

THE NEW ITALY

MURIEL GRINDROD

Price 5s. net

ROYAL INSTITUTE
OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

UNIVERSAL
LIBRARY

OU_152438

UNIVERSAL
LIBRARY

OSMANIA UNIVERSITY LIBRARY

Call No. 329.45/G86 N.

Accession No. 27028

Author Grindrod M.

Title New Staff.

This book should be returned on or before the date last marked below.


THE ROYAL INSTITUTE
OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
London: Chatham House, St James's Square, S.W 1
New York: 542 Fifth Avenue, New York 19

Toronto *Bombay*
Melbourne *Cape Town*
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

THE NEW ITALY

TRANSITION
FROM WAR TO PEACE

Muriel Grindrod



LONDON & NEW YORK
Royal Institute of International
Affairs

The Royal Institute of International Affairs is an unofficial and non-political body, founded in 1920 to encourage and facilitate the scientific study of international questions. The Institute, as such, is precluded by the terms of its Royal Charter from expressing an opinion on any aspect of international affairs. Any opinions expressed in this publication are not, therefore, those of the Institute.

First published 1947

PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN
AT THE BROADWATER PRESS, WELWYN GARDEN CITY
HERTFORDSHIRE

CONTENTS

FOREWORD	vii
I. ITALY IN THE WAR	i
The Fascist War	i
The Fall of Fascism	3
The "45 Days"	5
Neo-Fascism in the North	11
Resistance in the North	16
The Royal Government in Southern Italy	18
The Liberation of Rome	24
The Liberation of North Italy	27
The Italian Contribution to the War Effort against Germany	31
II. POLITICS, ADMINISTRATION, AND GOVERNMENT	34
The Political Parties	34
Local Administration and Elections	42
The Constituent Assembly	44
The Referendum on the Monarchy	47
III. THE ELIMINATION OF THE FASCIST STRUCTURE	50
The Machinery of Epuration	50
Its Application to the Individual	55
IV. ITALY'S ECONOMIC POSITION	58
Some General Considerations	58
How Far Italy can be Self-Supporting	59
The Industrial Situation	66
Foreign Trade	72
The Financial Situation	76
V. THE PEACE TREATY	80
APPENDICES	
I. The Programme Manifesto of the Fascist Re- publican Party	95
II. The Electoral Law of March 1946	99
III. Italian Foreign Trade, 1936-8	102
CHRONOLOGY	104

THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENTS SINCE THE FALL OF FASCISM	112
BIBLIOGRAPHY	113
MAPS	
The Frontier with Yugoslavia	83
The Frontier with Austria	87
Italy 1946	<i>At end</i>
INDEX	115

FOREWORD

THE Italian scene at this turn of the year 1946-7 is an extraordinarily fluctuating one. To try to pin it down on paper, to give it some quality of permanence, may seem a rash and unrewarding enterprise.

1946 has been an eventful year for Italy. It has witnessed the eclipse of the House of Savoy and the inauguration of the Republic. The first free elections for twenty years have been held. The Constituent Assembly has embarked on the formulation of the country's future Constitution. The peace treaty is no longer an uncertain factor. Reconstruction of war damage has made great strides. Foreign trade and industrial recovery have progressed even beyond the optimists' forecasts, only to receive a sudden check through the failure of coal deliveries as a result of the American strike. So the march of events has been rapid, even though to Italians, impatient to have done with preliminaries and to set their new house in order, it has in many respects seemed laggardly.

Nor is the pace likely to slacken in 1947. Even in these first days of the New Year two events have taken place which may have far-reaching effects. In the economic sphere Italians hope for great things from Signor De Gasperi's visit to the United States; while in the sphere of internal politics the split in the Socialist party, while it may eventually lead to a clarification of the political situation, has as its immediate result forced a change of government on the eve of the signature of the peace treaty.

Despite these many changes, however, some of which may prove evanescent, some more deep-rooted, there are reasons, if one views the Italian scene in perspective over the last three and a half years, for attempting at this point to make some sort of summing-up. The end of a chapter has been reached—the long-drawn-out chapter of transition after Fascism and of preliminary essays in democracy; and, also, of emergence from outside tutelage. The peace treaty will be signed, perhaps even ratified, by the time this book is published. After the long period during which uncertainty as to its provisions lay like an incubus over the whole country, Italians at least now know where they stand. Cold comfort, many of them will feel; for it is a stern peace, and

FOREWORD

staunch anti-Fascists must have hoped for terms which gave greater recognition to Italy's implementation of the charge to "work her passage home". With the signing of the peace treaty and the setting up of the Free Territory of Trieste will also come the end of Allied occupation in Italy, forecast in General Morgan's New Year message: "We confidently expect and hope that Italy will be completely evacuated by British and American forces during 1947". On the other hand, the early months of 1947 will also see the end of U.N.R.R.A. aid to Italy, which has done invaluable work in warding off starvation and disease and providing some of the raw materials for the country's initial efforts towards economic reconstruction.

Thus the emergence from outside tutelage cannot be other than a mixed blessing. Italians, for the first time for years, will have their country to themselves. But at this point their own responsibilities begin in real earnest. They are left to fend for themselves, with the prospect of no more material aid from outside beyond what they can earn and pay for themselves, and with the burden of reparations looming ahead for years before Italy can call herself truly independent.

Here the Italians' will to make a success of their new-found liberty, and their capacity for hard work, will in the long run be the final touchstone—that, and their quality of "resilience in spite of disappointment", to which a recent letter in *The Times* bore testimony. That resilience and vitality sometimes expresses itself in violent party wranglings, or in strikes and demonstrations, and this is an aspect with which readers of the press about Italy are perhaps too familiar. Strikes and demonstrations are "news", and so we hear about them; whereas there are no makings of a dramatic article in the day-to-day labours of the Constituent Assembly's Commissions, or in the working out of the legislation on Factory Committees.

Count Sforza, in his book, *Contemporary Italy*, quotes a passage from Machiavelli on this subject: "I maintain that those who blame the quarrels of the Senate and people of Rome condemn that which was the very origin of liberty, and that they were probably more impressed by the cries and noises which these disturbances occasioned in the public places, than by the good effects which they produced . . . And if it be said that these are strange means—to hear constantly the cries of the people furious

FOREWORD

against the Senate, and of a Senate declaiming against the people, to see the populace rush tumultuously through the streets, close their houses, and even leave the city of Rome—I reply that all these things can alarm only those who read of them, and that every free State ought to afford the people the opportunity of giving vent, so to speak, to their ambition.” These words, written more than four hundred years ago, have a pertinent application to-day. Liberty of thought, freedom of speech, have been lost and won in Italy many times since Machiavelli’s day, and now again re-won. It remains for the Italians of to-day to put them to good use.

M.K.G.

London, 20 January, 1947.

Acknowledgment

I should like to thank the friends, both English and Italian, who have helped me with advice and material in the preparation of this book; and especially I want to thank my colleagues in the Information Department of Chatham House, Miss D. P. Etlinger and Miss P. Harvey, for their help with the economic section.

Chapter I

ITALY IN THE WAR

THE FASCIST WAR

ITALY came into the war on 10 June 1940 in fulfilment of her obligations under the Axis Pact of 22 May 1939, after a nine-months' period of so-called non-belligerency. The country entered upon war at the side of Germany ill-equipped, without enthusiasm, and against the advice of many of its responsible leaders, notably Count Ciano and the vast majority of the military and naval chiefs. But the Duce had made up his mind. Italian forces fought in Greece, Libya, and East Africa, and a contingent was sent to the Russian Front. Both in Greece and in Libya the Italians became increasingly subordinate to the German military command, and without German aid disaster would have overtaken the Italian forces much sooner than was actually the case. Vast numbers of Italian troops were taken prisoner in Libya and East Africa. The Italian navy and air force also sustained severe losses in the Mediterranean. On 19 May 1943, immediately after General Messe's surrender in North Africa, Mr Churchill, addressing both Houses of Congress in the United States, declared that:

the African excursion of the two Fascist Dictators has cost their countries in killed or captured 950,000 soldiers. In addition nearly 2,400,000 gross tons of shipping have been sunk and nearly 8,000 aircraft destroyed, both of these figures being exclusive of large numbers of ships and aircraft damaged. There have also been lost by the enemy 6,200 guns, and 2,550 tanks, and 70,000 trucks.¹

Thus, at the time of the Allied landings in Sicily on 10 July 1943, Italian armed forces had met with disaster in every sphere. The military potential of the country was further drained by the need to supply occupation troops in Slovenia, Dalmatia, and Montenegro, where Italy had been in uneasy control since the Axis conquest of Yugoslavia in May 1941, and also to a more limited extent in Greece and France, where Italy supplied troops of occupation under German control. The country's

¹ *The Times*, 20 May 1943.

manpower was further reduced by Germany's increasing demands for Italian workers in the Reich. Civil mobilization had been introduced in February 1942, and by early in 1943 it was estimated that some 400,000 agricultural and industrial workers, including skilled technicians, had been sent to work in Germany. Italy was in no position to resist these German demands, for she was by this time almost entirely dependent on Germany for supplies of raw materials, and especially of coal, wherewith to maintain her industries. These industries in their turn were becoming increasingly dependent on Germany's estimate of Axis war needs, and during 1942 numbers of the smaller Italian factories had been compelled to close down or greatly to reduce their working hours owing to shortage of raw materials, the workers thus released being diverted to Germany.

Financially Italy had been in no state to embark on a long war, upon which she had entered with a considerable budget deficit. By 1943 the country was faced with a fear of inflation which successive much-advertised Treasury Loan issues and restrictions on bond-holding did little to alleviate. Foreign trade was necessarily restricted to Germany and the other European countries under Axis domination.

The food situation was serious, and, by the middle of 1943, coupled with Allied air-raids both on the northern towns and on Southern Italy and Sicily, was at the root of much popular discontent. Autarky in general, and in particular the *battaglia del grano* (battle for wheat), had never been a particularly convincing proposition, even before the war, for a country with Italy's geographical limitations; and, with skilled agricultural workers drafted to Germany and shortage of fertilizers and seeds, the grain position by 1943 was acute. Despite promises of State subsidies and rewards—lavish on paper, but apt to dwindle in practice—farmers failed to turn in their full quotas of grain to the State pools, with the result that rations of bread and *pasta*, the staple diet for Italians, especially in the South, were reduced to a minimum. Moreover, the nominal rations were often not available owing to lack of transport, mismanagement, or graft. Black market activities were widespread, extending from Fascist Party bosses to small shopkeepers and farmers.*

Food distribution had since 1941 been nominally in the hands of the Fascist Party, upon which much of the onus for its failure

naturally fell. This was only one of the causes of the Party's weakness. Party leaders were drawn from the ranks of the place-seeking sycophants who were completely out of touch alike with the Government and with the mass of the people. Four successive new Party Secretaries since 1939, all of them hitherto little-known personages, had failed to imbue the Party with fresh vitality, and discipline within its ranks had gone rapidly downhill—as witness the frequent expulsions for *scarsa fede fascista* (lack of faith in Fascism). Thus by 1943 the Party, far from constituting a link between the Government and the people, had become virtually a deadweight in the bureaucratic machinery.

THE FALL OF FASCISM

Such, in very broad outline, was the state of affairs inside Italy when Mussolini set out on 19 July 1943 for what proved to be his last meeting with Hitler as a free agent. Thereafter he was to become the prisoner, first of the Badoglio regime, and then of the Germans. The meeting took place at Feltre, and its immediate cause was the serious situation of the German forces in Russia, taken in conjunction with the Allied landings in Sicily. Hitler appears to have talked at great length on the need to improve the defences of Italy, and also of Greece, Sardinia, and Corsica, but made no concrete proposals regarding German reinforcements for Italy. The need for such reinforcements had been repeatedly stressed to the Duce by his military advisers, and especially by General Ambrosio, the Italian Chief of General Staff, who was present at the meeting.¹ Mussolini, however, put forward no request for reinforcements, and appears to have said practically nothing at the meeting. On his return to Rome he was faced with the necessity of accounting for this failure to the Fascist Grand Council, the supreme authority of the regime, which had not been summoned since 8 December 1939.

Dissatisfaction with the regime, and in particular with Mussolini's German policy, had not been confined to non-official circles during the war years. Some influential members of the

¹ An interesting account of the Feltre meeting and of the subsequent events leading up to the capture of Mussolini is to be found in *Come firmi l'armistizio*, by General Giuseppe Castellano (1945. Verona: Mondadori). General Castellano was at that time on General Ambrosio's Staff.

Government, notably Count Ciano,¹ the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Count Grandi, Minister for Justice and former Ambassador in London, and Giuseppe Bottai, Minister of Education and one of the best brains in the Fascist Party, had, at any rate in private, made no secret of their dislike of the German alliance and of the disastrous policy of linking Italy's fate with Germany's in a war of which the outcome, whatever it might be, could only bring with it a weakening of Italy's position. The same view was strongly held in certain military circles. Knowledge of this disapproval of his policy, combined with a consciousness that Italy could not now retract from the path he had chosen for her, may well have influenced Mussolini in making sweeping changes in his Cabinet in February 1943. These changes affected all but two Ministers out of the entire Cabinet. The outgoing Ministers, who included Ciano, Grandi, and Bottai, were replaced by little-known personalities whose main recommendation for office was that they had an orthodox Fascist career behind them. Mussolini himself took over the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, while retaining also in his own hands the Presidency of the Council of Ministers and the Ministries of the Interior, War, Navy, and Air.

At the time of the Feltre meeting Mussolini was thus responsible for military decisions, not only as Head of the Government, but also as head of all the Service Ministries. It was on this point that members of the Fascist Grand Council chose to take their stand. At the meeting which took place on 24 July 1943, Mussolini made a report on the situation and Count Grandi then presented a motion signed by 19 out of the 27 members of the Grand Council which declared that the Grand Council, 'after examining the internal situation and the international one, and the political and military conduct of the war, proclaims it the sacred duty of all Italians to defend at all costs the unity, independence, and liberty of the country . . . and declares that, to this end, it is necessary immediately to re-establish all the functions of the State, attributing to the Crown, to the Grand Council, to the Government, to Parliament, to the Corporations all the responsibilities laid down by law, statutes, and the Con-

¹ See the day-to-day diary which Count Ciano kept between 1939 and 1943, perhaps the most valuable and revealing document dealing with this period which has yet appeared—*Diario*, 2 volumes (1946. Milan: Rizzoli Editore); issued in translation as *The Ciano Diaries, 1939-1943* (1946. New York: Doubleday).

stitution; and invites the Head of the Government to beg His Majesty the King . . . to take over the actual command of all armed forces, land, sea, and air, in accordance with article 5 of the Constitution of the Kingdom, and the supreme initiative of decision, which our institutions attribute to him.'¹

In other words, the Italians had had enough of dictatorship. After a stormy discussion lasting into the small hours of Sunday, 25 July, during which amendments were proposed and rejected, Count Grandi's motion was passed by 19 votes to 7. Those voting in its favour numbered all the signatories of the motion and included Count Ciano, Bottai, Bastianini (Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs since the change-over in February), and the two surviving Quadrumvirs of the March on Rome, De Bono and De Vecchi. Those voting against included Carlo Scorza, the then Party Secretary, who had proposed an amendment which was rejected, and Buffarini-Guidi. An amendment proposed by Farinacci was rejected, receiving only one vote.

Mussolini himself does not appear at first to have realized the full purport of this decision. According to his own account,² he sought an audience with the King on the afternoon of 25 July and, at a brief and stormy interview, handed in his resignation, and was amazed to find himself put under protective arrest on leaving the Villa Savoia.³ He was subsequently transferred to Ponza. That same evening the King sent for Marshal Pietro Badoglio, who agreed to form a Government. The Fascist regime was at an end.

THE '45 DAYS'

The period between the downfall of Fascism and the announcement of the armistice (25 July—8 September 1943), which has come to be known as the Badoglio '45 days', must surely be one of the strangest in Italian history. It began with such high hopes of liberation from Fascism, and proved instead to be merely the threshold of a further period of strife and oppression which was to last eighteen months.

¹ *Giornale d'Italia*, 28 July 1943.

² *Storia di un anno* (1944. Verona: Mondadori).

³ This arrest, as was learnt later, was organized and carried out by a group of army officers, working quite independently of the Grand Council group; their plans had been laid some time previously, with the unofficial knowledge of King Victor Emmanuel, who only gave his consent to their being put into effect after the Feltre meeting. See Castellano, *op. cit.*

What exactly did Count Grandi and the other members of the Grand Council who sided with him anticipate for the future of the State when they cast their votes in favour of the end of Mussolini's dictatorship? They no doubt envisaged that they themselves would have to retire from the political scene for the time being. Some of them may have been clear-sighted enough to see that they might be signing their own death-warrants. But two factors that none of them could have foreseen were, first, that within two months Fascism would return in even more tyrannical form; and, secondly, that the war would drag on for nearly two more years. By the time the end came, of the immediate authors of Fascism's fall, one, Count Grandi, was an exile in Portugal; another, Giuseppe Bottai, was in hiding from sentence of life imprisonment; and a third, Count Ciano, had met his death at the hands of a Fascist execution squad.

The end of Fascism was, in fact, only the beginning of the turn of the tide which led to Allied victory in Europe. Herein lies some part of the reason for the chaotic days that followed for Italy. Another part is to be found in the manner of the revolution of 25 July. The immediate authors of that revolution belonged to a world of diplomacy, of political intrigue, of *combinazioni* in high places—a world which was poles apart from the underground anti-Fascists who had been working clandestinely for years to bring about that same revolution, from the factory workers who already in March 1943 had staged open strikes in Turin, or the anti-Fascist intellectuals who had gone into exile or taken no part in Italian life since 'Italy' and 'Fascism' became synonymous. No fusion could have been possible between these contrasted elements.

In the meantime, however, it seemed quite literally as if the Fascist regime had come to an end overnight. Marshal Badoglio announced the composition of his new Cabinet on 26 July—a Cabinet of little-known personalities most of whom had held office under Fascism but had shown no enthusiasm for the regime. The only Ministers retained from the Mussolini Cabinet were General Sorice, the new Minister for War, who had previously been Under-Secretary under Mussolini, and the Minister for War Production, General Favagrossa, who had repeatedly warned the Government about the impossibility of carrying on the war with inadequate supplies. The new Council of

Ministers met on 27 July and passed measures proclaiming martial law and providing for the dissolution of the Fascist Party and the Chamber of Fasci and Corporations, the abolition of the Special Tribunal for the Defence of the State, and the liberation of political prisoners. The daily papers, coming out already on 27 July under pre-Fascist editors, greeted the overthrow of the regime with unqualified rejoicings and gave accounts of popular manifestations of delight throughout the country.

Subsequent legislation in early August provided for the dissolution of all Party organizations, their functions where necessary being taken over by the relevant Ministries. Party funds were blocked, and a commission of inquiry was set up to investigate the illegal enrichment of Fascist officials. In the economic sphere the new Government was especially quick to take action, and showed some foresight in enlisting the help of those anti-Fascist elements which were anxious for much more revolutionary reforms than the Government was yet prepared to envisage. The central Corporative organs were abolished, but the syndical system was retained, and Syndical Confederations were set up covering workers and employers in the various branches of trade, industry, agriculture, and the professions. Among the Commissioners placed at the head of the various Confederations were some of the most important anti-Fascist personalities who had hitherto emerged, including some newly-released political prisoners—men such as Bruno Buozzi, well known before the advent of Fascism as Secretary of the Metal Workers' Union and Socialist Deputy for Turin; Achille Grandi, a former Catholic Deputy and Secretary-General of the Italian Labour Confederation; and Professor Guido De Ruggiero, the well-known philosopher and historian and collaborator with Croce on the *Critica*. Several of these first syndical leaders are still playing an active part in Italian reconstruction, whereas little is now heard of the majority of the members of the first Badoglio Government.

It was from these syndical elements that the first publicly voiced criticism of the new Government's policy came. But throughout August, once the first flush of liberation from Fascism had worn off, popular dissatisfaction and perplexity became increasingly apparent. The crux, of course, lay in the

Government's war policy. Marshal Badoglio had declared that the Fascist regime was at an end, but in the same breath he had added: 'The war must go on'. This, to a population which was heartily sick of being starved, bombed, and press-ganged in pursuit of a war forced upon them by the Fascist Dictator, simply did not make sense.

In announcing measures for the dissolution of the Fascist Party, the Badoglio Government had also issued a measure forbidding the formation of any political parties in Italy until four months after the end of the war. From the first, this measure was virtually a dead letter. Underground anti-Fascist parties had been in active existence in Italy since the beginning of 1943, and had in some instances attained a considerable degree of organization by the time that Fascism fell. For example, the Turin strikes of March 1943, hushed up by the Fascist press at the time but subsequently realized to have been the first signs of an organized popular uprising, were the work of these clandestine elements. By August 1943 there were six definite underground political groups at work: the Liberals, the Christian Democrats, the Labour Democrats, the Action Party, the Socialists, and the Communists—the same six groupings, in fact, which subsequently emerged as the six main political parties which formed the Committee of National Liberation. These groups throughout August jointly and severally issued appeals and manifestos demanding the end of the war and urging strikes in favour of peace. The Italian press, of course, took no official cognizance of these demands, coming as they did from bodies whose existence the Government refused to recognize, but the text of some of the manifestos appeared in the Swiss press,¹ and the fact of their existence was common knowledge.

Marshal Badoglio, in fact, must have been seriously embarrassed by these forthright demands for peace. Whatever may have been the views of the population in general, the Italian military leaders at least realized only too well the danger of publicly denouncing the German alliance before Allied aid was certain. Resistance to the Allies in Sicily came to an end on 17 August, but Sicily was a long way from Rome, and the Allies had not yet even landed on the Italian mainland. Could the

¹ e.g. *Volksrecht* (Zurich), 7 August 1943; *Libera Stampa* (Lugano), 17 August 1943.

Badoglio Government run the risk of a German armed occupation of North Italy with the Allies still so far away? In the event their forebodings turned out to have been only too fully justified.

It is impossible at this short distance of time to assess dispassionately the rights and wrongs of policy during this chaotic period. It is obviously easy to say, as do many anti-Fascists to-day, that Marshal Badoglio should have renounced the German alliance on 25 July; that the anti-Fascist workers would then have taken over the factories; that the King should have rallied the army to fight against the Germans;¹ and that precious weeks were wasted during which the Germans had time to organize their forces so that they could take over command in North Italy at a moment's notice. The dilemma of the Badoglio Government is also obvious, given that no contact had been made with the Allies when Fascism fell. Indeed, Allied propaganda, at this stage, with its attempts to counter Badoglio's "The war must go on" by repeated instructions, plugged from London, Algiers, and Tunis, to Italian military units to lay down their arms and go home, only served to increase the difficulties of the situation a month later, when, at the time of the armistice, Italian units which might have remained in existence to embarrass the Germans and assist an Allied landing near Rome were found to have vanished into air. The really vital factor, which neither Marshal Badoglio nor his critics were in a position fully to assess, lay in the fact that the overthrow of Fascism, coming at that particular moment, took the Allies by surprise, and to utilize it to the full would have involved a complete change in the plan of campaign. And this brings us into the sphere of military speculation which it is no part of this work to attempt.

The fact remains that Marshal Badoglio had already by mid-August set on foot steps towards the conclusion of an armistice with the Allies, while at the same time playing the difficult game of keeping the Germans in the dark as to Italian intentions. During August an envoy of the Italian Government, General Castellano, went to Lisbon and made contact with Allied

¹ Early in July 1943, German forces in Italy were said to be as follows: 4 divisions in Sicily, 2 divisions in Calabria and Apulia, 1 division in Sardinia, 1 brigade in Corsica, and 1 division, not complete, in the Orvieto zone. Between 26 July and 8 August, 8 further German divisions entered Italy from the north (see Castellano, op. cit., pp. 49, 73).

military authorities. General Castellano was only authorized in the first instance to explain the Italian military position, and to state that Italy was prepared to fight the Germans, but could only do so if she were assured of immediate Allied aid in the shape of a landing on the Italian coast north of Rome.¹ The Allied authorities, however, took the view that any discussion of the question presupposed the signature of an armistice with Italy, and General Castellano was therefore presented with the armistice terms for communication to his Government. General Castellano returned to Rome on 27 August, and after some further delays went to Allied Headquarters in Sicily, where on 3 September the armistice was signed by him as Marshal Badoglio's representative.² On the same day Allied forces landed in Calabria.

In the course of the negotiations between General Castellano and the Allied authorities the following points had emerged: (i) the Allies intended to make a preliminary landing in the south of Italy before the conclusion of the armistice was announced; (ii) the broadcast announcement that the armistice had been concluded was to be made some days later by General Eisenhower, and was to be followed immediately by Marshal Badoglio's proclamation of surrender; (iii) the main Allied landing on the Italian coast south of Rome was to take place within some hours of the announcement of the armistice; (iv) simultaneously with the main landing, American parachute divisions were to land at the mouth of the Tiber to help the Italians to defend Rome against the Germans.

In the event, this programme was fulfilled only in part. In the interval between the signature of the armistice and its announcement, news was received from Rome at Allied Headquarters that conditions in that city had in the meantime changed so radically as to make it impossible to carry out the operation involving the American parachute divisions. The armistice was thus announced by General Eisenhower and Marshal Badoglio on 8 September without the possibility of arranging for immediate Allied aid in the defence of Rome. The main Allied landing took place at Salerno on 9 September, but encountered

¹ For General Castellano's own account of his mission see *Come firmai l'armistizio*.

² Text in *Documents relating to the Conditions of an Armistice with Italy, September—November 1943*. Cmd. 6693, 1945. (London: H.M. Stationery Office.)

much greater difficulties than had been anticipated, and by then the situation in Rome had deteriorated beyond recall.

The Italians themselves have not yet unravelled the rights and wrongs of these tragic and chaotic days.¹ The armistice was announced on the evening of 8 September, and the bulk of the Italian fleet at once complied with the order to sail for Malta. It became almost immediately apparent that the Italians would be unable to defend Rome unaided. By 10 September German troops were in virtual occupation of the city, and other German forces were also occupying all the North Italian towns. The King and Marshal Badoglio left Rome for Southern Italy before the Germans came in, and on 11 September the King made a brief broadcast proclamation stating that "For the safety of the capital, so as fully to be able to perform my duties as King, I have moved, with the Government and the high military authorities, to another point of the national territory". On the same day Mussolini was rescued from confinement on the Gran Sasso by German paratroops, and a few days later the Fascist Republican Government was proclaimed. For the next nineteen months Italy was divided into two, the North under the Fascist Republican Government and the South under the Royal Government, with the dividing line creeping gradually north as the Allied line advanced.

NEO-FASCISM IN THE NORTH

For some days after his release Mussolini's whereabouts remained a mystery, but it was later announced that he had been taken to Germany and had visited Hitler.² On 15 September five Party Orders of the Day were issued in Mussolini's name, the first Order proclaiming that he resumed the supreme direction of Fascism in Italy. The Party, henceforward to be known as the Republican Fascist Party, was reinstalled, with Pavolini as Party Secretary, and all Party organizations were reconstituted. All authorities who had been removed by the capitulation of the Government were ordered to resume their posts, and it was further announced that steps would be taken

¹ For some contrasting Italian views on this period see *Roma 1943*, by Paolo Monelli (1945. Rome: Migliaresi); *L'armistizio e la difesa di Roma*, by General Giacomo Carboni (1945. Rome: De Luigi); and Castellano, *op. cit.*

² For Mussolini's own account of his capture, imprisonment, and release, see *Storia di un anno*.

against 'traitors and cowards' who had sided against Fascism during the Badoglio '45 days' and at the time of the capitulation. The Fascist Militia, abolished under Badoglio, was reconstituted as the basis for the Fascist Army. At the same time officers of the Italian armed forces were released from their oath of allegiance to the King. Mussolini and the neo-Fascists had, of course, no legal powers whatever to authorize or compel this release. The setting up of the neo-Fascist Republic constituted in itself an act of high treason against the still existing constitutional Head of the State.

