist* in 1922, *The Sociology of Revolution,* Phil, 1925.

[8] See the bibliography of Pavlov school's experimental studies, in I. Pavlov, *Twenty Years of an Objective Study of the Nervous Activity of Animals* (*Dvadzati aletniy opyt obiektivnago isouchenia vysshey nervnoy deiatelnosty jivotnykh*), Petrograd, 1923.

the behavioristic principles as would not be a mere terminological alteration of various subjective concepts (which is quite common in a great many "pseudo-behavioristic" works in psychology and sociology, and quite useless scientifically), but would be a real behavioristic analysis of the phenomena studied. Where such an analysis is impossible, it is better not to apply behaviorist methods and terminology; not to deceive the investigator himself and other people. From the foregoing one may see that the school proceeds carefully and systematically in its work. It has already found a vivid response from a series of the young sociologists in Russia. There are all reasons to expect its development in the future, when the conditions of Russia are more normal. This school and Petrajitzky's school are probably the most important currents of sociological thought in Russia from a purely scientific standpoint. Because of lack of space I must be brief in my survey of other sociological schools to some extent represented in Russia.

5. *Other schools.*—Among them may be mentioned K. M. Takhtareff's *The Science of Social Life* (1920), which combines the principles of Simmel's formal sociology with that of an economic interpretation of social processes. Also akin to Simmel's principles of sociology is S. Frank's sketch of sociology published in his *Philosophy and Life* (1909). A. Gwirzman attempted, in his book, *Sociology of K. Marx and L. Ward in Their Relationship* (1911), to combine synthetically K. Marx's and L. Ward's sociological principles. A. Zvonitzkaia, in her book *Social Bond* (1913), gave a very careful analysis of what F. Giddings would style "like-mindedness" (its essence, factors of its origin, growth, and disintegration) from the standpoint of E. de Roberty's "bio-social hypothesis." Voronoff, in his *Foundations of Sociology* (1910), has tried to interpret social phenomena from the standpoint of "social mechanics" or "social physics" set forth by the great thinkers of the seventeenth century and more recently outlined by H. Carey, L. Winiarsky, E. Solvey, Haret, Portuendo y Barcelo, and by some others. An outstanding contribution to "mechanistic sociology" is made by E. Spektorsky in his monumental work: *The Problem of Social Physics in the Seventeenth Century,* Vol. I, 1910, Vol. II, 1917.

6. *"Sociologization" of jurisprudence, political science, and economics.*—Besides the foregoing sociological works there have been published many valuable works in the field of economics and political and juridical sciences. Treatment of the problems of these disciplines has been becoming more and more sociological and less and less "formal" in corresponding treatises. As a result the fundamental problems of sociology have been carefully analyzed in them and many of these works may be regarded as valuable courses in sociology. Such, for instance are J. Pokrovsky's *Principal Problems of Civil Law,* B. Kistiakovski's *Social Sciences and Law,* P. Novgorodtzeff's *Contemporary Crisis of Jurisprudence,* and *Theory of Social Ideal,* E. Trubetzkoy's and I. Taranovsky's *Encyclopedias of Law,* N. I. Lazarevski's *Russian Constitutional Law,* and so on. Among these works should be mentioned also the *Ethics* of P. Kropotkin, unfinished on account of his death.

The second field of jurisprudence in which there have been made many sociological contributions has been that of criminal law and criminology. The works of M. Gernet, N. Chubinsky, A. Jijilenko, N. Rosin, Drill, Posnysheff, P. Sorokin, and many others have contributed considerably to the science of human conduct, to the problem of factors of criminality, and to the clarification of such forms of social relationship as social prestige and dignity, social shame, social honor, and so forth.

Similar has been the trend within the field of economics. Such fundamental works as Tougan-Baranovsky's *Principles of Political Economy, Theoretical Foundations of Marxism, Social Foundations of Co-operation,* P. Struve's *Economy and Price,* A. Bilimovitch's *Theory of Value,* S. Solntzeff's *A Theory of Distribution,* and many other works are essentially sociological in their character and represent valuable contributions.

7. *Sociological methodology.*—In the field of the methodology of social sciences also many important works have been published. Especially valuable among them are A. Lappo-Danilevsky's *Methodology of History* (3 vols.), N. Kareeff's *Methodology of History* and *Historical Typology,* A. Shpett's *History as a Science.* The works of A. A. Tchuproff in the field of a statistical study of social phenomena deserve special mentioning. His *Essays in the Theory*

of Statistics (1909) and his subsequent works in the field of mathematical statistics and quantitative study of social causation, published during the last few years abroad (he also had to leave Russia), have been so valuable that the Royal Statistical Society of Great Britain and several other societies elected him to honorary membership. Keynes styled his works as an "epoch-making" contribution.

8. *Treatises in general sociology.*—The most important work in this field is M. Kovalevsky's *Sociology* (2 vols., 1910) and his *Contemporary Sociologists* (1905). The first volume of the *Sociology* discusses fundamental problems of sociology; the second one, origin and evolution of principal social institutions (economic organization, religion, law and morals, family and marriage, arts, and so on). *Contemporary Sociologists* is a survey and criticism of principal sociological theories of the present time (G. Tarde, F. Giddings, M. Baldwin, Gumplowicz, Ratzenhofer, B. Kidd, Bouglé, Durkheim, M. Vaccaro, Ammon, Lapouge, Matteuzi, Lévy-Brühl, A. Coste, Simmel, K. Marx, and others). It is somewhat similar to P. Barth's *Die Philosophie der Geschichte als Soziologie,* but much better in its critical part. It possibly is still the most substantial critical analysis of the leading sociological theories in the literature of sociology of all countries. Somewhat similar to Kovalevsky's book is the *Sociology* of Professor Khvostov (1917). Its second volume is unfinished on the account of the suicide of the author in 1918, caused by the Soviet régime. Later on there were published a series of ignorant Communist sociological textbooks. But, with the exception of the before-mentioned book by Boukharin,[1] they have no scientific value.

9. *Social philosophies and philosophies of history.*—During the last few years there has been published by the Russian scholars who are abroad a series of works which may be styled "social philosophies." Some of them are near to what now is styled in Germany "meaning sociology" (Spranger, Th.Litt, partly M. Weber, and others). Some others in their principles remind one partly of J. de Maistre's and De Bonald's theories, partly of the works of Oswald Spengler, Keyzerling, and of this type of thinkers. Almost all these works show an antipositivist attitude. They contain also

a deep and thoughtful criticism of the principles of Western civilization. Side by side with this there are many interesting and sweeping generalizations. From a purely scientific viewpoint they have many shortcomings. Several of their conclusions are obviously questionable. On the other hand, they are extraordinarily suggestive, stimulating, and free from that "intellectual chewing-gum" which is so common in various "positivistic" books in sociology. As examples of this category of works I may mention S. Frank's *Downfall of the Idols* (of fundamental values of contemporary Western civilization), N. Berdiaeff's *The Logics of History* and *The Philosophy of Inequality,* N. Karsavin's *Philosophy of History,* S. Boulgakoff's *Philosophy of Economics,* P. Struve's *Reflections on the Revolution,* and, finally, the publications of the "Eurasians," who try to show that Asiatic culture is not inferior to the culture of the Western World, that Russia is a whole continent in which are synthetically combined the components of the European and of the Asiatic cultures (hence "Eur-Asia"), and that the future history of Russia is to be neither an imitation of the "decaying culture of Europe" nor a return to the culture of Asia, but a synthetic transformation of the valuable components of both cultures.

10. *Conclusion.*—The foregoing gives a very schematic and incomplete picture of Russian sociology in the twentieth century. Nevertheless it may show that sociology there has been progressing and growing. Having always been in the closest contact with the European and the American sociological thought, and having taken from them their valuable contributions, at the same time Russian sociology has been an independent and original product of Russian sociological thought, whose contributions to world-sociology have been very considerable. At the present moment, owing to a lack of freedom of thought and technical means of publication, sociological work within Soviet Russia is greatly handicapped. Nevertheless, I have no doubt that such a situation is temporary. The country is coming back, and normal conditions are being re-established. Sooner or later the existing unlimited censorship of the government will have to be abolished. As soon as these obstacles are put down, there are serious reasons to expect an extraordinary revival of Russian sociology. Even now there are

many valuable works prepared for publication as soon as the mentioned obstacles are removed. The crucificial experience of the Revolution has not passed in vain for those who survived it. It has greatly enriched and stimulated the thought of its observers. Through an extraordinary combination of conditions the Revolution has given an opportunity to verify many sociological assumptions on the one hand; on the other, to observe human beings and social processes under conditions which do not exist in a normal society. It is not surprising, therefore, that within the present Russia an unseen and most intensive revision of the fundamental principles of social science and a ripening of new sociological theories are going on now. It is probable that in the future they may result in a sudden "flaring up" of Russian sociology. Such a "flaring up" has happened many times after great revolutions; it is likely to happen also in the case of the Russian Revolution.

THE DEVELOPMENT AND PRESENT TENDENCIES OF SOCIOLOGY IN ARGENTINA[1]

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The subject matter of Argentine sociology, considered from the standpoint of its development, falls into three fairly well-defined periods, which necessarily overlap each other: (1) the preliminary period extending from 1837, the year in which the *Credo* of the "Young Argentine" group was drawn up, until the death of Echeverria in 1851; (2) the period of historical and particularistic theories of the interpretation of Argentine social institutions and individual traits, beginning with the publication of Sarmiento's *Facundo, or Civilization and Barbarism* in 1845 and extending to the end of the century, and (3) the period of special scientific studies of selected periods or phases of Argentine society on the one hand and of attempts at a general or systematic sociology on the other hand, falling within the last thirty years. Each of these types of sociological emphasis extends into the succeeding stage, but tends to diminish in relative importance. Within these several major divisions there is also a variety of secondary tendencies.

[1] To be published in full in *Social Forces*.

DIVISION ON SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

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ABSTRACT

The development of social psychology.—Social Psychology has come forward during the last few years as a subject of recognized academic and scientific importance. This is particularly evident in this country. The recent development of social psychology has, however, left social-psychological theory in a rather disorganized state. As we know it today, social psychology is a complex product with a bipolar basis in the study of social life and individual behavior. Because of the background of individualistic thought upon which it began to take form, social psychology got its first impulse from the side of the study of social life. This direction of social-psychological development is represented by folk psychology and modern sociology, especially psychological sociology. The development of social psychology from the side of the study of individual behavior has come into view more recently. It is represented by the rise into prominence of modern instinct psychology on the one hand, and by the development of "interaction" social psychology in this country on the other. On the basis of these and related more recently defined standpoints, social psychology has so far been carrying on broad generalization and constructive criticism rather than specific and detailed investigation. It is, however, necessarily beginning to enter upon this more careful development of its theory at the present time.

The last few years have brought social psychology forward as a subject of recognized academic and scientific importance. The advance which social psychology has recently made in this respect is particularly notable in this country. It was only with the appearance of the two systematic treatises by Ross and McDougall, in 1908, that social psychology began to attract any considerable attention here. In 1904 Professor Ellwood expressed gratification that social psychology was recognized at all in the program of the International Congress of Arts and Science to the extent of having been given place in one of the section meetings on sociology.[1] And even as late as 1916 Dewey was sounding a plea on "The Need for Social Psychology" before the psychologists of the country.[2] Today, however, social psychology is established as a recognized field of endeavor alongside of general psychology on the one hand and

[1] *Proceedings, International Congress of Arts and Science,* V, 859.

[2] *Psychological Review,* XXIV (1917), 266–76.

general sociology on the other; it has a secure place in college and university curricula; a rapidly expanding specialized literature to which both psychology and sociology are contributing; and a growing popularity which fairly threatens its scientific balance at this time when it is just beginning to enter upon a career of more careful scientific development.

But this recent development of social psychology, as may well be expected, has left social-psychological theory in a rather chaotic state. There has as yet been very little co-ordination in the field, and most writers have presented their particular conception or theory more or less in isolation from the rest of the developing field. As a result we are confronted at the present time with a somewhat confusing array of distinct and even conflicting standpoints and positions. The mere mention of such terms as folk psychology, crowd psychology, instinct psychology, suggestion, imitation, collective representations, conditioned reflex, habit, attitude, interest, desire, *gestalt,* is enough to recall this condition of affairs to anyone who has even a moderate acquaintance with the field. An examination of the current conceptions of the scope, outlook, purpose, methods, and relations of social psychology would similarly reveal the situation.

A recent work on psychology came out under the suggestive title of *Psychologies of 1925.* Were a similar work to be prepared for the field of social psychology, it would almost be necessary to give place to as many types as there are writers in the field. In short, there are at the present time a considerable number of social psychologies, but as yet very little established or generally accepted social psychology.

That is why it is difficult at the present time to make a brief survey of the development of social psychology adequately representative of the whole field. Social psychology is still largely a matter of distinct "schools" and "standpoints," and even of disconnected individual contributions to social psychological theory. To follow out the connections of these various individual developments would take us over a large part of modern psychological and psychosocial thought. For modern social psychology has been intimately a part, not only of the progress of modern thought in the

fields of psychology and sociology, but also in such related fields as cultural anthropology, psychopathology, general evolutionary thought, etc. All that can be attempted here, therefore, is the enumeration of certain basic currents of modern social-psychological development, and the relation, in a very general way, of the field of social-psychological theory as it has thus been constituted, to the pressing problems of verification and synthesis which confront it today.

It may be said that the first systematic attempt to build up a "social" psychology, in contradistinction to the individualistic general psychology which had held more or less undisputed ground during the early nineteenth century, was made by the folk-psychologists. From the founding of the *Zeitung für Völkerpsychologie und Spraachwissenschaft* in 1860 by Lazarus and Steinthal to Wundt, it was the aim of the folk-psychologists to develop a "social" psychology alongside of, and supplementary to, the current general psychology.

The conception of social psychology which the folk-psychologists sought to work out resulted chiefly, it is true, in culture history rather than in social psychology as we know it today. Folk psychology has accordingly become more closely identified with anthropology than with social psychology as specialized fields of investigation. Furthermore, during the early period when we are most concerned with folk psychology as a direct factor in the modern social-psychological movement, it was dominated by the presuppositions of Hegelian philosophy and the individualistic conceptions of introspective psychology, to an extent which has kept it apart from the main current of modern social psychological development in France, England, and in this country. Nevertheless, folk psychology has had some important results for modern social psychology as a whole. In the first place, folk psychology brought conspicuous support to the growing dissatisfaction with the traditional purely individualistic psychology and to the resulting interest in the study of human phenomena from more adequate social standpoints. Then, folk psychology was on fundamental social-psychological ground in its attempt to relate the objective elements of culture with the mental development of the individual. In addi-

tion, folk psychology was not only a factor in the modern social-psychological movement, because, like cultural anthropology and sociology generally, it was helping to bring the social aspect of psychosocial life more clearly into view, but also because its analysis had a distinct psychosocial, rather than a merely psychological, reference. It thus sought to concern itself with the cultural significance of such collective mental phenomena as it designated by the terms "folk," "people," "group mind," "social consciousness," "collective will," etc., phenomena which have ever since occupied psychosocial thought, and the subsequent investigation of which must be looked upon as a leading factor in the differentiation of modern social psychology. In all these ways, then, folk psychology introduced a challenging social and collectivistic emphasis into its work, which must thereby be recognized as one of the sources of modern social-psychological agitation and development.

The social-psychological aspects of folk psychology were supplemented by the early sociological students of social organization, especially in Germany and Austria. The term "social psychology" was first widely used by the latter group of students. It was Schäffle, specifically, who first gave wide currency to this term in his *Bau und Leben des sozialen Körpers* (1875–78), where he used it co-ordinately with the terms "social morphology" and "social physiology" in connection with his analogical treatment of society.

The standpoint of early sociology was definitely "objective" in the special sociological sense, rather than psychological. Its analysis of society, essentially in objective institutional and group terms, corresponded in general, in so far as social psychology is concerned, to the analysis of the individual mind by introspective psychology. Both are logically more or less distinct from social psychology, which came into being primarily as an attempt to bridge these two fields of investigation and which is characteristically psychosocial in its procedure therefore. Because of the background of individualistic thought upon which social psychology began to take form, the analysis of the objective social environment was, however, historically a necessary step in the development of social psychology. The connection between sociology and social psychology has therefore been very close from the beginning; and German sociology in

particular, with its insistance on the "group" approach and its emphasis upon the reality of the "social," must thereby be noted as an important factor in bringing the need of a social psychology into recognition. Of greater consequence in this respect than Schäffle's analogical "social psychology" are the less imposing but more substantial contributions to the group analysis of psychosocial life which have been made by Ratzenhofer, Gumplowicz, and, more especially for the purposes of this review, by Simmel.

Much more important, however, for the direct advance of social psychology was the development of modern psychological sociology in France and in this country. To the psychosocial theories of Tarde, Durkheim, LeBon and Lévy-Bruhl must be attributed much of the forceful impulse of the modern social psychological movement, both as regards social-psychological criticism of individualistic psychological theory as well as regards its more constructive attempts to build up a more adequate orientation of psychosocial interpretation.

Certainly the widespread interest and discussion which these theories stimulated could hardly have been called forth by the less spectacular development of social-psychological thought elsewhere. And in order to force a hearing during the early period of its development, social psychology needed just such spectacular support. There is no question here of the validity of the special theories in terms of which these writers sought to present such basic psychosocial phenomena as custom, convention, control, constraint, etc. The consideration of importance here as regards the development of social psychology is that their treatment of these phenomena brought the rôle of psychosocial interaction so forcefully into evidence that their influence expressed itself in a wave of heightened social-psychological interest, which leads directly into the modern period of more systematic concern with social psychology.

Nowhere, moreover, has the influence of these writers been more fruitful for the advance of social-psychological thought than in this country. Social psychology as it is represented here by such works as Ross's *Social Psychology* and his *Social Control,* by Sumner's *Folkways,* to some extent by Baldwin's *Social and Ethical Interpretations,* and, even though less directly, by Ellwood's *Intro-*

duction to Social Psychology, which came considerably later, is largely a development of the direction of psychosocial analysis which they so prominently brought into view. And these works are in turn intimately a part of the other type of social psychology which has become so popular in this country since the appearance of Cooley's *Human Nature and the Social Order* (1902), and which it is necessary to bring into relation with the general trend of social-psychological development to be described below.

So far, social psychology was receiving a one-sided development from the side of the study of social life. Social psychology was practically a synonym for psychological sociology. From this one-sided development social psychology was recalled by the rise into prominence of instinct psychology on the one hand and by the development of the genetic study of personal growth on the other. In the first connection, besides the basic work of Darwin, Spencer, and Bagehot, the more specific social-psychological formulations of McDougall, Shand, Trotter, and Wallas stand out; in the second connection, it is necessary to mention, besides James's suggestive treatment of the "social self," especially the work of Baldwin, Cooley, Dewey, Mead, and Thomas, to say nothing of the growing number of their notable more recent followers in this country.

The central impulse for the development of instinct psychology in its modern form came from early English evolutionary thought with its biological emphasis and its phylogenetic outlook, in the light of which the study of the hereditary bases of behavior loomed as the problem of central importance in the investigation of human conduct, while the latter trend of thought has developed almost entirely in this country. It has resulted in the formulation of a point of view with which we are most familiar here, and which might by contrast be termed "interaction" psychology, or rather "interaction" *social* psychology, since it ought to be made evident that this point of view is distinctively and emphatically social in its emphasis.

Instinct psychology, it is today generally recognized even by its severest recent critics, was a most important development from the standpoint of the advance of social-psychological thought. For it was not only in itself a distinct social-psychological advance on the older purely intellectualistic type of psychology, at least by possi-

ble implication, but the new outlook which it introduced into psychology provided the essential mechanism even for the more characterisic social-psychological interpretations of human behavior which have recently come into conflict with it. As instinct psychology has been developed by its recognized exponents, however, it has given expression to the social-psychological motive which it clearly embodies, more through the recognition of the basic rôle which social life plays in racial evolution than in personal development. Its interpretation of the latter has definitely relegated the social factor to a place of secondary importance as compared with the biological factor. In fact, in this connection it has practically replaced the old type of intellectualistic individualism with a new type of biological individualism, which it has been the more difficult to undermine because it has seemed to be so firmly grounded in the most prestigeful current of thought in modern scientific history. The implications for a broader social interpretation of personal development and social conduct, which the trend of thought upon which instinct psychology rests clearly incorporated, have been brought out, not by instinct psychology itself, but by that variant of the instinct point of view in social psychology which has been termed interaction social psychology here.

Interaction social psychology may be said to be a synthesis of the currents of thought represented by instinct psychology and psychological sociology. It began to take form in an atmosphere of protest against biological determinism and laissez faire doctrine in human affairs. It has incorporated instead as practical social motives, an intense interest in education and in the scientific control of human conduct. It took its departure from the orthodox position of the instinct theory of human conduct in the first place through a broader social interpretation of the evolutionary process as it bears on human development; but gradually it has been building up its standpoint through the direct functional analysis of the processes and mechanisms of personal growth and social action.

While seeking to give due place to the factor of original nature by recognizing that social environment acts through native equipment, this theory of human conduct has aimed not to overlook the equally important fact that before biological heredity becomes concretely expressive on the level of social conduct, it incorporates

social heredity as a basic component factor. Concrete conduct, it has maintained, is thus basically a complex phenomenon combining both biological and social components. It is basically both original and acquired, both individual and social, both a matter of biological heredity and social environment. Without necessarily bringing up the question as to which of these factors is the more important in human life, it has insisted that the instinct theory of human conduct does not leave room for this basic rôle of the social factor, and that instinct, as it is commonly understood, is therefore an inapt tool of analysis in social psychology. Accordingly, it has suggested alternative tools of analysis which have a more distinct social reference: habit, attitude, wish, desire, etc.

Since interaction social psychology has recently come into sharply defined conflict with instinct psychology, and controversy in the field of social psychology, especially in this country, has in the last few years centered about this conflict, it may be worth while to pause here long enough to indicate the point of departure between them more clearly. In so far as social psychology is concerned with the analysis of personal behavior, it is centrally concerned, as McDougall more than anyone else has helped to establish, with the problem of the basic springs to human action. In answer to the question, "What is their essential nature?" instinct psychology has replied that they are innate, i.e., basically a matter of biological heredity and only secondarily a matter of social heredity. As against this view, interaction social psychology has held that they are basically a matter of social as well as biological heredity; that they are social "in the germ," so to speak, in consequence of the fact that they are socially defined, conditioned, and directed, and by virtue of the very process of social give-and-take in which they function and come to concrete expression. In the terms suggested by Professor Faris, they are social products, not biological data.[3] Or, as Cooley has stated the matter, human impulses are not first biological and then social; they are "socio-biologic" from the first.[4]

[3] "Are Instincts Data or Hypotheses?" *American Journal of Sociology*, September, 1921.

[4] *Human Nature and the Social Order* (1922 ed.), Introduction.

This is not a matter of mere difference of emphasis. On the contrary, we are dealing here with a fundamentally different conception of human nature which is of the most far-reaching social-psychological importance, both theoretically and in its bearing on the practical problems of social control. This has nowhere been brought out more forcefully than in the recent social-psychological writings of Dewey. I accordingly quote a short passage from him:

> The ultimate refuge of the standpatter in every field, education, religion, politics, industrial and domestic life, has been the notion of an alleged fixed structure of mind. As long as mind is conceived as an antecedent and ready-made thing, institutions and customs may be regarded as its offspring. By its own nature the ready-made mind works to produce them as they have existed and now exist. There is no use in kicking against necessity. The most powerful apologetics for any arrangement or institution is the conception that it is an inevitable result of fixed conditions of human nature. Consequently, in one disguise or another, directly or by extreme and elaborate indirection, we find the assumed constitution of an antecedently given mind appealed to in justification of the established order as to the family, the school, the government, industry, commerce, and every other institution. Our increased knowledge of the past of man, has, indeed, given this complacent assumption a certain shock; but it has not as yet seriously modified it. Evolution in the sense of a progressive unfolding of original potencies latent in a ready-made mind has been used to reconcile the conception of mind as an original datum with the historic facts of social change which can no longer be ignored. The effect on the effort at deliberate social control and construction remain the same. All man could do was to wait and watch the panorama of a ready-formed mind unroll. . . . . The new point of view treats social facts as the material of an experimental science, where the problem is that of modifying belief and desire—that is to say, mind—by enacting specific changes in the social environment. Until this experimental attitude is established, the historical method, in spite of all the proof of past change which it adduces, will remain in effect a bulwark of conservatism. For, I repeat, it reduces the rôle of mind to that of beholding and recording the operations of man after they have happened. The historic method may give emotional inspiration or consolation in arousing the belief that a lot more changes are still to happen, but it does not show man how his mind is to take part in giving these changes one direction rather than another.[5]

What is necessary for the advance of this type of social psychology are detailed studies of the organization of specific types of reaction patterns in specific types of social situations. This is,

[5] *Psychological Review*, XXIV (1917), 273–74.

of course, not peculiarly true of interaction social psychology, but it is peculiarly evident in its case. For, refusing to accept the current instinct basis of procedure, it is left practically only with a point of view, which has so far been used, except in a very few instances, the most notable of which is the monographic study of the *Polish Peasant* by Thomas and Znaniecki, as a basis for valuable constructive criticism and broad interpretation, rather than as a basis for the concrete investigation upon which its development beyond its present point must obviously depend. In this, as noted, interaction social psychology has however not been alone, for social psychology as a whole has so far concerned itself more with criticism and broad generalization, than with specific investigation, and for the most part necessarily.

These have been the leading currents of social-psychological development until the present. Recently the conditioned-reflex concept has been systematically applied in the field of social-psychological interpretation, and it is beginning to define a new departure in social psychology. In addition, attempts are being made to carry over into social psychology some of the characteristic notions and conceptions which have been worked out in the fields of psychoanalysis and cultural anthropology. Moreover, with the definite extension of psychological interest to social psychology during the last few years there has been unprecedented activity in working out the applications of general psychological theory to the field of social-psychological problems. These are all notable steps in the recent development of social psychology, but it seems necessary to repeat here what has already been said previously, namely, that what social psychology needs most at the present time is the advance of concrete and detailed investigation within its own field of operations. If social psychology is to take its place among the sciences it must begin to shift emphasis from interpretation to investigation; it must begin to view its task in terms of the development of its own factual foundations; it must begin to establish itself as an inductive procedure.

Brief and fragmentary as this survey has necessarily been, it cannot be concluded without some slight further reference to these important considerations. It is of interest to quote here in this

connection the short paragraph on social psychology which the *Encyclopedia Britannica* has inserted into its new Thirteenth Edition. It reads as follows:

> Social psychology, largely under the influence of the writings of McDougall, and also affected to a considerable extent by modern psychopathology, has been very much to the fore. Lately attempts have been made in various directions to bring social psychology more immediately into touch with ethnology, history, and economics, and so to check its hitherto marked tendency to wide and rash generalization (New Vols., III, 256).

Not many social psychologists in this country will agree with this descriptive statement as a whole, but certainly few will take objection to the estimate of the task that is before social psychology at the present time, which it incorporates.

The broad generalization in which social psychology has engaged until now has had its place in the development of social psychology. It has tentatively mapped out the field of social psychological operations; it has crystallized points of view, defined problems, indicated issues, formulated preliminary hypotheses, theories, and principles; and developed a considerable body of literature, almost all of it of unknown scientific validity, it is true, but yet invaluable as a means of orientation and as a basis on which to proceed. Above all, it has dispossessed us of many disqualifying conceptions, and it has gradually built up a genuine appreciation of the social-psychological approach.

It has, however, precipitated a state of controversy in the field at the present time, from which there is no escape except through the slow processes of factual verification. Social psychology is inevitably, therefore, on the eve of a new era of research and investigation, of more careful procedure, and of gradual inductive reconstruction. In the factual investigation of concrete problems disagreements are resolved, co-ordinations are arrived at, syntheses are securely built up. Only in this way can social psychology begin to resolve the confusion and disagreement with which it is at present faced. And only in this way can it gradually begin to map out the secure ground from which it can proceed to the more orderly cumulative development which is the goal of every well-established science.

THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF PSYCHIATRY TO SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

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ABSTRACT

The contributions of psychiatry to social psychology.—Psychiatry, including as one of its schools psychoanalysis, in its interpretative developments of the present century has clarified and developed older concepts and also made some unique contributions to social psychology. Considering pathology rather as a matter of degree than of kind it utilizes abnormal cases as microscopic enlargements and has added to our picture of developed personality. The validity of psychoanalytic conceptions of behavior is limited to the reliability of the free association technique. These are somewhat discounted by other psychiatric schools. The essential contribution of psychiatry, understanding of human motivation, requires constant checking against the actual cultural history of the phenomenon studied. In the conception that all "cases" are failures of adjustment of personality to environment and the functional studies of the genesis of insanity (especially endocrinology) light is shed on the problem of the organism in its environmental relations. The deterministic conception of social behavior has been strengthened, new light thrown on the problem of prejudice, and "many social phenomena and institutions . . . . seem to be in process of being better understood. . . . . "

Social psychology has been taking shape chiefly during the past twenty years, but it will probably be many years yet before its outline will be quite definite. At the present time there are four streams of thought that bid fair to be incorporated into the mold of social psychology. The first deals with collective activity and phenomena having its origins in the work of Giddings, Tarde, Le Bon, Ross, and certain earlier sociologists. The second comes from the instinct-habit schools, with McDougall and Thorndike at one end and Cooley and Dewey at the other. A third idea of prime importance, but as yet little used in the treatises on social psychology, is the relationship of culture and psychology as represented by modern anthropologists. And finally is the work of psychiatrists.

I shall speak of psychiatry as the science as well as the practice, dealing with mental disorders whether on the psychic or physical plane, using the term in as inclusive a sense as possible. Psychiatry, as a science, is also recent, althought its practice is ancient. In its earlier stages it was largely descriptive and classificatory.

Since the twentieth century, however, it has become increasingly interpretive. It is this latter phase that is of most value to social psychology. In discussing possible contributions I shall not be limited by rigid scientific tests of proof, for if I did there would be little to talk about in either social psychology or psychiatry (or, indeed, in much of social science). The contributions to social psychology of psychiatry are therefore in the nature of theories and hypotheses, more or less definitely formulated and with varying degrees of probability of being true. What I shall speak of as contributions of psychiatry are not all literally discoveries made exclusively by psychiatrists. Certainly many of these ideas are to be found elsewhere in psychology proper. But in psychiatry they have been more fully developed and formulated and their wider significance attested. However, some of the theories may be said to be uniquely the product of psychiatrists. It is difficult to draw the line between psychology and psychopathology. The one is the general science; the other, being the special, might be expected to build particular developments of general theories. I shall speak of psychoanalysts as psychiatrists, that is, of one of the schools of psychiatry.

An important proposition from psychiatry is that the difference between the so-called normal on the one hand and the neurotic and psychotic on the other is more a difference of degree than of kind. Indeed the remark frequently heard among psychiatrists, that no one is wholly normal, seems to be based on the idea that the mental mechanisms found among the neurotics and psychotics are also found among all men and women. This is widely held to be true, even for constitutional and toxic psychoses. Rationalizations like those of paranoiacs are employed by normal persons. Kretschner's studies of the pre-psychotic temperament of his patients (and of the temperament of the average man) show characteristics in less exaggerated form. One sees, therefore, in neurosis and psychosis human traits greatly magnified. One might liken the service of psychiatry to the service of the microscope, in that they both greatly enlarge the vision. There are revealed certain aspects of behavior little noted by those who observe only the conventionalized behavior of normals.

It thus comes about that psychiatry has added to the picture of human nature. It has not added to our inventory of original nature, but rather to the picture of the developed personality, and has helped in the understanding of how the development takes place. Of course not all development takes place through the same experiences. But all children do have certain more or less common experiences, such as those coming from family contacts. For this reason developed personalities have universal elements in them, and are yet more than innate nature. It has made these contributions by trying to understand the particular conditioned responses, noteworthily those that usually operate unconsciously. The attempt to understand the motives and ideas of neurotics has been particularly fruitful through the psychoanalytic technique.

Their somewhat unusual picture of human nature is more or less familiar. It lays great stress on the sex factor in the early years of life, and on the ego-ideal which is strongly affected by social standards. Also particularly significant for conduct is the unconscious conflict of desires. The more serious conflicts center around sex desires and the ego, and are the continued activities of habits formed in early childhood. Particularly important is the fixation of habits in regard to affection on parents, companions of the same sex, or on one's own self. While experience sets up these habits, it is accomplished through inhibitions and control, operating in such a manner that one is little aware of the nature of the habits or desires conditioned, so that the resulting behavior and ideas may be quite different from their apparent meaning.

This conception of behavior has been obtained by means of the free association of ideas which are supposed to link the particular idea or behavior in question to the earlier experiences which reveal its true nature. The validity of these claims rests, then, upon the reliability of the free-association technique. It seems to me that the free-association technique is not a very precise instrument of measurement, and is likely to lead to very improbable theories through the influence of suggestion and the desires of the investigator. Although the margin of error must be rather large, yet many of their findings, particularly those that are so frequently found by different observers, would seem to have a reasonable degree of

probability of being true. While a majority of psychiatrists do not agree with the conclusions of the psychoanalysts, yet probably most of them do find from their own work conclusions, some here and others there, similar to many of the psychoanalytic theories. For instance, dissociation is widely recognized; so is mental conflict quite generally held to be important. There is agreement as to the significance of early habits, and the mechanisms of rationalistic explanations are frequently found. Perhaps all psychiatrists would stress the rôle of sex more than the average man, even though less than Freud. Unconscious motives are also commonly admitted to operate. A composite photograph of human nature as seen by all psychopathologists would not be quite the sharp strange picture of the psychoanalysts; but it would certainly bring out in bold relief a number of traits only dimly delineated in the ordinary picture, and certainly many of these traits resemble somewhat the extremes of the psychoanalysts.

The contributions of psychiatry to a study of human nature are essentially those of a dynamic psychology, a study of motives, of drives to action and thought. But the behavior of motives as seen by them appears strange in comparison with ordinary conceptions. Motives, it is claimed, are quite frequently unconscious. Many of them appear as if disguised. For instance, one hates because one loves. Or a person acts arbitrarily, yet the motives appear rationalized. One compensates with a show of strength because one is weak. A person is persecuted because it is an excuse for failure. Interpretations of the behavior of others are projections of one's own feelings, etc. In these cases only the surface manifestations are seen, the underlying motives are not recognized, that is, are unconscious.

These theories of motives furnish abundant suggestions for understanding social phenomena. But before speaking of these, it is desirable to make a point of explanation. Every social phenomenon may always be seen from two points of view. One is from the point of view of history or description in cultural terms. So, one may write a history of business cycles and deduce cause and effect, without a reference to psychology or motives, and the human curiosity may be approximately satisfied. Yet in other cases one may

wish to see social phenomena from the point of view of the motives involved. For instance, a historical description of the strange religious customs of sacrifices and atonements may not give one understanding of them, for one is curious to know what human needs such practices satisfy. There are many social phenomena, as in our economic life, where the motives may be rather obvious, such as the desire for wealth. But not all social phenomena are so easily understood on the psychological side. It is in such cases that the theories of certain schools of psychiatry make fertile contributions. For instance, certain ritualism and ceremonialism in religion may be better understood because of their similarity to the behavior of compulsion neurotics in giving outlet to mental conflicts (Brill). So also fairy tales and mythology may be better interpreted when related to unfulfilled wishes and day dreams (Abraham). One may see certain strange manifestations of the mind of primitive man as the "omnipotence of thought" in a world relatively unrestricted by the confines of the reality of science (Freud). Radicalism among well-to-do may be frequently a projection of an internal unrest onto the outside world (Wolfe). Mob activity and crowd phenomena are more intelligible in terms of unconscious motives (Martin). Children conditioned toward exhibitionism may make good actors in the theater (Frink). So there are psychological interpretations of crime, religion, art, feminism, social philosophies, the family, kinship, revolution, prohibition, etc. It is of course impossible here to assay all these claims. They are, however, interesting, new, and will be very illuminating to the extent that they are true.

It should be observed, however, that reading motives into behavior is very treacherous business, and too often such "popular psychology" thoroughly merits the condemnation it has received. This interpretation of customs and institutions by psychoanalysts, while most suggestive, is perhaps the least solid of their work. For in any particular instance the motives involved can only be determined after the fullest possible history and description in purely cultural terms—a sort of behavioristic social psychology. It is here that social psychology can be of great value in testing by cul-

tural data these theories as to psychological interpretations. For instance, an adherent of the theory of suppressed instincts interprets the strikes of labor unions as a breaking out of suppressed desires. Yet a historical description of strikes in cultural terms shows that they occur most frequently in times of prosperity, when there is least repression by bosses, and that strikes are called by leaders at these times because of the greater chances of winning when unemployment is rare and the market is active. Thus a quite different set of motives are shown to be involved in strikes.

We may say, then, that psychoanalysts furnish us with many new suggestions and significant hypotheses for interpreting social phenomena, but these hypotheses as to motives do not automatically explain. Rather, they must, each particular one, be tested in each particular case by the cultural data. Psychiatry has given detail and enlargement to the picture of human nature, but it must not be thought of by sociologists or psychiatrists as a blueprint from which the structure of social institutions may be read off. Social patterns are too varied, and the human nature in them can be determined in each case only after cultural analysis rather than psychoanalysis.

Not only has psychiatry given us something new on human nature, but of almost equal importance is its contribution to the problems of organism and environment. The basic approach of all schools of psychiatry today is to view their cases as failures of adjustment of personality to environment. Psychotics and neurotics are clearly individuals who have failed to adjust very satisfactorily to environment on the mental side, whether the failure to adjust be due to functional, toxic, or constitutional causes. This problem is of course of great importance for social psychology because of the fact that biologically man is relatively stable, and his rapidly changing culture presents problems and opportunities of adjustment. Is our changing society producing better psychological adaptation? There is much evidence to make us think that insanity is increasing; certainly there are astounding figures as to its prevalence. Dr. Salmon has stated that "in New York state one person in ten who reaches adult life enters a mental hospital before he dies" (Introduction to Henry's *Essentials of Psychiatry*). And

one must imagine that the milder cases of neurotic tendencies must be more frequent.

While psychosis is evidence of lack of adjustment between personality and environment, psychiatry as yet tells us very little that is definitely proved as to the causes of this maladjustment. However, progress in very specific directions is being made and the promise of fulfilment is good.

The causes of insanity are being sought in these directions: heredity, constitution, toxins, and functioning. Social psychologists are most interested in the causes of the great group of psychoses called the functional psychoses and psychoneuroses. Of course, there may prove to be, upon further study, organic changes at the base of these functional disorders. There is, for illustration, some evidence to show that manic-depressive psychosis is associated with disorders of the circulatory system and also of the pituitary glands. The sex glands, together with the thyroid, seem to disfunction in schizophrenia. Involution melancholia may be due in part to gonadal insufficiency. The important question, however, still remains: Do these bodily changes cause the mental states, or do the mental experiences cause the bodily changes? Thus the old question of mind and body is one on which psychiatry has a prospect of throwing light. We know that toxins do sometimes reach the nervous system and produce mental disorders; there is some evidence to show that toxins disarrange the endocrine balance and thus affect mental states. But on the other hand, as Cannon and Pavlow have shown, emotional experiences affect the glands of internal secretion, and may even render one susceptible to toxic influences. But if one considers heredity, constitution, and toxins as one class of influences, it would seem that they largely constitute a set of predisposing influences; and that the personality adjustment of particular individuals may accentuate or retard these influences. For instance, war, apparently as a psychological experience, precipitates mental disorder. And the greater prevalence of psychoses among city dwellers and unmarried persons may mean that such social experience encourages the predisposing organic influences. Social workers and children's clinics find certain types of psychological experiences harmful, and also that the resolution

of mental conflicts is helpful. It should be observed, however, that psychiatrists are by no means interested exclusively in phychological experiences. Iodine, lime, and other alkalis may help mental disorders, as does resolving mental conflicts.

We judge from the foregoing considerations that, although admitting the influence of heredity and toxins, experience in a social environment is an important factor in producing mental disorders. As to what social environment thus influences such maladjustment, the answers are being sought in case histories of patients, in studies of problem-children, in family relationships, in studies of criminals and unemployables. The more fertile hypotheses are those dealing with relationships within the family group, with conditions that bring on mental conflicts or accentuate day dreams, with the causes of feelings of inferiority, and with certain types of psychosexual habits. Psychiatry emphasizes the genetic approach and the importance of early environmental experiences, which is the period of greatest influence in molding the habits that complete the personality. It is, however, not unconcerned with the strains, shocks, worries, and sexual habits of adults' life, and indeed all precipitating causes of psychosis.

In addition to these two great contributions of psychiatry, that is, the contributions to the conception of human nature and to the adjustment-to-environment problem, there may also be mentioned two or three aids to scientific procedure in general that have come from the study of mental diseases. I have mentioned already that the services of psychiatry resemble somewhat the services of the magnifying glass.

Also, psychiatry has strengthened the determination conception of social behavior. Formerly, behavior was seen a good deal in terms of freedom of the will and of moral responsibility. Psychiatry is co-operating with psychology and sociology in strengthening the cause-and-effect conception of behavior, and is carrying this idea into new practical applications. This is nowhere better seen than in the field of social work. More and more is the behavior of delinquents and incompetents seen less as a matter of moral failure than as determined by specific sociopsychological causes.

Another contribution of psychiatry, and particularly of psychoanalysis, to scientific method in the social sciences is our greater knowledge of prejudice. One of the great differences between methodology in the natural sciences and the social sciences is the great influence of emotional bias in distorting reality in connection with the problems of social science. The mental behavior of neurotics gives us a much better understanding of how emotion and desire arise and function; and because of this better understanding we may be enabled to make fewer and smaller errors in problems where the data are not sufficient for proof.

These contributions are of particularly great practical value in specific social problems. First is the importance of them for the family life and the rearing of young children. The significance for social work is undoubtedly great in dealing with unadjusted families, workers, delinquents, dependents, and difficult children. Psychiatry is of value in studying certain types of causes of crime and the social conditions that bring about these causes, and hence also in the treatment of crime, especially of juvenile delinquents. The treatment of the sex problems of society will no doubt be affected more and more by psychiatric findings. Knowledge of maladjustment and nervousness finds its place in the work of the schools also; and it is proving effective in vocational guidance and in the fitting of workers to jobs in industry. Indeed, one recognizes now that the mental health of the whole population is a problem in society today, as is evidenced by the work of mental-hygiene societies. Indeed, it is perhaps not an exaggeration to say that psychiatry, with its new conception of the genesis of personality and the functioning of motives, has produced a veritable revolution in the approach to the problems of the family, of children, of crime, and of social work.

Aside from such social problems there are many social phenomena and institutions that seem to be in a process of being better understood because of the psychiatric influence in psychology. This seems to be particularly true of religion, and of the phenomena of primitive society, and of a great variety of customs. Certainly the institution of the family is better understood. So also symbolism, painting, and poetry. In fact, these influences of psychiatry are as

far-reaching as the whole domain of human nature in society; and these effects will be as lasting as their contributions are proved to be sound.

In conclusion, it seems to me that psychiatry has been peculiarly fertile in developing new hypotheses of personality and behavior of undoubtedly great significance, especially for social problems. As a science it is in one of those dynamic phases in which many ideas are bursting forth. It has therefore great promise, particularly from the psychoanalytic and the endocrine approach. However, precision and proof are rare. Social psychology may be expected to be of aid in proving or disproving these hypotheses, but when making use of them sociologists should do so only in conjunction with most careful cultural analysis.

THE MEASUREMENT OF PERSONAL AND SOCIAL TRAITS

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this paper is to review the contributions of the psychology of personality to social psychology. Special reference will be paid to the measurement of personality traits as they throw light upon certain problems of social psychology. For purposes of convenience we may look upon the study of personality as divided into two types of approach. The first of these may be thought of as structural or cross-sectional. Here the approach is very largely by the statistical treatment of tests which are devised for the measuring of personality traits. It is assumed that these traits exist as general characteristics, and through the measurement of indirect responses, which are largely verbal, an effort is made to examine these traits. The second approach might be called functional or historical-genetic, in which an effort is made to study the development of personality traits in the individual in his social environment. This method is sometimes called the biographical. So far very little attempt has been made to state the investigation of personality through this method in quantitative terms. The nature of the data, in fact, precludes this type of treatment in large part. Because the material cannot as yet be stated in quantitative terms, it does not follow that this second approach is not to be considered valid. It has many distinct advantages over the first method. It is far more dynamic and significant in throwing light upon the mechanisms which formulate personality traits than is the first approach.

In conclusion, one may say that a fairly adequate picture of personality must involve both methods of approach. Overemphasis upon the purely statistical and quantitative aspects of personality study must be guarded against. On the other hand, care should be taken in the treatment of data of the historical sort.

The purpose of this paper is to discuss with critical comment the contribution which the study of personality traits has made to social psychology.[1] It should not be imagined that the investigation of personality has been confined alone to the psychologists with

[1] The present writer has summarized the principal contributions to personality study in the last decade in the *American Journal of Sociology*, XXXII (1927), pp. 953–71. The interested reader should also consult the summaries and reviews made by the following: V. M. Cady, "The Psychology and Pathology of Personality," *Journal of Delinquency*, VII (1922), 225–48; P. M. Symonds, "The Present Status of Character Measurement," *Journal of Educational Psychology*, XV (1924), 484–98; M. A. May and H. Hartshorne, "Objective Methods of Measuring Character," *Pedagogical Seminary*, XXXII (1925), 45–67; M. A. May and H. Hartshorne, "Personality and Character Tests," *Psychological Bulletin*, XXIII (1926), 395–411; and G. B. Watson, "The Measurement of Less Tangible Qualities," *Vocational Guidance*, IV (March, 1926), 281–89.

their elaborate statistical technique. Such invaluable contributions have come from other sources that the present discussion would be incomplete without some mention of these other methods. A review of the whole gamut of personality studies, in fact, reveals two essentially distinct approaches to the data. One of these, which has been developed by recent psychology, concerns itself with a structural or cross-sectional treatment of personality in terms of traits, attitudes, and habits. The other, which has arisen from a number of sources, especially psychiatry, treats personality from a functional, historical-genetic standpoint. The former method owes its prominence to the work of Galton, Pearson, Cattell, Thorndike, and Terman, with their investigations of individual differences, particularly in the field of intelligence. The latter has arisen from the study of literary biography, from historical biography, but especially from psychiatry and sociology. Here we find the great biographers, the psychoanalysts led by Freud, Jung, and Adler, the invaluable work of Healy, and latterly the sociological reformulation of W. I. Thomas.

Let us turn our attention to a consideration of these two approaches, touching briefly the types of tests and materials and then turning to a discussion of their assumptions and methodology.

I. THE STRUCTURAL STANDPOINT

A. Time does not permit a formal treatment of the rating scheme and questionnaire except as these become a part of the larger testing technique. It will be necessary to confine the discussion largely to so-called objective tests of personality. Furthermore, we shall omit any reference to intelligence measurement, although intelligence may be considered one panel of personality. For convenience we may subdivide these tests of personal and social traits into four categories.

The first group of measures are those of volition or will-temperament, to use the term invented by Downey. In this field we have early attempts by Fernald to measure persistence in performing a simple physical act. But the whole matter of volitional traits has been made prominent by the work of Downey with her twelve tests of will-temperament which include, among others, flexibility,

resistance to opposition, co-ordination of impulses, volitional perseveration, and speed of decision. Other investigators, Bridges, Trow, Filter, and Gibson, have attempted to measure speed of decision. So too, Bridges has attempted to secure some measure of decision types. Moore and Gilliland's test of aggressiveness is partially a detector of volitional characteristics. Inhibition as related to racial groups has been studied by Crane. Sunne has made some comparisons of volitional traits among Negro and white adolescents.

A second group of tests are those which touch instinctive-emotional tendencies. We have a large number of distinctly laboratory studies of emotions which have been summarized recently by Landis.[2] There are the earlier contributions of Watson on native emotional expression. Moore has made an effort to measure the strength of anger, fear, and sex trends by a laboratory distraction experiment. Allport's tests of ascendence-submission and of expansion-reclusion touch both instinctive-emotional features and those of volition. Perhaps the best-known test of emotions is that devised by Pressey and used by Chambers in making a scale of emotional maturity. On the basis of an exhaustive emotional questionnaire devised by Woodworth for use in the army (1917–18), Mathews, Cady, Chassell, and Watson have attempted investigations of emotional stability. The latter two investigators are now at work making this questionnaire over into a test which they hope will reveal a number of aspects of personality, such as insight into others, a measure of self-esteem, and an exposure of emotional conflicts.

A very important group of tests have revolved around a third type of concern, namely, the measurement of moral or socialized traits. Fernald again was early at work in this field with his ethical discrimination test which has given others, like Kohs, a cue to the invention of elaborate tests of moral discrimination. Students of delinquency, among them Bronner, Cady, Liao, and Raubenheimer, have used ethical discrimination tests, tests of moral judgment,

[2] C. Landis *et al.*, "Criteria of Emotionality," *Pedagogical Seminary*, XXXII (1925), 209–34.

of cheating, of falsifying, etc., in their investigations. Brotemarkle's test for uncovering the ideational content of moral concepts lies on the borderline between an intelligence test and a test of moral information. One of the most exhaustive researches in this field is reported by Voelker in his *Function of Ideals and Attitudes in Social Education* (1921). He attempted to measure honor, trustworthiness, and truthfulness, particularly in an effort to discover the place which ideals played in moral judgment and moral behavior. At the moment May and Hartshorne are at work on a very extensive investigation of character education and are devising a duplicate set of scales for measuring knowledge of right and wrong and other moral attitudes.

A final grouping of tests might be made around the general notion of social attitudes and interests. Some of these tests, for example, of prejudice, are clearly related to moral concepts.

One of the most important contributions is that of Hart, with his test of "Social Attitudes and Interests." Manry and Neumann have followed up this type of approach with their studies of international attitudes. Van Wagenen, in his *Historical Information and Judgment in Pupils of the Elementary Grades* (1919), has dealt with the problem of "different traits of character revealed in historical situations," such as the traits of our national heroes.

Among important studies bearing on single traits may be noted the following: a measure of money-mindedness, by Shuttleworth; a test of liberal attitudes, by Allport and Hartmann; tests of open-mindedness, by Symonds; a variety of tests of social perception, by Landis, Gates, Allport, and others; of self-assertion, by Marston, Filter, and Allport; of resistance to meeting strangers, by Marston. Allport is engaged in an elaborate study of social attitudes ranging over a wide field.[3] Another important development is found in the work of G. B. Watson in his monograph, *The Measurement of Fair-Mindedness* (1925). This reports a perspicacious device for measuring consistency of attitude in matters concerning treatment of radicals, Catholics, Ku Klux Klan members, and

[3] Cf. *An Outline for the Study of Social Relationship of an Individual,* published by F. H. Allport, Syracuse University, Syracuse, New York.

many matters of public concern. Bogardus, following a suggestion of Park, has made an effort to measure racial prejudice in terms of the concept of social distance.

In this general category may also be placed a large number of tests of interests. One group of these studies has concerned itself with an effort to uncover the mental patterns of introversion or extroversion. Freyd, Marston, Laird, and Allport have contributed much here. Then, too, Freyd's *The Personalities of the Socially and Mechanically Inclined* (1924) is an important contribution to revealing fundamental differences in life-organization and interest. Strong and Cowdrey, by securing responses to types of occupations, amusements, and school subjects, to kinds of reading, and such like, have been able to relate interest to vocational inclination. This work becomes related to vocational guidance and one will find pertinent discussions of personality studies in this field in such convenient handbooks as Scott and Clothier's *Personnel Management* (1923), Laird's, *The Psychology of Selecting Men* (1925), and Bingham and Freyd's *Procedures in Employment Psychology* (1926).

These four types of tests reveal briefly the outstanding subject matter of objective measurements of personal and social traits. Let us turn to consider certain assumptions made by the investigators in these fields.

B. The essential nature of a test is a cross-sectional or anatomical picture of an individual, in reference to a group of individuals, at a particular time and place. Tests are concerned with the measurement of the reaction-time, of the precision and strength of a given mental or bodily function at the moment. Moreover, tests have been developed on the assumption of individual differences, and are only meaningful when we understand that any test score relates to the scores of other persons along the scale of arbitrary units laid down at the outset. Furthermore, most tests are of paper and pencil variety. These are usually given in the laboratory, the classroom, or the office. Some tests approach true experimentation when performed under rigid laboratory conditions with accurate instruments for the measurement of reactions. Very few of the tests present the individual with a genuine life-situation in

order to see what he will do. Some do, of course, such as some parts of the tests used by Voelker, and May and Hartshorne. One of the intentions of test-makers, however, is to devise short, easily administered tests which will give a measure of predictability of behavior without going to the elaborateness of studying concrete life-conditions, for after all the ultimate aim of personality-measurement is certainly the devising of short cuts to the prediction of human behavior, and thus to afford a means of controlling it.

That we may pass in review the fundamental features of these objective tests which are designed to give valid and reliable measures of behavior, let us treat briefly the following points: (*a*) the units of measurement and their distribution; (*b*) the validity of the tests; (*c*) the criteria of reliability; (*d*) the matter of specific or general reactions; and (*d*) the question of test norms and social norms.

a) The entire testing technique rests upon the study of individual differences begun by Galton and Cattel and elaborated statistically, in large part, by Pearson and his pupils. These differences have been treated by applying the mathematics of probability developed by Gauss and LaPlace. To be specific, test-makers assume that traits distribute themselves along a linear scale in the manner of the distribution of chance throws of dice or chance tosses of coins. It is assumed that, the units of the scale being equal, the distribution of the traits follows these equivalent units. In much biological data, such as height and weight, lengths of ears of corn, etc., we find a fair conformity to the Guassian curve of probability. Whether certain of the functions of the mind which come into these tests, such as memory, reasoning capacity, and so on, distribute themselves along a rectilinear scale has been gravely questioned.[4] Curiously enough, very little attention has been paid by test-makers to these cautions. On the assumptions of the Gaussian law of probability an extensive technique for the standardization of tests has been devised, using standard deviations or per-

[4] Cf. E. G. Boring, "The Logic of the Normal Law of Error," *American Journal of Psychology*, XXXI (1920), 1–33, and Boring, "A Priori Use of the Gaussian Law," *Science*, n. s. LII (1920), 129–30.

centiles for the most part.[5] Again, correlation methods give a means of comparing one set of distributions, say of intelligence, with another, say of moral judgments. Thus a check of consistency or correlation of one set of traits or attitudes with another is made possible.