Mussolini's new Fascist Republican Cabinet was announced on 23 September. The Ministers were, as might be expected, Fascists of long standing, among whom the only personalities of any importance were Marshal Graziani (Defence) and Guido Buffarini-Guidi (Interior). Mussolini himself assumed the direction of Foreign Affairs. Heads of provinces (*Capi Provincia*) or Federal Commissioners were appointed to take the place of the former Prefects. Commissioners for the various Fascist Confederations of workers were also appointed.

Formal recruiting for the reorganized Fascist Party was set on foot, emphasis being laid on the need for quality rather than quantity of members. All 'traitors to the Duce and to Fascism' were to be excluded, whatever might have been their merits before 25 July. The Party held its first National Assembly on 14 November at Verona, whither the main body of the Government had been transferred, and issued an 18-point 'Programme Manifesto'¹ which included a declaration of the fall of the monarchy and proclamation of the Social Republic, with Mussolini as its head, and outlined the Party's attitude towards constitutional, administrative, and social reforms. These projected reforms, which held out hopes of a much greater participation of the proletarian elements in the administration both of industrial concerns and of the State as a whole, gave a clear indication that the reorganized Fascist Republic was making a strong bid for the support of the working classes.

Exactly how far Mussolini himself was concerned in the drafting of this document is a doubtful point, for he remained very much in the background during this period. Its leftwards orientation would, however, seem to be in consonance with the

¹ See Appendix I.

Duce's own strongly anti-bourgeois views, as expressed in frequent outbursts against the apathy of the Italian middle classes during the war years. Such an orientation was, moreover, sound sense from the point of view of the promoters of the Italian Social Republic. The aristocracy, always sceptical as to the outcome of war on the side of Germany, would at this juncture be strongly influenced by feelings of loyalty to the monarchy, which the Italian Social Republic expressly disowned. The same was true of military and naval circles. The big industrialists had in the past in varying degrees supported Fascism from motives of self-interest, or because they could not help themselves, but the most optimistic neo-Fascist must in his heart of hearts have felt that no hard-headed industrialist would feel very confident in backing the Fascist State in its German-resuscitated form. Support from the impoverished middle classes, always a rather uncertain quantity even in Fascism's palmiest days, could afford little practical help now, when what was most needed was a strong financial backing plus gangs of Fascist stalwarts. The working classes, on the other hand, could, if disaffected, make the existence of the new Republic immeasurably more difficult in countless ways, especially in the preponderantly industrial North. It was, therefore, obviously to the interest of the Fascists to harness these proletarian forces as far as possible with promises of greater well-being and of a larger share in the running of factories, farms, and State. It is equally obvious that, with the Germans in virtual occupation of the whole territory under neo-Fascist nominal jurisdiction, these promises had from the outset little or no hope of ever being implemented, as their authors must have been among the first to realize.

In the meantime, one of the most urgent steps facing the Italian Social Republic was the reorganization of the army. Italian troops in Yugoslavia, Albania, and Greece at the time of the armistice numbered some 30 divisions, and these were for the most part disarmed by the Germans and dispatched to internment in Germany, though some contrived to escape and carry on guerrilla warfare against the Germans, either on their own or in conjunction with Marshal Tito's partisans. Many of the disarmed troops in North Italy were also sent off to Germany, where they were either used for forced labour or urged to join the German army. Recruiting appeals during the latter part of

September were issued both for the German army and for the Fascist Militia, which, as already stated, was to be the basis for the new Italian Republican Army. As steps towards army reorganization were set on foot, the calling-up of Italian military personnel for the German army was suspended, and in the prevailing state of confusion in North Italy it may be conjectured that the response was in any case very small. At the same time officers, n.c.o.s and men of the former Italian army were still being told in October that they must report to German H.Q., otherwise they would be looked upon as deserters and arrested.

By the end of November 1943 the main lines for the reorganization of the Italian Republican Army were fairly clearly defined. The army was to include volunteers and conscripts between the ages of 17 and 37. Officers must rise from the ranks. Rates of pay were considerably higher than those of corresponding ranks in the Royal Army.

Police reorganization was also set on foot. Two separate bodies were set up—the Republican National Guard (consisting of the Volunteer Militia, the *Carabinieri*, and the Police Corps of Italian Africa), and the Republican Police (which included the Public Safety Administration, the Corps of Police Constables, and the Metropolitan Police). Both were charged with the maintenance of public order and security. The Special Tribunal for the Defence of the State was also revived.

In other departments of life, too, the neo-Fascists aimed at speedily blotting out the work of the Badoglio hiatus and restoring matters to the pre-25 July *status quo*. In the North Italian universities the new Rectors installed under the Badoglio regime were evicted and replaced by Fascist professors. Within a week of the armistice the whole North Italian press had become Fascist once more, though for the most part under new and little-known editors, for most of the well-known journalists of Fascist days, such as Gayda, Ansaldo, and Appellius, disappeared or went underground after 25 July and did not resume work again. An exception was Farinacci, who, after six weeks' silence during the Badoglio period, when he was said to be in Germany, resumed his usual anti-Semitic and anti-Vatican fulminations in *Regime Fascista* as soon as the Fascist Republic came into being.

Anti-Jewish legislation, declared null and void under Badoglio, was revived and enforced with hitherto unknown severity. This aspect of the Fascist doctrine was, even nominally, of recent growth in Italy, for the racial laws only came into force in 1938, and many loopholes had been found to evade their strict observance. Now, however, under German influence the application of the Fascist laws against the Jews was tightened up and extended even to *discriminati*¹, and new decrees were introduced in mid-November providing for the confiscation of all Jewish property, the exclusion of Jews from trades, professions, and the army, and the refusal to allow them to retain Italian passports and Italian citizenship, in accordance with Point vii of the Verona Manifesto which stated that "Members of the Jewish race are all foreigners and for the duration of the war belong to enemy nationality".² A later police order (30 November) decreed that all Jews of any nationality residing in Italy must immediately be sent to concentration camps.

Thus, on paper at least, by the end of 1943 a large part of the machinery of the Fascist State had been reinstalled. In practice, however, German control pervaded everything. Railways and transport came under the German authorities. Factories were entirely dependent on the stocks of raw materials which Germany chose to allocate to them, and, as time went on, more and more small factories were compelled to close down and see their plant transferred to Germany. A vast campaign was also set on foot for recruiting Italian workers for Germany and for the Todt Organization to work on the defences of Italy.

In January 1944 the neo-Fascists staged their one big-scale attempt at a display of power, with the trial at Verona of Count Ciano, Marshal De Bono, and other members of the Fascist Grand Council who had voted against Mussolini on 25 July. Most of the accused were condemned *in absentia*, as they had either escaped abroad, like Count Grandi, or were in hiding. Sentence of death was passed on Count Ciano, on Marshal De Bono (a former *Quadrivir* after the March on Rome), and on three others, and they were shot on 11 January. Mussolini appears to have made no attempt to save his son-in-law, and

¹ The so-called *discriminati* were persons of Jewish origin who technically came under the laws but who, in practice, had hitherto applied for and obtained exemption.

² See Appendix I.

the whole affair seems to have been engineered at German instigation and with a view to providing an example for other possible 'traitors' to Fascism and to the Axis.

With the liberation of Rome in June 1944 the neo-Fascist sphere of influence contracted still further. The Ministries were at first distributed in various northern towns such as Venice, Padua, Verona, and Brescia, but by the end of the year were nearly all concentrated in Milan, which the neo-Fascists came increasingly to regard as the main garrison and centre for their last-ditch resistance. Mussolini himself had his headquarters on Lake Garda, where he lived under the strict supervision of a strong S.S. Guard until February 1945, when he moved to Milan. His public appearances were rare, and the conduct of affairs seems to have passed increasingly—always under German supervision—into the hands of Marshal Graziani as to military matters, and of the more outstanding of the *Capi Provincia* as to civil administration. Indeed, as communications became more difficult, the whole of the North tended to break up into quasi-independent districts each sharply divided from the others, with its own local chiefs and with little knowledge of what was going on elsewhere.

RESISTANCE IN THE NORTH

From the beginning the neo-Fascist Republic encountered resistance which increased in effectiveness as its organization became stabilized. This resistance falls into two parts, military and political, though latterly all armed resistance came under the control of the political organizations.

To take the military resistance first: partisan bands came into being in North Italy almost simultaneously with the inception of the neo-Fascist Republic in the autumn of 1943. They were composed of various elements: anti-Fascists who had emerged after 25 July and who went underground again after 9 September; officers and men of the Royal Army who went into hiding after the armistice and refused to respond to the call-up for the German, and later for the Fascist Republican, armed forces; and young men who wished to evade the call-up for the Fascist Republican Army or for forced labour in Germany. These bands, whose activities were at first purely local and sporadic, gradually attained a considerable degree of organiza-

tion under Italian army officers or civilian leaders, and by mid-1944 were operating throughout North Italy from the Val d'Aosta to the Slovene borders. Liaison was developed with Allied Force Headquarters, and Allied officers and arms were dropped by parachute to aid them. They were also joined by numbers of Allied prisoners of war. Some of the partisan brigades retained their purely military and non-political character, as, for instance, the Osoppo Division which operated in the north-east. Many, however, gradually acquired a political complexion, and among these the Communist Garibaldi Brigades predominated, especially in the north-east where they worked in close association with Marshal Tito's partisan forces. Of the other political brigades the most important were the *Giustizia e Libertà* groups organized by the Action Party.

Organized political resistance took somewhat longer to develop, but during 1944 local Committees of National Liberation (C.N.L.s) grew up in the North Italian towns and provinces, consisting of representatives of five of the six main political parties which formed the Committees of Liberation in the South.¹ These local Committees latterly all came under a central Committee, the *Comitato della Liberazione Nazionale per l'Alta Italia* (C.L.N.A.I.), or Committee of National Liberation for North Italy, which was in touch with Allied Force Headquarters and controlled both political and military resistance. The various political parties and groups also brought out clandestine newspapers, many of which continued as regular dailies or weeklies after liberation.

The Church also played a definite part in resistance, more especially through the efforts of the many parish priests who aided the partisans with food, money, or shelter, and who in some instances paid for it with their lives. Many anti-Fascist leaders who are now taking a prominent place in Italian political life received shelter during the neo-Fascist period in the Vatican or in seminaries or convents in Rome and elsewhere. This hospitality was extended to refugees of all political complexions, including such men as the Communist Giovanni Roveda and the Socialist Nenni.

The neo-Fascists adopted every method from cajolery to

¹ See p. 22. The Labour Democrats were not represented on the Northern Committees of Liberation.

brutality in their efforts to undermine resistance. Decrees were issued promising an amnesty to all partisans who surrendered, or, alternatively, threatening the sternest reprisals against any who failed to do so, or who were found aiding and abetting resisters or Allied prisoners of war. These threats on the whole had little effect. Some few partisans presented themselves at Fascist Headquarters, driven thereto, especially during the winter months, by exposure to the cold and by food shortage, or by fear of reprisal against their relatives, and neo-Fascist propaganda naturally made the most of their numbers. But even in these cases it often happened that the apparently repentant partisan, having secured arms and equipment, managed to escape again. Fascist brutalities against partisans and resisters in general intensified as time went on and as the neo-Fascist position became increasingly unstable. The system of mass extermination of hostages in reprisal for some act of sabotage became more and more frequent. The outstanding examples of this were the Fosse Ardeatine murders¹ of 23 March 1944, when 320 hostages were machine-gunned in reprisal for the killing of 32 Germans in the Via Rasella in Rome, and the shooting of hostages in the Piazzale Loreto in Milan.

Despite all these neo-Fascist attempts at repression, the resistance movement grew in strength and organization throughout 1944, and when the Allied armies reached North Italy in the spring of 1945 many North Italian towns were liberated by the anti-Fascists themselves, whose Committees of Liberation took over control until the Allies came in. Partisan casualties between 9 September 1943 and the end of the war have been estimated at 27,000 dead and 17,000 wounded in combat, together with 19,204 killed in reprisals.²

THE ROYAL GOVERNMENT IN SOUTHERN ITALY

Meanwhile the King and Marshal Badoglio were pursuing their difficult course in Southern Italy. By the end of September 1943 they were established in Brindisi, where they had been joined by Crown Prince Umberto and the service chiefs who had held office in the original Badoglio Government. On 29

¹ So called because the executions took place in these underground passages near the catacombs outside Rome.

² Ministero dell'Esercito: *The Italian Contribution to the War of Liberation against Germany* (1946. Rome).

September Marshal Badoglio met General Eisenhower and other Allied leaders, both military and political, on board the battleship *Nelson* at Malta and there signed the full armistice terms.¹ On the following day he announced the formation of a small preliminary Cabinet, consisting of himself as Head of the Government, and the four service chiefs of his previous Government. The King, broadcasting over Radio Bari on 2 October, the day, incidentally, after the Allied forces entered Naples, promised a broadening of the Government in the near future and urged all Italians to unite to drive out 'the age-old enemy'. Mr Churchill, speaking in the House of Commons on 21 September, had welcomed the downfall of the Fascist regime and the end of Italian armed opposition, and had held out hopes that the Italian people 'would be enabled in due course to regain their rightful place among the free democracies' and to 'work their passage home'.

Thus the stage was set for a change in Italy's status from enemy to that of co-belligerent. This step followed on 13 October, when the Italian Government declared war on Germany. Seen in retrospect, the ensuing months of this winter and spring of 1943-44, down to the liberation of Rome on 4 June 1944, mark a curious period of pause and disillusionment. The Italians were ready and eager for great events in the shape of a rapid advance of the Allies towards Rome and the formation of a strong Government which should quickly purge the country of anti-Fascist elements and miraculously restore peace and prosperity. Instead, everything hung fire. In the sphere of military operations, there was no lightning drive to the north, but merely the long, slow business of fighting mile by mile up the centre of the peninsula, punctuated by the unsuccessful Allied landing at Anzio on 22 January 1944, the long-drawn-out battering of Monte Cassino, and Allied air-raids on Italian ports and industrial centres. In the domestic sphere, the much-hoped-for strong Government resolved itself in the first instance into a Cabinet of technician Under-Secretaries formed by Marshal Badoglio on 16 November 1943, and reconstituted on 17 February 1944 with little change beyond the raising of these Under-Secretaries to the rank of Ministers. The Government's sphere of jurisdiction was at first limited to the four provinces of

¹ Text in Cmd. 6693, 1945.

southern Apulia, as the rest of Southern Italy on liberation came, in the first instance, under the control of Allied Military Government and subsequently of the Allied Control Commission which was set up on 10 November 1943, and was only later transferred to the control of the Italian Government.¹

The first Italian Governments after liberation were obviously called upon to work in circumstances of the very greatest difficulty, in a country fresh from the ravages of war, which must, moreover, have in many ways appeared to have escaped from the control of one 'ally' only to fall under that of another. It does, however, seem true to say that from the outset the Badoglio Governments appeared paralysed by the magnitude of their task and made only very slow progress in these early months. Some sort of a beginning was made with a purge of Fascist elements from within the framework of the State, and with measures of economic reform. But the Government soon incurred severe criticism from the more active anti-Fascist elements on the ground of its dilatory ineffectiveness, and also because of its close association with the monarchy.

This question of the monarchy, or the 'institutional question', as it came to be called, was in fact the burning topic which dominated the political scene during these early months of liberation, and which, though officially shelved after the King's withdrawal from public life in April 1944, continued to run as an underground thread through Italian politics until its settlement by the referendum of June 1946. From the first there was a strong feeling among the more active anti-Fascist elements that the King had compromised too far with Fascism for any Italian Government associated with him to have any possibility of success in a democratic sense, and the convinced holders of this view already favoured a republic. On the other hand certain elements, drawn notably from naval and military circles, who were in any case bound by their oath of allegiance to the King, and also from among the big landowners of the South, clung to the view that the monarchy represented the main force of continuity as well as of law and order in the country. This view also obtained some support from Liberal and Catholic opinion.

¹ The territory south of the northern boundaries of Salerno, Potenza, and Bari provinces, together with Sicily and Sardinia, were transferred to the control of the Italian Government on 11 February 1944.

ITALY IN THE WAR

Between these two opposing standpoints came the less extreme elements on either side who were willing to compromise on some such lines as those suggested, for example, by Croce, who proposed the retention of the monarchical principle, but with the abdication of the King, the renunciation of his rights by the Crown Prince, and a Regency for the six-year-old Prince of Naples. And, of course, for the vast majority of the people in this poor Southern region, politics and forms of government were only very minor considerations, for their main preoccupation was food and shelter.

Criticism of the Government came mainly, as has been said, from the more active anti-Fascist elements. Political opinion in the South soon developed and crystallized on party lines, and during October 1943 C.N.L.s were set up in Naples, Bari, and other towns, composed in each case of one representative from each of the six parties which had emerged during the Badoglio '45 days'. The most responsible leaders of these parties were, however, in many instances still in Rome or in North Italy, and consequently leadership in the South frequently fell into the hands of extremely vocal but not particularly solid personages. It has indeed been one of the great misfortunes of Italian political development since the liberation that that liberation began from the South, where the population is far less politically-minded and has produced far fewer responsible leaders than has been the case in the North. Two unfortunate results may be directly attributable to this fact and to the delay imposed by the long-drawn-out campaign up the Italian peninsula. First, the Allies inevitably derived some of their impressions regarding Italy's political capacity and orientation from the Southern region in which the Control Commission found itself compelled to function during these months of pause. The atmosphere of petty squabbles and intrigue, accentuated by the pullulating press which sprang up in every small town, contributed to give an impression of extreme political inexperience, to say the least; and the consequent tendency in some Allied circles to view the monarchy as an element of stability, and to believe that this attitude towards the monarchy was also widely held among the Italian people, resulted in assumptions which have had to be considerably modified in the light of subsequent experience. Secondly, the cleavage between North and South,

which had always existed in Italy owing to regional differences of character and of history, was strongly accentuated during this prolonged period of gradual liberation when the two regions were physically separated by the barrier of the fighting lines and were suffering widely different fates. The after-effects of this situation may still be seen in the resentment felt in the North both on the subject of the precious time wasted during the early period of liberation and potential reconstruction and also as regards Allied misunderstandings of the political situation, which Northerners attribute, at any rate in part, to the misleading impressions which the Allies derived from the South.

The six political parties which formed the C.N.L.s were, going from right to left, the Liberals, the Labour Democrats, the Christian Democrats, the Action Party, the Socialists, and the Communists.¹ On the monarchical issue the Liberals, Labour Democrats, and Christian Democrats were, in varying degrees, divided, while the Communists, Socialists, and Action Party have throughout favoured a republic, though the Communists were at first cautious in giving specific expression to this allegiance. These six parties organized a joint Congress of representatives which took place at Bari on 28 and 29 January 1944, and was attended by 160 representatives from the 15 provinces of Southern Italy then liberated and by some delegates from the North. At this Congress, which was described at the time as 'the first free political meeting in Italy for 20 years', the parties voiced their criticism of the existing regime in an Order of the Day agreed to by all six, which stated that, in the view of the Congress, 'the moral and material reconstruction of Italy presupposes the immediate abdication of the King',² and demanded the formation of a Government representing all six of the parties which should pave the way for a Constituent Assembly to be convened as soon as hostilities should end. A permanent executive *Giunta* was also set up, consisting of one representative from each party. Perhaps the most important measure taken at the Bari Congress, however, was the formation of the Italian Labour Confederation, the *Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro* (C.G.I.L.), in which industrial and agricultural, Communist and Catholic workers united under the combined

¹ For the present position and aims of these parties see pp. 34 ff.

² *Gli Atti del Congresso di Bari* (1944. Bari), pp. 56-7.

auspices of the Communist, Socialist, and Christian Democrat parties.

In February the Government moved to Salerno when that region came under the control of the Allied Military Government. Marshal Badoglio had from the outset made it clear that he considered his mandate should cease when Rome was reached and new leaders became available, but it became increasingly apparent that something must be done to broaden the basis of the existing Government, and to secure the co-operation of the six parties in it, without waiting till then. Negotiations towards this end, based on proposals that the King should abdicate in favour of the Crown Prince, had been going on for some time through the offices of the well-known Neapolitan lawyer Enrico De Nicola (now President of Italy) and of Croce. The Liberals and Christian Democrats had agreed to co-operate in a Badoglio Government on this basis, but the left-wing parties had hitherto remained intransigent. Early in April 1944, however, the Italian Communist leader Palmiro Togliatti returned to Italy from Russia, where he had been in exile since 1926 and had played a prominent part in the organization of the Comintern, having been a member of its Presidium until its dissolution. As a result of his estimate of the situation, Togliatti decided that the Communists must take part in the Government. He therefore brought about a complete reversal in the policy of the Communist party, which almost overnight agreed to join a Badoglio Government (which implied taking the oath to the monarchy) and withhold further attacks on monarchy and Government for the time being. The Socialists and Action Party, finding themselves isolated, also agreed to co-operate.

The way was thus now open for the formation of a six-party Government on a basis of the proposal that the King should withdraw from public life, and that his place should be taken by Crown Prince Umberto, who should be given the title of Lieutenant General. The King publicly announced his agreement with this proposal on 12 April, stating that the decision was to come into effect on the day the Allies entered Rome. In view of this decision, and of reiterated previous announcements from both Crown and Government to the effect that the Italian people should be free, at the close of hostilities, to choose their own form of government, the executive *Giunta* agreed that

THE NEW ITALY

nothing now stood in the way of the formation of a six-party Government. Marshal Badoglio therefore offered his resignation to the King on 17 April and was invited to form a new Government. In this Government, as announced on 21 April, the five most prominent political leaders then available, including Croce, Count Sforza (who had arrived in Italy in the previous October), and Togliatti, were given the position of Ministers without Portfolio, and other portfolios were evenly distributed among the six parties.

THE LIBERATION OF ROME

Yet another reorganization of the Government became necessary with the liberation of Rome, which took place on 4 June. The Badoglio Cabinet, in accordance with the Marshal's promise, resigned on the 6th, and in view of the objections raised by the majority of the Rome leaders to serving under Marshal Badoglio, the Crown Prince, to whom, pursuant to the King's promise of April, all royal powers had been transferred by decree on 5 June, called upon Ivanoe Bonomi, the 71-year-old President of the Rome C.N.L.,¹ to form a Government. Signor Bonomi's new Cabinet included such figures as Togliatti and Count Sforza from the previous Government, together with leaders such as Alcide De Gasperi (Christian Democrat), Count Carandini (Liberal), and Meuccio Ruini (Labour Democrat), who had been prominent during the resistance period in Rome. In view of the peculiar position of the monarchy there was some argument as to the form which the ministerial oath should take. Finally, when the Lieutenant General, Prince Umberto, received Bonomi and his Ministers on 22 June they took the oath, not to the Crown, but in the following formula: 'We swear on our honour to exercise our functions in the supreme interest of the nation, and to refrain, until the convocation of the Constituent Assembly, from any actions which may prejudice the solution of the institutional question'. The question of monarchy versus republic was thus nominally shelved until the whole country could be consulted, which meant, as it proved in the event, for the next two years.

This question of consulting the country proved one of the

¹ After liberation the Rome C.N.L. became the Central Committee, while regional C.N.L.s continued to function everywhere else.

main topics of party controversy during the coming months, and, together with disagreements on the vexed question of epuration, eventually led to the downfall of the Bonomi Government in December. The six parties of the C.N.L. which formed the Government were united in their desire to prosecute the war to an end, to purge the State of Fascist influences, and to proceed as quickly as possible to the economic and political reconstruction of the country. On the first of these desiderata there was little room for disagreement; but it was soon found that each party approached the questions of epuration and reconstruction from a different angle. With North Italy still in neo-Fascist hands, it was plainly inadvisable to attempt elections for a Constituent Assembly at this provisional stage. This did not, however, prevent heated arguments on the methods to be adopted when elections should come to be held, and, in particular, on the subject of whether the elections for the Constituent Assembly should precede or follow the local administrative elections.

In the absence of a Constituent Assembly, the parties of the C.N.L., and especially the left-wing parties, held the view that the C.N.L.s, both central and regional, should become recognized as an instrument of government, as being the nearest expression yet available of the will of the people, and should, for instance, make all local appointments. They pointed to the example of Florence, liberated in August 1944, where the local C.N.L. took over the city and ran everything during the interim period between the eviction of the Germans and the taking over of control by the Allies, and were prepared to continue in authority afterwards. This standpoint was strongly contested by the parties outside the C.N.L., notably the near-monarchist Partito Democratico Italiano on the one hand, and the Republicans on the other, who held the view that the C.N.L.s, being nominated by the various parties and not elected, had been arbitrarily appointed and could in no sense be regarded as representative of the people as a whole.

In the meantime the six parties of the C.N.L. presented a not particular edifying spectacle of jockeying for position, which may well have contributed to the doubts felt by outside observers as to their capacity for assuming political authority. The Communist, Socialist, and Christian Democrat parties, which had

emerged as the three 'mass' parties with the largest popular following, had, since the Bari Congress in January, co-operated in the economic sphere in the C.G.I.L.¹ The Communists now attempted to extend this co-operation to the political sphere, with overtures of fusion towards the Socialists and of closer collaboration towards the Christian Democrats. The Socialists, while agreeing in August to an alliance with the Communists,² steered clear of all attempts to turn that alliance into anything closer, and insisted on retaining their own individuality. The Christian Democrats, who viewed with some suspicion the Communist professions of sympathy on the religious ground, refused to commit themselves on the subject of the monarchy, and, while rejecting the Communist overtures, in general contrived to steer a middle course between left and right. The Action Party, though consistently republican throughout, already gave signs of that divergence of views within itself which resulted in a split later on, and while its right wing favoured a concentration of all the democratic forces, both left and right, its left wing feared association with any of the more conservative elements. In all this party inter-play the Liberals, though holding views similar to those of the Christian Democrats in some respects, were on the whole left rather apart, though they strongly resisted the tendency of the left-wing parties to force them into a more 'conservative' position than they (or at any rate their more progressive and republican wing) wished to adopt.

The first Bonomi Government fell in November 1944, nominally because of general dissatisfaction with its epuration methods and its alleged dilatoriness as regards reconstruction, actually because party disagreements, especially on the subject of the powers of the C.N.L.s, had made it unworkable. After three weeks of discussion and the suggestion of several other names as Prime Minister, Signor Bonomi eventually agreed to form another Cabinet, in which, however, the Socialists and Action Party refused to collaborate. The Cabinet as announced on 10 December 1944 therefore consisted of the four remaining parties—Liberals, Labour Democrats, Christian Democrats, and Communists—with the portfolios evenly divided between them.

¹ See page 22.

² See page 35.

This second Bonomi Government remained in uneasy control from December 1944 till the liberation of North Italy in May 1945 necessitated yet another change. During this period a further step was taken towards the rehabilitation of Italy's international status. On 24 February Mr Harold Macmillan, then High Commissioner on the Advisory Council for Italy, announced that Italy was henceforth to have much greater freedom of action in both foreign and internal affairs.¹ The Italian Government was to be free to deal direct with other Governments (i.e. not through the medium of the Allied Commission), to accredit and receive ambassadors or representatives to and from Allied and neutral countries, and, subject to restrictions imposed by the prosecution of the war, to resume trade relations with other countries. Government appointments, other than service appointments, in the zone south of the army control line were no longer to be subject to the approval of the Allied Commission. A general reduction of the powers and personnel of the Allied Commission was envisaged.

THE LIBERATION OF NORTH ITALY

The major offensive of the Fifth and Eighth Armies which was to bring with it the end of the campaign in North Italy began in mid-April 1945. Bologna, south of which the line had remained stationary for months, fell on 21 April, and on the same day strikes began in Milan and continued till the 25th, when partisans attacked and took over the town. Between the 25th and 27th partisans freed many other towns of North Italy, including Genoa and Turin, and in each town the local C.N.L. took over control. Mussolini and his mistress, Claretta Petacci, were arrested by patriots near Como on the 27th and summarily executed on the 28th. Their bodies were taken to Milan and exposed in the Piazzale Loreto, the scene of one of the neo-Fascist mass executions of hostages. A similar fate also befell some of the other neo-Fascist hierarchs; Pavolini, Starace, and Farinacci were executed by patriots, while Buffarini-Guidi was captured while making the last of many abortive attempts to escape to Switzerland and, after some months in prison, was sentenced to death on a charge of collaboration with the Germans and executed in July 1945. Marshal Graziani was arrested by

¹ Text in Cmd. 6693, 1945.

frontier guards at Como and handed over to the Allies, and at the time of writing still awaits trial.

It had been agreed between the Allied authorities and the C.L.N.A.I. in the previous December that, if liberation was first effected by the patriots, the C.L.N.A.I. would take over control during the interim period until the Allies arrived. This arrangement was put into effect, and in the event the period of C.L.N.A.I. control lasted throughout May, until Allied Military Government formally took over the Lombard provinces on 1 June. Thus during the first days of liberation it was the C.L.N.A.I. who issued proclamations regarding the maintenance of order, the surrender of arms, the abolition of certain articles of Fascist legislation, and so on, and who appointed Prefects, mayors, and other local officials.

Communications between North and South were difficult throughout May, partly because of lack of transport, partly because the Allied authorities instituted a *cordon sanitaire* between the two regions, limiting communications to official and military contacts. In view of the need to decide on the future of the Italian Government, however, arrangements were made for meetings between the members of the Government and C.L.N.A.I. leaders, and on 5 May C.L.N.A.I. leaders flew to Rome for discussions. They came away confirmed in their view that Rome had only limited understanding of their problems and that something much stronger than the Bonomi Government must be set up. Negotiations continued on 16 May, when a number of Ministers and party leaders from Rome flew to Milan. The C.L.N.A.I. then put forward strong demands that it should be adequately represented in the new Government, which, in its view, should be chosen by the central C.N.L., as the organ most nearly corresponding to Parliament. An agreement was reached on 25 May to the effect that a new Government should be formed at once, and that elections for a Constituent Assembly should take place as soon as possible; in the meantime, the national *Consulta*,¹ which had been agreed to in principle in the previous March, should be convened; electoral administrative committees should be set up in communes and provinces; and the C.N.L.s should act as advisory bodies for the local authorities.

It was on this last point—the advisory functions of the

¹ See pp. 30, 45.

C.N.L.s—that dissension centred after the Ministers returned to Rome. The Communists, Socialists, and Action Party all supported the thesis that the C.N.L.s should retain, at the very least, local advisory powers—those parties would, in fact, have preferred to see much wider powers, including legislative, executive, and judiciary functions, left in the hands of the C.N.L.s. The Liberals, on the other hand, supported by the Christian Democrats and Labour Democrats, were strongly opposed to the continued recognition of even the local advisory powers of the C.N.L.s, for they considered that this would be tantamount to agreeing to a perpetuation of these resistance committees as institutional local organs of administration. In their view, the C.N.L.s should henceforth confine themselves to the purely political sphere and should serve mainly as a focal point for consultations between the political parties.

This long-drawn-out dispute as to the powers of the C.N.L.s may seem in retrospect disproportionate. But it must be remembered that in the North the C.N.L.s had for eighteen months, during the whole neo-Fascist period, organized active resistance, and had attained a very high degree of organization, in some regions becoming virtually a state within a state. In the South, on the other hand, the central C.N.L., which had been extremely active in Rome up to the liberation, found less and less need to exercise any functions beyond those of criticism as the Government took the conduct of affairs into its own hands. The North, moreover, felt that it had had little reason to believe in the capabilities of any Government hitherto formed, and was sceptical of the effectiveness of any such Government unless strongly supported by the C.N.L.s. Hence the divergence of views.

Agreement was eventually reached between the six parties on 2 June, on the basis that the provincial and communal C.N.L.s should continue for the time being to exercise local consultative functions, but only until the normal organs of local administration should be set up by democratic elections; otherwise, C.N.L.s must confine themselves to purely political activities. This decision coincided with the end of C.L.N.A.I. authority in the North on 1 June 1945, when A.M.G. took over control of the Lombard provinces.

After some further discussion between the parties, each of which put forward a candidate for the premiership, the name of

the Northern leader Ferruccio Parri was proposed by the C.L.N.A.I. representatives and met with general approval, and he was asked to come to Rome. Parri, who belonged to the Action Party, had been consistently anti-Fascist throughout, and had served terms of imprisonment under Fascism. During the resistance period he was a prominent leader both in the Action Party and as Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Freedom Volunteer Corps of partisans. On 17 June Prince Umberto asked him to form a Government, and, after discussions with the C.N.L. and various party leaders, he agreed. His Cabinet included the Socialist leader Pietro Nenni and Manlio Brosio (Liberal) as Vice-Premiers, with Togliatti as Minister of Justice. Parri retained the Ministry of the Interior in his own hands.

The Parri Government lasted five-and-a-half months, through a period fraught with many difficulties—the slow process of linking up between North and South,¹ sporadic manifestations of local unrest (including some agitation for Sicilian autonomy which resulted in the arrest of Sicilian Separatist leaders), supply and reconstruction problems, and the pervading question of Trieste and Venezia Giulia, whose fate was discussed inconclusively at the London Council of Foreign Ministers in September 1945. Parri himself, though an ardent patriot actuated by the highest motives, appears to have been too little accustomed to the arduous business of administration to keep his difficult six-party team in order and get things done. Nevertheless, some progress was made. The national *Consulta* met on 25 September 1945 and following days and thoroughly discussed several questions of government policy. A beginning was made with the preparation of the electoral law for the Constituent Assembly, and also of the electoral lists. A decree was passed in September granting autonomy to the Val d'Aosta. Over-all plans for reconstruction were set on foot.²

The breakdown of the Parri Government came in late November, as the result of agitation on the part of the Liberals, and especially of their right wing, who had for some time adopted a critical attitude, and who finally came out with demands for a broadening of the Government by the inclusion of

¹ The provinces of Lombardy, Veneto, Piedmont, and Liguria were restored to the control of the Italian Government on 15 September 1945.

² See page 58.

some of the older statesmen such as Orlando or Nitti. The Liberals also took exception to the Government's action in enforcing a new law on epuration without first bringing it before the *Consulta*. In both these specific points, as well as in their general criticism of the Government, the clash between the traditionalist outlook of the Liberals and the more opportunist, if less slow-moving, methods of the left-wing parties was clearly discernible. The Liberal members in the Government resigned, and after an attempt to patch things up Signor Parri himself tendered his resignation to Prince Umberto on 24 November. After a week of discussions, the six parties agreed on the name of Alcide De Gasperi, Foreign Minister in the out-going Cabinet and leader of the Christian Democrat party, as their candidate for the premiership. Yet another period of delay followed while Signor De Gasperi struggled to obtain agreement among the parties as to the allocation of ministerial posts, but on 9 December he succeeded in forming a Cabinet. All six parties were represented, and in fact the De Gasperi Cabinet differed very little in personnel from its predecessor, except for the transfer of the Ministry of the Interior (previously held by Parri himself), to a Socialist, Romita, and the surrender by the Liberals of the vice-premiership held by Brosio in the Parri Government. Signor De Gasperi retained the post of Foreign Minister.

THE ITALIAN CONTRIBUTION TO THE WAR EFFORT AGAINST GERMANY

Following on the armistice of 8 September 1943, and the Italian declaration of war against Germany a month later, Italy took her place as a co-belligerent beside the Allies. The part played by partisan resistance in the North has already been dealt with.¹ The contribution of the Italian Government in co-operation with the Allied forces falls into two parts, that of the armed forces, and the economic aspect.²

The bulk of the Italian fleet left La Spezia and sailed for Malta as soon as the armistice was announced. From then until the end of the war Italian ships, both of the navy and of the mercantile marine, were on active service in the Mediterranean.

¹ See pp. 16-18.

² Facts and figures in this section are taken from *The Italian Contribution to the War of Liberation against Germany*. See also *Italy Works her Passage*, edited by G. Valentine Selsey (1945. London: British-Italian Society).

During that period the Italian navy escorted 1,621 convoys and was engaged in special missions, reconnaissance sorties, and anti-submarine operations. Its losses totalled 135,443 gross tons, while those of the mercantile marine amounted to 836,139 gross tons. Naval bases such as Taranto and Brindisi fell intact into the hands of the Allies, and their naval personnel and technical staff put themselves at the disposal of the Allied navies. Repairs to Allied ships were carried out in Southern Italian ports.

The military contribution took longer to become effective owing to immense difficulties of reorganization and re-equipment. In the early days the Italian Government in Southern Italy could raise arms and clothing sufficient to equip only a very small, select fighting force, but by October 1943 a small motorized group had been formed, which first went into action at Monte Lungo in December 1943. This group became the nucleus of the Italian Corps of Liberation, consisting of soldiers from the Alpini, the Bersaglieri, the Artillery Corps, and most of the other services, which in mid-1944 took part in the operations which led to the liberation of Central Italy. This Corps was disbanded in October 1944 and instead six combatant groups were set up, each comprising 9,000 men, who, in conjunction with the partisans, contributed to the total liberation of North Italy. Italian army casualties during this whole period numbered 15,068 dead, 11,705 wounded, and 19,203 missing.

The Italian air force had sustained severe losses during the closing stages of the African and Sicilian campaigns, so that, by the time the armistice came, only a limited number of planes was available to join the Allies. These included, however, not only about 100 planes at the flight units in Apulia and Sardinia, but also some 200 more which succeeded in escaping from Central and North Italian airfields and passing the fighting lines. With these Italian planes, many of them badly in need of repair as time went on, the Italian air force took part in operations till September 1944, after which it began to be supplied with planes by the Allies.

On the economic side the Italian contribution took the form of supplies, financial contributions corresponding to the issue of Am-lire,¹ sums placed at the disposal of the Allied authorities,

¹ i.e. Allied military currency for occupation expenses.

requisitions, industrial and agricultural contributions, and transport. The progress of the war after the armistice necessitated the use by the Allies of Southern, and later of Central, Italy as a base for operations, not only for the Italian theatre of war, but also for the Balkans and the whole of the Mediterranean theatre. Thus the financial burden on Italy assumed much greater proportions than those of normal 'occupational expenses', and the Italians consider that some part of this financial contribution should be taken into consideration as offsetting, at least in part, the amount due from them in reparations. It is extremely difficult to form an accurate estimate of the amount of the financial burden thus entailed, involving as it does the whole series of extremely complicated economic and financial arrangements made between Italy and the Allies during the war, which still await settlement. For the purpose of presenting their case to the Peace Conference, however, the Italians have attempted some such estimate, and have put their financial contribution at a round figure of 391,700 million lire,¹ in which the largest separate items are the issue of Am-lire and the requisitioning of public and private buildings.

¹ From this total should be deducted the amount credited by the American Treasury to the Italian Treasury in respect of some part (roughly a third) of the Am-lire issued for pay of American troops in Italy. This sum amounts to 157 million dollars, or some 35,325 million lire.

Chapter II

POLITICS, ADMINISTRATION, AND GOVERNMENT

THE POLITICAL PARTIES

LIBERATION brought with it a fever of political activity which expressed itself in the formation of a great number of political parties or groupings, some of them of purely local significance, each, as far as paper restrictions permitted, running a weekly or daily paper of its own in each locality. Many of these small groups faded out after a brief existence, and by the time the administrative and general elections came to be held, in the spring and summer of 1946, the main party lines were fairly clearly defined—though, as an example of the persistence of the small-party mentality, it may be mentioned that in the elections for the Constituent Assembly voters in Rome and in Naples were faced with 27 parties from which to choose. Many of these parties had, however, from the outset small chance of polling sufficient votes to obtain representation, and, as the event proved, in both the administrative and the general elections the vast majority of citizens chose to cast their votes for one of the main parties rather than squander them on one of the small groups. Reasons of space preclude any attempt to cover the whole range of the party programmes, and here only those of the main parties can be summarized.

To take first the six parties which formed the C.N.L.s between late in 1943 and the middle of 1946, when with the formation of the Constituent Assembly the *raison d'être* of the C.N.L.s came to an end. Of these six parties, the three 'mass' or popular parties, the Communists, Socialists, and Christian Democrats, which since January 1944 had collaborated in the C.G.I.L.,¹ maintained their several entities unchanged throughout, whereas the other three, the Liberals, the Labour Democrats, and the Action Party, either because of internal divisions or combination with other groups for election purposes, underwent considerable fluctuations.

(i) *The Communists*

The Communist party has throughout been the best organized

¹ See p. 22.

of the Italian parties. Its main strength has lain in the North, and till mid-1945 it looked as if it might prove the strongest of the parties. It suffered a severe loss of prestige, however, at the time of the Yugoslav occupation of Trieste in May-June 1945, when the Italian Communist leaders began by endorsing this occupation; and though, like all the other parties, the Communists have since declared that Trieste must remain Italian, they have never quite recovered their former position. The party numbers among its leaders some Italian Communists of long standing who during the Fascist period spent some part of their exile in Russia. Among these is the head of the party, the ex-Comintern leader Palmiro Togliatti, one of the ablest politicians in Italy to-day, whose return to Italy in April 1944 marked a definite turning-point in the orientation of the party.¹ How strong the link still is between Togliatti and Moscow can only be guessed, but at any rate his years of exile do not seem to have diminished his patriotism. Partly, no doubt, for tactical reasons, which probably govern a good deal of his very astute policy, he has exercised a moderating influence on some of the more headstrong of his followers, and has also, especially in the earlier days of liberation, made a considerable display of readiness to co-operate with the other two 'mass' parties. This desire for co-operation in the case of the Socialists has even taken the form of proposals of fusion, which the Socialists have hitherto rejected, though a pact of alliance was agreed upon in August 1944 and further strengthened by a 'unity of action pact' in October 1946,² and in many localities the two parties fought the administrative elections of 1946 on joint lists. Overtures to the Christian Democrats during 1944-6 met with even less success, but official Communist policy nevertheless till recently studiously refrained from adopting an anti-Catholic standpoint, and freedom of religious worship and organization forms one of the articles of the party's programme. The recrudescence of anti-clericalism, however, which was noticeable towards the end of 1946, received support from the Communist press. In foreign affairs, as stated in their election manifesto,³ the Communists

¹ See above p. 23.

² A "United Front" agreement between Italian Socialists and Communists had already been concluded some years before the war between the Socialist leader, Nenni, and the Communist Luigi Longo, of Milan, during the period when both were exiles in Paris.

³ *Unità*, 8 May 1946.

aim at a non-nationalistic and non-imperialistic policy which shall include 'friendship with the Soviet Union, as with the other great democratic Powers', but they also denounce 'the campaign of chauvinist provocation against the Soviet Union'.

(ii) *The Socialists*

The Socialist party also finds its main following in the North. Its leader, Pietro Nenni, spent many years of exile in France during the Fascist era, as did also some other prominent members of the party, and the desire for collaboration with 'the Socialist parties of other countries is a definite article of faith. The Socialists had till recently abandoned their anti-clerical standpoint of former days, though their left wing gave some support to the anti-clerical campaign towards the end of 1946; in their election manifesto¹ they demand a lay republic with liberty both for the Catholic Church and for all other religions. On the subject of collaboration with the Communists the party has divided into two wings, the left wing under Nenni insisting on the need for unity of action with the Communists (though even Nenni has rejected all attempts at actual fusion), while the more moderate right wing, which includes such figures as Saragat, President of the Constituent Assembly till January 1947, and also the *Critica Sociale* and *Iniziativa Socialista* groups, opposes closer collaboration with the Communists and stresses the links between Italian and international Socialism. This division led to a definite split at the Socialist Congress in January 1947, when the right wing Socialists under Saragat broke away and formed a separate party. As regards foreign policy, the Socialist party upholds the repudiation of war and the limitation of national sovereignty, and desires that Italy should not form part of any *bloc*, either western or eastern.

(iii) *The Christian Democrats*

The Christian Democrat party is the successor of the Partito Popolare founded by Don Sturzo after the 1914-18 war. It is a progressive Catholic party, and draws its support from among Catholics in all walks of life, especially from agricultural workers in the rural areas. Its leader, Alcide De Gasperi, was for some

¹ *Avanti*, 3 May 1946.

time the head of the Partito Popolare after Don Sturzo's resignation. Since the liberation, both as Foreign Minister and as Prime Minister since late in 1945, he has steered both country and party through many difficulties. Some of those difficulties have been due to the central position occupied by the Christian Democrats, which has exposed them to both overtures and attacks from left and right alike, especially on the subject of the institutional question. On this point the party for a long time refused to commit itself; it included monarchists and republicans, and De Gasperi, though himself known to be in favour of monarchy as an institution, fully recognized this fact. At the party congress in April 1946, however, the question was put to the vote, with the result that 739,000 members declared in favour of a republic and only 254,000 voted for the monarchy.

The social and economic programmes of these three 'mass' parties are, at any rate on paper, remarkably similar, as indeed might be expected from their successful collaboration in the C.G.I.L. All demand reforms in industry, including workers' representation on factory councils and the end of monopolies; and in agriculture, including land for the peasants and the breaking-up of the big *latifondi*, or estates. All want an extension of the co-operative principle, both in agriculture and in industry. They also agree on the necessity of reforms in banking and taxation, in social assistance and in education. Another common point between the three 'mass' parties, and one which indeed is shared in varying degrees by all the political parties, lies in the recognition by all of the need for a much greater degree of decentralization and regional autonomy, and also for the development of Southern Italy. The difference between the parties on these questions lies rather in degree and emphasis. For example, while Communists and Socialists agree on the principle of nationalization, the Communists are more specific in demanding that it should cover industrial monopolies, public works, banks, and insurance companies; the Christian Democrats, on the other hand, while admitting the advisability of some degree of nationalization, would allow more scope to private initiative. On the other hand, while all three parties include liberty of worship as a part of their programme, the Christian Democrats naturally attach particular importance to

safeguarding the religious life of the community and maintaining the agreements entered into with the Holy See.

(iv) *The Action Party*

This party formed one of the strongest and earliest nuclei of resistance to Fascism during the clandestine period. It originated in 1942 as a successor to the *Giustizia e Libertà* group formed by anti-Fascist exiles in Paris under the Rosselli brothers in 1929. It has from the outset been uncompromising in its attitude towards the monarchy, and included a demand for a republic in the 8-point programme which it issued during the Badoglio '45 days'. The party, whose leaders in its early days were drawn largely from among intellectuals, claims to have been the pioneer group in the realm of ideas, and it is quite true that many of its tenets have now been accepted by the 'mass' parties. These tenets, according to the official election programme,¹ include (besides the demand for a democratic republic) regional decentralization, the elimination of monopolies, a degree of nationalization, factory councils, taxation of inheritance, agrarian reforms including expropriation of the *latifondi*, freedom of worship, educational reforms, and the regeneration of the South. In the sphere of foreign affairs their standpoint differs considerably from that of the 'mass' parties except on the need for a just peace treaty, which is a point common to all. The Action Party is in favour of a 'United States of Europe', which, in its view, should be a prelude to the end of nationalism and the creation of a world State.

In the resistance days this party commanded a certain amount of support for the vitality of its views, but as it gradually became clear that it had little to offer which was not included in the programme of the 'mass' parties, it lost considerably in membership, notably to the Socialists, from whose right wing it differs very little in many respects, and to the Republican party. It has also been weakened by internal splits, which came to a head at the party congress in February 1946, when the Action Party Ministers resigned from the Government and right-wing elements of the party, including Ferruccio Parri, the Prime Minister after the liberation of the North, and Ugo La Malfa, hitherto one of its most able and active leaders, withdrew from

¹ *Italia Libera*, 7 April 1946.

the party and formed a new party of their own, the Republican Democratic Alliance. The result was that the Action Party obtained only seven seats in the general elections, and the Republican Democratic Alliance only two.

(v) *The Labour Democrats*

This party has from the outset been a very small one. It figured among the six C.N.L. parties in the South, though it had no counterpart in the North. It seems to have originated as a successor to the Reformist Socialists of pre-Fascist days, and to have maintained its existence largely around one or two figures belonging to an older political generation such as Ivanoe Bonomi, Premier after the liberation of Rome, himself a prominent Reformist Socialist in the past, and Meuccio Ruini, Minister of Reconstruction in the Bonomi and Parri Governments. Some of its more prominent members have links with Freemasonry. In programme the party differs little on the social and economic side from those of the 'mass' parties; it has been handicapped from the outset in that, while one of its main planks has been syndicalism, it has remained outside the Socialist-Communist-Christian Democrat coalition of the C.G.I.L. It appears to have aspired to the position of a big lay centre party to balance the Christian Democrats, but it has never commanded enough popular support to come anywhere near achieving this aim. On the institutional issue it has remained agnostic, though its leanings have certainly on the whole been towards a republic. At the end of March 1946 the Labour Democrats decided for purposes of the general elections to unite with the Liberals in the National Democratic Union. Bonomi at the time specifically stated that the Union proposed to leave its members free to vote as they chose on the monarchical issue. But the association of the Labour Democrats with the predominantly monarchist Liberals alienated the working class elements within the party, many of whom withdrew from it, and it has probably now little chance of independent survival except as a very small group.

(vi) *The Liberals*

The Liberal party, as the furthest to the right of the six parties forming the C.N.L.s, has found itself constantly in the position

of being pushed further towards the right than at any rate some of its members wish to go. In point of fact, as far as social and economic affairs are concerned, the Liberals have shown a distinctly progressive spirit. Outlining these aspects of their programme at the Liberal Congress at the end of April 1946, Count Carandini, the party vice-president, said¹ that the Liberals were in favour of private ownership and private enterprise, but would support the elimination of monopolies and the nationalization of the big concerns, and also of public works in so far as it seemed likely to lead to better functioning. The party is in favour of greater representation of the workers, both in industry by means of factory councils, and in agriculture through co-operative societies. In the field of agriculture, the party's guiding principle is that administration should remain as far as possible in the hands of experts, with a minimum of bureaucratic interference. While favouring a gradual development of small properties, the party is against the wholesale breaking-up of the big estates into parcels of land so small as to be uneconomic.

While the more progressive Liberals would no doubt subscribe wholeheartedly to this programme, it is probable that some members of the party, especially from among the Liberal Democrats of the South who were incorporated in the party in August 1944, would adopt a more conservative attitude. Individual liberty has been the party's watchword, handed on from its philosopher and president, Benedetto Croce, and the varying interpretations put upon that liberty go to make the Liberal party perhaps the most heterogeneous of all the Italian political groupings. At the same time the Liberals have consistently shown a feeling for law and order and for legal and constitutional tradition and practice, which is less pronounced in some of the newer parties. This feeling is largely responsible for the monarchist standpoint of many of its members. The party refused to commit itself on the institutional issue till shortly before the elections, but on 2 May at its congress a vote was taken which resulted in 412 in favour of the monarchy, with 261 for the republic and 121 abstaining.

As has already been mentioned, the Liberals united with the Labour Democrats, and also with Nitti's Reconstruction group,

¹ *Risorgimento Liberale*, 1 May 1946.

for purposes of the general elections, which these groups fought jointly as the National Democratic Union. Since the elections there seems to have been a tendency for the Liberal party to move further towards the right, culminating in September 1946 with the fusion in it of the right-wing Partito Democratico Italiano and with proposals for fusion with the Uomo Qualunque party (see below); this latter suggestion was, however, rejected by the Liberals in December 1946. These moves towards the right are likely to alienate the more progressive Liberals; some of them, such as Manlio Brosio, have already left the party.

Of the parties outside the C.N.L.s, the most important during the intervening period between liberation and the elections were the Republicans and the Monarchists. Both these parties, being outside the Government, were not bound by the ministerial oath, and were thus in a position to level criticism against both Government and C.N.L.s, especially on the institutional question. The Republican party combines a devotion to Mazzinian ideals with a very definite anti-Communist bias. Its leader is Randolfo Pacciardi, who commanded the Garibaldi Brigade in the Spanish Civil War. In many respects its views resemble those of the Action Party, from which it has gained some recruits as a result of Action Party internal divisions. Count Sforza, whose previous associations had been chiefly with the Action Party, stood as a Republican candidate in the general elections.

Monarchist opinion after the liberation centred chiefly round the Partito Democratico Italiano, whose leader, Enzo Selvaggi, edited its Rome daily paper, *Italia Nuova*. For purposes of the general elections this party and various other monarchist elements united to form the National Freedom Bloc (*Blocco della Libertà*), which on 13 April 1946 published a manifesto over the signatures of its leaders, Enzo Selvaggi, General Bencivenga, Alberto Bergamini, and Tullio Benedetti. The main theme of this manifesto was that, in the party's view, Italian liberty is associated with the monarchical institution and the defence of the State against totalitarianism. On the economic side the party declared its readiness to adhere to any economic reform which would improve the lot of the workers. As stated above, the Partito Democratico Italiano became fused with the Liberal

party in September 1946, and some of its members were subsequently in favour of joint fusion with the Uomo Qualunque party.

The only other party of any appreciable significance is the new Uomo Qualunque, or Common Man, party, which arose in 1945 under the leadership of a journalist and playwright, Guglielmo Giannini. This party, with its slogan of "We were better off when we were worse off!", has aimed at exploiting the grievances of the *piccolo borghese* and the man in the street in a way which is reminiscent of Fascism. It obviously has some powerful backing, and has run both a weekly and a daily paper whose popularity, like that of the party itself, has undergone considerable fluctuations but has at times been fairly widespread. The party's programme, as outlined by Giannini in a broadcast on 30 April 1946, is extremely nebulous on practical issues, but states that the State should be the administrator of the country's common property and the servant of its citizens. Even on the monarchical issue the programme is studiously vague, though the party has in the past had definitely monarchist leanings. As mentioned above, proposals for fusion between it and the Liberal-Partito Democratico Italiano combination were put forward in December 1946 but were then rejected. The party at that time changed its name to the *Fronte Liberale-Democratico dell' Uomo Qualunque*. Giannini's party has undoubtedly held a certain appeal for the more disgruntled elements of the population, as witness its relatively high poll in the general elections. But its programme would seem to contain too little that is constructive for it to carry weight against the 'mass' parties, though it would be likely to profit by a prolonged period of disillusion and unrest.

LOCAL ADMINISTRATION AND ELECTIONS

It was realized from the first that no permanent institutions of local administration on democratic lines could be set up until the whole country could be consulted, and in fact the municipal elections throughout Italy did not take place until a year after final liberation. Some provisional steps towards the change-over were nevertheless carried out in the South soon after the liberation of that region, and were extended to other regions as they became free.

In the sphere of communal administration, from the spring

of 1944 onwards the Fascist *podestà*, or mayor, of a commune was replaced by a *sindaco* supported by a *Giunta Comunale*, or communal committee. Both the *sindaco* and the members of the *Giunta Comunale* were nominated by the local Prefect in agreement with the local C.N.L., and as far as possible a balanced representation of the six C.N.L. parties on the *Giunta* was aimed at. Appointments were originally subject to Allied approval so long as the district in question was still under Allied control.

As regards provincial administration, a Prefect remained at the head of each province, as in Fascist and pre-Fascist days. The Prefects were appointed by the Allies in regions still under Allied control, and by the Italian Government in regions that had passed into their sphere of jurisdiction. The *Deputazione Provinciale* of pre-Fascist days was revived, varying in numbers from 6 to 14 or 15 according to the size of the province. Its members were nominated on the same principle as for the *Giunta Comunale*, and included representatives from each of the six C.N.L. parties.

This provisional system continued to function until March 1946, when, after a long delay due to the difficulty of compiling electoral lists, municipal elections were held throughout Italy. In these elections, which took place on five successive Sundays between 10 March and 7 April, votes were registered in 5,596 out of the total of 7,300 communes. Voting in the remaining communes, including most of the larger towns except Milan, was held over till the autumn and did not take place in the debated regions of South Tirol and Venezia Giulia.

The methods adopted in these elections, the first free elections to be held in Italy since the advent of Fascism, marked a return to the electoral procedure of 1915. The main communal body to be elected, as in 1915, was the Communal Council (*Consiglio Comunale*), with from 20 to 80 members according to the size of the commune. The Council, whose members hold office for four years, in its turn elects a smaller committee, or *Giunta*, and a *sindaco*, or mayor. In accordance with the electoral law voted by the *Consulta* on 23 February 1946, all citizens, other than proscribed persons, criminals, or persons closely associated with Fascism in the past, were eligible to vote, including, for the first time in Italy, women. Subject to the same exceptions, any citizen appearing on an electoral roll could stand for

election as a communal councillor. Two distinct voting systems were adopted. In communes with over 30,000 inhabitants proportional representation was used, electors voting for one of the party lists. In the smaller communes electors chose their representatives by majority vote on one general list. Voting was not compulsory, but a large proportion of the eligible electors went to the polls, as many as 80-85 per cent in most districts.