In the correlational treatment, however, of presumed common units, certain pertinent facts are often overlooked. Take the concept "mental age," for example. This has been treated in partial correlations as an equivalent unit throughout childhood and early adolescence. Yet it is well known that mental growth from five to six, or from six to seven, is not only much more rapid, but perhaps of different quality, than that between fifteen and sixteen years. Hence, partial correlations intending to segregate out a constant known as mental age may lead to distinct misinterpretations. This same problem may arise in any effort to establish age norms in a moral test. Again, it is often assumed that attitudes may be laid off along a scale of given number of units, one attitude being equivalent to another. Or, more serious, it is assumed frequently that there are given equivalent degrees of belief about a particular situation or person, and that one may lay off his degrees of belief or attitude along a scale of, say, nine or even thirteen units, four or six on the side of positive belief, or attitude, four or six on the negative side, with a neutral point at the median. One wonders, after attempting to fulfil these conditions, whether or not the facts may not be horribly distorted in an effort to satisfy the investigator in his concern for statistical niceties.

b) Another matter which concerns us is that of validity. How do we know that the tests measure that which they are supposed to? This question is usually answered by correlation with other tests already standardized, or with outside criteria, such as chronological age, home conditions, school success, or with independent judgments of such competent persons as we may assume can rate the validity of the test. For illustration, in a moral-attitudes test the judgment of stable leaders of our society would be considered significant in selecting a series of concepts to be called for in the

[5] One may consult W. M. McCall, *How to Measure in Education* (New York, 1922), or T. L. Kelley, *Statistical Method* (New York, 1923).

test. Or the judges might rate the individuals on a scale, which ratings would be correlated with the scores these individuals received in the test.

c) Likewise the reliability of the measurements is determined largely by correlational statistics. A test is administered to the same group two or more times and the performance of one occasion compared to that of the second. In some instances one-half of a test is correlated against the other half. Or reliability may be got at through validity, as with May and Hartshorne in their use of the judgments of assumed competent experts in the field of ethics.

The assumption of reliability is that there is a constancy in the performance of a group on two or more occasions which will make it safe to employ the test on like groups in order to determine their standings. This raises, again, the question whether attitudes and reactions have a specific or a general character, and whether test norms can hold for various social situations.

d) There are two aspects of this matter of specific or general response. The first concerns the presumption that there exist such general traits as neatness, persistence, and confidence. The other has to do with the assumption of universality of responses under different social situations of which we shall speak below.

The work of Trow and others has shown very definitely that there are no such general-response patterns as confidence, persistence, and so on. It may be that in certain moral reactions we have a generalized attitude and response pattern, but we must await further concrete investigation in order to know fully. So far the matter is uncertain.

e) As to whether there is a universality of responses of a given sort under varying situations is very doubtful. The work of Bronner and Washburn, to mention but two, indicates that moral attitudes differ in various social classes and in different nationality groupings. And that an individual's reactions will follow a common form in all situations is unlikely, even within homogeneous groups. Certainly the tests of Hartshorne and May show that persons respond differently under varying social conditions, a fact long ago recognized in sociology. What can a test norm be but the norm of a certain social group under certain stable conditions?

Any crisis may bring about such a reformulation of the "definition of the situation," to use Thomas' phrase, that the old standards disappear. Paper and pencil tests will hardly reveal the extent of this change of response. We have very little descriptive material on human behavior under intense crises, the account of Prince of the Halifax disaster being one of the few. But great catastrophes aside, we do not know the extent to which moral codes break down under varying situations. Or, at least, tests of moral attitudes do not seem to reveal this for us.

The limitations and the advantages of the cross-sectional tests of personality we shall mention in the final section. Let us turn to treat the contrasted method in the study of personality.

II. THE HISTORICO-GENETIC STANDPOINT

This approach has had very little attention from the psychologist, but has been developed, as we noted above, at first out of the literature of biography and autobiography and more particularly by modern psychiatry and social psychology. Krueger, in his forthcoming book, has dealt with the background of this method.[6] We may summarize this entire standpoint by saying that it assumes that the present functions of the person can only be understood in terms of their genesis. The method of psychoanalysis is largely that of uncovering, by the method of free association, the infantile and childhood formulations which lie at the roots of present attitudes, ideas, and habits. So, too, through the use of autobiographical and biographical materials, through letters, diaries, journals, memoirs, and all sorts of intimate documents, attempts are being made to secure a fairly complete picture of the history of the individual. The concern is not with the comparison of one individual with another under the assumption that they all possess common unit traits, as it were, laid out along a scale, but rather the hope is to secure a description of the cause-and-effect relations which have coursed through the personality in its life-history. The present case-history method and the interview and the genetic questionnaire methods belong in this same category.

In short, this approach is a dynamic, functional one, attempt-

[6] E. T. Krueger, *Autobiographical Documents and Personality*, a Doctor's thesis, Department of Sociology, University of Chicago, June, 1926.

ing to get at the mechanisms which produce the personality patterns. In contrast to the cross-sectional method, which can only reveal degree of or amount of, or the presence or absence of a trait or attitude at a given place, time, and social situation, the second standpoint emphasizes the historical sequence of personality growth. Taking into account the fundamental psychobiological tendencies, like emotion, instinct, intelligence, and volition, all found in differing strengths in persons, the historico-genetic method traces the rise and course of a personality in his social environment. This latter consists of two phases: one the cultural norms or patterns to which he is exposed. The other consists of the presence of other members of his particular groups: family, playground, occupational, recreational, or otherwise.

As examples of studies in this field, mention may be made of the psychoanalytic biographies, such as Blanchard's study of Comte; Dooley's, of Charlotte Brontë; Anthony's, of Margaret Fuller. More significant for social psychology, however, are the contributions of Healy in his study of delinquency; of immigrant personalities, by Thomas and Znaniecki; of unadjusted women, by Thomas; the important contributions of the Joint Committee on Methods of Preventing Delinquency, as in *Three Problem Children;* the work of Van Waters with juvenile court cases; Taft's paper, "The Effect of an Unsatisfactory Mother-Daughter Relationship upon the Development of a Personality," read before this body last year; Anderson's study of the hobo; Shaw's forthcoming study, *The Boy's Own Story;* Zorbaugh's use of this method in studying disintegrated neighborhoods; Krueger's important contribution in analyzing confessional autobiographies; and a whole group of researches completed or under way at the University of Chicago and elsewhere.

With the fundamental assumptions of the structural and the historico-genetic standpoints in mind, let us examine briefly some of the limitations and the advantages of the two approaches.

III. CRITIQUE OF THE TWO METHODS

A. The limitations of the structural standpoint are largely evident in the discussion of the assumptions of this procedure al-

ready made. Too often the precision of statistical analysis is purchased at considerable cost to psychological and sociological fact. Thus, for example, if the unit of measurement is assumed to fall under the Gaussian curve, some unnecessary distortion of actuality may result. Some workers, such as May and Hartshorne, seem to recognize this, in part, but most statistically-minded psychologists remain oblivious to it. Then there are grave questions as to the employment of rating schemes as a method of testing the validity of measures, since we know from the work of Rugg, Thorndike, and Knight and Franzen how unsatisfactory ratings are.[7]

A particular caution, however, is required in the whole assumption of norms, first as to uniformity of norms in various social groups, and second as to the measurement of change of norms and of attitudes, and finally as to the correlation of norms determined by laboratory or schoolroom test against the behavior of life outside, especially under crisis.

On the other hand, in treating a group of persons as a unit and in comparing an individual against his group at any time, place, and given social condition, the measures of personal and social traits is of great service. Sociability, prejudices, factors in learning the moral code, all sorts of preferences, and the like may be thus profitably uncovered. Where norms for various social classes, for various nationalities, and even for the different sexes are established, we have a standard against which to compare any individual at the moment. In discovering emotional characteristics, temperamental or instinctive qualities like aggressiveness, impulsiveness, or perseverance, we have certain clues to an educational regimen in reference to these trends. And yet, the cross-sectional or structural method cannot serve us completely for purposes of prediction and control, which, after all, we conceive to be the ultimate aim of scientific study. But let us examine the limitations and advantages of the second approach before making an effort to state a more adequate basis for arriving at this end.

B. The limitations of the historical method are evident when

[7] Cf. H. O. Rugg, "Is the Rating of Human Character Practicable?" *Journal of Educational Psychology*, XII (1921), 425–38; 485–501; XIII (1922), 40–42; 81–93. F. B. Knight and R. H. Franzen, "Pitfalls in Rating Schemes," *ibid.*, XIII (1922), 205–13. The so-called "halo" effect in rating is well recognized.

we contemplate the nature of suggestion and its place in human behavior, when we understand the distinct limits to accuracy of report which associative memory puts upon us, when we know the place which autistic or phantasy thinking plays in life. In truth, the digging up of past experiences by association is open to considerable qualification. In turn, personal documents, such as letters, memoirs, diaries, and confessional autobiographies are open to the same criticism that all forms of self-rating, self-revelation, and self-analysis are. The real motivations, especially, are not easy to get at from self-analysis, even though the main features of the mental mechanisms may be thus uncovered. If we wish to push the matter fully into the realm of motives, we may have to go beyond the ordinary autobiographical procedure. Here the interview, the method of mental analysis used by the psychiatrist, and the objective check-up from other sources of information come into play.

The advantages of this approach are likewise evident by the mere mention of the standpoint. We get at the mechanisms, at the causal sequences in the development of attitudes and traits. Simply to uncover a prejudice or a moral trait by a paper-and-pencil test will tell one nothing about how either one came into being, nor will it give a full clue as to how to proceed to modify it. When the sequence of life-events leading up to the attitude or trait is at hand, then only do we know how to undertake to alter or to continue this attitude or trait. Even so-called temperamental, emotional, and instinctive traits do not arise in a vacuum, but are at all times under the domination of the social environment in which the person lives, moves, and has his being.[8] Thus aggressiveness, impulsiveness, and speed of decision are not purely innate and unchangeable, for we know from the genetic method that these deep-seated patterns are often conditioned by early social contacts with mother, father, or other persons. In a word, the historico-genetic method reveals the dynamics of personality; the structural, cross-sectional method can only give us the statics.

It would be a mistake, however, to consider that either method

[8] An instructive biological basis of this same view may be found in the work of C. M. Child, cf. *Physiological Foundations of Behavior* (New York, 1924), and his paper in the symposium, *The Child, the Clinic, and the Court* (New York, 1925), pp. 126–55.

alone is sufficient. In a concluding statement I wish to indicate a middle ground between these two extremes which seem to me to represent a fuller and more complete approach to the study of personality for social psychology.

IV. AN ATTEMPT AT SYNTHESIS

In order, then, to get at the mechanism of personal response, in order to discover how the individual will react in the future, it is necessary to uncover as much of his past as possible. From the consideration of the habits and attitudes which a man has developed it is possible to make some prediction of what he will do in the future. New stimuli, a new regimen, especially those violent combinations of novel stimuli which we denote as crisis, may upset or change the more self-evident direction of the personality. But even these can only change the person in terms of the deeper formulations of human behavior which reach back into childhood.

Nevertheless, in order to secure a picture of the individual as he now stands in his group, we have no better means than the employment of measures of health, intelligence, and personality traits of the non-intellectual sort. These give us a point of departure in comparing the person with his social norm, in contrasting group with group, in contrasting through the individual the norms of one group with another, as might be done with gang personalities when confronted with the legal code of the political state. Still the difficulty with the test is that it gives us a somewhat stilted and unnatural profile of the person when it stands alone. To understand the person, one must observe him in his life-environment, one must see him in his vital, ever-changing, active life of participation in his family, his club, his trade-union, his professional or business organization, his church, his recreational associations, and so on through the whole gamut of human groupings. In short, we must see him as he is projected upon the background of his social milieu.

The most satisfactory approach, therefore, to the study of the personality, for social psychology, is a combination of these two methods. One without the other, in fact, seems incomplete. Some beginnings in this dual approach are seen in the work of Healy, Woolley, and G. B. Watson, to name a few. It is being followed by

some of those engaged in personnel work in industrial and educational institutions. For myself, I much prefer at the outset to secure the life-history, using whatever documents, like diaries, letters, and autobiographies, as are obtainable. It is also wise to secure whatever data one may anticipate from interviews and mental analysis at first. Finally, tests of intelligence, of emotions, of moral knowledge, of attitudes and emotional-history questionnaires should be given and analyzed. All the data thus secured should be checked up objectively from parents, school authorities, police, nurses, physicians, and whomever may have been concerned in the life-experiences. My point in leaving the cross-sectional study until the last is the danger of influencing the artless, uncolored account of the life-history which may come from the genetic method. Of course, sometimes the tests themselves may serve as an entrée into the mind and behavior of the person. The matter of which procedure to employ will depend upon circumstances and purpose.

All this implies a contribution from the angle of sociology. We must know the cultural patterns behind the behavior. We must uncover all that is available of the social contacts and relationships of the individual. These all play a part in giving us a more complete picture of the dynamic person in his social environment than any single view can possibly give. In short, one may say that until human ecology, using that term in a very broad sense, is allied with the historico-genetic and the cross-sectional statistical procedure, a full portrait of the living social being cannot be revealed.

DIVISION ON SOCIAL BIOLOGY

CHANGING CONCEPTS OF RACE

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ABSTRACT

Changing concepts of race.—Naive definitions of race develop when two peoples come into contact with each other: a weak group may stand in awe of the other, and one with an old civilization despise its new acquaintance. Some popular conceptions developed during the aggressive explorations of whites persist. At the beginning of scientific classification biological theory seemed to offer the most fundamental explanation. Of the pre-evolutionary concepts a very persistent one was that progeny of a mixture of colors tended to be physically weaker and infertile. Spencer and others rather firmly established the idea of a parallelism in the evolution of mental and moral characteristics with biological differentiations. In the present century comparative racial psychometry has shown considerable overlapping of the distribution curves; psychoanalysis has been related to the emotional conditions contingent on the relation of an individual's group to other groups; the behavioristic approach has undermined the theory that prejudice is instinctive, and physiologists now claim that color differentiation is too recent for the development of any differential racial endowment. At present it is difficult to formulate any definition of race except in terms of visibility or culture. The ignoring of other visible differentiations than color would seem to emphasize the primacy of cultural distinctions. Anthropology and sociology now seem to have a clarified racial concept. Sociologically race is a type of cultural conflict, with visibility as a mere contributory factor. The multiplication of contacts has given rise to much popular study of race relations. The omission of considerations of racial status in the contacts of Soviet Russians with Chinese and in the racial inclusiveness of Mohammedanism promises new developments of racial concepts in terms of social organization rather than physical characteristics

While the concepts with which we are concerned are essentially scientific, yet naïve and popular notions so condition the scientific that they cannot be left out of account.

Naïve ideas in regard to race are those which prevail when two peoples come into contact and formulate the very notion which is called race. If one group is weak it may look upon the other with fear, which sometimes takes the form of awe. If the civilization is old it despises the others. The first Chinese name for whites was "barbarian," and did not imply the race concept, but merely one of culture difference. Sir Francis Drake, when he visited China, gave a basis for the term "barbarian" because he simply took all

the precious things he could lay hold of, bringing them to Queen Elizabeth, who, seeing no Christian inconsistency, knighted him for his valor and loyalty.

Out of these first contacts which were made in the period when people with white skins were aggressive explorers, catching those with other colors off their guard, spontaneous traditions grew up which were transmitted as race concepts and are still widely accepted as such. Since these explorers, who were also exploiters, were without their own women, they transmitted their blood through native women without regard to color, and thus made a biological experiment whose results could hardly have been predicted, but which is an objective refutation of the idea that has at times prevailed that the races were of different blood.

When the beginning of scientific classification was made there was inevitable groping, both because of the lack of adequate data and because the other sciences were not able to contribute what was necessary to the interpretation of such facts as were known.

Biology seemed to be the most fundamental science to explain what were apparently all-pervasive physical differences. Psychology and sociology were not formulated as even tentative sciences until a great variety of political and social adjustments had been made on the basis of already accepted race definitions. It is important that there has been a contemporary parallelism between the recent rapid development through travel and political reorganization and the development of the handmaiden sciences whose aid is necessary for the progressive formulation of race concepts.

The first and most obvious fact out of which the notion of race has arisen comes from visibility. This was so obvious and unescapable that it was the starting-point of both popular notions and science. And, until recently, it has been very difficult to get behind it. From the first it has been easy to make a rough correlation between color and cultural development, although the values of the cultures have been generally misunderstood and despised, as for example that of the Chinese, and there were many cases where the correlation has not been actual.

There is little significance to any scientific concepts which preceded the theory of evolution. There were, of course, a good many

anthropological theories of race, because already travel and commerce had begun to expand. Perhaps the most persistent was that color marked such distinct species that, though they might interbreed, their progeny tended to be physically weaker and infertile.

Spencer made the correlation of physical and cultural evolution so logical that it determined race concepts for a generation, and is at present the foundation of much of the popular attitude toward race. It was under the aegis of the theory of evolution that anthropology had its great development. Keane and Brinton may be mentioned as influential examples. They also found a mass of anatomical material to support their theories, and they classified race anatomy in great detail.

Those of us who were introduced to the study of races in the nineties were given dogmatic conclusions which proved that race was not only a fact of wide physical variation, but also that mental and moral characteristics were parallel and equally distinctive. Much evidence was derived from the size and shape of skulls, which seemed to be correlated with culture; and running through it all was an incontrovertible interpretation in the light of evolution.

Immediately after the beginning of the century psychological comparisons began to appear. In most studies a comparatively few individual cases were used, and conclusions drawn which were generally in harmony with the anthropological conclusions. In 1904 and 1905, with the inspiration and help of William James and Robert M. Yerkes, I made the first racial tests on what at that time were large numbers, including some six hundred Indians, two thousand Negroes in various parts of the South, and twelve hundred whites. While at that time we knew nothing about "mental age," I had both age and sex categories. There was an aggregate of over fifty thousand individual tests. I started out predisposed to find distinctive mental race groupings. I plotted many curves, but the only outstanding fact that appeared was that, whatever grouping I took, all curves overlapped so that most of the cases fell within the same area. Although Professor James commended my work, its only scientific contribution, so far as I know, was its effect upon my own attitudes. As a disillusioned pioneer I have always been

unable to escape a good deal of caution in accepting the results of intelligence tests as evidence of racial differences. As a matter of fact, in this particular field the value of the comparative tests, when properly judged, has been to show that instead of racial variations in intelligence there is practical identity.

The two other aspects of psychology which have some bearing are psychoanalysis and behaviorism. The first is important in dealing with emotional and intellectual conditions which result from the relation in which the group to which the individual belongs stands to other groups. Behaviorism, by explaining the conduct of individuals in new terms, has undermined most of the old explanation of racial characteristics. One of its most distinctive contributions has been to show that racial antipathy, which racial purists hoped was instinctive, is only capricious and cultural. In fact the whole range of prejudice which plays such an important part in race concepts has been reduced by the new psychological explanations to cultural accidents and tradition.

The physiologists have collected much new material about the process of evolution, and now claim that the time which has elapsed since the differentiation of the color groups is much too short for the development of any differentiated racial endowment.

At the present moment any definition of race is difficult except in terms of visibility or culture. So long as we are not blind there is a certain validity in the classification by color. The trouble is, however, that other visible characteristics have been ignored, such as size. It would have been just as possible to have called all persons over 5 feet 9 inches members of the giant race, and those below of the pigmy race, if we had started out that way. The reason this was not done was because the various colored groups had more or less distinctive cultures.

With the added material from the other sciences and the greatly improved technique in their own fields, anthropology and sociology seem, for the time at least, to have greatly clarified the racial concept. In any social science it is never possible to escape entirely from popular attitudes, because observation itself is dependent on contemporary interests. The rapid development of contact both by travel and communication, as well as the political involvement

which came both in the war and its succeeding period, has made a general consideration of racial facts unescapable. Not the least important has been the demonstration of self-consciousness in the non-white races. Their leaders have undertaken to maintain self-respect in the face of white dominance, which has accounted for a new self-assertiveness; and they have also been diligent students of the scientific developments in the discussion. Not only the Japanese, Chinese, and East Indians, but the Negro, both in Africa and America, have called the bluff on the rationalizations which established the non-white peoples in a disadvantageous scale of values.

The potential and actual conflicts between races have stimulated religious groups to try to find what part they should play, and while idealism may not be scientific, it does not succeed constructively in any new field unless it runs in harmony with science; so the progressive religious groups have been collecting data as well as studying what has been accepted as the latest scientific findings. In the last four years a considerable number of books for propaganda purposes among religious constituencies have been published, and all these books have undertaken to be objective and scientifically sound. On the other hand, the fundamentalists, who have no more fears of evolution now than scholars had fifty or sixty years ago, but who have just discovered its implications, strangely enough accept its earlier conclusions with regard to race while rejecting its general principles. The fundamentalists serve, however, as an added stimulus to the other religious groups and have greatly stimulated popular interest in the race question. The recent race survey on the Pacific coast, and various studies among the Negroes, owe their origin to the popular religious interest.

Sociology, in its analysis of social situations, has discovered that the classification according to the old color distinctions is not an adequate explanation of all that is involved. Color as a visible sign of social grouping must be recognized as a factor in social attitudes, but not as a measure of individual or social capacity. In other words, the present concept of race may be defined as a social, rather than a biological, one, in which visibility is merely a contributing factor. Keane, in his ethnology, calls "race" a definite term indicating kinship, but "group" he calls an indefinite term. It is

an interesting fact that the American Negro ordinarily speaks of "our group"; and the sociologist now looks upon race as one of the human groups which must be explained by other principles than those of kinship. Race is a type of conflict group.

Perhaps the most outstanding element that is involved in group relations is that of status. Each race in its isolation had developed a technique of life and a control over economic conditions which resulted in competition and conflict when they came into contact. Very quickly relationships of inequality in respect to status became apparent; and now most of what seem to be race issues are little else than questions of status. On account of color it is very difficult for an individual member of a race to escape the status of his group, and therefore race is a significant social fact until the question of status can be removed. Until the visible signs may become familiar to the point of indifference, this is as possible for skin color as for eye or hair color. There is also an element of self-consciousness and perhaps fear of the strange.

The sociological point of view has been greatly stimulated and supplemented by the later anthropologists, of whom Boas, Goldenweisser, Lowie, and Kroeber are outstanding.

I wish to transgress somewhat beyond the legitimate scope of this paper to suggest two new factors which are going to have an influence on the race question, which in the Western World has assumed an importance as a social problem that is staggering in its possibilities of conflict.

Once the Chinese Wall served as a protection against the people of the North, who then were not conspicuously white, but were people of a different culture; but now the length of Siberia is a potential meeting ground for the yellow and white peoples, both of whom in this area are undergoing revolutionary changes both in government and social organization; and the Soviet government is the white representative in this relationship. Whatever evolution may take place in the future, at this particular crisis the Russian philosophy has no place for human distinctions based on status, and the development of the new relationships will begin, at least, without the issue of status between the races. And further, the actual educational and political policy of Russia, which I have no

time to describe here, in its dealing with both races and nationalities, not only giving full cultural independence but also promoting it, has in it most far-reaching possibilities.

The other factor of paramount importance is the development of modernism in Islam. After studying what was happening in Turkey I asked some eminent Moslems in Cairo about the possibilities of their religion being able to assimilate modern science. They said it was quite possible, and when a few minutes later they asked me how sociology dealt with psychoanalysis and behaviorism, I had no doubts. It happens that the area of the Mohammedan world is exactly the meeting place of the white, yellow, brown, and black peoples. All of these are found in this religion, and in it there is no recognition of race. While rich Egyptians may talk like Europeans, the great mass of Mohammedans are not conscious of a race problem, except as they hear of it in far countries. The Christians of the world, especially in Western civilization, only preach what Mohammedans practice.

In view of the fact that social theory always bears a relation to popular attitudes, we may anticipate that the concept of race is on the eve of still further modifications, and that they will be more and more formulated by sociologists in terms of social organization rather than of physical characteristics. The popular attitudes for some time will be influenced by pseudo-scientists of the Gobineau-Stoddard-Wiggam variety, and by the extreme eugenists, and it may be that the biologists will sometime find racial correlations that will be more valid than their early hypotheses; but at present race may be accepted as pre-eminently merely a culture concept.

THE CHANGING CONCEPTS OF POPULATION

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ABSTRACT

The changing concepts of population.—I have deemed it best to confine my paper to the changing concepts of the quantity and quality aspects of population, and to discuss these concepts as processes beginning with the vague philosophical conjectures of preliterate peoples, touching upon the views of the classical Greeks and Romans, the ecclesiastical ideas of the clergy, the theories of the political economists, and the more scientific theories of Malthus and post-Malthusian writers, and showing finally how these trends merge into present-day sociological concepts.

Although we do not have the support of universal agreement, we may assume that the human group arose in Asia and was dark in color. After this group had multiplied and spread over the surface of the earth and had formed itself into innumerable tribes, the population question undoubtedly arose. We may assume also that all tribes came to have their problem of numbers, and although their theories were often colored by the militaristic and religious factors, the economic question was paramount. It should not be construed, however, that the quality aspect of population did not enter and exist with that of quantity. The quality interest, though weak at first, assumed increasing importance as time went on. The absorbing question for a long time, however, was, How many can the tribe support?

Such positive measures as infanticide, human sacrifice, killing the old, witchcraft, and war, and such preventive practices as abortion, prolongation of the period of lactation, periods of tabooed coition, prepuberty coition, initiation ceremonies, delayed marriage, methods of preventing gestation, and celibacy, so admirably brought out by Car-Saunders in his book, *The Population Problem,* gradually became part of the mores of the different tribes and materially aided in restricting the numbers to the proper bounds. While most of these practices were designed to keep the numbers restricted to the food supply, some apparently had a eu-

genic bearing in that the less thrifty were often unable to secure wives, and in that the crippled, deformed, and weak children were the ones usually killed.

Advancing from preliterate society to the classical period of Greece, we find more definite ideas in regard to population. Although marriage was practically compulsory, the aim was to consider the physical capacity of parents and to permit only the fit to survive. Both Plato and Aristotle emphasized quality through the regulation of marriage and the exposure of weak and crippled children.

The Romans, too, became disturbed over the population problem and sought to regulate marriage, but chiefly with a view toward increase. They keenly desired quantity, but at the same time lamented the apparent infertility of the old Roman stock, which they considered superior to the plebeian and immigrant groups. That they had certain eugenic practices is shown by Seneca's comment in regard to drowning weaklings, and his assurance that it is "not passion, but reason, to separate the useless from the fit."[1]

While many religions evince a phallic origin, the rise of Christianity inaugurated a revolt against moral laxity and an indifference to an increase of population which lasted almost through the Middle Ages. People became more interested in the soul than the body, and the whole outlook on life became celestial rather than mundane; consequently little effort was made to improve conditions on earth. Following Epicurus, St. Paul advocated ascetic idealism, which the church came to venerate. The perpetuation of the race began to be regarded as a necessary evil, while a chaste celibacy came to be looked upon as an ideal state.

Following the Crusades, the discovery of America, the finding of new routes to India, the opening of the Orient, and the invention of printing and gunpowder, came a revival of letters and philosophical speculation, a broadening of the horizon of individuals, and a changed outlook on the part of the European nations. The religious groups came to look upon population as something regulated by an omniscient Deity, but the political economists were in

[1] Quoted by A. G. Roper, *Ancient Eugenics*, p. 12.

a state of transition, and present a variety of views. Mariana,[2] Bornitius,[3] Ḥusum,[4] and Besold,[5] for instance, seemed to have had no fear of overpopulation. Celibates and childless couples, according to Bornitius, should be penalized, and immigrants encouraged to settle within the nation. Patricius,[6] on the other hand, favored the restriction of immigration and foresaw a danger in the ignorant masses crowding into the cities. Machiavelli's[7] foresight led him to fear that population might become so excessive that it would be reduced by want and disease. In support of this view, Moore[8] and Wörd[9] saw that war, pestilence, and emigration tended to serve as relief for overpopulated nations.

Certain writers attacked the population problem from the standpoint of marriage. Moore would permit only from ten to sixteen children per family, and Cock[10] favored restricting the marriage of the poor. From the eugenic point of view, Colonna[11] feared that too early marriage might produce weak children; Botero[12] would not permit too great a discrepancy between the ages of a couple; Cock would have the men marry at thirty-five and the women at thirty; and Campanella[13] exclaimed: "We exhibit a studious care for our breeding of horses and dogs, but neglect the breeding of human beings."

Out of all this confusion emerged, between the sixteenth and

[2] Joannes Mariana, *De Rege et Regis Institutione,* 1605.

[3] Jacob Bornitius, *Partitionum Politicarum Libri* IV, 1608.

[4] Herman Latherus von Husum, *De censu, Tractatus Nomico-Politicus,* 1618.

[5] Christopher Besold, *Politicarum Libri Duc,* 1618; and *Discursus Politicus de Incrementis Imperiorum,* 1623.

[6] Franciscus Patricius, *De Institutione Republicae.*

[7] Nicols Machiavelli, *The Prince,* and *History of Florence.*

[8] Sir Thomas Moore, *Utopia.*

[9] Sebastian Franck von Wörd, *Germaniae Chronicon von des Ganzen Teutschland.*

[10] George Cock, *English Law or a Summary Survey,* etc.

[11] Egidio Colonna, *Li Livres du Gouvernement des Rois,* 1473.

[12] Giovanni Botero, *Delle Cause della Grandezza delle Citta,* 1592.

[13] Tomasso Campanella, *Civitas Solis,* 1637 (*City of the Sun*).

eighteenth centuries, three rather indefinite schools of political economy. It was a time of national expansion, colonization, commerce, and war. Consequently we have the rise of the Mercantilists,[14] Cameralists,[15] and Physiocrats,[16] all having rather definite ideas in regard to an increase in numbers. While there is no universal agreement, we may say that the Mercantilist doctrine, represented by such writers as Mun,[17] Child,[18] Fortrey,[19] Davenant,[20] Lau,[21] Leibnitz[22] Wolff,[23] Defoe,[24] and Suessmilch,[25] was interested in population because it was considered as a means of producing a favorable balance of trade. Gold and silver constituted a nation's wealth, and this was to be obtained by advantageous trading. The more people a nation had, the more products could be produced; the more produced, the more could be exported; and the more exported, the more gold and silver could be brought into the country, was the current line of argument. To bring about this increase in population, laws were passed to place disabilities on celibates and childless couples, to aid couples in getting married, to reward large families, to remove the stigma from illegitimacy, to aid immigration, and to prohibit emigration.

[14] See Gustav Schmoller, *The Mercantile System.*

[15] See A. W. Small, *The Cameralists.*

[16] See Henry Higgs, *The Physiocrats.*

[17] Thomas Mun, *England's Treasure in Foreign Trade,* 1664.

[18] Sir Josiah Child, *New Discourse of Trade,* 1668.

[19] Samuel Fortrey, *England's Interests and Improvements,* 1673.

[20] Sir Charles Davenant, *Trade of England,* and *Discourses on the Public Revenues,* 1698.

[21] Theodor Ludwig Lau, *Aufrichtiger Vorschlag von glucklicker, vortheilhafftiger, beständiger Einrichtung der Intraden und Einkünffte der Souverainen und ihrer Unterhanen,* 1719.

[22] Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibnitz, *Essai de quelques Raisonnemens Nouveaux sur la Vie humaine et sur le Nombre des Hommes, in works.*

[23] Christian Wolff, *Vernünftige Gedanken von dem gesellschaftlichen Leben der Menschen,* 1721.

[24] Daniel Defoe, *Extracts from a Plan of English Commerce, Being a Compleat Prospect of the Trade of this Nation,* 1730.

[25] Johann Peter Suessmilch, *Die Gottliche Ordnung,* etc., 1741.

The Cameralist doctrine, represented by such writers as Obrecht,[26] Becher,[27] Hornick,[28] Seckendorff,[29] Zincke,[30] Justi,[31] and Sonnenfels,[32] believing that the inhabitants of a country constituted its wealth, held that it was hardly possible to have too many people. The Physiocrats, on the other hand, represented by Turgot,[33] Mirabeau[34] and Quesnay,[35] Nemours,[36] Riviere,[37] and Le Trosne,[38] contended that, in general, an increase of numbers in a nation is a good thing, but that population, by being dependent upon the food supply, is definitely related to the agricultural possibilities of the country.

The eugenic element was not disregarded; certain writers believed that population might, by increasing in a geometric ratio, surpass the food supply and thereby cause such positive checks as war, pestilence, and starvation. Consequently human welfare came to occupy a more important place. Some writers noted lower birth-

[26] Georg Obrecht, *Fünf unterschiedliche Secreta Politica,* etc , 1617.

[27] Johann Joachim Becher, *Politische Discurs an den eigentlichen Ursachen des Auf- und Abnehmens der Stadt. Länder und Republicken, in Specie; wie ein Land Volckreich und Nahrhafft zu machen,* etc., 1688; and *Psychosophia oder Seelen-Weischeit,* 1678.

[28] Philipp Wilhelm von Hornick, *Oesterreich uber Alles wann es nur will,* 1684.

[29] Veit Ludwig von Seckendorff, *Der Teutsche Fürsten Staat,* 1655; and *Der Christen Staat,* 1685.

[30] Georg Heinrich Zincke, *Gedanken und Vorschlage von einem auf Universitäten auf die Cameralwissenschaften einzurichtenden besonderen Collegio-Statuum Europae Camerali,* 1746 (?).

[31] Johann Heinrick Gottlab von Justi, *Grundsatze der Policey-Wissenschaft, zum Gebrauch academischer Vorlesungen abgefasset,* 1756.

[32] Joseph von Sonnenfels, *Grundsätze der Policey-, Handlungs, und Finanz-Wissenschaft,* 1765.

[33] Anne Robert Jacques Turgot, *Sur le Commerce,* 1753.

[34] Victor Riquetti Mirabeau, *L'Ami des Hommes, ou Traité de la Population,* 1755.

[35] François Quesnay, *Analyse du Tableau Économique,* 1758.

[36] Du Pont de Nemours, *Abrégé des Principes de l'Économie Politique.*

[37] Mercier de la Riviere, *L'Ordre Naturel et Essentiel des Sociétés Politiques,* 1767.

[38] Guillaume François Le Trosne, *De l'Intérêt Social,* 1777.

rates and more unhealthful conditions in cities. Others would have eugenic marriages by having northern and southern Europeans intermarry, by regulating the age of marriage, or by having marriage for five- or ten-year periods with a possibility of renewing the contract.

In 1798 Malthus' famous essay on the *Principle of Population* appeared. It came as a reaction to socialism and as an answer to some of the theories of Godwin[39] and Condorcet.[40] It was a period of rapid transition from agriculture to the factory system, from manufactor to machinofactor. As a consequence, labor was dislocated, due to the inclosure laws, and the mobility of the poor was toward the cities. Many were unable to secure employment; poverty and misery increased by leaps and bounds. As a result the foci of attention turned to human welfare and the evils of an excessive population. It was an opportune time for Malthus to come forth with his brilliant inductive generalizations. He thought he saw the cause of the malady, but as a therapeutist he was a theologian.

Malthus laid down two postulates: "First, that food is necessary to the existence of man. Secondly, that the passion between the sexes is necessary, and will remain nearly in its present state." He stated that population tends to increase in a geometric ratio, while food supply increases in an arithmetic ratio. Population, he thought, has the power to double every twenty-five years. He mentioned two checks: *Preventative,* due to moral restraint or foresight in marriage, and *positive,* which includes such things as war, famine, pestilence, disease, and malnutrition, which kill after birth.

The publication of Malthus' essay raised a storm of protest. Bonar tells us he was the best-abused man of his age. The church fulminated and Caralile railed against him, but Darwin and Mill accepted his conclusions. Some people considered that Malthus had made an original contribution; but others, considering the the-

[39] William Godwin, *Enquiry Concerning Political Justice and Its Influence on Morals and Happiness,* 1703.

[40] M. Condorcet, *Esquisse d'un Tableau Historique des Progrès de l'Esprit Humain,* 1794.

ories of Botero,[41] Bodin,[42] Gaunt,[43] Petty,[44] Hale,[45] Montesquieu,[46] Saxe,[47] Buffon,[48] Brückner,[49] Ortes,[50] and other pre-Malthusian writers, failed to see anything new in the essay.

The discussions arising from Malthus' essay caused an increasing interest in population. The problems, chiefly the number and quality aspects, had already received considerable attention, but no unified observations, investigations, or study. It must not be considered, though, that no scientific method was evolving, for isolated trends were emerging into theories which were to direct the course of scientific investigations. Malthus' work, by gathering together and synthesizing previous endeavors, gave an impetus to a more scientific consideration and treatment of population problems. For this reason it seems to me that the work of Malthus marks the transition from a philosophical to a scientific study of population.

In regard to causes and consequences of an increase in numbers, there are a few rather outstanding theories which should be noted here. William Thompson,[51] writing in 1824, disagreed with the idea that population tends to increase up to the means of subsistence, and expressed a theory which is current today. He observed that when the conditions of people are wretched, the prudential check does not operate, but that when those people obtain comforts and become accustomed to them, there develops an un-

[41] Giovanni Botero, *Delle Cause della Grandezzadella Città*, 1592.

[42] Jean Bodin, *The Six Books of a Commonweale.*

[43] Captain John Gaunt, *Natural and Political Observations upon the Bills of Mortality*, 1662.

[44] Sir William Petty, *Treatise of Taxes and Contributions*, 1662; and *Political Arithmetick*, 1690.

[45] Sir Mathew Hale, *Primitive Origination of Mankind*, 1667.

[46] Charles Montesquieu, *The Spirit of Laws*, 1746.

[47] Hermann Maurice de Saxe, *Reveries or Memoirs upon the Art of War*, 1756.

[48] Comte de Buffon, *Natural History*, 1749 (?).

[49] John Brückner, *Théorie du Système Animal*, 1767.

[50] Giammaria Ortes, *Riflessioni sulla Popolazione delle Nazioni per rapports all'Economia Nazionala*, 1790.

[51] *An Inquiry into the Principle of the Distribution of Wealth Most Conducive to Human Happiness.*

willingness to part with them and thus "the prudential check is called into full existence, and is abundantly adequate to prevent an injurious increase of numbers, or such as would lessen those comforts."

In 1834 John Rae[52] added the concept of "effective desire" to population theory. In Hawaii he found an abundance of vacant fertile land on which a man working two hours a day could support a large family; and yet population was not increasing. This he explained as being due to the lack of "effective desire for offspring." The Europeans, due to the spirit of nationalism and frequent wars, had this desire "hammered into the race," while the Hawaiians had not had such an incentive. He also disagreed with Malthus' idea that overpopulation causes vice. Among the Hawaiians he found plenty of vice, yet there was no overpopulation.

In 1841 Thomas Doubleday[53] fathered a theory to explain the large number of children among the poor families and the small number among the wealthy. He divided population into three groups: wealthy, middle class, and poor. He stated that the birth-rate was decreasing among the wealthy, increasing among the poor, and at a standstill among the middle class, due to the physiological effects of food. Fecundity, he thought, was in inverse proportion to the amount of nourishment. C. E. Pell,[54] writing in 1921, closely followed Doubleday and presents practically the same view.

Herbert Spencer[55] published his theory of population in 1853. He postulates that there are two forces—power to maintain individual life, the process of individualization, and power to generate the species, the process of genesis—which vary inversely. This law, he thought, not only applies to the animal kingdom, but to individuals of a species. Consequently, as people develop and raise their standard of living, the birth-rate decreases because their fecundity decreases. The amount of energy, he argued, is limited, and the more there is used in self-attainment, the less there is left for re-

[52] *The Sociological Theory of Capital.*

[53] *The True Law of Population Shown to be Connected with the Food of the People.*

[54] *The Law of Births and Deaths.*

[55] *Principles of Biology,* Vol. II, Part VI.

production. College women, therefore, are relatively infertile because the energy has been used in self-attainment. He believed, however, that the pressure of population was the cause of this biological, economic, and social advancement, but as the pressure gradually finishes its work it must bring itself to an end.

Arsene Dumont,[56] reacting against Malthus' theory because he did not believe population tends to exceed the means of subsistence, proposed in 1890 his "law of social capillarity": tendency to rise in the social scale. A low birth-rate, he declared, coincides with wealth, education, and the absence of religious beliefs; while a high birth-rate correlates with ignorance, poverty, and credulity. He maintained that in a country ridden with the caste system, like India, the social capillarity is weak or lacking, consequently a high birth-rate obtains; but that in a democratic society the social capillarity is great because the capable and ambitious have an opportunity to rise, therefore they limit the birth-rate.

Simon Nelson Patten,[57] writing in 1895, sought to restate Malthus' law so as to make it practicable and workable. "The opposition to be harmonized," according to Patten, "is not between population and the means of subsistence, but rather between population and productive power. Productive power depends upon the intelligence of man and the efficiency of the social organisms, and as this productive power increases, the food supply increases." Productive power thus checks population and increases the food supply. Patten believed that as society advanced the appetites and passions of primitive man were gradually subdued, and "through the growth of economic, sociological, and physiological checks to population, society is gradually getting itself into a better condition, where there is greater harmony between the different sides of human nature. The opposition between the productive power of society and its rate of increase is lessened, while vice and misery cease to be necessary consequences to social progress."

In 1923 Cox published *The Problem of Population.* He finds that as population grows, the rate of growth tends to decline. This, he concludes, is a natural law which is applicable to plants, ani-

[56] *Dépopulation et Civilization.*

[57] "The Law of Population Restated," *Political Science Quarterly,* Vol. X.

mals, and men. By way of comparison, the normal boy weighs seven pounds at birth. In the first four months of his life he doubles in weight. If he continued at this same rate of growth he would weigh fifty-one tons by the time he becomes six years of age. Cox apparently considers this a natural law applicable to population, yet he seems to believe that the decline in the birth-rate is due to the use of contraceptive methods.

Pearl published his *Studies in Human Biology* in 1924. His population theory seems to be little else than mathematical calculations applied to the sponge theory of population. Pearl experimented with the increase in numbers of the fruit-fly and studied the growth of population in several countries, and then worked out his "s" curve for population growth. "In the early years," he says, "following the settlement of a country, the population growth is slow. Presently it begins to grow faster. After it passes the point where half of the available resources of subsistence have been drawn upon and utilized, the rate of growth becomes slower, until finally the maximum population which the area will support is reached." Pearl estimates that the United States can support a population of 197,000,000, which will be reached by the year 2100.

From the qualitative side it is claimed that the hard conditions under which primitive and preliterate peoples lived tended to eliminate the weaklings. Added to this were their conscious or unconscious practices of elimination and the conscious efforts of the Greeks and Romans, to which reference has already been made. With Mercantilists and Cameralists, every additional child was the source of an additional amount of wealth, regardless of whether it was of poor stock, illegitimate, or of good breed. With the church every child was a soul to be saved for the Kingdom of Heaven. If the child was deformed, crippled, or poor, so much the better, because then the wealthy could lavish their moneys upon it and thus insure their own entrance within the "pearly gates." This attitude became so powerful that national poor laws were passed and soup kitchens established. The greater the efforts of charity, the more of "God's poor" there were to be fed, until finally the burden became intolerable. Against this Malthus reacted, and thus is explained his hostile attitude toward the existing policies of charity.

Malthus' idea of population surpassing the food supply gave Darwin his idea of the "survival of the fittest." Following Darwin and Wallace came a number of theories of heredity by such men as Spencer, Mendel, Galton, Weismann, De Vries, which upset completely the old idea of "fixity of the species" and caused inheritance to be considered more in the light of biological knowledge. The quality concept received an increased stimulus and a twofold view; superior inheritance and the control of the birth-rate developed.

Some idea of eugenics has existed from ancient times. We know that as early as the first half of the sixth century B.C., the Greek poet, Theognis, wrote: "We look for rams and asses and stallions of good stock, and one believes that good will come from good; yet a good man minds not to wed an evil daughter of an evil sire, if he but give her much wealth. . . . . Marvel not that the stock of our folk is tarnished, for good is mingling with the base." Theognis was followed by Plato, Aristotle, and other writers who stressed the idea of eugenics. Following the Greek scholars, however, came a period of almost two thousand years in which the idea of eugenics was occasionally stressed, but more often ignored. Indeed, eugenics needed more biological knowledge. Malthus, therefore, by calling attention to the relationship between birth-rates and human welfare, caused Darwin and Wallace to enunciate the theory of natural selection, and to indicate the effects of artificial selection. It was not until the publication of Galton's article on "Heredity, Talent, and Character," in 1865, and his book, *Hereditary Genius,* in 1869, however, that the eugenic movement was fully launched. In these he showed that intelligent fathers beget sons with marked abilities, and that the persecution of the freethinkers by the church, and the celibacy of the priesthood and sisterhood, does the race an irreparable harm.

In 1872 William Greg published his *Enigmas of Life,* in which he argued that the principle of survival of the fittest holds true for races and nations, but not for individuals. He maintained that nations, in their social progress, reach a stage of culture where they keep alive the weak, defective, and incompetent. He asserts that paupers and the like should not be permitted to marry, and that

only the "pure, vigorous, and well-developed" who pass a competitive examination should be permitted to continue the race.

DeCandolle, Pearson, Davenport, Jordon, Goddard, and a host of others followed the lead taken by Galton and Greg; eugenic societies have been established, and defective groups like the Jukes, Kallikaks, Nams, Zeroes, Hill Folk, and Mongrel Virginians have been studied. Yet eugenics remains largely a theory, as the mass of people are not ready for a practicable application.

With the eugenic movement might be considered the modern birth-control movement, which started about the same time and has now spread to all the highly civilized nations. In different countries it has taken on various names, as neo-Malthusianism, Malthusian League, League for Voluntary Parenthood, American Birth-Control League. Some of its advocates purpose to control all population, so that countries will not be overpopulated and surpass the food supply; while others wish to control only the reproduction of the unfit. This movement is gradually emerging from the propagandist stage and promises to be successful. From the eugenic point of view, however, it appears to be a very dangerous practice in the United States, because the educated and wealthy know and use contraceptive methods, while this knowledge is denied the poor, uneducated, and defective groups.

Excluding the novice, propagandist, and alarmist, population problems, until the last few years, have been studied chiefly by statisticians, economists, and eugenists, and very little by sociologists. Various phases of the problem, however, have been dealt with by sociologists, but they have generally accepted the conclusions of men in other fields, instead of developing a technique and making a scientific study of the problems in the light of modern sociological thinking. Nevertheless, an increasing number of departments of sociology are adding courses in population problems, a fact which signifies that sociologists are beginning to realize that this is a fertile field for study, and that, after all, our sociological problems have a population basis.

While the chief interest in population problems continues to center around quantity and quality, different students of the problem select particular aspects of these phases. The statistician is in-

terested primarily in quantity as abstraced from sociological data; the historian, in both quantity and quality in accounting for events in the historical process; the eugenist, in quality and means of producing and maintaining a better race; the educational psychologist, in mental capacities; the social worker, in the maladjustment of persons in our population; and the sociologist, in the process of movements, amalgamation, conflicts, accommodation, assimilation, and fusion of cultures. Still the whole problem remains somewhat confused, and many agree with Sumner, who, in 1906, wrote: "At the present moment the most civilized states do not know whether to stimulate or restrict population; whether to encourage immigration or not; whether emigration is an evil or a blessing; whether to tax bachelors or married men."[58]

Perhaps there has never been a time in the history of the world when the need was greater for the sociological study of population problems, and perhaps the United States furnishes us the most complete laboratory for such a study in its modern setting. We have an unparalleled growth of numbers which is rapidly filling our great open spaces, an intermingling and amalgamation of all the racial groups in the world, a rapid decline in the fertility of the educated and wealthy groups, and a migration, urbanization, and industrialization of our population.

Seemingly there was never a time in the history of the world when people evinced such migratory desires. Perhaps Thomas' four wishes are little stronger than formerly, but people have more ways of satisfying them; at least they are moving. From thickly populated Europe with 467 people per square mile, and thinly populated South America with only 8 per square mile, people move. From nations with few opportunities and from lands like the United States, Canada, Australia, South America, and Africa, with many advantages, they emigrate. The United States is a nation far famed for opportunities, and as a result we have one-sixth of the Canadians, and our foreign-born group is almost large enough to form a Belgium and Holland, or a Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and Switzerland combined. Here we have a mingling of all races and nationalities and a fusion of all cultures. And not only are people

[58] *Folkways*, p. 310.

moving across national boundaries, but they are shifting from East to West, North to South, rural to urban, and vice versa. Consequently we have within our states various racial and national conglomerations, and within our cities a multitude of groups based on race, nation, wealth, and social position. The inhabitants of tenements, rooming-houses, apartment houses, and auto camps, and tourists, migratory workers, hoboes, and auto tramps—all display more or less a spirit of restlessness. By moving and coming in contact with other groups, they bring about a fusion of cultures that results in conflicts, adjustments, and an altered or new population type.

If we agree that sociology is the scientific study of the process of psychic interaction of persons in relation to physical and cultural influences, what can the study of population problems contribute? The number and kind of beings largely determine the type of psychosocial relationships and cultural possibilities. Stable units produce a durable society, while a Bohemian type causes an effervescent relationship. If a country is sparsely inhabited and relatively isolated, we may expect little advancement, while if there is a comparatively dense population in ready communication with other groups, cultural contacts are frequent, psychic mutations rapid, and advancement steady. Such factors as migration, immigration, urbanization, industrialization, racial contacts, amalgamations, and cultural fusions are influencing the persons composing the units, breaking down the old beliefs, traditions, customs, mores, increasing the processes of psychic interaction, stimulating psychic mutations, changing psychic distances, and producing a more flexible society.

Perhaps I can illustrate more clearly what I conceive the present sociological concept of population to be by referring to a study which Professor W. C. Smith and I are making of the first, second, and third generations of Americans. In this study we are primarily interested in the backgrounds, the forces which cause people to move, the behavior patterns, the attitudes they carry with them, the cultural conflicts, social isolation, reactions, adjustments, amalgamation, psychic mutations, and the reactions of others toward them as the psychosocial adjustments take place in the social units. The

three hundred life-histories already collected reveal a complexity of population problems especially in the "process of spatial groupings of interacting human beings or of interrelated human institutions." The sociologist, as I see it, is not merely interested in food supply, numbers, movements of population, races, or amalgamation, as problems, but rather in causes and effects of human behavior. That is, he is not merely interested in the Negro because he is black, the Japanese because he is yellow, the immigrant because he has moved, the migrant because he is strange, the roomer because he is unmarried, or the auto-tramp because he is unstable, but rather in what forces cause him to be what he is, act as he does, how other people affect him, and how they react to him. Personally, I think that population problems need to be studied in relation to their complexity in social situations. Since no two countries present the same complexity, due to various social, economic, political, and religious conditions, any deductive generalizations or limited inductive studies setting forth theories of population are inadequate. In our study we have selected one population problem and are studying it with regard to the particular form it assumes under prevailing conditions in this and the mother-countries. To be sure we are still interested in numbers, quality, rate of increase, movements, etc., but only in relation to the particular areas in which each obtains. Although the study has not progressed far enough to permit generalizations or the statement of any theories, it seems to justify the conviction that population problems need a systematic and inductive sociological study that will take into consideration backgrounds, cultural differences, individual life-patterns, psychic isolation, interactions, and adjustments. Some work has been done along this line; more is being done; but we can say with Malthus, "much remains yet to be done."

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE PHYSICAL BASIS IN THE TEACHING OF SOCIOLOGY

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ABSTRACT

The importance of the physical basis in the teaching of sociology.—Our social sciences "began as talk; they have reached the stage of thought, with some evidence that an era of seeing is at hand." Recognizing that while science and hypothesis are inseparable, but that social sciences as distinguished from philosophies can be developed only on the basis of first-hand observation of living groups, and admitting the backwardness of these sciences (history, political science, economics, psychology, anthropology, and sociology), what has the physical field to offer them? Analogy from the findings of biology and even concepts developed by biologists from clues in older social thinking cannot be carried over directly into social science, but must be tested and re-verified. An orientation course with an effort to get the student interested in observing and reading for himself may give him an appreciation of the social significance of the work of scientists and of the difficulty of fathoming the secrets of nature even in the apparently simple things. Thus a generation may be trained to be critical in the interpretation of social phenomena. The problems of life cannot be adequately comprehended except in relation to the background, both organic and inorganic.

It was Ruskin, I believe, who wrote: "The more I think of it, I find this conclusion more impressed upon me: that the greatest thing a human soul ever does in this world is to see something. Hundreds of people can talk for one who can think; but thousands can think for one who can see. To see clearly is poetry, prophecy, and religion—all in one." The history of our social sciences illustrates this thought of Ruskin. They began as talk; they have reached the stage of thought with some evidence that an era of seeing is at hand. I trust that Comte does not turn in his grave at this restatement of his so-called "law." A glance at several of the fields may make my meaning clear.

History, not long ago, was concerned chiefly with things political. Armies on their way to war marched across its pages with enough of accounts of women and gold captured, or of royal scandals, to give the story the human touch. A child's statement: "I don't like the history of England. It is nothing but a story of cut-off heads" is an apt summary. Date after date was offered the student until one sympathized with him who said: "The only date in

history that I can remember is 1492 when the Pilgrims landed on Plymouth Rock." The fundamental facts in the daily life of the peoples supposed to inhabit the various countries were omitted, chiefly, I suspect, because unknown.