The result was a striking victory for the three 'mass' parties. Communists and Socialists together won in 1,976 communes, Socialists alone in 140, and Communists alone in 140; Christian Democrats in 1,907; and all the other groups, including Liberals, Labour Democrats, Republicans, Action Party, and right and centre combinations, divided the remaining 1,433 seats between them. As these figures show, the Communists and Socialists together outweighed the Christian Democrats, and this was especially true in the larger towns, where almost without exception they obtained a majority. In Milan, the most important town voting at this time, the Socialists gained a big majority with 225,383 votes, as against 167,316 for the Christian Democrats and 155,140 for the Communists. No other party came anywhere near the figures obtained by the 'mass' parties. Detailed figures regarding the gains of the smaller parties are only available in respect of the communes of over 30,000 inhabitants where the method of proportional representation was adopted, but in these communes, numbering 4,163 seats in all, the Republicans won 222 seats, right-wing groups 201, Liberals 113, Uomo Qualunque 52, Labour Democrats 45, and Action Party 27, as against 1,942 for the Socialist-Communist combination, and 1,627 for the Christian Democrats.

Municipal elections in the larger towns, which were held over till November 1946, showed a marked swing away from the Christian Democrat party by which the Communists profited heavily in the North and, to a lesser extent, the Uomo Qualunque party in Rome and the South. Abstention at these elections was widespread, in some instances less than 50 per cent of the electors going to the polls.

THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY

The formation of a freely elected democratic parliament constituted one of the main political aims from the earliest days

of liberation, and the left-wing parties in particular ever since the Bari Congress had urged that some sort of interim parliament should be set up without waiting for general elections. It was realized, however, that no satisfactory elected Assembly could be formed until the whole country could be consulted, and it was obvious that even after the liberation of the North the compilation of electoral lists would prove a long and slow business in view of the chaotic state of the country.

It was therefore decided in March 1945 to set up a provisional *Consulta*, or Consultative Assembly, to act as a consultative body and express opinions on general problems and legislative provisions put before it by the Government. This decision was not implemented at once, as with the liberation of the North in April 1945 new forces came into play. However, the *Consulta* eventually held its first meeting on 25 September 1945. It consisted of 429 members nominated by the Government on the basis of lists put forward by the various political parties (including the main parties outside the C.N.L.) and trade union and professional associations, and also included some anti-Fascist former Deputies. Count Sforza was elected President. One of the main duties of the *Consulta* was to discuss the provisions of the electoral law, the draft of which it finally voted on 23 February 1946,¹ and also to examine the law on the Constituent Assembly.

The draft decree on the powers of the Constituent Assembly was approved by the Council of Ministers on 2 March 1946, and by the *Consulta* on 6 March at its last plenary sitting. The functions of the *Consulta* as an interim Assembly pending the formation of the Constituent Assembly then terminated. The decree on the Constituent Assembly, which was coupled with another decree providing for a referendum on the monarchy, was signed by Prince Umberto on 18 March.² It stated that the Italian people would be called upon to decide on the constitutional form of the State, whether republic or monarchy, by a referendum to be held at the same time as the elections for the Constituent Assembly, and it provided that, in the event of a decision in favour of a republic, the Constituent Assembly should at its first meeting elect a provisional Head of the State to hold office until the final Constitution should have been drawn

¹ See Appendix II.

² *Gazzetta Ufficiale*, 23 March 1946.

up by the Assembly. The Assembly is to be wound up on the day on which the new Constitution comes into force, and, in any case, within eight months from its first meeting, though this time-limit may be extended by the Assembly itself. Until that date, legislative power is vested in the Government, with the exception of electoral legislation and Acts for the approval of international treaties, which must be approved by the Assembly. A vote by the Assembly against the Government does not mean that the Government must resign, resignation being compulsory only as a result of a special vote of lack of confidence following a resolution introduced two days in advance by the President of the Assembly.

The elections for the Constituent Assembly took place in markedly orderly fashion on 2 June 1946, at the same time as the voting on the referendum. Voting for these elections was compulsory, so the very high poll (90 per cent in some of the biggest constituencies) was not surprising. The system of voting by proportional representation for a party list was adopted. For this purpose the country was divided into 32 multi-seat constituencies, varying considerably in size. The number of seats ranged from 36 in the constituency of Milan to 7 in that of Caserta. There was also a national pool for seats and votes over and above those allocated to the constituencies; this pool in the event numbered 80 seats. The total number of seats was 556, not including 13 for Venezia Giulia and 4 for Bolzano, in which disputed areas elections were not held. The results demonstrate the predominance of the 'mass' parties, and the new Government formed under De Gasperi on 12 July was composed of these parties and the Republicans.

<i>Party</i>		<i>Votes</i>	<i>Seats</i>
Christian Democrat		8,083,208	207
Socialist		4,744,749	115
Communist		4,342,722	104
National Democratic Union		1,559,417	41
Uomo Qualunque		1,209,918	30
Republican		997,690	23
National Freedom Bloc		636,493	16
Action Party		333,758	7
Other Lists		1,044,935	13
TOTAL		<u>22,952,890</u>	<u>556</u>

The big Christian Democrat vote was no doubt in part attributable to the women voters, and also to the many Italians

who were searching for a 'middle way' between left and right. Reasons of foreign policy may also have had some influence, both in increasing support for the party of Signor De Gasperi, who was also Foreign Minister at that time, and in diminishing adherence to the Communist party which was in a difficult position owing to the Russian attitude at the Council of Foreign Ministers both on the subject of Venezia Giulia and also with regard to the other aspects of the Italian peace treaty—reparations, the Italian colonies, and the fleet. Right-wing votes showed some increase on the local elections, and the Uomo Qualunque party rather unexpectedly proved a good deal more successful in the general than in the earlier local elections.

The Constituent Assembly held its first meeting on 25 June and elected as its President Giuseppe Saragat, a prominent right-wing Socialist with a long record of anti-Fascist resistance, who was the first Italian Ambassador in Paris after the liberation. As the referendum had gone in favour of a republic, the Assembly also had the duty of electing a provisional Head of the State, and on 28 June Senator Enrico De Nicola was elected by 396 votes out of 504. De Nicola is a Naples lawyer of no avowed party affiliations, and was chosen partly because of the desire to make a suitable gesture towards the South. He has also played an important part in politics behind the scenes since the liberation, especially during the winter of 1943-4 when the institutional question was under discussion.¹

A Government Decree of 24 June abolished the Senate, which had in any case been virtually non-existent, and had held no sittings, since 25 July 1943. If the new Constitution provides for a bicameral system of government a new Senate will be formed on a different basis.

THE REFERENDUM ON THE MONARCHY

The institutional question, which had played so large a part in the early stages of Italian politics after liberation, had been nominally shelved in the spring of 1944 when King Victor Emmanuel withdrew from the political scene and the parties forming the C.N.L. and the Government bound themselves to refrain from any actions which might prejudice an eventual solution.² On the whole this truce was observed during the

¹ See p. 23.

² See pp. 23-4.

intervening two years. Other problems of immediate importance—problems of reconstruction, epuration, and the day-to-day struggle for food, shelter, and adequate wages—occupied the attention of Government and people alike, and the institutional question, though never far from the surface, sank to some extent into the background. A new access of republican opinion made itself felt with the liberation of North Italy in April 1945, for in the North feeling was especially bitter against the House of Savoy for their alleged desertion at the time of the armistice. At the same time some traditional feelings of loyalty towards the monarchy came to the surface again as the elections drew nearer. Thus the issue was by no means a foregone conclusion.

When on 18 March 1946, Prince Umberto signed the decree authorizing the elections for a Constituent Assembly, he also gave his signature to another decree calling for a referendum on the institutional form of the State, and in a letter to the Prime Minister, De Gasperi, he undertook to abide by the free decision of the people. Shortly after this rumours arose as to King Victor Emmanuel's impending abdication, but these were contradicted at the time, and the announcement on 9 May that the King had abdicated in favour of Prince Umberto and was leaving Italy for Egypt came as something of a surprise. The Crown Prince automatically became King as Umberto II, and issued a proclamation in which he promised that 'in the renewed constitutional monarchy the fundamental acts of national life will be subordinated to the will of Parliament', and confirmed his undertaking to abide by the forthcoming vote.

How far this eleventh-hour decision to abdicate affected the voting on the referendum it is difficult to say. Had it come at a much earlier stage it might well have had a considerable influence on opinion in favour of the monarchy. Even in the spring of 1946, it probably enabled Italians who still retained some feeling for the monarchical principle to vote with a clearer conscience for the retention of the monarchy in the person of Umberto, who was generally considered to have been much less deeply involved with Fascism than his father, and on whom some anti-Fascist hopes had centred in the past. On the other hand, the step could obviously be interpreted as a piece of last-minute electioneering, an aspect which was at once seized on by the politicians of the left, notably Togliatti, then Minister of

Justice in the De Gasperi Government, who characterized it as unconstitutional and contested it on juridical grounds.

Be that as it may, the results of the voting on 2 June showed a fairly narrow majority in favour of a republic. The Court of Cassation announced on 18 June that the total of valid votes cast for the republic was 12,717,923, and for the monarchy 10,719,284. Northern constituencies were found to have voted fairly solidly for the republic, in some cases with very big majorities, while Rome and the South voted preponderantly for the monarchy, with a particularly large majority in Naples. These final results differed very little from those already made known after the first count, on 10 June, when the official proclamation of the Republic took place. Ex-King Umberto, however, delayed his departure from Italy till 13 June, and on leaving issued a final proclamation, some portions of which, as De Gasperi suggested, may have been due to ill-advised counsellors, but which in any case contrasted unfortunately with the correctness of his attitude during the two years of his Lieutenant Generalship, and with his avowed desire, expressed to the last, to adopt the best course for his country's good.

The chapter of the monarchy would thus seem to be closed. The relatively even balance of the voting is bound to make the task of the new Republic a difficult one, especially as the early stages of its development must coincide with the adjustment of the country to the peace settlement.

Chapter III

THE ELIMINATION OF THE FASCIST STRUCTURE

TWENTY years of Fascism obviously left an imprint upon Italy which could not be wiped out overnight. It was relatively easy to do away with the actual Fascist machinery, and indeed laws for this purpose were passed by the Badoglio Council of Ministers on 27 July 1943, two days after Fascism fell. But the elimination of the Fascist outlook, and of the individuals who represented that outlook, from the various departments of Italian life proved a long and tedious business which was only nearing official completion by the time the Constituent Assembly was formed in mid-1946.

THE MACHINERY OF EPURATION

Marshal Badoglio's Government on 27 July passed a decree ordering the dissolution of the Fascist Party, the Chamber of Fasci and Corporations, and the Fascist Grand Council. Other Party organizations, such as the *Gruppi Universitarii Fascisti* (G.U.F.), the women's Fascist organizations, the National Institute of Fascist Culture, etc. were also dissolved. The functions of the many smaller Fascist organizations, covering all branches of activity, especially social assistance, were allocated to the relevant Ministries. The work of the *Gioventù Italiana del Littorio* (G.I.L.), the Fascist youth organization, was divided between the Ministries of War and Education. Fascist Party funds were blocked forthwith, and the Ministry of Finance was put in charge of their liquidation and the transfer of any assets to the State. A commission was also set up to inquire into the illegal acquisition of wealth by Fascist officials. Subsequent legislation provided for the abolition of the central Corporative organs, that is to say, the National Council of Corporations, the Central Corporative Committee, and the Corporations themselves. The Ministry of Corporations became the Ministry for Industry, Trade, and Labour. New Syndical Confederations were set up by mid-August 1943, with prominent anti-Fascist

labour leaders, including Bruno Buozzi, Giovanni Roveda, and Achille Grandi, as Commissioners.¹

All this was set in motion during the '45 days' between the fall of Fascism and the armistice. With the return of Mussolini and the revival of Fascism in the North, these laws were naturally disregarded in those parts of Italy which came under the illegal Fascist Republican Government's sphere. But they nevertheless remained law, and as the Royal Government gradually re-established itself in the South their application and extension became one of its major tasks.

Side by side with the Italian Government's laws for the elimination of Fascists, or for epuration, as it came to be called, there were also, of course, the orders to the same end issued and applied by Allied Military Government or the Allied Control Commission in the territory under their control from Sicily onwards. As the Allied authorities took over the control of a zone, they removed Fascist Prefects, mayors, and other officials and replaced them as far as possible by Italians who had not been closely associated with the Fascist regime. This process was necessarily a difficult one, and aroused a good deal of criticism among Italians, who alleged that the Allies had in certain instances been nothing like drastic enough. The Allied authorities, on the other hand, were faced with the problem of finding among the anti-Fascists sufficient personnel with the requisite administrative experience. Italian law, including the epuration laws, came into force in each zone as soon as it was restored to the jurisdiction of the Italian Government, and the onus then fell upon the Italians.

It took some time to evolve the machinery whereby epuration was to be effected. Italy was the first country in Europe to work out such laws, and their makers were handicapped by the deleterious effects of Fascism upon the Italian legal system, and also, in the early days, by the fact that many of Italy's most prominent lawyers were still in Rome or in the North. However, a law providing for the 'defascistization' of the State administration and of all concerns and institutions connected with the State had been worked out by the end of December 1943. This law remained at first virtually a dead letter, though a High

¹ Subsequent developments in the economic sphere will be dealt with in the next chapter.

Commissioner to apply it was appointed in February 1944 in the person of Tito Zaniboni, an anti-Fascist of long standing but little legal experience, who had made an attempt on Mussolini's life in 1925. After repeated protests from the C.N.L. parties at the Government's tardiness in getting epuration under weigh, Zaniboni was replaced in May 1944 by Count Sforza, who became High Commissioner for Epuration, with Mario Berlinguer, a Sardinian lawyer and prominent Action Party member, as his legal assistant.

Count Sforza retained this thankless office till the end of 1944, and during this period the main law governing the whole of subsequent epuration practice (No. 159 of 27 July 1944) was introduced, and the appropriate machinery for its execution set in motion. Prior to this, and just before the liberation of Rome, a decree of 26 May provided for the setting up of judicial organs in the various provinces of both liberated and A.M.G.-controlled Italy, to judge persons guilty of Fascist crimes, and a list of 23 categories of such crimes was appended.

The law of 27 July 1944 had four main aims: (i) the punishment of Fascist crimes; (ii) the epuration of the State administration; (iii) the liquidation of Fascist property; and (iv) the confiscation of illicit gains. Assistant High Commissioners were appointed to deal with each of these four departments. As regards the punishment of Fascist crimes, the following measures were adopted (Articles 1-10). A High Court of Justice, consisting of a President and eight magistrates, was set up to try members of the Fascist Government and Fascist hierarchs who were 'guilty of having annulled the institutional guarantees, destroyed popular liberties, created the Fascist regime, or compromised and betrayed the country by dragging it into the present catastrophe'. The District Assize Courts, which had existed under the Fascist regime but were now completely reorganized, were empowered to judge all other cases envisaged under the law, such as those of *squadristi*, or leaders of the March on Rome. These Assize Courts each consisted of two magistrates and five *giudici popolari*, or lay judges. Both the High Court and the Assize Courts could demand the death penalty, or a life sentence in less extreme instances, for cases of high treason (e.g. collaboration with the Germans) or failure to fulfil the military oath. In general, soldiers were tried by military tribunals, but cases of

high treason among the highest ranks, as for instance the case of Generals Pentimalli and Del Tetto, accused of surrendering Naples to the Germans, came before the High Court.

As regards the epuration of State administration (Articles 11-25), in which was included not only the Ministries but also all organizations controlled by or dependent on the State, such as railways, posts and telegraphs, etc., the following categories of officials were to be dismissed from service: officials who took an active part in Fascist affairs; who owed their advancement to the Party; who had been *squadristi*, or Militia members, or who had taken part in the March on Rome, or been active Party members of long standing; who after 8 September 1943 had followed the Fascist Government, or taken an oath to it, or collaborated with it. Epuration was to be effected through individual commissions set up to deal with each Ministry or organization. The same system was applied in the case of the professional categories (the legal, educational, medical, etc. professions) and of the press.

As regards the liquidation of Fascist property and the confiscation of illicit gains (Articles 26-38), it was stated that all profits acquired as a result of adherence to the Fascist regime should be confiscated by the State.

At the beginning of his High Commissionership, Count Sforza defined his aim as: '*Far presto, colpire in alto, perdonare in basso*' (to act quickly, strike at the big shots, and let the small fry go). As far as *far presto* goes, the Epuration Commission certainly failed to live up to these standards. But as regards the type of wrongdoer to be eliminated, the law of 27 July 1944 did aim as far as possible at penalizing individuals rather than whole categories, and at bringing to justice the Fascist hierarch who had committed specific acts against society, while dealing more leniently with the minor civil servant or teacher who had in the past become a Party member merely in order to retain his office and livelihood. The law also aimed at providing a just trial for the accused. Proof of responsibility had to be established, and the accused was free to choose his own counsel and to appeal against the sentence.

Count Sforza's regime as High Commissioner was followed by a six-months' interregnum during which a Central Epuration Commission was set up, with Bonomi as its nominal head and

under him four provisional Joint Commissioners. It was during this period that the sensational escape of General Roatta in March 1945, while his trial was in progress, once more focused public attention on the shortcomings of the epuration system. As a result of this outcry it was decided to reorganize the system afresh and for this purpose one of its main critics, the Socialist leader Pietro Nenni, was appointed High Commissioner in July 1945. By this time epuration was nearly completed in the South, but the whole of North Italy had by then been liberated, and Extraordinary Assize Courts were set up to deal with the innumerable cases arising there, including the vexed question of the responsibility of civil servants who had gone North with the Fascist Republican Government.

In October 1945 the Cabinet approved a bill abolishing the High Court, which had functioned only in the South, and the Extraordinary Assize Courts set up for the North, and replacing them by a unified system to function throughout the whole country, consisting of special sections of the Assize Courts whose duties at the end of a year were to be assumed by the ordinary judicature.

In November 1945 the Council of Ministers passed a far-reaching new law¹ dealing with epuration among administrative officials. This law provided that higher grade officials could be dismissed for what was termed 'political incompatibility', while officials of the five lowest grades were to be exempt if their only crime was that they had in the past belonged to the Fascist Party. Dismissal was henceforth to be the only sanction applied in the case of administrative officials. The measure was also to be extended to employers in private concerns. This law would seem to have been based on eminently reasonable arguments, aiming as it did at eliminating from office all responsible undesirable elements, while also removing the fear of dismissal from the thousands of petty officials and employees whose only crime, as Nenni said, was that they had been deceived. It also represented a real effort to finish up the whole business of epuration quickly, before the political elections were held. It aroused strong protests on the part of the Liberals,² however,

¹ No. 716 of 9 November 1945.

² These objections were one of the reasons for the Government crisis of November 1945 (see pp. 30-31).

who also objected to another law put forward at the same time providing for the transfer to the Ministry of Finance of all matters concerned with the confiscation by the State of illicit profits acquired under the Fascist regime. This latter law was only put into effect in March 1946.

Despite all delays, by the spring of 1946 the process of epuration was judged to be nearing completion, and preparations were made for winding up the whole work of the High Commission. Its functions during the last period were transferred to the Presidency of the Council.

ITS APPLICATION TO THE INDIVIDUAL

By far the largest category of citizens to be affected by epuration was, of course, that of State officials of every kind, from the Fascist hierarch to the lowest municipal employee. All these officials had automatically held Party membership cards and might therefore be subject to dismissal, if no more, and, especially in the early days when denunciations were rife and the application of the law was anything but uniform, the uncertainty as to their fate felt by great numbers of these minor officials was a serious factor making for general instability in the State. This position was only effectively cleared up by the law of November 1945.

Epuration in the regular armed forces aimed at eliminating those officers who were known to have entertained strong Fascist convictions or held political posts under the regime, or who had collaborated with the Germans or taken the oath of loyalty to the Fascist Republic. As mentioned above, extreme cases of high treason among officers were tried by the High Court of Justice, while other cases came before the military tribunals. The penalty in the latter cases was dismissal with loss of rank.

As regards the police, all former members of the Fascist Militia were excluded from the ranks of the *Carabinieri*, and all police who collaborated with the Germans or who took part in Fascist execution squads were sacked. Some prison officials were dismissed on their records. Incidentally, any persons who had belonged to the Black Brigades¹ during the neo-Fascist period were deprived of all electoral rights and forbidden to hold any office in the future.

¹ The Black Brigades, or *Brigate Nere*, were the re-formed Blackshirt, or Militia, Brigades under the neo-Fascist Republic.

Another category of persons who came in for wholesale condemnation were the members of the notorious Fascist Special Tribunal for the Defence of the State, which, set up in 1926 in direct contradiction to Article 71 of the Italian Constitution, had for many years exercised special and arbitrary powers in trying cases deemed to be against the security of the State. Proceedings were set on foot against all who had served on this Tribunal between 1926 and 1945, numbering in all 134. Many were found to have died or disappeared, but 49 were due to come up for trial in mid-1946.

In the sphere of education, a preliminary epuration was carried out by Allied Military Government in Sicily, and also in the other regions of Southern Italy as they came under Allied control.¹ Professors and teachers of known or long-standing Fascist convictions were dismissed, and the use of the *libri di Stato*, or State text-books, was forbidden. The Italian Government continued the work of epuration on these lines when they took over control. Considerable difficulties were experienced at first in abolishing the State text-books owing to the shortage of paper for printing new ones, and schools often had to make do with the old text-books, with the worst propaganda passages removed.

A body which has latterly by implication been closely involved with Fascism is the Senate. Under the Constitution the Senate, which is the second Chamber (the first being originally the Chamber of Deputies, and since 1939 the Chamber of Fasci and Corporations), was composed of men over 40 who for one reason or another had deserved well of the State. Under the Fascist regime, this attribution frequently came to mean either that a would-be Senator had proved himself to be a particularly *bien-pensant* Fascist, or that he had poured considerable sums into the Party coffers. Thus, as time went on, the Senate became more and more closely identified with the regime. Its position under the future Constitution is in any case still uncertain,² but in the meantime it was decided to dismiss all those Senators who had held office as Fascist Ministers, had approved laws destructive of the country's liberty, had been directly responsible for

¹ For an interesting account of this phase see *Italy in Transition*, by G. R. Gayre (1946. London: Faber and Faber).

² See above, p. 47.

THE ELIMINATION OF THE FASCIST STRUCTURE

keeping Fascism in power, or had gone North with the neo-Fascist Government. Senators who were known to have done what they could to oppose the regime retained their office. As a result, 310 out of 420 Senators were declared eligible for epuration. Of these, 218 had been dismissed by the end of 1945, while the cases of the others were still to come up for trial.

The law of 27 July 1944 provided (Article 6) for the trial of crimes committed during the Fascist period which had gone unpunished owing to Party protection, and for the revocation of amnesties granted through Fascist favour. This led to the re-opening of the trial for the murder of the Socialist Deputy Matteotti in 1924, the conduct of which had constituted one of the most flagrant examples of injustice during the Fascist regime.

Of the major Fascist hierarchs, several met with summary justice at the hands of Italian patriots when North Italy was liberated. Others either fled the country or are still in hiding. Their property has been confiscated and they have been condemned in absence either to death or to long terms of imprisonment. Many are now serving their sentences in prison. On the other hand, considerable numbers of less prominent Fascists were released from prison, or had their sentences reduced, as a result of the amnesty for political prisoners declared on the inauguration of the Italian Republic in June 1946. It had been customary for a new Head of State to announce an amnesty to mark the beginning of a new era; and in this particular instance it may have been felt that the gesture of an amnesty would serve to reconcile to the Republic the families of those imprisoned as a result of epuration. But the measure caused much dissatisfaction among anti-Fascist Italians of long standing, who felt grave doubts as to its fairness and as to the advisability of releasing dubious elements at such an early stage in the life of the new Republic.

Chapter IV

ITALY'S ECONOMIC POSITION

SOME GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

ITALY, with a steadily increasing population which has now reached over 45 million, is one of the most densely inhabited of the European countries, more particularly of those so largely agricultural. In 1943 the number of inhabitants to the square km. was calculated to be 146·9, as compared with 75·1 for France (1940 figure).¹ As will be seen from the following table, the main source of employment for the Italian people lies in agriculture, which in 1936 occupied 47·7 per cent of the total employed population.

OCCUPATIONS OF ITALIANS OVER AGE OF 10: 1936 CENSUS*

<i>Occupation</i>	<i>Numbers Engaged</i>	
	<i>Total</i>	<i>Males</i>
Agriculture	8,756,064	6,328,531
Hunting and Fishing	86,721	83,181
Industry	5,375,152	3,997,779
Transport and Communications	702,201	667,049
Commerce	1,504,820	1,068,285
Banking and Insurance	100,543	88,242
Liberal Arts and Professions	142,958	108,893
Public Administration	808,866	575,938
Private Administration	81,059	29,693
Religious Cults	126,323	74,938
Domestic Economy	660,725	75,901
TOTAL ..	18,345,432	13,098,430

Despite this predominantly agricultural trend, however, much of the country is not suited for cultivation, consisting of

¹ Statistics quoted in this section are taken, unless otherwise stated, from the yearly *Annuario Statistico Italiano* and League of Nations: *Statistical Year-Book*. The latest Italian census figures are for 1936. Frequent use has also been made throughout of the detailed scheme of estimated industrial requirements (based on past production and trade figures and on estimated production possibilities for 1946) which was drawn up in October 1945 under the auspices of the Italian Ministry of Industry and Trade and published as *Piano di massima per le importazioni industriali dell' anno 1946* (1945. Rome; here referred to as *Piano*); a second edition of this work, published in June 1946, covers estimates of industrial imports and exports for the financial year 1946-7. For a useful summary of Italy's economic position at the end of the war, see also *The Problem of Italy: an Economic Survey*, by Ivor Thomas (1946. London: Routledge).

* *Annuario Statistico Italiano*, 1940.

ITALY'S ECONOMIC POSITION

barren mountains and poor soil, especially in the South. In the past Italy to some extent solved the problem of a population increasing beyond the limits which the country could sustain by the expedient of large-scale emigration, chiefly to the United States and Latin America. Between 1901 and 1913 an average of from 550,000 to 650,000 emigrants left Italy each year to seek work abroad. The United States Immigration Act of 1921, which imposed severe restrictions on immigration, closed the door of one of the main receiving countries, and this legislation had its counterpart in the years after the 1914-18 war in Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina, Australia, and New Zealand. The table on page 60 shows how this policy affected emigration from Italy.

Against these emigration figures should be set the considerable numbers of Italians who for one reason or another returned to seek work in Italy. But even so, the fact remains that whereas net emigration from Italy in the years 1921-5 still averaged some 160,000 a year, the corresponding figures for 1937 and 1938 had sunk to something under 25,000.

This downward trend of emigration was in consonance with Fascist demographic policy, which from 1925 onwards, regardless of Italy's inability to support a larger population, for nationalistic reasons discouraged Italians from leaving the country while at the same time fostering an increased birth-rate among an already extremely prolific people. The only exception to this policy of keeping Italians at home was the encouragement given to would-be emigrants to the Italian colonies in North and East Africa. Despite lavish expenditure on the development of these colonies, however, Italians soon realized the difficulties of making a living there. The pre-war (1938) Italian population of the African colonies, Libya and East Africa, amounted to less than a quarter of a million, according to Italian estimates.¹ All these combined factors contributed to increase greatly Italy's unemployment difficulties during the early 1930s.

HOW FAR ITALY CAN BE SELF-SUPPORTING

The Fascist autarkic experiment was based on a desire to make Italy as nearly as possible self-supporting in raw materials

¹ *Statesman's Year-Book*, 1940. See also *Ethiopia*, by Ferdinando Quaranta (1939. London: P. S. King).

THE NEW ITALY

ITALIAN EMIGRANTS SEEKING WORK¹

Period or Year	Annual Total or Average		European Countries		Transoceanic Countries					
	Absolute Number	Per 100,000 Inhabitants	France	Total	Canada	U.S.A.	Brazil	Argentina	Others	Total
1906-1910	651,288	1,908.6	60,225	257,594	9,090	266,220	20,652	91,217	6,515	393,694
1911-1915	548,612	1,546.4	65,063	243,535	14,227	210,940	21,484	51,992	6,434	305,077
1916-1920	217,001	595.9	67,834	95,754	2,499	102,416	3,692	11,112	1,528	121,247
1920	614,611	1,690.1	157,025	205,372	8,475	349,042	10,563	37,431	3,728	409,239
1921	201,291	530.1	44,782	84,328	3,816	67,495	8,587	33,277	3,788	116,963
1921-5	303,264	787.4	131,894	172,360	4,131	45,194	9,705	64,497	7,377	130,904
1926-30	212,245	528.5	86,319	122,872	2,384	32,529	5,413	42,163	6,884	89,373
1931-5	91,628	218.6	35,153	63,447	415	13,244	1,491	10,165	2,866	28,181
1936	41,710	97.0	9,614	21,882	330	10,207	1,320	5,781	2,190	19,828
1937	59,945	138.1	14,717	29,670	343	15,640	1,349	8,943	4,000	30,275
1938	61,548	140.6	10,551	33,554	401	12,197	1,122	9,886	4,388	27,994

¹ *Annuario Statistico Italiano, 1941.*

and foodstuffs. To this end some aspects of the country's economy were artificially stimulated with the aid of large State subsidies. Unfortunately for the success of the experiment on any long-term basis, Italy's poverty in essential raw materials, and even in the type of soil suited for widespread intensive cultivation, rendered her a most unsuitable country in which to attempt any such scheme.

(i) *Raw Materials*

Italy possesses relatively large quantities of a few raw materials, such as mercury, sulphur, zinc, bauxite, and hemp. She has hitherto been the world's biggest producer of mercury, with Spain a close second.¹ Her zinc production is the highest in Europe, and her production of hemp second only to that of the U.S.S.R. But while these items are of importance to her export trade, they do not include basic raw materials essential to her own economy, such as coal, iron ore, petroleum, and even timber. As will be seen from the table on p. 62, in these she is particularly deficient.

For basic raw materials Italy has always been compelled to rely heavily on imports, especially for coal and oil. In 1938 her imports of these were as follows:—coal and coke, 12,032,000 metric tons, or 15·6 per cent of the value of her total imports; petrol, 114,000 metric tons (0·9 per cent); residual mineral oils, 955,000 metric tons (2 per cent); other mineral oil products, 1,619,000 metric tons (5·2 per cent).²

Coal is the most essential item in any scheme of reconstruction for Italy. The country's own reserves are small and of poor quality, lying chiefly in Sardinia (Sulcis mines). (The Arsa mines, which in 1942 represented a quarter of the total Italian production, now come within Yugoslav territory.) There are also lignite mines in Central Italy. Output increased very considerably during the war, and in 1941-2 trebled the pre-war figure. In view of this fact and of the rapid resumption of work in the coal-mining industry since the end of the war, it has been

¹ Italian mercury comes from two sources, the Monte Amiata mines in Tuscany and the Idria mines in Venezia Giulia. Under the terms of the peace treaty the Idria mines, whose output averaged about one-eighth of the total Italian production, will no longer be within Italian territory.

² League of Nations: *International Trade Statistics*, 1938. See also Table, Appendix III, pp. 100-101.

ITALIAN PRODUCTION OF RAW MATERIALS¹ (in '000 metric tons)

Commodity	Production in 1938	% of world production	Comments	Commodity	Production in 1938	% of world production	Comments
METALS*				OTHER MINERALS†			
Antimony ..	0.925	2.5	Highest in Europe except for Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia.	Asbestos ..	7.0	—	—
Bauxite ² ..	361.0	8.7	6th in world.	Coal ..	960.0	0.1	0.1
Iron ore ..	520.0	0.7		Lignite ..	1,322.0 ⁴	0.6	0.6
Lead ore ..	40.0	2.2	3rd in Europe; low in relation to big producing countries (U.S.A., Mexico, Canada, and Australia).	Petroleum (crude) (Italian) ..	13.0 ⁵	—	—
				Pyrites ..	930.0	8.9	4th in world.
				Sulphur ..	397.0	12.8	2nd only to U.S.A.
				BUILDING MATERIALS			
				Cement ..	4,587.0	5.5	6th in world.
				Timber ⁶ ..			
				TEXTILE FIBRES AND RUBBER†			
Magnesite (crude)	6.0	0.4		Cotton ..	8.0	0.1	0.1
Manganese ore	15.0	0.4		Flax ..	3.3	0.4	0.4
Mercury ..	2.301	44.4	Highest in world.	Hemp ..	117.0	28.5	2nd only to U.S.S.R.
Silver ³ ..	0.026	0.3		Silk ..	2.0	4.0	Highest in Europe
Zinc ore ..	88.0	4.7	Highest in Europe except for Germany and Austria.	Wool ..	15.0	0.8	0.8
				VEGETABLE OILSEEDS			
				Cotton-seed ..	15.0	0.1	0.1
				Linseed ..	7.0	0.2	0.2
				Olive oil ..	175.0	23.6	2nd only to Spain.

*Chrome ore, copper, gold, molybdenum, nickel, tin, tungsten, vanadium—none, or only negligible quantities.

†No phosphates or potash.
‡No rubber; some synthetic rubber was manufactured during the war, but was never produced on a large scale.

¹ *World Production of Raw Materials* (1941. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs); and League of Nations: *Statistical Year-Book, 1938-9*.

² The two main bauxite-producing areas of Italy are Istria, and the more recently exploited S. Giovanni Rotondo deposits in Southern Italy. Under the peace treaty the former source will no longer remain within Italian territory. Carlo Penseri, writing in *L'Industria*, No. 1, 1946, p. 69, suggests that the Southern Italian deposits hold out much better prospects of future development than the Istrian.

³ Estimated figure.

⁴ Or, expressed in terms of coal, 265,000 metric tons.

⁵ Albania in 1938 produced 117,000 metric tons.

⁶ Timber is difficult to estimate in terms of annual production. In the years before the Abyssinian war home production averaged some 3 million cu. metres a year, with a roughly equivalent amount imported to meet a yearly consumption of some 6 million cu. metres. After 1935, however, imports were cut down, with a consequently heavy, and quite uneconomic, increase in the quantity of timber felled in Italian forests, to compensate for which, and for the further inroads made during the war period, a very careful use of home-grown timber will be necessary for some years to come.

estimated that 1946 production may approach pre-war figures (less the output of the Istrian mines).¹ Even so, and putting Italian needs at the conservative figure of some 11,400,000 tons for 1946,² this leaves a very large margin still to be covered, estimated at an import requirement of some 800,000 tons a month.³ Against this, an average of only some 450,000 tons a month was imported in the first seven months of 1946. In June 1946 Italy received a coal allocation from the European Coal Organization which included some supplies from the Ruhr, but by far the greatest proportion of coal imported has come from the United States through the medium of U.N.R.R.A. The revised U.N.R.R.A. plan of September 1946 envisaged an average coal import of 600,000 tons a month till the end of 1946, but deliveries were seriously affected by the American coal strike.

Italy possesses an important alternative source of energy in her water-power, derived from the rivers of the Alps and the Apennines, which serves to some extent to counteract her deficiency in other fuel resources, and which by 1938 was responsible for a very high percentage of her electrical energy. Here the picture is less dark, for, contrary to the worst fears, Italian power stations, particularly in North Italy, emerged from the war relatively little damaged. It has been estimated that in 1946 North Italian power stations should be able to produce some 96 per cent, and Central and Southern Italian stations some 61 per cent, of the pre-war (1938) figure, which totalled 15,108 million kilowatt-hours.⁴ But though the settlement of the peace treaty leaves the South Tirol, with its extensive power installations, in Italian hands, the cession to France of the important hydro-electric power stations in the Briga-Tenda and Mont Cenis regions, which supplied much of the power needed

¹ 'Elementi statistici sull'attuale ritmo produttivo dell'industria in Italia', by Amedeo Benussi, in *L'industria*, No. 1, 1946, pp. 104-5.

² *Piano*, p. 192.

³ This figure was reduced to an absolute minimum of 650,000 tons a month when the Italian delegate put his case before the European Coal Organization in May 1946. It was then stated that this import figure would allow Italian industry to reach 68 per cent of its pre-war capacity. See Bank for International Settlements: *Annual Report 1945-46*, p. 29.

⁴ *Piano*, pp. 20-21. This estimate seems to have been fairly correct—see League of Nations: *Monthly Bulletin of Statistics*, July 1946, according to which electrical production over the first five months of 1946 averaged 90 per cent of the pre-war figure.

for factories on the Ligurian coast and in the Val di Susa and Turin industrial areas, may sensibly diminish power resources in those regions.¹

(ii) *Foodstuffs*

The Fascist attempt to make Italy self-supporting was based on somewhat better premises with regard to foodstuffs than to raw materials, for, as has been already stated, she is a country with a predominantly agricultural economy. Even here, however, conditions are not too favourable for an autarkic experiment, especially in view of Italy's very large consumption of wheat products. Large tracts of Italy are barren and hilly or even mountainous, especially in the South, and the soil, except in the Po plains, is often poor and more suited to the cultivation of vines, olives, almonds, vegetables, and fruit than of grain crops or fodder. Despite the mountainous character of much of the country, the proportion of ploughed land in Italy is relatively high; in 1937 it was estimated as 42 per cent of the total surface, or the fourth highest in Europe,² and since then Mussolini's much-advertised and extremely costly schemes for *bonifica*, or land reclamation, coupled with the intensive drive for cultivation during the war, has put further tracts of land under cultivation. But even so Italy has not succeeded in making herself self-supporting; as regards cultivable land, saturation point has almost been reached for wheat, and moreover, in view of the predominantly poor quality of the soil, much of the surface now under cultivation can only continue to be productive with an extensive use of fertilizers. Italy herself produces no natural phosphates, and the shortage of fertilizers has been an increasingly acute problem during the war period. This fact, coupled with irregular rotation of crops and the excessive exploitation of certain crops during the war, means that the soil has become seriously impoverished.

In view of these facts it will readily be seen that the Fascist claim for the 'Battle for Wheat', which was supposed to have made Italy practically self-supporting in that respect, rests on extremely precarious premises—which in their turn can at any time be further falsified by the advent of a really bad harvest year such as 1945.

¹ See p. 89.

² *Piano*, p. 30.

ITALY'S ECONOMIC POSITION

It is true that in respect of certain foodstuffs, such as, for instance, wheat, maize, rice, and olive oil, Italy is one of the largest producers in Europe, excluding the U.S.S.R. as regards wheat. Even here, nevertheless, in only one instance—that of rice—do her exports exceed her imports,¹ as will be seen from the following table showing Italy's production of foodstuffs for 1935, a representative year, together with the balance of imports and exports.

ITALIAN PRODUCTION OF FOODSTUFFS, 1935²

TOGETHER WITH NET IMPORTS (+) AND NET EXPORTS (—)
(in '000 metric tons)

Commodity	Trade				Production
Barley	+	87	..	..	204
Maize	+	253	..	..	2,496
Oats	+	190	..	..	519
Rice	—	125	..	..	735
Rye	+	12	..	..	158
Wheat	+	550	..	..	7,696
Butter	+	0.2	..	..	45 ³
Olive oil	+	8.7	..	..	218 ⁴
Meat	+	25.7	..	..	633 ⁵
Sugar (beet)	—	—	..	..	289
Tobacco	—	1.2	..	..	46.3

In considering Italy's needs in the matter of foodstuffs, it must be remembered that Italians are more dependent than other western countries on grain products—bread and *pasta*. Relatively little meat is eaten—practically none among the peasants of the South. Nevertheless, even before the war a good deal of meat had to be imported, and since the war the position has been much more acute, with some 30 per cent of the live-stock lost, and with a serious shortage of animal feeding stuffs. To tide over the gap between the bad harvest of 1945 and that of 1946, which proved considerably better, supplies of wheat, amounting to 645,000 metric tons, were imported by U.N.R.R.A. during the first five months of 1946.⁶ Another million tons were allocated for the second half of the year, deliveries still outstanding being continued into early 1947, after which U.N.R.R.A. supplies are expected to cease. With this help

¹ Olive oil is imported for refining in Italy.

² League of Nations: *Raw Materials and Foodstuffs*, 1939, p. 53.

³ Estimated figure, 1934.

⁴ Excluding oil extracted from residues.

⁵ Figure for 1934.

⁶ *New York Times*, 16 June 1946.

THE NEW ITALY

the bread ration was maintained at 200 grms. a day during the first six months of 1946, and with the prospect of a good harvest the ration of bread was raised in July to 250 grms. a day, while that of *pasta* went up from 1 to 2 kg. a month. In consequence of the destruction of many Italian olive groves during the war, there is now a great scarcity of edible oils, which may to some extent be covered by the refinement of imported peanut oil.

THE INDUSTRIAL SITUATION

Industry in Italy developed rather later than in some other European countries. Mining made great progress in the early 1870's, and was followed by the development of the metallurgical industry in the early part of the present century, when the chemical industry was also established. The textile industry from the first played an important part in Italian industrial life. The silk industry existed before the unification of Italy, and the cotton industry had reached a considerable level of development by the end of the nineteenth century, while the woollen industry had become firmly established before the war of 1914-18.

Industrial production in Italy increased very considerably during the middle 1920's, and by 1928 the main industries were textiles, mechanical engineering, building, and the chemical industry.

The introduction of the autarkic experiment during the next ten years did not result in any great increase in industrial production in general, though certain sectors expanded very considerably, notably the rayon industry, production of aluminium, and also power production. By 1938, when Italy was already partially geared to a war economy, the changes in the output of the various industries, as compared with 1928, were as follows:

INDEX OF INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION, 1938¹

(1928 = 100)							
<i>Total</i>	<i>Textile</i>	<i>Metallurgical and mechanical</i>	<i>Paper</i>	<i>Building</i>	<i>Power, heat, and light</i>	<i>Extrac-tive</i>	<i>Chemical</i>
107.5	83.0	133.2	142.6	90.6	135.0	157.3	129.9

The trends already observable here continued, as might be expected, throughout the war years; in other words, the power

¹ *Piano*, p. 38.

and metallurgical and mechanical engineering industries increased production very considerably (the power industry having more than doubled its 1928 output in 1942), while the building and textile industries declined still further.

Contrary to all expectations, the North Italian factories were left relatively intact by the end of the war. Some damage had been caused by Allied bombing, but the worst fears that the factories would be wrecked or that plant might be transferred wholesale to Germany were not fulfilled. Thus from this point of view at least Italian industry embarked on reconstruction much less severely handicapped than had at first been anticipated. It was reckoned that productive capacity in the North had been reduced by only 5 to 7 per cent, while in the Centre and South, where damage was more serious, the reduction in capacity was put at rather less than 30 per cent.¹

There were, however, other serious factors calculated to hamper industrial revival. Of these, the most immediately obvious were (i) transport difficulties; (ii) shortage of raw materials, especially coal; (iii) shortage of foreign exchange; (iv) shortage of working capital. Other difficulties which became apparent as soon as the factories resumed work and envisaged selling their products were (v) high production costs, especially as regards wages; (vi) shortage of markets; (vii) the difficulty of opening up trade relations with outside countries, given a general lack of confidence in the lira and the uncertainty of Italy's economic position under the peace treaties.

Of the immediate difficulties, that of transport continued to be a seriously hampering factor throughout the early part of 1946; and though as the year went on it was gradually overcome as repairs to railway lines, bridges, dock installations, etc. were effected, shortage of rolling stock continued to present a problem. As to the shortage of raw materials, the coal situation has already been discussed above. Its crippling effect on Italian industry can only be partially offset by increased hydro-electric power production. Some factories still possessed at the end of the war stocks of raw materials on which they could work, but these were becoming exhausted by the middle of 1946, and the need for large-scale imports of industrial raw materials became increasingly urgent. Of U.N.R.R.A. supplies during the first

¹ *ibid.*, p. 47.

half of 1946, only 35 per cent consisted of raw materials, the remainder being foodstuffs; though for the second half of the year it was planned that 53 per cent should take the form of raw materials.¹ As the year went on some supplies of raw materials were also purchased abroad through private enterprise, though here would-be Italian buyers came up against the shortage of working capital and of foreign exchange, and were also seriously handicapped, as mentioned in (vii) above, by the doubts prevailing abroad as to Italy's general economic position.

Given the difficulties outlined above, it has sometimes been suggested that post-war Italy would be well advised to abandon efforts to maintain her heavy industry at a high level, and should concentrate rather on agriculture, light industries, and the home and handicrafts industries, or *artigianato*, for which she has always been famous. On the other hand, as regards an increased concentration on agriculture, a diametrically opposite point of view is put forward by many students of Italian affairs, who hold that, even with an extensive breaking-up of the large landed estates such as is envisaged by the Government, it will be impossible for the soil to support more workers, and therefore, to quote Mr Ivor Thomas,² 'if the Italian standard of life is to be raised . . . it will be necessary to get a higher proportion of her population into industry.' In considering the pros and cons of these suggestions the pre-war structure of Italian economic life must be borne in mind. As has already been mentioned,³ 47·7 per cent of the total employed population were then occupied in agriculture. Of the remainder, by far the largest proportion—29·3 per cent, or some 5,375,000 persons, according to the 1936 census—were employed in industry. Of the average number of persons employed in industry during 1936-40, estimated at 5,370,000, it has been calculated that 3,250,000 can be classed as *dipendenti*, or employees; 1,119,000 as *artigiani*, or craftsmen; and 1,001,000 as employers of labour.⁴ The *dipendenti*, or employees, were distributed as follows among the various industries⁵:—

¹ *Avanti*, 9 August 1946.

² *op. cit.*, p. 81.

³ See table, p. 58.

⁴ *Piano*, p. 223. The high figure of 1,001,000 for 'employers' includes owners of workshops and other very small concerns.

⁵ *ibid.*

ITALY'S ECONOMIC POSITION

<i>Industry</i>	<i>Average number of workers, 1936-40 (in 1'000's)</i>
Mining and quarrying	137
Timber, wood, carpentry	103
Food	453
Metallurgical	104
Mechanical engineering	675
Non-metallic minerals	177
Chemical	128
Paper	55
Printing	59
Hides and Leather	69
Textile	593
Clothing	62
*Power, gas, and water	42
Building	480
Various	113
	3,250

In other words, by far the largest number of industrial workers were employed in the mechanical engineering and textile industries, with the building and food production industries coming third and fourth. These two latter industries will obviously continue to employ large numbers of workers, especially in view of the vast reconstruction programme which may be expected to provide work in the building industry for many more than the pre-war number for some time to come.

As regards the future of Italian heavy industry opinions are especially divided,¹ and its resumption on any large scale is in any case likely to be limited for some time to come by the amount of necessary raw materials that can be imported. But the mechanical engineering industry, where the change-over from war-time to peace-time production has already been effected in many factories, stands in urgent need of iron and steel for the manufacture of machines connected with reconstruction requirements (rail and road transport and machinery replacement), and for the resumption of the automobile industry. A reasonable view, and one held by many Italian economists, would seem to be that heavy industry should eventually limit itself to meeting the needs of the transport, mechanical engineering, and ship-building industries.

In pre-war years Italy was the world's largest exporter of

¹ For a detailed discussion of this question, see 'L'avvenire della siderurgia italiana', by Ivo Monti, in *L'industria*, No. 1, 1946, pp. 10-46; and 'Chiose al Bilancio', by Libero Lenti, in *Corriere della Sera*, 22/23 July 1946.

rayon yarn, second in cotton yarn, and third in raw silk.¹ The resumption of work in the textile industry is a vital factor in Italy's rehabilitation. Here again, however, the need to import raw materials, especially cotton, was an initial difficulty in recovery, and one which U.N.R.R.A. imports during the early part of 1946 could do little to solve. This position, however, improved considerably with the increase of industrial imports in the second half of the year. A partial and temporary solution has been found in arranging for Italian mills to work on account with supplies of raw materials provided by foreign firms whose productive capacity is already overburdened, retaining as part-payment some percentage of the raw materials for the home market.² By the autumn of 1946 the cotton industry was working at over 70 per cent of capacity and was even doing an export trade which promised to be greatly increased in 1947. The woollen industry had also made great strides towards reaching its pre-war position. The artificial fibres industry still lagged behind owing to the difficulty of obtaining the necessary cellulose and chemicals and also, more especially, the large quantities of coal needed for the industry; by the autumn of 1946 it had reached about one-third of the pre-war production.

Reference has already been made to the high production costs which constitute one of the main difficulties of Italian industrialists. Here a word must be said about the labour situation. In order to maintain workers in some degree of employment the Government, after the liberation, placed a ban on their dismissal. This ban was relaxed to some extent in January 1946, when the dismissal of a certain small percentage was allowed, but the whole position remained extremely unsatisfactory, and it will be some time before the effects of legislation, promised for the autumn of 1946, will be felt. The result has been that industrialists have been faced with an enormous pay-roll, towards meeting which a Government subsidy gives them only partial assistance, while in many instances, owing to shortage of raw materials, factories (with the exception of textile concerns) have been able to provide so little work that many of the workers are practically idle, or are only employed for very short hours. On

¹ See 'Italy's Textiles', by Mary E. Poole, in *Foreign Commerce Weekly*, 1 June 1946.

² *ibid.*; and *Manchester Guardian*, 3 April 1946.

ITALY'S ECONOMIC POSITION

the other hand, wholesale dismissal of workers would only further aggravate the unemployment situation, already rendered acute by the return of large numbers of prisoners of war and former conscript workers from Germany. In August 1946 the total number of unemployed in Italy was estimated at well over 2 million.¹

A further difficulty in the labour field lies in the fact that both wages and unemployment pay are quite inadequate in relation to the greatly increased cost of living.² The C.G.I.L. has made strong representations on this subject and, at any rate to some extent, sponsored the strike wave which took place early in July 1946, which was followed by the granting of a government cash bonus to all workers. In October an agreement was reached between the Industrialists' Confederation and the C.G.I.L. providing for increases of 35 to 50 per cent on basic wages and 50 per cent in allowances for children. This agreement also envisaged a six-months' truce in wage disputes in order to allow the Government time to implement its policy of raising the workers' living standard. It is also hoped that the creation of administrative committees in industrial concerns, with equal representation of both employers and workers, the establishment and legal recognition of which forms a part of the Government's policy, may assist towards an improvement of conditions, though any such improvement must in the last instance be dependent on possibilities for the resumption of work in factories on a much larger scale.

The policy of the Government with regard to nationalization has been in favour of State control of public works and of certain branches of industry, while leaving scope for private initiative. Signor De Gasperi, replying in an interview during the Peace Conference to M. Molotov's criticisms on this score, said that the State controlled 60 per cent of the metallurgical industry, 90 per cent of the shipyards, 100 per cent of the passenger shipping, 75 per cent of the telephone network, and 35 per cent of the electric power. He furthermore added that as the State controlled 87 per cent of all savings through the Institute for Industrial Reconstruction and other public bodies, no large-

¹ *Manchester Guardian*, 26 August 1946.

² According to U.N.R.R.A. estimates in the autumn of 1946, the cost of living had then increased to thirty times the 1938 figure, whereas wages on an average had only increased to eleven times the pre-war figure.

THE NEW ITALY

scale financing other than that countenanced by the State could occur.¹

FOREIGN TRADE

It is obvious that one of the most important factors in Italy's rehabilitation lies in her resumption of foreign trade. Here again the difficulty of shortage of raw materials arises. As has been shown above, Italy needs to import raw materials for industrial manufacture; but, apart from agricultural produce, her main source of exports wherewith to pay for those imports would naturally lie in industrial manufactured goods, and these she cannot produce without raw materials. Hence a vicious circle.

An adverse balance of trade was a normal feature in Italy's pre-war external accounts, as will be seen from the following table.

ITALIAN TRADE BALANCE²

		<i>Imports</i>		<i>Exports</i> (⁰ 000,000 lire)		<i>Balance</i>
1925	..	26,200	..	18,274	..	— 7,926
1927	..	20,375	..	15,634	..	— 4,741
1928	..	21,920	..	14,556	..	— 7,364
1929	..	21,303	..	14,884	..	— 6,419
1930	..	17,347	..	12,119	..	— 5,228
1931	..	11,643	..	10,210	..	— 1,433
1932	..	8,268	..	6,812	..	— 1,456
1933	..	7,432	..	5,991	..	— 1,441
1934	..	7,675	..	5,224	..	— 2,451
1935	..	7,790	..	5,238	..	— 2,552
1936	..	6,039	..	5,542	..	— 497
1937	..	13,917	..	10,432	..	— 3,485
1938	..	11,271	..	10,458	..	— 813

This deficit was offset chiefly by receipts from the tourist trade, by remittances from emigrants, and by receipts from shipping contracts, which last item in normal times accounted for nearly 10 per cent of the total assets in the Italian balance of payments and averaged over 1,560 million lire a year over the years 1936-39.

In the immediate pre-war years the autarkic experiment resulted in a considerable decrease in Italy's foreign trade, both import and export. The main imports were coal, oils, scrap iron and other metals, and raw cotton, while the main exports were fruit and textile manufactures.³

¹ *Messaggero*, 15 August 1946.

² *Annuario Statistico Italiano*, 1939.

³ See table, Appendix III.

ITALY'S ECONOMIC POSITION

The gradual increase of German influence, resulting in a diversion of trade towards Germany and Austria and away from the United Kingdom and United States, can be seen from the following tables. Another point to be noted in the second table is the very small proportion of imports which Italy received from her colonies, to which, on the other hand, her exports were very considerable.

DIRECTION OF ITALIAN TRADE 1926-38¹

			% of exports to Central Europe	% of exports to U.S.A., U.K., and British Empire
1926-30	..	..	38.80	37.61
1931-35	..	..	40.81	34.30
1935-38	..	..	46.04	30.89

MAIN COUNTRIES TRADING WITH ITALY, 1936-38²

	1936 ³		1937		1938	
	Import	Export	Import	Export	Import	Export
Germany ..	26.8	19.6	18.6	14.4	26.8	18.9
Austria ..	6.1	3.5	4.5	2.8		
U.S.A. ..	14.8	9.9	11.0	7.5	11.8	7.5
United Kingdom ..	0.9	2.8	4.0	6.1	6.3	5.6
Switzerland ..	3.9	6.2	3.0	4.9	3.4	4.7
Argentina ..	2.9	2.9	7.6	3.9	2.4	3.9
France ..	2.1	3.5	4.2	4.2	2.2	3.1
U.S.S.R. ..	2.6	0.2	0.8	0.1	0.1	—
COLONIES						
Eritrea ..	0.5	19.2	0.8	15.2	0.2	12.6
Ethiopia ..	0.1	1.3	0.5	2.6	0.3	2.8
Libya ..	0.8	6.0	0.7	3.8	0.5	5.0
Italian Somaliland ..	0.9	3.9	0.5	2.1	0.7	2.1
	2.3	30.4	2.5	23.7	1.7	22.5

It will thus be seen that, in envisaging a resumption of foreign trade relations, Italy was at once faced with the problem of having to find new markets, Germany and the former colonies being out of count, and the South American markets still impracticable owing to transport difficulties.

This problem only presented itself in practical form at the beginning of 1946, for till then the Italian Government had no freedom of negotiation as regards foreign trade, being still subject to Allied authority in this matter. As from 15 February 1946, however, the Italian Government was empowered to resume private trading without reference to Allied control,

¹ *Piano*, p. 44, note 1.

² *League of Nations: International Trade Statistics, 1938*, p. 158.

³ Affected by sanctions.

THE NEW ITALY

subject to the limitation (which applied also in other countries) that items on a 'reserved commodity' list of goods in short world supply could not be exported.