Political science was talking learnedly about the "divine right of kings," and thus developing a theory of sovereignty. Call to mind the long diatribes on the natural rights of man which became the shibboleths of the French Revolution and were written into our own early political creeds. Recall the natural man contracting to surrender his liberties in order to get protection for and against himself. It was the state versus John Doe rather than the state as the expression of John Doe. Let us not think that this older concept has entirely disappeared, for it still lives in the church.

A century ago moral science was giving birth to the dismal study known as political economy during its years of infancy, but rechristened "economics" as it developed. Its attention was centered on the agricultural laborer living from hand to mouth. The wage-fund theory and the iron law of wages became its orthodox statement of belief, to be accepted later as cornerstones in the so-called "radical socialism." Competition was the life of trade, and competition between nations might well lead to war, as the world has seen in recent years.

Psychology was still lost in the maze of metaphysics and was groping after a spiritual mind housed in a physical body. Then it began to talk of intellect, sensibilities, and will, until it made the last the essential thing in man, free and unhampered by the limitations of the flesh. To all riddles of conduct it had one stock explanation—instinct—until instincts became hardly less numerous than the sands of the shore.

Anthropology was changing from the collecting of hearsay tales as to the appearance of savage races and their superstitions to the gathering of the artifacts of primitive folk, living or dead. It viewed the primitive man as a creature of custom, and used such expressions as "group marriage" and "group control" as key words. On this point hear Malinowski in his recent work, *Crime and Custom in Primitive Society*. Underlying all these ideas was the assumption that in primitive societies the individual is com-

pletely dominated by the group—the horde, the clan, or the tribe—that he obeys the commands of his community, its traditions, its public opinion, its decrees, with a slavish, fascinated, passive obedience." Or again:

> Paradoxical as it sounds, it is yet true that present-day anthropology neglects primitive law just because it has an exaggerated, and, I will add at once, a mistaken idea of its perfection.
>
> The extreme difficulty of the problem lies, I think, in the very complex and diffuse nature of the forces which constitute primitive law. Accustomed as we are to look for a definite machinery of enactment, administration, and enforcement of law, we cast around for something analogous in a savage community and, failing to find there any similar arrangements, we conclude that all law is obeyed by this mysterious propensity of the savage to obey it.
>
> Anthropology seems here to be faced by a similar difficulty as the one overcome by Tylor in his "minimum definition of religion." By defining the forces of law in terms of central authority, codes, courts, and constables, we must come to the conclusion that law needs no enforcement in a primitive community and is followed spontaneously. That the savage does break the law sometimes, though rarely and occasionally, has been recorded by observers and taken into account by builders of anthropological theory, who have always maintained that criminal law is the only law of savages. But that his observance of the rules of law under the normal conditions, when it is followed and not defined, is at best partial, conditional, and subject to evasions; that it is not enforced by any wholesale motive like fear of punishment, or a general submission to all tradition, but by very complex psychological and social inducements—all this is a state of affairs which modern anthropology has so far completely overlooked.

Sociology has followed a similar course and yielded to similar temptations. I need do no more than mention the "law of the three stages," of Comte; the easy derivation of the state from the family, by Maine; Morgan's notion that metronymy preceded patronymy (Is it not curious that we now know that those Indian tribes best developed socially followed Morgan's type, whereas the hunting tribes were patronymic?); Ward and his "gynocentric" theory, Kidd with his "supra-rational sanction" of religion, Tarde and his "imitation," Durkheim with his emphasis on "control"; not to forget Giddings and his "consciousness of kind," nor the vast host of social "laws" of more recent discovery and publication.

By way of contrast let us glance at the activities of the men now at work in the various fields just reviewed. The historian

seems to be concerned chiefly with the social and industrial life of the different peoples. The political scientist is observing the actual functioning of government; he is watching the polls to observe voting habits; he is cultivating the acquaintance of the politician and studying the work of the legislature. There is a noticeable dearth of economic theory in our own generation, but an equally marked development of such special fields as finance, both public and private, of industry and statistics. The psychologist has discarded most of the old terms or has redefined them till only the term is left. He is concerning himself with the structure of the brain and the nervous system and is trying to find out why man "acts like a human being," if I may use this expression for behavioristic psychology. The anthropologist has forgotten his museum of antiquities and, by patient years of field work, is seeking to understand at first hand the actual life of other peoples and to become a culture historian when he enters the classroom. That the sociologist is equally responsive to the trend of the times is evidenced by the program of this session and the contrast it offers to those of early meetings of the society.

In substance all this can have but one meaning. The men working in the social fields have come to realize that if they are to develop sciences as contrasted with philosophies they must get their material by actual observation of living groups. At the present time no man has any great understanding as to why groups of humans behave as they do, no matter how many facts he may know about them. A's explanation may, in reality, be pretty close to a real explanation, just as the Greeks approximated a theory of evolution, but it is a guess based on reflection rather than a statement of observations. Now science and theory are inseparable, as Poincarè well shows in his brilliant essay *Science et Hypothèse,* and there is plenty of guess work left in medicine; but there is a wide difference between the Chinese use of fossils, called "dragon-bones," as cures for human ills and our use of quinine and strychnine. Frankly admitting, then, that we are about as close to being social scientists as the Indian medicine man was to being a doctor, we may well ask what the physical field has offered or has to offer that may be of help or harm to us.

Let me not be misunderstood. I stand with all the rest, if you will pardon my conceit, both as regards my information and my ignorance. The same sources of information are open to us all and, in theory at least, have been used by us all. We cannot avoid using the body of facts and theory that has come to us, much as we may distrust many of our own conclusions. The only criticism that may justly be made of us arises when we fail to recognize the weakness of our own position and do not strive to overcome it. For instance, we have a great problem of crime and lots of criminals both in and out of prison. What does anyone know about the best methods of treating criminals or of preventing them? Are our results commensurate with the tremendous costs? Is anyone satisfied with present methods save perhaps certain criminals and their more criminal lawyers? What can we say when the legislator asks our advice? Shall we recommend any of the panaceas now on the market? There is a great wave of interest in the study of man, who, as Bagehot says, "unlike the other animals, has had to be his own domesticator." What are we teachers offering to the students? Are we cramming them with half-baked theories of our own fabrication or half-understood theories of others? Are we asking them to memorize a table of social "laws," or trying to arouse their intelligent interest and training them to distinguish between the essential and the unessential, the trivial and the important? Are we stimulating them to realize the quotation from Ruskin with which I began, and to see clearly? Such are the questions I put to myself, and often the answer must be "I, too, have sinned."

I presume that our president had the biological background in mind when he suggested the topic for this section. With his consent I have deliberately enlarged the subject, for I want to touch on matters not wholly biological. As we turn our attention to these after this long introduction let us have a word of warning from one of the most eminent of living biologists, Thomson.

> The fallacy of regarding sociology as no more than a recondite branch of biology is not merely verbal, implying differences of opinion on the tedious question of the best definitions of these two sciences; it involves a misconception of what human society is, a misconception which is discredited by the facts of history and experience. No one doubts that the life of a social group is made

up of a complex of activities of individual persons—but these are integrated, harmonized, and regulated in a manner as far beyond present *biological* analysis as the integration, harmonization, and regulation of the chemical and physical processes in the individual organisms are at present beyond *mechanical* analysis. . . . .

To keep to the concept of selection for a moment: it was applied to plants and animals; it was illustrated, justified, if not demonstrated and formulated; and now it comes back to sociology as a great law of life. That it is so we take for granted, but it is surely evident that in social affairs, from which it emanated as a suggestion to biology, it must be re-verified and precisely tested. . . . . In any case, a formula borrowed from another science and applied to a new order of facts—even to those in which it first arose as a suggestion—must be rigorously tested. Otherwise, both organic and social sciences resolve themselves into sociomorphic illusions.

Social science has by no means avoided the danger just suggested. I am told that allegory was first applied to the Bible as an aid to sense and reason, but it became a source of mischievous error. In my college days Butler's *Analogy* was still a required text. It is a far cry from Mandeville's *Fable of the Bees* to Bagehot's *Physics and Politics*. We all know, only too well, what an irruption into the social field has recently taken place on the part of certain biologists, who, casting aside all care and discretion, have sought to base social programs on alleged biological discoveries. If we are to avoid serious error we must be extremely cautious in the use of biological analogies or the transfer of biological laws to society. What a wealth of discussion there is on heredity and environment! One hears on all sides the word evolution applied to social institutions. How often are the terms defined and the definition adhered to in the discussion? That there has been a biological evolution practically every informed man believes; but it does not follow that there has been a social evolution, nor that the laws of any social evolution that may be shown are the same. Natural selection plays a large part in the explanation of biological evolution; but what is the rôle of natural selection in society? The crude and detailed pictures of Schaeffle are forgotten by most students even, but there are more subtle dangers to be avoided. In fact, I wonder if the word "evolution" as applied to society is not merely a substitute for the older term, "history."

Let it be granted that the most important as well as fascinating

study is that of man himself. It is surely the most difficult. We do not know our own history. We do not know when the first great migrations took place, nor their causes, nor their routes, nor the fauna and flora of the lands traversed; all of which would surely throw much light on our own development. Our control over food supply, over sources of light and power, has become so great that few of us know the world on which we live and from which our living must come. We talk in terms of money, not of goods. As one result our sphere of influence is ever widening. Formerly what man did in one locality had little influence on men living elsewhere. Now, with the extension of commerce in the necessities of life, the activities of one country may mean starvation to men on the other side of the globe. Just at the time when the world is becoming an economic unit the average man knows it only in terms of pavements and golf courses.

Years ago, somewhat to my surprise, I found that the average college student had little detailed information of his own physical environment, and that what he knew consisted of random facts rather than correlated knowledge. He was emphasizing the unusual rather than the common. He stressed the differences rather than the similarities of racial groups, the contrasts between men and animals rather than the resemblances. He boasted so much of man's control of nature that he ignored nature's control of man. He had no vision of the interrelations between different forms of life, save that all were made for the use of man. His education had been so largely from books that he was losing any sense of proportion. Rule 3 on page 2 seemed neither more or less important than Rule 10 on page 20. He asked even in social matters for rules, not reason; for decisions, not for evidence. To meet this situation I began to give some of the simple facts in the relation of man to the earth and to other forms of life. I told something of the story of evolution and heredity and discussed the problems connected with their application to man. I did not seek to teach the facts of science, but to use such as I had for purposes of illustration. The effort was made to get the student interested in reading and observing for himself. We traced the struggle for the right to study and think. Then we considered the history and problems of our social

institutions. Often the student was puzzled to get the connection between the background and the later topics, but it dawned on him ultimately and his subsequent reactions seemed to justify the method. To me it is most interesting to find a department of psychology in one university doing much the same thing, and to witness the development of orientation courses at such universities as Chicago, Columbia, and Pennsylvania. In this last the demand came in the Wharton School without any pressure from the sociology department. This but means that many men have seen the need which I encountered.

We might stop for a moment to ask what such a study can accomplish. Entirely apart from the subject matter, I believe that it is very necessary to get men who are entering various professions to appreciate the social significance of the work of the scientists. It is to them that we owe all the inventions and discoveries which, added together, mean our mode of living. Most of our students lack adequate training in the careful observation of details and testing of results before interpretation. If they can be taught how difficult it is to fathom the secrets of nature in what appear to be the simplest things, perhaps we may get a generation to be critical in the interpretation of social phenomena, which are surely harder to understand than chemical reactions. The older social philosophy complained of what it called the "niggardliness of nature." To men of today the problem appears rather to lie in man's ignorant exploitation of nature and his disregard of the consequences of his policy both for himself and his successors. In other words, neither we nor our students will be able to understand our social problems until we can interpret correctly the relation of man to his physical background.

In many of our older states we are spending about as much for the care of the insane as we are for public education. If this continues we shall be under the necessity of killing the insane or being killed by them, with some considerable doubt as to the group to which many of us belong. Who knows the cause of this riddle, or the solution? The city of Philadelphia spends not less than $28,000,000 yearly on behalf of the unfortunate, but almost nothing for the investigation of the problems involved. How sensible!

Take the war debts. We insist on the recognition of the debt rather than the repayment; but let this pass. We can't accept payment in gold, for, then we should have most of the world's supply and our money system would be upset. We can't accept payment in goods, for we have a protective tariff standing in the way. We can't accept payment in services, for this is contrary to our immigration policy. Is the solution to this riddle economic? political? social? Meantime our immigration law is destined to relocate a large part of the Negro population of the United States and the West Indies too, perhaps, as well as attract many Mexicans.

Just now we produce more of certain food stuffs than the world wants at prices profitable to the grower. This is equally true of cotton, and so the cotton-grower is joining the corn-grower to force the body politic to come to their rescue. What is the answer?

We want rubber, and feel hurt in soul as well as in pocket when England forces us to buy at her price; but this is just what the cotton and corn men want us to force England to do. What bearing does this have on international peace? Can any great group of men on earth be refused the necessities for their civilization without arousing the bitter animosities which lead to retaliation, and, in the extreme cases, to war?

It is evident that I have used the foregoing as illustrations without attempting to discuss any of them. It is evident, too, that no one group of students, call them what you will, can be held responsible for the understanding of the causes and the administration of the proper remedies. I am but suggesting that no one can get any adequate comprehension of these and hundreds of other questions who does not consider man in relation to the background, both organic and inorganic. Here lies the necessity just now for all of us in the social field not to be thinking of the lines of demarcation between our own chosen topics and those of others, but of the co-ordinating and correlating which must be done for the sake of the common welfare.

In many instances, perhaps the majority, the bulk of this correlating in our schools falls to the lot of the sociologists. It is for this reason that I am stressing this matter at this time rather than trying to evaluate the work of the biological sociologists. Whether

for good or ill, we are compelled to decide our social programs as we go along, and we cannot wait for the development of theory but must get our theory from the results of our practice. Perhaps this is the better way after all. The medical profession has set us an excellent example. Can we do better than follow it?

Our understanding of things social must lag until we can study mankind with the same meticulous care which has been devoted to atoms and microbes. We are too prone to think that we qualify as geniuses in accord with the definition of Emerson and proceed to generalize on the basis of a single illustration. It might be well for us to adopt as our motto the one used long ago by DuBois: "We study the problems that others discuss."

DIVISION ON HUMAN ECOLOGY

THE CONCEPT OF DOMINANCE AND WORLD ORGANIZATION

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ABSTRACT[1]

The spatial distribution of human beings and institutions is not accidental. On the contrary, it is a product of evolution and represents a dynamic functional interrelationship in which the units are organized around centers or points of dominance. The pattern is not unlike that of the living organism, which, as Professor Child points out, is a vital integration of organs, cells, and tissues functioning in harmony with a center of dominance. Moreover, human, like biological, evolution reveals an ongoing tendency toward a more specialized and refined relation between the center of dominance and the subordinate integrated parts. The development of communications is rapidly transforming the world from the small, undifferentiated, symmetrical unit of spatial distribution into the highly centralized and specialized axiated pattern. This type of pattern, which originated in the Western Hemisphere, is now penetrating the Orient and the primitive life of the tropics. Thus both old and new regions of the world are coming under the influence of the great urban centers of Europe and America. The change in spatial distribution effected in the village and urban communities of Asia is the basis of much of the present unrest. The fringe of Asia is today an economic frontier of the Western World, but gradually new centers of dominance are emerging, such as Tokyo, Osaka, Shanghai, Singapore, Calcutta, and Bombay, which are beginning to disturb the equilibrium of the Western centers. The world is fast becoming a closed region organized on the axiated pattern in which centers and routes are gaining precedence over boundaries and political areas as points of interest in spatial distribution.

[1] Printed in full in the *American Journal of Sociology*, XXXIII, July, 1927.

POPULATION AREAS AND PHYSIOGRAPHIC REGIONS IN CANADA

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ABSTRACT[1]

The conjunction of topography, transportation, and natural resources determines the divisions of labor and population selection. Canada has four populated physiographic areas, and of these the Great Lakes–St. Lawrence Valley region has been central in the development and population of Canada. The chief topographic barrier in this expansion has been the Laurentian shield, crossed only by railroads at high cost in construction and operation. The western section of the central area is isolated from the maritimes by intervening cultural and physical barriers. In Canadian expansion the central area has played the dominant rôle economically, politically, and socially in the system of centralized decentralization. The social structures of these physiographic regions are interdependent, but also distinctly different from each other. This latter indicates that the social distances between these areas of settlement are relatively great.

THE GHETTO

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ABSTRACT[2]

The ghetto, the modern Jewish immigrant settlement in the Western World, has arisen out of the medieval European urban institution by means of which the Jews were effectually separated from the rest of the population. It represents a case-study in isolation and accommodation, and indicates the proccesses involved in the formation and development of local communities in city life. The natural history of this institution shows that it developed as a

[1] Printed in full in the *American Journal of Sociology*, XXXIII, July, 1927.

[2] Printed in full in the *American Journal of Sociology*, XXXIII, July, 1927.

gradual and undesigned adaptation to a strange habitat and culture, and its disintegration proceeds independent of legal enactment. The Jews, in so far as they are a separate ethnic group, are a product of ghetto life, which accounts for the reappearance of the ghetto wherever Jews settle in large numbers. The modern ghetto in its location and structure is determined by the unique status of the Jew and by his traditions. His neighbors in the New World tend to be the same as in the Old. Eastern ghettos differ from those of the West in that the latter generally have as many local areas of settlement as there are waves of immigrants. As the Jew becomes conscious of his subordinate position in the ghetto he flees, but he is pursued by fellow-Jew until his new habitat assumes the atmosphere of the ghetto itself. In the course of his migration, his personality changes as the culture of his group fuses with that of the larger world outside.

THE ECOLOGICAL APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF THE CHURCH[1]

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ABSTRACT[1]

The church shares in the ordinary processes of growth which characterize the spread of population. The growth of the church is to a certain extent determined by birthrate and by population shift due to desire for economic betterment. Especially important is the shift of populations due to search for status. Many of its ethical problems grow out of conflicts which come in the pressure of population groups upon each other. The Civil War was a conflict between those who wanted quantitative extension of the population and those who were insistent on qualitative conditions. Church rituals reflect the great hazards through which populations go in the struggle for existence. The church, through its religious ministry, seeks to assure people in the midst of this struggle. It especially comes in to help people meet those strains which come in the struggle for life on the higher levels.

[1] Printed in full in the *American Journal of Sociology*, XXXIII, July, 1927.

DIVISION ON METHODS OF RESEARCH

THE USE AND LIMITATIONS OF STATISTICS IN SOCIOLOGICAL RESEARCH

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In discussing this topic I shall take up first certain fundamental questions as to the applicability of statistical methods to the objects of sociological research. This will involve a consideration of scientific method in the physical sciences, in order to reveal the validity of statistics as a method in the social sciences.

Karl Pearson makes the method of the pursuit of the facts the criterion of science. "The man," he says, "who classifies facts of any kind whatever, who sees their mutual relations and describes their sequences, is applying the scientific method and is a man of science."[1] There is nothing in this definition to exclude any one of a number of techniques; it applies equally to the statistician, the culture anthropologist, the folk-lorist, the social psychologist, and the student of individual cases. The peculiar contribution of the statistician is the application of a quantitative method to the facts of societal life. In the words of Yule,[2] he is using "methods specially adapted to the elucidation of quantitative data affected by a multiplicity of causes." He is attempting a minimal statement of fact; he tells the truth in the shortest way that is consistent with accuracy. This, after all, is the function of all science. Some phenomena of the physical and social fields lend themselves better than others to this type of statement.

In the physical field we may cite as examples of the application of quantitative methods physics, astronomy, some phases of chemistry; in the biological field we have descriptive measurement in

[1] Karl Pearson, *The Grammar of Science* (1911 ed.), Part I, p. 12.

[2] G. A. Yule, *An Introduction to the Theory of Statistics*, p. 5.

zoölogy and botany, in psychology, and in certain aspects of genetics; and in the social sciences, a large part of the field of economics, much of sociology, and something of politics. In general we may use quantitative methods where there are magnitudes that can be objectively measured. As examples of sciences of a non-quantitative type we have geology, much of the material of which is refractory to quantitative treatment, certain phases of chemistry, and a vast area of the fields of zoölogy and botany. In the social sciences we have structural analysis of economic and social institutions, such as the factory and the family, which are in general non-quantitative. The same applies to political forms. There is no mathematical formula possible to describe the functioning of the United States government.

It is unwise, however, to go too far in drawing the line of demarcation between quantitative and qualitative data. What is qualitative today may be quantitative tomorrow; a "high pitched" tone becomes a certain number of vibrations per second; a "color" becomes a position on a spectrum scale; a "bright child" has a high I.Q.; the United States is a "rich country"—its inhabitants had an average income of $335 per capita in 1914. Such transformations of qualitative description into quantitative forms increase both the exactness and the brevity of the description. They are "minimal statements of fact." But progress in science does not always rest on this type of development. Darwin's theory of evolution was not quantitative in method, but it was nevertheless epoch-making. The early stages of a new scientific analysis of facts are almost of necessity qualitative. The concepts of the molecule, of the atom, and of the electron, while they may be developed mathematically, were in their inception creations analogous to those of the artist's or poet's imagination. These two ways of looking at reality must be used together to get a complete image.

In sociology from its beginnings we have been interested in the problem of causation. What are the "forces" which produce societies, social activity, folkways, institutions, etc.? This is a question which has brought numerous answers. Some sociologists have made desires, instincts, habits, the "causes" of society and social activities. Others have emphasized the environmental factors.

Others have combined these two groups. This search for "causes" is universal in science. What does the word "cause" mean?

Now all that science knows, as Pearson points out, is a succession of sense impressions. If a physicist wishes to find out the relationship between the volume of a gas and the pressure upon the gas his procedure is as follows:

A given mass of the gas is kept at a fixed temperature. The investigator exerts a certain measured pressure on the gas. Then he reads on a scale what the volume is; changes the pressure, makes a new reading, and so on within the limits of pressures to be used. He may repeat this as many times as is convenient. He plots on a system of rectangular co-ordinates the volumes as Y and the pressures as X. He finds a number of slightly different volumes for any given pressure. Through these groups of points he draws a line by the method of least squares. The algebraic formula of this line is the "law" of pressure-volume relationship. This formula is PV equals K (a constant). That is, given a certain mass of a gas, the product of the pressure and the volume is always the same. The line is a curved line starting high at the left and declining at a decreasing rate.

To turn to an example of the use of quantitative methods to ascertain causal relationships in a social science, let us consider Ogburn's study of the standard of living of two hundred families in the District of Columbia in 1916.[3] To ascertain whether the size of the income of the family affected the difference between the income and the expenditure (i.e., the deficit or surplus) he made a correlation table. In essence a correlation table is the same thing as the plotting of the points by the physicist: for every group of values of X (size of income) there were certain values of Y (amount of difference). A line of least squares passed through these points yields the formula: $Y=-166.45+0.144\ X$. The familiar "correlation coefficient" is simply a special form of the coefficient of X in this equation.

To say that we have perfect statements in these two examples of the causal connection between pressure and volume, or size of income and amount of deficit or surplus, is obviously untrue. Actu-

[3] *Publications of the American Statistical Association,* Vol. XVI, No. 126.

ally temperature affects volume (Gay Lussac's Law); and the size of the family has something to do with deficit or surplus. Therefore the two formulas given do not take into account these other conditioning factors. However, by a combination of Gay Lussac's Law and Boyle's Law we get:

$$PV = P_0V_0(1 + \tfrac{1}{273}\, t)$$

and by the use of the methods of partial correlation we get, where X is the size of income, Y, amount of surplus or deficit, and Z, the size of the family, the following equation:

$$Y = -82.70 + 0.14921X - 1.88Z,$$

from which the net effect of X on Y or Z on Y can be easily determined in the form of a partial correlation coefficient. In a similar manner the effect of other factors besides X and Z can be eliminated.

Are we justified in saying, therefore, that the "law" revealed by Ogburn's study is as reliable as the "law" of Boyle or of Gay Lussac? By no means.

In the first place the well-established laws in the purely physical sphere have been tested innumerable times under sensibly identical conditions and have always returned the same proofs of their validity. So far as I know this study of Ogburn's is quite unique. It holds good for two hundred families in Washington, D.C., in 1916, whose income ranged from $800 to $1,800, and which satisfied certain other requirements of the study. By these requirements some of the possible variables in the causal relationship were eliminated, but many still remained, as Ogburn's article shows. Any other studies of this kind would be unique also in that they would involve other populations at other times. Each would be an empirical investigation. If the families selected were homogeneous with Ogburn's, if all the conditions of the first study were observed meticulously, and then if the formulas for the lines of regression were the same, or nearly identical, we could begin to talk about the uniformity of this socio-economic law in its mathematical form.

This is all rather unlikely. To find even two hundred families anywhere or at any time that would be exactly homogeneous in all essential respects with those of Ogburn's study would be very diffi-

cult. The social world is not static and conditions are never the same. That means that the margin of variability in results must be greater than in the rigidly restricted world of the physical laboratory.

Moreover, the whole of modern statistical method is based on the mathematical theory of probability. Within the limits set by this theory and by the concrete nature of the data it is possible to predict what would be the value of the surplus or deficit for any particular size of income or size of family. The basis of this range of predictable values is to be found in the fact that here, as in all statistics, we are dealing with a sample. We almost never have an entire universe of facts. It is of course true that the observations of the physicist do not all fall on a point; but the theory of the distribution of error of observation, while mathematically much like that of correlation, is based on a totally different procedure. Improvement of the mechanics of measurement may cut down the range of error of observation, but such improvement will not necessarily bring about a similar improvement of accuracy of estimate in statistics.

It must be remembered also that the mathematical validity of many statistical procedures is based on the satisfaction by the data of certain mathematical assumptions. For example, the correlation coefficient is reliable only where the relation between the variables correlated may be represented by a straight line.[4] Many economic and social data do not satisfy this requirement. Again, Professor Persons has pointed out[5] that the fundamental assumption of random selection cannot be applied in many problems of business forecasting, and that therefore the law of probability cannot be held to be applicable to these problems in any strict sense.

I spoke of the causal relationship between size of income and amount of surplus. Some skeptical questioner may pertinently inquire whether I think we have the causes of the surplus or deficit even if we know the mathematical relationship among all the possible measurable elements of standard of living. He might appropriately ask whether the time, the place, and the people may not have some influence, driving people to spend either more than they earn,

[4] Truman L. Kelley, *Statistical Method*, p. 172.

[5] *The Problem of Business Forecasting*, pp. 8–12.

or, within a limited amount, almost all they earn. That is, what are the cultural concomitants of this phenomenon? Would a group of immigrants newly arrived from China show the same results? If they did not, then the differences between Ogburn's group and the Chinese group would be quite impossible to measure. In other words, the inductive method involves the interpretation of statistical facts, such as correlation coefficients, in the light of non-statistical facts.[6]

The theory of correlation is of course a mathematical formulation of the law of concomitant variations set forth by J. S. Mill. Where the data are not quantitative, this logical method of Mill can be used with equal scientific, if not with mathematical, validity.

I have discussed so far the problems involved in the discovery of what we call "causal" relationships by statistical methods of the more refined kind, namely, the use of correlation. *For certain types of material* these methods are fruitful beyond any other. But by far the largest part of all statistical work is much simpler and more understandable to the lay or professional mind, and fully as effective as an instrument of analysis.

The procedure of statistical analysis begins with classification into groups of definite size and the counting of the cases in each group; in other words, "frequency tables." Much statistical work is done with qualitative groupings, as for example the distribution of a population by country of nativity. Summaries of frequency tables in the form of averages, condensed descriptions of their tendency to variation in the form of standard deviations and so forth, and the orderly presentation of series in which time is one factor and frequency of occurrence the other are all simple and yet of the greatest value. The graphic method, too, is fruitful, not only for description, but also for its suggestive value in analysis. It is a safe principle for the statistician never to use the more complicated method if the simpler will serve the purpose.

In an exact sense the title of this paper is tautological. The "uses" of statistics define its limitations, and vice versa. I wish to call your attention, however, to certain other principles of the use (and so of the limitations) of this method.

[6] Cf. statement by Professor Persons, *The Problem of Business Forecasting*, pp. 5–7.

A point stressed early in statistical textbooks is that of the statistical unit. Just what is it that is being measured? A handicap of all the social sciences is a terminology appropriated from daily life. The barren word-battles that have turned on the definition of terms that had originally no scientific connotation are the commonplaces of economic, political, and sociological theory. If non-quantitative reasoning calls for accuracy of definition, how much more is it needed when the element of measurement is added! Some of the simplest words reveal unexpected inexactness when one attempts to make them units of statistical observation. What is a house? A farm? What are earnings? Wages? Income? Rental? Criminals? Such terms may have a legal, an economic, and a colloquial meaning. Which shall be taken? For one purpose the legal, and for another the economic, may be better. But if there can be any ambiguity of meaning, the value of the statistical counting is greatly reduced. The same reasoning applies to units of measurement. For example, What is a ton? Is a dollar the same unit of measurement in 1926 that it was in 1914? Some of the most urgent kinds of information cannot be acquired because we have no adequate objective definitions, either of things we are measuring or of the units of definition to begin with.

Unfortunately, the labor cost of statistical research is high. Whether it be in a study based on questionnaires or in one based on schedules filled out by enumerators, the securing of a large enough sample to be representative and statistically reliable means in many fields of investigation a cost practically prohibitive to all save the largest individual purses. And after the collection of the material comes the labor of tabulation, calculation, and analysis. In elaborate studies, particularly those involving the use of correlation, this represents a very heavy burden in time, and often also in money. While the cost of mechanical tabulation is low in comparison with hand tabulation, it is nevertheless high relative to the individual statistician's ability to pay for it.

The use of printed material such as that of the census is still open to him. Unfortunately, whatever studies he makes of such material must follow the categories of classification as they appear in type. He cannot make his own cross-classifications. It is just

these that most often reveal the interrelations that are of causal significance.

Increasingly, therefore, we may expect statistical work to drift into the hands of those engaged in group research, such as the National Bureau of Economic Research, university research bureaus or institutes, and governmental bureaus and departments. The work will be not less, but greater, in amount.

In this paper I have endeavored to point out what seem to me the outstanding facts of a methodological nature relative to the use of statistics in sociology:

1. Statistics is a method of measurement, of counting, applicable to facts of social life.

2. In the social, as in the physical, world, not all facts are susceptible of measurement.

3. By causation is meant—whether in the social or the physical world—an invariable sequence of certain occurrences.

4. In certain essentials the statistical methods of correlation are identical with the methods of the experimental sciences.

5. Social phenomena cannot be repeated under the same circumstances. Therefore there is a much greater degree of inaccuracy in predictions based on statistics than in the case of physical measurement; and a given set of phenomena cannot be reproduced as in the experimental sciences.

6. The theory of probability and of sampling constitutes the theoretical basis of modern statistics. Statistical results are reliable in the degree that they are based on methods in which the mathematical presuppositions are applicable to the data used.

7. In general it is best to use the simplest method that fits the facts.

8. Since certain facts in society, as in nature, are not, at least at present, measurable, we must constantly combine the statistical and the non-statistical data in order to understand causal relations. No statistical coefficient is more than a fragment of description. Its interpretation involves other types of facts as well.

9. Basic in all statistical method is the exact definition of the fact measured and of the unit of measurement.

10. Statistics is a very costly method of investigation, increasingly beyond the power of the individual investigator for that reason.

CASE STUDY METHOD

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ABSTRACT

Case study method.—Social research in a given problem begins with the accumulation of material in the form of concrete and detailed cases. The case may be an individual, an institution, a community, or any group considered as a unit for study. Case study method emphasizes the total situation or combination of factors, the description of the process or sequence of events in which the behavior occurs, the study of individual behavior in its total social setting, and the analyses and comparison of cases leading to formulation of hypotheses. A case study of a delinquent boy is presented to illustrate the study of the behavior of an individual in terms of the complex of factors in which the behavior occurred.

The following reflections regarding the uses of case study method have resulted from an intensive study of a series of cases of male juvenile delinquents and a comparable series of non-delinquent males living in the same urban communities. In this study the term "case method" has been limited to research into the causative factors in delinquent behavior, using the detailed and concrete case as the unit for study.

The initial task in the study was the accumulation of a mass of raw material in the form of cases, described in concrete and specific detail, including the usual medical, psychological, and psychiatric data, as well as the cultural background of the family and community, and the life-history and social relationships of the individual. The case, presented in this detailed manner, affords a complete and vivid picture of the interrelated factors constituting the situation in which the behavior problems of the individual have arisen. The meaning of each of the specific factors is dependent upon its relation to the other factors in the situation. Likewise, the particular delinquent act of the boy can be understood only in terms of the total setting in which it arises and of which it is a part. The extremely wide variation in rate of delinquency among urban communities and the localization of particular types of offenses in

certain areas of the city would seem to suggest the close relationship between delinquent behavior and the particular combination of factors in the community in which delinquency occurs. Thus it seems necessary to emphasize the total situation and the relatedness of the factors that comprise this situation in studying delinquent behavior.

The detailed case, particularly the life-history document, reveals the process or sequence of events in which the individual factors and the particular social environment to which the child has been responsive have united in conditioning the habits, attitudes, personality, and behavior trends. Personality types—consistent or characteristic forms of behavior—seem to be revealed in the life-history document. Thus the objective type of person writes a chronological account of his life, while the egocentric writes a justificatory document which is integrated about his dominant personal attitudes.

An intensive case study of a series of families in which there are both delinquent and non-delinquent boys is indicating how widely the family may vary as an environment for its different members. It is probably the unique differences in individual make-up, experience, and social contact, revealed in such a comparative study of cases, that are most significant in determining the divergent behavior trends in children living in the same household.

Proceeding from an analysis and comparison of such case material, hypotheses may be formulated. At this point the material may be treated statistically, in the hope of confirming or disproving hypotheses, determining more precise correlations, avoiding conclusions based upon unusual or exceptional cases, and determining the scope and central trends of the problem.

The foregoing discussion may be illustrated by the following excerpts from the case of a fourteen-year-old Greek boy referred to a child-study agency by his parents, who complained that he refused to work, was lazy, persistently lied, stole a small sum of money from home on two occasions, truanted from home repeatedly, quarreled with and often struck his mother and married sister, and had violent temper tantrums.

The medical examination revealed no physical discrepancies

aside from carious teeth and a slight visual defect. He had good general development, being eleven pounds overweight.

According to psychometric tests, he grades as having good mental ability, and an intelligence quotient of 98. He was classified as emotionally unstable by the psychiatrist, who also stated that he was frank and direct in reactions.

The traditional background of the family may be indicated by giving excerpts from the life-histories of the father and mother:

FATHER'S STORY

I was born in Athens, Greece. My father was a strict man. He beat his kids if they did not mind. At the age of eleven I started to work as an apprentice in a machine shop, for I didn't want to go to school. All boys there, except the rich ones, begin to work at fourteen. I worked hard, but I didn't get no pay. That is the way things are in Greece. The boy works and learns a trade to make a living; that is a good way—that is the only good way. In America things are not good for a boy. He don't learn a trade, nothing else—just wants to bum around. It is good for a boy to work hard. He is some good then and knows lots when he gets big and can make his own living without stealing. I had to mind my father. I couldn't do anything else; if I didn't I got beat up. Many times I got beat up. The father whips lots in Greece. That is the reason there kids mind and don't get into bad things. He was the boss and I couldn't argue him. Here in America the kids don't have to mind. They only laugh at the father and fight him and play all day. I came to America nineteen years ago and worked in a machine shop all the time. I work hard and give my kids good food to eat, clothes, and everything. My oldest kids are good, but Angie want to play ball and run around with Irish kids and not work. I say, "Angie, work in your uncle's restaurant and learn the business, for that is good for you." He just fights and curses and runs away. I whip him and send him to work, but he calls me bad names. He fights all of us and steals. His uncle give him good chances in restaurant, but Angie no care. Just want to be thief and bum. He worst boy I ever saw. I can't make him be good. Won't you scare him hard, maybe have him arrested and put in jail to scare him and make him work and not fight and not steal any more.

MOTHER'S STORY

I was born in Sparta, Greece. My father and mother poor people, nothing much to eat and have to work hard. I no went to school. They keep me home and I work hard with my brothers and sisters. If I want to be bad my father lick me hard and make me work harder. We no never did much bad like kids in America. The father he boss and lick kids hard. Over there when kid comes 'leven years old they stop school and work for father and learn job. All kids

give money to father and he spend it for them. That is the right way when children mind father and mother and know something and have something to live on and for his wife and kids. In America kids curse father and call him "old man" and make faces of him and gets mad and fights when father licks him. That is not right. Kids are bad and need lickin', lot's lickin'. But father can do nothin', just lick and lick, but kids only fight. Angelus no wanto work. He big man fourteen and wanto play ball all day. Father say, "You go today and work in restaurant and work with uncle, for he pay and you learn the business." What does he say? He make faces, cusses, laughs, and runs out to play ball. He cusses everybody, hollers, and runs away. He very bad boy. He no like restaurant business. He no wanto work. He tell me, "Go to hell," "Shut your mouth," "Why don't you holler all the time?" He get up at noon and go out and play ball. That not right. I go out to the ball game and say, "Angie, come home with me from these bad boys and work." He laugh at me, make a face, and tell me to go home and do my own business. He like nothing but ball. He gets very mad and breaks the chairs, smashes the house, and falls on the floor kicking and saying bad names to me. His father work hard, have heart trouble. Angie oughto help. His father work hard when he was only eleven years old. That would be right way for Angie.

Interviews with neighbors are valuable in determining the status of the family in the community, attitudes of neighbors toward the family, and the manner in which they have been instrumental in defining the boy's attitudes toward his family. In this case the neighbors are decidedly in favor of the boy, protecting him from his family, and assuring him that he is justified in rebelling against the harsh treatment of his "foreign" parents.

TYPICAL INTERVIEW WITH NEIGHBORS

That's a dago family or Greek or some other foreigners. They fight most of the time. The oldest girl (married daughter) has a sharp tongue. You can hear her all the time laying somebody out. The kid seems purty nice; he would be all right if they didn't beat him all the time. I guess they are like all foreigners. They have a bad house all night. They pound Angie around, want him to work and support the family, I guess. I don't blame the kid. I told him he didn't have to work, and that it was against the law for him to work yet. These foreigners want their kids to work before they are out of the cradle. You ought to throw the old folks in the pen instead of the kids. They don't belong in this country; they don't know how to live here. I wish they would move out of here, but they own those houses, so I guess they are here to stay. We don't have much to do with them, only I side with the kids. I like the boy; he is a nice chap. Too young to work. I'd leave that dump (home) if I was him. I've told him not to live there and put up with them damn foreigners.

BOY'S OWN STORY

I have had a lot of trouble at home. They all fight me and hate me. They don't want me to play or have any fun with the fellows. They say I ought to work all day, then play just a little at night. The other fellows my age don't work, and I don't see why I have to if they don't. My married sister always has her gab to say. She can't keep her nose out of my business. She tells my mother what to do with me—that I ought to work and never play, and that I ought to be put in jail. She is always fighting me. I can't help but curse her. I get so mad I can't hold myself. She'd make anybody sore. My uncle tries to boss me all the time, and make me work. He wants me to work in his restaurant. I don't like that business; I want to be a ball player. He sticks with my sister against me. They both hate me. My mother makes me mad when she won't let me play baseball. She always goes out where we play ball and whips me and then the boys have the laugh on me. When she goes away they say, "You've got a heck of a mother." That's one thing that makes me boil inside, and the fellows have the laugh on me. I like to play baseball; its the greatest game in the world. I'd like to be a professional baseball player—a real great player. Babe Ruth is the kind of a player I would like to be. Everybody knows him, and the fellows all talk about him. He's a great swatter. I wish I could bat like him. I always read everything in the sport section of the paper every day. I want to play ball; I don't want to work all day—I'm too young to work. That makes everybody sore at home, and everybody beats me and hollers on me, and I get mad and feel like killing some one. They beat me and put pepper in my eyes to make me work.

That's the way they are all against me. I feel like I don't belong there. They tease me and nag me, and that makes me sore. Then I hit them with anything. I can't have any fun. If I work hard they still fuss with me and don't give me any of my money. I get filled up with mad feelings and tear into them. I can't help it. They all think I'm a liar and a thief. I get blamed for everything. I wish I didn't have to live there sometimes.

The fellows used to call me "dago" and "wop," but now I'm a good player on the team, and they don't call me names. Everybody calls my folks wops and dagos; nobody likes us and never have anything to do with us. Nobody else is foreigners around here but us.

When I stole the money from my mother I bought a ball bat and glove. They wouldn't buy any for me. They don't think enough of me to buy anything for me.

The following stenographic report of a family interview is sufficient to reveal the actual family situation in which the boy's behavior difficulties were occurring. Note the interplay of gestures, attitudes of other members toward the boy, and the latter's conception of himself in relation to these attitudes:

FAMILY INTERVIEW

(Father, mother, brother-in-law, married sister, Angelus, and the other children were present. Throughout the interview, Angelus stood in the corner of the room, maintaining a defiant and antagonistic attitude.)

Interviewer: Mr. Debakus, I have come here to see you in regard to Angelus. I understand that you are having some difficulty with him.

Father: Angie is a very bad boy. I have ten kids (pointing to the children, who were standing in the room), but Angie cause lots of trouble. He run away, fights, steals, and want to play all day. He lazy, won't work. And———

Married daughter: Angie he is awful bad. He swears at me and hits me and talks awful bad. He swears at his mother and won't do a thing she tells him. He fights her, even strikes her and calls her names, something awful. You should hear him cussing and swearing at his father and mother. You wouldn't believe it if you wouldn't hear him. Yes, and he steals. He stole two dollars and bought a ball glove once. He took the money from his mother. He's always running off with other boys without asking his ma. Now what can you do with such a boy? He's got a good job working in his uncle's restaurant, but we have to beat him to make him work there, and he whines and complains that the work is too hard and he don't want to work there. He's stubborn and bullheaded and lazy. It's a good job and he could learn the business and the uncle would treat him swell. He only makes excuses to not work, but pa beats him and makes him work.

Mother: I have a big family and have to work hard washin', but Angie he want to loaf around and run away with other boys. I lick him, but he swears back and runs off again. I afraid he learnin' to steal with them. He don't work. My husband has heart trouble and can't work much. He lies lots and steals. Maybe you scare him, Mister, so he work.

Married daughter: You can't believe a word he says. He's a big liar and———

Boy (interrupting): Yes! You're the liar! You don't need to stick in! Why don't you go home and take him (pointing to the brother-in-law) with you? You make me———

Married daughter: You see how he talks back. You should hear him when he swears at his mother. It's awful the way he swears at his parents!

Boy: Shut up, you hain't got nothin' in this! You don't live here! Why don't you go home where you belong?

Married daughter: He was always wantin' me to cook him a good dinner. One day I told him I would cook him a good meal. He wanted to help, and asked if he couldn't go to the store for me, and acted so nice. But as soon as he'd got his belly full, then he began to cuss me and talk mean to me. That's the way he is. He can be awful nice if he wants you to do somethin' for him, then he turns around and cusses you afterwards. I won't have anything to do with him!

Boy: She lies! I don't want anything to do with her neither. I never will make up with her.

Mother: And the worst part is, Jimmie, who is only twelve, do everythin' just like Angie do. Jimmie is good boy now, but I afraid he learn bad things if Angie keep on bein' bad.

Boy: Yes, you just think Jimmie ain't bad. What did he do to Irish the other day? He tripped him and hurt his face when he fell, and then Jimmie just laught. I guess he's just as bad as I am. You all just think the other kids are angels, and that I'm the only one that's bad. You're all aginst me!

Married daughter: We wouldn't be against you if you would be good and work. You're always fighting and cussing. You're the cause of all the trouble around the house.

Boy: You're always talkin' against me and makin' fun of me! Nobody likes me here. You're all against me. I don't want to stay around here. I can't do anything that I want to do. Irish [a chum] don't have to work. He can do anything he wants to. Nobody always hollerin' at him. I don't see why I can't play ball an' not work in an old restaurant all day.

Married daughter (sarcastically): Why, you've got an easy job. You dont have to do much. It don't amount to much, what you do. You're just lazy and want to play all day. What do you care what Irish does? He's a bum, and you'll be just like him.

Boy (retorting): Oh, you don't know nothin' about my work! You wouldn't think it was easy if you had to do it all day! Why don't you do a little work? You're always stickin' your nose in. You've got a big mouth.

Married daughter: Have I? Well, I'll slap yours, if you get too fresh! If I can't, my husband can. You're too fresh, you little bum! You're just like the lazy bums you run with. You're good to them, but cuss your own father and mother. You need a good beating! Everybody's too good to you!

Brother-in-law: He [referring to Angelus] talks too much; don't know how to mind. He needs somebody with a strong arm to handle him awhile. His parents let him play with them. He's got a hot head. I'd take it out of him if I lived with him. I have beat him a few times, but you'd have t' kill him t' break him. But he needs it.

My father was strict with me in Greece. He knowed how t' lick. There the kid has t' mind or be killed by beatin'. My father's word was the law there.

There the married sons usually live at home with the father. It is like one big family, but the father rules everything. Believe me, he rules, too! Mine did! All the money that is earned is turned over to the father. The father is very strict and whips his kids lots if they don't mind. If I had done like this kid [pointing to Angelus] my father would beat me t' death! That's the reason they obey over there and don't steal and get into trouble. They're afraid of their father. I was terribly afraid of mine. When the old man dies, the oldest son runs things. If he is good and the brothers like him, they stay, but if he is too mean, or their wives don't like to obey him, they all leave.

There the boy has t' work. Why should this kid [Angelus] play ball all day and not work and help his father? If we don't beat him he won't mind, and will grow up to be a thief or kill somebody. He already is a bum! I've tried to help the parents out by whipping him. I've given him several good beatings for quarreling and fighting. He needs more of it, and harder.

Boy: Yes! You're not my boss! You've got no right to whip me! I don't have to mind you! You can't make me mind you! I'm not goin' to be bossed around by you! Why don't you go on home and take care of your own business? You're always stickin' your nose in.

They're all against me. They hate me around here. They don't want me to have any fun—just work. This hain't like any home. They are all against me! [crying].

Married daughter: You baby, you'd better cry! It'll be better for you t' cry instead of stealing and fighting so much.

Boy: Shut up! You're always sassin'!

Married daughter: I've seen you cry before; it don't worry me. You'll be beating somebody the next minute.

Mother: Mister, see Angie has a hot temper. He fight and quarrel everybody, like you see.

Boy: Oh! You're all against me! You make me feel like killing somebody. You don't want me here!

Married daughter: Yes, you'll be a murderer, running with them little Irish bums. What did we tell you? You're just like them, want to be a lazy bum. We don't want you to disgrace our family. You're the only bum in the family.

Brother-in-law: He seems to think that he doesn't need t' work, but just bum off the family. He ought to have my father for a little while in Greece. He'd make a man out of him. They're too easy with him here. He runs everybody around here but me. I gave him a good trimming the other night.

Boy: I'll get you some of these days! If I were bigger I'd get you now. I'll lay you out! Go back to Greece where you come from; nobody wants you here! [At this point everybody laughed, and Angelus became very angry and rushed out of the house into the back yard. As he was leaving, he cursed his parents and said: "You are all against me and hate me! I will kill you! I'll run away and never come back!"]

Married daughter: You see how mean he is. He is liable to kill somebody. He's dangerous! Won't you have him arrested?

Mother: Mister, please scare Angie. He very bad boy. We no can make good boy him.

Father: I lick him many times hard with club. Think sometimes I kill him. No good. He very bad. Just like Irish bum kids. No work, wanto play. That is bad.

Mother: Mister, I got ten kids, work hard. Lots a' worry. I lick Angie, hard, every day. Father lick him; brother-in-law lick him; sister lick him;

everybody lick him. Still he bad boy; say he kill all us. Mister, he bad boy, scare him, Mister, please. Tell him, "Angie, work or I put you in jail for long time." Then he be good, maybe! [At this time the brother-in-law went out to Angelus, took him by the arm and started to pull him into the house. Angelus called him a son of a b—— and told him to go back in the house. The brother-in-law, becoming angry, struck Angelus in the face, and the latter threw himself on the ground, screaming, cursing and kicking. The father and mother and the married daughter ran out of the house, and as the father hurried toward Angelus, the latter ran into the alley and disappeared. He returned late that night and slept on the doorstep.]

When compared with other cases, it is clear that this case falls definitely in the class of cultural conflicts. We have in the family background a persistence of the old Grecian family pattern, the outstanding features of which consist in the exercise of paternal authority, rigorous discipline, and the subordination of the individual member to the ideals of economic security. In accordance with this tradition the boy must go to work at an early age and contribute his earnings to the family budget. On the other hand, the boy is living in a community which is predominantly third-generation German and Irish. His attitudes and behavior are definitely organized in terms of play, sports, and attending high school, all of which are in direct conflict with family expectations. This conflict is made more acute because this is the only Greek family in the community, and the boy has accepted the antagonistic and superior attitudes of the neighbors toward his parents. It is in this conflict of values, attitudes, and interests that the boy's temper tantrums, stubbornness, and open defiance of parental authority have developed. The particular behavior difficulties of the boy are incident to the larger cultural conflict between the family and the prevailing social patterns of the community.

THE ANALYSIS OF CULTURE

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ABSTRACT

Up to the present, culture surveys have been limited to the primitive civilizations, but they are applicable to the higher civilizations as well. Western civilization is both a culture and a composite of cultures. It is important to know the channels by which diffusion of culture traits has taken place, and the conditions which facilitate diffusion. We need a culture survey of our nationality groups and of the various culture areas within the national boundaries. This would give a better understanding of the factors in our civilization which are fundamental, both structurally and dynamically.

The most important contributions of social anthropology in the nineteenth century were with regard to comparative customs, institutions, and social organizations. The most important contributions of the first quarter of the present century are probably the analyses of culture, including particularly the diffusion of culture traits. While these concepts are not distinctly new, they have been clarified and elaborated by contemporary workers who have brought to the task new methods, knowledge, and insight.

Culture may be defined as all those artificial objects, institutions, modes of life or of thought which are not peculiarly individual but which characterize a group and have both spatial and temporal contiguity; or, in the oft-quoted words of Tylor, as "that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society."[1] Culture, therefore, is supra-individual. The individual is a carrier and transmitter of it and he may modify it; but no individual creates more than an infinitesimal portion of the culture which he acquires through membership in a group. A tribe, usually the smallest unit investigated by the ethnographer, is a culture unit, but it is not the creator of all the phases of culture which it embodies. Its culture is like that of neighbors, or of some neighbors, in so many respects that one cannot regard the resem-

[1] *Primitive Culture*, I, 1.

blances as due to chance or as originating independently; for if chance were invoked, the marvel would be that the tribes which have most traits in common should be geographically contiguous.

The ethnologist, then, is able to recognize culture areas which include within their borders several tribes. Thus the outstanding culture traits shared by the Plains Indians show such marked similarity in many details that we speak of it as Plains area culture. So of the culture of the Eskimo, which is spread over a long narrow strip of the Arctic New World, involving many distinct localities which have no direct contacts with one another. Indeed, practically the whole of the ethnographically known aboriginal New World can be mapped into culture areas.

Recently an attempt has been made to do this for Negro Africa, though not with the same success as the task has been carried through for North America, owing, possibly in part at least, to the more rapid diffusion of culture traits through much of the African continent, and owing partly also to the nature of the ethnographical data, which have not been so well defined for Africa as for North America. There are distinct culture areas in Oceania, such as Polynesia, Melanesia, and Micronesia, and certain culture areas in the Philippines are readily recognized.

Much of the aboriginal world can be mapped into culture areas the character of many of which is fairly well known, though with regard to some large geographical areas there is little information or practically none at all. Enough is known about aboriginal cultures, however, to justify certain important conclusions regarding them. Can as much be said for the areas occupied by the "higher" civilizations?

MODERN CIVILIZATION AS A CULTURE AND A COMPOSITE OF CULTURES

Modern civilization is both a culture and a composite of cultures. The various culture traits include industries, economic activities and organizations, political life, education, literature, science, art, law, ethics, and idealism. The use of the radio is a culture trait; so is the drinking of tea, the smoking of tobacco, utopian idealism, the democratic urge.

The explanation of our present form of civilization is, in fact, impossible without the concept of culture. Western civilization developed out of small kinship groups common among the Germanic peoples, and it forged ahead only after Graeco-Roman contacts. Graeco-Roman influence is but a name for the resurrection and diffusion of culture. To describe the historic process in the terminology of the anthropologist, there was the diffusion to north and west of various culture traits: of the science, literature, and architecture of Mediterranean civilizations; of law, medicine, and education. To speak of certain Germanic peoples as Latinized is but to say that they adopted various culture traits from Roman civilization.

But much has happened in addition to the spread of Graeco-Roman culture throughout the area which we now call Western civilization. Western civilization is far flung and it has many local diversifications, some of which occupy large geographical areas. Between these various portions of the culture there are contacts, and culture traits spread from one minor culture area to another. There is an English culture, a French culture, a German culture; and each has borrowed traits from all of the others.

Thus there is culture within culture. There are sections of American culture, such as portions of the mountain regions of Kentucky and Tennessee, which are different in content and in emphasis from other culture areas, such as portions of New England.

The mechanism by which culture traits spread in civilization has not, to our knowledge, been carefully studied, though possibly no single problem of culture life would yield richer returns. Certain conditions which facilitate the adoption of a trait, and a careful study of these might give new insights into the main factors responsible for culture changes.

Some things spread because of their obvious utility—such as matches, improved firearms, and military appliances generally—others because they make an aesthetic appeal, such as art in its various forms. Others spread because of an appeal to a sense of the dramatic, or because they contain elements of the comic, as is well evidenced in the ubiquity and eternal life of jokes. The intel-

lectual and religious appeals are further examples of qualities which favor the spread of culture traits, although in every instance one must consider the nature of the soil as well as the potentiality of the implanted culture seed.