One of the main difficulties in the way of reopening trade relations was Italy's shortage of foreign exchange. The Government on 22 March 1946 approved a measure designed to meet to some extent the private exporters' difficulty in this respect by permitting them to retain 50 per cent of the foreign-exchange proceeds of their sales abroad (hitherto retained by the State) wherewith to finance private imports, while the remaining 50 per cent is to be made over to the State, to be repaid later at the official rate of exchange. The foreign exchange thus acquired by the private trader is to be used within 3 months, for the purchase of goods classified as essential imports by the Ministry of Commerce.

Despite the various adverse factors, Italian foreign trade figures showed a remarkable increase during the first eight months of 1946. At the end of this period the monthly value of imports had trebled, while that of exports had increased ten-fold, and in September 1946 passed the 8 milliard mark. The following table shows the value of imports and exports and the commodities involved.

ITALIAN FOREIGN TRADE, JANUARY—AUGUST 1946¹

Commodities	Tonnage	IMPORT		EXPORT		
		Value (‘000,000 lire)	% of total	Tonnage	Value (‘000,000 lire)	% of total
Foodstuffs	1,427,732	21,091	39·6	251,422	7,740	24·0
Oilseeds, oils, and fats	24,584	1,036	1·8	1,355	93	0·3
Textile materials and products	148,360	13,079	23·0	32,314	15,968	50·6
Metallic minerals, metallurgical and mechanical engineering products	89,248	1,989	3·1	107,707	1,785	5·2
Non-metallic minerals (including coal), building materials, china, glass	3,622,536	10,672	20·0	67,822	618	1·9
Wood, cordage	38,502	287	0·5	21,263	832	2·3
Chemical products	573,207	3,717	6·4	19,968	1,613	5·1
Various	107,554	3,390	6·2	16,779	3,341	10·6
TOTAL	6,031,723	55,261	100·0	518,630	31,990	100·0

As will be seen, the value of exports was still very much lower than that of imports, though the proportion of exports to imports

¹ *Il Globo*, 10 October 1946.

increased as the months went on. Textiles accounted for by far the largest proportion of the export trade (50 per cent); this included silk, artificial fibres, and cotton manufactures, while on the import side there was a large import of raw cotton. Foodstuffs (mainly vegetables and fruit) constituted the next main item of export (24 per cent of the total); imports of foodstuffs included the large consignments of wheat referred to above.¹ Chemical and mechanical engineering products (machinery, precision instruments, etc.) together accounted for something over 10 per cent of the total exports; the relatively small proportion of metallic mineral imports goes to show what difficulties the heavy industry has to face. Coal, of course, accounts largely for the very high figure of non-metallic mineral imports. Other significant import items have been mineral oils, paper, and rubber.

By far the largest volume of imports (about a third of the total value) has come from the United States, and this position is likely to continue for some time. Other sources of imports have hitherto been Britain, Switzerland, France, Sweden, and Egypt. Exports to the United States were low in the early months of the year, but increased until by the autumn of 1946 they represented nearly a third of the total value. The other main recipients of Italian exports were Britain and Switzerland.

Apart from her trade relations with the United States and Britain, Italy had by the autumn of 1946 negotiated provisional short-term commercial treaties with Switzerland, Sweden, Spain, France, Denmark, Norway, Belgium, Austria, Holland, and Poland.² Resumption of trade with South America has hitherto been impeded by transport difficulties, but arrangements were made for an Italian economic delegation to go there in the autumn of 1946 to explore possibilities. Russian trade representatives visited Italy in July, but small hopes of trade relations were held out until after the signature of the peace treaty; though under the peace treaty Russia is to send raw materials to Italy for manufacture on reparations account.³ In discussions with Signor Nenni in Paris at the time of the Peace

¹ See p. 65.

² For details, see 'Italy's Commercial Treaties', in *Italian Economic Survey* (published by the Association of Italian Joint Stock Companies), June 1946; and *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 7 March and 10 June 1946.

³ See pp. 90-91.

Conference, M. Molotov is said to have declared that Russia would have no objections to Italy's resumption of trade with Roumania and Poland,¹ and a trade agreement with Poland was, in fact, signed in October 1946 providing for an exchange consisting of coal from Poland and an equivalent value of agricultural and industrial goods from Italy.

Italy's efforts to resume trade relations on any large scale are bound to be severely hampered by her shortage of merchant shipping, resulting both from war losses (which amounted to nearly one-third of the total tonnage), and from the uncertainties of the peace treaties. The Italian merchant fleet before the war was the sixth largest in the world, with a total tonnage in 1938 of 3,290,000 tons.² The Minister of Merchant Marine, Aldisio, stated in August 1946³ that the main possibilities of reconstruction lay in salvage (from which it was hoped to recover 300,000 tons); in acquisitions from abroad (50 Liberty ships of a total gross tonnage of 340,000 tons have been bought in the United States); and in the production of Italian shipyards, which might be able to launch 200,000 tons in the near future. Aldisio hoped that during 1947 Italy might command about half her pre-war merchant tonnage; though it should be added that other estimates are nothing like so optimistic, especially in view of the consideration that under the peace treaty Italy loses the Trieste shipyards.

THE FINANCIAL SITUATION

It is impossible within the scope of a small book such as this to do more than touch on one or two of the salient points in the Italian financial situation. That situation has been especially complicated since the war ended owing to such factors as the prevailing uncertainty regarding reparations and the economic clauses of the peace treaty, and also to the aftermath of the division of the country during the neo-Fascist period, when there were two separate Ministries of Finance pursuing totally divergent policies.

One legacy of neo-Fascist days is the enormous amount of currency now in circulation. By the end of 1946 this had reached

¹ *Le Monde*, 10 August 1946.

² League of Nations: *Statistical Year Book*, 1938-9, p. 199.

³ *Il Globo*, 21 August 1946.

the astronomical figure of over 400 milliard lire (as against 18,955,000,000 in 1938, and over 96,000,000,000 by July 1943). Signor Einaudi, the Governor of the Banca d'Italia, in presenting his report to the Bank in March 1946, attributed the major responsibility for the increase which took place between the armistice and the end of 1945 to the Germans and neo-Fascists, as 61.2 per cent of the increased currency in circulation emanated from the neo-Fascist Republican territory, the remainder being almost entirely attributable to the issue of Amlire, as the Allied military currency for occupation expenses came to be called. Signor Corbino, then Minister for the Treasury, in his statement of policy to the Constituent Assembly on 22 July 1946, stated that no additional note issue had been made after 12 December 1945. Nevertheless, notes in circulation in fact soon started to increase again, and by the middle of the year had passed the December 1945 figure. No more military lire were issued after 15 March 1946, when the total issued amounted to over 90 milliard lire.

Italian financial policy during the earlier part of 1946 suffered from severe difficulties, not the least of which was a division of opinion among those in control as to how best the problems of reconstruction should be tackled. Ever since the formation of the first Bonomi Government after the liberation of Rome there have been two financial Ministries in the Government, one for Finance, which is concerned with the raising of revenue, and the other for the Treasury, which is concerned with expenditure.¹ These Ministries have always been in charge of men of different party affiliations. The Treasury Minister in the first De Gasperi Government of December 1945 was Signor Corbino, a non-party economist of the liberal school, while his colleague in the Finance Ministry was a Communist, Scoccimarro. These two Ministers expressed widely differing viewpoints, which corresponded roughly to those held in right- and left-wing circles respectively, on such subjects as State intervention in economic affairs, capital levy, currency devaluation, and the adjustment of wages to cost of living. The renewal of both Ministers in the same offices in the second De Gasperi Government in June 1946 appeared to threaten a prolongation of the uncertainties as regards financial policy which

¹ They were, however, combined in January 1947.

had overshadowed the earlier part of the year, and continued left-wing criticisms led to Corbino's resignation in September. He was replaced by Giovanni Battista Bertone, a Christian Democrat and former Minister of Finance under Facta in the pre-Fascist era.

Bertone, in his first speech after assuming office,¹ stated that the estimated budget deficit had already been overstepped in the first quarter of the financial year 1946-7 (i.e. July-September 1946). Expenditure for the year had been estimated at 341 milliard lire, revenue at 148 milliard, and deficit at 193 milliard. During the first quarter, however, though revenue had been higher than was anticipated, the estimated deficit was exceeded by over 50 milliard lire, largely because of heavy expenditure (over 40 milliard lire) in respect of public works, and the Minister now anticipated an expenditure of 700 milliard and revenue at between 400 and 450 milliard in the year ending June 1947. Another serious feature of the financial situation, to which Bertone referred in a later speech,² is the enormous public debt, amounting to over 1,000 milliard lire, of which 270 milliard is represented by short-term bills, 263 milliard by Treasury Bonds due to expire within the next three years, and at least 350 milliard by bills due to the Bank of Italy. The extraordinary burdens which account for this large-scale expenditure and indebtedness are of a kind which must inevitably recur for some years to come, e.g. reconstruction of public works, war damage compensation, reparations, etc.

To meet this situation Italy will need to draw on both internal and foreign sources. As regards internal resources, radical revision of the taxation system is envisaged, together with a much heavier tax on landed property and an extraordinary levy on capital. Currency devaluation, which was the subject of violent disagreements throughout the earlier part of 1946, was definitely foreshadowed by Signor Bertone in October. In adopting these measures the Government aims at putting a stop to speculation and stabilizing prices, though devaluation would, of course, in the absence of price control, tend to give a further impetus to prices. It was also hoped that the truce in the wages dispute, agreed to in October,³ would go some way towards

¹ *Il Globo*, 26 September 1946.

² *Il Globo*, 17 October 1946.

³ See above, p. 71.

ITALY'S ECONOMIC POSITION

anchoring the value of the lira. The 3½ per cent Reconstruction Loan launched on 15 November 1946, which was open for six weeks, brought in 231 milliard lire.

As regards foreign borrowing, Italy's prospects greatly improved with her admission on 2 October 1946 to membership of the Bretton Woods Agreement, carrying with it participation in the Bank for Reconstruction and the International Monetary Fund, wherein she has been allotted a quota of \$180 million. She will thus be in a position to ask for a loan to finance her 1947 import programme, though it is not a foregone conclusion that she will get it, since the policy of the Bank will in general probably be to act according to commercial considerations of credit-worthiness. One essential step will be to stabilize and make freely convertible the lira, which has undergone a noteworthy depreciation on the black market, the rate (which is openly quoted in a reputable Rome financial daily, the *Globo*) going up as high as 1,450 or even 1,600 lire to the £, as against the official rate of 400, or 900 for commercial transactions.

Another encouraging feature in the sphere of foreign finance was the decision of the United States in mid-October 1946 to make immediately available to Italy the sum of \$50 million as part reimbursement, to be followed by further payments, for lire advanced by Italy during the war to the U.S. forces there for various purposes other than troops' pay, which latter item has already been reimbursed. It was hoped that this initiative, which was followed by a similar gesture on the part of Canada, would serve to facilitate negotiations for a big loan to Italy from the Export-Import Bank in Washington; and in fact the United States Government announced on 14 January 1947 that it was prepared to lend \$100 million to Italy in 1947.

Thus in the winter of 1946-7, though the burden of reparations still loomed ahead and the uncertainties attendant on industrial revival in post-war conditions were still very considerable, there were nevertheless some grounds for encouragement in the Italian economic scene on the international side, especially in view of Signor De Gasperi's successful visit to the United States in January 1947. At home, however, the problem of the unbalanced budget still remains, and is likely to be a perennial difficulty, as indeed it was in pre-war years, unless some more effective means of collecting taxes can be devised.

Chapter V

THE PEACE TREATY

UNCERTAINTY regarding the provisions of the peace treaty overshadowed Italy's efforts towards political and economic reconstruction during the whole of the three years following the conclusion of the armistice in September 1943. Italy declared war on Germany on 13 October 1943, and from that date, as has been shown above,¹ gradually played an increasingly active part as a co-belligerent beside the United Nations. Thus the position of Italy at the Peace Conference differed from that of the other ex-enemy satellites, in that she could offset her participation in the Axis war by a much longer period of definite contribution made to the cause of the United Nations.

This aspect of the question presented itself very clearly to Italian minds. In the view of anti-Fascist Italians, the events of 1943—the downfall of Fascism, the armistice, the declaration of war on Germany, the setting-up of an anti-Fascist Italian Government, and the development of active resistance in the North—constituted a complete break with the past, and while it was realized that Italy must pay for a war fought and lost beside Germany, it was also strongly felt that that was *Mussolini's* war, and that the new Italy, having honestly done what she could to 'work her passage home', should be recognized as such and freed from the stigma of association with the Fascist past. This point of view came out clearly, for instance, in the objections raised by the Italian Government to the wording of the preamble of the draft peace treaty, which began: 'Whereas Italy under the Fascist regime became a party to the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Japan, declared a war of aggression, and entered into war with all the Allied and Associated Powers . . .'—a wording which the Italians, unsuccessfully, maintained should be changed to 'Italy *had been led by* the Fascist regime . . .' The same psychological approach also goes some way towards accounting for the Italian attitude regarding the territorial and, more particularly, the reparations clauses of the peace treaty.

¹ See pp. 31-3.

THE PEACE TREATY

Italians argue that the United Nations held out encouragement that a democratic Italy would eventually be enabled to take her place among the free nations, and that it is consequently unjust and illogical, in a treaty which includes promises of Allied support for Italy's application to join U.N.O., to hamper Italian efforts at reconstruction by imposing territorial losses and heavy reparations demands.

The provisions of the Italian treaty were discussed by the Four-Power Council of Foreign Ministers at meetings in London in the autumn of 1945, and again in Paris in April-May and June-July 1946. The recommendations of the Council were incorporated in a draft peace treaty¹ which was presented for consideration to the Peace Conference of twenty-one nations which met in Paris from 29 July to 15 October 1946. The Paris Conference discussed this draft clause by clause and proposed amendments which were accepted or rejected according to a majority vote. The draft treaty was then re-examined, in the light of the amendments recommended in Paris, and finally approved, by the Council of Foreign Ministers in New York in November-December. The Ministers' deputies then drew up the final texts,² and it was agreed that the treaty should be signed in Paris on 10 February, 1947, and should come into force shortly after, on ratification.

The treaty covers three main aspects—territorial (including colonial); naval, military, and air; and economic. While the territorial aspects have aroused the most controversy and have proved the most difficult of settlement, the economic clauses may prove to be of greater significance as regards their effects on Italy's revival.

THE TERRITORIAL CLAUSES

The territorial and political clauses are concerned with Italy's frontiers with Yugoslavia, Austria, and France; the Greek claim to the Dodecanese; and the question of the Italian colonies.

¹ *Draft Peace Treaty with Italy*. Italy No. 1, Cmd. 6892, 1946. (London: H.M. Stationery Office.)

² *Treaties of Peace with Italy, Roumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Finland*. Misc. No. 1 (1947), Cmd. 7022. (London: H.M. Stationery Office.) A summary of the treaty provisions is given in the *Commentary on the Treaties . . .* (Misc. No. 2 (1947), Cmd. 7026). Subsequent references will be to the Articles and Annexes of the final treaty, unless otherwise stated.


(i) *The Frontier with Yugoslavia*

It is impossible here to go into the complicated question of the rights and wrongs of the Italo-Yugoslav frontier question.¹ It proved to be the knottiest problem facing the Peace Conference, and even at times threatened to cause its breakdown. Both Italy and Yugoslavia consider that they have a claim to the frontier region on historical grounds dating back far beyond the period of its inclusion in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Yugoslavia, as one of the United Nations, claimed that the frontier with Italy, which as a result of the peace settlement of 1919 included within Italian territory the whole of Venezia Giulia (i.e. the Istrian peninsula and the mountainous region to the north of it), should be readjusted in her favour so as to allocate all Venezia Giulia, including Trieste, to Yugoslavia. The Yugoslavs base their claim chiefly on ethnical grounds, and contend that a large Slovene population was unjustly handed over to Italy in 1919 and suffered the fate of a persecuted minority during the Fascist period. The Italians, on the other hand, while admitting that the population of the peninsula's eastern region is predominantly Slav, point to the Italian character and population of the coastal towns on the west, and especially of Trieste, and to their close association with Italy in the past. The question of Trieste itself provides a further complication, for while the town is mainly Italian, its hinterland has a largely Slovene population. Under the Austro-Hungarian Empire the port was in a flourishing condition and a large proportion of its traffic came from the upper Danubian regions. After its allocation to Italy this hinterland traffic declined and tended more and more to go north, utilizing the Rhine and Danube waterways and the north German ports rather than Trieste. Thus the future of the port, under whatever regime, would seem to depend to a great extent on the revival of this hinterland traffic.

The situation was still further complicated by the seizure of Trieste by Marshal Tito's forces at the time of its liberation from

¹ This question, both between the two wars and since 1945, has been the subject of an extensive propaganda literature, in which the Yugoslavs have shown themselves much the more prolific of the two parties. A useful work giving much statistical information is *The Italo-Yugoslav Boundary*, by A. E. Moodie (1945. London: G. Philip). For a recent summary of the situation see 'The Venezia Giulia Question', in *The World Today*, October 1945.

THE PEACE TREATY



THE FRONTIER WITH YUGOSLAVIA

the Germans in May 1945.¹ The Yugoslavs at first refused to surrender control to the joint Allied authorities, and remained in occupation of Trieste and the peninsula until 21 June 1945,

¹ For a description of conditions at this time see 'Trieste Diary', in *The World Today*, October 1945.

when they withdrew behind a provisional boundary between the Anglo-American and Yugoslav zones of occupation (the 'Morgan line'), which was fixed by agreement between General Morgan and General Jovanović. This provisional boundary was to remain in force until, but was not to prejudice, the final settlement.

Faced with this problem, the Council of Foreign Ministers decided to send out a commission to examine conditions on the spot, and in March 1946 a Four-Power boundary commission conducted a detailed investigation in the region, but failed to reach agreement on its recommendations. Each of the investigating Powers proposed a different line,¹ the Russian line lying furthest to the west and including roughly the maximum Yugoslav claims; the American furthest to the east, followed fairly closely by the British, allotting a large part of the Istrian peninsula to Italy and dividing between Italy and Yugoslavia the coal and bauxite deposits of the region; and the French line being the one most nearly approximating to an 'ethnic' frontier, but leaving Trieste with only a very narrow hinterland.

It was this French line, with some minor modifications, which the Council of Foreign Ministers eventually decided to adopt as a basis of settlement, and they furthermore proposed to deal with the special question of Trieste by creating a Free Territory of Trieste to the west of the French line, including the port and the region surrounding it.² These recommendations were discussed at length by the Paris Conference, where the Italian and Yugoslav representatives stated their respective cases and also attempted without success to reach some agreement by direct conversations. The Conference endorsed by a more than two-thirds majority the decision to create a Free Territory of Trieste. It was obvious from the first that the proposed settlement would satisfy neither party. The Italians had hoped for a line further to the east, approximating more nearly to the 'Wilson line' proposed, but not adopted, after

¹ See map p. 83.

² Articles 11 and 16 in draft treaty. In the final treaty, the frontiers between Italy and Yugoslavia are defined in Article 3, those of the Free Territory in Articles 4 and 22. Article 21 provides for the establishment of the Free Territory of Trieste, and the texts of the other instruments concerned therewith are given in Annexes vi-x (Annex vi, Permanent Statute of the Free City of Trieste; Annex vii, Instrument for the Provisional Regime of the Free Territory of Trieste; Annex viii, Instrument for the Free Port of Trieste; Annex ix, Technical dispositions; Annex x, Economic and financial provisions).

the 1914-18 war; while the Yugoslavs remained intransigent in their claims for the whole peninsula, including Trieste. The Italian standpoint received support from the Western Powers, while the U.S.S.R. supported Yugoslavia, though with some degree of embarrassment when Yugoslav intransigence threatened to clash with Russian commitments made at the Four-Power conferences.

The question of the Statute of the Free Territory and the powers of its Governor and proposed Assembly aroused the bitterest arguments, for the Western group, fearing that Yugoslavia might attempt to 'pack' the Assembly with Slovene elements, wished to limit the power of the Assembly and give far-reaching authority to the Governor, whereas the Eastern group sought to restrict the Governor's influence and give the maximum degree of authority to the Assembly. This whole question was left undecided in Paris, and led to prolonged controversy in New York. It was, however, finally the subject of M. Molotov's major concessions there. It was agreed¹ that the Governor (who must not be a citizen of Italy or of Yugoslavia, or of the Free Territory) should be appointed by the Security Council after consultation with the Governments of Yugoslavia and Italy, and that executive authority should be in the hands of a Council of Government to be formed by and responsible to the Assembly. The Governor is to have power to veto any treaties with foreign Governments which in his judgment conflict with the Free Territory's Statute, Constitution, and laws. He is to appoint the judiciary from among candidates proposed by the Council of Government. And he is to appoint, and have power to dismiss, the chief of police (who must be neither Italian nor Yugoslav), who in his turn will appoint and dismiss members of the police force. The chief of police will take his orders from the Council of Government in 'normal times', but the Governor may assume authority over the police in times of emergency, and has the authority to decide when an emergency exists. The Trieste Assembly is to be elected four months after the Governor takes office, and the Constitution of the Free State is to be approved by it.

Further agreements reached in New York with regard to the Trieste Territory include the creation therein of a free port,²

¹ Annex vi.

² Annex viii.

the Statute for which is to be drafted by the Council of Foreign Ministers for approval by the Security Council, while a commission of inquiry is to investigate the Customs and economic prospects.

On the vexed question of the withdrawal of Allied troops from the region, it was decided that the Governor of the Free Territory should announce, 90 days after taking office, whether or not troops could leave the territory. If this opinion is affirmative, the military authorities on the spot are to decide when the troops can go. In any event, immediately on ratification of the treaty the troops of each of the three occupying Powers—Britain,¹ the United States, and Yugoslavia—are to be reduced to 5,000 each, and are thenceforward to be at the Governor's disposal.¹


By a decision of 10 January, 1947, the Security Council accepted its responsibilities in relation to the Permanent Statute, the Provisional Regime, and the Free Port of Trieste.

Neither Italy nor Yugoslavia are satisfied with the terms of the treaty. Yugoslavia, indeed, withdrew from the Paris Conference just before it ended, and announced that she would not sign the treaty in the form then proposed. Subsequently Marshal Tito, through the medium of Togliatti, in November put forward a proposal that Trieste should remain under Italian sovereignty provided Gorizia were ceded to Yugoslavia. The Italian Government declined to consider this proposal, but expressed its willingness to enter into direct negotiations with Yugoslavia. The best hope for a satisfactory implementation of the treaty probably lies in the working out of ways and means by such direct negotiations between the two countries.

(ii) *The Frontier with Austria*

The question of Italy's northern frontier with Austria fared somewhat better at the Conference, largely as a result of efforts towards conciliation on the part of the Italian and Austrian Governments. Here too the makers of the present peace settlement were faced with a legacy of the 1914-18 war, and here too both sides based their claims in part on long-standing historical grounds. By the Treaty of St Germain in 1919 Italy had acquired the South Tirolese region of Austria up to the Brenner frontier. This involved the transfer to Italy of nearly a quarter of a million

¹ Annex vii, Article 5.



THE FRONTIER WITH AUSTRIA

Austrians, who for the next twenty years suffered enforced Italianization at the hands of the Fascists. Austrians during this period repeatedly put forward arguments for a revision of the frontier,¹ and one of the first actions of the Austrian Provisional Government after its recognition in October 1945 was to renew the Austrian claim to the South Tirol.

On ethnical grounds Austria has a very strong case with regard to the northern portion of the region, roughly coincident with the present Italian province of Bolzano, whose population, despite a good deal of Italian infiltration between the wars, is still predominantly German in character. The Italian character of the southern portion (the province of Trento) has never been in doubt, and Austria would have been satisfied to

¹ See, for example, *Die Wahrheit über Südtirol, 1918-26*, issued in an English edition as *The Case of German South Tirol against Italy*, edited by C. H. Herford (1927. London: Allen & Unwin). For a recent summary see 'The South Tirol and its Future', in *The World Today*, December 1945.

leave this region in Italian hands if the frontier could have followed the roughly linguistic boundary north of Salerno, approximating fairly closely to the boundary line between the two provinces. Italy, on the other hand, based her arguments for the retention of the whole region partly on strategic grounds and partly—a more convincing argument in these days of potential atomic warfare—on economic considerations such as the extensive development of hydro-electrical power which Italian money and labour set on foot in the South Tirol between the two wars.

The South Tirolese question was the first of the major issues of the Italian treaty on which the Council of Foreign Ministers reached an agreement, and the recommendation put forward on 30 April 1946 was that the frontier should remain unchanged (Article 10). How far the question was decided on its own merits, and how far as a result of power politics at a high level, can only be a matter for speculation. Be that as it may, Austria appealed unsuccessfully against the recommendation in Paris; it also seems probable that Italy would have viewed an adverse decision regarding South Tirol with something approaching equanimity if she could instead have hoped to obtain a satisfactory settlement regarding Venezia Giulia and reparations. However, faced with the prospect of having to make the existing frontier a practicable proposition, Signor De Gasperi for Italy and Dr Gruber for Austria concluded a separate bilateral agreement on 5 September 1946. This agreement provided for complete equality of cultural and economic rights for the German-speaking inhabitants of Bolzano province and the bilingual areas of Trento province, with elementary and secondary education in both languages, equal right of entry into the public services, and a measure of local autonomy. The Italian Government has pledged itself to reach within a year an agreement with the Austrian Government for revising the options for German or Italian citizenship which were forced upon the South Tirolese by Hitler and Mussolini in 1939. The Italian Government also undertakes to provide liberal facilities for passenger traffic and exchange of goods between North and South Tirol. This agreement, which has been written into Article 10 of the final Italian peace treaty¹ was welcomed by the parties immediately concerned and by the Conference Powers as

¹ Annex iv to Article 10.

THE PEACE TREATY

an example of what could be effected by a determined effort to find a peaceful solution for a difficult problem.

(iii) *The Frontier with France*

Adjustments on the French frontier amount to the cession by Italy of four small frontier areas, whose importance lies chiefly in the fact that in two of them, the Mont Cenis region and the Briga-Tenda area, there are large hydro-electrical installations which have hitherto supplied power for Italian factories in Turin and Liguria. The cession of these regions to France was voted in Paris on 1 September, with the proviso that France should give guarantees to Italy regarding the maintenance of electrical supply.¹

(iv) *The Dodecanese*

The cession of the Dodecanese to Greece was recommended by the Council of Foreign Ministers and agreed to unanimously by the Paris Conference; the islands are also to be demilitarized.²

(v) *The Italian Colonies*

The Council of Foreign Ministers recommended that Italy should renounce all right to the Italian possessions in Africa (i.e. Libya, Eritrea, and Italian Somaliland), and that their final disposal should be determined jointly by the Four Powers within a year of the coming into force of the treaty. During the intervening period the colonies should remain under British administration. These recommendations were agreed to by the Paris Conference on 25 September.³ The question of the final disposal of the colonies—whether they are to be placed under United Nations joint trusteeship, or under individual mandate to one or other of the United Nations—thus remains in abeyance for a year.

THE NAVAL, MILITARY, AND AIR CLAUSES

Under Part IV of the final treaty Italy is required to reduce her navy to 25,000 men, her army to 250,000 (including *Carabinieri*), and her air force to 25,000. She is to retain two battleships, four cruisers, and various smaller craft,⁴ up to 200

¹ Articles 6–9 and Annexes ii and iii. ² Article 14. ³ Article 23 and Annex xi.

⁴ Listed in Annex xii A.

medium and heavy tanks, 200 fighter and reconnaissance planes and 150 transport and other types of plane, and no submarines or bombing aircraft. The remainder of the fleet¹ is to be divided among the Four Powers, any surface vessels or submarines not listed being scrapped or sunk. Italy is also forbidden to construct or acquire any battleship, aircraft carrier, submarine, or assault craft. Extensive areas in Sardinia, Sicily, Apulia, and the frontier areas with France and Yugoslavia are to be wholly or partially demilitarized, as are also the Pelagian Islands and Pantelleria.

THE ECONOMIC CLAUSES

As will have been seen from the previous chapter, uncertainty regarding Italy's economic future under the peace treaty seriously hampered the country's efforts towards economic revival during the period between the end of the war and the final decision regarding the terms of the treaty.

The economic clauses of the final treaty govern reparations (Article 74); restitution of property removed by Italy from United Nations territory (Article 75); the renunciation of war damage claims by Italy against the Allied and Associated Powers (Article 76), and of claims against Germany (Article 77); the restoration of, or indemnification for, United Nations property in Italy (Article 78); and the question of sequestration of Italian property in Allied territory (Article 79). Of these the most important items are reparations and the closely allied question of Italian property in Allied territory.

At the Council of Foreign Ministers' meeting in April 1946, the U.S.S.R. proposed that Italy should pay reparations to a value of \$300 million, of which two-thirds would go to Yugoslavia, Albania, and Greece, the U.S.S.R. retaining \$100 million. This figure of \$100 million for the U.S.S.R. was eventually agreed to by the Four Powers after discussion at subsequent meetings of the Council of Foreign Ministers, and was embodied in Article 64, A of the draft treaty. No definite agreement was reached at this stage, however, as to the amount of reparations to be allotted to Yugoslavia, Albania, and Greece, and the figure of \$200 million for these remained a tentative proposal.

At the Paris Conference statements were invited from all

¹ As listed in Annex xii B.

countries who had participated in the war against Italy. These statements, which were put forward by fourteen countries, including Albania, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, Greece, the United Kingdom, and Yugoslavia, but not the United States, the Dominions or China, were not strictly speaking claims, but were more in the nature of an estimate of the cost of the war attributable to Italy, or of the damages caused by Italy, in the case of each individual country, with, in some instances, a claim attached, at a figure considerably lower than the estimate. Even so, the claims put forward reached astronomical figures which in total would have far exceeded any possible capacity for payment on Italy's part.

Great Britain put forward a detailed statement estimating the value of compensation for damage done to shipping, to Malta and other colonies, and for the general cost of the war against Italy, at £2,880 million. In presenting this statement before the Economic Commission, however, the British delegate described it as 'a historical document' which 'it was hoped would serve a practical purpose of helping the Commission to assess the merits of the other claims before it and to see them all in due perspective',¹ and he added that Britain had no intention of requiring Italy to meet the claim save within the limits of the Article governing disposition of Italian property in allied territory. The United States also renounced their claims, estimated at \$20,000 million; so did the Dominions and China. France waived her claims (estimated at £587,500,000), but early in October proposed a bilateral agreement with Italy formally renouncing the confiscation of Italian property in France and the colonies, against a payment by Italy of 16,000 million lire. A separate agreement was made with Egypt on 12 September, whereby Italy was to pay to Egypt £E.4,890,000, partly from Italian assets in Egypt and partly by Italian goods to be chosen by the Egyptian Government.

After prolonged discussions and the consideration of many amendments in the Italian Economic Commission of the Paris Conference, the British proposal that total reparations to be paid by Italy, in addition to the \$100 million allocated to Russia, should amount to \$225 million (£56,250,000) was carried on 4 October by 11 votes to 4, with 5 abstentions. Of

¹ *The Times*, 10 September 1946.

this total it was decided that Greece and Yugoslavia should each receive \$100 million, and Ethiopia \$25 million. A vote taken on whether Albania should receive reparations resulted in a 10-10 tie. The Council of Foreign Ministers in New York subsequently agreed to raise the total of Italian reparation payments (apart from payments to Russia) to \$260 million, to offset the reduction in Bulgarian reparation payments insisted on by M. Molotov. It was therefore finally decided that Yugoslavia should receive \$125 million, Greece \$105 million, Ethiopia \$25 million, and Albania \$5 million.¹ The Four Ambassadors are to co-ordinate and supervise the execution of these provisions. Reparations are to be made within seven years of the treaty's coming into force, by the delivery of war industries plant, of current industrial production (with a moratorium for the first two years) or by any other form of capital goods or services which may be agreed upon by Italy and the beneficiary country.

As regards Italian property in Allied territory, its seizure, retention or liquidation was agreed to both by the Paris Conference and in New York.² Some countries (e.g. France and the U.S.A.) have said that they will not press their claims under this clause to the full. France and Egypt, as already mentioned, are making special agreements with Italy on the subject, and it seems probable that some of the minor claims put forward by other countries will also be settled by this method.

As regards damage to property in Italy belonging to countries of the United Nations, opinions among the Great Powers differed, the U.S.A. and United Kingdom asking for total compensation, whereas the U.S.S.R. here was prepared to limit her demands to 25 per cent compensation. The final compromise reached in New York fixed compensation at two-thirds of the agreed value of the property damaged.³

It may prove in the event that the actual reparation payments outlined in these terms may weigh less severely on Italian economy than will the closely inter-related provisions under Article 79 for the sequestration of Italian property if fully implemented. Article 74 states (part B, para. 4) that the U.S.S.R. and other States entitled to receive reparations from current production shall furnish Italy on commercial terms with the materials which Italy needs for the production of the goods demanded

¹ Article 74, B.

² Article 79.

³ Article 78, para. 4(a).

by them as reparations, payment for these materials being made by deducting the value of the materials finished from the value of the goods delivered. If this arrangement works satisfactorily, and without imposing too heavy a financial burden on Italy, it will at least provide Italian industry with raw materials which will enable her factories to give work to greater numbers. As regards the sequestration of Italian property abroad, however, Italians can find no source of consolation, however meagre, for if fully implemented it would mean cutting Italy off from her chief sources of potential foreign trade revival and foreign exchange at a time when these are among her greatest economic needs.

APPENDIX I

THE PROGRAMME MANIFESTO OF THE FASCIST REPUBLICAN PARTY, VERONA, 14 NOVEMBER 1943

CONSTITUTIONAL AND INTERNAL

1. A Constituent Assembly shall be convened, possessed of sovereign power, and of popular origin, which shall declare the fall of the Monarchy, shall solemnly condemn the last King as a traitor and deserter, and shall proclaim the Social Republic and appoint its Head.

2. The Assembly shall be composed of representatives of all the syndical associations and administrative organizations, including representatives of the invaded provinces by means of delegations from those who have escaped and reached free territory, of combatants and prisoners-of-war, Italians abroad, the magistracy, the Universities, and other bodies whose participation helps to make this Assembly a synthesis of all the valuable elements in the nation.

3. The Republican Constitution will ensure to citizens, soldiers, and workers the right of control over and responsible criticism of the public administration. Every five years citizens will be summoned to express their opinion on the appointment of the Head of the Republic. No citizen arrested *in flagrante*, or detained for preventive measures, can be detained over seven days without an order from the judicial authority. Except in cases *in flagrante*, an order from the judicial authority is necessary for domiciliary search. In the exercise of its functions the magistracy will act in full independence.

4. Italy's negative electoral experience, and the partially negative experience of a method of appointment too rigidly hierarchic, suggests that a mixed system would give better results, e.g., the election by the people of representatives to the Chamber, combined with the appointment of Ministers by the Head of the Republic and of the Government, who will also ratify elections made within the Party, and appoint a National Directorate.

5. The organization which must complete the people's education on political problems is indivisible. The Party, an order of fighters and believers, must prove itself an organization of absolute political purity, worthy of being the guardian of the revolutionary idea. The Party membership-card will not be asked for in connection with any post or employment.

6. The Republic's religion is the Catholic-Apostolic-Roman. Any other cult which does not conflict with the laws will be respected.

APPENDIX I

7. Members of the Jewish race are foreigners. For the duration of this war they belong to enemy nationality.

8. The main objective of the Republic's foreign policy must be the motherland's unity, independence, and territorial integrity within the sea and Alpine boundaries assigned by nature, by the sacrifice of blood, and by history—frontiers which are now threatened by the enemy through invasion and through promises made to the Governments which have taken refuge in London. Another essential objective will be the maintenance of the living space indispensable to a people of 45,000,000 souls who have insufficient room to live. This policy must also be directed towards the realization of a European community, with a federation of all nations which accept the following principles: (a) the elimination of age-old British intrigue from our continent; (b) the abolition of the capitalist system; (c) the struggle against the world plutocracies; (d) the development, for the benefit of European peoples and of the natives, of Africa's natural resources, with absolute respect for those peoples, especially Moslems, who, as in Egypt, have already achieved civil and national organization.

SOCIAL

9. The basis of the Social Republic and its primary objective is manual, technical, and intellectual labour in every form.

10. Private property, the fruit of individual work and savings, the integration of human personality, will be guaranteed by the State. It must not, however, be allowed to disintegrate the physical and moral personality of others through exploiting their labour.

11. In the national economy everything which, in scope or function, goes beyond private interests and affects those of the community comes within the State's sphere of action. Public services and, in general, war manufacture must be administered by the State through semi-State bodies.

12. In every industrial, private, semi-State, and State firm, technicians' and workers' representatives shall co-operate closely, through their intimate knowledge of the administration, in the fair apportioning of wages and in the distribution of profits between the reserve funds, interest on share capital, and the participation of the workers themselves in these profits. In certain firms this can be managed by an extension of the prerogatives of the present factory commissions, in others by the replacement of the executive board by administrative councils consisting of technicians, workers, and a State representative, and in others by semi-syndical co-operative means.

APPENDIX I

13. In agriculture, the proprietor's private initiative reaches its limit at the point where such initiative fails to be effective. Expropriation of undeveloped land and badly-managed enterprises may lead to the allotment of the land among the farm-workers, transforming them into direct farmers, or to conversion into semi-syndical co-operative or semi-State enterprises, according to the various exigencies of agricultural economy. This is already established by the existing laws, the application of which is being infused with the necessary impulse by the Party and syndical organizations.

14. Direct producers, artisans, professional people, and artists are fully authorized to carry on their individual productive activities for family or group purposes, provided they fulfil the obligation of handing over to the pools the quantity of goods fixed by law at the prices established by the controls.

15. The house will no longer be merely a right of property, but a right to property. The Party includes in its programme the establishment of a national organization to provide working-class houses, which, by absorbing the present housing organization and enlarging its scope, will ensure that the house shall become the property of the worker's family in every category, by means of direct building of new dwellings, or by the gradual acquisition of existing ones. The intention is to affirm the general principle that, once the rent paid covers the capital and interest involved, that payment establishes a title of purchase. As its first task the organization will solve the problems arising from war destruction by the requisition and allocation of empty buildings and by temporary construction.

16. The worker is automatically inscribed as a member of his category syndicate, without impediment to his transfer to another syndicate when he so demands. The syndicates will converge in one Confederation, including all workers, technicians and professional men, with the exclusion of owners who are not directors or technicians. It will be called 'The General Labour, Technical, and Arts Confederation'. Employees of State industrial concerns and public services will belong to category syndicates, like any other worker. All the impressive social measures established by the Fascist regime during two decades remain in their entirety, as well as the Labour Charter which, in its spirit, is the starting point of further developments.

17. The Party regards adequate wages for workers as an inviolable principle, to be achieved through the adoption of minimum national scales and through prompt revision of local scales. This will affect particularly the small and middle-class employees, both State and private. In order that this measure may be fully effective, part

APPENDIX I

of the wages will be paid in foodstuffs at official prices through canteens provided by firms. Only in this way can prices and currency be stabilized and market equilibrium restored. Black market speculators, like traitors and defeatists, must come within the sphere of the Special Tribunals and be liable to the death sentence.

18. With this preamble to the Assembly, the Party demonstrates that it is not only 'going out to meet the people', but that it remains among them.

APPENDIX II

THE ELECTORAL LAW OF 10 MARCH 1946

Considerations of space preclude the reproduction here of the text of the electoral law in its entirety. It runs to 85 Articles and covers 16 pages of the *Gazzetta Ufficiale*. The main points are here briefly summarized.

LEGISLATIVE DECREE OF THE LIEUTENANT GENERAL, 10 MARCH 1946, NO. 74.¹ REGULATIONS FOR THE ELECTION OF DEPUTIES TO THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY

PART I. GENERAL PROVISIONS (ARTICLES 1-3)

The Constituent Assembly is elected by universal suffrage, by a direct, free, and secret vote given to lists of competing candidates.

The method used is that of proportional representation.

Voting is compulsory.

573 Deputies are to be elected, divided among 32 constituencies (*collegi*). Each constituency is to elect at least 7 Deputies.² Residual votes go to the national pool (*collegio unico nazionale*).

PART II. ELECTORATE (ARTICLES 4-11)

Section I. Active Electorate (Articles 4-6)

All Italian citizens are electors who are of age on 31 December 1945, subject to certain exceptions, which include mental deficient; bankrupts; condemned criminals; persons condemned under the legislation providing for sanctions against Fascism; and persons who have held particular offices under Fascism.

Section II. Eligibility (Articles 7-11)

Those citizens, both male and female, are eligible to serve on the Constituent Assembly who on the day of the elections are over 25 years of age, with the exception of those defined in Articles 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11 of the present Decree. Those ineligible include the holders of certain administrative offices under Fascism, former holders of various official positions who have been discharged for reasons of epuration, and persons who collaborated with the Fascist Republican Party; and also persons who, at the time of the elections, hold certain official positions under the Italian Government.

PART III. ELECTORAL ROLLS (ARTICLE 12)

The drawing-up of the electoral rolls will be carried out in accordance with the present Decree and with Decrees already passed on the subject.

¹ Supplement to *Gazzetta Ufficiale*, No. 60, 12 March 1946.

² Each constituency is composed of two or more provinces. The largest constituency, that of Milan-Pavia, had to elect 35 Deputies, while in the smallest, that of Potenza-Matera, only 7 Deputies were to be elected. Val d'Aosta, which was subject to special provisions (Articles 66-7), elected only one Deputy.

APPENDIX II

PART IV. PREPARATORY ELECTORAL PROCEDURE (ARTICLES 13-33)

Electoral committees are to be formed at least 70 days before the elections take place. The lists of candidates for each constituency must be put forward by not less than 500 and not more than 1,000 voters. Each party list must include not fewer than 3 candidates, and not more than the total number of Deputies to be elected in the constituency. Lists for the national pool must be put forward by not less than 12 delegates belonging to the party presenting them. Candidates for the national pool must also stand on at least one of the constituency lists.

Lists are then to be presented to and checked by the Court of Appeal or Tribunal of the constituency, and further checked by the Court of Cassation, which will provide for their publication.

Two electors are to be appointed as representatives in the electoral office of each ward and at the Court of Appeal or Tribunal of each constituency.

(Description of voting slips, urns, seals, and stamps follows).

An electoral office is to be set up in each ward (*circoscrizione*), consisting of a president, 5 scrutineers, and a secretary. The president is to be a local magistrate or lawyer appointed by the Court of Appeal, and is to receive the pay of a Grade V civil servant. Scrutineers are to be appointed by the *Giunta Comunale* from among the local electorate. The secretary is to be appointed by the president and should be a legal or State official. The scrutineers and secretary are to be paid 300 lire a day. All are to be regarded as public officials for the period of the elections, and will be subject to fines should they fail to perform their duties.

PART V. VOTING (ARTICLES 34-49)

Propaganda meetings are forbidden on election day, and no propaganda is to be conducted within 200 metres of the polling station.

Only persons on the electoral roll may enter the polling station or cast their votes.

No arms may be carried.

The president is to make policing arrangements, and can call on the police or the armed forces.

Electors must vote in person except in cases of physical disability, and must show their identity cards.

The names and numbers of voters must be checked with the electoral roll. Each voter will then receive a voting slip and in a separate cubicle, to ensure secrecy, will make a mark against the party list for which he wishes to vote, indicating also his preferences as regards individual candidates within that list. He may indicate two preferences if the number of Deputies to be elected in his constituency is 15 or less; three, if the number exceeds 15. No one may show him how to record his vote. He must then fold and gum up his voting slip and return it to the president, who will place it in the urn and mark off the voter's name on the electoral roll. If a slip is spoilt, a substitute

APPENDIX II

one may be obtained. Three electoral officials must be present throughout the polling period.

The president is to pronounce judgment on disputes.

PART VI. SCRUTINY OF VOTES (ARTICLES 50-65)

At the appointed time the president shall declare the poll closed. He will then check with the roll the numbers who have voted, and also the number of unused and spoilt slips, and will seal the urn containing valid voting slips. The polling station will then be closed for the night and placed under police guard.

Next morning the president, with the assistance of the scrutineers, shall proceed to count the votes, reading out the results from each slip, which will then be checked by a scrutineer and noted by the secretary. The spoilt slips shall also be counted.

The president shall then declare the result in a report to be signed in duplicate by all members of the electoral office. A sealed copy of this report shall be taken to the offices of the Tribunal. The other copy shall be deposited with the Secretariat of the Commune, where it can be seen by all electors. The Court of Appeal or the Tribunal shall then work out according to proportional representation who are the elected candidates, and the Prefect shall make known the results to the public. Surplus votes shall be allotted to the national pool.

PART VII. SPECIAL VOTING ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE VAL D'AOSTA CONSTITUENCY (ARTICLES 66-7)

PART VIII. PENAL DISPOSITIONS (ARTICLES 68-79)

Penalties, which include imprisonment for from 1 to 8 years and fines varying from 3,000 to 20,000 lire, are laid down for the following offences during the election period: bribery, coercion (whether by violence or otherwise), abuse of office, disturbance of electoral meetings or of the free course of the elections, tampering with electoral lists, unauthorized entry into polling stations, voting if ineligible, or preventing eligible voters from voting. Penalties are increased if arms are used or if group action is involved. Condemnation for any of the foregoing offences carries with it loss of electoral rights.

PART IX. FINAL DISPOSITIONS (ARTICLES 80-5)

No Deputy can be arrested, except in the case of *flagrante delicto*, nor subjected to penal proceedings, without the authorization of the Constituent Assembly. No Deputy can be subjected to police questioning or to domiciliary search. Deputies are to be paid a monthly salary.

The Treasury Minister is to charge to the Budget expenses incurred through this Decree.

Any elector failing to vote must give his reason.

(There follow the signatures of Umberto di Savoia and of the members of the Cabinet, dated Rome, 10 March 1946.)

APPENDIX III
ITALIAN FOREIGN TRADE, 1936-1938¹

MAIN IMPORTS

Commodity	1936		Weight (⁰⁰⁰ metric tons)	1937		Weight (⁰⁰⁰ metric tons)	1938		Weight (⁰⁰⁰ metric tons)
	Value (^{000,000} lire)	Per cent		Value (^{000,000} lire)	Per cent		Value (^{000,000} lire)	Per cent	
Wheat ..	311	5.1	535	1,394	10.0	1,658	226	2.0	289
Rubber, raw ..	77	1.3	16.8	224	1.6	25.4	180	1.6	29.4
Timber ..	146	2.4	579	320	2.3	861	237	2.1	572
Paper pulp ..	171	2.8	225	345	2.5	252	391	3.5	267
Copper, brass, bronze ..	221	3.7	86	449	3.2	81	348	3.1	80
Iron and steel (raw) ..	90	1.5	118	204	1.5	168	233	2.1	192
Iron and steel (scrap) ..	89	1.5	400	245	1.8	545	227	2.0	615
Petrol ..	111	1.8	223	190	1.4	279	103	0.9	114
Residual mineral oils ..	166	2.7	1,139	285	2.0	1,211	227	2.0	955
Other mineral oil products	163	2.7	524	475	3.4	1,177	576	5.2	1,619
Coal and coke	767	12.7	9,265	1,741	12.5	12,927	1,732	15.6	12,032
Wool, raw ..	147	2.4	19	544	3.9	42	375	3.4	35
Cotton, raw ..	450	7.5	101	1,056	7.6	166	820	7.4	157
Chemicals and manures	147	2.4	122	351	2.5	379	169	1.5	217
Iron and steel manufactures	184	3.0	70	331	2.4	106	284	2.6	79
Machinery and parts ..	408	6.8	39	600	4.3	41	747	6.7	52

MAIN EXPORTS

Commodity	1936		Weight (⁰⁰⁰ metric tons)	1937		Weight (⁰⁰⁰ metric tons)	1938		Weight (⁰⁰⁰ metric tons)
	Value (^{000,000} lire)	Per cent		Value (^{000,000} lire)	Per cent		Value (^{000,000} lire)	Per cent	
Citrous fruits	250	4.5	269	536	5.1	371	534	5.1	351
Other fresh fruit ..	242	4.4	200	332	3.2	237	422	4.1	268
Dried fruits ..	367	6.6	67	363	3.5	54	461	4.4	63
Olive oil ..	67	1.2	14	156	1.5	20	184	1.8	29
Tomato preserves ..	99	1.8	49	194	1.9	87	166	1.6	79
Wines and vermouth ..	181	3.3	1,437 ² + 55 ³	271	2.6	1,872 ²	282	2.7	1,430 ²
Metals and manufactures	209	3.8	105	361	3.5	120	391	3.8	117
Hemp ..	93	1.7	16	234	2.2	39	210	2.0	33
Silk, thrown (moulinée) ..	145	2.6	2.6	190	1.8	2.0	200	1.9	2.5
Silk, artificial ..	316	5.7	30	566	5.4	44	482	4.6	39
Cotton yarns ..	61	1.1	6.7	246	2.4	20	228	2.2	18.8
Woollen manufactures	112	2.0	5.0	371	3.6	12.8	397	3.8	13.3
Silk manufactures	159	2.9	4.9	363	3.5	11.9	450	4.3	17.6
Cotton manufactures	323	5.8	25	844	8.1	48	755	7.3	43
Machinery and apparatus ..	145	2.6	15	274	2.6	24	335	3.2	25
Motor vehicles ..	342	6.2	33	624	6.0	47	259	2.5	18

NOTE: Total imports in 1937 were more than double, in 1938 nearly double, those of 1936, owing to the effects of sanctions in 1936. Similarly, exports in 1937 and 1938 were nearly double those of 1936.

¹ League of Nations: *International Trade Statistics*, 1938, pp. 159-160.

² Thousand hectolitres.

³ Thousand bottles.

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

Jan. 1943–Dec. 1946

1943

- | | |
|--------------|---|
| 14 January | Roosevelt and Churchill meet at Casablanca. |
| 23 January | Eighth Army takes Tripoli. |
| 29 January | Eighth Army crosses Tunisian frontier. |
| 5 February | Extensive changes in Italian Cabinet, including dismissal of Ciano, Grandi, and Bottai. |
| 28 March | Mareth occupied by Eighth Army. |
| 17 April | Carlo Scorza becomes Secretary of the Fascist Party on resignation of Vidussoni. |
| 7 May | Tunis and Bizerta taken. |
| 12 May | General von Arnim surrenders in North Africa. |
| 13 May | General Messe surrenders in North Africa. |
| | Fighting there ends. |
| 11 June | Pantelleria captured. |
| 12 June | Lampedusa captured. |
| 10 July | Allies land in Sicily. |
| 17 July | AMGOT begins to function in Sicily. |
| 19 July | First bombing of Rome. |
| | Hitler and Mussolini meet at Feltre. |
| 24 July | Meeting of the Fascist Grand Council. |
| | Grandi's motion accepted by a two-thirds majority. |
| 25 July | Mussolini dismissed and arrested. |
| | Marshal Badoglio becomes Prime Minister. |
| 26 July | Martial Law proclaimed in Italy. |
| | Badoglio forms a Cabinet. Fascist Party dissolved. |
| 5 August | Capture of Catania. |
| 17 August | End of resistance in Sicily. |
| 3 September | Armistice signed in Sicily by General Castellano, but not announced. |
| | First Allied landing on Italian mainland, in Calabria. |
| 8 September | Announcement of armistice. Italy surrenders unconditionally. |
| 9 September | Allied landing at Salerno. |
| 10 September | Rome occupied by German troops. |
| | Italian fleet makes formal surrender at Malta. |
| | King Victor Emmanuel and Badoglio withdraw to Bari. |
| 11 September | Mussolini set free by the Germans. |
| 15 September | Mussolini organizes the Republican Fascist Party and assumes supreme direction of Fascism in Italy. |
| | Pavolini appointed temporary Secretary. |

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

1943

- 18 September Mussolini makes statement on German radio.
- 19 September Germans evacuate Sardinia.
- 23 September Formation of the neo-Fascist Government announced.
- 24 September Offensive by Fifth Army from Salerno opens.
- 29 September Full armistice terms signed by Badoglio at Malta.
- 30 September Badoglio forms preliminary Cabinet.
- 1 October Allies enter Naples.
- 7 October Count Sforza arrives in Italy.
- 13 October Italy declares war on Germany and becomes a co-belligerent of the Allies.
- 1 November Broadcast of declaration of Moscow Conference (19-30 October) on Italy.
- 10 November Formation of Allied Control Commission for Italy.
- 12 November General Roatta removed from post of Chief of Staff, Italian Army.
- 14 November First National Assembly of the Republican Fascist Party at Verona. Manifesto embodying draft Constitution of Italian Social Republic issued.
- 16 November Badoglio forms Cabinet.
- 28 December Ortona captured by Eighth Army.

1944

- 8 January Trial of Ciano and other members of Fascist Grand Council opens at Verona.
- 11 January Ciano and four others shot.
- 22 January Allied forces land at Anzio.
- 28 January Bari Congress of the six parties represented on the Committees of National Liberation.
- 11 February Transfer of Allied-occupied territory to the Badoglio Government, i.e. of territory south of northern boundaries of Salerno, Potenza, and Bari provinces, and the islands of Sicily and Sardinia.
- 13 March Diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R. resumed.
- 15 March Fifth Army launches offensive at Cassino.
- 23 March Fosse Ardeatine murders.
- 26 March Togliatti returns to Italy.
- 4 April Sir Noel Charles appointed High Commissioner for Italy.
- 17 April Badoglio resigns; asked by King to form new Government.
- 20 April Badoglio forms a new Ministry on a broader basis.
- 23 April Mussolini meets Hitler in Germany.
- 11 May Allies launch large offensive on Gustav Line.
- 18 May Capture of Cassino.
- 22 May General Alexander issues first Italian partisan communiqué.
- 25 May Fifth Army link up with Anzio beachhead.

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

<i>1944</i>	
4 June	Allies enter Rome.
5 June	King of Italy signs a decree making Prince Umberto Lieutenant General of the Realm.
6 June	D Day.
7 June	General Alexander makes first broadcast to Italian patriots in North Italy.
9 June	Ivanoe Bonomi forms a new Government.
22 June	Ministers take oath; Bonomi Cabinet's first meeting at Salerno.
Early July	Strikes in Northern towns; partisans active. Germans taking over authority (especially military) from neo-Fascists.
15 July	Bonomi Government transfers from Salerno to Rome.
18 July	Poles capture Ancona. Partisans to be incorporated in the Italian army organization.
19 July	U.S. forces occupy Leghorn.
20 July	Provinces of Foggia, Campobasso, Benevento, Avellino, and Naples (except commune of Naples) transferred to Italian Government jurisdiction.
21 July	Mussolini received by Hitler (after attempt on Hitler's life on 20th).
27 July	Epuraton law passed.
2 August	Graziani appointed C.-in-C. of new army of Italian and German divisions.
5 August	Eighth Army occupies Florence south of the Arno.
8 August	Communist-Socialist joint programme of action issued.
10 August	Mr Churchill in Italy till 28th.
13 August	Florence clear of Germans.
15 August	Provinces of Littoria, Frosinone, and Rome, and town of Rome restored to Italian Government jurisdiction.
End August	Gothic Line reached.
18 September	Caruso's trial.
27 September	Churchill-Roosevelt declaration regarding status of Italy.
4 October	Mr Eden's statement in House of Commons regarding Italian colonies.
16 October	Provinces of Viterbo, Rieti, Aquila, Chieti, Pescara, and Teramo pass under Italian Government jurisdiction.
16 November	General Roatta arrested.
20 November	Count Carandini arrives in London as Italian representative.
26 November	Cabinet crisis; Bonomi resigns.
28 November	British objections to Count Sforza's candidature as Foreign Minister.

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

1944

- 5 December Eighth Army occupies Ravenna.
- 10 December Second Bonomi Government announced; Socialists and Action Party refuse to collaborate.
- 14 December Canadian troops enter Faenza.