Is culture analysis a proper problem for the sociologist? I think that it is, and that it would be a profitable approach to a study of the present social order. However that may be, in certain fields it can assuredly be used with profit, particularly in the case of relatively small and coherent culture groups. During two summers the writer made a study of various nationality groups in a community of about fifty thousand inhabitants,[2] 65 per cent of whom were foreign-born. Within the larger community were distinct smaller groups of Japanese, Basques, Chinese, Albano-Italians, Mexicans, Greeks, Armenians, and several others. As might be expected, each of these nationality groups was a culture group different in many respects from all others. Within the community was a group of about five thousand Germans from the Volga region in Russia, who were almost as thoroughly segregated and as much apart from the remainder of the community as if the group were surrounded by a wall. Geographically they lived on American soil, but culturally they were in many respects a German-Russian village. Quite different were the Armenians, little segregated and more disposed to understand and participate in things American; yet without a knowledge of their historical background and of the culture traits which they had brought with them, an understanding of this group would be impossible. In short, only an analysis of their culture would afford an insight into the life of any of these respective nationality groups. In the United States there are thousands of such groupings and we know little about them save as to certain conditions of living or of labor. Of their traditions, customs, ideas, ideals, superstitions, intellectual activities, hopes, and ambitions we have meager information.

Of the various culture areas within the United States there have been no analyses. There is no account of them in their completeness, and glimpses of certain phases of the life do not take the

[2] Fresno, California. The investigation referred to was made in 1919 and 1920 for the *Fresno Republican,* then edited by Chester H. Rowell.

place of the rounded study which would describe the various traits of the culture in their functioning interdependence. Perhaps the greater portion of the South, the "Bible belt," as Mencken has called it, is a culture area; at any rate in many portions of the South, such as parts of Texas and of Louisiana, there are distinct culture areas. A New England community is certainly a different kind of culture area from that of mountaineers in Virginia, Tennessee, or Kentucky. We know something about these culture areas, but we do not know any of them with sufficient thoroughness. In the main, in the case of so-called "backward" areas, we have emphasized the absence of certain culture traits rather than described those which are present.

The community survey suggests an approach to a culture analysis, but so far it has been limited mainly to the material phases of the culture, the statistics of economic enterprises, conditions of work, of housing, and the like; and it has usually dealt with a geographical rather than a true culture area. Usually it yields little information about the driving forces which create or maintain institutions and activities, and as a rule it is silent about other culture phases of communty life.

It would be interesting to see a culture map of the United States, or rather a series of maps, showing the geographical distribution of various culture traits and their local coloring. This would show the distribution of traits of material culture—of machinery in its various forms, of travel and transportation and the facilities for both. It would show the distribution of types of physical equipment—of buildings and dwellings, materials used in construction, house furnishings and equipment.

Foods and industrial activities constitute another important culture phase which should be analyzed and plotted. In spite of the fifty-seven hundred manufactured varieties which are on the market, foods differ locally. Compare, for example, the southeastern and the southwestern sections of the country.

The distribution of industrial activities would not be difficult to ascertain, so far as the outstanding ones are concerned, but the local variations are sometimes important.

Aesthetic activities would include the interest in music, art,

and architecture and the accomplishments in these various fields. Landscaping, gardening, and provision of parks are among the items which would be included.

Intellectual activities and accomplishments would constitute one of the most important portions of such a survey. What do the people know, what do they believe, what knowledge do they aim to attain, what is their equipment in libraries, educational institutions, personnel of investigators, museums, and so on?

A difficult but important item of investigation is the culture horizon. To what extent does a given locality participate in other cultures? In village A, how many elements of Eastern and Western civilization are present? How much of Egypt, Greece, and Rome can be seen in museum, in architecture, or in public or private library? What portion of the larger culture world penetrates through the channels of the press, journals, travelers from the community, or travelers who visit the community? To what extent are the traits of the local culture those which are practically world-wide—such as matches, tinned goods, automobiles—to what extent is it practically nation-wide, and to what extent is it peculiar to the locality? In brief, what are the aesthetic, intellectual, economic, and political horizons of the culture, and what are the horizons of its material equipment?

But the problems must be worked out in detail as one proceeds with the task. They differ from those which confront the ethnographer. He deals with a small and relatively homogeneous group whose contacts with the outside world are narrowly limited. But civilization invades and is invaded by a great variety of cultures. Compared with the aboriginal civilization, the present-day civilization of North America is uniform throughout—the same newspaper, the same automobile, the same soaps, drugs, foods, etc.

Even so, sectional differences in many phases of culture persist in parts of the country, and local diversities there are, though roads, automobiles, press, telephone, and radio are rapidly making them, at least superficially, similar throughout the land.

A phase of culture which the ethnologists have not adequately emphasized is the interdependence of the various traits of a given culture. They do not function as isolated or independent traits, but

each is related to all the others. This applies to the higher no less than to the simpler cultures. A study of culture in higher civilization, therefore, should be concerned with the interrelations of the various culture traits. How does the science affect the religion, and vice versa? What is the relation between the press and various other phases of the culture, its industrial organization, its political flair, its educational policies, its community spirit?

Each trait should be studied in its relation to all others, for each affects all the others. The automobile has made many important changes in addition to a facilitation of traffic; the telephone does much besides enabling us to speak at a distance; a doctrine of equal rights for all ultimately affects economic classes, the relations between the sexes, and the status of children. A doctrine of evolution in the organic world is applied to mind, morals, religion, and indeed all phases of life.

Culture analyses make the subtle forces of social life more apparent to those who live in them, for people are not cognizant of their culture environment. A Bryce gives us the best interpretation of American life; an Ostrogorski tells us more about our political parties than we had known; a Lowell explains to Englishmen their own form of institutions. It is difficult for a people to see their own culture, for it is the medium through which they look out upon the world, and it furnishes the standards by which they estimate culture traits.

Culture influences are the determining forces of the social world. The prejudice which we call racial is at basis merely cultural, and nothing does so much to mitigate it as an understanding of one's own culture and that of other peoples. Culture analysis is, indeed, eminently proper for sociology. What importance have social forces, social origins, social psychology, social anything, aside from the particular culture in which they are embodied? Culture is the frame of reference in which sociology can unify its data.

GENERAL METHODOLOGY

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ABSTRACT

"Methodology" is the logicians' name for the process by which new scientific knowledge is formed. The methods of research which characterize contemporary sociology have been developed as a result of the effort to make social work and social reform intelligent. *The phases of general methodology.*—The general method of scientific sociology has three phases: generalized description, classification, and the formation of abstract concepts and hypotheses. Sociological concepts are of two kinds: point-of-view concepts and classificatory and analytical, or disjunctive, concepts. *Technique of investigation as a phase of methodology.*—In addition to the formation of concepts and hypotheses, general methodology implies techniques for the collection and analysis of concrete data. These techniques may be classified in two ways. First, the study of each class of concrete materials develops to some extent its own techniques of investigation, and some nine classes of sociological techniques in present use may be distinguished from this point of view. Second, there are standardized techniques of sociological investigation which are useful in many or all of the special fields of study. Four or five of these standardized techniques may be distinguished, including the three described in other papers of this division, in addition to the historical method and perhaps the method of "natural history."

The term "methodology" seems to have been devised by nineteenth-century writers on logic to meet the need for a category under which they might discuss the general procedure by means of which new scientific truth is discovered. In other words, for the newer philosophy which has evolved by grappling with the problems created by the development of natural science, logic is an instrumental science—instrumental, that is, not in the defense of cherished beliefs, but in the systematization of knowledge derived from experience and subject to verification by observation and experiment.

While one set of philosophers have occupied themselves with the task of adapting formal logic to the demands created by the rise of the physical sciences, however, others have devoted particular attention to the methodological problems which have arisen in connection with the newer studies called the social sciences. At about the beginning of the twentieth century sociological thought

received a fresh impetus from a new source, and the effect of this impetus was in general to direct the efforts and the methods of the sociologists into channels more in conformity with the trend of the older natural sciences. The social changes which we designate collectively as the Industrial Revolution had created during the nineteenth century a series of practical social problems, including new forms of poverty, social unrest, and new types of crime and vice. A new profession developed to meet the need occasioned by these evils: the profession of the social worker. The earlier forms of social work were characterized by naïve faith in the virtue and power of "charity" to relieve the unfortunate, and of punitive justice to restrain the antisocial. It was soon discovered, however, and it has become increasingly apparent with longer experience and reflection, that these naïve measures were based upon entirely too simple a conception of the causes of the evils in question. Social workers and philanthropists beginning, let us say, with Charles Booth, have felt the necessity of studying the conditions with which they were trying to cope before attempting to prescribe the remedial and constructive measures to be used. Gradually social agencies have adopted the practice of studying their problems more objectively and of modifying their techniques and policies in the light of their past experience as recorded in their own files. Social surveys are beginning to be made with the sincere purpose of finding out how things happen and what can be done, and not simply for the purpose of justifying the existence of a particular agency or institution. In the measure in which this change has taken place, social philosophy and social work have come to be supplemented and guided by social research. If we wish to make of sociology a true natural science, it must be based upon social research.

THREE PHASES OF GENERAL METHODOLOGY

The method by which a general or abstract science is built up from concrete and practical experience has several typical steps or stages. It begins with a procedure which may be called generalized description. This procedure involves the selection of some case or sequence of events for study as a type. The description of this case

is centered upon those features of the case which we feel to be "what might have been expected," that is, those features which we believe we can explain in terms of the operation of natural forces and processes. This stage in the general method of social research may also be called the natural-history stage; it involves the depiction of the natural history of human society. Natural history is concerned with the typical or the representative, as contrasted with historical narrative, which seeks to convey to the reader with the aid of an artistic technique the unique features of an event "as it actually happened." Obviously, however, the criteria of historical narrative and of natural history are in many respects the same. The scientific analysis which is based upon the natural history must explain the concrete events which actually happened, or it will not serve the desired purposes of prediction and control. The value of generalized description, in other words, is dependent upon the care, objectivity, and insight with which the original cases were observed. The cases used by Queen and Mann in their textbook on *Social Pathology,* and the case materials presented by Mrs. Wembridge in *Other Peoples' Daughters* are good examples of the natural-history technique in process of differentiation from the simple description of individual cases.

A second procedure involved in the general method of social science—one which in practice must develop concurrently with the generalization of description—is classification. In the domain of social science, the features of the concrete cases which are of the greatest causal significance are frequently so obscured from our observation that classifications are made on the basis of superficial and irrelevant, rather than fundamental, resemblances. What we take the concrete experience to be is determined by the habits of thought and action which we have taken over as cultural patterns from the society in which we have grown up, so that a natural process tends to perpetuate the time-honored and conventionalized classifications and analyses. Perhaps a fair example of this type of error is the practice of treating the political or governmental, commonly so called, as a fundamental category of social control, when in fact many matters which are apparently controlled by political means are really determined by the mores. Careful scrutiny and

analysis of concrete social data must therefore precede and accompany classification.

The purpose of classification as a phase of scientific analysis is the formation of concepts and hypotheses. At this point our survey of the general methodology of social science brings us back to the logicians' definition of methodology. Sigwart, in his treatise on logic, names as one of the two general tasks of methodology, "the complete determination of concepts." As a matter of fact, one might almost define "a science" in some such terms as "a logically ordered system of concepts and hypotheses, designed for the analysis, explanation, prediction, and control of some general class of empirical phenomena."

The formulation of concepts and hypotheses is, then, the third phase or step, and in a sense the final one, in the general methodology of social science. The method is, to be sure, an ascending spiral. When a hypothesis has been formed or an old one modified, it is next in order to test it by trying to see whether it is able to explain concrete cases other than those from which it was abstracted. This involves, of course, the collection, scrutiny, analysis, and classification of new data, and so the whole cycle is traversed again. Indeed, it was probably some half-formulated hypothesis, more or less intuitively arrived at, which led to the objective study of the original data.

The concepts employed in a general science are of several kinds, differing in their degree of abstractness. Hobson asserts that "Some concepts have direct perceptual counterparts, such concepts have been formed by a direct process of abstraction, in which what are, for the purpose of formation of the scheme, irrelevant characteristics of the perceptual objects or processes have been removed by abstraction." "Concepts of the other species," he continues, "have no such direct perceptual counterparts, or it is not assumed a priori that they have such; they are formed by an effort of constructive imagination, for the purposes of the representative system."[1] This statement sets forth substantially the same doctrine concerning the rôle of general concepts in science which had been previously stated by Vaihinger in his "as if" philosophy, when

[1] Ernest W. Hobson, *The Domain of Natural Science*, p. 32.

he declared that the concepts of a science are always in some sense and degree fictions. The function of such general concepts is that of elements in a frame of reference by means of which the concrete data with which the science is concerned may be explained and described in terms which make them comparable, so that the experience which is had in one case may be made to reveal what can be expected in another.

Now, as a matter of fact, the science of sociology has in recent decades made progress toward the establishment of a standardized outfit of conceptual tools for the handling of the problems which it is more and more clearly identifying as its own. It seems quite clear, in the first place, that in sociology we have developed a number of concepts, each of which serves to define a point of view from which almost the whole range of phenomena in which we are interested may be studied. Thus we are making use of several closely related terms which define a point of view from which sociology proceeds as a physical science, or at least as a biological science. "The economic process," "competition," "population," and "human ecology" are such terms. They indicate a point of view from which we can study the distribution and interaction of human beings in space, and their organization into economic structures. "Collective behavior," or "collective psychology," is a concept invented by French writers to indicate a point of view from which social happenings are studied with special attention to their corporate or collective character. A point of view has also been defined from which we study the social interaction by a distinctly psychological technique, with due regard for the motives which animate the actors and the imaginations which they have of one another. We have, however, at present no standardized general term by which to designate this point of view, since "social process" is taken to include the physical as well as the psychological aspects of the social interaction. "Human nature," "social attitudes," and "personality" are terms which represent one or more points of view which are likewise psychological, but which involve the focusing of attention upon the interacting units—the persons and their socially significant attitudes, wishes, and ideas.

Next, it can be pointed out that we are developing, under each

of these points of view, concepts for the classification and analysis of the materials which are dealt with. Perhaps it would be better to refer to these concepts simply as disjunctive concepts, thereby calling attention to the logical criterion by which they are to be tested. Thus, for example, we strive to identify types of ecological formations and typical ecological factors, types of personalities or social rôles, and we endeavor to subsume in general categories the motives which activate all social behavior. The persistent attempts which American sociologists have made to draw up and use lists of wishes, interests, or "social forces" seems to indicate the felt need for a scheme of disjunctive concepts—clearly of the fictional type—by means of which social phenomena may be analyzed into simple, homogeneous elements, even though such elements are not empirically observable in the experienced cases.

TECHNIQUE OF INVESTIGATION AS A PHASE OF METHODOLOGY

Enough has been said in the foregoing paragraphs to indicate reasons for concurring in Sigwart's dictum that "the complete determination of concepts" is one of the two major tasks involved in general methodology. His phrase to designate the other major task is "the adequate grounding of judgments." Here again we may take his terminology as point of departure, although in what follows we shall perhaps deviate from Sigwart's own intention. At any rate, it is possible to describe a phase of the general method of sociology which may in practice be distinguished from the development and revision of conceptual systems. "The adequate grounding of judgments," which Sigwart postulated as the second phase of general methodology, depends upon the development of techniques for the collection, representation, and analysis of data, and this work is especially important in social science, where the data cannot as a rule be secured under closely controlled laboratory conditions.

It is, in fact, only metaphorically that we may speak of "sociological laboratories." Social research must secure data by the aid of whatever objective and critical methods we may be able to devise for the observation of events which occur in the world of everyday experience, where factors in which we are not for the time

being interested nevertheless cannot be excluded. It is helpful here to consider two different classifications of methods for dealing with concrete materials.

The first plan of classification arranges the techniques of investigation with reference to the empirical character of the materials studied. Some of the largest contributions to the general science of sociology, if not the only ones, have in the past been made and will doubtless continue to be made by students who have been interested in particular social problems, usually practical problems, and who have set to work to find out more about the forces and the people with which they were concerned—what the relevant facts really were and how things really worked. By pursuing these inquiries, such students have gradually gained greater and greater knowledge of their problems. At the same time they have gradually developed and perfected techniques for getting and interpreting the facts which they have needed. The study of every particular class of concrete phenomena and every type of practical problem in the social field which has so far been investigated represents, therefore, in a certain sense a special technique of research. Classifying from this point of view, one may enumerate the following special types of recent and contemporary social research: (1) The study of communities and other territorial groups—the "community survey" method. (2) The study of conflicts and conflict groups, illustrated by studies of race relations, industrial relations, and international relations. (3) Studies of social unrest and social "movements." (4) The study of single phases of institutional life, as in the sociological study of religion, "sociological jurisprudence," and in the study of cults and of festivals. (5) Studies of personality types, personal experiences and case histories, and "personality problems." (6) The study of cultures. (7) The study of group symbols and group ideals, as in the study of folk-lore and literature, and the sociological study of art. (8) The study of public opinion and the political process. (9) The study of economic competition and co-operation, and of economic organization.

Finally, by another method of classification, we can distinguish several specialized techniques of investigation which have been perfected and standardized to the point where they are ap-

plicable in the study of many or all of the special classes of problems, though for obvious reasons each of them has been more useful in some researches than in others. These are the techniques three of which have been described in the other papers presented in this division: the statistical method, the method of case study, and the method of cultural analysis. These three are probably the most nearly standardized techniques of social investigation which have been developed down to the present time. There is some question, however, whether or not we ought to add one or two others to the list. Professor Teggart has recently published a provocative volume in defense of the historical method as a method of social research. Space does not permit of a discussion of his argument here. It may be remarked, however, that the case which he makes out for the study of "the way things have come to be as they are"[2] is a very strong one. It is doubtless true that the primary objectives of history and of sociology taken as a natural science are essentially distinct. Each may be shown to have its own value. Still, it is also true that in the task of scientific sociological analysis we have need of the historical method as at least an auxiliary technique; for in many cases it is only by investigating the process by which particular social situations have come to be what they are that we can comprehend them as they are.

A case might also be made out for adding a fifth general technique of investigation, the natural-history method, previously described. It is, perhaps, not very fundamentally different as a method from the case-study method; both are methods of generalizing description or of studying particular instances as types. Still there is a wide difference in practice between the intensive analysis of particular cases—usually cases of personal behavior—and the method involved in gathering a quantity of information about religious sects, for example, to the end that one is enabled to describe the manner in which any sect is formed, grows, and decays or alters its character. Apparently the latter is a method which can be made widely applicable in the study of the factors and processes of social life as seen from a certain point of view, namely, that of organization pattern.

[2] Frederick J. Teggart, *Theory of History*, pp. 164–65, 168, 171, 187–97.

In summary, this paper has attempted to show, first, that the general method of sociological research is not fundamentally different from that of any other general natural science; it involves techniques for the assembling and analysis of empirical data, and a conceptual system which is the instrument whereby the experience represented by the data can be brought to bear upon the solution of problems which subsequently arise. Secondly, the methods of sociological research, like those of other sciences, have to be adapted in their details to the character of the materials studied. The space limits of this paper have precluded reviewing in any detail the evidence of progress in the development of sociological methodology; it is believed, however, that the study of the recent history of sociology tends to reveal that gains have been made both in the way of standardizing the conceptual system and in the effectiveness of techniques of investigation.

DIVISION ON SOCIAL RESEARCH

PROBLEMS AND METHODS IN STATISTICAL ETHICS

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I

The traditional treatment of ethics has been almost entirely theoretical. Discontent with this purely theoretical treatment has led to the development of descriptive or comparative ethics. In the hands of such men as Westermarck, Hobhouse, Tufts, and the French school of sociological moralists, comparative ethics has been primarily historical. By using the genetic or evolutionary approach to moral problems, these writers have made important contributions to our knowledge. Another attempt to make ethics more empirical has come from the schools of ethics which may be called utilitarian, telic, or consequential. These thinkers emphasize the importance of the future in our moral judgments. This approach to ethics has been fruitful also. But neither knowledge of the unverifiable past nor knowledge of the more or less inaccessible future can be substitutes for detailed knowledge of the living present in all its variety and processes of change. So one of our main needs at the present time is the development of studies in contemporary morality, as well as in other aspects of our valuations.

There have been two approaches to contemporary morality in recent writings. Some men (F. C. Sharp, G. C. Cox, C. F. Taeusch) have studied cases of actual moral problems or codes. This work has led to a survey of what men consider right and what they consider wrong. For reasons to be indicated shortly, this work has been useful, but incomplete. The other approach has been by psychologists (G. G. Fernald, F. L. Wells) who were trying to get tests for defective or delinquent persons. This work has been important, but in a limited way.

II

In order to secure significant additions to our knowledge, it is necessary to have an adequate combination of hypothetical theory and factual verification. Merely to stare blankly at the facts will not teach us much. So we must ask what theories are pertinent to our study of comparative ethics.

One of the most fruitful of modern discoveries is the logic of relations. From the time of Aristotle until our own day, almost all logic has been concerned with class concepts and their manipulation in such relatively trivial forms of thought as the syllogism. Under the influence of our American thinker, Charles Peirce, there has been developed an elaborate logic of relations by

such men as Schroeder, Whitehead, and Russell. With this logic as a tool of analysis, much of our traditional thinking needs to be revised. Roughly speaking, we may say that most important matters involve relational facts rather than class concepts. In accordance with this theory, the present writer has attempted to work out a relational, or, as it has been called, melioristic, theory of value. Without going into details, it may be said that this theory asserts that all facts of value involve what may be called the relation of better or worse. To the relation of betterness, all other value characteristics are subordinate, whether the moral qualities of right and wrong, the general qualities of good and bad, or what not.

If this relational or melioristic theory of value can be accepted as either completely or partially true, then it follows that our study of comparative ethics must deal with more complex problems than the traditional ones, and must use more complex tools of investigation. Fortunately we have one such tool for inductive investigation in the recent development of the statistics of correlation. With the help of correlational statistics, we can deal adequately with the relational nature of value and with similar complex relational problems.

With the relational theory of value as an hypothesis and with correlational statistics as a method of inductive investigation, the present writer has published three studies in comparative ethics, or what may be called statistical ethics (the *International Journal of Ethics*, January, 1923; April, 1924; January, 1925). Although several additional investigations are nearly completed, the present short discussion can deal only with the general nature of the problems and methods which have been involved in this work.

III

There are many moral topics that might be studied. My previous work has centered around a list of "sixteen worst practices." It is important to note that the list of practices was given by popular opinion, in this case by many hundred students at the start of a course in ethics. Some very serious forms of misconduct, such as murder, are not included because they are not practices among the groups involved. Other practices, such as smoking or dancing, are included because they are considered objectionable by a small minority among the groups. No good practices are included because it is difficult to get a satisfactory list of such topics. I am now experimenting with a positive list of good traits of character. It is to be noted that classes are necessary as topics because it is desirable to compare the comparative value and the comparative frequency of the topics. For this purpose individual actions would not do, though it may be useful later to study such topics. It may be advisable later to study classes of actions which have been logically and accurately defined. But popular opinion could hardly do this, so our first studies must deal with the topics as they function in popular opinion. The topics, as given by popular opinion, may seem somewhat vague or ambiguous. But they function with surprising definiteness in all our results.

With this list of sixteen worst practices, rankings were secured concerning both the comparative worseness of the practices and the comparative frequency of occurrence of them. At first the comparative worseness was secured for human beings in general, regardless of sex. This gave very definite results, but it was clear that a further question must be raised concerning the comparative value when the practices were done by men and when they were done by women. In the studies of comparative frequency, the sexes were separated for all questions. For all three problems, "general worseness," "double standards," and "frequency," rankings were secured from the following groups: different academic classes in the University of Texas, men and women separately, similar groups at other American universities, and, more recently, from different occupational groups, high-school students, and a few other groups. The studies so far finished have covered American universities with fair, though not complete, adequacy, and have merely sampled other groups. No facts have been secured as yet from groups outside of the United States.

It should be noticed that all the studies which I have made have been concerned with discovering the central tendencies of various groups. Of course attention has been paid to the average deviations or other measures of dispersion, but no attempt has yet been made to give adequate studies of individuals as individuals. We have made a map of what may be called "moral mediocrity." But eccentricity may be more important than mediocrity. Only we must first have the central tendencies from which to measure. Let me emphasize the point that no assertion or suggestion has been made that the central tendencies are or should be normative in any sense. Some judgments may be more reasonable than the central tendencies of these groups; some may be less reasonable. But here we have larger and more philosophical problems.

IV

What are the specific problems upon which light may be thrown by the study of the sixteen practices, when they are ranked according to both comparative value and comparative frequency, and when they are studied with the methods of correlational statistics? Some eight problems may be indicated briefly.

1. If the relational theory of value is true, the question occurs whether popular opinion exhibits the relational structure to fit this theory. The statistical studies have shown a very definite relational structure in all the results. So I think it may be said that the relational or melioristic theory of value has had significant, though of course incomplete, verification.

2. We have had many guesses concerning the alleged differences among human valuations. But the facts are that the most frequent coefficient of correlation is plus .98 among large groups of university students. This is an extraordinarily and almost incredibly high degree of uniformity. Naturally the correlations will be lower when individuals are compared separately, but clearly we need facts rather than ignorant dogmas.

3. Some thinkers would say that the valuations are uniform because they are standardized by tradition. Also they would say that there is no tradition concerning frequency, and therefore there could be no uniformity there. But the facts are otherwise. The coefficients of correlation for frequency usually run from plus .95 to plus .99. Again the uniformity is surprisingly high. For reasons that cannot be discussed here, I think that these frequency estimates are fairly reliable as evidence concerning actual behavior, certainly more reliable than any other evidence that I know.

4. We have had many theories concerning the relation between moral standards and actual behavior. The first accumulation of facts indicates that there is a correlation of negative .56 to .58 between comparative worseness and greater frequency of practice.

5. Our figures give very definite information concerning the differences between the morality of men and the morality of women. Concerning the general value scale, there is no significant difference, as the correlation between the men and the women is plus .98. But concerning the so-called "double standard," there are interesting differences. Idleness is the only practice which is considered worse for men than for women. But there are many practices which are worse for women to do: smoking, swearing, drinking, vulgar talk, sex irregularity, and gambling. Concerning the actual behavior of the two sexes, there is what is usually called a chance correlation, that is, the coefficient of correlation is plus .03. Whether or not there ought to be a code of double standards, there undeniably is a fact of double behavior.

6. There is space merely to indicate that we can study the influence upon our moral topics from the differences in age, in geographical location, in occupation, and in other ways. There is an underlying uniformity, but there are many interesting differences in the moral results for study and explanation.

7. Of peculiar ethical interest is the problem concerning the criteria which popular opinion uses in making the rankings according to comparative value. In this connection we can study, by the method of correlation, all of the traditional hypotheses, such as hedonism or utilitarianism. This method may transform ethical theory into a combination of the formulation of hypotheses and the factual verification of them.

8. Finally, it may be mentioned that these studies give to the general problem of social description an extension into the realm of ethics and other aspects of value.

V

I shall not spend any time arguing whether this work in statistical ethics is a part of philosophy or ethics, sociology or psychology. It is obviously on the borderline of several subjects according to our traditional classifications. Two things are necessary: first, to enliven our factual descriptions with fruitful and significant theories or hypotheses; second, to insist that all our theories and hypotheses must be submitted to factual verification.

THE DETERMINATION OF GRADIENTS IN THE GROWTH OF THE CITY

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It is only recently that sociologists have begun to study the city from the standpoint of its growth. The main processes in urban development are now being defined and analyzed. The most evident process, looking at community growth ecologically, is that of radical expansion from the center.

The center of every city, or the point of dominance in urban growth, is the downtown business district; in Chicago, the loop. As business and light manufacturing expand into the residential district surrounding it, there appears a zone in transition, the so-called slum of every English and American city. The skilled worker and his family depart from this area as it deteriorates, and build up the zone of workingmen's homes, not too far away, of course, from the factories in which he works. The professional and clerical groups employed in the downtown offices live still farther out, while those who can afford it and who prize suburban life escape to the commuters' zone.[1]

All American cities which I have observed or studied approximate in greater or less degree this ideal construction; no one, however, not even Columbus, Ohio, perfectly exemplifies it. To make the point concrete, the theory of concentric circles may be applied to Chicago. The lake front makes an important alteration in the pattern. In place of concentric circles are semicircles or belts. Other lake cities, like Cleveland and Detroit, exhibit this same variation. But with this difference the pattern holds. The loop is the business, civic, social work, and cultural center. The zone in transition in Chicago, as in other cities, holds in their most intense and concentrated form the social problems of the city: bad housing, poverty, vice, and crime. It is an area in which flourishes all that is picturesque and arresting in the modern cities: Hobohemia, immigrant colonies like the Ghetto, Greektown, Little Sicily, Bohemia, the Moody Bible Institute, cabarets, and spiritualistic halls. The zone of workingmen's homes is the area of second settlement for the immigrant well on the way to Americanization, already aspiring to enter the residential zone of single family dwellings and apartment houses of the native-born American. Only in the commuters' zone of restricted neighborhood development does the American of our native traditions feel somewhat secure from the tide of immigrant invasion.

Having worked out this general description of radial expansion, interest at once turns to a feasible method of measuring this process and its effects upon community life. The suggestion was made by Professor Robert E. Park that it would be desirable to work out gradients in city growth. By gradient is meant the rate of change of a variable condition like poverty, or home ownership, or births, or divorce, from the standpoint of its distribution over a given area.

[1] See Park, *The City*, p. 51, for chart illustrating these zones.

That the incidence of these social phenomena varies widely by different areas of the city had been clearly seen in a series of spot maps which our students have prepared. Similarly, Dr. Mowrer, in his new book on *Family Disorganization,* shows a significant chart[2] of areas of the city (around the loop) where there are both divorce and desertion; other areas, generally apartment-house districts where there is only divorce, and the suburban districts where neither divorce nor desertion is to be found. On the basis of this study he defines, with reference to family life, five types of areas: (1) the non-family area, (2) the emancipated family area, (3) the paternal family area with desertion, (4) the equalitarian family area with both divorce and desertion, and (5) the maternal family area with neither divorce nor desertion.

A first requisite for the determination of gradients in urban growth was the securing of a suitable unit area or district for comparative statistical data. Fortunately, Chicago is one of the eleven so-called "tract cities." By "tract city" the census bureau designates those urban communities where certain tabulations can be made by census tracts. Accordingly the Local Community Research Committee of the University of Chicago secured data for the 500 census tracts of the city. These data include, among other facts, country of birth of the foreign-born, families and dwellings, sex and age groups. While the census tracts are not identical in size, they are almost always some division of a mile, being most frequently one-eighth of a square mile, a size entirely satisfactory for a unit district.

It next was necessary to select a series of tracts to measure the effect upon the urban community of radial expansion. It seemed highly desirable to choose a line of unit districts which had experienced the full force of radial expansion, uncomplicated so far as possible by the presence of other factors. The choice, therefore, fell upon the line of tracts just south of West Madison Street, since this thoroughfare is by far the clearest illustration of the effect of radial extension from the dominating business center, uninfluenced by the lake front, which excludes other lines of unit districts under the influence of arterial streets running out of the loop.

This line of tracts running west along West Madison Street starts in the central business district with the intersection at State Street which 200,000 people pass daily, and extends through the zone in transition, the zone of second immigrant settlement, the middle-class residential district zone, and ends in the higher-class residential district zone of Oak Park.

Each of the unit districts is one-quarter of a mile wide, giving, theoretically, 36 unit districts in a 9-mile line from State Street to Harlem Avenue, the west boundary of Oak Park. Actually, these 36 district units are represented by 20 census tracts.

The figures on home ownership (Table I) will indicate the method used in the determination of gradients. In the first census tract (unit districts A 1 and

[2] P. 121, Chart XI.

2) the percentage of families owning homes is less than 1; in the second census tract (unit districts A 3 and 4) it is 1 per cent; in unit districts B 5 and 6, comprising one census tract, it is 4, rising to 7, then 12, then 15, 18, falling to

TABLE I*

HOME OWNERSHIP: PERCENTAGE OF FAMILIES OWNING THEIR HOMES
(UNITED STATES CENSUS, 1920)

Urban Area	Unit District	By ½-Mile Unit	By One-Mile Unit
Central business-district zone	A 1	0	0.5
	2	0	
	3	1	
	4	1	
Zone in transition (area of first immigrant settlement)	B 5	4	5.5
	6	4	
	7	7	
	8	7	
	C 9	7	12.3
	10	12	
	11	15	
	12	15	
Zone of second immigrant settlement (workingmen's homes)	D13	15	17.3
	14	18	
	15	18	
	16	18	
	E17	17	19.8
	18	16	
	19	23	
	20	23	
Middle-class residential-district zone	F21	29	33.3
	22	30	
	23	31	
	24	40	
	G25	40	40.0
	26	40	
	27	40	
	28	40	
Higher-class residential-district zone	H29	40	51.0
	30	40	
	31	62	
	32	62	
	I33	62	62.0
	34	62	
	35	62	
	36	62	

*Numbers connected by brackets were derived from the same census tract.

17 and 16, and then rising to 23, 29, 30, 31, 40, and finally to its highest point, 62 per cent, in Oak Park. Combining these ¼-mile unit districts in one-mile unit districts by giving each unit district equal weight, a quite regular upward graduation of percentage of families owning homes is obtained. The gradients of home ownership are particularly significant, since home ownership is both one of the most significant negative indexes of mobility and one of the positive indications of the stability not only of the family but of community life.

The data obtained from the census made it possible to tabulate in the same way (Table II) the percentage of the total population in these unit districts of males, of persons twenty-one years and over, and the percentage of foreign-born. In all these cases the differences are most marked in the unit districts in the first 4 or 5 miles, although in all cases the difference is very great from the loop to Oak Park; percentage of males from 85.5 per cent to 47.0 per cent; persons twenty-one years of age and over, from 88.2 to 66.4; and percentage of foreign-born, from 39.0 to 14.

In a similar way (Table III) the data for poverty, divorce, and juvenile delinquency rates were worked out from spot maps prepared by Fay B. Karpf and Erle F. Young, Ernest R. Mowrer, and Clifford R. Shaw. It is significant to note here that the highest rate of poverty occurs in the zone of first immigrant settlement, while the two high points of the divorce rate occur in the outer half of the zone of first immigrant settlement and the inner half of the zone of second immigrant settlement. The objection may well be made that the incidence of poverty and divorce is figured on total population, whereas poverty should be calculated upon the number of families, and divorce on the number of married persons. In the boy-delinquency rate, where the boy population 11–17 years is taken as the base, the most striking differences are obtained as from 443 per 1,000 in the first mile unit, 58 in the second mile, 27 in the third mile, 15 in the fourth mile, 4 in the fifth mile, and none in either the sixth or seventh mile. Note particularly the figures for the first two ¼-mile units of the central business district, where over half the boys were brought into the juvenile court in an 18 months' period.

From the standpoint of the determination of gradients in urban expansion, these figures on boy delinquency, at least for the first four 1-mile unit districts, are very interesting. For the actual numbers are very close to a series of square roots.

The final table is an attempt to arrive at a quantitative analysis of the actual course of change in these unit districts by a comparison of the rates of increase or decrease of population. In the central business district and in the greater part of the zone in transition, land values rose due to present or prospective business use, although population declined in the period from 1910 to 1920. This drop in land values marks the movement westward of the zone of deterioration. Interestingly enough, the high points in land values at business intersections appear to forecast residential deterioration of the neighborhood.

TABLE II*

COMPOSITION OF POPULATION

(PERCENTAGE OF MALES, OF PERSONS TWENTY-ONE YEARS OF AGE AND OLDER, AND OF FOREIGN-BORN OF TOTAL POPULATION, BY UNIT DISTRICTS)

URBAN AREA	UNIT DISTRICT	PERCENTAGE OF MALES		PERCENTAGE OF PERSONS 21 YEARS AND OVER		PERCENTAGE OF FOREIGN-BORN	
		¼-Mile Unit	1-Mile Unit	¼-Mile Unit	1-Mile Unit	¼-Mile Unit	1-Mile Unit
Central business district zone..	A 1	83.6	85 5	85.3	88.2	30	39.0
	2	83.6		85.3		30	
	3	86.5		92.0		48	
	4	86.5		92.0		48	
Zone in transition (area of first immigrant settlement).....	B 5	72.5	66.3	82.2	81.2	38	33.0
	6	72.5		82.2		38	
	7	60.0		80.1		28	
	8	60 0		80.1		28	
Zone of second immigrant settlement (workingmen's homes).	C 9	49.8	54.1	77.4	74.6	21	20.0
	10	51.4		75.5		22	
	11	52.6	73	72.3		19	
	12	52.5		73.3		18	
	D13	50.4	49 0	66.0	67.6	20	19.8
	14	48.7		67.2		20	
	15	48 8		67.0		19	
	16	47.9		70.0		20	
	E17	48.2	46.1	72.3	74.8	21	18.3
	18	45.0		73.4		16	
	19	45.6		76.8		18	
	20	45.6		76.8		18	
Middle-class residential-district zone.....	F21	47.0	47.8	68.7	68.5	19	18.8
	22	46.9		70.7		17	
	23	47.3		67.4		20	
	24	49.8		67.1		19	
	G25	49.8	49.8	67.1	67.1	19	19.0
	26	49.8		67.1		19	
	27	49.8		67.1		19	
	28	49.8		67.1		19	
Higher-class residental-district zone.....	H29	49.8	48.4	67.1	66.7	19	16.5
	30	49.8		67.1		19	
	31	47.0		66.4		14	
	32	47.0		66.4		14	
	G33	47.0	47.0	66.4	66.4	14	14.0
	34	47.0		66.4		14	
	35	47.0		66.4		14	
	36	47.0		66.4		14	

* Numbers connected by brackets were derived from the same census tract.

TABLE III*

POVERTY, DIVORCE, AND JUVENILE DELINQUENCY RATES

(POVERTY AND DIVORCE RATES PER 1,000 POPULATION, AND BOY-DELINQUENCY RATES PER 1,000 BOYS OF THE JUVENILE COURT AGE IN THE POPULATION [11–17 YEARS, INCLUSIVE] BY UNIT DISTRICTS)

URBAN AREA	UNIT DISTRICT	CASES PER 1,000 POPULATION					
		Males and Females, All Ages				Males 11–17 Years	
		Poverty		Divorce		Boy Delinquency	
		¼-Mile Unit	1-Mile Unit	¼-Mile Unit	1-Mile Unit	¼-Mile Unit	1-Mile Unit
Central business district zone..	A 1	1.9	2.0	2.6	2.0	539	443
	2	1.9		2.6		539	
	3	2.0		1.3		346	
	4	2.0		1.3		346	
Zone in transition (area of first immigrant settlement).....	B 5	3.9	3.2	2.9	2.9	57	58
	6	3.9		2.9		57	
	7	2.5		2.9		58	
	8	2.5		2 9		58	
	C 9	1.5	2.1	4.8	4.3	20	27
	10	1.5		4.9		37	
	11	2.2		3.3		38	
	12	3.1		4.0		12	
Zone of second immigrant settlement (workingmen's homes).	D13	3.0	1.3	3.0	3 4	16	15
	14	0.8		4.2		7	
	15	1.0		2.7		13	
	16	0.3		3.2		25	
	E17	0.2	0.1	2.6	2.0	4	4
	18	0.2		2.6		4	
	19	0.0		1.4		4	
	20	0.0		1.4		4	
Middle-class residential-district zone.....	F21	0 0	0.1	0.7	1.3	0	0
	22	0.0		1.9		0	
	23	0.3		1.4		0	
	24	0.1		1.2		0	
	G25	0 1	0.1	1 2	1.2	0	0
	26	0.1		1.2		0	
	27	0.1		1.2		0	
	28	0.1		1.2		0	
Higher-class residential-district zone.....	H29	n.d.		n.d.		n.d.	
	30						
	31						
	32						
	G33	n.d.		n.d.		n.d.	
	34						
	35						
	36						

* Numbers bracketed were derived from the same census tract. Poverty rates derived from *Map of the Distribution of Philanthropy and Poverty, 1920–21*, by Fay B. Karpf and Erle F. Young; divorce rates obtained from *Divorce Map of Chicago, 1919*, by Ernest R. Mowrer; boy-delinquency rates secured from *Map of Cases of Boys in the Cook County Juvenile Court, 1923–24*, by Clifford R. Shaw.

The area of stationary or slight increase in population is marked by drops in land values, while the areas of rapid increase in population give the biggest gains in land values.

The space allotted to this paper has been sufficient to give only the raw data of gradations in the incidence of certain aspects of urban life in their distribution over the city. The further steps in the study are to plot frequency curves and to derive, if possible, mathematical formulas for these gradients in urban organization and growth. Finally, it is all-important to take time series in the same city and to make comparative studies in the other ten census-tract cities.

THE USE OF PSYCHOANALYTIC CLASSIFICATION IN THE ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: IDENTIFICATION[1]

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I

A present trend in sociological research is toward inductive study of personal histories. But psychiatrists seem to have the deepest insight into personal behavior. Psychiatry has values for social research and theory as well as for social work. The reinterpretation of current sociological generalizations in terms of psychiatric insights is a task as important as the more familiar study of the biological and cultural sources of social behavior.

As in physical medicine, the knowledge of disease gives better understanding of so-called "normal" conditions. There is no such cleavage between normal and abnormal as is popularly supposed. Mental disease is a social judgment, a name used to classify certain behaviors out of touch with currently and locally accepted social realities. There is a relativity of sanity as well as of morals.

A considerable number of persons, such as the Salem witch-baiters, can succeed in persuading each other of the validity or virtue of certain beliefs and attitudes, yet be judged by observers as "crazy" because the outsiders have not shared the group's experience and the group has not shared the observers' experience.

Furthermore, others are not so apt to declare a judgment of insanity if more than one share a delusion. The larger the number sharing and countenancing the delusion, the greater the presumption of plausibility or sanity.

The only check-up on the validity of any attitude shared by a group is obtained by extending the horizon of its situation to include points of reference (verification) outside the original group.

Common beliefs, attitudes, wishes, complexes, and behavior patterns, despite possible invalidity for new situations, are apt to be approved, imbedded in mores, channelized in institutions. Spiritualists, for example, institutionalize and encourage the so-called "abnormal" state of trance dissociation, etc.

Psychiatrists have observed certain type responses or behavior patterns and have formulated concepts and terminology with which to handle these phenomena. But these types of behavior are seen to be common in some de-

[1] The following is an abstract of the full text of this paper, which appears in the *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, June–September, 1927. A condensed translation also appears in the *Kölner Vierteljahrsheft für Sociologie*.

gree to all men, and they operate in a social milieu. They must have value also in the understanding and control of all social situations.

The method is merely that of Huxley: observing similarities and tying them in bundles; but the labels are borrowed from psychiatry. In every situation the psychiatric sociologist or socioanalyst looks for the dynamic mechanisms in the individuals involved, even as the biological sociologist seeks "traits"; the social psychologist, the "attitudes"; and the culture historian, the "values" and stored stimuli.

Verification, if it can be so called, consists here merely in trying out the new categories as pigeonholes for classification and as intellectual grasping tools in the analysis, through historical and case studies, of as many varieties of group situations as possible.

Through the extension of conscious insight and the further objectification of attitude and method, psychopathology contributes to all the social arts and sciences. The psychiatric attitude is a way of responding to the attitude-problems of persons, objectively evaluating the assets, liabilities, trends, and relations involved in the total situation, including the psychiatrist, and attempting to solve the equation in a satisfactory way without praise or blame by the psychiatrist or permanent dependence upon him.

Psychiatry, unlike most psychology and most physiology, deals with the behavior of the human organism as a unit-whole in its response to situation. It thus contributes to the interpretation of "social attitudes" rather than of "social values."

In true psychiatric socioanalysis we seek the mechanisms of actual persons, and through these an interpretation of groups considered as functional unities composed of interacting, interconditioned socii. In mere psychiatric analogy, on the other hand, the theorist attempts to find in the alleged "social mind" processes or attitudes or psychoses analogous to those of the individual. Thus, Prussia was a megalomaniac; Jugoslavia has an oppression psychosis; the Jewish race shows overcompensation; the United States has paranoid illusions of grandeur with regressive infantilism and withdrawal from reality, etc. It may be that such behavior patterns can be found operative in the group-selves of persons dominating these groups. But, to paraphrase Burke, one cannot diagnose a whole nation.

The temptation to group-realism and organismic analogies must be guarded against here in a new form.

II

It is natural that psychiatric concepts originating in the treatment of the maladjusted variant individual should have been introduced to interpret maladjusted variant groups before being utilized in the objective analysis of groups considered "normal" by the sociologists.

Among students of social science who have used psychiatric classification

in the analysis of social behavior are Parker, Tead, Groves, Holt, Martin, Swisher, Ogburn, Cory, Robinson, Miller, Peters, Kolnai, Tannenbaum, Wolfe, Rivers, Malinowski, Sorokin, Williams, Burgess, Young, Reed, Rice, Myers, Armstrong, Becker, Playne.

Among the sociologizing psychopathologists are Freud, Jung, Pfister, Rank, Herbertz, Low, White, Róheim, Patrick, Southard, Jarrett, Putnam, Blanchard, Platt, Burrow. I omit here the popularizers.

Much of these writers' material was already familiar to those of us who had already absorbed the concepts into their social thinking directly from the psychiatric literature. My own first paper was written in 1919, and the basis for the present study in 1919–20, though I had utilized the psychiatric approach in teaching theory since 1916.

The possible contributions to social theory of Kempf and Sherrington are not yet generally appreciated.

Among the psychiatric concepts and mechanisms which seem to have been used most satisfactorily are: the unconscious; the autonomic system; postural tensions, intra-psychic or organic conflict; the complex; the divided self; repression; reconditionings of response; transference, symbolization, substitution, sublimation; ambivalence; integration; regression, narcissism, infantilism, etc.; extroversion and introversion; sadism; masochism; exhibitionism; escapes from reality; defense-mechanisms; rationalization; identification.

III

Identification is fundamentally the process by which the self is recognized and its limits defined. The limits of the self are recognized by the degree of control experienced. That which is observed to respond immediately to subjective impulse is the physical self. It is observed as functioning as a unity similar to that of other persons. The selves of others are similarly identified by us.

The process of defining or experiencing the limits of a self calls, logically, for inclusion (within the functional unity) and for exclusion. This process is normally continuous, though largely unconscious. We imagine that for us the self is rather well defined, at least on the physical plane. But is the chyme of a person just about to be seasick, or the mortified toe of a frozen soldier, a part of him?

A behavioristic definition of identification is ultimately in terms of coordinated control and of observably like response. Obviously the observability of the similarity of response is ultimately a subjective judgment; the weak point in behaviorism. But we probably have our nearest approach to a physiological basis for the foregoing phenomena in Sherrington's "common paths," or possibly Marston's "psychons."

The psychiatrist recognizes that the process of inclusion or extrusion applies constantly to one's experiences, memories, and character, as well as to

one's body. There is a sort of spiritual metabolism, by which parts of experience are assimilated and more or less integrated in the self and others are rejected, repressed, forgot, or at least are recognized in memory as not to be identified with one's true self.

If, however, the organism has ever been dominated in behavior by any complex or behavior pattern, so that subjectively the self has been identified with it, those experiences or memories acquire insistence. They are harder to repress, and conflict or alternation, rather than integration, may set in. The individual becomes the dividual or divided self. Carried to an extreme, we have the multiple personality or the paranoid. Conscience and temptation are more familiar examples.

A decision, as Bergson has pointed out, involves irrevocably voting-in some element of personality, and voting-out certain possible experiences, sometimes whole segments of possible selves.

Psychiatrists recognize the inclusive and assimilative phase of the identification process under the term "introjection," and the extrusive process as "projection."

The colloquial expression "to identify one's self" with a group or cause refers to the introjective phase of the identification process. The group experience is a part of one, and one behaves as if the group's unity were his own. He feels and speaks for the group, behaves *as* that one of his group-selves. An individual of abundant energies and wide sympathies might be called naturally introjective. Such persons in our current world are "joiners," are easily influenced by groups or leaders, play many rôles, or think easily in "we" terms.

Projection, by contrast, is the attributing of experiences to the not-self or to other selves. A frequent usage of "projection" is to describe the process by which attitudes and traits imagined within the self are projected upon the screen of another self. The pathological varieties include illusions of persecution or grandeur. Other varieties of projection are seen in such phenomena as contact and imitative magic; the reference of pain to the not-self by the Christian Scientist; the imputation of independence to the control by a "medium"; the cynic's aloofness, etc. Prejudice often justifies itself by projecting upon the out-group the traits which the in-group-self would wish to hate, and identifies every member of the out-group with those traits.

It is not only barbarian cults or deluded maniacs who depend upon scapegoats. Many a man or group has his community's sins wished upon him (projection); or by willing introjection he does vicarious atonement for them.

The conception of one's rôle, like imitation, depends in part upon the satisfactions one gets from introjecting one or another personality or elements thereof.

Projection and introjection combine in such phenomena as totems, the influence of collective representations, the "moral sentiments" of Adam Smith and the "consciousness of kind" of Giddings, the "Unknown Soldier," the sym-

pathy of the antivivisectionist, morbid fears of death, the identification by a chamber of commerce leader or Central American politician of the interests of the entire community with his own interests, etc.

The maturing process represents normally both projection and introjection: a successive sloughing off of old experiences and assimilation or integration of new experiences. Fixation or regression at infantile levels may occur, however.

Conscience may be projected upon the group, as in some cases of agoraphobia or illusions of persecution, or upon God or Devil; again, the herd experiences may be introjected as "conscience." Psychic isolation, if conscious, involves the identification mechanism, especially projection.

Wherever a type of behavior is recognized as similar to one's own, similar interests or wishes are "projected upon" the observed persons. If experience has shown that the common wish is for a common objective which cannot be shared, the response will be combative competition; if experience contains no such conditioned response, the satisfactions of mutual approval, or the accidental or foreseen advantages of joint effort may lead to a sense of group, i.e., the sense of functional unity, with which each individual then introjectively identifies himself. Here we have consciousness of kind, together with the less conscious bases of group formation, described in terms of identification behavior in the component individuals: projective identification followed by group introjection.[2]

Groups once formed are recognized by a self much as are individualities. If people behave so as to be recognized and responded to as a collective functional unity in some respect, the word "group," and other group words, will be among the responses of recognition.[2]

Because selfhood is linked with the conception or feeling of functional unity, it is easy (by conditioned response) to project upon a group the attributes of selfhood. Hence the "crowd spirit," the "soul of the nation," the *Zeitgeist*.[2,3]

In the so-called "collective psychoses," the members of the group have a situation in common and have identified themselves with some interpretation of that situation. They corroborate one another, and, especially in the case of combat groups, the reciprocal attitudes, setting up and conditioning a system of circular responses between the groups at their contact points, confirm the ideas of each group about the other. Each projects upon the other traits, partly imagined by the first group, partly actually felt by the opponent, or adopted as a pose in response to the attitude of the first group.

[2] The relation of the conditioned reponse to identification and to consciousness of kind was recognized by the writer in a paper prepared for the *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology* in 1919–20. At least one other writer has since published the point elsewhere.

[3] The *Gestalt* terminology may be helpful here, but does not seem to add anything new to the conception.

It takes an outside observer to see each group in other relations, and to "diagnose" the group as collectively "neurotic." If, however, all humanity has the same illusion about some situation, there is no way out but accident. If the sane of the earth have lost their sanity, wherewith shall they be saved? We need a sociological Einstein or a deus ex machina.

The formulation and familiarization of psychiatric concepts may actually create modes of behavior in their own image. People will behave *as if* they had libido, complexes, transferences or divided selves, and (*à la* James-Lange) will "get that way," or may react against such mechanisms *as if* they were there to be reacted against. This sophistication is sufficiently observable already to suggest the complexity of such research.

PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS FROM A STUDY OF INVENTORS

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Progress depends, to a considerable degree, upon invention. By what measures, then, can society stimulate progress by providing suitable conditions for inventors? As a preliminary excursion in the inductive study of this problem, members of the Bryn Mawr seminar in Social Origins in 1925–26 collected and analyzed the information available about those of the inventors mentioned in Kaempffert's *Popular History of American Invention* for whom data are not too fragmentary to be useful. Information was secured relative to 171 individuals who had made significant contributions to mechanical invention, including most of those outstanding among the English and American inventors of the past three centuries.

Our problem hinges on two questions: By what characteristics or symptoms can potential inventors be identified? What motives actuate inventors; what factors cause them to invent? Relating to the first of these points, the occupation of the father seemed promising. Of the inventors in our list for whom information as to the occupation of the father is available, 23 per cent had fathers who were professional men. Of the men listed in the 1921 edition of *American Men of Science,* 43.1 per cent were sons of professional men. In the United States in 1850, 3.1 per cent of white men having occupations were in the professions. While the number of cases in our sample is too small to be conclusive, the indication is that inventors do tend to come from the professional class more than from others; but the large proportion who come from non-professional families makes the occupation of the father very inadequate as an index of probable inventive ability.

About 10 per cent of the inventors on our list are known to have had fathers or other near relatives who were inventors. Although this proportion is doubtless much higher than in the population at large, the ratio is too small to justify placing much emphasis upon this factor in seeking potential inventors.

The heading of personality traits suggests itself as a promising lead in the search for symptoms of the inventive temperament. While no systematic personality studies have been made of inventors as a group, the characteristics mentioned in biographical sketches are suggestive. Many of the traits vary radically as between individual inventors. Some had excellent business sense;

some seemed almost to lack this trait. Some were gentle and kind; some irritable and difficult. One trait does stand out with startling emphasis in the cursory references which we have been able to trace: inventors have had a very marked tendency to tenacity, persistency, and even obstinacy. To succeed as an inventor one must stick to one's problem in spite of discouragement and distraction. Although the mental characteristics of ingenuity, keen intelligence, insight, and the like take a prominent place in the personality sketches studied, it is a striking fact that such qualities take second place when compared to persistency. Energy, courage, and eccentricity appear with significant frequency. Of special interest to the psychiatrist is the fact that timidity and sensitiveness are repeatedly mentioned.

Even more significant as a basis for selecting promising inventors is the fact of their recidivism. Two-thirds of the men in our list are known to have made more than one invention; indeed, 18 per cent are credited with five or more inventions. It is highly probable that if the full facts were obtainable the others also would be found to be repeaters. The best symptom of potential inventiveness, then, is the fact of having made inventions. Ethel Verry gives evidence from her observations of spontaneous activities of children two to four years old that certain of the children were continually introducing games and activities of their own invention, while other children in the group never did so.[1] It would not be difficult to devise objective tests to isolate very early in life the individuals who show inventive capacity and tenacity of purpose. Such tests, however, would have value only on the assumption that there is a high correlation between the presence of these traits in childhood and in later life in the same individuals.

But if the potential inventors were located, what could society do to stimulate their inventive activities? There is a popular superstition that inventors are in general self-taught. It was therefore a surprise to observe that 59 per cent of the men in our list had had either college or technical courses, or both. This was true even before 1800. About a third of the inventors were either self-taught or had only a grammar-school education, but the tendency in recent years has been toward the higher education of a larger and larger proportion.

As a stimulus to invention, it is evident from even our scanty data that contact with other inventors takes a prominent place. In the lives of 39 per cent of the men on our list such contacts are known to have played an important part.

First impressions in studying inventions emphasize the frequency with which important innovations are made by individuals who come in from outside the industry involved. More careful study of the lives of the men in our list, however, indicates that only about one in five was an amateur or outsider in the industry to which his invention applied. Sixty per cent were old hands

[1] Ethel Verry, "A Study of Mental and Social Attitudes in the Free Play of Preschool Children," University of Iowa Master's thesis.

in the work affected by their inventions, and about 20 per cent were professional inventors.

Our patent laws are based upon the tacit assumption that the financial return is one of the great incentives to inventors. Perhaps the most striking result of our analysis is the discovery of the relative infrequency with which this motive appears in the actual stimulation of inventors as reported by their biographers. The hope of making money from the invention is noted only five times in the material which we have been able to locate relative to these 171 inventors, while the joy of manipulating materials, of experimentation and exploration, appear in connection with 66 different individuals. Next in importance in the apparent motivation of inventors is the perception of a need to be met, a problem to be solved. Thus our conception of what stimulates invention has undoubtedly been too mechanical and intellectualistic. We have thought of a terminal reward as the attractive force which has lured the inventor on through his long struggle. Actually it appears that the pleasure of the inventive process, the zest of pitting one's powers against a puzzling obstacle, the fun of using one's mental and mechanical abilities, the satisfaction of rendering a service to one's fellow-men—in a word, the joy of functioning—is the driving power that keeps the typical inventor going.

What are the things that hold the inventor back? As to the real discouragers—the things that defeat the inventor—it is hard to obtain objective evidence. We tabulated the frequency with which certain circumstances are mentioned which would seem to be of a deterrent nature. Poverty leads the list in frequency, being mentioned in connection with one-sixth of the inventors in our list. Next comes ridicule, mentioned in connection with one out of eight men. Conceivably, in some cases, ridicule and even poverty may have acted as stimulants, but their net results can hardly have failed to distract and hinder most of the inventors who suffered from them. After poverty and ridicule come lack of equipment, initial failure, and infringement of patents, with family opposition, destruction of models, and other forms of violence bringing up the rear.

As to actual rewards received by inventors, wealth is noted as coming to 28 per cent, fame or recognition to 37 per cent, and the knowledge of their own success to 53 per cent. One or more of these rewards came to 69 per cent of the men in our list. On the other hand, disappointment or poverty or both were noted as the ultimate rewards of only 20 per cent. In this respect there has been a striking change for the better. For inventors who did their major work before 1800, disappointment and poverty are mentioned almost as frequently as success, fame, and wealth, i.e., 17 times as compared with 24 mentions of favorable outcomes. After 1800 the ratio is better, and for inventors doing their major work after 1890, the good rewards are mentioned 15 times as frequently as the bad.

Recognizing candidly the extremely tentative nature of the conclusions which can be built upon such fragmentary data as we could obtain, it seems

worth while to suggest a hypothesis which is consistent with these data and which it is hoped may stimulate more elaborate studies in this field:

Potential inventors can, probably, be located early in life by studying the relative inventive tendencies of school children and by observing the inventive performances of young men and women. Outstanding characteristics of successful inventors are: first of all, persistence; then intelligence, energy, and originality. Persons showing these characteristics and exhibiting a strong tendency to invention should be given as full an education as possible. They should especially be brought into contact with other inventors. They need not, and probably should not, be given a very large financial compensation. All that they require is to be brought into contact with interesting problems, to be given adequate laboratory and field opportunities, to be thrown into frequent contact with other workers in allied fields, and they will invent.

If this, in its broad outlines, is a correct hypothesis, there is reason for optimism about the future course of invention. Not only has the harsh treatment accorded inventors before 1800 been greatly mollified, but the development of great modern research institutions, both in private foundations and in connection with commercial establishments, is following much the lines indicated. Probably the greatest opportunity for improving our present technique of stimulating invention lies in earlier and better selection of potential inventors. The young people given the best opportunities for research are often selected in a quite casual, or at best unscientific, way. Much of our best potential inventive capacity is miseducated in stereotyped schools and browbeaten into psychopathic conditions by resistence and resentment against their attempts at innovation in childhood. We can create progress by the simple expedient of early location of potential inventors, eliminating the distorting factors now pressing upon them, and exposing them to the problems that need solving with tools adequate to attack the problems.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF ETHICAL STANDARDS IN THE AMERICAN TRADE ASSOCIATION

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WORKING HYPOTHESIS

Our working hypothesis is that ethics is a biological function: the adjustment of the human species to its social environment. If men are to live together, it is necessary to establish workable relations and harmonize competing interests. This function is carried out through the social group, by means of customs, standards, and codes.

The primary concern of social science is not with abstract ideals of conduct or with the particular standards evolved by various communities. It is rather with the function of ethics itself, the process of social adjustment, the general method of evaluating behavior which has been followed by the human species. To learn this it is necessary to study typical social groups, to see how the function is normally carried on.

The American trade associations supply a unique laboratory for this purpose. They are compact social groups, bound together by common interests. Starting with ethical chaos, they have within twenty years developed certain definite and generally accepted standards of practice. These standards cover the relations between competitors and between the industry and the public. In many cases they have been expressed in written codes, which may be used to throw light on the problems the industry has been compelled to face.

QUESTIONS TO BE DETERMINED

1. What is the method of appraising conduct which has been followed by the typical social group?

2. How far does the standardization of conduct have a survival value for the group as a whole?

3. Is it possible to work out a technique for appraising conduct through the study of its social effects?

RESEARCH PROJECT

For a number of years I have been carrying on an extensive study of trade-association procedure from the standpoint of social control. The present project is an intensive study of at least six representative industries to determine the historical and practical basis of standards of practice now recognized. The object is to secure the inductive approach to ethics which we have lacked hitherto. If it proves possible to make an accurate generalization of the meth-

od of ethical appraisal followed by the trade association, this method will then be checked by applying it in the field of industrial relations, where social adjustment is still in process. The object here is not to solve specific problems. It is rather to develop criteria for guiding the research work in social science which is now in prospect.

In order to facilitate the collection of certain data I propose using a group of mature graduate students who would carry on field work in the industries selected. Each man would live for a year with that industry, starting as an employee in the shop and office of a representative plant, transferring to the trade-association office in order to see the industry in its organized aspect, and spending the balance of his field year interviewing men who could supply the information desired.

METHODS OF WORK

Each industry must be approached in the spirit of the social scientist, rather than the reformer, without attempting to attach praise or blame. It must be studied from within, largely through the use of participant observers. My general method is as follows: First, select certain important standards generally accepted by the industry as the thing to do or not to do. This does not mean that the standard is universally followed, but at least it must be followed by the leading firms in the organized industry. Check back ten to twenty years to learn, by contrast, the practices which were common before the trade association was formed or fully functioning. Trace the steps by which standardization of practice took place, the internal and external conditions affecting the movement, and, as far as possible, the psychological process involved in the growth of common standards or behavior patterns. Considerable data may be gathered on motivation, but this question will be kept in the background. The final step is to assemble the evidence from the different industries studied and make such generalizations as may be warranted in regard to the method of ethical appraisal and control within the social group.

FACTORS OF CHOICE IN MARRIAGE

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My general project is a study of the sources, conditions, and techniques of the choice of the sexes in marriage. The present discussion, however, is in no sense a summary of the research undertaken, nor even an outline or prospectus of what the larger study is to include or fully treat. All that can be attempted now in the limited time allowed is to sketch very briefly, first, what perhaps will be the heart of the study—at least, what will be its recurring, underlying themes—and second, the factual material or sources of data to be considered.

Choosing being a mental process, an examination, on a factual basis, of the matters pertaining to choice will seek to study the source material or mental stuff of choice and its conditions.

A sociological study of the factors of choice, of the motives, conditions, and situations that result in a decision with regard to a life-mate, will attempt to describe especially the relations that exist between this mental content and the larger social situations of which the men and women choosing are a part.

Accordingly, if by choice in marriage, as choice in anything else, we mean "a comparatively elaborate process of mental organization or synthesis," "an organization of comparatively complex social relations"—Professor Cooley's definition of choice—[1] and we remember the underlying sociological claim now gaining headway,[2] namely, that all things human are inherently social, that the biological equipment for man's characteristically human behavior is necessarily and unavoidably shaped, influenced, controlled by the social life into which it is born, that man's mental life is a social life, then it follows that the factors of choice must be seen in their nature as social matters.

The truth is that human life expresses itself in its psychic aspects in impersonal, social, as well as in personal, individual phenomena. As far as choice of the sexes in marriage is concerned, the impersonal, or social, life affects it at least in three large ways:

First, social life supplies men and women with the source material, the working patterns, the possible alternatives, the ideas and ideals, the attitudes

[1] *Human Nature and the Social Order,* p. 53.

[2] Cf. C. H. Cooley, *ibid.;* John Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct;* L. L. Bernard, *Instinct;* W. B. Bodenhafer, "The Comparative Rôle of the Group Concept in Ward's Dynamic Sociology and Contemporary American Sociology," *American Journal of Sociology* (November, 1920–May, 1921); C. W. Margold, *Sex Freedom and Social Control.*

and techniques for choice. The larger life has its worked-out preferences, its ingrained standards, its typical niceties, its prevalent modes, its more or less organized ways, put to use by individuals in the choices they make.

Second, through the form and complexity of social organization and the many conscious and unconscious devices often employed for this purpose, social life affords or denies men and women variety of opportunity for rich, congenial, and full choice, one society facilitating diverse social intercourse and a multitude of acquaintance, thus amplifying the scope of choice, while another restricts it.

And third, whether or not men and women choose rationally, inclusively, morally, depends upon the type of social control, the type and level of the appeals, the kind of discipline, the level of freedom, current in their group life. Social life may encourage—indeed, make it almost inevitable—for men and women to choose well-nigh blindly, in a routinary, mechanical, perfunctory fashion, without much exercise of their higher intellect, their imaginative insights, their invigorated understanding. It may, on the other hand, so control and facilitate them as to include in their choice, primarily through the progressive use of their vital thinking and through their animated identification of self with the higher things in life, an ever increasing eagerness for fulness of life coupled with a constant readiness for an enlargement of its purpose.

Among the recurring underlying themes, then, in our study is, for one thing, the social nature of ideals, sentiments, standards, principles. Our study will aim to present the facts and principles that illustrate the intimate relations existing between social suggestion and individual choice, between prevalent mode and individual illustration, between social evaluation and personal desire.

It is regarding the presentation of the remaining two sets of social factors of choice, especially the first, regarding the socially provided conditions facilitating congenial choice, and second, with reference to the socially induced and socially maintained levels or planes making for integrated choice, that consideration upon factual data will be especially stressed. There is today, as far as love, marriage, and family life is concerned, a manifest urge for a better, a more serviceable social organization, also a demand for a higher form of social control. More room is demanded for the more especially personal needs of men and women. There is the stress upon a romantic eroticism and a persistent cry for freedom. It is too often assumed in this connection that these matters of rational choice and high living are individual and not social at the same time.

It will be our task to show that larger scope for the more especially personal factors in the choice of the sexes, to the extent that these are actually enhancing—pertaining, that is, not to the more nearly animal or sensuous nature of the person, but rather to his higher psychic nature—by necessity is attainable only by redoubled emphasis, both upon a higher form of social organization, with persons and social wholes participating freely, the stress being upon the higher principle of unity rather than that of uniformity, and upon a

more psychically invigorating social control, which prizes psychic insight above merely instituted routines. Similarly, rationality in choice—to the degree that it is real—necessarily presupposes not only cumulatively acquired and socially held standards, but also, necessarily, socially worked out conditions maintained through psychically invigorated imaginations.

The stress upon love between mates as an irreducible minimum for marriage likewise—in so far as this is translated to be an emphasis upon the provision for increased opportunity for communion of spirits and singleness of outlook of husband and wife in many matters—by necessity depends upon certain specific educational, economic, and spiritual conditions provided for men and women by their social or larger life.

It would seem that the best, the most inclusive, data for studies of this kind are obtainable directly from an intensive critical observation of human life. No matter how poor, incomplete in its working, inadequate in its representation for purposes of analysis the case studies at hand may be, they are still richer, in their possibilities for research because of their dealing with the living presence, than data obtained from other sources. The difficulties, however, with using such sources are that the experiences and fields of observation of the ordinary observer are very limited. For the most part the illustrative material of the present study will come from literary, biographical, historical, and anthropological sources.

That the factors of choice are matters of social intercourse, that is, that they have reality in minds other than the persons directly choosing, is strikingly illustrated by J. M. Barrie in his comedy, *The Admirable Crichton,* where social attitudes and social conditions are shown to make all the difference in the choice from among sets of wooers. The same is shown in the love affair of Thomasin Yeobright and Diggery Ven in Hardy's *The Return of the Native.* Likewise is this theme presented in a much more overt way, as less implied and more actually dramatically shown, in the participative action of Lord Miltoun's family, of his relations, friends, even his servants, in Galsworthy's *The Patrician.*

Much literary material is at hand to illustrate the rôle that the character of the organization of boys' and girls', men's and women's social life has in their choice in marriage. Thus, Miltoun's love for Mrs. Noel in Galsworthy's *The Patrician,* Captain Valentine Brown's love for Phoebe Throstle in J. M. Barrie's *Quality Street,* Dr. John Vokerat's love for Anna Mahr in Gerhardt Hauptmann's *Lonely Lives,* the love of Rosaura, first for Lelio and then for Ottavio, in Goldoni's *The Liar,* the relations between Helen and Ernest in J. L. Williams' *Why Marry?* exhibit the effects of amplitude of social contacts and the degree and level of freedom of intercourse among the sexes.

Finally, perhaps a glimpse of the social factors involved in rationality in choice and in truly human freedom can be given by calling to mind the causes for the marked diversity of moral level exhibited by the several pairs of lovers

in Williams' *Why Marry?,* already referred to. The author is explicit in his explanations. Helen and Ernest have made full use of the advantages of modern college education. He has made a scientist out of himself, a lover of truth, a believer in the inner nature of things. Social conditions, likewise, have instilled in her the democratic spirit and made her a champion of many of the ideals of modern womanhood. Jean and Rex, on the other hand, who exhibit the least promise, in their choices, of opportunity for fulness of life, are characterized by the author in his dramatis personae: "*Jean,* the host's youngest sister, who has been brought up to be married and nothing else; *Rex,* an unmarried neighbor who has been brought up not to be anything but rich."

CULTURE CONTACTS IN THE WEST INDIES

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In an article published three years ago I ventured to call the lower West Indies a sociological laboratory. Though their history covers only four centuries, there has been within that time nearly every variety of cultural experience and the period has been sufficiently long to have shown some degree of perspective in cultural evolution. Moreover, there are few regions that have had such complexity of national and ethnic elements. Spain, England, France, Holland, Denmark, Sweden, and the United States have at various times had possessions there. The population mass has been formed from various European types, from the aboriginal Indians, from Africans, and from East Indian coolies, together with mixtures of nearly all of these. On the linguistic side the prepotent tongues have been Spanish, English, and French, and in the case of the last two there are interesting dialects which almost partake of the character of distinct languages.

Although the islands are fairly well bunched and although they have lain on or near the great highways of trade, they exhibit a certain degree of isolation. There never has been and there is not now any real union or federation among the English colonies, and the French islands have only that kind of solidarity which comes of their being politically a part of France. Beyond administrative agencies there are almost no common institutions; there is little active sense of common interests; and in most of the islands there is a spirit of particularism which discourages any movement toward unity. On the whole the islands are not prosperous or progressive. This is of course largely due to economic stagnation, but this condition is itself to some extent attributable to the spirit of the population.

Throughout the eighteenth century the islands, both French and English, possessed a considerable permanent white population. This was already declining in the early nineteenth century, and the abolition of slavery hastened the process. Outside of Trinidad and Porto Rico the number of permanent white residents is now small; such Europeans as are found are mainly connected with business or administration. The whole district is in process of becoming African. In Barbados, Jamaica, Porto Rico, and Haiti the population is dense, while St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Grenada, and Dominica are but sparsely peopled. The disappearance of slavery brought about a shortage of labor supply, because after emancipation the Negroes refused to work regularly. Experiments were made in bringing first Portuguese and then Chinese laborers, but these groups failed to meet expectations and gradually drifted into trade.

Demarara and Trinidad then undertook to meet the situation by importing coolies from India under a system of indenture, a plan which was continued until the period of the world-war. Many East Indians remained as permanent settlers after their indenture had expired, and they or their descendants now constitute about a third of the population of these two colonies. The coming of these Orientals brought into the situation an ethnic and cultural group which may eventually dominate the whole southern portion of the district. All attempts to secure any considerable European immigration have thus far failed, and the future seems to be definitely committed to the African and the East Indian.

Spanish influence on the cultural development of the smaller West Indies was meager because Spain was ousted from the scene before real colonization was fairly started. The minor European powers, Holland, Denmark, and Sweden, though their occupation lasted through the colonizing period, never succeeded in impressing their stamp on even the language of the population. English was always the prevailing speech in the Danish islands, as it still is in the Dutch islands. England and France fought a long battle for territorial dominance as well as for cultural hegemony. Barbados, Antigua, and Jamaica were always, and are still, intensely English; Martinique and Guadeloupe, as intensely French, despite the fact that the population is overwhelmingly African. In St. Vincent, Grenada, St. Lucia, and Dominica, France held possession most of the time until the Napoleonic Wars, when the islands passed to England. Upon them France left the deep impression of her language and culture which a period of more than a century has been unable to efface. But in some of the smaller French islands the language is now predominantly English, due perhaps, as also in the Dutch islands, to the influence of commerce.

On turning to Haiti we find certain peculiar conditions which set it off from the other islands. Haiti, originally a French colony, revolted and established her independence at the beginning of the nineteenth century. For more than a hundred years the country maintained not only its independence, but a vigorous attitude of isolation. The whites were all expelled at the time of independence, and so complete was the revulsion from foreign control that white residents were afterward barely tolerated and were not allowed to own land. Haiti became a black republic in fact as well as in name. The language, however, and such extraneous cultural influences as survived, remained French. It was to France that the people looked for guidance in education and religion; it was to France that the élite aspired to migrate as soon as they were able. But the mass of the people were culturally African and not French. The century of isolation brought little change in the general population except an accentuation of those African traits which they possessed at the time of liberation.

Consequently the present cultural and social status of Haiti differs from that of the other West Indian islands in several important respects. After

emancipation the people had no apprenticeship in political or economic life, but were launched directly into an independent national career with little background except that of Africa. In their century of independence they acquired the pride and consciousness of a nation. By reason of their isolation they had little opportunity to assimilate material advantages from outside sources or to cultivate that degree of self-criticism which is necessary for proper psychic balance. The upper classes have sought to profit by the prestige of French culture without having the practical guidance of French domination. Thus there has developed a rift between the small group of the élite who have accepted French cultural standards and the overwhelming mass of the people who have remained on the African level.

But it was the incapacity of Haiti to manage the more practical machinery of civilization that led to her failure in the national career. The century of independence demonstrated that Haitians, like most other Africans, are weak in social organization. On the political side it is perhaps true that they are better suited for tribal organization than for the modern democratic type. On the economic side they have shown small capacity for independent development, though living under unusually favorable conditions of soil, climate, and geographical location. In any case the political and economic breakdown was so decisive that drastic action from outside became imperative if society was not to fall into complete disintegration. Revolutions had characterized Haitian history from the beginning and, in the decade before 1915, they had apparently become chronic. The actual intervention in that year fell to the United States because no European power could safely be allowed to undertake the task.

Yet there are several considerations which have rendered intervention by America more difficult than it would have been if France, for instance, had taken the step. The language of the people is French; the legal and educational institutions are mainly French; and the general cultural outlook has been in the direction of France. The Americans, when they went in, were in the strictest sense aliens. American ideas and methods from the first clashed with the Haitian temperament. Although we Americans have always been familiar with the Negro, it has been a Negro who was partially assimilated to our own type. With the tropical African firmly seated in a tropical environment we have had little contact.

Furthermore, in the matter of technical efficiency the difference between Americans and Haitians is enormous. In technological equipment Haiti at the intervention was probably the most backward region in the West Indian group. The Americans have introduced the most advanced methods in road-making, sanitation, public buildings, agriculture, and administration. That these methods are not congenial to the Haitian spirit is already apparent; but that they are necessary if the country is to be brought up to even average standards is equally clear. Haitians have small taste for technical efficiency, while the

American experts who have been sent there represent the best types in the military, engineering, and medical service.

Contact between a highly energized group and a slack tropical people is always likely to breed discord. The two live on entirely different planes, because in the one case there is the pressure of many and urgent needs and in the other an absence of serious pressures of any kind. The real difference lies in the standards to which they have learned to conform as much as in fundamental physical or psychic traits. Progress for the Haitians depends in the last analysis on their developing dynamic demand for more and better things in both economic and cultural equipment, and the near future will probably determine whether this will happen. It depends also on their capacity to acquire a disciplined, socialized mode of life; not necessarily one modeled wholly on the European-American type, but one at least free from the naive, slovenly attitude of the past.

Adaptation to a better economic technology will probably be more rapid than general cultural improvement. Since the American administration does not control education, it is difficult to impart rational standards. Failure to take over the administration of justice has shut out the use of the usual methods of coercive adaptation. The Americans, however, do control the police force, and have thus been able to begin the repression of one of the worst of African survivals, the more barbarous forms of voodoo worship. But it is probable that even in this field the distintegration of superstition, while destined to be gradual, will depend as much on attrition and the opening up of the country as on repressive measures.

The present situation is therefore a mixed one. The influence of a masterful psychic culture of French origin superimposed on an African temperament clashes with a masterful technical efficiency which the Americans have introduced in practical administrations. The situation is further complicated by the fact that the Americans are, presumably, to remain for only a limited period, after which they are to turn the country back to the Haitians. This necessitates quick action, and quick action is exactly what is least adapted to the cultural transformation of a backward people. Should the United States withdraw in 1936 when the treaty expires, Haiti may sink back into something of the old state of lethargy and disorder; but some, at least, of the material advantages of the occupation will probably be retained.

PROGRESS OF SOCIAL WORK

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ABSTRACT

Progress of social work.—The present magnitude of social work is indicated by the number of welfare agencies, by even an incomplete survey of their funds and income, by the development of private and community philanthropic foundations and trusts, and by the "unsalaried good will" represented in the services of many social workers. Qualitatively there has been an increasing emphasis on "welfare and justice" (prevention of want and enlargement of life), and on attention to facts. There is a demand for carefully trained and well-paid personnel. While university courses, especially on social and labor problems, and familiarity with studies of the family by sociologists are almost prerequisite for social work, the data collected by social agencies are used by sociologists, and workers contribute occasional class lectures. There has been specific progress in the divisions of family welfare, child welfare, and public health. Eugenics has won the approval of social workers.

I shall not try to give a history of social work or describe all its phases. I must content myself with a brief discussion of a few of the more important developments in the social welfare movement. In the first place, I invite your attention to the magnitude of social work. Although it is very old, social work as a conscious organized effort has made its greatest progress in recent decades. The practice of charity is probably as old and as widespread as human sympathy and parental love, and in its earlier forms social work was the relief of suffering offered by religious agencies and by the state. But its forms and auspices have latterly been greatly extended and it has reached great proportions.

Although there are no accurate figures to show how many social-work organizations there are in the United States—not to mention other nations—there is scattered information which gives some indication of the magnitude of this welfare service. Recent studies show that in New York City alone there are at least 1,500 social welfare agencies, voluntarily supported, with an annual budget of between $40,000,000 and $50,000,000. In addition, the municipality expends between $30,000,000 and $35,000,000 a year through its welfare departments and boards, making an aggregate of between $70,000,000 and $85,000,000 spent in that city in a single year from private and public funds for the organized work of social betterment.

It may help us to realize the size of this work if we recall that its expenditures are much larger than the amount of money spent by all the churches of all denominations for their maintenance and activity. There are in the greater city of New York approximately 1,100 Protestant churches with an annual current expenditure of about $13,500,000; there are about 365 Catholic churches

with an estimated expenditure for church purposes, not including schools, of between $5,000,000 and $8,000,000; there are about 165 Jewish churches with current disbursements of about $3,500,000. In a word, there are about 1,600 churches in New York City with an annual budget for maintenance and benevolences of between $22,000,000 and $25,000,000. There are about the same number of churches as welfare organizations, but they spend about half as much money as the private charitable societies alone and about one-third as much as that spent by the private and public welfare agencies combined.

It has been estimated that in Chicago about $50,000,000 are spent in a year for social work from both public and private funds. In 299 other cities that have community chests or financial federations, not including Chicago, New York, and Boston, with an aggregate population of 24,000,000, the voluntary or non-official charities expend approximately $57,000,000 in a single year. No attempt is made here to give totals for the entire United States, but it must be evident that vast sums are expended annually in what we are pleased to call social work.

Some of these privately supported or voluntary associations have become very powerful institutions. For example, in New York City the Presbyterian Hospital has investments and properties valued at more than $13,000,000, while Mount Sinai Hospital has funds and properties valued at more than $11,000,000, and St. Luke's Hospital about $9,000,000. The fifty-six hospitals (including the foregoing) that belong to the United Hospital Fund of New York City together have funds and properties valued at approximately $123,000,000. The New York Association for Improving the Condition of the Poor has invested funds of almost $5,000,000 and an annual operating budget of more than $1,300,000; the Charity Organization Society of New York has invested funds of $3,768,000 and an annual budget of $752,700; the Brooklyn Bureau of Charities has invested funds and properties valued at more than $1,250,000 and an operating budget of more than $550,000; the ninety-one members of the Federation for the Support of Jewish Philanthropic Societies of New York City spend almost $8,000,000 in a year; and the Catholic Charities of the Archdiocese of New York spend more than $1,000,000 yearly.

One of the most significant developments in the field of social work is the creation of large financial foundations and trust funds which has taken place in the United States, notably in the last twenty-five years. These represent the conviction of men and women of vision and wealth that social work is of great and fundamental importance. They also represent vast sums of money which are to be devoted through years and years to social betterment. There are many varieties of foundations, and one foundation may have many purposes, but they may conveniently be classed as welfare foundations and educational foundations. However, no line can be drawn completely dividing these two classes because some foundations provide for both purposes, and because in the last analysis you cannot draw a line between welfare and education.

However, I have not included the endowments of universities, colleges, and technical schools in this discussion. It may help us to grasp the significance of these foundations if a few of them are described very briefly.[1]

The Russell Sage Foundation was established in 1907 by Mrs. Russell Sage with an initial endowment of $10,000,000, and later her will added $5,000,000 more. The income is being used for "the improvement of social and living conditions in the United States of America." Its methods include research, publication, education, the establishment and maintenance of charitable and benevolent activities, agencies, and institutions, and the aid of such already established.

The Rockefeller benefactions are notable among great endowments. The Rockefeller Foundation was chartered in 1913 "to promote the well-being of mankind throughout the world." The funds thus far have been devoted chiefly to comprehensive programs whose aims are to eradicate certain causes of human ill and to build up positive programs for bettering conditions. It has undertaken chiefly work in medical education, in the biological sciences, and in public health, notably the eradication of the hookworm disease. The Foundation amounts to $165,000,000, both the income and principal of which may be appropriated.

The Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial was founded in 1918 for general charitable and philanthropic purposes, including the encouragement of social agencies. The Memorial has a value of about $73,000,000. These benefactions, together with those of the General Education Board, the International Education Board, the Institute of Medical Research, and the Bureau of Social Hygiene, represent an aggregate endowment of about $368,000,000.

The Carnegie benefactions include the Carnegie Corporation of New York, to which Andrew Carnegie gave $125,000,000, which will be increased to $135,000,000 upon the settlement of his estate; the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, of $10,000,000; the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, of $27,000,000; the Carnegie Hero Fund Commission, of $5,000,000; the Carnegie Institution of Washington, of $22,000,000; the Carnegie Relief Fund of Pittsburgh, of $4,000,000 (later increased to $12,000,000 by the United States Steel Corporation). These various benefactions by Mr. Carnegie amount to about $247,000,000.

There are many other notable foundations that should be mentioned because of their size and achievements; but no attempt is here made to describe all foundations, but only to indicate something of their number and magnitude. I have classed seventy-eight foundations as belonging primarily to the welfare group, forty of which show an aggregate of about $432,000,000, the value of the other thirty-eight being to me unknown. I have listed thirty-nine foundations in the educational group, twenty-one of which have endowments aggre-

[1] The figures with respect to foundations are taken from a bulletin of the Russell Sage Foundation Library on American Foundations (rev. ed., August, 1926).

gating about $358,000,000, the value in the other eighteen being unknown to me. If we combine these welfare and educational groups, still omitting endowments of educational institutions, we have sixty-one foundations amounting to $790,000,000, and fifty-six others whose values I have not been able to learn, making a grand total of 117 foundations with a value probably in excess of $1,000,000,000.

There is a similar development taking place under which great trust funds are being assembled, usually called community trusts, which aim to receive and safeguard donations in trust, to employ the principal or income or both for educational and charitable purposes in a broader and more useful manner in future years than it is now possible to anticipate. The funds are usually held by a trust company, which invests them and collects the income. The disbursements are usually directed by a committee, some members of which are appointed by the trust company and the others by some public authorities. A recent inquiry disclosed fifty-eight of these community trusts in the United States, but I am unable to give the amount of their funds.

Through patient inquiry it should be possible to complete the figures and set down in dollars and cents the amount of capital funds and income devoted to social work in the United States, but no one can find and measure the stored up good will and the unsalaried services given in philanthropy, especially by the churches and the religious orders. Money can neither measure nor buy the services given gratuitously night and day, in hovel and hospital, in prison and orphanage, out of the love of mankind.

It must be apparent from this incomplete information as to the number of welfare agencies, their funds and income, as to philanthropic foundations and trusts and unsalaried good will, that already the adventure in social work has reached tremendous proportions. And when we consider that a single welfare society may have from 7,000 to 8,000 families under care in a year, and that a single hospital may have as many as 100,000 patients in its wards and clinics in a year, it begins to appear that no inconsiderable portion of the people are ministered to in one way or another by this great group of welfare agencies.

Thus far I have spoken only of the quantitative progress of social work, and I now invite your attention to its qualitative development in a general way. Although powerfully motivated by sympathy and parental affection and still much concerned with the relief of suffering, social work is now governed largely by considerations of welfare and justice, and aims at the prevention of want and the enlargement of life for the people. The uncritical still give alms to the ill-clad beggar and pass on; but those who think ask why he begs. Can he earn? Where is his chance? We willingly care for the sick, but we demand food inspection, sanitation, good housing, public health education, periodic physical examinations, and compensation in industrial accidents and diseases. We still feel sorry for the young child whose father dies, but we demand that

sickness be prevented if possible, and nearly every state in the Union now gives an allowance or pension so that such a child can live decently, stay in school, and have the chance to become a good productive citizen. In a word, social work loves not sympathy and relief less but justice and welfare more. Social work does not despise or neglect the instinctive factors, but uses them and leads one's interest into scientific ways; does not undervalue the affective, but adds the intellectual qualities of men in both its beneficiaries and its backers.

This means, among many things, that social work seeks a factual basis; facts in a given situation, whether of poverty or delinquency; facts as to a given problem, whether of unemployment or an epidemic; and follows whither the facts lead. It means an increasing adequacy and accuracy of record, constant checking, evaluation, research, and experimentation; it means objectivity, scientific method. It also means confidence and achievement. Social work knows better what it is doing and why, with the result that it has greater resources and greater results.

This qualitative development has taken social workers into the fields of legislation and public administration. The laws governing the employment of women and children, state allowances for children permanently deprived of parental support and training, accident compensation and sickness insurance, tenement-house laws, probation, and parole are to a great degree the outcome of experiences and efforts of social workers. Public health administration, medical inspection of public schools, boards of child welfare, hospitalization of the sick, and out-patient service for minor ailments, together with auxiliary social service, are partly the result of advocacy by social workers, and in many cases are manned by them. But social work does not run to laws and institutions alone, for it is vitally concerned with the recreational and moral interests of the people. The weekly allowance made to a family by a welfare society now includes something for recreation as well as insurance and food. Public playgrounds and parks, wholesome places and forms of amusement and community centers are matters of vital concern to social work.

Going along with this increasing knowledge, standardizing of method, and enlarging responsibility has come the demand for a carefully trained and well-paid personnel, giving us practically the requisites of a new profession, namely, an objectivity of subject matter, a body of facts, literature and experience, a full-time service by technically trained people, and a recognized place in the social economy.

Such are some of the developments in the general qualitative character of social work. But before leaving this topic I may incidentally call attention to some very obvious connections between these matters and sociology. In the first place, social work may be said to address itself to the family, to the community, and to the recreational interests of the people: exactly the groups and things that sociology is concerned with, according to Professor Ellwood. Social workers are eager students of psychology and of all forms of social control.

They owe much of their background to university courses in the social sciences, especially social and labor problems, and their technical or professional training to the schools of social work, which in most cases are attached to some university that has a strong department of sociology. The chief executives in social-work organizations practically require preparation in these fundamental courses and professional schools as prerequisite to an appointment to a place of responsibility other than clerical, and professors in the universities welcome the social worker of broad training and experience who can speak as one having authority before their classes and seminars. There is accumulating a mass of critically determined facts coming out of the research and the day-by-day and face-to-face work of the social agencies which I am happy to note the universities are beginning to use and promote.

I have spoken thus far in general terms of the quantitative and the qualitative progress of social work. But I do not wish to deal with my topic wholly in its general aspects. So now I ask you to consider the progress or development of some of the main divisions of social work.

First, that of family welfare: Social work philosophy now does recognize the central place of the family unit in society and is committed to the policy of keeping the household together if the parents are mentally and morally fit to bring up the children. All social workers pay at least lip service to this principle, but there are three difficulties in the way of living up to it. Large institutions for the care of orphans and neglected children were built up and partly endowed in the earlier years, and now they bid actively for children to fill their rooms, with the result that families are sometimes broken up for reasons of poverty alone; sometimes tax money can be used to care for children inside of institutions, but not in their own homes, so the law of least resistance operates to break up families; and some people think that it is better to put children in institutions than to leave them at home, because in the former case they may have stricter religious training and supervision. These are among the belated forces that militate against the free use of the policy of keeping the family together.

How far this policy is the result of the teachings of sociology and how far it is the result of experience in social work itself I am not prepared to say. It would be surprising, however, if such monumental books as Westermarck's *History of Human Marriage* and Professor Howard's book on *The History of Matrimonial Institutions,* and other notable contributions to the nature and function of the family had not been influential in defining and establishing this principle of social work. To me it is equally certain, however, that the experience which social workers have had with broken families and homes and the observed consequences of institutional care have been equally powerful in bringing about this practice of keeping the family united.

In assisting a family to maintain an independent unitary status financial assistance is given according to a carefully determined budget which makes provision for the necessary expenditures to maintain a satisfactory standard of

living. This was not always so, for in earlier years such assistance was given in the form of uncertain doles. The family budget is the basis upon which rest the efforts of family welfare societies to maintain their families on a satisfactory standard of living and not on a mere subsistence level, as of old. In modern family welfare work there is special provision for the hygienic physical and mental interests of the family. This is a long way from the old practice of palliative relief, and engages the teachings of sanitation, medicine, and psychology.

Another division of social work may be called child welfare. Reference has already been made to the earlier practice of congregate care of children and the recent practice of keeping them in single family households. In earlier years it was customary to assemble orphans and even half-orphans in almshouses and so-called "homes," but now nearly all the commonwealths have adopted the policy of aiding widowed parents, if need be, to keep their children at home or with relatives or foster parents.

But child welfare means more than meat and drink. It includes sound physical health, normal mental development, and opportunities for recreation. These are concepts of preventive medicine, phychology, and morals which are eagerly seized upon by modern child welfare workers. They also indicate how the modern conception of child care differs in content and technique from the old practice of putting them in almshouses or binding them out, where they were usually neglected or exploited.

A third division of social work may be called public health, comprising especially propaganda for the prevention of tuberculosis, cancer, and heart disease; for the practice of periodic health examinations, social, mental, and oral hygiene, visiting nursing, and medical social service. The great movement for the prevention of tuberculosis which has covered the United States in the last score of years got its inspiration from two facts: first, the germ theory of the disease and the consequent possibility of control; and second, the proof that tuberculosis was one of the chief causes of poverty. The remarkable decrease in the morbidity and mortality from tuberculosis which has come about in the last fifteen years can be traced partly to the greater prosperity of the people themselves, but also to the official and non-official control of cases and to the constant propaganda that tuberculosis can be cured and prevented—contributions from medicine and organized social work.

The attack upon cancer and heart disease has been delayed because of a lack of knowledge as to the causes of these diseases and the acceptance of a standard program of prevention. But considerable advance has been made even in these newer sectors of the battlefield against preventable diseases, opportunities that were unknown when this century opened. Even more recent is the propaganda for periodic health examinations, that is, a recurrent inspection of all parts of the human body even as one inspects his automobile from time to time. Visiting nursing and hospitable social service owe their beginning and their value to the part which they render in restoring and convalescing to

health those who for the most part are unable financially to command complete service of the highest quality. These divisions of public health work are a service to the state even as education is, and it may be, since disease and sickness in their many forms are the cause of most social pathology, that the problems of poverty, defectiveness, and delinquency will be solved chiefly by tax funds and official administration in public health and preventive medicine, which seems to be a reasonable service by the state.

The forms of social work thus far mentioned are chiefly concerned with the individual and the family and with the environment. But there is a matter which concerns the racial qualities, which involves the facts of heredity. For many years social workers have been saying that some folks never can do their part in a self-sustaining society because they are feeble-minded or defective, partly as a result of inheritance. The biologist has been saying for some years that characters are transmitted in mankind just as they are in other animals, including some forms of defectiveness. Now the social worker and the biologist are at one in this, and they are only waiting the advance of knowledge to incorporate eugenics as a part of the welfare program.

I have assumed that there is an intimate and essential connection between the sociologists and the sociological courses of our universities on the one hand and the social workers and the social work of today on the other. In a word, between them there are reciprocal obligations and opportunities in the further quantitative and qualitative development of social work, to the end that family welfare work, child welfare work, public health work, and community work—the ensemble of social work—may continue to make solid progress.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RELATION BETWEEN SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL WORK

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ABSTRACT

The development of the relation between sociology and social work.—When the American Sociological Society first took official cognizance of the fact that sociology might have some relation to social work (1921) the preponderating opinion of social workers sufficiently interested to express themselves seemed to be that point of view, rather than technique, constituted the contribution of sociology to social work. Some even questioned this contribution. Sociologists then recognized the data collected in social work as worthy of exploitation. Other evidences of the relationship may be studied. Of the older periodicals of sociology and social work, the *American Journal of Sociology* and the *Survey,* contain very few articles of common interest. In studies such as the Americanization studies of the Carnegie Institution and in other publications, especially on social pathology, sociologists have made contributions valuable to social workers. Student research projects in sociology are frequently in the field of social work. It seems "that thus far sociologists have been more ready to utilize social work and to contribute to it than social workers have been to seek or even accept such contributions." Conflicting claims as to the interrelations are made today. The establishment of a Section on Sociology and Social Work might contribute toward a helpful interrelation; but it also seems essential that sociology become more critical of itself and build up a science of human behavior.

This session reminds one of a similar meeting of the society held five years ago. At that meeting, in Pittsburgh, in 1921, the first attempt was made to outline the relation between sociology and social work. Indeed, this was the first time that the American Sociological Society took official cognizance of the fact that sociology might have some relation to social work, although it became conscious of such a relation to teaching and the training of teachers as early as 1915.[1] At this meeting provision was made for round-table discussions on the relation between sociology and social work and other subjects relating more specifically to social work processes. With regard to the relation between sociology and social work, two papers were read: one by Professor Eliot, based on the returns to a questionnaire which had been sent to a number of more-or-less representative social workers with the aim in view of getting their views first as to the value which sociology in its theoretical, historical, and applied aspects is and can be to social work, and secondly, as to its importance as a basic subject in training for the profession of social work. As a result of this inquiry he concluded that, "The contribution of undergraduate sociology to the

[1] See Report of the Committee on Sociology in the Training of Teachers, *Publications of the American Sociological Society,* Vol. IX, 1915; also "Sociology in the Education of Teachers," *ibid.,* Vol. XIII, 1918.

equipment of the social worker is chiefly in the general perspective, restraint, and inspiration obtained, though applied sociology sometimes has specific value for technique."[2] According to him, sociology is important, at least in the pre-professional curriculum; and social workers, though frankly skeptical and rather critical of sociology, are nevertheless interested in the subject, otherwise they would not stop to criticize it, for, as he puts it, "one does not stop to kick a dead horse."

The other paper of that session on this subject was by Professor Todd, who made a number of interesting and valuable suggestions on methods of teaching and content of courses in sociology based on his experience in preparing a curriculum for social work training with sociology as a background.

Both speakers were, on the whole, fairly definitely of the opinion that sociology has a place in the training for social work, and stressed the view that there is and that there should be more co-operation between sociology and social work. They both felt that each could profit from the other and that it was merely a question of working out a *modus operandi.*

The discussion which followed brought out a number of interesting and conflicting views. In his summary, the chairman of the meeting stated that "The sense of the meeting was clearly that sociology does have a contribution to make to the equipment of the social worker," although it consists largely "in adding to his fund of organized knowledge of the nature of social relationships in normal society and to his point of view toward social work, rather than to the technique of community organization or even of 'getting Mrs. Jones to the clinic.' "[3]

It is, it seems to me, of significance to recall in this connection that at the time two gentlemen who have had a good deal of contact with sociology, social work, and more especially with the training of social workers, "frankly questioned," and "doubted" this contribution, and that a third person, who has made a most important contribution to the training of social workers and who holds a very strategic position in influencing social workers, believed in it but was not clear just what this contribution is.[4]

In other ways also was this meeting indicative of a realization of the possible contribution which sociology could make to social work, and vice versa. One of the persons who "questioned" the possible contribution of sociology to social work suggested at a different divisional meeting "that the American Sociological Society take such steps as may be found advisable to help the agencies of social work to devise such records as will make the material [collected by the agencies] of scientific as well as practical value." He went on to say that "if the sociologist will advise with the social worker as to what material and form would be desirable in these records from the point of view of a science

[2] Thomas D. Eliot, *Publications of the American Sociological Society,* XVI, 236.

[3] *Ibid.,* p. 241.

[4] *Ibid.*

of society and teaching requirements, such suggestions would be most welcome and would probably add also to the practical value of these records."[5] He suggested that a joint committee of the American Sociological Society and the National Conference of Social Work could work on this matter, a suggestion that has been carried into effect since then, at least so far as this society is concerned. Just how these suggestions can be reconciled with his skepticism about any relation between sociology and social work is not altogether clear.

Still at a different session of the same annual meeting, Professor Gillin, reporting for the Research Committee of the American Sociological Society, stated that "a neglected field of scientific research is that of social psychology." After pointing out what such a study should consist of and how informative it could be, he goes on to say that "there is a world of material for such a study all about. Case histories in dozens of social agencies and in courts furnish raw material for the social psychologist. Such a social psychology (according to him) would not be remote from the interest of the social worker. It would be as vital to the social practitioner as anatomy and physiology are to the practicing physician or the nurse. It would bring order out of the present chaos in what is now poorly named 'community organization'."[6]

The meetings of the society during the following year (1922) were also fruitful, at least so far as common thinking on the problem of training for social work is concerned. The conference on the training of social workers, at which Professor Gillin reviewed the Tufts report on *Education and Training for Social Work,* served to emphasize the need for "a background education in the sciences bearing upon social problems," of which need there was, in his opinion, a "deplorable lack of appreciation by social workers and agencies."[7] He went on to say that "in many cases there is also no appreciation by teachers and officers of educational institutions of the importance of hard discipline to honest-to-goodness field work under competent instruction. . . . . The social worker and the professor must get together to their mutual advantage and to the benefit of the student. . . . . "[8]

A number of other attempts have been made since then to point out the relation between sociology and social work. Professor Eliot carried his original study to completion and threw a great deal of light on the attitudes of social workers throughout the country toward the importance of sociology as a subject in the prevocational training of social workers. His studies would seem to indicate, however, that social workers in general are far from being convinced that sociology is of importance to social work. In fact, economics and psychology are frequently considered as having greater value for social workers

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 263.

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 248.

[7] *Ibid.*, XVII, 205.

[8] *Ibid.*

than sociology.[9] Even in the case of applied sociology, which might be assumed to be rather closely allied to social work, there are as many executives who consider it of no value when engaging staff members as there are those who consider it of some value. Curiously enough, theoretical and historical sociology receive more favorable consideration from executives, in this regard, than does applied sociology.[10] Of significance is the fact also that three schools of social work felt keenly enough on the subject to express themselves on the valuelessness of sociology as a background, even though there was no question to that effect on their questionnaire. It should be a matter of some concern to teachers of applied sociology, it seems to me, that their subject, even though it includes "social economy and charities and corrections,"[11] ranks practically no higher from the standpoint of having "specific value for technique" than does theoretical sociology.[12] Moreover, of seventy-five persons sufficiently interested in the "specific technique value" of the three branches of sociology, only 29 or 38 per cent gave applied sociology first rank.[13] Sociology fares slightly better with regard to its "general value for point of view." But even here only 58 out of 75 persons replying are willing to go down on record as holding that sociology, regardless what its nature may be, has any value for developing a desirable point of view for social work.[14]

Other equally interesting and perhaps also somewhat disconcerting deductions might be made from his compilations,[15] but enough has been said to indicate what the situation is, or at least was in 1921.[16]

The interest engendered and displayed in the relation between sociology and social work in the meetings of 1921 and 1922 was not followed up in any concrete or definite manner. While Dr. Healy was invited to read a paper on the contribution which case studies can make to sociology,[17] nothing of any practical value was done and the subject has not come up again for consideration at the meetings of this society until today. There were, of course, some

[9] Thomas D. Eliot, "Sociology as a Prevocational Subject: The Verdict of Sixty Social Workers," *American Journal of Sociology*, XXIX, 744 (see note to Table VIII).

[10] *Ibid.* (see Table IX).

[11] *Ibid.*, p. 741.

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 742 (see Table VI).

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 742 (see Table VI).

[14] *Ibid.*, p. 743 (see Table VII).

[15] See also "The Social Workers' Criticism of Undergraduate Sociology," *Journal of Social Forces*, II, 506–12.

[16] Though his study was published in 1924, it was based on material collected in 1921, and therefore can only be taken as indicative of the attitudes prevailing at that time.

[17] *Publications of the American Sociological Society*, XVIII, 147–55.

papers and sessions on subjects of specific social work interests, such as the session on the family during the meetings of last year. But aside from these no thought was given to our subject, at least so far as the program of the Society is concerned. Even the committee which was appointed by the Society to study the value which case records might have as teaching material has never reported, if the official proceedings are to be taken as an index.

So much, then, for the evidence regarding the activities of the American Sociological Society. Let us next consider some of the other evidences which may indicate a recognition of the existence of a relationship between sociology and social work.

A thorough consideration of all of the evidence would require, in addition to the studies suggested by Dr. Eliot,[18] an examination of the contributions to the periodicals devoted to sociology and social work, especially the *American Journal of Sociology,* the *Journal of Social Forces,* the *Journal of Applied Sociology,* the *Survey* and *The Family.* In addition to these, the *Proceedings of the National Conference of Social Work* would have to be studied in order to see what they contain, which would indicate the existence or absence of the relations in which we are interested; the books recently written in both fields would have to be examined, and the various research projects dealing with different aspects of social work under way by students and faculties of sociology in the various universities would have to be reviewed; the membership and attendance lists of both societies would have to be analyzed in order to determine how much overlapping there is; and last, but not least, the curricula of the professional schools and their admission requirements would have to be examined for information on how important a place sociology holds in them. Such an inquiry would require a great deal more time for completion than was available for the preparation of this paper, or would be available, for that matter, for the presentation of the information, were it available. However, even the mere mention of the foregoing items will bring up a number of associations in the minds of most people here, which, if they could be tabulated, would be the strongest possible proof that the two fields are closely interrelated. It may be suggestive therefore, to examine, even though superficially, such information as is more easily at hand, and see what light it throws on the question under consideration.

If one were to judge from the contents of the *American Journal of Sociology,* the official organ of this society, social work is almost non-existent as a field of interest for sociology. With the exception of the abstracts, in which articles on social work frequently figure, very little space is devoted to social work as such. The only articles appearing in this journal in the last few years which are of special interest to us in this inquiry are two contributions: one by Dr. Eliot reporting the results of his study, already alluded to,[19] and one by

[18] Cf. *ibid.,* XVI, 237.

[19] Cf. *supra,* p. 7.

Dr. Burgess on the "Delinquent as a Person," a sociological interpretation of the delinquent from the standpoint of the fundamental wishes formulated by Thomas.[20] Whether this is because the editors consciously adopted the policy of limiting its field to purely sociological subjects, or whether there is such an abundance of material on theoretical sociology that it crowds out all else, an explanation which would seem to be suggested by the editors' recent decision to increase the size of the publication,[21] the fact remains that the official publication of the American Sociological Society has done little to foster an interest on the part of its readers in social work as a possible source of sociological data. This takes on added significance when it is borne in mind that a large number of social workers are members of the society and also subscribers to the *Journal.* (An occupational analysis of the membership of 1926 reveals the interesting fact that social workers constitute the largest single group in the Society, outside of the sociologists themselves.)

What has been said about the *American Journal of Sociology* with regard to the space it devotes to social work may be said to be true of the *Survey,* the so-called "trade organ" of social work, in so far as sociology is concerned. Sociology, as a subject having any contribution to social work, is conspicuously absent from its pages, despite the fact that considerable space is frequently devoted to matters bearing on the other social sciences, especially economics and political science. (The *Survey Graphic* is, of course, an exception, because it aims to treat a single subject more or less exhaustively from various viewpoints.) The same may be said to be true of the other important social work periodical, *The Family.* Here, as in the *Survey,* one finds scarcely a hint of what the two fields could do for each other. To be sure, these journals are replete with articles dealing with what could be important material for sociological analysis, as, for instance, the series of articles in *The Family* on immigrant backgrounds.[22] But thus far there seems to be little recognition that such analysis would be of value to its readers. Occasionally one finds articles by out-and-out sociologists. But these are usually definitely concerned with the subject matter of social work.

It was no doubt this sharp division of interests, and the feeling on the part of many that the gap should be abridged, that prompted the launching of the *Journal of Social Forces* and the *Journal of Applied Sociology.*[23] These journals, though serving very largely the same public as the two periodicals just discussed, really meet a definite need, as their popularity would seem to indicate. The *Journal of Social Forces,* or, as it is now called, *Social Forces,*

[20] E. W. Burgess, "The Delinquent as a Person," *American Journal of Sociology,* XXVIII, 657–80.

[21] See Editor's announcement, *American Journal of Sociology,* XXXII, July, 1926.

[22] See *The Family,* I, 18–21; IV, 160–64; VI, 107–10 and 181–84.

[23] See "Editor's Announcement," *Journal of Social Forces,* I, 56–61.

has definitely sought to serve each of the two groups and provides a common meeting ground for them. Here one finds contributions to sociological theory and social work practice at the same time. As we might expect, this journal is more directly concerned with our subject than any of the others. Three papers which appeared recently deal specifically with the subject of our discussion. One of these, by Professor Eliot, has already been referred to.[24] Another is by Professor Burgess on the "Interdependence of Sociology and Social Work." He points out that although each of these had a different origin and has a different purpose, they both converge in research, in which they are equally interested. He points out further that sociology can contribute to social work in the use of such concepts as "social forces," "wishes," "folkways," and the various "diagnostic concepts of disorganization." On the other hand, social work can contribute the materials accumulating in the various social agencies for teaching purposes.[25]

The third paper is on "The Relation between Sociology and Social Work." It first discusses the antagonism and the mutual lack of confidence between sociologists and social workers and the reasons for these. It then proceeds to indicate how some of the concepts developed by sociology might be applied to social work, and presents some concrete situations illustrating their possible application. The point is made that just as sociology can contribute helpful concepts for analyzing and understanding human nature, so can social work contribute its vast store of accumulated experience and knowledge to the upbuilding of a scientific sociology. Also, social work could, and no doubt would, supply inexhaustible laboratory facilities for testing, proving, or disproving what are so far only interesting speculations and generalizations on the part of sociology.[26]

There are other contributions to this journal, and likewise to the *Journal of Applied Sociology,* which, while dealing less avowedly with the question of relation, are nevertheless of considerable importance to us because they illustrate how really close the two fields are and how much each has to offer to the other. However, time does not permit our going into further detail here.

One of the striking evidences of the growing recognition of the relation between sociology and social work is the "Americanization studies" of the Carnegie Corporation. This series was undertaken as an attempt to aid social workers and others concerned with the practical problems in the Americanization process. In the words of the editor: "It arose out of the fact that constant applications were being made to the Corporation for contributions to the work of numerous agencies engaged in various forms of social activity intended to

[24] Cf. *supra,* p. 8.