1945

- 15 January Allied direct control over Italian press ends.
- 18 January Tarchiani appointed Italian Ambassador in Washington.
- 24 February Mr Harold Macmillan's announcement regarding relaxation of conditions hitherto limiting Italian Government's freedom of action.
- 4 March General Roatta escapes during trial.
- 8 March Agreement signed between Italian Government and U.N.R.R.A. representative in Italy.
- 22 March Mussolini's speech on 26th anniversary of the foundation of Fasci di Combattimento.
- 31 March Council of Ministers approves proposal for *Consulta*.
- 2 April Eighth Army landing near Lake Comacchio.
- 10 April Eighth Army crosses the Senio.
- 14 April Fifth Army advancing on Bologna.
- 19 April Strikes in Turin and Milan begin.
- 21 April Capture of Bologna.
- 24 April Eighth Army occupies Ferrara.
- 25 April Fifth Army enters Mantua and Parma.
- Partisans attack and take over in Milan.
- 26 April Fifth Army occupies Verona and crosses Adige.
- Germans surrender to partisans in Genoa; most of Turin in patriot hands.
- C.N.L.A.I. takes over control in North.
- 27 April Fifth Army enters Genoa and Piacenza.
- Mussolini arrested at village on Lake Como.
- 28 April Mussolini and other leading Fascists, including Pavolini and Farinacci, executed by patriots.
- Fifth Army takes Brescia and Bergamo, U.S. troops reach Como, Eighth Army reaches Venice and Mestre, New Zealand Division reaches the Piave.
- 29 April Instrument of surrender of German armies in Italy signed at Caserta.
- Patriots liberate Turin.
- 30 April Partisans fighting Germans in Trieste.
- 1 May Graziani calls on Ligurian armies to lay down arms.
- New Zealand troops reach Udine and make contact with Marshal Tito's forces which have entered Trieste.
- 2 May Surrender of German armies in Italy announced.
- New Zealanders enter Trieste.

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

- 1945
- 3 May Germans in Trieste surrender to New Zealanders; Yugoslavs occupy municipal buildings there.
 - 5 May C.N.L.A.I. representatives arrive in Rome.
 - 8 May General Morgan meets Tito in Belgrade and suggests withdrawal of Yugoslav forces from Trieste area.
 - 12 May Field Marshal Alexander in Belgrade discussing Trieste question with Tito.
 - 13 May C.N.L.A.I. leaders return North.
 - 16 May Ministers go North for further discussions.
 - 19 May Field Marshal Alexander issues statement protesting against Tito's claims in Venezia Giulia.
 - 22 May Eighth Army takes over Trieste.
 - 25 May Six-party agreement reached in Milan as to programme for new Government; Ministers return to Rome.
 - 28 May 'Cordon sanitaire' between North and South ends.
 - 1 June A.M.G. (Lombardy) issues order regarding end of C.N.L.A.I. authority in North; C.N.L.A.I. decrees to be replaced by A.M.G. orders.
 - 2 June Six-party agreement regarding powers of C.N.L.s.
 - 9 June Agreement signed in Belgrade between British, U.S., and Yugoslav Governments defining limits of A.M.G. control in Venezia Giulia.
 - 12 June Bonomi resigns.
British and Americans take over in Trieste; Yugoslav troops withdraw.
 - 17 June Ferruccio Parri asked to form Government.
 - 19 June Provinces of Florence, Leghorn, and Pistoia transferred to Italian Government control.
Parri Government formed.
 - 20 June Italo-Yugoslav agreement signed, completing that of 9 June, and defining limits of 'Morgan Line'.
 - 14 July Italy declares war on Japan.
 - 3 August Potsdam decisions announced; Italy to be admitted to U.N.O. after peace treaty concluded.
 - 4 August Emilia, Apuania, Lucca, and town of Ancona handed back to Italian Government control.
 - 9 August Val d'Aosta Autonomy Bill passed.
 - 30 August Commission for preparation of electoral law set up.
 - 15 September Lombardy, Veneto, Piedmont, and Liguria restored to Italian Government control, leaving Udine, Trento, Belluno, and Bolzano still under A.M.G.
 - 17 September Italian Delegation to Council of Foreign Ministers, headed by De Gasperi, arrives in London.
 - 18 September Council of Foreign Ministers discusses Italian colonies; Russian proposal for trusteeship over Tripolitania.

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

1945

- 19 September Council of Foreign Ministers' decisions regarding Venezia Giulia—(i) line to be as nearly as possible the ethnic one; (ii) Trieste to be internationalized.
- 25 September Inaugural meeting of *Consulta*. Sforza elected President. Separatist risings in Sicily.
- 2 October Sicilian Separatist leader Finocchiaro-Aprile arrested in Messina.
- 3 October Unification of purge measures throughout the country.
- 8 October Liberal criticisms of Government policy.
- 12 October Draft decree on Constituent Assembly prepared.
- 18 October Italy re-admitted to I.L.O.
- 6 November Armistice terms published.
- 9 November New epuration law passed.
- 15 November Allied Supreme Command restores control of Italian army to Government.
- 17 November Liberals propose widening of Government.
- 22 November Liberal Ministers resign from Government.
- 24 November Parri resigns.
- 1 December De Gasperi asked to form Government.
- 9 December De Gasperi Government formed.
- 19 December Renner demands return of South Tirol to Austria.
- 24 December Moscow Conference statement regarding peace treaties.
- 30 December Fighting between Sicilian Separatists and *Carabinieri*.
- 31 December All metropolitan territory except Venezia Giulia and Udine returned to Italian Government jurisdiction.

1946

- 19 January Further agreement (supplementary to that of 8.3.1945) signed between Italian Government and U.N.R.R.A.
- 26 January Exchange rate for foreign trade fixed at 900 lire to the pound, and 225 lire to the dollar.
- 8 February Action Party Ministers resign from Cabinet.
- 15 February Italian Government empowered to resume private trading without reference to Allied control.
- 23 February *Consulta* approves draft electoral law.
- 27 February Cabinet decides on referendum on monarchy, to be held simultaneously with general elections.
- 7 March Allied Commission of Investigation arrives in Trieste.
- 9 March *Consulta* at its final plenary sitting approves decree on powers of the Constituent Assembly.
- 10 March Municipal elections begin.
- 11 March General strike in Trieste.
- 18 March Prince Umberto signs decrees on Constituent Assembly and authorizing referendum.

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

1946	
8 April	National Freedom Bloc (Monarchist coalition) formed.
25 April	Council of Foreign Ministers' discussions in Paris on Italian Peace Treaty begin.
30 April	Council of Foreign Ministers rejects Austrian claim to South Tirol.
3 May	De Gasperi states Italian case before Council of Foreign Ministers.
9 May	King Victor Emmanuel abdicates in favour of Prince Umberto.
10 May	Crown Prince proclaimed King Umberto II.
11 May	Socialist Party Congress in Florence.
16 May	Council of Foreign Ministers' discussions end; revised armistice terms initialled.
2 June	General elections and referendum on monarchy take place.
10 June	Referendum results proclaimed, in favour of republic.
12 June	King Umberto sends letter to De Gasperi saying he will abide by verdict of Court of Cassation on referendum.
13 June	King Umberto leaves Italy; issues proclamation before departure.
15 June	Council of Foreign Ministers resumes discussions in Paris.
18 June	Final election results announced.
24 June	Government Decree abolishes Senate.
25 June	First meeting of Constituent Assembly; Saragat elected its President.
27 June	Council of Foreign Ministers recommends that Briga and Tenda be awarded to France and Dodecanese returned to Greece.
28 June	De Nicola elected President of the Republic.
29 June	French proposals for Trieste put forward at Council of Foreign Ministers.
1 July	De Gasperi resigns; asked to form new Cabinet.
3 July	Extensive release of prisoners under political amnesty.
4 July	Council of Foreign Ministers agrees on Italian reparations to Russia.
12 July	Second De Gasperi Government formed.
16 July	Series of strikes begins in North on wages question.
22 July	Corbino (Treasury Minister) makes speech on financial situation.
29 July	Peace Conference opens in Paris.
	Text of Draft Peace Treaty with Italy published.
10 August	De Gasperi states Italian case at Paris Peace Conference.

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

- 1946*
- 17 August Communist press attacks on De Gasperi's handling of Italy's interests in Paris.
 - 1 September Paris Peace Conference recommends cession of Briga and Tenda to France.
 - 2 September Corbino resigns.
 - 5 September Agreement signed with Austria regarding South Tirol.
 - 18 September Bertone appointed Treasury Minister.
De Gasperi makes statement in Constituent Assembly regarding Government's achievements and policy.
 - 21 September Fusion of Partito Democratico Italiano with Liberal Party.
 - 25 September Bertone makes budget speech in Constituent Assembly.
Paris Peace Conference votes recommendations regarding Italian colonies.
 - 26 September Constituent Assembly passes vote of confidence in Government.
 - 2 October Italy admitted to membership of Bretton Woods Agreement.
 - 4 October Paris Peace Conference votes recommendations regarding Italian reparations.
 - 9 October Peace Conference finishes discussion of Italian Treaty; adopts French proposals regarding Trieste.
 - 15 October Peace Conference ends; Yugoslavs withdraw and say they will refuse to sign Treaty.
 - 19 October Nenni takes over Ministry of Foreign Affairs from De Gasperi.
 - 24 October Ex-partisan agitation in Biella region.
 - 26 October Further Communist-Socialist joint action pact signed.
 - 30 October Agreement signed between C.G.I.L. and Industrialists' Confederation regarding wages increase and truce.
 - 4 November Council of Foreign Ministers begins further discussions on Italian Treaty in New York.
 - 5 November Togliatti visiting Belgrade; Tito offers to forego Yugoslav claim to Trieste if Gorizia is ceded to Yugoslavia.
 - 7 November Cabinet discusses Tito proposals; refuses to consider ceding Gorizia.
 - 10 November Municipal elections in large towns; Communist gains.
 - 18 November Council of Foreign Ministers reaches decisions regarding powers of Governor of Trieste.
 - 20 November New Treasury Loan launched.
 - 27 November Further decisions regarding Trieste at Council of Foreign Ministers.

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

<i>1946</i>	
5 December	Foreign Ministers reach decisions regarding reparations.
7 December	Italian trade delegation arrives in Britain.
12 December	Final meeting of Council of Foreign Ministers in New York; only undecided point in Italian Treaty concerns future of navy.
17 December	General strike in Naples owing to food shortage, rise in prices, and unemployment; ends on 19th.
20 December	Cabinet decision to withdraw Italian Ambassador to Spain.
27 December	General strike and disorders in Bari owing to unemployment and food shortage; ends on 30th. •

ITALIAN GOVERNMENTS SINCE THE FALL OF FASCISM

<i>Duration</i>	<i>Prime Minister</i>
26 July—8 September 1943	Pietro Badoglio
1 October—16 November 1943	„ „
16 November 1943—17 February 1944	„ „
17 February—17 April 1944	„ „
20 April—5 June 1944	„ „
9 June—26 November 1944	Ivanoe Bonomi
10 December 1944—12 June 1945	„ „
19 June—24 November 1945	Ferruccio Parri
9 December 1945—1 July 1946	Alcide De Gasperi
12 July 1946—20 January 1947	„ „ „
1 February 1947—	„ „ „

BIBLIOGRAPHY

General, Political, and Reference

- Badoglio, Marshal Pietro: *L'Italia nella seconda guerra mondiale*. (1946. Verona: Mondadori.)
- Carter, Barbara Barclay: *Italy Speaks*. (1946. London: Gollancz.)
- Ciano, Count Galeazzo: *Diario*. 2 vols. (1946. Milan: Rizzoli.)
Issued in translation as *The Ciano Diaries, 1939-1943*. (1946. New York: Doubleday.)
- Italy: Ministero dell' Estero: *The Italian Contribution to the War of Liberation Against Germany*. (1946. Rome.)
- Luzzato, Riccardo: *Unknown War in Italy*. (1946. London: New Europe Publishing Co.)
- Macartney, M. H. H.: *One Man Alone: The History of Mussolini and the Axis*. (1944. London: Chatto and Windus.)
- Macartney, M. H. H.: *The Rebuilding of Italy*. (1945. Cambridge University Press. Current Problems Series, No. 25.)
- Monelli, Paolo: *Roma 1943*. (1945. Rome: Migliaresi.)
- Mussolini, Benito: *Storia di un anno*. (1944. Verona: Mondadori.)
- Selsey, G. Valentine, ed.: *Italy Works Her Passage*. (1945. London: British-Italian Society.)
- Sforza, Count Carlo: *Contemporary Italy: its Intellectual and Moral Origins*. (1946. London: Muller.)
- Wiskemann, Elizabeth: *Italy*. (1947. Oxford University Press. World To-day Series.)

- League of Nations: *Statistical Year-Book*. Annual. (Latest issue 1942-44.)
- Annuario Statistico Italiano* and *Compendio Statistico Italiano*. Annual. (Latest issue 1946.)

Armistice

- Carboni, General Giacomo: *L'armistizio e la difesa di Roma*. (1945. Rome: De Luigi.)
- Castellano, General Giuseppe: *Come firmai l'armistizio*. (1945. Verona: Mondadori.)
- Documents Relating to the Conditions of an Armistice with Italy, Sept.-Nov. 1943*. Cmd. 6693, 1945. (London: H.M.S.O.)

Allied Control

- Allied Control Commission in Italy: *Rassegna dell' Attività del Governo Militare Alleato e della Commissione Alleata in Italia*. (1945: Rome: Sezione delle Relazioni Pubbliche, Commissione Alleata.)
- Gayre, G. R.: *Italy in Transition*. (1946. London: Faber and Faber.)

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Peace Treaty, Frontiers

- 'The Draft Treaties of Peace: I. The Italian Treaty', in *The World Today*, November 1946, pp. 501-511.
Draft Peace Treaty with Italy. Italy No. 1, Cmd. 6892, 1946. (London: H.M.S.O.)
Massey, Isabella M.: *The Question of Trieste*. (1945. London: British-Italian Society.)
Moodie, A. E.: *The Italo-Yugoslav Boundary*. (1945. London: G. Philip.)
'The South Tirol and its Future', in *The World Today*, December 1945, pp. 270-280.
Treaties of Peace with Italy, Roumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland (texts for signature in Paris on 10 February, 1947). Misc. No. 1 (1947), Cmd. 7022. Together with *Commentary on the Treaties*. (Misc. No. 2 (1947), Cmd. 7026). (London: H.M.S.O.)
'Trieste Diary', in *The World Today*, October 1945, pp. 159-186.
'The Venezia Giulia Question', in *The World Today*, October 1945, pp. 147-59.

Economic

- Italy: Ministero dell' Industria e Commercio: *Piano di massima per le importazioni industriali dell' anno 1946* (1945. Rome); and *Piano di massima per le importazioni e le esportazioni industriali dell' anno finanziario 1946-7*. (1946. Rome.)
Thomas, Ivor: *The Problem of Italy: An Economic Survey*. (1946. London: Routledge.)
UNRRA Italy Mission: *Economic Notes* (weekly); and *Economic Survey* (supplements to *Economic Notes*, vol. I, Nos. 27, 28, 30, 31, 32, 34). (1946. Rome: UNRRA Italy Mission.)

INDEX

- ACTION PARTY**, 8, 17, 22, 23, 26,
29, 30, 34, 38-9, 41, 44, 46;
Congress (Feb. 1946), 38
- Advisory Council for Italy**, 27
- Agriculture**, 37, 38, 40, 58-9,
64-5, 68
- Air Force**, 32, 89-90
See also Armed Forces
- Albania**, 62*n*, 90, 91, 92
- Aldisio, S.**, 76
- Allied Control Commission**
(later Allied Commission), 20,
21, 27, 51, 73, 86
- Allied Military Government**, 20,
22, 28, 29, 43, 51, 56
- Ambrosio, General**, 3
- Am-lire**, 32, 33, 77
- Amnesty, political**, 57
- Ansaldo, Giovanni**, 14
- Anti-clericalism**, 35, 36
- Anti-Semitism**, 14, 15
- Anzio**, 19
- Appelius, Mario**, 14
- Armed forces, Army:**
till 8 Sept. 1943, 1
under Fascist Republican
Government, 12, 13-14
epuration of, 55
during co-belligerency, 31-3
under peace treaty, 89-90
See also Air Force, Navy
- Armistice**, 9-11, 19, 31, 80
- Austria**, 75, 81, 86-9
- BADOGGIO, MARSHAL**, 5-11, 18,
19, 20, 21, 23, 24, 50
- Bari Congress**, 22, 26, 45
- Bastianini, Giuseppe**, 5
- Belgium**, 75
- Bencivenga, General**, 41
- Benedetti, Tullio**, 41
- Bergamini, Alberto**, 41
- Berlinguer, Mario**, 52
- Bertone, G. B.**, 78
- Bologna**, 27
- Bolzano**, 46, 87, 88
- Bonomi, Ivanoe**, 24, 26, 28, 39,
53
- Bottai, Giuseppe**, 4, 5, 6
- Bretton Woods Agreement**, 79
- Briga**, 63, 89
- Brindisi**, 18, 32
- British Dominions**, 91
- Brosio, Manlio**, 30, 31, 41
- Buffarini-Guidi, G.**, 5, 12, 27
- Buozzi, Bruno**, 7, 51
- CANADA**, 79
- Capi Provincia*, 12, 16
- Carandini, Count**, 24, 40
- Castellano, General**, 3*n*, 9-10
- Casualties: during co-belliger-**
ency, 32; partisan, 18
- Catholic Church**, 17, 20, 35, 36-
8
- Chamber of Fasci and Corpora-**
tions, 7, 50, 56
- China**, 91
- Christian Democrats**, 8, 22, 23,
25, 26, 29, 31, 34, 35, 36-8,
39, 44, 46, 47; Congress
(April 1946), 37
- Churchill, Winston**, 1, 19
- Ciano, Count Galeazzo**, 1, 4, 5,
6, 15
- C.L.N.A.I.**, 17, 18, 28, 29, 30
- Committees of National Libera-**
tion (C.N.L.), 8, 17, 21, 22,
24-9, 34, 39, 41, 43, 45,
47, 52
- Critica Sociale*, 36
- Croce, Benedetto**, 7, 21, 23, 24,
40
- Coal**, 2, 61-3, 67, 72, 75
- Co-belligerency**, 19, 31-3, 80
- Colonies**, 59, 73, 81, 89
- Communists**, 8, 17, 22, 23, 25,
26, 29, 34-6, 37, 39, 44, 46, 47

INDEX

- Confederations, Syndical, 7, 50
Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro (C.G.I.L.), 22, 26, 34, 37, 39, 71
Consiglio Comunale, 43
 Constituent Assembly, 22, 24, 25, 28, 30, 34, 36, 44-7, 48, 50
 Constitution, 45, 46, 47, 56
Consulta, 28, 30, 31, 43, 45
 Contribution, Italian, to war effort, 31-3, 80
 Corbino, E., 77, 78
 Corporations, 7, 50
 Cost of living, 71
 Council of Foreign Ministers, 30, 47, 81-92
- DE BONO, Marshal, 5, 15
 De Gasperi, Alcide, vii, 24, 31, 36-7, 47, 48, 49, 71, 79, 88
 Del Tetto, General, 53
 De Nicola, Enrico, 23, 47
 Denmark, 75
 De Ruggiero, Guido, 7
 De Vecchi, C. M., 5
Deputazione Provinciale, 43
 Diplomatic relations, 27
 Dodecanese, 81, 89
- EDUCATION, 37, 38, 56
 Egypt, 75, 91, 92
 Einaudi, Luigi, 77
 Eisenhower, General, 10, 19
 Elections, administrative, 25, 34, 42-4
 Elections, for Constituent Assembly, 25, 28, 34, 39, 41, 42, 45, 46-7, 48
 Electoral law, 30, 43, 45, 46; text, 99-101
 Emigrants, 59, 60; remittances from, 72
 Epuration, 25, 31, 50-7
 Ethiopia, 91, 92
 European Coal Organization, 63
- FACTORY COUNCILS, 37, 38, 40, 71
- Farinacci, Roberto, 5, 14, 27
 Fascism, elimination of, 3-8, 28, 50-7
 Fascist Grand Council, 3, 4, 50; meeting of 25 July 1943, 4-5, 15
 Fascist Party, 2, 7, 50, 53, 54, 55
 Fascist Republican Government, 11-16, 18, 51, 53, 55, 76-7, 95-8
 Favagrossa, General, 6
 Feltre meeting, 3
 Finance, 2, 32-3, 71-2, 76-9
 See also Foreign exchange, Loans
 Florence, 25
 Food and foodstuffs, 2, 64-6, 68, 75
 Foreign exchange, 67, 68, 74, 93
 Foreign trade, 2, 27, 58*n.*, 67, 72-6, 93, 102-3; treaties, 75
 Fosse Ardeatine murders, 18
 France, 63, 75, 81, 84, 89, 90, 91, 92
 Freedom Volunteer Corps, 30
 Freemasonry, 39
- GARIBALDI BRIGADES, 17
 Gayda, Virginio, 14
 Genoa, 27
 Germany, 1-4, 8-10, 11-16, 19, 73, 77, 80
 Giannini, Guglielmo, 42
Gioventù Italiana del Littorio (G.I.L.), 50
Giunta Comunale, 43
Giustizia e Libertà movement, 38; partisan groups, 17
 Gorizia, 86
 Grandi, Achille, 7, 51
 Grandi, Count Dino, 4-6, 15
 Graziani, Marshal, 12, 16, 27
 Great Britain, 73, 75, 84, 86, 91, 92
 Greece, 81, 89, 90, 91, 92
 Gruber, Dr Karl, 88
Gruppi Universitarii Fascisti (G.U.F.), 50

INDEX


- HITLER, ADOLF, 3, 11, 88
Holland, 75
Hydro-electric power, 63, 66, 67, 71, 88, 89
Industry, 2, 37, 63n., 66-72, 93
Institute for Industrial Reconstruction, 71
Iniziativa Socialista, 36
Italia Nuova, 41
Italian Corps of Liberation, 32
JEW, 15
Jovanović, General, 84
LABOUR, 70-1
Labour Democrats, 8, 22, 26, 29, 34, 39, 40, 44
La Malfa, Ugo, 38
Liberal Democrats, 40
Liberals, 8, 20, 22, 23, 26, 29, 30, 31, 34, 39-41, 42, 44, 54; Congress (April 1946), 40
Loans, Treasury, 2, 79; foreign, 79
MACMILLAN, HAROLD, 27
Matteotti trial, 57
Mercantile marine, 31, 32, 71, 72, 76
Messe, General, 1
Milan, 27, 43, 44, 46
Molotov, M., 71, 76, 85, 92
Monarchist issue, 20-4, 26, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 47; referendum on, 45, 47-9
Mont Cenis, 63, 89
Monte Cassino, 19
Monte Lungo, 32
Morgan, General, viii, 84
Morgan line, 84
Mussolini, Benito, 3-5, 11-12, 15, 16, 27, 52, 80, 88
NAPLES, 19, 34, 53
Naples, Prince of, 21
National Democratic Union, 39, 41, 46
National Freedom Bloc, 41, 46
Nationalization, 37, 38, 40, 71
Navy, 11, 31, 32, 89-90.
See also Armed Forces
Nenni, Pietro, 17, 30, 36, 54, 75
Nitti, F. S., 31, 40
Norway, 75
Occupation expenses, 32, 33, 79
Orlando, V. E., 31
Osoppo Division, 17
PACCIARDI, RANDOLFO, 41
Pantelleria, 90
Parri, Ferruccio, 30, 31, 38, 39
Partisans, 16-18, 27, 28, 30, 31, 32
Partito Democratico Italiano, 25, 41, 42
Partito Popolare, 36, 37
Pavolini, Alessandro, 11, 27
Peace Conference, 33, 71, 80-92
Peace treaty, vii-viii, 47, 61, 62n., 63, 67, 76, 80-93
Pelagian Islands, 90
Pentimalli, General, 53
Petacci, Claretta, 27
Poland, 76
Prefects, 12, 43, 51
Press, 14, 34; clandestine, 17
RATIONING, 2, 66
Raw materials, 2, 59, 61-4, 67-70, 72, 75, 92-3
Regime Fascista, 14
Regional autonomy, 37, 38
Reparations, 33, 75, 78, 79, 80, 88, 90-3
Republic: feeling for, 22, 26, 38; formation of, 45, 47-9, 57
Republican Democratic Alliance, 39
Republican party, 25, 38, 41, 44, 46, 47
Resistance, clandestine, 6, 8, 16-18, 24, 28, 29, 30, 38, 80
See also Partisans
Roatta, General, 54

INDEX

- Rome, 10, 11, 16, 34, 44
 Romita, G., 31
 Roveda, Giovanni, 17, 51
 Rosselli, Carlo and Nello, 38
 Ruini, Meuccio, 24, 39
- ST GERMAIN, treaty of, 86
 Salerno, 10, 23
 Salurno, 88
 Saragat, Giuseppe, 36, 47
 Scoccimarro, M., 77
 Scorza, Carlo, 5
 Security Council, 85, 86
 Selvaggi, Enzo, 41
 Senate, 47, 56-7
 Sequestration of Italian property abroad, 90, 92, 93
 Sforza, Count Carlo, viii, 24, 41, 45, 52, 53
 Sicilian Separatism, 30
 Sicily, 3, 8, 30, 56
 Sorice, General, 6
 Socialists, vii, 8, 22, 23, 25, 26, 29, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 44, 46; Congress (Jan. 1947), 36
 South America, 73, 75
 Southern Italy, development of, 37, 38
 Spain, 75
 Special Tribunal for the Defence of the State, 7, 14, 56
 Starace, Achille, 27
 Sturzo, Don Luigi, 36, 37
 Sweden, 75
 Switzerland, 75
 Syndical organization, 7, 39, 50.
See also under C.G.I.L.
- TARANTO, 32
 Tenda, 63, 89
- Textiles, 66, 67, 69, 70, 72, 75
 Tirol, South, 43, 63, 86-9
 Tito, Marshal, 17, 82, 86
 Togliatti, Palmiro, 23, 24, 30, 35, 48, 86
 Trento, 87, 88
 Trieste, 30, 35, 76, 82-6
 Turin, 6, 8, 27
- UMBERTO II (formerly Crown Prince), 18, 21, 23, 24, 30, 31, 45, 48-9
 United Nations, 80, 81, 89 •
 United States, 63, 73, 75, 76, 79, 84, 86, 91, 92
 United States of Europe, 38
 U.N.R.R.A., 63, 65, 67, 70
 Uomo Qualunque, 41, 42, 44, 46, 47
 U.S.S.R., 35, 36, 47, 75, 76, 84, 85, 90, 91, 92
- VAL D'AOSTA, 30
 Vatican, 17, 38
 Venezia Giulia, 30, 43, 46, 47, 61, 82-6, 88
 Verona Manifesto, 12, 15; text, 95-8
 Victor Emmanuel III, 5, 11, 18, 19, 20-21, 23, 24, 47-9
- WAGES, 71
 War damage claims against Italy, 90, 92
 Wheat, 2, 64-5
 Wilson line, 84
- YUGOSLAVIA, 35, 81, 82-6, 90, 91, 92
- ZANIBONI, TITO, 52

ITALY 1946

Scale in Miles
0 20 40 60 80 100



Some Chatham House Publications

THE BALKANS, TOGETHER WITH HUNGARY. Information Notes No. 8	1s. 6d. net
THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH AND THE WORLD. By Richard Frost	1s. 6d. net
BRITISH SECURITY. A Report by a Chatham House Study Group	8s. 6d. net
FRANCE AND BRITAIN. A Report by a Chatham House Study Group	6s. od. net
FRANCE YESTERDAY AND TODAY: A Short Survey. By Katharine Munro	4s. 6d. net
GREAT BRITAIN AND PALESTINE, 1915-1945. Information Papers No. 20	7s. 6d. net
INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF FULL EMPLOYMENT IN GREAT BRITAIN. By Allan G. B. Fisher	15s. od. net
THE PATTERN OF PACIFIC SECURITY. A Report by a Chatham House Study Group	2s. 6d. net
POWER POLITICS. By Martin Wight. "Looking Forward" series No. 8	1s. od. net
SOVIET RUSSIA: An Introduction. By Kathleen Gibberd. Revised edition	5s. od. net
UNITED NATIONS DOCUMENTS, 1941-1945	10s. 6d. net

London and New York

THE ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Toronto · Bombay · Melbourne · Cape Town

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

and of all booksellers