[25] Cf. E. W. Burgess, "The Interdependence of Sociology and Social Work," *Journal of Social Forces,* I, 366–70.

[26] Cf. M. J. Karpf, "The Relation between Sociology and Social Work," *Journal of Social Forces,* III, 1–8.

extend among the people of the United States the knowledge of their government and the obligations to it.[27] That sociology and sociologists should be turned to in such a connection is, in itself a significant index of the realization that the fields of social work and theoretical sociology are interrelated. Fortunately, sociology rose to the occasion and made some important contributions which have already noticeably influenced not only Americanization work and workers but also social workers in other fields.

But the sociologists' contribution to the "Americanization Studies" is by no means the only instance of the interest on the part of sociologists in problems relating definitely to social work. In the last few years a number of noteworthy attempts have been made to relate sociological theory to social work. The works of Todd, Thomas, Gillin, Chapin, and more recently the writings of Steiner, Queen, and Sutherland, are interesting illustrations of this trend. Surely the fact that the "Century Series on Social Work" is being edited by a sociologist is not without significance in this connection.

I cannot leave this topic without mentioning at least the numerous research projects under way in the various departments of sociology throughout the country. Whether it is because social work offers the most fruitful field for sociological research and doctoral dissertations, or whether it is because the tendency is to give students more concrete problems for research, a perusal of any list of research projects reveals more problems related to social work, especially as regards community organization and delinquency, than to any other single subject.[28] Just what influence this type of research will have on social work is, of course, impossible to foretell. It can hardly be questioned, however, that the contact which these future teachers of sociology are bound to have with social work and workers, and the contact which social workers will have with the scientific approach to social problems, are bound to influence both. It is likely to develop in the future sociologists a sound respect for the concrete and practical approach of the social worker, and it is just as likely to engender in the social worker a greater confidence in, and respect for, the sociological approach and point of view. In the words of Professor Giddings, "Sociology cannot give social workers rules of technique as yet. But sociology can give them and should give them poise and balance, a comprehensive view, a sense of relative values, an apprehension of proportions and probabilities."[29] I think most persons will agree that such contacts are bound to result in a more scientific sociology, as well as in a more scientific type of social work.

From what has been said it would seem only fair to conclude that thus

[27] See Foreword to *The Immigrant Press and Its Control* by Robert E. Park (Harper & Brothers, 1922).

[28] Cf. *American Journal of Sociology,* XXVI, 96–104; XXVIII, 79–90; XXIX, 85–95.

[29] F. H. Giddings, *The Scientific Study of Human Society* (University of North Carolina Press, 1924), p. 99.

far the sociologists have been more ready to utilize social work and to contribute to it than social workers have been to seek, or even to accept, these contributions. Just what this seeming indifference on the part of social workers is due to is, of course, difficult to tell. It would seem, however, that the schools of social work could be an important factor in the situation. It is really they that should endeavor to bridge the gap and make available to social work that which is applicable to it, regardless where it comes from.[30] Let us, therefore, see what the attitude of the schools of social work is toward sociology.

Despite the fact that the first school of social work in this country started as an independent enterprise, the other schools are mostly closely related to sociology. An examination of twenty-five of the foremost colleges and universities throughout the country which have schools of social work or which offer courses in social work shows that, with the exception of two or three instances, the schools are the direct offspring of the departments of sociology. In those institutions which offer courses in social work such courses are almost exclusively offered by members of the departments of sociology. In the light of this, the fact that three schools went out of their way to indicate, in Dr. Eliot's questionnaire, that sociology is not especially helpful as a background to social work is somewhat startling.[31] Moreover, we were told recently by a person in authority in one of the larger colleges that schools of social work prefer students who have not had sociology because they have less to unlearn. It cannot be said that these are isolated instances. A casual study of the catalogues of the schools of social work reveals that sociology is usually not mentioned as a prerequisite for admission, and, so far as my knowledge goes, the Association of Professional Schools of Social Work has not declared itself as favoring such background.

Professor Steiner, in a chapter on training in his recent book on *Community Organization,* published sometime during 1925, says that the minimum requirement for social work "would seem to be the usual undergraduate courses in sociology, economics, political science, psychology, and biology." He goes on to say that the value of such a requirement is now quite generally recognized by those interested in the professional education of social workers.[32] He expressed a similar view in his earlier study (1920) on *Education for Social Work,* a view in which Professor Tufts concurred.[33] It is of interest, therefore, to quote a recently published pamphlet by the American Association of Social Workers on this subject. We are informed here that "A well-rounded college

[30] M. J. Karpf, *Proceedings of the National Conference of Social Work* (1925), p. 652.

[31] See *supra,* p. 6.

[32] J. F. Steiner, *Community Organization,* pp. 379–80.

[33] James H. Tufts, *Education and Training for Social Work* (Russell Sage Foundation, 1921), p. 152.

curriculum affording a broad cultural education is regarded as the best preparation for training in family case work, rather than a course of study too closely related to the social sciences."[34] This pamphlet came out last June, about a year after Professor Steiner's book was published and more than five years after he wrote that one of the characteristics of the institutions offering training for social work "is their insistence on prerequisite studies in the social sciences as a basis for professional instruction."[35]

In light of the foregoing it may well be doubted whether the kind of relationship which some of us would like to see developed between sociology and social work is likely to be brought about in the very near future. One effective method would be to establish a section or division in this society on sociology and social work. Such a section could not only further a relationship which would be helpful to both fields, but it could be instrumental in developing a body of material on applied sociology which would give it new and added recognition as the science of human behavior. However, important as the establishment of such a section would be for developing a mutually helpful relationship, it will not come unless sociology, conscious of its developing technique and its great promise, becomes more critical of itself than it has been hitherto and builds up a science of human behavior. Until then there will be those partisans who will extol its virtues beyond their worth and others who will scoff at sociology having any contribution to make to social work, and for that matter, to any field concerned with the problems of human relationships.

[34] *Vocational Aspects of Family Social Work* (American Association of Social Workers, 1926), p. 22.

[35] Cf. J. F. Steiner, "Education for Social Work," *American Journal of Sociology*, XXVI, 499.

SECTION ON RURAL SOCIOLOGY

SOME OBSERVATIONS OF FARM LIFE IN EUROPE

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ABSTRACT

Many of the leaders of rural affairs in Europe declare that they should give more attention to social questions, although very few studies in this field have been made. While the place of the peasant on the land is one of hard work, still he is rising to the status of a man who knows his business and is able to take care of himself. To him the care of the land, co-operative enterprises and rural institutions, and the best possible development of his mind are a part of his conception of national patriotism. When the American farmer arrives at the point where his activities are prompted by a similar basic patriotism and love of things rural, the majority of our country-life problems will have been solved.

SOME UNRELATED OBSERVATIONS

First, the International Institute of Agriculture at Rome, Italy, after several hours of interesting discussion, participated in by De Vuyst, of Belgium, Bilbao, of Spain, Fjelstad, of Norway, Mikulski, of Poland, Strickland, of British India, and others, voted to organize a commission of specialists to study the problems relating to the improvement of rural life.

Second, much to my disappointment, I found little or no systematic rural social research carried on in Europe, either by government agencies or by private agencies. Let me now qualify a bit this broad statement, however.

In Switzerland the Association of Swiss Peasants makes some effective use of the statistics of various elements of the farm population of Switzerland, and also keeps daily records of the cost and standard of living of one hundred farm families, although confessing that no use is made of these records to assist the farmer in better consumption, but only to bolster up demands for peasant legislation.

In Sweden, and in fact in Italy, France, and some other countries the agricultural-laborer class is the object of constant *reconnaissance,* if not of scientific research, by governments.

In England, under the inspiration of Patrick Geddes, the practical sociologist, a branch section of the British Sociological Society has engaged itself in making certain regional social surveys, putting their product into map form. Mr. Farquarson, of Le Play House, has made such surveys in Scotland; and some students have made similar studies of farm villages in the "Slovakia" end

of Czechoslovakia. These surveys have the characteristics of rural surveys in America of ten or fifteen years ago.

In Wales the beginnings of real socio-economic studies are appearing, under the direction of Professor A. W. Ashby, of the University College of Wales, who has to his credit a socio-educational study of Oxfordshire while he was an instructor at the University of Oxford.

When the ministers of agriculture were asked why no research was being conducted on the human phases of farm life, the reply invariably was "We know the facts already. We see the farm people. We know, and they know, the human problems. There is nothing to inquire into. Besides, the great problems of the farm and of the farm population are all economic." The naïveté of this formula had a familiar sound.

Third, I found a small note of pessimism in Denmark among persons brought up, educationally speaking, in the period of Denmark's co-operative glow—pessimism about co-operation itself, which looks as if Denmark had "gone stale." The two or three facts mentioned were: first, the dropping off of attendance on the part of farm youth at the smaller folk-schools; second, the abandonment of several smaller folk-schools; third, the individualistic attitude of younger farmers, who seem determined to make their own hay while the sun shines and to avoid that type of voluntary unpaid service which their fathers gave without stint to make the co-operative movement move and stick. Denmark, after a little, may be sending its farmers to other countries to learn anew the secret of co-operation.

Fourth, Sir Horace Plunkett and his secretary, Mr. Walter, were with the American party quite a little in Belgium and Denmark. Sir Horace heard a great deal in Denmark about the humanistic influences lying back of Denmark's better farming practices and better business techniques. Mr. Walter told me that Sir Horace was apparently very much impressed with the historical sequence of steps in the Danish co-operative movement; and upon my asking whether Sir Horace would now be inclined to modify his famous formula, "Better farming, better business, better living, but better business first," Mr. Walter replied that this very thing lay mulling in his own mind. Perhaps we shall see the formula changed to "better farming, better business, better living, but better living first."

Fifth, land reform, especially with the breaking up of large farms and estates into small holdings—economic units, as they are called, varying in acreage according to type of soil and type of farming—land reform, I say, brings to the fore the old question of how to avoid subdivision of the small holdings into uneconomic units through the process of inheritance. What struck me especially, in this connection, was the realization in Switzerland that inheritance without subdivision, but by mortgage upon the farm to pay off the heirs who migrate to cities, is a constant leakage of surplus wealth from farms to cities, and should be made as small as possible at the time of settlement by a government appraisal of the farm at, or even below, its producing, rather

than its speculative, value. Even so, I was told that the farms of Switzerland carry constantly a mortgage of about 50 per cent, a good share of which comes from inheritance pay-offs.

THE STRUGGLE OF THE PEASANT FOR A GOOD STANDARD OF LIFE

I was impressed in Europe with the struggle of the peasant to rise from a level of bare existence to a better standard of life. The peasant in Italy, for example, is essentially the hoeman. He spades considerable areas; he digs the vineyards with a heavy mattock. If he plows, he plows by hand with the long-beamed primitive plow, driving a small horse, a donkey, draft cows, or white oxen when he works on a large farm. The peasant cuts grass with a hook sickle. He rakes by hand. He carries heavy loads on his back. He pulls at the cart, if he has one, to aid his small draft beast. Six men may be seen spading a field in lieu of plowing. A man may be working an irrigation pump instead of the horse, donkey, or ox. A man may carry pails upon pails of water, and, cup in hand, splash water out upon his truck crops.

The peasant woman, barefooted, hoes, breaks hard lumpy ground with the mattock. She cuts grass, loads hay, weeds truck crops on her knees, weeds all the wheat fields, long hours, rain or shine, always walking, carrying heavy loads on her head or back. She washes the household linen by hand at streams, rivers, ponds, in cold water.

The brutality of lifting, pulling, carrying, walking, back bent, eyes to the earth, condemns the peasant to peasantry—until some social miracle happens to break the chain of benumbing events in his life; and this miracle has been and is happening in Europe in country after country, and while the word "peasant" everywhere remains, the characteristics of the peasant are radically changing. Let the following statement of Dr. Jacob Lange, of Odense, Denmark, head of a famous folk-school of small-holders, indicate the change that has taken place in the peasant of Denmark, who, in the early part of the nineteenth century, is described as "unprogressive, sullen, and suspicious, averse to experiment, incapable of associated enterprise": "With us the peasant is not the unthinking dray-horse of society, hauling the chariot of the refined and educated classes; but is more and more becoming the main stem and root of the nation, fully able to take care of himself and make beneficent use of every progressive step, and rising to that stage where he perceives that nothing human should be foreign to him any longer." What Dr. Lange says thus about the peasant of Denmark can in some measure, at least, be said about the peasants of the thirteen countries of central and northern Europe which I visited.

WHAT AMERICA CAN LEARN FROM EUROPE'S ACHIEVEMENTS

Farmers in Europe have some advantages over farmers in America. The farmers of Europe have not so great a health problem as America has; no such rural church problem; no serious communityizing problem; no rural illiteracy

problem; not such a threatened problem of deterioration in human stock through migration to cities; not so serious a tenancy problem. American farmers, if they follow in the steps of European farmers at their best, will determine to know by education the way the world of men and affairs moves on, so that they may take their places in the councils of state and nation. They will not be satisfied to hire proxies. They will win their struggles by brain power, face to face with men of other crafts.

As for co-operaton, the American farmer will learn as a patriot to co-operate with his neighbor. The profit motive standing alone will not make co-operation succeed in America any more than it does in Ireland. A régime of humanism back of the technique of co-operation is required to overcome the serious difficulties of so democratic a procedure as business by collectivism.

A corollary of co-operative production and marketing is co-operative consumption—pooling of money for the great staple goods of culture and civilization.

An American love of farm life, based upon the hope of a new rural civilization, will stop any unwarranted movement of the best farmers to cities; it will help build the necessary rural institutions; it will make the farm home a depository of comfort; it will make the agricultural village or town the depository of prideful rural business and service agencies.

CONCLUSION

If I were to sum up my strongest impressions from rural Europe, I would say that they are the diffusion of intelligence and skill among the masses of European farmers; added to the determination to take care of their own social and economic status by their own brain power; added to an emotional patriotism and a profound love of farm life.

The chief lessons I learned from European farmers is that American farmers will always find themselves outwitted by nature or man until the mass of American farmers become highly intelligent, not only upon agriculture, but upon human affairs in general; and this means adding to the fire of the profit-making motive a never-say-die resolution to know, know, know, coupled with a social will to work out a civilization for rural America.

SOME AGENCIES FOR RURAL PROGRESS IN EUROPE[1]

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ABSTRACT

The church represents the chief influence in rural progress in Europe. Many of the modern movements in agriculture and agricultural education were fostered by church officials. In northern Europe agricultural education has been developed to some extent in all countries but more especially in Denmark. A rather thorough system of extension teaching in agriculture and home making is well established. An outstanding feature of country life in Europe is that of co-operation which extends to marketing, purchasing, and banking. Co-operation in one or more of these forms is established in every country. This movement is the result of both religion and education. The farm women's movement is making a distinct contribution in a number of countries. National agricultural policy favors the small landholders.

Agencies for progress include the institutions and organizations through which constructive activities are developed.

CHURCHES

Churches stand out as the greatest agency for progress. Because the churches and the governments have been so closely related in European countries, one can see a reflection in present conditions of the policies of the different churches.

In Denmark it is the folk high-schools, inspired by Bishop Grundtvig, which are credited with training 90 per cent of the leaders of farmers' organizations. There the national church has been a factor also in developing in farm people the habit of working together.

In Scotland, education, which has been emphasized for about 400 years, came to the front in the long fight which the clergy waged with the nobility. The situation is somewhat different in England, where less emphasis has been placed upon education for the rural people. In Ireland, Flanders, and parts of Germany the interests have again been different. In Flanders it seems that co-operative buying and selling agencies have been directly promoted and developed by leaders in the church.

SCHOOLS

Schools are the second great agency for progress. Statistics have been given regarding army recruits (1901–10) showing 7.9 per cent in Belgium, .2 per cent in Denmark, .05 per cent in Germany as illiterate. Comparable statistics for the British Isles show illiteracy among those signing marriage registers, 1.6 in Scotland, 1.8 in England and Wales, and 8.1 in Ireland. These

[1] Report based on six weeks' study in rural Europe, summer of 1926.

figures probably give a fair indication of the efficiency of the school system and the educational foundation for progressive rural activities.

Although we did not make a special study of rural schools, we saw several types. One could not but contrast those in England and Denmark, the countries in which we had the best opportunity to observe them. The Danish schools are better equipped and the Danish schoolmaster is a keen-eyed, aggressive community leader.

Special education in agriculture has been developed in most of the countries in Northern Europe. Of particular interest is the agricultural education which is being developed in the open country by trained workers who, like the Smith-Lever force of workers in the United States, are trying to build a definite agricultural program.

CO-OPERATIVE MARKETING ORGANIZATIONS

Denmark is renowned for its co-operative marketing associations. Developing in a country which is predominantly agricultural, they have been the agency through which economic gains have been made.

Germany has practically no co-operative marketing. There they are starting out again, however, to build this type of agency. Co-operative land banks were a factor in German agriculture before the war, but the change in currency has disrupted them so that their influence is reported as much less today. England, like Germany, is lacking in co-operative marketing. Industrial sentiment there seems to be definitely against it. Leadership is also lacking, and the social differences among farm people complicate their economic problems. In Scotland a beginning has been made. The chairman of the Scottish Board of Agriculture explained the limitations, however, and stated that the Scottish farmer had not felt the need sufficiently as yet.

Ireland has made more progress in co-operative organization. They have had leadership in this field since Sir Horace Plunkett established the work of the Department of Agriculture in 1900. We were told that co-operative creameries now handle 50 per cent of the output of Irish butter. Many co-operative stores are also active. During the war the interest for such institutions declined because of strife and of the high prices which made it easy for producers to make money without organization. Considerable attention is now being given to standardization and grading.

FARM WOMEN'S ORGANIZATIONS

Standing out in the front rank among all progressive rural agencies in Europe one must recognize the farm women's organizations. The Women's Institutes of England, Wales, and Scotland are spoken of as the greatest rural social development of a century in those countries.

Canada is credited with the first step in this movement. A Women's Institute was organized at Stoney Creek, Ontario, in February, 1897. In Norway something similar, the House-Mothers' Association, was started in 1898. From

Norway there has been a spread into Sweden, Denmark, and Finland. The total membership among rural women in the Scandinavian countries is now estimated at 70,000.

In 1904 Mr. de Vuyst, director of agriculture in Belgium, had visited Canada, and in 1906 he started the Circles of Farmers' Wives which now has a membership of 67,000 Belgium farm women. It is said that similar organizations exist in Poland, Holland, Germany, Austria, and Russia. Through Sir Horace Plunkett's influence in Ireland, the United Irishwomen became established in 1910.

The start which was made in England and Wales in September, 1915, was closely related to the Canadian organizations. The name was borrowed, and a Canadian woman was very active as the first organizer. In Scotland the movement is more of a "home-grown" affair. Their interest started in December, 1916, with the efforts of Mrs. Blair, the wife of a Scottish farmer in East Lothian.

Now, when the movement is ten years old, there are more than four thousand institutes—about 500 in Scotland and 3,712 in England and Wales. A fifth of the parishes in England and Wales and one-half those in Scotland have such organizations. Membership in the locals averages about sixty women. More than a quarter of a million, in all, are now paying the membership dues of two shillings a year.

When we realize that in countries where there are such distinct classes all are now united, from the Queen down to the farm laborer's wife, paying equal membership dues in a voluntary organization, we can appreciate the genuineness and strength of this movement. While it is still true that "social status begets official status," yet all have a part in the program and the steady growth of the organization is carrying it beyond even the hopes of its founders.

NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL POLICIES

A complete sketch of European agencies for rural progress must finally call attention to certain established policies of the governments. This, of course, is in itself a big subject, and one hesitates even to mention it. There are a few points which are so definitely established that perhaps they can be stated clearly in a few sentences.

Farm-home ownership.—In the first place it seems that every one of the six countries visited is giving definite encouragement to the "small holder." They are systematically trying to help small farmers to secure ownership of family-sized farms. Germany passed a bill during the past summer providing M. 250,000,000 to be used in buying big estates, which they are dividing and selling on a long-time amortization plan.

Denmark has its Small Holders' Act of 1919, giving approved young farmers the privilege of possessing 12½-acre tracts by putting up the buildings. It is now taking over the remaining 2,000 large estates, 25 per cent at a time.

In Scotland there are the Crofters Act of 1886, and Land Settlement acts of 1911 and 1919. Sixty-one estates of 246,000 acres have now been taken over by the Land Settlement Board. Many more have been redivided so that they are now leased to more tenants.

Ireland is buying and reselling its big estates. The leaders there stated that in twenty years they hope to have 60,000 more families established as landowners. England and Belgium were developing along about the same line. By these policies the countries are meeting the unemployment problem and making their governments more stable politically. It is this they have in mind primarily. Establishing more men on farms probably does not improve the economic condition of the farming class.

International trade policies.—Next to the land-settlement work, one is impressed with the recognition which these countries have given to international trade relationships and their effects on agriculture. Germany fifty years ago adopted a strong protective tariff policy. It severely injured the Danish farmer who was exporting pork, but because there was not a surplus produced locally it helped develop German agriculture along with German industry. Denmark, on the other hand, has held to its free-trade policy because of its agriculture. With its surplus of farm products, upon which the prosperity of the nation depends, it is anxious to have the greatest possible opportunity to sell this product in foreign markets, and the farmers are definitely opposed to increasing their costs by duties on imports.

England is often referred to as the classic modern example of a country neglecting its agriculture. Because of this it was of particular interest to see in the British Museum a letter which was written nearly eighty years ago. The author was a member of parliament who had led in the fight for the repeal of the Corn Laws. The letter was written to a friend who had evidently congratulated him on his victory. In it he expressed definitely his view that this would mark the end of taxes on foodstuffs and would open the way for greater industrial development. It seems that the principal value which the English government has recognized in land has been its social value. Two hundred years ago landowners could be members of Parliament, and one hundred years later it was voted to give additional titles with additional estates. The exodus from the farms because of economic conditions has been very rapid during the last fifty years.

The Irish Free State is building tariff walls. As it is an agricultural exporting nation, the economic benefits to the farmers are doubtful. Prices of clothing and other manufactured goods appeared to be higher in Ireland than in England and Scotland.

Education for farm efficiency.—Finally, national agricultural policies are in evidence in the educational programs. Germany is thorough in this, as in everything else. Denmark has given encouragement to local initiative and has rewarded successful efforts in this field. It was also one of the first to establish a college for technical training in agriculture. Belgium, in its reconstruc-

tion program, has made large provision for the beautification and improvement of country life. England is now trying to deal with its situation through training farm managers and young farmers in schools and giving advice to farmers in counties. Scotland has limited technical training developed in chemistry, botany, and special farm lines. The Irish Free State is proceeding very directly to educate farmers to standard grades, with the motto "The best quality and more of it."

CONCLUSION

A complete story of agencies for rural progress should include a discussion of the press, transportation facilities, and several other factors. In this statement only a few have been considered. No mention has been made of agencies in any except six countries in Northern Europe. Perhaps, however, even this limited study will help in developing a perspective and a scale of measurement which will aid in judging the policies and activities of agencies in this country.

SOME OBSERVATIONS ON RURAL LIFE IN NORWAY

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ABSTRACT

Agriculture in Norway is conducted with skill and intelligence. The land system favors permanency of population. The rural family maintains many of the elements of self-sufficedness. Life is lived in the midst of a reasonable leisurely attitude, thus conserving human energy. Organized religion is not meeting the needs of the people. Recreation represents, for the most part, activities which are native and long established. General education and technical information concerning the various phases of agriculture are almost universal.

Agriculture as an occupation is highly esteemed by the Norwegians. In spite of the fact that only 2 per cent of the land area is suitable for cultivation, nearly one-half of the population of the country make their living entirely or partly from the soil, and thus live in rural environment. Some interesting characteristics of Norwegian rural life are:

First, there is unusual skill and intelligence shown in supplementing farm earnings by work in the fishing and lumbering industries. Thousands of Norwegian farmers near the western and southern coasts spend the winters lumbering in the nearby forests, which in most cases are a part of their own farms. They cut pine for lumber and birch for stovewood, and they are constantly replanting so as to assure themselves and their descendants of an adequate supply. Many spend the fishing season along the coast or on some of the beautiful rivers and lakes where fish abound. These occupations of farming, fishing, and lumbering are similar in that they call for a certain hardiness and love of outdoor life. While the earnings from no one of them are large, two or all three of them together furnish an adequate family income. I do not here refer to those who fish exclusively.

Second, there is little or no farm land speculation in Norway. A modified primogeniture system prevails and seems satisfactory to all concerned. The oldest son inherits the ancestral estate. He is obligated to maintain his parents while they live and also to pay each of the other sons or daughters certain amounts in cash. If the family is large, some of them are likely to migrate to the cities or to America; but in many cases they manage to lease a little piece of land on favorable terms and settle down in the neighborhood as agricultural laborers. The freedom from the curse of land speculation helps to lend a certain definite spirit of dignity and stability to the whole agricultural industry which is so often lacking in the United States. If a farm is purchased by an outsider, any one of the heirs may repurchase it within twenty years. The farm bears the family name. If a man marries a woman who has a farm, or

purchases a farm, he usually changes his own name to conform to that of the farm.

Third, the standard of living of the Norwegian rural people is distinctly satisfactory. They own few automobiles and probably not many luxuries of any kind. But food is ample, of good variety, and excellently prepared. The women are skilled in the old domestic arts of our American pioneers. The long winter evenings favor the use of the loom and the spinning wheel. Clothing is warm and substantial. Many farm and household utensils are home made. There is little waste. Agricultural schools train men for general farming, but many women take special courses in butter- and cheese-making and get positions in modern cheese factories, which are now becoming numerous. The favorite and one of the most expensive of the cheeses is the goat cheese, which is often made at home.

Housing is probably the least satisfactory element in the standard of living. Most of the houses were built many years ago and have few modern conveniences. In many sections, however, electric current is available and is used for lighting, ironing, etc., in the farm homes. We rode all of one afternoon in an automobile through Setersdalen, one of the most primitive sections, where many of the houses had sod roofs, but all of these houses were lighted by electricity. This is especially significant in a country, part of which is in total darkness in mid-winter and the other part of which has only a few hours of daylight during that season.

The aesthetic side of home life is not neglected. We saw thousands of blooming flowers on the sod roofs of the neat log-cabin homes in the Setersdal region; and it seems a well-nigh universal custom in both the city and the rural districts for the housewives to keep potted plants, in bloom, in the windows. This practice lends a touch of simple beauty to the rural scene. The native costumes, worn by both men and women in some sections, are artistic as well as durable.

Fourth, the care of dairy cattle and goats is women's work, whether it is done by the women of the household or an employed woman. In the hay harvest women and men work together. The labor is performed somewhat leisurely, however, for only one horse is used, and it does not seem burdensome to either men or women. One of my most pleasant afternoons was spent in a picturesque little hayfield at the foot of a snow-capped mountain. The patriarch of the family, seventy years old, his two husky sons, one daughter, and myself, with wooden hayrakes and short-handled pitchforks, made up the crew. When the hay is ripe all turn to and help harvest, for the rainy season is near at hand. Because of the cool and often uncertain weather the hay is hung up to dry on temporary wire fences.

Fifth, the religion of the rural people is nominally that of the Lutheran state church; and a neat little church building is a conspicuous part of every village landscape. Many of the more intelligent people, however, are beginning to feel that the authorized state religion is too lifeless and mechanical to

be of real value. These people either refrain from church attendance or establish certain independent religious groups. As in rural America, the church seems to be falling distinctly short of its possibilities as an agency of socialization.

Sixth, recreation: There are few consciously organized recreation agencies. Perhaps the only important exception to this is the circle of young people's societies that seem to have sprung up spontaneously in many of the rural sections. There is little organization machinery about them, but they seem to function quite satisfactorily. They have no particular connection with any other institution, like the school or church. These groups sponsor skiing parties, summer picnicking parties, and other wholesome forms of recreation. Skiing is Norway's national sport, and must be a thrilling pastime on the snow-covered hillsides.

Social conversation around the home fireside, participated in by old and young, is also not entirely a lost art.

Seventh, education and intelligence: Elementary education is compulsory and universal in Norway. Agricultural schools of secondary grade for both men and women are available to all who have the requisite mental ability and a modest amount of money. Agricultural fairs and exhibits are well established and well attended. We saw an excellent fair of this kind at Bodö, on the west coast of Norway, well within the Arctic Circle. In neatness, educational value, and general arrangement this fair would put to shame any American county fair the writer has seen, and, except as to *scale* of exhibits, would rank along with our best state fairs. We visited the fair on a pleasant Sunday afternoon, and the buildings and exhibit gardens were thronged with interested and intelligent observers.

Newspapers, farm papers, and some books by the best Norwegian writers are found in most farm homes. Illiteracy is practically unknown. The national government has spent money with relative liberality to build roads and maintain schools even in the most isolated sections; and the results are plainly visible. When our three million American mountaineers have these great civilizing agencies provided, perhaps our high rate of illiteracy in the United States will decline sharply. The Norwegians believe it pays. A visitor to the country, as I was, who can talk with the humble farmers (both men and women) on the latest political news and on the sociological problems of rural life feels a thrill of genuine satisfaction when he realizes that these plain Norwegian farmers are in touch with modern thought and are able themselves to contribute to it in no mean way.

Eighth, a certain deliberate, leisurely, unhurried attitude toward life in general and their own problems in particular seems quite characteristic of Norwegian rural people. Perhaps this trait or attitude is partly responsible for the impression a sociological observer gets that the Norwegian farmers seem to be somewhat of experts in working out the kind of freedom that Mr. Cooley says

is too much lacking in America, the freedom to get the most out of the class and occupation we are in, rather than striving to get *out* of this class and into a so-called "higher" one. The Norwegian farmer, his wife, son, and daughter love the farm. They think and plan and work to make it more productive and beautiful, for they expect to spend their lives there. The mountain lands where they graze their cattle, and the rushing streams, are full of beauty for them.

One day when I commented to a Norwegian friend on how slowly the summer sun sank beyond the western horizon, and on the long twilight which was lasting until midnight, he replied in rather philosophical fashion: "Well, Mr. Harris, you know *everything* moves faster in the United States, even the sun." Then I reflected: May it not be possible that American rural life might gain a bit in the sum total of real human satisfactions if we incorporated here and there *some* of the mental and spiritual attitudes and values that have been worked out by the farm people in this very old land of Norway?

THE NATURE AND FUNCTION OF RESEARCH

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ABSTRACT

Science is a relative, intellectual product. Its groundwork is evidence and its validity depends upon the quality of the evidence and the accuracy of its interpretation. The method of science is the result of the effort to get rid of the two chief causes of error: inadequate determination of premises and exaggerated conclusions. Research is the process by which the method of science is applied in discovering new truths. It consists in passing from a simple fact or group of facts to a generality. Exact thinking in research presupposes a clearly defined and differentiated field of study. This is best achieved through the project statement which clearly indicates the what, how, and why of the study, as well as its objectives, its procedure, and its ultimate purpose. This involves a thorough knowledge of all work previously done in the field. A limited undertaking evidences analytical ability. To deal with simple, homely things in a large way: this is the essence of research.

In approaching this subject with special reference to rural sociology, we may assume at the outset that the latter is in the nature of science (at least in the making), and that it may be advanced by research in accordance with the method of science. It is only from this standpoint that I could assume to discuss the matter, for in the subject of sociology itself I am an outsider. But all science has certain common attributes, and there are general principles which apply to research and hold true regardless of the particular branch in which it is carried on.

THE NATURE OF SCIENCE

A common dictionary definition of science is "knowledge which has been systematized and formulated with reference to the discovery of general truths or the operation of general laws." The science of any subject, large or small, is the organized information about it which possesses a high degree of validity and has been crystalized to express general facts or truths. "A science teaches us to know, and an art to do." One of your sociological colleagues (Professor Giddings) says that "Science is nothing more than getting at facts and trying to understand them." It is more than common experience. Years ago one of the earliest American agricultural investigators, Dr. S. W. Johnson, of Connecticut, explained that "Common experience is the native rank but wild growth of knowledge; science is its trained and cultivated development."

What we regard as science at any particular stage is of slow growth and represents many changes. It is never complete, but is constantly being added to, corrected, and revised. It is developed through the accumulation and study of records obtained by experimentation, observation, measurements, and from

existing sources; and beyond this it grows and strengthens by discussion and criticism.

This evolutionary process represents three stages: First, the record of the individual, or personal knowledge; second, the conversion of the personal knowledge by verification and collation into valid, impersonal knowledge; third, the systematic co-ordination and condensation of the conclusions. For this reason science has been defined as "knowledge which has acquired impersonal validity."

Science, being man-made, is not absolute but relative; represents the highest degree of probability attainable at a given time; and is in constant state of change. It is an intellectual product, which takes form in the human mind, and consequently the quality of it bears a close relation to the development and equipment of the producing intellect. Its groundwork is evidence, and its validity depends upon the quality of the evidence and the accuracy of its interpretation. Familiarity with the sources of error and the principles on which accuracy rests is therefore essential to an understanding of science and the authority attaching to it.

THE METHOD OF SCIENCE

What is known as the method of science relates to the general principles of securing accuracy; it is the art of making durable, trustworthy records. The progress of science depends on the perfecting of existing methods and the development of new ones which will enlarge the field of inquiry and enable making records which are more accurate and trustworthy. Hence the method of science is a perfected application of the human resources of observation and reflection. It is the result of the effort to get rid of the two chief causes of error: inadequate determination of premises and exaggerated conclusions.

Assuming that there is absolute truth, and that the individual makes all the mistakes, the basic task in the pursuit of new knowledge is the elimination of error. This depends primarily upon insight into the sources of error. Such insight, in turn, involves an intimate technical acquaintance with the methods, with just what they *can* show, with what they *cannot* show, and with the misleading results they may produce. The personal equation always exists, although it can be quantitatively stated in only a minority of cases. It is especially prominent in the interpretation of observations, and this has been pronounced the greatest source of error. This error of interpretation is largely attributable to the uncontrolled tendency to let the conclusions exceed the supporting power of the evidence—to go beyond the point which the data justify.

The basis of evidence is facts, resting on precise observation and experiment multiplied sufficiently to give validity. Facts differ widely in their importance. Even among well-established ones, some are pregnant while others are sterile; some have no reach; they teach us nothing beyond themselves, and the person who has derived them has not become more capable of foreseeing other new facts. On the other hand, there are facts of great yield; each of them

marks a definite contribution or step in advance, and paves the way for further progress.

The visualizing of the kind of facts needed to advance knowledge of a subject and the selection of those applicable is a part of the modern scientific method. It gives direction to the undertaking, in place of the unguided, fortuitous gathering in of whatever shows up. It implies going after the facts needed, rather than waiting for them to appear in the dragnet.

RESEARCH

Research is the process by which the method of science is applied in discovering new truths. It is the means by which the materials out of which science is developed are sought out, weighed, arranged in orderly form, and interpreted. It advances by gradual steps and systematically, for it is essentially a building process and grows upward.

Research and investigation are synonymous. Both imply the making of records, the determination of individual facts, not as ends in themselves, but as means of discovering a truth or a general fact. The process is a directed, systematic, creative effort, and involves constantly the element of inquiry. The endeavor is to unfold the nature of the problem under investigation, to ascertain the kind of facts needed for its solution, and, as they are gathered, to develop from them an idea or a theory upon which more general facts may be built.

In these respects research differs from exploration, or from general observation that takes in everything that may attract the interest. In the early stages a subject may be explored to get at the nature and content of it and to find a significant feature for study and a place to take hold. But at the earliest practicable stage research assumes a definite, concrete, and limited character. The broadside attack and the shotgun method yield volumes of report but results usually in inverse proportion. Mere accumulation and cataloguing of facts without comparison or inference is not classed as research; unless the causes and relations are studied, the element of inquiry so essential in research is lacking.

Isolated facts rarely have much value in solving a problem or changing the status of knowledge. Agassiz declared that "facts are stupid things until they can be combined into truth." Poincaré well illustrated this view in his contention that "Science is built up with facts, as a house is with stones, but a collection of facts is no more science than a heap of stones is a house."

Research therefore consists in passing from a simple fact or a group of facts to a generality. It aims not only to increase and summarize the evidence, but to digest it so as to form a critical judgment about the matter, and, if possible, to lead up to a conclusion of breadth and permanence. One of its important attributes is that it is purposeful, not in a general way but concretely, and that it attempts to make a definite contribution. However broad and groping the process may be at the outset, the desire is definitely focused on the ob-

jective; everything is guided by the purpose to add something substantial to the structure which is in process of building.

This attempt to make a real contribution is distinctive. There is an important difference between an actual contribution and an addition to the bulk of the literature. Mere accumulation of published records and observations with descriptive matter may not prove a real help but a possible hindrance in advancing knowledge, for all such matter will have to be weighed and sifted, which may require more time than it is worth. Not volume, but substance, counts.

A census enumeration is not, of course, a form of research; it is routine and mechanical, and the chief requirements are accuracy, trustworthiness, and common sense. Similarly, the filling out of a questionnaire in connection with a survey is not in itself research, but may be pure routine unless something else goes along with it—a study of the setting and the relationships, an attempt to find the cause of the observed condition, i.e., of the effect. The field worker who does not see and think beyond the formal answers to his questions is not a student, but a collector, operating in a routine, mechanical way.

Just as there are inveterate collectors of specimens, there are collectors of so-called "facts," but in neither case can the progress of knowledge depend on such amateurs. The collector may even be an exasperation and a hindrance to the investigator. The complaint is recalled of a paleontologist against amateur collectors who gather up specimens of fossils and rocks in unusual localities, without study or record of the surrounding conditions. Such a thoughtless species of vandalism not only robs the specimens of their scientific value, but destroys for all time materials which might have been of great value in the hands of those competent and willing to study it in place.

I wonder if this does not apply in some measure to the means by which economic and sociological material is gathered. Much importance is attached in such research to the survey method, and evidently the field must be looked to for the materials out of which evidence is made. In this sense the field is the natural laboratory. But too often the field work has been left to untrained observers, while those who are trained to see, to wonder, and to discern remain at their desks. As a result, the facts recorded in connection with the survey may not be studied in their natural setting, or with reference to other facts they may suggest which might have a bearing or offer an explanation. In such cases the opportunity is lost for the time being, and to that extent the investigation may be superficial. In a branch of inquiry where so much depends on the gaining of accurate impressions and inferences, especially as supplying a working idea, it would seem very important that the field study be placed in competent hands.

ESSENTIALS IN RESEARCH

We have seen that research is objective, that it is narrowed down to a definite purpose, and that its aim is constructive in the sense of disclosing new contributions which can be fitted into the existing fund. It attempts to fill in the

gaps. One of its distinguishing features is the skill and ingenuity expressed in deriving and marshaling facts, and in the interpretation of their full meaning. This implies foresight, the ability to see beyond immediate data and to devise means of getting other data that will enable further steps. Research is not mechanical, although it may employ mechanical means, and it can never be allowed to degenerate into routine, for it depends upon an alert, searching mind, ready to detect and seize upon any idea the data may suggest and turn it to advantage. It is what the individual puts into the undertaking that determines its effectiveness and the originality of his contribution.

If, then, research is an attitude of mind, as has often been said, it is an attitude of sound inquiry, of thoughtful consideration, of concentration of all the powers for the time being upon the subject in hand. The searching process involves in high degree the quality of individual initiative—fundamentally a native quality which may be trained and developed in an atmosphere of scientific inquiry.

Research calls for vision and perception. The need is for men and women trained to see, to think, and to foresee. Vision, a trained intelligence, and an open mind is the prescription of one writer for the essentials of investigation. Lively imagination plays a great part in research. Agassiz explained that 'imagination is that powerful faculty with which we conceive of relations which are beyond the reach of our perception through the senses, without which there is no progress in science"; but he emphasized the necessity for control of imagination by experiment, by observation and experience, else it may lead to error.

Manifestly the investigator needs to be open-minded, ready to receive a new idea, on the watch for things in his own work that may suggest it, and, above all, free from prejudice and sentiment. Once the mind is closed against the perception or reception of an idea that does not agree with the individual conception, error is perpetuated, not by bad reasoning, but by failure to reason. The development of independent judgment is especially important for the investigator. He should strive to achieve an open mind. Intellectual integrity is a difficult quality to acquire, but it is indispensable to research.

"All beliefs are to some extent influenced by the wish to believe, and the wish to believe has the strongest influence in matters which closely concern us" (Minot). This is especially true where common bases of measurement cannot be applied. It may present special difficulties in a subject like yours, as suggested by a recent writer who explains that one reason why moral and social sciences have not reached the actual grade of sciences may be in the first instance the peculiar nature of their subject matter. He says: " . . . . Wherever human interests, feelings, and passions are directly involved, the serene objectivity which science cannot do without becomes exceedingly difficult to attain, and, when attained, to keep up. Mostly the conflict of opinions, either outspoken or tacit, makes the unbiased analysis of facts a sheer impossibility. Had mathematics, in the eyes of men, the same kind of interest as politics, per-

haps mankind would never have known what truth really is." And he adds that "not until we look at social facts as we do at physical ones shall we discover scientific truth about them."[1]

Some will contend that genius has a large place in research, and this is true as far as it goes; but fortunately it is not an indispensable factor. No one will question that at times the spark of genius has made possible great strides in the field of knowledge. However, the progress of science is not dependent upon it, and others may share in it. What is frequently recognized as genius consists of certain brilliance of conception and imagination, keen observation and foresight, ability to forecast possible relationships and to draw deductions from a wide variety of evidence.

Genius has been defined as the capacity for taking infinite pains, and while this is not a complete definition, it expresses a very important essential in research which no one can neglect, be he genius or one less brilliant. It is well understood that brilliant advances usually trace back to a long line of painstaking inquiry.

Real genius is relatively rare, and for most persons, the great rank and file, capacity for discovery rests upon the more prosaic basis of hard work, dominated by the attitude of research. Contrary to the common saying, the investigator is not more born than made, for many of the most essential traits can be cultivated. As one writer has said: "The investigator should have a mind at once fertile and well trained. . . . . Fertility of mind is not so much an inborn quality of the mind itself as of the training and association which that mind has had." A former president of the Carnegie Institution declared that "successful research requires neither any peculiar conformity nor any peculiar deformity of mind. It requires rather peculiar normality, and unusual patience and industry."

The recognition that the average person may share with genius in the advancement of science gives hope and inspiration to those who have a taste for it and will so prepare for it as to *get the most out of their own minds.*

PREPARATION FOR RESEARCH

Research is therefore in a large sense an individual matter. Success in it requires more than interest and desire. It involves originality; and it depends in very large degree on what the investigator puts into it: initiative, insight, and imagination. He can be helped to some extent by suggestion and stimulation, but if he is to do productive investigation he must be capable of independent work. Hence the fundamental importance of training that is thorough and severe, not only in his specialty but in the methods of research, with experience under productive investigators. Nothing will fully take the place of such stimulating contacts.

In a subject in which research is only partially organized and teachers are

[1] Lévy-Bruhl, in *Science* (November 19, 1926), p. 486.

scarce, it may be quite as profitable for the student preparing for research to secure knowledge of it by working for a time in another branch of science, preferably one related to his specialty. Since the principles of research are common to all branches and differ mainly in details, the mental equipment he will get will better enable him to apply the essentials of research to the study of problems in his special field.

CONDUCT OF RESEARCH

More than fifty years ago Dr. S. W. Johnson, previously referred to, described the various steps by which research is carried on. He had in mind experimental research, but the illustration will apply. He said:

> The philosopher experiments with an object in view, and distinctly in view. . . . . He first collects and collates all the facts known with regard to it. He then seeks to construct a consistent explanation of these various facts. It may be that he finds it impossible to do this. Then he must verify the facts; perhaps some are false, or he sees them from an insufficient point of view, or he must collect more of them by extending his observations, it may be by experiment. He shortly is enabled to form a hypothesis, to frame a theory which promises to account for the facts. Yet it is not a hypothesis but truth he seeks, and now he begins to test his theory. Every deduction which he can draw from it must prove true, else the theory is false. He therefore unites the conditions which his theory indicates will produce a given prevised result. If the result follow, his theory is confirmed; otherwise it must be rejected and a new one formed and similarly proved. Here is where experiment assumes its chief dignity and value. Here it must be suggested by reason or it cannot be expected to answer any good purpose. Here, if rationally devised and skillfully executed, it must reveal a truth; and though the truth be negative it is not the less valuable, for every new negative result limits within narrower bounds the space wherein positive truth is to be sought.

I can conceive that in general it is easier to carry on effective research in the older fields of inquiry than in the newer ones, where as yet there is lacking a consensus of opinion concerning what may be investigated and what criteria may be followed. There are certain advantages also in the field of experimental science, where conditions can be brought under control, variables limited, and theories tested out. In a subject like rural sociology it usually is necessary to derive conclusions from a wide variety of evidence, in which there may be many variables. In such cases it will not be sufficient to collate and summarize the data collected, for the ultimate aim in research is not merely to present a statement of a case or describe a situation, but rather to get at a general fact, or trace a relation between a condition and the factors responsible for it, or to find a remedy where needed. This means that the data will need to be investigated to get at their full meaning, to eliminate or offset unessentials, and to secure clues for further inquiries. The process will be multiplied until a sufficiently high degree of probability is reached to warrant a conclusion.

The process is one of analysis and synthesis—analysis of the problem and of the available information bearing upon it, sifting out fact from opinion, rec-

ognizing distinctions between isolated cases or manifestations and those of wide or general occurrence; and then projecting beyond this further inquiry to develop and sustain a working theory and reach a conclusion. A complete or final answer may not be secured, but at least a wider vision of the subject and a more critical, balanced judgment regarding it will be obtained.

The pioneer must blaze his own way and build his own paths. There will be false steps inevitably, excursions which will be unproductive in the direction hoped for; this is in the nature of research. The main thing is to recognize the negative character of these and profit by them, instead of pursuing them indefinitely in the vain hope that ultimately something may turn up. Be on the lookout for your mistakes as well as your successes. It is no disgrace to make a mistake provided it is recognized and profited by. Then each obstacle will become a stepping-stone instead of a stumbling-block.

In the earlier stages of research much foundation work is necessary which is of a more elementary nature than that to come later. Special emphasis is likely to be laid on the development of a background, but this easily can be overemphasized and, in effect, made an excuse for delay in taking up research. As a matter of fact, much of the best background material is obtained when its collection is guided by a discriminating purpose, such as a research problem supplies; this prevents indiscriminate scattering. And conversely, the gathering of data, if purposeful, presents as good an opportunity as ever will come for doing some substantial investigation.

In the early stages of a science there is a tendency for pseudo-science to assume a prominent place. There is a disposition to write articles and essays based on quite limited data and shallow investigation. If I am right, sociology has not escaped this and is not wholly beyond its influence. Such writings often give the force of fact to impressions formed from casual observation, and assume to discuss subjects in an authoritative manner. They rest on theorizing without the facts; the theory is formed far in advance of the data, and from then on the reasoning is influenced by the will to believe. Such work is not of the nature of research, and it is not the material out of which science is constructed. In a subject like yours real damage is likely to be done to the cause of its sound advancement by the attempt to build it with the pen rather than by thorough investigation.

The scientific worker is bound to give the basis for his generalizations if he is to inspire confidence and to be taken seriously. He must show the scope and quality of his investigation and the nature of his reasoning. This will enable evaluation of the effort and its distinction from half-truth.

THE PROJECT

In selecting a topic or subject for research it is important to distinguish between a field, a broad general problem, and a project. The field comprehends a group of general problems, and each of the latter includes many sub-

jects which must be investigated before the general problem can be worked out. Research implies relatively small units in order that it may be intensive and thorough. The project therefore represents a differentiation of the field and the general problems, and stands for a topic of such scope and individuality that it may be capable of independent investigation.

The project outline as a means of formulating and defining a scientific inquiry has come into quite general use. It is an evidence of clearer and more deliberate planning, and of more systematic, ordered effort. While it is not a thing to be standardized, it may be expected to conform to certain essentials which experience and good usage have disclosed.

A project statement ought to leave no uncertainty regarding its three salient features, what, how, and why, i.e., its objective, its procedure, and its ultimate purpose or the reason for it. The objective will indicate intelligence and clear thinking in differentiating the things to be done from those which might be done or are already known; the plan of procedure will evidence a critical consideration of ways and means for attaining the ends sought in the project; and the "why" will show that there is a motive behind the investigation which makes it worth while.

Out of the innumerable things which might be investigated some are more important, more timely, more promising of useful results than others. Such are entitled to first consideration, other things being equal. For we are concerned with the things which have application, specifically with such "sociological investigations as have for their purpose the development and improvement of the rural home and rural life" (Purnell Act). This defines the general field, and while it is not to be construed too narrowly, it will naturally be expected that the investigation will lie within the "three-mile limit" of our particular jurisdiction. What is outside of that is the responsbility of some other group; let them take the broad general questions of health and education, of the subnormal, the criminal, and the insane. Rural sociology has a large field as applied to normal, law-abiding people living under rural conditions, and the factors of their successful relationships; it cannot undertake to appropriate the whole field of sociology, although at times the study of its problems may lead incidentally into collateral fields. At this stage there is much to be done on explicit subjects which lie at the very feet of the rural sociologist, without getting into the more general field.

As in other branches of agriculture, rural science problems are very complex, and before they can be studied in a discriminating way they need to be analyzed to determine what comprises them, and as far as practicable these parts or phases separated for more intensive study. Evidently some difficulty is experienced in this direction. Some projects, for example, have proposed to deal with the whole subject of "Rural Social Organizations and Agencies Essential to a Permanent and Effective Agriculture." It is not sufficient, of course, to assume that something in the rural situation needs remedying, and

then attempt to study the whole subject of rural living at once. Before progress can be made in investigation it is first necessary to survey the broad subject sufficiently to apprehend some significant features or factors, after which these units can be worked out piecemeal.

So it is highly important to avoid mere abstractions and to get down to a concrete subject on which the investigation is to be centered. The framing of a clear objective, one of limited scope which takes account of the general status of knowledge on the subject and the particular thing to be done, is an excellent beginning. Science is exact, and an attempt to add to it by research is naturally exact in its purpose and design; and because of this the attempt is necessarily restricted in scope. A limited undertaking evidences analytical ability in seeing into a complex subject or dissecting a question which, in its entirety, represents a field of research rather than a practicable project. To deal with simple, homely things in a large way—this is the essence of research.

Seeing a problem is one thing, but visualizing the means by which it may be studied and solved is quite a different one. The project statement may be expected to bear evidence, not only that the problem is clearly seen, but that a feasible method for its solution has been devised. In practice, the latter is not always the case. In the haste to get to work only a quite sketchy procedure is determined upon, and many essential details are left to be provided for later if possible. No one would expect to start out on a building project to cost ultimately $5,000 to $25,000, or on a several years' exploration of a new region, without thorough planning and preparation. To do so might invite partial failure, if not disaster.

Of course it is not possible to anticipate the exact course which study of a given topic will take, but the general line of approach can be indicated, with provision for taking care of important details. This will show, among other things, that attention is to be concentrated upon the problem in hand, and everything else ignored for the time being; that the mistake is not being made of imagining that a great variety of data on other interesing subjects can be gathered in connection with the primary one. There is a large graveyard representing just such hopes and ambitions. The graves are marked with the simple epitaph: "He scattered his fire." Most of us can find full range for all our abilities even if we concentrate them for the time being on a limited and simplified topic.

OUTLINING THE PROJECT

As we have seen, the selection of a suitable topic begins with a reconnoissance of the field in which it is designed to work, the apprehension of a live problem in that field, and then, after an examination of it, the segregation of a suitable phase or unit to constitute a project. The assumption is that the specialist in rural sociology knows considerable about country people and rural life, and that this will give him a vision of the general field and judgment as to what it is important to do. If he lacks this he is under a handicap and will

probably spend considerable time in getting a background before he finds a real research subject.

The next step may well be a review of the literature on the subject, with special reference to that which bears directly on the theme. It may be scattered and require considerable search. The object is to familiarize one's self with the subject as a whole, its status, what has been done on it, and the methods employed. This will give a thorough understanding of the subject to be investigated, enable profiting by what has preceded, and avoid unnecessary duplication. Furthermore, it will clarify the main objective, which at the outset may have been vague and complex. Projects have been noted which listed a dozen or more objects, none of them very definite.

The next step will be to determine the leading factors, features, or phases which enter into the project, for there are usually several, and whether they are studied separately or concurrently, they need to be recognized to avoid important omissions and make the investigation a well-rounded one. The study of the subject and the literature will enable this differentiation, and discover the order or sequence in which the different elements can be best taken up. With this done, the procedure can be worked out intelligently. The framing of this procedure involves consideration of the kind of evidence necessary to the study of each of the recognized elements or features, and the means by which this information can be secured. Account will be taken of the existing sources of data, the reliability and suitability of such material, and the need for additional information which will have to be gathered.

The means for securing the additional new material usually involves some element of uncertainty, for it cannot always be predicted that a given kind of data or facts will provide the basis for a decisive answer or even an inference. It is here that judgment and insight have an important part in the selection of facts. This stage also involves in practice the determination of what the data and facts mean, and constructive thinking as to what they forecast. Hence the plan cannot be rigidly made in advance, but often will need to be modified as the investigation progresses. However, a general course of action can be mapped out which will help in the first stages even if it has to be supplemented, and the effort can be limited from the outset to getting the data and information specifically needed.

So far the work has all been preparatory to a well-directed effort. It has given, however, a skeleton plan which indicates specifically what is to be done, the lines of approach, the sequence along which the inquiry will develop, and the tentative procedure. These preliminaries may seem tedious and unnecessarily formal, especially to the one new in research and impatient to be on the job. But, as a matter of fact, he has been on a very vital part of his job, and one thing that needs to be realized is that preliminaries and formalities are important. For research is a formal matter; it is not informal or haphazard, but is a premeditated, carefully conceived, mature effort, and the preliminaries

are worthy of any worker. The process of outlining a project implies thinking the problem through, and it gives an orderly, systematic program, subject to revision at such time as the results point the way to it.

As the writer pointed out on another occasion, a project is "the substance of things hoped for"; it ought not to be the disappointing "evidence of things not seen." The seeing ought to begin with the preliminaries. Then the worker should ask himself over and over at successive stages whether the objective is concrete and clear; is the research keeping it in view and adhering to it; are the data of the right kind and adequate to attaining the objective; and is the interpretation of them sound, or could they be given another meaning? Close observation and study are necessary to satisfy these queries, and in the end to show when enough material has been secured.

Every project seeks an authoritative answer; it looks toward completion, and there is considerable advantage, particularly in the earlier stages, if the effort can be so organized that the end may be in sight and attainable in a reasonable time. Some workers are prone to outline projects so broad and comprehensive that they will require years and possibly a lifetime for accomplishment. As an expression of a high ambition such projects may deserve approval, but as practicable undertakings they are often wide of the mark, and are apt to represent a tendency toward diffusion and indefiniteness which delays conclusions. This is likely in the end to be discouraging alike to the investigator and the one responsible for administration. Although research is an individual product, it is likewise a public affair, notably where publicly supported. To be both constructive and instructive, with a tangible idea of how results may be made beneficial, is surely a worthy motive.

The Purnell Act expresses a belief in the applicability of research to the problems of human attitudes and relations. The broad charter it gives supplies an opportunity which largely has been lacking. It ought to afford inspiration to prepare for and occupy this field effectively.

REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON RESEARCH IN RURAL SOCIOLOGY

C. C. TAYLOR, CHAIRMAN NORTH CAROLINA STATE COLLEGE OF AGRICULTURE

ABSTRACT

Research in rural sociology is handicapped by a lack of trained research workers and by a lack of knowledge and appreciation of rural social research by directors of state experiment stations and other administrative officers. Accepting research as an endeavor to discover, to develop, and to verify knowledge, there is great need for the development of research techniques which will yield results comparable to those obtained in the more exact sciences.

There are five aspects of research in rural sociology which your Committee considers worthy of consideration at this time, viz., first, the conclusions of last year's report; second, the work of the Committee during 1926; third, the present status of rural social research; fourth, the needs and prospects of the future; and fifth, proposed steps for meeting the needs of rural social research.

Last year's report.—You will remember that last year the Committee reported on the findings obtained by means of questionnaires sent to all state agricultural experiment stations and rural sociologists in agricultural colleges; that those findings, in addition to containing a report on projects under way and contemplated, reported the opinions of these two groups on the most worth-while projects and the greatest obstacles in the way of carrying on rural social research.

The chief difficulties noted and criticisms made by experiment station directors were: (1) The projects are too broad and sometimes intangible; (2) Many rural sociologists lack experience and training in research; (3) There is a lack of definite and trustworthy technique or method in this field of investigation; (4) There are no rural sociologists connected with some of the stations.

The two chief difficulties reported by the rural sociologists were: (1) lack of funds; (2) Too much burdened with teaching schedules.

In the Committee's report of last year, the following statement was made: "There are two chief tasks immediately ahead of the rural sociologists. The first is the task of developing research methods and trained workers in the field of rural social research. The second is the task of developing in the directors of the state experiment stations a knowledge and appreciation of the field of rural social research." It was shown that on November 10, 1925, there were thirty-seven states who had no social research yet started under the Purnell Law, and that the replies from state directors indicated that there

were fifteen of the states which were not planning rural social research in any way.

The conclusion of last year's report contained the suggestion that rural social research of the future would probably be conducted by three types of agencies, namely, (1) The agricultural experiment stations under the Purnell funds; (2) The Division of Population and Rural-Life Studies of the United States Department of Agriculture, co-operating with state agencies; and, (3) Agencies working under private endowment funds. It was stated that the research carried on under the Purnell Law would probably have to be fairly well standardized and somewhat restricted in scope because of the necessity of the findings being of immediate and clearly revealed practicable use; that those carried on by the Division of Population and Rural-Life Studies should probably be of two types: (*a*) Those having to do with problems of national scope, and (*b*) those which attempt to correlate the studies of the various states; and that to the endowed agencies would probably fall the delightful task of pioneering in the new and unexplored fields of research.

The work of the Committee during 1926.—During the current year the Committee has corresponded with all the state agricultural experiment stations; kept in touch with national directors of agricultural research; and, from these and other sources, attempted to compile statistics on the present status of rural social research in the United States.

The present status of rural social research.—Since last year's report named the three types of agencies upon which rural social research depends, we shall attempt to report the status and quantity of research being conducted during 1926 by each of these types of agencies.

A. Research projects on Purnell funds approved for 1926. Quoting from the "Progress Report of the Committee on Rural Social Organizations and Agencies Essential to a Permanent and Efficient Agriculture"—that is, the Purnell Rural Sociology Committee.

A report submitted from Dr. E. W. Allen's office showed that there are sixteen state agricultural experiment stations pursuing twenty-two research projects in rural sociology. The total budgets of these twenty-two projects aggregate $60,868 for the year. During the year 1925–26, eleven stations carried eighteen projects in rural sociology. The Committee does not have the information on the status of the projects set up one year ago.

The gain in the number of stations engaged in rural social research this year over one year ago is five, and the gain in projects is four. The comparison in total budgets is not at hand.

The Committee has made as careful a study of current projects as is possible, by correspondence, and believes that the following classification is approximately correct.

Project No. I, on "Young People's Organization as a Factor in Rural Life." 2—Missouri and Virginia.

Project No. II, on "Factors Influencing the Effective Location of Rural Groups." 2—Missouri and Washington.

Project No. III, on "Rural Population—Composition and Change." 5—New York, North Dakota, Michigan, Missouri, and Tennessee.

Project No. IV, on "The Standard of Living of Farm Families." 4—Oklahoma, South Carolina, Michigan, and North Carolina.

Thus thirteen of the twenty-two projects are on studies named and outlined by the Committee at its two previous meetings.

The remaining nine projects are on "Rural Grouping or Community Organization"; five on "Social Psychology," and four others not easy to classify.

In that report we submitted data which showed that the lack of trained personnel in the field of rural social research was one of the chief handicaps in promoting work in this field. We should like now to suggest that considerable progress could be made in the direction of obtaining better-trained personnel if a number of men, now engaged in part-time research, could be placed on full-time research, and possibly men employed at other than land-grant institutions, or who are pursuing graduate studies, could be engaged by agricultural experimental stations for research work in rural sociology.

Furthermore, the Committee is convinced that sociological research could be made much more effective if project leaders could be relieved, in greater part, of a heavy load of teaching and administrative work in order to give more thorough and careful supervision and assistance to the research work. Experience shows that best results are secured when the leaders actively participate in the actual work of the project.

B. Research projects of the Division of Population and Rural-Life Studies and by co-operating institutions, 1926. These projects may be classified under eleven main headings and are fifty-eight in number, with thirty-one states co-operating. They are as follows: (1) Rural population, 5 projects, 5 institutions co-operating; (2) group organization, 13 projects, 13 institutions co-operating; (3) standards of living of farm families, 21 projects, 21 institutions co-operating; (4) social aspects of tenancy and ownership, 1 project, 1 institution co-operating; (5) community enterprises and institutions, 8 projects, 7 institutions co-operating; (6) young peoples' organizations as a factor in rural life, 3 projects, 3 institutions co-operating; (7) social psychology studies, 3 projects, 3 institutions co-operating; (8) influence of physical environment factors in rural life and organization, 1 project, 1 institution co-operating; (9) local government in rural society, 1 project, 1 institution co-operating; (10) social implications of economic relationships, 1 project, 1 institution co-operating; (11) rural health and social welfare, 1 project, 1 institution co-operating.

Ten of these projects are also supported by Purnell funds; eleven of them are in co-operation with state extension services; and four of them are with institutions not supported by state funds.

C. Projects of other agencies, for the most part endowed: (1) rural population, 4; (2) group organization, 1; (3) standards of living, 2; (4) community enterprises and institutions, 6; (5) young peoples' organizations, 1; (6) local government, 1; (7) social and economic relationships, 5; (8) rural health, 7.

This is a total of twenty-seven projects being carried on by the following agencies: Institute of Social and Religious Research, 5; United States Children's Bureau, 3; agricultural journals, 3; Scripps Foundation, 2; American Library Association, 2; Federal Council of Churches, 2; colleges and universities, 2; state and national historical and scientific societies, 2; Y.M.C.A., 1; Y.W.C.A., 1; National Committee on Mental Hygiene, 1; International Health Board, 1; National Child Welfare Association, 1; and Commonwealth Fund, 1. There are undoubtedly many other minor projects which we have failed to locate.

Subtracting the duplicates of the United States Department of Agriculture and Purnell projects, we have listed here ninety-seven projects. Many of the projects carried on by the third group are of national, or at least more than state-wide, scope. There are seventy being carried on by educational institutions within the states. Of these, sixty-three are supported in whole or in part by agricultural experiment stations. There are seventeen states with no research projects in rural sociology, and thirty-two states not supporting rural social research with Purnell funds. The delinquency of the seventeen states with no projects at all warrant naming them. They are: Arizona, California, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Mississippi, Maine, Oregon, Rhode Island, West Virginia, and Wyoming.

Needs and prospects of the present and future.—The three outstanding needs of the present are: (1) trained research workers; (2) better understanding and more sympathetic consideration on the part of directors of agricultural experiment stations and others responsible for research funds; (3) acceptable techniques or methods for doing social research.

There has been very little research work done in sociology outside the fields of anthropology, ethnology, population studies, and historical studies. For this reason there has never been developed a large corps of research personnel. The field of social research is now developing, and there is great need to increase the number of persons preparing themselves by graduate training for research positions. It is the field of rural sociology which probably in the near future holds out the surest opportunity of remunerative employment for well-trained persons.

In addition to increasing the number of persons preparing themselves for research work, there is definite and immediate need that a larger portion of the time of rural sociologists who are trained and experienced in research methods be given to the direction and conduct of rural social research. Many of these

men are now overburdened with teaching and administrative work, leaving this new and difficult field to be penetrated by inexperienced and poorly trained understudies.

There is also a great need that all those engaged in research, even the best trained and most experienced, avail themselves of opportunities for conference on projects and methods of research. Some persons are not temperamentally equipped to do research. We must recognize that our group will have its full quota of such persons. Such persons will function surely only if guided by definite research criteria. By conference and study together, and probably by no other means just at this stage of development, can we expect to make a respectable showing in concrete results. By such conference or schooling together we should be able to forestall many unworthy and impossible projects, which, if attempted, will handicap research work in many places for a long time.

Directors of agricultural experiment stations are, in very few cases, trained in sociology. This field of research is an experiment with them. They are, in many cases, apparently going to continue to allocate their funds to fields which they understand. Surely we may expect, however, that they will carefully watch the results of stations now fostering social research. If these results are trustworthy contributions, then we may look for sympathetic consideration at the hands of experiment station directors in due time.

Probably the greatest need of all is that of research techniques. This is true of the whole field of sociology. Research is an endeavor to discover, to develop, or to verify knowledge. Social research, more than any other, must accept the fact that its chief tasks will be to develop and verify knowledge which is now in existence but only crudely or vaguely understood. This is true for two reasons: First, because everybody knows something about social phenomena, and second, because the social is most often, if not always, merely the social aspect of physical and economic phenomena. The sociologist is, therefore, on the one hand confronted with the problem of justifying his status as a research worker by the methods developed in the field of economics and the more exact sciences and on the other hand, of making his findings of social facts as acceptable as the statements of the journalist and platform orator. It is doubtful whether the technique by which he can accomplish this feat is known.

In a great many other fields of research so much has already been done that the problems are automatically set by the gaps in sure knowledge already developed. In the field of Rural Sociology so little has been done that no gaps are apparent because no fences have been built. The opportunity for shooting in all directions is great and almost inevitable unless opportunity is given for definite conference and planning among those engaged in social research. Of course, by trying out various fields we may and will uncover a wider gamut of problems. At the same time we will probably make many more false starts, and with but few men engaged and with little or no standing in the field of re-

search it is highly questionable whether we can afford the costs of a wide variety of trials and errors.

In selecting our research problems we should probably better be guided by the answers to three major questions: (1) Will the contemplated findings be a real discovery? (2) Is there high promise of bringing the project to definite conclusions? (3) Is there a fair degree of surety that the conclusions will be valuable and useful? Rural social research, especially that supported by Purnell funds, where it is in rigorous competition for financial support with other important and well-established fields, should subject itself rigidly to these tests. Its problem must be clearly apprehended; its prospects for definite findings must be promising, and its methods of work must be definite and accurate.

Proposed steps for meeting the needs.—The needs for a greater number of trained research workers must, of course, be met by training persons for the tasks. The training places are the graduate schools of the universities, and especially the graduate schools of the colleges of agriculture. Fellowships, courses in rural sociology, courses in statistics and other methods of research, and in advertising make these institutions especially valuable as training centers. Men now engaged in teaching and administrative work, capable of conducting research, should seek release from other tasks and lend themselves to the task. Rural sociologists employed at places where there are no research opportunities should be listed and their names and credentials presented to those who can open opportunities for social research.

A better understanding of the field of rural sociology on the part of those responsible for research funds can probably best be developed by first accomplishing valuable researches at places where the opportunities now exist, and second, by developing a medium by which these accomplishments can be brought to their attention. This latter could best be done by personal visitation and conferences, but can be partly accomplished by the development of some journal which will publish the current findings of rural social research.

Concerning the development of research techniques, the Committee is glad that it can report that definite steps are now being taken to bring all rural sociology Purnell workers together in a conference or school to work on this and other tasks common to them.[1] Such a school, recommended by the Rural Sociology Purnell Committee, has been approved by Dr. Allen and a Committee is now at work preparing the program for such a school. It is hoped that all rural sociology Purnell workers will be able to attend this week's school, and that as many others as possible will also participate in it.

In conclusion the Committee believes that it is justified in reporting that progress has been made during the past year and that there are prospects for much greater progress during the coming year if diligence and arduous labor on the part of this group can be assured.

[1] This conference was held at Purdue University, April 4–9, 1927. *Editor.*

A REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE CONDUCT OF EXTENSION WORK IN RURAL SOCIOLOGY

B. L. HUMMEL, UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN

ABSTRACT

Extension work in rural sociology represents the applied aspect of the subject matter of the field. The variety of working conditions in the various states has resulted in divergent types of extension activity. The trend is toward a rational application of the basic principles of social organization to rural affairs. This involves a recognition of the community as the primary group for purposes of the development of rural progress. The outstanding need in rural sociology extension is for reliable research in the dynamics of rural society.

This report deals only with rural sociology extension work carried on by the land-grant colleges through the state agricultural extension services. Other institutions are doing rural sociology extension, but we have not attempted to include their work in this report.

At the present time eight states, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Iowa, Missouri, Nebraska, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Maryland, each have one person giving full time to rural sociology extension. The last-named states, Mississippi and Maryland, have started the work during the past year. West Virginia and New York each have two full-time workers in this field, bringing the total up to twelve state specialists devoting full time to rural sociology extension. In addition, South Dakota, Minnesota, and Colorado each have one person giving attention to this in addition to other duties. It is definitely known that several other states are interested in adding a man for this work as soon as possible.

Because of the wide variation in the type of work being done in the various states, it is difficult to make a definite classification. The committee has, however, agreed that the work can be divided, first upon a basis of whether the work is being developed as service to existing institutions and organizations or as community organizations. In the latter case the emphasis is placed upon the bringing about of a more definite interrelation of the people within natural community groups, who in the past have been variously associated because of certain common group interests, but who have not had either a sufficiently organized relationship, adequate group consciousness, or sufficiently definite objectives to make of them efficient working groups. Pennsylvania, Ohio, New York, and Iowa are giving chief attention to the training of the active leaders in various existing organizations within the community. Mississippi, Nebraska, Missouri, and West Virginia are putting the emphasis on the development of leadership for all-inclusive community group action.

A second classification might be made in regard to the type of service rendered. Among the states where community organization is being developed, West Virginia and Missouri have made surveys in a number of the counties and have mapped the natural community areas within these counties. The community grouping indicated then becomes the basis for the development of community work, and in Missouri has been accepted as the basis for the agricultural and home economics work as parts of a general community program.

In all the states which are placing emphasis on the development of community organizations, suggestions are being furnished on sound principles of organization, assistance given in selecting practical programs of work, and books and charts provided for the recording of the minutes of the meetings and the activities of the organizations.

In South Dakota, Minnesota, Iowa, and Nebraska, where the work is chiefly with existing organizations and institutions, special attention is being given, along with other services, to the furnishing of regular monthly program material to all organizations desiring such assistance. This material consists of songs, recitations, debates, and outlines for the discussion of various topics of interest to farm people.

In Ohio, New York, and Pennsylvania special attention is being given to recreational work for the benefit of all groups interested in getting leaders trained to help with such work.

It will be seen from the foregoing that even after due allowance is made for the differing conditions which exist between the states under consideration, there is still a wide divergence in the rural sociology extension work in various places, and there is undoubtedly a very definite need for a more clear-cut conception of what should constitute such a program. A definite decision on such a matter will readily be recognized as a most difficult task.

One difficulty in getting general agreement on this matter is realized when we recall that it has not been possible as yet to arrive at a consensus of opinion as to what constitutes rural sociology. Another difficulty which will be appreciated by all is the lack of sufficient research data to give a dependable basis upon which to formulate a definite program. There is also a need for an acceptable philosophy of life as applied to rural conditions which may serve as a guide in the development of an appreciation of social values in rural life. Not only is it difficult to determine the job to be done, but it is also difficult to arrive at a conclusion as to the best methods to be employed.

The committee hesitates, therefore, to present definite suggestions at this early and pioneering period. It does seem, however, that at this time, in developing and establishing rural sociology extension work as an integral and important phase of the great agricultural extension program in the United States, it is essential that this phase of extension be of such a nature that it will give as true a conception as possible of the real content of rural sociology and its important relationship to all programs of work which deal with rural people

and their problems. It is the opinion of the committee that a tendency to limit a program in rural sociology extension to the doing of some particular job, which is only one of the many things which fall within this broad and inclusive field, will not tend to bring about a true appreciation of the contribution which rural sociology has to make, both directly and indirectly, to the solution of rural problems.

Whatever else it may include, certainly rural sociology does have to do with the relationships among rural people or, in other words, the rural social structure. It would be hard to find anywhere a more rapid change than that which is taking place in the rural social structures at the present time. There is, perhaps, no general movement that is taking place in a more haphazard fashion and with less guidance than the re-shaping of this rapidly changing mesh of relationships. Rural schools are being closed or are struggling on under miserable conditions with no satisfactory readjustment made. School consolidations are taking place in a most irrational way, which is resulting in fine large school buildings being located most peculiarly in regard to all other centers of interest. Single isolated districts are being left outside consolidated districts which have been formed on all sides. Rural churches are being abandoned and the remaining memberships scattered into most unnatural and irrational groupings. Telephone exchanges are being closed and hardships imposed by unnatural separations of closely associated people. Lack of institutional life on the basis of natural groupings is resulting in a lack of social contacts and the necessary recreational activities required to maintain a healthful social status. Rural people are becoming isolated in a new sense in the midst of such innovations as the radio and the automobile because they have no group life in which they take an active and responsible part.

There is an imperative need for guidance in the reconstruction of a new and stable, though not a static, rural social structure. Certainly it is true that there is an insufficient amount of reliable research data available on such problems. No one realizes this more than the extension specialists who are facing these problems so directly. However, if the rural sociologists cannot make use of some of the most fundamental principles of sociology, and, applying them to the existing situation, give some help and direction, then who is to assume this responsibility, and what degree of rationality can we expect in the haphazard change which will take place while we are discovering a solution which, after a long period of careful and painstaking research, may be proved to be absolutely scientific and unquestionably right.

Passing to another consideration, let us suppose that this first difficult problem of social groupings was settled and the institutions essential to a high standard of life in a rural community re-established upon a new basis which would make possible a continued and effective period of service; we would have, and we do have, another field of service in which there is no other group or profession so well prepared to serve as the sociologists. This need is

brought about by the lack of correlation between the forces either within or outside the community itself. May it not be that the greatest service to be rendered in a rural sociology extension program is the establishment of a socially sound, and therefore a constructive, co-operative relationship between all functioning organizations at work in the rural community? This might be brought about in part at least by gaining a recognition of the community as the basic social unit to be used in planning all programs dealing with rural problems. It may be that some agreement can be reached as to what and where the community groups are. The development of a high degree of community group consciousness within these communities would certainly be a contribution which would tend to facilitate the carrying out of any worth-while program of activity with these groups, and therefore encourage their general recognition.

Direct assistance in the planning of co-ordinated programs of community work which include all phases of community life would be another strong correlating force, and the developing and directing of the latent leadership within the communities would be of unquestioned value.

It is not improbable that the process of correlation might begin within our own organizations. The work of agricultural extension services might well be more closely correlated through the development of functioning community groups which would have interest in, and make the entire extension program more effective. With all extension work correlated through inclusive community programs, co-operation can then be established with other agencies which are serving the community.

A case in point would be a community in which the agricultural and home economics extension work was carried on by the same community group through which the county superintendent of schools, the county nurse, the state parent-teachers' association, the state library association, the local dairymen's association, the county farm bureau, the Boy Scouts, and the county chamber of commerce all reached the people of the community. Here was group consciousness and a working relationship which made all progress easier.

The carrying out of such a rural sociology program as this would of course include many specialized phases, but these should certainly be made subordinate to the larger objectives. These ultimate goals, on the other hand, must be made apparent to those who are so vitally concerned with our work, and be made sufficiently immediate to be of practical value to the people of rural communities who are endeavoring to solve their own problems and to those outside the community who have a real service to offer. It is only when we see our job in this larger sense that we will demonstrate the real contribution that rural sociology extension has to make to rural progress.

METHODS OF SOCIAL RESEARCH

BRUCE L. MELVIN
Cornell University

ABSTRACT[1]

Rural sociology is becoming more and more scientific. Certain essentials in scientific methodology can be adapted from the older sciences. These are: a definite method of procedure, limitation of the field and of problems, objectivity, and, on the part of the workers, the approach to the projects must be as pure scientists. Likewise there are tendencies in the work of the rural sociologists which manifest certain scientific tendencies. These aspects are: Distinctive methods and techniques which characterize each project, new methods of research which emerge as products, the creation of exact units of measurements, careful definition of the elements being studied, experiments in the fields of community organization and social problems, and the use of the participant-observer idea. Rural sociology will become a science only through painstaking, detailed, and long-continued work in research.

REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE TEACHING OF RURAL SOCIOLOGY

C. E. LIVELY, CHAIRMAN
Ohio State University

ABSTRACT[2]

Rural sociology is essentially an attempt to understand and interpret human relations by confining itself to the scientific study of that majority group of society who live in areas which are primarily rural. It is gradually emerging from the "problem stage" to that of the more rational approach to rural social phenomenon in its various phases viewed in the light of modern social thought. The varied circumstances under which the subject must be taught necessitates

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[2] To be printed in full in the *American Journal of Sociology*, XXXIII, September, 1927.

different types of treatment. The development of the subject matter in this field is dependent upon the progress of extended reliable research which now appears to be at hand.

JOINT CO-OPERATIVE STUDIES ON THE ECONOMICS AND SOCIOLOGY OF RURAL LIFE

E. L. KIRKPATRICK
United States Department of Agriculture

ABSTRACT[1]

The major problems dealing with farm life involve both the social and economic aspects. Studies in either field can perhaps be best achieved through joint research projects in which both interests are represented and which are conducted on a truly co-operative basis. While the various phases of such a co-operative study will each have its particular aspect, still these should be blended so as to correlate the two objectives in an attempt to make better family living the final objective of all effort in behalf of agriculture.

[1] Printed in full in the *American Journal of Sociology*, XXXIII, September, 1927.

THE SECTION ON EDUCATIONAL SOCIOLOGY

E. GEORGE PAYNE, CHAIRMAN, NEW YORK UNIVERSITY

THE PROGRESS OF EDUCATIONAL SOCIOLOGY

The section on educational sociology outlined its program in line with the general topic of the meeting of the American Sociological Society and discussed specifically the progress of educational sociology. In order to prepare the data as a basis for our discussion, a member of the society, Mr. Harvey Lee, instructor in educational sociology in New York University, made a survey of the present status of educational sociology in the various institutions of the country and presented the written report as the first publication of the section for discussion at the meeting.

Two sessions were held. The first, a general discussion, dealt with the nature and progress of educational sociology, and the second was devoted to the discussion of the yearbook or survey. The Executive Committee had in mind the definite discussion of fundamental educational functions for the purpose of determining what educational sociology has to offer to the educator in the formulation and carrying out of educational policies. They wished to consider sociology as basic to the whole problem of school instruction. The program involved a definite conception of educational sociology, and the following definition involves that conception:

The science of sociology has come to be applied to several fields of practical endeavor, notable among which are religion, social work, and education. In the field of education a new science fundamental to educational theory and practice, which is generally designated educational sociology, is rapidly assuming form. This new science is seeking to discover the principles and indicate the practices essential to educational procedure in its social implications. The new science, moreover, starts with a consideration of social behavior and the principles of its control with reference to specific ends or purposes as consciously controlled through the social institution, the school. Educational sociology, cannot, however, limit iself exclusively to the study of the school as an educational agency, since in any society much of the important work of education does always take place outside of the school in social institutions not designed primarily for educational purposes but which nevertheless perform an important educational function. Educational sociology, then, evaluates the educational work of these supplementary institutions in order to define the educational function of the school, the state's chief educational agency. Educational sociology seeks, therefore, to explain the social forms, social groups, and the social processes, that is, the social relationships in which or through

which the individual gains and organizes his experiences or behavior in their relation to the school as a co-ordinating agency.

The educational sociologist is therefore interested in the principles underlying, and in research into, a special set of problems of group behavior which cluster about the school; in the way the child acquires and organizes his social experiences, or in what way the group of which the child is a member patterns his attitudes and personality; in the analysis of the behavior situations, apart from the school; in the analysis of the efforts of the school, in the light of the influence of the outside-of-school behavior patterns, to adjust the child to the social situation in which he lives, and in surveys for purposes of measuring the effectiveness of the school in so adjusting the child through modifications of his behavior.

Since the educational sociologist conceives the school as a co-ordinating agency in the development of controls of behavior, he does not confine the limits of his science to the consideration of the objectives of education, but includes a consideration of subject matter and activities of the school, the method of instruction, the school and classroom organization, and the character of measurement designed to determine the results of the conscious or planned educational process taking place within the school. In a word, since any phase of educational procedure in operation will have social outcomes, the nature of that procedure must conform to sociological principles, and therefore becomes subject matter appropriate to educational sociology.

Furthermore, the program involved not merely a discussion of the subject "What Is Educational Sociology," by Professor Ellwood, but the various factors involved in an educational program, as follows: (1) the place of sociology in determining the character and function of the curriculum; (2) the sociological basis of the method of instruction; (3) the sociological determination of the school and classroom organization; (4) the sociological problem of measurement of the results of educational procedure.

The program emphasized further the problem of research in the field of this new science. It seems desirable to present a brief abstract of the papers with special emphasis upon the paper dealing with the problem of research, as the sense of the meeting seemed to be that the next step in the society should be the presentation of specific researches which are going on in the field.

The essential statements of Professor Ellwood are:

Educational sociology is not primarily a sociological study of educational institutions and processes. It should be primarily sociology, and not education. It is sociology applied to the whole problem of education, just as educational psychology is psychology applied to the problem of education. There is, however, this difference. Educational sociology is probably even more closely related to general sociology than educational psychology is to general psychology. This at least will be the thesis of this paper, though the writer is not trying to judge the situation in psychology. He wishes merely to emphasize a fact which seems to have been overlooked by a ma-

jority of both educationists and sociologists; namely, that educational sociology not only starts with, but it deals with, the most vital and central aspects of general sociology. Educational sociology is not, therefore, a superficial aspect or branch of general sociology. On the contrary, it is the very heart, so to speak, of general sociology, so far as the latter is the science of human society. From the development of educational sociology we may therefore expect not only great help in solving the practical problems of education, but also a revitalization and humanization of the science of sociology itself.

If educationists wish to make their work scientific they ought to devote themselves with enthusiasm to the development of educational sociology. Its development, I am confident, will transform our whole system of education. It is of course premature to prophecy just the results in detail of the development of the science of educational sociology. But one result will be that it will become plain to everyone that education is and should be nothing but the formalization and intelligent control of the social process. It will be seen that the two functions of the school are to reproduce and control the social process in such a way as to aid the progress of culture in the highest degree. The process of education should be a systematized, rationalized, and morally controlled social process. Just as in the social process generally, verbal language will be found to be the vehicle of culture. In the years to come we are certainly destined to hear less about the education of the hand preceding the education of the mind, etc., and more about the education of the imagination. The social life is possible only through the fact that we carry in our imagination the images of our fellow human beings or of our human environment. Just as in the social life, if it is to be normal, we see that we must keep free channels of intercommunication between the individuals of the group, so in education we shall see that without the open mind, freedom of thinking, and freedom of teaching an education which shall be effective for progress will be impossible. Educational sociology will also teach us that, while the work of culture is necessarily carried on by specialized training, socialization is a more fundamental process than vocational training.

Professor Counts, after an introductory statement indicating the general function of educational sociology, pointed out that his discourse would center around three topics: the task of the school, the appraisal of the curriculum, and the control of education. He says, concerning the appraisal of the curriculum:

A second large task which demands attention is that of appraising the curriculum. And until a technique is developed for achieving this purpose, no curriculum can be constructed which will enable the school to perform effectively its special functions. By appraisal I do not mean the sort of thing that we have commonly done in our school surveys. Genuine appraisal must involve something more fundamental than the bringing in of "experts" to pass judgment on prevailing practice in terms of "best practice" elsewhere or in terms of the theories which the experts hold. These theories will always be necessary instruments in appraising any particular program, but they must rest upon a more objective basis than they do at present. The appeal here is for a type of fundamental research which must be organized and prosecuted by the sociologist.

If the purposes of the school are formulated in terms of social life and welfare, the appraisal of its program must be made in the same terms. Nothing reveals more

emphatically the formal character of the school than the various tests and scales which have been developed to measure school products. The school constitutes a little world of its own, and its success is measured in terms of its own procedures. We test our pupils for knowledge of algebra, history, Latin and chemistry, and if they do well on our examinations, we feel that the school is discharging its social obligations. Clearly the need is for a new type of appraisal, an appraisal which measures educational procedure in terms of its effect on social behavior outside the school. We must confess that for the most part such an appraisal is lacking today. We know how well our pupils have mastered the subject matter of the curriculum; but as to the effect this will have upon them as members of society we have but little knowledge. With regard to certain of the more obvious and simple acquirements, such as reading, writing, spelling, and the narrower vocational knowledges and skills, we can make fairly trustworthy guesses. But if we pass by the toll subjects and the more practical courses, we enter a sphere where dense ignorance prevails. What one of us knows how a year's schooling in geography, history, French, or biology affects the subsequent behavior of a pupil? Although I recognize fully the almost insurmountable difficulties to be encountered in any attempt to make a broad social appraisal of the curriculum, I am convinced that it will be impossible to construct a curriculum intelligently until some success in this direction is attained. And such an appraisal will have to be largely the work of the sociologist.

Mr. Stalcup presented the discussion of the topic: "The Sociological Basis of the Methods of Teaching." He outlined the problem of research into this field as follows:

Learning is experimental. Individualization is personality development; socialization is group development. These may be mutually reciprocal. Psychologically and sociologically the social forces that make for growth in one make for growth in the other. Method is the way, the manner, sometimes an orderly plan or procedure by which the learning or acquiring of experience takes place. Learning is conditioned by the kind of situations involved. It is a well-known fact that our present methods emphasize individual learning of knowledges with little or no provision for student activity or participation. The pupil, the student, is provided with a ready-made program of knowledges and then dominated by the rigid régime of the teacher. Freedom, self-expression, self-activity, social approval as life-forces or factors in group living are now being recognized as possible avenues of approach to teaching method. Conflict, co-operation and leadership are also creative forces in group life that have indications for class method.

1. *The problem* of research which I will discuss in this paper is the study of conflict, co-operation, and leadership by a general survey of the literature of the field, and by the use of a diary in the hands of a participating observer in the school, for the purpose of determining their sociological value as possible bases of teaching.

2. The *tentative working hypothesis* is that *knowledges gained, habits formed,* the *ideals established,* the *attitudes fixed,* the *practices set up* by individuals are most highly *motivated* by the social stimuli and social responses, i.e., interactions within the group.

3. The method embraces the following procedures: (*a*) *A historical survey of the sociological literature* of conflict, co-operation, and leadership to discover the nature, the characteristics, the social importance and significance of these dynamic

forces as set forth and interpreted by the students of sociology. (*b*) The *field research*. (1) The diary is used in the hands of "participating observers." The "participating observer" is an active member of the group making and recording observations of what the group is doing or thinks it is doing. It is believed that the "active inside member" of a group will get more accurate evidence of what goes on within the group than an "outside observer." Certainly observations by the regular members of the group will be more reliable, for the members of the group will be more spontaneous, and more natural in their activities and relationships. This should make the data more objective.

4. The group being studied is the school. It was chosen because of its accessibility. Classes of mine and of my colleagues in the School of Education of New York University are being used. Two types of "participating observers" were chosen: one of teachers who observed their own groups; the other of teachers who were members of the before-mentioned classes in New York University. The second group observed in college and university classes. In all cases the groups selected were those in which a major part of the time was devoted to "group discussions." There can be little or no opportunity for manifestations of these forces in a teacher-dominated group. As to the general distribution of the groups, they ranged from the kindergarten to the graduate school of the university.

There are yet some dangers to be overcome in this type of research; first is the fact that the "participating observer" may not be adequately trained; and second, that in pioneering of this kind the technique may likewise prove to be inadequate.

Since the feeling of the members present was that the next step in the program-making for the section should be the arrangement for the report on researches actually going on in educational sociology in various departments in universities and colleges in the country, it seems desirable to present a rather extensive abstract of Professor Zorbaugh's rather striking paper dealing with the whole problem of research in educational sociology in a fundamental way. The statement is as follows:

The school, like every self-conscious social group, faces three problems: the problem of policy, What do we want to do? The problem of human nature, What facts about human nature must be taken into consideration? and the administrative problem, What machinery can we set up most efficiently to carry out our policy? The philosophy of education is meeting the first problem with the affirmation that the aim of education is "the adaptation of the child to living in our contemporary civilization." School Administration is working out the solution of the third problem. The human-nature problem has been divided between educational psychology and educational sociology. Educational psychology has interested itself in the technique of building new habits into the organism. The experiments of the University of Chicago School of Education with eye movements in reading represent the ultimate refinement of this technique. While admirable as psychological research, such experiments are realtively inconsequential as compared with studies into the processes of social adjustment which will enable us to put content into our now too-empty formula of education as adaptation. It is in this aspect of the human-nature problem, in the mechanisms involved in social adjustment, that educational sociology is interested.

Before discussing research in educational sociology it will be well briefly to out-

line the writer's point of view in sociology. For sociology, like psychology (witness *Psychologies of 1925)* still has its schools. The writer conceives of the sociologist, not as dallying with naked savages on the banks of the Nile trading stories, not as closeting himself with a tabulating machine and computing death and divorce rates, not as attempting to ameliorate social conditions, not as speculating as to why the mills of the gods grind slowly and fine. The sociologist is not merely cultural anthropologist, statistician, social worker, or philosopher of history. The sociologist is, rather, a scientist interested in the analysis of the mechanisms of social behavior, in reducing the interacton of human beings to predictable sequences of events. His problems fall roughly into three groups: the analysis of the mechanisms involved in those relatively stable constellations of attitudes which we call groups—the community, family, gang, church, school, and the like; the processes involved in less organized types of social behavior, such as mass movements, mobs, fashions, the crowd, and the public; and the social definition of the individual's relatively random innate impulses after the patterns of his groups, and the adjustment of the resultant personality to social situations.

Educational sociology is the application of the sociological method and technique to the problems of collective behavior which cluster about the school—the analysis of the social situation from which the child comes to the school and to which he must adjust, of the processes involved in personal adjustment, of the school group as collective behavior, and the implications of this analysis for curriculum and method. Moreover, educational sociology is interested in working out a technique for measuring, not the acquisition of "knowledge" as reflected in verbal responses, but the changes in total behavior in the direction of social adjustment that result from classroom instruction.

The implications of such a conception of educational sociology for research may be illustrated by a brief discussion of studies now going on in the School of Education of New York University. A group of community studies—one of them a study of Negro Harlem—are directed toward the analysis of the cultural situation, peculiar to a given community, which defines the behavior patterns of the child, gives him the *gestalt* or frame of reference against which he interprets his school experiences. Such studies may be expected to demonstrate the necessity of refashioning the curriculum and classroom organization of the individual school in terms of the cultural situation represented by the community of which it is a part, and the social inadequacy of a uniform educative procedure based on a half dozen or more logically deduced "objectives." Another group of studies—illustrated by Professor Stalcup's study of "Conflict and Leadership in School Behavior," by a study of "Social Suggestion and Learning," or by a study of "The Rôle in the School Group of the So-Called Incorrigible"—aim at the analysis of the school as a social situation and as collective behavior. Such studies, also, may be expected to have interesting implications for classroom organization and method. The School of Education is this year getting under way the Social Behavior Clinic, a completely equipped behavior clinic directed, not by the usual psychiatrist, but by a sociologist, for the purpose of studying the process of personal adjustment. Its work is to be intimately co-ordinated with the experimental schools of the School of Education. Finally, Dr. E. George Payne's experiment in health education in New York Public School 106 is an indication of the direction experiments in social measurement may be expected to take. Working with a control group, an experimental health-education curriculum,

and a scale for measuring, not the child's health "knowledge" as reflected in verbal responses, but changes in his total social behavior, it was attempted to discover the effectiveness of health education in terms of actual social adjustment. The results, published under the title *Method and Measurement of Health Education,* are suggestive both from the point of view of technique and utility.

Educational sociology may well take a leaf from the history of educational psychology. If it is to justify itself as a discipline in teachers colleges and schools of education it must do so by productive research.

The effort of the Chairman has been to present the essential points in the main papers that were submitted to him or presented for the program in St. Louis, and has left out of the discussion the responses to these papers and all reference to papers not received.

THE SECTION ON THE SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION

The Section on the Sociology of Religion in the American Sociological Society is one of the recent departments set up by this Society. It is faced, first of all, with the problem of method. Are religious facts subject to observation and the discovery of general laws and principles as are other social phenomena? What are the original documents for such a science of religio-social phenomena? With questions like this, such a department is faced. Research in this field at present divides itself into approximately three groups:

First, research in the field of religious institutions, their distribution, and the laws governing their distribution. This is carried on quite largely by the American Institute of Social and Religious Research.

Second, research in religious education, the relation of religion to character development. This field has been occupied by the Religious Education Association.

Third, research in social ethics and in pathological, social, and religious experience. Research in this field has been carried on by Chicago Theological Seminary, by Rev. A. T. Boisen on the staff of this institution, who is located at Worcester State Hospital for the Insane in Massachusetts. Similar work in research is carried on at Union Theological Seminary and at Yale University. All of these institutions were represented in the meetings held at St. Louis. Dr. Ozora S. Davis, president of the Chicago Theological Seminary, and Mr. A. T. Boisen reported on Wednesday morning, Dr. Davis giving an account of the gathering of personal-experience material and its use in the classroom; Mr. Boisen telling the story of his research at the Worcester State Hospital. Mr. Galen M. Fisher and Mr. Paul Douglas reported on the work of research in religious institutions carried on by the American Institute of Social and Religious Research. Dr. Ruth Shonle reported for the Religious Education Association.

Research in this field is developing slowly, but it is improving its method and will probably make rapid strides in the future. Haste is not necessary, but rather care in the development of method.

ARTHUR E. HOLT.

THE SECTION ON THE FAMILY

Mrs. W. F. Dummer, Secretary

The section of the Family held three meetings; the first Wednesday morning, December 29, which was devoted to reports on the study of the Family by Mrs. W. F. Dummer, Margaret Flenniken and Hornell Hart and with general discussion led by Ernest R. Groves and William F. Ogburn; the second was held on Thursday morning, December 30, with papers by Ernest R. Mowrer, Orfa J. Shońtz, and Kimball Young; at the third meeting, a luncheon session, also on Thursday, Miriam Van Waters read a paper, "Antagonistic Relationships in Family Life." Wednesday noon the section on the Family held a joint session with the American Home Economic Association Committee on the economic and social problems of the home, at which Arthur J. Todd and Ernest R. Groves spoke. At the business meeting of the section, Ernest R. Groves was elected chairman, and Mrs. W. F. Dummer secretary, of the section. The papers given at these meetings, with the exception of the one by Miriam Van Waters, are published in full in the May, 1927, issue of *The Family;* abstracts of these papers follow.

THE PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP: PROJECTION OF AMBITION[1]

KIMBALL YOUNG, UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN

The purpose of this paper is to present but one aspect of the parent-child relationship, namely, that dealing with the projection by parents of their own ambitions upon their children. The particular cases to be cited and interpreted deal very largely with instances where the unfulfilled ambitions of parents have led them to force their children into a regimen of education for which the children are very frequently unsuited.

This study makes clear another aspect of the child-parent relationship in which the attitudes and habits of the child are influenced by the family contacts, particularly the parents. The circular response of child and parent is somewhat broken down in the situation, which resolves itself very largely around a linear relationship in which the parent forces the child into a type of activity for which he is frequently unsuited.

[1] Paper printed in full in *The Family*, VIII (May, 1927), 67–73.

THE STUDY OF FAMILY DISORGANIZATION

ERNEST R. MOWRER, CHICAGO

ABSTRACT[1]

Past studies of family discord may be grouped under (1) studies in divorce and (2) studies in desertion. Neither the simpler nor the more complicated statistical methods of studying divorce and desertion give a description of family disorganization as a process. The natural history of the development of the case-study method of inquiry into family disorganization would include Miss Brandt's description of the typical deserter, Eubank's analysis of typical desertion cases, the large group of case histories of immigrant demoralization, in Thomas and Znaniecki's *The Polish Peasant,* and Miss Sherman's interpretation of desertion in terms of racial characteristics.

The conception of family disorganization as a process necessitates a clearer definition of the essential character of the family relationship than is found in the bulk of the studies of family disorganization. Familial disorganization may be defined, so far as it concerns the relationship between husband and wife, as that series of events which tends to terminate in the disruption of the marriage union. These family tensions may be reduced to a fourfold classification: incompatibility in response, economic individuation of life-patterns. Out of cases of domestic discord, typical sequences of behavior, events may be abstracted and further sociological analysis made in terms of attitudes and wishes. Although in the future it may be possible to reduce the description of processes of family disorganization to qualitative terms, for the present the most useful description of causes of family disorganization is likely to be found in the objective analyses of case studies.

THE PSCHOLOGY OF THE MARRIED WOMAN WHO WORKS[2]

ERNEST R. GROVES, BOSTON UNIVERSITY

In the assignment of this subject the married woman who works because of the economic pressure of poverty was excluded from the discussion. The psychological aspects of married women working outside the home from choice and not from necessity reveal the changes that are now taking place in the inner life of the family. Any effort to discover the psychology of the married woman who works meets not only all the difficulties that appear when we attempt to get a clear understanding of some concrete phase of human behavior, but also a special obstacle due to the temptation to rationalize as to the motives behind married women's employment.

[1] Printed in full in the *Family,* VIII, (May, 1927), 83–87.

[2] This paper is printed in full in *The Family,* VIII (May, 1927), 92–97.

At present the psychological reactions to married women working outside the home show the influence of section, class, and age. The city environment, the professional class, and the younger group of married women furnish the largest number of married women workers and disclose the emotional responses brought out by such employment. In these reactions the man, the woman, and the child require independent interpretation.

For the man the working of the wife outside the home represents a loss of power, an attack upon his headship of the family. The family attitude of the male shows itself in his reaction to this fact. If he clings to former family traditions he becomes sensitive to the possibility of criticism by his friends and relatives; if the wife is strikingly successful he exhibits jealousy and attacks her for her supposed neglect of her home duties; emotionally he drifts from her and affection is lessened as he senses the competition of his wife who has proved her efficiency as a worker in either industry or a profession. If, on the other hand, the man is in sympathy with the recent trend toward woman's greater self-expression, a deeper feeling of fellowship is awakened and the husband welcomes his wife into a partnership of full equality.

The woman finds in her opportunity to work a new independence and a necessity for adjustment of conflicting interests. If her work attracts her and is a free choice of something more satisfying than housekeeping, she wins a sense of freedom and relief from repressions connected with domestic responsibilities. If in her contact with other men and women she comes to see that her husband lives below the standards she finds generally maintained in their class she grows superior and suffers a loss, first of pride and later of affection. If her experiences outside the home give her a more substantial sense of the realities of life and a greater appreciation of masculine responsibilities, then she, too, enters a richer fellowship and the family is consolidated on a higher level of affection and understanding than is possible when the married woman does not work outside the home.

Children of women who work easily come to feel lonely and even neglected. If they are farmed out to the fullest degree possible, from early childhood they develop feelings that they are not loved, and receive emotional hurt. If, on the other hand, they are given reasonable contact with the mother and the privilege of seeing themselves a part in a family enterprise they come to have pride in their mother's work and to share in a fellowship that includes all the members of the family.

The psychological effect in the community of the married woman's working is to add to the influences that are slowly bringing women to a social equality with men.

THE COMMISSION ON FAMILY LIFE OF THE NATIONAL BOARD, Y.W.C.A.

MARGARET FLENNIKEN, SECRETARY

This Commission, organized in the fall of 1924, started its work by making a study of attitudes toward family life as they exist within the membership of the Y.W.C.A. This was done through discussions in already existing groups such as were found in summer conferences and in clubs in local Associations. During the summer of 1925 the discussions were held in groups totaling over five hundred. The material has been used in approximately sixty-five groups since that time.

In order to open up the subject in an objective manner, two tests were used, adapted from the work and opinion tests worked out by Professor Goodwin Watson, of Teachers College, Columbia University. The way in which the score is marked reveals the points of greatest disagreement, of highest emotional tension, of deep-seated prejudice. Out of these revelations the group then chooses the phase of the subject which it wishes to pursue further. The method of approach has proved both interesting and effective.

The score, as analyzed to date, reveals the following: (1) a considerable variety of opinion on all questions considered; (2) much self-contradiction; (3) much of dogmatism.

The most positive agreement was on the following (+2, absolutely true, and +1, partially true, taken together):

	Percentage
The monogamous family is the foundation stone of our present social order	62
Homemaking, if well done, is a full-time job	72
Equal initiative in finding and choosing mates	62
Nothing excuses women having sex relationships outside marriage	62
Little children are one of life's greatest joys	86

DEBATABLE ANWSERS (0)

Women tolerate sex relations, but men glory in them	38
Every woman wants a career as well as a family	22
State responsible for defining grounds for divorce	36
A woman should have as many children as God sends her	22
The number of intelligent unmarried women is a reflection on what marriage has to offer	30

IMPORTANT MINORITIES

(—1, probably false, and —2, absolutely false, taken together)

Nothing justifies women having sex relations outside of marriage	16
A woman should have as many children as God sends her	26
Broken homes are the chief causes of juvenile delinquency	14

The problems which emerged as most perplexing and surrounded by a high degree of emotional tension were: (1) the proper regulation of marriage;

(2) outside activities and home-making; (3) the economic problem of entering marriage; and (4) the effect of broken homes on childhood.

The *Handbook for Leaders of Discussion* and the summary of discussions held may be secured by writing the Commission.

SOME INDUSTRIAL-MANAGEMENT ASPECTS OF MARRIED WOMEN'S WORK, AND THEIR BEARING ON THE FAMILY[1]

ARTHUR J. TODD, NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY

Industry begins to recognize that it cannot function in a vacuum, that it is linked with the home even though it may not engage in large-scale welfare work, health, recreation, gardens, etc. Authorities do not all agree on the actual number of married women employed. Apparently 40 per cent of all employed women are or have been married. From 1890 to 1920 the percentage of married women gainfully employed nearly doubled. While the percentage of all single, widowed, and divorced workers remained about the same from 1910 to 1920, the percentage of the married actually dropped about 10 per cent. The largest proportion of employed married women are from fifteen to twenty-four years old. We need more carefully analyzed statistics for divorced and widowed by ages, also notations of children, if any.

We ignore in this discussion married women in distinctly professional work because, for the most part, they are seeking to "express themselves" and obtain their "freedom" by avoiding a household establishment, by avoiding children, or by using some other woman's service.

Why do married women work outside the home? Because they must; because they want to improve their family standard of living; because they are wanted by industry. The economic effect on the home of their work depends upon: (*a*) how much time is given, (*b*) the woman's social status (widow, husband incapacitated, grown-up children, young children, no children), (*c*) competition with men, "dumping," flooding the labor market, marginal wages, (*d*) grade of job and whether it pays enough to permit employing a home substitute, (*e*) skill of woman and whether she chooses the job for which she is best fitted, (*f*) whether she stays long enough on the job to acquire skill and "perquisites," (*g*) whether she is able to benefit by organization and group action, (*h*) whether her work permits or forbids her home to enjoy "indirect income," i.e., public subsidies to wages, enjoyment of public education, recreation, culture.

Authorities disagree as to how much married working women must contribute to support of dependents. In England a report showed 88 per cent of

[1] This paper is printed in full in *The Family*, VIII (May, 1927), 88–92.

all working women responsible only for themselves. In United States, studies of the Woman's Bureau seem to indicate the opposite.

From management standpoint one of the most obvious problems is care of the nursing mother. Maternity insurance, time off to nurse, and day nurseries in or near the plant are ordinary methods. As to labor turnover of married women, the figures so far have not ordinarily been kept in such a way as to reveal either sex or marital status, but voluntary "quits" in some industries show "home duties" as the largest factor for women. Some industries find less labor turnover amongst the married, both men and women. On the other hand, married workers, both men and women, show higher absence rate. One company found 175 per cent more absences among married females than among single males. Saturday absence is so common among women workers in many industries as to suggest the practicability of a five-day week. In general, women workers are absent more on account of sickness, in some cases 75 per cent more than men. And though there are no separate figures for married women, pregnancy and child birth no doubt increase their rate. Pregnancy is a special management problem involving prejudice of fellow-workers, superstition, aversion, and requiring consideration of such hazards as lead poisoning.

Management is also up against the difficulty of limiting women's hours in certain industries employing both men and women. Married women are at a disadvantage in this particular, and also in the matter of overtime and seasonal peaks of production. The home also suffers from the effect of uncertain hours and overtime.

Women tend to be assigned to less skilled jobs, but when they "stick" and work along in the same sections as men they may become equally skilled and equally well paid. On week work they are usually paid less, but on piece work they may earn more than men in the same section. Married women are preferred for some industrial jobs, for example, as industrial nurses. In general, married women are not directly penalized, and are not fired if they marry. Some women are very successful as foremen, but others tend to stiffen into grenadiers, to imitate the dress and manners of men, to be very conservative and hard-boiled.

There is no evidence to show that the fact of marriage has any decisive effect on men's wages other than that of woman's labor in general. In the future they may have a much more apparent effect, for industry, having been cut off from immigrant labor, appeals to the great reserve forces of married women. There are no definite figures to show whether married women are less disposed to organize than the unmarried; the general impression, however, is that they are less so. Hence they may hinder labor organization, and leadership and may be used to keep men in line and to fight unionism. Also, on account of their lack of union discipline, they may indulge in impromptu unauthorized strikes.

If women work because they have to and if infant mortality jumps ac-

cordingly, does it jump higher than it would have jumped if the family earnings had not been increased by the amount of the woman's earnings (on the principle that infant mortality is in inverse ratio to income)? Figures are lacking for an answer to this question.

The vicious circle of domestic handicap (widow, husband incapacitated, children in trouble, the sex triangle, etc.) reacts on employment and reverberates back on the home in reduced earnings, worry, loss of skill, discharge. Sometimes family quarrels are carried into the shop and add to management problems. Sometimes married women with shady records carry scandal and indecencies amongst younger girls.

What becomes of the children of working women? Some die; some are deposited in day nurseries; some left to themselves; some parked with neighbors; some left with husbands out of work or partly "laid up"; some in school before and after regular school hours.

What are the alternatives to outside work for a married woman? (*a*) To have a husband who can afford her; (*b*) to accept a lower standard of living; (*c*) so-called home work "as is," cottage industry, tenement industry; (*d*) home work under a utopian system of decentralized motive power under proper public inspection; (*e*) a family wage (repudiated by both British and American official labor organizations); (*f*) state subsidies, mothers' pensions, endowment of motherhood; (*g*) maternity insurance and more generous workman's accident compensation or other forms of insurance not yet worked out; (*h*) part-time industrial employment for both husbands and wives, permitting a new division of labor both inside and outside of the home.

Conclusions.—There is a pitiable lack of exact facts on most of the problems presented here. We need many more facts and co-ordination of facts for the effects of women's work, practical alternatives to outside industrial employment, effects on health, mortality, juvenile delinquency, and other phenomena. Just as it was found desirable to set up a research institute or federation in the field of personnel research to make available a large volume of independent investigations, so we need a family research institute corresponding to the Institute of Land Economics, Eugenics Research Laboratory, Institute of Meat Packers, Engineering Research, and Rockefeller Institute.

THE LAND OF "POCO TIEMPO" ("PRETTY SOON")[1]

ORFA J. SHONTZ, LOS ANGELES

To see the Mexican family in an American juvenile court or court of domestic relations is not to understand unless we are aware of the background.

Poco Tiempo ("pretty soon" or "after a while") is not only the usual response to what an American deems an urgent social situation, but it is a

[1] This paper is printed in full in *The Family*, VIII (May, 1927), 74–79.

fixed attitude toward trouble: "Your troubles will vanish if you wait." The Mexican mother of a girl before the court will say: "It is not that I have failed to take care of her. An unfortunate accident has befallen us."

The Mexican shares this attitude with many primitive peoples. Why hurry with the hurrying world; let's wait and see what comes. The Mexican is a race of the highest culture and artistic development, unselfish, patient, tender-hearted, of great personal beauty, courage, and refinement. Their social relationships are marked by courtesy. Mexicans have a universal respect for childhood and old age. All family relationships are closer, warmer, and more sacred than with us.

Legal codes express and preserve human values much as architecture expresses human purpose and ideals. Let us contrast the Mexican code with our code with reference to marriage and family relationships.

The American legal code.—The American view is pretty well illustrated by the California Civil Code definition of marriage: "Marriage is a personal relation arising out of a civil contract to which the consent of parties capable of making that contract is necessary" (Sec. 55 C.C. of California).

The Mexican code.[2]—"Marriage is the lawful partnership of one man and one woman united in indissoluble bonds in order to perpetuate their species and to assist each other to bear the burden of life"(Mexican Civil Code Act. 155). Husband and wife are bound to reciprocal fidelity and to mutual succor of each other. The wife must obey her husband in domestic matters and in those concerning the education of their children and the management of their property. Brothers and sisters are required to support their minor brothers and sisters only until the latter are eighteen years of age. If only one of the family is able to provide, he must do it all.

In the matter of children born out of wedlock, the names of the parents, if married persons, cannot be entered upon the records even if requested, but if one is unmarried, his or her name may be entered; but if the mother is a married woman living with her husband, in no case can the name of any other man be entered as the father.

Mexicans feel security in their family because of their laws and traditions. No family is too big or too poor to take in another child. Homes may be dirty and have not much to eat, but all is shared equally with the child. There is rarely beating or acts of cruelty.

Organized social agencies can and should approach the Mexican family ideal with respect, provided they are familiar with its underlying legal basis and its spiritual traditions.

SUMMARY

1. The Mexican attitude toward what we would define as an urgent social situation is patience, self-abnegation, grace of word and behavior. He says *poco tiempo,* "pretty soon."

[2] Translated by Joseph Wheless, St. Louis and Mexico City.

2. The Mexican family code as expressed in Mexican law is a definite recital of duties and rights of each member in a wide circle of human relationships. The family is distinctly the unit in social organization. Every safeguard is thrown around the conventional marriage and the conventional family. The welfare of the individual, considered as such, is of secondary importance.

3. Confronted with a changed social situation the Mexican attempts to adjust, but the result is disintegration.

4. The Mexican is imported in large numbers to serve as labor supply.

5. The resulting social problem should be viewed in its wider significance; every attempt should be made to safeguard the Mexican idea of family unity and family responsibility.

6. The solvents applied to Mexican ideas in the American community should be under the conscious control of a goal-idea, not the blind operation of our traditions and moral prejudices.

ANTAGONISM IN PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIPS[1]

MIRIAM VAN WATERS, LOS ANGELES

In recent years interest has been aroused in obtaining more or less complete life-histories of delinquents. From juvenile courtroom impressions it has been observed that children who show marked antagonism to parents, who say "I would rather die than go home," and mean it, are comparatively rare, but that these cases are the most difficult to adjust and do not respond to the various forms of social treatment in vogue, placement in foster homes, probation, placement in correctional and opportunity schools, and the like. It has also been observed that some other individuals, in spite of serious offenses and an unsatisfactory social environment, quickly adjust with a slight amount of treatment. They possess what may be called a "fortunate personality."

These courtroom impressions led to a study of fifty cases of delinquent girls undertaken by Dorothy Crowley Frost, of Los Angeles. They were selected from two thousand juvenile court cases on the basis of persistent attitudes of antagonism to parents, refusal of the child to return home, refusal of the parent to take the child home, persistent running away from home, expression of dislike, coldness, and hostility. All were American girls within the normal range of intelligence, free from organic defect. The economic status of the families was average (i.e., all were living on wages or income, without public or private relief). None of the families studied had records of criminality. No acts of physical cruelty or injury had been committeed by the parents against the children. The family relationship was found unsatisfactory in the following aspects: dominance of the mother by the father; emotional strain and tension and anxiety on the part of the mother; the mother's reliance

[1] To be published in *The Family*.

on some male relative, friend, or counselor outside the family; the feeling on the part of the child that she did not belong to the family; lack of privacy in the living arrangements for the child; interference of neighbors and relatives in the management of the child; conflict over religion between the parents; infliction of small slights and humiliations upon the child; trivial unjust accusations. The specific origin of antagonism clusters around an unwise administration of discipline, tactless reprimands, nagging, and the like.

The mother's poor opinion of the father, her criticism of him as an unworthy object, economically, socially, morally, apparently develops in the child an antagonism against both parents. Children who develop antagonism project it upon all those who stand in the parent relation—teachers, probation officers, social workers. Such children are trouble-makers, constant repeaters, moody, suspicious, incapable of team work or play. They tend to disrupt any social group. They tend to petty thievery, swindling, false accusations, lying, truancy, blackmailing, etc. None of those studied have committed serious offenses.

Study of the personality of these children show an absorption in phantasy and dream life. They repair the unsatisfactory family life in reverie, build elaborate dream pictures of other parents, and fail to take interest in the objective world. These children present the gravest problem to educators and social workers.

AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY
REPORTS OF COMMITTEES OF THE SOCIETY

REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON SOCIAL RESEARCH

The work of the Committee was greatly facilitated this year by the kindness of Professor F. A. Ogg, of the University of Wisconsin, who turned over

TABLE I

NUMBER OF RESEARCH PROJECTS REPORTED AND NUMBER OF PERSONS REPORTING, CLASSIFIED BY TYPE OF SUBJECT AND ARRANGED IN THE ORDER OF THEIR FREQUENCY

	No. of Projects	No. of Persons
1. Social psychology	43	33
2. Rural sociology	43	22
3. Educational sociology	40	32
4. Race and nationality	28	20
5. Sociological theory	24	21
6. Miscellaneous and studies of social work	24	15
7. Economics	24	15
8. Community Life	23	21
9. Marriage and the family	21	15
10. Religion	19	18
11. Penology and criminology	16	14
12. Population and migration	14	11
13. Social Control	10	6
14. Method	10	9
15. Social politics	9	6
16. Mental hygiene	9	6
17. Cultural anthropology	9	8
18. Social medicine	8	5
19. Labor and industry	6	6
20. Personality studies	6	7
21. Social change	4	3
22. Social economics	4	4
23. Ethics	4	1
24. Juvenile delinquency	2	2
25. Law and sociology	2	2
26. Heredity	2	2
27. Public opinion and newspapers	2	2
28. Dependency	1	1
29. Social origins	1	1
30. History	1	1
Totals	409	309

to us the questionnaires returned to him by members of this Society in the course of the investigation of the Council of Learned Societies. We were thus relieved of the necessity of sending out questionnaires of our own.

The subjects of research have been roughly classified on the basis of the grouping used by the Committee in 1924 and 1925. The figures in Table I, column A, are the numbers of subjects, and in column B are the numbers of persons reporting.

The difficulty of classifying subjects with no more evidence than a title—sometimes quite vaguely expressed—is obvious, and this report does not attempt to secure more than a highly approximate accuracy of allocation. Certain groups have been added which were not found in the grouping of 1924, and in one case no studies were reported for a particular group.

The table shows in general a strong tendency for workers to be interested in more than one topic. This is not brought out as clearly as it might be. A man reporting in several different groups appears as one person in each of those groups. The table as given somewhat obscures this versatility.

Arranging the material in the order of the size of the groups of subjects reveals somewhat the present tendencies in research. The purely theoretical aspects of sociology are but little stressed. Only a reading of the listed titles can reveal how objective the work of the members of this Society is today. In this connection it might be noted that 20 per cent of all studies reported are of local and well-defined areas; 15 per cent are apparently of the survey type; and 31 per cent either explicitly (or implicitly, in the opinion of the chairman of this committee) involve the use of statistics.

It is noteworthy, too, that the number of projects reported this year (409) is very much larger than those reported either in 1924 (204) or in 1925 (about 125). Perhaps the fact that the report, coming from a national body through an office not of this fellowship, evoked greater interest than our own questionnaires have.

While this list of titles and names is encouragingly large, we do not believe that it is the full list that might possibly be constructed. The names of a number of well-known sociological workers do not appear upon it at all. We are safe therefore in assuming that it represents an underestimate of our activities, rather than the opposite.

LUCILLE EAVES
C. E. GEHLKE, *Chairman*
HORNELL HART

REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON TEACHING OF SOCIAL SCIENCES IN THE SCHOOLS

Your Committee on the Teaching of Social Sciences in the Schools begs leave to report that a very successful luncheon-conference on the "Teaching of a Twelfth-Grade Course in Sociology in High Schools" was held at our annual

meeting in St. Louis, December 28–31. Papers on "A Twelfth-Grade Course in Sociology for High-School Students" were presented by Professor J. O. Hertzler, of the University of Nebraska, and Professor C. J. Bushnell, of Toledo University. The discussion on them was led by Professor H. R. Tucker, of the Cleveland High School, St. Louis.

CHARLES A. ELLWOOD, *Chairman*

REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

As chairman of the Executive Committee of the Joint Committee composed of representatives of the various social science associations,[1] I beg to submit herewith my report on the operations of the year.

It was not until the end of April of this year that the acceptance of the plan was authorized by all of the associations involved. This left only the month of May in which to begin the financial campaign before the summer vacation. This campaign was at once undertaken and was renewed with the opening of the academic year, so that in all there have been three months of steady work devoted to the proposition.

It will be remembered that the plan contemplates the raising of some $650,000. About five-sixths of this sum is now assured, but on condition that the entire amount be raised. We are accordingly now on the last lap. Naturally, however, the situation becomes more difficult as the probabilities or possibilities are exhausted. It is for this reason that, inasmuch as I have hitherto conducted the campaign entirely single handed, I would urge every member of the Association, and especially the officers and representatives on the special committees, to canvass the possibilities in their own city or town, and to let me know at the earliest practicable moment what they can do to help.

Furthermore, inasmuch as it is not improbable that the fund may be entirely completed during the next few months, it is of the highest importance that each Association constitute its representatives to act as a permanent committee, charged with the responsible duty of overseeing the activities of the Executive Committee in working out the details of the plan and putting it into operation, in the event that the project becomes assured. This involves not only the elaboration of a series of important financial contracts, but, what is of far greater significance, the final decision as to the methods, contents, and details of the encyclopedia itself.

Finally, I should like to ask for a renewal of the grant made last year in order to defray secretarial expenses.

Respectfully submitted,

EDWIN R. A. SELIGMAN, *Chairman*

[1] This report was presented by William F. Ogburn, who, with Howard B. Woolston, chairman, and Harry Elmer Barnes, constitute the Committee on the Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences of the American Sociological Society.

REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON A NATIONAL SOCIAL SCIENCE FRATERNITY

In the absence of the chairman of your committee on the establishment of a National Social Science Fraternity, Dr. L. L. Bernard, I beg leave to report that such a social science fraternity, namely, Alpha Pi Zeta, organized on the same general lines as the honorary society of Sigma Xi, has now been organized and incorporated. It was incorporated under the laws of the state of Illinois, in May, 1926. It has now five chapters established, at the University of Missouri, University of Minnesota, University of Indiana, University of North Dakota, and Northwestern University. Other chapters are in the process of organization.

At the annual meeting held at Hotel Statler, St. Louis, December 29, Professor F. S. Deibler, of Northwestern University, was elected national president, and Professor Kenneth Colegrove, also of Northwestern University, was elected national secretary-treasurer. Correspondence regarding the organization of chapters should be directed to Professor Colegrove.

At the same meeting, Professor John R. Commons, representing the Order of Artus, a national honorary society for economics, was present and said that the members of that order were ready to surrender their name and charter and to merge their chapters with Alpha Pi Zeta. There are seven chapters of this order established in leading universities, and Professor Commons reported that the society had over eleven hundred dollars in the treasury. A committee, consisting of the newly-elected president and secretary, and of Professor Frank Knight, of the University of Iowa, was appointed to effect the consolidation. The society of Alpha Pi Zeta would seem, therefore, to be firmly established.

CHARLES A. ELLWOOD, *Acting Chairman*

REPORTS OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY

TO THE SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH COUNCIL

The report of the activities of the Social Science Research Council for the year 1926 was made by William F. Ogburn, who, with F. Stuart Chapin and Shelby M. Harrison, represents the Society on the Council. Since the report of the chairman of the Council, Charles E. Merriam, has been published in full as a pamphlet, and sent to all the members of our Society, no further report will be given here. Additional copies of this pamphlet may be secured by writing to The Chairman, Social Science Research Council, University of Chicago, Chicago.

ON THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF THE NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR THE SOCIAL STUDIES

During the past year the joint commission on social studies in the schools has had no meeting, and, so far as I am aware, has transacted no business. I believe that this commission is no longer active, as it has been superseded by the National Council for Social Studies, on whose board of directors I have had the honor of being the representative of the American Sociological Society during the past year.

I beg to report that your representative did not attend the meeting of the National Council and its board of directors last February. I wish to report, however, that the work of the National Council has been eminently successful. It has now a membership of over 1,200 teachers of social studies, mainly high-school teachers. Through its influence a number of states are requiring more courses in modern social studies in the high schools. This is particularly true of the courses in sociology, which have increased very rapidly in number during the last three years in the high schools in the United States. The organ of the National Council for Social Studies is the *Historical Outlook*. Membership in this body is open to any teacher of social studies who wishes to pay the duties of $2.25 a year, which includes subscription to the *Historical Outlook*. The Secretary of this organization is Professor Edgar Dawson, of New York City. I would recommend that the co-operation of the American Sociological Society with this body be continued.

Respectfully submitted,

CHARLES A. ELLWOOD

TO THE AMERICAN COUNCIL OF LEARNED SOCIETIES

The Council was represented at the seventh annual meeting of the U.A.I. at Brussels in May, 1926, by Mr. Waldo G. Leland, of the Department of Historical Research of the Carnegie Institution of Washington, and Professor Louis J. Paetow, of the University of California. A summary of the proceedings will appear in the *Bulletin* of the A.C.L.S. for May, 1927.

Bulletin 5 of the Council appeared in May, 1926, and *Bulletin 6* is planned for May, 1927. It is proposed in the near future to change the *Bulletin* from an annual to a semiannual or a quarterly, and to make it more adequately a medium of information regarding research projects actively in progress. Members of the constituent societies can secure copies of the current number of the *Bulletin* by request addressed to the Secretary of the Council.

Out of the activities of the Committee on Medieval Studies of the Council the Medieval Academy of America has come into being and has taken over the work in this field heretofore conducted by the Council, including the bulletin on the *Progress of Medieval Studies in the United States*. The application of the Medieval Academy for admission as a constituent society will be submitted to the Council at its next annual meeting.

Professor Allen Johnson, heretofore of Yale University, assumed his duties as editor of the *Dictionary of American Biography* on February 1. The staff, as at present organized, consists of the editor, four assistants, and a secretary and a stenographer. The list of persons whose biographies will be included is now substantially complete. Writers have been secured for nearly six hundred biographies, chiefly in A and B, and two hundred manuscripts have already been received. Under the terms of the agreement with the New York Times Company, Volume I is to appear before August, 1929. The remaining nineteen volumes are expected to be issued at the rate of three per year. The editorial offices are located in the Hill Building, 17th and Eye Streets, Washington.

The Committee on Aid to Research, G. S. Ford, chairman, made its awards for 1926 on March 31 under the annual subvention of $5,000 from the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial. Twenty-one grants, in no case exceeding $300, were distributed to scholars in various parts of the country to further projects they are engaged upon. They are at present reporting upon the progress so far made, and usually the grant has resulted in a substantial gain of time needed for the completion of the projects. In some cases the results are already in press. Copies of the circular giving information as to procedure and conditions may be obtained from the secretaries of the constituent societies, from Dean G. S. Ford, University of Minnesota, or from the Secretary of the Council.

Under a grant from the Carnegie Corporation the Council is approaching the completion of a survey of research in the humanistic and social sciences. The director of the survey, Professor F. A. Ogg, of the University of Wiscon-

sin, devoted his time to the survey from February 1 to August 1, with headquarters at Washington. He has now returned to his regular duties, but is expecting to make to the Council within a few months the report which will sum up the results of the survey. The Executive Committee of the Council has taken action authorizing the Director to distribute to the respective societies the materials which he collected from individual members of the constituent societies regarding research projects, with the suggestion that each society submit the material to its research committee or some other appropriate agency, in the hope that it may be used as the basis for a digest of the present tendencies and prospects of research in the given subject. It is requested that the Council be kept informed of any steps that may be taken by the societies, and when these steps result in a digest or other report that a copy of this be transmitted to the Council.

The General Education Board has just consented to provide, during a period of five years, the necessary administrative expenses up to a maximum of $25,000 per year. The appropriation was made on the basis of a budget which was submitted to the Board by the Council and which called for the sum just named. This generous grant will enable the Council to secure a full-time executive officer, to establish permanent headquarters, to increase the facilities of the committees of eminent scholars who so generously give their co-operation in problems and projects of research, and in various other ways to facilitate the work which falls within the scope of the Council. The details of the application of this grant will be determined by the Council at its annual meeting in January, but it can already be foreseen that the capacity of the Council to serve the interests represented by the constituent societies will be vastly increased when the new status goes into effect.

Respectfully submitted,

WILLIAM I. THOMAS

PROGRAM OF THE TWENTY-FIRST ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY

ST. LOUIS, MO., DECEMBER 28–31, 1926

CENTRAL TOPIC, "THE PROGRESS OF SOCIOLOGY"

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 28

9:00 A.M. Registration.

10:00–12:00 A.M. **Division on Social Research.** Charles E. Gehlke, Western Reserve University, presiding. Ten-minute reports on research projects. *The Auditorium.*

"Problems and Methods in Statistical Ethics," A. P. Brogan, University of Texas.

"The Determination of Gradients in City Growth," E. W. Burgess, University of Chicago.

"The Use of Psychiatric Classification in the Analysis of Social Behavior: Identification," T. D. Eliot, Northwestern University.

"Preliminary Conclusions from a Study of Inventors," Hornell Hart, Bryn Mawr College.

"The Development of Ethical Standards in the American Trade Association," Edgar L. Heermance, New Haven.

"Factors of Choice in Marriage," Charles W. Margold, Michigan State Normal College.

"Culture Contacts in the West Indies," U. G. Weatherly, Indiana University.

12:30–3:00 P.M. Luncheon meetings.

Committee on Sections. *Room L.*

Sociology and Social Work, Frank J. Bruno, Washington University, presiding. "The Progress of Social Work," Thomas J. Riley, Brooklyn Bureau of Charities. "The Development of the Relation between Sociology and Social Work," M. J. Karpf, Training School for Jewish Social Work. *Room D.*

College Teaching of Sociology, Hornell Hart, Bryn Mawr College, presiding. *Room B.* Round-table discussion on (1) The Use of Objective Examinations; (2) Content of the Introductory Course; (3) The Treatment of "Delicate" Subjects.

Research Problems of Graduate Students, Kimball Young, University of Wisconsin, presiding. *Pantry.*

3:00–5:00 P.M. **Division on Human Ecology,** Robert E. Park, University of Chicago, presiding. *The Auditorium.*

"The Concept of Dominance and World-Organization," R. D. McKenzie, University of Washington.

"Population Areas in Canada," C. A. Dawson, McGill University.

"The Ghetto," Louis Wirth, University of Chicago.

"The Ecological Approach to the Study of the Church," Arthur E. Holt, Chicago Theological Seminary.

6:00–7:30 P.M. Dinner Meeting of the Section on the Community, in joint session with the National Community Center Association. *West Dining-Room, 13th Floor.*

"Shall We Kill the Community Movement?" Walter Burr, Kansas State Agricultural College.

"A Survey of Adult Education in America Today," Carl H. Milam, American Library Association.

"Methods and Results of Organization in a Rural and Mountain Community," J. F. Steiner, University of North Carolina.

"A Study of Social Centers in Michigan," Arthur E. Wood, University of Michigan.

8:00–10:00 P.M. **Division on Social Psychology,** Edward A. Ross, University of Wisconsin, *The Auditorium.*

"The Development of Social Psychology," Fay B. Karpf, New York.

"The Contribution of Psychiatry to Social Psychology," William F. Ogburn, Columbia University.

"The Measurement of Personal and Social Attitudes," Kimball Young, University of Wisconsin.

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 29

9:00 A.M. Business Meeting of the Society. *The Auditorium.*

Reports of representatives to the Social Science Research Council, the Board of Directors for the Council of Social Studies, the Joint Commission on Social Studies in the Schools, the American Council of Learned Societies, the Dictionary of American Biography, the American Year Book.

10:00–12:00 A.M. Meetings of sections of the Society.

Section on Rural Sociology, in charge of E. L. Morgan, University of Missouri. *The Auditorium.*

Report of the Committee on Research, C. C. Taylor, North Carolina State College of Agriculture, chairman.

"Methods of Social Research," Bruce L. Melvin, Cornell University.

Discussion: C. R. Hoffer, Michigan State College of Agriculture; C. C. Zimmerman, University of Minnesota.

"The Nature and Function of Research," E. W. Allen, Office of Experiment Stations, U.S.D.A.

Section on Community Organization, in joint session with the National Community Center Association, in charge of A. E. Wood, University of Michigan. *Room B.*

"Cultural Adjustments in the Polish Community of Buffalo," Niles Carpenter, University of Buffalo.

"Evaluation of Community Activities," M. C. Elmer, University of Pittsburgh.

"The Base Map as a Device for Community Study; Illustrated by Cincinnati Studies in Recreation, Religion, and Juvenile Delinquency," Earle Eubank, University of Cincinnati.

"The Changing Community and the Church," S. C. Kincheloe, Chicago Y.M.C.A. College.

"A Study of Chicago Settlements and Their Districts," Clark Tibbitts, Chicago.

Section on The Family, in charge of Mrs. W. F. Dummer, Chicago.

Reports on Studies of the Family. *Room C.*

General Discussion led by Chase Going Woodhouse, Margaret Flenniken, Hornell Hart, Ernest R. Groves, and William F. Ogburn.

Section on the Sociology of Religion, in charge of Arthur E. Holt, Chicago Theological Seminary.

Reports on Research in Progress.

12:30–3:00 P.M. Luncheon Meetings.

Section on Rural Sociology. In joint session with the American Farm Economics Association. *Room E.*

Report of Joint Committee on Relations of Social and Economic Factors in Rural Progress: O. G. Lloyd, Purdue University.

"Determination of Rural Standards of Living," Elizabeth E. Hoyt, Iowa State College of Agriculture.

"Joint Co-operative Studies on the Economics and Sociology of Farm Life," E. L. Kirkpatrick, Bureau of Agricultural Economics, U.S.D.A.

Section on the Sociology of Religion, in charge of Earle Eubank, University of Cincinnati. *Dining-Room, 13th Floor.*

"Has the Church an Authoritative Contribution to Make to the Ethics of Industry?" Affirmative: Arthur E. Holt; Negative: William Brandt, St. Louis Federation of Labor. General Discussion.

Section on the Teaching of Social Science in the Schools, in charge of Charles A. Ellwood, University of Missouri. *Pantry.*

"A Twelfth-Grade Course in Sociology for High-School Students," J. O. Hertzler, University of Nebraska; C. J. Bushnell, Toledo University.

Discussion led by H. R. Tucker, Cleveland High School, St. Louis.

Section on The Family, in joint session with the American Home Economics Association Committee on the Economic and Social Problems of the Home. Chase Going Woodhouse, chairman. *Dance Floor.*

"The Effect of the Outside Work of Married Women upon the Home."

"Some Management Problems with Employed Married Women which May Affect the Home," Arthur J. Todd, Northwestern University.

"Psychological Aspects of Married Women Working Outside the Home," Ernest R. Groves, Boston University.

Discussion led by Lita Bane, University of Wisconsin.

3:00–5:00 P.M. **Division on Social Biology,** Carl Kelsey, University of Pennsylvania, presiding. *The Auditorium.*

"The Changing Concept of Race," Herbert A. Miller, Ohio State University.

"The Changing Concept of Population," Hannibal G. Duncan, University of Southern California.

"The Importance of the Physical Basis in the Teaching of Sociology. Carl Kelsey.

5:00 P.M. Meeting of the Executive Committee.

6:00–7:30 P.M. **Dinner Meeting of the Section on the Community,** in joint session with the National Community Center Association. *West Dining-Room, 13th Floor.*

"The Fascisti Attitude toward Local Community Control," a Fascist.

"Spacial Distance and Community Organization Pattern," R. D. McKenzie, University of Washington.

"The Community Chest and the Community," C. C. North, Ohio State University.

"Light on the Neighborhood and the Community from the Protestant Church Parish," H. Paul Douglass, Institute of Social and Religious Research.

8:00–10:00 P.M. **Joint Session** with the American Economic Association and the American Statistical Association. *The Statler Hotel.* Presidential Addresses: "Economic Advisory Work for Governments," Edwin W. Kemmerer, American Economic Association.

"The Development of Sociology in the United States," John L. Gillin, American Sociological Society.

"The Dilemma of the New Statistics," Leonard P. Ayres, American Statistical Association.

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 30

7:45 A.M. Breakfast. Ohio Sociological Society.

9:00 A.M. Business meeting for reports of committees. *The Auditorium.*

Committees on Social Abstracts, Social Research, Teaching of Social Sciences, Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, National Social Science Fraternity.

10:00–12:00 A.M. Meetings of the sections of the Society.

Section on Rural Sociology. *The Auditorium.*

Report of Committee on the Teaching of Rural Sociology, C. E. Lively, Ohio State University, chairman. Discussion: J. H. Kolb, University of Wisconsin; Walter Burr, Kansas State College of Agriculture.

Report of Committee on Extension Work, B. L. Hummel, University of Missouri, chairman. Discussion: S. H. Hobbs, Jr., University of North Carolina; T. B. Manny, Hendrix College.

Section on Community Organization. *Room C.*

"Districting of the City and Community Organization in St. Louis," Elwood Street and Staff of the Community Council of St. Louis.

"Mirrors of Harlem, Investigations and Problems of America's Largest Colored Community," Ira de F. Reid, New York Urban League.

Section on Educational Sociology. "The Progress of Educational Sociology," E. George Payne, New York University, presiding. *Room D.*

"What Is Educational Sociology?" Charles A. Ellwood, University of Missouri.

"The Subject Matter of the Curriculum and Sociology," George S. Counts, University of Chicago.

"The Sociological Basis of Method," B. F. Stalcup, New York University.

"The School and Classroom Organization," C. C. Peters, Ohio Wesleyan University.

"Research in Educational Sociology," Harvey W. Zorbaugh, New York University.

Section on The Family, in charge of Mrs. W. F. Dummer, Chicago. *Room E.*

"The Study of Family Disorganization," Ernest R. Mowrer, Chicago.

"The Land of Poco Tiempo," Orfa J. Shontz, formerly Referee of the Los Angeles Juvenile Court.

"The Parent-Child Relationship," Kimball Young, University of Wisconsin.

Section on the Sociology of Religion, in charge of Arthur E. Holt, Chicago Theological Seminary. *West Dining-Room, 13th Floor.*

"Co-operation in Research in Personal and Social Experience."

"Isolation in Relation to the Religious Aspects of Mental Disorder," Anton Boisen, Massachusetts Hospital for the Insane.

"Case Material as the Basis for Courses in Pastoral Ministry: Can These be Furnished by Research Institutes?" Ozora Davis, Chicago Theological Seminary.

12:30–3:00 P.M. Luncheon Meetings.

Section on Rural Sociology. *Room D.*

"Trends in the Rural Life of Norway," Thomas L. Harris, University of West Virginia.

"Denmark a Sociologic Demonstration," Newell L. Sims, Oberlin College.

"Some Agencies for Rural Progress in Europe," W. H. Stacy, Iowa State College of Agriculture.

"The Development of Rural Sociology in Europe," Charles J. Galpin, Bureau of Agricultural Economics, U.S.D.A.

Section on Educational Sociology, W. R. Smith, University of Kansas, presiding. *Pantry.*

Report upon the Status of Educational Sociology in Teacher Training Institutes, from members present.

"The Survey of Educational Sociology," Harvey Lee, New York University.

Section on the Family. *Dance Floor.*

"Antagonistic Relationships in Family Life," Miriam Van Waters, Los Angeles.

3:00–5:00 P.M. **Division on Historical Sociology,** Walter B. Bodenhafer, Washington University, presiding. *The Auditorium.*

"English Sociology," Harry Elmer Barnes.

"German Sociology," Carl Brinkmann, University of Heidelberg.

"Sociology in Argentina," L. L. Bernard.

"Russian Sociology," Pitirim A. Sorokin, University of Minnesota.

6:30 P.M. **Annual Dinner of the Society.** *Main Dining-Room.*

FRIDAY, DECEMBER 31

9:00 A.M. Annual Business Meeting of the American Sociological Society.

10:00–12:00 A.M. **Division on Methods of Research,** Floyd N. House, University of Virginia, presiding. *The Auditorium.*

"The Use and Limitations of Statistics in Sociological Research," C. E. Gehlke, Western Reserve University.

"The Case Study Method," Clifford R. Shaw, Institute for Juvenile Research, Chicago.

"Cultural Analysis," Wilson D. Wallis, University of Minnesota.

"The Progress of General Methodology," Floyd N. House.

12:30–3:00 P.M. Luncheon Meeting. Round table on "Scientific Methods in the Social Sciences," William F. Ogburn, Columbia University, presiding. *Room D.*

Discussion opened by E. A. Ross, W. I. Thomas, C. H. Farr, C. J. Galpin.

THE AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY

ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SECRETARY FOR THE FISCAL YEAR DECEMBER 1, 1925, TO NOVEMBER 30, 1926

Membership Statement

Last year the total membership of the Society was 1,086. This year it is 1,107, a gain of 21 members.

Membership in 1925		1,086
Members resigning	36	
Members dropped	171	
Members deceased	7	
Total lost		214
Members renewing		
Exchange members	5	
Paid members	867	
New members	235	
Total members for 1926		1,107

Student Membership

Last year the Executive Committee was authorized through an amendment to the constitution, to fix a special rate for student membership for 1927. Although the announcement of the special rate for 1927 was sent out late, the following teachers have already sent in lists of students recommended for membership: R. E. Baber, Read Bain, Harry E. Barnes, W. G. Binnewies, W. S. Bittner, F. W. Blackmar, Evelyn Buchan, C. J. Bushnell, Charles H. Cooley, Charles W. Coulter, J. E. Cutler, G. R. Davies, C. A. Dawson, Frederick G. Detweiler, Edwin L. Earp, Charles A. Ellwood, Ellsworth Faris, Joseph K. Folsom, L. E. Garwood, John L. Gillin, J. O. Hertzler, Henry J. Jeddeloh, M. J. Karpf, Daniel H. Kulp II, J. P. Lichtenberger, Norman C. Meier, Albert Morris, W. L. Nofcier, Howard W. Odum, William F. Ogburn, E. George Payne, Stuart A. Queen, M. Wesley Roper, E. A. Ross, C. W. Schroeder, H. B. Sell, E. H. Shideler, Newell L. Sims, H. M. Snyder, Pitirim A. Sorokin, Frederic M. Thrasher, A. J. Todd, Malcolm M. Willey, A. E. Wood, H. B. Woolston, Dale Yoder, Erle F. Young.

The Work of the Society

In 1926 the Society carried on its work through its representatives on six national organizations: the Social Science Research Council, the American Council of Learned Societies, the Board of Directors of the National Council for the Social Studies, the Joint Commission on Social Studies in the Schools, the Joint Committee on the Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, the Diction-

ary of American Biography, and the American Yearbook. The five officially recognized sections of the Society tend more and more to carry on activities between the annual meetings. The Executive Committee, voting by mail, approved the proposal to increase the payment to the University of Chicago Press from $2.00 to $2.50 per member, so as to insure the enlargement of the *American Journal of Sociology* by an increase of 192 pages a year. Under the authorization that the Secretary be empowered to arrange for publication in book form of the papers in the *Proceedings*, provided no expense was incurred by the Society, the Secretary signed a contract with the University of Chicago Press calling for a royalty to the Society of 15 per cent of the retail price of the book.

Necrology

In the death of Albion W. Small, the Society lost one of its founders and at all times one of its most devoted and active members.

Respectfully submitted,

E. W. BURGESS, *Secretary*

REPORT OF THE FINANCE COMMITTEE

Your committee has supervised the examination of the books of the American Sociological Society for the fiscal year ending November 30, 1926. The auditor reports that "The cash balance was confirmed by correspondence with the depository, all recorded cash receipts were traced into the deposits, and disbursements were made on the authority of properly authorized bills. The postings of the ledger were checked from the books of original entry and found to be in order. Bills authorizing expenditures were examined and found to be in order. The bonds representing investments were presented for his inspection by the Chicago Trust Company, which is holding them in safekeeping."

We submit for your consideration Balance Sheet (Schedule "A") and Statement of Cash Receipts and Disbursements (Schedule "B") prepared by the Secretary-Treasurer on the basis of the report by a qualified examiner, who prepared the following exhibit: "Balance Sheet"; "Cash Receipts and Disbursements"; "Statement of Profit and Loss"; "Securities Owned."

The Committee begs leave to submit herewith the original report of the examiner for the archives of the Society.

The statement of Cash Receipts and Disbursements includes in its cash receipts "Dues from members, 1927" ($100.00). To this should be added the uninvested receipts from life members ($655.62). The cash balance determined by subtracting from this sum total ($755.62), the apparent cash balance ($550.57), gives a deficit at the present time of $205.05. Comparing this deficit with the deficit as of last year ($367.17), there appears a surplus of $162.12 in the operations for the current year. This surplus of $162.12 really

represents, then, a gain over last year of $375.31 in the operations of the Society.

Attention is called in the "receipts" to the generous contribution of $767.50 from the members. This is especially gratifying, since only about $500.00 had been anticipated from this source.

Under the authority of the Executive Committee, the Secretary-Treasurer has been authorized to invest $600.00 in life memberships, on the advice of N. C. Plimpton, or with the approval of the Finance Committee.

The Committee submits herewith a comparative table of incomes and expenditures for the last nine years (1918–26, inclusive), prepared by the Treasurer. We should like to call your attention to the fact that the financial operations of the Society have more than doubled in this period.

Your Committee begs leave to submit herewith the fifth annual budget of the American Sociological Society, covering the fiscal year ending November 30, 1927. The increase of nearly $600.00 in expenditures for the *American Journal of Sociology* is occasioned by the added expense due to the increase in the size of the *Journal* by 192 pages a year, authorized by the Executive Committee.

Your committee was again impressed, as it has been during the last few years, with the unusually devoted and loyal service which our Secretary-Treasurer has been giving to the Society. We feel that the work of Professor Burgess for the welfare of the Society has been invaluable and that the Society owes its recent development in no small measure to his untiring efforts. The committee was impressed, also, with the amount of routine work which devolves upon him because of inadequate clerical service. We urge upon you the need for additional clerical assistance because undue demands are made upon the time of your Secretary. We respectfully recommend that a sum, not to exceed $2,000 per annum, be authorized for assistance to the Secretary-Treasurer in such form as he may need.

The foregoing recommendation, which the committee hopes will be approved, may increase the budget for the coming year to the extent of $1,200. This sum will have to be raised. Your committee therefore heartily indorses the plans now being made for increasing the membership of the Society. It also recommends that you consider the advisability of establishing grades of membership such as now obtain in various other societies similar in aim and work to the American Sociological Society. The generous response on the part of the membership to the request for contributions last year is at least some index of the many friends which the Society has. Your committee is confident that there are a number of members who will be willing to pay a larger annual fee in order to make it possible for the Society to function as it should.

Respectfully submitted,

THOMAS D. ELIOT
FERRIS F. LAUNE
MAURICE J. KARPF, *Chairman*

SCHEDULE "A"

BALANCE SHEET AS OF NOVEMBER 30, 1926

Assets

Cash in bank		$550.57	
Office furniture	$146.65		
Less depreciation—up to and including 1926	70.83	75.82	
Proceedings on hand, 1,494 volumes, at $0.50		747.00	
Investments:			
Northwestern Electric Company 6 per cent Gold Bonds		500.00	
St. Cloud Public Service Company 6 per cent Gold Bonds		675.38	
Total assets			$2,548.77

Liabilities

Surplus as at December 1, 1925		$2,292.08	
Additions:			
Increase in stock of *Proceedings* by 38 copies	$ 19.00		
Net Gain—Schedule "B"	246.12	265.12	
Deductions:			
Depreciation—office furniture	8.43		
Net additions		256.69	
Total liabilities			2,548.77

SCHEDULE "B"

STATEMENT OF CASH RECEIPTS AND DISBURSEMENTS FROM DECEMBER 1, 1925, TO NOVEMBER 30, 1926

Cash on deposit November 30, 1925			$ 304.45

Cash Receipts

Dues from members for 1927	$ 100.00		
Dues from members for 1926	4,366.05		
		$4,466.05	
Contributions from members		767.50	
Exchange with remittances		16.10	
Postage with remittances		2.10	
Income from *Proceedings*		384.84	
Interest on checking account		9.84	
Interest on bonds and savings account		76.19	
Receipts for abstract service		50.00	
Total receipts			5,766.62
Plus credit from University of Chicago Press			300.00
Total			$6,371.07

Cash Disbursements

Proceedings, Volume XIX	$1,621.52	
American Journal of Sociology	2,491.74	
Clerical aid, salaries, etc.	661.44	
Postage and express	256.85	
Printing (including abstract service)	221.35	
Stationery	164.90	
Secretary's expense at annual meeting	120.20	
Committee on Social Science Encyclopedia	100.00	
Society membership, A.C.L.S.	54.35	
Exchange on remittances	35.40	
Membership refunds	69.15	
Refunds on contributions	7.00	
Auditing	10.00	
Insurance on *Proceedings*	2.00	
Office expense	4.60	
Total disbursements		$5,820.50
Cash on Deposit November 30, 1926		550.57
Cash on Deposit November 30, 1925		304.45
Net gain for year		246.12

TENTATIVE BUDGET
of the
American Sociological Society for the Fiscal Year of 1927
(December 1, 1926, to November 30, 1927)

Receipts

	Estimated Receipts for 1927	Actual Receipts for 1926	Actual Receipts for 1925
Dues from members	$5,500.00	$4,382.05	$4,332.84
Sale of publications	400.00	384.84	363.10
Press credit	300.00	300.00	300.00
Interest	125.00	80.03	124.60
Abstract service and other receipts	75.00	50.00	90.00
Exchange and postage	25.00	18.20	22.63
Contributions		767.50	
Total receipts	$6,425.00	$5,982.62	$5,233.17

Expenditures

	Estimated Expenditures for 1927	Actual Expenditures for 1926	Actual Expenditures for 1925
American Journal of Sociology	$2,750.00	$2,491.74	$2,176.00
Proceedings	1,700.00	1,621.52	1,670.47
Clerical aid and salaries	800.00	661.44	646.93
Postage and express	275.00	256.85	247.48
Printing (including abstracts)	275.00	221.35	268.24
Stationery	175 00	164.90	133.66
Secretary's expenses at meetings	75.00	120.20	24.65
Society membership, A.C.L.S.	60.00	54.35	116.70
Committee on Social Science Encyclopedia	150 00	100.00	. . . .
Delegate to Council for Social Studies	50.00		
Auditing	10 00	10.00	10.00
Exchange on dues	35.00	35.40	32.90
Refunds on memberships and on contributions	50.00	76.15	26.00
Insurance	3.00	2.00	2.50
Miscellaneous expense	17.00	4.60	40.83
Total expenditures	$6,425.00	$5,820.50	$5,446.36

ANALYSIS OF ACTUAL INCOMES AND EXPENDITURES

1917–26

Year	Receipts from Dues	Total Receipts	Expenditures	Deficit	Cash Balance
1917					$ 389.65
1918	$2,415.35	$2,810.70	$2,863.87	$ 53.13	327.48
1919	2,598.30	2,962.79	3,196.74	233.95	93.53
1920	3,172.50	3,591.96	3,815.90	233.94	—130.41
1921	3,708.50	4,400.72	4,617.22	216.49	—346.90
1922	4,228.72	4,903.79	5,002.75	98.96	—445.86
1923*	4,439.45	5,097.86	4,994.08	†103.78	—342.08
1924*	4,722.40	5,516.78	5,328.68	†188.10	—153.98
1925*	4,332.84	5,233.17	5,446.36	—213.19	—367.17
1926	4,382.00	5,982.62	5,820.50	†162.12	—205.05

*The figures for 1923–25 do not include receipts from life memberships.

†Surplus.

ANNUAL REPORT OF THE MANAGING EDITOR FOR THE FISCAL YEAR DECEMBER 1, 1925, TO NOVEMBER 30, 1926

On November 30 the number of different volumes of the *Papers and Proceedings* on hand was as follows:

Volume	Copies	Volume	Copies
I	59	XI	0
II	0	XII	66
III	0	XIII	0
IV	18	XIV	0
V	20	XV	227
VI	0	XVI	113
VII	18	XVII	94
VIII	42	XVIII	102
IX	0	XIX	308
X	130	XX	297

The total number of volumes, 1,494, is 39 more than were reported last year.

Respectfully submitted,

E. W. BURGESS, *Managing Editor*

THE AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY

MINUTES OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING, ST. LOUIS, DECEMBER 29, 1926

The meeting of the Executive Committee was called to order at 5:10 P.M. by President John L. Gillin, in Room L, the Missouri Hotel. Members present besides the President and the Secretary were Messrs. Blackmar, Cutler, Hayes, Odum, Ogburn, Queen, Ross, Sutherland, and Weatherly.

The annual reports of the Secretary and of the Managing Editor were read and approved. The report of the Finance Committee made by its chairman, Mr. M. J. Karpf, was accepted. A motion prevailed that the Managing Editor be instructed to print, in full, the report of the Finance Committee. After discussion a motion made by Professor Weatherly was passed providing that an amendment to the constitution be submitted for three classes of annual membership: members paying a fee of $5.00, subscribing members paying a fee of $10.00, and contributing members paying a fee of $25.00.

The motion was then made and passed that the Secretary, upon approval of the President, be authorized to expend not to exceed $2,000 for clerical assistance during the next year.

Upon the report by Professor U. G. Weatherly, chairman of the Committee on Honorary Members, that Professor C. A. Ellwood had nominated Victor B. Branford, of the London Sociological Society, for honorary membership in the Society, it was moved that his name be recommended to Society for election. The Secretary made the report of the meeting of the Committee on Sections, stating that the organization of two new sections on population and race relations, and on sociology and social work, had been suggested. Upon a motion by Professor Ogburn the creation of a section on sociology and social work was approved and the President and Secretary authorized to appoint its program committee. Moved and carried that the present Secretary and Treasurer be re-elected. Consideration was then given to a petition from five members of the Society suggesting that the Society arrange for joint meetings with the American Psychological Association and the American Anthropological Association. A motion was passed that this result be achieved, if possible, through a request to the Social Science Research Council to consider the feasibility of joint meetings of its constituent societies in alternate years.

Respectfully submitted,

E. W. BURGESS, *Secretary.*

MINUTES OF THE FIRST BUSINESS MEETING FOR REPORTS OF COMMITTEES, ST. LOUIS, DECEMBER 29, 1926

The first meeting was held in the Auditorium of the Missouri Hotel at 9:15. Professor W. I. Thomas made the report of the American Council of Learned Societies. Professor W. F. Ogburn gave a report as the representative of the Social Science Research Council. Professor F. Stuart Chapin made the annual report for the Committee on Social Abstracts, with the recommendation that there be added to the Committee on Social Abstracts other members to assist in working out a classification of sociological literature. On the motion of Professor Robert E. Park the recommendation was adopted.

Respectfully submitted,

E. W. BURGESS, *Secretary.*

MINUTES OF THE SECOND BUSINESS MEETING FOR REPORTS OF COMMITTEES, ST. LOUIS, DECEMBER 30, 1927

The second business meeting of the Society to hear reports of committees was called to order in the Auditorium of the Missouri Hotel by President Gillin at 9:15 A.M. The report of the Committee on Social Research was made by Professor Gehlke, and ordered filed with the Secretary. Professor Ellwood reported orally as representative of the Society on the Board of Directors for the Council of Social Studies and on the Joint Commission on Social Studies in the schools. He also made a statement of the national social science fraternity, Alpha Phi Zeta Society. Professor Ogburn made the report of the Committee on the Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. Professor Cutler moved that the report be accepted and the committee continued. These reports are printed elsewhere in the *Proceedings.*

Respectfully submitted,

E. W. BURGESS, *Secretary*

MINUTES OF THE ANNUAL BUSINESS MEETING OF THE AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY, DECEMBER 31, 1926

The twenty-first annual business meeting of the Society, held in the Auditorium of the Hotel Missouri, was called to order at 9:10 A.M. by President John L. Gillin. Since the minutes of the last business meeting were printed in the *Proceedings,* their reading was dispensed with. The minutes of the meeting of the Executive Committee were then read by the Society.

A motion was made and carried that the minutes be approved, with the exception of the proposed amendment to Article III of the constitution. The amendment was read by the secretary, and its adoption was moved by Edward Cary Hayes. James E. Cutler moved, as an amendment to the amendment, that the life membership be raised to $100, which carried. The amendment was then adopted, so that Article III now reads:

There shall be four classes of members in the Society: members paying an annual fee of $5.00; subscribing members paying an annual fee of $10.00; contributing members paying an annual fee of $25; and life members, comprising those members who make a single payment of $100.00. Life members shall be exempt from annual dues. Members shall have each year the privilege of designating the class of membership which they choose for that year.

A joint membership may be taken out by husband and wife upon the payment of an annual fee of $6.00. A special rate of annual fees for student membership may be authorized by the Executive Committee.

Each member is entitled to a copy of the current publications of the Society.

The report of the Resolutions Committee (M. C. Elmer, James E. Cutler, and G. P. Wyckoff) was read and approved. It expressed the appreciation of the Society for the co-operation of Washington University, the St. Louis Convention Bureau, the Chamber of Commerce, the St. Louis Sociological Society, the St. Louis Council of Social Agencies, the Missouri League of Women Voters, the Hotel Missouri, the City Club, and the Committee on Local Arrangements. It submitted the following resolution, which was adopted:

During the past year the Society has lost a member to whom we have looked for years as a never failing source of suggestion and guidance—Albion Woodbury Small. His life and his works have so permeated the very foundation of sociology and have so influenced thousands of students throughout the world, that he will continue to live on in their attitudes, ideas, ideals, and practices. He was ever hopeful and confident of a nearer approach to an understanding of social life, and believed firmly that sociology would contribute a definite part to the great work of aiding mankind in learning to live together. He was kind, generous, and considerate of the efforts of other men—never too busy to aid those who came to him for help and guidance, giving the discouraged new impetus to attempt what often seemed impossible. He was an inspiration, a counselor, a guide, and a friend to us all. He always exhibited the most genuine tolerance for the viewpoint and efforts of others, and was always ready to receive criticism and admit the limitations of his own work.

Talks were made from the floor by Edward T. Devine and G. P. Wyckoff. Thomas D. Eliot made a statement favoring the submission of papers to the Secretary one month before the annual meeting. His suggestion that next year the Executive Committee set a date for the receiving of abstracts and consideration of the expense of publishing a manual of abstracts was referred to the Executive Committee.

In presenting the report of the Committee on Nominations, C. C. North, chairman, made a statement of the purpose and policies of the present method of nominating and electing officers. The following were elected to the various offices: president, William I. Thomas; first vice-president, William F. Ogburn; second vice-president, Emory S. Bogardus; members of the executive committee, Mrs. W. F. Dummer and Thomas D. Eliot.

The meeting then adjourned.

Respectfully submitted,

E. W. BURGESS, *Secretary*

CONSTITUTION OF THE AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY

ARTICLE I—NAME

This Society shall be known as the American Sociological Society.

ARTICLE II—OBJECTS

The objects of this Society shall be the encouragement of sociological research and discussion and the promotion of intercourse between persons engaged in the scientific study of society.

ARTICLE III—MEMBERSHIP

There shall be four classes of members in the Society: members paying an annual fee of $5.00; subscribing members paying an annual fee of $10.00; contributing members paying an annual fee of $25; and life members, comprising those members who make a single payment of $100.00. Life members shall be exempt from annual dues. Members shall have each year the privilege of designating the class of membership which they choose for that year.

A joint membership may be taken out by husband and wife upon the payment of an annual fee of $6.00. A special rate of annual fees for student membership may be authorized by the Executive Committee.

Each member is entitled to a copy of the current publications of the Society.

ARTICLE IV—OFFICERS

The officers of this Society shall be a President, two Vice-Presidents, a Secretary, a Treasurer, elected at each annual meeting, and an Executive Committee consisting of the officers above mentioned *ex officio,* past Presidents for five years after the expiration of their term of office (provided that this action shall not remove from the Executive Committee any past President whose term of office expired more than five years before December 31, 1925), and six elected members, whose terms of office shall be three years.

The offices of Secretary and of Treasurer may be filled by the same person.

ARTICLE V—ELECTION OF OFFICERS

All officers except the Secretary-Treasurer shall be elected by a majority vote of the members of the Society present at the annual meeting. The Secretary and Treasurer shall be elected by the Executive Committee.

ARTICLE VI—DUTIES OF OFFICERS

The President of the Society shall preside at all meetings of the Society and of the Executive Committee, and shall perform such other duties as the Executive Committee may assign to him. In his absence his duties shall devolve, successively, upon the Vice-Presidents in the order of their election, upon the Secretary, and upon the Treasurer.

AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY

MEMBERSHIP LIST FOR 1926–27[1]

ABBOTT, EDITH, University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill.
ABBOTT, W. LEWIS, 216 East Espanola St., Colorado Springs, Colo.
ABEL, T. F., 107 Cayuga Heights Road, Ithaca, N.Y.
ADAMS, HAROLD E., 2117 Adelbert Road, Cleveland, Ohio
ADAMS, RALPH S., 432 Perkiomen Ave., Lansdale, Pa.
ADDAMS, JANE, Hull House, 800 S. Halsted St., Chicago, Ill.
AFFELD, EDA E., 873 President St., Brooklyn, N.Y.
AHRENS, ERICH A., 5604 Maryland Ave., Chicago, Ill.
ALBERT, MARY MARGUERITE, 108 Military St., Houlton, Me.
ALBIG, J. W. JR., University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pa.
ALBRIGHT, LEILA R., Lake Erie College, Painesville, Ohio.
ALEXANDER, W. A., Indiana University Library, Bloomington, Ind.
ALEXANDER, W. M., Fayette, Mo.
ALLPORT, FLOYD H., 103 Genesee Park Drive, Syracuse, N.Y.
ALMACK, JOHN C., Box 571, Stanford University, Calif.
AMANN, DOROTHY, Librarian, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, Tex.
ANDERSON, FRANK LEONARD, 64 S. Munn Ave., East Orange, N.J.
ANDERSON, WALFRED A., State College Station, Raleigh, N.C.
ANDREWS, BENJAMIN R., 1 Old Wood Road, Edgewater, N.J.
ANDREWS, JOHN B., American Association of Labor Legislation, 131 E. 23d St., New York, N.Y.
ANDREWS, MARY K., 404 Well St., Greenville, Ill.
ANGELL, ROBERT COOLEY, 2008 Day St., Ann Arbor, Mich.
ANGIER, ROSWELL P., 140 Edgehill Road, New Haven, Conn.
AREINOFF, DAVID, 765 New Jersey Ave., Brooklyn, N.Y.
ARESON, C. W., 130 E. 22d St., New York, N.Y.
ARMSTRONG, ELSIE, 5140 Woodlawn Ave., Chicago, Ill.
ARMSTRONG, SAMUEL TREAT, Hillbourne Farms, Katonah, N.Y.
ARTMAN, J. M., 5732 Harper Ave., Chicago, Ill.
ASH, ISAAC E., Ohio University, Athens, Ohio
ATHEY, MRS. C. N., 100 S. Patterson Park Ave., Baltimore, Md.
AUBREY, EDWIN E., Vassar College, Poughkeepsie, N.Y.
AUMAN, JEAN L., 724 Simpson St., Evanston, Ill.
AUSTIN, CHARLES BURGESS, 112 Cottage Ave., Mount Vernon, N.Y.
AUSTIN, MRS. GERTRUDE B., 112 Cottage Ave., Mount Vernon, N.Y.
BABCOCK, DONALD C., University of New Hampshire, Durham, N.H.
BABER, R. E., 2015 Grand Ave., Nashville, Tenn.
BABSON, ROGER, 5 Babson Park, Wellesley Hills 82, Mass.
BADANES, SAUL, 32 Cameron Ave., Babylon, L.I., N.Y.
BAIN, READ, University of Washington, Seattle, Wash.
BAKER, O. E., 1212 N. 16th St., Abilene, Tex.
BAKER, PAUL, 3029 S. Adams St., Fort Worth, Tex.
BAKKUM, GLENN A., 108 Elston Place, Ithaca, N.Y.
BALCH, WILLIAM M., 610 N. 6th St., Baldwin City, Kan.
BALL, CONSTANCE L., 600 Lexington Ave., New York, N.Y.
BALLARD, LLOYD VERNOR, 917 Park Ave., Beloit, Wis.
BAMFORD, EDWIN F., University of Illinois, Urbana, Ill.
BANE, JULIET LITA, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wis.
BANZET, ERNEST M., Michigan State College, East Lansing, Mich.
BARGER, J. WHEELER, Department of Rural Life, Montana State College, Bozeman, Mont.
BARNES, HARRY E., Smith College, Northampton, Mass.
BARNES, IRENE, Meadville, Mo.
BARNHART, KENNETH E., 1815 South Newstead Ave., St. Louis, Mo.

[1] See last page for supplemental list.

BARRETT, HENRY J., 249 W. 22d St., Erie, Pa.
BARRY, A. G., 1203 W. Dayton St., Madison, Wis.
BARTLETT, HARRIETT M., 985 Memorial Drive, Cambridge, Mass.
BAUGHMAN, GEORGE WILLIAM, 47 West Blvd., Columbia, Mo.
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